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PEACEMAKING: FISSION AND FUSION

First lecture in the Henry Marshall Tory lectures, delivered by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, October 28, 1958.

On this, the occasion of the fiftieth birthday of the University of Alberta, I bring to you on behalf of my colleagues in the Government our warm birthday greetings and our very best wishes ad multos annos. Fifty years is a long time in the life of a man, but it is a short period indeed in the life of a university. Yours, however, has been a remarkable half century of increasing strength and of widening influence for your province and thereby to our entire country and to the world. It seems almost incredible that the University of Alberta began fifty years ago so modestly on one floor of a high school, with the president and four professors who, together, almost outnumbered the total student body. At the beginning of this present session I understand that you have over five thousand five hundred students enrolled, and that your plans are complete for the establishment of the University of Alberta in Calgary, thus extending the service of the University. Even in a country such as ours which has become accustomed to near miracles of rapid development, this spectacular expansion of the service and prestige of your university must surely long since have out-distanced the brightest hopes of those courageous and enlightened men of fifty years ago who planted such a sturdy twig now grown into this vigorous and noble tree of learning.

In a more personal vein, I express my deep sense of the honour which the Friends of the University of Alberta have accorded to me in inviting me to deliver this year the lectures in memory of Henry Marshall Tory. The tangible memorials of this great Canadian are many, splendid and abiding, but who would venture to assess those more intangible memorials of the heart and of the mind - memorials which will keep alive the contributions of this dedicated scholar who was the founder of so much that is excellent in the intellectual life of our nation. The

glowing record of his career fully justifies the designation Scholar Patriot. Far from a shallow jingoism, his patriotism was based on a deep feeling for and an almost instinctive response to the challenges which form the core of the Canadian experience. His patriotism found expression in the creative efforts which he put forward on behalf of any enterprise which he considered to be a worthwhile contribution to the nation which he loved so well. He was, in fact, a nation-builder no less than those who wrote our constitution or who spanned the continent with the steel of railways, or who wrested new homes from an inhospitable wilderness, or who delved beneath the surface of the earth to bring forth hidden riches. He realized that the wealth of nations is more than a statistical abstraction; he knew that a nation must have profound spiritual and intellectual dimensions as well. And it was in the planes of the spirit and of the intellect that his contributions to Canada were made, contributions which have been woven, either directly or indirectly, into the very fabric of Canada. McGill University was his Alma Mater. From the life of that great institution he derived inspiration as a student and later he became more closely integrated with it as a member of the teaching staff in physics and mathematics. As the voyageurs of old had set out from Montreal in search of new horizons, so did the trail of this nation builder lead West for the development of new educational frontiers for Canada. His efforts, while associated with McGill University, led to the founding of a college in British Columbia which was later to become one of Canada's foremost institutions of higher learning, the University of British Columbia. The breadth of his spirit and the depth of his understanding linger on in the life of the University of Alberta, which he virtually founded. Countless men from all parts of Canada who served in the war of 1914-1918 are deeply in his debt for the opportunities which were made available to them through Khaki College, an educational enterprise which Dr. Tory helped to plan and fashion, and over which he presided.

It is not without great significance that the final phase of his career was spent in Canada's capital city. Wherever he went there seemed to spring up and flourish new institutions which we today regard as indispensable units in our national existence. His years in Ottawa were no exception; Carleton University and the National Research Council stand, at the focus of his country's federal life, as monuments to the stupendous and creative vitality of this man.

Of the value in another context of Dr. Tory's contribution to education in general and to science in particular, I intend to speak more fully. Before doing so, however, I am bound to conclude my personal tribute to him by saying that his benefits for Canada are lasting ones; they will be appreciated and valued by generations of Canadians, even though they may not always be aware of the giver of the great

legacy which they will be inheriting. It is, therefore, with a deep sense of humility and of gratitude that I accept the honour of giving the third of the Henry Marshall Tory lectures and of paying my tribute of respect and affection for a great citizen and, I declare proudly, a distinguished son of Nova Scotia.

It would be difficult to speak of any aspect of the intellectual, scientific or cultural life of Canada which has not been shaped or enriched by the life and work of Henry Marshall Tory. I am well aware that in speaking to you on certain matters relevant to the national life and the international relations of Canada that I shall be dealing with subjects which were far from alien to the catholic scope and the penetrating calibre of Dr. Tory's mind. A scientist by inclination, by training and by profession, he was, however, no laboratory recluse who found the measure of all things in the test tube and the galvanometer. In him were combined the intellectual integrity demanded of the scientist, together with the imagination, tolerance and ideals of the humanist. His life, his work and his outlook were integrated with the times in which he lived. Indeed, in many respects, his career represents in considerable degree a cross-section of this century's most potent trends of thought. As Dr. Johnson said of Shakespeare, "He had a comprehensive mind", and it is, therefore, not surprising that Henry Marshall Tory was concerned with, and exercised an influence upon, some of the forces which have fashioned the world as we know it, as this, the anxious decade of the nineteen fifties, draws to a close.

Science and research were the points of departure for his career, and in his leadership of the National Research Council, there was an implicit recognition of the extent to which scientific endeavours have become an intimate part of our lives as individuals and as a nation. The establishment and early years of operation of the Council under Dr. Tory's wise and careful guidance represent, too, the concern of government for, and inevitable involvement in, the affairs of science.

In more specific terms, I think that there is something almost symbolic in the close relationship, both personal and professional, which Dr. Tory enjoyed with Ernest Rutherford, later Lord Rutherford, whose work in atomic physics has become the basis for many of our hopes and many of our anxieties. In brief, Dr. Tory's career represents to me a demonstration of the extent to which science moulds our daily lives and bears upon current social, political and, indeed, international affairs.

It is tempting to affirm dogmatically that ours is the age of science, until one recalls the dangers which sophisticated historians see in the over-simplified distortion which occurs when the constant ebb and flow of human affairs

are too glibly and too neatly compartimentalized. The inaccuracies of historical designation and interpretation notwithstanding, it is indisputable that science, at least in its assumptions and conclusions, if not in the details of its equations, reaches into and permeates our lives to a degree that pure reason never achieved in the 18th century, any more than the restless spirit of discovery inspired whole populations in the age of the first Elizabeth. In harmony with the social changes which have transformed our thinking since the ages to which I have referred, the spirit of our own era is a more broadly based one reflecting more accurately the consciousness, the concerns and the outlook of the majority of the people.

As seen in terms of our daily lives, the mass impact of science has given us a standard of living which would have been almost inconceivable not so many years ago, and which shows every sign of improving year by year. At the governmental level, however, it is not so easy to take such a melioristic or modified Leibnizian view of the possibilities which have been opened up by science. On the one hand, technological advances have made it possible for governments to undertake national development programmes which, fifty years ago, would have been dismissed as fantastic. Parenthetically, I might observe that one of the most remarkable concomitants of the rapid scientific advances over the past century has been in the speed with which the fantasies of one era have passed into the commonplace realities of a subsequent generation. Jules Verne, except in his most fanciful moments, is really old straw today, and what is more astonishing, Buck Rogers is fast becoming so, with every new press despatch datelined Cape Canaveral.

My reference to a launching site is not inadvertent; it is intended to illustrate the other side of the mataphorical coin that I referred to in observing that the development of science and the increasing involvement of government in scientific matters does not present a prospect which is entirely optimistic. It is tragically symptomatic of the paradoxical conditions to which we are becoming numbly accustomed that the first fruits of man's scientific achievements in the nuclear sphere should have been used for the obliteration of two populous cities. The orderly disorder of the natural world, which man at last, in large measure, has been able to apprehend, appears to have no counterpart in man's conduct of his international responsibilities. Indeed, it would be hardly exaggeration to declare that our enormous strides forward in scientific ventures and in technical skills have been more or less by-products of the progressively destructive savagery of nations and of national groups, one against another. The conquest of the air, greatly accelerated by the First World War, has been accompanied by the almost unbelievable achievements in technology in the two decades since the beginning of World War II. In consequence of forced-draft technology and following that example of man's chaotic conduct of his

international relations, a beginning has been made in the conquest of space, and an end has been put to the relatively harmless weapons which man hitherto has used, whether for conquest or defence. Indeed, there is now a small minority of scientists who envisage some possibility that man's inventive genius, whether wittingly or not, may find it possible to release, by some unforeseen and appalling design and device, the limitless power of the hydrogen of the great seas, a release which some anticipate might involve cataclysmic changes in this planet, and perhaps even in other planets which share our solar system. This final catastrophe was curiously foreseen a little more than two thousand years ago by the Roman poet and philosopher, Lucretius, who toward the end of his long poem, "On the Nature of Things", after the exposition of his thesis on the atomic structure of the universe and of all that it contains, referred with gloomy foreboding to the possible dissolution of our world. He wrote as follows, about sixty or sixty-five years before Christ:

> ".... nor are atoms wanting which could by accident gather together out of infinity and overwhelm this sum of things in ungovernable tempest, or bring upon us through their blows some other frightful disaster; nor is the nature of space and the depth of infinity lacking into which the walls of this world might be dispersed."

The ungovernable tempest, adumbrated in Lucretius' speculations is now, we are assured, a possibility. The storm of human annihilation could be unleashed by accident or through oversight. More tragically, however, the ungovernable tempest could be let loose by governments. Never has the power of governments been so literally overwhelming, and in this nuclear age it is sometimes difficult to discern the dividing line between scientific procedure and high policy. I cite in this context the recent conference of scientists which was held in Geneva to determine whether an effective system for the detection of nuclear tests could be devised. The fact that more constructive results flowed from this conference than from many of the more recent political conclaves has led many persons to speculate on the possibility of substituting for the traditional formal attire of the diplomat, the white "lab" coat of the scientist. Whatever might be the objections to such a sartorial transformation, there can be no doubt that nuclear science has become and will probably remain a first principle, in fact, almost a postulate, in the formulation of foreign policy. Diplomacy was once considered an art. Today, in the task of the peacemaker, as never before in history, are blended both art and science and from these ingredients, there can be envisaged the formation of a new compound foreign policy, a new political fusion of forces in the international crucible.

If the amazing development of science over the past fifty years has had the effect of widening the horizons of diplomacy and revolutionizing the scope of the peacemakers' endeavours, so too the impact of increased educational opportunity has been felt in the formulation of foreign policy. In the context of this Henry Marshall Tory memorial lecture, I believe that it is not inappropriate that some attention be devoted to this second inter-relationship. As science and education were intimately associated in the mind and career of Dr. Tory, so too are these - shall I call them factors? trends? of modern thought - so too are they fundamental to the revolution which has taken place in diplomacy. The fact that a distinguished scientist and an inspired educator was also one of the foremost proponents of the League of Nations Society in Canada, serving in his long association with it as President for a five-year term was, I am convinced neither the result of accident nor the indulgence of a dilettantish attraction to the glamour with which the practice of foreign policy has all too erroneously become invested in the popular view. This peripheral, perhaps, but nonetheless important facet of Dr. Tory's career denotes, I suggest, an awareness on his part of the dangerous directions in which events were moving - of the frightening fissions of divisive forces, both political and scientific, which had either occurred or were in a menacing embryonic state. It also represents a groping on the part of a man of great intelligence and abiding goodwill whose career, I repeat, was symbolic of his times, towards solutions to, remedies for, and safeguards against what might have been apprehended as inexorable disaster.

If, in the widespread effects of increased educational opportunity are to be found certain elements of the solution to some of these problems, so at the same time has the acquisition of higher education on the part of more and more of our people had an effect in revolutionizing the scope of diplomacy. I hesitate to use the phrase, mass education, for in speaking of education, it is not a population's minimum level of intelligence, good taste and cultivated attitudes which I have in mind. A little knowledge is indeed a dangerous thing, and mass pressure and reasoned influence are two different things under a democratic form of government. It is rather in terms of what I have called reasoned influence that I see the greatest effect of the broadening popular base of education, on the formulation of foreign policy. That the universities have a role to play in this regard is self-evident. To this audience, I need scarcely issue a warning against a world order based on prejudice, ignorance, half-truths or mass mis-information. Throughout the centuries of Western civilization, the universities have stood as citadels of independent thought, and thereby under-girded those standards which shape the actions of individuals and nations.

One of the main effects of a system of education which is more broadly based than ever before in history is the sense of involvement in a widening world which it imparts to those who benefit from it. If the purpose of education is to broaden as well as deepen the circle of one's experience, it is inevitable that as forces and factors which were once remote become understood by more and more people, there will be a correspondingly increased popular sense of positive intellectual participation in the world of events.

Having made these observations, let me return to the second motif in the theme which I have been developing of the impact of science and education on foreign affairs. As a result of the development of a broad and deep educational system and philosophy, and as a result of the relative ease with which the enquiring mind can obtain information, public opinion is becoming better informed about the conduct of foreign affairs and ordinary citizens are becoming more aware of their own role in external relations. In a world that has become very small by improved means of transportation and communication, giving events in Djakarta, Karachi and Budapest a new sense of immediacy, it would be almost impossible for the man in the street to avoid feeling involved at least to some degree. As a result, the diplomatic exchanges across the green baize conference table can become in a matter of hours a subject of conversation at countless dinner tables throughout the world.

The development of a better informed and more articulate public opinion is a factor which any democratic government can ignore only at its peril. In a democratic society no government can venture to propose or to put into effect foreign policies which are unlikely to receive the support of the great majority of its citizens, or which may destroy the essential unity of a nation. The early governments of Western Europe did not suffer from this disability. Since the Eighteenth and indeed throughout a large part of the Nineteenth Century, decisions concerning war and peace were not considered to be matters with which the people as a whole, the great majority of them illiterate, had any concern whatsoever.

Today, the democratic governments of the Western world could not afford to adopt such a haughty indifference to the wishes of their people and, indeed, by their very nature, would have neither desire nor reason to do so. What I have termed reasoned influence plays, I emphasize, a powerful part in the formation of a government's foreign policy. In certain respects, this more immediate sensitivity to the wishes of an electorate places us at a disadvantage in the world of today because our adversaries apparently suffer from less restraint of this character upon their policies or practices. I wonder whether there is not an interesting parallel to be drawn, in so far as public opinion and foreign policy are concerned

between the contemporary authoritarian world, and the by-gone age which I have mentioned when international affairs were regarded as one of the mysteries not to be revealed except to a chosen few who, in turn, were more than content to exercise their priestly functions in the confident knowledge that their decisions, even if disastrous, would be ratified, supported or ruthlessly enforced. For the nations of the West at least, this day has long since disappeared, and our foreign policies have come to reflect more faithfully the character and wishes of a nation's people instead of only the aspirations and designs of its governors. I might add in passing, however, that I suspect that a similar process may be beginning in Eastern Europe.

In making these generalized statements, I have perhaps implied that the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is more perfect than is actually the case. We in Canada, just as citizens in other Western democracies, have a long way to go before a public, well-informed and fully conscious of its responsibilities, is competent to make wise collective judgements in vexed and complex matters, which nonetheless have the gravest consequences upon a people's well-being, or even upon their chances of survival. I understand, for example, that not long ago, a popular poll revealed that about ninety per cent of Canadian citizens of voting age supported NATO, but that only about six per cent had a reasonably clear idea of what NATO is, and of its functions. The same is probably true of Canadian public opinion regarding the United Nations. I offer another example: at the time of the Hungarian tragedy two years ago, there was widespread though ill-informed indignation that the United Nations did nothing whatsoever to prevent the re-enslavement of the Hungarian people, following their heroic rising against injustice and tyranny. It seemed to come as a surprise to many people that the United Nations has no forces whatsoever at its disposal, and that its majority decisions have, in practice, no sanction, apart from the intangible weight of world opinion, or apart from the responsibility which the great powers are disposed to assume in making effective the decisions of the United Nations.

Nonetheless, in spite of such popular misconceptions, and despite the lingering indifference to international affairs which they reflect, there has been in recent years a vast change for the better in the general acceptance by the Canadian people of the fact that a nation such as Canada must assume the grave responsibilities which invariably accompany the possession of wealth and strength. Since 1939, Canada and the Canadian people have assumed and have discharged the gravest of duties. It seems probable that our obligations in the future will be at least no less demanding, and will require for their proper conduct the full support of a well-informed and united people.

It is remarkable and grimly paradoxical to reflect that in the past century the burgeoning of science and the advancement of education - both of which attempt to discover and organize knowledge of man's physical environment and to discipline the human intellect and spirit - should have had as a concommitant a steadily increasing degree of disruption, disorganization, destruction and distrust in the conduct of international relations. The by-products of science and education have injected strong new catalysts into the formation of foreign policy. The knowledge and power - one is reminded of Bacon's dictum that "Knowledge is power" - that science has made available to governments as an instrument of policy have transformed the climate in which the relations between nation states are conducted. Similarly, large and new segments of enlightened public opinion capable of responsible and independent judgment, as I have observed, have made it mandatory for governments, where no such need was felt in earlier times, to tailor policies more closely to a democratic social and political pattern. The anxious uncertainties and indeed the chaos in the contemporary world order represent in my view the failure of national governments to come to grips in an adequate fashion with the problems created by these fundamental changes. The traditional techniques of diplomacy are proving inadequate to meet the challenges facing us, and as the climate of international relations has been fundamentally altered, so too have the techniques of diplomacy undergone change. It is on some of these changes, as they affect the current shaping and execution of Canadian foreign policy that I now desire to comment.

At the risk of dwelling on the familiar and the commonplace, may I remind you of certain purposes and practices in the conduct of a nation's international affairs - purposes and practices which until our own time have not appreciably changed in their essential nature over the course of the last two centuries. In general, and in brief, the purposes of diplomacy have been to ensure the nation's security, to enlarge its commerce and hence its wealth, to ehhance its prestige in a wide variety of cultural affairs, to protect the interests of its own nationals in foreign countries and, in short, in the words of the fine old drinking song "to keep foes out and let friends in". To achieve these ends, elaborate channels of diplomatic communication and rigid rules of protocol were devised. When these failed, a war may have resulted. Such conflicts were, by our standards, limited and perhaps inconsequential in nature and in area, but with the passing of time, they have become progressively more extensive and dangerous, and it is as a result of this succession of breakdowns that the peacemakers have been forced to devise more adequate procedures. Imperfect though some of these techniques may be, they can be counted as steps in the right direction and although any one of them in isolation is doubtless inadequate for the enormous tasks confronting us, I do believe that progress has been made.

But let me first assure you that such progress has been halting, hesitant and fraught with difficulties. Indeed, as the process of revising our methods continues, it would seem that the difficulties to be overcome only proliferate. Let me cite only the example of terminology. The diplomatists' task is difficult enough when governments disagree over policy, but when the same governments disagree in their semantics, the task of negotiation sometimes tends to assume the nightmarish proportions of Orwellian double-think. Upon words and ideas which we had thought were long familiar to us and which for centuries had been used for what we supposed to be a fairly precise means of communication between man and man or nation and nation have been super-imposed, novel and not infrequently contradictory meanings. "Liberty", which throughout Western history has hitherto denoted something reasonably pointed and clear, now seems to have acquired a variety of new connotations, including the liberty of citizens to do promptly and exactly what they are told to do, and the liberty of writers, artists and scientists to write or to compose or to discover whatever may be required of them. Nations which venture to ally themselves together for protection against the perils of unannounced and unprovoked assault have somehow come to be described as bloodthirsty imperialists. It is indeed a confusing world in which we live; and it is often against this incomprehensible background of semantic confusion that we must now attempt to construct, in an atmosphere of mistrust, the foundations of a new world order. Confronted with difficulties of this nature, the tasks of the peacemaker have become progressively more difficult. We do not forget that the peoples of authoritarian states prefer a more democratic system; and there is no doubt that the Russian people in 1917 desired a more liberal dispensation than they were vouchsafed by destiny. It is encouraging to know that authoritarian régimes must retain the language of democracy, in order to appeal to the inherited predispositions of their people, but this knowledge is of relatively little immediate help to the negotiator.

At the time of the First World War, Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, remarked that "in time of war the first casualty is always the truth". To up-date this wise observation, to give it a more contemporary relevance, it could be claimed that in the period of cold war and constant tension and gnawing anxiety which have prevailed since 1946, the most significant casualty has been the clear and considered use of language as a means of reaching understanding and agreement.

These semantic difficulties reflect - and I am not sure whether they do not contribute substantially to - the increasingly rigid positions taken by the two contending power groups at the present time. Backed by the threat on either side of unlimited and catastrophic force, the resulting

division constitutes a new and terrifying, and sometimes seemingly impossible, chasm for traditional diplomatic procedures to bridge. This difficulty with which diplomacy is now faced has been well expressed at the beginning of chapter seven of Henry Kissinger's "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" published in 1957, which has stimulated a great deal of new thinking, and has, therefore, and naturally, aroused also a great deal of controversy. Mr. Kissinger writes:

> "It may seem like a paradox to ask diplomacy that it rescue mankind from the horrors of a thermonuclear holocaust by devising a framework of war limitation. How can there be an agreement on the limitation of war when all negotiations with the Kremlin have proved that the two sides have rarely been able to agree even on what constitutes a reasonable demand?"

A little later in his book, Mr. Kissinger points out that no state is prepared to negotiate about its own survival, and that no nation is prepared to abandon safeguards which it considers essential to its own survival, merely for the sake of maintaining an uneasy harmony in international affairs.

To quote further from another of my principal authorities (I am now, of course, referring to a statement I myself made during the disarmament debate at the United Nations a year ago):

> ".... our debate in this Assembly is not merely about disarmament, but about human survival. We have yet to prove that we are capable of the radical adjustment in our thinking which the modern age demands. We are still using the outworn vocabulary of international rivalry in the age of intercontinental missiles and the beginning of venture into outer space."

I have attempted to illustrate the sweeping changes which have taken place in the climate which colours contemporary international relations. I have also mentioned the fact that these changes, because they affect the assumptions on which a foreign policy is based, have necessitated some far-reaching revisions in the classical conceptions of diplomatic procedure. Nowhere are these specific changes more evident than in the position and functions of ambassadors, the professional practitioners of the diplomatic craft.

In the halcyon days of diplomacy, before the advent of the vast changes which I have described, an Ambassador abroad was entrusted with what seems to us now an extraordinary freedom of action and power of negotiation. His reports or requests for instructions to his Foreign Office at home were thoughtfully drafted and beautifully written in the sure knowledge that he would receive no reply, if he ever did get one, for many weeks to come. Nowadays, of course, this has

all changed. A communication drafted in the East Block at Ottawa at lunch time can, with relative ease, be presented to the State Department in Washington later in that same afternoon. A careless remark or a provocative speech in any capital can be distributed throughout the world at the speed of light. Whereas in the life of the Nineteenth Century diplomatists there was time for sober second thoughts and alternative solutions, there is now little or no impediment to the rapid interchange of international courtesies and discourtesies. Improved means of communication have drawn the frontiers of diplomatic negotiation closer to the metropolitan centres of decision, and as a result the sphere of independent authority of a diplomatic representative, as well as his scope for initiative have been drastically limited.

But increased networks of communication have facilitated not only the transmission of words; accelerated means of transportation have enabled foreign ministers and foreign secretaries to move about and around the globe at short notice for direct and personal conversations with their counterparts elsewhere in the world. That these innovations have their advantages I would be the first to admit. I am convinced that in many instances a person to person encounter is worth an entire archive of elegantly phrased messages. At the same time there can be no doubt that in diplomacy, speed is not an unmixed blessing and in this sphere more than almost in any any other, precipitant action without careful thought, appraisal and re-appraisal, whether agonizing or not, must be avoided. The spirit of calm, unfortunately, is rapidly disappearing from diplomacy, if it has not already vanished entirely. Thanks to rapid telegraphic communication, lights burn late in foreign office around the world as Mr. Khrushchev's cocktail comments are decyphered and interpreted for the post-breakdfast edification of higher officials and ministers. On-the-spot negotiations are, nowadays, frequently conducted through the medium of simultaneous translation which, while undoubtedly accelerating the rate at which comments can be exchanged, also imposes a kind of psychological obligation on the negotiator to reply without delay. It is therefore little wonder that negotiators in self-defence sometimes come to the conference table with rigidly fixed positions which they enunciate under conditions of simultaneous provocation. The aircraft too makes possible for a Foreign Minister in a week an itinerary which would have dumbfounded the participants in the glittering Congress of Vienna; it also seriously curtails his meditative and contemplative functions. He is too frequently up in the air and moving from personal encounter to personal encounter to get his feet under his desk for sufficiently long and undisturbed periods to devote to policy decisions the calm and deliberate thought which they require. Improved means of communication and transportation - and I return to an earlier

theme to remind you that the two are by-products of science - have imparted to diplomacy a hectic air and a sense of urgency which sometimes make it difficult for the diplomatist to play the role which has, traditionally been his.

There are, however, today, as compared with the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century, more important changes in the conduct of a nation's international relations than in the role assigned to its diplomatic representatives, be they third secretaries, ambassadors or foreign ministers. Just as the ambassadors of an earlier period possessed a much greater freedom of action than they now have, so too it seems to me that the individual states which they represented practised a diplomacy which was much more independent of other nations. There have been, of course, throughout history, numerous alliances frequently changing in composition since most states were vitally interested in making sure that if war could not be avoided, they could at least manage to emerge on the side of the winning international grouping. But such groupings were a far different expression of a nation's foreign policy than the type of alliance which has been emerging in more recent years. There is nothing in history to compare with the present North Atlantic Treaty Organization by which fifteen states have agreed in large measure to pool their military resources and to regard an assault on any one of them as an assault on them all.

In short, what has been happening is simply this: national governments faced with international problems of new and dangerous dimensions have recognized the need for, and they have developed channels of, consultation and co-operation which, had they been proposed a century or even a half century ago would have been regarded as an intolerable infringement upon the almost sacred principle of sovereignty. We have come, perhaps too slowly, to the conclusion that given the facts of our new international life, the decisions which we as nations are called upon to make cannot be made by one man as the ambassadors of an earlier era might have done, or even by one government within whose power, however, responsibility for these decisions still resides. The day may not be too far distant when we shall be ready to transfer much or all of this responsibility to supra-national authorities. I pass over this idea without comment and interject it here only as a possibility, the advantages and disadvantages of which must be carefully weighed as future circumstances may require. In the meantime, however, there has been on the part of national governments a willingness and indeed an eager readiness to discuss and co-ordinate with friendly powers, measures of foreign policy on problems of common interest and concern. This pehnomenon, new in the degree of intimacy of exchange, I have designated as <u>fusion</u> in the title of these lectures. In it the peacemaker must find the most effective counterpoise to the fissions, both atomic and political, which have so disturbed the world order of the independent and isolated nation-state.

NATO is one of the best examples of coalescence in foreign policy. I imagine that many Canadians, remembering well the essentially isolationist attitude of Canada throughout the nineteen thirties, are still somewhat astonished, and I think some of them may well be perturbed, that Canada, along with its allies, has undertaken to defend with force the independence, let us say, of Greece and of Turkey. Canada, together with its allies in NATO, through bitter experience, has come to realize that safety cannot be assured by a policy of non-commitment. Through the understanding among NATO's members that consultation among them should precede any action by one of them which is likely to affect seriously the circumstances of the others, it is clear that Canada has undoubtedly given up some measure of its complete freedom of action in international affairs as the price to be paid to ensure a greater measure of security.

Similarly, our commitments to the United Nations require, among other things, that we abandon force as an instrument of national policies and in a sense oblige us, if ever this should become possible in actual practice, to provide armed forces to assert and to enforce the authority of the United Nations against an aggressor. In accepting these obligations, we have showed our willingness to abandon a further measure of complete independence in international affairs to ensure a collective security, rather than to rely entirely upon our own resources which, we realize, are entirely inadequate for our defence in this period. We in Canada have gone through a remarkable revolution in our attitude toward international relations generally in the course of only about twenty years.

I have been discussing the principal difference between the present day and the traditional conduct of a nation's foreign policy and I have mentioned our participation in the work of NATO and the United Nations to illustrate my thesis that in the earlier diplomatic world a nation such as Canada was much more at liberty to go its own way than could now possibly be the case. There are, however, other special relationships for Canada which have come to exercise an important influence on our foreign relations, and while these influences could not accurately be described as restraints or limitations, they are nonetheless significant ingredients in the amalgam of Canadian foreign policy in a world grown too small for independent action or, at least, action which is initiated without due thought being given to any more than the most immediate national consequences.

In developing Canadian foreign policy, the Commonwealth, for example, provides the most effective and most amicable means of communication between the Western world, Southeast Asia and Africa. In this context it is well that we should remind ourselves that the white,

English-speaking members of the Commonwealth are now in a very small minority among the association's total membership. From our fellow Commonwealth members we may, and frequently do, differ as only a cursory glance over the record of a vote on almost any issue at the United Nations will show. But while we may differ on specific issues, there are certain underlying questions on which we are not divided and this basic agreement on ideals and purposes constitutes the cement of Commonwealth relationships. The fact that these relationships are ill-defined in no way reduces their effectiveness and, indeed, a case could be made out to prove that the lack of a formal constitution and common institutions really strengthens the Commonwealth as an effective means of communicating with other nations, whether within or outside the Commonwealth, nations whose views and policies we must take into account, as they must ours, in a realistic approach to the problems of the international community in which we live.

Thus far I have concentrated attention on the factors and forces from overseas which exert a modifying effect on any tendencies we may have shown in earlier decades towards a foreign policy of freedom of action, with no commitments and no involvements. Let us now look at the continent of North America. Whether some of us like it or not, it is inevitable and inescapable that one of the strongest single influences upon our international action stems from the presence of our neighbour, the United States. By reason of the obvious facts of geography, of economic inter-dependence and of social and cultural parallels, there must emerge the clear conclusion that as far as can be seen at the present time, it would be difficult to conceive of a Canadian foreign policy which on any vital point of issue would be violently opposed to that of the United States. As in our relationship with Commonwealth nations we may differ but for the sake of the United States no less than for our own, and for the sake of the rest of the world, it is ardently hoped that the United States and Canada will never be hostile to one another. Our differences, of course, do not in any way prejudice our right and indeed our obligation to influence, to persuade or even to protest, whether publicly or in the quiet of diplomatic discussions, any action of the United States which would affect any vital Canadian interest, or endanger world peace.

From all of these factors - our relationships with NATO, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the United States - our foreign policy has been compounded. We have come a long way from the days in which Canada longed for the isolationist haven of no commitments and no involvements, the days in which we had, in fact, no foreign policy at all. The same sort of transformation, I maintain, has been wrought in the international orientations of the nations of the

Western world. From the era of free-wheeling independence in foreign policy we have recognized the need for and moved towards a greater degree of inter-dependence. A fusion has taken place, making foreign policy a more comprehensive undertaking. Watching this phenomenon, however, the haunting question cannot but come to our minds: Has the fusion been sufficiently great or adequate in nature to counterbalance the fissions which have revolutionized the international community? If the answer could be in the negative, let me remind you of some of the difficulties which democratic governments face in effecting a transformation of this order.

The inherent slowness of democratic government to act is at once their strength in domestic affairs where swift and precipitant action is often arbitrary and unjust, and their weakness in international relations, where speed of decision is coming more and more, as a matter of survival, to be an imperative requirement. The combined resources of the Western world are indeed vast; but we have now seen on three desperately perilous occasions, in 1914, in 1939 and in December of 1941, following Pearl Harbour, how agonizingly long a time is needed for their mobilization and deployment. And when we had finished with the Kaiser and his General Staff, and when we had destroyed Hitler's fascist formations, how eager we were to believe that the world was now safe, and that sensible men could now go about their reasonable tasks; and how readily and how speedily we disbanded our armies, and scrapped our armaments. When confronted with the urgent threat or the even more urgent reality of war, the democracies, given time, have proven themselves invincible; but with the coming of peace, which as a reasonable and sanguine people we trust will be permanent or of long duration, we are constitutionally incapable of perpetuating our enmities, or of remaining armed to the teeth when no enemy is immediately in view. When confronted with an imminent peril, our governments are prepared to impose and our peoples are ready to accept, almost any dimunition of traditional liberties, and almost any device of the totalitarian states, and these devices, it has been our experience, we can apply more effectively than they; but only if we have the time to do it.

Democracy's apparently built-in inertia is, however, in so far as decisive diplomatic action is concerned, a problem which has its roots deep in our own political and cultural heritage. There are for us, certain cherished values and ideals which we are not prepared to sacrifice - we may suspend their applicability in times of crisis but we cannot approve their permanent submergence - simply to facilitate an accelerated diplomatic reaction time.

There is another difficulty - the over-riding need for constant and vigorous re-thinking of our international position, the need for new ideas, new insights and new interpretations. I might observe here that this is a traditional requirement for the diplomat, but in the light of the impact on foreign policy of ever-widening educational opportunities and the emergence of better-informed public opinion, it has come to acquire a special importance for the peacemakers of the contemporary world.

I have attempted to outline some of the complexities and the variety of considerations which must be fused into policies and courses of action by democratic governments. Preceding policy decisions, however, is the need to develop an informed and accurate collective view of the nature of the problem or challenge which confronts the West. This involves a continuing diplomatic assignment and imposes the obligation to keep our assessment of the problem realistic, up-to-date and fresh. This is not, I reiterate, a new task; it is the one aspect of diplomacy which has altered perhaps least throughout the period of sweeping changes that I have been discussing. What is new, however, is its complexity and its urgency in an international scene where power is no longer diffused and balanced among groups of nations but has become, in effect, polarized in new titanic contenders, one of which is, of course, the Soviet bloc. The task of accurate assessment becomes more difficult where a group of nations such as the members of NATO are confronted by the enigmatic problems posed by the Soviet bloc, where the cultural gap between the different societies to which the power polarization corresponds has made it difficult to know and to understand one another, and where this latter difficulty, serious in itself, has been compounded by the deliberate isolationism which has surrounded the development of Soviet society.

It is with this lack of basic understanding and the difficulties in making accurate assessments of Soviet intentions, whether political, military, or commercial, as they affect the policy of the West in seeking an accommodation with the Soviet Union, that I intend to deal in my second and concluding lecture tomorrow evening.

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