Peacebuilding and Human Security
After September 11th
Conference Report

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Introduction

April 24-26, 2002 more than 300 representatives of non-governmental organizations, research institutions, Canadian government officials and others gathered in Ottawa for the sixth annual consultations cosponsored by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC). Participants welcomed for the first time members of the newly formed Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS), a network of academics engaged in research and teaching on issues related to human security. The 2002 meeting was titled *Peacebuilding and Human Security After Sept. 11,* in part to reflect the nascent collaborative venture between the CPCC and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, but also to reflect the urgency of rededicating efforts to improving human security at a time of international uncertainty and conflict, as well as the undeniable progress in building peace in various parts of the world.

One evident highlight of the event was a roundtable discussion on Peacebuilding and Human Security After Sept. 11, specifically designed to provide a moderated forum to air "hot issues" and involving the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, distinguished co-panellists, moderator Ann Medina, and discussion with the audience.

This report attempts to capture the substance of that lively and timely discussion, as well as the rich variety of presentations and debate in other plenary and workshop sessions on Teaching Human Security, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, rebuilding in Afghanistan, Conflict Prevention in Africa, Gender and Conflict, Warlords, Justice or Peace? and other subjects.

SESSION 1: Introduction to the Canadian Consortium on Human Security

David Viveash, Director of the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), formally opened the Consultations by introducing the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS). In relation to the CCHS, the 2002 Consultations had several objectives: to stimulate research related to human security, promote greater connections between academic and practitioners and to strengthen links between government, non-governmental organizations, and other actors. Mr. Viveash gave special thanks to the cosponsoring organizations and the organizing committee made up of CPCC, CCHS and DFAIT representatives.

The founding Director of the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, Paul Evans, from the University of British Columbia, told the gathering the Consortium is seeking to promote academic research and the importance of coordination with non-governmental organizations and government officials. Dr. Evans remarked that the study of human security has attracted a lot of new participants in the past few years and the central question is now to know how the Consortium can produce new ideas and formulate policy relevant research and reports. Recognizing the challenge of the time, he noted that since September 11[th,] 2001 discussion was

needed on how human security thinking had changed in light of new policy priorities on terrorism.

Jean-Francois Rioux, of the University of Quebec at Montreal, underlined the benefits to be derived from the joint meeting of the Consortium with the CPCC in bringing together academics and practitioners and permitting them to exchange information. Because the Consortium is a virtual enterprise, apart from the holding of seminars, communication is through sharing of documents and bulletins by electronic mail. The Consultations, therefore, represent a good opportunity for networking.

Rapporteur: Julie Gagné, Université Laval

SESSION 2: Measuring Human Security

David Malone, of the International Peace Academy, chaired the session and in his opening remarks made four key points. In the past few years the concept of human security has been enshrined in foreign policy dialogues despite initial and ongoing hesitancy within some official circles. It is encouraging and exciting to see that new conceptions of human security are being worked on and implemented within numerous jurisdictions and institutional sites around the globe. The acceptance of *The Responsibility to Protect* report released by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is one example of how the conceptual framework of human security is being implemented within some institutional and governmental circles. Human security has the ability to mobilize support from the general public, even in the absence of a commonly agreed definition.

In her presentation, Sabina Alkire, of the Commission on Human Security, noted that human security is a concept without a universally accepted definition. Currently there are over 25 definitions in circulation. However, the benchmark definition is contained in the 1994 United Nations Development Report. It emphasizes safety from chronic threats, protection from sudden and harmful disruptions, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. Human security is argued to be universal rather than territorially bound, multi-dimensional, interdependent, preventive rather than reactive, and people-centred. Definitions of human security can generally be seen to branch out in two directions. The first emphasizes poverty (e.g. Caroline Thomas, Fen Hampson) and the second emphasizes violence (e.g. official Canadian and Norwegian conceptions). The official Japanese and World Bank definitions incorporate both strands in different ways. The Commission on Human Security has struggled to develop a working definition of human security that is a) robust in the diversity of threats it can encompass; and b) functional as the basis for operational responses by different institutions to human security threats. The proposed working definition adopted by the Commission on Human Security is: "the objective of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment." The key here is to be proactive rather than reactive.

According to Andrew Mack, of the University of British Columbia, regardless of the definition of human security being utilized, it is paramount that policy-makers have access to good data, which in turn can generate good analysis that can inform and shape good policy. Econometric

approaches to the study of human security are vitally important to researchers and policy-makers. It is through statistical models and data gathered that we have become aware of relationships between various factors in international relations (e.g. the Correlates Of War database made it possible to develop the notion of the "Democratic Peace"). As there is already a Human Development Report, what is needed is an annual mapping of violence resulting from conflict or criminal activity, as proposed in the Human Security Report. It is extremely unfortunate that there is a real dearth of official and reliable data for the construction of robust econometric models. Human security is a concept with various interdependent components; measuring methodologies must therefore try to encompass objective and individual psychological factors. Mack argued that there must be greater collaboration between the research and policy communities. To that end, researchers must consciously make their work more accessible and comprehendible to the policy community (e.g. less technical jargon, executive summaries of longer research articles).

Taylor Owen, also of the University of British Columbia, reviewed a selection of methodologies used to measure human security. He stated that measurement indexes adopting the broader definition of human security tend to face several problems including: a) the availability of data; b) the accessibility of data; c) the robustness of data; d) aggregating data from different sources; and e) assigning weight to numerous variables. Models that fall into this category include: a) the Murray/King model, which looks at generalized poverty; b) the Bajpai model, which measures the human security capacity of the individual; and c) the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS) model, which measures a spectrum of environmental, institutional, social, and economic factors. Models using a narrower definition of human security (e.g. the Human Security Report) are more feasibly implemented, but the spectrum of issues that they can focus on is constrained. One option is to expand the Human Security Report, which currently measures human security in terms of violent deaths per 100,000 -- both from conflict and criminal activity -- to include regional deaths from disease and disasters.

Jean Daudelin, of the North South Institute, argued that for someone engaged in local-level humanitarian or development work, meta-indexes like the Human Security Report or the Human Development Index, which focus on national aggregate levels, have little relevance to many of the issues at hand. Disaggregating data to a sub-national level is the key to constructing meaningful human security indexes. Traditional methodologies focusing solely on national level data miss the variation and diversity of human security experiences within a region. Two key questions of utmost importance have not yet been asked: a) what use do we have for human security indexes? b) what variables do we want to compare in human security indexes and why do we want to compare these variables? (i.e. countries may rank better but compared to whom?) Daudelin argued that with the poor quality of data available, there is a distinct possibility that there will be the illusion of knowledge rather than the actual production of knowledge. This illusionary knowledge may be looked upon to provide universal answers based on faulty generalizations, which in turn could contribute to bad policy.

In the presentations and ensuing discussion several key issues and challenges were aired. Among these were problems of definition and conceptualization, for example, whether the characteristics of human security have a universal foundation and whether the poverty and violence strains of human security can be reconciled while retaining conceptual clarity and succinctness. At the

same time, it is recognized that there are dangers in making a crude poverty-violence link, which may unfairly stigmatize marginalized populations (i.e. just because someone is poor does not make them predisposed towards violence). There must be a concentrated effort to tease out conceptions of human security held (either implicitly or explicitly) by other governments, especially those of the developing world. In terms of data and methodological challenges it is widely recognized by the research community that there are significant issues surrounding the quality and reliability of accessible data. Good data is hard to find. One daunting challenge is the lack of disaggregated data (e.g. sub-national data, data on ethnic minorities, data on those living in poverty, gender data) available to policy-makers. A consensus has to be reached on the legitimacy of data gathered by non-official (i.e. non-governmental or non-IGO) sources including NGOs or others working in the field. The point was also made that existing indexes tend to only use negative indicators (e.g. numbers of deaths from violence) to measure human security. There should be an effort to incorporate positive indicators (e.g. the capacity of a region to deal with an issue) into the indexes. Another on-going challenge is how to include other aspects of human security (e.g. the environment, susceptibility to disease), in the measurement index while making sure that it remains coherent and relevant for policy-makers.

Operationally, the overarching question that needs to be answered is why do we want a human security index? If that is answered positively, one of the most pressing problems is figuring out how to move beyond the inherently political and subjective nature of indexes so that a human security index could potentially be considered a legitimate measuring instrument. How do we target societies at risk? If human security stresses preventive over reactive measures, how can measuring human security contribute to prevention? The concept of human security is not readily accepted in Washington. Can the American security framework be massaged or circumvented?

The discussion identified a number of gaps in knowledge and information sharing about data and methodologies. The research and policy communities may still be unaware of some of the specialized data used by NGOs and others in the field. This data should be investigated and harnessed if useful. As of yet, subjective elements of human security have not been incorporated in measurement indexes. There is a disturbing lack of disaggregated data. Too few measures of human security examine disease. The measurement methodologies remain focused on vulnerabilities rather than capabilities. More time could be spent investigating coping strategies.

Finally, participants put forward four principal recommendations:
- Efforts need to be undertaken to design regional, national, and sub-national measures of human security.
- There needs to be a focus on the collection of disaggregated data.
- Finding existing indicators to use as proxies for human (in)security (e.g. levels of infant mortality have a strong correlation with regime stability), must be made a priority.
- There needs to be greater interaction, collaboration, and communication between the academic and policy-making communities interested in human security.

Rapporteurs: Kyle Grayson, York University; Kate Woznow, University of British Columbia, (UBC)

SESSION 3: Research Priorities and Partnering on Human Security

In a brief introduction of the session, Lloyd Axworthy, of the University of British Columbia, stated that its purpose was to focus in a concrete way on the creation and consolidation of the Consortium in a way that fosters linking theory and practice.

Fen Hampson, of Carleton University, emphasized that policy initiatives and dramatic changes in the nature of international relations have stimulated a proliferation in the scholarly literature on human security and broadened its scope. There are three distinct conceptions of human security that shape current debates and thinking about the subject: the natural rights/rule of law conception; the humanitarian conception; and a broader view of human security, which includes a strong social justice component. Hampson presented a preliminary review of the literature on human security, underlining research progress in policy-relevant issues: globalization and its impact on human security; democratization and development; regional and national perspective of human security; terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and transnational crime. He concluded by stating the importance of finding tools for measuring human security and developing subjective studies on human security such as case studies.

A member of the CPCC executive, Kathy Vandergrift, of World Vision Canada, reflected on NGO priorities and identified three substantive areas for collaborative research between academics and non-academics and three priorities relating to structures and methodology. The three substantive areas are: the implementation of international standards and norms (the gap between these standards and reality is getting wider); the link between community level peacebuilding and macro-level factors in conflict (e.g. local peacebuilding initiatives may be successful but they do not impact the larger geo-political factors that are involved, such as the role of international trade, corporate complicity, and super-power politics); and conflict prevention/resolution (e.g. collaboration between NGOs and academics). Three priorities in the area of structures and methodologies include: information exchange and mapping of capacities and interest in policy-related research between NGOs, government, and academics; good practices emerging from NGOs (with academic collaboration); and a continuous circle of learning between NGOs, government, and academics, rather than linear policy papers.

Atef Odibat, of the Regional Human Security Centre, Jordan, commented on research priorities and shared experiences from his regional centre. He outlined seven research priorities: 1) definition and concept of human security; 2) indicator issues; 3) root causes of human insecurity; 4) health and human security; 5) tolerance (cultural dialogue); 6) regional comparison and human security (e.g. Asian, Western, African, and Middle Eastern views); and 7) gender and human security. He provided an overview of the history, activities, and issues that the Regional Human Security Centre in Jordan has worked on since it was inaugurated in May 2001. The Canadian government has given three years of support towards the centre, as have the governments of other countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands. Activities have included: a Jordanian brainstorming session on human security; a regional brainstorming session on human security; a workshop for Arab diplomats introducing human security as a concept; regional consultations with Syria and Lebanon; and a national workshop on "children and human security". Issues identified include: unemployment; child labour; domestic abuse; drug

trafficking and addiction; traffic accidents; gender issues; transboundary criminal activity; terrorism; environmental degradation; and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Last year the Centre held a variety of workshops and activities: a gender and democratization workshop; a child soldiers conference; a small arms conference; and a human security forum. Preparations were being made for a regional workshop for the judiciary.

Stephen Baranyi, of the International Development Research Centre, elaborated on exciting research that Southern institutions are doing on peacebuilding and human security and flagged a few approaches for developing transnational partnerships on these issues. Common research agendas emerging in both the South and the North are related to the definitional debate on human security; the connections between globalization and human insecurity; the ethical dimensions of human security; gender-sensitive analyses of peace-making, peacekeeping and other human security issues; and the uses and abuses of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in war and peace processes. Additional issues on which Southern organizations are doing important research include: the uneven track record of truth and reconciliation commissions and war crimes tribunals, and the cost/benefits of alternate approaches to transitional justice; policy and programmatic options for promoting security sector reform; and macro-economic, fiscal and social policy aspects of post-war reconstruction, viewed from a Southern rather than Northern donor perspective. IDRC supports research on regional security in different sub-regions of the South (e.g. Central America and Southern Africa). While partnering with Southern institutions poses some challenges, benefits of such collaborations are two-fold. First, there is much to be learned from their knowledge (including their perspectives on Northern policy debates), and for them to gain from a relationship with us (e.g. access to latest literature, methodologies, resources, and capacity to disseminate information). Second, collaboration increases the prospects for policy uptake. Baranyi offered three models for North-South research partnering: the conventional Northern-led approach; South-South partnership, where Southern institutions from different regions collaborate to design, fundraise, and manage joint projects; and finally a mixed model whereby the initiative emerges from either the North or the South, and where both sides are meaningfully involved in implementing, learning from and reaping the benefits of the project. He pointed out that it is a false assumption that most of the comparative and theoretically-sophisticated research on human security issues takes place in the North, while Southerners do case studies, test theories or gather data for others' research. Rather, a great deal of exciting research on human security issues is emerging from the South.

Don Hubert, of the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division of DFAIT, focused on policy relevant research priorities on human security. He suggested that deductive conceptual work on human security is reaching the limits of its usefulness, and that thenext advances in thinking about human security are likely to be based on inductive reasoning, building from what we know outwards. Hubert presented the many connections within the human security agenda, including human rights, humanitarianism, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, disarmament and public safety. Linking those agendas could increase the effectiveness of research on human security. He also underlined the importance of basing interventions on the priorities of affected populations, and mentioned the efforts made by the World Bank (*Voices for the Poor*), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (*People on War*), to seek community views on priorities and approaches. Finally, Hubert contended that research should move beyond international relations and start to focus on issues such as community-based policing. Institutions that are closest to

people have often the greatest effect and the decisions that matter most to people's security are actually domestic, not international.

The key issues emerging from the presentations and subsequent discussion were the need to agree on a common definition of human security, to listen to Southern human security definitions and priorities and to build partnerships between NGOs and academics. The main gap identified was between international standards related to human security and their actual implementation.

Principal recommendations arising were to:
- Move research to a more inductive approach, from the particular to the more general, to try to find ways to act more effectively and sharpen responses.
- Focus research on community-based policing.
- Concentrate academic efforts on finding effective measurements of human security.
- Create Canadian and Southern research partnerships to inform the human security debate and policy.

Rapporteurs: Julie Gagné, Université Laval; Jessie Sutherland, University of Victoria

SESSION 4: Teaching Human Security

David Dewitt, of York University, opened the discussion by indicating that the teaching of human security must not simply take place in schools, but must seek to reach a much larger research community. This would stretch the parameters of the concept and force the discussion of many critical questions. Emily Monro, of the University of British Columbia, introduced a paper written with Paul Evans and Brian Job and gave a review of current human security courses or courses in which human security was taught. She noted that undergraduate-level courses are generally in the areas of foreign policy or global studies, with no full courses devoted to human security. Brian Job, also of the University of British Columbia described the human security course at UBC taught by himself, Paul Evans, and Lloyd Axworthy. It is interdisciplinary, linking the natural and social sciences, and seeks to engage outside people and experts and incorporate a strong information technology (IT) component. What has been learned from delivering the course is that it is not a challenge to sell the concept of human security -- to students, it is a rational and a largely assumed perspective, while in many ways, the traditional security debate seems irrelevant to them. This, however, negates much of the scholarly work that is concentrated in this area. For Job the main challenges now being faced are: advancing beyond consciousness raising, developing a set of working tools, acknowledging and incorporating non-academic perspectives, and remaining interdisciplinary, keeping the issues of governance on peoples minds and presenting the moral and ethical dilemmas involved.

Claude Bruderlein, of Harvard University, who is developing a curriculum on human security, noted that although we should not underestimate the potential of human security as a field, it is not yet a science and is in need of further academic definition. He cited some teaching possibilities, including piggy-backing on an established curriculum, for example health, international relations etc., and then, drawing from a wide variety of disciplines, or using human security as a critical tool for law, health, and politics. Since the concept is evolving very quickly,

there is limited opportunity for fundamental research. We must go in with a very open mind, create a space for a broad exchange of ideas and focus on the identification responsibilities. Human security teaching should focus on scholarship opportunities, for example, a curriculum, a journal, or website and students should not be restrained by a specific definition. Finally, academics must distinguish between policy advocacy and scholarship and keep a distance from foreign policy agendas, especially in the United States. This is important to retain a healthy independence in teaching and theory.

Karen Dalkie, of the Canadian Bureau for International Education, described how human security is taught in Canadian classrooms at the elementary and secondary levels. Human security teaching concentrates on broadening the understanding of issues, primarily by connecting local issues with global problems. This is done in order to help students understand the interdependence of the world. NGOs can help facilitate this process by providing user-friendly, accessible material that puts a human face on sometimes remote concepts. One significant problem is that it is often difficult to link in with provincial curriculum. The approach inherent in the assertion that, "we must not only teach human security but practice it as well," recognizes the local dimension of human security and the need to revise the ethos of education to incorporate issues of conflict resolution and community involvement. Dalkie recommended that there be a review of provincial curriculum to see where human security fits in and that the traditionally ad hoc relationship between NGOs and the education system be formalized.

Maxime Longangue, of Enfants d'ici et ailleurs, described his organization as a student-run, non-governmental agency with close ties to French Africa that uses education as a means of promoting human security. The primary focus of the teaching is on promoting intercultural relationships and awareness. Allowing students to experience other cultures helps contextualize issues of human security. Also, it promotes a sense of citizenship and civic responsibility. Its four-part program, which is being run in Canada and Africa, includes: discussion of concepts; the practice of human security; the importance of rights and a discussion of the comment, "In what kind of world do I want to live." Teachers are provided with a small resource kit and are trained on the general concepts. Longangue said human security cannot be dealt with without civil society. It cannot simply be discussed in an academic or policy context. It has to go through the awareness of the entire society and be understood by people without academic or political training.

Some of the gaps identified in the session included the need for a mechanism for sharing ideas and materials for the teaching of human security. This would take place on several levels. For primary and secondary, it would include ways of incorporating human security into provincial curricula. For the university level, it would possibly be a website where materials, course outlines and lessons learned could be posted. It is still up for debate to what extent the definitional question must be solidified in an academic course or program. Do students need to have a definitive conceptual definition of human security, or are the general principles sufficient?

The discussion with the audience produced a number of questions and comments. One participants asked: "If I walk into a classroom how will I know that Human Security is being taught? What is the difference between human security and the peace or human rights programs

that have been taught for 50 years?" Another commented that curricula are incredibly difficult to change. It would be very useful if the Consortium could provide ways of introducing human security into classrooms. Another noted that when looking for positive examples of interdisciplinarity, women's studies departments are good examples. Women's studies scholars have been involved in these issues for 30 years. It was also suggested that community colleges. offer similar courses and wariness of political science ownership should be practiced. New teachers are not even taught the principles of sustainable development, let alone the newer concept of human security, one participant said, and that there was a very big gap between what was being discussed and what teachers are expected to bring into the classroom.

Rapporteur: Taylor Owen, University of British Columbia

SESSION 5: Welcome by The Honourable Denis Paradis, Secretary of State (Latin America, Africa, la Francophonie)

Charlotte Maxwell, Executive Committee member of the CPCC, introduced The Honourable Denis Paradis, Secretary of State for Latin America, Africa, la Francophonie, who formally welcomed everyone to the consultations on behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and began his remarks by stating that Canada is playing a leadership role in developing the human security agenda. Most conflict is now within states, rather than between states, with civilians as primary targets. There has been an expansion in non-state actors, including terrorists and warlords, who have no respect for human rights or humanitarian law and who believe themselves to be above the law. There are grave concerns regarding failed states in Africa and parts of Asia, along with the more widespread crisis of governance and state capacity that imperils peace and regional stability. It is time to protect civilians more adequately, to bring an end to impunity, to support fragile democracies, to prevent post-conflict states from regressing to conflict prone situations, and to assist governments in taking measures to address transnational criminal activities and terrorism. Traditional security mechanisms cannot guarantee the security of Canadians. Better defences are not enough. Success over the long term requires an enhancing of the safety of people both at home and abroad.

The human security agenda has a long list of impressive successes, according to the Secretary of State, such as the campaign that resulted in the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition and destruction of anti-personnel land mines, as well as the campaign for the signature and ratification of the Rome Statute that lead to the formal creation of the International Criminal Court. On the UN Security Council, Canada ardently defended the importance of protection of civilian populations, of children affected by war, and the role of women in peace and security.

The $50-million fund available over five years under the Human Security Program constitutes a unique tool for policy development, he noted. The fund supports institutions such as the CPCC, CCHS and the Regional Centre for Human Security based in Amman, Jordan. The program also provides flexibility to react quickly to initiatives on the ground, which are often identified by NGOs and research centres dealing with peacebuilding and human security issues. Canada and other like-minded countries have made human security an integral part of discussions, programs

and activities of leading international organizations. The Human Security Network has brought together 13 countries from several regions of the world, such as Chile, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, and Thailand.

The G8, with Canada assuming the presidency, has started a series of peacebuilding initiatives and a working group on complex issues such as the illicit drugs trade, and the demobilization, reintegration and disarmament of combatants in Afghanistan. The G8 was also developing a Plan of Action, in response to NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

In the aftermath of September 11th and the climate it created, the Secretary of State said, it is more important than ever to have these consultations on peacebuilding and human security and that they address such crucial questions as the mutually reinforcing nature of human security and state security. The security of individuals and respect for human rights is not possible in an insecure environment. Achieving security of the state is derived from providing people's basic rights and safety. This complementarity, however, often raises difficult questions on how best to develop strong and multi-faceted policies that respond to the full spectrum of objectives.

Rapporteur: Robin Wentzell, CPCC

SESSION 6: Peace and Conflict in Africa

Conflict is about control of resources, access to resources, or resistance because other people are excluding you from resources, André Jaquet, High Commissioner for South Africa, said in his introductory remarks. Africa is a resource-rich continent but for centuries those resources have been exported. When independence came, resources were managed badly because of conflicts over access to resources and the disruption of the past. Corruption and bad management continue in Africa. Elites who do not want to give up power exploit ethnicity, language or religion for their own purposes. Africa's position on the poverty index has gradually declined over the last 10 years. The continent now hosts not 25% but 30% of the world's poorest people.

What really made Africans sit up and take notice that changes had to begin, the High Commissioner said, was the case of Rwanda, where in a matter of 100 days, perhaps 800,000 people were killed. A German traveler in the 1800's who came across the region which is now Rwanda, wrote that many countries in Europe would envy the cohesiveness, the single sense of organization, of social justice and harmony that reigned in that area. But for European colonialists to get access to resources, they had to divide people. The colonizers decided that if you had a long, aristocratic, European nose or over nine cattle, you were an aristocratic Tutsi. If you had a stubby nose or eight or less cattle, you were a Hutu. That was the beginning of the long slippery slope towards the holocaust in Rwanda, which arose over access to resources.

Faced with a desperate situation like Rwanda, Africa had to do something and this lead to the formation of the African Union. Its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), was fine for battling colonialism, but it was an imperfect instrument to tackle the real problems, such as the problem that globalization presents for Africans. The African Union was to be born on July 1, 2002 and the first presidency was to be in South Africa. An Action Plan was needed to

accelerate things, which was the origin of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is an effort to attack one or two very specialized tasks -- not to take authority away from the continental organization, but to kick-start, act as a catalyst and accelerate action. The most urgent things on the agenda are conflict resolution, peace and good governance. Africa cannot do this alone, hence the idea of a partnership with the G8.

This is not a funding exercise, the High Commissioner said, it is a fundamental attempt to change the way Africans do business in Africa. It is easier for Africans to accept conditionalities when they are self-imposed. It puts greater responsibility on Africans to actually live up to these expectations. Canada and Prime Minister Chrétien have shown huge commitment to this process. In the end, what will matter is when people really do govern, then conflict might decrease. If Africa is rich in resources and conflict is over resources, a good start might be made in the Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which is also a resource rich country. Africans are talking much more about conflict resolution and this is where the input of civil society and governments from outside Africa, who sometimes may see the situation more clearly and have resources to help, would be valued.

Africa, many other nations in the world, and now since September 11, North America, are starting to recognize newly emerging forms of conflict, Lt.-Gen. (retd) Romeo Dallaire, of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), stated in his remarks. In Central and West Africa there are a wide range of scenarios being played out from humanitarian catastrophes that turn into security nightmares or security nightmares that create humanitarian catastrophes. Describing the mind-boggling scope of these crises for a largely Canadian audience, General Dallaire, asked them to imagine moving the population of Montreal to Ottawa with only what they have on their backs, feeding them twice a day, providing security and water and treating diseases. The scale of needed responses often creates an impression of impossibility and apathy. He noted that during the Rwandan catastrophe, figure skater Tanya Harding's attempts to get her competitor's kneecaps destroyed got more media attention in North America than the Rwandan massacre during the same three months.

African internal conflicts, he argued, have been created by autocrats and dictators, who were kept in power since their revolutions in the late 1950's and '60's by Cold War imperatives. Both sides in the Cold War supported regimes that could maintain internal control and prevent flare-ups. In 1989 we did not need them anymore; the Cold War was over, so we left them to sort themselves out. This is exactly what they have been doing -- sorting themselves out against autocratic powers, where moderates are continually under threat and extremists exercise a brutality that defies the mind. There have also been conflicts between nations. For example, in the Great Lakes region, there was an explosion from Rwanda into a whole region, which now involves the east of Zaire, southern Uganda, Burundi, and even western Tanzania. Internal conflicts can turn into regional conflicts, which become far more complex and usually relate to self-interest in resources, as demonstrated in the Great Lakes region. There is also banditry or small-scale conflicts. One example is the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, which has no outright ambition except killing and not accepting a government structure. Another is the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the Southern Sudan, a conflict with the government of Sudan, which has significant religious overtones. There are also cross-border

conflicts relating to trade in illicit resources, such as diamonds. This creates impossible tensions between nations. An example is the trade in diamonds in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

In most of these scenarios, General Dallaire said, we have found ourselves wanting in assessing their impacts, in developing the political will to intervene in a proactive fashion, and in deploying resources to attempt to stop them. This is not only in primarily military conflicts, but also where we see slaughters of ethnicities, religious groups and the like. Certainly in Rwanda, the idea of genocide was foreign to our minds because genocide equated to the Holocaust during the Second World War. We could not imagine anything coming close to the Holocaust and so we had picked up new terms such as ethnic cleansing or political decapitation. To spark a reaction, we found ourselves using the word 'holocaust.' Even with this terminology, there was no reaction or interest because there was no self-interest. There have been ad hoc reactions, he said. We have poured a lot of money into aid, to wash our hands of the blood because of our non-intervention or will to intervene. Or, we have tried to ignore conflict, or gave haphazard support to a single nation, a coalition, or the UN. While we have found ourselves facing many disparate conflicts in Africa, with others waiting in the wing, it is funny how Zaire has disappeared off the map since we started concentrating on Afghanistan. But the philosophy of sorting out one crisis and moving onto the next one is not conducive to resolving conflict in the long term and hopefully preventing it from exploding.

There are two questions to ask ourselves. First, "Are all humans human or are some more human than others?" For example, a staff officer from a country that was assessing whether to send some of its military into Rwanda, went to General Dallaire's office about three weeks into the genocide. He asked questions such as: How many were killed last week? How many today? How many are likely to be killed tomorrow? How many more weeks will this continue? When asked why do you need such statistics, it became clear that for their small population to support this effort, their calculation of political risk was that for every one of their own soldiers killed or wounded there had to be 85,000 dead Rwandans. Another nation did an assessment and in debriefing General Dallaire said: There is really nothing here. We have no self-interest here. There is absolutely no value. All you have here are humans.

When every human being is not perceived as being human, the will to assist either proactively or to stabilize the situation simply does not exist. There is no will strong enough to go in there and face such catastrophic scenarios. There have been a few exceptions, but mostly we tend to wait until the situation stabilizes, the number of dead has augmented and then we throw in billions of dollars in aid, Dallaire said. Who is making money on this aid? It seems to be an interesting business to be in. Rather than giving $200 million to save a nation from avoiding a catastrophe, and failing to give the money to the UN for the general to operate, we then give billions of dollars in aid, only a few months later.

Can we answer the questions: "Are all humans human or are some more human than others?" Do we have the right tools in these complex conflicts to do the job? Do Western security, diplomatic, or humanitarian methodologies actually work in Africa? Do they provide instruments to actually resolve these conflicts? Are we just adapting Cold War methodologies that are rarely innovative, adaptive or anticipatory and are incapable of supporting the implementation of peace agreements? For General Dallaire, a whole new military and diplomatic

conceptual base is needed to face these types of complex conflicts and time must not be a factor. There have been 400 years of complex problems, including minority and majority issues, the colonial period, then the post-colonial Cold War period, and a period of working under very difficult peace agreements after many years of civil war. Time must be measured in decades, nothing less. The plan for support can be 40, 50 or 80 years. An investment of 40 years in Cyprus was a pretty smart investment. There was not too much killing, Dallaire said. Maybe they will need 40 more years before that Green Line disappears, but what is 80 years in the life of a nation?

David Angell, of the Department of Foreign Affairs, noted that G8 leaders were to meet in Kananaskis, Alberta in just over two months from the time of the Consultations, with Africa at the centre of the agenda, not as a one-off item. Africa is alone among continents in seeing poverty rise, in having a diminishing life expectancy, which is already 16 years lower than the next lowest region. All of the indicators are dramatic and trending downwards. Prime Minister Chrétien has advocated repeatedly that Africa would be the focal point of the Kananaskis summit. He supported that commitment with the $500 million fund for NEPAD in the December budget. The Prime Minister traveled to listen to 14 African leaders in the course of seven or eight days. The discussions focused very much on issues that related to human rights, to democratization and to the very strong emphasis placed in the NEPAD on good governance, peace and security. But the Prime Minister also spoke at some length of the obligations incumbent upon the G8 partners – the importance of opening up markets, of addressing the issues of agricultural subsidies.

Among the pledges that the African leaders have made through the NEPAD is a pledge to promote peace and stability. They have undertaken joint responsibility to strengthen the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the regional and continental levels to ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace, and to hold each other accountable to that end. The focus on peace and security in the NEPAD is unfortunately warranted. Half the countries in Africa are directly or indirectly affected by armed conflict. One African in five is directly affected by armed conflict and the number of civilians killed is higher than in any other region. At the same time, the situation regarding peace and security in Africa is manifestly better today than in 1999-2000. In Angola, the continent's longest running armed conflict is nearing an end. In the Congo, there is a viable peace process in place. In the Sudan, there is evidence of willingness by countries outside of Africa to become engaged constructively. In Sierra Leone, a war of extraordinary brutality has ended. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, a peace process is taking hold, the boundary decision has come down and it appears to be holding. These are encouraging signs but obviously not grounds for complacency, he said.

Angell suggested that positive developments could be in part attributed to the engagement of South Africa, in particular, in Burundi and in Congo. But also there has been engagement on the part of the international community. Sanctions worked in Angola; we would not be looking at a ceasefire now, if the UNITA rebels had not had their supply lines choked, Angell said The linkage between conflict diamonds and armed conflict is being addressed realistically and effectively with Canadians such as Ian Smillie, Bernard Taylor and David Pratt playing a big role in that. It is quite remarkable that the two major rebel forces that were funded through conflict diamonds have now both been defeated – the RUF in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola.

The G8 Africa Action Plan will build upon this positive momentum, Angell said, noting that there was a very explicit request in the NEPAD for support to emerging conflict prevention mechanisms in Africa. The transition from the OAU to the African Union is quite a remarkable development in Africa's history and it has a major bearing on the peace and security architecture of the continent, he said. Other issues such as combating the spread of illicit weapons, addressing the linkage between resource exploitation and armed conflict, providing support to societies emerging from armed conflict and consolidating peace also have an impact.

Later, replying to questions from the audience, General Dallaire remarked that new military skills are needed to deal with new types of conflicts. These are skills that we do not have because we have been concentrating on classic warfare. War-fighting skills are required where the scale demands it, but war-fighting skills are not enough. Canadian soldiers require a whole new set of skills to try and help to resolve local disputes in these conflict areas. This requires knowledge of subjects such as anthropology, philosophy and sociology. Furthermore, there is a need to integrate security and humanitarian diplomacy -- coordinated planning is essential as well as multi-skilled commanders at various levels. Despite attempts at reforms since 1989, we are still adapting Cold War methodologies and integrated approaches of NGOs, CIDA and diplomats have not been finalized.

Asked for his views on unilateral versus multilateral peace operations, General Dallaire said he did not believe singly-lead coalitions can go in and solve the problem or that the United Nations should become a "sideshow". A country that decides to kill rather than attempting to bring people to an international court reflects a very severe deficiency in the maturity of the international system and in that country particularly. For Canada, he said, many think we are a middle power, small in the big leagues, or even smaller than we actually are. Instead of taking niche opportunities, we tend to want to move within the big team and not maximize our middle power strengths -- a good work ethic, mastery of technology and no overseas colonial past. Canada can be a leader with the UN - always within the UN - in groupings protecting human security or human rights. Should we continue to support efforts in areas where we have no self-interest but where human beings are suffering? We need to use our skills, people, will and values to provide support to them for a better world.

John Harker, of Dalhousie University, argued that if we look at our partnership and the conditions in the NEPAD document -- referred to by Prime Minister Chretien as pre-conditions to sustainability, not just conditions -- we will have to provide increased help for local capacities in Africa. Aid programs of one department or another have done quite a bit to use Canadian NGOs to sustain civil society in Africa. However, we have not put as much effort as we should in ensuring that peacebuilding processes include local experiences and inputs from civil society alongside those of the elites who were trying to rearrange things for themselves or the people they ostensibly represented. This seems to me to be a major area where we could do more good.

Regarding the peace process in the Congo, the inter-communal dialogue talks fostered by Canada only two years ago have been a reasonable success. They will only work if civil society in the Congo has a sense of ownership in what processes emerge. Similarly with the Sudan, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said he hopes the G8 will focus a lot on this conflict. However,

this should not be matter of looking for some fresh elite process, and turning away from examining the value of local developments. A number of local peace initiatives are flourishing and working in the Sudan, despite great odds, and sometimes in variance with the broader picture. One quick illustration is a peace agreement made by a Sudanese People's Liberation Army field commander concerning his own immediate ancestral lands where Arab cattle herders and erstwhile raiders were allowed to use his grazing lands in return for the promise of no abductions and leaving their weapons at home.

Global Witness, a British NGO, which with Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) has been nominated for a Nobel prize, pointed out last year that nearly $2 billion dollars of unreported oil revenues paid by great corporations were siphoned off to fuel the Sudanese government's war effort, at the same time that we had to pay $200 million US to sustain internally displaced persons as a result of the war. There is a danger in focusing only on resources that we do not look at the complexity of other contributing factors. Justice Africa brought out a study on war in Africa, wondering what really caused the resumption of wars within states, rather than between them. They highlighted failed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. If you do that badly the chances of returning to conflict are great. At the same time, the World Bank group on conflict said that you have to look harder at the problems of emigrants. If you have a large diaspora in America, your chances of having a civil war in Africa are very great. If you have a small diaspora, they are more limited.

Rapporteur: Robin Wentzell, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee

SESSION 6.1: La Prévention des conflits en Afrique

Intervenant en premier, Madame Geneviève Gasser, de la Direction générale de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient de l'Agence canadienne du développement international (ACDI) a axé son exposé sur les causes et les difficultés à prévenir les conflits en Afrique, l'intervention de l'ACDI et du gouvernement canadien et, pour terminer, elle a proposé des pistes d'action pour une meilleure prévention.

Définissant le conflit comme le résultat de "la poursuite des buts incompatibles entre plusieurs acteurs", plusieurs facteurs, en effet, contribuent à l'émergence des conflits en Afrique: les politiques d'exclusion, la prédation du patrimoine national par les gouvernements, le brutal déclin économique, la persistance des inégalités entre les groupes, la mauvaise définition des lois sur la citoyenneté, l'exploitation des différences ethno-régionales et religieuses à des fins politiques, l'afflux d'armes légères... Cela a fait qu'environ la moitié des États africains ont été, ou sont en conflit violent. Et ces conflits ont eu pour conséquences : le découragement des investissements étrangers, le détournement des ressources limitées qui auraient pu servir au développement économique et social, plus de 14 millions de réfugiés et près de 11 millions de déplacés intérieurs dont la plus part des victimes, selon les estimations du Haut commissariat de l'ONU pour les réfugiés, sont des enfants. Comme il vaut mieux prévenir que guérir, la prévention nécessite que l'on tienne compte du potentiel et de limites de l'influence externe, que l'on adopte une attitude transparente et communiquer clairement ses intentions, qu'on reconnaisse le rôle des femmes en tant qu'actrices à part entière dans le maintien et le

rétablissement de la paix, qu'on renforce les capacités locales, qu'on approfondisse le dialogue entre partenaires et que les donateurs coordonnent leurs politiques d'intervention.

Le Canada qui est actif en Afrique dès après l'accession de ces pays à l'indépendance intervient dans le continent à travers l'ACDI, le Ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce international et les organisations multilatérales (OUA, PNUD, UNICEF…). Les interventions du Canada visent principalement la promotion de la paix et de la sécurité, la consolidation de la paix et des activités liées à la résolution plutôt que de prévention des conflits. Dans la région des Grands Lacs comme dans celle du Bassin du Nil, seul ou de concert avec des organisations multilatérales, les projets du Canada visent la consolidation des capacités institutionnelles des ONG qui oeuvrent dans la protection des droits de la personne, la démobilisation des enfants soldats, le programme de désarmement, l'éducation à la paix, la gestion des ressources…

Prenant la parole, Jim MacKinnon, d'Oxfam Canada, a axé son intervention sur le conflit que connaît le Zimbabwe depuis un certain temps. Pour avoir passé trois ans au Zimbabwe, l'orateur trouve que le conflit zimbabwéen aurait pu être évité si les mécanismes de prévention avaient été mis en œuvre à temps et si les partenaires étrangers avaient agi de concert dès le début.

Ce conflit qui a tendance à être réduit à la seule question foncière dépasse celle-ci et touche aux problèmes d'alternance politique et du respect des droits de la personne. Lorsque des personnes manifestent dans Harare en scandant des slogans contre des commerçants asiatiques en disant que Idi Amin avait raison d'expulser les ressortissants asiatiques de l'Ouganda, cela n'a rien à voir avec le conflit foncier qui oppose le régime de Mugabe aux propriétaires fonciers blancs. Car, il a été observé au Zimbabwe qu'à part les propriétaires fonciers la violence et la politique d'intimidation et de harcèlement systématiques sont dirigées aussi contre des journalistes, des animateurs d'ONG, des enseignants et on assiste aux assassinats ciblés dans les milieux ruraux qui n'appuient pas le président Mugabe et son parti politique. Les récentes élections ont été une occasion pour le pouvoir d'agir ouvertement. Au vu des observateurs internationaux, les électeurs et l'opposition ont été harcelés, et la tenue du scrutin a été biaisée et non équitable.

Sur le plan économique, on dénombre aujourd'hui plus 3 millions de personnes exposées à la faim sur une population de 12 millions ; on observe une baisse économique annuelle estimée à 20%, des régions rurales marginalisée et l'utilisation des rations alimentaires à des fins politiques.

Pour éviter l'explosion généralisée du conflit au Zimbabwe, des mesures de prévention devraient être mises en oeuvre. Celles-ci devraient concerner la protection de l'opposition et les travailleurs agricoles, la résolution de la crise humanitaire, augmenter le fonds de démocratisation et de consolidation de la paix à travers le groupe de coordination des ONG. En plus, le Canada devrait encourager la tenue de nouvelles élections au Zimbabwe et amener les pays de la SADC et de la Commonwealth à maintenir des pressions sur le Zimbabwe. Une Mission diplomatique permanente d'observation devant suivre de près l'évolution de la situation est très importante afin que des actions urgentes et nécessaires soient entreprises à temps.

Quant vint le tour de Amos Anyimadu, professeur au Département de science politique de l'Université du Ghana, l'accent fut mis sur le politique et le NEPAD au regard de la promotion

de la sécurité humaine en Afrique. Il a fait remarquer qu'en temps de crise, souvent, le politique est malheureusement mis de côté alors que c'est exactement le moment où il faut des mesures politiques. Même si la question de sécurité humaine n'est pas nouvelle en Afrique, l'orateur a trouvé utile d'insister sur l'adéquation entre l'octroi d'aide aux pays africains et le respect par ces derniers des valeurs des pays donateurs. En effet, pour octroyer de l'aide, les pays donateurs devraient exiger aux récipiendaires le respect de la déontologie et insister sur l'observance des critères définissant la sécurité des personnes.

Finalement, ce fut le tour de Serge Blais, responsable du programme Afrique à Développement et Paix, d'intervenir pour souligner le rôle des ONG et des États dans la prévention des conflits et de démontrer l'inutilité du NEPAD dans ce domaine. De prime à bord, l'orateur a évacué tout rôle efficace de l'État dans la prévention des conflits par le fait qu'en Afrique, dans la plus part des cas de conflit, on fait face à des États affaiblis qui ont perdu leurs capacités d'action et de gestion. Pour que cela soit possible, il faut d'abord "refonder les capacités des États qui nécessitent des réformes en profondeur". Mais, comment y arriver ? Peut-on reformer les États par le haut sans le concours de la base et s'attendre à des résultats encourageants ? Le NEPAD, tel que conçu par quelques Chefs d'État africain dont la légitimité provient de l'extérieur, peut-il être d'une quelconque utilité dans la prévention des conflits ? Il faut absolument chercher d'autres avenues: la participation de la société civile à travers les programmes d'éducation civique et la mobilisation à la base.

En effet, lorsqu'on parle de l'exploitation des différences ethniques et régionales à des fins politiques, facteurs générateurs des conflits, il n'y a que des actions des groupes sociaux à la base qui peuvent contrecarrer ce genre des manipulations. C'est un travail de longue haleine, peu visible et dont les résultats ne sont pas mesurables. Pour ce faire, des réseaux et moyens de communication doivent être mis en œuvre pour faire échec aux schémas générateurs de conflit dans lesquels les chefs de guerre veulent toujours enfermer les populations. Des moyens économiques constituent l'autre volet de prévention des conflits, surtout ceux qui sont générés par la misère et la précarité des ressources. Ici, des réseaux de micro-crédit et de coopératives se présentent comme des moyens d'action pour lutter contre la pauvreté et résorber les conflits à la base. Ces réseaux constituent en fait des lieux d'apprentissage et d'émergence des nouveaux dirigeants ayant en esprit l'obligation de rendre compte de leurs actions à la population.

Pour une réelle prévention des conflits en Afrique, il faut valoriser les initiatives locales, celles qui sont gérées par des ONG locaux. Ce sont ces ONG et leurs animateurs qui peuvent efficacement intervenir dans la prévention et la résolution des conflits. C'est pour cela qu'il faut renforcer les capacités d'action et de mobilisation de la Société civile.

Tirant la conclusion des exposés et des échanges intervenus entre les orateurs et l'assistance, le president, Alan Bones, du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce international (MAECI a fait remarquer que l'Afrique dont on avait parlé tout au long de la séance était différente de celle qu'on entend et que l'on voit à CNN. Pour ce qui est de la sécurité humaine tout comme du NEPAD et de la prévention des conflits, le président a appelé l'assistance à éviter les positions idéologiques pour adopter une démarche pragmatique, réaliste et pratique. Récusant les soutiens et les interventions militaires en faveur des parties en conflits, Bones, a insisté sur le fait que la voie de la prévention et de la résolution des conflits en Afrique passait nécessairement

par l'appui à la société civile, à l'éducation à la démocratie et à l'implication des femmes et des jeunes dans tout ce qui vise la paix et le développement, et l'imputabilité des dirigeants.

Rapporteur: Kadari Mweme-Kabyana, McGill University

SESSION 6.2: Controlling Small Arms in Africa

Lynne Griffiths-Fulton, of Project Ploughshares, stated that the extraordinary suffering in the Greater Horn of Africa was the result of interrelated civil and inter-state wars that have lasted for decades. The large number of small arms and light weapons in the region have exacerbated the suffering. Porous and expansive borders, weak governments and under-resourced national security systems have made small arms difficult to control and account for. They have found their way beyond armies and security forces to criminal organizations, private security forces, vigilante squads and individual citizens. An estimated 100 million small arms are thought to be in circulation within Africa alone. Project Ploughshares, along with the Africa Peace Forum (APFO), assisted in the drafting of the Nairobi Declaration, which was signed by governments in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions. It reflects the signatories' political will to address the illicit proliferation of small arms in the two regions. An effective response to the small arms problem will require regional cooperation and an increased commitment by the international community.

Denis Chouinard, of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, noted in his presentation that the proliferation of small arms has been gaining momentum and that discussions on the subject are important between groups involved in the field. According to a Safer World report, 2 million children have been killed by small arms and 6 million affected over the last decade. Such numbers have been challenged by some, but it is important to take action rather than debate statistics. He noted that many countries in Africa are making progress in addressing the small arms problem, among them Mali and other nations in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. Chouinard concluded by saying that departments within government must integrate their efforts to find and identify needs and to create partnerships within Canada and internationally.

Ibrahima Sall, Director of the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in Africa (PCASED), noted that 90% of conflicts in Africa use small and light weapons. To deal effectively with that a moratorium has been agreed on the importation and production of small arms in West Africa. Under the moratorium, 15 nations have also made a commitment to share information on stocks, both public and private, and to address the leakage of small arms across borders. Sall noted that the moratorium is a legal tool that gives nations and organizations such as PECASD, legitimacy in carrying out this work. The difficulty with many NGOs is that they do not have such a mandate, and cannot implement programs in the field. Sall indicated that while it is has been important to establish the moratorium and take practical measures to destroy stockpiles, and set up a registry, other initiatives such as distribute information to civil society, harmonizing and modernizing legislation among states, and entering a dialogue with gun manufacturers have also been beneficial. In education, one goal has been the promotion of a culture of peace within states. This has involved providing input for school

programs from kindergarten on up, to teach about peace, governance, the rule of law, tolerance, as well as developing curriculum, procedures and trainers.

Wendy Cukier, of the Coalition for Gun Control, suggested that there is a need for a broad strategic vision regarding small arms and that it is important to work on capacity building and communications. A better understanding of gun violence is needed, she said, with impact, death, injury, economic costs, women, children, all needing to be considered in a broad approach. There is a also need to rethink issues such as, what types of weapons are causing death? One South African study indicated 50% of deaths were caused by handguns, 30% by rifles, and 4% by AK-47s. Civilian guns are leaking from legal to illegal sources, including police weapons and surplus conflict weapons. Other outstanding issues include the nature of gun ownership, age, gender, and supply and demand. She argued that priorities should include new legislation, the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition, creation of gun-free zones such as schools, and educational initiatives. More attention should be focused on implementation, enforcement and ensuring police cooperation.

Key issues and challenges noted in the overall discussion were that because no one country can affectively deal with the issue of small arms on its own, a combined, concerted, international effort is imperative that involves cooperation between government, non-government and civil society, both domestically and internationally is a key issue. It is also important to have sustainable, long-term programs enacted by government and non-government organization, and to have such programs complement one another, rather than being initiated on their own, or in a vacuum.

Gaps identified by the participants were that more consultation is needed between government, non-government and civil society, so as to be able to better coordinate peacebuilding efforts and more effectively initiate programs, and that there is a need for institution building, especially in the most conflict torn regions within Africa, to strengthen legislation, enforcement, education and monitoring of small arms, stockpiles, and imports.

Recommendations stemming from the discussion included:
- Increase support for civil society initiatives, education in regards to creating a culture of peace;
- Secure long term sustainable funding for capacity and institution building, democratization, and good governance;
- Strengthen partnerships between North and South countries, as well as non-government actors and civil societies;
- Take a broad-based, comprehensive approach that addresses not just small arms issues, but development, gender, children etc.;
- Place moratoriums on production and imports of small arms to conflict zones; and
- Strengthen and harmonize legislation within African regions in regards to small arms.

Rapporteur: Ivan Zenar, University of Waterloo

SESSION 6.3: Resource Conflicts in Africa

Mark Taylor, of Forskningsstiftelsen Fafo, a Norwegian research institute, began the discussion with a description of some of the preliminary findings of recent research on economies that help sustain conflict. The emerging conclusions are that economies of armed conflict are linked to the darker side of globalization. All the technologies and capabilities of globalization are being used by warlords and terrorists. They are using global markets to sustain themselves. There is a growing sense that economies that help sustain armed conflicts are unacceptable. This poses a problem for Third World countries and transnational corporations where "conflict commodities," such as diamonds and timber, are produced and brought to market by:

- anarchic exploitation – this blurs the line between licit and illicit activity, undermines sovereignty, and is the result of armed conflict;
- criminalized transactions – when criminal networks become part of the production chain (theft, fraud and laundering); and
- militarized production: Involvement of governments involved in extraction of resources (direct) or indirectly.

These present dangers of risk for transnational corporations when operating in "dark markets." One notion looked at is "rogue companies" who operate illicitly, often connected with warring parties. They are increasingly coming to the attention of the UN, but the label is a danger for legitimate transnational businesses. 'Black market' defines illegal transactions; 'grey market' defines the mixing of licit and illicit goods; and 'red market' defines legally or illegally produced goods that are traded on the legitimate but unregulated global markets. The implications of the merging of business and conflict are obvious for peace and human security, but they it is also a real threat to the sovereignty of nations and a big problem for democratic and transparent governments.

Dev Sharma, of CARE Canada, focused on water resource conflicts, at both the micro and macro levels. Challenges include water scarcity, lack of accessibility, deteriorating quality, fracturing of management, fracturing of monetary resources, lack of awareness by policymakers, access and equity. Water shortages are evolving: by the year 2000 there were 26 countries with water shortages and by 2050 there will be an estimated 66 countries with water shortages. Population in water stress areas is growing. By 2025, 66% of Africa's population will live in areas of water stress. Between 5 to10 million deaths a year are attributed to a lack of clean water. There is environmentally induced scarcity, which tends to lead to inter-communal and intra-ethnic conflicts. Migration in search of water is growing. Key issues include the link between poverty and water, and the link between water and food security. Other key issues include the link between water and health, issues of governance and the lack of political will, water privatization, water, gender and traditional rights. Management strategies should be driven by securing access, equity and affordability; integrated water management; community empowerment and governance. Water security in the 21st century depends on the empowerment of people and the eradication of poverty, Sharma noted.

David Viveash, of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, discussed the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds and how that process might be applicable to other conflict resources. The Kimberley Process began in May 2000, in Kimberley, South Africa on the initiative of southern African diamond producing countries and in response to pressure from the NGO community (especially Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness), the UN, the

diamond industry, and consumers. The final Kimberley meeting will be in November 2002, and will launch the Kimberly product. Some may say it took too long, but it was fundamentally successful. The strengths of the process were its inclusiveness (bringing together governments, industry and civil society groups), a common sense of purpose and strong leadership, particularly from South Africa. Its weaknesses were: inclusiveness, when it was difficult to get the right people around the table, and the cultures of governments, industries and civil society clashed; unhelpful side issues, such as an initial problem with the E.U., and the participation of Taiwan; and uncertainties about the process' mandate and it came from.

Viveash said that the lessons learned from the process were that there is a difference between inclusiveness and being open-ended and that democracy has its limits and not everyone can be involved in every decision. Another lesson has been that there is a need to know what the goals are before beginning; as well as what the rules of the game are before sitting down at the table.

From an NGO perspective Ian Smillie, of Partnership Africa Canada, said that some of the lessons learned from the process were that diamonds are not a popular issue. Fortunately the media picked up on the initiative and made it a popular issue, which led the media to report about the conflicts. A second lesson was that NGO campaigns can be very effective, and a good coalition of small, remote NGOs was formed. Thirdly, the diamond industry was willing to engage with the NGOs, fuelled by their engagement at the UN. As well, the UN panel added to the credibility of the NGOs. Another crucial aspect was that South Africa championed the process. They initiated and improved it. Behind the scenes, the U.K. did a lot as well. Lastly, it was an inclusive initiative and NGOs were always allowed to speak.

There are several problems remaining regarding diamonds, Smillie said. Conflict diamonds are only 4 – 10% of the market, but up to 20% of diamonds are illicit, either stolen or smuggled. There remains opportunity for further trouble in the diamond industry. The issue of monitoring and verification is still outstanding. There must be third-party monitoring, and there is no current monitoring system set up. The lack of monitoring in this process is a failure, because the actors are not all honest brokers. He said one objective in pursuing the initiative was to get friendly governments to agree to voluntary monitoring, and embarrass those others into agreeing.

Along with setting up a monitoring mechanism for ensuring the viability of the Kimberley Process, and increasing the capacity of countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone to implement it, other key issues and challenges related to resource-related conflicts in Africa are ensuring that a gender perspective is brought in and raising the level of awareness amongst policy makers, particularly with regard to water issues.

Gaps identified in the general discussion included the need to also look at resources such as oil, and specifically the involvement of Canada's Talisman Energy in the Sudan, to expand and strengthen global economic regulations to protect against black and grey markets, and the corporate accountability scandals in the US, and a need to better examine the role of private security firms and mercenary organizations in resource conflicts.

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Recommendations stemming from the session included:

- Involve the UN Security Council in the Kimberley Process, in order to ensure an appropriate monitoring mechanism emerges. A secondary option is to create a voluntary code of conduct for willing nations to sign and pressure abusing nations to join as well.
- Increase awareness programs for policymakers on water issues.
- Increase capacity-building programs for grassroots and women's organizations around issues of water management.
- Continued and increased funding by the Government of Canada for research relating to the economies of conflict, illicit markets, the trafficking of humans/women/children.
- Ensure that the experience of the Kimberley Process and its lessons are transformed into more open policy regarding NGO and private sector involvement.

Rapporteur: David Mozersky

SESSION 6.4: Security Sector Reform in Africa

Having recently returned from Ethiopia and Eritrea, where he worked on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Lt. Col. Dean Milner presented the Department of National Defence perspective on how to improve the situation in Africa. Canadian Forces personnel are currently deployed to three UN peacekeeping missions in Africa – UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, MONUC in the Congo and UNMEE. It is currently felt that the Canadian Forces (CF) are overextended and trying to do too much in too many areas. It would be more prudent to concentrate their efforts since they possess such limited resources. Milner felt the CF should instead pick a spot, similar to what the United States or France and the United Kingdom have done, and focus solely on one or two countries. The Canadian Forces currently has 17 members deployed to Sierra Leone, which has been a good effort. Elections in Sierra Leone were imminent and the United Kingdom has estimated that they will need another 10 to 20 years to transform the security forces there. The Sierra Leone mission has been successful enough that it could be considered a blueprint for future missions. The mission in the Congo (MONUC) is not going as well, and the UNMEE mission is also encountering difficulties because of weak governments and a poorly education population. DND needs capable, well-trained soldiers and also needs to coordinate efforts with the French or the British when going into a country to maintain effectiveness. In addition, we need to make a long-term commitment to a mission. Simply operating in a country for one or two years is insufficient. More likely, we will have to commit troops to a mission for ten to fifteen years.

Alhaji Bah, of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), endorsed the idea of making a long-term commitment in peacebuilding and noted that the international community should be thinking in terms of decades not just one or two years to ensure sustainability. IDRC is funding security sector reform programs in Africa. In Sierra Leone, after a brutal civil war demobilisation is almost complete, but civil-military relations have been completely destroyed. Through a decade of civil war, the public lost confidence in the security forces and there is no trust in the armed forces. Security sector reform holds the promise of reforming institutions and developing the capacity to provide civilian oversight. The armed forces within Sierra Leone currently are not held accountable to the general public and are rife with corruption. The

demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process has involved several international actors including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The peace agreement outlined the DDR process and made a strong national commitment to it. While the demobilisation and disarmament phases are nearly complete, the reintegration process is encountering several difficulties, primarily because the country has little infrastructure left and little opportunities for the former combatants. Monies received for reintegration are being spent on diamond mining equipment. Gender issues have been ignored and little has been done to foster the reintegration of female ex-combatants.

As civilian police liaison within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, John White of the RCMP, has been involved in the missions to Sierra Leone and Guinea. In Sierra Leone, civilian police were sent to advise and assist the government in the restructuring of the police force. It is crucial that the judicial, penal and policing institutions be able to operate at the same level of efficiency or there will be difficulties. Within Sierra Leone, corruption was present in all institutions and laws need to be reformed to help eliminate it. British civilian police officers have been effective in procuring equipment for the police forces and plan to be on the ground in Sierra Leone for the next 15 years. In general, police require sufficient funding to carry out their missions and the participation of skilled officers. NGOs on the ground in post-conflict areas need secure and safe environments with the rule of law applied to carry out their activities. Officers need to be able to investigate complicated crimes. However, it is important that Western techniques are not imposed on those we are working with. Finally, it is important that economic reconstruction provide employment opportunities for civilians, thereby contributing to the prevention of crime.

Yvan Conoir, of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, described the activities of the Centre within a project in francophone Africa: capacity-building related to military and police institutions. He noted that significant reform of the security sector in that part of Africa is difficult because institutional changes have not yet occurred, for example, there is no female recruitment in the Senegal military, and the institutions are still built on the colonial model (for example the French gendarmerie.) What has changed? Objectives and mandates of security institutions: better democracy process and principles of good governance, better support of the rule of law by the military, etc. Similarly, at the international level, there is a reinterpretation of objectives and mandates and more varied participation in peacekeeping operations, for example the participation of countries such as Libya, Mozambique. More peacekeeping is necessary to ensure there are more African leaders and African troops and so that Africans can take care of security on their territory. A few different programs were created to meet these needs, including the African Crisis Response Initiative, led by the United States. Its goal was to reduce the US burden for security in Africa and capacity-building was needed to give them the tools to do the job themselves. Unfortunately President Bush decided not to continue the program. France also has a program where every two years, a regional military exercise is organized with the political objective of obtaining a continental perspective. France has also created a school for the sharing of knowledge between the North and the South, with instructors from Europe going to Africa to teach. Previously, Africans would have to go to Europe for training. Finally, Canada initiated a program with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to foster capacity-building and carry out demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programs. Previously there was no DDR project in francophone Africa.

During the discussion two major gaps were identified: that the CIDA-RCMP relationship is dysfunctional, the Civilian Police Arrangement is not working and a new tool for deployment needs to be created; and that resources and funding are limited and create challenges in carrying out missions and tasks. Recommendations flowing from the discussion were that:

- The G8 and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can provide opportunities for Canada to play a pivotal role in peacebuilding.
- Canada needs to define its role for SSR in Africa and develop entry points, strengths and a comprehensive approach.
- Look at Africa as a whole and decide where we should go and why – FOCUS.
- Increase the resources and funding to the RCMP and Canadian Forces to increase capabilities.

Rapporteur: Trista Guertin, St. Mary's University

SESSION 7: The Responsibility to Protect: Intervention and State Sovereignty

Fergus Watt, of the World Federalists of Canada, introduced the plenary session on the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) by emphasizing that *"The Responsibility to Protect"* is a development of tremendous significance in the realm of international affairs. He expressed hope that the membership of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) will support the dissemination and implementation of the report and the principles it represents.

Jill Sinclair, of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and co-head of the Canadian Secretariat for ICISS, provided a brief history of Canadian involvement with the commission. She recalled UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's stark portrayal of a dilemma in which the highly polarized debate on humanitarian intervention precluded the development of an effective response to egregious violations of human rights in such cases as Rwanda and Srebrenica, in the former Yugoslavia. Canada, Sinclair observed, established ICISS in the hopes of opening up "an intellectual space for honest debate" on the question of humanitarian intervention. The Commission was chaired by extraordinary individuals from both North and South, including commissioners responsible for political, ethical and operational dimensions of the debate, and sought out voices from all viewpoints and geographical backgrounds. Its challenge was one based in political reality, in the sense that ICISS was created to stimulate debate that would resonate with governments around the world. Sinclair noted that the report has created only a first space for debate, and that Canada remains committed to ensuring that its findings are taken back to the international community in the form of a substantive political challenge.

Thomas Weiss, director of the Ralph Bunche Institute at The City University of New York's Graduate Center and co-head of the ICISS research directorate, reminded participants to think of

the report not only in terms of past events, but also in terms of the "next" Rwanda. He suggested that recent action in Afghanistan is evidence that the international community has a vested interest in contributing to long-term, preventive action. He also reiterated that ICISS was very much a response to Security Council ineptitude in a variety of situations. In fact, he suggested, one of the strengths of ICISS is that, like the Brundtland Commission, ICISS was demand- driven, "rather than an idea looking for consumers." It is partly for this reason that the report has been welcomed in political circles, and why he predicts that "The Responsibility to Protect" will be mainstreamed in the next four or five years. While he agreed with the previous speakers that the Government of Canada has an important role to play in this process, he urged non-governmental organizations, academia and the media to play a much more active role in promoting its ideas. History demonstrates that changed behaviour requires a changed way of thinking. By spreading the message that "sovereignty is not the enemy of human rights – it's actually a precondition of human rights," substantive change can be brought about.

Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the Commission, now President of the International Crisis Group, and a former Australian foreign minister, discussed by videoconference the content of the report. He reiterated the moral imperative of providing protection, noting in particular that while the international community may share increasingly common values, it still suffers from the lack of a common framework for action. ICISS hoped to remedy the situation by setting three pragmatic goals: to generate an intellectually robust but practical report; to provide recommendations not likely to be rejected out of hand by any player; and to ensure that these recommendations have practical potential for motivating state action. The report emphasizes that the intervention–sovereignty debate has taken place in the context of evolving norms of conduct, in which there is an increasingly widespread acceptance of the premise that state sovereignty implies not only rights, but also responsibility. Embedded in this emerging conception of sovereignty as responsibility is the further premise that if a government abandons its citizens or proves incapable of protecting them, its sovereignty would yield to the responsibility of the larger international community. Evans noted that the concept of a responsibility to protect resonates with the post-war notion of human rights, the emerging concept of human security, and with the norms underlying numerous international treaties and practices designed to protect the individual. Framing the debate to make clear the dual responsibility of sovereignty, however, offers three advantages: it begins with an acknowledgement of the importance of the state, it shifts the perspective of debate to that of the victim, and it enables the discussion of "protection" as not only reaction, but also prevention and rebuilding.

Equally important as the change in terminology are the report's six criteria for military intervention when reaction does become necessary. These criteria provide a framework for whether, when and how to intervene. The "threshold" criteria, for example, limits military intervention for human protection to two (actual or apprehended) circumstances of "just cause": large-scale loss of human life; or large-scale ethnic cleansing, including killing, forced expulsion, terror and rape. Should intervention be warranted, the "precautionary" or "prudential" criteria come into play. These include right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. Finally, the "right authority" criteria stipulates that there is no more appropriate body than the UN Security Council to authorize military intervention. The report supports this stipulation with a call for further Security Council reform, suggesting that the question is not one of finding an alternative, but of ensuring that the council is able to act

promptly and systematically when needed. The alternative is either ineffective operations or a weakened multilateral system. When the Security Council is unable to act, the international community would need to find alternative political authorities through which to carry out its responsibility to protect, perhaps acting under the authority of regional organizations. Fortunately, Evans observed, the message has been heard. The Government of Canada is committed to follow-on, and the report was to be the subject of a Security Council strategy retreat in May 2002. Perhaps most encouragingly, was UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's statement in New York that the report "[takes] away the last excuses of the international community for doing nothing, when doing something could save lives."

The discussion following the presentations demonstrated widespread support for the report, but also some concern. Questions focused on prospects for consistency in the report's real-world application. Several participants argued that not enough attention was paid to the question of who is being protected. One participant questioned the lack of attention to gender in the report, while others wondered more broadly about the inequities evident in previous international responses (or lack thereof) to human rights violations, noting that international intervention has tended towards defining some victims as "more human" or "more worthy" than others. Finally, one participant expressed doubt that the report would serve to stimulate action in such entrenched cases as the Sudan, which falls under the sphere of existing conventions on refugees and genocide, but which has thus far been neglected. The panelists responded by reminding participants that the report is wide-ranging, and that its six criteria for intervention apply to military responses only. In fact, the report encourages more consistency in international action, as well as a more comprehensive approach to prevention and rebuilding across a broad spectrum of society. With regards to the situation in the Sudan, one panelist agreed that international action was needed, but pointed out that the report's prudential criteria (including "last resort" and "reasonable prospects") suggest that a diplomatic response is needed first and foremost. Mr. Evans mentioned some of his own current work with respect to Sudan and expressed cautious optimism that there may be some progress in the near future.

A related concern was that the report may in fact serve as justification for inappropriate, non-humanitarian intervention, its arguments serving as a "pretext" or a "license" for invasion. Some mentioned Afghanistan as an example. The panelists agreed that misuse of language has been a problem in the past, and underscored again that ICISS was created in large part to address inconsistencies in international response – whether in the form of unheeded calls for assistance or unwarranted intervention. Moreover, the report's guiding criteria serve specifically to limit both the conditions under which military action is called for, and its form and scope when used. Current action in Afghanistan, it was noted, is neither a humanitarian response nor one founded on the concept of a responsibility to protect, and thus does not represent a challenge to the report.

Rapporteur: David Beal, United Nations Association in Canada

SESSION 7.1: Conflict Prevention

Aileen Carroll, Member of Parliament, noted in introducing presentations that the best approach to prevention issues is inclusive, coherent and comprehensive. All stages of conflict must be taken into account and prevention from a regional approach and response is essential.

Independent Chilean security analyst Raul Sohr stated that a central challenge of conflict prevention is to redefine the concept of security and diffuse a shared understanding of human security where a large degree of scepticism continues to exist among a number of states. An additional challenge is to strategically use the concept of human security to redefine perceived threats. For example, in the 1970s, the Peruvian state defined security issues as threats to national sovereignty by neighbouring states, accordingly planning a military response. As it turned out, the largest and most destructive threat to the Peruvian state was internal; the Peruvian state was not militarily equipped to deal with the *Shinning Path* revolutionary group. Central threats to human security today include: a) militarism and military spending; b) threats to human rights; c) crime and disparity of 0resources; and d) threats to democracy and civil society.

John Watson, of CARE Canada, said it is critical to recognize the changing nature of conflict and the increase in human insecurity in the post-Cold War era. Political leaders, once propped up or kept out of power by intervening world powers, have sometimes resorted to the politics of 'hate' in order to stay in power. There are central themes in this strategy, which include: land and property rights (legal issues); illegal economies; and media and hate propaganda. Globalization is not necessarily a positive phenomenon, particularly given that shares in prosperity are not even. Parallel to this, there has been a drop in development assistance in the post-Cold War era. The rise of neo-liberal economics sometimes compels leaders to choose between structural adjustment programs (SAPs) or hate politics. Hate politics then becomes a justification for militarism. When we start conflict prevention analysis from this assumption, new pressure points are revealed, points where non-governmental organizations can respond and act effectively. For example, when there is a loss of international resources, local leaders often lay blame on propertied minority groups. Therefore, work on legal property issues is a critical place to intervene. Radio and rallies evoke hate politics to mobilize people around leaders – this is an early warning indicator (monitor hate) that flags "goon squads" that act as enforcers of hate politics. While the prospects for prevention may be grim, as it is difficult to reverse hate politics, at least NGOs and international organizations can lay the ground work for prevention.

Susan Brown, of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), contended that a conceptual link between development and conflict has slowly evolved in development agencies, so that prevention-oriented policy and tools exist today to assist bilateral and multilateral development organizations. CIDA has developed the Peacebuilding Fund, recognizing that prevention is the most effective way of going about the development business - the Carnegie Commission demonstrated this in nine case studies, where the cost of conflict was estimated at $216 billion US. If prevention had taken place, the world community would have saved 76%, Brown argued. Similar studies on military spending and peacekeeping have been done by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion. But the dilemma is that it is easier to mobilize after conflict and not before. Most intervention, particularly development, occurs after a conflict takes place, when it is easier and safer to work. In other words, a *culture of prevention* does not yet exist. At the same time, some new initiatives are occurring. These initiatives include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) Guidelines on Conflict Prevention and Development, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Website - including a compendium of tools, lessons learned and best practices; conflict prevention training such as the CIDA peacebuilding course for junior development officers; and Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER).

David Carment, of Carleton University, stated that good prevention is highly ambiguous and difficult to measure, whereas intervention is not only visible, but also has clear sets of thresholds and a set of measurable aspects. Given this, how can the academic and policy community move towards a more effective prevention tool? Presently, the policy community is far ahead of the academic community in terms of human security issues. Academics must identify: a) conflict generating factors; b) who the stakeholders are, both agents and spoilers; and c) peace generating factors. Moreover, there is a large analytical gap between academics and policy-makers that needs to be closed.

Some of the key issues and challenges that emerged from the presentations and subsequent discussion were that: the ideal risk assessment model is often far from what is feasible; information is scarce and knowledge sharing is inhibited by individual NGO or government interests; and in the domestic Canadian climate, emphasis on results based management means low tolerance for ambiguous results, while at the same time it is difficult to measure success in conflict prevention, when success is signified by nothing occurring. Therefore, development organizations need to become more flexible in country selection criteria, concentrating not only on 'good performers' but also on 'bad performers' such as countries engulfed in conflict or just emerging from conflict.

Recommendations emerging from the session were:
- Building a consensus within the international community on human security as a policy and guide for action should be a priority. Developing countries can play a central role in the security sphere and must be included in building this consensus.
- Key areas internationals can and should intervene in include: development of indicators; land and property rights (legal issues); illegal economies; and media and hate propaganda.
- The political will to intervene before conflict must be created. Governments must be convinced "to pay to see no results," that is, to invest in preventive measures. More attention needs to be focused on supporting NGOs and early warning mechanisms, not recognized in the ICISS report.
- NGOs should focus on the following priorities: property; commodities; technology; diaspora roles in conflict; the reduction of 'hate politics'; and youth strategies.
- Canada engages in weapons trade – we need to clean up our act – and money should be reallocated from military expenditures to preventing conflict.

Rapporteurs: Erin Baines and Emily Monro, University of British Columbia

SESSION 7.2: Reaction

Paul LaRose-Edwards, of CANADEM, began by suggesting that in the interest of building on the discussion on the "The Responsibility to Protect", participants assume that there is a responsibility to protect, and focus on exploring concrete ways in which Canada can implement or operationalize the responsibility.

Andrew Mack, of the University of British Columbia's Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, a former director for strategic planning to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, began by recalling how, in 1999, the Secretary General electrified and angered much of the UN General Assembly by highlighting the inconsistencies in international response to humanitarian emergencies and articulating a powerful moral imperative to "do something." At the same time, a cynicism born of a long history of imperialism cloaked in humanitarian rhetoric pushed many states to see intervention as an unacceptable assault on sovereignty. "The Responsibility to Protect" reframed the debate so as to demonstrate that sovereignty as a principle of non-intervention has never been the central issue. In cases of intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East Timor, the problem was not one of sovereignty, but of a reluctance of Northern states to "pay the price" of intervention for the protection of human rights. Mack pointed out that while many observers have explained this as a "lack of political will," the phrase is analytically useless, and does not lend itself to a solution. What is needed instead is a way to persuade key players in the North that it is in their interest to react as early as possible. Noting that there are various ways to make this argument, he submitted that "The Responsibility To Protect" could play a key role as a vehicle for norm development.

Fergus Watt, of the World Federalists of Canada, observed that "The Responsibility to Protect" has tremendous potential to equip the multilateral system and the UN for the 21st century. He welcomed in particular the report's openness to the possibility of intervention not authorized by the Security Council should it fail to react appropriately, and suggested that the report may help to build a much needed system of norms and political accountability for such interventions. Watt's enthusiasm was qualified primarily by the report's lack of a clearly defined program of action, as he feared that it may be difficult to sell the report in political circles. Emphasizing that Canada could play an important role in this, he suggested that Canadian civil society push to explore the report's implications for the upcoming Canadian foreign and defence policy review process. He also proposed that it might be worth establishing an international ad hoc coalition or perhaps using the existing Human Security Network to engage other states. Finally, he hoped that Canada would lead by example, recommitting itself to the goal of achieving a robust rapid reaction capability or by further integrating Canadian management of peace support operations by improving interdepartmental cooperation, emergency assessment, training and deployment.

Lt. Col. Gaston Côté, of the Department of National Defence, underscored the point that further integration of peace operations is needed by observing that it is critical to resist at every opportunity the tendency to separate the military, political and economic aspects of international responses to conflict. In the same vein, he argued that it makes more sense to deploy military force at an early stage and as part of a strategy of prevention rather than reaction. As evidenced by the deployment of the Canadian Forces in Eastern Zaire during Operation Assurance in 1996, effective and credible diplomacy plays a key role in the prevention phase. Regarding reaction, Côté noted that effective international action demands a clear, robust and enforceable mandate, an effective authority structure and focus, and a strong partnership structure. He also observed

that Canada supports the development of a rapid reaction or deployment capability for peace operations, but that much work still needs to be done. The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, for example, meets the standards established by the United Nations' Brahimi Report (deployment in 30 days from a Security Council resolution for traditional peacekeeping operations or 90 days for more complex operations), but even these standards may not meet the demands of the most critical situations. At current levels of training and strategic lift capability the Canadian Forces do not have the requisite level of readiness to deploy this rapidly in sufficient numbers.

Thomas Weiss, of City University of New York and co-head of the ICISS research directorate, argued that the central thrust of the report is that "ideas matter." The report's attempt to include values within the framework of national interest is an important but difficult challenge, and Weiss hoped that the events of September 11 have reinforced Michael Ignatieff's argument that "bad neighbourhoods are black-holes". He underlined the report's distinction between "peace enforcement", modeled on the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and "coercive protection" operations that are tasked with disarming refugee camps, protecting safe zones or corridors, etc. He noted, however, that the latter type of operation is poorly understood in military terms, and need to be further developed. He also wondered if the report's emphasis that military reaction is to be considered only as a last resort may inadvertently retard the prospects of convincing the international community to act with due force as early as possible.

In the general discussion that followed several participants agreed with Weiss that a key challenge for the international community is to develop a better understanding of how to undertake effective coercive protection, and of the role such operations could play in various situations. One participant, for example, identified a need to develop a better understanding of how to protect children in conflict situations. Others focused on the recent shift in peace support operations away from the UN aegis and towards coalitions of the willing. Several participants agreed that this shift is a central one for Canada, although there was a wide range of opinion as to the potentials and pitfalls of Canada's apparent new preference for non-UN coalition operations. It was pointed out that Canada has been suspicious of the performance of UN peace operations in the mid- to late 1990s, and that the UN is not an ideal mechanism for directing the more robust type of operation that has become typical in recent years. Identified as an area of particular concern was the lack of military standards for cooperation between national contingents regarding command and control, training and equipment. It was observed that the UN is itself divided on the issue and is unclear as to how to respond to the trend towards regional and coalition-based operations. A number of participants pointed to the need for reform of the UN Security Council. Finally, some participants noted that Canada's ability to react quickly and appropriately remains hindered by a lack of adequate information and intelligence, and that improved communication and cooperation with non-governmental partners with ready access to vital information would help the government to assess when and how to act to protect human rights around the world.

Some participants proposed that both Canada and the UN should return to a serious consideration of creating a standing UN rapid reaction capability. Recent developments in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, following the Brahimi Report, suggest that the option may be worth pursuing. Others argued that a rapid reaction capability is politically unfeasible in the current environment, pointing out that even the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade and the Rapidly

Deployable Mission Headquarters are struggling to keep afloat. Alternatively, some suggested, the UN should consider more carefully the prospects for contracting operations out to private military companies (PMCs). Examples such as the efficiency of Executive Outcomes (a former PMC) in both Angola and Sierra Leone suggest that they may have a key role to play in the future, as they are capable of deploying on short notice and are less confined by the political concerns that inform often restrictive rules of engagement for UN operations. It was also observed, however, that private companies already play a key role in UN and multilateral operations, most often in the form of security for essential equipment and infrastructure – a role that national armed forces are often not suited for. Some participants submitted that international non-violent forces – not mercenaries or regular armed forces – needed to be explored, as the strength of such organizations as Peace Brigades International comes in large part from a moral imperative rather than from arms.

Rapporteur: David Beal, United Nations Association in Canada

SESSION 7.3: Rebuilding

In his introductory remarks David Bruer, of Peacefund Canada, said there is a commitment owing by the international community to rebuild as post-conflict societies are very fragile and human suffering continues to occur even after the conflict has ended. This process is a long and winding road. Often there is a lack of employment in post-conflict societies. In many instances, fields are mined so farming cannot take place. In such desperate instances, it is no wonder that the offer of a few dollars will entice men to join a local warlord's army, as has been the case in Afghanistan. Access to basic needs such as food and water is crucial following conflict. It is important to attain peace in a particular country or region, but it is also important to recognize that many will continue to suffer if rebuilding is not carried out.

Seddiq Weera, of McMaster University, said that the general public in Afghanistan remains in fear of those with arms, particularly warlords, but are happy that peacekeepers were in the country. He also noted that peace education is an important but neglected component of the current campaign in Afghanistan. Peace education requires: the reconstruction and rebuilding of broken relationships and lost trust which is just as important as infrastructure, as well as the application of problem-based initiatives and a holistic approach. The use of 'conflict mapping' to understand a protracted war paves the road for blaming and is generally short-sighted, unfocused, and an oversimplification of the conflict. In the regional or international context, it is vital to seek cooperation rather than playing the "blame game" with all or some of Afghanistan's neighbours.

Annette Ittig of York University, suggested that Afghanistan could not as yet be neatly categorized as a "post-conflict society", as the country is still experiencing incursions (including civilian casualties) from the US-led coalition against as-Quaeda and Taliban groups. Moreover, there are power struggles between the Afghan Transitional Authority and regional warlords as well as widespread criminalized activity. One consequence of the lack of actual rule of law in Afghanistan is that the war economy in Afghanistan continues to expand, particularly and trade of opium, as well as in illicit arms dealing. The resolution of these issues requires a long term, regional approach including the compliance of Iran, Pakistan and the CIS. A concurrent problem is the fact that the US-led effort is not designed to protect the people of Afghanistan but rather to protect American interests. As for rebuilding in Afghanistan, it is unclear whether or not local warlords, particularly those implicated in war crimes, can become peacebuilders. This is compounded by the fact that memories of past abuses are long. A critical issue is the return and sustainable reintegration of refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs). It is important to recognize that refugees and IDPs are not passive. Rather, they possess remarkable survival skills and coping mechanisms. Among their economic strategies is the receipt of remittances from family and members of the diaspora. Such remittances could play a key role in Afghanistan's post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in the rehabilitation of the country's devastated private sector.

Serge Lortie, of the Department of Justice, said that in general justice reform in the context of rebuilding war-torn developing countries is relatively new. Justice reform initiatives must be flexible, and most importantly, demonstrate a willingness to listen and learn from society. From a legal perspective, four main considerations are applicable to Afghanistan. First, human security must be the primary objective of justice reform. Thus, disarmament of ex-combatants and thugs must occur, and a civil police force must be established as a replacement for military forces. A high priority must be set on establishing a criminal code, civil code, and prisons (though some of this already exists in Afghanistan). Second, attention must be paid to the relations between the new and old regimes. To help avoid widespread revenge and retribution, a legal body designed along the lines of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission must be implemented. Third, state institutions must be strengthened, and the police, judges, and civil servants must be paid reasonable wages. Fourth, knowledge is all-important because justice reform must take into account prior and local norms, practices, and laws.

While the cases are diametrically opposed in many ways, it is important to apply the lessons learned from peacebuilding experiences in Latin America to the current challenges in Afghanistan due to specific parallels that exist between the Central American and Colombian conflicts, said Colleen Duggan, of the International Development Research Centre. With Guatemala in mind, there is a need to re-think the neo-liberal democratic reconstruction model that has become dominant within the international community from the early 1990s onwards because it often entails: the highly accelerated and wholly unrealistic establishment of a new political systems; a rush to the holding of elections; and the formation of an economy predicated on neo-liberal principles in situations where market conditions do not exist. Moreover, a series of questions must be addressed regarding the type of state to be founded (democratic, secular, multiethnic), the nature of law and order arrangements that will be in place once the UN departs, and whether or not the international community will remain engaged for a long period in the rebuilding of the country. The question of war economies and the role of the illegal drug trade

must also be addressed. In reflecting upon mortality rates as a principal indicator of human insecurity more thought should be given to concepts such as rage, humiliation and certain forms of personal insecurity (torture, rape) which are often assigned a different weighting by victims of violent conflict.

In the presentations and subsequent discussion a number of issues and challenges were stressed. At this point, it is unclear what sort of political system will emerge in Afghanistan. The drug trafficking issue is significant as opium crop substitution efforts have been disappointing. Information coming out of Afghanistan is often sporadic, incomplete, disjointed, and may be distorted by the US and allied powers in certain instances. In general, more attention and research is vital in order to clarify current challenges as part of the overall rebuilding and reconstruction processes within Afghanistan. Women are under-represented in the decision-making processes. A degree of impunity exists in Afghanistan as a number of individuals within the emerging government may have committed war crimes. Rebuilding and reconstruction schemes are often employed with a 'cookie-cutter' approach. It was also noted that the issue of weapons of mass destruction in nearby Pakistan and India is not generally part of discussions about the future of Afghanistan the absent from the discourse on Afghanistan.

The following recommendations emerged from the session:
- In all areas of rebuilding and reconstruction, long-term efforts must be undertaken.
- Regional dimensions, such as drug-trafficking, external support for domestic warlords, and the simmering conflict between Pakistan and India, must be addressed.
- Gender issues ranging from decision-making processes to peace education must be reinforced.
- The Afghani diaspora should be asked for help and assistance, ranging from financial and humanitarian aid to insights on how to rebuild the country.
- The private sector in Afghanistan is generally weak and should be strengthened and separated from its traditionally tight association with the government.

Rapporteur: Andrew Grant, Dalhousie University

SESSION 8: Peacebuilding and Human Security Post-September 11th

SESSION 8: PEACEBUILDING AND HUMAN SECURITY POST SEPTEMBER 11TH

In a break with tradition, the 2002 Consultations were the scene of a timely and lively debate on the challenges in peacebuilding and human security post September 11th that brought together the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Bill Graham, Lieutenant Colonel Gaston Côté, of the Department of National Defence, Rieky Stuart of Oxfam Canada, Pierre Beaudet of Alternatives, Morteda Zabouri from the University of Montreal and Paul Evans, of the University of British Columbia. Chaired by James Wright of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and moderated by veteran broadcaster Ann Medina, the session focused on three major themes: the War on Terrorism, Multilateralism and What

Next for Peacebuilding and Human Security? What follows is an unofficial transcript of highlights of the discussion and subsequent questions and answers involving the audience that was compiled by Robin Wentzell for the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee.

Ann Medina: Canada is now playing a military role. Our usual non-combatant activities are no longer in the forefront of the national arena as we participate in military solutions. Why has this happened? There has been a failure of prevention. The wounded US is now challenging the world with "you are with us or against us" and the strategies of the 1980's and 1990's are no longer effective. Are the risks to human security greater since September 11th?

Paul Evans: This event changed the world: it changed the US; the US became more assertive; and there is a new face of global terrorism. However, the changes are not as deep as first thought. Worldviews did not change but convictions deepened. An IPSOS Reid poll on the fundamental risk to your security, conducted in February/March in 13 countries, revealed that mass destruction was not high on the list. The real concerns were crime and violence at the national level, accidental threats and health, rather than nuclear war and terrorism (with India being the one exception). Only 8% in Canada and less than 16% in the US thought mass destruction was the highest risk.

Pierre Beaudet: The biggest surprise is that we were surprised. There have been all sorts of signs. We have declarations and policies in place to protect against these risks and yet the international community was still caught by surprise. What do we do now? What is happening in Afghanistan is not encouraging and is worrisome. We are still following the same process. We have not accepted the lessons of September 11th.

Rieky Stuart: We need a change in perspective. Like a change from winter to spring, we feel different, we see things differently and we react differently, but the same things are still there. September 11th has shown us how fragile our economic situation is and fear and insecurity are marking our lives. The risks to human security are violence, weapons and war. This despair and distrust builds a vicious cycle. There needs to be a shift from a vicious cycle to a virtuous cycle, built on trust. The insights and understanding of September 11th should help us make this shift. There are now opportunities to use these insights to build human security...

Morteda Zabouri: The shock of September 11th arises from ignorance. We do not know enough about the types of threats that exist, nor how to treat them, especially where manipulation is used to support their cause. The Islamic movement is a political movement that acts transnationally. In political science, we study rational actors in political action. These rules cannot be applied to stop this type of terrorism.

Gaston Côté: This new phenomenon -- globalization of threats -- requires new solutions. With the previous bipolar threat of two nuclear powers, it was hard to monitor and eliminate, but now with a global threat it is even harder to control. Prevention is needed. How is this done in countries like Afghanistan where there is no legitimate government and no rule of law? We need

to review our solutions and look at human security as key to prevention and as a tool to aid in the eradication of terrorism.

Bill Graham: In a superficial way, the risk to human security seems greater after September 11th. However, when General Lewis McKenzie was asked this point, his answer was that the situation is now better because we know there is a problem and now we are addressing it. But war can exacerbate the problem. Using the human security agenda is the use of soft power -- which represents what we are like as Canadians. What happened on September 11th demonstrates what we have been talking about when we speak of human security. We cannot use counter-terrorism to violate human rights. A viable state respects the rights of citizens and human rights. Col. Côté is also right -- if there is no security, there can be no reconstruction in Afghanistan. Canada has pledged $100 million over two years for reconstruction and we have to make sure it is effective.

Medina: This has upset the whole international order. If the reactions are ignorance and fear, are we acting from this perspective? Dr. Evans, if people are not really afraid, how does this play out in the US, Canada and Great Britain?

Evans: We are facing 9/11 and a Bush administration approach to world order. We can empathize with the deep feelings in the US, but we are now dealing with a much more assertive US. Rather than denouncing the US, how can we deliver an alternative? Should we use the approach that human security is now more important rather than less important? This is not the flavour of the month in the US, but we could strengthen the human security approach internationally.

Beaudet: We are speaking of the ignorance of whom? This is a voluntary ignorance, much like the situation during the massacre in Rwanda, when General Dallaire's warning went deliberately unheeded. We have successfully confronted the US in the recent past, so it is feasible to say to them "this is too much".

Medina: The unintended consequences of the steps taken by the US post September 11th seem to have exacerbated the Middle East conflict. Can the UN or human rights bodies do something? Can they stop these problems or deal with the Bin-Ladens of the world?

Graham: There is no military solution for Israel. They need to return to dialogue and to conclude that they have to live together, so how will they do it? Canada can be the interlocutor for both sides, providing constructive support. There is so much animosity between the parties that they can only do this with a moderator. Canada could participate, but could only do this with the support of the US. The G8 and Canada are supportive of the steps taken by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in the Middle East.

Stuart: How do we persuade the US that other strategies will be more successful? We need to find more space for the dissenting voice.

Zabouri: Could the UN policies for prevention, human security and peace have stopped these kind of threats? There were two distracting processes -- resources and structural problems. With

institutional deficits and globalization, millions of youth cannot be absorbed. Forty percent of the Islamic population is under 15 years of age and 20% are unemployed. There are no national solutions in their countries and they are attacking this situation. For prevention there needs to be capital, goods and worldwide productivity.

Questions from the audience

Question: Is the solution now that the right is right versus might is right?

Stuart: We have to find a balance between the unilateralism of the US and the humanitarian issues which need to be addressed. We need to address the deconstruction of Afghanistan, as has been done in other countries, for example, the deconstruction of the former USSR and the US aid provided to support this deconstruction. We also need to support the efforts of the Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Madam Sima Simar, in the reintegration of women into the political process.

Question: At the G8 in Kananaskis, can we try and dissuade the US from adopting a new nuclear policy?

Graham: This is up to the Prime Minister, but I believe the point will be raised. Colin Powell has a sincere belief in the multilateral approach, although there are other American voices that favour a new policy approach. We have to work with like-minded groups in the US...

Côté: At the moment, the military intervention does have a purpose, but this is a short-term purpose. The question is reconstruction, which needs a multifaceted, holistic approach in Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries.

Evans: With the Bush administration, US interests are primary in its foreign policy. They use the tools needed, rather than its commitments, believing others can give-in in terms of objectives defined by the US. This is not the only view in the US, but it is the ascendant view. This approach has been exacerbated by 9/11, but it started before September 11th.

Stuart: We need to use all of our connections to encourage alternative voices in the US, whether it is NGOs, foundations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, women's groups or business groups. Canadians are well placed to do this because we probably understand their culture and reality better than any other country. If we do not use these connections and relationships for peace and for trying to find common, non-violent, non-military solutions to the problems posed by 9/11, we will be guilty of contributing to the kind of human insecurity that exists.

Medina: Given Canada's unique position with the Commonwealth, with the Francophonie, and now as head of the G8 this year, is there a role we can play internationally, not just with the United States, in terms of trying to get an effective multilateral coalition?

Graham: Absolutely. That has been our traditional role and, as you say, the institutions are there. There is the Commonwealth, the Francophonie, the Organization of American States, and

to some extent the G8, although the G8's mandate has largely been in macro-economic areas. However, you can cast the Prime Minister's African agenda in the light of the human security agenda by saying we need a substantial reinvestment in Africa as a place where there are huge human problems, whether it is health in terms of AIDS, or security in terms of local conflict. We need to build with African partners, not in a neocolonial sort of way, but with an African partnership, a sense that good governance and other issues will be encouraged. We will supply resources, to encourage these changes and to create a new form of partnership to encourage behaviour that enables Africa to get on its feet.

The Canadian government's job is to continue to work with the traditional multilateral agenda as well, but we do go back ultimately to the United States. The curious thing is that when it comes to the anti-terrorism agenda, the US wants a multilateral approach. We need to encourage them to recognize that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to have a multilateral approach to other issues like disarmament and other important issues where they are absent.

Beaudet: It needs to be said that a week does not go by without the US insulting the rest of the world, whether it be regarding Kyoto or the Middle East. It also needs to be said that the process of militarization in the US is beyond all limits - US$400 billion! To solve the problem of education in the entire world would cost four days of the US military budget. Their military budget is 35 times higher than their aid budget. This does not make sense and we need to confront them on this point.

We need a policy of engagement with the US, along with our policy on terrorism. For example, in terms of the Middle East, we could say that they are so powerful that we cannot get around this. While this may be true, the US cannot politically resolve the problem in the Middle East. The Europeans, Arab countries and other partners, which includes Canada, can play a role in saying the US cannot play the role of mediator in the Middle-East conflict. It needs to be handled by the UN in a multilateral process.

Questions from the audience

Question: The Islamic movement is gaining momentum out of frustration, rather than out of a vision or policy. Professor Zabouri was asked to respond to this frustration rather than the political goals of the Islamic movement.

Zabouri: It is clear that there is frustration, but the elite Islamists have a strategy. They have created an organization of war. We need something like the Westfalian model, which permits integration of one part of humanity, which is not integrated, but has the capacity to be integrated, with others...

Question: What is being done by Canada re the American efforts to put weapons in space?

Graham: Our policy is against the weaponization of space. We have to use the tools that we have to reinforce the multilateral community's rules against weaponization of space and to try and bring our American friends to a realization that ultimately it's in their long-term interest to cooperate with the multilateral system to ensure that nobody else weaponizes space either. In

reality, they have an enormous advantage at the moment. As mentioned by Mr. Beaudet, their military budget is astonishing. They added $48 billion this year to their military budget, which is more than the budgets of most of the countries in the world. We have to work on and through the multilateral system, which is the only way to constrain them from making policy decisions which are not in the global interest and ultimately not in their own long-term interest either. This cannot be achieved through force, but rather through the force of ideas, as actors in the international community.

Medina: **We have talked about what has been done in Africa by Canada and also on what had to be done and is being done in Afghanistan. When so many NGO groups have to respond to crises - what resources are left for the long-term building, which we know is far more important?**

Stuart: The cost of prevention versus the cost of cure is one to ten. Dealing with Afghanistan and the aftermath of Rwanda is at least ten times, if not more, the cost of prevention. It just makes sense that you would invest more in prevention. Presently, there are a number of places where conflicts are ending. Where there is a sliver of hope created, it would be a very wise investment to substantially fund peacebuilding, demilitarization and reconstruction. A few examples are Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Angola, and perhaps Zimbabwe. What is the possibility of trade sanctions ending in Cuba? What are we doing to prepare for that day? A second point is humanitarian law, which is increasingly honoured in the breach rather than in the observance. Canada has taken a number of steps to promote it. We need to determine why and how this breach of humanitarian law is happening and what could be done to strengthen it. The Minister's White Paper seems to offer an opportunity for Canadians to have this discussion and to assert, not as a stance of cabinet or government but as the stance of the Canadian people, that these are the values we stand for and how we want to approach them.

Medina: **Is there one area where perhaps we underestimated or overestimated and ought to take a closer look? For example, is our reliance on the UN the most effective means that we thought it would be?**

Evans: We are now in an era when human security is going to be a fundamental principle of Canadian foreign policy. It is going to be partly a matter of where we allocate our internal resources within Canada. We have been picking on the United States for its defence budget and homeland defence -- which have been extraordinary -- but even the United States is now increasing its foreign aid. Depending on the numbers and how you interpret them, as much as $16 billion is being committed in a new bill. How that is going to be used is open for question, but it raises on our side revisiting how we are going to advance the human security agenda and the balance between some going on the defence side and more into the foreign aid side and also how it is to be used. A focus in our aid programs on human security and a reorientation of a little more money in that direction would be helpful.

Beaudet: There is something deeply dishonest in the peacebuilding debate, when CIDA and the NGOs are judged critically for their peacebuilding efforts. But they demand miracles of us. We are asked to go to Burundi to work on a peace process, which we have done and there has been some movement, but frankly, we are not given the means to do so.

Notwithstanding the proposed increase in aid in the US, their military budget is 35 times higher than their aid budget. There are two important points. First, in the four year review of their foreign and defence policies -- which was started by President Clinton and not by Bush -- they elaborate a policy of "full spectrum dominance". They are doing what they said they would do. They are being honest and loyal to themselves. "Full spectrum dominance" does not mean multilateralism. Second, they have a policy of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". We have seen this approach with the Jihad and in what the US has done in Afghanistan. They continue to support dictators because they have suddenly become enemies of the Jihad. They have done this in Central Asia, in the Middle East and elsewhere. We have to confront this, while at the same time continuing our efforts in Burundi, the Congo, the Sudan and elsewhere.

Medina: Mr. Minister, do you have any comments before accepting questions from the floor?

Graham: We know the point about prevention is true. We have seen this in Canada where better investments in social conditions and housing could have reduced criminality, drugs and poverty. We always seem to look at the way to correct a problem, rather than its cause. The international world has done the same, but we are learning lessons. With the help of the NGO community and others we have been pushing forward. For example, the International Criminal Court is an important development in the area of the human security agenda. We need to support the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report that has come out on state sovereignty. I am going to convene a group of global parliamentarians to try and discuss how to do this. The debate is the same debate we had in Canada about Kosovo and whether it was appropriate to intervene... From the aid perspective, the Prime Minister has stated that we are going to increase our aid by eight per cent per annum now. So we are on the road back. We need to work together to see how we can refine our policies and what new policies need to be developed. Regarding the foreign policy review, we want to look at how the world has changed and how we can take some specific actions within that new context.

Questions from the audience

Question: What is going to be the scope and depth of the international policy review? Is it going to be an in-house fine-tuning or is it going to be a widely consultative approach? Is it going to go into depth? How broad are the options likely to be? To what extent is it going to be integrated with the defence review, which we have also been promised?

Graham: I am not in a position to provide specific details before I get Cabinet authorization. But generally, this review is going to be within certain time limits. We cannot spend several years doing it. I think there are some needs and changed conditions that we have to look at, for example, what we have discussed today about the Islamic world, but also the Americas, and a host of specific issues. There will be consultations with Canadians, but within a fairly tight time frame. For example, there may be papers and ideas on the Internet for consultation with the NGO communities over the summer, with a broader consultation process in the fall. However, it will not be as elaborate as the process for the last policy review, due to the need to finalize the report sooner rather than later.

Medina: Do you think it should be fairly deep? Do you think some radical changes are needed or can it be fast-moving, fast-paced?

Wright: There needs to be a deep review outside DFAIT, but the Minister is absolutely right about the time frame. It is essential that it be integrated with the defence policy review, which we have also been promised, and with both human security and national security issues which may fall between those two stools and which need to be included.

Question: What is your government doing relating to the genocidal war in the Sudan and the role of the Canadian company there that is paying taxes that fill the purse of Canada, at the expense of the poor and dying people of southern Sudan? It is human security which is involved here. What is the fate of these people?

Graham: We have been wrestling with the Talisman Energy question for some time. My predecessor, Lloyd Axworthy, arranged for many missions to the Sudan. We collaborate a great deal with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in trying to get peaceful conditions re-established in the Sudan. We recognize the complexity and the terrible nature of the problems there. We are also part of a special aid group to deal with it from that perspective. In terms of Talisman, we have a legal regime where we can sanction countries on the basis of multilateral institutional decisions and there is none in respect to the Sudan. I believe we should not construct what I call a "Talisman foreign policy", but rather foreign policy around general principles.

The Foreign Affairs Committee will be going to the Sudan as soon as they finish their present mandate to look at what we should be doing about corporations or Canadians' activities in zones of conflict. But we live in a democratic country, a free country and some people here feel that they have a right to do certain things outside of this country. We have not controlled what everybody in this room does when you go outside of this country. Before we put rules into place to do that, we have to think it through and look at it from a general context of zones of conflict and what Canadians can do and should not do in that area, rather than to react to one specific situation, however difficult and terrible it is.

I have a great deal of sympathy for your position, sir, and, believe me, we are looking at it. We have been struggling with it for a long time and will continue to do that. We are trying to make positive contributions in the Sudan. I have just been dealing with a couple of these issues recently.

Question: You can get aid if you do good governance and yet human security is worse in what we are now calling failed states or very fragile states. How do you reconcile this? How do we have a coherent approach?

Stuart: I agree it is a problem. I think that some of the discussions that are going on now in CIDA around strengthening aid effectiveness might lead us to focus more on the success stories than on problems. There are no easy answers because just distributing the money all over equally is not sensible either. It needs to be usefully addressed.

Graham: There is an inconsistency, but not a deep inconsistency. The G8, and particularly the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative, will give additional aid to areas where we can create a good governance model, which others will be encouraged to follow. There will continue to be failed states, such as the Great Lakes area and Zimbabwe, which may fall into that category. We will continue aid there to human beings on a humanitarian basis. However, we are going to try to use the cream, or the extra, from the G8 system to work on advancing a good governance model.

So I think we are going to refine CIDA programs to focus on how to be more effective on fundamental issues such as AIDS, women, children, and education in all countries, or where we can use aid effectively. But we are also trying to create a new paradigm, a new model, working with the African partners to make a real difference.

Stuart: You cannot build human security only through humanitarian work. It needs to include the building of the virtuous cycle that I mentioned earlier. It needs a peace-building and a reconstruction focus.

Question: What can Canada do to lead their American and British partners, and other members of the Security Council to adopt a coherent policy in the Great Lakes Region to put an end to the war?

Graham: This is an enormously complex problem and one in which I am not yet that educated. Two weeks ago I met with British Foreign Minister Jack Straw and French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine in London. What was interesting for me regarding the Great Lakes Region was that for a long time they have seen the possibility of a type of war between anglophone supporters and francophone supporters. I think this element at least has to be regulated. The Europeans, the English and the French have said that we should collaborate together to regulate the problems in the Great Lakes. I think we could first speak with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and then with the francophone leader to try and get them to regulate it.

It is an illusion to think the Americans are interested in this problem. We have to determine how we can do this with CIDA, with proper means to go there and work on it. As mentioned earlier, the Prime Minister has put Africa on the agenda for the G8 meeting, with the possibility of engaging Mr. Bush as well as the other leaders in the G8, on these types of problems.

Beaudet: I hate the word "failed state". I think it comes from the same paradigm of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilisations". I think it has a racist undertone. Germany in 1945 could easily have been read as a failed state, but has now proven differently. I think the Congo is not a failed state and neither is the Sudan and neither is Angola. There are lots of forces leading towards reconstruction and towards peace and they deserve to be heard. We cannot hear them if we think, "Ah, it's a failed state" and the second phrase is "write them off".

Medina: All right. But we have heard them today. We have had some responses. We also have heard about some of the frustration, some of the fear, some of the ignorance that is out there and how that could bode ill in terms of building a future that does not rely upon military solutions. We also heard though about the kinds of efforts, renewed efforts, that must be made in particular

areas where there may be considerable hope for avoiding some of the problems that we have seen elsewhere. My surprise in hearing the panel is the degree of optimism, with an exception or two, and I hope that this optimism proves to be correct in the face of some big people south of us and some big problems nearby. I thank the panel very, very much. I thank all of you for your questions. I know there is frustration that you could not ask more questions, but I thank you very much.

Wright: Thank you all for this exceptional discussion. I think we can say that human security is not only at the forefront of our foreign policy right now, but that we are going to be fairly busy with this agenda in the years to come. As one of the officials that the Minister referred to earlier, we try very hard to have the answers. We do not have all the answers. The great value of a forum like this is fresh approaches for long-term planning. It was an excellent discussion. I would like to thank all the panellists, especially the moderator who, I think, did exceptionally well in very challenging circumstances. Ann Medina, thank you very much.

Medina: Thank you.

SESSION 9.1: **Gender and Conflict**

The session began with two clips from the film "Women Facing War" produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which focussed on the impact of the loss of family members on women and the needs of the girl child.

Jennifer Klot, of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) described follow-up to Security Council's first Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. She noted the resolution's political significance in linking gender equality to international peace and security. This year, the Security Council will assess measures taken to implement the resolution and it will take action on the report it requested of the Secretary-General on the impact of armed conflict on women. An independent Expert Assessment commissioned by UNIFEM will also inform this debate. The Independent Assessment is being carried out Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), former Finance Minister, and Elisabeth Rehn (Finland), the world's first woman Minister of Defense.

The Council's debate on the second anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325, to be held in October 2002, will represent another watershed opportunity to strengthen protection for women in armed conflict and to support women's role in peace-building. A new resolution by the Security Council can ensure that gender issues, as they relate to peace and security, become a regular item on the Council's agenda, and can also set out a clear agenda for action by member states, regional organisations, the UN system and other relevant bodies. Key issues on this agenda include the adequacy of existing legal standards for women's protection; the gender dimensions of security; the role of peace operations and civilian police in protecting women; women's participation at the peace table; strengthening women's organisations and the integration of a gender perspective into prevention and early warning.

Christine Vincent presented CANADEM, which is a Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-sponsored roster of Canadian experts skilled in the human rights, peacebuilding, and democratization fields, whom it refers to the UN and other international organizations, the Canadian government and NGOs for short-term field missions. It currently includes about 3,000 professionals, a third of whom are women, of which only about 35 have gender advisory capacity. CANADEM is actively looking for more gender experts, particularly for Afghanistan. On behalf of the joint NGO, government Women, Peace & Security Committee, it has conducted a survey of barriers to female participation in UN field missions and found that these barriers consist of persistent sexism and bias in the recruitment and promotion practices, cultural attitudes towards women both among non-Western UN staff and nationals of mission countries, age restrictions, the inability to bring dependents along on many missions, safety concerns, and the urgency and length of overseas missions.

Pamela Scholey of IDRC presented on the issues women face in post-conflict situations, referring particularly to the Middle East. She emphasized that the Arab feminist movement is the most promising avenue for social and political transformation in the region as this movement is challenging the core values and structures currently shaping Arab society. Scholey stated that while women face many of these issues whether conflict is occurring or not, in post-conflict scenarios women have enhanced opportunities to effect social change. For example, as witnessed in Palestine during the first intifada, conflict situations provide an impetus for women to organize which is bolstered by the fact that women's liberation is often promoted as part of the political program in revolutionary wars. Despite the fact that women's participation in formal peace negotiations is limited, they are often highly active in 'track 2' or informal peace processes. In Palestine, the women's movement has succeeded in defeating some discriminatory regulations and has also been active in numerous other ways, including launching educational campaigns regarding political rights, among other issues, and contributing to the dialogue regarding gender and citizenship and various areas of lawmaking.

Scholey noted that in conflict and post-conflict scenarios women frequently provide economically for the household undermining men's sense of masculinity, which when combined with high levels of unemployment may be contributing to men joining Islamist groups in order to assert their masculine identity. It is also important to note that women's ability to absorb economic shocks is limited and severely compromised by the fact that their unpaid work is not included in the formal accounting used in planning reconstruction, resulting in women being further marginalized from economic reconstruction programs.

Concerning social reconstruction, Scholey emphasized that at their most effective community and state solutions to the physical and sexual violence perpetrated against women could result in the notions of femininity and masculinity being transformed, pointing to the potential of the feminist movement in the Arab world to bring about reconstruction, especially the cultural reconstruction of gender identities. Community and state solutions to sexual violence are imperative as individual counseling is not enough; social reintegration and resolution of these issues often does not occur at the community level. Western donors should be aware of the sensitive nature of these issues and the potentially negative effects of their visible participation in this process and partner with indigenous feminist groups already active in the region. Scholey concluded by stating that 'reconstruction' is a misnomer, as it is actually new construction that is

needed to develop the relations and structures required to prevent new conflict from occurring. A broad-based feminist perspective can offer this to post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

The presentations were followed by an update on the Women, Peace and Security Committee. After the 2001 Peacebuilding Consultations, the CPCC Gender Working Group and government counterparts formed a joint government-NGO committee on gender and peacebuilding to follow up on Resolution 1325 and related matters. The Committee set up a listserv and formed three sub-committees on capacity building, advocacy and training. The training sub-committee has focussed on the design and use of gender training materials for military and civilian participants in peace support operations. The capacity-building sub-committee aims to build domestic capacity on gender and peacebuilding, to build rosters of gender experts for peace support deployments and of eminent women candidates for UN envoys, and to help implement international obligations including the provisions of Resolution 1325.

One of the major challenges identified in the following discussion was how to obtain a higher level of participation for women in organizations active in peacebuilding and particularly in field missions. If assessment missions are not defined to take gender into account, gender will not be included in the design of the operation. Even including a gender expert on the team is not enough, as it is difficult for one individual to have expertise in the wide range of subject matters required. It is also important to keep in mind that not all women have a high level of gender-awareness. Different experiences with including women and gender issues in peacebuilding activities were discussed. For example, during formal peace negotiations, international mediators often have the chance to get gender issues onto the agenda if they come with a certain level of gender-expertise. Addressing gender issues is sometimes a welcome diversion from debates on ethnicity and can help to get negotiations on other issues un-stuck. Gender awareness among the negotiators can also be enhanced through one-on-one discussions at social occasions.

At the field level, including more women in projects such as mines awareness makes the projects more effective, but also has a cost. In many cultures women are expected to return home every evening, and additional costs are incurred due to maternity benefits and replacement training. These costs need to be factored into projects that NGOs negotiate with donors.

A recurring critique was that gender is still equated with women. However, there are significant differences between women -- some can have very hierarchical mentalities, be part of a ruling minority, or ally themselves with parties that benefit from a war and do not want to end it. Not only do different women have different perspectives and attitudes, they also have different needs that have to be taken into account. Another key issue was the importance of including men. In the Bosnian experience, one of the most effective interventions to reduce domestic violence was the creation of a space for men to talk about their experiences of violence. UNIFEM has successfully reached a male audience by working with a few male allies and tying into their networks. The study of male roles and identity has only recently become more popular, and even though there are now good publications on masculinity and male roles and concerns, much of the gendered data is still women-oriented.

One way of including men is gender training. In patriarchal cultures, this requires a particularly respectful approach, making it clear that the participants are experts on their culture. Values such

as social justice and personal relationships with female relatives are often a good way to connect with men on touchy issues. A peace march of 3000 women in Colombia saw an impressive participation of young men, many of whom had become involved through their mothers. This shows the importance of male-inclusive youth programs by women's organizations. However, the need to bring in men does not negate the need to continue to push for women's participation.

One of the major gaps identified is the absence of women in decision-making positions in the UN system as well as governmental agencies, and particularly in field missions. There is now only one woman among the 60-70 special representatives of the UN Secretary General serving in peace related functions. Even UNICEF, which is reported to have almost achieved gender parity among its staff, has few women participating in emergency response missions. Another gap was attention to particular sub-groups of women. One sector that seems to have been neglected is that of female adolescents, who are not reached by girls' education programs, nor by women's groups. Finally, an important gap was the inclusion of men in gender-related activities and debates, including gender training and grassroots-organizations. This gap was noted mostly in women-specific civil society organizations, as well as in academic gender-research.

Several recommendations arose: one being that more gender training for international agency staff is needed to increase the general level of awareness. Such training should provide concrete tools, not only concepts, which can be sets of questions that help people understand a local culture and gather information relevant to specific subject areas. Beyond training, there is also a need to change the incentives by incorporating gender mainstreaming in performance evaluation systems, making budgetary allocations for it, and establishing accountability mechanisms. Second, international mediators should continue to push for more women at peace negotiating tables. Particular attention should be paid to selecting women that are representative of different sectors of the population. Third, NGOs struggling for gender equity should make more efforts to include men. This involves the gathering of data on male roles, concerns and identity, gender training with men, and male-inclusive youth programs.

Rapporteur: Silke Reichrath, IDRC

SESSION 9.2: Peace or Justice?

The chair of the session, Rena Ramkay, of the Centre for Mediation at Carleton University, noted that the panel would discuss responses by governments and other international actors can respond to crimes against humanity by addressing the relationship between truth and justice. Some people conceive of truth and justice as competing with one another, arguing that sometimes justice has to be sacrificed for truth or truth for justice. However, the panellists argued that history has taught us that these concepts must be complementary: both truth and justice should be pursued at the same time in order to rebuild a country on a solid foundation.

Valerie Oosterveld, of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, noted that last January, after a long and painful armed conflict, peace was officially declared in Sierra Leone. On May 14th 2002 the country was to hold its first elections since 1996, and was introducing two independent and complementary mechanisms: a truth and reconciliation commission and a hybrid (domestic/international) criminal tribunal. The former will focus on finding the truth and

making it public in order to rebuild the country. The latter will help to address impunity, facilitate healing and reconciliation, and ensure the rule of law. In addition, it is meant to enhance a human rights culture in Sierra Leone. It is important to handle the relationship between the two institutions carefully, Oosterveld said, especially because both mechanisms will run concurrently and could contend for the same information. However, there are great opportunities for cooperation between the two, for example, in witness protection. Both institutions will lay the groundwork for the judicial system of Sierra Leone and most importantly, build lasting peace in the country.

Alex Neve, of Amnesty International Canada, commented that, throughout history, justice has been short-circuited and impunity has prevailed. When a country is emerging from conflict, one of the biggest challenges it faces is dealing with justice. While crimes against humanity have decreased over the last decade and recently some have been prosecuted, international jurisdiction to prosecute such crimes is currently lacking. This will begin to be remedied with the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was to enter into force on July 1st 2002 and would prosecute crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Seventy-six countries have ratified the Statute and will complement their national courts' jurisdiction with the ICC, however, the number of ratifying countries needs to grow and countries with high rates of human rights violations need to be encouraged to fully adopt the Statute. In order for the ICC to successfully achieve its purposes, national governments and NGOs must support the ICC with their expertise and input. In this way, the world will be able to build peace through justice.

Leon Wessels, of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa, remarked that in November 1993, although violence was still occurring in South Africa, a general excitement regarding the democratization of the country could also be felt. People showed interest in the elections and in the drafting of the constitution, however, moving forward remained a painful process. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was created to provide a bridge "from the shame of the past to the hope of the future." The TRC faced several difficulties including the debate over granting amnesties to perpetrators in exchange for testimony and low participation rates due in part to the shame and denial associated with human rights violations. In spite of these issues, the commission was an important part of the healing process for South Africans. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation was subsequently created as a follow-up to the commission.

Barbara Bedont from the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice emphasized that there are several possible approaches to crimes, including granting amnesty, as was frequently the case under Latin American military regimes in the 1970s and exposing the truth through informal mechanisms, for example, the release of East German secret police files once Germany was reunified. The question in these two cases is whether justice should be sacrificed for peace. Bedont argued that justice and peace are mutually dependent -- without justice a strong foundation for peace cannot exist. When amnesties are granted, the message that crimes are unacceptable is not sent and it is only a matter of time before the crimes will be repeated. Likewise, the suffering of victims is not properly addressed when truth is exposed through informal means. While the traditional goals of criminal justice -- retribution, rehabilitation, prevention and deterrence – may have some forgiveness and healing to occur -- Bedont argued

that restorative justice, which addresses systemic problems by trying to achieve reconciliation, is above all other forms of criminal justice the best way to deal with crimes.

Several key issues and challenges were raised. One, TRCs are useful tools in peacebuilding and reconstruction, however, they are not "magical solutions" to a country's problems. It takes a great effort from governments and civil society to achieve peace. Two, within TRCs and the ICC, issues such as the power of judges and gender distribution should be considered. Three, leaders, not just "foot soldiers," should also be prosecuted in cases like Sierra Leone and South Africa as direct criminal perpetrators. Only then can it be proven that nobody is above the law and that corruption can be avoided. Several gaps were also noted, one of the biggest in peacebuilding and reconstruction being funding. One should remember that low-income countries need financial assistance to create and operate appropriate criminal justice institutions and programs. Secondly, the international community should monitor TRCs and other peacebuilding mechanisms to make sure they efficiently serve their purpose.

Recommendations put forward included: the importance of signing and ratifying international treaties such as the International Criminal Court Statute and the need to resolve systemic problems such as racism and disparities in income in order to achieve reconciliation.

Rapporteur: Tiani Jiménez, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

SESSION 9.3: Democratization and Good Governance

Geoff Dubrow, of the Parliamentary Centre, began his presentation with a provocative question: "Is it possible to strengthen the role of parliament in a country where there is no prior history of statehood/autonomy, no prior democratic template to guide it, and no national unity?" Is it even worth working in such a country? While looking at the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dubrow concluded that it is still possible to support the strengthening of parliament in such countries. Compared to other Eastern European countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina faces these three challenges simultaneously. The 1995 constitution created a federal system in which the federal government has little power and taxation ability. The new federal government is further weakened by the presence of inexperienced officials. The lack of national unity in the country is evident in deep ethnic cleavages, which have been enshrined in the constitution. The lack of unity spawned a deeply divided parliament that spends much time on determining the agenda and often blocks new policies, making it difficult for the country to build stronger democratic institutions and to become more self-sufficient, in part because a weak parliament allows the international community to intervene and impose laws. Dubrow argued that there is a role for institution building in such circumstances and proposed three concrete ideas: first, building linkages between civil society and parliament; second, raising awareness about the functions of parliament; and third, promoting self-sufficiency by strengthening capacity. However, in order to be successful, sufficient time and resources will be required.

Shauna Sylvester from the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society examined the role that the media can play in furthering democratization. Firstly, she defined media as: "Several mediums or channels used in an organized fashion to communicate to groups of people."

Secondly, she highlighted some indicators of free media: respect for human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association, tolerance and respect for differences, and independent media. The media is important to democracy because it can provide important and accurate reporting, reflect a diversity of views, offer early warning signs, act as a watchdog and hold government accountable, as well as amplifying the voices of civil society. Thirdly, Sylvester provided some examples from South Asian countries where a great diversity of experiences exists. Some countries may experience ethnic division, the use of the media for propaganda, the presence of gender bias and the expression of sexist views in the media, or the domination of corporate ownership of the media. For example, she referred to the Indigenous-Language Editors in South Asia who decided not to report certain events and to play down casualties so as to ward off reprisals during the communal riots in Gujarat, India. Sylvester acknowledged that Canada has its own problems and may not offer an adequate example for others to follow. However, she pointed out that Canada's good reputation abroad and the respect for Canadian reporters represent significant advantages. Foreign partners are interested in Canada's experience with separation issues, with cultural diversity, and in creating a vibrant civil society.

Richard Harmston, of SAP Canada, offered an overview of the challenges and accomplishments experienced in South Asia. Beginning with human development he stated that the "poverty dialogue" program developed in the region allowed researchers to observe that the poor often feel a sense of insecurity and isolation, due in part to long working hours which results in little time available for participating in family and community life; and they experience distrust in institutions and their ability to respond to their needs. These realizations point to the fact that in order to strengthen democracy in the region, a broad range of issues will have to be addressed, including the fact that the region has often suffered from violent conflicts and is home to two of the nuclear powers, which adds to insecurity. Each country is distinct but certain common challenges to democracy can be highlighted: the "weaponization" of the region, caste and class divisions and the huge gap between the rich and the poor, the inability of governments to deliver on promises and to respond to the population's needs, the centralization of government (in certain cases), the presence of corruption and of pervasive poverty, and the lack of accountability of government. However, important accomplishments also need to be emphasized. Firstly, there has been a movement over the past decade to build a place for more meaningful municipal governments. For example, India changed its constitution to allow for stronger municipal governments and greater participation. This initiative, although it faces its own challenges (such as the risk of decentralizing corruption), could be revolutionary for the region. Secondly, one can observe a maturing of civil society that can provide a counterpoint to government and play a more significant "watchdog role". Harmston concluded by mentioning that it is important to engage South Asian governments on a range of policies in order to enforce positive trends and challenge negative practices. It will be important to support civil society, to build linkages between our own and South Asian civil societies, and to demonstrate solidarity, he said.

During the discussion period, it was pointed out that the media can also be used as hate media, for example in Rwanda, in which case it would be more appropriate to silence the media in order to protect peace and democracy. How the media could truly express diverse views and be neutral when in fact it has owners and political affiliations was also questioned. Sylvester responded that one should look at the wide range of types of media that exist, for example, community radio stations, which are not corporately owned. One should not take a defeatist view

of the media but instead learn to build a relationship with the media and take advantage of its potential for supporting democracy and peacebuilding. Finally, it was pointed out that Canada should also evaluate how it could improve good governance within its own borders; good governance and democratization should not be an issue that only concerns Southern countries. Several challenges were noted. It was mentioned that peacebuilding interventions often face significant delays, which limit the efficacy of such interventions. Secondly, there is always a limit to what foreign interventions can actually accomplish, which emphasizes the fact that the democratization process needs to be initiated from within the country and its civil society. Thirdly, there also exists the challenge of creating new indigenous models of democracy and not imposing a "one model fits all" template.

Several recommendations were made: an appropriate timeline, with the option of reconsidering decisions made in the light of the new developments should be implemented with institution-building projects. Education should taken into account as an important tool to consider in support of democratization. Thirdly, while there are limits to what intervention can accomplish, there are still actions that a country like Canada could undertake to build an environment favourable to democratization, such as election monitoring and supporting civil society. Finally, it is important to find ways to favour a stronger and a more continuous participation of civil society in democratic institutions. The media and the model of local and municipal governments being developed in India were identified as means through which such an objective could be reached.

Rapporteur: Marie-Thérèse Helal, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

SESSION 9.4: Warlords

The workshop began with the screening of a CBC documentary on warlords in Afghanistan, reported by the workshop's chair, Carol Off. The documentary called attention to the challenges posed to humanitarian agencies working in areas controlled by warlords. It illustrated how some international bodies currently working in Afghanistan are forced to work within the confines set out by local warlords. Following the screening, participants were presented with a working definition of the term warlord, defined warlord as "a man who has power in a failed state and who holds on to this power through the use of force".

Ian Smillie, of Partnership Africa Canada, discussed how the phenomenon of warlords has been on the rise over the past 10-20 years. The expediency of African decolonisation during the 1960s and '70s was presented as a contributing factor in the emergence of weak states. The movement to downsize public sector capacities during the 1980s further compounded the problems of weak states by restricting their ability to ward off rebel movements and to protect civilians. Smillie made a compelling case that the phenomenon of warlords does not occur in isolation and that warlords in fact learn from one another's experience. Control over natural resources, the easy procurement of weapons, the forced recruitment of child soldiers and the ability to terrorize civilian populations, raid humanitarian convoys and internally displaced persons camps, and persuasively articulate and air grievances were presented as shared attributes of warlords. The West's proven track record of not sanctioning or forcefully intervening to

displace warlords gives little enticement for warlords to genuinely take part in peace negotiations or to respect fundamental human rights.

Joe Leberer from Médecins Sans Frontières, having worked as a humanitarian worker in warlord-controlled areas, drew upon his firsthand experience to describe the drawbacks of working where warlords reign, identifying three main challenges. Chief among these is the lack of access to vulnerable populations because of the inability or unwillingness of warlords to ensure the physical safety of humanitarian workers. Secondly, while certain short-term gains could be achieved by accommodating warlords, he cautioned that in doing so, humanitarian agencies also risk becoming part of the problem by conferring legitimacy upon warlords, both locally and internationally. Thirdly, humanitarian organizations play a delicate game of maintaining both real and perceived impartiality and neutrality in order to operate freely and securely in volatile contexts. For this reason, the responsibility to tackle the problem of warlords cannot be found at the humanitarian level. Instead, Leberer stressed that political action must be taken both in the short-term, to create the necessary "humanitarian space" for agencies to operate, and in the longer-term as effective solutions to the problem of warlords. The humanitarian crises produced by warlords are ultimately political and require political responses.

Lt. Col. Gaston Côté, from the Department of National Defence, drew upon his peacekeeping experiences in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Congo. Côté noted how peacekeepers are routinely confronted with the reality of warlords. The degree to which warlords pose a challenge to peacekeeping operations is largely contingent upon rules of engagement. Côté remarked that peacekeeping operations under UN auspices in the former Yugoslavia could be halted by something as trivial as a roadblock. By contrast, warlords found themselves at the short end of the stick once peacekeeping operations were transferred over to NATO. Côté said that as one speaks to locals it becomes clear that the legitimacy of warlords is artificial; those at the mercy of warlords do not support the status quo. He therefore dismissed allegations of the West imposing its values in this regard. When one scratches the surface, one realises that there is always a more legitimate, though often latent, political structure. Côté argued that such structures, wherever possible, must be activated. Finally, he asserted that co-opting warlords only serves to entrench an already difficult problem.

Several key issues and challenges were noted. Firstly, the fact that warlords in Afghanistan are being co-opted and backed by the international community for the sake of expediency. This risks undermining the legitimacy of the new government in the eyes of the Afghani people. Secondly, the question was raised whether the phenomenon of warlords can be understood as a process of social transformation; an intermediate stage between colonialism and emerging political structures and thus whether parallels can be drawn between feudalism in Europe and modern day warlords.

Thirdly, it was noted that warlords are not simply local problems, but are products of a broader international context. The West's military/industrial complex (resources, e.g. oil, arms industry) may have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Fourthly, seeing warlords as a problem that can be best addressed by strengthening the powers of the state was questioned. This approach does not readily translate into greater human security, as states in some instances can

also be violators of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The distinction must be made between weak government and good governance.

Finally, it was emphasized that there is no quick fix to the problem and "one size does not fit all". As such, the problem needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. What is clear, however, is that the problem cannot be solved on the ground or dealt with at the humanitarian level. International/multilateral level solutions must therefore be explored.

Two gaps were noted: warlords often use the rhetoric of grievance to legitimize their actions, how do we differentiate between the wolf and the sheep, between warlords and true national liberation movements? And, how can warlords be best held accountable for human rights abuses? What is the tradeoff between peace and justice? What if any impact will the International Criminal Court have on addressing the issue of warlords?

Four recommendations were made. First, that multinational corporations be held accountable for their collusion with warlords. A code of conduct coupled with monitoring mechanisms, spot checks and audits is required. Second, the UN should take a more proactive and forceful role in addressing the problem. For example, a proposal was forwarded to transform the Trusteeship Council into an entity that could specifically tackle the problem of failed states. Third, the British military intervention in Sierra Leone is a case in point that warlords can be put down quickly. Because warlords learn from each other's experiences, the use of force to apprehend some warlords would send a clear message to others. Finally, the foreign assets of known warlords should be traced and frozen. Travel bans for warlords, their families, and close associates should be put in place.

Rapporteur: Mark Selby, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

SESSION 9.5: Issues and Trends Follow-Up

James Wright from DFAIT, chair of the closing session, said that over the course of the three days of the consultations very intense, productive discussions and debate had occurred. However, the consultations had highlighted real challenges lie ahead, such as engaging Washington, examining the root causes of terrorism and other forms of violent conflict, and international humanitarian law issues. He also noted that human security is an important aspect of the work in the reviews proposed for foreign, defence and aid policy.

Paul Evans from the University of British Colombia noted that the Consultations showed there were many issues which intersected between policy development, field activity, activism and advocacy and academic research He suggested that useful follow-up could be carried out in the areas of the root causes of conflict and terrorism and information technology and the dark side of its uses by 'uncivil' society actors. More concretely, he suggested convening a workshop to match Human Security Fellows with representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs to determine where research connects with various themes relevant to the government. NGO colleagues would be invited to join the discussion. Secondly, there is also the possibility of collaborative research by the academic and NGO communities being carried out for presentation

in advance of the next Consultation. Finally, an informal, perhaps virtual, working group on the teaching of human security could be created.

Kathy Vandergrift, representing the CPCC, noted several themes that emerged from the NGO side during the Consultations. Firstly, further work needs to be done in defining human security and in determining priorities for research, which is seen by NGOs as an important area for collaboration with academics by NGOs. There was also broad agreement on the importance of teaching human security and increasing the links between NGOs and the teaching community to do that effectively and also to reach out broadly into the community, to parents and children. Thirdly, it was apparent that peace and conflict in Africa will remain high on the agenda for many and that concepts in "The Responsibility to Protect" report hold potential for development by NGOs, particularly those involved in the CPCC's Working Groups. She concluded by saying that a short-term challenge for the NGO community was to ensure that human security and peacebuilding priorities are prominent in the foreign policy and defence reviews

David Viveash from DFAIT suggested several general areas for possible departmental follow-up. Firstly, working with the Human Security Network to export the Canadian-developed gender training initiative; in terms of the "The Responsibility to Protect", engage the Human Security Network countries as partners for further collaboration; third, refine the definitions on human security; fourth, engage the Human Security Network on small arms and light weapons issues; and finally, explore opportunities to establish mirror organizations or partnerships for NGOs, the academic communities and governments in Human Security Network countries.

Rapporteur: Robin Wentzell, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC)

From:	Greenwood, Maha -AGP
Sent:	January 29, 2003 11:49 AM
To:	Belanger, Patrick -SXCI
Cc:	Gartshore, Geoff -AGP
Subject:	RE: Sept 11

Patrick,
Attached is the hard copy
as well people can look at our website at: www.humansecurity.gc.ca

Final report-fre.DOC   Final Report.DOC

Please let me know if you need any more help.
Maha Greenwood

-----Original Message-----
From: Gartshore, Geoff -AGP
Sent: January 29, 2003 10:42 AM
To: Belanger, Patrick -SXCI; Norfolk, Adrian -AGH; St. John, Geoffrey -IDC; Greenwood, Maha -AGP
Subject: RE: Sept 11

Patrick,
Maha Greenwood will be able to help track this down for you. I am unaware o the specific title you cite, but there is a general report on the Consultations. Thanks Maha,
Geoff.

-----Original Message-----
From: Belanger, Patrick -SXCI
Sent: January 29, 2003 10:08 AM
To: Norfolk, Adrian -AGH; Gartshore, Geoff -AGP; St. John, Geoffrey -IDC
Subject: Sept 11

Hi,

My name is Patrick Belanger and I'm a Research Assistant in the Library. I was wondering if one of you could help me or point me in the right direction with this question.

I received the following question from our librarian at Canada House:

A colleague of mine here at Canada House in London has asked me to find out whether the conference proceedings of an Annual Consultation co-sponsored by DFAIT and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security: on April 24-26, 2002, and entitled **"Peacebuilding and Human Security After Sept 11"**, has yet been published in hard copy or digital form. If the answer is "yes", but only as a hard copy, I wonder if I might borrow the volume in order to forward it to a Library client as a "short term loan". The enquirer is a full-time doctoral student in the Department of International Politics

Any suggestions?

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