





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

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Reprinted from *The Scottish Geographical Magazine* for May 1894.

## THE GEOGRAPHICAL UNITY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

By GEO. R. PARKIN, M.A.

(Read at a Meeting of the Society in Edinburgh, March 1894.)

(With Maps.)

IN placing before you the large map of the World which Mr. Bartholomew has prepared for me to especially illustrate the position of the British Empire, it might seem as if I had furnished you with an ocular refutation of the very name which I have given to this address. In this map you at once see geographical diversity and separation apparently carried to their utmost extent. Parts of the Empire are found on every continent; they are in the extreme north and the extreme south; they are in the Frigid, the Temperate, and the Torrid Zones. The portion we examine may cover a continent, or half a continent; it may be a lonely island or an isolated promontory; it may be coloured deeply to indicate full possession, or it may have the subdued tint which points only to pervading influence. There are vast areas which are practically incapable of settlement or commercial development; there are others which already feel the full rush of human life and industry; and there are others still which lie only waiting for the presence of civilised man and the appliances of civilisation, to deal with their boundless resources, and transform them into happy homes and prosperous spheres of activity. There are prairies large enough to absorb the population of European kingdoms with ease; there are deserts in whose almost boundless wastes armies might be swallowed up and lost. Every ocean washes the shores of the Empire; ships are constantly making the full circuit of 25,000 miles around the globe without touching at anything but widely separated British ports.

Population is as diversified as position and climate. While the back-

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bone of national strength is white, Caucasian, and English-speaking, beyond this all is diversity; every colour—black, brown, red, yellow; all races—Negro, Indian, Mongolian, Malay, Papuan, Kanaka, Maori; all religions—Christian, Mohammedan, Buddhist, Parsee, and Pagan. Language is even more various than race, creed, or colour. Diffusion, separation, isolation, variety, every expression which contrasts with the term unity is what naturally suggests itself to one who merely looks at a map of the Empire, without studying the great facts which underlie its history, its progress, its aims, its manifest place and work in the world, the new conditions under which it exists to-day. I fear that this primary, superficial, and utterly misleading impression of national disconnection still dominates great numbers of minds; it is to modify such an impression that this paper is chiefly intended.

That I have begun by placing before you this map which so vividly represents the scattered state of the Empire, with its dividing spaces of continent, and ocean, and zone, will be, I trust, some guarantee that I wish to face my text fairly.

What I wish to prove is, that in spite of all this apparent diversity, the territorial growth of the Empire has been not abnormal, but strictly organic—the outcome of racial instincts and the fundamental necessities of national life; that each part is fitted to minister to the wants of the other parts, or of the whole, with singular felicity of adaptation; that this vast diffusion of territory is so linked together as to be fitted in a very special way for the performance of peculiarly high national functions; that dismemberment would mean for it what dismemberment means for any highly complicated and efficient organism; that, in short, to speak of the geographical unity of the Empire is no paradox, but a simple truth—a truth which it is of the utmost importance that all British people should vividly realise.

In entering upon the argument by which I hope to justify these conclusions, it seems necessary, in the first place, to briefly consider a few of the most salient features in the historic growth of the Empire.

If we take the coming of the Saxons as our point of departure in British history, then we may say roughly that eleven centuries were passed in the manifold processes of internal growth and change before our people began to get even a hint of the world-wide destiny that was in store for them.

First, in this period there was for some hundreds of years that fierce clash of people against which was to settle, by the survival of the strongest, the prevailing strain of race. At last there emerged a population in whose blood was curiously mingled Saxon force, and Celtic fire, and the Berserker energy of the Sea-Kings.

Then followed some further centuries spent in internal struggles, varied occasionally, but only incidentally, by continental wars, which gave temper and fibre and greater homogeneity to the race, and stability, with ordered liberty beyond that of other nations, to social and political institutions.

But from the very first the direction of the country's history was dominated by one geographical fact which differentiated its position from

that of every other European State, and from that of every nation known to ancient history—the fact that it was an island; an island, too, penetrated on all sides by estuaries which suggested commerce, and hinted at the revival of the sea-roving spirit, which, during the long constructive period, had slumbered, but was by no means dead.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century signs of a renascent maritime energy began to show themselves, and soon developed with wonderful rapidity; as the century drew to a close, in “the spacious times of Great Elizabeth,” English navigators—Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, Cavendish, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Raleigh, and others—had given ample proofs of those qualities which pointed with no doubtful finger to the sea as the scene of Britain’s greatest glories and greatest gains.

They had circumnavigated the globe: they had made their name feared in the remotest seas: they had tracked the Spanish galleons to the places from which Spain drew her stores of wealth; they had vanquished in open fight the most imposing fleet that the pride and wealth and skill of man had ever put upon the sea.

But though the force of them and the fear of them prevailed everywhere, as yet there was little thought of territorial expansion. While Spaniard, Frenchman, Portuguese, and Dutchman were planting their feet in many lands, the sixteenth century closed while yet scarce an Englishman had found a fixed home beyond his own narrow seas. As yet only the pathways were being found for the flood of Anglo-Saxon life which was to follow.

The seventeenth century saw a change in this. The spirit of adventure, the desire for wealth, the wish to free the soul from old-world traditions and despotisms, conspired to kindle the colonising spirit. An outlet had to be found for forces which, if pent up at home, might well have wrecked the State. The first great expansive movement of British people was as natural and organic as the force which compels the bursting of a bud, or the transformation of a chrysalis. It is now possible to present a map of the Empire abroad, as it is here before you. At the end of the seventeenth century, as you see, there is a thin line of settlement along the eastern coast of North America; trading posts or points secured for the refreshment of navigators are scattered here and there. Trade and settlement are the two characteristics of the period; the movements are tentative, but in each lies the germ, on two distinct lines, of astonishing growth.

Let us here mark the philosophy of this growth, while we are at its very beginnings. That philosophy, in one of its main aspects, at least, has been admirably stated by Lieutenant Mahan, of the American navy, in his profound work upon *The Growth of Sea Power*, now everywhere accepted as the ablest study of the question yet written. He says:

“As a nation, with its armed and unarmed shipping, launches forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. In the present day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the world; and their shelter is enough while peace prevails. It was not always so, nor does peace always endure. . . . In earlier times the merchant seaman,



seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and profitable freight. He therefore intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favour, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the merchantable products of the land could be continually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which should carry them to the mother-country. As there was immense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such establishments naturally multiplied and grew until they became colonies; whose ultimate development and success depended upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they sprang, and form a very great part of the history, and particularly of the sea history, of the world. . . .

"The needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for when safety had been secured at the far end of the road.

"The voyages were long and dangerous, the seas often beset with enemies. In the most active days of colonising there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness the very memory of which is now almost lost, and the days of settled peace between maritime nations were few and far between. Thus arose the demand for stations along the road, like the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defence and war; the demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta, Louisburg at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence—posts whose value was chiefly strategic, though not necessarily wholly so."

The territorial expansion, then, of the seventeenth century was the natural result of forces working in the national life.

We pass on to the eighteenth century. All is now again changed. This is for Britain the period of storm and stress. The century opened in comparative quiet, save when broken by continental wars which we now know were but a mere prelude to what was to come. Its middle decade was marked by a contest of which the brilliant American historian, Parkman, has said:

"The Seven Years' War made England what she is. It crippled the commerce of her rival, ruined France in two continents, and blighted her as a colonial Power. It gave England the control of the seas and the mastery of North America and India, made her the first of commercial nations, and prepared that vast colonial system that has planted New Englands in every quarter of the globe. And while it made England what she is, it supplied to the United States the indispensable condition of their greatness, if not of their national existence."

The century closed in another Titanic struggle which shook the whole civilised world—a struggle for national life or death.

It was in this latter half of the eighteenth century that for the first time in her long history Britain learned the secret of her destiny; that she began to fully understand "the meaning of the riddle of her might." Against the most colossal military genius and the most tremendous military combination that the modern world has known she matched her seakings' blood; the might of the waves against the might of the land.

Have you ever reflected upon the tremendous odds against us when we entered upon our struggle with Napoleon—odds so overwhelming that without our ocean power nothing apparently could have saved us?

"In 1789" (I quote from that remarkable book on *Social Evolution*, lately written by Mr. Benjamin Kidd) "the population of Great Britain was only 9,600,000, the population of France was 26,700,000. The annual revenue of France was £24,000,000, that of Great Britain was only £15,650,000.

"At the beginning of the nineteenth century the French people numbered some 27,000,000, while the whole English-speaking peoples, including the Irish and the population of the North American States and Colonies, did not exceed 20,000,000." (The population of the United Kingdom at this period was only 14,000,000.)

Lieut. Mahan's statement upon this period of British history is also most effective.

"When war broke out with Spain in 1739, the navy of England was in numbers more than equal to the combined navies of Spain and France; and, during the quarter of a century of nearly uninterrupted war that followed, this numerical disproportion increased. In these wars England, at first instinctively afterward with conscious purpose, under a Government that recognised her opportunity and the possibilities of her great sea power, rapidly built up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations were already securely laid in the characteristics of her colonists and the strength of her fleets. In strictly European affairs her wealth, the outcome of her sea power, made her play a conspicuous part during the same period. The system of subsidies, which began half a century before in the wars of Marlborough and received its most extensive development half a century later in the Napoleonic wars, maintained the efforts of her allies, which would have been crippled, if not paralysed, without them. Who can deny that the Government which with one hand strengthened its fainting allies on the Continent with the life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own enemies off the sea and out of their chief possessions, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Havana, Manilla, gave to its country the foremost *role* in European politics? and who can fail to see that the power which dwelt in that Government, with a land narrow in extent and poor in resources, sprang directly from the sea?"

This desperate struggle, long hanging in the suspense of doubtful issue, was decided at Trafalgar, for to Trafalgar Waterloo itself was but a sequel—a corollary.

We came out of the conflict bleeding at every pore; with one great fraction of the Empire wrenched from the parent stem; with a national debt such as had never weighed down a country before; with social and industrial dangers of the gravest kind. But it left Britain unquestioned mistress of the sea, and with the foundations of a new empire—the material for working out a new history—more wonderful than the old.

In this second map you may see where we stood in the early years of the nineteenth century.

Now, let me say that the vast growth of this period also—a period of dire struggle ending in victory and conquest—was once more inevitable

and therefore organic; it was in a contest for very existence that the empire was so widened by accessions of territory in India, America, and at minor points.

If these vast territories, however, had remained as simple conquests, if they had not become grafted into the very life of the nation, they might easily have come in time to be looked on as mere excrescences, and so to be got rid of as opportunity offered.

But what are the facts? The work of conquest had barely ceased when the process of complete assimilation began. A new era now opens upon us. A few years were required to collect our shattered forces, to steady political institutions, to get our new bearings in the world, and then it might be truly said of our national life that "old things have passed away and all things have become new." Our history for the last half-century may for our purpose to-night be summed up in a few words. It is a national life expanding, and ever more and more expanding, abroad; intensifying, and ever more and more intensifying, at home.

The growth of population, with the astonishing organisation of industry and application of manufacturing power within; the steady flux of population from our shores to form new centres of national strength abroad: these are the characteristics of our time which chiefly concern us.

You have before you the map of the Empire at this last decade of the nineteenth century. It presents an entirely new set of problems, problems which we must face resolutely and study with what accuracy we can.

Observe that the comparatively small province of Quebec, which we won by conquest, has now, under the impulse of settlement, expanded into the great Dominion; a country covering half a continent, and an area well-nigh equal to Europe.

The two or three penal settlements of Australia have spread out into the vast provinces which cover a whole continent—again nearly as large as Europe.

New Zealand is comparatively small, and yet even it is nearly as large as the United Kingdom.

From the Cape of Good Hope our purchase from the Dutch has spread, and is spreading, over the most habitable parts of Africa.

The complete spontaneity of this expansion no man who studies the facts can question. It has taken place in the very teeth of Government opposition. The rulers of this country, for instance, long hesitated about laying any claim to New Zealand, but were driven to it unwillingly at last; they had no thought of taking possession of the whole of Australia; they interposed to prevent Australia occupying the islands around them; their hands are even now being constantly forced in Africa by a restless energy which resistance seems only to stimulate.

No impulse from our rulers led to the opening up of the vast Canadian North-West; it was simply the push of Canadian energy, pioneering the way for English, Scottish, Irish, and other emigrants. Taking the countries I have mentioned as a whole, the expansion of the Empire has consisted in the rush of a national life, powerful beyond all precedent, along the geographical lines of least resistance. This spon-

taneous rush has not even been confined to the Empire, but has contributed quite as much to building up the United States as well. The force of which we are speaking, so wonderfully penetrating in influence abroad, has its genesis in the homes of this country. I venture to say that there is not a person in this audience who has not found or will not find it in operation by his own fireside. A lady beside whom I sat a few evenings ago at a London dinner-table told me that she had seven brothers abroad in the Colonies, and, she added, all doing well. Multiply such a fact as that by what each of you knows of the circumstances of the homes with which he is familiar, and you can judge for yourselves whether the expansion of the Empire is or is not a vital process. One statistical fact will bring vividly before your minds the vastness of its operation during the last hundred years. I have mentioned that at the opening of the last decade of the eighteenth century the population of Great Britain was 9,600,000, as compared with the 26,700,000 of France. At the opening of the last decade of the nineteenth century, the English-speaking peoples, excluding subject races and the Negroes of the United States, number 101,000,000, while the French people number less than 40,000,000.

But besides this expansion by colonisation of which I have spoken, another well-nigh as wonderful has taken place.

The needs of commerce first carried us to our great Eastern Empire; they have combined with other forces to keep us there. The few trading ports of the seventeenth century, the fringe of dominion won in the eighteenth, have steadily spread during the nineteenth, until our possessions reach the Himalayas, and push out west and east far beyond the Indus and the Irrawaddy. Here we have come, not to colonise, but to trade and rule.

This, you may say, is not normal and spontaneous growth; it is the mere aggregation of conquered provinces, such as built up the Roman Empire. A study of history soon modifies this judgment.

One thing at least we can say with certainty: that this great growth was not intentional. Ruler after ruler was sent out to India with the strictest orders to avoid the annexation of territory, and one after another seems to have gone with the sincere purpose of carrying out these instructions, only to find himself in the grasp of a destiny which he could not control.

When once we had expelled our only European rivals, the French, from India, when once our hold on the sea-coast became essential to our commercial position, we found ourselves coming under the operation of a law which seems to hold whenever highly civilised man comes in contact with the less civilised races—he ends by ruling them whether he will or no. At any rate, under the impulse of some force which statesmen and people alike could not control, we rule to-day 286,000,000 of people in India; and so closely have its commercial interests become bound up in our own, so vital is the link of industrial connection, that in addressing the London Chamber of Commerce five years ago Lord Dufferin could with truth affirm that “it would not be too much to say that if any serious disaster ever overtook our Indian Empire, or if our political

relations with the Peninsula of Hindostan were to be even partially disturbed, there is not a cottage in Great Britain, at all ovents in the manufacturing districts, which would not be made to feel the disastrous consequences of such an intolerable calamity."

The unity, then, even with our great dependencies, is vital. Every year brings out in more vivid relief some striking illustration of the close industrial dependence, based, you will observe, on geographical conditions—in other words, on geographical unity between different parts of the Empire. Let us take a few conspicuous examples.

Sixty or seventy years ago the woollen industry of this country, which had for centuries given employment to a considerable number of people, took a new start, through the application of machinery, and since that time its development has been prodigious. The manufacture of wool is not only the chief industry of the great Yorkshire towns, but is also found giving wide employment in the south of Scotland, in the Stroud valley, and in other parts of England. Altogether some millions of people depend upon it. Now, in this country, upon Scottish moors, Welsh mountains, and English pastures, wool is raised with much expense and difficulty. But at the very time when this woollen industry began to advance by leaps and bounds, we also began to occupy those milder climates to which our people have gone in New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa. In these countries the conditions for raising wool inexpensively are almost ideal. The mild climate, the wide extent of lands unsuited to anything but pasturage, the possibility of managing vast flocks with little labour, entirely changed the conditions of sheep-raising. The result is that the enormous demands made by the newly invented machinery and the growing industries of this workshop of the world have been met without difficulty.

Of the five countries from which woollen fibres are imported, four—New Zealand, Australia, India, and South Africa—are under the British flag; while the fifth, South America, has been chiefly exploited by British capital. But beyond all the natural advantages which these countries enjoy for raising wool, there remains the great fact that they border closely upon the sea; that nowhere do the wool-packs have to be carried any great distance by land before they come in contact with the great industrial uniter—the Ocean. Had these wool-growing areas been in the centre of Asia, or even in the centre of Europe, how different would have been the conditions of our woollen manufactures! To-day the cost of bringing a bale of wool from New Zealand or Australia to London, 11,000 or 12,000 miles, is little greater than it subsequently costs to carry it from London to Leeds, Bradford, or Galashiels, 200 or 300 miles.

Take cotton again, none of which can be grown on our own soil. Our greatest supply has come from the United States, that offshoot of our race which sprung from the first great period of national expansion. But it now comes in large volume from India and Egypt (from the latter far more freely since British influence has given security to capital and labour), and it could undoubtedly be produced abundantly in our Australasian and African possessions, so that exclusion from the American

supply, as in 1865, could never again produce such disastrous consequences.

The geographical fact that jute is best produced in a single district of India, where under British rule capital and labour are free to operate successfully, and whence safe transit in peace or war is secured by the flag, means not a little to the greatest industry of Dundee.

And so the argument might be carried through an immense range of industry.

My next illustration will be found in the question of food supply. This country imports every year twenty million quarters of wheat out of the twenty-eight million quarters which are required to feed its people. In the past these vast supplies have been drawn largely from the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the United States of America. But the population of the United States is increasing so rapidly that the best statisticians estimate that consumption will soon press closely upon the food-producing capacity of the country. The area of wheat production has shifted steadily westward from New York through Ohio, Illinois, and Kansas, and then northward to Wisconsin, Dakota, and Nebraska. Now the great North-West of Canada is admittedly the largest undeveloped wheat area of the world. There is also a vast extent of country suited for the rearing of cattle and for cattle products, such as cheese and butter. Now notice the geographical position of this enormous wheat and cattle area in North-Western Canada in relation to the consuming millions of this country. The greater part of them lie far beyond the centre of the continent. But here the uniting power of waterways again asserts itself. From the Straits of Belle Isle, where a steamship crossing the Atlantic first enters the inland water of Canada, to the head of Lake Superior is a distance of 2384 miles. For the greater part of this distance the gulf, rivers, and lakes present an almost unbroken system of navigation. Only seventy miles of canal were required to be constructed to make this system complete. This canal system is already finished for vessels drawing twelve feet of water. But with this the Canadian people are not satisfied. Just as Glasgow has spent an enormous sum in dredging the Clyde, and as Manchester has made such sacrifices to get into immediate touch with the ocean, so the Canadian people are resolved that their vast north-western granary and ranching country shall have the full advantage of the waterways with which nature has provided her so liberally. All the canals are being deepened, and a new lock is being constructed on the Canadian side of the Sault St. Marie, so that within two years a ship of 2000 tons can be loaded at the head of Lake Superior and make its way on British waters directly to London, Manchester, or Glasgow.

As with wheat, so with cattle. In a single year 400,000 live cattle are sometimes brought across the Atlantic. Of these 100,000 or more come from Canada, and the Canadian supply will from this time forward be the rapidly increasing factor in the trade, as every one knows who studies the American continent or watches the growth of the trade of English and Scottish ports. As with cattle, so with cattle products such as cheese and butter. Of the former, Canada last year sent this country no less than 113,000,000 pounds.

Look once more on the map, at the vast prairies and the land areas of Canada; let your eye follow along the line of the great lakes and the St. Lawrence to the sea, and you will see the most remarkable example of geographical unity in the world; conditions under which the greatest supply of human food can be produced at a minimum of expense, and then again transported at a minimum of expense along a vast waterway which leads directly to the greatest artisan and consuming population that the world has ever known. A late leader in the *Times* says:

"It is remarkable that mere mileage should tyrannise over the human imagination as it undoubtedly does, in days when science has done so much to annihilate space. A man can step out of Canada into the United States, while a broad ocean separates the Dominion from England. It is apparently almost impossible for many people to recognise the triviality of the circumstance. Neither country is concentrated on the frontier line. We have to deal with both as we deal with masses in physics—*i.e.* we have to reckon from their centres of gravity. The Canadian centre of gravity might be much nearer to that of England than to that of the United States, even if the nature of the attraction in both cases were the same. The sea unites far more than it divides, and the sea runs into the heart of the Dominion. If we measure by the scale of commercial dynamics, Liverpool is nearer to the St. Lawrence than to the Thames." And again:—"Freight, not mileage, is the true mercantile measure of distance, and it will soon not be always easy to say whether Toronto lies nearest to Manchester or to New York or Chicago."

To take a still more distant point, the same illustration may, in the matter of food supply, be extended to New Zealand, whence we last year got upwards of 1,500,000 frozen carcases of sheep, which, so far as cost of production and carriage is concerned, ought to be supplied to the consumer here at a little more than half the price of the home-grown mutton. Anything beyond this goes to the middlemen.

Turning now to another article of common consumption—once considered a luxury of the rich, but now become the luxury of cottage and palace alike—tea, we find some facts of a very surprising character.

In 1883 the United Kingdom imported from China 156,000,000 lbs. of tea; from British India 59,000,000 lbs., and from Ceylon only 2,005,000 lbs.

In 1892, only nine years later, China sent us but 57,050,708 lbs., while the supply from British India had risen to 111,711,261 lbs., and from Ceylon to 66,041,630 lbs.

That is, whereas in 1883 China supplied about 72 per cent. of our tea, and countries under the flag 28 per cent., in 1892 our dependencies supplied 76 per cent., and China only 24 per cent.

The proportions have still further changed within the last two years, but the precise figures are not at the moment available. It is to be observed, also, that the immensely increased consumption of this poor man's luxury has been due to a lowering of price traceable chiefly to the ease and security with which British capital and British industrial skill have been applied to production under the flag in India and Ceylon.



The reverse side of this illustration is equally striking. Of all Ceylon's exports of tea in 1893—amounting to 84,387,656 lbs.—more than 83,000,000 lbs. went to the United Kingdom, Australia, and other countries within the empire, and only about 1,000,000 lbs. to foreign countries.

The geographical fact that populations which consume tea and others which produce tea are under the same flag, manifestly produces a unity of commercial and industrial interest such as few people imagine.

If we follow this thought to its conclusion and study the facts with care, we shall find that nothing more astonishing has occurred in our industrial position than the degree to which the areas of production of raw material and food have shifted under the flag during the last few years, and the increasing tendency shown to still further do so. The geographical unity of the Empire is, in short, asserting itself in the most practical form. But before we can grasp the situation fully, we must turn from the extraordinary picture of expansion which we have studied to the equally wonderful process of contraction which has gone on during the last half-century. First, the world has, for most practical purposes, been recreated, and on a smaller scale, by the applications of steam.

The man is still alive in Canada who was stoker on the first engine George Stephenson built to run between Stockton and Darlington.

Since then—that is, well within a man's lifetime—£800,000,000 have been spent in the United Kingdom alone on railways: in all countries the amount is estimated at between 5000 and 6000 millions, or one quarter of all the invested capital of the world. All this has been spent to give contiguity to places once remote from each other. But railways are not all. If the ocean was a uniter before, how much more has it become so since steam has been applied to navigation! In measure of time weeks of separation have been changed into days. The facts that three-fourths of the world's commerce is carried on in steamships, and that the whole of the power used by all the nations of the world for the defence of commerce depends upon the use of coal, have become to British people primary facts which touch upon their very existence. The security of the seas has become a necessity, and the security of the seas depends upon the geographical distribution, or rather the geographical continuity, of coaling-stations and coal-supplies all around the world. It is a question of coal endurance.

We have lately had stated in precise terms, by one of the highest living authorities on the subject, what the conditions of coal endurance are for our ships of war. Speaking before the Royal Institution on March 9th last, Mr. W. H. White, the Director of Naval Construction and Assistant-Controller of the Navy, stated that a first-class battle-ship built in 1861 carried 750 tons of coal, and, with the engines then in use, could keep the sea for six days, steaming at the rate of ten knots an hour. The limits of such a ship's endurance at sea would therefore be only 1440 knots. Pointing out how great an advance had been made in this respect since 1861, he added that a first-class battle-ship of the new Naval Defence Fleet could leave port with nearly twice as much coal on board, and, partly on account of improved engines, could steam



continuously at ten knots an hour for twenty or twenty-one days without exhausting her coal. That is to say, the limits of a battle-ship's coal endurance at sea still remain under 5000 miles at the very best. Observe that this is not sufficient to enable her to cross the Atlantic and return without renewing her supplies of coal; not enough to carry her from St. Helena to Australia; barely sufficient to carry her from St. Helena to Mauritius. For a nation whose very existence depends upon keeping open the pathways of the sea, what volumes of meaning are conveyed in the statement of a single fact like this! But you will easily understand that ten knots an hour, which gives this minimum of coal consumption, and the maximum of steaming distance, is not likely to be an ordinary steaming speed for either commerce preservers or commerce destroyers. The additional facts which Mr. White gave in connection with this further aspect of the question are very striking. A first-class battle-ship, for instance, is driven ten knots an hour by 2000 horse-power. At fourteen knots, 5500 is necessary; at eighteen knots, 13,500 horse-power. These more rapid rates, therefore, mean a greatly increased consumption of fuel, and therefore a lessening of coal endurance.

Keeping these conditions thus accurately stated in mind, look at the distribution of our national coaling-stations along the great trade routes: Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Bombay, Trincomalee, Singapore, Hongkong; Sierra Leone, Ascension, St. Helena, Cape Town, Mauritius; the Australian and New Zealand ports; Halifax, Quebec, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Kingston; the Falkland Islands and Esquimalt. After that consider the deposits of coal on the east and west coasts of Canada, in South Africa, in India, and Australasia, and you will find that for a nation whose commerce is all round the world, little more could be done to make geographical unity complete; little more to give the fullest effect to the contraction of distance which is effected by steam.

But this is not the only contraction. That the whole world has become in our generation one great whispering gallery we all know. The same idea is expressed by a different but sufficiently exact metaphor when we say that a new nervous system has been given to the world. The land telegraph and submarine cable have changed the whole conditions of national life; above all, they have revolutionised the meaning of the terms geographical unity and geographical dispersion. Especially is this true of the British Empire. The circumstances of our national existence have brought it about that we have been compelled to take the chief part in creating this new nervous system for the world, from which, moreover, no other nation, nor indeed all nations put together, derive a tithe of the practical advantage that we do. Out of the 152,936 miles of submarine cable in existence, above 102,656 miles have been made in British workshops, laid by British vessels, and now pay their dividends to British shareholders. The amount of British capital invested in British lines is stated to be £26,530,589, as at present standing, and not including such debentures as have been redeemed. This also excludes the cost of the lines under Government administration. But this is the merest fraction of what they mean to us. The transactions of finance and commerce, the regulation of demand and supply, the

direction of our commercial fleets and of the armed navy which defends them, all now depend in great measure upon the far-reaching influence of electric force. More important still is the unity of thought thus gained. It is no flight of imagination, but a simple fact, to say that by the agency of the telegraph, backed up by the diffusive power of the press, in a few short hours the heart of our nation through all its world-wide extent may be made to beat with one emotion—from Montreal to Melbourne, from London to the Zambesi, from the Ganges to the Saskatchewan.

Think of the single fact that more than £1000 per day is spent in telegraphic communication between the United Kingdom and Australasia alone, and in that fact we have some measure of the value put by our people upon this new link of unity which has been added in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

But this nervous system is not as complete as the geography of the Empire makes possible; one may say that it has defects which might prove fatal if not remedied in time, and at this present moment are fraught with no small dangers. The greatest gap consists in the lack of connection between Canada and Australia. Reflect upon what this means. There is, perhaps, no responsibility which statesmen feel more deeply than that connected with the maintenance of our position in India and the East. The financial and commercial interests which we have at stake there are simply enormous, and practically reach every home in this country. For purposes of trade, as well as for defence, both military and naval, instant communication with the East has become almost a necessity. But it would be almost certainly broken at once in the event of our being engaged in a great European war. There are at present many routes of telegraph by which we can reach India and Australia: across the Continent by way of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, around Africa, and even across Siberia. But all these lines either pass through possibly hostile countries, or through shallow seas where they could easily be fished up or destroyed in time of war. A cable across the Pacific would be free from both these fundamental objections. That this cable should be laid has become a matter of imperial necessity. The Home Government has been asked to give it financial support. But even if no such aid is given, it now seems probable that the work will be carried out by the united efforts of Canada and Australia. A conference to deal with this and other questions of inter-colonial connection is to meet in Canada during the present season, and I think there can be little doubt about the result of its deliberations. The meeting of such a conference will furnish another striking illustration of the organic unity of the Empire.

The second important flaw to which I have referred in the cable communication of the Empire is in the lack of direct communication with the West Indies. At present our important colonies and naval stations there can only be reached by wires passing through the United States, and in some cases touching at islands belonging to foreign Powers. This missing link in our cable system could be supplied with comparatively little trouble and expense. Two years ago a line was laid from Halifax to

Bermuda, connecting those two important naval stations. The extension of this line for a few hundred miles would give us an independent means of communication with our West Indian possessions. The question of granting the line a moderate subsidy is now under consideration of the Imperial Government, and it is to be hoped that its construction will not be long delayed.

This new set of nerves will undoubtedly change the whole conditions under which the naval wars of the future will be carried on, quite as much as the change from wooden and wind-driven ships to those built of iron and impelled by steam. Once more we may say that, as with steam, this change has resulted in a reconstruction of the world, a reconstruction which creates a practical unity out of what was before separation.

One point is worthy of special illustration as showing what unity and concentration of action in defending commerce a widespread empire gives.

For our immense trade in Eastern and Southern waters we have a choice of route inward and outward; by the Cape of Good Hope; by Cape Horn; for passengers, troops, sailors, and even the less bulky kinds of expensive freight by the Pacific and trans-Canadian route. For our present purpose, it will be better to leave out of consideration the Suez Canal route.

Now, when our Pacific cable line of telegraph is completed, this variety of route gives us a wonderful means of attaining security for our trade. The method may be explained as follows:—Those responsible for the defence of the Empire fix long beforehand certain routes, to be known respectively as, say, the A, B, C, D routes. These may not only vary in passing around the different points I have mentioned, but also by a variation of the latitude and longitude of sailing a hundred miles more or less north or south, east or west, as the case may be. These routes, planned in secret but communicated in sealed orders to the authorities of the great outlying parts of the Empire, are thought out carefully beforehand. Then, on the outbreak of war, the whole machinery of our vast commerce may be directed over different routes, known to ourselves but unknown to the enemy, with perfect ease. One week, for instance, every ship which leaves Australia or New Zealand would be ordered to go by a special Cape Horn route; another week the B or C route might be selected according to the exigencies of the naval protecting force. Thus our own naval authorities would know precisely at what point and at what time to expect every ship of commerce which required convoy, while an enemy would be left to find out these facts as best he could, under circumstances of the utmost difficulty. Such a system would certainly mitigate greatly the terrors and dangers of the much talked-of commerce destroyer. It seems to me clear that in this way any serious risk to British commerce could be avoided until our ships had reached those narrow seas nearer our shores where the full protecting force of the navy could be put forth for their defence.

Nothing proves the reality of unity in any body more than the vigour of the living circulation which goes on throughout its various parts. And what a wonderful flow of circulating human life there is constantly

passing between the centre and circumference of the Empire in spite of distance. Witness the lines of huge steamships crowded with passengers which are every day finding their way to or from Canada, or the Cape, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Witness the fact that scarcely a family in these islands has not one and often several members in the remotest parts of the Empire. Witness the large contingent of colonial and Indian students always attending our medical and other colleges, some remaining to practise in this country, more going back to carry with them what we have to give of professional skill and literary culture. Think over, again, the list of your acquaintances, and remark what numbers are people who have spent years abroad in Colonial or Indian work. Notice the increase which takes place year by year in the space given by your daily papers to the doings of British people abroad—space not so many years since almost exclusively devoted to the affairs of foreigners. Go to Sydney or Toronto, and you find much of the same world-news served up to you morning by morning that you get in Edinburgh or London; only in Toronto the difference of time makes it a little more up to date, while in Australia time is slightly in your favour.

You meet a friend in London; as he shakes hands with you in farewell, he hails a cab to catch a P. and O. boat for Singapore, or an Allan Liner for Vancouver. You see a familiar face, and you remember that you last saw it a few weeks ago in Montreal or Melbourne. These are not exaggerations, but the ordinary facts of daily life to men of business and travel—in these days a very numerous class. In the autumn of 1888 I was speaking at a large meeting in your Edinburgh Music Hall. About six months later, I found myself, quite casually, sitting at dinner in Melbourne with four people who had been at the same meeting, while our hostess mentioned that a fifth who had called during the afternoon had also referred to being there.

It is very curious and suggestive to watch the play of some of the forces which promote the circulation of our race throughout all parts of the Empire. Britain itself is cramped in size; it has a climate good for rearing men, but not favourable to the easy enjoyment of life; it is the centre of an advanced and, therefore, conventional civilisation. Men go abroad to get elbow-room; to find a sunny and exhilarating climate; to escape the shackles of conventionality. All this they can do on the open veldt of South Africa; in the lonely bush of Australia; on the wide prairies of Canada; or listening to the "long wash of Australasian seas" upon the lonely coasts of New Zealand. That the change is a healthy one no man can doubt; it gives free play to that Berserker energy of our Norse blood which still clings to us; it is what unlimited oxygen is to lungs long shut up in crowded rooms. But the impulse to movement is not from the centre outward alone. Sated with freedom, space, movement, action, the man who has gone abroad longs to keep in touch, at least, with the old home, and the good things which, more than any other land, it contains. He comes back as opportunity permits; he brings or sends back his children to come under the influence of art, taste, culture, refinement, historic surroundings; appreciation of all these things is quickened by long abstinence; a new value is put upon them from the

comparative roughness of colonial life. Thus you have the steady pulsation of a healthy life; a reciprocal action good for both.

This movement—movement made more easy and natural by its common citizenship—will one day be recognised as being for our national life what the great currents are for the ocean, a preservative from stagnation: on the one hand, a safeguard against that enervation of wealth, luxury, power, and over-civilisation which has overthrown the greatest nations of the past; on the other, an influence, stimulating and refining, for rough energy. Thus the geographical diversity of the Empire makes for a higher unity and harmony of national development.

The material greatness of Britain has been built up on the trading instincts and trading habits of the British people. They are the basis on which other elements of greatness rest, or have furnished the best means for their development. It is very curious to observe how true this general statement is when we study the question in detail. We have had the fighting energy, almost equal to that of the Romans, of a great military race. Yet our military tendencies have been almost entirely employed for the preservation of our commercial position. We are a naval people, and have attained great naval skill and wide supremacy; but all this has been won by seeking pathways for our trade across the seas, or in the defence of that commerce. It has enabled us to reap the fullest advantage from our enormous national resources in coal, iron, temperate climate, maritime position, and physical vigour. The vast accumulations of wealth in this country which have come from trade do not go along to the trader and manufacturer. The wealth of the aristocratic classes who own land is largely due to the increment of land values arising from the growth of the artisan and commercial population, and from the keen competition for the possession of land among men who have made their fortunes in trade and manufacture.

The prosperity and comfort of the professional classes—lawyers, doctors, etc.—depends upon the opportunities offered by an exceptionally rich community, made so by trade.

The leisure of our learned classes at the great universities, which gives to the nation a keen intellectual life, depends directly or indirectly upon trade and the industries which develop trade.

So we shall find, if we follow up the subject, the influence and benefit of trade extending through all the ramifications of our national life. But that trade depends on the fact of our being and continuing an ocean empire—an empire which is made by the sea a geographical unit.

Once more, without any touch of national vanity, we may truly say that our British people stand to-day in what one of our great poets has called the "foremost files of time." We are facing, as no other nation has faced before, the most difficult social and political problems: how to work out the highest good for the highest number; how to give the greatest measure of liberty to the individual while retaining the greatest security for the community.

Consider the remarkable circumstances under which we are doing this. Instead of working from one example and under one set of conditions, we are working under a hundred. We are trying every system

of government, from the freedom of democracy to methods which can only be described as paternal despotism, and in each case with equal desire to secure the good of the governed. We are testing social systems in forms various beyond any previous experience.

In these points the Empire, in its wide extent, seems only commensurate with the greatness of our mission and our destiny. Complexity is the mark of a higher form of organism; of an organism fitted for the performance of exceptional functions. This is a great law of nature, well known to apply to the material world, vegetable, mineral, and animal. But nothing is more certain than that it applies to the life of nations as well. I know of no more interesting and fascinating study than that which deals with the geography of countries and continents in its relation to the growth of nations and the progress of civilisation. In the earlier stages of existence man spread out over the wide, monotonous plains of Mesopotamia, of Egypt, of Central and Southern Asia, where the conditions of life were easy but curiously equal. There immense communities arose; magnificent and imposing, but half-developed, civilisations were produced. The empires have passed away; the civilisations have, in many cases, remained, but have continued for centuries without change—struck, as it were, into apathy by the wide monotony, the want of variety in the surroundings and internal conditions under which they arose. These great inland plains could not develop man's higher powers. He moves westward; he comes in contact with the sea, with islands, peninsulas, countries of varied scenery and conditions, which stimulate his activities and open new vistas to his thought. There, around the borders of the great inland sea, we see springing up the wonderful civilisations of the ancient world; those of Palestine, of Phœnicia, of Asia Minor, of Greece, of Rome, of Carthage.

Here was an amazing advance. Under the influence of contrast, variety, manifold geographical conditions, and a sea furnishing an easy pathway for commerce and for the interchange of ideas, the human mind made a marvellous forward spring. Language, literature, art, philosophy, the science of government, all reached with a bound levels undreamed of before, and in some instances scarcely retained since. Even religion broke free from the shackles of slavish Eastern fear; it became etherealised and intellectual, if not moral. But Palestine, and Greece, and Rome, with all their astonishing achievements, were drawn into the meshes of the monotonous, apathetic, sensual, half-civilised East. The Jew, hanging up his harp upon the willows by the waters of Babylon; Alexander, the Greek, unnerved and overthrown amid the magnificent revels of the same great Eastern capital; Antony, the Roman, yielding to the seductions of Cleopatra and her Oriental luxury, are but types—types of a higher civilisation yielding to a lower from want of moral backbone. The ancient West, with all its noble gains, surrenders to the more ancient East.

Once more geography, with its subtle and mighty influence upon life, comes to the rescue of mankind. Down upon that demoralised Western civilisation sweep the German, the Goth, the Vandal, the Scythian, nurtured among the gloomy forests, the mountain ranges, the vast wind-

swept plains of Northern Europe and Asia, amidst those hard conditions which give physical and mental and moral fibre.

The civilisation of the world, the garnered wisdom of ages, seems to be swept into a hopeless abyss; it is only that it may have a new and nobler birth. On the fierce Northern energy has now been engrafted the moral strength of Christianity; the capacity to win back and make use of the culture of Greece, the governing power of Rome. Then comes the Renaissance of national life on small, concentrated spheres of action—Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Germany, Belgium, Britain. But while the geographical area of each European nation is circumscribed, the horizon of activity and effort expands. New worlds are discovered; new routes are found; instead of the inland sea, the mightiest oceans become the field of man's highest activities. Who is to take the lead in this new process of new World Growth? Who is to realise the idea of an Ocean Empire united in spite of distance? Long the decision hung in the balance; now it seems clear (and let us say it with all humility and sense of responsibility) that the Briton with his Teutonic basis of strength must take the leading place in this great sphere of world-activity. Two of the new continents, America and Australia, have fallen almost exclusively to our race. A third, Africa, seems, in its most habitable parts, well within our grasp by the compulsion of circumstances and almost without our conscious effort. Once more, again, as representing the civilisation of the West, we go back to the East: to Egypt, to India, to China. We go armed not merely with the intellectual gains of the Greek, the fighting and governing energy of the Roman, but with the moral energy of the Christian. We go again as masters; surely it is not again to become slaves.


Not if we know the greatness of our destiny and accept it. Not if we recognise that under this strange diversity and complexity of our national life there is the material for a wonderful unity of effort and organisation; that we have a marvellous opportunity to make our moral and political impact upon the world greater even than in the past, and greater for the highest and noblest aims.

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

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## AL SKETCH-MAP ON "THE GEOGRAPHICAL







# HISTORICAL SKETCH-MAPS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

KIN'S ADDRESS ON "THE GEOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE."

