





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


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Thoughtful THE Doubtful Refers

Mysterious Congress.

A

LETTER from *Aix la Chappel,*

DETECTING

The Late Secret Negotiations there ;
Accounting for the Extraordinary Slowness
of the Operations of the Campaign since
the Action at DETTINGEN ; and, *parti-*
cularly, for the Resignation of the E—l of
S—R.

WITH

Many other curious *Particulars* relating to
the present Broils of EUROPE.

By a NOBLEMAN, distinguished for *Integrity* and
Consummate Knowledge in *Public Affairs.*



L O N D O N :

Printed for M. COOPER, in *Pater-noster-row.* 1743.

[Price Six Pence.]

1870

Jan 1st

to

Jan 2nd

to

Jan 3rd

to

Jan 4th

to

Jan 5th

to

Jan 6th

to

Jan 7th

to

Jan 8th

to

Jan 9th

to

Jan 10th

to

Jan 11th

T H E
Mysterious Congress.

S I R,

Aix la Chappel, $\frac{21}{14}$ September, 1743.

OUR Water Drinkers here this Season seem to verryfy the political Fiction concerning the Waters of *Lethe*; for all is Life and Spirit, Gaity and Mirth, Profusion and Expençe, just as if the present melancholy Scene in *Europe* had been the Reverse of what it is. There seems to be no Memory, no ideal Traces of the late and present Distractions and Devastations in these *once* happy Regions of *Germany*; and even the native *Germans* themselves seem as insensible of the Miseries of their Country as we Foreigners, and appear not a whit more anxious about the dreadful Consequences of the *present* dangerous Schemes of the contending Courts.

I was many Days in Suspence concerning this general Spirit of Gaity and Insensibility; I could not suppose it to be altogether spontaneous, tho' it wore the Appearance of Nature, because it appeared to me unnatural,

that a numerous Company of People, composed of Individuals of all the different Nations of *Europe*, should be actuated at one time with the same identical particular Passion: Such, in Reality, it appears throughout the whole People here at present. The richer Tradesman, the Artificer and Peasant seem as unattentive to *Cares* and *Sorrow* as the *Baron*, the *Count* or *Prince*. This happy Propensity to Pleasures and Forgetfulness is not more conspicuous among the Youth than the Aged, nor among the Men of Dress and Gallantry, than the Men of Business, Politics and Intrigue. In short, 'tis one universal Calm all over the Place, one general Suspension from all manner of Functions that employ the Head, or affect the Heart.

This general, but unusual Serenity, made me suspect it rather artificial than natural, notwithstanding the uncommon Warmth and Clearness of the Air, which undoubtedly continue to inspire Mirth and Chearfulness. I know you will look upon this Suspicion of mine to be owing to an Oddity in my Temper, or to that Propensity to Speculation, which you often told me would create me much Occupation and Trouble in the Course of my Life. All I shall say in my own Defence, is, that my Oddity or Propensity to speculating has often been of Use to me in tracing out *Truth*, when it appeared so enveloped as to seem out of the Reach of human Understanding; and that any Trouble attend-

ing

ing such Researches as mine, even while they subsist, is more than compensated by the Leachery of *Expectation*, which you, my Friend, as much as any Man in *Europe*, know by Experience, to be beyond that of *Fruition* itself.

To indulge, then, an odd Turn of Thought, which is always attended with Delight to myself, I resolved to pry narrowly into the Life and Conversation of the foreign Ministers, of whom we have here as many as would form a Congress for a general Peace. I did not think it impossible to find amongst some of these refine Statesmen the Source whence all the seeming careless Allacrity of this Place imperceptibly issued. You may be sure my Attention was first and principally fixt on the Minister of *France*, who affects to be valedudinary more than many others less florid in the Face, and more advanced in Years. I was encouraged in the Experiment the more, that I could not be persuaded that so many Ministers had flocked hither, fortuitously, at one and the same time: You are acquainted with the Names of those who are come hither from the *Hague*; but the secret *Plenipo's* far exceed these in Number. I don't know a principal Power in *Europe* that has not a Minister here, tho' their Characters be known to very few. They are all Invalids, visit to make the Waters pass, and converse to pass away the time. Thus, perhaps, is the most important Negotiation that ever *Europe* carried

ried on imperceptibly in the Face of the World, under the Pretext of Recreation and Amusement.

My chiefest Care, as I hinted, was employed to be minutely informed of the Actions of the Marquis de F——n. I had him watched Night and Day, and mixed in all public Company he frequented. I was the most assiduous of his Visitors, the most voluble of his *Gazetteers*, and the loudest in Praise of his own particular Maxims, and those of his Court. You won't wonder, if, by these Means, and my being subject to a Prince disinterested in the present Broils of *Europe*, but by Inclination, suspected to wish well to *France*, I came to be looked upon, if not as a Confident, at least as one not to be suspected for Partiality, or of an Intention to acquire Information, in order to communicate it abroad. In this Light was I viewed by that Nobleman; in this Light am I still viewed by him and all his Acquaintance: I am looked upon as a neutral Person, and am often chosen a Mediator to adjust Matters between jarring Politicians. The Partizans of *Bourbon* and *Austria* have frequent Recourse to my Impartiality. You see, my Friend, your old Chum is become the Man of Consequence, when and where you would least expect it: But the only Pleasure I receive from my being this *Homme de Consequence*, is, that I am thereby the better enabled to amuse you, at least, if not satisfy your Curiosity.

One need not be on so good Terms as I am with the principal Ministers here, and particularly with the *Imperial*, the *French* and the *Spanish*, not to perceive that Water-drinking was not the principal Inducement of assembling so many Statesmen together: Nor could I, without betraying too great Supineness, overlook the Politics of the Marquis de F——n particularly, to whose Address may be ascribed that general Serenity or Unthoughtfulness, so obvious in every Face but his own, where *Thought* and *Care*, tho' imperceptible to the Multitude, seem to me to have erected their Thrones. You may perceive himself sensible, that the Disquietudes of the Heart do work up into the Countenance, for he is incessantly making Faces and complaining of Pains he does not feel, to colour the Unevenness which but too apparently denote Solitude of Mind: But all his Demeanor, all his Looks and Motions are so apt and well-seasoned, that few read his inward Perturbations.

Thus, Sir, has this Minister, by the sole Force of his Address, been able, not only to hide his own Uneasiness and Anxiety, but even when he laboured most under them, to inspire all who converse with him or see him, with Content and Serenity of Mind. All the Ministers of his Party are in the Secret, or act as if they were; for they are, like him, eternally promoting some trifling Amusement or other, and inculcating the
Happiness

Happiness and Necessity of unbending the Mind sometimes and forgetting Cares. To be at one of our Evening Circles, sometimes, you would imagine yourself at old *Athens* among a Set of *Epicureans*. To pass calmly thro' Life, to gratify the Senses reasonably; in short, to go down, smoothly and unruffled, the Stream of this World, is the Doctrine propagated at every Table, and seems to be that which is imbibed and followed by all Orders here. The Affectation of being in the Mode is so prevalent, that you won't wonder if the happy Infection be now become universal, tho', as I have said above, I look upon it to be solely owing to the Address of Monsieur *F——n*.

You will naturally ask, to what End or Use could this Scheme of general Serenity be to that Statesman, supposing he came with a View to negotiate some important Treaty? I answer, to cover his Intentions, and prevent the Interruptions necessarily attending public Negotiation. But here has been, besides, more Necessity for Disguise than ever was known on other Occasions: For though there seems to be a general Negotiation for consolidating all the present Disputes of *Europe* generally; yet am I confident there are two other more secret Negotiations going on, where the profoundest Secrecy is necessarily observed, because they directly thwart each other: And out of these again spring lesser negotiating Shoots, regarding the particular Interest

terest of Individuals, which require no less the Mask of Secrecy. Where there are above thirty Ministers, and all are Acting and Counter-acting; where all are in Motion, yet where all would be thought to be in none; where all are diffident of each other, and would seem to confide with the greatest Implisness in each other; where, in short, there is so much a doing, and so little Appearance of Business, you will suppose that the refinest Strokes of the Ministerial Art are practiced.

The Situation of Affairs in *Europe*, particularly in the Empire, required a Negotiation; but how to begin one was the Difficulty. The *Dutch* declined the Mediation offered by the Emperor and *France*; the *Venetians* excuse themselves; and the Pope would not be relished by *England* particularly, and some other Protestant Powers in *Germany*. The Northern Powers were too intent upon their own Affairs to be troubled or intrusted with those of others. Thus were Matters circumstanced till after the late Action at *Dettingen*, which made it more necessary for *France* particularly, to hasten the setting a general Negotiation on foot.

To consider the Opportunity thrown in the Way of *France*, from the Blunders of the Confederate Army, to put an End to the War, glorious to her own Cause, one can't but admire the secret Workings of Providence, who delights to damp the Presump-

tion of Man, by rendering the most feasible of his Schemes abortive. Never were Generals more infatuated, than those who gave so great Advantages to a superior Enemy; but never was so great Advantage so ill improved. What an *Italian* Nobleman here said on that Occasion, though in very few Words, seems to express very aptly the Characters of the Generals of both Armies: *The Fools escaped, because they had to deal with Mad-men.* One Observation naturally arises from the Poignancy of these lively-drawn Characters, if true, *viz.* That *Fools* seldom improve, but the *Mad* have their Intervals: And a Review of the different Motions of these Armies, since the Affair of *Dettingen*, will rather confirm than efface the Truth of this Observation.

The *French*, as if recovered from the Frenzy, which obstructed their blasting at one Blow all the Hopes of the Courts of *Vienna* and *London*, prudently retired, not only to cover their own Country, threatened with a mighty Invasion, but to take all Excuse from *England* particularly, for attacking her in consequence of her Guaranty of the *Pragmatic Sanction*. On this Side there are visible Marks of Sense and military Conduct; but is it so on the other? I am afraid not; at least it does not appear to indifferent Spectators, that the Allied Commanders have improved the Advantages they had after the Retreat of the *French* over the *Rhine*.

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It is supposed the Operations of the Campaign were settled at *Hanau* when Prince *Charles* was there. The Plan, they say, was that young Prince's; which I very much doubt, because I can't suppose he would be Author of a Plan, whatever he might do to agree to it in *Deference to a useful Ally*, that should lay himself under inseparable Difficulties. It might be Policy in one who intended to temporize, whose Views tended rather to carrying Points at *home*, than making Conquests on *France*, and who perhaps had seen so much of Danger at *Dettingen*, that he had no Stomach to more: I say, in such a one it might be Policy to divide the Forces, in order to lessen the Weight of the Attack, and to send the Prince where he must expect to meet with the greatest Resistance, or pass the fairest Season in Inaction. Thus, and in no other Light, can the Conduct of the Commanders of the Allied Armies be accounted for.

For to suppose that *England* was in Earnest, and that Prince *Charles* had the Direction of forming the Plan of Operation; to suppose that young Hero a free Agent, and to act as he has done, would be to suppose, that he is a mere Novice in his Profession, or that, being enamoured with the Sweets of Hazard and Difficulty, he scorned to conquer by the obvious and easy Methods of War.—When that Prince was at *Hanau*, he might with more Ease march down than

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up the *Rhine*. By marching down, he commanded the Passage of the River, and was at Hand to second, or be seconded, in forcing the Way into the Territories of *France*. But what Advantages could be proposed by his marching into a sterile Country up the River, supposing he had been sure of passing it, that he might not hope for, had he descended and joined or approached the combined Army? There were none, there could be none in View. The Attack upon *Alsace* by both Armies united, would be more violent and secure, than it possibly would or can by their being separated, and at so great a Distance from each other. The Speculatists in military Affairs spoke loudly of Misconduct, when the Intention of such a Separation of the Armies was first made public: And did not they condemn upon good Grounds? Does not the Event prove the Rectitude of the Condemnation? Has not that impolitic Measure afforded the *French* breathing Time? Have not they had, by that single Step, Leisure to encrease their Armies in *Alsace*, fortify their Lines, fortify and supply their Towns; and, what is yet of more Consequence, to recover from their Panic? Seasons are to be observed in all Affairs of Life, but especially in War, where a Day, sometimes an Hour unimproved, always retards, and often obstructs the Execution of the best laid Schemes.

But

But to consider that Separation of these Armies in another obvious Light, how fatal may it prove? To that commanded in Person by a Warlike King, may it not be dreaded that it will risk too much in retreating, should it be thought impracticable to attack the *French* in their Lines? or should this Army attack and fail, where is the Resource, when Prince *Charles* is at so great a Distance? Luck and Chance, that had preserved that Army at *Dettingen*, may still accompany it; but without some such supernatural Aid, or unless the *French* are still mad enough to slip Opportunity, as they did on the Banks of the *Mayn*, there is an Appearance that there may be Cause for regretting the Separation, and for saying, that even the Wise are not always prudent. The Case may be still worse with the Army near *Friburgh* and *Brisac*, should it not be able to pass the River, or should the combined Army at *Spire* meet with any Check. The Country about *Friburgh*, at best is barren; but after so long a Stay, of so great an Army, we must suppose it quite exhausted. What then must become of the Army there, supposing it cannot pass the River, before the Army below separates to go into Winter Quarters? The Prince can't possibly winter his Army in the *Brisgau*; he dare not attempt wintering in *Alsace* if he could, when perhaps the combined Army is at so great a Distance as the *Netherlands*; and to march back to the *Austrian* hereditary

But

tary Countries, which he must necessarily do, in an advanced Season, will exceedingly harrass the Whole, perhaps destroy a good Part of his Army.

But may not that young Prince run yet a greater Hazard? May not the *French* be not only strong enough to prevent his visiting them, but to pay him an unwelcome Visit, when he is most harrassed, most in Want, and least able to receive unwelcome Guests, as he would wish? Such a decisive Stroke is to be dreaded, if the combined Army make not more vigorous Efforts than they seem inclined to hitherto; and infallibly must happen, should *Noailles* join *Cogni*, leaving the combined Army intangled with Fortresses, or inclined to put an unmeaning, inglorious End to a Campaign, begun with no View to the Aggrandizement of the House of *Austria*, tho' otherwise given out for carrying Points at home.

These, inauspicious as they may seem, are but Consequences that might have been apprehended and foreseen very naturally from a *Separation*, which all the World condemned, as being repugnant to all the Maxims of War, and, indeed, to all Maxims of sound Policy. The Inaction of the Royal Army: (an Epithet of Distinction) which has been hitherto accounted for, as owing to the Slowness of the *Dutch* Troops, will be now without Excuse, those Troops being joined, at least come so near as to be depended upon, in

case

case they have no secret Orders to be on the *Defensive* only. I shall have Occasion hereafter, perhaps, to observe upon the Policy of the wary *Dutch*; but before I quit this Subject of the *Separation*, let me do Justice to the Nobleman who lately commanded the *B——sh* Troops in the Field: I should have said *nominally*; for such it seems his Command was for some Weeks before he resigned.

The Velt Marshal, Count of *S——r*, was thought by some to have projected and advised that memorable March to *Aschaffembourg*, which had like to have proved fatal to his Prince and the whole combined Army. But when that important Transaction came to be discussed and minutely scrutinized, it appeared so far from being a Measure of that Nobleman's, that it had been taken entirely against his Opinion. That March was a Measure solely *H——n*; as, indeed, most Measures have been, since that Army took the Field. What is certain is, that Lord *S——r* merited greater Confidence than was reposed in him, on many Accounts, but particularly for contributing more than any other whatever, to the Escape at *Dettingen*; and for having advised following the Blow, and attacking the *French* the Day after the Action, when the *Hessians* and *Hanoverians* at *Hanau* might, if ordered, have joined time enough. It is indisputable that the Advice was eligible and consummate, considering

ing how high in Spirits the combined Army was, and how Cress-fallen and disconcerted that of Monsieur *Noailles*: Nor is it unlikely that the same Politics, or *Panic*, which I observed might have influenced the Resolution of separating the Armies, had prevailed on this Occasion: For when the Heart is once strongly seized with any Passion, there is scarce any Prospect of Advantage can remove the contracted Prejudice. Even the strongest Efforts of Reason are too feeble to efface it.

Those who had endeavoured to have fastened the March to *Ascheffenbourg* on Lord *S_____*, would likewise fix upon him as Author of the *Separation* of the Armies, after the Public cried out against that Measure. This last malicious Fiction was not swallowed, at least here, as glibly as the first. We were now convinced that he was against the March to *Ascheffenbourgh*, was for pushing the Advantage at *Dettingen*, and that he advised attacking Marshal *Noailles* the Day after, since he was not permitted to pursue the flying *French*; therefore it would be difficult to persuade us, that he, who had dissuaded against the March, and advised the Attack, could be capable of advising the *Separation*; a Measure so obviously destructive of the Scheme concerted between the Courts of *London* and *Vienna*, and so self-evidently against all the Rules of War or Reason.

No, Sir, that Lord was not so much as consulted on that important Occasion; nor, indeed, was he called upon for Advice in any Affair of Moment ever since the Arrival of the — in the Field. Whether any ill Offices had been done that Nobleman before; or, whether after the Arrival, the *Hanoverians* had found Means to ingross the R—— Heart and Ear; or, whether rather, the noble Lord had reasoned and advised with too great Sincerity and Freedom, without paying that Deference to the foreign Generals, which perhaps was expected by themselves and *others*; whichever of these was the Reason, I can't say, but it is currently believed here, and was, long before his Dismission, that he stood but indifferently, when there was most Reason for him to hope, he should be best received. The Word *Dismission* here might more properly be supplied by that of *Resignation*, which was undoubtedly the Case, if our Intelligence at *Aix* be well founded. My Lord requested to be dismissed, and his Requests was as readily granted as it was earnestly made; it being not at all improbable, that the K—— and the L—— were heartily glad to be asunder. Few Princes love the Liberty of some Servants; and there are no honest Servants who can, or ought to help or correct Nature, when, perhaps, their own Honour, the Safety of the Prince himself, and the Good of their Country, depend,

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in some Measure, on their virtuous Plainness and Tenaciousness.

A Chief General of an Army being accountable, at least to his Honour and Character, for the Operations of the Campaign, has a Right to the principal Direction of all military Affairs, while the Troops are in the Field; and it may be said too, with equal Propriety, that he has a Right to the Confidence of his Prince. If he was thought worthy of the Chief Command, surely he must be deemed worthy also of Trust and Confidence: There seems to be a reciprocal Obligation between the Prince and General: The Zeal and Affection of the one exact the Favour, and Confidence of the other; therefore, whenever the latter fails, the first necessarily ceases. I may do a Man no ill Office, because he does not confide in me; but I doubt whether my Christianity would carry me so far as to be warm and zealous in his Interest, when I was convinced, from undeniable Evidence, that I was not only indifferent, but even obnoxious in his Eyes.

Our Speculatists here, tho' 'tis thought we have some of the most refined in *Europe*, seem not a little puzzled to account for the Conduct that is supposed to have produced the Resignation of that noble *Veteran* in the Midst of a Campaign; and, in Appearance, at the Eve of a general Action. They think the Provocation must be very gross that could drive a gallant old Officer to act a Part that would

would be as unseasonable as without Excuse, without some offered, unbearable Sights and Indignities. On the other Hand, they are at a Loss for the Motive that should induce the offering such Sights as could not be brooked by one of even more Phlegm and less Resentment than my Lord S——r.

We are not unacquainted with the too obvious Partiality in Favour of *Countrymen*; nor that Councils have been called of *these only*, tho' against all military Rules, even if they had been Principals, as they are but *Mercenaries* only. We are not uninformed neither, that most *Measures* have been settled in a private Cabal of *foreign Officers*, previous to laying them before a regular Council for Form sake only; and that some *Measures* of Consequence were entered upon, and even executed, without the Sanction of any Council, at which the *General*, or any of his Fellow-Subjects were present. We have heard too much to doubt of *Partiality* shewn in the Choice of *Quarters*, the Dates of *Commissions*, and many other Instances: We have heard also of Whispers, that the *British* Troops were *exposed*, and *some others* industriously *spared* at *Dettingen*: We have been told too, that the *Livery* of H——r was preferred, on that important Day, to that of *England*; at which one might wonder, if *Prudence* had ever been known to conquer a rooted *Prejudice*.

The Report of all these *partial Transactions* have reached us here ; but still are we at a Loss, not for the natural *partial Biass*, nor the general Discontent it might have occasioned amongst those who imagined they had a Right to Favour and Preference, if any were shewn ; but for some Cause more mysterious relative to the *General* particularly. The rumoured *Partiality* affected him only in common with the Rest of his Countrymen ; and any direct *Slights* that were offered to himself, may be supposed to have been so frequent that they became habitual ; for otherwise we can't well account for his not resigning sooner, since it is confirmed by all Hands, that he was no favoured, cherished Person from the Beginning.

'Tis hard to guess, you will say, why a Man would be entrusted with a Chief Command that was not liked ; yet we read and have known many Instances of the Kind. He was of the prevailing Party, and a fit Person, in a double Capacity, to persuade the *Dutch*, that the Court of *L——n* had changed her System, and was in earnest : But tho' he acted his Part, as became a prudent and zealous Servant, 'tis a Doubt whether he would not have been more cherished if he had been more observant of the real Sentiments of his Court. It might be intended, perhaps thought necessary, to create a vast Expence, to make a grand Figure abroad, and to put on every Appearance of Earnestness ;

ness; but still there might be Reason for not relishing a Man that should be too earnestly for improving Opportunities, and procuring some Advantage for his Country, to compensate for the excessive Drains of a Campaign, enormously expensive.

A Supposition, then, prevails here, that Lord S—r, like the rest of the intruding Party, was made an Agent of Necessity only; and that the same ill Usage and Power, which forced him out of the Circle, will soon drive out the rest, if they have not lost all Sense of Feeling. Obtruded Servants are seldom continued longer than they are absolutely necessary.

'Tis thought, that the *unguarded Expressions*, which accompanied the peremptory Refusal of the *Memorial* I send you inclosed, determined that Lord to an immediate Resignation, which he had meditated for some Weeks before. The *Memorial*, you see, relates to a particular Transaction in the Camp, in which the *B—s* Officers thought they had been misrepresented by some sycophant Foreigners. A Justification, it seems, was thought necessary; but whether in Fact it was necessary or not, a *Memorial* relating to so great a Corps of Officers, merited some Consideration; or, if judged proper to be refused, the Refusal needed not be accompanied with the most aggravating Circumstances and Expressions. It was too sensible to a Man of my L—d S—r's Spirit, to be told, *That there*

there was not a Word of T——b in the Memorial he so warmly espoused.

Lady Fame, you know, is a Babler by Profession; she has too many Tongues to be moved by *Truth* alone; but if she may be credited, all these Particulars concerning that gallant Nobleman, are not only true, but another not less natural than any of the rest. The many-mouthed Dame, then, reports, that a *personal Caution* at D——n, natural to most Men, and, perhaps, thought more necessary in K—s than others, was spoke of by that L—d, with too little Reserve, a Day or two after that Action. These Sort of Indiscretions are seldom forgiven; the *Point of Honour* is too sharp to be resisted by the Armour of either Interest or Reason.—But not to detain you any longer on a *Resignation* which has been lately the Subject of all Conversations here, 'tis thought, that that distinguished Nobleman's former and late Services, as a Minister and a Soldier, merited greater Confidence, more Favour, and better Usage than he has met with since he first took upon him the Command of the Army he has now quitted.

To consider the more than ordinary *Services* performed by that Nobleman in his Embassy to F——e, it may be wondered that he was slighted, in the late Reign particularly, or even in the present. If it be true that he had then done signal Services to the Family, he merited the Gratitude of all;
and

and yet we have seen him dropp'd by all, and now signally slighted. What can we impute these *Phenomina* in Politics to? Might not he have over-rated his Services; or were they not of so delicate a Nature, that, tho' they could not well bear the Light, he had bragg'd of them as meritorious Actions? There are some *Actions* that ought not to be *commanded*, much less performed, or even *attempted* to be performed.—But we will leave the General to cover his Disgusts with amusing Ceremonials at the *Hague*, to trace the mysterious Steps of our great Men here, who cover important Negotiations, by an in-tire Suspension of all ministerial Ceremonies.

I have mentioned *France*, as standing most in need of some Negotiation or Expedient for putting an End to the Broils of *Europe*, that she might ward off the threatened Invasion of her Territories; after the gross Errors of his Generals at *Dettingen*. But tho' that Crown seem'd to want Peace most about that Time, there are Reasons for believing that the Blessing was as earnestly sought by *one* of the invading Powers. The Queen of *Hungary* had been prevented coming to an eligible Accommodation with the Emperor, when *Prague* had been invested last Year; that believing Princess had been buoy'd up with Hopes of great future Conquests; but however all this might have answered *domestic* Purposes, 'tis thought the Court of *L—n* was never in earnest. That Cabinet might
be

be glad of any Pretext for keeping Armed, perhaps, and of *impoverishing* a stubborn People, but our Speculatists here won't be persuaded that a War with *France* was ever intended: And, indeed, the Conduct in the Field, adds but too strongly to the Plausibility of the Supposition.

As *England* then had no Aversion to a Peace *in futuro*, which could not affect the domestic Schemes of her Court, *France* found not much Difficulty in disposing her to a Negotiation, provided Dust could be thrown into the Eyes of the Public. The *French*, who abound in Men of Genius and Finness, proposed the Expedient lately executed here. The Season, the Water, the Company, every thing contributed to answer the Views of all who had any Interest in keeping the Secret of a Negotiation.

But under the Cover of a Negotiation for a general Peace, which seemed to be the Intention of the Court of *L—n*, the *French* took the Opportunity of a separate Negotiation with *Prussia* and *Saxony*. The *H—n*, who chiefly transacted the *B—sb* Affairs here, perceiving the Use *France* would make of the Opportunity of a Congress, gave Notice to his Court, and had Orders to countermine *France*, and, in Conjunction with the *Austrian* Minister, to treat separately with *Prussia* and *Saxony*.

Besides these, there was a direct Negotiation between *Spain* and *Sardinia*, and an indirect

direct one between the Emperor and the Court of *Vienna*, in which *France* had a Share, tho' nominally it appeared otherwise. There was also an Attempt to set a Negotiation on foot for reconciling the Northern Powers: But *France*, who has her Views in keeping in the Fire between the *Danes* and *Swedes*, till she has settled her own Affairs, found Means to thwart the Measures of all who had attempted to enlarge the Compass of the Negotiation.

Now, that all Negotiation here seems to be at an End, or suspended, and that most of the Ministers are retired to their respective Courts, or Places of Residence, we may venture to speculate on the various Negotiations. But if, in this speculative Research, I don't always hit on the true Pin of Affairs, be satisfied at least, that I speak the Sense of all the best Judges here.

The general Negotiation, carried on at a *Polish* Nobleman's House, went on heavily from the Beginning, but more from the Tenaciousness of the *Austrian* Minister, than all the others concerned; and he, indeed, of all others, had most Reason to be tenacious. He insisted on an Equivalent for *Siletia*, and an absolute Renunciation of all Rights to the *Austrian* Inheritance on the Part of the Emperor. He insisted likewise, for some Days, to be indemnified for the Expence of the War, to be put in Possession of the * *Stado*

D

de

* Fortresses in the Possession of the King of the *Sicilies*.

de Praesidio, on the Coast of *Tuscany*; and that the *Grand Duke* should be immediately elected King of the *Romans*; but gave up these three last Points: And tho' the Emperor's Renunciation was a Point as strenuously opposed by the Imperial Minister, as it was earnestly pressed by the other; yet a Modification being hit upon by Monsieur *F——n*, the first was the only Point that was never brought to any tolerable Degree of Adjustment. The Modification mentioned above, was, that the Emperor and Queen should surcease all Pursuits of Claims to each other, during the Term of Twenty-five Years; and that all the principal Powers of *Europe* should guaranty the Performance. This Medium, tho' not thoroughly relished at either Court, was at last digested at *Frankfort* and *Vienna*. But the Affair of the Equivalent was infinitely more puzzling. The Emperor was incapable of giving any; the other Princes of the Empire would give none; who then, but *France*, was able, or ought to have compensated the Queen for a forced Cession of one of her fairest Provinces?

All agreed, and *France* herself could not deny, that she was best able; but many doubted, and she especially insisted, that her being able was a very bad Reason for obliging her to compensate for the Depredations of another. The Current, however, being against *France*, and *Lorraine* being in every Mouth as the proper and only Equivalent,

Monseigneur

Monſieur *F—n* was driven to all his Shifts. He propoſed the ſecularizing ſome vaſt Spiritualities in the Empire in Favour of the Queen; but finding the *German Alarm* general on the Propoſal, he dropp'd it for another equally diſtaſteful to the *Germans*, who deſired no Increate of the *Auſtrian Power*, or Dominion beyond the *Rhine*. This was, that the Arch Dutchy of *Auſtria* ſhould be erected into a tenth Electorate, and that *Hungary* ſhould be incorporated with, and deemed a Circle of the Empire. This laſt Alternative would go down well enough at *Vienna*, but at no other Court in *Germany*; therefore was the Marquis obliged to have Recourſe to other Means, in order to turn the Tide of Prejudice from his Country.

It was eaſily perceivable that the Court of *Vienna* was upheld by that of *L—n*; and that, could this latter be brought to acquieſce to any other Equivalent except *Lorrain*, the Queen of *Hungary* muſt ſubmit. All the Batteries of his Addreſs and Invention the Marquis pointed this Way. The Demolition of the Works about *Dunkirk* was propoſed; and even the intire Deſtruction of that Harbour was inſinuated: But the *H—n*, who had the principal Direction of the Negotiation, turned a deaf Ear to all Advantages in favour of *E—d*: Therefore then was Monſieur *F—n* obliged to turn his Thoughts to finding out what might be deemed more agreeable to the *H—n* Palate. He propoſed

a specific Guaranty of the *Electorate* and all its Territories and Acquisitions; and that this Guaranty should be strengthened by that of the Empire; but perceiving that an Addition of Territory was the principal Point in View, he proposed secularizing, or rather annexing the *Bishoprick* of *Oznabrug* and guarantying the Possession of it to *H——r*.

This Bait being greedily swallowed, it was not doubted that the Queen must be obliged to sit down contented with a very moderate Equivalent in Money payable at several very distant Payments: But the *Dutch*, *Prussian* and *Saxon* Ministers, alarmed at the Willingness with which the *H——n* agreed to secularizing *Oznabrug*, tho' he had been the most strenuous against the first Proposal of a general Secularization in Favour of the Queen, it was thought proper, both by the *Marquis* and *Baron*, to drop that Part of the Scheme for the present, intending, however, to assume the Deliberation of it as Opportunity offered, either from some intervening Accident in the Course of the Negotiation, or from some Advantage or Disadvantage in the Field. Could a Disunion, as to that Point, be wrought amongst the opposing Powers; or did Prince *Charles* pass the *Rhine*, and oblige the *French* to leave *Alsace* open to him and the combined Army; or else did he attempt passing, and was repulsed with great Loss; in short, did any signal Incident happen, the *French* and *H——n* Ministers did
not

not doubt but thereby there would be Room to work upon the Plan of annexing *Oznaburg* to the Dominions of *H—r*.

One Thing was very distinguishable on this Occasion, of which Monsieur *F—n* took all the Advantage possible. He saw that all the Avenues to the Friendship of the Court of *L—n* must be by the round-about Way of *H—r*; and that the greatest Advantages to *E—d* equal not the least to the *E—e*. This is the Compass that Minister steered by; and this, probably, his Court will steer and succeed by, in dissolving the present, and preventing any other Alliance against *France*.

During a Suspension of the general Negotiation, occasioned, as has been observed, by the Opposition of the *Dutch*, *Prussian* and *Saxon* Ministers to secularizing the See of *Oznabrug*, particular Negotiations were carried on more vigorously. One had been set on Foot by *L—d C—t* with *C—t M—o* at *Frankfort*, in Regard to *Spain* and *England*. My Lord would confine the Negotiation simply to the Objects of the present War between these Crowns; but the *C—t* insisted to have a Settlement for *Don Philip* in *Italy* taken into it. My *L—d* was forced to yield to the Phlegm and Steadiness of the *Spaniard*; and, upon that Basis, the Negotiation was removed from *Frankfort* hither. By this Means Monsieur *F—n* came to learn, that, if this Negotiation succeeded, it must be at the Expence of a Dissolution of the present Harmony

mony between his Court and that of *Madrid*, therefore he laboured to thwart it; but finding more Difficulty than he imagined, he gave Advice to his Court, which occasioned a Resolution of joining a Body of *French* to *Don Philip's* Army. This put an End to the Panic of the Court of *Vienna*, who must have yielded *Parma* and *Placentia* at least, as an Equivalent for a Peace between *England* and *Spain*.

It is plain enough, that if these Points could have been gained, *viz.* a Peace with *Spain*, by making *Don Philip* a Sovereign in *Italy*; and one in the Empire, by annexing *Oz nabrug* to the E——e, the Grandeur of the House of *Austria*, and the *Ballance of Power* would be quite forgot by the most puissant of the present Auxiliaries of that tottering House. This, I think, proves evidently, that the Support of the House of *Austria* was but the secondary View of the Court of L——n, in the expensive Figure she makes in the *Rhine*. *England*, certainly, has an Interest in accommodating her Disputes with *Spain*; but undoubtedly she can have none in aggrandizing the E——e; and yet if *France* had been able to gain on *Prussia* and *Holland* to agree to the secularizing Scheme, the Queen of *Hungary*, who stood E——d so much of late, must be obliged to agree to the Terms of *France*. The Steadiness of the Opponents has hindered the Perfection of this Scheme hitherto: but as no Difficulty of this Nature is insurmountable,

ble, we may expect that *France* will, sooner or later, extricate herself, by procuring Advantages for an E——e that had contributed scarce any Thing towards the Expence incurred.

The Negotiation aforesaid, between S—n and E——d, opened Way for an Attempt of one between the Courts of *Madrid* and *Turin*; but it had no other Effect than to quicken the Pace of that of *Vienna*, the slowest in the World, to adjust all Difficulties between her and the Court of *Turin*. I won't answer, however, that this last Court, who understands her Interests perfectly well, won't listen with Seriousness to *Spain* if she exceeds in her Offers; and that the *French* join the *Spaniards* in *Savoy*.

But the greatest Pains, at least the most general, were taken to gain the Court of *Berlin*. E——d would naturally have greatest Influence there if her K—— had not been a neighbouring E——r: But, notwithstanding, a Prejudice on this Account, which is not like to be easily effaced, she would succeed before *France*, if she had acted distinctly from H—r: But by being led into the Scheme for secularizing *Oznabrug*, she increased the Jealousy of *Prussia* so far as to induce her to listen to the Overtures of *France* preferable to all others. *France* improved this Advantage and concluded a Treaty with *Prussia*, which will oblige the Queen of *Hungary* to moderate her Imperiousness towards the Head of the
Empire,

Empire, and even to abandon all Thoughts of making Conquests on *France*; or, at least, of detaining such Conquests, should she be so successful as to make any.

This, in my Apprehension, was the only Treaty brought to Perfection at this Place, tho' some others were so advanced, that they may be soon concluded: But as any signal Success in the Field, on either Side, must change the System of the principal Parties, there is no judging how far Demands may rise or fall: This, however, we may conclude, that whenever Peace is made, it will be at the Expence of the Queen of *Hungary*, in *Italy* as well as in *Germany*, provided any Acquisitions of Power or Territory can be gained by *France* to *H—r*. Here centers all the Politics of the Court of *L—n*; here centers also the Expence of *E—d*; therefore, if *France* can, by any Scheme, procure Advantage here, the Weight of *E—d* necessarily subsides on that Side.

Farewel, my noble Friend; if I should be so unhappy as to differ with your Notions of public Affairs, let me stand excused, for following those of all our refined Politicians here: But, however, I may happen to disagree with you in political Speculations, I shall be all my Life long,

Your's, &c.

F I N I S.

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