

# STATEMENT DISCOURS

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SECRÉTAIRE  
D'ÉTAT AUX  
AFFAIRES  
EXTÉRIEURES.



ADDRESS BY THE  
HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MACÉACHEN,  
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,  
TO THE  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT,  
GENEVA,  
FEBRUARY 1ST, 1983

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## MUTUAL SECURITY: NEGOTIATIONS IN 1983

May I first extend to you, Mr. Chairman, my congratulations on assuming the chair for the first month of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. I should also like to extend to Ambassador Garcia Robles my congratulations on his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. The Peace Prize is much more than a personal honour; it is a symbol of the devotion to peace that must be at the heart of our collective work.

I recall the message of the late Lester B. Pearson, a friend and Cabinet colleague of mine, when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. He said that in the nuclear age nations face a choice between peace and extinction. In the twenty-five years since then, nuclear war has been avoided, but at the cost of an awesome build-up of nuclear arms. The horrible instruments of destruction, so terrifying in the 1950s, have been replaced by new and more deadly successors. The threat of a sudden, total collapse into nuclear suicide has been overlaid with an equally chilling prospect of suicide by stages, of nuclear war that could never be "won".

The Government of Canada believes that 1983 must be a crucial year in reviving the momentum of arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Just a little over a year ago there were no negotiations on nuclear weapons. Since then, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and more recently have resumed talks on strategic nuclear arms (START). The emphasis not just on limitations but on reductions is most welcome.

Recently, there have been signs that the negotiating process is beginning to work. The leaders of both superpowers have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to serious negotiations. Proposals have been made by both sides, some of which have been vigorously promoted in public. A greater sense of urgency appears to be developing. In the meantime, both superpowers continue to agree informally to abide by the main provisions of the SALT agreements.

This is not the forum for those negotiations, though we all realize that unless concrete progress is achieved in those talks, our collective fate will be at risk no matter how much may be achieved in this forum. What we can draw from past experience is a fundamental conclusion that must apply if arms control and disarmament negotiations -- bilateral or multilateral -- are to succeed.

An increase in mutual security is the only sound basis for effective arms control and disarmament. As Prime Minister Trudeau stressed at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament, security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis. Attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work. Security is a matter of weaponry but also of perception and confidence. Action by one side which is perceived by the other to be threatening creates or widens a gulf of suspicion. Action produces reaction, and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain. Both suffer from the effort and the political relationship is poisoned. Arms control negotiations offer an escape from this danger only if the parties accept as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It follows from this that an attempt by any power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity.

While this may be a home truth, it is directly relevant to the current situation. The origins and evolution of the INF talks illustrate the point.

In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20 missile. The North Atlantic Alliance was understandably concerned by this new threat to the territory of several European member states. Moreover the Soviet Union and the United States were at that time working towards codification of a balance in intercontinental nuclear weapons.

Thus, in December 1979, NATO members, including Canada, took what has become known as the "two-track" decision. We agreed to deploy Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, beginning in late 1983. Canada has since been asked to help test the cruise missile guidance system. Second, NATO proposed negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit land-based intermediate-range missile systems on both sides. So began the dynamic leading to the INF talks.

Since 1979, progress has been made, but much too slowly. The Soviet Union was sharply critical of the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range missiles in response to the SS-20 missiles, and initially was reluctant to take part in negotiations. Subsequently, the Soviet Union agreed to preliminary discussions in the autumn of 1980. Formal negotiations began in November 1981.

The period since November 1981 has been marked by exchanges of concrete proposals. The negotiations have been conducted seriously and have made some progress. Given the underlying need to take into account the legitimate security concerns of both sides, NATO ministers have agreed that this requirement could best be met through the elimination of all existing Soviet and planned United States' missiles in this class. We have also confirmed our earlier decision to begin deploying the missiles at the end of 1983, unless there were concrete results from the negotiations. We are willing to give full consideration to any serious Soviet proposals that would enhance the chances for effective and verifiable agreements.

Recently, the Soviet Union made a proposal concerning possible reductions of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. While the proposal is unacceptable in many respects, it appears to recognize that NATO governments have a legitimate concern about the number of SS-20s aimed at their European member states, and that a reduction is necessary.

This in itself is progress. However, it is not yet clear both sides have accepted that mutual security must be the basis of the negotiations. That is why 1983 is crucial.

Canada has a large stake in the INF negotiations. We intend to press vigorously the following basic approach:

- Canada places its full weight behind the negotiations. We strongly support a negotiated solution that will make deployment of the missiles in Europe unnecessary.
- Likewise, in the absence of concrete results in the negotiations, Canada considers that there is no viable alternative to deployment of the missiles.
- Every serious proposal must be seriously examined. By the same token, propaganda ploys must not be permitted to undermine serious negotiations.
- Statements aimed at public opinion cannot be a substitute for genuine willingness to reach an agreement.

-- Increased mutual security must be accepted as the fundamental consideration in the negotiating process.

Despite the obstacles, the Canadian Government is convinced that these negotiations can demonstrate in 1983 that the arms control and disarmament process can be made to work.

1983 is also a year of opportunity for the Committee on Disarmament. Public concern about the issues is high. The need for early action is clear, and mutual security is also the foundation for our work here.

I see encouraging signs in this Committee since I was first responsible for Canadian foreign policy some seven years ago.

The presence now of China and France along with the other three nuclear weapon states is the most striking and hopeful development.

The growth in size of this negotiating body, while at first glance sobering, is also encouraging. More widespread representation from all parts of the world in a body devoted to arms control and disarmament is a positive development despite the complications this inevitably introduces for a negotiating forum. Governments in all regions have a direct interest -- and a corresponding responsibility -- in contributing to the global quest for a more secure world.

Working groups have been established on certain key subjects. The increasing participation of technical experts is another significant development.

These have been positive steps, but we must demonstrate to the world that this is a serious negotiating body which can produce concrete results.

How can we ensure that the real work of negotiation is pressed with vigour? The negotiating table is full of proposals, but they must be translated into agreements. The recent Prague Declaration referred to the work of this Committee in an extended way. As I said in Ottawa last week, any aspects of these proposals which would lead to progress towards concrete and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements will receive our support,

but I want to single out particular issues on which Canada believes progress should be made in 1983.

The pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is a fundamental nuclear issue before this Committee. We were pleased by the establishment last year of a working group in the Committee on a nuclear test ban, but we were disappointed that, having waited so long for consensus, the Committee did not move quickly to begin substantive work. I urge that this new working group begin to discharge its mandate as a matter of urgency in 1983.

Another promising avenue is the ad hoc group of seismic experts. Since its inception in 1976, it has been developing an international seismic data exchange system which will be an international verification mechanism forming part of the provisions of an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. At the second UN Special Session on Disarmament last year, Prime Minister Trudeau called for it to become fully operational at an early date and in advance of a treaty. Canada has committed resources to enable us to become a full participant in the exchange. We are convinced that the early entry into operation of the data exchange would be an effective way to make progress towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban.

This step-by-step approach can ensure that key elements of a treaty are in place even before the final political commitment to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. This process can develop a momentum toward the conclusion of a treaty and can be complementary to the necessary negotiations among nuclear weapon states.

I take this opportunity of drawing to the attention of this Committee an equally high Canadian priority for 1983, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons through the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT emphasizes the non-discriminatory transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. It also provides for the de-escalation of the arms race on the part of nuclear weapon states and for the rapid and effective movement towards disarmament. More states have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, such voluntary renunciation has not been matched by corresponding action by the nuclear weapon states to halt the build-up of nuclear weapons. Only tangible moves by the superpowers will demonstrate the sincerity of their commitment to non-proliferation. Those of us with nuclear

technology and those without must seek to persuade the nuclear weapon states to live up to their bargain to which they are committed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Canada is prepared to seek international consensus on the development of principles which would result in a more universal and effective approach to non-proliferation. Such principles should include a formal renunciation of nuclear explosive devices and an agreement to permit the safeguarding of all nuclear activities throughout the entire range of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is fundamental to the creation of a stable and permanent non-proliferation régime. Under such conditions, bilateral nuclear commitments could then be subsumed into a truly equitable and responsible international order.

I suggest that the time has come for genuine movement towards the realization of these objectives.

Arms control and disarmament also must extend to non-nuclear weapon systems, some of which are as potentially horrifying as nuclear weapons.

The time is right for progress this year towards a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We intend to participate vigorously along with others in seeking to realize the maximum from the present opportunity.

Continuing Canadian research on defensive measures enables us to put forward suggestions on such aspects as the verification provisions of a treaty banning chemical weapons. Canada has contributed working papers. We have allocated funds to enable Canadian technical experts to participate here in Geneva for longer periods beginning with the 1983 session. Expertise from many countries, including non-members, has been brought to bear in this Committee on the complex issues involved. The achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons again illustrate that work in this body can complement bilateral negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, another area for progress is the subject of weapons for use in outer space. This issue has been described as the first arms control problem of the twenty-first century. I urge the Committee to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal

régime. Canada contributed to this objective in a working paper tabled here last summer. Verification is likely to loom large, as it does for a nuclear test ban and a chemical weapons ban. The expanding programme of verification research in Canada will seek to identify possible solutions. We intend to participate actively in this work. It is the view of my Government that it is time to establish a working group on this subject.

Mr. Chairman, I have focussed on four important issues, four Canadian priorities for 1983, on which I wished to put Canada's position strongly:

- Canada will press for progress toward the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
- Canada will press for a more effective non-proliferation régime;
- Canada will press for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons;
- Canada will press for progress towards the objective of prohibiting all weapons for use in outer space.

These are issues where there are prospects for genuine progress and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security.

Recent years have not been propitious for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. Yet the process has continued and is again beginning to show hopeful signs. Public statements by world leaders have underlined that the arms spiral is a major worldwide danger and that the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements is vital. There is room for optimism if arms control and disarmament negotiations are based on realism. Mutual security is our common goal.