

CANADIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

CAUTION: ADVANCE TEXT

PRESS RELEASE No. 107

December 13, 1967

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY

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New York, N. Y. 10017  
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DISARMAMENT

Text of Statement to be made in the First Committee by the Canadian Representative, E. L. M. Burns, in the General Debate on General and Complete Disarmament: A Comprehensive Test Ban and the Elimination of Foreign Bases, Wednesday, December 13, 1967.

I should like first to say a few words about Item 29b, the report which has been prepared by the Secretary-General on the effects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, and on the Security and Economic implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons, document A/6858. The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs for Canada, has described the report as "an important and constructive contribution to the continuing international discussion on this question." These are a few points in the report which our delegation feels should be emphasized.

The Canadian delegation would like heartily to commend the members of the Secretariat concerned with this report, and also to thank most warmly the experts who participated in compiling it. We think that they have succeeded admirably in the first part of the task which was set before them; to put in clear and unmistakable language, with all the weight of their renown as authorities on the subject, the horrific effects which will be produced by nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons if they are ever used. No one can deny that if the thousands of weapons in the stockpiles are loosed, they will cause horrible, almost inconceivable death and destruction. But the impact of this knowledge has been softened by much repetition. It is a truth which has regrettably become a platitude, and perhaps a bore. The world would like to ignore it, to forget about it. To offset this dangerous tendency it would be good if all of us in this Committee would read and re-read the first chapters of the Secretary-General's report. It would, I hope, bring us to a realization of the sort of questions we are dealing with. These are questions of the life or death of hundreds upon hundreds of millions

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of men and women, of the death or crippling of civilization, as we know it. With the continuation of the nuclear arms race, there is no end in sight except nuclear war. If there is shortsighted concentration on supposed national security interests and prestige, and a refusal to agree to any measure which will check or prevent further expansion of the nuclear armaments race, those who refuse are voting for nuclear war-- nuclear war that may be decades away, but which will surely come.

I wish to draw attention to the sections on the economic and security implications of acquiring nuclear weapons, in the light of our hope that we shall have a non-proliferation treaty open for signature before long. The Secretary-General's report points out the many implications and problems involved in the decision to become a nuclear weapon state and argues **strongly** against further spread of nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt that the cost in economic terms would be high; an additional annual expenditure of \$170 million dollars a year to develop a modest nuclear armament. Yet, even this estimate should be considered on the low side, since, as the report notes, this figure is derived from a comparison of government expenditures on defence, education and health, and such expenditures are subject to different systems of accounting and rates of currency exchange throughout the world. Furthermore, defence expenditures vary from year to year and proportionally from country to country. I believe we should pay attention not to the bare statistics but to the experts' observations about potential cost. A large number of variable factors indicates that nuclear weapons cost could be much higher than annual expenditure of \$170 million dollars. Some of these variables mentioned in the report are: expected increase in cost in countries lacking highly-developed scientific, technical and industrial capability--probability that possession of unsophisticated nuclear weapons will lead to the demand for sophisticated nuclear weapons--liability of delivery systems to very large overruns in development costs--and relatively greater impact of re-allocation of funds away from peaceful development in developing countries with a relatively low standard of living. It should be noted that the report states that the acquisition of nuclear weapons system could, under certain circumstances, cost in the vicinity of \$800 million to \$900 million dollars annually for a ten-year period of development of the system, rather than \$170 million dollars.

We think it evident that the cost of developing <sup>a</sup>nuclear weapons system would be very high for no matter what country, at whatever level of development. But let us suppose that a country decided that the cost was bearable; would development of nuclear weapons necessarily enhance its **security**?

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As regards security, the report makes several points which we feel are of deep significance. The authors observe that it is possible for a country to possess both prestige and security without being a military power, and similarly, that the possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily prevent decline in political influence. Furthermore, even nuclear powers have not been able to exercise political and economic influence in consistently effective fashion. Nor have states without nuclear weapons been deterred from battle with nuclear powers. In these instances, mere possession of nuclear weapons has not contributed to the achievement of national objectives by nuclear powers.

As a country with well-developed nuclear industry, oriented strictly towards peaceful uses, we believe with the authors that the solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in further spread or elaboration of nuclear weapons. The world now has a choice between two courses; either a continuation of the arms race which in turn enhances insecurity in a continuous spiral; or to begin a process of arms control and disarmament through measures which will enhance international security and effectiveness of this Organization. It is our belief that this process of arms control and disarmament must start now, with a non-proliferation treaty which must be followed by further measures of arms control or disarmament.

I should also like to mention another very useful initiative taken by the Secretary-General in connection with disarmament negotiations. This is the compilation and publication of the book "The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965." This is a concise history of the disarmament negotiations through those years; and in fact, in spite of the title, the record goes on to 1967. It contains the most important documents of the negotiations, and is altogether a most useful compendium for anyone engaged in discussion of disarmament. I commend it to the attention of all members of this Committee who may not yet have studied it and, on behalf of the Canadian authorities, I should like to thank the Secretary-General for having the book produced.

As the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee informed you, not very much time was devoted during our long sessions this year, to the subjects of GCD, Cessation of Nuclear Tests and the Elimination of Foreign Bases--all of which we had been requested in resolutions of the XXIst UNGA to take under urgent consideration. But the elaboration of a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, had the priority--and rightly so, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation. So in speaking on the subjects mentioned, none of the delegations of States members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will have much to say to you--if anything--other than has been said before. However, it seems to the

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the integrity of the financial system and for the ability to detect and prevent fraud. The text also notes that records should be kept for a sufficient period of time to allow for a thorough audit.

2. The second part of the document describes the various methods used to collect and analyze data. It mentions the use of statistical techniques to identify trends and patterns in the data. The text also discusses the importance of ensuring that the data is representative and that the analysis is unbiased. The document concludes by stating that the results of the analysis should be used to inform decision-making and to improve the efficiency of the system.

3. The third part of the document provides a detailed overview of the system's architecture. It describes the various components of the system, including the hardware, software, and network infrastructure. The text also discusses the security measures in place to protect the system from unauthorized access and data loss. The document concludes by stating that the system is designed to be scalable and flexible, allowing it to adapt to changing requirements and to support a growing number of users.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the future plans for the system. It mentions the need to continue to improve the system's performance and to address any outstanding issues. The text also discusses the importance of staying up-to-date with the latest technology and of seeking out new opportunities for innovation. The document concludes by stating that the system is expected to remain a key component of the organization's operations for many years to come.

Canadian delegation worth while putting on the record of this Committee, once again, our position in regard to the important matters dealt with in resolutions 2162C, 2163, and 2165 all of the XXI UNGA.

One reason for this is that after this Committee or some other appropriate organ of the United Nations has succeeded in completing its consideration of a treaty of non-proliferation--which we hope will be done early in 1968--we must make up our minds as to which measure of disarmament we should devote our energies. Which measure of disarmament will afford the best chance of realizing further progress? It is common ground, the Canadian delegation thinks, that as we have just said a NPT must be followed--and soon--by other measures of disarmament or arms control, which will slow down, if not halt, the arms race, particularly in the sphere of nuclear armaments. Such measures should increase confidence among the nations and so improve the prospects of an eventual agreement on GCD.

An eventual agreement on GCD. It is eight years now since Resolution 1378 XIV was passed, which set this as the goal at which disarmament negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations should aim. Regrettably, in spite of drafts of a treaty by the USSR and a programme by the USA intended to set out the way the nations should move towards disarmament, little advance has been registered. No member of the ENDC has disputed the validity of the goal. This body has been negotiating on GCD since it was set up in 1961, when it and the principles under which it should negotiate were blessed by resolution of the 16th General Assembly. It is not the goal that is at issue, but how to get started, how to take the first steps towards that goal. Resolution 2162C XXI states:

"Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests."

The Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR in his statement at our 1546th meeting on 11 December gave the views of his authorities as to why no progress has been made by the ENDC towards agreement on a draft treaty to establish General and Complete Disarmament. He placed the blame on the USA and its allies. We do not wish to enter into a controversy on this matter. However, we do wish to point out that the essence of the disagreement, ~~which~~ might be called the log-jam in the GCD negotiations--is on how the nuclear armaments of the

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great powers shall be reduced and finally eliminated. At present, as we have heard, the nuclear armaments race goes on at an ever-dizzier pace. I would say, in spite of the assertions of the USSR delegation, that it takes at least two to make a race, and that in the interacting and reacting competition between what are called the super-powers, neither one can expect to be exempt from blame in view of the fears which this race excites in the world. I should like also to quote what the representative of Sweden said at our 1545th meeting, on 11 December:

"It is not possible, I find, to exclude from a speech on disarmament here in the United Nations a reference to the recent news of further development of nuclear devices for military purposes on the part of both the super-powers. Contrary to the hope of all humanity the Governments of the main powers have not been able to commence discussions even on a mutual restraint in as far as the development and deployment of nuclear missiles and anti-missiles is concerned. Both powers seem to have gone ahead instead with decisions to pour more money into the further refinement and enlargement of their capabilities in regard to strategic nuclear weapons, both in the defensive and the offensive category. This cannot but have a very unfortunate and discouraging psychological effect. Perhaps it is already under-cutting the hopes that this generation, which in the political sphere, is sensing a lessening of the risks of a war between the super-powers, should also see them entering upon a course of gradual nuclear disarmament. There can be no purpose in hiding the sombre truth that signs point in the opposite, the negative direction in regard to the nuclear armaments race between them." (PR 1545, pp 17, 18).

Can this nuclear arms race be halted? In January of this year the USA proposed through diplomatic channels, that they and the USSR should discuss the stopping by agreement of the production and development of offensive and defensive missiles. It is understood that at the time the USSR agreed in principle to hold such talks but since then the matter has rested. Must the nuclear missile arms race go on until all concerned reach agreement on a treaty on GCD? One hopes not. On the other hand, the prospects for GCD would be very much brighter if the nuclear-missile arms race could be halted by preliminary agreement between the nuclear powers.

High on any list of partial measures which could lead eventually to GCD is a treaty suspending all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests--in other words, the comprehensive test ban. I should be less than realistic if I said that the prognosis for an early conclusion of such a treaty is good. On the one hand the representatives of the nuclear powers

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in the ENDC have stated that their countries were in favour of arriving at an adequately verified test ban. On the other hand, both the United States and the USSR continue to carry out nuclear tests underground while Communist China and France are testing in the atmosphere. The ostensible obstacle to the early conclusion of a CTB is the lack of agreement on what constitutes "adequate verification." As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, stated at the 332nd meeting of the ENDC this year, the obstacle is simply that "one side is upholding the theories that on-site inspections are necessary to ensure no violations occur; while the other side reiterates that national means of detection and verification are satisfactory and that no on-site inspections should be prescribed." There is, fortunately, a more optimistic side to this last problem. Progress is being made and various countries, such as the United States, are carrying out extensive and active research programmes, the result of which will, hopefully, yield completely instrumented verification methods which will be generally acceptable. It is the Canadian position that such research must be continued and that the information so obtained should be shared internationally. Indeed, as I said in a statement at the ENDC, such an interchange of information and ideas could well contribute to the spirit of mutual trust and understanding necessary to facilitate agreement on the political aspects of a comprehensive test ban. To this end Canada has played and continues to play an active role in the so-called seismic detection club which Sweden originally suggested and which was endorsed in resolution 2032 (XX).

Very much related to the question of a CTB is the continued development and production of ballistic missiles both offensive and defensive. The development of such weapons virtually by definition involves some nuclear or thermo-nuclear testing. We are particularly concerned at this time by the decisions of the USSR and the USA to develop and deploy anti-ballistic missile defences. To our regret we must say that these decisions announce another expansion of the spiral in the nuclear arms race.

It may seem reasonable for any country to take all the steps it considers necessary for its national security--in this case the installation of ABMs--but we must remember that, in addition to the expenditure required to provide the desired protection, the protection itself in this case could well upset the balance of deterrence with incalculable results. The most likely result, however, would be another round in the arms race, involving the further development of both defensive and offensive missiles. And what does this produce? Only wasteful expenditure on a massive scale with little or no added security to the countries engaged in this deadly competition in destructive power.

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We hope the nuclear powers concerned will find it possible to meet and discuss the halting of the arms race in its latest and very discouraging aspect.

There is another measure which my Government believes would significantly slow down the nuclear arms race and also would constitute a move towards further disarmament. I refer to the internationally controlled cessation of the production of fissionable material and the transfer to peaceful purposes of such material which is now being stockpiled for weapons purposes--or the "cut-off and transfer" as it has come to be called. The history of this proposal is, I am sure, well known to all so I shall not go into detail about it. Suffice it to say that, in our view, the implementation of the cut-off and transfer, following an agreement on non-proliferation treaty, would demonstrate that the nuclear powers also are willing to carry on the move toward nuclear disarmament. It would also reassure non-nuclear signatories to an NPT who would have forgone the right to possess nuclear weapons. Finally, it would be a step towards carrying out United Nations recommendations on the desirability of reaching agreement on collateral measures of disarmament.

Specifically there are two features of the cut-off and transfer proposal which Canada finds particularly attractive. First, the rest of the world would benefit from the distribution for peaceful purposes of a large quantity of enriched uranium. Canada has had a fair amount of experience in the field of civil nuclear assistance to various countries and we are therefore particularly aware of the benefits which nuclear energy can bring in the sphere of economic and social development. Second, we consider that the verification procedures, which have been worked out by the United States are relatively simple and unobtrusive. The USSR, up to the present, has not accepted this view and Soviet representatives have characterized these proposals as "control without disarmament" and have charged that verification procedures were simply a cover for the gathering of military intelligence. We cannot subscribe to this view. Rather we share the opinion of the representative of the USA to the ENDC, Mr. William Foster, when he said at its 256th meeting, "To assert that the cut-off and transfer, and weapons destruction proposals" has nothing in common with disarmament "amounts to stating that slowing down has nothing to do with stopping. Had the cut-off of production of fissionable materials been negotiated when it was first proposed, the United States arsenal of weapons today would have been a fraction of its present size. Without a halt in the near future, nuclear stockpiles are bound to grow ever larger, adding to the vast amounts of potential death and destruction."

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In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both primary and secondary data collection techniques. The primary data was gathered through direct observation and interviews with key personnel. Secondary data was obtained from existing reports and databases.

The third section details the statistical analysis performed on the collected data. Various tests were used to determine the significance of the findings. The results indicate a strong correlation between the variables studied, suggesting that the observed trends are not due to chance.

Finally, the document concludes with a series of recommendations based on the findings. These suggestions aim to improve the efficiency of the current processes and address the identified areas of concern. It is hoped that these measures will lead to a more streamlined and effective operation.



We remain hopeful that the USSR will re-examine its objections to this measure, which we see as an excellent possibility for slowing down the arms race.

Finally, I should like to mention briefly Item 31--the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

As we are all aware, the priorities given the negotiation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the ENDC prevented the Committee from discussing this subject in any depth. The Canadian position on this question can, however, be stated in a very few words. It is based on two principles: (1) the right of sovereign states freely to conclude defence arrangements involving, if agreeable to the parties concerned, the establishment of military bases on their territory, and (2) non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Moreover Canada has always maintained that progress towards general and complete disarmament can best be achieved through balanced, equitable and effectively controlled measures. Proposals regarding bases that we have seen so far do not meet the criteria. They involve a sacrifice in the collective security arrangements of the West without any balancing obligation on the part of the USSR and its allies. In the Canadian view, foreign bases should be and will be eliminated in the process of general disarmament. In fact we have seen many bases disappear in the past decade, in response to lessening tensions, and changes in strategic conditions; and we shall doubtless see many more disappear, if international relations improve.

