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THE FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND COORDINATION PROGRAM

EVALUATION ASSESSMENT: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

OFFICE OF INTERNAL EVALUATION AND AUDIT (UAP)
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY 1982

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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Attached for your information is the UAP Program Evaluation Team's report on their investigatory efforts concerning the foreign policy formulation and co-ordination aspects of the Department (old mode). The report is labelled 'preliminary' because of the fact that the assessment had to be brought to a halt by the Reorganization announcement of January 12, 1982, i.e. at the very moment when our recommendations concerning possible courses of action were about to have been put forward. The report is accordingly distributed for information purposes and the record only, since no decisions are required of anyone as to the document itself at this particular point in time. It will, however, remain a key background document for future consideration and discussion of evaluation plans for the new Department.

- 2. Also attached is a summary table of evalution issue and option questions (drawn from Chapter Four of the report), which were to have formed the basis of the "recommendations-that-never-were", referred to above. The first two columns of this table are paraphrased straight from the report, the second two were added recently as an aid in placing the questions in a better context for the new Department.
- Some specific and, we think, useful conclusions can be drawn from the table (as seen from our vantage point some three months after the start of the reorganization), and these are presented below under Specific Conclusions. But as a lead-in to the specifics of what the Team came up with after eight months of work, we feel some more general observations and conclusions may prove of interest:
- Program evaluations, strictly speaking, seek to analyse the end result and final consequences of an organization's activities on society in general (or parts thereof, towards which the activities were directed). For External Affairs (old and new mode), "society" translates into a domestic scene, i.e. the Canadian public at large, and private industry, and an international scene; (bilateral, multilateral). All other "target

areas" are then said to be concerned with internal government structure and process. With the exception of very specific and directed thrusts, it therefore seems to us virtually impossible to address directly the consequences of Departmental activities in society at large. Accordingly it is not surprising that the most useful areas for evaluative work are seen to lie, generally, within the governmental sphere of activity.

- B. Foreign policy, when considered for evaluation purposes (from an internal government perspective), appears to exist on two planes; the very general and the very specific, with not too much of use in between. On the general plane, issues have proved too nebulous and complex to come to grips with; on the specific plane, issues become so specific as to take on the dimensions of individual projects (an internal audit concern).
- C. Much descriptive material concerning foreign policy activities is in current circulation, to which stockpile the Team has now made its own contribution. What is missing, (with respect to the gap between the general and the specific referred to in para. 2 above) is an explanation of these activities in terms useful to evaluation and other management endeavours. Are there patterns or regularities in foreign policy practice that might prove useful in understanding the discipline? Can it be explained to practitioners and outsiders alike in terms of general principle, or will we be obliged to rely on descriptions of events, procedures and structures? We predictably discovered no general principles or laws governing foreign policy practice, but we think it will be necessary to go beyond description alone, at some time or other, in order to address meaningfully the results of Departmental efforts. In this respect, the report sets out the Team's view concerning how foreign policy accomplishments might be approached in terms of basic causal connections between the various activities, their raisons d'être, and their end results.
- D. With respect to the consideration of the end results of the Department's activities, upper limits may be said to exist concerning:
 - (a) the Department's ability to develop and implement coherent foreign policy, and
 - (b) the degree to which it can be held accountable for the achievement of national foreign policy objectives.

Concerning the former, it seems evident that the Department cannot present a clearer picture of foreign policy than that which is held by the government of the day (however useful its advice may be at the margin). Concerning the latter, the Department exercises national prestige and influence, and contributes to their enhancement, but it does not possess these qualities in its own right.

- E. Returning to the attached table, and coming up to the specific conclusions mentioned earlier, very few of the evaluation questions identified by the Team appear to be significantly affected by the Reorganization. The only and obvious exceptions were those questions dealing with the mandate, and with the accountablity/ responsibility confusions between the Department and OGDs, and between Headquarters and posts abroad. These questions are now being subsumed by the new legislation exercise, among others.
- F. Several evaluation questions have been labelled by the Team as being of academic or theoretical interest. This is not to suggest that these questions should necessarily be dismissed on grounds of being hypothetical, but rather that they might be subcontracted out for study to academic or private research organizations (Cf. Von Riekhoff, et.al, (1976), on Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives; and Brecher, (1972), on Israel's Foreign Policy System). The reason behind this suggestion is that most of the relevant information is derived from interviews and examination of departmental records. As such, its interpretation is subject to the biases of the investigator (as in most cases where analogy and inference must be used in place of direct observation). The Department may wish to avail itself of a variety of points of view.

Specific Conclusions

- 4. Below, in point form, are listed some of the more salient aspects emerging from the Team's consideration of the FPFC program:
 - A. From the Report (to identify the questions indicated refer first to the attached table, then to the Report, Chapter 4, for further detail)
 - (i) Review the contribution of External Affairs to the shaping or influencing of domestic policy, by virtue of its international experience. (Questions 8 and 16).
 - (ii) Explore External Affairs' working relationships with other government departments, with respect to liaison and co-ordination of Canadian foreign policy. (Questions 10, 14, 17 and 22).
 - (iii) Investigate all aspects of foreign policy information flow, or the handling thereof, within the Department. (relate to analysis/synthesis activities). Questions 11 and 27).

B. From the general FPFC environment

(i) A geographic perspective, both bilateral or multilateral (and not excluding domestic regions), might be suitable

for evaluation purposes. A given country, region, or institution might be selected, and the totality of Canadian interests in that area (and how they are manifested) could then be investigated. Bilateral strategy papers could serve as a starting point.

- (ii) Should we wish to look to the future, some of the suggestions made in Section E of our plan for an evaluation plan of a reorganised Department of External Affairs (our memorandum UAP-87 to you of March 19, 1982 refers) might prove worthy of consideration as yet another possible approach to the FPFC evaluation.
- 5. As I pointed out earlier however, the purpose of this memorandum is not to open up here a discussion on the <u>pros</u> and <u>cons</u> of what might be a valid evaluation option or options for the FPFC program, but rather to tell you how far we had gone along this road when Reorganisation caught up with us.

J.E. Thibault, Head, Office of Internal Evaluation and Audit.

Chapter Four

Evaluation Issues and Options

Pro	gram Rationale		•	
A -	General Issues			
	Question	Suggested Approach	Usefulness	Affected by Reorganization
1.	Should the existing mandate be formalized and strengthened.	- Detailed analysis of Deptl. functions - research review - catalogue of functions	- limited - previous attempts unsuccessful	- profoundly (New Legislation)
		 consensus of high- level discussion group (Delphi group) 	- very limited - too large group needed	- profoundly (New Legislation)
	Do activities and outputs match:	 too vague; no approach suggested 	•••••	•••••
	- objectives?			
	<pre>- national foreign policy?</pre>			
	- foreign ministry concept?			
	Do objectives match mandate?	- ditto	•••••	•••••
	Do activities:			
	match govt. priorities?	- ditto	•••••	•••••
	result in informed decision-makers?	- case studies - peer review - "what if" scenarios	- very limited - reduces to second guessing	- no
	help strengthen structures in the international arena?	- case studies of ongoing multilateral issues - historical review of Canadian contribution to a selected innatl organization - interview heads of selected innatl. orgs interview special interest groups	 limited, generalization difficult interviewee biaises introduced 	- no
: I	short term view the best for judging effectiveness?	- academic, philosophi- cal questions, contract-out to academic community - minister has commented (long term view - recent address)	limited (managerially)high (theoretically)	- no
- :	Specific Issues			
•	Is the mandate clear in the light of summit meetings?	- case studies and interviews	 high should result in guidelines re. roles and responsibilities 	- significantly (New Legislation)
(((Is it possible, and desirable for EA to articulate objectives and assign them priorities?	- Direct management issue - not an evaluation issue <u>per se</u>	 high (theoretically), and practically to the extent an answer is found 	- no

	Question	Suggested Approach	Usefulness	Affected by Reorganization
8.	informed of domestic	- catalogue of recent initiatives - analysis of EA contribution - "what if" scenarios - interviews - case studies	 high, theoretically, but practical useful- ness governed by degree of subjectivity time consuming 	- slightly
	- if no - is EA influence limited to period after other governments have reacted.			
9.	Have major international incidents been successfully anticipated in the recent past?	- ditto	<pre>- moderate; less if "track record" is only outcome; more if timing, and subject matter considered separately.</pre>	- no .
10.	Does EA have credibility in the eyes of other govt. departments?	- interviews	 high, and higher depending on how management correlates credibility and the exercise of influence. 	 profoundly (subsumed by new legislation)
11.	Can EA access <u>all</u> relevant information and opinion concerning given issues.	- case studies - interviews - "what if" Scenarios - test cases and simulations	 high, although essentially an analysis of information capabilities time consuming 	- no ·
Imp	acts & Effects			
<u>A -</u>	General			
12.	Are impacts and effects attributable to EA activity identifiable?	 addressed during assessment stage relationships tenuous and diffuse 	 moderately, in that an area of enquiry essentially eliminated 	- no
13.	Are there any side effects to EA (FPFC) activity? Could harmful side effects and failure to achieve desired effects be differentiated?	- none suggested	 not worth pursuing as a separate issue use as "add on" to another investigation 	- slightly
14.	How does FPFC support OGD programs?	- address in conjunction with other issues (No. 10) - use as a ranking factor	n - ditto	- no
15.	Does FPFC duplicate, overlap or conflict with OGD programs?	 interview OGD program managers classify programs by subject area, (sample) 		- significantly

	Question	Suggested Approach	Usefulness	Affected by Reorganization
<u>B</u> -	Specific Issues			
16.	policies or programs have been revised as	- relates to No. 8 - select example - examine documentation - interviews	 moderate; high if co-ordination given high priority 	- no
	What percentage of all such programs?			1
	Does relevant OGD agree?			
17.	Do OGD recognize and accept EA intervention?	- relates to No. 14 and No. 10 - pursue in conjunction.	- ditto	- no
18.	For what areas does EA have full policy and program responsibility?	 relates to No. 6 document historical shifts 	- 1ow	significantly (New Legislation)
	What is rationale for division of responsibility?			
19.	international stature and ability to influence world events been affected	eliminate bias.	 none; if viewed as occasion for academic criticism moderate to high; if viewed as source of constructive commentary instructions would need careful drafting time consuming 	- moderately
20.	What is the impact of various constraints on the FPFC program? - rotationality - changes in technology - summitry - emphasis on human capital	- address as factors to consisder in determination of alternatives, or - in consideration of the various support programs	 as determined by associated study, if any 	- slightly
	Are internal specific objectives consistent and integrated. Do they form a coherent guide to foreign affairs. Can such objectives be identified and articulated?	 academic; difficult; contract out to academic community assign to experienced FSO's 	 high; if addressed in conjunction with specific thrust, ie. bilateralism difficult to determine generally 	- no

	Question	Suggested Approach	Usefulness	Affected by Reorganization
22.	Does FPFC contribute to establishment of relative trade-offs and priorities, given multi- dimensional foreign policy objectives.	- closely linked to credibility (No. 17)	- as determined by related questions; possibly very high	- no
23.	What is Canada, impact in innat'l. fora? Relate to FPFC program.	 management review issue, relates to No. 4(c) 	•••••	•••••
24.	How many posts are needed? Is resource allocation in keeping with objectives?	 modified zero-based budgeting scenarios cost-effectiveness analysis 	 could be high, depending on program activity - planning element studies expensive and time consuming 	- significantly
Alte	ernatives			
<u>A -</u>	General Issues			
25.	Is it possible to define the objective setting process, to give priorities, and greater direction in conduct of foreign affairs.	 addressed by mgt. review process; strategic overview object of reorganization 	- subsumed by re-org. task forces	- profoundly
26.	Are there more cost-effective ways of:	 too general, none suggested (see specific questions below) 	•••••	•••••
(a)	informing decision- makers	55.6%,		
(b)	developing coherent foreign policy			
(c)	ensuring co-ordination of interests abroad			
(d)	representation abroad, and reportage			
<u> 3</u> -	Specific Issues			-
27.	Are there other and better ways to gather information?	 interviews review practices of other foreign ministries cost effectiveness analysis address in conjunction with No. 11 	 high; if mgt. gives priority to analysis of information analysis processes 	- moderately
28.	Do redundancies or gaps exist in post support services?	- management review issue	•••••	•••••

Question	Suggested Approach	Usefulness	Affected by Reorganization
29. How would foreign policy be developed if FPFC program did not exist?	- academic study (contract out) - interviews - "what if" scenarios - review practices of other foreign ministries	- 1 ow	- no ·
30. What would be the advantages of OGD and provinces handling their own international relations? What co-ordination would be necessary? Who would do it?	 academic historical review of previous attempt (Second German Empire) 	- 1ow	- slightly
31. Are there better ways of deploying resources to achieve similar ends?	- catalogue advantage and disadvantages of several approaches - interviews, opinion gathering	- subsumed by current task forces	- significantly

THE FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND CO-ORDINATION PROGRAM

Evaluation Assessment: Preliminary Findings

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Office of Internal Evaluation and Audit (UAP)
Department of External Affairs
May, 1982

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Chapter One

The Assessment Process

I. INTRODUCTION

The 1981-82 Evaluation Plan identified 26 evaluation components, essentially on an organizational basis, which can be grouped as follows:

- (a) Resource Operations (Personnel, Finance, Physical Resources, Communications, etc.)
- (b) External Affairs Services (Consular, Information, Protocol, etc.)
- (c) Foreign Policy Operations

Evaluation work began two years ago on group (b) with the Consular Services study, and continues with the current evaluation of the Information Abroad Program. No evaluation work has been done as yet on group (a) since, as essentially common support services, they are thought to better approached on an internal audit basis. There remains group (c) Foreign Policy Operations, which, with the addition of the foreign policy formulation and coordination elements of Legal Affairs in group (b), will now be described as the Foreign Policy Formulation and Co-ordination component group (FPFC) for purposes of evaluation.

The greatest scope for program evaluation, and hence its greatest potential usefulness to Management was seen to lie in this area, the elements of which could be addressed either individually or collectively. As they appeared to have several traits in common, at least for purposes of an initial assessment, it was agreed to consider them as a whole. A list of them follows:

Component	Organization			
	Old Symbols New Symbols			
FPFC: Geopolitical	GAP GEP GNP GPP unchanged GSP			
FPFC: Economic and Technological	ECP ESP unchanged			
FPFC: United Nations Affairs	UNP CMP			
FPFC: Commonwealth Institutions	FCC CMC			
FPFC: Francophone Institutions	FCF CMF			
FPFC: Federal-Provincial	FCO RPF			
FPFC: Disarmament	DPA XDA			
FPFC: Defence Relations	DFP unchanged			
Policy Planning Secretariat	POL SPF			
Legal Affairs (Policy Formulation and				
coordination elements)	FLP LAP			

These components represented the <u>raison d'être</u> of the Department of External Affairs prior to the January 12, 1982 reorganization.

Accordingly, in June 1981, the Program Evaluation side of the Office of Internal Evaluation and Audit, assisted by Consultants from the Bureau of Management Consulting, Department of Supply and Services, began work on an Evaluation Assessment of the Foreign Policy Formulation and Coordination activities of the Department. This is a report of the work accomplished as of January 12 last, when the Government made known its decision to restructure the Department of External Affairs so as to include within its sphere of responsibility all aspects of trade and export promotion abroad.

II TERMS OF REFERENCE

The terms of reference for the Evaluation Assessment were set out in a proposal submitted to and approved by the Audit and Evaluation Committee of the Department on February 16, 1981.

The Committee then agreed that the evaluation of the ten departmental components identified as being principally involved in foreign policy formulation and coordination should be helpful in reaching conclusions about the effectiveness, efficiency and economy with which the Department was fulfilling its primary role. These components encompassed most if not all aspects of what is considered to be the Department's central policy agency functions.

Additionally, the components under reference provided the vital linkage with the posts abroad, other government departments (OGD), the provinces, foreign governments, multilateral agencies, etc. An assessment of these activities should also throw light on such areas as departmental objectives and priorities. It might conceivably shed some light on the relevance of the departmental evaluation component structure itself, especially where some doubt existed regarding the appropriateness of this structure.

It was understood that, upon completion of the work called for in this proposal, Senior Management would expect to be provided with a program profile and a series of options for an effectiveness evaluation of the program component (FPFC); the options should address issues, methodologies, scope, depth and costs.

Evaluation assessments are an important first step in the evaluation of a department's programs. Their purpose is to provide Senior Management with an objective and independent review of a program, with an identification of the issues which could be addressed through a later program evaluation, and with an outline statement of the methodology which would be followed in conducting the evaluation.

III SCOPE OF WORK

The conduct of foreign affairs (or external affairs as they are referred to in Canada) is divided into the formulation and execution of policies. Foreign Policy Formulation (and Coordination) is therefore central to the role of the Department. This assessment is concerned with the way in which it is perceived, understood and carried out at home and abroad.

IV TEAM COMPOSITION

The Evaluation Team was composed as follows:

J.E. Thibault - Director, Program Evaluation (UAP): Team
Leader

W.R. Priest - Senior Evaluator (UAP)

R. Barry Reed - Senior Consultant, Bureau of Management Consulting, Department of Supply and Services

B. Lundman - Consultant, Bureau of Management Consulting,
Department of Supply and Services

Y SPECIAL SUPPORT, REVIEW AND STEERING MECHANISMS

Throughout the project, the Evaluation Team was assisted by, and benefitted from the experience and advice of the Head of Internal Evaluation and Audit, Mr. K.W. Maclellan, a seasoned foreign service officer with extensive knowledge and appreciation of departmental management and review practices.

As well, the Evaluation Team sought general advice at key points in the project's work program. An Advisory Committee including the following senior officers of the Department was convened for this purpose:

- J.R. McKinney Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of Energy, Investment and Science Relations
- R. P. Cameron Director-General, Bureau of International Security Policy and Arms Control Affairs
- B. Buckley Secretary to the Senior Management Secretariat and Foreign Operations Coordinator

Finally, the Team was provided with general direction by the Audit and Evaluation Committee; Mr. D. Molgat, Deputy Under-Secretary, Management, chaired the Committee. He was assisted by:

D. Bresnahan - Director-General, Bureau of Finance and Management Services

D. M. Miller - Director-General of Personnel

P.Hancock - Chairman, Policy Planning Secretariat

B. Buckley - Secretary, Senior Management Secretariat

VI GENERAL APPROACH

The methodology developed to carry out this Assessment generally followed the approaches and principles recommended for use in program evaluation by the Comptroller General of Canada in his "Guide"

on the Program Evaluation Function in Federal Departments and Agencies" and its companion volume "Principles for the Evaluation of Programs by Federal Departments and Agencies".

Briefly, this methodology involves, among other things:

- (a) developing and understanding of the operation of the foreign policy formulation and coordination function of the Department, and of its environment;
- (b) identifying potential evaluation questions;
- (c) determining prospective potential evaluation approaches;
- (d) formulating evaluation options, and
- (e) assessing the general merits of the various evaluation options.

VII SPECIFIC APPROACH TO THE FPFC COMPONENTS

The first step of the general approach outlined above (understanding the program and its environment) proved, and is still proving to be, singularly difficult. Some observers may feel that, after reviewing this report, the subject matter is still not completely understood; or alternatively, that it cannot be approached in an objective and rigorous manner. Herein lies the heart of the problem facing the Team: the great variety of opinion concerning what the Department as a foreign ministry does, how and why it does it, and, most importantly, to what effect. Thus it was discovered early on that while it was one thing to describe FPFC activities, it was quite another thing to explain them. The following represents a digest of approximately two and one half person-years of Team effort in attempting to answer these questions. The prime source of information was a series of interviews with departmental officers at all levels, review of a variety of literature and internal documentation, and consideration of two foreign relations issues deemed representative for observation and testing purposes.

Yet wide areas of consensus do exist concerning "what goes on", and this has been built upon. Also, some aspects of the Department's activities are easier to come to grips with than others. The chief difficulty has been the complexity with which the various aspects of the departmental modus operandi (both structurally and procedurally) interrelate. Also unclear were questions concerning the point at which the Department ceased to become a department of government per se and became a staff support group for the government of the day; or became the official spokesman of the country as a whole, internationally. Of equal concern, for similar reasons, was the consideration on a "horizontal" basis of the wide variety of foreign relations issues, versus the "vertical" nature of the consultation and decision-making process (eg. Posts - Headquarters - Cabinet - Summit). Other questions involved the Department's roles domestically, in juxtaposition with its international roles.

The answers, or partial answers to these and other related questions (presented in Chapter Two) constitute our understanding of the Foreign Policy Formulation and Co-ordination process, and hopefully point the way towards a similar understanding of the outcomes, impacts effects of this process. Chapters Three and Four describe our thinking in this regard as of January 12, 1982. The following paragraphs describe briefly how we went about gathering information, and developing testing and refining ideas.

A Backgound Material

Both the Bibliography and the Review of Similar Work, Chapter Two, page 54, give an indication of the written material consulted during the course of the study. Another of our early discoveries was that, although more than enough descriptive material was available concerning processes, structures and issues in Canadian foreign relations, we were essentially breaking new ground in attempting to identify its end results and underlying factors.

B Analogies, Patterns and Models

The immediate result of the above review was a number of "visualizations" of how FPFC worked internally, and with respect to the foreign environment. After their first test - on the foreign service members of the Evaluation Team - they were ready for wider exposure (see Diagrams 1 and 2). We found that, like any analogy, they generally raised more questions than they answered, and tended to describe certain aspects of the situation better than others. Nevertheless they proved very useful to us as a shorthand method of presenting complex relationships, for testing assumptions, as well as in seeking patterns or regularities which would prove useful in understanding the discipline.


C Interviews With Senior Desk Officers


The main result of the analogy-building stage was a need for the clarification of, and the acquisition additional current information on, the various basic roles and activities of the Department that we had identified. A series of interview questions were drafted in order to elicit information on such topics as policy formulation; policy co-ordination, internal (Departmental) and external (other government departments) post support; and information processing (in the sense of intelligence, as opposed to the storage and retrieval of documents).

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As a first step, fourteen senior desk officers (including several Deputy Directors), representing all of the FPFC Bureaus were interviewed, in sessions lasting individually from one to two hours. In addition to the above topics, the discussions covered the officers' perceptions of the role of the desk officer, and by extention the roles of the Department in general, with respect to FPFC. The information thus gathered was descriptive, candid, and very useful. The senior desk officer was seen as being the principal working level of the Department. The original intent was to continue interviewing, as required, at progressively higher levels, but this possibly was overtaken by events.

FPFC COMPONENTS





D Consideration of Two Foreign Relations Issues

Two curent issues, or cases were chosen for study which were thought to be representative of the complexity of FPFC activities (i.e. intricate events, with many Government departments and outside institutions and/or organizations involved, conflicting or overlapping Canadian Foreign Policy objectives, etc.). The cases were:

- (1) the slaying of a Canadian lay missionary in Guatemala in July 1981 (Raoul Joseph Leger), by Guatemalan security forces. Initially a consular incident, it escalated to the bilateral and multilateral level as one of a series of currently developing Central American crises.
- (2) the sale of arms to South Africa in controvention of a UN embargo, to which Canada is signatory, by a Canadian company (Space Research Corporation) which had incidentally received assistance from the Canadian Government under the Defence Industry Productivity Program. Although for several years in the making, this case, which is of extreme political sensitivity, is still evolving.

While there is no intention of pursuing the development of these cases here, two points nevertheless are worthy of note:

- the objective in examining the issues was to follow passively the actual use of process and structure in the light of the end results sought after in each case in both their long term and short term aspects.
- the two cases served to confirm our understanding of FPFC as it is presented throughout this report.

E Presentation of Initial Observations

Taken together with the foregoing analytical work, the results of the interviews referred to earlier left several general perceptions which appeared to merit further exploration and testing. The first was that the policy formulation role of the Department seemed relatively weak in comparison with its implementation roles (co-ordination and 'information processing'), which appeared to predominate, even after taking into account the relative position of the desk officer in the Departmental hierarchy. The second was that, taking FPFC as we then perceived it as a whole, we noticed several lines of division; a horizontal one between the desk officer level and Senior Management, and several vertical ones at and below the level of the desk officer, which highlighted:

- bilateral (geopolitical activities);
- internal co-ordination (within External Affairs mostly on multilateral matters), and
- external co-ordination (mostly with other government departments on fuctional matters).

As the interviews represented the completion of the initial stage of the Assessment, a brief stock-taking period lead the Team to decide on a presentation to the Office of the Comptroller General (as the agency of government responsible for the orderly discharge of the evaluation function by departments), of its finding up to this particular point, at which time it would wish to raise several questions concerning the next steps which might be taken in pursuit of the Assessment.

Specifically, the Team had in mind such questions as: the addition to FPFC of the Legal Affairs Bureaux (it was not on the original FPFC list); the role of the Policy Planning Secretariat (subsequently discussed), and the variety of views concerning the independence of the posts with respect to policy formulation, and implementation. Also for discussion were to be such questions as the advisability of extended interviewing (including the carrying out of this exercise outside the Department), plans for following the course of some specific foreign policy issues (Section D), and consideration of comparable practices of other countries' foreign ministries (see separate documentation relating to the Team's visit to the U.S.A.).

The presentation took place on August 26, 1981. The Office of the Comptroller General raised fundamental objections to the way the Assessment was progressing. Our approach was said to be too process or means - oriented, and as a result fell within the ambit of internal audit. Their advice was accordingly that the Team's efforts be re-directed in a "results-oriented" manner so that such questions as "what impact the department has" with respect to Canadian international relations could be addressed, i.e. what is Canada's influence on world affairs, and what is the Department's contribution? Whereas such questions would be difficult to grasp in general, specific aspects should be tackled, such as economics, trade, and peace and security. With respect to the latter, it was suggested that the impact of Canada's role in disarmament might be examined.

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The Team, in other words, should cease trying to link activities to outputs to effects to objectives (such as any of these could be identified). It should rather seek a suitable foreign policy issue, and in a 'top-down' manner, identify the actual outcomes of Canada's efforts, and then evaluate the impact of these outcomes. The Departmental contribution would thus be isolated and analysed, and the relationship of the results to any relevant objectives, could then be dealt with.

The Team's response to the OCG's observations was that it felt it premature to approach effectiveness questions associated with foreign policy issues without an adequate knowledge of the processes, structures, actors, intentions and environments involved. For example, the Team was still grappling with the idea of co-ordination, which exists, all at the same time, as a basic activity, as an output (a means to an end), or as an effect in itself (the end result, as it were, of a major multilateral overture).

In order for the evaluation to proceed however, it was decided within UAP to begin the Assessment anew, this time following as closely as possible not only the intent of, as had been done to date, but the actual approach and the evaluation questions in the suggested OCG Guidelines.

The Contents of Chapters Two, Three and Four reflect the results of this approach.

VIII Concluding Notes

During the course of the Assessment, a number of concerns were raised which, on the face of it, appeared quite central to the Department's continued ability to receive, absorb and shape information to the ends of policy through research, analysis and assessment. These concerns had to do variously with program delivery role and responsibility, and the likely effects thereon of foreign service consolidation; the role of the Head of Post, both perceived and actual; the deployment of present resources in the face of increasing public demand on departmental services at home and abroad; the value and use made of departmental information retrieval systems, the absence of methods by which to tap the expertise of the ever-growing body of knowledgeable and experienced personnel, with respect to foreign countries, in the senior reaches of the Department, etc.

A closer look at these concerns showed (a) that they had been with the Department in one form or another for some time, or (b) that they could appropriately be dealt with in conjunction with basic evaluation questions - the questions one would normally consider as a matter of course during an evaluation assessment. To varying degrees, all of the concerns expressed above have been carried through to the prospective evaluation questions which were formally assessed by the Team.

The report which follows accordingly presents the Evaluation Team's understanding of the Policy Formulation and Coordination Role of the Department in profile form (the program environment: its mandate, population, linkages with other departments; objectives and impacts/effects; issues and concerns). It discusses the specific evaluation opportunities assessed and concludes with a presentation of the evaluation options (individual evaluation questions are separately assessed, and an analysis of the main options is presented).

Chapter Two

Program Profile - Foreign Policy Formulation and Co-ordination

I. PROGRAM DEFINITION

This evaluation assessment deals with the Foreign Policy Formulation and Coordination (FPFC) program components of the Department of External Affairs. In general terms, these components provide advice leading to the formulation, promulgation, and implementation of foreign policy which is directed towards and consistent with the national objectives of Canada and international realities. These components form the core of External Affairs. When many people think of the activities of External Affairs, they envisage the FPFC Program.

Geography and economics have been the principal determinants of Canada's existence as a nation. It is therefore natural for these underlying factors to be reflected in its national aims which call for:

- the fostering of economic growth
- the safeguarding of sovereignty and independence
- working for peace and security
- promoting social justice
- enhancing the quality of life
- maintaining a harmonious natural environment

Taken together, these constitute the national interest. Where this interest is defended and pursued abroad through a series of related activities, this is what is known as foreign policy. Foreign policy is nothing more than the conduct of international relations and the exercise of national influence abroad so as to serve an enlightened self-interest. This becomes a deliberate program.

Discerning the nature of this program is a prerequisite to its evaluation. It is obviously multifaceted in the sense of encompassing the totality of the national interest, which touches on or is influenced by the foreign environment. It includes many actors both at home and abroad. The foreign policy issues involved are multitudinous. Some originate in Canada where a degree of control is possible. Others emanate from the vagaries of the international environment. They vary in importance from the marginal to impingement on the future well being of the nation. Their duration stretches from the transitory to intractable permanence. Issues are usually highly complex and sometimes imprecise. They are seldom predictable or quantifiable; their impacts and effects are often long term in nature. It is not clear if these issues are all handled in the same way, or how activities and issues are related.

In these circumstances it seemed that, after examining many different approaches to identifying this program, it could best be

described by the generic term: Foreign Policy Formulation and Coordination (FPFC). This term is applied to the entire range of activities involved in the formulation, coordination and implementation of foreign policy. These activities constitute the program which now concerns us.

The Department was primarily established to implement this program. Most other programs and activities which it has since acquired are designed to support to the FPFC program. Paradoxically, the FPFC also supports the international and domestic programs of many other government departments. If the program were not performed within the Department it would need to be undertaken elsewhere. When the FPFC program is seen from this perspective, the complexities of the many domestic and international interactions, the ephemeral nature of the issues, and the intangibility of impacts and effects become more understandable and more amenable to assessment.

Notwithstanding its difficulties, the question of dealing with foreign policy issues was not abandoned by government. Analysis showed that like other foreign ministries, the Department has, over the years, adopted several approaches with a view to rationalizing the structure of its FPFC program. The resulting organization usually reflected the size of resources at the Department's disposal and the priority then accorded to certain specific issues. In other words, issues tended to determine the organization of resources needed to deal with these same issues. It is not surprising therefore that our analysis of issues and their grouping into generic clusters followed to some extent, but not completely, the organizational structure of the Department.

As mentioned above, it is possible to approach FPFC from other vantage points. For instances, most issues can be grouped differently. They could be regarded as either geographic, (i.e., bilateral/regional), or multilateral. They could be classified as political, economic, social, strategic. In effect, we followed the latter course but have expanded the generic clusters.

The organizational units responsible for foreign policy issues were grouped into 9 or 10 separate components having a degree of similarity which outweighed any differences. These were:

Geopolitical
Economic & Technological
United Nations Affairs
Commonwealth Institutions
Francophone Institutions
Federal-Provincial
Disarmament
Defence Relations
Policy Staff
Legal (except Legal Advisory Services)

Although several organizational entities are included in these components, they can be considered together for assessment purposes since:

- there is a considerable homogeneity of objectives. All the organizational entities are concerned with carrying out Canada's objectives in the international sector, as well as attempting to "manage" Canada's relations with other countries in both bilateral and multilateral fora by providing a comprehensive overview of the international scene (and Canada's situation) in all sectors of interest (economic, political, etc.).
- (b) the entities undertake common or related activities. All are concerned with the generation and provision of information, the development of short-run and long-run policy alternatives, the general direction of policy implementation at posts and in Canada, as well as maintaining and developing general relations with other countries. In some cases, programs are delivered by groups responsible to other departments (e.g. IT&C), with External Affairs providing administrative support and assistance. Thus the entities all conduct activities of a basic "staff" nature.
- they are all organized and administered in a similar way. Commonality of objectives, similar operating methods and related activities, as well as rotationality result in similar organizational structure. Although on paper there is a hierarchical structure, the amount of cross-organizational interaction and cooperation make organizational boxes largely irrelevant. This degree of interaction and interdependency leads one to consider these components as a single program. It is theoretically possible to disaggregate the program according to the focus of primary interest (e.g. economic, defense and security) but there are practical difficulties in dividing resources and responsibility in this fashion.

This program is carried out by HQ organization entities (listed in the following paragraph) in conjunction with posts abroad. Not all personnel at the posts engage in FPFC activities, as there are a number of other programs at posts. At many posts, it is difficult to establish program boundaries since an officer may work on several programs, and the proportion of time devoted to any one program varies depending on the issue, and the priority assigned. The extent of foreign policy formulation activity also depends on other factors: initiative by the Head of Post, by the HQ desk officer, the bilateral relationship, etc.

The FPFC components described above are organized around themes, but, in general, do not have unique responsibility for activity in that area. There is considerable overlap in interest across groups. However the component name is generally associated with the following Bureaux or Divisions.

(a) the <u>Geopolitical</u> component is made up of the Bureaux of African, Asian, European, Latin American and Caribbean,

- and United States (except Economic) Affairs. These are generally responsible for Canada's bilateral relations;
- (b) the Economic and Technological component comprises the Bureaux of Energy, Technology and Science Relations, and of Trade Development and General Economic Relations and the Economic and Trade Sections of the United States General Relations Division;
- (c) the <u>United Nations Affairs</u> component covers the Bureau of that name;
- (d) the <u>Commonwealth Institutions</u> component comprises a Division of the same name in the Bureau of Coordination;
- (e) the Francophone Institutions component is made up of the Division of the same name in the Bureau of Coordination which deals with l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique and related organizations and international institutions based on linguistic identity. This Division was established in response to provincial activity in the area;
- (f) the Federal/Provincial Coordination component is covered by the Division of the same name in the Bureau of Coordination. It was established to deal with the increasing desire of some provinces to become more involved in international affairs. It coordinates provincial activities and provides liaison to the provinces:
- (g) the Arms Control and Disarmament component includes both part of the Bureau of International Security Policy and Arms Control Affairs, and the Ambassador for Disarmament. This component reflects the committment of the Government to furthering the cause of world peace and security through disarmament;
- (h) the <u>Defense Relations</u> component comprises the other part of the above Bureau. Over the years, a variety of structures were devised to give appropriate expression to this program's mandate;
- (i) a <u>Policy Staff</u> component (the Policy Planning Secretariat) provides the Under-Secretary with the capacity to conduct analyses, studies and reviews of a policy nature independent of continuing operational exigencies;
- (j) the <u>Legal Affairs</u> component is made up of the Bureau of Legal Affairs less its Legal Advisory Division. These resources are included in FPFC program because Legal Affairs provides not only information on the legal implication of foreign policy initiatives, but looks as

well at the foreign policy implications of changes in the legal system and has primary responsibility for such subjects as the Law of the Sea, international humanitarian law, and generally, the development of international law. Legal Affairs, might accordingly be regarded as providing a "support" program, except for their active role in policy formulation referred to, as well as suggesting policy changes in both legal and non-legal matters.

An approximation of the person-years associated with the FPFC components in total, is presented in Table I, as <u>Planning Element I</u>, <u>General Relations</u>. As FPFC covers activity at Headquarters and abroad, these figures present a more realistic picture of FPFC P/Y resource distribution than would figures for the relevant Headquarters Bureaux or for posts abroad, each of them considered separately.

TABLE I
DEPARTMENTAL PY RESOURCES
PRIOR TO JAN 12/82
(1982/83 MAIN ESTIMATES)

	<u>(PE I)</u>	(PE II)	(PE III)	(PE IV) Assist.	(PE V)	
	General <u>Relations</u> **	Consular	Public <u>Affairs</u>	to other Progs.	HQ Staff	TOTAL
1. <u>HQ</u> 2. PROG 3. SUPPORT 4. <u>TOTAL (2 + 3)</u> 5. ABROAD	311 182 493	20 12 32	63 40 103		348 673 1021	742 907 1649
6. <u>ABROAD</u> 7. PROG 8. SUPPORT 9. LES 10. <u>TOTAL (7+8+9)</u>	198.4 142.1 <u>326</u> 666.5	43.8 47.6 149.7 241.1	67.9 75.1 269.2 412.2	405.9 540.2 1737.1 2683.2	 	716 805 2482 4003
Grand <u>Total (4 + 10)</u>	1159.5	273.1	515.2	2683.2	1021	5652
Total Program (2 +7) Total Support (3+8+9)	509.4 650.1	63.8 209.3	130.9 384.3	405.9 2277.3	348 673	1458 4194 5652

^{*} PE = Planning Element

^{**} General Relations = Approximately equivalent to FPFC program components domestically and abroad

II. PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

The FPFC organization is a large unit dedicated to the provision of advice to decision-makers (or policy makers) and to the direction, both at home and abroad, of the implementation of foreign policy. Implementation generally involves the transfer of information about Canadian wishes, initiatives, and activity to some target group in another other country, or its local reprentatives in Ottawa. Information is also gathered, both at posts and Headquarters and processed in support of policy formulation.

As well, the policy formulation process of the Canadian Government as a whole requires consultation and coordination with other programs in other government departments to ensure that all international ramifications have been considered and that insofar as is possible, foreign policy is consistent and coherent.

The activities of the FPFC program are thus aimed at insuring that this process functions reasonably well, and that accurate and appropriate, and timely advice is provided to decision-makers (no matter what its departmental source).

The "activities" are the actual tasks performed in the program. At a very basic level, these can be reduced to observation, communication, and cogitation, each having several aspects. The visible outputs of such activities (or tasks) are most often written but will include verbal communication. The allocation of time and resources to the various tasks may vary from post to post, and also between post and Headquarters. A desk-officer (based at Headquarters) will spend more time communicating with others, and less on direct observation, than will a political officer at a post.

These three basic functions may be excercised as follows:

- (a) Observation: This includes reviewing the local media (both at post and Headquarters), keeping contact with officials and private acquaintances, and visiting different areas of the country (post).
- (b) Communication: There are some aspects of observation in communication, but communication basically implies an information gathering and liaison function. A number of sources of information may be used, both at posts and Headquarters (conversations at parties and other social events, briefing sessions, formal meetings with foreign officials), but information may be exchanged at the same time.

Communication also involves the preparation and sending of messages to and from posts, the formulation and presentation of diplomatic notes, and, especially at Headquarters, meetings with and calls to other government departments.

(c) <u>Cogitation</u>: This activity is a necessary part of analysis. It is necessary in the preparation of reports, briefings, etc. and requires some interaction with other officials and departments. The

end result is the creation of policy alternatives and the analysis of policy options which may lead to either advice to policy-makers, or direction of implementation by others.

In addition, some resources may be devoted to activities of a support nature. These are carried out by foreign service officers because of the status of the recipient and include such tasks as making arrangments for ministerial visits abroad, and for foreign delegations to Canada.

However, rather than considering these basic elements by themselves, it is often preferable to lump such activities according to some common purpose, and use such purposes to label the activities. The activities of the FPFC program fall into four major groups, each one comprising a number of activity elements. These elements complement both each other and certain activities of other programs in other departments.

Management:

There is only one activity element associated with management: post support. Post support may require the employment of other activity elements to gain its objective (efficient operation of the post), but generally involves providing the post with policy and operational support, answers to questions, advice on allocation of resources, and acting as a focal point for the transmission of messages to and from the

Production of Information:

This activity can be subdivided into elements necessary to process information into a format that is useful. Such elements range from the observation of events in a country of interest to the production of concise option papers on political issues. Particularly important are post provided running accounts of events, conditions or developments in the country of accreditation, and detailed accounts of current problems, special studies, and assessments of the country's relations with Canada and other countries. Within the range of these reports will fall copies of messages addressed by attachés (defence, commerce, agriculture, science and so on) to their respective departments.

The information imparted to Headquarters in these reports has to be analysed, related to any relevant material already on file, and checked against other sources of information such as local foreign diplomats, interested individuals or groups, and other departments of government. This is the raw material which will serve as the basis for the formulation of foreign policy for the attention of the decision-makers.

The essential elements can be described as follows:

(a) <u>Data</u> Collection:

This involves gathering material by personal observation or reading, sorting the material according to its subject matter, and setting it down for future analysis or other use.

(b) Analysis:

Analysis describes the process of reviewing documents and other information in order to extract the important elements and also to distinguish probable fact from fancy. This also includes deducing the probable outcomes of various courses of action based on existing information.

(c) Discussion/ Consultation: Meeting with one or more other individuals within the organization to arrive at a common understanding of certain issues or to attempt to reach consensus on a decision or course of action describes this element.

(d) Synthesis:

Integrating data and opinions to chart possible courses of action (policy initiatives) or to provide a comprehensive, coherent view on a subject or issue of current importance, summaries.

Policy Formulation:

The policy formulation activity necessarily includes the production of information (and hence all its elements) combined with additional elements, namely liaison and critical review. Policy formulation demands a greater exercise of judgement and selection of good options than production of information. Existing information must be reviewed for relevant material. Then the material and policy suggestions must be evaluated in the light of current objectives. Policy formulation <u>involves</u> not only the generation of alternatives but also choice among them.

As well, policy formulation <u>may involve</u> initiating recommendations, commenting on those initiated in other government departments, or coordinating consideration of proposals among officials. In some cases <u>it entails</u> the further step of drafting and clearing with OGD policy recommendations to Ministers. It also includes preparation of instructions to delegations, briefing notes for ministerial and other visits, ministerial or official speeches, statements, or press releases. Another approach is to follow essentially the same procedures, in order to develop guidelines or strategies to establish parameters for policy formulation by OGD.

The necessary elements in addition to production of information are:

(a) Liaison:

This describes meeting with individuals from outside the organization to exchange views, to pass on information or to solicit new information informally. This may be directed towards achieving mutually acceptable courses of action.

(b) Comment/ Criticism: The review of the work of peers or outsiders to add personal views complementing the material or taking issue with various points raised in that material is an important elment of policy formulation.

Policy Implementation:

A policy is implemented in a variety of ways. These include instructions to posts and delegations, negotiations with foreign countries at home or abroad, diplomatic notes, conferences, visits, ministerial statements, political and economic consultations, etc. Delivery is effected locally by informing the interested accredited representative(s), and abroad by posts, through the despatch of delegations to the relevant foreign government or through international organizations. Implementation requires an exercise of judgement, since the most appropriate and effective approach must be chosen.

Implementation may also be indirectly addressed by the establishment and maintenance of structures such as mixed commissions, international agencies, or special programs of varying intensity and duration.

The main activity elements are liaison (described above) and:

- (a) Negotiation: This element describes meeting with individuals from outside the organization to attempt to reach consensus on a decision or course of action. Often this is an extended process with foreign governments to create a common international legal framework to pursue certain activities.
- (b) Representation: This can be considered both as an activity element (the process of formally formulating and presenting the Canadian position), and as an output (the views themselves transmitted to foreign officials in the exercise of influence). In this case, deliberate meetings for the exchange of Canadian views with foreign governments or officials are envisaged.

These activities are all inter-related and cannot easily be separated. In practice, on each issue an officer must apportion his time among many of these activities. Moreover, there are natural links which cause a change from one activity to another. For example, as a result of negotiation, new information may be required from posts to develop a new policy position. Information transfer is the most common link. All activity elements, except post support, can be characterized as the application of human capital to problems and issues in foreign policy. Resources are dedicated to the transmission of both information and analyses to decision-makers (both domestic and foreign).

III PROGRAM OPERATIONAL OUTPUTS

The staff nature of the FPFC program raises problems in defining the goods and services which leave the program (or the Department), i.e., identifying outputs which have been "produced" by the program. "Outputs" of the FPFC program largely consist of intangible information and advice accompanied by a significant tangible volume of paper. Some of these outputs are normally retained within the organization (a sort of "intermediate output"). These may be jointly produced with other outputs. In any case, they are crucial to the effective operation of the FPFC program.

Much of the output of the FPFC program may be regarded as "process-oriented" - i.e. services which serve to ensure that certain events and functions can take place, so that the achievement of foreign policy objectives is faciliated. Such output lubricates the decision-making process, ensures sufficient consultation within Canadian boundaries so that consistent action takes place abroad, and coordinates and directs the implementation activities of posts.

These outputs are characterized below, the first five of which are those that emerge from within the organization and have effects outside the program:

(a) Position
Documents:

These include statements of the current stand on issues under discussion or about to be discussed e.g. Minutes of meetings (final decisions), "White" Papers, Briefs, Speech Notes, Instructions for voting in international bodies.

(b) Policy Instruments:

Formal agreements between various parties or formal government decisions which govern the relationships between countries or embody Canada's national stance, are policy instruments, e.g. Treaties Conventions, Agreements, Legislation, Orders-in-Council.

(c) <u>Arrangements:</u>

Included here is facilitative action on the part of the Department to set up visits (foreigners to Canada, government officials abroad), international conferences, etc. This may include facilitative support during a visit or conference, e.g. arranged itineraries, introductory notes, arranged accommodation, support for conferences and accompaning visitors.

(d) <u>Policy</u> <u>Rationale:</u>

Policy rationale includes explanatory statements outlining the history or reasons for adopting particular policy stances. Also included are replies to groups or individuals seeking specific information on opportunities abroad, policy stances, political situations, etc.

e.g. Foreign Policy for the Canadians; the Third Option paper; ministerial speeches and pronouncements, letters, briefs, and other forms of advice such as the likelihood of obtaining foreign gov't contracts; names of officials or important contacts in a specific country.

(d) Representation: Deliberate meeting or written message between a government representative and some individual or group with the intent of exchanging information or exercising influence. e.g. Delivery of official note to foreign ministries (or official statement).

The following three outputs are intermediate outputs (normally retained within the organization) and together form what we have styled a "contingency structure", i.e. an enhanced organizational capability to deal with issues or situations which may emerge in the future.

- (e) Network of Contacts:

 This is a group of individuals who have known roles and influence, and can be approached by a program officer if necessary.
- The knowledge and information stored, both in files and with respect to the experience of program officers, that has been accumulated without a specific final output in mind. e.g. political and economic reports, knowledge of alliances and voting patterns in an international organization.
- This is self-explanatory. It is singled out because the department has highly decentralized decision-making under a great deal of uncertainty. The "organic" style of management in the Department, and the decision-making process employed forces individuals to develop the necessary skills to make decisions in these circumstances (or demonstrates their incapability to develop such skills).

The following two outputs are also intermediate outputs, which may or may not lead to final outputs, that have been included because of their importance in initiating program action or in coordination with other groups and programs.

- (h) <u>Identification</u> As a result of analysis, possible courses of action of <u>Possible</u> to improve Canada's position internationally may be suggested or proposed.
- (i) Alternatives, These may be proposed or negotiated, many as part of Strategies, Tactics: These may be proposed or negotiated, many as part of the coordination process, prior to the final selection of the path to be followed.

It is also possible that a number of impacts or effects may also be described as outputs. For example, the establishment or modification of frameworks or structures which are used for action on the domestic or international scenes may be an "output" resulting from FPFC activities. There are many possible levels of "outputs" within the organization, and they impinge in various ways outside the program. It is also difficult to isolate the contribution of the organization to outputs, for the outputs themselves are often compromises among a number of actors.

IV. PROGRAM ENVIRONMENT

A. Mandate

As Sir Wilfrid Laurier pointed out in 1910, when the Act which was to create the Department was introduced in Parliament:

"All governments have found it necessary to have a department whose only business shall be to deal with relations with foreign countries..."

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The mandate begins with the Department of External Affairs Act of 1909 having as operative paragraphs: (our underlining)

- "4. The Minister, as head of the Department, has the conduct of all official communications between the Government of Canada and the government of any other country in connection with the external affairs of Canada, and is charged with such other duties as may be assigned to the Department by order of the Governor in Council in relation to such external affairs, or to the conduct and management of international negotiations so far as they may appertain to the Government of Canada.
- 5. The administration of all matters relating to the foreign consular service in Canada shall be transferred to the Department of External Affairs."

The original mandate, of course, applied to the entire Department and assigns three specific responsibilities to External Affairs:

(a) the conduct of all official communications;

(b) the conduct and management of international negotiations, and

(c) looking after the foreign consular service.

The first two of these responsibilities clearly form part of what we have identified as the Department's FPFC program. Both seem to imply the formulation and coordination of policy as well as its delivery in an international framework. Moreover, the Act anticipates the possibility of extending the mandate by Order-in-Council. A broader mandate did in fact evolve over the years as Canada progressed from colony to nationhood and became a sovereign actor in the external environment.

It is nevertheless important to recognize for evaluation purpose that this succession of explicit and implicit accretions to the traditional concept of a foreign ministry's mandate and role have not produced a coherent and agreed mandate statement. One difficulty is that legislation pertaining to some other departments assigns specific responsibility for certain international matters to them, as tariffs are assigned to Finance and international monetary questions to the Bank of Canada, etc. Another is that some departments were already operating independently abroad in pursuit of their separate mandates before External Affairs was founded in 1909, such as Trade and Commerce, and Immigration. Probably of more importance is the changing

subject matter of international relations which has become increasingly concerned with economic, scientific, environmental, energy, transportation and other technical subjects falling within the purview of domestic departments.

This question is not new. The quickening pace of Canada's involvement abroad following signature of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the widening range of subject matter being considered bilaterally and multilaterally raised questions about the Department's role and about the responsibilities of other departments. When appearing before a House of Commons Committee on March 25, 1930, the then Under-Secretary, Dr. 0.D. Skelton, presented the following perception of the Department's role: (our underlining)

"We have in the Department at Ottawa a <u>cental agency</u> whose duty it is to provide a permanent storehouse of information and a central directing force for the work in the legations abroad, and to facilitate participation in the Imperial Conferences, the League of Nations, and the special conferences from time to time. Other departments are of course interested in their special phases of this international work."

There are unanswered questions of principle inherent in this last sentence which continue to cause difficulties from a program evaluation perspectives. In fact, The role and purview of other government departments for policy formulation in Ottawa and for program delivery abroad have become interwoven with those of the Department of External Affairs.

Some departments naturally preferred to retain control over the development of policy for programs within their purview and to deliver programs with their own personnel. Even so, agreement was reached in 1971 on a codification of existing consultative practices into "seven principles" of policy coordination:

- (i) The development of any national policy with external contents or implications should reflect the combined judgement of the departments at the official level, and Ministers at Cabinet level, concerned with the relevant functional matters on the one hand and those concerned with the external aspects and applications on the other.
- (ii) It should be the responsibility of originating departments to see that their policy proposals are referred for consideration by and consultation with other agencies pursuant to (i) above.
- (iii) The Secretary of State for External Affairs and his department, as part of their responsibility for the conduct of Canada's external relations, shall be responsible for ensuring co-ordination with respect to external aspects and applications of national policy.

- (iv) The Department of External Affairs shall maintain, in consultation with other departments, a continuing overview of Canada's foreign policy for the purpose of identifying any problem areas or deficiencies, as well as opportunities for forward planning.
 - (v) Pursuant to (i) above, all foreign operations programs should be developed on the basis of co-ordinated policy planning and carried out after consultation between the Department of External Affairs (and with respect to trade matters, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce) and other departments concerned.
- (vi) The Treasury Board should ensure that departments planning activities at home or abroad affecting foreign operations have followed the procedures in Propositions (i) and (v) above before making a submission to the Board for the allocation of resources for programs involving foreign operations.
- (vii) It must be the responsibility of the Privy Council Office to ensure that policy proposals which have not been subjected to the evaluative process set out in (i) above do not get submitted to Cabinet until this has been done.

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An effort was made during the past decade to resolve the two issues of responsibility for policy formulation and for program delivery. Interdepartmental issue of policy formulation has been approached from two viewpoints. One concerns agreed principles and the other involves imposed mechanisms for consultation such as the seven "principles". These are interdepartmental arrangements and as such do not resolve program evaluation preferences for clear lines of responsibility and accountability, nor do they assist in discerning causal linkages or impacts/effects.

The government's approach to the issue of program delivery since 1971 has been comparatively simple. Several attempts have been made to reduce the number of separate foreign services operated by various departments by consolidating them within the Department of External Affairs. Support staff was integrated in 1971. Program staff from CEIC and CIDA were consolidated with External Affairs staff on April 1, 1981. However, the process of integrating all government operations abroad remains incomplete. (see Chapter One concerning the January 12, 1982 reorganization).

In conclusion, the legislative mandate is very vague; the real mandate has been determined by practice and by cabinet decisions. This legislative mandate applies to the whole of the Department, it therefore applies to FPFC which is an essential element of the Department of External Affairs under its mandate (and also that of any foreign ministry).

In the Canadian context, the mandated functions have been categorised as:

- (a) the <u>formulation</u> (and coordination) of Canadian foreign policy;
- (b) the <u>development</u>, <u>maintenance</u>, <u>and exploitation of</u> relationships with countries and international
- (c) the conduct of diplomatic relations, including representation of all Canadian interests abroad;
- (d) the conduct of <u>consular relations</u>, including representation of all related Canadian interests abroad; and
- (e) the <u>direction</u> and <u>management</u> of programmes <u>directly</u> <u>supporting</u> Canadian foreign policy interests (cultural, information programmes), and the management of the <u>programme</u> of assistance to Canadians in furtherance of the consular function.

It is the first three which are the direct concern of the FPFC program. They all however enable Canada to further its national interests in their international dimensions.

B. Population

Foreign services exist to keep governments up to date on developments in the international scene, to provide advice to decision-makers based on expertise and accumulated experience in foreign affairs, as well as to provide an accepted channel of communications between governments. Certain structures and institutions have been developed and maintained which assist in the transfer of information between governments. Even a country with a policy of isolationism desires such programs and links with other countries.

The staff nature of this program means that there is no specific target population outside government and the foreign service community. Much of the output of FPFC program is information and advice. This information and advice generally circulates within the government, but the accuracy and appropriateness of the advice affects the well-being of all Canadians and may have an impact on other nationals as well.

Although there may be certain groups to which policy responses are directed for political reasons, goods and services do not flow from FPFC to the general public. An exception is the information on travel and other conditions in certain countries provided by some desk officers at HQ to the public; this is a courtesy and not really part of FPFC activities.

Within the government, the Department plays in some sense a central agency role. Among the responsibilities incumbent upon the Department as a central agency are:

(a) the exercise of creative leadership in providing the Minister, Cabinet and the Prime Minister with sound and timely advice on issues and programs having important international dimensions;

- (b) providing other departments with coherent policy and priority guidance covering the full range of Canada's international relations, and
- (c) the provision of services to the foreign affairs community inside and outside the federal government.

The clientèle of FPFC program may therefore be said to include:

- (a) in the first instance: the Minister, Cabinet, the Prime Minister and eventually Parliament, whose members represent the people of Canada;
- (b) ministers of other government departments;
- (c) other government departments and the provinces with their specialized areas of interest; and finally
- (d) the non-governmental groups whose interests range over a whole gamut of international issues with domestic implications, and all domestic issues with international ramifications, i.e., the churches; professional associations; trade unions; business organizations; ethnic groups; expatriate organizations; associational groups such as the UN Association, CIIA, CIPO, etc; the press, and academia in general.

Taken as a whole, the FPFC program components exercise leadership in the development, coordination, and formulation of a coherent Canadian policy which is alive to present day realities at home and abroad but responds first and foremost to Canadian interests. The broad range of interests and actors in the foreign sector, necessitates coordination and liaison activities.

C. Confounding Factors

The ability to ensure that Canadian interests are served is limited by a number of factors. The ability of the FPFC program to achieve objectives and to carry out its functions is constrained by factors external to Canada, and by factors inherent in the organization and history of the Canadian governmental system. These "confounding factors" make it difficult to attribute effectiveness to any particular program in the international area, and particularly difficult to attribute effectiveness or impact to a staff group such as the FPFC program.

A major factor which influences the structure, activities, and success of a foreign ministry (and hence the FPFC program) is the economic and military strength and stature of the country in the international scene. A realistic appraisal puts Canada as a middle power. We have clearly more in common with the large powerful industrialized nations than with the developing world. As most political scientists are wont to remind us, Canada has become an

important actor on the international scene from whom much is expected. We are not anymore the small and fragile nation whose Department of External Affairs the Prime Minister of the day once considered abolishing as an economy measure. A recent U.S. study of world power rankings (G.T. Kurian, for "Facts on File", New York, 1979) using an index compiled by Professor Ray Cline comprising a composite of critical mass, economic and military capability, strategic purpose and national will, placed Canada in eighth position.

For all of this, we may still consider ourselves as a middle To the numerous Third World countries with low per capita incomes, however, Canada is more than that - in fact one of the wealthiest of the world's nations. Canada in the 1980s has wide and varied interests abroad and many previously domestic concerns have now assumed an international character - for instance, resources and energy. But even though the enhancement of direct Canadian interests, i.e. the preservation of national unity and national sovereignty; concern for social justice and human rights; energy and food problems; worry about a deteriorating physical and human environment, may now appear to be receiving more government attention and emphasis than heretofore, any thought of Canada returning to the sidelines of the action towards global development is clearly out of the question. Indeed, the extent of Canada's involvement in such matters as: North/South questions, the Law of the Sea, world concern over the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, hemispheric affairs, disarmament, la Francophonie, etc., belies this possibility.

Major efforts at influence are directed bilaterally through representation in 121 countries and multilaterally through representation in a variety of global and regional organizations for which financial support is an obligation of membership.

In the international arena, our major military alliances are western (NATO, NORAD), but Canada is an active member of the Commonwealth and is now increasing its presence in La Francophonie, as well as contributing to the UN, but in all cases, the impact of other countries actions (or lack of action) influences Canada's ability to achieve certain outcomes.

In such a world, with so many possible linkages and interests in various countries and organizations, the number of events, issues, etc. to be tracked and acted upon is exceedingly large. These are of varying duration, importance and immediacy. This fact by itself, leads to the requirement of flexible program design with rapid responsive capacity.

Another important factor as noted in the Section A on Mandate, is that External Affairs is not the only foreign affairs participant in Canada. Other actors included:

(a) Government departments with large international programs, and policy control in these areas:
IT&C (Trade Commissioners) (before Jan. 12, 1982)
CIDA (Aid programs - until 1981)
CEIC (Immigration - until 1981)

- (b) Government departments with program liaison with other countries:

 DND

 RCMP (Sol-Gen)

 Agriculture

 NHW

 Fisheries, Environment
- (c) Government departments whose domestic policies might give rise to international reaction: Communications EMR Labour Transport
- (d) Government departments who interact with international
 institutions:
 Finance
 Bank of Canada (independent)
- (e) Central agencies:
 PMO/PCO e.g. summit meetings;
 Treasury Board
- (f) all departments:
 with respect to ministerial travel.
- (g) the provinces several provinces have made forays into the international arena on several topics and some maintain agents-general abroad. Since External Affairs is concerned that Canada should at all time be seen to speak with one voice in international affairs, the Department has sought, in a variety of ways to ensure that provincial concerns were reflected in the conduct of Canada's foreign relations.

Providing a coherent foreign policy framework and guidance covering the full range of Canada's international relations of necessity accordingly implies sustained liaison and coordination in both an informal and structured manner with the Prime Minister's Office, the Office of the Privy Council, Treasury Board, some twenty or more departments of government, the provinces, 121 diplomatic and/or consular missions in 86 countries.

The existence of all these groups (including some public interest groups) with common interests in foreign affairs and policy, but differing departmental objectives and priorities, can give rise to conflict on both policy development and program delivery. The FPFC program is charged with coordination, but lacks the authority to impose its ideas. Thus consultation and persuasion are the only vehicles. This can dilute the impact of External Affairs on any one issue or policy, and also means that FPFC resources must be conversant with issues that range far beyond those of political representation.

The Component Role Model (Diagram 3) attempts to describe the complexity of the domestic environment in which the FPFC program operates. This model is a general description of the activities of the foreign policy formulation and coordination components of External Affairs. It can be applied to a single component or to the ensemble of all these components. It shows certain outcomes in foreign affairs and the contribution of the FPFC program to them. It also describes some of the sources of influence which are not completely under External Affairs control. These are called "intervening factors". It presents highly simplified "picture". Several points are nevertheless worthy of note:

- (a) the process may start up anywhere, depending on the issue involved. Activity may be the result to several types of stimuli. Some of these are not within External Affairs or under External Affairs control.
- (b) the process of coordination/consultation/interaction with other government departments takes place at all levels.

(c) policy formulation involves several activities including information gathering/processing/analysis.

(d) implementation requires some FPFC component input, but action is not always carried out in the FPFC program (or even External Affairs for that matter).

(e) monitoring is a continuous process which has many feedback loops (not all of these are shown).

. There are several outcomes depicted (the wavy lines). Not all of these are strictly outcomes of Departmental (FPFC) activity, but may be influenced by it. These are:

- (a) information/policy alternatives/advice;
- (b) policy;
- (c) action;
- (d) reaction.

Outcomes can be attributed to a number of factors, including External Affairs activity. But, attributing cause to External Affairs alone on any particular issue may be difficult.

For example:

(a) lack of "success" at the "reaction" stage may be due to:

1) an intransigent audience;

 changes in world events which have affected the environment in which the policy or action was to work;

poor implementation; or

4) poor policy.

Only 3) and 4) could be directly attributed to External Affairs. As well, the net impact on the outcome of 1) and 2) may be difficult to ascertain.




Figure 3.

(b) "failure" at the policy decision stage may be due to:

1) poor decision - making capabilities;

2) political interference (from OGD or others); or

faulty advice from the Department.

Only 3) may be directly attributed to External Affairs activity.

Thus the impact of the FPFC program on any one issue may be blunted by:

(a) other government departments interests;

(b) the political process;

(c) delivery or implementation not responsibility of External Affairs:

(d) the vagaries of world events - which are not negligible because of limitations on Canada's international "power"

To minimize the impact of the first three factors above, some formal and informal structures have been developed. These links and consultative mechanisms are not only required for departments with programs that are delivered abroad, but also for programs which are domestically focused. The necessity of considering possible ramifications of domestic initiatives in the international area is not always recognized let alone appreciated by domestic policy makers, and complicates the processes. The FPFC program also attempts to ensure consultation on such policies, and may also be responsible for the reaction and response to international reactions.

D. Linkages With Other Programs

Inter-program and inter-departmental linkages are required because programs and departments with activities in the foreign sector have been organized by functional responsibility rather than by objective. Thus programs at External Affairs and other departments have overlapping interests, if not responsibilities. The FPFC program in External Affairs is concerned with the coordination of policies with international ramifications (both their formulation and implementation) of all departments concerned. The first objective of FPFC program is to ensure that the policies and their proposed implementation further all aspects of Canada's interests; failing this, to ensure that conflicting policies are thoroughly reviewed before implementation. Consistency is important. The FPFC program may also manage the delivery of some other government department's programs where that department itself lacks a delivery system (in some countries).

Linkages are necessary because policy issues cut across program and departmental lines. The mechanisms, structures, and contacts for consultation must be in place before they are needed. Resources within the FPFC program and other departments are devoted to developing and maintaining these linkages. Impact on policies is more likely determined by other factors such as credibility. External Affairs purports to provide an overview, which may balance sectoral and functional views.

While linkages and contacts are required with almost any government department, concentration is on relations with those departments which have major program interests in the international sector. Many of these relationships have developed over time in the course of ongoing work and are not the results of direct intervention by decision-makers. However some interaction has been formalized (see the ICER principles).

The FPFC program has strong links within the Department. Several departmental programs complement the activities of the FPFC groups and may be called on to assist in certain situations.

The Information Abroad Program aims at carrying to target audiences in priority countries specific messages related to immediate Canadian Developments and policy issues, using information that is in the public domain. The three main thrusts of the program are: (a) the traditional responsive role of answering inquiries and lending films; (b) promotional 'image-building' or goodwill- generating activities; and (c) media-relations.

Like the previous program, that of <u>Cultural Relations</u> is also concerned with the promotion of Canadian objectives and policies abroad by means of cultural, artistic (including sports) and academic exchanges with a number of interested countries, notably, the United States, the members of the European Community and Japan. Such programs may be integrated with foreign policy initiatives.

In a general sense, the Consular Program is intended to provide services, protection and assistance to Canadian travellers and residents abroad, and to protect Canadian interests abroad. There are 111 consular posts abroad. Consular services may be used in some situations as a way of applying pressure towards Canadian objectives (e.g. human rights).

Other programs at External Affairs are key support units without which the Department could not operate posts abroad.

The Communications Program is meant to fulfill the communications requirements of the Government between Headquarters and Canadian missions abroad and to protect the integrity of those communications during transmission. This system is used by other departments as well. It also strives to maintain the highest possible standards of technical security in an extremely sensitive environment.

The Personnel Program is complex due to the existence of two distinct personnel regimes in the Department. The non-rotational regime is similar to the personnel operations of other government departments. The rotational regime, which covers over 2,000 employees who serve at Headquarters and at posts abroad, is governed by special systems and procedures concerning assignments, appraisals, promotions, and postings. Many personnel functions performed by line managers in other departments are centralized in External Affairs.

This program controls the posting of individuals as well as providing services such as travel arrangements and removal of effects. It also administers pay, leave, and allowances.

The Physical Resources Program has a two-fold objective: the first is to provide and maintain office and housing accommodation abroad in support of Canadian government activities with due regard for efficiency, effectiveness and economy.

A second and related responsibility is to provide procurement and export shipping services to meet departmental material requirements at Headquarters and for 121 missions abroad in the most efficient and economical manner as well as in compliance with government directives and regulations.

The Library Services Program is primarily a research library facility serving the needs of foreign service personnel both in the Department at Ottawa and at posts abroad. The library provides background and literature references on issues which FPFC officers may require, as well as providing subscriptions to newpapers and periodicals. At some posts librarians also handle up to four fifths of all inquiries received from host country public.

The Records and Information Management Program complements Library Services, by providing storage, retrieval, and some analysis of documents produced or passing through the department. The "files" are an important source of information on past and current situations and issues in a country, Canada's past policy responses, and other background information. Good records and a good retrieval system are essential for the efficient functioning of the FPFC program when most officers are rotational.

The Financial Management Program aims at obtaining, allocating, controlling and managing sufficient levels of financing resources for the effective operation of the Foreign Service including: the provision of adequate financial services and control in the areas of financial planning, financial mnagement reporting, and financial analysis and the development of department policies, systems and procedures for both (a) the preparation of program forecasts, estimates and budgets, and (b) financial anlaysis and reporting.

A Post has considerable contact with all these units (particularly physical resources, personnel and finance). However Headquarters based FPFC personnel (particularly the desk officer) plays a key role in linking Headquarters and the Post. To a certain extent, the Headquarters' support unit is functionally responsible for the posts, but the posts may request that the desk officer intercede on their behalf with such units. This has developed into a function of the desk officer which has been called "post support". The time devoted to such activities varies greatly depending on the time available to the desk officer, the number of requests made by the post, and the interest of the desk officer in this sort of work.

Thus, much of the time of a Headquarters based FPFC program personnel, is spent in direct interaction with posts, or with other programs on the posts behalf, either within External Affairs or in other government departments. The internal coordination activity is very important for policy formulation and implementation. Consultation within FPFC program components is also a natural element of formulation since policy must be developed so as to cover all the implications of any issue.

The depth, extent, and strength of all these linkages make it difficult to assess or evaluate External Affairs or FPFC program activities in insolation from other programs in other departments. This is particularly true for the evaluation of policy thrusts or other initiatives on any particular theme. Other government department activities must be consistent, complementary and synchronized by FPFC program actions. The enrivonement in which the FPFC program operates can be characterized as complex and highly interactive. This makes evaluation per se difficult. However the extent of interactions is interesting in itself and could be the subject of further investigation.

V. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND IMPACTS/EFFECTS

The effects or impacts of the program are the results that follow from the program outputs. All of the impacts for the FPFC program except the one that is the result of the contingency structure ("operational capability") are realized outside the department. In many cases the outputs will be filtered through senior management levels at External Affairs prior to any impact. Thus outputs pass out of the program, through a decision-making and supervisory process, before their impact can be anticipated. However, the management style of the organization makes it difficult to draw a sharp line between the FPFC program and senior management.

In the main, these impacts are designed to further Canadian interests abroad, but in many cases they depend on the actions of other parties to achieve their ultimate aim as described in the previous section. For example, Cabinet (or a Minister) will make better decisions when the factors, options and probable outcomes associated with a policy decision are explained. The Department may wish to have the best decision (in line with its general goals) but the decision itself is all too often outside External Affairs control and may depend on other factors. Some of these are described in the Component Role Model (Page 31).

As well, only first level impacts and effects are described in any detail. A number of links may exist between such impacts and effects and higher level impacts which would be better described as the achievement of a foreign policy objective. Not only are there several links, but the number of confounding and intervening factors reduce the likelihood that a chain of dependency can be traced. The impacts and effects described below are not completely independent of each other. There is considerable complementarity and commonality.

Before discussing the impacts and effects, departmental and program objectives will be outlined.

A. Objectives

The Department lacks formally stated objectives, except in a very general sense. The departmental "Blue Book" objective, much of which relates to the FPFC components, is, "To promote in their international dimensions the national objectives of economic growth, sovereignty and independence, peace and security, the promotion of social justice, quality of life and a harmonious natural environment."

The difficulty with the "Blue Book" objective is that it enunciates themes which are subscribed to in general by most societies, but do not have a common interpretation (nor can they in a society which allows relatively free expression and diverse thought). Conflicting opinions arise as to the preferable courses of action in pursuing these themes (for then there will be "winners" and "losers" among particular interest groups within Canadian society).

The objectives which actually govern what takes place within the FPFC components are:

(a) rarely specifically articulated;

(b) transmitted "culturally" rather than hierarchically;

(c) applied to the specific issues of the day rather than more general program thrusts.

Since they are not articulated, it is hard to judge their relevance. Also, there is no fixed set of priorities for objectives, but rather priorities change in response to outside events.

In effect, the character of a country's foreign policy is determined by the evolving pattern of emphasis given these aims by its government in the light of foreign and domestic constraint, including the resources available to that same government. One accordingly does not talk so much of Country X's foreign policy. One refersto that country's policy on a particular issue.

However, some objectives have been articulated. Some of these sources are:

- (a) The White Paper "Foreign Policy for Canadians" of 1970 set out a conceptual framework for Canadian foreign policy based on six main national aims: economic growth; sovereignty and independence; peace and security; social justice; enhanced quality of life; and harmonious natural environment. However, their generalized macro nature is difficult to apply in specific instances, whatever their individual current relevance. (Other basic documents guide and implement foreign policy objectives: the Third Option paper (1972); the 1971 White Paper on Defence, the 1975 Stategy for International Development, etc)
- (b) A refinement and updating of "Issues and Objectives in Canadian Foreign Policy and External Operations" was produced by the Department, approved by ICER and circulated to all posts on April 30, 1979. These are also of a macro nature, involve OGD, as well as External Affairs and cut across organizational lines within the Department, e.g. national issues with international dimensions were cited as national unity and identity; economic growth; energy; environment and marine resources; employment and immigration; service to Canadians.
- (c) Earlier systems for considering financial estimates for departments contained a program forecast which in turn was covered by a strategic overview. The overview provided ministers with the Department's optique on policy priorities, and the resources needed to attain them. The new PEMs retains this feature. While still in the developmental stage, the PEMs is the closest approach to a Department-wide objective setting process and provides both Headquarters and posts with a general policy thrust and operational guidelines.

- (d) More succinct objectives are prepared annually by posts abroad as part of Country Programming for the allocation of person years. These transform the more general macro objectives into post terms for one country or International Agency during a designated time span. They are not rolled into a Headquarters' Bureau perception nor are separate geographic objectives formulated in any consistent manner.
- (e) In 1981, as part of an improved planning system, an earlier system was revived to provide newly appointed Head of Post with a letter of instruction delineating post objectives for his assignment. The procedure was also extended to providing new Directors General, at Headquarters with similar instructions. It will take several years before this system can be applied to all managerial positions.

(f) Country specific strategy papers.

Many of these objectives setting systems have implications for the FPFC program. It must be recognized however that few, if any, of these systems provide discrete, specific objectives of a quantifiable nature. They tend to be generalized and to leave considerable flexibility for interpretation both domestically and at posts abroad. Interpretation and implementation tends to be left to the operational level and the accountability process is not well established. In effect, years of association with foreign policy issues and with their interpretation in the national interest induces officers with an almost instinctive perception of what should or should not be pursued. This perception is, of course, not static but evolves with experience.

It seems clear, however, that Canadian foreign policy objectives are almost completely identical to FPFC program objectives. The FPFC program is the program by which national foreign policy objectives are formulated, coordinated and usually implemented. This concept borders on the axiomatic. It is possible for department of government to develop a domestic policy that contravenes Canada's international obligations, and it may implement the policy with or without following the seven principles mentioned above. However, by the nature of government operations eventually the domestic policy must be subjected to the FPFC process and a cabinet decision taken, or the FPFC program may have to deal with international repercussions.

The key objectives of the FPFC program coincide with those of the department as a whole because this program forms the heart and core of the foreign service. However the FPFC program has limited control over the objectives, current priorities and sub-objectives. These fall within the purview of senior management, cabinet, and sometimes parliament. Policy directives from these groups are often vague, and the FPFC program has some leeway in interpretation for implementation. As well, the program may have generated the options, provided rationale, etc., for the decision-makers. Thus the FPFC program may not only initiate policy actions in accordance with departmental objectives, but also be given explicit directives from sources outside the FPFC program.

B. Impacts and Effects

(1) Action in Government priorities and Policies:

There is one impact which is clearly linked to the EA output (although the output itself may have seen strongly affected by OGDs). This is the action (or lack of action) which results from representation (or similar less formal requests for action). Action may take many forms, ranging from voting support by another country for a Canadian stance at the United Nations, to a release of political prisoners, or withdrawal from some occupied territory by another country.

A number of assumptions underlie the link between action and a positive impact on goal achievement. A positive reception may not result. It is assumed that all government policies/priorities take adequate account of international implications so that domestic/international objectives are balanced. This assumes that short-run and long-run objectives are in accord. (This may not hold - e.g. National Energy Policy and relations with the USA). It is also assumed that decision-makers who order or choose plans of action are well-informed.

(2) Frameworks

Established/

Modified for

National/
Bilateral/
Multilateral

Action:

Some of the impacts are to establish framework structures in which:

- (a) international decision-making can take place (such as meetings of heads of state).
- (b) international action can take place in a mutually acceptable fashion (such as bilateral or multilateral treaties).

In this case also, the Department has limited control and it is difficult to attribute success (or lack of it) entirely to one party.

The key assumption that permits the linking of such frameworks to goal attainment is that such frameworks are necessary for communication, negotiations, and interaction which in the long-run lead to goal attainment. (i.e. such structures are necessary for the functioning of international relations). Some of these structures are multilateral, some bilateral, and some national (domestic) since interaction is necessary between the federal government and the provinces, or different federal departments.

(3) Framework for Negotiation/ Information Transfer:

Such structures permit the revelation of positions, or bargaining stances which may enable negotiation and action. Much of the conduct of international affairs is dependent on the existence of structures which permit the orderly transfer of information, etc. and allow for the settlement of disputes without resort to aggression i.e. the existence of structures through which irritants can be voiced mitigates conflict in the world. Once again the link to goal

attainment is tenuous. Such frameworks may be necessary, but are not sufficient to ensure that goals are achieved.

(4) Informed Decisions (Canadian Government): Not all informed decisions are made in the FPFC units or even inthe Department. Some are political, others are made in OGD's. Informed decisions may include the delineation of goals, setting priorities on goals, etc. "Informed" implies awareness of impact on international relations of various activities. However FPFC activities should result in better informed decisions.

The link between decisions and goals depends on the operationalization and implementation of decisions which may or may not occur in FPFC. To be effective, the information provided must be timely, accurate, appropriate, and absorbed completely.

(5) Informed Canadian Bureaucrats/ /Public:

For this impact/effect increased levels of information (not decisions) is the results of FPFC activity (as distinct from No. 4, above). Parliamentaries Included in the

informed "groups" could be foreign service officers who can function better in their duties because they are better informed. The impact on goal achievement is one step further removed from No. 4, but once again information is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for goal achievement.

The assumptions linking informed Canadian with goal achievement include:

- (a) more information is better than less;
- all information is of equal value only the most useful information is gathered;
- the ultimate impact results from decisions, action and structure which will in turn be improved if set in motion by better informed people;
- better informed bureaucrats coordinate policies with adequate consultation and consideration of implications for international relations;
- better informed parliamentarians are more understanding and sympathetic to program capabilities so there are fewer public gaffs;
- a better informed public accepts government policies more easily. For example, businessmen should be informed about initiatives i.e. international markets and governmental policies affecting their activities.

(6) Informed
Foreign
Governments/
Publics:

This impact/effect is the direct result of policy implementation which has been defined as the transmittal of information to foreign targets groups. The link to objective achievement is tenuous since the assumption embodied is that the target groups will react rationally and in accord with our expectations. Thus it is assumed that the information cannot be used against us, and that desired responses usually are obtained. A balance must be maintained, in some circumstances between revealing bargaining points, etc. and givingsome information (supplying formation is not always in our best interest). The general goal to which this is linked is to maintain and develop sympathy for and interest in Canada and Canadian objectives/goals.

(7) <u>Unintended</u> <u>Impacts:</u>

Certain undesirable results may emerge from the process as well, such as:

(a) Annoyance

(b) 'Bad Reaction' (unanticipated) including:

solidification of opposition;

(2) breakdown in structures (e.g., caused by delay

(3) undesired decision/action/occurence (");

(4) retaliation;

(5) misinterpretation

(c) Self-justificatory work (additional)

These are not often made explicit, but should be considered.

The last effect is that which relates to the contingency structure; the store of knowledge, contacts, and trained foreign service officers. This is often developed jointly with other FPFC outputs, but may be an end in itself.

The "operational capability" effect is included to illustrate the capability created by the program activities and output to cope with possible future critical issues or operational requirements. As with any contingency capability, this is generated not to meet a current requirement, but to reduce the risk inherent in a somewhat unpredictable future. The existence of such a capability will influence the ability to attain other foreign policy objectives in the future.

VI. LOGIC CHART

The logic chart shown in Diagram 4, Activities - Outputs - Effects (AOE) Model, presents the simplified logical linkages between the activities and the elements that make them up, their outputs, and at least one level of the impacts and effects that have been described in earlier sections of this Chapter. Although it appears complex, the overall relationships are simple, if interaction and feedback (both of which are extensive) are neglected. The management activity of post support is tied to arrangements and hence to frameworks for negotiation/info transfer. The maintenance and support of the post abroad is necessary for the transfer of information in foreign countries.

The production of information is a major element which feeds into policy formulation, but also has value on its own as the activity to establish the <u>information base</u> (an essential element of the <u>contingency structure</u>). Policy formulation has some direct outputs (policy instruments, rationale, position documents) as well as initiatives and alternatives. Indirect outputs include the development of a network of contacts, trained individuals, and arrangments of various sorts. These in turn reinforce the contingency capability.


Policy implementation requires formulated policy as an input. Its elements, (representation, liaison, and negotiation) result in output of representation, plus most of the outputs of formulation since, for example, documents used to support a policy position may in turn be used (perhaps in a reworked form) to implement policy because implementation involves the transfer of knowledge through a number of channels. The impacts and effects resulting from implementation are many, ranging from action to informed foreign governments or publics.

The logic chart presents only a limited range of outputs and effects. Many of the boxes are "generic" - i.e., they are broad categories and cover many similar outputs. As well, the impacts and effects presented are only the "first order" effects - these of course are linked to higher order impacts and responses. Only the positive chains have been described. As noted in the Component Role Model (Page 31) the influences on both the activities and the resulting impacts and effects are many and may be beyond the direct control of the program described here.

In the logic chart, the connections only display the immediate links between the various levels and do not show the flow that is ultimately necessary to produce a given output or effect. For example, in order to make a representation, diplomatic relations (part of a framework - shown as an effect) exist. Analysis is only possible after information has been collected. These are dynamic or flow dependencies and do not appear in our static model. A flow model of a "typical issue" was, in fact, prepared as part of the background material for this assessment, but for brevity's sake is not included in this report.

<u>Feedback</u> loops are only generally described. Monitoring of impact will be an important part of both policy formulation and policy implementation processes. This may also be a complex and resource intensive process involving all FPFC activities.

AOE MODEL - FPFC AT EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



VII. EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM

A. History

When the Department was established in 1909, the intention was not to set up a foreign office and a foreign service as such, since foreign policy was then an imperial concern. It was rather to establish a locus for processing the increasing flow of documents on international questions of concern to Canada, and was staffed by officials trained in the preparation of despatches on such questions. After 1920 however, it became increasingly evident that Canada's interests could no longer be best served by the British diplomatic and consular authorities. The Department accordingly began to take a greater hand in the direct administration of Canada's external relations.

By the end of the Second World War, Canada had emerged with a vastly increased industrial base, much expanded trade relations and a growing economy as a relatively strong western power and assumed, on the international scene, a position of influence not far behind that of the great powers. The reasons for this were quite simple: Canada's comparative position in the world had been temporarily inflated because of the exhaustion of countries such as France, Italy, Germany and Japan. In the years that followed, the United Nations, of which Canada was a founding member, provided Canada with a stage on which to perform and an arena in which skill counted for more than muscle. Likewise, a larger and multiracial Commonwealth born of the dissolution of the Empire; a NATO born out of the Cold War; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and dozens other emerging international organisations (most of them in close association with the United Nations) gave Canada scope to exercise its national influence.

By the late 1950s however, the situation had changed. The European countries and Japan were well on their way to recovery and were now exerting an influence on the world stage commensurate with their increasing strength. Then too, the appearance of new independent states and the multiplication of the membership of the United Nations gradually reduced the importance of middle powers (and founding members) like Canada.

Of late, Canada has not been as prominent on the United Nations scene as formerly, except in the areas of development assistance, the Law of the Sea, human rights and environmental issues. The emergence of new nations and their strategic, political and economic importance has resulted in a greater emphasis on bilateralism.

Relations with Africa, the Middle East and Asia, virtually non-existent in 1945, have come to occupy a substantial band in Canada's external spectrum. Relations with the United States, Europe and Japan have continue to become more important and complex. Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are of rapidly increasing concern to Canadians.

Thus Canada has interests in most parts of the world and in most international organizations. As the extent of representation has increased - so has the scale of departmental operations. These

operations include the traditionally acepted ones of representation of the national interest abroad, the analysis of information regarding current developments, and negotiation. The form that these operations have taken has been partly determined by convention and historical precedent.

In the old days (pre 1918), the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to a small international elite who shared the same sort of background and who desired to preserve the sort of world it knew and the values it believed in. Nowadays, the foreign service is generally composed of career rotational public servants drawn mostly from the department (or departments) responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs and foreign trade (in Canada, the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce), although it can and does include as well specialists from other departments and/or agencies of government on single assignment. These public servants are divided into program staff (officers) and support staff. The great majority of the program staff belong to the "foreign service" occupational group within the Public Service, but other professional groups, such as thos grouping medical doctors, economists, scientists, engineers, accountants etc. are also represented. Support staff are drawn from public-service-wide categories, and include secretaries, clerks, communicators, technicians, protective personnel and messengers.

Abroad, the program staff will - by convention - be described as diplomats and recognised as (a) ambassadors, high commissioners or permanent representatives, or (b) ministers (deputy high commissioners or deputy permanent representatives), counsellors, first, second, third secretaries or attaché according to whether they (a) manage, or (b) assist in or support, the management of international relations.

As John Holmes reminded academics in his paper on "The Study of Diplomacy", which he presented at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies of Dalhousie University in 1973, "the primary function of any diplomatic mission abroad, i.e. a combination of two or more of the public servants mentioned above, is negotiation (which is but another word for diplomacy), and that includes the constant preparation of the ground for possible negotiation". Or, to quote Arthur Andrew in his article "His Ex or Telex" published in the International Journal of Autumn, 1970: "As might be expected of the diplomat, his first duty is to keep international communications open and international exchanges flowing; everything depends on that". This in turn implies a sustained dialogue between post and headquarters on all matters connected with the particular program to be delivered.

Generally speaking, negotiation with foreign countries and/or institutions is carried out privately and face-to-face. Whether, with today's highly developed means of communications, this is still the best way for diplomacy to be carried out remains to be seen. For his own part, Sir Harold Nicolson had no qualms on this score. In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 1961 and entitled "Diplomacy Then and Now", he remarked that "one of the most important assets of diplomacy is precision; the telephone (as was demonstrated by the U-2 incident) is an imprecise instrument, and liable to create

misunderstanding". (How much more $\underline{\underline{a}}$ propos might his remarks be as regards the telex or its present day derivatives. And we all know about President Wilson's idea of "open covenants openly arrived at").

However this may be, diplomacy as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments" (Sir Ernest Satow), has stood up successfully to the test of time. It calls for persuasion, compromise, conciliation; it rests on patience, confidence and fair-dealing.

The delivery system of a program with attributes such as those described above, and which provides information and advice both to decision-makers (foreign and domestic) and to those who must deliver other programs in the foreign sector, has aspects which are understandably both simple and complex. The simplicity arises in the basic nature of information processing and formulation of policy advice; the complexity in the requirement to interact with and convince a range of people with possibly conflicting interest in the area. Rapid response time to a multitude of issues and concerns is an additional requirement.

An essential part of the delivery system is the network of foreign posts. Canada is represented in most influential countries of the world and in major western multilateral institutions. These posts serve as the eyes, ears and mouth for the FPFC program, as well as being the delivery platform for other programs such as the trade commissioners' service, consular program, and defence liaison. The posts gather information as directed from Headquarters, or on their own initiative. Much of it, after verification and polishing, is sent to Headquarters where it is further analyzed, stored, and circulated. The posts are also the main medium for the transfer of information (formally or informally) to other governments through diplomatic links. Foreign missions in Ottawa form a symmetric network, where information can be transferred between HQ based personnel and representatives of foreign governments based in Ottawa. Such transfers compose one aspect of policy implementation which is part of the resonsibilities of the FPFC program.

The organizational structure used by the Department and the FPFC program is similar to many other foreign ministries:

- (a) There is a core of rotational foreign service officers who spend time at both posts and Headquarters on a relatively regular rotation. They may be posted anywhere.
- (b) Support staff may be either rotational or non-rotational (either foreign or Headquarters based). Thus some support staff arefamiliar with Headquarters operations, others are not. Career patterns of support staff tend to be different from those of FSO's.
- (c) The FPFC groups are generally made up of FSO's and associated secretarial support. Officers do most of the policy work and information processing.

- (d) The career patterns of FSO's in most foreign services are similar:
 - (i) recruitment of individuals with strong academic backgrounds (most have M.A.s and above);

(ii) entry is primarily at the bottom level:

(iii) there is little direct formal "training". Experience is gained through a variety of postings at both HQ and abroad. Of course, supervision is greater for recent recruits;

(iv) progress through the ranks is slow - but many varied postings are available at each level;

(v) there is little functional specialization and/or matching of background and experience to positions to be filled. Generalists are the rule;

(vi) rank and responsibility are not always equal. Appointment, assignment and promotion are based on rank or level not on position;

- (vii) foreign services tend to be top-heavy. Conventions dictate that ambassadors be of "appropriate" rank - and wide representation means a large number of highly ranked individuals.
- (e) FSO's have similar backgrounds and experience (after joining the foreign service) which may lead to consistency and homogeneity of objectives and little need for written direction. Guidelines for action tend to be unwritten because they appear intuitively obvious to the initiated.
- (f) Considerable flexibility is required both for the organization and for the individual - because of the wide variety of issues to be handled at any one time. Rapid respond is required. Hence there has been developed a human capital intensive "contingency structure" which is based on wide general experience.

Subject area specialization is not promoted because flexibility would be reduced - although there may be negative impacts on credibility in functional areas. Similarly, labour relations and resource deployment techniques are specialized to suit the foreign service environment.

- (g) Flexibility in organization is extended to a non-hierarchical system. Initiatives may be generated at any level, and consultation across organizational lines is possible at most levels. This is also required so that redeployment of resource can take place to permit rapid response to issues.
- (h) Organizational structures have been determined by a number of factors, including historical precedent. Traditionally, geographical desk officers have always existed. To these have been added functional specialty groups and groups charged with the coordination of effort in multilateral fora. However many issues cut across organizational lines.

Although responsibility for a certain area lies with one division or individual, the linkages between that division and those responsible for other functional or geographic areas are strong. Thus there must be constant consultation, information transfer, and liaison. The requirement for liaison and reference unites the different organizational components into one program. Considerable time is spent in consultation, both within the FPFC program and outside.

B. Formal Coordination

The techniques of co-ordination are extremely flexible. Depending on circumstances, any means of interdepartmental communication from an informal telephone conversation between officials who know each other personally to a full-dress Cabinet discussion may be invoked. Where a certain class of problems crops up at regular intervals, the classic solution is a formally established interdepartmental committee of officials. And this, in turn, may be ad hoc or permanent - such as, the Committee of Deputy Ministers on Foreign and Defence Policy, supported by four ADM Sub-Committees and a new Interdepartmental Secretariat. FPFC program personnel are active in the committees. As well, much policy will flow out of FPFC to such committees.

The Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS) has an impact on the operation of the FPFC program. The FPFC program must not only formulate and implement policy, but also must do some strategic planning for future expenditures in the envelope. As well, the allocation of funds within the envelope affects many facets of FPFC operation (everything from the manpower considerations of opening new posts, to specific policy thrusts).

The Department of External Affairs is part of the Foreign and Defence Policy sector which embraces two resource envelopes. One envelope refers solely to the program and budget of one department, i.e.: National Defence. The second envelope contains the resources for External Affairs and Aid. Although 14 departments and agencies are represented in the Sector, only three, National Defence, External Affairs and CIDA, are fully engaged: they seek all their resources in the sector and submit their Strategic Overviews for consideration by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy. Several other departments have a pronounced interest in the sector, but, the policies and programs of those other departments are vetted, managed and supported for the most part by the allocation of resources in other Sectors.

The Cabinet Committee is responsible for development of a sectoral strategy. The Prime Minister has also charged the Chairman of the Committee, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, with management of the sector. The Chairman is expected, in the exercise of his authority, to integrate policy and financial considerations and to arrive at decisions in his Committee, decisions which will not normally be modified by the Priorities and Planning Committee or by Cabinet.

The Committee of Deputies, or Mirror Committee exists to support the collective decision-making of Ministers by means of the review of major policy and expenditure issues. It is expected to focus

on sectoral strategy and on the work plan. It provides as well a forum for "testing the adequacy and timeliness of proposals." Most of these have to date originated with External Affairs and CIDA. A few other departments (National Defence, ITC, Finance) have on occasion brought items before the Committee or one of its Sub-Committees. The Mirror Committee is also intended to encourage resolution between Ministers and officials directly concerned of issues that do not require referral to a full Cabinet Committee. The USSEA chairs the Committee.

There are also several ADM sub-committees which structure further interdepartmental interaction. At each decreasing level, the level of detail discussed increases, and the focus is narrower.

The most active sub-committee is the ADM Sub-Committee on Economic Relations. By virtue of its terms of reference, it has assumed the mandates of the old Interdepartmental Committee on Relations with Developing Countries (ICERDC), International Energy Group (IEG) and Interdepartmental Committee on Commercial Policy (ICCP). As a forum for examination of development and/or North/South questions, the Economic Sub-Committee has been regularly engaged in looking at such issues as Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) allocations emergency Balance of Payments support and International Monetary Fund relations with the developing world. It has also dealt when the need arose with Law of the Sea matters, fisheries questions, relations with the Economic Community and science and technology. Energy questions on the other hand have taken up little of the Sub-Committee's time, perhaps by the inability of External Affairs and EMR to agree on the need for a comprehensive look at the international implications of Canada's energy policy.

The ADM Sub-Committee on Political Relations offers an opportunity for other interested departments to comment on almost views developed almost exclusively in External Affairs and - until submission - will have been the subject only of working-level consultation.

The ADM Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations is the successor to ICER, (a) monitoring the interdepartmentally agreed approach to Head of Post authority and responsibility; (b) managing the annual Head of Post appraisal process and (c) organising the annual Country Assessment are its continuing responsibilities. It is the focal point for Interdepartmental consultation and decision-making on foreign operations matters.

The ADM Sub-Committee on Defence Policy is the least active of the Sub-Committees.

The Secretariat (ISC) deals with policy as well as operational matters. The interdepartmental nature of the Secretariat is reflected in its composition: National Defence, Immigration, ITC, CIDA and External Affairs are represented. The Head of the Secretariat is from External Affairs and his deputy from National Defence. In the broadest sense, the Secretariat is responsible for the support of the Mirror Committee structure by organising meetings and providing advice, on specific issues of a political, economic, defence or foreign operations

nature, as well as on sectoral strategic questions and priorities; the management of inter-envelope questions (including resource transfers), and the evaluation of selected programs. The Secretariat has also engaged in developing, in consultation with PCO and TCB, an annual draft strategic overview for a "shadow envelope" in the area of foreign operations.

Within Cabinet committees and in Cabinet, it is the Ministers who make the final decisions on major policy matters and expenditure changes. Ministers are advised by their department, but must balance this advice against other considerations. Foreign policy is made by (and in the name of) the Government.

Where a decision at the administrative level does not appear likely because of diverging points of view, or if the matter is important the matter will be referred to the Minister or Ministers, the Prime Minister or Cabinet for settlement. Ministers would normally reflect the viewpoint of their respective departments. By the very nature of their appointment however, (which is a representative one) they will also bring to bear, in the discussion of the matter at issue, a provincial (or regional), cultural/ethnic or even religious viewpoint. While the decision when taken will be primarily political in character, it should - more than anywhere else in the policy formulating process - reflect a conciliation between the aims sought and the national interest.

If Ministers and Cabinet are important instruments in the formulation of foreign policy, so is Parliament to a much lesser degree. Parliament reflects public opinion, however formed and influenced. Irrespective of political affiliations, MP's may, depending on their numbers, exert influence on the government of the day through vote or debate, - in the House or in Standing Committee, - and force it to amend, reconsider or withdraw foreign policy proposals which do not accord with their views.

Thus, the environment in which the Department operates is further complicated by the political process (and the importance of foreign affairs within the political process) and the requirement for interaction at higher levels (as a results of PEMS). As well, the number of departments with interests in the foreign sector, leads to complexity in defining the role of External Affairs and hence the role of the FPFC. The role is tied directly to the ability to influence the decision-making process and its outcomes.

Thus, there are a number of factors which are related to history which influence the mode of operation of a program such as the FPFC program. These include:

(a) historical precedent which determines how much diplomatic activity is conducted, and, to a certain extent, the organizational structure of the department. A long history, plus long career patterns within the department, have left their mark not only on desires to change, but also on credibility, and on the degree influence exercised outside the department.

- (b) resource constraints have made choices necessary. Posts cannot be opened everywhere. New person-years are few and a between. This increases the need for flexibility, which has to be balanced against the requirement for increased knowledge in certain specialized areas.
- (c) <u>degree of representation/diversity of environment</u>: Canada is under pressure to open more posts, but generally the resources are not readily available. An extensive network of posts is currently operated. Closing posts is difficult.

different situations are faced at each post. Post size and activity vary considerably from country to country. This makes generalization difficult in analysis of impact. As well, such variety means that some officers must concentrate on that country or area with the result that - generalists must still specialize to certain degree. Thus geographic desks and functional specialities exist.

(d) rotationality: the requirement to staff posts abroad with foreign service officers, but still be able to have positions for them in Canada, requires a certain number of Ottawa positions which can be filled by the generalist.

Rotationality makes it difficult for an officer to acquire functional expertise in some areas because of lack of tenure in certain areas (the longest standard HQ posting is 4 years).

Rotationality leads to the requirement of good transfer techniques, good corporate memory and recognition that a newly appointed officer in FPFC areas may not immediately be familar with either a subject or geographical area.

However, flexibility and generalist knowledge may also be of value to a foreign service officer who must react promptly to a specific issue, and understand the broad implications.

(e) the ambivalent nature of the position of the Head of Post complicates both the organization and the analysis.

The Head of Post is an Order-in-Council appointee. In theory, he represents in his country accreditation the Crown in respect of Canada. Nominally he is responsible for representing Canada, for the management of the Post; for all programs, departmental or otherwise, administered at his Post, and of all the personnel en place. Yet many officers serving under him are receiving policy and program direction from and are answerable to other departments. If the Head of Post is to manage, he should have the authority to make decisions with respect to the allocation of resources between programs; to be consulted with respect to the relative priority between competing needs, whether program or administrative. Some of these problems may disappear with the further consolidation of the foreign services.

Activity with respect to foreign policy formulation and co-ordination initiatives in this area depends upon with the Head of Post, as well as on the independence and initiative of the desk officer.

(f) basically, it is the <u>need for a contingency structure</u> which has lead to the use of human-capital-intensive ways of performing many elements of FPFC activity. Memory, contacts, overview, are vested in the individual, rather than the organization. This, plus the staff nature of the work performed, shapes the program and its environment.

VIII. PREVIOUS REVIEWS OF DEPARTMENTAL PROGRAMS

A general and comprehensive review of all of the studies conducted on, or by the Department which are of general relevance to evaluation issues would read essentially like a history of the Department. A first point to be drawn from all of these studies, taking the Glassco Report (1963) as a starting point, is that the Department has undergone an almost continuous series of investigations. These have taken a variety of forms, and have covered a variety of topics. An illustrative sample follows:

Form		Topic	Recent Example	
1.	Internal, Administrative	Efficiency Improvements	"Study of Administration in the Department of External Affairs - The Balance between Operations and Administration", Sharpe Report (April 1979)	
2.	Internal, Management	Review of Departmental Roles	"A Study of the Role of the Department of External Affairs in the Government of Canada", McGill Report (January, 1976)	
3.	Central Agency Review	Survey of Departmental Management Practices and Controls	"IMPAC - Department of External Affairs", <u>OCG</u> (1980)	
4.	Interdepart- mental Task Force	Analysis of Canadian Interests and Representation in a given area. Modified A-Base reviews	(a) "Report of the Task Force on Representation in the United States" submitted to The Committee of Deputy Ministers on Foreign and Defence Policy (September 1981) (b) "Report of the Task Force on Multi-Post Countries - France Germany", Aug 20, 1979.	
5.	Royal Commission	Investigation of the effects of Environmental Changes on the Foreign Service, and on the Dept.	"Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service", McDougall Report, (October 1981)	

Throughout the above must be inserted the numerous studies carried out by private and BMC consultants retained for specific purposes, especially on personnel, organizational, and administrative areas.

As the last two reports mentioned above are still under active managerial consideration, we will not be commenting upon them directly. An action plan resulting from the IMPAC review (1980) is also in process. Nevertheless some of the recommendations in the last two reports do lead to our second point; i.e., that the same statements concerning the need for improved capabilities for planning management, objective and priority establishment, policy direction etc., keep reappearing year after year. These are also key elements in the conduct of program evaluations. For example, the Task Force on Representation in the USA stated, among its many recommendations on management: "Statements of major objectives for Canada's representation in the United States should periodically be reviewed by ministers"; (No. 64) and, "An agreed set of objectives and goals should be the basis for some form of regular evaluation of performance". (No. 66). The McDougall report (above) summarizes the situation as follows; "It seems fair to say that for the foreign service there has been change, but little improvement; the fundamental problems remain, still very much is identified by Glassco (1963) and Pierce (1970). It is time they were resolved". (page 264).

A first conclusion might accordingly be that very little management improvement seems to have taken place in these now almost generally accepted problem areas. Another could be that any such improvement may not be discernible in the environment we have been describing.

A further source of information concerning the workings of the Department is to be found in books and articles on Canadian international relations, written by academics and foreign service officers, within the political science literature. (See bibliography). Also included here are the memoirs of retired ambassadors and other senior foreign service officers. Our third point in connection with the above is that various aims, activities, and outcomes with respect to diverse aspects of Canadian foreign policy, both individually and collectively, have been thoroughly described by experts, both practicioner and academic. The most useful of these works for our purposes deal with policy formulation and decision making processes, whether issue specific, or in general. While the insights thus provided can be quite revealing, often their treatment of procedures or issues is confined to descriptions of problems or events, or else to second guessing or criticizing whatever actually took place. Otherwise, when useful suggestions are in fact offered, their reception and implementation usually suffered from much the same fate as described earlier in respect of the reports.

Yet another source of relevant material is contained within reviews which other countries have carried out in their foreign ministries (notably Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), Britain, of 1977, and the Murphy Report, (USA), of 1975). Their direct relevance to our present concerns however tended to be limited, because of differences in review mandate, and in the substantive nature of those countries foreign policy. Yet they did shed some interesting light on

policy formulation and implementation procedures and structures. While we have found much here of general relevance, our fourth and final comment would be that we have been unable to locate any material to date of direct relevance to the application of program evaluation techniques to the formulation, co-ordination and implementation of Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter Three

The FPFC Components - General Issues

I. INTRODUCTION

In their <u>Guide on the Program Evaluation Function</u>, the Office of the Comptroller <u>General (OCG)</u> suggest that the principal evaluation issues for a given program or component will emerge by posing a series of basic questions, and attempting to answer them. Asking these questions generally follows the construction of one or several program models in conjunction with the program description. Other issues to be addressed during the evaluation may be suggested by departmental senior management or by program management, or may arise from the study itself.

In the subsequent sections, we have applied the basic questions following the OCG pattern (which appear in quotes in the text), to the Foreign Policy Formulation and Coordination (FPFC) components. In attempting to answer these questions, we have identified a number of more specific questions as possible evaluation issues. In some cases, the specific questions are preceded by general remarks. Sometimes the discussion of the questions is broken down into consideration of various aspects of the question indicated by subheadings. The issues which emerge are numbered in order of their appearance. The OCG questions are deceptively simple. In applying them to the FPFC program, it was found necessary to subdivide the discussion which led to the generation of the issues as follows:

TABLE 2.

Guide to the Discussion of the General Evaluation Issues

Section (Page) Theme		Question Type	Specific Discussion topic	General Issue Identified (Page)
II (59)	Program Rationale	-General -Specific(1) -Specific(2)	A. Mandate B. Objectives A. Mandate B. Objectives C. Impacts & Effects	Issue 1. (62) Issues 2 to 7 (64) Issue 8 (65)
III (66) IV	Impact & Effects	-Specific(1) -Specific(2)		Issues 9 to 11 (66) Issues 12 & 13 (67) Issues 14 (67)
(67)	Objectives Achievement	-Specific		155ues 14 (0/)
V (68)	Alternatives	-General -Specific(1) -Specific(2)		 Issues 15 & 16 (68)

The last section, beginning on page 69, consists of a set of additional questions which arose during the course of the study. Although the basic themes re-occur, and some overlap exists, the specific wording of the questions, and their intent is somewhat different from those presented below.

II. PROGRAM RATIONALE

"Does the program make sense?"

- 1. The FPFC mandate must be deduced from the general departmental mandate. The legislative authority flows from the Department of External Affairs Act (1909) which gives it responsibility for
 - (a) the conduct of all official communications between Canada and any other country in connection with external affairs of Canada;
 - (b) other duties as may be assigned (by Order in Council) in relations to external affairs, and
 - (c) the conduct, management of international negotiations.

Remark: There has been very little specified under "other duties" in (b) above save as regards the issuance of passports, Consular matters, and questions affecting Foreign Consulates in Canada.

- 2. The Minister is also responsible for the administration of certain specific Acts relating to treaties entered into and creating obligations for Canada. i.e.
 - (a) those Acts closely linked to FPFC functions:
 - An Act carrying into effect the Treaties of Peace between Canada and Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, (SC 1948 c. 71)
 - An Act carrying into effect the Treaty of Peace between Canada and Japan (SC 1952 c. 50)
 - United Nations Act (RSC 1970 c. U-3)
 - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Act (RSC 1970 c. F-26)
 - Department of External Affairs Act (RSC 1970 c. E-20)
 - Diplomatic Immunities (International Organizations) Act (RSC 1970 c. D-4)
 - Privileges and Immunities (International Organizations) Act (RSC 1970 c. P-22)
 - Privileges and Immunities (NATO) Act (RSC 1970 c. P-23)
 - High Commissioner in the United Kingdom Act (RSC 1970 c. H-5)
 - Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act (RSC 1970 c. T-7)
 - Geneva Conventions Act (RSC 1970 c. G-3)
 - Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities Act (SC 1976-77 c. 31)
 - (b) those Acts entrusting him with responsibility for organizations or institutions created pursuant to Canada's international obligations or commitments:

- An Act Respecting the International Boundary Waters Treaty and the existence of the International Joint Commission (RSC 1970 c. I-20)
- An Act creating the International Development Research Centre (RSC 1970 c. 21(1st Supp))
- Roosevelt-Campobello International Park Commission Act (SC 1964-65 c. 19)
- Rainy Lake Watershed Emergency Control Act (SC 1939 c. 33)
- Fort Falls Bridge Authority Act (SC 1970-71-72 c. 51)
- 3. Other views as to what the Department should engage in were expressed by the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization, 1963, in Vol. 4. p. 104 of its Report to the effect that External Affairs should be responsible for the development of policy and the conduct of ongoing relations with other countries. In this respect, it should act as:
 - (a) the chief advisory body to the Government, and
 - (b) the official channel of communication in matters of foreign policy.

There were also several White Papers issued on the subject of Canada's Foreign policy i.e.:

Federation and International Relations 1968
Federalism and International Conferences on Education 1968
Foreign Policy for Canadians 1970
The Third Option Paper 1972

4. Other basic documents have guided and implemented foreign policy objectives:

the 1971 White Paper on Defence the 1975 Strategy for International Development

- 5. A large portion of the current mandate derives from Cabinet decisions, in particular the ICER "seven principles" of policy coordination (1972, 1973):
 - (a) the development of national policy with international implications reflects the combined judgement of functional and External Affairs ministries;
 - (b) it is the responsibility of the originating department to refer proposals to External Affairs, etc.;
 - (c) the Secretary of State for External Affairs is responsible for the coordination of the external aspects of national policy, and its applications;
 - (d) External Affairs maintains a continuing overview of the country's foreign policy (problems, planning, initiatives);
 - (e) foreign operations programs are to be based on coordinated policy planning, and implemented after consultation with External Affairs;

- (f) Treasury Board should ensure that consultations have taken place before approving the required funds;
- (g) the Privy Council Office will ensure that policy proposals not properly evaluated under (i) above will not be submitted to Cabinet until this has been done.
- 6. A.S. McGill, in his 1976 Study of the Role of the Department of External Affairs in the Government of Canada, suggested among others the following policy roles:
 - (a) information about and interpretation of international developments;
 - (b) knowledge of linkages, cross-impacts with other Canadian policies;
 - (c) advice on tactics, timing and instruments.
- 7. The FPFC mandate is derived from the above as described (in points 1 to 6), in relation to the particular geopolitical entity or functional area assigned to each particular component.

Program Rationale 1 (specific question)

"To what extent are the mandate and objectives of the program still relevant?"

Remark: Mandate and objectives were studied at length in the McGill Report on departmental roles (as above).

An answer is sketched out below:

A. <u>Mandate</u>

- 1. The legislative mandate is very vague; the real mandate has been determined by practice, and Cabinet decisions (particularly the "seven principles" of ICER).
- 2. Specific duties such as those spelt out in the External Affairs Act concerning communications between governments and conduct of international negotiations, are still relevant.
- 3. One role assumed by the Department is the coordination of national policies which have international implications; this is clearly a role which must be performed. External affairs has been given this role. This is sensible in the light of the network required abroad to communicate with foreign governments. (McGill noted that only 15 percent/20 percent of policy initiatives with foreign implications originated from External Affairs).

- 4. With improving communications systems and greater international economic interdependence, domestic policies have a greater impact than previously on our international relations. Thus the requirements for integration of national initiatives to obtain foreign acceptance is increasingly necessary. This strengthens, if anything, the mandate of the Department.
- 5. There is some confusion in the mandate as a result of the increasing incidence of summit conferences and meetings; who - for example - should provide the background and advice appropriate for these meetings?
- Issue 1: Is the mandate sufficiently clear in the light of summit meetings? Does the existence of this form of foreign policy formulation reduce the mandate of External Affairs? Are the relative responsibilities of the Prime Minister's/Privy Council Office and External Affairs clear vis-à-vis summit meetings?

B. Objectives

- 1. The Department lacks formally stated objectives, except in a very general sense.
- 2. The departmental "Blue Book" objective, much of which falls to the FPFC components is "to promote in their international dimensions the national objectives of economic growth, sovereignty and independence, peace and security, the promotion of social justice, quality of life and a harmonious natural environment".
- 3. The objectives which actually govern what takes place within the FPFC components are:
 - (a) rarely specifically articulated;
 - (b) transmitted "culturally" rather than hierarchically;
 - (c) applied to the specific issues of the day rather than more general program thrusts.

Since they are not articulated, it is hard to judge their relevance. Also, there is no fixed set of priorities for objectives, but rather priorities change in response to outside events.

- 4. This raises general questions which have evaluation implications, but are not an evaluation issues per se:
 - (a) Is it possible for External Affairs to articulate specific objectives and assign them priorities?
 - (b) Is it desirable for External Affairs to do so?

It certainly is desirable from the evaluation point of view, for otherwise the objectives achievement questions are difficult to answer. Even if objectives can be imputed, it is difficult to rank their importance in governing activities.

Remark: Possibly the most accurate answer to these questions is "partly" and the challenge to External Affairs is to develop the appropriate set to spur and guide departmental initiatives.

Program Rationale 2 (specific question)

"Are the activities and outputs of the program consistent with the mandate and plausibly linked to the attainment of the objectives and the intended impacts and effects?"

A. <u>Mandate</u>

- 1. The formal legislative mandate only deals with communication with foreign governments and international negotiations. The portions of the activities and outputs shown in the AOE model (quod vide) associated with those areas (representation, part of negotiation, part of arrangements, part of liaison, part of policy instruments, part of position documents) clearly fit into the mandate.
- 2. The evolved mandate, particularly the ICER "seven principles", covers the remainder of the activities and outputs.

B. Objectives

- 1. The stated "objectives" (or rather themes) are extremely broad and cover the whole gamut of government programs, except for those programs which support government operations abroad in general (such as most of the activities of Public Works, Supply and Services and the central agencies). The role assumed by External Affairs is one of coordination and policy development in order to produce the optimum benefit for the national interest abroad.
- 2. The coordination is accomplished:
 - (a) by acquiring knowledge of other countries and supplying relevant parts of this knowledge to OGD's as they develop domestic policy and programs, and
 - (b) by suggesting courses of action (or trade-offs) regarding appropriate courses of action to achieve the "best" outcome for Canada.
- 3. In order to accomplish the above, there are a number of implicit assumptions invoked, including:
 - (a) External Affairs has the appropriate knowledge and the capability to present this in comprehensible terms to other government departments.

- (b) External Affairs is informed about domestic thrusts with international implications prior to their formal enunciation or implementation;
- (c) External Affairs has the requisite expertise to develop general courses of action in functional areas which are under the implementation control of other government departments.
- (d) External Affairs is in a position to judge (or has access to an informed arbiter that can judge) the "best" outcome for Canada;
- (e) Assumption (d) itself assumes that there is a way of judging the "best" outcome;
- (f) External Affairs has sufficient influence (or control) to persuade (or force) other government departments to change their policies or programs in the more general government interest;
- (g) External Affairs is in a position to 'predict' (or to anticipate with reasonable accuracy, but obviously not certainty) the reaction of foreign governments to domestic policies and programs which affect their countries.
- 4. Some of the above assumptions lead to some issues which could possible be included in an evaluation study.
- Issue 2: Does External Affairs have credibility in functional areas in the eyes of OGD's?
- Issue 3: Does External Affairs have the capability to draw everything relevant from its "collective memory" in a particular problem situation? Does External Affairs normally draw enough from its "collective memory"?
- <u>Issue 4:</u> Is External Affairs generally informed about domestic program initiatives sufficiently in advance?
- Issue 5: Is the "best" outcome for Canada to be judged in the short term or in the long term? Is there a ranking of general objectives to select the "best" course of action. If so, is it (or should it be) articulated?
- Issue 6: Has External Affairs anticipated the possibility (from posts or geographic desks to senior management) of major international incidents in the recent past (e.g., Israeli bombing of Iraqi reactor, assassination of Sadat, U.S. reaction to the National Energy Program)?
- Issue 7: Does External Affairs have a record of changing other government departments' program thrusts prior to their enunciation, or is their influence largely limited to the period after foreign governments have reacted?

C. <u>Impacts and Effects</u>

1. The requirement to communicate with foreign governments is greatly facilitated by staff in the field; also there is a recognized need for coordination, and maintaining an "overview" of foreign developments that necessitates staff abroad. This justifies the existence of staff abroad. What is not clear is:

Issue 8: How many posts are needed and how large a staff needs to be posted abroad, or at each post?

Remark: This question appears to have been settled arbitrarily on the basis of the resources which the Under Secretary has been authorized by Treasury Board to employ. The forces to open posts have been largely political (pressure to open new posts from foreign governments or in response to provincial initiatives). It has been difficult to keep posts small in practice (except in countries with more than one post). Also, the resource allocation process has been incremental, and large posts have retained their staff on the basis of the "need" to continue the current activities. The difficulty of answering this question is exacerbated by the fact that the organization is geared to provide information as well as a political overview, and there is often no obvious short-term objective pay-off. Information must be stored in anticipation of future requirements (some information is needed for contingency planning), and there will never be enough time to gather data and provide information when a specific issue arises.

- 2. There is some difficulty with regard to the linkage between activities and the ultimate desired effect. In our AOE model, only the <u>direct</u> effects of the FPFC programs are indicated. These are generally only means to achieve something greater for the government (and thus indirectly for Canada). For example, some of the output is designed to inform government decision—makers to enable them to choose the most propitious course of action. However, narrow political influences may prove to be of greater influence than External Affairs output. Thus the plausibility of the link is tenuous because of the outside influences. Many of the larger intended impacts are liable to frustration because of outside influences.
- 3. The degree to which an outcome can be attributed to EA depends at what point of impact evaluation is carried out (see the Component Role model). Regardless of the point of impact, the effects of coordination on the ultimate outcome are generally more difficult to link, much will depend on the degree of influence exercised through one or several other government departments.

III. IMPACTS AND EFFECTS

"What has happened as a result of the program?"

Impact and Effects 1 (specific question)

"What impacts and effects, both intended and unintended, resulted from carrying out the program?"

- 1. This is a difficult question because of the "staff" nature of the FPFC program. Should one attribute outcomes of following External Affairs advice to that advice or would an equally favourable outcome have resulted without External Affairs intervention?
- 2. One possible approach to answering this question is the following:
- Issue 9: What domestic polices or programs with international implications have been revised as a result of External Affairs intervention (in the direction suggested by External Affairs)? What percentage of all such programs do these comprise? Does the affected department agree that the change was necessary?

Approach: A census of all issues arising in External Affairs (plus an investigation of one that might have arisen (found by soliciting other government departments) in a geopolitical or functional area over some specified interval of time. (Case study from file research).

- 3. Another issue relating to the "larger" intended impacts from direct External Affairs intervention is the following:
- Issue 10: Do foreign governments act in the way that Extenal Affairs tries to influence them? In other words, does External Affairs have any clout on the international scene? If so, what is the source and nature of the clout? Is it used to maximum advantage?

 Approach: Case studies in a selected geographical or functional area. Comparison with known intervention of other foreign governments and the general reaction to them.
 - 4. Another general issue is the following:

Issue 11: What have been the unintended effects of the FPFC programs?

Approach: Case studies plus interviews with other government departments, central agencies.

Impact and Effects 2 (specific question)

"In what manner and to what extent does the program complement, duplicate, overlap or work at cross-purposes with other programs?"

- 1. By their very nature, the FPFC programs are designed to complement other programs. Issue 10 above was directed partly towards answering the above question.
- 2. There will be some internal overlap between the different FPFC programs, because of the functional/geographical differentiation. There may also be post/Headquarters duplication or overlap (or second-guessing?).
- Issue 12: Do the functional/geographical and bilateral/ multilateral distinctions cause needless duplication or overlap? If so, is there some way to avoid this? Further, if so, is there a preferred approach to handling issues in one or other of the two sets of modes?
 - 3. Inevitably, the requirements of trade-offs between domestic issues and international implications will result in other government departments being frustrated by the intervention of External Affairs. This could be thought of as FPFC working at cross-purposes with other programs.
- Issue 13: Is the intervention of External Affairs recognized as necessary by other government departments? Do the latter accept that the interventions serve the general public interest? (This issue has been hinted at or partially dealt with in previous issues).

Approach: Select various sample issues, talk to other government departments.

IV. OBJECTIVES ACHIEVEMENT

Remark: Since the expectations are rather general in nature, this question depends on the viewpoint of the beholder.

<u>Objectives Achievement</u> (specific question)

"In what manner and to what extent were appropriate program objectives achieved as a result of the program?"

- In those FPFC components with stated objectives, the objectives tend to describe a role rather than the desired achievement. The general objectives (stated earlier) are too vague to render the above question meaningful.
- 2. In terms of the implicit objectives, the interesting issue is the following:
- Issue 14: Are the internally generated, issue specific objectives consistent and integrated? Do they form a coherent guide to the conduct of foreign affairs?

V. ALTERNATIVES

"Are there better ways of achieving the results?"

There clearly must be some way to resolve conflicts arising from the reaction of foreign governments to domestic policies and programs. Thus the coordination role must be assumed by some government agency. Also, to exist in the world, our government must be able to communicate with others. Over time, a somewhat formal way of communicating has been generally accepted (and adopted by international convention as well as customary practice). This form must be adhered to a large extent.

Alternatives 1 (specific question)

"Are there more cost-effective alternative programs which might achieve the objectives and intended impacts and effects?"

1. Given the remarks above, there are constraints regarding alternative programs, given international custom. The coordination role might be given to a central agency such as PCO, but it would have to build an infrastructure largely duplicating that of External Affairs (which is needed for communication) in order to gain insight into foreign developments and likely reactions to domestic thrusts. This would appear to be less cost-effective than giving External Affairs total responsibility.

Alternatives 2 (specific question)

"Are there more cost-effective ways of delivering the existing program?"

1. Given the international practices alluded to above, this question reduces to two basic sub questions:

(This may presuppose that a more objectives-oriented management approach is appropriate for External Affairs. This may not be so, given the Japanese management model which is gaining some popularity in North American business circles - "Theory Z").

<u>Issue 16</u>: Are there better ways of deploying resources to achieve similar ends?

(e.g., fewer posts, different Headquarters/post split, different training, recruitment of functional expertise from other government departments, better match of skills/experience in posting).

Many of these areas have implications for or fit into the context of evaluation of some of the heavy resource - consuming External Affairs internal support programs.

VI. ADDITIONAL FPFC EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Program Rationale

General Questions/Issues:

- (1) Should the existing mandate be formalized or strengthened to cover the existing range of functions? Are there gaps in the functions for which a new mandate may be required? Are both multilateral and bilateral relations covered?
- (2) Are the activities and outputs of the Foreign Policy Formulation and Coordination (FPFC) components consistent with:
 - a) departmental objectives?
 - b) national foreign policy?
 - c) the "Foreign Ministry" concept?
- (3) Do the objectives of the FPFC components fit within the mandate?
- (4) Is it likely that the activities of FPFC program:
 - a) result in action in accord with government policies and priorities?
 - b) result in adequately and appropriately informed domestic and foreign decision-makers?
 - c) help to maintain and strengthen structures in the international arena?

Program Rationale

Specific Issues:

(5) Is it possible for External Affairs to articulate specific objectives and assign them priorities?

Is is desirable for External Affairs to do so? Impacts and Effects

General Issues:

- (6) Are any impacts and effects in the world at large identifiable in either micro or macro form as a result of FPFC activities? Can these be specifically attributed to External Affairs or can on External Affairs contribution be isolated?
- (7) Are there any side-effects (harmful or beneficial) arising from FPFC activities? Are these more identifiable than those direct effects discussed above in (1)? Can we distinguish between a harmful side effect and a failure to achieve the desired effect?

- (8) In what manner and to what extent does the FPFC program support other government programs within or outside External Affairs?
- (9) In what manner and to what extent do FPFC activities duplicate, overlap or work at cross-purposes with other government programs? - specify examples. Is such overlap or duplication mandated? Does it make sense sometimes?

Impacts and Effects

Specific Issues:

(10) For which areas does External Affairs have full responsibility for policy and program? What is the rationale for the division of responsibility?

Have there been shift in program responsibility? Where do the PCO. PMO. etc., look for advice?

- (11) Has the international stature of Canada and its ability to influence world events (large or small) been affected by the activities of the FPFC program?
- (12) What are the impacts of:
 - the rotational system
 - changes in technology, telecommunications
 - summitry
 - emphasis on human capital?

Objective Achievement

General and Specific Issues:

- (13) Objectives are generally multi-dimensional. Does the FPFC program contribute to the establishment of relative priorities and trade-offs in foreign policy?
- (14) What is our impact in multilateral fora? How many Canadians are asked to head international organizations? What is our general image? Can our "image" be related to FPFC activities?
- (15) Is the resource allocation to posts in keeping with objectives?

Alternatives

General Issues:

- (16) Are there more cost effective ways of:
 - a) ensuring that decision-makers and visitors are adequately informed?

- b) ensuring that a coherent and coordinated foreign policy is promulgated?
- c) ensuring coordination of all interests and activities abroad. (ensuring that Canada speaks with a single voice)?
- d) ensuring representation abroad and accurate and timely reporting of non-domestic events?

Alternatives

Specific Issues:

- (17) Are there other ways to gather and provide information?
- (18) Are all of the post support activities of the FPFC program necessary? Are there any omissions?
- (19) How would foreign policy be shaped and by whom, if there were no FPFC program? What form would policy take and how could it be implemented?
- (20) What would be the advantages and disadvantages of letting the provinces and other government departments all handle their own international relations? What coordination would be necessary? Who would do it?
- (21) Are there better ways of deploying resources to achieve similar ends? Several avenues include:
 - complete decentralization (no headquarters)
 - complete centralization (replace ambassador with a telephone)
 - flying squads
 - non-resident diplomats
 - more flexible resource allocation schemes
 - fewer posts
 - different headquarters/post splits
 - changed recruitment pattern
 - better match of skills/expertise to postings
 - bilateral vs multilateral focus
 - revised functional/geographic split

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Chapter Four

Evaluation Issues and Options

I. INTRODUCTION

In the course of the Evaluation Assessment, a number of basic issues (or questions) emerged which appeared to be of possible interest to the Under-Secretary. Many of these resulted from attempts to answer the general questions suggested in the guidelines issued by the Office of the Comptroller General, as discussed in Chapter Three. Others came to mind while the Evaluation Team discussed the program with senior and junior officers associated with the FPFC program and especially with the FPFC Advisory Committee. Still others arose in early discussions with OCG staff.

The original intention of the Evaluation Team was to present these issues to the Audit and Evaluation Committee in order to select those of greatest interest and importance to Senior Management. This was to occur after a final review of the models of the program and of the development of the issues, with the Advisory Committee, the OCG and others. Unfortunately, this course of action has been overtaken by events. On the one hand, the reorganization of the Department of January 12, 1982 has thrown the existing evaluation plan into disarray. The evaluation components themselves will have to be reconsidered. On the other hand, the OCG has yet to comment on accomplished work at this stage, the basic documentation for which was forwarded to them on November 24/1981.

Nevertheless, the Evaluation Team considers it important to document the work carried out to date so that future evaluators will have at least partially tilled soil. Moreover, some of the ideas and considerations aired at the time may yet be of value while the lines of authority and responsibility are developed in the enlarged Department. The remainder of this Chapter sets out the Team's preliminary thoughts on the evaluation issues; i.e. what their relative priority might have been and what approaches to evaluation might have been considered. These ideas however, have not been developed to the point of costed options, as to do so would seem an imprudent investment in the light of the recent reorganization.

Each of the remaining sections of the Chapter deals with one of the four themes suggested by the OCG for evaluation, as presented previously, viz., program rationale, impacts and effects, objectives achievement, and alternatives. There are usually subsections dealing with general issues and with specific issues. Each issue is posed as a question or series of questions. Possible approaches to the issue are then listed and an opinion given concerning its cost and benefits. In some cases, no approach is suggested and the reasons for this are presented.

II. PROGRAM RATIONALE

A. General Issues

(1) Should the existing mandate be formalized or strengthened to for which a new mandate may be required? Are both multilateral and bilateral relations covered?

One approach to this issue could be analytic. The analysis would start with the compilation of a detailed catalogue of the functions of the Department as well as those which have obvious international implications of other departments and the provinces. A research review would then be conducted to assess how the functions fit within the mandate and to outline other possible frameworks.

The analytic approach would be highly subjective. Its success would depend on the comprehensiveness of the catalogue of functions and the ability of the team to invent options. Its acceptance would depend on the credibility of the Team. Such approaches have been tried in the past and have not resulted in significant change for they are too wide-ranging and speculative. The results are unlikely to justify the work entailed.

Another approach is to select a group for interviews, comprising individuals both from within External Affairs and from outside (other government departments), provinces and the general public) and elicit opinions on the questions. Responses would be fed back for comment, rather like a Delphi forecast. This process would continue until a consensus emerged or until members of the group had established positions which were unchanging.

This approach is time-consuming and expensive, for a large group would be required. Moreover, it is likely that some group members would have personal axes to grind and consensus would be very unlikely. Even so it could prove interesting to get a wide variety of opinions on the questions.

- (2) Are the activities and outputs of the FPFC components consistent with:
 - (a) departmental objectives?
 - (b) national foreign policy?
 - (c) the "Foreign Ministry" concept?

As it stands, this question is too broad in scope to be addressed effectively. Bits and pieces of the questions occur an alternative formulations among the other issues. Therefore, no evaluation approach has been formulated for this global question.

(3) Do the objectives of the FPFC components fit within the mandate?

This question is too vague to answer. As pointed out earlier, both the mandate and the objectives are all-encompassing and stated in generalities. Any approach to this issue is unlikely to produce more than a welter of words.

- (4) Is it likely that the activities of FPFC program:
 - (a) result in action in accord with government policies and priorities?
 - (b) result in adequately and appropriately informed domestic and foreign decision-makers?
 - (c) help to maintain and strengthen structures in the international arena?

The approaches can be broken down according to the three questions (a), (b) and (c). The first of these (a) is not particularly relevant for there is limited program delivery outside the government. Rather, FPFC activities establish and modify policies and priorities. Moreover, the linkages between FPFC activities and the final associated actions or outcomes are generally indirect and tenuous. Therefore no approach has been set out for this question.

An approach to (b) is to use case studies and peer review. A number of cases would be selected. For each case, a set of "what if" scenarios would be developed that are compatible with the information existing at the time the decision-maker was briefed. Then a panel of peers would be asked whether the information provided to the decision-maker was adequate and appropriate or, if not, what changes would have made it so.

There are some problems with this: approach. First of all, there might be a great deal of second-guessing, (hindsight is always clearer than foresight). Secondly, there is a danger that the process would focus on mistakes rather than on the positive contributions of FPFC activity. Finally, it is more likely to give "box scores" for the past rather than identify opportunities to improve in the future. The problems at External Affairs tend to be unique. Therefore it is difficult to learn from particular examples. One must learn from adressing a family of problems rather than individual ones.

There are several approaches to part (c) (which has an essentially multilateral slant). The first of these is by way of case study. A few cases (multilateral problems or issues) would be selected and analysed to identify Canadian initiatives, attempting to isolate their impact and assess their contribution. These cases should be fresh (in fact, it could prove very useful to track an ongoing case) so that the evaluation would be of current rather than past impact.

The second approach is an historical one. A selected international governmental organization would be the object of a historical study looking particularly at how Canada influenced the evolution of the organization and the organizational impact. This history would have to be traced up to the present to make sure current impacts are considered. Care in selecting an organization with real contemporary relevance would be required.

A third approach would be to interview the heads of several international organizations or agencies to ascertain what countries are most influential in that organization, the source of their influence and where Canada fits among them. It would be important to distinguish between influence based on size or historical power, influence based on

political sensitivity and acumen, and influence based on respect for the country on other grounds (e-g-, fairness and objectivity).

The final suggested approach is to interview special interest groups such as the United Nations Association, seeking their opinions on the listed questions. Groups should be chosen both within Canada and abroad to ensure a broad perspective.

The case study and historical approach both suffer from the problem pointed out previously; the difficulty of drawing inferences about the general state from particular instances where each of the instances is rather unique. Both also run the risk of emphasizing past instead of present influence. The third and fourth approaches are subject to the particular biases of the people interviewed. This question is probably moderately interesting to the Department. To minimize the biases noted above, perhaps the best approach is to combine a current case with interviews of Agency Heads. This would provide both freshness and balance of perspective.

(5) Is the best outcome for Canada to be judged in the short run or the longer term? Is there a ranking of general objectives (criteria) to select the "best" course of action? If so, is it (or should it be) articulated?

These (or parallel) questions face any manager evaluating his programs. They are especially problematical in a political environment where priorities change rapidly. Nowhere is this more true than in the realm of external affairs. These are basic philosophical questions, and therefore an academic approach is most relevant. For external affairs, a background paper already exists: that written by Professors Von Rickhoff, Sigler and Tomolin for the Department in 1975]. If such questions were to be adressed, they should be contracted out to the university community. However, the value in these questions is stimulating management thinking during evaluation; little of practical utility is likely to emerge from a research paper.

B. Specific Issues

Is the mandate sufficiently clear in the light of summit meetings. Does the existence of this form of foreign policy formulation reduce the mandate of External Affairs? (i.e., does the mandate cover support for the Prime Minister at summit meetings? Does the PMO/PCO have overlapping responsibilities with External Affairs with respect to summitry?).

This is a very interesting question which emerges as a result of the increasing incidence of international summit meetings addressing issues of international importance. Is there a clear boundary between PCO/PMO responsibility and that of External Affairs? Otherwise what is the degree and nature of overlap?

The suggested approach is threefold. All instances of summitry should be catalogued along with the split of responsibilities which occurred. Interviews should be conducted with officials of the

PCO, the Under-Secretarial Group, and selected FPFC officers to ascertain their perspective. Finally, any parallels with other government departments should be sought. From such a study, guidelines should emerge for future division of responsibility so that the respective actors understand clearly each other's role and so that the most appropriate resources to treat each facet of the preparation for and participation in summit meetings can be used.

(7) Is it possible for External Affairs to articulate specific objectives and assign them priorities? Is it desirable for External Affairs to do so?

This is very close to the general issue (5) above and is similarly academic. However it is a hard question facing those responsible for strategic planning in the department. It is more appropriate for them to attempt an answer than as the subject of the FPFC program evaluation.

(8) Is External Affairs generally informed about domestic program initiatives sufficiently in advance? Does External Affairs have a record of changing the program thrusts of other government departments prior to their enunciation, or is FPFC program influence (and activity) largely limited to the period after foreign governments have reacted?

The suggested approach here is multifaceted. A catalogue of domestic programs initiatives with foreign implications should be prepared, covering the last two or three years and the fraction in which External Affairs was not notified in advance computed. Several instances should be selected and the intervention of External Affairs recorded along with its outcome. A few of these should be cases where External Affairs was not notified until the policy had been announced. These should be investigated to determine the most likely outcome if External Affairs had been informed earlier (by a survey of parties who might have been involved on a "what if" basis). The same "what if" approach should be applied to determine what might have occurred in the absence of External Affairs intervention.

This approach would involve much work, both in making up the catalogue and in interviewing people about what happened (or might have happened). The "what if" analysis is of necessity subjective, but it is the only way to estimate the impact of External Affairs coordination. This is an item of high priority to investigate effectiveness. Of course, the method is somewhat conjectural, but there is no completely objective approach.

(9) Has the FPFC program anticipated the possibility of major international incidents in the recent past?

The suggested approach is essentially the same as that outlined for issue (8) above. Effectiveness is again the key factor, in this case applied to the anticipation aspect of information gathering. This could be best carried out in conjunction with (8).

(10) Does External Affairs have credibility in the eyes of other government departments? Is such credibility required?

The suggested approach is to ask these questions of senior officials in the functional areas in other government departments, and to officers in the functional groups in External Affairs to ascertain the degree of coincidence of the perspective from within and outside the department. This is an important question for management, because at first glance credibility would appear to be necessary if EA is to persuade others to follow suggested courses of action.

(11) Does External Affairs have the capability to draw everything relevant to a particular problem or situation from its "collective memory"? Does External Affairs normally draw enough from its "collective memory"?

One approach to this issue is case studies plus interviews similar to those suggested for (8) and (9) above, with the "what if" questions focused on the probable impact of greater or less information being available.

Another more enterprising approach is simulation. A number of reasonable hypothetical situations would be constructed based on a very thorough search of files and interviews with experienced individuals. These would be presented as problems to officers who would be responsible for producing a solution and keeping track of all information sources that are used.

Although this is a process question, it is of extreme importance for Management. Heavy emphasis has been placed on collecting and storing information in the Department. If the system cannot effectively use the retained output, then serious questions must be raised about the effectiveness of the investment of the associated resources. Either suggested evaluation approach would be expensive in terms of time consumed.

III. IMPACTS AND EFFECTS

A. <u>General Issues</u>

(12) Are any impacts and effects in the world at large identifiable in either micro-or macro-form as a result of FPFC activities? Can these be specifically attributed to External Affairs or can the External Affairs contribution be isolated?

This is an issue for the assessment phase of evaluation. This question has been addressed to the appropriate extent elsewhere in the preliminary assessment report. In brief, the linkages appear to be very tenuous in the great majority of instances.

(13) Are there any side effects (harmful or beneficial) arising from FPFC activities? Are these more identifiable than those direct effects discussed above in (12)? Can we distinguish between a harmful side-effect and a failure to achieve the desired effect?

This issue is not worth studying all by itself (the costs far exceed any conceivable benefits). However, it should be considered in conjunction with any issue which requires cataloguing and interviewing. The questions above could be posed as an "add-on" to interviews and the resulting responses could be compiled into a journalistic review of the unanticipated effects.

(14) In what manner and to what extent does the FPFC program support other government programs within or outside External Affairs?

This issue is linked with a number of others, particularly the issue of credibility (question (10)) and should be addressed in conjunction with them. It is most relevant as a ranking factor or criteria in assessing proposed alternative ways of carying out FPFC activities.

(15) In what manner and to what extent does FPFC activity duplicate, overlap or work at cross-purposes with other government programs? Is such overlap or duplication mandated? Does it make sense sometimes?

The suggested approach is to classify programs in a number of areas (e.g., trade, energy, environment) and select a number of programs in each classification to identify areas of conflict and overlap. The last questions would be posed in interviews with the program managers of the selected programs. This issue is likely to be of moderate interest to Management.

B. Specific Issues

What domestic policies or programs with international implications have been revised as a result of External Affairs intervention (in the direction suggested by External Affairs)? What percentage of all such programs do these comprise? Does the affected department agree the change was necessary?

This issue would be addressed by selecting a number of specific examples, documenting these from existing records and interviewing parties involved at the time to ascertain the degree of change and collect opinions as to whether changes were necessary. The issue is quite close to issue (8) in program rationale and should be approached in conjunction with it.

(17) Is the intervention of External Affairs recognized as necessary by other government departments? Do the latter accept that the intervention serves the general public interest?

This is linked with issue (14) above and the previous credibility issue, issue (10), under <u>program rationale</u>). It should be approached in conjunction with these other issues in the same fashion.

(18) For which areas does External Affairs have full responsibility for policy and program? What is the rationale for the division of responsibility? Have there been shifts in program responsibility? Where do the PCO, PMO, etc., look for advice?

Much of this issue is related to issue (6). Shifts in responsibility could be documented in an historical review. Unfortunately, this whole issue is confounded by the ever-changing evolution of the international political realm, and of Canadian government organization.

(19) Has the international stature of Canada and its ability to influence world events been affected by the activities of the FPFC program? In other words, does External Affairs have any clout in the international scene? What is the source and nature of this clout? Is it used to maximum advantage?

This is a somewhat academic issue. The preferable approach is to engage two or three university specialists in foreign affairs to write papers on the subject. More than one source is necessary for the subject is contentious and individual bias must be corrected. There is one element that is begged in the above questions which casts a shadow over any answer. This is the extent to which Canadian clout remains consistent over time.

- (20) What are the impacts on FPFC of:
 - the rotational system?
 - changes in technology, telecommunications?
 - summitry?
 - emphasis on human capital?

The factors above act as constraints on the program and are not essential features of it. They are best addressed in the evaluation of the associated support programs or as factors to consider in establishing alternatives to the existing program.

IV. OBJECTIVES ACHIEVEMENT

(21) Are the internally generated issue-specific objectives consistent and integrated? Do they form a coherent guide to the conduct of foreign affairs?

This is extremely difficult to answer, for it is not even clear that such objectives can be isolated and articulated. The only possible approach to this issue is an academic one, either by subcontract to an outside analyst (a former experienced senior departmental officer) or as a special assignment to an experienced serving officer.

Objectives are generally multi-dimensional. Does FPFC contribute to the establishment of relative priorities and trade-offs in foreign policy?

This is also closely linked to the general credibility issue (Issue (17) and other issues cited there).

(23) What is the country's impact in multilateral fora? How many Canadians are asked to lead international governmental organizations? What is our general image? Can our "image" be related to FPFC activities?

This is an ongoing question of management review, and therefore need not be addressed in evaluation. It is also addressed to some extent in question (4(c)).

How many posts are needed? Is the resource allocation to posts in keeping with objectives?

An approach is to look at the probable activities and output under different scenarios of post size and dispersion. A modified zero-base budgeting approach would be used (i.e., ask managers what activities would be carried out with hypothetical reductions of 10 percent and 25 percent of staff and an increase of 10 percent). The impact of the elimination or addition of posts should also be considered, using cost-effectiveness analysis.

V. ALTERNATIVES

A. General Issues

Is it possible to define the objective-setting process to give priorities and greater direction in the conduct of foreign affairs?(ie.is planning possible?)

This question is being addressed as part of the Department's response to the OCG's survey, as weel as in the structuring of IMPAC the strategic overview of the Department.

(26) Are there more cost-effective ways of:

(a) ensuring that decision-makers and official visitors abroad are adequately informed?

(b) ensuring that a coherent and coordinated foreign policy is promulgated?

(c) ensuring coordination of all interests and activities abroad (ensuring Canada speaks with a single voice)?

(d) ensuring representation abroad and accurate and timely reporting of non-domestic events?

This question is too broad and the measurement problem too great as stated. Facets of these general questions are considered under the specific issues.

B. Specific Issues

(27) Are there other and better ways to gather and provide information?

The approach would be to interview experts and review the operations of other foreign services to identify alternative ways of gathering information. These alternatives would be subjected to a cost-effectiveness analysis to discover if there are preferable program designs. This issue should logically be addressed in conjunction with issue (11) under program rationale that looks at the use of the "collective memory".

(28) Are all the post support activities of the FPFC program necessary? Are there any omissions?

This is a management review question outside the domain of evauation. It might be appropriate for study by the Administrative Services Consulting Group.

(29) How would foreign policy be shaped and by whom if there were no FPFC program? What form could policy take and how could it be implemented?

There are three possible approaches to this question. One is to perform an academic study (using a subcontracted expert in foreign affairs). Another is to generate a set of scenarios and interview departmental officers to find out the probable effect of implementing these scenarios. The third is to study a number of foreign offices of other countries or their equivalent (e.g. department politique federal in Switzerland) looking for significant differences and their impact.

(30) What would be the advantages of letting the provinces and other government departments all handle their own international relations? What coordination would be necessary? Who would do it?

On the face of it, this would be an extremely cumbersome arrangement. To shed some light on it, an historical review of the Second German Empire (which would appear to have used this approach, but in guide a different use!) could be carried out. For obvious reasons, it is not clear what practical results would ensue from such a study.

- (31) Are there better ways of deploying resources to achieve similar ends? Several avenues include:
 - (a) complete decentralization (no headquarters);
 - (b) complete centralization (no posts, as presently constituted);

(c) flying squads;

- (d) non-resident diplomats;
- (e) more flexible resource allocation schemes;

(f) fewer posts;

(g) different headquarters/post splits;

(h) changed recruitment pattern;

- (i) better match of shills and expertise to postings;
- (j) bilateral versus multilateral focus;
- (k) revised functional/geographic split.

The approach would be to make a catalogue of the advantages and disadvantages (in terms of probable impact) of each of the avenues chosen. Views of FPFC officials would be solicited to form the catalogue. A consistent set of criteria would be developed and used to assess each of the alternatives. This would probably be a contentious study and cause some anxiety among departmental office. However, it might be interesting to discover the probably effects of fairly significant charge in system design.

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