



# Statements and Speeches

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## CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

A Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, December 3, 1976.

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...(W)hile our domestic policy and our domestic objectives will tend to be fluid, at least superficially, our foreign-policy activities have to be of a more stable and long-range nature, and certainly cannot be subject to buffeting on a constant basis by a variety of pressure groups, however well-intentioned and however deserving those may be.

And so against that kind of brief comment about the way in which I visualize handling the foreign affairs of this country, let me spend much of my time now by talking to you about the subject that I thought might interest you more than any other, and that is how Canada will behave as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations when we assume our membership on that Council on January 1.

It is interesting in this context, by the way, to note that Canada is now taking on its fourth tour on the Security Council. We were there back in Mr. Ignatieff's first tour, I believe, in New York in the first decade of the United Nations, and we have been there in each of the decades since.

During that time, the Security Council has suffered its own ups and downs. There was a period when there was very grave doubt and many reservations were expressed as to whether or not, in fact, the Security Council and, by implication, the whole of the United Nations, might have to undergo serious revision in its structures and its mechanism, because it didn't appear to be working. Some of you will remember that back in the late 1950s the Security Council in one year met only five times because of a whole series of events that occurred during that period of the Cold War and the tensions between East and West. Well, since that time, slowly but to some extent, one can say, satisfactorily, the Security Council has changed its shape and has, in my judgment, become more effective. That does not mean that it is a perfect instrument -- clearly it falls far short of that; but, as against those five meetings that I mentioned in one year, in the first half of 1976, the current year, the Security Council has met some 69 times and, indeed, in addition to that, there have been a

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number of informal sessions of one type and another, so that it can be said with a good deal of accuracy that the Security Council is now almost a continuing body meeting pretty much all the time, and one that has to be seized of the many serious problems that are generating and have generated tensions throughout the world.

For all these reasons, we in the Government of Canada thought very seriously this year when it became apparent that our election to the Council for the fourth time was probably going to come about. We had to ask ourselves whether, indeed, it was an appropriate role for Canada and, put very frankly, we had to ask ourselves whether we were prepared to make and to take the hard decisions that I have no doubt will be put in front of us over the next two years of 1977 and 1978. I think it is part of the Canadian tradition, and it is a reflection of that tradition, that, while we realized the problems that lay ahead, there was not in the last analysis any serious thought on our part that we could allow this opportunity to pass, or this challenge to pass. And so it is that, as of a month from now, Canada will be back on the Security Council.

What, then, are some of the issues that I see coming before the Council in the foreseeable future? Some of them are quite easy to forecast, quite easy to predict.

Undoubtedly, the whole troubled question of Southern Africa will, in one form or another, find its way to the United Nations in 1977. We, of course, have no way of knowing, any more than any other country has, what is going to emerge from the present round of talks in Geneva on the future of Rhodesia (or Zimbabwe, as it is now coming more and more frequently to be called).

For our part, looking at Southern Africa in total for the moment, we have, of course, consistently rejected and denounced the *apartheid* policies of South Africa. There has been no waffling, no qualification, in that regard. And, indeed, Canada was among those countries that urged, and ultimately achieved, the voluntary embargo by a great many nations of any sales of arms or sensitive equipment to South Africa, and we have scrupulously adhered to that policy for many, many years.

Incidentally, there is always room for discussion in responsible groups such as this as to Canadian policy with regard to commercial transactions of a non-sensitive nature with countries with which we have profound differences on matters of ideology. Up to now, we have taken the position that trade in commercial goods of a non-sensitive nature with South Africa ought to be carried on by private interests if they so wish, and that it is no part of the Government's

responsibility to put any inhibitions in the way of that type of trade. The same, of course, could very well be said for many other countries where, once again, we are strongly divided between ourselves and those countries on ideological questions. And so, therefore, our position has been that, in the broad terms of commercial activity, it would be virtually impossible for us to set down guidelines or restrictions in terms of how private interests in Canada will be dealing with countries about which we have these kinds of objections; and South Africa, of course, stands out as the best example of that.

Similarly, in terms of South Africa, we have at the moment a most pressing question in front of us with regard to the whole question of sports activities between teams or participants from Canada and segregated teams from South Africa, whether in that country or with South African teams coming to Canada. Once again, we have taken the position that individual citizens of our country should not be inhibited, or prohibited, in terms of what they wish to do as individuals, but that, as the Government of Canada, we are discouraging those kinds of exchanges and have determined that we shall not provide any form of financial assistance as long as the *apartheid* policies are maintained. This, of course, has led us and many other countries of the Commonwealth into a somewhat difficult position, as of this moment, with regard to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton in 1978.

We have made many efforts already, and I believe with some success, to ensure, and to try at least, to have this matter resolved amicably and to ensure, I repeat, that there is the widest possible participation by Commonwealth countries, both black and white, in the Games; and I shall be holding further talks in that connection during this trip on which I am about to embark.

In the broader sense, of course, Southern Africa, as opposed to South Africa, is really more in the news these days because of the Rhodesian situation. And while none of us can, at this time, forecast what will emerge, as I said a moment ago, from the Rhodesian talks in Geneva, there is one thing of which we can be sure, and that is that majority rule will come to Rhodesia and will come sooner than later. And the question, it seems to me, that faces all of those who are either directly involved in the talks or who are in a peripheral role at the moment -- such as Canada -- is whether that transition to majority rule, which, of course, we support, is going to be brought about in an orderly and peaceful way or whether it is going to be accompanied by the kind of violence that all too frequently over the postwar years has accompanied the independence or freedom movement in one country after another, not only in Africa but elsewhere

in the world.

For my own part, I feel that the black leaders in Rhodesia have a great responsibility to recognize that they now have the opportunity to gain the support of the vast majority of the developed countries -- including Canada, including the United States -- by moving towards a rational transition, by working for a change that can be brought about with a minimum of disruption and with no bloodshed -- even though that may be an unrealistic expectation -- but nevertheless to work for the smoothest possible kind of change. And so the message that I have been conveying through all diplomatic and other channels that are open to us to the black leaders is to take to heart this important lesson and to demonstrate that they have the maturity and the competence to bring about this desirable change, which we and so many other countries support in the United Nations, in an amicable way.

...I am sure some of you who have a special interest will wonder whether or not any requests or proposals have yet come to us as to the kind of role that Canada might play during the transitional period. The fact is that, other than some quite general and, I may say, vague suggestions or comments, nothing has yet emerged of a specific nature for consideration by the Government of Canada. There has been reference, from time to time, to the possibility of the establishment of a special fund. And, incidentally, I should say in passing that much of the publicity in this regard has, I think, been somewhat off the mark, in that there is no suggestion that this fund, if it ever develops, will be used to finance the exodus of white Rhodesians. It is thought of more as a stabilizing fund for the preservation of the economic and political climate in the country, which, in fact, will encourage both the white Rhodesians and the black Rhodesians to settle any differences and to go on living amicably together. But I just mention that because there has been quite a bit of misunderstanding about it.

The second point is, of course, that there has been a suggestion that the Commonwealth might well have a role to play. And you may have noted that in my public comments on this question I have said simply that the principle is one with which none of us can really argue but that we should want to be very clear what kind of position a Commonwealth force, be it civilian or military, might be called upon to exercise in a Rhodesian situation in a transitional period. Certainly I should not wish, nor, I think, would any Canadian wish, to see Canadian forces, for example, used as a buffer between blacks and whites, or to see us once again thrust into a peacekeeping role between people who are genuinely, indeed, anxious to be literally at each other's throats. But, nevertheless, if there is a possibility

of a useful role for the Commonwealth, Canada will look at it realistically; but so far we have made no commitments on either of those scores.

I notice that, as I talk about these subjects, I tend to get into, perhaps, more detail than is necessary and therefore cut down on the amount of time that I want to spend on other subjects of equal, and perhaps greater, importance. So I shall simply say, in terms of the Southern African situation, that we are equally concerned about what is happening in Namibia. It is clear that it is an illegal régime -- a variety of international bodies have reached that conclusion -- and that South Africa is going to have to accept that decision and be governed accordingly.

Similarly, we do not, in Canada (nor to the best of my knowledge does any -- certainly any developed -- country) recognize the Transkei and that device and technique now being employed by South Africa as an appropriate, or suitable, or effective answer to *apartheid*. And so, therefore, it is not our intention, nor do I expect that it will be, that we shall give recognition to the Transkei as a full-fledged member of the United Nations.

But, as I started to say when I talked about the items that are going to come before the Security Council, you can see, just from some of the things that I have said, that the Southern African situation is going to be one of great intricacy and is going to call for a great deal of skill and, in some respects perhaps, a great deal of courage, on the part of the members of the Security Council, including Canada.

The second area, of course, where we are deeply concerned, for historical and many other reasons, is the Middle East. I do not think it any secret that matters in the Middle East, except for the tragedy of Lebanon, have been somewhat quiet in recent months for the very simple reason that all of the parties concerned realized that, until there was a resolution of the domestic election in the United States, it was highly unlikely that there would be strong initiatives from that quarter. Now the United States elections have been held. Fortunately, the situation in Lebanon is stabilized -- for how long, of course, we do not know, but it is stabilized and there is some ground for confidence. Therefore it is my view that negotiations with regard to a permanent settlement in the Middle East should begin at the earliest possible moment, that the situation that exists at present is one that (though, as I said, it is quiet now) could erupt once again into a very serious danger, not only to the peace of the area but to the peace of the world.

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Now I am not particularly concerned whether the talks are held in Geneva or somewhere else, but it is my intention to call upon all of the parties -- in my official role -- to resume those talks as quickly as possible, and to commit Canada's best efforts to getting them going in a climate that is best designed to bring about a permanent solution. None of us is so naive as to think that that solution will come easily. But it will not come at all unless there are a commitment and a willingness by all the parties to get together in a realistic fashion and face the complexities of bringing about a permanent peace.

So far as Canada is concerned, our position, with regard to the State of Israel is clear, unequivocal. We subscribe to the United Nations resolutions that ensure Israel the right to survival behind safe and secure boundaries, and there is no intention, no thought, of changing that position. Furthermore, we believe that a settlement in the Middle East must not only ensure the letter of that United Nations resolution but the spirit of it as well. And, of course, we're equally determined, as I think every reasonable person is, to see that the Palestinians, the Palestinian people, are also relieved of the terrible crushing burden so many of them have had to suffer for so many years. On humanitarian grounds alone this is surely an essential element in any Middle East solution that must be found. And, once again, it is not enough, it seems to me, to argue that it is complicated and complex and that we had best get along with a little patchwork here and a little patchwork there -- that there are those hundreds of thousands of people who have rights, which again have been recognized by the world community, and that we must see that as an essential part of the equation and of the solution.

In the interim, of course, Canada has been one of the major contributors to the United Nations' organization for refugees in the Middle East, and only two or three weeks ago I was able to give to the Secretary-General of that organization an additional amount of \$300,000 for this year for that purpose. But all of these are what I have called patchwork solutions. I have no doubt that, as members of the United Nations, and particularly of the Security Council, in this coming year, we in Canada, as with South Africa but perhaps with more visibility, will have to make some very difficult decisions relating to the Middle East. And I have no doubt either that there will be many who will say, as has already been said, that, by joining the Security Council, in some way or the other Canada's policy towards the Middle East is going to change in some direction, there is going to be some perceptible shift. Let me reassure you on that point. Our policy will continue to be as I have outlined it and, as you who are students -- at least of international affairs -- will

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know, we have declared it to be for many, many years. But I am also resigned to the very distinct possibility that, on this or that particular issue, there are bound to be those in Canada who will disagree with the position taken by Canada. I can only tell you that, during my period as Secretary of State for External Affairs, no such decisions, no such votes, no declarations, will be made or taken by us without the most careful analysis and scrutiny of resolutions or actions to ensure that they are consistent with the basic principles that I outlined a few moments ago.

There is much, much more that I could say about the Middle East, but once again time constraints make it impossible. But, if Canada, as has happened on two previous occasions, can be in the Security Council and can use its influence to move towards the resolution of the problems of the Middle East, then this will be one of the most satisfying things, I think, not only for those of us who have the active responsibility at a given moment but also for all Canadians, who have had such an intense interest in that area for so many reasons for so many years.

I suppose one of the other questions that is going to occupy us in the Security Council in the United Nations will be the question of the membership in the United Nations of some additional countries. Over the years there has been, of course, a growth in membership to the point where there are not very many countries that are not now participants, but there are some, one of them, of course, being the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It is Canada's position that Vietnam should be entitled to and should be given membership in the United Nations. We say this because our commitment has been for years to universality. We do not believe that the United Nations ought to be a club made up only of countries that think alike; in point of fact, exclusions, as we have seen in the past on a number of occasions, simply result in a heightening of tensions in particular regions of the world or between different ideologies of the world. That is why, for instance, for the same reason of universality, we should argue for the retention of South Africa as a member, and we should argue for the retention of Israel as a member.

And so we should also, and shall, at the Security Council continue to press for the admission of those countries that are still outside the UN, even though, I repeat, we may not be even remotely close to agreeing with their ideology or some of their basic political principles. The point is that the UN will only work if we are prepared, within that forum, to listen to views and to argue with views with which we disagree, rather than spend our time in a confined club patting each other on the back and telling each other what good boys we are.

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Also, in 1977, there are, I have no doubt, likely to be important developments in the whole area of *détente* and, of course, the companion area of disarmament. For a number of reasons, 1976 has not been a particularly productive year for East-West talks relating to disarmament. I think it is fair to say once again that probably the SALT talks and some of the others that have been going on in different forums have suffered as a result of the uncertainty about the future political leadership in the United States, as well as, of course, for a variety of other reasons. But in 1977, once again, I think it is incumbent upon us in Canada to call, as we have already started to do, on the great powers to undertake a determined effort to ease the tensions that are inherent in the current arms race. And here, once again, I'm sure you will understand that this is a subject that again could occupy many hours not only of talk but of discussion; but it is sufficient for me to say this evening that, to me, 1977 is a very crucial year in that vitally-important field, not only important in the sense that it heightens the possibility even of inadvertent war but also important in the sense that it is diverting such scandalously large sums of money into the arms race when so much of the world is in such incredible poverty and need.

And that brings me to the fourth and final area where I believe there will be great need for wisdom and vision in the Security Council in the United Nations in 1977 and in the years beyond, and that is in the area that has come to be called the North-South dialogue. This is such a complex subject that it is virtually impossible, without the to-and-fro of questioning and discussion in small groups, to deal with it adequately. But the simple truth of the matter is that we have a situation in the world today -- perhaps brought to a head by the OPEC-country developments -- in which the vast majority of the people of the world, the vast majority of the countries of the world, are in a deplorable condition economically and in every other imaginable way.

It occurred to me the other day, for instance, when I was looking at some statistics, that a simple way to try to convey the scope of the world's poverty was that there were 900 million families -- people rather -- in the world whose income in a year was only half of what a Canadian family with two teenage children received from family allowances alone. If you can think about it in those terms, it gives you some kind of conception of why we are facing, in the underdeveloped world, not only a challenge to our magnanimity but, I suggest, in a very real sense, a challenge, ultimately, to our survival. Because, until we can find a suitable means of sharing more equally, not just in the kind of welfare manner of much of the past but in a way that gives these people in these countries hope for the future, then there will invariably be the kinds of mounting

suspicion that have led to voting blocs in the United Nations, that have led to, in some measure at least, such repugnant resolutions as the association of Zionism and racism.

All of these things are a reflection, at least in part, of that ferment that is going on in the underdeveloped world. And so the North-South dialogue is reflected now in the Conference on International Economic Co-operation in Paris, of which my colleague and predecessor, Allan MacEachen, is Co-chairman. That forum must make progress, because, unless it does, unless the developed countries are prepared to demonstrate clearly what they are prepared and willing to do by way of commodity agreements, whatever form they take, by way of debt-forgiveness or easing for some of the poorest countries, and in a whole range of other areas, then, of course, the leverage of essential commodities such as oil, and the OPEC group, will unquestionably be used against the developed countries in ways I shudder to contemplate in terms of the potential they may have eventually for ripping the world literally apart.

And so, in the Security Council once more, Canada is going to have to be wise and judicious and generous, not only in terms of our own people and what they are prepared to do but in terms of the leadership that we can give to the developed world. All in all, then, it is going to be a busy year, and that is quite a challenge when one takes into account two other factors I want to touch on very briefly.

First, having to deal with a new administration in the United States. I have no great qualms, incidentally, about that prospect, because Canada/United States relations have gone on for so long and are based, by and large, on such a firm foundation of understanding and mutual awareness of each other that a change of administration is not going to significantly alter that relationship. But, nevertheless, it is going to be important that we deal with them in as frank and forthright and rapid a manner as we possibly can to avoid their festering into something far more serious.

And finally, of course, not only must those challenges at the United Nations be coupled with our relations with the United States and how we are going to share this continent but we also have to decide what we are going to do with our own country.

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