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SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES. NOTES FOR A SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE HONOURABLE MITCHELL SHARP, TO THE INSTITUTE OF NEWSPAPER CONTROLLERS AND FINANCE OFFICERS IN TORONTO, OCTOBER 15, 1973

"CANADA AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY"

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Shortly after the Second World War, Walter Lippmann wrote that the Atlantic ocean unites the Americas and Western Europe "in a common strategic, economic and cultural system". While this proposition remains fundamentally unchanged, the Atlantic Community has undergone many important changes in the intervening years.

In contrast to the tragic conflict in the Middle East, détente in Europe is well advanced. A significant new pattern of relationships has evolved between the super-powers and new centres of power have emerged in Japan and in China. Intersecting with these changes has been the construction of an increasingly cohesive and dynamic European Community -- a development which has implications for Canada as well as for the United States which are as much political as they are economic.

It was timely then, this spring, for Dr. Kissinger to open the United States' initiative on the Year of Europe.

My initial reaction to this speech was one of welcome -- but of cautious welcome. We welcomed it as a serious and constructive attempt to launch a co-operative review of the Atlantic relationship in the light of the new set of problems facing the U.S.A. and its allies. We also interpreted it as an important reaffirmation of an outward-looking American foreign policy.

But as I said our welcome was cautious. One reason for our caution was because it was not clear whether -- and if so how -- the Canadian interests would be taken into account.

Canada was mentioned, but almost as a footnote. And for that matter how would Japan fit into a formulation which seemed to bear on the interests of the industrialized democracies as a whole? Was it by way of a tri-polar system? Dr. Kissinger had identified three main power centres in the non-communist world: the United States, Europe and Japan. While we have no illusions about becoming a fourth power centre, we believe that we have a distinctive contribution to make. We remain concerned not to find ourselves polarized around any of the main power centres.

In my travels outside of Canada, I have sometimes found an assumption that Canada should fall naturally and inevitably into the United States' orbit. This is perhaps understandable, but it is unacceptable to Canadians. It is inconsistent with our conception both of what Canada is and what our interdependent world should be. It runs against the grain of post-war Canadian efforts to build an open and liberal world trading system. It is also contrary to the Canadian Government's basic policy of a relationship "distinct but in harmony" with the United States.

North America is not a monolithic whole -- economically or politically. Nor do I think it would be in the interest of any of the parties concerned to deal with a single North American colossus.

Canada's relationship with Europe is not the same as the United States' relationship with Europe. There are political, economic, cultural and linguistic elements in our relationship with Europe which are unique. Perhaps in relative terms our relationship is more important to us than the United States of America's relationship with Europe is to the Americans. Forty-two percent of our immigration

continues to come from Europe. Our national fabric is made up of many distinctive ethnic groups -- many of them European. These have not been assimilated into a Canadian homogeneity. They preserve and value their links with Europe as they do their Canadian nationality. Canada's security is indivisible from that of Europe. Our exports to Europe represent 2.8 percent of our G.N.P. -- whereas the United States' exports to Europe represents 1.3 percent of the United States' G.N.P. The countries of the European Economic Community together constitute our second most important trading partner -- after the United States.

Now, the second reason for being cautious in welcoming the Year of Europe was my concern that a declaration or even a series of declarations should not be regarded as a substitute for the hard work in many forums required to find solutions to the substantive political, military and economic problems facing the trans-Atlantic community. From the Canadian point of view, moreover, we would not want a declaration to divert us or the Europeans from developing the sort of meaningful long-term relationship we have been pursuing with the enlarged European Economic Community.

Thirdly, we are anxious that the discussions now going forward between the community and the United States do not in any way pre-empt the NATO forum from performing its role as a diplomatic instrument in reinforcing the basic solidarity of the Atlantic nations. Without trespassing on the existing universal and regional forums for economic negotiation, NATO has, under Article 2 another task in avoiding serious conflict and disarray between member states in their economic policies.

We should be addressing ourselves to the equally vital issues of spiralling inflation, rising deficits from energy and defence expenditures and the capricious movements of world finance.

You will understand that questions such as these were very much on my mind when I met with Dr. Kissinger in New York for the first time in his new capacity as Secretary of State. While we did not have an opportunity for detailed discussion, it was a most cordial and satisfactory meeting. Dr. Kissinger expressed interest in -- and an awareness of -- the Canadian perspective on many of these and other bilateral questions. I believe we are on common ground with respect to the development of the Atlantic relationship within appropriate multilateral forums such as NATO and the O.E.C.D.

While there is much common ground, you will appreciate that the Canadian approach to the Atlantic relationship is by no means always identical with the American. There are distinctive Canadian views on the European Security Conference, on the development of relations with the enlarged community and on such issues as trade and monetary policies.

Canadians are often accused of being reserved -- perhaps of other things as well. Some of this may be true, although as a feature of the national character, I believe the charge is exaggerated. However, on the international plane reticence, no less than bombast, is a characteristic we cannot afford. On these issues, which vitally affect our present and future

self-interest we are determined that our position should be clearly understood -- and not overtaken by default. I look forward to the opportunity of discussing these questions in greater detail with Dr. Kissinger and with Mr. Christopher Soames in the very near future.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I find there is a tendency when speaking about issues of great importance to us all to say that I am expressing "the Canadian view". Very often, of course, this is both pretentious and inaccurate. I should be expressing "the view of the Canadian Government". For as this group will be aware, the views of the government are not always uniformly accepted across the land. Newspapers especially tend to have their own point of view. Although, as you may have noticed over the years we, on the government side, are not invariably graceful or generous in acknowledging this role of the press, we do value it.

I believe that in spirit we would subscribe to these remarks by Thomas Jefferson:

"The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right, and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to choose the latter."