





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

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Great Britain and France,

W I T H

Its Consequences and Importance ;

Giving an ACCOUNT of the

VIEWS and DESIGNS of the *French*,
with the INTERESTS of *Great Britain*, and
the SITUATION of the *British and French*
COLONIES, in all parts of *America* :

I N W H I C H

A proper BARRIER between the two
NATIONS in *North America* is pointed out,
with a METHOD to Prosecute the WAR,
so as to obtain that necessary security for our
COLONIES.

By an IMPARTIAL HAND.

Æquè pauperibus prodest, locupletibus æquè ;

Æquè neglectum pueris, senibusque nocebit. HOR. Epist. 1.

L O N D O N :

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T H E

P R E F A C E.

WHEN we have so many *Contests* in this nation among friends, we hope they will not forget the *Contest* with their foes ; nor think it improper or unseasonable to take a view of what seems to have given rise to them all, *the Contest in America between Great Britain and France.* This is a contest, in which the whole nation, as well as a few contending parties, is concerned and interested. Among our many contests then we have endeavoured to write *one for ALL* ; one that concerns all, and one that may serve for all other contests, if it is attended to. And in doing this, we have endeavoured to accommodate it to ALL, if such a thing is possible. It is not only the subject itself, but the manner in which we have endeavoured to treat it, that makes us hope at least, it will be looked upon as a matter of general and public concern, without the least regard to any private

a

views

views or interest whatever, and far less a respect to parties. We have no other concern in any party disputes, by writing this *Contest*, but to wish what we seem now to have reason to hope for, that the management of such important concerns, as those we treat of, may be intrusted to those who will take the most care of them.

—————*Detur Digniori.*

It is true indeed, that no one can put pen to paper on these that are now reckoned political subjects ; without being suspected of some sinister design in them, or at least of writing with a view to favour some party or other. This our political writers have brought upon themselves, and upon all others who would endeavour to inform the public of any thing relating to those matters. They seem to write against our party disputes, that have been such an obstruction to public affairs, only to countenance their favourite party. What is worse, they and many others among us seem to write rather with a spirit of defamation, than with a view to information. If they treat of any subject that concerns the state, they must abuse their rulers, or

fellow citizens, instead of informing their readers. This is so far from being our design, that we cannot but reprehend it in others. Our only design is, to make our colonies in America, and their situation, better known both to themselves, and to the nation at home; to give some account of those countries in America, that the two nations are contending for, and of our disputes about them, which seem to be but too little known to any of us; and to consider the way of recovering our losses in them: and if any among us should think themselves hurt by such an inquiry, we are sorry that their interest should interfere so much with the public interest.

I am but too apprehensive indeed, that these our contests in America, and all accounts of them, are reckoned by many to be prejudicial to the greatest blessing any nation can enjoy, peace. It was this that has made me hitherto resist the frequent solicitations of many to give some account of those matters, that they were pleased to think I had taken some pains to be acquainted with. But since our peace is sufficiently broke at present, the only way to

restore it seems to be, to prosecute the war
 in such a manner, as to obtain a firm and
 secure peace from it at last. How that is
 to be done, is the chief subject of our in-
 quiry, which we imagine may be more
 conducive to the peace of this nation, than
 any thing else that may be proposed for
 that purpose; and may perhaps be a means
 of preventing the many wars it is other-
 wise threatned with on account of its colo-
 nies, as well as the fatal effects and con-
 sequences of them. This you may per-
 haps see some reasons for in the following
 account, *of the views and designs of the
 French in all parts of America; and of the
 fatal effects of suffering them to settle on our
 frontiers there; to prevent which was the
 chief design of our endeavouring thus to
 represent them, and to point out the con-
 sequences of them. It was from these views
 and designs of the French, and by suffering
 them to settle on the frontiers of our colo-
 nies in America, that they brought on the
 present war; and we seem to have no way to
 put a happy end to this, or to prevent ma-
 ny more such wars on the same accounts,
 but to secure ourselves against them in
 time,*

time, when it may be done ; the way of doing which is the chief design, scope and tendency of our discourse to represent.

The importance of thus securing our plantations must appear to all, who are the least acquainted with them, or the concerns of the nation in them. It is sufficient only to mention the sum total of the yearly produce of our plantations, that centers in Britain, to be convinced of their importance at first sight ; which sum, upon a moderate computation, appears to amount to at least five, if not six, millions sterling a year. Besides this, the plantations breed and maintain an incredible number of seamen and mariners, not less perhaps than 40 or 50,000 a year, which are both the treasury and bulwark of the nation. They employ likewise nigh two thousand sail of ships a year ; great numbers of which are built in the plantations for the more immediate service of Britain.

It is this that makes this nation both prosperous at home, and considerable abroad. The American colonies are now become a great source of that wealth, by which this nation maintains itself, and is
respected

respected by others. They are likewise the great support, not only of the trade and commerce, but even of the safety and defence of Britain itself. It is from them chiefly that Britain has those constant supplies of seamen and mariners, on which its very existence as a nation seems entirely to depend—It ought never to be forgot, what was so very observable in the beginning of our naval equipments in January and February 1754, when our ships were detained by a long continuance of contrary winds from returning from America, our fleets, so necessary to prevent an invasion, could not be mann'd, 'till those ships arrived from the plantations—But if we give up any part of our plantations, or suffer them to fall into the hands of the French, their trade and commerce, shipping and seamen, must prosper and encrease, as much as ours would decline and decrease; and let any one consider, from the invasion this nation was lately threatned with, what would be the consequence of such events! A small ballance might then have turned the scales entirely against us in their favour, which they must undoubtedly soon have

have by being suffered to secure their present pretensions in America.

But however important those our concerns in America may be, it must be owned, that the whole nation has been very neglectful of them. We seem to have paid no regard to them, 'till the French opened our eyes about them, and made us take notice of them, whether we would or not. And even then, when we were certainly threatned with the loss of the greatest part of all North America, (which will plainly appear, I believe, from what is shown in the following discourse, to endanger the loss of all our colonies there) many seemed to reckon this a matter of very little consequence, as some would persuade us still, if they could find any arguments for that purpose. You have brought this nation into a war, say they, for a port or two in Nova Scotia, or an Indian fort on the river *Ohio*. This is what we were constantly told by the ambassador of our enemy himself—these are Indian affairs—of little consequence—which I do not understand, nor trouble myself with, said he on many occasions.

But

But if you will look into the following discourse, you will see I believe very plainly, that this port or two, or those Indian affairs of so little consequence, amount to no less than nineteen parts in twenty of all the continent of North America, which is much more than all Europe put together. But by such arguments as these we were almost lulled into a fatal sleep, 'till we should have had nothing but perdition before our eyes, as soon as they were opened. It is to prevent the like mistakes for the future, that we have endeavoured thus to represent them.

The result of this contest in America between the two nations must surely be, to gain a power and dominion, that must sooner or later command all that continent, with the whole trade of it, if not many other branches of trade; which must all fall into the hands of France, sooner or later if we suffer her to secure her present encroachments on the British dominions in North America, as will plainly appear from the following discourse. This is the subject of the contest in America. And when the two nations, who want neither cou-
rage

rage nor affection to their cause, have such a pledge as this at stake, there is no wonder to see constant jealousies, and frequent ruptures between them. But they who are negligent in it, I am afraid, must suffer by it. This we have learned already from fatal experience ; which we hope it cannot be taken amiss to endeavour to prevent for the future.

Not to mention any other consequences of the neglect of our affairs in America, it was certainly this that has brought the nation into this present war. The French indeed would endeavour to persuade the world of the very reverse, and tell us, it was the too great attachment of the nation to its interest in America, that has made them kindle this war in Europe. But if we inquire into the real truth of the matter, it will appear to every one, that it was rather the little regard that this nation has all along paid to its concerns in America, by which our frontiers there were left open and defenceless, and our colonies unguarded and exposed to the invasions of the French from all quarters, that has made them take this opportunity to seize a great part of the

British dominions there ; which the nation has so far neglected, that the French and others seem to think, they did not belong to it for that reason. If *Nova Scotia* had been settled, or otherwise secured, after the treaty of Utrecht, when it was restored to this nation, there would have been no occasion for the late disputes or the present war about it. The territories and subjection of the six nations of Indians in North America, which include the *Great Lakes*, river *Ohio*, and many other places, that had been constantly contested between the two nations, from their first settlement in America, were by that treaty likewise given up by France to Britain. Before that the French had endeavoured to extend themselves into those inland parts of North America, and to bring the possessors and proprietors of them under their subjection ; which they now gave up all pretensions to, and relinquished to Britain, that had a more just, and prior right to them. But all those countries have been so far neglected by this nation, that one would imagine, it had no concern in them. Even the French that had quitted their

claims

claims to them, were allowed to make as much, or rather more use of them, than we did ourselves. It was for this reason, that the French revived their claims to them, and seem to have imagined, that all those countries that they had given up, or never had any right or title to, belonged to them ; or at least that Britain would never contest them, in the manner they were resolved to do, and enter into a war on that account, since the whole nation seemed to pay so little regard to them.

But as soon as the eyes of our people came to be opened about those things, for which they were beholden to the French, the only question with them seems to be, who were the authors of all this neglect and misconduct ? This every one would put off from themselves, and lay upon those who are obliged to bear all, it seems, the *Ministry*. But it is to be feared, if the ministry, or any others, are to be loaded with all the faults, bad policy, neglects and misconduct of this nation, especially in America, they will be more than man can bear, or answer for. It would appear, that some others have a

hand at least in the management of our concerns in America, if not of the more important affairs of government, as well as the ministry. The people of Britain seem to have their share in the management of public affairs, especially relating to America, as well as the government. If we would do justice to our cause then, we should consider the conduct of the one, as well as the other. And if that is duely inquired into, it is to be feared, that it will appear, the government has had rather too little concern in our affairs in America, instead of being the sole authors of all the misconduct in it.

This would appear to be the case, from the first part of our inquiry, concerning *the Transactions in our colonies that gave occasion to the French Encroachments*; which are plainly the cause of all our present losses and misfortunes in them, and of the difficulties the nation is brought into about them. And in these it will appear, that the people have had a much greater hand, than the ministry. It may be said perhaps, that a government ought to influence and overrule all the actions of the people, and to be answerable for them.

But

But that does not appear to be so easily done in a British government, nor so agreeable to its constitution. The happy constitution of the British government allows its subjects many liberties and privileges, the abuse of which, for their own private interest, contrary to the public welfare, they have to answer for much more than the government. If the government interposes its authority over them, there is as great a clamor, or rather greater, about the breach of liberties and privileges, as about the neglect of public concerns. It is to be hoped then, that the people and the colonies themselves will consider this, so as to give some attention to the public affairs that they are concerned in, and not let the private views of any, or party disputes of others, interfere with the public interest and welfare; which is but too often the case where the people have any thing to do with public affairs: and that the government likewise will attend a little more closely to the concerns of the nation in America.

But let us not confine our inquiries about such important concerns to persons, but extend them to things. Let us inquire

into our conduct itself, and the reasons for it, instead of the authors of it. If either our ministry or our people have been guilty of what others may reckon misconduct, it was perhaps by acting according to the best of their judgement, and doing what they thought was right, as well as many others. If their conduct has been amiss then, it proceeds perhaps from wrong principles or false notions, instead of negligence. Let us inquire then into the notions and principles by which this nation seems to regulate all its conduct with regard to its colonies ; which opinions of the people must influence the measures of the ministry, and every one else. Such an inquiry may not only account for the past conduct of the nation in America, but may help to reform the future perhaps, which is of much more consequence.

The false notions then that this nation seems to have entertained concerning its colonies, which appear to have influenced many opinions and measures relating to them, and to have been a great cause of the neglect of them above represented, and consequently of our present losses and disturbances

turbances in them, may be reduced to the following heads :

1. It is well known, that our colonies in America are rather more under the tuition and influence of the merchants in Britain, than the government perhaps ; and that all public measures relating to them are very much influenced by the opinions of our merchants about them. But the only things that they seem to attend to are the profits of trade. When we talk of those remote and inland countries in America, What do they produce, or what will they fetch ? say they. This, it is true, is necessary to be considered likewise, but it is not the only thing to be attended to. The great thing to be considered by all states is power and dominion, as well as trade. Without that to support and protect our trade, it must soon be at an end. But if we consider the vast extent of those inland countries in North America, and the numbers of natives in them, with the still greater numbers of people they must maintain, the power they must necessarily give to any state possessed of them must appear to be very great, and sufficient to command all the trade of America. It is
by

by acting upon this principle, of gaining a power and dominion, that the French have gained such a trade with it ; have overrun our colonies in the manner they have done, and must soon worm us out of them altogether ; so long as we mind nothing in Britain but trade, and nothing in America but planting. It is for want of attending to this in time that the trade of this nation now suffers so much, and must be soon ruined altogether, if we continue to act on these principles.

2. But even in point of trade, and immediate returns to Britain, those inland countries in North America are much more valuable, than any seem to reckon them. It is generally imagined, that they are so remote, that nothing can be brought from them to Britain. But we see by the accounts of them what a prodigious and extensive water-carriage there is all over them, by which any commodities almost may be brought from them to convenient ports for a British market. It was but a few years ago, and in this present age, that we seem to have reckoned any places worth seating in our tobacco colonies, beyond the falls of the rivers, or the naviga-

navigation for British vessels, because it was imagined, we could not bring tobacco from them : but now those places are become the center of these colonies, and tobacco is made and brought to Britain from beyond the Apalachean mountains, and has been for some years. But if we can bring such a cumbersome and bulky commodity as tobacco from thence, how much easier will it be to transport other lighter commodities from the remotest parts of those inland countries, especially by the navigation they afford ; and there is no doubt, but that many such commodities hereafter mentioned, might be made in them ; not to mention the great quantities of skins and furs, the richest commodities in all North America, that are got in them without either risque or charge ; with which alone the French colonies are able to make such a figure, and to vie with us, in the manner they have lately done.

3. Many others again seem to pay little regard to the colonies in any respect, and look upon them only as a drain of people out of the nation, that might be more useful at home perhaps ; by which this

nation may be exhausted of its people, as Spain has been, say they. But let them consider, what those people do that go to the colonies. They are certainly the great and principal support of all the trade and manufactures of the whole nation, without which the people in Britain would make but a poor figure, if they could even subsist as an independent nation. Every one that settles in the plantations maintains at least six people in Britain, in the opinion of the best judges *. “ And “ the continual motion and intercourse “ our people have into the colonies, may “ be compared to bees of a hive which “ go out empty, but come back again “ loaded ; by which means the foundation “ of many families is laid.” † Besides, our colonies are a great receptacle of numbers of foreigners from all parts, who both strengthen and enrich the British dominions, without taking any people from Britain. But on the contrary, when the trade of the colonies is thriving and prof-

* See Sir *Josiah Child* on trade.

† *Gee* on trade, pag. 151.

perous,

perous, it brings and has brought more people to Britain perhaps, than all they ever took from it; who are all an addition to the British strength and power.

4. But the false and groundless notion that seems to influence many people's opinions and conduct with regard to the colonies, is, the fear of their rebelling, and throwing off their dependance on Britain. The little foundation there is for such an opinion, and the impracticability of the thing, has been very well exposed already, by Mr. *Gee* in his excellent discourse on trade. But there is no argument like experience and matter of fact, of which we have the plainest instances now before our eyes. We see, that all our colonies in North America are not able to resist a handfull of French, but are likely to be overrun by a few ragamuffians in Canada; and how will they ever be able to withstand the whole force and naval power of Britain, that commands the navigation of the seas, without which our colonies could not subsist for a twelve-month. This then is a notion of the most dangerous consequence, if it influen-

ces any of our measures relating to the colonies, and especially to let the French have a power nigh them to keep them in awe. It was never known surely, that any state, jealous of two others, ever thought it to be its interest to allow them to have a power nigh one another, that may at any time be united against it. They who are of this opinion must suppose, that France is to become an auxiliary to Britain, to preserve its colonies, trade and commerce ! But we should rather believe the very contrary, that France endeavours to deprive Britain of all those three sources of her power and prosperity, as much as is in her power ; and that if our colonies were inclinable to rebel, France would both encourage them to it, and support them in it ; which she may easily do by having an influence over them. We see no great harm indeed, in their remaining in Canada, providing they are confined to their just and lawful bounds in it ; which it will be no easy matter to do, without a constant guard and a sufficient force over them. But if they are allowed to go any farther, we may see the fatal effects of it from
what

what has already happened entirely from that cause.

But however remote this consideration is at present, as it undoubtedly is, it ought without doubt to be the care of Britain, to establish her colonies on such a footing, as to secure their dependance hereafter, when it may be in danger perhaps. And this, it is imagined, she may do by promoting both their welfare and her own, instead of checking their growth, or laying them under any other inconvenience. The thing that breeds a jealousy between Britain and her colonies is not power, but manufactures, in which they interfere with one another. And as the people increase, their manufactures, and the necessity for them, must increase likewise ; which will be the first cause of a rupture between Britain and her colonies, if ever any such thing happens. Now the only way to prevent this, if the people grow numerous in the colonies, is, to put some other employments in their hands, that may serve them instead of manufactures, and may make them depend upon Britain for the very means of their support. Of such employ-

employments there are numbers, which both they and the whole nation have the greatest occasion for ; as the making of *Hemp, Flax, Silk, Wine, Oil, Raisins, Currants, Almonds, Indigo, Madder, Salt-petre, Potash, Iron, Pitch and Tarr*, with *Timber*, and all other *Naval Stores* ; all which might be easily made in some one or other of our plantations in North America, and they are the very things that this nation chiefly wants.* It appears from an

* The reason why those things have not yet been made in our colonies is, that the way of making them, especially to any advantage, so as to turn to account, is not understood by our people there, and seems to be as little known in England. These are foreign employments and manufactures, if we may call them so, that are unknown to Englishmen both at home and abroad ; which is the only reason why they have not yet been attempted with success in our plantations in America, as I can assure the public from a due attention to them for many years, both here and there.

Of this we have the most convincing proof in *Potash*. That has been often attempted in our colonies, but could never be made to turn to account. The reason is, they don't so much as know what *Potash* is, but take it to be only a common salt of ashes made by lixiviation, and that both in Britain and the plantations. This appears from the government having lately given a reward of 3,000 sterling for making such a common lixivial salt, that is made by every chemist's apprentice, and even by the com-

estimate

estimate that has been made of them, that Britain does not lay out less perhaps than three millions a year upon those commodities, and that chiefly in money; which drains it of its substance, and keeps up a ballance of trade against the nation, while it might be supplied with them from the colonies for manufactures. This would

mon country people in England, both for the chemists, and for those that make it into *Pearl-ash* by calcining it again. But the commodity that is wanted by the name of *Potash* in Britain, is made with much less labour and expence than any of these lixivial salts, and at the same time contains the whole substance of the ashes, instead of nothing but the little salt that is in them; while it bears a greater price in Britain; by which means there is not less perhaps than a thousand per cent. difference in the profits of making right *Potash*, and this salt of ashes that the government has purchased the art of making for the benefit of the colonies!

By these means the making of that commodity in our colonies must rather be prevented, than encouraged. And we may say the same of all the other commodities here mentioned, of which I have known many like instances, which I could not but take notice of on that account. It is only for such reasons as these, that a notion prevails among many unskilful people, that those commodities cannot be made in America, where there are all the conveniences for making them that could be desired, if it was rightly set about. I have known tryals made of them all, that would convince any intelligent person of the possibility of making them in our colonies to the best advantage.

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be the way both to secure the dependance of the colonies, and to reap the benefit of them ; and at the same time to promote their growth and prosperity likewise. If the colonies depended upon making those commodities, they must depend upon Britain to vend them, and could not subsist without her ; as we may see by the tobacco and sugar colonies, who depend entirely upon making such commodities for a British market. At the same time Britain would then have some dependance on the colonies for those necessary products, which would make their interest and dependance mutual, and more closely connected together. And it would certainly be more profitable to the colonies themselves to make those commodities, than to make manufactures. They are the produce of lands, that are both cheap and in plenty in our colonies ; whereas manufactures are the produce of labour, that is both scarce and dear in them, and require many hands and improvements to carry on to any advantage ; all which they are without, and thereby spend their time upon manufactures to
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little or no purpose, as we may see by daily experience.

5. But there is an obstruction to all these improvements in our colonies, especially in the northern colonies on the continent, where they are most wanted, that is insurmountable, and makes it impossible for them ever to attempt them, in any general manner at least, so as to turn to any considerable account to this nation, so long as those colonies remain in the situation they are in at present, that is, by being surrounded on all sides by the French. This indeed I perceive is not understood, and will hardly be believed by the generality of the nation, who appear to be entirely unacquainted with the way in which these and all other commodities are and ought to be made for a British market in the colonies; but it is so evident to me, from a due attention and reflection upon those things for many years, that this consideration alone has chiefly induced me to be at all the pains I have been to make the nation sensible of the real inconveniences it suffers by the French encroachments, which are so great, that they

must at least deprive this nation of the benefits and advantages of its colonies on the continent of America, in a great measure, if not of those colonies themselves.

The reason of this is, that those colonies, however large and extensive some may think them, have not lands to spare for making these commodities and improvements for Britain, so long as they are surrounded and hemmed in by the French, in the manner they now are. This is a matter of fact that must appear to all that are well acquainted with the way of making these or any commodities for Britain in our colonies, which I am sorry to see, that so few people are, or ever have applied themselves to consider. None of these or any other commodities are or can be made in North America for Britain, but where good lands are so cheap, as to be worth nothing in a manner. Their labour is so dear, that if they have to pay a price for lands with it, it will never turn to account to make any of these gross and cheap commodities upon them, and afterwards to be at the charge of sending them to Britain. They can hardly afford to
make

make them for their own use in the plantations, and far less for Britain.

This is a matter of fact that must be obvious to all who have duely attended to such things in our colonies themselves ; which I am sorry I cannot make others so sensible of, as the importance of the subject really requires. But they may easily percieve this by attending to the state of our northern colonies on the continent, where they neither do nor can in their present situation make any commodity for Britain ; and by comparing it with our southern colonies, where they make the greatest plenty of one of the grossest and cheapest commodities perhaps that is made any where, I mean tobacco. In the last of these there are but few people extended all over a wide and spacious country nigh 250 miles between the sea and mountains, abounding with great plenty of fruitful lands, fit to produce this or any other commodity for a British market ; but in the northern colonies, there are great numbers of people hemmed in within a hundred miles between the sea and mountains, by which their good lands (that

are scarce, as their lands in general are but mean) are too valuable to make any of these or other gross and cheap commodities upon them for Britain. Lands fit to produce such commodities are already worth from forty shillings to five pounds an acre in most of our northern colonies, as they are more or less convenient ; whereas the lands that have produced tobacco, or any commodity for Britain, have been sold generally for five pounds a hundred acres, or at most ten pounds. The only proper lands almost we hear of in *New-York* in particular, for making hemp and flax, are on the *Mohawks* river, where we are told that some lands are worth 40l an acre, and upwards. This is as dear as lands are in England, where those commodities are not made on that account, even to be consumed here ; and how can they ever be expected to be made, so long as this is the case, in America, and bear the charges of transporting such gross and bulky commodities from thence to Britain. This is owing to the French having seized the vast tracts of fertile lands in that province,

vince, on the lakes *Champlain, Ontario, and Erie, &c.* by which the rest are so dear.

Where lands are dear and scarce, and the people numerous, that is, where they are hemmed in and confined from extending themselves, their good lands are and must be taken up entirely in producing corn and the necessaries of life, and the people become farmers as they are in Britain, instead of being planters to make any commodity that is wanted in Britain, as we see they are in our northern colonies ; whereas in the southern colonies or any others, where they make such commodities for Britain, their whole labour is and must be chiefly bestowed upon them alone, and they must get the necessaries of life with little or no labour, from what the earth produces in a manner of itself, or at least with little labour and culture, otherwise they could not live by making those gross and cheap commodities for Britain. For this reason wherever they make such commodities, they must have the greatest plenty of land, and a large range, as they call it, for their stock of creatures, which in a manner must maintain themselves, instead
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of being maintained by the labour of men, where such labour is bestowed upon making these commodities. A tobacco planter in *Virginia* and *Maryland*, for example, where the lands in general are much better than in any part of North America, reckons he should have fifty acres of land for every worker, as they generally run. Where they are confined to less, they either leave off making tobacco, as all our white people have done in a great measure in the lower parts of those countries, to make the necessaries of life, corn, provisions and cloathing; or are obliged to remove to and beyond the Apalachean mountains, where they may have plenty of good and fresh lands; as a great part of the poor people in the tobacco colonies have been obliged to do of late. If they are confined then within the Apalachean mountains, as they must be by the French encroachments upon the *Ohio*, they will soon be forced to leave of making such plenty of tobacco as they have done, or any other such cheap commodity for Britain; and will not be able to make them there, and send them to Britain, so cheap as they are made in
other

other parts of Europe, while they have no security for the trade but to make them cheaper. As it is, there are none hardly in all our colonies that make tobacco or other commodities for Britain, but slaves, whose maintenance is made to cost so little : the white people cannot get necessaries by such employments, but are obliged to make them themselves, unless they have great plenty of good and fresh wood lands fit for the purpose ; which wood lands are to a planter in North America what a dunghill is to a farmer in Britain, that they cannot do without, at least unless they have large stocks, which our planters there seldom or never have.

The engrossers and forestallers of lands then in our colonies, whether it is by large patents, proprietary or charter grants, or French encroachments, if they enhance and raise the price of lands, as they generally do, deprive Britain of most of the benefits and advantages of its colonies, and must do it in a manner entirely at last. This is the way by which the northern colonies never have and never will make any commodity for Britain, in their present situation.

situation. The country indeed is more improved in them, in farming, trades, manufactures and towns, but these improvements turn to no account to Britain, but on the contrary interfere with it. The only commodities made in these northern colonies for Britain are, fish, some iron, and ships, which are not the produce of lands; their lands are neither in sufficient plenty, nor cheap enough for those purposes.

The chief staple of those northern colonies, if ever they are put in a situation to make any commodity for Britain, must be hemp and flax, which cost this nation nigh half a million sterling a year, and that chiefly in money, whilst they might save that sum yearly by making these two commodities only in the plantations. But to put our colonies in a situation to make these and other commodities to any advantage, the people that are already in them should be extended all over *Sagadahoc*, lake *Champlain*, lake *Ontario*, and the greatest part of lake *Erie*, with the river *Ohio*; otherwise they are too confined to be real planters of commodities that are
 wanted

wanted in Britain, and must become nothing but a set of farmers and manufacturers, as the people in Britain are. This they already are in the northern colonies, by being confined to towns, and villages, or in forts and garrisons, to defend themselves against the French and Indians, that surround them on all sides. To make a commodity for Britain, the people must extend themselves up and down the woods, where there are good and convenient lands for that purpose, as they are in the tobacco and rice colonies ; which they can never do, if they are hemmed in and surrounded on all sides by an enemy.

By this we may perceive a very false notion that every one almost seems to entertain of our colonies, to wit, that we have colonies and land enough already, if not too much. This is so far from being true, that, to make our colonies turn to the account they might and would be of to Britain, the people that are already in them should be extended over twice as much land as they now occupy ; unless you would make a *lex agraria* in them, and take many people's lands and properties

ties from them for the public use, and divide them among the people in general, when they do not cultivate them, as is but too much the case in all our colonies.

But if our colonies want room to make commodities for Britain at present, how much more will they do it hereafter! The number of people in them is observed to be doubled every age, or thirty odd years, and when that happens, they must become artists instead of planters, and manufacturers of British commodities, as cloathing and other necessaries, otherwise they can never be supplied with them, unless they have great room to produce commodities enough to purchase them. These colonies will then be a constant charge and expence to Britain, especially if the French surround them, as they now do, while they will be little or no advantage to it, but rather a loss perhaps by interfering with Britain in its staple commodities. Even at present all the returns of our colonies on the continent of America to Britain does not amount to above ten or twelve shillings a head perhaps, for all the people in
them

them taken together, which is not sufficient to cloath them, besides the many other necessaries and superfluities they want and get from Britain.

If all those things are rightly considered, the French encroachments and possessions in America must appear in a very different light, and prove of much worse consequence to Britain, than any among us seem to apprehend. They may perhaps be an improvement to the colonies in arts, trades, manufactures and towns, but that will deprive Britain of all the advantages of them. The colony of Canada alone, insignificant as some reckon it, and as it has hitherto been indeed, has deprived Britain of the labour of nigh one half of the people it has in North America, by confining them to towns and townships for their security and defence, by which they are obliged to bestow their labour on manufactures, instead of cultivating their lands for Britain—If this is rightly considered, there is not such an objection against our taking *Quebec*, or any other place in *Canada*, as most people seem to imagine—That indeed is a considerable en-

terprize, which, like all others of that kind, is not to be undertaken without due deliberation ; for which reason we consider both some of the advantages and disadvantages of it in the following discourse ; the last of which appear to me to be very inconsiderable, if any at all ; especially if we consider, that this may prove the shortest way to root the French out of all their other encroachments, and bring them to reason very soon, if that is to be done indeed by any other means.

6. But the direction of all those things is entrusted to many people in our colonies, who have but few or no opportunities of being acquainted with them. They have not that intercourse and correspondence with the more improved parts of the world, that is necessary to inform them of many things relating to their own more immediate concerns at home, and far less with foreign affairs: with regard to which, they may be said never to look hardly beyond the smoak of their own chimnies. Of this we have many flagrant instances in the conduct of their affairs with the French. They seem never to have been apprized

apprized of the designs of the French upon them, 'till they were at their very doors ; and to be still less acquainted with the rights and claims of the nation in America, which they seem hardly to extend beyond their private plantations ; by which they have let the French overrun the British dominions all around them, in the manner they have done, with little or no opposition from our colonies, who were chiefly concerned in preventing them. When the government demanded an account from the colonies of the encroachments that were, or were likely to be, made upon them, they seem to have apprehended none, so long as their own plantations were safe in the mean time ; which appears to have been the occasion of the fatal security we were in, and of the little regard that was shown to the protection of our dominions in America, after the late war ; when all our disturbances and losses in them might easily have been foreseen, by any that were acquainted with the views and designs of the French, and as easily prevented by a due attention to them in time.

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It was for these reasons, that we have been at this pains to point out the views and designs of the French upon our colonies, and to represent their situation with regard to them, for the information of our people both at home and abroad. It was certainly for want of due information, and a right opinion concerning those things in time, that this nation has been led into such difficulties about them; and it is to be feared, that a continuation of the like measures, founded on the like opinions, must be productive of much worse consequences. For these and many other reasons, it is the opinion of all, that nothing is more wanted, than to give this nation some just accounts of its colonies, and a true information of the situation of its affairs in America; as well as to show the colonies themselves the situation that they are in, and the designs of the French upon them; both which they seem to be so little acquainted with, or at least to pay so little regard to.

This is a thing that we may say is always, and has been long wanted, which we have entertained some design to do for
many

many years, but could never before be prevailed upon to comply with it. The many different opinions about those things, and the still more different views and interests of others, make it impossible for any man to satisfy all parties about them; or to give his opinion of them, without being subject to both censure and abuse perhaps for his pains. Those things are reckoned to relate to policies of state, which private people have nothing to do with; at least they can expect but little satisfaction from being concerned in them, especially in such critical conjunctures. For these and many other reasons I had destroyed what I had wrote on these and other things relating to America, with an intent never to be concerned with them again; and it is not without reluctance that I now am. But the losses we have sustained in America, the vast territories the French have overrun and seemingly secured there, with the threatening situation we seem to be in on that account, prevailed upon me at last to put pen to paper again, in this cursory manner, about those things that I had formerly spent some time upon; and to consider the method

method of repairing those our losses, before it might be too late, and out of our power perhaps to do it.

In doing this our only design was to give a bare narration of matters of fact, chiefly relating to the situation and importance of those countries that the French have overrun and lay claim to in America, that we might be able to form some better judgement of them, than what seems to have been hitherto formed at least by many. Such a representation of facts, relating to things that so nighly concern this nation, must always be of some use and service to it, let those countries belong to whoever they will ; and it is only those matters of fact that we pay any regard to, or intend to represent. It is from them alone, and from numbers of such facts, that we can form any just opinions of matters of such consequence, or the importance of them ; which, it must be owned, are but little understood by many, who daily give their opinions about them, and would influence our measures relating to them. This I should be very sorry to do, any farther than was consistent with the general and public interest and welfare of the

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the whole nation both at home and abroad; which can never suffer surely by a fair representation of matters of fact. All that we intend by such a representation, particularly of the French encroachments, is, to show what and where they are, and the consequences of them; and it is surely much better to see the consequences of such things in time, than to feel them; as no one can doubt but we must do some time or other, if the French are allowed to remain in possession of the many encroachments they have made upon us, which we see no way attempted as yet to dispossess them of.

The manner in which I have done this, I can neither commend, nor altogether condemn. The greatness and importance of the subject would have required and admitted a much fuller and more explicit account of it. But I had spent as much time upon it, if not more, than my other affairs would well permit; which is the reason, why I have not yet been able to offer to the public the second part of this discourse, relating to the rights and titles of the two nations in America, that was

partly drawn up with a design to be printed herewith; altho' the substance of it is to be found in this part, which has swelled it to this size.

It was not the desire of appearing in public, which has become so very disagreeable, that it has hitherto determined me against it, but the importance of the subject, whilst it seems to be so little understood by many at least, that has made me attempt to give this account of it. And however I may have done that, I doubt not but there will be objections to it. The many different opinions about those things are never to be reconciled, 'till we come to have a more perfect knowledge of them. And it cannot be expected, that any one person should be thoroughly acquainted with every particular at least relating to so many vast and extensive regions as those we treat of, which are so little known to any. This we hope may be a sufficient excuse for any imperfections or errors that may appear in our account of them.

One objection to what we have advanced, we cannot but take notice of here, relating to the number of people supposed
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to be raised and now in arms in our colonies. Their particular number might not perhaps be so proper to be thus publickly represented, especially at this present. They are said, however, to be many more now than we make them. But this we have only by very late advices, and since our following accounts were wrote, which were mostly drawn up last winter, after our American troops were disbanded, and before we heard of any more being raised. But it is not our design to give an account of our force there at present, but to represent the manner in which we have all along acted in America in general, and the fatal consequences of it; which it is to be hoped we shall amend some time or other, when our eyes come to be opened. If we have done that already, it is so much the better. But it cannot be doubted, that we have hitherto acted in the weak manner we have represented, by which we have sustained such losses; which it is our only design to represent in general, without so particular a regard to our numbers of troops at this or any other time. And if we have acted in that manner before, we may perhaps do the same again. What has been may be. This we imagine it is

more prudent to caution against, that we may be upon our guard, than to magnify our force and strength, as some would endeavour to do. It was by trusting too much to our strength, and despising our enemies, which is always dangerous, that has led us into our present difficulties from them. So at the beginning of the last campaign in America, we were told that we had 16,000 troops there; notwithstanding which we lost *Oswego*, and did nothing besides. And many accidents at least may happen, that may make our loss as great in this campaign perhaps; which we seem not to be well prepared against, if they should happen, as far as we can see at least. Even if we should succeed in all the schemes that are said to be intended, how are they to recover *Niagara*, or *Fort du Quesne*, the only two things almost we have to do? You may say the French will give them up for other places: but I don't see, that they are so very complying, unless they are forced to it.

So likewise the people of *Pensylvania* are said to have amended their former conduct, as here represented, and to have raised

raised considerable supplies for opposing the enemy ; which we should be glad to see the good effects of, rather than to hear tell of it. It is certain, that we have yet seen nothing but losses upon losses, with very dismal and threatening consequences of them, unless they are prevented in time. If our colonies continue in the divided state they have been in, and we still remain inactive in America on that and other accounts, both they and this nation will have reason to repent it perhaps as long as they have a being. If the French once secure themselves in those places that they have usurped on our frontiers in America, we seem to have no way ever to be free from constant danger, and perpetual sources of wars, charges and expences from them. They have already overrun those countries only with a handful of ragamuffins in Canada, and what may we not expect from standing armies, and redoubtable fortifications erected every where upon our frontiers? Which we must expect to see very soon, unless they are rooted out of their encroachments in

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time,

time, which I cannot yet see that we are likely to do.

The method of doing this is not so much our business to inquire into, or our design to represent. We could not, however, pass over some account of it in the following discourse, where it inevitably came in our way. The great dispute about that seems to be, Whether it should be done with British troops, or the forces of our colonies? We are not at all concerned which it is done with, providing it is done. But the diversity of opinions about the way of doing it seems to make us do nothing in it. All our preparations, as we have said, seem to have little tendency to root the French out of their encroachments in the inland parts of America; the chief thing for which the nation engaged in this war. How expedient it may be to do that with British troops, sent from hence to those remote inland parts of America, through so many difficulties, with so many charges and delays, let us learn from those we have sent there. This may at least be said, that it might be done with much less charge
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by the forces of our colonies, than by troops sent from Britain ; altho' there is no doubt, but these last are more to be relied upon, if they could be spared for that purpose, when they are or may be so much wanted for other purposes ; or if the nation thinks it convenient to be at the extraordinary charge of sending troops to America, when it is already said to be involved in an expence of ten millions sterling a year ; which it is likely to be tired of, before its business may perhaps be done in America. And we may farther say, that the number of people in our colonies seems to be almost the only advantage we have over our enemy, and that it is certain we have made little or no use of this advantage ; which was our reason for considering it, and representing it, in the manner we have done. If any will give us a better account of obtaining the desired ends we propose by it, we shall reckon ourselves obliged to them, as well as many others perhaps.

—————*Si quid novisti rectius istis,*
Candidus imperti—————

ERRATA.

- Pag. 22. lin. 28, they were, *read*; it was.
27. l. 14. Maurice, r. Montanus.
28. l. 3. these, r. those.
— l. 28. take, r. taken.
100. l. 10. crowns, r. livres.
101. l. 23. r. strengthen themselves.
126. l. 25. *dele* that.
129. *L'ult.* 4 or 500,000, r. 2 or 300,000.
— l. 12. *dele* daily.
159. l. 23. wetter, r. western.
176. l. 19. add, Virginia.
186. l. 12. ter, r. water.
210. l. 12. siluation with them, r. situation with
themselves.
237. l. 26. *Wabache*, r. *Miamis*, nigh the river
Wabache.

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S E C T. I.

The situation of the British colonies in North America, particularly with regard to the encroachments of the French, and the conduct of the present war.

THE state and condition of the British colonies in America is now become a matter of general inquiry, as it is of the utmost concern to this nation, and that more now perhaps than ever. Those American colonies, that have been long known to the most intelligent to be a great source of the trade and commerce, and naval
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power, on which this nation so much depends, are now marked out as such by its declared enemies, are become the object both of their envy and resentment, and are made the means of accomplishing the ruin of this nation, if possible, from being its great support and advantage. Our enemies not only endeavour to wrest some of the most important parts of them out of our hands, to prescribe laws to the whole nation, and bounds and limits to it upon its own territories; but they have already over-run such a part of the British dominions in North America, that if they remain in possession of their usurpations and encroachments there, this nation seems to have no security left for any of its colonies in America, and must be at a greater expence to protect and support what the French are pleased to leave it, than all it may be worth perhaps.

If the prosperity and welfare of this nation then depends so much upon its colonies, as no one seems to doubt of, the prosperity, safety, and security, of the colonies depend upon the present critical situation of affairs, which deserves the most serious regard and attention. This is the more necessary to be considered, as the state of our colonies, or our present situation in them, is so little understood in general, that some seem to think our affairs there to be in a manner desperate, and past retriev-

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ing; while others would persuade us, that they are in no manner of danger: and among the many different opinions that are daily given, about the proper method of conducting our affairs in America, or carrying on the war there, you will hardly see any two of them that agree. Many depend upon the number of people in our colonies, and seem to rest secure in them, without making any use of them; while others seem to think, that all the people we have there will be of little service in their present situation. For these and many other reasons the true situation of our colonies is highly necessary to be inquired into, not only to recover our present losses in them, but to prevent the like for the future.

Many things relating to our colonies in America seem to deserve and require a more particular account of them, but there are three things that require our more immediate care and attention, to wit, *1mo*, the French encroachments; *2do*, a union of the force of our colonies; and, *3tio*, the proper method of conducting it in the present war; which shall be the subjects of this our inquiry.

It was entirely for want of a proper union of our colonies, that the French have been suffered to make so many encroachments on them, and have hitherto opposed all the attempts we have made to recover them. The

force of our colonies is likewise so disunited by the many small provinces, and different states or governments, into which they are divided, that they seem hardly capable to defend themselves, instead of making head against an enemy. Our colonies in America seem to be in the same situation that Britain was of old, when it was divided into so many different states or kingdoms, with such different views and interests, that they all fell an easy conquest to a much inferior force of the Romans that invaded them. Upon that occasion *Cæsar* observes very justly, “ while every one fought
 “ for themselves, they were all easily over-
 “ come : ” and our colonies seem to be threatened with the same fate, unless some proper measures are taken to unite their force together for their mutual defence ; the necessity of which, and way of doing it, are chiefly intended to be represented in the present discourse.

In doing this, it was impossible to avoid some accounts of things that may be reckoned perhaps rather of a private nature, than of a more general and public concern. But where the private concerns of any interfere with the public welfare, they ought certainly to be taken notice of on that account. It is suspected, that the private influence our colonies have been very much under has been the occasion of all the losses we have sustained, and are threat-

threatened with in them. This is taken notice of by our enemies themselves, who tell us, if the English had as great a regard for their king and their country, and the public welfare, as they have for their own private interest, they might long ago have been masters of all the most important places in America *; whereas for want of such a public spirit they are now threatened with the loss of the greatest part of it, that must in time endanger the whole. But in representing those things, it is to be hoped, that we have done it in such a manner, and for such purposes, which was our only view and design at least, that they may turn out as much for the interest of those more immediately concerned in them, as for the general interest and welfare of the whole nation.

I. *Some transactions in our colonies which gave occasion to the French encroachments.*

The first and principal of the French encroachments on the British territories is *Crown-Point*: and it may not be improper to inquire how they came by a place that is likely to cost this nation so many millions, if it has not already. There are many particulars relating to this, which we have not now time to in-

* Vid. du Tertre hist. des Antilles, tom. III.

quire into, but in general it was as follows, by the best information we have been able to procure.

When the French first attempted to settle at *Crown-Point*, on the east side of the lake, opposite to where their fort now stands, in or about the year 1726, as well as I remember, they were drove from thence by the colony of the *Massachusetts Bay* in New-England; the only colony we have that either ever has or is able to oppose any of their designs in any part of America; and this they did, only by ordering them to be gone from that place, as I have been informed. But soon after this came on the dispute between *Massachusetts Bay* and *New-Hampshire* about their bounds, which seems to have engrossed the whole attention of those colonies, and to have contributed at least to their neglect of this place, if it was not the cause of its falling into the hands of the French.

The issue of this contest was, lake *Champlain*, and all the territories thereabouts, were adjudged to *New-Hampshire*, (a small and inconsiderable colony at that time, however thriving, it is hoped, if the French do not put a stop to it) which they were no ways able to maintain and defend. By this means, while two were contending for the bone, the French ran away with it, and established themselves at

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Crown-Point in the midst of these quarrels among ourselves, without any considerable opposition that I have heard of, but some protests against it; particularly by the *five nations* of Indians, who seemed to know the consequence of this place, that was their original abode and habitation, better than we did.

The defence and security of this important place has since devolved entirely upon the colony of *New York*, in whose province it is supposed, although not determined, to be. But because the former settlement of the French at *Old Fort*, on the east side of lake *Champlain*, was removed about the year 1730 or 31, to fort *Frederic* at *Crown-Point*; the people of *New-England*, the only colony able to defend it, seem to have imagined, that they had no farther concern in it, as being on the other side of the lake out of their district, although but half a mile farther from them; for which reason they left it to one who was not able to oppose the French at it, if they had attempted it;

What made the colony of *New-York* more unable to guard themselves against these and other encroachments of the French, was, not only the division of their government by taking the whole province of *New Jersey* entirely from it, just about the very time that the French settled at *Crown-Point*; but still more so perhaps, the suit that these two colonies have
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been so hotly engaged in both before and since ; which seems to have engrossed their attention much more than the French either at *Crown-Point* or *Niagara*, and to have cost them more perhaps than would have been sufficient to have prevented the French settling there at all, or to have dispossessed them, if they had attempted it ; and thereby to have saved all the immense charges the nation has incurred, and is still liable to incur, on those accounts. The heats and animosities between these two colonies, and their several parties in both of them, seem to have carried them as great lengths as they ought to do against a declared and inveterate enemy ; while at the same time the French were upon their borders, and were securing their frontiers, as they have done. But if they did not dispossess the French, they have dispossessed one another over and over again, and that with open violence. To look into their transactions for several years past, of which they have printed such folio volumes, one would think they had been at open war with one another for these forty years past ; and have now a war to maintain against the French, when they seem both to have been exhausted by war with one another.

To get a redress of such grievances they apply to England, where they have sustained a

litiguit, as bad perhaps as war itself, that had lasted five and thirty years, the last time I heard it plead, when they had not yet come to the merits of the cause! altho' this whole dispute about their bounds and limits, (which, with the like disputes every where almost, have cost more than might have settled the bounds and limits of all the British dominions in America) depends upon two very simple points, neither of which, that are plain facts*, seem to be so much as known to our people in America, who are so little acquainted with their domestic concerns, and far more with their foreign affairs.

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* The words in the charter of *New Jersey*, on which the dispute between that province and New-York about their bounds depends, are, "and to the northward, as far as the *Northernmost Branch* of the said bay or river (of *Delaware*), which is in $41^{\circ} 40'$ of latitude."

Here are two places then, *the Northernmost Branch of Delaware river*, and the *latitude $41^{\circ} 40'$* , that are both mentioned in describing the bounds of this grant; and as these two do not coincide together, the question is, which is to be made the boundary, according to this description of it in the charter?

By the words of the charter it is plain, that the boundary thereby intended is the *Northernmost Branch of Delaware river*; and that the latitude there mentioned is only a further description of that branch of the river, and not of the absolute bounds of the grant, independent of such a branch of the river.—The words, *which is in latitude $41^{\circ} 40'$* , mean, *which branch of the river is in that latitude,*

When this is the practice in our colonies, how is it possible, but that the French should over-run them ! If either of those colonies, and far more both of them, had paid the tenth part

tude, and not which bounds of the province shall be in that latitude, as many seem to imagine.

But when we come to lay off the bounds of this province, it appears, that there is no branch of *Delaware* river whatever in the latitude $41^{\circ} 40'$, found by observation, as appears from all the surveys of it ; and consequently the spot on *Delaware* river in that latitude, be where it will, can never be the place intended by the grant to be the bounds of *New-Jersey*, as many would make it.

To determine the bounds of this grant then agreeable to the charter, the first thing is to know what is the *Northernmost branch of Delaware* river there meant ? Which plainly appears to be the river *Lecha*, or western branch of *Delaware*, as it is called with respect to the eastern branch. That lies at the foot of the mountains, as far north as the country was known, when this charter was granted at least, or indeed till very lately, and is the northernmost branch of *Delaware* here meant — This is likewise the northernmost branch of that river that can be supposed to be considerable enough to make it be pitched upon for the bounds of so extensive and general a grant. The river *Delaware* has but two considerable branches, especially that were then known, to wit, the *Schuylkill*, and this western branch, which lye north and south of one another, and the last seems plainly to be the *northernmost branch*, that can be supposed to have been known or taken such notice of, as to be made the bounds of the whole country, when this grant was made.

What puts this out of doubt to me at least, is, that this

part of the regard and attention to *Crown-Point* or *Niagara*, upon their frontiers with the French, as they have to *Frederic Phillips's Mills*, *Little Minisink Island*, and
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northernmost branch of Delaware river was taken to be exactly in the latitude $41^{\circ} 40'$, when this charter was granted. They had then no surveys of this country, nor any observations of the latitude, but were obliged to depend upon the draughts and maps they had of the country, in all which we see the upper forks or northernmost branch of Delaware river laid down in the latitude mentioned in this charter. This will plainly appear upon consulting and comparing the maps of *Vischer*, *De Wit*, *Allard*, *Dankers*, *Maurice*, *Speed*, *Seller*, *Keith*, *Lea*, and *Senex's* map of the bounds of Pennsylvania.

Besides, it appears, that the bounds of *Pennsylvania* were described in the charter of it, chiefly from the map of *Nieuw-Nederlandt* by *Vischer*; and there is all reason to believe, that they would make use of the same map in describing the bounds of New-Jersey the very year thereafter, that being the best map of the country then extant. But in this map of *Vischer* the upper forks of the river Delaware, altho' very ill laid down, are plainly made to be in latitude $41^{\circ} 40'$.

It was by this means, that the bounds of this grant were placed in those odd minutes of latitude; whereas if it had been intended to have fixed them in a certain latitude independent of any place, there is all reason to believe, that such a general and extensive grant would have been bounded by some even degree of latitude in those western parts, as we see it is in the eastern parts on *Hudson's* river, where it is bounded by the latitude 41° .— If this latitude of $41^{\circ} 40'$ was a mistake, it is no more than

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Warwayanda plantation upon their own borders with one another, it is plain, that neither of these important places would ever have been in the hands of the French, and neither they nor this nation would have had any occasion to have entered into this present war on that or any other account perhaps.

But what would any one say or think of this matter, if they should hear, that one of those colonies, and the chief of them, should have had as great a civil war within itself, as it had with its neighbours: and not only so, but as obstinate a dispute likewise at the same time with its mother country; which seems to have been the case, ever since *Zenger's* trial in *New-York*, as far as I can learn at least, from all hands and both sides—Which side may be in the right, or which in the wrong, in those disputes, is none of our business to inquire; but there can be no manner of doubt, that the public interest is neglected, and suffers by them, which is all we have to consider, or in-

what must be expected, before we had any certain observations of the latitude. — It was usual then, to take all those remote places in the woods and inland parts of America to be more distant than they really are, whence the forks of Delaware, as well as many other places in America, were taken to be nigh a degree of latitude farther north, than they are since found to be by observation. But this was never known, 'till after the year 1719, when those parts were surveyed, and the latitude observed.

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tend to represent, for the sake and welfare of both sides.

But I would not have any one imagine, that our colonies are only to be blamed for all the misconduct in them, however blamable they may be. The merchants in England had their share in this, as well as in most other transactions in our colonies—When a very wise and necessary regulation was proposed in *New-York*, to settle *Oswego*, that important place we have all heard so much about of late (would any one believe it), it met with all the opposition from the merchants in England, with all the misrepresentations of that and the whole province, that could be devised ;* by which they put off that design for some years, and neither they nor their abettors seem ever to have concurred heartily in it at last ; one cause possibly of our late loss of it.* The private reasons of this their conduct, for they could certainly have no public reasons for it, were, a company of them had engrossed the whole trade of supplying the colony, as was pretended, with goods for the Indian trade ; which they sold in wholesale to the French, instead of retailing them to our people, or the Indians.* And for that reason they and the rest who were con-

* See several memoria's on this subject in *Colden's* history of the five nations.

cerned in this clandestine trade with the French, chose rather that the French should be convenient to them at *Crown-Point*, than that the English should settle at *Oswego* ! Hence the French got so peaceable and quiet possession of that place (that now costs so much blood and treasure to recover) rather by our connivance, than our opposition : and the fixations of Indians told us flatly, that *the French built their Forts with English Strouds*,† the goods we supplied them with ; and remonstrated against it, as prejudicial to our interest and their welfare.

Notwithstanding this care the Indians seem to have taken of our affairs, more than we have done ourselves, many people abused them there in the most scandalous manner, taking in their very *Corn Fields* in surveys of lands, that the Indians had voluntarily granted them—captivating some of the Indian youths for slaves—selling them water for rum—with many more such practices I do not doubt ; but a particular account of these three I have from good authority, with many aggravating circumstances, too gross to be publicly told—All this was on and about the time that the French settled and secured themselves at *Crown-Point* and *Niagara*. And can any one

† Ibid. page 19.

imagine,

imagine, that all those practices did not contribute to it? Not to mention our shameful desertion of the five nations at many times I could point out.

We should have many more such things to take notice of, if this was either a place or a proper time to do it. We cannot, however, pass over another like dispute in our colonies about the river *Ohio*; which is supposed by many, who seem hardly to have heard of any other places in our colonies, 'till they were so alarmed about this, to have been the sole occasion of the present war with the French. But if they will look a little farther, they will find, that the French usurpation of the river *Ohio* in 1753 and 1754 was only a consequence, and a necessary consequence, that could not well be prevented, of their being suffered to secure *Crown-Point*, and *Niagara*, several years before, from the causes we have represented; either of which places, or *Nova Scotia*, are of more immediate consequence to them than the river *Ohio*.

Our party disputes, however, seem to have contributed not a little to the French getting possession of that river likewise. For altho' the people and assembly of *Pensilvania* would not allow *Fort du Quesne* on the river *Ohio* to be in their province in 1754, after the French had seized it, yet in 1750 and 1751 they or
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their traders at least, claimed it as their sole privilege and property, and carried their pretensions so far, as to give the Indians such bad impressions of the people of *Virginia*, that they would not allow our people from *Virginia* to come nigh that river for some time. Their petty debates ran so high, that some people, I have been told, lost their lives by them, and an insurrection or revolt of the Indians was to be apprehended from them. This brought on a dispute between the two provinces, which could only be decided by settling their bounds and limits. This settlement again was opposed by the proprietor of *Maryland*, who might have been injured by it. Thus our own private disputes subsisted, when the French put an end to them, by seizing all the places in dispute.

These disputes between our several colonies, and unsettled claims of different proprietors, were the chief occasion of the river *Ohio*, and all other places, being so ill secured and settled, when the French took possession of them. Many people who would otherwise have taken grants of those lands, knew not who they were to obtain them from, or to hold under: The bounds of *Virginia*, *Maryland* and *Pensylvania*, the three colonies that make the middle division of the British dominions in North America hereafter mentioned, all joined together about

about *Fort du Quesne* on the *Ohio*, and were undetermined between them, as they still are. The *Ohio Company* again had a large grant at the same place, which was as undetermined as the rest. Here were four different proprietors then to interfere with one another at this important place, which is the chief frontier of all those colonies, and of the whole British dominions perhaps in all North America; and should have been secured in the very first place. But now there were none to do this important business; notwithstanding the many colonies we have in America, and particularly hereabouts, about the forks of the *Ohio*, where the greatest strength perhaps that we have in America might be exerted, if it was rightly conducted.

Proposals were made, and in time, to have remedied all those inconveniences, and to have prevented the many fatal consequences of them, that have since ensued, which were then foreseen in 1751, but all to no purpose. It was proposed;

1. That these three colonies, *Virginia*, *Maryland* and *Pensylvania*, should unite together, to keep up a joint interest on the *Ohio*, where they had several settlements; particularly by a good and respectable fort at or about the forks of the *Ohio*, the place where *Fort du Quesne* is since erected by the French.

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2. To lay off their several bounds, that people might know who to settle under.

3. To determine the bounds of the *Ohio Company*, that they might not interfere with other settlers.

4. To settle a *tariff* of trade with the Indians ; and appoint officers to see it complied with.

5. To unite all the Indians on and about the river *Ohio* in one body, subject to some rule and order, made for their welfare, and the English interest.

And what was so proper then, may not appear improper perhaps another time. If those things had been done, they would certainly have prevented, or frustrated, the attempt of the French upon the *Ohio*, and all the many fatal consequences of it : and they may perhaps be as serviceable for that purpose another time. But many obstacles then came in the way to all those designs ; which we hope will be considered and removed. The chief seemed to be the dispute between the proprietors of *Maryland* and *Pensylvania* about their bounds ; and the jarring interests and contests between our different colonies. But we hope, they will decide their disputes among themselves, rather than let the French do it for them.

Many who are little acquainted with, and ill informed of those things, seem to have laid

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the whole blame of all this upon the *Ohio Company*. But, alas! they appear to know little of the matter. If that company had been as much to blame as some people would make them, they were by far the least of four concerned. The establishment of that company was surely well intended, and for the most laudable and commendable purposes. For this they had only the promise of a grant of 200,000 acres of land, not yet passed the seals, I am told, upon the same conditions nearly that all private people obtain such grants every day; only they were to have seven years allowed them to settle those lands, (which private people are obliged to settle in three years), upon condition that they would transport a certain number of people, and build a fort upon the lands to be granted; and upon their complying with that, they were to have 300,000 acres of land more. Now what are 500,000 acres of land in that country? If it had been ten or an hundred times as much, the government ought to have given it to any that would have taken it upon those terms; and a company is surely much abler to comply with the conditions of such grants, and to settle the country, than private people; to whom such things are only entrusted in our colonies. We hope then to see many *Ohio*

Companies, instead of suppressing the present one.

All that appears or has been found inconvenient in this company, and from all such large grants, is, the charge of surveying them, it seems, will not quit cost; by which their bounds lie undetermined, and others who might settle before them, are liable to be ejected by them, when they come to lay off their grants. This is a real inconvenience from all such large grants, especially when they have a number of years allowed to ascertain their bounds. The only way to remedy this inconvenience, as far as I can see, is, to let the grants extend to certain distances from any place or places that the granter or grantees shall pitch upon; which distances they may lay off at any convenient time, and others may easily judge of in the mean time, so as to settle round them, and not to trespass upon them.

The *Ohio* company's grant then was no more than a grant of land made by the government to settle the country about the river *Ohio*, and it was not the only grant of many that were made for that purpose; altho' the French would pretend the contrary, and tell us, we had no other claim nor interest there, but from this company. But by their leave it appears, from the books of the secretary's office in *Virginia*, that we had no less than

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3,000,000 of acres of land granted in that colony alone, west of the *Alleghany Mountains*, upon the branches of the river *Ohio*; besides the several other settlements made there by the people of *Pensylvania*; long before they took possession of this country, and of our forts and settlements in it, driving our people out of it, in 1753, and 54, by force of arms.

Thus much we could not but take notice of here, to show from matter of fact, as well as from the reason of the thing, that is plain and obvious, the use and necessity of a better *union of our colonies*. This we have represented by particular instances likewise, that we may see where that union is most wanted, and how it should be effected. The parties here mentioned are those that are to support not only one another, but the whole British interest in North America, whose union is chiefly wanted for that purpose, not only at this present juncture, but at all times: while they are thus at variance with one another, from the frivolous pretences, or private views, that we have thus represented. This we have done in order to show the use and necessity of an accommodation of those differences among ourselves; as well for the interest of the parties concerned, as for the welfare of the whole nation that is concerned in them; especially now when we

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have sustained so many losses, and are threatned with so many more, occasioned entirely by our *party disputes*.

II. *A triple union of our colonies in North America proposed, to retrieve our present losses, and to prevent the like for the future.*

The union of our colonies is a subject much talked of, but seems to be little understood, to make it turn to any account at least, if thoroughly considered. Some such union is no doubt necessary; since all our losses and misfortunes in them seem plainly to have proceeded from the want of it. For this reason *a general union* of all our colonies is proposed, which we fear might only serve to divide and disunite them, more perhaps than they are already.

But not to mention any grand and general union of our colonies, or of so many distant and remote provinces, with so many very different views and interests, that might never perhaps take place, nor be executed to any purpose, like other grand designs and projects; let us only consider what is feasible and practicable in the mean time, and what seems to be absolutely necessary to oppose the enemy in their present situation; to provide for the mutual security and defence of our colonies at
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all times; and to guard against such surprizes for the future, as they have lately met with.

For this purpose we should divide our several colonies in North America into certain parts, whose situation is much the same, and whose interest, that rules every thing, is more easily connected; by which their mutual union is consequently more easily accomplished, and complied with when established. But otherwise, if we talk of a union of all our colonies together, when is it ever likely to take place, or to be attended with the desired ends? What mutual interest, connection, or dependence, have *New England* and *Carolina*, *Virginia* and *Nova Scotia*, &c. for example. This is a union that might be necessary, like a convention of states, upon particular and extraordinary occasions, but like such conventions that we see in all states, whose situation, views and interests, connections and designs, are so very different, it might be attended with as little benefit perhaps, as it would be tedious and difficult to bring about. For this reason we shall propose another sort of union of our colonies, that appears to me as absolutely necessary at first sight, if we would ever consider their security and defence, as it is easily accomplished at this present, if they have any manner of regard for their own interest and safety.

For this purpose we should consider, how
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our colonies on the continent of North America are, or ought to be, divided. They are usually divided into the northern and southern colonies; which only regards their trade, but not their security and protection. With regard to this, we should consider all those remote and distant provinces, and different colonies, as making only three, or at most four different countries, with regard to their natural bounds and situation, or situation with respect to an enemy.

For this purpose we should divide our many colonies on the continent of North America into three, the *Northern*, *Middle*, and *Southern*. Under the first I include *Nova Scotia*, *New England*, *New York*, and *New Jersey*. In the middle division are *Pensylvania*, *Maryland*, and *Virginia*. And in the southern division we include North and South *Carolina* and *Georgia*.

These three divisions make three different and distinct countries; separated from one another by natural boundaries; different in situation, climate, soil, products, &c. while the several colonies included in these divisions, which we look upon as different countries, are all one and the same country in these respects, as well as in point of situation with regard to an enemy; and make only different provinces of those three countries, that differ from one

another only as the southern and northern parts of every country generally do; being separated from each other only by land-marks, as different parts of the same country commonly are.

Now instead of a general union of so many different provinces, if we should advise only a union of those that are included in these three divisions, I cannot see any thing that should hinder it from taking place immediately, and always subsisting, for their mutual defence and security at least. Whatever other more general union may be thought proper, if any such is, this triple union is at least absolutely necessary for their safety and protection, and should always subsist under any other union of our colonies that may be proposed— The great inconvenience arising from the division of the British dominions in North America is, that the divisions are generally too small for their safety and defence, however convenient they may be for the sake of government; but by thus uniting several of these divisions together for the purposes at least of defence, if for nothing else, this inconvenience may be removed, without producing any other that might arise from changes of forms of government, alterations of constitutions, &c.

All the colonies in this *triple union* have a natural connection and interest in one another

ther, and in the same places ; by which they must more readily unite to defend them. But if we propose to the southern colonies to attack *Crown-Point*, *Niagara*, or *Canada*, they art not only inconvenient for that purpose, and would spend more time, charges, provisions, &c. in getting to the place of action, than might be necessary to do all their business nigher home, in their own precincts ; but they likewise think they have nothing to do with those places that are so remote from them : as the northern colonies, on the other hand, think they are as little concerned or interested in the river *Ohio*, *Missisipi*, &c. This is what makes our colonies so backward to stir and unite together to defend each others frontiers. But the frontiers of all those included in this *triple union* are one and the same ; they have all one interest and concern in them, whichever province they may be in ; and they will and must unite together to defend and secure those frontiers at all times, as well as to root the French out of them at present.

Such an union then may be easily effected, if the disunited parties have any manner of regard to their safety or welfare in any respect. And let us see what may be done by such a *triple union* of our colonies ; which may be called a *real union*, if established, so far at least as relates to the

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chief thing proposed and wanted from it, the security of their frontiers.

It would take up too much room, and more time than we have to spare, to represent the situations of all those several colonies, with the mutual interest, connection, and dependance of those that are included in each of these three divisions upon one another. That I think may be pretty well judged of, as far at least as relates to our present purpose, only from considering their situation in a map. And all the use we shall make of it is, to show how by such an union properly conducted, they might make head against the enemy at present, and oppose their designs at all times.

This I think may be easily collected from comparing their situation, with the situation of the enemy. The chief force of the French is now and at all times assembled about *Crown-Point, Montreal, and Fort Frontenac*; which places lie opposite to the middle of *New-England*, with *Nova Scotia* on one hand, and *New York and New Jersey*, close adjoining on the other. Is it not very natural then, for those four colonies to be united together for their mutual security and defence, against an enemy in such a situation, both now and hereafter? And is it not the interest of every one of them to join and concur immediately in such a union of their force together for their

mutual security and defence? If any in them may think otherwise, they don't know what their interest is; or won't consider it in a true light; for which reason they should be *compelled* to comply with it for their own good, as well as the rest hereafter mentioned.

If those colonies had been so united at the beginning of our late disturbances, and the force in those four alone had been mustered together, by each supplying their established quota, our present disturbances might have been quelled, and nipped in the very bud. And it is to be feared, that, without such a union of those colonies, we shall hardly be able to make head against the enemy at last, and recover our losses from them, since they have gained so much ground upon us.

At the same time, the force of *Pensylvania*, *Mary-land* and *Virginia*, should be sent against *Fort du Quesne* on the river *Ohio*; and always united together to secure, fortify, and garrison that place; which lies directly opposite to the center of these three colonies, with an easy access to it from them all; and is the chief frontier that they have to defend and protect. This was proposed, and if it had been done, before the French invaded those colonies, it is plain, they must have marched out of them as soon as they came into them, and have prevented all the losses the nation has sustained, and

and may sustain on that account. And I do not see any other way, either to recover our losses in them at present, or to secure them hereafter, but by the same means.

The three *Southern* colonies again, North and South *Carolina*, and *Georgia*, are opposed to the French on the *Missisipi*, but have enough to do to defend themselves, and will want assistance from the other colonies, instead of lending them any, if ever they should be attacked. To guard against such an attack, (which we should apprehend from the numbers of men and troops we see the French are daily sending to the *Missisipi*, where they sent 2000 regular troops immediately after the treaty of *Aix*, and had 10 or 12000 men there by the accounts of their deserters before the present war *) these colonies should keep up two good and respectable forts; one at fort *Moor*, or *Augusta*; and another among the *Cherokees* at least; if not a third among the *Creek Indians* likewise; unless this last should be found to be at too great a distance to defend, as it seems to be.

To do this effectually, the colony of *Virgi-*

* Since the writing of this we are told, that the French have actually taken this step, and intend an invasion of *Carolina*, with a considerable force they have assembled on the *Missisipi* for that purpose; if this is not a *Feint* to divide our force, and keep us from attacking them in *Canada*, which is more generally believed.

nia, in the middle division, should perhaps join with these southern colonies in maintaining their forts among the *Cherokees*, where *Virginia* has an interest; as *Pensylvania*, in this middle division likewise, should join with *New York* and *New Jersey*, to recover and secure *Niagara*; which is close upon the borders of that province, if not within it, as I suspect it may be found to be, and is the chief frontier and barrier to it against all the invasions and encroachments of the French.

All this is not only very proper and convenient, but so manifestly necessary, especially in the present situation of affairs, that I wonder it has never been done before now, or that any should have occasion to propose it at this day. We talk of the numbers of people in our colonies, but what do they signify in point of defence, unless they are united together, which might be so easily done.

If we consider the situation of our colonies in this light, that we have represented them in, it is every way as good and promising, as it is otherwise dismal and threatening. The chief force of the French lies in *Canada*, where the principal force we have likewise, which is in our northern colonies, is ready to oppose them, and convenient to attack them. Here we have not less than 80 or 100,000 men at least fit to take the field, while they have not above 12 or 15,000 at

most

most, exclusive of European troops on both sides.

The next most considerable body of the French is assembled about fort *duquesne* on the river *Ohio*, from their garrisons there, and their straggling settlements about lake *Erie*, and the *Illinois*. What their numbers may be is uncertain : they are not, however, above one or two thousand French at most, by all accounts, although they have the Indians there at present to join them ; many of whom would join us, as they have always done, if we had a force there to support them. But whatever their numbers are, we have a vastly greater force there to oppose them, not less than three or fourscore thousand men, in the middle division of our colonies above mentioned ; out of all which a sufficient force might be raised surely to repel all the French that are upon the *Ohio*, or nigh it. If they had been ordered to do this at first, it is imagined it might have been done long ago, and all the losses the nation has sustained on that account might have been thereby prevented ; as the many greater losses it will sustain, by letting the river *Ohio* continue in the hands of the French, may still be prevented by the same means ; which appears to be the only way to do it, or the only way at least in which it is likely ever to be done.

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Our southern colonies indeed are but weak, in comparison of the northern colonies, but the French on the *Missisipi* are much more so likewise. There are twice or thrice as many men in North Carolina alone, most of which are fit to bear arms, as in all *Louisiana* put together, besides what we have in *South Carolina*, and *Georgia*. They have indeed many negroes in *South Carolina*, which are a clog to them, and for that reason they will want succours. If the French have sent the force to the *Missisipi*, that many imagine, it is certainly necessary to send a force after them to *Carolina*.

If the force we have in America might be rightly employed in this manner, those we may send from Britain might be as well disposed of. We see below, that the force of the French in N. America is like an army supported by two wings, *Quebec* and *New Orleans*; either or both of which places, as may be thought most proper, a force once embarked is convenient to attack; while our force in America goes against the main body of the enemy, at *Crown-Point*, and fort *du Quesne*, for which it is as convenient.

All this is so plain and obvious, that it need not be insisted upon; we shall only consider the expediency and necessity of some such measures, and the fatal effects of neglecting them, in the present situation of affairs.

III. *The*

III. *The expediency and necessity of raising and uniting the force of our colonies in the present situation of affairs, and the fatal effects of neglecting it.*

All that is proposed by the above mentioned union of our colonies, is only a junction of their force for their mutual safety and defence; which might be as proper and convenient at all times, as it seems to be absolutely necessary at the present time. We talk much of driving the French out of their encroachments, but it does not seem to be so easily done. We have been three years only going to attack them, and have not yet been able even to do that. On the contrary, they gain ground upon us every where; while we seem to do nothing but sit still and look on. We hear many things proposed, or rather talked of, but we should be glad to *see* something *done*. Surely it is high time. In the mean time we should be glad even to hear any thing proposed, that was likely to succeed. Our strength and dependance seems to be our numbers of men in North America; but what use do we make of them? I don't see any of them hardly employed!—Not even in services upon which their all seems to depend; as well as the whole concerns of the nation in America! This is the only advantage we have over

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our enemy, which we seem to make no use of, to counterbalance the many other advantages they have over us.

What may be the reason of all this, we cannot divine, and far less explain. We have many hundred thousand men in North America fit to bear arms, and not much above one thousand perhaps in arms.* I mean the regiment of New York actually under their general. As for what the other colonies *may intend* to do, when or how it will be done, we don't see. *New England* is said to have promised succours indeed; but how or when will those succours, or any force we have, or that is proposed to be raised in all America, recover *Niagara*, or the river *Ohio*, the only two things wanted almost? Or will they ever march from *New England* to either of these places? Surely it is very inconvenient, if not impracticable to do it.

Is this the way to drive the French out of America? To recover our lost territories from them? — Or even to hinder them from over-running all that continent? — To secure our colonies, and hinder their encroachments for the future? — Or ever to expect an honourable peace from them? — It was for these purposes, that we went to war, and if we don't pursue them, what occasion had we for such a war?

* This was wrote some time ago.

There

There may be schemes laid for those purposes, deeper than we can see through; otherwise they must be of little signification. Our only aim seems to be, to take *Crown-Point*, and have assembled no force but for that purpose. But what consequence is that of, suppose we should take it? It would hinder the French from cutting our throats, you will say, at present, but it will not do it hereafter. They will carry their point, notwithstanding we should take *Crown-Point*. This is not their point in view, and far less the only one we should have in view. Their great point is, to secure *Niagara* and fort *du Quesne*, by which they will secure all the inland parts of North America, and almost that whole continent; and have all the rest of it at their command, when they please. And if they can keep you employed about *Crown-Point*, till they do that, they may laugh at you when you have taken it. Whereas, if we were to secure these places, we should lose little or nothing by *Crown-Point*.

For this reason we have been at no small pains to explain the consequence and importance of many places, as well as of *Crown-Point*; which few seem to have any notion of. It is true, *Crown-Point* is an important place to gain, and a way to distress the French, if we should carry it; but it is not the way to

get the better of them, and root them out of their encroachments, the only thing we want. To attack the French at *Crown-Point*, *Montreal*, or *Quebec*, places that we might do very well without, is like attacking them in Flanders; to take the bull by the horns; while we have so many ways to circumvent them, and to carry every point we want, without any of those more expensive, precarious, and fruitless exploits.

If you would root the French out of America altogether indeed, take *Crown-Point*, *Montreal*, and *Quebec*; which may not be so easily done perhaps, nor so much for our purpose. But if you would recover your losses, secure yourselves, and prevent the farther progress of the French, or their future encroachments, take *Niagara* and *Fort du Quesne*. This we apprehend might not be so difficult to do, as to attack *Canada*, whilst it would do all that we want. Whereas, if they keep us wholly employed in attacking *Canada*, *Cape Breton*, or any other place, which they would employ us about for some time at least; if we succeed at last, which may be very precarious; yet they will carry all they want; if we leave them in possession of *Niagara*, and the river *Ohio*. It may be said perhaps, we shall take those places at last; but I can see great danger in so many delays; especially if we consider

sider our engagements elsewhere, as well as in America.

Now if we consider the situation of our colonies here represented, how easy might it be, to take *Fort du Quesne*, and secure the river *Ohio* at least? By which we might have access to *Niagara*; root them out of all their encroachments about lake *Erie*; and drive their force from our frontiers, so as to have nothing to fear from it. —By this one step likewise we should recover and secure all the Indians of North America, and retrieve our lost credit with those people, who do us so much mischief, and the French so much service; the great point we have to gain.

We are not afraid, I hope, that every one is to meet with the fate of the unfortunate general *Braddock*, or ever to attempt those places any more, because he miscarried at them. We were not then so well acquainted with those places, nor our own strength or situation, as it is to be hoped we are now, or may be; to which every piece of intelligence may contribute something.

For this purpose our northern colonies, with the forces in them may easily keep the French at home to defend themselves on their their own frontiers, if not take their frontier places from them: while the middle division of our colonies above mentioned, with whatever

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
ever force they could muster, might assemble upon the *Ohio*, and attack *Fort du Quesne*. These middle colonies have not less than seventy or eighty thousand fencible men in them, if not more; and could such a number of men be of no service to recover our losses and their own; or to oppose a thousand or twelve hundred men the French have upon the *Ohio*? I do not hear of one of them employed for that purpose, if it be not to keep two or three forts at bay with the Indians; at as great an expence perhaps first and last, as it would take to drive the French from the *Ohio* altogether, by one stroke of their whole force joined together: by which likewise all their encroachments upon us, *Niagara, Lake Erie, le Detroit, &c.* must fall into our hands; and we might recover by this one step all we want in N. America, in the same manner that the French took it from us.



This, that we have represented, seems to be the way to conduct, and dispose of the superior force we vaunt of in America; which is otherwise like an unwieldy machine that is not to be managed, nor made any use of; and that at all times, as well as the present.

From what has been said, I hope, no one will imagine, that I pretend thereby to propose measures, and far less to prescribe rules, to the right honourable their general and
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



commander in America, to whose superior skill and conduct the direction of those things is entrusted, with such just and general applause and satisfaction. Our only view and design is, *to strengthen his hands*; by making every one *unite* and *concur* with him; otherwise we are afraid of little success. And when they do that, I hope they will rather take his advice, than mine, who am no ways acquainted with such military operations; whatever little intelligence I may have gained of the situation of our colonies, which he has so much better opportunities to know.

Our colonies and others perhaps may imagine, that every thing is to be *done at home*, and that Britain is to take the whole burthen of protecting and defending them. But we fear they may have occasion enough to exert and employ all the force they can, if they expect to be effectually protected and defended—Britain has many affairs to manage at home, that more nighly concern it; and others again in many parts of Europe, which must be attended to; while it is led into difficulties and distresses for its colonies. The colonies then must exert themselves, both in their own defence, and in the interest of their mother country; if ever we expect to see them in any manner of safety again, or the troubles in them brought to a happy conclusion.





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They know surely, that their welfare depends upon the prosperity of Britain—Do they complain of *high duties* upon their commodities? They cannot expect to be free from them, when there are such *high taxes* in Britain. And there must always be such *taxes* from long and tedious wars, the occasion of them.

Our colonies seem to be very desirous and tenacious of their liberties and priviledges: but how long do they expect to maintain them, if the French come among them? They can never expect them from a French yoke. Nor could they expect to enjoy them by being made independent, as some may imagine perhaps. They would then want tyrants of their own to surpress those, that would otherwise tyrannize over them, as I have often heard many of the most judicious people in them declare, and as every one must perceive—The only way by which their mother country is able to maintain its liberties and privileges, is, by being seperated from the same continent with other despotic powers, particularly the French, which would otherwise swallow it up, in the unguarded government that liberty affords. And they can only expect the like privileges from the same source, by concurring with their mother country to repel the usurpers both of property, liberties and privi-

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leges, from among them. Otherwise they must expect to be plunged at once from one extreme into the other, and have a **DICTATOR** put over them, as the Romans had of old, and all states must have, when the abuse of liberty brings them to the last extremity.

Let every one then concur and unite together to put an end to such necessary sources of immense charges and expence; and root out an enemy, that is, has been, and ever will be, the constant and perpetual cause of these and all our other burthens and misfortunes; so long at least as they remain where they are.

It is to be feared indeed, that our planters may make but bad soldiers; and I shall not pretend to say much in their behalf in that respect, altho' I know no trials that have been made of them, but what they have behaved very well in. British troops indeed, and regular forces, are no doubt much more to be relied upon, if they were to be had; but I see few of them to spare, for the services that appear to be requisite in America. And if we consider the force of the French, and the many occasions there are, or may be, for the British troops elsewhere, we fear all aids may be wanted, and our militia in America may be wanted, as well as other forces, which may at least be of some aid and service, if they are not equal to regular troops. If they know little of the art of war, it is high time they should learn something

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thing of it at least; especially what we here propose for them, to unite their force together, when the French come among them: by which there is no doubt but they might be of some service, to root the French out of many places, which must be recovered, or else this nation had surely better have nothing to do with America. And all that is wanted for this purpose, is only a small sum in supplies, which would afford many succours, if they were only *ordered* to be raised.

Some perhaps may imagine, that these public accounts of our situation in America, may be prejudicial to our interest, by being known to our enemies. But let them know it when they will, if we were thus to unite our force in North America together, we might tell them with it, that we defy them to hurt us. And if we do not do that, but continue in the divided distracted condition we have been in, I defy them to make our situation worse than it is. They have done all they could to ruin us already, and have concerted every scheme they could for that purpose, from any intelligence that could be given them, which they do not seem to stand in nigh so much need of, as we do. It is surely high time for us then to do something next; not only to retrieve our present losses, but to prevent the like for the future. And for either of these purposes

I see nothing more expedient than what is here proposed, to raise and unite the force of our colonies together, for their mutual defence, and the recovery of our losses in them. If we do not make use of the advantages that God and nature has put into our hands, what better success can we expect, than what we have met with, from the fatal neglect of those advantages already.

The expedience and even the necessity of thus raising and uniting the force of our colonies in America, must appear to all who will compare the situation of affairs in Europe and America together, especially in the present conjuncture. Our enemy has already overrun all North America in a manner, and taken every place that may be convenient for them to secure the whole; and to draw our forces from thence, in order to prevent us from recovering our losses, or making head against them, they threaten us with invasions at home, or a war on the continent of Europe, by which we are unable to relieve our colonies by forces sent from Britain: and what have we to do, or what can be proposed to be done, in such a situation, but to raise the force of our colonies themselves, that is there ready upon the spot, and sufficient to do all that is wanted? If this had been done at first, it might have prevented all the losses the nation has sustained; and there seems to be no other way to retrieve

those losses, or even to prevent many more such, but by the same measures now. This is the way in which our enemy has acted; they have raised the whole force of their colonies, and how are we to oppose them, but to do the same in our colonies?

If we have or may have other engagements elsewhere, and nigher home, this will give us an opportunity to attend to them, and comply with them; for which purpose let us get rid of our engagements in America, and unite our force together, wherever it may be wanted for other purposes: a thing that might have been done long ago, with half the expence it has since cost, if it had been only *ordered*: and a thing that must be done at last, if we ever expect to do any thing, as far as I can perceive at least. All that we have got, or can expect, by delaying it, is, to make it ten times more difficult and chargeable to do, as we have already done. The enemy are every day pouring in troops into all parts of America, while we have none to spare to send after them, that are likely to do any thing at least, and make no use of the numbers of men we have there?

Without some such measure at least, what do we do, but protract a tedious and expensive war, that is as great a load and burthen to the nation as it is a discredit and dishonour to it; without any view of an end to such an inglorious

glorious and expensive war; or any prospect from it at last but ruin and destruction every where! — We are surrounded by a dangerous enemy on all sides, who do us all the mischief in their power, and we do not so much as arm our people in their own defence, not even to prevent their throats from being cut! This we are likely to hear many more accounts of, from the great force the French have sent to America of late, and raised there together, than the many tragical scenes that have been committed by the inconsiderable force they have had there hitherto.

It cannot be alledged, that there are no men to be raised in our colonies, since the contrary is so well known. They raised nigh 10,000 men the last year in all our colonies put together, sufficient not only to have saved *Oswego*, but to have done all that was wanted perhaps, or at least to have put an end to the business this year, if they had had *orders* for that purpose. But it is neither our business nor design to inquire into past conduct, but to provide for the future. If our colonies raised such a force before, voluntarily and of their own accord, how much greater force might they not raise by *express orders* for that purpose; which is all that seems to be wanted, to retrieve all our losses in America, to root our enemy out of all their encroachments there, and to bring them to reason very soon; all that was wanted

wanted by this war; which we seem to have no other way to accomplish!—If we do not attempt this at least, what do we do but carry on a war, without so much as endeavouring to answer any of the ends of it?—If it had been intended to give up those countries in America, that the French have overrun, we could not take a more effectual way to do it, than what has been taken—And it would have been much better surely to have done that at first, before we incurred such an expence for them, and lost the honour and glory of the nation with them.

We are amused indeed with an intended expedition to America, which we wish all success to. But what if that should fail? Or what if the French should attack some of our more important colonies, while we are attempting some trifling place of theirs? And what if they should have sent more men to America, than we have done? They have certainly many more to spare for that purpose. What situation would our affairs in America be in then? We should meet with nothing but disgrace and dishonour, with loss upon loss every where; which there would be no way to prevent, but by raising our force in America.

Five or six thousand men indeed might have done the business in America very easily at first, but we have now let that opportunity slip, it is to be feared. The French have been

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sending men to all parts of America for these three years past, and have raised all the men they have there to join them; and we see what a convenient situation they are in every where to assemble their whole force together; which must be superior even to the force that we propose to send to attack them in their entrenchments and fortifications. What have we to do then, but to raise the force of our colonies likewise, either to join those sent from Britain, or to make a diversion in favour of one another? By this we might do our business at once, before it is too late, and out of our power to do it at any rate; which it would otherwise seem likely to be very soon. Without this we only employ a few men at a time to be made a sacrifice of, and seem to act as if we were afraid of hurting an enemy, that has done us all the mischief in their power, and threaten us with the loss of every thing that is of consequence or concern to us.

It was the like dilatory and backward proceedings in the beginning of the last war, that kept the nation so long in it, and run it into such a debt by it, for no manner of purpose; but the same measures in this war are likely to be attended with much worse consequences: we gained nothing by that, as indeed we had nothing to gain by it from the Spaniards at least; but we have much to lose in

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this war, and seem to be in a fair if not a certain way to do it, unless we prevent it in time, before it may be too late. The consequence of such losses must be, the nation will be deprived of its very *resources*; by which, and by which alone, it is able to recover itself after so many losses and misfortunes, and expensive wars, or even to hold out under them. The colonies are the great sources from which this nation draws its substance, and supports itself under such burdens and oppressions from debts and taxes; and if it is deprived of them, it must be deprived of its very vitals, and the only means it has either to recover or support itself; not to mention its naval power. Our enemy seeing this strike at the very root of our prosperity and felicity, with a view to cut us off both root and branch, if possible; which we seem tacitly to submit to, or do not use our endeavours at least to prevent!

It seems to be the only inquiry of many, who may be the authors of such measures, and who not; which is none of our business or design to inquire into, and would avail but little to the nation perhaps, if we did. Our only design is to prevent such calamities, if possible; to which we imagine a fair account and representation of them may be somewhat at least conducive. In giving such an account we do not inquire into conduct, but only represent matters

matters of fact as we find them, as far as they have come to our knowledge. This we imagine is the best way to amend our conduct, if it has been amiss.

For doing this we claim only the privilege dictated to all mankind by that golden rule; *no man should set idle, and see his country suffer.* But in complying with, that we do not study to make others suffer with it; but on the contrary, would advise and assist them, as far as is in our power at least, to prevent the wrongs the nation complains of, as well as the vengeance it is apt to take upon those, whoever they are; that may so sensibly wrong it. And for either of these purposes we can do nothing better, than *inquire into the state of our affairs in America*, in order to retrieve them, before it may be too late; for which purpose, an *inquiry* into the situation, importance and consequence, of those countries there, that the enemy has overrun, with the ways of recovering them, seems to be the most *proper inquiry*, either to obtain such desired ends; to redress the grievances of the nation; or to prevent the ruin with which it is otherwise threatned.

IV. *OBSTACLES to this union of our Colonies considered.*

We see some difficulties indeed in all this that has been proposed, as plain and reasonable

as it otherwise appears; which we cannot but animadvert upon, since those difficulties, whoever may make them, are so plainly repugnant to the public interest and welfare.

In the first place, they say, interest rules all the world, and why should it not rule our colonies likewise? If we make any proposal to rule Englishmen, without allowing them some share and interest in it, we fear our proposals will be all in vain. As long as the colony of *New-England* can defend their own frontiers, that they are told only belong to them, by the forts of *Massachusetts*, *Pelham*, *Shirley*, and *Stevens*, &c. if they are even allowed these, we fear they will have but little regard to lake *Champlain*, *Crown-Point*, or *Lake Ontario*, that lie on their neighbours frontiers, unless they are allowed some interest in them. This they have a right to by their charter, which extends from sea to sea, while they have been hemmed in by other colonies within 100 miles of the sea. By this means, that respectable colony, that is the only support and security of all the rest we have there, and is only able to oppose the designs of our enemy, is confined from exerting itself, and prevented from being of the general service it might otherwise be. It is confined in a manner to the sea coast, has hardly land sufficient to support the people in it, instead of producing any commodities for
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Britain ; by which it is obliged to interfere with Britain and the other colonies in trade and manufactures, while the French overrun all those countries about it, which the people of *New-England* would have settled and secured long ago, if they had been only allowed to do it.

But at the time when the French seized most of their present encroachments on us, about the year 1730, both Britain and many of the colonies seemed to be in a state of warfare with *New-England*. This is a difficulty, you may imagine, that is easily removed by *declaring a Peace* between them : but that perhaps may be as difficult to do, as even to make a peace between Britain and France at this present ! There are difficulties in this so great, that I do not know how to propose them, and far less to remove them. But is there no way to be thought of, to allow those *Charter Colonies* to extend any farther, or as far as they can ? Surely the security of the British dominions, of all lake *Champlain*, lake *Ontario*, *Niagara*, &c. depends very much upon it ; whatever objections there may be to it.

This is an obstacle that seems to strike at the very root of our progress and improvements in North America, especially in the charter colonies ; and there are others that equally retard and obstruct it in all this north-

ern division of our colonies abovementioned. There are disputes subsisting between the crown and the people there, that are enough to overfet every thing that could be propofed, and far more undertaken, for either of their interests. There is no wonder then to fee the French overrun our colonies, as they have done, while thefe disputes engrofs the attention of the public fo much, and crofs and thwart all public meafures that can be propofed.

But to fee if any thing can be done in thefe northern colonies; the chief thing is furely to ftrengthen the colony of *New-York* as much as poffible; which, we are forry to fee, fome would rather endeavour to divide and weaken, contrary to the general and public intereft and welfare of the whole nation both at home and abroad, and the chief thing the nation has to attend to perhaps in all America. How far this colony, and the whole nation in America, has been weakened already, by feperating *New Jerfey* from it, I would rather leave to others to fhew, who may be better acquainted with it. This we may fafely fay, as far as I can fee, that, however convenient fuch a divifion may be for the good of government, if it has proved fo, as it was faid to be for a governor, when it was made, we can at leaft fee nothing in fuch a divifion confiftent with the fafety and
 security

security of those colonies, and far less with the strength of the nation in America.

The province of *New York* is not above 12 or 15 miles broad, if so much, in the chief and principal part of it nigh the sea-coast, and not above 60 or 70 within land; whilst it has a frontier to defend, from *Montreal* to the *Straits* of the lakes and farther, that is immense, not less than 1000 miles and upwards in length from east to west, besides its great breadth from north to south: and that at a great distance from the seat of government, which is at the very remotest extremity of the province from this frontier.

This again is the whole frontier of the British dominions in America, that is and has been opposed to the French, and liable to their constant incursions and encroachments. It is on this frontier that *Crown-Point*, *Lake Champlain*, fort *Frontenac*, *Oswego*, *Niagara*, *Detroit*, and all the most important places in North America, and encroachments of the French, are situated. All these places are left entirely to this single little colony to defend and secure, while we have so many more potent ones on all sides of it:—We might have defied the dice surely to have thrown our affairs in North America into a worse situation, than they are by the division of our colonies.

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If those things are rightly considered, how necessary will it appear, to let not only *New Jersey*, but *New-England* likewise, have some share and interest in those frontiers. The French indeed have contracted them into a pretty narrow compass of late, but they are not more secure on that account.

If it belonged to us to make such proper regulations, as might be most conducive to the public safety and security, we should rather think, that *Connecticut*, if not *Rhode-Island* likewise, should be joined to *New-York*, instead of separating *New-Jersey* from it. And if the French continue in possession of *Crown-Point*, some such regulation may not only be proper, but absolutely necessary; I mean, for their mutual safety and defence.

While this little colony of *New York* had all this extensive frontier to defend, and all those important places on it to protect and secure, or guard against an enemy, it has had the whole weight and burden of the management of the six nations, on whom the interest of Britain in America depends, as much as it does upon this colony itself. In short, the whole interest of the nation in America, so far as regards the French encroachments, seems to depend upon, and to have been left to this little colony alone.

If those things are considered, how necessary

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ry and requisite will a union of our colonies appear to be! It is for want of this alone, that the French have been able to oppose all our more numerous and potent colonies in America, and to over-run them as they have done; because they had in fact none to deal with, but this one single colony of *New-York* alone, which is no way equal to the task, however thriving it may be.

When such important concerns depend upon this one colony, it has been divided and distracted in itself; opposed by its neighbours; weakened and divided; burdened with expensive law-suits; and in feuds and dissensions with the government at home; by which the French have been in a manner allowed to over run our frontiers without any opposition from us; and the nation is now put to such an expence both of blood and treasure to recover them. *Hinc ille lachrymæ:*

If you would oppose the designs of the French in America then, either now or hereafter; recover your losses and territories from them; put a stop to their encroachments, and exorbitant growing power; secure yourselves against it; protect and defend your colonies; or prevent the losses and misfortunes, expences and charges, dangers and difficulties, that they may and will bring this nation into; I repeat

repeat it again, *now or never strengthen the colony of New-York—Hic labor, hoc opus est.*

Many judicious and reasonable proposals have been made for this purpose, particularly by doctor *Colden*, and Mr. *Kennedy*; which since they have never been regarded, I forbear to mention them, or any others, as too extensive for my design.

We come next to consider the middle division of our colonies above mentioned, and the obstructions that occur to their union. Here we have a most disagreeable subject to consider, the religious principles of mankind; which likewise, with every thing that could well be thought of, have conspired to ruin our affairs in America, and must certainly endanger the loss of our colonies altogether, unless those causes of their danger and disgrace are remedied and removed in time.

This will plainly appear from what has already happened. The first motions of the enemy in our late disturbances, their chief encroachments upon us, about lake *Erie*, and the river *Ohio*, lye in the province of *Pensylvania*, that has as many, if not more people in it than all this middle division of our colonies put together, and both from this and its situation with regard to the enemy should be the strength and bulwark of the nation in that part; whilst this colony either disclaims the use of arms, or

is so divided by a mixt multitude of people of so many different nations and persuasions, that it can make no use of them, nor exert the great force and strength it might otherwise be secure in, from such a number of people in so small a compass. Here then lies our weak side; which the enemy, even the Indians, knew so well, that they have taken the advantage of it all along; and seemed to be the great cause of their bold and desperate attempt upon the *Ohio*. They told us there, "altho' they were sensible the English could raise two men for their one; yet they knew, their motions were too slow and dilatory to prevent any undertaking of theirs. — They expected to fight the English for three years, (as they have done) in which time they should conquer:"* knowing our defenceless state there. And for all I can yet see, they are like to make their words good.

This we do not say with design to prejudice a people, to whom the nation is much indebted for a flourishing colony they have planted, in one of the most important parts of the British dominions in North America. On the contrary, we mean only to show them their undoubted error, for their own good and the welfare of the whole nation, that depends much

* Washington's journal, page 15, 17.

upon them ; which they have now the fairest opportunity to show, if they are not blind to all sense and reason, as well as their own interest, in more respects than one.

They are situated in the very midst of the British dominions in America ; opposite to all the inland frontiers of them ; are high and convenient to all those inland parts, much more so than any other British colony ; have a ready access to them ; and numbers of men to defend them ; while they are defended and secured themselves by the other colonies on the side of the sea ; and have nothing to fear but a handfull of French, lately settled on their borders. Is it not their business then, as much as it is their interest, to root them out ? If they do not, will they not encrease and multiply ? to the perpetual disturbance and annoyance of them and all their neighbours, and the ruin of the British interest in America entirely, if not of the whole concerns of the nation there ?

This is a matter of weighty concern and serious consideration. And surely if they would consider rightly of it, no people in the world perhaps ever had a fairer opportunity offered them, not only to secure their own interest and properties, but to gain every thing else that is valued and esteemed among men ; the applause and praise of their prince ; the thanks

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and esteem of their neighbours; the safety and welfare of their country; the rewards of the great and blessings of the poor; with every thing else that must necessarily be the fruits of these great and laudable attainments. Surely if they act like men, they will never lose an opportunity of acquiring such honour and glory, and so much good both for themselves and their posterity; which in their present situation they may both have so much need of.

But on the contrary, if they lose this opportunity, and suffer themselves to be blind to their own interest, as well as the interest of the whole nation, by sitting still with their hands in their bosom, while they and their neighbours are in danger of having their throats cut every day; will it not be said, as it has already been said, that they are a chief cause of all the losses and misfortunes the whole nation has suffered, and may suffer on their account; and that they possess such a fine and spacious, fruitful and flourishing country, in the midst and most convenient place of all the British dominions in America, to oppose their declared enemy, for no other end and purpose, but to let that enemy overrun it, and endanger or ruin the whole nation and all its colonies by it — Weigh these

two together, and see which you will choose—
One of them I am afraid you must choose.

All then who have any regard for that once thriving and flourishing colony of *Pennsylvania*, will not only advise and persuade them, for their own safety and welfare, as well as their very being in a manner, to throw off that impracticable principle (not to say worse of it) of living in the midst of the French without the use of arms, but will compel them to it, if they continue obstinate. If they have no occasion for arms now, they very soon may and will; and may bring the nation into many more difficulties again perhaps, if they continue in that persuasion. If they had accepted of the offer that was made them many years ago, to build a fort on their frontiers, upon the very place where fort *duquesne* now stands, that place would not have been in the hands of the French, and they would not have had both their own and their neighbours throats cut by a merciless enemy, as they have had; and this nation would not have sustained the loss of so much blood and treasure, as it has, and is likely to sustain, on that account.

Pennsylvania is both by its situation, and numbers of people, the chief frontier of all the British dominions in all North America: the whole concerns of the nation in the inland parts of
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America, and the security of that whole continent, depend much upon it. And if the people will not defend such an interest, it must be given to those that will, otherwise it will infallibly be lost. I say it and foresee it plainly, who have foreseen and foretold all the present losses we sustain on those and the like accounts, as any one might do, who will be at the pains to consider our situation in America, and compare it with that of the French.

It is in vain to plead the different principle by which you have lived so peaceably, and thrived so well, among the Indians : that is not the way to live and thrive among the French. And it is still more inconsistent, to be holding councils and assemblies for years together, to see whether you shall repel an enemy, or suffer them to keep quiet possession of his majesty's dominions, at your very doors ; because you may imagine, contrary to plain evidence perhaps, that you have no concern in them.—If the case was so, is not your house in danger, when your neighbour's is on fire ?

It is not only now, but for ever hereafter, when the French offer to settle any where on or about lake *Erie*, or the river *Ohio*, that the colony of *Pennsylvania* must join at least in opposing them ; however distant they may be from their limits, which terminate hereabouts ;

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otherwise those important places must be lost to Britain. — There is no other British province, either convenient or able to recover, secure or defend the river *Ohio*, and the greatest part of lake *Erie*, which are the chief aim of the French to secure, both now and always, but *Pensylvania* alone. This will plainly appear, if we take a view of the provinces round this.

New-Jersey, that borders on *Pensylvania* to the east, has no interest here, nor within some hundreds of miles of it. And *New-York* is in the situation above represented, having more to do already than it is able to do. *Maryland* adjoining to *Pensylvania* on the south has no interest neither on the river *Ohio*, which their province does not extend to, but ends in a point at the mountains. Hence they have no inland frontier at all hardly, by which they neglect those frontiers so much. But if they do not join with the rest, both in recovering and securing the river *Ohio*, they will soon be in jeopardy, and the first that must suffer. The road from fort *du Quesne* leads directly into *Maryland*.

The next province on which the recovery and security of the *Ohio* depends, is *Virginia*, which is not nigh so convenient to it, as either *Maryland* or *Pensylvania*. The people of *Virginia* pass through part of both these provin-

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ces to go to the *Ohio*. Fort *du Quesne*, and the other principal places on the *Ohio*, are in *Pensylvania*, and not in *Virginia*. There is but a small corner of the province of *Virginia*, which runs out north-west from the rest of the province, like a single point, that borders upon the principal places of the *Ohio*, at a great distance from the chief inhabited parts of the country; while those places are opposite to the very center of *Pensylvania*, and not far from it. With this *Virginia* has not an half, by all accounts, of the fencible people, that *Pensylvania* has. They are likewise clogged with negroes; have a large and important sea-coast to defend; and have a large southern frontier upon the *Cherokees*, and westward to the *Mississipi*, to settle and secure; all which *Pensylvania* is free from. This is the way by which the *Ohio* was lost, when it was left to *Virginia* alone. Not but that this province should bear a principal hand in defending the river *Ohio*, and all other places upon or to the southward of lake *Erie*, let them be in *Pensylvania*, or where they will. They have a large and extensive concern both north, south, and west of this; whereas *Pensylvania* ends a little beyond fort *du Quesne*, if not at it: unless some way could be found out to extend those proprietary colonies, as well as the charter colonies.

For all these reasons, we see how much depends upon *Pensylvania*; no less than the security

curity of the greatest and best part of all North America; which must be lost, unless they defend it, and their own province with it. This I know is a harsh doctrine, difficult to teach, and more so to learn, but it is a true one, and must be observed; otherwise all the interior parts of North America, here so often represented, must be given up to the French; which I do not see how they are ever to be rooted out of indeed, unless the colony of *Pensylvania* joins with others for that purpose. And if that was to be the case, what becomes of *Pensylvania*? Will the French spare it, think you, because the people will not fight? They may think as they will, but I think I can see plainly, that the French have not only taken a great part of it already, at least a third, if not one Half of that province, but that they must and will keep that and all the rest with it, whenever they may want it, unless the people learn to fight, and that obstinately too—Let them not depend upon others to do it for them—There are none to do it—Every one has enough to do with their own concerns, and they must mind theirs, or give them up altogether.—All this they may plainly see, by comparing the present situation of affairs in Europe and America together.

What we have said is not out of prejudice, or any other design that can be excepted to; but on the contrary, we have been thus particular

cular in representing the situation of this province, out of regard to so thriving a colony, which might be the great strength and security of many of the most important concerns of the whole nation in America, if rightly conducted; while it otherwise seems to be in imminent danger of being lost, and many other important places with it. If the French remain in possession of that important place, fort *du Quesne*, the first thing they will do, no doubt, will be to convert it into a strong and redoubtable fortress, which will give the people of *Pensylvania* a greater occasion for the use of arms than any others perhaps in all America besides; and they seem to have no way to prevent that necessity, but to use their arms now, before it may be too late.

Here then we may see the incredible bad situation of our colonies, with regard to an enemy. Many seem to inquire and wonder, how it is possible for a handful of French to over-run them, as they do; but if they were to know the truth, they would see it could hardly be prevented, without some new regulation in our colonies. The charter colonies of *New-England* possess the whole sea-coast in the northern parts, for 500 miles and upwards, while they have no concern in the inland parts: and the proprietary colonies, *New-Jersey*, *Pensylvania*, and *Maryland*, pos-

sefs all the rest of the sea-coast to *Chesapeak* bay almost, for 4 or 500 miles farther, while they imagine they have no concern in the inland parts of America neither. These charter and proprietary colonies are directly opposed to the enemy, and all their encroachments, while they imagine they have no concern with them. Their private concerns end, where the public and great concerns of the nation begin. By this means the only two colonies we have to oppose the French, or prevent their encroachments, are *New-York*, and *Virginia*; the one burdened as above represented, the other more encumbered perhaps with negroes, and at a great distance from the enemy, every way incapable and inconvenient to oppose them.

The only two considerable bodies of men in all our colonies are in *New-England* and *Pennsylvania*; which, by being opposed directly to the enemy, might at all times oppose and prevent any of their designs, if rightly conducted; but as they are, the one is confined and hemmed in, as if designed to be kept from acting, while the other will not act at any rate: by which they are both in a manner lost to the nation, at least in its concerns in the inland parts of America. The other proprietary colonies, *New-Jersey* and *Maryland*, that abound likewise with men, seem to think

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themselves secure, when the French over-run all North America. But if they all act as they have done, they had better give up their grants and charters to their own country, than to the French; which the proprietors of Carolina were obliged to do but a few years ago, only on account of a few Indians. But how much more formidable must they be, when all the Indians in North America are joined by the French, as they already are or soon must be, unless all our colonies unite to prevent it.

It is by this means that the French over-run our colonies, and ever must do, while they continue in this situation. And it is in vain to pretend to hide this from the French; they have seen it long ago, as much as we feel it; which even their officers told us on the *Ohio*, the cause of their bold and otherwise desperate attempt upon that place. The only use that can be made of this our situation, is not to huddle it up, as it has been, but to see it, and amend it.

One would have thought it was not in nature for the British dominions in America to have been put in the situation they are. They are in possession of the sea-coast indeed, as if they had been designed to oppose a naval power, or their mother country; while all their inland frontiers are left naked, defenceless, exposed and unguarded every where, to
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the usurpation of a declared enemy, who secure the whole by two places, *Niagara* and *Fort du Quesne* ; without a single one to prevent and oppose them, notwithstanding all the numerous and powerful colonies we have!— Britain may pretend to keep those colonies, if she will, but it will not be long that she will keep them in this situation, unless it be, *to keep them for the French*, and that at as great an expence perhaps as they may be worth.

This seems to have been the first war the nation has engaged in for its colonies, but it is not likely to be the last of many, if they continue in the situation they are in. How convenient such wars may be to this nation, let them consider in time. The colonies themselves likewise have hitherto thrive and prospered, but they are not like to do so long, if they are oppressed with wars, loaded with taxes, and burdened with debts, as they are already, in opposing only a handfull of French, who must soon become as numerous, and more powerful than they are, if they keep their present usurpations.

Let all then who desire the prosperity and felicity of those realms, unite and conspire together for such noble purposes ; join in harmony and friendship for their mutual safety and welfare ; unite and conspire together to root out a declared enemy from among them ; and show themselves the worthy sons of *B R I T I S H A N C E S T O R S*.

S E C T. II.

The views and designs of the French in America.

THE many unlimited views and designs of the French in America, the means of accomplishing them, and our methods to prevent them, can never be unworthy the regard and attention of this nation, nor appear improper or unseasonable for us to consider, and far less at this time. They have laid down a plan and system of affairs there, as well as in Europe; have it always in view, and act by it in every thing they undertake; by which they give such perpetual and constant disturbances to this nation, which only stands in their way, against an universal rule and dominion in all parts of America.

The great view and aim of the French, especially since the treaty of Utrecht, seems to be, to extend their trade and commerce, and thereby to gain a naval power. They saw in the wars preceding that treaty, what a figure the maritime powers made by these means, by which they were able to give such a considerable opposition to the ambitious views of France in all parts of Europe; which the French had no way to prevent, but to supplant them in their trade and commerce, and thereby to gain that source of power, which they seemed only to want, to carry every point they

they aspired at in Europe, as well as in America. With this view we see with what address they have established themselves in the most considerable branches of trade, and that in a very short time, chiefly since the treaty of Utrecht. This we may perceive by their extensive trade to *Spain*—to *Guinea*—to the *East-Indies*—and to *Turkey*—besides the vast increase of their trade to the *Sugar Islands*, so as to supply all Europe in a manner with that valuable commodity—and a great increase of their fishery, fur-trade, lumber and stores for their islands, &c.

But the most profitable branch of trade seems now to be to the plantations in America, which are the great support of the trade and naval power of Britain. This the French have hitherto had little or no right or title to, by which their colonies and plantations there have been so inconsiderable. America was first discovered and divided between Spain and Britain, who have chiefly settled and peopled it, and the French had no original right there, but what they have got by usurpation and encroachment. Seeing this, their great view and aim is, to secure and enlarge their trade and power in America, and to make good their title, where they have none, by force of arms.

It was the prosecution of this their plan and system, that has made them engage in the present war with Britain. They have pursued

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it peaceably ever since the treaty of Utrecht ; by which they have gained such a prodigious increase of trade and commerce since that time. But in the last war they saw how much we crossed and thwarted their designs; for which reason they seem to have been determined upon another, ever since the conclusion of that. The short peace that intervened between them, seemed to be only a truce, and a more vigorous preparation for a new and more bloody war. They were going on, during the whole time of that precarious peace, to secure one place after another in America, 'till they were prepared to attack us on all sides. All this proceeds from that plan and system of affairs, that they have laid down in America, with a view to gain a trade and commerce, and naval power ; a view that they seem never to lose sight of, *and in which we should never lose sight of them.*

It was not for this or that single place, either in Nova Scotia, or on the river Ohio, that they engaged in this expensive and desperate war with Britain, as some seem to imagine ; but it was to secure themselves the certain means of accomplishing much greater designs, no less than an absolute power and dominion over all North America, as we shall abundantly show in the following discourse.

If we would either extricate ourselves then

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out of our present difficulties, or prevent the like for the future ; curb the growing power of the French, or retrieve the losses we have sustained from it ; we should sift their designs to the bottom ; prevent every step they take to accomplish them ; and oppose system to system ; the chief design of the present discourse.

The many views and designs of the French in all parts of America may be reduced to the following heads :

I. To get possession of Nova Scotia, and to annex that extensive province to Cape Breton. This seems to be their chief aim, and principal point in view ; for which they chiefly engaged in this present war with Britain. This they have had in view ever since the year 1719, when they conceived such extravagant hopes of North America, as if it was to be another Mexico and Peru ; upon which they began to dispute our limits here, and every where else in North America.

The expectations they have always had from the French that were left in Nova Scotia after the treaty of Utrecht, have always given them hopes of regaining this province some time or other. They seem to have been confirmed in those hopes by the tryal they had of them in the last war, when they openly declared for the French, or secretly abetted their interest every where.

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They went so far at last, as to refuse allegiance to his majesty of Great Britain, their prince and sovereign. It could not well be otherwise, when the mild government of Britain allowed them such indulgences, that the governor and bishop of Quebec had more rule over them, than their own. This seems to have been the reason of the conduct of the French with regard to Nova Scotia, ever since the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, and the cause of their entering into a war to gain it; which they seem to have made sure of, with fifteen thousand people in it, and all the Indians about it; entirely at their devotion and command; who had prevented us from settling the country, and seemed to keep it still for the French ever since the treaty of Utrecht. This was a more prevailing argument, than the puns and quibbles they started about the limits of this country.

The advantages they would gain, and we should lose by this province, require our more particular consideration: for which reason we have considered that subject by itself, and refer for farther information to a particular account of *the importance of Nova Scotia*, printed herewith. But in general, it appears, that by the possession of Nova Scotia, they must gain the whole fishery of all those coasts of North America, which their historian Charle-

voix justly represents as more valuable than mines of gold. This must give them a naval power, and a superior one to Britain in time; with the possession of all the best and most convenient ports in North America to station their ships at, their grand point in view: this leads them into all our colonies on the coast of that continent; gives them ready access to them all both by sea and land; and would soon make them superior to Britain in all parts of America; especially with the other points they have in view, to accomplish at the same time, chiefly by means of this engine, that is, as it were, a handle and key to all the rest.

II. But their grand point in view for these sixty years and upwards, has been, to suppress the progress and farther growth of the British colonies in North America, by encroaching upon them and surrounding them on all sides; and thereby to secure all the interior parts of that continent to themselves, which must soon give them the command of the whole. For this purpose, and with this view, they have endeavoured to secure two colonies, *Canada*, and *Louisiana*, one in the northern, the other in the southern parts of North America, and to join them together quite across that whole continent. This they seem to have first conceived some notion of in 1684, when they sent
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Mr. *la Salle* to take possession of the *Mississippi*. In 1698, immediately after the treaty of *Ryswick*, they renewed the same design. But they had no hopes or success in it, till the year 1717, when they first established their *Mississippi* company, on purpose to defeat the whole intention of the treaty of Utrecht, and recover their pretensions in America, that they gave up by it.

This was the use they made of their *Mississippi* scheme in 1719, if not the sole design of it. After they had conceived such extravagant hopes from that country, they began to contest the undoubted rights of Britain every where in North America, even in Nova Scotia itself, that they had but just given up entirely, *en son entier*; and then laid the foundation of all their contest ever since with Britain. They saw, if they could not get gold from the *Mississippi*, they might get what was more valuable, the trade and commerce of America, by securing the extensive countries that river spreads over; all which they laid claim to in 1719, and built this *system* upon that *bubble*.

The great noise they made about the *Mississippi* at that time, seems to have given them and some other people an opinion, that they had a right to it; but if they will be at the pains to enquire into their rights and titles, they will find them as ill grounded, as the

bubble on which they were founded ; and that they would defraud Britain as much by their pretensions, as they did all others concerned in their scheme.

By the treaty of Utrecht they gave up the unjust claims they had formed to Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay, the territories of the Five nations of Indians, which make a great part of the inland countries of North America : together with their claims to half the island of St. Christophers. It was their business then to contest those claims, that they had quitted all pretensions to : and to find others in lieu of them. This the Missisipi, and the river St. Lawrence, opened them a large and very extensive field for : they were settled on the mouths of those rivers, and they took it into their heads, after the great hopes they had conceived from them ; that this gave them a right to all those rivers, and all their branches, as far as they extend, to their very sources.

Now these two rivers are the great and chief sources of water of all the whole continent of North America, and spread over it far and nigh, much farther than it is known. The five great lakes of North America, and all the rivers that fall into them, are all by this their system, a part of the river St. Lawrence, and belong to them on that account. This includes all the territories of the *Six Nations* of

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Indians, and all the places now contested with them; which they found means to recover a right and title to, they imagine, by this one claim on the river St. Lawrence, after they had given up all pretensions to them by the treaty of *Utrecht*.

As for the *Mississipi* it is still more extensive than the river St. Lawrence. It springs in the northern and western parts of North America, about the same sources with the waters that fall into the great Lakes and the river St. Lawrence, and runs through that whole continent almost, from the latitude 50° or 51° , to the latitude 29° . Its branches again spread from east to west, rather farther perhaps than this its course from north to south. They rise on the east in the *Apalachean* mountains, not above two hundred miles from the Atlantic ocean, and extend west to the mountains of New Mexico, not much farther from the South Seas, by all accounts. This may be seen by the course of the rivers *Ohio* and *Missouri*, those two principal branches of the *Mississipi*. The countries that these rivers extend over, they call *Loufiana*; as they include all the other countries to which the branches of the river St. Lawrence extend in *Canada*, and lay claim to both. This is a claim that is immense! not less than nineteen parts in twenty of North America. To use their own words, *Voila une etendue de terres habitables, dans laquelle l'imagination se perd**.

* Relation de la Loufiane, tom. I. p. 8.

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This is in one word their claim in North America, and their whole and sole right and title to it. From that extravagant pretence alone, their having two or three paltry settlements on the mouths of these two great rivers, they lay claim to them all, and all those extensive countries that they spread over. If you search all their voluminous writings you will find no other right or title whatever to such exorbitant claims, that they can show the least grounds for.

This you may see is just such another claim as the Dutch might make to all Germany, as far as the river Rhine runs, because they are settled on the mouth of that river. They have no other grounds for such a claim ; nor no better pretensions to make it good, if we conduct our affairs rightly. Yet it is from this extravagant pretence, and from this alone, that they presume a claim to all their encroachments upon us, and to every place that lies in their way to oppose this their general system.

III. Their next view is, to secure those extensive territories, that they thus lay claim to ; for which they have left no stone unturned for many years. For this purpose they have been securing one place after another, and building fort after fort, for many years. We see the plan and system they have laid down in North America, and all their

proceedings are directed and tend immediately to execute and accomplish it. With this view they proceed from north to south across that continent, and seize every convenient place in their way ; in order to join their two colonies of *Canada* and *Louisiana* together. For this they have hitherto been obliged to go a vast way round about, by four of the great lakes, and thence down the river *Illinois* into the *Mississipi*. But seeing a nigher and more convenient pass by the river *Ohio*, they at last seized that.

Their great business and point in view is, to stop the farther progress of the English colonies, and prevent their getting a secure footing in this extent of territory that they lay claim to. They had done this pretty well in the northern colonies by *Crown Point*, and *Niagara*, which prescribe limits to us there, and hinder us from having any access to the continent of North America beyond those places. But in the more southern parts they saw our people spread and gain ground daily in all the interior parts of North America, for four or five hundred miles beyond the mountains, where they met with no obstructions from the French. The chief access we have to those inland parts of the continent is by the river *Ohio* ; for which reason it was necessary

cessary to secure that ; the cause of their rash and bold attempt upon it.

This they first attempted immediately after the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, when they sent 500 men to the *Ohio* under *Mr. Celeron* in 1749. But not succeeding then, and being drove from it by the Indians, they have been securing their way to it ever since. For this purpose they rebuilt and strengthened the fort of *Niagara* in 1751, the key to all their designs, and especially to the *Ohio*. At the same time they gave great encouragement to all that would settle any where on lake *Erie*, and planted many of their disbanded soldiers and others there at that time. These were settled chiefly about *Detroit*, the river of the *Miamis*, and *Sandoski*, on the west end and south side of that lake, convenient to the Indians ; for a trade with whom it was imagined those places were chiefly seated. But the French court seem to have other views. Finding our people encrease and multiply daily on the river *Ohio*, they sent a party of men to take possession of that river in 1753, and cut off all our farther progress in North America, and communication with all the natives in it, by that step.

By this means they have already carried their grand point in view, and accomplished their

their whole design entirely, we may say by thus joining Canada to Louisiana, by means of the river Ohio; as they have now no interruption to that design, and nothing in their way between them; or if there was, how easy is it to erect forts and settlements down the Ohio to the Missisipi; which would preserve that uninterrupted passage that they now have from the mouth of the river St. Lawrence to the mouth of the Missisipi, and the whole way by water, for three thousand miles.

However incredible then their pretensions abovementioned may appear to be, and however vast those regions are, that extend to the sources of the rivers St. Lawrence and Missisipi; yet it is certain they have secured them all, by that single step of seizing fort *du Quesne* on the river Ohio, together with *Niagara*; as we shall shew more particularly below; and as may appear to any one on inspection of a map; especially if they consider at the same time, that these two places are the only passes almost from our colonies into all the interior parts of North America.

We have the more reason to take notice of this, and indeed all their other forts, as they may and will in time no doubt be converted into impregnable fortifications, whatever they may be at present. If they secure the continent of North America in this manner by these

two forts, we shall no doubt be as much annoyed with them, as we have been with Crown-Point, and find as much difficulty to get at them: which they have no doubt in view likewise.

IV. But with all this they want a convenient port upon the sea-coast; which they have had their eye upon long ago. The one they have pitched upon is New York; as they see that to be most convenient to them on many accounts. This appears from the letters of the governor of Canada to their ministry at France, published by *F. Charlevoix*. They were ripe even for the execution of this their project so long ago as 1689, and went to America for that purpose; but were prevented by the Indians, who had over-run all their frontiers. But they seem to have had it in view ever since.

New-York is adjacent and contiguous to their settlements in Canada, and all their encroachments upon us; and affords the nighest and most convenient passage to them from sea. If they were to be in possession of this colony alone, they would not only be actually possessed of a vastly greater extent of territory, even at this day, than all we have in America put together, perhaps twice or thrice as much, by thus uniting all their straggling settlements together; but they would have all the Six Nations of Indians, and all the other natives of

of that whole continent, entirely at their command. They would then likewise surround the colony of New-England on all sides, the only strength we have in America, which must be at their mercy; as all our other colonies would be open and exposed to them on every side, without the least security or barrier against them. This then is a matter of great importance, and the first thing they aim at, whenever they have a mind to attack us in America, as we may see at present.

This seems to be the first design and great project of the French in America, to which all their others are as it were subservient at present, intended to make a diversion in favour of this. This is so well known from all their former proceedings and transactions in America, as well as from their printed accounts, that it is surprising it should not have been attended to at first.

Ever since the French first form'd their present plan and system of affairs in America, they seem never to have lost sight of New-York, but have laid close siege to it, we may say, and have been attacking it by regular approaches for many years. It was for this purpose that they have been at such pains and charges in fortifying and securing *Chambli*, *St. John's*, *Fort la Motte*, *Crown Point*, *Ticonderago*, and *Fort Frontenac*; attempted *Anon-*

dago in 1718; and when they were drove from that, secured and fortified *Niagara* in 1721 and 1751: and since demolished *Oswego*; as they did *Sarabstogo* in the last war: which places are, as it were, the keys of this province, surround it on all sides, and in a manner entirely command it.

They have indeed been hitherto so far prevented in their design, that they have never yet been able to attack the town of New-York by sea, whilst they pour in the whole force of Canada upon it by land, the plan they laid to attack it before; otherwise it is plain from all that has happened for these three years past, whenever they are able to do that, they must succeed in the whole of their designs, and soon make themselves masters of that important province; which must by one stroke render them superior to the English in North America, as they are already in the islands; and put it in their power effectually to accomplish all their designs here explained, however great and extraordinary they may otherwise appear. It is for this reason that we see they have such a force always ready to attack this province, for which their whole force in America is convenient.

V. What we have represented above chiefly relates to the designs of the French in the northern parts of the continent, we
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come next to consider the southern parts. Here they have as great if not much greater things in view, from their vast pretensions on the *Mississipi*; and let us see, if we cannot unravel them, and make them appear.

They have hitherto been confined chiefly to the mouth of the *Mississipi*, about *New-Orleans*, or a hundred miles or two above it, and have made but little progress there as yet. The cause of this they tell us, was, when they saw themselves so disappointed in the extravagant hopes they had conceived of this country, they ran from one extreme to another, and condemned it as good for nothing, by which their people abandoned it entirely. Those who had been such sufferers-by it, could not even hear it mentioned, instead of settling and peopling it; which prejudice has hitherto made their colony very inconsiderable.

They have happened likewise to be settled here both on a bad soil, and in an unhealthy air. The soil about the *Mississipi*, for about 200 miles from its mouth, is sandy and barren; the river overflows its banks, and the water stagnates in a low flat country, which makes it unhealthy. But higher up the river they have both a different soil and climate; the lands are very fertile, inferior to none; and the country more healthy, being high and dry, and refreshed with breezes from the adjacent moun-

mountains. Here then they have been endeavouring to establish themselves for some years; chiefly about *Kappa*, and the country of the *Natches*, where they have carried on their settlements with great diligence within these few years.

The great design they have in this at present is the culture of *Tobacco*: this is the only branch of trade now, in which they do not vye with Britain, if not outstrip it. For this reason they have given great bounties upon this commodity from the *Mississipi*, which the soil and climate in the interior parts of the country is every way fit for; while about the mouth of the river it only produces *Rice* and *Indigo*. When they are well settled here then, where they have such a vast extent and choice of fresh lands for this commodity, they must outstrip our tobacco plantations, that are worn out with culture, in the same manner, and for the same reasons, that their sugar islands have so much outdone ours. It is well known, that upon such plenty of choice and fresh lands as they have here, they may make three times the quantity of that commodity, that can be made on old worn out plantations. And altho' the river *Mississipi* is not easily navigated up against the stream, yet any thing may be conveniently brought down it to its mouth, where there is a good port for shipping, at *Balize*.

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But hitherto the Indians have stopped their progress on the *Mississipi*. In 1729 they were cut off by an Indian massacre there. And the banks of the *Mississipi* have been so infested by the *Chicasaws*, declared enemies of the French, that it has been dangerous for them to frequent it. For these reasons they sent a body of 2000 regular troops to the *Mississipi* in 1749 and 50, in order to awe those Indians, who had chiefly declared for the English in the late war.

Between the *Mississipi* and our settlements in Carolina lies the river *Coussa*, which they lay claim to from the same pretence as they do to the *Mississipi* itself, to wit, because they are settled on the mouth of it at *Mobile*. This river is of great extent, heads among the *Cherokees*, and runs through the whole country of the *Creek* Indians; whom they form pretensions over on this account. These Indians are the chief barrier and security of the provinces of *Carolina* and *Georgia*; whom the French are constantly endeavouring to get footing amongst; and thereby likewise to cut off our communication with that warlike nation of the *Chicasaws*; who have hitherto been as great an obstruction to their progress on the *Mississipi*, as the *Iroquois* have been in *Canada*; for which reason they have almost destroyed

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destroyed them, and have attempted to do it entirely.

In 1715 those Indians almost overran *Carolina*; and at that time the French seized the most convenient place in all that country, the fort of *Albamas*; which had been an English factory and settlement many years before. This they still keep possession of, and threaten many other encroachments upon us here likewise, as well as in the north, particularly among the *Cherokees*. And if the French get footing among those Indians, who are so numerous, or get them to join them, as they have done the northern Indians, which they have often attempted, the provinces of *Carolina* and *Georgia*, that have so few men in them, must soon be in a worse situation, than our other colonies have been to the northward.

All this is owing to our neglect of their unjust and illegal usurpation of the *Mississipi** ;

* They secured the *Mississipi* in 1712 by a grant to *Mr. Crozat*, made on purpose to frustrate the stipulations they had just entered into with Britain, “ in regard to “ the articles concerning North America, in which he “ (Lewis XIV) granted almost every thing the queen of “ England desired”. † By these stipulations they were to quit all the claims they then had in North America, except *Canada*; to frustrate which, and defraud this nation, they formed this new claim to the *Mississipi*; where

† *Memoires de Torcy*. Vol. II. p. m. 306.

to which it is said they have lately sent great numbers of troops, besides those they had there before; from which our southern colonies cannot but be in some danger.

where they then had no pretensions, that were publicly known at least. This appears from the dates of these two acts: the cessation of arms, in consequence of those engagements to Britain, was signed August 19th 1712, and on September 14th following, Lewis made this grant to his secretary *Crozat*.

After the peace, they secured the *Mississipi* by a new grant to the company in 1717. And if we allow of that, they gain much more than they were to give up by the treaty of *Utrecht*; and make void all the advantages the nation was to reap from it, the surrender of their claims in North America, wherever they then had any that were openly avowed and publicly known, which those to the *Mississipi* were not. They had then deserted it, except a few *Strays* left among the Indians at *Mobile*; and the English were then in possession of the *Mississipi*, with people on it, at the treaty of *Utrecht*.

Their grant of the *Mississipi* is "bounded by the lands of the English of Carolina", by the words of it. But the lands of the English of Carolina include that whole grant, according to grants made to them in 1584, in 1630, and 1664, long before this French grant, or any other pretensions of theirs to the *Mississipi*, were so much as thought of; and long before the treaty of *Utrecht*—All these grants, colonies, and possessions of the English, they trespass upon by this grant of the *Mississipi*; as well as upon those of *Virginia* in 1584, and 1609; besides other later claims of the English from *Purchases* and *Possessions*.

They cannot think surely, that we should pay any regard to the magnified discoveries of *Mr. La Sale*; a

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But the views of the French from the *Mississipi* are still more extensive and considerable; as we shall shew below.

VI. To sum up the whole views and designs of the French in America together, we

roving cavalier who rambled over those countries in 1680, to retrieve his own desperate circumstances, as they tell us themselves. Yet it is from this insignificant pretence, and this alone, that the French claim the *Mississipi*, *Ohio*, *Great Lakes*, and nineteen parts in twenty of all North America!—If he, or *Hennepin*, made any discoveries, they had them and their guides from the English, as is attested by two of the principal men in Canada at that time, *Mr. de Tonti*, and *F. le Clercq*.

The English (besides their first discoveries and grants) discovered those countries and the *Mississipi* in 1672 and 1678—were the first that found the way into that river—were cut off soon after on the isle *Massacre* nigh its mouth, so named from thence—settled on the *Mississipi* again in 1698—secured a passage and the country from thence to the coast of Carolina that year—carried on a trade there for many years—had the sole possession of the *Mississipi* in 1714, and at the treaty of *Utrecht*; when the French had only a few stray people at *Mobise* and *Iste Dauphin*.—This they were only deprived of for a while by an insurrection of the Indians in Carolina in 1715—After which the French seized the *Mississipi*, *Albamas*, &c. and granted it to their *Mississipi* company only in 1717; after the treaty of *Utrecht*, which decided those claims. At least we allow of none since—Their claims to the *Mississipi* then are as groundless and unjust, as the bubble they made of it; which has been long ago shown in *Cox's Account of Carolana*, to which we refer the reader.

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should not forget the sugar islands. Here they are already very strong and powerful; much superior to the English, or any other nation; and seem to have it in their power already to command all those islands, whether English or Spanish, when they please. If the English have a superiority over them on the continent of North America, or the Spaniards in South America, the French have the same advantage over both in the Islands; which afford the most profitable commerce perhaps of any.

Their possessions and colonies in the Islands are now become so considerable, that they supply all Europe with sugars; while the Spaniards and English do no more than supply themselves. The island of *Barbadoes*, that has hitherto been so fruitful, and afforded such supplies of that commodity for nigh a hundred years, is but a small spot; the soil of which is worn out by such perpetual culture, and will no longer produce sugar without great charge and expence. *Jamaica* again is mostly a mountainous country, that is either unfit for culture, or inconvenient for it in many respects, by which great part of it lies uncultivated. Whereas the French are possessed of the large island of *St. Domingo*, at least the most valuable part of it, which is every way fruitful, and affords as much land

fit for sugar, as all the other islands put together almost; besides the vast quantities of *indigo*, and other commodities that come from it. By this island alone, which the French have settled since the treaty of Utrecht, they have gained a greater trade perhaps, than all they had before that treaty; by which they are now able to vie with us so much in trade and commerce every where, and to do so much mischief.

Notwithstanding this, the French still endeavour to enlarge their dominions in the islands; have seized the island of *St. Lucia*, and lay claim to all the other neutral islands, *St. Vincent*, *Dominica*, and *Tobago*; and will no doubt take the first opportunity to secure them, if they have not in a great measure already, by means of that strong fortress they have on the island of *St. Lucia*, that is reckoned to be one of the most impregnable of any in America, from which they are always ready to march out, and make a conquest of all the islands round it.

All this power and vast trade, the French have gained chiefly by means of the island of *Hispaniola* (*St. Domingo* they call it for a blind) the largest, most convenient, and most fruitful of all the sugar-islands; which they seized entirely by fraud and artifice, and hold it only from usurpation. The English were formerly

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at great expence to conquer this island, but to no purpose, while the French got it for nothing. The west end of *Hispaniola*, where they settled first, was a retreat for the *buccaneers* and *freebooters* of all nations, whom the French took under their protection, and by their means secured the greatest part of the whole island, worming the Spaniards out of it by degrees, as they would the English in North America.

But I do not see, that they have any right or title to this island confirmed or acknowledged to them. Such usurpations can never be called a just right. They have settled this island almost entirely since the treaty of Utrecht, and thereby gained much more than they were to give up by that treaty, in parting with *St. Christophers*. By these means they have evaded that treaty every where; and gained a vastly greater trade since, chiefly by means of this illegal usurpation, than they ever had before.

If the French then keep possession of the neutral islands, with the island of *Hispaniola*, what must become of our sugar-trade, or even of the islands themselves? They were able to destroy the island of *Nevis* in 1706, by the inconsiderable force they had then, and how much more able will they be to destroy any of our islands with the superior force they have

now. It is well known, that the only safety of our islands has been the superior force of our colonies upon the continent; but if the French over-run the continent likewise, and get the natives to join them, as they seem to have done already, what must become of our islands, that are surrounded by such a superior force every where.

The security of our islands then depends very much upon the success of our present engagements on the continent. The connection of these two, and their mutual dependance on one another, is well known. The islands at least can hardly subsist without the colonies on the continent. This is another great point the French have in view by their proceedings on the continent, in order to strengthen themselves still more and more in the islands; by which they must have the command of them, and that whole valuable branch of trade entirely to themselves. For this they only want a good and convenient colony or two upon the continent, such as *Nova Scotia* or *Louisiana*; which makes them so intent upon securing those countries, in order to supply and support their islands among other things; thereby to gain all the rest in time, as they must certainly do, if they go on there as they have done for twenty or thirty years past.

VII. All the designs of the French above-mentioned, great as they appear and really are, yet if they ever succeed in any one of those, they may be reckoned only as preludes to much greater things—They are but a few leagues distant from the island of *Cuba*, with a force sufficient to seize it, when they please. And what is there to hinder them to do it? I have been informed, that they have attempted settlement on that island already, at *Cape Mayze*; by which they may soon worm the Spaniards out of *Cuba*, as they have done out of *Hispaniola*. *Cape Mayze* is one of the most important passes in all America, such as *Niagara* is on the continent. This and the other settlements they have opposite to it in *Hispaniola* secure the *windward passage* entirely, the only safe passage we have from the islands: and at the same time leads directly to the *Havana*.

This was one of their great reasons for being so intent upon securing the *Missisipi*, and driving the Spaniards from about it at *Pensacola* in 1719, because they say, “This navigation to *Louisiana*, will further procure us “a free (*or forced*) resort to the two famous “ports of the gulph of Mexico, *viz.* the “*Havana* and *Vera Cruz*.*”——And we

* Second Voyage of La Salle, pag. 188.

may see by the quantities of gold, and other Spanish commodities, taken in their ships from the *Mississipi* in the last war, that they have not only found a way to the Spanish ports from thence already, but likewise to the mines of *Mexico*; to which they have an open road, and a secure trade, commonly followed by them from the *Mississipi*.

The French no sooner went to the *Mississipi*, after the peace of *Utrecht*, than the first thing they attempted was this trade to the Spanish mines. For this purpose they immediately sent a ship to *Vera Cruz*, and a convoy over land towards the mines of *St. Barbe*.^{*} This indeed the Spaniards were then alarmed at, and prevented them by the war that ensued between them and the French in 1719.

^{*} Mr. *Crozat* de son côté, avoit recommandé a *M. de la Motte Cadillac*, qu'il s'etoit associé pour son commerce, de faire des detachemens du côté des *Illinois*, pour la découverte des mines; & du côté des *Espagnols* de l'ancien & du nouveau *Mexique*, pour établir le commerce avec ces deux provinces—*La Motte Cadillac* étoit a peine débarqué à l'isle *Dauphine*, qu'il envoya le Navire, sur laquelle il étoit venu, a la *Vera Cruz*.—Le gouverneur se flatta de réussir mieux (*which they have done*) dans une autre tentative, qu'il fit par les terres pour le même sujet.—Il avoit confié la conduite de cette expedition au sieur de *St. Denys*. Il lui donna pour dix mille francs de marchandises, & convint avec lui qu'il les laisseroit en depot chez les *Natchitoches*, nation sauvage établie sur la riviere rouge, &c. *Charlevoix Hist. N. France*, tom. IV. p. 170, & 199.

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But the long peace and good understanding between the two nations has since given the French an opportunity to pursue this their design with more success; of which we need no better proof than what is here mentioned, besides many accounts we have of this trade of the French from eye-witnesses. In this manner they encroach upon the Spaniards secretly and artfully in time of peace, in the same way as they have done upon the English.

This road from the French settlements in *Louisiana* to the *Spanish mines*, which you will see laid down in their maps *, is much shorter than is commonly imagined by many, who take such distant countries to be more remote than they really are. When the Spaniards refused them free access to their mines, they secured their way to them by a fort built for that purpose †, on a large branch of the *Mississippi* running west, called the *red river*; among a considerable nation of Indians called the *Natchitoches*, their friends and allies, where they keep a strong garrison, and laid up their magazines for this clandestine trade with the Spaniards, † as they still do. About fifty or sixty leagues west from the *Natchitoches*, are another considerable nation of Indians

§ See the maps of *de l'Isle* and *Bellin*.

† *Charlevoix*, *ibid*.

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called the *Cenis*, whom we are told the French have likewise got amongst; or have alliance with them, as they may easily get; and who lead directly both into *Mexico* and *New Mexico*. From the *Cenis* to the Spanish frontiers that defend their mines, called by them *Presidio del Norte*, is but 150 leagues by the French accounts,† or about 200 from *Natchitoches*. But these distances are always reckoned greater in the woods of America than they really are. By the best accounts of geographers, it is but 170 leagues west from the *Cenis* to the mines of *St. Barbe*, reckoned the richest in all *Mexico*, and about the same distance north-west to *Santa Fez*, the capital of *New Mexico*, that is, about 220 leagues from the French settlements at *Natchitoches*. And by the same accounts it appears to be but 280 leagues in a strait line from *New Orleans* to *St. Barbe**.

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† Charlevoix, *ibid*.

* This we are certain of nighly, from the observations of the longitude at *New Orleans*, and bottom of the Bay of *Mexico*. nigh the meridian of *St. Barbe*, with the latitudes of these two places.

These mines of *St. Barbe* lye in the north east parts of *Old Mexico*, at the foot of the mountains of *New Mexico*. The country is plain, level, and open to them, the whole way from the *Missisipi*; and the mountains of *New Mexico*, which

This is but a small way for the French to go for gold and silver, when they go so constantly all over the continent of North America, from the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to the mouth of the *Mississipi*, upwards of 1000 leagues, only for a few beaver skins. And if they have not the same conveniencies of a water-carriage to *Mexico*, yet they have a much greater convenience perhaps for that purpose, from the great plenty of beasts of burden in all that country that leads to *Mexico*, which is full of horses wild in the woods; where they tell us, "We purchased a very fine horse, that would have been worth twenty pistoles in France, for an axe.*"

This is a grand object the French have in view, which makes them so intent upon securing those vast countries they call *Louisiana*; which not only leads to, but must command the adjacent *mines of Mexico*; if they do not abound equally with mines themselves, as there is no doubt but they do, although the French have run from one extrem to another in searching for them. This makes them so impatient to get rid of the English power in

which separate that province from *Louisiana*, are but small hills, like the Apalachean mountains in the east, or rather lower, as we have from certain accounts.

* La Salle, *ibid.* p. 16.

America, which only stands in their way between these and all their other designs; the cause of their entering into this war for that purpose.

It has surpris'd many to see the French engage in so expensive a war, only to support their inconsiderable colony of Canada, as some imagine; from which they have nothing but a few beaver skins, and that at the charge of 400,000 crowns a year to the public, they tell us*. If this was their only view, we could never imagine they would be at such a risque and charge about it. It plainly appears from hence then, as well as from all other accounts, that their views are much greater, to wit, the security of *Louisiana*, as well as *Canada*, and all North America with them; which must give them the command of the adjacent Spanish mines, whenever they find it proper and convenient; besides the whole trade and commerce of that continent in time.

This their view and design plainly appears to be the whole scope of their present and late proceedings in America, from the result and conclusion of our negotiations with them about it in 1753. Our ministry offered

* *Charlevoix*, *ibid.* *La Potherie Hist. Amerique Septentrionale*, &c.

to come to terms of accommodation with them, which they would willingly have done upon any *reasonable terms* that could be proposed, *but the French insisted upon all the river Ohio as a preliminary to such a treaty of accommodation!* as we have from the best and undoubted authority. They saw plainly, that the possession of that river would put it in their power to command all North America, and insisted upon that, as a preliminary to treat with them about it.———If this was to be the preliminary article, what could we expect from the treaty!——It was not for a port or two in *Nova Scotia*; but for all North America in effect, that they were contending, and are still.

This their settlement on the *Mississipi*, if not taken notice of, is likely to turn to as great account to them in time, as they conceived it might in 1719. They are not only convenient here to go to the mines of *Mexico*, to which they have a good road already opened by land, and begin to carry on a considerable trade there; but if they encrease and strengthen here, as they must soon do in so fine and extensive a country, while they have such a superior force adjoining to this in the islands, they must by means of these two so easily joined together, and constantly supporting one another, soon be able to reap all the

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profits of the Spanish treasures in America, if not to seize them—a thing that *all Europe* is concerned in surely, as well as *Britain*.

This must be the consequence some time or other, although few seem to see it in a true light now. Their views and designs then in North America are much deeper laid, and their consequence must be much more alarming to all who can see before them, than most people seem to apprehend. It is not to be imagined, that they would have engaged in so hazardous and expensive a war as this, only for the sake of a few beaver skins, or a few barren spots in Canada.

Their views are much more extensive. They not only aim at the acquisition of all those immense territories above described, but they expect to get something with them. They see that those possessions must secure to them the benefit of most of the treasures of all America, and that they will have it in their power to seize them whenever it may be convenient, after they are well established in those immense territories that they call *Louisiana*; which is their view and aim, by their present proceedings in North America. This they have had in view ever since they sent Mr. *la Sale* to take possession of the *Mississipi*, and especially since the vast hopes they conceived of it in 1719; when they drove the Spa-

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Spaniards from about that river, and began to contest all the English claims that might interfere with their designs.

All those things have been meditated many years; but they are now come to a *crisis*, and we must prevent them *now or never*. If the French have over-run all those countries, and made themselves masters of them already, only with a handful of men, how will they ever be rooted out of them; when they come to be well secured and fortified in them, the the first thing they will do, without doubt; and to increase and multiply, as they must do in such fruitful countries?—It will then be in vain to say that Britain ought to vindicate its rights to those countries; or that Spain is endangered by them. They must both submit to the fate they have brought upon themselves, if they suffer the French thus to over-run North America, and to secure and fortify themselves in it. We never see them part with a place they once get sure footing in; nor give up or neglect such advantages as those here represented, the Spanish treasures in America.

It is not our opinion only, that the French must sooner or later seize the adjacent Spanish mines, by means of their possessions in *Louisiana*, but we see the same declared on a very different occasion, by a very intelligent and judi-

judicious author, besides others, in an account of the Spanish possessions in America themselves; where he tells them, “if ever the French should become numerous in their settlements on the river *Missisipi*, the Spaniards will run no small hazard from their neighbourhood, as must readily appear to any man who considers with what address the French have settled themselves in *St. Domingo*.”

This was the great view of *Mr. la Salle* in his rambles over this country in 1680, in quest of the mines of *St. Barbe*; and of the French king sending him afterwards in 1684 to take possession of the bay of *St. Bernard*, that is not far from them. The prosecution of this design they were only interrupted in by the war with England in 1689; but immediately renewed the same design again in 1698, as soon as ever that war was over. Britain put a stop to them again by the war that ensued. But soon after that they gained their point by a *bubble* in 1719, which they could not do by force; seized the Spanish possessions about the *Missisipi*, and have ever since been going on to strengthen and secure themselves in those vast countries. They felt indeed that Britain again crossed their

* History of Spanish America, page 54.

designs in the last war ; for which reason they pursued them so closely in the peace that ensued ; and were determined to make their point good, and do as they thought fit ; or engage in another war on that account with Britain, when they thought its power was sufficiently reduced by an expensive war with two of the greatest potentates in Europe.

If those things are rightly considered, *Spain* has as much reason to be alarmed at the present proceedings of the French in America, if not more, than *Britain*. The French are close upon their borders in the bay of *Mexico*, as well as in the *Islands* ; but Britain has no force nigh them. The French have a force in *Hispaniola*, and that raised within thirty years, if not twenty, sufficient to command the islands already. And if with this they get such a power as they are contending for on the *Missisipi*, to secure all that river, and all its branches, even to the sources of the *Ohio*, these two forces, that are so easily joined together, in the midst of the Spanish possessions, must endanger them, as much more than they do the British territories, as they are so much greater objects.

We see, it is only the naval power of Britain that has hitherto opposed the French in all those designs ; but if they go on to strengthen themselves on the continent of America, and

gain but a tenth part of the territories they pretend to lay claim to there, and are now contending for, the cause must be decided by a land war, in which Britain is no way able to contend with France. This we may see from the transactions of both in America at present. The situation of the French colonies likewise is infinitely better, in a state of war, than the British, as we may see from what has happened, and what is here represented. With this Britain must lose its naval power, and *France* gain one, if she becomes superior in America. And what security will either *Spain* or *Britain* have for their possessions in America then? If the French grow so powerful both by sea and land, as they must soon do, by carrying any of their present pretensions in America.

If the English interfere with the Spaniards in America, it is only in a *smuggling trade* that is of little consequence: Whereas the French take both their trade and their country, secure and fortify them, as they may see by *Hispaniola*.

But *Britain* is so far from aiming at any new acquisitions, or conquests, that it is not even the desire or interest of the nation to have them, if they were given to it. They would cost more than they are worth to a commercial nation, and oblige it to keep a

standing

standing army, contrary to its desire and interest, to protect such acquisitions, in the midst of other powerful neighbours, who might claim or covet them.

But on the other hand, *France* is a military and warlike nation, as well as a commercial one, that maintains 300,000 men in arms, when Britain has but 18,000, both at home, and in all its dominions in the East and West-Indies put together. With such a *standing army* (the very hate and dread of the English nation, which they will not allow of even for their own safety and protection, instead of making conquests on their neighbours) the French aim at *Conquests and Dominion*, as well as *trade and Commerce*, wherever they go; and pretend therewith to have a *claim* to whatever is *convenient* for them. It is by such *standing armies*, which have enslaved their own people, that they would make all around them submit to them; have kept all Europe in constant alarms for a hundred years past; and now attempt the same in America.

There they want to push a *trade and commerce*, as well as their arms, to support this exorbitant power. And let *Spain*, or any others, consider which of these two, *Britain*, or *France*, with such powers, views and interests, they would choose for a neighbour—They

may have it in their power perhaps now to choose which they will ; but may not hereafter be left to the choice of either their neighbours, or their own possessions ; any more than we see Britain is at present, from having indulged such a neighbour nigh them.

The only view of Britain by this present war, or any other proceedings in America, is, to preserve her undoubted rights and possessions, from the usurpation of so dangerous a neighbour and declared enemy, that has, must, and ever will, put her to more expence to secure her own, than all it may be worth to her ; especially if she suffers the French to surround her on all sides ; to take one place after another, which ever may be convenient to them ; to prescribe bounds and limits to her every where in her own territories ; and take those from her that must endanger all the rest they are pleased to leave her—the just and unavoidable causes of her declaring war against France, after so many open hostilities from it : and which Britain has used no other way to carry on, but to maintain a *superior navy* (the great clamor of the French,) against such a *superior army*, for *self-preservation*, that must be allowed to all people. Whereas we see the views of France by this war, are, not only to defend all those arbitrary proceedings against the laws of

nations

nations ; but to maintain her illegal usurpations by violence, that were got by fraud and artifice ; and to enforce the puns and quibbles of her commissaries, against the manifest rights of nations, by force of arms !—*Hunc tu Romane caveto.*

If those things are considered, *Spain*, nor no other power, has reason to be alarmed at the proceedings of *Britain* ; but on the contrary ought to see such gross insults on the rights of mankind redressed, if they have any regard to justice.—The Spaniards perhaps may be offended, as they have good reason to be, at the unjust and unnecessary war this nation entered into with them before ; but it is well known, that was not a war of the *Nation* ; it was made only by a *party*. The nation was aggrieved, it is true, but it was by *France*, from her many infringements of the treaty of *Utrecht*, not by *Spain* : and it has suffered sufficiently for its mistake.

If those things are rightly considered, it is to be hoped, they will commit no more such mistakes again ; but mind the true interest of the nation, particularly with regard to these views and designs of *France*, by which this nation is both hurt in its interests, and wronged in its just rights.

All these designs and views of the French in *America* have hitherto been treated as groundless

groundless suggestions; but now I think we may be convinced of them, from fatal experience. They have been reckoned to be so very distant, if there was any reality in them, that they seem to have been looked upon as not worth notice; but now they are come to our doors, and make us take notice of them, whether we will or not. It was for this reason that we have been at this pains to represent their several views and designs, that we may not again be surprized by them, nor caught so unguarded against them: and shall next consider the situation they are in to accomplish them.

S E C T. III.

The situation of the French colonies, and their abilities to accomplish those designs.

THE situation of the French in North America is every way as convenient, to execute all those their schemes abovementioned, as our situation is inconvenient and disadvantageous to prevent them. They have had all those things in view for many years, have been constantly preparing themselves for those purposes, and have thereby put themselves in a situation proper to execute them; while we have never once thought of them. It was
this

this their situation that made them take that otherwise desperate step to secure the river Ohio in 1753, and has made them so successful in it. For this they began to prepare themselves immediately after the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, by securing and fortifying *Niagara* that leads to that river; and by strengthening and settling themselves at *Sandofki*, the river *Miamis*, and *Detroit*, about lake *Eric*; and gaining an interest with the natives there, which support and command the river *Ohio*. All those settlements they had to back and support them there, and about fort *du Quesne*, when they seized that place; while we had only some straggling settlements on the *Ohio*, with a small fort building there, but hardly garrisoned, at a great distance from our other more secure settlements, and separated from them by the mountains. By this means they could hardly fail to secure the river *Ohio*, by one stroke, as we see they did.

By that step they set down between us and all the natives of North America, who reside only upon those our frontiers: and by means of fort *du Quesne*, and *Niagara*, they intercepted our communication entirely with all the natives of that continent, except a few *Iroquois* and *Cherokees*, by which they have all the Indians of that whole continent in a manner to join with them, and support them, who have done us more mischief than the French them-

themselves. By this means they have even a superiority over our more populous colonies, and have always as many men in the field, if not more, than we have; notwithstanding our boasted superiority in North America. This they saw, and every one might plainly have foreseen, when they took possession of fort *du Quesne*, and *Niagara*,

The situation and advantages of these two places is hardly to be described or conceived, or compared to any thing else: there is perhaps no part of the world so awed and commanded by a number of places, as North America is by these two only: they command in a manner that whole continent: for which reason we shall consider their situation more particularly below in the account of our frontiers. By means of these two places alone the French entirely secure all those vast and extensive territories above described, to the very sources of the rivers *St. Lawrence* and *Missisipi*, with the great *Lakes*; cut off our access to them, and deprive us of all communication with them; by which they have all those vast regions, and all the natives in them, entirely at their command. This was their view in seizing the river *Ohio*, and there was no wonder to see them take such steps to secure that one place on this river, when they could do it so easily, only with a handfull of men; and

could gain by it an extent of country larger perhaps than all Europe, which they could secure only by means of two little forts!— and maintain only with a few woods-men and Indians.

If this is considered, I say, we need not be surprized at the proceedings of the French, nor how they come to pretend to claim all the vast regions above described in *Louisiana* and *Canada*, by only a handful of people in them. If they had no other advantages but their number of men, we should be as little alarmed by them, as some others seem to be. But when they come to secure, by this means, a tract of country as large as all Europe, and all North America in a manner, only by a small handful of ragamuffins too, out of the few people they have, it is high time to be alarmed, I think, if we have any manner of regard for our own safety.

And if those things are rightly considered, it will appear, that the proceedings of the French on the *Ohio*, and in all other parts of North America, were not merely to secure a few straggling settlements, or a little peltry trade with the Indians; as some, who appear to be little acquainted with those matters, and never heard of them before, seem to have imagined. Their views and designs are much greater, and might easily have been foreseen, if we

had been apprised of the vast advantages they gain by these two places, and how easy it was to secure them, as they did. †

With all this, the countries they secure by means of those two places are not more extensive, than they are convenient to them. By means of *Niagara* and fort *du Quesne* they join their two colonies of *Canada* and *Louisiana* together, by the nearest communication that is between them; and are thereby able to assemble their whole force together against the English, whenever they please; the other grand point they have in view.

The conveniences they have for this purpose of uniting their two colonies together, are as great and almost incredible, as the vastness of the concerns they secure by it. Those who are so little acquainted with North America, as most of our people are, seem to imagine, that if the French were thus to join *Canada* and *Louisiana* together, it would be of little use to them, while their settlements in them are so remote and distant, as *Quebec* and *New Orleans*. But they must know, that there is a navigation and water-carriage, the whole way from the mouth of the river *St. Laurence* to the mouth of the *Missisipi*, all over and across the continent of North America, upwards of 3000 miles, by which their most remote settlements are all connected together. In all this distance there is no interruption of a carriage by water, except at the
great

great fall of *Niagara*, where there is a convenient land-carriage of about twenty miles; and even that they may avoid by going up the rivers a little west of it, where two branches of Lake *Ontario* and Lake *Erie* almost join together. Besides this, they have a small land-carriage from the rivers of Lake *Erie* to the branches of the *Mississipi*, but fifteen miles at most, and in some places but four or five; with a fall or two in the river *St. Laurence* about *Montreal*. These are the only interruptions to a water-carriage from the mouth of the river *St. Laurence* to the river *Mississipi*.—You may even go from *Hudson's Bay* to the Bay of *Mexico*, or from *Lake Superior* to the remotest part of *Hudson's Bay*, all over the continent of North America, by water the whole way*.

This prodigious water-carriage in North America is occasioned by the great extent of the rivers *St. Laurence*, and *Mississipi*, which spread over all the continent in a manner, for 2000 miles and more, and whose branches interlock with one another; with those five great lakes intervening between them, that make so many inland seas, upwards of 1200 miles in length.

It is by means of this water-carriage, that the French have always kept up a communi-

* See the Travels of *Joseph le France*, in Mr. *Dobbs's* account of *Hudson's Bay*.

cation between their settlements in *Canada*, and the *Mississipi*. For this purpose they have hitherto been obliged to go a great way about, by *Lake Huron* and *Michigan*. They have another shorter way from the west end of *Lake Erie*, by the river *Wabache*, although seldom, if ever, followed by them. But the shortest and most convenient way of all, is by the river *Ohio*; which shortens their way 5 or 600 miles. That river is navigable the whole way from its sources to the *Mississipi*, with only one fall in it, that is navigable both up and down. By means of this river then they have a ready passage at all times from *Canada* to the *Mississipi*, and avoid the dangerous navigation of the great lakes that cannot be attempted but at certain times. This then was a prodigious advantage the French gained by the river *Ohio*, besides all others. And if they kept up such a communication between their two colonies before by that dangerous navigation of the great Lakes, how much more will they do it now, by the river *Ohio*; and thereby constantly infest the frontiers of all our colonies, as they have already done.

By this means then we see, that the French can readily assemble and unite all their force in North America together at any place they find convenient; and thereby carry every point

they

they please : their many settlements in North America are divided into four bodies, *Canada*, *Louisiana*, the *Illinois*, and *le Detroit*, which are all connected together by the navigation above described, and the river *Ohio*. These are all under one government with the same views and interest; while we are divided and disunited by different governments, laws, and customs, with as different views and interests, as ever any people had ; by which our force is never to be joined, whilst theirs is always so. And their force when thus joined is superior to the force of any one of our colonies, especially when they are backed by the Indians ; by which means they succeed in every thing they undertake, in the manner we see, with only a handful of men, against all the numbers we have in our colonies, when they are taken together. But if the French take them one by one, as they have done, they must soon take them all, as they are superior to any one of our colonies

It was this vast advantage, and convenience that made the French so intent upon securing the river *Ohio* ; a step that we might always see they would take, if it was possible for them. In the midst of this extensive navigation stands that important place of *Fort du Quesne* upon the *Ohio* described below, which is not more important than it is convenient to them.

them. It is in the center of the whole French force in all North America joined together, which is here united and connected in one body, with numbers of Indians to back them; who are all supported with little or no labour or expence, or from what the country naturally produces, as is shown below.

This place again is as convenient to annoy and distress the British colonies. It is from hence that they send out parties of woodsmen and Indians, that have overrun all the frontiers of *Virginia*, *Maryland*, and *Pensylvania*, that are all open and exposed to them; where they have laid waste, and broke up all our settlements in some whole counties.

To bring this view of the situation of the French colonies then a little nigher home: if they have such an extensive water carriage all over North America, there is no doubt but they have the same in a smaller compass round them. Accordingly we see a ready communication by water, between all those forts that they have drawn round us, by which they readily pass from one to the other; and transport troops, stores, artillery, &c. with a great deal of ease, at a small expence.

By this means they carry on a war in America with much less charge and expence than we can do; which makes them so much more ready

ready to engage in such wars: They go from place to place, all over North America, by water, while we have many long and chargeable journeys to make by land, before we can get at them. If our troops are to be transported, it is by tedious and expensive embarkations by shipping; while they build fleets upon the spot, and at the instant they want them; transporting both their fleets of canoes and themselves wherever they desire. Hence they have made such a progress every where, while we have been three years going to one of the nighest and most convenient forts they have, but have not yet been able to get to it; and suffered so much in crossing the woods and mountains, in going to attack Fort *du Quesne*; which they come to by water.

If we consider this their situation, and compare it with the situation of our colonies as represented below, there is no wonder they should gain such advantages over us. To prevent this we have no other way but to break that chain of forts, that they have drawn round us, and linked themselves together in the manner we see.

For this reason, we should next take a view of this their chain of forts, which may be seen on a map as here enumerated, and are,

Crown-

<i>Crown-Point,</i>	<i>Fort du Quesne,</i>
<i>Fort la Motte,</i>	<i>Sandoski,</i>
<i>Chambli,</i>	<i>Fort Miamis,</i>
<i>St. John's,</i>	<i>Great Wiaut,</i>
<i>Sorel,</i>	<i>Little Wiaut,</i>
<i>Montreal,</i>	<i>Le Droit,</i>
<i>La Galette,</i>	<i>Missilimakinac,</i>
<i>Fort Frontenac,</i>	<i>Fort St. Joseph,</i>
<i>Toronto,</i>	<i>Le Rocher,</i>
<i>Niagara,</i>	<i>Fort Chartres,</i>
<i>Presqu' Isle, leading</i>	<i>Kaskaskies.</i>
<i>to Buffalo river,</i>	<i>Kappa,</i>
<i>and the Ohio,</i>	<i>Albamas.</i>

Besides these, their two fortresses of *Quebec* and *Lewisburg* should not be forgot, nor *Trois Rivieres*, *New Orleans*, and *Fort Louis* at *Mobile*, with number of other smaller ones, purposely omitted, more perhaps than are here enumerated; besides the forts they have in their own precincts in *Canada*.

What the condition of these forts may be is not so much to the purpose, as some perhaps may imagine. They are sufficient we see to keep possession in the mean time, and they are easily strengthened. Forts and fortifications are well known to be engines that the French deal in, and know how to manage to the best advantage. If they are not strong now, they can soon make them so. This we may learn from *Crown Point* and *Lewisburg*; which

were as little and much less regarded some years ago, than any of these forts may be now; whilst they have since cost this nation such sums, and ever will cost it, ten times more than they cost to erect, so long as they stand. And if these two have cost us such sums, Fort *du Quesne* and *Niagara* are likely to cost much more, whatever they may be now.

This is the chain of forts that we have heard so much talked of, and the batteries that the French have erected against us, upon our own territories too, with which they distress and annoy us in all quarters, while they are safe and secure themselves, under the defence of their cannon.

It is by means of these forts, situated up and down at convenient distances, in the most important places, that they are able to launch out into all parts of North America, and spread over that whole continent, with such a handful of people, without any thing to fear, even from the traitorous savages, whom they rather awe and command, than apprehend or dread any thing from them, by means of these forts. While on the other hand, our people in the colonies are not only exposed at home, but in danger every where abroad: their frontiers are all open and exposed to the incursions both of the French and Indians; and in the remote Indian coun-

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tries they have no security at all, but what they may purchase for their money, with a constant charge to the public, as well as to many individuals. So long as this is the case there is no wonder to see the French overrun all North America. These are advantages that overpower numbers, and give the few people they have there, a superiority over ten times the number that we have; even if their situation was the same in other respects, as it is still more different and disadvantageous in many other respects.

Whatever we may think then of these French forts, their advantages are certainly very great, and that both in time of peace and war. They secure the whole continent of North America in a manner, and all the vast regions, and many conveniences attending them, above described. They awe and command all the natives, secure their furr-trade, give them a protection for themselves, and their wives and children, against their enemies; a thing that they have often asked of us, but have never obtained; by which they are so ready to join the French; and so ready to engage in war with all their neighbours, to support the French interest, when they know themselves to be secure at home.

It is observed of the natives of America, especially those about the great lakes, that they cannot

or will not live without war ; so that we may be sure of perpetual disturbances from them, if we allow the French thus to protect and encourage them in what is otherwise their natural propensity.

By this means the French secure all the interior parts of North America, only by a few Indians, and Indian traders or woodsmen ; by whose means they draw our own allies from us, and therewith get possession of our territories, with little or no charge or expence, only by means of a few forts or truck-houses, that secure their goods and merchandizes at the same time : while we are deprived of all those advantages, and extensive fruitful countries, that belong to us ; and cannot support our interest with a much greater charge and expence.

For all these purposes the French have only to keep up three forts or fortifications, that can be any charge to them, to wit, *Crown Point*, *Niagara*, and fort *Du Quesne*. All their other little forts are only as it were redoubts to these, and serve chiefly to keep up a communication between these three ; which are or soon will be no doubt more considerable fortresses.

By these three alone, they secure all the frontiers of their own colonies—all the

frontiers of our colonies—and all North America with it, except a slip on the sea-coast.

The situation and advantages of these three places are almost incredible, but they are not less certain on that account. By *Niagara* and fort *Du Quesne* alone, they cut off our communication with all the interior parts of North America, and secure them entirely; while they secure themselves at home merely by *Crown Point*. For this reason it will be necessary to give a more particular account of these three places, as we shall do below; which may be here referred to these other vast advantages of the French colonies in their present situation.

It is this their situation that gives them such an advantage over us. They have only these three places to guard, while we have some hundreds. And even of these three, *Niagara* is secure by its situation, defended by the lakes and mountains alone, since the demolition of *Oswego*. Fort *Du Quesne* is much in the same situation, being defended by five ridges of mountains, and many woods that are difficult to pass, which lie between it and our settlements. They have nothing then to attend to but *Crown Point*; while we seem to disregard *Niagara*, which we can hardly get at; and neglect
fort

fort *Du Quesne*, which we seem to think impracticable, since the defeat of general *Braddock*.

As they have nothing to defend then but this one place, they are likely to give us enough to do with that, and keep us at a bay with it, 'till they secure all the rest, and all their many encroachments upon us. They are in possession of all the frontiers of our colonies, and can at any time pour in their irregulars, *Coueurs de Bois*, and Indians into them; by which our people dare not stir, nor march to *Crown-Point*, or any where else, but are obliged to stand upon their defence at home. Even the most remote southern colonies, *Carolina* and *Georgia*, are exposed to them, and in danger of being attacked by them, from *Mobile* and *Albamas*; from which the French can march over land to their frontiers, and are not far to come by water to their coasts; and attack them both in flank and front at the same time.

By this means our force is divided into as many small parties, as we have colonies on the continent, which are ten in number; while theirs is all united and mustered up at one place. It is by this means that they get the advantage of our numbers only with a handful of men, that they have hitherto had at least.

But

But if their force is now encreased to any thing like what it is represented to be, they must not only gain advantages, and secure every place we are contending for, and all North America with it, but our colonies themselves must be in danger from them, so long as they remain in the inactive divided state we see them. We boast of our force being ten times greater than theirs, and seem to rest secure with that, without making any use of it! But what is a divided and broken force? If we have ten times as many men, we have more than ten times, perhaps ten times ten as many places, to defend with them; while they have only one in their present situation, and the way we act. Their frontiers are defended by two or three forts, ours are all open to them, and we have every place on them for 2000 miles to guard. And it may be always observed, that, by uniting their force together, in the manner we have represented, they are constantly superior to us at any one place.

Here then we may see, that the situation of the French force in North America, both now and at all times. It may be compared to an army drawn up in a body about lake *Champlain* and *Montreal*, with lake *Ontario* and the river *Ohio*, supported by two wings,
Quebec

Quebec and *New-Orleans*. These wings we cannot attack but by expensive and hazardous embarkations by sea. For this reason we attack, with only a small part of our force, the strongest part of their main body on lake *Champlain*, that is supported by both wings, neither of which we attempt.

If those things are duly weighed and considered, how necessary will it appear for us, to attack fort *Du Quesne*, as well as *Crown-Point*; by which we may be able to make use of the numbers of men that we have. We have many men in *Virginia*, *Maryland* and *Pensylvania*, that do nothing, and can do nothing, but guard their own frontiers, or set still and look on, expecting hourly to be attacked from fort *Du Quesne*; whereas if they were once to take and secure that place as it was intended at first, those colonies would be safe, and might join the rest at *Crown-Point*, or any where else.

Without some such measure at least, I can see nothing we do or attempt, (unless we have a mind to attempt *Quebec*, and divide their force effectually, by striking at the root of it at once,) but to protract a tedious and expensive war, without any hopes of success or advantage from it at last; but on the contrary, with the prospect and imminent danger of a loss by it, that is much greater than

than most seem to apprehend ; the loss of all the vast regions and other concerns above described, with the danger if not the certain loss of all North America with them ; besides the charge we must be at for—that loss.

This we have good reason to apprehend and be alarmed at, if the force of the French in North America is any way to compare to what it is represented. There are lists of their forces from good hands, that make them amount to no less than 40,000 men now in arms, ready to attack us on all sides, in their two colonies of *Canada* and *Louisiana* together. In these two provinces they have by those lists no less than 11,000 regular troops, with 4,000 woodsmen, or *Coueurs de Bois*, that are well known to be the most dangerous enemy of any, and are those that have chiefly done us so much mischief ; besides 25,000 militia, who are reckoned equal to any regular troops, in that part of the world at least, and in those woods, and are as well trained perhaps.

These numbers we hope are not altogether to be depended upon ; otherwise the consequence is to be dreaded. But if we consider, that they had 12 or 15,000 militia in *Canada* in the last war, that may be called a standing army there ; besides the numbers

of men and troops, chiefly disbanded soldiers, they sent to all parts of lake *Erie* and the river *Ohio*, immediately after the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, who are the people that were ready upon a call to do us the mischief they have lately done ; with 2,000 regular troops they sent at the same time to the *Mississipi*, where they had by the accounts of their deserters no less than 12,000 men in the year 1752, with 1000 pieces of cannon mounted in all their several forts there ; and where they are daily sending men and troops every day, as we may see by our captures ; besides the numbers of men sent to *Canada*, and *Cape Breton*, more than we know or have heard of, without doubt : if all those things are considered, I say, we have all reason to believe their force to be much greater than has been imagined ; and for that we need only appeal to convincing matters of fact, and consider what they have been able to do with it.

This is at least certain from all accounts, that their whole force in America, and all the men they have in it, are now in arms against us every where, determined to carry their point, if possible ; while our people are looking on with their hands in their bosom, with not above 1 or 2000 men now in arms perhaps, out of 4 or 500,000 we have

in North America, to oppose this force, that is raised against them. As long as this continues to be the case, I do not see what better success we are likely to expect in this campaign, than we met with in the two last. We may take *Crown-Point* perhaps, and do very little after we have done that.

If we consider our situation in America, and compare it with the situation of the French, here represented both together, I cannot see for my share as yet, what is to hinder them to carry every point they aim at, and effectually to secure all North America; so long as we act in the manner we seem to do at least. They have already overrun all that whole continent, except the sea coast—have seized every place that is convenient or necessary to secure it—have demolished the only place we had to oppose or attack them—and have their whole force in arms to make good their conquests, and encroachments every where—all this they have done with a handful of woodsmen and a few troops—and how much more will they be able to do with their whole force thus assembled together, and supported by constant supplies and succours from France.

Let us then reflect upon this situation of the French in North America, and see what might be the consequences of allowing them any new acquisitions there.

Danger.

Dangerous consequences of suffering the French to be in possession of Nova Scotia, or any other colony on the sea coast of North America.

But what if the French had been, or were to be, in possession of *Nova Scotia* with all this?—Surely if we consider the consequences of that, this nation has good reason to thank those true patriots of their country who preserved that province for it. If the French were in possession of this province, even at this present, and much more so hereafter, it would be easy for them to accomplish all their vast designs above represented, great and extravagant as they would appear at first sight, and as some perhaps may think them.

The only force we have to oppose them in America is in *New England*; which durst not stir, any more than the rest of our colonies can do at present, if the French were in possession of *Nova Scotia*. They have on the frontiers of these two provinces, a body of the most warlike Indians in all America, the *Abenakis*, with all the Indians of *Nova Scotia*, who are declared enemies of the English, and constant friends and allies of the French, that are convenient to, and constantly supported by, the whole power of the French at *Quebec*: which two have constantly over-

run *New England*, and have laid waste the whole frontiers of that country again and again, whenever any disturbances happen between the French and the English.

How much are we oblig'd to those then, who may have prevented those disasters in time, by fortifying *Kenebec* river. It is only by that means, that we are able to raise a few men in *New England*, to oppose the French in their present undertakings ; who would have enough to do to defend themselves against *Quebec*, and *Nova Scotia*, and their eastern Indians together, if the French had both those places, that are so convenient to support one another, and to annoy us, as they formerly did. Of what consequence is it then to keep those eastern Indians out of *New England*. The safety of all our colonies seems to depend much upon it at this present. For this reason we should not neglect the inroads they have into this province by *Saco* river, and *Penobscot*, as well as the others described below ; especially when we consider how ready the French are to play off these their engines upon us at all times.



Here then we may plainly see the advantage of *Nova Scotia* : it gives our northern colonies room to aid and assist the others, that are not able to defend themselves—It prevents *New England* from being overrun
by

by the French and Indians, as they have formerly been, and as the rest of our colonies are now; by which that province is able to support the rest.—If it was not for this, the French might take any or all our colonies they please one after another.





By dividing our force in the manner they have already done, and as they would much more do with *Nova Scotia*, we should be entirely unable to act with it, great as some would make it; but if we offered to attack the French here, we should be exposed there, and could not assemble the force of our colonies together, any more than we have yet been able to do, without exposing them to be over-run by a savage and barbarous enemy. It is this that makes our colonies as unable to assist one another, as some think they have been unwilling, and none have yet been able to lend any assistance to the other but *New England*; which that would likewise be unable to do, if the French had *Nova Scotia*. By this means we have been obliged to undertake so many fruitless and unsuccessful expeditions, without so much as attempting any one that is likely to succeed; and we should always be in that situation, if the French had possession of *Nova Scotia*, or any other colony on the sea-coast of North America.

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When our force is divided in this manner, if the French could send a force from *Nova Scotia*, or any other place on the sea-coast of that continent, while they attack their frontiers by land, and pour in their savages and Indians upon them, if it was only to make a diversion, there is not certainly any one of our colonies in a condition at present, whatever they may be hereafter, to withstand such an attack; if it be not perhaps *New-England* alone: and that too would soon be in jeopardy, if the French were to be in possession of both *Nova Scotia* and *Cape-Breton*, with *Crown-Point* and *Canada*, with which they surround that colony on all sides, and prevent a possibility of its increase; while they have room to extend themselves, and to increase on all sides, all over the continent of North America.

How necessary is it then for our colonies to unite together to repel such invasions, and to be upon our guard against them! It is much better to prevent such distempers, than to cure them.

The grand view and aim of the French in America, we see, is, to make themselves masters of *New-York*, if possible; which their whole force in North America, that is so readily joined together, is so very convenient for, as we may see at this present. For this purpose they only want an opportunity to attack that

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province by sea, as they propose, while they invade it with their whole force by land, to make themselves masters of it very soon ; as we may see from all that has happened for these three years past. But how easy would it be for them to attack the town of *New-York* by sea, or even *Boston*, or any other of our colonies, if they were to be in possession of *Nova Scotia*, with colonies of people in it, supported, as they are every where, with forts and garrisons, and such convenient ports and harbours for fleets of ships ; all which they could not fail to have here in a very short time : where these their armaments would be within a few days sail of *New-York*, and not far from any of our colonies ; whilst our fleets in Britain, if they were ready, are at the distance of as many week's sail from them, if not much more—just as they were from *Minorca*.

If by these or any other the like stratagems the French were to make themselves masters of *New York*, they would not only have one of the most convenient ports in all North America, which would secure them the most ready and convenient passage to all their settlements in *Canada*, *Crown-Point*, *Niagara*, &c. but they would likewise have all the Six Nations of Indians, and their dependants, and all the other natives of those northern parts of

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America to a man, at their mercy and command; and would be supported by this whole force, that lies all convenient and compact in a small compass, ready to be drawn together on a very short warning; which is surely much greater than any force we have there to oppose them, or could well fend there.

Of what consequence then is *Nova Scotia* to this kingdom!—and of what consequence would it be to the French!—No less than the safety and security of all our colonies in America seems to depend upon it. If the French were possessed of that, we see, that by one single stroke, struck when we are unguarded, as we are apt to be, and as we were on the *Ohio*, they are able to seize any of our most important colonies, to maintain themselves in them, and to become superior to the English by one blow in North America, as they already are in the Islands.

A comparative View of the Situation of the two Nations in America.

Let us not be too secure then in our boasted superiority in America. We have more men, it is true, but what condition or situation are they in? Surely this nation ought to enquire into that very carefully, since its all seems very much to depend upon it. The French are much superior to Britain in Europe

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rope, and if they do not preserve a superiority in America, what safety have they any where? If they are able to bring this nation into such charges and difficulties about its colonies alone (and keep them in suspense for years together, whether they shall take them or not) as well as from its engagements upon the continent of Europe, how long will it hold out?

It is certainly necessary, that Britain should have a superiority over France in America, when it is so inferior to it in Europe, if we have any regard to the liberties of all Europe, as well as this nation. But if we consider the situation of the two nations, as here represented from undoubted matters of fact, the superiority of Britain in America will not appear in the light that many take it in, who consider only our number of men.

Our colonies are all open and exposed, without any manner of security or defence.—Theirs are protected and secured by numbers of forts and fortresses.—Our men in America are scattered up and down the woods, upon their plantations, in remote and distant provinces.—Theirs are collected together in forts and garrisons.—Our people are nothing but a set of farmers and planters, used only to the axe or hoe.—Theirs are not only well trained and disciplined, but they are used to arms

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from their infancy among the Indians ; and are reckoned equal, if not superior in that part of the world to veteran troops.—Our people are not to be drawn together from so many different governments, views, and interests; are unable, unwilling, or remiss to march against an enemy, or dare not stir, for fear of being attacked at home.—They are all under one government, subject to command, like a military people.—While we mind nothing but trade and planting. ——— With these the French maintain numbers of Indians—We have none,——These are troops that fight without pay—maintain themselves in the woods without charges—march without baggage—and support themselves without stores and magazines—we are at immense charges for those purposes.—By these means a few Indians do more execution, as we see, than four or five times their number of our men, and they have almost all the Indians of that continent to join them.

With this they are in possession of a vastly greater extent of territory, at least five times as much as the English. And in all this extensive possession they have not above two places to guard on the continent, *Crown-Point* and *Niagara*, while we have some hundreds. They have likewise a convenient water-carriage to all their forts, settlements, and forces, while

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we can hardly get at ours, or at them, by many tedious and expensive marches by land. By this means their force is easily assembled and united, and lies compact together about *Montreal*, *Fort Fontenac*, *Niagara*, and *Crown-Point*, which are all convenient to support one another, and to get support from all the French settlements; while our force is dispersed in a single extended line along the sea-coast, and cannot be drawn together.—Hence they get the better of us with ten times their numbers; and at present their force is all in arms—ours is still to raise, or to transport thither.

If all those things are considered, what reason have we to dread the power and encroachments of the French in America, as well as in Europe! and how careful ought we to be to guard against them! particularly by keeping them out of *Nova Scotia*, the *Great Lakes*, and river *Ohio*; and by strengthening the colony of *New York*, as much as possible; if not our islands likewise.

It is true, we have hitherto been superior to the French in North America in numbers of people, but how has that happened? It was because they had no right nor titles there, and were constantly opposed by the English even to settle. But since we allowed them, and gave them, a footing there, they have made titles enough by usurpation and encroachment. They have hitherto likewise been op-

posed by the natives, who have done them infinite mischief formerly, but are now obliged to submit to them, and join them : The *Five Nations* have hitherto stopt their progress in *Canada* entirely; who are now no longer able to cope with them; no more than the *Chicasaws* are on the *Mississipi*. By these means they have hitherto been confined to a barren inhospitable soil in *Canada*, or to sandy desarts on the mouth of the *Mississipi*.

But if they once get secure possession of those vast and fruitful regions on the *Great Lakes*, river *Ohio*, *Mississipi*, with *Nova Scotia*, which they are now contending for, their situation in America, will be quite altered. They will then have the most fruitful countries of any in all America in the midst, and most healthy climates, of all that continent, more than twenty times what Britain would have left; and they want not many more men than Britain has to people them, and soon to become superior to the English every where. This they soon did, in a few years after the treaty of *Utrecht*, from the like advantages in the islands, by allowing them to usurp that large and fruitful island of *Hispaniola*.

Reflections on the present situation of the French in America.

The consequence and result of all this contest
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is a naval power, which depends upon *trade* and *commerce*, as that does now in a great measure upon the *plantations* in America. The American colonies are now become considerable, and real objects worth attention; great part of the maritime trade of Europe centers in them; and Britain has perhaps not less than 5,000,000 *l.* sterling a year from them, besides the chief support of its naval power. The French seeing this, and that their naval power was ruined by Britain in the last war, were resolved to strike at the root of our power and prosperity, and source of our *trade* and *Navigation*, the American colonies. And if they once get a superiority there, as they must do, by getting possession of all those vast regions in America, that they are contending for, they must soon become superior to Britain both by sea and land especially as they have so many more men.

If any then may ever think of yielding up those vast countries in the inland parts of North America to the French, or of letting them remain in possession of *Niagara*, or *Fort du Quesne*, which secure them entirely, let them consider the consequences of it. They are no sooner possessed of them than they become superior to the English in North America, as they already are in the Islands. And what then becomes of our colonies, trade, and commerce, and consequently of our power,

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and safety in Europe? The only safety and security that this nation has against their growing power, is a small superiority we have had over them in America, upon which our superior navy depends. It was these two that plainly gave peace to Europe in the last war, and made the French give up their conquests every where. If Britain does not preserve a considerable superiority then in America, the liberties or properties not only of this nation, but even of all the states of Europe that depend so much upon Great Britain, must be endangered by it.

All Europe then seems to be concerned in our present quarrel in America, and to be interested in our success. The only states in Europe that oppose the exorbitant power of the French, are, the empire, and the two maritime powers: but if the empire is divided in itself, and ruined by intestine broils, as it is likely to be; while one of the maritime powers is already ruined, and quite sunk; and the French become superior to the other, and even joined by the head of the Empire, what becomes of the liberties of Europe?— as well as America?

This nation has already spent and exhausted its treasure and substance, in supporting the liberties and privileges, and defending the property of the other states of Europe, against

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against a common enemy : and if it is no longer able to do that, when it may be most wanted perhaps ; but sees its own interests and concerns given up by those, whom it has been at such a charge to support ; the grand alliance in Europe against the French must be broke ; and they must deal with each party as they think fit ; in the same manner as they do with our divided and disunited colonies in America : especially when we see the principal states in Europe now doing all that lies in their power to ruin one another, as if it were on purpose to establish an universal dominion of the French over them, who *assist them to their ruin.*—*Divide & Impera.*

Seeing this, as it was plainly seen at the conclusion of the last war, the French have been going on with such diligence ever since, to strengthen themselves in America ; and to get the better of the power of Britain there, which only crosses their designs every where. And if they had not been a little too forward and premature in the execution of their designs in North America, it is the opinion of all who are best acquainted with those things, that it would not have been in our power to have opposed or prevented them, if we are as it is ; which I think we may plainly see from what has happened. How shall we ever be able then

to oppose them again, if they are once well settled and fortified, encrease and multiply, as they must do, in all those vast and extensive countries in America, that they have now overrun with such a handful of men? They must then certainly give law to Britain and all others in America, if not to all Europe with it.

You may say perhaps, Britain will hereafter keep a *standing army* in her colonies; both to awe them and her enemies. If they had thought of that a little sooner, it might have prevented the necessity of it perhaps. But if they have not been able to keep a force sufficient to defend themselves at home, let them consider in time, before it may be absolutely necessary to keep such a one, and to no purpose perhaps, how convenient it may be for them to keep a *standing army*, sufficient to defend both themselves at home, and all America besides.—If Britain should send ever so many men to America, cannot France send twice, nay ten times, as many, with more ease?—The one keeps 300,000 men in pay, or at least 200,000 and more, when the other can hardly keep 18,000.

With such a number of men, if the French hold all the secure passes, and strong places in North America, throughout the whole continent; with so many fortifications to support them, what security can any one think

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think, Britain will have for a little slip she has on the sea coast. France may *promise* it to us by treaty, and we must be at her mercy to fulfill her *promise*. But 300,000 men are a more prevailing argument than *French promises*. They have no other argument for all the usurpations and encroachments they have made in America, and defend by that argument alone.

This must inevitably bring the nation into *land wars*, to defend her colonies, or she must give them up altogether. But such *wars on the continent*, especially with France, must be the ruin of this nation entirely, if it is so constantly obliged to engage in them. They are obliged to be at a double expence in such wars from a naval force to protect themselves, and a land army to oppose their enemies; burdens and loads, that a nation already exhausted with them, cannot be supposed to hold out in her groans under much longer. And they seem to have no other way ever to get rid of them, but to remove the cause and occasion of them, to drive the French from their borders, and to keep them at a distance from them, now when they seem to have it in their power to do it; an opportunity, which if let slip, may never perhaps offer again.

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Others may think perhaps, that Britain may always protect her colonies with her fleets; which is an opportunity they now have to redress themselves; and if they do not make use of that, they may never have such another one again perhaps. Are we to suppose, that France is never to have a ship at sea again? I don't see we have hurt her navy, the only thing we had to do. And if they had but a very few ships at sea now, to invade our colonies, what would become of them? It was but the year before the last, that they had five and twenty sail of ships to invade them, when we sent but eleven after them; and we may not perhaps have even that disproportionate number ready, or be able to spare them, at another time— It is the whole bent and drift of that powerful nation, France, to gain a naval power; and we have no just and fair way, if any possible way, to prevent it, but to keep them out of our plantations, that must give them even a superior navy to Britain in time.

It is not merely for the sake of what those inland countries in America may *fetch in trade*, by immediate returns, the only thing that many among us seem to consider, that makes the French risque such an expence both of blood and treasure for them; but it is to gain a *power*, which will at any time
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command *trade*— and that a *naval power*, which will as easily command *Britain*—and all its *colonies*—which four must certainly go together—If the French had a naval power at this present, what must become of the British colonies, or of Britain itself? And there is no doubt, but they will use their utmost endeavours to get a *naval power*; which seems to be the chief design of their proceedings in America, that is become the root and source of all such power.

They who are little acquainted with the situation of the two nations in America, and still less with the importance of the present contest between them there, seem to think it very much and sufficient, that we should hold all the sea coast of North America. But it will plainly appear, from what has been said, if we did not do that, we should soon hold none of it. And how long shall we hold the *sea coast*, if the French hold *all the rest of that whole continent*, that is larger than all Europe? And this they must do, by holding only *Niagara*, and fort *Du Quesne*.

It is plain, they will then want *sea ports*, to get to those their inland territories, and will be able to command any they please. They keep 2 or 300,000 men against 18000, and are at the same time in possession of all the secure passes, strong holds, and fortified places

places all over the same continent with us, where they have only to march to take possession of any or all the places we are masters of. They can at any time assemble their whole force together for this purpose, whilst ours is so divided and disunited, and thereby carry any point they aim at. And can we imagine, that they will ever neglect so material a point as this? No: our colonies on the sea coast must be all exposed to them, and they will be able to seize any one or more of them, whenever they think fit, and all our islands with them, if we leave them thus in possession of all the rest of the continent.

Our next care then should be, to consider the situation of our own colonies, with regard to those views and designs of the French, and see how we are to guard against them. For this purpose we should next take a view of the French encroachments, and the several Countries they have seized in the British dominions in North America, by which alone they are able to make their situation so threatening to us. We should likewise consider the consequence and importance of those places that they have seized, with the ways of getting at them, and recovering them; the only way, it is imagined, to retrieve the affairs of the nation in America; which shall be the subject of our further enquiry.

S E C T.

S E C T. IV.

Of the FRONTIERS of the British settlements in North America; the encroachments of the French upon them; and a proper BARRIER between the two nations.

THE encroachments of the French upon the British territories in North America, have plainly been the cause of our late disturbances, and of our losses and misfortunes from them; which have brought this nation into a greater charge and expence than might have been sufficient to have secured all that continent, if it had been duly attended to in time. But the little knowledge of those remote countries, and the diversity of opinions about them, seem not only to draw our attention from them, and to cross every measure that is proposed about them, but must occasion the total loss of them, if we continue to neglect them as we have done. To prevent this, it is necessary to enquire more particularly, into the situation of those places that are in the hands of the French, to see their consequence and importance both to them and us, and the way by which we are to recover them. This we shall do, not by any exaggerated accounts of the consequences of those things, but

but by a bare narration of matters of fact, and a description of those places that the French are possessed of, and aim at ; by which their importance, and the consequence of letting the French remain in possession of them, must appear to all who will be at the pains to consider it ; and we hope that this may be somewhat conducive likewise to the more desired end of regaining them.

I. Of CROWN-POINT, and the several passes to Canada.

The first of the French encroachments upon us, *Crown-Point*, stands in the very middle of *New-England* and *New-York*, so convenient to distress either, and so well known upon that account, that we need not insist upon it. It was erected there since the year 1730, upon lands too that belonged to ourselves, on purpose to distress, annoy, and attack us, whenever it should be found proper or convenient ; as any one might have perceived at first sight, and as the consequences have but too fully proven.

It is here that the French muster up their whole force in *Canada* to invade our colonies, and fortified this place for that purpose, for which it is so convenient. From hence they marched out in the beginning of the last war, sackt and burnt the fort of *Saraktoga* in *New-York*,

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York, and laid waste the whole frontiers of that province, by means of this place ; the first time we seem ever to have thought it of any consequence. And although we then had 3600 men that marched to attack it ; yet, either for want of orders, as was alledged, or finding it too strong for them, they returned without proceeding to it.

What our late accounts are of the strength and condition of the fortifications of this place, I have not heard, but from a plan and description I have seen of it taken upon the spot in 1748, they appear not to be very considerable. The place was only defended then by Pallisades upon the ramparts, surrounded by a fosse ; within which the barracks or caserns were the chief wall of defence. It had a considerable citadel indeed nigh the lake, on which it stands ; an octagon of stone work, with walls ten feet thick, made bomb proof, and sufficient to lodge 500 men ; by which the landing place from the lake was commanded. But the whole is commanded by a hill within reach of it ; on which the French were entrenched, as their only security, before they took possession of the pass of *Ticonderago*, that leads to it.

But the great and only security of this and other forts in the woods of America, is the difficulty of getting at them, and of transport-
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ing artillery to attack them ; for which and other reasons the situation of those places is of more consequence to consider than their strength.

Crown-Point stands on the head of lake *Champlain*, a large lake fourscore miles long, by which there is a navigation to it from all parts of *Canada*. A small point of land surrounded by this lake on all sides, and secured by a moat on the side of the land, makes what is called by us *Crown-Point*, and by the French fort *Frederic*. This fort lies midway between *Albany* and *Montreal*, the two chief places on our frontiers, and those of the French. It effectually covers all *Canada*, and blocks up our passage entirely into that country ; while it leads the French directly into *New-England* and *New-York* : unless we have a standing army there to oppose them, which we have been obliged to keep two years for no other purpose. This proceeds from the situation of the place in the midst of high mountains, or sunken morasses, on all sides ; which secure it from our attacks. We have but one way to it, it seems, that is reckoned more impracticable than the place itself. This is by the narrow pass of *Ticonderago*, between two lakes, where we have a river to cross, that the French have secured. By this means we have been two years going to this place, without being able to come at it.

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At the same time this place secures the whole country about lake *Champlain*, the original inheritance of the *five nations* of Indians, which they have made over to the English long ago. This is the most fruitful country in all those parts of America, and in that respect worth all Canada perhaps besides. The lands here are covered with *Sugar* trees and *Ginseng*, tokens of the richest lands in America.

This place then is both a nursery and battery of the French against us, and at the same time a safeguard to them. If it had not been for this place alone, and the security it gives the French in *Canada*, it is plain, they durst not have attacked us, any where in America, nor have brought the nation into the charge and expence it has incurred on that account. Of what consequence then are those places in the woods and desarts of America, as some call them, when they fall into the hands of the French! Surely we ought to neglect none of them after this, which was not thought worth notice a few years ago.

But to return to the passes into this country, that lead to this place. The usual way to *Crown-Point*, is well known to be by *Wood-Creek*, by which there is a passage to it by water, all the way from the sea, except twelve miles of an easy land carriage that is in our hands. The French indeed are said to have

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blocked up that creek ; but if it should be found convenient upon any occasion to make use of that short and easy pass, can't it be opened ?

Or can't we go to *Crown-Point* by the old Indian road from *Connecticut* river to *Otter* river, that falls into lake *Champlain* just below *Crown-Point* ? I have seen such a road laid down, that appears to be but short, from a branch of *Connecticut* river, above *Stephens's* fort, called formerly *Medoſtec*, to the head of *Otter* river.

By this a road might be opened to lake *Champlain* from *New-England*, as well as from *New-York*, and the many people we have in that province might go directly to it, without going round by *New-York*, the only way they seem to think of. By this means likewise we might avoid the fortified passes, defiles, and French entrenchments, that obstruct our passage to lake *Champlain* and *Crown-Point* entirely, in the only way we attempt to go to it.

The French have found another way from lake *Champlain* into *New-England*, above this, by crossing *Connecticut* river about *Cobasser*, or *Cobawſe*, and so to the head of *Pennycook* or *Allen's* river. It was by this way that they came into that province, and cut off the town of *Haveril* in 1708.*

* This is the *Hevreuil* mentioned by *Charlevoix*, Tom.

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This road leads to the bottom of lake *Champlain*; whereabouts we are said to have had a fort formerly called *St. John's*, that should have been restored to us by the treaty of *Ryswick*, by the accounts of the French themselves.*

By this way it might be easy to invade *Canada* without going nigh *Crown Point*, and make a diversion from that place; either on the river *St. Francis*, or at *Chambli*: which last would cut off their communication at *Crown-Point* with *Canada* altogether; and might make it fall into our hands, without the many delays, risque and charges of attacking it.

IV. pag. 95; which their geographers place on the head of *Connecticut* river, and out on the heads of *Hudson's* river, some hundred miles within land, and without our settlements; whereas it is in the heart of that province, on the sea coast, nigh the mouth of *Merrimac* river.

* This I have met with no accounts of, but from a very noted author the *Abbé de Fresnoy*, in the following words: if it be not that we see a fort as here described by him laid down in several maps, on the north of lake *Champlain*, above *Chambli*; and another by that name, where the *Scachtacook* Indians now reside.

Le fort de *S. Jean* situé sur la rivière de *S. Laurent*, au couchant de celui de *Rieblieu*, & au nord du lac *Champlain*, doit par la paix de *Ryswic* faite en 1697, avoir été rendu aux Anglois, sur lesquels les François l'avoient pris vers la fin de l'année prececente. *Methodé de Géographie*. Tom. III. p. m. 141.

But there are other ways of invading *Canada*, from *New-England*, besides these; the ways by which the French and their Indians have so often invaded that province: altho' they may be found perhaps to be fitter for such Indian expeditions, than for more regular troops; which, however, I cannot think those abovementioned are. We should not, however, neglect those inroads into *New-England* from *Canada*, since it is by them that the French so much annoy that province; the bad effects of which on all our affairs in *America* we have pointed out above.*

The chief body of the French *Abenakis* Indians, by which they so much infest our settlements both in *New England* and *Nova Scotia*, and have thereby prevented our securing this province hitherto, are settled under the French upon two branches of the river *St. Lawrence*, to wit, the rivers *Puante* and *St. Francis*, about midway between *Quebec* and *Montreal*, in the heart of their province, and in two missions appointed on purpose to secure them, at *Becancour*, and *St. Francis*. From these they have a ready passage over the hills to the head of *Kenebec* river; which is the rendezvous of the French and Indians, in all their hostile attempts upon the English.

* Page 132.

The spot of these remarkable enterprizes is, either at the ponds on the heads of the rivers *Kenebec* and *Chaudiere*, known by the name of *Amaguntick*; or at a large lake, a little to the northward and eastward of these, said to be the principal and most important place in all that country, and a proper barrier between the two nations; of which we have no accounts, but some imperfect descriptions.*

* Vid. *Voyages de Mr. le Beau*; who travelled from *Quebec* to *Norridgewoak* across this lake; and thence up the river *Amariscoggin* to the *Senekaas*. The account he gives is; that he ascended the river *Chaudiere*, over several falls, and some high hills at last, which brought him to a large lake; seemingly by turning to the left or eastern branch of the river *Chaudiere*: of this lake he says; “apres avoir traversé de suite trois endroits, que je puis bien nommè trois petits lacs, qui formoient une figure ovale toute bordée de grands arbres, nous arrivames enfin par le moyen d’une petite riviere fort agreable, sur le bord de ce fameux lac—qu’ils appelloient *Ottanaki*. Je ne l’ai point vu sur aucune carte. Suivant ce qu’ils m’ont dit, qu’à le traverser en droite ligne, il etoit bien aussi long que tout le chemin que nous avons faits depuis *Quebec*: je puis juger qu’il doit avoir au moins deux cens lieues de circuit. Je m’imagineois etre sur le bord de la mer.— Ils m’ont assuré, que ce lac ne recoit de l’eau d’aucune riviere; qu’ au contraire il en fournit à plusieurs, & qu’il y a aussi loin de cet endroit chez les *Anglois*, que chez le *Francois*. Ce qui fit que je leur repondis, que ces rivieres se repandant de cotè & d’autre, pouvoient donc bien leur servir de limites ou de separation.” Tom. I. p. 223, 242.

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When they are assembled at these places, they have two ways to invade *New-England*; that we seem to take no notice of: one by *Kenebec* river, the other by *Pembscot*. In the first they come down *Kenebec* to the chief town of the Indians, *Norridgewoak*, and then leave that river to go up a branch of it, call'd *Maditigoa*, which heads very nigh *Saco* river; that leads into the heart of *New-England*. It was by this way that they seem to have come into that province, when they surpris'd and cut off our men nigh *Saco* river under captain *Lovell* in 1724, who did not expect to meet

His accounts indeed will appear a little romantic perhaps to those who are not well acquainted with America. But our people have likewise discovered a large lake on the head of *Kenebec* river, which seems to be the one here described; altho' I cannot believe it to be so large as 200 leagues in circumference. This, however, is certain, that this is a place of very great importance, and the inroad both into *New-England*, and *Nova Scotia*, which we mention on that account; as the French are so ready to seize all such places, and give us such disturbance with them, while we entirely neglect them.

And if the French are allowed to settle any where on the south side of the river *S. Lawrence*, which they have no right to do, the ridge of mountains north of this lake, that runs from the bottom of lake *Ghamplain* to the lady mountains in *Nova Scotia* at the mouth of the river *S. Lawrence*, from which the waters of that river spring, seems to be the only proper and natural boundary and barrier between the two nations.

them there. This seems to be the way by which those French Indians have so often infested *New-England*, as it is the nighest and most ready way for them to come into all parts of that province; especially as they are said to have another ready and short pass from the heads of *Saco* river to *Casco* and *Falmouth*, by which they avoid the falls and bad navigation of the river *Amariscoggin*, that leads to those places.

These accounts we have from some surveys made, of those parts after the Indian war in 1724, agreeing with Mr. *Bryant*'s actual survey 1740, so far as it goes; in which, and many others, these two rivers, *Saco* and *Maditigoa*, are both laid down and described to head within four or five miles of the river *Amariscoggin*, on each side of it; altho' they are both omitted in some supposed surveys, and our late maps of this country.

This deserves our notice the more, as the forts the government has built on *Kennebec* river, to prevent these incursions into *New-England*, fort *Halifax*, and *Wester*, do not obstruct or secure this chief pass into it; nor even cut off a retreat from it; as they have another way both to retreat and to enter that province, by going up *Amariscoggin* river to the heads of *Conneticut*; by which there is a ready pass to the river *St. Francis* above mentioned, laid down and described like-

likewise in the same surveys we mention, as well as in governor *Burnet's* large manuscript map of *New York*.

This is not said in prejudice to these two forts, which appear to be in the most proper places to secure the chief passage of all by *Kenebec* river, and to be convenient to our settlements to support them. But it might likewise be proper perhaps to have other forts, either at *Norridgewoak*, or at the lakes above mentioned on the heads of *Kenebec* river, whenever we have a force sufficient to defend them. There we might be ready at any time to oblige the French to draw their force out of all their encroachments on us, which I do not see that we are otherwise likely to do.

The other nigher inroad into both *New-England* and *Nova Scotia*, and that directly from *Quebec*, is by the river *Penobscot*. For this they come up the river *Cbaudiere*, that falls into the river *St. Laurence*, just above *Quebec*, and pass over from the heads of that, to the eastern branches of *Kenebec* river, which join the western branches of *Penobscot*, that lead them into all our frontiers both of *New-England* and *Nova Scotia*, and down to the sea-coast, by a good navigation the greatest part of the way. It was by this communication with *Quebec*, that the noted French partizan,

tizan, the baron *St. Castin*, whom we imprudently suffered to remain at *Penobscot*, after the treaty of *Utrecht*, distressed our settlements of *Nova Scotia*; while his accomplice, *F. Ralle*, at *Norridgewoak*, obstructed with his Neophytes all our settlements on the frontiers of *New-England*, by the inroads above described; by which those countries come to be so unsettled and unguarded, and so little known to us.

It may be the more useful to take notice of these passes to *Canada*, as by means of them we seem to have it in our power to distress the French in the most sensible manner; and to divide their force, in the manner they do ours, when they seem to have no sort of safety but in having their force all united together, as is above represented. But if we were to attack them in *Canada*, by one or more of the ways here described, we might soon oblige them to draw off their force from *Crown-Point*, and other places, to defend themselves at home. This seems to be the best way likewise for us to employ our superior numbers of men, if we would make any use of them. And at the same time, it is the most proper, if not the only way, to carry on a war to advantage in *America*, where the country is all open, obstructed only by woods. This we may learn from our enemies at present, and from all former transactions of that kind. They invade us on

all quarters, and keep our men at home at a bay with them ; by which our force is so divided that we can do nothing with it, at least at any one place. By this means, we see, they over-run all North America, only with a handfull of men ; while we do nothing with ten times their numbers, and a much greater charge and expence. The difficulty of transporting cannon, and other cumbersome baggage, by land-marches, through close woods, and impassable ways, makes it very tedious, expensive, and precarious, to succeed in a more regular way in N. America.

To attack the French in this manner, we see we have many different ways, and the very ways they have made use of to distress us, when they took the forts of *Casco*, *Pemaquid*, *Haveril*, and many others in *New-England*, by invading that province from *Canada* by the inroads above described. If by these we were to invade *Canada* in like manner on all quarters, and fort *Du Quesne* at the same time, while we attack *Quebec*, or *New Orleans*, or both of them, by sea, how easy would it be to reduce the French to reason very soon, and put an end to so inglorious and expensive a war in America by one stroke !

But many seem to rest secure with their sea-ports, as if they alone were able to defend them against a nation that keeps a standing
army

army of three or four times their number; and is at the same time in possession of all the secure passes, strong-holds, and fortified places, all over the same continent with them. But the case is not in North America as it is in Britain, where such standing armies, kept on purpose to command us, are not easily transported to our coasts, the only safety this nation has against them; they are there upon the same continent with us, and have only to march to take all the ports we are in possession of, unless we prevent them by some such ways as are here pointed out, and now when it may be done.

II. *Of the Passes to the great LAKES, and particularly of NIAGARA.*

From the passes to *Canada*, we come next to consider those to the *great Lakes*, and territories of the *Six Nations*, which are of such consequence and importance in all our concerns in N. America; while we have little or no access to them, especially since the destruction of *Oswego*. We have many populous colonies indeed hereabouts, and the chief force of the nation in America, in *New-England*, *New-York*, and *Pensylvania*, is by its natural situation convenient to these territories, and inland seas; on which the security of all the continent of North America depends, except the small and narrow part that we are possess of on the sea-coast; while in our present

sent situation we have hardly any way to come at them. This we are precluded from by the French being in possession of lake *Champlain*, and *Crown Point* on one hand, with many large and almost impassable ridges of mountains on the other hand. These mountains arise on the banks of *Hudson's* river in *New York*, beginning at the *Katskill* mountains about a hundred miles from the sea, and spread over all the northern parts of *Pensylvania*: by which that province and *New Jersey*, which lye opposite to these lakes and territories of the six nations on the sea-coast, are deprived of a ready passage to them; as *New England* is by lake *Champlain* to the northward.

By this means we have no good passage to the lakes and six nations from the sea, but through the province of *New York*, between *Crown Point* and the above mentioned *endless mountains*, as they are called. It is by this means, that the protection and security of those important territories and spacious lakes comes to have devolved almost entirely upon that small province of *New York*. But here the passage to them is as convenient, as it is difficult in other places. By the easy navigation of *Hudson's* river, and a branch of it, called the *Mohawk's* river, that is navigable within four or five miles of the rivers that fall into lake *Ontario*, at *Oswego*, we have a ready passage from the town of *New-York* to the lakes

lakes by water, except about twenty miles of an easy land-carriage, in that whole distance, which is commonly reckoned 370 miles in all, but others call it 466.

This our most ready and convenient passage to any of the interior parts of North America is commanded by the town of *Albany* at one end of it, and by *Oswego* at the other; by which we may see the importance of these two places, and the use of securing and fortifying them. *Albany* again not only defends this pass, but at the same time it is a place of arms, and the magazine of all our stores, as well as the chief place upon our frontiers there, that are daily exposed to the incursions of an enemy; upon all which accounts it deserves and requires to be made a place of strength, before any one place we have perhaps in all the inland parts of North America.

After *Albany* we should not forget *Oswego*, which seems to be the next most important place of any we are possessed of in those inland parts of America. It not only commands this passage to the great lakes, and all the inland navigation of North America above described, but it is the only place we have that gives us any access to that continent beyond the precincts of the sea-coast that we are settled upon. With this it is the chief frontier place both of *New York* and *Pensylvania*; which leads

leads both the French and Indians into these colonies, if it remains in their hands. It stands in the country of the *Six Nations*, adjoining to and in the midst of their principal settlements; so that whoever are possessors of this place must have the chief influence, if not the sole command over those people; whose power and interest is very considerable, and extends many hundred miles all around them to most of the natives of North America, that are within reach either of them or us. Here all those Indians from the remotest parts of North America, even from *Hudson's bay*, and *Lake Superior*, have been wont to come to the *English Markets* for almost all their necessaries, and carried on a considerable trade with us at this place, the profits of which alone are not to be despised; besides the interest it gave us among so many different nations all over the continent, which is now entirely lost by the demolition of the defenceless fort we had at *Oswego*. At the same time *Oswego* leads to *Niagara*, *Fort Frontenac*, and all the other encroachments of the French, and is the only place almost that allows us any access to them.

But the principal and most important place perhaps of any in all the inland parts of North America is *Niagara*, which stands in the midst of the country of the *Six Nations*, between their chief settlements, and their many dependants
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and confederates, and in a manner entirely commands them all. It there stands between the mountains one one hand, and the great lakes on the other, surrounded by one or other of these two, with the whole continent open to it on the west, and our colonies on the east; so that none can pass that way, or have any access to the interior parts of North America, without crossing endless mountains on one hand, or broad seas on the other, but by the narrow pass of *Niagara*, or an unknown and unfrequented way by the heads of the river *Ohio*. Here the waters of those great lakes, that spread over the continent far and nigh, are so narrow and shallow, that they are even fordable for passengers on foot, whilst on all other hands they form seas, nigh 100 miles broad, and 1200 miles long. By this means *Niagara* is the chief and almost only pass into the interior parts of North America, both from north to south, and from east to west, either from the French settlements or ours. At the same time this pass is so secured by the mountains and lakes, that it is almost inaccessible but by water; which was the reason of the vigilance of the French in destroying our naval equipments at *Oswego*, least we should thereby be enabled to get to a small fort they have at this important place*.

It

* Since the destruction of *Oswego*, which leads to *Niagara* by the lake *Ontario*, we seem to have no way

It is by this pass, and this alone, that the French go to the river *Ohio*, *Fort du Quesne*, *Detroit*, the *Missisipi*, and all their other encroachments on us, except *Crown-Point*. They maintain and support themselves in those encroachments without any expence or charge almost whatever only by means of the Indians, whom they have no access to, and debar us from entirely, by means of this important pass. It is by this place alone that they are and ever will be able to over-run and annoy our colonies in the manner they do, so long as they hold *Niagara*.—But if we were possessed of this one place, we might be free from them, and all their encroachments, incursions, devastations, &c*.

to get at it, if it be not by the river of the *Senekaas*, that runs into their country from *Oswego*, which seems to be very practicable : as well as a way from the heads of that river to fort *du Quesne*, by the heads of the *Ohio* ; which would appear to be more convenient than the way to that place from *Virginia*, over so many ridges of mountains, all which may be avoided in this way ; which is at the same time convenient to our forces assembled in *New York* and *New England*.

* The great lakes are further secured by means of *le Detroit*, or the straits of lake *Erie* ; the straits of *Missilimakinac*, and the falls of *St. Mary*, between the lake *Huron* and lake *Superior* ; all which we have no access to, but by *Niagara*, or a very round about way by fort *du Quesne*.

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But we seem only to regard *Crown-Point*, and neglect *Niagara*, which is a place of vastly greater consequence, and that in time of peace as well as in time of war. *Crown-Point* commands only lake *Champlain*, and its environs in time of peace, and affords a secure frontier to *Canada*, or an inroad into *New York* and *New England* in time of war; but the influence of *Niagara* extends far and nigh almost over the whole continent.

N I A G A R A commands in a manner all the interior parts of North America, and is a key as it were to that whole continent—opens or obstructs a communication with all the natives of North America, the *Six Nations*, *Ohioes*, *Shawanoes*, *Miamis*, *Twightwies*, *Illinois*, *Poutewatamis*, *Nadouessians*, *Hurons*, *Utawas*, *Messessagues*, and many others—awes and commands all those people—lies in the midst of the extensive territories of the *Six Nations*, and commands their *Beaver-Country** entirely—secures their fur trade, and all the other inland trade of North America—commands all the *great Lakes*, and secures the

* So the *Six Nations* call in a general sense all the country from the river *Ohio* to lake *Nepissin*; but more particularly the peninsula of the lakes, between the lakes *Ontario*, *Erie* and *Huron*, extending northward to lake *Nepissin*, and the river *Utawas*.

navigation of them, that extends 12 or 1300 miles—prevents or secures the junction of the two French colonies in *Canada* and *Louisiana*—cuts off or maintains their passage to the river *Ohio*, *Missisipi*, *Lake Erie*, *le Detroit*, *Sandoski*, *Miamis*, *Fort St. Joseph*, *Illinois*, *Kaskaskis*, &c.—stops the farther progress of the English or of the French (which ever are possessed of it) in North America—lays our colonies open to the inroads and incursions both of the French and Indians—whilst it would secure them from both in our hands—and unite the frontiers of our northern and southern colonies together, for their mutual defence and security, which might all be secured by this one place, while they could not by many hundreds without it!

All this will plainly appear only from looking to the situation of this place in a map, with the account of it above given, as it is well known to those who are acquainted with it.

How came we then ever to neglect such a place? Or to suffer the French to fortify it before our eyes, and that upon our own territories too? Without listening to the solicitations of the Indians, particularly at the treaty of Albany in 1722, to prevent it? Which we might have done then, only by ordering them to quit it, as we did but a year or two before

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before at *Onondago*. This fatal neglect is plainly the cause of all our present disturbances and losses; and we hope it may not be thought improper to endeavour to prevent the like neglects and misfortunes for the future; which we shall never do, unless we secure this place.

It was for this important place of *Niagara*, and *Nova Scotia*, that this nation engaged in this present war, if they know their true interest. The great claim that Britain has in the inland parts of North America is over the territories of the *Five Nations*, which this place lies in the midst of, and in a manner entirely commands. We talk much of the river *Ohio*, which is likewise a place of great consequence, it is true, but it seems to be of less consequence than *Niagara*, which in a manner commands it. If we were possessed of *Niagara*, the French in *Canada* would be cut off from any access to the river *Ohio*, and almost all their other encroachments on us. But if we let them remain in possession of this place, all our colonies will be open to them, and we need never expect to be free from encroachments, broils and dissensions with them. Unless we recover *Niagara* then that so justly belongs to us, we engaged in this war to no manner of purpose; but must have frequent and daily occasions for many more such wars,

with little prospect of any better success from them, than we have hitherto met with in this.

We had surely nothing else to do then, either to have prevented the present war in America, or to have done what we pleased in it, but to have vindicated our just and indisputable right to *Niagara*, and to have secured that single place at first. None could have hindered us to have done this, as the trifling fort the French have there, erected since the year 1751, stands entirely by itself, at a great distance from their other settlements, and in the midst of the country of the Six Nations, our friends and allies. By this means we might have put an end to our disturbances in all appearance, long before war was declared. If the French had offered to stir, how easy might it have been for us, by means of *Niagara*, *Oswego*, the *Six Nations*, &c. to have demolished fort *Frontenac*, another encroachment upon our territories; while the numbers of people we had in *New-England* stood upon their guard against *Crown-Point*. By this means likewise we might have carried the war into our enemies country, instead of bringing it into our own, as we did by going to fort *Du Quesne*. And what was so proper then, may not be improper again perhaps, if it is yet, when those things are
rightly

rightly understood ; which it is our only design to make them, now as we endeavoured to do then.

As for the importance of the great *Lakes*, that are thus commanded by *Niagara*, we need not insist upon it. That will abundantly appear from their vast extent, and situation in the midst of all the most important places in North America, and most of the natives in it. These *Lakes* are five in number, which form so many seas, that all communicate with one another, and afford an inland navigation, that extends over the whole continent almost of North America, as appears from the account of it above given. Whoever then are masters of these lakes must command that continent, sooner or later, since they have such an easy access to it, and ready passage over it all, by means of this navigation ; whilst those who are only settled on the sea coast are precluded from a passage to the inland parts of the continent by many ridges of mountains that surround them in all parts, and hem them in on every side : by which they are likewise deprived of any communication with the natives, who chiefly reside on and about those great lakes, for the sake of the fruitful lands, and mild climate, with the great plenty of furs, that they afford.

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These lakes especially the two lower ones, lake *Ontario*, and *Erie*, with great part of the two next adjoining to them, lake *Huron*, and *Michigan*, are the property of the *Five Nations* of Indians, and have belonged to them by conquest and actual possession upwards of a hundred years; which they have made over to the crown of Great Britain by many solemn and formal acts and deeds, and the same was acknowledged by France itself at the treaty of *Utrecht*, as we shall abundantly prove in the second part of this discourse concerning the rights and titles of the two nations in America. The only claim the French have to them is, the liberty they had by the treaty of *Utrecht* to frequent those countries of the Indians for the sake of trade; from which they would now pretend a right to them, we suppose, as they have been allowed to make some settlements in them, for the convenience and refreshment of their traders in passing backwards and forwards, as they pretended when they made them.

The chief settlements they have here are *Niagara* and *le Detroit*, or the *Straits of the Lakes*, between lake *Erie* and *Huron*. At the first they have only a small fort, built chiefly of wood, and since the year 1751, where they keep about sixty or seventy men, for no other purpose but to keep possession of this important

ant pass. They have likewise lately built a magazine upon the river side immediately above the great fall, in order to lodge their goods and stores, that they are obliged to transport by land from their fort below the fall to this storehouse; the distance between which is reckoned twenty miles. These are the only settlements they have at *Niagara*, where the country is mountainous and barren, unfit for culture for the most part. But not far from it the country is more fruitful on the sides of the lakes *Ontario* and *Erie*. These lakes are here about 36 miles asunder; to wit, 8 miles from lake *Ontario* to the fording place in the river of *Niagara*, and as far from thence to the great fall; from which it is reckoned 20 or 22 miles to lake *Erie*, and the river is navigable the whole way, with only a small rippling nigh the entrance of the lake. These accounts I have from some of our people who have been all over those parts.

But at *le Detroit* the French have a more considerable settlement, ever since they usurped that place contrary to treaty with the Indians in 1700. Some of our people who were there in 1750 and 51 report, that the French had there about thirty or forty plantations or farms, in a fine champaign country, with about 5 or 600 people, and three villages of Indians; one of *Hurons*, called by our people

Wiendoes

Wiendoes ; another of *Poutewatamis*, called *Pous* ; and a third of *Outawas*, or *Thawas*. The number of Indians in those villages was uncertain, as they are so constantly out on hunting parties ; they judged them about 3 or 400 fighting men. As for their fortifications they were no way considerable, being at such a distance from any danger of an attack, but from the Indians ; altho' the French have since strengthened this place no doubt, as it is the great support of their interest among the natives of all those western parts of the continent, and the center of their several straggling settlements among them.

III. *Of the river OHIO, and Fort Du Quesne.*

The river *Ohio* is next to be considered ; which runs through great part of our colonies of *Penslvania*, and *Carolina*, and waters a country that is nigh five hundred miles square, which is reckoned one of the finest countries in all North America. This river is not less than 10 or 12000 miles long by all accounts, from its source nigh the habitations of the six nations to its mouth at the *Missisipi*, with several large rivers falling into it, that spread over our colonies far and nigh. A large branch of the *Ohio*, called *Wood River*, from *Colonel Wood* of *Virginia*, who discovered it first

first in 1654, and several times afterwards, of which an authentic account is to be seen in the archives of the royal society, besides the accounts we have of that discovery from our historians ; this large branch of the *Obio*, I say, rises in the mountains of South *Carolina*, and runs through that province, and all North *Carolina*, to the middle of *Virginia* : besides several other branches of it that rise in the Apalachean mountains from the same sources with the rivers that run through our settlements east of those mountains, and make a navigation from the *Obio* down to the sea-coast, excepting a small land carriage from one river to the other.

The *Obio* is besides remarkable for its gentle current, contrary to most of the inland rivers in North America, which are very rapid, with numbers of falls in them ; but we hear of only one fall in the *Obio*, which is navigable both up and down, as appears from the journals and several verbal accounts of our people, who have gone up and down the whole river. They tell us indeed that the river is very crooked, as is usual with all rivers that run through a level champaign country, as this does ; but this at the same time makes its current slack, and the whole river easy to navigate, all the way from the *Mississipi* nigh to the river of the *Senekaas*, which falls into lake

Ontario at *Oswego*. Another river of lake *Ontario*, the river *Condè*, or new river, rises still higher to the sources of the *Ohio*, and affords a navigation from the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to the mouth of the *Mississipi*, quite across the continent of North America ; beside the many communications of the branches of the *Ohio*, with lake *Erie*.

The country on the south sides of the *Ohio* is very mountainous, and difficult to pass for some hundred miles. The Apalachean mountains there extend west within one or two hundred miles of the *Mississipi*. But on the north side of the *Ohio*, between that and lake *Erie*, the country is level and very fertile, being likewise watered with numbers of rivers that run through it from the brinks of lake *Erie* to the *Ohio*. With this it affords plenty of salt from the many salt springs, and even salt water rivulets, with which this country abounds, that is of great use in those inland parts. It likewise abounds with both food and raiment, we may say, from the vast quantities of wild oxen or buffaloes found in the extensive meadows all over this country ; a creature peculiar to North America, that is larger than an Ox, with a fleece like a sheep, of which several manufactures have been made little inferior to silk : which was particularly recommended by Lewis XIV, in his grant of the

Mississipi

Missisipi to *Mr. Crozat*, as a valuable commodity in trade. Besides, this country affords great plenty of deer, beaver, skins and furs, the richest commodities of all North America.

We need not wonder then, how the French or any others may maintain themselves in this country, with little or no charge, especially with so many natives in it at their command: and how they must soon encrease and multiply in it, to the constant disturbance and annoyance of all our colonies, so long as they hold any of this country south of lake *Erie*, and far more the whole of it.

If we consider the situation of this country, between the *Ohio* and lake *Erie*, that is not above fifty or sixty miles broad in the eastern parts, but nigh two or three hundred miles in its western parts, bounded by the great lakes on one hand, and extensive ridges of mountains on the other, with this convenient pass and navigable river between them, leading directly into the middle of our settlements from all the interior parts of the continent; opposite to which likewise are many easy and convenient passes in the mountains, and navigable rivers, down to the maritime parts; if we consider this, I say, of what consequence must this country be to us? And how fatal has our neglect of it been? We have no other

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way that is known from any of our present settlements in all North America, except South Carolina, to any of the interior parts of that continent, but through this country by *Fort du Quesne*, or by *Niagara*. On the south of these we are precluded from a passage to that continent by the mountains that run three or four hundred miles west, and on the north by the great lakes.

It ought, however, to be enquired into, how far the river *Holston* is navigable, both above and below the *Cherokees*, and what sort of a passage that river may afford into our colonies; lest we should neglect that, as we have done the river *Ohio*.

Not to mention the vast encrease of people, power, trade and commerce, that this country on the *Ohio* must necessarily bring, it would moreover secure the possessions we already have, which it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to do without it. These two places alone, *Fort du Quesne*, and *Niagara*, would protect and defend our colonies from both the French and Indians, if well secured by us; whilst if they remain in the hands of the French, we shall have an inland frontier to defend, east of these places, as we now have, that is upwards of 2000 if not 3000 miles in extent: and that constantly exposed, as it now is, to the incursions of a hostile and warlike enemy, and to the

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the depredations of an indigent, necessitous, and barbarous people; which it will be impossible for us to prevent, with all the forts and garrisons, and the immense charges that we must be at for that purpose.

By these two places alone then, we may here see, what we have so often intimated, that the French secure all North America beyond our settlements, with all the natives of that whole continent to support them in it, and unite all their colonies and straggling settlements together; which gives them an extent of territory, power and dominion, that all we are possessed of there bears no proportion to.

It was this great advantage and convenience that made the French so intent upon securing the river *Ohio*; a step that we might always see they would take, if it was possible for them. It signifies nothing to be disputing their title to it; such a *Convenience* is *Title* enough to them. They have no other title to all the other places, and immense regions, that they form claims to over all North America.

The most convenient of all the places in those countries, and indeed in all the whole extensive navigation above described, from the river *St. Lawrence* to the *Mississipi*, is fort *du Quesne*. This place is about mid-way between *Canada* and *Louisiana*, and serves as an *entrepot* between these two French colonies;

nies ; for which it is more convenient than any one place in all North America, just as *Louisburg* is between *Françe* and *Canada*. It stands, at the same time, in a fine fertile country, of vast extent, and in a healthy climate ; where we may expect to see the French encrease and multiply apace. In these respects the territories of the *Obio* are preferable to all the other possessions of the French in all America put together.

Nature itself has conspired to render the river *Obio* hereabouts a place of consequence and importance, and the rendezvous of all the people in North America that are within reach of it, far and nigh. The great thing wanted in those inland parts, both by man and beast, is *Salt* ; which is found in great plenty all round about fort *Du Quesne*, but chiefly in the *Salt Ponds*, between that and lake *Erie*. Upon this account, that country, called by the six nations *Canabogué*, is the chief resort both of man and beast from all parts. To these ponds and other salt springs hereabouts, great flocks and herds of deer and wild oxen constantly resort for the benefit of salt ; upon which creatures the inhabitants chiefly subsist, and have great supplies of provisions by that means without either labour, charge, or expence. This draws numbers of huntsmen here to pursue their game, the chief employment of

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of those parts. The traders again follow the huntsmen for their skins and furs. These are the chief causes of war and bone of contention here, where the warriors resort to seek their enemies. Upon these accounts, the parts hereabouts are the chief support of the inhabitants—the seat of war,—and mart of trade; from all parts of North America, far and nigh. — Here the six nations have a town (*Gwabaago*), chiefly for their hunting: and a town of each of the cantons is settled hereabouts. Here their enemies, even the *Catawbas* from South Carolina meet them, and fight those many battles we hear and read of. Here likewise the French and English Indians, and traders resort, either to trade with or surprise one another; from whom we have these accounts, that are much magnified by them.

These advantages were the more immediate occasion of the French seizing the river *Ohio*. They give us the most extraordinary accounts of the country hereabouts, particularly the country above described on the south sides of lake *Erie**; but add, “ the banks of this
“ lake

* “ Lake *Erie* is justly dignified with the illustrious
“ name of *Conti*; for assuredly it is the finest lake upon
“ earth. You may judge of the goodness of the climate,
“ from the latitudes of the countries that surround it. Its
“ circumference extends to 230 leagues; but it affords
“ every

“ lake are commonly frequented by none but
 “ warriors, whether the *Iroquois*, the *Illinois*,

“ every where such a charming prospect, that its banks
 “ are decked with oak-trees, elms, chefnut-trees, wal-
 “ nuts, apple trees, plum-trees, and vines, which bear
 “ their fine clusters up to the very top of the trees, upon a
 “ sort of ground that lies as smooth as ones hand. Such
 “ ornaments as these are sufficient to give rise to the most
 “ agreeable idea of a prospect in the world. I cannot ex-
 “ press what vast quantities of deer and turkeys are to be
 “ found in these woods, and in the vast meads that lye
 “ upon the south sides of the lake. At the bottom of the
 “ lake, we find wild beaves upon the banks of two
 “ pleasant rivers that disembogue into it, without cata-
 “ racts or rapid torrents (*Riv. Blanc*, and *Gwabago*).
 “ It abounds with sturgeon and white fish. It is clear of
 “ shelves, rocks, and banks, and has 14 or 15 fathom
 “ water. The stags, roe-bucks, and turkeys, run in
 “ great bodies up and down the shore, all round the lake.
 “ —In fine, if there was a clear and free passage for ves-
 “ sels, from *Quebec* to this lake, *it might be made the finest,*
 “ *the richest, and most fertile kingdom in the world* : for over
 “ and above all the beauties I have mentioned, there are
 “ excellent *Silver-mines* about 20 miles up the country,
 “ upon a certain hill, from whence the savages brought
 “ great lumps, that have yielded that precious metal with
 “ little waste.” *La Hontan*, vol. I. p. 217.

This account of the country is agreeable to all others ;
 but for the *Silver-mines*, I have heard no further account
 of them, than that all the country hereabouts abounds
 with lead-mines, that afford silver, as is common for lead-
 ore ; which gave rise to the *Mississipi* bubble in 1719. But
 all the western parts of this country in *New-Mexico*
 abound with silver, and why should not the eastern parts
 likewise ?

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“ the *Oumamis*, &c. and it is very dangerous
 “ (for them) to stop there.*” But as soon as
 the English began to be well established on
 the *Ohio*, they not only had all the natives
 hereabouts in their interest, but some of the
 French Indians, as they call them, particular-
 ly a tribe of the *Hurons* from *Detroit*, the
Owendoes, left them, and joined the Eng-
 lish on the *Ohio*; and many other Indians
 threatened to follow them, for the sake of a
 more beneficial trade they had from the Eng-
 lish. Upon this the Canadians, who depend
 entirely upon this Indian trade, cried out they
 were undone; and sent a party of their people
 to seize this important place on the river *Ohio*:
 which the court of France supported them in,
 or rather directed them to do, seeing the vast
 advantages it would gain thereby, the accom-
 plishment of all their extravagant designs
 above described, and the security of all North
 America, by this single stroke; which they
 saw we should prevent them in, if suffered to
 remain any longer on the river *Ohio*.

This is a true state, I believe, of the first
 origin and causes of our late disturbances with
 France; and must be a perpetual source of the
 like ruptures, if the French remain where
 they are; as will appear, I think, very plain-
 ly from what follows in the next section.

At the same time, the French have many In-

* *Idem*, p. 218.

dians about *Fort du Quesne* to support them, and other settlements again to back that, along the south side of lake *Erie*, at those important and convenient places, *Canabogue*, and *Sandoski*; besides their considerable settlements and colony at *le Detroit*; with others on the rivers *Miamis*, *Wabache*, *St. Joseph*, *St. Mary's*, *Illinois*, and *Mississipi*, at *Cabokies*, *Tamaroas*, *Metcbigamias*, and *Kaskoskies*, &c. all which places are convenient to fort *du Quesne*, and have a ready communication with it by ter.

The French have hitherto divided all their straggling settlements up and down those extensive regions, that are connected together by the vast water-carriage above described, into three colonies, to wit, *Canada*, *Louisiana*, and the colony of the *Illinois*, upon the upper parts of the *Mississipi*, between the other two: to which we may now add a fourth, that has been formed into a very growing colony, since the peace of *Aix*, but served before only as an entrepot between the others, to wit, *le Detroit*, or the *Straits* of the lakes: all which are convenient to fort *du Quesne*, and the adjacent parts on the river *Ohio*; are connected and linked together in one body by it; and all conspire and unite together to protect and support this place, that is in the center and midst of them all; which may be called a fifth colony that
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the French have lately usurped, and is likely to become the most considerable of all; as all their remote settlements in the other two that are west of this, *Detroit* and the *Illinois*, will now become superfluous and needless, and will naturally join those on the river *Ohio*, that are so much more convenient, especially for the Indian trade; for which alone their remote western settlements were made.

Here then, about fort *du Quesne*, we may expect to see the chief force of the French from all parts of North America, mustered up together upon our frontiers, not only for their own safety and security, but likewise for their interest and convenience: and if we consider the many advantages and conveniences of this country, it is plain, that this colony of the French on the *River Ohio*, must soon become the most important of any in N. America; and must, with their other settlements west of it, and the interest and influence they all give them over the natives, command all the interior parts of that whole continent, and give law to it all, if ever it comes to be well settled.

Fort *du Quesne* is convenient, not only to *Canada* and *Louisiana*, but to all the settlements the French have among the Indians, up and down the whole continent of N. America. Here they may make all those Indian

nations come to them, instead of undertaking so many perilous and expensive voyages as they have been obliged to do, in search of the Indians; and will have all those Indians to support them here, just as they have had at *Montreal*.

Now, what will *Oswego* signify to the English after this, if they should get it again? — Nothing at all surely. It was supported by, and built on purpose for, a trade with those *Far Indians*, as they call them in *New York*, who will be all stopt at *Niagara*, fort *du Quesne*, and other places on the *Ohio*, if the French remain in possession of them.

Fort *du Quesne* then is the very center of all the French force in N. America put together, and will unite all their many settlements in it, and all the natives of that whole continent, in one body; if it has not done it already: which is of much more consequence than most people seem to apprehend, who are little acquainted with America, or the situation of the two nations in it. For hitherto the force of the French in N. America has been entirely broke and divided, by so many different straggling settlements up and down on the remote branches of the rivers *St. Lawrence* and *Missisipi*, and the great lakes; by which it has been so inconsiderable and disregarded, that it was never before apprehended. But

now

now all those straggling settlements are collected and linked together, not only with one another, but with their two capitals of *Quebec* and *New-Orleans*; by which their force has become so considerable all at once, by that one stroke of seizing the river *Ohio*, and fort *du Quesne*.

Upon these accounts we may see, that fort *du Quesne*, or some place hereabouts, is or will be the most considerable and important place of any perhaps in all North America; and is by its situation and many conveniences the most fit of any place to become the capital of that whole continent, and to give law to it all. It is not only the center of all that prodigious navigation from the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to the mouth of the *Missisipi*, from north to south; but there is still as considerable and a much more important navigation to it from east to west: the heads of those large rivers, *Potowmack*, and *Susquebanna*, that fall into *Chesapeak* bay in *Virginia* and *Maryland*, interlock with the branches of the *Ohio* hereabouts, and afford a navigation from the Atlantic ocean, even through the Apalachean mountains, which centers at fort *du Quesne*: whilst there is another more considerable navigation from it westward, even to the mountains of *New Mexico*, by the several branches of the

Missisipi

Mississipi that spring from them, and fall into that river nigh the mouth of the *Ohio*.

We may soon expect then to see fort *du Quejne* become as considerable and respectable a place, as it is a convenient and important one; and to be made another *Louisburg* or *Quebec*, if it remains in the hands of the French. And if they found so good a title to this place, from its great convenience, will it not be more convenient for them to seize some of our colonies on the sea coast, in order to get more conveniently to it?—And what is there to hinder them to do that?—It is surely high time that we should enquire into this at least.

But this important place stands in *Pensilvania*, and their way to it runs through that province, which they know very well disclaims the use of arms, whilst they glory so much in them, and make their way good here entirely by force of arms—What a contrast is this?—Surely if any people, that ever had any thing to do with the French, ever had occasion for arms, the people of *Pensilvania* have perhaps the most, and that at this present, to preserve their country and their all, and to prevent a redoubtable fortress being erected against them here, when it may be done.

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IV. *Consequences of the French encroachments, and method to prevent them, by a BARRIER between the two nations.*

By the usurpation of those three places alone, *Crown-Point, Niagara, and fort du Quesne*, not to mention their other encroachments, we see, the French cut us off from any further communication with North America, and secure all the rest of that continent to themselves, beyond the bounds that they would prescribe to us, to wit, at the *Apalachean* mountains. Not to mention any other consequences of this, nor to aggravate matters beyond what the plain matter of fact will admit of, let us see what part of America such bounds would give them, and what proportion that bears to the part they are pleased to leave to Britain, by such an exorbitant and unjust claim.

The settled part of our colonies, east of these encroachments of the French, which is all they would allow us, is not above 100 miles in breadth in many places, particularly in *New-England*, the chief and only strength of the nation in all America. If we extend our colonies to the *Apalachean* mountains, those mountains are not above 100 miles from the sea in the northern parts, and but 250 miles in any place, to wit, about *Currotuck* between *Virginia* and *North Carolina*, where the continent

continent between the sea and those mountains, is the broadest. All this appears from several surveys and actual mensurations of distances, besides the common computations. This is the whole breadth of our present settlements from the sea to the westernmost ridge of the *Alleghany* mountains; which at a medium, in the latitude 40° , appears to be but 60 leagues, but we shall allow it to be 70 leagues. Their length again extends from *Savannah* in *Georgia*, in latitude 32° , to *George's River* in the northern parts of *New-England*, nighly in latitude 44° ; which is but twelve degrees of latitude, or 720 miles in a straight line, that is, 240 leagues. But we shall allow the greatest extent of our possessions, from the river *St. Juan* to *Penobscot* in *Nova Scotia*, to be 330 leagues, as it measures in some maps of North America, here made use of for a general view of that continent. This length 330 multiplied by 70, the mean breadth, makes 23,100 square leagues.

But in the French maps here quoted,*

* Vid. Carte de Nouvelles decouvertes par Mr. de L'Isle.

This I make use of not for the sake of accuracy, but as a comprehensive general view, all that we want to exhibit: and the breadth of the continent of North America is here laid down from the Russian discoveries on the western coast, the most certain accounts we have of it.

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and many others, the claims of *France* in North America extend from the *Apalachean* mountains to the south seas : all which extent of territory they may not only claim, but must actually secure and enjoy by holding only *Niagara* and fort *du Quesne*. Now if we consider the extent of this extravagant claim, it is immense ; and all they would leave to Britain, great as some imagine it to be, bears no proportion to it, as will appear from a general estimate of it.

By the best accounts we have of the longitude, or breadth of North America, it is at least 720 or rather perhaps 780 leagues, from the *Alleghany* or *Apalachean* mountains to the south seas, about the middle of the continent, in latitude 40°. And it is just the same distance, 720 leagues, in the middle of the continent between east and west, from the bay of *Mexico* to the latitude 64°, which is about as far north as the continent is known ; altho' the French would extend their claims in *Louisiana* to the arctic pole.* Now this breadth and length of 720 leagues makes 518,400 square leagues, the contents of the French pretensions in North America ! This compared to

* La Louisiane n'a peut etre point d'autres bornes au nord que le pole arctique. *Relation de la Louisiane*, Tom. I. p. 8.

23,100 square leagues, all they would leave to Britain, is more than 22 to 1.†

If we extend the French pretensions only from the *Apalachean* mountains to the mountains of *New Mexico*, they are 1,300 miles broad from east to west, which, including *Canada* and all they claim besides in North America, is to what Britain now enjoys, as 17 to 1.

The Spanish territories again in North America, by this French division of that continent, extend from the *Rio del Norte*, which they make the boundary between *Mexico* and *Louisiana*, to the *Rio Colorado*, that separates *New Mexico* from *California*, and bounds the Spanish dominions on the west, by their pretences.* On the north again they would limit the Spaniards at the latitude 40° ;* and we shall suppose their territories on this continent to be extended south to the middle of the bay of *Mexico*, or southern part of *California*, that is, to the tropic, much farther south than they can be any way contested. By this the Spanish territories here are 160 leagues in breadth from

† In this estimate we include the Spanish provinces, but leave out *Canada*, *Nova Scotia*, and all *Labrador*, which claims of the French are about equal to what we include of the Spanish territories in this estimate.

* Vid. de *L'Isle's* map abovementioned.

east to west at a medium, and 350 leagues from north to south, which makes their whole superficial contents 56,000 square leagues. If we include *California* in these territories, they make 87,500, square leagues; which is about a sixth of the abovementioned claims of the French, and nigh four times as much as they would leave to Britain.

If we divide the whole continent of America then, north of the bay of *Mexico*; into twenty-five equal parts, *France* not only claims, but must actually enjoy by her present pretensions, twenty of those parts, and leaves only four parts to *Spain*; and but one to *Britain*; whilst *Britain* has a real and original right to that whole continent, except the south-western parts that belong to *Spain*, and a small part of it in *Canada*; which of right only belongs to *France*.

This is the way in which the French would divide the continent of North America! And however extravagant and unreasonable, as well as unjust, these their pretensions must appear to all the world, yet we see, they maintain them by the sword; and would endeavour to persuade the world of the justness of this their cause!

It is true, the French are not yet in possession of all this extent of territory; but it must all fall to them, by their present pretensions: and they will no doubt take care to secure it

soon, as there is no way to prevent them to do it, if they are left in possession of *Niagara*, and the river *Ohio*.

The extent of territory they are now in possession of by these their late encroachments and usurpations is very large, and vastly greater than all that Britain enjoys, great as some would make it. From the Allegany mountains to *Fort Orleans*, the westernmost of their settlements on the river *Missouri*, a large branch of the *Missisipi* that extends westward across the continent, as the river *Ohio* does eastward, the breadth of their present possessions is nigh 250 leagues, which multiplied by 400 leagues, the length of those possessions from the bay of *Mexico* to the limits of *Hudson's bay*, makes 100,000 square leagues. All which they have already usurped in North America, within these few years, exclusive of *Canada*, *Cape Breton*, &c. that may belong to them; and exclusive of *Nova Scotia* and *Labrador*, which they pretend to claim likewise.

Their usual route from the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to the mouth of the *Missisipi*, by way of the great lakes, which they seem to reckon themselves in secure possession of, is upwards of 3000 miles, which may be thus computed: From the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to *Niagara*, or rather to lake *Erie*, is about 1000 miles, which they call
Canada;

Canada. Their *Pays d'en haut*, as they call it, extending from thence to the *Mississipi*, by way of the *Lakes* and river *Illinois*, their usual route hitherto, is upwards of 1000 miles farther. And from thence to the mouth of the *Mississipi* is counted 1170 miles. In all which distances they have fixed forts here and there, in the most convenient passes, to secure all this vast extent of territory, and thereby keep all the natives in it under their command.

If we compare this to what Britain now enjoys on the sea coast of North America it is nigh as five to one. Even if we extend our possessions from the river *St. Lawrence* in latitude 49° , to the river *St. Juan*, in latitude 30° , all that the nation claims, I believe, it makes but 19 degrees of latitude, or 1140 miles in length from north to south, and not 200 miles in breadth from east to west at a medium—The great extent of the British possessions on the coast of North America, that are generally reckoned to be upwards of 2000 miles in length, proceeds from the many windings of the road, and meanders of the coast, with the computed distances in the woods of America being often greater than the real distance.

If we compare these pretensions of the French with their real rights and titles in North America, they are still more surprizing and unreasonable.

sonable. They who have no just right or title to any part of North America, but to those two *places* alone upon the river *St. Lawrence*, *Tadoussac*, and *Quebec*,* if their rights and titles

* The French were constantly drove out of all parts of North America by the English, who first discovered and seized that whole continent, even out of Canada itself in 1627, 28, and 29, and never had any right there (notwithstanding all the pains their commissaries take by many false assertions, easy to be shewn, to make out a title); 'till a right was given them by Charles I, by the treaty of *St. Germain* in 1632; who thereby only surrendered to them, *tous les lieux occupés en la Nouvelle France, &c. all the places occupied (or seized) in New France, Acadia or Canada, by the subjects of his Majesty of Great Britain*—Now it appears from the accounts of *Champlain* governor of the country, and all others, that the *only places occupied, seized, or possessed*, in those countries, either by the French or English at that time, were, *Port-Royal* and *St. Saviours*, in *Nova Scotia*, with *Tadoussac* and *Quebec* in *Canada*—The two first of these places they restored to us by the treaty of *Utrecht*; and for the two last they were to indemnify our subjects, meaning *Sir David Kirk*, the only lawful proprietor of them, to whom the king had granted them, and from whom he could not take them without a valuable consideration, amounting to £5000, which the French never payed, but still owe; as appears from a memorial of *Sir Lewis Kirk* and brother, to king *Charles II*, after the restoration, and many other accounts.

By this treaty then the king gave up only those *places*, and not the *countries*. For that reason he confirmed his former grants of the *country of Canada* the very next year after the treaty of *St. Germain*, as appears from the said memorial, the words of which are, “the king of England

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were duly enquired into, now lay claim to it all in a manner; not only to satisfy their present ambitious views, but to make us and the

“ taking notice, that, altho’ the forts and castles, according
 “ to the league, were delivered up into the possession of
 “ the French, (especially such as had been erected during
 “ their possession thereof) yet that his subjects were not
 “ to be excluded from trade or free commerce, in those
 “ regions that were first discovered and possessed by his
 “ subjects, did, with the advice of his council, by his let-
 “ ters patents, dated May 11, 1633—Grant unto *Sir Lewis*
 “ *Kirk*—full privilege, not only of trade and commerce
 “ in the river *Canada* (*St. Lawrence* so called) and places
 “ on either side adjacent, but also to plant colonies, and
 “ build forts and bulwarks where they should think fit”—
 And not only so, but the king and parliament, that same
 year 1633, ratified and confirmed to the subjects of Britain
 five different grants they had made both of *Nova Scotia*
 and *Canada*, in the years 1621, 25, 27, 28, and 33,*
 instead of ceding those countries to the French—For these
 reasons Cromwell took *Nova Scotia* from them in 1654,
 and maintained our right to it at the treaty of Westminster
 in 1655. And altho’ they had a right to *Nova Scotia*
 given them afterwards by the treaty of *Breda*, yet they
 never had any to *Canada*, nor any part of it, but the two
places here mentioned. And if due enquiry is made, it will
 appear, that they have no just right or title to any other
 part of North America, unless we allow usurpation and
 encroachment to be a right.

For these reasons Queen *Anne* maintained in a manifesto
 in 1711, *her just and incontestable rights and titles to all North*
America—except a part yielded to France—which was held in
fee from the crown of Britain, and ought to revert to it.—

* Scots acts of parliament, *Ann.* 1633, Ch. 28.

world believe, that their claims are very great, if ever they come to be settled. But of this we may perhaps give a more particular account, when we come to treat professedly of this subject.

All this extent of territory they hold merely by means of a parcel of strolling Indian traders, that have rambled up and down those countries, because they could not live at home; and for that reason alone they pretend to claim such a vast extent of this whole continent. They have not above seventy or eighty thousand people at most in all their dominions in America, that they call *Canada*, with 14 or 15000 in *Louisiana*, and of those nine tenths and more are settled within the compass of about sixty leagues between *Quebec* and *Montreal*; whilst they pretend, by means of the rest, a parcel of *Coueurs de Bois*, as they call them, that are scattered up and down the

And the city of London, in the 22d article of their instructions to their representatives in parliament, after the treaty of *Utrecht*, ordered that enquiry be made, *why the French were left in possession of Canada.*

There is a great change of affairs then in so short a time as since the treaty of *Utrecht*, if the French now claim 20 parts in 25 of the whole continent of North America, who then had only a right to these two places; or at most no farther than from the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to *Montreal*, with some small claim they may have about lake Superior perhaps.

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woods and desarts, and live a lawless life among the savages, without any settled abode or habitation, to claim and hold all this immense extent of territory here described.

We have indeed hitherto disregarded those their encroachments upon our territories in a manner that some think highly blamable: but to tell the truth, they have been so very slender and insignificant for the most part, that they were hardly worth notice, till they came to be espoused and protected by the French king. Their settlements in all those countries were no more than truck-houses in the woods among the Indians, in order to carry on a trade with the savages, built only for their safety and refreshment in passing backwards and forwards, as they themselves have declared on many occasions, and particularly at *Niagara*, even in 1751, when they were erecting their present fort there. Upon these accounts their encroachments have been disregarded by us; especially as they seem to have a right by the treaty of Utrecht to frequent those countries of the six nations for trade, whilst they declare them by the same treaty to be *subject to the dominion of Great Britain, Magnæ Britannie imperio subiectas* †. For these reasons few seem to have imagined, that the French would ever

† *Treaty Utrecht*, Art. 15.

claim all those countries by means of a parcel of strolling and straggling traders, that were allowed to wander up and down in them ; although I must own, I always suspected their design to do it some time or other. They took the opportunity to do it, when they thought Britain was reduced by the late expensive war ; and they will no doubt take every other opportunity that offers to distress us still more and more in America, if we allow them such a power to do it.

This they will never be without an opportunity to do whenever they think fit, so long as that chain of forts above mentioned, with which they have surrounded our colonies on all sides, is allowed to stand. These are so many batteries erected against us, not only to deprive the nation of its just rights, but to distress and annoy us, whenever they have a mind. There they constantly keep troops, stores, and magazines of all warlike engines, and muster their forces together : while our people mind nothing but planting, and are entirely defenceless, open, and exposed every where.

So long as we suffer these or other French forts to be erected thus upon our frontiers, they will cost us much more than if we were to build ten times as many ourselves, as we plainly see from what has happened of late. They will even oblige us to do that, if we let

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only *Niagara* and fort *du Quesne* stand, and we may be little the better for it after all perhaps. Our frontiers are not to be guarded without an incredible number of forts, as will appear from considering them: they extend from the mouth of the river *St. Lawrence* to the bay of *Mexico*, nigh three thousand miles round by the mountains, in all which distance we must build forts at every pass, to secure our colonies only against four fortifications of the French, to wit, *Quebec*, *Crown-Point*, *Niagara*, and *Fort du Quesne*, if we allow their present forts there to stand. And when we build forts there, it may be for no other purpose perhaps, than those we have built, to let the French seize them. They keep standing armies for that purpose, and can at any time bring their whole force together, we see, against any of our settlements, while our force is always divided and disunited; and such *Standing Armies* as may be sufficient to oppose the French are not only inconvenient in many respects, but this nation is perhaps unable to maintain armies sufficient for that purpose.

If we suffer the French to secure and fortify our frontiers in North America in the manner they have done, their forts there may cost this nation as much as the fortifications in Flanders have done, and the nation may be as little the better for it perhaps. It was those fortificati-

ons in Flanders that have brought this nation into such an immense debt, and all its present difficulties and incumberances, which it is so far from being likely to get rid of, or ever to be free from, that we see a perpetual and constant source of the like calamities, burdens and taxes, from the same French engines erected every where on our frontiers in America, and at our own doors, instead of those of our neighbours.

What is still more provoking, all those French forts are erected upon our own territories. There is not one of all the French forts in the list of them above mentioned *, but what stand on territories belonging to Britain, if it had its just rights ; except perhaps *Chambli* and *Montreal*, with those below them in *Canada*. These forts are the French encroachments we hear of, which not only deprive this nation of its undoubted rights, but at the same time distress and annoy it in the manner we see, and that by means of its own territories!—It is this that the nation is so provoked and alarmed at, and for so good reasons.

By these encroachments, and the chain of forts that the French have drawn round us, they cut us off from any access even to our own territories, in all the interior parts of North-America ;—secure all that continent to themselves beyond this their chain,— include

* Page 120.

in their bounds all the vast regions above described,—prescribe laws, bounds and limits, to Britain every where in its own territories,—and take just as much of North America as they think proper, or find convenient,—thereby enabling themselves to seize as much more of it as they may at any other time think fit,—All those extensive regions that they thus claim to themselves they cannot indeed occupy; but like the dog in the manger, they will allow no one else to do it, building forts at every place that can exclude the English from any access to them.

These their forts were the *Real Arguments* they made use of to settle our bounds and limits, when they put us off with their sham negotiations, and the frivolous pretences of their commissaries.

The consequences of these things are much more threatening and alarming to Britain, than many seem to be aware of. We see, the Indian natives of North America, who have hitherto been under the dominion or power of Britain, are already obliged to throw it off, and put themselves under the protection of the superior power of the French; and what is there to hinder the British colonies there to do the same, if they had a mind for it? — Or how will they be able to withstand the united force of both the French and Indians

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ans of all that continent against them, if they were ever so intent upon doing it? — Surely if the French go on to increase and strengthen themselves only for a very few years longer, as they have done since the treaty of *Aix*, they must be able to command any, or even all the British colonies in N. America, and make them submit to their terms, whenever they please, if they were ever so inclinable to refuse them. To be fully convinced of this we need only consider what they have done already, and that when they were no way prepared for it. If the French had taken a few years more to have prepared themselves for the execution of their present designs, they might have been able in a very short time to have made most of our colonies submit to them; and there is no doubt but they will be well prepared for that very soon, unless Britain takes care to prevent it, now when it may be done; which if they do not do now, they are likely never to have it in their power to do hereafter.

What shall we think then of the opinion of some lame or designing politicians, who pretend to tell us, that it is the interest of *Britain* to allow *France* a considerable power in America, in order to keep the British colonies in subjection! This is surely the first time that any one ever imagined it, *to be the interest*

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Interest of Britain to aggrandize the power of France.

If we consider the use that France has made of the power we have let her usurp in America already, it is surely a sufficient warning to Britain never to let her enjoy any more there, nor even to secure what she has usurped. A very little more we may see would turn the balance in their favour, and deprive Britain of her colonies altogether; which must be the case sooner or later, if France is allowed to enlarge its power, and strengthen itself in North America. Besides, it would certainly cost this nation ten times less to secure her colonies herself, than to let the French do it for her; and if it would cost so much less, it would be done as much more securely by that means. If Britain wants a security for the dependance of her colonies against their growing power, she will want it much more for the French having a power nigh it, that may be able to make them independent of Britain at least, if not to make them submit entirely to France. This is the next game we may expect to see the French play; if they cannot conquer the British colonies, they will endeavour to make them independant, and thereby get the trade of them; which would have been the true interest of France at present, much more than what they have done, in the opinion of all
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who are well acquainted with the affairs of America. And if the French once have a power, either in Europe or America, sufficient to make the British colonies independant, there is no one that will doubt their inclination to do it; and no one can doubt their ability to do it, if both their forces should at any time be joined together. To allow France a power in America then, is not only to increase their power in Europe, but it is a ready way, and seems to be a certain way, to make Britain lose her colonies altogether, and that perhaps very soon, either one way or another; and to enable those colonies to throw off the British yoke, whenever they have a mind.

If those things are rightly considered, pray, what objection is there to our taking *Quebec* or *New-Orleans*, or even both of them, if we were able to do it, as we might easily be, if we would only endeavour at it?—There is surely no other reason against this, but that it might distress the French in the most sensible manner; if that can be called *Reason* to Britain in its present situation—But such *Reasons* we hear thrown out every day, either to countenance the private views and designs of some, to support the ignorance of many, or the false notions of others.

If we expect to put an end to this war in any reasonable time, or ever bring it to a

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happy conclusion, we should certainly pursue the most vigorous measures, while it is in our power to expect success from them: and what other measures can be called vigorous but this? It is for want of such vigorous measures, that the nation has sustained such losses by the war; and a continuance of such measures must lay the foundation at least of the total loss of its colonies altogether. France indeed gave this nation a peace in the last war, and she may do the same now, but with the same view, of accomplishing the ruin of the nation, by depriving it of its colonies; which has been her pursuit ever since the last war, and must be much more so hereafter, unless we put it out of her power *now or never*. And how we are to do that, but by distressing her in the most sensible manner we can in America, I cannot see.

These are some few of the consequences of the French encroachments in North America, and the dilemma that Britain is brought into by them. But there are still others that are more grievous. If the French are allowed to settle and fortify themselves on the frontiers of the British dominions in the manner they have done, this nation need never expect to be free from constant disturbances from them, as we shall show more particularly below: this is a matter of serious consideration, that deserves to be

more particularly inquired into; and for that reason we shall do it by itself, from matters of fact, and past experience, the surest way to form a right judgment of things.

To remedy and prevent all those evils, and the many bad consequences of them, we see no other way but for this nation to secure itself a good BARRIER in North America, against the constant encroachments and invasions of the French. They have seen the use and necessity of such a *Barrier* for their neighbours, in a like situation with them, and have laid out immense sums to obtain one for them, but seem never to have thought of a barrier for themselves, when they have perhaps rather more occasion for such a one, by being upon the same continent and in the neighbourhood of the French; who are perpetually employed in military and warlike operations, whenever they see the least advantage to be reaped from them.

To point out such a proper boundary between the two nations in North America, is the chief design of this discourse; from which it will appear, that the only safe *Barrier* we can have there, either to curb the growing power, or constant encroachments and invasions, both of the French and Indians, is the river *St. Laurence* from its mouth to its source, and the *Great Lakes* that empty themselves into it. These are not only the just and equitable bounds

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bounds that we ought to confine the French to, for our own safety and security, but we ought likewise to do it for the sake of *Justice*. They never had any just claims or pretensions whatever beyond these bounds, but what we once imprudently gave them in *Nova Scotia*, or what they have since usurped by fraud or force, as we shall more fully show perhaps another time * : and these are the only bounds that are ever likely to preserve the peace between the two nations, in America at least, as will sufficiently appear from what is said in the next section, and account of *Nova Scotia*.

The use and advantage of such a barrier to this nation in N. America must abundantly appear to all, who consider the fatal effects of neglecting it so long, and the many inconveniencies, losses and misfortunes, this nation now sustains merely on that account. It was for this just boundary, and such a proper

* I do not descend to particulars here, but only consider the advantage of the lakes as a barrier in general. But if we give up the *Peninsula of the Lakes*, or *Beaver-Country* of the six nations above described, we shall not only lose a great influence over those people, and suffer the French to settle close upon us at lake *Erie* and *Niagara*, but the nation will lose that its just right and claim.— This country then should be left for the poor Indians to whom it belongs, who get their lively hood chiefly from it, and have dearly earned it by the many bloody wars they have sustained to conquer and preserve it.

safety and security for her colonies, that the nation engaged in this present war : and by having this occasion of the war in view, it may perhaps point out the proper method of carrying it on to purpose, and of obtaining the desired end from it.

The necessity of such a barrier for our colonies will still further appear, from the loss of the only barrier we have hitherto had for them. If we look back into the history of our colonies, and those of the French, we shall find, that our colonies have not derived the peace and quiet, safety and security, they have hitherto enjoyed, from the number of their men, and far less from their caution and vigilance, or the care that has been taken of them by Britain, but from the Indians in alliance with them, and particularly the *Six Nations* ; who are situated between the French and us, upon the borders of both nations, and have been in a manner the safeguard and only barrier of our colonies ever since they were settled, particularly against the French. These people were at constant war with the French and their confederates, for nigh a hundred years after they settled in *Canada*, and almost drove them out of that country again and again ; whilst they were at the same time constant and faithful friends and allies to the English, and always espoused their cause, both against the French

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and the other Indian natives. It was this that has hitherto prevented the French from extending themselves, or encreasing in numbers in North America; whilst it afforded an opportunity to us to carry on our settlements with safety and security. But the case is quite altered now: the French are now become too numerous for those Indians, and have them at their mercy, especially since we have suffered them to overrun their country; by which they daily fall off from us, and are obliged to do it for their own safety. If the French then in North America are joined by the Indians, instead of being opposed by them, as they have hitherto been, it will make a very great difference in the situation of our affairs there. Add to this; the French have now joined their two colonies of *Canada* and *Louisiana* together, and can at any time muster up all their own force, as well as that of their allies, at any one place they think proper, which they never could do before. It is this that has made them become so powerful in North America all of a sudden, before any one seems to have suspected it, or would believe it. This makes it high time and highly necessary for us, to look out for some safe and secure Barrier for our colonies, against the inroads and invasions both of the French and Indians; who have committed such slaughters there of late, when
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the *Six Nations* were no longer able or willing to prevent it, as they have formerly done.

But the English nation seems to have acted all along in North America, as they do in Britain, where they are surrounded on all hands by the sea, and have their wooden walls to protect them. But surely the case is very different on the continent of America, where they are surrounded every where by forts and garrisons, the well known engines of their declared enemy, instead of being protected by their own element, as they call it. In such a situation it is highly necessary to look out for some other security for themselves, than *wooden walls*, at the distance of thousands of miles! But we see no other security for our colonies in North America, but the barrier abovementioned; without which they must be open and exposed on all sides, as they have hitherto been.

Let us only see, what the French themselves say to this, and learn from an enemy, “ The English, say they, take very little precaution to guard their colonies from a surprize, or an attack of their neighbours: insomuch that, if the French had as much constancy, and took as proper measures to secure their conquests in America (which they are now aiming at) as they show boldness and intrepidity in making them, *the crown of England would not hold one inch of land perhaps on all the continent of North America.*”

* Charlevoix Tom. III. p. 290.

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S E C T. V.

The fatal effects of suffering the French to settle on our frontiers in North America, the causes of the present war.

IF the French are suffered to transgress the bounds abovementioned, and settle any where in *Nova Scotia*, or to the southward of the river *St. Lawrence*, and of the *Great Lakes*, they will then be intermixed with our people, and in one and the same country with them, exposed to the constant resentments, insults, and encroachments of each other; the consequences of which we need not tell, but may sufficiently learn from past experience, and see enough of its bad effects, now before our eyes, never to suffer it again. It was to this that the present war was entirely owing, and how many such wars may it not occasion? Whenever the two nations have been thus intermixed together in the same countries, in any parts of America, even altho' their respective bounds and limits have been prescribed and chalked out to them, but without any bounds of separation that may keep them asunder and at a distance from one another, there has been nothing but a perpetual warfare

fare between them, with rapine and plunder, murder and bloodshed, and all the alarms and disasters of war perpetually on both sides : and how much more is this likely to be the case in North America, where their bounds and limits are still undetermined, and where they have so many constant broils and disputes about them alone.

This we may sufficiently learn from what has already happened over and over again, when the two nations were in joint possession of *New-foundland*, *Hudson's Bay*, and the Island of *St. Christophers*, with *Nova Scotia* and *New-England*. They were then at perpetual variance, with constant alarms and disturbances to their mother countries, in the same manner as they have been ever since the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* ; and that merely from suffering the French to transgress the bounds here mentioned, and to intermix with our people on the south sides of the river *St. Laurence*, and of the great *Lakes*.

This has been particularly taken notice of long ago by one of their nation likewise, a grave and serious writer, on the affairs of America too, who has given us a long detail of no less than sixteen different "*reasons to prove, that it is impossible for the two nations, the French and English, to live in peace,*"* These are

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his words, and that in the year 1670, and they have proved very true, I think, ever since. But if there were such *reasons* subsisting then, alas ! how many more cogent ones are there now ? Their many different claims and pretensions, that are so repugnant to one another, their old hatreds and animosities, clashing interests, and jarring disputes, that have been suffered to run on so long without being decided, can never but make them come by the ears together, if they are thus suffered to be within constant reach of one another, or rather daily at one anothers doors ; as they must be, if the French settle any where to the southward of the river *St. Lawrence*, or the *Lakes* ; unless we give up the whole continent to them.

This I believe might be safely said of both the nations even here in Europe, humane or polite, or whatever else they may reckon themselves ; but in America there are more frequent

deux nations, Francoise & Angloise, puissent vivre en paix.

1. La haine est telle entre ces deux nations, & ils sont si animés l'une contre l'autre, & particulièrement la nation Angloise, qui est altière & orgueilleuse naturellement, & qui ayant toujours été battue des François dans Sainte Christophe, ne pourra jamais être contente qu'elle ne se soit vengée d'une façon ou d'une autre. Les François, qui ne sont pas fort endurant, se voyant morguez & injuriez par les Anglois selon leur coutume, & se trouvant obligez de rendre ce qu'ils ne croyoient apparemment devoir faire, auront infailliblement peine de se contenir, &c. Du Tertre Hist. des Ant-Isles, Tom. IV. p. 355.

and prevailing reasons, not only for representations and remonstrances, but for more open hostilities between them.

It is well known, that the French all over N. America subsist in a manner entirely upon a trade with the Indians, for which they are obliged to ramble and stroll all over that continent almost, in the manner they do, and to live with the savages, in uninhabited woods and uncultivated desarts, without rule or order, or even the common laws of human society among civilized peopled. Such surely are the *Coureurs des Bois*, *Busblopers*, and others who make great part of the people of *Canada*, especially upon their frontiers and ours. By this they are bred up and inured to all the barbarous manners and customs of the savages, and even study to follow many of them; as they necessarily must, in order to gain their interest and alliance. One custom is notorious among those savages, and seems to be their most prevailing policy and passion, that is, to expell and extirpate all that are within reach of them, under pretence, they tell us, of preserving their game on which they subsist. Hence they are never once at peace with their neighbours, but declare war for killing a deer or a beaver, for the loss of a friend in former wars, for the reveries of a dream, or any such frivolous conceits; and the French must assist them

them in it, or quit their country. Customs like these surely alter the very nature of men, as well as the genius of nations; and makes the French, who delight so much in arms and conquests every where, defended and secured by their forts and garrisons, as they are here, while we are every where open and exposed, so very ready on all occasions to take up the hatchet, as they call it, and pillage a defenceless people, whom they esteem rich likewise and worth plundering; while they have the greatest occasion for such plunder, indigent, necessitous, and naked as they are in *Canada*.

It was from these motives, and by these practises, that they gave occasion to the disturbances that more immediately occasioned the present war.— I am well assured by a neutral person of neither nation, who was a long while among the French in *Canada* during the late war, that the treaty of *Aix* was no sooner signed, than the French there breathed after nothing less than to have the pillaging and plundering of the English plantations, that they had got amongst in the war; for which they were constantly spiriting up their people and Indians, with the hopes of both riches and glory by it.

How well were they encouraged in these designs, by the governor of *Canada* sending five hundred men under Mr. *Celeron*,

to take possession of the river *Ohio*, and drive our people from it; and that in the spring of the year 1749, just as they had signed the treaty at *Aix*; by which they expressly stipulate not to settle any parts of America that were in dispute between the two nations, and consequently none of those surely that were already and had been for some time settled by us.

When they were drove from this by our Indians there, the very people that have since been obliged to join them, and have done us so much mischief, they transported all the people they could to *Niagara, le Detroit*, and the south sides of *Lake Erie*; gave great encouragements to all that would settle there; seized the most convenient places and strong holds in the country; and soon over-ran a great part of it. All this surely was with a view to secure the *River Ohio*, and make their way good there, the next time they came to it, as any one might easily have foreseen.

When they had done this, they began to commit hostilities upon our people every where. They began first with plundering and pillaging our Indian traders, wherever they met with them; seized several of them by force of arms, confined them in prison there, and sent them to France as they do prisoners of war; laying a premium upon the heads of others, and threatening

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ening destruction to all the English that offered to come among the Indians.

With this they attacked and burnt our fort at *Pickawillany* upon the river *Miamis* in 1751, roasting our people alive that were in it, in the barbarous and inhuman manner of the *Canadians* and savages. All this was done in open violation, not only of the treaty of *Aix*, but of the treaty of *Utrecht* likewise, by which both nations are to enjoy full liberty of frequenting those countries for the sake of trade.

These were their practices upon the *Lakes*, and in the confines of the river *Ohio*, from the year 1749 to 1752. At the same time it is well known what disturbance they gave our people in *Nova Scotia*, who could hardly stir out of doors without danger of being scalped by the Indians that were set on, and headed by the French; and how they seized and fortified *Chiegnesto*, *Bay Verte*, and the river *St. John's*, in order not only to annoy and distress us in this manner, but to secure the country.

In *New-England* and *New-York* their proceedings were more insufferable. They seized some people in *New-England*, and sold them for slaves in their islands, as I have been told. And it is certain, that they apprehended some of our people in *New-York*, about their lawful business within their settlements, refusing in a most insolent manner, to deliver them up,

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'till they were paid the common price of slaves for them.

Their replies to our remonstrances about those things were perhaps more insolent and insufferable than even the deeds themselves; and in effect seemed not only to vindicate and countenance those proceedings, but to threaten with more such, if we did not sit quiet with these; as would appear from the noted letter of the governor of *Canada* to the governor of *New-York*, in answer to these our complaints, dated at *Montreal* Aug. 10. 1751.

When we put up with these affronts and abuses for the sake of peace, they seem to have thought they might do any thing they pleased with us. — For this reason they came with an army of men, supported by a train of artillery, to take possession of the river *Ohio*; fortified themselves on *Buffalo* or *Beef River*; drove our people from their settlements at *Venango*; and took a fort we had nigh that place, with fifty men in it; seized our fort at the forks of the *Ohio*, since known by the name of fort *du Quesne*; marching out from thence and attacking our people at the great meadows, killing many of them, carrying off their baggage, cannon, &c. as in times of open war; and all this in time of peace as they call it. But surely an open war was declared by the French in America from their first invading
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the river *Ohio* in 1753, as much as it was in Europe by invading *Minorca*; and far more by these hostilities.

All this was done, you may say, only by a party of ragamuffians in Canada: but can any one suppose, that it was done without the connivance and concurrence of the court of France?—Had they not many troops of the French king's with them; and did not he send a fleet of ships with numbers of troops to support them?

All those proceedings the French in America are constantly encouraged in by their governors, prompted to by their clergy *, and supported by the crown of France; as they always will be, so long as that crown sees the vast territories, encrease of trade and commerce, and extensive power and dominion, it must gain thereby.

We see then from all these instances, and

* Their clergy not only endeavour to secure all those Indian countries, in order to make the natives catholics, or rather to gain their interest and allegiance to the crown of France; but they have a considerable estate at *Montreal*, which is prodigiously encreased by all the trade of those inland parts centering at this place, where they have a tax upon it. For these reasons the clergy of France are constant advocates for the people of Canada, and influence the court in their behalf. There is no wonder then to see the French colonies thrive, and over-run ours in the manner they do, when they have both the church and state to encourage and support them; especially if our colonies are deprived of the like aids.

many

many others that might be produced, how unlikely if not impossible it is, ever to expect a secure peace from the French in America, if we allow them to transgress the bounds here mentioned, and to intermix with our people on the south side of the river *St. Lawrence*, or the *great Lakes*; since all the disturbances here mentioned have proceeded entirely from that cause. This very argument is made use of by the French king himself in his answer to a memorial sent from England, June 1712. art. 3. and is so far insisted on by him, that he seems thereby to have gained the sole possession of the island of *Cape Breton*, because he observes, *Experience has made it too visible, that it was impossible to preserve the peace in places possessed in common by the French and English nations*: which all the interior parts of North America must be, if the French are suffered to pass over these their only just and lawful bounds here mentioned.

The case is this: the French see themselves inferior to the English in America, which they seem determined not to allow of, as they know their superiority in Europe. This makes them watchful of every opportunity to circumvent the English, and to deprive them of their just rights and claims. The more inferior they are, the more important they are to strengthen themselves, and weaken us. It was this that brought on the present war, the first we have

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have had with them about our colonies ; but it is not likely to be the last, if we allow them to settle upon our frontiers, and establish themselves in those extensive countries, that surround our colonies on all sides.

If any desire or expect a peace then from the French, in America at least, and far more to preserve those extensive realms to the crown of Britain, let them insist upon the *Barrier* we propose, as the only security for it ; otherwise whatever peace they may make, will in all appearance be like the rest they have made, only a truce to recruit their force, and a more vigorous preparation for a new and more bloody war—Let all then who desire with us to see this nation enjoy the fruits and blessings of peace, after so many expensive wars, look out for some ways and means to preserve it ; otherwise their desires and endeavours are likely to be attended with no better success than they have hitherto been. But there is no other security for a peace from the French, than to be *well prepared for war* ; which we shall never be, so long as our colonies are all open, naked, defenceless, and exposed to them on all sides ; which was plainly the occasion of the present war.

It was not to encourage and far less to prolong this war, that we have been at this pains to represent our situation in America,

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but it was with hopes of being put in such a situation by it, as to obtain a firm and lasting peace from it; to which this consideration of some security for our frontiers is the best if not the only preparative, as it was surely the only effectual way to have preserved it before, or to do it hereafter.

A brief answer to the French vindication of their proceedings in America.

AFTER the above account of the proceedings of the French in America, it may not be improper to take some notice of their vindication of them, as contained in a memorial on this subject presented the last year by the court of France to all the courts of Europe*; especially as that memorial has not yet been answered by any that I know of, and has lately been translated into English, with a seeming commendation of it.

In this memorial they endeavour to show, that the English have been the aggressors every where in America, and thereby the authors of the present war. To make out this, they endeavour to puzzle the cause, and to obscure the truth, by a recital of numbers of facts and incidents, that may be true in themselves, but

* *Memoire Contenant le precis des faits, 1756.*

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

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have little or no relation to the point in question, and are so blended with manifest falsehoods, that it is difficult to discern and distinguish what may be true in their accounts, from what is false; in the same manner as they have done in the memorials of their commissaries. But to come to the point, and to cut off all superfluous arguments, we shall find that there are but three things that relate to the purpose in all this volume in quarto.





1. The first is; they suppose all the inhabitants of Nova Scotia that were of French extraction to be French subjects. This they take for granted, without ever offering to prove it, altho' the whole of all that they assert relating to Nova Scotia depends upon it. The rest is only a recital of facts relating to the treatment of those French inhabitants of Nova Scotia by both nations; which might have been just enough on the side of France, if they had been French subjects; but as it is, their proceedings were more unwarrantable and insolent on account of this their motive for them, as they own it to be, than from any thing else that could well be alledged.

The first fact they mention relating to *Nova Scotia*, which they own and openly avow, is, that they sent a party of troops there in 1749, immediately after the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, to encourage and support the inhabitants





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against the crown of Britain.* This was in fact to send troops to encourage the British subjects to rebel, and resist their prince and sovereign; than which nothing can be a greater injustice, injury, or indignity to any nation: All the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, of whatever nation or extraction, were well known to all the world to be British subjects, and to have lived as such under the government of Britain, ever since the treaty of *Utrecht*.

This is not only so well known, that no one ever doubted of it, but we have the most positive and authentic proofs of it, that could be desired—When *Nova Scotia* was restored to Britain by the treaty of *Utrecht*, it was stipulated by the XIVth article of that treaty, by his most christian majesty, that “the subjects of
“the said king may have liberty to remove
“themselves within a year to any other place,
“as they should think fit, together with all
“their moveable effects: but those who were

* Ils s'étoient adressés au Comte de la Galiffoniere, qui, pour les rassurer, leur avoit envoyé un officier avec un petit détachement de soldats & de milices du Canada. *ibid.* page 6.

This first step of *Mr. Galiffoniere*, to enlarge his own government of Canada, and the little notice the court of Britain took of it, seems to have animated him all along in those disputes, and to have made him the incendiary that has brought on all these disturbances between the two nations.

“willing

“willing to remain there, *and to be subject to*
 “*the kingdom of Great Britain*, are to enjoy
 “the free exercise of their religion, according
 “to the usage of the church of *Rome*, as far
 “as *the laws of Great Britain do allow the*
 “*same.*”

In pursuance of this, the inhabitants of *Nova Scotia* being summoned by proper officers appointed for that purpose by the crowns of Britain and France, several of them chose to quit the country and their possessions, and were transported to Cape Breton, thereby acknowledging the country to be transferred to *Great Britain*; while others remained in *Nova Scotia*, who took and subscribed an oath of allegiance to her majesty Queen Anne.

At the accession of King George the 1st; his majesty was proclaimed in all the principal parts of *Nova Scotia* in like manner as in his other dominions, and the inhabitants of that country, both French and English, took and subscribed an oath of supremacy and allegiance to his said majesty as their lawful sovereign, in the months of March and April 1715. They did the same to his present most gracious majesty George II, in October 1727. All this was done over the whole country, where there were any inhabitants, particularly at *Annapolis, Minas, Chiegnecto, St. John's River, Penobscot, &c.* the very places that are
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contested by the French : all which we have authentic proofs of from the public records of those transactions in the Plantation-office.*

After this what could possibly justify the court of France in sending troops and officers among those British subjects, to make them resist their lawful sovereign ? They thereby claim not only the territories of Great Britain, but its subjects likewise ! We had indeed very much neglected those our territories and subjects both, and the mild government of Britain allowed them to do in a manner what they pleased ; but that was no reason why they should belong to France, altho' it was the reason that made the French claim them.

Notwithstanding this they pretend to blame the court of Britain for making innovations, as they call them, in the territories in dispute, contrary to treaties. But what innovation is to compare to this, the French king's sending troops and officers to command in Nova Scotia, and to build forts in that country ? Neither of which it is well known he ever once had there since the treaty of Utrecht ; altho' there is no doubt but he would have had many of both, if he had had the least right or pretensions to the country : while on the other hand a governor has constantly been appointed over

* Vid. A fair representation of his majesty's right to Nova Scotia, pag. 57—63.

Nova Scotia by the crown of Britain, with a council and proper officers under him, who have exercised a jurisdiction over that whole country, ever since it was restored to Britain by the treaty of Utrecht, as is well known to all.

Even the French officers themselves, particularly the *Chevalier la Corne*, the French commandant at *Chicoutou*, did not dispute the British rights to that place, but owned it to be within the bounds of the British dominions, particularly to our officers that were sent there to summon him to retire, as appears from their journals of April 23d, 1750. He was only there to protect and support the Indians, he said. Notwithstanding this the French afterwards built their fort of *Beau Sejour* at this very spot; and others nigh it at *Bay Verte*, and *St. Johns*, on territories that as justly belonged to Britain, and have been clearly proven to do so.

It is well known to all the world, that the court of Britain was so far from being desirous to break the peace, that they suffered or winked at all those proceedings of the French in America, much longer than was consistent with their interests, or the safety of their subjects, and that entirely for the sake of peace: which was the plain cause of the boldness of the French thus to abuse their moderation and lenity, and afterwards to blame them for it.

The

The moderation of the court of Britain can never be represented in a stronger or a clearer light, than in their negotiation with France about the limits of *Nova Scotia*, to any that will consider it. They listened for no less than six years to such groundless pretences, and frivolous arguments of the French, that the very mention of them was enough to have made any reject them at first sight, and never to have given the least ear to them.

The whole claim of the French in *Nova Scotia* is founded upon an ambiguous passage or two in an obscure old author, *Mr. Denys*, who happens to tell us, when you go out of the bay of *Fundi*, you enter upon the coast of *Acadie* :* And for that reason alone the French pretend, that the coast of *Acadie* extends only to the entrance of that bay ! This ambiguous expression, rather than opinion, of *Mr. Denys*, is the whole and sole foundation of the French claims, and the only authority they have for the limits they would ascribe to *Nova Scotia* ! All their other pretended arguments and authorities, on which they have wrote three volumes in quarto, on purpose to puzzle the reader, and obscure the truth, are used only as a mask to this one, on which they solely rely

* Description des costes de l'Amerique septentrionale, p. 56, 58.

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* Ibid

for the limits they would assign to *Nova Scotia*. There is not a single author extant, nor any other authority whatever, antient or modern, that was ever seen or heard tell of, in which the limits of this country are described as they would have them, but in this one author alone, and in him only in these words of uncertain meaning; and yet they would make these two or three random words, trifling and ambiguous as they are, a charter of *Nova Scotia*, to determine the rights of nations!

What makes the testimony of this author still of no manner of authority in this dispute, if it was ever so clear or express, is, that he was a party concerned in it: he was one of four proprietors of this country, who had the very same dispute with one another about their bounds in it, as Britain has with France. And he was so far interested in the very part that France takes in this dispute from him, to confine the limits of *Acadia* to the peninsula, or rather to a part of it, that he tells us, it cost him at different times 153,000 livres, and 15,000 crowns, to defend it;* which was plainly the cause of the above-mentioned passage in his book, the like of which is not to be found in any other authority whatever.

* Ibid. pag. 5, 6, 18.

And are such obscure, ambiguous, trifling passages, in one single old book, so contradictory to all others of much better authority, wrote by a fisherman in *Nova Scotia*, who tells us himself he had spent nigh forty years among the savages there, by which he was little acquainted with such literary subjects, or the way of treating them,* are these, I say, to be made authorities for princes, and laws to determine such important concerns and rights of nations!—Especially when they are so directly repugnant to all other real and unexceptionable authorities, of which we have adduced so many.

Yet it was to maintain such arguments as these, founded on those authorities alone, that the French have engaged in this war with Britain; and would endeavour to persuade all mankind of the justness of such a cause!—But surely all these their arguments on this subject must appear to be a downright insult upon the understanding and common sense of this nation, and of all mankind; as much as the whole of their proceedings upon them, since the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, have plainly been nothing else, but an open breach of public faith, and a manifest violation of the most

* Vid. Preface, p. 2.

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solem treaties, to which all Europe, as well as America, were witnesses—*pudet hæc opprobria nobis.*

The limits of *Nova Scotia* are so full and clearly described in the charter of it, and in all other accounts, that the noble proprietor of it justly observes, it was impossible ever to contest them.† This was plain and manifest to all the world, who knew very well, that there neither is to this day, nor ever was, any other country between *New England* and the river *St. Lawrence*, but *Nova Scotia* alone. This was so clear to the French themselves, that they saw they could not dispute the limits of *Nova Scotia* any other way, which they were resolved to do at any rate, right or wrong, but by denying that there was any such country at all!—*pour la Nouvelle Ecosse c'est un mot en l'air—un pays ideal* || ; *Nova Scotia* is a word in the air—an ideal country, say they; which is the sole argument they have to dispute its limits!—Their way of ascertaining the limits of *Acadia* is still more surprizing. All that they would allow to Britain of that country, is no more than a fourth part or proprietorship,

† Encouragement to colonies by Sir William Alexander, pag. 32.

|| *Memoires des Commissaires, passim.*

what *Mr. Denys* would with his will have allowed to his fellow proprietor and competitor *Mr. d'Aunay*, from *Canso* to the bay of *Fundi*. This is what they would make all *Nova Scotia* or *Acadia*, *en son entier*, as it was restored to Britain by the treaty of *Utrecht*.— Hence they comply with the treaty of *Utrecht*, by maintaining, *that there is no such country as Nova Scotia ! And that a fourth part of Acadia is equal to the whole.*

This they do, in order to contest as much of that country as was possible ; whilst they were going on to seize and secure the rest of it, during the time of the negotiation about it. This was the way in which they complied with the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, by which it was stipulated, that neither party should settle any of the countries in dispute in America, 'till those disputes were decided by commissaries ; which the French were determined should never be done, 'till they had settled and secured them all, as they did.

2. The next argument made use of in this memorial relates to the river *Ohio* ; which they pretend was discovered by *Mr. la Salle* in 1679, and has ever since belonged to them on that account ; which is the only title they can show to it.* But what an insignificant pre-

* *Memoire*, Pag. 13.

tence must this appear to all who are any way acquainted with the transactions of *la Salle*, even as they are magnified by the French writers! He went over the lakes, and down the river *Illinois* to the *Missipi*, and never came within many hundred miles of the river *Ohio*, especially the forks of that river about *Fort du Quesne*, which he never once heard tell of: yet from thence the French pretend to claim all that country, and all North America with it beyond those bounds!—This is just as they pretend to claim under *Mr. Demys* in *Nova Scotia*.

They pretend to tell us, that the English never formed any pretensions to the river *Ohio*, nor to any part of the country about it. But it is well known, and was acknowledged by the natives of the country at *Albany* in 1754, that the English had settled on the *Ohio* thirty years before that; where we had many settlements on and about that river from *Venango* to *Shawnoab*, or the lower *Shawnoes*, extending along the river for four or five hundred miles and more, when the French came there in 1753; besides a settlement at *Pickawillany* on the river *Wabache* established in 1749, five hundred miles west of *Fort du Quesne*; which fort itself was projected and laid out by the Ohio company: besides another fort we had nigh *Buffalo* or *Beef* river, that was seized with the gar-
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rison in it by the French, as they own themselves ; † in all which places we have had not less than 400 men and more at a time, besides many that constantly resided there, especially at and about *Logg's Town* that was chiefly built by the English, and has had not less than 40 or 50 English houses in it ; all which we have from living eye-witnesses. Even at *Venango*, the very first place the French came to on the *Ohio*, “ We found the French colours
 “ hoisted at a house from which they had
 “ driven *Mr. John Frazier*, an English subject.”—*Croghan* of *Pennsylvania* had other settlements at that same place likewise ; besides others that were settled at *Kittanning*, and other places thereabouts. Not to mention the actual purchases the English have made of all those countries from the natives—The grants of them from their sovereign—and their prior discoveries of them—all which plainly show not only the pretensions the English formed, but the real claim they had, to the *Ohio*.

How does all this agree with this memorial of the court of France, in which they tell us,
 “ the *Ohio* had not been frequented by any
 “ but the French, while the English never
 “ formed any pretensions to the countries it

† Ibid. pag. 17.

‡ Washington's Journal, pag. 17.

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“ runs through †.” If the French did not find any number of English on the *Obio*, when they came down that river in 1754, it was because they were obliged to retire on the approach of the French to *Beef* river in 1753.

It was never known, that the French ever set a foot upon the *Obio* before the year 1749, when they were drove out of the country by the natives, who have always been in alliance and friendship with the English; as they consist chiefly of the natives of the other parts of *Virginia*, *Maryland*, and *Pensylvania*, who have been conquered and subdued, and settled here, by the *Six Nations*, subjects of Britain, who are settled among them; and to whom all this country of right belonged, before they made it over to the crown of Britain, by several formal deeds and surrenders.

The claims of the English to the *Obio*, and all the territories about it, are founded on the following undoubted just rights and titles; 1. the discovery and seizure of all the continent of North America, long before the French or any others knew any thing of it: 2. the discoveries of all those inland countries of N. America more particularly in 1568, 1654, 1672, 1678, and from 1725 to 1740 and 1754, &c. 3. several grants of all those countries on the *Obio* to British subjects in 1584, 1609,

† Memoire, p 13.

1620, and 1681: 4. a formal surrender and actual purchase of all those countries from the natives in 1684, 1701, 1726, and 1744: 5. an actual possession and settlement of them in consequence of these rights to them. All which must make a just right and title to the river Ohio, and all the territories about it, if any thing can.

To this the French can have nothing to object, nor to alledge in behalf of their pretensions, but the supposed discoveries of *La Salle* in 1680; a roving cavalier who rambled over part of North America to retrieve his his own desperate circumstances, as we have said; from which frivolous pretext the French pretend to claim all the countries he might have heard tell of in his rambles, without any other right or title whatever to them.

The French then have but two arguments for all their pretensions in North America, to support which they entered into this war with Britain, to wit,—*The private rambles of Mr. La Salle in North America,—and the party Claims of Mr. Denys in Nova Scotia!*

There is nothing then can possibly justify the French seizing this country on the *Ohio* by force of arms. They have not the least colour of any pretext to vindicate such a proceeding. They would insinuate indeed, that the English endeavoured to stir up the Indians

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here against the French, and that all *Canada* was alarmed on that account*; which is a mere surmize of theirs, without any manner of foundation. All their pretended alarms proceeded only from the English drawing a few skins and furs out of these their own territories, and from the Indians choosing to deal with the English rather than the French, which Indian trade is the whole dependance and subsistence of the poor Canadians †.

When the French seized the *Ohio*, they not only drove the English inhabitants from their houses and habitations, but pillaged them all of their effects, to the amount of several thousand pounds *sterl.* generally reckoned not less than 20,000: and the French court is pleased to represent it in this their memorial as a very great crime in them for offering to make reprisals! They sent out one of their officers, Mr. *Jumonville*, to summon the English to quit the *Ohio*, as they pretend; or rather, as our people alledge, to scour the country, and drive all the English out of it; which *pretended officer of justice* happened to be killed in a fray with some of the English and Indians, who had been thus robbed and plundered, and drove out of house and home; and this supposed massacre, as they are pleased to call it, they would make a sufficient reason

* Ibid. p. 15.

† See above, p. 185.

for invading and attacking our people again with open force, in a pitch'd battle, on the 3d of July 1754.

These were the causes, and the necessary and unavoidable causes, of sending an officer with a party of troops from England, to quell those disturbances on the river *Ohio*. But the court of France is pleased to aver, " this " could not be the consequence of the distur- " bances on the river *Ohio*, because it was " impossible they should then have heard " of them in London * ;" to wit, from the beginning of July 1754, or rather from the month of August 1753, when the French first invaded those territories, to the month of September or October 1754 ; which is as false as every thing else they advance. You may hear from those parts in London in a month or less, and far more in three or four, or rather in thirteen months.

These open hostilities, and other unwarrantable proceedings of the French upon the *Ohio*, are well known to have been the causes of sending general *Braddock* to oppose them ; and and afterwards of stopping their ships, that they sent full of troops, to reinforce and support their other forces, with which they had so openly invaded the British dominions ; for both which they cry out so much against us. But if we had all their orders given to *La Jonquere*

* Ibid p. 23.

and *Du Quesne*, governors of Canada, with those to *Contrecoeur* and *St. Pierre*, their generals on the *Ohio*, as they have the orders given to general *Braddock*, how necessary would those his orders appear to have been, that were only the consequence of those given before to the French commanders, and of their open hostilities.

And even in these proceedings the moderation and pacific measures of the court of Britain, that are otherways well known, must appear to all, who are any way acquainted with the situation of affairs in America. The true interest of Britain was without doubt to have sent their troops directly to *Crown-Point* and *Niagara*, instead of ordering them to the river *Ohio*, acrols all the mountains of *Virginia*, in which the greatest part of them perished. But as those places had been in the hands of the French for some time, the court of Britain endeavoured to avoid any unnecessary umbrage that might be given to France, by dispossessing them of those places abruptly, till the disputes relating to them could be more amicably accommodated; which so appears to have been the reason of undertaking that expedition to fort *du Quesne* in 1754, instead of going directly to *Niagara*, which we saw to be necessary the next spring: for which our ministry have been so much blamed by this nation, in not pursuing more vigorous mea-

measures, while they are here equally upbraided by France for pursuing these—This it is to be ministers of Britain in affairs with France!

III. After what has been said, there is no occasion to insist upon the negotiations, and evasions of them by our ministry, alledged by the court of France, in the sequel of this their memorial. They had brought the court of Britain into a long and tedious negotiation of seven years about those disputes in America, till they had seized all the countries in dispute, even in the course of the negotiation; and now they wanted to draw them into another like negotiation, till they could secure themselves in those places they had seized, or be better prepared for doing it; which was plainly the scope and drift of all their negotiations. For this reason, when our ministry came to the point with them, and the only point in dispute, to settle the limits between the two nations in America, and make them evacuate the territories they had so unlawfully seized, altho' they would have given up part of the undoubted rights of Britain for the sake of peace, yet all the answer they could get from France, by their own confession, was an absolute refusal of the just proposals of Britain; *Cette response etoit un refus absolu d'y souscrire*, page 43.

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