



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

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
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THE
BRITISH TREATIES

OF
1871 & 1874.

LETTERS
TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

BY
H. C. CAREY.

PHILADELPHIA:
COLLINS, PRINTER, 705 JAYNE STREET.
1874.

5404

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

MR. PRESIDENT:—

The Senate having postponed action upon the Treaty submitted for confirmation just previous to the adjournment of Congress, and the public press having fortunately caused removal of the seal of secrecy to which it had been subjected, opportunity has been thus afforded for public examination of the question of our relations with the British provinces, and to that end I venture to invite your attention to the brief statement of facts which will now be given, as follows:—

Somewhat more than four years since, in June, 1870, the two houses of Congress by a joint resolution instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint a special agent charged with inquiring into "the extent and state of the trade between the United States and the several dependencies of Great Britain in North America;" and in conformity therewith that officer selected for the performance of a duty so important Mr. J. N. Larned, a gentleman who appears, by his report of Jan. 28, 1871, now before me, to have been actuated by no feeling other than that of a sincere desire to obtain for himself, and for public use, an accurate idea of the effects which had resulted from the adoption of reciprocity, so called, in 1854, and from its repudiation in 1865, in compliance with an almost unanimous demand to that effect, at the close of the first decade of its existence.

To some of the facts thus obtained and reported it is that I now, Mr. President, invite your attention, as follows:—

In the last year of the previous system, 1854, as therein is shown, the imports from Canada amounted, in round numbers, to \$6,700,000, our exports meanwhile somewhat exceeding \$15,300,000, the balance being favorable to the Union to the extent of \$8,600,000. In the last of the Treaty years, to wit, in 1866, the six millions of imports in 1854 had grown to forty-six millions, our fifteen millions of exports of this latter year having remained throughout almost entirely unchanged, and the balance having become adverse to the extent of more than thirty millions; thereby enabling our northern neighbors to profit to that large amount by selling in the dearest markets, and applying the proceeds to purchasing in the cheapest ones.

Extending the field of observation so as to embrace all the provinces now included in the Dominion, we obtain, for the four last of the treaty years, the results here given as follows:—

| | Exports. | Imports. | Balance. | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| 1863 | \$28,620,000 | \$24,621,000 | \$4,599,000 | favorable. |
| 1864 | 26,567,000 | 38,922,000 | 12,353,000 | unfavorable. |
| 1865 | 28,862,000 | 36,176,000 | 7,314,000 | “ |
| 1866 | 25,521,000 | 53,387,000 | 27,866,060 | “ |

We see, thus, that the Dominion market for our products actually declined; that here furnished for Dominion products having meantime more than doubled.

The years 1869 and 1870, reciprocity having ceased, still exhibited adverse balances, greatly less adverse, however, than had been that of 1866: those of the two years combined having been but \$33,000,000. [Since then, as shown by the British Commissioners themselves, the movement thus described has been continued, and with such effect that the adverse balances of the three past years combined have but little exceeded \$16,000,000, little more than half that of the last year of the Treaty, or of the two more recent years, 1869 and 1870].*

Commenting upon the unsatisfactoriness of this state of trade, the special agent is led to study the causes of its existence, and finally, to an inquiry as to the process by means of which they may be remedied, with the result which will be now exhibited, as follows:—

“It appears, therefore, that an intimate freedom of commerce between this country and its northern neighbors, which is so desirable for both parties, cannot be contemplated except in connection with a material change in the conditions of the foreign relationship that the provinces sustain towards us. It involves, of necessity, an entire identification of the material interests of the two countries, by their common association in some form or other. If the provinces do not choose to become one with us politically, they must, at least, become one with us commercially, before the barriers are thrown down which shut them out from an equal participation with us in the energetic working of the mixed activities of the New World, and which deprive us in a great measure of the reinforcement that they are capable of bringing to those activities. The alternative of annexation is the Zollverein, or a customs union, after the plan of that under which the German states secured free trade among themselves and identity of interest in their commerce with the outside world. * * * *

“There does exist a feeling in the United States with reference to them which it ought not to be difficult for the people of the provinces to understand. It is the unwillingness of a reasonable jealousy, and of a just prudential selfishness, to extend the material benefits of membership in the American Union, without its responsibilities and reciprocal obligations, to communities with which the certain relations of an independent friendship cannot be cultivated or maintained; which are controlled by a distant foreign power, and which are at all times liable to be

* Believing the *import* entries in all cases to be those most likely to be correct, the special agent gives them as obtained from both sides of the line. What has been the course adopted by the British Commissioners is not known, and it is for that reason difficult to account for the fact, among others, that while the American account of imports and exports for 1872-3 exhibits an unfavorable balance exceeding \$10,000,000, that of the Commissioners gives one of little more than half of that amount.

placed in an attitude of unfriendliness or hostility to this country by causes outside of themselves, or through events in connection with which they have nothing on their own part to do. Between two equally independent and responsible nationalities, homogeneous in blood and character, and with every interest in common, situated as the United States and their northern neighbors are toward each other, it would be as easy to settle the relations of intimate fellowship upon an enduring basis, as it is made difficult to do so in the case of these provinces by reason of their dependent status.

"The circumstances which make the common boundary of the two countries an actual barrier instead of an imaginary line, are under their control, not ours. It is for them to determine which affects them most importantly, their political association with Great Britain, or their commercial and industrial association in interest with the United States, and which shall be yielded to the other, since the two are unquestionably in conflict. There is no apparent evasion of that choice that they must make."

The Treaty of Washington now closely followed this Report, providing for the settlement of various questions between the United States and Canada, but wholly excluding from consideration that of "Reciprocity," which but recently had been so fiercely agitated. To all appearance this last had been settled by the Special Agent's Report. Peace, so far as that question was concerned, prevailed, and continued to prevail until May last, when throughout a fortnight or more there was emitted from the "Reciprocity" Bureau which had then found place in an obscure corner of the Treasury Department, a series of literary fireworks the like of which until then had not been known in connection with our diplomatic arrangements. Assuming generally the form of editorials, readers were to be by them awakened to the fact, till then wholly unperceived, that in ceasing to grant to strangers advantages that would have been unhesitatingly refused to any of themselves, they had been guilty of "a spiteful mistake;" and that "the popular judgment" now appeared to be on the side of a renewal of that policy by means of which Canadian farmers had, throughout a whole decade, been allowed to sell their produce at the high prices prevailing here as a consequence of the building of furnaces, factories, and rolling-mills, while purchasing their ploughs and their harrows at the lower prices prevailing in British markets, consequent upon that American competition which, by means of a protective tariff, had been established. The PUBLIC OPINION thus manufactured, and intended for operation on senatorial minds, coming next to be gathered together, it stands now before me, forming as large a collection as perhaps was ever made of variations of a single tune, evolved from a single mind, and apparently given to the world by aid of scarcely more than a single pen.

Little more, Mr. President, than a fortnight later the public mind is found to have been startled by announcement of the fact of a Treaty being "now before the Senate" having for its object that of carrying into practical effect the *public opinion* which so skilfully had been manufactured; and now it is that we arrive at a course of diplomatic operation wholly unprecedented, to wit, that of sending to the Senate

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an elaborate argument, on the part of the British and Canadian Commissioners, in favor of a renewal of the but-lately-so-universally-condemned commercial policy, unaccompanied by even a single word from the State Department to the effect that an absolute refutation of most of what was therein presented would be found in a document furnished to the Senate in January, 1871; and that so conclusive had been regarded the Report then made that the question had, as I believe, never even been brought before the Congress by which the Washington Treaty had been negotiated.

Marked "confidential," and thus prevented from appearance before the public eye, this plausible argument was meant to remain unanswered, and it may well be doubted if even a dozen copies have ever been seen outside of the senatorial body. With much difficulty, and after weeks of effort, I myself succeeded in obtaining one, to a single passage from which I shall, Mr. President, invite your attention in another letter, with a view to enabling you to form an idea of its general character, giving, however, in advance a brief statement of real facts derived from authorities that cannot at all be questioned; meanwhile remaining,

Very truly and respectfully yours,
HENRY C. CAREY.

November 18, 1874.

LETTER SECOND.

MR. PRESIDENT:—

The subject-matter of the passage above referred to is that of the communication of the Canadas with the outside world throughout the many months when the St. Lawrence is closed by ice or fog, or by both combined. For nearly thirty years past they have been allowed the privilege of free passage for men and things through the territory of the Union, and to how serious an extent their very existence has been dependent upon continuance of that grant will now be shown, as follows:—

By the census of 1839, Upper Canada, now Ontario, was shown to have a population but slightly exceeding 400,000 souls. Six years later Congress granted to it, and to its sister colonies, the free right of way above referred to, and from that time forward—further aided by reciprocity, so called, granted in 1854—the growth of numbers was so rapid that in 1861 the population amounted to almost 1,400,000, or nearly three and a half times more than it had been twenty-two years before.

With the slightest possible exception, from the date of the grant above referred to, the British free-trade policy had been that of the American Union, and with such effect, as regarded immigration,

that in the closing year of the period above described it had fallen to but a single hundred thousand; or little more than a third of the number at which it had stood a dozen years before, when that policy had but begun to produce its natural effect in closing mills, mines, and factories throughout the Union. With 1861 there came, however, a total change, making such demand for labor in the field, the factory, the furnace, and the mine, that with each successive year the attractive force of the Union increased, with such diminution in the power of the Canadas to retain even their home-grown population that the total increase of the decade ending in 1871 was but little in excess of 300,000, or about $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.*

Such having been the sad state of things resulting from abolition of privileges in our markets granted under the name of "reciprocity," where reciprocity had really had no existence, there occurred, most surprisingly, to Canadian statesmen, the "happy thought" described in a passage from the Toronto correspondent of the *New York Tribune*, which reads as follows:—

"The amount of compensation to be paid to Canada by the United States for the lease of the in-shore fisheries was, according to the Treaty of Washington, to be determined by a commission. The data upon which to determine their value, however, were so uncertain, and the difficulties in the way of arriving at a solution of the point were seen to be so great, that the happy thought occurred to the Government to combine an abandonment of this claim with the positive obligations in connection with the canals in order to induce the United States to renew reciprocal relations with Canada. There can be little doubt that these reasons, combined with the desire on the part of Canada for a renewal of reciprocity, constitute the determining cause for her taking the initiative in the matter."

How insignificant, compared with this magnificent suggestion, is the real value of the fisheries, will be shown hereafter. What is the value of the transit privilege that has now for thirty years been gratuitously accorded is shown in the facts that have above been given. To the end, however, of enabling themselves to obtain a large price for the one, while paying nothing for the other, it was needed to show how readily the Canadas could dispense with that which for so long a period had constituted, during two-fifths of the year, their sole means of communication with the outer world free from custom-house interruption, and hence it is that we find in this remarkable document the passage above referred to, and which reads as follows:—

"Under the influence of the formal notice given by the United States in 1865, of their intention to terminate the Treaty, federation of the Provinces, then under dis-

| | 1861. | 1871. |
|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| * Upper Canada | 1,396,061 | 1,620,851 |
| Lower " | 1,110,666 | 1,191,516 |
| | <u>2,506,727</u> | <u>2,812,367</u> |

How great had been the difference of the two policies as regarded their influence on population is shown by the fact that the increase of Minnesota alone had been greater than that of Upper Canada, and that of Missouri nearly twice that of the Canadian provinces combined.

cussion, was hurried on and became a *fait accompli* within fifteen months after its repeal. The Intercolonial railway was at once undertaken, at a cost of over \$20,000,000, at the national expense, to secure direct connection to and from the Atlantic Ocean, at Halifax and St. Johns on Canadian soil; and the last section of that road will be shortly opened for traffic."

So far as regards the mere words of this statement it is certainly true. A road *has been* in process of construction, and will probably be completed in the course of the coming year; but how far it can by any possibility be attended with such results as are here suggested, if not even vouched for, by Commissioners, one of whom represents her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria, and the other the Government of the Dominion, you will be enabled, Mr. President, to judge after study of the following facts:—

From Montreal to Portland the distance is less than 200 miles, most of the country through which the road passes being sufficiently settled to enable it to contribute largely toward maintenance and further improvement of its communications within itself and with the outside world.

From Montreal to Halifax, through British territory, the distance is about 1000 miles, of the last 800 of which, passing, as they mainly do, on the edge of an uninhabited and uninhabitable desert, there are but very few which can, under any circumstances whatsoever, contribute toward maintenance and improvement of a road that has been made for no purpose other than that of purchasing, by means of a large and wasteful expenditure, the assent of the lower provinces to the federation; but which, as the Commissioners would now have us believe, is to render the Dominion entirely independent of her neighbors south of the lakes. How far this can prove to be true we may now examine as follows:—

The charges for transportation of the rudest products on such a road, cannot be less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ cents per mile, or, for 800 miles, \$20 per ton; equivalent to 60 cents for a bushel of wheat. Add to this one-third as much for transport of merchandise received in return, and we have 80 cents per bushel *additional to the total charge by way of Portland*. Trade under such circumstances could, for little less than half the year, have no existence whatsoever, and the upper provinces, limited to that route alone, must steadily decline in population, passing gradually toward the condition in which they had stood at the date of the first grant of transit privileges.

Having studied carefully these facts, Mr. President, you can have little hesitation as to the cause of the sudden appearance of the "happy thought" above referred to.

Having so studied them you will, Mr. President, be enabled to form a somewhat correct idea of the general value of this "memorandum," the accuracy of whose presentations is vouched for by Her Britannic Majesty's Representative in Washington, Sir Edward Thornton, and by the Canadian Commissioner, the Honorable George Brown; and also to appreciate the real motives of those by whom you had been induced to transmit such a Treaty, and even to urge

its consideration, at a time when there remained but three days of senatorial life; and when so many other important measures remained unmaturing. Happily, you yourself assumed no responsibility in reference to its contents, the Senate having been advised that you were not prepared to say "as to whether it makes all the concessions that could justly be required of Great Britain, or whether it calls for more concessions from the United States than we should yield."

Seeking now the responsible authors of the extraordinary measure thus proposed, we are led at once to turn to the Secretary of State, whose letter to yourself, Mr. President, by which it was accompanied, is here given as follows:—

" DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 17, 1874.

"I have the honor to inclose a copy of the draught of a treaty for the reciprocal regulations of the commerce and trade between the United States and Canada, with provisions for the enlargement of the Canadian canals, and for their use by United States vessels on terms of equality with British vessels, which British plenipotentiaries have proposed to this Government.

(Signed) HAMILTON FISH.

THE PRESIDENT."

You will here observe, Mr. President, that this important Treaty was passed forward to yourself unaccompanied by even the slightest suggestion that it had ever been considered, or even read, by your Secretary of State. That it had not been so would seem to be conclusively established by the fact that that gentleman subsequently, in conversation with at least one distinguished senator, gave assurance that he "assumed for himself no responsibility whatsoever, the Treaty having been prepared by the British Commissioners, and he having merely as a matter of duty caused its presentation to the Senate."

Most certainly, Mr. President, you could not so have understood this matter at the time when you said to the Senate—"I therefore express an earnest wish, that the Senate may be able to consider and determine before the adjournment of Congress whether it will give its constitutional concurrence to the conclusion of a Treaty with Great Britain for the purposes already named, either in such form as is proposed by the British plenipotentiaries or in such other more acceptable form as the Senate may prefer."

Could it have been possible that you would so have spoken, Mr. President, had you understood the real facts? Assuredly not. You would certainly have seen that a fraud had been in preparation far exceeding any of those which had recently so much occupied the Congressional attention, and would have required, for examination into the character of a measure so important, that time of which it had been the object of the conspirators engaged in its preparation to deprive both yourself, Mr. President, and the many millions of people who were to be bound by its provisions throughout the long period of five and twenty years.

Having thus exhibited in some small degree the curiosities of this remarkable diplomatic feat, I propose in another letter to show how this negotiation compares, in the arrangements therefor, with the Treaty of Washington; and how the two compare with each other as to the importance of the questions proposed by them to be settled; meanwhile remaining, Mr. President,

Yours very respectfully,
HENRY C. CAREY.

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 19, 1874.

LETTER THIRD.

MR. PRESIDENT:—

Toward the close of the administration of President Johnson the Hon. Reverdy Johnson was sent to England, charged with an effort at obtaining satisfaction for the many and serious injuries under which throughout the whole period of the rebellion we had so severely suffered. By very many of his constituents, and by me among the rest, the course of proceeding thus indicated was deemed unwise, no nation having ever yet obtained justice from any other nation by means of such solicitation as was to be now attempted. That in the view thus expressed they were certainly right came soon to be proved by the fact, that the British press with one voice denounced our claims as utterly absurd; and, that so little was the satisfaction granted that not only did the Senate refuse to ratify the convention then submitted for its consideration; but that you, yourself, Mr. President, in your first message, denounced it in the terms that follow, to wit:—

“Toward the close of the last administration a convention was signed at London for the settlement of all outstanding claims between Great Britain and the United States, which failed to receive the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. The time and the circumstances attending the negotiation of that treaty were unfavorable to its acceptance by the people of the United States, and its provisions were wholly inadequate for the settlement of the grave wrongs that had been sustained by this government as well as by its citizens. The injuries resulting to the United States by reason of the course adopted by Great Britain during our late civil war in the increased rates of insurance; in the diminution of exports and imports, and other obstructions to domestic industry and production: in its effect upon the foreign commerce of the country, in the decrease and transfer to Great Britain of our commercial marine; in the prolongation of the war, and the increased cost (both in treasure and in lives) of its suppression; could not be adjusted and satisfied as ordinary commercial claims which naturally arise between commercial nations. And yet the convention treated them simply as such ordinary claims, from which they differ more widely in the gravity of their character than in the magnitude of their amount, great even as is that difference. Not a word was found in the treaty, and not an inference could be drawn from it, to remove the sense of the unfriendliness of the course of Great Britain in our struggle for existence, which had so deeply and universally impressed itself upon the people of this country.”

The year that followed having exhibited no change in the relations of the two countries, and no improvement on the part of the provincial authorities, your second message recommended, first—

“The appointment of a commission to take proof of the amounts and the ownership of their several claims on notice to the representatives of her majesty at Washington; and that authority be given for the settlement of their claims by the United States, so that the government shall have the ownership of the private claims as well as the responsible control of all the demands against Great Britain. It cannot be necessary to add that whenever her majesty’s government shall entertain a desire for a full and friendly adjustment of these claims, the United States will enter upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a conclusion consistent with the honor and dignity of both nations.”

and second, the passage of a joint resolution authorizing the President—

“To suspend by proclamation the operation of the laws authorizing the transit of goods, wares, and merchandise in bond across the territory of the United States to Canada; and, further, should such an extreme measure become necessary, to suspend the operation of any laws whereby the vessels of the dominion of Canada are permitted to enter the waters of the United States.”

Now, for the first time, did the British people awake to the fact that they were really to be held accountable for the many and grievous sins of which they had been guilty, prompted thereto by an almost universally prevalent idea—so gladly expressed by Earl Russell when using the term Dis-United States—that the prosperity of Britain was to be promoted by any and every measure tending to production of discord between the farming, the planting, and the industrial portions of the Union; between those in which freedom had been established, and those in which slavery had been until then maintained. The alarm now excited being in full proportion to the contempt hitherto expressed, Britain herself became applicant for a settlement; and hence it was that the Treaty of Washington came at length to be arranged. What was by it allowed to us, what the price agreed to be paid therefor, and what the machinery by means of which the arrangement was effected, it is proposed now to show, as follows:—

First. We were permitted, at heavy cost, to prove a debt which, after deducting the counter-payments required to be made, amounted to less than a single month of our customs revenue, or about \$13,000,000. Had your suggestion, Mr. President, been adopted, and had Congress authorized the assumption of all properly authenticated claims, the repayment by Britain might have been postponed *ad infinitum* without causing a moment of anxiety to any of our Finance Ministers.

Second. Provision was made for submitting to arbitration the question of the Northwest boundary line, a matter that time alone would effectually have settled; each and every day furnishing new evidence that British Columbia must at no distant day cease to be a portion of the British empire.

Third. Certain arrangements were made in reference to canal and

river transportation, none of which could have been deemed necessary on our part, had proper attention been given to a passage here below given from the special agent's report (the italics being mine), then on the tables of both Houses of Congress, as follows:—

“No one will question that we find convenience and advantage in the use of Canadian channels for the passage of our commerce between the Eastern and Western States, nor that we find profit in acting as the carriers of so large a part of the commerce of Canada with the outside world. Both these arrangements of trade are of important value to this country, and its interests would suffer materially from any suspension of either; but the difference in the situation of the two countries with reference to them is very marked. To the Canadian provinces their importance is *nothing less than vital*, since on the one hand *the very sustenance of the arterial system of the Canadas is derived from the American commerce which circulates through it*; while on the other hand their own commerce with the world abroad can only be conducted at exceeding disadvantage, if at all for five months of the year, otherwise than across the territory of the United States, and by the privilege of the customs regulations of the American government.”—*Learned, Report on the State of Trade, Jan. 1871.*

Graciously now permitted to make contributions toward support of Canadian canals and roads without which they could not be maintained, we were required to pay for the privilege of so doing by granting to Canadian ships the same right of way on Lake Michigan, within our border, that they enjoyed upon the border lakes.

Fourth. The fisheries question was disposed of by providing that we might re-purchase rights which had been secured to us by the peace of 1783, but which had been brought into question under Canadian interpretation of the convention of 1818. The price to be paid was, first, a renewal of that free admission of fish which had been granted under the former treaty, and under which our imports of fish and their products had grown from \$800,000 to \$3,000,000, while our tonnage engaged in the fisheries had fallen from 137,000 in 1854 to 89,000 in 1866; and, by aid of constant persecution on the part of the Dominion authorities, to an average of but 73,000 in 1868 and 1869. The gain from reciprocity having, as here is shown, been all on the Canadian side, we were now, of course, required not only to renew the former stipulation as to compensation to be made therefor, but also, to add thereto the free enjoyment of fishing rights along our Atlantic coast as well as free market here for all their products. Not content with having thus secured a price far greater than the real value of all they seemed to grant, the Dominion authorities insisted upon a money payment in addition; and by way, probably, of proving that no limit could be set to our concessions, it was provided that a commission should be instituted whose duty it would be to determine what further price must be paid should it, on investigation, be proved that the rights of older times, whose re-purchase had been authorized, had a greater money value than could be assigned to the extensive and important privileges now granted to the colonists. In full accordance with the general principles which seem to have been established

for government of the body by which this remarkable treaty was negotiated, not a word appears to have been said in reference to the question as to whether or not payment should be made *to us* in the event of its being established that the privileges we had granted had a value far greater than could be assigned to the rights upon whose re-entry we were to be now permitted.*

Absolutely worthless as was all we had obtained, we were now, in further payment, required to renew to the Canadas, free of charge, a grant of right of way that, as, Mr. President, has been shown, is vital to their existence; and further, not only to grant to Britain, a full and entire release from the dangers to which, in the event of war, her commerce had become subjected, but also such a definition of neutral rights as must in all the future secure British property on the ocean from seizure by our ships.†

Such, Mr. President, were the concessions obtained at a moment

* "The statement of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the fisheries, is the best argument against them. For the privilege of fishing without annoyance, and buying bait, for catching mackerel only, within three miles of the shore of the British province, which has been and can be demonstrated even by the admission of the Canadian authorities themselves to be scarcely worth seven thousand dollars a year, the Treaty throws open all our fisheries, from Eastport to Delaware Bay, to British fishermen in full competition with our own.

† "In addition to which we are to give the introduction of all kinds of fish and fish-oids free of duty into this country, and virtually open to Canada a trade and industry which produces more than twelve millions yearly to the United States. And while we surrender all this, we make no provision for the reimbursement of our fishermen for their vessels seized and confiscated without right, while prosecuting their hardy toil of the sea, for a series of years by Canadian and British cruisers. And yet all the people are [assumed to be] in favor of every provision of the Treaty of Washington!"—*Hon. B. F. Butler.*

‡ "Bear in recollection that Great Britain, during the war, had in effect ruined our commerce; that from that shock it has in no considerable degree recovered; that England is to-day doing the carrying trade of the world in her ships; that it is of the last importance to her to be able to protect her shipping, so that she may bring to her island raw material and there manufacture it and carry back the product; and you will understand the necessity of this second rule to Great Britain in time of war—especially, if adopted, as we have covenanted it shall be, by the other maritime powers; and this necessity appears more clearly in view of the fact, as the British Commissioners claim, that this rule is not now a part of the Law of Nations.

"Under this rule, no private or public armed vessel of a nation at war can get any supplies to aid her in carrying on warlike operations in any foreign port of the world. Now it has, without doubt, come to be settled law that coal, to a steam vessel-of-war, is a military supply. Nothing is more certain than that all attacks upon an enemy's commerce must hereafter be made by swift armed steam-vessels, as was done by the Shenandoah and Alabama in the Confederate raid upon our own. But speed in a steam-vessel uses up coal almost in an arithmetical ratio of progression to the amount of speed attained. Therefore steam-vessels pursuing the commerce of an enemy must use vast quantities of coal, requiring frequent visitations to ports and harbors for renewal. Now, the United States have not a single coaling station in the world, beside the harbors on her own coasts, other than hired docks in neutral ports, from which, under this rule, we must be at once shut out in case of war. The establishment of this rule, therefore, protects British commerce in all time, because under it no steam-vessel of war of the United States, either private or public, can steam more than five days' distance from our own coasts, for the reason that no one of them can carry, with its armament, more than ten days' coal, and it is neither prudent nor safe for a war steamer to be on the ocean without coal to return to port—five days out and five days back."—*Ibid.*

when Britain had really become alarmed at the dangers with which she was threatened, and when but slight manifestation of self-respect on our part would have been required for obtaining something approaching to a reality of justice. How enormous was the further price paid therefor will be seen on a comparison of the claims secured with those enumerated in the passage here given from your first message and now rejected. Such comparison would, as I think, certainly result in establishment of the fact that in the admirable maxim *festina lente*—make haste slowly—would have been found the true policy of the Union; and that the Treaty of Washington, with its unparalleled array of knights and nobles, ministers and judges, president elective and sovereigns hereditary, has been, so far as the Union was concerned, one grand mistake. Comparing now the admirable position in which we should have stood had your advice, as given above from your second message, been followed; or, still further, had Congress authorized you, under certain circumstances, to notify Britain that she was no longer to hold herself entitled to the privileges accorded to “the most favored nations,” with the contemptible one in which we have since been placed, need we wonder that the British nation should have raised its chief negotiator on this occasion to a Marquisate? Assuredly not: never has diplomatist better earned his laurels than did the Earl de Grey on this occasion.

Reserving for another letter, Mr. President, consideration of the single reason that has recommended this unfortunate Treaty to many of our citizens, I remain,

Yours very respectfully,
HENRY C. CAREY.

November 20, 1874.

LETTER FOURTH.

The recommendation of the Treaty referred to in my last is, Mr. President, that by its means peace had been preserved; and hence it is that the example thereby set is now so strongly urged upon the world at large. Than this, however, there could be no greater mistake. The American people had no desire for war, and all the fear thereof was on the British side. For this the plain and simple reason is, that from day to day she is making herself more and more dependent on foreign trade, and less and less capable of engaging in war with any civilized power of even moderate force. Hence it is that she now turns one cheek when the other has been smitten, quietly submitting when Germany and Russia turn deaf ears to her remonstrances on behalf of Danes and Poles; or when the Czar tears to rags that Treaty of Paris which was meant to secure in all the future the control of Turkey to France and England. Never

in the history of the world has there been a case of submission more complete; never a wider contrast than that presented by the almost contemporaneous conduct of Britain toward the weak communities of the East, as this latter will here be shown, as follows:—

Taking first the case of the Burmese Empire, we have a statement of facts, given by Mr. Torrens in his recent valuable volume entitled "Empire in Asia," which reads as follows:—

"At first the lieutenant of the Queen demands restitution of £990, and an apology, from the governor of a Burmese town; without giving time for fair discussion, he raises the terms of his requisition to £100,000 and an apology from the Burmese Court; and while a temperate letter from the King, offering to negotiate, remains unanswered, he hurls an invading force against his realm, drops all mention of compensation or apology, and seizes an extensive province, with threats of further partition of his dominions if he will not pay the expenses of the war, the world being asked the while to believe that all has been done unwillingly, in self-defence."

Numerous cases of a similar kind are given by Mr. Torrens, but, leaving them and turning now to China, we find the following in reference to the Opium wars, the most disgraceful of all those of recent times:—

"Mr. Gladstone, in speaking of the opium war with China, once remarked that 'justice was on the side of the Pagan.' Never was this more true than at the present time, when a Pagan government, in spite of domestic anarchy, of the paralyzing influence of official corruption, and of the perpetual menace of foreign intervention, yet nobly endeavors to exert what remains of its shattered authority on the side of virtue and the good order of the State. On the other hand, I know of nothing more ignoble than the heartless indifference with which the failure of these patriotic efforts is regarded by so-called civilized nations, or the immoral cynicism with which English statesmen not only excuse but justify our share in entailing the greatest of calamities on one-third of the human race. If it were possible for us to escape from the responsibility which must ever attach itself to the authors of the first Chinese War; if we could prove that in forcing the legalization of the opium trade by the treaty of Tientsin we yielded to iron necessity; if, moreover, we could demonstrate that our duty to India compelled us to prefer the temporary exigencies of revenue to the lasting interests of morality—it would still be incumbent on us to face the fact that our position is at once shameful and humiliating. But when we know that the direct responsibility of every act that has led to the degradation and rapid decline of the Chinese Empire lies at our own door, and that the policy which has borne these evil fruits is still being, in a great measure, carried out by the concurrent action of Anglo-Indian administrators and British statesmen, the ignominy demands some fortitude for us to bear it. We, however, do bear it; and, at the same time, lose no opportunity of ministering to our self-love by pretending that wherever English commerce extends, or English influence penetrates, both confer untold benefits upon the less favored nations of the world."—*Fortnightly Review*, London, September, 1871.

"How England makes and keeps Treaties," is the title of an article in a recent number of the same highly respectable journal, from which the following is an extract:—

"In the same way and at the same time, we have everywhere obtained that our goods shall be imported into all these countries at duties of either three or five per cent. We are continuing to apply to Eastern nations this double system of tariffs, and jurisdiction of goods and judges. To attain those ends, we use all sorts of means, from courteous invitation to bombardments. We prefer to employ

mere eloquence, because it is cheap and easy; but if talking fails we follow it up by gunboats, and, in that convincing way, we induce hesitating 'barbarians' not only to accept our two unvarying conditions, but also to pay the cost of the expedition by which their consent to these conditions was extorted from them. We tried patience and polite proposals with Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco. China was so unwilling to listen to our advice, so blind to the striking merits of our opium and our consuls, that we were obliged, with great regret, to resort to gentle force with her. Japan presents the most curious example of the series; it is made up of ignorance circumvented and of indignation frightened. Indeed, if we had space for it, the story of the Japan treaties would be worth telling, because it is a very special one, because it is the newest triumph of our justice abroad, and because it may be taken as indicative of our present 'manner,' as painters say."

As is here most truly said, the "story" of Japan is well "worth telling," and so fully illustrates the danger of treaty making with a nation whose prime article of faith is found in the brief sentence "buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest one;" and whose cardinal principle of political practice is found in a constant effort at *compelling* the nations of the world to seek her market both as buyers and as sellers, that I here give of it the latest chapter, which reads as follows:—

A dozen years since Japan concluded treaties with Great Britain, France, and other European powers, closely resembling that with Turkey, and those with other Eastern nations, by means of which they have been so largely barbarized, and so generally ruined. Unused to treaty making, however, the Japanese authorities wisely inserted provisions by means of which it was supposed to be secured that those now made were to be replaced by others at the close of the first decade. That time arrived two years since, and down to the last hour it was supposed that new treaties would be made. Not so however, Britain at once asserting that there could be no "revision," except with the consent of both parties, and that until such consent should have been obtained the original treaty must remain in force. From that time the Japanese government has stood in the position of being compelled to submit to all the provisions of a treaty whose maintenance cannot fail to result in utter ruin; or, on the other hand, risk being involved in war with a nation that has always in the Eastern seas more vessels of war than would be required to close at once all that great domestic commerce, now carried on by means of boats and ships, between the various towns and cities, islands and provinces of the empire. Here, as everywhere where Britain is concerned, might triumphs over right.

Careful study of these facts, Mr. President, can hardly fail as I think to satisfy you, that in treating with that nation, more than with any other, the greatest caution is required. How far such caution has been exhibited by those to whom we stand indebted for this present Treaty shall be shown in a future letter by

Yours very respectfully,

HENRY C. CAREY.

PHILADELPHIA, NOV. 21, 1874.

LETTER FIFTH.

MR. PRESIDENT: At the trivial cost of a few millions of dollars Britain had now not only secured herself against a demand for reparation of error, whether of commission or omission, in the past, but had so far strengthened herself on the ocean as to enable her, in all the future, to set at utter defiance any nation uniting with us in giving assent to the newly-devised rules in regard to neutral rights. Further, she had enabled her colonial dependents not only to sell their wares at greatly more than their real value, but had also secured insertion of a provision by means of which the hitherto eternally-recurring fisheries question should again be brought upon the stage, giving occasion for the production of that "happy thought"—fully exhibiting itself in the "Memorandum" now before us—whose object is that of setting aside all the legislation by whose aid it had been sought to secure our domestic commerce, and our navigation interests, against foreign, and mainly against British, interference.

To that end it was essential to magnify, and that to the utmost possible extent, the value of those rights whose repurchase had been permitted, while in a corresponding degree undervaluing the highly important privileges we had granted; and hence it is that we have been favored with estimates, varying between five and fifty millions, of the claims now to be made upon our national treasury. Following out this idea, the Commissioners inform us that the fishing privileges granted us are absolutely "priceless;" meantime carefully reminding us that in the event of refusal to grant, and that without delay, the demands now made we shall be held liable for the large amount of money that the mixed Commission will be sure to grant. What is their real value and how it accords with the view thus presented is shown in the following fact:—

Our tonnage engaged in the cod and mackerel fisheries in the three years preceding adoption of the, so-called, reciprocity system, in 1854, averaged 157,000 tons. In the closing year of that system it had fallen to 89,000 tons. Two years later, in 1868, it had further fallen to 82,000, and the average of that and the following year was 73,000 tons. In the last fiscal year it has grown to 99,000 tons, the "priceless" boon having enabled us to reach a point more than a third lower than that at which we had arrived twenty years since, before sham reciprocity had been adopted.

Such being the facts, may we not, Mr. President, feel somewhat surprised that your Secretary of State should have allowed so false a presentation of the case, prepared by foreign hands, to be laid before the Senate; that, too, without a word tending toward revival in their minds of the fact that, three years before, there had been laid upon senatorial tables an American report by which it had been shown that under "reciprocity" the fisheries had almost perished?

Is there, Mr. President, any other country in the world, having a really organized government, in which such a transaction could have occurred? I doubt it very much.

Nominally treating of a reciprocal free trade with the British provinces, this treaty is really one of free trade with the British empire, the imperial government granting the privilege of free import from this country of a vast variety of manufactured articles, conditioned, however, that, as compensation therefor, the colonists secure to Britain herself the right to pass free into Canada, as a step toward passage into the Union, similar commodities, as being of the "growth, produce, or manufacture" of the Dominion. The whole arrangement is but a new edition of the fable of the monkey and the cat, the former employing the latter to draw from the fire the chestnuts that would have burnt his own fingers had he attempted to do the work himself.

At what cost to Canada, and ultimately to ourselves, we are to be allowed to obtain the "priceless" privilege by means of which we have been enabled to add five and twenty thousand tons to a fishing fleet that, with a view to compel our repurchase of ancient rights, has been harassed almost out of existence, is shown in a passage here given from the *Toronto Mail*, as follows:—

"Notwithstanding all that has been said and written about the proposed treaty, during several months past, one very important part of the consequences involved appears to be as yet only dawning upon the public mind. * * * * The new treaty includes many things, and these embracing some of the most important of our manufactures, that the old one did not. Further, the extension of the free list to such an extent in manufactured goods necessitates the formal declaration made in Memorandum of negotiations published a few weeks ago, to the effect that *whatever we admit free coming from the States must also be free coming from England*. In spite of all the publicity that has been given to this feature of the treaty—or connected with it, as we should say, for it does not appear in the treaty at all—the public generally are but beginning to find out that *free trade with England as well as with the United States, is really provided for*. We are every day hearing of influential, generally well-informed men, who say that the fact just stated is to them a recent revelation, and that until very lately they had no idea that a treaty with the United States carried such sweeping consequences. They say that, had they known it sooner, they would have been heard from more decidedly on the question."

That the treaty is in effect a British, and not a Canadian, measure, and that its tendency is in the direction of subjugation to British domination of the whole country north and south of the St. Lawrence, is shown in a passage from the *Sheffield Telegraph*, which reads as follows:—

"What wonder these gentlemen indulged in heated speeches and passed condemnatory resolutions? They know, that, the reciprocity treaty once passed, the days of monopoly are numbered. Congressional and especially Senatorial mills grind slowly, but with the new Democratic blood being rapidly introduced into their management, they will inevitably grind monopoly into an impalpable powder. * * * England has been emphatically assured by the Canadian Prime Minister, the Canadian plenipotentiary, and—lastly and most strongly—by Lord Dufferin, in his speech at Chicago, that Canada will not consent to a differential arrangement to the prejudice of the mother country. *In other words, what the United*

*States is permitted to import into Canada at specific duty or free of duty, that also it will be arranged may be imported from the United Kingdom on precisely the same terms. Well, then, shall not our iron and hardware manufacturers go up and possess the land? * * ** Shoals of American citizens are passing over to Canada in the summer season, and as we, when in a continental country, buy our box of cigars or other cheap products of that country, so American citizens in Canada ransack the various cities and towns for cheap purchases; articles of British manufacture being specially in demand. Our serious advice to our manufacturers is: Leave no stone unturned to take the leading position in the Canadian markets when the reciprocity treaty is ratified. Send to the New Dominion the best specimens of your manufacture, and charge the lowest practicable price, because in so doing you will be hastening the downfall of American monopoly, and, by your excellent workmanship and reasonable charges in the smaller markets of Canada, throwing open for yourselves the larger and almost unlimited market of the American Union, and obtaining a foothold there from which, if you act with sustained energy and discretion, you can never be driven."

North and south of the St Lawrence it has, as above is shown, been desired to prevent the people liable to be affected by it from understanding that the real intent and meaning of the treaty was that of ultimately abolishing all the protection by means of which an industrial independence had been sought to be established. How the Dominion Administration seeks to make such a measure palatable to its constituents is shown in the following passage from one of its journalistic supporters:—

"The three articles named (coal, fish, and lumber) make up about 30 per cent. of our exports to the States. If the free admission to the American markets of 30 per cent. of our exports to the States is worth seven millions a year, the *free admission of all we send them is worth twenty-three millions a year.* * * * We have left out of this calculation entirely reciprocity in the inland coasting trade and the free registration of vessels. The tory leaders would have us refuse to accept the immense annual value the Hon. George Brown has demanded for the free use of our fisheries, because it may compel a few manufacturers to change the manner of doing business."—*Ontario Reformer.*

Such being the real facts of the case, the writer "wonders—

"that any sensible writer should quote his (Senator Morton's) speech as a reason why Canadians should oppose reciprocity. Canada, so situated that *she will have all the advantages of being a State in the American Union, and all the advantages of British connection, without any of the disadvantages of either country,* will be in a most happy position. Enjoying free access to the two best markets in the world without any of their burdens to bear, will make Canada about the best country to emigrate to on the face of the earth."—*Ibid.*

That the views thus presented are in harmony with those of the Canadian government, is shown in a passage from a recent speech of the Hon. A. Mackenzie, Prime Minister of the Dominion, which reads as follows:—

"I am more convinced now than ever that in the port of Quebec must eventually centre the whole commerce of the country. There can be no question that your local energy can, if well-directed, control the import and export trade of half this continent. Not merely has Quebec the convenient situation and the vast area necessary for the accommodation of all our own transport, but also for that of the long tier of the Northern United States which stretch along our border. We are now making great efforts to extend the commercial advantages we possess by the renewal of the reciprocity treaty with our neighbors. Mr. Brown and his

co-plenipotentiary have, as you are aware, laid the basis of a new treaty at Washington. While it is of course impossible that all can gain every advantage they each desire in the matter, I am perfectly satisfied that Quebec will reap enormous advantages over all other places under the proposed measure, which will no doubt greatly extend our trade relations on both sides of the line."

Inviting now, Mr. President, your attention to the fact that the Commissioners urge upon us that the re-establishment of sham reciprocity must have *an effect directly the reverse of that here indicated*, to wit, that of *securing to us* "the lion's share of a traffic already amounting to two hundred and thirty-five millions per annum,"

I am, very respectfully,

HENRY C. CAREY.

November 23, 1874.

LETTER SIXTH.

MR. PRESIDENT: South of the lakes, reciprocity is urged upon our people as a means of relieving THEMSELVES from the payment of duty upon Canadian products. That north of us reciprocity is urged on the ground that by its aid Canadian producers will be freed from the heavy duties THEY now pay into our national treasury, is shown in a passage from the journal above referred to, replying, as it does, to the question, "Do consumers pay duty?" here given, as follows:—

"The crop of wheat in the United States is officially estimated at 240,000,000 of bushels. We, as a Dominion, imported more wheat and flour than we exported in 1872, as per our government official returns. It is, therefore, very evident that we could not influence in the least degree the market price of wheat in the United States, and that *if we sent our wheat there we lose the duty*. The proportion of our *surplus* of horses, cattle, sheep, and wool to the amount they consume is so very small that it is equally plain that we cannot influence the price in their market, and that *we lose the duty*. The Americans consumed last year nearly 40,000,000 bushels of barley, of which we gave about one-tenth. If one-tenth can control the market price, then we can dictate the price of barley in the United States, and compel the consumer to pay the duty. We think that *our farmers lose the duty on barley*, or at least the greater part of it. The American people north of the Ohio consume not less than 8,000,000,000 feet of pine lumber per annum, of which we gave them not to exceed 700,000,000 in any year, or about one-eleventh. The city of Chicago alone annually receives more lumber than we export to all countries. We supply a large proportion of the peas consumed in the United States, and we think that the consumer of them pays the duty, but *this is the only natural product, whether from the farm, forest, mine, or sea, which we export to the United States in such quantities as will enable us to compel the consumer to pay the duty.*"

The view here presented is unquestionably correct, *the man who must go to market being always compelled to pay the cost of getting there*, let it take what form it may, whether of freight, insurance, or charges at the custom house. Acutely feeling this, British manufacturers now resort to every species of fraud and falsehood; urging

upon consumers here that they it is who pay the duties, meanwhile knowing well that any and every diminution of duties paid at our custom houses goes directly toward swelling those profits by whose aid they have thus far been enabled to retain almost the world at large in a condition of industrial dependence.

That the Commissioners have been not unwilling to take their full share in the great work thus indicated, it is proposed now to show, as follows:—

At page 18 of their "Memorandum on the commercial relations" of the countries north and south of the lakes, occurs a paragraph which reads as follows:—

"The entire interchange of traffic from 1820 to 1866 showed a cash balance in favor of the United States of \$195,219,272. But this state of things came to a sudden end with the expiration of the treaty; and the balances in favor of the Dominion have since been as follows:—

| | | |
|------------|-----------|-------------|
| In 1866-67 | | \$9,281,009 |
| 1867-68 | | 4,099,949 |
| 1868-69 | | 7,893,082 |
| 1869-70 | | 14,240,477 |
| 1870-71 | | 2,921,625 |
| 1871-72 | | 8,202,352 |
| 1872-73 | | 5,236,514 |

Total balance against United States in seven years . \$51,875,098"

Reduced to plain English, this passage—vouched for by Sir Edward Thornton, Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain to the United States, and by the Hon. George Brown, Commissioner representing the Dominion—reads as follows: "So long as the Reciprocity Treaty continued in existence there was a large balance in favor of the United States. So soon as the treaty passed out of existence all this changed, the balance, in every year that has since elapsed having been favorable to the Dominion." How now stand the real facts of the case? Let us see! In the first two years of the treaty our exports to the British Colonies now constituting the Dominion amounted in round numbers to \$43,000,000, and our imports to \$29,000,000, leaving a favorable balance of \$14,000,000; or \$7,000,000 per annum. In the last three years of the treaty, ending June 30, 1866, our exports amounted to \$81,000,000 and our imports to \$128,500,000, leaving an unfavorable balance of \$47,500,000, or an average of nearly \$16,000,000 per annum; and yet these commissioners stand pledged for the assertion that this latter state of things had followed, instead of having preceded, abolition of the sham reciprocity system!

How the present, and more profitable, system, has operated, is found in the fact that from \$25,000,000 in the last year of the treaty, our exports, as exhibited in the Commerce and Navigation Reports for 1873, have now grown to \$34,000,000; our imports meanwhile having fallen to \$44,000,000, leaving an unfavorable balance of but \$10,000,000, or little more than a fifth of that of the three last treaty years combined.

At page 14 of the "Memorandum" we find numerous figures exhibiting changes in the "aggregate imports and exports" of several years immediately previous and following repeal of the treaty, without a single word tending to show that—as in 1867, when the diminution in our exports had been but \$5,000,000, our imports meanwhile falling almost five times that amount—nearly the whole loss had fallen upon the Dominion; and, that hence it had been that its administration had so eagerly caught at the "happy thought" above referred to.

The figures throughout this document, prepared for the mystification of senatorial minds, are almost countless. What their general value, Mr. President, may be inferred from the fact of our being here assured that the Dominion, in 1871-2, took of our "export traffic \$22,152,464 more than France and all her possessions;" that result having been arrived at by the singular process of adding to our *twenty-seven* millions of real exports, more than *twenty-four* millions of goods that had been simply allowed, free of duty, to cross the State of Maine!

By aid of a similar process the Commissioners elsewhere find themselves enabled to assure Senators that "with the exception of Germany, Canada was, in the year 1872-3, the largest customer of the United States outside of the British empire;" meantime knowing well, that of the nearly twenty-seven millions of merchandise passing, duty free, from Portland to Montreal, *and here classed as being of our home production*, nearly all had come in the winter months, giving employment to British steamers that in the summer had traded between Liverpool and Montreal; thus enabling the Dominion to maintain an intercourse with the outside world which otherwise could have had no existence. Nevertheless, they, with calm assurance, assert that the profits of this transit trade had enured mainly to the United States, "without any corresponding advantage to the provinces"!

In face of these remarkable misrepresentations of the real facts of the case, the Commissioners gravely volunteer the assurance that in the preparation of this "Memorandum" there has been no "*arriere pensee*"—no desire at concealment or misrepresentation in regard to any matter whatsoever. *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.*

Those which have been here exhibited are but types of those of this whole "Memorandum," discreditable, as it is, to its authors, while insulting to yourself, Mr. President, and to that Senate for whose mystification it had been prepared.

It may, however, Mr. President, be asked how it had been that the Commissioners should have ventured so to play with facts and figures. To this the answer is, that this document had not been intended for the public eye, if indeed for the eyes of all the Senators. Marked "confidential," and sent in, as a public document, but little more than a fortnight previous to adjournment, when all were busily occupied, it remained so private that eminent members of the Senate, known to be opposed to "reciprocity," could with

difficulty be persuaded that such a paper had ever been brought to senatorial notice; and it may now, as I think, be confidently asserted that it would to this hour have remained unknown, and unsuspected, had not the *New York Tribune*, on the 6th of June, performed an act of public justice in favoring its readers with a very copious abstract of its contents; thus for the first time enabling our various industrial interests to obtain some idea of the destructive character of the movement that had been for so many months in preparation. Secrecy and crime, Mr. President, commonly travel in company, and when these transactions shall come, as I think they may, to be fully investigated, it will be found that the case now before us presents no exception to the rule.

How far it could have been justifiable in the Treasury Clerk, who appears from the "Memorandum" itself to have been concerned in its concoction, or in your Secretary of State, by whose order it was placed in the hands of Senators, to endorse in any manner whatsoever a production so little creditable to those concerned in forcing upon the Union so one-sided and destructive a measure, I leave for you, Mr. President, to determine, remaining meanwhile,

Very respectfully,

HENRY C. CAREY.

PHILADELPHIA, November 24, 1874.

LETTER SEVENTH.

MR. PRESIDENT:—

Having thus exhibited the various modes in which our northern friends have sought to prove to farmers and manufacturers, north and south of the lakes, the advantages that must result from establishing for all the future a perfect industrial dependence, I proceed now to show what, in the event of this treaty unfortunately becoming the law of the land, must inevitably be the result, so far as we ourselves are concerned, as follows:—

The first three articles having reference to those "priceless" fisheries for which we have already so largely paid, they may for the present be laid aside.

By the fourth it is provided, in schedule A, that agricultural products generally, wool included, timber, fish, salt, ores, and raw materials of various kinds, shall, for the next three years, be admitted at reduced rates of duty, and thereafter, for the term of twenty-three years, free of all duty whatsoever.

That we may understand the necessary operation of this article it is needed to look for a moment at the widely-differing commercial policies of the two countries. South of the lakes it has been deemed expedient to bring the producer to the side of the consumer,

the result of that policy, maintained now for nearly fourteen years, having been that of making so large a demand for labor as to have carried immigration upward until in the past year it had arrived at nearly half a million, with such corresponding increase in the demand for, and prices of, all those products of the field, the farm, and the mine, whose prices are not fixed in foreign markets, as to have made a demand on the British provinces of almost as much real value as that of all the world beside. North of the lakes, on the contrary, the policy has been that which looked to separation of the producer from the consumer, as a consequence of which the demand for labor has been so limited that hundreds of thousands of Canadians have been compelled to seek employment within the Union; and that the total growth of Upper Canada in population, in the decade 1860-70, has but little exceeded 200,000, being less than that of the single State of Minnesota. As a further consequence, the rude products of Canada have, to a large extent, found their best market south of the border line; that, too, despite the duties payable at our custom-house, all of which, as, Mr. President, was clearly shown in my last, they feel and know to have been paid by themselves alone. What they now ask is, that the moneys they have thus far paid into our treasury shall in the future be retained by themselves, to the end, in the words of Canadian treaty advocates, that they may "*have all the advantages of being a State in the American Union, and all the advantages of British connection without any of the disadvantages of either country.*" This obtained, and "*enjoying free access to the two best markets in the world, without any of their burdens to bear, will,*" as the enthusiastic writer continues, "*make Canada about the best country to emigrate to on the face of the earth.*" How far it can be to the interest of our farmers to co-operate in bringing about this result it is for them to determine.

Schedule B extends the same provisions to axes, spades, shovels, ploughs, hammers, and agricultural implements of almost every description whatsoever.

Timber is cheap in Canada and so is iron in England. What is now proposed is, that the latter shall supply such parts of machines as are composed of iron, Canada doing the same with those composed of wood, the joint products passing into the American market duty free. The direct effect of this would be, that the whole of this vast manufacture would be transferred to the country beyond the lakes, depriving our farmers of the market now afforded them, while largely contributing toward opening for cultivation that great wheat country of northwestern Canada, all of whose products are to be admitted here duty free. On this head a highly intelligent resident of Canada, in a letter now before me, writes as follows: "In a few years the Red River Territory, including the Saskatchewan Valley, will be the great competitor of the Western States in all their products. Those extensive regions are amongst the most fertile on this continent, and are now attracting attention. With the

extension of the Canadian Pacific Railroad they will soon be settled, and will supply the United States with cattle, wool, and grain, to the serious injury of war-taxed American citizens of contiguous States."

Schedule "C" extends the same provisions to iron of every description, from the pig to the steel bar, the locomotive, the stationary engine, and mill machinery of every kind; to various cotton-goods; to satinets, tweeds, boots, shoes, leather, cabinet-ware, paper, and paper-making machines, printing type, stereotyping apparatus, railroad cars, and to so many other commodities that, with time, and with that annihilation of many important branches of manufacture which must inevitably follow treaty ratification, it will be found that almost as much merchandise will pass free through Canada as will pay duty at our custom houses.

How, it will be asked, can this possibly be? For answer, I have to say, that nothing could be more simple. A few furnaces in Canada, and as many in Nova Scotia, may be made to cover hundreds of thousands of British pigs; a dozen steel and iron mills in like manner covering hundreds of thousands of tons of rails. A very moderate number of papermills may be made to cover 100,000 reams of paper. Machinery of every kind, coming out in parts ready to be put together in Canada, must be here received as being of Canadian manufacture. That this *must* certainly be so will readily be seen, it being clear that all such commodities, "being the growth, produce, or manufacture of Canada or the United States," are to be admitted free of duty. That a man may become possessed of an axe he must have two pieces, one of iron and another of wood. Until they are brought together he has no axe. The man who brings them together claims to be manufacturer of the axe, as the man who brings together its several parts, wood and iron, may properly claim to be manufacturer of the machinery of a cotton mill.

By articles V. and VI. it is provided that, as a boon to us, certain canals shall be enlarged, or constructed, and that in consideration thereof we shall cause other canals to be constructed, by means of which vessels drawing twelve feet may pass from the St. Lawrence to the waters of the Hudson, and thence to New York. How this will operate we may now examine, leaving aside, for the present, the well-known fact, that of the various works for whose construction we are here made to ask, the major part has long since been arranged for as being required for Canadian purposes alone. In accordance with a convention to that effect, the parties to this treaty maintain each one war vessel on the lakes. By the treaty this is practically set aside, the whole British fleet, so far as it draws not more than twelve feet of water, being now to be brought within twelve or fifteen days of Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Chicago, and every other town or city that in the long period of five and twenty years may come into existence on or near the borders of the lakes. In the event of future difficulty with

Britain (and great difficulty must inevitably result from such a treaty as is now proposed), what can we do, knowing that all those cities are practically under the guns of almost the whole British fleet? Shall we have any course open to us other than that of abject submission? It seems to me, Mr. President, that we shall not.

Further, by aid of these enlargements the whole lake country will be made accessible to British ships registered as belonging to American owners, and filled with Canadian iron and other free products, *all of which may have come from beyond the Atlantic*. Can this be prevented? Assuredly not! Even as it is, smuggling is carried on at a scale that is alarming; but to what may it not be carried when every inspector shall be required to decide if iron pigs have been the product of Nova Scotian or Lancashire furnaces—whether tweeds and cottons have been made in Canada or in the British islands?

Free transit across the State of Maine having been granted, the Canadian markets will be as well supplied in the winter as the summer months. British merchandise of all descriptions will, *as British*, be carried from Portland to Montreal, to be thence distributed, *as Canadian*, throughout the towns and cities not only of the north and northwest, but also of the south and southwest. What then will become of the New York and Boston trade? What can be the inducement to bring merchandise to those ports when British ships, instead of, as now, coming in ballast, can come to Montreal laden with foreign merchandise; or when American railroads can be employed in carrying such merchandise to that port to be distributed throughout the west as being of Canadian manufacture? What of that customs revenue upon which we are now so exclusively dependent for payment of our annual expenses, interest on the debt included? It is safe to say that what, on the one hand, with free foreign merchandise passing as Canadian; and, on the other, diminution of the power of purchase consequent upon destruction of our industries, not one-half will be collected at our custom-houses that is now received.

Fifteen years since, under a so-called strictly revenue tariff, our customs revenues were but \$50,000,000 and we were compelled to borrow \$30,000,000 to meet our regular annual expenditure, including but little charge for interest. Under a protective tariff we have collected more than \$200,000,000, and can, at any moment, have it restored to even a larger amount. Instead of this, it is now proposed to give us a system that, at its best, would offer opportunities for fraud almost boundless; and yet so clumsily contrived as almost to warrant the idea that it had been intended to afford opportunity for evasion in every possible shape and form. That the effect of this, upon the revenue, must prove most disastrous appears so clearly obvious that it occurs to me, Mr. President, to suggest the question as to how the deficiencies may be supplied. Throughout the war, perfectly free to determine for ourselves our course of

action, we taxed for national purposes raw materials and manufactured products of almost every description; but by this treaty we in effect declare that such taxes shall never be again imposed, however great may prove the need. If coal and iron, wool and cotton, ores and petroleum, are to come from abroad free of duty, how *can* we tax those produced at home? How *can* we collect duties on iron after having provided that iron ships may be sent to Canada in parts, and there set up to be employed in our coasting or foreign trade while but nominally owned by American citizens? Must not the Federal government almost at once be driven to taxes on the land, and on its various products? Such taxes being to the last degree unpopular, must not the effect of this treaty be that of tying our hands to such extent as to place us prostrate before that nation which everywhere wars upon civilization by exerting all its energies for producing separation of consumers from producers, the whole to be then treated as the poor dependents we must inevitably become? Having by the treaty of Washington provided that neutral rights shall be so construed as to secure to Britain the power, as against ourselves, to war upon the ocean, are we not now asked so to act as to secure to her in all the future the power to make war upon this North American land? The more, Mr. President, you shall reflect upon the facts that have been here presented, the sooner, as I think, you will be led to see that such must inevitably be the effect of ratification of a treaty for which, as yet, no member of your cabinet has ventured to make himself responsible to you, nor have you made yourself so to your constituents.

To all the considerations adverse to ratification thus far given there is yet one to be added that, as I think, demands most serious attention, being that which will now below be given, as follows:—

Our statutes at large abound in treaties providing that various nations of the world shall, in all cases, be put upon the footing of "the most favored nations." Under the former treaty with Canada the question as to the effect of this provision never arose, for the reason that free admission was granted to few, if even any, articles that other nations desired to send us. Under this one all will be different, France, Germany, Belgium, and other manufacturing nations claiming to be put on the same precise footing with the Dominion, entitled to send us such of their products as are here enumerated, as free from customs duty as are those of Canada, or of Britain. Such demand arising, what answer could be made? Could it be that we should be enabled to avoid recognizing the right thus claimed? Assuming that it could not, as assuredly would be the case, would it not be a saving of trouble and expense to declare our custom-houses to have been altogether closed?

Having studied the facts thus presented, you will, as I think, Mr. President, be prepared to agree with me that reversing, as it certainly does, the whole policy of the Union, this treaty is the most important that has ever been submitted to senatorial consideration;

and the one which most demanded that nothing should be done except in accordance with the most approved forms of diplomatic intercourse. How far such has been the case, and how far, in that respect, the course pursued has been in accordance with the forms observed in reference to the infinitely less important treaty of 1871, I propose to show in another letter, meanwhile remaining, Mr. President,

Yours very respectfully,

HENRY C. CAREY.

PHILADELPHIA, November 25, 1874

LETTER EIGHTH.

MR. PRESIDENT:—

Absolute secrecy having been the rule adopted by the conspirators engaged in revolutionizing our financial and navigation systems, we were kept in entire ignorance of their preliminary movements until—as a consequence of recent communication to the British Parliament of such portions of a correspondence on the subject as seemed fit for publication—now at last enabled to see a little behind the scenes, learning thence that on the 23d of February last there occurred to Mr. Brown, and his colleague Mr. Mackenzie, the “happy thought” that the then present was “a most favorable opportunity for the renewal of negotiations for a reciprocity treaty between Canada and the United States of America, by which the claim for compensation as regards the fisheries might be settled without the reference provided for by Article XXII. of the Treaty of Washington.”

In what manner, Mr. President, could this wonderful discovery have been made? Had there been any discussion of the subject in our public press? in legislative bodies? at public meetings? in Congress? To the best of my belief there had been nothing of the kind, and if I am right in this, as I certainly think I am, the discovery of the fact that such “opportunity” had now arrived must have resulted from a correspondence between officials, north and south of the lakes, that it has not yet been deemed expedient to bring before the public eye.

In all time past, Mr. President, our government has been remarkable for the perfect publicity of its diplomatic movements, the example which has thus been set having been the cause of change on the part of Britain, and of other European powers. Directly the reverse, however, we find ourselves compelled to look to Britain for information as to what has now been done even in our midst, at Washington itself. May we not, Mr. President, find in this some evidence that mischief was on foot; that something known to be very wrong, if not even criminal, had been in contemplation?

Little more than a month later, say on the 28th of March, we find by their "Memorandum" the British Commissioners to have been in communication with our Secretary of State, learning from him that he had "no communication to make," and that he would wish THEM to "indicate the enlargements of the old treaty that would be likely to be acceptable to BOTH countries;" the whole movement being still kept so entirely secret that no suspicion whatsoever was entertained, on this side of the border, that any change in our commercial policy had even been suggested.

From that hour the Secretary seems to have disappeared wholly from the scene until, on the 17th of June, when there yet remained but five days of the session, we find him transmitting to you, Mr. President, the "draught of a treaty which British plenipotentiaries have proposed to this government;" thereby indicating that between him and those plenipotentiaries there had been *no negotiation whatsoever*; and that, as has since been learned from the "Memorandum" itself, he had left it entirely to them to determine the terms of the most important of all the treaties ever proposed between us and any foreign power; that one by means of which "Canada was to enjoy all the advantages of being a State of the Union without any of its disadvantages;" one whose necessary effect must, to the ruin of our shipbuilders and manufacturers, be that of throwing the whole country open to the import, free of duty, of British ships and merchandise; and the only one that had ever been suggested by which we were to be held bound, hand and foot, throughout a period of time equal to a whole generation, say five and twenty years!

Silence had throughout prevailed, nor, Mr. President, was it broken until, as already stated, about the middle of May the public mind was startled by a flight of literary rockets passing outward in all directions, north and south, east and west, from close neighborhood of the Treasury building; each and every of them bearer of an admonition to our people to the effect, that if they would be prosperous in the future they could be so only on the condition above described, to wit, that of enabling our northern neighbors to enjoy "all the advantages of being within the Union," while freed from all the liabilities of a State; leaving wholly out of view, however, the fact, that by aid of preliminary arrangements with Britain, the ports of Canada, and through them, necessarily, our ports on the lakes, were practically to be open to free admission of some of the most important of all the British manufactures.

The publication thus made had, of course, the effect of stimulating desire for further information, application therefor being made to the then Assistant Secretary of State, with, however, as then was understood, no effect other than that of being enabled to learn that the matter was one in which the State Department took no part whatsoever; and that, if further information were desired, application must be made to its head, the Secretary himself. That this was certainly so we since have learned, Mr. President, from his own letter to yourself, transmitting the treaty exactly as

it had been proposed by the British plenipotentiaries to your government.

Curiosity stimulating to exertion, earnest search came now to be made for the *place* in which the negotiation might be in progress, as well as for the *men* by whom the work was being done. It was, and most emphatically, a pursuit of knowledge under difficulties; but, earnestly prosecuted as it was, it resulted in bringing to light the remarkable facts, that the former had been discovered in a somewhat obscure corner of the Treasury Department, the latter there exhibiting themselves in the persons of two gentlemen, one of whom, although now in our public service, was by birth a Nova Scotian, the other being a bonnie Scot; both maintaining close relations with that Dominion whose rulers were now seeking to secure for their fellow-subjects, and for those of the British Isles, all the advantages of being within the Union wholly free from the responsibilities of that people with whom they thus demanded to become commercially allied.

Before proceeding further, allow me now, Mr. President, to ask your attention to the wonderful difference in the preliminary arrangements for the treaties of 1871 and 1874, those provided for the former exhibiting a care and thoughtfulness, and an array of moral and material force, more remarkable than anything of the kind on record; wonderfully contrasting, too, with the absolute unimportance, so far as we ourselves had been concerned, of the question as to whether decisions should be now arrived at, or postponed, even were it to be to the Greek kalends.

Looking now to the latter, that of 1874, we find before us questions of more importance than had ever before been even spoken of by our diplomatists, yet treated in a "hole in the corner" fashion of which the parties have been themselves so much ashamed that no single person, on our side at least, has ventured to make himself responsible for endorsement of a treaty which had there been *dictated* by representatives of Britain; and, to all appearance, accepted for us by nobody beyond a late subject of Queen Victoria who might, perhaps, within even the next half year, and wholly without disadvantage, replace himself in the Dominion, renewing the oath of allegiance to his recent sovereign.* The more, Mr. President, you shall reflect upon the contrast thus presented, the more must you be led to think that, were it not so sad that

* Of the person here referred to as, to all appearance, acting in the capacity of Minister Plenipotentiary for the regulation of our intercourse not only with Canada and Britain, but with foreign nations generally, the *New York Tribune* some two years since spoke as follows:—

"The International Statistical Congress is about to convene at St. Petersburg, and it is not agreeable to realize that the Administration could not find citizens of the United States sufficiently enlightened to serve as delegates, but must confer the compliment on a foreigner who is smart enough to hold office and manage year after year to support his family at the public crib, although he secured the exemption of his son from military service during the late rebellion, by making oath that he was a foreigner."

public affairs should be thus conducted, the whole thing would appear ridiculous beyond all diplomatic precedent.

By whom, Mr. President, had this gentleman been appointed to so responsible a position? That it was not by yourself may be regarded as absolutely certain. That it was not by your Secretary of State is equally so, he having left the whole arrangement of this important matter to the Commissioners. Such having been the case, our very extraordinary representative on this occasion would seem to have been a mere volunteer; and yet, there was, perhaps, no single person in the public service the nature of whose relations with the Dominion could by any possibility have been regarded as so absolutely disqualifying him for the important duties for whose performance he thus had volunteered.

The other negotiator, the Hon. Mr. Brown, is editor of a public journal, an active, and by many regarded as an unscrupulous, politician, exercising much influence in the Colonial government, and having, as is well understood in Canada, absolute control of that secret service fund which proved so largely useful on occasion of the negotiation and ratification of the treaty of 1854; at which time its lavish application under the direction of Mr., now Sir Francis, Hincks, then regarded as corruptionist general, was so thoroughly understood both at Washington and at Toronto, and so bitterly denounced by Canadian journals of the day; most especially, too, if my memory serves me rightly, by the *Toronto Globe*, of which the honorable Commissioner has now, and may possibly then have had, the entire management.*

Behind this secret service fund there are, however, interests of great importance, represented by men who well know that, because of the protection secured to our farmers, our manufacturers, and our working people generally, they themselves are compelled annually to pay into our treasury many millions; and further, that if they can succeed in breaking down that fence by whose means our interests are protected, those millions will be retained by themselves, to their own great profit. Such being the case, need we wonder that some of the very wealthy among them should have pledged themselves, as they are understood to have done, for large sums to be, if needed, added to the corruption fund?

This Treaty however, as has been shown, is a *British*, and *not a Canadian* one, and it is to Britain herself that those who are urging it on must mainly look for help. To what extent it may probably

* "That system was introduced by Mr. Hincks. It commenced by an expenditure of some fifty thousand dollars. It went on growing and expanding every year, after the Treaty was in force, for the last ten years. And half the so-called claims of those who lent their *influence* to get the Treaty passed, are not paid to-day.

"Mr. Hincks was of the opinion that some of those who got most of the first outlay of money, in the neighborhood of Washington, did the most to obstruct the passage of the Treaty, so that they might keep up the yearly supply of subsidies. This may have been an unjust and uncharitable judgment, but it was one held very decidedly and firmly by Mr. Hincks."—*Scottish American Journal*, July 20, 1865.

be obtained will be appreciated by those who shall peruse with care a parliamentary report here given, as follows:—

“The laboring classes generally in the manufacturing districts of the kingdom, and especially in the iron and coal districts, are very little aware of the extent to which they are often indebted for their being employed at all to the immense losses which their employers voluntarily incur in bad times, in order to destroy foreign competition, and to gain and keep possession of foreign markets. Authentic instances are well known of employers having in such times carried on their works at a loss amounting in the aggregate to £300,000 or £400,000 in the course of three or four years. If the efforts of those who encourage the combinations to restrict the amount of labor and to produce strikes were to be successful for any length of time, the great accumulations of capital could no longer be made which enable a few of the most wealthy capitalists to overwhelm all foreign competition in times of great depression, and thus to clear the way for the whole trade to step in when prices revive, and to carry a great business *before foreign capital can again accumulate* to such an extent as to be able to establish a competition in prices with any chance of success. *The large capitals of this country are the great instruments of warfare against the competing capitals of foreign countries, and are the most essential instruments now remaining by which our manufacturing supremacy can be maintained*; the other elements—cheap labor, abundance of raw materials, means of communication, and skilled labor—being rapidly in process of being equalized.”

The war, Mr. President, thus indicated, is now being carried on under the guise of friendship, and is a thousand times more to be feared than any one which might avail itself of the services of the rifle and the mitrailleuse.

In some manner interested as partner in the management of the extraordinary combination above described, and whose secrets have generally been so well preserved, we find a gentleman well known in Washington circles as manager of schemes for whose promotion champagne and gold may advantageously be dispensed; and as being himself, upon occasion, giver of entertainments made profitable to both host and guests. Had you, Mr. President, yourself unseen, been present on some of those occasions, you might perhaps have heard the questions—“Have you seen Brown? Will you see him? Might you not as well make a few thousand dollars?”—these questions followed up by remarks to the effect that, “being backed by millions, we shall certainly put it through the Senate.” Of all this the general result must inevitably have been the production in your mind, Mr. President, of a conviction that money had been used, and to an extent hitherto unknown, for the purpose of carrying into practical effect a grand conspiracy against the peace, prosperity, and honor of both the American people and their State.

“Can it be possible,” it may here be asked, “that the Commissioners could, in any manner, be cognizant of such transactions?” For answer I need but say, that nothing could have been more disgraceful than that what was so well known, in both Washington and Toronto, to have occurred in 1854; and that the present Commissioners cannot be supposed to be greatly more virtuous than Lord Elgin then was; or than those men are by whom Britain is now represented in the various countries of the East, among whom, as,

Mr. President, has been shown, there is a perpetual exhibition of unscrupulousness as to the measures to be used when maintenance or extension of the British power is brought into question. What is now being done in Japan is infinitely worse than what is being attempted here. Nevertheless, the men, abroad and at home, by whom such things are done would be shocked on being told that their conduct was, as certainly is the case, unworthy of gentlemen.

Of all the communities of the world there is none in which it is so fully recognized that "the smuggler"—that is, the man who lives by violation of the laws of his own or of neighboring countries—"is the great reformer of the age;" none by which, in treating with other nations, the Jesuit maxim, that "the end sanctifies the means," is so fully and distinctly adopted. If, then, these Commissioners have done that with which public opinion now so generally charges them, they have but acted in full accordance with that political faith in which they have been educated; and which, as yet, the Cobden Club, of which they are understood to be members, has not in any manner repudiated.

The men who by aid of champagne and gold engineered to final ratification the treaty of 1854, made free use of the name of "Hincks," and the British government subsequently signified its approval of his conduct, on that and other occasions, by gazetting him to a baronetcy, and appointing him to the Governorship of Demerara, with a salary equal to that then paid, Mr. President, to your predecessors. Those who are now engineering this infamous sacrifice of all American interests, make equally free use of the name of "Brown," and it is well understood in Canada that success in the work in which he is now employed is to be rewarded by enabling him to take his place beside Sir Francis Hincks and the Marquis of Ripon, each and all having been indebted for promotion to the skill evinced in obtaining from us grants of inestimable value, giving nothing in return.

Admitting now, Mr. President, that on the thorough examination of this matter which, as it may be hoped, will now be had, it come to be clearly established that the warrant of the present agents for using the word "Brown" is fully equal to that of the former for so using that of "Hincks," what is the position in which these Commissioners will then be placed? Seeking an answer to this question, and studying the laws of diplomatic intercourse, we learn that that of foreign ministers, in reference to public affairs, is limited to the government alone; and that any departure from this salutary rule constitutes an offence meriting reprimand from the government represented, as well as from that to which the party has been accredited. So thoroughly is this understood among civilized communities, that not even the smallest of those of Europe would for a moment tolerate such interference between it and its subjects as is believed here to have taken place. What in this respect had been the action of your predecessors, Mr. President, is shown in the case of M. Genet, in the days of Washington; of Mr. Jackson, in those

of Madison; and of Mr. Crampton, in those of President Pierce; the two former having been promptly dismissed for having ventured to appeal to the people against the government, and the last for having ventured to enlist men for service in the Crimean war. Studying now these several cases, we find them all to have been greatly less objectionable than the one here presented for consideration; the parties to the former having, with possibly some exception in the Crampton case, worked in the broad light of day, thereby enabling the government to understand their true position; those who have now so freely used the Commissioners' names having throughout carried into effect what is known in Canada as the "Hincks System;" working so entirely in the dark that you, Mr. President, although directly on the spot, have been kept in entire ignorance of the fact that hundreds of thousands of dollars are believed to have been employed in the purchase of public opinion within and without the halls of Congress. The one might be regarded as frank and open war; the other, under the guise of friendship, as plainly and simply the purchase of treason to the people and the State. If the one demanded, as it certainly did, prompt dismissal, would not the other, on the relation of principal and agent being conclusively established, demand not only instant dismissal, but also apology from the government that had allowed itself to have been so greatly misrepresented? Firmly believing that careful investigation would prove that such had certainly been the case, and that the facts have been throughout as they above are given,

I remain, Mr. President, yours, very respectfully,
HENRY C. CAREY.

November 26, 1874.

LETTER NINTH.

MR. PRESIDENT: The machinery having been thus exhibited by aid of which this remarkable treaty was to be concocted, we may now examine how it has been made to work, as follows:—

From and after the revocation of treaty privileges, in 1866, their re-establishment became to so great an extent the leading idea in Canadian minds that it may be doubted if at any subsequent session of Congress the Dominion has failed to be represented in its halls by agents charged with study of the ground, to the end of carrying into practical effect the idea so generally prevalent beyond the lakes. When, then, our Secretary of State, in March last, referred the whole question to Commissioners, representing both Canada and Britain, fully impregnated with the "happy thought" of selling once again the "priceless" fisheries at greatly more than their real value, these latter so fully understood what it was that they desired to effect, that they could without difficulty have furnished a treaty,

fully and completely mounted, within the space of eight and forty hours. Nevertheless, nothing of the kind was done, more than as many days having been required for bringing about a state of things by means of which an apparent public opinion favorable to accomplishment of their purposes could be created. How that was done, between the 6th and 20th of May, has been already shown, and that it must have required considerable expenditure, must now, Mr. President, be clearly obvious to all who have studied the facts which have above been given.

A fortnight later came the news that a treaty was already "before the Senate;" not as yet, as we then were told, submitted for ratification, but only with a view to obtaining the advice of that body in reference thereto; and yet, by many senators it was, and most truly so far as their information went, positively denied that any such document had been communicated to the senatorial body. An abstract thereof, however, given, as has been shown, on the 6th of June, by the *New York Tribune*, having furnished proof that an onslaught on our shipping and manufacturing interests was in preparation, there occurred to its negotiators the "happy thought" that by making a show of application for information as to how our various industries were likely to be affected by such a measure as that proposed, the whole proceeding might be made more pleasing to the public eye.

To that end letters were sent out, but by what authority beyond that of the treasury clerk who signed them remains as yet unknown, asking information as to whether *Canadian* interference was in any manner to be apprehended; suppressing altogether the fact that the Dominion had given to the British authorities assurance that all goods similar to those which were to be now admitted free from here would be so admitted coming direct from the British isles; as also, the further fact, of greatly more importance, that, in strict accordance with the wording of the treaty, our ports would practically be opened for the free admission of a large proportion of the British manufactures, ships included. Intended for deception of their recipients, these letters had the effect anticipated, to wit, that in their entire ignorance of the real facts many answered that they saw little objection to what had been proposed; those answers being now, as it is understood, held ready for production by the negotiators—one a resident, the other a native, of the Dominion—as evidence, full and complete, that our manufacturers have really nothing to fear, if not even much to hope, from ratification of a treaty every line of which, as is shown by their own "Memorandum," had been allowed to be dictated by the Commissioners, without, so far as can be seen, even a shadow of objection on our part.

Need we now wonder, Mr. President, that such letters should, upon occasion, have been accompanied by suggestions to the effect that their contents were not to be made known to editors of protectionist proclivities? Certainly not! One such I myself have

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seen. How many more there may have been I cannot pretend to guess; but am certainly of opinion that the emission of even a single one, with the signature of a government employé, is an offence that should not be allowed to pass unnoticed.

By the "Memorandum" of the Commissioners sent to the Senate on or about the 5th of June, it was proposed that "animals and their products, products of the farm, the forest, the mine, and the ocean; dyestuffs, manure, and rags;" should be admitted free; these *propositions* being followed up by *suggestions* to the effect that ships of the Dominion should be placed on an equality with our own; that several descriptions of manufactures should, on both sides, be so admitted; and that various arrangements relative to the St. Lawrence, to canals north and south of the line, and to light-houses, should be incorporated into the treaty now proposed.

To whom, Mr. President, could these *propositions*, and these *suggestions*, have been made? Not, certainly, to your Secretary of State, he having not only declined to make any "propositions" whatsoever, but having since distinctly stated that he held himself in no manner responsible for any portion of the treaty now before us. To whom, then? Not certainly to your Finance Minister, he having, even in a case like this, where all his calculations were so liable to be set at naught, no authority to enter into negotiations with any foreign minister whatsoever. Outside of these there could be no one to whom they could honestly be made; and yet, within a fortnight we find that not only had they all, both "propositions" and "suggestions," been accepted, but that thereto had been added "lead and leather, paper and paper-making machinery, printing type, stereotypes, carriages, railroad cars, steam engines, mill machinery, locomotives, tweeds, satinets," and various other commodities that had been neither proposed nor suggested when, but ten days previously, the Commissioners had felt that it might be possible so far to trespass on the credulity of our people as to cause ultimate failure of a scheme whose success thus far had obviously far transcended their expectations.

By whom, then, on our side, had this work of acceptance been perpetrated? So far as can be seen, Mr. President, there has been none beyond that same treasury clerk to whom the Commissioners acknowledge their indebtedness for figures that, as presented in their "Memorandum," could have been arranged for no purpose other than that of mystifying such Senators as were permitted to see the document in which they subsequently were given; that one who, in the few days allowed to elapse between presentation of the "Memorandum" and conclusion of the treaty, professed to seek among our manufacturers for information, while concealing most important facts; and that one who, without authority of any kind that can be now perceived, has negotiated the most important treaty ever submitted to the Senate for consideration; not only revolutionizing, as it does, our financial and navigation systems, but so binding ourselves to a foreign nation as to deprive our

successors, throughout a whole generation, of all power for correction!

The Japanese nation bound itself for ten years, but now finds itself to have lost all control over its own actions, having, in effect, bound itself forever. Let this treaty be ratified and *it will be found that we, in like manner, shall have bound ourselves forever.*

Pausing now for a moment in the history of this extraordinary transaction, allow me, Mr. President, to call your attention to the fraud involved in furnishing, for senatorial use, a document to be accepted as giving, in their full extent, the demands made upon us with a view to prevent that "feeling of dissatisfaction" which might arise "if the large value placed by the Canadian people on their fisheries were not reasonably compensated;" and then, with the session so near its close that but five working days yet remained, furnishing to our Secretary a document containing further demands of great importance, without, so far as can be now discovered, even a word as to the additions which had thus been made.

On or before the 16th of June, within ten days of the publication by the *Tribune* of the contents of a *confidential memorandum* prepared for the mystification of Senators, and from which had been excluded very much that seems subsequently to have been surreptitiously introduced, the treaty, "armed all in proof," must have been placed, Mr. President, in the hands of your Secretary of State. On the 17th, as has been shown, it was forwarded by him to you without a suggestion to the effect that he had even sought to master its contents. On the 18th, relying upon him as your constitutional adviser in all such matters, it was forwarded by you to the Senate, accompanied by a message in which you in like manner disclaimed responsibility for it. On the 19th it was read by its title, and referred. On the 20th, without the slightest knowledge of its contents on the part of the farmers, miners, mechanics, manufacturers, ship-builders, and ship owners of the Union, it was meant by the conspirators that it should be enacted into law, Senators having been publicly notified that, in the event of their failing to perform that important duty, you, Mr. President, would compel their presence in extra session, to their great annoyance and their heavy cost. Happily, the scheme failed in all its parts, the aspect of the Senate on that day having alarmed the conspirators; and you, Mr. President, having refused to become party to any such attempt to force upon the country a treaty so important and so entirely unconsidered. With Monday, the day assigned for adjournment, came the lifting of the veil, the *Tribune* having made public the whole text of a treaty whose real character had been meant to be concealed until ratification had been accomplished; and until we should thus have bound ourselves for five and twenty years to the wheels of the British chariot, to be ridden over at the pleasure of those who are now, in Japan, engaged in adding a new and important chapter to the already most discreditable history of treaty-making by the British people and their government.

Such, Mr. President, is, as I believe, a true account of a conspiracy that has no parallel in our history; if, indeed, in any other. Recommending it to your careful consideration, and hoping that the conduct of all concerned therein may be made to undergo a thorough examination, I remain, with many apologies for my repeated trespasses on your time and attention,

Yours very respectfully,
HENRY C. CAREY.

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 27, 1874.

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