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WORKING PAPER 19

RESOLUTIONS ON  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
CANADA'S RECORD AT THE UN

by Bernard F. Grebenc

November 1989



PREFACE

Working Papers, the result of research work in progress or the summary of a conference, are often intended for later publication by the Institute or another organization, and are deposited with the Library of Parliament for distribution in limited quantities to interested specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are not intended to be published in their original form, but in published form as abstracts.

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Bernard F. Grebenc holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Halifax. From January 1986 to December 1987 he was a research assistant at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa. This paper is based on research carried out by the author while at the Centre.

Recently Mr. Grebenc completed a study on maritime affairs for the Ottawa branch of the Naval Officers Association.

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## PREFACE

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The opinions contained in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 43rd session of the General Assembly of the United Nations opened in autumn 1988. Resolutions concerning different aspects of arms control and disarmament were on the agenda. Outside of UN and government forums, these resolutions are rarely followed on a year by year basis. This paper compares the resolutions of the 43rd session with those of the 42nd session in 1987. Such work carried on from year to year would offer many advantages.

First, any interested researcher could compare the wording of the different resolutions considered by the General Assembly from one year to the next, and discover the trends in the way members vote, particularly Canada. Second, this comparison would shed light on Canadian policy towards arms control and disarmament, and would illustrate how this policy has been expressed in detail. Finally, it would establish an analytical framework to gauge the effects of changes in governments, stresses on East-West tensions, and shifts in North-South relations.



CONDENSÉ

La 43<sup>e</sup> session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies s'est ouverte cet automne. A l'ordre du jour figurent des résolutions sur divers aspects du désarmement et de la limitation des armements. En dehors de l'ONU et des tribunes gouvernementales, il est rare que l'on suive chaque année ce qu'il advient de ces résolutions. Le présent document compare les résolutions adoptées au cours de la 43<sup>e</sup> session à celles l'ayant été pendant la 42<sup>e</sup> session en 1987. L'exécution d'un tel travail d'une année à l'autre présenterait de nombreux avantages.

Tout d'abord, à mesure que le fonds des connaissances de ce genre s'accroît, les intéressés peuvent comparer la teneur de diverses résolutions étudiées par l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU d'une année à l'autre, et déceler les tendances se manifestant dans les façons de voter, particulièrement dans celle du Canada. En second lieu, cet exercice fait la lumière sur la politique du Canada en matière de désarmement et de limitation des armements, et il montre comment cette politique s'est exprimée dans la façon dont notre pays a voté sur lesdites résolutions. Enfin, il établit une base pour l'exécution d'analyses dans l'avenir, analyses qui pourront prendre en compte des facteurs comme les changements de gouvernement et la nature des relations Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud lorsqu'il s'agira d'examiner des questions qui, à l'ONU, se rapportent à la limitation des armements et au désarmement. Pareils travaux seraient utiles dans ce contexte, certes, mais ils permettraient aussi de mieux comprendre l'ensemble des relations internationales et le rôle que l'ONU joue dans la société mondiale, et d'évaluer la manière dont les gouvernements envisagent la sécurité tant sur le plan national qu'international.



## INTRODUCTION

Outside the United Nations (UN) and state governments, the yearly tracking of the contents of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) arms control and disarmament (ACD) resolutions is not common. What is published in Canada is limited in scope. The Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, for example, publishes a table in December each year showing skeletal information about these resolutions. The Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs annually publishes a slightly more detailed table in its Winter/Spring edition of Disarmament Bulletin. However, neither publication includes a review of the contents of any of the resolutions other than that which the Arms Control and Disarmament Division incorporates on a few that are introduced by Canada as lead sponsor.

In the past this void was filled by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. However, the Centre has not published anything on this subject since 1986. This study continues from where the Centre left off and reviews the past two sessions of the UNGA's consideration of ACD resolutions. It also includes an accounting of the final voting record of Canada for the past few years and makes observations, based on the data compiled, about Canada's position on the UNGA ACD resolution voting process. In addition, general comments are made about this process based on the record of consensus that has been achieved since the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

The value of tracking the contents of UNGA ACD resolutions on a yearly basis may be measured according to a variety of criteria. First, as the body of such data is compiled over time, interested individuals are afforded the opportunity to compare the contents of various resolutions from year to year. Second, such information, in combination with voting results, may shed light on Canada's ACD policy as it is acted upon and expressed both domestically and internationally. It also lays the foundation for future analyses wherein such factors as changing administrations and the nature of East-West and North-South relations may be incorporated. Furthermore, publications such as this help to contribute to our understanding of the nature of international relations and the role of the UN in international society. Lastly, they may also shed light on the perceptions entertained by various governments about their views on international and national security, and how stability in global and regional relations can be fostered.

This paper is broken into two parts. Part One focuses on the contents and voting record of Canada on the resolutions considered by the UNGA during its past two sessions (the 42nd and 43rd sessions). In this section, attention is given to what Canada's representatives have said about Canada's interests and policy on ACD matters generally. In addition, the contents of various resolutions that have specific reference to Canada's interests in the ACD field will be summarized and compared.

Part Two, on the other hand, will focus on a comparison between Canada's voting record and a number of selected countries over the past ten years, plus a more general overview of the UNGA's consideration of ACD resolutions over the same period. Included in this section will be a detailed comparison of the voting records of Canada and those selected countries for the past two sessions. This particular addition builds upon the record compiled by the author in a previous publication overviewing the results of the 41st session of UNGA. [See: "A Survey of Arms Control Resolutions at the United Nations 41st General Assembly (1986)," Arms Control Communique, no. 39, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa, 2 July 1987.]

The primary sources for the information incorporated into this study are listed at the end of this paper. However, the author would like to express his appreciation to Melina Buckley for her contribution to this work which included helping to compile the data for the years between 1978 and 1984, and to Michael Bloom who painstakingly inputted this paper into computer format. The author would also like to thank those within offices of the Ambassador for Disarmament, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, for assisting the author through the provision of material. Lastly, the author would like to express his appreciation to Joan Broughton of the United Nations Association in Canada who made available the UN documents containing the resolutions considered by the UNGA during the past two sessions.

The author would also like to note that the conclusions and observations made in this study are entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of either the Department of External Affairs or the UNA in Canada.

## PART ONE

### I General Observations

In some quarters, the UN has been criticized as an organization which is overly bureaucratic, too political, and ineffectual. Such criticisms are, perhaps, unfair and without justification in the broadest sense. There can be no doubt that the operation of the UN can be improved, but to base the value of the UN on how it operates is not to recognize its function in international society.

The UN plays both an active and passive role in intersocietal relations. In its active role, the UN has helped to limit or resolve conflicts between states. It provides safe refuge for those fleeing from all kinds of intolerance and injustice, assists in alleviating global hunger and disease, and continually works to raise the standard of education throughout the world. In these areas, the UN provides valued and needed services on behalf of the international community in the realm of relieving human suffering. The work of those agencies which act on the UN's behalf to facilitate these services, can be more easily measured than can the service which the UN provides in its passive role. Yet, the value of this role in international society is largely dependent on the willingness of state governments to cooperate with it, for the UN is a creature of their making.

In the UN's passive role, it serves the international community as a forum through which the community's state actors can deliberate on matters of international import; issues such as international peace and security, the arms race, or the norms, principles and/or rules that states employ in regulating their behaviour. In this regard, the UN functions as a tool for facilitating cooperation among state actors, promoting greater stability and understanding.

Toward these ends, the UN has achieved some success. For example, it provided a forum and organizational structure for the negotiation of a new set of regulations, which have helped to better order and stabilize international oceanic relations. In other areas, such as in the ACD field, the UN provides a variety of forums through which the international community can deliberate on questions associated with controlling the arms

race. Here again, the success or failure of these deliberations does not reflect on the value of the UN in international society, for outcomes are ultimately dependent on the willingness and creativity of those who engage in these efforts. Nonetheless, the fact that the UN provides these forums for deliberation is valuable in itself, for in a society that is decentralized, the UN serves as an alternative vehicle through which potential conflict among states can be avoided by pursuing diplomacy rather than by resorting to violence.

In the fall of every year, the members of the UNGA vote on a wide range of ACD and international security resolutions. These resolutions are filtered through the UN's First Committee. The scholarly significance of these resolutions lies in what they reveal about the diverse views entertained internationally on the subjects of ACD and international security. Furthermore, how states vote on the various resolutions provides insights into how each country interprets the intent and meaning of each resolution, and what may be the fundamental principles that underpin each country's ACD policy. Thus, by reviewing the voting record, interested observers can appraise how various governments choose to act and express themselves in this area.

In the past two UN sessions, the First Committee deliberated on more than 80 international security and ACD-related resolutions. In 1987, at the 42nd session of the UNGA, 66 ACD resolutions were forwarded to the General Assembly for consideration, 3 less than in 1986. The First Committee had previously decided to decrease the number of resolutions that were forwarded to the UNGA annually. However, at the 43rd session of the UNGA in 1988, 72 ACD resolutions were voted on by the General Assembly -- the most the UNGA has considered over the past ten years. Previous to 1988, the high was 71, reached in 1985 at UNGA 40.

There has also been a conscious effort on the part of First Committee members to overcome the ideological differences which plagued the Committee's work during the first half of this decade. Statistics reveal the degree to which consensus was reached on resolutions. In 1987, 39.5 % of the 66 resolutions were adopted without a vote (AWV), as compared to 30.4 % in 1986. In 1988, consensus was reached on a total of 28 resolutions, representing 38.9 % of the 72 considered by the UNGA. While there was a decrease in the percentage of consensus achieved between 1987 and 1988, the difference, though small, is interesting from the perspective of what it may imply about the nature of

international security relations. (For further comment on the relevance of consensus voting within the UNGA on this matter, see Part Two, section II, A.)

For its part, Canada has long played an active role in the work of the First Committee. It was one of the countries that forcefully pushed for a reduction in the ideological tone of the resolutions that various governments presented to the First Committee. Canada has also been active in attempting to streamline the work of the First Committee so as to allow a more thorough review of the various resolutions it receives from the UN membership. Indeed, Canada co-sponsored a resolution to this effect in 1987: resolution 42/42N, entitled "Rationalization of the work of the First Committee," introduced by Cameroon. In 1988, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament chaired the First Committee's deliberations and thus directed the adoption of the recommendations included in resolution 42/42N during the 1988 session. Generally, Canada's stewardship of the First Committee's work in 1988 was well received and successful.

## II Canada at UNGA 42 and UNGA 43

### A) Canada's Presentations to the First Committee

Every year during the fall session of the UN, a Canadian representative outlines Canada's interests, concerns and priorities in the ACD field. This presentation is usually given to the First Committee by Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament as was the case when Ambassador Douglas Roche addressed the Committee on 13 October 1987. However, since Ambassador Roche chaired the 1988 session of the First Committee, the 18 October presentation was given by Canada's UN Ambassador, L. Yves Fortier. The fact that Ambassador Fortier addressed the Committee and not another official from External Affairs, signals the emphasis which Canada places on the role of the UN in the process of achieving global peace and security.

While the 1987 and 1988 presentations were generally similar, there were circumstantial and substantive differences which set the two apart. The circumstantial differences resulted from the changes in global relations that occurred between the two sessions of the UN. The 1987 address was ripe with a sense of optimism, coming as it did just in advance of the pending US-USSR Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)

agreement, and just on the heels of the successful UN-sponsored International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. Ambassador Roche quoted from the consensus document which embraced a broad approach to international security, emphasizing "not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects." The Conference was, said Ambassador Roche, of "landmark importance" because it acknowledged that "peace is a multi-agenda process involving economic and social development as well as arms control measures, the protection of human rights...[and] an end to racial discrimination." The thrust of the 1987 presentation was that the world was moving ever closer to overcoming the ideological dilemmas that had previously inhibited the successful conclusion of new multilateral ACD agreements.

However, in 1988, Ambassador Fortier noted that while progress was being made in superpower nuclear arms talks and, correspondingly, that the general tenor of East-West relations continued to grow warmer, there were other problems in the ACD field that had undercut the optimism of the previous year. Ambassador Fortier noted, in particular, the spring 1988 Third United Nations Special Session On Disarmament (UNSSOD III). Its failure to achieve consensus on a concluding document, along with the lack of progress in other broad-based multilateral ACD negotiations, as well as the "proliferation of resolutions and a general dispersion of effort" within the First Committee, were examples of the kinds of factors which were contributing to this phenomenon. In essence, Ambassador Fortier registered Canada's concern over the possibility of a return to excessive ideological rhetoric in 1988. Consequently, he attempted to inject into the UN's deliberations a recognition of the fragile nature of the ACD process. He counselled "patience, persistence and realism" on the part of all states and the avoidance of an approach that looked for "quick fixes."

Both presentations underscored Canada's view that the central ingredient for the successful conclusion of new ACD agreements in the modern era was the advancement of a stable and secure superpower relationship, particularly as it related to nuclear weapons developments. In this regard, both Ambassadors indicated Canada's strong endorsement of the direction which the two superpowers had taken in the ACD field over the past few years, and the trend that appeared to be developing in East-West European military alliance relations in the area of promoting confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), as well as a conventional arms balance. Yet, though both presentations shared

this central premise about the nature of the ACD process, there were substantive differences between the two.

In 1987, Ambassador Roche identified compliance with existing ACD agreements and "maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime" as principal concerns. Canada's specific areas of interests were those resolutions relating to verification, chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), and Canada's own "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" (FIZZ).

In contrast, Ambassador Fortier focused on the contribution the UN could make to the ACD process, especially that which the First Committee could make through its consideration of ACD resolutions. As in 1987, Canada was most interested in those resolutions that dealt with verification, chemical weapons, and a CTBT. However, Ambassador Fortier also made special reference to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; this had been omitted in 1987. Furthermore, he added that Canada was "eager to engage with other delegations in constructive and dispassionate dialogue on how best to bring the conventional arms race, in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, under more effective control."

It would be inappropriate to draw from the above that Canada was uninterested in these latter issues at the 1987 session of the UNGA. Reference has been made to them in previous presentations to the First Committee. Rather, the conclusion one ought to make is that in the prevailing circumstances of 1988, Canada felt it necessary to call international attention to them once again in the hope that efforts in these areas would not be allowed to slip in the wake of greater attention being given to more high profile issues.

Ambassador Fortier's address also signalled Canada's intention to be active in the First Committee's 1988 deliberations in an effort to limit ideological rhetoric by cautioning patience, persistence, realism, and compromise. In this regard, Canada reinforced its traditional role in global affairs: quiet middle-power diplomacy. While Canada's policy on ACD issues would be creative within the confines of this traditional approach, it was highly unlikely that Canada would boldly step outside the bounds of this tradition. This approach suggested that, in the main, the superpowers would set the principal terms of reference in the ACD field upon which the rest of the world could then build.

This latter observation, however, ought not to be interpreted as implying that Canada would concur without question with one or the other of the two superpowers. Rather, it implies that Canada recognizes that on many ACD issues, particularly nuclear weapons issues, the major players are the superpowers; all countries should bear this fact in mind when forwarding resolutions for consideration by the First Committee and the UNGA. It is this perception that has underpinned Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament for many years.

B) UNGA 42 and 43 ACD Resolutions That Correlated with Canada's ACD Policy Interests as Expressed in the First Committees' Deliberations

This section shall review the contents of the various ACD resolutions that correlated with Canada's stated interests in this field during both the UNGA 1987 and 1988 sessions. However, it is of interest to note that of the 66 ACD resolutions considered at UNGA 42, Canada voted in favour of 16, voted against 8, and abstained from 16 others. As cited earlier, 26 resolutions were adopted without a vote. Canada also co-sponsored 14 of these 66 resolutions. (See: Appendix I for UNGA 42 voting results.) This record compares with the 1988 UNGA results as follows: Canada voted in favour of 23 out of the 72 resolutions considered, voted against 5, abstained on 16, and co-sponsored a total of 17 resolutions. In 1988, 28 resolutions were adopted without a vote (AWV). (See Appendix II for UNGA 43 results.)

The 1987 and 1988 sessions of the General Assembly shared a number of ACD resolutions in common. A total of 55 resolutions dealt with at UNGA 42 were again forwarded to the UNGA 43 for consideration. Of these 55 resolutions held in common, a total of 20 were AWV in both sessions. For its part, Canada changed its vote on 6 of the 55 resolutions which the two sessions shared in common. However, two changes had more to do with the different AWV status of two resolutions than with a change of heart on the part of Canada. Table 1 below lists those resolutions on which Canada registered a different vote in 1988 from that recorded in 1987.

**TABLE 1**  
**CHANGES IN CANADA'S VOTING ON UNGA ACD RESOLUTIONS (1987 vs 1988)**

RESOLUTION TITLE	UNGA 42 (1987)				UNGA 43 (1988)			
	<u>Res. No.</u>	<u>InF</u>	<u>Ag</u>	<u>Abst</u>	<u>Res. No.</u>	<u>InF</u>	<u>Ag</u>	<u>Abst</u>
UN Fellowships on Disarmament	42/391	<u>156</u>	1	0	43/76F	(AWV)		
UNSSOD III	42/40	(AWV)			43/77B	<u>152</u>	0	2
Disarmament Week	42/42H	133	0	<u>21</u>	43/78G	(AWV)		
Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction	42/35	135	1	<u>18</u>	43/72	<u>152</u>	0	2
International Cooperation for Disarmament	42/42E	118	<u>18</u>	14	43/78C	136	1	<u>13</u>
Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security	42/93	76	12	<u>63</u>	43/90	<u>97</u>	3	45

InF = In Favour    Ag = Against    Abst = Abstaining    Underlined = Canada's vote

What follows is an overview of the various resolutions dealt with by each UNGA session that had a bearing on Canada's interests in the UN's consideration of ACD matters.

### Verification

In both UNGA 42 and 43, one resolution was specifically related to the subject of verification. In 1987, Canada sponsored resolution 42/42F entitled "Verification In All Its Aspects." It was adopted without a vote. This particular resolution was not introduced in 1988. Rather it was replaced by a Swedish resolution entitled "Study on the UN's Role in the Field of Verification" (43/81B) which Canada co-sponsored. It recorded a vote of 150 in favour, 1 against, and no abstentions. (Only the USA voted against the resolution.)

The 1987 resolution was one which Canada had introduced in the past. However, what set it apart from its predecessors was that the UNGA 42 version requested that the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) "conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its 1988 substantive session, in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (emphasis added). It noted as well that verification measures help to facilitate the "effective implementation of disarmament agreements" and build confidence by providing "an objective means of determining compliance."

Resolution 43/81B, on the other hand, noted that the UNDC had completed its consideration on the subject of verification as requested by resolution 42/42F. It endorsed the report which the UNDC had drafted and requested that the Secretary-General: 1) undertake "an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification"; 2) identify and review "existing activities of the United Nations" in this field as it relates to arms limitation and disarmament; 3) assess the "need for improvement in existing activities as well as explore and identify possible additional activities" that may be taken in this area; and lastly, 4) provide "specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in this context" in a comprehensive report to be submitted to UNGA 45 in 1990. Like resolution 42/42F, the Swedish resolution of 1988 underlined the importance of verification to the process of building confidence in any ACD agreement, but added that the UN had a "useful role" to play in this area.

#### Nuclear Testing and FIZZ

At UNGA 42, Canada introduced a resolution entitled "Prohibition of Fissionable Materials for Weapons Purposes" (42/38L, commonly referred to as the FIZZ resolution). In a vote of 149-1-6, only France was opposed. Of the other major nuclear weapons states (NWS), only the USSR endorsed the resolution; China, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA all abstained. Canada introduced the same resolution in 1988 (43/75K); each of the NWS voted as they had in 1987.

Among other things, both FIZZ resolutions declared "that the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes...would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race." In addition, it noted that such a prohibition plus one on "other explosive devices would be an important step in

facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Given these two observations, FIZZ requested that the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) continue to "pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices" under the item entitled Nuclear Weapons In All Aspects, and that it keeps the UNGA informed of its progress.

The subject of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was addressed at both sessions of the UNGA. New Zealand introduced the resolution entitled "Urgent Need for a CTBT" in 1987 (42/27), and Australia introduced its 1988 counterpart (resolution 43/64). In 1987, the CTBT resolution received the support of 143 countries, was opposed by 2, while 8 states chose to register abstentions. At UNGA 43, the final tabulation recorded was 146 in favour, 2 against, and 6 abstentions. Canada co-sponsored both resolutions. France and the USA opposed both the 1987 and 1988 versions of the resolution. Among the NWS, only the USSR supported the two resolutions, with China and the UK abstaining on both.

The 1987 CTBT resolution welcomed the 17 September 1987 joint superpower statement announcing the commencement of bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing in 1987. It reaffirmed the conviction that a treaty on the "prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance." Accordingly, 42/27 urged that the following actions be taken: 1) that the CD "initiate substantive work" on a CTBT; 2) that all states, including the NWS, cooperate in this effort; 3) that the NWS, "especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals," agree to appropriate verifiable interim measures directed at reaching a CTBT; 4) that those NWS which had not yet done so, adhere to the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT); and 5) that the CD take "immediate steps for the establishment...of an international seismic monitoring network."

The 1988 version of this resolution welcomed the "ongoing negotiations" between the two superpowers that were being conducted in accordance with the 17 September 1987 joint statement. Resolution 43/64 also noted "the significant development" that had been made between the USA and the USSR on "improved verification arrangements to facilitate the ratification" of the treaties on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and On Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Lastly, the 1988 resolution

welcomed the conclusion of the "historic" INF Treaty in December 1987, as well as the US-Soviet "agreement in principle on and progress made towards" a 50 percent strategic nuclear forces reduction agreement.

As it has for a number of years, Mexico introduced two resolutions on nuclear testing that were voted on by both UNGA 42 and 43. All four resolutions were entitled "Cessation of All Nuclear Tests." In 1987, the first of these resolutions (42/26A), garnered a final vote of 137-3-14, while its 1988 counterpart (43/63A) recorded a vote of 137-3-13. Canada abstained on both these resolutions. Among the NWS, the USSR supported both versions of the resolution and China abstained. The remaining three NWS opposed both versions of the resolution. The second of the Mexican nuclear testing resolutions in 1987 (42/26B), recorded a final vote of 128-3-22, while its parallel resolution of 1988 (43/63B), received the support of 128 countries, was opposed by 3, and had 21 countries choose to abstain. As on the first of the Mexican resolutions, Canada abstained on both 42/26B and 43/63B, whereas the USSR voted in favour of both. The UK, France and the USA registered opposition to the two resolutions. China, however, was absent when the vote was taken on the 1987 and 1988 versions of the second Mexican nuclear testing resolution.

There were differences between the 1987 and 1988 versions of the two Mexican resolutions on nuclear testing, although their general thrusts were similar. Both sessions' sets of resolutions were complementary in nature. Resolution 42/26A urged the depositary states of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the USA, the UK, and the USSR) "to abide strictly by their undertakings to achieve the early discontinuance of all [nuclear] test explosions...for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end." It also requested, in veiled terms, that the NWS "bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions." The 1988 version of this resolution (43/63A), on the other hand, did not include a clause related to the immediate halting of nuclear tests. Furthermore, though 43/63A acknowledged the special commitments which the three depositary states referred to above had made regarding the discontinuance of nuclear testing, it did not make reference to the notion of abiding "strictly" to their undertakings. Rather, it urged these states to "seek to achieve" such an "early discontinuance."

The second Mexican resolution of 1987 (42/26B), focused more directly on the obligations of the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). It recommended that each NNWS which was a party to the PTBT "formally submit an amendment proposal to the depositary Governments with a view to convening a conference...to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a [CTBT]." It further requested that these NNWS report the progress made on this proposal to the 43rd session of the UNGA. The 1988 version of this resolution (43/63B), welcomed "the submission of the Depositary Governments" of the PTBT which included an "amendment proposal" for the convening of a conference to deal with proposed amendments to the PTBT as noted in the 1987 version of this resolution. It also called for the inclusion of an item onto the provisional agenda of the 44th session of the UNGA which would deal with the subject of amending the PTBT. In all other respects, the two resolutions were identical.

Lastly, UNGA 42 considered a resolution that was not reintroduced to the 43rd session of the UNGA. Entitled "Notification of Nuclear Tests," it was introduced by Australia (42/38C). One hundred and forty-seven countries endorsed this resolution, while only France opposed it, and 8 countries chose to abstain. Canada and the USSR both voted in favour of 42/38C, whereas China, the UK and the USA abstained.

This notification resolution recalled its forerunner of 1986 (41/59N) and noted that "despite the continuation of nuclear explosions," the states conducting them had yet to provide the Secretary-General with the data which 41/59N requested be forwarded to his office. In light of this situation, 42/38C called upon all states to "comply with resolution 41/59N."

#### Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (CBWs)

Three resolutions related to CBWs were dealt with by each UNGA session in 1987 and 1988. All were adopted without a vote. Canada co-sponsored the three that were introduced in 1988, but in 1987 Canada was associated with only one (resolution 42/37A which Canada introduces to the UNGA alternately with Poland). In 1988, Poland introduced resolution 43/74C entitled "Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons," the counterpart to 42/37A. Austria introduced both 42/37B and 43/74B which were entitled "Second Review of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)," while Australia introduced

42/37C and 43/74A entitled "Measures to Uphold the Chemical Weapons (CWs) Geneva Protocol of 1925."

Each of the UNGA 42 and UNGA 43 CBWs resolutions were essentially the same in their contents. However, the 1988 version of Australia's CW resolution was much stronger in its wording. The Australian resolution of 1987 expressed "concern" over the fact that CWs were being used in the world today, and that there were "indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals." It requested the universal strict observation to the principles of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It also called upon the Secretary-General to undertake "investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State" concerning CW use in contravention of the Protocol. Such investigations, 42/37C observed, were necessary "in order to ascertain the facts of the matter." So that this latter objective could be facilitated on short notice, the resolution requested that the Secretary-General compile and maintain two lists. One, the resolution noted, would be a list of "qualified experts provided by Member States," and the other, a list of "laboratories with the capacity to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited" by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

In 1988, resolution 43/74A expressed "deep dismay," rather than "concern," over the fact that CWs had been proven to have been used "in violation" of the Geneva Protocol and "other rules of customary international law," namely those "rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict." It also requested that the Secretary-General "carry out promptly investigations in response to reports" that may be brought to his attention concerning the use of CWs, and that he promptly report his findings following the completion of any such investigation "in accordance with the procedures established" by resolution 42/37C. (Emphasis added to distinguish the major difference between the 1987 and 1988 versions of this resolution.)

Austria's 1987 resolution, 42/37B, followed up one it introduced in 1986 (a resolution which Canada had co-sponsored). In accordance with the 2nd Review Conference of the BWC, 42/37B noted with satisfaction that an ad hoc meeting had succeeded in adopting a consensus "report finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration," and thereby would enable BWC state parties to exchange such information on an annual basis according to a standardized procedure.

Furthermore, 42/37B requested that all BWC member states ratify the Convention if they had not already done so, and that those states which were not parties to the Convention, join it "at an early date."

The 1988 version of this resolution, 43/74B, echoed the same sentiments as its 1987 counterpart. Where it differed was in its expression of satisfaction with the fact that a second exchange of information and data had "commenced" in the fall of 1988 (the first had been completed during the previous fall). It further called upon those states "that have not yet exchanged information and data" in 1988 to do so in accordance with the prescriptions of the consensus report that was adopted in 1987 by the ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts.

Canada's resolutions on CBWs, 42/37A, and that of Poland's in 1988, 43/74C, were virtually identical. They both acknowledged the importance of concluding a chemical weapons convention (CWC) as early as possible. While noting the progress made toward this end by the UN's Conference on Disarmament (CD), they both expressed regret that such a treaty had not thus far "been elaborated." The 1987 and 1988 CBW resolutions called upon the CD to intensify its efforts toward this end by "inter alia increasing the time during the year that it devotes" to these negotiations and "re-establish" the ad hoc Committee on CWs with a "mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning" of each year's session. Finally, both resolutions declared the "urgent necessity" and importance with which all states should give to abiding by the terms of the 1972 BWC. However, though both versions of the resolution called upon all the states to strictly adhere to the terms of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CWs, the UNGA 43 version noted that this was particularly important in 1988 given the proven use of CWs in armed conflict. Furthermore, 43/74C also recognized the "importance of the declaration made by [some] States on whether or not they possess" CWs, and of the "further international exchange of data in connection with the negotiations" on a CWC. Lastly, the 1988 resolution welcomed the French government's offer to convene a conference on the Geneva Protocol in Paris between 7 and 11 January 1989.

#### Compliance and CSBMs

At UNGA 42 AND 43, the USA introduced a single resolution on the subject of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements (42/38M and 43/81A, both

entitled "Compliance with ACD Agreements"). Canada co-sponsored both resolutions and they were both adopted without a vote. In short, these two USA resolutions commented that "full confidence in compliance with existing [ACD] agreements can enhance the negotiation of [other] arms limitation and disarmament agreements." They further urged all states which are parties to any ACD treaty, "to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements." They also called upon all states to "support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions" so as to maintain or restore "the integrity" of any existing agreement. However, whereas 42/38M requested that the Secretary-General bring the resolution to the attention of the UNSSOD III conference that was held in the spring of 1988, the UNGA 43 version made no reference to UNSSOD III. Rather 43/81A welcomed the efforts by "State parties to develop additional co-operative measures...that can increase confidence in compliance" with ACD agreements, and thereby, "reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding."

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) introduced a resolution entitled "Confidence-Building Measures Guidelines" to both the 42nd and 43rd sessions of the UNGA (42/39F and 43/78H respectively). As with the American compliance resolutions, the 1987 and 1988 versions of this resolution were AWV and Canada co-sponsored both. Resolution 42/39F referred to its 1986 counterpart (41/60C) and noted "that the concept of confidence-building [was an]...important instrument for the strengthening of international peace and security and for promoting and facilitating the attainment of disarmament measures." As such, it requested that the UNDC consider the "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level" at its 1988 session.

The UNGA 43 version of this resolution, 43/78H, while sharing the same view of the value of confidence-building measures, also noted with appreciation the work of the UNDC in this field and the report it drafted "containing the agreed text of the 'Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level'." It further recommended that the UNDC's guidelines be implemented by all states while "fully taking into account the specific political, military, and other conditions prevailing in a particular region." Resolution 43/78H also requested that the Secretary-General submit a report to the 45th session of the UNGA "on the implementation of these guidelines on the basis of national reports on

accumulated relevant experience." Finally, it called for the inclusion of an item entitled Implementation of the Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures onto the agenda of UNGA 45.

Lastly, France introduced a resolution entitled "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Conventional Disarmament in Europe," to UNGA 43 that had no counterpart in 1987. Canada was also a co-sponsor of this resolution which, like the others in this category, was adopted without a vote. The resolution, 43/75P, welcomed the progress "so far" achieved in the European-based deliberations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and in the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional armaments and forces in Europe, which were both ongoing within the framework of the 1986 Stockholm Agreement on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It urged continued efforts aimed at realizing the objectives of these efforts, and invited all states "to consider the possibility of taking" similar measures focused on "reducing the risk of confrontation and strengthening security, taking due account of their specific regional conditions."

#### Disarmament and Development

In 1987, Canada co-sponsored a resolution introduced by France entitled "Relationship Between Disarmament and Development" (42/45). It was adopted without a vote. A different, but similarly titled resolution, was introduced by Zimbabwe to UNGA 43 (resolution 43/75B). It too was adopted without a vote. Resolution 42/45 stated that the fall 1987 International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development "constituted a significant development in the process of multilateral review, at a practical level," on the relationship between these two issues. Consequently, it requested that the Conference's report be "brought to the attention of the Preparatory Committee of the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament" (UNSSOD III), and that the Committee include on UNSSOD III's agenda an item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development." Zimbabwe's resolution, on the other hand, did not make any reference to the UNSSOD III Conference. It requested, rather, that "the Secretary-General...take action through appropriate organs, within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the [1987] International Conference [on the relationship between disarmament and development] and...submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session." It further called for the

inclusion of an item on this subject onto the agenda of UNGA 44. Canada did not co-sponsor the Zimbabwean resolution on this topic.

### Outer Space and the Arms Race

In 1987 and 1988, Sri Lanka introduced to each UNGA session a resolution entitled, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" (resolutions 42/33 and 43/70 respectively). Although Canada has expressed an interest in this issue over the years, it did not co-sponsor either resolution. Neither resolution was adopted without a vote, yet both received the overwhelming support of the UNGA's members. Both received the support of 154 states, no abstentions, and only the USA voting against them. It is of interest to note that, in 1986, the USA voted to abstain on a similar resolution.

Sri Lanka's 1987 resolution expressed grave concern over the threat posed "to all mankind by an arms race in outer space," as well as its potentially destabilizing effects on international peace and security. Accordingly, it called upon the two superpowers to "pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations" on this matter, and requested of all states, "especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain...from actions contrary" to either the objective of preventing an outer space arms race, or the provisions of any existing relevant treaty.

Resolution 43/70 added that the ad hoc CD Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space had conducted an examination of the "various issues" related to this topic in 1988. It suggested that this examination had "contributed to a better understanding of a number of [related] problems." Furthermore, 43/70 emphasized more forcefully than did its 1987 predecessor, the "complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts" in this area. In virtually all other respects, the UNGA 42 and 43 versions of this resolution were the same.

### Superpower Nuclear Weapons Talks

Two resolutions, both entitled "Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations," were introduced to the 1987 and 1988 sessions of the UNGA. Canada co-sponsored the two that were introduced by the UK (42/38A and 43/750), while Zimbabwe introduced the other two (42/38D and 43/75A). Neither set of resolutions were adopted without a vote. The 1987

version of the British resolution garnered a vote of 115-0-39, while its 1988 counterpart recorded the support of 100 countries, no votes against, and 49 abstentions. The two Zimbabwe resolutions recorded greater support that did their respective British counterparts. Resolution 42/38D's final tabulation of votes was 143-0-13, while resolution 43/75A's final result was 140-0-13. Canada voted in favour of all four resolutions as did the USSR and China. France, the UK and the USA registered their support for both British resolutions but abstained on the Zimbabwe set.

The UNGA 42 version of the UK resolution noted with satisfaction that the superpowers had agreed to an INF Treaty, and also had committed themselves to engage in an effort to reach "a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in their strategic offensive arms." An early agreement on the latter, the resolution stated, "would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security." The resolution called upon the two superpowers to spare "no effort" in pursuit of either a treaty on strategic offensive arms or on other issues that were the subject of the Geneva-based Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The 1987 Zimbabwean resolution differed from its British counterpart of that year in its call for the superpowers "to intensify their efforts with the objective of achieving agreements in other areas," such as on a nuclear test ban. This, declared 42/38D, was "a matter of urgency." In all other respects, the 1987 versions of these two resolutions were similar.

In 1988, the British and Zimbabwean resolutions contained most of the elements of their 1987 forerunners. However, the UK's 43/750 resolution welcomed the ratification and "the successful commencement of the implementation of the provisions" of the INF Treaty, as well as noting "the importance of the verification procedures contained in the Treaty." These procedures were an "example of the high standards of verification that are now achievable in arms control agreements, both bilateral and multilateral." Furthermore, the UK resolution also noted with satisfaction that the US and the USSR had produced a June 1988 joint statement announcing that a "joint draft text of a treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms had been elaborated," and that it would serve to further their efforts in this area. Zimbabwe's 43/75A resolution differed from its predecessor in that it made reference to the notion that "bilateral and multilateral" disarmament negotiations "should facilitate and complement each other, and that progress at the bilateral level should not be used to postpone or prohibit action at the multilateral level."

### Conventional and Regional Disarmament

In 1987, Denmark introduced a resolution entitled "Conventional Disarmament" (42/38E). The resolution focused on the work of the UNDC, suggesting that the Commission's 1987 report on conventional disarmament serve as the basis for further deliberations on the subject during the 1988 session of the UNDC. These deliberations should be aimed at "facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of conventional arms reduction and disarmament." The 1988 version of Denmark's "Conventional Disarmament" resolution, 43/75D, welcomed the "increased [international] awareness of the implications of many aspects of the conventional arms build-up, both in its qualitative and its quantitative aspect[s]" and of the "wide support expressed...for greater attention" to the subject. It asserted that the UN has a "central role" to play in this field and that it should "continue to encourage and facilitate disarmament in all fields," particularly in light of the various reports forwarded to the UNGA in 1988 by the UNDC and UNSSOD III. Both versions of this resolution were adopted without a vote.

A second resolution focusing on the work of the UNDC in this area was introduced to the UNGA during both its 1987 and 1988 sessions. These resolutions, 42/38G and 43/75F, which were sponsored by China, were broader-based than their Danish counterparts. They noted the dangers posed to "world peace and security" by any war or conflict fought with conventional weapons. The 1988 version mentioned "the loss of human life and property" resulting from such wars and conflicts. These dangers, both resolutions noted, were particularly heightened given the lethal and destructive capabilities of modern conventional weapons. The 1988 version made reference to the fact that "conventional armaments consume large amounts of resources." Both resolutions urged all states, particularly those with the "largest military arsenals" and the members of "the two major military alliances," to enhance their efforts to realize the objective of conventional disarmament.

At UNGA 42 and 43, Peru introduced resolutions on the subject of conventional disarmament on a regional scale (resolutions 42/38N and 43/75S, respectively). Neither resolution was adopted without a vote, though 42/38N garnered 154 votes in favour, with no country voting against, nor any abstaining. The UNGA 43 version, however, did not come close to receiving the same degree of support; only 125 countries voted in favour

of 43/75S. While no state voted against the resolution, 24 countries did abstain. The 1987 version of this Peruvian resolution attributed "the primary responsibility" for "halting and reversing the arms race" to the most "militarily significant States," especially the NWS. However, 42/38N's primary thrust was in its firm "support of all regional and sub-regional endeavours...directed to strengthening mutual confidence and to assuring the security of all States involved, making possible regional agreements on arms limitation in the future."

While the 1988 version of this resolution reiterated these observations, it was a far more expensive resolution than its 1987 forerunner. It drew "attention to the fact that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, conventional disarmament measures should be resolutely pursued, in the context of which conventional disarmament on a regional scale acquires urgency and renewed importance." It articulated support for an active role on the part of the UN, and the Secretary-General in particular, in the area of promoting peace "in various areas of tension in the world." Such efforts, resolution 43/75S noted, reaffirmed "the primary role of the United Nations in promoting peace and disarmament, and for the strict observance of the principles and norms embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." Only the USA, among the major NWS, chose to abstain on the 1988 version of this Peruvian resolution. The majority of the other countries that abstained were from the Middle East and Africa.

Lastly, Belgium introduced a resolution on "Regional Disarmament" in 1987 that was not reintroduced in 1988 to the UNGA. Canada co-sponsored this resolution (42/39E) which was adopted without a vote. In some respects, this resolution was similar to that which Peru introduced on the subject of regional disarmament in 1988 (43/75S). The Belgian resolution acknowledged that "any regional disarmament enterprise must take into account the specific conditions characteristic to each region." While the resolution encouraged all states "to consider and develop as far as possible regional solutions in the matter of arms reduction and disarmament," it requested that the UN "lend its assistance to States and regional institutions that may request" such assistance aimed at establishing frameworks for regional disarmament.

### The United Nations and Disarmament

Czechoslovakia introduced a resolution entitled "Implementation of UNGA Disarmament Resolutions" (42/38J) to the 42nd session of the UNGA. In 1988, the same resolution (43/75H) was sponsored by the Ukraine. The 1987 resolution garnered the support of 128 countries, while 2 countries voted against it, and 24 abstained. The UNGA 43 version recorded a final result of 125-2-26. Canada abstained on both resolutions, as did France and the UK. The USA voted against both, while China and the USSR voted in favour of both. The two resolutions stated "that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be strengthened substantially through an increased effort by Member States to implement faithfully [the various] General Assembly resolutions" that are dealt with each year by the UNGA. They both deemed it "important" that all UN states treat UNGA recommendations on disarmament "with due respect in accordance with the obligations" outlined in the UN's Charter. Accordingly, resolutions 42/38J and 43/75H invited all UN members "to make available to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on ways" to improve international compliance with UNGA resolutions and requested that the Secretary-General submit an annual report to the General Assembly on this matter.

Cameroon introduced to UNGA 42 and 43 a resolution entitled "Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament" (resolutions 42/380 and 43/75R). Both resolutions were adopted without a vote and were co-sponsored by Canada. Essentially, the two resolutions were the same, although 43/75R made reference to "the common desire expressed" at UNSSOD III "on the necessity to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament," as well as "the increased reaffirmation of the faith in the United Nations as an indispensable instrument for international peace and security." Other than this modification, the two resolutions were identical and noted "that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security" and that the UN should "play a more active role in the field of disarmament in accordance with its primary purpose" as identified by the UN's Charter. In light of this aim, both resolutions declared that the UNDC should "continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations" in this field, and report its "findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate," to forthcoming UNGA sessions.

In 1987, Czechoslovakia introduced resolution 42/42E entitled "International Cooperation for Disarmament." It introduced a modified version of the same resolution to UNGA 43 (43/78C) which proved to be more acceptable to the majority of UN members. Resolution 42/42E garnered a recorded vote of 118-18-14, whereas its 1988 counterpart recorded a final vote of 136-1-13. Resolution 42/42E invited all states "to consider, in the spirit of cooperation, ways and means to achieve a broader internationalization of the current disarmament negotiations." It stressed that such efforts should be aimed "at averting nuclear war through the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuation of nuclear-weapon tests, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and conventional disarmament on a global scale."

The 1988 version of this resolution (43/78C), made no overt reference to the objective of "internationalizing" the disarmament negotiation process. Rather, it invited all states "to consider, in a spirit of cooperation, ways and means to facilitate both bilateral and multilateral solutions to disarmament." The resolution noted that the objective of "achieving effective arms limitation and disarmament agreements" had to be accomplished "on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security, non-use of force and the rule of law in international relations." Resolution 43/78C also stressed that a "necessary balance between bilateral and multilateral approaches to arms limitation and disarmament" was desirable and "should be secured through a significantly enhanced role of the United Nations and its respective bodies in this field." Lastly, it took "into account" that since UNGA 42, "there have been important and encouraging developments in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament."

China introduced a single resolution entitled "Nuclear Disarmament" to both the 42nd and 43rd sessions of the UNGA (resolutions 42/38H and 43/75E, respectively). Both resolutions were adopted without a vote. Resolution 43/75E stated "that the qualitative aspect of the arms race needs to be addressed along with its quantitative aspect." In all other respects, the two resolutions were the same. Both welcomed the joint superpower Geneva statement of 21 November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." They both noted as well that the CD "has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament" and that "bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other." They also indicated that the superpowers had a "special responsibility" in this field and should "take the lead in

halting the nuclear-arms race" through earnest negotiations aimed at "the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals."

Finally, both the 1987 and 1988 sessions of the UNGA considered resolutions on UNSSOD III that were introduced by Yugoslavia (resolutions 42/40 and 43/77B, respectively). The 1987 resolution centred on the issue of convening UNSSOD III, whereas the 1988 version dealt with the results of the Special Session which was held in New York between 31 May and 25 June 1988. The 1987 resolution was adopted without a vote. However, its 1988 counterpart did not receive consensus. Though no votes were registered against 43/77B, two countries (the UK and the USA) abstained, while 152 states voted in favour of the resolution.

Resolution 42/40 expressed "concern at the continuation of the arms race," which, it stated, "aggravates international peace and security [sic] and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development." It endorsed the report of the Preparatory Committee for UNSSOD III, plus "the recommendations contained therein." It requested "all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly" in advance of the convening of UNSSOD III.

Yugoslavia's 1988 resolution on UNSSOD III, on the other hand, declared a conviction "that, in the international community's continuing search for lasting security, multilateral action has an increasingly important role" to play, and that the UN has a particularly important contribution to make because "it provides the most appropriate forum...[through which the international community can] contribute actively and collectively to the consideration and resolution of disarmament issues that have a bearing on their security." Accordingly, 43/77B called upon "all states to contribute to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament." Resolution 43/77B also expressed regret with the fact that UNSSOD III "ended without agreement on a concluding document," but noted that "the third special session devoted to disarmament, served the purpose of increasing awareness of the areas where future efforts should be concentrated and understood the urgency that States should work resolutely for the common cause of curbing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and achieving disarmament." Finally, the resolution expressed "appreciation of the numerous construc-

tive proposals submitted by Member States to the General Assembly [during UNSSOD III, that were] aimed at advancing disarmament and increasing security."

### C) New UNGA 43 ACD Resolutions of Interest

This section includes a review of a few UNGA 43 ACD resolutions that were not considered during UNGA 42. They reflect themes that are growing in their importance to the international community and to the multilateral aspect of the ACD process.

#### Impact of Science and Technology

India introduced a resolution to the 43rd session of the UNGA entitled "Scientific and Technological Developments and Their Impact on International Security" (43/77A), addressing the qualitative aspects of the arms race. It garnered the support of 129 countries, was opposed by 7 states, while 14 states, including Canada, abstained. France, the UK and the USA, among the NWS, chose to vote against it. China and the USSR, on the other hand, voted in favour of the resolution.

Resolution 43/77A recalled that UNSSOD I had "stressed the importance of both qualitative and quantitative measures in the process of disarmament," and observed "that at no stage since the first special session devoted to disarmament has the qualitative aspect of the arms race been seriously addressed by the international community." It noted that new "technological advances" had the potential for "escalating the level and sophistication of armaments" which would, in turn, negatively affect the security of all members of the international community and cause setbacks to all disarmament efforts. Within this context, resolution 43/77A stressed, it is important "that scientific and technological developments are not exploited for military purposes," but rather "harnessed for the common benefit of mankind." "Without prejudice to research and development efforts being undertaken for peaceful purposes," the resolution requested "the Secretary-General to follow future scientific and technological developments, especially those which have potential military applications, and to evaluate their impact on international security...and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its 45th session." Resolution 43/77A also invited all UN states to "establish panels at the national level to monitor and evaluate such developments," and to forward their views, evaluations and proposals

on this subject, to the Secretary-General. Lastly, 43/77A requested that the Secretary-General submit a report on the implementation of the resolution to UNGA 44.

#### On ACD Treaty Review Conferences

In 1989 and 1990, respectively, there will be review conferences for the 1971 Seabed Treaty and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The UNGA 43 witnessed the introduction of two resolutions focused on the convening of these conferences; one introduced by Norway entitled "Review Conference of the Parties to the Seabed Treaty" (43/75M), and the other sponsored by the UK entitled "Implementation of the Third NPT Review Conference's Conclusions and the Establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference" (43/82). The Norwegian resolution was adopted without a vote, but that of the United Kingdom's (which Canada co-sponsored) was not. It recorded a final vote of 137-0-11. The USA and the USSR both voted in favour, but France chose not to participate in the vote and China was absent when the vote was taken.

The Norwegian resolution noted that, "following appropriate consultations, a Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties" to the 1971 Seabed Treaty, "is to be established prior to holding a further review conference in 1989." It also requested "the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Committee and its preparation." Lastly, 43/75M expressed the "hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty."

The British Resolution noted that, "following appropriate consultations, an open-ended preparatory committee has been formed of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or represented on the Conference on Disarmament, as well as any party to the Treaty that may express its interest in participating in the work of the preparatory committee." The only request made in the British NPT resolution was that the Secretary-General "render the necessary assistance and...provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties" to the NPT and its preparation.

## Arms Transfers

There were two resolutions at UNGA 43 which expressed concern over the international transfer of arms. Canada co-sponsored a Colombian resolution, entitled "International Arms Transfers" (43/75I), that recorded a final vote of 111-0-39. Among the countries which abstained on the resolution were China, India and the USA. France, the UK and the USSR all endorsed the resolution. The second resolution on this topic, introduced by Trinidad and Tobago and entitled "Liability for Illegal Arms Transfers," was adopted without a vote. This second resolution 43/83, merely declared that the UNGA "decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session an item entitled 'Liability for the illegal transfer and/or use of prohibited weapons and weapons or substances which cause unnecessary human suffering'."

Like resolution 43/83, resolution 43/75I introduced to the provisional agenda of UNGA 44 an item entitled "International arms transfers." The decision to include both these items on the 1989 agenda, suggests that more attention will be given to the subject of arms transfers in the future. Resolution 43/75I also stated that the issue of "arms transfers in all their aspects deserves serious consideration by the international community" because of their "potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security"; their "known and potential negative effects on the process of peaceful social and economic development of all peoples"; and the "increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking."

In light of these concerns, resolution 43/75I requested all governments to reinforce "their national systems of control and vigilance concerning production and transport of arms"; examine "ways and means of refraining from acquiring arms additional to those needed for legitimate national security requirements...[as well as] ways and means of providing for more openness and transparency with regard to world-wide arms transfers." It further requested that the CD take the above-mentioned considerations into account during its deliberations on conventional disarmament, and that the Secretary-General seek out "the views and proposals of Member States on the matters" identified above, and "collect all other relevant information for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session."



**PART TWO****I) On Canada's UNGA 42 and UNGA 43 ACD Voting Record**

This section compares Canada's voting record with those of 16 other countries which reflect a cross-section of the various blocs represented in the United Nations. The states chosen are Australia, China, France, the FRG, India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Sweden, the USSR, the UK, the USA, and Yugoslavia.

Table 2 below shows the degree of support given by each of the states to the resolutions considered by the UNGA in 1987 and 1988. Two percentage figures are recorded in the Table. One is the number of resolutions a state supported as a percentage of the total number of resolutions considered during each session (%TSu). The other is the number of resolutions a state voted in favour of expressed as a percentage of the total number of resolutions that were not adopted without a vote in either year (%InF). The category (TSu) is a total of all the resolutions a state voted in favour of (InF), and all those resolutions that were AWW. [For example, in 1987, Canada voted in favour (InF) of 16 resolutions, but since 26 resolutions were AWW, Canada supported a total (TSu) of 42.] The Table also records the total number of resolutions each country voted against (Ag), as well as those on which they chose to abstain (Abst). Lastly, the category (Ab) records the number of resolutions on which a country did not choose to participate in a vote, or was absent from the UNGA when a vote was taken. [The percentage calculations for China in 1987, and China and France in 1988, are affected by the fact that they were absent for a number of recorded UNGA resolution votes during each session. Thus, their (%TSu) calculations are based on the total number of resolutions considered in each session minus the number recorded in (Ab).]

TABLE 2

## Calculations of Support for UNGA

## ACD Resolutions (1987-1988)

## Part 1 UNGA 42 (1987)

Total number of resolutions considered	66
Total number of resolutions AWW	26
Total number of resolutions not AWW	40

Rk	Country	%TSu	TSu	%InF	InF	Ag	Abst	Ab
1	Romania	100.0	66	100.0	40	-	-	-
2	USSR	98.5	65	97.5	39	-	1	-
3	Mexico	95.5	63	92.5	37	-	3	-
4	Yugoslavia	93.9	62	90.0	36	-	4	-
5	China	83.9	52	72.2	26	-	10	4
6	Sweden	83.3	55	72.5	29	-	11	-
7	India	83.3	55	72.5	29	1	10	-
8	New Zealand	74.2	49	57.5	23	4	13	-
9	Australia	72.7	48	55.0	22	5	13	-
10	Norway	71.2	47	52.5	21	5	14	-
11	Japan	68.2	45	47.5	19	5	16	-
12	Canada	63.6	42	40.0	16	8	16	-
13	FRG	62.1	41	37.5	15	8	17	-
14	Netherlands	62.1	41	37.5	15	9	16	-
15	UK	56.1	37	27.5	11	14	15	-
16	France	54.5	36	25.0	10	17	13	-
17	USA	48.5	32	15.0	6	25	9	-

TABLE 2

## Part 2 UNGA 43 (1988)

Total number of resolutions considered	72
Total number of resolutions AWV	28
Total number of resolutions not AWV	44

Rk	Country	%TSu	TSu	%InF	InF	Ag	Abst	Ab
1	Romania	100.0	72	100.0	44	-	-	-
2	USSR	98.6	71	87.7	43	-	1	-
3	Mexico	97.2	70	95.5	42	-	2	-
4	Yugoslavia	95.8	69	93.2	41	-	3	-
5	China	89.4	59	81.6	31	-	7	6
6	Sweden	86.1	62	77.3	34	-	10	-
7	India	86.1	62	77.3	34	1	9	-
8	New Zealand	83.3	60	72.7	32	2	10	-
9	Australia	81.9	59	70.5	31	3	10	-
10	Norway	77.8	56	63.6	28	4	12	-
11	Japan	72.2	52	54.5	24	4	16	-
12	Canada	70.8	51	52.3	23	5	16	-
13	Netherlands	63.9	46	40.9	18	5	21	-
14	FRG	63.9	46	40.9	18	6	20	-
15	UK	58.3	42	31.8	14	11	19	-
16	France	56.3	40	27.9	12	13	18	1
17	USA	47.2	34	13.6	6	25	13	-

Table 2 illustrates that, except for the USA, there was greater support for the UNGA resolutions considered in 1988 than in 1987. The Table also shows that there were vast differences recorded in the overall degrees of support registered by these countries when the resolutions that were AWV are included in the tabulations (%TSu), and when they are not included (%InF). For example, only the USA registered less than 50 percent support for the resolutions considered in both 1987 and 1988 when those that were AWV are incorporated into the calculations. However, when the resolutions that were AWV are withdrawn from the calculations of support, a number of countries drop below the 50 percent level of support registered in favour of the remaining resolutions considered. In 1987, Japan, Canada, the FRG, the Netherlands, the UK, France and the USA all fell into this latter category. In 1988, only the Netherlands, the FRG, the UK, France and the USA fell into the category.

Differences between calculations which include resolutions AWV and those which exclude them also show up when comparing Canada's record of voting with each of the identified countries. Table 3 compares Canada's voting record with each of the other countries when all the resolutions AWV are incorporated into the calculations. The Table documents the following data: rank; country; the number of times each country voted the same as did Canada (VS); the percentage of similarity in voting results (%VS); the number of times each country and Canada voted dissimilarly (VD); and lastly, the number of times a country was absent when a vote was taken on a resolution, or chose not to participate in a recorded vote (Ab).

Table 4, on the other hand, records the similarity of voting records when the resolutions AWV are withdrawn from the calculations. The data incorporated into Table 4 includes: rank; country; the number of times each country voted similarly with Canada in favour (InF), against (Ag), or abstained (Abst); plus the percentage of similarity (%VS). [For a resolution-by-resolution accounting of how Canada and each of the selected countries voted on each of the UNGA 42 and UNGA 43 resolutions (including those that were AWV), see Appendices III and IV.]

TABLE 3

**Comparison Between Canada's Voting Record and  
Selected Countries Including Resolutions AWV (1987-1988)**

<u>1987</u>					<u>1988</u>						
Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VD	Ab	Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VD	Ab
1	FRG	98.5	65	1	-	1	Japan	93.1	67	5	-
2	Holland	97.0	64	2	-	2	Holland	93.1	67	5	-
3	Austral	89.4	59	7	-	3	FRG	91.7	66	6	-
4	Japan	87.9	58	8	-	4	Norway	90.3	65	7	-
5	NZ	87.9	58	8	-	5	Austral	87.5	63	9	-
6	Norway	87.9	58	8	-	6	NZ	86.1	62	10	-
7	UK	83.3	55	11	-	7	Sweden	80.6	58	14	-
8	France	78.9	52	14	-	8	UK	79.2	57	15	-
9	Sweden	74.2	49	17	-	9	France	77.9	55	16	1
10	USA	65.2	43	23	-	10	Romania	70.8	51	21	-
11	Romania	63.6	42	24	-	11	USSR	69.4	50	22	-
12	China	62.9	39	23	4	12	China	68.2	45	11	6
13	USSR	62.1	41	25	-	13	Mexico	68.1	49	23	-
14	Mexico	59.1	39	27	-	14	Yugosl	66.7	48	24	-
15	Yugosl	57.6	38	28	-	15	USA	58.3	42	30	-
16	India	50.0	33	33	-	16	India	56.9	41	31	-

TABLE 4

**Compilation of Similarity in Canada's  
Voting Record With Selected Countries  
Excluding Resolutions AWV (1987-1988)**

<u>1987</u>						<u>1988</u>					
Rank	Country	% Vs	InF.	Ag	Abst	Rank	Country	% Vs	InF.	Ag	Abst
1	FRG	97.5	15	8	16	1	Japan	88.6	22	3	14
2	Holland	95.0	15	8	15	2	Holland	88.6	18	5	16
3	Austral	82.5	16	5	12	3	FRG	86.4	18	5	15
4	Japan	80.0	16	4	12	4	Norway	84.1	22	4	11
5	NZ	80.0	16	4	12	5	Austral	79.5	23	3	9
6	Norway	80.0	15	5	12	6	NZ	77.3	23	2	9
7	UK	72.0	11	8	10	7	Sweden	68.2	22	-	8
8	France	65.0	9	8	9	8	UK	65.9	14	5	10
9	Sweden	57.5	15	-	8	9	France	62.8	12	5	10
10	USA	42.5	6	8	3	10	Romania	52.3	23	-	-
11	Romania	40.0	16	-	-	11	USSR	50.0	22	-	-
12	USSR	37.5	15	-	-	12	Mexico	47.7	21	-	-
13	China	36.1	11	-	2	13	Yugosl	45.5	20	-	-
14	Mexico	32.5	13	-	-	14	China	44.7	16	-	1
15	Yugosl	30.0	12	-	-	15	USA	31.8	6	5	3
16	India	17.5	6	-	1	16	India	29.5	13	-	-

As can be seen from comparing Tables 3 and 4, the percentage similarity drops considerably when the resolutions AWV are dropped from the calculations. However, there is a more significant trend revealed by these figures. Table 2 illustrates that among the selected countries, the two East bloc alliance members recorded the highest level of support for the ACD resolutions considered by each session of the UNGA. Indeed, Romania and the USSR registered almost unanimous support for all the resolutions dealt with in 1987 and 1988. The next group of 5 nations are composed of those states which are either neutral or nonaligned. This group is followed by a collection of 7 states, including Canada, that may be depicted as middle-power First World countries. These states are closely associated with Canada through either military, political or economic associations, and in the ACD and international security fields, it should not be surprising that these states share similar interests with one another. Finally, the last three states which recorded the lowest level of support for the ACD resolutions

considered by the UNGA in 1987 and 1988, include the three Western members of the NWS club. Though Canada is associated with these states through military, political and economic ties, it is clear that their interests in the fields of arms control and disarmament are not necessarily similar to those of Canada. This is not to suggest that their interest in this field is entirely incongruent with those of Canada, for as Table 3 shows, there was a high degree of similarity in two of the three countries' voting patterns with that of Canada when those resolutions AWV are incorporated into the calculations. Both the UK and France voted similarly with Canada on more than three-quarters of all the resolutions considered in 1987 and 1988. Only the USA, Canada's closest neighbour and largest trading partner, among the three, registered less than three-quarters similarity in voting patterns with Canada; indeed, in 1988, the level of similarity dipped to only 58.3 percent.

Based on the data included in Table 2, it is not surprising that the 6 countries that supported approximately the same number of resolutions as did Canada in both 1987 and 1988, also recorded the highest levels of similarity in resolution voting with Canada (as recorded in Table 3). The percentage of similarity recorded in Table 3 suggests that Canada and these 6 states voted similarly not just on those resolutions that they supported, but also on those they did not. Table 4 confirms this suggestion. It reveals that these states voted similarly with Canada on a high proportion of those resolutions which Canada opposed or on which it abstained, as well as those which Canada endorsed. Conversely, the degree of similarity in Canada's voting record with that of the UK, France and the USA, was based largely on those resolutions which Canada either voted against or upon which it abstained.

Table 2 notes that Canada supported a larger percentage of resolutions during the UNGA 43 than during UNGA 42. The most interesting aspects of Table 2 relate to the data which compares Canada's voting record on resolutions that were not AWV. The Table reveals that in 1987, Canada voted in favour of only 40 percent of the resolutions that were not adopted without a vote, whereas in 1988, the percentage of support rose to 52.3. Canada voted against 20 percent of these resolutions in 1987, and only 11.3 percent in 1988, while it abstained on 40 percent of those resolutions considered by the UNGA 42 and 36.4 percent of the total in 1988. In contrast, if one includes the resolutions on which there was consensus, Canada's record of endorsement increases radically. Correspondingly, Canada's nonsupport decreases dramatically. The Table shows

that Canada supported 63.6 percent of all the resolutions considered in 1987, opposed just 12.1 percent and abstained on only 24.2 percent. During UNGA 43 Canada supported a total of 70.8 percent of all the resolutions considered, opposed just 6.9 percent and abstained on 22.2 percent.

Table 2 also shows that Canada's degree of support rose substantially compared to that of the UK, France or the USA (which actually declined). It also shows that the USSR's level of support remained constant, whereas China's rose by 6 percentage points. These differences among the voting records of the NWS suggest that three Western and the two non-Western NWS hold radically different perspectives on the subject of UNGA ACD resolutions. They also suggest that Canada's views differ from those of any NWS. This proposition tends to be supported by the data recorded in Table 4.

These observations appear to indicate that, although Canada is closely aligned with the Western NWS, it follows its own course on ACD and international security matters. In particular, Canada's policy tends to accentuate the value of the UN's role in these matters, a proposition clearly endorsed by Canada's representatives during their First Committee speeches. Furthermore, Canada's increased support for the resolutions in 1988 suggests that it saw those resolutions as more positive in tone than those of 1987.

## II) A Decade of UNGA ACD Resolutions (1978-1988)

### A) General Observations on Voting Results

It was earlier noted that the UN plays both an active and passive role in international relations. In its passive role, the UN provides the international community with a forum through which conflict or change may be dealt with diplomatically, rather than violently. It was further observed that the effectiveness of the UN in this role is primarily dependent on the degree to which state actors choose to employ the various forums the UN provides for the facilitation of peaceful change or the reduction of conflict. However, the UN also serves students of international politics in the sense that the debates conducted within the various UN forums often mirror the climate of international relations at any given time. When there is tension in East-West or North-South relations, for example, this tension is often reflected in the tone and quality of the deliberations conducted within UN forums. This proposition suggests that when there is

a high degree of tension in these relations, there is usually a corresponding low degree of consensus achieved.

It may be presumptuous to suggest that the above proposition always holds true. It might be more accurate to suggest that this correlation may be confined to specific areas of international exchange -- areas such as international security, finance, development, trade, or arms control and disarmament. It is possible that while there is disharmony in one area, there may be consensus in another area. However, in general, international tension in security affairs and consensus voting on ACD resolutions are inversely related.

Canada has argued that success or failure in the multilateral area is largely dependent on the nature of bilateral superpower relations. This position appears to contain some wisdom. However, there is no guarantee that any multilateral effort will bear fruit just because superpower relations are good. In part, this can be explained by the fact that there are different perspectives on the nature of security and ACD between North and South actors. It is the proposition of this paper that success in the multilateral ACD arena is dependent on two factors: cooperation in superpower relations, and relative harmony in perspectives between North and South.

Table 5 below shows the level of consensus achieved on UNGA ACD resolutions for the years between 1978 and 1988. It records each UNGA session and corresponding year, the total number of resolutions considered each year (RC), the number of resolutions in which consensus (AWV) was achieved during every session, and the percentage level of consensus reached for each year (% AWV).

TABLE 5  
CONSENSUS VOTING ON ACD RESOLUTIONS (1978-1988)

<u>UNGA</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u># RC</u>	<u># AWV</u>	<u>% AWV</u>
33	1978	41	18	43.9
34	1979	38	19	50.0
35	1980	43	20	46.5
36	1981	48	17	35.4
37	1982	58	18	31.0
38	1983	63	17	27.0
39	1984	63	18	28.6
40	1985	71	20	28.2
41	1986	69	21	30.4
42	1987	66	26	39.5
43	1988	72	28	38.9

The Table shows that from 1978 to 1985 there was a trend toward increasing the number of resolutions voted on every year by the UNGA, while the number on which consensus was achieved remained relatively constant. However, the percentage of consensus fluctuated, increasing between 1978 and 1980, decreasing between 1980 and 1983, and then reaching a constant level in 1984 and 1985. Between 1986 and 1987, there was a decrease in the total number of resolutions voted on by the UNGA, with a corresponding increase in the number, and in the percentage, of resolutions that were adopted without a vote. Finally, in 1988, while the number of resolutions AWV rose by two from 1987, the total number of resolutions also rose, resulting in a marginal decline in the level of percentage consensus.

If the proposition stated above is correct, then the table suggests that, between 1978 and 1980, North-South and East-West tensions were relatively low. On the other hand, between 1981 and 1985, tensions seem to have risen among international actors on security-related issues. In 1986 and 1987, the figures suggest that these relations warmed and a measure of stability and common purpose was re-established in the ACD and security field. The marginal decline in the percentage of consensus reached in 1988 as compared to 1987 hints that the level of international tension may have increased somewhat.

At the close of the 1960s and during the first few years of the 1970s, superpower relations showed signs of warming. This was the period during which the US and the USSR had agreed to a Seabed Treaty as well as a package of strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT I) that included the cornerstone Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defence treaty. However, the era of detente did not last long and, by the mid-1970s, superpower relations once again became strained. It was not until the period beginning with the election of President Jimmy Carter that the tensions in superpower relations began to lessen and a new impetus was given to superpower arms control efforts. Two years into Carter's term, the US and the USSR managed to strike a new set of SALT agreements in 1979 (SALT II).

By 1978, North-South relations had also undergone a transformation. During the early 1960s, a proliferation of newly independent Third World states joined the family of nations. These states banded together to form the Group of 77 and used their numbers to focus the agenda of the UN on matters that had direct relevance to their interests. Primarily, these interests related to development and the world economy. However, they had other interests -- the relationship between international security and nuclear arms control, as well as the role of justice, equality and law in international relations. Generally, these new states objected that the major powers set the political, economic and security agenda. This, they noted, ran counter to the spirit of the UN and its Charter. Furthermore, it did not reflect the changed nature of international society which had begun to occur after the Second World War.

To offset the influence of the major powers in world affairs, these new members of the UN pushed for the adoption of multilateral approaches. In promoting multilateralism, the South has not radically departed from traditional norms of interstate behaviour or practice. Rather, these states have taken a position not all that dissimilar from the view held by a number of smaller and middle-power states in the North, including Canada.

During the 1970s numerous multilateral conferences were convened under the auspices of the UN. A wide variety of global issues were studied and debated. Perhaps the most ambitious of these efforts was the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This trend towards multilateralism permeated the realm of international security and arms control. Previously, it had been generally accepted that the subject of

international security was largely within the purview of the superpowers. However, with the 1976 UNGA call for a special session devoted to disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the membership of the UN opted for a multilateral approach and the South was afforded an opportunity to articulate its positions and interests in the security field more forcefully than ever before.

By the time UNSSOD I was convened, superpower relations had begun to improve and multilateralism was generally accepted as having a legitimate role to play in the security field. These two factors help to explain why there was a high degree of consensus between 1978 and 1980. The second factor also helps explain why an increasing number of resolutions were forwarded during this period, and through to 1985. It was a trend that would not be reversed until after 1985, when international efforts were made to reduce the number of resolutions.

In the early 1980s, the complexion of superpower relations changed dramatically. The SALT II agreement, which the Carter administration had negotiated with the USSR, was never submitted to the US Congress for ratification. Many members of Congress believed that Carter had weakened America's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and that this weakness was reflected in the SALT II accord. Taking office in 1981, the new Reagan administration favoured the build-up of America's military assets, and was skeptical about arms control. The slogan of the new administration was "peace through strength." Only the US could determine what was in its best interest; multilateral deliberations were undesirable because they might limit America's sovereignty or independence in world affairs.

This view led to the emergence of a tense relationship between the US and the South. The negative US view of multilateralism, translated into a jaundiced perception of the UN's role in international affairs. The US judged that the UN had become hostage to interests of the South. Nowhere was this attitude more dramatically illustrated than in the US approach to the negotiations on the Law of the Sea -- the US rejected the Convention in 1982.

As the Reagan era was beginning, the Brezhnev era was coming to an end. Uncertainty surrounded the transition of power. The Soviet Union failed to provide a clear signal to the international community as to what direction it would take in the

1980s. It could only respond to the hard line adopted by the Reagan administration with a 'mirror image' hard line of its own. Thus, between 1981 and 1985, US-Soviet relations were marked by tension, mistrust and animosity. The character of this relationship would not change until the succession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 (following a series of leadership changes caused by successive deaths), and the return of Reagan for a second term in office beginning in January of the same year.

The hostility that existed in East-West and North-South relations during the years between 1981 and 1985, showed up in the ACD resolutions. The UN debates, and the rhetoric of many of the ACD resolutions, were characterized by an antagonistic North-South division. Because of this antagonism, and the poor relationship that had evolved between the superpowers, the level of consensus declined during this period.

Beginning in late-1985, the superpowers became more cooperative. This was partly due to the impact that General Secretary Gorbachev had on the politics of Soviet administration. The new Soviet leader wanted to revitalize the economy. He encouraged foreign investment, permitted greater domestic freedom to criticize Soviet leaders, and sought to stabilize the USSR's relations with its neighbours and the US.

The new Soviet policy did not meet with immediate favour in the US. At the outset of its second term, the Reagan administration remained skeptical of Soviet intentions. Initiatives in arms control following Gorbachev's ascension to power were cautiously examined in Washington. It was not until the two leaders met in Geneva in the fall of 1985 that US and Soviet arms control concerns began to converge -- or at least be perceived as complementary. In essence, the two leaders found common ground upon which they could build a more constructive approach to their security relations.

The first tangible results of this new trend surfaced in a multilateral forum when, in September 1986, an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe was signed in Stockholm by 35 states, including all members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Progress in other multilateral arms control and disarmament forums was also being made at this time. The most high-profile of these was the Conference on Disarmament's negotiations on a chemical weapons ban wherein it appeared that the USSR might be willing to compromise on the sticky issue of challenge inspection. In 1987, the USSR did indeed accept, without significant reservation, the idea of

challenge inspection and announced its intention to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile.

On the heels of these multilateral successes came indication of progress in US-USSR arms reduction talks. In October 1986, the two leaders met for a second time in Reykjavik, Iceland. The Reykjavik meeting proved to be pivotal in the security relationship between the superpowers. Out of these negotiations came the seeds of the fall 1987 INF agreement which eliminated intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe. There was also general acceptance of the idea that a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons could be negotiated in Geneva at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Furthermore, by the fall of 1987, the superpowers had agreed to conduct bilateral negotiations on the subject of nuclear testing.

Thus, the period following the 41st session of the UNGA through to the beginning of 1988 was one in which the superpowers' relationship thawed considerably from what it had been during the first half of the 1980s. The warming of this relationship led to significant progress in the ACD field at both the bilateral and multilateral level of security affairs. There can be no doubt that the change in this relationship also had its effect on North-South ACD relations. It led to a lessening of ideological rhetoric in multilateral negotiations on ACD matters, and correspondingly, to a reduction in the ideological tone of the ACD resolutions submitted to the UNGA. Furthermore, there developed during this period a common understanding that the number of resolutions had become too unwieldy. Accordingly, the number was reduced in 1986 and 1987, and the level of consensus rose.

Between the 42nd and 43rd sessions of the UNGA, superpower relations remained positive. Progress in bilateral ACD negotiations was slow, but it continued along the course initiated in the fall of 1985. The slow pace may be explained in part by the fact that 1988 was an election year in the US, and new US initiatives in the bilateral ACD field were unlikely to be offered.

In 1988, however, relations between North and South states soured somewhat. This strain affected some multilateral negotiations. The success of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development was not matched at the 1988 Third UN Special Session Devoted to Disarmament. The failure of UNSSOD

III to reach consensus on a final document can largely be attributed to two factors. On the one hand, the US held that the UN and other multilateral forums had little to contribute to the strategic relationship between the US and the USSR. Many South actors argued that international disarmament efforts ought to focus on the responsibility of nuclear weapons states to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, they added that multilateral forums should play a significant role in this area. On the other hand, the South actors showed no interest in allowing the agenda of multilateral forums to be expanded to include topics linked to their own responsibilities in the disarmament area. For example, they evaded the issue of their own spending on arms and their involvement in local conflicts.

Thus during UNSSOD III there was a gulf between North and South views on ACD and international security matters. The progress made in certain multilateral negotiations during 1986 and 1987 was largely a consequence of good superpower relations. These multilateral forums had served as alternative stages for the superpowers to conduct arms control negotiations which were not on the agenda of bilateral forums. So long as they were focused on bilateral concerns, these multilateral efforts proved to be fairly successful. Once there was an attempt to shift to broader international security questions, a multiplicity of views surfaced, and the North-South split was exposed.

The above analysis suggests that consensus voting on UNGA ACD resolutions is dependent, not only on the climate of superpower security relations, but on North-South security relations as well. Nowhere was this more clearly illustrated than in the results of the 1988 UNGA session. Despite the continuation of good superpower relations in the arms control area, 1988 witnessed a decline in the level of consensus achieved on ACD resolutions that, perhaps, can be explained by the growth of North-South tension on matters related to international security. If this latter statement is correct, what does it suggest regarding future arms control and disarmament deliberations, particularly in the realm of multilateral efforts?

In answering this question, one can offer only a conjecture because the answer depends on a number of variables. There can be no doubt that the climate of superpower security relations is an important variable. If it grows colder, progress in security or disarmament is unlikely. However, should these relations improve over the next few years, then progress in the multilateral area will depend on North-South relations.

For North actors, national security questions very much depend on the nature of superpower security relations. This is largely because most of the North actors are associated with one or another alliance. Thus, if superpower relations continue to warm, the threat will be perceived to diminish.

However, the security interests of the South are different from those of the North. Not all Third World intraregional security dilemmas are a product of superpower rivalries, although they have been exacerbated by superpower meddling in the past. It is this latter practice which many Third World actors continue to fear, in addition to their own more local security concerns. Both matters have had an impact on the South's prioritization of security questions and set them apart from those of the North. Unless these North and South views are reconciled, it can be expected that progress in multilateral ACD forums will be slow.

#### B) Pattern's in Canada's UNGA ACD Voting Record (1978-1988)

This section will compare Canada's voting record with that of 15 selected countries over the past decade. For Canada, the primary concern appeared to be superpower security relations, as illustrated by Table 6 below. When superpower relations cooled in the early- to mid-1980s, Canada's record of support for UNGA ACD resolutions declined. When this relationship warmed after 1985, Canada's record of support began to rise.

After UNSSOD I, a greater number of neutral and nonaligned states became active in the UNGA's process of ACD resolution review. They introduced new resolutions reflecting their particular concerns, concerns which contrasted with those of the North. North-South relations, cool during the first half of the 1980s, began to warm after 1985 until 1988. It was during this period that concerted efforts were made on the part of the international community to reduce the ideological tone and number of resolutions considered by the UNGA each year.

Table 6 below shows that after 1978, Canada abstained on an average of 22 percent of the resolutions considered by the UNGA each year. The majority of these abstentions were on resolutions sponsored by the members of the neutral and nonaligned states. The

remainder were on those sponsored by East-bloc nations. Not one Canadian abstention during this period was on a resolution introduced by a Western state.

Table 6 records the following categories: each UNGA session and corresponding year; the total number of resolutions that Canada supported each year, including those adopted without a vote (TSu); the total number of resolutions opposed by Canada (Ag) and the total number on which Canada abstained (Abst) each year; corresponding percentages for each of these three categories; and the total number of resolutions dealt with by the UNGA each year.

**TABLE 6**

**Canada's Voting Record On UNGA ACD Resolutions (1978-1988)**

<u>UNGA</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>TSu</u>	<u>%TSu</u>	<u>Ag</u>	<u>%Ag</u>	<u>Abst</u>	<u>%Abst</u>	<u>Total</u>
33	1978	35	85.4	3	7.3	3	7.3	41
34	1979	28	73.7	2	5.3	8	21.0	38
35	1980	31	72.0	3	7.0	9	21.0	43
36	1981	31	64.6	7	14.6	10	20.8	48
37	1982	35	60.4	9	15.5	14	24.1	58
38	1983	33	52.4	14	22.2	16	25.4	63
39	1984	36	57.5	14	22.2	13	20.6	63
40	1985	43	60.6	14	19.7	14	19.7	71
41	1986	44	63.8	9	13.0	16	23.2	69
42	1987	42	63.6	8	12.1	16	24.2	66
43	1988	51	70.8	5	6.9	16	22.3	72

North-South and East-West divisions had an impact on Canada's voting record. Canada did not oppose any of the resolutions introduced by Western nations. This suggests that Canada voted more similarly with Western nations than it did with non-Western nations over the past decade. This is confirmed by the data incorporated in Appendix V which shows the similarity between Canada's voting record and those of 15 selected countries for the years between 1978 and 1986. (The record of similarity for 1987 and 1988 is recorded in Table 3 on page 35.)

Canada voted similarly to Western nations, but there are some countries within this group whose records are more similar to Canada's than others. The table in Appendix V and Table 3 above reveal that Canada has most consistently voted with the FRG and the

Netherlands among the selected countries, followed by Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Australia. What distinguishes these nations from the others cited in the tables, is that they are middle-power First-World states.

Generally, their shared views set them apart from the three Western nuclear weapons states (NWS). Canada's degree of similarity with the three Western NWS (the UK, the USA and France) shifted over the past decade. The degree of similarity with the USA declined throughout the period to the point where, in 1988, Canada voted more similarly with the USSR and China than it did with the USA. As for the UK and France, the figures for degree of similarity hover in the neighbourhood of 80 percent. The comparatively high levels of voting similarity for the UK and France can be accounted for by the fact that the percentage of disagreement on those resolutions which Canada either opposed or abstained on, was relatively low. The records of the like-minded middle-power states were distinguished from those of the Western NWS by the number of resolutions that Canada supported, but which the latter group did not endorse.

The levels of similarity with remaining states were, on average, considerably lower. Indeed, India and the USSR voted more dissimilarly with Canada between 1982 and 1985: the lowest levels being reached during the 38th session of the UNGA in 1983. In 1983 and 1984, Mexico also voted more dissimilarly than similarly with Canada. During the 1980s, only Sweden, among this latter group, had an average record of voting similarity with Canada above 70 percent. This compares with the averages of China at 67 percent, Romania at 62 percent, Mexico at 58 percent, the USSR at 53 percent, and India at 50 percent. The higher percentages of dissimilarity between these latter countries and Canada are accounted for by the fact that they disagreed with Canada on a high degree of those resolutions that Canada either opposed or abstained on during each of the UNGA sessions in question.

Throughout the period between 1978 and 1988, these latter states supported the vast majority of the resolutions considered during each UNGA session. Indeed, Romania, the USSR and Mexico consistently supported more than 90 percent of all the resolutions considered each year. There was a much greater degree of harmony in voting patterns between the states of the East and South blocs than there was between either of these blocs and the Western states of the North. As Table 6 shows, Canada's record of support steadily dropped from a high of 85 percent in 1978, to a low of 52 percent in

1983, and then slowly rose to a level of 70 percent in 1988. This record was largely mirrored by Canada's Western counterparts as the data in Appendix V and that of Table 3 suggests. These contrasting levels tend to support the notion that when there is tension in either East-West or North-South relations, Western states will probably support a lower percentage of the resolutions considered each year by the UNGA, and that there will be a high level of disagreement between Western states and East or South states on these resolutions. The relations between the blocs also appear to have an affect on the degree of consensus. Western states, particularly the USA, it would appear, tend to judge UNGA ACD resolutions more harshly when relations are tense.

However, the tables referred to in this section show that Canada has charted its own course over the years, and has not necessarily allowed itself to be pressured into adopting the views of its major allies, particularly the USA. The relationship between the actors of the North and South has not yet reached the level of harmony that was achieved during the last two years of the 1970s. If these conditions persist, it is probable that Canada will not endorse a much higher percentage of the ACD resolutions in the near future than it did in 1988. This prediction is based on the fact that, in the past, Canada has consistently abstained on approximately 22 percent of the resolutions considered each year, and the majority of these resolutions were introduced by South bloc nations. Assuming that North-South relations continue to decline, it is probable that the number and ideological tone of the resolutions introduced by the Third World states will not decrease, and indeed, may increase in the future. The percentage of resolutions that Canada opposes or abstains on may increase, particularly if the ideological rhetoric of South bloc resolutions intensifies. This was a major concern of Ambassador Fortier's 1988 address to the UN's First Committee.

An intensified ideological split between North and South would reverse the progress that had begun in 1985 when East-West relations began to warm. It would weaken the UNGA's role in promoting global arms control and disarmament, and reduce the prospects for greater security at the level of international relations. This is a possibility that Canada views as unconstructive. Accordingly, Canada will probably attempt to bridge the gap between North and South actors in the multilateral ACD field, an area in which the UN plays a prominent role as a facilitator of deliberation.



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## APPENDIX I

Appendix I outlines the voting results on each of the 66 ACD resolutions considered by the UNGA in 1987. Canada's position on each resolution is indicated by the underlining of the appropriate category (In favour/Against/Abstained). Included in the tabulation is the resolution number, the lead sponsor for each resolution, and the resolution title. The asterisk beside various resolution numbers indicates those of which Canada was either a lead- or a co-sponsor.

## ACD RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNGA 42 \*\*

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
42/25	Mexico	Treaty of Tlatelolco	<u>147</u>	0	7
42/26A	Mexico	Cessation Of All Nuclear Tests	137	3	<u>14</u>
42/26B	Mexico	Cessation Of All Nuclear Tests	128	3	<u>22</u>
*42/27	NZ	Urgent Need For A CTB Treaty	<u>143</u>	2	8
42/28	Egypt	NWFZ In Middle East		Adopted Without Vote	
42/29	Pakistan	NWFZ In South Asia	<u>114</u>	3	36
42/30	Sweden	Excessively Injurious Conventional Weapons		Adopted Without Vote	
42/31	Bulgaria	Security Of NNWS Against Use Or Threat Of Nuclear Weapons	112	<u>18</u>	20
42/32	Pakistan	Assurance To NNWS Against Use Or Threat Of Nuclear Weapons	<u>151</u>	0	3
42/33	Sri Lanka	Prevention Of An Arms Race In Outer Space	<u>154</u>	1	0
42/34A	Madagas.	Denuclearization Of Africa	<u>151</u>	0	4

\*\* Note: This table records the official tallies of the votes taken at the time these resolutions were voted on. It does not record any corrections in the results that may have been requested by a delegation which expressed its desire to have its vote changed.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
42/34B	Madagas.	Nuclear Capability Of South Africa	140	4	<u>13</u>
42/35	Byeloru.	Prohibition Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction	135	1	<u>18</u>
42/36	Romania	Reduction Of Military Budgets		Adopted Without Vote	
*42/37A	Canada	Chemical & Bacterteriological Weapons		Adopted Without Vote	
42/37B	Austria	2nd Review Conference Of BW Convention		Adopted Without Vote	
42/37C	Austral.	Measures To Uphold CW Protocol of 1925		Adopted Without Vote	
*42/38A	UK	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	<u>115</u>	0	39
42/38B	Japan	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons		Adopted Without Vote	
42/38C	Austral.	Notification of Nuclear Tests	<u>147</u>	1	8
42/38D	Zimbabwe	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	<u>143</u>	0	13
42/38E	Denmark	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
42/38F	Iraq	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons	119	2	<u>32</u>
42/38G	China	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
42/38H	China	Nuclear Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
*42/38I	UK	Objective Information On Military Matters	<u>133</u>	0	12
42/38J	Czech.	Implementation of UNGA Disarmament Resolutions	128	2	<u>24</u>
42/38K	Sweden	Naval Arms & Disarmament	<u>154</u>	1	2

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
*42/38L	Canada	Prohibition Of Fissionable Material For Weapons Purposes (FIZZ)	<u>149</u>	1	6
*42/38M	USA	Compliance With Disarmament Agreements		Adopted Without Vote	
42/38N	Peru	Regional Conventional Disarmament	<u>154</u>	0	0
*42/380	Cameroon	UN's Role In Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
42/39A	Cyprus	Review & Implementation Of Concluding Document Of 12th Special Session Of UNGA	129	1	<u>23</u>
42/39B	India	Freeze On Nuclear Weapons	139	<u>12</u>	4
42/39C	India	Prohibition On Use of Nuclear Weapons	135	<u>17</u>	4
42/39D	Nepal	UN Regional Centre In Asia		Adopted Without Vote	
*42/39E	Belgium	Regional Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
*42/39F	FRG	Confidence-Building Measures Guidelines		Adopted Without Vote	
42/39G	Mexico	World Disarmament Campaign	146	1	<u>9</u>
42/39H	Mexico	Nuclear-Arms Freeze	140	<u>13</u>	2
42/39I	Nigeria	UN Fellowships On Disarmament	<u>156</u>	1	0
42/39J	Madagas.	UN Regional Centre For Peace & Disarmament In Africa		Adopted Without Vote	
42/39K	Peru	UN Regional Centre In Latin America		Adopted Without Vote	
42/40	Yugosl.	3rd UNGA Special Session On Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
42/41	Sri Lanka	World Disarmament Conference			Adopted Without Vote
42/42A	GDR	Non-Use Of Nuclear Weapons	125	<u>17</u>	12
42/42B	Iraq	Recommendations Of 10th Special Session Of UNGA	137	1	<u>14</u>
42/42C	Argent.	Cessation Of The Nuclear Arms Race	137	<u>13</u>	7
42/42D	Argent.	Prevention Of Nuclear War	140	3	<u>14</u>
42/42E	Czech.	International Cooperation For Disarmament	118	<u>18</u>	14
*42/42F	Canada	Verification In All Its Aspects			Adopted Without Vote
*42/42G	Bulgaria	Report Of Disarmament Commission			Adopted Without Vote
42/42H	Mongolia	Disarmament Week	133	0	<u>21</u>
42/42I	Mexico	Comprehensive Disarmament Program			Adopted Without Vote
42/42J	UK	UN Disarmament Studies			Adopted Without Vote
*42/42K	NethInd.	Report Of The Conference On Disarmament	<u>127</u>	0	28
42/42L	Yugos.	Report Of The Conference On Disarmament	135	5	<u>15</u>
42/42M	Yugos.	Recommendations Of 10th Special Session	142	<u>12</u>	3
*42/42N	Cameroon	Rationalization Of First Committee Work	<u>134</u>	0	20

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
42/43	Sri Lanka	Indian Ocean As A Zone Of Peace			Adopted Without Vote
42/44	Iraq	Israeli Nuclear Armament	97	2	<u>52</u>
*42/45	France	Relationship Between Disarmament & Development			Adopted Without Vote
42/90	Malta	On Security & Cooperation In Mediterranean Region			Adopted Without Vote
42/91	Poland	Preparation Of Societies For Life in Peace	128	0	<u>24</u>
42/92	Yugos.	Strengthening International Security	131	1	<u>23</u>
42/93	Poland	Comprehensive System Of International Peace and Security	76	12	<u>63</u>



## APPENDIX II

Appendix II outlines the voting results on each of the 72 ACD resolutions considered by the UNGA in 1988. Canada's position on each resolution is indicated by the underlining of the appropriate category (In favour/Against/Abstained). Included in the tabulation is the resolution number, the lead sponsor for each resolution, and the resolution title. The asterisk beside various resolution numbers indicates those of which Canada was either a lead- or a co-sponsor.

## ACD RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNGA 43 \*\*

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
43/62	Mexico	Treaty of Tlatelolco	<u>149</u>	0	5
43/63A	Mexico	Cessation Of All Nuclear Tests	137	3	<u>13</u>
43/63B	Mexico	Cessation Of All Nuclear Tests	128	3	<u>21</u>
*43/64	Austral	Urgent Need For A CTB Treaty	<u>146</u>	2	6
43/65	Egypt	NWFZ In Middle East		Adopted Without Vote	
43/66	Pakistan	NWFZ In South Asia	<u>116</u>	3	34
43/67	Sweden	Excessively Injurious Conventional Weapons		Adopted Without Vote	
43/68	Bulgaria	Security Of NNWS Against Use Or Threat Of Nuclear Weapons	117	<u>17</u>	16
43/69	Pakistan	Assurance To NNWS Against Use Or Threat Of Nuclear Weapons	<u>152</u>	0	3
43/70	Sri Lanka	Prevention Of An Arms Race In Outer Space	<u>154</u>	1	0

\*\* Note: This table records corrections requested by all states which wanted to change their votes after they were first recorded. Therefore, unlike the table in Appendix I, it does not record the official tallies recorded on the day on which a vote was recorded on a resolution.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
43/71A	Tanzania	Denuclearization Of Africa	<u>151</u>	0	4
43/71B	Tanzania	Nuclear Capability Of South Africa	138	4	<u>12</u>
43/72	Byeloru.	Prohibition Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction	<u>152</u>	0	2
43/73	Romania	Reduction Of Military Budgets		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/74A	Austral.	Measures to Uphold CW Protocol of 1925		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/74B	Austria	2nd Review Conference Of BW Convention		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/74C	Poland	Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons		Adopted Without Vote	
43/75A	Zimbabwe	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	<u>140</u>	0	13
43/75B	Zimbabwe	Relationship Between Disarmament & Development		Adopted without Vote	
43/75C	UK	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons		Adopted without Vote	
43/75D	Denmark	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
43/75E	China	Nuclear Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
43/75F	China	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/75G	GUK	Objective Information On Military Matters	<u>129</u>	0	11
43/75H	Ukraine	Implementation of UNGA Disarmament Resolutions	125	2	<u>26</u>
43/75I	Colombia	International Arms Transfers	<u>111</u>	0	39
43/75J	Iraq	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons	115	2	<u>31</u>

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
*43/75K	Canada	Prohibition Of Fissionable Material For Weapons Purposes (FIZZ)	<u>144</u>	1	7
43/75L	Sweden	Naval Arms & Disarmament	<u>153</u>	1	0
*43/75M	Norway	Seabed Treaty		Adopted without Vote	
43/75N	Sweden	Comprehensive UN Study On Nuclear Weapons	<u>142</u>	1	9
*43/75O	UK	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	<u>100</u>	0	49
*43/75P	France	CSBMs & Conventional Disarmament In Europe		Adopted Without Vote	
43/75Q	Nigeria	Prohibition on Dumping Radioactive Wastes for Hostile Purposes	<u>126</u>	1	12
*43/75R	Cameroon	UN's Role In Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	
43/75S	Peru	Regional Conventional Disarmament	<u>125</u>	0	24
43/75T	Tanzania	Dumping of Radioactive Wastes	141	0	<u>13</u>
43/76A	Cyprus	Disarmament & International Security	129	1	<u>21</u>
43/76B	Mexico	Freeze On Nuclear Weapons	135	<u>13</u>	3
43/76C	Mexico	World Disarmament Campaign	144	0	<u>10</u>
43/76D	Tanzania	UN Regional Centre For Peace & Disarmament In Africa		Adopted Without Vote	
43/76E	India	Prohibition On Use of Nuclear Weapons	133	<u>17</u>	4
43/76F	Nigeria	UN Fellowships On Disarmament		Adopted Without Vote	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
43/76G	Nepal	UN Regional Centre In Asia		Adopted Without Vote	
43/76H	Peru	UN Regional Centre In Latin America		Adopted Without Vote	
43/77A	India	Impact of Science & Technology On International Security	129	7	<u>14</u>
43/77B	Yugosl.	3rd Special Session On Disarmament (UNSSOD III)	<u>152</u>	0	2
*43/78A	Bahamas	Report Of Disarmament Commission		Adopted Without Vote	
43/78B	GDR	Non-Use Of Nuclear Weapons	127	<u>17</u>	6
43/78C	Czech.	International Cooperation For Disarmament	136	1	<u>13</u>
43/78D	Mexico	Climatic Effects Of Nuclear War	<u>145</u>	0	9
43/78E	Argent.	Cessation Of The Nuclear Arms Race	135	<u>13</u>	5
43/78F	Argent.	Prevention Of Nuclear War	136	3	<u>14</u>
43/78G	Mongolia	Disarmament Week		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/78H	FRG	Confidence-Building Measures Guidelines		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/78I	Nethlnd.	Report Of The Conference On Disarmament	<u>95</u>	0	55
43/78J	Romania	Economic & Social Consequences Of Arms Race	<u>143</u>	1	9
43/78K	Mexico	Comprehensive Disarmament Program		Adopted Without Vote	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
43/78L	Nigeria	1990s As 3rd Disarmament Decade		Adopted Without Vote	
43/78M	Yugosl.	Report Of The Conference On Disarmament	136	3	<u>14</u>
43/79	Sri Lanka	Indian Ocean As A Zone Of Peace		Adopted Without Vote	
43/80	Jordan	Israeli Nuclear Armament	99	2	<u>51</u>
*43/81A	USA	Verification in All Aspects: Compliance with ACD Agreements		Adopted Without Vote	
*43/81B	Sweden	Verification In All Aspects: Study On UN Role In The Field Of Verification	<u>150</u>	1	0
*43/82	UK	Implementation Of 3rd NPT Review Conference's Conclusions & Preparation For 4th Review Conference	<u>137</u>	0	11
43/83	Trinidad	Liability For Illegal Arms Transfers		Adopted Without Vote	
43/85	Malta	On Security & Cooperation In Mediterranean Region		Adopted Without Vote	
43/86	Cameroon	Strengthening Regional & International Peace & Security		Adopted Without Vote	
43/87	GDR	Need For Results Oriented Political Dialogue	127	1	<u>24</u>
43/88	Poland	Preparation Of Societies For Life In Peace	128	0	<u>24</u>
43/89	Yugosl.	Strengthening International Security	127	1	<u>23</u>
43/90	USSR	Comprehensive System Of International Peace and Security	<u>97</u>	3	45



## APPENDIX III

COMPARISON BETWEEN CANADA'S UNGA 42 ACD  
VOTING RESULTS AND 16 SELECTED COUNTRIES

## Country Coding System

Australia	Au	New Zealand	NZ
Canada	Ca	Norway	No
China	Ch	Romania	Ro
France	Fr	Sweden	Sw
West Germany	FRG	Soviet Union	USSR
India	In	United Kingdom	UK
Japan	Ja	United States	USA
Mexico	Me	Yugoslavia	Yu
Netherlands	Ne		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/25	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Au, Ca, Ch, FRG, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu, Ja, Ne		Fr	
42/26A	Cessation of All Nuclear Tests	Au, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Ca, Ch, FRG, Ja, Ne	
42/26B	Cessation of All Nuclear Tests	In, Me, Ro USSR, Yu	Fr, UK USA	Au, Ca, Ne, FRG, NZ, No, Sw, Ja	Ch
42/27	Urgent Need For A CTB Treaty	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, USA	Ch, In, UK	
42/28	NWFZ In Middle East		Adopted Without A Vote		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/29	NWFZ In South Asia	Au, Ca, Ch, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, Ro, UK, USA	In	Fr, No, USSR, Yu, Sw	
42/30	Excessively Injurious Conventional Weapons		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/31	Security of NNWS Against Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons	In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA	Ch, Sw	
42/32	Assurance to NNWS Against Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Uk, Yu		In, USA	
42/33	Prevention of an Arms Race In Outer Space	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu	USA		
42/34A	Denuclearization of Africa	Au, Ca, Ch, FRG, In, Ja Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Fr, UK, USA	
42/34B	Nuclear Capability of South Africa	Ch, In, Me, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Ca, FRG Ja, Ne, NZ, Au	
42/35	Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, UK	
42/36	Reduction of Military Budgets		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/37A	Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons		Adopted Without A Vote		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/37B	2nd Review Conference of BWC		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/37C	Measures to Uphold CW Protocol of 1925		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/38A	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA		In, Yu	
42/38B	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/38C	Notification of Nuclear Tests	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr	Ch, In, UK, USA, Me	
42/38D	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	Au, Ca, Ch, In, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Fr, FRG, Ne, UK, USA	
42/38E	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/38F	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons	Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG Ja, Ne, NZ, No, UK	
42/38G	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/38H	Nuclear Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/38I	Objective Information On Military Matters	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu		In	Ch
42/38J	Implementation of UNGA Resolutions on Disarmament	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No,	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Sw, UK Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/38K	Naval Arms and Disarmament	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu	USA	In	
42/38L	Prohibition of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes	Au, Ca, FRG Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr	Ch, In, UK, USA	
42/38M	Compliance with Disarmament Agreements		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/38N	Regional Conventional Disarmament	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu			
42/38O	UN's Role in Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/39A	Review and Implementation of Concluding Document of 12th Special Session of UNGA	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
42/39B	Freeze on Nuclear Weapons	In, Me, NZ No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Ca, Fr FRG, Ne UK, USA	Au, Ch, Ja	
42/39C	Prohibition on Use of Nuclear Weapons	Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA	Ja	
42/39D	UN Regional Centre in Asia		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/39E	Regional Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/39F	Confidence-Building Measures Guidelines		Adopted Without A Vote		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/39G	World Disarmament Campaign	Au, Ch, In, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	USA	Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, UK	
42/39H	Nuclear-Arms Freeze	Au, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, UK, USA	Ch	
42/39I	UN Fellowships on Disarmament	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu	USA		
42/39J	UN Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament in Africa		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/39K	UN Regional Centre in Latin America		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/40	3rd UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/41	World Disarmament Conference		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/42A	Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons	In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA, Fr	Ch	
42/42B	Recommendations of 10th Special Session of UNGA	Au, Ch, Fr, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, USSR, Yu		Ca, FRG, In, Ne, Sw, UK, USA	
42/42C	Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race	Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, No, UK, USA	Ja, NZ	
42/42D	Prevention of Nuclear War	Au, Ch, In, Me, NZ, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne, No	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/42E	International Cooperation for Disarmament	In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA	Sw	Ch
42/42F	Verification in All Its Aspects		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/42G	Report of Disarmament Commission		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/42H	Disarmament Week	In, Ja, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA	Ch
42/42I	Comprehensive Disarmament Program		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/42J	UN Disarmament Studies		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/42K	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK		In, Me, USA, Yu	
42/42L	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No	
42/42M	Recommendations of 10th Special Session	Au, Ch, In, Me, NZ, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, UK, USA	Ja, No,	
42/42N	Rationalization of First Committee Work	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA		Ch, In, Me, Yu	
42/43	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace		Adopted Without A Vote		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
42/44	Israeli Nuclear Armament	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
42/45	Relationship Between Disarmament & Development		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/90	On Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean Region		Adopted Without A Vote		
42/91	Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu		Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK, USA	
42/92	Strengthening International Security	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
42/93	Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security	In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	Fr, Ja, Ne, UK, USA	Au, Ca, Ch, FRG, NZ, No, Sw	

\* Under this heading, those countries which were either absent during the vote on a resolution, or those not to register a vote on a resolution are identified.



## APPENDIX IV

COMPARISON BETWEEN CANADA'S UNGA 43 ACD  
VOTING RESULTS AND 16 SELECTED COUNTRIES

## Country Coding System

Australia	Au	New Zealand	NZ
Canada	Ca	Norway	No
China	Ch	Romania	Ro
France	Fr	Sweden	Sw
West Germany	FRG	Soviet Union	USSR
India	In	United Kingdom	UK
Japan	Ja	United States	USA
Mexico	Me	Yugoslavia	Yu
Netherlands	Ne		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs*</u>
43/62	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Au, Ca, Ch, Frg, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu		Fr	
43/63A	Cessation of All Nuclear Tests	Au, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Ca, Ch, FRG, Ja, Ne	
43/63B	Cessation of All Nuclear Tests	In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Au, Ca FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw	Ch
43/64	Urgent Need For A CTBT	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, USA,	Ch, In UK	
43/65	NWFZ In Middle East		Adopted Without A Vote		

\* Note: Under Abs, those countries which were either Absent during the vote on a resolution, or chose not to register a vote on a resolution are identified.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/66	NWFZ In South Asia	Au, Ca, Ch, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, Ro, UK, USA	In	Fr, No, Sw, USSR, Yu	
43/67	Excessively Injurious Conventional Weapons		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/68	Security of NNWS Against Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons	In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, No, UK USA	Ch, NZ Sw	
43/69	Assurance to NNWS Against Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu		In, USA	
43/70	Prevention of an Arms Race In Outer Space	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu	USA		
43/71A	Denuclearization of Africa	Au, Ca, Ch, FRG, In, Ja Me, Ne, NZ No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Fr, UK, USA	
43/71B	Nuclear Capability of South Africa	Ch, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK USA	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne	
43/72	Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu		USA	
43/73	Reduction of Military Budgets		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/74A	Measures to Uphold CW Protocol of 1925		Adopted Without A Vote		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/74B	2nd Review Conference of BWC		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/74C	Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75A	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	Au, Ca, Ch, In, Ja, Me NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Fr, FRG, Ne, UK, USA	
43/75B	Relationship Between Disarmament and Development		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75C	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75D	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75E	Nuclear Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75F	Conventional Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75G	Objective Information On Military Matters	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu		In	Ch
43/75H	Implementation of UNGA Disarmament	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
43/75I	International Arms Transfers	Au, Ca, Fr FRG, Ja, Me Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu		Ch, In, USA	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/75J	Prohibition of Radiological Weapons	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
43/75K	FIZZ	Au, Ca, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr	Ch, In, UK, USA	
43/75L	Naval Arms and Disarmament	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu	USA		
43/75M	Seabed Treaty		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75N	Comprehensive UN Study on Nuclear Weapons	Au, Ca, In, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	USA	Fr, FRG, Ne, UK,	Ch
43/75O	Bilateral Nuclear-Arms Negotiations	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA		Me, In, Yu	
43/75P	CSBMs & Conventional Disarmament In Europe		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75Q	Prohibition on Dumping Radioactive Wastes for Hostile Purposes	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu			
43/75R	UN's Role in Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/75S	Regional Conventional Disarmament	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu		In, USA	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/75T	Dumping of Radioactive Wastes	Au, Ch, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, UK, USA	
43/76A	Disarmament and International Security	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
43/76B	Freeze on Nuclear Weapons	Au, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, UK, USA	Ch	
43/76C	World Disarmament Campaign	Au, Ch, In, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, UK, USA	
43/76D	UN Regional Centre in Africa		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/76E	Prohibition on Use of Nuclear Weapons	Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA	Ja	
43/76F	UN Fellowships on Disarmament		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/76G	UN Regional Centre in Asia		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/76H	UN Regional Centre in Latin America		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/77A	Impact of Science & Technology on International Security	Au, Ch, In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, FRG, UK, USA	Ca, Ja, Ne, NZ, No	
43/77B	3rd Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III)	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		UK, USA	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/78A	Report of Disarmament Commission		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/78B	Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons	In, Me, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, UK, USA		Ch
43/78C	International Cooperation for Disarmament	Au, In, Ja Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	USA	Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, UK	Ch
43/78D	Climatic Effects of Nuclear War	Au, Ca, Ch, In, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu		Fr, FRG Ne, UK, USA	
43/78E	Cessation of Nuclear-Arms Race	Ch, In, Me, NZ, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Ca, Fr, FRG, Ne, No, UK, USA	Au, Ja	
43/78F	Prevention of Nuclear War	Au, Ch, In, Me, NZ, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne, No	
43/78G	Disarmament Week		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/78H	CBMs Guidelines		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/78I	Report of CD	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK		In, Me, USA, Yu	
43/78J	Economic & Social Consequences of Arms Race	Au, Ca, Ch, In, Ja, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	USA	Fr, FRG, Ne, UK	
43/78K	Comprehensive Disarmament Program		Adopted Without A Vote		
43/78L	1990s as 3rd Disarmament Decade		Adopted Without A Vote		

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/78M	Report of CD	Au, Ch, In, Me, NZ, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Fr, UK, USA	Ca, FRG, Ja, Ne, No	
43/79	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace				Adopted Without A Vote
43/80	Israeli Nuclear Armament	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
43/81A	Compliance With ACD Agreements				Adopted Without A Vote
43/81B	Study on UN Role in the Field of Verification	Au, Ca, Ch, Fr, FRG, In, Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, Yu	USA		
43/82	Implementation of 3rd NPT Conclusions & Preparation for 4th NPT Review Conference	Au, Ca, FRG Ja, Me, Ne, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, UK, USA, Yu		In	Fr, Ch
43/83	Liability for Illegal Arms Transfers				Adopted Without A Vote
43/85	On Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean Region				Adopted Without A Vote
43/86	Strengthening Regional & International Peace & Security				Adopted Without A Vote
43/87	Need for Result- Oriented Political Dialogue	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	

<u>No.</u>	<u>Resolution Title</u>	<u>In Favour</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstained</u>	<u>Abs</u>
43/88	Preparation of Societies for Life	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu		Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK, USA	
43/89	Strengthening International Security	Ch, In, Me, Ro, USSR, Yu	USA	Au, Ca, Fr, FRG, Ja, Ne, NZ, No, Sw, UK	
43/90	Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security	Au, Ca, In, Me, NZ, No, Ro, Sw, USSR, Yu	Ja, USA	Ch, Fr, FRG, Ne, UK	
43/86	Prevention of Nuclear War				
43/87	Disarmament				
43/88	CBMs Guidelines				
43/89	Region of CD				
43/90	Regional Disarmament				
43/91	Regional Disarmament				
43/92	Regional Disarmament				
43/93	Regional Disarmament				
43/94	Regional Disarmament				
43/95	Regional Disarmament				
43/96	Regional Disarmament				
43/97	Regional Disarmament				
43/98	Regional Disarmament				
43/99	Regional Disarmament				

## APPENDIX V

Categories:

Rank (Rk); Country; percentage of similarity in voting results (%VS); the number of times each country and Canada voted similarly, including those resolutions that were AWV (VS); the number of times a country was absent for a vote when the vote was taken on a resolution by the UNGA (Ab); and the number of times each country and Canada voted dissimilarly (VDs).

**COMPARISON BETWEEN CANADA'S VOTING RECORD AND  
15 SELECTED COUNTRIES (1978-1986)**

<u>1978/UNGA 33</u>						<u>1979/UNGA 34</u>					
Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab	Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab
1	FRG	95.1	39	2	-	1	FRG	97.4	37	1	-
2	Holland	95.1	39	2	-	2	Holland	94.7	36	2	-
3	New Zealand	95.1	39	2	-	3	UK	92.1	35	3	-
4	UK	92.6	38	3	-	4	New Zealand	89.5	34	4	-
5	Holland	92.6	38	3	-	5	Norway	89.5	34	4	-
6	Australia	92.6	38	3	-	6	USA	86.8	33	5	-
7	Japan	92.5	37	3	1	7	France	86.8	33	5	-
8	USA	87.8	36	5	-	8	Japan	86.8	33	5	-
9	Sweden	87.8	36	5	-	9	Australia	84.2	32	6	-
10	Romania	85.4	35	6	-	10	Sweden	81.6	31	7	-
11	Mexico	82.9	34	7	-	11	China	78.8	26	7	5
12	France	80.5	33	8	-	12	Mexico	76.3	29	9	-
13	China	80.0	24	6	11	13	Romania	73.7	28	10	-
14	India	73.2	30	11	-	14	India	65.8	25	13	-
15	USSR	61.0	25	16	-	15	USSR	60.1	23	15	-

1980/UNGA 35

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab
1	FRG	93.0	40	3	-
2	Holland	93.0	40	3	-
3	Japan	90.7	39	4	-
4	New Zealand	88.4	38	5	-
5	Australia	86.0	37	6	-
6	Norway	83.4	36	7	-
7	France	81.4	35	8	-
8	China	80.6	29	7	7
9	UK	79.1	34	9	-
10	USA	76.7	33	10	-
11	Sweden	76.7	33	10	-
12	Mexico	69.8	30	13	-
13	Romania	69.8	30	13	-
14	India	60.5	26	17	-
15	USSR	55.8	24	19	-

1981/UNGA 36

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab
1	FRG	93.8	45	3	-
2	Japan	93.8	45	3	-
3	Australia	89.6	43	5	-
4	New Zealand	89.6	43	5	-
5	Holland	87.5	42	6	-
6	Norway	83.3	40	8	-
7	France	83.3	40	8	-
8	UK	81.3	39	9	-
9	China	77.1	27	8	13
10	USA	72.9	35	13	-
11	Sweden	72.9	35	13	-
12	Mexico	64.6	31	17	-
13	Romania	62.5	30	18	-
14	India	54.2	26	22	-
15	USSR	52.1	25	23	-

1982/UNGA 37

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab
1	New Zealand	96.6	56	2	-
2	Holland	94.8	55	3	-
3	FRG	93.1	54	4	-
4	Australia	93.1	54	4	-
5	Japan	87.9	51	7	-
6	Norway	87.9	51	7	-
7	France	84.2	48	9	1
8	UK	82.8	48	10	-
9	USA	75.9	44	14	-
10	China	67.4	29	14	15
11	Sweden	65.5	38	20	-
12	Romania	58.6	34	24	-
13	Mexico	51.7	30	28	-
14	India	46.6	27	31	-
15	USSR	44.8	26	32	-

1983/UNGA 38

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab
1	FRG	96.8	61	2	-
2	New Zealand	95.3	60	3	-
3	Holland	92.1	58	5	-
4	Japan	90.5	57	6	-
5	Norway	88.9	56	7	-
6	France	85.5	53	9	1
7	UK	81.0	51	12	-
8	Australia	79.4	50	13	-
9	USA	68.3	43	20	-
10	China	58.8	30	21	12
11	Sweden	58.7	37	26	-
12	Romania	50.8	32	31	-
13	Mexico	49.2	31	32	-
14	USSR	42.9	27	36	-
15	India	41.3	26	37	-

1984/UNGA 39

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab	
1	FRG	93.7	59	4	-	
2	Holland	92.1	58	5	-	
3	New Zealand	90.5	57	6	-	
4	Japan	87.3	55	8	-	
5	Norway	84.1	53	10	-	
6	France	83.9	52	10	1	
7	UK	81.0	51	12	-	
8	Australia	79.4	50	13	-	
9	USA	68.3	43	20	-	
10	Sweden	65.1	41	22	-	
11	China	60.0	36	24	3	
12	Romania	58.7	37	26	-	
13	Mexico	49.2	31	32	-	
14	India	49.2	31	32	-	
15	USSR	47.6	30	33	-	

1985/UNGA 40

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab
1	Holland	90.1	64	7	-
2	FRG	88.7	63	8	-
3	Norway	88.7	63	8	-
4	Japan	88.7	63	8	-
5	Australia	88.7	63	8	-
6	UK	78.9	56	15	-
7	Sweden	71.8	51	20	-
8	France	70.4	50	21	-
9	USA	69.0	49	22	-
10	Romania	57.7	41	30	-
11	China	60.6	40	26	5
12	Mexico	50.7	36	35	-
13	Yugoslavia	50.7	36	35	-
14	USSR	47.9	34	37	-
15	India	42.3	30	41	-

1986/UNGA 41

Rk	Country	%VS	VS	VDs	Ab	
1	Japan	92.8	64	5	-	
2	FRG	91.3	63	6	-	
3	Holland	89.9	62	7	-	
4	Norway	89.9	62	7	-	
5	Australia	87.0	60	9	-	
6	UK	75.4	52	17	-	
7	Sweden	75.4	52	17	-	
8	France	68.1	47	22	-	
9	China	65.7	44	23	2	
10	Romania	62.3	43	26	-	
11	USA	59.4	41	28	-	
12	Mexico	58.0	40	29	-	
13	Yugoslavia	58.0	40	29	-	
14	USSR	55.1	38	31	-	
15	India	50.0	34	34	1	

1985/1984  
1985/1984

1985/1984  
1985/1984

RK	Country	SVS	SV	SVS	RK	Country	SVS	SV	SVS
1	New Zealand	96.0	85	90.1	1	FRG	93.0	84	88.0
2	Holland	91.0	82	88.0	2	Holland	91.0	82	88.0
3	FRG	89.0	80	88.0	3	New Zealand	90.0	81	88.0
4	Australia	87.0	78	88.0	4	Japan	87.0	78	88.0
5	Japan	86.0	77	88.0	5	Norway	86.0	77	88.0
6	Norway	85.0	76	88.0	6	France	85.0	76	88.0
7	France	84.0	75	88.0	7	UK	84.0	75	88.0
8	UK	83.0	74	88.0	8	Australia	83.0	74	88.0
9	USA	82.0	73	88.0	9	USA	82.0	73	88.0
10	China	81.0	72	88.0	10	Sweden	81.0	72	88.0
11	Sweden	80.0	71	88.0	11	China	80.0	71	88.0
12	Romania	79.0	70	88.0	12	Romania	79.0	70	88.0
13	Yugoslavia	78.0	69	88.0	13	Mexico	78.0	69	88.0
14	USSR	77.0	68	88.0	14	USSR	77.0	68	88.0
15	India	76.0	67	88.0	15	India	76.0	67	88.0
16	USSR	75.0	66	88.0	16	USSR	75.0	66	88.0

1985/1984

1985/1984

RK	Country	SVS	SV	SVS	RK	Country	SVS	SV	SVS
1	New Zealand	96.0	85	90.1	1	Japan	93.0	84	88.0
2	Holland	91.0	82	88.0	2	FRG	91.0	82	88.0
3	FRG	89.0	80	88.0	3	Holland	89.0	80	88.0
4	Australia	87.0	78	88.0	4	Norway	87.0	78	88.0
5	Japan	86.0	77	88.0	5	Australia	86.0	77	88.0
6	Norway	85.0	76	88.0	6	UK	85.0	76	88.0
7	France	84.0	75	88.0	7	Sweden	84.0	75	88.0
8	UK	83.0	74	88.0	8	France	83.0	74	88.0
9	USA	82.0	73	88.0	9	China	82.0	73	88.0
10	China	81.0	72	88.0	10	Romania	81.0	72	88.0
11	Sweden	80.0	71	88.0	11	USA	80.0	71	88.0
12	Romania	79.0	70	88.0	12	Mexico	79.0	70	88.0
13	Yugoslavia	78.0	69	88.0	13	Yugoslavia	78.0	69	88.0
14	USSR	77.0	68	88.0	14	USSR	77.0	68	88.0
15	India	76.0	67	88.0	15	India	76.0	67	88.0
16	USSR	75.0	66	88.0	16	USSR	75.0	66	88.0



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