



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

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
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A F O U R T H y  
L E T T E R

T O T H E

People of *England*.

O N T H E

Conduct of the M——rs in ALLIANCES, FLEETS,  
and ARMIES, since the first Differences on the  
*Ohio*, to the taking of *Minorca* by the *French*.

By *Dr. John Shebbeare* — see  
*Londres' Bibliographer's Manual*.

*Jocerne tecum per littoras? civem mehercule non puto esse, qui tempo-  
ribus his ridere possit; ita sunt omnia debilitata jam prope et extincta.*  
CICERO.

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L O N D O N ;

Printed for *M. Collier*, Bookseller at the *Royal Exchange*.

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# L E T T E R

T O T H E

People of *England*.

L E T T E R I V.

**A**T length the long predicted consequences and fatal effects of m——l misconduct, so much derided by those who gave and those who received the wages of iniquity, are become too alarming to be denied by the most hardy and inured to that pernicious practice.

Even those who traffic in your undoing, acquiesce in this truth, and presume to vindicate themselves by asserting ye were found undone, when the ad——n was delivered into their hands, and that no remedy has sufficient efficacy to save you from perdition.

The dire dilemma into which ye are brought, your distressed situation, the loads of accumulated taxes, the diminution of trade, the neglect of *English* welfare, the attention to *Germanic* interests, the reliances on foreign mercenaries, and contempt of *British* subjects for the defence of this island, the whole conduct of affairs, both at home and abroad, in *Europe* and *America*, and that despicable appearance to which ye are reduced in the sight of every nation upon earth, render this too visible to every eye the least inquisitive, and too afflicting to every heart not yet transformed to stone by the long practice of plundering its native land.

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To



To avoid all appearance of inflammatory declamation, and silence the defamatory tongues of all who share their country's spoils, who assert that every attempt to emancipate you from your evils, is a malignant design to depreciate the m——y; let us impartially recall to your eyes the most material articles of the ad——n, since the commencement of differences between the *British* and *French* subjects on the banks of the river *Ohio*.

In this place, the more effectually to lay before you the real causes of this war, it will be necessary to lead you back to a transaction not sufficiently known by all of you, which passed between the m——y of *France* and *England*.

In the year 1750, or 1751, some *American* traders, subjects of the king of *Great Britain*, travelled to the borders of the *Ohio*, to traffic with the natives of those parts. This being known to the *Canadian French*, messengers were dispatched to acquaint them, that unless they withdrew from their master's territories, their effects would be confiscated, and themselves carried to prison at *Quebec*. This message the traders thought fit to obey, and withdrew in consequence of it.

The succeeding season, another company of *British* subjects came to trade on the *Ohio*, and not withdrawing on a like message with the former, their goods were confiscated, and themselves carried prisoners to *Quebec*, from whence they were brought to *Rockelle* in *France*, and still detained in prison. Not conscious of having violated the laws of nations, or traded on any ground to which the king of *Great Britain* had not an undoubted right, they remonstrated to the B——sb m——y, insisted upon being claimed as B——sb subjects, and honourably discharged from prison, as persons unoffending the laws of nations; nay, they entertained the honourable hopes of *Englissmen*, that the m——y of E——d would not cease to demand an indemnification for the loss of that merchandize which had been unjustly taken from them, and reparation for the insult and long imprisonment of their persons; expectations becoming men who value their liberties, properties, and nation's honour;

nour. In this they were deceived: the true spirit of an *En—sb m—r* no longer dwelt amongst us; the amb—r at *Paris*, instead of demanding these subjects of his master, as men unjustly held in prison, and reparation for the injuries they had received, was ordered by the m—y to solicit, as a favour from the court of *France*, the discharge of them only, acknowledging their offence. Were not your s—n's rights, and your own privileges shamefully given up? Were not the lands on the *Ohio* confessed to belong to the king of *France*? Were not the *French* justified in imprisoning your fellow subjects, and confiscating their effects, by this tame behaviour of the *B—sb m—r*?

After this dastardly concession in those whose duty it is to defend your privileges, can it be a wonder, that that country was claimed by the *French* as their own, or that they began to build forts and block-houses to secure the trade, and ascertain the property of it?

Little as this transaction was known or attended to in *E—d*, the taking possession in this manner of the frontiers of *Virginia*, alarmed the people of that province; in consequence of which Mr. *Washington* attacked them in those parts, and was defeated.

It seems, however, that before this timid acquiescence of the *B—sb m—r*, in thus acknowledging that part of *A— a* to be the property of *France*, he had granted the lands on the *Ohio* to a quaker of the city of *London*, and his associates.

Thus caught between the king of *France* and a quaker, like the mariners of old between *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, he became unequal to the dangers and difficulty of the steerage, and fell into great embarrassments.

He now perceived, that though he had pusillanimously given up to enemies his master's rights and your privileges, that the *French* minister, tenacious of both, and his own honour, could not be negotiated into receding from what had been granted him: he perceived also, that the quaker, fortified by a pertinacious adherence to his own interest, could not be soothed into relinquishing the grant which had been made him. If the *French*

monarch was backed by the arm of flesh, and 200,000 men to support his claim to the *Ohio*, the quaker was sustained in his by the spirit of obstinacy, and interest of the legion of sectaries. On one side a *French* invasion and a war filled the m——r with horrid apprehensions; on the other, he was greatly disquieted, lest, by the deserting the quaker, he should offend the money-jobbers of the city, and be unable to raise the supplies.

To strengthen this dilemma of the m——r, there was added to the insuperable propensity in a quaker of never relinquishing an advantage, a secondary motive, which probably at that time escaped the sharp-sighted ken of our m——l Lynceus. The grant of the *Ohio*, however great it might be conceived, was a distant and problematical advantage only; a war on the continent of *America* was a present and positive one, as the remittances to the armies in those parts, an object of great gain, would pass through his hands, and by means of this money sent to *America*, his debtors in that country would be enabled to discharge those debts, which otherwise he entertained but little hopes of receiving.

Urged by these motives, this son of meekness and resignation pressed the m——r to send those subjects, whose loyalty to their king, and love to their country, are above all fear of danger, to sacrifice their lives in recovering the lands of men whose principles will not permit them to defend the cause, or fight the battles of their king or country.

Thus, at first, the want of spirit in the m——r, to vindicate his s———n's rights and subjects privileges, timidly beseeching as a favour, what he had a right to demand in justice from the *French*, has given that nation a better foundation to the claim of the *Ohio*.

And, lastly, the dread of being deserted by money-jobbers and sectaries, has prevailed over the terror of the *French* arms, and induced him to attempt recovering by force, what he had renounced by concession: happy that nation which is destined to the a———n of such consistent m——rs.

If it be asked, whence it comes to pass, that this behaviour of the *B—sb m—r* has never been mentioned in the *French* memorials relative to the disputes in *America*, it may be answered, with truth, that the *French* ministry perfectly knew, that this ceding the territories of *England*, by the timidity of the *m—r*, was no legal relinquishing the *B—sb* right to these lands, and that the *K—g* and people would never acquiesce in this concession.

They therefore made no public use of this argument, reserving it only between the *B—sb m—r* and themselves, lest a public declaration of this affair might remove him from the ad—n, and the *French* monarch lose an ally of greater consequence to his success, than any potentate in *Europe*; for what can impart such strength to an enemy, as the want of courage and capacity in the man who opposes him?

The *French m—y* had proved in a former war, and by long experience in peace, the inconsistency, inability, and timidity of this man. To these they were greatly indebted for their success in the late war; on his dispositions and capacity they presumed to encroach upon us during peace; on the same qualities they promised themselves the like advantages for the future. To discover his timid and absurd behaviour was to risque his removal, an event to be dreaded by all *French* subjects. They concluded, perhaps too rashly, that as no nation ever had furnished two *m—rs*, succeeding each other, so unequal to the task of governing as this man, that therefore no nation could; and in consequence of this manner of thinking, secreted this behaviour with respect to the *Ohio*, and chose rather to make *Nova Scotia* the object of the quarrel to the public. This they determined to sustain by arms, when they found themselves defeated in argument.

After a most gracious speech from the throne at the beginning of the session, when all was gentle and pacific, on *Tuesday* the 25th of *March* 1755, the scene suddenly changes, war becomes the universal conversation, and a message was sent from his *m—y* to both houses, importing that

the

the present situation of affairs required an augmentation of his forces by sea and land, to defend his just rights in *America*, and repel whatever attempts might be made against his kingdoms; not doubting but his faithful p——t would enable him to make such augmentations as the emergency of affairs should require.

To this message both houses presented very loyal addresses, expressing their utmost zeal and affection for his majesty's royal person, family, and government, assuring him of a ready compliance in supporting him to repel all attempts which may be made to disturb, or deprive him of his kingdoms.

Let us now see what provision has been made in defence of all parts of his m——y's dominions by his m——r, in consequence of this resolution of hostilities. Mr *Braddock* had been just sent to *Virginia* with *English* forces; the fatal effects of that expedition, the weakness of the design, and ineffectual execution of it, have already been laid before you.

The defeat of that officer being accompanied with his death, a mistake, not inferior to the first choice of this commander, was discovered to every eye; it seems there was no officer amongst the remaining military force which had been sent to *America*, equal to a command of such consequence.

The m——r then, who planned this expedition, must have concluded that Mr *Braddock* was both invincible and immortal; otherwise, as a disease might defeat all the success which the greatest courage, prudence, and capacity might achieve, and the *French* arms prevail by the loss of a general whom death only could conquer, he would have sent a second, equal to the task of commanding an army. My reason for saying this, is, that when opportunity had proved, contrary to m——l wisdom, that this general was neither invincible nor immortal, the command did not devolve on any officer sent from hence with Mr. *Braddock*.

Now to me it seems, that nothing can be a more convincing proof of the m——r's imagining Mr *Braddock* superior to death and defeat, and of the supposed insufficiency

iciency of all the officers who accompanied him, than the command in chief falling on g——l S——y.

This gentleman had been bred at the bar, and was grown old in the practice of it; by unforeseen accidents he at last became g——r of a province in *New England*; he had never been present at siege or battle, and his talents, however nicely adapted to his profession of the law, and other departments of a g——r, promised but little success in the management of military affairs, being by nature slow, diffident, and inert. Him, notwithstanding, the E——sb m——r selected to command the king's armies in *America*, accompanied with the appointments and pry of the late duke of *Marlborough*.

It is remarkable also, that the m——l choice falling on this gentleman, proved a more favourable circumstance to our enemies, than could have happened in the appointing of any other *American* governor. What a surprising genius for deviating from the right, is this nation blest with in a m——r!

The character of every other governor in *America* being unknown to the *French* court, whoever besides had been appointed g——l, they might probably have concluded, that as he ought to be, so he was, equal to the command of an army. This would, at least, have made our enemies less sanguine in their hopes of success; but Mr S——y was as well known at *Paris*, where he resided a long while com——y for settling *Nova Scotia*, as in *London*; so that the *French* ministry being perfectly acquainted with his talents, the apprehensions of danger from such a commander, were but little in their minds, or in those who were to oppose him.

Nay, so full were the *Parisians*, on the news of his being appointed commander in chief in *America*, that the first salutation amongst those who were acquainted with him was, *Que pensez vous monsieur, le ministre d'Angleterre a nommé notre ami monsieur S——y general des armées du roy en Amerique.*

Notwithstanding this appellation of friend by the *French*, I am convinced it did not arise from any prevailing inclination imagined in g——l S——y towards that

that nation ; nor would I be thought to blame him for accepting this post, so honourable and lucrative ; to have refused it, would have been an unexampled instance of self-denial ; an expectation not founded in the nature of man : nothing is more natural than to imagine ourselves equal to every undertaking which our superiors conceive us to be ; without this prevalent and encouraging self-opinion, the m——r must have long since resigned his charge.

In consequence of being destined to the chief command, Mr S——y repaired to *Albany*, where, after long imitating the celebrated *Fabius* in delay, he, at length, with the same deliberation, began his march, counting his steps, towards the *Lake Ontario*, where being, alas, too maturely arrived, and perceiving that nothing was to be done against the enemy, he as deliberately marched back again, meeting no opposition which he did not easily overcome : and thus began and ended the expedition of g——l S——y, exactly as it had been predicted by all who knew him, imitating the great *Lewis* in going up the hill and coming down again. In this, however, the whole blame rests on him who chose, and not on him that was chosen ; the g——l surely is to be pardoned who failed in his expedition, when the m——r was so much mistaken in his judgment of him.

Notwithstanding this manifest deficiency in the B—/b m——y, in the choice of their generals, that of the *Americans* was as remarkably just. General *Johnson*, formed by nature for the military art, whom sagacity blended with courage, activity with patience, rendered what is not always to be found amongst seen-service and regular bred warriors, was the object of their choice.

This gentleman, with the militia of the provinces, took the *French* general prisoner, and defeated ten times the number of those *French* troops, before which Mr *Braddock* and his regulars shamefully retired ; and though this military success was followed by no farther advantage to the *American* cause than that of taking prisoner the enemy's general, it must be imputed entirely to the jarring councils of the different provinces, delay in sending

ing provisions and recruits, envy of his success, and various other causes.

Let us now turn our eyes on what was transacted in another part of *America*. It seems the inhabitants of *New England*, being thoroughly acquainted with the importance of *Nova Scotia*, had resolved to drive the *French* from their forts in that part of *America*. With this view general *Winslow* and 2000 militia sailed for *Halifax*, where being arrived, and joined by about 2 or 300 regulars only, under the command of Col. *Monckton*, they took *Beau sjour*, and immediately all the other forts surrendered.

Thus the only advantages which were derived from all the military preparations against the *French* in *America*, were affected by a general unknown to the *B——sb* m——r, and a militia of *American*, and by an expedition planned by the provinces of *New England*, the last of which exploits the *Americans* had always in their power to accomplish, unassisted by men, money, or ships, from this island; whilst the generals and the expeditions appointed by the m——r were either ignominiously defeated, or rendered ineffectual.

The last summer then was productive of the reduction of *Nova Scotia*, Mr *Braddock's* defeat, Mr *S——y's* ineffectual march to *Oswego*, general *Johnson's* victory unpursued through deficiency of powers, and his relinquishing the service through disgust.

The campaign being terminated so little to the advantage of the *Americans*, the most natural thought which could employ the attention of a statesman, was that of speedily reinforcing those parts against the *French* attempts, which would undoubtedly be more vigorous the succeeding summer than the former, as men and ammunition would be sent them to sustain the establishments they had made on the back of the *British* settlements. Let us see what provision has been made, and how speedily assistance has been transmitted to your fellow subjects in those parts, from whence the great source of your wealth and commerce is derived.

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The first attempt in their favour was that of creating a regiment of *Germans* to be enlisted in *Europe*, and sent thither; whose officers were to be composed of men strangers to this land, and aliens to its liberties and privileges, unproved by experience, guiltless of siege or battle, in whose favour the *British* subjects of untainted loyalty and approved courage were rejected, and even an express article, in an act relating to the settlement of the present august family on the throne, was suspended by a particular bill in parliament. Notwithstanding all this, transacted in favour of foreigners, no advantage has hitherto accrued to the plantations from that design, neither men or officers being yet failed to that part.

The winter passed away, the spring was advancing! No g——l appointed! No *English* troops destined for the succour of *America*, till on *April* 15th, the transports set sail with *Orway's* and *Murray's* Regiments for *America*, too late to be of any assistance 'till next spring, unless the *French* may, peradventure, possess themselves of *Virginia*, or some other ill defended colony, before their arrival.

In such situation and distress as the provinces remained at the end of last autumn, when the deficiency of generals was so apparent to all comprehensions, is it to be believed, that the commander in chief should have been withheld 'till the latter end of *May*? and yet this has been the real state of the case.

That man, who was to supersede all others in command, has not been sent 'till it is probably become too late for him to perform any thing of consequence this summer. The general in chief, who should have been sent last autumn, and been present in a new country as long as possible before his entering upon action, to be acquainted with the different resolutions of the various provinces, to have known the genius of the inhabitants, planned the expeditions, and created a confidence in those who were to obey him, was the last person dispatched on this occasion.

It is but lately that even any one has been sent to *America*. Within two months Mr *Webb* has superseded Mr *S——y*, general *Abercrombie* Mr *Webb*, and lord  
*London,*

*Loudon* all of them: by this deep contrivance, indeed, the m——r has fulfilled the scriptures, which say, the first shall be last, and the last first; yet without the imputation of infidelity, there are those who cannot believe that the chief in command ought to be the least acquainted with the business he is to undertake.

Is there another head in *Europe*, besides the m——l, which would have sent commanders in this manner? If lord *Loudon* had gone first, Mr. *Webb* and general *Abercrombie* would have followed naturally; and, as they were under him in command, fallen into their places of duty, which are to obey his orders and dispositions; but as the m——r has destined the affair, the commander in chief must now follow the plans of men inferior to himself in military knowledge, or remain inactive; for certainly the preparation for every military expedition, must have been too far advanced before lord *Loudon's* arrival, to admit of any considerable alteration; nay, even before Mr. *Webb* and *Abercrombie* arrived; so that Mr S——y is, in fact, general in planning the operation of this campaign also. How ridiculous then was this m——l disposition in sending out the commanders? Lord *Loudon* must, from the nature of his commission, which supercedes all others, be imagined superior in every thing relative to the commanding an army, to all who were sent before him; otherways it is the greatest absurdity to have sent him at all; and yet, by pure subtilty of m——l contrivance, he must necessarily be the least acquainted with what he is to undertake, if he arrives time enough for action this campaign; and bound to follow operations already concerted by a man proved unequal to the undertaking, or remain on the defensive. Is not this cunningly subjecting a soldier and man of capacity to all the insufficiency of understanding, in that very person who was so much complained of in the conduct of the last summer's campaign, and defeating the whole expedition for this year? Admirable sagacity!

Besides this inversion of wrong for right, so natural to m——l understandings, in sending the officers of highest rank, it is to be observed, that even the inferior officers

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of lord *Loudon's* regiment, together with arms, amunition, and other military preparations. lie at this time \* at *Portsmouth*; and, what is not a little extraordinary, the muskets, and other military weapons, lay a long while on the wharfs, waiting for transports, which were not then hired to take them on board. I say nothing of the sagacity of that m——l conception, which shipped the carriages of the cannon on board one ship, the cannon on another, the ball on a third, and the powder on a fourth; a contrivance not easily to be paralleled in any ad——n. Hence, by this subtilty of thought, the chance of defeating the whole expedition was increased as four to one; for if each article had been proportionably mixed in the cargoes of the four ships, the taking one ship could have defeated but one fourth of the intencion, and so in proportion; but, as it was designed, the taking one ship renders the whole useles; how complaisant are the m——s in all their undertakings to your enemies?

To this might be added the 500 Barrels of gun-powder purchased untried of the *Dutch*, cunningly to prevent it's falling into our enemies hands; which, upon experiment, proved as explosive as saw-dust.

These last mentioned affairs, however, must be considered as below the attention of m——s, whose capacities are so different from the common, and are only a farther confirmation of that great faculty of rightly distinguishing and selecting men, fit to be employed in all situations under their directions.

If deficiency in the supplies granted by parliament had been the cause of this delay, and inattention to the most valuable of all our foreign possessions, much might have been offered in vindication of a m——r; but since our most royal master, our most gracious sovereign, in his most gracious speech from the throne, has been pleased to thank his people for the vigorous and effectual support, which has been granted him, what can be said in defence of men, who have thus absurdly applied it, shamefully neglecting the most important object of this kingdom? It would be ridiculous to name the cause of this delay;

delay ; it must be assigned to that which no man in *England* is weak enough not to perceive, the m——r excepted.

If then superior knowledge of mankind be necessary in a m——r, to direct him in his choice of those who are to act under him ; from these instances, not purposely selected, what hopes remain in you of him who always, undeviating, appoints the least qualified for the task committed to their care ?

Having thus set before you the deficiency in m——l attention towards providing for the *American* colonies, without the commerce of which this kingdom must soon languish into a total decay, and shewn, that even the trifling succour hitherto designed since *Braddock's* defeat, must, by the delay in sending it, be rendered ineffectual during this summer, let me now turn your eyes on what has been transacted in *Europe* during that time, in defence of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, together with another dominion, not belonging to this crown, and which to the present minute has been no great source of acquisition to this nation.

In 1755, during the time which passed between the message to both houses, and the prorogation of p——t on the 28th of *April*, no addition was made to our land forces : no law passed to arm the subjects of *Great Britain* against any invasion from the *French*, a neglect which there is too much reason to fear may one day prove fatal to this kingdom ; but great sums of money were granted, and the equipping a respectable navy engaged the whole attention of the adm——n.

His m——y having put an end to the session the same day, that no time might be lost, despising the menaces and invasions of the *French*, set out from *St. James's*, greatly risking his sacred person, through seas and tempests, to provide for the defence of his dominions. During his absence, let us recollect what were the occupations of the m——y at home towards this attainment : they were employed in committing violence on your liberties, depressing the courage of sailors by compulsion, manning fleets, which have been almost useless by their destination,

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on, and leaving the island open to the hourly invasion of the *French*, through deficiency of domestic force.

However, to the immortal memory of the m——r, this inattention at home was amply recompensed by his care on the other side the water. Two treaties, supposed to be teeming with advantages to this nation, were concluded: one with the empress of *Russia*, and the other with the *Landgrave* of *Hesse-Cassel*; the first signed at *Petersburgh*, the 30th of *September* 1755, the other at *Hannover* the 18th of *June* the same year.

The first article with *Russia*, confirms the treaty concluded in 1744, by which the empress agrees to furnish the king of *Great Britain* with 10,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, if his m——y's dominions should be attacked, or with 500,000 rubles in money, yearly, during the attack. Neither of which having been demanded during the last rebellion in *Scotland*, it seems no unjust inference to conclude, that that treaty related to H——r only; otherwise, by what argument shall we justify our m——y, who, during that time of peril and expence, neglected to make that necessary requisition of the troops, or money, in favour of *England*, stipulated in the treaty.

These forces being deemed insufficient in the present emergency, it was thought prudent to increase the number to 55,000, 40,000 of which, were to be infantry, and 15,000 cavalry; added to this, 40 or 50 gallies were to hold themselves in readiness to act on the first orders.

Besides what has been already said, relating to the treaty of 1745, which makes the basis of this, the fourth article in the second treaty with *Russia*, confirms its being designed for the defence of H——r only.

It is there said, that these troops and gallies shall not act except his *Britannic* majesty or his allies are attacked; and then the commanding officer, as soon as he shall receive his majesty's requisition, shall make a diversion with 30,000 infantry, and the 15,000 cavalry: and, at the same time, shall embark the other 10,000 infantry on board the gallies, in order to make a descent according to the exigency of affairs.

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Now, does not the second article, by agreeing that those troops shall be held in readiness on the frontiers of *Livonia*, and the galleys cruising on that coast, declare the intention to be that of invading the *Prussian* territories, if the king of *Prussia* shall attempt any thing against the *H—n* dominions? otherways the stipulation, that the commanding officer shall make a diversion with 30,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry, *as soon as* he shall receive his majesty's requisition, would appear a palpable absurdity; because these troops, which are to make this *immediate* diversion in favour of his majesty, cannot march into *France* in much less time than six months, if she should invade this island: this diversion then, to be put in execution *as soon as* the requisition shall be made on the part of *Great Britain*, cannot mean an attack upon *France*; much less can their marching to the aid of this kingdom be the intention of that article, unless the same m—r, who, twelve months since, did not know that *Cape Breton* is an island, had not at the time of concluding this treaty heard, that *Great Britain* is surrounded by the ocean.

Besides this, galleys being unfit vessels for transporting troops on the ocean, and the circumstance of being ordered to make a *descent*, according to the exigency of affairs, with 10,000 forces, prove, that these also were designed to assist the former number, in whatever they should attempt, and neither to invade *France* nor succour *England*. The term *descent* being always understood in a hostile sense, cannot well be intended to signify their coming hither as friends, and the number is too small to attempt an undertaking of that kind on the shores of *France*.

In consequence of this Agreement then for the defence of the e—l dominions, the empress of *Russia* is to be paid by *Great Britain*, 100,000 *l.* annually, during the term of four years in times of peace; and as soon as those troops shall pass the frontiers of her country, 500,000 *l.* a year. In consideration of this augmentation of her subsidy, the empress is to take upon herself the payment, subsistence, and transporting her troops, wherever they shall be ordered by *Great Britain*, and not to

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re-call them 'till the expiration of the treaty, though her own dominions should be attacked.

This article of the treaty is yet another confirmation, that it excludes all idea of the *Russians* being ever intended to defend this island; because the pay of an equal number of *British* troops, in the same proportion of horse and foot, would annually amount to 1,700,000*l.* Now is it possible to conceive, the *Russian* empress can have agreed to support those forces in *England*, where provisions are dear, on less than a third part of that sum, and where the pay of each national soldier is but just sufficient for his subsistence? Would not this be a kind of compact to starve her own subjects? much less would she oblige herself to the transporting them for the same money, which expence alone would consume the whole subsidy.

Indeed, by the 11th, a truly Christian article, it is agreed, that the *Russians* shall have full liberty to plunder wherever they come; this auxiliary consideration, as they would not fail to put it in execution, might probably prove an ample recompence for the smallness of their pay, after their arrival in *England*.

However, as I think it my duty to do justice to all mankind, weak as our m——l leaders may be; it appears, I own, too rank a contradiction, want of capacity, and inattention to their own interest, to have made a positive compact, that foreign troops shall interfere in the occupation and advantages peculiar to themselves, of plundering the people of *E——d*.

Wherefore, from this article alone it ought to be concluded, that this treaty was made solely for the interest of *H——r*; and you the innocent subjects of *E——d*, were thereby doomed to a more severe fate than the Almighty imposed on your first parents, who rebelled against his will; ye must now not only get your own daily bread by the sweat of your brows, but even labour for the bread of others, who have no natural claim on you, and with whom ye have no connection. Thus the trade and toil of *Englishmen* must be annually employed in gain-  
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ing half a million of money for the sole ease and safety of the subjects of *H—r*.

Notwithstanding these proofs to the contrary, if any one chuses to believe this treaty included any immediate reference to the assisting this kingdom of *G—t B—n*, he has my full consent, even then it will soon appear I imagine a small justification c<sup>t</sup> m—l proceedings.

Amongst the many precautions which all wise m—s have observed in concluding treaties, there have been two from which they have never swerved; the first is, that in all subsequent treaties they have observed the strictest care, that no alliance with a weaker potentate, shall defeat the advantages of former treaties made with a stronger; without attending to this observation, m—s lessen their powers by every new acquisition of allies, a subtilty not much unlike the denying the use of arms to the subjects of a kingdom, for their own defence during war, and trusting to hireling foreigners.

The second is, that the honour and interest of the nation, which they superintend, are to be the great objects of all m—s in their treaties with foreign nations. Without due regard to this observation, states, like dupes at play, become the beggared object of ridicule to all crowned heads.

Let us now enquire, whether these two essential maxims have been judiciously pursued by the m—s of *E—d*, in their treaties with *Russia*, *Hesse-Cassel*, and *Prussia*.

In order the more clearly to effect this, we must place things in the same situation they were before either of these treaties was concluded.

Before the conclusion of the treaty with the empress of *Russia*, the m—s of *E—d* were under no small apprehensions of the *Prussian's* laying hold of the growing differences between *G—t B—n* and *France*, and possessing himself of some of the electoral dominions. This his undertaking, though of no disadvantage to *G—t B—n*, might prove, notwithstanding, a most embarrassing circumstance, if a war should break out on the continent, to the m—s of this nation, whose constant



purfuit it has been to prefer the *H——n* to *B——s* interests.

To difengage themfelves from this perplexity, it was thought neceffary to conclude the treaty as above fpecified with *Ruffia*; and indeed it muft be acknowledged, that the profpect of things, by this new alliance with *Ruffia*, was greatly improved in refpect to *H——r*. The *Pruffian*, who before this fubfidiary treaty with the *Mufcovite*, had entertained fanguine hopes of enlarging his dominions, was now reduced to fear left his own territories might be diminished by this new alliance.

This treaty then with *Ruffia*, fetting the interest of this ifland out of the queftion, which it has constantly been for this forty years, whenever it came in competition with that of *Germany*, was truly beneficial to the electorate of *H——r*; it included the two advantages above mentioned, of increafing power by alliance for the people it was intended, and honour to the m——s, if men can merit fuch reward, who neglect the welfare of their own country to ferve that of foreigners.

The 55,000 *Ruffian* troops were undoubtedly an augmentation of the powers of *H——r* and its allies, as it fubjected the *Pruffian* king, their fufpected foe, and whose interefts are as incompatible with the *Auftrian*, as thofe of heaven and hell, to no fmall terrors on account of *Silefia*, if the empress queen fhould fix her heart on reposfing that gem, which had been plucked from her imperial diadem, and which fhe ftill beholds with longing eyes. At the fame time then that the *Pruffian*, by his dread of the *Ruffian* arms, was rendered incapable of annoying the ele——l dominions; the friendship between *H——r* and the empress queen, who confidered this treaty as made in her favour, was greatly ftrengthened; particularly as the latter entertained hopes of their being employed in her fervice in the recovery of *Silefia*, if the *Pruffian* fhould intermeddle in the quarrel between the king of *G——t B——n* and *France*; or in *Flanders*, if the *French* fhould attack that part of her dominions. Thus the *Pruffian* king, by means of this treaty between *G——t B——n* and *Ruffia*, was placed in that very anxious dilemma from which *H——r* had been juft extricated.

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This was the very situation in which it was the business of the *E—sb m—s* to place and secure him, and to extricate himself as expeditiously as possible, was the great object of the *Prussian*: let us now enquire which of these has ultimately attained the ends of their endeavours.

No man saw more perspicuously than the *Prussian* prince, how greatly the scale of advantages was turned in favour of *H—r* and *Austria*, by the treaty between *G—t B—n* and *Russia*; he therefore set about devising some means, by which to relieve himself from this disquieting dilemma; in consequence of which design, from his own pure inclination, without overture from *E—d*, it seems, he proposes a treaty between this kingdom and *Prussia*, which was speedily concluded.

At this time it was, that the mercenary tongue-pads were let loose in favour of the wisdom of our *m—s* in the *Russian* treaty; the salutary and humiliating consequences which it had produced on *Prussia*, and the beneficial alliance which had been so long wished, and at length completed between the two crowns. Let us now examine, whether this last treaty with *Prussia* has been productive of all those blessings, which it was boasted to have brought upon its wings; or whether like the drone it has not brought the sting only without the honey.

The two most material articles in this treaty are, first, that *G—t B—n* with her allies, and *Prussia*, shall mutually assist each other in endeavouring to keep all foreign troops from entering the empire.

The second, that *Great Britain* shall pay 20,000 *l.* as an indemnification for the captures of that merchandize which was taken on board *Prussian* bottoms, condemned and sold during the last war; and in return, that *Prussia* shall pay the *Silesia*-loan.

And here it seems evident at first view, that the whole benefit which might have accrued to the *Austrians*, and even to the *H—ns*, by this alliance with *Russia*, was defeated by this second treaty with *Prussia*. Because, as by the *Russian* treaty the *B—m—r* had agreed to employ the *Muscovites* in the empire of *Germany*, to the aid and interest of *H—r* and her allies; in this with *Prussia*, he

had most sagaciously engaged to keep them from their assistance. And thus those men, who valued themselves so highly for concluding the treaty with *Russia*, to bring her forces into *Germany*, were now artfully engaged by the king of *Prussia* to oppose the entrance of the very troops which they had hired in their favour.

By this single article, did not the king of *Prussia* find himself quite extricated from all the difficulties in which the *Russian* treaty had involved him?

If the empress should attack *Silesia*. he had now no other affair upon his hands but that of opposing her arms; because the m—s of *G—t B—n* had by treaty agreed to keep out the *Russians*, and free him from apprehensions on that side; from this change of circumstances, the empress queen grew disgusted with the *B—sb m—r*; she saw herself and her interests deserted, her friendship and alliance rejected and renounced in favour of a weaker potentate: and from that time, being convinced of the weakness of the *B—sb m—r*, entertained the idea of seeking the alliance of a stronger and wiser power: thus *Prussia* has totally defeated the sole advantage, which the *Russian* treaty had given the states of *E—d* and *H—*, over him, and this kingdom and the electoral dominions lost the use of the *Austrian* powers, by preferring a weaker alliance to a stronger.

Let us now suppose that *France*, notwithstanding this treaty between *G—t B—n* and *Prussia*, should resolve to attack the *H—n* dominions, what advantage can redound to that electorate from this convention between *G—t B—n* and *Prussia*, to oppose the entrance of all foreign troops into the empire? Will the m—s of this isle and those of *H—r* rely on this treaty with *Prussia*, and confide in the forces of that prince to prevent the *French* from invading the *H—n* dominions? or if they should entertain this confidence, and act in consequence of it, will the *Prussian* march his army in their defence, and give such an opportunity to the empress-queen of recovering *Silesia*, whilst he is deserting his own dominions, to fight the battles of *H—r*.

I imagine no man believes, either that the monarch would confide in *Prussia* on such an occasion, or that the king desert his own interests to follow those of others.

If the *French* then, notwithstanding this convention with *Prussia*, should march towards the territories of *H——r*, it seems evident that the *Russians*, according to treaty, must still be invited to the assistance of the electoral dominions; in such a case, of what contradictory and clashing circumstances will the two treaties appear to be composed?

The treaty with *Prussia* obliges the monarchs to exclude the *Russians*, and all foreigners, from the *German* empire; that with *Russia*, to call them to the aid of the electorate into *Germany*.

Thus the *Russian* troops, which, by the agreement with that empress, are to come as friends to the assistance of *H——r*, are, by the treaty with *Prussia*, to be opposed by those very *H——ns*, as enemies.

In consequence of this alliance with *Prussia*, if the *French* forces should march to invade the electoral state, and the *Russians* to defend it, at the requisition of our monarchs, the *H——ns* are obliged by compact to become so many drawcanfirs, and kill both friends and foes.

By the alliance with *Prussia* they are engaged to keep out the *Russians*; the moment then the *Muscovites* begin to march, according to treaty, and the request of our monarchs, to the assistance of *H——r*, the treaty with *Prussia* obliges the *H——ns* to divide their troops with those of that monarch, and march one half to resist the coming of their allies the *Russians*, and one half to resist their foes the *French*: what an illustrious instance of refined and profound politics is here produced!

By this judicious proceeding, our monarchs have fairly divested the *H——ns* of the *Russian* Assistance; for, if they rely on the alliance with *Prussia*, the *Russians* cannot act in their favour; and if they claim the aid of the *Russians*, one half of the *H——n* soldiers are, by compact with *Prussia*, obliged to join and oppose the very troops they call to their assistance.

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In this manner, in obedience to treaty, the electorate will be deprived of one half of her troops wherewith to engage the *French*, because they must be employed to oppose her friends the *Russians*.

This must be the necessary consequence of the treaties with *Russia* and *Prussia*, if both are put into execution; for, unless the *H——ns* oppose the *Russians* equally as the *French*, from entering the empire, the *Prussian* is entirely disengaged from all obligation between him and the *B——s* m——rs, and the *H——ns* are the first infracters of the treaty. Wherefore, as it is impossible, from the nature of things, that the *H——ns* can oppose the *Russians*, which they have called to their assistance, it follows, that the *Prussian* cannot act at all, because he would injure the *H——ns* more, in opposing the *Russians*, by calling off one half of the electoral troops, than assist them in opposing the *French*.

Thus the result of this boasted wisdom of the m——r, in the union between *Great Britain* and *Prussia*, is at last no more than a dexterous deliverance of the latter from that peril he was fallen into by the *Russian* treaty. He is at ease from all the fears which that alliance had imparted on the account of *Silesia*; disengaged from all obligation in his agreement with *England*, by the absurdity of our m——s, and the almost impossibility of its being put in execution; and may not improbably, by virtue of this alliance, be supported against the house of *Austria*, by the very *Russians* which our m——s originally had hired to oppose him.

Have they not then thus cunningly deprived themselves of all the advantages which the treaty with *Russia* had given them? Have they not, by renouncing the *Austrian* interest, displeas'd the empress queen; and, by this alliance with a weaker power, rendered themselves less able to resist the *French* arms in *Germany*? Have they not united the houses of *Bourbon* and *Austria*, after having spent 300 millions to keep them asunder? and to support the latter in opposition to the former. Is it possible then, that those m——s, who have been so easily circumvented by the *Prussian* king, could ever have perceived

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ceived the force and efficacy of that treaty with *Russia*? Ought not then the *Muscovite* alliance to be deemed the pure effect of chance or malice (which the article on plundering seems to insinuate), as that with *Prussia*, the legitimate child of ignorance and mistake?

After having, in the above manner, shown the effects of the first article in the *Prussian* treaty, which, indeed, concerns the *H—n* welfare immediately only, let us consider the consequences of the second article with respect to *G—t B—n*, in which the *B—s* m—rs agree to give 20,000 *l.* to the king of *Prussia*, in lieu of merchandize taken on board *Prussian* bottoms, condemned and sold during last war; and that prince to pay the subjects of this island the remainder of the *Silesia* loan.

Absurd as the first article has been proved to be, this second is not one step behind it in mistake and ridicule, and even before it in pernicious consequences; for as that first article, by having united *Austria* and *France*, may now cost this island two millions of money, in supporting the *Russians* for the interest of *Prussia*, if *Silesia* should be attacked; so the second article of the agreement bids fair to destroy all the commerce of *G—t B—n*, at least all the advantage she can draw from a superior fleet in time of war.

The merchandize repaid for by this treaty, was what had been legally taken, condemned, and sold. The equity of this proceeding had been defended, and our right justified, in a letter from the m—r to the *Prussian* court; and much more so in a memorial drawn by a lawyer and civilian, whose eminence and learning do honour to this nation. Nay, it was even asserted by these men, that the welfare and existence of this state, as a maritime power, essentially depended on our persevering in our right to these captures; and this, I believe, is the opinion of all men of understanding in the nation.

Notwithstanding which, in contradiction to all good sense and sound policy, restitution for these captures has been made to *Prussia*.

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By this concession, we either acknowledge that we have no right to seize military stores, designed for our enemies, on board neutral bottoms; that the decrees of that nation, on board whose ships they are taken, are valid, though contradictory to those made in the courts of *G—t B—n*; or that our m—s are become such timid and abject wretches, that whatever crowned head, however contemptible on the seas, shall dare to dispute the legality of seizing and confiscating such stores, shall be repaid whatever his subjects may lose.

I am sensible the m—s assert, that this 20,000 *l.* was not given to the king of *Prussia* as an indemnification for the captures made last war, but because they had a mind to present him so much of that money, which you labour to procure for them to squander.

Is not this answer to the full as childish as the article is pernicious; like two boys at school, where one gives the other money not to be beaten, and yet insists it was not through fear but pure love. Does this excuse him from the imputation of cowardice, or change the motive in the opinion of his school-fellows? Will not he be insulted by all the others as much as if he had confessed the true reason?

This illustrious instance of want of sense and want of resolution must have an advantageous tendency at the eve of a war. Will not the *Prussian* still insist upon the right of carrying stores in his ships to your enemies? Will not the *Dutch, Russians, Danes, and Swedes*, with all the other maritime states of *Europe*, demand, put in use, and support the like privilege for themselves, which you have already granted to the *Prussian*? and, if you oppose this liberty, will not your captures of their ships, however legal, draw the resentment and arms of all *Europe* upon you?

What then is the advantage of the payment of the *Silesia* loan, when compared to the dreadful consequences of this concession? How will you now distress effectually the commerce of your enemies, if your m—s permit neutral ships to transport and traffic, not only in the common produce and merchandize of *France*, and her colonies,

nies, but even in military stores, to the destruction of all your trade and security? will you longer vaunt your empire of the ocean?

Thus then, as by the former article, the m——rs of this k——m had effectually destroyed the good effects of the *Russian* treaty with respect to *H——r*, in this they have given a fatal wound to the interest and honour of *G——t B——n*. Destined, as ye are, to labour for *German* welfare, how will ye support the expence of those millions which it must cost, when the source of all your riches, your trade, is destroyed?

Now let me ask those hireling trumpeters of the m——l wisdom in concluding the *Prussian* treaty, what are the boasted advantages which are derived from it to this kingdom? Is the conclusion stronger in favours of m——l wisdom or m——l weakness? and what has this nation to expect under the direction of such penetrating and all-seeing m——s who have, by two articles in one treaty, driven *Austria* from their interest, united her with *France*, adopted the weak alliance of *Prussia*, laid *H——r* open to *French* invasion, destroyed the commerce of *G——t B——n*, and rendered our arms and councils contemptible in the opinion of all *Europe*?

Having thus, in some degree, explained the pernicious effects of the *Prussian* treaty, let us examine what advantages are likely to be derived to this kingdom from that with *Hesse-Cassel*, and what are the merits of the m——r in making it, and behaving in consequence of its conclusion.

The great object of this treaty is, that either 8 or 12000 troops, as *G——t B——n* shall require, of which the sixth part is to be horse, are to be furnished by the *Landgrave of Hesse* for this kingdom or her allies, and to be paid for by *E——d* only.

Now, as increasing the strength and sustaining the honour of a nation should always make the great objects of a m——r in his treaties with foreign nations; so frugality, in supporting and complying with them in the management of the public money, should ever be inseparable from every article.



Let us see whether this last duty of public parsimony has been more closely pursued in the alliance with *Hesse*, than those of power and honour were observed by that with *Prussia*.

By the fifth article it is agreed, that every trooper shall first be purchased at about 20 *l. Sterling*, and every foot soldier at about 7 *l.* which, in all, makes about 112,000 *l.* levy money; besides this, the *Landgrave* is to have about 37,000 *l.* annually before the troops march; and, as soon as they march, he is to receive 74,000 *l.* annually, till they enter into pay according to that of *H——r* or *E——d*; at which time the subsidy returns to about 37,000 *l.* annually; which again, when the troops are sent back, is to return to 74,000 *l.* a year, during the whole duration of the treaty, which is four years.

In the mean time, whatever men or horses die by disease, or are killed in battle, the beast is to be paid for at double the price of the human being; a blessed consideration for the subjects of *German* princes!

In like manner, whatever arms or artillery shall be found deficient, or taken by the enemy, a full recompence is to be made by *G——t B——n* to the *Landgrave of Hesse*.

By the tenth article, these troops shall be instantly sent back whenever the dominions of the *Landgrave* shall be attacked.

Let us now, in obedience to the inclinations of the *m——r*, allow, that the *Russians*, as well as the *Hessians*, were by treaty obliged to come to the assistance of *G——t B——n*. It being at length determined, that *France* would certainly invade this island; that the *B——sh* forces were unequal to the repelling a hostile invasion; that the subjects of *E——d* should not be armed in the defence of themselves, their king and country; and that foreign mercenaries were necessary for our protection and safety; let us then explain with what admirable fore-thought, prudence, and oeconomy, the *m——s* have proceeded with respect to the security of this land in the requisition of troops, according to the two treaties.

Fifty five thousand troops are, by compact with *Russia*, to be sent by the empress of that nation to assist *England*; these forces she is to transport and sustain for the annual subsidy of 500,000*l.* without any farther consideration for death of men and horses, or loss of military stores, and no return of them is to take place during four years, if the *Russian*'s dominions should be hostilely invaded.

Notwithstanding these conditions of this treaty are so favourable in price and frugality, no requisition of *Russians* has been made in behalf of *Germany*, but eight thousand *Hessians* are brought into *England*, the expence of which will amount this year, as the *ministers* confess, including levy money, subsidy to the *Landgrave*, death of men and horses, transporting hither and back again, and pay, to 2 million *Sterling*.

Thus this military aid in *Hessians*, costing double the money that seven times that assistance would have done in *Russians*, is fourteen times as expensive: a plain proof how different the bargains are which are made between this nation and the *Germans*, and this nation and *Russians*; and how much oeconomy in the public money, and the defence of this island, enter into the transactions of the *ministers* with *German* princes.

One article of frugality in the public money must not be omitted. Amongst the troops landed in *England*, there are about 900 horses, which, one with another, are not worth more than 4*l.* a piece; notwithstanding which, each of these horses has already cost about 12*l.* levy money, and 9*l.* in being transported hither; after this, 12*l.* more is to be paid for each horse which dies in the island; thus every dead *Hessian* horse will cost this nation 33*l.* eight times the real value, and becomes to the *Landgrave* worth three times more dead than alive. Is it not then the interest of the *Landgrave*, and the duty of the commanding officer, to take special care that none of these cattle ever revisit their native land; however, if any of them should survive, 9*l.* more are to be paid for the re-transportation of each; thus the hire of every *Hessian* horse, worth 4*l.* will then be only 30*l.* expence to you; not quite eight times his value.

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From this article may it not be justly inferred, that our m——s are as unskilled in beasts as men, and that this kingdom is the best market for *German* carrion in all *Europe*?

Another advantage attending the *Russian* treaty, not to be found in the *Hessian*, besides number and cheapness, is, that the *Russians* are by agreement obliged to remain here to your assistance, though the empress, their mistress, should be attacked.

Now, suppose the empress queen of *Hungary*, supported by this alliance with *France*, should invade *Silesia*; no improbable event, if the articles said to be in the treaty between those two powers are true; and at the same time the *French* should attack the dominions of *H——r* or *Hesse*, will not this island be then instantly divested of all foreign assistance from *Hessians*, as these troops must instantly return to the defence of their prince: thus, as well in use as oeconomy, the m——l choice of *Hessians*, who cannot tarry to your aid, in preference to *Russians*, who are engaged to stay, is most egregiously conspicuous and disadvantageous to this kingdom.

This mistake, or something more criminal, in preferring the aid of 8000 *Hessians* to 55,000 *Russians*; and wasting a million of money for the seventh part of the assistance, which may be rendered useless also, one would have imagined might have been sufficient to give the m——s an intimation of their error in the application of the treaties. Nothing appears to be less true; it being conceived, that the kingdom was not yet sufficiently protected from *French* invasion, it was agreed to request the e——r of *H——r*, your dear ally, that he would be graciously disposed to save this nation, by assisting the king of *G——t B——n* with 8000 of his troops.

Here again the *Russian* treaty was totally neglected. It was judged more eligible to apply for *H——ns*, at a fresh expence, than to make a requisition of the *Russian* troops. In consequence of this opinion, the p——t requested, and the kingdom was favoured with, 8000 *H——n* forces, which are since arrived. Does not this proceeding afford a fresh instance of m——l profusion; for  
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though the sum granted on this account is vastly short of what the m—s confels will be the expence of the *Hessians*, without the gift of prophecy one may venture to predict, that, at the conclusion, when the application of the million, granted by the vote of credit, comes to be specified, this expence will be equal to that of the *Hessians*; because I am convinced, the great wisdom and knowledge of the e—r of H—r, in concluding all subsidiary treaties, is in no sense inferior to that of the *Landgrave of Hesse Cassel*. According to this way of reasoning, 8000 *Hessians* and 8000 H—ns may cost two millions of money; four times the sum of almost four times the number of *Russians*. Add to this, the probability of the H—ns being less liable to tarry to your assistance than the *Hessians*, as H—r will more likely be attacked than *Hesse*, it may not improbably happen, that these two millions will be uselessly wasted in subsidies and other expences on foreign troops, which cannot be of service in protecting G—t B—n, whilst those that might be are entirely neglected and unrequested.

It was expected indeed, by every sensible and honest *Englishman*, that as the *Russians* were now visibly hired for the defence of H—r only, that the H—ns were to come hither in lieu of those *Russians*; and that, as G—t B—n now paid 55,000 *Muscovite* forces to defend the ele—e, that the 8000 H—ns were to be at the same expence by way of exchange to protect E—d.

This suggestion, however reasonable it may seem, proves by no means true in the event; for not only the H—ns as well as *Russians* are paid by G—t B—n, but there is too much cause to suspect, that yet another bargain is concluded for 8000 *Holsteiners*, since even the m—r had not the hardiness to contradict that assertion, when he was called upon to be paid for with B—sh money, that H—r may lose no defence by the absence of those troops which are arrived to the assistance of E—d. What a stupendous instance is this again of m—l profusion in favour of *German* states and neglect of E—sh: 500,000 *l.* annual subsidy to *Russia*,  
added

added to a million for *H—ns*, tack'd to half that sum, suppose for *Holsteiners*, make two millions of money for the feeble succour of 8000 *H—ns*, to be paid by *E—d*, w<sup>h</sup>ich troops after all, it is probable, may not tarry four months for the protection of this island.

Thus the preferring *Hessians* to *Russians*, at fourteen times the expence, is here again doubled, and the 8000 *H—ns* are chosen at the proportion of twenty eight times the cost which was agreed to be given for the *Russians*.

In this manner, the servants of the public, the guardians of your liberties and properties, the m—rs, have made three conventions in the place of one, neither of which, by this happy contrivance, will probably be of the least importance or security to this island; unless rendering you poor and despicable, and dooming your hands to triple labour, for raising money to pay these foreign mercenaries, be a public benefit to this k—m.

Mistaken, absurd, and profuse as this requisition of *H—ns* and *Hessians*, in preference to *Russians*, may appear to be, it is not yet by ten thousand degrees equally pernicious in its effects with that resolution, which has been taken against permitting you, natives of *E—d*, to protect yourselves, your king, and country.

By this act, the m—rs have subjected you, either to the invasion of your enemies, or the arbitrary will of mercenary troops, invited hither under the notion of protecting you.

The militia bill, that necessary law, devised for entrusting arms to your hands, had for its objects the most laudable motives; defence of yourselves, your f—n, and your country.

The security of these was to have been effectuated by a militia, consisting of 62,680 men, levied, clothed, and paid by the trifling sum of 175,197 *l.* and which the succeeding year would not have amounted to two thirds of that money; eight times the defence of the *H—ns*, forces, and yet not one tenth part of the expence; including also in its favour, what no sums of money can purchase,

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purchase, the love of their king and country, animated by the defence of their wives, children, and properties.

This measure, so necessary in itself, which would have rendered you at the same time free from the fears of hostile invasion, and the conquest of mercenary and pretended friends: this measure, reputable for the subject, parsimonious of public money, honourable to the m—r, glorious to the k—g, salutary to the constitution, and beneficial to the country, was rejected for inattention, profusion, disgrace, dishonour, insecurity, and ruin; freemen gave way to slaves, Britons to foreigners, liberty to thralldom: is there then the bosom of one *Englishman*, which still remains unwounded with the idea of this ignominious treatment? accused as ye are of cowardice or disloyalty; cowardice, if your loyalty is unsuspected; disloyalty, if ye are yet esteemed a brave nation; disloyalty to such a f—n, as 'till this reign has never filled the throne of *E—d*. For what other reasons can arms be withheld from your hands?

Since then your hands are denied the use of arms, stretch them empty as they are to heaven; though impotent with men, they may yet be prevalent before the Almighty. Ye are not yet denied the privilege of prayer, implore him to have that mercy on the *B—s* subjects which the m—rs have refused; that since by misconduct, want of understanding, or iniquity, they have driven every powerful state in *Europe* from your alliance, and by profusion and denial of arms rendered you incapable of fighting for your prince, that heaven of its all-gracious favour will be pleased to preserve and protect him yet to reign over ye a free and happy people; by this means alone it seems possible, that ye can be extricated from the numberless perils which surround you.

Having now, in some degree, plac'd the conduct of the m—rs in its just light, as it respects their behaviour in providing for *America*, *H—r* and *G—t B—n*, by land armies and treaties, let me turn your eyes on the administration of naval affairs, and candidly examine, whether symptoms of a more extensive capacity and greater

greater prudence have appeared in conducting this part of the m——l province than in the former.

In *January 1755*, the press for manning the *B——* fleet began with great violence. Scarce any age or quality preserved the brave seamen from this violation of *B——* liberty; every dock-yard resounded with innumerable strokes of axes, caulking hammers, screeking tackles, and cries of workmen. Pitch, tarr, and uproar, filled the towns of *Chatham*, *Portsmouth* and *Plymouth*; dispatch, panegyric, and my lord——, were united in the mouths of all men! no time could furnish an instance of such capacity in the head of the ad—— as the present, and even the diligence of Mr —— at *Plymouth* dock, who had most amazingly, by means of thirty coopers made 100 tons of cask in twenty four hours, to supply admiral *Boscawen's* fleet, was attributed to the great sagacity and foresight of this great m——r in naval affairs.

And indeed it must be acknowledged, that the merit of this expedition in cask-making of the agent victualler at *Plymouth* dock, was as much due to this great naval m——r (of which he knew nothing 'till it was completed) as any other part of marine preparation.

The officers who preside in the king's yards, have indeed a just claim to the praise of this kingdom for their diligence in equipping ships of war; to them, and to the great quantity of naval stores long laid in, it was owing that ships were so speedily prepared for the sea; for which reason, my sacrilegious hand shall never rob the cottage of the deserving man in low life, to decorate the palace of the undeserving, to whom chance has given riches and titles; or erect a trophy to a l——d from spoils which common men have won.

A parrot which could have pronounced by authority, equip ten ships at *Chatham*, ten at *Portsmouth*, and ten at *Plymouth*, would as effectually and as speedily have produced a fleet ready for the seas as the voice of the first l——d of the ad——y, and deserved as great an encomium for the transaction.

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The completion of the business was effected where he was not present, without one new invention, uncommon exertion, or peculiar attention of the understanding; and which, after the order had escaped his lips, whether he had been asleep or awake, dreaming or pretending to think, in his easy chair or on horseback, would have been equally completed in the same time.

Let us now examine, whether the man who has in this manner been extolled to the skies, as the best adapted for naval ad——n; by the merits of boatswains, gunners, ship-wrights, and dock-officers, and what he did not perform, has proved himself, in the execution of those duties which belong to him in chief, equal to the post in which he has presided; and deserving that applause, which in the beginning was so liberally bestowed upon him. To accomplish this, permit me to enquire in what manner, and to what purpose, the fleets of E——d have been disposed and destined, since the first naval preparations in *January 1755*.

The first instance in which the great knowledge of this president in maritime ad——n was exhibited to the public, was in that expedition in which *Mr Boscawen* was ordered to intercept the *French* fleet, designed to carry and convoy stores to the assistance of *Canada*. The whole of this remarkable exhibition of knowledge in marine affairs, has been already explained in a first letter to the people of E——d; in which it has been proved, that the number of the enemy's ships was unknown to our ad——, or not attended to; that our fleet was insufficient to the undertaking, if the destination of it had been, as it ought, before *Brest*; because *Macnamara's* Squadron was superior to the *English* at his leaving that port; for the same reason had he continued his voyage to *America*, *Mr Boscawen* and *Mr Holbourne*, by the weakness and division of their fleets, would probably have fallen a prey to that of the *French*; and even as it did happen, though the fleet of *France* was rendered inferior to that of *Mr Boscawen* by *Mr Macnamara's* return to *Brest*, all power of reaping any considerable advantage from it was defeated, by the *English* fleet being destined to cruize on



the banks of *Newfoundland* in those months when that station is covered with one general fog and darkness.

The *French* fleet being arrived in the river *St. Lawrence*, without any injury which could defeat the purport of their undertaking, the same genius which had so manifestly erred in the disposition of every article in *Mr Boscaawen's* voyage, was now determined to make ample atonement to his country for this deficiency of judgment, and by distributing the *E—sh* fleet in such a manner, that not a *French* ship of war should escape it in her return to *France*, demonstrate that he was yet equal to the supreme conduct of the *E—sh* navy.

*Mr Boscaawen* being ordered home, *Mr Holbourne* was commanded to cruise between cape *Breton* and the south western parts of *Newfoundland*, to intercept the *French* fleet returning from the river *St. Lawrence*, which service he punctually performed. Now it was that the m——I advocates were extremely clamorous in their panegyrics on the destination of this fleet, and him who had ordered it; notwithstanding which, it seems impossible to omit observing the parallelarity of judgment in this affair, between our first — of the ad—— and a justice of peace in the western parts of *England*.

It seems some time last summer, a thief who had robbed, and been apprehended, a desperate fellow, had escaped from before the justice, and flying to another house had bolted the door, and secured himself in one room of it. The constable, who had followed to this retreat, knowing the rashness of the man, and the nature of his situation, conceived no small apprehensions of danger in attacking him in that place; he therefore with great prudence acquainted his worship with the circumstances of the affair. The justice, after mature deliberation, wisely considered it was impossible that the thief, was he ever so brave, through want of provision and other necessaries, could long remain in that post; he therefore ordered the siege to be turned into a blockade, and bade the constable and his assistants to tarry before the door; watch the door, *Tom*, says his worship to the constable,

stable, through that door he must come, therefore mind the door, and he cannot possibly escape us.

This being resolved on, nothing could be more *alert* than the constable, and no men in *higher spirits* than his gang. The commander, as soon as it was dark, placed a lantern and candle at the door to see all that might pass from or to the house, and during the whole night most manfully with his associates stood on his arms, ready prepared, with his staff in his hand, happily to demolish the thief the moment he should pretend to fally and escape him.

This duty being performed through the length of two whole days and two whole nights, the justice in momentary expectation of hearing that the thief was taken, and the constable haranguing the mob, which attended on the thief's perseverance; at the same time wondering, that he had not been obliged to surrender thro' drought and hunger: when an old acquaintance of the besieged arrived with intelligence, that he had met the thief the first morning after his confinement, at the break of day, twenty miles from that very house in which the justice had to that moment imagined he was closely shut up: in fact, the sagacious head of the justice had never conceived, that, notwithstanding a door may be bolted ever so strong, and watched ever so diligently, a man might get out at the window, as it really happened in this very case.

In like manner, whilst Mr *H——ne*, according to the orders of his superior, was cruizing at the door between *Newfoundland* and cape *Breton*, and the marine m——r believed *Dubois de la Mothe* still confined and starving in the river *St. Lawrence*, that sly *Frenchman* slipt through the window, between the northern parts of *Newfoundland* and the continent, by the streights of *Peltisse*, unsuspected by the penetrating spirit of our first d——r in marine affairs; so that he heard *de la Mothe* and his squadron were safely arrived at *Brest*, before he knew he had quitted the river *St. Lawrence*.

Thus then, in the conduct of this naval transaction, there are to be found five very conspicuous instances of

most consummate ignorance; first the ignorance of the number of the enemy's ships; secondly, the insufficiency of the *English* fleet; thirdly, their not being ordered to cruize before *Brest*; fourthly, their being ordered to cruize where they could not see their enemy; and fifthly, to cruize between *Newfoundland* and cape *Breton*, to intercept a fleet which did not pass that way.

This justice, however, must be done the marine m—r to his honour; the first ignorance of a proper station for cruizing, preserved the *English* fleet from the danger of the last ignorance of the number of the enemy's fleet, and insufficiency of our own.

Notwithstanding this uniform concatenation of errors, there are those who attempt to justify this conduct, by saying it was impossible for Mr *Holbourne's* fleet to attempt intercepting *de la Mothe's* in both passages, because his squadron was not sufficiently strong to suffer a division for that purpose? Why then did the marine m—r expose himself to ridicule, in attempting to do that which he ought to have known must have proved ineffectual, and risk the destruction of his master's ships, by rocks and tempests, in those seas, where they could meet no adversary and do no service? did my lord *Winchelsea* ever conceive so fruitless an attempt, or commit so egregious a mistake?

Hence then it may be gathered, that if hereafter any naval captain, indulged with five ships, at the expence of 500,000 *l.* of the nation's money, to make a fortune for himself, shall sail round the globe, and by the very utmost effort of all possible chances, like throwing twenty aces on twenty dice the first time, take a ship worth a million of money for his and his company's advantage; that though he does not surround a weaker man than himself, he may yet preside and direct the whole navy of *E——d* to the ruin of the kingdom.

Such *fatality*, according to the present fashionable phrase of excuse, having attended the conduct of this naval expedition in every particular! a *fatality* doomed to attend insufficient judgments nine times in ten, since the creation! a fresh instance offers itself, of reinstating

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our marine m——r in the popular opinion, which began greatly to decline in his favour.

It seems monsieur *du Guay*, a *French* admiral, was arrived at *Cadiz*, with six ships of the line, in his way to *Brest*. This admiral, and this Squadron, the same naval genius, who had so wisely destined the former fleet of *E——d*, was determined to intercept.

He remembered the errors which had been imputed to his charge in the destination of *Boscawen's* fleet, insufficiency in force, and wrong appointment in the station of cruising; he was therefore determined to avoid these two mistakes, at least at this time. Accordingly, on the 18th of *July*, Mr *Hawke*, with eighteen sail of the line, was sent to intercept the six *French* ships under the command of *du Guay*; and with this whole fleet, so superior to the enemy, to cruise off cape *Finisterre*, 'till the *French* ships should appear.

This exploit again was trumpeted forth by m——l hirelings, as an insuperable proof of great marine knowledge in the director. The station was happily chosen, the number of the ships sufficient, and the game sure. Here was nothing for the most malevolent disposition to blame. Envy must now be dumb, or, if it spoke, speak in the praise of this design: and yet a mistake, much like the former in its consequences, prevailed also at this time; and in this manner it must prevail, when designs miscarry, not from accidents, for which men of sense may be pardoned in not foreseeing, but from radical insufficiency and understanding.

It seems that the same head, which had conceived that there was but one way of sailing from *Canada* to *Brest*, and had never thought of the streights of *Bellisle*, had in this place imagined the sea like *Hownslow* heath, where a man may sit on horseback on one side and see what passes on the other, and that all ships which are steering to *Brest* from *Cadiz*, are obliged to turn the corner at cape *Finisterre*, like race horses at a post, or lose their voyage. Probably this great naval m——r had reasoned much in the following manner: all ships, which have no enemy to fear or avoid, in their course from *Cadiz* to  
*Brest*,

*Brest*, make cape *Finisterre*; wherefore, every ship which knows there is an enemy in the way, and has reason to be under apprehension of danger, will certainly sail the same way; and therefore Mr *Hawke* shall be destined to cruize off cape *Finisterre* to intercept them. Admirable instance of sea logic! Without reasoning in this manner, is it possible he could have destined the fleet as he did?

Monsieur *du Gay*, however, it seems, from the same principles, drew inferences diametrically opposite; and in order to avoid the usual course which is steered from *Cadiz* to *Brest*, sailed directly west from *Spain* into the *Atlantic* ocean; when being at a great distance from the coast, he changed his course and stood directly for the land's-end of *E——d*. By this precaution of sailing west to a great distance before he steered towards the channel, he passed on the outside of all our fleet cruising at cape *Finisterre*; and arriving safely in the channel, fell in behind it with his squadron, and got safe into the harbour of *Brest*.

Such was the event of this second exhibition of boasted marine knowledge! Avoiding the errors of the former conduct generated the very miscarriage of this; and so it will for ever happen to men, who fancy, that by learning the mistakes of passed management they shall succeed in the present. Whoever does not intuitively distinguish right from wrong in the conduct of great affairs, can never be successful by judging from parallelarity; because, as in these two instances, tho' ships, seas, and the directing their stations, may be the whole concern in each, yet the similarity in these objects create no reason, either to avoid mistakes or pursue the advantages of a prior destination, where there is no resemblance of circumstances in the undertaking; and no two can be sufficiently similar, or sufficiently unlike, to justify a parallel or opposite conduct in any director of them.

The duke *du Tallard*, as I have been informed by a gentleman who thoroughly understands military affairs, made the same disposition at *Blenheim*, that the great *Gustavus Adolphus* had done at the famous battle which he won against *Valstein*; yet the *French* general was defeated, and the *English* triumphed. No circumstances can

be sufficiently alike to justify similar proceedings in men who are to direct. Imitators want force of understanding to penetrate, pursue, and put in action that which the original contrivers had conceived in various ways in laying down their plan. They are mimics of what was done, without comprehending the whole force of what might have been done: wherefore, in the progress of an action planned in imitation of another, when the circumstances vary from the former, not seeing the reason of the design, they are unequal to the supplying what the original contriver would easily have afforded: knowing no more than the historian has delivered, they follow servilely like copyists, and are defeated. Had this marine m——r, in his destinations of these naval expeditions, judged from original lights and principles, he must certainly have imagined, that *du Guay* would have avoided the beaten tract in times of peace; he would therefore have divided Mr *Hawke's* Squadron into two equal parts, which making nine in each Squadron, would have been still three to two; a proper and superior force wherewith to oppose monsieur *du Guay*; these, attended with smaller ships to have been used as scouts, by cruizing off cape *Finisterre*, and in the other station thro' which the *French* Squadron passed, there being but these two ways of steering their courses, without great ill luck, at least without blame to the planner of the cruize, must have intercepted the *French* fleet in its coming to *Brest*, and brought their ships into *English* harbours.

This however not being done, proves that the flying from error on one side, drives weak minds into an equal mistake to the opposite extreme, as young spendthrifts frequently become old misers.

Nor is it in matters of great moment only this insufficiency of conduct appears: the sloop which carried the field-equipage belonging to the officers of *Otway's* regiment from *London* to *Plymouth*, because the transports were sailed before she arrived at that port, was obliged to wait for orders to follow them.

The transports which the m——r had cunningly sent to bring the *Dutch* troops over, before he knew they would

would come, like a booby who seeks a midwife before his wife is with child, after their fruitless and expensive stay in *Holland*, sailed for the *Hessians*, when it was first discovered that no orders from the ad----- had been transmitted to justify the taking these troops on board. This neglect created this expensive delay, 'till a letter could come from and return to that part of *Europe*; nay, even the *H-----ns*, so very dear to this nation, were permitted to sail hither without convoy, so that two twenty gun ships of *France*, might have carried them all into *Dunkirk* with great facility.

The superintendency of our islands in *America*, is not one iota less remarkably provident. Monsieur *D'Aubigny* is too strong for our fleet at *Antigua* and the *Leeward* islands, and monsieur *Perrier de Sabvert* is in the same situation with respect to the fleet at *Jamaica*, notwithstanding that admiral *Townsend*, with his whole fleet of one ship, is safely arrived at that island.

In like manner, as the very ultimate of all sound judgment had been displayed in the distribution of the cannon, carriages, powder, and ball, separately on board the transports for *America*; so another exhibition of equal good sense appears in sending out the four commanders to the *Mediterranean*; for as by the sagacity of dividing the stores, the chance of defeating the design was increased as four to one; so by confining all these four commanding officers to one ship, and not sending them separately, the chance is increased in the same proportion, that the whole design of their voyage may be frustrated also. War has been already declared two months, and no ship is yet sent to give notice of it in the *East Indies*.

The judgments of our m-----rs, like pendulums, being eternally vibrating from one extreme to another, passing through, yet not resting in the mean, what hopes can ye entertain of reinstating the happy situation from which ye are fallen? That which should have been blended they have divided, and that which should have been separated they have united: and through the whole have proved themselves the very antipodes to common sense. Few men have been born with talents and abilities

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vastly superior to the rest of mankind; yet many have been well adapted to the knowledge and conduct of little things, who have been incapable of comprehending the effect and beauty of what is great and sublime; like the fly which admired the polish of a mirror, and condemned the architecture of *St. Pauls*. The merest fribble of a virtuoso, insensible to the great order of nature, can trace with delight and skill the various and minute shapes, shades, and colours, in a shell or flower, which distinguish one from another, but there appears in the ad——— of the present m———r in maritime affairs, an equal incapacity for the conduct of great and little matters; the same head which has so egregiously erred in the destination and appointment of larger fleets, has in like manner been insufficient to the minutest duty of his office; one instance of the former, more conspicuously flagrant than the rest, now comes to be laid before you.

Since the beginning of last *January*, every news-paper has been replete with the great military preparations which were making at *Toulon*, the number of ships equipping, and soldiers marching towards that port, *Marseilles*, and places adjacent. The object for which these forces were destined was as constantly mentioned: this subject was the common conversation of all ranks of men, from the artisan to the peer; and all except the m———rs believed that *Minorca* would speedily be attacked.

I don't mention accounts contained in news-papers as authentic relations which may warrant the m———l attention, but to ask that as at this time they have proved literally true, by what means it could come to pass, that those whose immediate duty it is to be informed of all transactions of such a nature amongst our enemies, should be the only persons unacquainted with them, or why they alone disbelieved the intelligence which gained credit amongst all mankind besides?

If the nature of this military preparation would have permitted a concealment of it, much might have been said in vindication of the m———rs who gave no credit to the account; but since thousands saw and declared it to all the nations upon earth, why were the m———rs dif-



fident of, or unacquainted with it? an instance unexampled in any ad——n but their own. The number of *Macnamara's* fleet had before been equally unknown or disbelieved; this then is the second instance of fatal ignorance, defective intelligence, or arrogant disbelief of the force of our enemies.

By whatever arguments the m——rs might be seduced to discredit this military preparation at *Toulon*, the very probability of *Minorca's* being attacked, and the essential importance which it is of to the *B——sh* commerce, ought to have created a jealousy in them, that the *French* would not long overlook so important an object, unattended to, and neglected as it was, by them. These considerations alone, without giving credit to what was transacting at *Toulon*, made it their duty indispensibly to have placed *Minorca* in security from all *French* invasion.

Besides these reasons, there was yet another motive to the strengthening that island from hostilities, and to the believing it threatened with an invasion, the repeated requests for succours from the brave commander of the castle of *St. Philip*. This gallant man, after reiterated letters to the m——rs, at length wrote to this purpose to his nearest relation; “ I have often requested succours from the m——r, I have been as often promised to receive them, and as constantly disappointed in the promise; this then will, I imagine, terminate in my falling a sacrifice to their neglect; however, though it should shorten my days a year or two, it will the sooner put you in possession of what I shall leave you, and in which I wish you happy.”

Notwithstanding the consequence of that island to this kingdom, what had been published by the public, written by the governor, and believed by all mankind, no attention was paid to the protection of it. No land forces sent, though the number within the fortress was known to be unequal to the duty and defence of it against a siege; and whereas in the year 1744 admiral *Matthews*, with a fleet of 48 sail, 9 of which were three decked ships, was employed in the *Mediterranean*; now commodore *Edgecombe* with 3 Ships and 2 frigates only,

was

was thought a sufficient protection for the *Mediterranean* trade, and island of *Minorca*.

Whatever were the reasons, no attention was paid to this important possession? Whilst all *Europe* beheld this neglect with amazement, and every true *English* heart trembled for the wound which he saw must be inflicted on his country, our m——rs were honourably engaged in laying wagers there was no fleet nor sailors to man a fleet at *Toulon*; that if there should be any it was not designed against *Mahon*; and treating with derision the apprehensions of all who foresaw the event, and whose love for their country would not permit them to be at ease; whilst the honour of the crown, and the interest of the kingdom, were open to insult and diminution, by this sinister neglect, and the *French* attacking *Minorca*.

During this time our royal navy, full manned and prepared for the seas, was riding triumphantly at *Spithead*, and the head of the ad——y paid as an ad——l, absent on leave; at the rate of a thousand a year, as if all that had been done in honours and profits had been hitherto inadequate to his merit. Glorious picture of wisdom in your m——rs! illustrious anecdote of their prudent ad——n, for their sons to read hereafter, and curse their fires! but happily providence, in commiseration to this people, has denied that blessing to the most conspicuous of them, kindly refusing to their wishes that progeny, which, treading in their fathers footsteps, must still be baneful to this isle.

At length, after four months passed in m——l inattention, and in wonder by gazing multitudes, Mr *Byng* set sail on the 5th of *April* from *Spithead*, with ten ships of the line for the *Mediterranean*.

During these months of inattention and neglect, *La Galissoniere*, with twelve ships of the line and five frigates, with transports sufficient to carry 15,000 men, ammunition, and artillery for a siege, commanded by the *Duc de Richelieu*, were gotten ready, and sailed from *Toulon*; and on the 18th of *April* landed in the island of *Minorca*, eight days after our fleet weighed anchor from *Spithead*, and almost six weeks before they arrived near

*Mahon*.

*Mahon*. The confirmation of the *French* descent on *Minorca* was the first intelligence which demonstrated the truth of what all men believed except the m——rs, and of what they had neglected in not sending succours to *Mahon*.

Pernicious as this delay of sending succours now appeared to every eye, it was not yet irremediable, tho' the troops were debarked, the citadel was not yet taken, and the avowed bravery of the commander justified the belief, that no shameful surrender of the fortress would stain the last moments of his life. Notwithstanding which, it was confidently asserted by the m——rs and their hireling spouters, that *La Gallifoniere's* fleet consisted only of eight ships of the line, and that Mr *Byng* would blow them out of the water.

Here was an opportunity to be envied of retrieving all the reputation which had been forfeited by the first neglect, in not sending a sufficient force to oppose the enemy's descent on *Minorca*.

Men of genius, though hitherto deluded or mistaken, would have improved this oversight into an advantage, and by reinforcing the Squadron under Mr *B——g*, with a number of ships equal to that with which he set sail, would have defeated the *French* fleet and starved their troops in *Minorca*. By preventing military stores, they would have saved *St. Philip's*, and by preventing the arrival of provision, have obliged the whole army to have surrendered prisoners of war.

How capable then was the first neglect of being converted to the glory of the king and kingdom? but, alas! they knew not the strength of that very citadel, which was to be besieged; and the moment they received the intelligence of the *French* being landed, desponding, they concluded it was taken; otherways the first inattention might have been metamorphosed from incapacity to wisdom, from disgrace to honour, from loss to advantage, from censure to applause. All the states of *Europe* would have believed the first behaviour, as designed to obtain the second advantage; and, converting an egregious imbecility into a refined stratagem, conceived highly of that policy,

policy, which is now universally despised and exploded. But, alas! the same saturnine planet rules our m—rs alike arbitrarily, at all hours and on all occasions; their genius tending eternally to the center, like a stone thrown into a cavern tells you by every stroke, that it sinks nearer to the abyss of waters, in which it flounders at last and is no more heard of.

The error which had been committed in not sending succours at first, improved by sending an insufficient force under Mr *Byng*, was still continued by neglecting to send a reinforcement, which would probably have joined him before he reached *Gibraltar*; at least a ship might have carried intelligence to *Corunna*; and as the winds were adverse for the Squadron, a courier would have reached *Gibraltar* before the fleet, and detained it till he was joined by a further force.

Notwithstanding this, Mr *Byng* was suffered to proceed with ten ships of the line, and the chance of meeting Mr *Edgeworth*, 13 in all against 12 *French* sail of equal force to relieve *Minorca*; whilst Mr *Osburn*, with 15 sail of the line, remained at *Spithead*, and 10 in the harbour of *Portsmouth*.

At length, after long delays from adverse winds, Mr *B—g* arrives on the 20th of *May* within sight of *Minorca* and the enemy's fleet. Imagine then, what must be the joy which fired the heart of the old gallant *Blakeney* at the sight of the *B—sb* fleet: warmed with all the spirit of a true subject, he now cherished the fond hopes of obtaining glory to himself, honour to his master, and interest to his country, by this succour which he saw, in defeating the enemy's fleet, and rendering all the *French* schemes abortive; such, probably, was the pleasing entertainment of his mind, when the *B—sb* flag appeared in sight.

But, alas! Mr *B—g*, after having attacked the *French* Squadron, with not a man killed or wounded on board his own and many other ships; with but 48 killed, and 168 wounded in the whole Squadron, retires unattempting to relieve the garrison of *Mabon*, because the *Intrepid* had her fore top-mast shot away, and leaves the

the brave general and his companions cooped within the garrison of *St. Philip's*, quite destitute of all hopes of relief.

Judge then, what was the horror of this brave man's mind, when he first knew the behaviour of our fleet, and saw all his expectations of relief and honour reduced to air; deserted in this manner by the *B — sb* navy, he was yet sustained by himself; his heart felt the behaviour of *Mr B—g* with more anguish than the necessity of being obliged to capitulate; he defended the citadel to the last, and then gave it up reluctantly to your enemies. If you have yet the faculties of human nature, weep over the severe fate of that brave man, and the sacrifice of your neglected fellow-countrymen! Pay that tribute to the remembrance of their bravery, though ye are denied arms to revenge their loss; then call to mind by whose conduct they have perished.

Resolve me then, those who daily suck the vital blood of *E—d*, and vociferate in defence of *m—l* conduct, whence did it spring, that the number of the enemy's fleet, which in the beginning was known to all, was still unknown to the *m—rs*? Why a superior force was not sent to destroy them? And why, when *French* forces were landed at *Minorca*, and the number of the Squadron acknowledged to be twelve, that a reinforcement was not immediately sent after *Mr. Byng*, yet to frustrate the *French* attempts, destroy the fleet, and starve or take prisoners marshal *Richelieu* and his whole army? Tell me ye who are hired or share in the spoiling your country for such purposes; tell me, — or is this behaviour so heinous, that even ye are dumb, and ashamed to vindicate your *m—l* masters?

How then are those opposite manners of *m—l* proceeding, with respect to *Germany* and *Minorca*, reconcilable with the interest of *G—t B—n*, and the duty of a *B—sb m—r*; why was *H—r* fortified and secured by treaties with *Russians*, *Prussians*, *Hessians*, and *Holfteiners*, purchased by profusion of *E—sb* treasure? *H—r*, which has already proved so fatal in exhausting the riches of *E—d*; and *Minorca*, though not the

source

source of your wealth, the protection of it when drawn from other fountains, totally disregarded? what reason can be assigned for this inverted behaviour, but that having lavished millions in consequence of those treaties, and the safeguard of *German* dominions, there remained not supplies sufficient to protect *Minorca*: this, tho' the most profligate, would have been some excuse; but these men are yet more unnatural and abandoned; they have fattened a spurious race with your heritage, and starved their legitimate offspring; whilst (from authority it is pronounced) your annual p——y supplies were vigorous and effectual.

Have they then thus disrespectfully treated you, that the sources of your wealth from commerce, being diminished by the loss of *Mabon*, your declining state may sooner introduce poverty, with dejection her companion, and adapt your souls to the wearing, with tranquillity, those chains which the m——l posspolite is forging for you? or, that your protection being destroyed against the *Barbary* corsairs, your honest sailors may fall a prey to that remorseless crew, and, learning there, teach at their return, that being yet one degree above the slaves of *Barbary*, you have not equal right to deplore your fate, and thus soothe ye to contentment?

Fatal as this may prove to this once happy country, culpable as the ad——l may appear in the eyes of all *Europe*, disgraceful as it is to the *B——sh* arms, and dishonourable to the crown of these realms, are not those who delayed the succours at first, those who left that neglect unremedied, by sending an insufficient force, and even providing against that second error by a reinforcement, yet infinitely more the objects of your resentment? speaking like men, not blinded with the reigning maladies of arrogance and self-sufficiency, but from the experience of former times, what expectations could be reasonably entertained, that ten *E——sh* ships of inferior force, or even when joined by Mr *Edgewcombe's* Squadron, that equal powers would have had a more than equal chance of victory; or that the event would prove less favourable to the enemy than the *English*. Such imaginations

ginations in favour of their countrymen may be laudable, and of service in the common sailor and common soldier, but in the man who is to appoint fleets and commanders, foolish, culpable, and destructive.

Let it be imagined, however, that the *B* — *sb* fleet, with this equality of force, could have conquered the *French*; was it reasonable to believe the victory would have been so cheaply purchased, and our ships so little damaged by the engagement, as to keep the seas and relieve *Minorca*? as it probably would not, and as both fleets were equally excluded from the harbour of *Mabon*, would not a conquest over the *French* Squadron have been even then attended with the loss of the citadel and island? To what realm could the *E* — *sb* fleet have steered to find materials to repair the injuries of the battle? Would *Spain* have supplied them with naval stores, and indulged them to rest in *Cartagena*? No man the least acquainted with the present dispositions of that court believes they would; probably then, considering the present state of *Lisbon*, *Plymouth* is the first hospitable harbour that could have afforded them assistance.

If a victory then, of such a nature as the above, would have prevented the fleet of *E* — *d* from keeping the seas and succouring *Minorca*, how much less likely is it, that effectual relief would have been the consequence of a drawn battle, or a defeat on our side? Does it not appear then too evident, that no success, which good sense has a right to expect with such parity of force, could have relieved the citadel of *St. Philip*, or justified the *m* — *rs* in sending out so small a Squadron for the defence of so important an object?

Whatever then may prove the event of this engagement to the admiral, let not the depravity of his behaviour seduce your attention from those who sent him so unequal to the undertaking. If after a candid and deliberate examination, it shall appear, that he has been egregiously remiss in his duty to his king and country at the hour of battle; consider how much more those are delinquent, who delayed the expedition and sent him at last with insufficient force. There are men, when su-  
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rior to their enemies, who wear the outside of gallantry and succeed, who perhaps, when on equal terms, from confessing some inward sensations of danger, may retire and miscarry; if it was his duty to have risked every thing in preservation of *Mabon*, was it less obligatory on them, by a superior fleet, to have prevented all probable presumption of miscarriage? After all, if Mr B—g's spirit proved in the experiment inferior to that of the enemy, was not the armament which the m——r gave him to command, inferior to that of the *French* also? on what account was the B—s fleet obliged to risque the loss of victory and *Minorca*, by engaging on equal Terms, when by being double that number, it might have preserved the island, and triumphed over your adversaries? Whence does it arise then, that if the marine m——r is by nature and capacity adapted to the duty of his high office, that a man so obviously unequal to the task was selected to command the fleet of E——d, and a fleet so inferior to the duty sent to protect *Mabon*?

Whatever delinquency may then be imagined to have been committed on this account, are not the m——rs still more criminal? The bravest man on earth, by exerting every superior faculty of the human mind, destined and appointed to command a fleet of that force, might only more conspicuously have manifested the insufficiency of the m——l provision and judgment, in the conducting this affair; and proved, that though victory should have crowned his arms, that the shattered condition of his ships would have rendered it impossible to preserve *Mabon*; whereas the m——rs had it in their power, by augmenting the force of the fleet, not only to have prevented disgrace, but to have commanded success, saved *Minorca*, defeated their enemies, and crowned themselves, the ad——l, their king and country with immortal honour.

Yet if you ask why more ships were not dispatched to the succour of *Minorca*, they answer, no more were manned ready for the seas. Was it then through want of power or pecuniary supplies, that this deficiency arose? not from the first, because that they exert in a more despotical manner than is known in the most arbitrary states



of *Europe*, in impressing seamen; not from the second, because no opposition in p——t has delayed one moment the levying what money the m——r pleased: if to this they shall add, that the kingdom cannot furnish sailors to man the fleet with more expedition, and that a large number of men of war are necessary for channel service, and to prevent invasions on this island, and therefore a greater force could not be sent to the *Mediterranean*; ask how it was done the last war? and why, in the p——t of 1755, when all this that has followed, and much more was apprehended, a militia bill was neglected to be passed? this would have permitted the m——r to have destined your fleet to useful enterprizes, and cleared *Spithead* from flying pendants, and the useless parade of a large navy without application or advantage. This would have saved you millions of money, and secured your shores from every hostile attack, more effectually than all the ships built since the *Æneas*, or *Argo* which set sail with admiral *Jason* to fetch the golden fleece from *Colchos*.

If then the souls of our m——rs are in unison with their country's good, why did they delay and reject this necessary duty to their king and their fellow subjects?

Let then the word *militia* be eternally halloo'd in their ears; may their imaginations awake, and sleeping be haunted with this terrifying neglect; may this idea be ever present to their minds, the ghost of that blessing which they straggled, 'till, alarmed by dread, and guilt, they repent and arm this defenceless land.

To what region is now fled all that panegyric, which was so loudly sounded through the kingdom, of dispatch, diligence, and capacity, in the m——c m——r? Why were those ships so expeditiously equipt, so ineffectually destined and applied? What injury has this hurry and expence brought on your enemies, or what advantage to this nation, unless the private gains of a few thousands, and the infamous appellation of thieves and pyrates from your enemies, unanswered by your m——rs, are conceived an adequate recompence for the national expence of millions, and the loss of character through all the realms of *Europe*.

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The baseless fabric of his temple of fame then is vanished; the deserted proprietor of that short-lived glare of reputation is now sunk into rayless obscurity, like the blifs of some poor cottager, who from his dream of millions wakes amidst the pangs of penury; happy for this isle, could the fatal effects of his male-administration vanish with the unmerited reputation of the author.

Egregiously delinquent as the m——rs have proved themselves in this neglect of *Minorca*, with what accumulated guilt ought they to be viewed, when the recapitulation of their whole conduct comes to be considered by you.

If those who have lost *Mahon*, and permitted your gallant countrymen in hopeless defence to fall the guiltless sacrifices of their neglect, the unavailing yet august victims of their own and country's honour, objects worthy of your admiration and affliction, the eternal stigma of an unnatural ad——n, have ruined your trade in the *Mediterranean*, subjected your sailors to the captures and slavery of *Barbary* pirates, by this one misconduct, what will be the whole event of the aggregate of their imbecillity, when by wrong choice of commanders in *America*, and inattention to that valuable part of *B—s* possessions, many provinces are left open to hostile inroad. May not the *French*, who have been some time sending troops to the *Mississippi*, this summer become masters of *Georgia* and *Carolina*, so defenceless and open; or perhaps some province more lucrative and better adapted to the necessities of *Faance*.

What have you to expect from your boasted naval bulwark, if the same men continue to direct it, who have already lavished in ineffectual destination and insufficient force so many millions? Have the *French* expeditions been rendered abortive in one instance? Have the captures of their ships of war exceeded three, equal to our loss only?

In like manner, behold what have been the fatal consequences of their transactions in *Europe*; treaties, ruinous to *E—d*, partial to *H—r*, and yet destructive to the welfare of that state; desertion of old allies and

more potent friendships, for connections with weaker and more needy powers; profusion of public money to hireling mercenaries, national degradation and contempt in foreign eyes, imputation of disloyalty or cowardice on yourselves, whilst you are denied the use of arms to defend yourselves, your wives, and daughters from open enemies, and the sacrilegious hands of venal foreigners, nurtured by your own money, brought on pretended terms of hospitality, if they should dare to treat you with insolence.

In the mean time, your fellow-subjects, seduced into the army by promises of being listed for three years, and to defend their country only, are kidnapped, and forced on board ship by compulsion, treated and transported like slaves, God knows where; to return, God knows when\*.

Is it not possible then, that by continuing to increase the number of insolent foreigners, and sending out the native troops, that at length a standing army of the former may become too formidable to be opposed by the people of *G—t B—n*, disarmed as ye are? Or even by the military thus daily decreasing by transportation to distant parts of the world, if at length they should resent the want of confidence which is manifested by thus relying on *H—ns* and *H—ns*, in preference to that loyal body of men.

Who then can wonder, if from one continued series of mistakes, and flagrant manifestations of in—l incapacity, the *Swedes* should snatch this golden opportunity of repossessing *Bremen* and *Verden*, the *Austrians* *Silesia*, the *Spaniards* *Gibraltar*, and the *French*, after having

\* PUBLIC ADVERTISER.

Extract of a letter from Plymouth, dated May 23.

Yesterday morning Col. *Campbell's* new-raised regiment was reviewed in the field, and ordered to appear at four o'clock in the afternoon on the dock, without arms; which they accordingly did, and, without much difficulty, marched into the dockyard, followed to the gates by the garrison, with their bayonets fixed, and muskets loaded, to keep guard while they were again reviewed by general *Home*, the colonel, and admiral *Bosclyn*; after which the companies were divided, and a signal-gun being fired from the admiral's ship, for all the boats to attend, they were immediately embarked without any disturbance, except heavy complaints at their being sent abroad, contrary to the terms of the advertisement, and the promises made them at the time of their enlistment.

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secured *Minorca* to themselves, invade the kingdom of *Ireland*: and, to close the whole, ransack this very island of *G—t B—n*?

Have not the treaty with *Prussia*, and desertion of *Austrian* interest, laid a probable foundation for the *Swedes* and *Germans* to accomplish the two former? Will not the suffering *Makon* to be taken, and yielding up that harbour to the *French*, encourage the *Spaniard* to attempt the third? and *France* having no farther object for her fleet in the *Mediterranean*, unite and employ all her force in perpetrating the fourth?

Will then the actual possession of some, and nearer prospect of subduing all these places, permit the m——l gang to raise the supplies for the ensuing year? Will those who have assisted the m——y, through the lucrative view of private interest, lend them their money when the danger of losing all exceeds the possibility of the profit? Then will it not too evidently appear, when bankruptcy, distress, and anarchy are let loose, that the unlimited profusion of *E—sb* gold for *German* interest has at length brought that inundation of evils, so long predicted, on this deplorable country?

Who then are friends, and who your foes? What are those men who dare to impute disloyalty to subjects, whose words and actions would have contributed to save this sinking state, if their counsel had been allowed? Shall the tracing a *Scotch* renegade jesuit through all his doubling lies and fallacies, to prevent future imposition on a few, by the discovery, be (as it ought) deemed a laudable and honest pursuit; and yet the unravelling the mischiefs which m——rs have brought on a whole nation, and attempting to rescue it from their impious hands, be blasted with the appellation of a libel? Be not, like individual atoms playing in the sun-beams, detached from one another, whirl'd to and fro, as the breath of m——l conduct blows amongst ye. Let the general good, like the general attraction, hold ye firm to what ye owe yourselves and country; otherwise, to what purpose do ye curse the a——l that forsook the cause of king and country, and praise the gallant *Blakeney* who never

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never deserted his trust? Why do ye importunately ask, will the *Spaniards* join the *French* to attack *Gibraltar*? Will the *French* invade this kingdom? Alas! neither imprecation nor panegyric, the taking or defence of *Gibraltar*, or even the coming of the *French*, can bring a greater though a more sudden evil on your condition. Nothing can long relieve or save this nation: if the same rulers in the cabinet continue to preside, ye need no foreign enemy to make ye slaves. Can ye conceive that the same men who have brought ruin on your affairs, have either inclination or abilities to reinstate them in their former happy situation? inquisitive but senseless of your fate, your souls seem to have lost all those virtuous and quick sensations, which have hitherto been the inseparable companions of a free state.

To what purpose then, when all remedies must come too late, will this predicted ruin be believed by you? What will then avail that anguish, when you curse your destroyers and your own inattention? perhaps accompanied with this embittering reflexion, that those whom ye assisted to ruin you have bound your hands in chains, and are become the arbitrary masters of the kingdom. Unless then ye suddenly awake from this trance into which ye are fallen, your foreign or domestic enemies will prevent ye, and then ye must sleep the sleep of death, *England* is no more!

However destructive therefore this action of Mr *B—g* may appear on enquiry, remember, before it be too late, once more I charge you to examine whether the original authors of that evil are not infinitely more criminal? If it shall be found, that his conduct has in one instance entailed disgrace on this kingdom, let it be seen whether the m——s have not, by numberless and repeated acts, almost overwhelmed the land with infamy; nay though he should be condemned for want of courage, will it not be just to enquire whether, if those men have, with unwearied diligence, depreciated every virtue, and sapped every honourable motive of the human soul, given power and honours to riches only, and neglected all  
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degrees of merit; this very imputation of want of resolution may not equitably be ascribed to them also?

Is it then a wonder, that men in all ranks, corrupted in head and heart, should be unequal to the tasks which honour only can inspire, and virtue accomplish? Remember then, if Mr *B—g* be doomed to punishment, to which it is not improbable he may, as a scape-goat offered to your resentment for the salvation of the m—rs, that this can avail nothing in your favour. Will not the same deficiency of judgment still operate in the choice of commanders and destination of expeditions, whilst the direction remains in the same hand? What expectation have ye by his removal, that your national affairs will wear a better face, or raise the fallen condition of this sinking land?

Will it not then be strictly equitable, that the same voice which calls Mr *B—g* to a candid examination of his conduct, should summon also those who have so long and so fatally superintended the direction of national affairs to an impartial enquiry, that ye be ascertained why the territories of *England* on the *Ohio* were shamefully conceded to the *French*; to whom, and to what purposes, your millions have been lavished, whether to the ruin or advantage of this island; on what account *Mahon* and *America* were neglected, and *H—r* preferred to all; and from what cause it happens, that six millions and a half in the last year of queen *Anne's* reign, could suffice for the interest of fifty millions, and the support of a vigorous war; that now twelve millions, when the annual expence of the debt, by the diminished interest of money, exceeds not what it was at that time, are not equal to the annual extravagance of the m—rs, or productive of one victory?

In her reign, though your treasures were exhausted, and your fellow-subjects slaughtered for *German* interests, ye sustained the flattering character of a brave and honest people amongst the nations, and were, by the superb victories which your general obtained, honoured and revered; but under the direction of these inauspicious m—rs, ye live without renown, and die without

victory,

victory, stigmatized with the infamous brand of thieves and pyrates, by that nation which then dared not to look ye in the face: Shameful alternative!

Notwithstanding this, if before a just tribunal the transactions of the m——rs shall be found both honourable and upright, and the approaching fate of B——n owing to these irresistible causes, by which all nations perish, and to which they are not accessory, they will then like souls passed through Purgatory to Paradise, rise from calumny to approbation, from hatred to esteem, from pain to pleasure. What then can be more acceptable to men of integrity, than such an enquiry? But if through the evidence of truth, they shall stand convicted of male-administration, let no malevolence presume to draw comparisons between the conduct of passed m——rs who have suffered, and the present who have not, or attempt increasing the heinousness of their actions, by truly stating those of the sufferers: for the sake of these who are yet alive, I wish you never to recal the decapitation of lord *Strasford*, or compare his and their conduct. Revenge is criminal, it is unworthy a *Briton*; if the love of your country must make ye feel the passions to which human nature is subjected, remember, though ye are men, that ye are Christians also; and, notwithstanding the ruin of this land is well nigh completed, implore your f——n to afford those enemies to his realm that mercy which they have ever denied his innocent people; and when he shall graciously preserve them from condign punishment, that he will mercifully cast an eye of pity also on millions of his faithful subjects, and save them from perdition, by at once removing from his presence, the spoilers of the dignity of his crown, and liberties of his subjects; keep then your eyes and attention steadily on your prince, from him expect relief; there remains yet one method by which ye may all be saved.

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