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The Guide to
Canadian Policies
on Arms Control,
Disarmament,
Defence and
Conflict Resolution

The Guide

1991

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TO CANADIAN POLICIES

ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,

DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1991

by

Jane Boulden

David Cox

Dept. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

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
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PREFACE

The Guide 1991 reviews major developments in the field of international peace and security from August 1990 to mid-August 1991, and surveys Canadian political statements and parliamentary debates on these issues.


This annual *Guide* is intended to be a user-friendly reference book for students, speakers, commentators and analysts who require reliable, factual information on recent Canadian participation and debate in the turbulent field of international affairs. This is the sixth annual issue of this publication and some of the material has been cumulative in previous years. This year, our writers have reduced the size of *The Guide 1991*, and refer readers to last year's edition if more background information is required.

The Guide 1991 contains a lengthy entry on the second Persian Gulf War which broke out as last year's *Guide* went to press. There is also a new entry dealing with arms control in the Middle East at a time when hopes have been raised for a Middle East peace conference. Section III of *The Guide*, dealing with conflict resolution, also contains an entry on Israel and the occupied territories as the whole Middle East region boomeranged back into the headlines in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. An entry on Yugoslavia gives an account of the tumultuous events taking place in its six republics.

A new section in *The Guide* deals with institutions reflecting the importance for Canada internationally of the CSCE, and Canada's involvements with its Pacific neighbours and those to the south.

While there is obvious value to an annual review and reference source, the whirlwind pace of international change in recent years inevitably means that its coverage must be interrupted at some crucial point. This year at the time of writing, the Soviet Union is in turmoil after an attempted coup, and the direction of the Union and its constituent parts hangs in the balance. These events and their sequel will be covered in next year's edition of *The Guide*.

Canadian interests and values are deeply engaged in the changes of this volatile world. Moreover, instantaneous global communication has brought such events to the living rooms of every Canadian and has increased broad public interest in them. We believe that this may deepen and widen reflection about effective Canadian roles in strengthening international peace and security. This *Guide* can contribute by enabling readers to set a clear context for recent events in international affairs, trace their evolution, and look critically at Canada's participation and potential roles.



Bernard Wood
Chief Executive Officer

INTRODUCTION

The Guide is designed as a reference to current Canadian policies in the field of international peace and security. It is divided into four sections: *ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*, *DEFENCE*, *CONFLICT RESOLUTION*, and *INSTITUTIONS*. Within these sections, individual entries are organized under the headings *BACKGROUND*, *CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY*, and *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*. A final section, *FACTS AND FIGURES*, provides basic data related to Canadian policy.

The *BACKGROUND* section provides the international context for Canadian policy, and may also incorporate Canadian policy prior to the year under review where this is appropriate. *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials. *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT* is intended primarily to reflect the responses of the opposition parties, and, for the most part, draws upon statements by designated party spokespersons. At the end of each entry, a selected list of current references and background readings is provided. This list is not comprehensive: in conjunction with the footnoted references to Canadian policy statements and documents, it is intended to guide the interested reader to further sources of information.

Some of the individual entries necessarily overlap. For this reason, and in order to avoid duplication, the *CROSS REFERENCES* at the end of each section may provide important additional information on the entry in question. In particular, readers may wish to be aware that, in addition to the data on peacekeeping in *FACTS AND FIGURES*, Canadian policies on peacekeeping operations are described in the individual entries of the *CONFLICT RESOLUTION* section. The lengthy entry on the Gulf War is also complemented by the entry on Israel and the Occupied Territories.

The 1991 *Guide* covers the period from the beginning of August 1990 to the middle of August 1991. It begins, therefore, with the international crisis triggered by the invasion of Kuwait, and ends before the tumultuous events caused by the aborted coup in the Soviet Union seemed set to dominate the international agenda of the coming year.

It would not be possible to cover such a great span of events and to complete *The Guide* in a timely manner without the concerted support of the staff of the Institute. In particular, we wish to thank the library staff for their unfailing assistance, and Veronica Baruffati for managing the publication. Institute staff members read individual entries and provided useful and timely comments and suggestions. Veronica Baruffati and Hélène Samson respectively copy-edited the English and French versions of *The Guide*. Veronica Suarez was responsible for the final inputting and formatting of *The Guide* entries.

Jane Boulden and David Cox
Kingston, Ontario
August 1991

SECTION I -- ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. ARMS TRANSFERS

BACKGROUND

Post-war efforts to seek agreement on the limitation or regulation of arms transfers have been limited. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which consists of the NATO countries minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia, has been effective in controlling exports to communist countries. Broader efforts to create regional or multilateral controls on arms transfers, however, have until recently received little support. After a number of unsuccessful resolutions in the UN General Assembly, in 1988, a Colombian initiative co-sponsored by Canada, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of members on the question of international arms transfers, and thereafter to carry out a study, with the assistance of governmental experts, on means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers. As a consequence of this resolution, the Secretary-General established the Group of Governmental Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency, which is expected to submit its report to the Secretary-General during the fall 1991 session of the General Assembly.

According to figures published in May 1991 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the global value of trade in major conventional weapons fell in 1990, declining approximately 35 percent from 1989 levels to an aggregate value of approximately US \$21.7 billion. According to the SIPRI Yearbook, 55 percent of arms deliveries were to Third World countries. The United States and the Soviet Union accounted for 69 percent of the value of the total trade, with the United States increasing its share from 34 percent in 1989 to 40 percent on 1990, while the Soviet share dropped from 37 percent in 1989 to 29 percent in 1990. In June 1991, a study released by the Office of Technology Assessment, an agency created to undertake independent studies for the US Congress, found that in 1988 (the last year in which figures were available), the United States exported US \$14.3 billion worth of weapons, three times more than the combined total of all other NATO countries. In the same year, the United States transferred to foreign countries production technology for seventy major weapons systems. According to Ruth Leger Sivard's *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*, from 1969 to 1988, five of the top ten arms importers were countries in the Middle East.

These figures, which might otherwise have passed with little political notice, were thrown into sharp relief by the Gulf War. The 1991 SIPRI Yearbook calculated that during the 1980s, Iraq imported US \$27.369 billion worth of weapons, 55 percent of which came from the USSR, 19 percent from France, and 8 percent from China. Although the United States was not a leading arms supplier to Iraq, a report presented to Congress by the Commerce Department on 11 March 1991 listed licences approved for sales to Iraq by the US Administration between 1985 and 1990. The total value of the

goods licensed was US \$1.5 billion, of which US \$500 million were delivered. Despite this comparatively small amount, in the aftermath of the war, the militarily high-tech character of many of these transactions has led Congressional critics to charge that the Bush Administration adopted a permissive weapons export policy towards Iraq until just before Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

Together, the five permanent members of the Security Council supply approximately 90 percent of the arms trade. With the partial exception of China, since the Gulf War, all have made or supported proposals for curbs on arms transfers. Several weeks after the Canadian Government proposed a summit meeting on weapons of mass destruction and the arms trade, at a news conference in Ottawa, President Bush gave only faint support to this proposal and emphasized that the United States did not intend to cease weapons sales to Middle East countries. Four days later, on 19 March 1991, in prepared testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney spoke of the need, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, "for tighter arms transfer and proliferation controls. Those responsible for violations of such control should be held strictly accountable."¹ At the same time, he and other Administration spokesmen made clear that controls on transfers would not preclude arms sales to US allies in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Shortly after these somewhat ambivalent statements from the Bush Administration, on 8 April 1991, British Prime Minister John Major called for the establishment of a universal register of arms sales to be supervised by the United Nations. Major received the support of the European Community for this proposal, and promised to pursue the initiative with other members of the Security Council. The British Government also indicated that it would seek to place the initiative on the agenda of the G-7 London meeting of the leading industrialized countries.

On 29 May 1991, in a noticeable change of emphasis, President Bush made a series of proposals for halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East which included a request to the major weapons suppliers to exercise "collective self restraint." Bush called for "a general code of responsible arms transfers" to include avoiding the transfer of "destabilizing" weapons and "effective domestic export controls on the end-use of arms or other items to be transferred." The suppliers would establish a mechanism for consultation to notify one another in advance of "certain arms sales," provide one another with annual reports on transfers, and meet regularly for consultative purposes.² He then proposed that the Permanent Members of the Security Council, Britain, China, France the Soviet Union and the United States, meet in Paris to discuss the

¹US Embassy. "Tighter Arms Transfer, Proliferation Controls Needed," *Text*, 91-20, 21 March 1991: 5.

²US Embassy. "Middle East Arms Control Initiative," *Backgrounder*, 91-39, 30 May 1991.

subject, including which weapons should be limited. Despite this more positive response to arms transfer transparency, the Bush Administration maintained its position that arms sales to allies and friendly states would continue as normal. In the weeks following the Bush speech of 29 May, the Administration announced the transfer of US \$2.5 billion in weapons and technical assistance to Middle East countries.

Immediately following President Bush's speech, at the close of a bilateral Franco-German summit in Lille on 31 May 1991, President Mitterrand proposed a sweeping new global arms control and disarmament programme which would include curbs on arms transfers and measures to create transparency. Mitterrand also said that the proposals would be presented to the permanent members of the Security Council. With the London meeting of the industrialized countries now emerging as an important venue for the discussions of arms transfers, in late May, Japan also called for greater transparency in the conventional arms trade. Speaking to a UN Disarmament meeting in Kyoto, Prime Minister Kaifu promised to submit a draft resolution to the autumn 1991 meeting of the UN General Assembly calling for improved levels of candour in the international trade in conventional arms. Kaifu said that Japan would cooperate fully with the UN to develop a framework which would allow the largest possible number of states to submit data concerning the arms trade to the UN.

Meeting in Paris on 8 and 9 July 1991, representatives of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council agreed that a comprehensive programme of arms control should be implemented in the Middle East. In addition to a number of measures relating to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the five declared their intention to observe rules of restraint in conventional weapons transfers using national control procedures and developing guidelines on this basis. They also agreed to develop procedures for consultation and the exchange of information. A group of experts will meet in September 1991 and a second plenary meeting will take place in London in October 1991.

At the end of the London Summit of the G-7, held from 15 to 17 July 1991, the participating countries published a "Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-Proliferation." The Declaration noted that many states depend on arms imports, but distinguished this from the threat to international stability caused by the accumulation of "a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self defence." The Declaration asserted that this could be prevented by the application of the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

The principle of *transparency* should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations, and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater

openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

The principle of *consultation* should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines which are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons....

The principle of *action* requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilising or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons....³

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is not a leading exporter of armaments, being a distant eighth largest in exports to the industrialized countries (with \$25 million in sales in 1990 out of a total US \$9,885 million in total sales to industrialized countries), and outside the top ten in sales to Third World countries. In a position paper released in September 1990, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs restated the basic Canadian position on arms exports. Canada exercises governmental controls over arms sales to all countries except the United States. Under the 1986 Export Controls Policy, the export of military goods and technology is "generally" denied to the following:

- countries that pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
- countries involved in or under the imminent threat of hostilities;
- countries under Security Council sanctions; and
- countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of human rights, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.

While generally not breaking any new ground, the September 1990 paper did mark an apparent shift in the Canadian approach. Previously, as for example in response to the 1986 recommendation by the Hockin-Simard Parliamentary Committee for an arms control register, the Department of External Affairs had expressed skepticism about the value of transparency and its effect on limiting transfers. The September paper commented that "[w]e believe that issues of arms transfer transparency are best addressed before issues of arms transfer control," thus appearing to envisage transparency as

³London Economic Summit 1991. *Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-Proliferation*, 15-17 July 1991.

a confidence-building measure intended as a stepping-stone to measures of actual control of international arms transfers.⁴

Towards the end of the Gulf War, on 8 February 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney and then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced a major Canadian arms control initiative. Speaking in Quebec City, Clark reviewed the events of the Gulf War and the importance of enhancing security in the area after its conclusion. He concluded:

In this belief, Canada plans to promote a world summit on instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction in the coming months. This summit would become a showcase for a new political consultation. It would aim to develop a strict plan of action that would result in the adoption by 1995 of an integrated framework of systems of non-proliferation and control of weapons, including conventional weapons.⁵

As subsequently elaborated, this ambitious proposal dealt with nuclear proliferation, the strengthening of the Missile Technology Control Regime, biological and chemical weapons and conventional arms. In respect to conventional arms, the "Programme of Action" declared:

We will urge a meeting of the major arms exporters to encourage a formal commitment to greater sensitivity to the export of conventional arms (i.e., greater transparency; constraint; consultations in situations where unusual build-ups seem to be developing).

We will advocate early action on an information exchange system regarding arms transfers, including serious examination by all states of the recommendations of the United Nations Experts Group now studying the question of transparency in arms transfers.

We will propose a commitment by the 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty to ensure that arms affected by the accord are not exported to regions of tension.⁶

The response to the Canadian proposal did not at first appear encouraging. The choice of 1995, for example, attracted negative comment since there were fears that this would entangle the renewal of the NPT in a broader and more complex set of arms control objectives. Specifically, there appeared to be little enthusiasm in Washington for the Canadian proposal. This was still the case when President Bush visited Ottawa. Asked at a joint press conference whether he supported the Canadian proposal for a world summit, Bush responded: "I'm not sure exactly what the proper structure is, but clearly

⁴Ernie Regehr. "Canada Prods United States on Arms Sales," *Arms Control Today*, June 1991: 16.

⁵Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf," *Statement*, 91/10, 8 February 1991: 7.

⁶External Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Proposal for a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991.

that idea might have some merit.... He [Mulroney] has not asked me to endorse that proposal, and again, I would like to talk to him before I commit ourselves further on it." Later in the news conference, however, after Bush had repeated the US position that it would proceed with arms sales to the Middle East which it considered appropriate, Prime Minister Mulroney interjected:

No one can fail to be struck by the irony of the fact that most of the hardware deployed in the Middle East was sold to the various factions by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This doesn't make a whole lot of sense if, on the one hand, you're trying to prevent war, on the other hand there is the propagation of war through policies in the past that have led to this kind of development. That's why Canada believes very strongly in the policies that we have put forward in regard to the control and, possibly, the elimination of these instruments of mass destruction.⁷

Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1990, Joe Clark announced that henceforth Canada would release an annual report on its exports of military goods. On 6 March 1991, the Government tabled the *First Annual Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada* in the House of Commons, emphasizing again the importance of making arms transfers and procurement as transparent as possible. The statistics in the report are based on reports of actual exports made against permits issued under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). These are then classified according to the description of munitions used in the Group Two of the Export Control List, which breaks down "munitions" into twenty-six categories ranging from small arms and machine guns to directed energy weapons systems and components. The principal limitation in this approach is that exports to the United States, which constitute approximately 75 percent of Canadian exports of military goods, are not included because export permits for Group Two (Munitions) on the Export Control List are not required for the United States.⁸

Some of the complexities involved in seeking to regulate the arms trade while supporting permitted arms exports were revealed in June 1991 when the Government introduced Bill C-6, a bill to amend the EIPA. Bill C-6 was triggered by the situation of two Canadian companies, General Motors of Canada and Diemaco Inc. of Kitchener, Ontario. Saudi Arabia had indicated that it would like to buy 1,117 light armoured vehicles from General Motors, stipulating that they be equipped with 25mm automatic cannon. Diemaco, which supplies C-7 and C-8 automatic rifles to the Canadian Armed Forces, wished to respond to an anticipated request for proposals by the Netherlands to supply the Dutch armed forces with automatic rifles, a contract valued at \$120 million. In both cases, the companies would have been prohibited from making such sales by a 1977 amendment to the Criminal

⁷United States Embassy. "U.S. Arms Sales to Israel, Saudi Arabia to Continue," (Transcript of joint news conference), *Text*, 91-19, Ottawa, 15 March 1991: 1,6.

⁸Department of External Affairs. *First Annual Report, Export of Military Goods From Canada 1990*. Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1991.

Code, which forbids the sale of automatic weapons except to the Canadian military and police forces. In contrast to other arms systems and components, therefore, which may be exported subject to the provisions of the EIPA, the Criminal Code imposed an outright ban on the export of automatic weapons.

Arguing that a complete ban on the export of automatic weapons was an anomaly, since the Group Two munitions list contained weapons far more lethal than automatic weapons, and emphasizing that Canadian companies would not be able to compete if they were completely excluded for all foreign markets, the Government proposed to amend the EIPA by creating an Automatic Weapons Firearms Country Control List which would set out the names of those countries to which Canadian manufacturers could sell. In introducing the amendments to C-6, Michael Wilson, Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, declared that the amendments

...will help place our defence industrial base on a competitive footing. They will also help Canada's overall defence capability. Canadian companies, only able to rely on domestic orders, are in danger of losing their viability.⁹

He also stated that the amendment was "fully consistent with Canada's program of action to bring greater transparency and consultation to the international trade in conventional weapons."¹⁰

The new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, commented:

I join the debate on Bill C-6 with a particular purpose in mind, and that is to respond to the suggestions that the proposed amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act are inconsistent with the arms control proposals made in February by the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark. No such inconsistency exists. Under the proposed amendments, exports of automatic weapons will be subject to the same stringent controls that have long been applied to the export of other military goods from Canada. These controls fully reflect Canada's arms control and disarmament policies.

Mrs. McDougall went on to note that:

...we are not proposing to put an end to the arms trade per se. Nor are we proposing to constrain any countries' ability to acquire arms for legitimate defence purposes. We have never suggested that defence needs should be left unmet.¹¹

⁹Minister for International Trade, "Amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act," *News Release*, no. 123, 23 May 1991.

¹⁰Minister for International Trade, "Notes for an Address to the House of Commons Debate on Second Reading, Bill C-6," *Statement*, 91/25, 30 May 1991.

¹¹Department of External Affairs, "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on Amendments to the Export and Import Act," *Statement*, 91/27, 30 May 1991:1.

1. Arms Transfers

After considerable Parliamentary opposition to the amendments was voiced, in exchange for the passage thereof, the Government promised in mid-June to suspend all further export of automatic weapons to the Middle East for a period of six months. It also undertook to support public hearings by a Commons committee in the autumn of 1991, and not to proceed with any further sales while the committee was at work. This compromise permitted both General Motors and Diemaco to pursue their respective contracts.

On 19 June 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall addressed the Berlin meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As promised in the February "Programme of Action," she made a strong appeal for a declaration on arms transfers:

I believe we all agree that this meeting in Berlin provides a timely and appropriate opportunity for us to make a political declaration on arms transfers. I am confident that we all recognize the importance of the issues and its relevance to the CSCE countries. States which are party to the CFE agreement have a special responsibility not to contribute, by transfer of armaments, to excessive build-ups of conventional arms outside the CFE area of application.¹²

In its closing statement, the Council of Ministers adopted the Canadian proposal to limit massive weapons build-ups by urging countries to make public their arms sales.

In the light of the recent experience in the Gulf region...this should be a priority of CSCE governments, and...ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues.¹³

On a number of occasions the Government expressed its keen interest in the report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency, due to be completed by the autumn of 1991. Canada is one of the few countries which is represented on the Group by a non-governmental specialist, Mr. Ernie Regehr, editor of the *Project Ploughshares Monitor*.

¹²Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for Remarks by the Honourable Barbara McDougall at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Council of Ministers Meeting," *Statement*, 91/32, 19 June 1991: 5.

¹³*Globe and Mail*, 21 June 1991: A8.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 14 March 1991, NDP critic John Brewin questioned the Prime Minister on his exchange with President Bush, suggesting that Bush had thrown "cold water" on the idea of a global summit, and asking: "Is the global summit dead? Are there alternatives that the government would have in mind if in fact the idea is a goner?" In response, Mulroney rejected this interpretation of the President's attitude, and commented:

...we began the process of examining [the global summit] last night. The Secretary of State for External Affairs met with eight heads of government, I believe, throughout the region in the last number of days. All of them believe that it had some merit. The President is going to examine it today with President Mitterrand and over the weekend with Prime Minister Major, and slowly but surely, hopefully, the idea will advance.¹⁴

On 27 March 1991, the Standing Committee on National Defence tabled its report on "The World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction." Broadly supportive of the Government's initiative, the Report recommended, *inter alia*, that an international arms transfer register be established under United Nations auspices. It then commented:

While the focus of the summit is global, the Committee wishes to suggest that the pursuit of this overarching interest might well be served by an initial emphasis on regional agreements. It is here that Canada has comparative advantages that should be put to good use.... Canada is now a member of the Organization of American States and has participated in the peace process in Central America. It should also be possible for us to play a major role in sub-Saharan Africa, where we could put our links with the Commonwealth and the Francophonie to good use. We are also a Pacific nation and our interest in maintaining stability in the North Pacific should not be ignored. [The Committee recommended, therefore, that] Canada should concentrate its efforts on helping to establish regional systems of arms transfer transparency, and these efforts should be targeted toward areas of Canadian diplomatic advantage.¹⁵

The strong Parliamentary support for the Government's conventional arms initiative did not extend to the amendment to the EIPA, which was sharply criticized, in particular by the NDP. The Liberal Party did not outrightly oppose the prospective sales, but took the view that the proposed amendment was too permissive. Liberal MPs indicated that they would seek specific sub-amendments in Committee "to put limits on the list of countries that can buy weapons from Canada and to oblige that list and any addition to the list to be sent to a committee of this House for examination and approval."¹⁶

¹⁴Commons Debates. 14 March 1991: 18468.

¹⁵Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 63, 25-26 March 1991: 3-6.

¹⁶Commons Debates. 30 May 1991: 837.

NDP spokesman John Brewin explained that, notwithstanding the economic benefits of the proposed contracts, his Party opposed changes "permitting the import and export of automatic weapons anywhere in the world." He continued:

...the Liberal Party wants this bill moved quickly to second reading where it can receive technical amendments. The issue before the House today is the principle of this bill. We in the New Democratic Party are firmly and unalterably opposed to this bill which will permit the export of automatic weapons anywhere in the world and runs completely counter to every effort to restrain arms sales: the bane of the existence of humanity in this century.

Just as the government begins an effort or said it was beginning an effort to try to restrain sales, what is one of the first pieces of legislation it brings before the House in this session? It is a bill to permit further export of weapons around the world by Canada.¹⁷

During the course of the Commons debates, Michael Wilson clarified the status of Saudi Arabia in relation to the proposed amendments. In introducing the Bill he noted that the new Automatic Firearms Country Control List would include only countries with which Canada has "an intergovernmental defence research development and production agreement." Asked whether such an agreement existed with Saudi Arabia, he replied: "...we have not completed an arrangement with Saudi Arabia. That would have to be completed before exports would be provided for."¹⁸

¹⁷*Commons Debates*. 30 May 1991: 793.

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1. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

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2. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BACKGROUND

The use of chemical weapons during World War I led the international community to develop ways of prohibiting their use and development. In the period after World War I, these efforts took place at the League of Nations. In 1925, at a meeting intended to develop ways of controlling the international arms trade, a US proposal to ban exports of chemical weapons led to the creation of the Geneva Protocol¹ which banned the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. As of 1 January 1990, there were 125 parties to the Geneva Protocol.

The Geneva Protocol remains the primary international legislation on chemical weapons. However, its limitations have been clear since it was first signed. While the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war, it does nothing to prohibit the development, production, transfer or stockpiling of such weapons. Efforts at the League of Nations after 1925 to expand chemical weapons limitations collapsed with the failure of the League in the 1930s. In the wake of the use of nuclear weapons, after World War II efforts to limit chemical weapons took a back seat to negotiations on atomic weapons.

It was not until 1968 that official international efforts began again, this time under the auspices of the United Nations. At that time, the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons was placed on the agenda of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC). In 1971, a shift in the position of the Soviet Union opened the way for consideration of chemical weapons separately from biological weapons. Britain had originally proposed this separation in 1968, but the idea was strongly opposed by the Soviet Union. By 10 April 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was open for signature.² The BWC prohibits the use, development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. As of 1 January 1991, 125 countries were parties to the Convention.

There have been two review conferences of the BWC, in 1980 and 1986. The conferences discussed ways of enhancing the convention. Issues of concern included developments made possible by new technologies such as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxin agents, and problems in verifying the convention. The second review conference in 1986 established a new arrangement which allows any signatory state to call for a meeting of an advisory group of experts if a problem arises concerning the application of the BWC. As well, signatories were required to begin work to reduce ambiguities and improve

¹The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, May 1925.

²The Convention on the Prohibition, Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 26 March 1972.

international cooperation. Following this, an exchange of information on research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases began in the autumn of 1987 and has continued annually. A third review conference is scheduled for the autumn of 1991.

The early success of the Biological Weapons Convention did not influence the negotiations on chemical weapons. In spite of continued work through the 1970s at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it was not until the early to mid-1980s that the goal of a convention completely banning chemical weapons appeared within reach. In 1982 and 1984, the Soviet Union and the US respectively, tabled draft treaties for a chemical weapons convention.

In 1985, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to initiate bilateral discussions on chemical weapons limits, in addition to the ongoing work at the CD. Since then, considerable progress towards a complete treaty has been made. However, while important advances have been achieved, there have been worrying developments on the international scene, including allegations that chemical weapons have been used. Since 1980, the UN Secretary-General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988, Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons -- this time against its own Kurdish population. On 26 April 1988, the UN Secretary-General presented a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action. Both Iran and Iraq are signatories of the Geneva Protocol.

Allegations have also been made about the intentions of Libya. In 1988, the US announced that Libya was building a chemical warfare complex at Rabta, about eighty kilometres southwest of Tripoli. Although Libya denied the charges, US accusations and presentation of evidence continued. It also became clear that the technology used by Libya had been obtained from companies in West Germany and Japan. The issue arose again in March 1990 when a US Government spokesman announced that there was now evidence that Libya was actually producing chemical weapons. The US refused to rule out the possibility that it might undertake a military operation in order to destroy the facility in question.

Prompted by the negative impact of such events, an international conference of 149 states was held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989. During the conference, twelve more states announced that they would sign the Protocol. The Final Declaration of the Conference incorporated four points: the commitment of the participants not to use chemical weapons (reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol); the necessity and urgency of concluding a chemical weapons ban; the need for states to exercise self-restraint and act responsibly until a comprehensive ban comes into force; and full

support for the UN as a forum for exercising vigilance with regard to the prohibition on chemical weapons use and, in particular, for the role of the Secretary-General in investigating alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Canada was an active participant in the conference. Canada's former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, reiterated that Canada has a firm policy of non-production of chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, acquire or stockpile chemical weapons unless they are used against the military forces or civilian population of Canada or its allies.

Although the conference was considered a success, some countries charged Western nations with maintaining a double standard by trying to halt the proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World, while at the same time maintaining, and continuing to develop chemical weapons themselves. Some Arab states maintained that as long as Israel possessed a presumed nuclear capability, they had the right to possess chemical weapons.

In June 1990, the bilateral discussions between the US and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons resulted in an agreement to begin exchanging and verifying data on their respective chemical weapons capabilities prior to the completion of the chemical weapons convention. As well, on 1 June 1990, the two completed a formal agreement which requires them to cease production of chemical weapons and destroy their chemical weapons stocks over a ten-year period, reaching an agreed level of 5,000 agent tonnes by the end of 2002. Destruction must begin by the end of 1992. Within eight years after a convention enters into force, the two pledge to have reached a level of 500 tonnes each (destroying 98 percent of their stocks).

Perhaps most important has been the effect of the Persian Gulf war. The war against Iraq by the UN multinational coalition raised, for the first time in many years, the spectre of wide-scale use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. As UN sanctions and then war began, it was known that Iraq had a chemical weapons capability and possibly biological weapons. It was also known that Iraq had used chemical weapons in its war against Iran as well as against its own population. These factors made clear both the need to complete and implement a global chemical weapons ban and the fragile nature of the process.

During the war, chemical and biological weapons facilities in Iraq were high on the priority list of targets bombed in the air campaign. In the end, chemical and biological weapons were not used

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by Iraq. However, in the aftermath of the war it was reported that Iraq used chemical weapons against segments of Iraqi population which were rising against the government.³

During 1990-1991, work on the chemical weapons convention at the CD continued. Two main obstacles to a complete agreement faced negotiators at the CD when they began their autumn 1990 session: the longstanding question of the degree of intrusiveness of inspection provisions and the desirability of maintaining a "security stockpile."

The draft treaty presented to the CD by the US in 1984 had called for "anytime-anywhere" inspection. Since then, the US and other countries have moved away from that position because of its high level of intrusiveness. It is thought that inspections on that scale might expose highly sensitive non-chemical weapon-related technology or facilities. The UK has proposed a form of "managed access" inspection which would allow inspections to go ahead but also allow the state being inspected to protect sensitive information. However, the US has been reluctant to agree to even this degree of inspection. In March 1991, the US shifted its position somewhat, bringing it more in line with the British idea, but still some distance from final agreement.

With respect to the second issue, the US had maintained that it would need to maintain a small quantity of chemical weapons (the two percent remaining after its agreed reductions, as set out in the agreement with the Soviet Union) as a security stockpile, pending a decision at that time about whether all chemical weapons-capable states had signed the convention. The US was alone in this position, unsupported by other states, and only weakly supported by the Soviet Union by virtue of their bilateral agreement.

However, on 13 May 1991, President Bush announced a major shift in the US position. According to Bush, the US was now ready to forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including in retaliation to the use of chemical weapons, once the convention enters into force. Bush also proposed that a provision stating that chemical weapons should not be used for any purpose, be included in the convention. Furthermore, the US would completely eliminate its chemical weapons within ten years after the convention enters into force, thus removing one of the most important obstacles to further progress.

The CD began a new session on 15 May 1991, and on 16 May, the US Ambassador reiterated Bush's announcement and called for the CD to go into continuous session with a goal of completing a treaty by 1992. With the removal of the security stockpile issue, the major questions still facing the

³Lardner, George Jr. and Al Kamen. "US Urged to Investigate Reports of Iraqi Gas Use," *Washington Post*, 5 April 1991: A14.

CD are primarily related to verification issues and include the degree of intrusiveness of challenge inspections and the composition of the Executive Committee. In July, the US presented a new proposal for challenge inspections. Rather than moving any closer to the British idea of managed access, the new US position provided for even less intrusive inspection than its own previous position. The new US proposal generated a regrouping of positions by other delegations.

The Persian Gulf crisis, as well as earlier events, had prompted efforts by a number of states to tighten controls on exports of chemical weapons material and technology. In December, the US approved a list of fifty chemical precursors that would be subject to controls when exported to countries where there was a proliferation concern. This list was adopted by the Australia Group, an informal group of twenty states which have sought to strengthen controls on the export of chemical weapons.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has signed and ratified both the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention and has a long tradition of supporting efforts to limit chemical and biological weapons. It has participated in the negotiations at the United Nations since they began, and over the years, the government has made a large number of important submissions to the negotiations. Canada's special interest has been in the area of verification. In 1985, it produced a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. (For further information see *The Guide 1990* and *The Guide 1989*.)

In 1988, in response to concerns raised by Canadians about research on nerve gas being undertaken at Canadian Forces Base Suffield in Alberta, the Government asked Mr. William Barton to carry out a study of the activities at Suffield. Mr. Barton's report, released in December 1988, concluded that all research, development and training activities undertaken at Suffield were for the purposes of self-defence, that this constituted the most prudent course for Canada, and that it was consistent with the international obligations undertaken by the Canadian Government.⁴ One of the products of the Barton report was the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee, made up of members of the scientific community. The Committee issued its first report on 15 August 1991, concluding that Canadian biological and chemical self-defence programmes posed no threat to public or environmental safety.

⁴William H. Barton. *Research, Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: A Review*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 December 1988.

2. Chemical and Biological Weapons

In an opening speech to the First Committee at the United Nations, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason welcomed the agreement between the US and the Soviet Union, achieved in June 1990, but noted that there was still a long way to go to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.⁵

A three-part resolution on chemical and biological weapons was adopted by consensus at the UN General Assembly. Resolution 45/57A urged the CD and all states to work towards completing the chemical weapons convention. Resolution 45/57B relates to preparations for the BWC review conference and calls on states which have not ratified or acceded to the convention to do so. Resolution 45/57C calls on all states to maintain strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol and endorses the Secretary-General's role in investigating any allegations of chemical weapons use.⁶

In recent years, Canada has undertaken a number of working papers, meetings and experiments to investigate verification issues relating to the chemical weapons convention. In August, Canada reported to the CD on a trial inspection it had carried out in July at the Merck Frosst Canada Inc. plant in Pointe-Claire, Quebec, to investigate the value and implications of procedures relating to chemical industries.⁷ Also in August, the Canadian delegation submitted a study on the size and costs of the international inspectorate that would be necessary to implement the convention.⁸

From 25 to 28 November 1990, a joint Canada-Netherlands trial challenge inspection was carried out in a Canadian Forces Base Lahr in Germany. One of the conclusions of the experiment was that sensitive information could be protected while providing inspectors with sufficient access to facilities to enable them to successfully complete their tasks.⁹

At a plenary session of the CD in August 1990, Canada's Ambassador to the negotiations, Mr. Gerald Shannon, outlined Canada's views. Ambassador Shannon stated that Canada's goal remains a "global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable" convention. However, he expressed disappointment at the lack of progress achieved during the summer and noted that a number of major

⁵Ambassador Peggy Mason. "Canadian Statement to the First Committee," *Disarmament Bulletin* 15, Winter 1990/91: 16-18.

⁶United Nations. *Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons*. Resolution 45/57, 4 December 1990.

⁷Department of External Affairs. "Preparing for a Ban on Chemical Weapons," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 23-24.

⁸Canada. *The Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Inspectorate: A Quantitative Study*. Ottawa: August 1991.

⁹Canada. CD/1052, 31 January 1991. Also: Department of External Affairs. "Canada-Netherlands Trial CW Inspection: Exercise ACID BREW," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 21.

crucial issues and difficult technical details remained to be resolved. In an implicit reference to the US position, Ambassador Shannon stated that Canada feels it is crucial to ensure the elimination of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. "To us, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the Convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion."¹⁰

In addition, for Canada effective verification means a regime that includes

...the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance.... We are convinced that if we can develop a full effective verification regime -- one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component -- we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the Convention.¹¹

With respect to the threats of possible use of chemical weapons in the Middle East, Ambassador Shannon said:

We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. ...Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations,...¹²

As a member of the Australia Group, Canada is also controlling the export of fifty chemical precursors on the list proposed by the US,¹³ and has introduced legislation to this end. Not all of the chemicals on the list are produced in Canada but the new legislation will mean that those chemicals may not be exported to Canada en route to a third country.

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, Canada proposed that a global summit of world leaders be held, under UN auspices, to issue a statement of political will on proliferation. This would be followed up by a summit in 1995 to mark the completion of the programme of action established at the first summit. As part of its initiative, Canada has made specific proposals on both chemical and biological weapons. For biological weapons, the Government notes that progress in genetic engineering has facilitated the development of biological weapons and that the BWC lacks meaningful verification provisions. Canada therefore proposes that confidence-building measures and conflict resolution

¹⁰Ambassador Gerald Shannon. "Canada Assesses CD's Progress Towards a CW Convention," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 25.

¹¹Ibid.: 26.

¹²Ibid.: 25.

¹³Department of External Affairs. "Canada Increases Chemical Controls," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 16, Spring 1991: 8.

provisions be developed at the next review conference. In addition, a special conference in 1993 should be convened to develop verification provisions.¹⁴

With respect to chemical weapons, Canada proposes that all CD member states commit themselves to completing the convention by the end of 1992, a goal later accepted by the US with its proposal that the CD enter into continuous session. Canada also proposed that the membership of the Australia Group be expanded.¹⁵

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this question during 1990-1991.

¹⁴Department of External Affairs. "Post-Hostilities Activities," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991: 4.

¹⁵*Ibid.*: 5.

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3. CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

BACKGROUND

On 19 November 1990 in Paris, twenty European states along with Canada and the US signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). The Treaty places limits on five categories of conventional weapons in Europe. It is a treaty of historic importance as it provides the first ever limits on the large numbers of weapons deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact along the East-West dividing line between the two alliances in Europe. It is also symbolic of the end to a long period of fear and mistrust between the two alliances.

Negotiations on the Treaty began on 9 March 1989 and culminated just prior to the signing of the Treaty in November. This remarkably short negotiation time reflects the degree of political change that occurred in Europe during that same period. Changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev led to new independence and new governments in most member states of the Warsaw Pact and, on 3 October 1990, East and West Germany united. With these changes came announcements of ongoing and planned withdrawals of Soviet forces and equipment from Eastern European countries. Negotiations on the CFE Treaty, therefore, worked to codify changes already in progress, as well as to establish new limits.

However, the negotiations also drew on the experience of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks which began in 1973 and continued without success until February 1989. The MBFR talks also sought to place limits on conventional forces but in a more limited geographical zone comprising East and West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The talks were plagued by a lack of political will and problems created by a fundamental difference in the approach of the two sides (see *The Guide 1986, 1987, 1988*).

The CFE Treaty consists of twenty-three articles along with eight protocols. The Treaty seeks not just to establish limits on certain categories of equipment and arms, but by doing so to reduce the capability for surprise attacks or offensive military action.

Under Article IV of the Treaty, each side is bound to an upper limit of armaments as follows:

Tanks	20,000
Artillery.	20,000
Armoured combat vehicles	30,000
Aircraft	6,800
Helicopters	2,000

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These limits refer to the entire area of application of the treaty which includes all of the European territory of states party to the treaty, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union. US and Canadian territory is not affected. Separate regional sub-limits are established for specified zones within the area of application.

In order to guard against any one state having a preponderance of the arms limited by the Treaty, no one state may possess more than approximately one third of the total arms permitted in a given category. Specific maximum levels are outlined for each category. For example, no individual state, including the US and the Soviet Union, can possess more than 13,300 tanks, 20,000 armoured combat vehicles or 13,700 artillery pieces within the zone (Article VI).

These limits will require only modest cuts in NATO tanks and helicopters, and no NATO cuts at all in the other categories. Warsaw Pact countries, however, traditionally relying on quantity to counter the qualitative advantage of NATO forces, will have to make significant cuts across the board (see Section V: FACTS AND FIGURES for details).

All reductions must be completed forty months after the treaty enters into force. The reductions are to occur in three phases. After sixteen months, twenty-five percent of the reductions must be completed, twelve months later, or twenty-eight months after the treaty enters into force, sixty percent of the reductions must be completed, and twelve months later, or forty months after the treaty enters into force, all reductions must be completed [Article VIII(4)].

The Treaty will enter into force ten days after all of the signatories to the Treaty have deposited instruments of ratification in the Netherlands. So, although the Treaty has been signed and some elements of the Treaty will be implemented (such as information exchanges), reductions will not officially begin until all states have ratified the Treaty.

Extensive verification measures have been developed to ensure compliance with the CFE Treaty. For example, detailed exchanges of information and notifications are required. The first official exchange of information occurred on 18 November, one day prior to signature of the Treaty by the heads of state. Further exchanges of information will be required thirty days after the Treaty enters into force, on 15 December every year after the Treaty enters into force, and at the end of the forty-month period of reductions.¹ The information required includes the structure and peacetime location of the command organization of land, air and air defence forces, designation and location of

¹Section VII, Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information.

units holding specified conventional armaments and equipment, and the location of designated permanent storage sites and reduction sites, all within the zone affected by the Treaty.

The Treaty outlines specific measures for the destruction of each category of weapon. With respect to aircraft and helicopters, states have the option of disarming and reconfiguring the equipment for training purposes rather than simply destroying it. Methods outlined in the Treaty must be used and the process will be monitored by inspectors.

A number of different types of inspection are available as verification methods. Inspections will be carried out to verify information exchanges and compliance with the limits established in the Treaty. Inspections will also be used to monitor the destruction of equipment and arms, and the processes used to convert aircraft and helicopters. A state cannot refuse an inspection of a declared site but a system of quotas is established in the Protocol on Inspection to ensure that no one state will be subject to an excessive number of inspections. Challenge inspections of specified areas (non-declared sites) are permitted but, in this case, the state to be inspected has the right to refuse the inspection.

A Joint Consultative Group (JCG) is established by the Treaty to provide a framework for all the states party to the Treaty to discuss ambiguous issues, questions of compliance and other questions relating to the Treaty. The JCG will meet twice each year and extra sessions will be held at the request of individual states.

The Treaty does not place limits on personnel levels or the number of troops deployed in the European area. In February 1989, the US and the Soviet Union had agreed to limit personnel to 195,000 troops each. However, this commitment was overtaken by planned Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and proposed US budget cuts calling for far fewer than 195,000 US troops in Europe. Rather than begin negotiations on new levels, in September 1990, the negotiators agreed to postpone this question in order to complete the Treaty by the November deadline. A commitment to proceed with negotiations on personnel levels and aerial inspection methods as the next stage in the CFE negotiations (known as CFE 1A) is part of the CFE Treaty. Aerial inspection is considered very important to the verification procedures for the Treaty. However, as with troop limitations, the effort to complete a treaty by November led negotiators to postpone the question. It is hoped that an agreement on these two questions will be ready for a planned summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1992. The first round of the CFE IA negotiations began ten days after the Treaty was signed, on 29 November 1990.

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In a declaration issued on the day the Treaty was signed, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to reduce its armed forces levels to 370,000. These reductions will begin once the Treaty enters into force. In a separate declaration, all of the signatories to the Treaty agree that they will not increase their peacetime authorized conventional personnel strength until the CFE 1A negotiations on the issue have been completed.

One day prior to the signing of the Treaty, the Soviet Union announced a ten-year draft plan for reductions and restructuring in Soviet armed forces, the first stage of which will involve a complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia and Germany by 1994.

Soon after the signing of the Treaty, NATO countries expressed concern about Soviet movements of large numbers of tanks and artillery out of the European zone, and therefore outside the limits of the Treaty, prior to its signing. Questions have also been raised about the validity of the data supplied by the Soviet Union in the first information exchange. In response, the Soviet Union explained that in a number of cases, the movement of equipment beyond the Ural mountains was related to unilateral Soviet reductions announced in December 1988 and still being implemented. Some of the equipment that has been moved has already been destroyed. The Soviet Union invited US experts to come to the Soviet Union to discuss this question. On the question of data, the figures supplied by the Soviet Union were much lower in some categories than had been expected by the US. Under the terms of the Treaty, there is a ninety-day grace period in which states may correct the information they submitted in the initial information exchange.

In March, a second issue became of considerable concern. The Soviet Union re-categorized three motorized rifle divisions, previously under the jurisdiction of the army, as naval "coastal defence" units and claimed that the equipment associated with these units was not limited by the Treaty. Similarly, the Soviet Union claimed that equipment held by the Strategic Rocket Forces was not subject to the terms of the Treaty. This indicated a fundamental difference in interpretation of the Treaty's terms between the Soviet Union and the other signatories. The problem prompted President Bush to send a letter to Gorbachev in an effort to find a compromise which maintained the terms of the Treaty. The question of interpretation was of such significance that it put all other arms control negotiations, especially the strategic arms negotiations on hold. After considerable high-level diplomacy throughout the month of May, US Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Secretary Bessmertnykh reached a compromise agreement on 1 June 1991.

On 14 June, in an extraordinary meeting of the Treaty signatories in Vienna, the compromise was made formal and official. In a binding statement in which the Soviet Union pledged its full compliance with the Treaty's terms, the Soviet Union also agreed to destroy or convert 14,500 of the

57,000 weapon systems that it had moved out of the Treaty zone prior to November 1990. It was agreed that the Soviet Union would maintain its disputed coastal defence and naval infantry units on the condition that these units not be expanded. It was also agreed that the equipment of the Strategic Rocket Forces would be exempt from the Treaty limits by considering them internal security forces. The other signatories gave binding declarations which accepted the Soviet pledges.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

At the signing ceremony in Paris, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the CFE Treaty on behalf of Canada. Canada has consistently supported the pursuit of an agreement limiting conventional armed forces in Europe and strongly supports the CFE Treaty. In negotiating and completing the Treaty, the Canadian delegation made a particular contribution in developing the verification and monitoring procedures.

A Government news release issued on the day the Treaty was signed stated:

The arms control provisions of CFE are unprecedented in scope. CFE makes a historically significant contribution to security and stability in Europe, to which Europeans and North Americans have aspired since the end of World War II.²

The agreement to postpone negotiation on aerial inspection measures left open the question of how such measures might complement or be complemented by an Open Skies regime (see *The Guide, 1990*). David Peel, the head of the Canadian delegation to the CFE negotiations, suggested in a statement to the CFE negotiations that Open Skies remain separate from aerial inspection measures for the CFE Treaty.³ He noted that Open Skies fulfils a confidence-building role while aerial inspection measures should be geared specifically to verifying the terms of the CFE Treaty. However, Mr. Peel went on to suggest that the order of negotiation be reversed so that Open Skies could be coordinated with the CFE aims. He stated:

Although we originally preferred parallel development of Open Skies and aerial inspection regimes, we now see a definite advantage in a sequential approach with priority being given to Open Skies.⁴

²Government of Canada. "Canada Signs Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," *News Release*, 19 November 1990.

³David Peel. "CFE and Open Skies," excerpts, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 10-11.

⁴Ibid.: 11.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On the day the Treaty was signed, Liberal member Warren Allmand asked the Government how the CFE Treaty would affect Canadian forces deployed in Europe. Mary Collins, the Associate Minister of National Defence, responded that most of the reductions required would be undertaken by Warsaw Pact members. Very few reductions would be required by NATO and "[a]lthough all the details are not known, we do not expect that it will actually affect our Canadian troops in Europe."⁵

However, Ms. Collins also stated that Canada had already made a decision to reduce its armed forces in Europe by 1,400 as part of reductions relating to cuts in the Canadian defence budget.

On 18 December 1990, Mr. Allmand pursued the question again. He also noted that the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the signing of the CFE Treaty, called into question the need for arrangements such as NORAD (see Chapter 18, NORAD). Mr. Allmand stated, as he had previously, that these developments suggested the great need for a new White Paper on Canadian defence policy.

Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, responded:

Canada welcomes the signing of the CFE Treaty. Canada will play an active role in verifying the CFE agreement. A Canadian military verification organization has been established to deal with all aspects of the Treaty. This verification regime could well become the most enduring element of a CFE Treaty and the cornerstone of a new European military security framework.⁶

During hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence on Canada's role in confidence-building and verification procedures in Europe, the CFE Treaty was occasionally discussed.⁷

⁵*Commons Debates*. 19 November 1990: 15391.

⁶*Commons Debates*. 18 December 1990: 16933.

⁷See: Standing Committee on National Defence. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 32-35, 12 and 13 December 1990.

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4. CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

BACKGROUND

At an important summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)¹ on 19 November 1990, in Paris, the thirty-four members of the CSCE signed the *Vienna Document 1990*, a new agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe. On the same day, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed by the twenty-two members of the CSCE, who are also members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The development of CSBMs began in Helsinki in 1973 when the then thirty-five members of the CSCE began negotiations on what became the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975. The Final Act dealt with three "baskets" of issues: security questions in Europe; cooperation in economics, science and technology, and the environment; and cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. In the security basket, states agreed to provide twenty-one days notice of all major military manoeuvres involving 25,000 or more troops. States also agreed that observers from other states could be invited to observe military manoeuvres. Provisions were included to enable the further development of "Confidence-Building Measures" such as these. A review conference was held in Belgrade from autumn 1977 to spring 1978 but no significant advances were made.

At the second review conference of the Helsinki Final Act, held in Madrid from November 1980 to September 1983, states agreed on a mandate for negotiations on CSBMs. The resulting negotiations were held in Stockholm between January 1984 and September 1986, under the cumbersome title of Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE). In its shortened version, the talks were also known as Conference on Disarmament in Europe, or CDE.²

These negotiations resulted in what is known as the Stockholm Document,³ in September 1986. It was concluded just as the changes in the Soviet Union were beginning to appear. Soviet agreement to a number of the provisions, and the extent of the provisions themselves, were considered an important step forward. The Stockholm Document reflects agreement in six principal areas:

¹The members include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia.

²See previous issues of *The Guide*, especially 1987, for a more detailed examination of these negotiations.

³Formally, *Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986*.

4. Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

declaratory measures; notification measures; observation; exchange of annual calendars; constraining provisions; and compliance and verification. *Inter alia*, the measures agreed to in the Stockholm Document include: forty-two days advance notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks; and a requirement that other signatories be invited to observe military manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 troops. Military activities which may not comply with Document provisions can be subjected to a challenge on-site inspection. States have the right to observe the exercise in question by ground and/or air, but no state will be required to accept more than three such inspections in one year. Each year on 15 November, states exchange calendars of military exercises planned for the next year. A one-year warning must be given of exercises involving 40,000 troops and exercises with 75,000 men or more require two years notice. Finally, states agree to refrain from the threat or use of force.

The Vienna Document builds on the Stockholm Document. The mandate for this set of CSBMs came from the third review of the CSCE in Vienna which concluded in January 1989. During the review, the idea that negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe, traditionally involving only the twenty-two members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, should be combined with CSBM negotiations involving all thirty-five members of the CSCE, was the subject of considerable discussion. In the end, it was agreed that the negotiations would remain separate but the two groups would meet periodically to keep each other informed.

The Vienna Document came into force on 1 January 1991. It is intended to build on the Stockholm Document and consequently restates its provisions. The new or improved measures included in the Vienna Document include:

- Annual exchanges of military information -- this information will be exchanged on 15 December each year and will include command organization, troop and major weapon system numbers in Europe for air, air defence, land and naval forces permanently stationed on land. In addition, information on military budgets will also be exchanged using the system established by the UN for standardized reporting of military expenditures.
- Risk reduction -- states may request explanations about unusual or unscheduled military activity, plus hazardous incidents. An explanation is required within forty-eight hours.
- Improved contacts -- exchanges, visits and contacts between military personnel, military institutions and academics are to be encouraged and facilitated. Once every five years, states with air combat units will invite other states to observe activity at an active peacetime air base.

- Information exchanges are now subject to an "evaluation visit" to ensure that the information provided was correct. One visit for every sixty military units is permitted, up to a maximum of fifteen.
- A network of direct communications between the states will be established to facilitate the transmission of messages relating to the agreement and to act as a supplement to diplomatic channels.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has been an active participant in the negotiations on CSBMs and is very supportive of the new agreement. Canada used its expertise in verification and communications to play an important role in developing provisions of the agreement relating to those questions.

At the 45th Session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored three resolutions on CSBMs. All three resolutions were passed by the General Assembly without a vote. Resolution 45/58I, co-sponsored with France, called upon states to evaluate the success of the negotiations on CSBMs in Europe. Resolution 45/58M, co-sponsored with Belgium, called upon states to consider the value of CSBMs. Resolution 45/62F, co-sponsored with Germany commended the guidelines on types of CSBMs established earlier in the year by the UN Disarmament Commission.

In speaking to the UN First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason, spoke of Canada's support for CSBMs and indicated that Canada believed CSBMs should be encouraged on other areas of tension.⁴

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The Standing Committee on National Defence held hearings during November and December 1990 on Canada's role in confidence-building and verification in Europe.⁵ During Ambassador Mason's testimony, discussion focussed on the role of CBMs at the UN and at the CSCE.⁶

⁴Ambassador P. Mason. "Canadian Statement to First Committee," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 17.

⁵See: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 30-35, 1990.

⁶Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 35, 13 December 1990.

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5. MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL

BACKGROUND

Since the crisis in the Persian Gulf there has been considerable interest in developing a regional arms control plan for the Middle East which would limit conventional arms transfers and weapons of mass destruction. In the past there have been various proposals for arms control in the Middle East including a proposal for making the region a nuclear weapon-free zone (see Chapter 10, NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES) but they have met with little success. New interest in Middle East arms control has been driven as much by the war itself as by the realization that the coalition was faced with many weapons that had been sold to Iraq by coalition members. As a result a number of the proposals that have been put forward for Middle East arms control have centered on controlling conventional arms transfers to the region (see Chapter 1, ARMS TRANSFERS).

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, Canada was the first country to propose new arms control measures. While the situation in the Middle East was key to the Canadian proposals, the proposals themselves have a global focus and do not seek to deal solely with the Middle East. Canada proposed that a world summit be held at the United Nations (UN) to establish a wide-ranging programme of arms control to be completed in time for a second summit to be held in 1995.

The Canadian proposals for the arms control programme encompass both conventional arms transfers controls and limits on weapons of mass destruction. They call for an early commitment to extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995, an expansion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention at the next review conference and a commitment to conclude the chemical weapons convention by 1992. As part of the plan, Canada also urged the major arms exporting countries to undertake a formal commitment to greater sensitivity and transparency in arms exports and proposed that the signatories to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe agree not to export their surplus arms to areas of tension.

During March and April 1991, there were increasing calls for arms control in the Middle East from countries in the region, as well as from the US and France. On 29 May 1991, after consultations with governments in the region, the US unveiled its proposal for Middle East arms control. The US proposal would involve an agreement among the five major suppliers of conventional arms, Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the US, on guidelines which would control the export of destabilizing weapons to the region while allowing exports for legitimate defence needs. Middle East states would agree to refrain from further acquisition, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles as a first step towards eliminating these missiles. The initiative also calls for a regional ban on the production and acquisition of weapon-capable nuclear material such as enriched uranium; calls on all states in the region to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and supports a nuclear weapon-free

zone as a long term goal. Similarly, all states in the region are urged to commit to joining the chemical weapons convention currently under negotiation, once it is completed. The Biological Weapons Convention will be holding a review conference in September 1991. The US proposal calls for the conference to use the opportunity to strengthen the conventions provisions.

Two days later, France announced its initiative in Middle East arms control. The French plan included similar goals on limiting weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms transfers and also included proposals for confidence-building measures intended to enhance regional security.

On 9 July 1991, after a two day meeting in Paris, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the main arms suppliers to the Middle East, agreed to seek the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to observe rules of restraint in exporting conventional arms to the region. Their final statement also encouraged countries in the region to develop their own proposals for arms control. The five countries will meet again in September and October to develop concrete measures to this end.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada supports regional arms control initiatives and is in favour of arms control in the Middle East. (For Canadian policy on arms transfers to the region see Chapter 1, ARMS TRANSFERS.) As discussed above, Canada has put forward a proposal which deals with Middle East arms control concerns, as they have been articulated since the Persian Gulf crisis, as part of a global initiative on weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms transfers. In announcing the Government's plan for a world summit, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark explained the rationale behind the Government initiative:

Over the years, ...we have all helped to create a military apparatus in this region, especially in Iraq, that is beyond human comprehension. Military assistance in the region has exceeded economic assistance. This must stop. ... To be credible, any peace plan must include strict measures to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the stockpiling of conventional weapons in the region. Multilateral negotiations have already begun regarding these crucial issues.... However, their success has been limited owing to the lack of political will or the conflicting interests of the various parties involved. It is urgent that we make further efforts to display a strong political will. In this belief, Canada plans to promote a world summit on instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction in the coming months.¹

¹Department of External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf," *Statement*, 91/10, 8 February 1991: 7-8.

In a speech to the Calgary Chamber of Commerce on 1 March 1991, Mr. Clark spoke of the difficulties inherent in trying to develop controls on arm transfers. He noted the contribution arms sales from coalition countries had made to Iraq's arsenal and the worrying trend of new supplier states.

For 45 years the search for security in the Middle East has been pursued largely through the avenue of arms. That search has failed. ...Despite billions and billions of dollars spent on arms -- what have we seen? We have seen five wars between Israel and her neighbours. We have seen Lebanon reduced to rubble. And we have this war,....[Canada's] initiatives will not, in and of themselves, address the arms trade challenge.... Action -- concerted action -- is required by others, ...but [the proposals] contribute -- and I believe they indicate our firm commitment to moving from hope to action...²

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In response to a question from Conservative member Jean-Guy Guilbault at a hearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs, Mr. Clark said that he was encouraged by international response to the Government initiative and said that Canada would now seek to develop a working group of states to continue planning.

...it is very important to have a number of countries of the South, that is to say, developing countries, so that such a conference is not perceived as something arranged by the rich nations...³

At the conclusion of its hearings on the question of a world summit, the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) issued a report on its findings. The Committee was encouraged by the Government proposal for a world summit. The Committee noted however, that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were the subject of ongoing negotiations and treaties while the trade in conventional arms was not. Given the connections between regional instability and the conventional arms trade, the Committee recommended that "...conventional weapons transfers should be a focus of particular concern for Summit participants" and stated that:

²Department of External Affairs. "Clark: We Have an Obligation to End the Mid-East Arms Race," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 16, Spring 1991: 6.

³Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991: 37.

It is not unrealistic to hope that the Summit may provide the catalyst for a broadened version of the Conventional Arms Transfers Talks (CATT) held between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977-78.⁴

The Committee went on to recommend further that one of the aims of the summit should be a formal system of arms transfer transparency, that an arms transfer registry should be established under UN auspices and that Canada should concentrate its efforts on helping to establish regional systems of arms transfer transparency.⁵ (See Chapter 1 for more details.)

⁴Standing Committee on National Defence. "Fourth Report, The World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 63, 26 March 1991: 4.

⁵*Ibid.*: 5-6.

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Arms Transfers
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

6. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

BACKGROUND

In April 1987, Canada, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the US announced that they had agreed on a coordinated policy for limiting exports of missiles and related technologies. The seven countries had been secretly negotiating the agreement, initially established through an exchange of letters, since 1983. Known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the agreement is not a formal treaty. It was prompted by growing concern about weapons proliferation in general and the proliferation of ballistic missiles in regions of tension and instability, in particular. It seeks to control technological transfers which may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems while permitting exports associated with civilian space programmes.

The MTCR affects exports of materials and technology related to missiles capable of carrying a 500 kilogramme payload over a distance of 300 kilometres. The range was considered to be the shortest militarily useful within a given region, and the payload represented the smallest considered possible for a nuclear warhead. Each state is responsible for its own implementation of the controls.

Two categories of technologies are controlled. Category I items include complete rocket and missile systems, production facilities for such systems, individual rocket stages, re-entry vehicles and rocket engines. This category represents the systems of greatest risk and states are required to exercise restraint and maintain a "strong presumption" to deny such exports. When items in this category are exported, the state undertaking the export must ensure that the item or technology is used only for the stated purpose once it reaches its destination.

Category II includes less sensitive items such as sub-systems and components. Many of the items in Category II have a number of possible uses, not all of them military. Thus, less restraint is called for in Category II although restraint must be exercised. Exports are to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The MTCR has been criticized because it does not include important supplier countries such as China, North Korea and the Soviet Union. It is also very difficult to ensure that technology exported for civilian purposes is in fact used for those purposes after it reaches its destination. However, since 1987, MTCR members have sought to strengthen the regime. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Spain have all joined the MTCR since 1987, bringing the current total to sixteen.

The Soviet Union has indicated that it is willing to adhere to the terms of the MTCR and it has been holding bilateral discussions with the US about cooperation in limiting ballistic missile

proliferation. After a summit meeting in Washington D.C. in June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev issued a communique which expressed their support for the MTCR, noted that they would continue bilateral consultations, pointed out their intention to seek regional methods for reducing proliferation and called on all countries to exercise restraint.

The concerns about ballistic missile proliferation that prompted the MTCR were given particular poignancy in the Persian Gulf crisis because of Iraq's possession and use of SCUD missiles and the possibility that they might be armed with chemical or biological warheads. The crisis has prompted stronger efforts at regional and international levels to develop more effective proliferation controls.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

As one of the original members of the MTCR, Canada has been a strong supporter of the regime and of controls on ballistic missile proliferation generally. Canada acted as the host for an MTCR meeting in July 1990 in Ottawa.¹

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, as part of an overall plan for post-hostility actions, Canada proposed that there be a world summit on the instruments of war and mass destruction.² The plan calls for efforts on various multilateral arms control issues with a view to taking further steps to control proliferation. A global conference under UN auspices would issue a statement of intent to this end, and a condemnation of proliferation. A second summit would be held in 1995 to mark the development of the new measures.

As part of its proposed programme, the Canadian Government has said that it will encourage expanded participation in the MTCR and will propose more stringent controls.³ With this end in view, at a MTCR meeting in Tokyo 18 to 20 March 1991, Canada proposed that the meeting review the Equipment and Technology Annex to the MTCR in order to consider ways of making the Annex's scope more stringent.⁴ The Tokyo meeting led to agreement on a plan for revising the Annex and expanding participation in the regime.

¹Department of External Affairs. "Canada Hosts MTCR Meeting," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 27.

²Department of External Affairs. "Post-Hostilities Activities," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Department of External Affairs. "MTCR Partners Meet in Tokyo," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 16, Spring 1991: 10.

In a statement released after the Tokyo meeting, former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

The Gulf War showed us the tragic impact of uncontrolled trade in missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. The Missile Technology Control Regime is an important forum for addressing these issues, but it would be stronger and more effective if more exporting countries were involved.⁵

In discussing proliferation concerns, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason noted that:

Perhaps even more destabilizing, ...has been the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. This is having two main effects: it compounds the danger presented by nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation and it is extending the reach of new powers into the developed world. International efforts...have come too late to do anything but slow down and hinder the development of ballistic missiles in a number of countries in the next few years.⁶

In discussing the Government's broad-based initiative on a world summit and proliferation, Ambassador Mason spoke of the need for proliferation to be dealt with as an issue related to regional stability as well as arms control.

...unilateral and multilateral controls on the part of suppliers alone cannot provide permanent answers. Proliferation, as a process, will be largely inevitable as long as the underlying factors that motivate weapons acquisition remain in play. To be effective, approaches to proliferation must form part of a broader security policy that aims at involving regional powers in stabilizing structures.⁷

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue.

⁵Department of External Affairs. "Canada Supports Stronger Controls on Missile Technology Transfers," *News Release*, no. 78, 25 March 1991.

⁶Ambassador Peggy Mason. "A New Security Agenda, Speech to the Conference on the Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World," 28 November 1990: 7.

⁷Ambassador Peggy Mason. "Opening Remarks to the Meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs," Montreal, 20 March 1991: 7.

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Non-Proliferation Treaty

7. NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, there have been few attempts to develop arms control agreements which deal specifically or exclusively with naval weapons. Prior to 1945, there were extensive bilateral and multilateral efforts to develop treaties limiting naval arms. During the 1920s and 1930s, multilateral efforts resulted in three treaties: the Washington Treaty on Limiting Naval Armament in 1922; the London Treaty of 1930; and a follow-on to the London Treaty, the London Protocol in 1936. These treaties placed limits on the types and numbers of warships maintained by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the US. The limits also extended to the types and numbers of weapons deployed on the ships.

This emphasis on limiting naval arms was not carried over into the post-World War II period. In fact, the post-World War II period has been in sharp contrast to the 1920s and 1930s with little in the way of effort or achievement in naval arms control. In 1972, the US and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, which seeks to reduce and prevent potentially dangerous incidents between the navies of the two countries. It does not limit naval arms. Similar agreements have also been signed by the Soviet Union with a number of NATO countries, including Canada.

Since World War II, a number of agreements which seek to ban nuclear weapons from a given zone or place limits on nuclear weapons themselves have been developed. As such, they may affect naval activity but do not constitute naval arms control. Of particular interest is the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty which *inter alia*, prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons under water.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed in 1972, prohibits the US and the Soviet Union from, *inter alia*, developing, testing or deploying an anti-ballistic missile system or component which is sea-based. The SALT II Treaty, signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1976, placed upper limits on the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and ballistic missile submarines that could be maintained by the two countries. More recently, the proposed START agreement will require the US and the Soviet Union to reduce their numbers of SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines. A political agreement that will accompany the START Treaty will require the two to exchange information about their planned deployments of sea-launched cruise missiles on an annual basis. Negotiations on confidence-building measures in Europe have included discussions of measures relating to naval arms.

Still, there have been no negotiations or agreements since 1945 which seek to deal exclusively with naval weapons, especially the large numbers of conventional naval weapons. The large size of the superpower navies and the proliferation of weapons at sea, especially tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships has prompted some countries to propose that naval arms control measures be pursued. For a number of years, the Soviet Union has proposed a variety of measures relating to naval activities. These have included confidence-building measures in certain regions such as the North Atlantic and the Arctic, bilateral confidence-building measures between the US and the Soviet Union such as declarations of which naval ships are carrying nuclear weapons, and a separate forum for discussing naval limits. In 1988, the Soviet Union made public details of its naval force deployments as a confidence-building measure. The US has been consistently opposed to naval arms control and has not responded positively to any of the Soviet or other international proposals. Other members of NATO, particularly the UK, have supported the US position.

At the United Nations, the question of naval arms control was before the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) from 1987 to 1990. Work at the UNDC included discussion of possible confidence-building measures, regulations for nuclear-powered ships, and strengthening existing multilateral agreements. A Secretary-General's Group of Experts report on naval arms control in 1985 outlined two objectives for further action. First, effective measures of reducing nuclear weapons at sea and second, developing measures which reduce conventional arms at sea.¹

In spite of an unchanging negative attitude towards naval arms control on the part of the US administration, there has been discussion of naval arms control within the US government. In April 1988, Paul Nitze, then an advisor to the President on arms control, proposed that the US and the Soviet Union agree to a complete ban on all nuclear weapons based on surface ships. This proposal, however, did not become part of the formal US position.

In response to a Congressional request, in April 1991, the US Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress on naval arms control prospects. The report concluded that naval arms control would restrict the US ability to carry out its global commitments and would be difficult to verify. The Pentagon report did note that confidence-building measures were the most promising naval arms control option, although it came out against a ban on tactical nuclear weapons and limits on submarines. Specific support was given to unilateral measures such as a proposal for the publication of data on the procurement and production of naval weapons.

¹Department of Disarmament Affairs, Report for the Secretary-General. *The Naval Arms Race*. Study Series 16. New York: United Nations, 1986.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is party to one of the oldest naval arms agreements, the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817. The Treaty limits US and Canadian naval activity on the Great Lakes. While Canada is willing to consider some forms of naval arms control, it is against any measure which might infringe on the basic freedoms of the high seas. Canada has supported UN resolutions on naval arms control and was active in the discussions at the UNDC. Canada has favoured limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and welcomed the US-Soviet agreement on annual information exchanges and the acceptance of the principle of constraint and the commitment to continue to seek further measures.²

Canada's strongest support for the concept of naval arms control comes in relation to confidence-building measures. In a speech before a conference on naval arms control, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason, reiterated Canada's support for such measures. However, Ambassador Mason noted that a growing expectation that naval measures might be added to the mandate of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) negotiations under the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would raise a number of difficult questions which need careful attention. These include the question of whether such CSBMs would detract from maritime security policy and whether the CSCE is the appropriate forum for such discussions.³

In outlining Canada's position Ambassador Mason said:

...Canada has actively promoted discussion within NATO on confidence-building in the maritime environment. Preliminary consideration on naval security and arms control has been undertaken, both in Brussels and in Ottawa. I believe that, despite the difficulties, we must continue to pursue such studies. Canada favours, in principle, consideration of measures that would promote mutual trust through transparency, enhance personal contact, and build upon the seafaring traditions of fairness and courtesy.⁴

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no comment on naval arms control during debates in the House of Commons. However, in hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

²Ambassador Peggy Mason. "The Canadian Position on Naval Arms Control," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 11-12.

³*Ibid.*: 11.

⁴*Ibid.*: 12.

on confidence-building and verification measures relating to Europe, the issue was raised by Committee members.

Liberal member Bill Rompkey asked officials from the Department of External Affairs about Canada's role in advocating naval arms control measures, pointing out that there appeared to have been little work done on the question within NATO.

...surely we could simply have an exchange of information that could start confidence-building measures that could eventually lead to some form of naval arms control. Has Canada put any ideas forward like that? Surely we could play a mediation role between the United States and the Soviet Union in that regard.⁵

In response, Mark Moher, the Director General for International Security and Arms Control stated:

...Canada was one of the first countries within the NATO group to suggest that at an appropriate time we will have to move to address the question of naval arms control and naval confidence-building measures. It has, however, been recognized that there are enough issues on the table at this stage...⁶

Mr. Rompkey raised the question again when Ambassador Mason was appearing before the Committee, noting that little progress on naval issues was occurring within NATO. Ambassador Mason reiterated that Canada believed that confidence-building should be the starting-point. With reference to NATO activities she stated:

Essentially, the whole NATO focus on naval arms control has been in the context of the CFE and CSBM negotiations. It has therefore been within the Madrid mandate, ...which very strictly limits naval questions. Essentially they cannot be independent naval questions; they have to be functionally related to ground force activity. ...That is the context in which it has been going on, and Canada has been one of the countries that, ...wanted us to go as far as it was possible to go within the Madrid mandate.⁷

⁵Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* [hereafter SCND. Minutes of Proceedings], no. 30, 6 November 1990: 8.

⁶Ibid.: 9.

⁷SCND. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 35, 13 December 1990: 22-23.

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8. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) -- THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) convened in Geneva on 20 August 1990. The Conference was scheduled to conclude on Friday 14 September, but continued through the night of the 14th, finally adjourning at about 6 a.m. on Saturday the 15th. Article VIII of the Treaty, which came into force in 1970, required that a conference "to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized" be called at the end of five years. Thereafter, also under Article VIII, a majority of the signatories may request further conferences at five year intervals. Article X of the Treaty, however, requires that in 1995, twenty-five years after its entry into force, a conference be convened "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." The 1990 Review Conference, therefore, was the last before the 1995 date for renewal.

The Elements of the Treaty

The NPT was negotiated between 1965 and 1968. During the negotiations, disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union centred on the prospect that the United States might transfer nuclear weapons to West Germany under a NATO agreement. A second significant disagreement occurred between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-possessing states. The latter argued that if the proposed treaty was to weigh equally on the parties, there should be a linkage established between horizontal and vertical proliferation.

The NWS resisted specific linkage, but in the end were obliged to compromise. Article VI of the NPT requires the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In addition, the Preamble to the Treaty recalled the determination of the parties to the 1963 Partial Test Treaty "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

With these general attempts to balance obligations between nuclear-possessing and non-possessing states, the NPT signatories undertook the following commitments:

- nuclear weapon states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states, or to assist them to acquire nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear weapons states undertook not to receive nuclear weapons and not to manufacture them (Articles I and II);
- non-nuclear states agreed to accept safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) to ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapon development (Article III), in exchange for which they were promised the right to participate fully in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including peaceful nuclear explosions (Articles IV and V).

Previous Review Conferences

At the 1975 Review Conference, discussion centred on proposals by non-possessing states to add several protocols to the Treaty. The first of these dealt with the achievement of a comprehensive test ban, and the second with reductions in the nuclear weapon capabilities of the NWS. The third called upon the NWS to provide guarantees that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-possessing states. The Conference, however, was unable to agree on the language of the three protocols, and narrowly averted breaking up in disagreement. At the last minute, the Conference president produced a personal assessment of the issues which was accepted as the Conference Report.

The 1980 Review Conference took place at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decision by President Carter to withdraw the SALT II Treaty from the Senate ratification process. The conference was valuable in reviewing a number of key issues, including the Israeli and South African nuclear programmes, and their application and scope of the safeguards programme. As in 1975, however, the non-possessing states were dissatisfied with the progress (or lack of it) made by the NWS in reducing their nuclear arsenals. Primarily because of this issue, the Conference was unable to agree on a final document.

The 1985 Review Conference exhibited a comparable pattern of achievement and failure, but was able to agree on a Final Document. It strongly endorsed the objectives of the Treaty and the role of the IAEA, and found compromise language on issues such as nuclear assistance and the Israeli-South African nuclear programmes. However, the Conference was divided on the issues of a comprehensive test ban and progress towards nuclear disarmament. In the outcome, a Final Document was made possible by the use of a formula in which "the Conference except for certain states" deeply regretted the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban and called upon the states concerned to resume negotiations in 1985. The "certain states" -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- asserted that they remained committed to the ultimate goal of a comprehensive test ban, but claimed that deep and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapon arsenals were the highest priority in terms of nuclear disarmament.

Issues at the 1990 Review Conference

Under the presidency of Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru, the 1990 Review Conference followed the procedures developed at previous conferences. The Conference created three Main Committees. The first dealt with issues arising from Articles I, II and VI of the Treaty. For many of the non-possessing states, especially the Third World countries, the key question before Main Committee I was the extent to which the NWS had met their obligation to achieve "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament..." In addition, this Committee also dealt with the Nigerian proposal for a treaty providing "negative security assurances" to non-nuclear states, and issues arising from the potential proliferation of nuclear weapon states.

Main Committee II dealt with issues concerning the safeguard programme administered by the IAEA, and with the potential to expand the scope of safeguards. Main Committee III dealt with the provisions of the Treaty providing access to all aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to non-possessing states, especially those in the Third World. In addition to these three committees, the Drafting Committee also played a key role at the Conference. In the final week, when the Main Committee reports are submitted, it is the drafting committee which is responsible for producing a Final Document for approval by the plenary meeting of the Conference.

During the four weeks of the Review Conference a great deal of positive work was accomplished in the Main Committees. In brief, some of the key elements were:

- promising discussions in Main Committee III in which several supplier states, including Belgium, Italy and the Soviet Union, associated themselves with drafting language which would have made all of their exports of nuclear materials conditional on the acceptance of the recipient of "full scope safeguards;"
- agreement on measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards;
- agreed draft formulations concerning armed attacks on nuclear facilities, the desirability of nuclear weapon-free zones, technical assistance to developing countries, a demand that Israel and South Africa submit all of their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, and a variety of other issues of importance to the reinforcement of the NPT regime;
- an agreement that the nuclear weapon states, while submitting unilateral negative security assurances as they had done in the past, would consult on the draft treaty proposed by Nigeria and other states.

These agreements were overshadowed, however, by a continuing dispute at the Review Conference about the fulfilment of the obligations of the NWS under Article VI. Throughout the Conference, the United States and the United Kingdom, strongly supported by the Western group, argued that the five years past had produced great progress in arms control. They pointed to the

1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to the high hopes that a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would be signed shortly. They also emphasized the progress in negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe, and the relaxation of tensions between East and West.

Led by Mexico, however, a number of non-aligned countries argued that, at the centre of the nuclear disarmament provisions referred to in the Preamble and Article VI of the Treaty, lay the obligation of the NWS to make progress towards a comprehensive test ban. The furthest that the United States was willing to go in accepting this linkage was to propose a sentence in the Final Document which would "note" the negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on verification measures in order to permit the ratification of two existing treaties -- the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

Despite efforts to find compromise language, the deadlock on this issue persisted to the end of the Conference. A dramatic last-ditch effort by the President sought to use essentially the same formula as that used in 1985 -- that is, acknowledging in the final draft differing views on the fulfilment of obligations under Article VI. The President's compromise draft failed to achieve the approval of Mexico and Iran when it was presented to the plenary meeting in the final hour of the Conference. There was, therefore, no Final Document.

In the aftermath of the Review Conference, a number of states, including the United States, chose to emphasize the constructive work of the Conference and to minimize the significance of the failure to agree on a Final Document. On the other hand, the absence of a Final Document appeared to nullify some of the work of the Conference. For example, supplier states such as the Soviet Union, Belgium and Italy, which had accepted draft agreements calling for full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, indicated afterwards that, in the absence of a Final Document, they no longer considered themselves bound by the negotiations.

Finally, the Review Conference was widely regarded as setting the scene for the 1995 Extension Conference. Insofar as progress towards a comprehensive test ban continues to be the principal criterion used by leading non-aligned states, such as Mexico, to measure NWS compliance with Article VI, the conclusion of the 1990 Conference suggested that the outcome of the 1995 Extension Conference would be uncertain. More immediately, the debate about nuclear testing pointed ahead to the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment conference, scheduled to convene in New York at the beginning of January 1991.

In the spring and summer of 1991, the non-proliferation regime was both reinforced and threatened. On 30 May, France, which did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the NPT, announced

that in principle it was ready to sign the NPT. Some weeks later, in mid-June, South Africa declared that it was ready to accede to the Treaty, and signed it in July. In doing so, however, South Africa did not explicitly declare that it was a non-nuclear weapon state. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, it became clear that Iraq had developed facilities for the enrichment of uranium which lay entirely outside the IAEA inspection system, and had also clearly sought to deceive IAEA inspection teams. Amidst growing concerns that the IAEA and other controls against proliferation were inadequate, in August reports circulated that North Korea, which, like Iraq, is a party to the NPT, had acquired sufficient weapons grade enriched uranium to build atomic weapons.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada approached the Review Conference on the basis of its historic support for the NPT as the centrepiece of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹ The Canadian delegation to the Conference played a vigorous part in the discussions, particularly with regard to Main Committees II and III, reflecting Canada's commercial interests and expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, as deputy Chair of the Drafting Committee, Canadian Ambassador Peggy Mason played a key role in the final days of the Conference in the search for a consensus document.

Canada's positions on the principal issues at the Conference were set down in formal statements to the opening plenary session of the Conference, and to the Main Committees. In regard to Articles I and II, Canada expressed confidence that the NWS were complying with their obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons, components or technology to non-possessors, but noted its concern about possible violations, at least in spirit, by non-possessing states. Without naming specific states, Canada noted that:

Statements by any party about the need to develop such weapons, clandestine procurement of nuclear sensitive items, evidence of unsafeguarded nuclear activity can raise concerns about less than full compliance with Article II.... It should be emphasized in the final document that states party should refrain from any word or deed that would raise questions about compliance.²

In regard to the fulfilment of disarmament obligations incurred by the NWS under Article VI, Canada's position was similar to that of other countries in the Western group. Ambassador Mason noted that "since 1985, progress of an unprecedented nature has been made toward halting and reversing the

¹See: Department of External Affairs. "Canada Supports Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *News Release*, no. 44, 5 March 1990.

²Statement of Articles I and II to Committee I, 29 August 1990.

nuclear arms race.... This progress is facilitated by the NPT and represents a significant advance towards fulfilling the Article VI goals."³ The statement noted the INF Treaty, favourable progress in the START negotiations, the CFE agreement and the prospects for a chemical weapons convention as matters which should be included in a "fair and balanced assessment" of progress on Article V.

In its assessment of progress towards a comprehensive test ban -- as noted above, the issue seen by the neutral and non-aligned countries as the litmus test of progress on Article VI -- Canada also supported the general position of the Western group while noting the importance of continued negotiations. Ambassador Mason commented:

However, even on this difficult issue, I believe there is justification for optimism. After a long hiatus, the Committee on Disarmament has this summer established an ad hoc committee on the item entitled "Nuclear Test Ban".... Canada actively participated in the recent meetings of this ad hoc committee and looks forward to the continuation of this body's work in next year's session of the CD.

Equally encouraging is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties which can now be ratified. Canada looks forward to the early resumption of bilateral superpower negotiations on further restrictions on nuclear testing.⁴

In regard to the obligation under Article IV to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Canada responded to a Conference request for national statements on bilateral exchange programmes. In reviewing its bilateral activities, Canada noted, *inter alia*, that it cooperated in peaceful nuclear activities with twenty-eight countries (of which four -- Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and the Philippines -- would be considered Third World countries). Canada's safeguards policy was restated in this submission in the following terms:

Canada will only undertake full nuclear cooperation with those non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that have made a commitment to non-proliferation, by either adherence to the NPT, or by taking an equivalent binding step and accepted NPT-type safeguards on all their nuclear activities.⁵

In a separate statement to Main Committee III, it was noted:

³Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament. *Statement to the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Geneva, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 24 August 1990: 9.

⁴*Ibid.*: 10. The ad hoc committee of the CD was given a "non-negotiating mandate" which expired at the end of 1990 and has not to this point been renewed.

⁵Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva. *Canadian Bilateral Nuclear Policies and Cooperation Activities in Support of Article IV of the NPT*. Geneva, August 1990.

Canada is prepared to provide limited assistance for safe and efficient operation of Canadian-supplied CANDU reactors in Argentina, India and Pakistan, but will not consider the resumption of full nuclear cooperation with those countries until they accept the NPT and full-scope safeguards.⁶

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall congratulated South Africa on its decision to join the NPT, noting also the earlier signatures of Zambia and Tanzania. She noted that Canada supports the proposal for a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southern Africa as a regional confidence-building measure and as a contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁷

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Parliament was not in session during the NPT Review Conference. However, Canadian Parliamentarian Warren Allmand, in his capacity as International President of Parliamentarians for Global Action, issued a statement expressing disappointment with the failure to achieve a Final Document. The statement said in part:

The Review Conference failed because many states believe the nuclear powers have fallen short of their Treaty obligations under Article VI. The nuclear powers, or some of them, tend to think otherwise. They claim a need to continue testing into the indefinite future.... A comprehensive test ban and the NPT are of equal importance. A CTB would greatly enhance the prospects of a significant extension of the NPT in 1995 when the time comes for its renewal.⁸

⁶Statement to Committee III, 28 August 1990.

⁷Secretary of State for External Affairs. Canada Congratulates South Africa on Signing the NPT," *News Release*, no. 164, 19 July 1991.

⁸Parliamentarians for Global Action. "Parliamentarians Disappointed With NPT Conference," *Press Release*, 19 September 1990.

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CROSS REFERENCES

Nuclear Weapons Testing -- The Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference

9. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING: THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

BACKGROUND

In 1958 the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom initiated negotiations on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Despite some progress in these negotiations, the prospects of an agreement diminished after the U-2 affair and the failure of the 1960 summit, and the conference adjourned in 1961 having failed to reach agreement. However, drawing upon the experience of the negotiations, after the Cuban missile crisis in 1963, the three parties negotiated and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear weapon tests in all environments except underground. It is open to signature for all states and, as of January 1991, has been signed by 118 states including Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and India. Neither China nor France have acceded to the Treaty but, over time, both have restricted nuclear weapon testing to the underground environment.

The PTBT is of unlimited duration. However, the Preamble notes that the "Original Parties" (the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom) sought "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and were "determined to continue negotiations to this end." This intent was recalled in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which came into force in 1970. The Preamble to the NPT recalled the determination of the PTBT parties "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

Two further treaties were negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States which imposed further limits on underground testing. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limited the size of underground tests to 150 kilotons while reaffirming once again the goal of a comprehensive test ban, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) established a similar limit on non-weapon nuclear explosions. These treaties, which came into force in 1976, were not open to signature by other states.

In 1979, during the latter stages of the Carter Administration, trilateral negotiations on a CTB appeared close to agreement, but faltered in face of increasing domestic opposition in the United States and the weakening position of the Carter Administration. In 1982, President Reagan decided not to resume negotiations on a CTB until improved verification procedures had been developed to monitor the 1976 Treaties.

At the Third Review Conference of the NPT in 1985, debate centred on the failure of the nuclear weapon states to pursue a comprehensive test ban. Similarly, in the United States, the 1982 Reagan decision not to resume negotiations led to considerable congressional criticism and calls for a moratorium on testing. Meanwhile, in August 1985, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on testing and called for other testing states to follow suit. While the Reagan Administration successfully resisted these pressures, it pursued negotiations with the Soviet Union on improved verification measures to monitor the 150 kiloton threshold. These negotiations finally produced agreed procedures which were presented to Congress in 1990 as verification protocols to serve as the basis for ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

In 1985, Parliamentarians for Global Action, an international organization of parliamentarians, began exploring the possibility that the Partial Test Ban Treaty could be amended to make it comprehensive. Based on a legal opinion from Abram Chayes, a former legal advisor to the State Department, Parliamentarians for Global Action urged key signatory states to petition for a conference to amend the PTBT. On 18 November 1986, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a resolution calling on the PTBT signatories to "undertake practical steps leading to the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty."

Article II of the PTBT states that any party may propose amendments to the Treaty. They do so by submitting the proposed amendment to the depository states, who are required to circulate it to all signatories. Thereafter, if required to do so by one third of the signatories, the depository states must convene a conference to consider the amendment. However, while only a simple majority of the signatories is required for the amendment to succeed, the majority must include the concurring votes of the original parties. In August 1988, India, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted an amendment which had received the support of one third of the signatories by March 1989. Essentially, the amendment added a protocol to the PTBT banning all nuclear explosions underground, "or in any other environment."

While declaring its opposition to the amendment (and thereby effectively giving notice that the conference could not succeed), the United States agreed to the convening of the Amendment Conference in New York on 7 January 1991. Before the presentation of the amendment, the US delegate stated that the United States "will not participate in, or provide any financial support to, any continuation of this Conference in any manner beyond the scheduled -- and agreed two-week session.... We urge other parties to join in bringing this process to a close." After the presentation of the amendment by Mexico, the supporters of the amendment chose not to force a vote. Instead, discussion centred on the further steps that might be taken, including the transfer of the CTB issue to the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

In 1983, the Conference on Disarmament sought to establish an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test ban, but was unable to agree on a mandate. Specifically, the major point of contention was whether an ad hoc committee should have a mandate to negotiate a CTB as opposed to analysis and recommendations to member states. In 1986, a Group of Scientific Experts was created to work in association with the CD, but not as a committee of the CD. The Group of Scientific Experts has concentrated on the technical requirements needed for a global seismic data exchange to support a comprehensive test ban. In 1990, the CD was finally able to create an ad hoc committee on a CTB. Agreement on a "non-negotiating" mandate led to four meetings of the Ad Hoc committee in 1990 and appeared to strengthen the otherwise tenuous base for the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

At the New York Amendment Conference, a number of states, including some such as Sweden who were in favour of amendment, argued that the documents from the Conference should be referred to the CD. Others, such as Nigeria and Mexico, argued that the CD had failed to deal with the CTB issue, and that the Conference should remain seized of the issue and reconvene at a specified date.

Despite the opposition of the United States, the final declaration of the Conference held out the prospect of a further meeting, but at an unspecified date. The brief final statement read:

Acknowledging the complex and complicated nature of certain aspects of a comprehensive test ban, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the State parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. Accordingly, they agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at the appropriate time.¹

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

A comprehensive test ban is one of six key arms control objectives identified by the Canadian Government. Since 1976, Canada has played a prominent role in the Group of Scientific Experts, and has upgraded the Yellowknife seismic array station as a contribution towards test ban verification. Nevertheless, its position on the Amendment Conference has been persistently critical. In particular, various Government spokespersons have argued that it was irresponsible to convene a meeting which had no chance of success, and dangerous to seek to link progress on a CTB to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In an early forthright comment to this effect, a spokesman for the Department of External Affairs commented:

¹Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies. *Arms Control Reporter*, 1991: 601,B30.

To threaten to bring down the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the quest for an amendment which, however well-intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.²

In the lead-up to the Amendment Conference, this continued to be the Canadian position. In his speech to the 45th United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1990, Secretary of State Clark commented on the linkage to the NPT in the following terms:

...we have been deeply disturbed by a tendency among some others to adopt positions which can only act to undermine the vital consensus which underlies the existing treaties on non-proliferation and nuclear testing... the pursuit of other objectives should not be allowed to threaten those existing agreements which have become so vital...it is Canada's firm view that both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage one to the other.³

Once the convening of the Conference was determined, however, Canadian policy focussed on the prospect that the meeting might offer a constructive opportunity for an exchange of views on the problems involved in a CTB. Speaking to the organizational meeting of the Amendment Conference in June 1990, Disarmament Ambassador Peggy Mason commented:

Canada believes that the Amendment Conference has the potential to build on common ground among parties and provide a fresh impetus to work toward the CTB goal, particularly at the Conference on Disarmament.⁴

In accordance with this view, Canada submitted a working paper to the Amendment Conference on verification requirements. The limited duration of the Conference, however, and the failure to establish working committees, prevented any comprehensive discussion of verification issues.

While offering only limited support to the proponents of the Amendment Conference, Canadian statements both before and at the Amendment Conference appeared to signal impatience with the slow pace of the negotiations on the ratification of the threshold treaties. At the 1990 United Nations General Assembly, Canada again co-sponsored (with Australia and New Zealand) a resolution

²Department of External Affairs. *Disarmament Bulletin*, Spring-Summer 1989: 30.

³Department of External Affairs. "Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Forty-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, 90/55, 26 September 1990: 6.

⁴Ambassador Peggy Mason, Head of the Canadian Delegation. *Statement*, 4 June 1990.

entitled "Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."⁵ Speaking to the First Committee on 16 October 1990, Ambassador Mason appeared to underline the need for faster progress:

On nuclear testing, Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties and that these two treaties will soon be ratified. While this step, in the eyes of many, was overdue, we believe that it represents an important basis upon which further restrictions on nuclear testing can be negotiated. In his plenary statement, [Secretary of State Joe Clark] welcomed the joint American and Soviet statement to a step-by-step approach to further restrictions on nuclear testing. He then went on to state Canada's belief that that commitment should be followed up immediately.⁶

Addressing the Amendment Conference, Ambassador Mason again reiterated:

Canada's belief that the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately follow up their commitment to negotiate further restrictions on nuclear testing with the final goal of a comprehensive ban...

In what appeared to signal a slight shift in Canadian policy, she continued:

Canada urges the two states concerned to negotiate further limitations on their respective nuclear testing programs, that could include both limits on the number and yield of tests as intermediary measures on the road to a conclusion of an effective and verifiable CTBT at an early date.⁷

On 18 January 1990, the Amendment Conference concluded its work, making a decision by recorded vote on the declaration quoted above. Seventy-four countries voted for the declaration, while the United States and United Kingdom voted against. Along with eighteen other countries, Canada abstained.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On Wednesday 16 January 1991, Liberal MP Warren Allmand, Chairman of Parliamentarians for Global Action, made a Statement in the House calling attention to the Amendment Conference. He commented:

⁵UN Resolution 45/51, 4 December 1990. The resolution passed with a vote of 140-2-6, France and the US voted against.

⁶Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Statement to First Committee," *Disarmament Bulletin*, Winter 1990/91: 16-17.

⁷"Statement by Ambassador Peggy Mason to the Amendment Conference," *Press Release*, no. 1. New York, 10 January 1990.

Unfortunately, the United States and the United Kingdom are opposing this conference and Canada is not supportive. This is hard to understand since some of the states involved in the Middle East crisis are pressing to develop nuclear weapons and a comprehensive test ban would retard this development.

Before this conference ends on Friday, I would ask the Canadian government to support the continuation of the conference and a comprehensive test ban. Stop the development of nuclear weapons.⁸

⁸Commons Debates, 16 January 1991: 17105.

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10. NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

BACKGROUND

Nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) are geographic areas, defined by treaty or agreement within which the presence of nuclear weapons, their manufacture and testing are banned. NWFZs differ in their specific aspects with some maintaining more stringent or different restrictions than others. Treaties establishing such zones often have protocols which are open to signature by nuclear weapon states and which require such states to respect the provisions of the zone. In establishing NWFZs, states hope to fend off or eliminate nuclear weapon-related activity in their region, limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, use the zone as a confidence-building measure which will promote regional security and contribute to the progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Rapacki Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Since the 1950s, a wide variety of NWFZs have been proposed and implemented. In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco established Latin America as the first NWFZ in a populated area. Parties to this treaty are required to use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes only, and to prevent the testing, storage or acquisition of nuclear weapons on their territories. As of 1 January 1991, twenty-three states were party to the Treaty.

In 1985, a NWFZ was established in the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty bans the stationing, manufacture and testing of nuclear explosive devices within the zone and also prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. As of 1 January 1991, eleven states had signed the Treaty. China and the Soviet Union have signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaty. The US, UK and France have refused to sign.

The success of these two zones, the only ones to be established in populated areas, has been mixed. Within the Latin American zone, not all of the signatories have completed safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required. In the South Pacific, the most serious drawback to the success of the zone has been the continued unwillingness of the US, the UK and France to consider signing the Protocols. In particular, France continues to maintain a very active nuclear programme in the Pacific and continues to carry out underground tests there. However, both zones continue to act as valuable precedents and confidence-building measures.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Seabed Treaty (1970) are also considered to be NWFZ treaties although their provisions extend to weapon systems other than nuclear as well.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in Africa, Northern Europe or the Arctic, the Balkan states, Central Europe, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the South Atlantic, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Southeast Asia. Most of these efforts have been made at the United Nations and some have been discussed at regional fora.

As a result of the Persian Gulf war, there has been renewed interest in the possibility of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The first proposals for such a zone were made in 1974 by the Shah of Iran. Since then, the idea has been discussed at the United Nations each year, with the effort intensifying after Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981. However, the idea has never been the subject of formal negotiations.

Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed, in December 1990, that after the Persian Gulf crisis was resolved, negotiations begin to turn the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear and chemical arms. This proposal was echoed by Britain in the aftermath of the war (see Chapter 5, MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL). Britain advocated the inclusion of provisions establishing the Persian Gulf region as a zone free of biological, chemical, and nuclear arms in the larger Security Council resolution establishing the terms of the ceasefire with Iraq. In the end, the Security Council resolution establishing the ceasefire conditions required the complete elimination of Iraq's capability in biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Within Canada, approximately 170 municipalities have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario and the Northwest Territories have declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately sixty percent of the Canadian population resides in locally declared NWFZs.

In February 1990, NDP Member Svend Robinson asked the Government to respect the 1983 declaration by the Vancouver City Council establishing Vancouver as a NWFZ and refuse to give nuclear weapons-equipped ships access to Vancouver harbour. In March 1990, NDP Member Robert Skelly tabled a petition in the House of Commons asking the government to establish a NWFZ in British Columbia which would prohibit port visits by ships with nuclear weapons (see 1990 edition of *The Guide*). The Government has not taken any action on this issue.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones wherever they are feasible and promote stability in an area. NWFZ proposals must meet certain requirements: they must have the support of countries in the area in question; they must promote regional and international stability.

Canada has never supported NWFZs in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans because of its membership in NATO. The Government believes that NWFZs in these areas would be inconsistent with NATO policy which has a defensive policy including a nuclear deterrent. Similarly, the Government has never supported the declaration of Canada as a NWFZ for the same reasons. Canada does not possess nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory. Canada is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (see Chapter 8, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY) which requires it "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons...."

A number of resolutions relating to NWFZ were put forward at the forty-fifth meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. A resolution which called for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East¹ was adopted without a vote. The resolution, *inter alia*, calls on parties to take steps towards a NWFZ in the area, and pending the establishment of such a zone, to refrain from developing, producing, testing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Canada voted yes to a similar resolution which supported a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia.²

As it has done consistently in the past, Canada voted in favour of a resolution which called on France to ratify Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it signed in 1979. Canada also supported a resolution calling upon states to respect Africa as a nuclear weapon-free zone and condemning South Africa's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.³ However, Canada abstained on Part B of the same resolution which, in part, termed South Africa's acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability a threat to international peace and security. The resolution demanded that South Africa submit its nuclear facilities to inspection by the IAEA and requested that the Secretary-General closely monitor South Africa's nuclear development.

¹UN Resolution 45/52, 4 December 1990.

²UN Resolution 45/53, 4 December 1990.

³UN Resolution 45/56A, 4 December 1990.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On a related issue, on 22 October 1990, Liberal MP Warren Allmand drew attention to the large numbers of nuclear weapons present in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Gulf crisis. He asked then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark to:

...take action through the United Nations to have the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union remove all nuclear weapons from the region immediately.⁴

In response, Mr. Clark spoke of the need to continue attempts to extend the United Nations mandate in the area in the hopes that a peaceful solution to the crisis would be found. Once Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was secured:

...[w]e can then get on to the serious question relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the region, that is to try to have some means in which the stores of Iraq and those of other countries can be gradually controlled and eliminated.⁵

When pressed again on the question by Mr. Allmand, Mr. Clark responded that:

...a call by Canada...for some kind of unilateral action on nuclear weapons, on some nuclear weapons,...could well have a counterproductive effect.⁶

⁴*Commons Debates*. 22 October 1990: 14501.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*: 14502.

11. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

RECENT LITERATURE

BACKGROUND

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11. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

BACKGROUND

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. In 1963, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. One hundred and nineteen countries have now signed the Treaty.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction anywhere in space. Military bases, installations or fortifications, as well as weapons testing of any kind and military manoeuvres are prohibited on the moon and other celestial bodies. The use of the moon for solely peaceful purposes was reaffirmed in July 1984, with the coming into force of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars the two states may maintain. Under Article V of the Treaty, the two parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile-land based." The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race in outer space.

Bilateral discussions between the US and the Soviet Union on possible limitations on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have been occurring on and off since 1979, when negotiations ended after a year of inconclusive discussion. One of the primary areas of disagreement about ASAT weapons is whether they are inherently offensive or defensive weapons. Repeated calls by the Soviet Union for a renewal of negotiations have proved unsuccessful. In 1983, the Soviet Union announced that it was unilaterally halting all ASAT testing. Two years later, the US Congress imposed a moratorium on tests of the US F-15 ASAT in space. In 1987, the US Air Force cancelled all funding for the weapon. In 1988, an effort to impose a more permanent ban on ASAT testing was launched by some members of Congress. Congressional supporters of ASAT not only succeeded in blocking a ban, but also in ending the moratorium imposed in 1985. The Soviet Union has continued to call for

discussions on ASATs and on outer space generally, and advocates establishing an international organization to inspect satellites before they are launched into space to ensure that they are for peaceful purposes only.

Another issue of concern for the maintenance of outer space as a peaceful environment has been the progress of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The US programme, commonly referred to as the "Star Wars" programme envisages placing systems in space which would shoot down enemy nuclear missiles, thus protecting the US against attack and limiting the effects of such an attack. While the final goal of the SDI programme remains several years away, and deployment plans are neither firm nor anticipated in the immediate future, the programme has significant implications for the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Several countries, especially the Soviet Union, have raised these issues with the US in a variety of fora. However, SDI remains at present a research programme. As such, it is permitted under both treaties and the US has been reluctant to discuss whether SDI might eventually violate arms control treaties (see Chapter 12, START).

At the multilateral level, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is the primary forum for discussion of outer space. The CD involves thirty-nine countries, including Canada. The "prevention of an arms race in outer space" has been an agenda item at the CD since 1985. In 1985, after three years of debate, the CD was able to agree on a mandate for an ad hoc committee. The Ad Hoc Committee has been renewed annually since then by the UN General Assembly.

After studying the relevant international law relating to outer space, in April 1988, the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD. The report concluded that the legal regime that applied to outer space, did not by itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that the legal regime should be consolidated and reinforced to enhance its effectiveness.

The Ad Hoc committee has continued to meet each year since 1985, but has not been able to develop a mandate for negotiations. In 1990, the UN General Assembly again re-established the Ad Hoc Committee, with the usual mandate "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects."

During meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee in July and August 1990, a variety of topics were discussed. These included an Argentinean proposal that the Convention for the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space be updated and strengthened. Poland proposed that work be undertaken to develop confidence-building measures which would promote greater openness. The US continued to maintain that a bilateral framework must be established first, before multilateral negotiations can usefully begin. The Ad Hoc Committee ended its session on 16 August 1990, with little in the way of progress towards a negotiating mandate.

Canada is a long time supporter of a stronger peaceful regime in outer space. In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament, the then Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, called for efforts to prohibit the militarization of outer space. Since 1982, when the CD first began considering discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Canada has submitted a number of important working papers to the CD. In 1985, Canada submitted a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at the CD."¹ In 1988, Canada presented three working papers. The papers dealt with terminology, a proposal for strengthening state practice under the 1975 Registration Convention, and a retrospective view of significant recent political, technical and military developments in outer space.²

As part of its programme on verification, Canada has conducted a research project known as PAXSAT A. The PAXSAT A study examined the feasibility of developing a system of satellites which could be used to verify arms control agreements in outer space. A similar project, PAXSAT B, examines the feasibility of verifying conventional arms agreements by using satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing. Canada presented its analysis of the PAXSAT study to the CD in 1987.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canadian support for efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space continues to be strong, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space remains one of Canada's six arms control priorities.

As part of the summer session at the CD, two Canadian experts spoke to the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space at the CD in July 1990. Jeff Tracey from the Verification Research Programme at Canada's Department of External Affairs, spoke about the past, present and future capabilities of commercial satellites with respect to arms control verification. Peter Stibrany, of Spar Aerospace, spoke about the ambiguities that might arise in space programmes in the next twenty years. In particular, he discussed the difficulty inherent in distinguishing between weapon and non-weapon activities.³

Two resolutions on outer space were put forward at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1990, Canada voted in favour of both resolutions. Canada and Egypt co-sponsored

¹CD/618, CD/OS/WP. 6, 23 July 1985.

²Canada. *Working Paper on the Use of Certain Terms Relating to Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/OS/WP. 27, 8 August 1988; Australia and Canada. *Strengthening State Practice under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*. CD/OS/WP. 25, 18 August 1988, Canada. *Arms Control and Outer Space: A Retrospective Review: 1982-1987*. CD/OS/WP 26, 8 August 1988.

³Department of External Affairs. "Canadians Address Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space," *Disarmament Bulletin*. Fall 1990: 15.

Resolution 45/55A, titled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space." The resolution calls for the CD to intensify its work on outer space, and requests the CD to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space, with the same mandate as in 1990. The resolution passed by a vote of 149-0-1, with the US abstaining. Resolution 45/55B "Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space," requests the Secretary-General to carry out a study on confidence-building measures that could be applied to outer space, and to examine the technologies that might be used and the mechanisms that might be developed. The Resolution calls for the report to be submitted to the General Assembly in 1993. This resolution also passed by a vote of 149-0-1, with the US again as the only abstainer.

In February 1991, the US proposed changing the principles on the use of nuclear power sources in outer space. The US wants to change the standards so that it will be able to display a nuclear reactor it has designed. Canada has spoken out against these changes at meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue during 1990-1991.

11. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

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Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

12. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

BACKGROUND

On 31 July 1991, in Moscow, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George Bush signed the Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty. The strategic arms reduction talks (START) took place under the umbrella negotiations on nuclear and space arms talks (NST), which began in January 1985. Talks on strategic arms had also occurred in 1982 and 1983 but ended when the Soviet Union refused to set a date for their resumption. The NST negotiations resulted in a treaty in 1987 which provided for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles (the INF Treaty) with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometres. This entire category of weapon system had been eliminated as of 1 June 1991.

Two treaties on strategic nuclear weapons were completed prior to the START Treaty. In 1972, the two superpowers signed the SALT I agreement and in 1979, they signed the SALT II agreement. These two agreements established upper limits or ceilings on the numbers of strategic intercontinental nuclear weapons that each side could maintain. Intercontinental range refers to the ability of a missile to travel between continents from one superpower to the other; this is considered to be 5,500 kilometres and above.

It had been hoped that the START Treaty would be completed sooner. However, final agreement was delayed by problems associated with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Persian Gulf crisis and difficulties in resolving the final sticking points. Final agreement between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev was reached at the G-7 meeting in London on 17 July 1991. The START Treaty affects intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the ground (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons.

The new START Treaty represents a significant step forward from the SALT treaties because, for the first time, the US and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons rather than simply limit them. The Treaty limits the two sides to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Within this limit, there is a sub-limit of 154 on deployed "heavy" ICBMs (ICBMs above a defined size). This provision will require the Soviet Union to cut its SS-18 missile force in half. Strict limits on this ten-warhead missile was one of the US' primary goals in the negotiations. The US does not have any heavy missiles. In a separate letter associated with the Treaty, the Soviet Union has agreed to destroy twenty-two SS-18 launchers each year over the seven-year reduction period to reach the required level.

Each side is permitted a total of 6,000 "accountable" deployed warheads. This means that 6,000 is not a firm limit on all warheads in their possession, but limits those warheads deemed accountable

by the Treaty. Within this upper limit, there is a sub-limit of 4,900 on warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs. No more than 1,540 warheads may be deployed on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1,100 on mobile ICBMs.

Under the terms of the Treaty, new types of heavy ICBMs are banned, as are heavy SLBMs and their launchers, and mobile launchers for heavy ICBMs. New ICBMs and SLBMs which have more than ten warheads are also prohibited. As part of a general trend towards having fewer warheads on strategic missiles, both sides will be permitted to "download" warheads from existing deployed missiles so that missiles which previously had ten warheads might now be deployed with only six or eight. Determining an upper limit of 1,250 on the number of free spaces that could be created this way was one of the final issues to be resolved in the negotiations. Placing an upper limit was considered very important because the possibility always remains that these warheads could be replaced (or uploaded) quickly.

The reductions the US and the Soviet Union will need to make to reach these levels amounts to approximately one-third of their presently deployed arsenals. (See STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE in the FACTS AND FIGURES section.)

Reductions will occur in three phases over a seven year period. The Treaty itself will last for fifteen years, with the option of renewal for five-year periods after that. Under a separate political agreement, both sides agree not to exceed 880 nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with ranges above 600 kilometres. Since neither side is anywhere near that upper limit, this is a very minimal constraint. Annual declarations of policy and planned deployments of SLCMs will also be given. Confidential data exchanges about nuclear-armed SLCMs with ranges between 300 and 600 kilometres will occur.

Under the counting rules established for strategic bombers, bombers loaded with nuclear bombs and short-range missiles will count as one launcher against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 warhead ceiling, regardless of the number of weapons actually carried. The US bombers carry a maximum of twenty air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), but only ten warheads will be counted against the 6,000 ceiling. One hundred and fifty US bombers can be counted in this way. Bombers with ALCMs in excess of this 150 limit will be counted with the actual number of warheads deployed on them. The Soviet bombers can carry a maximum of sixteen ALCMs and will be counted as eight warheads against the 6,000 ceiling. The Soviet Union is permitted to count 180 bombers this way.

The START Treaty is also important for its extensive verification provisions. These include information exchanges, a consultative commission and twelve types of on-site inspection. On-site inspection provisions include suspect site inspections, continuous perimeter portal monitoring of

mobile ICBM production facilities on both sides, and elimination inspections. Cooperative measures for keeping track of deployed mobile ICBMs have been developed and there is a ban on denying each side full access to telemetry during missile flight tests. For the first time, the two sides have also agreed to exchange telemetry tapes.

Although the Treaty represents a step forward, it has been criticized for not going far enough at a time when the new relationship between the US and the Soviet Union may have allowed much deeper cuts. While reductions on the order of about one-third will occur, (to approximately the level of arms the US and the Soviet Union had in 1982) the agreement is significant for what it fails to cover. As indicated above, the limits established in the Treaty apply to "accountable" warheads, not all warheads. With the exception of limits on non-deployed missiles for mobile launchers, there are no limits on the numbers of non-deployed launchers and missiles. Perhaps most importantly, while there is a ban on some new types of heavy missiles and launchers, there is really no constraint on modernization and production of new missiles.

On 1 June 1990, at a summit meeting in Washington, the US and the Soviet Union issued a joint outline for a set of negotiations to follow the completion of the START Treaty. The START II negotiations will seek to develop a framework which removes the incentive for a first strike and concentrates on encouraging more survivable systems. This will probably translate into an effort to move away from multiple warhead missiles.

Negotiations on defence and space arms had been occurring concurrently with the START negotiations, in Geneva. At these negotiations the two sides have been discussing the relationship between strategic offences and defences. In the first few years of the negotiations, the Soviet Union sought to tie agreement on these issues to agreement on reductions in strategic arms. In September 1989, the Soviet Union removed this condition, opening the way for separate agreement on strategic reductions. Negotiations on space and defence arms will continue after the signing of the START Treaty.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada supports the START negotiating process and welcomes the completion of the START Treaty. In a speech to the United Nations First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason outlined Canada's position:

Canada commends the perseverance demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in negotiating a START Treaty that will substantially reduce their arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons. The forthcoming signing and implementation of this Treaty will represent a significant achievement in the process towards nuclear disarmament.

Canada welcomes the commitment of both sides to follow up the START I Treaty with negotiations on a START II Treaty that would further cut the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.¹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

During hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND), Liberal member Fred Mifflin asked Ambassador Mason about what appeared to be slow progress on the START Treaty in contrast with the rapid changes at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and what this might indicate for START II. Ambassador Mason replied that to some degree, progress was dependent on eliminating the conventional asymmetries in Europe and discussed some of the difficulties associated with strategic arms control.

Whereas START I is getting rid of things they now recognize they do not need, START II will partly have to deal with identifying directions they have not gone in yet, directions they do not want to go in.... There is one other problem. The other problem has been that on both sides,...the top level has to be involved, ultimately, in all of this.... There is a limit to how much they can do at any one time,...²

¹Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Statement to First Committee," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 16.

²Standing Committee on National Defence. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 35, 13 December 1990: 16-17.

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BACKGROUND

Verification is a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreement in any of these sectors. In the early days of arms control, the US and the Soviet Union relied on national technical means of verification to monitor compliance with the SALT treaties. Since then, arms control provisions have required more stringent measures of verification and states have become more willing to accept more intrusive measures of verification.

In November 1987, the US and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) (see *The Guide 1988*). The INF Treaty contained new provisions for verification, including on-site inspection, which have provided an important precedent for other negotiations such as the negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe which resulted in the CFE Treaty in November 1990 (see Chapter 3, CFE). Also of recent importance is the completion of new verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) which resulted in both treaties being ratified by the US and the Soviet Union and officially entering into force in December 1990.

Canada has developed a very solid and respected expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. In 1983, Canada launched the Arms Control Research Programme which has an annual budget of \$1 million. This Department of External Affairs programme involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector, and includes such projects as the study of problems that arise in international negotiations, the creation of specialized technical training programmes and the organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Programme is managed by the Verification and Research Section of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division at the Department of External Affairs. It focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities have included a \$3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station in Yellowknife, which was officially opened on 11 September 1989. It has also undertaken a variety

of studies on chemical weapons verification, including two reports on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapon abuses which were submitted to the UN Secretary-General, and two recent reports on trial chemical weapon inspections. Canada has also considered the possibility of using space-based remote sensing for the verification of multilateral arms control agreements, under a system known as PAXSAT. Canada's PAXSAT A project investigated the possible use of space-based remote sensing for arms control in outer space and the PAXSAT B project examined the possible use of the technology for verifying conventional arms control agreements (for other projects see previous editions of *The Guide*).

In 1985, at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 on verification, which was passed by consensus. The Resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures," and urged them to "communicate to the Secretary-General ... their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques ... and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." This was the first time that a resolution on verification had proceeded beyond the negotiating stage.

Carrying out the requirements of this Resolution, in April 1986, Canada submitted to the Secretary-General a report entitled, *Verification in All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification*. This report, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, although bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will continue to be of paramount importance in this context.

In 1987 and 1988, Canada chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Working Group held discussions on verification procedures and techniques and on the role the UN might play in verification. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document listing sixteen principles of verification.

At the forty-third session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored a resolution (Resolution 43/81B) calling on the Secretary-General to initiate a study by a group of experts to examine the role of the UN in verification. The Group of Experts was charged with the task of reviewing existing UN activity in the area, assessing the need for improvements or new activities and providing recommendations for further action. The resolution passed by a vote of 150-1-0, with the United States opposing the motion.

After a year and a half of work, the Group of Experts submitted its study to the Secretary-General in July 1990. It was then forwarded to the First Committee and later to the General

Assembly (see below). The final report presents two general views on a possible greater role for the UN in verification, reflecting an acceptance by the group to "agree to differ." However, there was complete agreement that a "fact finding" role did exist for the UN through the Secretary-General and it was recommended that this be strengthened.¹ The Group also recommended that a data bank of verification research material be established from data provided by states on a voluntary basis. To facilitate easy access to the data, it was recommended that the UN publish lists of additions to the data bank and that the UN take an active role in facilitating the international exchange of data.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In 1990-1991, Canada has continued to play a strong role in the verification field. Mr. Fred Bild, the then Assistant Deputy Minister for the Political and International Security Branch at the Department of External Affairs, was chosen as chairman of the group of experts in recognition of Canada's role in bringing the study into being. As a result, Canada, as well as France and the Netherlands, sponsored the General Assembly resolution calling for the Group's report to be adopted and implemented. The resolution was adopted by consensus.²

In announcing that Canada would be presenting the final report to the First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason stated:

In Canada's view, the study provided an excellent opportunity to exchange views on a number of proposals.... We were particularly pleased that the Group succeeded in reaching a consensus final report that included a number of specific recommendations for further action.³

In speaking about a recently established coordination committee within NATO, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated that:

Canada, which has shared with allies the results of its own longstanding verification research programme sees this Coordination Committee and its supporting staff playing an increasingly key role in the verification efforts of Alliance members. In addition, dedicated multinational teams might be deployed for verification operations, and the

¹For a full description see: "UN Verification Study Completed," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 13.

²"Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification." UN Resolution 45/65, 4 December 1990.

³"Canadian Statement to the First Committee," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 17-18.

Alliance should begin giving serious thought to the development of shared verification tools - what might be called 'Alliance technical means.'⁴

As a signatory to the CFE Treaty (see Chapter 3, CFE), Canada has verification responsibilities to fulfill in the implementation of the agreement. In response to these new tasks, the Directorate of Arms Control Verification Operations (DACVO) at the Department of National Defence began a series of courses to train CFE inspectors. The course consists of a week on theory in Ottawa and a week of practical work in Europe. It is planned to develop a core group of fifty inspectors.

DACVO has a staff of thirteen at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and will be supported by a twelve member team which will handle data, as well as augmented National Defence intelligence staff. As of 5 October 1990, a seven member on-site inspection team is based at Lahr in Germany. They will conduct all on-site inspections and host inspections at Canadian facilities. It is expected that the organization will be able to handle twelve inspections per year.

Other activities carried out by Canada this year include ongoing work by an Expert Group on verification with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The expert group includes sixteen participants from eight countries. The first meeting of the expert group was held at Montebello in October 1990 where the participants outlined the objectives of the research project. From 25 to 28 November 1990, Canadian officials participated in a joint trial chemical weapons inspection with the Netherlands. A similar trial CFE inspection involving the two countries is planned for 1991.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The issue was not discussed in the House of Commons this year. The Standing Committee on National defence held hearings on Canada's role on verification procedures in Europe during November and December 1990, at which verification was discussed extensively. In particular, discussion focussed on Canadian initiatives, possible future Canadian action and the current state of arms control.⁵

⁴Joe Clark. "Canada's Stake in European Security," *NATO Review* 38, no. 5, October 1990: 6.

⁵Standing Committee on National Defence. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 30-35, see especially no. 30, 6 November 1990 and no. 35, 13 December 1990.

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SECTION II -- DEFENCE

14. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND DEFENCE

BACKGROUND

The Canadian Arctic became strategically important during the Second World War when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to ferry aircraft to the Soviet Union. After a brief lull in the post-war period, the strategic significance of the Arctic became apparent again in the early 1950s, when elements in the Eisenhower Administration became increasingly concerned about the possibility of an attack on North America by Soviet heavy bombers armed with atomic weapons. The Soviet detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1953 dramatically increased this concern, and was soon followed by the construction of the Pinetree Line across southern Canada and the United States. After further studies of air defence requirements, the United States asked Canada to join in the construction of a radar early-warning line in the far North. An agreement was signed in 1955, and during the following two summer construction seasons the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was built roughly along the 70th parallel.

Although the DEW line stations were manned primarily by the United States, Canada was able to use a clause in the agreement to increase the number of Canadian personnel operating the DEW line stations. Nevertheless, US personnel continued to play the major role in DEW line operations. In 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to replace the DEW line by the North Warning System (NWS). The North Warning System has been built mainly on the old DEW line sites, but combines modern, minimally attended long-range radars with unmanned gap-fillers. The Canadian section of the NWS, which, like the DEW line, transmits data to the NORAD Combat Operations Centre in Colorado Springs and the Canadian Regional Operations Control Centre at North Bay, Ontario, will be manned and operated entirely by Canadians.

Despite this change, after the Memorandum of Agreement was signed in 1985, the NWS was criticized by former senior members of the Canadian military on the grounds that it does not provide surveillance of the northernmost areas of the Canadian archipelago. (This would have required a relocation of the radar sites which, the Canadian Government argued, would have made the system prohibitively expensive.) Surveillance of the northernmost areas of the Canadian archipelago, therefore, is carried out on a random basis by US airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS). By agreement, AWACS on patrol over the Canadian north carry a Canadian crew member. In addition, on 30 June 1989, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and Maritime Surveillance aircraft, to be called Arcturus. The aircraft, Lockheed P-3s, are to be used for military, environmental, and maritime patrols in the Arctic, for fisheries patrols, and as supplementary search and rescue aircraft. The Arcturus will not be equipped with the expensive

submarine detection sensors and data processing installed on the Aurora aircraft, which are also Lockheed P-3s. McKnight explained the purchase as "a cost-effective measure to address the need to effectively patrol Canada's coastline and enforce Canadian sovereignty."¹

The most serious challenge to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is posed by the disputed legal status of the waters of the Canadian archipelago, specifically the Northwest Passage. In 1969, the tanker *Manhattan* traversed the Passage seeking to explore the feasibility of a commercial tanker route from Prudhoe Bay to the eastern seaboard. In response to this potential development, in 1970, the Trudeau Government enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which unilaterally established Canadian environmental jurisdiction up to 100 miles from the Canadian Arctic coast. Since 1973, the Canadian Government has maintained the position that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal, with no right of innocent passage.

In August 1985, the US icebreaker *Polar Sea* transited the Northwest Passage from east to west, again without requesting formal permission from the Canadian Government. The Mulroney Government responded, on 10 September 1985, by affirming its claim to full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, and establishing, by Order-in-Council, a straight baseline around the archipelago, thereby sealing off the Northwest Passage as an internal waterway. A number of other measures were also announced to strengthen the Canadian claim to sovereignty, including the construction of a Class 8 icebreaker and an increase in the number of surveillance flights. Shortly after these announcements, the Canadian and US governments began negotiations to resolve their differences on the status of the Northwest Passage. Two years later, on 11 January 1988, the parties signed the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which establishes cooperative procedures to facilitate navigation by icebreakers in the Arctic. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States undertook to seek Canadian consent for all transits by US icebreakers of waters considered by Canada to be internal. The Agreement also noted, however, that the respective positions of the two parties concerning the legal status of the Northwest Passage are not affected by the terms of the Agreement or any practice thereunder.

US concern about the status of the Northwest Passage reflects the global interest of the US Navy in preventing any attempts to close off waters considered to be international straits. In the case of the Northwest Passage, the specific concern is that the acceptance of the Canadian claim would prevent the submerged passage of nuclear submarines through the waters of the Canadian archipelago. Although such transits are unlikely to occur more than two or three times per year, the United States clearly seeks to retain the right to use waters of the archipelago without notification to the Canadian Government.

¹Department of National Defence. *News Release*, 30 June 1989.

In June 1987, the Canadian Defence White Paper listed a number of additional measures to support Canadian sovereignty, including upgrading of five northern airfields to serve as austere operating bases for interceptors, an increase in air surveillance, and the intent to deploy fixed sonar systems for submarine detection in Arctic waters. Most importantly, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to purchase ten to twelve nuclear submarines, in part to provide an under-ice capability so that Canada could assert its presence in the waters of the archipelago. In the 1989 budget, however, the procurement programmes of the Defence Department were severely curtailed, and the nuclear submarine programme was cancelled. In February 1990, Finance Minister Michael Wilson also announced the cancellation of the Class 8 icebreaker, citing the need to control the deficit, the changing international environment, and the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement.

In a speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev listed a number of Arctic arms control initiatives, calling on the circumpolar states to make the Arctic a "zone of peace." These proposals were generally received coolly by the Western powers, including Canada. In a speech in Tromsø, Norway on 9 December 1987, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark emphasized that it was the Soviet Union, not the other Arctic states, which had based large naval forces, including stockpiles of nuclear weapons, on the Kola peninsula. Moreover, he argued, the military issues in the Arctic, especially those concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons, were global not regional in their effect, and should be negotiated in established East-West fora. Despite this unenthusiastic response, issues arising from the Murmansk initiative remained on the political agenda. In the autumn of 1989, a panel report sponsored by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament proposed a series of arms control measures, as a response to Murmansk. These included a central Arctic demilitarized zone, Arctic "open skies," other aerial confidence-building measures, naval arms control measures, the establishment of a permanent Conference on Arctic Security and Cooperation, the recommendation that the Canadian Government seek from the Soviets an end to nuclear weapon testing at Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Arctic, and a unilateral Soviet statement that its submarines would not transit the waters of the Canadian archipelago.

Despite the sceptical response to the Murmansk initiative, Soviet officials renewed the call for Arctic arms control at a bilateral meeting in Ottawa in October 1989, some weeks before the planned visit of Prime Minister Mulroney to the Soviet Union. The principal outcome of Mulroney's visit to Moscow in November 1989 was a Canada-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North. The agreement was intended to facilitate bilateral cooperation and exchanges in scientific, economic, social and cultural matters. Speaking in Leningrad, Prime Minister Mulroney proposed the creation of an Arctic Council as a political body of the eight circumpolar countries to coordinate and promote cooperation amongst them. His speech did not offer further details on the nature of the proposed Council.

Although the Canadian delegation sought to avoid giving prominence to security issues, on the final day of the visit, it was revealed that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had told Clark in private that the Soviet Union undertook not to send nuclear submarines into the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This statement was subsequently reiterated in a newspaper interview with Shevardnadze. Although Prime Minister Mulroney reaffirmed the Canadian position that the appropriate avenues for the discussion of arms control issues were "the current ongoing arms control negotiations between the two superpowers and the two alliances,"² Clark noted that President Gorbachev had suggested that arms control issues be kept under regular review by the two foreign ministers. Clark commented: "We agreed to that immediately because we think that that will provide us with the opportunity to make proposals and provide an occasion for them to be looked at on a very high level."³ The first bilateral Soviet-Canadian government meeting on Arctic issues, including security matters, took place in Ottawa in June 1990.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In September 1990, the US icebreaker *Polar Sea* -- the same ship which had transited the Northwest Passage in 1985 -- embarked on a ten-day voyage to undertake scientific research in Arctic waters. It was the third icebreaker since 1985 to cross the Passage. In accordance with the 1988 Agreement, the US Coast Guard sought permission from Canada for the voyage. By a Cabinet order dated 28 August 1990, the Canadian Government also exempted the *Polar Sea* from the strict regulations of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The Act contains provisions which permit an exemption if the vessel meets equivalent standards. However, no public explanation of the exemption was offered.⁴

In May 1991, the new Defence Minister Marcel Masse announced a number of cuts in defence programmes, including the proposed purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles intended for use in the Arctic. The procurement of the tracked vehicles had been part of the package of military decisions intended to reinforce Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

In late August 1990, the founding meeting of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was held at Resolute Bay, Northwest Territories. IASC is a non-governmental organization of scientists from Canada, the United States, the USSR, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland.

²*Commons Debates*. 27 November 1989:6237.

³*Commons Debates*. 27 November 1989: 6261.

⁴Dennis Bueckert. "Canada Drops Arctic Rules for U.S. Ship," *Ottawa Citizen*. 6 September 1990: A12.

It is intended to promote scientific cooperation throughout the Arctic. Commenting on the event, Joe Clark stated:

Negotiations were difficult and lengthy.... Our representatives helped find ways to accommodate the different interests of the founding members and to allow for future participation by non-Arctic countries.... This is the latest in a series of initiatives by our Government, including the introduction of legislation to establish the Canadian Polar Commission, which will advise the Government on Arctic issues and provide a focus for Arctic science in Canada.⁵

Continuing the emphasis on non-security aspects of Canada's Arctic policy, in November 1990, Joe Clark announced at a conference in Ottawa that Canada would formally propose the creation of an Arctic Council to the circumpolar states when they met in Finland in the spring of 1991. He added that Canada would be prepared to provide the secretariat for such a body. Subsequently, in January 1991, officials from several Government departments met with a private group, the Arctic Council Panel, to discuss the initiative. Officials again made it clear that the Council would not have a mandate to discuss security issues. In a background paper issued at about the same time, the Department of External Affairs described Canada's position:

Canada is interested in developing realistic measures aimed at enhancing peace and security in all areas, including the Arctic. Given the limited scope of military activity in the Arctic and this activity's fundamentally defensive nature, we see little point in Arctic-specific arms control negotiations.... Arctic security is not a special case and should not be treated in isolation from broader East-West military security issues.⁶

In regard to the proposed Council, the paper commented:

An Arctic Council would provide a forum for the circumpolar states to meet regularly and discuss issues of common interest related to the protection of the common environment, the development of Arctic economies and the interests of the Arctic peoples. Canada believes that the agenda of an Arctic Council should be flexible, allowing for growth as confidence increases. While we see no need to put formal limitations on the Council's mandate, we do not envision the Council addressing military security issues, which are more appropriately dealt with in other forums.⁷

Appearing before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs, Disarmament Ambassador Peggy Mason repeated this position, noting again that Canada would raise

⁵Department of External Affairs. "Canada Helps Create a New Arctic Research Group," *News Release*, no. 177, 24 August 1990.

⁶Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade. "Arctic Security," January 1991: 5.

⁷*Ibid.*: 6.

the proposal for an Arctic Council at the forthcoming meeting on the environment sponsored by Finland in the summer of 1991.

This meeting took place at Rovaniemi in June 1991, and resulted in a Ministerial communiqué, signed by all eight participating Arctic states, on the protection of the Arctic environment. The Canadian representative, Indian and Northern Affairs Minister Tom Siddon, subsequently commented:

This signing has brought to a culmination what has come to be known as the Finnish Initiative and has committed our eight nations to work together in pursuit of a common Arctic environmental protection strategy.

The importance of the Rovaniemi Declaration should not be underestimated. It represents the first time that the circumpolar nations have committed themselves at the ministerial level to a concerted plan of action to protect the Arctic environment. It opens the way to more extensive cooperation amongst us on a multilateral and bilateral basis. And it will enable our group to speak more forcefully and in a unified way in the United Nations and other international bodies about our concerns for the integrity of the world's Arctic lands and waters.

On the subject of the Arctic Council, the Minister commented:

It is important that we maintain the momentum that has been built by the Finnish Initiative. To this end, the Canadian Government has proposed that the eight Arctic nations explore seriously the idea of establishing a permanent Arctic Council. This body would, in effect, institutionalize the Finnish Initiative and create a common forum at which a larger set of common circumpolar concerns might be discussed on a regular basis.

Achieving a permanent Arctic Council among a group of nations with widely differing geographic, economic and strategic interests will not be a simple task. But we believe it is a goal worth pursuing.

To move the process along, Prime Minister Mulroney will be writing to the heads of Government of the seven other nations inviting them to send representatives to Canada later this year. Together they can begin exploring how such a Council might be constructed and what its mandate and responsibilities might be.⁸

Although the Ottawa June 1990 bilateral meeting between Canada and the Soviet Union was private, subsequent comment indicated that Clark had raised the issue of Soviet nuclear weapon tests in the Arctic. The Department of External Affairs reported:

Canada expressed these concerns directly to Mr. Shevardnadze, as have Canadian officials to their Soviet counterparts. Canada intends to monitor the issue closely and to explore the possibility of multilateral cooperation in assessing the environmental

⁸Tom Siddon. *Speech to the International Meeting of Aboriginal Northern Leaders*, Copenhagen, Denmark, 18 June 1991.

impact. We will continue to seek the assurances of Soviet authorities that stringent environmental safeguards are imposed on all testing. In Canada's view, nuclear testing in the Arctic appears contrary to the common aim of Canada and the USSR to protect the Arctic environment. It also calls into question the proclaimed Soviet desire for a denuclearized North.⁹

In April 1991, a meeting was held in Ottawa to assess the procedures used at the Novaya Zemlya test site and to examine the environmental consequences of nuclear weapon testing there. The conference was privately organized, but supported and attended by a number of the circumpolar states, including Canada. Senior Soviet officials provided, for the first time, detailed analyses of the geology of the Novaya Zemlya test site, the procedures used in burial of the explosive devices, permitted radiation levels and instances of serious venting. No official Canadian comment on this data has been made to date.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In November 1990, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs produced a report entitled *Maritime Sovereignty*. In discussing the Arctic, the Report commented:

At some point, resource development in the region will increase and it is important that we be able to exercise effective control. Having clear legal title to the Northwest Passage would help to ensure this, as would an enhanced surveillance capability.¹⁰

The Committee recommended, therefore, that the government "reconsider the cancellation of the *Polar 8* icebreaker and examine the possibility of acquiring long-range patrol aircraft."¹¹ It also recommended continued negotiation over the status of the Northwest Passage and asked the government to "examine the possibility of unilaterally obtaining an International Court of Justice ruling on Canadian sovereignty over the Passage."¹²

The Committee also recommended the installation of fixed acoustic sensors in the Arctic which would be capable of detecting intrusions "from all directions." It noted that while conventional submarines could operate on the fringes of the ice cap receiving information from the sensors, the

⁹Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division. *Arctic Sovereignty*, January 1991: 6.

¹⁰Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Maritime Sovereignty*, November 1990: 9-10.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

decline of Canada's submarine capabilities was a serious issue, and it recommended that a decision on the purchase of conventionally powered submarines be taken without delay.¹³

In questioning witnesses appearing before the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, MPs raised a series of issues related to the Arctic. These involved confidence-building measures, the cancellation of the *Polar 8* icebreaker, naval arms control, and nuclear submarines. Specifically, Marc Ferland raised the possibility of leasing nuclear submarines:

What do you think of the idea of Canada, not purchasing, but leasing 1, 2, or 3 nuclear propelled submarines so that we are able to inspect ourselves what is actually taking place under the ice in our territory and are thus in a position to enforce the observance by all parties of any demilitarization agreement relating to the Arctic?¹⁴

There has been no official comment on this matter.

¹³Ibid.: 27-28.

¹⁴For Mr. Ferland's comments, see: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 31, 22 November 1990: 17.

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15. CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

BACKGROUND

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to establish the procedures whereby US military systems might be tested in Canada. Entitled the "Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Programme," the agreement was for a five-year period and contained renewal provisions such that, if neither side exercised its right of withdrawal on twelve months notice, the Agreement could be extended for a further five-year period. The Agreement was so extended on 28 February 1988 for five-years. In principle, the Government of Canada would need to give notice of its intent to withdraw on or before 28 February 1992 should it wish to discontinue the arrangement in 1993.

The Agreement allows the United States to request the testing of artillery, helicopters, surveillance and identification systems, and the guidance system on unarmed cruise missiles. It specifically prohibits bringing into Canada biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and the Canadian Government has the right to refuse any specific request to test a weapon system.

Although a number of systems have been tested under the Agreement, the most prominent has been the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). On 15 July 1983, the Government announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B cruise missile, which was then designed to be carried by the B-52 bomber and used as a stand-off strategic nuclear warhead against the Soviet Union. With a range of up to 1,500 kilometres, the cruise missile is released from the bomber and, powered by a small jet engine, flies aerodynamically to its target, if necessary at very low altitudes.

The guidance system of the AGM-86B is based on terrain-contour matching, which requires an on-board computer map of the attack route which is then compared with the actual terrain below. The missile also uses a radar altimeter to maintain low-altitude flight in a variety of topographical conditions. Since 1983, most tests in Canada have been in the winter months, since the cold-weather terrain is similar to that of the attack routes across the northern areas of the Soviet Union.

On 17 January 1989, the United States requested and obtained an amendment to the specific agreement on the testing of the AGM-86B to include the AGM 129-A Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), which incorporates certain elements of "stealth" technology and may have both a longer range and a higher speed than the ALCM. Whereas the ALCM/B-52 combination was generally seen by military analysts as a second strike, retaliatory weapon, the stealth potential of the ACM, combined with the superior performance of the B1-B bomber, raised public concerns in Canada that the ACM might constitute a first-strike weapon.

However, on 1 February 1989, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that Canada would allow testing of the ACM. Both he and then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stressed the increasing capabilities of Soviet cruise missile forces, and argued that the US cruise missile programme contributed to stable deterrence and the prospects for balanced arms control agreements. The first test of the ACM in Canada took place on 2 March 1989. A second "captive carry" test took place on 24 March 1990. Following a typical cruise missile test flight path, the B-52 flew over the Beaufort Sea and the Mackenzie River Valley, east over the area intersecting the Northwest Territories, Alberta and British Columbia, and south to the area of the Primrose Lake weapons testing range near the Canadian base at Cold Lake, Alberta.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In a departure from the previous pattern of tests, a further test of the ACM took place over northern Canada on 30 October 1990. The first and only test in the winter months of 1991 took place in late January. Both tests appeared to be uneventful, although in the second case, DND statements made clear that the test had been planned before the Gulf crisis, and was in no way connected to the deployment of cruise missiles in the Persian Gulf. The Government did not comment further on the rationale for testing.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Cruise missile testing was not debated in Parliament during the period under review. However, MPs from both opposition parties made statements in connection with the test conducted at the end of October 1990. On 29 October, Warren Allmand commented:

It is now 1990 and we have seen a major change in east-west relations with detente, cooperation, and arms reductions. Yet, today, another U.S. cruise missile will be tested in northern Canada.

We are now in the post cold-war era, with a treaty on intermediate nuclear weapons already signed and treaties on conventional arms, chemical weapons, and strategic missiles well advanced. What then is the purpose of continued testing of U.S. Cruise missiles in Canada?...Canada...should put an immediate end to Cruise missile testing in Canada.¹

¹*Commons Debates*. 29 October 1990: 14800.

On 30 October, Dan Heap commented:

...two years ago the government said it would continue testing Cruise missiles in Canada until progress is made on disarmament.

Two years later the Cold War is over. Gorbachev is reducing Soviet arms and dissolving the Warsaw Pact. He has offered to make the Soviet Union a non-nuclear weapons state if NATO will do the same.

Why is the government promoting war fever by testing the Cruise missile over northern Canada today? When will the government contribute to peace by ending the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada?²

²Commons Debates, 30 October 1990: 14875.

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16. DEFENCE BUDGET AND POLICY

BACKGROUND

In its 1984 election campaign, the Progressive Conservative Party drew attention to the underfunding of Canada's military forces, and promised to increase defence spending at an annual rate of 6 percent over and above inflation. After achieving office, the Mulroney Government delayed announcing a long-term policy on defence, pending the publication of a new Defence White Paper. On 5 June 1987, the Government tabled its White Paper, entitled *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* in the House of Commons.

In regard to defence budgets, *Challenge and Commitment* drew attention to the low level of funding of defence over the previous twenty-five years. Inevitably, the portion of the defence budget that suffered most from this neglect was that used to buy new equipment. In 1962-63, more than 20 percent of the budget was spent on capital projects. This level generally declined throughout the 1960s, until it reached a low point of about 9 percent in 1972-73. It began to increase thereafter, but it was not until about 1982-83 that it went above 20 percent again. In 1985, NATO countries spent, on average, about 25 percent of their defence budgets on equipment acquisition.¹

The White Paper set out an ambitious weapons acquisition programme over a fifteen-year period. This included the purchase of nuclear attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, a new main battle tank for the planned divisional commitment to NATO's Central Region, and associated communications equipment. In explaining the funding of this programme, the White Paper noted that major weapons programmes require long-term planning to produce results, and continued:

To provide a planning framework in which equipment decisions respond to, rather than lead policy, the Government has developed a new long-term planning and funding process. A rolling five-year funding plan will be introduced within a fifteen-year planning framework. An annual Cabinet review, each autumn, will establish firm budgets for the following five-year period, and planning guidance for the remaining ten years.²

In regard to the funding requirements of the acquisition programme, the White Paper announced that the Government was committed to "a base rate of annual real growth in the defence budget of two percent per year after inflation, for the fifteen year planning period." Above this two percent, additional funds would be added as necessary when major projects were introduced into the programme.

¹Department of National Defence. *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa, June 1987: 43.

²Ibid.: 67.

In the 1988 budget, the first after the White Paper, the budget estimates provided \$11.2 billion for defence, which constituted a real increase after inflation of 2.7 percent. About 26 percent of the total budget was allocated to capital expenditures. In 1989, however, planned expenditures for defence were held at \$11.34 billion, effectively marking a decline in expenditures after inflation as compared to the White Paper commitment of a minimum of 2 percent increase after inflation. Amongst other capital acquisition cancellations and cutbacks, the 1989 budget statement also cancelled the nuclear attack submarine programme. This severe reduction in the defence budget was a part of the Government's deficit reduction programme. Of a total expenditure reduction programme of \$1.545 billion in the 1989 budget, the defence share was \$575 million, or 37.2 percent of the total. The 1989 budget also forecast that over the following five years a total of \$2.7 billion would be saved through cuts in defence expenditures.

The 1990 federal budget did not cut defence expenditures to the extent anticipated in the five-year forecast. Although planned expenditures did not meet the White Paper commitment to a real annual increase of 2 percent, DND was allocated a 5 percent nominal increase -- that is, including inflation -- for the fiscal years 1990 and 1991. In 1990, therefore, the total defence budget was estimated at \$12.005 billion.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 23 November 1990, Supplementary Estimates, tabled in the House of Commons included \$350 million for the Department of National Defence. In explaining the increase, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight stated:

The Canadian Government's decision to deploy Canadian Forces to the Persian Gulf, together with its response to Quebec's request for assistance at Oka and Chateauguay, have imposed dramatic, unforeseen pressures on the national defence budget. Additional funds are therefore required to continue supporting Canadian Forces (CF) operations in the Gulf in their current role and to maintain an acceptable level of general military preparedness for our forces in Canada.¹

The \$350 million Supplementary Estimate included \$16 million to help offset the cost of operations at Oka, with the balance going towards various activities related to the Persian Gulf deployment.

¹National Defence. "Statement by the Minister of National Defence the Honourable Bill McKnight on Supplemental Funding," *News Release*, 69/90, 23 November 1990: 1.

Oka and Chateauguay

The total cost of the Canadian Forces operations were calculated to be \$83 million, of which \$6 million were for the deployment and return to base of CF personnel, and \$77 million for the cost of operations to 31 October 1990. The cost of operations included pay and allowances, the operating costs of vehicles and other equipment, rental of the equipment, rations and similar expenses. Costs other than the supplementary \$16 million were absorbed in the regular defence budget.

The Persian Gulf

In the Supplementary Estimates, the net operating expenditures of the Canadian Forces in the Gulf were estimated to be \$646 million to 31 March 1991, including approximately \$90 million per month, or \$525 million in total for "sustainment," comprising pay and allowances, the operating costs of all ships, aircraft and other equipment, rations and quarters, and other miscellaneous expenditures. Of this amount, \$81 million was provided in the Supplementary Estimate, while an unspecified amount was absorbed through scaling down operational training and exercises elsewhere.

In addition to these items, the supplementary estimates contained two further items. First, \$132 million was allocated for "military preparedness in Canada," which included \$17 million in contingencies for the continuance of the Gulf commitment after 31 March 1991. Second, \$121 million was allocated for re-equipping ships and aircraft for operations in the Gulf, and "to advance acquisitions of capital equipment which were originally planned for future years in the Defence Services Program." On 13 December 1990, then Defence Minister McKnight announced the acquisition of five CC-130 Hercules transport aircraft at a total cost of approximately \$220 million. \$100 million of this amount came from the sum set aside in the Supplementary Estimate.²

The 1991-1992 Estimates

In describing the external factors which influenced the budget, the National Defence Estimates concluded:

A principal priority of the Government is easing the federal deficit problem. Canada's security depends on a healthy economy, which, among other things, provides the resources needed to mount a defence of Canada and Canadian interests. Aside from the

²National Defence. "Acquisition of Five New Hercules Aircraft," *News Release*, 76/90, 13 December 1990: 1.

special funding demands created by the situation in the Persian Gulf, the growth in defence spending in 1991-92 will be at a nominal rate of five percent of the previous year's Main Estimates, exclusive of statutory costs.³

In accordance with the 1990 Budget, therefore, the 1991-92 defence budget provided for a nominal growth of 5 percent, or \$550.4 million, over the 1990-1991 budget. When certain other adjustments were made, the final increase was 5.6 percent, giving a total defence budget of \$12.83 billion. Of this amount, 21.1 percent is committed to capital expenditures as compared to approximately 24 percent in 1990.

Figures 1, 2 and 3 on the next page show Canadian defence expenditures in relation to other NATO countries, defence personnel as a percentage of the labour force in NATO countries, and Defence Expenditures in relation to other government expenditure envelopes.

In addition, \$600 million was included in the main estimates to fund the cost of activities in the Gulf after 1 April 1991 which could not be absorbed in the main budget. These resources are held within a controlled allotment. To the extent that the funds are not required for commitments emanating from activities in the Gulf, the allocation will lapse and the funds revert to the Treasury Board.

Defence Policy

After the collapse of the 1987 Defence White Paper, throughout 1990 Government spokespersons indicated on various occasions that a new statement of policy on defence was in preparation. Although there were general expectations that the statement would be released before the end of 1990, in December 1990, official comment indicated that it would be placed before Cabinet in the spring of 1991. Towards the end of April, it became evident that the long-awaited statement had indeed been presented to the Cabinet, but not yet approved. On 24 April, Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas, head of Maritime Command and Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, submitted his resignation some months in advance of his planned retirement. In a letter to Defence Chief General de Chastelain, and in subsequent press conferences, Thomas took issue with the fifteen-year defence plan apparently submitted to the Cabinet in February.⁴

³National Defence. *1991-1992 Estimates*, Part III: 21.

⁴For Admiral Thomas' letter of resignation, and the reply by General de Chastelain, see: Department of National Defence. "Resignation of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff," *News Release*, 26 April 1991, AFN: 17/91.


Figure 1:
Defence Expenditures as a % of
GDP (1989)

USA	5.9
Greece	5.6
Turkey	4.4
UK	4.2
France	3.7
NATO Average	3.2
Portugal	3.2
Norway	3.0
Netherlands	3.0
Germany	2.8
Belgium	2.7
Italy	2.3
Denmark	2.2
Spain	2.1
Canada	2.0
Luxembourg	1.2

Figure 2:
Defence Personnel as a % of
Labour Force (1989)

Greece	5.6
Turkey	4.5
Belgium	2.8
France	2.8
USA	2.7
Portugal	2.6
NATO Average	2.5
Netherlands	2.5
Italy	2.4
Norway	2.4
Germany	2.3
Spain	2.1
UK	1.7
Denmark	1.4
Canada	1.0
Luxembourg	0.9

Figure 3: Major Government Expenditures by Envelope



Thomas' principal objections to the proposed policy centred on its affordability and on the structure and roles of the Canadian Navy envisaged in the statement. In regard to affordability, Thomas wrote:

I must admit that I did not believe that another defence policy which proposes an unaffordable programme and promises capability which cannot be delivered would actually be proposed to government.⁵

Thomas did not elaborate on the funding basis of the statement, or his claim that it was unaffordable. In regard to the future of the Canadian Navy, Thomas was specifically opposed to the apparent intention to buy corvettes instead of future batches of the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF), and to the delay in replacing the existing force of Oberon-class submarines. He wrote:

I would agree that the centre of day to day activity may be in Canadian coastal waters (east and west). That is why we must progress and buy the MCDV [mine counter-measures] vessels. However, inshore requirements alone cannot determine the kinds of ships and submarines required for the future. It is a fact that blue water mid-ocean combat capable warships, in combination with the MCDV, can do any work Canada needs done at sea. They can be employed in the Persian Gulf or the offshore of Newfoundland. Corvettes can't. They have neither the reach nor the seakeeping...they are the wrong ships and won't be cheap. In my judgement the next most affordable and widely employable naval surface ship is likely to be a variant of CPF type vessels for which design and infrastructure cost have already been paid.⁶

Admiral Thomas went on to deplore the delay in replacing the conventional submarines, arguing that it would lead to the surrender of sovereignty "over the undersea water space surrounding our country," and strongly opposed the apparent priority in the statement presented to the Cabinet on the re-equipment of an expeditionary brigade group.

In his reply, which was supported by new Defence Minister Marcel Masse, Chief of the Defence Staff General de Chastelain took strong exception to Thomas' dismissal of the proposed new brigade group. Acknowledging that the 1987 White Paper was "out of step with changing geopolitical circumstances and unaffordable," he argued that "we must offer the Government the broadest possible range of military options" to meet future security requirements. Specifically, de Chastelain noted that the Navy would receive 40 percent of capital expenditures over the fifteen-year period (as compared to 33 percent for the Air Force and 27 percent for the Army).⁷

⁵Ibid.: 1/4.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.: 3.

On the question of future defence budgets, de Chastelain wrote:

...affordability is the very point on which we have focussed our attention most closely. Indeed, the principal point we have made to Government is that we should accept, as a given, the reduced funding levels which three years of severe fiscal restraint have imposed on us, and plan the future in light of realistic expectations.⁸

De Chastelain went on to note that 95 percent of the equipment funding requirements over the fifteen-year planning period had been identified. On the question of the expeditionary brigade group, he wrote:

The implication that the retention of an expeditionary brigade group capability denies needed money to the navy is only one point of view. The proposition that Canada should not maintain the ability to deploy even one brigade group abroad is to my mind short-sighted and unprofessional; and, as you are well aware, attracted no support in the departmental resource group over which you have presided these past two years.⁹

De Chastelain's response, therefore, strongly implied that the funding base for the fifteen-year programme would follow the defence budgets of the past several years, suggesting, therefore, that planning was based on a constant defence budget with no after-inflation increases in defence spending. As indicated above, the 1991-92 defence budget published in the Main Estimates released in February 1991 essentially indicated a zero growth defence budget.

Thomas' letter of resignation, and de Chastelain's reply, referred so frequently to the proposal before Cabinet that even though de Chastelain wrote that he could not "engage in public debate," it appeared that the proposal to Cabinet contained the following recommendations:

- the re-equipping of "an expeditionary force brigade group" as a priority investment;
- by indirect references in Thomas' letter and the response from de Chastelain, the long-term development of naval forces to comprise the currently authorized twelve new Canadian Patrol Frigates, four modernized Tribal class destroyers, and an unspecified number of corvettes as a substitute for future batches of the frigates;
- the twelve mine-sweepers promised to the Navy Reserve;
- a "modest" conventional submarine replacement programme "within a few years."

⁸Ibid.: 2.

⁹Ibid.: 5.

On 14 June 1991, speaking in Berlin, Prime Minister Mulroney commented:

In the course of 1991, in keeping with decisions announced in the 1990 budget, Canada will reduce its personnel in Germany by 1,400 people. And, after consultations with our allies, we will be reducing the size of our forces stationed in Germany further. My Cabinet colleagues and I will meet soon to determine the nature, scale and timing of these reductions. But Canada will not be withdrawing completely from Europe. Canadian forces will remain as long as there is a residual threat to European and Canadian security here and as long as we are needed and welcome.¹⁰

During the course of the year the prospect that one or more Canadian bases in Germany might be closed became part of a broader discussion of base closings. In general, despite frequent questioning by regional MPs, government spokespersons declined to comment specifically on which Canadian bases might be closed, with the exception of Goose Bay. According to official documents obtained by the St. John's Sunday Express, in February 1989, the Canadian Government announced new fees for all foreign users of Goose Bay, amounting to a doubling of the charges for the US Air Force to \$12.1 million. The latter resisted, but in May 1990, the Canadian Government repeated its position that the United States must pay the increased fees. In July 1990, the United States announced that it would withdraw from the base in July 1991.¹¹ Noting that a ten-year agreement with the German, British and Dutch air forces expires in 1996, Defence Minister Marcel Masse was quoted as commenting:

It's not in our mandate to pay for things we don't need. If the allies don't need Goose Bay, its sure we don't need all that heavy infrastructure. If the need disappears, the base disappears.¹²

In regard to announcements about other base closings, the Minister, and Associate Minister Mary Collins, indicated that the entire Cabinet would be involved in the eventual decision, leaving little doubt that the issue of base closings was closely linked to the promised revision of defence policy.

¹⁰Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Mulroney, Berlin, Germany," 14 June 1991: 3.

¹¹"Ottawa lost Goose Bay duel," *Globe and Mail*, 9 July 1991: 4.

¹²"Goose Bay may shut in '96, Masse warns," *Toronto Star*, 15 July 1991: A9.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In late October 1990, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs issued its Third Report to the House dealing with Canada's Maritime Sovereignty.¹³ The Committee recommended that the Government revive the Polar 8 icebreaker project, and acquire more long-range patrol aircraft for Arctic surveillance and the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. It also called for more helicopters to support search and rescue operations, and urged rationalization of activities among the seven departments of government which are involved in maritime activities, arguing that DND is best equipped to perform most tasks even though overfishing, smuggling and pollution are becoming more important than the traditional East-West confrontation. In its conclusion the Report commented:

All Committee members share the belief that the government should undertake a major re-examination of Canadian security policy. A new review ought to be extensive, and culminate in the publication of policy recommendations by 1 January 1992.¹⁴

A great deal of Parliamentary comment focussed on details of the budget, and on base closings. In both cases, however, opposition critics pointed to the absence of an overall policy. William Rompkey, for example, speaking for the Liberals, commented on the request for supplementary estimates for the military action in the Gulf:

We are talking about supplementary estimates and a defence budget in the complete absence of policy, as far as I can tell. The White Paper is gone. There is no White Paper to replace it, in spite of the fact that we have asked for that. We have also asked if we as a committee can participate in a public way to help put that new policy together, and that has not happened.... We are being asked as Parliament to approve supplementary estimates in a policy vacuum, and I cannot see how any responsible parliamentarian can be expected to do that.¹⁵

NDP critic John Brewin asked what public consultation was being undertaken by DND in the development of the review, and Louis Delvoie, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) responded:

There are ongoing contacts with centres of military and strategic studies that exist across the country in 14 different universities, with a whole host of think tanks and associations that take an interest in defence questions, and so on. Moreover, the

¹³Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs [hereafter SCND Hearings], *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 28, 30 October 1990.

¹⁴*Ibid.*: 67.

¹⁵SCND Hearings, no. 36, 13 December 1990: 10.

Minister has invited the public generally to write to him with their views on defence issues.¹⁶

There was no indication, however, that the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs would be consulted in advance of the Cabinet decision on the new defence policy. The same appeared true of base closings. In response to many interventions by MPs representing constituencies in which base closings appeared possible, Government spokespersons uniformly declined to discuss specific bases. In response to a question concerning the Long Point military base in Montreal, for example, in October 1990, Defence Minister Bill McKnight commented:

...there has been a preliminary study of depots throughout Canada...because of budgetary restrictions, because of the need for operational efficiency, and because of the changing geopolitical situation around the world, I cannot guarantee bases in any place in Canada or abroad.¹⁷

In Committee discussions, Associate Minister Mary Collins noted the relationship between equipment procurement and infrastructure in a time of tight budgets. In 1988-89, 26.2 percent of the budget went to equipment purchase and maintenance, whereas Collins predicted that 22.2 percent would be allocated in 1991-92. She commented:

...we are again going through the process of trying to come to the best mix of numbers of people and appropriate infrastructure to accomplish our job and hopefully be able to increase the percentage of our budget for equipment so the three can be more in line than they have been in the past. Equipment was down as low as 8 percent in the mid-1970s. Now we are looking at about 22 percent.... The percentage on equipment has naturally fallen back, because we have not reduced our personnel and infrastructure proportionately.¹⁸

Committee discussions with Collins also indicated that the total armed forces personnel would drop in 1991-92 from just under 87,000 to 85,000.¹⁹

¹⁶Ibid.: 22.

¹⁷*Commons Debates*. 25 October 1990: 14700.

¹⁸*SCND Hearings*, no. 62, 21 March 1991: 24.

¹⁹Ibid.: 16.

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17. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

BACKGROUND

Canada is an original member of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949. Article 5 of the Treaty defined the obligation of the members to collective defence:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 6 of the Treaty defined more precisely the area covered by the collective defence agreement:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America...on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

In regard to Article 5, during the bilateral negotiations on the 1958 North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD), the Canadian Government sought US agreement to establish NORAD as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty framework. This arrangement was not supported by the United States. There is, however, a Canada-United States Regional Planning Group which reports to the NATO Council. In regard to Article 6, this continues to define territorially the Treaty obligation assumed by the signatories. The problem of dealing with "out of area" conflicts has been a recurring issue in NATO, of which the most recent major example was the conflict in the Gulf.

During the negotiation of the Treaty, Canada also placed great emphasis on Article 2, which calls upon the Parties to promote peace "by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being." Although rarely invoked in the cold war years that followed, Article 2 has become of much greater interest in the past year as NATO has sought to adapt to a more political role.

After the onset of the Korean War, the United States began to station large numbers of ground and air forces in NATO Europe. On a smaller scale, Canada followed suit. Canada based an armoured

brigade group in Germany under the former, under the sector command of the British Army of the Rhine, and an RCAF division at bases in Germany and France. Canada has since participated fully in both the military and political institutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Responding to increasing public debate about the value of maintaining forces in Europe, in 1967 both the Liberal and Conservative Parties promised to review Canada's role in NATO, while the NDP supported withdrawal. On becoming Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau initiated a major review of Canadian foreign and defence policies. One outcome of the defence review, first announced in 1969 and confirmed in the 1971 White Paper, was a reduction of Canadian forces in Europe and changes in tasking. The land element was reduced from 10,000 troops to 5,000, and co-located at the existing RCAF bases at Lahr and Baden Soellingen in the NATO Central Region of southern Germany as a reserve force to US and German armoured divisions. The air element was reduced from six to three squadrons and assigned a conventional ground attack role. Canadian maritime forces operating in the western Atlantic are also committed to the maritime defence of the NATO area, but are based in Canada.

When these commitments were revised in the 1971 White Paper, Canada also retained a battalion group commitment to Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force Land (AMF/L), which was designed, according to the 1971 Defence White Paper, as "a multi-national, quick reaction, air-transportable force designed to act as a demonstration of allied solidarity in times of tension on the flanks of the Treaty area." The further commitment to send a combined air-sea transportable (CAST) combat group from Canada to north Norway was also retained, and appeared to gain in importance as a consequence of the reduction in the land and air forces permanently stationed in Europe.

After assuming office in 1984, on 11 March 1985, the Mulroney Progressive Conservative Government announced an increase of 1,220 military personnel in the strength of the Canadian forces stationed at Lahr in southern Germany. The object, according to then Defence Minister Erik Nielsen, was "to meet fully our commitments to NATO." The 1987 White Paper announced further changes in Canada's European NATO commitments. First, the Government declared its intention to withdraw from the CAST commitment to northern Norway. The commitment was officially terminated on 30 November 1989. As a replacement, on 24 June 1988, NATO announced the creation of a composite force for the northern flank, consisting of units from the United States, West Germany, Norway and Canada. The Canadian contribution consisted of a battalion comprising 1,200 personnel previously committed to the AMF/L, but now committed exclusively to the defence of northern Norway.

Second, the White Paper announced that the brigade group in southern Germany would be reinforced to division strength. This was to be accomplished by adding additional personnel and equipment to the brigade in Europe, and reinforcing the existing brigade group (4 CMBG) in times

of crisis with the equivalent of a second brigade normally based in Canada. Following the 1989 budget, it became clear that the new equipment planned for the division would not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, but senior Department of National Defence (DND) officials affirmed that the plan for a division-sized commitment to NATO remained in place.

In addition to these commitments, Canada also provides training facilities for NATO forces on Canadian territory. Shilo, Manitoba, is used by German troops for tank training, while the British Army uses facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British, Dutch and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying. From 1984 until May 1989, the Goose Bay facility was a candidate, along with Konya, Turkey, in the NATO competition for a new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre. In May 1989, the NATO defence ministers announced the indefinite deferment of plans to establish a new centre, citing, amongst other things, the changed international environment and pressures on defence budgets. The bilateral agreements between Canada and those countries currently using Goose Bay were not affected by the NATO decision.

Changes in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO Alliance

In 1990, the changes in Europe triggered by the new policies of the Soviet Union continued apace, posing new challenges to NATO doctrine and policy. In July 1990, the London Declaration of a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance recognized that NATO "must and will adapt" to the changing political map of Europe. Taking due note of the unification of Germany, the transformation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the potential of the CSCE to become "more prominent" in Europe's future, the London Declaration reaffirmed the position of NATO:

We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these last four decades. Yet our alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united Europe, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.¹

Since the London Declaration of July 1990, the political need to reassess NATO's role has been underlined by several further developments. First, on 12 September 1990, a Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was signed in Moscow by the two Germanies and the four

¹NATO. "London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance." *Press Release S-1(90)36*, London, 5-6 July, 1990: 1.

former occupying powers. The Treaty provides, *inter alia*, for the right of a unified Germany to belong to alliances. In Article 2, the two German governments "reaffirm their declarations that only peace will emanate from German soil." In Article 3, they renounced the manufacture and possession of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and declared that a unified Germany would adhere to the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Federal Republic also declared that it would reduce its armed forces to 370,000 over a period of four years, beginning with the entry into force of the first agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe (CFE).

The reunification of Germany took place on 3 October 1990. In an address to the NATO Council, Secretary General Manfred Worner commented: "We now include the whole of Germany in our alliance as we reassess our strategy and our force posture. I do not doubt that we will rapidly succeed in this endeavour."

In a second major development, in early 1991, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) effectively disbanded. Following Soviet decisions to withdraw its troops from eastern Europe, representatives of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in Budapest to formalize the end of the alliance as a military structure. Following a Soviet proposal for early elimination of the military structure of the alliance while leaving in place other WTO structures until March 1992, on 31 March 1991, Soviet military commanders in the eastern European countries formally acknowledged the termination of their military role.

Finally, in November 1990, the CFE agreement was presented to the Paris summit meeting of the CSCE. There is broad agreement amongst military planners and analysts that adherence to the force reductions established in the CFE agreement, combined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Europe, makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to achieve a decisive victory in the early stages of a European conflict. In sum, as NATO addressed questions concerning its future force structure in the spring of 1991, there was broad agreement that there was no longer a direct threat to alliance security posed by a massive, standing-start Soviet offensive across what was, prior to 3 October 1990, the inner German border.

CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY

On 20 September 1990, former Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that 1,400 military personnel would be brought home from Europe. The Minister added that the move was brought about by cuts in the defence budget over the two previous years. In response to questions from the press, McKnight was reported as saying that the cuts were in line with those of the allies:

The UK is reducing by two full divisions. The United States has announced a reduction of 190,000. The French are reducing. We have said that as the political situation and the security situation changes in Europe, we also will be making reductions.²

In a brief reference to NATO while addressing the CSCE summit meeting in Paris on 19 November 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney commented:

NATO continues to provide much-needed stability in a rapidly changing world; but we believe that stability can be assured at much lower levels of conventional and nuclear strength.³

However, the major elements of evolving Canadian policy towards NATO and the changes in eastern Europe were set down in an article written for a NATO publication by then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. Clark began by noting Canada's links to eastern Europe:

The remarkable events in Eastern and Central Europe are intensely personal for millions of Canadians whose roots are there. Many have ties of language and family. Some were forced to flee by the very regimes that have now collapsed. Most have family or friends whose hopes were thwarted, or lives diminished, by those old regimes, but who have the prospect now of building new lives and new societies in old homelands. Virtually no other nation possesses the web of intense personal connections to Eastern and Central Europe that we have in Canada.⁴

In emphasising this linkage, Clark went on to note the establishment by Canada of a task force on Eastern and Central Europe which was developing a three-pronged programme:

The first element will focus on economic development, including technical assistance and management training in areas such as agriculture, law, taxation, privatization, environment, finance and telecommunications. The second element will be a political cooperation programme focusing on the mechanisms of democracy. Its priorities will be to provide expertise in the areas of elections, law reform, a free media, the development of a professional public service, human rights and the democratic political process. Finally, the Task Force will look into the best ways in which to support Canadian business in the pursuit of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities with Eastern European partners.⁵

²Toronto Star, 21 September 1990.

³Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the CSCE Summit," 19 November 1990: 2.

⁴Joe Clark. "Canada's stake in European Security," *NATO Review* 38, no. 5 October 1990: 2.

⁵Ibid.: 7.

On military matters, Clark affirmed that "a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there remains crucial." While recognizing the historic significance of Canada's military presence, he nevertheless, at another point in the article, warned that the "military contribution is however bound to change over time." In contrast, Clark strongly endorsed a more political role for NATO:

Such a change meets long-standing Canadian interests. In fact, Article 2...which provides for active political cooperation and the promotion of free institutions, has often been called the Canadian clause in recognition of the role played by Prime Minister Lester Pearson in its creation.⁶

In regard to issues outside Europe, Canada joined with other members of the NATO Council in condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In particular, a Council statement on the Gulf issued on 18 December 1990 read in part:

We note that the crisis in the Gulf poses a potential threat to one of our Allies having common borders with Iraq, and we reaffirm our determination to fulfill the commitments stipulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty whereby an armed attack against one of our states shall be considered an attack against them all. We reiterate our firm commitment to the security of the entire southern Region, the strategic importance of which is highlighted by this crisis.⁷

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Most comment in Parliament tended to focus on the CSCE and conventional force reductions rather than NATO policies as such. However, in speaking to the debate on the Paris meeting of the CSCE in November 1990, NDP Defence critic John Brewin appeared to reaffirm his Party's long-standing position on Canadian withdrawal from Europe. In addressing the role of NATO military forces, he commented:

The target has gone. There is no military requirement for Canadian and American troops in Europe. The only remaining argument is a political one, that is that somehow American and Canadian troops are required to counter-balance some development in Germany.... We spend \$1.2 billion a year on maintaining a contingent in Europe. Everyone in this house can consider other more valuable and useful expenditures.... I suggest in the circumstances that is frankly immoral...we

⁶Ibid.: 3.

⁷NATO Council. *Statement on the Gulf*. Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 18 December 1990.

should continue to have a place at the table in view of our long historic relationship with Europe, but we do not need NATO to do that.⁸

⁸Commons Debates, 8 November 1990: 15311-15312.

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18. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE AGREEMENT (NORAD)

BACKGROUND

During the 1950s, Canada and the United States entered into a series of agreements concerning the air defence of North America. The purpose was to provide early radar warning of a Soviet bomber attack against North America following attack routes across the Arctic. The first of these radar networks was the Pinetree Line, built in 1951 at latitude 50°, followed by the Mid-Canada Line, an all-Canadian project completed in 1954 at 55° latitude. Still seeking greater warning time to ensure the ability of its bomber fleet to leave their bases on warning of a Soviet attack, Washington sought Canadian cooperation in the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across the 70th parallel, which was completed and opened in 1957.

During the same period, the Royal Canadian Air Forces (RCAF) and the United States Air Force (USAF) cooperated closely in the effort to provide an active air defence against the Soviet bomber threat, developing arrangements and operational procedures which treated Canadian and US air space as a single theatre for planning purposes. In 1957, an informal North American Air Defence Command was established, which, after surviving the transition from the Liberal to Conservative Governments in Canada in 1957, was formally established by executive agreement on 12 May 1958. The NORAD Agreement created a single command for the control of US and Canadian interceptors, the headquarters of which were located at Colorado Springs. Since the Agreement came into force, a Canadian officer has been Deputy Commander of NORAD, which was established in the first instance for a ten-year period.

From 1958 to 1962, great efforts were made to perfect continental air defences. The United States developed an advanced Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) command and control system using state-of-the-art computers to help analyze incoming tracks and direct interceptors, a series of new interceptors (the F-101, F-102 and F-106) was developed, and air-to-air nuclear weapons were designed and deployed by USAF. This effort was overtaken, however, by the growing perception that the emerging strategic nuclear threat was the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), not the manned bomber. After 1962, the deployment of active air defences was halted, the number of interceptors reduced, and further modernization was restrained.

At the same time, NORAD assumed an increasing role in strategic warning of a ballistic missile attack. In 1958, a crash programme was developed to build the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), and to develop a network of sensors, which came to be called the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS), to keep track of objects in space. In the United States, efforts intensified to develop an effective anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system which could be deployed in the late 1960s, at which time, it was believed, the Soviet ICBM threat would be at its peak. NORAD

was heavily involved in this transition from air to aerospace defences, but the Canadian role in space surveillance was considerably more limited than that in air defence, since BMEWS radars were not based on Canadian territory and Canada contributed only two Baker-Nunn deep space cameras to the SPADATS network.

As the initial period of the Agreement approached its end in 1968, therefore, there was a considerable difference of approach between the two parties. The United States was in the throes of a debate about the feasibility and wisdom of deploying an ABM defence, and would have liked, in any event, to reflect the shift to aerospace in the title of the joint command. The Pearson Government in Canada was leery of involvement in ballistic missile defences, wished to place greater emphasis on strategic arms control, and accordingly resisted any change in the NORAD Agreement which would emphasize the increasing role of NORAD in "aerospace" defence rather than "air defence." Accordingly, in the negotiations prior to the 1968 renewal, Canada sought and obtained a clause stating that the agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The title of the Command also remained the same despite the US desire to change it to North American Aerospace Defence Command.

Thereafter, air defence was consistently accorded a low priority in US strategic planning, primarily because of superpower agreement on the ABM Treaty and SALT I, and the relatively minor role of the manned bomber in Soviet strategic offensive forces. The NORAD renewals in 1973, 1975 and 1980 (for one year only because of the imminent Canadian election) were relatively uneventful, and marked the emerging role of NORAD as a "coastguard of the air" rather than the hub of an extensive air defence system. In March 1981, the Agreement was again extended for a five-year period, but with two significant changes. First, the ABM clause was deleted on the grounds that, since the United States was a signatory to the ABM Treaty, it was inappropriate to imply that only Canada was committed to avoiding the deployment of an ABM system. Second, Canada agreed to change "Air" to "Aerospace" in the name of the joint command, thereby recognizing the fundamental changes in the roles of NORAD which had taken place after 1963.

In 1985, one year before the formal expiry of the Agreement, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney met in Quebec City, and announced, *inter alia*, an agreement on North American Air Defence Modernization. The Agreement covered the following:

- four long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars, one of which was to be located in Alaska and the others in the continental United States;
- a North Warning System (NWS) to replace the DEW Line;

- use of Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS) to supplement the DEW Line in times of alert and to include Canadian officers in the crews;
- the upgrading of forward operating locations (FOLS) and dispersed operating bases to accommodate interceptor and AWACS aircraft;
- improvements to command and control and communications elements in the warning system.

The NWS, originally planned to be completed by 1993, will comprise fifteen minimally attended long-range radars, eleven of which are in northern Canada, and thirty-nine short-range, unmanned radars, thirty-six of which are in Canada. The NWS utilizes many of the prepared DEW Line sites, and cannot, therefore, provide surveillance of the most northerly Canadian Arctic territories. However, for the first time, all radar stations in the Canadian north will be staffed by, and under the operational control of Canada. On 29 September 1990, at an official ceremony at Hall Beach, Canada took formal responsibility for the operation of the Canadian elements of the NWS. The eleven long-range Canadian radars were completed in 1988, while the short-range radars sites in Phase Two of the NWS were planned for completion in 1993. The cost of the NWS is \$1.3 billion, of which Canada will pay forty percent, a cost-sharing ratio which applies also to the operation and maintenance of the system.

In regard to other elements of the 1986 Agreement, in 1987, Canada identified five forward-operating locations for the use of NORAD forces at Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and at Kuujjuaq in Quebec. In late 1990, the United States Air Force decided to scrap two OTH-B radars planned for a northward-looking facility in Alaska, and a southward-looking site in North Dakota, but took occupancy of two sites on the east and west coasts. However, in April 1991, the decision was taken to operate the east coast site in Maine, which has the ability to scan an area from Greenland to Cuba, for only forty hours each week, while USAF intends to turn off the west coast facility, but to maintain it with a skeleton crew. This decision did not appear to have any immediate impact on the Canadian plan to develop a Canadian Coastal Radar system, comprising three radars on the east coast and one on the west coast, which was intended to fill gaps left by the OTH-B system.

The 1987 Canadian Defence White Paper also indicated two additional programmes relevant to NORAD. First, Canada decided to participate in the US Air Defence Initiative (ADI), which is intended to investigate the application of new technologies to the detection, tracking and interception of bombers and cruise missiles, including those with "stealth" characteristics. The ADI programme, which is very small in comparison with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), has focussed primarily on detection of cruise

missiles. Second, Canada is pursuing an independent \$50 million research and development programme intended to explore the feasibility of space-based radar able to detect small, low-flying objects such as cruise missiles. The research is intended to continue for a seven-year period.

During 1990, a slight shift in emphasis in NORAD became evident. Major General J.D. O'Brien, Commander of the Fighter Group, Canadian NORAD Region, released an analysis which indicated a significant drop in Soviet bomber activities off the Canadian coasts, while cautioning that the Soviets still maintained a major capability to threaten Canadian territory. Second, in May 1990, then Defence Minister McKnight announced that the Canadian NORAD region would "implement a policy of directing all unidentified aircraft which enter the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) to land at a recognized point of entry." This announcement followed a government decision in August 1989 which authorized the use of Canadian NORAD forces in support of drug interdiction activities, and was intended to support the counter-drug activities of the RCMP and other government departments.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 19 April 1991, former External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight jointly announced that the two governments had agreed to renew the NORAD agreement for a further five years. The Agreement was signed in Washington before the end of the expiry of the current agreement on 12 May. In announcing the renewal, the two ministers commented:

NORAD has been and continues to be an efficient and cost-effective means for Canada to protect its sovereignty and national security by providing prompt, reliable information on possible or reported incursions and threats to Canada's air and aerospace. Together with NATO, NORAD continues to play a vital role in safeguarding Canada's defence and security interests.

In agreeing to the renewal, both governments have also acknowledged that with respect to their common interest in maintaining effective surveillance and control of North American aerospace, such control includes the monitoring of aircraft suspected of smuggling illegal drugs into North America. This reflects the important counter-narcotics mission which both governments assigned to NORAD since the Agreement was last renewed.¹

The agreement to accord NORAD a role in counter-narcotics was not incorporated in the text of the NORAD Agreement, which remained unchanged from 1986, but was recognized in

¹Government of Canada. "Canada and United States to Renew NORAD Agreement," *News Release*, 19 April 1991.

an exchange of notes, dated 30 April 1991, which formally extended the Agreement for a five-year period.

The 1991-92 Estimates confirmed the ongoing commitment to three programmes under the North American Air Defence Modernization agreement. First, construction continues on thirty-six short-range radars in northern Canada, with completion of the sites and their communications facilities expected in 1992-93. The NWS short-range radars in Alaska are planned for installation in 1993 and expected to be completely operational in 1994.

Second, construction is underway at the four FOL sites in the Northwest Territories, with work on the site at Kuujuaq, Quebec to begin following an environmental assessment. Two sites for AWACS dispersed operating bases at Edmonton and Bagotville will be completed during the current fiscal year. Third, plans continued to contract for the construction of four new, long-range microwave Canadian Coastal Radars to be fully operational by the mid-1990s. The total cost of the three programmes is currently estimated at \$1.25 billion.²

In April 1991, press reports from Washington suggested that, as part of a broad attempt to rationalize commands and resources, the Pentagon was considering a proposal to create a new Strategic Command which would include the offensive strategic forces of the US Navy and Air Force, and the strategic surveillance and air defence forces of NORAD. Responding to editorial comment which raised questions about Canada's involvement, through NORAD, in this suggested Strategic Command, Lieutenant-General R.W. Morton, Canadian Deputy Commander of NORAD, commented that it is

...incorrect to allege that a new organizational structure would merge NORAD, Space Command, Strategic Air Command, and the US Navy's ballistic missile submarine force. The NORAD agreement is a government-to-government document with clearly stated purposes. They are: to provide vital early warning of aerospace attack; to provide appropriate response to air attack; and to protect the air sovereignty of Canada and the US. This is a full-time job, functionally and organizationally distinct from the mission of the strategic offensive forces of the United States. While the US Department of Defense is looking at several organizational options as it reduces force structure, it is simply not true that NORAD will be merged with any other commands.³

²Government of Canada. *National Defence 1991-92 Estimates*. February 1991: 100.

³Lieut.-General R.W. Morton. "No expansion of Canada's NORAD Role," Letter to the Editor. *The Toronto Star*, 16 May 1991: A26.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In September 1990, The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) appointed a Sub-Committee to consider the NORAD renewal. The Sub-Committee commissioned a report from a panel of experts, which was later presented in SCEAIT Hearings, along with the written submissions of a number of public interest groups, Canadian industry comments, and a lengthy brief from the Dene Nation.⁴ The intention was to produce a report which would be tabled in the House of Commons by the full Committee.

Neither the Sub-Committee nor the full Committee, however, was able to reach agreement on a report. Noting that "unresolvable difference arose over the period and terms of a 1991 renewal of the Agreement," the Committee was nevertheless able to agree on the following:

Given the extraordinary changes in East-West relations and the ending of the cold war, the Government should carry out, in the first two years of any NORAD renewal period, a comprehensive public review of Canada-United States defence cooperation and the future surveillance needs of Canada, the United States and their northern neighbours.

As part of the review process, there should be a full and frank Canada-United States political dialogue about NORAD's future; about Canada-United States defence cooperation; and about the future surveillance needs of Canada, the United States and their northern neighbours. To that end, Parliament should initiate an exchange of views and information between Canadian and American legislators, with the first of the meetings for this purpose taking place before the termination of the NORAD agreement on May 12, 1991.⁵

In its announcement of the intention to renew the Agreement, the Government supported the proposal to carry out a public review of defence cooperation. However, no bilateral meeting of legislators took place before the formal renewal of the Agreement.

⁴Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 77, 18 and 19 December 1990.

⁵*Ibid.*, 77A: 1-2.

SECTION III -- CONFLICT RESOLUTION

19. CAMBODIA

BACKGROUND

The current situation in Cambodia has its immediate origins in the Vietnamese invasion in 1978, which resulted in the installation of a pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh. Canada, along with other western governments, suspended aid to Vietnam and, in 1982, recognized a coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk rather than the Phnom Penh Government of Hun Sen. Although the issue was brought before both the General Assembly and the Security Council, great power disagreement prevented action. China supported the Khmer Rouge faction of the opposition coalition, the Soviet Union supported the Vietnamese-installed government of Hun Sen, and the United States supported the two non-communist factions led by Prince Sihanouk and former prime minister Sonn Sann. In the case of the United States and its allies, this was not without its embarrassment since Sihanouk insisted that the Khmer Rouge, who are alleged to have killed one in every five Cambodians when they held power in Cambodia, should play a part in a post-settlement government.

Following a General Assembly recommendation that the Secretary-General should exercise his good offices in assisting the parties to arrive at a solution, after 1982, a Special Representative of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar sought to reconcile the viewpoints of the parties. Despite continued efforts in the following years, little progress was made until April 1989, when Vietnam announced that it proposed to withdraw its estimated 50,000 troops from Cambodia by the end of September. On 30 July 1989, nineteen nations, including Canada, together with the four Cambodian factions, participated in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia under the chairmanship of France. As co-chair with India of one of the main committees, Canada was involved in particular in drawing up ceasefire terms and defining an effective "international control mechanism" to assist in the implementation of a settlement. While the Conference was underway, a UN fact-finding mission, which included a Canadian representative, visited Cambodia, and returned to report that the effective monitoring of a ceasefire would require a peacekeeping force of 6,000 personnel.

The Paris Conference made considerable progress, but could not resolve all of the issues relating to power-sharing, or the role of the United Nations, which was distrusted by the Hun Sen government since the General Assembly recognized the opposition coalition and not the Phnom Penh government. Shortly afterwards, a number of governments, including Canada, declined a Phnom Penh invitation to participate in an observation mission to witness the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, which appeared to conclude on schedule at the end of September 1989. In December 1989, further progress seemed possible when Prince Sihanouk accepted an Australian proposal that called for the replacement of the Hun Sen government by a temporary UN trusteeship which,

accompanied by the UN peacekeeping force, would administer the country on an interim basis while training Cambodians to take over. In return for Hun Sen stepping down, Sihanouk promised to abandon his claim to the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. The proposal also called for the Cambodian parties to form a National Council in which Cambodian sovereignty would be vested.

In January 1990, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council endorsed a settlement along the lines of the Australian plan. Subsequently, Canada, along with other western countries, indicated that they would support a formula which would leave vacant the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. Further negotiations with and amongst the Cambodian factions and government followed, but without reaching agreement on the phasing and details of a settlement process. Within the opposition coalition, the Khmer Rouge in particular resisted the provisions of the Australian proposal. In late May 1990, the Permanent Members met again, and spelled out the conditions for UN participation in a peace plan. The political settlement, they declared, must include specific provisions for United Nations control over a ceasefire, an end to foreign military aid, free and fair elections under UN auspices, guarantees of human rights, and an agreement to guarantee the territorial integrity and unity of Cambodia.

Despite the ongoing disagreements between the non-communist members of the coalition and the Khmer Rouge, the Permanent Members continued to meet to develop a comprehensive plan for Cambodia. The search for consensus was greatly strengthened in July 1990 when the United States withdrew its recognition of the opposition coalition, and began talks with Vietnam on a solution to the Cambodian conflict. On 27 August 1990, the Permanent Members concluded a detailed agreement on the transition in Cambodia, marking the first time that they had been able to agree on all aspects of a settlement blueprint, which according to diplomatic sources, might involve as many 10,000 UN peacekeepers and 10,000 UN civilian administrators. On 10 September 1990, the four Cambodian parties met in Jakarta and apparently committed themselves to the UN framework for a comprehensive peace plan. They agreed to form a Supreme National Council composed of representatives from all four groups. The Council would represent Cambodian sovereignty, hold the Cambodian seat at the United Nations, and develop peace plans for submission to the Paris Conference.

Subsequently, however, further disputes between the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen government, particularly on the issue of representation on the proposed Supreme National Council, again thwarted agreement on the peace plan. Despite continued attempts to adjust the plan to gain the support of the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen government, during the winter and spring of 1991, the agreement of the four Cambodian parties continued to elude diplomatic efforts. In the same period, renewed fighting took place in Cambodia, giving rise to fears that the Khmer Rouge might be able to impose a solution by force. On 17 July, to the accompaniment of continued high levels of fighting in Cambodia, the Permanent Members held their fifth 1991 meeting on Cambodia. After a private,

two-day meeting they announced that a further round of negotiation would be held in late August 1991, but gave no indication that the four Cambodian parties were any closer to agreement.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Basic Canadian policies on the Cambodian conflict were articulated in 1989-1990. Specifically, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark had identified Canadian views on the prerequisites for an effective international control mechanism:

The mechanism should enjoy the full support and cooperation of all the parties, it should have a clear mandate including the necessary freedom of action and movement, it should be charged with reporting responsibilities to a recognized international authority, it should be established on a viable financial basis, and it should be of limited duration.¹

On 25 January 1990, Clark spoke of the Canadian position towards the Khmer Rouge:

The central problem in the Cambodian conflict remains how to deal with the Khmer Rouge in an eventual settlement process. ...Each position we, as a government, have taken on the question of Cambodia has been grounded in a determination never to allow the Khmer Rouge back into power.²

In the same speech, Clark also recognized that the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh "appears to have provided adequate government, and its record in most areas is far better than the Khmer Rouge Government which preceded it."³

During 1990-91, there was little change in the Canadian position, while it awaited the results of the efforts of the Permanent Members to obtain consensus on a comprehensive peace plan. Following the meeting of the four Cambodian parties in Jakarta in early September 1990, Clark expressed full support for the agreement reached by the parties. Clark announced that Ambassador Alan Sullivan, as co-chair of the First Committee of the Paris Conference dealing with the international control mechanism, would visit the capitals to determine what further work should be done, and complimented the Permanent Members:

¹Department of External Affairs. "Speech to the Paris International Conference on Cambodia, 30 July 1989," *Statement* 89/36: 3. For further details on the Canadian position on Cambodia in 1989-90, see *The Guide* 1990: 333-338.

²Department of External Affairs. "Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, on Canada and Indochina," *Statement* 90/05, 25 January 1990.

³*Ibid.*

The agreement could not have occurred without the impetus provided by the Permanent Five. Their hard work over the past eight months in hammering out a framework document provides further evidence of the capacity of the UN to devise practical ways to resolve difficult world problems.⁴

On 18 June 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall announced that Canada would open a diplomatic office in Hanoi, Vietnam on 1 July 1991. She commented:

By establishing a diplomatic presence in Vietnam, Canada will be in a better position to encourage ongoing reforms, monitor the human rights situation and implement our new aid program. It allows Canada to be an even more active player in the Cambodian peace process.⁵

On 22 July, speaking to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur, McDougall again supported the continuing efforts of the Permanent Members, and added:

At the same time, we believe that, in the end, it is of fundamental importance that any settlement be "made in Cambodia," for without the complete co-operation of all factions we cannot hope to have a durable peace.

We wish to thank publicly our Indonesian colleagues for their relentless efforts in support of the peace process. The efforts of those others involved, those within the permanent five, Thailand and Australia, have, at one time or another, kept alive the prospect for peace in Cambodia.⁶

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue in 1990-1991.

⁴Secretary of State for External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 201, 11 September 1990.

⁵Secretary of State for External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 144, 18 June 1991.

⁶Secretary of State for External Affairs. *Statement*, 91/35, 22 July 1991.

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BACKGROUND

In 1987, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias proposed a peace plan for the five Central American states which called for each country to begin a process of national reconciliation, ceasefires within existing constitutional frameworks, an end to the support of insurgents in other countries, free and democratic elections, measures to help the repatriation of refugees, and cooperative efforts to seek international economic aid. The Arias Plan, also known as the Esquipulas II Accord, was noteworthy because for the first time, all five Central American countries -- Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua -- signed the Accord.

In March 1988, direct talks began in Nicaragua between the Sandinista government and representatives of the Contras, and between opposition factions and governments in Guatemala and El Salvador. Little progress was achieved in 1988, but in February 1989, the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras reached an agreement in which the Sandinistas agreed to a democratic election in February 1990 in return for a promise from Honduras that the Contra bands operating within its borders would be disbanded. Immediately after this agreement, the five presidents met again and agreed, *inter alia*, to invite UN observers into the region. On 24 February 1989, the five governments wrote to the UN Secretary-General requesting a team of unarmed military observers from Spain, West Germany, Canada, and an unspecified country from South America. The main tasks of the observers would be to verify that none of the countries involved in the Accord supported subversive activities across borders, to report on guerilla movements across borders, and to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.

On 27 July 1989, the Security Council, including the principal backer of the Contras, the United States, adopted Resolution 637 which urged the Secretary-General to support the objectives of the Esquipulas II Accord. The five Central American governments reached further agreement at a meeting in Tela, Honduras, on 7 August 1989, when they agreed to the disbandment and repatriation of the Contras by the end of the year under the joint supervision of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). The Tela agreement also called for a "constructive dialogue" between the government and FMLN opposition forces in El Salvador. Immediately after this agreement, the United Nations moved to establish three verification teams. The International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) was established jointly by the United Nations and the OAS to oversee the disbandment and resettlement of the Contra forces. A second body, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), comprising Canada, Germany, Spain, Venezuela and Ireland, was established to verify compliance with the provisions of Esquipulas II concerning prohibition on transborder military activities. Finally, the United Nations Observer Mission for the

Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was set up to monitor the Nicaraguan elections scheduled for 25 February 1990.

As an active supporter of the UN role in the Central American peace process, Canadian specialists participated in the reconnaissance mission to define the operational requirements of ONUCA. Canada also sent eight official representatives to the UN team verifying the Nicaraguan elections. In those elections, on 25 February 1990, the National Opposition Union defeated the incumbent Sandinista government. Shortly afterwards, on 23 March, new President Violeta Chamorro announced that the Contras already based in Nicaragua had agreed to report to internationally supervised zones to surrender their weapons by 20 April 1990. On 19 April 1990, the Chamorro government and Contra leaders signed a further agreement providing for an end to the ten-year war and the disbandment and disarmament of all Contra groups by 10 June 1990. Despite delays and further disputes, on 27 June 1990, the remaining Contra leaders surrendered their weapons to President Chamorro in the presence of ONUCA and OAS military representatives.

In El Salvador, progress towards peace has been considerably more difficult. After two rounds of unsuccessful negotiations between the government of President Cristiani and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in autumn 1989, in late October fighting broke out again between the opposing sides. On 16 November 1989, regular forces of the Salvadoran army entered the University of Central America and shot six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter. Internationally, the murders resulted in urgent demands for a full investigation by the Cristiani Government, and drew attention to the need for an international presence in El Salvador to monitor the human rights record of the government. A subsequent US Congressional investigation found that senior officers had resisted investigation of their role in the crime and the ensuing cover-up, but there was little indication in 1990-91 that those responsible for the crime would ever be brought to justice.

Second, on 25 November 1989, an aircraft from Nicaragua carrying missiles and other weapons was shot down over El Salvador, leading Cristiani to suspend diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and casting doubt on compliance with the Esquipulas II agreement not to transfer military equipment across borders. Subsequently, the five presidents requested that the ONUCA mandate be expanded to include prevention of the supply of weapons to both the Contras and the FMLN.

During 1990, progress towards a settlement in El Salvador was extremely slow. In late August, Alvaro de Soto, special representative of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, acknowledged that, after six rounds of negotiations under the auspices of the UN, plans for a September ceasefire were no longer realistic. It was widely believed that without such a ceasefire, the FMLN and other opposition parties would boycott the municipal and national elections planned for March 1991. There was, however, an exception to the general lack of progress. In July 1990, the Cristiani Government

and the FMLN were able to reach a formal agreement on human rights. The parties agreed to allow the United Nations to establish an unprecedented, nationwide, long-term human rights verification mission. In principle, the mission was to be established after the signing of a ceasefire. In April 1991, however, the Secretary-General proposed that the human rights mission, which would be the first part of a larger operation officially titled the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), could be established ahead of a ceasefire and a political settlement. The Secretary-General proposed that the human rights component of ONUSAL could be on the ground beginning in June 1991.¹

The role of the armed forces remained at the centre of efforts to find a political solution in El Salvador. Although not publicly released, in November 1990, reports indicated that a UN peace plan contained provisions for an independent commission to investigate and dismiss military officers guilty of human rights violations, and to dismantle a large part of the country's security forces. In February 1991, unconfirmed reports indicated that a draft UN plan called for a temporary partition of the Salvadoran countryside into FMLN and army areas, with about 8,000 UN troops supervising the demarcation line.

Finally, on 27 April 1991, government and FMLN negotiators reached agreement in Mexico City on constitutional reforms which, amongst wide-ranging reforms to bolster an independent judiciary and the electoral process, explicitly subordinated the Salvadoran military to presidential control, stripped them of security functions, and enabled the National Assembly by majority vote to rescind a presidential directive to use the military to enforce order in a declared emergency. However, the agreement was conditional on a ceasefire, which continued to elude negotiators. In late June 1991, with the UN peace process again stalled, President Bush released a part of previously withheld military aid to the Cristiani Government, citing FMLN intransigence as the reason. According to US State Department figures, since 1987, the United States has authorized US \$440.5 million in military aid to El Salvador, and US \$1.5 billion in economic aid.

In mid-summer 1991, therefore, the continuing obstacles to a ceasefire agreement in El Salvador appeared to be the FMLN demand that the army recognize its control over territory during a ceasefire, and the future of the army itself.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In his speech to the General Assembly on 26 September 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark referred to "the successful conclusion of the democratic process" in

¹Report of the Secretary-General, *Central America: Efforts Towards Peace*, UN Security Council S/22494, 16 April 1991.

Nicaragua, and noted that "the UN's unique experience and expertise in peacekeeping has been invaluable."² On 7 December 1990, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that the 89 Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (89 RWAU) and a number of Canadian Forces observers would be brought home from Central America. Canadian participation in ONUCA involved 173 personnel, as well as eight medium and light helicopters of 89 RWAU. The observers were stationed in all five Central American countries, with 89 RWAU based at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. In commenting on the withdrawal, Defence Minister Bill McKnight commented: "The easing of tensions in Central America since ONUCA's arrival proves how effective UN peacekeeping operations can be."³

Following the demobilization of the Contra forces in mid-1990, the United Nations reassessed the requirements for ONUCA, and concluded that in circumstances of reduced tension it would be possible (and less expensive) to contract a civilian helicopter company for air transport. About thirty Canadian personnel remain with ONUCA, which may play a role in both El Salvador and Guatemala, should the peace negotiations in those countries reach a successful conclusion.

In regard to El Salvador, in November 1990, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark responded to the increase in military activity by placing primary responsibility on the FMLN:

This offensive action by the FMLN is a backward step and is not conducive to efforts towards national reconciliation in El Salvador. A year ago, many Salvadorans were killed, injured or orphaned during the FMLN's November offensive. These recent attacks have already claimed lives, and will only add to the suffering of the Salvadoran people. We urge both the FMLN and the Government...to continue the pursuit of a negotiated settlement.⁴

In the same statement, Clark referred to the murder of the Jesuit priests, declaring it "unacceptable that the perpetrators of this inhuman act have not yet been brought to justice."⁵

In March 1991, Canada dispatched eight official observers to serve with the OAS group monitoring municipal and legislative elections in El Salvador. The group reported relatively minor technical flaws in the election, which was boycotted by the FMLN.

²Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Speech to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, 90/55, 26 September 1990.

³Department of National Defence. "Repatriation of Canadian Forces Air Resources and Observers from Central America," *News Release*, 75/90, 7 December 1990.

⁴Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Clark expresses deep concern about FMLN offensive in El Salvador," *News Release*, no. 273, 23 November 1990.

⁵*Ibid.*

On 1 May 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall expressed strong support for the constitutional package agreed to by the Cristiani Government and the FMLN in Mexico City and subsequently passed by the legislative assembly, and went on to note with satisfaction that the parties had renewed their commitment to allow both an independent Salvadoran Commission to investigate human rights violations and a United Nations human rights observer mission (ONUSAL) to operate in El Salvador.⁶

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 19 November 1990, commenting on a non-governmental organization (NGO) recommendation that Canada provide more technical resources for UN election monitoring, NDP member Ray Skelly observed in Committee:

It seems to me that the Canadian government in the monitoring process has given credibility to a government in conducting elections that really do not assist democracy in that country. My recollection is that virtually each one, although they found some minor technical problems with it, has given a clean bill of health to each election in El Salvador. Yet what in fact they have done is given credibility to a government that is run by armed forces.⁷

On 13 March 1991, NDP critic Svend Robinson raised the issue of the El Salvador elections, which he said, "according to OAS observers from Canada and elsewhere were marked by intimidation, threats and fraud." He continued:

In view of the latest allegations...will the minister assure the House that he will voice Canada's serious concern to the El Salvadoran authorities about this attempt to steal the apparent victory of the democratic opposition in these already very seriously flawed elections?⁸

Acting for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in his reply, Minister for International Trade John Crosbie noted that the Canadian observers would report formally through the OAS, but that the government would hear their views informally on their return from El Salvador. "When we receive these reports from our observers, we will then make a considered opinion on this matter."⁹

⁶Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Welcomes Progress on Peace in El Salvador," *News Release*, no. 104, 1 May 1991.

⁷Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 73, 19 November 1990: 23.

⁸*Commons Debates*. 12 March 1991: 18402-3.

⁹*Ibid.*

Reviewing US policy and aid to El Salvador, Robinson then asked:

Will the Prime Minister today, in his meeting with US President George Bush, urge President Bush to stop funding this bloody military regime which has been responsible for over 70,000 deaths?¹⁰

In his reply, Crosbie referred to the continuing peace negotiations, and commented: "With respect to American policy in the area, that is for the United States government to decide." His continuing response indicated that the issue was not on the agenda for the Bush-Mulroney meeting.¹¹

On 12 April 1991, Robinson posed the following written question in the House of Commons:

Did the Canadian government send an RCMP Officer and a staff member of the Canadian Embassy in Costa Rica to conduct a technical review of the Salvadoran police investigation into the assassination of the six Jesuits and two women at the University of Central America at some time in the last two years and, if so, what was the content of any reports submitted to the Canadian government from this delegation.¹²

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark submitted the following written response:

In a statement at the OAS November 30, 1989, the Canadian Permanent Observer stated that Canada would consider any request from the authorities of El Salvador to help in the investigation of the assassination of the six Jesuit priests and their employees. At the request of the Salvadoran government, the Canadian Ambassador, accompanied by the RCMP Liaison Officer and another officer of the embassy in San Jose accredited to El Salvador, visited San Salvador from January 4-6, 1990 for meetings with the government, the Church and the University of Central America. The Embassy officials later met British, Spanish and American officials, as well as the Salvadoran Special Investigative Unit and two criminal investigators from Scotland Yard. They concluded with the assessment that the investigation, to that point, was proceeding in a serious and professional manner. The Salvadoran government made no specific request for assistance, and, since the investigation soon moved from the forensic to the judicial phase, it did not lend itself to Canadian technical intervention. No recommendation for further action was submitted to the RCMP.¹³

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²*Commons Debates*. 12 April 1991: 19458-59.

¹³Ibid.

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21. CONFLICT IN THE SOVIET UNION¹

BACKGROUND

The policies of glasnost, perestroika and greater democracy, advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev since he came to power in 1985, have made it possible for the fifteen republics which make up the Soviet Union to take steps towards greater independence. During 1990-1991, earlier moves towards independence by the Baltic republics were followed by Georgia and Moldova and in 1991, Gorbachev used military force in the Baltic republics for the first time, ending a policy of peaceful negotiation.

All fifteen of the Soviet republics have declared some form of sovereignty or independence. The moves towards complete independence taken by the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have been given the most international attention, perhaps due to their relatively recent experiences with independent statehood. Canadian comment has focussed more on the situation in the Baltic republics than on other areas and consequently, this section reflects that emphasis.

The three Baltic republics were formerly part of the Russian Empire and emerged from World War I as independent states. As part of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, these countries were annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. Each republic, although linked to the others by common histories, is linguistically and ethnically discrete and varies greatly in urban/rural mix.

Estonia was the first of the three to move towards independence, declaring sovereignty on 16 November 1989. This declaration was followed a year later, on 12 November 1990, by a declaration that the 1940 vote to join the Soviet Union was illegal because it occurred under military coercion. The invalidity of the 1940 vote and acceptance of the 1938 constitution were to be used as a basis for negotiating a new relationship with the Soviet Union. On 8 May 1990, the sovereign and independent Republic of Estonia was declared, using its 1938 constitution as a base.

Lithuania took a much stronger first step. After multi-party elections in February 1990, on 11 March 1990, the Lithuanian Parliament announced the formation of the Lithuanian Republic, declared the 1940 vote illegal and reinstated the 1938 constitution. In contrast to Estonia, Lithuania's declaration of the invalidity of the 1940 vote was equated with an assertion that Lithuania had never been part of the USSR and was, therefore, not now part of the USSR.

¹This entry covers events in the Soviet Union relating to the struggle of certain republics to move toward independence. *The Guide* was going to press in August, prior to the failed coup attempt in mid-August and subsequent events relating to the independence of the Baltic republics. Consequently, this entry does not reflect those changes.

When Lithuania refused to rescind its declaration in compliance with a demand from Gorbachev, an economic embargo against the republic was put in place. This embargo placed a tremendous strain on the Lithuanian population and economy. On 16 June, the Lithuanian cabinet proposed that a moratorium be placed on the 11 March declaration to allow for negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was passed by the Parliament on 29 June 1990.

The third Baltic republic, Latvia, declared independence on 4 May 1990, but has taken a gradual approach overall and has been willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union. (For an in-depth examination of the moves to independence by the Baltic republics, see Chapter 29 in the 1990 edition of *The Guide*.)

The declarations of sovereignty and independence have in some areas sparked actions by minority groups who fear discrimination by republic governments. Moldova (previously Moldavia) declared itself sovereign on 24 June 1990. Moldova was annexed from Romania in 1940 and the majority of its population are ethnic Romanian. However, approximately 150,000 Christian Turks, known as Gagauz, live in a small area within the republic. They fled to Moldova in the 1830s in order to avoid religious persecution in Turkey.

In response to the Moldova declaration of sovereignty, the Gagauz declared themselves independent in August 1990. In late October, the Gagauz planned to hold elections for a new government. However, thousands of Moldavan "volunteers" armed with clubs and other weapons began travelling to the Gagauz region on 25 October, in an effort to stop the elections. The Moldavans surrounded the area and set up roadblocks and the Gagauz prepared to fight. On 26 October, the Moldavan parliament declared a state of emergency, abolishing the Gagauz governing council, banning public meetings, and restricting travel. Both Gagauz and Moldova officials requested help from Moscow and Soviet Interior Ministry troops were sent to the area to oversee and permit the withdrawal of the Moldavans from the Gagauz region.

On 24 November, after two years of promises, Gorbachev unveiled a draft version of his proposal for a new union treaty. The new plan would create the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics, replacing "socialist" with "sovereign." It proposed a Federation Council which would include the President and Vice-President of the Soviet Union and the heads of all of the republics. The central government would maintain control over defence, borders, foreign policy and foreign economic policy as well as control over gold and diamond resources. The treaty was immediately rejected by Lithuania because it did not recognize the republic as a separate state. Latvia and Estonia also refused to discuss the treaty. On 17 December, in the face of increasing criticism of the draft, Gorbachev proposed that there be a nation-wide referendum on the treaty to allow citizens to express their opinion.

The new year opened with a marked change in the policy and actions taken by the Soviet government. On 2 January, Lithuania announced that it was withdrawing its offer to suspend its March 1990 declaration of independence due to the failure of the two sides to agree to begin negotiations on Lithuania's status. The two sides had held talks in October with a view to preparing for negotiations within weeks. However, with the appearance of Gorbachev's new draft union treaty in November, the Soviet government announced that there would be no negotiations with republics on the nature of their status until after the union treaty was signed.

On 7 January, the Soviet Defence Ministry announced it would send divisions of paratroopers into seven republics -- the three Baltics, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine -- in order to assist local authorities in picking up men who had been conscripted into the Soviet army but had not reported for duty. Large numbers of men drafted to the army from the Baltic republics did not report. For example, in Latvia, of 4,000 drafted last fall, only 1,000 reported for duty. The move heightened tensions in the republics, especially in the Baltic republics which had made repeated requests for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in the area. Contributing to the tension, on 27 November, the Soviet Defence Minister announced that Soviet troops had been given the authority to use force in order to defend themselves and government institutions if threatened.

On 8 January, approximately 5,000 pro-Soviet demonstrators (primarily Russian and Polish minorities) surrounded the Lithuanian parliament building protesting against proposed price rises. The demonstrators began smashing windows and were forced back by police. The police were soon joined by thousands of nationalist Lithuanians responding to a call for support from President Landsbergis. Protests and the stand off between the two groups continued for a second day. At the same time Soviet troops surrounded the parliament buildings and the television station. On 10 January, Gorbachev sent a message to the Lithuanian government warning that it was violating the USSR Constitution and the Constitution of Soviet Lithuania. The latter had been declared void with Lithuania's declaration of independence and Gorbachev demanded, as he had done many times, that it be reinstated.

The next day, 11 January 1991, Soviet troops in the capital city Vilnius took over the headquarters of the Lithuanian Defence Council and seized the Lithuanian printing house. At the printing house, a Soviet colonel responded to being doused with a water hose by shooting back at the building, wounding a security guard in the process. Seven civilians were injured that day. Overnight on 12 January, the army continued to raid various buildings including police, telephone and railway offices.

On 13 January, Soviet forces stormed the Vilnius Radio and Television tower using tanks and machine guns to force their way through unarmed civilians who had surrounded the station. Thirteen people were killed in the incident and 230 were injured. Thousands of citizens set up barricades around the Lithuanian parliament buildings preparing for any effort by Soviet troops to take the building.

Although a National Salvation Committee did not actively take control of Lithuania, it imposed a curfew and banned public gatherings on behalf of the Soviet Government. January 14 and 15 were declared national days of mourning. The actions by the Soviet Union received widespread condemnation internationally.

On 20 January, 100,000 people in Moscow participated in a protest against the crackdown. On the same day, Soviet troops attacked an Interior Ministry building in Riga, the capital of Latvia, killing four civilians. The attack came after a number of earlier incidents involving Soviet army raids on public buildings in the city.

There were further incidents in Lithuania, but at the end of the month, apparently in response to international pressure, Gorbachev announced that all excess Soviet troops were being withdrawn from the republic. On 9 February 1991, Lithuania held a national referendum in which 90.47 percent of the voters supported Lithuanian independence.

Other republics also took strong steps towards complete independence. In Georgia, on 30 January 1991, the Georgian parliament approved the establishment of its own armed forces and voted to abolish the Communist system of local government and to close a number of state farms. During February and March, unrest in the republic of Georgia between the Ossetian minority and Georgian nationalists (which had prompted the intervention of Soviet troops in December) continued. On 31 March, 89.5 percent of voters in a referendum supported the idea of an independent Georgia. On 1 April, the Soviet legislature authorized a state of emergency and sent troops to Georgia to end a siege in the South Ossetia area. On 9 April, the second anniversary of the killing of nineteen civilian protestors by Soviet troops in Georgia, the Georgian parliament unanimously agreed to declare Georgia independent.

Continuing an effort to maintain control of rebellious areas, in May, Soviet troops occupied Nagorno-Karabakhskaya, an area in Azerbaijan inhabited by Armenians. The Soviet government maintained that the villages were being used as bases for illegal paramilitary groups and that the Soviet troops were enforcing a July 1990 presidential decree requiring that illegal groups be disarmed.

During this entire period, President Gorbachev continued in his efforts to develop a new union treaty and his campaign for a favourable vote on the upcoming national referendum. Just prior to the referendum, on 9 March 1991, a new version of the draft treaty was published. The proposed treaty would establish a federative democratic state based on the voluntary union of equal republics. Local authority was broadened but the central government would still maintain control over areas such as defence and state security. As the original treaty does, the draft treaty accepted that republics had the right to secede but did not include specific procedures for secession.

The referendum took place on 17 March 1991. Voters were asked: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" Of the 136 million who voted, 79 percent supported the idea of a renewed federation. Six republics -- the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Moldava and Armenia -- boycotted the referendum.

On 24 April, talks between Gorbachev and the nine republics that had agreed to negotiate (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia and Turkmenia) resulted in a joint statement on a future path for action on a new union treaty. The statement acknowledged that a new union must be one between "sovereign states." In exchange for this acknowledgement, the nine republics agreed to maintain law and order and to work within the existing system until a new system was established. The statement recognized the right of the six republics that did not participate in the negotiations to make an independent decision about whether to sign the new treaty. However, signatories to the treaty would form a single economic bloc, to the exclusion of the others. Within six months of the signing of the new treaty, a new constitution would be ready, to be followed by elections to the new official bodies including -- for the first time -- a direct election of the Soviet President by one-man-one-vote suffrage. The treaty was finalized and opened for signature on 24 July 1991.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has never recognized the 1940 annexation of the Baltic States and recognizes their *de jure* independence.

Speaking to a conference on Canadian-Soviet relations, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark discussed the problems faced by the Soviet Union and Canada's support for Soviet reform. Clark noted that the strength of the Canada-Soviet relationship depended on the success of reform. However,

Canada is not a fair-weather friend of the Soviet Union. We support reform unreservedly and unambiguously.... This is a window of opportunity.... We must support reform because reform is right. We must support a new order there because it affects a new order elsewhere.²

²Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at a Conference on Canadian-Soviet Relations at the Government Conference Centre," *Statement*, no. 90/68, 28 November 1990: 4.

When Soviet troops moved into seven republics to enforce conscription, Mr. Clark issued a statement expressing concern about the situation, stating that Canadian concerns had been "forcefully" conveyed to the Soviet Ambassador and that Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had given Mr. Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney assurances that there would be no crackdown in the Baltic states.³

Canadian-Soviet relations cooled considerably after the use of military force in Lithuania and Latvia in January. Both Mr. Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney condemned the use of violence in Lithuania. Mr. Clark issued a statement in which he outlined the comments he had made to the Soviet Ambassador. Mr. Clark said that he had indicated that Canada deplored the use of force against a democratically elected government, that the Soviet Union must abide by its commitments under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and that any further use of force would be detrimental to Canadian-Soviet relations.⁴

A news release from the Office of the Prime Minister indicated that the Prime Minister had written President Gorbachev to "express the abhorrence of all Canadians at the unwarranted violence" used in Lithuania.⁵

The Prime Minister appealed for Mr. Gorbachev to show restraint and avoid further bloodshed. He urged the Soviet President to seek solutions consistent with the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the legitimate aspirations of Lithuania and the other Baltic States.... The Prime Minister advised that Canada was reviewing its offers of technical assistance and new lines of credit for the purchase of foodstuffs.⁶

Similar condemnations were issued in response to the violence in Latvia on 20 January.⁷

In a speech during an emergency debate on the situation in the Baltics in the House of Commons, Mr. Clark announced that the government had decided to suspend further action on an earlier offer of technical assistance to the Soviet Union and a \$150 million line of credit. Mr. Clark indicated that Canada was prepared to help the Baltic states in whatever way was possible, within a context that supported the reform process begun in the Soviet Union. He indicated that Canada was

³Department of External Affairs. "Clark Expresses Concern about Soviet Troop Movements," *News Release*, no. 4, 8 January 1991.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Clark Condemns Soviet Actions in Lithuania," *News Release*, no. 9, 11 January 1991.

⁵Office of the Prime Minister. "Prime Minister Condemns Soviet Violence Against Lithuania," *Release*, 13 January 1991.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Department of External Affairs. "Clark Strongly Condemns Violence in Latvia," *News Release*, no. 17, 21 January 1991.

considering establishing a Baltic Centre in Canada, as has already been established in Sweden, and in response to requests from the Baltic states, Canada was facilitating the shipment of medical supplies. Mr. Clark encouraged groups in Canada who might have materials of use to consider how they could be gathered and made available in order to be sent to the region.

Mr. Clark emphasized throughout his speech the strong support Canada gave to the Baltic states and the deep disapproval it felt about the use of force.

Bilaterally we are looking at concrete ways that Canada can support the Baltic States through increased contacts and direct assistance.... I am prepared to look at any other ways that are practical. There are limits upon what we can do given our obligations in the family of nations and given the importance of our continuing relations with the Soviet Union, ...I can say, that while I am aware of those limits, it is my intention...to push those limits as far as is humanly possible.⁸

The Lithuanian referendum on independence in February was observed by Canadian Embassy officers and the results were welcomed by Secretary of State Clark.⁹ Canada has made an effort to ensure that at least one diplomat is present in the Baltic region at any given time. This policy drew a complaint from Moscow about the diplomatic presence, especially in relation to the Lithuanian referendum, prompting a Soviet foreign ministry official to accuse Canada of interference in Soviet internal affairs.¹⁰

During July 1991, while attending the G7 summit in London, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would free up the technical aid and line of credit that it had suspended in January.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The situation in the Baltic states prompted many statements of support for the states by a number of MPs throughout the year.¹¹ MPs also tabled a number of petitions relating to the situation,

⁸*Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17533.

⁹Department of External Affairs. "Clark Welcomes Lithuanian Poll Results," *News Release*, no. 33, 10 February 1991.

¹⁰P. Koring. "Clark rejects Soviet protest," *Globe and Mail*, 21 February 1991: A7.

¹¹See: *Commons Debates*. 6 December 1990: 16373. *Commons Debates*. 18 December 1990: 16894. *Commons Debates*. 16 January 1991: 17106. *Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17491. *Commons Debates*. 5 March 1991: 17970. *Commons Debates*. 29 May 1991: 717 (relating to Armenia).

inter alia calling on the Canadian government to recognize the governments of the three states and to call on the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces from the area.¹²

On 15 January 1991, the House of Commons unanimously adopted a motion put forward by then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark which condemned the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania and supported "the right of the Baltic peoples to determine their own future."¹³

Many questions were raised about Canadian responses and policy in the wake of the military actions in Lithuania and Latvia. MPs suggested that Mr. Clark call in the Soviet Ambassador and advocated using the UN Commission on Human Rights and the CSCE processes.¹⁴ Mr. Clark indicated Canada's willingness to consider initiating such processes but also cautioned that the UN procedures would be subject to the Soviet veto and that the important thing was to try to find a way which would influence the Soviet leadership.¹⁵

On 21 January 1991, the House of Commons held an emergency debate on the crisis in the Baltics. Liberal member Jesse Flis outlined the requests that the parliamentary group on the Baltics had received from the Canadian Baltic communities for action by Canada. These included the imposition of sanctions on the Soviet Union, diplomatic recognition of Lithuania, a Canadian resolution in the UN condemning the Soviet aggression, and an emergency debate in the House of Commons.¹⁶

MP Alex Kindy noted that there were similar moves towards independence and struggles with the Soviet government occurring in other parts of the Soviet Union and advocated granting diplomatic recognition to the Lithuanian government.¹⁷

All of the MPs who spoke took the opportunity to express their support for the Baltic republics and condemn the Soviet crackdown. A number of the speakers described visits they had made to the Soviet Union and to the Baltic republics and drew connections to other events around the world such

¹²*Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17504. *Commons Debates*. 13 March 1991: 18403. *Commons Debates*. 26 March 1991: 18996. *Commons Debates*. 27 March 1991: 19085. *Commons Debates*. 23 May 1991: 440. *Commons Debates*. 12 June 1991: 1542. *Commons Debates*. 14 June 1991: 1747. *Commons Debates*. 19 June 1991: 2099.

¹³*Commons Debates*. 15 January 1991: 16983-4.

¹⁴*Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17495, 17497, 17501.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*: 17526.

¹⁷*Ibid.*: 17528-9.

as the Persian Gulf crisis, the Kurds and other human rights situations. Some MPs also read from letters received from their constituents expressing concern about the situation in the Baltics.¹⁸

On 5 March 1991, MP Bill Blaikie called attention to the recently completed referenda in the Baltic states and called on Canada to make it clear to the Soviet Union that until the Soviet government dealt adequately with the issue, Canada would raise the Baltic question at every opportunity presented in international fora.¹⁹

Liberal MP Jesse Flis, NDP member Dave Stubich and PC member Pauline Browes all belong to a group of MPs known as the Canadian Parliamentary Group for the Baltic Peoples. The three MPs visited the Baltic states in March 1991 to express their support for Baltic independence.²⁰ Upon their return, MP Jesse Flis rose in the House and advocated that Canada promote a special international conference on the Baltics in an effort to help move the stalemated negotiations in the Soviet Union forward.

The objective would be to bring interested parties together...where objective criteria and the rules of international law would be used to determine the legal status of the annexation of 1940 and to set...the terms of reference for further negotiations...²¹

¹⁸For the full emergency debate, see: *Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17524-17556.

¹⁹*Commons Debates*. 5 March 1991: 18014.

²⁰"Canadian MPs in Moscow back Baltic Independence," *The Gazette*, 19 March 1991: A10.

²¹*Commons Debates*. 22 March 1991: 18867.

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BACKGROUND

Since February 1986, when Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier fled the country, Haiti has been struggling to develop a democratic society, its first since Haiti gained independence in 1804. In February 1987, a new constitution for Haiti was approved which provided for presidential elections to take place on 29 November 1987. These elections were cancelled because of widespread violence and the deaths of thirty people. The balloting was postponed to 17 January 1988. Although the elections were characterized by violence and a large percentage of voters boycotted the polling, Leslie Manigat was declared the winner and was sworn in on 7 February, the anniversary of the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship.

However, the new government was short-lived and, on 20 June 1988, Manigat was overthrown in a military coup led by Lt.-General Namphy who promptly suspended the new constitution. Three months later, there was a second military coup, this time led by Brig.-General Avril. However, Avril was unable to control ongoing violence and opposition to his rule and, in March 1990, he resigned. In his place, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a Supreme Court justice was appointed, along with a Council of State, as provided in the 1987 constitution. This was in effect the first civilian government for Haiti.

In June, Pascal-Trouillot appealed to the United Nations (UN) for assistance in preparing for and monitoring their planned elections. The UN granted the request. A potential problem arose when in July, a former interior minister under Duvalier, Roger Lafontant, returned to Haiti. In October, he declared that he would run for President. However, the Haitian constitution prohibits anyone who had "zealously" supported the Duvalier regime from holding public office for ten years, and on 6 November, the candidacy of Lafontant was refused by the Provisional Electoral Council.

The elections went ahead as planned on 16 December 1990, under the observation of several hundred UN and Organization of American States (OAS) observers. The UN observers were part of the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Haiti (ONUVEH) established by UN Resolution 45/2 in response to the Haitian request for assistance.¹

The elections were won by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a popular Roman Catholic priest who had worked in the slums of Port-au-Prince. The Provisional Electoral Council formally declared Aristide the winner on 23 December. The elections went smoothly and there was a large percentage of voter turn out. The announcement of Aristide's victory generated large celebrations in Haiti. Internationally, the success of the democratic process, after so long a wait, was applauded.

¹UN Resolution 45/2, 10 October 1990. Adopted without a vote.

However, having been shut out of the elections, Roger Lafontant predicted that Aristide would not be permitted to assume the Presidency. On 7 January, Lafontant made good his threat and seized control of the Presidential Palace, forcing interim President Pascal-Trouillot to announce her resignation and declaring himself President. The coup was short-lived, however. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets in protest and Army Chief of Staff, General Hérard Abraham denounced the coup. Troops loyal to the constitution stormed the Palace, arrested Lafontant and freed Pascal-Trouillot.

Aristide was inaugurated on 7 February 1991. Run-off elections were held on 20 January for seats in the National Assembly where no clear majority had established a victor on the first ballot.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has firmly supported Haiti's efforts to establish a democratic government and administer free elections. On 21 September 1990, the Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry announced that Canada would contribute \$1 million to the Haitian election process.²

Ten Canadians from the Canadian Armed Forces went to Haiti as part of the UN Observer mission, as security experts.³ They assisted the Haitian authorities in establishing a security plan for the elections and in monitoring security on the day. Ten Canadians were also part of the OAS observer mission. They included Pierre-F. Coté, the director-general of elections in Quebec, who acted as personal representative for the Secretary-General of the OAS and coordinator of the OAS mission. In October, during the voter registration period, fifteen Canadians acted as observers.

On 18 December 1990, the day after the elections, Canada's then Minister for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

I join all Canadians in congratulating the Haitian people, as well as the interim government and the Provisional Electoral Council on the orderly way in which this election day passed.⁴

²M. Tison. "Un million \$ du Canada pour les elections en Haïti," *Le Soleil*, 22 September 1990: 28.

³Department of External Affairs. "Canadians Join UN Election Monitoring Team in Haiti," *News Release*, no. 252, 2 November 1990.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Canada Congratulates Haiti," *News Release*, no. 288, 18 December 1990.

Ms. Landry, the Minister for External Relations, announced that Canada would begin discussions with Haiti about restoring bilateral Canadian aid to the country.⁵ Canadian aid was cut off in September 1988.

Prime Minister Mulroney transmitted a congratulatory message to President-elect Aristide, stating:

We hope your Government can now swiftly create conditions conducive to implementing an economic and social development program that respects the fundamental rights of your people.... You may rest assured that Canada will continue supporting Haitian efforts to build a just, modern and open society.⁶

On 7 January 1991, immediately after the Lafontant coup had been reversed, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark and the Minister for External Relations Monique Landry, issued a joint statement welcoming the reversal of the coup and the release of the interim President. Mr. Clark stated:

Canada has fully supported the process of democratization in Haiti, and welcomed the first free and orderly elections in Haiti's history....⁷

Ms. Landry noted that the Canadian Government was encouraged by the support for democracy demonstrated by the Haitian armed forces and said, "[w]e hope that the long cycle of repression and despair which has marked Haiti's history may at long last be over."⁸

Ms. Landry led an all-party Canadian delegation which attended the inauguration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 7 February 1991.⁹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Progressive Conservative member Nicole Roy-Arcelin, rose in the House of Commons on 19 December 1990 to express support for the election in Haiti, and the victory of Aristide. She stated:

⁵Ibid.

⁶Government of Canada. Office of the Prime Minister. *Release*, 24 December 1990.

⁷Department of External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 3, 7 January 1991.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Department of External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 30, 6 February 1991.

After electing Jean Bertrand Aristide, ...this country will be able to make great strides towards democracy and justice. That is why I want to ask my government not only to increase material aid to this country but also to promote economic and political relations with [the] newly-elected government...¹⁰

We hope your Government can now swiftly create conditions conducive to implementing an economic and social development program that respects the fundamental rights of your people. You may rest assured that Canada will continue to support your people's efforts to build a just, modern and democratic society.

On 7 January 1991, immediately after the Labourer group had been re-elected, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark and the Minister for External Relations, Maurice Jomphe, issued a joint statement welcoming the reversal of the coup and the release of the interim President. The statement stated that a bilateral mission would be sent to Haiti to assist in the process of democratic reform. Canada has fully supported the reversal of the coup and the release of the interim President. It has also fully supported the reversal of the coup and the release of the interim President.

Mr. Landry noted that the Canadian Government has encountered by the support for democracy demonstrated by the Haitian people and his hope for the long cycle of oppression and despair which has marked Haiti's history. He said that the Canadian Government will continue to support the people of Haiti in their struggle for a better future. He said that the Canadian Government will continue to support the people of Haiti in their struggle for a better future.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

19 December 1990 to express support for the election in Haiti and the release of the interim President.

¹⁰Commons Debates. 19 December 1990: 16935.

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23. HORN OF AFRICA: ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, THE SUDAN

BACKGROUND

For Ethiopia and Somalia, 1991 marked the first change in government in many years, bringing to a climax what have been lengthy and costly internal wars for both countries. For Sudan, virtually alone in its support of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, its internal problems, backing of Iraq and refusal to allow aid agencies to deliver food have exacerbated a food crisis of immense proportions.

In Ethiopia, three main rebel groups have been leading the civil war. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has been fighting since 1961. Eritrea was under Italian colonial rule from 1889 until 1941 when it was taken over and administered by Britain. In contrast, Ethiopia was only under Italian colonial rule from 1935 to 1941. The two areas, therefore, developed very distinct identities up until World War II. In December 1950, UN Resolution 390A decided that Eritrea would be an autonomous territory, federated with Ethiopia. The British administration officially ended in 1952. However, in 1961, capping a long effort to take more control of Eritrea, Ethiopia simply annexed the area. The Eritrean people have been fighting the Ethiopian government for independence ever since. Eritrea provides Ethiopia with valuable access to the Red Sea, without which Ethiopia would be a landlocked country.

Two other rebel groups have been fighting since the mid-1970s. The Tigray People's Liberation Front is based in the province of Tigray and, prior to 1990, was staunchly Marxist in its ideology. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is based in the south and east. Other groups also exist. While the TPLF and OLF have also espoused a desire for autonomy, their primary goal has been to topple the dictatorship of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. This goal was achieved in May 1991.

A variety of factors contributed to this outcome. The new superpower relationship meant a changed situation for the Ethiopian government. The Soviet Union ended its military aid to the country, and the US agreed in January 1991 to act as a mediator for peace talks between the government and the rebel governments. While the peace talks were being held in London, rebel groups achieved some important military gains. A loose coalition of the three main rebel groups under the title, Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) also contributed to their strength.

By April 1991, only one sea port remained in government hands and rebels were advancing towards the capital, Addis Ababa. Many countries, including Canada, advised their citizens to leave the country. On 21 May 1991, Colonel Mengistu, ruler of Ethiopia since 1977 when he killed his predecessor, left the country for Zimbabwe leaving Vice-President Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan and Prime Minister Tesfaye Dinka in charge. Upon Mengistu's departure, the Prime Minister contacted the US embassy to ask the US to request a ceasefire from the rebels who were then

within fifty miles of Addis Ababa. The rebels refused a ceasefire but did agree to permit the evacuation of thousands of Ethiopian Jews to Israel in a massive airlift operation.

In the final week of May, the rebels took control of Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and Assab, the last port to remain in government hands. Successful rebel advances toward the capital occurred simultaneously with a round of peace talks in London. On 27 May, the acting President told the army to give up. Urged on by the US who sought to reduce chances of looting and rampaging, the rebel forces took full control of the capital the next day. The EPDRF formed a provisional government and stated its willingness to discuss the formation of a broader coalition and to hold elections within nine to twelve months. While agreeing to cooperate with the provisional government, the Eritrean rebels announced that they would form their own provisional government in Eritrea, pending a UN-sponsored referendum on Eritrean independence.

From 1 to 5 July, a conference involving all rebel troops was held in Addis Ababa. The aim of the conference was to work out election procedures for a Constituent Assembly which would then write a constitution. It was agreed that the question of Eritrean independence would not be dealt with at the conference. The TPLF has agreed to a UN referendum on Eritrean independence and the Eritrean leaders have agreed to wait for up to two years to hold the referendum in order to give the country time to stabilize. Famine continues to be a problem for Ethiopia and much-needed UN aid has been unable to be transported into the country because of the ongoing fighting. It is hoped that the end to fighting will open the way for aid to reach Ethiopian citizens.

Somalia

Somalia was created out of two colonies, British and Italian, and achieved independence in 1960. Until this year, Somalia was ruled by President Mohammed Syad Barre who declared himself President for life in 1969. Full-scale civil war broke out in Somalia in 1988 after Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace treaty re-establishing diplomatic relations, ending a ten-year conflict and providing for the withdrawal of troops from border areas. Three main rebel groups have fought the civil war: the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

In August 1990, the three groups agreed to cooperate in order to overthrow the Barre regime. After a month of fighting within the capital, Mogadishu, on 28 January, the USC rebels took over the city and established a provisional government. Barre and his family were reported to have fled to the south and would possibly go on to Kenya. The provisional government, led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed promised free elections and called for a conference of national reconciliation to discuss

the country's future. However, the other rebel factions have refused to recognize the provisional government. As of April, the conference had been postponed indefinitely and fighting between rebel groups continued in various parts of the country, especially in the south where SPM forces were reported to be heading north towards Mogadishu.

In contrast to the situation in Ethiopia, neither superpower has offered help or been requested to help. But as is the case in Ethiopia, much of Somalia's population is in need of aid, and by 1990, it was estimated that some 400,000 refugees had fled to Ethiopia. The war in Somalia has been particularly brutal and wide-scale human rights abuses and random killings by both the rebels and the military have meant that many aid agencies have pulled their workers out of Somalia.

Sudan

From 1899 to 1955, Sudan was administered by a Governor-General on behalf of Britain and Egypt. In spite of a democratic beginning, the differences between the Muslim Arabs in the north and the Christian and animist groups in the south, were too significant to support a successful transition. In 1958, the Army took over the government, dissolved the House of Representatives and suspended the constitution.

Since 1955, Sudan has been experiencing a civil war between the Muslim Arab north and the largely Christian south. Peace talks initiated in 1988 and early 1989 resulted in an agreement in March 1989. However, on 30 June 1989, the Sudanese army staged a coup, toppling Prime Minister Sadik el Mahdi in favour of Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) based in the south has continued to wage war against the government.

The ongoing war has contributed to famine and the displacement of civilians on a massive scale. In June 1990, CIDA estimated that 7,685,000 people in Sudan were threatened with famine. In southern Sudan, 250,000 people died of hunger and disease in 1988. International efforts to provide relief to the population have been caught in the crossfire between the two sides. The Sudanese government has refused to allow aid to be transported to areas where it is needed, and in September, the Sudanese armed forces bombed relief distribution centres in the south. Amnesty International has charged the Sudan government with genocide by starvation. The UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan continues a tenuous effort to get aid to the area, but, of the estimated US \$12.8 million thought needed by the UN for basic programmes, only \$2.1 million had been received by November 1990.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is a major contributor of aid to the Horn of Africa region. On 20 August 1990, Canada made a further contribution of \$400,000 to support an airlift of emergency food supplies to Ethiopia. Since 1981, Canada has provided a total of \$470 million in aid to Ethiopia, \$36.6 million in this year alone.¹ In April 1990, Canada established a set of principles for humanitarian relief efforts. In 1990-1991, Canadian Government Food Aid to the Sudan totalled \$15 million. \$11,344 million in food aid has been approved for 1991-1992.

In his speech to the United Nations, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

...in the Horn of Africa, the cycle of conflict, poverty and starvation continues. While we can take pride in the way the UN and its agencies provided food to those in need, only a lasting and political solution will end the terrible curse of famine in that region.²

On 10 May 1991, the Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry welcomed the planned peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the rebel groups, noting that Canada has actively promoted this outcome. Ms. Landry stated that "Canada considers these talks crucial because the cycle of underdevelopment and famine cannot be broken without an end to the civil conflict."³ Canada was active in international efforts to negotiate the re-opening of the port of Massawa in January and February 1991.

After President Mengistu left the country, but prior to the full takeover by the rebels, the Canadian government called for an immediate ceasefire and for progress at the peace talks in London. In a release from the Department of External Affairs, it was pointed out that the rebels had required that there be a change in government in order for the peace talks to be successful.

Canada hopes that the departure of former President Mengistu Haile Mariam and the readiness of the present Ethiopian government to work towards a transitional government will create the conditions for successful peace talks between the Government of Ethiopia and the rebel groups.⁴

¹Minister for External Relations and International Development. "Canada Welcomes Ethiopian Peace Talks," *News Release*, no. 115, 10 May 1991.

²Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, no. 90/13, 26 September 1990: 3.

³"Canada Welcomes Ethiopian Peace Talks," *op. cit.*

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Canada calls for Meaningful Talks in Ethiopia," *News Release*, no. 124, 23 May 1991.

The Minister for External Relations called on the rebel groups to re-open the "southern line" which had been closed because of fighting, to allow aid supplies to begin flowing again.⁵

A Canadian Press report in the *Globe and Mail* revealed that Canada had encouraged a member of Ethiopia's government to consider replacing President Mengistu in order to make way for democratic transition.⁶ The information came from Mr. Kasa Kabede who had been a member of President Mengistu's government and had taken part in the talks. Mr. Kasa left Ethiopia for Israel during the airlift of Ethiopian Jews.

Canada, in cooperation with the US, helped facilitate President Mengistu's departure to Zimbabwe by using its close relationship with the Zimbabwean government to ask and encourage it to accept the leader.⁷

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In December, NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin noted that Oxfam Canada estimated that \$1.75 million in further aid was needed for Ethiopia and asked the Government whether they would commit that amount to Ethiopia. Then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, responded that a special three-party group of Members of Parliament would be going to Ethiopia and the Government would consider their recommendations when they returned.⁸

Ms. McLaughlin pursued the question and asked whether the Government would consider sending surplus Canadian grain to Ethiopia. The Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry responded. She pointed to the re-opening of the port of Massawa as a positive step forward which would allow supplies to enter the country and said:

We will also go on cooperating...with the international community and the Canadian NGOs through which most of our food aid reaches the Ethiopian people, to provide as much assistance as possible to the Ethiopians.⁹

⁵Ibid.

⁶Warren Caragata. "Ottawa sought ouster of Mengistu," *Globe and Mail*. 30 May 1991: A8.

⁷Ibid.

⁸*Commons Debates*. 19 December 1990: 16941-16942.

⁹Ibid.: 16942.

Ms. McLaughlin continued to pursue the point:

My question is simple: Will the government give these [wheat] surpluses to the people who are now starving in Africa?¹⁰

In reply, Ms. Landry stated:

...to provide assistance and food to distressed people in Ethiopia the donor countries have to coordinate their efforts to make sure that food assistance does get to the people....We have assistance budgets and, ...we are prepared to buy the food and ship it to Ethiopia...the ongoing war often made it impossible for us to reach the people involved.... Our efforts have been successful in the case of the re-opening of the Massawa harbour. This amounts to a major victory for the international community, ...¹¹

A parliamentary delegation went to Sudan and Ethiopia in January 1991 to investigate the food crisis and the prospects for peace in the region with a view to recommending appropriate Canadian responses. The delegation was led by David MacDonald (PC) and also involved Ross Reid (PC), Christine Stewart (Liberal), Stan Hovdebo (NDP) and Betty Plewes from the Canadian Council for International Cooperation. The delegation travelled within Ethiopia and Sudan, and interviewed officials and representatives of non-governmental organisations in both countries.

The delegation's report stated that "it is difficult to know what to recommend for the Sudan."¹² They noted that at least seven million people were considered to be at risk from famine and that there was a shortfall of at least 1.2 million tonnes of food. The report recommended that Canada take the lead within the donor group in order to explore ways of dealing with the situation. In addition:

There is real fear in many areas that the Sudanese government is willing to let its people starve. In addition, reports of the repeated violations of basic human rights and the number of people who have been detained or imprisoned without due process raise fundamental questions about national sovereignty and the responsibility of the international community. Canada should examine reports of the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Africa Watch on human rights violations and be prepared to raise these issues, including the denial of food, in the February meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights and in other appropriate fora.¹³

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²*Report of the Parliamentary Delegation to Ethiopia and Sudan*. Ottawa, January 1991: 4.

¹³Ibid.

On Ethiopia, the report noted that Canada has given support to the four supply routes in Ethiopia and said that there was a need to establish a system of data collection, monitoring and famine prevention, since the UN cannot carry out these functions without the permission of the government. More particularly, the group called on Canada to play a role in facilitating the peace process by engaging in dialogue with all of the parties to the conflict in Ethiopia. This requires a change in policy or a clarification of existing policies. The jurisdictional division between External Affairs and CIDA on peace issues needs to be reviewed.¹⁴

Overall, the delegation concluded that Canada needs to develop a broad policy framework and evaluation procedures. As part of this process, Canada should seek to redefine humanitarian assistance to include famine prevention. Also, Canadian officials should be encouraged to engage in regular high-level discussions with parties to a conflict. To facilitate the policy process, the delegation recommends that an informal roundtable be established which brings together people working on the Horn of Africa with Canadian officials, non-governmental organisations and specialized institutions.

On 27 May 1991, Liberal member Sheila Finestone made a statement in the House of Commons applauding the successful airlift of Ethiopian Jews by Israel.

The importance of this undertaking at this time in the history of Israel, while coping with high unemployment and the integration of an overwhelming Russian immigration, is of particular importance.¹⁵

NDP member Svend Robinson made a statement calling for support for the right of Eritrea to define its own future. Mr. Robinson supported the right of the Eritrean people to have a free, fair and open referendum on their future and stated:

...obtaining a permanent solution to the problems of this region will require a peaceful settlement of the status of Eritrea that respects the wishes of the majority of the Eritrean people. I therefore urge the Canadian government to follow the example of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and other countries in upholding the right of the Eritrean people to define their own future.¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid.: 9.

¹⁵*Commons Debates*. 27 May 1991: 598.

¹⁶*Commons Debates*. 14 June 1991: 1733.

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BACKGROUND

India and Pakistan were formed in 1947 when British colonial rule over the area ended. Since 1947, the two countries have fought over the area of Kashmir, a struggle that has included two full-scale wars. India controls two-thirds of the Kashmir area which consists of two states, Kashmir and Jammu. Pakistan controls one-third of the area, which is known as Azad (free) Kashmir. Pakistan believes that it should have been given control over the whole Kashmir area because the majority of its population is Muslim. Pakistan is a Muslim country and the majority of the population in India is Hindu. Kashmir is the only state in India which has a majority Muslim population, but there are some 100 million Muslims living in other parts of India.

After the first war in 1947-1948, a UN military observer group (UNMOGIP) was established to supervise the "line of control" through the disputed area. Canada has participated in this UN operation since it began in 1949.

During the mid-1980s, tensions between the two countries flared, resulting in a number of skirmishes along the border area in the Himalayan mountain region. In 1989, India and Pakistan discussed the possibility of withdrawing their troops from the Siachen glacier area to create a demilitarized zone. No final agreement was reached, however. During August 1990, tensions again flared up in this area. Pakistan claimed that on 12 August 1990, India used artillery and mortar fire in an attack on Pakistani positions in the Kel sector. India denied the attack, which came one day after the second round of talks on easing tensions between the two sides was completed. Later in August, India was reported to have sent twenty tanks and a number of troops to the frontier to bolster its positions in response to the Pakistani use of heavy artillery in the Kupwara area.

Within the Indian state of Kashmir, ten people were killed on 13 August when people celebrating Pakistan's independence day clashed with security forces. On 3 September, India's Parliament voted to extend direct federal rule over Kashmir. Direct federal rule in the state was instituted in early 1990 when the Indian government dissolved the state government.

Tensions between the two countries are also fuelled by the possibility that one or both could deploy nuclear weapons within a short period of time. The possibility that Pakistan may be developing nuclear weapons has been an issue of concern to the US for some time. Under US law, Pakistan may not receive US aid unless the President provides Congress with certification of the absence of nuclear devices. This certification was not given when it was required in October 1990, and as a result Pakistan will not receive an estimated \$564 million in US aid during 1991. In addition, the programme of military equipment cooperation between the US and Pakistan has been interrupted.

In June 1991, Pakistan called on the US, the Soviet Union and China to act as mediators with Pakistan and India in discussions on making South Asia nuclear-free. The US responded positively to the proposal. However, India rejected the proposal, maintaining its position against such regional pacts and calling instead for a nuclear-free world.

Both India and Pakistan have experienced a tumultuous year internally in 1990-1991. On 6 August 1990, Pakistan's President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and asked the leader of the Opposition, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to form a government. Prime Minister Bhutto was elected in 1988 after Pakistan's military leader, General Zia, was killed in a plane crash. She was the first woman to lead a Muslim government and represented the first democratically elected government in Pakistan after eleven years of military rule. Her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was deposed in a military coup in 1977 and was hanged in 1979. The dismissal of the Bhutto Government was justified on the basis of charges of corruption and loss of public faith. Elections were called for 24 October.

Three days before the election, a Pakistani court upheld the dismissal of the Bhutto Government. The court judgement outlined nine areas where it said that the Bhutto Government had not been working within the constitution and concurred with the need for elections. On 23 October, Benazir Bhutto led tens of thousands of supporters in a 136 kilometre protest march from Faisalabad to Lahore. In spite of this tremendous show of popular support, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was defeated in the elections on 24 October. The PPP also lost in the provincial elections on 27 October. On 24 October, the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) won 105 of 206 seats while the PPP won only 45, down from the 93 they had won in the 1988 election. The IDA was also victorious in the provincial elections winning 208 of 234 seats. On 6 November 1990, Nawaz Sharif became the new Prime Minister of Pakistan.

In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) withdrew its support from the coalition government led by prime Minister V.P. Singh, prompting a parliamentary crisis for the Singh government which needed the support of the BJP in order to maintain its coalition government. The BJP withdrew its support after the arrest of its leader Lal Krishnan Advani and large numbers of his supporters. Advani was ordered arrested by Prime Minister Singh in an effort to halt the BJP's plans to build a Hindu temple on a site of a Muslim mosque. The BJP, a Hindu revivalist party, has gained tremendously in popularity since it took up the issue of the Mosque site. The Babri Masjid mosque was built in 1528. However, Hindus believe that it is the birthplace of the god Rama. The BJP has supported and encouraged a drive to tear down the mosque.

Astrologists determined that 9:44 a.m. on 30 October 1990 was an appropriate date for the destruction of the Mosque. On that day, approximately 15,000 Hindu pilgrims stormed the mosque

in an effort to tear it down. In the resulting confrontation, security forces opened fire on the crowd and used tear gas in an effort to stop the push to the mosque. The incident prompted further clashes around the country and 170 people were reported to have died in the first eight days after the crisis.

In the wake of the crisis at the mosque and the withdrawal of BJP support, sixty-eight members of Prime Minister Singh's own party, the Janata Dal, formed their own faction of the Janata Dal party. On 7 November, Prime Minister Singh lost a vote of confidence in the Indian Parliament and resigned. His resignation and the split in the Janata Dal party meant that the Congress (I) Party led by Rajiv Gandhi was in a position to determine the new government. The Congress (I) Party chose to support Chandra Shekhar and the party that had splintered from the original Janata Dal. On 21 November, Chandra Shekhar was named Prime Minister of India. The new government was short-lived however, and in early March 1991, Chandra Shekhar resigned. Elections were planned for May.

Indian national elections were disrupted when, on 22 May 1991, the leader of the Congress (I) Party, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated, reportedly by a supporter of Tamil activists seeking a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. The Congress (I) Party chose Narasimha Rao as its new leader. The elections continued on 12 and 15 June 1991.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 31 July 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark expressed concern about the developments in Kashmir, in particular the implementation of the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act to an area twenty kilometres wide along the Line of Control. The Act gives police above a certain level authority to shoot citizens violating a ban on assembly, or engaging in a breach of public order. While recognizing the need for civil stability, Mr. Clark encouraged Pakistan and India to pursue peaceful measures to resolve their difficulties.

Canada has consistently urged India and Pakistan to exercise moderation and restraint on the issue of Kashmir to avoid the risk of miscalculation or accident that could lead to a military clash.¹

A Canadian observer was present to monitor the tribunal hearings on the question of the dismissal of the Bhutto Government in Pakistan. The Honourable Ronald Atkey, an expert on

¹Department of External Affairs. "Clark Concerned About Developments in Kashmir," *News Release*, no. 160, 31 July 1990.

constitutional law, went to Pakistan in late October to observe the process.² Mr. Atkey, along with three other Canadian observers, was also present during the Pakistani elections. The other three Canadians were MP Allan Koury of Quebec, MP Charles-Eugene Marin, also of Quebec and Jess Flis, an MP from Ontario. The Canadian observers went to Pakistan after a request from the Pakistani government.

The Canadian Government reacted with shock and regret to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall rose in the House of Commons and stated:

I express the profound hope of the Prime Minister and of this government that this event will not be allowed to interfere with the democratic process at this very sensitive time during this very important election to India and to those of us who have an interest in democracy and the development of democracy in India. I know I speak for all Canadians in deploring this senseless violence and in extending condolences to the bereaved family.³

Barbara McDougall attended the funeral of Rajiv Gandhi on behalf of the Canadian government.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Opposition party members also spoke of the assassination in the House of Commons. Liberal External Affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy, NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin and Bloc Québécois member Jean Lapierre all joined the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs in expressing their sympathy with the Gandhi family and India.⁴

Progressive Conservative member Doug Fee stated that the Gandhi assassination should serve as a reminder to Canadians that they should be grateful for their society.

Our hearts and prayers go out to the people of India, and especially the family of Mr. Gandhi. At the same time we should offer a prayer of thanks for the privilege of living in Canada and serving in a tolerant, open, caring society where violence is not acceptable as a means to achieve political ends.⁵

²Department of External Affairs. "Honourable Ronald G. Atkey to Observe Pakistan Tribunals," *News Release*, no. 242, 22 October 1990.

³*Commons Debates*. 21 May 1991: 342.

⁴*Commons Debates*. 21 May 1991: 342-343.

⁵*Commons Debates*. 22 May, 1991: 375.

Liberal member Shirley Maheu brought to the attention of the House of Commons, the anniversary of the storming of the Gold Temple in Amritsar.⁶

⁶Commons Debates. 12 June 1991: 1523.

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25. ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

BACKGROUND

While the intifada continued and entered its fourth year, events in Israel and the Occupied Territories during 1990-1991 were dominated by events at Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the Persian Gulf War and diplomatic efforts to establish an agreement to convene a Middle East peace conference.

Temple Mount, a holy place for both Muslims and Jews, was the site of a confrontation between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli police on 8 October 1990, resulting in seventeen Palestinian deaths. Temple Mount is the site of the Al Aksa mosque, the holiest shrine for Islam after Mecca and Medina. According to Islam, this is where Mohammed flew to heaven on his winged horse. It is also the location of two holy sites for Judaism, the first and second temples of Solomon and Herod.

Differing accounts of the events were given after the incident. Reports from various investigations into the incident outline the following sequence of events. The Supreme Islamic Council called on supporters to go to the Al Aksa mosque after hearing reports that the Temple Mount Faithful, a small Jewish group which advocates tearing down the mosque and replacing it with a Jewish temple, would try to lay a cornerstone at the mosque. The Temple Mount Faithful have proclaimed their intent to do this during the Jewish holiday of Succoth for eight consecutive years, but have been blocked by Israeli authorities. Palestinians carried rocks and sticks with them to the compound in order to defend the mosque.

At the same time, Jewish worshippers had gathered below the mosque compound, at the Western Wall to celebrate the Succoth. At some point, the Palestinians began throwing rocks over the wall onto the Jewish worshippers. According to Palestinians, they did not begin throwing rocks until after the police began storming the compound. The Israeli police maintain that the Palestinians began three concurrent assaults on the Jewish worshippers before they began shooting. In the event, after using tear gas and rubber bullets the Israeli police forced their way into the compound and opened fire on the Palestinians with live ammunition. Seventeen Palestinians were killed and approximately one hundred and forty wounded. Police also arrested approximately one hundred Palestinians.

The incident received widespread international condemnation. The next day, on 9 October, the US asked the United Nations (UN) Security Council to consider a resolution which would condemn Israel's excessive use of force and support a mission by the Secretary-General to investigate. The US effort to get a Security Council resolution was linked to its need to preserve support from Arab nations for the coalition against Iraq. After considerable diplomatic effort, a resolution was developed which condemned the acts of violence committed by Israeli security forces, called on Israel to abide by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and requested that the

Secretary-General send a mission to the region and submit a report to the Security Council before the end of October. Resolution 672 was passed on 12 October. The US vote in favour of the resolution was a marked departure from its past practice of vetoing Security Council resolutions that criticized Israel.

The Israeli government appointed its own commission to investigate the incident on 10 October. On 14 October, the Israeli cabinet denounced the UN resolution and stated that it would not accept a UN investigating team. Later that day, the cabinet decided to increase Jewish settlements in east Jerusalem, a decision which was interpreted as an act of defiance against the US and the UN.

In the two weeks following the Temple Mount incident, Palestinians undertook reprisal attacks against Jews which in turn prompted Jewish reprisals. In one incident, on 21 October, a Palestinian stabbed three Jewish citizens to death. On 23 October, in response to the series of attacks, the Israeli Defence Minister ordered the Occupied Territories sealed. Palestinian residents were banned from entering Israel and those staying in Israel were ordered to return home. Since large numbers of Palestinians work in Israel, this placed a strain on the workers who were unable to go to work and the employers who found themselves without staff.

The next day, on 24 October, the UN Security Council passed a second resolution (Resolution 673) deploring Israel's refusal to cooperate with the UN investigation and requesting that it reconsider its decision. Israel again refused to accept the UN mission. On 26 October, the report of the Israeli commission looking into the incident was released. The report was critical of the lack of preparedness of the police but said that the officers involved in the shooting were blameless and that the use of live ammunition was justified. Affirming reports that had surfaced in the aftermath, the commission confirmed that Jewish worshippers were long out of range of the Palestinian rock throwers before the police opened fire. Israel announced that it would submit a copy of the report to the Security Council. Two days later, on 28 October, Israel began re-admitting Palestinians from the Occupied Territories into Israel although the cabinet toughened restrictions on who could enter.

The Secretary-General's report, concluded without the cooperation of the Israeli government, was submitted to the Security Council on 1 November. *Inter alia*, the report recommended that a meeting of the Fourth Geneva Convention be convened to discuss ways of giving greater protection to the Palestinians.

In the meantime, sporadic incidents of violence between Palestinians and Jews continued. On the weekend of 3 November, Palestinians protesting the prison death of a Palestinian, clashed with Israeli security forces. One hundred and fifty Palestinians were estimated to have been wounded and one Palestinian died in the violence.

At the United Nations, a vote on a Security Council resolution put forward by the non-aligned states, advocating a Middle East peace conference and providing for increased UN protection for Palestinians, was delayed three times to allow negotiations on the wording in order to avoid a US veto. A US veto would have been construed as a blow to the Persian Gulf coalition at a time when the Security Council was voting in favour of the use of force in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, a positive vote on the resolution as it stood would signal declining US support for Israel.

On 14 December, three Israeli workers were killed by Palestinians in an aluminum factory. An Islamic group claimed responsibility for the killings and in response, Israel announced on 16 December, that it was planning to deport four Gaza Strip citizens who are members of the same group. The policy of deportation has long been condemned by the US. In response to the Israeli announcement, the US decided to go ahead and vote in favour of the UN Security Council resolution.

Resolution 681 was passed on 20 December 1990. It deplored the Israeli decision to resume deportations and urged Israel to accept the *de jure* applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to the Occupied Territories. The resolution also called on the high contracting parties to the Convention to ensure that Israel respect its obligations, and asked the Secretary-General to develop his idea of a meeting of the parties to discuss possible action. The Secretary-General was further requested to continue monitoring the situation in the Occupied Territories. The resolution made no mention of a Middle East peace conference, but the president of the Council read a non-binding statement at the time which supported a conference.

On 16 January 1991, the Persian Gulf War began (see Chapter 29). Almost immediately, Iraq began firing SCUD missiles at Israel. In response to US requests and in recognition of the need to keep the Persian Gulf War limited, Israel refrained from responding to the missile attacks. A number of the missiles were intercepted by Patriot missiles and others fell short of their targets. In the end, none of the missiles contained chemical or biological warheads. However, the entire population had been given gas masks, and throughout this period, Israel remained in a situation of high alert. In order to ensure security, on 17 January, Israel imposed a strict curfew on the Occupied Territories easing it for a few hours at a time in different areas to allow for food purchases.

Israel also came under rocket fire at the end of January from Palestinians based in southern Lebanon who said they were acting on behalf of Iraq. Israel responded to the attacks and the two sides exchanged rocket and artillery fire for a few days before the PLO announced on 4 February that it would cease the attacks.

The Persian Gulf crisis prompted renewed and intensified efforts on Middle East peace. As early as September, both the US and the Soviet Union, in discussions with Israel, spoke of the need to develop

a credible peace process. With the end of the war, efforts to put a Middle East peace process in place intensified. On 7 March, US Secretary of State James Baker, began what was to be the first of many trips to the Middle East to discuss a US peace proposal. The US plan was based on a two-track approach which dealt with the disputes between Israel and its neighbours and broader regional questions. The US initiative was supported by the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates), Egypt and Syria.

The Israeli cabinet reaffirmed its support for Prime Minister Shamir's peace plan of May 1989 and on 20 March, emphasizing Israel's commitment to keeping the Golan Heights, Israel's Housing Minister announced that they would seek to double the Jewish population of the Golan Heights. More movement of Jewish settlers into the West Bank during April and an earlier decision to deport four Palestinians continued to make US-Israel discussion difficult. Although there were some moves forward, including an agreement in principle by Israel to attend a regional peace meeting sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union, by the end of April, the US was unable to get agreement on its specific proposals from the two key players, Israel and Syria, and Baker returned from his third tour of the region planning to reassess the situation.

On the eve of Baker's fourth trip to the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a statement in which it outlined its willingness to participate in an international peace conference as an observer (through its Secretary-General) and to participate in any meeting of regional states as individual states. This statement was considered a strong step forward and Baker hoped that it would create momentum for his discussions with Syria and Israel. However, the two states refused the compromise plan offered by Baker and remained adamant on two key issues. Syria wanted the UN to play a key role in any peace conference and felt that the conference should exist as a continuing enterprise in order to keep the process moving. Israel was against any UN role and was only willing to attend the conference as a one time event which would give way immediately to direct talks among the parties.

On 3 June, President Bush sent letters to the Israeli Prime Minister and to the President of Syria outlining a compromise plan and urging flexibility. Bush proposed that a single UN observer be allowed to attend but not be allowed to actively participate. On the question of duration, provision could be made for the conference to reconvene every six months in order to hear progress reports, providing all parties agree to the re-convening. The compromise proposal was rejected by Israel later that week. In spite of this setback, the US continued in its efforts. On 1 July, Bush hinted that unless Syria and Israel were more receptive to ideas, the US might go ahead and issue invitations to a conference, making it clear which states were throwing up obstacles to the process.

In a surprise move, on 14 July, Syria sent a letter of response to the Bush letter accepting the compromise without any additional conditions. This announcement was welcomed as an extremely promising development by the US and was also approved by the Arab states and the PLO. The next day, Israel announced that it would not change its position until it had full details of the Syrian position.

These events occurred as the G7 summit meeting took place in London. The G7 Communique, issued on 16 July, confirmed the summit members' support for the US peace initiative and urged flexibility by all parties. As a confidence-building measure, the G7 advocated that the Arab boycott of companies doing business with Israel be suspended and that Israel agree to suspend its settlements in the Occupied Territories (this measure had been advocated by Baker early on in the process).

On 19 July, Baker met with the Syrian President and confirmed the Syrian commitment to a meeting. The two agreed that the UN observer could take notes and communicate with participants but would not have a role beyond that. Israel announced on 22 July that it would reconsider its position in view of the Syrian shift. On 24 July, after having spoken of the Syrian move as equivalent to the Egyptian shift in position in 1977 which led to a peace accord, Israel announced that it would agree to the conference, on the assumption that its conditions for Palestinian representation would be accepted. Israel wants Palestinian representatives to be from the Occupied Territories and to have no overt connections to the PLO. Having achieved agreement in principle, the question of Palestinian participation was left for later discussion and the US put its high-level process on hold for August.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canadian support for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Arab dispute has always been grounded in a need to base any solution on UN Resolution 242, passed in November 1967, which outlines the principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and Resolution 338, passed in October 1973, which calls for a ceasefire and requires states to begin peace negotiations based on Resolution 242, immediately. In a speech to the UN General Assembly, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark reaffirmed Canada's position:

A just and lasting negotiated solution based on the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to self-determination, is more vital than ever.¹

¹Department of External Affairs. "Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to the Forty-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, 26 September 1990: 3.

After the killings at Temple Mount, Mr. Clark issued a statement calling for restraint and expressing "grave reservations" about the degree of force used by Israeli authorities.

Canadians were shocked and horrified by the eruption of violence in Old Jerusalem today....The tragic events of today highlight the urgent need for a resolution to the Palestinian question. The international community must dedicate itself to finding a just and lasting settlement, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.²

Mr. Clark's comments were echoed at the UN Security Council by Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier. Ambassador Fortier condemned the recent Israeli demolition of Palestinian housing in the Gaza strip, as well as the killing of an Israeli soldier which had prompted the retaliation.³ Mr. Clark later welcomed the unanimous Security Council adoption of Resolution 672 dealing with the Temple Mount incident.⁴

When debate on the Palestinian question began in the Security Council in November, Ambassador Fortier, in speaking to the press, spoke of the need to find an adequate way of protecting the Palestinians, noting that the subject "simply cries out for a solution," and that "[t]he ball is in the Security Council's court. We must decide how to ensure protection for the Palestinians in the future."⁵

Secretary of State Clark reiterated these comments as he began a trip to the Middle East for consultations. On 27 November 1990, Clark met with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders. In comments to the press, Clark made clear that there should be no linkage between the Occupied Territories and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. On the other hand, Clark maintained that the question of a Palestinian homeland would need to be dealt with after the Persian Gulf crisis.⁶

Back in Canada, speaking to Parliament about the Persian Gulf crisis, Clark discussed the possibility that the crisis may lead to efforts to resolve other Middle East problems.

We have of late witnessed a pattern of successes within the Security Council in addressing regional issues, not just in the Middle East, but also ...elsewhere. If that pattern continues, ...if we can maintain the strength of the United Nations...then a just

²Department of External Affairs. "SSEA Calls for Restraint in Aftermath of Violence in Jerusalem," *News Release*, no. 234, 8 October 1990.

³UN Security Council. *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Forth-Sixth Meeting*. S/PV. 2946, 8 October 1990: 48.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Clark Welcomes Unanimity of Security Council Decision," *News Release*, no. 238, 13 October 1990.

⁵O. Ward. "UN Debates moves to protect Palestinians," *Toronto Star*, 8 November 1990: A16.

⁶P. Koring. "Issue of Palestinian homeland must be resolved, Clark says," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 November 1990: 9.

lasting and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, which Canada views as necessary and urgent, may at last be possible. This is a matter that can only be addressed, however, separately from the current crisis.⁷

A number of resolutions were adopted by the UN General Assembly in its 45th Session relating to Israel and the Occupied Territories. Resolution 45/73, *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, was an omnibus resolution with eleven parts. Canada abstained from parts G and H of the resolution. Part G reaffirmed the inalienable right of displaced inhabitants to return to their homeland and part H dealt with the property rights of Palestinian Arabs. Canada voted against part 45/73 F which dealt with the provision of relief to Palestinian refugees by the UN Relief and Works Agency. Canada voted in favour of all other elements of the resolution. Canada registered a positive vote on all elements of Resolution 45/74,⁸ except for part A. Canada abstained from this element of the resolution which condemned a long list of Israeli actions and practices. Canada also voted in favour of Resolution 45/69 which dealt with the intifada and, *inter alia*, called for Israel to abide by the 1949 Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and reaffirmed that the occupation by Israel of Palestinian territory since 1967 in no way changed the status of the territories.

Speaking to the Security Council after the adoption of Resolution 681 on 20 December, Ambassador Fortier supported the statement made by the President of the Security Council on a Middle East peace conference and stated Canada's belief that Resolution 681 would make a significant contribution to the peace process. On behalf of Canada, Ambassador Fortier joined in deploring the recent Israeli deportation decision and said that Canada supports the possible use of the Fourth Geneva Convention and believes that the question must be examined carefully.

Canada believes that the international community has a role to play in protecting the rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories. The resolution responds to this concern by urging the monitoring and observing of the situation, with the help of the United Nations personnel stationed in the region. This should contribute to enhancing the protection of the Palestinians.⁹

On 18 January 1991, after the first missile attack on Israel by Iraq, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote to Prime Minister Shamir:

⁷*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15863.

⁸United Nations General Assembly. *Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories*, Resolution 45/74, 11 December 1990.

⁹United Nations Security Council. *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventieth Meeting*. S/PV.2970, Part II: 23.

You may be aware that I have strongly condemned Saddam Hussein's missile attack on your country tonight. ...Canada deplores this criminal and unprovoked act.¹⁰

Canada commended Israel, throughout the war, on its restraint in responding to the missile attacks. Canada also provided \$500,000 in aid to Israel through the Canadian Red Cross, to assist in providing medical supplies, temporary housing and housing repair. Canada also sent 10,000 gas masks to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza region.

In responding to questions after a speech to the Rotary Club, Mr. Clark expressed sympathy with Palestinian frustration with the UN process.

I can understand why Palestinians would accuse the world of acting with a double standard when it is prepared to act as decisively as it has with respect to Iraq and Kuwait and has been unable for so long to deal with Resolution 242...¹¹

In a later speech, Clark outlined Canada's position on a possible search for a regional peace plan in the aftermath of the Gulf War:

No regional security plan can expect to succeed unless it is firmly determined to make progress toward a comprehensive, lasting, negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the Palestinian question. Such a negotiated settlement must be based on Resolutions 242 and 338...even before the Gulf War, Canada let it be known that it favoured holding an international conference. ...A properly structured conference with reasonable chances of success could indeed be useful and contribute to the peace process.¹²

The question of Palestinian representation in the peace process and the credibility of the PLO was discussed considerably by Joe Clark. On his arrival in the Middle East at the beginning of a post-war tour of the region, Mr. Clark indicated to reporters that Canada still saw the PLO as an important actor although "its authority has been diminished" by the attitude it took in the war. Clark said that Canadian officials had expressed concern about the PLO stance during the war to PLO officials.¹³ These comments prompted speculation about a possible rift in the Government view when Prime Minister Mulroney spoke in the House of Commons on the same day. In response to a question, Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

¹⁰Office of the Prime Minister. *Release*, 18 January 1991.

¹¹P. Priegert. "I understand Palestinian frustration with UN: Clark," *The Gazette*, 5 February 1991: 4.

¹²Department of External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period," *Statement*, 91/10, 8 February 1991: 6.

¹³P. Watson. "PLO must play role in talks, Clark says," *Toronto Star*, 7 March 1991: A18.

Anyone who has looked at the position of the current leadership of the PLO, particularly in its support of Saddam Hussein, and their cheering of Scud missiles as they rained on Israel, would have to conclude that the PLO and its leader Arafat have been substantially, if not completely, discredited.¹⁴

Prime Minister Mulroney and Secretary of State Clark insisted that no contradiction existed. In a press interview in Syria, Mr. Clark outlined the problems in dealing with the question of Palestinian representation, noting that the key difficulty was in ensuring that the Palestinians are represented by a group they consider legitimate, which at the same time has the ability to make commitments on behalf of Palestinians that other negotiators can expect to be honoured.¹⁵ Prime Minister Mulroney reiterated his earlier comments about the PLO's credibility in a meeting with US President George Bush in March. Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

Canada has always taken the position that there has to be a solution to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. And it is up to the Palestinian people to choose their representatives. And its not up to Canada or the United States or, I assume, anyone else to impose choices on them.¹⁶

On 15 March, Mr. Clark discussed his trip to the Middle East in a statement to the House of Commons. In his discussion, Mr. Clark again returned to the question of Palestinian representation in the peace process. He stated:

...Canada can only agree with the Secretary-General of the United Nations; the Palestinians should be represented by the organizations or representatives they choose. Our distaste for the support for Saddam Hussein by the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization should not disqualify Palestinians from coming to their own conclusions...¹⁷

Mr. Clark went on to say that he had been encouraged in his meetings with leaders in the Middle East by their desire for a durable peace.

They are however not yet ready to move beyond the liberation of Kuwait to address the age-old problems on which they have been so long divided, except with wariness and with distrust. But move they must.¹⁸

¹⁴*Commons Debates*. 7 March 1991: 18173.

¹⁵R. Gwyn. "Clark offers deft analysis of PLO crisis," *Toronto Star*, 12 March 1991: A14.

¹⁶United States Embassy (text of joint Bush-Mulroney press conference in Ottawa). "US Arms Sales to Israel, Saudi Arabia to Continue," *Text*, 91-19, 15 March 1991: 5.

¹⁷*Commons Debates*. 15 March 1991: 18536.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

Mr. Clark engaged in a more detailed discussion of meetings with Israeli and Palestinian leaders in his presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) on 21 March 1991. Mr. Clark expressed his view that a key to peace was the dual recognition of the legitimate status of Israel as a state and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. He said that in speaking with Prime Minister Shamir and Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, he emphasized Canada's strong friendship with Israel, but also emphasized that a window of opportunity existed for peace that must be seized.

Israel has always demonstrated itself as a moral force, ...I emphasized to the leaders of Israel that the same sort of moral courage must now be demonstrated in the search for peace. ...I encouraged them, as I did the other leaders with whom I met...to envisage action on confidence-building measures that could contribute to an atmosphere conducive to further progress...¹⁹

One confidence-building measure that Israel could consider was to lift restrictions on the Occupied Territories and re-open the universities, while the Palestinians could give a clear reaffirmation of their recognition of Israel. Mr. Clark also indicated that while Canada supported the idea of an international peace conference on the Middle East, any negotiating forum which might be successful in achieving a solution based on 242 and 338 would be acceptable.

Too often in the past there has been the tendency to expect the other side to make the first move. ...If we permit the region to lock itself into such an inertia in the future, we will be sowing the seeds for future conflict, not future peace. Time is of the essence. I genuinely believe this conflict has opened a window of opportunity, [but]...it can not be held open forever. The next six months -- at most, the next year -- will be a critical time in determining whether the war with Iraq will go down in history as the key that opened a whole new era in the Middle East, or simply one more conflict in a tragic series of conflicts.²⁰

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

MPs made a variety of statements in the House of Commons, condemning the Israeli actions at Temple Mount and expressing support for the peace process.²¹

¹⁹Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (hereafter SCEAIT). *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991: 26.

²⁰*Ibid.*: 27.

²¹*Commons Debates*. 10 October 1990: 13976. *Commons Debates*. 15 October 1990: 14134. *Commons Debates*. 29 October 1990: 14799. *Commons Debates*. 31 October 1990: 14923. *Commons Debates*. 12 March 1991: 18346, 18347. *Commons Debates*. 13 March 1991: 18393.

During the hearing in which Joe Clark gave an account of his trip to the Middle East, NDP member Svend Robinson pushed the question of getting the peace process activated.

I have no reason to believe there is going to be any progress on the Palestinian question. But assuming that time goes by, at what point is our government prepared to say that we must move ahead, ...to ensure that pressure is brought to bear on Israel, ... and also on other states...²²

Mr. Clark responded that there were no guarantees and indicated that there was a sharp debate in Israel about the best future path to follow. He also said:

You ask when Canada is going to seek more rigorous means to change behaviour in the region. Not immediately, if ever, because I think there is a possibility now for persuasion to work. ...Frankly, I think the role of Canada in this regard is to try to keep lines open as much as we can, with people and groups and countries with whom others will not deal or cannot deal at the moment.²³

During this hearing, MPs entered into a wide-ranging discussion of issues relating to Middle East peace and the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Some of the issues raised included future Canadian policy, Canadian initiatives and the role of the UN.²⁴

²²SCEAIT. *Minutes of Proceedings*, op. cit.: 34.

²³*Ibid.*: 35-36.

²⁴For the full discussion, see: SCEAIT. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991.

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BACKGROUND

Discussions between North and South Korea on joint efforts and possible reunification experienced both progress and setbacks during 1990 and early 1991. Korea has been partitioned into north and south since 1945. An earlier effort at negotiating reunification took place between 1976-1981, when three international conferences were unsuccessful in making any progress on the question.

The discussions between the two sides are the result of an exchange of proposals which began in 1988. On 26 July 1990, after some eighteen months of difficult negotiations, representatives from the two countries signed an agreement which provided for the first ever meetings between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The agreement called for two sets of meetings, the first in Seoul, the South Korean capital, from 4 to 7 September, and the second in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, from 16 to 19 October 1990.

In the interim, a proposed opening of the border between North and South, at Panmunjom, from 13 to 18 August to allow free travel, did not materialize. Early in July 1990, North Korea had announced that it would open its half of Panmunjom, a city straddling the border, on 15 August, the Korean national celebration of independence from Japan. South Korea had responded positively and a pan-Korean festival had been planned. However, all plans fell through and on 15 and 16 August, there were violent confrontations between students and police in South Korea as students tried to make the trip to Panmunjom.

At the historic meetings in Seoul in September, it was clear that the two sides remained far apart on important issues. However, there was a general air of quiet optimism and cordiality. At the meetings, North Korea elaborated on previous proposals and presented a nine-point plan for military disarmament. The proposal included a call for the complete withdrawal of all US troops stationed in South Korea and an end to the annual joint US-South Korea military exercises. At present, the US maintains 43,000 troops in South Korea, although budgetary restrictions have prompted a US plan to reduce these troops by 10 to 12 percent. These moves would be a prelude to a three to four year period of overall reductions by both North and South resulting in both sides maintaining armed forces of about 100,000. Once arms control measures were in place, North Korea proposed that neutral troops could be deployed in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the border to oversee the process. North Korea also asked that South Korea give up its bid for a separate UN seat, and release three citizens jailed for unauthorized visits to North Korea as confidence-building measures.

In contrast, the South Korean approach was to emphasize non-military matters first. South Korea's Prime Minister called for a joint statement of intent which would, *inter alia*, recognize and

respect the two political systems, open the borders and call for an end to unnecessary international competition between the two. At the end of the two days of talks, the North Korean delegation was received by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo. President Roh proposed a summit meeting with his North Korean counterpart President Kim Il-Sung.

Although there was no final statement issued at the conclusion of the meetings, there was an agreement to meet again, and to establish a special committee to review each others' proposals regarding a seat at the United Nations. South Korea agreed to temporarily suspend its efforts to get its own seat. The question of a UN seat for one or both Koreas has been a long standing issue of concern. Both North and South Korea have observer status at the UN. South Korea has recently actively sought to win its own official seat at the UN. North Korea, however, has strongly opposed this position, claiming that a South Korean seat would formalize and perpetuate the countries' separation.

The general improvement in the state of relations between North and South Korea comes in the context of a changed atmosphere between East and West in the international arena. In particular, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the changes in Soviet foreign policy have left North Korea somewhat isolated in the world. As a result of these changes, both North and South have sought to encourage and develop new international ties. In the South Korean case, it has courted both China and the Soviet Union, previously traditional allies of North Korea, as part of its bid to secure a UN seat. On 30 September 1990, the Soviet Union established formal diplomatic relations with South Korea. In December, the South Korean President visited Moscow and pledged \$3 billion in economic assistance. Also in September, North Korea began discussions with Japan on normalizing relations. On 30 January 1991, Japan formally apologized for its period of colonial rule (1910-1945). However, these discussions stalemated in May over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

The second set of prime ministerial meetings began on 16 October. While these meetings had been preceded by successful exchanges of musicians and athletes, the meetings themselves were less successful than those in September. Neither side made changes of substance in their position, and the mutual retrenchment led to an exchange of accusations about bad faith. A third set of meetings in December, in Seoul, were equally unproductive with the two sides stalemated on the question of a non-aggression pact, the North wanting a pact signed immediately, the South wanting such an agreement to be accompanied by confidence-building measures.

Another set of meetings was planned for February 1991 but these were cancelled by North Korea when it became clear that South Korea planned to proceed with its military exercises with the US. On the plus side, prior to the cancellation, the two sides had agreed to establish unified teams in

table tennis and soccer to compete internationally. In mid-July, North Korea called for the talks on unification to resume, and South Korea accepted the invitation.

On 28 May, in the face of a determined South Korean campaign to seek a UN seat, North Korea announced that it would seek its own UN seat, noting that it could not allow South Korea to be the only official representative of Korea at the UN.

Although North Korea has proposed that the Korean peninsula be declared a nuclear-weapon free zone and has stated that it will refrain from testing, producing, stockpiling or introducing nuclear weapons on its soil, in recent years, the possibility that North Korea may be developing a nuclear weapons capability has become an issue of international concern. South Korea will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil, but it is widely thought that the US maintains some nuclear weapons there. North Korea is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but has refused to open up its facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea has said that it will sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA if the US will remove the threat to North Korea or give a formal guarantee that it will not launch a pre-emptive strike. In June, North Korea began formal discussions with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement but continued to tie its final acceptance of IAEA inspections to removal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea. The US refuses to link the status of its weapons to a commitment North Korea is required to make by virtue of its signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In South Korea, there were large-scale student protests during May and June, involving tens of thousands of students. Riot police have been out in response to the protests and many arrests have been made. The students were protesting the police beating to death of a student protester, and in later demonstrations called for the resignation of President Roh Tae Woo (whose cabinet has been plagued by scandals during 1991) and the withdrawal of US military forces from South Korea.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, visited South Korea for two days in late September. This was the first visit of a Canadian foreign minister since 1975. Mr. Clark held discussions with President Roh Tae Woo and South Korea's Foreign Minister Choi. Discussions focussed on international issues and Mr. Clark commended Korea for its support of the UN sanctions against Iraq.¹

¹Department of External Affairs. "Mr. Clark Concludes Talks in Korea," *News Release*, no. 208, 20 September 1990.

On 27 December 1990, Canada agreed to sell a second CANDU nuclear reactor to South Korea. Mr. Clark expressed his support for this proposed sale in his September visit.²

Canada has expressed concern about North Korea's position on the NPT Treaty. At the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT Treaty held in September 1990 (see Chapter 8), the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason stated:

...the obligation to conclude a...safeguards agreement within 18 months of NPT adherence is clear. All NPT parties should make every effort to respect this obligation. We have a special concern in this regard, however, that North Korea, a party with considerable nuclear activity, has not yet concluded its safeguards agreement. This is a particularly clear example of non-compliance which we hope can be resolved soon.³

In 1990, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, proposed that a dialogue on North Pacific security be initiated with a view to developing new consultative institutions which would facilitate increased security cooperation in the region. The Clark proposal envisaged a dialogue including Canada, China, Japan, the Soviet Union, the US and both North and South Korea.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue during 1990-1991.

²Ibid.

³Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva. "Statement by Peggy Mason Ambassador for Disarmament to the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, August 24, 1990," Geneva, 24 August 1990: 5.

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BACKGROUND

Civil war began in Lebanon on 13 April 1975 when skirmishes between Palestinians and the Phalange, on the heels of clashes between citizens of Sidon and the Lebanese Army, sparked large scale fighting among various political groups which grew into full scale civil war. The war has resulted in many thousands of deaths among Lebanese civilians, led to the division of Beirut into two warring sectors, devastated a prosperous economy, generated large-scale migration and displacement of the population and has left Lebanon the victim of various power battles in the Middle East region.

Lebanon was under French control from 1920 to 1941 when Britain took over the area during World War II. At that time, by British and Free French agreement, Lebanon was made independent. In 1943, the first president was elected and a parliamentary system was established under a "National Pact." Under the covenant, religious sectors are given representation on the basis of their numerical strength. In addition, by tradition, the President has been a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem and the Speaker of the National Assembly a Shia Moslem. Over time the Moslem population has gained in numbers through immigration and a higher birthrate. As a result, discontent among the Moslem population, as well as other religious groups, has developed about what is perceived to be Maronite Christian domination of the political process. A sense of discontent was also generated by regional economic disparities within the country.

The civil war has been complicated by the presence in Lebanon of large number of Palestinian refugees and guerillas. The presence of the Palestinian guerillas has prompted two Israeli invasions of Lebanon, in 1978 and in 1982. Israel left Lebanon in 1985 but kept a strip of territory along the Lebanese border which, along with the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army, it continues to patrol. Israel maintains that it must keep this "security zone" in order to prevent attacks against its borders by guerillas based in southern Lebanon and in further efforts to counteract and pre-empt guerilla activity, Israel has launched a number of air attacks against guerilla targets in southern Lebanon. The war has been further complicated by splits within the Christian and Muslim organisations which have resulted in battles within Lebanon.

In 1990-1991, it appeared that the first real steps towards peace in Lebanon may have been taken. The seeds of this progress were set in October 1989 when Lebanese leaders, under the auspices of the Arab League, agreed to a peace plan which included changing the constitution to redistribute power among the religious groups. The peace plan, known as the Taif Accord, provided for a national unity cabinet including representatives of all groups, the creation of a unified army, and the dismantlement of the various militias in Lebanon. It also provided for the redeployment of Syrian

forces within Lebanon to be followed by an agreement between Lebanon and Syria as to the strength and duration of stay of the Syrian forces.

In spite of agreement from most key parties in Lebanon, implementation of the Accord was thwarted by a faction of the Lebanese Army, led by General Michel Aoun who refused to accept the Accord because it did not call for the complete withdrawal of Syrian forces. General Aoun also rejected the election of Elias Hrawi as President in November 1989. President Hrawi is a Maronite Christian with good relations with Syria.

During July 1990, fighting erupted between the Hizbollah (Party of God) and Amal fighters in the Iqlim al Toffah district. The Hizbollah were attempting to get to Nabatiye, near the Israeli security zone, but were stopped short of their goal after eight days of fighting. The struggle drew in elements of the Fatah, the mainstream group of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yassar Arafat, and was estimated to have involved some 5,000 combatants. One hundred and forty people were said to have been killed.

Fighting within Christian and Palestinian groups continued through August and September. At the end of August, a three month ceasefire which had ended three months of fighting between rival Christian factions over control of East Beirut, ended with mortar and tank battles. From 7 to 9 September, in the Ein Hilwe area, the Fatah group of the PLO fought a battle against a rival Palestinian group led by Abu Nidal, successfully ousting them from their positions. It was estimated that the three days of fighting resulted in seventy-eight deaths.

At the end of August, Lebanese President Hrawi met with Syrian President Assad to discuss Lebanon. The Syrian President pledged to give any assistance necessary to help the Lebanese government implement the Taif Accord and regain control of all of Lebanon. At the end of September, President Hrawi began a new effort to make the Taif Accord possible and instituted a blockade of the area in Christian east Beirut, controlled by General Aoun and his forces. On 10 October, when the blockade failed to oust General Aoun's forces, President Hrawi officially asked the Syrian government for help.

On 13 October, under siege by Lebanese troops supported by Syrian artillery and jet fighters, General Aoun called on his army units to obey Lebanese Army commander Emil Lahoud (who was appointed by President Hrawi) and Aoun sought refuge in the French Embassy. Syrian forces bombed the Presidential palace in which Aoun had been hiding and took control of the palace by the next day. Aoun's removal opened the way for the disbanding of all of the militias in Beirut under the terms established in the Taif Accord. On 21 October 1990, Dany Chamoun, a prominent supporter of General Aoun was killed by masked gunmen in his home. His wife and two sons were also killed.

By the end of October the militia groups had all agreed to withdraw from Beirut and to the plan for a unified national army. The Lebanese Cabinet issued an order calling for the withdrawal process to begin on 10 November and end by 19 November. A last minute problem arose when the Christian Lebanese forces led by Geagea refused to leave until the government agreed to hand over their offices in Beirut which had been seized earlier. A compromise was reached and the Christian Lebanese Forces began leaving Beirut on 24 November. By 4 December, Beirut was finally free of militia and bulldozers destroyed the barricades which had formed the "Green Line" dividing west and east Beirut.

At the beginning of May, the process of disarming militias in the rest of the country was underway. The Army moved to deploy troops in locations taken over from the militia, remove roadblocks and re-open the coastal highway. In an apparent step away from the Taif Accord, a meeting between Syrian and Iranian officials at the end of April led to agreement that elements of the Hizbollah militia could remain in an enclave in the eastern Bekka valley. The first hitch in this process came when the PLO announced that it would not disarm its groups in Lebanon. The disarming of the Palestinian groups was thought to be critical to the Lebanese Government's success in regaining control of the country. In response to the PLO announcement, Government officials made it clear that the PLO could no longer exist as a state within a state and could not live outside the law.

On 15 June 1991, with the PLO continuing to be intransigent about disarming, the Lebanese Government sent troops to Sidon to begin the process. On 1 July, fighting between the Army and the PLO broke out. The resulting battle lasted four days and on 4 July, the PLO agreed to dismantle its power base near Israel and ship its heavy arms abroad. The next day, government troops took over the last of the PLO positions and PLO guerillas began turning over their weapons to government forces. During this entire period, Israel continued to launch air attacks against Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon.

In mid-May, Lebanon and Syria negotiated a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination. The treaty establishes joint Lebanese-Syrian government institutions to review Lebanese policy in defence, internal security, economics, foreign policy and social issues. A higher council including the heads of state, speakers of the Parliaments and Prime Ministers will oversee the joint institutions. After seven hours of debate the Lebanese parliament voted in favour of the treaty by a vote of twenty-eight to three. Christian Maronite members who voted against the treaty had not succeeded in eliminating a clause which nullifies any Lebanese laws which are in contradiction with the Treaty's terms. The Treaty was ratified by Lebanon on 27 May 1991.

For some sectors of the Lebanese population, the treaty has generated new fears of Syrian domination within Lebanon. It had been hoped that the Lebanese Government's success in ending

Palestinian guerilla activity in southern Lebanon would generate pressure on Israel to pull out of its security zone. However, Israel remains adamant about staying so long as there are foreign forces in Lebanon.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has always supported Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and has called for the removal of foreign troops, both Israeli and Syrian. Canada has also supported UN Security Council Resolution 425 which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. Canada was a participant in the UN peacekeeping operation established in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in its initial stages and supports the idea of expanding UNIFIL to include monitoring of the southern border.

Through aid administered by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Canada has sought to support organisations such as the Red Cross, working in Lebanon. Canada has also established a special immigration programme which speeds up the immigration process for people with relatives in Canada seeking to leave Lebanon.

In a speech at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), the Associate Minister for Defence, Mary Collins reiterated Canada's position and spoke encouragingly of the hopes for peace. She also stated:

Canada supported the efforts of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab League, and we urged the concerned parties -- especially Syria and the various Lebanese factions -- to join in these efforts. We were also pleased by the success of consultations among Lebanese Members of Parliament in Taif under the auspices of the Tripartite Committee of Arab Heads of State.Canada is very encouraged by the great sense of responsibility shown by Lebanese Members of Parliament toward their country, and we continue to encourage all Lebanese to support the legitimate government of President Hrawi.¹

In speaking at a second meeting organized by CIIPS, the Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa and the Middle East at the Department of External Affairs noted that the encouraging developments in Lebanon had contributed to a shift from vigilant hope about Lebanon to prudent optimism, especially in light of the extension of Presidential authority over greater Beirut. Mr. Perron

¹Minister for External Relations and International Development. "Lebanon: Hope from within, Notes for remarks by the Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence On behalf of the Honourable Monique Landry, Minister for External Relations and International Development," *Statement*, 27 September 1990: 4.

emphasised Canada's support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and the withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory.

We have used and will continue to use, every opportunity to urge those countries [with troops in Lebanon] to respect Lebanese sovereignty and to avoid complicating the already difficult problems of Lebanon.²

Responding to a question about Lebanon during a discussion of the Persian Gulf crisis, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

Regarding Lebanon, I discussed the matter in Israel, in Syria and Iran; I made a particular point of discussing the hostages when I was in Iran....The situation in Lebanon is still very difficult...but there have been improvements over the last few months, and we hope to encourage these improvements.³

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 24 October 1990, Liberal member Mark Harb requested the unanimous consent of the House to adopt a motion stating:

That this House, in this time of sadness in Lebanon over the death of political leader Dany Chamoun, extends its sincere sympathy to the people of Lebanon and that this House continues to pledge its support for sovereignty, independence and peace in Lebanon.⁴

The motion received unanimous consent. After the resolution passed, representatives of all three parties spoke of their support for the resolution. PC member Bob Corbett who seconded the motion said that it was "...important that we urge all the parties involved in the wrenching turmoil in Lebanon to come to grips with the root cause of their agonies."⁵

In March, Liberal member Paul Martin spoke about how the Persian Gulf crisis had obscured events in Lebanon and said:

²Marc, Perron, Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa and the Middle East, Department of External Affairs. "Le Liban: Nouveaux espoirs de l'intérieur," *Statement*, 14 December 1990: 5.

³Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991: 37.

⁴*Commons Debates*. 24 October 1990: 14631.

⁵*Ibid.*: 14633.

...it is unacceptable for the Canadian ambassador to be absent from Beirut. Lebanon is an occupied country. There are flagrant and constant violations of international law. Unfortunately, Canada has been very slow to react and to denounce those responsible.⁶

Liberal member Christine Stewart asked the government to condemn the continuing air raids by Israel against bases in Lebanon, noting that Lebanese civilians and children are killed in such raids.

In view of the very tense and fragile peace that is being sought in the whole of the Middle East, I ask our government to condemn these raids and to call upon the United Nations to intervene to prevent even greater tragedy from occurring.⁷

On 19 June 1991, MP Mark Assad tabled a petition in the House requesting that the Canadian Government re-open its embassy in Beirut as soon as possible.⁸

⁶*Commons Debates*. 20 March 1991: 18715.

⁷*Commons Debates*. 6 June 1991: 1274.

⁸*Commons Debates*. 19 June 1991: 2097.

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BACKGROUND

Myanmar, previously known as Burma, gained independence in 1948. Since then it has struggled to establish democratic governments but has primarily been ruled by military dictatorships. At present, Myanmar is under the rule of a military junta, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), led by General Saw Maung. General Maung took power from General Ne Win in September 1988. Once in power, General Saw Maung abolished all state institutions and established the SLORC. The changeover in government came after two months of continuous protests in the capital city of Rangoon and was accompanied by a violent crackdown against the pro-democracy movement, the strength of which had contributed to General Win's downfall. This crackdown resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 civilians.

The new regime had, however, promised to hold democratic elections when they came to power. These occurred on 27 May 1990. The opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 392 of 485 seats, almost 80 percent of the vote. Only ten members of General Ne Win's party, the National Union Party (NUP) were elected. Although the results were in by the end of May, they were not released until 1 July, the first indication that General Win and the SLORC were not going to forfeit their power easily. The SLORC claims that a parliament cannot meet and it must remain in power until a formal constitution is drawn up.

On 8 August 1990, the second anniversary of protests for democracy, students and monks taking part in a protest in Mandalay were fired upon by police. Four people were killed and several were injured. By September 1990, the SLORC had arrested more NLD members, including the acting leader Kyi Maung, his deputy and four senior party members. The two leaders of the NLD, Tin Oo and Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San, one of the leaders of Burma's independence movement) have been under house arrest since 20 July 1989. By the end of October, all but four key NLD leaders were imprisoned. The NLD representatives remaining free were forced to sign a state order (Order 1/90) which gives the SLORC the right to continue governing until a constitution is written.

Since then, the junta has continued its crackdown, jailing more political leaders. On 20 December 1990, it took the final step and declared the National League for Democracy illegal. The current experience bears a striking resemblance to past Burmese efforts to establish democracy. General Ne Win, deposed in September 1988, came to power in a military coup in 1962, overthrowing Prime Minister U Nu.

After the August protest by monks and students ended in violence, the Mandalay Monks Association began a boycott of the military authorities, refusing to minister to officials and their

families. By mid-October, this movement had spread across the country. In response, the SLORC began raiding monasteries and arresting monks. As in the case of the NLD, the SLORC's unceasing tactics took their toll and on 20 October, the boycott officially ended.

Groups, such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International, have drawn attention to the human rights abuses being carried out in Myanmar. However, the situation and the continued refusal of the SLORC to accept the results of the May elections have generated little in the way of international condemnation. As part of its campaign of arrests, in September 1990, the SLORC went so far as to enter the West German, British and US embassies to arrest Myanmar nationals working there. This prompted a formal protest to the Myanmar government by the twelve members of the European Community as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and the US. As part of the protest, the government representatives informed the SLORC that they did not accept it as the legitimate government of Myanmar.

At the General Assembly meeting of the United Nations in the Fall of 1990, Sweden advocated a UN resolution which would condemn the government of Myanmar for its human rights abuses, express concern about the failure of the government to transfer power and demand the release of all political prisoners. The resolution was also sponsored by the members of the European Community, Norway, Iceland, Australia, Austria, Canada, Poland and Hungary. However, the resolution failed to attract enough support to move ahead. In particular, Third World and Asian countries were reluctant to give the resolution support because they felt it interfered in domestic affairs. In the end, a resolution was adopted without a vote which deferred consideration of the draft resolution until next year's General Assembly meeting.¹ In addition, Panama has brought the failure of the SLORC to respond to the will of the people and its human rights record, to the attention of the Secretary-General. Consequently, the Forty-sixth General Assembly in autumn 1991 will address an item titled "[e]nhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections."

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada supported and welcomed the elections held in May 1990 in Myanmar, calling at the same time for the release of all political prisoners.²

¹United Nations General Assembly. *Request for the will of the people of Myanmar*, Resolution 45/433, 18 December 1990.

²Department of External Affairs. "Clark Welcomes Democratic Elections in Myanmar," *News Release*, no. 124, 14 May 1990.

The continuing refusal of the military government to hand over power, prompted Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark to write to General Saw Maung. In a 13 August 1990 letter to the General, Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's support for the elections, but also made clear that Canada now expects the government to complete the transfer of power to the elected representatives. Clark also called for the release of NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. Progress, or lack of progress, on these issues would affect Canada's relationship with Myanmar. "The course of those developments will have a direct impact on future relations between our two countries."³

Canada was one of the foreign governments to protest the Myanmar government's actions in September and early October 1990, and to support the Swedish resolution at the United Nations.

At the beginning of October, on behalf of the Canadian government, the Canadian Ambassador to Myanmar had expressed "grave concern" to the Myanmar government about the failure to transfer power to a parliament. Canada also protested the violation of diplomatic premises (see above). Clark expressed particular concern about the arrests of NLD members, stating:

The interim government and the army must initiate constructive dialogue with the National League for Democracy, convene the elected national assembly, and release all political prisoners. That dialogue is only possible if the leaders of the National League for Democracy are free.⁴

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The anniversary of the May 1990 elections prompted comment from two members of Parliament. NDP member Dan Heap noted the anniversary and stated:

Nevertheless, Canada continues to recognize this unlawful and violent military regime. Petro-Canada, of which the Canadian government is the sole shareholder, has a contract to develop oil in Burma for the enrichment of the military. I call on our government to condemn publicly this military attack on parliamentary government in Burma, to recognize the lawfully elected government, to withdraw recognition of that military dictatorship and to cause Petro-Canada to abandon its contract with that dictatorship.⁵

³Department of External Affairs. "Canada Urges Myanmar to Complete Move Toward Democracy," *News Release*, no. 187, 31 August 1990.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Canada Expresses Concern About Human Rights in Myanmar," *News Release*, no. 229, 5 October 1990.

⁵*Commons Debates*. 27 May 1991: 599.

Four days later, Liberal member Beryl Gaffney echoed Mr. Heap's words, calling on the Canadian government to demand the transfer of power and the release of political prisoners:

The Government of Canada must then bring all its influence to bear at the United Nations so that the rest of the world can also begin to do what is right for the people of Myanmar.⁶

⁶Commons Debates. 31 May 1991: 872.

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CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY

- a. Foreign aid to the military
- b. Policy statements on human rights
- c. United Nations approach
- d. Sanctions
- e. Reviews by joint committees in Parliament
- f. Canadian support for international law

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

- a. The commitment of Canadian Forces
- b. The efficacy of sanctions
- c. Resolution 678 and Canada's role
- d. Post-sanctions proposals for Myanmar

29. THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Because of the extensive materials relating to Canadian policy in the Gulf crisis, this entry in *The Guide* is sub-divided as follows:

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The invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and subsequent events dominated both international and Canadian news for most of the following seven months until the suspension of coalition military activities on 27 February 1991. Thereafter, international attention shifted to the plight of Kurdish refugees, environmental damage, and Iraqi compliance with the terms of the ceasefire. Throughout the summer of 1991, efforts by UN inspectors to examine Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities continued to keep the issue in the forefront of international attention as it became clear that Iraq had systematically developed capabilities aimed at the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles. Canada's major involvement, however, resulted from its position on the Security Council from the outset of the crisis on 2 August to the end of the year, and from its military contribution to the multinational coalition. In the post-hostilities period, Canada made a number of proposals directed to the broader problems of peace and security in the Middle East.

BACKGROUND

a. Issues surrounding the invasion of Kuwait

During the second part of July 1990, relations between Kuwait and neighbouring Iraq deteriorated rapidly. On 18 July, Baghdad Radio broadcast a speech by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accusing Kuwait of exceeding the production levels set by OPEC, and so driving down the price of oil. Iraq's lost oil revenues were claimed to amount to US \$14 billion. Aziz also accused Kuwait of stealing the equivalent of US \$2.4 billion from Iraq by producing oil from the Iraqi part of the transborder oil fields. By 24 July, an estimated 30,000 Iraqi troops had deployed to the border with Kuwait, although cross-border traffic remained normal and Iraq made no apparent effort to conceal the troop concentration.

On 26 and 27 July, an emergency session of OPEC was called. Despite the efforts of other Arab countries, no progress was made in resolving the crisis, which appeared still to be one relating to oil prices, oil production and lost oil revenues. Iraq's serious shortage of foreign currency in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, and a situation of over-supply in world oil markets, appeared to be the motivating factors in Iraq's aggressive approach to the dispute with Kuwait. Following the OPEC meeting, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt sought to mediate the dispute. Meeting in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, however, on 1 August the Iraqi delegation walked out of the talks, claiming that the Kuwaitis were not negotiating seriously. In addition to the initial claims concerning oil prices and production, it now became clear that Iraq had demanded that Kuwait forgive an estimated US \$10 billion in loans made to Iraq during the eight-year war with Iran. In the meantime, by the end of July, the Iraqi troop concentration on the border had increased to 100,000,

and, subsequently, US intelligence sources indicated that, by 1 August, combat support units had also deployed, providing the first compelling evidence that an attack was imminent.

In the weeks following the invasion and annexation of Kuwait, Iraq cited two more grounds for its action. First, on 8 August, it accused "western colonialism" of creating Kuwait in order to keep Iraq from "acquiring part of its tactical and strategic abilities." Subsequently, on 28 August, Kuwait was declared to be the 19th province of Iraq. Second, on 12 August, Iraq declared that the occupation of Kuwait could not be separated from other "occupations" in the Middle East.

Although the extent of the Iraqi build-up prior to 2 August was detected and reported by US intelligence agencies using satellite and other information sources, the Iraqi invasion on 2 August appeared to take the Bush Administration and other governments, both Arab and western, by surprise. Although conducted against a much smaller Kuwaiti military force, the speed and sophisticated tactics of the Iraqi armoured attack, and the occupation of Kuwait City in a matter of hours, impressed some military analysts as a professional military operation, apparently confirming the Iraqi military prowess which had been battle-hardened in the war with Iran. When Iraqi troops moved south of Kuwait City towards the border with Saudi Arabia, therefore, fears grew that Iraq also intended to invade Saudi Arabia.

b. Allied and United Nations response: 2 August 1990 to 29 November 1990

Although US intelligence agencies were fully aware of the Iraqi troop build-up, prior to 2 August, the Bush White House did not develop a definitive view that President Saddam Hussein intended to attack Kuwait. Moreover, in the days prior to 2 August, both King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt had expressed to western governments their conviction that Iraq did not intend to invade Kuwait. When the attack took place at 2:00 a.m. local time, there were no US military units within striking distance of the Iraqi forces and the initial response of the White House was one of surprise. Urgent requests from Kuwait for military assistance could not be met. The first US response, therefore, was to unilaterally freeze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, and to focus on the situation in Saudi Arabia.

On the same day, 2 August, the UN Security Council met and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Thereafter, the US efforts to coordinate the international response to the Iraqi attack moved along two parallel tracks: the first was to create an alliance of Arab and western states intended to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia; the second was to seek United Nations support for policies intended to bring about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait in accordance with the UN resolution of 2 August.

On 3 August, fourteen members of the Arab League, including Egypt and Syria, voted to condemn the Iraqi invasion. On the same day, in a move widely seen as confirming Gorbachev's desire to avoid confrontational foreign policies with the United States, the Soviet Union, which had been the principal military supplier of Iraq and its leading great power supporter, joined the United States in condemning the invasion. Meeting in Moscow, US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze jointly condemned the "brutal" invasion of Kuwait, and the Soviet Union announced an arms embargo against Iraq.

After initial hesitation, on 7 August, Saudi Arabia, faced with intelligence evidence that strong Iraqi forces had moved south of Kuwait City to take up positions on the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, expressed its wish "for the participation of fraternal Arab forces and other friendly forces" in the defence of Saudi Arabia. US fighter squadrons began to move to Saudi Arabia within forty-eight hours of this decision, while British and US naval forces had already begun to converge on the Persian Gulf. Insofar as the defence of Saudi Arabia required the positioning of land forces, the Saudi decision made possible large-scale US troop deployments on Saudi territory. Initial US estimates indicated that it would be necessary to move up to 200,000 troops to ensure the defence of Saudi Arabia against a determined Iraqi attack. On 10 August, twelve out of twenty-one Arab League members, including Egypt and Syria, agreed to send troops to assist in the defence of Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the defence of Saudi Arabia, and following a second UN resolution on 6 August imposing economic sanctions on Iraq, allied naval forces moving to the Gulf were also called upon to monitor compliance with the sanctions policy. With the mounting of a naval blockade, therefore, Iraq's relations with two of its overland neighbours, Iran and Jordan, became crucial to the effectiveness of the sanctions approach. On 15 August, and despite three years of unfinished negotiations under UN auspices to reach a peace agreement with Iran, Iraq accepted Iranian peace terms in order to stabilize the security situation on its eastern border. Although Jordan initially undertook to respect United Nations resolutions on sanctions, strategically and economically Jordan was severely affected both by UN sanctions, and by the stream of refugees which began to cross into Jordan. Making frequent complaints that the United Nations and the western countries were not providing adequate economic support to help deal with the refugees and the economic consequences of sanctions, King Hussein adopted an ambivalent position during the crisis, seeking to emphasize the search for a peaceful solution, declining to condemn Saddam Hussein in unambiguous terms, and emphasizing the enormous cost that Jordan would incur in the event of a war. The large Palestinian population of Jordan was overwhelmingly supportive of Iraq.

Between 7 August and the US mid-term Congressional elections on 6 November 1990, both Iraq and the US-led multinational coalition forces arrayed against it built up massive military forces in the Gulf region. In aggregate, the multinational forces constituted over 360,000 troops, 1,800 tanks,

and over 1,300 aircraft. The United States was much the largest provider. It had positioned nearly 240,000 troops, over 1,000 main battle tanks, nearly 700 aircraft, and 55 ships, including three aircraft carrier battle groups, a heavy battleship equipped with cruise missiles, and a number of nuclear attack submarines. The United Kingdom had contributed two armoured brigades totalling 15,000 troops with 200 tanks, 200 aircraft and 12 ships. France had provided 13,000 troops, 75 aircraft and 14 ships including an aircraft carrier. Other western countries, including Canada, provided ships, combat aircraft, and support units including medical teams. Syria deployed 50,000 troops and over 270 tanks along its border with Iraq, while making a commitment to send 19,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, and, amongst other contributions, Egypt promised to deploy 20,000 troops in Saudi Arabia.

For its part, Iraq responded by mobilizing increasing numbers of troops and increasing its forces in Kuwait and along the Saudi border. The total Iraq military forces in 1990 were estimated to comprise more than 1 million troops, over 5,500 tanks, of which a limited number were the most modern Soviet T-72 main battle tanks, and over 600 combat aircraft. Of these totals, by the end of October, Iraq was estimated to have deployed in Kuwait 430,000 troops, 3,500 tanks, 2,500 armoured combat vehicles, 1,700 artillery pieces, and a large number of aircraft, dispersed bases for which were located both in Kuwait and Iraq. In a further measure intended to deter an allied attack on its key installations, in mid-August, Iraq began rounding up westerners in Kuwait to use as hostages. An unspecified number of these hostages were held at key military and civil installations in Kuwait and Iraq as a "human shield." Following numerous official and unofficial representations, however, Saddam Hussein abandoned this policy, and announced that all western hostages would be freed by 25 December 1990. The hostage issue prompted the first statements by western governments that under international law Saddam Hussein would be held criminally responsible for these actions.

Two days after the mid-term congressional elections, on 8 November 1990, President Bush ordered a major reinforcement of US forces in the Gulf from 200,000 to 500,000. When completed, this reinforcement gave the Bush Administration the option to use its forces in an offensive mode, and so prepared the way for the offensive operations in February 1991. Subsequent analyses and accounts of White House decision-making suggest that the military plan for a large-scale bombing campaign against Iraq some time in January, to be followed by a ground offensive, was approved by the White House in late October 1990.

c. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions: 660 to 678

Between 2 August and 27 November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted twelve resolutions relating to the war in the Gulf.¹ These Resolutions began with 660, which, following the sequence of steps outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, condemned the invasion of Kuwait, demanded that Iraq withdraw, and called upon the two parties to begin intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences. On 6 August, again invoking Chapter VII, the Security Council decided to impose mandatory sanctions against Iraq, and called upon all states, including non-members, "to act strictly in accordance with the present resolution." The Council also struck a Committee, consisting of all members of the Council, to examine reports on the progress of the sanctions, and to oversee the actions taken by states in implementing the Resolution. The actual monitoring of the situation regarding the imposition of sanctions, therefore, was left to the individual states, members of the United Nations.

Of the ten further resolutions, seven dealt with issues which arose in the course of the dispute. These involved, for example, the status of the nationals of third countries in Iraq and Kuwait, the status of diplomatic missions in Kuwait, rejection of the annexation of Kuwait, and the attempts by Iraq to destroy the records of civil administration in Kuwait. Two additional resolutions dealt with sanctions, while the last one, Resolution 678, opened the way to the use of force rather than sanctions to bring about Iraqi compliance with Resolution 660.

Further to Resolution 661, on 25 August the Security Council returned to the implementation of sanctions in Resolution 665. Noting the failure of Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions, and particularly the attempts by Iraq to use Iraqi flag vessels for the export of oil, Resolution 665 called upon states deploying naval forces in the area "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary...to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping." Those states deploying naval forces, therefore, acting under the authority of the Security Council, were entitled to use appropriate force to implement the sanctions.

Tightening the sanctions noose still further, in Resolution 670 on 25 September 1990, the Security Council confirmed that sanctions applied to all means of transport, including aircraft. Resolution 670 reminded states that aircraft bound for Iraq should not be allowed to take-off from or overfly their territory, and decided that each state should "take all necessary measures" to ensure that aircraft registered in its territory or flown by operators resident in its territory complied with

¹These Resolutions are summarized in FACTS AND FIGURES.

Security Council decisions. Resolution 670, therefore, implied that aircraft violating the sanctions might be shot down by states implementing the sanctions decisions.

In Resolution 678, which was passed on 29 November by a vote of 12 to 2, with Cuba and Yemen voting against and China abstaining, the Security Council authorized the use of force against Iraq. Following a Soviet proposal, Resolution 678 determined first that Iraq should be allowed "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will," to comply with Security Council resolutions. After 15 January 1991, however, it authorized "Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait" to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

Resolution 678 broke new ground in the crisis in several ways. First, it left enforcement, if it became necessary, to those states which undertook the responsibility by virtue of cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, and it therefore entitled the US-led multinational coalition to act under the authority of the Security Council, but not as a United Nations force. Second, by imposing a 15 January deadline on Iraqi compliance with Security Council decisions, it created, *de facto*, a deadline for judgements about the merits of sanctions alone in bringing about Iraqi compliance with Resolution 660. Third, the objectives of the Security Council *vis-à-vis* Iraq and the Gulf region were, in principle, significantly broadened by the granting of authority to use all necessary means "to restore international peace and security in the area."

d. Diplomacy and war: 30 November 1990 to 27 February 1991

Between 27 November and 15 January both preparations for war and efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis intensified. On 30 November, President Bush offered to hold direct talks with Iraq to go "the extra mile for peace." After many false starts, bilateral talks between James Baker and Tariq Aziz were finally held in Geneva on 9 January 1991. In the meantime, on 10 December, Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid initiated an Arab mediation effort which foundered on 16 December when the Saudis refused to meet with the Algerian President. On 4 January, Aziz declined an invitation by the European Community (EC) foreign ministers to a meeting in Luxembourg. Following the failure of the Baker-Aziz meeting in Geneva on 9 January, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar flew to Baghdad on 10 January, but returned empty-handed three days later. On 14 January, France made last-minute peace proposals, exploring earlier French meetings with Saddam Hussein which suggested that Hussein might be willing to make concessions if the occupation of Kuwait were linked to the Palestinian problem. This last-ditch effort was blocked, and on 15 January, the Secretary-General made a final but despairing appeal to Iraq to avoid war. United States aircraft began the attack on Baghdad during the evening of 16 January 1991.

The offensive against Iraq fell into two clearly distinct phases. From 16 January to 24 February, multinational aircraft sought first to obtain air superiority through the destruction of Iraqi airfields, aircraft, and command and control systems. As these objectives were achieved, the air attack turned increasingly to the destruction of Iraqi ground forces, in particular its heavy armour, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. At the same time, selective strikes were launched against Iraq's suspected nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities, and against its SCUD missile bases. As frequently threatened in the weeks preceding 17 January, Iraq replied with missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel sustained direct hits in urban areas, but, under considerable pressure from the United States, chose not to retaliate. Iraq failed, therefore, in its attempt to turn the conflict into an Arab-Israeli one, or, at least, to force the Arab members out of the multinational coalition.

As the allied air campaign entered its fourth week, pressures grew at the United Nations to find the grounds for a ceasefire. In mid-February, the Security Council began a series of private meetings to explore various proposals for a ceasefire. Following Iraqi statements which suggested strongly conditioned acceptance of Resolution 660, the Soviet Union began intensive discussions with Aziz which culminated on 18 February, when the Soviets revealed a six-point peace plan calling for unconditional acceptance of Resolution 660, and Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to begin one day after a ceasefire, with a pull-out from Kuwait City to be completed in four days and total withdrawal from Kuwait within twenty-one days. Other Security Council resolutions would then lose force on the ground that the reasons for them had been removed. On 21 February, the Soviet Union indicated that the Iraqis had agreed to unconditional acceptance of Resolution 660 on the basis of this approach.

Also on 18 February, however, the United States on behalf of the Coalition gave an ultimatum to Iraq to begin large-scale withdrawal from Kuwait by noon on 23 February, and to complete it within one week. The United States pledged that coalition forces would not attack retreating Iraqi troops. Thereafter, the United States and other western countries, including Canada, expressed reservations about the Soviet plan, particularly its apparent willingness to drop other Security Council decisions concerning war reparations and restitution to the Government of Kuwait. Moreover, the United States in particular, citing the reference in Resolution 678 to the restoration of peace and security in the area, indicated its reluctance to reach a ceasefire which left the Iraqi army intact. As the Security Council continued to meet in closed session, efforts to reconcile these positions continued, but with time running out in the face of the impending US deadline. On Saturday afternoon of 23 February, Secretary-General de Cuellar made an appeal to the Council to continue to seek a solution, noting that "openings towards a cessation of the conflict have been clearly revealed during the past two days."

Despite continuing efforts on 23 February to reconcile the different approaches, no agreement was reached. On 24 February, under the command of US General Norman Schwarzkopf, the

multinational forces began a massive ground attack. Employing textbook tactics for armoured warfare, Schwarzkopf launched a frontal attack against dug-in Iraqi forces, but saved his heaviest armour for a rapid sweeping movement around the right flank of the Iraqi positions. On 28 February, the multinational forces suspended military operations. The leading elements of these forces were deep inside Iraqi territory, but stopped short of Basra, Iraq's second largest city and staging area for Iraqi military operations in Kuwait, and made no attempt to advance on Baghdad.

Although no definitive figures on the casualty toll were made public after the Iraqi defeat, based on the estimates of various officials of the multinational coalition, Iraqi losses were as follows:

- between 85,000 and 100,000 troops killed or wounded, the majority as a consequence of the bombing campaign;
- 42 Iraqi divisions, averaging 12,000 troops, destroyed or captured;
- 3,700 tanks; 1,857 armoured personnel carriers and 2,140 artillery pieces destroyed;
- 97 aircraft confirmed destroyed, plus 6 helicopters;
- 175,000 prisoners taken.

Multinational coalition losses were estimated as follows:

- 183 killed and about 500 wounded;
- 56 missing in action, plus a small number of prisoners of war;
- 45 allied planes lost, including 9 non-combat losses, together with 14 non-combat US helicopter losses.

In addition, Kuwaiti civilians numbering in the thousands were seized by the Iraqis and deported to Iraq.

e. The aftermath of the war: 1 March to 15 August 1991

In the two weeks following the suspension of hostilities by the coalition forces, the Security Council faced a series of issues in need of resolution: these included setting the conditions that Iraq would be required to meet prior to the establishment of a formal ceasefire; the terms of the ceasefire itself; the possible establishment of a UN peacekeeping force to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and assist in the stabilization of borders; the lifting of sanctions against Iraq; and humanitarian assistance.

Meeting shortly after the suspension of hostilities, on 2 March the Security Council adopted Resolution 685. The Council decided that, before a formal ceasefire, Iraq should first implement the list of political and military preconditions which had been laid down by President Bush in his announcement suspending military operations. Under the Resolution, Iraq was required to accept in principle its liability for damages resulting from the invasion of Kuwait and return stolen property, cease all hostile or provocative military actions, designate high-level military representatives to discuss practical military issues arising in regard to the ceasefire, and return all detainees, prisoners of war, and the remains of any who had died.

Despite hasty compliance by Iraq with the main provisions of this resolution, thereafter the negotiation of the terms of a ceasefire proved to be complex and controversial. Eventually, on 3 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687 by a vote of 12-1, with Cuba opposing. Amongst its many provisions, 687 set down a schedule of operations after the ceasefire that included the following:

- the immediate lifting of restrictions on emergency food aid;
- by April 17, the provision by Iraq of a list of chemical and biological weapons and plants, materials that could be used in nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles with a range over 90 miles;
- by 2 May, a fund for war damages to be fed by Iraqi oil revenues;
- by 17 May, a plan for the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;
- by 1 June, guidelines for implementation of a new arms embargo against Iraq.

In its response on 6 April, Iraq complained bitterly against the stern provisions of Resolution 687 and the alleged infringement of Iraqi sovereignty, but concluded: "Iraq finds itself before one alternative: to accept the resolution." Immediately thereafter, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a plan for the deployment of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). As subsequently approved by the Security Council on 12 April, UNIKOM comprised 1,440 armed and unarmed military personnel to be deployed in the area of the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized border zone extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait. UNIKOM functions were to deter violation of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone, to observe any hostile or potentially hostile behaviour from either side, and to support UN efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the thousands of displaced people and refugees in the area of operations. Although the area was generally barren, making surveillance relatively easy, UNIKOM faced two immediate hazards: the risk of military incidents as coalition forces withdrew from the line of contact with remnants of the Iraqi army, and the danger from unexploded ordnance and mines in the area. As subsequently agreed by the Security Council, UNIKOM drew personnel from thirty-four countries, including Canada, but without

representation from the Arab states. In a possibly precedent-setting move, all five permanent members of the Security Council were represented in the force.

In the same week, on 5 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which was also extraordinary in that it marked the first time that the Security Council has held internal state security actions to be a threat to international peace and security. In the wake of the defeat of its armies in Kuwait, the government of Saddam Hussein faced insurgencies from both the majority Shi'ite Muslims in southern Iraq, and the minority Kurdish population. As the remaining elements of the Republican Guard began to crush the rebellions, an estimated 300,000 refugees began fleeing across the border to Iran, and as many as 600,000 Kurds began crossing into Turkey. Brushing off Iraqi claims that the situation was an internal matter, the Security Council condemned the "repression of the Iraqi civilian population" and insisted that humanitarian organizations be allowed immediate access to all those in need of assistance.

In the following weeks, the plight of the Kurdish refugees became a critical problem for the western countries, first in terms of humanitarian relief as attempts were made to provide food and shelter to hundreds of thousands of Kurds fleeing into the mountainous border area of Turkey in harsh winter conditions. Faced then with the task of resettlement, and despite earlier statements by President Bush that the United States did not wish to become involved in a civil war in Iraq, on the initiative of the EC the western governments decided to move troops into northern Iraq in order to establish a safe haven for returning Kurdish families. Despite efforts to replace allied forces with UN guards, Kurdish apprehensions and concerns about the actions of the Iraqi military made it difficult thereafter for US and other allied forces to fully withdraw from northern Iraq.

In further fulfillment of the settlement laid down by Resolution 687, which stipulated a 120-day timetable for Iraq to destroy its weapons, Iraq was required to reveal to UN inspectors all details concerning the development and stockpiling of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In apparent compliance, on 18 April, Iraq submitted lists of such weapons to the United Nations and to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). Amongst other things, Iraq declared possession of 52 ballistic missiles, 30 chemical warheads, 1,481 artillery shells and bombs containing chemical weapons, and large supplies of various poison gases. The US State Department immediately labelled the disclosures "short on reality." Shortly afterwards, IAEA officials, though not revealing the contents of the Iraqi letter, expressed scepticism about the information provided.

These fears proved to be well-grounded when, in mid-May, IAEA inspection teams began investigating Iraqi nuclear facilities on the principle, established under the ceasefire agreement, that the inspection teams would have complete freedom of movement in Iraq. On 3 June, an Iraqi nuclear scientist defected to United States forces in Iraq. Subsequently, US officials stated that he had

described eight primary sites for nuclear research and development, only three of which had been destroyed by allied bombing, and four of which were unknown to allied intelligence. Following these revelations, on 22 June, an IAEA team arrived in Iraq for a second inspection, but were denied access to military bases suspected of harbouring nuclear facilities. Following further meetings of the Security Council and indirect threats from the United States to resume bombing of key facilities, Iraq agreed at the end of June to allow unrestricted inspections.

Based on these further inspections, in its report on 3 July, the second IAEA inspection team concluded that Iraq "had been pursuing an undeclared uranium enrichment programme using the electromagnetic isotope separation technique." This technique, which utilizes devices called calutrons to separate Uranium 235 from Uranium 238, had been developed by the United States in World War II but abandoned as ineffective. The revelation indicated that Iraq was in violation of its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Of broader consequence, it had been able to develop an enrichment programme outside the standard IAEA nuclear safeguards programme, thus indicating a major loophole in the NPT safeguards regime. Two further IAEA inspection teams visited Iraq in July and August, with a further team due at the end of the summer to investigate the possibility that Iraq had developed high explosive triggers for nuclear weapons. Three UN teams were scheduled in August to further investigate Iraq's biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Prior to their formal report, in mid-August, UN inspectors revealed that they had located supplies of anthrax sufficient to kill or incapacitate over areas of thousands of square kilometres. The Security Council and the IAEA continued to receive these inspection reports in the late summer of 1991.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

a. Response to the invasion of Kuwait and dispatch of Canadian Forces

On 2 August, the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark denounced the Iraqi military attack, which he described as "a totally unacceptable aggression," and indicated that, as a member of the Security Council, Canada was seeking an immediate meeting of the Council "to ensure a clear and effective international response to the Iraqi aggression." At the United Nations, Canadian ambassador Yves Fortier repeated this condemnation to the Security Council, and commented:

The draft resolution now before us is in complete accordance with the position already adopted by the government of Canada. For this reason, Canada has agreed to

co-sponsor this resolution, and we hope that it will enjoy the full support of all members of the Council.²

Following consultations with "its friends and allies" and "a lengthy discussion" between Prime Minister Mulroney and President Bush, on 4 August Clark indicated that "the Government had earlier today decided on further steps to reinforce Canada's condemnation of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait." These measures included:

- an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait;
- placing Iraq on the Area Control List under the Export and Import Permits Act which allowed Canadian exports to Iraq to be controlled;
- suspension of the Canada-Iraq Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Co-operation, and termination of Most Favoured Nation Treatment, which meant that Iraqi imports to Canada would face higher tariffs;
- the suspension of all trade and business promotion by the Government of Canada;
- suspension of the Canada-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding on Academic, Cultural and Sports relations.³

Several days later, at a press conference on 7 August, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated that Canada would offer military help if the NATO Council, which was about to hold a special meeting in Brussels, decided that it was necessary. At the Brussels meeting, the NATO Council agreed to harmonize allied policies, but did not issue a call for the dispatch of military forces. Mulroney was also reported as saying at the 7 August press conference that neither Saudi Arabia nor the United States had made a specific request for Canadian military assistance. On 8 August, responding to Security Council Resolution 661 imposing mandatory sanctions, Clark announced the imposition of sanctions against Iraq. All imports from and exports to Iraq and Kuwait were prohibited, a ban was imposed on export credits, and the Canadian assets of Iraq and Kuwait were frozen.⁴ On the same day, Clark called upon Iraq "to permit the departure from Iraq and Kuwait of all Canadians who wish to leave."⁵

²Department of External Affairs. "Text of Remarks by Ambassador Yves Fortier to the United Nations Security Council on the Iraq Invasion of Kuwait," 2 August 1990.

³Department of External Affairs. "Canada Announces Further Measures Against Iraq," *News Release*, no. 166, 4 August 1990.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Mr. Clark Announces Regulations on Sanctions Against Iraq," *News Release*, no. 170, 8 August 1990.

⁵Department of External Affairs. "Clark Comments on Situation of Canadians in Iraq and the Gulf," *News Release*, no. 172; *Toronto Star*, 9 August 1990.

On 10 August, with Parliament in recess, Mulroney announced at a nationally broadcast press conference that Canada would send three warships to the Persian Gulf. Describing Saddam Hussein as a "criminal of historic significance," he was reported as commenting: "If a clear warning is not sent to Iraq now, it will only be emboldened to find new victims."⁶ However, the Prime Minister was careful to avoid identifying the tasks which the ships would perform in the Gulf, which was to be revealed only when they were in the theatre of operations. Technically, this permitted the Government to avoid the recall of Parliament, which, under the National Defence Act, must review a decision to place Canadian military personnel on active duty within ten days of the passing of the order-in-council. Parliament was not scheduled to resume sitting until 24 September. It also temporarily avoided an emerging debate in the Security Council, where some members of the Council, among whom were reported to be France, the Soviet Union and Canada, believed that while naval vessels were required to observe and monitor the application of sanctions, it was premature for individual states to choose to mount a blockade against Iraq.

On 14 September, still with Parliament adjourned, the Cabinet announced its decision to send a CF-18 squadron (eighteen) with approximately 450 support personnel from their base in Germany to the Gulf. The number of CF-18s was increased to twenty-four prior to hostilities in January. Former Defence Minister Bill McKnight subsequently described the mission of the Canadian forces in the Gulf:

Under Security Council resolution 665 our maritime forces are authorized to use such measures as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward shipping to ensure that sanctions are not being violated. The CF-18s will provide long-range defence air cover in the operating area of the Canadian task group and will be part of an integrated multinational air defence network in the gulf area. Together with those defensive resources of other countries, our CF-18s will investigate unidentified or hostile aircraft and ships that could be capable of attacking the Canadian task group or other allied ships. They will also investigate any unknown radar contacts and take appropriate action to protect the men and women on Canadian ships.⁷

On 1 October, it was announced that the fighter aircraft would be based in Qatar, where they would provide air cover for the Canadian ships then assuming patrol responsibilities at the southern end of the Persian Gulf. In their patrol area, the trio of Canadian naval vessels were within range of Iraqi aircraft firing air-to-surface missiles, although such attacks would have required the Iraqi pilots to have first penetrated the defensive screen provided by a US carrier battle group and other naval forces deployed to the north of the Canadian task force.

⁶Cited in: "Canada ends tradition sends warships to Gulf," *Toronto Star*, 11 August 1990: 1.

⁷*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13259.

As the multinational naval force assembled in the Gulf, the coordination of naval forces became the responsibility of the US Navy as the largest national component. The Gulf was divided into several geographic sectors, each with a designated coordinator. Overall coordination of the air space over the sea was allocated to the Commander of the US Naval Forces Central, and of the overland air space to the Commander, US Central Air Force. The CF-18s flying combat air patrol over the Gulf received flight direction control from specialized US Navy ships, and reacted to directions from US Navy air controllers. The Canadian forces in the Gulf, however, remained under Canadian command and control for the duration of their operational mission.

The Canadian ships, equipped with night-capable Sea King helicopters and forward-looking infra-red radar, proved exceptionally well-suited for the task of intercepting vessels in the Gulf. By December, they were intercepting an average of twenty ships each day, representing more than 20 percent of all intercepts by the allied naval forces.⁸ This ratio rose to above 25 percent by mid-January.

On 16 January, with hostilities imminent, the Department of National Defence announced that preparations were underway to deploy 1 Canadian Field Hospital from CFB Petawawa to Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. In making the announcement, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight commented:

The deployment of the field hospital is made in response to a request from British authorities, and it allows Canada to make a vital contribution to the medical treatment facilities in the Persian Gulf. The decision to provide the medical facility also enables the multinational forces to meet the demands of the Geneva Convention for the treatment of Prisoners of War.⁹

After hostilities commenced, the Canadian Naval Task Group Commander became coordinator of the multinational Combat Logistic Force. With much of the combatant fleet deployed in the central Gulf area, allied supply ships and escort vessels were held in a protective area in the south, moving north with escorts to resupply combatants and then returning to safer waters. The Combat Logistic Force numbered approximately twenty-four ships from ten countries. The Canadian Commander assumed responsibility for scheduling all logistic force activities on behalf of the battle commander, and for the escort and protection of supply vessels.¹⁰

On 17 January, McKnight indicated that the CF-18s would continue to conduct combat air patrols as their primary task. However, he indicated that they would be available to tactical commanders for

⁸Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf*, 21 December 1990.

⁹Department of National Defence. "DND to Deploy Field Hospital to the Persian Gulf," *News Release*, no. 03/91, 16 January 1991.

¹⁰Department of National Defence. "Canada Controls Combat Logistic Force in the Gulf," *News Release*, no. 05/91, 28 January 1991.

sweep and escort missions to protect bombers and ground attack aircraft over Kuwait and Iraq. On 20 February 1991, McKnight announced that the CF-18s would undertake air-to-ground attack missions against military targets inside Kuwait and Iraq in addition to continuing combat air patrols over the Gulf. Asserting that the change was fully consistent with Resolution 678, McKnight commented:

Unless and until Saddam Hussein complies fully with UN resolutions, Canada will work with Coalition forces in the campaign to expel his forces from Kuwait.... The more we weaken Hussein's army from the air both before and during a ground battle, the fewer will be the casualties suffered by the Coalition forces, and the sooner we can end this war and restore the peace.¹¹

b. Policy statements on hostages and refugees

In mid-August, concerns mounted about the plight of Canadians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq. More than 500 Canadians had been contacted in Kuwait, and about 200 were reported to be in Iraq. On 18 August, Clark noted that

Canada will support any and all UN actions to safeguard the lives and security of foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. Canada has urged a number of non-aligned members of the Security Council to work for early and unanimous adoption of an effective resolution.¹² Resolution 664, which demanded that Iraq "permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries," was passed unanimously on 18 August.

Like other countries, Canada sought to keep open its embassy in Kuwait despite increasing harassment by the Iraqi military. Following the Iraqi decision to allow the departure of foreign women and children, the embassy was able to coordinate the safe departure of these Canadians from Kuwait. Faced with the interruption of water, telephone and other services, and continuing harassment by Iraq, it became increasingly difficult for the Kuwait embassy to function effectively. In mid-September, following the entering of diplomatic premises by Iraqi troops, Security Council Resolution 667, co-sponsored by Canada, again condemned Iraqi behaviour as contrary to international law and sought guarantees of diplomatic immunity. Despite increasing difficulties, operations at the Canadian Embassy continued until 19 October, when Clark announced the provisional suspension but not the official closing of the Embassy. Canada was amongst the last of the

¹¹Department of National Defence. "CF-18 Air-to-Ground Attack Role Authorized," *News Release*, no. 10/91, 20 February 1991.

¹²Department of External Affairs. "Iraqi Threats to Foreign Nations Unacceptable," *News Release*, no. 176, 18 August 1990.

western countries to suspend diplomatic operations in Kuwait. At that time, it was believed that some twenty Canadians remained in Kuwait.¹³

As large numbers of third country nationals who had been working in Kuwait and Iraq sought to flee across the border to Jordan, the Government of King Hussein struggled to manage a refugee crisis of increasing proportions. On 26 August, Canada provided a grant of \$2.5 million to Jordan to assist with refugees. It soon became apparent, however, that assistance on a much larger scale was required. Prime Minister Mulroney afterwards commented:

We subsequently announced a substantial expansion of that assistance, and approved as well a range of additional measures, altogether amounting to some \$75 million. One of these measures will be the airlifting of displaced people to their home countries and providing special assistance to some of those countries least able to cope with the impact of thousands of returning citizens. Another such measure will be assistance to the countries of the region suffering serious side-effects from the crisis and from sanctions against Iraq, especially Jordan, Turkey and Egypt.¹⁴

c. United Nations diplomacy

When Parliament resumed on 24 September, both Mulroney and Clark presented overviews of Canadian policy on the United Nations Security Council. Mulroney commented:

The United Nations has emerged from this crisis with new life.... We have seen the United Nations operate I think precisely as its founders would have envisaged and would have hoped.... It has taken, partly at Canada's urging, a careful, determined and step-by-step approach under Chapter 7.... Some have suggested that the enforcement by armed force of international law and of the United Nations' resolutions is somehow contrary to the spirit of multilateralism and Canada's traditions. Nothing could be further from the truth. The willingness of the United Nations to authorize military means to enforce the resolutions it has passed may well presage an important new era for multilateralism, a goal for which generations of Canadians have worked.¹⁵

Following meetings with James Baker in Washington on 22 September, Clark indicated that Canada had not ruled out sending ground troops to the Gulf, but was quoted as commenting: "We think it would be helpful in maintaining steady pressure [on Iraq] that we do not do everything at once." Amidst reports that Canada was anxious to dissuade the United States from action outside the framework of the United Nations, in his follow-up speech to Mulroney in Parliament on

¹³Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Embassy in Kuwait Suspends Operations," *News Release*, no. 241, 19 October 1990.

¹⁴*Commons Debates*, 24 September 1990: 13234.

¹⁵*Commons Debates*, 24 September 1990: 13232-33.

24 September, Clark indicated that any such further measures would be taken "in the context of the United Nations," and continued:

We have encouraged our close allies, we have encouraged others, and we have used our influence and our position on the Security Council to ensure that the action that proceeds...is within the mandate of the Security Council and, indeed, that the mandate given by the United Nations expands to take account of the circumstances as they develop in the region. We are working very hard to have United Nations auspices respected.¹⁶

One day later, on 25 September, Clark attended the Security Council proceedings and co-sponsored Resolution 670 imposing an air embargo on Iraq. While in New York, Clark also counselled restraint, suggesting that there should now be a pause. As he explained later, however, his message was twofold:

I proposed that we allow some time to President Saddam Hussein to reflect on his situation and the will of the international community.... At the same time, I have also made it clear that, if President Hussein does not withdraw from Kuwait in the face of the unprecedented international consensus and under pressure of sanctions, he must understand the willingness of the world to take further action, including military action. Canada is prepared to consider, with its Security Council colleagues, what the next steps might be.¹⁷

On 5 October, measures were announced to implement the embargo which prohibited the operation of aircraft transporting goods to Iraq and Kuwait, or attempting to land there, and the entry into Canadian ports of Iraqi registered vessels deemed to be carrying goods in violation of Resolution 661.¹⁸

The emphasis on proceeding step-by-step in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter continued to be a central theme in statements of Government policy throughout Canada's tenure on the Security Council. At the same time, in October and early November Clark made it clear that the Government was willing to countenance the use of force outside the framework of the United Nations. In a presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs on 25 October, Clark commented:

Ambassador Fortier and his team have been tireless in helping draft and helping pass resolutions that are clear and principled, and balanced to ensure they do the job they

¹⁶*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13246; "Canada won't reject idea of dispatching army troops to the gulf," *Toronto Star*, 22 September 1990: 14.

¹⁷Department of External Affairs. "Persian Gulf Situation," *News Release*, no. 240, 16 October 1990.

¹⁸Department of External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 230, 5 October 1990.

are intended to do without the unnecessary tension or debate. Although the front page of the New York Times has suggested that this has sometimes been to argue for greater moderation than desired by others, the degree of unanimity of the major players on the Security Council has been, quite frankly, extraordinary.¹⁹

Responding to questions in committee and in Parliament on the same day, Clark warned:

It is therefore possible that a veto would make it impossible to act under the auspices of the United Nations. That is why we are now and in fact have been from the outset, negotiating carefully and diligently to find a way that would make it easier for Canada to arrange for a system that would make use of the auspices of the United Nations.

However, Clark added, Canada's opposition to the Iraqi invasion would not be set aside "if China, for instance, were to exercise its veto in the Security Council. That would be irresponsible, and that is not our position."²⁰ In the following weeks Clark repeated this position in various statements and responses to questions in Parliament.

Some two weeks later, Clark flew to Bermuda to be briefed by James Baker on his most recent round of consultations in Europe and the Middle East. After the meeting, and following a comment by Baker that the US approach was "right in synch with the Canadian government," Clark was asked if Canada would support a resolution supporting the use of force. He replied:

I can't foretell what form a resolution might take, but Canada has always been of the view that you can't send people to the Gulf unless you are prepared to have them carry through with their responsibilities, and that it's better to have them carry through with their responsibilities under the aegis of the United Nations. So, we would be interested in cooperating with that kind of resolution.

Secondly, I said at the UN some -- now weeks ago -- that Canada has not ruled out any options with regard to other actions we might take.... We are contemplating at the moment no change in the nature or the number of Canadians who might be there in a military capacity and I was not requested to consider that today in conversations. But I make the point that we've ruled out no options. If it is the view of the government of Canada that there are other things we can do to make that very remarkable coalition more effective, then we'll take those actions.²¹

Immediately prior to the Security Council debate on Resolution 678, Clark visited the Middle East, meeting at length with both King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt. From the

¹⁹Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, at the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on the Gulf Crisis," *Statement*, 90/62, 25 October 1990: 4.

²⁰*Commons Debates*. 25 October 1990: 14693.

²¹United States Embassy. "Baker Says US, Canada Agree on Strategy in the Gulf," *Text*, 90-104, 14 November 1990.

onset of the crisis King Hussein's support of Iraq produced strong statements of disapproval from the Bush Administration. As the only western leader to visit Jordan between the invasion of Kuwait and the end of hostilities, Clark spoke in glowing terms of the role that King Hussein had played in the region, and was quoted as saying that the King "has been a constructive and courageous leader in this region for decades."²² On his return, he commented:

There may be the elements of a peaceful resolution of this crisis. I was more encouraged than I thought I might be by the conversations I had in the Middle East. I was encouraged by the determination of people ranging from Israeli leaders, to King Hussein, to the Palestinians to look for ways in which this experience may lead to constructive responses to other issues. So we hope that there will be means found to resolve this crisis.²³

Clark gave no indication, however, what the elements of a peaceful resolution might be. In referring to the Palestinian problem he noted that "one of the consequences of the current Gulf crisis could be a new sense of urgency about solving other problems facing that troubled region," but at the same time he specifically rejected the Iraqi claim that the issues were linked, noting that the Palestinian issue could only be addressed "separate from the present issue."²⁴

In his speech to Parliament supporting Resolution 678, Prime Minister Mulroney again emphasized the degree to which Canada had sought to dissuade the United States from unilateral action. Possibly freed from a concern to respect the privacy of Security Council negotiations by an earlier article in the *New York Times* which had revealed differences between the US position and that of some of its allies, including Canada, Mulroney commented:

In the many discussions I have had with President Bush on this subject, I have consistently counselled both restraint in securing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the need to work at all times within the authority of the United Nations Charter.

Indeed...an important disagreement took place in respect of an interpretation of Article 51 where Canada, through our distinguished ambassador Yves Fortier, led the fight in the Security Council to insist that the suggestion by the United States that any concept of unilateral action at that point in time must be resisted and that the solidarity that this had engendered at the United Nations must be respected.

I believe that that action taken by the Government of Canada...resulted in the solidarity we know today. It was consistent with the finest traditions of Canadian diplomacy.²⁵

²²*Globe and Mail*, 26 November 1990: 7.

²³*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15863.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Commons Debates*. 29 November 1990: 15960.

d. Sanctions

In the same speech, Mulroney also indicated the Government's scepticism that sanctions alone would force Iraq out of Kuwait. Noting a "remarkable consensus" amongst world leaders that a peaceful solution was desirable, Mulroney continued:

However, we have also found that a very strong consensus exists to the effect that if peaceful means do not work, recourse would have to be added to other necessary means. While the UN sanctions are undoubtedly being felt by the Iraqi and Kuwaiti people, we have found no widespread confidence that they are sufficient to bring about the desired result: namely, to persuade President Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait.²⁶

In the face of opposition demands for factual information on the efficacy of sanctions, on 30 November, Clark responded by noting his difficulty in sharing confidential information, which he later referred to again as "highly sensitive" information, but commented:

There is no evidence that in the next several months there will be any impact upon the decision makers in Iraq. If we were to rely only on sanctions, the consequence would be that over that period of time we would run the risk of more children dying, we would run the risk of Kuwait being sacked even more than it is now. We would run the terrible risk that in highly volatile region of some mistake being made which could inspire a conflagration that no one in this world wants.²⁷

In a letter to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs on 28 December, Clark emphasized not the potential for destruction resulting from the time taken to make sanctions effective, but the insensitivity of the Iraqi leadership to the hardship imposed. He wrote:

...the civil sectors of the economy are being affected more severely than the privileged military; rationing continues; prices of foodstuffs and consumer goods continue to rise; and more non-essential industries have been forced to reduce or cease production. Most important, the international cooperation in the imposing and policing sanctions is proving very effective, and sanction-breaking remains insignificant...

However, in spite of the fact that these are the most comprehensive and effective sanctions ever applied by the international community, we must recognize that there are no signs whatsoever that they are having their intended impact of persuading the Iraqi government to comply with Security Council resolutions.²⁸

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷*Commons Debates*. 30 November 1990: 16046.

²⁸Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Persian Gulf Situation," *News Release*, no. 294, 28 December 1990.

This continued to be the position of the Government on sanctions as the "pause for peace" called for in Resolution 678 began to run out and the deadline of 15 January loomed closer. In mid-January, however, Clark appeared less confident about the policing of sanctions, and both he and Mulroney expressed concern that the time required for sanctions to be effective might allow Iraq to perfect instruments of mass destruction. Replying to a question in the House on 16 January, for example, Clark commented:

...the most comprehensive set of sanctions ever devised in human history...are allowing now the passage into Iraq of chemical additives, lubricants, water purification chemicals, spare parts and other things that can be used to build the war machine.... Time...is allowing Saddam Hussein to devise new means of environmental warfare, to perfect his capacity to conduct chemical warfare, and to perfect his capacity to conduct biological warfare.²⁹

e. Response to peace proposals in January and February

In the final flurry of efforts to avert hostilities, and following the failure of the Geneva talks between James Baker and Tariq Aziz, on 9 January 1991, Clark flew to New York carrying a letter to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar which restated the Canadian views on an acceptable settlement. The precondition was Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The letter then proposed, *inter alia*

- an international guarantee for all borders in the Gulf area;
- the initiation of a process to settle Iraq's differences with Kuwait, bilaterally or by mutually agreed reference;
- the creation of a peacekeeping force as part of a broader security system for the region;
- a follow-on process to address other issues in the Middle East.³⁰

During the air campaign against Iraq, the Government rejected unconditionally all proposals for a pause, noting that the first step towards peace must be the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. In supporting the beginning of the ground campaign, Mulroney rejected the final Soviet efforts to develop a peace proposal with Iraq. On 23 February, the Office of the Prime Minister issued the following comment:

²⁹*Commons Debates*. 16 January 1991: 17117.

³⁰The Mulroney letter to the Secretary-General was tabled in the House of Commons, 15 January 1991; Clark summarized and commented on its contents in his presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 79, 21 January 1991: 7.

The Soviet-Iraqi proposal made yesterday fell unacceptably short of the objective of providing for complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Despite the characterization of the Soviet-Iraqi proposal as being unconditional acceptance of UN resolution 660, it, in fact, posed conditions that were unacceptable.

The substantial difference in the time frame between the Soviet-Iraqi proposal and the Coalition position would have allowed Saddam Hussein to repatriate his huge arsenal of tanks and artillery from Kuwait, thus making it impossible to restote peace and security to the area, as called for by UN resolution 678. (The Soviet-Iraqi proposal would have allowed 21 days for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces while the Coalition proposal called for seven days.) Other key conditions included in the Iraqi proposal sought immunity from reparations for the wanton damage caused by Iraq to its neighbours (Security Council Resolution 674), and from the question of violations of the Geneva Conventions (Security Council Resolution 670). Finally, nowhere in the Soviet-Iraqi proposal would Saddam Hussein have been obliged to renounce his claim over Kuwait as called for in Security Council Resolution 662. The Soviet-Iraqi proposal was thus inconsistent both with the objectives of a series of UN resolutions and with some of the most basic principles of international law.³¹

f. Proposals for post-war reconstruction and security

On 8 February 1991, in a speech by Clark and news releases, the Government revealed a package of proposals for post hostilities activities in the Middle East. In summary these were based on four "guiding principles," viz:

- no compromise on Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait;
- the governments and peoples of the region must support any peace proposals;
- the United Nations must be an integral part of the solution; and
- regional security must address all related issues -- political, economic, military and humanitarian.

On the basis of these principles, the central elements of the package were:

Humanitarian Assistance. The Government undertook to provide assistance to the direct victims of the war, especially the migrant workers, Iraqis and Kuwaitis, and to support the leadership of the UN Disaster Relief Organization and the High Commission for Refugees.

Peacekeeping. Canada undertook to participate in a peacekeeping mission to oversee the disengagement and repatriation of forces, and to maintain peace and order "while longer term security arrangements are made."

³¹Office of the Prime Minister. "Statement on the Beginning of the Ground Campaign to Expel Iraqi Forces from Kuwait," *Press Release*, 23 February 1991.

The Arab-Israeli Dispute. Noting the urgency of this issue, and its continued support for Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the package suggested that a comprehensive negotiated settlement "could include the convening of a properly structured conference" to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the parties.

Economic Development. The proposal suggested a regional Marshall Plan, financed in substantial measure from regional resources.

Arms Proliferation. Canada proposed that "the United Nations convene a Global Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to mobilize political will and energize efforts to produce results on a short term basis."³²

Prime Minister Mulroney further elaborated on these proposals on 12 February. While support was apparently received from the Secretary-General and the Nordic states, in the first instance there was a less than enthusiastic response from the United States and the United Kingdom. Reacting to this in a speech in London, England on 20 February, Clark offered an emphatic defence of the Government's proposals and a sharp critique of the arms transfer policies of the great powers:

...I believe it is imperative that the world declare that there be no Middle East arms bazaar. Ninety-five per cent of the weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein came from the five permanent members of the Security Council, the same Council which has had to respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression. During the Iran-Iraq war, 28 countries supplied both sides of the conflict, a situation which we must now see either as greed run rampant or as a short-sighted attempt to manipulate a region where control is impossible and where alliances can shift with remarkable speed. Our men and women now face the weapons the Coalition provided Iraq.³³

In regard to the proposal for a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Clark reacted vigorously to criticism from allied capitals:

It will be greeted with cynicism by officials in some capitals in the West, particularly on the part of nuclear weapons states. But I don't believe their political leaders can be

³²Government of Canada. "Government of Canada Unveils Post-Hostilities Proposals," *News Release*, no. 31, 8 February 1991; Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf," *Statement* 91/10, 8 February 1991; Department of External Affairs. "Post-Hostilities Activities," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991.

³³Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Delivered at the Royal Institute for International Affairs," *Statement* 91/12, 20 February 1991: 8. Similarly frank comments were made by Prime Minister Mulroney in a joint press conference with President Bush in Ottawa on 13 March. See chapter 1, ARMS TRANSFERS.

cynical. Their publics won't allow it. Public opinion is outraged by what we have learned about the history of arms sales to Iraq.³⁴

In the second week of March, Clark visited a number of countries in the Middle East, including a return trip to Jordan, it was believed that Canada might have a particular role to play in easing the strains between Jordan and the United States as a consequence of Jordan's partial support for Iraq. In his report on the trip, which began with discussions with the Secretary-General, Clark stated:

[The Secretary-General] urged us to try to heal some of the wounds of this crisis by helping leaders with whom Canada has close ties -- such as King Hussein of Jordan. He was concerned about the Palestinians whose leadership had been so criticized, but whose rights represent a continuing challenge to the reputation for fairness and effectiveness of the United Nations. Indeed, this issue dominated many of my subsequent discussions.³⁵

Clark offered no new proposals, but reiterated the Government's desire to play a constructive role in the solution of broader Middle East problems.

Following the adoption of Resolution 687 on 3 April 1991, attention shifted first to the plight of the Kurdish refugees, and then to the implementation of the inspection provisions in Resolution 678. With regard to the refugees, in addition to the \$77 million allocated in August 1990, the bulk of which had gone to Jordan and Egypt, on 5 April, an additional \$3.3 million was allocated for assistance to the Kurds. On 9 and 10 April, additional relief funds were allocated, bringing the total to \$8 million and making Canada one of the largest donors. On 15 April, the Department of National Defence began relief flights from Germany to Turkey and Iran, and from Incirlik in Turkey to Diyarbakir and other bases in southern Turkey. On 15 April, the decision was also taken to deploy Canadian medical personnel based in Germany to the Turkey-Iraq border to provide humanitarian aid to refugees.

On 9 April, in response to questions in the Parliament, Clark indicated that Canada would support the EC proposal for an enclave in Northern Iraq under UN protection despite doubts with respect to jurisdiction. In the event that the EC proposal was not acceptable, Clark also indicated that Canada would propose a plan to establish a UN presence in northern Iraq with a two-fold

³⁴Ibid.: 9.

³⁵Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on his Visit to the Middle East," *Statement* 91/16, 15 March 1991.

responsibility: to coordinate relief aid, and to act in an ombudsman role, "which would be able to guarantee, as best the world can, that undertakings with respect to amnesty are being honoured."³⁶

Despite fears that Canadian support of the Coalition would detract from its ability to participate in peacekeeping operations, on 16 April the Government announced that, at the request of the Secretary-General, it would participate in the United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). Out of a total force of 1,400, Canada provided a contingent of 300 engineers, whose principal task was the removal of mines and unexploded bombs that would impede peacekeeping in the area.³⁷

Canada provided three inspectors for UN teams conducting on-site inspections of Iraq's chemical weapons facilities. Joining in the general concern that the lists of biological, chemical and nuclear weapon facilities provided by Iraq in fulfillment of Resolution 687 were incomplete, on 9 July 1991, Mulroney echoed US threats to resume bombing of selected targets in Iraq if Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the terms of the ceasefire. The Prime Minister declared that the West would be justified in using further military force if Saddam Hussein were to pose a further nuclear threat to Israel or Iraq's Arab neighbours. In mid-August, as UN and IAEA inspection teams continued to uncover details of Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear weapon programmes, the sanctions against Iraq remained in force.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Parliament was not in session in August 1990, when Canada responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by sending naval forces to join the multilateral forces gathering in the Persian Gulf. A full debate on the Government's policy took place after Parliament resumed on 24 September. A second debate in the House began prior to the Security Council adoption of Resolution 678 in late November. Parliament resumed sitting on 15 January 1991 and another full debate took place on the eve of hostilities. The Gulf was a major topic during question time until the end of March 1991, and it was the subject of a number of joint sessions of the defence and external affairs committees of the House. Three parliamentarians, Lloyd Axworthy, Svend Robinson and Robert Corbett, travelled to Iraq in November 1990 in an attempt to secure the release of almost fifty Canadians being held hostage as part of Iraq's "human shield" tactic. They were denied a meeting with Saddam Hussein, but obtained the release of five hostages.

³⁶Government of Canada. *News Release*, 15 April 1991; *Commons Debates*. 9 April 1991: 19226.

³⁷Government of Canada. "Canadian Forces join United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)," *News Release*, 16 April 1991.

On a number of occasions both opposition parties strongly condemned the invasion of Kuwait and the failure of Iraq to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. While opposition comment was both extensive and varied, criticism of the government tended to focus on certain key issues, viz:

- the decision to send forces without consulting Parliament;
- the efficacy of sanctions;
- the authorization of "all necessary means" in Resolution 678 and the perceived departure from Canada's peacekeeping tradition; and
- post-hostilities proposals concerning regional security.

a. The commitment of Canadian Forces

Before the reconvening of Parliament, Liberal external affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy and NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin both criticized the Government for not recalling Parliament before sending ships to the Persian Gulf. When the debate on the crisis began on 24 September, Axworthy noted the Prime Minister's statement that the crisis was an historic event, and continued:

If that is the case, if it was so significant, so crucial and so vital, then why was Parliament kept in silence for seven weeks?... When it comes down to vital issues of international obligation, of war and peace, of sending Canadian troops overseas, to deny this Parliament the opportunity to be heard or to represent the Canadian people, to have the question posed, is a dereliction of duty by the government...³⁸

McLaughlin commented:

I am pleased to see the House finally has a chance to discuss the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq which took place a little over seven weeks ago. Let me make myself clear: the government has shown a flagrant disregard for Parliamentary democracy and Canadian parliamentary tradition by failing to call back Parliament.³⁹

b. The efficacy of sanctions

On 28 November, on the eve of Resolution 678, Acting Liberal leader Herb Gray commented:

³⁸*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13236.

³⁹*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13241.

[The Government] does not appear to be sufficiently interested in determining first whether the United Nations approved sanctions have been working. It does not appear to be sufficiently interested in finding a constructive and peaceful solution.... Maybe the government is reluctant to let us in on the facts about sanctions because there is evidence that the sanctions are working.⁴⁰

Recounting the unprecedented strength and rigour of the effort to enforce sanctions, Gray continued:

...the Security Council has imposed near airtight sanctions against Iraq. UN member countries are enforcing these sanctions with the help of a broad-based multinational force. At this time we are not convinced that sanctions have failed. On the contrary, as I have said, experts are pointing to increasing evidence of their success.⁴¹

Noting the number of experts who argued that sanctions would take time to work, NDP critic John Brewin expressed similar views about the Government's failure to give sanctions an opportunity to work:

It is a tragedy that the minister and the leaders of the international community have not been prepared to take the additional time necessary to understand that the continued isolation of Saddam Hussein will, in the long run, produce the results that are necessary. Turning him into a martyr to international exterior power will itself be a problem,...but beyond that the minister completely discounts the impact of war in that region.... All of the evidence is that sanctions, if given time, will work. Sanctions undercut prematurely, as the UN resolution proposes to do, will in fact move us to war much faster.⁴²

Noting the disparity between Clark's letter of 28 December to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and his statement in the House on 16 January, prior to the air attack on 17 January, both opposition parties renewed their argument that sanctions could be effective without the resort to force, and their request to the government for detailed information on the efficacy of sanctions. When hostilities commenced on 17 January, this issue continued to mark a fundamental difference between the policies of both opposition parties and that of the government.

c. Resolution 678 and Canada's traditional peacekeeping role

On a number of occasions opposition spokesmen argued that the multinational force could not be construed as a United Nations force and would not operate under the UN flag. Associated with this

⁴⁰*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15866-67.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15870-71.

argument, it was also argued that Canada would deprive itself of its traditional ability to act in a peacekeeping capacity by engaging in hostilities. On 15 January, for example, Liberal Lloyd Axworthy commented:

But if there are hostilities, when the judgement comes what is the role of Canada? Should we sort of march into the barricades waving the flag, not the UN flag but whatever flag it happens to be?... The contribution we can make in a military sense is minuscule. We have got good airplanes. We have wonderful armed services personnel, but in the over-all weight our contribution is small. It is small at least when we weigh it against the contribution we can make in the political, diplomatic sense. Wars have to come to an end. Ceasefires have to be negotiated, truces have to be honoured, peacekeeping has to take place, bridges have to be built, reconstruction has to occur, and that is the peculiar Canadian talent. That is the kind of capacity we have nurtured and built up over the years. That is what Canadians want to support. For us to become a combatant, for us to be on the frontlines, will destroy and eliminate the ability of Canada to play that kind of role.⁴³

On 22 January, several days after the onset of the air campaign, NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin explained some of the reasons for the NDP decision to vote against a House motion reaffirming support for the United Nations. McLaughlin commented:

We have consistently opposed Canada's participation in this war because we do not believe that economic sanctions and diplomatic measures were given a full chance. We do believe that the January 15 deadline was an artificial one; one that gave a momentum towards war, instead of a real pause for peace...the United Nations should not be authorizing member countries to go to war. Let us remember that these are not forces which are under the United Nations flag... Canada can make a more valuable contribution than simply as a participant in the military force. In dealing with this issue...we are confronted with three options: the options of supporting and the strengthening of economic sanctions; of renewing and continuing diplomatic efforts; or with war. Every option contained risks. The options of sanctions and diplomacy have the risks that come with time. The option of war contains the risk of loss of human life as well as economic, political and environmental disaster. One set of risks must be weighed against the other set of risks when making these decisions. We weighed these options and we decided that the tragic consequences of war were too high not to give diplomacy and economic sanctions a chance.

As well as being involved in the offensive aspects of this war, we have lost so much of our credibility to participate and provide an effective role in the mediation and peacekeeping aspects...we believe Canada can play a useful and constructive role. We will not be a participant in the war, but a true maker of peace.⁴⁴

⁴³*Commons Debates*. 15 January 1990: 17033.

⁴⁴*Commons Debates*. 22 January 1991: 17564-66.

d. Post-hostilities proposals for regional security

The Government's proposals to control arms transfers, and the March tour of the Middle East by then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark generally elicited support and approval from opposition critics. Liberal Fred Mifflin offered a series of possible initiatives for reconstruction and security in the Middle East, commenting:

The current scramble for reconstruction contracts in Kuwait has not yet been matched by a serious commitment to provide comprehensive aid to the countries of the region hardest hit by the war.⁴⁵

The Liberals proposed a six-point programme to address reconstruction, in which it was argued that the central role should be played by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, peacekeeping and border monitoring, confidence and security building measures, and arms control.

Mifflin concluded:

...the Liberal caucus...is convinced that if the United Nations is to emerge as a leading player in the management of international peace and security, it must be vigorous in promoting its role as an active participant in both the short and long term peace process in the Middle East.... We should therefore encourage the long-term changes the United Nations requires to become the agent of choice of the world community to lead the process of constructing and maintaining this new world order.⁴⁶

NDP member David Barrett focussed on the consequences of entering into alliances with leaders such as President Assad, and on the need to restore relations with Jordan. While generally supportive of the post-hostilities policies of the Government, he concluded:

...I believe that there will be a harvest of damage done to the western nations by the war, based on propaganda that we are not in control of.... We have placed ourselves, through this experience, in the position of being lumped in with the rest of the western nations and of being viewed, frankly, as attempting to impose western hegemony on the region.... I hope that every effort is made by this government...to set a distinct and separate pattern defining Canada.⁴⁷

⁴⁵*Commons Debates*. 15 March 1991: 18538.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*: 18540.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*: 18543.

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BACKGROUND

During 1990-1991, substantial progress on the dismantlement of the system of apartheid in South Africa occurred in tandem with an increase in violence and killings between rival black factions in the townships. The string of remarkable changes and events occurring in South Africa this year culminated in July with the first ANC National Conference inside South Africa in 30 years, the announcement that the US would lift sanctions against South Africa and the revelation that the Inkatha movement, one of the main protagonists in the ongoing battles in the townships, had been secretly funded by the South African security forces.

Since President F.W. De Klerk came to power in August 1989, he has followed a policy which moved South Africa away from legislative apartheid. On 7 August 1990, after the second set of negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the de Klerk government (the first were held in May 1990), the ANC announced that it had agreed to suspend its thirty-year old guerilla campaign. In exchange, the government had agreed to review and repeal security legislation, to release some categories of political prisoners and to facilitate the return of political exiles by April 1991. This agreement, a major achievement for South Africa, opened the way for negotiations to begin on developing a new constitution.

These achievements soon took a back burner to efforts to end violence in the townships around Johannesburg. Clashes between supporters of the Zulu-based Inkatha movement, led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and supporters of the ANC had flared throughout 1990 particularly in and around the city of Pietermaritzburg in Natal. However, by mid-August the battles had taken on a new degree of seriousness and permanence. During the week of 12 to 18 August, 178 people were killed, and by 23 August the death toll had exceeded 500. During this period, there was increasing pressure on the leaders of the two rival groups to meet to try to reach an agreement which might end the fighting.

It was not until 20 September that the ANC issued an invitation to Inkatha leader Buthelezi to meet. However, the invitation was extended to Buthelezi in his capacity as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, the Zulu homeland, rather than as head of Inkatha. At issue was recognition of Inkatha as an equal actor in the black anti-apartheid movement. The ANC has been reluctant to give Inkatha such stature. Buthelezi welcomed the invitation but responded that he would only attend in his capacity as head of Inkatha. On 22 October, the ANC finally agreed to extend an invitation to Buthelezi as head of Inkatha.

On 23 September, President de Klerk arrived in Washington to begin talks with US President Bush, the first such talks between US and South African leaders since 1945. President Bush praised

the progress achieved by de Klerk as "irreversible" and indicated that the US would consider lifting sanctions if more progress were made. Specifically, President Bush referred to the need to meet four of five conditions established by the US Congress in its Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. The Act requires South Africa to free political prisoners, legalize political parties, end the state of emergency, dismantle the Group Areas Act and enter into good faith negotiations for a new constitution. On 25 September, de Klerk told a US audience that he is willing to accept the idea of "one man one vote" in a new constitutional situation as long as there is adequate protection of minorities. He reiterated this willingness during a visit to the Netherlands in October. The Separate Amenities Act which segregated public facilities according to race was formally repealed on 15 October 1990. Parliament had voted to repeal the Act in June 1990 but its official implementation did not come into effect until 15 October in order to allow communities to prepare for the transition.

On 29 January, the long awaited meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi finally took place in Durban. At the end of the day, the two leaders issued a joint statement which called on their supporters to stop attacks in the townships and to promote peace. It was not clear, however, whether the joint statement would be successful in ending the fighting.

Three days later, on 1 February, in a speech marking the opening of a new session of Parliament, President de Klerk announced that the National Party would introduce legislation to repeal the acts that controlled land ownership, keeping most land in the hands of the white population. The acts to be repealed included the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966 and the Black Communities Act of 1984. In a surprise announcement, President de Klerk stated that his party would also introduce legislation to repeal the Population Registration Act which classifies South Africans into racial groups. Previously, de Klerk's position had been that this act could only be dealt with in the context of a new constitution. However, special transitional measures would be introduced to allow old and new structures to be in place simultaneously.

On 12 February 1991, Mandela and de Klerk met in an effort to move negotiations forward again. As part of a clarification of the ANC's earlier agreement to suspend its guerilla war, the ANC agreed to stop infiltrating and training guerillas in South Africa and not to create any new underground military structures. In return, the government recognized the ANC's right to engage in protests without intimidation or violence and agreed to speed the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles.

On 12 March, draft legislation which would repeal the land laws was tabled in Parliament in the form of five draft laws. Although the legislation would make it possible for South Africans to live where they chose it did not provide for any reparations for an estimated 3.5 million blacks who had been forcibly evicted from their land and moved to homelands. For this reason, the legislation was

criticized by the ANC. The Conservative Party, which had walked out during de Klerk's speech to Parliament, was also opposed to the legislation but because it was opposed to changing the laws.

In spite of repeated calls for restraint by Mandela and Buthelezi, and a second meeting between Buthelezi and Mandela on 30 March, resulting in a new peace plan, violence continued to escalate in the townships. It was estimated that 1,200 people had died in township fighting since August 1990. On 5 April, the ANC announced that unless the government undertook measures to end the violence by 9 May, the ANC would refuse to participate in further talks on the constitution.

Violence intensified at the end of April and on 6 May, blaming the ANC for the fighting, Inkatha threatened to send 100,000 fighters in to Soweto if the ANC did not stop the fighting within seven days. On 7 and 8 May, President de Klerk held separate meetings with Buthelezi and Mandela in an effort to breach the impasse. The Zulu, supporters of Inkatha, have a tradition of carrying spears and clubs. The ANC maintained that these weapons were contributing to the fighting in the townships and wanted the carrying of weapons in public to be banned. On 9 May, de Klerk announced that there would be a ban on the carrying of traditional weapons, with the exception of spears, in areas of unrest.

President de Klerk also attempted to meet two other ANC conditions and announced that single sex workers' hostels (one of the flashpoints for violence) would be phased out and that a commission to investigate misconduct complaints about the behaviour of the security forces would be established. However, these changes did not meet all of the ANC demands and on 18 May, the ANC announced that it would not participate in discussions relating to the constitution until all of its demands for an end to the fighting had been met.

At the beginning of July, the ANC held a national conference in Durban, the first such national conference held inside South Africa. Nelson Mandela was elected as President of the ANC, replacing Oliver Tambo. In a shift from its past emphasis, the conference also supported negotiations as the way forward. In closing the conference, Nelson Mandela said that the ANC had "...reaffirmed the premise that negotiation is a terrain of struggle leading to our central objective, the transfer of power to the people."

Since autumn 1990, accusations that government security forces were doing little to stop township violence and were in some instances encouraging it, were accompanied by accusations that a "third force" was instigating the fighting in the townships. On 19 July, top secret documents made available to the press revealed that the South African security forces had secretly given money to the Inkatha organization to help give it an edge over its rival, the ANC. The revelations called into question the credibility of the de Klerk government, especially after the depth of involvement of

government officials was revealed. Similarly, Chief Buthelezi's credibility as a leader has also been called into question. It is not clear how and to what degree this latest development, after so much positive progress on removing the apartheid system, will affect the situation in South Africa and its international standing.

International Sanctions

Progress in removing the legislative framework of apartheid prompted a reconsideration of sanctions by the international community. On 15 December, the European Community (EC) voted to lift its ban on new investment in South Africa. The move came after a letter from Nelson Mandela to the EC, asking them to postpone consideration of repealing sanctions until after the ANC had reconsidered their position. On 15 April, building on its earlier decision to allow new investment in South Africa, the EC agreed to lift a ban on imports of gold coins, iron and steel from South Africa. However, this decision has not yet taken effect as its implementation was blocked by the Danish Parliament.

The Commonwealth Committee on South Africa, chaired by Canada's former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, decided on 16 February to continue full sanctions pending concrete steps toward removing apartheid. The Committee agreed to review the sanctions situation after 30 April providing that South Africa met five conditions: the release of remaining political prisoners; allowing exiles to return home; repeal repressive provisions of security legislation; and repeal the Group Areas, Population Registration and Land Acts. It was also decided that trade, investment and financial sanctions should remain in place until a multiparty constitutional reform process made progress and that the arms embargo should remain in force until a new constitution is in place.

The Commonwealth also agreed to de-link the sports embargo from its general consideration of sanctions and agreed to permit competition between Commonwealth and South African athletes. On 27 March, the International Olympic Committee re-admitted South Africa to the Olympic games, subject to its compliance with conditions established by the Committee. South Africa had been banned from the Olympic Games since 1970.

The South African Parliament passed legislation repealing the land laws on 5 June 1991. On 17 June 1991, the Parliament voted to repeal the Population Registration Act, removing the final legislative pillar of apartheid and leaving only the constitution to be changed in order to end the formal system of apartheid. In recognition of these actions, on 10 July 1991, President Bush announced that South Africa had met all five of the conditions established in the CAAA and that consequently, US sanctions against South Africa should be lifted.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has been a very active participant in the international debate on South Africa. The Secretary of State for External Affairs acts as the Chairman of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers of South Africa, and Canada has been a strong advocate of sanctions and an end to apartheid in international fora such as the United Nations.

On 7 August 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark welcomed the announcement of an agreement between the ANC and President de Klerk. In particular, Clark welcomed the ANC's suspension of guerilla warfare, noting that Canada had encouraged Mandela to end the armed struggle when he visited Canada in June 1990. In addition, Mr. Clark re-stated Canada's willingness to help with the resettlement of exiles and political prisoners, and with the process of negotiations.¹

Mr. Clark also welcomed the formal repeal of the Separate Amenities Act on 15 October 1990, calling on the South African government to ensure that the effects of this change would not be counteracted by municipal legislation.

The South African government's public commitment to end apartheid should be accompanied by vigorous action to ensure that all citizens of South Africa are given full access, as a basic right, to public facilities throughout the country.²

The day after President de Klerk's announcement to Parliament of plans to introduce legislation to revoke the land laws and Population Registration Act, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated that he had phoned President de Klerk to congratulate him on the announcement. Prime Minister Mulroney told reporters:

[President de Klerk] has demonstrated great courage and determination in dealing with an extraordinarily difficult problem.... They are really at the beginning of the road, but he has clearly placed South Africa along what appears to be an irreversible course.³

On 10 February 1991, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark issued a statement commemorating the first anniversary of the release of Nelson Mandela, noting the "momentous steps" that

¹Department of External Affairs. "Mr. Clark Welcomes Breakthrough on Negotiations in South Africa," *News Release*, no. 168, 7 August 1990.

²Department of External Affairs. "Canada Hails repeal of Separate Amenities Act in South Africa," *News Release*, no. 239, 15 October 1990.

³T. Harper. "End near for Pretoria Sanctions, PM hints," *Toronto Star*, 2 February 1991: 1.

had been taken by South Africa since that time. Mr. Clark also stated that he hoped that formal negotiations would begin shortly and that political prisoners would soon be released.⁴

As chairman of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA), Mr. Clark outlined the rationale for the Committee's February decision to maintain sanctions, to the House of Commons. Clark spoke of the profound changes occurring in South Africa and said that the CFMSA had decided that they would "...only reward actual changes which dismantle the system of apartheid." To this end the CFMSA had decided to take a "programmed management approach" where the strongest sanctions would be kept until apartheid was abolished and the lesser sanctions would be lifted in response to "tangible proof of a determination to end apartheid irreversibly."⁵ Consequently the Committee had decided to meet again at a later date to assess progress on the first five criteria for change (see above for detail). In discussing the Committee's decisions, Clark stated:

Just as many South Africans show remarkable responsibility in facing their new challenges, so must the world community weigh and apply our influence with great care. The moral imperative remains: to end apartheid. Now, with change in the air, the question of how we contribute to that goal becomes more complex.⁶

On the specific question of developing a new constitution, the CFMSA agreed to provide constitutional expertise and funding to contribute to the process. As its contribution, Clark announced that Canada would provide \$1.8 million in 1990-1991 and \$2.3 million in 1991-1992. A further \$5.8 million would go to assist the return of exiles and political prisoners.⁷

In a speech to the Commonwealth Working Group on Human Resource Development for a post-Apartheid South Africa, Joe Clark spoke again of the progress that had been made to date, but also sounded a note of caution.

For blacks in the townships, ...apartheid is still alive and well. They are still pushed around by the security forces and by an indifferent or antagonistic white bureaucracy. They are still denied access to hospitals and schools.... And now they fear that the international community is beginning to forget them.⁸

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Clark Marks First Anniversary of Nelson Mandela's Release," *News Release*, no. 32, 10 February 1991.

⁵*Commons Debates*. 28 February 1991: 17791.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, to the Ottawa Meeting of the Commonwealth Working Group on Human Resource Development for a post-apartheid South Africa," *Statement*, 91/19, 17 April 1991: 2.

The effects of apartheid, such as illiteracy, poverty and violence will take years to overcome and Clark noted that:

We must increasingly look to the future, beyond the launch of formal negotiations to the creation of an apartheid-free society. This is the prize for which the struggle has been waged. I have been struck, in my discussions with other foreign leaders, by the priority they all accord to supporting the long-term development needs of South Africa.⁹

For its part, Canada has been involved in a variety of programmes aimed at dealing with social questions. In 1985, Canada established the Canadian Education Programme for South Africa which includes scholarships, small-scale initiatives in areas such as adult education, labour education and a scholarship and training programme in Canada. Canada also supports community development projects in South Africa. In addition, Canada established the Dialogue Fund, administered by the Canadian embassy in South Africa, which encourages the negotiation process and other interactions among various groups in the community. In 1990-1991, the Dialogue Fund was valued at \$2.3 million.

In outlining Canada's programmes, Mr. Clark summarized:

We are engaged in this work across a broad front, and we intend to stay with this issue for the long haul: applying our funding, experience, pressure, and support to bring about an end to apartheid.¹⁰

On 16 May, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, Joe Clark's successor, issued a statement expressing concern about the escalation of violence in the townships and the possible consequences for the ongoing negotiations, urging all parties to continue negotiations on the constitution in good faith.¹¹ In June, Mrs. McDougall issued a statement commending the South African government for its actions in repealing the legislation relating to land laws and the Population Registration Act.

This is a breakthrough for South Africa. Canada congratulates the South African Parliament, and the Government of President de Klerk, for taking this major step towards political reconciliation in South Africa. We also pay tribute to the thousands of South Africans who struggled for so long to bring about an end to apartheid. The abolition of this abhorrent legislation is their victory.¹²

⁹Ibid.: 3.

¹⁰Ibid.: 5.

¹¹Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Profoundly Concerned About Escalation of Violence in South Africa," *News Release*, no. 116, 16 May 1991.

¹²Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Commends Repeal of Pillars of Apartheid," *News Release*, no. 143, 17 June 1991.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

After the EC's decision to lift its ban on new investment in South Africa, NDP member Svend Robinson sought assurances from the Government that Canada would maintain its ban on investment and its policy of sanctions. The Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry replied that Canada was "determined to maintain our present policy" until the next meeting of the Commonwealth Committee.¹³

In response to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark's statement to the House after the Commonwealth Committee's meeting, Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy and NDP member Svend Robinson commended Mr. Clark's role in the process. In addition, both members called attention to the contribution made by Canadian churches and non-governmental organizations to progress. In supporting the changes made by the de Klerk government and the decisions of the Commonwealth Committee, Lloyd Axworthy sounded a note of caution.

Time is running out. We know that there must be a constitutional meeting by 1991 and I believe the mandate of the de Klerk government begins to run out by 1994.... How do we, in fact, maintain the constant pressure of having applied sanctions over the years and at the same time provide encouragement?¹⁴

Mr. Axworthy went on to recommend that the Government undertake a review of Canada's policy to date and the possible future steps that might be taken to support the reforms that are underway, under the auspices of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT). He also stated that the changes in South Africa should not lead Canada to forget the difficulties experienced by the front-line states.¹⁵

NDP member Svend Robinson pointed to the many elements of the apartheid system that remained to be changed and urged Canada not to give up its sanctions policy too early. In particular, he noted that there were more political trials in 1990 than in 1989, and that housing, education, literacy, unemployment and health issues must also all be addressed.

...the per capita spending on social services in the last year, in 1990, was five times more for whites than it was for blacks in South Africa.... As well, South Africa's strict security legislation must be revoked, particularly the Internal Security Act which provides for detention without trial and the banning of public gatherings. Most

¹³*Commons Debates*. 17 December 1990: 16820.

¹⁴*Commons Debates*. 28 February 1991: 17793.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

important, existing sanctions must continue until blacks are guaranteed full democratic rights in the South African Constitution;...¹⁶

SCEAIT discussed the question of reforms in South Africa. On 26 March 1991, it heard from Ronald MacLean, the Canadian Ambassador to South Africa who was accompanied by Lucie Edwards, the Chairperson of the Southern Africa Task Force at External Affairs.

Ambassador MacLean gave a lengthy summary of the situation in South Africa, outlining the prospects for future change, the rationale behind the de Klerk policies, and the areas which still need further work. Ambassador MacLean noted that the use (or abuse) of the security forces in South Africa was unchanged and that while policy changes were occurring, change had not filtered down to the day-to-day life of blacks in the townships. There was considerable hope to be found in the de Klerk policies, the negotiations on the constitution and in the willingness of the white society to accept change. However, a very difficult problem in the future would be dealing with the large number of poorly educated blacks and their high expectations for a new system.¹⁷

Much of the Committee discussion focussed on the current situation in South Africa, the prospect that the changes might be derailed, and how Canadian policy on sanctions might best be applied as change occurs. Committee members also discussed the possible post-apartheid problems with Ambassador MacLean and how they might best be addressed by Canada.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid.: 17795.

¹⁷For Mr. MacLean's remarks and the ensuing discussion see: Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 107, 26 March 1991.

¹⁸Ibid.

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31. SOUTHERN AFRICA: ANGOLA, NAMIBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE

BACKGROUND

Three countries in Southern Africa -- Angola, Namibia and Mozambique -- have, after years of post-colonial civil war, sought to achieve peace in their country and work towards multiparty democracy. This process has been considerably aided by the new warmth in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union which has led both sides to rethink their involvement in various regional conflicts and encourage peace negotiations. Improvements have also been linked to the movement toward ending the apartheid system in South Africa, a system which had fed instability and deliberate destabilization in neighbouring countries. Although the three countries have all begun this process, they are at three very different stages in finding their way to peaceful democratic societies.

Namibia was declared independent in March 1990, having made the transition to multiparty democracy through UN-monitored elections in November 1989. From 1884 to 1920, Namibia was a German colony. With the German defeat in World War I, Namibia, then known as South-West Africa, was placed under South African administration by the League of Nations. After World War II, no new agreement was concluded between the UN and South Africa, leaving the territory in South African hands by default. In 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the territory was still under an international mandate and required South Africa to submit the area to General Assembly supervision and file regular reports.

The UN changed the territory's name to Namibia in 1968, and in 1971, the International Court of Justice ruled again on the question, stating that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal. In the meantime, in 1966, the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which was formed in 1958, began a guerilla war against South Africa in an effort to gain independence.

In 1978, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which outlined a plan for Namibian independence, including a ceasefire and elections under UN supervision. It was not until 22 December 1988, however, that the plan was realized when Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed an agreement calling for its implementation. Official implementation of Resolution 435 began on 1 April 1989. In February, the UN authorized the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a 4,650 strong UN peacekeeping force, 1,000 civilian election monitors and 500 police officers. Although the process was nearly derailed by violence and accusations of torture and intimidation on both sides, in the end, the elections to the Constituent Assembly were successfully carried out in November 1989 with SWAPO winning forty-one of seventy-two seats. On 9 February 1990, a new constitution was approved by the Assembly and Namibia achieved full official independence on 21 March 1990. (For more details see *The Guide 1990*.) Namibia has become a

member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and has begun to establish formal diplomatic relations with a large number of countries.

The December 1988 agreements, which contributed to progress in Namibia, also affected Angola. Angola achieved independence from Portugal in 1975. Since then, Angola has been ruled by the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which took power after independence. The MPLA has been challenged ever since it took power by the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The fifteen-year civil war has taken its toll on Angola which has the highest percentage of limbless citizens in the world and whose resource-rich (including oil) economy has been devastated by the war.

Since 1975, the Soviet Union has supported the MPLA government with \$500 million in military aid. This has been supplemented by large numbers of Cuban advisors whose presence was as high as 50,000 soldiers at a given time. South Africa and the US have supported UNITA, with US support coming in the form of approximately \$50 million in arms each year.

The December 1988 peace accords signed by Angola, Cuba, Namibia and South Africa brought an end to South African assistance for UNITA and provided for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. The withdrawal has been monitored by a UN peacekeeping force (UNAVEM). These changes opened the way for peace talks. The first round, brokered by Zaire, established a ceasefire which broke down in June 1989. A second attempt was begun in April 1990, this time under Portuguese auspices. The slow process was given a boost in September 1990 when the US and Soviet Union agreed to act as mediators. The process was also aided by shifts in the MPLA government attitude. In July 1990, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos announced that the MPLA would accept the principle of multiparty democracy.

The negotiations resulted in a set of Peace Accords for Angola which were signed in Estoril, Portugal, on 1 May 1991. The accords called for a de facto ceasefire to begin on 15 May 1991, the date of the final formal acceptance of the accords by the two party leaders, with the formal ceasefire beginning officially on 1 June. A unified armed force of 50,000 including members of UNITA and MPLA forces is to be established. A United Nations force (an expanded version of UNAVEM which was established to monitor the Cuban withdrawal) will monitor the ceasefire and a political military commission involving UNITA, the MPLA and three mediators -- the US, the Soviet Union and Portugal -- will oversee the transition process and aid in preparations for elections and unified armed forces. Elections are planned for autumn 1992. The Accords were formally initialled by the leaders of the Angolan government and UNITA, in the presence of the UN Secretary-General, in Lisbon on 31 May 1991.

To date, the ceasefire has held successfully and preparations for elections are underway. All Cuban soldiers had been withdrawn by the end of May, five weeks ahead of schedule.

In contrast, although the Mozambique government has agreed to move towards multiparty democracy, talks between the government and rebel soldiers have not succeeded in ending the conflict and the situation for Mozambique's population continues to worsen due to lack of food, proper medical care and other basic services. Of a population of 16 million, estimates of internal refugees, a large percentage of whom cannot be reached by aid, range from two to five million. One million refugees are thought to have left the country. Large numbers are now suffering from famine while international aid is decreasing. In April 1991, only 37 percent of emergency food aid pledged by the West had arrived.

After Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won control of the nation. An opposition group known as RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana - also known as MNR) was formed by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in 1977. These two groups have continued a bloody military struggle since then.

After the end of white-minority rule in Rhodesia in 1982, South African Military Intelligence took over the support and training of RENAMO guerillas. This assistance was formally ended by the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa, signed in 1984. However, reports have suggested that South African elements continued to supply RENAMO unofficially, in spite of denials from the South African government.

Talks aimed at ending the civil war began in July 1989. Also in 1989, the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO government abandoned Marxism in favour of an economy based on liberalized trade. At the same time, the government announced that it would draft a new constitution for the country which would be based on a multiparty democratic system. The new constitution was developed during 1990 and became official on 30 November 1990.

On 1 December 1990, the peace negotiators in Rome announced that they had agreed on a limited ceasefire which would restrict Zimbabwean troops to two narrow transportation corridors. RENAMO agreed to cease military operations within those corridors. This ceasefire is monitored by a multinational commission. All Zimbabwean troops had been withdrawn to the corridors by 28 December, ahead of the 5 January deadline. However, attacks and violence have continued in the rest of the country. The sixth round of peace talks began on 2 May in Rome. Significant differences remain between the two sides.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada was a strong supporter of the transition process which brought Namibia to independence. Canada contributed a total of 301 personnel to the UNTAG team, including RCMP officers, election monitors and military personnel (see *The Guide 1990*).

In a speech to the United Nations, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

We take great pride in the UN's role in assisting Namibia make its transition to independence, an effort which was truly global, involving 109 members of this organization.¹⁹

Canada, along with the rest of the United Nations General Assembly supported a resolution calling for international economic assistance for Angola to aid in economic rehabilitation. The resolution was adopted without a vote.²⁰ Similarly, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which noted with deep concern the situation in Mozambique and called for all states to provide and expand help.²¹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on these issues during the 1990-1991 sessions.

¹⁹Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, no. 90/55, 26 September 1990: 2.

²⁰*International Assistance for the Economic Rehabilitation of Angola*. UNGA Resolution 45/233, 21 December 1990.

²¹*Assistance to Mozambique*, UNGA Resolution 45/227, 21 December 1990. Adopted without a vote.

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BACKGROUND

The state of Yugoslavia is a product of the first world war. It was first formed in 1918 when Serbia and Bosnia (which had historically been under Turkish rule) joined with Slovenia and Croatia, which had been part of Austria-Hungary, to create the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. It was thought that a union of this sort would protect the small states from foreign domination. The Kingdom was ruled by King Alexander Karageorgevic who initially promised a union of the groups which would enhance and ensure their integrity. However, in 1928, the King abrogated the Constitution and ruled the country as a dictatorship. In 1929, King Alexander changed the name of the country to Yugoslavia which means South Slav State. The King, a Serb, carried out policies which subsumed and ignored the interests of the Slovenes and Croats. He was assassinated in 1934 and his brother Prince Paul took over.

Yugoslavia was invaded by the Germans in 1941. After Yugoslavia's liberation in 1944, Tito's Communist government came to power and in the initial post-war years many thousands of anti-Communist Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were killed. Under Tito's leadership, Yugoslavia followed an independent Communist line which resulted in the country's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.

The union, enforced under various dictatorships since 1918, began to come apart after Tito's death in 1980, and the shift to greater freedom and democracy seen throughout Eastern Europe in recent years has made it possible for various republics in Yugoslavia to take steps towards independence. As presently constituted, Yugoslavia is composed of six republics and two nominally autonomous provinces. The six republics are Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercogovina. A number of distinct ethnic groups are distributed among the six republics, including Albanians, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. Comprising 40 percent of the total population, Serbs are the largest ethnic group in the country. Croats make up 19.8 percent, and Slovenes 7.8 percent (according to the 1981 census). There is a large crossover between Croatia and Serbia with some 600,000 Serbs living in the Croatian republic of 4.6 million.

The two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, are essentially outgrowths of Serbia. In 1990, Serbia suspended Kosovo's assembly and has been running the province directly. Nine of ten citizens in Kosovo are ethnic Albanian, but the Serbs claim that the province is the original Serbian homeland. The disparities in cultures, language and histories among the ethnic groups have been exacerbated by economic developments that resulted in Slovenia and Croatia being more economically advanced than the other republics.

In order to deal with the different republics, a system of collective presidency was established whereby representatives from the six republics and two provinces rule collectively and the presidency itself rotates among the eight representatives with each representative acting as president for one year.

On 9 December 1990, the republic of Serbia elected Slobodan Milosevic as its president. Milosevic leads the Serbian Socialist Party, previously the Communist Party, which maintained power over the past three years by building on and encouraging Serbian nationalism. The Serbian Socialist Party has been the only previously Communist Party to win an election in Yugoslavia.

As part of their move towards increased independence, Croatia and Slovenia took charge of republican defence forces. On 9 January 1991, the Collective State Presidency (CSP) ordered that all unauthorized armed units should surrender their arms to the Yugoslav Army (JNA) within ten days. It was not precisely clear what the CSP considered to be unauthorized units, but in Croatia and Slovenia, it was thought that the Government intended to disband the republican defence forces. On 19 January, with both the JNA and Croatian and Slovene forces on high alert, the deadline was extended by forty-eight hours. The crisis was averted when the CSP and Croatian leaders met and reached agreement on the demobilization (not disbanding) of Croatia's special forces.

On 25 January 1991, Macedonia adopted a declaration of sovereignty. On 20 February, following a December referendum in which Slovene citizens voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence, the Slovenian Parliament passed a resolution which called for the disassociation of Slovenia from Yugoslavia. One day later, on 21 February 1991, the Croatian assembly approved a similar resolution. In January, Croatia and Slovenia agreed to a mutual defence pact under which, if armed intervention occurs in one republic, the other republic will immediately declare full independence.

The declaration of Croatian independence sparked action from Serbs living in the republic. On 28 February 1991, the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina declared itself separate from Croatia. In the following two days, attempts by Serbian police reservists to take formal control of the town of Pakrac led to violence when Croatia sent in riot police. The Yugoslav army was brought in to re-establish order.

Talks on the future constitutional make-up of Yugoslavia were scheduled throughout this time period. However, there is a fundamental difference in the approach of Serbia which seeks a strong central government and the other republics which advocate a looser federation of independent republics.

Within Serbia, on 9 March, an anti-communist demonstration calling for an end to Communist control of the media in Serbia and for the resignation of the Milosevic Government, drew an estimated 100,000 protestors in defiance of a ban on such demonstrations established two days earlier.

The demonstration was put down by the Army and riot police, resulting in ninety injuries and the death of one policeman and one student. The leader of the protest, Vuk Draskovic was arrested. Further protests led to the release of Draskovic. As a further concession to the protestors, the head of the state-run television station resigned, along with the Minister of the Interior.

On 15 March, in what appeared to be a concerted effort to force the intervention of the armed forces, the President of the CSP, Borisav Jovic, the Serbian representative, resigned. He announced that his resignation was due to the failure of the CSP to support his call for a state of emergency. His resignation was followed by resignations from the Montenegro and Vojvodina representatives. In a further effort to subvert the process the Kosovo representative was forced out of the CSP, leaving only four of eight representatives, paralyzing the CSP, which needs a quorum of five to make decisions.

The next day, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic announced that the Serbian republic would no longer accept the decisions of the CSP and mobilized Serbian defence forces on the pretext of potential disorder in the province of Kosovo. Forces in Croatia and Slovenia were also mobilized and the country appeared on the brink of civil war. It was widely speculated that these actions were an attempt by Serbia to prompt the intervention of the army. As the country waited, there was no word from the armed forces, fuelling speculation that there was a split in the command. However, on 19 March 1991, in a somewhat ambiguous statement, the armed forces announced that it would not intervene in political affairs but neither would it allow intranational armed clashes to develop anywhere in the country. The crisis past, the Serbian Parliament asked Jovic to rescind his resignation. His return to the CSP was accompanied by the reinstatement of the other members.

Early in May, the CSP held an emergency meeting to deal with the ongoing violence between Croats and Serbs in Croatia. After an initial deadlock, on 9 May, the CSP agreed to give the Army sweeping powers, prohibited the movement of armed civilian units and called for Serbs and Croats to hand over their weapons. A new crisis occurred in the following week, when the three Serbian representatives on the CSP blocked the annual transition of the Presidency. Stipe Mesic, the Croatian representative was to be the next President and would have been Yugoslavia's first non-Communist President. However, Montenegro abstained from the vote on the Presidency in protest of the Federal Assembly's failure to ratify the nomination of three new members of the CSP. In conjunction with the three Serbian negative votes, this meant that Mesic failed to get a majority of five votes.

An emergency meeting of the Federal Assembly ratified the nomination of three new representatives in an effort to clear the way for the Montenegro vote. However, the CSP again failed to ratify Mesic's nomination who along with the Slovene and Macedonian representatives walked out of the meeting.

On 19 May, a referendum in Croatia resulted in an overwhelming vote for sovereignty and independence. Many Serbs boycotted the voting. With a declaration of Croatian independence on 29 May and an upcoming declaration by Slovenia planned for 26 June, Yugoslavia was once again on the brink of civil war. On 27 June, the Yugoslav army began attacks on the Slovene militia in an effort to remove them from border posts Slovenia had established on its border with Austria and Croatia. It is estimated that one hundred people died in the first day of fighting and it was later revealed that the army had acted without the approval of the CSP.

On 28 June, a mutually agreed halt to violence was established allowing for a mediation team from the European Community (EC) to negotiate a ceasefire. The ceasefire, agreed to on 29 June, allowed for Mesic to finally be instated as President and required Croatia and Slovenia to postpone further moves to independence for three months. As well, all army and militia would return to their barracks. Although the situation did not deteriorate again into full-scale battles, sporadic clashes continued to occur.

The violence in Yugoslavia was the subject of the first meetings of the new Conflict Prevention Centre at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE passed a resolution calling for an immediate end to the hostilities. This followed a 20 June resolution by CSCE ministers which supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and urged a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

On 8 July, a more substantive agreement between the Yugoslav government and Slovenia, mediated by the EC representatives, was achieved. It included the terms of the initial ceasefire, the release of prisoners, limiting the army to a designated zone, as well as a compromise on the border posts in which Slovenia maintained control but acted in conformity with federal regulations and deposited customs revenue in an account shared with the federal government. Under the plan, observers from the EC would go to Yugoslavia to monitor the ceasefire.

Although the agreement with Slovenia did not resolve the core problems, it has brought the situation under control. The same has not been the case for Croatia where violence between Serbs and Croats continues. Repeated attempts by EC and CSCE negotiating teams have brokered a number of short-lived ceasefires. In August, violence in Serbia and Croatia continued to escalate, edging just short of full-scale civil war.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has urged Yugoslavia to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis and has been supportive of the actions and resolutions taken by the CSCE. Prime Minister Mulroney stated that the unity of Yugoslavia was very important to the stability of Central Europe.¹

On 27 June, the first day of fighting in Slovenia, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall issued a statement urging a peaceful resolution.

Canada subscribed to the June 20 statement of CSCE ministers, which supported the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, based on economic reforms and the full application of human rights, including minority rights.²

Two days later, Canada welcomed the achievement of the ceasefire. In issuing a statement to this effect, Mrs. McDougall noted that thousands of Canadians had expressed concern about the situation and she urged all Canadians to support efforts to resolve the crisis. In addition, she stated:

Above all, what is needed at this time is peaceful dialogue among the parties involved.... We fully support efforts to organize an emergency meeting to address this issue under the auspices of the [CSCE].³

On 3 July, Mrs. McDougall issued a further statement, reaffirming Canada's support for the CSCE process and the CSCE statement issued that day.⁴

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 23 May 1991, Liberal member Albina Guarnieri called the attention of the House to the moves of Croatia and Slovenia towards independence and called on the government

¹T. Harper. "Unity question dampens PM's Balkan Policy," *Toronto Star*, 4 July 1991: A3.

²Department of External Affairs. "McDougall States Canada's Views on the Current Situation in Yugoslavia," *News Release*, no. 150, 27 June 1991.

³Department of External Affairs. "Canada Welcomes Ceasefire in Yugoslavia," *News Release*, no. 153, 29 June 1991.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Underlines Support for CSCE Position on Yugoslavia," *News Release*, no. 155, 3 July 1991.

...to respect the democratic wishes of the people who live in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia and to be prepared to recognize whatever form of government they choose.⁵

⁵Commons Debates. 23 May 1991: 471.

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BACKGROUND

The roots of the conflict in the Western Sahara, as in most cases of conflict in Africa, are in the effects of European colonialism. The area now known as the Western Sahara lies on the north Atlantic coast of Africa and borders with Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. In the late 1880s, Spain set up missions on three coastal areas in the region and laid claim to the area. Between 1900 and 1904, France and Spain determined the borders between the West Sahara area and the French controlled area of French West Africa, part of which is now known as Mauritania. In 1912, the two countries divided up a neighbouring area into French Morocco and Spanish Morocco.

After Moroccan independence in 1956, Spain ceded some parts of the territory it held to the new Moroccan state. However, Spain continued to hold the Western Sahara which it made into a Spanish province in January 1958, although Morocco made it known that it felt that it had a claim on the area. In 1957, irregular Moroccan forces had made an attempt to take the area militarily but they were pushed back by Spanish forces.

During the 1960s, general pressure for decolonisation began at the United Nations. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, on 14 December 1960, which called for decolonization, was accompanied by a list of territories which should be decolonized, including the Western Sahara. In 1963, discussions on Western Sahara began at the UN's decolonisation committee. By 1967, Spain had publicly accepted the idea of a referendum which would allow the local population to voice an opinion on their future. A UN resolution in December 1968 invited Spain to hold such a referendum and to consult with interested parties. Although it did not have a territorial claim to the area, Algeria announced that it was an interested party.

Consultations and better relations between Spain, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco characterised the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1972, Morocco and Algeria signed an agreement settling a border dispute between them. As part of its side of the deal, Algeria agreed not to oppose Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara. In 1974, Morocco and Mauritania concluded a secret agreement in which the two states agreed to partition the Western Sahara after Spain had withdrawn. Also in 1974, responding to Moroccan pressure, a UN resolution was passed calling for an International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on the Western Sahara question and urging Spain to postpone a referendum until after such an opinion was concluded.

Pressure from within Western Sahara came from a rebel group known as the Polisario, an acronym for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sakiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro, which was formed in 1973.

The Polisario claim to be the representative of the local Sahrawi people. They have been supported primarily by Algeria, and since 1973 have fought for the independence of Western Sahara.

On 16 October 1975, the ICJ released its opinion on Western Sahara. The Court concluded that while some legal ties between Morocco and Western Sahara and Mauritania and Western Sahara did exist, these did not translate into sovereignty over the area. Most important, it reaffirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. Morocco interpreted this judgement as clear support for its position and King Hassan announced that he would lead a peaceful Green March of thousands of Moroccans to Western Sahara to claim their territory. The Green March, with some 350,000 marchers crossed into Western Sahara on 6 November and stopped just short of Spanish military positions. It was announced that a breakthrough had been made in negotiations between Spain and Morocco and the marchers returned home. A potentially dangerous confrontation was averted.

Negotiations between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania did result in an agreement a week later in which Spain agreed to withdraw from Western Sahara, and Morocco and Mauritania would set up a joint administration. This agreement set the stage for the conflict that was to follow. In February 1976, the Spanish withdrawal from Western Sahara was complete. On 26 February, the Moroccan parliament voted to integrate Western Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania and the two countries began to establish administrations in the area. On 27 February, the Polisario announced the creation of Western Sahara as an independent state, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and a full-fledged conflict with Morocco and Mauritania began.

The war exhausted Mauritania which was also experiencing significant economic and political difficulties internally. In August 1979, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario in Algiers, renouncing its claims to Western Sahara. In the meantime, Algeria continued to be a player in the situation. During the ICJ hearings, Algeria had reneged on its agreement not to oppose Morocco's claim and had spoken in favour of Western Sahara independence and the right of the Sahrawi to self-determination. Algeria was the Polisario's strongest supporter and worked actively at the UN and in the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to generate support for self-determination and independence.

When Mauritania gave up its claim to Western Sahara, Morocco annexed the Mauritanian part of Western Sahara. However, Morocco found itself increasingly isolated. There had been little support for the Moroccan-Mauritania takeover initially, and there was considerably less support for the latest Moroccan annexation. In spite of increasing pressure at the UN and especially at the OAU, Morocco continued to hold Western Sahara and battle the Polisario until 1988.

On 30 August 1988, Morocco and the Polisario agreed in principle to a peace proposal put forward by the UN Secretary-General and a special envoy of the Chairman of the OAU. The peace

plan called for a ceasefire and a reduction in Moroccan troops to be followed by a UN-sponsored referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would be able to choose between independence and joining Morocco. In September 1988, the UN Security Council asked the Secretary-General to work out the details of a plan. On 22 April 1991, the Secretary-General submitted the plan to the Security Council and the Security Council gave formal approval to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) on 29 April. The peacekeeping force will involve approximately 2,295 civilian, security and military personnel from a number of countries and will last forty-two weeks.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada will contribute 740 troops to the peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara and a Canadian, Brigadier-General Armand Roy has been appointed to head the entire UN force. This will be Canada's largest contribution to a peacekeeping force since its contribution to the Cyprus operation in 1974.¹ In announcing Brigadier-General Roy's appointment as head of the military component of MINURSO, the Minister for National Defence noted:

The participation of Brigadier-General Roy in this operation will contribute directly to the easing of tensions in the Western Sahara and help assure the necessary conditions for a free and fair referendum.²

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue.

¹Government of Canada. "Canada Contributes Largest Peacekeeping Force Since 1974 to UN Operations in the Western Sahara," *News Release*, 18 July 1991.

²Department of National Defence. "Appointment to Force Commander United Nations Mission in Western Sahara," *News Release*, 29/91, 27 June 1991.

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SECTION IV -- INSTITUTIONS

34. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

BACKGROUND

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began on 3 July 1973 in Helsinki. It involves thirty-four countries, including Canada and the US. The CSCE gave European countries not involved in NATO or the Warsaw Pact an opportunity to discuss security questions, and all participating states an opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues. States have generally operated within three main groups at the CSCE: Western states (NATO members), Eastern states (Warsaw Pact members), and the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA). However, reflecting a membership which transcended the European military alliances, the CSCE has become a vital forum for the discussion of the future in Europe in response to the dramatic changes occurring in Eastern Europe.

The first CSCE meetings, held in Helsinki, resulted in the *Helsinki Final Act*, on 1 August 1975. The Final Act contained provisions in the three issue areas or "baskets" dealt with by the CSCE: security questions; cooperation on economic issues, the environment and science and technology; and cooperation on humanitarian and other fields.

Three review meetings have been held.¹ Both the second and third meetings established a mandate for talks on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the first set resulting in the Stockholm Document, the second leading to the Vienna Document (see section on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures for further details).

There have also been achievements in other areas. For example, the Helsinki Final Act included a set of agreed principles to guide relations between states. Principle VII dealt with the importance of human rights and provided a base from which the West could work to demand and encourage more respect for basic human rights and freedoms by states in the East, especially the Soviet Union.

For a number of years, the CSCE was considered to be secondary in importance to the alliance-to-alliance negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce the vast numbers of conventional forces deployed along the central front. However, with the changes that have occurred in Europe in the past few years, this attitude has changed significantly. The unification of Germany

¹The first review took place in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978. The second review was held in Madrid from November 1980 to September 1983, and the third review occurred in Vienna from November 1986 to January 1989.

on 3 October 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact² and the signing of a treaty reducing conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) all put a new emphasis on the need for a strong European institution which could provide a forum for cooperation. The CSCE, as an institution which deals with more than simply military questions, and which includes most European states as well as the US and Canada, has thus taken on new importance.

During 1989 and 1990, CSCE members worked to conclude a document on CSBMs to be ready for signing at the CSCE summit in November 1991. Similarly, the CFE Treaty was concluded in order to be ready for the summit. The CSCE summit meeting, involving the leaders of the then thirty-four member states,³ took place in Paris from 19 to 21 November 1990. Two other important documents were signed at the summit. Members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Joint Declaration of the Twenty-Two which proclaimed that the twenty-two states would refrain from the threat or use of force against one another and reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.

The thirty-four members of the CSCE also signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. This Charter is intended to provide a framework for future European relations. *Inter alia*, the Charter establishes a Council and a Secretariat for the CSCE. The Foreign Ministers of the participants will form the Council which will meet at least once each year. The Council will be supported by a committee of senior officials. The Secretariat will be based in Prague and will administer the CSCE. An Office of Free Elections was also established. It will be based in Warsaw, and work to facilitate contacts and exchanges of information on elections and strive to foster free elections in general.

The Charter also establishes a Conflict Prevention Centre to be based in Vienna. The Centre will work to reduce the risk of conflict in Europe. Its functions will include assistance in implementing CSBMs and possibly the development of dispute resolution procedures. At the first meeting of the CSCE's Council of Ministers, agreement was reached on a new mechanism for bringing forward issues relating to peace and security in Europe. If initial efforts to clarify a situation with the state or states involved fail, the state raising the problem may submit all relevant information to the CSCE within forty-eight hours. If the question remains unresolved, the state raising the problem has the right to call for an emergency meeting, providing it has the support of twelve other members. Although this new mechanism is considered a breakthrough in international relations, providing the first formal mechanism to deal with external and

²On 25 February 1991, Warsaw Pact members agreed to end the military side of the alliance as of March 1991. The possibility of continuing political cooperation would be decided at a later date.

³The unification of Germany brought the member total to thirty-four from thirty-five. Albania was granted membership in the CSCE in June 1991.

internal state problems, it does not include an ability to impose recommendations or solutions. All such decisions continue to require unanimous consent from CSCE members.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has been a strong supporter of the CSCE since its inception. This support has its roots in the years prior to the beginning of the CSCE when Canada played an active role in the negotiations leading to its development. Canadian involvement reflected a desire to ensure that Canada would be included in the new institution, thus further institutionalizing the link between Europe and North America.

Current strong Canadian support for the CSCE process continues to reflect both a Canadian belief in the value of the CSCE and a desire to ensure ongoing Canadian connections to Europe at a time when Europe and the CSCE are undergoing significant changes. In a speech on 26 May 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark spoke of a need for Canada to focus its efforts on transforming institutions such as the CSCE and made a number of proposals for changes in the CSCE structure.⁴ Some of these proposals for a stronger institutional framework for the CSCE have been incorporated in the new structures established in the Charter of Europe.

At a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in New York, prior to the 1990 CSCE summit, Joe Clark reiterated Canada's support for the CSCE as "the drawing board of the new European architecture"⁵ and emphasized the need to ensure that the new CSCE structure was one which was flexible and could grow.

Clark outlined five areas which he said should guide the deliberations on the CSCE. First, the need for strong political direction and leadership; second, the CSCE should have "...a truly democratic and representative face."⁶ To this end, Canada supports moves towards an Assembly of Europe. Third, there should be a centre for the prevention and resolution of conflict. Fourth, the CFE agreement should be completed in time for the summit. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Canada, Clark stated that the summit must:

⁴External Affairs. "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus on Canada and the New Europe," *Statements and Speeches*, 90/9, 26 May 1990.

⁵External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation Meeting of Foreign Ministers," *Statement*, 90/57, 2 October 1990.

⁶*Ibid.*: 2.

...reinforce and consecrate the trans-Atlantic and pan-European role of the CSCE.... In all its actions and decisions, the Paris Summit should reflect the compelling image and reality of a European order which bridges the Atlantic, a Europe which is a concept rather than just a continent.⁷

Prime Minister Mulroney was present at the CSCE summit and signed the Charter for a New Europe and the Declaration of the Twenty-Two on behalf of Canada. In a speech given to the CSCE summit on 19 November 1990, Mulroney linked the success of the CSCE to the new possibility for using the full potential of the United Nations (UN).

History records that the United Nations does not work well if [Europe] is deadlocked. And this region will not have peace if the nations of the world are united only in name. Our task here, therefore, is to strengthen regional cooperation for its own sake and to create conditions in which the United Nations can succeed, a goal that has been frustrated too often in the past by the very tensions we are burying here today.⁸

Mulroney spoke of Canadian support for the new framework established in the Charter, and stated:

Canada also supports the call for a parliamentary forum where elected representatives...can come together and cooperate on issues of concern to us all. Canadian parliamentarians will participate actively in establishing the mandate and machinery of such a parliamentary assembly.⁹

Canada has also strongly supported the reunification of Germany, one of the significant results of the changes in Europe in the past few years. On 3 October 1990, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

Few events in recent history hold more significance and hope for Europe and its partners. For the first time in decades our common goal within the Alliance of achieving a Europe united in peace and freedom is now within reach. We are pleased that this goal has been achieved peacefully, in consultation with all interested parties.¹⁰

⁷Ibid.: 3.

⁸Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, CSCE Summit Paris," *Statement*, 19 November 1990: 3.

⁹Ibid.: 2.

¹⁰Department of External Affairs. "Canada Welcomes German Unity, October 3, 1990," *News Release* no. 222, 2 October 1990.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 8 November 1990, just prior to the CSCE summit, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Patrick Boyer introduced a motion in the House of Commons calling on the House to:

...express its support for the CSCE as a key pan-European and trans-Atlantic forum within which a new cooperative security framework can be built through the maintenance and development of its comprehensive approach to security, political, economic, environmental and human dimension issues, and strengthened by the development of the structure of the CSCE process, including by the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly.¹¹

Each of the three parties announced their support for the motion. Representatives of all three parties pointed to the history of the CSCE and the remarkable changes that had occurred in Europe recently, emphasising the need for an institutional framework which could encourage stability during current and future changes.¹²

All of the speakers supported the CSCE process and the idea of a parliamentary assembly. Special emphasis was placed on the role the CSCE plays in cementing the North American-European link. The idea of a parliamentary assembly was given strong support as a method of maintaining peace and security and especially as a way of cementing North American links to Europe.

In supporting the parliamentary assembly idea, Howard Crosby, the Parliamentary Secretary to President of the Treasury Board, pointed out that this idea, and the question of whether such an organization should include only European parliamentarians, will be considered at the Interparliamentary Conference on European Cooperation and Security in July 1991. He emphasized that it will not be in Canada's interests to allow North America to be excluded from such an institution and therefore Canada should make sure that it makes its case strongly at the meeting.¹³

Some speakers raised questions or suggestions relating to the CSCE. Liberal member Jesse Flis suggested that there be a public dialogue on the CSCE, as there was prior to the Madrid review conference.¹⁴ A number of speakers pointed to the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, warning that the possibility of destabilization remained, and suggesting that Canada should ensure

¹¹*Commons Debates*. 8 November 1990: 15296.

¹²For the full debate see: *Ibid.*: 15296-15316.

¹³*Ibid.*: 15308.

¹⁴*Ibid.*: 15302.

that the CSCE be as strong as possible in order to help deal with this possibility and to ensure continued growth in interstate relations in Europe and North America. Liberal member Jim Karygiannis pointed out that as a result of the attention given to Eastern Europe, the important and difficult problems of Cyprus, a CSCE member, were being forgotten.¹⁵

NDP member John Brewin suggested that while the CSCE should be strengthened and supported, the time had come to end the Canadian and US military presence in Europe, shifting the money spent on the Canadian contribution to other needs, such as the deficit or childcare. Mr. Brewin maintained that Canada should remain an active participant in establishing the framework in Europe, but he suggested that NATO should be wound down and that to that end, Canada should end its participation in the alliance. He stated:

It is in Canada's interests...that we end Canadian and American military participation in Europe and that we leave to Europeans the responsibility of specific security concerns...¹⁶

¹⁵Ibid.: 15315-15316.

¹⁶Ibid.: 15312.

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BACKGROUND

In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of the idea of establishing a regional institution for consultation and cooperation in the North Pacific. In contrast to some other regions of the world, and especially in contrast with the improved climate for security and cooperation in Europe, North Pacific countries rely almost entirely on bilateral interactions in their relationships with regional neighbours. This is in part due to the vast distances that separate countries, the disparity in geographic size of countries and the lack of an historical tradition of dealing with problems as a region.

Some institutions do exist in the Pacific region. In the South Pacific, the South Pacific Forum was established in 1971. Australia, New Zealand and thirteen island states are members of the Forum which holds annual, private meetings. One of its most significant accomplishments has been the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) treaty which bans the stationing, testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons within the South Pacific. The Treaty entered into force in 1986 (see Chapter 10 on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones).

Four institutions are devoted to Pacific economic cooperation: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation. On the security front, Australia, New Zealand and the US form the ANZUS alliance which has been in place since 1951. Similar in nature to the NATO commitment, the three agree that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all, but even this limited alliance has been strained in recent years. Finally, the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN provides a forum for discussion of a variety of issues of concern, ranging from economic to security to domestic issues. While it is neither a full-fledged security arrangement nor one for economic integration, ASEAN has helped build much better relations among its members, and some coordinated approaches to other countries. At a meeting in July, ASEAN moved beyond its traditional discussions and began to consider the possible formation of a new trading bloc and a new forum for dealing with regional military and security questions.

Relationships in the North Pacific were greatly influenced by the Cold War. The new warmth in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union has given impetus and optimism to ideas for creating a North Pacific forum. Most of the proposals for a new forum aim toward the development of arms control, with confidence-building measures as a beginning. Some proposals have used the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a model for the North Pacific and advocated a similar forum which would establish an administrative base and give states the opportunity to consult on a variety of issues.

Australia was an early advocate of a CSCE-type structure to cover the whole Pacific region. Soviet President Gorbachev has also advocated similar institutional initiatives. The Soviet Union has also made a number of proposals for arms control and confidence-building measures in the Pacific. In September 1988, Gorbachev proposed that nuclear and naval arms in the Pacific region be frozen at current levels and that measures be aimed at reducing the possibility of confrontation in the Japanese Sea. The US has not given its support to any proposals for new institutions in the North Pacific. It has been reluctant to respond to such initiatives, as well as arms control initiatives, because it fears such measures will adversely affect its military presence in the Pacific, and potentially disrupt other delicate relationships (such as those with Japan, South Korea, and the Soviet Union) without necessarily enhancing security to any a major degree.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is very much affected by its position in the North Pacific. A large percentage of immigrants to Canada come from North Pacific nations. Canadians fought in the Korean war and played an important role in the control commissions established for Indo-China. In addition, Canada maintains strong economic ties with a number of North Pacific nations. Canadian airspace and waters can be directly affected by continuing heavy US and Soviet military activity in the region.

Canada, as a Pacific nation, has been an active participant in recent efforts of developing institutions in the North Pacific. As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark was particularly active in advocating and initiating discussions on this question. His initiative has been taken up by his successor Barbara McDougall.

Prior to and during a visit to Japan in July 1990, Joe Clark proposed that consideration be given to ways of developing a stronger sense of community in the North Pacific. He indicated that while the thaw in East-West relations made stronger cooperation possible, the opportunity should be seized to diminish the likelihood of regional disputes. Mr. Clark proposed that a dialogue on security cooperation be initiated among states bordering the North Pacific. These include Canada, China, Japan, North and South Korea, the Soviet Union and the US.

...there has not been a structure of security co-operation, of traditional military Alliances, of regional political institutions to mirror the European experience. I suggest it is time to consider security or political institutions in the Pacific.¹

¹Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at a Luncheon Hosted by the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan," *Statement*, 90/41, 24 July 1990: 3.

The proposal was not given immediate support by Japan, preoccupied with its longstanding boundary dispute with the Soviet Union, and with the strong Soviet military presence remaining in the area. US reticence toward multilateral efforts in the region remains, and there is still a general uncertainty as to how fruitful these approaches may prove.

From 4 to 7 October 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark hosted a meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Alberta. The meetings included discussion of increased cooperation between Canada and ASEAN at the political and economic level. One outcome of the meeting was the signing of a \$9.1 million training project agreement and four new development projects funded by CIDA.²

At a meeting of experts and government representatives on the North Pacific in April 1991, Joe Clark reiterated the need for new methods of consultation and cooperation in the Pacific and carefully pressed his 1990 proposals.

When I turn to the North Pacific, I cannot help but feel concern at the tenuous threads of communication and the sporadic nature of dialogue among the countries of the area. My concern deepens when I view these weaknesses in the light of the very significant challenges to security and stability we in the North Pacific face.³

In speaking of ways to address potential causes of insecurity, Mr. Clark suggested that security must be broadly defined and therefore efforts to develop mechanisms for common security must be multi-dimensional. In outlining the Canadian concept, he emphasized that what he was proposing did not seek to replace existing mechanisms, to interfere in bilateral issues or to superimpose institutions which had worked in other contexts (such as the CSCE). Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's strong support for economic institutions such as APEC, PECC, and the PBEC and said that Canada was seeking to encourage the development of "the habit of dialogue."⁴

We see a co-operative security dialogue as a regional or sub-regional multilateral exercise that brings together a relatively small number of countries that share geography and have common interests. We have focused our initiative on the North Pacific with this in mind... There is no intention on our part to force bilateral problems or arrangements onto multilateral agendas or to prescribe for specific problems some multilateral formula or forum. My contention is, though, that some

²Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Ministers Announce New Development Assistance Agreement with ASEAN," *News Release*, no. 225, 5 October 1990.

³Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Colloquium on North Pacific Co-operative Dialogue in Victoria, British Columbia," *Statement*, no. 91/17, 6 April 1991: 2.

⁴*Ibid.*: 4.

level of co-operation and dialogue at the multilateral level can help create an atmosphere in which bilateral issues can be more readily, but still bilaterally, resolved.⁵

This government interest has contributed towards stimulating and underwriting a scholars' dialogue on these issues to be carried out over a two-year period, with active participation by specialists from across Canada, all the North Pacific countries, and some others.

In the course of Prime Minister Mulroney's official visits to Hong Kong and Japan in May 1991, a range of issues of Pacific cooperation and security were raised and it is expected that these issues will also be part of the agenda of the blue-ribbon Canada-Japan Forum 2000 established by the two prime ministers to study the bilateral relationship and report in 1992.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on the Government's North Pacific dialogue initiative. However, MP Warren Allmand and MP Maurice Tremblay both called the attention of the House of Commons to the problems faced by Tibet.⁶

⁵Ibid.: 5, 8.

⁶*Commons Debates*. 12 March 1991: 18344. *Commons Debates*. 14 March 1991: 18456.

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36. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

BACKGROUND

The Organization of American States (OAS) was formed in 1948 at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota, Colombia. The OAS was preceded by the International Bureau of American Republics or the Pan American Union, which was established in 1890. The organization's charter provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes, common action against aggression, the promotion of representative democracy, economic, social and cultural development and calls for efforts to limit the spread of conventional weapons in the region. The Charter also prohibits direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of any state and prohibits the use of economic or political coercive measures by any state. At present, there are thirty-four member states of the OAS.

The OAS structure includes a number of administrative bodies. The Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs meets to discuss matters of urgency, usually relating to conflict or potential conflict. The OAS General Assembly meets annually and when it is not in session, the Permanent Council operates. In addition, there is an Inter-American Economic and Social Council, a Council for Education, Science and Technology and an Inter-American Judicial Committee. There is also an Inter-American Court of Human Rights and an Inter-American Defence Board.

In spite of the wide-ranging provisions in the OAS Charter, over time the organization has not lived up to its potential. It has been criticized for being a forum for US hegemony, or for military dictatorships or both. When it appears that US interests in the region cannot be served by the OAS, the US has chosen to act unilaterally. In recent years, the OAS has been unable to deal effectively with important problems such as the conflict in Central America, and the dispute settlement provisions have had little use. The establishment of the Contadora Group of five Central American states which eventually devised a regional solution to the Central American conflict is evidence of this.

However, moves towards democracy in some countries and the positive changes in the Central American situation have generated some hopes of changes in regional cooperation. There has also been a movement among member states to modify the organization to make it more responsive and useful through reform of the Charter.

Canada officially joined the OAS in January 1990, finally moving from observer status to membership. Canada is one of the last states in the Americas to join the OAS. In the post-World War II period, Canadian foreign relations were effectively concentrated on European relations and

the East-West nature of the international area. However, in the last two decades, Canadian interest in its own hemisphere has increased substantially. In announcing Canada's decision to join the OAS, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney noted that Canadian interests were directly engaged in the Americas and that Canada would no longer "stand apart."¹

In February 1990, Canada put forward a number of proposals for changes at the OAS. These included the creation of a Secretariat, regular summit meetings of Heads of Government, expanding links between parliaments, creating a Unit for Democratic Development, creating a unit to conduct impartial investigations of electoral or judicial irregularities, and a Commission for Sustainable Development. Canada also announced that it would seek to bring Cuba back into the hemispheric family.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada's proposal for a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy was adopted unanimously by the OAS General Assembly in June 1990. On 27 March 1991, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark issued a report on Canada's first year in the OAS. The report pointed to the agreement on the Unit as an important achievement for Canada. It also noted that Canada had been elected to the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, had joined the Inter-American Commission on Women and had created the Canada-Latin America Forum which would address mutual interests.²

Joe Clark's successor, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall attended Canada's second OAS General Assembly meeting in June 1991 in Santiago, Chile. In announcing her plans to attend the meeting Barbara McDougall stated:

Canada places great importance on our relations with our OAS partners. Membership in the OAS is a key element of the Canadian Strategy for Latin America. We come to this Assembly strongly committed to working together on issues of common concern.³

¹Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, San Jose, Costa Rica," 27 October 1989: 5.

²Department of External Affairs. "Clark Reports on Canada's First Year in the OAS," *News Release*, no. 79, 27 March 1991.

³Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Attends 22nd General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Chile," *News Release*, no. 126, 28 May 1991.

In her speech to the General Assembly, Mrs. McDougall reiterated Canada's commitment to the OAS.

In joining the OAS we share a commitment to strengthening and consolidating democracy and human rights. We seek a more secure and peaceful hemisphere without the threat of conflict. We are working toward a hemisphere that is at home with its environment and freed from the scourge of drugs.⁴

Mrs. McDougall spoke of the tremendous change occurring throughout the world and noted that it was essential for the OAS to use the opportunity to consolidate democracy in the region, saying that Canada would do whatever was necessary to assist in getting the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy established as soon as possible.

On the question of regional security, Mrs. McDougall proposed that the General Assembly adopt a resolution condemning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms and establish a working group to study regional proliferation.

In response to the Canadian proposal, the OAS initiated a discussion of problems relating to arms proliferation and the final communique of the Assembly recognized the need to limit regional arms proliferation. Mrs. McDougall said that:

In addressing this problem, OAS Foreign Ministers are sending an important political signal to all regions of the world about our commitment to contributing to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era.⁵

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no comment on the OAS in the House of Commons this year. However, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) held hearings on the situations in El Salvador and Guatemala. At the hearings, Liberal member Jesse Flis asked non-governmental organization representatives about Canada's role in the OAS, noting that progress on human rights issues seemed to progress faster at the CSCE than at the OAS.

⁴Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Meeting of the OAS General Assembly," 91/7, 3 June 1991: 2.

⁵Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Says OAS Stronger at Dealing with Key Issues," *News Release*, no. 134, 4 June 1991.

Is there anything we can learn from the CSCE process that might help speed up correcting some of these violations and bringing the countries to task a little earlier? Is there anything we have tried through OAS?... Is there anything through OAS that you can say has improved for El Salvador and Guatemala because of our membership?⁶

⁶Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 73, 19 November 1990: 21.

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BACKGROUND

In the last several years, there has been a variety of proposals aimed at strengthening the structure and processes of the United Nations. Some have come from the Secretary-General. For example, in his 1986 Annual Report, Perez de Cuellar suggested that a war-risk reduction centre be established under the auspices of the United Nations to provide early warning of potential conflict situations. In September 1988, the Soviet Union put forward a series of reforms aimed at enhancing the role of the United Nations in collective security, including proposals to hold periodic meetings of the Security Council at the foreign minister level, and giving greater support to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The Soviet Union has also called for the revival of the Military Staff Committee and suggested that it assist the Council in the strategic direction of peacekeeping operations. In his 1989 Annual Report, the Secretary-General proposed regular, high-level meetings of the Security Council to review situations of potential and actual conflict.

The resurgence of peacekeeping operations and the expectation that the United Nations will be required to conduct more operations, including ones relating to intra-, as well as inter-state conflict, have focussed attention on the need to strengthen peacekeeping procedures, as well as the capabilities of the Office of the Secretary-General. In turn, the renewed interest in peacekeeping has led experienced diplomats and commentators into a discussion of the broader activities of the United Nations and its potential as the central organization in an international system of cooperation. Such discussions have tended to emphasize the many areas of responsibility of the United Nations, which range widely from early warning of potential conflicts, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking to the promotion and codification of human rights, and development cooperation. This range of activities has led to calls for greater coordination of UN activities, and to suggestions that the United Nations is uniquely placed to provide leadership in building a system which former Canadian Secretary of State Joe Clark has called "cooperative security."

This discussion, which has centred on the potential of the United Nations to lead and coordinate multilateral approaches to international issues, has occurred in a year when negotiations have begun to seek agreement on the next Secretary-General. Attention has also been directed, therefore, to the human resources and requirements of the United Nations. Two distinguished former UN civil servants, Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, have proposed a fundamental reform of the Office of the Secretary-General. They advocate the appointment of several deputy Secretaries-General with functional responsibilities for peace and security, economic and social issues, and administration and management. The streamlined senior echelon would be joined by the heads of the key UN

agencies to form an "international cabinet for an energetic, coordinated approach to global problems."¹ The position of Secretary-General would be filled on the basis of extensive search procedures designed to replace the existing parochial approach to choosing the Secretary-General. While it is evident that no such process will be in place for the selection of the next Secretary-General, these proposals have drawn attention to the importance of the position of Secretary-General, and to the critical decision to be made in autumn 1991 in choosing a replacement for Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Most Canadian statements have focussed on peacekeeping. Canada has responded positively and enthusiastically to the progress made in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark commented:

Canada believes that more can be done to ensure that the UN's unique capacity to provide peacekeeping forces for regional conflicts remains effective and efficient. I am pleased that Canada was able to help breathe new life into the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which has now provided the UN with new proposals to improve present peacekeeping activities and to plan for new ventures. However, more work and even greater commitment will be needed to ensure that the UN is provided with the capacity and the resources to mount varied, speedy and successful peacekeeping operations...

In particular, Canada would support a United Nations effort to secure a clearer indication from all member countries of the forces and equipment they could make available in future UN peacekeeping operations. We believe that effort could include an inventory of civilian resources. This might include police forces, communications and logistic personnel and election experts and observers which could be used not only to keep the peace but to prepare for peace.²

In its recommendations to the General Assembly in December 1990, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations proposed to concentrate its future work on a short list of items aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. It also invited member states to provide further observations on its recommendations and future work. Canada responded to this invitation on 15 April 1991, endorsing the approach of the Special Committee and encouraging the Secretariat

¹Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers. *A World Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations*. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1990: 40.

²Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Speech to the 45th Session of the General Assembly," [hereafter Speech to the General Assembly] *Statement*, 90/55, 26 September 1990.

to continue its efforts towards rationalizing the procedures of peacekeeping operations.³ The Canadian response emphasized the importance of the move towards the better management of peacekeeping operations. In this respect it noted, *inter alia*, the work of the Secretary-General towards development of a model agreement between the UN and member states contributing personnel to peacekeeping forces, the importance of the forthcoming reports on the Namibia operation (UNTAG), and the factual report of the Secretariat describing the responsibilities, functions and structures of the various elements within the Secretariat dealing with peacekeeping operations.

This emphasis on consolidating practical approaches to the question of streamlining and rationalizing the Secretariat management of peacekeeping operations was also reflected in Canadian responses on financing peacekeeping operations. In this regard, the specific focus of Canadian diplomatic activity was the financing of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Throughout its tenure on the Security Council, Canada sought an agreement to change the financing of UNFICYP, which is based on the troop contributing countries paying for their own forces while the United Nations costs, which constitute about 30 percent of the annual UNFICYP costs of around \$100 million, are paid on the basis of voluntary assessments. On 14 December 1990, Canada sought a vote in the Security Council on a resolution to place the UN portion of UNFICYP costs on the basis of a mandatory assessment paid by all member states, and therefore in line with the standard practice in other peacekeeping missions. For different reasons, the Soviet Union, the United States and France were critical of this resolution, which was supported by all the troop-contributing states. Canada agreed to a delay in the vote for one week in order to allow further consultations.

On 21 December 1990, still faced with resistance from permanent members of the Council, the Canadian delegation agreed to a further amendment to the resolution. Ambassador Yves Fortier commented:

...we have continued our efforts to convince certain permanent members of this Council -- members that have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security -- that the time has come to solve the financial crisis of UNFICYP. We have attempted to convince these members that they, as well as other States Members of the United Nations...were duty-bound to shoulder their fair share of the financing burden.

Regrettably, we were not successful, and the spectre of a veto was hanging over the Council Chamber. In these circumstances, and with a view to advancing the interests of all the peacekeeping States, we amended our draft resolution still further (S/21988/Rev.1) so that the Security Council would undertake to examine alternative means of financing UNFICYP in the next six months, but with the understanding that

³Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. "Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, Addendum to the Report of the Secretary General." A/AC.121/38/Add.1, 26 April 1991.

if no alternatives to assessed contributions could be found in that time the Council would agree to finance UNFICYP using assessed contributions from 15 June 1991.⁴

Since Canada left the Council some ten days after this outcome, it was not in a position to directly press for a further resolution in June 1991. The "understanding" of 21 December, however, did not hold. On 14 June 1991, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consult those involved and report back by 1 October, at which time the Council would decide how to place UNFICYP on a sound financial basis. In the meantime, for the six-month period ending 15 June 1991, voluntary assessments yielded only US \$3.2 million against a budget of US \$15.4 million, bringing the total UNFICYP arrears to over US \$178 million.

In its response of 15 April 1991 to the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Canada proposed continuing discussions on the standardization of financial agreements between the UN and member states, as well as the development of the Working Capital Fund. Indirectly, it also renewed its criticism of those states which have failed to pay their assessed share of peacekeeping costs. Noting that "Canada's position on the question of funding peacekeeping operations is well known," the response continued:

The recent increase in the scale and number of peacekeeping operations has highlighted the need for adequate financial reserves to cover start-up costs. Thought should be given to practical means for increasing the Working Capital Fund without placing an unfair and inequitable burden on those Member States which traditionally pay their assessed contributions in full and on time...⁵

While the greater part of the Canadian response to the recommendations of the Special Committee focussed on practical ways to improve peacekeeping operations, certain proposals also looked ahead to broader questions. Specifically, the response also emphasized the value of informal consultations amongst states contributing to peacekeeping operations, and suggested a partial agenda for such informal discussions:

For our part, we would like to see discussion on, for example: the current situation regarding status of forces agreements between missions and host States; creation of a register of national, regional and international seminars, symposia, etc., related to peacekeeping; creation of a register of national and regional training programmes; and possible use of that informal forum for the conduct of briefings on current and potential operations.⁶

⁴S/PV.2971, 21 December 1990.

⁵A/AC.121/38/Add.1: 3.

⁶Ibid.: 5.

On the broader issue of expanding the scope of peacekeeping, the Canadian response commented:

The time has come to have a full and open discussion on the possible expansion of traditional, "after the fact" peacekeeping to a more proactive role in the prevention of conflict. Recent world developments have demonstrated possible scenarios where prior deployment of peacekeeping elements may have prevented the outbreak of conflict. Some thinking has been done in this area already ranging from the dispatch of a good offices mission of the Secretary-General through to full-scale deployment of armed troops. The Special Committee should continue to exchange views on this question.⁷

Although the Canadian Government did not express specific views on proposals such as those aimed at reforming the Secretariat or revitalizing the Military Staff Committee, in various statements the potential to expand the role of the United Nations was noted and supported. In a speech to the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, for example, Joe Clark commented: "Peacekeeping in the future must anticipate as well as react. It must deal with the causes of conflict and not just their symptoms. It must build peace and not simply keep it."⁸

On the point that the United Nations might play an expanded role in promoting a stable social order, in his September speech to the General Assembly Clark also pointed to Canada's efforts to promote democratic institutions and practices through the CSCE, the OAS and the Commonwealth. He continued:

Canada believes that there is a further role for this Organization [the United Nations] in encouraging democratic development. Through supporting the co-operation of the various regional organizations in exchanging information and improving co-ordination, and through encouraging member states in their many recent efforts to strengthen democracy, this Assembly can act as a catalyst in reinforcing both democracy and security.⁹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Most Parliamentary comment focussed on specific peacekeeping operations and is noted accordingly. On the broader questions of the United Nations role, on 21 and 22 May 1991, Parliamentarians for Global Action sponsored a meeting in Ottawa to develop a new approach to peacekeeping. The Canadian Chairman of the group, Warren Allmand, commented in Parliament:

⁷Ibid.: 4.

⁸Department of External Affairs. "Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy," *Statement*, 90/65, 8 November 1990.

⁹Speech to the General Assembly.

During the recent Iraq-Kuwait war there was much talk about a new world order. The war also taught us that the existing approach to peacekeeping was no longer adequate. It is mostly ad hoc, reactive, slow and underfinanced. In the case of the Iraq war, the force was overwhelmingly American and not under UN command.

What is needed is an early warning process that will provide for preventive peacekeeping. Under such a process there would be standing UN peacekeeping forces stationed in the different regions of the world which would be sent to trouble spots to deter and repel aggression such as that of Iraq against Kuwait.¹⁰

¹⁰Commons Debates. 22 May 1991: 3.

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SECTION V -- FACTS AND FIGURES

1. CANADA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The following provides a summary of the resolutions on arms control, disarmament and international security at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that were voted on during the 45th Session of the Assembly. Many of the titles of the resolutions provide some indication of their nature. One or two sentences explaining, in more detail, the contents of resolutions which were opposed by Canada or where Canada registered an abstaining vote are provided. For more detail on given issue areas, see the appropriate chapter in *The Guide*.

Four draft decisions were adopted by the First Committee. All the decisions were supported by Canada. They are:

International arms transfers
 Naval armaments and disarmament
 Conventional disarmament on a regional scale
 Information on arms control and disarmament agreements

<i>Resolution # and Lead Sponsor</i>	<i>Resolutions Supported by Canada</i>	<i>Vote (Yes/No/Abstain)</i>
45/8 (Costa Rica)	Tenth Anniversary of the University for Peace	Consensus
45/14 (Mongolia)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of People to Peace	Consensus
45/48 (Mexico)	Implementation of GA Resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco	141-0-3
45/51 (Australia)*	Urgent Need for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	140-2-6
45/52 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
45/53 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia	114-3-28

*Resolutions co-sponsored by Canada.

1. Canada at the General Assembly

45/54 (Bulgaria/ Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective int'l arrangements to assure non- nuclear-weapon states against the threat of use of nuclear weapons	145-0-3
45/55A (Egypt)*	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	149-0-1
45/55B (Argentina)	Confidence-building measures in outer space	149-0-1
45/56A (Sierra Leone)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	145-0-4
45/57A (Poland/ Canada)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57B (Austria)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57C (Australia)*	Chemical and biological weapons: measures to uphold authority of Geneva Protocol	Consensus
45/58A (Yugoslavia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
45/58C (China)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consensus
45/58E (Sweden)	Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons	Consensus
45/58F (Germany)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
45/58G (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58H (UK)*	Bilateral arms negotiations	99-0-50
45/58I (France)*	Confidence- and security- building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
45/58J (Hungary)	Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities	141-1-11
45/58K (Sierra Leone)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	144-0-9

45/58L (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	146-1-6
45/58M (Belgium)*	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
45/58O (USSR)	Defensive security concepts and policies	148-0-5
45/58P (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	142-0-10
45/59A (Nigeria)	UN disarmament fellowship training and advisory services program	Consensus
45/59C (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
45/59E (Brazil)	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
45/61 (Germany)*	Science and technology for disarmament	Consensus
45/62A (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus
45/62B (Indonesia)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
45/62F (Germany)*	Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Consensus
45/64 (Sweden)	Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consensus
45/65 (Canada)	Study on the role of the UN in the field of verification	Consensus
45/66 (Egypt)*	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	Consensus

45/79 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus
45/81 (Poland)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

45/59B (India)	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	125-17-10
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This resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on an international convention which would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Canada was joined by other NATO countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand in voting against. Warsaw Pact members such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, along with Israel and Japan were among the abstainers.

45/59D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	126-14-12
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Resolution 45/59D calls on the US and the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate freeze on their nuclear arms, including a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It also called on all nuclear weapon states to agree, by a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear arms freeze. As well as Canada, other NATO countries, Japan and Israel voted against the resolution.

45/62C (Yugoslavia)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war	132-12-9
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This resolution requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish ad hoc committees on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war to analyze how progress can be made on these two issues. Again, other NATO countries joined Canada in registering negative votes.

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

45/49 (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-17
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This resolution notes that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban as part of the Conference of Disarmament has occurred without a negotiating mandate. The resolution appeals to the Conference on Disarmament to promote the re-establishment of the committee in 1991 with a multilateral negotiating mandate for a nuclear test ban. France, the UK and the US voted against the resolution, Canada was joined by other European countries, China, Israel and Japan in abstaining.

45/50 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning nuclear tests in the Atmosphere, Outer space and under water	116-2-8
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This resolution anticipated the PTBT amendment conference planned for January (see Chapter 9). It recommended that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts towards a comprehensive ban continue under the auspices of the conference until a comprehensive ban is achieved. It also recommended that a working group be established by the Amendment conference to study the organization, institutional mechanisms and legal aspects of a comprehensive ban.

45/56B (Sierra Leone)	Nuclear Capability of South Africa	118-4-27
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This lengthy resolution, *inter alia*, welcomes the Secretary-General's report on South Africa's ballistic missile capability, reaffirms that the acquisition of nuclear capability by South Africa constitutes a grave danger to international peace and security, calls on all states to end military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and demands that South Africa submit its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Association.

45/58B (Yugoslavia) Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations 131-0-22

Resolution 45/58B welcomes progress on strategic arms reduction. It notes that the key to prevention of war is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and calls on the US and the Soviet Union to exert every effort to sign the START treaty by the end of 1990, as part of a larger effort to eliminate nuclear weapons. NATO and other European countries, abstained from the resolution.

45/58N (Sweden) Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment 138-3-12

In this resolution, the Secretary-General is asked to carry out a study of how potential resources allocated to military efforts could be used to protect the environment.

45/60 (India) Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security 133-3-16

Resolution 45/60 requests that the Secretary-General continue to follow this issue, in the wake of a Secretary-General's report on the question.

45/62D (Yugoslavia) Report of the Conference on Disarmament 128-8-16

This resolution, *inter alia*, notes the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and calls on the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen its work, urging it to give negotiating mandates to ad hoc committees on all agenda items.

45/62E (Mexico) Comprehensive programme of disarmament 123-6-22

This recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament be re-established by the CD. A number of European countries also abstained, and six NATO members voted against the resolution.

45/63 (Jordan)

Israeli nuclear armament

98-2-50

This resolution condemns Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa. It also expresses concern about information on Israel's continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and reaffirms that Israel should place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities.

45/77 (Yugoslavia)

Implementation of the
Declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace

128-4-17

This resolution notes successful progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold two preparatory sessions during 1991 to complete preparatory work for a conference on the Indian Ocean planned in 1992. Canada was joined by other NATO countries in abstaining. France, Japan, the UK and the US voted against.

45/80 (Yugoslavia)

Review of the
implementation of the
Declaration on the Strengthening
of International Security

123-1-29

This resolution reaffirms the validity of the Declaration in question. The resolution also reaffirms the responsibility of the UN on dismantling apartheid and reaffirms that democratization of international relations is necessary. Further, the resolution invites states to submit their views on implementing the Declaration.

2. CANADA AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

During Canada's last six months at the Security Council, from 1 August 1990 to 31 December 1990, Security Council debates and resolutions focussed on the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf resolutions are summarized in a separate section (see UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF). Canada voted in favour of all the Persian Gulf resolutions. In this time period, the Security Council also passed the following resolutions:

S/RES/672, 12 October 1990. Re: incidents in Jerusalem on 8 October 1990, condemns violence of the Israeli security forces, requests the Secretary-General to send a mission to the region;

S/RES/673, 24 October 1990. Re: deplores Israeli decision to refuse entry to a Secretary-General mission and asks Israel to reconsider its decision;

S/RES/676, 28 November 1990. Re: extension of Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group for two months;

S/RES/681, 20 December 1990. Re: requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Red Cross, to further develop the idea of a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, requests that the Secretary-General monitor the situation of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation.

Canada voted in favour of all the above resolutions.

3. THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES¹

1. Personnel²

Regular Forces	86,614
Primary Reserve	30,326
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	41,864
Civilian Strength	<u>38,360</u>
	197,164

<i>Command</i> ³	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>Reserves</i>	<i>Civilians</i>	<i>Total</i>
Maritime	10,317	4,212	7,150	21,679
Mobile	18,900	25,750 ⁴	6,500	51,150
Air	19,114	1,472	5,741	26,327
Communications	3,500	2,100	550	6,150
Canadian Forces Europe	8,000	--	4,400	--
Northern	--	--	--	90

¹Sources: Public Affairs, National Defence Headquarters; Department of National Defence. *Defence 90*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991.

²Public Affairs. Department of National Defence, July 1991.

³Not all commands are listed; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

⁴Of which 23,300 are militia, and 2,450 are supplementary Ready Reserve.

3. The Canadian Armed Forces

2. Functional and Regional Commands

<i>Command</i>	<i>Headquarters</i>
Maritime	Halifax, Nova Scotia
Mobile	St. Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

3. Canadian Naval Forces

- 3 Patrol Submarines (Oberon)
- 18 Destroyers
- 3 Operational Support Vessels
- 1 Tanker
- 2 Research Vessels
- 12 Patrol Vessels and Training Ships
- 5 Gate Vessels
- 14 Reserve Tenders
- 14 Tugs
- 70 Auxiliaries and Yard Craft
- 2 Mine Countermeasures Vessels (MCMAs)

4. Canadian Land Forces

(includes major equipment assigned to Mobile Command and Canadian Forces in Europe)

Tanks and armoured vehicles

- 107 Leopard C-1 Tanks
- 157 Lynx Armoured Fighting Vehicles -- Reconnaissance
- 195 Cougar Armoured Fighting Vehicles
- 799 M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers
- 256 Grizzly Armoured Personnel Carriers

Artillery

- 41 Model 44 (L-5) Howitzer (pack 105 mm)
- 163 towed Howitzer (105 mm)
- 74 M-109 Self-Propelled Howitzer (155 mm)

Anti-tank Weapons

- 376 Carl Gustav Recoilless Rifles (84 mm)
- 134 TOW Anti-tank Guided Weapons

Air Defence

- 54 L-40/60 Guns (40 mm)
- 78 Blowpipe Surface-to-air Missiles
- 20 Twin Guns (35 mm)

3. The Canadian Armed Forces

5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe⁵ (includes major equipment assigned to Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe)

Aircraft

- 27 CF-5 Freedom Fighters
- 126 CF-18D F/A-18A/B Hornets
- 16 CC-144 Challengers -- Electronic Countermeasures
- 18 CP-140 Aurora -- Maritime Reconnaissance

Transport Aircraft

- 32 CC-130E/H/MT Hercules
- 5 CC-137 Boeing 707
- 7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan
- 7 CC-138 Twin Otter
- 10 CC-115 Buffalo
- 60 CT-133 Silver Star
- 146 CT-114 Tutor
- 19 CT-134/134 A Musketeer
- 6 CC-142 Dash 8

Helicopters

- 34 CH-124 Sea King -- Anti-Submarine Warfare
- 64 CH-136 Kiowa -- Observation
- 44 CH-135 Twin Huey -- Transport
- 14 CH-113/A Labrador/Voyageur -- Search and Rescue
- 9 CH-118 Iroquois -- Search and Rescue
- 14 CH-139 Bell 206 -- Training

INFORMATION CORRECT AS OF JULY 1991

⁵Includes storage, instructional, and repair.

4. CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
1948 TO PRESENT

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Maximum Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Current Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Total UN Troop Contribution</i>
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1948-	22	79	298
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-1979	27	Yes ¹	102-39
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK) ²	Korea	1950-1954	8,000	-	
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ²	Korea	1953-	2	1	
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-1974	133	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1)	Egypt	1956-1967	1,007	-	6,373-3,378
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-1959	77	-	591-375

¹Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)

²UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*.

4. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo (Zaire)	1960-1964	421	-	19,828
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea	1962-1963	13	-	15,761
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-1964	36	-	189-25
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	575	6,411-2,345
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Dominican Republic	1965-1966	1	-	3
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India/Pakistan border	1965-1966	112	-	96-78
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-1969	2	-	-
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 2)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-1979	1,145	-	6,973-4,031
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973-	278	-	-
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel/Syria (Golan)	1974-	227	227	1,450

INFORMATION CORRECT AS OF JULY 1991

UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this Guide.

4. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Maximum Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Current Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Total UN Troop Contribution</i>
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978-	17	-	7,000-5,773
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Egypt/ Israel	1982-(1986)	140	25	2,700
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Afghanistan/ Pakistan	1988-1990	5	-	50-40
United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Iran/Iraq	1988-	540	-	408-955
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia	1989-1990	301	-	4,650
Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) ³	Pakistan	1989-	14	-	70
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Central America	1989-	173	24	380

³The Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) for the training of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 1989, is a humanitarian relief assistance programme. The Canadian contribution to the MACTP ended in July 1990.

4. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) ⁴	Afghanistan/Pakistan	1990-	1	1	10
United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	Iraq/Kuwait demilitarized zone	1991-	301	301	1,400
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Western Sahara	1991-	740	- ⁵	1,700
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)	Angola	1991-	15	1	600
United Nations Office in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	El Salvador	1991-	1	1	15
United Nations Truce Supervision Commission for Cyprus (UNTSO)	Cyprus	1964-	27	27	27
United Nations Disarmament Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel/Syria	1974-	227	227	227

⁴Following the termination of UNGOMAP's mandate on 15 March 1990, the UN Secretary-General established OSGAP which includes a small Military Planning Unit to assist the Secretary-General's Representative in his efforts to bring about a political settlement. It is, however, not considered a peacekeeping mission by definition.

⁵Canadian troops will begin deployment to Western Sahara in late 1991. Canadian Brig. General Armand Roy was appointed as the commander of the UN operation.

Source: National Defence, Canada.

5. CANADIAN TREATY OBLIGATIONS¹

The Geneva Protocol of 1925

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).
Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

United Nations Charter

Signed: 26 June 1945.
Ratified: 9 November 1945.
Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

North Atlantic Treaty

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.
Ratified: 3 May 1949.
Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.). Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.
Ratified: 28 January 1964.
Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

¹ In the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.
Information Correct effective 23 May 1991.

Source: External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Legal Affairs Bureau, Treaty section.

5. Canadian Treaty Obligations

Outer Space Treaty

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.)

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.) Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.

Ratified: 17 May 1972.

Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

Biological Weapons Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.)

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.

Ratified: 18 September 1972.

Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

ENMOD Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.)

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.

Ratified: 11 June 1981.

Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Entered into force for Canada: 11 June 1981

Inhumane Weapons Convention

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.)

Signed: 10 April 1981.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: 19 January 1990.

Entered into force for Canada: 18 February 1990.

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport.)

Signed: 22 September 1980.

Ratified: 21 March 1986.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

The Antarctic Treaty

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material.)

Done at Washington: 1 December 1959.

Entered into force: 23 June 1961.

Acceded: 4 May 1988.

Entered into force for Canada: 4 May 1988.

Charter of the Organization of American States as amended

Signed: 30 April 1948, Bogota.

Signed by Canada: 13 November 1989.

Ratified: 8 January 1990.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 January 1990.

Exchange of Notes Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning renewal of the Agreement affecting the organization and the operation of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

Exchange of Notes: 30 April 1991.

Entered into Force: 12 May 1991.

5. Canadian Treaty Obligations

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Protocol I with Annexes, Protocol II

Signed: 8 June 1977, Geneva.

Signed by Canada: 8 June 1977 (Protocol I)

12 December 1977 (Protocol II)

Ratified: 20 November 1990.

Entered into Force for Canada: 20 May 1991.

Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe with Protocols

(Provides for reductions in conventional forces in Europe.)

Signed: 19 November 1990, Paris

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Not yet entered into force.

**6. TREATY ON REDUCING CONVENTIONAL FORCES
IN EUROPE: NATO AND WARSAW PACT CURRENT
HOLDINGS AND REQUIRED REDUCTIONS¹**

	<i>CFE Limits</i>	<i>NATO</i>	<i>ex-GDR²</i>	<i>CANADA</i>	<i>WTO³</i>
<i>Tanks</i>	20,000	24,325	2,274	77	31,713
<i>ACVs</i>	30,000	34,230	5,817	277	41,832
<i>Artillery</i>	20,000	20,443	2,140	38	24,754
<i>Aircraft</i>	6,800	5,708	392	45	8,368
<i>Helicopters</i>	2,000	1,719	51	12	1,662

¹Based on final data exchanged by the parties to the Treaty in February 1991. For more information see: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. "Revised Data Summarized," ViennaFAX 2, no. 5, 28 May 1991: 1-5.

²East German equipment holdings are counted as part of NATO holdings. They are included in a separate category here to give some indication of the NATO holdings just prior to the unification of Germany (3 October 1990) and the signing of the CFE Treaty (19 November 1990.)

³The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) no longer exists. However, the states that were formerly allied together under the WTO are treated as a group for the purposes of the reductions required by the CFE Treaty.

7. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT AND THE EMERGENCIES ACT

The National Defence Act

Section 31

The Governor in Council may place the Canadian forces, or any component, ...thereof...on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so

- (a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or
- (b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.

Section 32

If Parliament is not meeting at the time forces are placed on active service:

...a proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parliament within ten days...

Part XI, Aid to the Civil Power

An attorney general of a province may request the aid of the armed forces in instances when:

...a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with...occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered likely to occur.

7. Key Provisions of the National Defence Act and the Emergencies Act

The Emergencies Act, 1988 (replaces the War Measures Act)

3. For the purposes of this Act, a "national emergency" is an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that:
 - (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
 - (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.

8. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

UNITED STATES ¹				
	Launchers	Warheads	Yield ²	Total Warheads
<i>ICBMs</i>				
Minuteman II	450	1	1.200	450
Minuteman III				
MK-12	200	3	0.170	600
MK-12A	300	3	0.335	900
MX	50	10	0.300	500
Total	1,000			2,450
<i>SLBMs</i>				
Poseidon C-3	176	10	0.050	1,760
Trident I C-4	384	8	0.100	3,072
Trident II D-5	48	8	0.475	384
Total	608			5,216
<i>BOMBERS³</i>				
B-1B	90	SRAM	0.170	1,100
B-52G/H	154	ALCM	0.05-0.150	1,600
FB-111A	24	Bombs	0.500	1,600
Total	268			4,300
TOTAL	1,876			11,966
START LIMIT	1,600			6,000⁴

¹Source: R.S. Norris, W. Arkin. "US Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1990," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1, January/February 1991: 48.

²In megatonnes.

³All bombers carry a mix of weapon systems. The B-52 is the only bomber to carry ALCMs.

⁴This limit does not apply directly to the totals. See Chapter 12 for explanation of sub-limits.

8. Strategic Nuclear Balance

SOVIET UNION⁵

	Launchers	Warheads	Yield ⁶	Total Warheads
<i>ICBMs</i>				
SS-11				
M2	100	1	1.100	100
M3	210	3	0.350	210 ⁷
SS-13 M2	30	1	0.750	30
SS-17 M3	50	4	0.750	200
SS-18 M4/5/6	308	10	0.550	3,080
SS-19 M3	250	6	0.550	1,500
SS-24 M1/2	86	10	0.550	860
SS-25	300	1	0.550	300
Total	1,334			6,280
<i>SLBMs</i>				
SS-N-6 M3	176	2 ⁸	1.000	176
SS-N-8 M1/2	286	1	1.500	286
SS-N-17	12	1	1.000	12
SS-N-18 M1/3	224	7	0.500	1,568
SS-N-20	120	10	0.200	1,200
SS-N-23	96	4	0.100	384
Total	914			3,626

⁵Source: R.S. Norris, W. Arkin. "Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1990," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 2, March 1991: 49.

⁶In megatonnes.

⁷The SS-11 M3 carries a multiple re-entry vehicle which is counted as one warhead.

⁸The SS-N-6 carries a multiple re-entry vehicle which is counted as one warhead.

	Launchers	Warheads	Yield ⁹	Total Warheads
BOMBERS				
Tu-142 Bear H	85	8 ALCM/Bombs ¹⁰	0.250 ¹¹	680
Tu-160 Blackjack	21	6 ALCM, 8 SRAM/Bombs		294
Total	106			974
TOTAL	2,354			10,880
START Limit	1,600			6,000¹²

Acronyms

ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
ALCM	Air-launched cruise missile
SRAM	Short-range attack missile

⁹In megatonnes.

¹⁰As in the US case, bombers carry a mix of weapon systems.

¹¹Estimate of total yield.

¹²This limit does not apply directly to the totals. See Chapter 12 for explanation of sub-limits.

9. SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

Resolution 660, 2 August 1990

Determined that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security, condemned the invasion, demanded an unconditional and immediate Iraqi withdrawal to the positions its forces occupied on 1 August and calls on Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations to resolve their differences.

Resolution 661, 6 August 1990

Noting the right of states to self-defence and the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter which outline the Security Council's options for actions, it was determined that Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 660. As a result, mandatory economic sanctions are imposed. States are prohibited from importing goods from Iraq or Kuwait and from exporting goods to the two countries. Medical supplies and foodstuffs for humanitarian purposes are excepted. A Committee to monitor progress and compliance with the sanctions is established.

Resolution 662, 9 August 1990

Demands an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and declares the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null and void, calling on all states to refrain from any recognition of the annexation.

Resolution 664, 18 August 1990

Demands the release of nationals of third countries from Iraq and Kuwait and that Iraq take no further action to jeopardize their safety.

Resolution 665, 25 August 1990

Calls on states cooperating with Kuwait, by deploying maritime forces to the area to monitor the sanctions, to use measures commensurate with the circumstances to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes.

Resolution 666, 13 September 1990

Requests the Secretary-General to seek information about the sources and availability of food in Kuwait and Iraq. If there are circumstances in which there is an urgent need to supply foodstuffs, the Secretary-General should inform the Council. The Secretary-General should also use his good offices to facilitate delivery and distribution of foodstuffs.

Resolution 667, 16 September 1990

Strongly condemns Iraqi acts against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait and the abduction of foreign nationals from diplomatic premises and demands the immediate release of all foreign nationals.

Resolution 669, 24 September 1990

Entrusts the Committee established to monitor sanctions with the task of examining requests from states for assistance because of hardships experienced due to the sanctions.

9. Summary of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions on the Persian Gulf

Resolution 670, 25 September 1990

Establishes regulations relating to aircraft leaving or entering Kuwait or Iraq. States are required to deny permission to aircraft taking off from their territory if the aircraft is carrying cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait. Such aircraft must also be denied permission to overfly state territory unless the aircraft lands at a designated airfield to be inspected. The sanctions committee is to be notified of flights carrying food and medical supplies. States are also asked to detain any ships of Iraqi registry that have been used in violation of Resolution 661 which enter their ports, or deny them entrance to their ports, except in an emergency.

Resolution 674, 29 October 1990

Part A of the resolution demands that Iraq stop taking third-state nationals hostage and stop mistreating Kuwaiti nationals. The resolution reminds Iraq of its obligations under international law in this regard and demands that Iraq facilitate the immediate departure of third-state nationals and provide the nationals and Kuwaiti nationals access to food, water and basic services. Part B of the resolution reposes the Security Council's trust in the Secretary-General to use his good offices to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Resolution 677, 28 November 1990

Condemns Iraqi efforts to alter the demographic composition of Kuwait and its destruction of Kuwaiti civil records. The resolution mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of an official Kuwaiti register of the population and to establish rules of access for the register.

Resolution 678, 29 November 1990

Authorizes states cooperating with Kuwait to use all necessary means to implement Resolution 660 and subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security, if Iraq fails to comply with the resolutions by 15 January 1991. States are required to provide support for actions undertaken and to keep the Security Council regularly informed.

Resolution 687, 3 April 1991

In this resolution the Security Council, *inter alia*:

- decides that upon agreement by Iraq to the provisions of the resolution, an official ceasefire is in effect;
- guarantees the inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait;
- requests that the Secretary-General submit a plan for the deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor the demilitarized zone along the border;
- decides that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction and removal of all its chemical and biological weapons and agents and related components, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, under international supervision;
- creates a special commission to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's chemical, biological and missile capabilities, Iraq will yield all such material to the special commission;

- demands that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable material, or any subsystems or components relating to nuclear weapons;
- demands that Iraq will submit, within fifteen days, a declaration of all chemical, biological, missile sites, as well as the locations, amounts and types of items relating to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable material;
- decides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities;
- decides that sanctions regarding sales and financial transactions relating to foodstuffs and materials for essential civilian needs no longer apply, pending notification to the sanctions committee or their approval.

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