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THE CANADIAN METHODIST REVIEW.

A BI-MONTHLY DEVOTED TO
Theology, Philosophy, Sociology, Bible Study, and
Christian Work.

Published under the Auspices of the Theological Unions.

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VOLUME VI.

JANUARY TO DECEMBER, 1894.

Subscription Price, \$1.00 Per Annum: Single Numbers, 25 cents.

FOR SALE AT

THE METHODIST BOOK ROOMS,
TORONTO, MONTREAL AND HALIFAX.

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
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THE CANADIAN Methodist Review.

[NEW SERIES.]

VOL. VI.] JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1894. [No. 1.

PRAYER AND THE LAWS OF NATURE.

THE whole question as to the possibility of prayer resolves itself into the one, of the existence of a Personal God. By a Personal God we mean a Supreme Power, possessing self-consciousness and absolute freedom of will. If you merge God into nature and think of Him as not the eternal and extraneous cause, but simply the essence of things; if you regard that great aggregate of facts and forces which we call the Universe as only another term for Deity, and in your thought fail to enthrone a personality above and behind the powers and phenomena of matter, then certainly to you the very idea of prayer is an absurdity. Prayer and pantheism, or materialism, are mutually exclusive the one of the other. If there is no personal Will behind all material phenomena, moving and directing all things in accordance with intelligent though established methods, then prayer has at least no objective reality, and becomes a mere vocal drill or spiritual gymnasium. But admit the reality of a Personal God, who is knowable by and accessible to man, and you thereby establish the possibility of prayer.

W. Gladden says, "that even agnostics adore that Unknown Cause of all things whose existence they only dimly guess."

This statement has been taken exception to by one who is himself an avowed agnostic, and who as such denies anything

like a positive belief either in prayer or the personality of a First Cause. And, indeed, we fail to see how Divine adoration and agnosticism can go together. Positivism may, indeed, practise a species of worship; that is, as one has expressed it, "worship humanity in the abstract in order to serve it in the concrete." To this end she may very ingeniously invent a cult exclusively her own; still everyone must feel that positivism and prayer are not joined together by God, neither is their matrimony lawful. Positivism has no Personal God, for it has only to do with phenomena. An unknowable God is one inaccessible to our thought, and as such cannot be the object of intelligent praise or prayer. And yet it was, doubtless, the philosophy of such men as Kant, Hamilton and Mansel which opened the door for this form of modern unbelief. While these teachers avowed their belief in God, they taught that He never could be the object of our knowledge. According to them, finite knowledge of an infinite Being is impossible. We cannot think in an infinite way, and therefore we cannot think of an infinite Being. For us to think, is to limit and condition that which we think, therefore the infinite and the unconditioned by us can never be thought. The knowing faculty must be commensurate with the object known, but in this case there can be no such relation between the mind said to know and the object that is said to be known; therefore, the highest and last consecration of all true religion must be an altar erected to the worship of the unknown God. Such a belief renders intelligent and efficacious prayer impossible.

But what do such teachers mean when they assert that the infinite is unknowable? Do they mean that the infinite is inaccessible to human thought? If they mean by the term unknowable the incomprehensible, then we agree with them. But if they mean, as they evidently do, that the infinite is inconceivable, then we cannot accept their dictum. To say that we have no faculty to comprehend the infinite, is true; but to assert that the mind has no power to apprehend the infinite, is false. We are told we cannot form any idea of the infinite, because we cannot form an infinite idea. But just here observe that their very use of the term "infinite"

involves their own refutation. When the agnostic speaks of the infinite, does he mean nothing? Is there absolutely no idea in his mind corresponding to the word upon his lips? If so, then certainly language with him is not always the instrument and vehicle of thought. The very presence of that term in our language proves the presence of its corresponding thought in our mind. And as Butler has said, "it is impossible even in imagination to eradicate that idea from the mind." Yes, the idea of the infinite is already in the universal mind, and answering to this universal idea there must be an objective reality.

But we are told that the existence of a Personal God, and, therefore, the possibility of prayer, are insusceptible of demonstration. A certain high authority, in one of our leading periodicals, has recently stated, "that the doctrine of prayer rests upon a mere hypothetical basis and must break down beneath the tests of modern methods." We contend, however, that this scientist asks us to take far more for granted in accepting his teachings on science than the Christian has in accepting the teachings of the Bible in the matter of prayer. We challenge anyone to name a doctrine or discovery of modern science which does not ultimately rest upon a mere hypothesis. All modern doctrines regarding such familiar phenomena as heat, light, sound, etc., rest upon a mere theoretical basis. Are we not told that all such at bottom are nothing but molecular vibration? But how does any scientist know that there is such a thing as a molecule? Whoever saw a molecule? We have no sense organ and no apparatus by which any sense we have can be enabled to perceive the presence anywhere of a molecule. Every chemist has to receive the existence of such a thing only as a grand hypothesis; for it admits of no ocular or sensible demonstration whatever. Thus we see that the chemist, as well as the Christian, has to take something for granted.

We believe, however, that even in the lowest realm of theistic evidence, the personality of God, and, therefore, the possibility of prayer, carries with it as much evidence, to say the least, as the Copernican theory of the solar system or Dalton's theory of

atoms. Let me here submit only one line of theistic argument in as brief a space as possible.

All readers of this paper will readily admit that there are in existence only two substances or entities of which all else are but phenomena. These are mind and matter. Dr. McCosh has shown conclusively that we know both one and the other, as having real existence, permanence and power. Now, if we recognize the principle of causation, as we must, seeing it is so deeply embedded in the mental constitution, we must admit either that mind is the antecedent cause of matter, or matter is the antecedent cause of mind. I know that a J. S. Mill would say that it is as reasonable to suppose that matter, as it now exists, is eternal, as to say that mind is eternal. But we venture the assertion that no position could be more illogical or untenable. Our position is that the greater alone can account for the lesser; the lesser can never account for the greater. Therefore mind must be the antecedent cause of matter, and not matter the antecedent cause of mind.

Even infidelity admits that the unknown cause of all things must be eternal. If so, matter cannot be the cause of all things, for evolution shows that it has not been eternally what it is. It is subject to the laws of change, and in its ultimate constitution it is said to have the property of derivation, which, of course, is inconsistent with the idea of eternity.

Again, infidelity teaches that the cause of all things must be infinite and absolute; then matter cannot be the cause of all things, for being measurable, it is finite; and, being subject to the law of change, it has but a relative existence. Again, we are told that the cause of all things must be self-existent; but matter has the elements of passivity and dependence, which are opposed to self-existence. It cannot, therefore, be the cause of all things. Again, the cause of all things, it is admitted, must possess attributes superior to the things evolved or made, for the effect can contain nothing greater than the cause; but if this be so, matter never evolved mind, for mind has attributes infinitely superior to those of matter. So that logically we are shut up to the conclusion that mind must have preceded matter; that a supreme mind must be the cause of matter; that it must

be eternal, self-existent, infinite, absolute, and, in short, clothed with all those attributes which inhere in the Christian conception of Deity.

If there is then a God who is personal, and there must be, for how could impersonal force confer on me personality; if there is a God who is self-conscious, and there must be, for how could unconscious matter evolve conscious mind; if there is a God who is free in an infinite way as man is in a finite way, and there must be, for how could we derive this attribute from any cause utterly destitute of the same; I say, if there is such a God, then we have all we now contend for, the absolute possibility of the Bible doctrine of prayer.

Has prayer a place in the constitution of nature? Has the Creator made provision for it in the outward mechanism of things? We have a strong presumption in favor of this conclusion, in the fact that prayer has its basis in the constitution of man. As we shall see, it must follow, if prayer is a law within, it must have a place or provision in the operation of the laws without. Man is not only of a piece with nature, but he is nature epitomized. Man is a living microcosm; the universe itself culminates and is compressed in him. Man and nature are the counterparts of each other. Every faculty in man is matched by some fact, or class of facts, in nature, and every law in man has its corresponding law in nature.

This statement sweeps the entire gamut of animate and inanimate existence. Wherever there is a subjective want, it is the intention of nature that there shall be an objective supply. So scientifically certain is this law that the very presence of the one may be accepted as proof of the other. The eye may be said to prove the reality of light; the ear, the reality of sound, and the lungs, the reality of an external atmosphere. Every want of the living organism has its corresponding supply in its material environment. Everyone admits that this law of correspondence holds good throughout the whole realm of organic and inorganic nature. If such is the case, does not the law of analogy necessitate the belief that the same thing holds good as regards the entirety of man's being, and that of his material and spiritual environment? If we accept this principle, then

the position is established, that if prayer has its basis in the constitution of man, it must also have its basis in the constitution of nature. If it is a law within, it must be a law without.

A great many of the objections urged against the Christian doctrine of prayer arise from a misconception of its true nature.

Mozley says "that the power of prayer is, in fact, the power of strong wishes. Wishes are prayers if men believe in God, and if their wishes are formed around His presence."

"Prayer is the soul's sincere desire,
Uttered or unexpressed;
The motion of a hidden fire
That trembles in the breast."

Perhaps the best definition of prayer is that which some of us learned at our mother's knee: "Prayer is the offering up of our desires unto God in the name of Christ, for things agreeable to His will." Without desire, heart-felt desire, breathed into the bosom of God, there can be no true prayer.

You have all frequently heard of the proposal that was made some years ago by a leading scientist of England which he called a quantitative test of the efficacy of prayer.

It was proposed to place two different hospitals in different relations to prayer. Let all the patients in both places receive not only impartial, but so far as medical skill goes, identical treatment. Let one half of them, however, be made the special subject of prayer for recovery, and the other half absolutely excluded from the supposed benefits of Christian intercession. After the lapse of a stated period, it will then be found out to what extent any real efficacy can be attributed to prayer.

I have somewhere heard this prayer-gauge test disposed of by the *reductio ad absurdum* argument. It has been shown that in order to have a fair trial all the patients would require to have the same disease, and have it exactly in the same degree. But this would require them to possess the same mental and material characteristics. This again would require them to inherit the same personal qualities, which means that they would have to be all born of the same parents. But

inasmuch as children of the same parents frequently develop different traits and temperaments, all this would still be insufficient. In order to have a fair test they must all have the very same bodies, souls and personalities, in fine, there must be the very same patients in this hospital as are to be found in that, which of course is an absurdity.

But we think that all such prayer-tests are impracticable, not only from the impossibility of procuring the necessary physical conditions, but from the impossibility of procuring the necessary spiritual conditions.

If prayer were a force which operated in accordance with mere mechanical or chemical law, then it might be possible to apply such a test. But prayer, as we have seen, is *desire*, and as such it is primarily a spiritual force. The man who would adopt such a test would have to unchristianize himself in the act. He would have to pray purely on scientific grounds. He would have to divest himself for the time being of everything like positive faith in the efficacy of prayer. As a scientist he would have to pray without any mental prejudice or bias in either direction. This would be prayer committing suicide. Such a man would be a non-believer in the very thing he was about to test. In stripping himself of all positive faith in prayer, he would thereby violate the first condition of all acceptable and efficacious prayer, "for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him."

But suppose that in using such an experiment, the man still retained his faith in prayer, would he not have to unchristianize himself in his sympathies? This is apparent from the very nature of the test, for while he would voluntarily include one class of patients, he would just as voluntarily exclude the other. Suppose him sincere in asking for the recovery of those for whom he prayed, if he wished his test to prevail; while his expressed desire would be that the one party should be restored, there would be a tacit wish on his part that the other should not. He who would dare offer up to God such a prayer, would render it unprincipled, and therefore impossible for God to answer it.

There are two methods, it seems to us, by which God may answer prayer for an external good, without anything like a violent or visible suspension of the ordinary course of nature. In answer to prayer, he may so modify the laws of nature, as to reach us with special help and deliverance, or so modify us as to bring us into such conformity with those laws, that they will become the channels by which will be conveyed to us the blessing which we seek. Let us look for a moment at the former of these two possible methods.

The great objection which is to-day urged against the form of prayer which refers to external things, is that based upon the uniformity of the laws of nature. It is assumed by some that no prayer for external blessing can be answered by God, except by such an interruption of the natural order of things as amounts to nothing less than a miracle. This to the modern mind is the greatest absurdity. This objection, however, we think, proceeds upon a false conception of what are called the laws of nature. Prof. Fisher defines a law of nature as simply God's plan of acting, or the plan the living God ordains. Dr. Lee says "that gravitation, capillarity and chemical affinity are but terms we use to define the operations of mind." Law is not an agent, it is only a mode of action. It is not a power, it is only a process. It is not a force, it is the mode or manner in accordance with which the force operates. A force of nature is simply the energy of God. The force of gravity is the force of God. We must never separate the idea of God from the laws of nature. Law and God are one. Nature's laws are the rhythmic pulse-beats of that life immanent in all things which we call God. In brief a law of nature is simply the uniform method of the Divine action in the realm of matter. We believe in a God, who not only transcends all things, but who is immanent in all things. This being the case, it is possible for God to act in a natural way, in and through the great organism of nature. Our position is that it is possible for God to answer prayer, even for material things and providential favors of a special character, not against but in accordance with the laws of matter, without anything like a suspension of the same. We think God can answer such a prayer, not by contravening the laws of nature but simply by controlling them.

Those who take the ground that God cannot so modify nature as to produce the most extraordinary effects in answer to prayer without contravening the laws of matter, withhold from the Almighty a power which they themselves exercise on a finite plane every day. You say God cannot thus sway the forces of matter without miracle, then you make Him less than the infant of days. Every child in its mother's arms can and does modify the forces of matter within its reach. Every time it shakes its tiny rattle, it defies and controls that awful force which swings every satellite, steadies every sun and holds together with its invisible bands the great fabric of things.

You and I can so control and combine the forces of nature as to produce an effect, which is supernatural in the sense that nature alone could never produce it. This may be done, and is done, without suspending any law of matter.

The other day I saw a rose which seemed to have reached the very perfection of itself, but nature alone never produced that rose; I saw as much of the florist in it as I did of nature. The florist is not almighty, and yet he can so control the laws and forces of matter as to produce an effect which supersedes any effort of mere nature. In this low sense man is performing miracles every day, that is, if you accept the mere philosophical definition of a miracle, namely, the control and subordination of a lower by a higher force. The telegraph operator in transmitting his message around the globe performs such a miracle, not by suspending any law of nature, but simply by using the forces at his command. And in proportion as our knowledge of nature increases, so will our power to control her forces increase, until we are able to do the greater miracles to which Christ, according to some theologians, referred when He said to His disciples, "Greater miracles than these shall ye do."

It is the belief of some that the miracles of our Lord were primarily miracles of knowledge, rather than of power. He performed His miracles in virtue of His more intimate acquaintance with the interior properties of matter, and the occult forces of nature. He brought the sick and the dying into touch with certain curative agencies, which are to be found latent or active in certain realms of material nature. Hence

the astonishing cures which He effected. Of course we cannot endorse this view, but we think it contains the fraction of a truth. There is no doubt that when our knowledge of the wonderful powers and properties resident in matter is perfect, we will be able to do that which, looked at from our present plane, we would regard as miraculous in the highest sense. Now if it is possible for man so to modify the action of natural laws as to change the procession of material phenomena and produce entirely new results without the suspension of any natural force: I say, if it is possible for man to do this, in a limited way, is it not possible for God to do the same thing in a larger way? As Mark Hopkins has said, "The Universal Father can surely change phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men without a miracle, quite as easily as man can." How He may do this we may not be able to determine, but we may be sure that a *Personal* God has not so imprisoned himself within the mechanism of the material universe, that He cannot reach His children in the hour of their perplexity and need. We may be sure that such a Being possessing such powers, and related to us by such tender ties, has left open certain secret avenues amid the play and interplay of mechanical forces and laws, by which He has access to us at all times. And as Isaac Taylor says, "This is indeed the great miracle of nature and Providence, that no miracles are required to accomplish God's purposes."

A great many of our difficulties in regard to prayer and its answer objectively considered, will be removed when we have arrived at a true idea of the relation in which God stands to material nature. Those relations are not, we think, what many suppose. God is not to the material fabric what the architect is to the building which he planned, or what the machinist is to the machine which he constructed, or what the watchmaker is to the watch which he made. We believe that God stands related to material nature in a more intimate and vital sense. With the sage of Chelsea, we do not believe in an "absentee God, sitting idle ever since the first Sabbath at the outside of His universe and seeing it go."

The universe is not a mass of inert matter, not infinitized mud nor a dead machine; it is something like a living organism

—an organism which enshrines an Infinite Spirit who is the animating and actuating soul of all things. God lives in and acts through all material nature, in some such way as my soul lives in and acts through all my material organism.

Carpenter says: "I deem it just as absurd and illogical to affirm that there is no place for a God in nature, originating and controlling its forces by His will, as it would be to assert that there is no place in man's body for his conscious mind."

When we look upon God as immanent in all things, we can then understand that it is not necessary for Him to break through the external harmony of the universe to answer prayer, because its laws are only, as we have seen, the uniform methods by which He works in and through it all. I have said that man himself is a little self-conscious universe, and if in this little universe which you call man, the soul can, in and through its physical organs, put forth volitions which change the current of external phenomena in accordance with both the laws of matter and mind, why should not God, who acts upon matter from within as the soul does through the body, be able to do the same thing, and that in accordance with His own nature as well as that of the material universe?¹ If man can so employ nature as to supersede nature without suspending her laws, surely God who is both in and above nature can do the same thing.

Of course, in holding to the doctrine of the Divine immanence, we would not be understood as in any way endorsing the teachings of Pantheism. Though the relations of God to nature are as vital as those of the soul to the body which it animates, yet the latter is not a perfect analogue of the former. The body contains all of the soul. Nature does not contain all of God. God preceded nature in a more absolute and causal sense than life precedes the organism, or the soul the body. Alongside of this doctrine of a God in all things, we place its correlative doctrine of a Personal God above all things. We believe in a God who is over all as well as through all and in all. As Le Comte puts it, we are compelled to acknowledge an infinite and immanent Deity behind phenomena, but manifested to us on the outside as an all persuasive energy.

1. See Fairbairn on "Science and Religion."

Such a view of prayer as we have now advanced in regard to external law is in keeping with every dictate of reason and doctrine of revelation.

Schleiermacher's doctrine that prayer brings about its own answer by operating in an unknown way, in the realms of mind and matter as a new cause among causes, is, to say the least, too mystical and misleading to help us in solving the difficulties our subject suggests. The same thing may be said of the speculations of Chalmers when he says "that there may be a subtle tie of connection between the prayer and its answer in the domain of second causes." Such views destroy the true nature of prayer by reducing it to a mere mechanical agency or mystical force, operating in accordance with mere mechanical law.

And how very silly and suicidal is that theory which declares that the only benefit of prayer is that which is realized in its reaction upon the soul that prays. Certainly there is a reflex benefit in prayer, which has to be included in an exhaustive inventory of its benefits, but this surely is not all that prayer means to us. Those who advocate this theory as one which includes all that prayer is intended to do for us, very often work into it elements which do not properly belong thereto. They tell us that every good desire cherished may become the prophecy of its own fulfilment. Man in the moral sphere may become whatever he desires. Thus prayer by its own inherent property involves its answer.

Now, we believe that God is so immanent in human nature—that man is so permeated and environed with Divine influences that morally he may become whatever he desires to be. In fact, he is for the time being whatever his supreme desire makes him.

"The thing we long for that we are,
For one transcendent moment,
Before the Present, poor and bare,
Can make its sneering comment."

Yet this is true only so far as this desire is born of God and opens the soul to the Divine influence and action. Hence the poet from whom we have quoted goes on to finish his thought thus:

“To let the new life in, we know,
Desire must ope the portal,
Perhaps the longing to be so,
Helps make the soul immortal.”

But this is something more than the reflex power of prayer. In fact, no one can offer a sincere prayer on the sheer strength of this theory. The reflex benefit of prayer is itself possible, only as such a prayer is the product of faith in its real objective validity. No man can be sincere who prays on the same principle on which he exercises himself bodily by Indian clubs or dumb-bells.

Nor can we take the position that the benefits of prayer are limited to the spiritual realm. There are Christian teachers who take this position. They claim that God and man are accessible to each other only in the realm of soul. On the spiritual side of our nature there are secret avenues by which the Divine Spirit gains immediate access to the human. This is, however, the only channel by which supernatural help can come to man.

Now, if God were altogether indifferent to our secular life, or if He were so incarcerated in the mechanism of nature, that He could not reach us from without, this doctrine might have some weight. But when we look upon God as our Father, who encourages us in everything to make known our requests to Him, and when we understand that His relations to external nature are so vital and immediate that all its movements are God's movements, then we may take heart of hope and pray for secular blessings as well as for subjective and spiritual favors.

But we are reminded that all this opens wide the door for fanaticism in its worst forms. Teach this doctrine and you have fanatics praying for the diseased and dying, as if there could be any obvious or occult connection between a breath of words on human lips, and the malady which may be working out its fatal purpose in the body of the dying one for whose recovery prayer is offered.

Just here we find ourselves confronted with what is known as the Faith Cure system. The fact is, the question of prayer in relation to disease is so germane to our subject that we can-

not close this paper without referring to it in the most cursory manner.

What is meant by the "Faith Cure?"

It is a cure said to be wrought in answer to the prayer of faith to the exclusion of all medical advice and appliances.

Now, to be consistent with our position, we cannot deny the efficacy of prayer for the sick. But we believe that all such prayer must breathe the spirit which culminates in the Gethsemane cry of Christ, "Nevertheless not *my* will but *thine* be done."

We cannot accept all the teachings of the Faith Cure school as scriptural, nor can we accept all its reported cures as supernatural. This whole theory is invalidated by the fact that it rests upon a scriptural and theological fallacy. It assumes, falsely, we think, that the atonement of Christ provides for the *immediate* remission of all the natural as well as judicial sequences of sin. As we have only to believe for the salvation of the soul from sin, we have only to believe for the salvation of the body from suffering. Now, we believe that the atonement provides for the immediate redemption of the soul and for the ultimate and absolute redemption of the body, but nowhere do the Scriptures encourage the belief that the latter will be effected in this life. The full redemption of the body from all disease, and from death the final outcome of the same, will be brought about, according to the teachings of inspiration, by the general resurrection from the dead at the last day.

Since the "faith curist" believes the atonement provides for immediate immunity from all the natural disabilities of sin, to be self-consistent, why does he not, as one has suggested, claim exemption from poverty, ignorance, privation and even death itself in this life, for all these according to his own teaching are the penal results of sin? It is true that in the case of the believer all the natural sequences of sin lose their punitive quality. They are no longer retributive, but restorative and disciplinary; still as experience teaches, full immunity from all those disabilities and diseases which are the fruit of sin, is not granted in this life.

Another thing that invalidates the claims of this school, is

its illogical teaching as regards the conditions upon which the supernatural cure is said to be granted. The patient is often required to believe that he is cured, contrary to the presence of symptoms which plainly declare he is not. In order to be healed he is required to believe that he is healed, when in reality he is not healed. This is a rag torn from the crazy patchwork of a certain theology which says to the penitent soul, "all your sins, past, present and to come, were forgiven when Christ cried on the cross, 'It is finished.' You have only to believe this in order to find peace with God." That is to say, believe you are pardoned, *in order to be pardoned*, which is contradictory in thought, tense and terms. Analogous to this is the fallacy found in the teaching of some of the "faith curists." In proof of this I will give the words of one of the notable leaders of this school, as quoted in an article published in the *Century*, December, 1885, p. 276. He says: "When anointed, believe that you do now receive. Say I am healed now. Do not say I expect to be healed. Believe against *contrary* physical evidence. After having claimed the promise, be not surprised at the continuance of symptoms and physical pains. You may expect sudden and powerful returns of your sickness after anointing and prayer. But carefully note that they are only tests of your faith. You ought not to recognize any disease, believing that God has rebuked it."

Another fact which greatly lessens our faith in such "Faith Cures" is, we are sorry to say, the published returns of such institutions are not always reliable.

The author whose words we have quoted above says: "Of those reported as cured many are not at all cured. In two volumes, entitled 'Faith Cures,' there are 150 cures reported. Of these we find seventy-one, or nearly one-half are not cured. but at best only benefited. Yet they are reported under the head of 'Faith Cures.' Any ordinary hospital acting thus would be rightly reprimanded as fraudulent in its reports."

Another fact which greatly invalidates the claims of such cures to be regarded as *supernatural* is that many of them can be explained upon *natural* grounds, or at least they are paralleled by such as have been explained in this manner. Among

the cases reported as cured at such institutes and conventions are a great many said to have been consumptives. Personally, I know several who had developed similar symptoms, but were cured by a visit to a Roman Catholic shrine, not by miracle, but as skilled physicians declared, solely by natural causes.

Again, in those printed returns we find some said to have been cured from dropsical affections. The most stubborn cases, however, of dropsy have been cured by strong mental and nervous excitement. Dr. Abernethy, as quoted by Dr. Buckley, gives the case of a person *permanently* cured of this disease by being frightened beyond all limit by a mad bull, the relief coming through the kidneys.

Still more, in those reports a great many are said to have been cured of rheumatism, but it has been demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that similar cures have been effected through the imagination. The author I have just named refers in his work on "Faith Cures," to the many cases of rheumatism which were cured by the famous "metallic tractors" and their imitations, formed simply by wood and iron. The patient was made to believe he was being galvanized, when in reality the materials used possessed no such property. Dr. Buckley also cites a remarkable cure of paralysis, the result purely of imagination. Sir Humphrey Davey placed a thermometer under the tongue of the patient simply to ascertain the temperature. The patient, however, imagined this was intended to stimulate and energize the benumbed parts, and as the result actually obtained permanent relief.

Another objectionable feature of this system is its disparagement of all those remedies which God through the laboratory of nature has provided for the mitigating of pain, and the correcting of the disorders to which our bodies are liable. I know that this stricture does not apply to all espousers of the Faith Cure, but it does apply to a great many. We heard one of its leading apostles in effect declare that the use of medicines by the Christian patient was a practical denial of the provisions of the Gospel and the power of God, and revealed the law spiritual plane upon which such a Christian lived. Now, we believe it is our privilege to pray for the recovery of sick-

ness, just as it is ours to pray for daily bread; but just as prayer for the latter does not absolve us from the use of means to obtain bread, no more does prayer for the former justify the non-use of medicine to obtain recovery. More than once we have had to deplore the sacrifice of a beautiful and useful life to this unfortunate delusion. We all have read with sad hearts the story of the young missionary who died as the result of this religious hallucination. To the last he refused to take the medicine, which under the blessing of God would have saved his life, as it did that of others similarly afflicted. To say the least, such a doctrine entails a fearful responsibility upon those who advocate it.

The last objection which I offer to this theory is, its advocates do not sufficiently qualify their sayings and supplications by a Christ-like deference to the will of God in all things. They seem to think that under all circumstances *their* faith is the determining factor, and *their* wish another term for the Divine will.

Now, we believe that the ideal prayer is not the human dictating, but submitting to the Divine. It is a prayer saturated with the spirit of filial submission, and in the hour of its keenest agony it will ever find relief in the cry, "Not my will, but thine, O God, be done."

But now that we have said all this, we desire also to say that we believe with all our heart and mind in the efficacy of the prayer of faith for the sick. When we have removed all these excrescences we find at the core of this system an element of truth which we gladly recognize. In fact, we have no doubt that many have died who might have been restored by the prayer of faith, and this is evident both upon natural and supernatural grounds. Such a prayer often secures all those mental and spiritual conditions so favorable to recovery. If the patient is despondent, with a mind shrouded in an element of gloom, the effects of such a mental state must be very adverse to a cure. But when by prayer the patient becomes restful, happy, resigned, this very condition often means two-thirds of a cure.

There are three conceivable methods by which God may

raise the sick in answer to prayer, even when all medical skill has been baffled :

1. He who stands behind the constitution of all matter, as the fontal source of all chemical force, may, in accordance with laws known only to himself, infuse into the remedies employed such virtue as may result in a cure, especially when some moral or spiritual purpose is thereby subserved.

2. He may, in accordance with the laws of mental suggestion, under His immediate control, drop the idea into the mind of anyone concerned of a new and hitherto untried remedy, the application of which may lead to the desired results.

3. When there has been no organic break effected in the vital organism by which what we call natural law is rendered inoperative, how easily can God as the life-giving Spirit immanent in all, so act along the line of those laws as to liberate or replenish the curative forces of the system, in such a way as to neutralize the action and arrest the progress of the disease, and thus lead to the patient's perfect recovery.

Who that believes the Bible can doubt the efficacy of prayer in relation to things external? Listen to Jacob's passionate cry as he wrestles with the angel until the daybreak, "I will not let thee go until thou bless me," and this prayer prevails with God on the one hand, and Esau on the other. Moses on the mountain prays, and the enemies of Israel are scattered. Hannah prays with the intense desire of motherhood, and Samuel is born. David prays, and his enemy is delivered into his hands. Asa prays, and lo, the tide of battle is changed, and victory perches upon the banners of Israel. Isaiah and Hezekiah pray for deliverance from the sword of the Assyrian,

"And the angel of death spread his wings on the blast,
And breathed on the face of the foe as he passed,
And the eyes of the sleepers waxed deadly and chill,
And their hearts but once heaved, and forever were still."


Daniel prays in the lions' den, and the mouths of the lions are stopped. The three Hebrew children pray, and pass through the furnace untouched by the fire. Elijah prays, and his prayer unlocks the treasures of the sky, and soon the parched soil drinks in the refreshing shower. The Church prays, and

Peter is delivered from prison. Bartimeus prays, and receives his sight. Jesus prays, and the angels come and minister unto Him. Thus it is true "that prayer moves the hand that moves the world." Certainly Tennyson is right when he says:—

"More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of, wherefore let thy voice
Rise like a fountain for me night and day ;
For what are men better than sheep or goats,
That nourish a blind life within the brain,
If, knowing God, they lift not hands of prayer
Both for themselves and those who call them friend
For so the whole round world is every way
Bound by gold chains about the feet of God."

Toronto.

JAMES HENDERSON.



WERE THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST PENAL?

THE question at the head of this article has engaged the earnest attention of the profoundest theologians in the past, and will do the same in the future. It lies so near the roots of the Christian faith, and so unavoidably arises in any thorough discussion on the nature of the Atonement, that it is impossible for it to become obsolete. Clear and sound views upon it must contribute to healthy religious character and experience. It is once more opportunely raised in a recent series of articles in the CANADIAN METHODIST QUARTERLY (January, April, July, 1893) by my old and highly respected friend, Dr. William Jackson, the worthy President of the Montreal Conference of the Methodist Church in Canada. Of Dr. Jackson's work, both as minister and theologian, I have long been proud. I know him too well to think he will resent any honest attempts to criticise his articles, or will misunderstand the motives which prompt my reply. I am sure he cares more for the eduction of truth than for the unquestioning acceptance of his particular views. The articles are trenchant, yet courteous; the evident result of sincere conviction; strong with the strength which comes of wide reading and close thinking, and are generally marked by a lucidity of

presentation which is too often wanting in theological as in other treatises.

Dr. Jackson argues well on law as having its prime source in the nature of God, though he seems mistakenly to understand Dr. C. Hodge as denying the same (see Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. III., pp. 261-263). But to speak of "law as the eternal principle of right, and law as the governmental application of this principle to particular cases," may promote the confusion it is intended to remove. If moral law "is a law given by an intelligent being to an intelligent being," an "authoritative expression," "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him," "the rule of conduct laid down by the Supreme Sovereign for the regulation of the lives of all His moral creatures" (pp. 47-51), why apply the word to the nature or character of God? Why not speak of the eternal "principle," or attribute, or perfection of righteousness, and thus avoid suggesting, by the word law, some sort of abstraction over, above, or beyond the Supreme, to which He is subject? The law is what He commands, according to that "principle." To say that principle is regnant in Him is only to say He who is perfectly righteous is regnant, for it is himself, and not any authority without or distinct from Him. His nature gives the right, according to which His will gives the law.

Dr. Jackson remarks that "Methodism has never formulated an authoritative theory of Atonement." But so far as that is so, the same thing might be predicated of most Methodist doctrines. Certainly Wesley and his followers have put forward their views of the nature of the Atonement, and that, too, respecting the very points on which Dr. Jackson treats in his contribution "towards the formulation of a consistent Arminian theory." I do not suppose they cared whether they were Arminian or not, so that they were Scriptural, though, I venture to think, we shall find them more Arminian than Dr. Jackson, if less Limborchian. My friend adds: "Nor does she (Methodism); in our judgment, possess one (theory) that is perfectly consistent with the other elements of a genuine Arminian soteriology" (p. 44). If we are eclectic enough to appropriate

from Arminianism whatever of it is in accord with Scripture, it matters little whether we can square it with other elements of Arminianism or not. John Fletcher was at some pains to show that Calvinism and Arminianism had each its good and its evil side. Our aim should be to secure the good of both, and reject the evil. Dr. Jackson would no more accept the picture given by Arminius of Divine justice and mercy in conflict with each other (Works by Nichols, Vol. I., p. 349) than Calvin's notion of sovereignty. I had understood that we Methodists were called Arminians because of our agreement with James Harmens on the "five points" of predestination, universal redemption, free will, the work of grace, and final perseverance (see Wesley's Works, Vol. X., p. 359); not on the nature and rationale of the Atonement, though even on that question Dr. Jackson follows Limborch rather than Arminius. If Dr. Jackson means that the measure of Arminianism we have already adopted requires logically that we bring some of our other views into harmony therewith, I may remind him that that is partly the question in dispute between us. I cannot help thinking the theory he so earnestly advocates is out of agreement with Methodist soteriology, and that the readjustment to be desiderated is on his side, his right to claim the support of such worthy names as Whedon and Miley notwithstanding.

I need not here discuss the statements on the attributes that "holiness is subjective," and "justice is objective—the expression of Divine holiness in acts of righteous government," "God's prescription of righteous laws as the Supreme Governor" (pp. 352, 353). This may be justice in government, but not justice "as a Divine attribute." Dr. Jackson, however, makes it clear that he holds to essential righteousness as inherent in the nature of God. But how does this accord with the statement that "fatherhood is the primary relation of God to man, and that all the other relations of God to man (*e.g.*, justice) exist for the purpose of carrying out the beneficent ends of the fatherhood?" (P. 56.) Beneficence is benevolence in action, but has not justice also its own proper ends? Had he affirmed that the fatherhood includes justice as co-ordinate and co-essen-

tial with benevolence, and that both worked for the ends of fatherhood, that would have harmonized with the idea that justice is an inherent attribute; but the sentence just quoted appears to reduce the necessary attribute of justice to the rank of a subordinate means or instrument adopted by fatherhood for the attainment of benevolent ends only. The ends to which eternal justice must tend are, no doubt, harmonious with those of essential benevolence, though the justice may regulate the method in which benevolence works; but seeing, as Dr. Jackson admirably shows, justice cannot be resolved into a form of benevolence, neither can it be resolved into a mere means subservient to the ends of benevolence.

I propose, however, to address myself to the question whether the sufferings of Christ were penal or not. To assert and establish the negative appears to be a principal, if not the paramount, object of Dr. Jackson's able articles. To deny that the punishment of Adam's sin fell on his posterity, and to maintain that their sufferings were the painful but not the penal result of that sin; and indeed to deny all transference of punishment from the one whose sin deserves it to another, is logically of a piece with denial of all guilt and punishment in the sufferings of Christ as our substitute. It also belongs to the same position to hold that when the penal law of God is transgressed, it is not absolutely necessary that punishment be enforced; but on account of the non-penal sufferings of Christ, the Divine prerogative of mercy may pass by the claim which the law makes to the punishment of the offender. According to the non-penal theory the sufferings of Christ served instead of the punishment called for by the broken law, but had no element of punishment in them. They were endured not as deserved or merited by any transgression, but as a substitute for such endurance. Thus *they* were not merited or deserved by the sin of anyone. I am obliged to join issue with my friend, because I am convinced he is in error. In reading the articles it has struck me repeatedly that Dr. Jackson, like others of his school, is apt to beg the question in the terms of his definition. To say guilt is the blameworthiness of the evildoer, and punishment the infliction of suffering on him only who has done

wrong, leaves nothing to be argued. It is only another way of saying neither guilt nor punishment can be transferred. The definition takes for granted the conclusion in dispute. We are told punishment is "suffering inflicted on an individual on account of personal guilt . . . on account of personal blameworthiness as an expression of His displeasure at the sinner's wrongdoing" (p. 236). I presume it would be "on account of *personal* guilt," if the innocent suffered it; but, from the context and scope, I understand Dr. Jackson to mean that the punishment must be *confined* to the person of the wrongdoer. If so, the words cannot be admitted as a definition accepted by both sides, but only as a thesis to be proved. The words do not define punishment as I, with many others, understand it. They unwarrantably exclude all possibility of transfer from the culpable to the innocent. I have quite as much right to lay it down that punishment is the infliction of the suffering ordained by the Lawgiver, to be the judicial consequence of disobeying the law. Whether it can, under any circumstances, be borne by any other than the actual transgressor, is matter of argument.

Again, to say guilt is culpability, blameworthiness, or demerit (*reatus culpæ*), and thence to infer that it cannot be transferred, is of no force or relevancy to those who, like myself, hold that guilt sometimes also means *liability* or obligation to *punishment* (*reatus pœnæ*); and when the latter sense—the only sense in which we should contend for transfer—is persistently ignored, the issue is confused, and the disputants talk about two different sides of the shield. To affirm that personal demerit is "the only source of guilt," *i.e.*, blameworthiness, settles nothing; for we are all agreed on that point. The question is, whether the penal consequence of "demerit" is necessarily confined to the transgressor, and the possibility of transfer thereby precluded? While the only guilt which we hold to be transferable is liability to punishment (*reatus pœnæ*), why should so great pains be taken to disprove the transferability of guilt in the sense of culpability (*reatus culpæ*).

I. ARMINIAN AND METHODIST TEACHING.

Dr. Jackson has quoted the opinions of several theologians in support of his theory. It would be easy to quote the words of a large number of leading men against it, and to show how firmly they regarded the sufferings of Christ as punishment due to man's sin.

(1) Dr. Daniel Whitney, an Arminian champion, contending against imputation of sin in the sense of culpability, says, on Rom. v: "The Holy Ghost still speaking of His suffering for our sins in this metonymical sense, as it is: (i.) when He is said to *bear our sins* only because He bore the punishment due to them, (ii.) when He is said to be '*made sin for us*;' He being made sin for us, not by contracting the guilt (personal culpability) of it, but only suffering punishment for it in our stead" (Five Points, Div. I., p. 92). My friend roundly declares that the sufferings of Christ for our sins were not punishment.

(2) I share my friend's profound regard for Bishop Butler's Analogy; and Butler, in the passage quoted by Dr. Jackson (p. 363), says in defence of the vicarious sufferings of Christ, "Vicarious punishments may be fit and absolutely necessary." He also remarks "that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience" (Analogy, Part II., Chap. 5).

(3) John Goodwin will be allowed to be a sound Arminian; yet he wrote concerning the sin of Adam: "So then Adam and his posterity miscarrying with so high a hand of disobedience, there developed a necessity upon God, if He meant to glorify himself, like himself, and as God, either to punish the whole brood of transgressors, according to the full exigency of their demerit, or, which is the same, according to the tenor and import of the threatening, or else to find out some other person to suffer for them, whose punishment or sufferings might be altogether as considerable, and argue as great respects to His authority, wisdom and righteousness as the punishment of Adam, and all that were now delinquents in his loins, that is, his whole posterity, the second Adam only excepted, up to the line of their transgression and guilt would have done" (Justification, Sec. VIII). He says the penalty of death incurred by

Adam "was inflicted upon him to whom the law was given though not upon his person, personally considered, but as subsisting and having a being in that spiritual branch of his posterity, Christ." (*Ibid.*) Assuming Adam's nature, Christ "suffered . . . the penalty of the law." (*Ibid.*)

(4) But what of Arminius himself? On the proposition "that the sufferings of Christ were penal," Dr. Jackson observes that "many Arminians have adopted it" (p. 238). Does he forget that Arminius held it? I understand my friend to look upon physical death, not as a punishment of any sin, but as the "result" of Adam's sin. Arminius says he dare not affirm that "temporal death, which is imposed or inflicted on the saints, is *not a punishment*, or has no regard to punishment, when it is styled 'AN ENEMY that is to be destroyed' by the omnipotence of Christ" (Works, Nichols, Vol. I., pp. 705, 706). On the priestly office of our Lord, he says: "Justice demanded, on her part, the punishment due to her from a sinful creature; and this demand she the more rigidly enforced, by the greater equity with which she had threatened it, and the greater truth with which it had been openly foretold and declared" (p. 349). Again, on the suggestion of wisdom, punishment was "transmuted into a expiatory sacrifice," by suffering of death; that being "the punishment adjudged to sin." (*Ibid.*) But the penal element was in that expiation; for he adds concerning the oblation on the cross, "thus paying the price of redemption for sins by suffering the punishment due to them" (p. 355). Christ's body "had suffered the punishment of death." (*Ibid.*)

(5) Differing from Dr. Jackson's reading of Anselm, I take the satisfaction he contends for as akin to, but not in all respects parallel to, the payment of a debt; that is, to suffer the punishment of his sin was a debt or obligation which man owed to the wronged honor of God; but as he could not pay it, Christ, by His sufferings, paid it in man's stead. "It is not proper," he writes, "for God to pass by sin thus unpunished." (*Cur Deus Homo*, p. 67). "If it is not becoming to God to do anything unjustly or irregularly, it is not within the scope of His liberty, or kindness, or will, to let go unpunished the sinner who does not repay to God what he has taken away" (p. 70.)

To pay in this case is to endure the punishment. "When on account of sin he (the sinner) is deprived of blessedness and of all good (punished), he repays out of what is his own, though against his will, what he has stolen" (p. 73.) The good in man which God seeks "cannot be accomplished unless there be some one to *pay* to God in *compensation* for the sin of man, something greater than everything that exists except God" (p. 123.) Man's restoration "could not be effected unless man paid to God what he *owed* for sin, and which *debt* was so great that though no one ought to pay for it who was not man, no one could pay for it who was not God" (p. 169). "So that he who in his own nature ought to pay might be in a person who could" (pp. 169, 170). The life of this man (Christ) is so exalted and so precious that it may suffice to pay what is *due* for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely more" (p. 171, italics mine).

(6) Coming now to Methodist theologians, Dr. Jabez Bunting wrote: "Mankind as sinners, were in a state of exposure to God's avenging justice; and it became God to enforce the claims of that justice by demanding that whoever undertook to deliver them from it should pay the price of their deliverance by suffering in their stead. It is a righteous thing with God to render tribulation to sinners (2 Thess. i. 6), to punish transgression in their own persons, or in that of their Surety" (Sermons, Vol. I., p. 64).

(7) Dr. Jackson, who quotes approvingly from Richard Watson (p. 240), as representative a man in Methodist theology as ever lived, will not object to my doing the same. "The sufferings of Christ when considered with respect to our sins are to be considered as a punishment." On the bearing of sins by our Lord, he writes: "Now to 'bear sin' is, in the language of Scripture, to bear the punishment of sin" (Lev. xxii. 9; xviii. 20.) "The penalty is exacted from Him, though He himself had incurred no penalty personally." He expresses himself in the words of Erskine: "The Judge himself bore the punishment of transgression," and immediately afterwards he combats objections "to the justice of laying the punishment of the guilty upon the innocent." He speaks of "the willingness of the substitute to submit to the penalty"; and "of this trans-

lation of the penalty to a substitute." "The law of God was not repealed nor relaxed." Atonement was by laying "the punishment of the guilty upon the innocent" (Institutes, Vol. III., pp. 133, 134, 135, 136, 187, 188-192).

(8) The doctrinal standards of the parent body of Methodists were provided by John Wesley himself in his N. T. notes and first fifty-three sermons. In these the doctrine of our Lord's penal suffering is explicit enough, *e.g.*, "The attribute of justice must be preserved; and inviolate it is preserved if there was a real infliction of punishment on our Saviour" (on Rom. iii. 25, 26). "'Who himself bore our sins.' That is, the punishment due to them" (on 1 Pet. ii. 24). "'Made under the law.' Both under the precept, and under the curse of it" (on Gal. iv. 4). "Christ having once died to bear the sins—the punishment due to them" (on Heb. ix. 28). "If He was our substitute as to penal sufferings, why not as to justifying obedience?" Wesley answers, "The former is expressly asserted in Scripture, the latter is not expressly asserted there" (Works, Vol. X., p. 319). "By the merits of Christ all men are cleared from the guilt of Adam's actual sin" (Works, Vol. VIII., p. 277). Then they must have been under that guilt. On imputed righteousness and antinomianism, Wesley said the Methodists had "leaned too much towards Calvinism" (Works, Vol. VIII., pp. 237-278). But he never intimated that they had leaned too much to the doctrine of Christ's penal suffering. I fear the non-penal theory "leans too much towards" the rationalism which marred the teaching of some remonstrants.

(9) Space cannot here be found for the many Methodist hymns in which the penal theory is unmistakable, *e.g.*, in the present authorized hymn-book of the parent community, "Looking at the cross, my soul knows her guilt was there" (703); "The Father hath punished for you His dear Son" (707); "Your sins on Him were laid" (36); "Thou my pain, my curse hast took, all my sins were laid on thee" (27).

II. EVIDENCE OF SCRIPTURE.

We must, however, appeal to Scripture as the supreme authority. Our Lord is said to *bear sin*. He is "the Lamb of

God which beareth the sin of the world" (John i. 29). He was "once offered to bear the sins of many" (Heb. ix. 28). "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree" (1 Pet. ii. 24). All will allow He could not bear sin in the sense of having himself done the evil deed; nor in the sense of being personally culpable for it. But He could bear the liability to suffer its punishment, and so could bear its penal consequence. I know not what else His sin-bearing could mean. It cannot mean simply pain or misfortune caused by sin, but not judicially due to it; for in no sense would that be sin. Nor can it mean that He suffered sinful treatment by sinners; for that could not be bearing the sin of "many" and of "the world."

Moreover, in the place from which Peter draws his statement (Isa. liii.), it is said, "The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." "It pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief." In that connection it is said, "He shall bear their iniquities," "He bare the sin of many," "For the transgression of my people was he stricken," which in the margin of the R. V. reads, "To whom the stroke was due." The American section of the Revisers would have it, "cut off out of the land or the living for the transgression of my people to whom the stroke was due."

In the Scriptures sin and iniquity sometimes evidently denote punishment, or liability to it; e.g., Abigail begged to be liable for her husband's evil deed. "Upon me be the iniquity" (1 Sam. xxv. 24; see 2 Sam. xiv. 9). When David prayed, "Put away, I beseech thee, the iniquity of thy servant" (2 Sam. xxiv. 10), he could not intend the actual sin, or its blameworthiness, but only his liability to bear the punishment. "Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities" (Lam. v. 7) evidently means the penal consequences; for "iniquities" must imply more than calamitous "results." The word stamps the suffering with a judicial character; and further, it shows the punishment called "iniquities" fell on persons who had not actually committed the wrong. "His iniquities shall be upon him" (Num. xv. 31) describes the punishment of one cut off for his sin. To be "cut off" was the

punishment of their sin, not its non-penal result; it was the very suffering appointed and imposed as the penalty. Yet it is called "iniquity," implying that iniquity was a name for punishment; its infliction being the judicial administration of law, not simply the "result." When the suffering ordained as the penalty of sin falls not on the actual transgressor, but another person, and is called "iniquity" inflicted by the Divine Judge, it cannot but mean punishment.

The punishment of Sodom is called the "iniquity," which it was possible for innocent Lot to share, and in which he could be "consumed" (Gen. xix. 15). "And he hath brought upon them their own iniquity" (Psa. xciv. 23) evidently employs the word in the sense of punishment, as is done by Job, "God layeth up his iniquity for his children," where, again, we see the punishment of the transgressor falling upon other persons (Job xxi. 19). Aaron confessing the sin of his sister and himself, sought to ward off its punishment, which he called "sin," when he said to Moses, "O my lord, lay not, I pray thee, sin upon us" (Num. xii. 11; cf. Ezekiel xliv. 10). When God adjudged the children of Israel to "bear their iniquities, even forty years," in the wilderness, what can the word mean but their punishment? (Num. xiv. 34; see Num. ix. 13; xviii. 22, and xxx. 15; Ezekiel iv. 4, and xxv. 29; Lev. xx. 19 and xxiv. 15.)

The second commandment (Ex. xx. 5) teaches that in jealousy and displeasure God visits "the iniquity of the fathers upon the children." Visitation for sin is more than the natural "effect" of sin; it is sufferings inflicted in "recompense" for sin, and is therefore punishment. But for that relation it were cruelty. The idea of transferring the punishment from the sinner to another runs through the account of Ezekiel, bearing the iniquity of Judah forty years (Ezekiel iv.). The fact that, under Divine government, the whole human race is the victim of suffering and death is undeniable. How can it be accounted for in harmony with the righteousness and love of God? To say it is the non-judicial, or non-penal, "effect" is no vindication against the suggestion of undue severity. For if there be nothing in the law to require it, the infliction of the misery might have

been omitted. Or if it be said the object was to proclaim the holiness of God, the imposition of so much undeserved suffering would appear to be altogether disproportionate to the end. On the other hand, regarding the suffering as involved in the penalty of sin, we have an explanation which harmonizes the fact with the perfections of the Most High.

Dr. Jackson asks, "Is the suffering of the drunkard's wife and child penal, or is it the natural result of their relation to the husband and father? Are the sufferings of the infants penal, or are they the natural result of their relation to a sinful ancestry?" Unhesitatingly in each case I answer *both*. The first, as the suffering is part of the penalty of the race—sin, though to a great extent turned into beneficent discipline; the second, as natural processes, including procreation, are the means by which the "death through sin" is enforced. All this sheds light on 2 Cor. v. 21, "Him who knew no sin He made to be sin." Not a sin-offering, for that would spoil the intended contrast between "sin" and "righteousness;" He could not make Him to have committed sin, nor to be blameworthy for it; but He could, with the consent of the substitute, make Him bear the punishment, here called "sin." How could it be sin at all, except as the obligation to bear sin's punishment, or as the actual bearing of it? To call it "sin" manifests its judicial relation to the transgression of law. To apply the word to non-penal sufferings would be a misnomer, and would sever the connection, now expressed by the word, between those sufferings and the obligation to punishment from which they were intended to deliver us. The statement that He was made to be sin would appear a most inappropriate way of saying He was made to suffer, but not in punishment of sin. It comes to the same effect if we take "made to be sin" to mean He was the embodiment, or impersonation of sin. For we have still to ask how sin could be specially attributed to Him? To which there is no fair answer, except that in Him were concentrated the obligation and punishment of the world's sin. When, therefore, it is said, "The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all," and He was "made to be sin," I can attach no consistent sense to the statements but the obvious one that, though perfectly innocent himself, He bore the punishment of our sin.

Should it be answered that the suffering was non-penal, but called iniquity and sin as the natural effect caused by sin through a self-acting process of nature, and not by the judicial act of God, that reply would be inadequate. The intolerable strain forced on the meaning of the word would condemn it. The word is applied to such punishment as could not be the product of natural causes, e.g., the punishment of Sodom, which was effected by a special intervention of the Almighty. When a man is utterly "cut off" for his blasphemy, the punishment is called his "iniquity"; but his blasphemy was not the *natural cause* of his being cut off; it was rather the *moral reason* for his being cut off by the act of the administrators of penal law. The physical death of Adam's posterity through his sin is not the effect of his sin, by process of natural causation; but the reason why the Sovereign Judge inflicted physical death judicially on all men. But for this judicial action, there is no reason to think the sin, which is an act of the soul, would have effected that death by a process of natural causation. Therefore, to say the suffering is the non-penal, natural effect of sin, being incorrect, will not avail to neutralize the teaching I have drawn from the above passages. The truth of penal suffering comes out if we examine the scriptural idea of our Lord's sacrifice for sin. The sin, that is, the punishment, is upon Him. How could it be the effect, if not the punishment of sin? If it was not the punishment, it must have been the effect of something else than the sin; for if sin, as moral cause, effects anything it is punishment. It was as an "offering of sin," "once offered," that He did "bear the sin of many." But in what sense He did that may be gathered from the sacrifices which were divinely appointed to typify His offering of himself. When the priest made atonement for the sins of himself and the people, after slaying the one goat, the order of proceeding with the other was this: "Aaron shall lay both hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins, and he shall put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away . . . the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a solitary land" (Lev. xvi. 20-22). How like

"the Lord hath made the iniquity of us all to meet on Him" (Isa. lvi. 6), and "He bore our sins in His own body on the tree" (1 Peter ii. 24). Can we fairly avoid the conclusion, that as the sins—*i.e.*, the guilt or obligation to punishment of sin—of the people was laid on the animal symbolically, so really "the sins of the whole world"—*i.e.*, the guilt or obligation to punishment for sin—was laid on the Divine-human antitype?

It is remarkable that *death* was the penalty due to man for his sin (Gen. ii. and iii.). "Through one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men" (Rom. v. 12). If the death penalty came upon all men, and many suffer it who never live in sin individually, how then can it be said punishment is never transferred? "Through the trespass of the one the many died." "By the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one." "Sin reigned unto death" (Rom. v.), and death was precisely the evil which Christ, as our substitute, endured, when He "died for the ungodly." "Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous" (1 Peter iii. 18), He was "made a little lower than the angels . . . that, by the grace of God, He should taste death for every man" (Heb. ii. 9). Sinking to the lowest depths of His humiliation, He groaned, "my soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death" (Mark xiv. 34). So far His suffering was of the same nature due to man's sin. Why so, if His suffering was not intended to fulfil that penalty, and yet was intended to deliver the sinners from it? That man might not die, Christ died. How could the one death stand instead of the other, except as it met the requirement of the law instead of the other?

At the risk of shocking the advocates of the non-penal theory, I will quote J. Wesley on Matt. xxvi. 37: "'Sorrowful and in deep anguish.' Probably from feeling the arrows of the Almighty stick fast in His soul, while God 'laid on him the iniquities of us all.' Who can tell what painful and dreadful sensations were then impressed on Him by the immediate hand of God."

This view is confirmed by the incomparable *extent* of suffering involved, in the death of Christ. How much He suffered

we know not; but we know the agony and desolateness of His death went immeasurably beyond anything ordinarily experienced by men. Assuming that He stood under the obligation of the sinful race to the law, having, in man's stead, to render what was due thereto, we understand why His death involved mental pain so overwhelming. But if His death was not the fulfilment of the law's claim, no reason appears why there should have been such depth of agony; or why it should have been necessary at all for Him to die. For if not the carrying out of the law's penalty, but only a display of God's hatred of sin, and love of righteousness, had been required, that would have been possible with little or no suffering; as to let sin go unpunished would display the opposite of these qualities.

"God sent forth his son, born of a woman, born under the law" (Gal. iv. 4). The law here is not the ceremonial, but the moral law; for Gentiles as well as Jews were under it. Christ was born under the law in the sense in which we were under it. He was born into our nature, and our obligation to the law; unless, in the same sentence, we needlessly attach widely different senses to the same phrase "under the law." But our position "under the law," after we had transgressed its precept, was one of obligation to suffer its penalty. Therefore, if Christ came under the law as we were under it, He came under its primitive claim. His becoming subject to the precept of the law, even on the Limborchian theory, could not redeem us who were under its penalty; consequently His being "under the law" must intend more than subjection to its precept. But how could He come further "under the law," except by becoming liable to its punishment? To suffer, however deeply, something not required by the law would as little place Him "under the law" as it would have any fitness and sufficiency to redeem us from liability to its penalty.

(To be continued.)

Didsbury, Eng.

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HABAKKUK.

"THE burden which Habakkuk, the prophet, did see." Who then is Habakkuk? Habakkuk, *the prophet*? and what is *the burden* which he saw? First, let us direct our attention to Habakkuk, *the man*; and then, to Habakkuk, *the prophet*.

As to Habakkuk, *the man*. From the rubric at the close of the third chapter, it has been conjectured that our prophet must have belonged to the tribe of Levi. There is a tradition that refers him to the tribe of Simeon. What was said to be the grave of Habakkuk was pointed out between Gabatha and Keila, in the days of Eusebius and Hieronymus. The learned editor of this book, in Lange's Commentary, says: "It cannot be affirmed with certainty that it was the true one," and adds, "for more certain data concerning the circumstances of his life we are consequently directed to his book, and even this book furnishes us with no information, apart from the characteristic condition of the times, except his name and the notice that he was a prophet." All the learned writers whom we have been able to consult express themselves in substance in the same way as Canon Farrar, who says: "Of the prophet Habakkuk, we know no personal details."

To Habakkuk, *the prophet*, we now turn by asking what is a prophet? what is prophecy? The definition of prophet and prophecy, as given by Webster in his dictionary unabridged, I take as being the commonly accepted notion of the terms under consideration. "Prophet" is, first, "one that foretells future events; a predictor, a foreteller;" second, "in Scripture, a person illuminated, inspired or instructed by God to announce future events." "Prophecy, a foretelling, prediction; a declaration of something to come." According to Bishop Butler, "prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass." Among the unlearned the ordinary conception of the word is narrowed down to this, that a prophet is a *foreteller*,—a predictor of future events,—prophecy is prediction, the foretelling of future events. With perhaps the majority of ordinary Bible readers, the terms *prophet* and predictor or foreteller, and *prophecy* and prediction or foretelling, would

be used interchangeably without realizing that there was the slightest difference of meaning between them. This popular conception is altogether inadequate. The original word for prophet is נָבִי (nābi) and occurs in the Old Testament Scriptures some 300 times. Its derivation is disputed, the matter in dispute being from which of two verb-roots it may come. One of these roots is used in the sense of speaking under a Divine influence,—the other signifies to boil forth, to gush out, to flow as a fountain. “If this etymology is correct, the noun will designate a person who burst forth with spiritual utterances under the Divine impulse, or simply one who pours forth words.” By analogy, its form might indicate that it was to be taken in a passive sense, but the great majority of Biblical critics say that the active sense of announcing, pouring forth the declaration of God, is more in accordance with the usage of the word. In the LXX. the word nābi (נָבִי) is uniformly translated by *προφήτης*, and in the authorized English version by prophet. The best lexicographers say that *προ* in *προφήτης* and *πρόφημι*, from which it is derived has a *local* rather than a *temporal* signification, and denotes antecedence or priority *in place*, rather than antecedence or priority in time. “In that case *προφήτης* would denote an authoritative speaker in the name of God, and in this sense it is applied in the classics, to the official expounders of the oracles; and to the poets as prophets of the Muses, *i.e.*, as speaking in their name, at their suggestion, or by their inspiration.”

The passage of Scripture which establishes the meaning of *nābi* is found in Ex. iv. 14-16, as taken in connection with Ex. vii. 1. The first one reads thus, “And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Moses, and he said, Is not Aaron the Levite thy brother? I know that he can speak well. And also, behold, he cometh forth to meet thee, and when he seeth thee he will be glad in his heart. And thou shalt speak unto him, and put words in his mouth; and I will be with thy mouth, and with his mouth, and will teach you what ye shall do. And he shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and he shall be, even he shall be to thee instead of a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God.” This passage taken in con-

nection with the other, Ex. vii, 1, "I have made thee a god unto Pharaoh: and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet" (*nābi*), shows that a prophet is one who speaks for another, who utters the words another has put in his mouth.

In the light of these passages of Scripture which fix the Scriptural usage of the word *nābi*, it is seen that a prophet is God's spokesman. His communications are prophecy. These communications might, and in a great many instances did, have reference to the future, but they were by no means limited to the prediction, or foretelling of events yet in the future. His communications were just as much prophecy when he spoke of the past or of the present, or confined himself to the declaration of absolute or universal truths, which have no relation to time. The word prophet, then, it must be admitted, does not merely signify one who predicts future events, nor is the term prophecy to be confined to the prediction of such events. The prophet is a forthteller as well as a foreteller. He is the spokesman of God to communicate His messages to men. Originally and primarily the prophet is an orator, a preacher, a spiritual guide, the interpreter of God's will to the people, or, in the words of Dr. Workman, "a prophet in the technical sense of the term was a religious teacher, possessed of spiritual insight, whose office it was to declare the Divine will, and to interpret the Divine purpose. His declarations had reference sometimes to the past, sometimes to the present and sometimes to the future."

The lecturer of last year, Rev. S. Sellery, B.D., says: "I find Professor Workman is in agreement with Archdeacon Farrar and other distinguished Biblical scholars in maintaining that the predictive element in prophecy is secondary; that the definite announcement of events yet distant is but a small and subordinate part of the prophet's mission. In other words, the prophets were not so much foretellers as forthtellers; they dealt not so much with future contingencies as with present realities; they disclosed the concealed facts of the present rather than revealed the hidden events of the future; that is, they were interpreters of God's will to the people. They were moral teachers; they were spiritual guides." Farrar is also quoted, and expresses himself thus: "It is of the deepest importance for any

genuine comprehension of the prophets in their real grandeur, to see that they were preachers of righteousness, statesmen and patriots, enlightened to teach an ever-apostatizing nation."

In theological matters, it is an old saying that what is new is not true, and what is true is not new. Judged by this criterion, the characterization of the prophet's office, as given by Farrar and Workman, is a correct one, and the opinion expressed by them, if new to us, is not new to the theological world. In the introduction to his commentary on Isaiah (the unabridged edition of which was published nearly fifty years ago), we find Dr. Joseph Addison Alexander, of Princeton, a pillar of orthodoxy in his day, setting forth similar views. His words are: "The gift of prophecy included that of foresight and prediction, but it included more. The prophet was inspired to reveal the will of God, to act as an organ of communication between God and man. The subject of the revelations thus conveyed was not and could not be restricted to the future. It embraced the past and present, and extended to those absolute and universal truths which have no relation to time. That the prophets of the old dispensation were not mere foretellers of things in the future is apparent from their history, as well as their writings. It has been well said that Daniel proved himself a prophet by telling Nebuchadnezzar what he had dreamed, as much as by interpreting the dream itself; that it was only by prophetic inspiration that Elisha knew what Gehazi had been doing; and that the woman of Samaria very properly called Christ a prophet because He told her all the things that ever she did. In all these cases and in multitudes of others the essential idea is that of inspiration, its frequent references to things still future being accidental, that is to say, not included in the uniform and necessary import of the terms."

Now, a word or two in explanation as to how it has come about that the terms *prophet* and *prophecy* have acquired the narrow and restricted conception with which their meaning is commonly associated. Alexander says: "The restriction of these terms in modern parlance to the prediction of events still future has arisen from the fact that a large proportion of the revelations made in Scripture, and precisely those which are the

most surprising and impressive, are of this description. The frequency of such revelations and the prominence given to them, not in this modern usage merely, but in the Word of God itself, admit of easy explanation. It is partly owing to the fact that revelations of the future world would be naturally sought with more avidity and treated with more deference than any other by mankind in general. It is further owing to the fact that of all kinds of revelation, this is the one which affords the most direct and convincing proof of the prophet's inspiration. The knowledge of the present, or of the past, or of general truths, might be imparted by special inspiration, but it might be acquired in other ways, and this possibility, of course, makes the evidence of inspiration thus afforded more complete and irresistible than any other. Hence the function of foretelling what was future, although but a part of the prophetic office, was peculiarly conspicuous and prominent in public view, and apt to be more intimately associated with the office itself in the memory of man. The restriction in modern usage of the term prophet to one who predicts future events, and prophecy to the prediction of these events, has arisen from the fact that a large portion of the prophetic writings, and precisely that very portion which is likely to impress the reader, is of this description." But the Scriptures of both the Old and New Testaments make it manifest that the terms in question are not to be thus restricted, but also admit of the sense of declaration and interpretation. We dismiss this part of the subject by saying the word prophet does not signify merely one who predicts future events, nor is the term prophecy to be restricted to the prediction of such events. The prophet may sometimes be a foreteller; he is always a forthteller, declaring or interpreting the mind of God to the children of men.

These somewhat lengthy remarks anent prophet and prophecy are in place in our present discussion, as Habakkuk the prophet stands before us as a great moral teacher rather than a predictor of specific future events. "Habakkuk," says Pusey, "is the prophet of reverential awe-filled faith. This is the soul and centre of his prophecy. Prophecy in Habakkuk, full as it is, is almost subordinate. His main subject is that

which occupied Asaph in the seventy-third Psalm—the afflictions of the righteous amid the prosperity of the wicked.” Farrar adds his testimony to that of Pusey, and says of Habakkuk: “He is far more a moral seer and a deep theologian than a herald of the future. The predictive element in him is almost reduced to nothing (for the Chaldean invasion which he prophesied was already on the horizon), the spiritual is almost exclusively predominant.”

Before considering “the *Burden* which Habakkuk the prophet did see,” it will be proper to say a word as to the time in which he flourished. Pusey and others think that he exercised his prophetic ministry in the reign of Josiah, B.C. about 626, but the greater number of critics, with greater show of probability, conclude that the period in which he discharged his office as a prophet was in the reign of Jehoiakim, somewhere between B.C. 610 and 598, and near the actual commencement of the Babylonian captivity.

We are now prepared to direct our attention more fully to “the *Burden* which Habakkuk the prophet did see.”

The word *burden*, *massá*, מַסָּה is of frequent occurrence in the prophetic writings, noticeably in Isaiah, who speaks of the burden of Moab, Damascus, Egypt, Dumah, Arabia, Tyre: and Nahum also speaks of the burden of Nineveh. The literal meaning of the word *massá* is a lifting up, as of the voice, and besides its common meaning of a load (for which several other terms were used), it frequently occurs in the prophetic writings in the special signification of an oracle of God. Sometimes it is used in the sense of a denunciation of evil; yet it did not exclusively imply grievous and heavy tidings, but a message from God, whether its import were joyous or afflictive. “The burden which Habakkuk the prophet did see” is used as the heading for the whole book. The burden is a message from the Lord which Habakkuk, as the Lord’s spokesman, was called to deliver, and it is a burden, indeed, because it announces heavy judgments upon the covenant nation and the imperial power of Chaldea. The subjects treated by the prophet are three; the first subject is faith, struggling under the oppressive sight of the afflictions of the good at the hands of the wicked

among God's covenant people, Israel. The second is the sufferings of the covenant people themselves, as meted out to them by the Chaldeans, who are God's instruments for the avengement of that wickedness. The third, that of the prophet's great hymn, is faith, not jubilant until the end, yet victorious, praying, believing, seeing in vision what it prays for, and triumphing in that of which it sees no tokens, and whose only earnest is God's old lovingkindnesses to His people.

"The burden which Habakkuk the prophet did see," as to its literary character, takes the form of a colloquy or dialogue, in which the prophet first speaks in the name of the true Israel as an advocate of righteousness, and when he had poured out his complaint concerning the wickedness that abounded among the elect people, he takes the other part in the dialogue, and becomes the spokesman of God, and makes known the Divine purposes in regard to the punishment of Israel's crimes. The first colloquy extends from verse 2 to verse 11 of chapter i. It contains a grievous complaint, and the Divine answer thereto. The prophet opens it with a reverential, earnest appeal to God, like that of the saints under the altar in the Apocalypse. "How long?" he cries, and prays that God would end or mitigate the violence, oppressions, strife, contentions, despoiling, powerlessness of the law, crookedness of justice, entrapping of the righteous by the wicked then rampant.

Hear the words of his complaint. I borrow the spirited translation of Lange's commentary :

" How long, Jehovah, do I cry ?
 And thou hearest not ?
 I cry to thee, ' Violence !'
 And thou helpest not.
 Why dost thou let me see wickedness ?
 And why dost thou look upon distress ?
 Oppression and violence are before me,
 And there is strife, and contention exalts itself.
 Therefore the law is slack ;
 Justice no more goes forth ;
 For the wicked compass about the righteous,
 Therefore justice goes forth perverted."

To this grievous complaint, God replies by summoning the

attention of the nations at large to the manner in which He works His sovereign will. His answer in effect is that a terrible day of retribution is coming, that He himself would raise up, as the instrument of His chastisements, a nation, rough, restless, aggressive, terrible, self-centred, owning no law or authority but its own will, deifying its own power, sweeping the whole breadth of the land, and taking possession of it, capturing every fenced city and gathering captives like the dust, mocking at kings and laughing at strongholds, and that this fierce and terrible nation should be the executor of His will in bringing to punishment the wickedness that abounded among the covenant people, Israel. He further intimates that this scourge should pass away, and that the invaders, through the instruments of the Divine vengeance, should not themselves be held guiltless.

Let me read to you, from the version in Lange's Commentary, Jehovah's answer to the prophet's grievous complaint. Jehovah is introduced as summoning attention :

“ Look among the nations and see !
And be ye amazed, be amazed ;
For I am about to work a work in your days,
Ye will not believe it, though it were told.”

He then proceeds :

“ For behold ! I am about to raise up the Chaldeans,
That bitter and impetuous nation,
Which marches over the breadths of the earth
To take possession of dwelling-places that do not belong to it.
It is terrible and dreadful :
Its right and its eminence proceed from itself.
And swifter than leopards are its horses,
And speedier than the evening wolves ;
Its horsemen spring proudly along,
And its horsemen come from afar :
They fly like an eagle hastening to devour.

“ It comes wholly for violence :
The host of their faces is forward ;
And it collects captives like the sand.

“ And it scoffs at kings ;
 And princes are a laughter to it :
 It laughs at every stronghold,
 And heaps up earth and takes it.

“ Then its spirit revives,
 And it passes on and contracts guilt :
 This, its strength, is its god.”

The first half of Habakkuk's question, that in regard to the prosperity of the wicked among his own people, is answered by God's announcing His purpose of raising the Chaldeans to be the instruments for inflicting His chastisements on the wicked in Israel. The other half as to the suffering condition of the righteous it leaves unanswered, for such scourges of God swept away the righteous with the wicked.

In the second dialogue, which extends from the twelfth verse of the first chapter to the end of the second chapter, Habakkuk renews the question as to the righteous. This dialogue, like the former one, has a complaint on the part of the prophet, and an answer thereto from the Lord. The prophet wants to know why Jehovah, the Eternal One, the Holy One, employs the Chaldeans to be the instruments of inflicting His chastisements on His own people when they were more wicked than the chosen nation itself.

The prophet, in putting his complaint into words exclaims :

“ Art thou not from eternity,
 Jehovah, my God, my Holy One ?

“ Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil ;
 Thou canst not look upon injustice.
 Why lookest thou upon the treacherous ?
 Why art thou silent when the wicked destroys
 Him that is more righteous than he ?”

In the remaining verses of the first chapter, the prophet describes with the vividness of one who saw it before him the irresistible invasion of the Chaldeans. Israel was meshed in a net, should that net be emptied ? The second chapter commences with the prophet waiting in silent expectation for the answer. He says :

“I will stand upon my watchpost,
And station myself upon the fortress ;
And I will wait to see what He will say to me,
And what I shall answer to my complaint.”

In due course, Jehovah gives the answer to his complaint :

“And Jehovah answered me and said :
Write the vision, and grave it on tablets,
That he may run who reads it.”

It was no promise of immediate deliverance. The deliverance will surely come and will not fail, but he must wait for it.

The answer is :

“Behold the proud :
His soul is not right within him
But the just by his faith shall live.”

“In one short saying,” remarks Canon Cook, “the two general aspects of the prophet’s enquiry are dealt with; the pride and injustice of the invader are dealt with, and the just man is assured of *life, i.e.,* preservation from evil and salvation, on condition that he hold steadfastly to the principle of faith.” The swelling pride and self-dependence of the Chaldee stands in contrast with the trustful submission of faith.

“Short, and, at first sight, irrelevant as the oracle may seem,” says Farrar, “it contains all that is necessary for the justification of God and the consolation of man. It is enough to know that the Chaldee is inflated with pride though he is living by robbery and wrong. In that pride and injustice lie the germs of his future destruction, though the destruction may be long delayed. And the righteousness of the righteous does not only contain *the promise of life—it is life.* . . . The just man, the ideal nation is not under any crushing disadvantage. His justice is his crown of life and rejoicing. It is not he that needs to be pitied, but his oppressor. Yes! for the pride of the Chaldee is an inflation like that of drunkenness. His greed is as insatiable as death, and all the nations gathered under his crushing sway shall rise and taunt him.”

The taunts of the nations are given in five strophes, which

heap up the several accusations against the Chaldeans for their rapacity, selfish greed, their ambitious buildings, their insulting corruption of the nations, and their senseless idolatry. Each strophe comprises three verses.

Rapacity of the Chaldeans :

“Woe to him that increases what is not his own !
How long ?
And who loads himself with pledges.
Will not thy biters rise up suddenly,
And those awake that shall shake thee violently,
And thou wilt become a prey to them.”

Their selfishness :

“Woe to him that procureth wicked gain to his house !
To set his nest on high,
To preserve himself from the hand of calamity.
“Thou hast devised shame for thy house ;
Cutting off many peoples and sinning against thyself.
“For the stone cries out from the wall
And the spar out of the woodwork answers it.”

Their vain ambition :

“Woe to him that builds a city with blood,
And founds a town in wickedness.
“Behold, is it not from Jehovah of hosts
That the people toil for the fire,
And the nations weary themselves for vanity ?
For the earth shall be filled
With the knowledge of the glory of Jehovah,
As the waters cover the sea.”

Their cruel drunkenness :

“Woe to him that gives his neighbor to drink,
Pouring out thy wrath and also making drunk
In order to look upon their nakedness.”
“Thou art sated with shame instead of glory ;
Drink thou also, and show thyself uncircumcised :
The cup of Jehovah's right hand shall come round to thee,
And ignominy shall be upon thy glory.”

Their idolatry.

“What profits the graven image, that its maker has carved it ?
 The molten image and the teacher of falsehood,
 That the maker of his image trusts in him to make dumb idols ?
 Woe to him that says to the wood, awake !
 To the dumb stone, arise !
 It teach ! Behold it is overlaid with gold and silver ; and there is no
 breath in its inside.”

Such is the five-fold cry of various oppressed nationalities as they take up their proverbs and serious taunts against the Chaldean power. But filled with yet deeper thoughts the prophet exclaims :

“Jehovah is in His holy temple,
 Let all the earth be silent before Him !”

The third chapter—one of the most magnificent pieces of poetry in the Bible—is called “A prayer of Habakkuk the prophet, set to Shigionoth.” The expression, “set to Shigionoth,” is a musical term, and has no connection with the prophecy. It might be rendered, “with triumphal music, or “to the Music of Psalms of Ecstasy.” This liturgical definition, like almost all such terms preserved in the Old Testament, is obscure, and since tradition in these things is quite unreliable, its signification can only be conjectured. “Upon or set to Shigionoth” is rendered “after the manner of dithyramb.”

The dithyramb, it may be said in passing, was a kind of poetry, chiefly cultivated in Athens, of a *lofty* but usually *inflated* style, originally in honor of Bacchus, afterwards also of the other gods. It was the germ of the choral element in the Attic tragedy. It was sung to the accompaniment of the flute, while the rest of the chorus danced in a circle around the altar of the god. Plutarch describes dithyrambs as being “full of passion and change, with motions and agitations to and fro.”

“The prayer of Habakkuk the prophet” is for a revival of God’s work for Israel. He cries out :

“O Jehovah ! I have heard the report of thee, I am afraid ;
 O Jehovah ! revive thy work in the midst of the years ;
 In the midst of the years make it known :
 In wrath remember mercy.”

His prayer is scarcely uttered before there swells forth a hymn of praise for the congregation. It describes the glorious manifestation of Jehovah when in the days of old He came for the deliverance of His people :

“ God comes from Teman,
And the Holy One from Mount Paran.
His splendor covers the heavens,
And the earth is full of His glory.

“ And the brightness is like the sun
Rays stream from His hand,
And there is the hiding of His power.

“ Before Him goes the plague,
And burning pestilence follows His feet.
He stands and measures the earth :
He looks, and makes nations tremble.
The everlasting mountains are broken in pieces,
The eternal hills sink down :
His ways are everlasting.”

The dividing of the Red Sea and the Jordan, the standing still of the sun and moon under Joshua, are tokens or images of yet future deliverances. All nature shakes and quivers at the presence of its Maker ; yet not nature but the wicked are the objects of His displeasure. The prophet sees God's people delivered as at the Red Sea, just when the enemy seemed ready to sweep them away as with a whirlwind ; but since the fact still remains that the Chaldean is at hand, and there is no present help, he is filled with anguish and trembling at the thought that he must but sit still and wait quietly for the day of distress when he that approaches the nation shall press upon it. He concludes with that wondrous declaration of faith, though all nature should be desolate, all subsistence gone, and everything contrary to God's promises of old to His people should be around him, yet, says he, “ I will rejoice in the Lord, I will exult for joy in the God of my salvation.”

He exclaims :

“ For the fig tree will not blossom ;
And there is no produce on the vines ;
The fruit of the olive tree fails,
And the fields bear no food :

The flock is cut off from the fold ;
 And there is no cattle in the stalls.
 But I will exult in Jehovah,
 And rejoice in the God of my salvation.

“ Jehovah, the Lord, is my strength,
 And makes my feet like the hinds,
 And causes me to walk upon my high places.”

So ends the prayer and the poem, and to it is appended the musical direction, “To the chief singer on my stringed instruments.”

Before passing on to the spiritual lessons which we may derive from our study of “the burden which Habakkuk the prophet did see,” a few remarks on the position of our prophet in the order of the Minor twelve and a brief reference to his literary style will be in place. Habakkuk stands eighth in that order and is immediately preceded by Nahum. As Nahum is important in the succession of prophecy, in that his book concludes the Assyrian series, so is Habakkuk, in that he with Jeremiah begins the Babylonian. His place in the Canon is justified, not only by the close relationship of the contents to those of Nahum but also by the inscription, “The Burden.” Just as the *massaim*, the Burdens are placed together in the book of Isaiah, so also are they in the book of the Minor Prophets.

Concerning the coincidences with the earlier prophets however proportionally few in Habakkuk, they are more numerous than in Nahum. With the mantle of the prophet our author bears also the chaplet of the poet, and a rich acquaintance with the Psalms is a noticeable feature in Habakkuk, as it is also in Micah and Nahum, and in that respect corresponds with the lyric character of the book. Michaelis, after a close examination, pronounces him to be a great imitator of former poets but with some new additions of his own which are characterized by brevity and no common degree of sublimity.

Critics, both ancient and modern, have been unanimous in assigning Habakkuk a very distinguished place among the sacred poets. “The imagery of Habakkuk,” said Daniel Webster, “is unsurpassed in all literature.” It is especially the peculiar strophic character of Chapter ii. with its awful five-

fold woes denounced against the Chaldeans, and "that matchless Pindaric ode," as Ewald calls the anthem in Chapter iii., which have challenged such universal admiration. Of this famous ode in the third and concluding chapter, it has been said: "For the boldness and rapidity of its flights, the sublimity and grasp of its conceptions, the magnificence of its imagery and the music and melody of its rhythm, it stands unsurpassed in all the whole compass of Hebrew poetry. There is nothing nobler in Isaiah, more daring in Ezekiel or more gorgeous in the latter sections of Job. This, his last strain, is as of a second David leaping from crag to crag like the free gazelle, in a strength mightier than his own."

We summarize our remarks on Habakkuk's literary style by saying that for grandeur and sublimity of conception, for vigor and fervor of expression, for gorgeousness of imagery and for melody of language, the book of his prophecy ranks among the very first productions of sacred literature.

We invite your attention now to some of the spiritual lessons which the study of "the burden which Habakkuk the prophet did see" may teach us for our own benefit and the benefit of those who receive the Divine message from our lips.

First lesson: Of general application in Church and State; in the Church as representing those who professedly stand in covenant relations with God, and the State or nation, which like the Chaldeans makes no acknowledgment of His supremacy. For each alike, the lesson to be learned from Habakkuk is this: "The face of the Lord is against them that do evil." "Though hand join in hand the wicked shall not be unpunished." "Woe unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him, for the rewards of his hands shall be given him."

"But the Lord is in his holy temple, let all the earth keep silence before him."

The second lesson is for all saints, whether in the prophetic line or out of it, who worry over the wickedness that abounds within and without the Church, and to them the book of Habakkuk would say: "Fret not thyself because of evildoers, neither be thou envious against the workers of iniquity. Rest in the Lord and wait patiently for him; fret not thyself be-

cause of him who prospereth in his way, because of the man who bringeth wicked devices to pass. Cease from anger and forsake wrath, fret not thyself in any wise to do evil; for evil-doers shall be cut off, but those that wait upon the Lord, they shall inherit the earth. For yet a little while and the wicked shall not be; yea, thou shalt diligently consider his place and it shall not be. But the meek shall inherit the earth and shall delight themselves in the abundance of peace."

"The just by his faith shall live."

The third lesson that Habakkuk may teach us is that, amid circumstances of the greatest destitution and distress that may come to God's children during their earthly pilgrimage, it is their privilege and duty to bring into their practice the apostolic injunction embodied in the precept, "Rejoice evermore." "Rejoice in *the Lord* always, and again I say rejoice," or as Habakkuk beautifully expresses it, "Although the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines, the labor of the olive shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat; the flock shall be cut off from the fold and there shall be no herd in the stalls, yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation."

Lucan, Ont.

E. A. CHOWN.

THE NATURE OF CHRIST'S ATONEMENT.

A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE FORMULATION OF A CONSISTENT ARMINIAN THEORY.

ARTICLE V.

THEORIES INTO WHICH THE THOUGHTS OF THE CENTURIES HAVE CRYSTALLIZED.

SECTION IV. HUGO GROTIUS.

HUGO GROTIUS was born at Delft, April 10th, 1583. It has been truthfully remarked that his "Is one of the most illustrious names in literature, politics and theology."¹ The only work of his with which we are at present concerned is entitled

1. McClintock & Strong's Cyclopaedia, Vol. III., p. 1017.

“A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ, Against Faustus Socinus.” This furnishes the opportunity to remark that the critics would have dealt more fairly with Grotius if they had always borne in mind that his book was written as a reply to Socinus, rather than as an attempt to develop or promulgate a theory of his own. The cast of the work itself was determined by the writings of Socinus rather than by the taste or predilections of its author. Socinus had founded his objection to the generally received doctrine on confessedly legal grounds. The previous training of Grotius qualified him, perhaps, better than any man of his age, to look at the atonement of Christ from a legal standpoint. We have the authority of Vossius for saying, that in dealing with Socinus, Grotius felt himself shut up to this particular course. This fact may account for some of the acute legal distinctions with which the book abounds, and may also account for his evident departure from the doctrine as held by the Reformed Churches of his day.

Grotius starts out by defining the doctrine of atonement as he understood it and as he proposed to defend it: “God,” he says, “was moved by His own goodness to bestow distinguished blessings upon us. But since our sins, which deserved punishment, were an obstacle to this, He determined that Christ, being willing of His own love toward men, should, by bearing the most severe tortures, and a bloody and ignominious death, pay the penalty for our sins, in order that, without prejudice to the exhibition of the Divine justice, we might be liberated, upon the intervention of a true faith, from the punishment of eternal death.”¹ At the outset it is extremely important that we should not read into the terms of this definition a signification which they did not wear in the mind of Grotius. It must be remembered that he was an Arminian, and this fact places him in a position of equal antagonism to Calvinism on the one hand, and to Socinianism upon the other; he could not, therefore, hold with the former that the atonement was the satisfaction of justice, in any retributive sense, any more than he could

1. “The Defence,” ch. 1, pp. 1, 2. The edition quoted is translated by F. H. Foster, Ph.D., and published by W. F. Draper, Andover, 1839.

hold with the latter that God could forgive sin without any satisfaction whatsoever. Hence, though the words "penalty" and "punishment" are freely scattered over the pages of "The Defence," we must not attach to them any such significance as they are intended to bear in the theological writings of the divines of the Reformed Church of his day. With Grotius these terms mean the sufferings which Christ endured as our substitute, and in virtue of which we may be delivered from that punishment which our sin had deserved. This we deem to be the import of the Scriptures as interpreted by Grotius. We think it has been previously shown¹ that these terms cannot, in any accurate, philosophical sense, be applied to the suffering and death of Jesus Christ, for then He must have suffered exactly as we should have done had He not intervened on our behalf. This position has now been long abandoned as untenable. There is, therefore, on the part of all, a deviation from the strict meaning of these terms. All that Grotius did was to carry this principle of deviation from strict philosophic accuracy a little further than others had been accustomed to do. And when once the principle has been admitted, where is the authority for saying it must stop just at a given point? That we have given the correct interpretation of these terms as used by Grotius is evident from the fact that he uses them to describe the sufferings which come upon men on account of the sins of others, which cannot, according to our judgment, in a strict and proper sense be called punishments.

The root principle of "The Defence" is found in the fact that in Atonement God is regarded as a ruler rather than as a judge. Grotius says, "Socinus confesses that we are treating of liberation from punishment. We add that we also are speaking of the infliction of punishment. From this it follows that in all this subject God must be treated as a ruler. For to inflict punishment, or to liberate anyone from punishment whom you can punish (which the Scripture calls justifying), is only the prerogative of the ruler as such, primarily and *per se*; as, for example, of a father in a family, of a king in a state, of God in the universe. Although this is manifest to all, yet it

1. See Article II. of this series.

can easily be proved from the consideration that punishment is the last thing in compulsion." Again: "Our assertion needs the less proof because Socinus himself somewhere confesses that God in punishing and acquitting men must be regarded as a prince, than which no remark could be more true." And again: "God is not here to be looked at as a judge placed under the law. Such a judge as that could not liberate the guilty from punishment, even by transferring the punishment to another."¹ This is the peculiar merit, or, as some would say, the demerit of this book of Grotius, which depends altogether upon the standpoint from which it is contemplated. We, however, think that every candid mind must admit that he has made out a strong case, and, for the particular purpose for which he wrote, an unanswerable one. The principal points of the argument against Socinus are as follows: First, "To punish is not an act properly belonging to the offended party as such."² Second, "In the nature of things, the offended party, as such, has no right in punishment."³ Third, "The right of punishing in the ruler is neither the right of absolute ownership, nor the right over a thing loaned."⁴ The remarks of Grotius in reference to the right of the offended party are just and true in regard to material, but too sweeping altogether when applied to moral loss. He carries the principle to an extreme when he says that "God, when injured by us, is not properly a creditor in punishment."⁵ Surely the relation of God to man is of such a character, and sin against Him of such a nature that He may justly punish it as it deserves. The Psalmist was more correct in his conception when he said: "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned."⁶ It is undeniable that all sin is a personal injury done to God, and though He does not stand upon His personal right and inflict the merited punishment, but freely forgives the wrongdoer so far as his sin is a personal injury, it is surely poor logic to say a right does not exist because it is not exercised. Where no right is given up there can be no exercise of mercy. "We

1. "The Defence," ch. 2, pp. 51, 52 and 53.

2. "The Defence," ch. 2, p. 55.

3. *Ibid.* p. 53.

4. *Ibid.* p. 64.

5. *Ibid.* p. 62.

6. Psa. li. 4.

have sinned against God as an individual being, since He has an inalienable claim to our service, but our sin is also against the well-being of all intelligent moral agents, whose rights, as the Supreme Governor, it is His office to protect, and for the defence and vindication of which He is essentially the executive power. In the former, in His individual relation, the great God, with most illustrious clemency, freely forgives, foregoes His claim, and pities the criminal; it is in the latter only—in the name of public law, instituted and to be sustained for the public safety, and of whose awards He is, not merely by delegation, but originally and necessarily, the executive power—in this character only that He either exacts the penalty or receives the ransom.”¹ Whatever of defect or excess there may be in this second chapter of “The Defence,” one thing is certain, Grotius demonstrates the proposition he set out to prove, viz., that in the work of Atonement God is to be regarded as moral Governor of the world. And it is a most significant fact that the most strenuous defenders of the doctrine of penal satisfaction have borrowed his line of defence against Socinians. Even so astute a writer as Turretin employs the identical thought and almost the exact language of Grotius. “God here is not merely a creditor, who may at pleasure remit what is his due, nor merely the party offended who may do as he will with his own claims without injury to anyone; but He is also a judge and rectoral governor, to whom alone pertains the infliction of punishment upon offenders, and the power of remitting the penal sanction of the law. This, all jurists know, belongs to the chief magistrate alone.”² The irreconcilability of this language with what immediately follows is no concernment of ours. This quotation is intended simply and only to show that the ground taken by Grotius is the only consistent and effectual answer to Socinus. He has not and cannot be answered from the standpoint of a satisfaction to God’s retributive justice.

From the fact that God is, in atonement, to be regarded as a Ruler, it is concluded that the atonement itself must be con-

1. Rev. J. Gilbert, “The Christian Atonement,” p. 174. There is a note of great value commencing on p. 375, in which this question is sifted to the bottom with the candor, ability, and thoroughness which is so characteristic of this volume.

2. Turretin “On the Atonement,” p. 18.

sidered as a measure belonging to the administration of justice. Here there are two points to be noted; we may consider the act in its relation to penal law, or to equity. If we look at it in the latter aspect, Grotius says, "The act of God, of which we treat, will be the punishment of one to obtain the impunity of another:"¹ but if "we have regard to the sanction, or penal law, the act will be a method of relaxing or moderating the same law, which relaxation we call, in these days, dispensation."² In arguing out what is here called the "moderating or relaxing" of law, it is shown: that the law has neither been executed, abrogated, nor interpreted according to equity.³ Law is said to be relaxable because it "is not something internal within God, or the will of God itself, but only an effect of that will."⁴ Grotius acutely distinguishes between a promise to reward and a threat to punish; the former cannot be taken away, the latter is deserved, but it is not absolutely necessary to inflict it. He says, "Although it is optional to promise, yet to break promises is not optional."⁵ "He who has committed a crime, deserves punishment, and is on that account liable to punishment, which necessarily follows, from the very relation of sin and the sinner to the superior, and is properly natural. But that all sinners should be punished with a punishment corresponding to the crime is not simply and universally necessary, nor properly natural, but only harmonious with nature. Hence it follows that nothing prevents the law which demands this from being relaxable."⁶ This relaxation of law is not, however, allowable on any or every occasion; but God "had a most weighty reason, when the whole human race had fallen into sin, for relaxing the law. If all sinners had been delivered over to eternal death, from the nature of the case, two most beautiful things would have entirely perished: on the part of men religion toward God, and on the part of God the declara-

1. "The Defence," ch. 3, p. 73.

2. *Ibid.* p. 73.

3. *Ibid.* pp. 73, 74.

4. *Ibid.* p. 75.

5. *Ibid.* p. 76.

6. *Ibid.* pp. 77, 78.

tion of special favor toward men."¹ This third chapter of "The Defence" is the one which has been most strenuously attacked by the defenders of the doctrine of penal satisfaction; for if the relaxation of law be admitted, the ground is entirely cut from under their feet. Dr. Shedd quotes the most of it,² and then charges Grotius with separating the Divine will from the Divine nature. We do not agree with the views of Grotius concerning the relation of the law to the will of God: but Dr. Shedd is further from the truth on one side than Grotius is on the other. There is nothing in Grotius, unless it has been overlooked contrary to the statement of Dr. Shedd that law is "the pure and necessary issue of the principle of justice in the Divine mind."³ In reply to the objection of Socinus, that primitive justice does not reside in God, but that it is an effect of His will, Grotius says: "Certainly the act of punishing is an effect of the will; but the justice or rectitude from which other things as well as the execution of punishment spring, is an attribute residing in God."⁴ But when Dr. Shedd says that Divine law "is incapable of 'relaxation,'"⁵ he assumes a position which it is impossible to maintain; for, on Dr. Shedd's own showing, the law has been relaxed; he says, "The sufferings of Christ are not identical with those of the sinner, but they are of strictly equal value."⁶ Dr. Shedd claims that there is no relaxation of penal law in the case as just stated. Now, we submit that if there had been no relaxation, the sinner must himself have suffered to the uttermost rigor the demands of law; that on this ground the idea of a substitute had been utterly ruled out. Even if the idea of substitution had been admissible, without relaxation the substitute must have borne exactly that which was deserved—both in kind and degree—by the person whose place the substitute had taken. Now Dr. Shedd not only does not claim, but denies that this has taken place; there must, therefore, have been relaxation somewhere. When the historian turns critic it is expected that he will

1. "The Defence," ch. 3, pp. 79, 80.

2. "History of Christian Doctrine," Vol. II., ch. 5, sec. 2.

3. *Ibid.* p. 335.

4. "The Defence," ch. 5, p. 110; see also, pp. 102, 103.

5. "History of Christian Doctrine," Vol. II., p. 356.

6. *Ibid.* pp. 359, 360.

answer the positions of his opponent, otherwise it had been better to be historian only. Dr. Shedd, as critic, attacks in Grotius a principle which lies at the base of the theory of which Dr. Shedd is the advocate.

The views of Grotius regarding the justice of God are somewhat fragmentary, appearing here and there as the exigencies of the discussion required. Careful examination and comparison of one place with another are necessary, otherwise we shall do him the wrong so many have done in attributing to him views he did not hold. That he believed justice, even in a punitive aspect, to be an essential attribute of Deity we have seen above. In our study of his book, however, it is essential to remember that he is discussing, not the essential nature of God, but God in His relation of moral governor of the world. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that Grotius deals with justice chiefly as a principle in the administration of government rather than as an attribute of the Divine nature. Surely this is a very different matter to affirming that there is no such attribute essential in the Divine essence, as many of his reviewers would have us believe he does. And Grotius was right as the incontestable logic of fact demonstrates. That fact is that the sentence pronounced upon sinners has not been executed. Had justice, as an attribute of Deity been allowed to take its course without any other consideration, that sentence must have been executed. Why the suspension? What considerations came into play to modify the justice inherent in the nature of God? Grotius' answer is God's love to men and His desire for their well-being. Is this arrest of penalty unjust? Grotius answers, no; for it has been accomplished by a method which demonstrates at once God's hatred of sin, His respect for the honour of law, and his compassionate regard for man. In the estimation of Grotius the atonement of Christ was a wise and just measure to secure the ends of moral government, and permitted the exercise of the Governor's prerogative to pardon the guilty on such conditions as should secure the general good.¹

1. The following note contains, on the whole, a fair presentation of Grotius' views on this subject: "The justice of God demands the eternal punishment of every sinner. If justice is satisfied, this result inevitably follows. When men have sinned, nothing remains but to forgive

There is here no underestimate of the terrible evil, or of the malignant nature of sin. Prof. Smeaton affirms that Grotius' "views of sin are shallow."¹ Surely the learned Professor must have overlooked the opening of the third chapter of "The Defence," where sin is described as "having an intrinsic depravity from the immutable nature of the case, or also an extrinsic depravity on account of the contrary precept of God, deserved, on that very account, some punishment, and that, too, a grave one."² Again, he says, "Every sin is seriously displeasing to God, and the more displeasing, the more grave it is. . . . God has, therefore, most weighty reasons for punishing, especially if we are permitted to estimate the magnitude and multitude of sins. But because, among all His attributes, love of the human race is pre-eminent, God was willing, though He could have justly punished the sins of all men with deserved and legitimate punishment, that is, with eternal death, and had reasons for so doing, to spare those who believe in Christ. But since we must be spared by setting forth, or not setting forth,

them, or permit a whole race to be lost; that is, God must either *wave* the demands of justice, or He must *execute* them to the eternal destruction of all men. His love prompts Him to forgive. But the question arises, May not free forgiveness result in harm on the whole, even if it does benefit a few? May not love in its broad sense, as love to the whole, *oppose* forgiveness as well as *suggest* it? Evidently it does, for free forgiveness will do great harm in breaking down the authority of God's law, and thus injuriously affecting God's government over the entire universe, as well as over the race of man. All moral beings, angels as well as men, would say, upon seeing the free forgiveness of men, that God was a *weak* ruler, and thus be *tempted* to sin against Him; but, what is of vastly greater importance, they would say that He was an unrighteous ruler. A righteous ruler must *disapprove* of sin. But to forgive is to express approval of the *sinner*, and thus to express approval of the *sin*, unless something else shall, at the same time, exhibit the contrary feeling. But God cannot express approval of sin without not simply *appearing* to be, but *being* an unrighteous ruler, and so He cannot forgive sin freely without being, an unrighteous ruler. Now, the government of God rests upon His character. It is good because God is good, and so may claim the submission of creatures ultimately because He is good. If He should forgive sin without atonement, His subjects would therefore feel *called upon in conscience*, and by the deepest feelings of their nature, to rebel against Him, that they might serve some righteous ruler; that is, to leave the service of Him who would thus have proved himself to be no true God, in order to serve Him who should be the true God. Regard for His own government, therefore, both on the side of love for man and love for Himself, impelled God not to forgive men without atonement.

God therefore determines to set up an example in the affliction (or, as Grotius inexactly called it, the punishment) of Christ, in order that while forgiving men for Christ's sake, He might express in that death for the sake of which they were forgiven, His disapproval of sin. The punishment of sinners is *just*, and the affliction of Christ is *not unjustly* substituted for their punishment. Accordingly, God *expresses* the demands of justice, and His regard for them, while, at the same time, He does the only thing that He can do, if He will save sinners, and *waves* its real claim." Prof. Foster's "Notes" to his translation of Grotius, pp. 280-282.

1. "The Apostles' Doctrine of the Atonement," p. 535.

2. "The Defence," ch. 3, p. 72.

some example against so many great sins, in His most perfect wisdom He chose that way by which He could manifest more of His attributes at once, viz., both clemency and severity, or His hate of sin and care for the preservation of His law."¹ Now, if Grotius had taken "shallow" views of sin, it is not likely that he would have taken such pains as he has done to bring out the infinite efficacy of Christ's atoning work, especially as viewed from the standpoint of His incarnation. Socinus had intimated that the consummate perfection of Christ's person gave no weight to His sufferings. Grotius says, "But we believe otherwise. We believe that this punishment must be estimated with the consideration in mind that He who bore it was God, although He did not bear it as God. . . . The dignity of His whole person, that is, the dignity of Christ, contributed not a little to this estimation."² Alluding to this very passage, part of which he quotes, Prof. Smeaton, in his other elaborate volume on the atonement, says, "Grotius is peculiarly clear and fresh on this point."³ The Professor's statements do not harmonize. If sin were a slight evil, assuredly there was no need for such a sacrifice as Grotius makes out Christ's to have been.

While, therefore, we do not find in Grotius any undervaluation of the evil of sin, nor a blind justice working ruthlessly on, we do find an admirable tempering of justice with love similar to that which shines so conspicuously on the pages of Holy Scripture. This may be seen in the passage just quoted from ch. 5, p. 107. Here is another similar statement: "Further, God not only testified His own hatred of sin by this act, and so deterred us from sin (for it is an easy inference that if God would not remit the sins even of those who repented, except Christ took their punishment, much less will He permit the contumacious to go unvisited); but, more than that, He also declared in a marked way His great love for us in that we are spared by one to whom it was not a matter of indifference to punish sins, but who regarded it of so much importance

1. *Ibid.* ch. 5, p. 106, 107.

2. "The Defence," ch. 8, p. 177. See the whole paragraph, also the next.

3. "Our Lord's Doctrine of the Atonement," p. 442.

that, rather than dismiss them altogether unpunished, He delivered His only begotten Son to punishment for them! The ancients said of forgiveness that it was neither *according* to law, nor *against* law, but *above* law, and *for* law. So may we say with emphasis of this Divine grace. It is *above* law, because we are not punished; *for* law, because punishment is not omitted, and remissions granted that we may live hereafter to the divine law."¹ And, again, when replying to the argument of Socinus that it was not out of liberality that God forgives sin, Grotius says it was beneficence: "It is beneficence in the first place, because when God was moved with great hatred of sin, and could no more choose to spare us than He did the angels that sinned, yet that He might spare us He not only admitted such a payment as He was not bound to admit, but, further, He himself devised it."²

Having laid down and defended the above mentioned principles, Grotius proceeds to show that the sufferings of Christ were not unjust, in which he completely demolishes the position assumed by Socinus. His appeals to Scripture and history for confirmation show not only the depth of his insight, the breadth of his reading, and the greatness of his scholarship, but also the moral earnestness of his soul. The relation of the sufferings of Christ to sin are traced to His appointment by the Father, and to His identification of himself with the human race. In addition to former quotations we add the following: "Socinus urges that there ought to be at least some connection between the guilty man and Him who is punished. Such a connection he recognizes between a father and a son, but does not recognize between Christ and us. We might reply that no man is unconnected with another; that there is a certain natural union among men by birth and blood; that our flesh was assumed by Christ. But another and greater connection between us and Christ was designed by God. For Christ was designated by God himself as the head of the body of which we are members."³ He says again that Christ's connection with sinners was very close, "by His nature and kingdom and surety-

1. "The Defence," ch. 5, pp. 109, 110.

2. "The Defence," ch. 6, pp. 135, 136.

3. *Ibid.* ch. 4, p. 36.

ship."¹ With statements like these before us, it is strange that it could ever have been affirmed that the theory of Grotius "stands in no necessary or even real connection with sin."² According to Grotius Christ suffered and died as the substitute of the sinner to make the pardon of sin consistent with the government of God, while actual deliverance from sin is experienced only by those who with penitent hearts truly believe in Christ.

Neither do we understand, as Oxenham, Crawford and others have done, that in the estimation of Grotius, atonement was a mere governmental display. They who take this view miss the meaning of Grotius or caricature it. At the bottom of the theory propounded in "The Defence," there lies the same real thought as underlies all theories that are worth the name, viz., the demerit of sin. Grotius does not agree with many of his critics as to the mode in which that demerit is met by Jesus Christ; and we are glad that he does not; but that the demerit is recognized and met in the scheme propounded by him is, we think, undeniable. Grotius does not say that the sufferings of Christ were the exact equivalent of the punishment human sin had deserved. But when Socinus objected that no legitimate cause could be assigned for the death of Christ outside the Divine will, unless we say that He deserved to die, Grotius does say, "But that the punishment was laid upon Christ we refer to the volition of God and Christ in this sense, that that volition has its cause not in the desert of Christ (who though He knew no sin, was made sin by God), but in the consummate fitness of Christ for displaying a distinguished example. This consisted in His intimate union with us, and in the incomparable dignity of His person."³ Whatever may be said as to its value, here is certainly an objective necessity for the incarnation and death of God's only begotten Son in order to the forgiveness of sin. We do not pronounce upon the truth or falsity of the position assumed, but it does seem worthy of a better fate than caricature and hard names. Calvary was something more than "a

1. *Ibid.* ch. 4, p. 100.

2. Baur, quoted by Prof. Foster in "Notes" to "The Defence," p. 293.

3. "The Defence," ch. 5, p. 113.

grand dramatic exhibition"¹ in the estimation of the devout man who wrote "The Defence."

Baur,² Prof. Smeaton,³ and Dr. Shedd,⁴ the latter especially, makes a most determined effort to fasten the doctrine of acceptilation on Grotius.⁵ The best answer to this is Grotius' own words. Having declared that God's acts in atonement as a ruler, and that atonement is "an act of the administration of justice generally so called," he adds: "From this it follows that we are not treating here of acceptilation, as Socinus thinks, for that is not an act of the administration of justice."⁶ More at length he says in another place: "That liberation which, without any payment, entirely destroys the debt, if it is performed concerning the thing loaned with certain solemn words, is called in civil law acceptilation. But, in regard to the punishment, it has no proper name (inasmuch as it necessarily excludes payment of any kind and amount), but is called by the common names—grace, pardon, indulgence, abolition. Socinus therefore makes a two-fold mistake when he applies to that remission which God concedes to us, a word taken from the civil law, viz., acceptilation. For, in the first place, this word may be applied, even when no payment precedes, to the right over a thing loaned, but it is not, and cannot be, applied to punishment. We nowhere read that indulgence of crimes was called by the ancients acceptilation. For that is said to be accepted which can be accepted. The ruler properly exacts corporal punishment, but does not accept it, because from punishment nothing properly comes to him. But, in the next place, acceptilation is opposed to some sort of payment. Hence it is figuratively defined, an imaginary payment. But Christ gave His life a ransom

1. Oxenham, "Catholic Doctrine of Atonement," p. 237, quoted by Prof. Foster.

2. Hagenbach, "History of Doctrine," Vol. II., p. 361.

3. "The Apostles' Doctrine of the Atonement," p. 534.

4. "History of Christian Doctrine," Vol. II., p. 364.

5. Dr. Shedd professedly quotes from Grotius, ch. 7. Now, to begin with, there is nothing concerning acceptilation in ch. 7. The only passage in "The Defence" which can be compared with what purports to be a quotation from it on p. 364 of the "History of Christian Doctrine" is in ch. 6, pp. 125, 126, which are quoted below. If Dr. Shedd gives his own condensation of Grotius his quotation points are misleading. If he was quoting a condensation from some other author, he ought to have said so. One thing is certain, he is not quoting Grotius, and anyone who is willing to take the trouble can verify this for himself with the data here furnished.

6. "Defence," ch. 3, p. 72.

for us. We were bought with a price, that is, we were liberated by some payment. This is, therefore, no case of acceptilation." ¹ Here also belongs the famous distinction of Grotius between *satisfactio* and *solutio*, which is at once answer to Socinus and demonstration that he did not teach the doctrine of acceptilation; for in immediate connection with the above quotation, he says: "This is a remission with an antecedent satisfaction."² Foster says: "He (Grotius) sets payment over against acceptilation as its contradictory, but suggests also a *contrary*, satisfaction. In his mind, satisfaction is neither acceptilation nor payment; God could have refused the satisfaction of Christ, because the law demanded the punishment of the guilty one himself. The mere substitution of another as payer (in case of punishment, not in debt), makes the punishment the payment of another thing. But the payment offered—the satisfaction—accomplished the desired objects, and accordingly was accepted. God was not bound to accept, hence it is satisfaction, not payment. But it was in itself sufficient, hence it is satisfaction, not acceptilation."³

Dr. Dale, with evident approval, quotes Ritschl as saying that Grotius gave up "the idea of penal satisfaction for past sins, and substituted for it the idea of a penal example for the prevention of future sins."⁴ Prof. Smeaton has a similar expression: "It means no more than that a certain expedient was adopted to *deter from sin in future*, or to influence other orders of being in the universe."⁵ Grotius took special pains to guard against this misconception of his position. After quoting Heb. ix. 25-28, he says: "The sacrifice of Christ will appear to differ from the Levitical in that the power of the latter was limited by the space of a year; but the power of the former extended itself through all ages, since His passion was regarded by God as completed before all ages, though in fact completed at a fixed time, and so the decree of God has thus been openly revealed to us. . . . These words have evidently no force except the

1. "Defence," ch. 6, pp. 125, 126.

2. *Ibid.* p. 128.

3. "Notes" to "The Defence," pp. 235, 236.

4. "The Atonement," p. 236.

5. "The Apostles' Doctrine of the Atonement," pp. 535, 536.

power of the death of Christ extends itself to all sins which have ever been remitted to men from the beginning of the world, just as judgment after death extends to all those sins which the man has committed during life."¹ "The effect of the oblation of Christ was extended to all the sins which have been committed and remitted from the foundation of the world."² Whatever views others may ascribe to Grotius, these words are evidence that he did not regard the death of Christ as designed merely to deter men from the commission of future sin, but also as procuring the pardon of past sin.

As an answer to Socinus, "The Defence" must be regarded by every candid mind as complete. This was the purpose for which it was written, and it accomplishes its end in a manner more satisfactorily and triumphantly than has ever been possible on the part of any writer, from the standpoint of penal satisfaction. On that theory some of the positions of Socinus are as impregnable as the rock of Gibraltar. The governmental theory of Atonement, as taught by the New England divines, has a close relation to that of Grotius; but it has been colored by the soil through which it has filtered, and it has carried with it some vitiating elements. The governmental theory is essentially Arminian, and the New England divines have not been able to divest themselves altogether of the leaven of Calvinism, or having done so have gone to the opposite extreme. Hence the theory under this appellation has never exerted a widespread influence because of the trammels with which it has been clothed, and the difficulties by which it has been environed.

Perth, Ont.

W. JACKSON, D.D.

1. "Defence," ch. 6, p. 119.

2. *Ibid.* ch. 6, p. 120.

ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN THE ENGLISH BIBLE.

THE TORAH.

THIS is the ancient Hebrew name of that which the Jews considered the most important and fundamental part of the Old Testament. They were accustomed to divide the Old Testament into the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms, and they considered to be pre-eminent among these the Torah, or Law. It signifies the institution, or instruction, the divinely-appointed custom or manner. It is much wider in significance than our word law, and includes the whole religious, moral, political and social institution of the Hebrew people, by which they directed their lives, and which was maintained in living force among them by a systematic and prescribed form of *instruction*.

It appears to be quite certain that this *institution and instruction* has existed in its present *written* form since the days of Ezra, because (1) this is the Jewish tradition; (2) a Greek translation was made 250 B.C.; (3) a distinct, but substantially identical, copy has existed among the Samaritans since the final separation of that people, which took place about the time of Nehemiah. Beyond this date we have evidence of a very ancient living transmission or inculcation of the Torah by two classes of public teachers, the priests and Levites and the prophets.

We have also a very ancient injunction embodied in the Torah itself, making this instruction the duty of every father of a family.

We have further testimony that written records, or a book of this Torah, existed prior to the days of Ezra, and that some portion of this Torah was committed to writing by Moses himself. (See passages quoted below.)

Finally, Moses himself has been universally recognized as the author or founder of this Torah and of the systematic instruction by which it was maintained among the Hebrew people.

These seem to be well-established historical facts. They do not, of course, prove that Moses wrote the entire Pentateuch in its present form. They are quite consistent with the develop-

ment of the Torah in the hands of the inspired public teachers to whom it was committed, and with its final consolidation or codification by Ezra. But they do prove to us that we have before us the most ancient body of moral and religious, as well as of national, instruction that has survived to our day. A candid, critical examination of the contents of this instruction will, we think, give us good reason to say that we have here a body of instruction in religion, morality and the world's early history in relation to religion and morality worthy of its place in the forefront of the record of God's revelation of himself to man. We shall find that its moral teachings are pure; that its religious faith and conceptions and doctrines harmonize with the highest religious truth which the human mind has reached, though sometimes couched in symbols suited to an early age; and that its statements of historic fact are proved by the best ancient monuments to be trustworthy.

These things being so, we need not trouble ourselves about the literary construction of the documents or their precise age. If they teach us God's truth, our first business is to understand that truth: the form of its transmission need trouble us for the present only so far as it may help to our understanding of the contents.

THE CONTENTS OF THE TORAH OR INSTRUCTION.

1. Instruction in the beginnings of things.
 - (a) The creation of the world.
 - (b) The primitive condition and fall of man.
 - (c) The beginnings of the development of sin and of religion, included as was usual in early times in condensed genealogical tables.
 - (d) The first great Divine judgment against sin.
 - (e) The beginnings of the nations.
 - (f) The beginnings of the chosen family.
 - (g) The beginnings of some neighboring and cognate peoples.
 - (h) The beginnings of national life in the growth of the people in Egypt, and in the Exodus.
2. The instruction in the Covenant, laws, statutes and judgments embodied in the book of the Covenant.

3. The instruction as to the place and ceremonies of public worship.

4. Instruction as to the subsequent history of the chosen people under the leadership of Moses.

5. A recapitulation or second form of the instruction, embodying the book of the Covenant, with various expansions and additions and a few fundamental institutions of religious worship set in a remarkable body of prophetic exhortation, closing with an account of the close of the life of Moses.

6. This is followed by an appendix book, describing the settlement of the chosen people in the promised land under Joshua. There is no evidence that this appendix formed part of the public traditional instruction or Torah, though the critics believe that there is literary evidence that it was compiled by the same hand which finally gave us the Torah in its present written form.

Each part of this remarkable body of ancient literature has its own special interest and importance. The fourth and sixth parts are of great historical and archæological, as well as religious, interest. The third lays the foundation in form and terms of important elements of our Christian theology. The second and fifth, which should be compared and studied together, give us a most remarkable body of ethics and jurisprudence. The first part has for ages laid our foundations in theology, and has formed the delightful basis of the religious instruction of the young; and no better book of instruction on the beginnings of things exists to-day.

Note on the preservation and transmission of ancient literature.—It is certain that among all ancient nations, writing held a less prominent place in the living dissemination of their law, history and other traditions than did *viva voce* teaching. Long after written documents began to exist, men still depended upon the memory and the living voice for what we might call the distribution to the public of their national literature. The Hebrews were no exception to this, and had three great literary classes who combined, as far as we can judge, the work of the scribe or writer, the oral teacher and the original author. These were the (1) priests, or Levitical body, whose business

was with the Torah, or law, and the public records; (2) the prophets, or schools of the prophets, whose business was with the Word of the Lord, but who founded their work upon the national history and upon the Torah; (3) the wise men, or elders, and the singers, who were occupied with the moral and religious experience of the people, writing or orally delivering and handing down psalms, proverbs, poems and tales setting forth religious truth. They, too, founded their work upon the Torah and upon history.

On the question of the transmission and delivery of the Torah to the Hebrew people by the priests, consult Jer. xviii. 18, ii. 8, viii. 8-10; Deut. xxxi. 9, etc.; Ezek. vii. 26; Hosea iv. 6, viii. 12; Hag. ii. 11; Mal. ii. 7. On the relation of the prophets to the Torah, see Isa. i. 10, viii. 14-20, xxx. 9, 10. On the Torah as the subject of parental instruction, see Deut. iv. 9, etc.

It may be remarked that some sections of the Pentateuch are predominantly marked by the preceptive or oracular form which probably represents the style of priestly instruction. Others are eminently hortatory appealing to the moral and religious sentiments, and so are allied to the prophetic style. It is quite possible that both these forms of delivering the institutional instruction or Torah to the people may date back as far as the time of Moses. They each indicate the hand of a class of inspired teachers.

In this connection also we must not lose sight of the authority of Christ and the Apostles. While paying due regard to scientific candor, we may not be able to assert that their testimony implies more than that the popular ascription of the Torah to Moses was reasonably justified by the facts of the case, and hence needed no correction, still it does imply this, and further, their Divine authority as a part of Scripture. On this point at least there can be no question, and with the historic testimony before us, we think there is no occasion for the serious difficulties which separate the two extreme schools of modern criticism so widely from each other.

PART I.

THE INSTRUCTION IN THE BEGINNINGS.

This may be considered under two divisions, contained in (1) The Book of Genesis; (2) The first nineteen chapters of the

Book of Exodus. This second division constitutes the historical introduction to Part II., as the first division is an introduction to the entire book of the Torah.

The first division is subdivided by the editor into eleven sections, viz.:

1. The account of *the beginning* or creation, followed by ten books of generations or posterities, *i.e.*, matters which sprang from some person or thing named in the title or heading.

2. The generations of the heavens and the earth. Chapters ii. 4; iv. 26.

3. The generations of Adam. Chapters v. 1; vi. 8.

4. The generations of Noah. Chapters vi. 9; ix. 29.

5. The generations of the sons of Noah. Chapters x. 1; xi. 9.

6. The generations of Shem. Chapter xi. 10-26.

7. The generations of Torah. Chapters xi. 27; xxv. 11.

8. The generations of Ishmael. Chapter xxv. 12-18.

9. The generations of Isaac. Chapters xxv. 19; xxxv. 29.

10. The generations of Esau. Chapters xxxvi. 1; xxxvii. 1.

11. The generations of Jacob. Chapters xxxvii. 2; l. 26.

It is impossible to discuss the subject matter of these instructions on the beginnings in one general statement. Some of the matter was common to the Hebrew people and to other nations of south-western Asia, and had been moulded into something of its present form before the time of Moses. It is quite possible that this may have formed a part of the original Mosaic Torah. In other cases there are minor historical reference of a later date, which indicate either a later date for the complete collection, or an expansion or re-editing of the original at a later time. These points can, however, be best considered under each section. They can have no serious adverse bearing on the authority of a work which was carried forward by a line of divinely-appointed and inspired teachers

SECTION I.—THE CREATION.

CHAPTER I. 1; II. 3.

This section contains a statement concerning the beginnings or creation of the world or universe designated by the Hebrews as "the heavens and the earth." It is remarkable: 1. For its

elaborate and symmetrical construction. 2. For its profound insight into the great facts and relations of nature, and hence for its substantial harmony with even our most advanced modern science. 3. For its exalted religious and moral conceptions. We may advantageously study the document under these three heads:

I.—ITS STRUCTURE.

It consists (*a*) of a preliminary statement of the universal creation, and of the primitive chaos described as unordered, uninhabited and without light, but under the operation of the Divine Spirit. (*b*) Of two series each of three creative days. The first three creative days include five creative acts, viz., the ordering of the four great elements in nature, fire, or light and heat, air, water, earth or dry land, and the production from this ordering of the food of life in the vegetable world. The second three creative days also include five creative acts, viz., the ordering of the heavenly bodies as the rulers of the seasons or temporal changes which, in their turn, regulate all life, the bringing forth of life in each of the three elements in which life appears, viz., the water, the air, and the dry land, and, last of all, the creation of man as the sovereign of all that God had made. (*c*) These two series are followed by a seventh day in which creation ceases, founding the fundamental religious institution, the Sabbath set apart to God.

This carefully constructed order of the creative acts is, as we shall see presently, and as is indicated by the linguistic forms in the original Hebrew, founded on natural relations or permanently established laws referred to by the expression, "it was so." The divisions of the days, on the other hand, though not without a basis in the natural order, yet belong rather to the literary form, and hence are indicated by the usual Hebrew device for literary divisions, a refrain, "And there was an evening and there was a morning one day," etc. The day of literary form is clearly the ordinary day of twenty-four hours. That which it was intended to represent was the unknown time of one or more great creative operations. Before passing from the form of the account of the creation here given, we may remark that the same, or nearly the same, order of creative operation

has been preserved among the ancient Persians, the Babylonians and the Etruscans, and that the documents in the second case can be traced back beyond the time of Moses.

II.—ITS HARMONY WITH SCIENCE THROUGH ITS PROFOUND INSIGHT INTO NATURE.

First of all, the account is evidently founded on that most ancient generalization of the four elements in nature—fire, air, water and earth. It is needless to say that modern science, while supplementing the defects and correcting the errors of this ancient philosophy, has vastly enlarged our apprehension of its substantial truth. They are not elements in the sense of modern chemistry, but they are elements in this sense, that these four things underlie the whole being and movements of the natural world, and in some way, either by natural or supernatural insight and observation, the men of ancient times had come to understand this. But this account has further determined the natural order of these: 1. The heat-light as the most fundamental, determining the movement of all the others; 2. The air as bounding and sustaining the great movements of the waters; 3. The water as bounding and fructifying the land; and, 4. The land as bringing forth the food for all life. Now, it is not too much to say that this simple order in nature which the Old Testament in many passages shows us to have been understood by the ancients, is at the same time so fundamental that all true science must conform to it. The ancients, I believe, by a divinely-quickened insight, read it from the great facts of nature before their eyes. Modern geology reads the same order from the pages of the rocks, or deduces it from the laws of physics.

But the account before us goes still deeper into the truth of nature. By its use of the *hiphil* it continuously recognizes the operation of second causes in the Divine creative processes. Again, by the use of the phrase, "and it was so," or rather, "became so," it everywhere recognizes creation as the beginning or establishment of fixed law. Again, in its use of the word *min*, or kind, it recognizes the fixity of species both in the animal and vegetable world. Lastly, there is the entire absence

of any theory as to the detailed method of the creative process, thus avoiding the great source of both ancient and modern error. The account confines itself simply to the great facts which it sees. This applies as well to its description of the original chaos which is made up of four items all obvious to clear reason—not yet ordered, not yet inhabited, not yet illuminated, but, nevertheless, pervaded by the Divine creative Spirit. We may safely contrast this, in its scientific simplicity and truthfulness, with Herbert Spencer's undifferentiated matter, or Tyndall's firemist, with its promise and potency of all that is to be.

This scientific harmony is not less conspicuous in the second series. In the first place, it posits as the foundation of the existence and functions of animal life, the ordering of the elements, and the food supply of the first series. It next posits the ordering of the heavenly bodies, ruling the seasons and the day and night, which govern the activities of all animal life. These are simple but universal facts governing biological history in all the past as well as in the present. Then it posits the creation of life in each of the three elements in which life exists in an order determined by both the gradation and abundance of life: first, the water as the medium of the most abundant and simpler life; next, the air on the same ground, then the dry land, and, last of all, man. Here, again, we find a broad (not minute), primitive generalization of the great facts still existing in nature, and which, as existent from the beginning, are true to all science founded on facts. Finally, the superior spiritual nature of man is distinctly and emphatically recognized in harmony with facts acknowledged by all our best science. While thus true to fact throughout, the primitive character of the generalization here employed, and its difference in point of view from our modern science are manifest in the classification of land life. Still, even this classification represents, like the four elements, great natural facts lying right on the broad surface of nature, but on that very account, penetrating to profound depths of her work.

III.—THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE.

We come to consider that which constitutes the true essence of this account of creation as a part of the Word of God, its moral and religious significance:

(1) It builds upon the definite theistic basis, viz., an absolute beginning of the universe as well as of each of its great stages of progress; beyond that it finds only a personal God.

(2) It never for a moment separates the universe, not even in its chaos, from the presence and power of the Divine Spirit.

(3) It makes each step in the creative ordering the result of the expressed thought and will of God.

(4) It connects each step with the Divine good-will. Both these are expressed in anthropomorphic terms, but yet such as convey their true meaning even to a child. We cannot improve upon them.

(5) It views man from the spiritual side of his nature—in the image and attributes of God.

(6) It makes the peculiar form which it gives to the account of creation the means of enforcing the three most important of human relations—labor in subduing nature, society in the marriage relation, religion in the Sabbath institution. The forms by which these three institutions are each appended to the account are each a part of the literary structure, including the arrangement in seven days, but this structure is quite in harmony with the parabolic form so often and so usefully employed elsewhere.

NOTE.—Compare as a commentary on this account of Creation Psalm civ.

SECTION II.—THE PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE BEGINNING OF SIN.

CHAPTERS II. 4; IV. 26.

NOTE.—Before beginning the analysis and study of this section, we may note the essential difference from the preceding in its language and style. It has no longer the set phrases and forms of the oracular or preceptive style, but a flowing, descriptive style especially marked by the use of symbols.

The use of the Divine name is also distinctive throughout. Portions of the matter also appear in various traditional forms among ancient nations, and these traditions extend back beyond the time of Moses. This matter again does not—like that of the first section—lie beyond the range of human experience, except in two or three points where it gathers up in a new arrangement and presentation the matter of the first section. These elements are mostly incidental, and may easily be separated from the main body of the tradition. This latter, on the other hand, contains subject matter quite capable of traditional remembrance from the origin of the race, though it seems quite clear that the facts have been clothed in somewhat symbolic language in later, though still very early, times. The two methods of interpretation which vary from this, that of absolute literalism on the one hand, and that of pure myth on the other, seem to us less consistent with all the facts than this which we have proposed.

The section consists of three important sub-sections: (1) The primitive condition and development of man; (2) the temptation and fall; (3) the early development of sin. These occupy the second, third and fourth chapters respectively.

SUB-SECTION I.—THE PRIMITIVE CONDITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MAN.

The sub-section opens (*a*) with the editorial heading dating from the completed creation of the heavens and the earth.

(*b*) The statement of the primitive condition of the earth in its relation to man. The plants and herbs from which he derives his food were not yet formed, for the rain which nourishes them had not yet fallen, and there was no man to till the ground. Every term here centres around man, and we are pointed to the field which he cultivates, to the plants which he places in the soil, and to the autumn rain which prepares it for tillage. All this was not begun, because there was not a man to till the soil.

(*c*) Hence, first, the man was formed from the dust (*i.e.*, the finest elements) of the soil on his earthward side, but endowed with Divine inspiration of life on his Godward side. This

two-fold conception of man in his essential nature frequently appears in the Old Testament.

(d) Next, the place of his abode is prepared, furnished with fruits and flowers, and the tree of life, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. This, it will be seen, is the preparation of the world directly *for man*, and that in some limited local portion. It is an entirely different fact, and an entirely different point of view from the creation of the whole vegetable world in its relation to the soil, on the one hand, and to all animal life, on the other.

(e) Next is an extended description of the geography of this original home of the race, in terms suited to the Hebrew age and people.

(f) Next is the divinely-ordered settlement of man in the beautiful home prepared for him, and his relation to it of necessary labor.

(g) Next is the Divine ordering of man's moral nature, by which he is related to God. To understand this fully, something must be anticipated from the next section. Two trees are mentioned pre-eminently. The first was the tree of life, which represented and secured the gift from God of immortal life. The second was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was made the outward and visible sign of forbidden sin involving penalty of death.

(h) Preliminary to the Divine intention to provide a help for man, he is next made acquainted with all the varied life of the world around him, and his language is developed by giving them names, but only to make him feel separate from them all. Note that here is described not a universal creation of animal life, but of that life which is associated with man, the beasts of the field and the birds of the air.

(i) Lastly, we have described the formation of woman as the helpmeet of man, their perfect and perpetual unity and the original purity of this relation.

Of the nine elements which enter into this representation, the garden, the state of innocency, and the two significant or sacramental trees appear in other of the ancient traditions. They must have had some origin sufficiently powerful to per-

petuate its influence for thousands of years and among various branches of the race. Such origin could scarcely be the mere figment of imagination. It must have been based directly or indirectly upon some fact of supreme importance, and either universally known by common experience or universally remembered by common tradition. The geographical locality is also a matter of ancient tradition, and is verified by modern ethnology, and thus takes its place on the same basis of original fact. Of the remaining five, the first is negative and merely introductory. It describes the absence from the world of man and his environment. The second is a simple didactic statement in the most direct form of a patent fact, the formation of man in the two elements of his nature, dust from the soil and inspiration from God. The third is the statement of the Divine order which relates man to his environment by labor, not originally as a curse but as a good. The fourth is a statement of another necessary fact, man's development into thought, emotion and language by contact with the living beings of his environment. The last is the Divine bringing together of the sexes in a perfect unity of holy life. This again, however, we may conceive of its first occurrence, stands forth as an indisputable fact. But while thus every separate element stands forth as founded in fact either patent in the nature of things or handed down to us by tradition, how are we to interpret the presentation, the clothing which has woven the whole into so beautiful a picture? The key to this question we think we have in the fact clearly pointed out by the critics, that this entire section bears the stamp of the prophetic style. It was the constant habit of the prophets in all ages to present truth in tropical or symbolic form, and such we think we certainly have in what may be called the garnishing of this and the following sub-section. The background shaded by negatives, the order in which the various elements are marshalled, the minor touches of amplification, and perhaps even the peculiar account of the origin of woman never again referred to in Scripture, except on the point of date, may largely belong either to the literary or symbolic elements of the prophetic style.

SUB-SECTION 2.—THE TEMPTATION AND FALL OF MAN.

We shall first analyze the account and then consider its interpretation. It presents:

(a) The tempter under the form of the serpent, the most crafty of the beasts of the field.

(b) The person tempted the woman.

(c) The temptation by steps. (1) A suggestion that the prohibition of the tree of knowledge was needless and arbitrary. This is met by a rehearsal of the broad permission and also of the prohibition, each with added emphasis. (2) This is met by an assertion of untruthfulness on the part of God, to which no reply or else no time for reply is given. (3) Next follows an assertion of the wonderful power of the fruit based on one element in its name. It is asserted that God doth know that supernatural knowledge like to that of God himself would follow.

(d) The writer then sums up the temptation as consisting of appetite, desire for pleasure and ambition, all taking their place in the mind of the woman while distrust of God has pushed conscience into the background.

(e) Next follows the act both of herself and her husband.

(f) Next follows the immediate inward result of sin—guilty shame and terror in the presence of God. This is expressed by two acts.

(g) Next follows the process of Divine judgment, expanded into a wonderful picture of the human heart under conviction of sin, yet seeking to excuse itself.

(h) Next follows Divine sentence, in each case converting their great gifts of life into means of pain, but separating the tempter from the human race by a perpetual conflict in which the tempter shall be finally crushed and man shall be, though smitten, yet victorious.

(i) Lastly, we have a completely new ordering of human life in which man, deprived of his innocency, is separated from his primitive abode and its manner of life, and from the religious institutions which belonged to it, and a new form of the Divine presence appearing all through the Old Testament is established, viz, the cherubim.

In attempting to interpret this record, we must note at the outset that at every step it presents a profound and universally true analysis of man's moral nature in its relation to sin. This wonderful insight into the inner workings of sin in humanity is characteristic of all the prophetic Hebrew Scriptures. But have we nothing more than this here? If not then the whole presentation must be taken as an allegory or symbolic representation of universal truth, and so some have interpreted it. But this interpretation loses sight of two things: (1) That we have here a very ancient and widespread tradition. A mere parable or allegory could not easily become such without facts behind it. (2) That certain historic facts (not mere general truths) embodied in this record enter into the very essence of the provisions of human redemption as set forth by our Lord himself and His apostles, especially by St. Paul. We feel constrained, therefore, to look in this chapter, not merely for symbolic presentation of general truth, but also for certain definite historic facts which lie at the very basis of Christianity. We may freely admit that these facts are presented to us in the literary prophetic style, including not only pictorial embellishment but also a large element of symbolism. What, then, are these facts? We think they are the following:

- (1) An original estate of innocence and happiness.
- (2) Two primitive institutions intended for the development of man. (a) Moral nature; (b) His religious nature.
- (3) Direct Divine communication with man in some one of the forms by which such communication has been made.
- (4) A temptation presented by some one from without, based on the original moral institution.
- (5) The sin of man under this temptation.
- (6) A Divine reordering of man's life with new moral and religious institutions, involving (a) Sentence against sin; (b) Hope of deliverance.

Questions:

1. The significance of the first promise.
2. Its relation to sacrifice.
3. The meaning of the cherubim and the sword of flame.
4. The significance of the two trees as institutions of Eden.
5. The methods of God's manifestation to man in the world's earlier ages as compared with the present.

SUB-SECTION 3 OF SECTION II. AND SECTION III.

We shall consider these two portions together for the following reasons:

1. Sub-section 3 is prophetic and traces the early development of sin. The latter part of Section III. is likewise prophetic in style and presents the culmination of that development.

2. The last two verses of Sub-section 3 present us with the beginning of the line in which God was served. The greater portion of Section III. is occupied with the continuance of this line.

3. This parallel division which begins here runs through the Old Testament, distinguishing between the Church and the world, the Jew and the Gentile, those who serve the true God and those who serve other gods.

4. Both documents prepare our way for the great judgment against sin which is recorded in the next section in terms sometimes priestly, sometimes prophetic.

The combined section sets before us:

(a) The development of the two lines, that of Cain and that of Seth. Each of these is carried down in a genealogy. That of Cain is given in the prophetic narrative with little precision of form, but with abundance of illustrative narrative serving his purpose of setting forth the development of sin. In contrast with this he sets forth the beginnings of true religion in the history of Abel, and in the days of Seth and Enosh. That of Seth is given in distinct precision in the priestly formularies, with only one or two historical notes pointing out the great distinctive examples of early religion. The compiler then gives us, from a prophetic source, the culmination of the world's sin preparatory to judgment, by the intermarriage of the two races.

(b) The line of the development of sin includes: (1) The birth of Cain and Abel. (2) Account of their occupations. (3) Their distinctive religious worship and its relation to God. (4) The consequent rising of sinful passion in the breast of Cain, with a Divine forewarning of his danger. (5) The culmination of Cain's passion in the murder of his brother. (6) His trial

and judgment in the Divine presence. (7) His sentence and its results. (8) His dwelling in the land of Nod, his posterity, and the beginnings of civilization. (9) The extended development of civilization in the days of Lamech and his posterity, with a fragment of ancient martial poetry illustrating the evil spirit of the age.

(c) The line of the descent of the sons of God includes: (1) A genealogical list from Adam to Noah. (2) A table of ages which has peculiar variation in each of our three ancient texts. (3) Two remarkable notes, one on Enoch, the other on Lamech and Noah, with which we may connect the statement at the close of chapter iv. These present us with the beginning and onward progress of true religion between the fall and the deluge.

(d) The culmination of these two lines is found in the first eight verses of chapter vi. This includes a statement: (1) Of the increase of population. (2) The intermarriage of the two races. (3) A limitation of human probation on account of prevailing sin. (4) The appearance in the world of abnormal types of humanity and of wickedness. (5) The Divine sentence of judgment. (6) Noah's acceptance before God.

On the interpretation of these two sections but little comment is needed. The prophetic parts exhibit the same profound insight into the inner nature and movement of sin as before. There is the same employment of figurative language, *e.g.*, sin crouching like a wild beast at the door. There is also the same free employment of material from ancient tradition. The priestly parts, on the other hand, exhibit the same systematic and formal method of treatment. Both must be interpreted with careful reference to these peculiarities. The following questions will direct attention to important points: 1. The origin and significance of sacrifice in religious worship. 2. The relation of human employments and early civilizations and migrations to religion. 3. The genealogical table in the Old Testament and other ancient records, its formal construction by numbers, and its relation to chronology. 4. How much is implied in the religious life of these early ages? 5. What is the relation of the national myths to the giants and heroes of

chapter vi., and to such names as Tubal Cain? 6. What is the relation of the priestly ten patriarchs and of the prophetic seven patriarchs (*a*) to the traditions of other nations? (*b*) to the ten patriarchs between Noah and Abraham?

SECTION IV.—THE DIVINE JUDGMENT AGAINST SIN.

CHAPTER VI. 9; IX. 29.

This section ends the old world with its moral history, and begins the new. It records an event which has more fully than any preceding event left its impress on the memory of the race. Its traditions extend to all quarters of the globe, except, perhaps, Africa. They are too specific to be explained as either myths or legends. The present document embodies all the specific facts of the tradition in a form superior to any other tradition, and evolves in the most perfect form their moral and religious lesson. It differs from the preceding records in that we have here throughout a combination of the two lines of account—the priestly and the prophetic. The priestly record makes the event not only a Divine judgment against sin, but also a manifestation of God's grace in saving the righteous, and the foundation of a covenant of natural religion between God and man, and of laws and ordinances connected therewith. The prophetic account, as usual, dwells on the development of sin, tracing its reappearance in the person of Noah and his immediate descendants. It also, as usual, contains the greatest number of points of contact with the outside traditions.

The whole combined narrative is so simple and direct in its style, whether under the priestly or prophetic form, that there is no difficulty in the matter of interpretation.

The account may be divided into four sub-sections: 1. The preparations in the prophetic and priestly accounts (chap. vi. 9, vii. 5). 2. The deluge (chap. vii. 5-24). 3. The deliverance (chap. viii.). 4. Appendix (chap. ix.).

1. The preparations. The first record gives a minute and formal statement of (*a*) Noah's righteous character, his generations, the world's corruption; (*b*) the Divine decision for judgment; (*c*) minute specifications for the construction of the ark, its material, sub-divisions, size, lighting and ventilation; (*d*)

prediction of the deluge; (e) promise of new *covenant* with Noah; (f) direction as to the animals and food to be taken into the ark; two of each kind, male and female. (The terms used are those of Gen. i.)

The second part gives in prophetic style (a) the direct command to enter the ark with the animals, the clean by sevens, man and his wife (the terms used in chapter ii.); (b) The prediction of the flood (not as the deluge), but as forty days' rain; (c) Both accounts, though in different terms, imply the destruction of all life, the priestly in "the earth," the prophetic from the face of "the soil," or "ground."

NOTE—The variations of the two accounts lie, (1) in point of time, one before and the other after the construction of the ark. This may indeed account for all else, as this is clearly the deliberate result of selection by the compiler, and certainly, to his mind, implied no contradiction; (2) in the different forms of expression characteristic of the respective sources; (3) in the omission from the prophetic account of the directions for building; (4) in the distinction of clean beasts in the second account, looking to the sacrifices recorded in the same account, sub-section 3. Such offerings would be impossible without the extermination of the clean animals, if the priestly record is to be construed as meaning only two. The compiler evidently did not so construe it.

2. The deluge itself. The critics acknowledge that the account here is almost completely composite. It includes (a). The date of the flood. (b) The entrance into the ark, naming the classes of life, and clean and unclean, but not the number seven. (c) Lapse of a week. (d) The flood described by the technical term. (e) The date is given a second time in detail. (f) The flood is described a second time in two great causes. (g) The entrance into the ark is described a second time in great detail, without the distinction between clean and unclean. (h) The note is added, "Jehovah shut him in." (i) The rising progress of the flood is described in four defined stages. (j) The destruction of all life is described, in two successive statements. (k) The time of the rise is specified.

Note the double statements throughout in this sub-section

and their characteristic forms of language. As before they are not perfectly parallel, but yet not inconsistent. Note also the relation to facts of the four stages of the rising water, floating, moving onward, hills disappear, the vessel moves over the hills drawing fifteen cubits of water. These specified details mark the priestly account throughout.

3. The deliverance. Chapter viii. 1-19.

This includes (a) Account of the decline of the waters. (b) The resting of the ark. (c) The appearance of the mountain tops. (d) The sending out of the birds. (e) The final drying of the earth. (f) The going forth of Noah and his family and all the animals from the ark.

NOTE—This account also is composite as appears from the double statements in the case of the dates, the decline of the waters and the drying of the earth. The sending forth of the birds is in the prophetic style and common to this and the Babylonian and other traditional accounts.

4. The after events to the death of Noah.

Here we have marked variety in the two sources, and they may well be considered separately. It must not, however, be supposed that they are necessarily at variance. The compiler takes from the prophetic source what may supplement or enlarge the priestly,

The priestly includes (a) A blessing upon Noah similar to that pronounced upon the first parents of the race. Mark the parallelism of chapter ix. 1-3 with chapter i. 28-30. (b) Ordinances respecting the eating and the shedding of blood. (c) The great natural covenant of God with Noah, and through him with all living things upon the earth. (d) The age and death of Noah.

To this there is added in the prophetic style (a) The sacrifice of Noah parallel with the Babylonian account. (b) The names of the sons of Noah as repeopling the earth. (c) The story of Noah's husbandry, his drunkenness and its results, ending in a fragment of ancient poetry, the second which appears in this book.

Note on the record of the deluge as a part of Divine revelation.—Both the prophetic account and some of the great

national traditions lay great stress on the deluge as a Divine judgment on the world's sin. The priestly record, while recognizing this, puts forward more prominently the revelation of Divine goodness to the righteous and re-establishment of God's covenant with the race. Both know nothing but the true monotheistic and Old Testament conception of God, while the Gentile traditions are full of polytheistic fancies.

Question :

What was the relation of the flood (a) to the sense of sin in the ancient world? (b) To the faith of the ancient world in God in its primitive form? (c) To their peculiar methods of recognizing God in nature?

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THE "INVITATION" SYSTEM.

IN the stationing of ministers and probationers, the Methodist Church in Canada at the present time occupies a very anomalous position in which its actual practice is not in harmony with its avowed principles. The Discipline says: "Each Annual Conference shall station all the ministers and probationers for the ministry within its bounds according to the rules of the Discipline on the Stationing Committee, and it shall have authority to require that all appointments made by the Stationing Committee shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Discipline." Notwithstanding the fact that no provision has ever been made by rule of Discipline or otherwise for the "calling" of pastors, yet there has grown up among us an "invitation" system which makes the Stationing Committee a mere registration, or, at most, sanctioning board. The expression, "subject to the approval of the Stationing Committee," which accompanies all invitations and acceptances is a mere formal way of compliance with the law, as in practice it has more than once been evidenced, by both Quarterly Boards and ministers, that if the invitation was not approved of they were not very willingly "subject" to the action of the Stationing Committee. The traditional, as well as the expressed principle of Methodism in the working of its itinerancy, is that the Stationing Committee should absolutely appoint the ministers to their circuits.

If, however, the time has come when the "invitation" system should be recognized as a part of our economy, then let it be placed under such disciplinary regulations as will make it perfectly in harmony with and conducive to our itinerant connexionalism.

In settling matters of ecclesiastical government or economy, we are not much helped by New Testament teaching or Primitive Church practice, as no uniform method or absolute form is given. The Master ordained no exact form of Church government, but simply commanded His followers to "go into all the world and preach the Gospel to the whole creation," and to "make disciples of all the nations—teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you;" leaving the method of doing this work to form itself by the "logic of facts." From New Testament teaching and practice we may gather a few general principles which plainly show that circumstances of time and place influenced methods of action. The constitution of the Church, so far as any was formulated, was in no sense hierarchical but eminently democratic, being modelled after the Jewish synagogue or the Gentile guilds. Hilary says: "When the Church became established everywhere things were arranged in a different way from the first. For, at first, all (Christians) were teachers, and officiated in baptism. . . . As the Church grew it was allowed to all believers to preach, to baptize, and to explain the Scriptures in the congregations." From the Acts we also learn that the councils or official gatherings consisted of "the whole Church," "the multitude together" or "the brethren," thus admitting the lowliest member to the meetings. Among the first office-bearers are the Apostles who were directly chosen and appointed by Christ, even the election of Matthias by the one hundred and twenty brethren seems never to have been approved by Christ, who Himself filled the vacancy of Judas by the calling of Paul. As the Church expanded and the exigencies of the work demanded, two other kinds of officials are brought into existence, viz., elders and evangelists. The elder, Alford says, was "an office borrowed from the synagogue and established by the Apostles in the churches." Lightfoot says: "In the language of the New Testament the same officer

of the Church is called indifferently bishop and 'elder." So, also, Ellicott tells us that "the title of office, *bishop*, is perfectly interchangeable with the title of age, *elder*." Hence the elder or presbyter of the Jewish Christian Church, corresponding to the President of the synagogue, had its equivalent in the bishop or overseer (superintendent) of the Gentile Church, which corresponded to the chairman or "manager" of their municipal and social institutions. This class of officials, according to New Testament usage, which is confirmed by the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," was elected by the local Church, doubtless with Apostolic approbation. This is clearly inferred from Acts xiv. 23, where Paul and Barnabas are said to have "ordained (appointed for, in R.V.) them elders in every Church;" *χειροτονεω* means "to elect by stretching out the hands," and not to ordain by laying on hands. The evident meaning then is to *appoint by vote*, not by the arbitrary authority of the Apostles, but by the voice of the Church. This is also clearly set forth in Acts vi. 3: "Look ye out therefore, brethren, from among you seven men of good report . . . whom we may appoint," as well as inferred from other New Testament passages. In the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles" occurs the following direction: "Elect, therefore, for yourselves, bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord."

The evangelists (heralds of glad tidings) were not a distinct *order* of church officials, as deacons, presbyters and Apostles, all might exercise evangelistic functions. They were itinerant preachers who acted as "fellow-laborers" and assistants of the Apostles by whom they were directly appointed and under whose superintendence they worked. It might be well to note in passing that the term "deacon," *servant, attendant* or *minister*, did not receive its ecclesiastical meaning as a Church officer during the Apostolic age. Slater, in his work on "The Faith and Life of the Early Church," says that "the word has a general significance, and is freely used to describe the exercise of any ministry whatsoever." He adds, "If there is a general term for the ministry in the New Testament, it is *deacon*," being applied to service rendered by the Apostles as well as by the elders or bishops.

A comparison will reveal the remarkable likeness there is between the beginnings of Methodism and the development of Christianity. That divinely-guided man, John Wesley, regarded his preachers as "helpers," and sent them forth by his own authority and selection as itinerants. They corresponded in their office, work and appointment to the New Testament evangelist. While Methodism remained a purely evangelistic agency, such a system was doubtless the best and quite in harmony with the mind of the Spirit as manifested in the Church of the Apostles. As the work of the Methodist itinerant preacher crystallized into a perfectly organized Church, the appointing power exercised by the one man was taken over by the Conference or an authority that represented it. Thus grew up the Stationing Committee of our Methodism. It will be seen, however, that in neither its inception nor principle is there a recognition of the changed condition of the Church. It is no longer a mere evangelistic agency but a pastoral church. Its preachers are not only evangelists but bishops and deacons as well. The principle of the sending forth of evangelists still prevailed, instead of the election and appointment of elders in harmony with New Testament practice. Nor is the present "invitation" innovation in agreement with Apostolic principles, as then the election was by the whole Church and not assumed by an official board without authority from the constituency which it is supposed to represent.

In the practice of modern churches there are practically three systems: direct appointment by the Church courts, selection by the Church members, or some combination of these two. Ours may be regarded in theory as belonging to the first or hierarchical form, but in practice as a modification of the third. And here we repeat the very important suggestion that we should either make our practice harmonize with our theory or adapt our theory to our practice. If we are to follow the example of the Apostolic Church, we will not cling to institutions for their own sake, or reject new appliances that bear the evidence of greater adaptability to present circumstances. Apostolic Christianity, as also John Wesley, laid aside, extended, modified or adapted the machinery of the Church as the

exigencies of the work required. Why should the Church of to-day be more conservative?

This matter of stationing ministers evidently requires General Conference legislation. Our attitude should, first, be one of inquiry. Diagnose the case and then seek the remedy. To this end let us ask the following questions: Is the principle adopted by our fathers of making the appointments by the absolute authority of the Stationing Committee, the best for our times? Is it in the interest of our Methodism to allow the present "invitation" system to become an unwritten law of the Church without any disciplinary regulations? Is the present stationing plan the best that could be adopted for our Church? Is there anything in the polity of Methodism that would prevent the adoption of another system? Is our present method giving general satisfaction, or are there serious objections? Is the defect in the theory or the practice, or in both? Can we harmonize our theory and practice or make such changes as will result in a better system? Our investigation compels us to feel that a remedy is needed and can be provided.

Before suggesting a new scheme it would be proper to point out objections to the present one, and also to call attention to fundamental principles in our Church polity that must of necessity underlie any system that may be adopted.

A few objections to the present system may be noted.

(1) As already shown it is not in harmony with the practice of the New Testament Church nor in accord with the provisions of our Discipline.

(2) It is un-Methodistic if the theory prevail that each minister belongs absolutely to the whole Church, and is an office-bearer of the entire body. Then, of course, the appointment should be made by the Conference or a power representing it.

(3) The invitation is not given by the local Church, but by a committee largely self-constituted without either request or authority from their constituency to do that work.

(4) The great body of the congregation who have the most direct interest in the matter and must provide the financial support have no voice in the appointment.

(5) Its practice is humiliating, cheapening and degrading to the ministry by creating the impression that the minister is in the market, that his calling is a mere business profession, that he is up for the highest bidder, and that his relation to a Church is that of an employee for a financial consideration.

(6) Ministerial influence is weakened by it since it is continually subjecting the minister to unnecessary criticism, bringing him in a money relation to the people, and rendering him, rightly or wrongly, liable to be accused of acts that would be unworthy of a ward politician or a business tramp.

(7) It keeps our Churches in an unsettled state, for no sooner does one man enter upon his work than the officials begin to turn the attention of the people toward another.

(8) It encourages unrighteous ambition and sets a premium on inordinate self-seeking and unscrupulous scheming.

(9) The self-sacrificing motive and God-glorifying purpose that are absolutely fundamental in any true form of Christianity are in danger of being jeopardized by both ministers and people.

(10) It works to the disadvantage of our older, experienced and more mature ministers, men who are possessed of the connexional spirit and able to edify and do permanent work. Why should not experience and maturity be recognized and valued in the ministerial calling the same as in business and professional life? Are they not more fully recognized in other churches than in ours? A principal objection of a prominent layman to his son's entering the ministry was, "I want my son to take up some business in life that he will be able to work at when he becomes a man."

(11) It makes it hard for a Methodist preacher to be a faithful minister of Christ and a true man. To attain certain places and positions, he feels himself under restraint as to public and ecclesiastical questions; he is constrained to foster morbid tastes and feed sensational appetites in the congregations; he is restrained from rebuking certain social and other evils, hence does a superficial work; he feels it to his advantage to cater to the notions of certain individuals; and he is almost compelled to take his opinions second-hand or have his convictions formulated by others. All this is detrimental to the develop-

ment of the highest type of Christian manhood, or the truest ideal of a Christian minister.

(12) The last, though not least, objection to be mentioned is, that its tendency is toward congregational independency, and destructive of the heroic spirit of the Methodist itinerancy, as ministers find it necessary to keep in the line of a certain class of stations if they wish to secure the best positions.

There are a few fundamental principles that are essential to the Methodist form of Christianity, and ought to be held sacred in the adoption of any system for the appointment of its ministers.

1. The ministry is a holy calling, and not a business profession. The man must be called directly by God to the sacred office, and also by the Church as a confirmation of the Divine call, it being believed that both the man and the Church are moved by the Holy Ghost. Nor should this principle in its application be limited to the general call into the office and work of the ministry, but be made to apply to the particular place and kind of ministerial work. It ought to be truly and absolutely said of every pastor in relation to his Church, "in the which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops (overseers) to feed the Church of God." Paul and his companions were "forbidden of the Holy Ghost to speak the Word in Asia," and "the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not to go into Bithynia," when God purposed them to preach the gospel unto Macedonia. The minister is fully given to and positively is in the hands of Christ and His Church. His attitude should be, "Here am I, send me," believing that if God has called him into the work, He will give him some work to do, without his own special management.

2. Methodism is a *connexion*, not a federation of separate and independent congregations. It is a living unit, "one body in Christ"; such a vital cohesion of each local church into the *united societies* as to make them "severally members one of another." The local Church is one of many members in the same body and should serve and be controlled by the body. Every minister belongs to the whole Church, and not to any particular congregation. As "servants of Christ Jesus" by and

through the authority of the entire Church, they are liable to be appointed anywhere, no particular church having absolute claim to any one minister. This principle of connexionalism implies the spirit of self-sacrifice upon the part of both ministers and people. Personal preferences are waived and individual rights surrendered upon the part of each for the good of the whole. "Each for all and all for each," is the motto. While the minister cannot dictate as to his appointment under such a system, neither should a Church factiously oppose the man appointed, but receive him as "sent of God," through the instrumentality of the stationing authority.

3. The Methodist ministry is an itinerancy, by which every Church is supplied with a pastor and every minister has an appointment. Through it also the various gifts and special individuality of the ministers are exercised for the benefit of different parts of the work. This itinerancy, however, does not of necessity imply a limited term of pastoral service at any one Church. The system is not contingent upon the term being one year as in the days of Wesley, or six months as with the Salvation Army, or three years as with us, or five years as in the Methodist Episcopal Church, or even ten or more years. The principle is that the whole work come under the survey of the Conference each year, and if the individual or general good requires it, a minister may be sent to some other appointment. The good of the work should decide every time and no iron-clad rule should prevent it.

4. The door to the ministry is held and guarded by the laity. Ministers come from the ranks of and are made by the laymen, and should be made to feel that they have a sure constituency behind them. The people, therefore, should be responsible for their constant employment and proper maintenance. This principle enters into the basis of all our connexional funds.

5. Methodism is *from* the people and *for* the people, and its government should be *by* the people. The membership of our churches should be taken more fully into the confidence and sympathy of our Official Boards in financial and other business matters by Annual Church Meetings.

6. Methodism was raised up "to spread Scriptural holiness

throughout these lands." It is not a business corporation, or a financial organization, nor are its Churches social circles, religious clubs or entertainment associations. Its one purpose is to build up men and women into a Christ-like character and establish the kingdom of heaven on earth. Its whole aim should be to "make man," not money.

In suggesting a remedy, we do not expect to find a perfect scheme, and if we did, it could not be worked faultlessly by imperfect men. What should be sought is a plan that would reduce the objections to a minimum, and best conduce to the maximum interests of the Church as a whole. A writer in a recent number of the *Knox College Monthly* condemns "The 'Calling' System" as it works in the Presbyterian Church, and makes it responsible for their not more rapid comparative growth. He says: "The clergy of the Presbyterian Church are by far the ablest, the best educated, and the most efficient in Canada; and *cæteris paribus*, they can more than hold their own when laboring in city, town, or country, with the clergy of other denominations"; and in speaking of other Churches remarks, "whose people are not as high in average intelligence as ours." From these facts, he infers, that with a system that would provide a settled pastor for every congregation, the Presbyterian Church would be "more thriving."

His suggestion is that "the Presbyterian and Methodist systems of settling and translating pastors might be amalgamated into a better system than either, by which the popular voice and ecclesiastical authority might combine in the selection of a pastor." To this we give our most hearty assent, and upon this principle will propose a scheme.

1. Let there be a ministerial code of ethics that would compel ministers to stand at least as high in relation to each other and their work as do physicians and lawyers in their respective professions. Also, let there be a code of honor among churches which will prevent action that would do discredit to an ordinary business house. The golden rule, in its highest spiritual significance, should certainly be applied in the working of any system.

2. Let the invitation be from the membership of the Church

at a meeting called for that purpose. The Quarterly Official Board may act as a Nominating Committee, and submit two or more names upon whom a vote shall be taken by ballot, a majority being necessary to a choice. A congregation might authorize a Board to make the selection, but the people should have the privilege of being heard. The Church, however, should not say, "this man or none." One or more preferred names might be sent to the Stationing Committee, to whom the invitation should be sent and not to the man. The minister, of course, could be consulted, and have the right to express his feelings in the matter.

3. The Stationing Committee should be as nearly as possible a disinterested body. It should represent the Conference and the District Meetings. After Dr. Riggs' plan of providing a superintendency for the Wesleyan Church in England, let the Districts be grouped into divisions of the Conference, two or more Districts in a group, and from each division let the Conference elect a minister who shall, during the year, have an oversight of his division as to the needs of the work and the requirements of the men. Also, let the May District Meetings elect members as at present, and those two classes of representatives, together with the President of Conference, constitute the Stationing Committee. It should be provided, however, that it be composed of ministers only, as the laymen exercise their full right by giving the invitation; and eligibility to membership should be confined to such ministers as will not be expected to move that year.

4. Both the Transfer and Stationing Committees should be treated as a jury or a Board of Arbitrators, regarding it as a breach of trust for any member thereof, to be approached or personally canvassed in the interest of any appointment. Provision should be made by which both the minister and the church might be heard before the Committee, but never by an individual member.

5. The Committee should be a court of final appeal in stationing the ministers, and have absolute power to appoint pastors to vacant churches, supply ministers with appointments, make changes when necessary, and confirm such invitations as approved.

6. Invitations not to be given except within the Conference year in which the appointment would be confirmed, so that the attention of neither pastor nor people should be diverted from each other.

The above may not be the best possible scheme that can be suggested, but it is given with the hope that the subject will attract the attention of the Church, and lead to legislation at the next General Conference. If the "invitation" system has come to stay, it ought to be put under disciplinary regulations, and recognized as a part of the polity of Methodism. This whole question is becoming more and more important, and requires most serious consideration. The evils that have grown out of the present system are universally acknowledged, and if we are true to the Divine trusts committed to us, we will make a very earnest effort to devise a remedy. We should have some system that would command the entire confidence and respect of our people.

Toronto, Ont.

A. M. PHILLIPS.

THE BIBLE STUDY UNION.

WE seek to encourage the systematic study, as distinguished from the mere reading of Scripture. The book or books of the Bible from which the Sunday-school lessons are taken is selected each half-year, and the members of the Union are simply expected to study those portions with the aid of some standard Helps. The subject of study for the term ending July 1st, 1894, is the book of Genesis and Exodus I-XIV. The Helps recommended (and others may be used) are Chancellor Burwash's Analytical Studies in the CANADIAN METHODIST REVIEW, and the "Hand-Books" on Genesis and Exodus, published by T. and T. Clark: 70 cents each. Examinations will be held during July, for those who may wish to secure certificates, fee 25 cents. Ministers and others are requested to call the attention of our people to the objects of the Union, and send names of members to A. M. Phillips, Toronto, Ont.

Editorial Reviews of Books and Periodicals.

The Place of Christ in Modern Theology. By A. M. FAIRBAIRN, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford; Gifford Lecturer in the University of Aberdeen; late Morse Lecturer in Union Seminary, New York; and Lyman Beecher Lecturer in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Toronto: Upper Canada Tract Society. 8vo, pp. xxiii.—556. Price \$2.50 net.

This is a book which is not merely to be read, but to be studied; and it will amply repay careful and thorough examination. It is valuable, first of all, as an indication of the drift and tendency of the theological thought of the time, and as an illustration of the method of Biblical and theological investigation which, though adopted in Germany somewhat earlier, can scarcely be said to have come into vogue among us until within the present generation. This is what may be described as the historico-critical method. It is that which traces existing systems and institutions to the germ in which they had their beginning, and then, following the course of their development, endeavors to determine how far they are the result of the forces which were at work in them from the beginning, and how far they have been moulded by external influences. This method Dr. Fairbairn, in the former part of this work, applies to theology and the Church. Recognizing the fact that both the one and the other of these, in the form in which they have come down to us, are the result of an evolutionary process, he holds that, in order to a complete exposition of them, "the primitive organism must be studied until it is known, and so must the primitive environment; the results must then be examined and compared with the forces active in organism and environment respectively." The creative organism is "the causal Person and Mind, Jesus Christ." He founded the Society and filled it with His own life, though He gave it no fixed or formal political constitution. And the problem which our author sets himself to solve is, "How did this parent germ or creative organism—the religion instituted by Christ—behave itself in various environments: what was their action upon it and its actions upon them?" How far were the forms which it assumed, and the characteristics which it manifested in the various stages of its development due to the immanent laws of its own being, and how far to the elements in which it lived?

It will be readily seen that, although all this is not only intrinsically interesting, but is necessary in order to prepare the way for an intelligent comprehension of the return to Christ which is the most remarkable characteristic of the religious thought of the time, and the basis of the new theology, it is quite impossible to treat it intelligibly in a brief notice of this kind. All that can be done within these narrow bounds is to indicate in a very few sentences some of the principal external factors which were at work in the early history of Christianity in shaping and giving direction to its development. It must be remembered that the religion of Christ preceded in chronological order both the existence of theology and the Church. It is true that the Lord Jesus Christ founded the Christian Society, but He gave it neither a political constitution nor a creed, much less a systematic body of divinity. The atmosphere which surrounded it in its infancy was purely Jewish. This fact constituted the first danger to

which the new faith was exposed. Humanly speaking, but for the influence of the Apostle Paul it must have, even during the first generation, degenerated into a Jewish sect. As it was, it was perhaps inevitable that by the close of the apostolic age it should have imbuéd, in some respects, more of the spirit of the old dispensation than of the new. The reason of this is not far to seek. Though the books of the New Testament had been written, the New Testament did not exist. The sacred writings which had been appealed to by our Lord and His apostles were the Old Testament Scriptures; and though they read into them a new and deeper meaning than they ever had before, it was only those who were filled with the Spirit, who lived and walked in the Spirit, who could distinguish between the letter and the spirit of these writings. The consequence was, that in proportion as the deep spirituality and supernatural enlightenment of the initial period of the history of the Christian religion began to subside, the legalism, formalism, and ceremonialism of Judaism began to assert themselves in the Christian communities.

It is true this particular tendency was measurably counteracted by the growing influence of the Gentile Christian communities. But here again the religion of Christ came in contact with equally potent influences which were destined to leave a deep and lasting impression upon it. The most influential of these external factors, Dr. Fairbairn groups under three heads, viz., the Greek Philosophy, the Roman Polity, and the Popular Religion. The first of these exerted a potent influence upon the evolution of Christian theology; the second upon Christian ecclesiology, or in determining the constitution and laws of the Church; and the third upon Christian ritual and form of worship. The Greek Philosophy taught the early Christian apologists and theologians to think; it furnished them with weapons to fight, and with tools to work. Besides, it had accumulated a great body of truth, metaphysical and ethical, which was absorbed by Christianity in the course of its theological development. The Roman Polity may be said to have given to the Christian Society its constitution and laws. And though it is not quite so easy to trace the influence of the Popular Religion of the Roman Empire, there can be no doubt that very much of the ritual and form of worship of the Mediæval Church owed their origin to this cause.

Now, all this was, perhaps, to a certain extent, inevitable, and even desirable. Those vast accumulations of truth and of practical wisdom, the result of the thought and labor of a long succession of generations and ages, and of not a few of the greatest men that the world has ever seen, was, as Dr. Fairbairn remarks, intended by Divine Providence for use, not to be destroyed. Nevertheless, all this had the effect of leading away the mind of the Church from Christ, and preventing it from developing its theology and ecclesiology from His person and character and teaching, and from its worship solely by His example and by the guidance of the Holy Spirit, in whom He was to be present in His Church forever. And though "Scholasticism" and the "Renaissance" contributed materially to the evolutionary process which has run through the Christian centuries, and which is traced through its several stages in this interesting and important work, the return to the germ cell of Christianity never seems to have entered into the minds of the great men who from time to time came upon the stage. Even the Reformation had not the effect of carrying back the minds of men so far. Scholasticism grappled with three great problems, or, perhaps more properly, three great groups of problems, which were so closely related as to be essentially one, the first of which was religious, the second theological, the third philosophical. The religious question referred to the relation of faith to authority, on one hand, and to knowledge,

on the other. The theological question referred to the redemptive work, its exposition and definition. And the philosophical question referred to the condition, the methods, and the objects of knowledge. The revival of learning, in addition to the quickening influence which it exerted upon the mind of Christendom, and the revolt of individualism against the absolutism of both Church and State, had the effect of calling back the minds of Christian scholars to the study of Christian history, and especially to the study of the Christian Scriptures.

In this way the ground was cleared for the Reformation. But though the Reformed Churches renounced the ecclesiology of the Mediæval Church, they accepted in the main its theology as formulated by Augustine. It is true they substituted an infallible book for an infallible Church, and, instead of accepting the dictums of the Church as the end of controversy in all things, they went behind the Church and made their appeal directly to the Holy Scriptures, as the infallible rule of faith and practice. But it was left for the critical spirit of these later times to go behind even the Christian Scriptures, in a certain sense, and to call back the mind of Christendom to Christ himself. Like the Lutheran Reformation, this new movement, which has already in a great degree revolutionized Christian thought, and which seems to be destined to produce such valuable results in the future, originated in Germany, and is, in the main, the product of the German mind. The sketch of it which Dr. Fairbairn has given us is full of interest, and will well repay a careful study. Among other things it illustrates in a striking way that law of Christian progress by which it subordinates to itself all the great movements of mind and all the mental and even material forces which come into play in the course of the ages, and makes them work together for the triumph of truth and the establishment of the kingdom of God in the earth.

But, though the temptation to linger here is very strong, we must reluctantly pass on. Hitherto our author's work has been historical and critical; but the Second Book, which constitutes the remaining part of the volume, is theological and constructive. It does not profess or claim to be a system of theology, but as the author tells us, "It is an attempt at formulating the fundamental or material conception of such a system; or, in other words, it is an endeavor, through a Christian doctrine of God, at a sketch of the first lines of a Christian Theology." To attempt to indicate, even in faintest outline, the scope of such a work in a paragraph would of course be folly. Perhaps the best thing that can be done is to quote the introductory paragraph of this part of the work which indicates the outline of what is to follow, and which will appropriately introduce to the reader a book which, without making ourselves responsible for every opinion that it contains, we can heartily recommend as a valuable addition to the library of every minister and theological student:

"The questions which fall to be discussed in this Second Book are mainly of two kinds—exegetical, concerned with the source of our conception of God; and constructive, concerned with its explication. We use exegesis that we may think of God as Christ did; but we construct a theology when His conception of God is made the idea through which we interpret the universe. His consciousness is the source and norm of the conception, but the conception is the source and norm of the theology. This theology must then, to use a current term, be, as regards source, Christocentric, but as regards objects or matter, theo-centric; in other words, while Christ determines the conception, the conception determines the theology. Hence what we have to do is, first, to attempt to interpret God through the history and consciousness of Christ; and, secondly, to elaborate this interpretation into the main lines of a theology."

And to this we may be allowed to add the closing paragraph which better illustrates the spirit and style of the work: "From the strife of the sect we would turn into the calm and gracious presence of Him who is at once the head and the heart of His Church. He has given us His peace and it abides with us even amid the collisions and contradictions of men. These are but of time, while He is of eternity. And in His presence we may not meet negation with negation, and affirm of those who say that there is no Church but theirs, that theirs is no Church of Christ. On the contrary, we shall draw no narrower line than those traced by the hand of the Son of Man: "Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother."

The Problem of Methodism. Being a Review of the Residue Theory of Regeneration and the Second Change Theory of Sanctification and the Philosophy of Christian Perfection. By the REV. J. M. BOLAND, A.M., D.D. Printed for the author by the Publishing House of the M. E. Church South, Nashville, Tennessee. Toronto: William Briggs. Price \$1.00.

Notes on Boland, or Mr. Wesley and the Second Work of Grace. By the REV. R. C. HORNER, B.O. Toronto: William Briggs. Price 75 cts.

In the first of these books, which is said to be already in its fifth edition, Dr. Boland undertakes to prove that Mr. Wesley is inconsistent with himself and with the teaching of the apostles in holding:

1. That inward sin still remains in the believer after regeneration.
2. That entire sanctification follows regeneration as a state or second blessing attained by faith.

The author further sets forth his own theory:

1. That sin is completely removed from the soul at regeneration, and hence, that for the attainment of perfect moral purity there is no need of any further work.

2. That the only subsequent work is growth or the gradual development of the maturity of the Christian character by the exercise of our graces.

This is, of course, strange doctrine in Methodism, and, in fact, its first article is strange doctrine in the entire Christian Church, if we except a few minor sects whose views in this respect have been almost universally repudiated.

Mr. Horner handles the misrepresentations and misconceptions of his opponent in a most masterly manner. Anything more completely exhaustive and more perfectly conclusive than his exposure of the misquotations and, hence, misrepresentations into which Dr. Boland has fallen, can scarcely be conceived. With painstaking fidelity and scientific method, Mr. Horner follows him through Wesley's works and through his Scriptural quotations, not giving incomplete extracts, garbled or even altered in phraseology, but the exact and complete paragraphs, word for word, in their proper connection, and thus exposing in the most demonstrative manner the misrepresentations of his opponent. Here and there in Mr. Horner's book there may be a slip or a weaker point, but these scarcely mar the perfection of the work, as, if they were all eliminated, the argument is still intact in all its cogency. We feel proud of Mr. Horner as a Canadian Methodist preacher. With Mr. Horner's work before the public it is not necessary for us to say a word to point out Dr. Boland's misconceptions both of Wesley and of Scripture. We may, however, add a word on his philosophy of Christian perfection on which he evidently prides himself, and which is the prolific source of all his errors. This philosophy he claims to be founded on modern psychology, of which, of course, poor benighted John Wesley was ignorant.

This philosophy consists :

1. In the doctrine that sin lies only in the act of the will. This is no new doctrine. It was taught by Pelagius. It is held by some modern ethical philosophers, but has been rejected by all the profounder spirits from Augustine downwards. Wesley understood it fully and recognized all that it contains of truth while rejecting its error.

2. In the failure to recognize that through heredity and habit, no man is now found with normal natural desires and appetites. Hence his abnormal, lawless action is treated as if it were normal and innocent—or as Mr. Horner puts it, “the Fall of Man is ignored.”

3. In assuming that perfection “is reached by a true unfolding of our moral and spiritual powers together with the integrity of character which is superinduced by a retroaction upon the activity involved in resisting temptation successfully.” We have quoted this verbatim from p. 325, because it would be dangerous to attempt to translate it into plain common-sense language. But if we understand it rightly, it entirely ignores the work of the Spirit by which, even after regeneration, the Divine sanctifying truth is presented to us with such supernatural power as at the same time overcomes the power of all desires that are opposed to God’s will, and reduces them to a willing obedience to God’s law, and on the other hand kindles all virtue and every grace into the most perfect activity and strength of which our nature is capable. To deny that thousands have rejoiced in such an experience of sanctification through the truth and by the power of the Spirit, without waiting for the natural effects of the “retroaction” process, is to ignore the facts of history both in the Apostolic age and in later days.

We are sorry to learn that Mr. Boland’s book has had a considerable circulation among our young preachers, and we hope that not one who has read it will fail to read Mr. Horner’s powerful antidote.

The Higher Criticism. An Outline of Modern Biblical Study. By the REV. C. W. RISHELL, A.M., PH.D. Cincinnati : Cranston & Curtis. Price 75 cents.

It is difficult to determine the purpose of this little work of 214 duodecimo pages. To summarize within this brief space all the theories or so-called results of Higher Criticism, both of the Old Testament and of the New, is a task for which very few men are competent. The statements, even though accurate, must be so extremely general that there can be no accurate discrimination of the true from the false, or of the main line of permanent results from the tentative and often extravagant efforts which have attached themselves to the beginnings and even later progress of the science. Perhaps the time has not yet arrived for such an historical *resumé* as will enable us to distinguish the permanent from the tentative, and the true from the false in the Higher Criticism. It is only becoming apparent that there are true and permanent results being slowly attained, and the aim of all honest enquirers should be to ascertain what these are.

The author classifies the theologians of our day as ultra-radical critics, conservative critics and ultra-traditionalists. This is perhaps one of the best things in the book, and his sympathies seem to be with the conservative critics though his expressions of opinion are very timid. Traditionalism, whether that of the Jews or of the early Christian Church, or of the second generation of the Reformers, builds upon a preconceived theory of what the Bible ought to be. We certainly can never expect to arrive at the truth in that way. We must ask, not what theologians have thought the Bible ought to be, but what it actually is as God has given it to us. Honest, reverential, critical investigation of its contents seems the only

way to arrive at satisfaction on this point. But the ultra-radical falls into precisely the same mistake as the traditionalist. He starts from a preconceived theory of what the Bible cannot be, and as a consequence of this *a priori* element in his investigations, he is just as likely to be involved in false conclusions as the traditionalist. We cannot recommend this little book as likely to be either safe or useful to young theologians. "Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring."

Kant's Kritik of Judgment, translated with Introduction and Notes. By J. H. BERNARD, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Archbishop King's Lecturer in Divinity in the University of Dublin. Macmillan & Co., London and New York. Toronto: Wm. Briggs. Price \$3.50.

The English reader of Kant can congratulate himself that all that is essential to a full understanding of his philosophy is now accessible. The "Kritik of the Pure Reason," and also that of the "Practical Reason," have long since been translated into English; not so, however, the "Kritik of Judgment." No one ever set himself a more difficult task than did Kant when he determined to investigate what we can hope to achieve with reason, when all the material and assistance of experience are taken away. Most of us know the relation of Hume to this great undertaking. It was his scepticism, resulting mainly from the empiricism of Locke, that first "aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumbers." The mental activity, thus and then awakened, has never since fallen asleep.

In the work before us, what is the problem Kant sets himself to solve? It has long been an accepted position that "knowing, feeling and willing" constitute all the activities of the soul. We owe this division to J. N. Tetens, a contemporary of Kant. It was adopted by the latter, and from that period has been all but universally received. These three movements or moments in our spiritual life are generally expressed by the three terms, "Intellect," "sensibility" and "will." Some sciences rest mainly upon one of these activities or movements, and some upon another. Some are purely or mainly intellectual; others emotional, and yet others practical. The object of a Kritik is to determine the *a priori* element in each movement, that is, the element not given in experience, but that without which experience is impossible. Hence, the three Kritiks—"The Pure Reason," "The Judgment," and "The Practical Reason," these dealing respectively with the pure sciences, with æsthetics and with ethics. The aim is, then, to find the *a priori* elements in the second of these divisions.

Kant regarded the present work as the coping stone of his critical edifice. Part First is divided into two books, the first treating of the beautiful, and the second of the sublime, followed by an appendix on "Taste." These are analyzed with the critical investigation characteristic of everything that came from Kant's pen. There are depth and significance in his treatment that we look for in vain in the pages of Allison and Burke.

Part Second takes up the "Teleological Judgment." Is there a purposiveness in nature? What is the relation between ends and mechanism, between freedom and necessity? Materialism, Hylozoism, Spinozism, all alike fail to meet the demands of the problem. Theism remains as the only possible doctrine that we can at all accept. "Teleology finds the consummation of its investigations only in theology." Not that the Divine Existence can be demonstrated. It is rather a practical postulate without which we are involved in complete mental confusion. As a theory, it is "superior to all other grounds of explanation," and "is completely satisfactory from every human point of view for both the speculative and practical use of our reason." The result of Kant's investigation is thus tersely put by Falcken-

berg: "As doctrines mechanism and teleology are irreconcilable and impossible; as rules of maxims of inquiry they are compatible, and the one as indispensable as the other. After the problem of life, which is insoluble by means of the mechanical explanation, has necessitated the application of the concept of ends, the teleological principle must, at least by way of experiment, be extended to the whole of nature. This consideration culminates in the position that man, as the subject of morality, must be held to be the final aim of the world, for it is only in regard to a moral being that no further inquiry can be raised as to the purpose of existence. It also repeats the moral argument for the existence of a supreme reason, thus supplementing physico-theology, which is inadequate to the demonstration of one absolutely perfect Deity, so that the third Kritik, like the two preceding, concludes with the idea of God as an object of practical faith."

Kant's treatment of this great question is just now of special importance in view of antagonizing doctrines set forth by the advocates of evolution.

We owe a debt of gratitude to both translator and publishers for bringing this rich and varied thought of Kant within reach of a wider circle of readers at a time when strong thinking is so much needed. The value of the volume is greatly increased by a glossary of Kant's philosophical terms.

History of Modern Philosophy. By RICHARD FALCKENBERG, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Erlangen. Translated with the author's sanction by A. C. ARMSTRONG, JR., Professor of Philosophy in Wesleyan University. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1893.

No better work on the history of modern philosophy has been put before the English reading public for many a day. It begins with Nicolas of Cusa, born 1401, and brings the subject down to the present time. The author passes in review the brilliant names who, for five hundred years, have represented the world's deepest thought, and have, consequently, determined the general trend of both theory and practice. Their speculations have found their way into every department of practical life. The home, the state, the lecture room, divinity hall, criticism, the religious life, systems of theology and political legislation have all felt their influence. Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bishop Butler, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and others are successively brought before us, their theories expounded, their mistakes noted, and their philosophical relations and significance determined. The volume opens with an introduction that carries the reader to the heart of the subject, its difficulties, its nature and its claims, and closes with a retrospect indicative of further tendencies in speculative thought.

The book is characterized by vigor, grasp of principles and wide and accurate reading. There is not a dry or uninteresting page from beginning to end. It is admirably suited for a text-book, and is sure to win its way to general favor. The translator deserves our gratitude for the successful accomplishment of a difficult task, while the mechanical execution reflects great credit upon the enterprising publishers. To the student in theology the value of such a book lies in the fact that his own chosen field fails to explain itself unless aided by the side-lights that come from a knowledge of philosophy. Theology is bound up with the history of speculative thought. Locke, Kant and Hegel have all but determined some of the great tendencies and results in modern criticism and dogma. Their relation to present thought is similar to that of Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The one can be understood only in the light of the other. A "History of Doctrines" ought to be read side by side with a "History of Philosophy." If the *fruit* is found in the one, the *root* of the tree that bore it will be found in the other.

Verbum Dei. The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1893. By ROBERT F. HORTON, M.A. New York: Macmillan & Co. Toronto: William Briggs. Price \$1.75.

The theme of the lecturer, to use his own words, is, "Every living preacher must receive his message in a communication direct from God, and the constant purpose of his life must be to receive it uncorrupted, and to deliver it without addition or subtraction" (p. 17). In explanation of the nature of these communications, he says (p. 47): "This lecture will certainly have failed of its purpose if it leaves an impression that there was anything which ought to be regarded as exceptional or incapable of repetition in the Divine events and the personal communications from God through the Law and the Prophets." In support of this opinion, he mentions several instances in modern times in which preachers at critical periods of their ministry have received Divine direction as to the themes upon which they should discourse. One of these instances is taken from our own Rev. E. R. Young's "By Canoe and Dog-Train." Mr. Young tells that upon a certain occasion he visited a band of pagan Indians who seemed resolved to pay no attention to his preaching. Tired in body and sad at heart, he prayed for Divine guidance. God heard his prayer. Immediately he arose and shouted, "I know where all your children are, all your dead children," instantly gaining the attention of the Indians who eagerly and tearfully gathered around him to receive instruction.

It seems to us that many preachers, perhaps all preachers, could tell of similar instances in their own experience, when, in answer to prayer, the right word was given to them. In our own experiences, we believe, there have been some such instances. But to regard, as the lecturer does, such instances of Divine direction as equivalent to "the old prophetic inspiration" (p. 81), which has given us the Bible, is, in our opinion, a mistaking of one thing for another—the result of which is to belittle the Bible. And, indeed, the lecturer carries on the same process by another method. For, in the fourth lecture, he plainly tells us that while the Word of God is in the Bible, the Bible is not the Word of God. Every man, therefore, in his study of the Bible must use his own judgment as to what part of it is the Word of God. And, inasmuch as "there is nothing to show that God has not been speaking to His saints, His prophets, His preachers since the first century, in the same way He spoke to men of old, and in their writings there are not precious words of God which every man of God would wish to receive and obey" (p. 144), there is no reason why the Bible should not be continually and indefinitely enlarged by these modern revelations.

We prefer to say with Dr. Schaff, that "the hand of God has drawn a bold line of demarcation between the century of miracles and the succeeding ages, to show by the abrupt transition and the striking contrast, the difference between the work of God and the work of man, and to impress us the more deeply with the supernatural origin of Christianity, and the incomparable value of the New Testament."

All the true things which are said in the closing lectures respecting the Bible and the great writers and poets of modern times, do not, in our judgment, redeem the fundamental error of the book.

The Divinity of Jesus Christ. By the authors of "Progressive Orthodoxy." Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. Price \$1.00.

The authors of this work are the editors of the *Andover Review*, whose theological position is well known. In view of their breadth of teachings, it is gratifying to find them in the great theme of this work in substantial agreement with most conservative orthodoxy. The conclusions are not reached by any processes common to the usual forms of theological science.

On the contrary, the conflicts of the many schools described, for example, in "Newman's History of the Arians," would probably be to them uninteresting or offensive. "The dogmas of the coessentiality of the Son with the Father, and of the two natures in one person arose, it is maintained, through a commingling of philosophies now superseded with an imperfect historical knowledge of the Scriptures." Thus they represent traditional orthodoxy. How then do they reach the goal of the divinity of Jesus? Evidently by the path, now well beaten by representatives of this school, viz., Christian consciousness, the consciousness of Christ and His followers. By this method, with much ability and a devout spirit, they furnish an exposition of the "origin and reasonableness of the belief of the Church" in the divinity of Christ.

The Bridge of History over the Gulf of Time. A popular view of the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity. By THOMAS COOPER. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. New York: Hunt & Eaton.

The author is the well-known Chartist, poet, sceptic and Christian philosopher. The nineteen arches of the bridge are the nineteen centuries of the Christian era. The author shows the presence and influence of Christianity in each of these centuries, and thus traces it back to the personal ministry of the Lord Jesus Christ. The material of the book was originally presented in the form of popular lectures, which accomplished much good. It maintains in book-form its original characteristics.

The Witness of the World to Christ. By the REV. W. A. MATHEWS, M.A., Vicar of St. Lawrence, Appleby, etc. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Price 90 cents.

The writer deals with the great religious questions and difficulties of the day. He felt it to be necessary, in order to his own establishment in the faith of Christ, that he should carefully examine the current objections to Christianity, and the result was so satisfactory that he here presents the substance of his investigations for the satisfaction and establishment of others. The book will be very helpful to sincere enquirers after truth.

Public School Physiology and Temperance. By WILLIAM NATTRESS, M.D., M.R.C.S. Eng. Authorized by the Education Department of Ontario. Toronto: Wm. Briggs, Wesley Buildings. Price 25 cents.

This little book will, we trust, secure a very prominent place in the *curricula* of the public schools. It furnishes valuable information upon the physiological effects of tobacco as well as alcohol, and methods of aiding the sick and injured and of preventing disease. The youth who heeds the instructions here given will be fortified against temptations which have ruined countless numbers of the young and old, and will be able also to render intelligent assistance in cases of accident and injury such as we all are liable to meet with at any time.

Fresh Light from the Ancient Monuments. (Seventh edition.)

The Races of the Old Testament. Both by A. H. SAYCE, LL.D. Price \$1.00 each. London, Eng.: The Religious Tract Society. Toronto: William Briggs.

Both these works belong to the "By-Paths of Bible Knowledge" series, and will throw important side-lights on the Book of Genesis. The first is a sketch of the most striking confirmations of the Bible from recent discoveries in Egypt, Assyria, Palestine, Babylonia and Asia Minor. The chapter on the Book of Genesis will just now be specially interesting as the

monuments, accounts of the creation, deluge, etc., are compared with the Bible.

The second is a study in ethnology from the monuments, pictures and sculptures of the ancient orientals largely illustrated. The science of ethnology is discussed, and of language and race. The tenth chapter of Genesis is examined and compared with other ethnological records. The Semitic and Egyptian races, the Canaanite and Hittite peoples, and the tribes of Africa, Europe and Arabia are all surveyed. No one will rise from reading these books without a better conception of Old Testament history and a stronger faith in the inspirations of the Bible.

Peloubet's Select Notes on the International Lessons for 1894. Boston: W. A. Wilde & Co. Toronto: Upper Canada Tract Society. Price \$1.25.

Illustrative Notes. By DRS. HURLBUT and DOHERTY. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Toronto: William Briggs. Price \$1.25.

Bible Studies. By DR. PENTECOST. Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. Price, cloth, \$1.00; paper, 60 cents.

Sermons by the Monday Club. By twenty-three leading Congregational ministers. Boston: Congregational S. S. and Publishing Society. Toronto: William Briggs. Price \$1.25.

The above are standard helps in the study of the International S. S. Lessons for 1894, and each in its kind is probably unsurpassed. One of the great advantages of the uniform lesson system is apparent upon an examination of these volumes and comparing them with the "helps" of twenty years ago, when the work began. We are now beginning, for the fourth time, the study of the Bible in course, and anyone procuring this set would, at the end of the seven years, have a most invaluable library of Bible commentaries.

In many respects we would place *Peloubet* as the best of the list. It is "inductive, suggestive, explanatory, illustrative, doctrinal and practical;" it acknowledges the latest research in archæology and science, and utilizes the best Biblical scholarship, without endorsing the rationalistic criticism, such as admitting the composite character of the Book of Genesis as to authorship.

Hurlbut and Doherty are, perhaps, a little more conservative along the lines of the Higher Criticism in their spiritual, meaty, compact "Illustrative Notes," which will be found exceedingly suggestive as to methods of teaching, illustration and application.

Dr. Pentecost gives us his expository "Bible Studies" from amidst the duties incident to his settling in a new pastorate in London, Eng.; and as a result they do not "smack" so much of the student as of the practical man in the field applying the truth. They will be specially helpful to the preacher and Bible-class teacher.

The "Monday Club Sermons," are short, plain, practical talks on the topics of the Sunday School lessons, and well adapted for week-evening meetings. They will greatly aid in suggesting spiritual application.

Recent Exploration in Bible Lands. By THOS. NICOL, D.D. Second edition. New York and Toronto: Funk & Wagnalls Co. Price 50-cents.

Recent Explorations is a very valuable little book for Bible students, each of whom should, in his study of the sacred page, listen to the voices that are speaking from the monuments and inscriptions of the buried past.

We have brought before us here the Chaldean Genesis, Chedorlaomer's campaign, the Empire of the Hittites, Egypt before and during the oppression, the Exodus and its route, Israel in the desert, Canaan in the Tel-el-Amarna Tablets, the Moabite Stone, Jerusalem and the Temple, the Siloam Inscription, Assyria, Babylon and Persia, the Gospel sites, etc. The result of these investigations is to establish the antiquity of the art of writing, to show the existence of materials for accurate history prior to the call of Abraham, and to confirm the Scripture incidents in numerous instances.

The Pulpit Commentary. By CANON SPENCE and REV. J. S. EXELL. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. Toronto: William Briggs. Price \$2.00.

Expositor's Bible. By W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, LL.D. London, Eng.: Hodder & Stoughton. Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. Price \$1.50.

Hand-Book for Bible Classes. By REV. ALEX. WHYTE, D.D. Edinburgh, Scot.: T. & T. Clark. Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. Price 70c.

Genesis, in each of the above series, is a standard work, and will form valuable aids for those who would be students of the whole Book, as in contrast with being mere gleaners of the Sunday School Helps.

In the "Pulpit Commentary," *Genesis* has reached the eighth edition. A "General Introduction to the Old Testament" is ably given by Canon Farrar, followed by an exhaustive article on "The Leading Principles of the Divine Law as manifested in the Pentateuch," by Bishop Cotterill, of Edinburgh. The exposition and homiletics is by that very able commentator, Rev. Thos. Whitelaw, M.A., which he opens by a very full discussion of "The Authorship of the Pentateuch," and an "Introduction to the Book of Genesis," written from a moderate standpoint. This commentary is not only homiletically rich, but is sufficiently critical for any ordinary student.

Genesis, in the "Expositor's Bible," is written by Marcus Dods, D.D., and has reached the sixth edition. It is a remarkably spiritual and practical application of the great historic events narrated in the book. It is especially suggestive to the preacher.

Genesis, in the "Hand-Book Series," is also edited by Marcus Dods, D.D. The two should really go together as companion volumes. In form and matter this little work is unsurpassed. Everybody should read the introduction, which is moderately liberal, as to the character and authorship of *Genesis*. The notes on the text of the book itself are simply unsurpassed. It should be in the hands of every teacher and student of *Genesis*.

None Like It. A plea for the Old Sword. By JOSEPH PARKER. \$1.25.

We have received the advance sheets of this work by the great London preacher from the Fleming H. Revell Co., Toronto. The book is written from the conservative side of Biblical criticism, and is certain to have a wide circulation. We will give it fuller notice in our next issue.

Campaign Echoes. The Autobiography of Mrs. Letitia Youmans, the Pioneer of the White Ribbon Movement in Canada. Toronto: William Briggs. Price \$1.00.

This is the life record of a woman of great natural gifts and literary culture combined with the noblest type of Christian character. We have known her from childhood, and every page calls back the past and thrills

us with a holy inspiration. It is a book which our modern political philosophers who talk about natural liberty to please ourselves in the matter of alcoholic drink, would do well to read. If they are not utterly insensible to better things, it will give them at least a glimpse of two worlds which they have never yet seen, the hell in which the submerged victims of drink are daily perishing, and the heavenly spirit of self-abnegation which can consecrate life to saving others.

The Psychology of Childhood. By FREDERICK TRACY, PH.D., Lecturer in Psychology in the University of Toronto. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co.

This little volume, the work of a native of Ontario, evinces more than ordinary learning, ability and thoroughness of scientific method. The aim of the author is to make as complete a collection as possible of facts touching the development of the senses, the emotions, the intellect, the will, and the use of language in childhood. In doing this he has availed himself of a wide range of recorded facts, as well as of the work of anatomists and physiologists in their studies of the development of the brain and organs of sense in childhood. As he has confined himself to a period scarcely reaching beyond the first three years of life, he has not touched the wide and important field of the moral and religious elements in development. The psychological results of educational processes are likewise excluded as lying beyond his field.

But although for the sake of scientific completeness the field is thus narrowed, we have here a work of intense interest and importance to the psychologist, the educator, the physiologist, and in fact to every intelligent parent. The work, while thorough and painstaking in its execution, is modest and unpretending, but none the less abreast of the best modern scientific methods. We shall expect good work in the future from its able young author.

A Lawyer's Examination of the Bible. By HAVARD H. RUSSELL, LL.D. Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. Price \$1.00.

This is a style of apologetics which ought to do much good. The author makes every reader a juror. The case is stated impartially, the issues are joined, and witnesses by the score are examined, and the verdict of the reader is eloquently sought for the Bible, salvation and immortality. A work of such ingenious and popular style may be made very serviceable in dealing with the great majority of doubters.

Gold, Gold in Cariboo. A Story of Adventure in British Columbia. By CLIVE PHILLIPPS-WOLLEY. With six illustrations by GODFREY C. HURDLEY. London: Blackie & Son; Toronto: Copp, Clark & Co. 12mo, pp. 288.

Raff's Ranch. A Story of Adventure among Cow-boys and Indians. By F. M. HOLMES, author of "The Cruise of the Petrel." With three illustrations by PAUL HARDY. 12mo, pp. 191. Same publishers.

A Golden Age. A Story of Four Merry Children. By ISMAEL THOM, author of "Every Body's Business," "Bab," "Phil. and his Father," etc. 12mo, pp. 224. Same publishers.

Messrs. Blackie & Sons make a specialty of publishing books for young people, and so far as we have been able to examine their publications, while they are interesting and stimulating, they are far from all suggestions of impurity and otherwise exceptionable matter. The books before us are

of this order. They may be safely read by boys, and while they are full of adventure, such as is sure to interest readers of this class, they abound in pictures drawn from life of a state of things, which, though passing, existed but a few years ago in what was then the Wild West. The scene of the first lies in British Columbia, among the mining camps of the Upper Frazer, and gives us glimpses of life in that region thirty years ago. The second describes the exciting incidents of ranch life and cowboy experience in the States of the Far West. The third is a story of happy childhood, applicable to all countries and all times. Nicely printed, nicely illustrated, and attractively bound they are pretty sure to meet with a hearty welcome among young people.

The Intellectual Culture of the Christian. By the REV. JAMES MCCANN, D.D. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curts. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Price 40 cents.

This is a book well got up, and with its 110 bright, clear pages full of the sublimity of common sense starting with a fair appreciation of piety without culture, and showing the directions and means by which a Christian may develop his best manhood. It is an excellent book for a student; it will also serve as a helpful stimulant to a minister when about to prepare an educational address. It is good for every intelligent Christian, and for every Christian who wishes to be intelligent.

The Treasury of Religious Thought begins the year with an excellent number. The reader will find in the monthly visits of this magazine an invaluable repository of sermons, articles, illustrations and other matter admirably adapted to the wants of any preacher and Christian worker.

The twenty-seventh volume of *The Homiletic Review* opens with a comprehensive article by Prof. William C. Wilkinson, on "The Attitude of Christianity Toward Other Religions." Dr. Robert Balgarnie follows with an article dealing with some of the difficulties of prayer consequent upon the doctrine of the Trinity, as held by those who maintain the evangelical view. The Rev. William C. Schaeffer discusses the subject, "Emotion in Religion." Dr. William Hayes Ward tells of the light that has been thrown by recent discoveries upon the life and character of Belshazzar.

The frontispiece of the January number of *The Chautauquan* is a fine view of the Leaning Tower of Pisa. It accompanies a brilliant descriptive article on a trip through Italy by Bishop John H. Vincent. The warden of Toynbee Hall, Rev. S. A. Barnett, writes of "University Settlements," in which he says: "The object of settlement is in one word, 'friendship.' In the formation of friendships, neighborhood, opportunities of contact, the experience of the same surroundings, play important parts. The development of towns, which has sent the rich to live in one quarter and the poor in another, has thus made friendship between a rich man and a poor man more rare than when both lived in the same village or in neighboring streets."

The Preacher's Magazine for January is the first number of the fourth volume of this most excellent Homiletical Periodical. The leading sermon is entitled "Christian Brotherhood," and is by the Venerable William M. Sinclair, Archdeacon of London. The senior editor, Mark Guy Pearse, contributes another chapter on "Moses: His Life and Its Lessons," taking up "The Story of the Golden Calf."

Some excellent illustrations form a new and interesting feature of the January issue of *The Missionary Review of the World*. This number is overflowing with first-class articles by eminent writers in other lands. The *Review* grows in interest and helpfulness with every year. The editor-in-chief opens Volume XVII. with an article on the "Columbian Exposition at Chicago." He treats especially of the Congress of Religions, in regard to its effects on the Kingdom of God. Dr. Gordon follows with an intensely interesting and instructive article, in which he tells of "Three Weeks with Joseph Rabinowitz," that prince of Jewish converts to Christianity.

The Presbyterian and Reformed Review is representative of the more orthodox party in the Presbyterian Churches of America. The editorial staff is composed of representatives of their different theological colleges with Benjamin B. Warfield as chief. Canada is represented by Drs. Caven, of Toronto; McVicar, of Montreal; Ross, of Kingston; McKnight, of Kingston, and King of Winnipeg. It is a very strong theological quarterly. In the October number Prof. Green examines "Dr. Brigg's Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch," and Prof. Warfield gives an article on "The Westminster Doctrine of Holy Scripture." Prof. Caven has an editorial on "The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada." A most profitable feature of the periodical is the "Reviews of Recent Theological Literature."

The New World for December sustains its position as "A Quarterly Review of Religion, Ethics, and Theology." The writers are able representatives of the liberal school of thought. The leading articles in this number are: "The Babylonian Exiles," "The Peculiarity of John's Theology," "Plato's Conception of a Good Life," "The New Socialism and Economics," "The Religion of the Chinese People," "The Ethics of Creeds," "Heresy in Athens in the Time of Plato," "The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism," "Thoroughness in Theology," and "The Parliament of Religions." The orthodox theologian will not always agree with all that he reads in this review, but it will make him think, perhaps, and give him clearer conceptions of truth from his own stand, and so far he will be benefited.

The American Catholic Quarterly (October). This number has unusual and very special interest. It has two articles of a scientific character, and one defining the limits of papal infallibility. But its chief interest centres in an article on "Anglican Ritualism," and another on "Reunion or Submission." In these the assumptions of "the Parkerite sect" are handled unmercifully, but logically. It must be disheartening to the most advanced Anglo-Catholic to have his position clearly shown to be that of an heretical schismatic.

The A. M. E. Church Review (October). The leading article is by the Right Rev. James Theodore Holly, D.D., LL.D., on "Political Economy." Dr. Johnston states four important arguments in Theism. Mr. Moore contributes a valuable study in Homer, and Mr. Henderson has some sensible and practical points about the educational work of the African M. E. Church.

The London Quarterly Review. The numbers for July and October maintain the high standard of the *Review* in the excellence of its scholarship and the wide range of its topics.

We may notice, as especially interesting to theologians, the following: In the July number, "Christ's Place in Modern Theology," being a review of Dr. Fairbairn's volume on this subject; and in the October number,

"Modern Congregational Theology," a kindly and timely criticism of "Faith and Criticism;" essays by Congregationalists, and "The Apostolic Succession," based on the well-known work of the Rev. Thomas Powell. The writer of this article concludes by saying, "But indications are not wanting—notably in Mr. Gore's and Mr. Lock's writings—that the experimental religion of our High Anglican brethren will one day burst the bonds in which, to our grief and its own detriment, it is now confined." To which we add a reverent Amen.

The Preacher's Assistant. The various departments, Sermonic, Bible Study and Christian Work, Current Thought in Theology and Religion, and Editorial, are well filled with timely and interesting matter.

The Century Magazine is one of the greatest of the magazines: two thousand pages of the best literature and one thousand illustrations by the greatest artists in the world in one year. In 1894 there will appear Mark Twain's most dramatic story, "Pudd'nhead Wilson," and a series of superb engravings of the old Dutch masters. In the January number our readers will be specially interested in an illustrated paper by Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania, setting forth the relations of "The Bible and the Assyrian Monuments," in which is included an account of the creation and the flood as described on these monuments. The comparison with the Biblical narrative is of curious interest. The general subject is further treated in an editorial article.

Special interest attaches to an article on Sir James Simpson's "Introduction of Chloroform," the circumstances of which are recorded by his daughter. The article makes appropriate mention of the previous discovery of sulphuric ether as an anæsthetic by Dr. Morton, and of his experiments at the Massachusetts General Hospital. The article touches on the relation of Professor Simpson's discovery to hypnotism, and there are portraits of Sir James and Lady Simpson.

St. Nicholas for young folks is seven magazines in one, *Wide Awake* being the last to be merged into it, which adds two hundred pages to the volume. It is unquestionably the best magazine of its kind for boys and girls. In 1894 there will be a Natural History series, a serial story by Mark Twain, a series on American authors, stories of India, "Wild Life" described by an educated Sioux Indian, and papers on the Government. In the January number, "How Paper Money is Made," "Stamp Collecting," and "The Little People from Java" (as seen at the World's Fair) will be read with interest.

The Expository Times has a fine programme for 1894, in which are articles on the parables of Zechariah, the kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus, the Biblical doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, an exposition of Romans VIII., the Holy Spirit in His work upon Christ and the believer, the Biblical Theology of the books of the Old and New Testaments, and an authoritative and systematic account of the Higher Life Teaching by the leaders of the Keswick movement, some of which are treated in the January number. It is a most fresh, scholarly, readable and suggestive magazine for the Bible student.

The Review of Reviews is certainly "The Busy Man's magazine," whether he be lay or clerical. Articles that will be of special interest in the January number are an illustrated character sketch of Lord and Lady Aberdeen by the Editor, and also another by Mr. Stead on "The Mission and Destiny of Canada." "Relief for the Unemployed in the American Cities," by Albert Shaw, and "Relief Work, its Principles and Methods," by Washington Gladden, are important sociological contributions. The regular departments are well sustained.