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


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
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WAR AND PEACE:

THE EVILS OF THE FIRST
AND
A PLAN FOR PRESERVING THE LAST

BY
WILLIAM JAY


Reprinted from the original edition of 1842
with an introductory note

by

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

Director of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In 1842 there was published in the city of New York, a little book of approximately a hundred pages, entitled "War and Peace: the Evils of the First, and a Plan for Preserving the Last." In lieu of preface or introduction the author contented himself with Dr. Franklin's oft quoted dictum and outstanding challenge to men of good will, which he printed on the title page: "We make daily great Improvements in *Natural*, there is one I wish to see in *Moral Philosophy*; the Discovery of a Plan, that would induce & oblige Nations to settle their Disputes without first Cutting one another's Throats."*

John Jay recommended "a plan" to the Congress in 1785, when holding the position of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under the government of the Confederation;† five years later, John Jay, as Acting Secretary of State under the Constitution, until Jefferson's return from France to assume the Secretaryship of State, recommended the same plan to the first President of the United States, who sent to the Senate of the First Congress under the Constitution‡ Jay's report to the Congress of the Confederation. On November 19, 1794, John Jay, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special

* Letter to Dr. Richard Price, February 6, 1780, *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, collected and edited by Albert Henry Smyth, 1906, Vol. VIII, p. 9.

† For Report of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Respecting the Eastern Boundary, dated April 21, 1785, see *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. I, p. 94.

‡ For the text of a Message from the President of the United States Relating to Differences with Great Britain Respecting the Eastern Boundary, Communicated February 9, 1790, see *ibid.*, p. 90.

Mission to Great Britain, signed the first treaty under the Constitution, which aptly bears his name, carrying his plan into effect of submitting to mixed commissions the differences between Great Britain and the United States, which diplomacy had failed to adjust. The contribution of John Jay to his friend Franklin's request for a plan was thus the introduction of arbitration into the modern practice of nations.

The contribution of William Jay, the author of the treatise on War and Peace, rendered the plan of his illustrious father effective by an agreement, to be included in future treaties, not to resort to hostilities but to submit a controversy arising under the treaty to the arbitration of one or more friendly powers, and to abide by the award to be rendered in the case.

* * *

The treaty of September 3, 1783, with Great Britain recognized the independence of the United States, but the Northeastern Boundary as defined in the Second Article thereof, was uncertain. Therefore, Jay, appointed Secretary of State upon his return from Paris, where he had been a negotiator of the treaty, recommended that the matter be referred to our Minister at London, to be taken up with the British Government, and, because of failure to reach a satisfactory settlement through diplomatic channels, that the difference be submitted to a mixed commission, whose composition he stated and whose procedure he outlined in the report laid before the Congress. No action was taken at the time and the copy of the report transmitted to the Congress five years later met a similar fate.

In the meantime many and serious causes of friction had arisen between the two countries. Contrary to Article IV of the Treaty of 1783, impediments had been interposed

by some of the United States to the recovery of debts due British creditors, and the Northwestern Posts had not been evacuated by British troops in accordance with Article VII of the same Treaty. Since the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution, British vessels had seized and confiscated American vessels, contrary to the law of nations, and in some instances British vessels had been improperly taken in American waters, or upon the High Seas by French vessels improperly fitted out in American ports. Feeling ran high on both sides; the two countries were rapidly drifting into and were upon the verge of war when, in 1794, President Washington determined as a last resource, to send John Jay, first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, on Special Mission to Great Britain, to attempt an adjustment of the numerous differences and a removal of the many and perplexing obstacles to peace.

The mission was not of Jay's seeking, nor was it to his liking. "No appointment ever operated more unpleasantly upon me," he said in a letter to his wife, "but the public considerations which were urged, and the manner in which it was pressed, strongly impressed me with a conviction that to refuse it would be to desert my duty for the sake of my ease and domestic concerns and comforts."* He had previously written to Mrs. Jay: "If it should please God to make me instrumental to the continuance of peace, and in preventing the effusion of blood and other evils and miseries incident to war, we shall both have reason to rejoice." And in language which betrays the man and the spirit which pervaded his every thought and act, he continued, saying, "Whatever may be the event, the endeavour will be virtuous, and consequently consolatory.

* William Jay, *The Life and Writings of John Jay*, 1833, Vol. I, p. 311; *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay*, edited by Henry P. Johnston, 1893, Vol. IV, p. 5.

Let us repose unlimited trust in our Maker; it is our business to adore and to obey."*

Reaching England in June, he put himself into immediate communication with Lord Grenville, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and beginning with the subjects upon which agreement seemed likely, then taking up the more delicate and difficult matters, and avoiding written communications, inasmuch as "men who sign their names to arguments, seldom retract," he concluded a treaty on November 19, 1794, which preserved peace but cost him his career.

By Article V of the treaty, the river intended under the name of the St. Croix was identified by commissioners appointed in accordance with its terms; the commissioners appointed under the 6th Article failed to determine the sums due British creditors, but their government ultimately accepted the sum of £600,000 offered by the United States in satisfaction of their demands; and the 7th and most important Article of this kind, submitted to a mixed commission of five persons, claims of American and British merchants for the alleged illegal capture of vessels and wares to be decided "according to the merits of the several cases and to justice, equity, and the law of nations." The success of this last commission was such as to convince the two countries of the feasibility of this method of settlement, as it has since convinced all others respecting justice, equity, and the law of nations.

It was fortunate that the United States was represented by the elder Jay in the entire transaction; it was fortunate that the younger Pitt was Prime Minister of Great Britain throughout the same period. The one proposed arbitration, to which the other was receptive, and if in 1786 Pitt

* Jay, *The Life and Writings of John Jay*, Vol. I, p. 311; Johnston, *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay*, Vol. IV, pp. 4-5.

was unwilling to include a clause to that effect in the treaty of that year with France, he was nevertheless disposed in the treaty with the United States to follow the advice of his intimate friend and confidant, William Pulteney, who had said in a letter addressed to him under date of September 14, 1786:

It is to be considered whether this is not a good opportunity to ingraft upon this treaty some arrangement that may effectually tend to prevent future wars, at least for a considerable time. Why may not two nations adopt, what individuals often adopt who have dealings that may lead to disputes, the measure of agreeing beforehand that in case any differences shall happen which they can not settle amicably, the question shall be referred to arbitration? The matter in dispute is seldom of much real consequence, but the point of honour prevents either party from yielding, but if it is decided by third parties, each may be contented. The arbitrators should not be sovereign princes; but might not each nation name three judges, either of their own courts of law, or of any other country, but of whom the opposite nation should choose one, and these two hear the question and either determine it or name an umpire—the whole proceedings to be in writing? This would occasion the matter to be better discussed than is commonly done, and would give time for the parties to cool and most probably reconcile them to the decision, whatever it might be.

It has frequently occurred to my mind that, if France and England understood each other, the world might be kept in peace from one end of the globe to the other. And why may they not understand each other? I allow that France is the most intriguing nation upon earth; that they are restless and faithless; but is it impossible to show them that every object of their intrigue may be better assured by good faith and a proper intelligence with us, and might we

not arrange everything together now so as completely to satisfy both?*

Starting from the premise that we are free agents, that war is an evil, William Jay maintains that the extinction of other evils shows that war itself may be eliminated by the gradual growth of a public opinion against it and by the creation of agencies which nations can create and use just as individuals have created and used them.

On the first point he says by way of introduction:

Civilization and Christianity are diffusing their influence throughout the globe, mitigating the sufferings and multiplying the enjoyments of the human family. Free institutions are taking the place of feudal oppressions; education is pouring its light upon minds hitherto enveloped in all the darkness of ignorance; the whole system of slavery, both personal and political, is undermined by public opinion, and must soon be prostrated; and the signs of the times assure us, that the enormous mass of crime and wretchedness, which is the fruit of intemperance, will at no very remote period disappear from the earth.†

On the second point he says, also by way of introduction:

Individuals possess the same natural right of self-defence, as nations, but the organization of civil society renders its exercise, except in very extreme cases, unnecessary, and therefore criminal. A citizen is injured in his person or property—were he to attempt to redress his wrong, a forcible contest would ensue, and as the result would be uncertain, the injury he had already sustained might be greatly aggravated. Instead therefore of resorting to force, he appeals to the laws. His complaint is heard by an impartial tri-

* J. Holland Rose, *William Pitt and National Revival*, 1911, p. 340.

† *War and Peace*, pp. 76-77; *post*, pp. 51-52.

bunal, his wrongs are redressed, he is secured from farther injury, and the peace of society is preserved.*

He admits, as he and as we, too, must, that a court of nations is lacking, although expressing the opinion that one may be established, saying: "No tribunal, it is true, exists for the decision of national controversies; but it does not, therefore, follow that none can be established."†

These introductory statements have been quoted as they show Mr. Jay to be as sound a prophet as he was an historian, and the following passage is calculated to inspire confidence in his judgment as a man of affairs, who looks the facts in the face and who proposes to reach the millennium by degrees. Thus he says:

We have often seen extensive national alliances for the prosecution of war, and no sufficient reason can be assigned why such alliances might not also be formed for the preservation of peace. It is obvious that war might instantly be banished from Europe, would its nations regard themselves as members of one great society, and, by mutual consent, erect a court for the trial and decision of their respective differences.‡

Such a transformation, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, as it were, he admits to be impossible

since time would be necessary to enlighten and direct public opinion, and produce general acquiescence in the plan, as well as to arrange the various stipulations and guarantees that would be requisite. It is not surprising that those who suppose such a tribunal can only be established by a simultaneous movement among the nations who are to continue warring with each other till the signal is given for universal peace,

* *War and Peace*, p. 77; *post*, p. 52.

† *War and Peace*, p. 78; *post*, p. 52.

‡ *War and Peace*, p. 78; *post*, pp. 52-53.

should be startled at the boldness and absurdity of the project. Of such a project *we* are wholly guiltless. We have no hope or expectation, in the present state of the world, of a general and simultaneous negotiation throughout Christendom in behalf of a tribunal for the decision of national differences and the suppression of war. Such a movement can only be expected *after* an extensive although partial abandonment of the military policy; and must be demanded and effected by the pacific sentiments of mankind. We have no hesitation, therefore, in avowing our belief, that, under existing circumstances, the idea of a congress of nations for the extinction of war, is utterly chimerical.*

The difficulty of the problem did not, however, deter him; on the contrary, it rather forced him to urge his own country to take a first step in the hope and belief that other nations would be drawn into the movement and that a foundation would be laid for further progress, perhaps for that tribunal between nations which seemed impossible at the moment.

The step in advance toward the ultimate goal was to be made along the lines of least resistance, or as he puts it "in the way least likely to excite alarm and opposition," inasmuch as in efforts "to promote the temporal or spiritual welfare of mankind, we ought to view their condition as it really is, and not as in our opinion it ought to be —and we should consult expediency as far as we can so, without compromising principle."† In support of these eminently sane views he points to the wisdom of Wilberforce and his followers who did not begin with the abolition of slavery, on which, however, they were set, but contented themselves with the abolition of the slave

* *War and Peace*, pp. 78-79; *post*, p. 53.

† *War and Peace*, p. 80; *post*, p. 54.

trade as a first step "being well assured that by pursuing both objects at the same time, they would excite a combined opposition that would prove insurmountable. . . . Had the British abolitionists employed themselves in addressing memorials to the various courts of Europe, soliciting them to unite in a general agreement to abandon the traffic, there can be no doubt that they would have labored in vain, and spent their strength for nought. They adopted the wiser plan of awakening the consciences, and informing the understandings of their countrymen, and persuading them to do justice and love mercy; and thus to set an example to the rest of Europe, infinitely more efficacious than all the arguments and remonstrances which reason and eloquence could dictate."*

Therefore as "a mode for preserving peace" calculated to "shock no prejudice" and to "excite no reasonable alarm," he proposed to insert an article to the following effect, in our next treaty with France "our first and ancient ally" with which no rivalry existed in commerce or manufactures and with which the future promised to be harmonious:

It is agreed between the contracting parties that if, unhappily, any controversy shall hereafter arise between them in respect to the true meaning and intention of any stipulation in this present treaty, or in respect to any other subject, which controversy can not be satisfactorily adjusted by negotiation, neither party shall resort to hostilities against the other; but the matter in dispute shall, by a special convention, be submitted to the arbitrament of one or more friendly powers; and the parties hereby agree to abide by the award which may be given in pursuance of such submission.†

* *War and Peace*, pp. 81, 97; *post*, pp. 54-55, 69.

† *War and Peace*, pp. 81-82; *post*, p. 55.

Neither the father nor the son claimed his particular plan as a "discovery," but each has been, and still is, the source of modern precedent and practice. In the present case the authority of Vattel, the master in such matters, was invoked in justification of the plan, who showed the feasibility of arbitration by the experience of the Swiss Cantons over a period of centuries:

Arbitration is a method very reasonable, very conformable to the law of nature, in determining differences that do not directly interest the safety of the nation. Though the strict right may be mistaken by the arbitrator, *it is still more to be feared that it will be overwhelmed by the fate of arms.* The Swiss have had the precaution in all their alliances among themselves, and even in those they have contracted with the neighboring powers, to agree before hand on the manner in which their disputes were to be submitted to arbitrators in case they could not adjust them in an amicable manner. *This wise precaution has not a little contributed to maintain the Helvetic Republic in that flourishing state which secures its liberty and renders it respectable throughout Europe.**

A mere recommendation to resort to arbitration, such as is contained in the Peaceful Settlement Convention of the Hague Conference, would not have satisfied this practical reformer, who was of the opinion that "there is too much reason to fear that it will often be unheeded by the parties to a controversy, *after* their feelings have become irritated and their passions inflamed. Something more than a recommendation is wanted to prevent a national dispute from terminating in a national conflict." And he rightly insisted upon a definite obligation, saying, "No

* *War and Peace*, pp. 82-83; *post*, p. 56.

The passage which Jay quotes is found in Book II, Chapter 18 of Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi naturelle*, Vol. I, p. 521, of the original French edition of 1758, in two volumes.

plan will be effectual in suppressing war that does not in time of peace and good will, *anticipate* future differences, and provide for their accommodation." Therefore, the plan which he proposed was of this character, of which he felt justified in saying, that "its practicability arises from its extreme simplicity."*

Each treaty containing the proposed article would be an incentive to further treaties, so that "before long some minor states would commence the experiment, and the example would be followed by others," justifying the hope and the belief that "in time these treaties would be merged in more extensive alliances, and a greater number of umpires would be selected."†

Indeed, it was not "the vain hope of idle credulity that at last a union might be formed of every Christian nation for guaranteeing the peace of Christendom, by establishing a tribunal for the adjustment of national differences, and by preventing all forcible resistance to its decrees."‡

But Mr. Jay did not feel called upon, in advocating the first step, to discourse upon the measures to be taken in order to attain the final result, saying expressly that it was "unnecessary to discuss the character and powers with which such a tribunal should be invested."‡ He therefore contented himself with the prophetic statement that "whenever it shall be seriously desired, but little difficulty will be experienced in placing it on a stable and satisfactory basis."‡ And his conclusion is as true now as then—for Mr. Jay, not merely an active member of the American Peace Society and its president for a decade, but, lawyer by training and judge by profession, knew whereof he spoke: "That such a court, formed by a con-

* *War and Peace*, pp. 89-90; *post*, p. 61.

† *War and Peace*, p. 96; *post*, p. 65.

gress of nations in obedience to the general wish, would, next to Christianity, be the richest gift ever bestowed by Heaven upon a suffering world, will scarcely be questioned by any who have patiently and candidly investigated the subject."*

* * *

The little book carried conviction in its day and its day is not yet passed. The plan which he advocated has, like that of his father, made its way into treaty after treaty, and the Article he advocated, called from its French name the *clause compromissoire* is familiar alike to the ordinary diplomatist, the international lawyer, and the enlightened layman. John Jay's actual treaty of 1794, submitting specific disputes to arbitration, and William Jay's proposed article of 1842, submitting future disputes arising under the treaty state the American Policy of Washington, the Commander in Chief in the war which made us a nation:

In my opinion, it is desirable that all questions between this and other nations be speedily and amicably settled.

And together they point the way to the American vision of Grant, the Commander in Chief in the war that preserved the Union of Washington:

I look forward to a day when there will be a court established that shall be recognized by all nations, which will take into consideration all differences between nations and settle by arbitration or decision of such court these questions.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1918.

* *War and Peace*, p. 96; *post*, p. 65.

WAR AND PEACE:

THE EVILS OF THE FIRST,
AND
A PLAN FOR PRESERVING THE LAST.

BY
WILLIAM JAY

We daily make great improvements in natural, there is one
I wish to see in *moral* philosophy—the discovery of a plan
that would induce and oblige nations to settle their disputes
without first cutting one another's throats. — FRANKLIN

NEW-YORK:
WILEY AND PUTNAM, 161 BROADWAY
1842

WAR AND PEACE

MORAL, as well as political revolutions, have frequently owed their origin to causes, and been accomplished by agencies, which, to human vision, appeared utterly powerless.

Could the priests, the philosophers, the statesmen of the pagan world have listened to the command of the risen Saviour to his little band of apostles, to teach and baptize all nations, their indignation at the presumption of the injunction would have been checked by their contempt for the weak and ignorant individuals to whom it was addressed.

When an Augustinian friar declaimed from the pulpit of Wittemberg against the sale of indulgences, who could have anticipated that his voice was to rouse a sleeping world, and to * burst the cerements in which the human mind had for ages been enveloped?

But without recurring to former times, we may find in our own striking illustrations of our remark. Within the last forty years the African slave trade was flourishing in all its legalized atrocity; it is at this day prohibited by every Christian nation, and they who engage in it are adjudged infamous, by the unanimous verdict of the civilized world. On the 7th July, 1783, six Quakers* met in London, "to consider what steps they should take for the relief and liberation of the negro slaves in the West In-

* William Dillwyn, George Harrison, Samuel H. Hoare, Thomas Knowles, John Lloyd, and Joseph Woods. Their names are registered in heaven, let them not be forgotten on earth.

dies, and for the discouragement of the slave trade on the coast of Africa.”

And who were these six men who presumed to attempt the abolition of slavery and the slave trade—who aspired to move the moral world—to arrest the commerce of nations—to proclaim liberty to the captive, and the opening of the prison doors to them that were bound? Did they sway the councils or lead the armies of Empires—were they possessed of learning to command the attention of the wise and great, or of eloquence to mould to their will the passions of the multitude? They were humble * 5 * and obscure individuals, belonging to a small and despised sect, and precluded by their religious tenets from all political influence. But they had discovered from the Book of God, what had escaped many wise and good men, that slavery was opposed to the attributes and precepts of the Almighty Ruler of nations. In laboring therefore for its suppression, they were assured of his protection, and without regarding their own weakness or the obstacles before them, they proceeded calmly and steadily in the path of duty, leaving the result with HIM, with whom all things are possible. These humble men set in motion a train of agencies which, in 1807, accomplished the abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain; and in 1830 completed its abolition throughout christendom, and which, in 1838, effected the liberation of the negro slaves in the British possessions, and which, in all human probability, will before long effect it throughout “the West Indies.”

These mighty changes, be it recollected, have been accomplished solely by the exhibition of truth, and by bold and persevering appeals to the conscience and the understanding. No miracle has wrought conviction, no armies have controlled the course of legislation; no blood has soiled these glorious triumphs of humanity.

* 6 * But we live in an age of moral wonders, and behold on every side of us confirmations of the promise, "in due season ye shall reap if ye faint not." We are at this moment in the midst of a revolution perhaps not less extraordinary, and certainly not less important to human happiness than the one to which we have just referred.

But lately, a vice which has rendered our world a theatre of crime and wretchedness since the waters of the deluge retired from its surface, was spreading desolation in every community and almost in every family. In vain did revelation proclaim that the drunkard cannot inherit the Kingdom of Heaven—in vain did example teach that degradation, misery and death were the attendants on this terrific vice. It invaded every station, and numbered its victims in every rank and department of society. The palace and the hut, the temple and the prison, the crowded mart and the sequestered haunt were alike the scenes of its disgusting triumphs. In this fair land which we would fain believe, is peculiarly moral and enlightened, intemperance has inflicted upon us two-thirds of our pauperism, nine-tenths of our crime, and an annual loss of 30,000 lives, and twelve millions of dollars!

* 7 * In the midst of this moral pestilence, the American Temperance Society arose with healing in its wings. Few in numbers, with no hope but in God, with no motive but love, with no weapon but the press, its members declared war against this potent and deadly foe to human happiness. The wisdom of the world mocked at the enterprise, and poured ridicule and contempt upon its authors. But unmoved by obloquy, undaunted by difficulties, this little band of philanthropists, like their illustrious predecessors in the conflict with slavery and the slave trade, proceeded to arrest the public attention by an exhibition of

facts, and to influence the public opinion by addresses to the understanding and the conscience—and what results do we behold! Thousands and hundreds of thousands of our citizens have abandoned the use of intoxicating liquors—to an extent no less cheering than astonishing; the use of those liquors has become vulgar and disreputable, and is daily decreasing. They have been banished from our army, and nearly so from our navy, and are rapidly disappearing from our commercial marine. The wise and good, the powerful and influential of all classes, are arraying themselves against the fell destroyer, * 8 and the victories they are achieving are * exciting the admiration and stimulating the efforts of other nations. Prussia, England, Ireland, Scotland, Sweden and Saxony, have organized their temperance societies; and we may hope that within twenty-four years from the formation of the American Society, a triumph will have been gained even more glorious for mankind, than that which in a similar period was acquired over the slave trade.

After these splendid and blessed results, who shall presume to set bounds to the career of christian benevolence, or to specify the obstacles which are insuperable to faith and perseverance, when exercised in obedience to the will of God? The Press, that mighty engine for good or evil, is in this age at the command of all who choose to wield it, and when used in the cause of truth and benevolence, continues, as in the instances we have cited, to produce effects which the most sanguine imagination dares scarcely to anticipate. While this world remains a state of probation, human nature with all its powers and propensities will remain unchanged; but its powers may be developed and directed, and its propensities controlled by the influence of reason and religion.

We would appeal then to christians, to philanthro

* 9 pists, and to patriots, and ask them, if * there is not an evil under which humanity is groaning, as great, as universal, and yet as surmountable as the slave trade, or intemperance? WAR still extends his bloody sceptre over the nations of the earth, and is still dooming countless multitudes to wretchedness and slaughter. And shall we not rise in resistance to this remorseless tyrant, and may we not hope at least to curb his power, if we do not overturn his throne? Shall we shrink from the effort, in remembering how many ages his reign has endured—how powerful an alliance he has formed with the depraved passions of the human heart—how many millions are paid and fed and clothed for supporting his authority, and how apparently feeble must be any barrier that *we* can oppose to his cruel despotism? Let us recollect the anti-slavery societies of Great Britain, and the temperance societies of America, and believe that the blessing of Heaven may also descend upon the humble labors of PEACE SOCIETIES.

But it may be said that in regard to the suppression of the slave trade and intemperance, success, however difficult, was seen from the first to be attainable, and hence exertion was invigorated by hope. In the first case all that was wanting was a majority in the British Parliament, and, in the second, the practice of total abstinence it was known would of course exterminate intemperance; but that war, being the consequence of human depravity, must necessarily continue till the age of universal righteousness foretold by prophecy.

Were this reasoning sound it would be an erroneous inference from it that we were released from all obligation to labor for the peace of mankind, because we were assured that wars would not wholly cease before the millennium. The corruption of human nature will continue as it has ever done to produce crime and misery, but

are we therefore to make no effort to lessen their amount. Slavery and intemperance are as directly the consequence of human depravity as war, yet it is now obvious to all, that they are not necessary and irremovable evils.

Unhappily the great mass of mankind believe that the very depravity which is the source of war renders it at once both necessary and lawful; and that the preservation of liberty, property, and happiness, depends on the disposition and ability to oppose a forcible resistance to aggression. So imperfect is human reason, and so liable to extraneous influence, that the currency of an opinion

too often affords but slender evidence of its truth.

* 11 * The supposed necessity of war is founded on the idea that however much we may deprecate it, it nevertheless prevents a greater evil than itself. But alas! few have any just conception of the calamities inflicted by war, and fewer still have ever inquired whether the evils it is intended to prevent cannot be averted by other means. In deciding how far war is really necessary, it is obviously important that we should first ascertain what sacrifices it exacts, and what sufferings it occasions. This is a topic that affords an ample theme for fervid declamation. The horrors of the battlefield, the confused noise of the war-rrior, the garments rolled in blood, the shrieks of the wounded and the dying, the groans and tears of widows and of orphans, the conflagration of cities and the devastation of kingdoms may indeed be portrayed with such pathos and eloquence as to cause a thrill to vibrate through every nerve. But the impressions thus made are transitory, our excited emotions soon recover their wonted calmness, and the understanding and conscience being unenlightened, remain unaffected.

Let us then take a sober and unimpassioned view of

war, not as it existed in remote antiquity, when whole nations contended in arms, and the soil was literally * 12 drenched with human gore—* when no quarter was given in the field—when kings and princes were chained to the triumphal car of the victor, and their surviving subjects doomed to hopeless slavery; but of war as it exists in our own days, and as waged by enlightened and Christian nations. Passion and policy have, in all ages, invested war with a halo of glory that has attracted for it the idolatry of mankind; be it our endeavor to strip it of its glittering disguise, and, by sober arguments and undisputed facts, to exhibit it in its loathsome deformity.

He is a superficial inquirer who, in investigating the evils of war, confines his observation to the scenes and consequences of actual hostility. War is a demon whose malignant influence is felt at all times and in all places. Paradoxical as it may seem in the very midst of peace and security, it is blighting the labor of man, adding weight to his burdens, and laying snares for his virtue. Our country is now at peace with all the world, yet are we not conscious of the presence of the Demon? What means that periodical military display which is ever disturbing the repose of our most retired hamlets—what those martial titles borne by such multitudes of our citizens—what our military schools—our widely scattered * 13 garrisons—our * frigates traversing every ocean? How comes it that a million and a half of our population are called on certain days from their homes to be instructed in the art of slaughtering their fellow men; and that millions of dollars are annually subtracted from the earnings of labor in anticipation of future conflicts? He alone who will estimate the treasures expended in our military preparations, and the time squandered, and the vice engendered by our militia system, will have some

adequate idea of the costly sacrifice yearly offered by the United States on the altar of Moloch.*

* The enrolled militia of the United States is 1,503,592. This vast multitude are called from their homes several days each year for the purpose of inspection and drilling. The first item then of the expense of our militia system is the annual loss to the country of many millions of days' labour. But this multitude must be "armed and equipped as the law directs," and hence an expenditure of 15 or 20 millions more. Next, the commissioned officers must be arrayed in regimentals, with all "the pomp and circumstance of glorious war." Many thousands of the militia are moreover organized in "uniform corps"; and are, of course, compelled to provide themselves with expensive clothes which are useless except on parade. Next comes the cost of music, of standards, of artillery, of cavalry, and of state arsenals and magazines. It is impossible, for want of the necessary statistics, to ascertain with precision the yearly aggregate expense of our militia, but it certainly can not fall much if any short of fifty millions.

With regard to the military expenditures of the United States we can speak with more certainty; and we shall be scarcely credited when we affirm that these expenditures, *in proportion to the revenue of the country*, are lavish beyond the example of any European power!

In 1838, the ordinary revenue was.....	\$24,309,299
Payments for the navy.....	\$6,403,551
Do. for purposes strictly military, including military pensions....	12,665,210
	<hr/> 19,068,761

Here we have an expenditure of 78 cents for every dollar of revenue for military preparations.

But it will be said that the country can not be fairly regarded as at peace in 1838, because we were then engaged in the Florida war, and were compelled to expend millions in driving from the Peninsula a few hundred Indians, that they might no longer harbor fugitive slaves from the plantations of Alabama and Georgia. Be it so; let us then turn to 1833, when the country had not even a savage foe in arms.

The revenue that year was.....	\$33,918,125
Payments for the naval service.....	\$3,091,357
Do. for purposes strictly military, including military pensions....	10,342,746
	<hr/> 13,434,102

This gives us about 40 cents for every dollar of revenue spent in *preparata* for war!

In 1832 the military expenditures of France were 34 cents on a dollar, and those of Great Britain in 1826 were only 24 cents on a

* 14 * Yet this sacrifice, costly as it is, is but as a grain
 * 15 of incense to thousands of hecatombs * when com-
 pared with the peace establishments of Europe.*

But why confine our views to our own country and to Europe? The southern continent of America, Africa, and Asia, all teem with countless multitudes whose trade is blood.

Would we know the cost of human happiness at which this mighty machinery of war is constructed, let us conceive the results of an equal expenditure of treasure, time, talents and physical strength in the peaceful and ordinary pursuits of life, and we shall then, and not till then, be able to estimate the price paid by the world for being *prepared* to repel aggression. Were the millions yearly lavished by our country in military preparation devoted to the cause of science and religion, to the facilities of intercourse, and the promotion of social and individual comfort, an amount of happiness would be diffused through our land that would cast in the shade all our past prosperity, unexampled as it has been. If we apply

* 16 a similar supposition to * Europe, the imagination is dazzled with the bright and blissful visions which instantly rise to view. The revenue of the christian states of Europe is estimated at \$823,000,000, and it is supposed that at least one-half of this prodigious sum is expended

dollar. Wonderful as is this disparity, it is greatly increased when we remember that the payments by France and England, to which we have referred, are the *total* payments of those governments for military purposes, while to the similar payments by the federal government are to be added the expenditures in the several states on account of the militia.

* The armies of Europe (exclusive of the Ottoman empire) amounted in 1828, a period of general peace, to 2,265,500 men. *Balance Politique du Globe*, by M. Adrien Balbi.

In 1840, the army of Russia was said to be 600,000
 of France 300,000
 of Great Britain 114,000

during *peace* in military preparations, and in the payment of war debts. And is it a matter of wonder that a cry of distress is resounding through the eastern continent, and that starving multitudes are rising in resistance to the constituted authorities, when labor is thus robbed of its earnings, without receiving in return the smallest addition to its comfort, happiness, or virtue?*

* 17 * Free institutions are called for in expectation that they will lighten the public burdens; but in vain will nations seek for prosperity in political revolutions so long as they shall trust to the sword for peace and security. The military preparations of France under her present monarch are far more onerous than under the arbitrary sway of his predecessor; and the people are complaining of the government for consequences which spring directly from their own military mania.

It may indeed be said that the expenditures caused by war ought not to be regarded as wasted, since they afford employment and subsistence to vast multitudes, and encourage various arts and trades. True it is, that soldiers are fed and clothed, and so are the inmates of our almshouses and prisons; but surely it will hardly be main-

* The total expenditure of Great Britain in 1836 was £48,800,000. This was appropriated as follows, viz.:—

To interest on national debt	£28,500,000
To army and navy	11,700,000
To civil list	8,600,000

It thus appears that of every dollar of expenditure paid, there were on account of the debt, which is strictly a legacy of former wars 58 cents
On account of the army and navy 24

—
82

And now we discover the astounding fact, that of the multiplied and grievous taxes under which the people of England are groaning, 82 cents of every dollar paid into the national coffer are offered at the shrine of war, while the remaining 18 cents are sufficient to support the splendor of the throne, and to provide for the necessary expenses of government!

tained that the prosperity of the whole community is advanced by compelling one portion to maintain the other.

The treasure expended in equipping and supporting armies is not, indeed, annihilated, but the *labor* for which it is given as an equivalent adds nothing to the wealth and happiness of the country, and is therefore useless.

He who tills the soil, or produces any of the necessities or comforts of life, not only maintains * himself, but contributes to the general stock, whereas, he who fabricates a musket for government is supported at public expense, while the result of his labor in no manner promotes the public weal; and hence the community suffer, first, the charge of his maintenance, and, secondly, the misapplication of his time and skill.*

These considerations lead us to perceive the magnitude and oppressive weight of the burden imposed on the people of Europe by the vastness of their military preparations. It is not so much the *amount* of expenditure as the *application* of the national revenues that occasions the complaints wafted to us on every eastern breeze. Patriotic and judicious taxation may enrich instead of impoverishing a nation. The canals of New-York made at a cost to the public of ten millions of dollars, have conferred upon the people of that state an amount of wealth and convenience which no political economist can estimate; but what valuable fruits would have been the result, had this money been expended in paying some * 19 thousand men for learning the * manual exercise; or in erecting barracks or fortifications? So, also, the large sums yearly expended by the state in diffusing

* From 1803 to 1816, the British Government issued 1,680,000 barrels of gunpowder, and 3,227,715 muskets. This immense manufactory gave employment unquestionably to a large number of operatives; but, independent of the waste of the material, their labor was useless to the public.

education among every class of its citizens are restored tenfold to the people in rich and varied blessings; but what comforts, what benefits, are derived from the numerous and onerous trainings of the New-York militia, and the vice and drunkenness and idleness which attend them?

Were the two millions of soldiers in Europe dismissed to productive labor, and were the treasures now lavished in preparing for war, employed in elevating the moral and intellectual character of the peasantry, and in promoting the happiness of all, society would instantly wear a new aspect—the jealousy now subsisting between the ruler and the subject would give way to confidence—industry and enterprize would succeed to listlessness and despair—poverty would be exchanged for competency, and the human faculties, roused into action by education, and stimulated by hope, would attain the greatest perfection allowed to man by his Creator. We have said that the malignant influence of war is felt in the very midst of peace: and surely the assertion is abundantly verified by

the facts we have stated. But what imagination can * 20 conceive, what pen portray that mass * of wretchedness, desolation and woe, which mankind are capable of accumulating, when all their malevolent passions are in full activity, and are aided by the resources of art and science, by the wealth and the physical strength of nations! It is moreover an appalling reflection that all this wretchedness, and desolation and woe, is the serious and avowed object of war, a means to an end, and not an incidental and lamented consequence. They who wage war desire and intend to slay their enemies. It is for this express purpose men are hired and armed, and navies equipped and sent to sea. The greater the havoc made of human life and happiness, the more glorious the victory, and the more successful the war. It is also well understood by

the party declaring the war, that his own country and people are exposed to all the evils he is endeavouring to inflict on his enemy—that they whom he employs to slaughter, may themselves be slaughtered, that his own cities may be fired, his own fields ravaged.

What a fearful responsibility is involved in a declaration of war! The scriptures abound with strong expressions of the divine abhorrence of murder; and with what indignation must a Being of infinite benevolence view that enormous mass of murder perpetrated in war?

* 21 * Shall the blood of Abel crying from the ground bring down vengeance upon his murderer, and shall not the blood of thousands and tens of thousands, shed to gratify the ambition and avarice of monarchs or senates, be avenged by the sovereign Ruler of nations?

That wars are frequently waged from the same lust of plunder that actuates the highwayman is abundantly testified by the whole course of history; and it is unnecessary to prove what no one will deny, that very many wars have been obviously unjust, and therefore highly criminal. Our object, however, is to show that every war, without exception, involves guilt, and must be offensive to the Deity. To effect this object it is not requisite to prove that all war is forbidden by scripture, or that no aggression, however unprovoked, and however dangerous, can justify a forcible resistance. Nor do we mean to deny the right of self-defence, nor even the lawfulness of subduing by force of arms, when necessary, pirates and banditti; and still further are we from questioning the right indispensable to the very existence of civil government of enforcing obedience to the laws. When we say that every war without exception involves guilt, we mean to apply the remark to war as it actually exists between nations with all

* 22 its * usages and attending circumstances. It may

be possible for the imagination to conceive of a defensive war commenced in the spirit, and waged in accordance with the strictest principles of Christianity; but we deny that profane history has recorded any example of such a war.

When we recollect the vast amount of human misery necessarily occasioned by war, few will be disposed to question that a resort to arms must always be criminal when not unavoidable. Were rulers and their subjects mindful of the tremendous responsibility incurred by the authors of a war, with what deep and trembling solicitude would the question of peace or war be discussed—what numerous expedients and sacrifices would be proposed to avert the necessity of mutual slaughter, and with what hesitation and grief would hostilities be at last commenced? But alas! when has a patient and conscientious inquiry into the justice and necessity of a war preceded its declaration? Instead of calm investigation, and equitable and conciliatory propositions, we have lofty demands, fierce denunciations, proud references to our own strength, and inflammatory appeals to the passions of the populace. Pride, revenge, the acquisition of territory, or some supposed political advantage, are in general the true * 23 and * only causes of an offensive war, while those set forth in the declaration usually aggravate its guilt by the addition of falsehood. Nor let it be supposed that the sin of war rests only on the party by whom it is commenced. War is at the present day almost invariably preceded by negotiation; and in the communications of the respective parties, we seldom discover that scrupulous regard to justice and moderation which a desire to avoid hostilities would prompt. Few indeed of the pretexts assigned for a war would even, in the opinion of those by whom they are advanced, justify taking the life of a single

individual by the civil magistrate; and yet little or no commutation is felt in commencing a contest which must inevitably prove fatal to multitudes of unoffending persons. The guilt of the crime seems lost in its very magnitude, and he who would shrink from taking one life will often labor to bring about a war in which he knows human blood will flow in torrents.

A cause frequently assigned in justification of war is the preservation of national honor: one party demands a concession as due to his honor, and the other refuses it as inconsistent with his, and thus the work of slaughter commences for a sentiment—for the preservation
 * 24 * of a character which probably neither merits nor possesses.

Sir Robert Peel, the present Premier of Great Britain, in a late speech to his constituents remarked, "I do hope that neither this country nor the United States will be *mad* enough to allow a difference of opinion about a boundary to set them in a hostile position towards each other. Undoubtedly it is necessary for each country to maintain its honor, *for without maintaining its honor, no country is safe.*"

Language like this was unworthy the character and station of the gentleman who used it, belonging as it does, by prescriptive right, to bar-room politicians and town-meeting demagogues. No country safe without maintaining its honor! Alas! then, for Great Britain, for at the very time these words were uttered she was waging against China one of the most dishonorable and detestable wars that has ever stained her annals. Indeed, it is difficult to point to a war recorded in history waged more directly against the health, morals and happiness of a numerous people, or from motives more basely sordid, than the British opium war; and yet he who is now the prime agent

and director of this war talks of the safety of Great
 * 25 * Britain as resting on the maintenance of her
 honor!*

* We have used strong expressions in regard to this war, and we have used them deliberately, not only from a thorough conviction of their truth, but also from a belief that it is the duty of every friend of justice and humanity to bear his testimony against the cruel and heartless conduct of the British government.

The assault upon China affords, moreover, too strong and apt an illustration of the evils of war and the duty of preserving peace, to be overlooked in the present treatise. This is not the place to enter into a minute exposition of the iniquity of this war, and of the ravening cupidity of those who conduct it, even to the extorting of millions for the ransom of a defenceless city. A few brief facts will suffice to explain the *true*, although, perhaps, not the avowed motives of the war. The British East India contraband trade in opium amounted in value from 15 to 20 millions of dollars yearly, and yielded an annual revenue to the India government of about a million and a half. Hence the East India proprietors have strong pecuniary inducements for poisoning the Chinese. Now the late energetic measures of the Emperor not only contemplated the entire stoppage of this lucrative trade for the future, but occasioned to the East India smugglers an actual present loss of about ten millions of dollars. It is not therefore surprising that the East India interest, both at home and abroad, powerful and extensive as it is, and interwoven with the wealth and aristocracy of the nation, should have persuaded the ministry of the absolute necessity of vindicating British honor, of placing trade with China on a secure basis for the future, and of bringing the insubmitting barbarians to their senses.

To some it may seem paradoxical that the same government which has exhibited such a sublime devotion to the rights of the negro, should be so utterly callous to the well-being of the Chinese. The solution is easy. The opium war is a *government measure* adopted by politicians, and probably with the expectation of receiving political support in return from the East India interest; precisely as certain northern members in congress, in obedience to southern dictation, and in consideration of southern votes, trample upon the right of petition, and do many other things they ought not. The abolition of slavery and the slave trade, on the contrary, so far from originating with the government, were demanded by the PEOPLE of Great Britain in a voice which their rulers were afraid to disregard. Mr. Stanley, one of the ministry, in supporting the Emancipation Bill in the House of Commons, declared that so loudly was it called for by the public, *that no ministry could retain office who refused it.*

- * 26 * The French Republic, the terrific progeny of
atheism and of crime, not only remained *safe* amid
the assaults of her invaders, but turning the tide of
* 27 war, she poured upon Europe a deso- * lating flood
which threatened to engulf every throne and
every altar. The power of the republic became concen-
trated in Napoleon, of whose extraordinary character,
honor formed no element. Yet Napoleon was not only
safe but triumphant, till he had nearly acquired the mas-
tership of Europe; and his fall was occasioned not by the
loss of honor, but by the frosts of Russia.
- * 28 * Perhaps the most sublimated wickedness and
baseness in degree, although limited in extent, per-
petrated by any civilized government at the present day, is
practised in the city of Washington. There, in the boasted

To vindicate our strictures from the imputation of national preju-
dice, we are induced to add a few very brief extracts from British
publications, and from the proceedings of public meetings held to
remonstrate against this government war. As indicative of the
sentiments of the religious community in England, we may refer
to the language of two religious periodicals, the first belonging to
the dissenting interest, the other to the established church.

The *Eclectic Review*, speaking of the "wholesale confiscation of
opium," and of the "breaking up of the haunts of respectable British
smugglers," declares, "we have been dealt with according to our
deserts. May it provoke us to repentance and a change of conduct."

"If we must have war," says the *Christian Observer*, "it ought
to be for a more honorable object than that of indemnifying smug-
glers whose contraband goods were legally seized and destroyed."

At a public meeting held in London, without reference to party
distinctions, the Earl of Stanhope presiding, the following resolu-
tion, among others, was past: "Resolved, that this meeting deeply
laments that the moral and religious feeling of the country should
be outraged, the character of Christianity disgraced in the eyes of
the world, and this kingdom involved in war with upwards of three
hundred and fifty millions of people, in consequence of British
subjects introducing opium into China, in direct and known viola-
tion of the laws of that empire."

The celebrated Campbell, in a poetical remonstrance to his nation
against the war, after allusions to her former glory, thus gives vent
to his indignation at her present baseness:—

citadel of American liberty, native born American citizens are seized and imprisoned on *suspicion* of being fugitives from bondage; and when the suspicion is disproved by the non-appearance of a claimant, the prisoners are sold as slaves for life to raise money to pay their *jail fees!*

Does Sir Robert Peel impute the capture of the national metropolis in the last war to this stain on its honor, or to the enterprise and valor of British troops?

It would be *madness*, the Premier tells us, for the two nations to go to war about the boundary. The land in dispute is not worth fighting for; but self-preservation requires each nation to maintain its *honor*. If therefore either party insists on cutting a tree on the wrong side of the alleged line; or should a silly minister think it expedient to display his patriotism by writing a blustering and insulting letter, then indeed two great and christian nations must, for very safety, commence the work of human butchery.

* 29 Would to Heaven this rant about national * honor

"And all thy merchant princes swelled the cry
That the vile drug must sell, though nations die—
No more be styled the empress of the main,
Who strike not now for glory, but for gain:
Pour o'er the feeble land the poison flood,
And drive the guilty bargain home with blood."

As a sample of the *spirit* in which this war is carried on by the invaders, we give, in conclusion, an extract from a letter by an eye witness, relating to the capture of the island of Chusan, on the 5th of July, 1840. "Every house was indiscriminately broken open, every drawer and box ransacked, the streets strewed with fragments of furniture, pictures, chairs, tables, grain of all sorts, &c., &c. For two days the bodies were allowed to lay, exposed to sight, where they fell. The plunder, however, was carried to an extreme; that is to say, did not cease till there was nothing else to take, and the plunderers will, no doubt, be able, on our return to Calcutta, to place at their friends' disposal, and for the ornamenting their houses trophies gained, not from the Chinese soldiers, or from a field of battle, but from the harmless and peaceable inhabitants and tradesmen of a city doomed to destruction by our men of war."

was confined to those who are now at the point of the bayonet easing the Chinese of their purses. But we also have politicians who are far more concerned for the *honor* than for the morality of the nation; and these gentlemen have just made the extraordinary discovery, that the honor of the Republic requires that her flag shall prove an ægis to villains of all nations who may think proper to traffic in human flesh.

In 1814, the United States bound themselves by treaty with Great Britain, to use their "best endeavours" to promote the entire abolition of the slave trade—a stipulation which has been falsified by the conduct of the government from the date of the treaty to the present hour. Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, the Empire of Brazil, and the South American Republics have mutually agreed that the cruisers of each other may search suspected slavers, bearing any of their flags, *and if found engaged in the traffic, to send them to certain ports for trial and condemnation.* Russia, dispensing with the formality of a treaty, publishes an ukase virtually giving permission to the cruisers of all nations to do what they please with any slaver who dares to dishonor the Russian flag. But the United States, so far from joining this league of christianity against an accursed traffic, now aim at rendering it nugatory, by insisting that the star-spangled banner shall protect, even from visitation, every slaver above whose deck it may be unfurled! In vain does Great Britain protest that she claims no right to interfere with *American* slavers; but inasmuch as they are the only *privileged* ones on the ocean, and as it is a matter of public notoriety that slavers of other nations seek safety in carrying the flag of the republic at their mast head, she does claim the right to ascertain whether a suspected slaver displaying the

of every American cruiser to ascertain in like manner the national character of any vessel bearing the British flag. In vain does every maritime power in Europe, and all, with one exception in America, accord to all others the same right. The great slave-holding Republic is too jealous of her *honor*, to permit an inquiry to be made into the nationality of any vessel from whose mast the stars and stripes are streaming, although that vessel should be a Chinese junk.* Let the slave trade revive in all its unutterable horrors—let thousands and ten thousands of human beings be consigned to wretchedness and death, but let not a vessel carrying a piece of bunting with certain devices be required to show her papers under the penalty of WAR.

Such is national honor, the safeguard of nations, and, for the maintenance of which, national slaughter is indispensable!

But whether the contest be for national honor, or for some less intangible and imaginative object, still it should be recollected that a party, in declaring war, is acting as judge in his own cause, and is, therefore, liable to all the bias and prejudice which passion and interest are ever prone to exert over the frailty of our nature. Surely there is danger, lest a government, in deciding on its own rights, and even on its honor, may not always judge

* The American government vainly attempts to avoid this absurdity by disclaiming any desire that their flag should exempt *foreign* vessels from visitation, but, at the same time, it insists that to board an *American* vessel, bearing the American flag, and to require a sight of her papers, is an indignity that can not, and will not, be borne. Now it unfortunately omits to point out by what natural or nautical magic a cruiser can ascertain, without boarding, whether a slaver, carrying the republican flag, belongs to American or Spanish scoundrels. When reminded that such a rule must give entire impunity to the slave trade, it coolly replies, "This may be deplored, but can not be avoided." See Mr. Stevenson's letter to Lord Aberdeen, October 21, 1841.

righteous judgment; and may, in a moment of irritation and passion, not only invade the rights of others, but hazard the peace, security, and happiness of its own citizens. A recent occurrence forcibly illustrates the justice of this remark.

An American slaver, named the *Creole*, "well manned and provided in every respect, and *equipped for carrying slaves*,"* sailed from Virginia for New-Orleans on the 30th October, 1841, with a cargo of 135 slaves. When eight days out, a portion of the slaves, under the direction of one of their number named MADISON WASHINGTON, succeeded, after a slight struggle, in gaining the command of the vessel. The sagacity, bravery, and humanity of this man, do honor to his name, and, but for his complexion, would excite universal admiration. Of the twelve white men employed on board the "well-manned" slaver, only one fell a victim to their atrocious business. This man, after discharging his musket at the negroes, rushed forward with a handspike, which, in the darkness of the evening, they mistook for another musket—he was stabbed with a *bowie knife wrested from the captain*. Two of the sailors were wounded, and "their wounds were dressed by the negroes." The captain was also injured, and he "was put into the forehold and his wounds dressed;" and his wife, child and niece, were unmolested. It does not appear that the blacks committed a single act of robbery, or treated their captives with the slightest unnecessary harshness; and they declared at the time, "that all they had done was for their freedom."

The vessel was carried into Nassau, and the British authorities at that place refused to consign the liberated

* The very words used in a protest made by five of the slaver's crew, at New-Orleans, 7th Dec., 1841. The facts given above are taken from the protest.

slaves again to bondage, or even to surrender the "mutineers and murderers" to perish on southern gibbets.

Admitting Madison Washington and his associates to be murderers, do the laws of nations require the surrender of murderers? To this question the American government has returned an emphatic answer: first, by making the mutual surrender of murderers an article of the *treaty* concluded with Great Britain in 1794, and in constantly refusing, since the expiration of that treaty, to surrender murderers when requested to do so by the British authorities. Hence it is obvious that the refusal of Great Britain to surrender murderers to us cannot be a just cause for war.

But these slaves, after breaking their bonds, took * 34 refuge in the British dominions, and hence * arises the question, do the laws of nations require the surrender of fugitive slaves? This question, also, our government has itself answered, and of course must be estopped in its claims by that answer. Some years since our minister in England was instructed to propose a treaty stipulation, whereby the British government should agree to surrender all the slaves who might take refuge in Canada, we offering, *in consideration, and on condition* of such agreement, to surrender such slaves as might escape to our shores from the British West India Islands. We also endeavored, but in vain, to induce Mexico to enter into a treaty stipulation to restore our fugitive slaves. Should a ship load of fugitive slaves from Martinique, arrive in New-York, there is no authority known to the constitution or laws that could surrender them.

Bearing in mind the *facts* we have detailed, we may now form an opinion how far the judgment the slave-holding members of the United States' senate are prepared to render in the case of the Creole is impartial, and dispas-

sionate, and consistent with wisdom and justice. The subject was incidentally brought before the senate on the 22d December.

* 35 MR. KING, of Alabama, said, "If such out * rages continued he solemnly believed nothing could prevent a collision—unless that the government [Great Britain] should retrace her steps WAR must inevitably come."

MR. CALHOUN, of South Carolina, held the liberation of the slaves of the Creole "to be the most ATROCIOUS OUTRAGE ever perpetrated on the American people. As soon as they could get full information, they ought to demand that those who committed the *piracy* should be delivered to this government. If we cannot obtain justice, every man with an American heart will be ready to raise his hand against *oppression!*!"

MR. BARROW, of Louisiana, "was not willing that those he represented should submit any longer to the insolence of a foreign power. He wished the committee to present to the people the true principles of national law, which we would maintain at all hazards. The people of the South would not submit to British interpretation of the laws of nations, drawing a distinction between slaves and goods. The transfer of slaves from one state to another is a matter of every-day occurrence, and if these contemptible British subjects of Nassau are permitted to go on in this way, seizing by force of arms, and liberating slaves belonging to American citizens, the *South*

* 36 would be compelled to * fit out armaments, and *destroy Nassau and other British towns* that trample on the laws of nations and the rights of our citizens."

And are men, in whom the moral sense is so perverted by interest as to regard Madison Washington a *pirate*, and who, although vindicating the conversion of millions of

their fellow countrymen into beasts of burden, can yet declaim about "oppression," fit to decide questions involving the rights of man? Again, we ask in soher earnestness, is it prudent, is it safe, that men so blinded with passion as to talk of the slave holders fitting out expeditions to destroy the towns of the West Indies, when it is well known a mighty army of black soldiers is ready to reciprocate the visit, and to plant the standard of emancipation in the cotton fields of the South, should be entrusted with the awful power of kindling a conflagration which would consume their own homesteads, spread terror and desolation through a large portion of our country, and be finally quenched only in the blood of multitudes?*

* 37 * If we have reason to believe that rulers too seldom inquire into the justice of the wars they wage, we are morally certain that by their armies, the question neither

* These gentlemen in their wrath seem to have forgotten the following significant hints they had received only a few days previous, from the war and navy departments.

"The works intended for the more remote *Southern* portions of our territory particularly require attention. Indications are already made of designs of the *worst character* against *that region* in the event of hostilities, from a certain quarter, to which we can not be insensible." *Report of Sec. of War, Dec. 1.*

"A war between the United States and any *considerable maritime power* would not be conducted at *this day*, as it would have been twenty years ago. The first blow would be struck at us, through our *institutions*. No nation, it is presumed, would expect to be successful over us for any length of time in a *fair contest of arms* on our own soil; and no wise nation would attempt it. A more promising expedient would be sought in *arraying what are supposed to be the hostile elements of our social system against one another*. An enemy so disposed, and free to land upon any part of our soil which might promise success to the enterprise, would be armed with a *fourfold power of annoyance*. Of the ultimate result of such incursions we have no reason to be afraid. (?) but even in the best event, war upon our own soil would be the more expensive, the more embarrassing and the more *horrible* in its effects, by compelling us at the same time to oppose an enemy in the field, and to *guard against attempts to subvert our social system*" *Report of Sec. of the Navy, Dec. 1.*

is nor can be understood. Of the multitudes hired to kill their fellow men, how few have the capacity or inclination to examine the merits of national differences, the means used to settle them, or the necessity and morality of the contest in which they are employed? Armies we know are usually raised by voluntary enlistment, and can it be agreeable to the will of the Holy and al-

* 38 * merciful God, that his intelligent and accountable creatures should, from mercenary motives, engage in the work of human destruction, wholly ignorant and wholly regardless of the justice and necessity of the act?

In almost every army there are foreign adventurers who have no national interest whatever in the pending contest—men who have taken arms from no sentiment of patriotism or justice, but solely for their wages, which, in such a case, are literally the price of blood.

To such men the war in which they are fighting, is and must be unjust. They are hired to kill men who have injured neither them nor their country, and against whom they have no cause of complaint.

It not unfrequently happens that these mercenaries are engaged on opposite sides, and are thus brought into mortal conflict with each other. In the late disgusting strife in Portugal, Englishmen were arrayed against Englishmen, and Frenchmen against Frenchmen.* If

* In July, 1833, two hundred and six English sailors who had enlisted for the service of Don Miguel, were discharged without leaving England in consequence of the news of the victory obtained by Captain Napier, (English,) in the service of Don Pedro, over Don Miguel's fleet. The boatswain headed a deputation sent to the Lord Mayor by the discharged sailors to ask for redress. That magistrate inquired if they were aware they had been enlisted to fight against their own countrymen, who were serving under Don Pedro. The reply was in the affirmative. His Lordship then remarked, "as you make such a pounds, shillings, and pence affair of it, perhaps you have no objection to fight for Don Pedro."—"If we are well paid for it," replied the boatswain, "it does not signify whom we fight for."

* 39 the conduct of such men be sinful, can they who employ and pay them be innocent?—and yet what belligerent ever refused the aid of mercenaries?

Another revolting practice in war, is that of encouraging deserters. In every campaign there is an interchange of these men, and wretches covered with treason and perjury are cordially welcomed, and arms are put into their hands to murder their late associates and fellow countrymen.

It is a fundamental law of the Divine economy that sin shall be punished, although in regard to individuals, this law is fully executed only in another state of being: yet as in that state nations do not exist, their punishment is inflicted here. Hence every war, without exception, brings with it its own retribution, and this retribution is wholly independent of the final result, being experienced by the victor as well as the vanquished.

* 40 The sacrifices of labor and of wealth required by the mere preparation for war have already been noticed. Those sacrifices are increased almost beyond calculation by actual hostility. The war expenditures of Great Britain, from 1793 to 1815, are estimated at \$3,200,000,000, a sum of which the mind can form no definite idea. And yet before we can arrive at the whole cost of this protracted war, we must add to this sum the value of the time lost, and of the property destroyed in consequence of the contest. It should also be recollected that the heaviest burdens of war are imposed at a time, when in consequence of the interruption of commerce and of regular industry, the community is least able to bear them.

But the pecuniary sacrifices demanded by war are far from being the only or most costly offering made at the altar of this cruel and insatiable demon. He requires from his votaries a surrender not merely of their wealth but

of their social enjoyments and affections, their comforts, their morals and their lives. He who could witness the anguish of parents, wives and children, caused by the mere enlistment of an army; and the debasement and ruin of thousands of ingenuous and promising youths, would

have before him a more vivid and heart rending picture of the evils of war than any pencil can * paint; and yet the picture would be incomplete and the colors faint, when compared with the accumulated horrors of a single campaign.

Let the mind dwell for a few moments on the invasion of Russia by Napoleon, and reflect on the griefs, the anxieties, the pangs of separation endured by the innumerable families from which were gathered the vast host composing the contending armies; let it watch the progress of the war—the toilsome marches—the carnage of battle—the conflagrations of Smolensko and Moscow—the desolation of whole provinces—the famine and cold, and agonizing deaths which overwhelmed the retreating army; let it imagine the wailings of multitudes for their slaughtered relatives, and let it contemplate the fearful account to which hundreds of thousands of immortal souls were untimely summoned, and it will form some idea of the nature and extent of that awful retribution with which war is visited by the Governor of the universe. And let it be remembered that this retribution as already observed, is not confined to the defeated party. Russia was victorious over her invaders, but being the seat of war, the amount of suffering that fell to her share was immensely more than that endured by her enemy.

The French army was, it is true, nearly annihilated, * 42 * but its numbers were few compared with the Russians who perished in battle, and those who were

called to mourn over the destruction of cities, and the devastation of provinces.*

And now let us ask, why do nations voluntarily expose themselves to such calamities? However unworthy may be the real purpose, the only one which respect for the moral sense of mankind will permit to be avowed, is the removal of some present, or the prevention of some future evil. Could we be sure that the means we use would produce the desired effect, the wisdom of employing them would still depend on the proportion between their cost and the value of the object to be obtained. But war is an instrument wholly uncertain in its operation, and frequently if not generally exceeding in its expense, the importance of the purpose for which it is used.

It is customary for nations to appeal to Heaven for the justice of their cause. Such appeals are rarely sincere, and too often are more likely to repel than invite divine assistance. But whether sincere or not, the justice of the cause affords but little if any ground for anticipating * 43 * the favourable interposition of Heaven. Both sacred and profane history teach us that base and perfidious men have often waged with success most iniquitous wars; and that conquerors, like other instruments of wrath, are but agents in executing divine judgments. Nations are all in a greater or less degree, deserving of punishment, and it frequently comports with the providence of God to inflict that punishment by permitting them to be the prey of lawless violence.

If then the result of war is wholly independent of the justice of its origin, on what is it dependent? To this the common reply is, the relative strength and skill of the parties. But the race is not always to the swift, nor the

* In the battle of Borodino, the killed and wounded are said to have been 75,000, of whom 45,000 were Russians.

battle to the strong. A powerful nation has often been foiled in its attempts upon a weak one, and numerous are the instances in which unexpected revolutions and alliances have turned the tide of war. Indeed, the very existence of war is owing to the uncertainty of its result, for it is obvious that if success could be distinctly foreseen, the party doomed to defeat would refuse to contend.

The folly of war is also apparent from the fact, that the object for which it is waged could almost always
 * 44 be obtained by other and less * hazardous means, and that when obtained it is rarely worth the blood and treasure lavished in its acquisition.

Cicero long since declared "*iniquissimam pacem, justissimo bello antifero;*" and the sagacious Franklin remarked—"Whatever advantage one nation would obtain from another, it would be cheaper to purchase such advantage with ready money, than to pay the expense of acquiring it by war;" and only eight days after this illustrious patriot had placed his name to the treaty of peace, which acknowledged the independence of his country, he wrote to a friend, "may we never see another war, for, in my opinion, there never was a good one, nor a bad peace." Both reason and experience bear their testimony to the correctness of these sentiments. The chance of defeat, which is always great, of course lessens the value of the object for which we contend, for the same reason, that when the result of a lawsuit is doubtful, a prudent man will accept a compromise rather than hazard his whole demand. The value of the object is also lessened by the prodigious expense at which alone it can be obtained. Let us test these principles by an appeal to history.

Great Britain claimed the right of raising a revenue from her colonies by taxation, and made * war
 * 45 upon them for the purpose of collecting this revenue.

The colonies, on the other hand, took arms to establish, not their independence as a distinct nation, but simply their exemption from taxation by the British parliament, instead of their own colonial legislatures. To human view the contest was unequal, and the success of the mother country beyond a doubt. Yet in her attempt to extort a few thousand pounds from her feeble and defenceless colonies, she drew upon herself a seven years war in which she found the power of France, Spain, and Holland, arrayed against her, and after sacrificing, as is estimated, 200,000 of her subjects, and adding £103,000,000 to her national debt, she was compelled to purchase peace by the severance of her empire. Had she condescended to limit her demand on the colonies, and to offer equivalent privileges and immunities, her blood and her treasure would have been spared, and her power would have been augmented instead of being impaired.

But it may be said, that however disastrous may have been this war for Great Britain, it was glorious and happy for the colonies. Let it however be recollected that this glory and happiness consisted, not in exemption from British taxation, the sole object of the war on the part of the colonies, but in the establishment of a great confederated republic, an incident of the war, as *unwished for as it was unexpected.** Had the

* As this assertion will startle many, and is in direct contradiction to the annual declarations of 4th of July orators, and others who are fond of representing our fathers as resorting to arms for the purpose of establishing a republic, it may not be amiss to correct the prevailing error on this subject, by an appeal to indisputable authorities.

The Congress of 1774, specified the acts of Parliament which infringed upon the rights of the colonies: and in their petition to the King, after setting forth their grievances, remarked, "these sentiments are extorted from hearts that would much more willingly bleed in your Majesty's service—we wish not a diminution of the prerogative, nor do we solicit the grant of any new ~~rights~~ ~~in our~~

war been continued by the colonies as it commenced only in resistance to British taxation, and had the peace of 1783 guaranteed them from all future taxation by Parliament, the object for which they had appealed to arms would have been obtained, and we may fairly ask, if they would not have obtained it at a price incalculably * 48 beyond its value? Let us * endeavour to form some estimate of the amount of taxation which the colonies imposed upon themselves, rather than pay the stamp and other duties claimed by Great Britain. It appears from official documents, that so early as September, 1779, the money borrowed by Congress for carrying on the war, independent of the proceeds of taxes, amounted to \$197,-

favor: your royal authority over us, and our connexion with Great Britain, we shall always carefully and zealously endeavour to support and maintain."

The Congress of 1775, after the commencement of hostilities, and the capture by the colonists of the fortress of Ticonderoga, ordered an inventory of the royal stores taken in the fort to be made, in order that they might be returned "when the restoration of the former harmony between Great Britain and the colonies, so *ardently wished for by the latter*, should render it prudent and consistent with the overruling law of self preservation."

After organizing the army, and making every preparation for war, Congress published a declaration in which they affirm: "We mean not to dissolve that union which has so long and so happily subsisted between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored. *Necessity* has not yet driven us into that desperate measure: we have not raised armies with ambitious designs of *separating from Great Britain and establishing independent states.*"

But the pertinacity of the British ministry prevented the colonists from laying down their arms, and they soon found it impossible to use them with efficiency in the character of loyal subjects, and hence the necessity which, in 1776, drove them into the "desperate measure" of a declaration of independence. The New-York Convention, in receiving this declaration, resolved, "that while we lament the ~~the~~ necessity which has rendered this measure unavoidable, we ~~lament~~ the same, &c."

Should it be pretended that these official asseverations were hypocritical, and the subterfuges of state policy, we appeal to the following individual testimonies:

I never heard in any conversation from any person, drunk or

682,985; other and large loans, it is well known, were afterwards made both at home and abroad. If to the amount expended by Congress, we add the contributions of the several states, and the losses sustained by individuals, we cannot resist the conviction that the *mere interest* of the aggregate sum would greatly exceed any taxes the British ministry had ever contemplated imposing upon the colonies.

But pecuniary disbursements formed as usual but a secondary item in the cost of the war. The slaughter of their fellow citizens* the capture of their cities, the devastation of large portions of their country, together with the depreciation of morals always consequent on a long war, are to be included in the price paid by our fathers * 49 for their exemption from British taxation. * And can we doubt that Britain would have rejoiced to have sold that exemption at a trifle compared with what we actually paid for it? And what an accumulation of human misery would such a contract have prevented! To the colonies it would have secured without a groan all the independent, the least expression of a wish for separation, or a hint that such a thing would be advantageous to America."

Dr. Franklin in 1775.

"During the course of my life, and until after the second petition of Congress in 1775, I never did hear any American express a wish for the independence of the colonies."

John Jay.

"That there existed a general desire of independence of the crown in any part of America before the Revolution, is as far from truth as the zenith is from the nadir.—For my own part, there was not a moment during the revolution, when I would not have given every thing I possessed for a restoration to the state of things before the contest began, provided we could have had a sufficient security for its continuance."

John Adams.

"Before the commencement of hostilities, I never had heard a whisper of a disposition to separate from Great Britain; and after that, its possibility was contemplated with affliction by all."

Thomas Jefferson.

* The militia and regular troops called into service during the revolutionary war, were 287,954 men.

dence they desired; and to England, and to Europe, it would have saved the lives and happiness of multitudes.

A later period of our history furnishes a still more striking illustration of the imprudence of resorting to war as a mode of redressing injuries. In 1812 the United States declared war against Great Britain, on account of certain orders in council destructive of neutral commerce; and also on account of the right claimed and exercised by Great Britain of impressing her native subjects from the merchant vessels of other nations when on the high seas. The obnoxious orders were revoked before the news of the war reached England, and the contest was continued solely on account of impressment.*

* 50 * The greatest number of American seamen ever officially alleged to have been compulsorily serving in the British Navy was about 800. To suppress this abuse, the United States drew the sword, and formally threw away the scabbard; and the honor of the republic was pledged again and again to rescue her seamen from this oppressive claim on the part of Great Britain.†

* Immediately on the receipt in America of the intelligence that the orders in council had been repealed, the British commanders proposed a suspension of hostilities, presuming that as one prominent cause of the war was removed, peace might be restored. But the cabinet of Washington would listen to no accommodation. "As a principal object of the war is to obtain redress against the British practice of impressment," said the Secretary of State, "an agreement to suspend hostilities, even before the British government is heard from on the subject, might be considered a relinquishment of that claim."—*Am. State Papers*, vol. 8, p. 333.

† "The impressment of our seamen," say the committee of foreign relations in 1813, "being deservedly considered a principal cause of the war, the war ought to be prosecuted until that cause is removed. To appeal to arms in defence of a right, and to lay them down again without securing it or a satisfactory evidence of a good disposition in the opposite party to secure it, would be considered in no other light than a relinquishment of it. War having been declared, and the case of impressment being necessarily included as one of the most important causes, it is evident that it must be

*51 To secure our seamen from impressment, the whole country was subjected for about three years, to the burdens, hazards, and vicissitudes of war. Our commerce was swept from the ocean, our citizens oppressed with taxes, the villages on the Canadian frontier were laid in ashes, and the very metropolis of the republic captured, and its public edifices fired by foreign troops.

Great Britain, who, at the same time we declared war against her, was engaged in a mighty struggle with the colossal power of France, found herself, by the overthrow of Napoleon, at liberty to direct her fleets and armies exclusively against the United States. Our government, despairing of extorting from Great Britain a relinquishment of the obnoxious claim, and foreseeing only an accumulation of calamities from an obstinate prosecution of the war, wisely directed their negotiators, in including a

* 52 *treaty of peace, to "omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment."* The instruction was obeyed, and the treaty, which once more restored to us the blessings of peace which we had rashly cast away, contained not the most distant allusion to the subject of im-

provided for in the pacification; *the omission of it in a treaty of peace, would not leave it on its former ground; it would in effect be an absolute relinquishment; an idea at which the feelings of every American must revolt.*—*A. S. Papers, vol. 8, p. 429.*

In the negotiations for peace the relinquishment by Great Britain of the right of impressment was made a *sine qua non*. "Your first duty will be to conclude a peace with Great Britain, and you are authorized to do it, in case you obtain a satisfactory stipulation against impressment, one which shall secure under our flag protection to the crew. If this encroachment of Great Britain is not provided against, the United States have appealed to arms in vain. If your efforts to accomplish it should fail, all further negotiations will cease, and you will return home without delay." *Instructions to Am. Commissioners.*—*Am. S. Papers, vol. 8, p. 577.*

In a subsequent letter of instructions it is intimated to the commissioners that the treaty should secure wages from the British government to all American impressed seamen who shall be discharged under the treaty!

pressment, nor did it provide for the surrender of a single American sailor detained in the service of the British Navy, and thus, by the confession of the federal government, "The United States had appealed to arms in VAIN."

But was the conduct of Great Britain more consistent with true wisdom than that of their assailants? Although she must be regarded in this war as the victorious party, not having surrendered the claim on account of which it was waged; yet, at what an immense cost did she avoid the surrender? To retain the privilege of taking from American merchant vessels a few straggling seamen, she encountered a three years war in which 2,422 of her vessels were captured by the Americans; more vessels probably than all the seamen she had ever recovered by impressment! In return for these losses, and for the cost of the war, and the consequent additions to her debt and taxes, she retained a claim, which, for the last twenty-six years, she has not found it necessary to enforce.

The last fifty years have been fruitful in wars, * 53 * and also in proofs of their exceeding folly. The impetuous and frantic proceedings of the French Legislative Assembly, struck Europe with awe, and her monarchs trembled on their thrones while witnessing the indignities cast upon the unfortunate Louis. It was supposed that the permanency of all monarchical governments was involved in the future fortunes of the French king, and hence the declaration at Pilnitz (22d August, 1791), by which Austria and Prussia virtually invited the other powers of Europe, to unite with them in breaking the fetters with which the French people had bound their sovereign. The invitation not being accepted, the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia, resolved to hasten alone to the rescue of their royal brother, and as a preliminary step, submitted to France such demands as plainly intimated an

intention to resort, if necessary, to force. These demands probably hastened the fate of him in whose behalf they were made. They were answered by a declaration of war, and in a few months Louis was led to the scaffold. The allied army invaded France, and were soon compelled to retreat. They were followed by the enemy who spread dismay through Germany, and wrested the Netherlands from the sway of Austria.

* 54 * Great Britain, on the execution of Louis, recalled her ambassador from Paris, and refused any longer to acknowledge the French minister at her court, and was preparing, without any justifiable cause, to join in the *melée* when her intentions were anticipated by the energetic leaders of the new republic. An English army was sent to the continent, and driven from it with disgrace.

Prussia, wearied with defeat, sought for peace and obtained a treaty which, instead of reestablishing the French monarchy, transferred to the regicides a portion of her own dominions.

Austria, after a disastrous war of six years, saw a victorious army approaching her capital, and joyfully accepted peace as a boon, although purchased at the expense of the Netherlands, and a portion of her Italian possessions.

England, deserted by her allies, continued the war with an obstinacy that no experience of its futility could shake, and with a pride that disdained to inquire for what object it was waged.

France, triumphant over every enemy accessible to her arms, resolved, in her wantonness of power, to plant her standards on the Pyramids, and without condescending to offer an excuse for assailing an unoffending people, already looked on the land of the Pharaohs as an ap-

* 55 * pendage of the great republic. On the 10th of May, 1798, the most formidable and magnificent armament that had ever been equipped on the French shores took its departure for Egypt. Within three months that proud fleet had been captured, and the army it transported was subsequently returned as prisoners in the vessels of their enemies.

The French troops having taken possession of the papal territories, the king of Naples, alarmed by the proximity of such formidable neighbors, although without other cause of complaint, thought it expedient, for the security of his own dominions, to throw down the gauntlet to the French republic. In a few months he found himself a fugitive, and his kingdom for whose safety he had declared war, in the entire possession of his enemies.

The growing power of France, which had been aggrandized by every effort made to check it, now excited an alliance against it between Austria and Prussia. During the progress of this new war, the fortunate soldier who swayed the destinies of France, proposed peace to Great Britain. That nation, safe in her Island fortress, and guarded by her wooden walls, had little to fear from any continental power. But seduced by the meteor of
* 56 * glory * she preferred war to peace, and her people were burthened with taxes, not merely to maintain her own armaments, but to replenish the exhausted coffers of Austria. That rash and unfortunate state, weakened and humiliated by successive defeats, at last closed the contest she had commenced by the ignominious treaty of Luneville. Prussia, likewise, after a murderous conflict, concluded a peace which gave no guarantee whatever of her own safety or that of others.

England was thus left to struggle alone with her gigantic foe. The war she had provoked and prolonged, contrib-

uted nothing to her prosperity or security; and had in truth no real object but the gratification of her national pride. That pride, however, was at length compelled to submit to the inglorious peace of Amiens, by which England obtained, in return for her prodigal expenditure of blood and treasure, Ceylon in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies—possessions which would have been dearly purchased at the cost of one year's hostility.

Such was the result of ten years' war waged against the French republic, not to resist but to *prevent* aggression. Had the powers of Europe remained simply on the defensive, and abstained from all interference with the internal dissensions of France, order would soon have succeeded to confusion, either through the energy of some successful chieftain, or the establishment of a regular government. But the attempts made to coerce and conquer France, armed a whole nation in defence of its liberties, and created that military enthusiasm and desperation which, like a volcanic irruption, burst forth with resistless fury, spreading terror and desolation in its course.

Never had the precarious issue of war been more forcibly taught to mankind, but it was a lesson unheeded by Europe, and least of all by England. Mortified by the failure of all her vast efforts to limit the power of the new republic, confident in her naval superiority, and trusting to her pecuniary resources to enlist new allies in her cause, she panted to renew the contest from which she had so recently retired. When a war is desired it is rarely difficult to find pretexts to justify it. In the present instance, however, Britain could not complain of any infraction of the late treaty, as it had been violated only by herself.* France had offered her no violence, nor was

* By the refusal to surrender Malta.

there proof that any was intended. She was therefore compelled to * assume the attitude of champion and protector of Europe, and scarcely twelve months after the peace of Amiens, she renewed the war against France avowedly on account of the grasping and inordinate ambition of her ruler, as manifested in his recent encroachments on *Switzerland and Piedmont!* But the hostility of Great Britain, instead of curbing the ambition of Napoleon, opened new paths for its splendid and adventurous career, and the petty encroachments which had excited her alarm, were instantly followed by the occupation of Hanover, the patrimonial possession of the house of Brunswick. In the course of a few months England beheld with amazement and dismay arrayed on the opposite coast a numerous force, indicating, in the name it bore, "Army of England," the invasion it meditated. The terror inspired by this army is evinced by the preparations made to repel it. To nearly 100,000 troops of the line, were added 80,000 disciplined militia and about 300,000 volunteers. "The land," says a distinguished historian, "seemed converted into an immense camp, and the whole nation into soldiers." The mere expense of these preparations must far have exceeded the value of any acquisitions the nation could rationally have anticipated from the war; an expense incurred by its own wilful rejection of the blessings of peace.

The war, as we have stated, was commenced to repress the ambition of the French ruler, and in less than one year after its declaration, that ruler had exchanged the truncheon of first consul for the imperial sceptre.

Soon after his coronation, Bonaparte once more offered peace to England, but her passion for war led her not only again to refuse the proffered boon, but to lavish her wealth in rekindling on the continent the flames which had but

just been extinguished. An alliance was formed between Great Britain, Austria, and Russia, against France. This new war was announced by Napoleon to his senate on the 22d Sept., 1805, and on the 13th Nov. following he entered Vienna in triumph!

The Russians hastened to the succor of their unfortunate ally, and on the 2d Dec. the battle of Austerlitz dissolved the confederacy, and in a few days after, the treaty of Presburg completed the humiliation of Austria, by depriving her of more than a million of square miles of territory, and two and a half millions of subjects.

* 60 With a folly bordering on insanity, Prussia * now resolved to take the field against a nation of whose energy and strength she had just witnessed such a tremendous exhibition. The grievances of which she complained were trivial and utterly unworthy the risk of an appeal to arms. On the 1st of Oct., 1806, she issued her declaration of war, and the campaign immediately commenced. After gaining some advantages, Bonaparte offered peace to Prussia, but her infatuated monarch did not deign to return an answer, and on the 13th day after his declaration of war, his power was prostrated in the battle of Jena, he himself was a fugitive, and his capital in the occupation of the very enemy he had just defied.

At Berlin the French emperor issued a decree which was the beginning of what was afterwards called the continental system; by which all commercial intercourse between Great Britain and France, and her allies, was interdicted. The operation of this system occasioned vast loss and distress to England, and greatly aggravated the sufferings she endured from this unnecessary war.

The Russians had advanced to the support of Prussia, but finding their ally already conquered, immediately retreated. They were pursued by the victor and a

* 61 series of murderous * conflicts ensued in one of which 50,000 human beings perished. At length the treaty of Tilsit gave peace to Prussia and Russia, and converted them from allies into enemies to Great Britain, and supporters of the continental system.

Thus had Britain the mortification of witnessing the coalitions her subsidies and intrigues had raised against France, serving only to swell the triumphs and augment the power of her rival. She had renewed the war to rescue Europe from the grasping ambition of the first consul, and yet, notwithstanding all her mighty efforts, that consul had become emperor of France, and his brothers, kings of Holland, Naples and Westphalia; and Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had enrolled themselves among his allies. Could peace have rendered France more powerful, Europe more enslaved, or England herself more burthened and exposed?

Soon after the treaty of Tilsit, France and Russia jointly offered peace to England, consenting to leave her in possession of whatever she had acquired in the course of the war. But again was the blessing spurned, not because the rights of Britain were in jeopardy, but because the same boon was not also tendered to *Spain* and * 62 *Sweden!* And on what principle of duty, * on what plea of state expediency can the continuance of the contest by Britain under such circumstances be justified? Had it been in the power of Britain to rescue Spain and Sweden from the designs of their enemies, her right to shed her own blood in defence of other nations might well be questioned. The result of her former efforts as the champion of Europe ought to have taught her humility, and she was doomed soon to receive another lesson not more gratifying to her pride. As if Providence designed to rebuke her arrogance, only a few months elapsed after she had

rejected peace, that she might extend her protection to Spain and Sweden, before Madrid surrendered to the French emperor; an English army was ignominiously driven from the Peninsula,* and Finland wrested from Sweden became a province of Russia.

The infatuation of England communicated itself to Austria. To that power France had given no cause of complaint since the treaty of Presberg, but had faithfully observed all its articles. Still Austria found in the ever increasing power of Napoleon a pretext for renewing hostilities against him. An army of 550,000 men
· 63 · flattered Austria with a glorious issue to the war she commenced on the 9th April, 1809. In thirty days Vienna was once more in possession of the French, and on the 6th July the battle of Wagram placed the house of Austria, for the third time, at the mercy of Napoleon; and for the third time was peace purchased by prodigious sacrifices.

Surely this brief retrospect of the wars arising from the French revolution is sufficient to humble the pride of human reason. We see nations voluntarily rushing to combat, rejecting peace as an evil, counting war as a blessing, spurning the lessons of experience, and again and again seeking safety and power in the same paths which had repeatedly led them to defeat and spoliation. It has been very far from our design in this retrospect to justify the conduct of the great conqueror of Europe. The ends he pursued and the means he employed were generally alike unlawful, but the impartial inquirer into his history will be compelled to admit that, for very many of the wars waged against him, he had given no other provocation than the possession of great power and inordinate ambition. That his power was augmented and his

* Under Sir John Moore.

ambition indulged by the very assaults of his enemies cannot be questioned; and unless we are greatly
* 64 * deceived, our retrospect forcibly illustrates the little dependence that can rationally be placed on war as a means of national security.

But it may be contended that the successive defeats sustained by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, were owing to their inferiority in military strength and skill to their enemy; and that the nation that can bring into the field the most numerous and best appointed army, must invariably be successful. Were we to admit the truth of this assertion, it is, nevertheless, obvious, that unless the superiority of the army to which victory is destined can be previously ascertained, war must remain undivested of any portion of its uncertainty. But if this superiority can be discovered before the contest is commenced, how, we may ask, are we to account for the fact that Austria, Russia, and Prussia, were in numerous instances so grievously deceived? The wars they waged against France were either declared or invited by themselves, and they must therefore have flattered themselves that they had at least an even chance for success. All history, however, and none more fully than that of Napoleon himself, bears testimony to the great and instructive truth that the battle is not always to the strong, and that no military force
* 65 * or skill whatever, can enable the eye of man to penetrate the future and distinctly to foresee the result of a single campaign. Does this bold assertion excite the smile of incredulity?—we again appeal to that mighty captain whose astonishing exploits we have just recapitulated.

Napoleon, on taking a survey of Europe after his last conquest of Austria, beheld the whole continent courting his alliance and protection, with the single exception of

Spain, in which the arms and treasures of England were employed in strengthening a popular resistance to his will. Bent on the destruction of his insular foe who, inaccessible to his armies, was both indefatigable and implacable in her hostility, he determined to enforce against her the continental system in every country that could be controlled by his power. Russia refused to submit to all the restrictions of this system, and he sternly resolved to compel obedience to his mandate.

The preparations for this war by France exceeded in effective strength any the world had ever witnessed. Greater numbers may, in ancient times, have assembled in arms, but history affords no reason to believe that any body of men were ever summoned to the field possessed in as great a degree of the constituents of military power, as the army now collected by Napoleon. The gross * 66 amount of the regular disciplined force of the empire, and its dependencies and allies amounted to the almost incredible number of 1,187,000.* From this mighty mass the emperor could draw at pleasure to maintain the war; and he selected about half a million to carry the French eagles into the heart of Russia. This prodigious multitude were inured to arms, and accustomed to victory, and were commanded not by a Xerxes or Darius, but by one of the most energetic, skilful, and fortunate soldiers that Europe had ever known. Could military superiority insure success, surely Napoleon was justified in his confident anticipations of triumph: and yet in a few months this mighty monarch was seen deserting at night the wreck of his army, and seeking safety in flight under a borrowed name! The sufferings and destruction of his once proud army belong to history, suffice it to say that 450,000 perished.

* Scott's Napoleon, vol. ii, p. 318.

It is unnecessary to trace further the progress of this memorable war, which, it is well known, terminated in the entire subjugation and humiliation of France, and in the exile and captivity of her late powerful emperor, of * 67 whom it may * be said with more truth than of the Swedish hero—

“He left a name at which the world grew pale,
To point a moral, or adorn a tale.”

Happy would it be for mankind, would they learn the moral which the name of Napoleon so strongly enforces, that military power cannot confer national happiness or security.

We have already noticed the pertinacity with which Great Britain prosecuted the war against France. For this protracted contest which lasted with a trifling intermission from 1793 to 1815, the moralist will, with difficulty, find any justifiable motive; or the considerate statesman any adequate object. The private grievances of which she complained were utterly insignificant, and, indeed, her avowed reason for refusing so often the proffers of peace was the necessity of preserving the balance of power in Europe by raising barriers to the encroachments of France. Yet no dispassionate investigator of the history of that period can doubt that the hostilities excited by England on the continent, were the chief causes of that vast accumulation of power which centred in the French emperor. To attain her object Great Britain * 68 expended, as is said, the sum of \$3,200,000,000, * but it was spent in vain. The power of Napoleon was, indeed, checked and finally destroyed, but not by the arms of England, and his banishment to Elba was effected almost without the aid of a British musket.

British troops, indeed, caused his overthrow at Water-

loo, but had there not been a British soldier on the continent, there is no reason to believe that he could have retained possession of a throne from which he had once been driven, and which was no longer guarded by the affections of the people or the moral influence of uninterrupted victory.

For her wanton waste of human life and happiness Great Britain is now suffering a severe retribution. The whole nation groans beneath a load of debt that represses industry and has filled the kingdom with murmuring and sedition. Institutions which, till lately, were the pride of Britons, are now tottering to their fall, and, so far as it is permitted to human ken to penetrate the future, it beholds the shadows of an approaching and portentous revolution. For her blood poured out like water, for the millions wrung from her people and lavished in subsidies and military equipments, Great Britain has received no * 69 one substantial good; and the * vainglorious privilege of pronouncing with exultation the names of a few victories, is her only reward for her immense sacrifices, her present troubles, and her gloomy forebodings.

But we may be told that however foolish and criminal may be wars of ambition and conquest, yet that national liberty is a blessing worth every sacrifice, and that war is often indispensable to its acquisition and protection. Could liberty be always attained and preserved by war, there would certainly be often strong inducement to wage it: we flatter ourselves, however, that we have already shown that the result of war is precarious, and that it often disappoints the most rational expectations. Would we consult the records of history, we should find that war has proved far more frequently the foe than the friend of freedom. Rarely have usurpers triumphed over the liberties of their country but by the sword. The ancient

Despotism of France was overthrown by representative assemblies and a republic established on its ruins. That republic was annihilated by an adventurous soldier through the agency of the army entrusted to him for its defence. The liberties of England have been acquired not by force of arms, but by the energy of parliaments.

The ruin of almost every republic that has been
 * 70 * blotted from the list of nations, may be ascribed to the military spirit fostered by its citizens.

That war is in its nature adverse to political freedom, is not a discovery of modern days. A Roman statesman long since declared that laws were silent in the midst of arms, and the experience of ages has converted the words into a proverb. Civil liberty requires the substitution of laws for the will of the ruler; but in war, the will of the ruler and of his subordinates becomes the source of legitimate authority. *Salus populi* is acknowledged as the *supremum*; and the bulwarks erected around the civil rights of the citizen are all levelled on the proclamation of martial law.

Innumerable instances might be cited of the voluntary sacrifice of constitutional liberty to the policy of
 * 71 * war,* and almost every campaign * produces its dictator. All history bears testimony to the natural

* Few men have ever been more jealous of encroachments on their rights than the fathers of the American revolution, yet were they frequently induced by the exigencies of the contest in which they were engaged to submit to most despotic measures and to entrust to their delegates most dangerous powers. At one period of the revolution no citizen of the state of New-York was permitted to pass from one county into another without a passport; and the convention of the same state authorized a committee of three, to send for persons and papers— to call out detachments of the militia—to apprehend, imprison, and banish whom they thought proper—to impose secrecy on those they employed—to make drafts on the treasury, and to raise officers and employ as they pleased 220 soldiers.

tendency of war to establish and strengthen arbitrary power. The pride and pomp of war; the unlimited power of the commander; the gradations of rank and the blind mechanical obedience exacted from the troops, all conspire to render an army a fit instrument of tyranny.

Happy would it be for our race, could it be said of armies as of persecutors of the Christian faith, that they can only kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. Alas! the *souls* as well as bodies of men are sacrificed in every campaign. The acknowledged demoralizing effect of war necessarily results from the great degree in which those engaged in it are withdrawn from the softening influences of domestic life, and from religious worship and instruction; as well as from the stimulus given by hostilities to all the malignant passions of our nature. Familiarity with violence, cruelty and death, tends to harden the heart and deprave the mind; while the irregular administration of justice amid the hazards and tumult of war, encourages fraud and crime. Surely no one who has examined the subject—who has listened to the testimony of history and observation, will * 72 deny that in the long and gloomy train of the * attendants on war, are always to be found the worm that dieth not, and the fire that shall never be quenched.

In the policy of nations no maxim is more universally received, with full and undoubling confidence in its truth, than that "to preserve peace it is necessary to be prepared for war." But the wisdom of man is foolishness with God, and upon few maxims of worldly wisdom has Providence more indelibly impressed the stamp of folly and of falsehood. The maxim is founded in ignorance or forgetfulness of the depravity of human nature. It supposes that aggression will be prevented by the power to repel it, while the incitement to aggression by the power

to commit it, is wholly overlooked. It is not true that military preparation prevents assaults. The very possession of power provokes envy, jealousy, and hatred, and thus invites hostility. When has Europe beheld a nation more thoroughly prepared for war than France under Napoleon; and when has any nation, in the same period of time, been more frequently and violently attacked? History affords no example of a nation so powerful as to be exempted from enemies. On the other hand, great military strength has certainly no tendency to encourage pacific dispositions in its possessor—while the nature of man remains unchanged, his cupidity, oppression and injustice, will ordinarily be proportioned to his means of indulging them, and those nations will be most frequently engaged in war who are most competent to wage it.

From the commencement of the 18th century Great Britain, France, and Russia, have been the most formidable powers in Europe, while Holland, Denmark, and Portugal, have ranked among the minor states. From 1700, to the general peace in 1815, these countries had been engaged in war as follows, viz:—

Great Britain	69 years.
Russia	68 “
France	63 “
Holland	43 “
Portugal	40 “
Denmark	28 “

This statement, however humiliating to the moral character of mankind, affords some impressive lessons. It teaches us the awful prevalence of war, and, of course, the duty of Christians to labor for its suppression; and it reveals the important truth, the more important from our

indisposition to believe it, that in the righteous retribution of Providence those nations which most cultivate the arts of war, are made to drink most deeply of its bloody

* 74 eup. * From this statement we also learn the folly of the opinion which has been current in all ages, that national power is conducive to national happiness. To extend the limits and augment the resources of his native country has ever been the aspiration of the patriot, and a nation's gratitude is claimed for him, who, by policy or force, adds another province to the national domain. The importance attached by statesmen to national wealth, population and military resources, arises from the wretched delusion that national happiness can only be insured by force of arms. But what truth can be more obvious than that national happiness is merely the aggregate happiness of individuals, and surely the happiness of individuals rests on other grounds than the revenues, fleets, and armies of the government to which they are subject. Military power has no necessary connection with the general diffusion of virtue, education, and freedom, the elements of human happiness; it is, on the contrary, but too often the instrument of a barbarous and debasing despotism. The actual amount of individual and domestic suffering in France while Napoleon was arbiter of Europe, was probably greater than under any other sovereign who had ever wielded the French

* 75 sceptre; and who can * doubt for a moment, that there is comparatively more comfort and less misery in the diminutive state of Connecticut, than in the mighty empire of Russia?

The last plea that can be urged in behalf of war, is that it is indispensable in self-defense. To this we reply that every war is professedly defensive, while scarcely any is so in fact. It will be difficult to specify a single instance

in which a war might not have been averted by honest and sincere negotiation, or by a sacrifice far less costly to either party than the prosecution of hostilities. Let it be remembered that precisely the same plea is advanced in vindication of duelling; a plea we all know to be utterly false. War is national duelling, in which each party is exposed to calamities incomparably more dreadful than the grievances they are seeking [to] redress.

Surely, the facts we have adduced, confirm the truth of Jefferson's assertion, that "War is an instrument entirely inefficient toward redressing wrongs—it multiplies instead of indemnifying losses."

But after all that can be said against war, and after the fullest admission of its folly, cruelty, and wickedness, still the question recurs, how can it be prevented? It

* 76 would be * an impeachment of the divine economy to suppose that an evil so dreadful, was inseparably and inevitably connected with human society. We are informed by divine authority that wars proceed from our lusts, but our lusts, although natural to us, are not unconquerable. He who admits the free agency of man, will not readily allow that either individuals or nations are compelled to do evil. The general prevalence of Christian principles must necessarily exterminate wars, as well as all other national crimes, and hence we are informed by revelation, that when righteousness shall cover the earth, "the nations shall learn war no more."

And are we to wait, it will be inquired, till this distant and uncertain period, for the extinction of war? We answer, that revelation affords us no ground to expect that all mankind will be previously governed by a sense of justice, but that, on the contrary, there is abundant reason to believe that the regeneration of the world will be a gradual and progressive work. Civilization and

Christianity are diffusing their influence throughout the globe, mitigating the sufferings and multiplying the enjoyments of the human family. Free institutions are taking the place of feudal oppressions; education is pouring its light upon minds hitherto enveloped in all the darkness of ignorance; the whole system of slavery, both personal and political, is undermined by public opinion, and must soon be prostrated; and the signs of the times assure us, that the enormous mass of crime and wretchedness, which is the fruit of intemperance, will at no very remote period disappear from the earth. And can it be possible that of all the evils under which humanity groans, war is the only one which religion and civilization and the active philanthropy of the present age can neither remove nor mitigate? Such an opinion, if general, would be most disastrous to the world, and it will now be our endeavour to prove that it is utterly groundless.

Individuals possess the same natural right of self-defence, as nations, but the organization of civil society renders its exercise, except in very extreme cases, unnecessary, and therefore criminal. A citizen is injured in his person or property—were he to attempt to redress his wrong, a forcible contest would ensue, and as the result would be uncertain, the injury he had already sustained might be greatly aggravated. Instead therefore of resorting to force, he appeals to the laws. His complaint is heard by an impartial tribunal, his wrongs are redressed, he is secured from farther injury, and the peace of society is preserved.

* 78 * No tribunal, it is true, exists for the decision of national controversies; but it does not, therefore, follow that none can be established.

We have often seen extensive national alliances for the prosecution of war, and no sufficient reason can be as-

signed why such alliances might not also be formed for the preservation of peace. It is obvious that war might instantly be banished from Europe, would its nations regard themselves as members of one great society, and, by mutual consent, erect a court for the trial and decision of their respective differences. But such an agreement, we are told, is impossible. That the immediate or early establishment of such a court is impossible, we are not disposed to deny, since time would be necessary to enlighten and direct public opinion, and produce general acquiescence in the plan, as well as to arrange the various stipulations and guarantees that would be requisite. It is not surprising that those who suppose such a tribunal can only be established by a simultaneous movement among the nations who are to continue warring with each other till the signal is given for universal peace, should be startled at the boldness and absurdity of the project.

Of such a project *we* are wholly guiltless. We have *79 no hope or expectation, in the present state of the world, of a general and simultaneous negotiation throughout Christendom in behalf of a tribunal for the decision of national differences and the suppression of war. Such a movement can only be expected *after* an extensive although partial abandonment of the military policy; and must be demanded and effected by the pacific sentiments of mankind. We have no hesitation, therefore, in avowing our belief, that, under existing circumstances, the idea of a congress of nations for the extinction of war, is utterly chimerical. But both reason and experience warrant the hope that some one nation may set an example which, through the blessing of Providence, may be made instrumental in ushering in the reign of universal peace.

But by whom and in what manner, it will be asked, is this example to be set? It may be a feeling of national

vanity, and it may be an inference from the peculiarities of history, position, and institutions, that leads us to hope that to the United States will be reserved the happiness and glory of teaching to mankind the blessings of peace and the means of securing them.

The American government was the first to prohibit the slave trade, and the first abolition of negro slavery * 80 was effected in our Northern * states; and to this country justly belongs the origin of the temperance reformation. The local situation of our Republic, and the nature of her foreign relations, seem to indicate her as the first of the nations of the earth by whom the sword is to be sheathed, to be drawn no more. No nation has less reason to covet the possessions of others, or to apprehend the loss of her own. At peace with all the world, we are placed in circumstances peculiarly favorable for the experiment of a policy avowedly and permanently pacific. At the same time, our widely diffused commerce, our extended territory, and our rapidly increasing population, all unite in attracting observation, and will necessarily give to the experiment, if successful, a powerful influence with other nations.

But still the question recurs, *how* is the experiment to be made? Certainly, in the way least likely to excite alarm and opposition. In every effort to promote the temporal or spiritual welfare of mankind, we ought to view their condition as it really is, and not as in our opinion it ought to be—and we should consult expediency as far as we can do so, without compromising principle. Wilberforce and his associates were, from the first, fully sensible of the cruelty and injustice of West India * 81 slavery, yet they * forbore taking any measures for its removal till they had accomplished the abolition of the slave trade; being well assured that by pursuing

both objects at the same time, they would excite a combined opposition that would prove insurmountable.

Any attempt to persuade congress to abandon all military preparation, to disband the army, to sell the navy, to raze the forts which protect our harbors, and to proclaim to the world that the United States would never again take arms to repel invasion or to enforce their rights, would only quicken into new vigour the military prejudices of the community. Let us then inquire whether a mode for preserving peace may not be devised that will shock no prejudice, and excite no reasonable alarm.

Of all the nations with whom we have relations, none, perhaps, enjoys in an equal degree our good will as our first and ancient ally. Between us and France no rivalry exists in commerce or manufactures; and we perceive at present no prospect of an interruption of that harmony which has so long marked the intercourse of the two nations.

Suppose in our next treaty with France an article were inserted of the following import—"It is agreed between the contracting parties * that if, unhappily, any controversy shall hereafter arise between them in respect to the true meaning and intention of any stipulation in this present treaty, or in respect to any other subject, which controversy cannot be satisfactorily adjusted by negotiation, neither party shall resort to hostilities against the other; but the matter in dispute shall, by a special convention, be submitted to the arbitrament of one or more friendly powers; and the parties hereby agree to abide by the award which may be given in pursuance of such submission."

To what well founded objection could such a stipulation be subject? It is true, treaties of this kind have been

but of rare occurrence, but all experience is in their favor. Vattel remarks (*Law of Nations*, book ii, chap. 18), "Arbitration is a method very reasonable, very conformable to the law of nature, in determining differences that do not directly interest the safety of the nation. Though the strict right may be mistaken by the arbitrator, *it is still more to be feared that it will be overwhelmed by the fate of arms.* The Swiss have had the precaution in all their alliances among themselves, and even in those they have contracted with the neighboring powers, to agree beforehand on the manner in which their disputes were to

* 83 be submitted to arbitrators in case they could not adjust them in an amicable manner. *This wise precaution has not a little contributed to maintain the Helvetic Republic in that flourishing state which secures its liberty and renders it respectable throughout Europe.*"

But, it may be said, one nation ought not to permit another to sit in judgment on her rights and claims. Why not? Will the decision be less consistent with justice, for being impartial and disinterested? It is a maxim confirmed by universal experience, that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and are nations less under the influence of passion and interest than individuals—nay, are they not less under the control of moral obligation? Treaties have often been violated by statesmen who would have shrunk from similar perfidy in their private contracts. Is it to be supposed that Sweden or Russia, or one of the South American Republics, in a controversy between us and France, without the slightest bias of interest, and with the observation of the civilized world directed to her decision, would be less likely to pronounce a fair and righteous opinion than either France or ourselves?

But we can decide our own controversies. That

* 84 is, we can go to war and take our chance for the result. "It is an error (says Vattel), no less absurd

than pernicious, to say that war is to *decide* controversies between those who, as is the case of nations, acknowledge no judge. It is power or prudence, rather than *right*, that victory usually declares for."

The United States, as we have seen, chose to decide for herself the controversy about impressment by appealing to the sword. In this appeal they, of course, placed no reliance on the reasonableness, humanity, and justice of their demand, since such considerations could have no influence on the fate of battle. They depended solely on their capacity to inflict more injury than they would receive, and this balance was to turn the scale in their favor. But it so happened that Great Britain, far from offering to purchase peace by relinquishing the practice of impressment, seemed rather disposed to continue the war, and we finally thought it most expedient to conclude a treaty having no reference to the matter in dispute.

Let us now suppose that a stipulation similar to the one we have proposed with France, had, in 1812, existed between the United States and Great Britain. The question of impressment would then have been submitted to one or more friendly powers in something like the following form:

* 85 * "Great Britain claims the right of taking her own seamen in time of war out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas; and she accords a similar right to all other nations. The United States, on the contrary, claim that their flag shall protect all who sail under it, whether British deserters or others; and they further object to the right claimed by Great Britain on account of the abuses necessarily connected with its exercise in reference to American vessels, in consequence of the great similarity in language and appearance of the seamen of the two nations, whereby American seamen are frequently im-

pressed under the pretence, whether real or affected, that they are British subjects."

It is scarcely possible that the umpires could have given any decision on this question so injurious to either party as was the prosecution of the war. Had the claims of Britain been confirmed, some American seamen would, no doubt, have been compelled occasionally to serve in the British navy; but as the British government claimed no right to detain such, and always professed their readiness to surrender them when proved to be Americans, the abuse would not probably have been carried to a very great extent; and regulations might have been * 86 made to lessen if not prevent, it altogether. But, after all, how small would be the number of such compared with the thousands who perished in the war; and how insignificant their sufferings resulting from serving on board a British instead of an American vessel, when weighed against the burdens, the slaughters, the conflagrations, inflicted on their country by the contest. If, on the other hand, the decision had been in our favor, Great Britain would have lost a few seamen from her marine, but she would have saved the lives of a far greater number, and she would have saved an amount of treasure which would have commanded the services of an hundred fold as many sailors as she could ever hope to recover by impressment.

It is not probable that the umpires uninfluenced by passion or prejudice, would have sanctioned, without qualification, the claims of either party. Desirous of doing justice to each they would not unlikely have regarded the British claim as warranted by the maritime law of Europe, but as causing in its exercise injuries to the United States to which no European nation was exposed. They would, therefore, have endeavoured to compromise the

conflicting claims by requiring Great Britain to abstain from impressing any seamen whatever from American vessels. On the other hand, * as a compensation to Great Britain for relinquishing her right in deference to the security of American seamen, they might have called on the United States to pay to Great Britain such a sum as, upon investigation, might be deemed a full equivalent for the services of such of her sailors as might enter the American marine.

Such an award would not have been acceptable to either party, and yet it would have promoted the interests of both far more than the war which they fruitlessly waged against each other.

Indeed, we can scarcely anticipate any future national difference which it would not be more safe and prudent to submit to arbitration than to the chance of war. However just may be our cause, however united our people, we cannot foresee the issue of the conflict, nor tell what new enemies we may be called to encounter, what sacrifices to bear, what concessions to make.

We have already partially commenced the experiment of arbitration by referring three of our disputes to as many European sovereigns. A question relative to the interpretation of the last treaty of peace with Great Britain was referred to the emperor of Russia, and decided * in our favor. The king of the Netherlands * made an award on the subject of the boundary line between us and Canada, which was, in fact, a compromise unauthorized by the terms of submission, and satisfactory to neither party, but far less injurious to either than would have been one month's hostility. A war with Mexico has lately been averted by a reference to the matters in dispute to the king of Prussia.

France also has sanctioned the principle of arbitration

in her treaty of peace with Mexico, negotiated in 1839. Each party preferred claims against the other for alleged injuries, and, instead of continuing the war for the enforcement of these claims, they terminated their hostilities, and, by treaty, agreed to refer the decision of these claims to "a third power," thus giving to other nations a novel and most salutary example.*

It is one of the auspicious signs of the times, that the importance of adopting some plan for averting war is beginning to attract the attention of American legislators.

In 1838, the Legislature of Massachusetts passed a resolution declaring it to be "the duty of all civilized communities to unite in the adoption of any practicable * 89 plan calculated to * effect so noble an object as the abolition of war and the preservation of peace among the nations of the earth;" and they expressed the opinion that a congress of nations for the establishment of a tribunal for the settlement of national controversies, was a scheme deserving the consideration of enlightened governments. These resolutions were directed to be laid before congress and the several state legislatures.

The same year an able report was presented to the House of Representatives of the United States by the committee on foreign relations on the subject of a congress of nations for the suppression of war. The committee pointed out the obstacles in the way of such a congress, but they recommended "*a reference to a third power of all such controversies as can safely be confided to any tribunal unknown to the constitution of our country.* Such a practice (say the committee) will be followed by other powers, and will soon grow up into the customary law of civilized nations."†

* See treaty concluded at Vera Cruz, March, 1839.

† This report is ascribed to Mr. Legare, the chairman of the committee, and the present Attorney General of the United States.

Notwithstanding the wisdom and humanity of the recommendation of the committee, there is too much
* 90 reason to fear that it will often be unheeded by the parties to a controversy, *after* their feelings have become irritated and their passions inflamed. Something more than a recommendation is wanted to prevent a national dispute from terminating in a national conflict. No plan will be effectual in suppressing war that does not, in time of peace and good will, *anticipate* future differences, and provide for their accommodation. The plan we propose is of this character, and its practicability arises from its extreme simplicity.

A treaty with France like the one we have described, would exert an influence far beyond the two nations immediately affected by it. The importance of the United States would be immediately raised in the estimation of Europe, because it would be seen and felt that whatever nation might enter into collision with us, it could not expect the aid of France, but that, under all circumstances, we should continue to enjoy the friendship and commerce of our ancient and powerful ally. These considerations would not be without their effect upon England. She has colonies near us which we may capture or essentially injure, and which cannot be defended by her but at great expense and inconvenience. A war with us must ever be undesired by her, since, in such a
* 91 contest, she has much to lose and very little to gain. Our treaty with France would, moreover, deprive England of the aid of the only nation in Europe that could afford her very important assistance in a war against us. She would, therefore, find it her interest to avail herself of a similar treaty, and thus secure to herself an uninterrupted and lucrative commerce, and protect her Canadian possessions from the assaults of a powerful neighbor.

Once assured by such treaties of permanent peace with France and Britain, we should find our alliance courted by the other powers of Europe, who would not readily consent that these two nations should alone have guaranteed to them continued peace and commerce with the United States. Hence, there can be no doubt that they would cheerfully enter into similar treaties with us. Under such circumstances we might offer to our South American neighbors the same stipulations with full confidence of their cordial acceptance.

And will it be said that all this is visionary and impossible? Let it be remembered, the plan we propose violates no principle of human nature, and is founded not on any supposed reformation in the passions and propensities of mankind, but upon obvious principles of national policy, deduced from reason and experience, and susceptible of the plainest demonstration. It is a plan adapted to the existing state of civilized society, and accommodated to the passions and prejudices by which that society is influenced. It is, indeed, perfectly consistent with the precepts of Christianity, but it is also in accordance with the selfish dictates of worldly policy. It interferes with no military preparations, and it offends no prejudice of the most ultra advocate of pacific principles.

To this plan we can imagine only one plausible objection, which is, that such treaties would not be observed. It is readily admitted that if the only guarantee for their faithful performance consisted in the virtue and integrity of statesmen and politicians, the confidence to be reposed in them would be but faint. Happily, however, we have a far stronger guarantee in national interest, and in public opinion. Every government that felt disposed to violate such a treaty would be conscious that by doing so it would be sacrificing substantial interests for precarious

advantages; exchanging the blessings of continued peace for the hazards and calamities of war. It would, indeed, require some very powerful temptation to induce a people to forego the peace, security, and exemption,

* 93 * from military burdens conferred by such a treaty.

Public opinion, moreover, would unite with self interest in preserving these treaties inviolate. A government who, for the purpose of avoiding war, had pledged its faith to abide by the award of umpires would, by going to war in defiance of that award, and in palpable violation of its solemn engagements, shock the moral sense of mankind, and would probably disgust even its own subjects. At the present day all governments are more or less controlled by public opinion; and the progress of education and the power of the press, enables every individual to sit in judgment on the conduct of his rulers. Such a war would be dishonourable, because it would be felt by all to be unjust and dishonourable. It would also be reprobated by the umpires, whose decision would thus be contemned, and by every nation which had entered into a similar treaty. It ought, also, to be remembered that each new treaty would tend to secure the observance of all the preceding ones, as each nation would feel that the value of its own treaty would greatly depend on the faithful performance of all the others; since, if one were violated with impunity, the power of the others to preserve peace would necessarily be weakened. In short, such a war would most probably be prevented or speedily terminated by the interference of other powers interested in enforcing treaties for the preservation of peace.

* 94 * But, surely, it would be the height of folly to refuse entering into an advantageous treaty, because it might possibly be violated. What profitable commercial treaty was ever rejected on this ground? Even admitting the

case supposed, our local situation, our population, and resources, relieve us from all danger of a sudden and hostile attack. No future enemy of the United States will ever indulge the idea of conquest, and the only serious consequences we could apprehend from unexpected hostilities, would be the interruption of our commerce, while the nation, strengthened in all its resources by her past exemption from war, could immediately place itself in the attitude of defence.

Dismissing then all idle fears that these treaties honestly contracted, and obviously conducive to the highest interests of the parties, would not be observed, let us contemplate the rich and splendid blessings they would confer on our country. Protected from hostile violence by a moral defence, more powerful than all the armies and navies of Europe, we might, indeed, beat our swords * 95 into ploughshares, and our spears * into pruning hooks. The millions now expended in our military establishments could be applied to objects directly ministering to human convenience and happiness. Our whole militia system, with its long train of vices and its vexatious interruptions of labor would be swept away. The arts of peace would alone be cultivated, and would yield comforts and enjoyments in a profusion and perfection of which mankind has witnessed no parallel. In the expressive language of scripture, our citizens would each "sit under his own vine and under his own fig tree, with none to make him afraid." and our peaceful and happy republic would be an example to all lands.

It is impossible that a scene so bright and lovely should not attract the admiration and attention of the world. The extension of education in Europe, and the growing freedom of her institutions, are leading her population to think, and to express their thoughts. The governments

of the eastern continent, whatever may be their form, are daily becoming more and more sensitive to popular opinion. The people, already restive under their burdens, would soon discover that those burdens would be reduced, if not wholly removed, by the adoption of the

* 96 American policy, and they would * inquire why they were denied the blessings of peace. Before long some minor states would commence the experiment, and the example would be followed by others. In time these treaties would be merged in more extensive alliances, and a greater number of umpires would be selected; nor is it the vain hope of idle credulity that at last a union might be formed of every Christian nation for guaranteeing the peace of Christendom, by establishing a tribunal for the adjustment of national differences, and by preventing all forcible resistance to its decrees.

It is unnecessary to discuss the character and powers with which such a tribunal should be invested. Whenever it shall be seriously desired, but little difficulty will be experienced in placing it on a stable and satisfactory basis. That such a court, formed by a congress of nations in obedience to the general wish, would, next to Christianity, be the richest gift ever bestowed by Heaven upon a suffering world, will scarcely be questioned by any who have patiently and candidly investigated the subject.

But many, while admitting the expediency of the plan we propose, will be tempted to despair of its adoption.

That many and formidable difficulties must be encountered in inducing * this or any other government to engage to submit all its future claims and grievances to arbitration cannot be denied. But similar difficulties have been experienced and surmounted. The abolition of the slave trade and the suppression of intemperance were once as apparently hopeless as the cessation

of war. Let us then once more recur, for instruction and encouragement, to the course pursued by the friends of freedom and of temperance. Had the British abolitionists employed themselves in addressing memorials to the various courts of Europe, soliciting them to unite in a general agreement to abandon the traffic, there can be no doubt that they would have labored in vain, and spent their strength for nought. They adopted the wiser plan of awakening the consciences, and informing the understandings of their countrymen, and persuading them to do justice and love mercy; and thus to set an example to the rest of Europe, infinitely more efficacious than all the arguments and remonstrances which reason and eloquence could dictate.

In vain might moralists and philanthropists have de-claimed for ages on the evils of drunkenness had no temperance society been formed till all mankind were ready to adopt a pledge of total abstinence. The authors of the temperance reformation did not lavish their strength and resources in attempting to convince the world, but they commenced at home, and, forming themselves into a temperance society, gave a visible proof that the principle they recommended was both practicable and salutary. And, surely, if we desire to convince mankind that war is an unnecessary evil, it is indispensable that we should be able to point them to some instance in which it has been safely dispensed with; nor can we hope to persuade the people of Europe while our own countrymen remain unaffected by our facts and arguments.

Here, then, must be the field of our labors, and let those labors be quickened by the reflection, that while they are aimed at the happiness of the human race, they are calculated to confer on our beloved country a moral sublimity which no worldly glory can approach.

But what means shall we use? The same by which the commerce in human beings was abolished, and which are now driving intemperance from the earth—voluntary associations, the pulpit, and the press. Let the friends of peace concentrate their exertions in peace societies * 99 —let the ministers of the Prince of peace * inculcate universal love, and call upon their hearers to engage in this blessed work; and let the press proclaim, throughout the length and breadth of the land, the folly, the wickedness, and the horrors of war; and let it call on the people to petition their rulers to secure, by treaty, the future peace of the country. In the first treaty that shall be formed for this purpose we shall behold the dawn of that glorious day, the theme of prophets and the aspiration of saints, when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

The present age is propitious to the enterprise. It is an age of energy and of freedom. All the powers of mind are in full activity, and every eye and every ear is open to the reception of new truths. Science and philanthropy are daily achieving triumphs which the past century dared not imagine. The world is no longer governed by princes and senates, but by public opinion. Yet this despot wields only a delegated authority, and each individual, however humble, can enhance or diminish his power. Who then will refuse his aid to enable this mighty potentate to say to the troubled nations, peace, be still; and to compel the rulers of the earth to stay the slaughter of their * 100 subjects by * referring their disputes to another tribunal than the sword?

In this cause every man can labor, and it is a cause in which interest and duty call upon every man to labor. But it is a cause which peculiarly claims the zeal and devotion of Christians. They are the servants of HIM who is

not only the mighty God, the everlasting Father, but the **PRINCE OF PEACE**. They know that war is opposed to all his attributes, and contradicts the precepts of his word. Conscience gives her sanction to the means we have proposed, and prophecy assures us of the accomplishment of the object to which they are directed. Why then will not Christians use the talents and influence given them from above to effect this blessed consummation? Let them not plead in excuse for listlessness and indifference, that it is God alone who "maketh wars to cease to the end of the earth." In the moral government of the world, the purposes of its Almighty ruler are accomplished by his blessing upon human means. He has promised that righteousness shall cover the whole earth, and, in reliance on this promise, his servants are now bearing the everlasting gospel to all nations, and kindreds, and tongues, and people. He has also promised that nations shall learn war no
* 101 * more, and, in his faithfulness, we have all the incentive which certainty of ultimate success can give to human exertion. And in what cause can the energies of Christian benevolence be more appropriately exercised? To arrest the practice of war is to stop the effusion of human blood, and the commission of innumerable crimes and atrocities—it is to diffuse peace, and comfort, and happiness, through the great family of man—it is to foster the arts and sciences which minister to the wants of society—it is to check the progress of vice—to speed the advance of the gospel—to rescue immortal souls from endless misery, and to secure to multitudes of our fellow men a felicity as durable as it is inconceivable.

For him who, in faith and zeal, labors in this great and holy cause, a rich reward is reserved. While doing good to others he is himself a participator in the blessing he bestows. The very exercise of his benevolent affections

affords a pure and exquisite delight, and when he enters the world of peace and love, he shall experience the full import of those cheering but mysterious words, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God."

