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


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
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
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## A FOURTH

# LETTER

## ΤΟΤΗΕ

## People of England.

### ON THE

Conduct of the M -----rs in ALLIANCES, FLEETS, and ARMIES, fince the first Differences on the Obio, to the taking of Minorca by the French.


Lownder Bibliocompleis manual.

Jocerne tecum per littoras? civem mehercule non puto esse, qui temporibus his ridere possit; ita sunt omnia debilitata jam prope et extincta. Cicero.

## L O N D O N;

Printed for M. Collier, Bookfeller at the Royal Exchange.

MDCCLVI.



# LETTER

A

### ΤΟ ΤΗΕ

## People of England.

## LETTER IV.

The dire dilemma into which ye are brought, your diftreffed fituation, the loads of accumulated taxes, the diminution of trade, the neglect of *Englifb* welfare, the attention to *Germanic* interests, the reliances on foreign mercenaries, and contempt of *Britifb* fubjects for the defence of this ifland, the whole conduct of affairs, both at home and abroad, in *Europe* and *America*, and that defpicable appearance to which ye are reduced in the fight of every nation upon earth, render this too visible to every eye the leaft inquisitive, and too afflicting to every heart not yet transformed to ftone by the long practice of plundering its native land.

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To avoid all appearance of inflammatory declamation, and filence the defamatory tongues of all who fhare their country's fpoils, who affert that every attempt to emancipate you from your evils, is a malignant defign to depreciate the m\_\_\_\_\_y; let us impartially recall to your eyes the moft material articles of the ad \_\_\_\_\_ n, fince the commencement of differences between the Britifb and French fubjects on the banks of the river Obio.

In this place, the more effectually to lay before you the real caufes of this war, it will be neceffary to lead you back to a transaction not fufficiently known by all of you, which passed between the m——y of France and England.

In the year 1750, or 1751, fome American traders, fubjects of the king of Great Britain, travelled to the borders of the Obio, to traffic with the natives of those parts. This being known to the Canadian French, meffengers were dispatched to acquaint them, that unless they withdrew from their mafter's territories, their effects would be confiscated, and themselves carried to prison at Quebec. This message the traders thought fit to obey, and withdrew in consequence of it.

The fucceeding feafon, another company of British fubjects came to trade on the Obio, and not withdrawing on a like meffage with the former, their goods were confilcated, and themfelves carried prifoners to Quebec, from whence they were brought to Rochelle in France, and flill detained in prifon. Not confessous of having violated the laws of nations, or traded on any ground to which the king of Great Britain had not an undoubted right, they remonstrated to the B-----/h m-----y, infifted upon being claimed as B----/b fubjects, and honourably discharged from prison, as persons unoffending the laws of nations; nay, they entertained the honourable hopes of Englishmen, that the m-y of E-d would not cease to demand an indemnification for the lofs of that merchandize which had been unjuftly taken from them, and reparation for the infult and long imprifonment of their perfons; expectations becoming men who value their liberties, properties, and nation's honour;

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nour. In this they were deceived: the true fpirit of an En-fbm-r no longer dwelt amongft us; the amb-r at Paris, inftead of demanding these fubjects of his matter, as men unjustly held in prison, and reparation for the injuries they had received, was ordered by the m-y to follicit, as a favour from the court of France, the discharge of them only, acknowledging their offence. Were not your f ---- n's rights, and your own privileges fhamefully given up? Were not the lands on the Obio confessed to belong to the king of France? Were not the French justified in imprisoning your fellow fubjects, and confiscating their effects, by this tame behaviour of the B--fb m---r?

After this daftardly conceffion in those whose duty it is to defend your privileges, can it be a wonder, that that country was claimed by the *French* as their own, or that they began to build forts and block-houses to secure the trade, and ascertain the property of it?

Little as this transaction was known or attended to in  $\mathcal{E} - d$ , the taking possession in this manner of the frontiers of *Virginia*, alarmed the people of that province; in confequence of which Mr. *Washington* attacked them in those parts, and was defeated.

It feems, however, that before this timid acquiefcence of the B-/b m—r, in thus acknowledging that part of A—a to be the property of *France*, he had granted the lands on the *Obio* to a quaker of the city of *London*, and his affociates.

Thus caught between the king of *France* and a quaker, like the mariners of old between *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, he became unequal to the dangers and difficulty of the fleerage, and fell into great embarraffments.

He now perceived, that though he had pufilanimoufly given up to enemies his mafter's rights and your privileges, that the *French* minister, tenacious of both, and his own honour, could not be negociated into receding from what had been granted him: he perceived alfo, that the quaker, fortified by a pertinacious adherence to his own interest, could not be foothed into relinquishing the grant which had been made him. If the *French* A 2 monarch monarch was backed by the arm of flefh, and 200,000 men to fupport his claim to the Obio, the quaker was fuftained in his by the fpirit of obfinacy, and interest of the legion of fectaries. On one fide a French invasion and a war filled the m—r with horrid apprehensions; on the other, he was greatly disquieted, left, by the deferting the quaker, he should offend the money-jobbers of the city, and be unable to raise the fupplies.

I o firengthen this dilemma of the m——r, there was added to the infuperable propenfity in a quaker of never relinquifhing an advantage, a fecondary motive, which probably at that time elcaped the fharp-fighted ken of our m——1 Lynceus. The grant of the Obio, however great it might be conceived, was a diftant and problematical advantage only; a war on the continent of America was a prefent and politive one, as the remittances to the armies in those parts, an object of great gain, would pass through his hands, and by means of this money fent to America, his debtors in that country would be enabled to difcharge those debts, which otherwise he entertained but little hopes of receiving.

Urged by these motives, this son of meckness and refignation pressed the m----r to send those subjects, whose loyalty to their king, and love to their country, are above all fear of danger, to facrifice their lives in recovering the lands of men whose principles will not permit them to defend the cause, or fight the battles of their king or country.

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Thus, at first, the want of spirit in the m——r, to vindicate his f——n's rights and subjects privileges, timidly befeeching as a favour, what he had a right to demand in justice from the *French*, has given that nation a better foundation to the claim of the Obio.

And, laftly, the dread of being deferted by money-jobbers and fectaries, has prevailed over the terror of the *French* arms, and induced him to attempt recovering by force, what he had renounced by concellion : happy that nation which is deflined to the a \_\_\_\_\_n of fuch confiftent m\_\_\_\_rs.

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If it be asked, whence it comes to país, that this behaviour of the B - m m - r has never been mentioned in the French memorials relative to the difputes in America, it may be answered, with truth, that the French ministry perfectly knew, that this ceding the territories of England, by the timidity of the m - r, was no legal relinquishing the B - m right to these lands, and that the K - g and people would never acquiesce in this concession.

They therefore made no public use of this argument, referving it only between the B - /k m r and themfelves, left a public declaration of this affair might remove him from the ad r n, and the French monarch lose an ally of greater consequence to his fucce's, than any potentate in Europe; for what can impart fuc's ftrength to an enemy, as the want of courage and capacity in the man who opposes him?

The French m-y had proved in a former war, and by long experience in peace, the inconfiftency, inability, and timidity of this man. To thefe they were greatly indebted for their fuccels in the late war; on his difpolitions and capacity they prefumed to encroach upon us during peace; on the fame qualities they promifed themfelves the like advantages for the future. To difcover his timid and absurd behaviour was to rifque his removal, all event to be dreaded by all French subjects. They concluded, perhaps too rashly, that as no nation ever had furnished two m-rs, fucceeding each other, fo unequal to the tafk of governing as this man, that therefore no nation could; and in confequence of this manner of thinking, fecreted this behaviour with refpect to the Obio, and choic rather to make Nova Scotia the object of the quarrel to the public. This they determined to fuffain by arms, when they found themselves defeated in argument.

After a most gracious speech from the throne at the beginning of the selfion, when all was gentle and pacific, on *Tuefday* the 25th of *March* 1755, the scene fuddenly changes, war becomes the universal conversation, and a message was sent from his m-y to both houses, importing that the the prefent fituation of affairs required an augmentation of his forces by fea and land, to defend his just rights in *America*, and repel whatever attempts might be made against his kingdoms; not doubting but his faithful p——t would enable him to make such augmentations as the cmergency of affairs should require.

To this meffage both houfes prefented very loyal addreffes, expreffing their utmost zeal and affection for his majesty's royal perfon, family, and government, affuring him of a ready compliance in supporting him to repel all attempts which may be made to diffurb, or deplive him of his kingdoms.

Let us now see what provision has been made in defence of all parts of his m—y's dominions by his m—r, in confequence of this resolution of hostilities. Mr Braddock had been just fent to Virginia with English forces; the fatal effects of that expedition, the weakness of the defign, and ineffectual execution of it, have already been been laid before you.

The defeat of that officer being accompanied with his death, a miftake, not inferior to the first choice of this commander, was discovered to every eye; it seems there was no officer amongst the remaining military force which had been sent to America, equal to a command of such confequence.

The m\_\_\_\_r then, who planned this expedition, muft have concluded that Mr Braddock was both invincible and immortal; otherwife, as a difeafe might defeat all the fuccefs which the greateft courage, prudence, and capacity might atchieve, and the French arms prevail by the lofs of a general whom death only could conquer, he would have fent a fecond, equal to the task of commanding an army. My reafon for faying this, is, that when opportunity had proved, contrary to m -\_\_\_l wifdom, that this general was neither invincible nor immortal, the command did not devolve on any officer fent from hence with Mr. Braddock.

Now to me it feems, that nothing can be a more convincing proof of the m——r's imagining Mr Braddock fuperior to death and defeat, and of the fuppofed infufficiency ficie the

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conldock fufncy ficiency of all the officers who accompanied him, than the command in chief falling on g----y.

This gentleman had been bred at the bar, and was grown old in the practice of it; by unforfeen accidents he at laft became g———r of a province in New England; he had never been prefent at fiege or battle, and his talents, however nicely adapted to his profeffion of the law, and other departments of a g———r, promifed but little fuccefs in the management of military affairs, being by nature flow, diffident, and inert. Him, notwithitanding, the E—/h m——r felected to command the king's armies in America, accompanied with the appointments and pry of the late duke of Marlborougb.

It is remarkable alfo, that the m—--- 1 choice falling on this gentleman, proved a more favourable circumflance to our enemics, than could have happened in the appointing of any other *American* governor. What a furprifing genius for deviating from the right, is this nation bleft with in a m—--r!

The character of every other governor in America being unknown to the French court, whoever befides had been appointed g—1, they might probably have concluded, that as he ought to be, fo he was, equal to the command of an army. This would, at leaft, have made our enemies lefs fanguine in their hopes of fuccefs; but Mr S—y was as well known at Paris, where he refided a long while com—y for fettling Nova Scotia, as in London; fo that the French ministry being perfectly acquainted with his talents, the apprehensions of danger from fuch a commander, were but little in their minds, or in those who were to oppose him.

Nay, so full were the Parifians, on the news of his being appointed commander in chief in America, that the first falutation amongst those who were acquainted with him was, Que penjez vous monsteur, le ministre d'Angleterre a nommé noire ami monsteur S----y general des armies du roy en Amerique.

Notwithstanding this appellation of friend by the French, I am convinced it did not arife from any prevailing inclination imagived in g-1 S-y towards that that nation; nor would I be thought to blame him for accepting this poft, fo honourable and lucrative; to have refuted it, would have been an unexampled inftance of felf-denial; an expectation not founded in the nature of man: nothing is more natural than to imagine ourfelves equal to every undertaking which our fuperiors conceive us to be; without this prevalent and encouraging felfopinion, the m----r must have long fince refigned his charge.

In confequence of being defined to the chief command, Mr S----y repaired to Albany, where, after long imitating the celebrated Fabius in delay, he, at length, with the fame deliberation, began his march, counting his fteps, towards the Lake Ontario, where being, alas, too maturely arrived, and perceiving that nothing was to be done against the enemy, he as deliberately marched back again, meeting no opposition which he did not cafily overcome : and thus began and ended the expedition of g\_\_\_\_l S\_\_\_\_y, exactly as it had been predicted by all who knew him, imitating the great Lewis in going up the hill and coming down again. In this, however, the whole blame refts on him who chofe, and not on him that was chosen; the g-1 furely is to be pardoned who failed in his expedition, when the m--r was fo much miftaken in his judgment of him.

Notwithstanding this manifest deficiency in the B-/bm--y, in the choice of their generals, that of the Americans was as remarkably just. General Johnson, formed by nature for the military art, whom fagacity blended with courage, activity with patience, rendered what is not always to be found amongst feen-fervice and regular bred warriers, was the object of their choice.

This gentleman, with the militia of the provinces, took the *French* general prifoner, and defeated ten times the number of those *French* troops, before which Mr *Bra.dock* and his regulars fhamefully retired; and though this military fuccels was followed by no farther advantage to the *American* caufe than that of taking prifoner the enemy's general, it must be imputed entirely to the jarring councils of the different provinces, delay in fending and

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ing provisions and recruits, envy of his fuccess, and various other causes.

Let us now turn our eyes on what was transacted in another part of America. It feems the inhabitants of New England, being thoroughly acquainted with the importance of Nova Scotia, had retolved to drive the French from their forts in that part of America. With this view general Winflow and 2000 militia failed for Halifax, where being arrived, and joined by about 2 or 300 regulars only, under the command of Col. Monckton, they took Beau fjour, and immediately all the other forts furrendered.

Thus the only advantages which were derived from all the military preparations against the French in America, were affected by a general unknown to the  $E_{--}/b$ m—r, and a militia of Americans, and by an expedition planned by the provinces of New England, the last of which exploits the Americans had always in their power to accomplis, unaffited by men, money, or ships, from this island; whils the generals and the expeditions appointed by the m—r were either ignominiously defeated, or rendered ineffectual.

The laft fummer then was productive of the reduction of *Nova Scotia*, Mr *Braddock's* defeat, Mr *S*——y's ineffectual march to *O/wego*, general *John/on*'s victory unpurfued through deficiency of powers, and his relinquifhing the fervice through difguft.

The campaign being terminated fo little to the advantage of the Americans, the most natural thought which could employ the attention of a flatesman, was that of speedily reinforcing those parts against the French attempts, which would undoubtedly be more vigorous the fucceeding summer than the former, as men and ammunition would be fent them to suftain the establishments they had made on the back of the British fertlements. Let us see what provision has been made, and how speedily afsistance has been transmitted to your fellow subjects in those parts, from whence the great source of your wealth and commerce is derived.

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The first attempt in their favour was that of creating a regiment of Germans to be enlisted in Europe, and sent thither; whose officers were to be composed of men itrangers to this land, and aliens to its liberties and privileges, unproved by experience, guiltless of sege or battle, in whose favour the Britifb subjects of untainted loyalty and approved courage were rejected, and even an express article, in an act relating to the settlement of the present august family on the throne, was suspended by a particular bill in parliament. Notwithstanding all this, transacted in favour of foreigners, no advantage has hitherto accrued to the plantations from that design, neither men or officers being yet failed to that part.

The winter passed away, the spring was advancing! No g-l appointed! No English troops destined for the succour of America, till on April 15th, the transports set fail with Otway's and Murray's Regiments for America, too late to be of any assistance 'till next spring, unless the French may, peradventure, posses themselves of Virginia, or some other ill defended colony, before their arrival.

In fuch fituation and diftress as the provinces remained at the end of last autumn, when the deficiency of generals was so apparent to all comprehensions, is it to be believed, that the commander in chief should have been with held 'till the latter end of May ? and yet this has been the real state of the case.

That man, who was to fuperfede all others in command, has not been fent 'till it is probably become too late for him to perform any thing of confequence this fummer. The general in chief, who fhould have been fent laft autumn, and been prefent in a new country as long as possible before his entering upon action, to be acquainted with the different resolutions of the various provinces, to have known the genius of the inhabitants, planned the expeditions, and created a confidence in those who were to obey him, was the last perfon difpatched on this occasion.

It is but lately that even any one has been fent to America. Within two months Mr Webb has fuperfeded Mr S----y, general Abercrombie Mr Webb, and lord London, mil

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Is there another head in Europe, befides the m----l, which would have fent commanders in this manner? If lord Loudon had gone first, Mr. Webb and general 1 bercrombie would have followed; naturally; and, as they were under him in command, fallen into their places of duty, which are to obey his orders and dispositions; but as the m----r has deftined the affair, the commander in chief must now follow the plans of men inferior to himself in military knowledge, or remain inactive; for certainly the preparation for every military expedition, must have been too far advanced before lord Loudon's arrival, to admit of any confiderable alteration ; nay, even before Mr. Webb and Abercrombie arrived ; fo that Mr S--y is, in fact, general in planning the operation of this campaign alfo. How ridiculous then was this m---- I disposition in fending out the commanders? Lord Loudon mult, from the nature of his commission, which superfedes all others, be imagined fuperior in every thing relative to the commanding an army, to all who were fent before him; otherways it is the greatest absurdity to have fent him at all; and yet, by pure fubtility of m--- l contrivance, he must necessarily be the least acquainted with what he is to undertake, if he arrives time enough for action this campaign; and bound to follow operations already concerted by a man proved unequal to the undertaking, or remain on the defensive. Is not this cunningly subjecting a foldier and man of capacity to all the infufficiency of undertlanding, in that very perfon who was fo much complained of in the conduct of the laft fummer's campaign, and defeating the whole expedition for this year? Admirable fagacity!

Befides this invertion of wrong for right, fo natural to m--1 understandings, in sending the officers of highest rank, it is to be observed, that even the inferior officers of of

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of lord Loudon's regiment, together with arms, amunition, and other military preparations. lie at this time \* at Portsmouth; and, what is not a little extraordinary, the muskets, and other military weapons, lay a long while on the wharfs, waiting for transports, which were not then hired to take them on board. I fay nothing of the fagacity of that m-l conception, which shipped the carriages of the cannon on board one ship, the cannon on another, the ball on a third, and the powder on a fourth; a contrivance not eafily to be paralelled in any ad--n. Hence, by this fubrility of thought, the chance of defeating the whole expedition was increased as four to one; for if each article had been proportionably mixed in the cargoes of the four thips, the taking one thip could have defeated but one fourth of the intention, and fo in proportion; but, as it was defigned, the taking one fhip renders the whole useles; how complaint are the m-s in all their undertakings to your enemies?

To this might be added the 500 Barrels of gun-powder purchased untried of the *Dutch*, cunningly to prevent it's falling into our enemies hands; which, upon experiment, proved as explosive as faw-dust.

If deficiency in the fupplies granted by parliament had been the caule of this delay, and inattention to the moft valuable of all our foreign posseful fines, much might have been offered in vindicati n of a m——r; but fince our most royal master, our most gracious fovereign, in his most gracious speech from the throne, has been pleased to thank his people for the vigorous and effectual support, which has been granted him, what can be faid in defence of men, who have thu absurdly applied it, speefully neglecting the most important object of this kipgdom? It would be ridiculous to name the cause of this delay;

• 12th of June.

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( delay; it must be assigned to that which no man in England is weak enough not to perceive, the m---r excepted.

If then fuperior knowledge of mankind be neceffary in a m----r, to direct him in his choice of those who are to act under him; from these instances, not purposely selected, what hopes remain in you of him who always, undeviating, appoints the least qualified for the task committed to their care?

Having thus fet before you the deficiency in m----l attention towards providing for the American colonies, without the commerce of which this kingdom must foon languish into a total decay, and shewn, that even the triffing fuccour hitherto defigned fince Braddock's defeat, must, by the delay in sending it, be rendered ineffectual during this fummer, let me now turn your eyes on what has been tranlacted in Europe during that time, in defence of Gre t Britain and Ireland, together with another dominion, nor belonging to this crown, and which to the prefent minute has been no great fource of acquifition to this nation.

In 1755, during the time which paffed between the mellage to both heules, and the proregation of p----t on the 28th of April, no addition was made to our land forces: no law paffed to arm the fubjects of Great Britain against any invalion from the French, a neglect which there is too much reason to fear may one day prove fatal to this kingdom; but great fums of money were granted, and the equipping a respectable navy engaged the whole attention of the adm——n.

His m———y having put an end to the feffion the fame day, that no time might be loft, defpifing the menaces and invalions of the French, let out from St. James's, greatly rifquing his facred perfon, through feas and tempefts, to provide for the defence of his dominions. During his absence, let us recollect what were the occupations of the m-y at home towards this attainment : they were employed in committing violence on your liberties, depreffing the courage of failors by compulsion, manning fleets, which have been almost useles by their destination, on, and leaving the illand open to the hourly invalion of the French, through deficiency of domestic force.

However, to the immortal memory of the m\_\_\_\_r, this inattention at home was amply recompenfed by his care on the other fide the water. Two treaties, fuppofed to be teeming with advantages to this nation, were concluded: one with the empress of *Ruffia*, and the other with the *Landgrave* of *Helfe-Caffel*; the first figned at *Petersburgb*, the 30th of *September* 1755, the other at *Hanover* the 18th of *June* the fame year.

The first article with Ruffia, confirms the treaty concluded in 1744, by which the empress agrees to furnish the king of Great Britain with 10,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, if his m——y's dominions should be attacked, or with 500,000 rubles in money, yearly, during the attack. Neither of which having been demanded during the last rebellion in Scotland, it seems no unjust inference to conclude, that that treaty related to H——r only; otherwise, by what argument shall we justify our m—y, who, during that time of peril and expence, neglected to make that necessary requisition of the troops, or money, in favour of England, stipulated in the treaty.

These forces being deemed infufficient in the present emergency, it was thought prudent to increase the number to 55,000, 40,000 of which, were to be infantry, and 15,000 cavalry; added to this, 40 or 50 gallies were to hold themselves in readiness to act on the first orders.

Befides what has been already faid, relating to the treaty of 1745, which makes the bafis of this, the fourth article in the fecond treaty with *Ruffia*, confirms its being defigned for the defence of H——r only.

It is there faid, that these troops and gallies shall not act except his *Britannic* majesty or his allies are attacked; and then the commanding officer, as foon as he shall receive his majesty's requisition, shall make a diversion with 30,000 infantry, and the 15,000 cavalry: and, at the same time, shall embark the other 10,000 infantry on board the gallies, in order to make a descent according to the exigency of affairs.

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Now, does not the fecond article, by agreeing that those troops shall be held in readiness on the frontiers of Livonia, and the gallies cruifing on that coast, declare the intention to be that of invading the Pruffian territories, if the king of Pruffia shall attempt any thing against the H-n dominions? otherways the stipulation, that the commanding officer shall make a diversion with 30,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry, as foon as he shall receive his majesty's requisition, would appear a palpable absurdity; because these troops, which are to make this immediate diversion in favour of his majesty, cannot march into France in much less time than fix months, if the fhould invade this illand : this diversion then, to be put in execution as foon as the requisition shall be made on the part of Great Britain, cannot mean an attack upon France; much lefs can their marching to the aid of this kingdom be the intention of that article, unless the fame m----r, who, twelve months fince, did not know that Cape Breton is an illand, had not at the time of concluding this treaty heard, that Great Britain is furrounded by the ocean.

Befides this, gallies being unfit veffels for transporting troops on the ocean, and the circumstance of being ordered to make a *descent*, according to the exigency of affairs, with 10,000 forces, prove, that these also were defigned to affist the former number, in whatever they should attempt, and neither to invade *France* nor succour *England*. The term *descent* being always understood in a hostile fense, cannot well be intended to signify their coming hither as friends, and the number is too small to attempt an undertaking of that kind on the shores of *France*.

In confequence of this Agreement then for the defence of the e----l dominions, the emprefs of Ruffia is to be paid by Great Britain, 100,000 l. annually, during the term of four years in times of peace; and as foon as those troops shall pass the frontiers of her country, 500,000 l. a year. In confideration of this augmentation of her subsidy, the empress is to take upon herself the payment, subsistence, and transporting her troops, whereever they shall be ordered by Great Britain, and not to re-call re-call them 'till the expiration of the treaty, though her own dominions should be attacked.

This article of the treaty is yet another confirmation, that it excludes all idea of the *Ruffians* being ever intended to defend this ifland; becaule the pay of an equal number of *Britifb* troops, in the tame proportion of horfe and foot, would annually amount to 1,700,000*l*. Now is it poffible to conceive, the *Ruffian* emprefs can have agreed to fupport those forces in *England*, where provifions are dear, on lefs than a third part of that fum, and where the pay of each national foldier is but juil fufficient for his fubfiftence? Would not this be a kind of compact to flarve her own fubjects? much lefs would fhe oblige herfelf to the transporting them for the fame money, which expence alone would confume the whole fubfidy.

Indeed, by the 11th, a truly Christian article, it is agreed, that the *Ruffians* shall have full liberty to plunder wherever they come; this auxiliary confideration, as they would not fail to put it in execution, might probably prove an ample recompence for the smallness of their pay, after their arrival in *England*.

Wherefore, from this article alone it ought to be concluded, that this treaty was made folely for the intereft of  $H_{----r}$ ; and you the innocent fubjects of  $E_{----d}$ , were thereby doomed to a more fevere fate than the Almighty imposed on your first parents, who rebelled against his will; ye must now not only get your own daily bread by the fweat of your brows, but even labour for the bread of others, who have no natural claim on you, and with whom ye have no connection. Thus the trade and toil of *Englishmen* must be annually employed in gaining ing l the N

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be conintereft an the belled n daily our for n you, trade a gaining ing half a million of money for the fole cafe and fafety of the tubjects of H-r.

Notwithstanding these proofs to the contrary, if any one chuses to believe this treaty included any immediate reference to the associated to be a streat included of G = t B = n. The has my full confent, even then it will foon appear I imagine a small justification  $c \in m = 1$  proceedings.

Amongst the many precautions which all wife m \_\_\_\_\_s have observed in concluding treaties, there have been two from which they have never swerved; the first is, that in all subsequent treaties they have observed the strictest care, that no alliance with a weaker potentate, shall defeat the advantages of former treaties made with a stronger; without attending to this observation, m-\_\_\_\_s less their powers by every new acquisition of allies, a substity not much unlike the denying the use of arms to the subjects of a kingdom, for their own defence during war, and trusting to hireling foreigners.

The fecond is, that the bonour and interest of the nation, which they superintend, are to be the great objects of all m\_\_\_\_\_s in their treaties with foreign nations. Without due regard to this observation, states, like dupes at play, become the beggared object of ridicule to all crowned heads.

Let us now enquire, whether these two effential maxims have been judiciously purfued by the m\_\_\_\_\_s of  $E_{----d}$ , in their treaties with *Ruffia*, *Heffe-Caffel*, and *Pruffia*.

In order the more clearly to effect this, we must place things in the fame fituation they were before either of these treaties was concluded.

Before the conclution of the treaty with the emprefs of Ruffia, the m\_\_\_\_\_s of E \_\_\_\_\_d were under no fmall apprehensions of the Pruffian's laying hold of the growing differences between G \_\_\_\_\_t B \_\_\_\_\_n and France, and possible proves between G \_\_\_\_\_t B \_\_\_\_\_n and France, and possible proves for the electoral dominions. This his undertaking, though of no difadvantage to G \_\_\_\_\_t B \_\_\_\_\_n, might prove, notwith flanding, a most embarrasfling circumflance, if a war should break out on the continent, to the m\_\_\_\_\_s of this nation, whose constant C \_\_\_\_\_\_purpurfuit it has been to prefer the  $H_{----n}$  to  $B_{-----}$  interests.

To difengage themfelves from this perplexity, it was thought neceflary to conclude the treaty as above specified with Russia; and indeed it muss be acknowledged, that the prospect of things, by this new alliance with Rusfia, was greatly improved in respect to H----r. The Prussian, who before this subsidiary treaty with the Muscovite, had entertained fanguine hopes of enlarging his dominions, was now reduced to fear left his own territories might be diminiss of this new alliance.

This treaty then with Ruffia, fetting the interest of this island out of the question, which it has constantly been for this forty years, whenever it came in competition with that of Germany, was truly beneficial to the electorate of  $H_{---r}r$ ; it included the two advantages above mentioned, of increasing power by alliance for the people it was intended, and honour to the m --s, if men can merit such reward, who negless the welfare of their own country to ferve that of foreigners.

The 55,000 Ruffian troops were undoubtedly an augmentation of the powers of H - r and its allies, as it fubjected the Pruffian king, their fufpected foe, and whole interefis are as incompatible with the Austrian, as those of heaven and hell, to no finall terrors on account of Silefia, if the empress queen should fix her heart on reposfelling that gem, which had been plucked from her imperial diadem, and which the ftill beholds with longing eyes. At the fame time then that the Pruffian, by his dread of the Ruffian arms, was rendered incapable of annoying the ele----l dominions; the friendship between  $E_{r}$  and the empress queen, who confidered this treaty as made in her favour, was greatly ftrengthened; particularly as the latter entertained hopes of their being employed in her fervice in the recovery of Silefia, if the Pruffian should intermeddle in the quarrel between the king of G-t B-n and France; or in Flanders, if the French should attack that part of her dominions. Thus the Pruffian king, by means of this treaty between G-t B-n and Ruffia, was placed in that very anxious dilemma from which H—r had been just extricated.

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This was the very fituation in which it was the bufinefs of the E-h m-s to place and fecure him, and to extricate himfelf as expeditiously as possible, was the great object of the Prussian: let us now enquire which of these has ultimately attained the ends of their endeavours.

No man faw more perfpicuoufly than the Pruffian prince, how greatly the fcale of advantages was turned in favour of H——r and Auftria, by the treaty between G—t B—n and Ruffia; he therefore fet about devifing fome means, by which to relieve himfelf from this difquieting dilemma; in confequence of which defign, from his own pure inclination, without overture from E—-d, it feems, he propofes a treaty between this kingdom and Pruffia, which was fpeedily concluded.

The two most material articles in this treaty are, first, that G - t B - - n with her allies, and Prufia, shall mutually affist each other in endeavouring to keep all foreign troops from entering the empire.

The fecond, that Great Britain fhall pay 20,000 l. as an indemnification for the captures of that merchandize which was taken on board *Prussian* bottoms, condemned and fold during the last war; and in return, that *Prussian* fhall pay the Silefia-loan.

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had most fagaciously engaged to keep them from their affiltance. And thus those men, who valued themselves fo highly for concluding the treaty with *Ruffia*, to bring her forces into *Germany*, were now artfully engaged by the king of *Pruffia* to oppose the entrance of the very troops which they had hired in their favour.

By this fingle article, did not the king of *Pruffa* find himfelf quite extricated from all the difficulties in which the *Ruffian* treaty had involved him?

If the empreis thould attack Silefia, he had now no other affair upon his hands but that of oppoling her arms; because the m---s of G-t B----n had by treaty agreed to keep out the Ruffians, and free him from apprehenfions on that fide; from this change of circumflances, the empress queen grew difgusted with the B-/h m--r; fhe faw herfelf and her interests deferted, her friendship and alliance rejected and renounced in favour of a weaker potentate : and from that time, being convinced of the weakness of the B-- h m ---- r, en. tertained the idea of feeking the alliance of a ftronger and wifer power: thus Pruffia has totally defeated the fole advantage, which the Ruffian treaty had given the flates of E - d and H - r over him, and this kingdom and the electoral dominions loft the use of the Auftrian powers, by preferring a weaker alliance to a ftronger.

Let us now suppose that France, notwithstanding this treaty between G—*t* B—*n* and Prufia, should refolve to attack the H—*n* dominions, what advantage can redound to that electorate from this convention between G—*t* B—*n* and Prufia, to oppose the entrance of all foreign troops into the empire? Will the m—s of this ifle and those of H—*r* rely on this treaty with Pruffia, and confide in the forces of that prince to prevent the French from invading the H—*n* dominions? or if they should entertain this confidence, and act in confequence of it, will the Pruf an warch his army in their defence, and give such an opportunity to the empresqueen of recovering Silefia, whill the is deferting his own dominions, to fight the battles of H—*r*.

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I imagine no man believes, either that the m-s would confide in *Pruffia* on fuch an occasion, or that king defert his own interests to follow those of others.

If the French then, notwithstanding this convention with Pruffia, should march towards the territories of  $H_{---}r$ , it seems evident that the Ruffians, according to treaty, must sill be invited to the affistance of the electoral dominions; in such a case, of what contradictory and classing circumstances will the two treaties appear to be composed ?

Thus the Ruffian troops, which, by the agreement with that empress, are to come as friends to the affiftance of  $H_{---r}$ , are, by the treaty with Pruffia, to be opposed by those very  $H_{----r}$  ns, as enemies.

In confequence of this alliance with Pruffia, if the French forces should march to invade the electoral state, and the Ruffians to defend it, at the requisition of our m—s, the H—ns are obliged by compact to become so many drawcansirs, and kill both friends and foes.

By the alliance with *Prufia* they are engaged to keep out the *Ruffians*; the moment then the *Mufcovites* begin to march, according to treaty, and the requeft of our m—...r, to the affiftance of *H*—...r, the treaty with *Pruffia* obliges the *H*—...ns to divide their troops with there of that monarch, and march one half to refift the coming of their allies the *Ruffians*, and one half to refift their foes the *French*: what an illuftrious inftance of refined and profound politics is here produced!

By this judicious proceeding, our m—rs have fairly divefted the H—ns of the Ruffian Affiftance; for, if they rely on the alliance with Pruffia, the Ruffians cannot act in their favour; and if they claim the aid of the Ruffians, one half of the H—n foldiers are, by compact with Pruffia, obliged to join and oppose the very troops they call to their affiftance.

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In this manner, in obedience to treaty, the electorate will be deprived of one half of her troops wherewith to engage the *French*, because they must be employed to oppose her friends the *Ruffians*.

This must be the necessary confequence of the treaties with Ruffia and Pruffia, if both are put into execution; for, unlefs the H—ns oppose the Ruffians equally as the French, from entering the empire, the Pruffian is entirely difengaged from all obligation between him and the B—fb m—rs, and the H—ns are the first infracters of the treaty. Wherefore, as it is impossible, from the nature of things, that the H—ns can oppose the Ruffians, which they have called to their affistance, it follows, that the Pruffian cannot act at all, because he would injure the H—ns more, in opposing the Ruffians, by calling off one half of the electoral troops, than affist them in opposing the French.

Thus the refult of this boafted wifdom of the m——r, in the union between G—t B——n and Pruffia, is at laft no more than a dexterous deliverance of the latter from that peril he was fallen into by the Ruffian treaty. He is at eafe from all the fears which that alliance had imparted on the account of Silefia; difengaged from all obligation in his agreement with E——d, by the abfurdity of our m——s, and the almost impossibility of its being put in execution; and may not improbably, by virtue of this alliance, be fupported against the house of Auftria, by the very Ruffians which our m——s originally had hired to oppose him.

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I them. Ruffia the Aund, by mfelves they er havand to t poffieafily we perceived ceived the force and flicacy of that treaty with Ruffia? Ought not then the Muscovite alliance to be deemed the pure effect of chance or malice (which the article on plundering feems to infinuate), as that with Pruffia, the legitimate child of ignorance and miftake ?

After having, in the above manner, flown the effects of the first article in the *Pruffian* treaty, which, indeed, concerns the H-----n welfare immediately only, let us confider the confequences of the fecond article with respect to G--t B----n, in which the B----fs m----rs agree to give 20,000 l. to the king of *Pruffia*, in lieu of merchandize taken on board *Pruffian* bottoms, condemned and fold during last war; and that prince to pay the subjects of this island the remainder of the *Sile*fa loan.

Abfurd as the first article has been proved to be, this fecond is not one step behind it in mistake and ridicule, and even before it in pernicious confequences; for as that first article, by having united *Austria* and *France*, may now cost this island two millions of money, in supporting the *Russians* for the interest of *Prussia*, if *Silesia* should be attacked; so the second article of the agreement bids fair to definoy all the commerce of G-tB-n, at least all the advantage she can draw from a superior fleet in time of war.

The merchandize repaid for by this treaty, was what had been legally taken, condemned, and fold. The equity of this proceeding had been defended, and our right juftified, in a letter from the m—r to the *Pruffian* court; and much more fo in a memorial drawn by a lawyer and civilian, whofe eminence and learning do honour to this nation. Nay, it was even afferted by thefe men, that the welfare and exiftence of this flate, as a maritime power, effentially depended on our perfevering in our right to thefe captures; and this, I believe, is the opinion of all men of underftanding in the nation.

Notwithstanding which, in contradiction to all good fense and found policy, restitution for these captures has been made to *Pruffia*. By this conceffion, we either acknowledge that we have no right to feize military flores, defigned for our enemies, on board neutral bottoms; that the decrees of that nation, on board whole fhips they are taken, are valid, though contradictory to those made in the courts of G-t B-n; or that our m-s are become fuch timid and abject wretches, that whatever crowned head, however contemptible on the feas, shall dare to dispute the legality of feizing and confiscating such flores, shall be repaid whatever his fubjects may lose.

I am fensible the m—s affert, that this 20,000 *l*. was not given to the king of *Pruffia* as an indemnification for the captures made last war, but because they had a mind to present him so much of that money, which you labour to procure for them to squander.

Is not this answer to the full as childish as the article is pernicious; like two boys at school, where one gives the other money not to be beaten, and yet insists it was not through fear but pure love. Does this excuse him from the imputation of cowardice, or change the motive in the opinion of his school fellows? Will not he be infulted by all the others as much as if he had confessed the true reason?

This illustrious instance of want of fense and want of refolution must have an advantageous tendency at the eve of a war. Will not the *Pruffian* still instit upon the right of carrying stores in his thips to your enemies? Will not the *Dutch*, *Ruffians*, *Danes*, and *Swedes*, with all the other maritime states of *Europe*, demand, put in use, and support the like privilege for themselves, which you have already granted to the *Pruffian*? and, if you oppose this liberty, will not your captures of their ships, however legal, draw the refertment and arms of all *Europe* upon you?

What then is the advantage of the payment of the Silefia loan, when compared to the dreadful confequences of this conceffion ? How will you now diftrefs effectually the commerce of your enemies, if your m—s permit neutral fhips to transport and traffic, not only in the common produce and merchandize of France, and her colonies. nice all em

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Thus then, as by the former article, the m—rs of this k—m had effectually defroyed the good effects of the Rufsian treaty with respect to H—r, in this they have given a fatal wound to the interest and honour of G—t B—n. Defined, as ye are, to labour for German welfare, how will ye support the expence of those millions which it must cost, when the fource of all your riches, your trade, is destroyed ?

Now let me ask thole hireling trumpeters of the m—1 wifdom in concluding the *Prufsian* treater, what are the boafted advantages which are derived from it to this kingdom? Is the conclusion flronger in favours of m—1 wifdom or m—1 weaknefs? and what has this nation to expect under the direction of fuch penetrating and all feeing m—s who have, by two articles in one treaty, driven *Auftria* from their interest, united her with *France*, adopted the weak alliance of *Prufsia*, laid H—r open to *French* invasion, destroyed the commerce of G—1 B—n, and rendered our arms and councils contemptible in the opinion of all *Europe*?

Having thus, in fome degree, explained the pernicious effects of the *Prufsian* treaty, let us examine what advantages are likely to be derived to this kingdom from that with *Heffe-Caffel*, and what are the merits of the m—r in making it, and behaving in confequence of its conclution.

The great object of this treaty is, that either 8 or 12000 troops, as G - t B - n thall require, of which the fixth part is to be horfe, are to be furnished by the *Landgrave* of *Heffe* for this kingdom or her allies, and to be paid for by E - d only.

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Let us see whether this last duty of public parsimony has been more closely purfued in the alliance with *Heffe*, than those of power and honour were observed by that with *Prussia*.

By the fifth article it is agreed, that every trooper fhall firft be purchafed at about 20 *l*. Sterling, and every foot foldier at about 7 *l*. which, in all, makes about 112,000 *l*. levy money; befides this, the Landgrave is to have about 37,000 *l*. annually before the troops march; and, as foon as they march, he is to receive 74,000 *l*. annually, till they enter into pay according to that of H - - - - d; at which time the fubfidy returns to about 37,000 *l*. annually; which again, when the troops are fent back, is to return to 74,000 *l*. a year, during the whole duration of the treaty, which is four years.

In the mean time, whatever men or horfes die by difeafe, or are killed in battle, the beaft is to be paid for at double the price of the human being; a bleffed confideration for the fubjects of *German* princes!

In like manner, whatever arms or artillery fhall be found deficient, or taken by the enemy, a full recompence is to be made by G - t B - n to the Landgrave of Hesse.

By the tenth article, these troops shall be instantly fent back whenever the dominions of the Landgrave shall be attacked.

Let us now, in obedience to the inclinations of the m - r, allow, that the *Rufsians*, as well as the *Hefsians*, were by treaty obliged to come to the affiftance of G - i B - n. It being at length determined, that *France* would certainly invade this ifland; that the B - f forces were unequal to the repelling a hoftile invafion; that the fubjects of E - d fhould not be armed in the defence of themfelves, their king and country; and that foreign mcrcenaries were neceffary for our protection and fafety; let us then explain with what admirable fore-thought, prudence, and oeconomy, the m shave proceeded with refect to the fecurity of this land in the requisition of troops, according to the two treaties. Fifty

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land aties. Fifty Fifty five thousand troops are, by compact with Ruffia, to be fent by the empress of that nation to affist England; these forces she is to transport and suffain for the annual subsidy of 500,000 l. without any farther consideration for death of men and horses, or loss of military flores, and no return of them is to take place during four years, if the Russian's dominions should be hostilely invaded.

Notwithstanding these conditions of this treaty are for favourable in price and frugality, no requisition of Russians has been made in behalf of <math>G—*i* B—*n*, but eight thousand *Hessians* are brought into *England*, the expense of which will amount this year, as the m—s confess, including levy money, subsidy to the *Landgrave*, death of men and horses, transporting hither and back again, and pay, to a million Sterling.

Thus this military aid in *Hefsians*, coffing double the money that feven times that affiftance would have done in *Rufsians*, is fourteen times as expensive: a plain proof how different the bargains are which are made between this nation and the *Germans*, and this nation and *Rufsians*; and how much occonomy in the public money, and the defence of this ifland, enter into the transactions of the m-----r with *German* princes.

One article of frugality in the public money must not be omitted. Amongst the troops landed in  $E_{----d}$ , there are about 900 horfes, which, one with another, are not worth more than 4 l. a piece; notwithstanding which, each of these horses has already cost about 12 /. levy money, and 91. in being transported hither; after this, 12 l. more is to be paid for each horfe which dies in the ifland; thus every dead Hefsian horfe will cost this nation 33 l. eight times the real value, and becomes to the Landgrave worth three times more dead than alive. Is it not then the interest of the Landgrave, and the duty of the commanding officer, to take special care that none of these cattle ever revisit their native land ; however, if any of them should survive, 91. more are to be paid for the re-transportation of each; thus the hire of every Hessian horse, worth 4 l. will then be only 30% expence to you; not quite eight times his value. From

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Another advantage attending the Rufsian treaty, not to be found in the Hefsian, belides number and cheapnefs, is, that the Rufsians are by agreement obliged to remain here to your affiftance, though the empress, their mistrefs, should be attacked.

This miltake, or fomething more criminal, in preferring the aid of 8000 Hefsians to 55,000 Rufsians; and wafting a million of money for the feventh part of the affiftance, which may be rendered ufclefs alfo, one would have imagined might have been fufficient to give the m—s an intimation of their error in the application of the treaties. Nothing appears to be lefs true; it being conceived, that the kingdom was not yet fufficiently protected from French invalion, it was agreed to requeft the e—r of H—r, your dear ally, that he would be gracioufly difpofed to fave this nation, by affifting the king of G—t B—n with 8000 of his troops.

Here again the Ruffian treaty was totally neglected. It was judged more eligible to apply for H—ns, at a fresh expense, than to make a requisition of the Ruffian troops. In confequence of this opinion, the p—t requested, and the kingdom was favoured with, 8000 H—n forces, which are fince arrived. Does not this proceeding afford a fresh instance of m—1 profusion; for though d, that and that on in all

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8000 is prois for hough though the fum granted on this account is vafily fhort of what the m-s confels will be the expence of the Heffians, without the gift of prophecy one may venture to predict, that, at the conclusion, when the application of the million, granted by the vote of credit, comes to be specified, this expence will be equal to that of the Heffians; becaufe I am convinced, the great wildom and knowledge of the e---r of H----r, in concluding all fubfidiary treaties, is in no fense inferior to that of the Landgrave of Helle Caffel. According to this way of reafoning, 8000 Heffians and 8000 H----ns may cost two millions of money; four times the fum of almost four times the number of Ruffians. Add to this, the probability of the H-ns being less liable to tarry to your affistance than the Heffians, as H--- r will more likely be attacked than Heffe, it may not improbably happen, that thefe two millions will be ufelefsly wafted in fubfidies and other expences on foreign troops, which cannot be of fervice in protecting G - B - n, whilf those that might be are entirely neglected and unrequefted.

It was expected indeed, by every fentible and honeft Englifbman, that as the Ruffians were now vifibly hired for the defence of H—r only, that the H—ns were to come hither in lieu of those Ruffians; and that, as G—t B—n now paid 55,000 Mufcovite forces to defend the ele—e, that the 8000 H—ns were to be at the fame expence by way of exchange to protest E—d.

 added to a million for  $H_{---ns}$ , tack'd to half that fum, fuppole for *Holfteiners*, make two millions of money for the feeble fuccour of 8000  $H_{---ns}$ , to be paid by  $E_{---d}$ , w' .ch troops after all, it is probable, may not tarry four months for the protection of this illand.

Thus the preferring *Heffians* to *Ruffians*, at fourteen times the expence, is here again doubled, and the 8000 H—ns are chosen at the proportion of twenty eight times the cost which was agreed to be given for the *Ruffians*.

In this manner, the fervants of the public, the guardians of your liberties and properties, the m——rs, have made three conventions in the place of one, neither of which, by this happy contrivance, will probably be of the leaft importance or fecurity to this ifland; unlefs rendering you poor and defpicable, and dooming your hands to triple labour, for raifing money to pay thefe foreign mercenaries, be a public benefit to this k——m.

By this act, the m——rs have fubjected you, either to the invalion of your enemies, or the arbitrary will of mercenary troops, invited hither under the notion of protecting you.

The militia bill, that neceffary law, devifed for entrufting arms to your hands, had for its objects the most laudable motives; defence of yourfelves, your f---n, and your country.

The fecurity of these was to have been effectuated by a militia, confisting of 62,680 men, levied, cloathed, and paid by the trifling sum of 175,197 *l* and which the fucceeding year would not have amounted to two thirds of that money; eight times the defence of the H--n, forces, and yet not one tenth part of the expence; including also in its favour, what no sum of money can purchase,

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purchase, the love of their king and country, animated by the defence of their wives, children, and properties.

This measure, fo neceffary in itfelf, which would have rendered you at the fame time free from the fears of hofile invalion, and the conquest of mercenary and pretended friends : this measure, reputable for the subject, parfimonious of public money, honourable to the m----r, glorious to the k-g, falutary to the conflitution, and beneficial to the country, was rejected for inattention, profusion, difgrace, difhonour, infecurity, and ruin; freemen gave way to flaves, Britons to foreigners, liberty to thraldom : is there then the bosom of one Englishman, which still remains unwounded with the idea of this ignominious treatment? accused as ye are of cowardice or difloyalty; cowardice, if your loyalty is unfulpected; difloyalty, if ye are yet efteemed a brave nation; difloyalty to fuch a f----n, as 'till this reign has never filled the throne of *E*——d. For what other reasons can arms be withheld from your hands?

Since then your hands are denied the use of arms, firetch them empty as they are to heaven; though impotent with men, they may yet be prevalent before the Almighty. Ye are not yet denied the privilege of prayer, implore him to have that mercy on the B——/b fubjects which the m——rs have refused; that fince by mifconduct, want of understanding, or iniquity, they have driven every powerful state in *Europe* from your alliance, and by profusion and denial of arms rendered you incapable of fighting for your prince, that heaven of its allgracious favour will be pleased to preferve and protect him yet to reign over ye a free and happy people; by this means alone it feems possible, that ye can be extricated from the numberless perils which furround you.

Having now, in fome degree, placed the conduct of the m—rs in its juft light, as it refpects their behaviour in providing for America, H—r and G-t B—n, by land armies and treaties, let me turn your cyes on the administration of naval affairs, and candidly examine, whether fymptoms of a more extensive capacity and greater greater prudence have appeared in conducting this part of the m----l province than in the former.

In January 1755, the prefs for manning the B--- fb fleet beganwith great violence. Scarce any age or quality preferved the brave feamen from this violation of **B**---- **b** liberty; every dock-yard refounded with innumerable strokes of axes, caulking hammers, screaking tackles, and cries of workmen. Pitch, tarr, and uproar, filled the towns of Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth; difpatch, panegyric, and my lord —, were united in the mouths of all men! no time could furnish an instance of such capacity in the head of the ad- as the prefent, and even the diligence of Mr - at Plymouth dock, who had most amazingly, by means of thirty coopers made 100 tons of cask in twenty four hours, to fupply admiral Boscawen's fleet, was attributed to the great fagacity and forefight of this great m-r in naval affairs.

And indeed it must be acknowledged, that the merit of this expedition in cask-making of the agent victualler at *Plymoutb* dock, was as much due to this great naval m—r (of which he knew nothing 'till it was completed) as any other part of marine preparation.

The officers who prefide in the king's yards, have indeed a just claim to the praife of this kingdom for their diligence in equipping softwar; to them, and to the great quantity of naval stores long laid in, it was owing that ships were so speedily prepared for the sea; for which reason, my facrilegious hand shall never rob the cottage of the deserving man in low life, to decorate the palace of the undeserving, to whom chance has given riches and titles; or erect a trophy to a 1-d from spoils which common men have won.

A parrot which could have pronounced by authority, equip ten fhips at *Chatham*, ten at *Portfmouth*, and ten at *Phymouth*, would as effectually and as fpeedily have produced a fleet ready for the feas as the voice of the first 1---d of the ad—y, and deferved as great an encomium for the transaction.

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The completion of the bufinets was effected where he was not prefent, without one new invention, uncommon exertion, or peculiar attention of the understanding; and which, after the order had effcaped his lips, whether he had been affeep or awake, dreaming or pretending to think, in his easy chair or on horfeback, would have been equally completed in the fame time.

The first instance in which the great knowledge of this prefident in maritime ad----n was exhibited to the public, was in that expedition in which Mr Boscawen was ordered to intercept the French fleet, defigned to carry and convoy fores to the affiftance of Canada. The whole of this remarkable exhibition of knowledge in marine affairs, has been already explained in a first letter to the people of E----d; in which it has been proved, that the number of the enemy's ships was unknown to our ad----, or not attended to; that our fleet was infufficient to the undertaking, if the deffination of it had been, as it ought, before Breft; because Machamara's squadron was superior to the English at his leaving that port; for the fame reason had he continued his voyage to America, Mr Boscawen and Mr Holbourne, by the weakness and division of their fleets, would probably have fallen a prey to that of the *French*; and even as it did happen, though the fleet of France was rendered inferior to that of Mr Boscawen by Mr Mainamara's return to Brest, all p. wer of reaping any confiderable advantage from it was defeated, by the English fleet being defined to cruize on the

the banks of Newfoundland in those months when that flation is covered with one general fog and darkness.

The French fleet being arrived in the river St. Lawrence, without any injury which could defeat the purport of their undertaking, the fame genius which had fo manifeffly erred in the difposition of every article in Mr Bofcawen's voyage, was now determined to make ample atonement to his country for this deficiency of judgment, and by diffributing the E - fb fleet in fuch a manner, that not a French ship of war should escape it in her return to France, demonstrate that he was yet equal to the fupreme conduct of the E - fb navy.

It feems fome time laft fummer, a thief who had robbed, and been apprehended, a desperate fellow, had efeaped from before the justice, and flying to another house had bolted the door, and secured himself in one room of it. The conftable, who had followed to this retreat, knowing the rafhnels of the man, and the nature of his fituation, conceived no finall apprehentions of danger in attacking him in that place; he therefore with great prudence acquainted his worfhip with the circumflances of the affair. The justice, after mature deliberation, wifely confidered it was impossible that the thief, was he ever to brave, through want of provision and other neceflaries, could long remain in that post; he therefore ordered the flege to be turned into a blockade, and bade the conflable and his affiltants to tarry before the door; watch the door, Tom, fays his worfhip to the con-Itable,

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ftable, through that door he mult come, therefore mind the door, and he cannot pollibly efcape us.

This being refolved on, nothing could be more alert than the constable, and no men in bigber spirits than his gang. The commander, as foon as it was dark, placed a lanthorn and candle at the door to fee all that might pafs from or to the house, and during the whole night molt manfully with his affociates flood on his arms, ready prepared, with his flaff in his hand, happily to demolifh the thief the moment he should pretend to fally and escape him.

This duty being performed through the length of two whole days and two whole nights, the juffice in momentary expectation of hearing that the thief was taken, and the conflable haranguing the mob, which attended on the thief's perfeverance; at the fame time wondering, that he had not been obliged to furrender thro' drought and hunger: when an old acquaintance of the belieged arrived with intelligence, that he had met the thief the first morning after his confinement, at the break of day, twenty miles from that very house in which the justice had to that moment imagined he was closely flut up: in fact, the fagacious head of the juffice had never conceived, that, notwithstanding a door may be bolted ever fo ftrong, and watched ever fo diligently, a man might get out at the window, as it really happened in this very cale.

In like manner, whilft Mr H---ne, according to the orders of his fuperior, was cruizing at the door between Newfoundland and cape Breton, and the marine m---r believed Dubsis de la Mothe still confined and flarving in the river St. Lawrence, that fly Frencoman flipt through the window, between the northern parts of Newfoundland and the continent, by the streights of *Eellifle*, unsuspected by the penetrating spirit of our first d--r in marine affairs; fo that he heard de la Mothe and his fquadron were fafely arrived at Breft, before he knew he had quitted the river St. Lawrence.

Thus then, in the conduct of this naval transaction, there are to be found five very confpicuous inflances of moft

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most confimmate ignorance; first the ignorance of the number of the enemy's ships; fecondly, the infufficiency of the English fleet; thirdly, their not being ordered to cruize before Brest; fourthly, their being ordered to cruize where they could not see their enemy; and fifthly, to cruize between Newfoundland and cape Breton, to intercept a fleet which did not pass that way.

This justice, however, must be done the marine m-r to his honour; the first ignorance of a proper station for cruizing, preferved the *English* fleet from the danger of the last ignorance of the number of the enemy's fleet, and infusition of our own.

Notwithstanding this uniform concatenation of errors, there are those who attempt to justify this conduct, by faying it was impossible for Mr Holbourne's fleet to  $\pi$ tempt intercepting de la Mothe's in both passages, because his squadron was not sufficiently strong to suffer a division for that purpose? Why then did the marine m—r expose himself to ridicule, in attempting to do that which he ought to have known must have proved ineffectual, and risk the destruction of his master's ships, by rocks and tempests, in those seas, where they could meet no adversary and do no service? did my lord Winchelsea ever conceive fo fruitless an attempt, or commit to egregious a mistake?

Hence then it may be gathered, that if hereafter any naval captain, indulged with five fhips, at the expense of 500,000 l of the nation's money, to make a fortune for himfelf, fhall fail round the globe, and by the very utmost effort of all possible chances, like throwing twenty aces on twenty dice the first time, take a ship worth a million of money for his and his company's advantage; that though he does not furround a weaker man than himfelf, he may yet preside and direct the whole navy of E ---- d to the ruin of the kingdom.

Such fatality, according to the prefent fashionable phrase of excuse, having attended the conduct of this naval expedition in every particular! a *fatality* doomed to attend infufficient judgments nine times in ten, fince the creation! a freth inflance offers itself, of reinstating our. our gre arr Bro gen E·

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our marine m—r in the popular opinion, which began greatly to decline in his favour.

It feems monfieur du Guay, a French admiral, was arrived at Cadiz, with fix fhips of the line, in his way to Breft. This admiral, and this fquadron, the fame naval genius, who had fo wifely defined the former fleet of E - d, was determined to intercept.

He remembered the errors which had been imputed to his charge in the defination of Boscawen's fleet, infufficiency in force, and wrong appointment in the flation of cruizing; he was therefore determined to avoid these two mistakes, at least at this time. Accordingly, on the 18th of July, Mr Hawke, with eighteen fail of the line, was fent to intercept the fix French ships under the command of du Guay; and with this whole fleet, so fuperior to the enemy, to cruize off cape Finisterre, 'till the French ships should appear.

This exploit again was trampeted forth by m—1 hirelings, as an infuperable proof of great marine knowledge in the director. The flation was happily cholen, the number of the fhips fufficient, and the game fure. Here was nothing for the most malevolent disposition to blame envy must now be dumb, or, if it fpoke, fpeak in the praise of this defign: and yet a mistake, much like the former in its confequences, prevailed alfo at this time; and in this manner it must prevail, when defigns miscarry, not from accidents, for which men of sense may be pardoned in not forefeeing, but from radical infufficiency and understanding.

It feems that the fame head, which had conceived that there was but one way of failing from Canada to Breft, and had never thought of the ftreights of Bellifle, had in this place imagined the fea like Hownflow heath, where a man may fit on horfeback on one fide and fee what paffes on the other, and that all fhips which are fteering to Breft from Cadiz, are obliged to turn the corner at cape Finifferre, like race horfes at a poft, or lofe their voyage. Probably this great naval m—-r had reafoned much in the following manner: all fhips, which have no enemy to fear or avoid; in their courfe from Cadiz to Breft,

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Breft, make cape Finifterre; wherefore, every fhip which knows there is an enemy in the way, and has reafon to be under apprehension of danger, will certainly fail the fame way; and therefore Mr Hawke shall be defined to cruize off cape Finisterre to intercept them. Admirable instance of sea logic! Without reasoning in this manner, is it possible he could have defined the fleet as he did?

Such was the event of this second exhibition of boasted marine knowledge! Avoiding the errors of the former conduct generated the very milcarriage of this; and to it will for ever happen to men, who fancy, that by Lanning the mistakes of passed management they shall fucceed in the prefent. Whoever does not intuitively diffinguish right from wrong in the conduct of great affairs, can never be fuccefsful by judging from parallelarity; becaule, as in these two instances, tho' ships, seas, and the directing their flations, may be the whole concern in each, yet the fimilarity in these objects create no reason, either to avoid mistakes or pursue the advantages of a prior defination, where there is no refemblance of circumstances in the undertaking; and no two can be fufficiently fimilar, or fufficiently unlike, to juftify a parallel or opposite conduct in any director of them.

The duke du Tallard, as I have been informed by a gentleman who thoroughly understands military affairs, made the fame disposition at *Blenbeim*, that the great *Gustavus Adolphus* had done at the famous battle which he won against *Valstein*; yet the *French* general was defeated, and the *English* triumphed. No circumstances can

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who are to direct. Imitators want force of understanding to penctrate, purfue, and put in action that which the original contrivers had conceived in various ways in laying down their plan. They are mimics of what was done, without comprehending the whole force of what might have been done : wherefore, in the progress of an action planned in imitation of another, when the circum. flances vary from the former, not feeing the reason of the defign, they are unequal to the fupplying what the original contriver would cafily have afforded : knowing no more than the hiltorian has delivered, they follow fervilely like copyifts, and are defeated. Had this marine m-r, in his definations of these naval expeditions, judged from original lights and principles, he must certainly have imagined, that du Guay would have avoided the beaten tract in times of peace; he would therefore 'ivided Mr Hawke's squadron into two equal parts, 223 which making nine in each fquadron, would have been ftill three to two; a proper and fuperior force wherewith to oppose monsteur du Guay; these, attended with smaller fhips to have been uled as fcouts, by cruizing off cape Finisterre, and in the other station thro' which the French fquadron paffed, there being but these two ways of fteering their courses, without great ill luck, at leaft without blame to the planner of the cruize, must have intercepted the French fleet in its coming to Breft, and brought their ships into English harbours.

This however not being done, proves that the flying from error on one fide, drives weak minds into an equal miftake as the oppofite extreme, as young fpendthrifts frequently become old mifers.

Nor is it in matters of great moment only this infufficiency of conduct appears: the floop which carried the field-equipage belonging to the officers of Otway's regiment from London to Plymouth, becaufe the transports were failed before flue arrived at that port, was obliged to wait for orders to follow them.

The stanfports which the m——r had cunningly fent to briag the Dutch troops over, before he knew they would 40)

The fuperintendency of our iflands in America, is not one iota lefs remarkably provident. Monfieur D'Aubigny is too ftrong for our fleet at Antigua and the Leeward iflands, and monfieure Perrier de Salvert is in the fame fituation with respect is the fleet at Jamaica, notwithstanding that admiral Towny and, with his whole fleet of one fhip, is fafely arrived at that ifland.

In like manner, as the very ultimate of all found judgment had been difplayed in the diffribution of the cannon, carriages, powder, and ball, feparately on board the transports for *America*; fo another exhibition of equal good fense appears in fending out the four commanders to the *Mediterranean*; for as by the fagacity of dividing the stores, the chance of defeating the defign was increased as four to one; fo by confining all these four commanding officers to one ship, and not fending them feparately, the chance is increased in the same proportion, that the whole defign of their voyage may be frustrated alfo. War has been already declared two months, and no ship is yet fent to give notice of it in the *East Indies*.

The judgments of our m-----rs, like pendulums, beaing eternally vibrating from one extreme to another, paffing through, yet not refting in the mean, what hopes can ye entertain of reinftating the happy fituation from which ye are fallen? That which fhould have been blended they have divided, and that which fhould have been feparated they have united: and through the whole have proved themfelves the very antipodes to common fenfc. Few men have been born with talents and abilities vaftly val

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vally superior to the reft of mankind; yet many have been well adapted to the knowledge and conduct of little things, who have been incapable of comprehending the effect and beauty of what is great and fublime; like the fly which admired the polifh of a mirror, and condemned the architecture of St. Pauls. The mereft fribble of a virtuolo, infenfible to the great order of nature, can trace with delight and skill the various and minute shapes, fhades, and colours, in a fhell or flower, which diffinguish one from another, but there appears in the ad ----- n cf the prefent m\_\_\_\_\_r in maritime affairs, an equal incapacity for the conduct of great and little matters; the fame head which has to egregioufly erred in the defination and appointment of larger fleets, has in like manner been infufficient to the minutest duty of his office; one inflance of the former, more confpicuoufly flagrant than the reft, now comes to be laid before you.

I don't mention accounts contained in news-papers as authentic relations which may warrant the m——— l attention, but to ask that as at this time they have proved literally true, by what means it could come to pais, that those whose immediate duty it is to be informed of all transactions of such a nature amongst our enemies, should be the only perfons unacquainted with them, or why they alone disbelieved the intelligence which gained credit amongst all mankind besides ?

If the nature of this military preparation would have permitted a concealment of it, much might have been faid in vindication of the m——rs who gave no credit to the account; but fince thoufands faw and declared it to all the nations upon earth, why were the m——rs dif-F fident of, or unacquainted with it ? an inflance unexampled in any ad \_\_\_\_\_\_n but their own. The number of *Macnamara*'s fleet had before been equally unknown or disbelieved; this then is the fecond inflance of fatal ignorance, defective intelligence, or arrogant disbelief of the force of our enemies.

By whatever arguments the m——rs might be feduced to difcredit this military preparation at Toulon, the very probability of Minorca's being attacked, and the effential importance which it is of to the B——/b commerce, ought to have created a jealouty in them, that the French would not long overlook to important an object, unattended to, and neglected as it was, by them. Thefe confiderations alone, without giving credit to what was transacting at Toulon, made it their duty indifpenfibly to have placed Minorca in fecurity from all French invafion.

Befides thefe reafons, there was yet another motive to the firengthening that ifland from hoftilities, and to the believing it threatened with an invafion, the repeated requefts for fuccours from the brave commander of the caftle of *St. Philip.* This gallant man, after reiterated letters to the m — rs, at length wrote to this purpofe to his neareft relation; " I have often requefted fuc-" cours from the m— r, I have been as often promif-" ed to receive them, and as conftantly difappointed " in the promife; this then will, I imagine, terminate " in my falling a facrifice to their neglect; however, " though it fhould fhorten my days a year or two, it " will the fooner put you in poffeffion of what I fhall " leave you, and in which I wifh you happy."

Notwithstanding the consequence of that island to this kingdom, what had been published by the public, written by the governor, and believed by all mankind, no attention was paid to the protection of it. No land forcess fent, though the number within the fortress was known to be unequal to the duty and defence of it against a fiege; and whereas in the year 1744 admiral Matthews, with a fleet of 48 fail, 9 of which were three decked ships, was employed in the Mediterranean; now commodore Edgecembe with 3 Ships and 2 frigates only, was was trad V

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was thought a sufficient protection for the Mediterranean trade, and island of Minorca.

Whatever were the reafons, no attention was paid to this important possible of the second second second second rembled for the wound which he faw must be inflicted on his country, our m----rs were honourably engaged in laying wagers there was no fleet nor failors to man a fleet at Toulon; that if there should be any it was not defigned against Tabon; and treating with derision the apprehensions of all who foresaw the event, and whose love for their country would not permit them to be at ease; whils the honour of the crown, and the interest of "he kingdom, were open to infult and diminution, by us finister negles, and the French attacking Minorca.

During this time our reyal navy, full manned and prepared for the feas, was riding triumphantly at Spithead, and the head of the ad—y paid as an ad—l, abient on leave, at the rate of a thoufand a year, as if all that had been done in honours and profits had been hitherto inadequate to his merit. Glorious picture of wifdom in your m—rs! illustrious ancedote of their prudent ad—n, for their fons to read hereafter, and curfe their fires! but happily providence, in commiferation to this people, has denied that bleffing to the most confpicuous of them, kindly refusing to their wishes that progeny, which, treading in their fathers footsteps, must ftill be baneful to this isfle.

At length, after four months passed in m——l inattention, and in wonder by gazing multitudes, Mr Byng fet fail on the 5th of April from Spithead, with ten ships of the line for the Mediterranean.

During these months of inattention and neglect, La Galissoniere, with twelve ships of the line and five frigates, with transports sufficient to carry 15,000 men, ammunition, and artillery for a siege, commanded by the Duc de Richelien, were gotten ready, and failed from Toulon; and on the 18th of April landed in the island of Minorca, eight days after our fleet weighed anchor from Spithead, and almost six weeks before they arrived near Mahon.

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Mahon. The confirmation of the French defcent on Minorca was the first intelligence which demonstrated the truth of what all men believed except the m\_\_\_\_\_rs, and of what he had neglected in not fending fuccours to Ma m.

Pernici is as this delay of fending fuccours now appeared to every eye, it was not yet irremediable, tho' the troops were debarked, the citadel was not yet taken, and the avowed bravery of the commander juftified the belief, that no fhameful furrender of the fortrefs would flain the laft moments of his life. Notwithftanding which, it was confidently afferted by the m——rs and their hireling fpouters, that *La Gallifoniere*'s fleet confifted only of eight fhips of the line, and that Mr *Byng* would blow them out of the water.

Here was an opportunity to be envied of retrieving all the reputation which had been forfeited by the first neglea, in not fending a sufficient force to oppose the enemy's defeent on *Minorea*.

Men of genius, though hitherto deluded or miflaken, would have improved this overfight into an advantage, and by reinforcing the fquadron under MrB - g, with a number of fhips equal to that with which he fet fail, would have defeated the *French* fleet and flarved their troops in *Minorca*. By preventing military flores, they would have faved *St. Philip*'s, and by preventing the arrival of provision, have obliged the whole army to have furrendered prifoners of war.

How capable then was the first negle & of being converted to the glory of the king and kingdom ? but, alas ! they knew not the flrength of that very citadel, which was to be befieged; and the moment they received the intelligence of the *French* being landed, defponding, they concluded it was taken; otherways the first inattention might have been metamorphofed from incapacity to wisdom, from difgrace to honour, from loss to advantage, from censure to applause. All the states of *Europe* would have believed the first behaviour, as defigned to obtain the fecond advantage; and, converting an egregious imbecility into a refined stratagem, conceived highly of that policy, on Mited the rs, and ours to

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policy, which is now univerfally defpifed and exploded. But, alas! the fame faturnine planet rules our m——rs alike arbitrarily, at all hours and on all occafions; their genius tending eternally to the center, like a ftone thrown into a cavern tells you by every ftroke, that it finks nearer to the abyfs of waters, in which it flounces at laft and is no more heard of.

The error which had been committed in not fending fuccours at first, improved by fending an infufficient force under Mr Byng, was still continued by neglecting to fend a reinforcement, which would probably have joined him before he reached Gibraltar; at least a ship might have carried intelligence to Corunna; and as the winds were adverse for the squadron, a courier would have reached Gibraltar before the fleet, and detained it till he was joined by a further force.

Notwithstanding this, Mr Byng was fuffered to proceed with ten ships of the line, and the chance of meeting Mr Edgecombe, 13 in all against 12 French fail of equal force to relieve Minorca; whilst Mr Osburn, with 15 fail of the line, remained at Spithead, and 10 in the harbour of Portfinoutb.

At length, after long delays from adverfe winds, Mr B-g arrives on the 20th of May within fight of Minorca and the enemy's fleet. Imagine then, what must be the joy which fired the heart of the old gallant Blakeney at the fight of the B-/h fleet: warmed with all the sof obtaining glory to himfelf, honour to his master, and interest to his country, by this succour which he faw, in defeating the enemy's fleet, and rendering all the French schemes abortive; such, probably, was the pleasing entertainment of his mind, when the B-/h flag appeared in fight.

But, alas! Mr B---g, after having attacked the French fquadron, with not a man killed or wounded on board his own and many other fhips; with but 48 killed, and 168 wounded in the whole fquadron, retires unattempting to relieve the garrifon of Mahon, becaufe the Intrepid had her fore top-maft fhot away, and leaves the

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the brave general and his companions cooped within the garrifon of St. Philip's, quite deflitute of all hopes of relief.

Judge then, what was the horror of this brave man's mind, when he first knew the behaviour of our fleet, and faw all his expectations of relief and honour reduced to air; deferted in this manner by the B - fb navy, he was yet fustained by himfelf; his heart felt the behaviour of Mr B-g with more anguish than the neceffity of being obliged to capitulate; he defended the citadel to the last, and then gave it up reluctantly to your enemies. If you have yet the faculties of human nature, weep over the fevere fate of that brave man, and the facrifice of your neglected fellow-countrymen! Pay that tribute to the remembrance of their bravery, though ye are denied arms to revenge their los; then call to mind by whose conduct they have perished.

Refolve me then, thole who daily fuck the vital blood of *E*—*d*, and vociferate in defence of m——l conduct, whence did it fpring, that the number of the enemy's fleet, which in the beginning was known to all, was ftill unknown to the m——rs? Why a fuperior force was not fent to deftroy them? And why, when *French* forces were landed at *Minorca*, and the number of the fquadron acknowledged to be twelve, that a reinforcement was not immediately fent after Mr. *Byng*, yet to fruftrate the *French* attempts, deftroy the fleet, and flarve or take prifoners marfhal *Richelieu* and his whole army? Tell me ye who are hired or fhare in the fpoiling your country for fuch purpofes ; tell me, —— or is this behaviour fo heinous, that even ye are dumb, and afhamed to vindicate your m—— 1 mafters?

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fource of your wealth, the protection of it when drawn from other fountains, totally difregarded? what reafon can be affigned for this inverted behaviour, but that having lavifhed millions in confequence of thole treaties, and the fafeguard of *German* dominions, there remained not fupplies fufficient to protect *Minorca*: this, tho' the most profligate, would have been fome excufe; but thefe men are yet more unnatural and abandoned; they have fattened a fpurious race with your heritage, and flarved their legitimate offspring; whilst (from authority it is pronounced) your annual p---y fupplies were vigorous and effectual.

Have they then thus difrespectfully treated you, that the sources of your wealth from commerce, being diminished by the lots of *Mahon*, your declining state may sooner introduce poverty, with dejection her companion, and adapt your sour so the wearing, with tranquillity, those chains which the m—I possible is forging for you? or, that your protection being destroyed against the *Barbary* corfairs, your honess failors may fall a prey to that remorfeless crew, and, learning there, teach at their return, that being yer one degree above the flaves of *Barbary*, you have not equal right to deplore your fate, and thus soothe ye to contentment?

Fatal as this may prove to this once happy country, culpable as the ad-l may appear in the eyes of all Europe, difgraceful as it is to the B-- h arms, and difhonourable to the crown of these realms, are not those who delayed the fuccours at first, those who left that neglect unremedied, by fending an infufficient force, and even providing against that second error by a reinforcement, yet infinitely more the objects of your refentment? fpeaking like men, not blinded with the reigning maladies of arrogance and felf-fufficiency, but from the experience of former times, what expectations could be reasonably entertained, that ten E - f fhips of inferior force, or even when joined by Mr Edgecombe's squadron, that equal powers would have had a more than equal chance of victory; or that the event would prove less favourable to the enemy than the English. Such imaginations ginations in favour of their countrymen may be laudable, and of fervice in the common failor and common foldier, but in the man who is to appoint fleets and commanders, foolifh, culpable, and defiructive.

Let it be imagined, however, that the B - h fleet, with this equality of force, could have conquered the French; was it reafonable to believe the victory would have been to cheaply purchased, and our thips to little damaged by the engagement, as to keep the feas and relieve Minorca? as it probably would not, and as both fleets were equally excluded from the harbour of Mabon, would not a conquest over the French squadron have been even then attended with the lots of the citadel and ifland? To what realm could the E----/b fleet have fteered to find materials to repair the injuries of the battle? Would Spain have supplied them with naval stores, and indulged them to refit in Cartbagena? No man the least acquainted with the prefent dispositions of that court believes they would; probably then, confidering the present state of Lisbon, Plymouth is the first hospitable harbour that could have afforded them affiftance.

Whatever then may prove the event of this engagement to the admiral, let not the depravity of his behaviour feduce your attention from those who fent him fo unequal to the undertaking. If after a candid and deliberate examination, it shall appear, that he has been egregiously remiss in his duty to his king and country at the hour of battle; consider how much more those are delinquent, who delayed the expedition and fent him at last with insufficient force. There are men, when superior

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perior to their enemies, who wear the outfide of gallantry and fucceed, who perhaps, when on equal terms, from confelling fome inward fentations of danger, may retire and mifcarry; if it was his duty to have rilqued every thing in prefervation of Mabon, was it lefs obligatory on them, by a fuperior fleet, to have prevented all probable prefumption of milcarriage? After all, if Mr B-g's fpirit proved in the experiment inferior to that of the enemy, was not the armament which the m---r gave him to command, inferior to that of the French allo? on what account was the B--- fb fleet obliged to rifque the lofs of victory and Minorca, by engaging on equal Terms, when by being double that number, it might have preferved the ifland, and triumphed over your adverfaries? Whence does it arife then, that if the marine m-r is by nature and capacity adapted to the duty of his high office, that a man to obvioufly unequal to the task was felected to command the fleet of E and a fleet fo inferior to the duty fent to protect Mabon?

Whatever delinquency may then be imagined to have en committed on this account, are not the m--rs ....l more criminal? The bravelt man on earth, by exerting every fuperior faculty of the human mind, deflined and appointed to command a fleet of that force. might only more confpicuoufly have manifested the infufficiency of the m ----- l provision and judgment, in the conducting this affair; and proved, that though rictory fhould have crowned his arms, that the fhattered condition of his ships would have rendered it impossible to preferve Mahon; whereas the m-rs had it in their power, by augmenting the force of the fleet, not only to have prevented difgrace, but to have commanded fuccess, faved Minorca, defeated their enemies, and growned themfelves, the ad-----l, their king and country with immortal honour.

Yet if you ask why more fhips were not difpatched to the fuccour of *Minorca*, they an wer, no more were manned ready for the feas. Was it then through want of power or pecuniary fupplies, that this deficiency arole? not from the first, because that they exert in a more despotic manner than is known in the noss arbitrary states G of of Europe, in impressing seamen; not from the second, becaufe no opposition in p-t has delayed one moment the levying what money the m ---- r pleafed: if to this they shall add, that the kingdom cannot furnish failors to mann the fleet with more expedition, and that a large number of men of war are necellary for channel fervice, and to prevent invalions on this illand, and therefore a greater force could not be fent to the Mediterranean; ask how it was done the laft war? and why, in the p——t of 1755, when all this that has followed, and much more was apprehended, a militia bill was neglected to be paffed? this would have permitted the m-r to have defined your fleet to uleful enterprizes, and cleared Spithead from flying pendants, and the ufelefs parade of a large navy without application or advantage. This would have faved you millions of money, and fecured your fhores from every hoftile attack, more effectually than all the flips built fince the a..., or Argo which let fail with admiral Jafon to fetch the golden fleece from Colchos.

If then the fouls of our m — rs are in unifon with their country's good, why did they delay and reject this neceffary duty to their king and their fellow fubjec.s?

Let inch the word *milita* be eternally halloo'd in their ears; may their imaginations awake, and fleeping be haunted with this terrifying neglect; may this idea be ever prefent to their minds, the ghoft of that bleffing which they ftrangled, 'till, alarmed by dread, and guilt, they repent and arm this defencelefs land.

To what region's now fled all that panegyric, which was folloudly founded through the kingdom, of difpatch, diligence, and capacity, in the m—-e m—-r? Why were those thips for expeditionally equipt, for ineffectually defined and applied? What injury has this hurry and expence brought on your enemics, or what advantage to this nation, unleas the private gains of a few thoufands, and the influmous appellation of thieves and pyrates from your endmies, ananfwered by your m—-rs, are conceived an addequate recompence for the national expence of million<sup>3</sup>, and the loss of character through all the realms of *El urope*. them

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The baseles fabric of his temple of fame then is vanished; the deterted proprietor of that flore lived glare of reputation is now funk into rayles obscurity, like the bliss of fome poor cottager, who from his dream of millions wakes amidit the pangs of penury; happy for this isfle, could the fatal effects of his male administration vanish with the unmerited reputation of the author.

EgregiouIly delinquent as the m——rs have proved themfelves in this neglect of *Minerca*, with what accumulated guilt ought they to be viewed, when the recapitulation of their whole conduct comes to be confidered by you.

If those who have lost Mahon, and permitted your gallant countrymen in hopeless defence to fall the guiltlefs facrifices of their neglect, the unavailing yet august victims of their own and country's honour, objects worthy of your admiration and affliction, the eternal ftigma of an unnatural ad----n, have ruined your trade in the Mediterranean, subjected your failors to the captures and flavery of Barbary pirates, by this one mifconduct, what will be the whole event of the aggregate of their imbecillity, when by wrong choice of commanders in America, and inattention to that valuable part of B--hpoffeffions, many provinces are left open to hoftile inroad. May not the French, who have been fome time fending troops to the Miffippi, this fummer become mafters of Georgia and Carolina, to defenceless and open; or perhaps fome province more lucrative and better adapted to the necessities of Faance.

What have you to expect from your boafted naval bulwark, if the fame men continue to direct it, who have already lavifhed in ineffectual deflination and infufficient force fo many millions? Have the *French* expeditions been rendered abortive in one inflance? Have the captures of their fhips of war exceeded three, equal to our lofs only?

 more potent friendships, for connections with weaker and more needy powers; profusion of public money to hireling mercenaries, national degradation and contempt in foreign eyes, imputation of difloyalty or cowardice on yourielves, whilf you are denied the use of arms to defend yourfelves, your wives, and daughters from open enemies, and the facrilegious hands of venal fereigners, nurtured by your own money, brought on pretended terms of hospitality, if they should dare to treat you with infolence.

In the mean time, your fellow-fubjects, feduced into the army by promifes of being lifted for three years, and to defend their country only, are kidnapped, and forced on board flip by compulsion, treated and transported like flaves, God knows where; to return, God knows when \*.

Is it not possible then, that by continuing to increase the number of infolent foreigners, and fending out the native troops, that at length a ftanding army of the former may become too formidable to be oppofed by the people of G - t B - n, difarmed as ye are? Or even by the military thus daily decreasing by transportation to diftant parts of the world, if at length they fhould refent the want of confidence which is manifelted by thus relying on H----ns and H----ns, in preference to that loyal body of men.

Who then can wonder, if from one continued feries of miftakes, and flagrant manifestations of m---- l incapacity, the Swedes fhould fnatch this golden opportuniiy of repossenting Bremen and Verden, the Austrians Silefia, the Spaniards Gibraltar, and the French, after having

Extract of a letter from Plymowth, dated May 21. Yesterday morning col. Campbell's new-railed regiment was reviewed in the field, and ordered to appear at four o'clock in the afternoon on the dock, without arms; which they accordingly did, and, without much difficulty, matched into the dockyard, followed to the gates by the garrison, with their bayonets fixed, and muskets loaded, to keep guard while they were again reviewed by general Home, the colonel, and admiral Mofyn; after which the companies were divided, and a fignal-gun being fired from the admiral's fhip, for all the boats to attend, they were immediately embasked without any disturbance, except heavy complaints at their being fent abroad, centrary to the terms of the advertisement, and the promises made them at the time of their inlifting.

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<sup>\*</sup> PUBLIC ADVERTISER.

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fecured Minorca to themfelves, invade the kingdom of Ireland: and, to clofe the whole, ranfack this very ifland of G - t B - n?

Have not the treaty with *Pruffia*, and defertion of *Auf*. trian intereft, laid a probable foundation for the *Swedes* and *Germans* to accomplifh the two former? Will not the fuffering *Mahon* to be taken, and yielding up that harbour to the *French*, encourage the *Spaniard* to attempt the third? and *France* having no farther object for her fleet in the *Mediterranean*, unite and employ all her force in perpetrating the fourth?

Who then are friends, and who your foes? What are those men who dare to impute difloyalty to fubjects, whofe words and actions would have contributed to fave this finking flate, if their counfel had been rollowed? fhall the tracing a Scotch renegado jefuit through all his doubling lies and fallacies, to prevent future imposition on a few, by the discovery, be (as it ought) deemed a laudable and honeft purfuit; and yet the unravelling the mifchiefs which m-rs have brought on a whole natition, and attempting to refcue it from their impious hands, be blasted with the appellation of a libel? Be not, like individual atoms playing in the fun-beams, detached from one another, whirl'd to and fro, as the breath of m---- I conduct blows amongft ye. Let the general good, like the general attraction, hold ye firm to what ye owe yourfelves and country; otherwife, to what purpose do ye curse the a-l that forsook the cause of king and country, and praife the gallant Blakeney who never

never deferted his truft? Why do ye importunately ask, will the Spaniards join the French to attack Gibraltar? Will the French invade this kingdom? Alas! neither imprecation nor panegyrie, the taking or defence of Gibraltar, or even the coming of the French, can bring a greater though a more fudden evil on your condition. Nothing can long relieve or fave this nation: if the fame rulers in the cabinet continue to prefide, ye need no foreign enemy to make ye flaves. Can ye conceive that the fame men who have brought ruin on your affairs, have either inclination or abilities to reinflate them in their former happy fituation? inquifitive but fentelefs of your fate, your fouls feem to have loft all thofe virtuous and quick fenfations, which have hitherto been the infeparable companions of a free flate.

To what purpofe then, when all remedies must come too late, will this predicted ruin be believed by you? What will then avail that anguish, when you curle your deftroyers and your own inattention? perhaps accompanied with this imbittering reflexion, that those whom ye affisted to ruin you have bound your hands in chains, and are become the arbitrary mafters of the kingdom. Unless then ye fuddenly awake from this trance into which ye are fallen, your foreign or domestic enemies will prevent ye, and then ye must fleep the fleep of death, England is no more!

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Mr it be r the crione feen l remy; age, and givd all trees degrees of merit; this very imputation of want of refolution may not equitably be afcribed to them alfo?

Is it then a wonder, that men in all ran. \$, corrupted in head and heart, fhould be unequal to the tasks which honour only can infpire, and virtue accomplifh? Remember then, if Mr B-g be doomed to punifhment, to which it is not improbable he may, as a fcape-goat offered to your refertment for the falvation of the m-rs, that this can avail nothing in your favour. Will not the fame deficiency of judgment thill operate in the choice of commanders and defination of expeditions, whilf the direction remains in the fame hand? What expectation have ye by his removal, that your national affairs will wear a better face, or raife the fallen condition of this finking land?

Will it not then be firicily equitable, that the fame voice which calls Mr *E*—g to a candid examination of his conduct, fhould tummon alfo those who have fo long and to fatally superintended the direction of national affairs to an impartial enquiry, that ye be afcertained why the territories of England on the Obio were fhamefully conceded to the French; to whom, and to what purposes, your millions have been lavished, whether to the ruin or advantage of this ifland; on what account Mahon and America were neglected, and H—r preferred to all; and from what cause it happens, that fix millions and a half in the last year of queen Anne's reign, could fuffice for the interest of fifty millions, and the support of a vigorous war; that now twelve millions, when the annual expence of the debt, by the diminished interest of money, exceeds not what it was at that time, are not equal to the annual extravagance of the m-rs, or productive of one victory?

In her reign, though your treasures were exhausted, and your fellow-fubjects flaughtered for *German* interefts, ye fustained the flattering character of a brave and honess people amongst the nations, and were, by the fuperb victories which your general obtained, honoured and revered; but under the direction of these inauspicious m-----rs, ye live without renown, and die without victory, victory, fligmatized with the infamous brand of thieves and pyrates, by that nation which then dared not to look ye in the face: Shameful alternative!

Notwithstanding this, if before a just tribunal the transactions of the m\_\_\_\_\_rs fhall be found both honourable and upright, and the approaching fate of  $B_{----n}$ owing to these irressifiable causes, by which all nations perifh, and to which they are not acceffary, they will then like fouls passed through Purgatory to Paradife, rife from calumny to approbation, from hatred to efteem, from pain to pleafure. What then can be more acceptable to men of integrity, than fuch an enquiry? But if through the evidence of truth, they shall stand convicted of male administration, let no malevolence prefume to draw comparisons between the conduct of passed m-rs who have fuffered, and the prefent who have not, or attempt increasing the heinousness of their actions, by truly stating those of the sufferers: for the fake of these who are yet alive, I with you never to recal the decapitation of lord Strasford, or compare his and their conduct-Revenge is criminal, it is unworthy a Briton; if the love of your country must make ye feel the passions to which human nature is fubjected, remember, though ye are men, that ye are Christians allo; and, notwithstanding the ruin of this land is well nigh completed, implore your n to afford those enemies to his realm that merſ.... cy which they have ever denied his innocent people; and when he shall graciously preferve them from condign punishment, that he will mercifully cast an eye of pity alfo on millions of his faithful fubjects, and fave them from perdition, by at once removing from his prefence, the spoilers of the dignity of his crown, and liberties of his fubjects; keep then your eyes and attention fleadily on your prince, from him expect relief; there remains yet one method by which ye may all be faved.

FINI

