



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


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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.



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ADVERTISEMENT.

AS the Author of these Considerations has ventured to differ from the commonly received opinion, it may be of use to confirm his sentiments with the highest and most unexceptionable authority; that of his Prussian Majesty, who, in a writing, said to have been drawn up by himself, speaks in the following manner :

“ AS no German prince has a right to meddle with the internal policy of Great Britain, nor with the constitution of its government; I have some reasons to hope, that the English nation will not meddle with the domestic affairs of the Empire. And I entertain those hopes the more; because England has no reason to meddle with this quarrel from any consideration of its commerce, or otherwise. And although it had a greater inclination for one German court than for another, yet I think it too unreasonable to pretend, that such powerful and respectable princes, as those of the Empire are, should be obliged to rule their conduct upon the inclinations of those amongst the English, who strive to
make

ii A D V E R T I S E M E N T .

make their countrymen enter into foreign quarrels;
that are of no manner of concern to England.”

Rescript to a manifesto of his Prussian Majesty,
delivered and printed at the same time, by his
Minister at London, in the year 1754.


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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.



THE author of the following Considerations does not pretend to more knowledge or better intelligence than other persons : he proposes only to offer to the publick the calm dispassionate reflections of a private man, upon the present state of our affairs, and the method we have lately chosen of carrying on the war : Reflections, which appear to him to be just, and which therefore he supposes may approve themselves to the understandings of others his fellow subjects, who shall read them as he intends to write, without any view to particular men ; but to contribute that little he is capable of to the publick service. If his observations are false, they will then be neglected : if they are true and well founded, he is sure they are of importance enough to deserve our regard.

B

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The only war, which England is at this time engaged in, is a War with France. How much soever our attention may be diverted, or our affections warped towards this or the other power of Europe; yet that is the only State, which England is professedly at war with. France is its natural rival in time of peace, and its only formidable enemy in time of war. So far are we from having declared war with any other State, that Britain has scarce a contest subsisting with any other power in Europe. Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, the Empire of Germany, and the several particular States of it, may each of them, at different times, wish us well or ill; but Britain has now no opposition of interest with any of them, and in a general national respect has very little to hope or fear from them.

If we take a comparative view of the strength of the two nations, whatever may be said at present of our naval force, it must be allowed that France is superior to us in its land force. Could we indeed revive the old Gallic constitution, which prevailed under the posterity of Hugh Capet; when France was divided, as Germany is now, among a number of independent princes, who after paying homage to the sovereign, made war with him, or one another, as they pleased: or had we the maritime provinces in our own possession, and the Dukes of Burgundy and Bretagne for our allies; we might then carry on a war of equality with the crown of France at land, and hope for such victories as those
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of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. But from the time when the whole of France was united to the crown, and the liberties of the States and nobility absolutely subjected to its power, the kingdom of France has been, in the extent of its country, the number of its inhabitants, and the greatness of its revenue, superior to Britain. The maps will teach us the first of these ; all the writers on political arithmetic agree in the second ; and the third we have learned the last winter from a gentleman, who, by being the master of our own finances, may be allowed to have the best knowledge of those of other countries : and whose argument did not at all dispose him to magnify the French Revenue.

France is stronger at land, not only than England, but than any other power in Europe. The Empire of Germany in the extent of its country, and the number of its inhabitants may be equal, if not superior, to France ; but the division of it into a great number of separate independent States, while France has its whole force united under one absolute monarch, renders Germany greatly inferior to France. Hence it is, that France has for a century past been formidable to the rest of Europe ; and has twice been able to support a long war against the united alliance of the whole.

Whenever any power in Europe shall have grown up to a degree of strength, much greater than that

of any other power; it from thenceforward becomes the interest of the other States, to be watchful over it, to guard against the growth of it, and mutually to assist each other, when they are attacked by it. This is the universal maxim of politics, which has held good in all ages, from the first establishing of governments. *Dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur*, is related by the historian as a cause of the extending the Roman monarchy; and must be a principal, or at least a concomitant cause, in the growth of every other.

It was from this principle, that France and the rest of Europe were jealous of Charles the Vth, when Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, with the Indies, were united under one head. “ *And all true Englishmen, since the decay of the Spanish monarchy, have ever taken it for granted, that the security of their religion, liberty and property; that their honour, their wealth, and their trade depend chiefly upon the proper measures to be taken from time to time against the growing power of France.*” This was the language of parliament in their address to King William just before his death; and of that House of Commons, which has been thought his wisest, and to have best consulted the nation’s interest.

The three powers of Europe, which are most indangered by France, and which by their union alone can carry on an effect: land war against
France

France, are Germany, Holland, and England: Spain, and Savoy, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, may any of them accede to such an alliance, but Germany, Holland, and England, must be the basis of every confederacy, which can be of any avail against the land power of France.

I never read the history of the two grand alliances, which were formed by King William against the growing power of France, without feeling the warmest sentiments of gratitude to that great deliverer of Europe. Never did King of England appear with greater dignity, than he did in that great Congress, held at the Hague in the year 1691; when the Emperor and Empire, the Kings of Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, by their several ambassadors, the Electors of Germany by their particular ministers, and several of them in their own persons, with at least fifty of the greatest Princes of Germany, all attended to hear him plead the cause of Europe; and all joined in one common league and declaration against France. This was an august alliance worthy of a King of England to fight at the head of. An alliance which brought down 200,000 men upon the French frontiers, beside those in British pay*. And though King William was not
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* Lewis XIVth had generally five armies in the course of this war; sometimes six, and never less than four. Those in Germany and Flanders often amounted to 100,000 soldiers; beside garrisons kept in the frontier towns. The French monarch

the most successful warrior, yet the weight of this alliance broke the power of the French, and made them sue for the peace of Ryswick. And the good faith which was observed in the conducting that treaty, and the equal regard, which was paid to all the Princes concerned, gave so general a satisfaction, as to lay a firm foundation of confidence in the honour of the English government; and enabled King William to form a second like alliance, when the death of the King of Spain, and the seizure of that whole monarchy for the grandson of France, made it necessary.

France, in consequence of that first alliance, beheld five armies of 50,000 men each upon its frontiers, three of them commanded by the Electors of Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburg, not fighting with one another for the French diversion, but invading of France upon the Rhine, beside the grand army of the Empire under the Duke of Lorraine, and the united force of England and Holland in Flanders. And, though the strength of France was at length exhausted by contending with the troops of all Europe; yet the long opposition, which it made to the united efforts of Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Savoy, Spain, Holland, and England, proves the immense height of power,

narch had at one time, including his land and naval forces, 450,000 men in pay. Neither the Turkish Empire, nor the Roman, had ever so many wars at once to support.

VOLTAIRE le SIEC. cap. xv.

which

which that kingdom may arrive at, and the absolute necessity there was of forming such an union.

We have since heard so much of the attempts of France towards an universal monarchy, and the balance of power, necessary to be preserved in opposition to it ; and have seen it made a pretence for so many meaner purposes ; that we now nauseate the subject, and do not like to hear any more of it. Yet a measure, which was once right, must continue to be right to eternity. And though France may not have a Prince, equally able and enterprizing with Lewis the XIVth yet the kingdom is the same, and its land forces are still formidable to Europe : at least, it is the only State which either Europe in general, or England in particular, can be endangered by ; and the only State, which England is now at war with.

Every measure, which has a tendency to the uniting the powers of Europe among themselves and against France, must therefore be for the general good of Europe, and the particular interest of England : and every measure, which tends to set the States of Germany, Holland, and England, either at war with each other, or amongst themselves, must be a measure calculated for the good of France, and the prejudice of the other powers of Europe. For the same reason every measure, tending to the continuance or increase of such a war, must be for the benefit of France, and the prejudice

prejudice of Europe : because it is a weakening of the rivals of France ; and keeping those powers at variance, from whom France can have nothing to fear, but in their union.

Ever since the times immediately preceding the treaty of Westphalia, it has been the constant aim of the French government to establish an equality of power and independence among a number of princes in Germany, and to keep them as much as possible divided from each other, both in interest and in religion. The crown of Sweden, and the Protestant States of the Empire, had for many years preceding that treaty, been indangered by the power of the House of Austria : and therefore, when Gustavus Adolphus declared war against it, France, to serve its own purposes, willingly entered into alliances with him, and his succeeding generals, through the whole course of the war : and the Cardinals Richieu and Mazarine, while they were persecuting it in France, became the Defenders of the Protestant Faith in Germany. This independency of the several German States, which was so firmly established by the treaty of Westphalia, is what the German Princes call the Liberties of Germany, and the System of Germany. And the French willingly guaranteed this treaty ; knowing, that while they kept Germany thus divided, they themselves should be the less indangered by it.

If every war between England and Holland, or between either of these and Germany, or in Germany itself, between any two States of the Empire, be, so far as it goes, a prejudice to Europe, and a security to France; it follows, that whenever such wars shall arise between any two German States, and much more between any two principal powers of Europe, it will be the policy of France to encourage and inflame them. Thus the French court, in Charles the IId's time, encouraged the Dutch to undertake a war with the English, and afterwards excited the court of England to declare war against Holland, promising to both the assistance of their fleet, but leaving them both in battle to destroy each other.

On the other hand, whatever wars shall arise between any two States of Europe, or any two princes of the Empire, it will be the interest of every other State, except France, to compose these differences, if it can be done, by their mediation and good offices.

If every war, which arises between any two particular States of the Empire, be itself a misfortune, and contrary to the interest of Europe; the evil will be still the greater, and the mischief so much the more extensive, if France shall make itself a party in the war, and shall join itself to either of the two sides, to keep the dispute alive so much the longer. Accordingly we find that this has been the constant

policy of France, to mix itself in all quarrels in the Empire, and keep up the disputes of the contending parties as long as it can ; till one or the other is reduced, or they shall both see their interest to agree.

Should England or Holland take the opposite part in any such dispute, this would be a still greater misfortune ; and could only serve to extend and multiply the evil, and lengthen the continuance of it : and, whoever be the parties, or whatever be the event of the war, must be a misfortune to Europe ; and so long as it continued must be a weakening of Germany, and a service to the cause of France.

Thus let the whole force of Germany be considered as equal to a hundred : and let any two powers of it be at war together, whose force shall be to each other as eight to ten of those parts. So far as this war goes, it is a loss to Europe by the destruction or diminution of the force of eighteen parts. If the quarrel be adopted by any of the other powers of Germany, that produces a loss or diminution of so many more parts : If France, to keep up the contest, should take the weaker side, and add to the power whose force is eight, so as to make it superior to ten, the evil is not lessened, but made greater. Should England be so unfortunate as to join in the contest, and send its land force of fifty into the war, and France there-

upon send a force of eighty ; the party assisted by England would be but little benefited by the alliance ; the English would still be the weaker side ; the force of Europe would be diminished so much the more ; and France only be advantaged. This is a kind of reasoning which must hold invariably just in all ages. And whether Britain shall take the part of Hesse against Saxe, or of Saxe against Hesse ; of Austria against Prussia, or of Prussia against Austria ; the interest of Europe is hurt, the powers of Germany are weakened, and France only can be aggrandized at the expence of both.

Should the reader think this reasoning too minute, and make a doubt, whether the cause of Europe can be so much affected by the disputes of these minor States of the Empire ; I am not disposed to augment the importance of them : but then, if the interest of Europe be not concerned in them, that of England must be much less so ; because no German dispute can be an object worthy the British regard, but only as the interest of Europe is affected by it. Whether Wittenburg or Wirtemberg, Lunenburgh or Lawenburgh, Sultzbach or Anspatch, shall get the better in any dispute, is an affair, which may engage the passions, the prejudices, and sometimes the interest of any particular Elector : but all these party quarrels of Germans among themselves are beneath the notice of the imperial crown of these realms. Britain knows none of them, but as members of the Empire in

general, and as parts of one great whole, to be actuated against France the common enemy.

In short, either there is such a thing, as a common interest of Europe; and Germany is or may be of use to Britain and the common cause; or it cannot. If there is no such common cause, or Germany cannot be of use to it, then certainly it cannot be of use for England to lavish its millions about it. If there be such a cause, and Germany ever can be of use to England by serving it, it can be so only by its union. Germany divided into factions, and fighting one half of it against the other half, cannot weaken France, or serve the cause of Europe. Nothing but a hearty union of the Emperor and Empire, and the several States, which compose it, acting under one head, can be of any avail for this purpose. The sowing divisions therefore in the Empire, and abetting the quarrels between any of its members, may serve the humour of a particular elector; certainly does serve the cause of France, but never can the interest of England.

I don't determine, whether the Germans are likely soon to agree together in any one point; and much less in uniting with England and the States General in a war with France: but till they do thus agree, England has nothing to do with their little internal quarrels. The only chance we have however for such an union, and the only means of accelerating it

it, is to leave the French to themselves ; not to conquer Germany, for that is impossible to do, but to harrass it as much as they please, and make themselves as odious as we can desire.

If a regard for the interest of Europe in general ought to keep us from meddling in any German domestic war, the particular interest of Germany will be no less hurt by our engaging in it. One of the greatest calamities, which can happen to a country, is doubtless that of a civil war. A war between two members of the Empire is in respect to that head, under which they are all united, a civil war. There may be some difference between the degree of obedience, due from the several States to the head of the Empire, and that of the subjects of any particular kingdom to theirs ; but so far as the interest of the Empire is affected, and so far as the present argument is concerned, this is a German civil war. One of the most mischievous circumstances attending civil wars has generally been, that each side, being more animated by their party hatred, than by the love of their country, the weaker is too apt to call in a foreign force to its assistance. These always enter to serve their own purposes, and not that of the country in general, or of the particular party, which invites them. This begets a precedent, and excites the other party to take the same destructive measure. Thus the State is over-run with armies much greater than its own ; and every part of the country ravaged to the destruction

struction of the individuals ; till at length perhaps the war terminates in an issue, very different from what either of the parties had originally intended. Every one knows, that this is the general history of civil wars. Place the scene where you will, or in what age of the world you think fit, this has been the common course of them. Our own country indeed was fortunate enough, to have all the powers of Europe so much employ'd against each other, during the period of our civil war, that they had no leisure to attend to the English concerns. Though France did us the kind office of sending a minister, under the pretence of a mediator, to inflame our differences, and blow them up into a civil war as soon as it could ; but its troops were otherwise employ'd.

Germany has been so unhappy, as to have a dispute arise between two of its leading Princes about the right to four great duchies in one of its remotest provinces. What the names of these are, I confess I do not know ; nor I suppose does one man in ten thousand of my fellow subjects ; though we have spent so many millions about them : but they lie somewhere in Silesia, one of the most eastern inland provinces of Germany, with twenty intermediate States between us and them. Such a dispute arising in Germany was doubtless a misfortune to it. However, as the revenues of neither of the parties are inexhaustible ; the probable issue of such a war, if they were left to themselves, would be,

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that one or the other of them would find their revenues brought to an end, and would be obliged to submit. Whether Prussia or Austria carried its point, cannot be a matter of the least consequence to England: for, beside that the country itself is at too great a distance for us to be affected by it; England has actually taken both sides of the controversy, and therefore cannot be really interested in either. But the misfortunes of Germany are not so speedily determined. Unhappily for the poor people, the one side called in the French, and the other the English. Can this be for the interest of Germany, to have the flame of a civil war fed with a stock of fuel infinitely greater than its own? To have the revenues of England and France poured into the Empire, so much the longer to enable the Germans to destroy each other, and multiply the miseries of this civil war through all the parts of the Empire?

But it may be said perhaps, that, if Britain does not take any part in these German wars, France nevertheless will: and therefore England's interfering is only a necessary opposition to France. How far this may be right in respect of England, shall be considered hereafter; but we are now treating of it only in relation to the interest of Germany. Doubtless then it is the interest of France, as often as any of the German princes go to war, to assist the weaker party, and blow up the contention. This the French may practise by themselves, to a certain

tain degree, and for a certain time ; till the Germans shall see their own interest, and the French shall make themselves odious. But if, as often as France declares on one side, England adopts the other, how is Germany relieved? France will always take care to send troops enough to keep the balance even ; and all that England can do by its officiousness, will be the drawing so many more parts of Germany into the quarrel, and enabling the Germans to cut each others throats so much the longer. That is, leave the French to themselves, they will doubtless do as much mischief as they can ; but in time they may make themselves generally hated, and the Germans wise enough to agree : and England, so long as it continues neuter, will be courted by both parties, and by its good offices may mediate a peace between them : but the hope of peace vanishes, the instant we declare for either of the parties ; which are thereby set the farther at variance. That is, we double the calamity to Germany, and divide with France the odium of it.

But if the French are left to themselves in Germany, this will increase their influence in the several courts of it. For a time it may ; but Britain cannot help that. So long as the contending parties are exasperated against each other, England, by espousing the cause of either, cannot probably benefit the side it adopts ; certainly cannot benefit itself, and only makes the influence of France over the other side so much the stronger.

Would

Would we then have all Germany be over-run by the French? I answer, No. Humanity teaches us to wish hurt to no country; but Germany is not *ours*. If the French will stir up divisions among the German Princes, and they are weak enough to yield to them, is England answerable for this? If any country in Europe is to be over-run by the French, whither can their armies (especially when we are at war with them) be better turned, than into Germany? A country, which they never can conquer, which can best bear their invasions, and the powers of which alone, by uniting together, are able to repell them. If Germans themselves have so little affection for Germany, as to call in foreign troops to oppress it; are we bound to feel a greater concern for their country than they? Is Britain to make itself the general Knight Errant of Europe, to rescue oppressed States; and exhaust itself, and neglect its own wars, in order to save men in spite of themselves, and who will not do any thing towards their own deliverance?

But shall we suffer the Protestant interest to be oppressed? This is a question put into the mouths of many good people, and therefore deserves a particular answer. We happen now to have one nominal Protestant Prince on our side; and therefore the Protestant interest has been speciously held out to our view. But in the last war we were fighting for the Queen of Hungary, and this Protestant Prince had only a Popish King of France for his
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defender.

defender. Did we then think the Protestant interest at all concerned in that war? And why should we in this? This great champion of Protestantism was then universally decried by us, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle. Have his writings made us think better of his religion? We set out even in this war with considering him as an enemy to our Protestant Electorate; and hired an army of Russians to invade him. What is it then, that has at once changed him in our opinion, from a despiser of all religion, to the defender of the Protestant? But not to insist on this,

In the first place, if we recollect the state of Europe at the time of the breaking out of the present war, what one Popish power had attacked the Protestant religion, or had shewn the least intention to infringe the liberties of any one Protestant State? Something of that sort might have happened before; but at that time there was not a Palatine or a Saltzburgher complaining. Even that most bigotted House of Austria was then practising less of its religious tyranny over its Protestant subjects, than it had been ordinarily used to. Not one innovation had been made in the Empire in prejudice of the Protestant interest, except only that the K. of P. had built a Popish church at Berlin, and had the foundationstone laid in his own name, in the midst of his Protestant dominions. Should the Protestants of Germany therefore, in such a time, have pretended, that their religion was

in danger, and that they took up arms for the defence of it, the Papists may very justly conclude, that they never will lay them down again; for there never was a time, when the Protestants had less ground of complaint, than at the time of the commencement of this war. How then can this be called a religious war? The truth is, such an assertion might pass in an English assembly, willing to believe any thing that was said to it. They might be told, that the Empress Queen was going to destroy the Protestant religion, and the system of Germany: but no one of the Protestant powers upon the continent was under the least apprehension of danger to their religion, at that time, from the House of Austria, whatever might have been their jealousies from the K. of P.

Should any one doubt of this, let him in the next place consider, who are the parties, which are engaged in this war. If we look round Europe, we shall find as many Protestant States fighting against us, as for us; and more, who rather wish ill, than wish well, to our cause, which therefore they certainly do not think the cause of Protestantism. Swedes and Saxons are in arms against us; the Russians, though not Protestants, are still farther from being Papists; and the Dutch and Danes have given no proof of their wishing success to our cause. I do not mean the defence of H—r, but the war, in which we are supporting the K. of P. Does any one think, that the

French attack the Hanoverians, because they are Protestants ? Or that the end of their sending their armies thither is to convert them to Popery ? Did they make the least attempt of that sort, while they were in possession of the country ? Surely then we may allow the other Protestant States of Europe to be judges of the interest of their religion, as well as ourselves : and not one of these have expressed the least apprehensions of danger threatened to it. We may, if we please, hardly call this K. of P. the defender of the Protestants ; but no one Protestant State in Europe will thank us for what he has done ; nor will any German Protestant State act with us, except only those, which we have bought, and taken into our pay.

In the last place, let us consider the operations of this war, and what are the effects, which it has actually produced ; which in every other case is allowed to be the best rule to form a judgment upon. The very first concerted operation of this Protestant champion, was the entering into, and seizing of Saxony, the first Protestant State of the Empire ; and setting all the Protestant States at variance with each other.

The reader will remember, that we are not now considering, whether this Prussian war was a just one ; but how far it is a religious one. Whether Prussia or Saxony be in the right, the hurt done to the
 Protestant

Protestant interest in Germany, by setting two Protestant Electorates at variance, is just the same; and the Popish States alone can rejoice in the destruction of either. There have been times, when the zeal of the Popes of Rome made them hold frequent consistories to consult, how they might best destroy that pestilent northern heresy, as our religion was once called, when the reformation was first adopted by the northern powers of Germany; and there have been bigotted Emperors, who have formed leagues, and made many attempts, in conjunction with the court of Rome, for the destruction of Protestants; which Providence was pleased to disappoint. But what is there, that the bitterest enemies of our religion could have devised, so effectually to serve their purpose, as the lighting up a war between these Protestant States themselves? Which, without raising any jealousy of Papists; without the cruelty of persecution; without the odium of incurring any breach of faith, should set these Protestant powers upon worrying each other, with infinitely greater destruction than any the sharpest persecution ever produced, and ruining the whole north of Germany.

Could a Gregory or a Ferdinand have wished for any thing more, than that Saxony, where the reformation first began, should be ravaged from end to end: its country wasted, its cities ruined, their suburbs burnt, its princes and nobles driven into banishment, its merchants beggared, its peasants forced

forced into arms, and made to sheath their swords in the bowels of their countrymen, or in those of their Protestant neighbours, Bohemians, Hungarians, and Silesians; or else forced to fly for shelter into the armies of France, there to fight under Popish banners, against their Protestant brethren, and made to march over the bodies of Protestant Englishmen*.

Could the coolest malice of jesuitism have doomed our Faith to a heavier vengeance, than to have Protestant Saxons, stabbing Protestant Britons, Protestant Hanoverians, murdering Protestant Wirtenburghers, Protestant Hessians fighting against Protestant Palatines, Protestant Swedes invading Protestant Prussians, and Protestant Bohemians, Hungarians, and Silesians, coming all armed under Popish standards, to cut the throats of Protestant Brandenburgers. All this, and more have we seen (eventually, though not intentionally) brought about by the councils of Protestants themselves, and have in one year given more money to effect it, than the amount of all the sums, which the court of Rome has contributed for

* The troops, which marched over general Kingsley at the battle of Minden, and which must have been first cut to pieces, if our horse had come up, were Saxon infantry. The regiments, which the French opposed to Prince Ferdinand's attack at Bergen, were Saxons; and throughout the war, the German corps in the French army, have been made the greatest sufferers.

the destruction of Protestantism, from the birth of Luther, to this day.

But shall France be suffered to conquer H—r ? No one, who is in the least acquainted with the State of Europe, and the constitution of the Empire, can suppose the crown of France should entertain a thought of making a real and permanent conquest of H—r. France enters Germany as a friend and ally of the Empire, and as guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia ; and as such cannot pretend to make a real conquest there : that would be quarrelling with its allies in the very act of assisting them. An Electorate of the Empire is not to be annihilated, but by the destruction of the whole Germanic constitution. For a King of France to make himself E—r of H—r, and eject a whole family out of its rights, would be so great an act of violence, that every member in the empire would rise against it. Sweden and Denmark, could not but take the alarm at it. And if France were to pretend to hold the E—te in its own right, what must become of the intermediate States ? Would the French conquer them too ? That must commit them in eternal quarrels with every member of the Germanic body. Would the Empire suffer a great part of Germany, and two or three Electorates at once to be cut off from its dominions, and made a part of the kingdom of France ? Tis the very thing which England should wish the French to attempt, in order to unite all Germany against them.

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Would they then hold the Electorate by itself, detached from all their other dominions? H—r in that case, might prove the church-yard of the French, as well as Italy has been, and the other parts of Germany. Nor would England have any reason to envy France, the impracticable task of defending a country, surrounded with enemies, and separated from all its other dominions. But in reality, the constitution of Europe, makes every thing of this kind absolutely impossible. All that France can propose, after the greatest success there, can be only to take a temporary possession of the country during the war; to hold it in deposit, as the K. of P. did the Electorate of Saxony. And, if this were to happen, doubtless every good man ought to be sorry for it: but wherein consists that superlative greatness of the evil, that Britain should thus move Heaven and Earth, and risk every danger to prevent it. The French 'tis true, would possess themselves of the revenues of the country; and all the taxes, which the people now pay to their sovereign, would be paid to France. But would England be so much impoverished? Or would the crown of France be so very formidably enriched by the acquisition? A French army, in the country, would themselves probably find a use for all the money they could raise there: but suppose a very disinterested general should be able to remit a couple of hundred thousand pound from H——r to Versailles, which is probably more than the French revenue would ever gain by it; is there

any kind of œconomy in our having put ourselves in three years time to an expence of twelve millions, to prevent France from getting six hundred thousand pounds out of Germany ?

But the poor people, it may be said, deserve our compassion. True, they do so ; and for that reason we ought to let them alone, and not make their country the theatre of a war, which must ruin them. A small State, which is invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than itself, is doubtless under a great misfortune ; all resistance is useless, and it has nothing to do but submit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune ; and that is, by having another great State, almost equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it. If the country submit, it has but one army to maintain ; and may in the beginning yield upon terms, which are tolerable : but if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is sure to be oppressed by them both. An army is a many headed monster, that must be fed ; and the defending army ought to have as many mouths, as the attacking ; and each will get but all they can from the poor inhabitants.

We have indeed heard, with concern, of turning a country into a mere desert. But what was the reason ? Not because the country was conquered ; that is a reason for preserving it ; but to prevent the danger of its being lost.

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The present more humanized laws of war, do not admit of burning of towns, and destroying of countries, where there is no opposition made. " *Before Christianity was established in the world: when vanquished provinces were laid waste, and depopulated, says Marshal Saxe, the fortifying of great towns might wear some appearance of reason; but now that war is carried on with more moderation and humanity, as being, by these measures, productive of more advantage to the conqueror, &c.*" These more violent ravages are only committed in time of actual war, and are solely the consequents of opposition. And when two great armies are carrying on a war in a country, each of them will make this destruction; when it happens to be necessary for them, to prevent their enemies finding subsistence in it, or pursuing them through it. Each of them will be apt to do it, without asking themselves whether they are the invaders, or the defenders of it.

The Spaniards burnt their own country in Queen Ann's war; and, if the French should be able to throw over a body of men into England, while our armies are fighting in Germany, it ought to be done here. I do not say whether it would be done or not, but every horse, cow, and sheep, ought to be driven off or destroyed, and every stack, mill, and oven, burned or ruined. These are evils, which are not prevented, but made
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in a country by resistance: they never follow, from its being invaded, but frequently arise out of its being defended. Nothing of this kind was practised in H—r, while the French were victorious, and in quiet possession of it: they would not destroy the country then for their own advantage. But let a superior army come to drive them out, or let a defending army be obliged to abandon it, each will be apt to leave as little as possible behind them, to accommodate their enemies in their pursuit. Such are the calamities, to which we wilfully expose a small State, by making it the seat of war, between two potentates much greater than itself.

Compassionate minds might still entertain a doubt about these things, and suspect that there might be some unknown evils in a French army's possessing themselves of H—r, if we had not already tried it. But we have now made the experiment, and know the worst of it. The French have already been in possession of this country. Did the sun refuse to shine, or the rivers cease to flow, upon that account? They certainly did not here in England. Britain still continued an island, and its government still subsisted, though the French had seized on the government of H—r. But the poor people were miserable. Without doubt they were sufferers, and deserved our compassion, but possibly not to that degree, which may have been represented. Instead of consulting our imaginations, or hearkening to exaggerated descriptions at a distance;

there is a surer method of judging, and that is, by consulting the sufferers themselves, and listening to the language of their actions. What did they do on that occasion? The H——n chancery renouncing all their English connections, made the convention of Closter-Seven: by which, they agreed to give the French the possession of the country, desiring to live in a quiet state of neutrality. Happy, if they might have continued so: but soon after the K. of P. gained the victory of Rosbatch, and he did not think it proper to allow them to remain at peace. His arguments prevailed, and the army of Observation took up their arms again. The unnecessarily giving offence, is not the way to do good; and therefore I attempt no farther elucidation on this head. But whatever else may be dark in this mysterious transaction; one thing at least is clear; that, since the H—ns by themselves were content to sign a neutrality, and let the French stay in their country, we need not put ourselves to the annual expence of four or five millions to keep them out.

Here I may be told, perhaps, of the Duke de Richlieu's extortions, while the French army was in the country; and every benevolent mind will doubtless feel a just concern for the sufferings, which the poor people indured; far be it from me to attempt to lessen them. But the reader will recollect, that these oppressions were alledged as one of the pleas for the convention of Closter-seven's being broken;

broken; and that therefore some allowances are to be made for the aggravations, which are natural upon such an occasion. And did not this general render himself odious by his excesses? And did not some of his own officers condemn him by a contrary behaviour? Both of these therefore prove the truth of what I have said, about the more civilized laws of war: else the one could not have been condemned for the breaking them, or the other honoured for observing them. But beside this, it is to be considered, that H—r by its union with P. was become obnoxious to the other Princes of the Empire. They had with indignation seen the K. of P. twice set all Germany in a flame, ravage some of the finest parts of the empire, and sacrifice the lives of his own subjects, and theirs, by thousands, to his ambition; many of them had been actual sufferers, and all were kept in fear by him. By this conjunction therefore of the H——n cause with his, the French gained a specious pretence to gratify their own malice, and their generals rapacity, at the poor H——ns cost; and at the same time the merit of serving the Empire, and revenging the cause of its suffering members in so doing. The extraordinary part therefore of the sufferings of the poor people, is not to be placed to the English account, but to the P—n. Had the E—e appeared in Germany, in as inoffensive a light, as the interest of England, and the good of the poor people of H—r should have led us to wish, the French might not have ventured on those excesses.

cesses. But they knew, that none of the other Princes of the Empire would resent them: that they had then, before their eyes much greater severities, practising in Saxony *; and therefore, might not be displeas'd to see a few of the same extortions brought home to that E—te, which they might be apt to think, had been one of the causes of them. After all, it must be allow'd, that some officers are more rapacious than others, and the poor H——ns had then the misfortune of having the French army commanded by one of the worst of them. But in general, the French are a fair enemy, and neither they nor we have exercis'd any unnecessary cruelties to each others subjects. Nor could the country therefore have any sufferings to fear beyond the allow'd usage of war upon an English account: nor would a French army stay there, in all probability, more than one campaign, if we would but keep out of it, and take from the French court all hope of drawing over an English army to meet them there.

In the course of the last war, we saw French armies traverse all Germany, and enter into the countries of friends and foes. Their coming into any country, is doubtless a bad thing, but we have never known the Germans themselves consider it in so

* The city of Leipzig was then actually under a sort of military execution: and the merchants made to draw bills upon their correspondents, and kept under guard, till their bills were accepted.

very terrible a light, as to throw away millions after millions to prevent it.

If one French General's conduct prove an exception to the received laws of war, we have every year a very strong evidence to confirm them. The Landgraviate of Hesse, is as fine a country as any in North Germany; and yet their Landgrave lets us have his troops for the sum of 340,000 *l.* and suffers the French to possess themselves every year of his country, and come into his capital; his troops being at that very time fighting against them in our service. And we, here in England, thought so very lightly of their having entered it now the third year; that we made rejoicings for the action of Warbourg, in which we had at most killed only 1500 French, and taken as many prisoners, and fired the Tower guns for it, as a victory gained; though we knew, that by that very action, the French had taken possession of Cassel. If two successive Landgraves have every year exposed their country, and their own palace to be possessed by the French, for the benefit of letting us their troops for 340,000 *l.* Then, though we cannot positively ascertain the damage, this gives us at least a negative measure of it; and proves, that it cannot exceed that sum.

The reader will observe, that I give every advantage to this estimate; and suppose them to set the lives of their soldiers at nothing. However,
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if the Landgrave did not repent, and we fired guns of rejoicing, at the time when the French army got possession of Cassel; can their getting one step farther, appear so very tremendous a thing, that this nation should spend three, four, and five millions to prevent it.

But H——r is now attacked solely upon an English account; and therefore England ought to defend it. Certain it is, that the Electorate is invaded merely on an English account—And will not this always be the case? Is it possible for that country to give our enemies less ground of offence in any future quarrel, than it did in this? Could the French pretend to say, that the Electorate had taken any part in the dispute between the two nations about our possessions in America? Who does not see then, that the single reason, why it is attacked, is because the French know, that we shall defend it? That the French therefore only march their troops thither; because, as we, by our superiority at sea, have the advantage in attacking the French settlements in America, and the East and West Indies; so the French, by their superiority at land, and their greater nearness to H——r, are sure to have the advantage, by meeting the English troops there. They would not go thither, unless they were certain of finding us there: they always will go thither, as long as the English councils resolve to oppose them there. The reason is, that it is not worth their while to march their troops so far
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from home, from any other motive but that. I would not be understood to depreciate the Electorate; or to set the value of it below that of other countries: but no particular district in North Germany, is rich enough to make it worth the while of a great kingdom, like that of France, to march its troops so far out of its own dominions, merely for the sake of maintaining them at free quarter. One German Prince may treat another in that manner; as for instance, when this war shall be concluded, the Elector of Saxony may perhaps choose to go and eat up another E—te by way of retaliation for our having, as he may think, so largely contributed to the destruction of Saxony. He, as a German, may have his German passions, prejudices, or affections; and one German power may attack another, without giving umbrage to the Empire: but to a great King, like the King of France, it cannot be an object. If he send a great army, the people cannot maintain them: if a little one, they will drive them out of it: if he duly adjust the proportion of troops, between what will keep the country in subjection, and what it can support, the expedition will at best but pay its own charges; and nothing will remain to the Crown of France. Indeed, how should there be any thing? According to the present laws of war, the utmost, which a French army could do, would be to oblige the people to quarter their soldiers, and to pay to the crown of France the same taxes, which they now

do to their own sovereign *. Would a single floren of that money find its way to Paris, in that case, more than does now to London? Are general officers such good managers for the crown revenue? Would not they find uses enough to employ it, where they are, or pretences to put it into their own pockets? Will the people pay their taxes to their enemies more cheerfully, than to their natural sovereign? Or will it be collected, and remitted to Paris, upon cheaper terms by thirty thousand commissioners of this revenue, than it can be by the civil officers to their own Elector in time of peace? And yet, till we can prove how much comes to England, we need not fear the King of France's being enriched by it in time of war.

Hanover in itself therefore cannot be a sufficient object to induce a great kingdom to send its troops thither merely to distress the poor inhabitants: by which it is likely to ruin all their discipline, and turn them into thieves and banditti; and from which it can propose to draw nothing to itself, but the odium of an unjust invasion of the rights of innocent people. All Europe, after one campaign would condemn the cruelty and meanness of such

* The reader will remember, that in all that was said about the French administration, the chief document of it, was a decree of the French council, for the receivers of the Electoral revenue to be accountable to a Mr. Faigy, for the produce of them. And considering, that the decree does not mention a syllable of *increasing* the taxes, the violence seems to have been offered to the affections of people, rather than to their purses.

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a behaviour in a great kingdom like France; which should thus confess its inferiority to its enemy, by seeking to revenge its quarrel on a defenceless country which had not the least concern in it. And no measure could make the French more obnoxious to the Empire, if we would but keep out of it. It would then be a German cause, and not an English one; and the Electorate would have a right to call for the assistance of the Empire to its protection. It might suffer a little at first perhaps, as the German councils are slow; but from the nature of things it is evident, that the French army never would stay there more than a single winter. The French therefore, would not think it worth their while to go thither, unless they were sure to find an army in English pay to fight with, and justify their coming thither.

I now add, that whenever an English army is there, they always will go thither; because that is the most advantageous method of carrying on the war for them, and the most disadvantageous for England. It must be so as long as the present war shall last: because England has so great a superiority at sea, that they have no other country to go to. The French have now no one place to fight us in, unless we find for them a field of battle in Germany. They cannot invade England: if they could, there would not be a man of their army in Germany. But their troops probably would not embark on board their transports, after having seen their fleet destroyed, which should have protected

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them; or, if they would, they could not get out. They cannot send over their troops in a sufficient number to attack us in the West-Indies; no, nor to defend themselves, if a pure regard to Britains good could have prevailed with us to attack them there last winter; because their ports are all blocked up. The French troops therefore, must either have remained at home unemployed, or be sent into Germany. And, at a time, when they were precluded from invading England, and their West-India islands lay all naked and exposed to us; whither could they wish to transfer the war, rather than into Germany, where they have nothing to lose, or be in fear for; and where could they wish to have us meet them, rather than in a country, where we have nothing to hope for?

Should any one in answer to this, alledge that Britain has nothing to lose in Germany, any more than France has. I answer, yes. England has its greatest stake there; it has H——r to lose. Should the reader demur to this, and raise a doubt, whether that country be really of so much importance to Britain; I cannot answer his doubts: but if it be not of that importance, what then are we fighting for? Why have we been spending twelve millions in Germany, to defend, only from insult, that, which cannot be of so much worth to us; or to prevent the French from getting into a country, where they will find nothing to tempt their stay, or to remit to their own crown, when they have been there?

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Shall then the innocent Hanoverians be quartered upon, and oppressed by the French troops, and the English not attack them? Not, if we have any compassion for the Electorate: for then the French will always go thither. And how cruel a hardship shall we bring upon the country, if we thus make it the seat of our wars: or when will there be an end of the poor people's sorrows, if by thus considering them, as a part of ourselves, we furnish all nations with the means of annoying us; and make the Hanoverians backwards rue the smart of every quarrel, which may happen to arise between Britain, and any other powers upon the continent?

But some perhaps may say, let who will attack the Electorate upon our account, we will revenge its cause. We may, if we please, resolve that we will defend it against every power in Europe; but, without being at a greater expence to maintain that government, than our own in time of peace, we cannot defend it against any. This is an evil, which necessarily arises out of its distance from us. The parliament may address for it; and generous British hearts ought to feel for it; but they cannot protect it: either from the French, when they are pleased formally to attack it; or from any of the lesser States of the Empire, if they choose suddenly to over-run it. Do we doubt of this? The course of the war, has afforded but too many proofs of our inability in this respect. How did the war begin? The scene in Germany, opened with our being in alliance with the Empress Queen. And
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the K. of P——a, under the encouragement of France, was threatening to invade the E——te. We looked over all the other parts of Europe in vain ; and sent to the farthest North, and agreed to give five hundred thousand pounds to the court of Russia, to march fifty-five thousand men into P——a, in order to find that Prince employment at home. We afterwards perceived, that this Russian diversion, which was to march through Poland, would be ineffectual: what then was to be done? That was the only resource which B——n had for defending it; and that failed. We were then forced to see our inability; and by renouncing our treaty with Russia, and giving up our old allies, were made to buy off an evil, which we could not repel. And being thus brought into a state of dependence upon a single ally, he knew how to improve it from one step to another, till we are at length reduced to an appearance at least of being tributaries to a K. of P——a.

Here, perhaps, a generous English breast may revolt against the expression, and disdain to own, that the money we pay to P——a, is a tribute. He is our ally, and we pay him a subsidy, but not a tribute. Let us consider then the nature of each, and what it is, which constitutes the difference between them. A subsidy is an honorable pension, given by one State to another, in consideration of services done, or benefits to be received. Thus, for instance, the five-hundred thousand pounds we were

to pay to Russia, would have been a subsidy, because we were to have an army of fifty-five thousand men in return for it : and the exposing of his country as a frontier to Hanover, and the letting us his troops, is a service done by the Landgrave of Hesse, and therefore the money paid him, is a subsidy. But what is it, that the K. of P—— a has done for the money we pay to him ? Was his having fallen upon a Protestant Electorate, and destroying Saxony, a service done to Britain ? Was that the act of merit, which constitutes this payment a subsidy ? Will this nation take upon itself the blood of a hundred thousand German Protestants, and avow the shedding of it as a benefit received ? Is it then his having attacked the Empress Queen ? whether justly or not, is his concern ; whether advantageously for England, is only ours. That cannot be the benefit received ; for we have already seen, that the lighting up a civil war in Germany, and much more the involving that part of it, which we ought most to wish the welfare of, in a quarrel with the Diet, and the other Princes of the Empire, cannot be a service done to England ; whatever it may be to France.

But the Empress Queen refused to defend the Electorate. True, she alledged her own danger : and therefore he increased that danger : and by pressing her so much the more, drove her into a closer union with our enemy : by which she had been before induced to put into the hands of France,

Nieuport

Newport and Ostend; and may possibly be driven
 to cede to the Russians, such a part of their con-
 quests, as may give them a vote in the Diet, and
 thereby distract the German councils so much the
 more. Are these such valuable considerations to
 Britain, as to make this a subsidy? Once indeed
 he fought with the French, in the Imperial army
 at Rosbatch; but fought them as his own enemies,
 and not ours. The French, to save appearances
 with their allies, marched out of their way to at-
 tack him; otherwise he had not shewn the least
 disposition to go out of his, to serve us.

Does he then supply our army with troops?
 There were, it is said, in the campaign of Crevelt,
 two Prussian regiments of horse, who refused to
 charge the French, and thereby lost us the fairest
 opportunity, we ever had, of defeating them. But
 supposing, that they had done their duty; two or
 three regiments cannot be an equivalent for six-
 hundred and seventy thousand pounds. In Queen
 Ann's war, the subsidy paid to a K. of P——a,
 was fifty thousand pounds; for which, we sent his
 troops to fight the French in Savoy. But what is
 the benefit, which this much greater sum is the
 purchase of? It will be difficult to name any real
 service he can do to Britain; though it may be easy
 to see the mischief, he can do elsewhere.

If we look into the three last treaties with him,
 we shall have still more reason to think, that he is not

bound to no service whatsoever. Some general expressions there are about a common cause, which he seems left at liberty to interpret to his own convenience. What is the common cause, between two parties, who have no common enemy? We are not at war with the House of Austria, and he will tell us, he is not at war with France. The treaty does not oblige him to yield us any specific assistance; yet we give him more than the whole amount of the subsidies, which in Queen Ann's war, we paid to our German allies all put together. We deliver up our money to him, for this one cogent reason, because he wants it; and that seems the only thing there certainly determined, that he will have it: he will have it all at one payment, immediately upon the ratification; the use he is to make of it, is to raise troops, to strengthen himself, without his being obliged to send a man to us; he is to fight his own battles, and not ours*; and by his victories, to enable himself to demand the more of us. If by any of these treaties, he guarantees the Electorate, his actions have already shewn, that he understands by it nothing more, than the not attacking it himself: for so far was he, after the first treaty, from sending an army to keep the French out of Hanover, that he withdrew his troops

* The reader may see this treaty in the appendix, which is the more worth his perusal, because he will find no treaty like it, since the time of King John.

out of Wesel, in order to let them in. The sums given, therefore, seem not calculated to purchase a defence, so much as to keep off an attack; that is, it is a consideration paid to buy off an evil of suffering, which is the strict definition of a tribute. And if B——n will singly undertake the defence of so remote a country, it must submit to see that famous sentence reversed: *Auro, non Ferro, Liberanda est.*

But the K. of P——a is a great Prince; and B——n may submit to pay him just fourteen times the price*, which was agreed for the redemption of Rome. Still there is no end of the troubles of the Electorate, upon this mistaken plan of defending it; for now, that we have discovered to Europe our weak part, we have put it in the power of every the meanest Prince in Germany to insult us, and make us buy it over again: for we can defend it against none of them.

I have already hinted the possibility of an Elector of Saxony's seeking an indemnification for his subjects sufferings, on another Electorate, which he may think to have too largely contributed to them. But Britain may not always have the honour of a crowned head to contend with. Suppose a Duke of Wirtemberg, as he has already changed his reli-

* A thousand pound weight of gold.

gion, possibly with a view to a tenth Electorate ; should be fed with that hope, and persuaded by the Imperial court to invade H——r. Could Britain defend it against him? Not without an expence of many millions. We may think the troops of the Electorate itself are a match for his, and so they are. But we have heard of a French army's entering the Empire under the title of troops of the circle of Burgundy. Or, a peace being made, soldiers of fortune enough may be brought, by the Court of Vienna's encouragement, and French money, to engage in that Prince's service. Or why may not the French themselves march down their troops to the Rhine, and break them on one side of the river, to cross over and become troops of Wirtemberg on the other? This has been the method, in which the French have executed their treaties, even after a specific renunciation, which in our future treaty cannot be thought of *. To compleat the embarrassment, perhaps his majesty of P——a may choose to hold the balance of power even between the two contending houses of B——k and Wertemberg : and Britain, by attempting things out of its power, may give that petty Prince the honour of beating

* By the Pyrenean treaty, the French court formally abandoned the Portuguese. But Marshal Schomberg went into Portugal, with a body of French troops ; whom he paid with the money of Lewis the XIVth, though he pretended to maintain them in the name of the King of Portugal. These troops, being joined by the Portuguese forces, obtained a complete victory at Villa Viciosa ; which fixed the crown in the house of Braganza. VOLTAIRE.

us, with whom it is a disgrace to us to contend. Such are the effects of a mistaken act of duty. By thus considering a distant country as a part of Britain, and discovering too great a fondness for it, we expose the poor people of it to continual broils and misery, and intail perpetual ignominy on B——n, by attempting to defend them. They may justly come within our compassion; but for that very reason, we ought to separate our cause from theirs, because they are far removed out of our protection. Could the Electorate ever have been designed to make a part of us, and to be thus tender to us as the apple of our eye; it would have been placed under the guard of our front, and not out of the reach even of our hands*.

But the two houses of parliament, it is said, have promised that they will defend the Electorate. If they were so improvident as to promise such a thing, we have now found it to be impossible:

* The author hopes, that nothing in these sheets will be misinterpreted to the disadvantage of a country, for which he thinks that every good subject ought to have the sincerest regard. 'Tis the pointing out what appears to him the most effectual method of securing it from the present and future attacks of our enemies, which makes one principal end of these considerations. Much less would he knowingly say any thing on the subject, which should not express the most respectful duty and reverence towards the best of sovereigns. He considers the argument of the next head, of perfect and imperfect obligation, as a point of ethics, and not of politics: and therefore the reader may pass it over, if the objection does not strike him.

the fault therefore must be in the making such a promise, and not in the non-performance of it; because no promise binds to impossibilities. This is the short answer, and might suffice. But possibly, there may be those, who after having made their court, by running the nation into a greater expence for the German war, than it had then the least idea of; may hope to make their excuse to the people, by pretending that they have done it only in consequence of a former vote. Thus are Britain's treasures to be lavished away in millions, and more money spent on the German war alone, than the whole sea and land service cost in the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns; and instead of seeking to redress ourselves, we are to be disputing who did it. If it has been wrong, and no one will avow the past, let no one adopt the future. The time may come, when the nation, being exhausted by the German war, and perhaps intimidated by that very Prince it is now upholding, may be forced to give up its own conquests to buy him a peace. Then every member of the administration will disown this excessive regard to Germany, and each individual will say, that for his part he was always against it. If he expect that we should then believe him, let him openly disown it now. Now let them stand up each in his place, and declare that they are for serving their country, and defending Germany, in a practicable way; by attacking the French in their islands, by which only they can ever be formidable to Britain, and thereby securing

curing an ample indemnification for that part of Germany, for which alone we ought to have any concern. Now they may put a stop to the ruinous part of the war; and save their country; and save themselves from the charge of having gained the good opinion of the public, by expressly declaring against these measures, and then making use of that popularity to carry them to an infinitely greater height, than any other men could have thought of. Now I say, they may save themselves and save the public; but if they will go on, bidding against each other, till their countries' treasures shall be exhausted; an injured nation, robbed of its best conquests, must then conclude, that they are all equally blameable.

But the public faith is a subject we may prance high upon; and it may easily be said, that being once engaged, it ought sacredly to be observed. The public faith, engaged by act of parliament, upon a valuable consideration given; as that given to creditors of the publick, who advance money upon it, is doubtless a perfect obligation, and ought to be observed with the strictest sanctity. But does any one really think, that a complimentary address of either, or both houses of parliament, carries in it such a complete obligation? Has the address of either house, the validity of an act of parliament? The resolutions of a house of commons, are in point of obligation on that same house of commons (for upon a future one they lay no obligation at all) to be considered as any other declaration of the resolutions of private men. They
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ought to declare no more than they really intend, so far as things then appear to them, to be consistent with sincerity, and so long as things continue in the state, which they appeared in at the time of declaring those resolutions, they are bound to keep to them, to preserve the character of constancy. If upon trial made, they find the thing resolved on, to be either impossible, or impracticable, or to be attended with much greater difficulties than they had imagined, or greater expence than the thing itself is worth, they may then, upon this better information, alter those resolutions, without any impeachment either of their sincerity or their constancy. Every civilian knows, that this is the nature of an imperfect obligation, or of a promise, made without a valuable consideration to be given for it. And every other man may know how far a resolution of the house of commons is to be depended on.

They began the last war with a resolution, as they did this; and resolved that they would make no peace, till the Spaniards should renounce the right of search; and they never after thought any more of it. I might add, we suffered our heads to be turned with German politicks; and instead of conquering for ourselves, we at last forgot both the Spanish war and the French, and spent our money in Germany against the King of Prussia, for fear he should get, what we are now spending still more millions to prevent his losing.

Should any one still urge, that the promise to defend the Electorate, was not a simple promise, but a perfect

perfect obligation, I now answer in the first place, that the parliament never did promise to defend it. The words of the address are; *We think ourselves bound in justice and gratitude to assist your Majesty against insults and attacks, that may be made upon any of your Majesty's dominions, though not belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, in resentment of the part your Majesty has taken in a cause, wherein the interests of this kingdom are immediately, and so essentially concerned.* The declaring, that they think themselves bound in justice and gratitude to assist in the defence of his Majesty's foreign dominions, is surely a very different thing from the taking upon themselves the whole and absolute defence of them. The very promise of assisting another, carries in it, the supposition of the person himself, exerting his own force in the same cause; otherwise it is not assisting him, but doing the thing ourselves. And has the parliament failed in this promise? Have they not done more than was promised? Have they not taken all the Electoral troops, which are in the field, into their pay, and far from not assisting, born the expence of the whole*? Even formal

* The argument here does not require, nor does the author intend any disrespectful supposition, that the Electorate has not contributed what it can to its own defence. Possibly the maintenance of its garrisons, and its civil government, may nearly employ its whole force. The distinction intended, is, between a promise to assist, and a promise absolutely to defend, which are surely very different engagements.

treaties of alliance and mutual assistance between independent nations, do not bind either party to any farther assistance, than the obligation specifically expressed. Thus for instance, to take the treaty, which that address referred to; by the treaty with Russia, the Empress was to assist us with but such a specific number of troops, and we were to assist her with such a specific sum of money. And even in cases of the most perfect and full alliance; where two States expressly covenant to assist each other *totis viribus*, as is the case between the Dutch and us, yet all the writers on the law of nations agree, that this covenant does not imply an obligation upon one State, to ruin itself in the defence of another. *Succuram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream*, is the judgment of Seneca, adopted by Grotius. *Defendi debent socii, sive in tutelam sese & fidem aliorum dederunt, sive mutua auxilia passi sunt. Illud vero addamus, ne tunc quidem teneri socium, si nulla spes sit boni exitus: boni enim, non mali causa societas contrahitur* *.

We think ourselves bound in justice and gratitude, to assist against insults and attacks: is not this the very language of compliment? And can any one suppose, that this contains a perfect obligation, like that, which is made by a specific alliance between two independent nations; upon a valuable consideration given? In the first place, in respect

* Puffend. & Grot. Lib. 2do. cap. 25to.

of the party bound, it cannot affect the people of England : for they can be bound only by an act of parliament ; and as to the house itself, it is in them a declaration of their present sentiments, and cannot preclude them from the right of altering those sentiments, upon farther information : because, in the second place, the party, to whom the promise is made, being not to give any specific valuable consideration in consequence of that declaration, can have no strict right conveyed thereby to the performance. Should it be said, that what had been already done, was the valuable consideration given, every one must see that a favour voluntarily conferred before hand, cannot make the specific consideration of a future covenant. The only proper right, which that confers, is an obligation of gratitude. But an obligation of gratitude, in the very idea of it, leaves the party obliged, a right of judging of the nature and extent of the grateful returns he is to make.

But it was then said, that this should be the return, the assisting in case of attack. If therefore the obligation arises out of the declaration of Parliament, then that promise can imply an obligation to nothing more, than what was meant by it at the time of making it. Now there is no one, who remembers the passing of that address, but must also remember, that at that time, and for at least a year after, it was the avowed sense of all parties, and confirmed by repeated assurances, that

not a man should be sent to the continent. Whether we should send money or not, as subsidies, to hire foreign troops, was made a matter of doubt, and the debate upon the motion, turned upon the subsidy treaties with Russia, and with the Landgrave of Hesse. But all parties expressly declared, that they would not send a man out of the kingdom.

Could it be conceived, even the next sessions, when repeated assurances were given that no English troops should be sent to Germany, that the nation then actually stood bound by the obligation of a promise, to send thither a greater body of British troops, and those to be under a foreign General too*, than the Duke of Marlborough was ever intrusted with? or than our great deliverer King William carried out with him, only to the mouths of the great rivers in the Netherlands? If the nation then stood bound by the obligation of such a promise, why did any gentleman mislead the

* Nothing in these sheets will be intended to serve one party against another. In comparing the British forces, sent to the continent in this war, and in former ones, the contrast is heightened by the greater number being sent to be under a foreign general. But if the nation is to risk so great a body of its subjects under any general; surely we cannot have too good an one. I could wish indeed, that he had been an Englishman; because then we might have valued ourselves upon his great abilities, as more certainly ours. Whereas, if the present system of our adopting German quarrels should be continued, it may very possibly be our chance, in the next war, to have all those abilities employed against us.

publick by such assurances to the contrary? If the address did not contain any such promise, whence this failure in his own?

In short, men may talk big about the publick faith, but every one knows what is meant by a resolution of the house. If they thought that such a declaration might be of use to deter the K. of P——a from entering the Electorate, it was a kindness done to it, or intended at least, to make it. Certainly it was a proper act of duty, to let the world see, by such a declaration, the strict harmony, which subsisted between his Majesty and his subjects. But no one ever thought before, that such a resolution implied any thing more than an intention to assist in a reasonable degree, and in a practicable manner. And, if we found one way of doing it too heavy a burden for us, then to try another. And if, upon all the other powers in Germany failing us, or declaring against us, we found that our assistance must at last be ineffectual; then to attack the French on their coasts, and in the East and West-Indies, so much the more vigorously, in order to obtain by our conquests, an indemnity to our friends for their past sufferings, and a full security against any future attacks. *Nec servanda promissa, quæ sint iis, quibus promiseris inutilia, nec si plus tibi noceant, quam illi profint, cui promiseris* *.

* Cic. de Off.

The reader may by this time probably be fully satisfied on this head: and therefore I willingly omit the insisting on another plea, which totally sets aside the obligation of any promise. And that is the change in the state of the parties, which has been twice made since that declaration. Let it be a promise, yet it was to defend the Electorate against the K. of P——a and the French, the rest of the Empire being with us; and to take a body of Hessians, and fifty-five thousand Russians into our pay, who were to fight for the defence of it. If after that, the assistance offered be renounced, and a new agreement made with the K. of P——a, who was not bound by it to send a man to fight in any cause of ours, and who would embroil the E——e with the Empire; does a promise of granting assistance in one way, give a claim to it in every other way? The promise was, to pay Russians to fight against P——ns; is the paying P——ns to fight against Russians, due to the performance?

Still the British nation expressed its duty as it ought; and though the Russian force was thrown into the opposite scale, took upon itself the pay of all the Hanoverian troops that were fighting in the field in defence of their own country, and a body of Hessians beside; when the H——n chancery made a second total change in the state of parties, and agreed to leave the French in possession of their country.

country. Here was a total renouncing of all their connections with Britain, though their troops were then actually in its pay. That neutrality was, it is said, made without the knowledge of the English government, certainly without the knowledge of parliament; and that therefore could not be bound by its consequences. A total change therefore having been twice made in the state of parties, from that which subsisted at the time of making those addresses, all the plea of obligation from them ceased. *Tunc fidem fallam, tunc inconstantiae crimen audiam, si cum omnia eadem sint, quæ erant promittente me, non præstitero promissum. Alioquin, quicquid mutatur, libertatem facit de integro consulendi, & me fide liberat**.

The reader will excuse my having so largely considered this point. As I am taking that side of an argument, which has the popular prejudice against it, it was necessary that I should leave no plausible objection behind me unanswered. I now return to my subject, which is singly confined to Germany: far from condemning, I desire to express my thankfulness for every thing, which has been done during the war, in every other part of the world.

The intention of these sheets, has been to inquire, and submit to the publick consideration, whether the present course we have taken, of transferring the English war with France into Germany be not a

* Sen. de Benef. Lib. iv. cap. 35.

measure,

measure, calculated for the hurt of Germany, rather than of France ; and tending to promote the interest of France, rather than of England. In the prosecution of this argument I have attempted to shew, that Britain's joining and making itself a party in any of the internal quarrels of the Empire, and especially its sending troops thither upon any such account, must be, at all times, contrary to the interest of Europe, and contrary to the interest of Germany ; and in the present case, contrary to the interest of Protestantism, and contrary to the peace and true interest of Hanover. I am now to consider the German war, in a more important light, and offer to the publick consideration my reasons for doubting, whether it be not a method of carrying on a war with France, which is to England ruinous and impracticable ; and which therefore, if too long persisted in, must probably end in the giving to France an undue ascendancy over us ; and expose us to the necessity of suing for peace, at the expence of our most valuable conquests. Whether on the other hand, there be not a method of carrying on the war, by which we have it in our power at this time to maintain our superiority over our enemy, and intail it to our posterity : by which we may be enabled to carry on the war at the expence of France, and not of Britain ; and at last conclude it by a peace, which shall remove the chief ground of rivalry between the two nations ; and thereby give security to Britain for many years to come.

I should

I should not at present have mentioned this latter part of my design, if I did not see it necessary to guard against the suspicion, that any thing, which shall be offered to prove the impracticableness of this part of the war, is intended as a plea for the abruptly putting an end to the whole. Providence has been pleased to present to our view, the means of solid peace and independence: and to have reserved for the peculiar glory of his Majesty's reign, the placing our island in a state of happiness; unknown to our ancestors in any period of our history. Britain now gains, by a British sovereign, a greater advantage over France, than even Henry the Second brought with him to the crown, with half the provinces of France in his possession. We have now a more important alternative offered to our choice, than will probably ever be proposed to us again. We have now no less an option to make, than whether we will lavish away five millions a year in Germany, without a possibility of doing that or England any good, and annually run the kingdom ten millions in debt; till it shall be at length exhausted, and unable to defend either: or whether we will realize to this nation a revenue of five millions a year for ever, at our enemies expense; and totally disable France hereafter from raising a marine power, which can ever be in any degree formidable to Britain. Whether we will risk our countries ruin in a German war, which tends to nothing; or whether we will conquer for ourselves

ourselves and Germany both, by securing an ample indemnification for the past sufferings of the Electorate, and effectually deterring our enemies from any future invasion of it. Let us but go on, and by one more easy conquest, disable the navy of France from ever rising again, and the peace of this island is then fixed on its firm and proper basis; and we may thenceforward look on all the quarrels of the continent with indifference.

And what is this Germany to Britain? Could we but be true to ourselves, and pursue the advantage, which providence has put into our hands, and by seizing our enemies islands, make ourselves masters of that trade: we might then give the French the offer of peace or war, as long as they pleased: for all the motives for our going to war with them, and all the means of their coming to war with us, would be at an end. Let then the French rage as they please; let them bribe and threaten the several German courts, till they shall learn to unite; let the Empire suffer French armies to march from the Rhine to the utmost Danube; and pillage every city in their passage, from Mannheim to Belgrade; all these cannot build them a single frigate to annoy our coast with. Britain may then calmly look on in security; and thankful for its own independence, need feel no other sentiments arise upon the occasion, than those of Christian compassion. Not that any thing of this nature really would happen. On the contrary the peace

of Germany would be better secured, as well as that of Britain. For the great source of their wealth being cut off with their islands, the French would thenceforward be as little able to march their armies out of their own territory, and maintain them in Germany, as the Germans are now to send their armies into France. Should this prove too great a happiness, for us to be allowed to conquer for ourselves; we must then fight for the K. of P—a's glory, and a foreign interest, in a German war, which I have said, is a war that is ruinous and impracticable. I shall now give my reasons for it. And,

In the first place, this is a war, in which Britain stands single and alone, to contend at land with France. And how much soever we may flatter ourselves with the notion of our own strength, and the French weakness, France is at this time, as it has been for a century past, superior to us at land. I have in the beginning of these considerations, put this among my postulata; but our news writers, who generally set the opinions of the times, have been so strongly exhibiting the greatness of the English force, that I know not whether I may be allowed to rank it below the French. The reader however will remember, that I am not now speaking of our naval strength; and if we could be persuaded to use that power more, and talk of it less, we might perhaps be acting a wiser part. But in comparing the land force of the two nations, tho'
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we may happen this year to have the better general, yet for these fourscore years past, all Europe has been complaining of the exorbitant power of France. Either this meant nothing at all, or it meant, that France was more powerful than any other state. Stronger than Germany for instance, and certainly stronger than Holland, or than England, which has ordinarily kept up fewer land forces, than either of the other two. Soon after the revolution, France alone maintained a War against Spain, Germany, Holland, and England, with Denmark and Sweden in the same alliance. And for several years carried on a war of equality, frequently a war of offence against them all. And in the beginning of this century, France, and part of Spain, supported a war of ten years resistance, against England, Holland, and Germany, with Denmark, Savoy, and Portugal, united in the same cause. From that time all parties among us have been complaining, that the treaty of Utrecht gave the French too much power. And I suppose the reverence for the preceding administrations, during the two last reigns, has not been such as to make us say, that the superior abilities of our former ministers, have given so great a check to the French land force, as to turn the whole balance of power in our favour. In the last war, France dismantled the barrier of Flanders, and raised up a new power in the Empire to counter-balance the natural head of it : can it then be supposed that France, which was able to brave all Europe in two preceding wars,

is now all at once, in the beginning of the present war, reduced so low, as to be inferior in its land force to England alone? And that too without having suffered any material loss in it, tho' France maintained a seven years war against the grand alliance, after the loss of forty thousand of its best troops at Blenheim, and after having twenty thousand more killed and taken at Ramillies, still held out five years longer.

But how can England be said to stand single and alone, when it has an alliance with the magnanimous K. of P——a? Not, I fear, against France: for he has never declared war with it. Against the House of Austria, he is a willing ally; but we are now considering the force of England against France; and when Britain is already engaged in a war with France, can it be the stronger for adopting another Prince's quarrel with the House of Austria? We may easily persuade *ourselves* that he is an ally against France; but it may not be easy to shew any thing in the convention of the 11th of April, or the succeeding treaty, which will convince *him* of it. Possibly he may tell us, that that convention regards only the liberty of the Germanick body; and that France, though occasionally in the preamble, is not once mentioned in the articles themselves, nor any thing else relative to the English war with it. That the common interest means only the interest of their two houses against
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the archducal; and that this convention cannot refer to a war with France, because the two parties covenant not to make any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, without comprehending each other in it: which, he may allege, proves that the treaty only refers to their German quarrels, because he wants no treaty of peace or truce with France, being at peace with it already. I do not say that this would be a just plea; but if he should think proper to make it, England then stands alone in its war with France, as much as if it had not that alliance with his Majesty of P——— against the Empress Queen.

But still however he is an ally. By a treaty which obliges us to furnish him with money, only because he wants it, and which therefore he will never cease to want; and which, upon reading it over, we shall be apt to think, will not oblige him to furnish us either with money or troops, should we want them ever so much. Nothing is more common, than to hear the wars of the two great alliances condemned as consuming wars; because England, it was said, paid all. Yet all the subsidies, which King William paid to German Princes, at a time when they had two hundred thousand men fighting against France, do not amount to the half of the subsidy, we now pay to the K. of P——— alone, who could not, or would not garrison one of his best towns for us. In Queen Anne's war, for the subsidy of fifty thousand pounds, we not only sent
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cight thousand Prussians to fight the French in Savoy; but had twelve thousand more in our pay in Flanders. We now pay him six hundred and seventy thousand, for which he calls us an ally, and suffers us to fight the French ourselves. What then have we gained by this ally? Two things: the one is the being obliged to pay him money to enable him to fight his own battles, against enemies; which Britain has no quarrel with: the other is the driving the rest of German Princes into a closer union with France, and making ourselves obnoxious to Europe for supporting this ally: can it be supposed that Britain is the stronger for either of these?

But is he not a man of great abilities? Doubtless he is so; and one of the clearest proofs of it, is his obliging us to pay him six hundred and seventy thousand pound for nothing. In that respect he is certainly the greatest Prince, ever known to Britain before. Yet with all that enormous sum, which is a five times greater subsidy, than we paid to any German Prince in Queen Anne's war, and with all his great abilities, he is but just able to stand himself: and we call him an ally, and fancy that he supports us. We confess he lives by miracle, and are wondering every year that he does not fall: and yet this is the Prince, which we have placed our only dependence on. We take a pleasure in recounting the number of enemies he has to contend with, without
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once considering, that we make all those enemies ours, by upholding him against them. Instead of bethinking ourselves of the exorbitant expence he is of to us, we make that an argument of his importance; and prove him to be the best ally, that Britain ever had, because he costs us more than them all. Baron Bothmar in Queen Anne's war was a valuable ally: for he lent us, at the usual price, a regiment of dragoons. The Prince of Buckbug is so in this war; without making us any enemies, he furnishes us for our money with a brigade of artillery. But our magnanimous ally furnishes us with new enemies, instead of new troops; is upon the least success we gain, drawing away our forces, instead of adding to them; and is every year to us in clear money just six hundred and seventy thousand pounds less than nothing.

But when we have enabled him to conquer all his enemies, he will then help us to conquer ours. The British crown and parliament can avow nothing but what is just; but arbitrary Princes, whose law of right lies only in their own breasts, are not always govern'd by the strictest rules of gratitude. Their practice has often been to look out for instruments fit for their purpose, whom they can call allies, and perswade to do their business for them first, and then to leave them to themselves to do their own as they can. Their regard to their future advantage, sometimes weighs more with them, than the remembrance of past benefits. Should he
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think that our fears for the Electorate make his best security for the continuance of his subsidy, he may not think it for his interest to remove those fears. On the other hand, many persons may think that Britain may find it a much harder task to conquer his, than it will to conquer its own enemies, if he be not one of them : If he should be one, the less we conquer for him the better.

But he is certainly a very great Prince. So we read in our papers about three hundred times a-year. Whether the true standard of a Prince's greatness consist, in his making his own people happy, or those of other countries miserable, is a question, which we are not concerned in. But however, we may admire him as a great warrior, or whatever be our idea of his greatness, he can never be a useful ally to Britain, or contribute in the least degree to ours. What is it that this revival of his claim to Silesia must probably end in ? Possibly, during his life, by means of his superior abilities, and by making sometimes France help him, and sometimes England, he may be just able to keep it : but in the mean time he has involved himself and his family in a quarrel never to be ended with the House of Austria, which will seize every opportunity to recover it. Can then a Prince be a useful ally to Britain, or afford us any real assistance, who needs it so much himself, and knows that he has a determined enemy catching at every occasion to surprize him ? Before that either of them can be of any service

vice to Britain, they must at least be out of danger themselves. Which from the nature of their quarrel they never can be free from. Should our present ally beat his rival, and force the Empress Queen to a treaty: that cannot produce the least degree of confidence between them. Silesia is to the Austrian family so great an object in itself, and so very necessary to the defence of the rest of their Turkish Frontier, that they never really will give it up. A treaty will be nothing more than a suspension of fighting. All the faith of treaties is at an end with them. He knows that the first instant they can attack him to advantage, they will break the treaty, from the very same principle, upon which he revived his claim. In short, the two houses are committed in an eternal war, which can never end, till one of them is absolutely subdued. Neither of them therefore can be of the least service to Britain, while the other survives. Did ever any one think of gaining assistance from either of two spent warriors, which it saw agonizing in a struggle for each other's destruction? To France they may either of them be a natural ally: because it is the interest of France to keep up continual wars in the Empire. France will naturally support the weaker. But England has no interest to serve by the internal wars of the Empire: on the contrary, we can never hope for any good from it, but in its union. The interest of England therefore, since there can be no peace between them, is to let them fight out their quar-

rel. When one of them is subdued, the other will be glad of our alliance, and then only will be worthy of having it.

And what is all this slaughter of German Protestants to end in? Probably he will either fall in battle; or see Silesia lost in his lifetime, his successor at least will not have the same opportunities, or the same address to make France and England alternately exhaust themselves in his defence: and will probably be forced to give it up; after seeing an ample vengeance taken on his own dominions, for all the ravages committed on the Austrian. Will he then appear to have been the friend of Protestantism, for having in his lifetime twice ravaged one Protestant Electorate, held a continual rod over another, and at his death given to the Papists, a pretence totally to ruin his own. And this is the Prince, whom, because the French first raised him up to imbroil one part of Germany, and because we know that he can too easily join with them to imbroil another, we call a great man, and think that we can never enough admire him. Nay, are nursing and making greater, to enable him to demand of Britain so much the more, and to serve France so much the better. For to France only he can be a serviceable ally: to B——n he can be at most, but the terror of an Electorate, the Idol of the crowd, and the Hero of a News Paper.

I return therefore to my first position, that in this German war, Britain stands single and unaided against France: and the land forces of France are more numerous than those of England.

We may be told perhaps, that riches are the sinews of war; and our news papers will teach us to value ourselves upon our having contracted eight or twelve millions of new debt this year, (for I know it may be consider'd differently) as much as if we had paid off so many of the old. But money will not hire troops to fight in a cause, which all the powers of Europe are averse to. Will the Russians, or Swedes, or any of the States of the Empire lend us forces to fight against themselves? Have not the Dutch and Danes refused us? Can the King of P——a help us? On the contrary, is he not daily sending recruits to our enemies? By ravaging Saxony he is driving its Protestant inhabitants to despair, and laying them under the hard necessity of resorting for bread to their Prince Xavier's standards in the French army. The resources of our enemies are infinite. France exceeds Great Britain in the number of its people, and by the nature of its government, is able to send out as many of its subjects to its military services, as their King shall be pleased to order: and besides its own superior resources, France has Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Flanders to recruit out of. What has England to oppose to all these? Nothing but the bodies of its own subjects, which can

very ill be spared from its agriculture and manufactures, and the levies from the districts of Hanover and Hesse. We may think that we have been rather successful in Germany in the two last campaigns, which perhaps may easily be accounted for: but is it possible not to see the inequality, in the numbers of men at least, which there is between us and our enemies?

Can England then, by its money alone, be a match for all Europe? If we were so, is it fit that we should wantonly declare it, and thereby give umbrage to every other state? Money may, in a qualified sense, be allowed to be the sinews of war; but it must find men to make up the flesh and substance of our armies, which, in the present state of Europe is impossible. In short, all things have their fixt measure and bounds; and the present war continuing, and parties remaining affected as they now are, increase the French revenue to the double of what it is, you cannot render the French navy equal to the English; nor could the same addition of wealth to England make its number of land forces equal to the French.

Thus far we have argued upon the supposition, that the English revenue was greater than the French. But is that the real state of the case? The ordinary revenue of France, I fear, is greater than that of England. What the amount of the French revenue is, I confess I do not know; but I form

form my judgment upon the view of it, which was given us the last sessions, by a gentleman, who from his office, may be supposed to understand it best : and who very candidly stated the subject, and left his hearers, if they had pleased, to draw the consequences. The standing revenue of France, we were then told, is twelve millions ; five of them are anticipated, and the remaining seven, subject to any deficiencies in the other five, make the present revenue of France. Beside this, they have borrowed two millions ; and these nine millions make the whole fund of France for carrying on the war ; which he was pleased to say, was a sum, very inadequate to the expence of such a war. Now then let us consider, what is the English revenue to oppose to this. The standing revenue of England for carrying on a war, is only the land and malt tax, which amount to two million seven hundred and fifty thousand pound : to which may be added, so much as can be taken out of the sinking fund : though some persons may consider that as already pre-engaged. But allowing however a million and half to be taken thence, we have then four million to oppose to the French revenue of seven million. But beside this, we have borrowed for this year, twelve millions ; eight millions on annuities, and four on the sinking fund. Go on then for two years longer on this plan : France at the three years end, will be six millions in debt ; and England, if we reckon the twelve millions borrowed, will be thirty-

thirty-six. If we will allow but the eight millions borrowed, England will be twenty-four millions in debt. Can we need a more convincing proof, that this is a ruinous war?

But why are the French nine millions, a sum very inadequate to the expence of such a war? No one chose to ask the question, though every thing was stated with the greatest fairness and precision. Fifteen millions is certainly a greater sum than nine. But France has fitted out no fleet this year. Our navy costs us five million six hundred thousand pounds; though it has been all the summer employed in no one offensive service. This at once reduces the stock of the two nations for the land war, to nine millions, and ten millions. Add to this, the charges of transporting men and horses; the fleet of transports to be kept always in readiness for every emergency; the difference of English and French pay; and the much greater facility, which the French have of recruiting and supporting their troops from the Rhine and Main; consider these, and many other disadvantages we are under; and we shall not think the French nine millions a sum at all inadequate to any purposes, which we can effect at that distance with our ten. Their ordinary revenue, if they have seven millions, on the present plan of the war will enable them to bring more men into the field, without borrowing at all, than we can by getting every year eight millions in debt.

Every

Every one, who has thought on the subject of war, must have considered the three different kinds of it: a war of offence, a war of equality, and a war of defence. And every one knows, that of these, the last is most disadvantageous and the most difficult. Where an army is to defend itself only, a general will find employment for all his attentions: but if it be to defend a long tract of country; unless the attacking general be greatly inferior in his art, he will usually prevail. The reason is, that the general, who acts offensively, has it in his own choice, when and where to direct his main force; whereas the defender must equally divide his: and if the attacking general fail in one instance, he suffers little, but is ready to try another: and some where, at some unguarded time, he will find an opportunity to come with five thousand, where the defenders have but one. Lines of defence may perhaps be made effectual in countries, cut by impassable canals, where there is no marching but on the Dykes of them: and yet, even there, the French never formed lines, which the Duke of Marlborough did not pass: but an inland open country, like Hanover and Hesse, is not to be covered, but by a superior army; and that ought not to do it, but to act offensively. The Duke of Cumberland found it so in the first campaign; our succeeding general, with all his abilities, has found it so ever since. Both summers the French have forced their way into Hesse at least, which he was covering, as well as Hanover: and the French have
every

every year brought a superiority of numbers into the field : as great a superiority, as they ought in good policy to send to that service, whatever be the number of their forces at home. I know indeed that our General, by the superiority of his genius, has been able to drive them back again, and linger out the rest of the campaign, without suffering them to return ; and this we call a victory, and are elated with the success. Yet this is the very kind of war, which the interest of the French should make them wish for. Just the contrary measure is, politically considered, the desirable one for England : to bring the matter to an immediate issue, and seek the French upon the first open ground, they have to pass, and force them to a pitched battle. To this it is easily answered, that neither the Duke of Cumberland nor Prince Ferdinand were strong enough to do this. I acknowledge that they were not : and I say further, that they never will be : for whatever force we may send to Germany, France will always send a greater. It has more troops than England ! and while the English councils persist singly to engage in a land war with France, they ever must be inferior, and ever must act only on the defensive.

Can we think of loading our revenue with a greater debt, and raising more money than we did last year ? And surely no friend of his country would wish again to see so great a proportion of fifteen millions devoted solely to Germany, with

scarce a single new regiment, or new fleet of offence, sent out all the summer upon an English service. If after all this, and the assurances that the German army was ninety-five thousand strong, the French came into the field twenty thousand men superior to us, when are we to hope to equal them? If France, even in its bankrupt state, can overmatch us, when in the height of our credit, can we ask a stronger proof that this war is a ruinous one? We may value ourselves upon little trifling advantages, and swell as we will, our enemies know that we must burst before we equal them, and will therefore spin out the war to its utmost length, till our credit or our patience shall be exhausted.

But in order to give this argument its full force, let us suppose, that we had more men to enlist in England than were in France, or that we had more countries to recruit out of; and that we could borrow more millions still to pay them; and could, by means of these, bring a larger army into the field than the French could oppose us with: this is a war which is not only ruinous, but impracticable: it is carrying it on in a method, which can tend to no decisive issue in our favour, nor to any effectual damage to our enemy. 'Tis in a country where a victory can do us no good, and where a defeat can do the French no essential hurt. No wise government ever thought that the end of making war, was merely the killing of men. Britain should of all others be the most tender of risking the lives of

its subjects upon such a hazard. The great intent of war is by victory to conquer an enemy's country, and by lessening either his provinces, his subjects, or his revenues, to bring him to reason. England is morally sure of effecting this every where else ; but can hope for nothing of this kind by its war in Germany. Suppose us to gain a compleat victory ; is there any fruit of it to be reaped in Germany ? Does Britain propose to gain territory or towns in Germany ? Would they be worth having if they were given us ? What then is the reward ? Instead of seeing the French upon the Wesel, (or that other brook the Memel, which British ears never heard before,) we should find them upon the Main ; that is, at so much greater a distance from England, and so much nearer to France ; that is, we should have the war to carry on at so much greater expence, and have our provisions, our military stores, and our recruits to send so much the farther ; and our enemies would find all their supplies so much the nearer.

Let us try the chance of war a second time, and if the French are generous enough to give us an open field, (which they certainly won't do, unless they are as strong as we) let us fight them over again. If they should beat, all our advanced magazines are lost : but suppose us to gain a second victory ? what would be the fruit of it ? The French may then, perhaps, retreat over the Rhine into their own country. But would any Englishman wish to fol-

follow them thither? Britain invade France, singly, and by its own strength, upon the Rhine, among all its frontier towns? The Duke of Marlborough, with the single strength of Britain, would not have done it after the battle of Blenheim. Had he then, or have we now a battering train sufficient to force regular fortifications? With all the intermediate states of Germany for our enemies, could we send them heavy artillery, and that infinite apparatus requisite for the siege of a great town? When we had got it, would we keep it, if we could? Could we keep it if we would? Or rather, long before the necessary stores could be sent from hence, or be brought to our army, the French would have drawn troops enough from their great garrisons and frontiers, as well as from their interior militia, to surround and cut it off from every possibility of return. France now puts not forth half the strength, it would then exert, to destroy an English army, which it should see cooped up among the strong towns on its frontiers.

If we are so very sanguine, and think the British force equal to the whole power of France at land, it were better sure not to cool the ardor of our troops by marching them five hundred miles into Germany. Instead of attacking this Bull by the horns on his German frontier, let us rather gore him in his flank, or pierce him to the heart: Let us give our enemies troops the pain of a long march, and not our own; and land, as our ancestors did, at

Calais, or Boulogne, or Newhaven, and march to Paris: this will be a much shorter, and a much cheaper method of carrying on the war, as well as a much more effectual means of bringing the French to terms. Let us make our enemies country the seat of war, rather than our friends, if we really think ourselves strong enough to cope with their whole land force; and it will be a much easier task to supply our army with artillery and the necessary stores up the Sein, to take Roan and Paris, than it would be to send them over the Maine, the Neckar, and the Rhine, to take Strasburg.

But the absurdity of England's ever thinking to possess itself of fortified places on the Confines between France and Germany, is sufficient, without mentioning the hazard of such an attempt: allowing it not impossible to take a town, it would be absolutely so to know what to do with it. This is a war, therefore, where fortune itself cannot help us; we cannot avail ourselves even of our victories, and the most repeated success could only multiply our difficulties, and double our charges: that is, it is a method of carrying on a war with France, which from the very nature of it, is impracticable.

If in the present course of the war, Britain can get nothing by its victories, France, on the other hand, can lose nothing by a defeat. Except only in the number of the killed and wounded, which in the common course of battles, may be set at about
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the double of that of the conquerors, what other loss have our enemies to sustain? They are driven out of Germany. Be it so: was any one of the towns, which they shall quit in their retreat, their's before? Will they have a single fortification the less for the greatest victory we can gain? Or will the French revenue be at all lessened, or the state brought so much the nearer to bankruptcy, for their having no army to pay out of their own country? Still you'll say Germany is cleared to them. True, it may be so for the next summer, if the French don't chuse to march thither. But England's expence must go on. Our enemies will not tell us, that they don't intend to go thither; they certainly will go, if we attempt to lessen our expence, and withdraw a great part of our troops. Where then is the end of our labour? Can the French wish for a more advantageous plan of carrying on a war, than this; in which they know that no decisive stroke can be struck by us against them; and in which they are sure, that in the long run England must be exhausted, were its treasures and its credit five times greater than they are?

And can we hope to maintain our conquests, by persisting in a land war upon so disadvantageous a plan? There are people so very inconsiderate, that if we are but fighting with the French, they are content. But surely it becomes a wise state in making choice of the province, which it shall send its troops to act in, to consider, where it can fight to greatest advan-

advantage : where it can put its enemy to most expence, and be itself at least ; where its enemy is weakest, and itself strongest ; where its victories will turn to its own best account, and by hurting its adversary in his most essential interest, reduce him the soonest to sue for peace. The war in Germany answers no one of these purposes. France cannot be hurt in any material interest, but must in the end carry its point by ruining our credit. The utmost we can propose, is only to kill them a few men : and what have we done, even in that respect, for these four years past ? Our British troops never saw a General that had so large a use of them : but France scarce knows in its history so innocent a war. Was the battle of Hastenbeck so much in our favour ? or their loss of men greater than our own ? Will such trifling affairs, as those of Crevelt and Warburg, produce any consequence, except the firing the Tower guns *, and giving a pretence to send over more men ?

Did we find the French army the weaker last summer, for those prodigies of valour, shewn the year before by two English brigades at the battle of Minden ? Let the General have done his duty, and brought up the horse, as he ought, to charge the French, or trample down three or four thousand Saxon and French foot. It would doubtless have been a very good thing : that might have

* Fifteen Millions spent, and fifteen hundred enemies killed : is it not doing Frenchmen's heads too much honour, to fire guns of triumph upon such an occasion, and shew that we value them at ten thousand pounds a scalp ?

more

more than double the number, which the French really lost there, and would have made the victory more brilliant. But where would have been the substantial benefit to England? How would the main of the war have been affected by it? The French army perhaps might not have been able to make a stand quite so soon; and might have crossed the Main; and the English might have entered Frankfort. And is Frankfort worth to England the taking a French cock boat? Was it before a French town, or will it after be an English one? The only loss therefore would have been of men. But France cannot be hurt by the mere loss of men, which, were it five times greater, it could presently supply, by draughts from its militia; or replace when it pleased, with recruits in Germany. But is our state so large? or are our husbandmen and manufacturers so very useless to it? as to justify the pitting five and twenty thousand Englishmen, against thirty or forty thousand French, merely to try their valour, and which shall kill the most men; with a bett of at least five millions to three depending upon the main? And all this, without the possibility of any one national advantage accruing from the victory?

The distinguishing art of this war has hitherto consisted in the raising trifling skirmishes into battles, and victories. We overlook the ruining our troops, in the praises of their valour; and there are who knew, that they could not make their court in any method so effectually, as by magnifying the victories

ories of our German army, and aggravating the losses of the French. But with all their losses, the French have been every year stronger in Germany than we : as much stronger as in good policy they ought to be. In reality, I fear we must be much mistaken, if we think that France is but just superior to us. Could France furnish out armies upon the Rhine, the Moselle, and the Maese, with two more in Spain, and Savoy, all at the same time ; and can we flatter ourselves that all its resources are now exhausted by sending one single army to invade Hanover ?

Do we not now see the French court making dispositions for a second army ? and have we not already felt the effects of it ? What then was the foundation of those vain boasts, which are given out in the beginning of every session ; that the French are ruined ; and the next German campaign must be their last ? far from being bankrupt by maintaining their ground all the summer in Hesse, with an army superior to ours, their government now finds itself in a capacity to form two armies ; and must we not therefore have taken a wrong measure of their strength, when we represented their finances as unequal to the expence of one ?

We have before seen the impracticableness of making war with France on the Upper Rhine ; shall we now then march to the Lower Rhine ? To what purpose ? To take Wesel. That is not the French fron-

frontier, but the King of Prussia's. But we would prevent the French from forming an army there. The want of Wesel did not prevent the French from resolving to march their army that way in the year 1757, and neither would it now. In order to effect that therefore, we must form a greater army there ourselves, else we may be repulsed and beaten back. But suppose we could prevent the French from forming their army upon the Lower Rhine; they would then order it upon the Roer or the Maese: and is it a matter of the least consequence to them, where it is formed, if we do but go after it? The French cannot propose to conquer England by sending armies into Germany: their only hope is to exhaust and weary us out by a land war, which we must carry on with them upon such very disadvantageous terms; and to divert us from their islands, by employing our attention in Germany. They have found that the mistaken zeal of the nation, and our eagerness to fight a Frenchman any where, have made us willing to meet them on the ground of their own chusing with one army, and they are now trying to decoy us with another. And were that second army to be on the Maese, it would answer their intention better than one on the Lower Rhine; because their troops would be so much the nearer home: And if the nation be obstinate, and our credit will not break sooner, rather than not exhaust us, they will trail us on with a

third army on the Moselle, or on any other part of their frontiers which we shall choose*.

But let us suppose the nation to be powerful and zealous enough to raise twenty millions, and that, with the other five, we could draw down good troops for another army, I had almost said, out of the moon; for upon this earth I have shewn they are not to be had. Go on thus for three campaigns more, and kill 20,000 French in each, till not a battalion remained on the right of the Rhine from Basil to Emerick. Still we should find ourselves as far from a peace as ever. We might the next cam-

* A young Prince of spirit, who has distinguished himself in a second character, may think it time to have a command in chief. Could he have had the good fortune to have killed fifteen hundred Frenchmen: it would have been about the size of our former victories; and under the noise of such a triumph, he might have gained another establishment, and a resolution to form an army for him. The novelty of a foreign general is now over. But surely it will not be easy to shew how Britain could have been in the least benefited by having two such Generals; and two armies, (if it could have found men) instead of one; and at least two more millions of its treasure to be spent in Germany on the support of them; and all this expence incurred for the sake of regaining Wesel for an ally, which he himself had magnanimously abandoned, when the works of it were intire, and would not defend, either for his own sake or ours. While with half the treasure, and half the number of troops, which are sent to Germany, to serve no one English or good German purpose, we might possess ourselves of the French islands, which they could never retake from us; and gain to his Majesty a hundred thousand subjects; and to Britain a revenue of four or five millions: Besides securing Hanover, and putting an end to the expence of the war when we please.

paign

paign be stronger in the field than France. But how should we avail ourselves of this superiority? What would be the advantage of it? None. The court of France would know of that superiority; and would order their army not to march that year into Germany, and would answer their purpose just as well, by having put us to twenty millions expence, while they were at none: and by having kept their troops and their money at home would have so much the better a fund for the next year's war, when England would be exhausted. In short, this is a war, which France never can be hurt by, and never can be weary of. A land war with England alone is an advantage, and which France has not enjoyed these hundred years. 'Tis the triumph, and not the trial of their arms to fight us single in Germany*; and if they know their own interest, they will never send an over-powerful army thither to drive us out of it, and put us upon bethinking ourselves of ours.

But when we had beat the French out of Germany, we would go and assist the king of Prussia. Against whom? The army of the Empire? Britain has no quarrel with the Empire of its own; and it has been already shewn, that it never can be the interest of Britain to abet the quarrels of the members of the



* It will not be a justification of this part of the war, to say that we have had great success elsewhere; because I shall hereafter shew that the war in Germany has not in the least degree contributed to our successes in any other part of the world, but either hindered or retarded them.

Empire against each other. Can we give to France a greater pleasure than to see us, their declared enemy, employed in a war with the empire, their most dangerous rival? Shall we then attack the Austrian army? The Empress Queen is not at war with us, and has not Britain enemies enough already, without going into East Germany to seek for more? But they are all enemies of the king of Prussia. And are we subjects of the king of Prussia? He is our ally. By a treaty which obliges us to no such thing. We guaranteed Silesia. In the same terms as he did H——r, which he was going to attack. But he needs our assistance. Are then the British troops never to see an end of their labours? Are our men and treasures so very numerous, that we should send our subjects to seek out Bohemians, Hungarians, Bosnians and Slavonians, Bannatines and Warasdiners, and twenty other people of the East, with whom we never had the least concern? Are we sure that we can conquer Austrians, Russians, and Swedes, all in one summer so intirely, as that his M—— of P—— may not need our assistance the next summer, when the French will invade the Electorate with fresh force? If we should help him to conquer all his enemies, are we sure that he would be the better friend to us for his not needing our assistance? Are we sure that the price of his friendship would not rise with the importance of it? Is it certain that he would return our kindness, and help us against the French? Let us at least have a treaty to oblige him to it; and not trust



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it, as it now is, merely to his gratitude. Did he not in the last war quit the French, who were his makers, as soon as he no longer wanted them? These and a thousand other questions ought to be answered, before we resolve on sending our army into East Germany. We once professed never to trust our troops beyond the mouths of the great rivers of the Ems and Weser: but whither are they to go, that are to fight the K. of Prussia's battles. If our army is to go so far into the inland parts of Germany, how is it to act? Shall it join the K. of P——a? And are Britons then doom'd to fight, not only under a foreign general, but under a foreign king too? He will probably use them soon, knowing that they will soon be weary of being so used. Shall they then act by themselves? Where are their magazines? Shall they follow them too from Embden to Breslaw? If the nation is now brought a million and half in debt for the article of forage, how many millions will supply us at that distance? Not to ask how Englishmen are to find their way back, if they should be exposed and routed; let us suppose him and them to be victorious, and to oblige his enemies to treat with him; and let us suppose this German prince to be a more faithful and more grateful ally than any other German prince ever was to us; and that he would really assist us against France, what could he do for us? He might join our army, and beat the French out of Hanover. Be it so. Still Britain must be at the expence, and still keep up an army there, and our
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subsidies must still go on. Probably his would rise upon it, and he might then insist upon a million. Has he not without this been attempting an increase already ?

But let his subsidy remain the same, and let the French be driven out of Germany ; What advantage would Britain receive thereby ? Why when the French could no longer come into Hanover, and make war with us, they must make peace. Nothing less. So long as we could keep his M—— of P—— in humour, and he should find himself at leisure to guard us, the French might cease to invade the electorate. But why should that oblige them to sue for peace ? Is the French government at an end, when they have no longer an army in Germany ? Will their provinces, their people, or their revenues be the less, for their armies not crossing the Rhine ? The Hanoverians, if the Prussians and they agree together, may be at rest for a summer ; but why should the French cry out for peace, when nobody hurts them ? Surely, it is not enough that they do not hurt us ; we must hurt them before they will sue for peace. For that then we must attack them in their islands, and take from them all they have left : that will drive them to a peace, or pay us the annual expence of a naval war. If then we must recur at last to our fleet, and make the peace for ourselves ; why take so immensely wide a circuit, to come at a point which lies streight before us ? Why run the nation thirty millions more in debt, to
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do that two or three years hence, which might have been done last winter, by which we might have secured a peace and indemnification for Hanover at the French expence; and by which, now that North America is ours, we shall have it in our own power to put an end to the war, whether the French choose it or not: No matter whether they will treat with us; from that time they cannot have a ship at sea, nor a possibility of coming at us. The channel and our fleet would keep the peace; we should not want to get any thing from them, and they would not be able to get any thing from us.

Many of my readers might think it unnecessary to pursue this argument any farther; but strongly prepossessed as the nation has been, there is no end of raising suppositions in favour of this K—— of P——. I have heard it said that he would make the Empress Queen, make it a condition in her peace with him, that she should join her forces to his, and assist us against France. But we must have helped him to beat her five times successively, before she could consent to fight against her ally: whereas, hitherto, he has been nearly as often beaten as victorious. But be it so, let them both come to our aid. We shall then have two armies in Hanover: a Prussian, and an Austrian army: Hanoverian auxiliaries, in British pay. The poor Hanoverians, I am afraid, would not thank us for bringing two such sorts of guests into their country. Perhaps,
they

they would as soon choose to see the French there, as a Prussian army and an Austrian.

Let them then go out of it, and both, in conjunction with the English army, march and attack the French upon the Rhine. Still we are not upon so good a plan as the old Revolution system, when the Germans had three armies invading France upon their own account, and in their own pay. Let us suppose them then to be generous enough to fight the French upon their own pay, and that the Empire and the Dutch would join them, and all declare war against France. Should we not then wish all that flower of the German youth, those hundred thousands, which the French, for these four years past, have with pleasure seen cutting each others throats, should we not then, I say, wish them all alive again to strengthen our battalions, and thicken our squadrons in the common cause? And is not this the very position, which we set out with in these Considerations; that it was the French interest, and not the English, which was served by civil wars in Germany? And thus, after having granted every thing on this head which the fondest presumption could have asked; after having heaped up suppositions upon each other without end to serve the present system, and made the greatest improbabilities concur to favour it, we should, after all, be brought two or three years hence, to that state of Europe, which in former wars we sat out in; with this still remaining difference, of England's being exhausted of its treasures, and Germany of its troops.

troops. So much better things were the old grand alliances, than the new continental connections.

In short, if we are to persist in this ruinous and impracticable German war, let the wealth and power of the nation be as great as they will, it is England and not France which must sue for a peace. Whatever be our successes, France is untouched; whenever the French government knows that they can send thither an army superior to ours, they will attack us; whenever we are too strong for them, they will not send: But, far from being ruined by the intermission of a single campaign in Germany, they are thereby only made the stronger for the next. Why then should France sue for peace, when at worst they have only to stand still, and keep their money at home, and their troops upon their frontiers, holding the appearance of marching into Germany, and our ruin is completed: for we must be at still the same expence; and after having got six and thirty millions in debt, must go on to eight and forty.

But we have been so long talking of the magnanimity of our ally, that many persons will not give up their opinion of his ability to serve us. He has been called the magnanimous by too great an authority to admit a doubt of his having it in his power to do great things for us. For the sake of such persons, it may be of use to think of his will: and reflect a little on what foundation that general

persuasion rests, of his being so much our friend, or how far we can determine whether he is most inclined to do us good or hurt. The entering into this consideration will be an apology to the reader for having presumed to differ so much from the received opinion; and as what I have to offer will chiefly consist of reminding him of past facts, he will himself judge of their consequences.

One of the inconveniencies, necessarily arising out of the number of our present news writers, is their being all of them obliged to aim at popularity. Hence whatever happen to be the prevailing opinion of the time, these are vying with each other, which shall say most in favour of that opinion; and carry the conclusions drawn from it to the greatest height. And as at least ninety nine hundredth parts of the people take their opinions from the papers, every thing is hereby run to excess. Wise men repeat what weaker men write; not thinking themselves concerned to exercise their judgment, about matters derived from so slight an authority; but they are heard as their own, and thereby acquire the strongest authority. Great men in their country retirements talk the news in common conversation, not as really matter of their opinion; but merely to find chat for their country visitors; fools repeat this after them, with the addition of Such a great man told me: and thus by the season when gentlemen come to town, these crude fancies are ripened up for them; and seriously represented as the sense of the nation.

Let

Let any man recollect the several violent prejudices, which the kingdom has run into, and he will find most of them derived from this source. Not to go so far back as the last war, when the magnanimity of the Queen of Hungary, and the perfidiousness of the K. of P——, were the favourite topicks; let him think only how the present war opened with the most violent encomiums on the bravery and good conduct of General Blakeney. Not a day past for three months together, without our reading some article or other in his favour. And all these things affirmed, and received for true, during a time, when from the very circumstances of the siege and the island, every man might have known, that no one could have received a single line from him or the garrison; and when, for any thing these writers could tell, this old gentleman might have been dead a fortnight before the siege of St. Philips began. Yet what was said by the news-writers upon so slight a foundation, was repeated by gentlemen in the country; and by winter when they came to parliament, this was considered as the sense of the nation, and he was made a lord upon the credit of it. After him the K. of P—— became the favourite of these authors. Had he done any thing for Britain? Had he in his former life ever shewn the least favourable disposition to us? Had we not long been condemning him as serving the cause of France, raising a civil war in the empire, and embroiling our allies, and making the most solemn treaties give way to his ambition? Did we not think him at

least capable of penning memorials, which were appeals to the people against our government, and keeping a minister here to converse among our merchants, and spread these seeds of disaffection? Did he not appear to us as a prince, that in the mere wantonness of malice, was braving the nation's honour at sea; speaking in the most disrespectful terms of our late gracious sovereign at his own court; and insulting him at others by sending one of our rebels for an ambassador? Had we not condemned him as breaking again the faith of treaties, and even after he had gotten all he claimed in Silesia, attacking our allies afresh, to save our enemies the French?

We set out in the present war with the same opinion of him, and the first scene of it was, as was then thought, to have been opened with such a determined act of hostility as princes do not often forgive. We knew the court of Russia's disposition to attack him, and gave 500,000 pounds for 55000 Russians, to make a diversion, seemingly to eat him up. Soldiers are apt enough to riot in their hostilities, when in an enemy's country, and Russian soldiers were not then known to be more gentle ravagers than Germans: but it was determined by the express articles of this treaty, that they should have all the plunder; and that they might be sure to take enough, we were to allow them nothing else to live upon: whatever be the licence of war, such things do not ordinarily make the articles of a treaty.

Con-

Considering it merely as a treaty for the hire of troops, it was not a dear one. It was for 40,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry to be kept in Livonia, adjoining to Lithuania; and there to remain till they should be wanted; with 40 or 50 gallies. Thirty thousand of this infantry, and the fifteen thousand horse were to march, if his majesty's German dominions should be attacked, in order to make a diversion; and the other ten thousand infantry were to be embarked on board the gallies, in order to make a descent. For this England was to pay the Russians one hundred thousand pounds while their troops remained in Livonia; and four hundred thousand more, as soon as, in consequence of the requisition, they should have passed the frontiers of their country; and the King of England engaged to procure for them a passage through Poland.

By article the 11th, *All the plunder, which the Russian troops shall gain from the enemy, of what nature and quality so ever, shall be for the advantage of those same troops.*

Art. 7th. *Whereas her Imperial Majesty is particularly interested in the tranquillity of the North, and considering also the proximity of the countries; wherein the diversion in question will probably be made, and the facility her troops will have of subsisting immediately in an enemy's country; she takes upon herself alone, during such a diversion, the subsistence and treatment of the said troops by sea and land; as also the heavy*

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artillery, which they may have occasion for, and of the details thereunto belonging. Signed at Peterburgh, 30th Sept. 1755.

The dread of these guests diverted his P——n M——y from his intended attack upon the E——l dominions, and brought him three months after to sign the treaty of Westminster; solely to keep all foreign troops out of the Empire, with a direct view to the Russians on our side, and the French on his.

We thought he might keep it; and disgusted the Russians for his sake. From this time he no longer bore the harder titles we had been used to give him, and we instantly turned round in our opinion. He was the hero of the age, the protector of the German liberties, and the champion of Protestantism. He was in England, our second king and defender of our faith. Even those men, whose principles had kept them, during the foregoing part of their lives, repining at one German king, now drank the health of our two kings, as cordially as if they had been born at Berlin. Illuminations were made in our streets for this new king's birth-day; and I think, like the mighty Mr. Vernon, he had two rejoicing nights in about a fortnight. Every thing then became Prussian. We had Prussian caps for our ladies to look fine with, and Prussian cross-bones to shew their men the more frightful; and which was more than both, we had Prussian ale for

for the mob to get drunk with. Let any one then have tried to insert an article in any of our papers, which should have tended in the least degree to moderate this excessive regard to him; or to bring in doubt either the good faith, the religion, or the wisdom of this favourite, in making all Europe his enemies, it would not have been received; the proprietors would have objected, that such an article would make their paper unpopular, and would upon no terms have been brought to print it.

'Tis a melancholy truth, and not much for the honour of our national gratitude; but this prince, whom we had never thought our friend, and who, we had been used to think, (I don't say rightly) had shewn in his actions a neglect of all moral obligation, and in his writings a contempt of every religious principle, became at once the standard of all excellence in war and politics; and has retained his popularity with us for a much longer term, than our great and good king William could hold it, with all the merit of having been the saviour of Holland, of Britain, and of Europe.

He is now called our ally; and there is a reverence due to that title: and therefore none of the hard things, we used to say of him, are now true: but any intelligent man, who shall recollect what we had been doing at the court of St. Petersburg, and the evident tendency of the Russian treaty, will find it very hard to persuade himself, that he can ever for-
get

get it ; or that three months after, when the treaty of Westminster was made, any two courts in Europe might stand less cordially affected to each other, than those of London and Berlin.

The thoughtless mob may be instantaneously converted in his favour ; especially as he is a warrior, and fights a great many battles ; and the news writers, who pay their whole court to the popular opinion, would then soon ascribe to him all other excellencies. But the reader, who considers how the electoral houses must have regarded each other at the signing the treaty of Petersburgh, will not help putting the question to himself : Can then such fervent love shoot up in the breasts of princes in three months time only, out of deadly hatred ? Do the resentments even of private men subside so soon, after the most premeditated rancour ? The operations of fear may be instantaneous : but love and friendship are plants of a slower growth. The one might fear for Hanover, and the other for Prussia ; and both might thereby be brought to suspend their hatred ; and after that they would certainly talk in terms of the most cordial affection and confidence, were it only to conceal, if there should be any, their mutual distrusts. But if the conditions of our future peace with France are to depend upon his favour, we can surely hope for very little assistance from the friendship of a man, who may think that we have given him so inexpiable a cause of hatred.

Should

Should the reader have any doubts about the justness of this reasoning, let him try it by experiment. This treaty of Westminster consisted but of one article, and solely regarded the keeping of all foreign troops out of the empire. What was the effect? We observed our part of the treaty, and kept out the Russians; but he might think, notwithstanding our servile professions of esteem of him, that the surest hold he had of us, were our fears, and therefore having obtained his own purpose to keep out the Russians, he slighted Wesel, which his father had been at an infinite expence in fortifying, and let in the French. He knew how much our dread of him would once make us bear, and we then knew that he could at any time join with his sure friends the French; and therefore Britain, far from resenting any breach of a former treaty, submitted to make another with him, in which we seem humbly to deprecate his forsaking us, and offer up our six hundred and seventy thousand pounds to buy our security. The reader will find this treaty at the end, and may try if he can make any thing more of it.

But may we not hope from his gratitude for his assistance in our future peace, after having so largely assisted him in his wars? Have then the house of Austria's returns for our having so long supported them, and spent so many millions in their service, been such as to admit of our hoping any thing from the gratitude of German courts? Will any Prince

in Germany once think of our money, the moment after it is spent? What were the returns, which this very Prince in the last war made to the French, who were his makers? As soon as his own purpose was served, and he had got what he wanted, he left them, and made a treaty with the Queen of Hungary. We thought he afterwards broke it indeed, and when this nation was rejoicing at Prince Charles's having passed the Rhine, fell upon the Queen of Hungary in time of full peace, to bring him back again, and prevent our ally from growing too great. Does he not now know, whether we chuse to see it or not, that he has owed all his importance to the cunning of his management between the French and us? and is it not the usual policy of men in such circumstances to secure their enemies, as soon as they have wearied their friends? Have we then any hope but that, should he have the prescribing the terms of our peace at the end of the war, his great object will be to make the French nation his friends, after having got all he can out of the English?

Such only are like to be the effects of this nation's exhausting itself to raise him, and making the conditions of our future peace depend upon his pleasure, instead of our own. Will he then think it for his interest to suffer his first and natural allies, the French, to be stript of their settlements, and Britain made so strong as to be independent on him, and all other petty German connections, from whence only he can derive his greatness? Too long have these

these German Princes, though not their people, found the sweets of those contests between the French and Us, in which we have been courting them for their troops; for any one of them to wish to see Britain gain such an ascendancy by a future peace, as would at once put an end to their gainful importance.

And what is the merit, he may then ask us, by which we can pretend to have obliged his gratitude? The English nation, which is receiving nothing for the money we annually pay him, may think that he is obliged to them for it. But he may consider it in a very different light; he may perhaps tell us, that we have had our million's worth for our million; that he received our money as the purchase of an immunity for Western Germany, and that so long as we continue to pay it, and he confines his ravages to the East, he fully discharges every obligation he is under.

His power over us is now, I hope, come to an end: but should we have gone on, supporting and raising him up to be the arbiter of Germany, what part would be exempt from the effects of it? Would then that favoured land, which we have so long moved heaven and earth in defence of; by which the French have, in two succeeding wars, artfully laid upon us the burden of bribing one half of Germany, and fighting the other: would this devoted Electorate at last escape him? His demands

would rise with his greatness, and the time must have come when our money or our patience would be exhausted: sooner or later he would be wanting something more of us than we should be able to pay for its immunity. Would then the prey, which he has so long watched for, appear the less inviting, for Britain's being obliged to give up the protection of it? or would the morsel be the less delicious, for our having spent there so many millions in the defence of it?

But that great question, which has been so long agitated, whether Britain ought to have any continental connections, has now been determined, and all parties happily agree, that it must have its continental connections.

As this is the first time these terms have been heard of in a political debate, and their author did not explain his meaning in them, it will be necessary for the reader, before he can form any judgment on the subject, to settle in his own mind, what he is to understand by them. A continental connection may mean, either a connection with the whole continent of Europe, or with a part of it; it may mean a connection with a very large part, or a very small part. The grand alliance, formed by King William, between England and all the other states of Europe against France, was a continental connection: a treaty with any German Prince for a body of troops, as with a Prince of Buckburg for a regiment

ment of artillery, is a continental connection. Is it possible for us to form any judgment upon a proposition, which is expressed in terms so very vague and indefinite? Two things then occur in the beginning of this discussion. The one is, that this great question, said to have been so long agitated, and now determined, never was a question before; because the terms of it were never before put into a proposition, from the Conquest to this time: the other is, that it never can be a question; because the terms of it are so very vague and general, as to have no determinate meaning in them, and precisely to express nothing at all.

However, as the subject requires our consideration, the only fair way which I know of treating on it, is by an induction of the several particular senses, in which the proposition may be understood, and weighing the merits of each.

If the terms be understood in their most general sense, and the question be, whether Britain ought at any time, or in any case whatsoever, to have any sort of connection with the whole, or any part of the continent of Europe? This seems to be a question too general to be ever agitated at all; because it is impossible for any man to say, that there may not arise some certain occasions and circumstances of affairs, which may unavoidably force us to have some connection with the continent: at least, this ques-
tion

tion cannot have been agitated since the act of settlement, because that was itself a continental connection, and a very happy one, though intended perhaps to be not quite so great an one. The fetching a future Queen from the continent, which good Englishmen may wish perhaps might for this time not be from Germany, would be a continental connection. If therefore the terms of this question are understood in their utmost latitude, it cannot have been agitated since the act of settlement. But whether the question was determined then, or has been more happily settled now, we shall gain very little knowledge by the decision: for because it is allowed, that there may possibly be a case, wherein Britain's having a continental connection may not be wrong, it will by no means follow, that every continental connection which it shall enter into, must therefore be right: else we must read our logic backwards, and say, *Omne minus includit majus*. In order to speak definitively, therefore, and bring the question to an issue, we must fairly say what is the particular continental connection which we intend.

A continental connection, then, in the next place, may mean a connection with the whole continent, or with a part of it. A connection with the whole cannot be the sense meant, because the whole continent of Europe never was connected against any other part of the world; at least since the wars for the Holy Land. Or if it were, Britain's being in amity with, or equally well affected towards every nation

nation in Europe, though a very good moral virtue, which I could heartily wish we had a great deal more of, yet politically expresses nothing: because such an equal connection with all the nations of Europe is, as to all the operating effects of it in war and peace, the very same thing as the having no connection with any of them. Beside that the subject under consideration was war, which in the very idea of it, excludes that of a general amity.

Britain's continental connections therefore, must be with a part of Europe; and if so, they must either be with a greater part of it, or a small part of it. If our connections are to be with the greater part of the continent, then in order to make the proposition applicable to the present case, the reader will find himself under a necessity of subjoining a farther question; Whether Britain's continental connections are to be connections of friendship, or connections of enmity? for of the several great powers of Europe, which used to be our allies, we have no connections of friendship with any one of them. Neither Holland nor Denmark will have any connection with us; and the Empress and Empire of Germany, and Russia, and Sweden, are in conjunction with the French our enemies. If therefore continental connections mean connections with the great powers of Europe, they must mean connections of enmity: for of friendship with us they have none. All the connections therefore which we can have at present with these, must, I fear, be at the muzzles of our musquets.

Where

Where then are our continental connections? An Elector of B——gh, in consideration of the yearly sum of six hundred and seventy thousand pounds, is content not to hurt another Electorate; and Britain, for the defence of it, has an alliance with the continent of Hesse. It could get no other connection; it must have some connection; and therefore took up with that: which is the last and only sense, which the proposition, that Britain must have its continental connections, can be understood in, to be a justification of the present German war.

Does then the proposition mean, that Britain ought always to have some continental connections or other; and that therefore, if one part of the continent refuse to accept of any connections with it, still it must have them, and must therefore seek them in another? For a moment let us lament the fate of our island, that having so long remained above water, it must now sink, unless chained and moored by some connection to the continent: and then ask whether the proposition in this sense does not prove rather too much. For if we adopt this new doctrine, that it is absolutely necessary for Britain to have some continental connection, it will thence follow, that if the part of Europe, which has the right on its side, will not accept of our connections, we must then make them with those that are in the wrong: if the party, which is the strongest, will not be connected with us, we must then connect our-

selves with the weakest. I will not presume to arraign the justice of my country, so far as to suppose that the former has been our case : indeed it cannot always have been so, because Britain has actually been in this war connected on both sides : but a debt of six and twenty millions, contracted since these last continental connections, will long remain a very feeling conviction of our having taken the weaker side against the stronger.

But not to lose sight of our subject in this smoke-ball of a pompous phrase : the great question, which has really been agitated from the revolution to this day ; and the only one, in which England is concerned, is, How far it ought to unite itself in alliances of war upon the continent ? And the reader must have observed, that the whole tendency of these Considerations has been to establish, and bring us back to the true revolution system : that the only enemy upon the continent, which Britain can be endangered by, is France : that whenever the other nations of Europe will unite in an effectual alliance of war against France, it will then be the interest of England to join in that alliance : but that in every divided state of Europe, and much more in every divided state of the German Princes with each other, it must, if the foregoing principles are true, invariably be the interest of Britain never to concern itself with them ; at least farther than by offering its mediation to compose

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them :

them : that the French nation's having taken one side of a German contest, is so far from being a just motive for England's taking the other, that for that very reason we ought so much the more to keep out of it.

This is the principle, which actuated our greatest statesmen, for the first twenty years after the Revolution; and this was the sole principle, by which one of the best politicians, that ever sat on the English throne, governed himself through his whole reign. 'Twas the forming that grand alliance, which, after having first been the saviour of his own country, and then of Britain, completed his character, and made him the deliverer of Europe. And nothing but that alliance could have broke the chains, which France was then preparing for it. Had King William, when he came to the crown of England, instead of setting himself at the head of Europe, and uniting the several princes of it in arms against France, been so ill advised as to make himself the head of a German party, and form only petty German connections, and brought the British force into the internal broils of the empire: the French Monarch might have inwardly thanked him, but not a power in Europe would have joined him. And had the nation been *then* disposed to raise treble the sums, which his wars really cost, all our treasures had been spent in vain, and Europe had been enslaved.

But

But his great mind too well knew the British interest to be misled by such councils. Instead of chusing to be the head of a German faction, we see him actuating the joint councils of Europe, with all the Princes of it attending him to consult for the general good, against the common enemy. There was, I have heard, at the time, a picture made of that great congress; but the reader's own imagination will easily form one for himself, by perusing the list in the margin of those great personages, which assisted in it, with the number of troops they respectively agreed to raise, for the purposes of this alliance*.

Such

* These all assisted at the Congress.

The Elector of Brandenburg	The Prince his brother
Electoꝛ of Bavaria	Duke of Saxe Eysenach
Duke of Lunenburg	Prince Philip Palatine
Duke of Zell	Duke of Zulback
Duke of Wolfenbittel	Prince of Wirtemberg New-
Landgrave of Hesse Cassel	stadt
Prince Christian Louis of Bran-	Prince of Wirtemberg
denburg	The Prince his brother
Prince Waldeck	Duke of Courland
Prince of Nassau	Prince Ferdinand his brother
Stadtholder of Friesland	Prince of Anhalt Zeerborst
Prince of Nassau Saarbrug	Landgrave of Homburg
Governor of Bois le Duc	Three Princes of Holsten-Beck
Prince of Nassau Dillemburg	Duke of Holstein
Prince of Nassau Idstein	Prince of Commerci
Duke Administrator of Wir-	Prince Palatine of Birkenfelt
temberg	Count of Horn
Two Princes of Anspach	Count of Erback
Landgrave of Hesse D' Arm-	Count Tirimont
stadt	Count de Brouay

Such was the august assembly which attended him at the Hague. But could we now raise him up, to take a view of the state of parties in Europe, how

Count de Gryal
 Count d'Arco
 Count de Rivera
 Count de Sanfra
 Count de Lippe
 Count d'Espense
 Count de Fugger
 Count de Denhof
 Count de Carelfon
 Baron of Pallant
 Baron of Spaein

The Rhinegrave
 His Brother
 Marquis of Cashlemonlayo
 Marquis of Castanago, governor
 of the Spanish Netherlands
 General Chauvert
 General d'Elwicht
 General Barfus
 General d'Autel
 General Palfi, &c.

The ambassadors and foreign ministers present were,

From the Emperor,
 Count de Winditzgratz and
 Berka
 Chevalier de Campecht
 From the king of Spain,
 Don Emanuel de Colonna
 From the king of Denmark,
 Count of Rebenklam
 M. Centhe
 From the king of Sweden,
 Count of Oxenitern
 From the king of Poland,
 M. Moreau
 From the elector of Bavaria,
 Baron of Broomgarden
 M. Prielmeyere
 From the elector of Branden-
 burgh,
 M. Vandiest
 M. Smettau

From the elector of Saxony,
 M. Haxhaussem
 From the elector of Treves,
 Baron de Leyon
 M. Champagne
 From the elector of Mentz,
 M. Talberg
 M. Meyers
 From the elector of Cologne,
 General and Baron Berufaw
 M. Soelmaker
 From the elector Palatine,
 M. Hertermans
 From the duke of Savoy,
 Count de Pielat
 President de la Tour
 From the duke of Zell,
 M. Zieger
 From the bishop of Munster,
 M. de Nort

From

how would our great Deliverer grieve to see the generous labours of his life counteracted and defeated ! to see British councils and British treasures employ'd in fomenting quarrels among the princes

From the landgrave of Hesse Cassel,	From the duke of Hanover, M. Klekk
Baron Gortz	From the duke of Holstein Gottorp,
M. Reppelaar	M. Tourken
From the duke of Wolfem- bottle,	From the prince of Liege, Counsellor Mean
Baron Crosek	

Of king William's own subjects who attended him to this solemnity, were the

Duke of Norfolk	Bishop of London
Duke of Ormond	Lord Dramlendrits
Earl of Devonshire	Lord Dursley
Earl of Dorset	Earl of Portland
Earl of Essex	Earl of Monmouth
Earl of Nottingham	Duke of Schoimberg
Earl of Scarborough	His brother count Meinhard,
Earl of Selkirk	&c. *

The quotas agreed on were as follow ;

The Emperor	—	20,000
K. of Spain in Flanders	—	20,000
States General	—	35,000
D. of Savoy, and troops of Milan	—	20,000
E. of Bavaria	—	18,000
E. of Saxony	—	12,000
Landgrave of Hesse	—	8,000
Circles of Suabia and Franconia	—	10,000
D. of Wirtemberg	—	6,000
E. of Brandenburg	—	20,000
Prince of Liege	—	6,000
Bishop of Munster	—	7,000
E. Palatine	—	4,000
Prince of Lunenburg	—	16,000

* Rapin, vol. III. fol. 164.

of the empire, whom it was his great care to reconcile to each other, and unite in the common cause! to see B——n, instead of taking the lead in any grand alliance, humbly seconding the ambition of an E——r of B——gh, and offering up (what he might think) an annual tribute, to prevent his destroying any more than one protestant E——te! And how would the mighty statesman's ghost stalk indignant by the man, who, when we were sunk so low in our alliances as a little subsidy treaty with a landgrave of Hesse, and a single elector, should think to raise them only in sound; and attempt to confound a diminutive, defensive, ruinous, and impracticable measure with that grand alliance, in which he had fought at the head of Europe, by the help of a pompous equivocal phrase of continental connections!

I know that it has been said, that England paid all in these alliances of king William; and it was flattering the nation's vanity, to suppose that no country had any money in it but England. The Dutch, however, paid their third part of the subsidies in both these alliances, and brought three fifths of the troops: but whatever we paid, the object was great, and worthy of a true patriot and friend to Europe. But what was it that we did pay? The whole sum granted that year, 1691, for the land service, was 2,380,698*l*. This was to maintain the troops in England and Ireland,
and

and six thousand Danes, hired for the recovery of that island, and for our part of the grand alliance. The effective pay of these land forces, being 69,636 men, amounted to 1,880,698 l. and the remaining five hundred thousand pounds, as appears by the resolutions of the preceding and following years, were for the train, general officers, levy money, transports, subsidies, hospitals in Flanders, and contingencies. The appropriating particular sums to each particular service, had not then been brought into use; but in the distribution of this five hundred thousand pounds among the several services here enumerated, what proportion of it can be allotted for subsidies? Some of these articles in the present war would singly eat up such a sum. But suppose the moderation of those times to have left one hundred thousand pound for subsidies: this was all that could be paid among the German princes, who maintained four armies of forty and fifty thousand men each upon the frontiers of France: and this was in those days represented by king William's enemies, and by men of the like principles before the peace of Utrecht, as a ruinous land war: that is, we paid our money to German princes by thousands, to put all the empire in arms against France, and that was a ruinous war. We now send it to Germany by millions, without any real allies; nay, a great part of it to be employed in enabling those, who should be our allies, to cut each others throats; and it is right, for this only reason, that Britain must have its continental connections.

I do

I do not mean to say, that these subsidies did not afterwards grow larger. The reader may see the gradual increase of them in the history of the public revenue, with every thing else which can be known on this subject. I have extracted the German subsidies, which we paid in the year 1704, when the British and Dutch forces marched into Germany, and in conjunction with part of the Imperial army, beat the French, with the ruin of forty thousand of their best troops*.

In the year 1706 †, the subsidies to our allies were increased; but the whole expence for the land

	l.	s.	d.
* For payment of her majesty's proportion of the subsidies to be paid to her allies for part of her quota of 40,000 l. — — —	55,272	00	0
To the king of Denmark,	37,500	00	0
To the landgrave of Hesse Cassel,	11,848	00	0
To the elector of Treves,	5,924	00	0
To the states of Suabia,	31,642	00	0
To the elector Palatine,	712	00	0
To Mons. Moncado, for loss of waggons and horses,	8,000	00	0
To the marquis Miremont,	400	00	0
	<hr/>		
	151,298	00	0

† To the king of Denmark,	37,500	00	0
To the king of Portugal,	150,000	00	0
To the duke of Savoy,	160,000	00	0
To the landgrave of Hesse Cassel,	5,952	7	6
To the elector of Treves,	5,852	7	6
To the elector Palatine,	4,761	18	6
To the king of Prussia,	50,000	00	0
	<hr/>		
	414,056	13	6

army, including all our subsidies, and the pay of our own quota, amounted to no more than 2,814,583l. 15s. 9d. For this our enemies were obliged to maintain an army in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Savoy, Germany, and Flanders; and were opposed by equal ones of our allies, in all those several parts of Europe, with the destruction of twenty thousand French at the battle of Ramillies, and the loss of a whole army, and half a million of treasure, at the siege and battle of Turin.

I know it has been said, that our allies did not supply their several quotas; but the Dutch proved, that theirs was kept complete; the rest might be deficient: that is to say, instead of two hundred thousand men, our allies supplied only a hundred and fifty thousand; all of which, with our own quota of fifty thousand men, were brought to fight against France, for an expence to England of 2,815,000l. We have this year spent the double of that sum in Germany alone, and have never had ninety thousand men for it. Is not the addition of a hundred and fifty thousand men a better thing than the having none? If our magnanimous ally, to whom we pay a greater subsidy than, in the year 1706, we paid to all our allies put together, would now send us a hundred and fifty thousand men to help us against the French, should we quarrel with him, and say he did nothing, for want of the other fifty?

Q

Britain

Britain cannot indeed now complain to its allies, for any failure in their several contingencies; for our magnanimous ally will tell us, that he is bound to none. Instead of forming alliances against France with the great powers of the continent, it forms continental connections: that is, it contentedly lavishes away its treasures for a something, which it can draw no troops from, called by a fine name, which it can put no meaning to.

Till such great occasions shall return again for Britain to act in conjunction with Holland, and Germany, and the other parts of Europe, united in a real alliance against France; the true interest of Britain, or of any part of Germany, can never call for our troops upon the continent. We have indeed too long been making ourselves parties in the internal quarrels of the Empire, to hope soon to see that and the other states of the continent united in such an alliance: but till then we can have no connection with it. Previous to Britain's having any continental connection, that continent must be connected in itself. To talk of forming a connection with that, which is itself unconnected, is a contradiction in terms. 'Tis advising us to catch hold of a loose heap of dust, which far from yielding any stay to us, can serve only to raise a cloud to blind our eyes with. But when all that continent is connected with France in an alliance against us, and the cause we would espouse; the sending our troops thither in such a case, upon such a pretence, is little better than

than the running our head against a wall, and saying we must have a connection with it.

The principles already laid down contain, I think, a full answer to a plea, which has been often urged for the German war, that it is a diversion. However, as it has been used by great authority, some of my readers may think it requires a particular answer. If others do not, they may pass over what follows: or at least they will excuse the writer, if in the course of this answer, they should meet with some things, which they may think too nearly border on what has been said before. All truths are and must be consistent with each other. 'Tis the property of error only to fly out into endless lengths, without respecting any common point or centre: But every just argument must have the several parts of it, like the angles in true measuring, all coincide and close in with each other.

The German war then, it is alleged, has been a diversion to the French from their naval; and prevented their carrying their operations at sea, so far as they might otherwise have done, if that had not engaged their attention.

If the war in Germany be considered as a war of diversion, I would then premise, that the very idea of a war of diversion, supposes that Britain makes it a war of choice, and is not brought thither by necessity; and if so, I have already observed, that

it is the duty of every wise state, in making choice of the province, which it shall send its troops to act in, to consider where it can make war to greatest advantage; where it is itself strongest, and its enemy weakest; where it has itself least to lose, and its enemy most; and where its victories are like to have the best effect, and soonest bring its enemy to peace.

The present war with France began with a contest about the foreign settlements, and colonies of the two nations. A matter, in which the parliament declared that the immediate and essential interests of these kingdoms are concerned. Why then should we desire to divert any of the course of it into a land war in Germany? It could not be, because we found ourselves the most pressed, and in danger of losing most at sea; for England is on that element superior to France, and has been in a continual course of victory. It could not be because our victories were fruitless; because we are gaining those very points which we fought for; and making the most valuable acquisitions, which we could wish for. The only acquisitions, which, when we have taken the French islands, it could be of any advantage to us to gain, and the only ones, which it is practicable for us to keep. Is it then to increase the enemy's expence? A state may sometimes think fit to change the scene of a war, because, by carrying it on in one particular manner, they have it in their power, with a few troops, to employ a much greater
number

number of their adversaries. Thus Britain, by putting 10,000 men on board its fleet, might oblige the French to keep a much greater number on its coasts. If the length of the north and west coast of France from Dunkirk to Bayonne be 800 miles, then ten thousand men on board our fleet, require 80,000 men on the French coast, for the French to find an equal match within an hundred miles to oppose to them *. But this cannot be the sort of diversion intended by the German war.

If we would make a diversion in Germany, it must be by sending thither more troops than France can, or an equal number, or an inferior number. As to the first case; if the land force of France be greater than that of Britain, then, in the first place, England cannot send a greater force to Germany, than France can. In the next place, if it could send a greater force thither, it must then put itself to infinitely greater expence than France; and therefore must create thereby a greater diversion of its own revenues, than of its enemies. And, in the last place, if England could send to Germany a greater force than France, the French court, knowing that our army would be superior, would order their own to stay at home that summer: and in that case the diversion made would be only of English treasures, in an armament beyond our natural strength, with-

* This is what Sir William Monson says in one of his answers to Lord Essex's Queries, Armies at land cannot fly, but armies at sea have wings.

out a possibility of doing our enemy any hurt; while the French money and troops having been kept at home, would be the more ready to attack us in Germany the next year. And we have already seen the folly of invading France in that case; or of marching into East Germany.

Let us next suppose that England should send an equal force to France. Where is the advantage in such a diversion? England puts itself to at least as great expence to raise and hire fresh troops, as France is at in employing its own standing army to repel it: and if the sources for a land force are greater in France than in England, then if from two unequal powers you take what equal parts you will, the superior will remain superior, as much as before. But do we really transport troops into Germany upon as cheap terms as France can march men over the Rhine or Maese, making the country maintain them in their passage? Are English regiments raised or supported as easily as French? Still therefore the diversion will be against us.

But the truth is, all the diversion, which Britain can make to France in Germany, is by sending fewer troops at double the expence, to act against a greater number of French. Thus it has been every year of the war hitherto, and thus it will continue. I admit that we have happened to have a superior General; but how cruel a hazard is this exposing our troops to? The superiority of British valour is a

very popular topic; and we are readily disposed to admit the force of every argument to prove that twenty thousand Englishmen can beat thirty thousand French: but a statesman, who shall act upon this principle, will be thought a very shallow politician: and if English soldiers are so much more valuable than French, he must have too little a regard for the lives of his countrymen, who will risk them upon terms so very unequal.

Where some great and important interest is at stake, I hope no ten thousand Englishmen will refuse to fight with double the number of French: and much more when thirteen English ships were sent with troops to relieve Minorca, I am sure that no English commander would refuse, in such a case, like Mr. Bing, to fight with twelve French ships; where so great an object is at stake. But in Germany, where no English interest can be concerned, and no German interest, if rightly understood, the matching twenty-five thousand Englishmen against thirty thousand French, merely on the confidence of our greater valour, and still worse the exposing them against forty thousand, is by much too expensive an affair to be chosen upon any account as a French diversion; and by much too serious an affair to be considered in any sense as an English one.

The German war therefore, allowing it to be a diversion, is not an eligible diversion; because Britain must put itself in a greater expence to make it, than

than it can its enemy to repel it. I now add, that the German war is no diversion at all. By a diversion every one knows is meant, the turning of a war from one part, where we would not have it go, to another part, where we have less to fear from it. But the bringing the war into Germany is no diversion at all. It is not a diversion of the *Forces* of France: It is not a diversion of the *Treasures* of France.

As to the former, it may be an employment for the French forces, but is not a diversion of them. For what one service has the French court to employ their troops in, but in Germany? They may, if they please, march them down to their coast, and there they must remain. Have they ships to transport them, or a fleet to protect them in their passage? Though I doubt whether the French troops would suffer themselves to be imbark'd, now that they have seen their men of war destroyed, and the British fleet continually upon their coast; yet where so important a concern is at stake, it becomes no man to say, that an invasion is impossible; or that the French may not at some time or other, by some very fortunate concurrence of circumstances, be able to land ten thousand men upon our coasts. But then this, I think, we may safely say, that though for once they might happen to elude the vigilance of our fleet; and by the favour of winds, and tides, and long nights, may throw over ten thousand men for once; yet there will be the chances of a thousand
sand

send to one against the same accidents concurring to enable them to send over ten thousand more in due time to support them. Thirty or forty thousand men encamped or cantoned upon our south coast, makes us therefore absolutely secure; because the first ten thousand would be disposed of, long before a second ten thousand could arrive to support them.

As this reasoning seems just in itself, so we have the evidence of facts to confirm it. Why is it, that the French troops are not now stationed upon the coasts opposite to ours, but because both nations see the impracticableness of bringing them over? The British councils certainly are convinced of this; else why are our national troops sent out of the kingdom? and we may fairly conclude that the French court thinks in the same manner, else what is it which hinders their invading us? Is it the want of troops? That may be a reason, why we should not invade France; but it cannot be a reason why a country, which has always two or three hundred thousand men in its pay, should not invade us. It is not therefore the want of troops, but of the means to bring them over, which prevents the French from invading us. Were their fleet superior to ours, we might then leave Germany as naked as we pleased, not a battalion would be sent thither. All would be brought down upon their coast, and a hundred thousand of them, if they were necessary, sent over to ours. France therefore has not a man the less upon its own coast for the German war. It does

not send its army to invade the German dominions from choice, but necessity ; because they cannot get to England, and have no other ground to meet us on.

If this be not a diversion of the French forces from England, neither was it any diversion of them from the defence of their colonies and islands. These are too interesting a concern to the French trade and revenue, to be neglected in their councils : and therefore we have always found the French court ready enough to support them, as long as the least chance remained of their getting their forces over thither. The number of transports, with troops and ammunition for their colonies, which we took in the beginning of the war, shew this ; and the garrisons, we found in Cape Breton and Quebec, and the long resistance they have made in America, prove that they were well supported. It was not therefore the want of troops, or their unwillingness to send them ; and much less the German war, when the income of the whole Electorate would not be worth to the French nation, if they had an army there, one half of the value of Martinico ; but their utter inability to convey them, while their ports were blocked up by the English fleets ; which prevented their sending over forces every where superior to ours.

If the German war be not a diversion of the French troops from any other service, neither is it of their treasures. What the quantity of these really is,

may not be easy to determine ; our enemies certainly have some millions to spare, else they need not spend them in Germany ; which is not their way into England, nor instantly to put an end to the war, though it may give them the advantage in the end. But though the sources of their revenue were the double of what they now are, yet the German war would be a diversion of them from no other service, which could annoy us ; because they have no other to employ them in against us. These treasures of France, whenever Britain shall, by the enormous waste of its own, be reduced to ask a peace, will soon grow formidable. Too long have they been trembling for their East and West-India colonies, as well as their American settlements; not to see the absolute necessity of a fleet to protect them : and their first care after a peace, if we leave them that far the greatest nursery of their seamen, their sugar trade intire, will, doubtless, be to attend to their marine. But while the war continues, it is impossible for them to employ their treasures to that purpose. They might possibly buy ships of Danes, Swedes, or Genoese ; but to what avail ? When that could only put us so much the more upon our guard, give our fleet an opportunity of taking one half of them in their passage into the French harbours, and oblige the rest to lie rotting there unmanned, when they had got in ? While their ports are all blocked up, and they cannot send out a single man of war, but by stealth, it is absolutely impracticable for them to raise their navy to an equality with ours. Where are their

sailors to be found? They can only be made by long voyages at sea; but how can that be done, when they have neither men of war nor merchantmen, which can venture out of their harbours; and the sugars of their own islands are brought home in neutral ships? Will they then attempt to form them as Duilius did his rowers at land? Our British tars would have little to fear from such land-made seamen. In short, the present war continuing, and the state of parties remaining in Europe, as they now are; no accession of treasure could make England equal to France at land, nor France equal to England at sea.

But say others, though it may not be so now, yet in the beginning of the quarrel the German war was a seasonable diversion; if our enemies had not spent their force in Germany, they might then have attended to their marine with more effect, and that might have made them formidable to us. But the very idea of our choosing the German war as a diversion, supposes that we must have been there first. How early in the war soever therefore the French began to spend their money in Germany, we began as soon, and certainly spent as much; and that money employed on our marine, would have carried it to as much greater a height, as the French navy could have been improved by the savings of theirs: and if our navy was at first superior to theirs, then, if to unequals you add equals, the superiority would still be ours. But in fact, in the beginning

ning of the quarrel, the French court did attend wholly to their marine, and had no German war at all. In the first year of the war therefore, when only such a diversion could have been of any service to us, we had it not; and by the next year, when their sailors were shut up in our prisons, and their ships in their own ports; when Toulon, Brest, Rochfort, Louisburg, and even Cape Francoise were blocked up; when their fishery was destroyed, their West-India navigation at an end, their sugars brought home in neutral bottoms, and their breed of sailors therefore totally ceased, from that time we did not want it.

If from reasoning we recur to facts, and recollect the course of the French conduct in the beginning of the war, that will prove, a posteriori*, the justness of our reasoning on this head.

The only prospect which the French had of invading us with success, was, by surprising us in the beginning of the war, before we were prepared for them. Then the nation was justly alarmed with the danger of an invasion, and owed a more grate-

* The nation's second orator reasons *a priori*, from facts, and bids us look into our history for arguments *a priori*: seeming to have considered his own arguments, which were drawn from Queen Elizabeth's reign, as a hundred and fifty years more *a priori*, than any from queen Ann's. But our facts being of a much later date, we are content to give the argument drawn from them, the more humble title of an argument *a posteriori*.

ful return, than it paid him, to the noble lord, who equipped and mann'd a fleet with so incredible a speed, as prevented the enemy, and surprized not only all other nations, but even ourselves: and at the same time, with equal foresight and steadiness, crippled the French marine in the very beginning, and prevented their manning the fleet they had prepared at Breit and Rochfort to invade us, by seizing all their ships in their return to Europe, till we had got fifteen thousand of their best seamen in our power. That was the French season for invading us. All their attempts since have been the effects of desperation rather than of council. But during all the year 1756, while the French had any hope left of invading us, they never thought of entering Germany; and so far was the Electorate from being in any danger of an attack, that we brought troops from thence over hither. England was then too great an object in the French councils, for them then to trifle away their money and troops in Germany. But the next year, when they found themselves totally fallen from that great hope of ruining us at once, then they took the after-game of trying to do it more gradually; and therefore thought of Germany: And whatever may be now pretended of our having chosen the German war as a diversion, every one must remember, that the army of observation was an army of defence and not of diversion. 'Twas the child of our fears, and our fond concern to keep the French out of the E——te, and not of any councils of diversion to draw them into

into it. Then only it was when our enemies found that we had raised a sufficient land force to guard our coast from surprize, and to repel any invasion, that they began to think of sending troops into Germany: and when by the vigilance of our squadrons, at the mouths of their harbours, and the loss of so many of their transports in their passage to their colonies, they found it impracticable to go any where else; then it was that they passed the Rhine, still making every effort, and running every hazard, to succour their colonies. At length they found to their cost that they could not go thither; but they knew that the English forces could, and that they could not resist them there; that was the part where only they were vulnerable; their best trading interest lay in their islands, which were now naked and exposed; and therefore it was a diversion of the French choosing, and not of the English, to draw the British force into Germany, where they knew themselves to be invulnerable, and were always sure to be superior to us.

I hope I have in no part of the foregoing sheets discovered any want of humanity for the inhabitants of the Electorate, or of duty to our common sovereign. I would always consider them as our fellow subjects, and our fellow protestants; I wish that Hanover could be joined to this island, that we might consider them as our countrymen. But till then, it is for the interest of both, that they keep the distance which nature has placed them at, and
that

that Britain should know nothing of the Electorate, but as a part of the empire, if that and the other powers of Europe should ever unite again in an alliance against France. Till then for England singly, and by its own force to attempt to defend it, is taking the certain way to bring the French into it, and making that the seat of war in every future quarrel. 'Tis giving up all the advantages of our situation, and joining our island on to the continent, by finding for our enemy a field to beat us in. It is giving up all the benefit of our naval superiority, for the sake of a distant land-war, which I have now I think shewn to be ruinous and impracticable. It is carrying it on in a country, where victory itself can do us no good, and where a defeat can do our enemy no hurt. Not to mention that in the present case, it seems to be exhausting our treasures to support a man, who never can have it in his power, and who is yet to give us the proofs of his having ever had it in his will to do us any service.

Providence has been pleased to put the whole advantage of the war into our hands; and I fear we are giving it to our enemies. We have it in our power to conquer for Hanover, and secure for it such an indemnification, as shall effectually deter the French from ever entering it again. We seem to be taking the course, in which the most we can do, is to be ruined for it, and disabled from ever after defending it. Let any discerning man ask him-

himself, what one thing we have done in Germany this year, or the French suffered there, to make them want a peace more than the last. It is not now the business of France to exert its whole force, as it did in former wars, with three or four armies in Germany. It is not the interest of France to beat us out from thence; that would open our eyes. The French themselves have found already, and then the people of England would soon see, that the crown of France can get nothing in Hanover, and Britain can lose nothing: and the French, if we intreated them, would not suffer their army to stay there a twelvemonth round. Perhaps it may not be the interest of either of the two generals to put an end to the war: it certainly is not the French interest; and our foreign general has it not in his power to do it, though his success should be five times greater than any he has yet met with. Put his three campaigns into one: not the expences of them, they will remain a heavy load of debt on our revenue: our millions in Germany, too like to our moments, *pereant & imputantur*; but put the victories of his three campaigns all into one; three such as those of Crevelt, Minden, and Warburgh, all in a summer, could have no effect on France towards putting an end to the war. The French court at the worst could but have their army driven home; and would be as ready the next year to invade the Electorate as the last. In short, there has never any reason yet been given to convince us, that France may not, with little more than its ordinary revenue, keep on

the war in its present state for ten years to come. France, while it is itself suffering nothing, and running its enemy every year ten millions nearer its ruin, will not sue for peace. Many persons I know will think it strange to hear of ruin in the midst of victory and success. The English nation, it will be said, never appeared so great as it has the last year. But may we not deceive ourselves by making the vast increase of our debt the measure of our greatness? Can our conquests be rendered in the least degree more secure, for any the greatest successes we can hope for in Germany? The only way to secure the present, is to go on to make more: not useless ones on the Mississippi, but by seizing the French islands, and holding their whole West-India trade in deposit for Hanover; and thereby cutting off the means of their present supplies to invade it, as well as making them willing to submit to any terms to recover a part of their losses? Is there any possible way left for the French to save or recover their colonies, but only by beating or exhausting us in Germany? Could they do either, if we would not go thither? Shall we be the better able to defend our conquests for our having three years hence fifty millions the less in our pockets?

I know it is said that we have money enough; I acknowledge that hitherto we have felt no want of it: but surely the most sanguine among us will not say that an expence of fifteen millions is to be continued 15 years longer. Should other wise and good men

men think, that we cannot support such an enormous expence beyond another year; yet no one, as a friend of his country, would be fond of giving his reasons for it. There are others indeed, who think that the greater debt we incur, the better; because then, say they, we shall be so much the nearer wiping out the whole. This third sort are not the people which I shall reason with; I only wish that the two former would bethink themselves in time of the dangers, to which they expose the publick from them, by running the war into an expence so much beyond our abilities.

I am as thankful as any man for the taking of Montreal; but that service has been compleated by the regiments which were there before; the nation therefore has this year been at no expence of transports, &c. upon that account. Nor has any expedition which we know of been formed this year, any more than the last, against the French islands. While the only possessions of value belonging to our enemies out of France, have lain open to our conquests, our men of war have been watching a few broken back'd ships in the Villain for want of other employment; yet without any new expedition hitherto failed, or any fresh national attempts, more than the continuation of those of last year, our expences have increased. I have hitherto spoke of fifteen millions; but will not the real charge of this year 1760 be eighteen millions? And have we not even still heard

of memorials, complaining, that enough is not done for the German service? As the demands for the British war must necessarily be reduced; those for the German seem to be increasing.

We are now, it is said, going to create twelve millions new debt, with an expence possibly of twenty: If indeed a British parliament will concur, to fix in the unbiaſſed mind of our gracious ſovereign, ſo very erroneous a ſtandard of loyalty. Can Gentlemen think of going on thus to load our national induſtry with the intereſt of twelve millions a year; for a ſervice, in which, ſuppoſing our army to be as ſucceſſful as we pleaſe, it will be hard to point out any benefit, even of the ſmalleſt value, which can reſult to Britain. We may talk as we pleaſe of a French bankruptcy; but can any man prove, that our enemies may not go on ſeven years longer? Will any man avow the running his country a hundred millions farther in debt? Dare we imagine, that our credit can extend ſo far; or our manufactures and exports, bear the load of ſuch an intereſt? I will leave the reader to picture to himſelf, what muſt happen long before we have gone ſuch a length. Shall we then, when all the neighbouring nations have been drawing their money out of our hands, and quarrelling with us for their principal; with all the confuſions of bankruptcy; in that general ſtate of diſtruſt, which every individual muſt have of his neighbour; with our ſwords poſſibly aimed at each other's throats; ſhall we then be able to raiſe

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ten millions within the year to protect the Electorate, or to defend ourselves.

Some of my readers will recollect upon this occasion, the history of one of the first of the ancient states ; which, tho' under a popular government, was esteemed the wisest : till that fatal period ; when, being engaged in a war at home with their only dangerous rival, which was superior to them at land, but which they triumphed over every year at sea with a fleet of two hundred sail ; they at length, when their riches and naval power were at their greatest height, and their enemy's coast lay all open to them, neglected their own war, to go upon a distant land-war, in support of a little remote state, scarce heard of before, and made important only by that alliance. We shall soon, I hope, see the mistake of persisting in any such impracticable attempts ; and shall not give occasion for posterity to pass the same judgment upon our German war, as the wise Roman did upon the Sicilian : *Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt : in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum, existimatur.* Cic. in Ver.

*Translation of a Convention between his Majesty
and the King of Prussia, concluded and signed
at London, the 11th of April 1758.*

T R A N S L A T I O N .

WHEREAS a treaty between their Britannic and Prussian Majesties was concluded and signed on the 16th day of January 1756, the stipulations whereof tended to the preservation of the general peace of Europe, and of Germany in particular : and whereas since that period France has not only invaded the Empire with numerous armies, and attacked their aforesaid Majesties and their allies, but has also excited other powers to act in like manner : and whereas it is so notorious, that the extraordinary efforts made by his Prussian Majesty to defend himself against the number of enemies, who have attacked him on so many sides at once, have occasioned a very great and burthensome expence ; whilst, on the other hand, his revenues have been greatly diminished in those parts of his dominions which have been the seat of the war ; and their Majesties having mutually determined to continue their efforts for their reciprocal defence and security, for the recovery of their possessions, for the protection of their allies, and the preservation of

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of the liberties of the Germanic body; his Britannic Majesty has resolved, in consequence of these considerations, to give an immediate succour, in money, to his Prussian Majesty, as the speediest and most effectual; and their aforesaid Majesties have thought proper, that a convention should be made thereupon, in order to declare and ascertain their reciprocal intentions in this respect; for which purpose they have appointed and authorized their respective ministers, viz. In the name and on the part of his Britannic Majesty, his privy counsellors, Sir Robert Henley, knight, lord keeper of the great seal of Great Britain, John earl of Granville, president of his council, Thomas Holles duke of Newcastle, first lord commissioner of his treasury, Robert earl of Holderness, one of his principal secretaries of state, Philip earl of Hardwicke, and William Pitt, esquire, another of his principal secretaries of state; and in the name and on the part of his Prussian Majesty, the Sieurs Dodo Henry baron of Knyphausen, his privy counsellor of embassy and minister plenipotentiary at the court of his Britannic Majesty, and Lewis Michell, his *chargé d'affaires* at the said court; who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles.

I.

His Majesty the king of Great Britain engages to cause to be paid, in the city of London, to the person

person or persons who shall be authorized for that purpose by his Majesty the king of Prussia, the sum of four millions of German crowns, amounting to six hundred and seventy thousand pounds sterling ; which intire sum shall be paid at once, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, upon the requisition of his Prussian Majesty.

II.

His Majesty the king of Prussia engages, on his part, to employ the said sum in keeping up and augmenting his forces, which shall act in the most advantageous manner for the common cause, and for the End proposed by their aforesaid Majesties, of reciprocal defence and mutual security.

III.

The High contracting Parties moreover engage, viz. On the one part, his Britannic Majesty, both as King and as Elector ; and, on the other part, his Prussian Majesty ; not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention or agreement whatsoever, with the powers who have taken part in the present war, but in concert, and by mutual consent, and expressly comprehending each other therein.

IV. This

IV.

This convention shall be ratified; and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged on both sides, within the term of six weeks, to be reckoned from the date of the signing of this convention, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof, We the under written ministers of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, and of his Majesty the King of Prussia, by virtue of our full powers, have signed this present convention, and have set the seals of our arms thereto.

Done at London, the 11th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1758.

ERRATA. Page 116. line 14. for *desire*, read *have desired*.
117. line 3. for *its*, read *their*.

F I N I S.

