

Statement

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Déclaration

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THE HONOURABLE BARBARA McDOUGALL,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
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"CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE 1990s
FROM MOSCOW TO SARAJEVO"

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Some three and a half years ago, as the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended, a sense of jubilation was in the air. The dream of achieving a "new world order" seemed to be achievable. Democracy had triumphed; prosperity in the West was at an all-time high, and free markets were being embraced by the former communist countries.

It was a heady time -- a brief period of relief following the Cold War tensions that had dominated our lifetimes; a glimpse of what the future could be like in a free, open, and co-operative world.

It has been a sobering three years: economic recession in the West; turmoil in some republics of the former Soviet Union; the agony of the former Yugoslavia; the drama and tragedies of Somalia and Cambodia. The dominant mood is one of pessimism and unease, supplanting the optimism of 1990.

The tumultuous events of the past few years were earth-shaking in every sense. The international community was often forced to make policy on the run. We acted and reacted to the power of the pervasive, new global media, which drives public opinion as never before. We tried to make sense of a torrent of events, conscious of the urgency of our tasks and the demands of our impatient publics, but we are often frustrated by the perceived need to respond before adequate plans and strategies can be developed.

We have learned at least one crucial lesson from going through a century's worth of crises in just three years. If we are to succeed in creating a stable and peaceful world, we need a long-term strategic vision with a global sense of perspective, and a comprehensive framework for building collective security.

The global context, the "security environment" in which Canada and other states fit and function, is rather Hobbesian. It is a world of brutality and viscousness, as we have seen in Bosnia. It is a world of intractable problems and inescapable dilemmas, as we have seen in Cambodia. It is a world of natural disaster compounded by human folly, as in Somalia. But it remains, also, a world of hope. The Referendum in Russia confounded the experts when the Russian people themselves chose to support not only President Yeltsin, but the road to reform and market change. And in South Africa, my destination when I leave New York this afternoon, a multiracial democracy is slowly and painfully rising from the ashes of apartheid. In my travels, I have seen first-hand the depth and variety of challenges to stability facing the world, and I see the enormity of the task that lies ahead in overcoming conflicts that now dot the globe.

The new challenges that have replaced the simple dichotomies of the Cold War are familiar to all of us:

- the fragility of new states and the tentativeness of democratic institutions;
- ethnic strife, nationalism and racism;
- proliferation of weapons of all sorts with ineffective control mechanisms;
- environmental abuse, and the devastation of entire regions around the globe; and
- the threat of mass migrations of political and economic refugees.

These challenges add up to an unpalatable menu facing our political leadership, and you'll be glad to know that I'm not going to dig into each of them this morning. What I do want to discuss is the Canadian framework for dealing with these issues, "co-operative security," because it is increasingly relevant to how others might manage their way in this puzzling new environment. There is no question in my mind that the involvement and co-operation of all nations is essential if we are to ensure long-term stability.

This view leads directly to Canada's strong and unequivocal commitment to the United Nations. Through its good times and bad -- and there have been plenty of the latter -- Canada has been steadfast in its view that the United Nations is the best vehicle for international progress toward stability. Other countries relied mainly on "hub and spoke" relationships during an era in which much of the world was aligned in blocs.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the UN has taken on new importance. Many states are now more willing to use multilateral institutions to address problems, more accepting of the Security Council and other UN bodies to debate and to decide on key issues of peace and security.

This change of positioning of the UN opens up enormous possibilities for its use as the central point for conflict management. The Secretary-General's *An Agenda for Peace* points the way forward by revitalizing and clarifying the UN's role in intervention. It also calls on member countries to demonstrate the political will to put the "Agenda" into action.

Canada played an important role in the development of this document. Much of it reflects not only our philosophy as a nation, but our long-term experience in multilateralism and peacekeeping.

The Secretary-General has forcefully argued that the UN must be both more active and more interventionist in preventing and resolving conflict. This approach is not a reversion to colonialism, under which the UN simply becomes a new instrument for the interference by the major, richer, developed world into the affairs of poorer countries and regions. Instead, it is something new, something creative, that will ensure we have a political instrument that parallels the globalization already taking place on the economic side of world affairs -- and political co-operation on a global basis is as essential as economic co-operation.

Fundamental to Canada's approach to co-operative security is adapting peacekeeping mechanisms to meet new requirements.

Canadians believe that we invented peacekeeping. Not only did we invent it, but we have been one of its major active proponents, participating in virtually every UN peacekeeping exercise to date.

We, Canada, are today engaged in 15 peacekeeping missions around the world, from El Salvador to Cambodia to Somalia to Bosnia. With under 1 per cent of the world's population, we provide about 10 per cent of the world's peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping is an invention that we have been most willing to share with the world, one that has already saved untold numbers of lives and prevented untold amounts of damage to property and to the world's environment. It does not come cheap.

Peacekeeping this year will cost the United Nations US\$3.7 billion, a staggering amount, but not excessive in a global economy of US\$22 trillion. Nor is it excessive when one considers the costs of the alternatives: instability at best, anarchy, probably, and in many cases, war. These do not come cheap, either, as the economic costs alone can be measured in large multiples of the costs of peacekeeping. And the economic costs fade into insignificance when compared with the human devastation that results.

It makes sense, then, to face up to the new challenges that lie ahead, recognizing the new risks to peacekeepers, the tougher situations in which the UN must act, and of the substantially increased numbers of operations that the UN has both authorized and is currently considering.

To meet the challenge, the United Nations, therefore, must be in a position to call on more nations to shoulder the responsibilities of peacekeeping. Canada, and the other regulars, cannot do it alone. Japan made a bold decision, politically controversial at home, to send peacekeepers to Cambodia -- its first such mission ever. Germany is

participating for the first time by sending peacekeepers to Somalia.

We welcome these moves and urge both countries to do more. Other countries must also be moved to take part -- whether through encouragement, guilt or coercion.

We would also encourage the U.S. to consider a more active peacekeeping role. I recognize that the U.S. has a pre-eminent role in the world in peace enforcement, such as occurred in the defence of Kuwait -- a role no other country, certainly not my own, is in a position to play, although Canada has always proudly done its part in defence of freedom.

Nevertheless, U.S. involvement in peacekeeping would recognize the need for new kinds of "defences of freedom" in the current environment.

We have to look at peacekeeping as something more than conflict management. The concept can be stretched and moulded and applied to other needs. It may well be the best approach for dealing with ethnic and nationalistic conflicts, the greatest challenge of our decade. It may also be adapted to meet new demands, for example, in support of broad humanitarian operations.

This is indeed what is occurring now, however imperfectly, in Bosnia and Somalia. And as you are aware, peacekeeping is also under way in Cambodia, in support of a massive effort to build a democratic system and restructure the economy, as well as in the resettlement of some 250,000 refugees.

All of these operations are controversial, costly and fraught with risk. The risks to the people of these countries, in the event of failure, are obvious. The risks to the participating peacekeepers are extraordinarily high.

But there is another risk. Failure will lead to widespread disillusion with the whole idea of international co-operative security among countries needing assistance, moral suasion or strong external pressure. For them, it will mean that arming oneself is better than trusting one's neighbour. Failure will also lead to disillusion among the peoples of those countries who have shown the courage to incur the costs and risks, by funding and taking part in these complex, multifaceted UN operations.

Let me stress, then, that all of us in the international community have a stake in these ventures and must summon the political determination to ensure their success.

I recognize the inherent difficulties.

First, we have graphically seen in recent days and months that agreeing on the nature and extent of a problem does not necessarily guarantee agreement on its solution, even among traditionally like-minded nations.

Second, we have to reconsider the UN's traditional definition of state sovereignty. I believe that states can no longer argue sovereignty as a licence for internal repression, when the absolutes of that sovereignty shield conflicts that eventually could become international in scope. Some standards are universal: human rights must be respected; democratic institutions must be safeguarded; judiciaries must be free and independent, national sovereignty should offer no comfort to repressors, and no protection to those guilty of breaches of the common moral codes enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The third challenge is that of UN management and funding. Canada participated in a group that looked at the whole question of UN management and called for a major restructuring of UN functions and agencies. The Secretary-General has begun the process of reorganization and we, along with other member countries, continue to press for more -- much more. But the UN will never be as efficient as it might be as long as it does not have a reliable source of income. Member debts to the UN now amount to US\$2.3 billion. The whole concept of international burden-sharing, to say nothing of the UN's ability to meet the growing demands on it, is called into question by the crippling nature of this financial burden. It is time to recognize that, whatever its faults and whatever its costs, a strong United Nations is fundamental to the kind of co-operative security that we envisage.

But other organizations also have a role. Our approach to co-operative security recognizes as well the importance of regional responsibility. Even more than the U.S., Canada is a member of many regional organizations where the issue of security has risen to the top of the agenda.

In the Organization of American States, for example, hemispheric security is now a serious matter for discussion, including subjects such as non-proliferation and the control of conventional weapons. In the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), security will be on the agenda this summer for the first time. And in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is re-evaluating its role in future security issues.

Whatever the organization, co-operative security will increasingly rely on a range of potential responses on the part of the international community, to provide maximum flexibility, appropriateness -- and anticipation. For example, "peace building" calls on us to use some of our development assistance

funds in support of human rights and the development of democratic institutions. Since democracies rarely attack each other, early support of fledgling democracies is in our own interests.

Canada has earned respect through our development assistance programs as a country that is committed to putting its resources where its principles are. In Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, we have earned our credentials with a framework for economic co-operation that is ahead of most other G-7 (Group of Seven leading industrialized) countries, at least in per capita terms.

Canada, I believe, has done its part to help. And we have been frank with those governments that have still not lived up to their responsibilities at this time of challenge.

In turning its back on communism, Russia faces formidable difficulties in building a free-market economy and a full-fledged democracy, as we all know. It also has committed itself to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons, and to address broader problems of regional and global security. But it faces additional economic problems that will result from the destruction of its nuclear program, and it faces domestic problems with respect to the management of the ethnic and racial conflicts on its peripheries. Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union, must continue to attract both international recognition and assistance if we are to avoid an upward spiral of discontent that may eventually lead to conflict.

It is impossible to talk about co-operative security today without reference to the former Yugoslavia. This situation, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has demonstrated the difficulties faced by the international community in developing a comprehensive political and diplomatic response to a tragic and vicious conflict.

Almost two years ago, in September 1991, Canada called for UN intervention in the region. At that point, containment was still a real possibility. But it was many months before a consensus was reached, during which time the violence and atrocities escalated. The first battalion into Sarajevo in support of the UN humanitarian mission was Canadian. Today there are over 22,000 peacekeepers in Croatia and Bosnia, of whom 2,100 are Canadian.

Recently, Canadian Forces have once again come into the eye of the hurricane in Srebrenica, until a few weeks ago, a little-known city in Bosnia. A group of some 150 soldiers escorted humanitarian aid missions, helped evacuate the wounded and supervised a UN-proclaimed safe haven. They have been joined since by additional troops but they are still in place, on the

ground, and in that safe area, the peace is holding. This means lives are being saved, and aid is getting through.

The same can be said of Visoko and Kiseljak in Bosnia, the western sector in Croatia where there are additional Canadians, and many other towns and villages where peacekeepers from around the world -- French, British, Spanish, Egyptian, Argentinean and others -- are assisting to save lives and prevent atrocities.

The risks in these places are still enormous, and the safety of the UN troops, the humanitarian workers, and of the local population that they are there to protect, must be fully taken into account as we consider future action.

I was in Croatia and Bosnia ten days ago, and looked into the eyes of women and children in refugee camps who have experienced unspeakable terrors. This experience heightened my frustration at "the received wisdom" concerning this conflict. First, that it does not matter much, because killing has gone on in the Balkans for centuries; and second, that it is a problem of such infinite complexity that it cannot be managed at all.

We cannot allow such a trivialization of this or any other global problem. The situation in the former Yugoslavia provides a looking glass through which we can see the future. Giving up on the situation there will send appalling signals to tyrants and villains and hate-mongers around the globe.

When I was in Washington Friday, I told Secretary of State Christopher that Canada welcomes the new active role of the United States, to work together with allies and the international community to find an end to the current tragedy in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. As one of the countries with troops on the ground, Canada agrees entirely that we can not allow political setbacks to incite among the parties to the conflict new rounds of violence and atrocities. But we must remember that, ultimately, peace there will require a political solution. We must therefore use all the political and diplomatic leverage at our disposal to explore the parameters of peace, to find an alternative to continued bloodshed.

Canada strongly supports the sending of UN observers to the Bosnian-Serbian border to ensure that no arms reach Bosnian Serbs. We also believe that the French proposal for temporary safe havens guarded by UN troops has merit. In the coming days we will continue our consultation with our friends and allies on other steps.

Last week, Prime Minister Mulroney outlined the criteria necessary if, ultimately, we must consider military action. Let me quote him directly:

First, there should be clear political agreement on the objectives. Second, the scope of military action would have to be defined geographically. Third, military action would have to be appropriate to the circumstances. Fourth, the conditions that would precipitate a Western military response would have to be clearly enunciated for all concerned in advance. And, finally, due regard must be given to the disengagement scenario, prior to deeper involvement.

Most fundamental of all, no military action can be contemplated without the agreement of the Security Council. Our emphasis will continue to be on the vital role of the United Nations. Co-ordination among the Secretary-General, the heads of agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the key member states is absolutely crucial.

Co-operative security in the 1990s is clearly not an easy task. Nor will we find a solution to every problem. But there must be a collective will to find solutions wherever possible. For Canada, the revitalization of multilateral co-operation and the stimulation of a more active, interventionist UN offers by far the best prospect of long-term success.

Unilateralism as an approach to world problems is now dead; bilateralism is suffering from a hardening of the arteries. The way of the future is co-operative security, engaging East and West, North and South, in a common search for peace and stability -- in everyone's best interests.

Canada is in a unique position to advance and promote the concept of co-operative security. The values that have traditionally guided our approach to peace and stability -- respect for human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law -- are now more than ever entrenched around the globe.

Co-operation is the only way that the world will be able to negotiate the difficult journey to the next century. Canada has and will continue to play its part. May the efforts of all of us succeed in creating a world that is safe and secure for peoples everywhere.