




**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

© 1982

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intérieure
- Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplémentaires:

- Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached/
Pages détachées
- Showthrough/
Transparence
- Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	14X	18X	22X	26X	30X
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12X	16X	20X	24X	28X	32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



National Library of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

27 of 1000000

10

V
MONT

TACTICS OF INFIDELS

BY THE

REV. L. A. LAMBERT

AUTHOR OF

"NOTES ON INGERSOLL,"

"HANDBOOK OF SCRIPTURE REFERENCE," ETC.

TORONTO:

WILLIAM BRIGGS, 78 & 80 KING STREET EAST.

MONTREAL: C. W. COATES.

HALIFAX: S. F. HUESTIS.

(1887.)

BL 2727
L3

2094

INTRODUCTION

In 1885 I wrote a series of letters reviewing Ingersoll's tactics and assertions about Christianity and religion in general, as exhibited in two articles published by him in the *Workman Review*. These letters were subsequently collected and published in a book form under the title *Notes on Ingersoll*. The little book had a large sale and was favorably received by the religious as well as by the secular press. Being the property of Ingersoll—who is cunning of temper—was sold to the Department of Agriculture, under the Act of the Parliament of Canada, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven, by William Briggs, Book Steward of the Methodist Book and Publishing House, Toronto, at the Department of Agriculture.

For some of his disciples or admirers of the *Notes*—I believe his unimpeached character. We hold ourselves responsible to him and to all the good whiffets of his shallow school.

My anticipation was justified by the fact Ingersoll so talkative generally maintained a studied silence, though urged by the press and by interviewers in a way that must have been annoying to him.

Two years after the appearance of the *Notes*, one of his disciples, urged by "multiple requests" and challenged, published a "Reply to Rev. A. A. Lambert's *Notes on Ingersoll*."

From these "multiple requests" it is natural to infer that some response was considered necessary and that Mr. W. Lambert was the man competent to give it. Notwithstanding the title of his book, it is in fact nothing more than an essay towards a defence

re
li
le
bo
lit
by
lie
we
bo
the
bili
res
his

soll
sile
ers

of
cha
bert

infer
and
give
in fa

INTRODUCTION.



IN 1882 I wrote a series of letters reviewing Ingersoll's tactics and assertions anent Christianity and religion in general, as exhibited in two articles published by him in the *North American Review*. These letters were subsequently collected and published in book form under the title, *Notes on Ingersoll*. The little book had a large sale and was favorably received by the religious as well as by the secular press. Believing that Ingersoll—who is cunning of fence—would take advantage of my obscurity and treat the book with haughty silence, I said in the conclusion of the *Notes*: "Let some of his disciples or admirers rehabilitate his smirched character. We hold ourselves responsible to him and to all the glib little whiffets of his shallow school."

My anticipation was justified by the fact. Ingersoll, so talkative generally, maintained a studied silence, though urged by the press and by interviewers in a way that must have been annoying to him.

Two years after the appearance of the *Notes*, one of his disciples, urged by "multiple requests and challenges," published a "*Reply to Rev. L. A. Lambert's Notes on Ingersoll*."

From these "multiple requests" it is natural to infer that some response was considered necessary and that Mr. B. W. Lacy was the man competent to give it. Notwithstanding the title of his book, it is in fact nothing more than an essay towards a defense

vites an examination of his own motives, and when his insincerity is manifest it is time to tear from him that cloak of "honor bright" under which he attempts to hide it.

Notes. You may outrage Christian sentiment, you may laugh at and burlesque Moses and Christ, but you must be gentle and polite, and nice, when you speak of Mr. Ingersoll.

Lacy. Does the Father not see that in the discussion carried on between Judge Black and Mr. Ingersoll, the Christian religion, and neither Mr. Black nor Ingersoll, was on trial?

Lambert. No, the Father does not see it. Both Black and Ingersoll were on trial, because both were responsible, and amenable to criticism for their conduct and methods in the discussion. Do you pretend that a man can go before the public and misrepresent the Christian religion, slander the character of its great men, misrepresent his opponent, misquote and interpolate the Scriptures without putting his own character for veracity and sincerity on trial before the common sense of an honest public? True, a solid argument is not in itself strengthened or weakened by the good or bad character of him who makes it, but when he has recourse to calumny, vilification, misrepresentation, to foul and false libels against God and man, people will believe he does so for want of argument, and they are right.

Lacy. Let not an appeal to outraged "Christian sentiment" stop free, fair and full investigation.

Lambert. There is nothing in such an investigation that the Christian need fear. It is not Ingersoll's arguments, but his methods—which seem to be inspired by unbridled wantonness—that outrage Chris-

tion, sentiment, or Sentiment! deals not with truth or error, which is the business of the judgment, but has reference to feelings, to the proprieties and delicacies of life, and no man has the moral right to outrage it. It is shocked by foulness and filth, by irreverent gibes and jests at everything considered sacred and holy, by blasphemies against the Supreme Being, the Creator and Ruler of the universe. None of these is necessary to a free, fair and full investigation. And he who introduces them is not inspired by worthy motives.

The following extract, taken from Mr. Black's explanation of the sudden ending of the debate between himself and Ingersoll, will show who is the enemy of free, fair and full investigation.

"From the beginning," says Mr. Black, "it was understood that my defence was to be published with the accusation. * * * At the time of publication, I agreed that if Mr. Ingersoll had any fault to find with the result it might seem cowardly to refuse him another chance on the same terms. I was not afraid of any new assault he might make, if he was not afraid of my defence."

Three months afterwards, fifty pages of the foulest and falsest libel that ever was written against God or man was sent to me. I was entirely willing to treat it as I had the other; that is, give it the answer I thought it deserved, and let both go together. But it came when I was disabled from an injury from which I could not hope to get well for some weeks, and so I notified the editor (of the *North American*

Review.) To my surprise I was informed, that no contradiction, correction or criticism of mine or anybody else would be allowed to accompany this new effusion of filth. It was to be printed immediately and would occupy so much space that none could be spared for the other side. I proposed that if its bulk could not be reduced so as to admit of an answer in the same number, it should be postponed until a reply could be made ready for the next succeeding number. This and divers other offers were rejected, for the express reason that Mr. Ingersoll would not consent. Finding the *Review* controlled by him to suit himself, I do not think I was bound to go further.

Such are the words of the leader of the American Bar.

Now, Mr. Lacy, on what principle do you reconcile this conduct of Ingersoll with a desire for free, fair and full investigation? How reconcile it with sincerity, or with that "courage of the soul" of which he speaks so frequently and unctuously? To speak plain English, it was as contemptible as it was cowardly, and reminds one of the gallant Colonel's invasion of the South, which according to Mr. Ridpath, consisted in marching down there and then marching home again where there was less careless shooting. In his first, which proved to be his last skirmish, the doughty Colonel offered to acknowledge the Confederacy if they would only stop shooting at him. He must have been terribly scared to give up the cause so suddenly. His heart was perhaps brave enough, but it was a question of knees. That little

A skirmish taught him that soldiering in the South was not as safe or lucrative as blackguarding the Christian religion in the North; so he took the first opportunity to change his base. He was taken prisoner and General Forest, with dry humor and a keen appreciation of his prisoner's value as a soldier, expressed a willingness to exchange him for a mule! Verily, the General's tongue was as incisive as his sword. He, no doubt, thought that if let off his prisoner would make a bee-line for home, and stay there—which by the way it appears he did. It was well for the country and the Union cause that our brave men who languished in the Southern prisons were not of like accommodating disposition. It is amusing to hear the Colonel's injudicious admirers alluding to this incident in his short military career as a proof that he is a "fellow of infinite jest." They fail to see that they exhibit him as a cowardly poltroon who, later on in the war, would have been courtmartialled and shot. The Colonel is not afraid of Almighty God, bless you, no; but a loaded musket with the glittering eye of a Confederate at the other end of it, is another thing. Had the manly men of the North been equally "brave," the clank of the chain would still mingle with the groans of the slave. It required men like Grant, who feared God and not the musket, to put down the rebellion and free the slave. And now after these worthy ends have been attained, the talkative infidel is once more to the front.

Lacy. How could Mr. Ingersoll defend his positions at all, if handicapped by a sentiment he deems spurious?

Lambert. Let him defend his positions by reason and logic, not by what Judge Black calls "foulest and falsest libel, and effusions of filth" and Christian

sentiment will not be offended. Reason and logic may overthrow an opinion or change a conviction into a doubt; but they cannot offend sentiment. It is ribaldry and buffoonery that offend sentiment. The Christian can listen with equanimity and good temper to arguments against the existence of God or the divinity of Christ, because arguments may be met by arguments, and intellect by intellect; but when the clown of a circus or the end men of a minstrel troupe makes these awful questions the butt of his contumacious, Christian sentiment revolts. "What can the magnificent clown make fun for us if handicapped by a sentiment he deems spurious?" If he cannot, he had better throw aside the cap and bells. The sentiment of an individual, a community, or a people springs necessarily from honest convictions. I say *necessarily*, because it cannot spring from dishonest convictions; for a dishonest conviction is not a conviction at all. All admit that honest convictions should be respected. Infidels harp on this idea as if they originated it, whereas it is a fundamental principle of Christian philosophy. True, the conviction may be an error, and error should not be honored, but in honoring an honest conviction, we honor the honesty of him who holds it, not the error he holds. As long as he who honestly errs should be respected, the sentiments in him which arise from his error should be respected. We have no right to outrage his sentiments merely because we believe him to be in error. Hence Ingersoll's utter disregard of the sentiments and feelings of Christians, even supposing them to be in the wrong, is entirely indefensible. I make no special plea here for Christian sentiment. The principle that honest convictions and the sentiments

growing out of them should be respected, is a universal principle—applicable to all. Christian sentiment should be honored and respected, not merely because it is *Christian*, but because it is a *sentiment arising from honest conviction*. Whether it is true or false is a question with which the honest and decent disputant has nothing whatever to do. He should deal with principles, doctrines, facts, and deal with them rationally and logically, and leave sentiments to stand or fall with the bases on which they rest and from which they originate. If Ingersoll were to go to Constantinople and speak against Mohammed and Mohammedanism with the same verbal licentiousness and disregard of truth that he speaks against our Divine Lord Jesus Christ, he would commit a crime against Turkish society that would receive and deserve the bastinado. *Lacy*. If he (Ingersoll) disputes the authority of the Catholic church, he shocks Catholic sentiment; if the doctrines of Calvin, he outrages Presbyterian sentiment; if he disputes the authority of *Lambert*, he may dispute to his heart's content the authority of the Catholic church, without shocking Catholic sentiment, because that doctrine, like all doctrines, is a matter of belief, faith, conviction, not of sentiment. I am not authorized to speak for the Presbyterian, but I believe that he, like the Catholic, distinguishes between things that belong to the domain of intellect and those that belong to the domain of sentiment. *Notes*. Mr. Ingersoll found the legitimate field of wit and drollery preoccupied by Artemus Ward, Mark Twain and others with whom he could not compete. He sought new fields and, with a reckless

audacity, selects that which the civilized world has always held sacred—Religion.

Lacy. We ask, What Religion? Whose Religion? Religion in the abstract or some particular form of faith?

Lambert. Everybody's religion. By the word religion, when used without adjective or qualification, is meant that primitive and universal intuition or idea which is common to all men, and is one and the same in all, however various their *forms* or *systems* of religion may be. This primitive idea is that of a power superior to that of man; of a Supreme Being who governs all things. From this primitive idea, springs the idea of relation between this Supreme Being and man, and from these are derived obligations, duties and the impulse to worship and to manifest that worship by external acts. All the various *forms* or *systems* of religion, true or false, that are known to the world have their origin in this primitive intuition or idea called religion; without it they would be alike impossible. This primitive idea is a fundamental fact of our nature, it is the common property of all men, Christian, Jew or Gentile. The errors of false systems of religion are not in the primitive idea but in the false *development* of it.

In all you have said on this point you have confounded this primitive idea with the various *forms* or *systems* it has assumed in its true and false development; in a word, you have confounded religion with *systems* of religion.

You may say that this primitive idea of a Supreme Being is not universal or common to all men, because atheists and agnostics like Ingersoll deny His existence. But their very denials prove that they

have the idea of Him, for how can they deny the existence of that of which they have no idea? To affirm or deny a thing we must have an idea of that thing. Will you admit that Ingersoll denies that of which he has no idea? He talks of God, does he talk of that of which he has no idea? The idea of a Supreme Being is universal—common to all men, without any exception whatever.

Lacy. If religion *per se* is a sacred thing, why should the Christian propagandist lay rude hands on the heathen's idol?

Lambert. Religion *per se* or *in se*, as a universal and primitive intuition, is sacred and good, because planted in the human mind by the Supreme Being. It is the same in the heathen as in the Christian, and true and sacred in both. Hence the Christian has no reason to lay rude hands on it. He respects it and tries to enlighten and direct it, and lead it to its true and only worthy object—the Supreme Being—the living God. The Christian does not object to that intuition in the heathen which impels him to worship something; he merely objects to the misdirection of that noble impulse by which it is led to and expended on an object utterly unworthy of it. He directs the heathen's attention from the stone and stick, before which he is prostrate, to his Creator and eternal and omnipotent Father. Can you who believe in a God object to this? Would you leave him in ignorance to worship a stone, or a snake, or a crocodile, when you could enlighten him?

Lacy. Or defame the religions of Zoroaster, Gautama and Confucius—religions ennobled by many sound doctrines and moral precepts.

Lambert. These systems of religion have some sound doctrines and good precepts;—to these the Christian does not object; nor the contrary; he rejoices to find them there; on the principle that it is better to have some truth than none. But these systems have many false doctrines and precepts;—to these the Christian objects; as every lover of truth and morality should.

Lacy. What right have we, logical or otherwise, in an argument with a dissenter, to assume our own religion as true?

Lambert. The same right that every man has to assume that his honest convictions are true; the same right the dissenter has to assume that his *dissents* are true; the same that you and Ingersoll have to assume that your dogmatic declarations are true. Why argue about a doctrine if you do not believe it? And if you believe it why not assume it as true? Would you have an honest man assume as false what he believes to be true, or assume as true what he believes to be false? Is it on this loose principle of sincerity that you argue with me? In logic the major and minor of every argument is assumed to be true until the dissenter or opponent proves it to be false. Do not your own words assume as true that we have no right to assume our religion as true against a dissenter? Have Christians no rights as against dissenters, objectors and infidels? You seem to infer they have not.

But the Christian religion does not rest on mere assumption. It is a fact of human experience, as patent as the sun that shines at midday. It is a fact that had its origin in miracles and prophecies. These miracles and prophecies are themselves facts of history, as incontestable as the acts of Pontius Pilate, the

Roman governor of Judea, or the acts of Augustus Cæsar. This is the position of the Christian, and so long as he is not driven from it by logic, reason and evidence—not by blasphemy and buffoonery—he has a right to assume Christianity to be true, and every other system of religion to be false. Of course, Ingersoll denies these claims of Christianity, but his denial is met by the Christian affirmation. Ingersoll has undertaken to *disprove* the truth of Christianity—to do this requires something more than denials and assumptions. The evidences of Christianity are spread all over the pages of Christian literature and need not be repeated here. Christianity is in possession of the minds, thoughts, morals and manners of the civilized world. To suppose that this institution, so interwoven in every fibre of civilized society, so dominant in its thought and movement, could be overthrown by the fallacies, sophistries and downright falsehoods of a handful of shallow, noisy objectors, is vain. The reasons that gave it a beginning, a development and a growth up to the present time, when it is the most powerful factor of human society, cannot be overcome by a joke or a play upon words. The reasons of its origin, growth and development are the reasons of its perpetuity.

Lacy. What right have we to demand a deference for our faith that is equally due to every creed which is honestly professed by intelligent men?

Lambert. It is as natural in a man to demand deference for what he believes to be true as it is for his body to demand food for nourishment. You do it; Ingersoll does it; we all do it, he who holds a false creed as well as he who holds the true one.

We would not be human if we did not. But the fact still remains that a creed that is false deserves no respect, no deference or consideration. To say that true and false creeds have a right to equal deference, is to destroy all distinction between the true and the false, to put truth and error on equal terms. Sane intellects can never do this. You confound the personal rights of the individual who holds an error with the right of error itself, and forget that error *as error* has no rights whatever as against truth. We owe no respect to a creed merely because some one honestly holds it. The honesty of the holding is no criterion of the truth. The respect we owe is to the honesty of him who thinks error—not to the error he thinks.

Lacy. Negation is often entitled to as much respect as affirmation.

Lambert. Who is to determine when a negation has this *oftenness* which gives it the value of an affirmation? Had you said that negation is entitled to as much respect as an affirmation, you would have said something that meant something. But I would immediately dissent, for negation *as negation* is not entitled to the same respect in logic as affirmation, for without affirmation all logic, all reasoning is impossible. Affirmation is an absolute necessity to begin to think, for no thought is possible that does not begin with an affirmation expressed or implied. A negation is the denial of an affirmation; it cannot be formulated in words without an affirmation. Take for illustration this negation: "A horse is not a man." Here you must affirm "A horse *is*" before you can say "not a man." In the same way you must affirm that God *is* before you can say He is *not*. This necessity runs through the whole domain of human cognition, and

is the fundamental principle of all reasoning. Aside from logic, the respect due an affirmation or a negation depends entirely on the quality and quantity of evidence in its behalf.

Lacy. In regard to theological questions, the chances in its (negation's) favor are as a thousand to one; for we are assured that there can be but one true religion.

Lambert. In regard to theological questions, as in all other questions, the chances in favor of affirmation and negation depend on the reasons and evidences in favor of one or the other. If men determined the true from false religions by the toss of a penny, the doctrine of chance might have place, but as each man must in the last resort depend on his own reason and judgment, the "head or tail" method of seeking truth is out of place. The claims of a thousand false religions do not in the least invalidate the claim of the true one. The value of a true coin is not affected by any number of counterfeits. He who measures the value of his negations by the doctrine of chance is one whose opinions are of but accidental worth.

Lacy. Blame not the traveller, who amidst this interminable wilderness of beliefs, hesitates, and doubts, and distrusts his guide, while confident voices from every side assure him that he is being led on to certain ruin.

Lambert. The intelligent traveller should investigate the claims of these conflicting guides, and not assume that he knows more about the wilderness than all of them together.

Lacy. "Have faith," says the guide. "Whose faith?" asks the pilgrim. "My faith," "My faith."

"MY FAITH!" answer a thousand voices, with ever increasing emphasis. What can he do?

Lambert. He can ask these guides the reasons or grounds of their faith, and examine them with care. To accept any faith without doing this would be unreasonable. As a rule, men who have faith are willing to give reasons therefor. It is a principle of theology that every man should obey his own conscience, and, therefore, that he cannot accept any system of religion that does not meet with the approval of his own judgment. The inference you leave to be inferred, that Christians abandon their reason and judgment when accepting a faith, is a pitiful sophism, but it is in keeping with infidel tactics. The Christian's judgment forbids him to accept any guide in whose integrity and ability to lead him he has no confidence, and if he have confidence in that ability and integrity, why should he not follow his chosen guide? Does he not, in doing so, follow his best judgment? It is a mistake to suppose that infidels have a monopoly of reason and judgment.

Notes. All this time while he (Ingersoll) has been combining the professions of the philosopher, the buffoon and the ghoul, he has talked sweetly of delicacy, refinement, sentiment, feeling, honor bright, etc. All this time he has delighted in tearing, and wounding, and lacerating the hearts and faith and feelings of those by whose tolerance he is permitted to outrage the common sense and sentiment of Christendom.

Lacy. We ask, is a faith which is worth being preserved, liable to be torn, and wounded, and lacerated by some one who doubts, and by doubting damns himself?

Lambert. I must repeat that it is not Ingersoll's doubts or arguments that offend Christian faith and feeling, but his buffoonery. Faith is of two kinds. It may be that body of doctrines which a system of religion proposes to its members, or it may be that mental habit or state of mind produced by belief in those doctrines. The former is called objective, the latter subjective. Now a system of religion is false only by reason of the falseness of its doctrines. These doctrines, then, are the only legitimate object of attack, because a religious system, if false, can be overthrown only by proving its doctrines to be false. Had Ingersoll confined himself to disproving the doctrines of Christianity, we could not reasonably object, because his arguments could be met by arguments. But he vulgarly attacks the mental habits, associations, sentiments and feelings of Christians by coarse buffoonery. There is no defence for such conduct; it is an offense against both reason and etiquette, as well as against the common decencies and amenities of civilized, social life. You may try to cover it up by a cloud of words, but in vain; the offense still remains in all its naked monstrosity.

Lacy. I worship the God of my choice, or none at all, if I like; not by tolerance but by *right*, a right inherent, inalienable.

Lambert. Then you have the same right to worship a false god that you have to worship the true one! It is a matter of *choice*, not of reason or conviction! This is to deny all distinction between the true God and false gods. It is difficult to reconcile your statement with the belief in a Supreme Being which you appear to hold. You certainly have no rights but those your Creator gave you, and He did

not give you the right to disobey Him, although He gave you the power. When you admit the existence of a Supreme Being, you destroy the *right* to worship any other being. As between the true God and false gods man has no right of choice. Ignorance alone can excuse him.

Lacy. If, as alleged, Mr. Ingersoll has advanced nothing new, and his arguments are borrowed from Paine, Bolingbroke and others, why has such a bevy of writers, priests and preachers essayed replies to his writings and lectures?

Lambert. On the principle, that when an objection is repeated, the answer should be repeated. If Ingersoll is as unassailable as you would make it appear, why do you essay a defence of him?

Notes. Wanting in originality, he (Ingersoll) draws liberally from the writings of Paine, Voltaire, Bolingbroke and others for his points and arguments. He does not succeed in advancing anything new against Christianity.

Lacy. Are there no new issues raised in the present which were unknown in the past?

Lambert. Yes, new objections have been raised, but they are not original with Ingersoll; he simply borrowed them without credit, and forgot to borrow the answers.

Lacy. Why employ epithets vile?

Lambert. A pretty question for a disciple of Ingersoll to ask.

Lacy. Foul words give no weight to statement.

Lambert. Tell that to your master; it may improve both his logic and his manners.

CHAPTER II.

Ingersoll. The Universe, according to my idea, is, always was, and forever will be * * * It is the one eternal being—the only thing that ever did, does or can exist.

Notes. When you say "according to my idea" you leave the inference that this theory of an eternal universe never occurred to the mind of man until your brain acquired its full development. Of course, you did not intend to mislead or deceive; you simply meant that your "idea" of the universe is, like most of our modern plays, adapted from the French or elsewhere. * * * The old originals from whom you copy thought it incumbent on them to give a reason or at least a show of reason for "their idea." In this enlightened age you do not deem it necessary. It is sufficient for you to formulate your "idea." To attempt to prove it would be beneath you. Have you got so far as to believe that your "idea" has the force of an argument, or that the science of philosophy must be re-adjusted because you happen to have an "idea?"

Lacy. The words, "according to my idea" are said to imply primitive conception; because I say "I have an idea," I leave the inference that no one ever conceived the same idea before!

Lambert. There is a difference between *an* idea and *my* idea. To say you have an 'idea might cause surprise, but to say it is *yours* is to claim originality for it. If Ingersoll were to claim some of Edison's

ideas as his, he would be liable to prosecution for infringement of the patent laws. The pantheistic theory of the universe is too old to be claimed by Ingersoll as *his* idea. In claiming it he carries out his usual method of appropriating the thoughts and speculations of others without giving credit, for which he deserves the title of the Philosopher of the Purloined. Of course one may get at his meaning, but this verbal hypercritic of Moses should try to say what he means.

Lacy. Let us try the good priest's logic on himself

Lambert. It is a question not of logic but of the correct use of words; proceed.

Lacy. According to his idea the Catholic church is infallible, the priest can forgive sins, and so of every doctrine of his church, *therefore* his brain first conceived the dogmas.

Lambert. The good priest would say: "according to his *judgment* or *conviction*," not "according to his idea." In this he would be careful not to imitate you or your client. His judgment, whatever it is worth is his own. The dogmas of his church are not his idea, though his judgment accepts them as true.

Lacy. True, our Rev. Father may claim that his faith is more than an "idea," but this only shows the superior modesty of Mr. Ingersoll.

Lambert. He may and does claim that his and every other man's faith is more than an idea, just as Ingersoll's theory of the universe is more than an idea, and this is why his use of the word is incorrect. Faith is an assent to truth on the authority of another. This assent is an affirmative judgment, and

whether true or false, is more, has a higher logical value, than an idea, which is a mere apprehension or conception that neither affirms nor denies. Ideas are the elements or timbers of a judgment, as the bricks are the component parts of a house. As the house is greater than one of its bricks, so is a judgment, an assent or a faith greater than any one of the ideas composing it. A judgment is, then, more than an idea, on the principle that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Your mistake arises from ignorance of the difference between a judgment and an idea. It is another mistake to advance this ignorance as an evidence of modesty.

Lacy. This only shows modesty of Mr. Ingersoll.

Lambert. This is the first time the good Father has seen ignorance of the first principles of logic cited as an evidence of modesty. Modesty seems to be a favorite virtue with you. It absorbs the greater part of your preface; it permeates it like the odor of a lily—pleasant enough in small quantities, but offensive when too much concentrated. Having established yourself in this desirable article, you are better able to discover it in your client, on the homœopathic principle probably, that like has an affinity for like. Ingersoll's modesty is an "idea" for which you can certainly claim "primitive conception" without fear of an adverse claimant at the patent office. It is difficult to determine which, the master or his disciple, should bear the bell for modesty. For a pure article without any sugar in it the master seems to have the advantage because he is modest enough not to parade his modesty as one of his strong points, while the disciple keeps his on tap—such as it is.

Lacy. The remark of Mr. Ingersoll was merely prefatory, and given to indicate his position to his adversary.

Lambert. That is no justification for the misuse of terms. There is no reason why a prefatory remark should not be as correct as any other remark. There is no time when a man should be more careful and correct than when indicating his position to his adversary.

Lacy. And (Ingersoll's remark) is followed by the modest confession: "of course upon a question like this (the origin of the world) nothing can be absolutely known."

Lambert. Modesty again! Instead of modesty we have in this so-called confession an example of the highest order of egotism. It assumes that what Ingersoll does not know cannot be known. He makes his intellect the highest measure of human capacity. He does not know how the world began or whether it began, *therefore* on this question nothing can be absolutely known! That is the meaning of his confession. Against this modest confession we have the faith of the world in all times that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." God who created the world can certainly tell that fact to man in some way, therefore on a question like this something can be absolutely and most certainly known. Ingersoll's confession is clearly a denial of the possibility of revelation; and if it be an evidence of modesty it would be well to have Mr. Lacy's definition of egotism.

Lacy. Let us come down to "hard-pan" and examine the Father's metaphysics.

Lambert. Yes. It is time to come to something harder and more tangible than Ingersollian modesty, which may be designated as very "soft-pan."

I will now give in full the argument in the *Notes* which you undertake to refute. According to Ingersoll's "idea," matter is eternal. Against this I argue thus:

Notes. That which is eternal is infinite. It must be infinite, because if eternal, it can have nothing to limit it. But that which is infinite must be infinite in every way. If limited in any way it would not be infinite. Now matter is limited. It is composed of parts, and composition is limitation. Change supposes succession, and there can be no succession without a beginning, and therefore limitation. Thus far we are borne out by reason, experience and common sense. Then—Matter is limited and therefore finite, and if finite in anything finite in everything; and if finite in everything, therefore finite in time, and therefore not eternal. The idea of an eternal, self-existent being is incompatible in every point of view with our idea of matter. The former is essentially simple, unchangeable, impassible, and one. The latter is composite, changeable, passible and multiple. To assert that matter is eternal is to assert that all these antagonistic attributes are identical—a privilege granted to lunatics only.

Lacy. Waving the question of the power of "experience" to bear us out in our ideas of the eternal, the infinite, and illimitable, is it true that that which is infinite must be infinite in "every way?" Every way is indefinite, but let us suppose it means in every attribute.

Lambert. We will not waive the question as to the power of experience. In the above argument I said, "Thus far we are borne out by reason, experience and common sense." The first part of the argu-

ment deals with the nature of the eternal and infinite—a question of pure reason. The second part treats of matter as composed of parts and subject to change—a question of experience. The third part compares the attributes of the infinite with the attributes of matter and finds them incompatible—a question of common sense. It served your purpose to pretend that I made experience the criterion of the infinite and eternal, and then pass it with a waiver. You have not studied Ingersoll's methods in vain. But no matter. Let us return to your question:

Lacy. Is it true that that which is infinite must be infinite in "every way?"

Lambert. Yes, it is true as we shall see in examining your arguments to the contrary.

Lacy. The human soul, scripture being judge, starts on an eternal pilgrimage. It never dies. Its life is eternal life.

Lambert. The soul *starts*. A start is a beginning. That which begins is not eternal because it has at least one limit—a beginning, while that which is eternal has neither beginning nor end. The human soul, once begun, will never cease to be. It will forever continue to be a being that had a beginning. And because it had a beginning it is finite in time, therefore not eternal. You must not forget that you are dealing with the Father's metaphysics. In the metaphysical sense a future eternal or infinite duration, is a contradiction in terms, for the moment you limit it to the future you deny its eternity or infinity. A limit to duration in *either* direction makes that duration finite.

Lacy. Yet as to infinity of duration future, the lives of angels and men are co-extensive with that of the deity. So the scripture teaches.

Lambert. The lives of men and angels will never cease, but they will always be finite lives because they had a beginning. The life of the infinite being is infinite, because it has neither beginning nor end.

The eternity of God is an actual, real and therefore present and simultaneous eternity, without past or future. The future life of man is not actual and real, but potential, and will ever remain potential. The difference between actual and potential is as great as that between being and not being. Man's life cannot be conceived but as existing in the temporal relation of a past and a future, while the eternity of God excludes all temporal relations, has neither a past nor a future. It is the eternal simultaneous *now* while man's life is a ceaseless merging of the future into the present, and the present into the past, and this succession is a necessary condition of finite existence. Between these two conceptions of eternity, that of God and that of the soul, there is no similarity, no comparison. These two eternities then are not alike, and the Scripture does not, as you say, teach that they are alike.

When you say "infinity of duration future," you contradict yourself; for infinity is the negation of all limits, while the term "future" affirms a limit.

A future duration is not a real duration, has no real existence. It is always just going to be, but never is. It is merely a conception of the possibility of the continuance of a finite being. The future is so thoroughly a nothing, that the soul cannot live in it. To live at all the soul must live in the *now*. The future must cease to be the future and become actualized in the *now* before it can be lived. As this future cannot have actual existence, infinity or eternity cannot be predicated of it, for the first attribute of the in-

finite is real, actual existence. The infinite must be a real, not a potential being. You speak of future as of an actual fact, whereas it is from its nature, always becoming but never becomes; it is always to be about to be.

Lacy. Space, which has been aptly defined as that which has its centre everywhere and its circumference nowhere, is infinite expansion but nothing more.

Lambert. This may be good poetry, but it is not metaphysics. It is simply no definition at all, for it involves a contradiction and therefore defines nothing, conveys no idea whatever to the mind. A thing may or may not have a centre, but no thing can have a centre everywhere; a thing may or may not have a circumference, but if it have it must be somewhere. Although you call the definition "apt," you appear not to be satisfied with it, for you give another.

Lacy. Space is infinite expansion but nothing more.

Lambert. Expansion of what? Expansion without something expanded is a mere fiction of the mind having no real existence outside the mind. Expansion is a mode of matter and without matter it is a non-entity. As matter is finite its expansion is finite. Herbert Spencer defines space as "the abstract of all co-existencies" and by "the abstract" he tells us he means "that which is left behind when the realities are absent." Now take away all reality and what have you left? No reality, nothing. Then according to Spencer's definition space is no reality. But reality, real being, is the first essential condition of the infinite, therefore, space, having no reality, no real existence aside from matter, cannot be infinite. Spencer also says we cannot attribute to space "absence of limita-

tion" and therefore again we cannot attribute infinity to it. Christian philosophers tell us that space, in as far as it is real, is the distances between extended or spaced things, and can exist only when extended things exist; just as form can have no real existence without things formed. Space in this sense is limited to extended things and therefore cannot be infinite. These same philosophers teach that space abstracted from things—or space absolute, *is the possibility of extended things*—that which makes extended things possible, and that aside from extended things it is nothing. To conclude then, it is evident, that whether we accept the agnostic or Christian definition, space is not infinite.

Lacy. So of time it is infinite duration only.

Lambert. Duration of what? Duration without something that endures has no real existence. The duration of finite beings is called time; the duration of the Infinite Being is called eternity. But without "being," finite or infinite, in which to endure, both time and eternity are mere mental abstractions, and abstractions wanting reality of being cannot be infinite. Time is, because finite, mutable things are—it is the measure of mutability. Eternity is, because an eternal, immutable Being is. Space is the simultaneous relation of extended things; time is the successive relation of mutable things.

Lacy. A line infinite in length extending through space, may be imagined or symbolized as steadily as we may symbolize space or eternal duration regarded as the sum total of infinite diurnal succession.

Lambert. It is difficult to know where to begin on this exquisite specimen of metaphysics. A line that is imagined is only an imaginary line—a mental fiction,

unreal, and wanting reality it wants the first condition of the infinite, which is real, actual being or existence.

To imagine, or rather to conceive an infinite line is to conceive a line to whose lineal value nothing can be added, for as long as an addition to it can be conceived it is not yet infinite. Is such a line conceivable as a reality? No. Let us see why. Imagine your infinite line extending through space in opposite directions—say north and south. Now this so-called infinite line is not infinite so long as we can conceive it increased by additional length. Let us now imagine another so-called infinite line of equal length with the first, and running parallel to it. If we add the second to the first do we not increase its lineal value? Most certainly. Then the first line was not infinite because it admitted of addition. Nor are the two together infinite because we may imagine another parallel line and another addition and a consequent increase of lineal value. We may continue this process for ever and never exhaust the possibilities—never come to a lineal value that excludes possible addition. From this you will see that you cannot conceive, much less imagine, an infinite line so “readily” as you thought.

Take another illustration. With infinites there can be no degrees of comparison—no greater or less infinite. This premised, take your infinite straight line and beside it imagine an infinite waving line. Is it not evident that the infinite waving line has greater lineal value than the straight infinite line? Here you see your theory of an infinite line involves the absurdity of two infinite lines one of which is longer than the other. This is enough to prove that you deceived yourself when you imagined that you could “readily” imagine an infinite line. But even granting

that you could imagine it, it would not help you out, for at best it would be only an imaginary line, which, *because only imaginary*, cannot be infinite.

Thus, on examination, your specimens of infinites are found to want the essential condition of infinity. They are not infinites either as realities or as fictions of thought. Therefore your effort to prove that a thing may be infinite in one way and not in another fails, and my proposition, that what is infinite must be infinite in every way remains untouched. There is but one infinite—the Supreme Being, and He is real and infinite in all his attributes; and besides Him there is no infinite. Everything that is not God or an attribute of God, is finite.

We come now to your "eternal duration regarded as the sum total of infinite diurnal succession."

This involves a contradiction. A sum total supposes a definite number of successions. A definite number must be an actual and fixed number as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. You may increase this series by the addition of one or more at each step, but as long as you continue to add you cannot have a sum total, and if you stop adding to sum up your total you have immediately a definite number of units; that number is the limit of the series. Then you have a limited series, beginning with unity and ending at the last number added. You may continue adding for ever and yet there will always be a last number to which you can still add another. Let your sum total be as great as you please to imagine it, it is still only the last number of a series of which the first is unity. Every series of numbers or successions must begin with unity—or one, and that which *begins* is not infinite.

You may say that a series may be continued infinitely. Yes, but the possibility of an infinite contin-

uance destroys the idea of an infinite sum total, for as we have seen, a sum total must be a fixed and limited number. An infinite number or series of successions as a reality is impossible because you can imagine or conceive no number that may not be increased by the addition of one, and that which is susceptible of increase is not infinite. The idea of infinity which we associate with numbers is not in the numbers but in the possibility of increase. The fact that this possibility can never be exhausted is again proof that an infinite real number is impossible—the same is of course true of successions. Metaphysicians divide number into *real* and *potential*. A *real* number, to exist or be counted, must be finite. It must be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or some such total expressing unity repeated a finite number of times. Potential number is nothing but the exhaustless possibility of increasing real numbers.

You may say here that if possibility of numerical increase be infinite we have at last found an infinite that has but one attribute. To this I reply that possibility is not a real thing but only a condition of real being—the absence of contradictory attributes in a being. The possibility of a potential infinite number is nothing more than the possibility of adding one to one or to any number. It is the possibility of always adding one to any number however large that makes an infinite real number impossible.

Let us now apply these self-evident principles to your "infinite diurnal successions." Whether you accept the Mosaic account or the theory of the evolutionists you must admit that diurnal evolutions or successions had a beginning, for Moses and the evolutionists agree on this question. According to the

latter, matter was first in a nebular condition and in time evolved into its present order of existence and movement. According to this theory there must have been a time when diurnal successions *began*. Now that which begins is not infinite, for it has at least one limit—a beginning, while the infinite is that which has no limits. Hence according to either theory of the origin of the present universe your notion of "infinite diurnal succession" is erroneous.

But again, aside from the question of when or how diurnal succession began, nothing is more evident than that the diurnal revolution taking place to-day is the last real one. It follows then that up to the present the real number of successions is finite, because fixed and limited to a certain number since the first one, and that which is finite at *any time* is *always* finite. The future successions cannot be counted because they have no existence, they are not. Your idea of them is simply your idea of the present or past revolutions mentally projected into the future. When the succession of to-morrow is completed the whole number of successions will be increased by one. Let these to-morrows continue coming forever, at the end of each one we find a definite and limited number of successions—always finite because always capable of increase. Your error as to the infinities arises from confounding possible being with real being, and your imaginative creations with the creations of God. It is the first duty of a student of philosophy to learn to distinguish between the possible and the real, and between the infinite and the indefinite.

CHAPTER III.

Notes. Matter is limited and therefore finite, and if finite in anything, finite in everything; and if finite in everything, therefore finite in time, and therefore not eternal.

Lacy. Does the good Father not see, his premises being admitted, that with one breath he has blown away the whole fabric of theology with its hopes of heaven or fear of hell?

Lambert. The good Father does not see it. He awaits with curious interest your proofs.

Lacy. The matter composing our bodies, according to the "*Notes*," is finite, in that it had a beginning, is composite, and is subject to change. Therefore finite in everything it cannot be eternal.

Lambert. Your conclusion from my premises is most correct. The matter composing our bodies is not and cannot be eternal, because it had a beginning. It will last forever, but will forever continue to be a thing that had a beginning and will therefore forever continue to be finite, and therefore not eternal.

Lacy. It (the matter composing our bodies) will fade away like the shadows that flit before us and are gone.

Lambert. It will not fade away for the reason that it will forever continue to be what it is—finite matter. If your theory that the finite becomes eternal by endless continuance were true, then finite matter would fade away, for in becoming eternal it would have necessarily to cease to be what it is, namely, finite, and become what it is not, namely, infinite.

Lacy. So also of the glorified body of the Lord.

Lambert. The glorified body of our Lord is finite matter and will continue forever as finite matter.

All through your book you show some respect, although inconsistently, for our Divine Lord and Redeemer. It is pleasant to see that, notwithstanding your infidel tendencies and sympathies, you cannot entirely conquer the Christian influences of your youth, drown in infidelity the sentiments then acquired, or dissipate the memories of the time when you knelt at your mother's knee. The lessons then instilled into your mind shine through the gloom of your book like stars in the night. There is not a true or beautiful thought in it, and there are many, that you did not acquire through your parents from Christian sentiments and principles. Everything that is false, tricky and contemptible in it you have learned from bad company. How her sturdy old Christian heart would grieve if she knew how her son was illusioned by the shallow phrases and shams of shallow thinkers! How she would "bless" the perverse ignorance and audacious dishonesty of her boy's misleaders!

Lacy. According to priestly logic, God Himself, with matter, time and space must cease to be.

Lambert. Matter, time and space are finite, but that is no reason why they should cease to be. They will continue for ever, and be for ever finite, because they had a beginning. But how do you make out that God must cease to be?

Lacy. It will scarcely be denied that even He is limited by the attributes of His own being.

Lambert. But it *is* denied. How infinite attributes can limit their possessor is incomprehensible,

for to assert infinite attributes is to deny all limitation. Your position involves the absurdity, that to deny limitation is to affirm it, that an infinite being is finite, because he is infinite. Infinity is an attribute of God. Now does not the *fact* of His being infinite exclude the fiction of His being finite?

Lacy. It is inconceivable how He (God) could annihilate space, create a being equal to Himself, or make a diameter equal to its circumference.

Lambert. The incapacity to conceive *how* a thing can be done is no proof that it cannot be done. But what do you mean by inconceivable? Do you mean that you cannot have a clear apprehension of the way, or of the various steps or movements in the process of an act? If so then all things are inconceivable. Or do you mean that you cannot see the processes of an act as you see a panorama on a moving canvass? In this case you should have said "unimaginable," not inconceivable.

The fact that the *how* of an act or process is inconceivable is no proof that it has not a *how*, or that it is impossible. The *how*, process or genesis of thought is inconceivable but this inconceivability does not justify us in denying the fact of thought. You admit that volition is an unsolved problem. If unsolved its *how* is thus far at least inconceivable. Will you therefore deny the fact of volition? How an acorn becomes an oak is inconceivable, and yet we must recognize the fact. We cannot conceive how a thought is transferred from the mind of a speaker to the minds of a thousand hearers, and yet it is a fact. Tell me not that the voice produces air waves and that these waves strike the sensitive organs of the ear, and thus conduct the thought to the mind, for I shall

immediately ask how an air wave can convey a thought or how a vibrating nerve can transmit it? No one thinks of denying these facts simply because they cannot conceive how they are effected.

Infidels have no "corner" on hows. How do you think? How do you know that you know anything? How do you know that you are, and that you are what you are and not something else? All these hows are inconceivable, and yet if there are any facts at all, they are facts. On what principle of logic or common sense do you accept without question all these inconceivables and reject others that are no more inconceivable? It is difficult to imagine what would happen if the modern skeptic were deprived of his favorite catchwords—the inconceivable, the unthinkable, the unknowable. He forgets that everything is mysterious. What is matter? What is that mysterious power it has of producing sensation in sentient beings? What is consciousness and what its cause? How does the intellect draw a conclusion? Are we to deny all these things because we cannot enter into their innermost essence?

I must here call your attention to a distinction which you always overlook when speaking of things as inconceivable. It is one thing not to conceive a thing and quite another to conceive a thing to be impossible. A proper appreciation of this distinction would save a good deal of meaningless talk. I cannot conceive *how* God created the world, but I can conceive no impossibility in the creative act. I cannot conceive the nature of matter, but I can conceive no impossibility in it.

Lacy. It is inconceivable how He (God) could annihilate space.

Lambert. It is a question of fact not of *how*. Tell the Esquimaux in his Boreal home that a man in New York can communicate instantly with another in London, and he will if he be a self-conceited sceptic, laugh at you as sardonically as ever Ingersoll laughed at Christian mysteries. "Go," he will say, "and tell that to the marines, but don't bore me with your superstitions; it is inconceivable how it can be done." He is right, for it is inconceivable to him, and was to us a few years ago, and yet it was possible all the time. The Esquimaux was wrong in making his inability to conceive the *how* of the thing the measure of the possibility of the thing. Just as you are wrong when you make your incapacity to conceive the *how* of the creative act the measure of God's omnipotence. We are not justified in asserting a thing to be impossible merely because we cannot conceive how it is done.

As to space, we have seen that it is not a real being, but only a relation between material beings; that abstracted from material beings it is nothing; that it bears somewhat the same relation to extended or expanded things that form does to matter or weight to ponderable things. Annihilate extended or expanded things and form and space and weight will "fade away like the shadows which flit before us and are seen no more." By the way, speaking of shadows suggests the question, How can God annihilate a shadow? By removing the substance that casts it. In the same way space would cease to be if God were by His omnipotent hand to annihilate extended things on which it depends for its existence. He removes the condition when He removes the conditioned.

Even man with his feeble hands can create and annihilate forms and shadows. Press a globular shaped piece of putty in your hand. What has become of its former shape? Has it not ceased to be? Has not a new form been created? What finite power can do with forms infinite power can do with things.

Lacy. It is inconceivable how He (God) could create a being equal to Himself, or make a diameter equal to its circle.

Lambert. These things are metaphysically impossible because they suppose a union of essential attributes that are incompatible and mutually destructive of each other. They suppose the co-existence of being and not-being in the same subject at the same time. A proposition that affirms and denies the same attribute of the same subject at the same time is a proposition that has nothing as its result. Thus when I say: A is and is not B, I affirm nothing of A or B, and the result of my contradictory proposition is nothing or zero.

In the same way, to do an act whose doing involves its not doing, or is contrary, is to do an act that results in nothing—that is, to do no thing. A contradictory proposition *affirms* nothing and a contradictory act *does* nothing. A contradictory act is one which involves necessarily doing and doing the contrary at the same time, the result of which is nothing. Hence to do a contradictory act is to do *nothing*. But to create a being equal to God is a contradictory act for it involves many contradictions, therefore to create a being equal to God is to do, not something, but no thing or nothing. Hence to say that God cannot create a being equal to Himself is

equivalent to saying that God cannot do nothing. Now the inability to do nothing is no limit to power, for power is the ability to do something. To make a square circle is to make the square and not make a square at the same time or to make a circle and not make it at the same time—which is certainly to make nothing, and to make nothing is no evidence of power, even in man.

Christian theology teaches that God can do all *things*, it does not teach that He can do all *nothings*; and to create a being equal to Himself is to do no thing, as we have seen.

I have said that for God to create a being equal to Himself involves many contradictions. Let us note some of them:—1. The equal god of your hypothesis would have to be both contingent and necessary at the same time; contingent because created, and necessary because like to God who is a necessary Being. Now a being that is contingent and not contingent at the same time is a contradiction which involves negation of being, and leaves nothing as the term of the creative act. 2. Your imaginary god would have to be created and not created; created in order to be, and not created in order to be equal to God who is uncreated. 3. This equal god would have to be absolute and dependent at the same time; absolute to be like God, and yet dependent on another for his creation. 4. He would have to exist before he was created; if not he could not be like God who existed before He created him. 5. He would have to be the creator of this world to be like to God who created it. He would then have to be the creator of a world that was created before *he* was created.

Such are the contradictions, absurdities and inanities which you imagine God must be able to do, or be limited in power!

I think I have said enough to show that metaphysical impossibilities do not limit the omnipotent power of God who can do all things.

Your argument against the power of God amounts to about this: God cannot be as stupid or silly as some of His creatures, therefore He is not omnipotent. He cannot make a fool of Himself, therefore He is not all powerful.

Lacy. Dr. Adam Clark * * * says that God can do anything that does not involve contradiction or absurdity.

Lambert. He was right. He knew that that which involves contradiction or absurdity is not a thing, but a no-thing.

Lacy. How are we to determine what proposition involves contradiction or absurdity he does not inform us.

Lambert. He supposed in addressing intelligent readers it was not necessary. He was not writing a Primer on Logic. A contradictory proposition is one that affirms and denies at the same time the same attribute of the same thing, or affirms of the same thing two attributes, the existence of either of which implies the non-existence of the other. A four-angled triangle or a crooked straight line or a square circle will do to illustrate. Do you really need to be instructed how to determine that these are contradictory? If so the science of logic begins where your logic leaves off. But perhaps this is only another example of Ingersollian modesty. Let me here give another illustration of a contradictory and absurd

proposition. I take it from your book, where you ask: "Is not man, when *free* to act, *controlled* by the strongest motive?" Here you suppose man to be free and not free at the same time. Really Adam Clark should have told you how to avoid this absurdity. The principle of contradiction, by which we determine what is and what is not contradictory, is one of the first, most immediate to the mind, and clearest of all human cognitions. Like the first principles of mathematics, it needs only to have its terms understood to be admitted. It is one of those principles that constitute the basis or starting point of all reasoning and without which all judgments are impossible. Hence it is strange that you find fault with Adam Clark for doing you the honor of supposing you knew it.

The principle of contradiction is this: *A thing cannot be and not be at the same time.* Being excludes non-being and non-being excludes being. This is a truth so immediate to the intellect that it needs no demonstration. Another principle which is a corollary of this is: *Whatever is, must be in some way; that is, have a manner or mode of being of its own; in a word, it must be itself and not something else.* It is by applying these self-evident principles to propositions and things that we are enabled to determine what is contradictory and what is not. Any and every proposition that implies being and not being at the same time and in the same sense in its subject is contradictory and logically absurd. For example: *A square is a circle.* This proposition is contradictory because it implies that a square is a square and at the same time not a square but some other thing essentially different; that a circle is a circle and at the

same time not a circle but something else. It sins against the two principles above laid down, for it supposes a thing to be and not to be at the same time, and that a thing is itself and at the same time not itself.

To know then whether a proposition or a thing involves contradiction, we must know its essential attributes. If we know these attributes we can positively deny contradiction. If we do not know these attributes we can neither affirm nor deny.

Lacy. How he (Clark) knows that the creation of matter out of nothing—which is the old way of putting it—does not involve contradiction and absurdity we are not told.

Lambert. As everything is possible that does not involve contradictory attributes, Dr. Clark was right in assuming the possibility of an act until the presence of contradictory attributes are demonstrated. He who asserts the possibility of an act is not required by any principle of logic or common sense to prove the *absence* of contradictory attributes—to do this would be to prove a negative. He on the other hand who asserts the impossibility of an act is bound to prove the *presence* of contradiction by demonstrating the presence of mutually destructive attributes. If you deny the possibility of the creative act it is for you to show wherein that impossibility lies.

Lacy. To our mind the act is inconceivable.

Lambert. Your inability to conceive the nature of an act is no proof that it is impossible. You must not confound your inability to conceive an act with your ability to conceive its impossibility. This is an error skeptics are prone to commit. You cannot conceive how two lines can forever approach each other

and yet can never meet. This is however a fact of conic sections.

There is no word more misused by the skeptic than the word "inconceivable." He thinks it to be an estoppel to all further argument, and forgets that in saying a thing is inconceivable to his mind he limits the capacity of his mind but not the possibility of the thing. To conceive a thing in logic is to have an idea of it. That of which we have no conception or idea is to us as that which is not. We cannot think or speak of that of which we have no conception. Hence it follows that you must have some conception of the creative act or you could not even assert that it is inconceivable. Therefore in asserting it to be inconceivable you prove that you have a conception of it. You must then admit that you conceive the creative act or that you talk of that of which you have no conception or idea. Hence your proposition is self-contradictory. You probably meant to say the creative act is *unimaginable*. This I grant, but it proves nothing. We cannot picture to our mind the creative act but we can conceive it, otherwise we could not dispute about it, for we cannot dispute about that of which we have no conception. We have a conception of what the phrase "creative act" means, therefore it is not inconceivable. It is the *how* of the creative act that we cannot conceive. But our inability to conceive the *how* does not prove the act to be impossible.

Lacy. Be that as it may there are limits to divine power.

Lambert. We have seen the nature of those limits and also the nature of your metaphysics.

CHAPTER IV.

Lambert. Before leaving the metaphysical questions I must revert to one point, lest you may think I declined to meet it on mere technical grounds. I refer to the possibility of the creative act, or creation. You say:

Lacy. How he (Clark) knows that the creation of matter out of nothing does not involve contradiction and absurdity we are not told.

Lambert. Of course Dr. Clark was not logically bound to prove a negative, as every logician and most lawyers know. But as skeptics are in the habit of assuming that creation involves contradiction and is therefore impossible, I propose to show that there is not only no contradiction, but that contradiction is impossible. Thus:

If to create beings where before there were no beings involves a contradiction that contradiction must be found in being, or in non-being, or in the relation of being to non-being. If it cannot be found in any of these three it does not exist. But contradiction cannot be found in any of these. Therefore there is no contradiction. Now:

First—Contradiction is the essential antagonism of *two or more* attributes. It cannot therefore exist in being, because being has but *one* essential attribute namely, existence, or to coin a word, "isitiveness." It requires at least two attributes to make antagonism or contradiction, just as it takes two to make a quarrel. As being has but *one* attribute, antagonism or contra-

diction is impossible in it. Besides, you admit the actual existence of things, and the *fact* of their existence proves that they are possible, and being possible, their existence cannot involve contradiction.

Second—Contradiction cannot exist in non-being. Non-being is nothing, and nothing is defined as that which has *no* attributes. Now that which has no attributes can have no antagonism or contradiction of attributes.

Third—There can be no contradiction in the relation of being to non-being as long as they are not predicated of the same subject at the same time and in the same sense, for non-being having *no* attributes cannot be in contradiction with anything having attributes because it is only by and through their attributes that the things can be conceived as contradictory or antagonistic. There is then no contradiction in the relation of being and non-being when being and non-being are not involved in the same subject at the same time. But does the creative act involve being and non-being at the same time? No, being is only *after* the act, while non-being or nothing is *before* it. This before or after leave no room for simultaneous contradiction.

Therefore there is not only no contradiction in the creative act, but contradiction is a metaphysical impossibility.

Lacy. The Pentateuch portrays God as of human form, after whose image man is made.

Lambert. In representing the Infinite Being to our minds we must from necessity of our infinite nature think of Him in modes of being known to us, although in doing so we are ever aware that these modes are not in the Infinite Being as they are in us. We must

think in human terms of thought, they are all we have and without them we cannot think at all. We cannot imagine (observe I do not say conceive) anything except by means of terms or symbols acquired through the senses. Therefore we cannot imagine God or image Him to ourselves unless we use forms and symbols known to us. Thus when we refer to the infinite knowledge of God, we represent it to our imagination by an eye and speak of the all-seeing eye of God, and no one but a very stupid person could think we attributed material eyes to Him. When we refer to His power and Fatherly protection we represent it by a hand and speak of the hand of God. This form of symbolic speech is common to all men and pervades all languages. We say the sun rises and sets although we know it does not. We speak of the scythe and forelocks and hand of time, of the cap of liberty, of the scales of justice, of the finger of scorn, of the head of a chapter, the foot of a page or of a mountain, the tongue of detraction, the ear of attention, the sword of revenge, the ribs of a ship, the nod of approbation, a limb of the law, the cry of pain, the tears of grief. All these and a thousand other forms of symbolic speech are familiar and intelligible, and mislead no one. What a silly ass is he who imagines that we "portray" all these things as of human form?

Yet when Moses, yielding to a legitimate and universal custom, speaks of the hand of God how quick the narrow-eyed skeptic snaps him up as portraying God in human form, and accuses him of anthropomorphism. This big word, which the skeptic is as fond of as a girl is of chewing gum, means to represent God in human form. Moses no more taught that God was of human form than we teach that time

admit the
their exist-
possible,
non-being.
d as that
h has no
diction of
on in the
ey are not
time and
attributes
having at-
ough their
ceived as
then no
non-being
lved in the
the creative
same time?
on-being or
er leave no
tradiction in
metaphysical
as of human
ite Being to
finite nature
us, although
e modes are
We must

is of human form when we speak of the hand or forelocks of time, or that scorn is of human form when we speak of its finger. Moses when describing the nature of God rose above all forms and called Him Je-ho-va, *I am who am*. This is the most perfect description of the Supreme Being that has ever been voiced to human ear or transmitted to the mind of man. This Mosaic Tetragramaton implies all perfection, infinity, independence, immutability, eternity, absolute Being, the cause of all that is or will be. Let the infidel find a more transcendent name for the Supreme Being before he criticises and misrepresents the great Hebrew legislator. Let him devise a more comprehensive term and we will adopt it.

Ingersoll says: "He (Moses) did not know that the sun wooed with amorous kisses the waves of the sea, and that they clad in glorified mist, rising to meet their lover, were by disappointment changed to tears and fell as rain."

Here, according to Mr. Ingersoll, the sun woos. That is exceedingly anthropomorphic. He (the sun, not Ingersoll) kisses the waves—the rude, anthropos. The waves, nothing loth clad in glorified mist rise to meet him; and he, the bashful Adonis, shrinks from the amorous advances of the wanton waves. Disappointment—who, by the way, had no right to interfere in this delicate affair—changed the waves, by magic perhaps, into tears. Who could believe that the great hierophant of agnosticism is so deeply sunk in the most heathenish anthropomorphism, if his own words did not reveal it? The scientific progress of the age seems to have made no perceptible impression on him. The science of astronomy and the spectro-scope tell us that the sun is a globular mass of matter

or fore-
when we
ne nature
Je-ho-va,
ription of
voiced to
an. This
n, infinity,
te Being,
nfidel find
me Being
great He-
omprehen-

know that
aves of the
ing to meet
ed: to tears

sun woos.
e (the sun,
anthropos.
mist rise to
rinks from
es. Disap-
ght to inter-
waves, by
believe that
deeply sunk
, if his own
progress of
e impression
the spectro-
ss of matter

and gas. Ingersoll "portrays" it as a luscious lipped osculator. Chemistry tells us that water is the result of two gases, or a sort of residuary legatee of two exploded gases. Ingersoll believes it to be a woman who flirts with the sun in open day and weeps because he limits himself to a mere labial salutation. And yet he talks of science and anthropomorphism!

You will say that I am unfair, and that your's and Ingersoll's phrases are figurative. I am aware of it, but I am only treating you as you treat Moses. Why do you claim a verbal license that you refuse to grant him? Interpret the language of Moses according to the rules of common sense, as you wish your own to be interpreted, and your anthropomorphic objections will fade away as the distempered dreams of a dyspeptic sleeper fade on awakening.

Notes. If this universe of matter alone exists, the mind, intellect or soul must be matter or a form of matter.

Lacy. Certainly, but this is but to affirm that all that is, is all that is.

Lambert. You mistake. It affirms that all that is, is *matter or a form of matter*, and it is to this conclusion that I object, for Christian philosophy in consonance with the common sense of mankind holds that there are beings that are neither matter nor forms of matter. These are God, spirit, soul. If all that is, is matter, as Ingersoll asserts, then God, spirit, soul, intellect or mind are matter or a form of matter. If his premises are granted this conclusion must follow. Your effort to avoid this conclusion is vain. And if all be matter there is no real liberty, for liberty cannot be predicated of matter. It is thus that materialism destroys the very liberty it pretends to defend.

Lacy. Those who hold that matter always existed, may yet hold that within its folds were enwrapped all the phenomena of past, present and future time, including animal and vegetable life, gravitating forces.

Lambert. They not only may but must so claim. It is a necessity arising from their doctrine, that besides matter and its forms there is nothing. But is the claim a valid one? We have seen in the *Notes* that the eternity of increated matter, the theory on which this claim is based, involves contradictions and absurdities. You carefully avoided meeting this argument of the *Notes*. But even if it were granted that animal and vegetable life were enwrapped in matter, the question still arises who enwrapped them in it? To enwrap is an act that cannot be without an actor. Who is this actor? Again, supposing this difficulty solved, there remains still a greater one, namely, the origin of mind, intellect, volition, thought, liberty. Your account of the origin of animal and vegetable life is not sufficient to account for these. Animal and vegetable life does not necessarily include thought, nor does thought necessarily suppose a material subject. This is why materialism fails to account for the origin of mind from the evolutions of matter.

Lacy. No one, so far as I know, regards thought as a material substance, although born of materiality, or expressed from its inter-relations.

Lambert. Then you have read materialistic and pantheistic literature to very little purpose. You should not require to be told that if there is nothing but matter and its forms, (which is the doctrine of Ingersoll,) thought must be matter or a form of matter, or nothing.

Ingersoll tells us that thought is *digested food*. Just think of the stomach making a Tennysonian poem out of a red herring or chicken salad!

Ingersoll. Man is a machine into which we put what we call food and produce what we call thought. Think of that wonderful chemistry by which bread was changed into the divine tragedy of Hamlet! (*The Gods*, page 47.)

Lambert. Yet, so far as Mr. Lacy knows, no one regards thought as material substance! But if this man-machine theory is true, why are we not all tragedians? What food do you eat that makes you think so differently from me? What is that mysterious agent that changes my food into faith and yours into skepticism? Or is skepticism the result of a diseased liver or an excess of bile? If thought is the result of the digestive organs why not throw logic to the dogs, eschew metaphysics and appeal to physic? Why not quit reasoning and take to emetics and cholagogues? Why spend time reasoning when a fly blister on the epigastrium will do as well. Let recipe take the place of reason, and argument give place to vermifuge. Why does Ingersoll try to convince his hearers when he admits that their thoughts and convictions depend upon the quality of their food and the condition of the alimentary canal? You say, "thought is born of materiality." Even if I should grant this, which I do not, the question would still remain, Is thought a material substance or is it not? If it be not matter then according to Ingersoll it is nothing. But you admit that thought exists, then if you believe the doctrine taught by Ingersoll you must believe it is matter. And yet you tell us that so far as *you know* no one regards thought as a material substance!

Lacy. So far as I know, no one * * * regards thought as a material substance.

Lambert. I spoke of mind, intellect, not of thought. To account for thought, even in the ridiculous manner you have done, does not account for mind or intellect—the thinking principle. Thought necessarily supposes a thinking principle or thinker. The question raised by me is this, What is this principle, material or spiritual? And whence is it?

Lacy. The Father, from words unsaid by his opponent, depicts fearful consequences; such as that the free agency of man is destroyed.

Lambert. The destruction of free agency is a necessary consequence of the principle that nothing exists but matter, for matter is governed by unvarying organic or mechanical laws, and these laws destroy free agency in all that is subject to it. But aside from the general principle of materialism, Ingersoll has said explicitly enough to destroy free agency or liberty in man. I quote his words:

Ingersoll. In the phenomena of mind we find the same endless chain of efficient causes; the same *mechanical necessity*. Every thought must have had an efficient cause. Every motive, every desire, every fear, hope and dream must have been *necessarily* produced. * * * The facts and forces governing thought are as *absolute* as those governing the motions of the planets. A poem is produced by the forces of nature and is as *necessarily* and naturally produced as mountains and seas. * * * Every mental operation is the *necessary* result of certain facts and conditions. (*The Gods*, page 55.)

Lambert. Now, Mr. Lacy, where is there in this system, as laid down by Ingersoll, room for free agency

of man? It would have been well if you had studied more attentively the teachings of your master before volunteering to defend him. If he is right you were not free in writing your book. It grew out of your brain as naturally as ears grow on a donkey's head.

Lacy. Will it be affirmed that the mind, in its conceptions and the moral results which follow from them, is entirely capricious?

Lambert. No sir. But while we are dealing with the question of free agency, free will, volition, we should leave caprice to physicians who make a specialty of mental disorders, and to breeders of goats. Capra is Latin for *goat*, hence caprice. Don't forget that we are treating of the *human* mind.

Lacy. Will it be affirmed that it is not governed by laws germane to its nature?

Lambert. The mind is governed by laws germane to its nature. One of these laws is that it is free in willing, and this freedom of willing is what we call the faculty of volition and from this springs liberty.

The mind as an *intellective* and *rational agent* is bound by the laws of its own nature to judge according to the facts and data as known to it. Its perfection consists in knowing things as they are and in judging them to be as they are. The mind then cannot *judge* that to be true which it knows to be false, although it can *will* the true to be false or vice versa.

The mind as a *voluntary agent* is controlled by no facts, no data, no law, for the law and essence of its being is to be free. It defies all law and all necessity, all limits and all control. It is the masterpiece of creation, the most wonderful of all created wonders. It is this faculty of free will, more sublime than the material universe, that makes man a responsible, moral

agent, and it is by and through it that he will be saved or damned.

Lacy. Is not man, when free to act, controlled by the strongest motive? (sic.)

Lambert. If he is *free* how can he be *controlled*, and if controlled, how free? But even granting that the will yields to what the judgment deems the strongest motive, it does so because it *wills* to do so, and is therefore free even when it yields to the strongest motive.

As long as you hold with your master that mind is controlled by an irrisistible and unbreakable chain of facts and circumstances, your supposition that man is free is absurd.

Lacy. If the individual nature of man impose no limits upon choice, how can we predict that if Washington had lived another year, conditions having been favorable to such a result, he might not have betrayed his country?

Lambert. We can predict nothing about it. We honor Washington for what he did and was, not for what he may or may not have been or done. We can neither credit or condemn him for what his action might have been in a case that might have occurred a year after his death. If Ingersoll's philosophy be true, Washington's life, from his cradle to his grave, was controlled by an irrisistable chain of circumstances over which he had no control, and of which he was the absolute slave. He deserved no credit for his patriotism, and would deserve no blame if he had turned traitor. He was a mere cog in the wheel of fate, and our veneration of him is no honor to his memory, because it is merely another cog in the same wheel. If Washington could not, like Arnold, have

betrayed his country, he deserves no credit for not having done so—no more credit or honor than we owe to a locomotive engine for not running off the track. We deserve no reward for not committing sins that we cannot commit. Washington's merit consists in the fact that while *free* to be a traitor or patriot he chose to be the latter. We honor him because in the face of danger and death he elected to serve his country while *free* to choose an opposite course. He was a great man because he was something more than a threshing machine that threshes out wheat or tares indifferently, without having any *will* of its own. You seem to be oblivious of the fact that when free will is *controlled* it ceases to be choice and becomes necessity. Washington was a believer in free will and divine providence.

Lacy. The action of the mind is subtle, and the data from which we would judge of its attributes and essence are wont to evade our grasp.

Lambert. We judge of the attributes and essence of the mind by its manifestations, just as we judge of everything else that comes under our cognizance. The mind is a conscious being, it apprehends, judges and wills. These are facts that no man can deny and save his reputation for sanity. To plead that the mind evades our grasp is to plead the white feather, and this is disgraceful in a disciple whose master tells us that thought is the result of hash and gastric juice, both of which are analysible and therefore cannot evade our grasp.

CHAPTER V.

Lacy. In chap. II of the *Notes* we are met by this surprising declaration: "The idea of law in general is and must be prior to the idea of particular laws."

Lambert. The mind in apprehending being must at the same time apprehend that it must have modes or laws, and the intuitive perception of the necessary relation that exists between being and mode is the perception of law in general. It is by the light of this primitive perception of law in general that we are enabled to determine and affirm particular law in a given case. Let me illustrate. Observation of matter shows us that one of its modes is a tendency in its particles or ultimate molecules to approach each other and unite. This tendency is called attraction or gravitation. It is found to be, when left to itself unvarying. It is called the *law* of gravitation or attraction. Now comes the question, How could we call this tendency *a law* if we had not, before we discovered it, an idea of law? How can we say a thing *is a law* if the idea of law is not prior in our mind to the idea of that thing? How can we say that snow is white if we have not, before we see the snow, an idea of whiteness in general? To say snow is white is simply to particularize the general idea of whiteness and limit it to a particular object. To say that gravitation is a law is simply to particularize the general idea of law and limit it to the object under consideration, namely, gravitation. We call it an idea of law in general because it is applicable to or predicable of all tendencies of nature discovered or to

be discovered. To say that we proceed from the idea of a particular law to the idea of law in general is to invert the mental process. We cannot deduce from a thing or get out of a thing more than there is in it. A particular cannot contain a universal any more than a pint measure can contain the ocean. Now as the idea of a particular law does not contain the idea of law in general it follows as a necessary consequence that you cannot deduce the universal or general from the particular, and therefore you cannot ascend from a particular to a universal without having, consciously or unconsciously, the universal already in your mind. As a matter of fact you have made use of the idea of law in general at the very time that you deny its existence. When you say gravitation *is a law* you make use of the idea of law in general, for without that idea in the mind, as a criterion, you could not intelligently affirm *law* of gravitation or anything whatever.

Law in general is to particular law what being in general is to particular existences, and as the idea of being in general does and must, in the order of cognitions, precede the idea of particular existences or things, so, in like manner, the idea of law in general must precede the idea of particular laws. It is only through the general or what metaphysicians call the universals that we can know particular things; it is only through the idea of *being* that we can have an idea of a *thing*. These are some of the considerations which made me say that the idea of law in general must be prior to the idea of particular laws.

The misapprehension that pervades your criticism of my proposition arises from confounding the idea of a general law with the idea of law in general. There is a wide gulf between these two ideas. A gen-

eral law, be it ever so general, is always definite, whereas law in general is indefinite and universal, because predicable of every particular law, just as the universal whiteness, is predicable of every white thing that exists or may exist.

Lacy. Our wonder at this postulate is heightened when we read in subsequent chapters of the *Notes* that justice, larceny, industry, prosperity, etc., are mere abstractions, and that abstractions are nonentities and "have none but abstract consequences, which are no consequence at all." Yet law is no less an abstraction than justice.

Lambert. Law considered apart from being is an abstraction—having no objective existence, just as larceny, industry, etc., considered apart from being are abstractions—nothings. All these are *modes* of being, and without being they are nothing, for mode cannot exist without existing in being.

Lacy. Then we must conclude that we gain a knowledge of particular laws by means of a *nonentity* "which exists intuitively in the mind!"

Lambert. This conclusion is the result of your narrow-eyed philosophy. Law considered apart from being, or on the hypothesis that being is not, is a nonentity. But being is, and therefore modes or laws of being are, and are real entities, just as theft is a fact because there are real thieves, murder a fact because real murderers exist, dishonesty a fact because there are dishonest people.

Our knowledge of particular laws then is derived from the idea of a real entity, for the idea of mode or law of being is necessarily implied in the idea of being, because being cannot be without *mode*. Therefore law is an entity because being is. The conclusion

you draw from my premises is certainly, as you say, an insane one, but it is your own.

Lacy. Suppose we see for the first time that molten lead when precipitated from a shot-tower, rain drops falling from the clouds, and the dew drops pendant on blades of grass, all assume a globular form. We inquire, why is this?

Lambert. Why do you ask, Why is this? Why and how does the interrogation occur to you at all? If you have not the intuitive idea that there *must* be *some* reason for it, what is it that moves your mind to seek a reason for it? When you go back into your own mind far enough to discover why you ask Why water assumes a globular form you will find what I have been insisting on, namely, the idea of law in general. You will discover that you have in your mind an intuition that being must have modes and ways of being and acting. This intuition or idea of law in general being admitted, the origin of your interrogation and the principle that moved your mind to ask it, becomes explicable, for the question, Why does water assume a globular form in falling, is equivalent to the question, What is the particular law in this case? And this seeking after a particular law necessarily implies and presupposes the idea of law in general, for we cannot think of seeking *a* law if we have no idea of law.

Lacy. Hence arises our conception of what we term the laws of attraction of various kinds.

Lambert. This is all very well, but it does not solve the difficulty, for the question still remains, How can you term the modes of attraction *laws* before you have an idea of law? And if you have an idea of law *before* you have a knowledge of attraction how can

you make your idea of law the *result* of your knowledge of attraction?

Lacy. When we further see that all nature is controlled by principles of action, modified only by changes of relation and condition, we arise to a conception of law in its abstract sense.

Lambert. The only inference we can draw from seeing that all nature is governed by principles of action, is that all nature is governed by a general, but at the same time a *real, actual* law. Now a real, actual law is very different from "law in the abstract sense." From our knowledge of the phenomena of nature we deduce and can deduce only real laws, whereas our conception of law in general arises and can only arise from our intuitive conception of the necessary relation that exists between being and mode.

As to what you call *abstract* laws, they have, in this connection, no place whatever. An abstract law is no law at all. It is a mere logical fiction having no existence except in the mind.

Lacy. Thus we ascend from effect to cause, from the special (particular?) to the universal.

Lambert. Before we can start from an effect to ascend to its cause we must know that it is an *effect*; but we cannot know this unless we have already in our mind the idea of cause. We cannot say *it is an effect* unless we know it had a cause. Cause and effect are correlative terms and the idea of the one necessarily involves the simultaneous idea of the other. Separate them and they are both meaningless. Cause has to effect a logical priority in the mind, but in the order of real being neither can have existence without the other; they are and must be simultaneous both in reality and ontological conception. What then, you will say, did

not God exist before the creation? Yes. Well then is not the cause of the universe prior to it? No. God existed before the creation as God, but not as *cause*. He could not be the *cause* of things till he *caused* them. Once having the idea of cause and effect we can ascend from a particular effect to its cause. But how do we acquire this first idea? Is it not evident that the ascent from effect to cause presupposes the idea of cause? This idea of cause cannot come from experience or sensation, because they both presuppose it.

Lacy. We do not usually formulate abstractions.

Lambert. Then you do not usually deal with mathematics, geometry or algebra, as these sciences deal with abstractions. An abstraction in logic is an attribute or mode of a being or thing considered by the mind apart from the thing in which it exists. Hence we can reason on and formulate abstractions just as we formulate real things although they have but a purely mental existence.

Lacy. Nor do we avail ourselves of one (abstraction) already formulated or intuitively existing in the mind, and then, by traveling downward, discover the differentiations of its action.

Lambert. You speak very positively of this, and yet I think I have shown that the opposite is true, namely, that we do and can apprehend particular beings only through the idea of being in general. Without the idea of action in the abstract you cannot assert that any particular thing is an action. You cannot say that A, B or C, acts unless you have a prior idea of action considered without reference to him. You have in your mind an idea of that mode of being called action or activity. This general or abstract idea you

particularize when you assert it as an attribute of A, B or C. It is evident then that the mind must travel from the abstract or universal downward to the particular, because without these universals the mind cannot travel at all, cannot apprehend things or form judgments. It is a principle of logic that a conclusion cannot be greater than the premise from which it is drawn, that is to say, we cannot infer from a postulate more than there is in it. From this self-evident principle it follows that you cannot infer a universal from a particular, for the particular does not contain the universal. Hence the ascending from a particular to a universal, without having already in the mind the universal, is a process purely imaginary on your part. When Bacon by induction or experiment sought general laws, he had from that fact an idea of law, for we cannot seek that of which we have no idea.

Your notions about deduction and induction are peculiar and evidently formed in haste for the occasion, and without reference to the elementary principles of logic. Induction is a process by which we induce or bring in facts. When the facts are brought in the work of induction is completed. Deduction takes these facts as a basis of inference and draws or deduces the conclusion. Hence both processes are necessary in scientific investigation. They are like the two handles of a wheelbarrow which cannot be propelled without having both well in hand—or like the two parts of a pair of scissors, each useless without the other. "In every scientific process or argument, induction and deduction both have place and are never separated from each other. Every such process begins with a principle or axiom. Under such principles facts are *induced* and arranged; this is

induction. From this principle and the facts under it, a conclusion is *deduced*; this is deduction. Take the following example of what always does and must take place in induction and deduction in their only proper forms. Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. Here is a general principle or axiom. A is equal to C and B is equal to C. Here we have our facts induced and arranged under the general principle, and this is induction proper. *Therefore* A and B are equal to each other. Here we have a scientific inference or deduction. Any induction in which facts are not ranged under a principle is a meaningless and lawless proceeding. Any deduction in which an inference is not deduced from a principle and facts ranged under it, is either a lawless leap, or a senseless begging of the question in logic and science."

These two methods, induction and deduction, when separated have no validity. Hence your logical structure based on induction alone is a "castle in Spain."

CHAPTER VI.

Lacy. But Mr. Ingersoll says, "Water always runs down hill," and the Father protests because water sometimes evaporates and goes up into the clouds. Fire demoralizes it; even vegetables seduce it by capillary attraction.

Lambert. It would have been more candid to have stated my argument and then replied to it, instead of garbling it. There is no fact in nature more evident to human experience than that water does not always run down hill. The formula "water always runs down hill" is as unphilosophical as it is untrue. There is only *one* case in which water runs down hill—that is when it is left to the sole control of gravitation or when gravitation overcomes centrifugal and all the other natural forces that act in opposition to it. Now as a matter of fact water is never left to sole action of gravitation, for all the other forces are as constant as that of gravitation, and water is never free from their influences. Centrifugal force drives the water from the poles up toward the equator. The moon pulls it up towards it. The Mississippi river from its source at Itasca to its mouth at the Delta, runs up hill, driven by a stronger force than that of gravitation. As long as this mighty river empties its waters into the Gulf of Mexico, it will remain a resistless current of argument against the inane platitudes of Ingersoll and his disciples. One instance is as good as a thousand to disprove a general proposition. What Ingersoll should have said is this: Water, like

matter in all its forms, yields to the stronger force, or water when left to gravitation *alone*, runs down hill.

Lacy. We might add that, perchance, a servant maid carries a bucket of water up a hill; therefore, water does not *always* run down hill. Surely this baby is too small to whip.

Lambert. I am of the same opinion. But the bantling is your own. This is not the first time I have had occasion to notice that the drift of your thoughts tend toward the kitchen. Were I not informed that you are a lawyer I would judge from the way servant maids and cooks float through your imagination and illustrations, that your profession was that of a head waiter to whose memory old associations cling like burs to a beggar's rags. When dealing with philosophical questions you should steer clear of housemaids and cooks and guard well your mind from the distractions of culinary odors.

Notes. The forces that govern matter are invariable.

Lacy. If so what becomes of miracles. The Father no doubt intended to be understood as having affirmed that the forces of matter are invariable unless when interfered with by some superior force. He wrote with sufficient precision; for no one can, while announcing general principles, stop to note every particular exception, and no rational man expects it.

Lambert. Here I must dissent. Every correct writer is expected to say precisely what he means. A stuttering intellect is as objectionable as a stuttering tongue. When I said the forces that govern matter are invariable I meant precisely what I said. One of the invariable laws of force is that it *always* yields to superior force. Hence force in yielding to

superior force does not vary, but obeys its own highest law. It is only when it does not yield to superior force that it varies from the essential mode of its being. It is invariable when it yields; it would be variable if it yielded not. Hence when the forces of nature yield to superior force—say that of the Creator, they do not vary, but obey the highest law of their being. The forces of nature are invariable, because change in them implies contradiction, or their utter annihilation. Take for example, the law of force called gravitation and suppose its *direction* to be changed. What has happened? Why it has simply ceased to be and the law of repulsion has taken its place. Hence a change in the laws of nature supposes them to be and not to be at the same time; it supposes gravitation to be gravitation and not gravitation at the same time. The essential nature of a thing cannot be changed without destroying the thing. The essential nature of the force of gravitation is to gravitate, if it ceases to do this it ceases to be. The same of the force called attraction; if it ceases to attract it ceases to be, and so of all the other forces and activities of nature. Hence when I said the forces that govern nature are invariable I meant precisely that—no more and no less.

Lacy. If that be so what becomes of miracles?

Lambert. It is precisely because the laws or forces of nature are invariable that miracles can be known. If these forces were variable we could not distinguish a miracle from a variation. If dead men remained dead or came to life indifferently we could not say that the resurrection of Lazarus was a miracle. If fire burned or froze us indifferently we could not say that the preservation of the children in the fiery

furnace was a miracle. And so of every miracle recorded in the Old and New Testament.

It is by comparing them to the known forces of nature and discovering that those forces could not produce them that we know they are miracles, that a higher power than those of nature effected them.

But, you will ask, does not this higher power, in producing a miracle, abrogate or interfere with or change the forces of nature? Here we have in a nutshell the objection of infidels to miracles. I reply that God in working miracles does not change, abrogate or interfere with the forces of nature. He simply intervenes by His power between the action of those forces and their results, or does directly what those forces could not of themselves do.

He intervenes between the forces and their result. I will make this clear by an illustration. I hold in my hand a pound weight. By thus holding it I do not interfere with the force of gravitation, for the force still acts and presses on my hand to the extent of a pound. I do however intervene between that force and its result for I prevent the weight from falling which would be the result if I did not intervene. Do I abrogate or change the law of gravitation? Certainly not, for whether I hold or let fall the weight the law continually and uniformly asserts itself. Do I vary the result? Yes, for I prevent it from falling. Now whether I lift the pound weight or the Almighty lifts the Rocky Mountains from their bases and holds them suspended in space, the law of gravitation is not varied or abrogated; but the still more general law of forces is affirmed, namely, the law that force yields to superior force. The first would not be a miracle because the force I wield is in nature. The second

would be a miracle because the force manifested is evidently above nature. But in neither case have we any evidence that the law is changed or abrogated.

Lacy. Issue is taken on the definition of law. Perhaps one has not yet been framed which is not liable to justly adverse criticism.

Lambert. This subject cannot be dismissed with a "perhaps." We cannot discuss any subject intelligently until we have a common understanding as to what the nature of the subject is. This common understanding cannot be had but by a definition. In discussing a subject then a definition is the first thing in order. If a definition cannot be given there can be no common ground on which to agree or disagree. That which cannot be defined in such a way that the disputants may know that they are disputing about the *same thing* cannot be discussed or talked about intelligently or intelligibly. The freethinking fraternity are shy of definitions. They prefer loose notions to exact definitions because they leave a wider margin for sophistry. In disputing with them we must insist on clear and exact definitions. It is the only way to keep them from cavilling and beating about the bush—the only way to keep them within sight of the question at issue. To talk about a thing while at the same time you confess that you cannot tell what that thing is, is to admit that you do not know what you are talking about. In such a case silence is the best evidence of sense.

Lacy. I might define natural law, in its general sense, as a governing principle or force.

Lambert. You certainly might, but in doing so you differ from Blackstone, Mill and other standard writers who agree as to the definition of law. That

the natural law is not force is evident from the fact that force itself is subject to law. That it is not a principle is equally evident for principles have reference to *intelligent* action. Intelligences act from principles, and they alone comprehend principles. Material nature acts in obedience to forces, and forces act in obedience to laws, and the supreme law is the supreme intelligence. The law of a clock is the design of its maker realized in machinery; the law of nature is the design of its Creator realized in matter.

Lacy. Yet I do not believe the common sense of the world will remain suspended while Blackstone, Ingersoll, the good priest, and my humble self (modesty again!) contend about a word which all rational men understand, but which no one may be able to define with entire exactness.

Lambert. If rational men understand what law is they can tell what it is, that is, give a definition of it. If they cannot do this it is very evident they do not understand what it means. And if they cannot define it with entire exactness how can they talk of it with exactness or intelligence?

Lacy. But, pray, consider the definition of the laws of nature as recorded in the *Notes*.

Notes. The laws of nature, then, as commonly understood, are the *the uniform action of natural forces expressed in words*.

Lacy. So we are to infer that if men were speechless, and could not *express natural forces in words*, the laws would be *non est*, and the universe plunged in chaos.

Lambert. We are to infer that if men could not express facts, forces and truths in words, facts, forces and truths would have to remain unexpressed. When

we formulate in words what a certain force will do under given circumstances, we formulate its law or mode of action. This formula is called the law. Thus when we speak of the law of gravitation we refer to Newton's formula which expresses the unvarying mode of that force's action. I said in the *Notes* that law in the sense of a verbal formula is merely subjective, that is to say, it exists only in the mind apprehending it, and not in nature. The verbal formula is simply an affirmation of what those forces do. This affirmation is an act of the mind and exists and can exist only in the mind, and therefore until conceived by the mind, has no existence. I made this distinction in the *Notes*, but it served your purpose to ignore it. I said "When physicists speak of the laws of nature, *they refer to the forces* of which the laws are but the verbal expression. They suppose philosophers have sufficient intelligence to understand this fact."

Lacy. The good priest has only confounded law with our conception of it, as "expressed in words."

Lambert. In saying this you could not have been ignorant of the fact that the good priest devoted a paragraph of half a page to distinguish law as existing in nature and law as existing in the mind or formulated in words. He anticipated just such quibblers as you, but he did not think that a disciple of the "honor bright" school would *suppress* a distinction and then pretend that it was not made.

Lacy. A pot-pie might be defined as a composite of dough, meat, butter, pepper and salt, as *expressed in words.*

Lambert. You seem to be more of an adept in gastronomy and the culinary art than in philosophy and metaphysics. On page 85 of your "Reply" you give a receipt for making apple-pie. There is a story to the effect that once upon a time a cat was changed by magic into a beautiful lady. All went well until one day when she was surrounded by many admirers, and putting on fine airs a rat ran round the room. The sight aroused old and almost forgotten instincts, and forgetful of her company and the part she was playing, she sprang after it. The catastrophe caused much amusement, and many and felicitous were the remarks made about it. Do not forget that you are now playing the philosopher.

Ingersoll. To put God back of the universe compels us to admit that there was a time when nothing existed but God.

Notes. It compels us to admit nothing of the kind. The eternal God can place an eternal act. His creative act could therefore be co-eternal with his being. The end of the act—that is, creation—could be co-existent with the eternal act, and therefore eternal. To deny that is to affirm that there could be a moment when the eternal and omnipotent God could not act, which is contrary to Christian teaching.

Lacy. But what you call "Christian teaching" is the very thing in controversy. What right have you to *assume* the point in dispute as true?

Lambert. Christian teaching is not the point in discussion here. The point is whether putting God back of the universe compels us to admit that there was a time when nothing existed but God. Whether this point be determined in the affirmative or negative does not affect Christian teaching in the least. Chris-

tianity teaches that God *created* the universe, and there stops. It does not affirm or deny that he created it from eternity or that he was alone before he created it. These are questions for the philosopher or the metaphysician—not for the theologian.

Why then, you will ask, did I adduce Christian teaching at all? I adduced it to show that it is conformable to right reason. To say that God is omnipotent and yet that there could be a moment when he could not act is to affirm and deny his omnipotence at the same time. But God is omnipotent, this you admit; therefore there never was a moment when he could not act, and therefore he could act or create from eternity—therefore the possibility of an eternal creation.*

Lacy. But you say, "The eternal God can place an eternal act." Reader, what is the placing of an eternal act? It is a conundrum which we give up and pass to you.

Lambert. An eternal act is an act that is co-eternal with the eternal actor. To place or posit an act is an expression familiar to writers on and readers of metaphysics, and it is strange that it is a conundrum to you. But the alphabet is a conundrum to some people.

Lacy. "To put God back of the universe" is certainly to affirm that in time or order of being he antedates the universe.

Lambert. Here you *assume* the point in debate. If creation is *co-eternal* with the Creator the latter

* This point is treated at length by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Opusculum Contra Murmurantes*, in which he takes the view above given.

does not antedate the former. That creation could be co-eternal must be admitted if we admit that God is eternal and omnipotent, and this we must admit if we admit his existence. Hence it does not follow that putting God back of the universe proves that he antedates it.

Lacy. If this be not so, what becomes of the dogma that God created matter "out of nothing?"

Lambert. If he can create from eternity he can create "out of nothing" from eternity. The dogma is in no danger.

Lacy. Can you conceive of such a creative act, without a time or point in infinite duration when it was performed? Try it.

Lambert. I cannot conceive *when* it was performed, for the simple reason that if it be an eternal act it could not, because eternal, ever have had a "when." Any act of which *when* can be asserted is not an eternal act. When is an adverb of *time*, not of eternity. As well might you ask, If God be eternal when did he begin? Do you not see that when you assert eternity of a being you deny all "whenitiveness" to it? Again, even if I cannot conceive it nothing follows, for conceivability is not the criterion of possibility as Herbert Spencer truly tells us, and as he is an agnostic his opinion ought to have some weight with you.

erse, and
that he
before he
philosopher

Christian
it is con-
l is omni-
t when he
nnipotence
, this you
t when he
or create
an eternal

d can place
cing of an
we give up

that is co-
or posit an
and readers
is a conun-
nundrum to

universe" is
of being he

nt in debate.
or the latter

s Aquinas in his
the view above

CHAPTER VII.

Lacy. We are told in the *Notes* that before creation was, time was not. This as poetry may pass, but as fact it is inconceivable.

Lambert. If it be conceivable, even as poetry, it is conceivable. Hence your argument from inconceivability falls to the ground, for that which is conceivable even as poetry is possible, and that which is possible is conceivable as fact. I must here again repeat, that inconceivability is not the criterion of possibility and that therefore our inability to conceive a thing is no evidence that the thing is impossible. If sceptics could once get this truth injected into their skulls, they would perhaps use their unmetaphysical catchword less. In the present case your error comes from confounding time with eternity. The ideas representing these two things are essentially different. Time is the measure of duration of created things, or the measure of successive changes of changeable things. Our idea of it is derived from the movements or changes of material, extended things. Without these movements and changes we could acquire no idea whatever of time. Time is divided into a past, present and future. These divisions are essential to the idea of it. Take them away and the idea of time is taken away, and is replaced by that of eternity, for eternity is one unpassed and unpassable moment, indivisible, having neither past nor future. It is the incommunicable, real, actual, now. Time is because changeable things are; eternity *is* because an eternal,

unchangeable Being *is*. Without changeable things and an unchangeable, eternal Being, neither time nor eternity would have any existence, for they are both appurtenances of things and Being and depend on them for their existence.

Lacy. As a fact it is inconceivable.

Lambert. This is a pet phrase of the infidel. It is to him what the fire cracker is to the patriotic urchin on the Fourth of July; and, like the cracker, is valueless when exploded. We can affirm or deny nothing of that which is inconceivable. That which we cannot conceive is to us as that which is not, for if we cannot conceive it we can have no idea of it, and if no idea, therefore no knowledge of it. We can pass no judgment whatever on that of which we have no idea. We cannot even affirm or deny that it is inconceivable, for on the hypothesis that it is inconceivable, we can know nothing about it, and we cannot affirm inconceivability of that of which we are ignorant. To talk about a thing and at the same time assert that the thing is inconceivable is to admit that you talk of that of which you have no conception, no idea, no knowledge. The mind cannot think of that which is inconceivable, for conceptions or ideas are the materials on which the activity of the mind operates; they are the raw materials, and without them the mental or logical process is impossible. Your blunder arises from confounding the faculty of *conceiving* with the faculty of *imagining*.

Lacy. But if it be true (that before creation was, time was not) how do we know that it is true?

Lambert. We know it in this way. Time is the measure of movement and change in moving and changing things; it is an appurtenance of changeable

things, and it is evident that an appurtenance of a thing cannot exist without the existence of that to which it appertains. Therefore, without created things, time could not be. It does not require much profound thinking to see this.

Lacy. We are also informed that reason teaches that the universe could have been created from all eternity. Whose reason?

Lambert. The reason of every man who has the capacity to deduce a conclusion from incontestable data. The data in the present case is that God is eternal and omnipotent, which is the same as to say that he is eternally omnipotent. This being the case he could act from eternity, and the result of an eternal, creative act is an eternal creation.

Lacy. What grounds have you for saying that reason teaches such an incomprehensible proposition.

Lambert. These. An eternal omnipotent being can act at any moment of his being; indeed if he could not he would not be omnipotent. How can you say the proposition is incomprehensible at the very time that you are disputing it? For how can you dispute it if you do not comprehend it? Are you so lost to all sense of logic as to dispute or question that which you do not comprehend? To comprehend is to understand, to mentally take in. Now if you have not understood or mentally taken in my proposition, on what principle of common sense do you dispute it?

Lacy. To create means to make, to bring into being. How then can any thing be made or brought into being "from all eternity?"

Lambert. To create is to reduce a possible universe to a reality, to give *real* existence to that which was before only *possible*. Now it is a fact that the

universe exists, therefore it is intrinsically possible, for if not it could never be. And if it be intrinsically possible once it must be intrinsically possible always. The universe was also always intrinsically possible because there is an eternal, omnipotent Being who can reduce it from a *possible* state to a *real* state. Then the universe was both intrinsically and extrinsically possible from all eternity. The conclusion is unavoidable that an eternal creation was possible, and this is what was claimed in the *Notes*. But this was not claimed as Christian teaching, for Christianity does not teach that the universe is an eternal creation, but as the result of reasoning from admitted data. The question is metaphysical and ontological, not theological. But you will insist and say:

Lacy. How * * * Can anything be brought into being from "all eternity."

Lambert. I do not know *how* it could be done, but my ignorance of the *how* has no bearing on the question. I do not know how Mrs. Winslow's soothing syrup is made, but it is made "all the same." I do not know how grass when eaten by an ox changes into flesh and hair, and when eaten by a goose changes into feathers, yet it does. It is sufficient for the present discussion that an eternal creation was possible,—that is the issue, and I believe I have shown its possibility. The *how* or *modus operandi* it would be useless to discuss for it is impossible for man to know it. Although we may not know *the* how, we know that everything that is possible has *a* how. Turn the matter as we may it always resolves itself into a question of pure possibility, and of that we have said enough, and perhaps too much for the patience of the reader, who, however, I hope will be kind enough to remember

that I have been under the necessity of showing the fallacy and shallowness of Mr. Lacy's metaphysics. I could not let the patent, yet quite prevalent philosophical trash pass without challenge. Most modern antichristian errors are based on downright ignorance, superficial notions and false ideas of metaphysics and ontology. It would be amusing if it were not sad to hear these pert egotists clatter about possibilities, infinities, inconceivables, unknowables, etc.

Lacy. To say that God could create anything the existence of which is co-eternal with his own being is to affirm the possibility of God having created himself.

Lambert. This conclusion is the result of very superficial reflection. To affirm that God could create himself involves the absurdity that he exists and does not exist at the same time. It supposes him first to exist, for unless he exists he cannot act or create; according to the axiom, that which is not cannot act. In the second place it supposes him not to exist in order to be created, for that which already exists cannot be again created. The absurdity of a proposition involving the existence and the non-existence of God at the same time is apparent at a glance. But this absurdity is not involved in the affirmation that God can act at any moment of his being, and therefore act or create from eternity. To show this I will use the illustration of Aquinas: An eternal foot eternally pressed in eternal dust makes an eternal footstep. Here we have cause and effect co-eternal. In the same way an eternal creator eternally creating creates a co-eternal creation.

Lacy. It is said that God is self-existent, but never has theology been plunged in the delirium of

nonsense so as to affirm that God was his own creator.

Lambert. It is refreshing to see theology getting credit, even a little credit, for common sense. The credit, however, is improperly given, for the question you speak of is not a theological, but a metaphysical one. It requires as good judgment to give credit as to give censure.

Lacy. But if it be true that the universe was always created, it must have existed "from the beginning."

Lambert. Certainly; that goes without saying. Observe, I do not say the world was always created, but that it might have been.

Lacy. That is, there never was a time when it was not. Precisely what Mr. Ingersoll asserts.

Lambert. The difference between Ingersoll and me is this: He holds that the universe is eternal; I hold, not that it is eternal, but that it *might* be. He holds that it was not created, I that it was created. He holds that besides this universe there is nothing, I that beyond and above it there is its creator, God. You see there is not a single point on which we agree.

Lacy. How pleasant it is to see extremes meet.

Lambert. Yes, particularly when they meet.

Lacy. To behold the good Father and Mr. Ingersoll, as in this case, clasp each other in logical embrace.

Lambert. It is particularly funny, seeing that we do not agree on a single point. To say that we do, speaks badly for your logical acumen. It seems to me if an embrace is in order it ought to be a triangular one and include you who discovered the reason for it. What a touching tableau it would be, the doughty Colonel, the good Father and the modest

Lacy engaged in a three cornered embrace, soiling each other's collars with lachrymal chloride of sodium! It is overcoming.

Lacy. We are told that "God is pure act," the source and origin of all activity and life. How there can be "pure act" or any other act without an actor, is another riddle to which we succumb.

Lambert. Riddles and conundrums seem to buzz about your brain like blue-bottle flies about a dead horse. You should try to learn and comprehend that which you do not know and understand, and not imbecilely yield to gross ignorance and display it as an evidence of profundity. A joke or a laugh can never hide ignorance or change it into wisdom.

An act is the reduction of a potentiality or possibility to a reality. *Pure act* is an act of being which excludes all potentiality. A Being which is *necessarily real*, which excludes from its essence everything that implies imperfection or defect of reality, is *pure act*. Potentiality of any kind always and necessarily implies defect or lack of reality; because it has always something not yet actuated or realized in act. Being, therefore, which is necessarily real, with supreme and infinite reality, excludes all potentiality. Now God is necessarily and essentially real. He excludes from his essence everything that implies imperfection or defect of reality. He is therefore Pure Act. To say that God is pure act is the same as saying that he is a Being to whom no perfection of being is wanting. Being is an act; man's being is an act; it is not *his* act, it is himself. He is not the actor of his act of being—but the act itself. This first act of being then is, so far as man is concerned, an act without an actor. But as his being is contingent and dependent, we

must seek further for the cause of it, and we must go back till we find a Being who is not dependent for his existence on another, a necessary Being, a Being who is so supremely perfect that he exhausts all possibility of further perfection. When we come to this uncaused cause of all causes and things we have found *Pure Act*.

Lacy. When the Father says that, "Kant held that we have absolute certainty of nothing; *which is equivalent to a denial of both God and the universe* (the italics are ours,) we dissent. Uncertainty is never affirmation nor negation.

Lambert. Certainty or certitude is a necessary condition of knowledge; without it knowledge is impossible. To know a thing and to be certain of it express one and the same idea. To be uncertain of a thing is to not know that thing in just so far as you are uncertain of it. Then that of which we are uncertain, we know not, and that which we know not is to us as that which is not. Hence Kant's denial of certainty is equivalent to a denial of both God and the universe—because it implies that to us they are not and cannot be an object of knowledge. Uncertainty, being ignorance pure and simple is, of course, neither affirmative nor negative.

CHAPTER VIII.

Notes. We know not God adsolutely, but we know with certainty that he exists,

Lacy. I do not deny his existence, but can we know that he exists?

Lambert. Yes, we can. I do not deny your existence, but can I know that you exist? But proceed.

Lacy. Bishop Alexander Campbell * * * * * said: "*Knowledge* comes to us through the senses; belief from evidence presented to the mind; *opinions* are the result of our reasonings." If then, knowledge comes to us through the senses, unless there be a sixth sense, how can we know that God *is*?

Lambert. It is to be hoped in the interest of Campbell's memory that you have failed to express his meaning. From the drift of your quotation it appears that Campbell was a follower of Locke as to the origin of ideas and knowledge. But his words as quoted by you fail to express the theory of Locke, who taught that ideas, and hence knowledge, come from sensation and reflection. Here Locke instead of giving the senses as the only origin of knowledge, admits that without reflection knowledge would be impossible. I infer then that you have failed to remember correctly Mr. Campbell's words. I believe he was too keen a logician to make unqualifiedly the statement you attribute to him.

If knowledge comes through the senses alone, as you make Campbell teach, how can I know that Mr. Lacy exists? I never saw, heard, touched, tasted or

smelled him. Now if there be no other means of acquiring knowledge than through the five senses, how can I know that he exists, since none of my senses testifies to his existence? He has never come within reach of any of them. So far then as my senses are concerned he is to me that which is not. Ah, but did you not read his "Reply to Lambert's Notes on Ingersoll?" I have read a book with that title, but which of my five senses tells me that the book ever had an author? My senses tell me that a certain book exists, but none of them tell me that it ever had an author or that an author was necessary. I have the knowledge that a book must have an author. As this knowledge could not come through the senses, which testify only to the book's existence, it must have come to me through some other source, and therefore knowledge does not come to us through the senses alone, whether they be five, six or twenty.

What then is the mental process by which I came to that intellectual state in which I can affirm Mr. Lacy's existence? My reason, enlightened by the idea of being in general tells me that a book could not come into being without a cause or author. My senses tell me that a book is in being. My reason then says, *therefore* its author also exists, and this affirmation of reason to itself constitutes what we call knowledge. It follows that my knowledge that the "Reply" had an author comes from reason and not through the senses. It is the result of a judgment of reason.

True, the senses supply the reason with sensations or the raw materials of thought, but just here their office ceases. And here comes the real difficulty. How can the reason, because conscience of a sensa-

tion, affirm anything more than the existence of that sensation. How can it pass from the consciousness of a sensation, to the idea of a real being external to itself? If the reason have nothing in it but the sensations supplied by the senses, how can it form an intellectual judgment and affirm the existence of some thing that is not itself nor a sensation? For instance, I have a sensation of hardness, smoothness, weight and dimensions; how can my mind from these data affirm the existence of something that is neither smoothness, hardness, weight or dimensions—namely substance? The mind on receiving a sensation invariably makes this affirmation. It cannot make it from data given by the senses, for the senses deal only with the qualities of things, as hardness, smoothness, etc., and not with things themselves. The mind then must have data of its own which, joined with the data supplied by the senses, enable it to affirm the existence of beings external to itself; which enable it to say: "I have a sensation, *therefore* something exists, something besides myself is in being." But how did the mind acquire in the first place the idea of being? It could not get it from sensation alone, for these are but modes of itself. And if we ask, How can the mind, from its own modes or modifications, infer the existence of things external to itself, we are brought back to the original difficulty. The mind cannot acquire the idea of being from the senses, for they only supply it with sensations of qualities, but do not supply the logical *nexus*, between qualities and real, subsistent beings. How then does the mind originally acquire the idea of being? There appears to be but one answer to this question, namely, it never acquired it, it is innate and co-existent with the mind. This idea of being is

the light of reason; it is that which makes the mind an intelligent being, and enables it to interpret sensations and from them to affirm the existence of things; which enables it to say: "There is a knock at my door, *therefore* there is someone without." This *nexus* between sensations and realities is the *Pons assinorum* of the philosophers and it has occupied their attention in all times.

As you appear not to see clearly and appreciate at its true value the difficulty which your quotation from Campbell raises, let us view it in another light. It is admitted by all logicians and philosophers, and indeed by all men who think at all, that it requires at least two ideas to form a judgment. When the mind affirms that something exists, it forms a judgment. In doing this it must have two ideas, the idea of a sensation and the idea of being. The first comes through the senses; but whence comes the second? It must come from within; it must exist originally in the mind, for the theory of sensationalism cannot account for it, but always supposes it.

Now then as the senses alone cannot account for the first judgment of the mind they cannot account for knowledge, for all knowledge is the result of judgments. I grant that in our present state of existence the mind cannot acquire knowledge without being stimulated into activity by those external stimuli which are supplied by the senses. But this does not prove that knowledge comes through the senses. It proves that the senses are a necessary *condition* of knowledge, but not that they are the *origin*, or *only* condition of it.

Let us now come back to the point from which we digressed. What is the process of the mind in

acquiring knowledge of a thing? The senses supply the mind with certain data called sensations. The mind having intuitively or innately the idea of being, and comparing it to the idea of particular sensations, forms a judgment to the effect that the sensation is caused by a being and that therefore a particular being exists. The particular being in the present case is a book called a "Reply etc." The mind still enlightened by the idea of being, also affirms that the book cannot come into being without a cause or author and that therefore the book has an author. It then says: "Therefore the author exists—therefore Mr. Lacy exists. And this is the way I come to know that Mr. Lacy *is*. This knowledge it will be observed comes not from the senses, but from a conjunction of the senses with *reason* or *intellect*."

This being premised, we can now consider the question: "How can we *know* that God is?" We have seen how we know that you exist, namely, because you did something—wrote a book. Well, there is another book called the Book of Nature. It is an admirable work, an exhaustless source of instruction, pleasure and amusement. Unlike some books it bears re-perusal; unlike others it never requires a second edition. It has a way of reproducing its leaves as Time's skeleton finger stains and mars them, and presents fresh pages to its readers as they hurry past from the cradle to the grave. Humanity, as it rises and sinks wave after wave, gazes on them in admiration as it passes away. But the book remains ever ancient and ever new while intelligences flit past it and are gone. It may appear a want of literary etiquette on my part to make a comparison, and yet I must say that this Book of Nature gives evidence of more

creative ability than you have displayed in your "Reply to Lambert's Notes on Ingersoll."

Now if your book proves *your* existence, why should not this magnificent Book of Nature prove the existence of *its* author? If my reasoning be sound in one case why is it not sound in the other? The process is the same in both. I know you *are* by your work; I know God *is* by his work. If you deny the validity of this reasoning you destroy in me the possibility of knowing that you exist; if you admit it, you admit that there is a way of knowing that God exists. I leave you to seek a fence over which to escape from this dilemma.

Ingersoll. What we know of the infinite is almost infinitely limited; but little as we know, all have an equal right to give their honest thought.

Notes. Has any man the right, common sense being the judge, to talk about that of which his knowledge is almost infinitely limited?

Lacy. Yes; but in return we inquire, is not the knowledge of every one, yea, the combined knowledge of all men of all time, "almost infinitely limited," in regard to that infinity that is above, below and around us?

Lambert. No, sir. The expression "almost infinitely limited" is unadulterated nonsense. The idea of anything being "almost" infinite in any way is too absurd to be discussed. In infinity there are no degrees, and between the finite and the infinite there can be no comparison whatever. Human knowledge is limited—the fact should be a lesson to infidel gasbags—but it is not infinitely limited. The reason is that that which is limited can be infinite in no way. A thing must be infinite or finite, and there is no place for an "almost."

Lacy. Infinity! We name thee but we know thee not.

Lambert. Well, if you know it not, why did you spend so much of your second chapter in discussing it. You appeared to know all about it then. Of all kinds of cant that offends human ears the most thoroughly nauseating is infidel cant. One moment, in its pride, it soars above the throne of the Omnipotent and gibbers at his providence; the next, in its offensively demonstrative modesty, it writhes in its own slime.

Lacy. Newton with his peerless intellect, after a life-time of devotion to science, in view of what he knew as compared with the great unknown, likened himself to a child standing on the margin of the sea and toying with pebbles upon the beach. *This bespoke the modesty of true science.* (Italics ours.)

Lambert. Just observe here how Newton, a man who believed in and worshipped God in awe and devotion, and bowed reverently before him in all his discoveries, is drafted into the service of infidelity, while it treats with contempt that God whom he adored and honored and praised by his discoveries. This outrage on the memory of a great and good Christian man were inconceivable if we did not understand the chicanery that characterizes those "honor bright" gentlemen whenever they put in an appearance. Notice again that they are not content with taking the Christian Newton's wonderful discoveries as infidel trophies. They have the unparalleled "cheek" to use even his Christian humility as a weapon against that Christianity which he professed and whose teachings were the solace of his last hour.

Lacy. This bespoke the modesty of true science.

Lambert. No, sir. It bespoke the modesty of a true Christian gentleman who believed that God knows more than he did, and who therefore venerated God's revelation as the only solution of the mystery of being and the destiny of man. He had a peerless intellect, and true science led him nearer to God.

Notes. All may have an *equal* right to give their honest thoughts but none has the right to give his honest thoughts on all subjects and under all circumstances.

Lacy. Certainly not; and no one has claimed such a right.

Lambert. You mistake. Ingersoll claims the right if language means anything. When he says, "all have the right to give their honest thought" he lays down a broad, universal proposition and makes no limits or exceptions to it. It was to the universal and sweeping nature of his proposition that I objected when I said "none has the right to give his honest thoughts on *all* subjects and under *all* circumstances." As you talk so much of logic you ought to know the difference between a universal and a particular proposition. Had you known this you would have understood what Ingersoll really did say, and would not have hastily and rashly denied that he said it. It is a great advantage to understand the author you defend.

When Ingersoll laid down his general proposition he formulated a principle that justifies the filthiest utterances that ever contaminated the moral atmosphere, or the mind of a rake. He justified the preaching of adultery, licentiousness, murder, robbery, nihilism, dynamitism, etc., for at one time or another in the history of man all these have been advocated in one

form or another by fanatics, lunatics, fools or blackguards. You will say Ingersoll did not mean this. You pay him a poor compliment; he believes that he can say what he means. There is no way of knowing what he means but by what he says. And therefore I dealt with what he said and with that only. His proposition is clear and explicit, and it asserts the very right which you say no one has claimed.

Lacy. Why does the Father lead his thousands of readers, who have never read Ingersoll, to believe that he has uttered words and sentiments which he never said or thought.

Lambert. I quoted word for word in the *Notes* Ingersoll's proposition; it justifies the preaching of every crime known to the Decalogue. How you can say he never said it, after I had quoted his very words, is, as you would say, a conundrum which I must give up. To say as you do that he never thought it, is strange in face of the fact that he said it.

CHAPTER IX.

Notes. This plea of honesty in thinking is a justification of every error and crime, for we must, in the very nature of the case, take the thinker's word for the honesty of his thought.

Lacy. Not always.


Lambert. Yes, always.



Lacy. His acts may belie his words.

Lambert. Certainly. But that proves only that he is inconsistent. When he tells you he gives you his honest thought he places himself under Ingersoll's dictum that he has a right to give that thought at any and all times and places, be it true or false, moral or immoral. The unlimited right once granted, the thinker becomes the sole judge of the honesty of his thought. The dynamiter, the nihilist, the assassin, the thug, the lecher and the rake have at last been supplied with a principle which, if admitted, would save them from the halter and the prison. Of course you will say Ingersoll did not *mean* all this. Well, if he did not he should not have said it. He must be held to the full force of his universal proposition, that "all have a right to give their honest thought," until he disclaims it. You are not authorized to make a disclaimer for him.




Lacy. But what is the Father warring with, and what is his doctrine on the subject of "free thought."

Lambert. He is warring with Ingersoll's proposition, which, being universal, justifies, under the plea of "honest thought," the preaching of and inciting





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

18
20
22
25

10
11

to every crime known to man—and the practicing of them as well, for a man can give what he may call his “honest thought” in acts as well as in words; and if the principle be true the plea is a justification, for, from the nature of the case no one can go behind the returns. If the rascal plead “honesty of thought” he stops all trial, all investigation, for there is no tribunal to determine the honesty of his thought. It is well for society that our courts make short work of this Ingersollian plea in the face of guilty acts. The Chinese High Binder and the Indian Thug on trial for murder may plead “honesty of thought,” but the court tries them on the facts in evidence, and if found guilty remits them to the sheriff who sends them, together with their plea of “honesty of thought,” to a higher court. Guiteau made the plea of honest thought on his trial, but little attention was paid to it except as evidence of his insanity.

Lacy. What is his (the Father's) doctrine on the subject of “free thought?”

Lambert. The Father's doctrine on the subject is very simple. It is, that there is no such thing. The phrase “free thought” is mere loud cant—a misnomer in philosophy and therefore has no place in the writings of the great masters of the science. There is however, a class to whom the phrase is the “harp of a thousand strings.” This class consists of what may be called the bummers of philosophy. They follow at a distance the army of silent, laborious philosophers and scientists, pick up here and there a fact or supposed fact, misinterpret it and then proceed with the music. They are to philosophy and science what a Chinese band is to a Chinese drama—the noise. They are the gong-men of science. Euphonious

phrases are in their line. They use them for their sound's sake and without much, if any, reference to sense. To these gentry the high sounding phrase "free-thaw-et" is irresistible. But to the intelligent student of psychology the expression is simply absurd, unless he considers it indicative of mental aberration, in which case it belongs not to philosophy but must be passed to the expert in nervous and cerebral disorders.

The psychologist knows that the intellect is not free; that it is chained to the data that is given it; that it must *necessarily*, if it acts at all, draw the conclusion from the data as they are or as it conceives them to be. It may have an incorrect conception of the data, in which case its conclusions will not accord with the facts, but they will and must accord with the intellect's conception of the facts, if the intellect be normal. Take a case. If $2 \times 2 = 4$ what will 2×4 equal? In replying to this question the intellect has no freedom whatever. If it be sane and sound it *must* say $2 \times 4 = 8$. And its *inability* to say otherwise is precisely what gives it its value as an authority in the search after truth. The dignity and value of the intellect then consists in its *utter lack of freedom*. If the intellect, by which I mean each individual thinker's intellect were free to say $2 \times 4 = 25$, is it not evident that it would lose its value as a criterion of truth? It follows then that the highest attribute of the intellect is its irredeemable slavery to data? Now thought is an act of the thinking principle or intellect, and as this thinking principle is not free, it follows that thought is not free, because the act of an actor that acts from necessity is not a free act. Therefore thought is not free, and therefore again there is no such thing as "free thought. Now my dear sir you have the "Father's"

doctrine on the subject of "free thought." How do you like it?

But you will ask, "if all this be true what becomes of the human liberty or freedom which Christian theology holds that man has?" Bridle your anxiety, my dear Lacy. Human liberty is perfectly safe, because no philosopher except you and some other disciples of Ingersoll ever dreamed of making the human intellect the seat and source of human liberty. And if you understood your master, as you should understand him in defending him, you would know that even he destroyed it, root and branch, when he made mind and thought the outcome of *digestion* conditioned by the action of the kidneys, liver and alimentary canal.

The philosophers of all ages, Christian and pagan, who admit that there is any such thing as liberty, unite in lodging it, not in the intellect, but in the *will*. They make human liberty consist in the *capacity* of the soul to *will* or not to *will* or to *will* the contrary, just as it *wills*. In this *capacity* of the soul consists human liberty, and not in the mere absence of prisons and chains.

Notes. The right to give an honest thought implies the right to realize that thought in action and habit.

Lacy. Here two distinct things are confounded, *moral* right and *legal* right. Which is meant?

Lambert. Both. When Ingersoll said "all have an equal right to give their honest thought," he certainly meant that a man should not be punished for giving his honest thought—hence the legal right; a man has the moral right to say and do what he believes to be right—under all circumstances and all

occasions; this is a necessary conclusion from Ingersoll's dictum. Hence both rights are meant.

Lacy. The moral right to do what one conceives to be a duty can only be denied by affirming that a man is morally right in refusing to do what he believes to be right.

Lambert. This is queer theology. I have the right to give five hundred dollars to the poor of Waterloo; I have also the moral right to decline doing so. A conviction that a thing is right does not induce an obligation of doing it. It simply leaves one free to do it or not. I believe it to be morally right for me to study the Choctaw language, but I am morally right in declining to do so. The moral right to do a thing does not oblige us to do it. It is the conviction of duty or obligation that binds us to do a thing, not the mere moral right to do it, as you seem to imagine.

Lacy. Guilt may be incurred by insufficient examination in regard to the *moral* quality of thoughts and acts. (Italics ours.)

Lambert. A thought is an intellectual judgment, and you should not need to be told that judgments as pure mental acts have no moral qualities. Morality is an attribute of a free agent and we have seen that the intellect is not a free agent, therefore moral qualities cannot be affirmed of its acts or thoughts. Morality is of the *will*, not of the intellect. You have evidently incurred guilt by insufficient examination in regard to the moral quality of thoughts, and you should not forget your own remark that "no man has the moral right to neglect opportunities of enlightenment." I ask you as a disciple of Ingersoll how you can attribute morality to thought when he tells you that

thought is the result of digested food? What morality is there in a beefstake? And if it be not in it how can the gastric juice evolve it?

Lacy. The solution of the apparent difficulty is this: The *moral* nature of an act is not determined by the mere act itself, but, measurably, by antecedent circumstances and conditions, proximate and remote.

Lambert. If the difficulty is only apparent it needs no solution. You have not told us what determines the moral nature of an act. To say circumstances and conditions *measurably* determine it is not to tell us what determines it. Hence your solution solves nothing. The moral nature of an act depends on the nature of the actor or agent. Every human act is a moral act, because it is the act of a moral or free agent. If a man deliberately kill another his act is a moral act—a very bad moral act of course, but yet a moral act, because he is a moral agent. If a locomotive kills a man it is not a moral act, because the engine is not a moral or free agent. Hence in the former case we call it murder, while in the latter it is simply killing. The difference between murder and killing is determined by the intention. If a hunter intending to kill a deer kill a man whom he mistook for a deer, he is not guilty of murder because he had not the *intention*. It will be observed then that the moral nature of an act depends on the nature of the actor, and the goodness or wickedness of the moral act depends on the intention of the free moral agent. It is a mistake to suppose that a good act is a moral one and a bad one is not. Every act of man, good or bad, done with an intention is a moral act. We attribute morals, good and bad, to man alone, because he alone of all the inhabitants of the earth is capable of forming an intention and acting from a motive.

Notes. I take it, then, that in claiming the right to give your honest thought you claim the right to promulgate that thought and put it in practice in the affairs of life.

Lacy. In a general way, yes.

Lambert. This will not do. You claim the right or you do not. To say you claim it "in a general way" is too indefinite. It leaves too many loop-holes. You, like Ingersoll, are fond of using loose, indefinite terms. They are the abomination of logic, and serve to confuse rather than to clear up a question.

Lacy. But what is the negation of this right? *you have no right to promulgate your honest thought or put it in practice in the affairs of life.*

Lambert. Had you consulted your logic before writing the above you would have learned that a universal proposition can be negated in two ways.—by a *contradictory* or by a *contrary* proposition. For example: "All men are wise" is a universal proposition the contrary of which is, "No man is wise," and the contradictory of which is, "Some men are not wise,"

Now Ingersoll's proposition is a universal one "that all have a right to give their honest thought." It denies all limits to this right. It is in this universality that its fallacy consists, for there are as you admit times, circumstances and subjects that limit this right. Hence in denying his proposition I do not say that no man has a right to give his honest thought, but simply that Ingersoll's proposition as a universal is false. It is irksome to have to explain these simple, elementary principles of logic to one who assumes to know all about them.

Lacy. The truth is we have no standard of right and wrong to which we can appeal without liability to error.

Lambert. That is not the point. The liability to err is human. The question is, Is there a standard, and what is it? You and Ingersoll admit the existence of a standard since you both try to tell what it is. You, with your usual indefiniteness, say it is in the mind and heart of man; Ingersoll tells us it is to be found in the *consequences* of acts. The disciple contradicts his master.

A standard of right, or a measure by which to distinguish what is right from what is wrong is necessary for man,—without it all difference between right and wrong is destroyed. Men may and do err in the application of this standard, but this fact does not lessen its value, for the error is not in the standard but in its application.

Lacy. You say, yes, “the will of God,” but how do we determine that will?

Lambert. When a man is called on to act he is obliged as a moral agent to consider, there and then, whether the act he is about to do is good or bad. He must determine it by the light of his knowledge of the will of God. If he does this honestly and to the best of his ability his act, so far as he is concerned, is good. He must always follow his conscience and act on his own honest interpretation of the standard. His knowledge and conception of it may change but the standard is unchangeable; because founded in the will and nature of God. It is man's duty to act according to the will of God as far as he knows it or honestly believes he knows it at the time. His *knowledge* of the will of God is the measure of his merit or demerit.

Lacy. Protestants say the Bible alone (is the standard).

Lambert. Protestants, like Catholics, hold that the will of God is the standard, and they value the Bible only because they believe it to be a revelation of that will. They do not confound the will with the instrument by which it is made known. In the same way the Catholic values the teachings of his own church. It seems that in representing Christian belief you are utterly incapable of stating it correctly.

Lacy. The standard of right and wrong, whatever rule may be professed, is in the mind and heart of man and has varied from age to age, as he advanced from the barbarism of the past to the comparative enlightenment of the present.

Lambert. The standard is certainly in the mind of man, for all peoples in all times have recognized a supreme will as the standard. Catholics, Protestants and Jews call it the will of God; Pagans call it the will of the gods—but all recognize a supreme, supernatural will as the standard of right and wrong. You say truly then that it is in the mind of man. But it is not always in his heart for men often do what they know to be wrong. This standard has never varied, though men's knowledge of it may have increased or diminished, or their application of it may have differed.

Lacy. Has this standard stayed the hand of persecution?

Lambert. It is the province of the standard to *indicate* what is right and what is wrong,—it goes no further. It enlightens the intellect but does not sway the will. Crimes and persecutions will continue as long as man has free will and is wickedly inclined, whatever be his knowledge of the standard—or will of God. Since Cain slew Abel men have a disposi-

tion to cut each other's throats, for one reason or another; in one age it is religion, in another patriotism, liberty, union, etc. We sent to their graves a million or so lately. It was in the name of liberty; if it had been in that of religion what a howl there would be! As long as man is free and viciously inclined he will find a reason to slay his brother, in spite of all standards. But this sanguinary penchant should not be considered a result of Christianity. Christianity has modified but it cannot eliminate this wolfishness from human nature. If knowledge from the standard were claimed to be an irresistible preventive of crime, your question would have some force. But men know the right and do the wrong. I may here return your question and ask, Has your standard or that of Ingersoll stayed the hand of persecution or put a stop to crime.

Y
C
S
a
a
w
k
to
st
an
or
A
C
ali
ma
rev
su
me
kn
age
un
per
tha
ical

(bu

CHAPTER X.

Lacy. Our knowledge of the rules of morality has come to us by slow degrees, and is not perfect yet.

Lambert. If so we cannot say that murder, theft or adultery is wrong. We must wait for developments ! Some new discovery may yet prove that vice is virtue and virtue vice, that honesty is a superstition, decency a prejudice and duty an illusion. I do not concede what you so trippingly take for granted that "our knowledge of the rules of morality come to us, (i. e. to the human race) by slow degrees." The rule or standard of morality was made known to the first man, and as men fell into idolatry, it by degrees faded out, or nearly so ; it was renewed and reinforced by the Almighty through Moses, and subsequently through Christ. The standard of right and wrong or of morality, is the will of a moral being ; this will can be made known only by that intellectual commerce called revelation, in one or another of its forms. It is absurd then to suppose that science, by which the infidel means the physical sciences, can give us any better knowledge of the will of God in its relation to moral agents. When you know the ten commandments and understand them in all their ramifications, you have a perfect knowledge of the moral law—a knowledge that cannot be improved by a knowledge of the physical sciences.

Lacy. By the old rule it was right to cremate (burn) witches and heretics.

Lambert. If by the "old rule" you mean the standard of right and wrong, it is the same now that it has always been. But you confound the local *statute laws* of former times with the universal *standard of morality*. We cannot say that those statute laws were right or wrong, wise or otherwise, because we do not know all the circumstances which they were made to meet. But be that as it may, those laws were not, and were not intended to be, the standard of right and wrong. They were special enactments made to meet special cases which the people of those times believed, for reasons better known to them than to us, to be necessary. We cannot account for the existence of prohibitory laws except by supposing the existence of that which is prohibited by them. There must therefore have been some sort of a social nuisance called witchcraft, or laws would not have been made to suppress it. If under these anti-witchcraft laws innocent people were put to death owing to imperfect modes of procedure, the same may be said of our own laws, for it must be admitted that under our laws against murder many an innocent man has been hanged. This, however, is no argument against the laws forbidding and punishing murder, or against the principal of trial by jury.

Your argument against the punishment of witches is based on the assumption that there were no witches and therefore that all who were punished as such were innocent victims of a popular delusion. But this is a begging of the question. The belief in witchcraft, necromancy, goety and what is called modern spiritualism but which is as old as the human race, is based on the belief that non-material beings exist in the universe, that the souls of men continue to exist after the

body is dissolved, and that these spirits and souls can communicate with those that still animate human bodies. This is a common or universal belief of the human race in all times, all places, of all nations and all tribes, civilized, semi-civilized or barbarous. It is found in the literature, customs and habits of all peoples. It is therefore exceedingly ridiculous to imagine that you can dismiss it with the same ease that you tip the ashes from your cigar. If there be not a basis of truth in this belief, how do you account for its universality? Is it not more rational to suppose it has a basis in truth than to suppose the human race to be constantly and persistently deceived? Keep in mind also that this constant and universal drift in belief is in perfect consonance with divine revelation. It is found in both the Old and New Testament, as it is found in the books of every people that have a literature, and in the traditions of those who have not. It is not true to say as you do that witches are regarded under the present "regime" as phantoms. True, the name "witch" is discarded but the thing remains, for there are more people "under the present *regime*," or at the present time who believe in and practice communication with spirits than there were in Judea or in the middle ages or in later times in France, England, Scotland and New England. In those times they were called witches, soothsayers, sibyls, pythons and pythonesses; in our time they are called mediums, clairvoyants, spirit-rappers, etc. The names have changed but the thing remains. There is, no doubt, much trickery and humbug in so-called modern spiritualism, but there never was a trick or a humbug or a lie that did not have in it a basis of truth—that was not a false presentation of a truth or a counterfeit of a

truth, and a counterfeit always supposes something genuine—else it would not be a counterfeit. Robert Dale Owen, in a work published twelve or fourteen years ago, stated that there were in the United States ten million spiritualists. Add to these the Swedenborgians and all Christians who believe in the possibility of spirits in the other world communicating with those in this and you will find that the vast majority of mankind believe to-day as the race has always believed. I do not wish to be understood as approving the practices of spiritists, because they are condemned by the Old and New Testament, and by the church, but the belief on which those practices are based, that is, the belief in the possible and actual communication of intelligences in the other world with those in this is universal, and cannot be denied by those who believe in revelation. The Old Testament recognizes the fact of such communications while it condemns the practice of it. "Neither let there be among you * * * any one that consulteth pythonical spirits, nor fortune-tellers, or *that seeketh the truth from the dead*. For the Lord abhorreth all these things." (Deuteronomy 18—10 to 12). Here in condemning the practice Moses admits the fact. Many other texts might be quoted to the same purport, but the above is sufficient. In the New Testament we have the following: "It came to pass as we went to prayer, a certain girl with a pythonical spirit (she would now be called a medium) met us, who brought her master much gain by divining, (a striking likeness between the ancient and modern medium.) The same, following Paul and us, cried out, saying: these men are the servants of the most high God, who show you the way to salvation. And this she did many days. But Paul, being grieved, turned and said to the spirit: I

command thice in the name of Jesus Christ, to go out of her. And he went out at that same hour. But the masters, seeing that the hope of their gain was gone, having apprehended Paul and Silas, they brought them into the market place to the rulers." (Acts 16—16 to 19.) Here again the fact of spirit communication is admitted and the practice condemned.

It is evident then that a belief in the communication of intelligences in one order of existence with intelligences in another order of existence is a fact of our nature, a fact verified by revelation. The practices of spiritism, necromancy, witchcraft, etc., have their foundation in this belief. Whether spiritists, witches, etc., really exist or have existed is not a matter of doctrine but of fact, and as a matter of fact it must be considered and treated as any other fact that comes under our cognizance. Each particular case must be credited or discredited according to the evidence, for the belief in the possibility of persons having dealings with spirits does not imply that any particular person has such dealings. We cannot argue the existence of a fact from its mere possibility. The question then is: Did ever witches or persons having dealings with spirits exist? In answering this question we must proceed just as we would if the question were, Did ever murderers exist? that is, we must consider the evidence. That persons have been executed for witchcraft on insufficient and even ridiculous evidence is clear from the records of trials for witchcraft in New England. But men have also been hanged for murder on insufficient evidence. It is easier and more rational to believe that persons were guilty of practices that are known as witchcraft, than to believe that nations would make laws against practices that never had any existence. And if these practices existed, as

they must have since they were the object of legislation, and if society believed them to be injurious to its welfare it had the right to forbid them and punish the perpetrators. Even granting for the moment that witchcraft was a delusion, yet society had the right to legislate against the *real* evils produced by the delusion, and the right to legislate against an effect implies the right to legislate against the cause of it.

Lacy. By the old rule it was right to cremate
* * * heretics.

Lambert. The intelligent student of human nature knows that "heresy" is always punished in one way or another. The political heretics of the south were punished by the killing of thousands of their people. Society will always punish those whom it believes, rightly or wrongly, to be inimical to its well being. Poets and philosophers may gush and gas, but they cannot change human nature. Nations, like individuals, have the instinct of self-preservation and will always punish what they conceive to be an attack on their stability. And it makes no difference whether the attack be in the form of a religious or political innovation. In Protestant countries Catholics were considered heretics and enemies of the state and were treated accordingly. In Catholic countries the same thing took place with the difference that the glove was on the other hand. They were both right in principle, but both failed in its proper application, for the principle that society has a right to destroy that which threatens its existence is unquestionable.

But if Ingersoll's doctrine be true, that all the events in the universe are but links in the unalterable chain of fate, on what theory do you or he condemn the witch hangings and persecutions of the past? If

those events are but inevitable links in the chain the persecutors were as guiltless as their victims.

Ingersoll. It will not do to say the universe is designed and therefore there must be a designer.

Lacy. Listen to the profound comment of the Father.

Notes. Why not if all have a right to give their honest thoughts?

Lacy. In such stuff the cotton of Catholicity with which it closes the eyes and stops the ears of its votaries?

Lambert. It is the stuff with which to stop Ingersoll's mouth by jamming his own nonsense down his throat.

Lacy. Does not the Father *know* that the words "it will not do to say" imply only that it is not *logical* to say?

Lambert. The Father knows that it is logical to infer a designer from the evidences of design and he denies that Ingersoll meant to imply the contrary. Even you admit this when you say that "there is great force in this argument," for you certainly would not admit force in an argument that is not logical. The argument from design is stated thus in logical form:

- *That which shows evidences of design had a designer.*
- The World shows evidence of design.*
- Therefore the world had a designer.*

To say, as you translated Ingersoll as saying, that this argument is not logical is to confess ignorance of the first principles of syllogistic reasoning. If there be any weak point in the argument it must be sought for elsewhere than in its logic. We must say to Ingersoll's credit, that he did not dispute the logic of the above argument; he disputed the truth of the minor

premise, namely, that "the world shows evidences of design," and the truth of this is to be looked for in experience and in the facts of nature, not in logic. When we see tracks of a human foot in the snow we say a human being has passed over it. When we see an intricate piece of machinery, a watch for instance, so constructed as to accomplish a design, we conclude that a designer threw his intention into the inert matter and made it go. When I read your "Reply" and find the thousands of letters of which it is composed so arranged that they convey a meaning; the pages regularly numbered; the half of a word at the foot of one page finished on the top of the next, I must conclude that there is an intelligent design in all this. In a word the "Reply" shows evidences of design, for I cannot believe that all these intelligent combinations were the result of chance; that the paper was made by chance, that the types were made and fell into their positions by chance, that the paper was folded, cut, and bound by chance. I must believe that behind all these there was a directing intelligence.

Now when we turn to the Book of Nature we find like evidences of intelligence, intention, design, in its beauty, order and harmony, in the adaptation of means to the end, just as we find design in a watch, a locomotive or in a book. We may not understand fully the design but we see enough to know that there *is* a design. It will then "do" to say: There are in the world evidences of design, and that therefore it had a designer. Although the argument from design is forcible, it is by no means the only one adduced by Christian philosophers to prove the existence of God, and Ingersoll acts the part of a special pleader when he leaves the impression that it is the only one.

CHAPTER XI.

Lacy. Some have believed in an eternal succession of being and unless disproved by science it is difficult to logically controvert the possibility of such succession.

Lambert. The eternal succession of which you speak is a logical absurdity and an ontological paradox. Succession exist only in things that succeed in moments of time. An eternal number of successions is an infinite number, but an infinite number of successions cannot exist, for the sum total of these successions must be a particular, definite number, and the moment you fix a number you will immediately discover that it is finite. A number may be potentially infinite. But it cannot be in *reality* so because it involves a contradiction. I have called your attention to this before.

Lacy. We can as readily apprehend the idea of a chain composed of successive links coextensive with space as we can the infinite extension of space itself.

Lambert. Yes, as readily, that is to say, not at all. We have seen in a former article that according to the agnostic philosopher, Herbert Spencer, "space is that which is left behind when all *realities* are absent." That is to say, that absolute space, space considered without reference to things, is nothing, and nothing has no extension, finite or infinite. In this Spencer agrees with Christian philosophers. Now Mr. Lacy, we cannot "readily" apprehend the idea of nothing. We cannot imagine an infinite chain as existing, for a chain to exist must have a certain number

of links. This number may be greater or less, but it must be a fixed number. It may have ten links or ten billion links, but the moment you fix a number you have a limit and your chain is finite. An infinite chain is one whose length can admit of no addition, for if an addition be made to it, it was evidently not infinite before that addition is made. Now try if you can to imagine a chain whose length would not be increased by the addition of another chain of equal length. Your error consists in mistaking the infinite *possibility* of increasing the chain and attributing that possibility to the chain itself, whereas the infinity is of the possibility, and not of the chain. You deceive yourself when you imagine that you can imagine an infinite chain or infinite space. But even suppose you could, it would prove nothing to your purpose, because it would be always only an imaginary chain and as such would want the first essential condition of a true infinite, namely, *real being*, for nothing can be infinite that has not real existence, or is not an attribute of real being.

Lacy. Again, the belief in a plurality of gods meets us as a doctrine held by some of the greatest minds of antiquity, and which in former times was believed in by the great majority of ignorant and educated.

Lambert. But what has this to do with Ingersoll's objection to the argument from the design? You have unconsciously rambled away from the question you started on. But no matter. If we go back to the highest antiquity of which we have any records we find that all peoples originally believed in one God and that they gradually fell into polytheism or the belief in many gods. But although they came to believe

in many gods they always believed there was above them all one Supreme Being, so that a belief in *one* Supreme Being is common to all men in all times, Christian, Jew, Mahomedan and pagan.

Lacy. Even the Jews believed the gods of the heathens were real deities, though far inferior to Jehovah.

Lambert. In making this statement you have followed with passive sequacity some author as unreliable as Ingersoll himself. The Old Testament is the best authority on the belief of the Jews. The following texts will show that you were deceived and misled by the authority on which you relied. "That thou mightest know that the Lord he is God, and there is *no other beside him.*" (Deuteronomy 4-35.) "See ye that I alone am, and *there is no other God besides me.*" (Ibid 32-39.) "Therefore thou art magnified, O Lord God, because there is none like to thee; *neither is there any God besides thee.*" (2 Kings 7-22.) "For there is *no other God but thou.*" (Wisdom 12-13.) "There is no other God beside thee O Lord." (Eccli. 36-5.) "Before me there was no God formed, and after me there shall be none." (Isa 43-11.) "I am the first and I am the last; and besides me there is no God." (Ibid 44-6.) "Remember the former age, for I am God and there is no God beside." (Ibid 46-9.) The Roman historian, Tacitus, a contemporary of Josephus, in his account of the Jews, says: "The Jews have no notion of any more than one Divine Being, and that known only to the mind."

Lacy. Christian theology also affirms that there are three Gods, co-equal and infinite in every divine attribute, although declaring that the three are in some inexplicable sense, one.

Lambert. This is the kind of stuff infidel writers feed their credulous dupes on. It is difficult to understand how one brought up in a Christian community, and pretending to know anything about even the simplest elements of Christianity, could honestly make the above statement. If he can make such an ignorant blunder about the belief of those among whom he lives, what reliance can we place on his statements about the ancient Jews or about the principles that governed the thoughts of men in former times? A Sunday school boy of ten years who, after studying the first three chapters of his catechism, should make such a statement as Mr. Lacy makes, would richly deserve to be spanked for inattention or pitied for his stupidity. And yet this modest defender of Ingersoll pretends to know and criticise Christian theology!

"Christian theology affirms that there are three Gods!" The man who makes such a statement sacrifices all claim to consideration as a scholar, or to having the most ordinary knowledge of the subject he elects to talk about. Yet this is the kind of people who are most flippant and noisy about theology, the Bible, and Moses. They are always as ready, as a self-cocking pistol, to give their "honest" and ignorant contents. Here is the author of a book, who undertakes to treat of philosophy, revelation and Christian theology, and who attributes to Christians a doctrine they not only do *not* hold, but which they have in all times *condemned!* And this ignorant upstart states it as if it were a matter about which there is no doubt whatever. Can any language be too severe for such an offense? If he be ignorant of the Christian doctrine on this subject he is too ignorant to discuss Christian theology in a cross road grocery; and if he

be not ignorant of the Christian doctrine of the unity of God, and yet made in cold type the above statement, what are we to think of him? Does not his statement justify me in dismissing him as too ignorant or too dishonest to deal with in discussing the great question at issue? I think it does, and yet I continue to make his book the text of what I have to say because my purpose is beyond an ulterior to the personality of this most worthy disciple of Ingersoll.

"Christian theology affirms that there are *three* Gods!" That is what he says, and were it not printed in clear type and in black ink I could not believe that it could have been written by any sane man in the nineteenth century.

It is a *fundamental* doctrine of Christianity that there is but *one* God. On *this* point *all* Christians agree

But it appears, according to Mr. Lacy, that Christian theology declares the three gods to be "in some inexplicable sense, one." Christian theology makes no such affirmation, because it is contrary to reason that three Gods can be in the same sense three Gods and one God. Here again this disciple misrepresents Christianity. Christian theology affirms that there are not three Gods, but *one* God, one divine nature, and that in this one divine *nature* there are *three persons*. The unity is asserted of the divine nature, the tri-unity of the divine persons, and it does not require more than average brains to understand that *nature* and *personality* are not one and the same thing.

But, says Mr. Lacy, it is "inexplicable." It is inexplicable how one can be one and three at the same time and in the same sense, but that is precisely what Christian theology does *not* affirm. When it affirms

unity and trinity of God it does not affirm them *in the same sense*. It asserts that the divine *nature* is *one*; the divine *persons*, *three*.

But you may urge that even this is inexplicable. It is easily explained. Thus, Is not *human nature one*? Human nature is the *union* of animality and rationality. Anything that is not this is not human. Now does this unity or oneness of human *nature* make many human *persons* impossible? To say so is to deny the facts of life. The oneness which we affirm of humanity refers to the *nature* of humanity, and the multiplicity we assert of it refers to *persons*. Humanity then is evidently *one* and *multiple* at the same time, though not in the same sense. Just so, God is one and three. This explanation will enable you to understand those divine words, "Let us make man to our own image and likeness," and teach you what every Christian is supposed to know, that in making man or humanity after his own image and likeness God made him both one and multiple, and that the likeness was not to consist in individual form. While on this point let us go a little farther. We cannot conceive humanity to exist at all except as one and three, just as God is one and three. All the millions of human beings that have existed or shall exist on this earth must be traced down to the *family*. The family is the father, the mother and the child. Without these three human society is inconceivable in the order of nature. The family has in it all the potentialities of human nature and without it human nature would cease to be. The family then is the type of humanity. Let us look at this mysterious thing called so unreflectingly "the family." It is composed of man the father, man the mother, and man the child.

It is essentially *one* and essentially *three*. Man the father, comes direct from God, man the mother comes from man the father, (from Adam's side) and man the child comes from the love between man the father and man the mother. Such is human nature. "Let us make man to our own image" said the eternal Father. Let us now go back to God the Father the first person of the Trinity. From him proceeds God the Son, and the love between the Father and the Son, is the Holy Ghost. Here is unity of nature and trinity of persons, just as we find in humanity (the family) unity of nature and trinity of persons. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost—man the father, man the mother and man the child. Here is the image and likeness of God in humanity and here is to be found the meaning of those divine words, "Let us make to our image and likeness." Observe that the three persons are so co-related that one cannot be conceived without the others. To be a father there must be a son, to be a son there must be a father, and so of mother and son; thus each supposes the others and is necessary to a conception of them. This explanation affords a key to what Ingersoll calls the "rib story." Why did the Creator take a rib from Adam's side to make Eve? Because in making man or humanity to his own image and likeness, he must make the second *human* person proceed from the first, as the second *divine* person proceeds from the first, and the third human person from the first and the second as the third divine person proceeds from the first and the second. When Moses wrote that God took a rib from Adam's side and made the woman, he stated one of the most profound and significant facts of all time, a fact which images forth that eternal relation which

exists between the three divine persons who said "Let us make man—humanity—in our own image and likeness."

Lacy. But in the statement of this doctrine (the unity of God) and its consequences Catholics and Protestants do not agree.

Lambert. Here again is a pitiful display of ignorance. In disputing with modern infidels about half one's time must be given to correcting their misconceptions and misstatements. Protestants, except Unitarians, and Catholics agree as to the unity and trinity of God, as a reference to their theological literature will show.

Lacy. One holding that Mary was the Mother of God, the other repudiating this dogma.

Lambert. However Catholics and Protestants may differ as to the office and place of Mary in the divine economy, their differences do not relate to the unity and trinity of God, which is the question on which you say they differ.

But the difference between Catholics and Protestants on the relation of Mary to God is not as you represent. Even this you could not get straight. In the first place Catholics do not believe Mary to be the mother of God in the sense that God had no existence until he was born of her. The Catholic doctrine is that Mary is the mother of the *humane nature* of Christ the second person of the eternal trinity; that this second person is from eternity—eternal; that he assumed human nature of Mary some 1,900 years ago. If I mistake not this is the doctrine also of Protestant theology. Catholics believe Mary to be a creature of God, as all of us are, but that she was selected by Him to be that mysterious link which unites the divine nature

to human nature in the Christ and that on account of this, her extraordinary and unique relation to God, she is deserving of our special love and veneration—not that she is divine, but that God has exalted and honored her above all other creatures. The facts on which this reverence is based is admitted by Protestants and Catholics alike.

Lacy. If the Catholic be correct, the Protestant is withholding from one to whom honor is due as unto the next to God in honor and glory; while, if the Protestant is right, Maryolatry is idolatry.

Lambert. The Catholic is right in honoring Mary and the Protestant is also right in condemning Maryolatry. Maryolatry is the worship of Mary as a goddess as the heathen worshipped their goddesses. There is a vast difference between worshipping her in this way and honoring her because God honored her. There was a sect in ancient times that worshipped Mary as a goddess, but it was promptly condemned and anathematized by the Christian church. Your cunningly worded insinuation that Catholics are guilty of idolatry because they venerate one whom God so highly favored is in perfect keeping with the tortuous spirit of the whole paragraph in which it is found. Catholics and Protestants may differ in the degree of their veneration of Mary, as Catholics themselves differ, some yielding her more, others less; but all agree as to the facts, so clearly set forth in the scriptures, on which that veneration is based.

CHAPTER XII.

Ingersoll. Was there no design in having an infinite designer?

Notes. None whatever, since there cannot be anything back of an infinite and eternal designer. There can be nothing more infinite, nothing prior to the eternal. It is as if you should ask: Is there anything more circular than a circle, anything squarer than a square?

Lacy. Certainly; but the "eternal" part of it is the very question in debate. This is assumed by one dash of the pen, the point in dispute.

Lambert. The "eternal" part of it is not the point; nor is anything assumed. The question here between Ingersoll and me was not as to the existence of an infinite and eternal designer, but whether, on the hypothesis that such a designer exists, there could be back of and independent of him a design? Or, granting the existence of an infinite designer, can there be back of him another infinite designer who designed him, and another back of him again, etc? In a word, can there be an infinite series of designs and designers. This is Ingersoll's question, to which I replied in the negative, because there can be nothing anterior to or back of the infinite and eternal; and this is true whether there really exists an infinite designer or not. In not distinguishing between a question of possibility and a question of fact you failed to discover the real point in dispute. To say that there is anything more infinite than the infinite or more eternal than the eternal is to fall into an evident contradiction, just as

he does who says there is something squarer than a square or more circular than a circle. To say that A is more infinite or eternal than B, is to deny the infinity and eternity of B. Ingersoll's question must then be answered in the negative, and this without any reference as to whether an infinite designer actually exists or not.

Ingersoll. It is somewhat difficult to discern the design or the benevolence in so making the world that billions of animals live on the agonies of others.

Notes. Until you prove that God so made the world that billions of animals live on the agonies of others, you are not called upon to discern design or benevolence in this agonizing state of things. It does not follow because agony exists that God designed it to be so. It is for you to prove that God designed this suffering before you should attribute it to him. You should be just—even to God.

Lacy. (1.) Can it be possible that Father Lambert fails to see the issue raised by Mr. Ingersoll's remark? or that he is ignorant of the scientific facts to which he alludes? or, no, he would not *intentionally* mislead those whom it is his duty to point heavenward. (2.) Therefore I say—for I think I understand the Father—that he attributes all the suffering in the animal kingdom to the primal sin of Adam. If not, if God did not design it, to what does he impute that suffering?

Lambert. For the sake of convenience of reference I have numbered the points in the above. (1.) The Father notices with some surprise that the disciple has failed to understand his master. Ingersoll is trying to prove the invalidity of the argument from design which is urged by theologians in proof of the

existence of God. In his effort to do this he says, "it is difficult to discern the design, etc." His purpose is to show that there is *no* design; that all events are but links in the endless chain of fate. Hence he had no inference to the scientific facts referred to by you, for these facts as adduced by you *prove design*, the very thing Ingersoll denies. It is amusing to see you, while defending Ingersoll, arguing tooth and nail against his thesis,—and doing it in apparent unconsciousness of the fact. Ingersoll denies that there is in the universe any evidence whatever of design, and forthwith Mr. Lacy, like the too willing witness, undertakes to prove that there are evidences of design! "If God did not *design* it (the suffering of animals) to what does he (Father Lambert) impute that suffering?" asks Mr. Lacy. He goes on to prove from scientific discoveries that there is design in the universe. In this he agrees with the theologians against Ingersoll. He spends half a page talking of the teeth, stomach, and structural parts of animals to prove that the sufferings of animals were *designed*, forgetting in his scientific exuberance, that Ingersoll denies that there is any design whatever! Suppose I grant for argument's sake that because some animals are flesh eaters, animal sufferings were designed, what follows? It follows of course that there was a design and therefore a designer. The very thing theologians insist on and which Ingersoll denies. It is a good thing for a polemic to know on which side of a question he is, and to have enough sense to keep on it.

But you will say: If God designed animal suffering he cannot be good or benevolent.

My dear sir, the goodness or badness of the designer is not in question just now. The question at

present is as to the *existence* of a designer, the nature of his designs will be considered in its proper place. His existence once settled, the goodness or badness of his designs will be in order. You have admitted design in the universe even though you conceive it to be a cruel one and therefore you have admitted a designer. This admission on your part is of vast importance, and far-reaching in its effects so far as you are concerned. It makes you stand out in opposition to your master, and simplifies the question between you and me. It admits the full force of the theological argument from design to prove the existence of a Supreme designer.

(2.) When you think you understand the Father you mistake. You don't understand him, when you imagine he attributes all animal suffering to Adam's sin. It would be more prudent in you to confine your rhetoric to what the Father *said*, and not spend your time in discussing what you imagine he might, could, would or should have *meant*.

(3.) If God did not design the sufferings of animals who did? This question supposes that all things that happen were originally designed—an assumption which cannot be admitted. It is a begging of the question. Before you attribute animal suffering to God you must prove that it was originally designed by God as an essential phase of life. This is what I required Ingersoll to do, and my purpose should have been evident to you. Had he undertaken, unwarily as you did, to prove evidences of design in the formation of the teeth and stomachs of animals he would have cut the throat of his own thesis, which is that there are no evidences of design.

Lacy. If design can be seen in nature, teeth, stomach, etc., of animals indicate that they were originally intended to feed upon each other.

Lambert. Design can be seen in nature or it cannot. If it can then Ingersoll's theory is wrong, and a designer exists. If design cannot be seen in nature your reasoning is all in vain. To agree with Ingersoll you must deny the existence of design, and to convict God of being the designer of animal suffering you must admit design. Strange as it may seem, you try to advocate both these two conflicting theories.

Lacy. If then, death and suffering did exist before human transgressions (as science teaches us it did) why claim that contrary to all analogy, *the effect goes before its cause?*

Lambert. As it is not claimed that all suffering in the universe is caused by human transgression it is not necessary to place the effect before the cause. The reason for these sufferings will be seen further on.

Lacy. Waiving the hardships to prattling infancy, in that the child must suffer for sin committed six thousand years before it was born, does it seem just that dumb brutes should endure uncompensated suffering because

" In Adam's fall
We sinned all."

Lambert. Why does the infant of to-day suffer because Adam sinned six thousand years ago? The answer is this. A possible being to exist in this world must exist as an individual. To exist as an individual it must exist as some kind or species of individual. It must exist as man, animal, vegetable or mineral. In whatever class of beings it assumes individuality or personality, it must assume the condi-

tions of that class. As merely possible being it has no choice of the nature it is to assume. Its place in existence is assigned it by him who has the power to give it existence. If it individualizes as a plant it is subject to the laws and conditions of that class of beings; if as a brute it is under the laws and conditions of that class; if as man it is subject to the laws and conditions of manhood or humanity, whatever those conditions may be or however they may have come about. Now Adam was not only *a* man, but he was *the* man, the only man and aside from him there was no humanity on earth. He was humanity, and Eve was human because she was from Adam. Now whatever condition Adam was in when he begot his like, in that condition his like must exist, because they are his like. A progenitor can not give more than he is. If humanity when called *Adam* put itself in a certain condition or state, humanity when called John Doe or Richard Roe will be found in that state. The child then is guilty of humanity's sin because it is human, and as human it is subject to the disadvantages of humanity—of that class of beings to which it belongs—it also has the advantages of its class. It is no more difficult to imagine how the prattling infant takes its guilt from Adam than it is to understand how it takes its existence and form from him through numberless intermediate individuals and thousands of years. The child born of an exile is an exile.

As to animals, even granting that their sufferings were designed, we can see benevolence in it. If they did not die the world would soon be uninhabitable. The same would be the case if they died and were left to decay. The economy of death makes the greater number of lives possible. It is more beneficent that

billions of animals may live for a time and die than that a comparative few should live and not die ; better that the world should be the temporary abode of many succeeding generations of beings than be the permanent abode of one generation ; better that one generation become the sepulchre of the preceding one than that the latter should in its decay and corruption make the conditions of life impossible on earth ; better to be if but for an hour than not to be ; better that a thousand animals should live one year than that one should live a thousand years. The law of the happiness of the greatest number on earth makes death necessary.

Animals destroy each other, yet that very destruction has its effect in diminishing the sufferings of want, disease and senile decay. "The essence of all suffering is mental. It is not the sensation, pure and simple, but such sensation accompanied by intellectual consciousness and reflection, which is so fearfully distressing. This distrust the brute creation is spared ; they suffer but never reflect on their sufferings, and therefore cannot be truly said to 'know' them." Before pain can be used as an argument against divine benevolence it must be shown that the sum total of pain in the life of an individual or in the universe is greater than the sum total of pleasure and the absence of pain. This cannot be done. That all animals, including man, love life with all its pains is evident *from the fact* that they preserve life as long as they can.

Lacy. (1.) No heaven could we covet where we must lose the identity of self—(2) forget the past with its memories of moral battles fought and won—(3) of friendships so dear and loves so holy that heaven would not be heaven if it denied their continuance.

Lambert. (1. We are conscious that we are, and that we are ourselves and not some one else. That this conscious identity will continue in the unending future is a Christian doctrine. If it be not true heaven would not be heaven nor hell hell, for what is happiness or misery to him who is not conscious that it is he that is happy or miserable?

(2.) The past with its memories of moral battles fought and won is a source of happiness to man here and hereafter, but the past with its iniquities done, its crimes and injustices committed, what of *it*? Why do you leave this side of the picture out of your poetical effusion? Will not the memory of this past make a hell even of heaven? Will not the memory of evil deeds be as heated plow-shares to the evil-doer? Memory to the good will be a part of their heaven and to the wicked the memory of their evil deeds and opportunities willfully lost will be a part, and no small part, of their hell.

(3.) Friendships pure, loves holy, emotions noble, aspirations sublime! What are they but qualities implanted in our nature by the Creator. But what of the ignoble friendships and unholy loves? Are these to receive the same reward? They may both continue but certainly not in the same place. Even in this world the true man will bar his door against the immoral wretch who seeks a place among his children at his fireside. Yet, according to you, God is a Moloch if he does not admit this unrepentant and rotten wretch into the company of the pure, true and noble! Are the evil-doers not to be punished because their punishment may afflict loving relatives! Should friendship, love, affection prevent the State from punishing criminals? Should a murderer go unhung because his death afflicts a loving mother or wife?

Should a spurious sentiment here stand in the way of social order or justice? Certainly not. Neither will it in heaven. God wills the conversion of the sinner and gives him the means of salvation. but if he perseveres in his course he brings destruction on himself. He has no one but himself to blame. He is the arbiter of his own destiny.

Lacy. Those of us who revere a Supreme Spirit bow not to a Moloch, etc.

Lambert. You certainly are not one of those who revere the Supreme Spirit, for you tell us that you are a disciple of Ingersoll who denies the existence of such Spirit.

Lacy. Suffering in the moral world is the child of violated law.

Lambert. This is an important admission. It chimes perfectly with what I said in *Notes* as to the origin of human ills in this world. You seem to have the ability to talk not only on either side, but on both sides at the same time.

CHAPTER XIII.

Lacy. To do justice to Mr. Ingersoll, as well as to show how fragmentary are the Father's citations from him, I will quote, somewhat at length, I will do justice even to an infidel.

Lambert. After making the quotation Mr. Lacy observes:

Lacy. In the brief excerpt which the Father quotes from the above, "The justice of God is not visible to me in this world," Mr. Ingersoll only states an orthodox sentiment, etc.

Lambert. The charge made here is that I was unfair to Ingersoll because I gave only a brief excerpt from a long passage of his argument. The reader will be somewhat surprised at this charge when he learns that, with the exception of the first sentence, which does not belong to the argument, and two parenthetic sentences equally irrelevant, I quoted every word of Ingersoll's reply as quoted by Mr. Lacy: that instead of selecting out one short excerpt, I replied *to the whole argument sentence by sentence*, and that I devoted the whole of chapter fourth of *Notes* and the greater part of chapter fifth to it! This is a fact, and from it the reader can judge for himself of the value of Mr. Lacy's statement.

Ingersoll. The justice of God is not visible to me in this world.

Lambert. Granted that it is not visible to you, are you so forgetful of the requirements of logic as to advance your inability to see it as a proof that God is not just in his management of this world? That is

the inference you intend to be drawn, but your statement does not rise to the dignity of an argument. It reminds one of the defense of the thief who was accused of stealing a coat. Two witnesses swore they saw him steal it. In rebuttal he offered to bring fifty witnesses who did not see him steal it. It is needless to say he was convicted. Poor Artemus Ward used to say "I do not see it in those lamps." He meant it for wit, and never dreamt that his idea would be purloined and adapted to philosophical investigation by the hierophant of modern philosophical know-nothingism.

Lacy. (1.) Mr. Ingersoll only states an orthodox sentiment proclaimed from the pulpit thousands of times a week. (2.) It accords with scripture; (3) it is the oft and sad refrain of the songs of modern Zion, and of afflicted and pious hearts everywhere. (4.) All say, "we know not why it is that sin defiles us, that sickness tortures us, and that death, cold and ghastly death, is the conqueror of all."

Lambert. (1.) My objection was to Mr. Ingersoll's implied inference that God's justice is not in the world, because it is not visible to him, the omniscient Ingersoll. This inference was the point and pith of his remark, and my purpose was to direct attention to it and show its fallacy. The sentiment of Ingersoll as to the justice of God *is not*, as you assert, proclaimed from the pulpit. The wickedness and miseries of man are portrayed and deplored, but the pulpit does not assert the invisibility of divine justice in the world. On the contrary it asserts the divine justice in all history, and sees evidences of it even in human suffering: You confound its threnodies over the miseries of man with Ingersoll's denials of the justice of God:

"It accords with the scriptures." This is equally as false as what you say about the pulpit. Here is what the Scriptures say about the justice of God.

He is just and right.—Deuteronomy 32-4,

He is faithful and just.—1 John 1-9.

I am the Lord who search and prove the reins, who give to every one according to the fruit of his devices.—Jeremiah 17-10.

For he will render to every man according to his works; and according to the ways of every one He will reward them. For in very deed, God will not condemn without cause; neither will the Almighty pervert judgment.—Job 34-11.

He shall judge the world with justice, and the people with truth.—Psalm 95-13.

Behold I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to every one according to his works.—Apocalypse 22-12.

I might quote page after page if necessary. But the above is enough to show that you are as much in error about what the Scriptures say as you are about what the pulpit says.

(3.) "It is the oft and sad refrain of the songs of modern Zion, and of afflicted and pious hearts everywhere." Here again you confound the lamentations over the miseries of man with Ingersoll's declaration that God's justice is not visible. You forget that modern Zion sees in human sufferings evidences of that divine justice which the infidel says are invisible. Suffering and justice are not incompatible. On the contrary they frequently go hand in hand as every judge and juryman in the country will tell you, although it is not always visible to the criminal. Afflicted and pious hearts recognize and experience

suffering, but this recognition is in no sense equivalent to Ingersoll's declaration that the justice of God is invisible; and this simple fact explodes your theory that all agree with the infidel's sentiment. The afflicted and pious hearts say "Thy will be done," knowing that the divine will is always just, although they may not understand its workings in a given case.

(4.) All say, "we do not know why sin defiles us."

No, they do not. All Christians say sin is a state or condition arising from disobedience. Its why and how is therefore perfectly apparent.

All say, "we know not why sickness tortures us."

How does this accord with your own declaration that "suffering in the moral world is the child of violated law?" Here you give a sound reason why sickness tortures us, a reason which you evidently had forgotten when you perpetrated the above gush.

All say, "we know not how death, cold, ghastly death, is the conqueror of all."

No they don't, for all know that death is the result of the natural law of physical decomposition—the law of growth and decay; the law by which matter is constantly changing its forms.

Notes. If there is an infinite, self-existent being, he must from his very nature, be infinite in everything; and if infinite in everything, infinite in his justice. To assert that he is not infinitely just is to deny his existence, but your statement supposes his existence, and therefore his infinite justice.

Lacy. All this is mere assertion without proof. It is worse; it is an unintelligible medley.

Lambert. On the hypothesis that an infinite, self-existent Being exists, it follows as a necessary conse-

quence that he is infinite in every perfection, for to lack any perfection is fatal to the concept of an infinite being. You may deny the existence of a triangle, but if you admit it, you must admit also the existence of its angles. To admit one and deny the other is to fall into absurdity. In the same way, once admit the existence of an infinite Being and you must also admit the existence of all the attributes necessary to the reality of that being. But you admit the existence of the infinite being, therefore you must admit all his infinite perfections. To deny infinite attributes is to deny infinity. Therefore you must assert the infinite attributes or perfections, if you assert infinite being. Justice is a perfection, therefore it must be asserted of the infinite being. Thus you see that the infinite justice of God follows necessarily from the admission of his existence. All this may seem "an unintelligible medley" to you, but I think there are readers who have intelligence enough to understand it.

Let us however go a little further for your benefit. The infinite being must be infinitely good. To deny goodness of him is to deny a perfection, and to deny him a perfection is to deny his infinity, for that which is not perfect cannot be infinite, as the limit to its perfection would limit and therefore destroy its infinity. But it is granted in the hypothesis that he is infinite—hence he is infinitely good. This Being, because infinitely good, must love good and hate evil, reward the one and punish the other. In this, and in its application to acts, consists justice. Justice is founded on goodness—it is goodness most wisely administered. Now what does goodness exact in regard to the guilty? It requires that they be punished neither more nor less than is necessary to repair offended order. This

is also what justice requires when wisely used. Goodness *per se* loves every individual, and in this respect it is inclined to do good rather than evil to the guilty, but inasmuch as it is intelligent goodness it differs from blind goodness where individual good conflicts with the common good. Then goodness wisely used should, on account of the love it has for the common good, punish the individual offender as far as is necessary to satisfy offended order or the common good; and on account of the love it has for the offender, it should punish no more than is necessary to make the proper reparation. In other words, the punishment inflicted by intelligent goodness should be the least that is compatible with the common good. In this consists the essence of justice. The supreme authority in a community which punishes with neither too great severity nor too great lenity, is, for that reason said to be just. This goodness wills good, not evil, to the individual, even to the guilty, and therefore prefers to benefit rather than punish. It wills that the whole community be tranquil, orderly and free from disturbance. It must therefore will the punishment necessary to bring about this result. That power then is *just* which, on account of its love for the common good, does not punish too lightly to secure the common good or more severely than necessary to effect it.

Now it is this perfect adjustment of the means to the end in the moral order that constitutes the infinite justice of God—infinite goodness and infinite wisdom unitedly exercised. All this is implied in your admission that an infinite Being exists.

Lacy. Suppose we never before heard of God and were told for the first time that he is a self-existent, infinite being, would not our first inquiry be: "Infinite in what?"

Lambert. This would be a natural inquiry for one who had no idea of the meaning of the words "infinite being," and the proper way to answer him would be to instruct him in the meaning of those words and what they necessarily imply. Suppose we had never before heard of a triangle and were told for the first time that it is a three angled figure. What would you think of the intelligence of the man who would ask, "Three angled is what?" Would he not need instruction in the meaning of the terms? Just so the other. The idea of infinite being carries with it necessarily every perfection; if any perfection is wanting or limited, the idea of infinite being is immediately lost, just as the idea of a triangle is lost when the number of its angles is changed.

Lacy. If answered that he is infinite in every holy attribute, would we not further ask: "How do you know this?"

Lambert. If you asked this question, you should be answered by being told the meaning of the terms "infinite being." Infinity in every holy attribute is as essential to the idea of infinite being as three angles are to the idea of a triangle. We know the infinite being has these attributes because without them he would not be infinite being. You admit he exists and therefore you must admit he has the attributes that necessarily follow.

Lacy. The Scriptures deal not in this patristic knowledge.

Lambert. When the Scriptures call God *I Am Who Am* they say everything implied by the phrase "infinite being"—that God is essentially all-perfect infinite, independent, immutable, eternal, omnipotent, etc., for the word Je-ho-vah implies all these.

Lacy. (1.) But to dispose of the *assertion* that infinity of being combined with self-existence implies "infinite justice," we *remark*, that (2) infinity can scarcely be predicated of justice. (3.) It is doubtful whether any attribute can be properly described as infinite which does not admit of degrees of comparison

Lambert. (1.) The naivete of this is refreshing. To dispose of my assertion you *remark*, etc. Whether my deduction of infinite justice from the idea of infinite being be a mere assertion or not I leave the reader to judge.

(2.) "Infinity can scarcely be predicated of justice." *Scarcely?* It either can or cannot. There is no middle ground. Your remark neither affirms nor denies the point in question, and therefore disposes of nothing.

(3.) "It is doubtful whether any attribute can be properly described as infinite which does not admit of degrees of comparison." Here again you do not affirm or deny anything. You merely doubt it. And this is the way you dispose of my assertion is it? The infinite, because it *is* infinite, admits of no degrees of comparison. To compare is to put two things or ideas together and discover their difference of degree in that quality in which the comparison is made. Their difference is found in the difference of their limitations, therefore things that have no limitations cannot be compared.

Lacy. We cannot say with philosophical propriety—just, more just, most just.

Lambert. Here at least you say something, but it is not true, because it is contrary to a well known principle of logic which is, that the predicate or at-

tribute of an affirmative proposition is limited in its extent to the extent of the subject of which it is predicated. In other words an adjective applied to a noun is limited in its extension to that noun. When I say A is just, justice is asserted of A only and is limited to him; and as he is finite the justice predicated of him is finite, according to the axiom of logic that the predicate can have no greater extension than its subject. The justice then of A, B, or C, is finite and therefore admits of degrees of comparison. Hence we can with philosophical propriety and logical accuracy say, A is just, B is more just, C is most just. In attributing justice to God there is no need of using the word "infinite," for as according to the axiom, that the extension of the attribute is equal to the extension of the subject, the justice asserted of God must be infinite since he the subject of the attribute "just," is infinite. Justice to be anything more than a sound or a word, must exist in beings. In finite beings it is limited because they are limited: in the infinite being it has no limits, it is infinite because he is infinite. You may affirm or deny justice of God, but when you affirm it at all you affirm it without limit.

Lacy. When we say just, we have expressed a quality in its fullness.

Lambert. In its fullness to the extent of the subject of which it is predicated, yes. In its fullness in its absolute sense, no. Here you again flatly contradict the principle of logic which I have referred to above, that the extension of the predicate is limited to the extension of the subject.

Lacy. Conventionally speaking, and for convenience, we employ the words "more just" and "most just," as when we say, A is a more just judge than B,

Lambert. A is a more just judge than B or he is not. If he is more just than B, philosophical propriety requires us to say he is more just, for it is always philosophical to say the truth.

Lacy. Philosophical diction is not so indulgent to us; for when we wish to draw an important conclusion by the use of words, we should employ them according to strict meaning.

Lambert. This is very true, and it is on this account I have required you and Ingersoll to define some of your words. The principle you lay down is a most excellent one, but you have sinned against it in giving expression to it. We do not "draw conclusions by the use of words." We draw conclusions by comparing ideas, and we *express* them by the use of words.

Lacy. "Infinite" is a word which strikes the popular mind as exceedingly eulogistic and it can scarcely realize that when we call God *just* we have accorded him as great praise as when we declare him "infinitely" just.

Lambert. It is not a question of praise, but of truth. This perching yourself on the Chimberaizo of self-esteem and speaking of the "popular mind" as of some almost invisible object away off down there in the distant valley, is characteristic of Ingersoll and his school. The popular mind, which is never radically wrong, may not know why, in asserting justice of an infinite being, it must assert infinite justice—just as you appear not to know it—out following an instinct of reason, it always does it. It knows that in asserting justice of God and in asserting it of man it never asserts it in the same sense. In the first, it calls it divine or infinite justice, in the second human or finite justice.

Lacy. Neither can any being be more than perfect.

Lambert. No being can be more than perfect in the perfection of its order, but there are degrees in the orders of being. If what you say be true there is no difference between a perfect oyster and a perfect man, as each is perfect, and according to you, neither can be more. Your own sense should tell you that although both may be perfect there is a difference of perfection between a perfect man and a perfect goose. A goose may be perfect in its order of being, but its order of being is not as perfect as that of man. Hence the attribute "perfect" is always limited to the subject of which it is predicted. If predicted of man it is finite perfection, if of God it is infinite perfection. This is according to the axiom of logic referred to heretofore in this article.

CHAPTER XIV.

Lacy. No man is truthful who will tell one lie.

Lambert. And yet he is more truthful than he who tells many lies. But if your saying be true how are we to classify you, who have said that Christians believe in three Gods? Are you ready to accept in your own case the consequences of your dictum?

Lacy. To say that he (God) is infinitely perfect or infinitely just is as redundant as to describe an object as infinitely round or infinitely square.

Lambert. This is of a piece with what I have already examined. When we say God is infinitely perfect we express a truth. We formally assert the attribute perfection to the full extension of the subject of which it is asserted. The subject—God, is infinite, and therefore the attribute asserted of him is infinite, and it is no redundancy to say it. To say an object is infinitely round or square is not a redundancy; it is simply a fallacy or an absurdity. To say it is round or square is to limit it, and to limit it is to deny infinity of it. Therefore to say an object is infinitely round is to say it is infinite and finite at the same time. Philosophical diction is not so indulgent as to permit this; neither is common sense.

Lacy. How do we know that self-existence necessitates the possession of specific qualities, good or bad?

Lambert. It is known by a process of reasoning which one who writes on metaphysical questions should not be ignorant of. I will take one attribute, the

eternity of the self-existent being, as an illustration. As I am not writing a treatise on theodicy, I need not go through all the divine attributes. One will be enough to show that these attributes follow necessarily, one from another. Granted that God is self-existent, it follows that he is eternal. We know this from the following process of reasoning.

That which is and which did not *come* into being is eternal. It is admitted in the hypothesis that the self-existent Being is or exists. It follows then that if he did not *come* into being he must be eternal. Well he could not have come into being for the following reasons: If he came into being he must have been produced by the agency of another or by his own agency or by chance. But neither of these can be said, for if he were produced by another he would not be *self-existent*—but existent from another. He did not produce himself, because that would involve the contradiction that he existed and acted before he existed. He was not produced by chance, because then again he would not be *self-existent*—but a creature of chance. Now it is granted that the self-existent Being is. And it is evident that he did not *come* into existence, therefore he is eternal.

In a like manner we prove that he is supreme, independent, perfect, omnipotent, immutable, absolutely simple and one. And from these qualities we prove, by an analogous process of reasoning, that he is a spirit endowed with understanding, will, liberty and infinite power, and that he is just, holy and true.

If you were in the least familiar with any handbook on theodicy you would never have asked the question I have just answered, for you would have known that the question itself is an exhibition of ignor-

ance on a subject which you would fain treat with tripping familiarity.

Lacy. Neither power nor wisdom measures the justice of men. Why should they (it?) the ethics of the deity?

Lambert. Both power and wisdom are necessary to the justice of men. He who has not the power to *think* and *will* and the wisdom to *know*, can be neither just nor unjust. Man's justice must then be measured by his power to will good or evil, do good or evil, and by his wisdom or knowledge of what is right or wrong, just or unjust. Hence the question based on your statement has no relevancy.

Lacy. The truth is, fear constrains the theological world to adopt certain and dogmatic and complimentary forms of expression when speaking of the deity.

Lambert. Here you assume that those who deny the attributes of God are more fearless than those who affirm them. What grounds have you for such a lawless assumption?

Lacy. It is supposed that the *vanity* of God delights itself in adulatory phrases and in the self-abnegation of his subjects.

Lambert. Supposed by whom? The Christian theologian knows that the idea of vanity is incompatible with the idea of the deity, and that any one who attributes it to God has no true conception of Him. He knows that such ideas of God arise from ignorance. He knows that the highest he can think or say of the Supreme Being is infinitely below the truth; that the human mind and tongue are inadequate to think or speak of God as he is.

Notes. The finite cannot be the measure of the infinite; the human mind is finite. Hence the latter

cannot be the measure of the former—in other words we have not the capacity, and for a stronger reason, not the jurisdiction to rejudge the justice of God.

Lacy. We are told that "the finite cannot be the measure of the infinite." True, but it may test its nature and quality though it may not measure its extent.

Lambert. How can the finite test the nature and quality if the infinite, if it be not a measure of that nature and quality? You should see that when you admit the finite is not the measure of the infinite you yield the point at issue.

Lacy. We know enough of space between material objects to render it unconceivable to us that space in any part of the universe, can differ from it save in extent.

Lambert. You thought you knew enough about it to enable you to assert that space is infinite, and yet we have seen that the greatest of modern agnostic. Herbert Spencer, agrees with Christian philosophers that it is not infinite; that considered separate from things, it is nothing. Hence your knowledge of space "included between two material objects" did not enable you to form a correct notion of space considered without reference to those two objects. This shows the difference between knowing enough and thinking we know enough.

Lacy. You say that "God's justice is infinite;" we admit its perfection, but the question is whether the God of *your conception* is just.

Lambert. When you admit the perfection of God's justice you concede all I claim when I say it is infinite, for you have told us that infinite is redundant, meaning no more than perfect. Hence our concep-

tion of God's justice agrees thus far and there can therefore be no question between you and me on this point.

Lacy. If we know aught of God, we are compelled by the laws of our mental and moral being to judge him.

Lambert. When we know that God is infinitely wise and infinitely just the laws of our mental being compel us to say that whatever he does must be most wise and just, however contrary to our notions of justice his actions may seem to be. To judge a being is to pass in review his acts, and measuring them by the measure of our confessedly limited judgment, condemn or approve them. This is the sense in which Ingersoll claims the right to judge the Supreme Being, and in this sense I denied and still deny that right, because it is contrary to the dictates of reason. To admit a being to be infinitely just and still claim the right to pass judgment as to the justice or injustice of his acts is irrational, illogical and self-stultifying. To examine the acts of the Supreme Being with a view of determining whether they are just or not, is to assume that they *may be unjust*, but you cannot assume this after having admitted that that Being is infinitely just. However unjust an act may *seem* to us, we are bound by the laws of our intellect to believe it to be just, so long as we hold the actor to be infinitely just. This is an imperative dictate of reason. We may question the justice of any given act until we discover that it is an act of the infinitely just Being, but when we discover this, all right to doubt, question or judge of the act immediately ceases. The sound intellect refuses to proceed further, because to go further would be to stultify itself. Let us take an illustration.

Suppose you admit the existence of an equi-angular triangle. When you know what this admission means you will see that your intellect has yielded the right to judge as to the relative value of its angles. Why? Because in conceding the *existence* of the equi-angular triangle you concede all that is essential to its existence, and after this concession, if you attempt to discuss the relative value of the angles you prove that you have no true conception of an equi-angular triangle. The conclusion from all this is that, if you grant the infinite justice of God you give away the right to judge, that is, to examine with a view to approve or condemn, his acts.

You may ask, do not theologians examine the acts of God with a view to judge and approve them? I answer, no. It is as great a blasphemy to examine his acts to approve them as it is to examine to condemn them, because in both cases it is to put the finite intellect above the infinite intellect, to pass judgment upon it, and this is a blasphemous usurpation, as inconsistent with the mental as it is with the moral law.

The fact is you have simply failed to say what you meant. You meant to say that the acts attributed to God in the Old Testament are not just, good, merciful, etc., and therefore they are not the acts of God. But here the judgment you pass is not on the acts of God but on acts attributed to Him. You deny that they are acts of God and this denial gives you a logical right to pass judgment on them. But this is very different from the right to judge God. Once admit that the acts attributed to God in the Old Testament *are* acts of God, and your right to judge of their justice immediately ceases. Hence instead of claiming the right to judge God, you should if you

wish to be consistent, claim that those acts attributed to him are not his. But it will not do to say, they are unjust and therefore they are not His, for the reply will be: If they are his they must be just. This reduces the whole controversy to this question, Are those acts God's acts? This is a question of *fact*, not of theology. And being a question of fact, the *nature* of those acts must be left out of the question until we discover who the real actor was. If God is the actor the acts must be right whatever we may think of them. If God was not the actor the acts are legitimate subjects of discussion. How is this question to be determined? Being a question of fact, it must be determined by the known facts of history. I cannot here go into an analysis of the history of the Jews from Abraham down to the time when the sceptre passed from the hands of Israel, and when all-conquering Rome sunk Palestine into a province. The acts of God in Hebrew history will come up in proper time, but the time is not now. As you bring them up I will defend them.

Lacy. If we say he (God) is righteous we pronounce judgment upon him, which, according to the Father's logic we cannot do, because the finite cannot pass judgment upon the infinite.

Lambert. When we say God is righteous we simply assert that the attribute "righteous" is necessarily involved in the assertion that the infinitely perfect Being *is*. This is not pronouncing a judgment on Him. It is merely asserting a consequence which *must* follow from the hypothesis that He is. This is a very different thing from passing His actions in review and judging Him to be just or unjust according as we judge His actions to be just or unjust. We do not

say that God is just because His actions are just; we say all his actions are just because He is infinitely just. In this we do not judge God; we only make Him, or rather our idea of Him, the ultimate basis of our judgments. In doing this we act the true part of rational beings.

Lacy. The Father virtually concedes the right of examination but not of judgment.

Lambert. I concede the right of investigation as to whether a particular act is an act of God, but when investigation discovers that that particular act is God's act, investigation and sound judgment must stop there, for what God does *must* be right, whatever we may think of it.

Lacy. It is apparent that if we have the right to think and examine any subject, it must be with a view to the formation of an opinion in regard to it, and *opinion is judgment.*

Lambert. I deny the right to think about and examine the acts of God with a view to the formation of a judgment as to whether they are right or wrong. It is both immoral and irrational. It is immoral for man to assume to judge his creator, and it is irrational to make the finite the measure of the infinite. In the second place, an *opinion is not a judgment.* Judgment in logic is a fixed quantity. Opinion is a thing unknown to logic.

Ingersoll. The question cannot be settled by saying that it would be a mere waste of time and space to enumerate the proofs that show that the universe was created by a pre-existent and self-conscious being.

Lacy. The learned priest takes issue with this statement, and claims that Mr. Ingersoll is refuted by

his, the Father's, averment that the books are full of refutations of Mr. Ingersoll's arguments, and of proofs positive of the doctrines he controverts. Considering that the good priest is a volunteer, and not, like me, invited to join the intellectual tourney, would not a little modesty on his part become the situation? Should he not, at least, name the books where those invincible proofs may be found?

Lambert. The priest still insists that the Christian philosopher is not bound to reprint large volumes on metaphysics, theodicy and cosmology every time some Tom, Dick or Harry expresses a doubt about the creation. Your and Ingersoll's ignorance of Christian and even gentile arguments on this point shows how poorly you are by your own confession, equipped to meet them. You undertake to refute those arguments, and after doing it to your own satisfaction you innocently ask what the arguments are and where they are to be found. In discussing metaphysics we have a right to suppose that you have a reasonable amount of information on its literature, and your pert confession of ignorance does not enable you to laugh your way out. If you really desire to know those arguments consult such authors as St. Thomas of Aquin, Rosmini, Rosset, Rothenflue, Liberatore, Tongiorgi, Sanseverino, Valecshi, or any hand-book on theodicy and ontology.

Lacy. In assenting to the fact of doubting the intelligible is the intelligence doubting, and there is required no other "intelligible," which satisfies the requirement for something intelligible without postulating any reality besides the intelligence.

Lambert. This very intelligible piece of word spinning is a criticism on Doctor Brownson's psycho

logical argument for the existence of God. This argument I will give in full in the next chapter. It is not clear in the first part of what Mr. Lacy says whether he asks a question or states a proposition. In assenting to the fact of doubting, the intelligence affirms the existence of a doubt. It may be admitted without detriment to Brownson's argument, that there need be no intelligible besides the intelligence itself. When the intellect reflects on itself it become the object of its own activity, and in cognizing or knowing itself it knows that an intelligence, a being exists. When you grant this, as you do, you grant all that is necessary for the validity of Brownson's argument. In making the intelligence its own intelligible, you admit the existence of an intelligible—the very thing the doctor was insisting on.

CHAPTER XV.

The following is Dr. Brownson's psychological argument for the existence of God, as published in the *Notes*:—

"I allow you to doubt all things if you wish, till you come to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe,—to deny as it does to affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, an impossibility, for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubt itself. You cannot doubt that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is one thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts would be to doubt that you doubt, for without intelligence there can be no more doubt than belief. Intelligence then, you must assert, for without intelligence you cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirms intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubt then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intelligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not, cannot act.

"This much, then, is certain, that however far you may be disposed to carry your denials, you cannot carry them so far as to deny intelligence, because that would be denial of denial itself. Then you must concede intelligence and then whatever is essential to the

reality of intelligence. In conceding anything, you concede necessarily all that by which it is what it is, and without which it could not be what it is. Intelligence is inconceivable without the intelligible, or some object capable of being known. So, in conceding intelligence, you necessarily concede the intelligible. The intelligible is therefore something which is, is being, real being too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without the real, there is and can be no possible or abstract. The abstract, in that it is abstract, is nothing, and therefore unintelligible, that is to say, no object of knowledge or of intellect. The possible, as possible, is nothing but the power or ability of the real, and is apprehensible only in that power or ability. In itself, abstracted from the real, it is pure nullity, has no being, no existence, is not, and therefore is unintelligible, no object of intelligence or of intellect, on the principle that what is not is not intelligible. Consequently, to the reality of intelligence, a real intelligible is necessary, and since the reality of intelligence is undeniable, the intelligible must be asserted, and asserted as real, not as abstract or merely possible being. You are obliged to assert intelligence, but you cannot assert intelligence without asserting the intelligible, and you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting something that really is, that is without asserting real being. The real being thus asserted is either necessary and eternal being, being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, or it is contingent and therefore created being. One or the other we must say, for being which is neither necessary nor contingent, or which is both at once, is inconceivable, and cannot be asserted or supposed.

“Whatever is, in any sense, is either necessary and

eternal, or contingent and created—is either being in itself, absolute being, or existence dependent on another for its being and therefore is not without the necessary and eternal, on which it depends. If you say it is necessary and eternal being, you say it is God; if you say it is contingent being, you still assert the necessary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary and eternal. The contingent, since it is or has its being only in the necessary and eternal, and since what is not, is not intelligible, is intelligible as the contingent, only in necessary and eternal being, the intelligible in itself, in which it has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. So in either case you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting necessary and eternal being, and therefore, since necessary and eternal being is God, without asserting God, or that God is; and since you must assert intelligence even to deny it, it follows that in every act of intelligence God is asserted, and that it is impossible without self-contradiction to deny his existence.*”

Lacy. Without preamble let us admit that God exists; yet those who believe in the eternity of matter believe also that all the possibilities of life were infolded within it from the “beginning.”

Lambert. In admitting the existence of God you concede the invalidity of all arguments against that existence, for it is an axiom of common sense that it is never lawful to argue against a fact. Having admitted, as you have, the existence of God to be a fact, you stultify yourself when you endeavor to show that arguments against that fact have any force. The fact being granted all arguments against it must necessarily be false. The “belief” of the atheist and the

agnostic is of no more weight than the belief of the Christian—considered merely as a belief. There is however this difference between the two beliefs. The Christian's belief does not involve a contradiction while that of the atheist does. The belief of the atheist as formulated by you supposes an effect without a cause. He believes all the possibilities of life are infolded in matter. Who *infolded* these possibilities in matter? According to the atheist, no one infolded them. Here we have an act done without an actor to do it. This is absurd. You may say these possibilities were eternally infolded in matter, but an eternal infolding necessarily supposes an eternal infolder. Hence it is evident that even if we grant the eternity of matter and that all the possibilities of life are infolded in it, we must still go beyond all this to find the reason *why* it is and *why* these possibilities are infolded in it. The human mind refuses peremptorily to take its ultimate repose on phenomena. It forever seeks through phenomena or appearances or apparitions to get at the real. It refuses to believe that phenomena or appearances, such as matter is, can exist without something real behind them to sustain them in being.

Lacy. Infinite succession of being is no more difficult of comprehension than self-existent, eternal being.

Lambert. You have just admitted the existence of the self-existent, eternal Being, hence you must concede that his existence does not involve contradiction or absurdity. Your admission closes the debate on this point.

An infinite succession of being clearly involves contradiction and absurdity, and is therefore impossi-

ble. A series is composed of units and therefore can be increased or diminished, and that which can be increased or diminished is not infinite. Again those who believe in infinite succession of being must admit many infinite series of beings, some of which must be greater than others, for example, an infinite series of trees and an infinite series of leaves; an infinite series of geese and a still greater infinite series of feathers. A series being composed of a greater or less number of units, must, to exist, have a definite number of units. It must be three, five or a million, or any number you like, but it must be fixed. Without this you can not imagine a series to exist. Now when the number is fixed your series is finite. A series that is once finite may be increased forever but can never become infinite.

Lacy. While we conceive of space as illimitable, the idea of a limit being unthinkable, we can, as we have shown, conceive as well of a chain composed of links interminable extending through space.

Lambert. We have seen according to Herbert Spencer, that space abstracted from extended things is nothing, and as such has no extension or limits. Hence the illimitable space of which you speak is a mental fiction, having no reality external to the mind; it is the mere *possibility* of extension. When you deprive space of limits you destroy it. Hence to conceive it we must conceive it as limited. On this point Spencer and Christian philosophers agree. A chain is composed of links each of which is a unit. It cannot exist without having a definite number of these units and it is therefore terminable and limited. Again this chain may be increased, for you can imagine another the same length and then add them together. You

can continue this process forever and you will never have an infinite chain. However long it may be it is still composed of units, and an infinite real number of units is a contradiction. But at best your chain is an imaginary one, has no real existence, and wanting this it wants the first condition of a real infinite, namely, real existence. You have introduced this space and chain business several times. It is monotonous to have to show its fallacy again and again.

Lacy. The truth is we may apprehend both or either (infinite space and chain.)

Lambert. The truth is we can apprehend neither. You mistake infinite possibility of extension for infinite real space and infinite possibility of increasing your chain with an infinite real chain. What you apprehend is a possibility not a reality, and between a possible or potential infinite and a real infinite there is an infinite gulf.

Ingersoll. Logic is not satisfied with assertion.

Notes. Then it is not satisfied with your assertion in reference to it.

Lacy. Certainly not. As an assertion merely, it carries no weight. It is a major premise, and if disputed it must be proved. If self-evident it need not be proved. We consider it as such.

Lambert. The question here is as to what logic requires. An assertion merely as such has no weight as an evidence of truth, but in the art of logic an assertion or proposition whether true or false, negative or affirmative, has a value, just as a figure has a value in a mathematical process. The figure may represent a false quantity but with that the mathematical process has nothing to do. It must take the data as given and deduce from them the result. A says B

owes him 5 and 6 and 9 dollars. Arithmetic says, then B owes A 20 dollars. But as a matter of fact A has lied, for B owes him nothing. Does A's lie about the data make the arithmetical computation false? certainly not. Why? Because it is not the office of arithmetic to test the truth of A's data. Its duty is to take the data and draw the conclusion. In the same way logic, which is the reasoning process by which from given data a conclusion is deduced, takes assertions or propositions without reference to their truth or fallacy and draws a conclusion, a true *conclusion*, if the process be properly conducted, whether the data be true or false. It is not the office of logic to pass judgment on the veracity of a proposition, but to determine the validity of an argument. It deals with the fallacy of argumentation, not with the fallacy of propositions. For example: All men are black. All horses are men. Therefore all horses are black. Here all the requirements of logic are met, and yet there is not a true assertion in the syllogism. The logical process is perfect and the conclusion, while false as a proposition, is nevertheless a true conclusion from the premises.

Again, to show that logic has nothing to do with the sense of the proposition, true or false, take the following syllogism algebraically expressed: A equals B: C equals A. Therefore C equals B. Here logic fills its office without any reference to the meaning of A, B or C. Substitute terms for letters and we have: A (all men) are B (mortal). C (John) is A (a man). Therefore C (John) is B (mortal). All this belongs to the first elements of logic, yet it is necessary to give it to show that assertions merely as such, and whether true or false, carry enough weight with them to meet

the requirements of logic. Therefore logic is satisfied with assertions. The fact is, both Ingersoll and his disciple invariably use the term "logic" in a false sense. Ingersoll might as well have said that grammar is not satisfied with assertions. Grammar deals with the correct expression of a proposition and has no reference to its truth or fallacy. Many a lie has been told in grammatical English, just as many a true deduction has been drawn from false premises and many false deductions from true premises.

It may be asked, if logic does not determine the truth of propositions, what does? I answer, research, investigation, experience. We know the proposition "all men are black" is false, not from logic but experience. The art of logic is simply the reasoning process by which we pass from truths already found to truths less known, and by which we guard against false arguments in such passage. It has nothing to do with the subject-matter of scientific investigation. That is the province of philosophy proper.

Notes. Logic as a science deals with principles, not assertions; and logic as an art deals with assertions only.

Lacy. The Father might have added that logic, as a science, when applied to the grandest problems which can engage the attention of man, scorns the quibbles and subterfuges of the schoolmen and directs its aim to the exposition of truth only.

Lambert. The Father might have added the nonsense you suggest had he been ignorant of the subject he was talking about. Logic as a science, treats of the *principles* upon which the human mind is based in reasoning, and with these *principles only*. Hence when you apply it to the solution of problems

in general you misapply it, and compound it with theodicy, metaphysics and ethics or with philosophy in general.

Your talk about the "quibbles and subterfuges of the schoolmen" is a cheap haberdashery which every modern philosophical peddler has on top of his pack to be thrown in as make-weight. Those familiar with scholastic philosophy, and the discussions about it, know that the faults found with it had reference to its metaphysics, not to its logic. Since Aristotle the art of logic has made no progress. He worked out all its possible processes and left it finished. There is only one logic given to man by his Creator as the rule of his reasoning, which is always true and independent of the subject-matter to which it may be applied. Call it inductive, deductive, Aristotelean, Baconian, scholastic, or what not, it is and always has been one and the same.

Lacy. I speak of logic with a soul back of it.

Lambert. Then you speak of a kind of logic unknown to logicians and philosophers. Logic has nothing to do with sentiments or emotions—that is the province of poetry and gush. The sphere of logic is purely intellectual. As well might you speak of mathematics or geometry with a soul back of it.

Lacy. Not that kind (of logic) which amuses itself with the jumping-jacks of technicality.

Lambert. Technicalities are necessary in all the sciences. Exact knowledge requires exact terms and definitions, and he who would be a master of philosophy must be familiar with them. Those only who are fond of loose, lawless thinking are averse to them.

Ingersoll. A fact is a legal tender.

Notes. A counterfeit is a fact; is it legal tender?

Lacy. Yes, as a *counterfeit* it is. It is a legal tender fact in court to convict the one who made or circulated it with criminal intent.

Lambert. Then a fact may be legal tender in one sense and not in another. The legal-tenderness of it depends on the use you make of it. A fact twisted out of its proper relations with other facts and circumstances, or by false presentation, can be made to lie like a false witness, who by the way is also a fact, and therefore a legal tender. A fact to be of any value must be interpreted, and then its value depends on the interpretation. A killed B. This is the fact. Is A guilty of murder? The killing is admitted. What value has this fact in determining the question whether A is guilty of murder or not? None whatever. The only value it has, merely as a fact, is to prove that B is dead, which is evident of itself and needs not any other fact to establish it. I give this illustration to show that a mere naked, external fact is not legal tender in any useful or practical sense. For granting the fact of the killing the practical question still remains, was the fact a murder, a justifiable homicide or an accident? If a murder, it was a criminal fact, if justifiable homicide or an accident A is acquitted. This shows that the value on legal-tenderness of the fact is not found in the mere external accomplished fact, but in the nature of the fact, which is determined by the *intention* of A when he accomplished it. It follows from this that a fact merely as such is not legal tender in the sense Ingersoll asserted it.

Again, it requires an expert to distinguish a counterfeit, as it requires an expert to determine whether an apparent or alleged fact is a real and genuine fact. Until this is determined neither the fact

nor the note is legal tender. Ancient astronomers held it to be a fact that the Sun went round the earth. They were just as dogmatic about it as you and Ingersoll are about fallacies which you and he advance as facts. He said water *always* runs down hill, and you said Christians believe in three Gods. He made deductions from his *fact* and you made deductions from yours. Yet neither of these "facts" is legal tender.

As a matter of fact men dispute about the genuineness of facts. I hold it to be a fact, that the Bible is inspired; you hold that it is not a fact. What is Ingersoll's little maxim worth here? Like most of his maxims it is of no value whatever. I conclude then that a fact is not legal tender in an argument to him who denies it to be a fact or who for valid reasons rejects the interpretation of it. Ingersoll is very fond of perpetrating taking little maxims which when analyzed have neither sense nor reason in them; and his disciple, with a delusive conviction that he understands the inner sense of his master, jumps on the stand, like a too willing witness, to testify to their validity.

Lacy. In the well understood sense in which Mr. Ingersoll used the word, (legal tender) it (a counterfeit) is not a fact, but a lie.

Lambert. I assume to know as much about the sense of a simple proposition as Mr. Lacy does. He has no patent right to interpret Ingersoll. The phrase used by Ingersoll was in its very nature misleading, and therefore had no "well understood" sense. A few moments ago friend Lacy told us that a counterfeit *is* legal tender. He now tells it is *not* a fact, but a lie. Now how a thing that is *not* a fact,

but a lie, can be legal tender surpasses our faculties of comprehension. But we are not done with Lacyan logic. According to him a counterfeit is *not* a fact. Then in the name of common sense what is it? Well, says Lacy, it is a lie. Yes, but even a lie must be a fact *as* a lie and therefore a fact.

Lacy. The same sophistical spirit pervades chapter VI.

Lambert. And I fear it will have to pervade chapter VII.

Lacy. Not content with animadverting the statement that "assertions and miracles are spurious coin" the good priest inserts the word "all" before "assertions."

Lambert. The good priest had a perfect right to insert "all" before "assertions." It is a principle of logic that when the subject of a proposition is left unlimited by quantitative restrictions it is to be taken in its universal sense. Ingersoll's utter disregard of this principle is the cause of many of his blunders. When I say "men are mortal" it is the exact equivalent to "*all men* are mortal." In both cases the proposition is universal, that is to say, "men," the subject of the proposition, is taken in its full extension, meaning *all men*. When Ingersoll said, "assertions and miracles are spurious coin" he made a universal, unlimited proposition. And the sign of a universal affirmative proposition is *all* just as *some* is the sign of a particular proposition. I used the word "all" to call the reader's attention to the fact that Ingersoll's proposition was a universal, unlimited one, because in that fact consists its fallacy. Had he said *some* assertions and *some* so-called miracles are spurious coin, I would have agreed with him.

Lacy. Where the Father's self-appointed task to *construe* and not to misconstrue, he as the commentator of Ingersoll, would have inserted *mere* in place of "all." In other words, *mere* assertion is not proof.

Lambert. The Father acted on the assumption that Ingersoll knew or ought to know how to say in English what he meant, and he did him the honor of supposing that he meant what he said. It was the Father's business to deal with what Ingersoll said. He leaves the construing to the disciple who admits by his glossary that his master could not or did not say what he meant. It is now in order for some one to construe the disciple and tell us the difference between an assertion and a *mere* assertion.

Ingersoll. Reason is the result of all experience.

Lacy. This is incorrect,——

Lambert. Of course it is. Ingersoll probably wanted to say: "*Knowledge* is the result of experience."

Lacy.—but it is quite as true as the Father's dictum that "the mind and reason are identical." Imagination is as much an attribute of mind as reason, yet imagination is not synonymous with reason.

Lambert. Here you confound the *act of reasoning* with that *entity* called reason which produces the act. That active, cognitive, intelligent entity which is conscious of its own existence and which thinks, reasons, reflects, imagines, wills, loves, hates, rejoices or is sad, in a word that principle which distinguishes man from the brute, is called soul, mind or reason; by whichever name called it is the same active entity or being. When it reasons its act is called reasoning, when it thinks its act is called thought, when it

reflects its act is called reflection, when it imagines its act is called imagination, when it wills its act is called volition, etc. Its ability to do all these things is called its faculties. But these faculties are not distinct from itself. They are simply its ability exercised in different directions and on different objects. We say a man walks, runs, leaps, dances, sings, talks, etc.; the ability to do these, we call faculties. And yet we know that all these acts are but different manifestations of one and the same force and proceed from one and the same principle of activity. It is the same of the mind or reason; though it manifests itself in many different kinds of acts, yet it is always one and the same actor. Thought is reason thinking, imagination is reason imagining, reflection, reason reflecting, etc. Imagination is no more an attribute of mind or reason than walking is an attribute of man. The attribute or faculty is the *ability* which man has to walk, and the faculty of imagination is the ability of reason or mind to imagine. In all you say on this subject you confound reason with reasoning, the actor with the act, cause with effect.

Lacy. Does not the soul act in its love and affectional longings?

Lambert. These acts of love and longing, of reasoning and willing are all acts of one and the same agent, and that agent, in man, is called soul, reason or mind.

Lacy. Here we gladly leave the field of metaphysics—

Lambert. This is not surprising considering the display you have made in it.

Lacy.—and turn to that book with which a priest of the infallible church is supposed to be conversant.

This brings us to the real subject and substance of the controversy as raised by Mr. Ingersoll, "Is *all* of the Bible inspired?"

Lambert. Here you mistake the issue. Ingersoll in the *North American Review*, undertook to prove that the Bible was not inspired. And I, in the *Notes* in reply to him undertook to show that he did not succeed in his undertaking. The question raised by me—and remember it is to me you are replying—was whether Ingersoll had proved that the Bible was not inspired, or whether his arguments against its inspiration were valid. My purpose was to show that he had proved nothing but his own ignorance, bad faith, and controversial dishonesty. In concluding the *Notes* I invited some little whiffet of his shallow school to rehabilitate him. This invitation you accepted. These facts will enable the reader to understand the present state of the question. Your deft attempt to shift our relative positions is worthy of that child-like and bland celestial immortalized by the pen of Bret Harte. The question then between you and me is not whether *all* of the Bible is inspired, but whether Ingersoll is inspired by a spirit of wisdom, honesty and "honor bright," whether his information is of the kind to make him a competent critic of the Bible, and lastly whether he has manifested those qualities which an honest seeker after truth expects to find in one who pretends to teach it. This is the question between you and me.

I will now follow you in your comments on the Bible, and I propose to show that your arguments are no better than Ingersoll's, and that whether the Bible is or is not inspired, neither you nor he has proved it is not.

Ingersoll. In passing it may be well enough to say that the commandment "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in the heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters under the earth," was the absolute death of art; and that not until after the destruction of Jerusalem was there a Hebrew painter or sculptor.

Lacy. Here it is alleged that the above command was a prohibition of two arts—painting and sculpture.

Lambert. Here you are wrong. Ingersoll's statement is plain, and admits of no two meanings. He says the first commandment *was the absolute death of art*, not of two arts, but of art. You, on reflection, saw that this unqualified proposition could not be maintained, and you forthwith set to work to "construe" it and limit it to two arts—painting and sculpture, so that it might appear defensible. This will not do. It would have been wiser to have frankly admitted that he was wrong and have done with it. But even limiting Ingersoll's statement to painting and sculpture, you fail to maintain his position, for you say:

Lacy. I do not think it (the commandment) was so intended (to forbid art,) however the Jews may have interpreted it.

Lambert. Here you yield the point that the command was not "the absolute death of art," for if it does not forbid art, as you admit it does not, the destruction of art cannot be attributed to it. If the Jews misinterpreted the command the result must be attributed to their misinterpretation of it and not to the command. But as a matter of fact the Jews did

not misinterpret it; they understood it as forbidding the making of images as objects of adoration and worship. This is evident from the fact that after the command was given they made images and likenesses for the adornment of the Temple—that very Temple in which they were to worship that God who gave the command. It follows from your own concessions thus far that Ingersoll's statement is not true. If this is the way you reply to me, I am satisfied.

Lacy. It would seem that a fair criticism would construe the words as limiting the making of works of art in so far only as they were intended for devotional purposes.

Lambert. Here you are right, and it follows that Ingersoll's criticism of the command was not a fair one. Why then stoop to hide this unfairness by running off on irrelevant issues? Why not frankly admit he was wrong, and pass on to other points? Why continue to hem and haw about it after you have admitted all I claimed?

Lacy. How Hebrew fastidiousness may have construed the prohibition I am not able to say.

Lambert. And yet their construction of it is evident from the texts which I quote in the *Notes*. But aside from this, the question between Ingersoll and me had reference to the command itself and not to the Hebrew construction or interpretation of it. He said nothing about Hebrew construction. That was a bit of fine sophistry for which you deserve undisputed credit.

Lacy. But the Father has done little to disprove the charge that the arts referred to were dead as to the Hebrew race until after the destruction of Jerusalem, by showing that God gave specific instructions for the

creation of works of art for the adornment of His own Temple.

Lambert. One who talks so learnedly of metaphysics and logic ought to be able to keep his eye fixed steadily on the point in debate until it is disposed of. The question between Ingersoll and me was not whether art was dead as to the Hebrew race, but whether if dead its death was caused by the commandment. The specific instructions given by God for the making of works of art were quoted to show that the first commandment did not forbid the making of works of art as such; for the command of God could not forbid making works of art when that same God who gave the command commanded them to be made.

Notes. Who made the golden calf?

Lacy. How the calf would stand as a work of art if made to-day no one can tell—

Lambert. Nor is it at all necessary.

Lacy.—but is it probable that as slaves of Egypt, or as dwellers in the wilderness, the Hebrews had time or opportunity to study art?

Lambert. It is most probable they had not. You suggest here two good *reasons* why the Hebrews should not be artists. But why did not these good and sufficient reasons occur to Ingersoll? Why did he overlook them and attribute the death of art to the command of God?

Lacy. So far we must excuse them (the Hebrews) for a lack of knowledge *which they could not obtain.*

Lambert. This is very considerate and proper, but was it fair in Ingersoll to attribute to the commandment a want of knowledge which circumstances made it impossible for the Hebrews to obtain? Was he ignorant of these circumstances—the Egyptian

slavery and the wanderings in the wilderness—or did he deliberately hide them from view that his attack on the commandment might appear stronger? If the first he is too ignorant to criticise the Bible, if the latter he is too dishonest.

Lacy. If God by miracle endowed special sculptors with artistic skill, for his own purpose, such endowment goes not to the credit of the Jews as an art cultivating people.

Lambert. Either God worked a miracle in the case or He did not. If He did, then you must admit the existence of miracles, and that the God of the Hebrews worked them. This upsets all Ingersoll's objections to miracles. If God did not work a miracle in the case of the Hebrew sculptors then their art must be accredited to the Jews. You may take either horn of this dilemma. Consult your own comfort. This reminds me of a question you ask a few lines above:

Lacy. What matters it then to the argument that exceptions only are given (of works of art) qualified by their own nature, and made conspicuous by divine command?

Lambert. It matters considerable, as you shall see. God revealed to the builders the manner of building and ornamenting the Temple or He did not. If He revealed it, then divine revelation is a fact. This oversets Ingersoll and does away with all objections against the existence of revelation. If He did not reveal the art to the builders, then the builders must receive the credit for building and adorning the Temple; which goes to prove that art was not dead among the Jews, and that Ingersoll's statement to that effect is false. Here again you may take a horn—either horn—of this dilemma. You are thus driven by your

own peculiar line of argument to admit miracles and divine revelation, or to admit that art was not dead among the Jews.

Mr. Lacy next treats us to an essay on art, in which he shows that there were great artists, poets, historians, etc., who were not Jews or Christians; but as no one ever denied the fact his effort in this direction was an unnecessary expenditure of brain power—an article to be economized with care. We admire the great men of pagan antiquity, but we have some admiration left for the masters in Israel and in the New Dispensation. After citing some of the great masters of painting and sculpture who were Christians Mr. Lacy admits that their efforts were inspired and their aims directed by religion.

Ingersoll. He (God) authorized the murder of millions.

Notes. He never authorized or ordered the *murder* of anyone from Abel to Garfield. God is the author and giver of life, and those he places on this earth He can remove at His will. No man has a right to live one instant longer than his Creator wills him to remain, be he born or unborn, innocent or guilty. As creatures of God we are absolutely His and can have no right whatever as against Him.

Lacy. The proposition embraced in the Father's comment raises two questions: 1st, Has God a "right" to do whatever He arbitrarily might will with His creature man, moulded in his image, whom He made a little lower than the angels, and thought worthy of a crown of glory and honor. Has He the right, for instance, to inflict wanton punishment without any moral aim whatever?

Lambert. Yes. He has the right to do whatsoever He wills with His creature man, first, because being infinitely perfect He wills rightly and justly, and secondly, because man is His creature. To suppose God to will unjustly or punish wantonly is to suppose Him to be imperfect, but you cannot suppose this since you have admitted Him to be perfect. God being infinitely perfect and just His will is infinitely perfect and just; and an infinitely perfect and just will has a right to will what it wills to will. This does not need demonstration, it follows from the admitted existence of a perfect Being. Whatever this perfect Being wills or does must be wise, just and good, however contrary to our ideas of goodness and justness it may appear. His perfection of will and knowledge being granted we have no longer the right to judge Him. We are bound to suppose that back of His will and action there are valid reasons, although we, being finite in knowledge, may not see them. When we presume to judge Him we must necessarily put our finite knowledge of principles and facts against His infinite knowledge. The man who presumes to do this sins against his own reason and against that infinite Being who gave him his reason.

God being infinitely perfect has a right to will what He wills to will, and against this right there can be no right; against His perfect will there is nothing but moral evil—sin. All moral evil, all sin is nothing but a dissonance, a revolt of finite wills against this infinitely perfect will. Man can have no rights that antagonize the perfect Being for that which antagonizes the perfect Being must, from the fact of antagonism, be wrong; and man as a rational being has no *right* to do *wrong* or be *wrong*.

When you speak of "arbitrary will" you introduce an idea that is incompatible with the idea of the infinitely perfect Being. "Arbitrary willing" supposes unreasonable captious, impulsive willing, where passion sways and right reason is quiescent. To assert this of the perfect Being is to assert imperfection of Him. This you cannot do after having admitted that He is perfect. Ingersoll is more logical than you. He saw that to admit an infinitely perfect Being he must admit the necessary consequences, and to get rid of these consequences he denied His existence. He has enough of the logical instinct to see the connection between admissions and their consequences—a point you seem to be utterly oblivious of, for you are continually making admissions and at the same time arguing against the results that flow from them.

Lacy. Has He (God) the right to inflict wanton suffering without any moral aim whatever?

Lambert. This is an absurd question. It is if you should ask, Has the perfect Being the right to do wrong? Has the perfect Being the right to be imperfect? A question that supposes imperfection in the perfect Being involves a contradiction and requires no answer. God, being perfect, has a right to do as He wills.

Lacy. (2) Had He, according to some mysterious rule of justice, the right to do so (act arbitrarily and punish wantonly,) would He, as the merciful ruler of the universe, exercise that right?

Lambert. Inasmuch as the perfect Being cannot be imperfect, He does not act arbitrarily or punish wantonly. It is not a question of mercy, but of divine nature. What God would do in a given case cannot be known to man, because man from the fact that he

is finite in knowledge cannot know all the "ins and outs" of that given case. If he could know *all* about the case he might, knowing the perfections of God, know what God would do in that given case. But man, being ignorant of the essential elements of the problem, is as foolish in undertaking to solve it as would be the mathematician who should undertake to solve a problem without knowing its conditions. The radical error of you infidels is that, in your abnormal self-conceit, you imagine you are in full possession of all the conditions.

Lacy. God, we are told, is "infinite" in every holy attribute; and that holiness embraces justice, mercy and truth. It may be assumed illogically, however, that justice in human language does not mean justice in the divine vernacular—that God's code of morals, so to speak, differs from man's code.

Lambert. God's code of morals, so to speak, is different from man's code. God's code is not something outside of and independent of Himself—it is Himself; whereas man's code is something outside of and independent of himself—it is the nature and will of his creator. While the code then is intrinsically the same, it is as different relative to God and man as the creator is different from the creature. Again, justice is essential to the perfect Being for we cannot conceive Him without it, whereas it is not essential to man for we can conceive him without it. This is an essential difference. God is *essentially* just; man is *contingently* so.

Lacy. Yet, if God has spoken to us at all, He has employed human speech as the medium of communication.

Lambert. Here you have uttered a profound truth. If the infinite intellect wishes to impart something to a finite intellect it must use a finite symbolism. When two intellects come in contact the basis of communication must be the capacity of the weaker; what the stronger knows over and above the capacity of the weaker is to the weaker "unthinkable," to use a fond expression of modern agnosticism. The infinite Being must therefore, when in communication with finite beings, use a medium suited to their capacity.

Lacy. If (we are) made to His (God's) "mental and moral likeness," we conceive and practice, under analogous conditions, the same kind of justice and mercy as he, only to a more limited extent.

Lambert. Granting your hypothetic premises I deny the conclusion. We neither conceive nor practice the same kind of justice and mercy that God does, because God and man are not and cannot be conceived to be "under analogous conditions." God's acts can have but two possible relations. They relate to Himself or to his creatures. Man cannot act in relation to himself and his creatures. He cannot act in relation to himself for being a creature his acts must have relation to his creator. He cannot act in relation to his creatures for the reason that he is not a creator and therefore has no creatures. Therefore there is no analogy between God's and man's acts. Again, man cannot act without relation to his creator and his fellow creatures, and God cannot act in such relation for he has no creator, no fellow creatures. Therefore again there is no analogy. Again, God is infinite and man finite and between the finite and infinite there are no "analogous conditions." Man is said to be just when he deals justly with his fellow creatures, but God

cannot be just in that way, because he has no fellow-creatures. He has only creatures who depend absolutely on him for their being, and this being the case he can deal with them as he wills and in doing so is responsible to himself alone.

Lacy. Justice and mercy, then, with God and man are qualitatively alike though quantitatively unequal.

Lambert. The quality of God's justice is infinite, the quality of man's justice is finite; the former *essential* the latter *contingent*. Then God's and man's justice are not qualitatively alike. God's justice has reference to his *creatures*, man's justice has reference to his *fellow-creatures*, therefore again the quality is not the same. Be justice qualitative or quantitative there can be no comparison between that of the infinite Being and that of the finite being, because between the finite and infinite there can be no comparison.

CHAPTER XVI.

Lacy. Fear of the superior power of God, and a gross conception of a liability on his part to use it to our disadvantage, may torture from us an admission that divine and human justice are not alike in kind.

Lambert. All this proves that you have not the most remote conception of the Christian idea of God. The Christian's idea is that God is the Perfect Being, and this excludes the idea that he could use power to our disadvantage, unless we deserve punishment. Divine and human justice are not alike in kind; this admission is tortured from us by common sense, not by the fear of God.

Lacy. But we can apprehend neither justice nor mercy which is not humanly conceived and realized; any other kind is unthinkable.

Lambert. The difficulty is not in conceiving divine justice but in understanding its application. Our ignorance of all the conditions, circumstances and divine purposes disables us from judging the acts of God in any given case. But knowing that he is the perfect Being we must conclude *a priori* that his every act is just, without reference to how it may appear to us whose minds are rendered impotent by ignorance. To know what justice is and to discern the justice of a particular act are different things. Man is capable of the former but not of the latter in all cases, for the latter depends on conditions of which he is ignorant.

Lacy. The Scripture, when speaking of duty, addresses man as man and appeals to his sense of right and wrong.

Lambert. The Scripture in addressing man must address him as man. To address him otherwise would not be to address him at all. His sense of right and wrong is a divine revelation and therefore a good thing to appeal to.

Lacy. Well may it (the Scripture); for we *have no other means* by which to judge of the morality of human actions, nor of the attributes of God.

Lambert. I have italicised the above words as they make an important concession. If, aside from the Scripture, there are no other means to enable us to judge of the morality of human acts and of the attributes of God, why do you reject the Scripture, which by your own admission, is the *only means* of knowing and judging of morality and the divine attributes? You have told us elsewhere that the Bible is crammed full of errors, immoralities and iniquities, and you now tell us it is the *only rule of morals*, the only means of acquiring a knowledge of the attributes of God! It was written, you tell us, by men who lived in dark and superstitious ages, and almost in the same breath you confess that there are no other means than the Scripture of judging of the morality of human acts!

Lacy. Has he (God) the right to violate those attributes which are in consonance with the moral sense he has implanted in us? If so, he has the right to do wrong.

Lambert. The infinitely wise and perfect Being has the right to act according to his wisdom and nature, and he has the right that imperfect creatures,

confessedly finite in knowledge and judgment, should not presume to judge him. Whatever He wills and does must be right. We cannot suppose the contrary without implying that he is imperfect, and to imply this is to deny his existence. To ask, Has the perfect Being the right to do wrong? is the same as asking, Can he be perfect and imperfect at the same time, or, Has a triangle the right to have four angles?

As God is infinitely perfect he cannot violate his own attributes. This would argue imperfection in him. We cannot entertain a supposition that implies imperfection in God after having admitted him to be perfect. But, you ask, can God act contrary to that moral sense which he has implanted in man? That depends on whether that moral sense has been dwarfed, warped, stunted or contorted out of its original normal condition. Polygamy is contrary to *our* moral sense but not contrary to the moral sense of the Mormon or Turk. So you will observe that our moral sense depends much on education. God implanted in us the germ of the moral sense just as he implanted in us the germ of intelligence, and both need to be developed by education. It does not follow that an act is really wrong in itself because it appears wrong to the ill-instructed moral sense of the individual. We must distinguish between the *idea* of right and wrong and that *judgment* by which the idea is applied to a given act. Man has the idea of right and wrong more or less developed according to circumstances, but this idea alone is not sufficient to form a practical judgment of any given act. To form this judgment, that is, to apply the idea as the measure of the goodness or badness of any given act, we must be in full and absolute possession of all the circumstances, con-

ditions and reasons of the act. That is, we must have full knowledge, for the correctness of our judgment depends on the correctness and extent of our knowledge. Now man's knowledge is confessedly finite and imperfect, while God's knowledge is infinitely perfect. This being the case man acts irrationally when he assumes with his finite and imperfect knowledge to judge of the morality of any act of that Being who is infinitely perfect in knowledge, and justice and truth. Wisdom dictates that when there is a clash between an act of God and man's idea of right, man must immediately conclude that he is not in full possession of all the facts, reasons and motives in the case; he must furbish his moral sense, and not assume to know as much or more than the perfect Being knows. To limit God's right in any given case or hypothesis is to assume that you know more than he knows, both as to the principles of right and the facts of the case—to place finite knowledge and intellect against infinite knowledge and intellect. Therefore, when there is a real or apparent dissonance between an act of God and the judgment of man, man, if he have the use of reason, must infer that his judgment is wrong. This is a logical and necessary conclusion from the admission of a perfect Being.

Lacy. Can we believe that he (God) has a right to create a sentient being, simply to damn him, and that for his own glory?

Lambert. Considering that he is the perfect Being, infinitely good, just and holy, we cannot understand how he could create a being simply to make him suffer. It appears to us it would be against his goodness and holiness and we cannot suppose him to act against his own essential attributes. But if he

cannot thus create a being, it is because of his own attributes and not because of any right inherent in the created sentient being. We are not called on to believe that God creates any being to damn it. Christian theology teaches that damnation is the result of man's free acts and not of divine predetermination.

Lacy. Why do we call God just? because he is powerful?

Lambert. No, but because he is the perfect Being of whom justice is a necessary attribute.

Lacy. Why do you adjudge him merciful? Is it for no better reason than that fear constrains you?

Lambert. For the same reason that we call Him just. See above. It is silly to talk of fear—the verisest trifling.

Lacy. If God be God, he is no Nero, no Herod, no Gessler, but a Father lifting up his children to himself.

Lambert. This is true, and therefore you and Ingersoll slander him when you make him out a tyrant.

Lacy. Parent of all, they are most like him who dare to speak the truth.

Lambert. This is also true, but the inference that Christians through fear dare not speak the truth is in the true Ingersollian style.

Lacy. We are told that we may not pre-judge the justice of God.

Lambert. Yes, and you were also told the reason.

Lacy. We believe that he is good, but you slander him by imputing to him acts he never did, and words by him never spoken.

Lambert. Here you beg the question in debate, namely, whether God said and did what the Scriptures represent him as having said and done.

Lacy. We believe that certain pictures of him contained in the Bible are but the conceptions of men who lived in the dark and superstitious ages.

Lambert. And we believe you mistake. Your belief in the matter is not of the slightest consequence until you give good and sufficient reason for it. This you have not done.

Lacy. Even admitting that God has a right to inflict wanton torture, as a being of perfect justice and infinite mercy, is it likely he would do so?

Lambert. But we do not admit that God can inflict *wanton* torture. Wanton torture is punishment inflicted without reason. But God who, is the perfect Being, cannot act without reason, because to do so would be an imperfection. Therefore your question is absurd.

Lacy. If man have no rights whatever as against him (God) he would have a right to thus afflict man if he chose.

Lambert. This does not follow. God cannot afflict man unjustly, but this arises from his infinite justice and not from any rights on man's part as against God. A moment's reflection ought to show you that man has no rights as against his creator. Man, a creature, possesses and can possess nothing but what he receives from his creator. This is self-evident, for the source of his being is the source of all he has. Therefore whatever rights he has he received from God. Now God is the perfect Being and therefore cannot give to his creatures any right as against himself. Man's security against unjust punishment rests not on any right he has, but on the nature of the perfect Being.

Lacy. Natural law holds sway over the universe.

Lambert. True, but this natural law is nothing more than the impress of the creator's will on matter.

Lacy. If we break that law, even by accident, we suffer the penalty.

Lambert. It would be interesting to know how man can break the natural law. We can understand how man can break the moral law, but how he can break the physical law, of which you speak, is a conundrum which we must give up.

CHAPTER XVII.

Lacy. We know how impartial justice is, and how sweet to our holiest contemplation is that mercy which endureth for ever.

Lambert. You infidel gentry are fond of personifying abstractions. Justice, unless it is an attribute of some being, is an abstraction, like whiteness without something that is white. Abstracted from moral agents justice is nothing real. To exist it must inhere in some real being as a quality in its subject. Absolute, infinite and perfect justice exists only as an essential mode of the absolute, infinite and perfect Being, and without this Being it cannot exist or be conceived to exist. To talk of justice as something beyond and independent of the perfect Being, as something to which he is amenable as an inferior to a superior, is to ignore its nature. The perfect Being is the centre, source and origin of all perfection in the moral as well as in the physical universe. As justice has no existence aside from the just Being, so that mercy which endureth forever has no existence aside from the merciful Being who endures forever.

Both justice and mercy, to be operative, require a being of infinite knowledge to apply them. Man, not having infinite knowledge, cannot apply them or know when they are applied. Take a case to illustrate. Two men being equally guilty under like circumstances and conditions, and being equally non-repentant of their guilt, will be equally punished by divine justice; and two men being equally good under

lik
wa
hy
ju
be
gu
ex
cal
equ
dit
edg
kno
bee
cas
the
and
why
acts
sub
dest
the
lay
it is
raise

a na
auth
taug
cribe
right
celler

claim
pages

like circumstances and conditions, will be equally rewarded. This is clear, but the case being merely hypothetical has no practical value to assisting us in judging of justice and mercy in any particular case, because we cannot know *when two men are equally guilty, or when the circumstances and conditions are exactly alike*. Now it is evident that to form a practical judgment in the case we must know that they are equally guilty and that the circumstances and conditions are alike. But man with his limited knowledge cannot know all these things. Hence he cannot know in any given case whether justice or mercy has been applied or not. And hence again, in no given case can man accuse the perfect Being of injustice, for the perfect Being alone knows when the guilt is equal and the circumstances and conditions alike. This is why the finite mind cannot be the judge of divine acts—why the mere attempt is a self stultification. To subordinate the infinite intelligence to the finite is to destroy it, and to subject God's judgments and acts to the human judgment is to deny God's existence. I lay stress on these incontrovertible principles because it is by their application that most of the difficulties raised by Mr. Lacy are to be solved.

Lacy. We meet a book of which 'tis said, God—a name implying all the beauty of holiness—is the author, and we ask, do the facts stated and the lessons taught in that book comport with the character ascribed to its reputed author? Say not we have no right to judge him; we agree as to his supreme excellence; it is the Book which is on trial.

Lambert. Have you forgotten that Ingersoll claimed the right to judge even God, and you, some pages back in your book, do the same thing. You

appear now to give up this position and make "the Book" the object of your censure.

Lacy. It is the Book which is on trial.

Lambert. The question according to your own statement of it is whether the Book is or is not inspired. The question then is not as to the Book or its contents, but as to its *inspiration*. If it is inspired by God its precepts and commands must be just and right, however they may appear to us. It will not do to say the Book commanded unjust things to be done and therefore it is not inspired. This is to beg the question, for if it be inspired those things which you imagine to be unjust are not and cannot be unjust. To say anything in the Bible is unjust is to deny its inspiration. But its inspiration is the very point in debate. You will then observe that the inspiration of the Book is the first point to be determined, for you cannot determine the nature of its precepts and commands until its inspiration is settled. If inspired its contents are just and right and beyond human criticism. But, you will ask, are we not to determine its inspiration by its contents? I answer, no. The claim that the Bible is inspired is not based on its contents but on facts, circumstances and evidence outside of and independent of the nature of the contents. Now inasmuch as the claim of inspiration is not based on the contents, that claim must be overthrown without reference to the contents. When the claim is overthrown the contents can be considered on their merits, but as long as the claim is not disproved the contents must be assumed to be in everyway correct, just and proper. If the Christian theologian adduced the contents of the Bible as evidence of its inspiration, they would then be legitimate subjects of discussion, but he

is
w
ju
a
sp
an
pa
lo
ar
un
be
th
ow
ins
for
mu
of
his
pro

obl
con
spi
mo
for

by
mea
acti
Rep
doc
trin
have
state

is not so illogical, for he knows that even if the infidel were to admit that the contents of the Bible were true, just and holy, it would be no proof of inspiration, for a book may be true, just and holy without being inspired, and it may appear to you unjust and untrue and yet be just, true and inspired. There are many passages in the Bible that claim inspiration, but every logician knows that these claims, inasmuch as they are made by the Book itself, have no validity or force until the inspiration is otherwise established, for if it be not inspired its claims are not inspired and are therefore of no weight. A book cannot testify in its own behalf. If it could we would have to admit the inspiration of the Koran and the Book of Mormon, for both claim inspiration. The inspiration of a book must then be proved or disproved by evidence outside of it. The inspiration of the Bible is proved by its history, by miracles and by the fulfillment of its prophecies.

Lacy. Can we believe, without mental and moral obliquity of vision, without renouncing every natural conception of right and wrong, that the good God inspired men to write that which shocks *reason* and moral sensibility to such an extent that we must call for the veil of *mystery* to obscure its deformity?

Lambert. This is a queer question to be asked by one who has declared that the Bible is the *only* means by which to judge of the morality of human actions, and of the attributes of God. See *Lacy's Reply*, page 60. The Bible is a book in which are doctrines, morals, prophesy and history. Its doctrines and morals are true and pure, its prophecies have been verified by accomplished facts, its history states with impartial fidelity the crimes of both Jew

and gentile. Many of the facts are discreditable to Jew and gentile and even to our common humanity, and shock our reason and moral sense. But if God inspired men to write history he must have inspired them to write it truthfully. Would you have him inspire them to write false history to prevent a shock to your delicate sensibility? Do you pretend that God sanctioned these crimes because he inspired men to record them in justification of his own action and as a warning and lesson to mankind? If you say the doctrines and moral teachings of the Bible shock reason and normal moral sensibility I take issue with you, and hope that the mere fact of differing from you is no evidence of moral obliquity of vision on my part. If mere assertion were proof you and Ingersoll would certainly have the best of it.

Lacy. Would we not rather believe that men—good men, considering the times in which they lived—wrote their conceptions of God, and, by their traditions, defiled the pure current of history?

Lambert. It is not a question of what we would *rather* believe, but what facts and evidence require us to believe. Those good men you speak of were as competent to record the facts of *their* times as you or our historians are to write of the facts of *our* times. And as to their conceptions of God, modern development has not enabled us to improve on them. As to their traditions, why should they be less reliable than our traditions? Those good men were as intelligent and competent to deal with the facts and traditions of their times as we are to deal with the facts and traditions of our times. It is cheap charity to grant them goodness at the expense of their intelligence; to say they were fools, but good fools. To say that they



defiled the pure current of history is to say that you know more about the history of their times than they did. Of course you do, but it is not modest to say it.

Notes. He who has the absolute right to take life cannot be guilty of murder in taking it; for *murder* is an *unjust* killing, and there is no unjust killing in the taking of life by him who has the absolute right to take it. There is no escape from this reasoning except by denying the absolute right, and you cannot deny this but by denying God's existence; for on the hypothesis that he exists, he is creator, and being creator, the absolute right of dominion over his creatures necessarily follows, * * * to deny this right is to deny God's existence.





Lacy. If by absolute dominion be meant to govern without regard to the principles of justice, written by God's own finger on the human heart, we fail to see it.

Lambert. Inasmuch as absolute dominion does *not* mean to govern without regard to the principles of justice, your *if* is of no consequence. No one thinks of asserting that the perfect Being can govern without reference to his own essential attributes, of which justice is one. When I assert the absolute dominion of God, I simply assert that he is accountable to no one but himself, and that whatever he does, merely *because* he does it, is beyond human criticism. God himself is the principle and the *only* principle of justice, and of being, and of life, and of intelligence, and of whatever we are, and of whatever anything is, or that is at all. He is the Reason of existences and of all their essential appurtenances. Without a revelation of some kind from the perfect Being, man is utterly incapable of making or imagining a rule of





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4502

EE 128
EE 123
EE 122
EE 120
EE 118

11
10
EE
EE

right or wrong. Therefore if he seek a rule at all he must seek it in the *will* and nature of the perfect Being.

Lacy. The right of dominion is not the tyrant's right.

Lambert. Of course it is not, and no sane man ever thought of saying it is.

Lacy. Suppose I had the power to speak into sentient life the sands of the sea and to endue them with mental, moral and physical being, would I be justified, because the creator of such, in inflicting suffering upon them from mere caprice or for my own pleasure?

Lambert. From *mere caprice* or for your own *pleasure*, no. But who claims that God punishes from mere caprice or for his own pleasure? Certainly not the Christian. By what right do you assume that God permits suffering or inflicts punishment through caprice or for pleasure? To assert, as I do, that God has absolute dominion is not to assert that he can act through caprice or that pain as such can please him. God, because he is infinitely perfect, always acts for a reason—a sufficient and adequate reason, and therefore never through caprice. That God cannot punish unjustly or through caprice arises from the fact that such action is contrary to his nature and attributes and not because the creature has any rights as against God. You may say that according to Scripture God has punished through caprice and for his own pleasure. But this I deny, and my denial is as good as your assertion.

If I were to grant all you say on this point it would not meet my argument, which from beginning to end does not imply the right to act from caprice.

You seem to imagine that power and authority simply because they are power and authority must necessarily be capricious, tyrannical and unjust. Against such a postulate I cannot stop to argue.

Lacy. "God has a right to take life." Granted.

Lambert. This admission covers the whole ground—concedes all I have claimed. He who has a right to take life does not commit murder in taking it. Therefore Ingersoll spoke falsely when he said God ordered the *murder* of millions. Your admission condemns Ingersoll as a false witness.

Lacy. But should he or would he convert the world into a slaughter-house and dispute his chosen people, as human butchers, to slay, not only men, but women, children, and babes unborn?

Lambert. This is too transparent. The question is not what God would or should do, but what he has a right to do. You admit he has a right to take life. He being infinitely wise and just is the judge—the only judge of why, how and when he shall take it. Whether by the lightning's flash, disease or the sword is of no consequence to the main issue which you have granted. The right to take life being admitted, you can no longer question the justice of God's commands in ordering the death of men, women and children for reasons which because they *are* his must be just. He is amendable to himself—not to us. The guilt must have been terrible that brought such terrible retribution.

Lacy. From the days of Abraham the lash of the Almighty was held *in terrorem* over their backs, and *his will was made clearly manifest to them*; and yet, with all, they were in a state of chronic rebellion against their divine ruler.

Lambert. The words in italics contain another of those illogical admissions by which Mr. Lacy upsets his own position. If the will of the Almighty was clearly manifested to the Jews, it must have been by revelation and miracles as recorded in the Old Testament. Except by miraculous manifestations and revelation there is no other way conceivable by which the will of God could have been manifested to the Jews. Now as you admit that the will of God was clearly manifested to the Jews, you must admit the only means by which it could have been so manifested; these means are miracles and revelations, therefore you must admit that miracles and revelations are facts. Here you antagonize Ingersoll who denies both and calls the former spurious coin. You have told us that the Bible gives us false conceptions of God, written by men who lived in dark and superstitious ages. You now tell us that the will of God was clearly manifested to the Jews! When will you learn to be consistent with yourself?

That many of the Jews were rebellious against God, and some of their rulers were bad men, is true, just as men in all ages have been rebellious and rulers bad, and this accounts for the punishment inflicted on them.

t
w
c
d

b
ic
de
th
A
m
in
fel
in
st
ca

he
H
an
th
fin
di
th
he
wh
ish
as

CHAPTER XVIII.

Lacy. The killing of the heathen by the idolatrous Jews is justified, although the heathen nations were ignorant of the divine law and its penalties, because they had been revealed to their ancestors hundreds of years before.

Ingersoll. Whatever the Jewish nation may have been guilty of, it was most certainly not guilty of idolatry. The laws of Moses condemned and put to death those who were guilty of it; yet in the face of this fact you call them without exception idolaters. As well might you call the American people polygamists because they made laws prohibiting and punishing polygamy. That some Jews from time to time fell into idolatry is true, just as some Americans fall into polygamy, but this does not justify the sweeping statement that the Jews were idolaters or the Americans polygamists.

You state with infallible assurance that the heathen nations were ignorant of the divine law. How do you know this? That they were not ignorant of the divine natural law is evident from the fact that, as you truly say, "it was written by God's own finger on the tablets of the human heart." Now this divine natural law, because written on the tablets of the human heart, must have been known to the heathen. It was for sinning against this law, of which they were not ignorant, that they were punished, and not for disobeying the divine positive law as revealed to the Jews, which they did not know.

The cause of their punishment is made clear in the Book of Wisdom. "Those ancient inhabitants of the holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did works hateful to thee by their sorceries and wicked sacrifices, and *those merciless murderers of their own children, and eaters of men's bowels, and devourers of blood* from the midst of thy consecration; and those parents *sacrificing with their own hands helpless souls*, it was thy will to destroy by the hands of our parents." (See Notes, page 65.)

Do not understand me as defending God's action in removing from the face of the earth those people because they were guilty, for I hold that he had the right to remove them whether they were guilty or innocent, just as by means of his natural law he is daily removing us, both innocent and guilty, both infancy and age. Against his will there is no appeal or right to appeal. He owes no man to-morrow.

The mistake you infidels make is in measuring God's economy by your experience of the narrow span of human life from the cradle to the grave, as if it were the be-all and end-all, whereas it is only the initiatory—the mere introduction into endless existence. The child whose first breath is its last has received a beginning, and is as fixed forever in the order of realities as he who lingers here in this migratory state for five score years to sink at last gray haired and trembling into his grave. To live as man forever we must begin to live as man here, and this beginning, short or long, secures an endless future. Of what consequence then in the long run is a longer or shorter sojourn here in this phase of being? The child that is born and dies to-day is as old as that which born to-day dies a hundred years hence. The

latter has greater experience here, the former greater experience beyond. What is this speck of time to either or to God? There is in all this infidel lachrymose blubbering an occult denial of a future existence; a want of that serene calmness which comes from a conviction of endless life, an indefinable, white-lipped, cowardly fear, the horrible imaginings of a fever patient. This want of belief in the future impels them to make the facts of this phase of existence the ultimate rule of divine justice. To please them God must interfere with his divine plan, shut up the eternities and begin and complete everything within the space of man's earthly life. It must be confessed to the honor of human nature that people of this kind are comparatively few.

Lacy. Mr. Ingersoll is severely reprimanded because he avers, according to Scripture, captive maidens were surrendered to lustful captors. He is accused of being reckless in statement. The charge he makes is termed a baseless assertion and an appeal to ignorance.

Lambert. And I repeat that his assertion is baseless and an appeal to or the result of ignorance. He said:

Ingersoll. He (God) gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors.

Notes. I flatly deny the truth of your statement and appeal to the only record that can give us any information on the subject, namely, the Old Testament. The Hebrew military laws did not abandon captive women to the insolence and brutality of captors. On the contrary they made special provision forbidding the first familiarities of the soldier with his captives. If you study the 21st chapter of Deuteron-

omy, verses 10 to 14, you will learn that the soldier was obliged to make the captive his wife, or to respect her person and honor. Instead of tolerating that licentiousness which the customs and laws of other nations authorized, the laws of the Hebrews kept the soldier in restraint. They show that the Hebrews were far in advance of other nations in all those regulations that mitigate the horrors of war. The pagan nations of that time allowed every familiarity with the captives, and afterwards they were sold as slaves or given to the lusts of slaves. This was strictly and specifically forbidden by the Hebrew law. And yet in the face of all this, you have the affrontery to charge the Almighty with permitting the Jews to do that which he forbade, and which they alone of all ancient nations prohibited by strict and specific laws. What will honest men of common sense think of a philosophy that has to be propped and bolstered up by such shameless misrepresentations of history?

Lacy. Why does the Father say "to" and not *through* the 14th verse. Without divining his motive it will be apparent that by so doing he would have disproved his own assertion and have justified Mr. Ingersoll's statement.

Lambert. It is clear from verses 11, 12 and 13, that the captor was required to *marry* his captive, and that the intercourse between them was to be that of husband and wife. "*Thou shalt * * * be her husband and she shall be thy wife.*" Does this justify the statement that God gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors? If so every woman that marries is given over to the lusts of her husband. But this is not the way men speak of women who are married. Verse 11th says to the Jewish soldier: "When thou

seest among the captives a beautiful woman, and hast a desire unto her, that thou wouldst have her to wife." Here there is no talk of giving captive maidens to the lust of captors, but of how the captors should *make them their wives*. The manner of doing so is laid down in verses 12 and 13 as follows: "Thou shalt bring her home to thy house; and shalt shave her head and pare her nails; and she shall put the raiment of captivity from off her, and she shall remain in thy house, and bewail her father and mother a full month."

There are three things to be observed here. 1st, the captor was to bring her home and by a simple ceremony adopt her into the family and nation and give her the right of a Hebrew woman. 2d, she was to cast aside the signs of captivity, that is, she was no longer to be considered in the relation of a captive. 3rd, she was to be left free one month to mourn the loss of her relations, and on the expiration of the month the captor was to marry her. There is certainly nothing here to justify Ingersoll's misrepresentation.

"This," says Philo, "is an admirable statute. On the one hand, instead of tolerating that licentiousness which custom and the laws of other nations authorized, it kept the soldier during thirty days, in constraint, and as it showed him his captive, during this interval in an undress, and stripped of all those ornaments which might add to her charms, it gave him time and opportunity to moderate the violence of his passion. On the other hand, this law was a balm to the sorrows of the captive."

But you say verse 14th disproves my statement and justifies Ingersoll's. The verse is as follows: "And it shall be, if thou have no delight in her, then

thou shalt let her go whither she will ; but thou shalt not sell her at all for money, thou shalt not make merchandise of her, because thou hast humbled her."

This verse simply means that if, after having married her, he saw fit afterwards to use his liberty of divorce, recognized by the Jewish code, she was then entitled to her freedom ; she was not to be retained as a slave, nor sold by him to be another's. The purpose of this law was to protect her liberty, to prevent her after the divorce from falling into slavery, and to secure to her the rights of a Hebrew woman. This verse then, instead of disproving my statement, confirms it, and proves that when Ingersoll said, "God gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors," he said what is not true. Instead of consigning the captive maiden to the lawless passions of the soldier, the laws contained in the above verses hold him in restraint, and leave him no way to approach her except through honorable marriage. If after marriage he takes advantage of the divorce laws, verse 14 still protects her and prevents her captor husband's cupidity from making her a slave or a prostitute. She must be free to go whither she will, free as the daughters of Abraham, for she is an adopted daughter of the nation. Such was the effect of those laws which Ingersoll and you quote as evidences of lawless lechery sanctioned by Almighty God. A more profound study of the laws of Moses, the man with a mind of unparalleled greatness, who acted with a primeval strength of his own, independent of all history, would enlarge your vision, enable you to judge more justly, and criticise in a more enlightened spirit. Instead of this scholarly method you prefer that of the serpent which beslimes every beautiful thing it touches.

CHAPTER XIX.

Lacy. Certainly; a lady of the present day would, no doubt, feel sufficiently "humbled" by treatment like this. (That is, changed from a captive slave to an honorable wife and afterwards divorced, but with all the rights of the women of the conquerors, and with all the ways of ambition open to her that are open to the ambition of the women of the nation—free to marry the peasant or the king, and without that stigma of immoral repute which attaches to the divorced woman of our day.)

Lambert. When the lady of the present day is divorced, her moral character is blasted and her future ruined; her disgrace ramifies out to her most remotest kindred and taints them as having bad blood. The man who dares to marry her partakes of her loss of social caste, sinks to her moral level, shares her ostracism, bares his brow and breast to the arrows and shafts of his enemies, to the sympathy of his friends and to the jibes and jokes of the thoughtless and heartless. Who dares to marry such a woman? How wretched then is her condition? It is indeed sad. She stands out alone, a solitary in society, an aimless creature whose lamp has been put out, whose hopes have no foundation but in the good God and in the eternity that awaits us all. The joys of earthly life have for her forever vanished.

But to judge of the condition of the Jewish divorced captive by this sad picture is to make a great mistake. The reason of her divorce is distinctly laid

down, and implies no evil repute; give her her liberty, let her go whither she will, with character unstained, free to marry in honor with him who offers her his heart and devotion, and who in doing so lost not caste or respect.

But he has "humbled" her. True, but not in the sense of defilement, as implied in Ingersoll's statement, for she was his wife. Her humiliation consisted in being divorced and not in the disgrace arising from outrage on an unmarried woman. She was divorced by the law that prevailed among the Jews. In all this there is not the slightest foundation for Ingersoll's filthy insinuation.

Lacy. So in the plentitude of thy mercy sell her not, noble man! devoted husband!

Lambert. You will admit that the law forbidding the Jews to imitate the custom of the neighboring heathens was an admirable law. But this is straying from the point, which is whether Ingersoll told the truth when he said that "God gave captive maidens to gratify the lusts of captors." That his statement is false is evident from the verse quoted from Deuteronomy.

As further proof you quote from Numbers: "But all the women children who have not known man by lying with him, *keep for yourselves,*" and add:—

Lacy. Female innocence to be offered on the altar of lust! Noble trophies of victory!

Lambert. A Comanche Indian would probably interpret the verse that way. But what is there in the words to justify the inference that the captives were devoted to the lusts of the captors? The captives were to be adopted into the nation and subsequently to intermarry with the Jews in accordance with the

law of Deuteronomy quoted above. It is only a libidinous imagination that can give the words any other interpretation. The United States government "keeps for itself" the children of those Indians whom it destroys. Are we to infer that those children are to be offered on the altar of lust?

Notes. God abhors lying spirits, false prophets and false philosophers; yet he permits them to exist, because he cannot make them impossible without destroying free will, or human liberty.

Lacy. The good priest has at last confessed it. There be some things that even God cannot do. To the extent of his inability he is of course "limited."

Lambert. I have already spoken of the imaginary limits to the power of the infinite Being. Power is the capacity to do something; infinite power is the capacity to do *all things*—not the capacity to do all nothings, such as contradictions. The inability to do nothing is no limit of power. Its limit is the inability to do something. Now an act that involves a contradiction results in nothing. To expend energy in doing an act that has no result is contrary to infinite wisdom. To make a square circle is to make nothing, because the essential attributes of one excludes the essential attributes of the other. The result is a square and a circle, or nothing. To make a *free slave*, like a square circle, is to do nothing, for if he be free he is not a slave, and if a slave he is not free. To do nothing requires no exercise of power and therefore is no limit of power. Now when I say God cannot make a man free and at the same time prevent him from lying, it is the same as saying that he cannot do an act that on account of inherent contradiction results in nothing. Christian theology teaches that

God can do all things. A square circle or a free slave is not a thing; it is a nothing. Your blunder arises from confounding something with no thing, or all things with no things.

Lacy. We now agree that some things are impossible with God, even if we disagree as to what is and what is not impossible.

Lambert. We do not agree; on the contrary we differ radically. God can do *all things*, and that which he cannot do is *no thing*—but a contradiction.

Lacy. But did the God of the Hebrews, as the Father avers he did, abhor lying spirits?

Lambert. Yes, as will be seen from the following texts:

Thou shalt fly lying.—Exodus 23-1.

These six things doth the Lord hate * * * a lying tongue * * * and a false witness that speaketh lies.—Prov. 6-16, 19.

Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord, but they that deal faithfully please him.—Prov. 12-22.

A false witness shall not be unpunished, and he that speaketh lies shall not escape.—Prov. 19-5.

The bread of lying is sweet to a man, but afterwards his mouth shall be filled with gravel.—Prov. 12-27.

He that gathereth treasures by a lying tongue, is vain and foolish, and shall stumble upon the snares of death.—Prov. 21-6.

The mouth that believeth killeth the soul.—Wisdom 1-11.

Do not devise a lie against thy brother * * * Be not willing to make any manner of lie, for the custom thereof is not good.—Eccli. 7-13.

A lie is a foul blot in a man * * * A thief is better than a man that is always lying; both of them shall inherit destruction. The manner of lying men is without honor; and their confusion is with them without ceasing.—Wisdom 20-26 to 28.

Cursing, and *lying* and killing and theft, and adultery have overflowed * * * therefore shall the land mourn.—Osee 3-2, 3.

These texts are from the Old Testament. The following are from the New;

You are of your father, the devil, and the desires of your father you will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and he abode not in the truth, because truth is not in him, for he is a liar and the father thereof.—John 8-44.

Putting away lying, speak ye the truth, every man with his neighbor.—Ephes. 4-25.

Lie not at all.—Coloss. 3-9.

There shall not enter into it (heaven) anything defiled, or any that worketh abomination, or a lie.—Apocal. 22-15.

Here we have enough to prove that the God of the Hebrews and Christians abhors and punishes liars of all kinds, whether they assume the cant of the hypocrite in religion or the cant of the hypocrite in philosophy, whether a sorcerer in the jungles of Africa or a lecturer in dress coat and neck-tie, whether for evil purposes or for 50 cents admission fee, whether ignorant or learned, gross or polite, funny or stupid—all are detested by the God of truth, and if unrepentant will be damned for their lying—whether they believe in damnation or not.

CHAPTER XX.

Mr. Lacy introduces his 10th chapter by stigmatizing the science of theology. He makes no distinction between true and false theology. It does not seem to have occurred to him that there is a true and a false theology, as there is a true and a false science, a true and false astronomy, a true and false philosophy, a true and false view to everything that can become an object of human thought. He sums up all human notions of religion under the word "theology" and concludes that because many of these notions are erroneous the whole science of theology is erroneous. The fallacy of this position is evident from the mere statement of it, for if the errors made by investigators in theology destroy the value of theological science, the errors of investigators in all other fields of inquiry would equally destroy the validity of all the other sciences. This is too absurd to deserve a moment's consideration. And yet in this absurd way does the average infidel talk. He seems to have no sense of precision in his logic—in thinking or in talking—as long as he can talk, talk, talk, without interruption, he is happy.

Lacy. It is difficult for theology to cleanse itself from the moths, the mould and mildew of the past.

Lambert. I go further than you and say that it is not only difficult but impossible for the science of theology to disassociate itself from the errors of the past or of the future. The true and the false will move along together, as a body and its shadow, But

the errors of men in theological speculation, can no more be attributed to the science of theology than the mistakes of an urchin in the Rule of Three can be attributed to the science of geometry or mathematics. Must a science be rejected because those who deal with it make mistakes? Must we throw aside the science of astronomy because of the mistakes of Galileo, Ptolemy and Brahe, or because of the new theories that are being broached of late? Moths, moulds and mildews are concomitants of real, substantial things. Moulds and mildews must have something to mould and mildew, or they would not exist; just so, theological errors cannot exist without theological truth in which they can inhere and which they mould and mildew, as moss grows on granite.

Lacy. It (theology) started out in a blaze of the miraculous; it assumed, as a God-given privilege, the right to torture and to slay.

Lambert. This is one of those many infidel phrases which requires the Christian to exercise his patience to meet with equanimity. It is false from beginning to end, false all through from top to bottom, as full of unmitigated falsehood as a thoroughly wet sponge is of water. Every fibre of it is impregnated to its fullest capacity with the spirit of fallacy. One could imagine that the lying spirit spoken of by the prophet Micheas was once again abroad. How a civilized man of this nineteenth century could be guilty of the false and absurd statement which Mr. Lacy has made himself responsible for, is unaccountable except on the theory that his intellectual vision has been seriously paralyzed by the sophisms of an eloquent, money-making showman.

Let us now examine Mr. Lacy's statement.

"It (theology) started out in a blaze of the miraculous."

If you had the slightest pinch of common sense in this matter you would know that the miraculous supposes the Deity and the Deity supposes theology, for theology means the science of the Deity, and therefore, that theology in the ontological order *precedes* the miraculous and hence cannot *start from it*. We cannot conceive a miracle without a miracle worker, therefore the miracle worker is the *first* element in the idea of the miraculous. This miracle worker, traced to the last analysis, is the Deity. Therefore the idea of the Deity *must precede* the idea of the miraculous, since the miraculous as a fact is inconceivable without the miracle worker, and the miracle worker inconceivable without the Deity. The idea of the Deity then precedes the idea of the miraculous, and is the subject matter of the science of theology. Now in as much as the *idea* of the Deity precedes any *action* of the Deity, theology precedes any action of the Deity and therefore precedes the miraculous, for the miraculous can be nothing but an action of the Deity. Theology is then necessarily prior to the miraculous and therefore could not start from it.

Lacy. It (theology) assumed, as a God-given principle, to torture and to slay.

Lambert. In as much as theology is the science which treats of God and His divine attributes—and of these alone, it is not easy to see how it claims the right to persecute, torture and slay. You simply confound *theology* with *religion*, a confusion which a writer pretending to exactness should not fall into. But does religion claim the right to persecute, torture and slay? The true religion under the Mosaic or Christian

dispensation, never claimed such a right, although it recognized the supreme jurisdiction of God over life and death and all things, and that God being perfect cannot punish unjustly, and therefore that punishments inflicted by His command could not be persecution, since persecution is the infliction of unjust punishment. The right to inflict just punishment is and has always been claimed by human society in all its phases, and justly too, because without this right society and social order would be impossible. We never think of accusing civil society of persecution or torture because it imprisons and executes law-breakers. Yet this was the only right claimed by Moses as the law-giver of the Jewish nation, the only right exercised by him as the executive of that nation. When in obedience to the command of God he made war on the guilty nations of Palestine he only obeyed the will of Him whose right to take life you have admitted.

Lacy. Let us, for the sake of argument, admit that idolatry and blasphemy were treason and merited death. In this view how stood Aaron the high priest, who made the golden calf?

Lambert. He stood guilty of treason, but was pardoned. God, who can by right inflict death on the guilty, can also pardon. At one moment you condemn your Maker for punishing, at another for pardoning. You are hard to please.

Ingersoll. He (God) sent forth lying spirits to deceive His own prophets.

Notes. I will give one hundred dollars to the poor of this town if you or your disciples make good your statement. I am familiar with the texts in Kings and Ezekiel which you probably imagine will bear you out, but if you carefully compare those texts with

your statement you will find that your zeal has run away with your discretion, and that your hatred of your Maker is more intense than your love for the truth.

Lambert. At this point Mr. Lacy steps in to the assistance of Ingersoll and quotes with jubilant triumph the very texts I referred to in Kings. They are as follows: "And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-Gilead? And one said on this manner and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him, wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And He said, thou shalt persuade him and prevail also; go forth and do so. Now therefore, behold the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all thy prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil against thee."

Lacy. Would it not appear from this that the "lying spirit" was on good terms with the Deity when he volunteered his service to lie for Him, which tender was accepted and approved.

Lambert. It might so appear to a reader who is ignorant of the Eastern parabolic modes of speech, but it would not so appear to the student familiar with these modes and who reads for the purpose of acquiring information rather than to indulge in narrow-eyed, inimical criticism.

The first point to settle is, did God, as Ingersoll says, send abroad lying spirits to deceive *his own prophets*? This must be determined before we go further. Loose talk will not do. Now if I were to grant every inference you claim to draw from your

qu
tha
evi
dec
it b
dec
suff
que
who
pro

fort
Aha
kno
agai
like
Aha
here
of h
here
the
prop
Mich
all I
no
prop
war
false
upon
texts
pict
to co
led t
disre

quotation from Kings, which I do not, it still remains that Ingersoll's statement is false, for there is no evidence in chapter 22d that God's own prophets were deceived. On the contrary the whole chapter leaves it beyond doubt that God's own prophets were not deceived, but spoke the truth and persisted in it and suffered imprisonment for doing so. Even from the quotation you give it is evident that the prophets who were deceived by the lying spirit were not God's prophets, but the false prophets of King Ahab.

But does it appear from the text that God sent forth lying spirits to deceive any one? Let us see. Ahab King of Israel consulted his false prophets to know the result of a war he was about to wage against the King of Syria. Josaphat King of Juda liked not the word of these prophets who foretold that Ahab would be victorious, and said: "Is there not here some prophet of the Lord, that we may inquire of him?" And Ahab replied: "There is one man here by whom we may inquire of the Lord, Micheas the son of Jemala, but I hate him, for he doth not prophesy good to me but evil." He however sent for Micheas and consulted him. Micheas said: "I saw all Israel scattered upon the hills like sheep that had no shepherd." These are the words of the true prophet, and they were verified by the result of the war undertaken by the king at the instigation of his false prophets, for his army was scattered like sheep upon the hills, and the king himself was killed. The texts quoted by you contain a dramatic parable or picture which the true prophet Micheas made use of to convince the king that he was being deceived and led to his destruction by his false prophets. The king disregarded the warning of God by the mouth of his

prophet Micheas, and was in consequence defeated and put to death. The language of Micheas is parabolic—a familiar form of speech used by all Eastern people and to be found in both the Old and New Testaments—the drift of which is to impress vividly on the mind of King Ahab that his false prophets were inspired by a lying spirit. God permitted the lying spirit to go forth but warned the king by the lips of Micheas to heed it not. The fact that God by Micheas warned the king against the prophets who were inspired by the lying spirit is a sufficient answer to your charge that he made use of it, or was on what you call “familiar terms” with it. Had you read carefully the whole of chapter 22d you would have seen that the whole drift of it is inconsistent with the literal interpretation you gave to the parabolic language of the prophet.

Lacy. When will humanity exchange the swaddling-clothes of its infancy for garments becoming its mature manhood?

Lambert. When will the infidel understand that he is not the accepted judge of the nature of mature manhood? When will he understand that man began his career on this planet in mature manhood and not in infancy? When will he learn that the egotism of assuming that manhood is more mature at present than it was four thousand years ago is puerile nonsense or a miserable begging of the question? When will he learn that snarling at everything sacred, as a rabid cur snaps and snarls at straws, is no evidence of sense or manhood? In a word, when will he get into his skull that if his brains had never developed there would still be brains enough in the world to get along with? What has infidelity or scepticism ever done

for
leg
sic
loc
all
tra
its
libe
ego
wo
Ch
the
mar
but
tion
wh
of w
leav
virt
Spe
gibi
regi
exp
as t
of a
hum

peo
exc
bro

Aar
acco
foun

for the world of mankind? Did it ever build a college for the advancement of learning, a hospital for the sick or an asylum for unfortunate little ones? We look over the surface of the earth in vain, and through all time in vain, for any such evidences of its beneficent tracks. Its past leaves no monument to be honored; its present is destructive of morality, social order and liberty; its disciples are proud, self-conceited and egotistic; it pilfers the results of the labors of honest workers in the field of knowledge and the fruits of Christian enlightenment, and unblushingly parades these stolen properties as its own; it talks of love for mankind with lips white with hate; of mercy now, but when it had the power, as in the French revolution, it proved that it had it not; it talks of honor, when its principles leave no reason for its existence; of woman while it strips her of all real dignity and leaves her no more than a female animal; it talks of virtue, while in its code the word has no meaning. Spectre-like it moves down the ages with Christianity, gibing and gibbering as monkeys in the equatorial regions bar and interrupt the advances of the civilized explorer. It enjoys the fruits of Christian civilization as the barnacle or parasite enjoys the vigorous health of a stronger organism, or as a tubercle lives on the human lungs. It is an intellectual disease.

Lacy. It is said that he (Aaron) permitted the people to worship naked, to their shame, and this excuse, filmy and attenuated as it is, is the best his brother Moses has given for him.

Lambert. "It is said." By whom is it said that Aaron permitted the people to worship naked? The account of the golden calf and the worship of it, is found in the 32d chapter of Exodus, and there is not

one word from the beginning to the end of it to justify your statement that Aaron "permitted the people to worship naked." The only verse that could by the most remote possibility justify you is the 25th, which is as follows: "And when Moses saw that the people were naked, (for Aaron had made them naked unto their shame among their enemies)." There is not the slightest suggestion here of a permission to "worship naked." The expression "to make one naked among one's enemies" means in all languages, to leave one defenseless among one's enemies, and none but a very crooked intellect would imagine that it meant "shirtless" among one's enemies. When Cardinal Wolsey says to Cromwell: "Had I but served my God with half the zeal I served my King, He would not in mine age have left me *naked* to mine enemies." There is no danger that the true critic will think the dying Cardinal meant that the King had deprived him of his clothing and left him in a state of nudity. It is only when Moses uses the word that the infidel wiseacre scents a whiff of the obscene. Aaron, by yielding to the demands of the people, as men in power often yield, joined with them in their disobedience to God, and in doing so lost His divine protection, and thus the people and he were left, without that protection, defenseless—naked to their enemies. When "Moses saw that the people were naked" he saw that by their disobedience they had stripped themselves of that divine promise and protection which was their only defense. He saw that "Aaron had made them naked * * * among their enemies." This is a simple and natural explanation of the 25th verse which you have so "honestly" misrepresented.

The Jewish targum of Jerusalem gives still another explanation of this verse. The Jews were accustomed to wear bands upon their foreheads and wrists on which was inscribed the sacred tetragrammaton *Je-ho-va*. When they turned from the true God to the worship of the golden calf they threw aside their insignia of loyalty to the God who brought them out of the land of Egypt. The Jew who was stripped of these phylacteries was said to be naked or uncovered, just as a man is said to be uncovered when his hat is off. The word "naked" has many meanings besides that of physical nudity. According to Webster it means defenseless, unprotected, unarmed, etc. It is strange that of all these meanings of the word the only one that occurs to you is that suggested by hungry-eyed libidinosity.

When you say that this nakedness is the best excuse Moses has given for his brother you suggest an idea that is nowhere to be found in the text. The great lawgiver offered no excuse whatever for Aaron. He turned to God and said: "This people have sinned a great sin; yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin—; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written."

Which is to be the most admired, the spirit of Moses as exhibited in this prayer, or the spirit of his critic?

* *

al ex-
ve so

CHAPTER XXI.

Lacy. What of Solomon the wise man, and of the long line of kings who introduced idol worship even in the temple of the Lord?

Lambert. Solomon and others who fell into idolatry were punished for the crime. Your "long line of kings who introduced idol worship even in the temple" is a fiction for which you can claim originality; it is the kind of line used by imaginative people when drawing the long bow.

Lacy. Did God punish his (Solomon's) treason with death? Oh! no!

Lambert. Had you read the whole chapter, 11th Kings I, you would probably have been satiated with the sufferings inflicted on the sinning monarch and not have grown indignant because God did not immediately take his life. It would appear that your Maker is always wrong, whether He punishes or pardons; if He does not kill the sinner He is partial, and if He kills him He is cruel. For the Supreme Being there is no escape from Lacy. It is a mystery how the All-wise Being could create an intelligence that can corner Him so easily, how He could create a being so much wiser than Himself.

Lacy. But in regard to treason as a justification for the slaying of millions, because God was king, and to deny His authority was treason; unfortunately for such logic, after the Book of the Law was found in the house of the Lord (2 Kings XXII, 8) the Jewish people were professedly governed by it and enforced

the laws therein prescribed, among which were commands that witches, idolaters and Sabbath-breakers should be put to death.

Lambert. This Book of the Law was the Pentateuch, the Book of the Laws of God whether administered by Moses, Josue, the judges or kings. The fact that this divine law was administered by kings does not change the nature of the case so long as the law was given by God for the government of the Jewish nation. To disobey that law was to disobey the divine lawgiver. To break that law was a crime against God as well as against the State which recognized him as its law giver. To make out your case you very judiciously suppressed a part of my argument in the *Notes*, which was as follows: "Grant society or government, and it is of no consequence whether X, Y or Z is its king; the principle of its action must be the same in reference to those things which touch its authority."

Lacy. We may ask whether God is not at all times the ruler of all men.

Lambert. He is, but not in the sense that He was for a time the ruler of the Jewish nation.

Lacy. If His justice and mercy sanctioned in olden times the slaughter of those who defied His authority, so also should they now.

Lambert. God has the right to remove the human race from the face of the earth when He wills to do so. He is the judge, the only judge, of the when and the how. God authorizes the taking of life, or slaughtering as you delight to call it, now as of old. That authority He gives to every government, and every government worthy of the name exercises it on those who defy its authority or trample on its laws.

The United States Government exercised that right in the late rebellion against its authority, and piled up in doing so a hecatomb of corpses. Canada lately did the same thing in the Northwest. Without this right all government would be impossible, and the world be given up to Herr Most and his fellow-anarchists.

Lacy. Idolatry, treason! No honest thought can be treason to Him who knows the hearts and motives of men.

Lambert. That is true. Hence we conclude that when God ordered the punishment of the guilty Canaanites He did not find in them sufficient "honest thought" to shield them from punishment. He knows the hearts and motives of men and when He punishes them we must assume that their thought was not honest. Your mistake is in assuming "honest thought" in every wretch that is punished for his crimes.

Lacy. The same punishment was meted out to idolaters * * * under kingly rule as under theocratic rule * * * the treason argument, therefore, as it proves too much proves nothing.

Lambert. The same punishment was meted out under kingly rule as under theocratic rule. Yes, but the *law* in both cases was the same divine law. Idolatry did not cease to be a crime against God and the State because Saul was made king. As long as the law of God was the fundamental law of the nation the crime of disobedience to it was the same and the punishment the same, and the treason argument the same. The law against idolatry was promulgated by God Himself, and when punished under the kings it was punished as treason against the Supreme ruler and lawgiver. It is a grave mistake to suppose that

because the Jews had kings they were no longer bound by the laws which God had given them.

Lacy. Humanity of to-day, even in capital cases, for the highest grade of crime, requires that the offender should be put out of the way (why not say slaughtered?) with as little suffering as possible.

Lambert. Here you admit in society the right to take life, to slaughter men, and to determine what are capital cases. How can you deny to Jewish society what you concede to modern society? God and the Jewish government under the kings declared idolatry to be of the highest grade of crime and punished it accordingly. When the Jews execute law breakers you call it slaughter or murder; when the humanity of to-day does it you call it "putting them out of the way." This is a beautiful distinction. If the plea of honest thought is so potent why not give the modern law breaker the benefit of it? Why reserve your maudlin sympathy for the law breakers of ancient Judea?

Lacy. We never torture the living or mutilate the dead.

Lambert. Is not imprisonment a torture? Why have insane asylums become a part of our prisons if not for the care of those whose minds have been destroyed by the tortures of imprisonment? Go to our medical colleges and then tell us "we do not mutilate the dead." You may say there are reasons that justify it. That I grant, but the fact disproves your statement. Is it not strange that the ancient modes of inflicting death are still existing everywhere in the world where Christianity does not prevail?

Lacy. With regard to liberty of conscience the Father seems somewhat confused. In one place his

words imply that "speculative conscience" is admissible and not subject to the penalties of mundane law divine. In other words, a man is privileged to think what he pleases if he does not speak of or formulate his ideas in overt acts.

Lambert. It would have been more candid to have quoted what the Father said than to have given your readers a false interpretation of it. So far as the human operation of law or government is concerned man is free to design and plan what he pleases, murder, theft, or any other crime; for so long as his thoughts and designs are purely speculative, that is, not reduced to acts, the government cannot know them, and therefore cannot take cognizance of or punish them. The inability of the government to know his mind gives him immunity from punishment, but it does not give him a right to "think what he pleases." This is not to say that his guilty thought is "admissible," but simply that government cannot punish an offence it does not know. Some modern governments allow a limited liberty of speech—our own for instance—but no government ever has or ever will tolerate that liberty in an unlimited sense. During the war men were imprisoned for exercising that liberty and the anarchist Most was arrested the other day in New York for doing the same. Again, while government tolerates a large liberty of speech, it punishes when certain doctrines are put into practice. Thus the communist may teach that all property is common, but when he or his followers reduce that doctrine to act he is jailed as a thief. The Mormon may teach polygamy as a speculative doctrine, but when he reduces it to practice he is punished.

But before God, man is responsible for his designs and thoughts and is culpable and punishable if they be evil, because God knows the nature of those thoughts and designs. This distinction between acts in their relation to God and in their relation to human government is very evident, and yet you do not or pretend not to see it.

Lacy. But who shall decide what is error, what meditations are evil, and what plans criminal?

Lambert. Have not you and Ingersoll been deciding to your own satisfaction, what is error? As long as our errors, meditations and plans are purely speculative, that is, not reduced to overt acts, God alone is the judge, for he alone can know the thoughts of men. If they are reduced to acts such as murder, theft, perjury, the government is the judge and the executioner. But in both cases God is the ultimate judge.

Lacy. The safest way is not to think at all, for the rod is over us and may fall, but to hire some ecclesiastic to think for us.

Lambert. Or buy Mr. Lacy's book or pay fifty cents to Ingersoll.

Ingersoll. Think of the author of all mercy imbruing his hands in the blood of helpless men, women and children *simply because He did not furnish them with intelligence enough to understand His law.*

Notes. Think of a man who is always talking "honor bright," manhood and truth, making such a false and groundless statement to intelligent readers. I italicise the words in the above quotation which contain a blasphemous fallacy. On what evidence or authority do you assert that men, etc., were punished *simply because they had not intelligence enough to*

understand the law? What evidence have you that they did not understand the law? Did those who were punished ever make this plea in extenuation of their crime? It is a principle of revealed ethics that those who have not intelligence enough to understand the law are not judged by the law.

To cover up this calumny on God, Mr. Lacy chips in thus:—

Lacy. It would seem that the wanderers in a desert wild would not have worshipped Aaron's calf if they had not honestly expected deliverance by it.

Lambert. These wanderers knew that idolatry was forbidden; they sinned against that knowledge and were punished. But is there any evidence that they were punished *simply because they had not enough intelligence to understand the law?* But your defence of these idolaters is a singular one; they would not have worshipped the golden calf if they had not honestly expected deliverance by it! In other words, they would not have done what they knew to be wrong if they had not honestly expected to obtain some benefit. If this defence be valid, it is equally good as a plea for the thief, for he would not steal unless he "honestly" expected some advantage from it. Indeed it is difficult to imagine how any one can break the law and subject himself to punishment without expecting to gain some desired end, but the honesty of his expectations is no justification for his unlawful act. Your plea for the wanderers in the desert involves a new principle of morals, a principle that if adopted would render law and order impossible.

Lacy. But what of the decree: That which dieth of itself ye may give to the stranger or sell to the alien

that he may eat it, but thou O Israel must forego the luxury!

Lambert. This illustrates the oblique eye with which the infidel looks on everything Jewish or Christian. That the Jews were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that had died of themselves is a proof that they and their neighbors were accustomed to eat such food, for a prohibitory law is never promulgated unless to prevent some practice. No legislator thinks of prohibiting things that are never done. When Moses gave this wise prohibition to his people he did not forbid them to give or sell such forbidden food to those aliens and strangers who desired it. According to this law of Moses, if a Jew caught a mess of salmon and let them die on the string he could not eat them because they died of themselves. Would there be anything wrong in his selling them to you who are accustomed to eat them in that way? You do not eat dog; would there be anything improper in your selling or giving a dog to an Indian who considers it a luxury? The Jew according to the law cannot eat oysters, clams or shell-fish of any kind; is that a reason why he should not sell to you who love the succulent bivalve more than you do the law of Moses? The whole force of your insinuation consists in the supposition that the Jew was permitted to cheat his customer, to sell him under false pretenses a kind of food he did not want; whereas he was permitted to give or sell what the customer wanted, but what he was not himself permitted to eat.

Lacy. Do not say to those who advocate liberty of conscience that they plead for the right to do wrong; though they hold that there are thoughts and acts for which man is not accountable to man.

Lambert. Those who claim, as you do, the right to think as they "please" certainly do claim the right to think wrong, evil, if they please so to think, and the *right* to think wrong implies the right to reduce that thought to act. As no one of sense will admit this latter right so no one can admit the former, for in rejecting the result we must reject the principle from which the result is logically drawn. The liberty of conscience does not mean that we can think or do as we please. There is a standard of right and wrong entirely independent of human judgment or volition, to which both should comply. In matters of detail men may differ in regard to this standard, but no one is free in conscience to disregard it as he conceives it to be. Conscience itself requires him to obey it, and deprives its possessor of the right of doing as he pleases. We must not confound *conscience* with *will* or volition. They are very different things, and are frequently in antagonism. Men often will to do things their conscience forbids and will not to do things their conscience commands them to do.

It is a mistake to say or infer that men do not claim the right to do wrong. You will certainly admit that to assassinate is wrong and yet there are those in this nineteenth century and in this country who claim that right. How can you as an apostle of "honest thought" meet these assassins? Grant them the plea of "conscience" and "honest thought," and grant, as you must from the nature of the case, that they are the judges of their honest conscience and honest thought, and what valid argument can you bring to oppose them? None whatever. If your and Ingersoll's theory of freedom of thought is correct, the anarchists are strictly logical. It is unwise, if not

wicked, to advocate a principle that deprives you of all valid arguments against these enemies of society.

Lacy. There are thoughts and acts for which man is not accountable.

Lambert. Yes, such as the actions of sleep-walkers and lunatics.

Lacy. Neither refer us to those erratic spirits who confound *liberty* with *license*.

Lambert. We must refer to those spirits, for they have the same right to appeal to liberty, conscience, and honest thought that you and Ingersoll have. Why assert liberty for yourself and deny it to those erratic spirits? Or why call them erratic because they carry your theory of "honest thought" a little farther than you do? If liberty is all that Ingersoll says it is why should the liberty of those erratic spirits be limited by what you call the educated common sense of the world? And if this educated common sense of the world is the criterion and limit of liberty who is to determine what is the dictum of this common sense? Are not these erratic spirits as free as you to determine what it is? The educated common sense of Utah and Turkey says polygamy is right; the educated common sense of Christendom says it is wrong. Now when the educated common sense of the world clashes and contradicts who is to determine? You should be slow to condemn the "erratic spirits" for they compose the rank and file of all the anti-Christians in Christendom. Besides, they might retort that you, not they, are the erratic spirits, and the Christian will believe that you are both right.

CHAPTER XXII.

Lacy. The boundary line which divides them (liberty and license) we may not be able to define with absolute exactness, but when license appears as the counterfeit of liberty, the educated common sense of the world protests.

Lambert. If the educated common sense of the world cannot draw the line where liberty stops and license begins how can it determine when license appears as "the counterfeit of liberty?" You first admit that it cannot draw the line and then assume that it can draw the line. How can the counterfeit be distinguished from the genuine if there be no criterion or rule or line? Where is the court to determine in any given case what the common sense of the world teaches? Who is its interpreter? By the educated common sense of the world you evidently mean that little mutual admiration society composed of rocket-headed infidels who follow the shallow Ingersoll. Every one who does not come up to your line of thought is a fool, a knave or a victim of superstition; every one who accepts that line of thought and carries it beyond you is "erratic." You do not see or care to see that your principle furnishes the "erratic" with all the ammunition they have.

Lacy. Human liberty is a science.

Lambert. We can understand how liberty may be a fact, how it can be the *object* of science, as the world is the object of the science of geology, the stars the object of the science of astronomy, the relation of

numbers the object of the science of mathematics, but how liberty, the world, the stars or numbers can be considered as sciences we must leave Mr. Lacy to explain. Science is *knowledge*, and things and their causes are the objects of the sciences. To say liberty is a science is simply to confound knowledge with the thing known. Liberty is a fact or a condition, but it is not a science.

Lacy. As a man advances in the scale of enlightenment, so do his ideas of personal liberty become more clear.

Lambert. That depends on the *kind* of enlightenment. The Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans were enlightened people; so are the Chinese of the present day, yet none of these seem to have clear ideas of liberty. As a matter of fact it is only where Christian enlightenment and civilization prevail that the true idea of liberty is known. Glance over the surface of the earth and point to any spot thereon outside the pale of Christendom where even the slightest pretense of liberty is found. The enlightenment then of which you boast is Christian, and it is the only enlightenment that has ever revealed the true nature of liberty. It is thus that the infidel plucks and enjoys the fruit of the tree he despises; he is like a certain animal that greedily munches the acorns without raising its downcast eyes to the tree on which they grew.

What I have said of liberty is equally true of the sciences; it is only on that bright spot of the earth where Christianity sheds its divine light that we find scientific progress in modern times.

Lacy. But "the right to think error" being denied him (man) the wheels of human progress must stop.

Lambert. It would seem that progress, if it be of the right kind, depends on thinking rightly, not erroneously. Error, because it is error, is a drag on the wheels of progress. Progress is a movement in the direction of truth and perfection, a movement from a less perfect to a more perfect state. Error is a deviation from that movement, a wandering from the straight line which is always the shortest way to the end to be attained. Arriving at truth and perfection by thinking error is like going from Buffalo to New York by way of New Orleans. How wandering from the object to be attained assists us in coming to it, will require the genius of more than an Ingersoll or a Lacy to explain. To err is human; it is a fact, a misfortune, a weakness of human nature—not a right. To make error a means to truth is to make darkness the source of light. The right to err is the right of the blind man to tumble into the ditch.

Lacy. Who that ever thought has not thought error?

Lambert. Few indeed; and this accounts for the slow movement of progress. It does not follow because all limp and hobble that limping and hobbling accelerate our speed. All the time spent in thinking error is so much time lost to progress and truth, just as time is lost by him who goes from Buffalo to New York by way of New Orleans, instead of going by the direct route. But suppose all great thinkers have at times thought error, does that sanctify error? Would they not have been still greater if they had not had the weakness to think error?

Lacy. Who does not know that from the beginning of his career man has been compelled to grope his way through darkness?

Lambert. It is not at all conceded that man began his way in darkness, but passing that, it may be asked: Is thinking error the shortest way to escape from that darkness? Is it not evident that the more correctly man thinks the sooner he will advance to the light? To think error is a misfortune arising from intellectual weakness, and the philosophy that would raise this misfortune to the dignity of a "right" might be introduced into our lunatic asylums, but it is not the philosophy that commends itself to right thinking men. Men can look with indulgence on him who errs, but when he glories in his imbecility as in a right, their indulgent spirit changes into one of contempt. Men do err and will continue to err, just as lame men will continue to limp, and for the same reason—weakness, in the first case, of intellect, in the second of muscle. But we have yet to hear of any one claiming a defective limb as a right or an ornament—except in dime museums.

Lacy. Yet, says the Father, God gives us not the liberty to think error.

Lambert. Certainly not. He simply gives us immunity from punishment for unintentionally thinking error, and this on the same principle that He does not punish the man who honestly limps. He knows the weakness of the human intellect, and that to err is one of those weaknesses; that to err is not a liberty to be given but a weakness to be considered with indulgence. This immunity from punishment for thinking error has place only when man thinks error *believing it to be the truth*, and the immunity is not for the error thought but for the honest *belief* of him who thinks it. It is the man's integrity that God respects and for which

He condones the error. In all this there is no liberty granted to think error as such.

Lacy. In the following words Mr. Ingersoll raises the point that an infinitely merciful God must pity the misfortunes of His children, and forgive an ignorance which is "invincible."

Lambert. Before quoting Ingersoll I must stop you to observe that what you state as the point was not the point raised by him. Had Ingersoll said that God would forgive "an ignorance which is *invincible*," he would have formulated a well known principle of Christian theology, and there would have been no cause of difference between him and me—no point to raise. Your sly introduction of a distinction as to ignorance and your attempt to imply that Ingersoll made it, must be considered as an illustration of what an infidel means by "honest thought." Now, to the quotation:—

Ingersoll. I insist that if there is a good and wise God, He beholds with pity the misfortunes of His children.

Notes. I insist on the same, but we must distinguish between misfortune and crime, misfortune and wickedness.

Ingersoll. I insist that such a God would know the mists, the clouds, the darkness, enveloping the human mind.

Notes. He does know; and takes into account these disadvantages in dealing with His creatures. But are you not a little inconsistent? Some pages back you exalt the human mind and claim for it the right to judge the justice of God, and now you deplore the mists and clouds that enshroud it.

Lacy. In regard to the distinction between the misfortune and the sinfulness of ignorance—and there is such a distinction—will the Father point it out clearly and definitely, so that we may know its ear-marks for all time.

Lambert. The ignorance displayed in formulating the above request is of that kind which theologians call *crass*. What you wanted to ask was this: What is the distinction or difference between ignorance that is sinful and ignorance that is not sinful, or in other words, when is ignorance imputed to us as a sin, and when not? The very asking of this question is an exhibition of the ear-marks of crass ignorance, for had you consulted some theological primer, as you should have done, you would not have had to ask the question at all. You would have found the distinction between vincible and invincible, guilty and not guilty ignorance clearly and definitely laid down for all time. Your ignorance is still further illustrated by your remark that if the Father explains the difference between ignorance that is sinful and that which is not, "he will confer a great benefit on humanity." From this it appears that you not only did not know the difference, but that you did not even know that the difference had ever been pointed out. The benefit has been conferred on humanity ages before you or the Father was born, and has been for centuries a permanent part of Christian theological and philosophical literature. As I did not undertake to teach you theology, I must refer you to such theologians as St. Thomas of Aquin, Billuart, Gury, Scavini, and Kenrick. Study their treatises on *Human Acts* and you will learn those distinctions which confer a benefit on humanity. I do not believe that because you need some information on the inter-

esting subject of ignorance I am obliged to republish their writings for your especial benefit.

Lacy. What of Catholic persecutions in the past?

Lambert. I simply hand your question back to you. What of them? Are you so silly as to imagine that I am so silly as to write an essay on the religious turmoils of three or four centuries ago and treat of their causes and circumstances, on the mere spur of an interrogation point? The interrogative trick is a shrewd one and non-committal, but like the game of three card monte, it is too old to catch any but those whose ignorance is invincible. When you commit yourself to definite statements in regard to those "Catholic persecutions" it will be time for me to reply to you. If your honest desire is for information, I recommend you to the writings of M. Le Maistre, Balmes, and Milner. It would give me great pleasure to republish all they have said on the subject for your benefit, but unfortunately I am not able, owing to pecuniary circumstances over which I have not and never had control. I am aware of course that when you and Ingersoll ask a question, or raise a moss-covered objection to revealed religion you expect all the literature on the subject to be reproduced, but in view of the expense the expectation is unreasonable.

Lacy. Were they (Catholic persecutions) right or wrong?

Lambert. The word persecution, like the word orthodoxy, depends for its meaning on him who uses it. When the Mormon is *prosecuted* for polygamy he calls it *persecution*. The Oneida sexual communists were prosecuted by public sentiment until they had to disband and their leader had to flee to Canada, where he died in exile. Ask one of those deluded misce-

genators and he will tell you they were the victims of *persecution*. The people of Chicago will prosecute the dynamite anarchists, and the anarchists the world over and in all time will call it persecution, and if the murderers are hanged they will be martyrs in the anarchist calendar. If you read history carefully and intelligently you will find that he who is vanquished is the "persecuted" and he who conquers is the "persecutor." The great majority of criminals who meet their end at the end of a rope believe that they are the victims of persecution. The next best thing to being a victor is to be a victim. These are the two opposite poles of every contest. The idea of being a victim compensates for the chagrin of defeat, and victory justifies itself by criminating the vanquished. In modern times the most unjustifiable revolutions are justified by the shibboleth of "liberty;" in former times they were justified by that of "religion;" but man remains always the same. He loves to quarrel and fight, and he is ingenious enough to always find a pretext. At one time it is "liberty," at another "religion," at another something else. It is only the shibboleth that changes. There is but the difference of a vowel between persecution and prosecution. The fellow that is whipped uses the former, and he who whips uses the latter. Catholics were in the majority three hundred years ago and as a consequence generally whipped their opponents; and this fact is the origin of the so-called Catholic persecutions. The Catholics of those times fought and died and killed for the public opinion prevalent at the time, just as men do now. The Protestants did the same. Men killed and died then for religious ideas; they kill and die now for political ideas. As the killing and dying

still goes on what have we gained by changing the reason of it from a religious to a political idea? More lives were lost in the political and social contests of the last hundred years than were lost in the last ten hundred years from strifes among Christians arising from differences of doctrine.

With these considerations in mind we can now come back to your question. Were they (Catholic persecutions) right or wrong? And I answer; it depends entirely on whether they were persecutions or prosecutions. To determine this requires a careful consideration of the causes and circumstances in each particular case. This would lead you and me away from our business.

Lacy. Of course the exigencies of theology require that broken fragments should be soldered together—that excuses be made for wrongs unspeakable; for it will not do to surrender the doctrine of infallibility.

Lambert. The exigencies of theology require that your quibbles should be promptly met and exposed. The “wrongs unspeakable,” of which you yet manage somehow or other to speak, are wrongs incident to human nature and will continue to exist in spite of all systems of theology. In as much as the infallibility of the church is in no way concerned with the unspeakable wrongs of which you speak, I fail to see how a question of surrender is involved.

Lacy. Faith in the theological world is exalted above works.

Lambert. St. James, one of the writers of the New Testament, and who for that reason ought to be considered good authority as to the meaning of faith in the theological world, says: “Faith without works is dead” (James 2-26). It would appear from this that

the theological world does not exalt faith above works. St. Matthew says: "That the son of man shall come in the glory of his father and his angels; and then shall he render to every man *according to his works.*" Does this look like putting faith above works? St. James says: "Do you see that by works a man is justified and not by faith only?" (2-24.) "God is not unjust that He should forget your *work.*" (Hebrews 6-9.) And yet you say the theological world puts faith above works! What is faith itself but a good work?

Lacy. How tolerant the church to those—if they subscribe to her dogmatic teaching—who do ill.

Lambert. The church teaches that he who knows the truth and does not regulate his conduct by it is in a worse state than the heathen who knows it not. Your statement is therefore slanderous as are your other statements in regard to the church. Your use of the phrase "venal" sin instead of *venial* sin shows how well you are instructed in the catechism.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Lacy. The Father talks much of blasphemy. As used by him the word is misleading, and is dust in the eyes of common sense, as well as an incentive to moral cowardice.

Lambert. According to Webster—whose definition agrees with that of the theologians—to blaspheme “is to speak of the Supreme Being with impious irreverence; to revile or speak reproachfully of God, Christ or the Holy Spirit. Blasphemy is an indignity offered to God by words or writing; reproachful, contemptuous, or irreverent words uttered impiously against God.” It was in this sense that I used the words “blasphemous jests” in reference to certain utterances of Ingersoll, and no one familiar with his lectures will question the justness of the phrase. Is it evidence of cowardice to fear to insult your Maker? Is it evidence of bravery to do it? Is it not rather a sign of rashness, foolhardiness, and diabolism? Ingersoll is a blasphemer, is he braver than Grant who was not?

Lacy. Do I blaspheme, because in my estimate I exalt God above the Father's conception of Him?

Lambert. It is not a question of what you may do, but what Ingersoll has done. You do not blaspheme by exalting God above the Father's conception of Him, but in asserting that you can do so, you give an illustration of extreme modesty. According to the Father's conception, God's attributes are infinite, according to yours they are finite, hence the Father's conception of God is as far above yours as the infinite is above the finite.

Lacy. In justification of wars of conquest and extermination, Father Lambert says: "Mr. Black defended what you call the *atrocities* of the Jews recorded in the Old Testament on the principles admitted by all peoples and nations, pagan philosophers and Christian apostles, that the right to exist implies the right to repel the opposing force that threatens destruction. If enemies come to conquer, a nation has the right to conquer them; if they give no quarter, they have a right to none; if the death of the whole population be their purpose, it has a right to defeat it by putting them all to the sword if it is necessary."

Lambert. The principle of *lex talionis* as formulated in the above extract from the *Notes* was not advanced, as you incorrectly say, to justify wars of conquest and extermination, but to justify the Jews in inflicting the same punishment on their enemies in time of war as their enemies inflicted on them. The conquest of Palestine and the extermination of its inhabitants is justified on a very different principle. For crimes set forth at length in the 18th chapter of Leviticus, God had doomed the inhabitants of Canaan to destruction, and he commanded the Israelites to exterminate them. This command is an all-sufficient justification. You have admitted that the Supreme Being is master of life and death. As He is the Supreme Being His commands need no justification; it is entirely above our criticism—even if He had not given a reason for it. He is amenable to Himself alone for what He does. That He gave the command is evidence that there was a sufficient reason for it.

Lacy. Let us apply the Father's logic to the exact point at issue, and see where it will lead the Jewish race. "If enemies come to conquer, a nation

has a right to conquer them." The Jews came *professedly* to conquer; therefore the heathen nation had a right to conquer them.

Lambert. They certainly had if they could, just as a condemned criminal has the right to escape execution if he can. They were condemned to death, not for defending themselves, but for crimes committed anterior to the invasion. You cannot find in the scriptures that their self-defense was a crime.

Lacy. "If they give no quarter they have a right to none." The Jews gave no quarter, therefore they had a right to none.

Lambert. The Jews obeyed the command of God and took their chances—they neither expected nor asked quarter.

Lacy. "If the death of the whole population be their purpose, it is right to defeat it by putting them all to the sword if necessary." The death of the whole population of the heathen nations was the avowed purpose of the Jews; hence the right of those nations to defeat that purpose by putting all of the Jews to the sword.

Lambert. The right to defend themselves to the best of their ability was not denied them. They did put as many Jews to the sword as they could and were never accused of crime for doing so.

Notes. God is the Creator, the Supreme Ruler of the universe and of all men. As such man owes Him allegiance and obedience.

Lacy. Not so; man owes him allegiance, not because he is powerful, but because he is just; obedience because of the righteousness of his law.

Lambert. Pray who said man owes God allegiance because he is powerful? Why spend your time in de-

nying what no one asserts? But I deny that allegiance is due to God merely because He is just, or His laws righteous. The mere fact of an authority or a ruler or a law being just does not induce an objection of obedience. To induce the obligation of obedience the authority, ruler or law must have the right of dominion or jurisdiction over us. There are many just and righteous laws that we are not obliged to obey, because they are made by law makers who have no jurisdiction over us. There are many just and righteous laws in Germany, France and England; if mere justness and righteousness alone induced obligation, we would be bound to obey them. Justness and righteousness alone then are not sufficient to impose allegiance and obedience. There is another element necessary, namely, dominion or jurisdiction over us. Now as God is Creator and Supreme Ruler He has supreme dominion and jurisdiction over us. It is this Supreme Creatorship and Rulership that induces the obligation of obedience when once His will is known, and His will is always just and right.

Lacy. What is the obedience which power alone commands?

Lambert. A very poor article indeed, and that is the reason why Christian theologians do not make mere power the source of obedience.

Lacy. Such low conceptions of the Deity and of the grounds of human obligation make "Bob" Ingersoll's possible.

Lambert. Such ignorance of Christian theology on the subject of obedience makes his dupes possible.

Lacy. Here a protest must be entered against the methods of warfare commended by the Father and termed "civilized."

Ingersoll. If they kill the babes in our cradles must we brain theirs ?

Notes. Here they are again—yes, by all means brain them, tear them limb from limb, salt them, ship them to the Cannibal Islands, make them read your article on the Christian religion or your lecture on “skulls”—do anything with them to keep them from muddling your brains when you are reasoning with men on subjects that require all your attention.

Lacy. Reader, do not mistake; the foregoing was not written by a Fiji chief, but by a disciple of the Prince of Peace!

Lambert. If the Father's suggestion is too atrocious, we might omit the reading of the article on the Christian Religion and the lecture on “Skulls.” Or, how would it do to make sandwiches of them and send them to the Sandwich Islands ?

Lacy. What has Mr. Ingersoll's personal character, good or bad, or the Father's cleverness, to do with the subject in dispute ?

Lambert. It is important to the controversy to know that Ingersoll's mere statement cannot be relied on, that he misrepresents his opponent, Judge Black; that he misquotes and interpolates the scriptures and that he falsifies almost every Christian doctrine that he treats of. In some of these points the disciple is worthy of his master, for instance where you *misrepresent* the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In defending Ingersoll you seem to have caught his method, as men catch contagious diseases. If you did not know the doctrine of the Trinity you should not have snarled at it or attempted to criticise it; if you knew it, you knowingly misrepresented it. I leave you and the reader to draw the inference. Thus you see that

the personal character of a disputant has much to do with the question in dispute. It would be a wise economy to exhaust less of your energy in defense of Ingersoll's character as it would leave you more to devote to the defense of your own. Your misrepresentation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is found on page 39 of your "Reply." "*Christian theology affirms that there are three Gods.*" These are your words. Read them over again, sir, and perhaps on reflection you may feel ashamed of your ignorance, or of being caught in such a freak of "honest thought." Do you pretend to say that a Christian in replying to such antagonists as Ingersoll and you must not go aside from the question to meet your false statements and brand them with the proper label? The main business of the Christian controversialist in meeting infidels is not so much to reason as to correct misstatements, and when this is done in plain English they whine about politeness, abuse, and so on. They have no regard for the feelings of others, while they expect others to treat them with lavender kids. When they utter glaring untruths in reference to Christian doctrines, we cannot accuse them of falsehood or lying, no, that would wound their delicate sensibilities. We must play "make believe" and refer delicately to their untruthful utterances as "honest errors," the results of "honest thought" and "honor bright"—pshaw. It is a fact worthy of note that most infidel arguments against Christianity are based on misrepresentation of its doctrines.

Lacy. The chapter under review (the 11th of *Notes*) is in the main devoted to the subject of war and slavery. Mr. Ingersoll had said that a war of *conquest* was simply murder.

Lambert. And I denied the truth of the proposition.

Lacy. It would seem that no one should have mistaken his meaning—certainly no one who kept in mind the kind of wars he was condemning, that is, the aggressive wars of the Jews.

Lambert. There is no mistaking his words. They are plain enough: "A war of conquest is simply murder." This is a universal proposition, and as such it cannot be limited, to suit your purpose, to the aggressive wars of the Jews. Ingersoll wished to condemn the invasion of Canaan by the Jews. To do this he laid down a general proposition and included those wars under it. His reasoning formulated syllogistically would stand thus: A war of conquest is simply murder. The wars of the Jews were wars of conquest. Therefore the wars of the Jews were simply murders.

If the major or first proposition in the above syllogism were true the conclusion would necessarily be true. Hence unless you wish to stultify Ingersoll you must confess that he meant precisely what his words express. But it is not true that wars of conquest are simply murders. No moralist or writer on the laws of nations concedes it; even you, Mr. Lacy, do not hold it as true, for you try to prove that Ingersoll did not mean it—that is, did not mean what he actually said. Had Ingersoll said the Jewish wars of invasion were murders he would have raised a question of *fact*, but when he said "A war of conquest is simply murder," he raised a question as to the *truth* of a general proposition. As the general proposition is not true, the inference he draws from it is to be rejected. You may be pardoned for the conceit of believing you

understand your master better than others, but your belief must not be permitted to override the rules of interpretation. In the present case you have evidently failed to understand your master, although, as you say, "no one should have mistaken his meaning."

Notes. According to Mr. Ingersoll, "a war of conquest is simply murder. But the war with the South was a war of conquest. Therefore (according to his logic) the war against the South was simply murder. Now Mr. Ingersoll participated in that war, therefore Mr. Ingersoll was a party to the crime of murder.

Lacy. The fallacy of this syllogistic statement lies in the use of the little word "conquest" as applied to the fact of which Mr. Ingersoll was writing.

Lambert. Your mistake arises from forgetfulness of the little fact that the word "conquest" has its meaning entirely independent of the facts to which Ingersoll applies it, and it is not in his power to change the meaning of the word to suit his or your fancy. The proposition in which he used it is a general one, and therefore it had no direct reference to the Jewish wars, although he intended subsequently to apply it to them. A general proposition must stand or fall by its own intrinsic truth and not on a particular application of it. Ingersoll wanted to condemn the Jew, and any kind of a hammer, even a false proposition, was good enough to hit a son of Abraham on the head with.

Lacy. The words "wars of conquest" in their proper historical application, mean aggressive wars, wherein one nation seeks to subdue and to establish dominion over another.

Lambert. That the phrase has been used in that sense is true, but to infer from this that that is the only proper sense is a grave mistake. According to Webster, "conquest" is the act of conquering or acquiring by force; the act of overcoming or subduing opposition by force, whether physical or moral; subjuration, victory. The act of gaining or regaining by success, as the *conquest* of liberty or peace."

According to these Websterian definitions, conquest means to overcome force by force without reference to the ultimate intention of the victor or the use to be made of the victory. A "war of conquest" then is a war in which each of the contestants seeks to overcome the other, and this, observe, without any reference to the establishment of dominion of one over the other. From this it follows that even "defensive wars for the establishment of independent governments," as well as "wars to maintain the integrity of governments already established," are wars of conquest. Our war with Mexico was as truly a war of conquest as was that of Cortez, although we did not make the same use of our victory.

Lacy. The historian, or conversationalist even, who should affirm that the United States had ever conquered Great Britain would be laughed at.

Lambert. A laugh, as an argument, proves nothing—except perhaps the lightheadedness, ignorance and conceit of the giggler. It is a historical fact that the United States conquered England and compelled her to submit to conditions, not only in the war of the revolution but also in the war of 1812, and the historian who fails to state this fails to state the truth.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Lacy. There never was a war waged against the "South" any more than a war against the city of New York when her riotous elements were quelled by United States soldiery.

Lambert. To what miserable straits you are driven in defense of your master! If sending the largest organized army that ever existed under one commander into the South, if fighting the most terrific series of battles during four years that are recorded in history, is not waging war, pray what is it? You may mislead the ignorant by your sophistries about the ancient wars of the Jews, but not about the late war; it is too recent. True, the war was waged against the South to put down a rebellion against the government's authority, but does that make it any the less a war? England waged war against her colonies to maintain her authority. To say she did not wage a war against the colonies, simply because she carried it on to maintain the unity of the Empire, is to ignore the meaning of words and the records of history. The United States waged a war for the union against the South which endeavored to destroy it; and they conquered, gained what they waged war for, and thus achieved as true a conquest as is recorded in history, although they did not dispossess the inhabitants of their lands.

To compare a street riot to the war of the rebellion shows a lack of discrimination in perfect keeping with the loose, indefinite theories of the noisy Ingersoll and his "modest" disciple,

Ingersoll. Slavery includes all other crimes. It is the joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer, and hypocrite.

Notes. How does it *include* all other crimes if it be the joint product of them? A product is an effect.

Lacy. An apple pie includes apples, dough, nutmegs, etc., yet is not the pie the joint product of these ingredients? Ask your cook.

Lambert. While he may not be able to dispute your superior knowledge of pastry, the cook will persist in believing that it is he who makes the pie, and that it is the joint product of his labor and ingenuity. He will not admit that apples, dough, nutmegs, etc., can produce a pie, for if they could the cook's occupation would be gone. Your "Reply" includes paper, ink, words and ideas. Is the "Reply" the product of these ingredients or the product of your mind? Your knowledge of the ingredients of an apple pie is evidently superior to your knowledge of the relations between cause and effect, producer and product. It is to be hoped that in your next reply you will indulge your readers with an essay on tarts. It may go a good way in disproving the inspiration of the Scriptures. Ingersoll's strong point is blasphemy; yours appears to be modesty and piety.

Ingersoll. The superior man is eyes for the blind.

Notes. His superiority does not consist in seeing for the blind, but in his *ability* to see.

Lacy. Then we ask is there no such thing as moral superiority?

Lambert. I am not aware that any one has ever denied it.

Lacy. Or if there be, is it dwarfed into insignificance by the overshadowing greatness of physical power?

Lambert. I do not think it is; on the contrary I believe it to be much more important to have than physical power. But for the life of me I cannot see what this has to do with the question. Superiority of whatever kind must consist in a fact, not in the results that flow from a fact. The latter are not superiority; they are but *evidences* of it.

Ingersoll. With me, liberty is not merely a means—it is an end.

Notes. This is too vague. We are all in favor of liberty, as we understand it, but we do not agree as to what it is or ought to be. It is a foolish loss of time to caw over the word until we have a common idea or understanding of the thing. Do you mean by the word the liberty Guiteau exercised, or that of the Nihilists, or that of the Mormons, or that of the thief, the robber or the murderer? All these appeal to liberty as vociferously as you do. Do you not see that this word "liberty" must be defined and limited—in other words, that it must become a known quantity before it can become a legitimate object of debate. If there is anything thoroughly detested and abhorred by logicians it is a word, or the use of a word, that has no fixed, clear and clean cut meaning to it. You use this word with what Shakespeare would call "damnable iteration," and in all your multifarious uses of it you have never, so far as I have seen, given a definition of it.

Lacy. Of course from this extract it would be inferred that the Father was in doubt as to what kind of liberty Mr. Ingersoll referred to.

Lambert. The Father was in doubt and is in doubt still, despite your luminous explanation.

Lacy. What will the reader think, when informed that the Rev. Lambert passed over three little words immediately preceding his last quotation, which words make the meaning plain beyond all cavil, and perfectly germane to the subject? These words are, "I abhor slavery." And he (Ingersoll) continues: "With me liberty is not merely a means—it is an end." Here it is manifest that the liberty spoken of is of the kind contradistinguished from slavery, from property-right in men, women and children.

Lambert. With all due respect for your intimate knowledge of Ingersoll's meaning, I must decline to accept your theory of interpretation. The word "liberty" has a meaning of its own which does not depend on its location or collocation in Ingersoll's sentences. When he speaks of "liberty" without any qualification whatever, as he did in the sentence I quoted, it must be assumed that he uses the word as other men use it. If he used the word in the sense you give to it he simply misused it; for men at all familiar with the use of words never use the word "liberty" in contradistinction with domestic slavery. "Freedom" is the word Ingersoll should have used if he meant what you imagine he meant. The *freedom* of the slaves is the result of Lincoln's proclamation; their *liberty* in this country is the result of the constitution of the United States. This is the reason why in all official documents concerning the former slaves they are called "Freedmen." Liberty is the genus, freedom is a species of it. But liberty, freedom, and free will are all jumbled together in the infidel vocabulary; sometimes they mean one sometimes another

thing, and they expect the benighted Christian to catch their meaning as it flies.

That Ingersoll's meaning is not clear is evident from the fact that Mr. Lacy has devoted half a page to explain it. According to Mr. Lacy's exposition of Ingersoll's idea of liberty, it means exemption from property-right in men. Will anyone in the 19th century admit that liberty means that? Was that what Patrick Henry meant when he said, "Give me liberty or give me death?" Was that what the colonists fought for when they made war with England? Or was it mere freedom from domestic slavery that Ingersoll meant when he said: "With me liberty is not merely a means—it is an end?" If so he misused the word liberty as he misuses many other words, and in this misuse consists, to a great extent, his sophistry. If Mr. Lacy spent half the energy and ingenuity in explaining the meaning of Moses that he spends in explaining Ingersoll he would take high rank as a hermeneutist.

Lacy. Because his (Lambert's) opponent praises liberty, without specifically defining its metes and bounds, he is gruffly reprovèd.

Lambert. And justly reprovèd. How can he talk sensibly about a thing unless it is defined by metes and bounds? "Liberty," "free thought," "honest error," "honor bright," etc., are infidel catch-words that require to be clearly defined and their meaning understood before they can pass current. In all discussions conducted intelligently, words or terms should be clearly defined in order that both parties may know that they are talking about the same thing. If a man is unable to give the proper definition of a word he

should at least tell us what he means by it; if he cannot do this he should not use the word at all.

Notes. "O liberty! what crimes are committed in thy name," said Madame Roland as she was carted to the guillotine.

Lacy. Madame Roland uttered an eloquent truth. But could not every victim of the accursed inquisition have said with equal truth, "O religion! what crimes are committed in thy name!"

Lambert. Yes; but as the crimes committed *in the name of liberty* are not to be attributed to liberty, so neither are the crimes committed in the name of religion to be attributed to religion. Neither is to be rejected because of these crimes. Bad men in all ages have abused both liberty and religion and will continue to do so, but this is no valid reason why either should be condemned. Bad men will persist in stealing the livery of heaven to serve the devil in. Liberty, like religion, is a divine gift, and blood has been shed in defense of and in the name of both. To subject either to indiscriminate and sweeping condemnation is as unphilosophical as it is contrary to common sense and justice. If we were to banish from the earth everything that human ingenuity and malice can abuse, life on it would not be worth living.

Lacy. The Father, unreasonably, we think, demands, a definition for almost every important word his friend, Mr. Ingersoll, employs.

Lambert. When the meaning of a word is obscure and when it is used now in one sense and now in another, a definition is the only way to arrive at a common understanding. The incorrect use of a word may, and often does, vitiate a whole argument; it frequently amounts to a begging of the question, and

gives room for sophistry. Ingersoll has a fatal facility in the use of words of many meanings, and in making them do duty now in one capacity, now in another. It is for this reason that the Father demands definitions. It is the only way to nail Ingersoll down to definite ideas. The demand for a definition, like a motion to adjourn, is always in order. True, it hampers eloquence and flights of imagination, but it is conducive to truth.

Lacy. The word "liberty" disconnected from any particular subject or train of thought is a mere abstraction.

Lambert. Here you confound the *name* of a thing with the thing itself. When we speak of liberty in reference to intelligent beings we mean the thing, not the sign or sound by which it is indicated. But liberty, according to your own definition, is not an abstraction. You say:

Lacy. Liberty is the right to do what one may please without intrenching on the rights of others.

Lambert. It seems that this is something more than an abstraction. But the definition is not correct, because (1) it does not define the genus, but only a species or certain kind of liberty, and (2) it includes too much, for there are many things we can do without intrenching on our neighbors which we have not the liberty or right to do. We have not the right to injure ourselves though we in no way intrench on our neighbor's rights in doing so.

Lacy. Yet the query arises, what does intrench on those rights (of other's)?

Lambert. That has nothing to do with the question; it is a matter of details.

Lacy. The ancient church held that heresy was a greater crime than murder.

Lambert. This is on a par with your statement about the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The ancient church held that murder is a crime deserving of eternal hell, and no greater punishment can be inflicted for heresy. The same moral code that forbids the one forbids the other, and the punishment in both cases is the same. There is the same difference between heresy and the teaching of it that there is between murder and the teaching of it. He who commits murder is guilty of a criminal fact, while he who teaches it is guilty of a criminal doctrine; of the two the latter is the greater enemy of society. It is the same with heresy, political or religious. When it threatens government or social order it is always punished. And the leaders and teachers of it are always considered the most guilty. Be this right or wrong, it is human nature.

Lacy. Do you, Father, justify what the church did and what is now regarded as ecclesiastical murder?

Lambert. I justify what the church really did, but not what she is ignorantly accused of having done. Nor do I justify the murders committed in the name of religion or the church, or in the name of liberty.

Lacy. Would you, now, had you the power, restrain me, or any one, by penal enactment, ecclesiastical or otherwise, from publicly avowing "Protestant" sentiments, or from proclaiming what you call infidel doctrines?

Lambert. I would judge of the sentiments themselves without reference to what you might call them. If you were as logical in your infidelity as the communists and anarchists are, and if you proclaimed

such doctrines as Herr Most, Spies & Co. preach in the name of liberty, I would, had I the power, put you behind the bars of a jail or lunatic asylum. The name you might give to your sentiments would have nothing to do with it.

Lacy. Do you believe in the broad-guage religious liberty we Americans enjoy?

Lambert. I believe that every man has the right and the obligation to follow and obey the dictates of his own conscience, although I do not believe that the mere plea of conscience should protect offences against social order or against the common principles of morality. The prosecutions of the Mormons shows that we Americans recognize a limit to the practice of certain so-called liberties.

Lacy. Were the United States under Catholic domination would what we call "religious toleration" be enjoyed to the same extent by people of all shades of religious and non-religious faith as at present?

Lambert. I see no reason to think otherwise. The danger to the liberties of this country is infidelity and its twin daughters, anarchy and communism.

Lacy. Some twenty years ago or more I read an editorial in the *Pittsburg Catholic*, in which the writer claimed that Catholic nations alone had the right to forbid the exercise of other than the prescribed kinds of worship, for the reason that non-Catholics only believe that they are right, while Catholics hold their faith with the certainty of knowledge.

Lambert. I must decline to hold the *Pittsburg Catholic* responsible for the nonsense your memory of twenty years or more attributes to it. I call for the *exact words* of that journal, not your travesty of them.

CHAPTER XXV.

Lacy. A year or so ago it was broadly published that a son of General Sherman, in a lecture before a Catholic institution of learning, spoke in advocacy of the inquisition. I never saw or heard a denial of the charge although I watched the papers to see if any was made.

Lambert. It would have been wiser on your part to have read the lecture of General Sherman's son than to take second-hand reports of its nature from the papers. Until you produce something more tangible than vague newspaper reports vaguely remembered you must not expect what you say to be seriously considered. I know not the opinion of General Sherman's son, not having seen the lecture referred to, but I know that he is not the Catholic church. At the same time he is as free to give his individual opinion as you are; and the weight of his opinion, as of yours, depends on the weight of the arguments adduced. If the son inherits the genius of his father I doubt not his ability to justify his opinions whatever they may be—against Mr. Lacy.

Lacy. But true or false, what say you on the subject? Your ideas may help us to a practical definition of liberty satisfactory to both of us.

Lambert. One of my ideas on the subject is that the *principle* whereon the Spanish Inquisition was established has been recognized by all governments past and present as just. The principle is this: "*Great political evils, and especially violent attacks levelled at the body of*

a state, can not be prevented or repelled but by means equally violent." "This," says Le Maistre, "is a political axiom, which no sensible man ever denied." Our own government acted on it during the late war. It suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*, so that the Secretary of State, by ringing a little bell, could arrest and imprison or exile any citizen, and against this action there was for the time no appeal. This was unconstitutional, but was justified on the principle formulated in the above axiom and on another less general proposition, stated by General Grant in his Memoirs, that those who were endeavoring to destroy the constitution had no right to appeal to its protection.

These are the *principles* on which the inquisition was established. Now what were the *facts*? They are thus succinctly stated by M. Le Maistre in his "Spanish Inquisition:"

"About the fifteenth century, Judaism deeply shot its roots into the soil of Spain, and threatened to kill the national plant. The riches and influence of the Jews, and their intermarriage with the most distinguished families of the government, rendered them truly formidable. They were a nation contained within a nation. Mahometism prodigiously increased the danger; that tree had been pulled down in Spain but its roots were unimpaired. The great question then was whether the nation could continue its Spanish character and independence, or whether Judaism and Islamism would divide the spoil of these rich provinces, if superstition, despotism, and barbarity were to drive their triumphal car over the rights and lives of mankind. The Jews were nearly masters of Spain, and between the hot-blooded Castilians and the degenerate sons of Israel no good feeling existed.

Their hatred was mutual and was often carried to excess. The Cortes (i. e. the Spanish parliament) cried aloud for the adoption of severe measures against the latter. An insurrection broke out in the year 1391, and a dreadful slaughter ensued. The danger daily increased, and Ferdinand, surnamed the Catholic, supposed that in order to save the country from utter ruin, it was indispensably necessary to establish the Inquisition, as best calculated to cure the political cancer which was rapidly corroding the heart of the nation."

These are the facts that caused the establishment of the Inquisition. Now I ask, had not the Spanish government, in view of impending destruction, the right to use every means in its power to repel the foreign invasion that threatened its existence? To say it had not is to deny a nation the right of self defense.

You may say the Inquisition was more severe than was necessary for self defense. But this, even admitting it, was an incident arising from the excited passions of the times, and not an essential part of the Inquisition. Our own courts have sentenced innocent people to death, but this incidental error is no argument against the existence of our system of judicature. Aside from this consideration, I believe that the Spaniards of that time were better judges of what was necessary to defend their country and repel invasion than we are who live five hundred years after. We imagine ourselves to be familiar with the punishments, but we are strangely ignorant of the offences for which they were inflicted.

Such are my ideas on the principles and facts which gave rise to the Spanish Inquisition. If you seek further information on the subject I advise you

to read "Letters on the Spanish Inquisition," by M. Le Comte Joseph Le Maistre. They will enable you to appreciate the lecture of the son of General Sherman, when you have time to read it. The time has happily passed—a result of modern progress—when a mere loose indefinite reference to the Inquisition has the force of an argument; a fact you seem to have forgotten.

Lacy. We now approach a marvelous piece of assertion. We are told that as to the physical and intellectual laws man has no liberty whatever.

Lambert. I have yet to hear of the philosopher who claims liberty as to the physical laws of the universe—so far as man is concerned. The genius who is to proclaim that man has liberty as to the physical laws of nature has yet to appear, and when he does appear, as he may, for it is not impossible, he will suffer under the disadvantage of being considered a "crank."

Lacy. Is it true, then, that the intellect of man which above all things else determines his choice and shapes his conduct, has no more freedom of action than a grain of sand, or the wave that dashes on the shore and returns again to the bosom of the deep?

Lambert. In the first place it is not the *intellect* of man, but his *will* that shapes his conduct, and his will, not his intellect is the seat of liberty. To speak with philosophical precision, it is *knowledge and will* that determine the actions of men, for the will cannot act without something to act on, it cannot desire a thing without knowing that thing. To the will, the unknown and the non-existing, are one and the same. The intellect as the seat of knowledge is a necessary condition of liberty, but knowledge without free will

cannot produce liberty. The seat of liberty is in the will, but the will cannot act without an object on which to act. This object is supplied by the intellect which intelligences or apprehends things, and these things presented by the intellect to the will afford the latter its field of operation, its field of liberty—and beyond this there is neither knowledge nor liberty. The intellect or intellectual faculty is to the will or volitive faculty what the telescope is to the astronomer; it presents the object to the will as the telescope presents the distant star to the eye of the astronomer. Having done this its work is done. The will like the astronomer then deals with the object presented; and the intellect like the telescope, having presented the object to the will, becomes inoperative, and the will dominates thereafter, and in this dominancy of the will consists liberty. As the astronomer directs the telescope to this, that or the other object, so the will directs the intellectual faculty to this, that or the other object as it wills. When I will to reply to Mr. Lacy, my will forthwith takes up its intellectual microscope and through it examines his sayings. My intellect in the case is the servant of my will, nay, the slave, for it finds no pleasure in the operation; it does its work as best it can at the imperative command of the will. The intellect is the instrument by which the will acquires its materials, and the will never loses control over it. When the intellect begins to bring home some unpalatable truths the will says: Stop, you must go no farther, and it stops. This is why ignorance is sometimes a sin, because it is the result of the will. The intellect cannot sin. It is the will alone that sins or can sin.

But is it not strange that a disciple of Ingersoll

should plead for liberty of intellect? Ingersoll teaches that the action of the intellect depends on the food we eat and on the condition of our digestive organs; and this food and this condition of our digestive organs depend on prior conditions of something else and these prior conditions depend on conditions still prior, and these on others in an endless chain. He holds that every thought and thing that is, is the necessary result of something that was. What are we to think of the disciple who, while following such a leader talks of liberty of intellect? If our thoughts are the result of what we eat, as Ingersoll says they are, how can the intellect be free? or how can Mr. Lacy talk about free intellect? or does the disciple really understand his master?

Lacy. May not man abuse his intellect as well as his moral nature?

Lambert. Certainly. But how unless by his *will*? How can a man abuse anything unless he can *will* to do so? And if the will is free to abuse the intellect, is that not sufficient to prove that it is the will and not the intellect that is free?

Lacy. Perhaps I do not understand the Father.

Lambert. I believe you do not. And yet you go off at half-cock to answer him.

Lacy. The subject of polygamy, as practiced under the Old Testament dispensation, is next in order.

Lambert. Very well, proceed.

Ingersoll. We are informed by Mr. Black that polygamy is neither commanded nor prohibited in the Old Testament—that it is only discouraged. It seems to me that a little legislation on the subject might have tended to its discouragement. But where is the legislation?

Notes. In your first article on the Christian religion you said that the Bible upheld polygamy as the highest form of virtue. Your opponent met your assertion with a denial that the Bible so held or taught. Here a direct issue was made—a question of veracity raised. And how did you meet it? Did you stand by your statement and proceed to prove it? Not at all. You reply by saying that the Bible did not legislate against it. This is an admission that your statement could not be sustained—a raising of the white flag.

Lacy. Here we are told is a question of veracity.

Lambert. Yes, that is about it.

Lacy. Veracity, of course, means adherence to truth. If a man lacks veracity he is untruthful; is, in short, what the Father, by necessary implication, often calls Mr. Ingersoll—a *liar*. Would this critic like to be tested by the same rule?

Lambert. Certainly.

Lacy. The Father says that Mr. Ingersoll asserted that the Bible upheld polygamy as the higher form of virtue. He said no such thing.

Lambert. Ingersoll said: "The believer in the inspiration of the Bible * * * is *compelled to insist that there was a time when polygamy was the highest form of virtue* * * * Once they (slavery, polygamy, etc.) were right—once *commanded* by God." I leave it to the reader, after reading the above quotation, to say whether or not I misrepresented Ingersoll's position when I represented him as holding that the Bible upheld polygamy as the highest form of virtue. The attempt to show that he did not so hold is the merest quibbling.

Lacy. The charge that the Bible *taught* or *upheld*

polygamy as the highest form of virtue would imply that the Bible contained commands or precepts exceedingly favorable to it.

Lambert. Precisely. And Ingersoll said: "slavery, polygamy, etc., * * * were once *commanded* by God." Therefore according to your own showing my charge against him was true. Here, in your very effort to disprove my charge, you verify it.

Ingersoll. In the moral code (of the Old Testament) not one word is said on the subject of polygamy.

Notes. Then why did you say the Bible taught polygamy as the highest form of virtue?

Lacy. We have shown that the Father imputed to Mr. Ingersoll words that were not written by him. Here we have the same false charge the second time repeated.

Lambert. The Father correctly stated Ingersoll's position. You seem to forget that Ingersoll said that slavery and polygamy "were once commanded by God." This one statement upsets all your fine spun explanations.

Notes. If you look in Genesis, chap. II, verse 24, you will find the following words: "Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave unto his wife (not wives) and they shall be two in one flesh." This is the law in the case.

Lacy. Mark what Father Lambert is trying to disprove. His opponent had said: "In the moral code of the Old Testament not one word is said on the subject of polygamy." Has this been disproved?

Lambert. The verse from Genesis laying down the doctrine of monogamy, and therefore disapproving polygamy, is a part of the code of the Old Testament, and therefore disproves Ingersoll's statement. If fur-

ther disproof is necessary I need only quote Ingersoll's own words, that slavery and polygamy "were once *commanded* by God." Now if commanded by God there must have been at least one word about polygamy in the moral code of the Old Testament. Surely your master's own testimony should be sufficient for you; of course he contradicts himself, but that is nothing new.

Lacy. Who wrote that one verse?

Lambert. It is nothing to our present purpose who wrote it. It is enough that it is a part of the moral code of the Old Testament of which Ingersoll spoke.

Lacy. To whom was the command given? No one knows.

Lambert. This has nothing to do with the point at present in issue; which is whether Ingersoll stated the truth when he said: "In the moral code (of the Old Testament) there is not one word on the subject of polygamy."

Lacy. But even if the clause referred to were prohibitory, the uninterrupted and unrebuked practice for thousands of years among God's own people, and even while He was their direct ruler, would certainly seem to be a practical repeal of the command.

Lambert. I insist on your keeping to the point. The question is, Is there one word on the subject of polygamy in the moral code of the Old Testament? Ingersoll says there is not. Do you still hold that he is right?

CHAPTER XXVI.

Lacy. The doctrine that if we had no revelation we would have neither moral sense nor moral law, not only antagonizes experience and sound philosophy but the scripture as well.

Lambert. The principle advanced by me was that if all revelation be rejected there can be found no valid argument against polygamy. This appears all the more evident from a consideration of your arguments against polygamy. You assert that it is wrong because it injures society and those who practice it. But this is a begging of the question, for those who believe in and practice polygamy deny point blank your assertion. An argument based on an assertion has no validity or force against those who deny the truth of the assertion. The majority of mankind outside of Christendom have believed in and practiced polygamy or its equivalent in some form. Hence if you appeal to reason alone and reject revelation you have this majority against you—a majority that does not believe that polygamy is injurious to society or to those who practice it. As a matter of fact your assertion is based on Christian sentiment and this sentiment is again based on divine revelation.

Now a word as to your statement above. And first, no one, at least no Christian philosopher holds that without revelation there would be no moral sense. The moral sense is a faculty of the soul by which it apprehends moral questions or the principles of morality when presented to it, just as our physical senses

are faculties by which we apprehend physical, material things when presented to them. The existence of the moral sense then does not depend on revelation. Being a faculty of the soul its existence is concomitant with the soul. But a faculty without an object on which to act is quiescent, dead, or useless. If there were no sounds the faculty of hearing would be of no use; if there were no visible things the faculty of sight would be of no avail; if there were nothing tangible we would not be conscious that we possessed the faculty of feeling. So with every faculty of mind and body; each must be brought into relation with its proper object. Now the proper object of the faculty of moral sense is moral principles. These principles must be presented to it before it can act on them or act at all. These moral principles are based on the *will* of the supreme, infinite and perfect Being, and they cannot pass from the mind of the supreme Being to the mind of the finite being without a revelation of some kind. Hence the moral sense without revelation would not have its proper object to act on; it would wither and die as the eyes of the fishes in the dark recesses of the Mammoth Cave lose the ability to perform their functions for want of light. Take away the moral principles that are known only by revelation and the moral sense would be a faculty without an object—a dead faculty. Moral principles are then necessary to its life; and these principles are supplied by revelation. Hence revelation is necessary to the life and activity of the moral sense, although not to its mere inoperative existence.

Second, the doctrine that without revelation there would be no moral law is verified by common sense and sound philosophy as well as by the Scripture.

The moral law as contradistinguished from physical law is, according to Webster who agrees with the theologians, "the will of God, as the Supreme moral ruler, concerning the character and conduct of all responsible beings." Now as the moral law is the will of God it is very evident that that will cannot be known to man unless it is revealed—hence the necessity of a revelation to a knowledge of the moral law. Hence, again if we have no revelation we can have no knowledge of the moral law. The moral law may and does exist in the mind of God, but it is no law for us until it is promulgated, and its promulgation is a revelation.

The doctrine that there is no moral law without revelation accords equally with Scripture. To show this I need go no further than the text quoted by you from St. Paul. "These (the Gentiles) having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law, *written in their hearts*, their conscience also bearing witness." (Romans II, 14, 15). If the law was written in their hearts it was certainly revealed to them by Him who wrote it in their hearts. This writing of the law in their hearts was a revelation. This is why I have said that without revelation of some kind the moral law cannot be known to man. Had you been familiar with the well known distinction between the divine natural law which was revealed to all men and the divine positive law which was revealed on Mount Sinai you would have understood St. Paul better.

Lacy. The Father quotes Rousseau, the French skeptic, to show the egotism of philosophers and the vanity of philosophy.

Lambert. The Father quoted him to show the egotism of the French infidel philosophers of his day.

When he "sized them up" he drew an excellent picture of the latter day infidels.

Lacy. The Father claims that before deciding what women's rights are, they must be determined rightly and independently of sentiments and feelings.

Lambert. You do not put it straight. The Father claims that until it is determined what these "rights" are, the question as to what the Bible says about them cannot be intelligently discussed. Here is one of those cases in which a definition is imperatively necessary. Until we have a clear, common understanding of what is meant by woman's rights it is idling time away to discuss the question.

Lacy. A rather difficult task to undertake, for who can discuss a moral question, or one involving human rights, without sentiment or feelings?

Lambert. It was not a question of discussion, but of a definition, or determining the meaning of the phrase "woman's rights." In defining terms there is no place for sentiment or feeling. Besides, he who cannot conduct a logical argument without sentiment or feeling is unfit to discuss any question. Sentiment and feeling are good things in poetry and in a certain kind of oratory, but they are as out of place in logic as they are in the solution of a mathematical or geometrical problem.

Mr. Lacy after charging me with garbling and misquoting Ingersoll's article, makes a long quotation for the purpose, he tells us, of doing justice to him. He is of course free to quote the whole of Ingersoll's article if it suits his purpose, while I am equally free to use my judgment and select such of his statements as I deem it proper to reply to, being careful to give *verbatim* the statements quoted. A writer is responsi-

ble for every statement he makes and each statement should stand or fall by its own intrinsic truth or fallacy. If the statements on which his argument is based are false, the whole argument falls. When Mr. Lacy asserts that I garbled or misquoted Ingersoll's statements I must refer him to that precept of the decalogue which forbids bearing false witness.

Mr. Lacy understands the trick of insinuation. He would rather refer than quote when he writes "of the treatment to which women were subject under Jewish rule and law ; for instance as delineated in the twenty-first and twenty-second chapters of Deuteronomy." I have already treated of the twenty-first chapter in a preceding article and need not repeat. It is sufficient here to state that the parts he objects to in that chapter consist of certain regulations made by Moses to protect female captives from the first familiarities of the soldier. The twenty-second chapter which his mock modesty forbids him to quote speaks of certain crimes and their punishments. For instance, it forbids a woman to be clothed with a man's apparel and a man to be clothed in a woman's apparel. How cruel in Moses to subject women to such limitations. It also lays down the punishment of a man who slanders his wife, and that to be afflicted on immoral women. It states the punishment for adultery, to be inflicted on both parties alike. It protects the innocent woman by inflicting death on her ravisher, and obliges the man to marry the woman whose confidence he has betrayed. Such is chapter twenty-second of Deuteronomy to which Mr. Lacy refers so delicately and blushinglly. The only right taken away from women in this chapter is the right to wear trousers or commit adultery. Does Mr. Lacy insist on these "rights?"

Notes. Moses forbade these abominations (the licentious modes of worship practiced by women at the altars of Venus and Cybele) and for this you accuse him of taking away the "rights" of women.

Lacy. What will the reader say when he finds that this is a plain unvarnished misstatement?

Lambert. Unluckily for you Ingersoll is somewhat specific in this matter. He, in speaking of the rights of women among pagans as contradistinguished from those of Jewish women, says: "In Persia women were priests." Now it is a fact that these pagan priestesses sacrificed their virtue at the lewd altars of their false gods. This was not a mere lapse on their part. It was a part of their abominable ceremonies. When Ingersoll refers to these priestesses as examples of better treatment than that accorded to Jewish women, he referred also to their official practices, knowingly or ignorantly. In any case he is responsible for his statement and all it implies. Now the practices of these pagan priestesses were forbidden by Moses to Jewish women. For this Ingersoll condemns him.

Lacy. The right of woman is to fulfill the highest destiny which she is mentally, morally and physically qualified to reach.

Lambert. The Christian philosopher would call this a *duty*. There is difference between rights and duties, although you persist in confounding them.

Lacy. We have the authority of Fenelon, Catholic Archbishop of Tours, that the Jews were not "one jot less corrupted" than the heathen.

Lambert. Fenelon, Archbishop of Tours, is a myth. There is or was no such person. When you are so incorrect as to modern facts you are not expected to be reliable as to ancient facts.

Mr. Lacy next gives us a little treatise on the meaning of the word "exterminate," to show that it may mean something more than to "expel, to drive out." It certainly may mean something more, but as a matter of fact in the case of inhabitants of Canaan as in the case of the Indians in this country, it means that the land was cleared of them in one way or another. The best evidence as to the correct use of the word is a standard dictionary. Consult Webster and you will find that the first meaning of the word "exterminate" given by him is "to drive from within the limits or borders of." When you say the Latin word *venio* means *to go*, the reader will be apt to agree with you that you are a poor Latin scholar. The word "prevent" does not mean "to go before" as you tell us. The texts you quote from Deuteronomy and Numbers to prove that exterminate means to destroy by killing, only show that those met in battle and taken prisoners were put to death. Those who fled were exterminated though not put to death.

Ingersoll. In this age of fact and demonstration it is refreshing to find a man who believes so thoroughly in the monstrous, the miraculous, the impossible and immoral.

Notes, Here you assume to determine what is monstrous, miraculous, impossible and immoral. It is refreshing in this age of general education to see an infidel offering his crude notions as ultimate principles or axioms.

Lacy. But of what was Mr. Ingersoll speaking when he referred to the monstrous? To the story of the loquacious serpent, to the alleged universality of the flood, to the story of a woman transformed into a

pillar of salt, and to the tower of Babel "stopped by the jargon of a thousand tongues."

Lambert. Yes, but it is denied that any of these are monstrous, impossible or immoral, and Ingersoll's mere affirmation does not make them so. Mark his method. He first says they are monstrous, etc., and then expresses astonishment that others do not agree with him. It seems to me that the great minds and master intellects of Christendom are as good judges of what is monstrous, etc., as Ingersoll or his disciple is. This assumption that they are all wrong and he only right is another illustration of Ingersoll's "modesty."

Lacy. What was referred to (by Ingersoll) as immoral? Slavery, polygamy, wars of extermination, and persecution even unto death for opinion's sake.

Lambert. But it is denied that slavery *per se* is immoral, and neither Ingersoll nor you have attempted to prove it. You confound slavery with certain abuses incident to it and condemn the one with the other, but you have wisely not attempted to show that that relation between capital and labor called slavery is in itself immoral. You seem to think it is enough to affirm it and then build up arguments on your affirmations, forgetful of the fact that the affirmations themselves stand in need of proof. True, Ingersoll *says* it is slimy and filthy, but you make a grave mistake when you imagine that is equivalent to proof. It is denied that wars of extermination are wrong or immoral when waged, as waged by the Jews, at the command of Him who is the Supreme master of life and death. It is denied that Christianity teaches that persecution for opinion's sake, is right, just or moral. These denials are valid and of force against your and

Ingersoll's gratuitous assertions, for it is a principle in logic that what is gratuitously affirmed can be gratuitously denied.

Lacy. In this age does the Father require a writer to prove that slavery is an evil and polygamy a sin?

Lambert. He does most emphatically require those who reject revelation to prove the wrong or sinfulness of slavery and polygamy. Those who believe in revelation believe they are wrong because they are forbidden. But on what principle do you, who reject revelation, believe they are wrong? O, they are slimy and filthy. There, there, we have had enough of that kind of talk; it proves nothing.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Ingersoll. Mr. Black comes to the conclusion that the Hebrew Bible is in exact harmony with the New Testament.

Lambert. Mr. Black comes to no such conclusion. It is no doubt true that "the Old and New Testaments are so connected together that if one is true the other cannot be false." This is your opponent's statement and it is very different from what you represent him as saying.

Lacy. How has the Father succeeded in making his point, small at best? By splitting a sentence in two, leaving out an extract quoted from Mr. Black's article, and substituting a period for a comma. This was necessary to show up the infidel!

Lambert. Ingersoll's sentence contained two propositions, one of which was false and the other true. When he said "Mr. Black comes to the conclusion that the Hebrew Bible is in exact harmony with the New Testament," he misrepresented Mr. Black. It is of no consequence what *else* he may have said in his sentence, whether true or false. It suffices that the proposition quoted by me is false. The Father quoted in full and dealt with Ingersoll's proposition and found it to be false. He had nothing to do with the other proposition in the same sentence which was true.

Lacy. Give me the same liberty with Shakespeare as the Father takes with Ingersoll, and I will convert the grandest sentiments of the noble bard into drivel and nonsense.

Lambert. You have a perfect right to quote Shakespeare or any other author as I quote Ingersoll, that is, proposition by proposition, and examine each by itself and on its own merits. If Shakespeare cannot bear this test he is not the poet he is generally supposed to be. The merit of Shakespeare consists in the fact that his sentences are built up of true propositions, and that is one of the many differences between him and Ingersoll. I do not doubt your capacity to manufacture drivel and nonsense, but not out of Shakespeare, as long as you quote his propositions.

Lacy. We now approach a subject worthy the moralist—the *status* of slavery *in itself* as related to morality. It seems to be agreed there are immutable principles, the violation of which no exigency will justify.

Lambert. Your first sentence is a sufficiently correct statement of the question, and the second gives a key to its solution. An evil *in itself*, or *malum in se*, as theologians term it, is an evil which no exigency will justify; while an evil by circumstances, or *malum per accidens*, is an evil which some exigency or circumstance may justify or cause to be no longer evil. Thus, murder, blasphemy, lying, etc., are evil in themselves and can therefore be justified by no exigency whatever, while working on Sunday, killing, destroying property, taking what belongs to another, are evils *per accidens*, and may be justified by circumstances. Working on Sunday is justified when there is an urgent necessity, for instance saving your house when on fire; killing is not wrong when done by a sheriff in the exercise of his office; destroying property is not wrong when it is for good reason deemed neces-

sary, as the destruction of property in the South done to end the war; taking what belongs to another is not wrong when there is grave necessity, for instance, a starving man does no wrong by taking sufficient food to support life for the time being, and when he cannot obtain it otherwise. There is then a class of acts that are wrong and forbidden under certain circumstances and not wrong or forbidden under other circumstances. These wrongs or evils are called *malum per accidens*. There is another class of acts that are wrong essentially, under all circumstances and are never justifiable. These are *malum in se*.

Now to which of these classes does slavery belong? That is the question at issue. I am glad to find that you and I agree that it belongs to the first class, and that it is not essentially wrong, or wrong in itself, for you tell us on page 111, that "We may suppose an example where slavery would be justified; as in case of war and by way of retaliation." In this you are right, and it follows that slavery is not wrong in itself, not essentially wrong, for if it were you could suppose no case in which it could be justified.

Lacy. But in such case the slave is held, not for profit, nor under pretense of converting him, but to *exact justice, to vindicate liberty, and generally to conserve the interests of humanity.*

Lambert. You make a remarkable admission here. Ingersoll says, "slavery includes all other crimes. It is the joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer and hypocrite." And yet you admit that in certain cases it may be justified and practiced, to exact justice, to vindicate *liberty* and to conserve the *interests of humanity!* It follows, if you and he are both right, that the "joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer and hypocrite" may be

utilized to exact justice, to vindicate liberty and to conserve the interests of humanity! It seems to me, to use a phrase of your own, that this is coming down to "hard pan."

You endeavor to make a point by stating that the Jews used the institution of slavery for gain—not for missionary but mercenary purposes. I may even grant this, and that they did wrong in doing so. But this does not prove that slavery is wrong. At best it only proves that they abused it. The abuse of a thing is no argument against the thing abused. If it were, liberty would be wrong, wealth would be an evil, for both of these may be and are abused. The question between you and me is not whether the Jews did wrong, but whether slavery is wrong in itself, and as you have admitted that under certain circumstances, in the interests of justice, liberty and humanity, it is justified, you have admitted all that I desire, you agree with me and go back on your master.

Lacy. Webster defines slavery as "the entire subjection to the will of another."

Lambert. Although you garble Webster's definition it is still good enough for my purpose. Is there anything evil or wrong in itself in "the entire subjection of one person to the will of another?" If so obedience to God would be evil in itself, perfect obedience to legitimate authority or government would be wrong, and the best citizen would be the worst. If entire subjection of an individual to the will of another or others is wrong it follows that the less entire his subjection is the better the man is; in other words the more lawless a man is the more perfect he is.

Lacy. Such is slavery pure and simple, as delineated by historic annals, sacred and profane, *qualified by but few restrictions* as to the life and person of the slave.

Lambert. If slavery be qualified by "restrictions as to the life and person of the slave" how can it be said that the slave is in *entire subjection to the will of another*? Your explanation of Webster's definition of slavery is in antagonism with historic slavery, for historic slavery did not mean *entire* subjection except in rare cases. The historic annals that speak of slavery speak also of the laws regulating it and defining the relations between master and slave. And the moment we suppose laws regulating these relations, that moment we must give up the idea that the slave was in *entire* subjection to the master.

Lacy. If the slaves could choose their masters, or even if the majority of men were humane the evils of servitude would, at least, be mitigated.

Lambert. No doubt of it. But we are not speaking of the *evils* of slavery; we are discussing the question whether slavery is itself an evil when considered without reference to the abuses of it. No one denies that men may make a bad use of it, as they can of everything else within their reach. What is denied is that slavery itself—the entire subjection of one person to the will of another—is evil in itself.

Notes. The church during eighteen centuries fought against slavery, and taught that all men are equal before God.

Lacy. Some churches did while others have been the apologists of slavery.

Lambert. Here you confound, as usual, slavery in itself with slavery as sometimes practiced. While the church has always held that slavery—the subjection of one to the will of another is not wrong in itself—it has always condemned the practice of it because owing to man's perversity and cruelty it is subject to so many abuses.

Lacy. But if slavery be not sinful why antagonize it?

Lambert. It is antagonized, not because it is sinful in itself, but because of the abuses it is subject to. Will you never get this distinction into your head?

Lacy. Or if right among the Jews why wrong among the Gentiles?

Lambert. It was not wrong in itself in either case. The wrong consists in the abuse, not in the use.

Lacy. Was a Jewish more merciful than a Christian master?

Lambert. Yes; he had to be by reason of the laws. These laws ordained that a slave, if a Hebrew, regained his freedom after six years, and if not a Hebrew, he became a freeman in the year of jubilee or at the death of his master, for according to the teachings of the rabbins the slave did not descend to the heirs. Jewish slavery was but temporary, while slavery among other peoples was for life. This makes a great difference.

Notes. The apostles claimed a divine communication and mission. They worked miracles.

Lacy. Here again is a begging of the question by one who was to grant nothing and take nothing for granted. Here it is *assumed* that miracles were wrought, the very statement denied in the controversy.

Lambert. There is the same evidence to prove the miracles of Christ and the apostles that there is to prove the existence and acts of Alexander and Cæsar, namely, history and tradition. If we reject the former we must on the same principle reject the latter, and if we adopt this principle we cut ourselves off comparatively from all the events and personages of the past. The miracles of Christ and His apostles are historic facts or events subject to the same rules of historic

criticism that other facts are. You may say, as Ingèrsoll does, that the people at that time were rude and ignorant and therefore not reliable judges as to what was or was not a miracle. But you and he forget that we do not adduce their evidence to prove the miraculous nature of the facts they relate, but to prove the facts themselves. Raising the dead to life, curing the sick instantaneously, and giving sight to the blind and hearing and speech to the deaf and dumb are facts to which the ignorant and rude can testify as well as the learned. That these facts really occurred was admitted by pagan and anti-Christian writers of the times immediately subsequent to the apostles.

The miracles of Christ as recorded in the New Testament were admitted by the Jews. It never occurred to Jew, Gentile or Pagan to doubt the fact of those miracles. Celsus, Porphyry and Julian admitted them and tried to deprive them of their significance and force by saying that Christ was a magician who had learned the black art while in Egypt with Mary, His mother, on the banks of the Nile. The Jews also accounted for His power by saying He had stolen the unspeakable word from the temple; and some of them held that He performed His wonderful works by the power of the devil. These explanations of the facts are an admission that they did not doubt the facts. Can we suppose these enemies of Christ would have admitted the facts if they had had any decent pretext to deny their existence? Certainly not. And it must be admitted that their proximity in time and place to them made them better judges of the reality of those events than are the skeptics of to-day. Mind, I do not say they were better judges of what constitutes a miracle than we are at the present time, but that they

were better judges of facts they relate, and which we now must call miraculous.

Lacy. The church might as well face the issue: *Is there sufficient evidence to convince intelligent and unbiased lovers of truth, that miracles, as recorded, were ever wrought?*

Lambert. If you were familiar with the church's literature you would know that it has never failed to face the issue. We have historic evidence of Christians and pagans that the facts took place—evidence that cannot be rejected without destroying the credibility of all history—and we with our knowledge of the laws of nature, know that they could not have taken place without the intervention of a power superior to that of nature. The most intelligent and unbiased lovers of truth in the most civilized part of the world for the last eighteen hundred years have deemed the evidence all sufficient. Your inference that the evidence is not sufficient for intelligent men is, in view of the history of the last eighteen hundred years, extremely modest, and would lead us to believe that when you speak of intelligent and unbiased lovers of truth you have reference only to the infidels of the present time, and imagine that they have a monopoly of intelligence and truth. It is needless to say that this "modest" assumption cannot be granted.

Lacy. The skeptic says, along with miracles we read of witchcraft and demoniacal possessions.

Lambert. And the merchant says, along with gold coin he meets with counterfeits, but he is not so asinine as to reject all money on that account. He takes care however to test each piece or note, and rejects the false and accepts the true.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Lacy. Witches have been banished from educated society, and demonology is a thing of the past.

Lambert. This is begging the question. That phenomena occur now as in former times which can be accounted for on no other hypothesis than the inference of non-corporeal intelligences is a fact established by evidence so incontestable that to deny them is to deny the validity and force of all evidence. The truth on which a belief in these phenomena is based, namely, the existence of non-corporeal intelligences, is believed now as it has always been believed by the human race, by the educated as by the ignorant. When you insinuate that spiritual phenomena are disbelieved in by educated society you are either unfamiliar with such society or you imagine it to be composed of a few infidels and skeptics. Had you read the works written in modern times by able and learned men, such as Goerres, Bizuard, Peronne, Lecanu, Gmeiner, Schneider, Brownson, Crookes, and others on the subject of spiritual phenomena, you would not talk so flippantly about educated society rejecting them. The light and airy way in which you treat this subject shows that you have not thoroughly studied it; not given it that attention which profound thinkers of all times have deemed it worthy of.

Lacy. The insanity of the present was the "evil possession" not only of the Jews but of other nations.

Lambert. Here is another gratuitous assertion, not worth the ink squandered in writing it, until

established by proof. There have been and are many cases of well established "possession" where the possessed were not insane, and many cases of insanity where the afflicted were not possessed. This distinction has always been made. There is no necessary relation between insanity and possession, and the evidences proving the one are of an entirely different kind from those proving the other. As you undertake to discuss the subject you should not be ignorant of this fact.

Lacy. A crazy man was supposed to be possessed by the devil.

Lambert. Supposed by whom? Where did you acquire this piece of information which you impart so gratuitously? We find in the Scripture that certain persons were said to be possessed, but we do not find that crazy men were supposed to be possessed. This is an inference of your own which is not justified by the premises. As a matter of fact the Scriptures themselves make a distinction between demoniac possession and insanity, and recognize the existence of both. This fact is sufficient to thoroughly upset your gratuitous assertion. In St. Matthew's gospel, chapter IV verse 24, we find the following: "And they brought unto him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those that *were possessed with devils*, and those that *were lunatic*, and those that had the palsey; and He healed them." Here it is evident that the Jews made a distinction between possession and lunacy. Again, "There came to Him (Christ) a certain man, kneeling down to Him, and saying: "Lord, have mercy on my son, for he is a *lunatic*." (Matth. 17-15.) In the first book of Samuel, chapter 21, David feigned madness to escape from

King Achish. "He changed his behavior before them, and feigned himself mad on their hands, and scrabbled on the doors of the gate, and let his spittle fall down on his beard. Then Achish said unto his servants, Lo, the man is mad: Wherefore then have ye brought him to me? Have I need of madmen, that ye have brought this fellow to play the madman in my presence? Shall this fellow come into my house? David therefore departed thence, and escaped to the Cave of Adullam." It appears from this that in the time of David they knew of insanity, as David's imitation of it sh ws. Jeremiah, speaking of the Babylonians, says: "They are *mad* upon their idols" (chap. 50-38). When Rhoda announced that Peter stood before the gate of the house of Mary the mother of John, "They said unto her, Thou art *mad*" (Acts 12-15). They thought she was crazy because they believed that Peter was in prison. "And as he (Paul) thus spake for himself, Festus said with a loud voice, Paul thou art beside thyself; much learning doth make thee mad. But Paul said, I am not mad, most noble Festus; but speak forth the words of truth and soberness." (Acts 26-24, 25.)

These quotations show that madness and lunacy were recognized as a derangement of the intellect, and not confounded with demoniac possession. I need not quote the many texts of Scripture that speak of demoniac possession; they are numerous and clear. From the above texts it follows that when you said "a crazy man was supposed to be possessed by a devil," you merely made an ignorant guess.

Lacy. The ignorant can still be made to believe in witches, ghosts and demons; but is it right to abuse the incredulity of unlearned and unreflecting minds.

Lambert. It seems impossible for an infidel to talk without an assumption of superiority over his fellow men. The human family, the learned as well as the ignorant, have ever believed in the existence of spiritual beings, and that they can communicate and have intercourse, for good or ill, with men. The exceptions are so small as not to be worth counting. Call these spiritual beings ghosts, angels, saints, demons, or what you will, the universal belief in their existence is a fact which no philosopher who has any regard for his reputation can afford to ignore or laugh at. Whether these beings have had intercourse with men and produced sensible phenomena is a question of fact, subject to the same tests and provable by the same kind of evidence by which all other sensible facts are tested and proved. The evidence that such phenomena or spiritual manifestations have taken place and still take place is so clear and strong that if we doubt it we must at the same time reject all evidence as a motive of credibility. The trick of attributing ignorance to those who differ from us can deceive only the unlearned and unreflecting.

Lacy. How long before fear will cease to be the ruling element of religion?

Lambert. If you had a true notion of what the word "religion" means you would understand that fear has nothing whatever to do with it. Fear is an element not of religion but of human nature, and as such is a good thing, as long as it does not degenerate into cowardice or pusillanimity. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, say the Scriptures. Fear is a proper appreciation of danger with a desire or impulse to avoid it. It is implanted in man by his Creator as a protection to his life. Courage is a

proper appreciation of danger with the strength to meet it when duty calls. Cowardice is an appreciation of danger with the lack of courage to meet it when duty requires it to be met. Pusillanimity is a want of manly strength and firmness of mind, dastardliness, mean-spiritedness, faint-heartedness. The Christian is free to admit that he is afraid of God when he has done something to offend Him, afraid of being punished for his offense. Fear in this case is the legitimate child of transgression; and, being legitimate, is respectable.

Lacy. We read of many miracles of to-day, not only among Catholics but among Protestants as well. All seem to be equally authenticated, and yet what scientific man will listen patiently to a recital of these wonders?

Lambert. It seems to me that scientific men should listen patiently to a recital of these wonders, if they are honest seekers after truth. But the truth does not depend on their patience or impatience, and it is very stupid in you to make these a test of truth.

Lacy. We repeat, it is too bad to impose upon the credulous.

Lambert. And I repeat it. But why did you not think of this fact when you said that Christians believed that there are *three Gods*? Was it ignorance or a perverse moral impulse that made you make that false statement? Having made it, you are the last person in the world to talk about "imposing upon the credulous."

Lacy. We read of many miracles of to-day, * *
● All seem to be equally well authenticated.

Lambert. "All seem to be!" Have you ever critically examined any of these miracles? Had you

or any of your so-called scientists taken the trouble to do so you and they would have found that miracles are not all equally authenticated. Honest and enlightened men have examined these miracles, and while they have rejected some they were forced by the weight of evidence to admit others. But this careful, laborious investigation is too troublesome for the superficial skeptic; he knows all about it, or thinks he does.



Lacy. Years ago a servant girl * * * offered me the loan of a Catholic publication.

Lambert. Was it perhaps this same servant girl who taught you the components of pot-pies and apple pies of which you have spoken so learnedly? You take a silly story from some publication the name of which you have forgotten, and from such evidence attempt to build up an argument against miracles. After giving, in your own words, the silly story, you say "this is only a specimen of legends innumerable, which are put forth as verities—*equal verities* as apostolic miracles—by a church claiming to be immaculate." Is such stuff the best argument you have against miracles? Your statement above is simply false. It is, as you say, too bad to impose upon the credulous. No one who loves truth desires victory at the expense of truth.




Lacy. There is another class which professes to open to our vision the portals of the unseen world; spiritualists.

Lambert. The incontestable facts of spiritualism prove the existence of non-material beings. There is much fraud and trickery perpetrated by so-called spiritualist mediums, but behind these there are facts which cannot be explained on any hypothesis save that of the existence of non-material, intelligent beings. This





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

1.8
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.6
6.3
7.1
8.0
9.0
10.0

100
50
20
10
5
2.5
1.25
0.63
0.315
0.157
0.078
0.039
0.020
0.010
0.005

has always been recognized by the church as well as by the Scriptures. Your effort to offset true miracles by the tricks and deceptions of fraudulent, catch-penny mediums is unworthy the spirit of honest investigation.

Lacy. The question of the verity of miracles, when divested of theological flummery, is a simple one. It involves only a question of *fact*.

Lambert. You say this as if it were an original idea with you. Christians have at all times insisted that miracles are questions of fact, and like other facts, provable by evidence.

Lacy. Why should the ignorant and superstitious be exclusively selected as witnesses of supernatural manifestations?

Lambert. This question implies a fallacy. The ignorant and superstitious are not exclusively selected. To say that those who have investigated miracles and been convinced of their verity are ignorant and superstitious is unmitigated impertinence as well as an evidence of ignorance.

Lacy. Ignorance is not, *per se*, holiness, nor credulity wisdom.

Lambert. Pray who says they are? You have caught the trick of manufacturing these little aphorisms from your master Ingersoll. There is no purpose in the above except to leave the inference that Christians believe ignorance to be holiness and credulity wisdom. You should remember your own words that "no one who loves truth desires victory at the expense of truth." While ignorance is not holiness it is not incompatible with it or with goodness.

Lacy. Would you convince us of miracles, submit your tests to scientific men, such as compose the French Academy of Science, for example?

Lambert. By "scientific men" you mean physical scientists, for such is the sense in which the phrase is used by modern infidels. Now a favorable report on a miracle by a committee of physical scientists would have no weight with those who do not already believe in miracles. Were their report offered to a skeptic as proof of a miracle he could and would reject it, giving as a reason the incompetency of the committee. He would say truly that physical science cannot go beyond its domain, which is material nature. But a miracle, by its definition, supposes the supernatural, supposes the interference of an intelligent agent superior to nature; and the scientists cannot affirm anything of this supernatural agent without going beyond the limits of their science, and when they go beyond those limits their authority is no better than that of the skeptic himself. The most the scientist can do in presence of a real miracle is to say that his science cannot account for it. There he must stop, for, as a scientist, he cannot account for any event whose cause is outside of and above the natural order. A real miracle is, by its definition, an event of this kind. The skeptic would therefore reject the scientist's favorable report as that of an incompetent witness. Even should the scientist, as a man of intelligence, be convinced of the reality of a miracle, he could not in his capacity of scientist testify to that reality; his testimony to be of any value should be based on grounds other than those of physical science.

True, physical scientists may detect the trickery and fraud of a false miracle, but as, owing to the nature of their science and the nature of miracles, they cannot testify to a true one, they are incompetent judges, and their testimony would convince no intelligent

mind that did not already believe in miracles. Your appeal then to the French Academy was an appeal to the wrong court.

Although scientific men cannot on scientific grounds testify to a miracle, yet as intelligent individuals they can testify to them on other grounds; and many of them have done so. Among the Mediæval scientists who believed in the miracles of the Scripture may be mentioned the Venerable Bede, Gerbert, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Leonardo da Vinci, and many others who cannot be named for want of room. Among the more modern may be named Copernicus, Nicholas de Cusa, Galileo, Kepler, Cesalpino, Vesalius, Fallopius, Mattioli, Aldrovandi, Castelli, Cavalieri, Toricelli, Bosilli, Cassini, Descartes, Leibnitz, Newton, Jean Picard the first president of the Academy of Science of which you speak, Boscovich, Ampere, Leverrier, Secchi, and many others whose names might be added to this long list of brilliant stars in the firmament of science, believed in the reality of the miracles recorded in the Scriptures. Many of these and others whose names have not been mentioned were members of the French Academy. It is a grave mistake to imagine that infidels have a monopoly of science.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Lacy. Who wrote the Gospels?

Ingersoll. The fact is, no one knows who made the statements of the evangelists.

Notes. The fact is, there can be no reasonable doubt whatever that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote the Gospels attributed to them. Your statement to the contrary has not a particle of evidence to rest on. You have as good reason, and no better, to say that no one knows who wrote Shakespeare, Paradise Lost or Milton, the Divine Comedy of Dante, Cæsar, Livy, Tacitus, Josephus, or Homer. No one ever doubts that these books were written by the authors to whom they are attributed. The same kind of evidence that proves the authenticity of these proves the authenticity of the Gospels in a higher degree. Historical evidence, common tradition, and a concatenation of circumstances are all we have to prove the genuineness of Hamlet and Othello, Paradise Lost, Livy, Tacitus and Josephus. And they are abundantly sufficient. Now this historical evidence, common tradition and concatenation of circumstances are equally strong for the authors of the four Gospels. They are stronger, for the facts treated in the Gospels have changed the course of human history, and in consequence the attention of mankind has been more particularly directed to them.

Lacy. Is there no difference in the amount of proof which a just criticism requires in establishing the authenticity of the Gospels and of the works referred to.

Lambert. No. The same kind of evidence that proves the authorship of the writings of Josephus, Livy, Tacitus, etc., will prove the authorship of the writings of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. All the critic has in either case is common tradition, historical evidence and monuments, and a chain of circumstances. Without these no book published over a hundred and fifty years ago can ever be authenticated. And it is a principle of sound criticism that with these the authenticity of a book can be established. Thus you cannot destroy the authenticity of the Gospels without laying down a principle which if accepted would destroy the authenticity of all literature prior to one hundred and fifty years ago. The world is not yet sufficiently advanced to accept this result of literary skepticism.

Lacy. The works of Shakespeare, Livy, etc., are professedly, mere human productions, written to regale imagination and teach us the facts of history, while the Gospels speak to us as from the skies. They come freighted with a record of miracles and wonders stupendous.

Lambert. Whatever they may be freighted with, the question still remains, *Who wrote them?* You seem to apprehend no difference between the authenticity and veracity of a book. The question between you and me at present is, *Who wrote the Gospels?* not, *Are they true narrations of events?* There are many incredible legends in Livy, but would any sane critic adduce this fact as evidence that Livy did not write the histories credited to him? Does the fact that *Robinson Crusoe* contains many fictions prove that De Foe was not its author? The Gospels contain a record of miracles and stupendous events. True, but

the question is not whether these miracles and events are real, but who wrote the record of them—true or false? Suppose for a moment that the contents of the Gospels are pure fiction, the question still remains, Who wrote them? The Christian world, the party most interested, has always claimed that the Gospels were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. Ancient writers, Christian and pagan, either expressly affirm it or take it as a fact undisputed. In all these eighteen hundred years there never has been an adverse claimant. Now in the face of these facts why, or on what principle of criticism should it be denied that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote the books ascribed to them—even on the hypothesis that the books are pure fiction? Observe, we are now speaking of the authenticity, not of the veracity of the Gospels.

Your argument against the authenticity of the Gospels, stripped of its unnecessary verbiage, is this: The Gospels contain many things which we cannot believe, they tell us of unseen worlds and of spirits and angels intangible, therefore they were not written by the authors whose names they bear! This is logic run mad.

Lacy. Moreover these writers (of the Gospels) do not agree among themselves.

Lambert. What has that to do with the authenticity of the Gospels? even if it were admitted, which it is not. Horace Greely, Alexander H. Stephens, and Jefferson Davis wrote histories of our late war. They do not agree among themselves. Does that prove that the books bearing their names as authors were not written by them? Can there be anything more utterly stupid than such an inference? Yet

such is the inference to be drawn from your words above—for you are arguing against the authenticity, not the veracity of the Gospels.

Lacy. Such being the case, our eternal interests demand that we should know both who speaks and by what authority we are addressed.

Lambert. Here again you are “off.” The question between us is a simple one. It is not, Who authorized the Gospels to be written, or whether their contents be true, or inspired, but, who wrote those books that have been handed down to us as the works of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John? It is purely a historical question, having nothing to do with the character of their contents, whether true, false, miraculous or otherwise. All these are important problems, but they have nothing to do here in the present question, which is, who wrote the Gospels? And why should not a Jew known as Matthew have written a history of the events of his time as that other Jew Josephus did? Why not Mark write as well as Tacitus, Luke as well as Livy, or John as well as Cæsar? What “antecedent improbability” is there in it? Is it because the Evangelists recorded what you call incredible and extraordinary events? That might be a reason why you should doubt their veracity, but it is certainly no reason to doubt that those particular men really recorded those events, whether they are real or imaginary.

You are a versatile writer. You undertook to give reasons why the authorship of the Gospels should be doubted, and you lugged in the question of their veracity, their inspiration, their ambiguity, their interpolation, their different renderings, their liability to mutilation, and wound up with a touch about the

salvation of the world. And all this within the space of half a page! These subjects are irrelevant to the question, Who wrote the Gospels. It is a law of logic as well as of common sense to deal with one question at a time, and not to befog it by the introduction of other issues. A moment's reflection should have shown you that the veracity, inspiration, etc., etc., of the Gospels are not germane to the question of their authorship—the point you undertook to discuss.

Notes. The more important the contents of a book are to mankind the more surely will its genuineness be admitted or denied from the beginning.

Lacy. Such is the case in periods of advanced civilization,—

Lambert. Such is the case in all periods.

Lacy. —but uneducated and barbarous peoples are so prone to superstition and unquestioning faith that they are ever ready to seize upon anything as true which ministers to their love of the marvelous.

Lambert. Pray what is there to minister to a love of the marvelous in the belief that Matthew wrote the Gospel attributed to him? If the book had been written by some one else would it not have equally well ministered to the love of the marvelous? Why then should the lovers of the marvelous attribute the book to Matthew if he did not write it? Your statement, if true, would be a reason why uneducated, barbarous people should believe in the contents of the book, but it would be no reason why they should believe Matthew to be its author, if he were not. But your statement cannot be admitted, for it is a well known fact that the more ignorant and barbarous a people are, the more difficult it is to withdraw them from their old beliefs and superstitions. Besides the Jews

had enough of the marvelous in their Scriptures, and the pagans enough in their polytheism to gratify to the full their love of the mysterious and wonderful. Hence if this was the only motive by which they were actuated, they had no need to admit authenticity of the Gospels to believe their contents.

Lacy. The age in which the Gospels were written was not a critical age.

Lambert. The preaching and writings of the Apostles and Evangelist constituted the rule of life of the Christians who lived in and immediately subsequent to their times. These Christians could know when one or more of their teachers wrote books, just as we know that Bancroft wrote a history of the United States, and Irving a life of Washington. And we are better authority in this matter than the conceited critic who is to live two thousand years hence. In the same way the early Christians knew more about the authorship of the Gospels than the critic of to-day.

Lacy. We know more of ancient Egypt than the average Egyptian knew of his own times and country,—

Lambert. Of course you do; but the great scholars in Egyptian antiquities claim no such knowledge. They are more modest in tone and more reliable in statement. If mummies could laugh, a guffaw would reverberate through the caves of Egypt and along the valley of the Nile.

Lacy. —More of Galilee, of its faiths, hopes and fears, than those who fished in its waters and struck their tents by its shores.

Lambert. It is very discouraging to argue with one who knows so much. What do "we" know of the faiths, hopes and fears of the ancient people of

Galilee but what we have learned from that people ? And how could "we" learn more of their lives and habits than they knew themselves, two thousand years after they had passed away ? The Old and New Testament and Josephus are our only sources of information, and they certainly do not tell us all the people knew. This superb pretention of superior knowledge is in perfect keeping with the spirit of modern infidel criticism. In the words of Festus to St. Paul, much learning doth make them mad.

Lacy. And yet let us not indulge in vain glory.

Lambert. A wise saying, in view of the senseless boasting in which you have just indulged.

Lacy. In the light of our present advancement and of our knowledge of the past, how futile to say : " It is a remarkable fact that the authenticity or genuineness of the four Gospels was never brought in question until modern times, and then only by a few infidels."

Lambert. Futile or not it is still a fact that the authorship of the Gospels was never disputed until modern times. If you deny this you should show in what age and by whom it was disputed. But you have been very careful not to attempt this.

Lacy. In the first place, little attention was paid to the small sect of the "despised Galileans."

Lambert. Enough attention was paid to them to crucify the founder and to execute his Apostles and other followers. Enough attention to cause Nero, thirty years afterward, to decree the death of tens of thousands of them ; to cause them to be thrown into the Flavian Amphitheatre to be devoured by hungry lions, or covered with pitch and used as lamps to light

the streets of Rome. It seems that this was giving them a good deal of attention.

Lacy. It was only after Christianity had become a power that special notice was taken of it.

Lambert. The Christians were first noticed and persecuted in Jerusalem when they were a helpless minority. The first notice was taken by the Sanhedrin on account of the many Jewish converts. "And as they (Peter and John) were speaking to the people, the priests and the officers of the temple and the Sadducees came upon them. Being grieved that they taught the people, and preached in Jesus the resurrection of the dead. And they laid hands upon them, and put them in a hold, till the next day," (Acts 4-1 to 4). This took place about three months after the death of Christ. "And they stoned Stephen, invoking and saying: Lord Jesus receive my spirit. And falling on his knees he cried with a loud voice, saying: Lord, lay not this to their charge. And when he said this he fell asleep in the Lord." (Acts 7-58). Was not this taking special notice of them? It is thus that your dogmatic statements vanish before the facts of history.

CHAPTER XXX.

Lacy. At Christ's death the number of His disciples, as far as the Scripture informs us, was about one hundred and twenty.

Lambert. Where do you find this piece of information?

Lacy. Acts I. 15.

Lambert. The text you refer to gives no information as to the number of Christ's disciples. Nor was it the purpose of the writer to give any. He simply states about how many were present on a particular occasion when Peter delivered his first sermon after the Ascension. Here is the passage: "In those days Peter rising up in the midst of the brethren said: (now the number of persons *together* was about an hundred and twenty) Men, brethren, the Scriptures must needs be fulfilled, etc." Now it is quite evident that the number given in parenthesis in this fifteenth verse was the number present when Peter rose up and spoke. Hence the text does not bear out your statement that "as far as Scripture informs us, the number of disciples at Christ's death was about one hundred and twenty." Had you quoted the text the reader would have seen this immediately. Did you merely refer to the text with the hope that the reader would take your word for its meaning and not examine it for himself? Or did you make the statement in the light of your former statement that "we" know more about affairs in Judea than those present knew? If so you should not have referred to a text that does not say

what you represent it as saying. You should have made the statement on your own authority and then the reader would be in no danger of being misled. The writer of the Acts tells us that there were about one hundred and twenty disciples together on a certain occasion. And Mr. Lacy forthwith informs us that, "according to Scripture," those present on that occasion were all the disciples there were at that time! With an opponent who knows more about affairs in Judea than the Apostles and disciples did; more of the affairs of ancient Egypt than the then inhabitants did, the Christian has no chance whatever in a discussion. Those who have the convenient faculty of manufacturing facts to suit their theories have a great advantage over the Christian who must stand by the facts as handed down by history. Had you read the second chapter of Acts you would have learned that on the occasion of Peter's second speech, "there were added that day about three thousand souls," (verse 41) and that they were "persevering in the doctrine of the Apostles." You would have learned that on the next public occasion, when Peter cured the lame man at the gate Beautiful, as narrated in chapters third and fourth of Acts, the number who believed was five thousand. Now if you did not know of these texts when you referred to the Scriptures as stating that there were but one hundred and twenty disciples, you made a bold statement in ignorance of the facts; and if you knew of these texts you exhibited a scandalous want of candor in ignoring them. All these conversions took place within a few months after the occasion you spoke of and before any part of the New Testament was written. This number of converts was greatly increased not only in Judea but in the neighboring

countries before Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote their Gospels. These converts were witnesses enough to bear testimony to the authorship of the Gospels, and to hand down their testimony to their children, and these to their children, and so on. These converts knew the writers of the Gospels as well if not better than you know Ingersoll, and they were no more liable to be deceived about their writings than you are to be deceived about the writings and lectures of Ingersoll. The future critic, if he should follow your example, will deny the authenticity of Ingersoll's and Paine's gospels and attribute them to some unknown authors of the twenty-third or fourth centuries. He will reject your testimony in their behalf—if he ever hears of you—as incompetent, because he will not consider the 19th century a critical age as compared with his own. You may say he would be unjust in this. He would indeed, but not more than you are to the writers and witnesses of 2,000 years ago. His critical conceit would be out of place—all the more so if he assumed to know more of our times than the present generation does. But he would only be treating us as you treat the people, learned and ignorant, of the Apostolic age.

Notes. The genuineness of the four Gospels was never brought in question until modern times.

Lacy. "Modern times" is exceedingly indefinite; but, if so, why were they not questioned?

Lambert. It is a fact that their authenticity was not questioned. You will seek in vain among the records of the early ages for any statement throwing doubt on the universal belief that the Gospels were written by those writers to whom they are credited. This fact is of great importance. It was to the inter-

ests of the Jews, who lived in the time of the Apostles and immediately subsequent, to expose the claims of the authorship of these Gospels if they were false. They exhausted their ingenuity in opposing and persecuting Christians, but in all their enmity and opposition they never went so far as to question the authorship of the four Gospels. The same is to be said of the anti-Christian pagan writers, and of the early heretics, who endeavored to explain away those portions of the Gospels that clashed with their views, when, if there had been any doubt of their authenticity they would have stated that fact as a reason for rejecting them entirely. This would have been their natural line of action. The failure to do this on the part of Jewish, pagan and heretical writers who criticised the facts narrated in those Gospels is the strongest possible evidence that there was no plausible ground for doubting the authenticity of the Gospels themselves.

Lacy. There is no evidence that, when the Gospels were written, they bore on their face any evidence that they were composed or claimed to have been written by the authors to whom they are now ascribed.

Lambert. Then how do you account for the universal belief that they were written by those to whom they were ascribed—a belief to be traced from the present up to the Apostolic age, a belief common to Jew, Pagan, and Christian? The originals are not extant, but all the ancient manuscripts of the four Gospels contain superscriptions ascribing them respectively to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. In the Peshito Syrica version of the second century the Gospels are ascribed to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. They were never ascribed to any other authors than those

whose names they now bear. How then could this sameness of superscription, both in manuscripts and versions occur, unless these had all been derived originally from Gospels having the superscriptions of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John? If the original manuscript of each Gospel had not been inscribed to a known author, all the copies of these original Gospels would have been destitute of the names of the authors, and the manuscripts that have come down to our age would exhibit to a greater or less degree the anonymous character of their ancient copies.* All the ancient manuscripts of the Gospels in all languages have the superscription of "according to Matthew," "according to Mark," etc. This fact can be explained only on the hypothesis that the originals were so marked either by their authors or by those who received them from their hands. A universal conspiracy to defraud is out of the question. It is not necessary to the authenticity of the Gospels to suppose that the Evangelists inscribed the titles on them. This could have been done by those converts for whom they were written. There is no reason why Theophilus, to whom St. Luke addressed his Gospel, could not have written the title, "Gospel according to Luke." This would be additional evidence of its authenticity. By the way, is there any evidence that when the works of Josephus, Tacitus, Livy, Cæsar, were written they were composed or claimed to have been written by the authors to whom they are ascribed? Is there any evidence that the titles of those works were written by their authors? Does our ignorance on these points affect the authenticity of those works?

*"Introduction to Holy Scriptures."—*Harman*.

Lacy. Justin speaks of them (the Gospels) as the "Memoirs of the Apostles," although neither Mark nor Luke were Apostles.

Lambert. It would have been more candid to have quoted what St. Justin said. In his Apology addressed to Antoninus Pius written about A. D. 138, he used the following language: "The Apostles, in the Memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered—that Christ commanded them, when He had taken bread and given thanks, saying: Do this in commemoration of me." In his dialogue with Trypho the Jew, written a few years later than the Apology, Justin more accurately describes the Gospels: "In the Memoirs which, I say, were composed by His (Christ's) Apostles *and their companions*, (it is stated) that sweat, as great drops of blood, fell from Him as He prayed, and said, If it be possible, let this cup pass from me." Now Matthew and John were Apostles, and Mark was the companion of Peter, and Luke was the companion of Paul. Bearing this fact in mind we can understand Justin when he says the Gospels were composed by Christ's Apostles and their companions. Again, Justin in his description of Christian worship states: "All who dwell in the cities, or in the country, collect together on the day called Sunday, and the Memoirs of the Apostles and the writings of the prophets are read as long as time allows." The Christians then, in the city or in the country were familiar with these Gospels and held them in the same esteem as the writings of the prophets. After quoting both from Matthew and Luke on the miraculous conception and birth of Christ, Justin adds: "As those who have related all things concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, teach,

whom we believe." There can be no doubt that the Gospels to which Justin refers as being written by the Apostles and their companions, and read on Sunday in the public assemblies of the Christians, were the very Gospels that we now have bearing the names of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. His first Apology of sixty pages contains about *forty passages or fifty-five verses*, mostly from Matthew and Luke, and one from St. John. There is also a clear reference to St. Mark's Gospel in Justin's statement that "Christ changed the names of the two sons of Zebedee, and called them Boanerges, which is Sons of Thunder." This, he states, is written "in the Memoirs of Him," (Christ). As Mark is the only one of the Evangelists who relates the giving of these names, Justin must have referred to Mark's Gospel.*

Notes. These Gospels were received in the earliest times as genuine, and were quoted by the earliest Christian writers, as the books of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.

Lacy. Yet it is a fact that the earliest Christian Apologist, Justin Martyr, though he quotes words contained in Matthew, Mark and Luke (never once from John and only once from Mark), yet does not mention the names of either, but quotes almost exclusively from Christ's words.

Lambert. In the first place Justin was not the first Christian Apologist. Quadratus and Aristides both wrote Apologies prior to him. Papias was another Christian author who wrote prior to Justin. This Papias, as quoted by Eusebius, states that John the Presbyter, who was acquainted with the Apostles,

*"Introduction to Holy Scriptures."—*Harman.*

said, "Mark, being the interpreter of Peter, wrote down accurately what things he remembered, not indeed, in the order in which the things were said or done by Christ, for he neither heard the Lord nor was he His companion, but afterward he was, as I said, an attendant on Peter, who preached the doctrines of the Gospel as circumstances required, not making, as it were, a systematic arrangement of the Lord's discourses. Mark, accordingly, committed no mistake in writing some things just as he remembered them." Respecting Matthew, Papias remarks: "Matthew wrote the oracles in the Hebrew dialect." Here is very direct testimony as to Mark from a writer prior to Justin.

You admit that Justin quoted from Matthew, Mark, and Luke, but deny that he quoted from John. In speaking of baptism or regeneration, Justin remarks: "For Christ said, If you be not born again, you cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." This passage was evidently quoted from John third chapter, fifth verse.

You again say, Justin did not mention by name the Evangelists. But he had already told us that the Gospels were written by "the Apostles and their companions," and it has never been claimed that any other of the Apostles but Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote the Gospels.

Justin, you say, quotes *almost* exclusively from Christ's words. Yes, from Christ's words *as recorded by the writers of the Gospels*. What more natural when he was treating of the doctrines of Christ? This very quoting of Christ's words from the Gospels, as written by the "Apostles and their companions," is the strongest possible evidence of their authenticity.

Lacy. Justin also says, these writings were also called Gospels and were written by "the Apostles *or* their companions."

Lambert. Justin says they were written by the Apostles *and* their companions. That is, by Matthew and John, who were Apostles, and by Mark, the companion of St. Peter, and Luke the companion of St. Paul. There is a difference between *or* and *and*. You speak of Justin Martyr as if he were the only writer. Justin died in the year 166, and Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, was born 177, eleven years after the death of Justin. Irenaeus gives the following testimony respecting the Gospels: "Matthew, indeed, among the Hebrews, delivered in their own dialect the writing of the Gospels, while Peter and Paul were preaching the Gospel at Rome and founding the church. After their departure, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, himself wrote and delivered to us the things preached by Peter, And Luke, the follower of Paul, delivered in a book the Gospel preached by him. Afterwards John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned upon His breast, also himself published his Gospels while he abode in Ephesus in Asia." Here is direct, positive evidence, and to the point at issue.

Lacy. Had the names of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John been prefixed to those works, or had they been popularly known as the writers thereof, would not St. Justin Martyr have referred to them as such?

Lambert. No, not necessarily, unless their authorship was disputed. Justin wrote in explanation of the doctrines of Christ and quoted from all the Gospels, as written by "the Apostles and their companions." It was not customary then to give textual reference as it is now. Even Irenaeus who gives direct

testimony as to the authorship of the four Gospels quotes from them without naming the author or giving the text. Besides as some of Justin's works are lost it cannot be said that he was silent on the authorship of the Gospels.

I might quote other authors of the second century, to which Justin belonged, in confirmation of the authorship of the Gospels, but I will merely mention the name of Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Theophilus bishop of Antioch.

Gospels
r giving
are lost
horship

nd cen-
n of the
mention
ria, and

CHAPTER XXXI.

Lacy. Who were those men who first attested the authorship of the first four books of the New Testament?

Lambert. The early Christian communities who received those books from the writers, and who read them every Sunday at their religious services. These early Christians were personally acquainted with the Apostles and Evangelists. They had heard them preaching the same facts and doctrines which were afterwards reduced to writing. They received these writings from the hands of their authors who were their friends and teachers, and they handed down these sacred deposits to their children. This is the strongest of all human testimony; it excludes all possibility of fraud or deception if the Apostles and their disciples were honest men, and you grant they were honest men.

Lacy. Honest men, no doubt, but were they careful in their methods and clear and rational in their conception of religious truth?

Lambert. When you grant that they were honest men you give away your case, for whatever may have been their conception of religious truth, they were certainly competent witnesses to the authorship of books which they received from their authors, and which, with the most sacred and solemn sense of obligation, they transmitted to their children. Suppose I grant for a moment that their conceptions of religious truth were altogether erroneous, and that their methods

were not clear and rational; suppose further that the doctrines in the Gospels are all false—and this is certainly supposing all you desire—still those disciples and friends of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John were competent and trustworthy authority on the authorship of those books written and presented to them by their friends. The authorship of those books was to them a *fact*, not a *doctrine*. They knew what Matthew wrote just as you know what Ingersoll wrote. The weight of your evidence as to the authorship of what Ingersoll wrote is not lessened by your want of method or clear and rational conceptions of religious truth. Whether your notions of religion are right or wrong, they have no bearing whatever for or against your testimony as to the authorship of the writings attributed to Ingersoll. The disciples of the Evangelists received their writings just as the disciples of Ingersoll receive his. They buy his books, place them in their libraries, familiarize their children with their contents and authorship. These children do the same to their children, and thus his books will be handed down for a time. This would happen all the same if they had no title pages or evidences of authorship, providing those who received them first knew, as they certainly could know during his life time, that they were his books. In fact this human tradition is much stronger evidence than a printed title page. Men can forge or make a title-page, but they cannot forge or make a tradition. A forged tradition always carries with it the tradition of its forgery. Thus though the Mormon church may continue for thousands of years its Bible will always carry with it the tradition of its fraudulent origin. The controversy as to its origin which began when it was first published is, and will

continue to be, a permanent part of its history. The Mormon may for all time deny that his Bible is a fraudulent production, but he can never truthfully deny that the charge of fraud was made against it when it first made its appearance. The enemies of Mormonism will see to it, in all future ages, that this charge of fraud will not fade from the memory of man as long as the Book of Mormon continues to exist. How different is it with the four Gospels? In all the writings of the early Christians that are extant there is no denial of fraud in regard to them—a proof that the charge was never made; no formal attempt to prove their authorship—a proof that in those times there was no denial, no controversy whatever about their authorship. In the same way, in the writings of the enemies of Christianity in those early times the authorship of the Gospels was never denied. On the contrary their attacks on the Gospels and doctrines contained in them take it for granted that the authorship was universally and always admitted as a fact beyond question. Celsus, Porphyry, Julian, and other enemies of Christianity in the first three or four centuries of the Christian era were more competent judges of the authenticity of the Gospels than are the skeptics of our day, because they had all the literature of their ages at command. Hundreds of books, for and against Christianity, were available to them, that are no longer in existence, and which are now known to have existed only by casual mention or quotation in the few books that have come down to us. For the first hundred and fifty or two hundred years after its origin, Christianity was the liveliest subject of controversy in the Roman Empire. More books were written for and against

it than were written on any other subject, and it is altogether unlikely that its enemies—men of culture and genius—would have left anything unsaid that would militate against its claims. A doubt of, or a denial of, the authenticity of the Gospels would have seriously effected the facts and doctrines contained in them. Those early anti-Christian writers knew this as well as the modern skeptic does. Yet, notwithstanding all this they wrote as men who, while they rejected the doctrines of the Gospels, never for a moment doubted that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were their authors.

You quote from Mosheim's Church History to prove that the early Christian writers attributed "to the words of Scripture a double sense, the one *obvious* and literal, the other *hidden* and mysterious, which lay concealed as it were, under the veil of the outward letter." It was needless to squander so much space to prove what no Christian scholar ever thought of denying. All interpreters of the Scriptures, ancient as well as modern, recognize that there are several senses in which many passages of Scripture may be interpreted. There is the literal, the figurative, the allegorical, the typical and parabolic senses. When Christ says: "I am the door," "I am the vine; ye are the branches," His words are to be taken in a figurative, not literal sense, for He did not mean that He was a combination of wood, hinges and latch. He meant to signify that He was to the kingdom of heaven what a door is to a house—the means of entrance. All the types, figures, allegories and parables of the Old and New Testaments are to be interpreted in a sense corresponding to their nature, while the facts and doctrines are to be interpreted in

a literal sense. Christ Himself, and St. Paul explain certain parts of the Scripture in a figurative, allegorical and parabolic sense. The objection of Mosheim to some of the ancient writers was not that they recognized these different senses but that they carried them too far and sought a hidden or mysterious meaning in passages that were to be taken in a purely literal sense. Had he meant what you would imply he would run counter to the unanimous teachings of all writers on the Scriptures and to all the principles of hermeneutics.

Lacy. Irenæus also, a learned and devout Christian Father, bears ample testimony to the "four and no more" of the Gospel writers. His reasons seem to the unlettered mind as *queer*.

Lambert. Irenæus, who lived in the second century, testifies to the *fact* that there were *four* Gospels; that they were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. It is *queer* that a lettered mind like that of Mr. Lacy should confound the reasons for believing a fact with reasons in explanation of a fact. Irenæus gave no reasons to prove that there were in fact four Gospels, because the fact was not disputed in his time. After stating that there were four Gospels he endeavored to give reasons, fanciful if you choose, why there should be four and no more. You will observe that these are two very different questions. The first is a question of fact, the second is a mere speculation. His speculations or theories are based on the admitted fact, not the fact on the speculations. A witness may testify that he saw A kill B, but if he goes farther and attempts to explain or give reasons *why* A killed B, he passes from fact to speculation. He may give reasons for his speculations, but it is clear to the lettered

mind that these reasons have no bearing on the fact to which he testifies. I may state truly that on a certain occasion powder exploded when ignited, but when I undertake to give reasons why it exploded, my ignorance of chemistry might lead me into an erroneous explanation. But my reasons why an explosion takes place under certain circumstances must not be confounded with my testimony that an explosion has taken place. One is a question of a fact, the other a question of theory. Now Irenæus testified that the four Gospels were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. After testifying to this fact he goes on to give reasons why there should have been four and no more written. And you, by an inexplicable confusion of ideas, confound his testimony to a fact with the reasons which he gave for a certain theory he held. It is not surprising that reasons given for a certain theory should be somewhat *queer* when advanced as proof of a fact. It must be observed that it is you, not Irenæus who did this. You simply misrepresent him when you give reasons advanced by him in favor of a certain theory as reasons given by him in proof of a certain fact. His theory may be quaint and his reasons for it fanciful, but they were not as *queer* as your misconception of his language or your misrepresentation of him. And yet you are a lawyer, and supposed to understand the nature of testimony, and the distinction between fact and theory.

Lacy. He (Irenæus) shall speak for himself: "It is impossible," says he, "that the Gospels can be more or less *than they are*. For as there are four zones in the world we inhabit, and four principle winds, while the church is spread abroad throughout the earth, and the pillars and basis of the church are the Gospels and

the spirit of life, is it right that she should have four pillars, exhaling immortality on every side, and restoring renewed vitality on men. From which fact it follows that the Word has given us four versions of the Gospels written by one spirit."

Lambert. Now any one but a lettered infidel would see that this reasoning of Irenæus in behalf of an analogical theory is built up on the acknowledged fact that there were four Gospels. His whole theory supposes that there was no doubt whatever in the minds of his contemporaries that there were four Gospels. It is this fact that gives weight to his incidental testimony. "It is impossible," says he, "that the Gospels can be more or less *than they are*," namely, four. His speculations on the fact may be true, false, fanciful or otherwise, yet the fact to which he bears unequivocal testimony still remains. It is no compliment to your intellect to suppose that you cannot see the difference between reasons or testimony urged to prove the existence of a fact and reasons advanced to establish a theory based on that fact. And it is no compliment to your honesty to believe that you knew the difference and yet mislead your readers by quoting Irenæus' reasons for a theory as his reasons for a fact. Yet this is precisely what you did, and it suggests the question whether your head is leveler or your heart honester than his.

Lacy. But supposing that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John wrote the Gospels, are we certain that they wrote them in their entirety as we have them now? We are certain they did not."

Lambert. And we are certain they did. And our certainty is as good evidence as your certainty unless you give us something in the shape of an argu-

ment to deal with. It is to be regretted that you did not see the propriety of this, and also recognize the fact that your mere *ipse dixit* on the subject is not worth the ink it took to write it. "We are certain they did not." Who is "we?" And what reason have "we" for the certainty?

Lacy. We hear the Bible called "God's Book," as if it had been written as a unit.

Lambert. If you heard that you must be in the habit of keeping strange company. If you had asked an intelligent Christian for information on the subject he would have told you that it was written by many authors and at long intervals of time; that its present arrangement, chaptering and versification is a matter of convenience.

Lacy. Not until the sixteenth century did the Catholic Church settle for itself the canon of Scripture.

Lambert. This is a very fair average specimen of your knowledge of the history of the Bible. Had you though it worth the trouble to be correct and truthful you might have learned that the Catholic church determined the Canon of Scripture in the Council of Hippo held in the year 393, reiterated it in the Council of Carthage in 397 and 419, and reaffirmed it in the Council of Trent. All this is a matter of history, but you were too busy imparting information to take time to acquire any. Strange that while you know more about their business than the ancient Jew and Egyptian did you blunder so amazingly about events that are right under your own nose as it were. Your vision is evidently focussed for long range.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Lacy. The Pope is in his own sacred person also infallible.

Lambert. Here as usual in presenting Catholic doctrines you misrepresent. Had you consulted any of the many books which treat of the decrees of the council of the Vatican you would have learned that they do not teach that the Pope personally or as a private individual is infallible, but that he is infallible only in his *official capacity*, as supreme head and judge of the church. As a lawyer you should understand this distinction. You know the decision of one of our judges given as a private individual, and unofficial, has no weight in law; while the same decision given formally in his public and official capacity, is decisive. It is singular that in treating of a Catholic doctrine you should lose sight of this common sense principle, and talk so ignorantly of a doctrine so easily understood.

Black. Nothing was said by the most virulent enemies against the personal honesty of the Evangelists.

Ingersoll. How is this known?

Notes. It is known from the fact that neither in tradition nor history is there anything directly or indirectly throwing the least suspicion or shadow of doubt on their honesty, integrity, and holiness of life.

Lacy. The truth is, history, save as written by themselves, is silent on the subject.

Lambert. This is admitting precisely what I said. If history is silent on the subject how can you defend

an implied attack on their characters nearly two thousand years after their death? Is it on the principle of "honor bright?"

Lacy. Josephus testifies that James and some other Christians were stoned as *breakers of the law*.

Lambert. In the eyes of imperial Rome at that time every Christian was a malefactor and breaker of the law, simply because he was a Christian, and was punished as such. You could not but know this, and yet you quote Josephus' words for the purpose of putting the Evangelists on a par with the inmates of our penitentiaries. Verily, your christophobia unfits you for the office of a critic.

Lacy. Suetonius, who says that Claudius Cæsar expelled the Jews from Rome *because they raised continued tumults* at the instigation of Christ.

Lambert. As Christ was crucified some years before the reign of Claudius Cæsar, either Suetonius or Claudius or Lacy must be in error. It is strange too, that the Jews should be instigated to tumult by the Christians when they united with the Roman authorities in persecuting these same Christians. Anything is a "good enough Morgan" for the infidel critic.

Lacy. Mr. Black having made the presumed honesty of the Evangelists the basis of his argument, the burden of proving his statement rested on him.

Lambert. Mr. Black made the fact that their honesty was universally and always admitted, the basis of his argument. This fact is too evident to need proof. Even down to the present time no infidel of any pretension to standing has ever accused the Evangelists of dishonesty or connivance or conspiracy to deceive their contemporaries or posterity. The worst

that Ingersoll ever said of them—and he is more decent in this matter than his apologist—is that they were mistaken. After a trial of nearly two thousand years it is too late to demand proof of the personal integrity of the evangelists. It is for those who question their honesty to offer good and sufficient reasons why we should at this late day reverse the judgment of their contemporaries and reject the concurrent testimony of ages. Are you so blinded by your *Christophobia* that you forget the principles of common law? Do not these principles require that he who attacks the veracity and honesty of a witness must produce positive, clear, and direct proofs of his dishonesty and want of veracity? According to these well-known principles the burden of proof is on those who dispute the honesty of the evangelists—on you, not on Mr. Black. What would the court think of the lawyer who would demand proof of the integrity of a witness whose integrity had never been denied? It is a remarkable fact that you cannot attack the character of the evangelists without subverting the first principles of evidence; cannot degrade them without denying them what the law grants to the greatest criminal, the right to be considered innocent until proved guilty. The evidence of anyone else must be credited until discredited by proof, but the evidence of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John must be discredited until proved! That is your position. Your anti-Christian bias makes you forget the principles of common law and evidence. You admit that history affords no evidence against the honesty of the evangelists. On what principle then of logic or morality do you insinuate that they were dishonest? The burden is on you to produce proofs to justify your insinuations

against four men whom the Christian world has always honored.

Lacy. The personal character of unlettered fishermen and tax-gatherers was not likely to be discussed, *pro or con.*

Lambert. But the personal character of four authors who introduced a new system of religion inimicable to and destructive of the existing systems, was very likely to be discussed. Just why you call these renowned authors unlettered is not clear. We have the same evidence that they were lettered as we have that you are.

Lacy. What should have drawn more attention to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John than to those men in the same social rank, whose names perished with their lives?

Lambert. What indeed? Yet something did draw more attention to them, for unlike those men in the same social rank, their names did not perish with their lives. It would have occurred to any one but you that they attracted attention by writing the Gospels and preaching the religion of Christ.

Lacy. Not their Gospels; for while they lived, as far as history teaches, their names were neither prefixed nor subscribed to those books.

Lambert. History does not teach that their names were not prefixed or subscribed to those books. On the contrary, wherever history speaks of the Gospels it attributes them to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Now how do you account for this fact if the evangelists were too obscure and unlettered to attract attention?

Lacy. We are told that the infidels who wrote against Christianity admitted the genuineness of the

miracles recorded in the New Testament, Why? Did they witness them? No; but then miracles were believed in the same as witchcraft and demoniacal possessions.

Lambert. The pagans who wrote against Christianity admitted the historical facts or events narrated in the New Testament, such as Christ's curing the deaf, giving sight to the blind, etc., but they endeavored to explain them away. The point here is that they admitted the *facts* narrated by the evangelists, while they denied their value as evidence of a divine mission. Then pagan authorities are adduced not to prove that curing the deaf, giving sight to the blind, etc., are miracles, but to prove the facts themselves, namely, that Christ did cure the deaf, give sight to the blind, etc. And on this point they are certainly more competent witnesses than the infidels of to-day. Evidence as to the existence of a fact is a different thing from evidence as to the miraculous nature of that fact. The pagan writers testify to the existence of certain facts narrated in the Gospels, and their existence once granted their miraculous nature is evident.

Lacy. In the early ages it was *assumed* that men could work miracles, such as healing the sick, raising the dead.

Lambert. And in modern times it is *assumed* by a few infidels that men cannot work miracles, etc.

Lacy. Many of the Jews no doubt credited the miracles said to have been wrought by Christ and His followers. Why should they not?

Lambert. Why indeed? When they saw Him healing the sick, giving sight to the blind and raising the dead why should they not believe He did these things?

Lacy. If an ass, in human speech, could rebuke a prophet, why should a Jew marvel at anything?

Lambert. If one ass could rebuke a prophet the Jew should not marvel that others could do the same. Rebuking the prophets for the purpose of increasing the profits has become quite an industry of late.

Lacy. "It is not for us to demonstrate the impossibility of a miracle; it is for the miracle to demonstrate itself." (Ernest Renan).

Lambert. If the skeptic asserts the impossibility of miracles it is certainly for him to prove his assertion, when called on, by demonstrating that impossibility. He must not shirk the logical responsibility which his assertion imposes upon him. Does any one familiar with M. Renan's methods believe that if he could have demonstrated the impossibility of miracles he would have declined to do it? The question of the possibility or impossibility of miracles must be discussed and determined before the evidence of their *existence* can be considered. If they are possible their existence can be proved, as other facts are proved, by a certain amount and kind of evidence, while if they are impossible no amount whatever of evidence can prove their existence. Miracles are possible or impossible, there is no medium; and the skeptic must take one or the other of these positions before he can discuss the subject. If he asserts the impossibility he should proceed to demonstrate the truth of his assertion. When he does this the question of the existence of miracles is forever settled. He must do this by reasoning, not by experience, because this deals only with what actually exists, not with what might take place. To him who denies the possibility of a thing all evidence in proof of the existence of that thing

must necessarily be useless. Suppose M. Renan to deny the possibility of the city of Paris, is there any evidence or any way whatever by which its existence could be proved to him? Certainly there is not. For as long as the conviction lasts he must consider the evidence of his own senses as delusive, because their testimony as to the existence of that which is impossible must be false. "A miracle," he tells us, "must demonstrate itself." But how can a miracle or any other fact demonstrate itself to him whose mind is convinced of its impossibility? Suppose M. Renan to be confronted with a miracle, the instantaneous resurrection of Napoleon Bonaparte or M. Thiers, for instance; suppose this fact were made patent to all his senses, yet all this would avail nothing so long as he is convinced that such an event is impossible, for in the face of an impossibility no amount of evidence, no testimony is of any avail. How then can he rationally or logically demand a fact, miraculous or otherwise, to be proved to him, as long as he holds that that fact is impossible? Such a demand sins against both reason and science. A man whose mind is in the condition of the supposed skeptic is impervious to all evidence, even the testimony of his own senses. Yet it is to a man of this kind that M. Renan requires a miracle to demonstrate itself! And Mr. Lacy quotes this illogical reasoner as if his authority settled the question.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Lacy. "What proof have we that Sirens and Centaurs do not exist except that they have never been seen?" (M. Renan.)

Lambert. If the fact that Sirens and Centaurs have never been seen is the *only* proof of their non-existence, we are not justified in denying their existence. To see a thing is proof that it exists, but not to see it is not proof that it does not exist. But how does M. Renan know that they have never been seen? By the testimony of mankind? There is no testimony of mankind affirming that Sirens and Centaurs have never been seen. This absence of testimony does not justify the inference that they have never been seen. We by no means assert that such things as Sirens and Centaurs exist, but do assert that M. Renan's argument does not prove that they do not exist. Let us now apply his argument as M. Renan intended the reader to apply it. His purpose was to discredit miracles by comparing them to Sirens and Centaurs that he assumes have never been seen. By substituting miracles for Sirens and Centaurs we can see his full meaning, thus: "What proof have we that miracles do not exist except that they have never been seen? Here he begs the question when he asserts that miracles have never been seen. How does he know they have never been seen? Is not the assumption contrary to the concurrent testimony of mankind? We meet his argument then by denying the assumption on which it is based. When

M. Renan proves that a miracle has never been seen, he can use the fact as evidence in favor of the assumption that there has been none, but until he does this, he must not imagine that a mere, gratuitous assumption has any weight against the positive and emphatic testimony of reliable witnesses to the effect that miracles have been seen.

Lacy. "What has banished from the civilized world a belief in the old demonology, except the observation that all the deeds formerly attributed to demons are well enough explained without their agency?" (M. Renan.)

Lambert. Here we have two groundless assumptions. In the first place, the belief in what M. Renan chooses to call the "old demonology" has not been banished from the world. The belief that good and evil spiritual beings exist and can have communication with human beings is as prevalent now as it has ever been. The vast majority of men in the civilized world, philosophers, scientists, scholars, Christian as well as pagan, believe that the Supreme Ruler of the universe is a spiritual Being who has communicated His will to man, and that He knows man's desires and wants. They believe that there are good and bad beings in the spiritual world as there are good and bad men in this world, and that as mind can communicate with mind so spirit can communicate with spirit. How spirit can communicate with spirit is no more a mystery than how mind can communicate with mind, and the latter is not denied even by the most inveterate skeptic. On this belief of intercommunication between the two worlds rests the belief of what M. Renan calls the "old demonology." When therefore he says that belief in the old demonology has been

banished from the civilized world he speaks contrary to the facts, and like Mr. Lacy, mistakes a little clique of egotistic skeptics for the civilized world, whereas it is but an infinitesimal element of it—a repetition of the Tooley street tailors.

In the second place, the assumption that the deeds formerly attributed to demons are well enough explained without their agency, is gratuitous and groundless. The best proof of this is the fact that skeptics do not pretend to explain those deeds; they deny them. If the deeds be once admitted there is no explanation for them except on the hypothesis that other agents than man and physical nature have taken part in them.

Lacy. "A being who has not revealed himself, is, for science, a being without existence." (M. Renan.)

Lambert. The existence of a being who has not revealed himself can be neither affirmed nor denied by science. Science can deal only with what it is cognizant of; beyond that it knows nothing, and hence can affirm or deny nothing. The inference that a being does not exist because not seen or known is unscientific. But passing this, and granting for the moment, M. Renan's statement, what progress have we made? None whatever, for the real question still remains. Has that Being whom men call God revealed Himself to man? Mankind has always answered the question in the affirmative, and against this affirmative testimony of the race the negative testimony of M. Renan has no standing in court.

Lacy. Can we or could we accept as true the statement that miracles were ever wrought—such as healing the sick, raising the dead, the conversion of water into wine, and the manufacture from five loaves

and two fishes, of bread and fish sufficient in quantity to feed five thousand men and a multitude of women and children, leaving twelve baskets remaining?

Lambert. As you admit the possibility of it, there is no reason why we should not believe as long as the evidence is sufficient. Observe, as Argyll remarks, "it is simply a question of evidence." If the evidence be sufficient, you would be unreasonable in refusing to accept the statement that miracles were wrought, or that anything else was done that does not involve impossibility.

Lacy. Should we accept such statements on the same kind and amount of evidence as we do the reign of a monarch, the history of a battle or the constitution of a State?

Lambert. Most certainly if we want to arrive at the truth. We may not be as much interested in a battle or in the reign of a monarch as we are in the miracles of Christ, and through indifference yield a certain kind of assent rather than bother ourselves about it. But if we are vitally interested in the battle or the reign of a monarch we must have *sufficient* evidence before we can accept it as true. A battle and a miracle are both facts subject to the senses. Both can be seen if they take place in our presence, and if they take place in our absence they must come to us through the testimony of others. And the testimony that proves the one will prove the other.

Lacy. No, for there is an antecedent improbability that such things ever happened.

Lambert. There is direct, positive and reliable evidence that such things have happened. Before this evidence all alleged improbability must give way.

Lacy. They (miracles) contradict human experience.

Lambert. This is begging the question, for it takes for granted the whole point in dispute. They may be beyond your experience or mine, but that does not justify you in saying they are contrary to human experience. They are certainly not contrary to the experience of those reliable witnesses who testify to them. How does Hume, whose argument you use, or you, know that miracles are contrary to human experience? True, they are not of every-day occurrence, but what evidence have you that men have not experienced or witnessed them? All you can say is that they have not come under your observation. That may be true, but it proves nothing. If you reject everything except what you have experienced you must reject all the facts of history, everything that took place before you were born, and deny the existence of every place you have not seen, for you have experienced none of these. You may say that others have experienced them, and seen the places you have not seen, and I reply that others have witnessed miracles, and seen things you have not seen, and their testimony to what they have seen is stronger evidence of the facts than anything you may say, who have not seen them. Besides, however certain you may be of past facts and absent places, it is yet true that you have not experienced them. All these facts and places then are contrary to your experience, yet you do not doubt their existence on that account. When you say miracles are contrary to human experience you make a gratuitous assertion contrary to the belief of mankind and the testimony of men.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Lacy. They (miracles) imply the intervention of a force unknown to either science or philosophy.

Lambert. When you admit the existence of God, as you have done, you admit the force implied by miracles, for His energy is the force that works them. Now you have an idea of God since you admit His existence. Well then, You acquire this idea of God and of His power from revelation or from science or from philosophy? You did not acquire it from revelation for that you reject. Then you must have acquired it from science or philosophy, for save by revelation, science or philosophy there is no way of acquiring it. Then as you reject revelation you must have acquired it from science or philosophy, and if so, this force of which you have an idea must be known to science or philosophy. To account then for your idea of God and your belief in His existence you are compelled to admit that He is not unknown to science or philosophy; and this necessary admission contradicts your assertion that miracles imply the intervention of a force unknown to science or philosophy. To make an admission on one page and then to make a statement on the next that contradicts it shows a fatal lack of memory or of philosophical insight.

But let us see what scientists and philosophers say on this subject. Mr. Darwin says: "The question whether there is a creator or ruler of the universe has been answered in the affirmative by the highest

intellects that have ever lived. * * * An omniscient creator must have foreseen every consequence which results from the law imposed by Him. * *

* An omnipotent and omnipresent creator ordains everything and foresees everything." Darwin rejected revelation, Whence then did he get these ideas if not from science or philosophy?

John Stuart Mill says: "I think it must be allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the adaption in nature affords a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence." You will observe that Mill's deduction is made on purely scientific principles.

Thomas Paine says: "I believe in one God and no more." Paine as is well known rejected revelation. Whence then did he get his belief unless from science or philosophy?

Professor Tyndall says: "Can it be there is no being or thing in nature that knows more about these matters than I do? Do I, in my ignorance, represent the highest knowledge of these things existing in this universe? Ladies and gentlemen, the man who puts that question to himself, if he be not a shallow man, if he be a man capable of being penetrated by a profound thought will never answer the question by professing the creed of atheism which has been so lightly attributed to me." Whence did Tyndall draw this conclusion if not from science or philosophy? Yet *you* tell us most dogmatically that the force implied by miracles is unknown to science or philosophy!

The history of philosophy is the history of the speculations of the human mind about the Supreme Being. The records of all nations prove this. Consult those of ancient Egypt, Greece, Palestine, Persia,

India, or China and you will find that the beginning and end of their philosophy was God and His manifestations to intelligences. What fools those ancient sages were to imagine that philosophy had anything to do with God! The only mitigating circumstance in their favor is that they had no Lacy to enlighten them. They lived too early and died too soon.

Lacy. Not only so, but we find them (miracles) wedded to superstitions which the educated world has long ago discarded.

Lambert. We find them wedded to Christianity; has the educated world long ago discarded it? With all your intrepidity of statement I do not think you will go so far as that. But let us suppose for argument's sake that your statement is true. What would you infer? That there have been no miracles? This is logic run mad. The gold found in the hills of the west is found mixed with alloy. Is it the less gold on that account? Is a diamond less a diamond because found in the mud? Is liberty less a glorious thing because her garments are tarnished by the ambitions and passions of men? Is truth to be rejected because error, the brazen faced jade, claims relationship? The fact is, no superstition ever existed that did not have a truth at bottom of it, and no error ever existed that did not have some truth to hang to. As error cannot exist without truth, evil without good, nor shadow without light, so superstition cannot exist without true religion. Error, shadow, evil, superstition, suppose and imply truth, light, good, religion, and without them can have no existence. Hence if you had reflected profoundly you would have seen that when you affirm superstition you affirm more than you intended. Superstition is an erroneous concep-

tion of the relation between the natural and the supernatural, an exaggeration or caricature of that relation. But all this presupposes a real, normal relation, because an exaggeration or caricature is impossible without some real thing that is exaggerated or caricatured, just as a counterfeit is impossible without some genuine thing of which it is a counterfeit. When you assert a counterfeit I immediately conclude something genuine, when you assert superstition I conclude true religion, when you assert shadow I conclude light, and when you assert error I conclude truth; and my conclusions are necessary inferences from your assertions. If superstitions were never associated with miracles I would begin to doubt the existence of miracles, as I would doubt the existence of light if there were no shadows. Did it ever occur to you to account for the *existence* of superstition? You will perhaps say, with your master, Ingersoll, that it was invented by priests, pagan and Christian. But this answer is exceedingly unphilosophical, for it only begets another question: How did they think of inventing it, how did the idea originate in the first place? Was there no reality to begin with? To emphasize the point I wish to make here, I ask, How did counterfeiting originate? According to Ingersoll's philosophy it originated with counterfeiters. Good, but how did the idea originate in the mind of the counterfeiters? *Could they ever have thought of it if there was not sometime and somewhere a genuine note or coin?* From this illustration you can see how silly is Ingersoll's account of the origin of the idea of God and of superstition. You say, miracles are wedded to superstitions which the educated world discards. So is genuine money wedded to counterfeits of all kinds which the educated

expert discards, but is the expert justified in denying the existence of all money because he occasionally meets with a counterfeit?

Lacy. Who now questions that astrology was a compound of superstition and imposition, or that witchcraft was a delusion?

Lambert. I question it, for one. Astrology was the ancient name of that science known at present as astronomy—the science of the stars. The errors associated with it arose from reasoning from incorrect data. The fact that superstitions were associated with it proves nothing, for there never was a superstition that did not have a truth at the bottom of it. To say that astrology is a compound of superstition and imposition is to belie the science of the ancients. You evidently confound *judicial* astrology, practiced by some quacks in the middle ages, with astrology properly so called.

Lacy. I hold in my hand "The Faith of Our Fathers," by the Rt. Rev. James Gibbons, D. D., in which he speaks of the "ridiculous charges of witchcraft." He says: "And who is ignorant of the number of innocent creatures that suffered death in the same State (Massachusetts) on the ridiculous charge of witchcraft toward the end of the seventeenth century."

Lambert. That many innocent persons suffered as witches on account of ridiculous charges is no doubt true, just as many innocent persons have suffered as murderers on account of ridiculous and false charges that were brought against them. As the latter does not prove that murders never took place, the former does not prove that manifestations called witchcraft never took place. That there were tricks and

frauds in witchcraft as there are in modern spirit manifestations is no doubt true, but these tricks and frauds are but counterfeits of a reality back of them, and without which they are inexplicable.

The old Puritan divine, Cotton Mather, who lived in New England at the time of witchcraft excitement, says: "Flashy people may burlesque these things, but when hundreds of the most sober people, in a country where they have as much mother wit certainly as the rest of mankind, *know them to be true*, nothing but the most froward spirit of sadducism can question them."

When you represent the Cardinal Archbishop of Baltimore as making light of those spiritual manifestations called witchcraft, obsession and possession, that have occurred in all times, before as well as since the seventeenth century, or as denying their possibility or existence, you misrepresent him. He knew the differences between witchcraft and a ridiculous charge of witchcraft—a difference which you seem not to be aware of.

Lacy. Should the Father bring me word that my friend, his neighbor, was dead and that he was with him when he expired, I would credit his statement implicitly; but if he assured me that a priest or bishop had restored the dead one to life—I might think him honest—but I would not believe one word of his statement. I would think first of trances and of all natural causes which might produce the semblance of death, *but no number of witnesses in that particular case would convince me that the dead had been brought to life,*

Lambert. This, in italics, is a strange statement from you, who agree with Argyle that miracles are simply a question of *evidence*. On page 136 you say

you dissent from Hume, who holds that no evidence can prove a miracle. You now agree with him and reject Argyle and say *no number of witnesses could convince you*. All this in space of three pages. You should try and be consistent. Why do you demand evidence when you are not prepared to receive it, or discuss it with candor?

Lacy. But were the accounts of miracles given us by the Evangelists strictly contemporary with the events they record?

Lambert. After declaring that no number of witnesses could convince you, it would be foolish in me to discuss the character and credibility of the evangelical witnesses with you. For whether their testimony be true or false the result in your mind will be the same. It is useless to discuss the credibility of particular witnesses when no number of witnesses can change your mind. After this confession you can no longer claim to be a just, fair and unbiased judge.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Lambert. Mr. Lacy denies the authenticity of the celebrated passage in Josephus' *Antiquities of the Jews*,—Book 18, chapter 3, paragraph 3—which speaks in eulogistic terms of Christ. If I were to grant, for argument's sake, that the passage is spurious, it would not serve his purpose, which was to show that Ingersoll was right when he said that Josephus "says nothing about Jesus," for there is still another passage in Book 20, chapter 9, which speaks of Christ—a passage whose authenticity has never been disputed, and which must have been known to Mr. Lacy, for I quoted it in the *Notes*. This second passage proves that Ingersoll was either not familiar with the writings of Josephus or that he was dishonest when he said that Josephus "says nothing about Jesus." Mr. Lacy seems to have forgotten the point he undertook to prove or imagined that by raising a dust about the first passage he could blind the reader to the existence of the second, which, for reasons best known to himself, he passed over in silence. But let us return to the disputed passage and examine Mr. Lacy's reasons for denying its authenticity. He tells us:—

Lacy. 1st, the context shows it to be an interpolation. 2d, the probabilities of the case, strong enough to exclude the possibility of an opposite conclusion, show it. 3d, it is shown to be spurious by learned Catholic and Protestant as well as Hebrew authority.

Lambert. Now proceed to make good these statements.

Lacy. First, as to the context. Just before the disputed passage intervenes Josephus is speaking of the wrongs suffered by the Jews at the hands of Pilate and of the end of a certain sedition. Then as we claim, was interpolated the passage: "Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call Him a man; for He was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as received the truth with pleasure. He drew over to Him both many of the Jews and many of the Gentiles. He was (the) Christ. And when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men among us, had condemned Him to the cross, those that loved Him at first did not forsake Him; for He appeared to them alive again on the third day; as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other things concerning Him. And the tribe of Christians, so named from Him, are not extinct at this day." What follows? "About the same time another sad calamity put the Jews into disorder," etc. What! Was it a calamity that the crucified Saviour had risen from the dead?

Lambert. No. But from Josephus' point of view it was a sad calamity that an innocent fellow countryman was condemned to the cross by the Roman governor at the instigation of leading Jews. The chapter in which the above celebrated passage is found is devoted to an account of some of the wrongs and calamities suffered by the people under Pilate and nothing could be more natural and consistent with the context than that Josephus should mention the crucifixion of an innocent man, and mention it too as a sad calamity—all the more sad because this innocent man was a "doer of wonderful works." The passage then is perfectly consistent with the context of the chapter.

Having mentioned Christ in another passage it is evident that Josephus knew of Him. And knowing of Him, what more natural than to give an account of His death in a chapter devoted to the acts of Pilate, the Roman governor, under whose authority He suffered? You do not deny that Christ suffered death under Pilate, why then should not Josephus mention the fact and mention it too precisely where he did—in that part of his history devoted to the acts of Pilate? And in speaking of it why not refer to it as a sad calamity, which it certainly was, from whatever point of view we look at it?

Lacy. But leave out the interpolation and you will see how the preceding and succeeding paragraphs dovetail together. (See "Antiquities of the Jews," Book 18, chapter 3.)

Lambert. Josephus, in the first three paragraphs of chapter 3, mentions three calamities, the third being the judicial murder of Christ. In beginning the fourth paragraph he says: "About this time *another* sad calamity put the Jews in disorder." Now it is evident that his statement will dovetail with any one of the three preceding paragraphs after the other two are excluded. Hence if your dovetail argument proves the paragraph referring to Christ to be spurious it proves equally that either of the other paragraphs is spurious. In a word your context argument proves nothing or it proves too much. Josephus was free to mention one or a dozen events or calamities and then speak of *another*; and this reference to another does not justify the exclusion of any of the former.

Lacy. Second, as to the probabilities of the case.

Lambert. Before going further let me call your attention to an egregious blunder you made. You

say: "The probabilities of the case, (are) strong enough to exclude the possibilities of an opposite conclusion." A little reflection would have shown you that no number of probabilities however great can exclude a possibility. Probability belongs not to things, but to our calculations about things; while possibility is of the essence of things. Possibility and probability can never antagonize or exclude each other. The probable is always possible, but the improbable is equally so, and the possible may be probable or improbable, that is, may or may not happen. You may pile probabilities sky high, but you can never exclude possibility of the opposite. A conclusion deduced from probabilities is at best only a probable conclusion. Impossibility of course excludes all probability, but improbability does not exclude possibility. These principles are so simple and self-evident as to scarcely need stating, and yet I must state them, because your ideas about them are confused and misleading. You seem so intent on justifying Ingersoll that you disregard the simplest principles of metaphysical science.

Lacy. Second, as to the probabilities of the case. Josephus was a Jew and, in his latter days, of that strictest of sects, the Pharisees, whom Christ had called hypocrites and vipers. Would not a convert from such a class, a man of noble lineage and of such great learning and literary power, have been referred to as one of the greatest triumphs of the new faith?

Lambert. If the early Christian writers had believed that Josephus was a convert to the Christian faith they would most probably have referred to the fact. But we have no evidence that they believed him to be a convert. On the contrary it seems to be the universal sense of all the ancients, without exception.

that Josephus was an unbelieving Jew, and not a believing Christian. St. Ambrose says: "If the Jews do not believe us, let them believe their own writers. Josephus, whom they esteem, a very great man hath said this (that is, the passage in question) and yet hath he spoken truth in such a manner; and so far was his mind wandered from the right way, that even he was not a believer as to what he himself said; but thus he spake, in order to deliver historical truth, because he thought it not lawful to deceive, while yet he was no believer, because of the hardness of his heart and his perfidious intention. However it was no prejudice to the truth that he was not a believer; but this adds more weight to his testimony, that while he was an unbeliever, and unwilling this should be true, he has not denied it to be so."

There are several things to be noticed in this quotation. The first is that the writer did not consider the words of Josephus as evidence that he was a convert. The second is that the writer found a noble reason why Josephus, though a Jew and a Pharisee, could write of Christ as he did. "He thus spoke in order to deliver historical truth, because he thought it not lawful for him to deceive." Eusebius refers to Josephus as "the Jew," and gives not the slightest suggestion that he was a convert. Thus your first probability, based on the bald assumption that Josephus was a convert, falls to the ground.

Lacy. Would not Josephus have embraced with holy ecstasy the religion of Him whom he believed to be "the Christ?"

Lambert. Is it very imprudent to base an argument on what Josephus or any one else might have done under certain circumstances. Men do not always

follow their convictions. Had Josephus believed that Jesus was the *Christ or true Messiah* expected by the Jews, it is not improbable that he might have become a convert. But it is by no means certain that he used the name "Christ" in that sense. There were several Jews of note who were called "Jesus," mentioned by Josephus. He wrote his *Antiquities* for the use of the Greeks and Romans who knew nothing of the character or office of that Christ, the anointed of God, the Messiah of the Jews and Christians. Hence in calling Jesus "the Christ," in a work addressed to the Greeks and Romans he could not have used the name in a sense utterly unknown to them, and therefore in calling Jesus "the Christ" he did not testify to his divine character, but simply designated one particular Jesus, and distinguished him from others of the same name by calling him Jesus Christ or Chrest or the Christ—a historical personage well known to the Greeks and Romans in Josephus' time. In alluding to a person who bore a name common to several others, what more natural than to distinguish him from them by the title "Christ" by which he was known? Josephus explains his meaning in Book 20, chapter 9, of his *Antiquities* where he says: "so he (Albinus) assembled the Sanhedrim of Judges, and brought before them the brother of Jesus, *who was called Christ*, whose name was James." Now inasmuch as it is not evident that Josephus in calling Jesus "the Christ," believed in his divine character, or intended to convey such a belief, your second probability disappears.

Lacy. He (Josephus) nowhere indicates a change of faith.

Lambert. True, and that is the reason why the early Christians did not believe that he changed his

faith. You seem to overlook the fact that it is only *you* who assumed that he changed his faith.

Lacy. Third. Historical and critical authorities, by a vast preponderance, negative the genuineness of the disputed passage.

Lambert. You said that Catholic, Protestant and Hebrew authority had shown the passage to be spurious. You now pass from these to historical and critical authorities. Why?

Lacy. True, Eusebius refers to it (the passage in Josephus) twice, and that is the first reference made to it in history.

Lambert. Eusebius was the first to *quote* the passage, but not the first to refer to it. Justin Martyr (A. D. 147) refers to it, nearly 200 years before Eusebius.

Lacy. Of Eusebius we are told that "he is the 'Father of History.'"

Lambert. We were never told any such tomfoolery, fiddlestick nonsense. If any one ever told *you* that, he evidently planted a joke where he thought it would do the most good.

Lacy. He (Eusebius) had neither style nor *absolute* veracity.

Lambert. Style is a matter of indifference when the question is one of truth. As to *absolute* veracity, no one has ever claimed it for Eusebius or any other historian.

Lacy. Origen, the most learned father of the church, who lived in the second century, says that Josephus was not a believer in Jesus.

Lambert. In this he agrees with all the ancient writers who treat of the question. It is only the latter

day critics who assume without any foundation that Josephus was a Christian believer.

Lacy. Were all these wise, learned, Christian writers, "Tooley street tailors?"

Lambert. By no means. They believed in the genuineness of the passage in question, and they believed at the same time that Josephus was not a Christian.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Ingersoll. Is it not wonderful that no historian ever mentioned any of these prodigies?

Notes. The prodigies you refer to are 1st, the massacre of the infants by Herod; 2d, the star of Bethlehem; 3d, the darkness at the time of the crucifixion. The first is referred to by Macrobius, a heathen historian * * * the second is mentioned by Chalcidus, a Platonic philosopher * * * the third is mentioned by Phlegon of Trallium.

Lacy. As to Macrobius, who lived in the fifth century, one would suppose that he was a poor witness of the events which transpired some four hundred years before he was born.

Lambert. *Ingersoll* said: "No historian ever mentioned any of these prodigies." Macrobius, a pagan historian, mentions the massacre by Herod. This is enough to disprove *Ingersoll's* statement, which was the purpose of the quotation. The historian was not quoted as a contemporary witness of what he related. Historians as a rule, are not contemporaries of the facts they relate.

Lacy. Again, a legend precisely like that of the massacre of the infants by Herod was believed to have taken place 1,200 years, A. D., when a tyrant sought the life of the child Krishna, the atoning saviour of the Hindoos.

Lambert. This is all very learned, but, it is nothing to the purpose. Macrobius spoke of the massacre by Herod. The point here is not the fact of the mas-

sacre, but the fact that Macrobius, a historian, mentioned it. And this fact contradicts Ingersoll's declaration that, no historian ever mentioned it. Here, as frequently elsewhere, you forget your thesis.

Lacy. Chalcidus who was born in the second century (scarcely contemporary with Jesus and the Apostles,) speaks, in his comments on the "Timaeus of Plato," of a star which presaged neither disease nor death, etc.

Lambert. Here you are wrong again. Chalcidus speaks of a *history*. "There is," says he, "another history which notes the apparition of a star destined to announce to men, not disease or some terrible mortality, but the advent of a God.

Lacy. What proof have we that Chalcidus referred to the events which attended the birth of Christ?

Lambert. Chalcidus referred to a *history* which related the event of the star. The history written by Matthew and called his Gospel was well known in the second century when Chalcidus lived, while the theogony of the Hindoo Bagharat Gita was not known to the Greeks or Romans of that age. We infer then that Chalcidus referred to the history that was in circulation in his own time—the Gospels.

Mr. Lacy quotes largely from the historian Gibbon to disprove the events referred to above. But if Macrobius is a poor witness of events that happened four hundred years before he was born, how can Gibbon be a good witness of the same events which happened seventeen hundred years before he was born? To show how unreliable Gibbon is when speaking of early Christianity I need only call attention to one of his statements. He says, in the quotation made by Mr. Lacy, that "A distinct chapter of

Pliny is designed for eclipses of an extraordinary nature and unusual duration; but he contents himself with describing the singular defect of light which followed the murder of Cæsar." Here Gibbon leads the reader to believe that Pliny treated the subject of eclipses with full and elaborate detail. What will the reader think when he learns that this *distinct chapter* of Pliny consists of only *eighteen words!* This whole distinct chapter is as follows: "Eclipses of the sun are sometimes of extraordinary duration; such as that which took place on the death of Cæsar, and during the war with Anthony, when the sun appeared pale for nearly a year."

To argue from this, as Gibbon does, that there were no other eclipses is a good illustration of his unfairness in dealing with the facts of Christianity.

Lacy. With regard to the passage from Phlegon, cited by the Father, and referring to the eclipse said to have taken place at the time of the crucifixion, Gibbon, in a note remarks: "It has been wisely abandoned."

Lambert. Gibbon, like you and Ingersoll, had a point to make. Wisely or unwisely, it is a fact that Phlegon's testimony has not been abandoned. Is it denied that Phlegon wrote the passage? No. Is it claimed that he lied? No. And if it were, the question would arise, How did he invent a lie that dovetails so wonderfully with the Scripture narrative?

Lacy. But Phlegon, it will be remembered, was not a contemporary with Jesus nor with the Apostles. Neither was Julian, nor any of the other authors called by the Father to testify to the prodigies which were said to attend the birth and death of Jesus.

Lambert. I must repeat here what I have had

frequent occasion to say, that you have lost sight of the point you set out to prove. Ingersoll stated that "no historian ever mentioned any of these prodigies;" and I quoted certain historians who did mention them. Observe, the question now is not whether the prodigies are real or fictitious, but whether historians have mentioned them. Your master says they did not; I have proved by quotations that they did. It is quite true that the historians I quoted were not contemporaries of Christ and the Apostles, or eye-witnesses of the events they relate. They were not quoted as such, and you knew it.

Notes. Why do you reject the works of the Evangelists and admit the works of Josephus?

Lacy. We do not reject the works of the Evangelists in an unqualified sense.

Lambert. They are either the works of the Evangelists or they are not. If they are, they should be admitted; if they are not, they should be rejected. Between these alternatives there is no medium, no choice. Your notion of an "unqualified sense," where there is a question of authorship is too ridiculous to be considered seriously.

Lacy. They (the Gospels) were (are) anonymous productions.

Lambert. My dear sir, are you so verdant as not to see that you are assuming as true the point in debate?

Lacy. They (the Gospels) record prodigies which, in themselves, are incredible.

Lambert. You forget that, with Gibbon, you have accepted the statement of Pliny as to the eclipse at the death of Cæsar and during the war with Anthony. What strange infatuation makes you and Gibbon

accept a miracle in behalf of Cæsar and Anthony and reject it in behalf of Christ? But letting that pass, what is there in the Gospel history that is incredible? Is it the curing of the deaf, dumb and blind, the calling back of Lazarus, or the resurrection of Christ? If there be anything incredible in the Gospels it must be these. Incredible means unbelievable and nothing that is possible is unbelievable. Do you pretend that the miracles of the Gospels are things that could not possibly have happened?

Lacy. We do not say that miracles have never been wrought, only that they have not been proven.

Lambert. Then why do you say they are incredible? What is believed should be capable of proof, but is nothing believable or credible but what has been proved? Words are useful things but they should be used with discrimination.

Lacy. Renan says: "None of the miracles with which ancient histories are filled occurred under scientific conditions."

Lambert. Pray how many of the innumerable facts which you unhesitatingly believe have occurred under scientific conditions? Did the acts of Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon or Washington occur under scientific conditions? They did not, and yet who thinks of doubting them? The principle of Renan, if logically carried out, will disprove not miracles alone, but the acts and very existence of these men, as well as all the facts of history. This is enough to prove that the principle is radically unsound. You believe you exist. Can science demonstrate it? If you think so your thoughts have been very superficial. Can science demonstrate any fact that happened twenty years ago? Certainly not. Our belief in past facts

must rest on testimony or memory, not on science. Science deals with principles; facts are subjects of experience. Science, in Renan's sense of the word, can never demonstrate a fact. Experience alone can do that. There is no word in the English language that has been so much abused by latter day fools as the word science. It is made the cloak of ignorance, incredulity and incapacity. It has a learned sound and is made to play an important part in the absence of sense. Reject all the facts that have not occurred under scientific conditions and what have you left?

Lacy. Renan says: "No miracle was ever performed before men capable of establishing the miraculous character of an act."

Lambert. It is not necessary that the witnesses of a miracle should be capable of establishing the miraculous character of an act. What is required of them is the capacity to recognize the fact or act itself. Their opinion of the character of the act is of no consequence to us. The most ignorant Jew that followed Moses out of Egypt was competent to say whether he marched on the bottom of the Red Sea or whether he passed over in a ship. We do not ask him if it was a miracle; we ask simply, was it a fact? The fact once established, we at the present time are as capable of determining its miraculous character as he who marched between the walls of water. The executioners of Christ were competent to know when they had carried out the death sentence, and those with whom He had intercourse afterwards were competent to testify to the fact. Their testimony was to the fact, not to the character of it, and they were as capable of recognizing a fact as M. Renan or any other infidel.

Lacy. Renan says: "In our days have we not seen nearly all men the dupes of gross prestiges and puerile illusions?"

Lambert. Yes, even M. Renan himself. But this proves too much, for if the fact that all men are subject to error destroys their testimony as to facts, we must reject all facts past and present that have not come under our personal experience. We must even doubt our own experience, for it sometimes misleads us. M. Renan's test of miracles, if applied to all facts, renders them illusory and relegates everything of which we are conscious to the realms of illusion. It is a compliment to Christian truth that its enemies cannot shake it without adopting principles that shake the foundations of all certitude.

Lacy. I can afford no longer to follow the Father in his chow-chow method.

Lambert. I humbly confess I did a great deal of wandering in the *Notes*. I can only urge in extenuation that I followed closely at the heels of the redoubtable Ingersoll!

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Lacy. The Father avers that Matthew taught the doctrine of "second birth," because he reports Jesus as saying, "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." In this passage we find no reference to a "second birth."

Lambert. We do not find the phrase "second birth," but we find the doctrine which that phrase signifies. When Ingersoll spoke of "the mystery of the second birth" he referred to a Christian doctrine not to a verbal phrase. As a Christian doctrine, Christians are more competent to determine what it signifies than you or Ingersoll. You may know more about everything else, and no doubt you do—in your own estimation—but it would be egotism to assume that you know more about Christian mysteries and doctrines than Christians do. When you said that Christians believed in *three Gods* you showed the extent of your information. The Christian Fathers have uniformly employed the word *regeneration*, (that is, second birth) as signifying baptism. St. Paul in his epistle to Titus expresses this same idea when he writes: "Not by the works of justice, which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the *laver of regeneration* (rebirth or second birth) and renovation of the Holy Ghost."—3-5.

Observe how well this corresponds with the words of Christ addressed to Nicodemus: "Rabbi," said the latter, "we know that Thou art come a teacher

from God, for no man can do the things which Thou hast done unless God be with Him." Jesus answered and said to him: "Amen, Amen, I say to thee unless a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God." And Nicodemus asked, "How can a man be born again when he is old?" And Jesus answered, "Unless a man be *born again of water and the Holy Ghost*, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven."

Now "regeneration," "second birth," "to be born again," when taken alone may mean something else besides baptism; but when either of the phrases is used in connection with water, as in the above quotations, it means baptism and that alone. When Christ commanded His Apostles, as recorded by Matthew, to go and teach all nations and baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, He meant that they should do for them that which He had told Nicodemus was necessary for salvation; that is, impart to them the second birth of water and of the Holy Ghost. In like manner, in the passage in Mark, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved," the phrase "to be baptized" means, to receive that second birth of water and the Holy Ghost, which Christ declared to be a necessary condition of entering into the kingdom of heaven. In both these passages then we have the mystery of the second birth, and therefore Matthew and Mark were not ignorant of it.

Ingersoll. There is not in all the contemporaneous literature of the world a single word about Jesus and His Apostles.

Lambert. In reply to this I quoted in the *Notes* an undisputed passage from Josephus, who was born in the year 37. I quoted another passage from Sueton-

nius, who was born in the year 72; another from Tacitus, born in the year 56; and yet another from Pliny the younger, born in the year 62. Mr. Lacy objects to these witnesses as not being contemporary and says: *Lacy.* What do these (Ingersoll's) words imply? Simply that during the life of Christ history and other literature took no note of Him and of His Apostles and of the miracles which the Evangelists record.

Lambert. Ingersoll meant more than this by the words "contemporaneous literature," for he himself refers to Josephus for the purpose of saying that his testimony in reference to Christ was an interpolation. "The paragraph in Josephus is admitted to be an interpolation." Does not this show that when he made this statement he had his mind on Josephus as contemporaneous?

But let us suppose for a moment that he meant "contemporaneous literature" in the strict sense which you give it. What, in this hypothesis does his statement amount to? Where is the "literature of the world" that is contemporary in your sense with the life of Christ? Where the histories? Are there any? Now if there are no histories extant that were written within those thirty-three years of Christ's life, of what value is Ingersoll's high sounding statement about "all the contemporaneous literature of the world?" What sense is there in appealing to the silence of books that no longer exist? But if the contemporary history no longer exists we have evidence that it did exist, and evidence of what it said. It was customary for the governors of the Roman provinces to send to the emperor an account of remarkable events that occurred in the places where they resided, just as

our territorial Governors report to the government at Washington. In conformity with this custom Pilate kept and reported to the emperor at Rome a record of Jewish affairs. These records are called *Acta Pilati*, or Acts of Pilate. Now Justin Martyr, in his first Apology for the Christians, which was presented to the Emperor Antoninus Pius and the Senate of Rome, about the year 140, having mentioned the crucifixion of Christ, and some of its attendant circumstances, adds, "*And that these things were so done, you may know from the Acts made in the time of Pontius Pilate.*" Let us pause here for a moment and analyze this evidence. Justin Martyr appeals to the Emperor and Senate to mitigate the cruel laws against the Christians, and in evidence of the wonderful works wrought by Christ he appeals to the "Acts of Pilate," that is, to documents that were then in the State archives and subject to the call of the Imperial Senate. The fact that under the circumstances he appealed to the archives is the strongest possible evidence that the records or *Acts of Pilate* existed at that time, namely, in the year 140, and that they verified the facts he referred to, namely, the resurrection of Christ, etc. Here then we have an appeal to "Contemporaneous Literature" and at the same time the facts it testifies to. This same Justin Martyr, in the same appeal, referring to some of Christ's miracles, such as healing diseases and raising the dead, says: "And that these things were done by Him, you may learn from the Acts made in the time of Pontius Pilate." Here again he refers the Roman Senate, of the year 140, to the imperial archives, or official State documents. Tertullian (year 200) in his Apology for Christianity, appeals to those same official reports of Pilate. Would

these writers, in addressing the Emperor and Senate, have appealed to those public documents unless they were certain of their existence and contents?

Ingersoll. Is it not more amazing than all the rest that Christ Himself concealed from Matthew, Mark, and Luke the dogma of Atonement, the necessity of belief, and the mystery of the second birth?

Notes. First. Atonement is the expiation for sin by the obedience and personal sufferings of Christ—redemption. Now Matthew says: "Even as the son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life for the redemption of many."—XX. 28. Mark makes the same statement word for word, X, 45. Luke says: "But those things which God hath foretold by the mouth of His prophets, that His Christ should suffer, He hath so fulfilled."—Acts III, 18. In the face of these facts how can you say Christ *concealed* this dogma from these Evangelists?

Lacy. But these passages do not teach the doctrine of vicarious atonement as preached by Paul.

Lambert. Let St. Paul speak for himself. He says "In whom (Christ) we have *redemption* through His blood."—Ephesians 1-7. "Being justified freely by His grace through the *redemption* that is in Christ Jesus.—Romans III, 24. "In whom we have *redemption* through His blood, the remission of sins."—Colossians I, 14. "For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus: who gave himself a *redemption* for all."—I Timothy II. 5, 6.

Thus we see when St. Paul is permitted to speak for himself, and without the assistance of Mr. Lacy, it

is evident that he preaches the same dogma that St. Matthew preached when he said: "The son of man came * * * to give His life for the redemption of the many." Both teach that man was redeemed by the blood of Christ; and this is the dogma of vicarious atonement.

Lacy. Nor do the words, "which God had foretold by the mouth of all the prophets that His Christ should suffer," aver that Christ died as a propitiatory offering.

Lambert. These words, quoted from St. Luke's "Acts of the Apostles," refer us to certain prophecies concerning the sufferings of Christ. It is evident then that we must consult the prophecies referred to, if we would understand the meaning and nature of those sufferings. Isaias says: "Surely He hath borne our infirmities; and carried our sorrows * * * He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and by His bruises we are healed * * * the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquity of us all * * * For the wicked of every people I have struck Him * * * He hath borne the sins of many;"—chapter 23-4, 5, 6, 8. These are some of the prophetic texts to which Luke refers, and they show the sense in which he viewed those sufferings, as well as what Matthew meant when he tells us that the son of man *gave His life for the redemption of many.*

Lacy. In refutation of the charge that the first three Evangelists were ignorant of the "necessity of belief," or that it was not taught them by Jesus, we are referred to Mark 16-16. "He that believeth not shall be damned." And to Acts 16-31: "Believe in the Lord Jesus: and thou shalt be saved, and thy house."

Lambert. Ingersoll did not charge that the first three Evangelists were ignorant of the "necessity of belief." He said that Christ Himself *concealed* this dogma from them. You show good sense in shirking the defense of his ridiculous statement, but you exhibit a sad want of candor in softening and modifying it in such a manner that its original Ingersollian meaning is hidden from sight. As formulated by you, Ingersoll's charge becomes quite another thing. He said Christ *concealed* the "necessity of belief" from Matthew, Mark and Luke. Do you believe he used that word thoughtlessly, or without a purpose?

Lacy. It should be remembered, 1st, that neither Mark nor Luke was an Apostle.

Lambert. What has that to do with the question whether or not Christ *concealed* from them the "necessity of belief," as your master asserts?

Lacy. By Christian commentators it is believed that neither of them was of the seventy disciples.

Lambert. Well, what do we infer from that?

Lacy. That neither of them listened to the teachings of Jesus, nor witnessed the miracles which they record as having been wrought by Him.

Lambert. Does it follow that because they were not Apostles, or of the seventy disciples, they did not listen to the teachings of Christ or witness His miracles? Where did you learn that these *alone* listened to His teachings and saw His miracles? Do you forget the multitudes that followed Him, or the thousands He fed with the loaves and fishes? What of Nicodemus and the rich young man who consulted him, and the multitude who heard the sublime sermon on the Mount and saw the resurrection of the son of the widow of Nain? The Scriptures themselves bear

witness that thousands, besides the Apostles and the seventy, listened to Christ's teachings and saw His miracles. By what mental process then do you infer that Mark and Luke did not see and hear Him? Until you prove that *none* but the Apostles and the seventy heard Him teach or saw Him work miracles your reasoning to prove that Mark and Luke did not is utterly futile—a fact which you should not need to have pointed out to you.

Lacy. Matthew * * * does not insist on the necessity of belief as a doctrine taught by Him (Christ).

Lambert. All of which, even if granted, does not prove that Christ *concealed* the doctrine from Matthew, which was the point you set out to prove.

Lacy. It should be remembered, 2nd, that in the "Gospel according to Luke," the author does not represent the doctrine in question as having been preached by Christ.

Lambert. Here again, all you say, even if granted, does not prove that Christ *concealed* the doctrine from Luke. My objection to Ingersoll's charge was that he accused Christ of *concealing* from Matthew, Mark and Luke things that He had taught to the other Apostles and to the Evangelist St. John. You, while pretending to defend Ingersoll on this point, intentionally or otherwise shirk the real issue. I lay stress on this word "conceal" because it was evidently used by Ingersoll for a sinister purpose, and because you try to hide it by covering it up under a multitude of words. To conceal one's principles is always suspicious. To say that Christ concealed doctrines from Matthew, Mark and Luke which He taught to John is to accuse Him of duplicity. Herein consists the sinister use of the word.

Lacy. It should be remembered, 3d, that the passage cited from Mark is not found in the two oldest Greek manuscripts.

Lambert. That portion of Mark's Gospel (from verse 9 to 20, of chapter 16) which is not found in the oldest Greek manuscripts (which only go back to the *fourth* century), is found in the Peshito-Syriac version of the *second* century. It is also found in the Vulgate of St. Jerome, in the Memphitic and Aethiopic versions, and was quoted by Irenæus about A. D. 180 from a version at least 220 years older than the oldest extant Greek manuscripts. The fact that a passage is wanting in a few manuscripts while it is found in all the others, even the more ancient, is no proof that it is not genuine.

and the
w. His
infer
Him?
and the
miracles
did not
need to
the ne-
christ).
does not
Mat-
in the
not rep-
preach-

grant-
doctrine
age was
Matthew,
to the
You,
point,
I lay
idently
because
ultitue
always
ctrines
ght to
onsists

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Lacy. Here again arises the question of the genuineness of the disputed passage in Josephus,

Lambert. Ingersoll said it was *admitted* to be an interpolation. You now concede it to be a *disputed* passage. Of course, as long as it is only disputed, it is not true to say as Ingersoll did, that it is *admitted* to be an interpolation. If he knew its genuineness was only disputed, he was uncandid, to say the least, in saying it was admitted to be an interpolation. And if he did not know it was disputed he was not familiar with the history of the discussion. Either hypothesis makes manifest his unreliability and unfitness to deal with the question, and shows how much wiser it would have been for him to have kept to his pantomimes. Had he known and desired to state the exact truth, he should have said that some critics claim that the passage is not genuine while others—a majority—hold the contrary. But this would not have served the end he had in view, which was to reject the passage altogether, and he did not hesitate a moment to misstate the case.

Mr. Lacy, very inconsistently it seems to me, appeals to the authority of a Jewish rabbi to settle the question. The rabbi may be, and no doubt is, a learned man, but there is no reason why we should adopt his opinion in preference to that of many other equally or perhaps more learned men. The rabbi's opinion, in view of the untenable reasons he gives for it, is of little weight as compared to the opinion and

reasons for it of those who hold the contrary. There is no reason why a Jewish rabbi, as such, should know more about the subject in question than any other critical scholar. The documents involved in the case are now equally open to all who wish to investigate the subject, and Josephus, though a Jew, wrote his histories in Greek, not Hebrew.

But let us now examine the rabbi's statements and see if they help Ingersoll out of the difficulty.

Rabbi. (Writing to Lacy.) The passage of Josephus you refer to is so generally recognized as an interpolation, that it is hardly worth while spending a line in proving it.

Lambert. The rabbi might have spent many lines in proving the statement he makes and yet not succeed. As a matter of fact the passage is not generally recognized as an interpolation. On the contrary the learned critics who believe the passage to be interpolated are in the minority. They are Bekker, Hase, Keim, and Schurer. While Hauteville, Oberthuer, Bretschneider, Boehmert, Whiston the translator of Josephus, Huet, Schœdel, and Boettger believe the passage to be word for word genuine. And Paulus, Heinschen, Gieseler, Weizacher, Renan and Ferrar believe it not to be an interpolation, but that it was somewhat changed from its original form by transcribers between the time of Josephus and that of Eusebius. M. Renan whom Mr. Lacy quotes with such high approbation, says, in the introduction to his *Vie de Jésus*: "I believe the passage on Jesus to be authentic. It is perfectly in the style of Josephus, and if this historian had made mention of Jesus it is precisely what he would have said of him. Only it is thought that a Christian hand retouched the pas-

sage, and added to it some words without which it would have been almost blasphemous, and perhaps retrenched or modified some expressions."

The learned rabbi will now see how far he erred in saying "the passage in Josephus is generally recognized as an interpolation," and that the majority of learned men who have written on the subject recognize the passage as authentic.

Rabbi. The passage bears *prima facie* the stamp of an interpolation—

Lambert. Is it not strange that the majority of learned critics could not discover this *prima facie* stamp? Proceed.

Rabbi. (1) Because it differs entirely from the usual style of Josephus.

Lambert. Whiston, the learned translator of Josephus, must have been a good judge—at least as good a judge as the learned rabbi—of Josephus' style. Whiston says: "The style of all these original testimonies belonging to Josephus is *exactly* the style of the same Josephus, and especially the style about those parts of the Antiquities wherein we find these testimonies. This is denied by nobody as to the other (testimonies) concerning John the Baptist and James the Just, and is now become equally undeniable as to that (testimony) concerning Christ."

M. Renan says: "It is perfectly in the style of Josephus."—"Il est parfaitement dans le gout de Joseph." (Vie de Jesu, Introduction, page 12.)

Rabbi. (2) It interrupts the narrative and has no connection with either the preceding or following.

Lambert. In reply to this the learned Dr. Schaff, whom Mr. Lacy quotes favorably for his learning, says: "Not necessarily. Josephus had just recorded a

calamity which befell the Jews under Pontius Pilate, in consequence of a sedition, and he may have recorded the crucifixion of Jesus as an additional calamity. He then goes on (in paragraph 4 and 5) to record another calamity, the expulsion of the Jews from Rome under Tiberius." (Schaff's History of the Christian Church, page 93.)

It is altogether improbable that Josephus, in writing a history of the Jews coming down to the year 66 of the Christian era should ignore Christ, when his (Josephus') contemporaries Suetonius, Tacitus and Pliny the younger make mention of Him. And if he mentioned Him it is natural that he would have done so in the chapter which he devotes to the acts of Pilate, under whom Christ was crucified.

Rabbi. Before Eusebius who is by no means the most ancient father of the church, no one mentions this passage; though in the numerous apologies of Christianity during the second century, it would have been quoted had it been in existence.

Lambert. There might be some plausibility in this statement if we had the complete works of the fathers and apologists who wrote prior to Eusebius and Origen. But as we have not their complete works, but only fragments of them, no inference can be drawn from their silence; for it cannot be known that they were silent. They may have quoted Josephus' passage in some of their writings that are lost. We of course cannot affirm that they did, but it is equally true that we cannot assert that they did not. Hence any argument based on their *supposed* silence is of no validity. But even granting for argument's sake that they were silent, a good reason may be found in the fact that Christ was a much more widely

known personage in the last half of the first and first half of the second century than was Josephus himself. There was therefore no particular reason why the fathers of that time should quote him.

It must not be supposed that Josephus was as well known to the world in the second century, as a historian, as he is in this nineteenth century. Tacitus, the famous Roman historian, was a contemporary of Josephus. He lived in the city of Rome at the time the Jewish historian wrote his Antiquities there. He wrote largely and professedly of Jewish affairs and of the origin of the Jewish nation, and yet he never mentions or quotes from Josephus' histories. Now if this contemporary historian, writing a few years after Josephus, and writing on the same subject, does not even mention Josephus, it is not at all strange that early Christian writers did not mention him, or even know of him.

Rabbi. Origen * * * states distinctly that Josephus was not a believer in Jesus.

Lambert. Origen says that Josephus did not believe in Jesus as *Christ*, that is, as the Messiah foretold by the prophet. He does not say Josephus did not believe in and mention Jesus as a historical person who was crucified under Pontius Pilate. The latter is the point in dispute. Origen, in the very passage referred to by the rabbi testifies to the fact that Josephus mentioned Christ. His words are: "The same Josephus also, although he did not believe in Jesus as Christ, when he was inquiring after the cause of the destruction of Jerusalem, * * * says, 'these miseries befell the Jews by way of revenge for James the Just, who was the brother of Jesus, *that was called Christ.*'" (contra Celsum Book I, page 35.)

The mistake of the rabbi consists in assuming that the celebrated passage of Josephus proves that historian to have been a believer in Christ as the Messiah. His words, "this was the Christ," no more proved that Josephus believed in the divinity of Christ than Pilate's inscription on the cross, "This is Jesus the King of the Jews," proves that Pilate believed Him to be the real King of the Jews. The efforts then of Mr. Lacy and the rabbi to prove that Josephus was not a Christian, is to no purpose.

d first
 myself
 y the
 know
 as as
 as a
 acitus,
 ary of
 time
 He
 nd of
 men-
 if this
 er Jo-
 es not
 e that
 even
 at Jo-
 ot be-
 retold
 d not
 erson
 tter is
 pas-
 e fact
 are:
 not
 after
 * * *
 venge
 , that
 e 35:)

