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**Report of the
Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security**

**THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK IN EVOLUTION:
WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001?**

Ottawa

28 February - 1 March 2002



PREFACE

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Dear participant,

You will find attached the final report of the Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security, held in Ottawa, on February 28 and March 1, 2002. This event was a great success and I am pleased to present you with the summary of our discussion and recommendations during those two days.

On behalf of Susan Cartwright, the then Director General of the European Union, North and West Europe Bureau, I would like to thank you for your participation in this seminar and recognize once again the work done by the organizers, the Western Europe Division and the Non-proliferation, Arms Control & Disarmament Division in DFAIT, in collaboration with the Dutch Embassy in Ottawa. Special thanks should also be given to Dr. David Haglund who acted as a rapporteur.

I hope that you will enjoy reading the report.

Sincerely,

Jill Sinclair
Director General
International Security Bureau

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Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security Ottawa, 28 February - 1 March 2002

INTRODUCTION

This seminar was a follow-up to one held at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) in mid-April 2000, sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in collaboration with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). That initial seminar, organized around the theme of "International Security: What Role for Canada and the Netherlands?," brought together a small group of government officials and academics from each country, to discuss important issues on the international security agenda and, especially, to probe the possibilities for developing joint initiatives whereby the two countries might further common interests.

In her welcoming remarks to the Ottawa seminar, Ms. Susan Cartwright (DFAIT) noted that the first seminar had been adjudged, by both governments, to have been so successful that hosting a second such event presented an opportunity her Department was more than happy to pursue. She also stressed a theme with which none present could disagree, namely that the two countries did constitute a "special relationship," one characterized by a commonality of values, interests, efforts and even preferred institutional forums. For Canada, said Ms. Cartwright, the Netherlands was and remained an "important ally." It would be clear from the two-days' proceedings that the Dutch thought similarly vis-à-vis Canada.

As with the first seminar, this one featured a relatively small group of government officials and academics from the two countries, but this time the discussions took place over two working days rather than one. They were organized into five substantive panels. This report conveys the important points made by the principal speakers of each panel (i.e., one presenter and at least one respondent, with duties alternating between Dutch and Canadian speakers). As well, a sense of the ensuing discussion is provided, although those who participated in the debate are not named. Panels one through three were held on the first day, and panels four and five on the second day.

PANEL ONE: GLOBAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

The lead presenter, as well as moderator, of this panel was Prof. Alfred van Staden (Clingendael), who began by noting that at least one major aspect of the Canada-Dutch special relationship stemmed from the part played by the Canadian Army in the liberation of the Netherlands in 1945, but the ties went beyond that historical legacy. Not so long ago, it was common for many in the Netherlands to conceive of "like-minded" groups and countries as constituting a pillar of Dutch foreign policy, and in this category Canada regularly figured. However, continued Prof. van Staden, one no longer hears much reference to the "like-minded," leading him to ask whether it might be possible and worthwhile to resuscitate the category.

He went on to observe that the theme of this seminar, namely "security," could not have been more well-chosen given the events of 11 September and their aftermath. More than ever was it necessary to develop a "comprehensive" understanding of security, including and especially the sources of contemporary terrorism. Prof. van Staden confessed to subscribing to the "root-causes" theory of terrorism, one that holds the phenomenon to be a function of feelings of relative deprivation nested in objective socio-economic disparities as between the developed and the developing world. He noted that his analysis was a "far cry" from that of US president George W. Bush, whose recent "axis of evil" speech was said to minimize the importance of socio-economic source(s) of terrorism. Prof. van Staden argued that, in general, Europeans tended toward the "root-causes" understanding, and that this set them at odds with the Americans' assessment of the problem and its origins.

Differing perceptions regarding the origins of the problem have also been reflected in differing responses to terrorism as between the US and the Europeans. Prof. van Staden noted that while in America the attacks have triggered a return, at least in part, to the "Hobbesian" view of the state as the best guarantor of security, the same has not happened in Western Europe, where civil-libertarians have been much more successful than in America in their bid to minimize the impact of counterterrorism legislation on individual liberties. To some degree, this was explicable in terms of the relative impact of the "shock" among Dutch (and other Western European) publics triggered by the 11 September attacks.

On the transatlantic level, the terrorist attacks and their aftermath have also had a differential impact, resulting from America's decision to "go it alone" in the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the offers of European Allies to join in the struggle as full participants. NATO Allies' invocation of Article 5 commitments, coupled with NATO's assigning AWACS planes and crews to North America, had only marginal

import (with the latter being described by Prof. van Staden as a "side show"). America's decision to minimize reliance upon the NATO Allies was argued to be a function of 1) the US desire to minimize constraints of coalition warfare as were evident during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, and 2) the conviction in the US that the European Allies fundamentally lacked the capability to play a useful military role. Prof. van Staden detected a trend within the Alliance, whereby it would become more of a "political" and less of a military grouping. One implication of the trend would be to make it easier for Russia to accept the Alliance's enlargement into the Baltic republics.

On the level of the European Union, the "good news" was to be found in the greater unity of purpose displayed by Western Europeans in the current crisis as compared with their disunity a decade ago, when Yugoslavia started to tear itself apart. That said, the responses of major countries in the EU betrayed a growing preference for bilateralism, as one European leader after another demonstrated "unseemly" haste to get to Washington to meet President Bush. The UK's role as linchpin was not something likely to enhance the EU's own influence, nor did Prof. van Staden detect anything in the Afghanistan war as having enhanced the credentials of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), notwithstanding its having been "declared operational" as a result of the current crisis. Still, should the US "backfill" militarily by reducing its presence in the Balkans, the impact may turn out to be positive for the ESDP, forced as the Europeans would be to assume more of the burden of conflict management in the former Yugoslavia. However, Prof. van Staden cautioned against expectations that European countries have become any more willing to take on greater responsibility for their own defence than they were before 11 September.

Prof. van Staden ended by noting that "NATO has been called the big loser of the Afghan War – and rightly so." He detected a widening divide between the US and its European Allies, certainly in the political dimension but also in the military one, where he envisioned the "spectre of military apartheid." The EU members would be well-served, in this new environment, if they avoided the temptation to "kowtow" to America, if they continued to stress the root causes of terrorism, and if they succeeded in developing greater operational capability, whether through spending more on defence or spending more wisely (i.e., avoiding duplication and achieving greater rationalization). He suggested that European publics were unlikely to want to allocate more resources to defence, but did feel greater rationalization could be attained. In his parting shot, he hinted that perhaps Canada might wish to have a role in the elaboration of European security and defence.

The Canadian respondent to Prof. van Staden was Ms. Jill Sinclair (DFAIT), who began by stating her general assent to the claim that security needed to be conceptualized in a much more inclusive manner. She also agreed that preventing terrorism did require close heed to the conditions that bred it. In her view, there was and remained much that Canada and the Netherlands could do together in responding to the contemporary security challenge, not the least important undertaking being to argue jointly the case for a broadened understanding of security consistent with the conception, "human security." She also worried that "we haven't learned the lessons of 9/11 yet."

These points of agreement having been broached, Ms. Sinclair identified areas where the Canadian and Dutch positions seemed to differ. First was the question of the meaning and impact of the attack on America. Notwithstanding the contemporary mood of the Dutch (and by extension of the other members of the EU), Canadians continued to experience the trauma of 11 September. "Canada," she said, "felt the attack on the US as an attack on Canada in the most visceral sense." Not only did Canada take the initial shock in a manner different from the Dutch, but Canada had decidedly not gone back to a business as usual position. Instead, "our country has changed irreversibly." The threat is taken very seriously, and Canadians are "more closely related to the US than ever before." Ms. Sinclair continued by observing that there had developed a new awareness of what it meant to be a neighbour of America's, as well as of what it meant to be a Canadian, and she noted that Canadians were in the midst of a debate over where the country would or should fit in the new command structure(s) being envisioned for US homeland security.

A second comment concerned NATO. Ms. Sinclair stated, "I think the Alliance is as healthy as it has ever been." The invocation of Article 5 for the first time constituted a powerful symbolic statement, and demonstrated that the Alliance had more than adequately met the test of solidarity. Indeed, she described the Article 5 invocation as "scintillating in its magic." Another encouraging development was the way in which NATO's further enlargement was shaping up, given that the expansion of the alliance was tantamount to the expansion of the zone of peace in Europe. The new NATO was not only becoming in many ways a partner with which Russia could work, but was also evolving into more of a political grouping, harking back to an earlier Canadian preference that the Allies pay closer heed to the processes and norms of political, economic and societal cooperation (associated with the concept of an "Article 2" alliance). NATO's adaptation was healthy, and gave the lie to those who were predicting its demise in the early aftermath of the ending of the Cold War.

A third point concerned the current state of relations between the EU and North American. It was not just the US that found it frustrating trying to deal with Europe, she observed, with an allusion to the celebrated comment of Henry Kissinger's about being

unable to find Europe's phone number: Canada, as well, too often found no one at the other end of the line, but just a "demonic call-forward system."

Fourthly, Ms. Sinclair thought the expression "military apartheid" a bit unfair. It was true that no one country could compete with the US when it came to developing military capability, but why was it important to do so? She doubted that the current administration in Washington represented a long-term challenge, if that is what it was, to the interests of the other Allies, and suggested that those Allies should rejoice in America's willingness to shoulder a disproportionate share of the military burden, which meant that they were freer to focus their own initiatives on addressing the root causes of terrorism. In her view, lamenting the existence of a capabilities "gap" detracted from the business of addressing root causes.

Finally, and the above disagreements notwithstanding, Ms. Sinclair reiterated that "we are absolutely kindred spirits," and suggested that the world had more need now than ever of creative policy ideas stemming jointly from the Netherlands and Canada.

Because of the richness and length of the two presentations, time proved scarce at panel's end, resulting in a decision to reserve general debate until the conclusion of the morning's second panel.

PANEL TWO: MULTILATERAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

The lead presenter and moderator of this panel were also Dutch. Prof. van Staden served in the latter capacity. Mr. Herman Schaper (MFA) began his presentation by noting that contemporary institutions of greatest significance for security represented an evolution of the structures erected by the West during the Cold War. In this vein, he observed that the idea of inclusive security institutions represented nothing new, and cited the Marshall Plan as an example of a security undertaking that went far beyond the simple military dimension.

Mr. Schaper departed from the first panel's lead presenter insofar as concerned the causes of terrorism. He pointed out that Dutch government officials tended to shy away from the "root-causes" phraseology, as it seemed to constitute a diminution of the challenge posed by terrorists. These latter, he reminded his auditors, "are criminals, after all." Moreover, it was unclear what exactly was connoted by the expression, "root causes," all the more so in that it was far from apparent that poverty per se must rank as one such

cause (as a glance at the economic status of the 11 September hijackers reveals). Far better, said Mr. Schaper, would be simply to conceive of terrorism as a "phenomenon in and of itself."

Mr. Schaper stated that America had a central role to play in the security of Europe, a fact that was widely acknowledged on the part of European officials, not least because American involvement "allows for" purely European cooperation within a wider compass than might be the case in the absence of such involvement. By contrast, the UN had an extremely limited role in European security, something that was unlikely to change. What was worrisome from the Dutch perspective was the huge disparity within Europe between the greater and the lesser powers. Institutional structures (i.e., NATO and the EU) provided the Netherlands with a "seat at the table," something that could not be said for the UN. However, recent talk within the EU of bestowing greater leadership functions upon a three-power "directory" was disturbing, from the Dutch perspective.

From the above analysis, Mr. Schaper inferred a set of four political objectives for his country: 1) maintain the transatlantic link; 2) support the process of European supranational integration; 3) spread democracy and prosperity to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); and 4) manage conflict in the Balkans. In respect of the latter, he noted that few would have expected, a decade ago, that the Netherlands would be deploying thousands of troops in the former Yugoslavia. By the same token, even more recently few would have imagined that the Netherlands would be sending hundreds of soldiers to Afghanistan.

In the realm of defence policy, Mr. Schaper was guardedly optimistic about the prospects of ESDP: "I'm not saying it is successful, merely that it has been making progress." An encouraging development has been the growing pragmatism of France vis-à-vis the alliance, reflective of a recognition in Paris that NATO was the "only game in town." For the Dutch, security priorities could be listed in the following order: 1) enhance the EU's military capability so as to avoid a "Potemkin-village" model; 2) foster closer EU-NATO collaboration; 3) find some means of bringing NATO members, including Canada, more explicitly into the picture as concerns EU-NATO collaboration; 4) develop the EU's crisis management capabilities in the nonmilitary aspects of security; and 5) reform the institutions of the EU itself to make it capable of responding to new challenges.

Turning to the important issue of increasing military capabilities, Mr. Schaper's previously stated guarded optimism shifted to outright pessimism. For all its rhetorical promise, ESDP continued to experience a "disappointing reaction" from European governments unwilling to allocate more resources to defence, or even to reform their

militaries significantly. Realistically, only three EU members seemed to be taking the issue of enhancing capabilities at all seriously: France, the UK and the Netherlands.

Finally, Mr. Schaper added a word about the OSCE, which the Dutch will be chairing in 2003. His country considered this security institution to be useful, particularly as it could provide early warning of impending crises. Some means of endowing it with a wider role, while at the same time reducing Russia's residual concern about its "interventionism," should be sought. Mr. Schaper suggested adding combatting terrorism, drug trafficking and crime to the organization's mission.

The Canadian respondent to Mr. Schaper was **Prof. Alexander Moens** (Simon Fraser University), who prefaced his remarks with a welcome to the Dutch participants, delivered in Dutch. Prof. Moens made no secret of the fact that he viewed the "bilateral house" after 11 September as being decidedly beset by stormy weather, not as a result of any specific Dutch-Canadian tensions but rather because of the transformations in US foreign policy set in motion by the attacks on Washington and New York. The effect of those attacks had been to render obsolete certain policy options that just a few years ago seemed worthwhile (as for instance the proposal to integrate military planning between NATO and the EU, which Prof. Moens himself once advocated but has now abandoned as being beside the point).

He added that 11 September had brought "a sudden end to the drifting 1990s," and in so doing had provided a glimpse of future security environment. Beyond dispute, he argued, was the transformation wrought by the attacks upon America's foreign policy, which had turned decisively away from recent "Wilsonian" and multilateral formulations in favour of a reconcentration upon American security and power. Prof. Moens reminded the group that the rise in American power should not necessarily be conceived as being detrimental to the interests of America's partners, even if it was likely to make Washington take its European Allies less seriously than heretofore. (As for Canada, geography would oblige Washington to take it seriously, indeed.)

Fundamentally, the US seemed to be abandoning the security order it had created in the aftermath of the Second World War. Less than ever before would it be interested in being entangled by alliances, and while the term "unilateralism" might not accurately capture the new American dispensation, it was obvious that for the Bush administration the current perceived threat from terrorism left little time or inclination for reflection upon "root causes" of the phenomenon.

What was to be done? Prof. Moens imparted some advice he gave to his students: throw out your old text books, and learn to "think outside the box." Insofar as initiatives

that Canada and the Netherlands might develop in common, he urged that we "do something radical" together, perhaps by developing some capacity actually to make a difference in the struggle against terrorism.

Discussion (of panels one and two):

- The "root-causes" thesis may be based on a fallacious assumption that development and peace are directly correlated, which flies in the face of at least one theory of political change associated with the "revolution of rising expectations" (i.e., that instability initially increases as objective conditions improve).
- If we take Afghanistan as the model for future conflict against terrorism, we may be making the mistake of "preparing to fight the last war"; in this respect, military institutions may be less relevant to the campaign against terrorism than police and intelligence assets.
- The military will, notwithstanding the comment immediately above, continue to have a vital counterterrorism function in respect of the challenge posed from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, while the US may be losing interest in NATO, it will still want to build coalitions.
- Even though the "roots-causes" thesis may be problematical in some respects, Afghanistan demonstrates the danger to our security if we ignore the problem of "failed states".
- It may be misleading to assume that the shock of 11 September has dissipated in the Netherlands, and that there has been a return to the status quo ante; after all, the Dutch are now debating in a vigorous and novel manner their refugee and immigration policies.
- The "marginalization-of-NATO" thesis may need to be qualified, for not only does the organization remain vital for a variety of reasons not directly related to terrorism, but the upcoming Prague summit may demonstrate a new resolve to enhance capabilities.
- A curious diplomatic paradox looks to be emerging: the extension of multilateral structures is placing a growing premium on bilateralism.
- The attack on America has resolved, for Canada, the Herman Kahn puzzle (i.e., of Canada's being a "regional power without a region") -- Canada has now been unequivocally given its region, and it is called North America.

PANEL THREE: CURRENT PEACE OPERATIONS CHALLENGES

Both the moderator and the lead presenter were Canadians, respectively MGen Michel Maisonneuve (Canadian Forces) and Prof. Joel Sokolsky (Royal Military College). Gen. Maisonneuve provided context for the discussion by drawing attention to how much the nature of peace operations had been changing even before 11 September 2001. Specifically, he suggested that peace operations had evolved through three stages: 1) the so-called "golden age" of classical peacekeeping of the pre-1989 period, 2) the "New World Order" burst of enthusiasm of the years 1989 to 1993; and 3) the profoundly more complex "gray zone" peace operations since 1993.

Prof. Sokolsky began by stressing that, in parallel with the evolution in peace operations, Canadian defence policy was becoming more closely integrated with American policy than ever before. This was not something caused by 11 September, but the attacks of that day would accelerate the trend. Yet this did not mean Canada would be focused militarily on North America. To the contrary, "if there is anything big going on in the world, we expect to participate in it." Canada had some 4,500 military personnel deployed in overseas operations, with the bulk of the latter being led by the US.

A second important aspect of Canadian defence policy concerned Europe. As did Washington, Ottawa too saw value in enlarging the alliance, and working with new Allies as well as PFP members in a "trans-European bargain" intended to promote and consolidate democracy in the CEE. Despite those who thought that Canada somehow "quit" Europe as a result of the 1992 decision to end the stationed force presence in Germany, the reality was that by the end of the 1990s there were almost as many Canadian military personnel in Europe (in ex-Yugoslavia) as there had been in Germany at the start of the 1990s.

What was new was the emphasis now being given in Washington to "homeland security." This, said Prof. Sokolsky, had led decisionmakers in Ottawa to seek to strengthen bilateral ties with the US, inter alia so as to reassure Americans that Canada would not become a "security liability" to them. In this regard, it bore noting that the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review in the US had identified the defence of the homeland as the country's top security priority. The new agenda suggested both sovereignty and budgetary implications for Canada, and with respect to the latter it was clear, from the most recent federal budget (of December 2001), that while more money would be allocated to security measures, it did not follow there would be major increases in the budget of the Department of National Defence.

Prof. Sokolsky concluded by emphasizing how much the new security agenda was being shaped by one overriding concern, the combatting of international terrorism. "It's as if the Cold War is back, and with it, Cold War type implications are presented to Canada." This, he said, meant that the US would be relying on NATO for political support and legitimacy, and that Canada would find itself "firmly affixed to its seat at the table of the American-dominated Western alliance."

There were two Dutch respondents to Prof. Sokolsky. The first was LGen P. J. M. Godderij (Ministry of Defence [MOD]), who remarked upon the similarities between the two countries' Alliance interests, and reminded everyone that NATO continued to be held together by America's Article 5 commitment to its Allies. Apropos the comment about Canada wishing to be part of any major military operations, Gen. Godderij regretted that Canada "had other priorities" in Afghanistan than participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deployed to Kabul. But he did remark upon the successful cooperation between Canada, the Netherlands and the UK in Bosnia, with SFOR.

Gen. Godderij emphasized that if the Europeans wanted to enhance their influence within NATO, they would have to develop the capacity to manage peace operations from which the US chose to abstain. Could they do so? Perhaps the lesson of UNMEE suggested they might be able to, and to do so with Canadian involvement. For in the Ethiopian-Eritrean case, both Canada and the Netherlands were able to function well together as the spearhead of a UN-centred "group of friends." Moreover, the Netherlands was able to prevail upon its EU partners to increase their contributions to post-conflict peacebuilding, by getting them to provide more economic assistance. A second "lesson" of UNMEE was that, notwithstanding the obvious reality that Canada would go along with the US most of the time, just as the Netherlands would go along with the EU most of the time, there did remain scope for constructive bilateralism as between the Dutch and the Canadians.

Insofar as concerns the evolution of policy governing peace support operations, Gen. Godderij informed the seminar of some recent reforms introduced in the Netherlands, intended to render more effective such operations. These were prompted by difficulties experienced with the UNPROFOR deployment to Bosnia, especially those associated with the "Srebrenica debacle." Among the objectives of the reform initiative had been to clarify command and control arrangements, and to render as "robust" as possible the rules of engagement.

The second respondent was Dr. Dick Leurdijk (Clingendael), who observed that there were also less positive experiences shared by the two countries (viz. Bosnia and the

tragic events of Srebrenica). The experience of the past decade in the Balkans, especially since NATO had become a central player there, demonstrated that a part of Europe that was once considered "out of area" for the Alliance had now emphatically come to be regarded as very much "in area."

Turning to the Alliance and 11 September, Dr. Leurdijk remarked that NATO invoked Article 5 only after receiving clear evidence of a linkage between external (to the US) terrorist groups and the attacks on Washington and New York; ironically, he observed, the support given to the US by the EU was more forthcoming, as well as less conditional, than that accorded by NATO.

Discussion:

- One should not underestimate the impact of the Prime Minister on Canada's propensity to be part of significant peace operations, for Jean Chrétien is very much an activist.
- Should Canadian military participation in Afghanistan even be conceptualized in terms of "peacekeeping," and is there a risk that sustaining its involvement there will mean that Canada, too, might consider ending its deployment in Bosnia?
- Apropos the comment immediately above, Ottawa accepts that Canadian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom means we are "in a state of armed conflict, we are at war" with the Taliban and al-Qaeda; thus we are not there in a peacekeeping role.
- As for Bosnia, the view from Ottawa is that we would like to reduce the size of our deployment, but we are not likely to announce any large-scale withdrawal by a specified date, and in this respect Canada's position on Bosnia differs from that of the US.
- Tony Blair may have stolen the Canadian terminology, given that Ottawa's announced doctrine on peace operations is "early-in, early-out," but the reality is "we don't have the capacity to be early, unless it happens a couple of miles outside of Petawawa"; sometimes we do leave early (e.g., Ethiopia, East Timor), but usually we are "end-staters".
- So, too, are the Dutch end-staters by preference, but regarding Bosnia they worry that a culture of dependency -- both economic and military -- has been fostered, and that this will militate against any solution ever being found.
- In Afghanistan, "ad hocery" governed where the Canadian Forces would be deployed; there was no deliberate choice to go with the US as opposed to ISAF and the Europeans.

PANEL FOUR: FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

This panel, the first on day two of the seminar, was moderated by Prof. Jan Geert Siccama (Dutch MOD), and featured as lead presenter Mr. Robert McDougall (DFAIT), who began by referring to a "pervasive sense of crisis in the field of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament" (NACD). Part of the problem resided in the fundamental tension between NACD, held to be "inherently international" in nature, and national security, which by definition put a premium on the efforts of single states, at least in the first instance. The tension mattered, because a sound national security strategy was one in which there was, or should be, close complementarity with NACD regimes; *mutatis mutandis*, the reverse held as well. Often, however, state decisionmakers lost sight of this complementarity.

Another source of the current crisis, Mr. McDougall continued, stemmed from suboptimal regional dynamics, in that while it was "axiomatic" that NACD could and did enhance prospects for regional peace and stability, it was often the case that a modicum of regional stability must first have been attained before conditions conducive to arms control could apply. What this suggested was that "we cannot expect countries to negotiate, join or sustain NACD commitments if they do not see such a step as reinforcing their national security."

An increasingly important issue confronting NACD, said Mr. McDougall, was the pace of technological development of weapons systems. New weapons were especially problematical (e.g., miniaturized nuclear "bunker busters," strategic missile defence, and spaced-based systems); these could be grouped under the rubric of "qualitative" or "vertical" proliferation. Then there was the more or less traditional problem of "quantitative" or "horizontal" proliferation, used to characterize the acquisition of established weapons systems by growing numbers of states or nonstate actors. Mr. McDougall explained that a technological race was also underway pitting those who would proliferate against those who would detect and check proliferation, so the story was not entirely a gloomy one.

In large measure, how the story ended would have much to do with geostrategic circumstances. Mr. McDougall identified three such circumstances: 1) the future of the US-Russia relationship; 2) the dual-edge ramifications of 11 September (meaning that while one consequence of the attacks had been to elevate the allure of nonproliferation in the campaign against terrorism, another consequence had been to render less attractive either arms control or disarmament, "always a tough sell in wartime"); and 3) the changing manner in which war was fought (with particular reference to the "Revolution in Military Affairs," or RMA).

For Canada, Mr. McDougall listed a set of near-term priorities, including: 1) promoting compliance with commitments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); 2) working with "like-minded" states (see the comments by Prof. van Staden, above) to strengthen efforts to stanch bio-weapons proliferation; 3) establishing a dialogue on outer space, with a prospect of achieving a weaponization ban; and 4) furthering efforts to reduce the levels of small arms in circulation worldwide. These were all areas in which Mr. McDougall foresaw much scope for enhanced bilateral cooperation between Canada and the Netherlands.

There were again two Dutch respondents to a Canadian presenter. The first was Prof. Paul Rusman (University of Groningen), who gave what he called an "outsider's" perspective. He began by echoing a theme set out in the Canadian presentation: the current war had indeed provided impetus to nonproliferation efforts linked to counterterrorism. But no such impetus had been witnessed in respect of arms control, upon which the US in particular took a dim view. To some degree, said Prof. Rusman, US misgivings with multilateral arms control regimes were well-founded, at least if the experience of the NPT inspection regime provided guidance: "for any bio-weapons verification regime is likely to repeat the NPT inspection regime, in which most inspection resources are spent in checking on the most unlikely proliferators (Germany and Japan), while left much more dangerous offenders off the hook."

Regarding the control of chemical weapons, here the major source of concern seemed to be the "chaotic manner in which Russia is proceeding with its mandatory ... destruction effort." Likewise in the nuclear area Russia figured as a worry, given the quantity and geographic dispersion of its sizable holdings of fissile materials. Also disquieting was the US decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, although its doing so was not expected to jeopardize arms reduction talks between Moscow and Washington, as had once been thought. More worrisome, from the arms control perspective, had been the US decision to withhold ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had the added demerit of eliminating America as "the world's arms control beacon."

The second Dutch respondent was MGen (Ret) C. Homan (Clingendael), who commenced on an upbeat note by remarking that the impending enlargements of NATO and the EU should bode well for cooperative security in Europe. Similarly uplifting was the record of arms control in Europe, starting with the CFE Treaty, and continuing through the Open Skies Treaty. Gen. Homan suggested that the key to remedying the defects associated with global NACD efforts might be found by trying to learn from, and apply, the lessons of the European experience, which had been replete with positive results in the area of conventional weapons systems. Gen. Homan suggested two avenues

of possible Dutch-Canadian cooperation: 1) control of small arms, and 2) resistance to the weaponization of space. In particular, he stated that should the US succeed in achieving space dominance, it would be a "destabilizing and dangerous development."

Discussion:

- Can it be said that the ending of the Cold War has led to the current "malaise" in NACD, and that absent the bipolar contest of yore, there no longer exists any coherent strategic rationale for arms control? In this regard, can one really generalize from the record of the European experience with conventional arms control? Might not stability, say, in South Asia require giving both sides more secure nuclear arsenals?
- While there is no alternative to dialogue on NACD, the only real achievement of the UN Conference on Disarmament was the NPT, which depended upon a particular geostrategic context that has ceased to exist.
- Like it or not, the US is going to weaponize space, and the spectre of an "arms race" in space is the product of overworked imaginations, for the reality is that no one else will be able to compete with Washington in this enterprise; in this sense, "we are better off today than we were in the 1945-1960 period".
- To the extent that arms controllers in Canada and the Netherlands evince disquiet about the RMA, does this not complicate their countries' stated determination to become more technologically relevant to the US, via the enhancement of their military capabilities?
- The reaction to the changed US attitude to arms control and disarmament should be twofold. Because effective arms control is not feasible without American support, ways and means should be found to cooperate with the US in strengthening the NACD regimes, particularly those related to WMD (as the Ottawa treaty has shown, arms control related to conventional weapons can also be successful without the US). At the same time, the long held belief in the value of multilateral arms control and disarmament should not be cast away overnight. Canada and the Netherlands share those policies and could cooperate to identify ways of bringing the NACD Agenda forward.
- Has not the tenor of this panel's presentations represented an instance of going "forward to the past," in that it skirts the real issue, namely trying to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of irresponsible regimes?

- Arms control has to apply to everyone, and the effect of the RMA is to render much easier the decision to go to war.
- Iraq will be key to the future tenability of NACD, for it is not enough just to be able to detect WMD, they have to be destroyed.
- If we are serious about intervening in the affairs of others to get them to treat their own population the way we treat ours (viz., the thrust of "human security"), should we not applaud the RMA precisely because it makes it easier to achieve the goals of war with fewer casualties?
- We do not need nuclear weapons to destroy WMD in the hands of terrorists, and we should not use them to do so.
- Arms controllers should go after "irresponsible" regimes, but more than that, they should also seek to establish greater predictability and thus help to resolve the security dilemma.
- Why, exactly, is the weaponization of space thought to be dangerous?

PANEL FIVE: THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

In many ways this panel was the capstone session of the seminar, with the principal speakers being the ambassadors from the two countries, and the moderator being Ms. Cartwright. The presenter was His Excellency Como van Hellenberg Hubar (Ambassador of the Netherlands to Canada). The respondent was His Excellency Serge April (Ambassador of Canada to the Netherlands).

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar began by stating how central transatlantic links are for the Europeans, and emphasized that these connections could not and should not be reduced to those between Europe and the US, as seems often to be the case. Canada had an important role to play as a "political force-multiplier," helping in the process to minimize the pressures that would drive the Atlantic Allies apart. But the bilateral (Canada-Netherlands) relationship had to be understood as one between countries each of which was growing ever more integrated with its own continental partners. This trend, while necessary to recognize, did not need to be deplored.

Indeed, according to Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar, there was much wisdom in Canada's aligning itself more closely with the US, just as there had been great benefit derived by the Netherlands from its decision to integrate more fully with Germany and other European countries. "I do believe," he said, "that a country locked into a cooperative setting, be it in Europe or in North America, has more chance to uphold the essence of its views on cooperation than in isolation." That is why the Ambassador rejected the charges brought by some against John Manley, Canada's Deputy Prime Minister, namely that he was too quick to sacrifice sovereignty in pursuit of closer integration with the US after 11 September. Just the opposite applied, accordingly to the Ambassador, for Mr. Manley understood that close and fruitful cooperation with the US was a "necessary precondition for the survival of Canada as a viable state." The Deputy PM was right to think as he did, and in so doing to confute the preferences of some of Canada's "academic elite," steeped as the latter have been in the "traditional anti-Americanism of the Franz Fanon generation, grown up with the ideology of 'Les Damnées de la Terre', and [the] insularity of the British."

As for the Netherlands, integration on the European scale was so logical that almost all the country's political parties supported it. But, said Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar, Europe would not be allowed to constitute the sole focus of the country's external reach; Dutch economic, political, military, and cultural interests extended far beyond Europe. This was all the more pertinent given the recent redirection of the European integration project, away from the federalist preferences of the Dutch and toward the kind of Europe of states envisioned by Charles de Gaulle. "We are now at a turning point, and De Gaulle's vision seems more up-to-date than I, for one, ever believed possible."

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar acknowledged that there were major differences in the processes and norms of continental integration on the two sides of the Atlantic, stemming largely from the disproportionate weight enjoyed by the US within North America as compared with that of even the largest European country within the EU. Some things, however, were similar: Canada, like most of the EU countries, had been spending less than it should on defence. Canada and the European NATO members had allowed the capability gap separating them from the US to expand. Nor were matters helped by Canada's "regrettably ... falling behind" in the provision of nonmilitary assistance to developing countries, particularly in light of the country's declaratory policy and its capacity to pay.

Neither the EU Allies nor, by extension, Canada should have an interest in promoting a division of labour within the Alliance that left the burden of military intervention ("hard power") to one ally or only a few Allies; subscribing to such an idea would be the quickest way to self-marginalization for a country. It also constituted "an

expression of defeatism, or at least of a complacent attitude." In fact, through the military support and other solidarity it had provided the US since 11 September, Canada had shown itself to be ahead of the other Allies. There were, said the Ambassador, many explanations in addition to altruism that accounted for Canada's rapid rallying to America's side, and notwithstanding ongoing difficulties in certain sectors (e.g., softwood lumber) it was undeniable that Canada's standing with the US had been elevated, leaving it placed better than most if not all the others in the "competition among Allies [over] who reacted in the most appropriate way to the distress of the US."

As for the Canada-Netherlands bilateral relationship, it sometimes appeared as if the two kindred countries were saddled with "the problem that they have no problem standing in the way of their friendship." As a result, it was too easy, since there was nothing fundamental for the two to solve, for them to succumb to the temptation of not doing anything together. So to think would be wrong. More than ever after the events of 11 September was it incumbent upon the two to "make good use of the benefit we derive from our international orientation and ... act in a complementary manner on the world stage."

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar concluded by sketching the outlines of a few items that could figure on a productive agenda for bilateral diplomacy. Foremost on his list was enhanced military cooperation between the two countries, including providing some role for Canada in decisionmaking within an evolving ESDP; this latter would also have the merit of contributing to Dutch efforts to solidify ties between NATO and the ESDP. Cooperation might also take the form of procurement of military equipment. Outside the military sphere, cooperative ventures could be mounted involving commercial and academic constituencies. The point to stress was that the willingness was there, in both countries, to pursue important projects together for mutual benefit.

The Canadian responder, Ambassador April, commenced by acknowledging that the Dutch, more so perhaps than any other Europeans, realized that Canada was "more than just an additional dose of glue with which to bind the United States to Europe." Canada appreciated that the Netherlands had long accepted Canada as a "partner in its own right" in the transatlantic relationship. And while at times the overconcentration of Europeans (and Canadians) upon the US might be misplaced, such was not the situation after 11 September: in the early aftermath of that tragic day, it was assumed by many that US policy would demonstrate a recommitment to multilateralism. But this had not turned out to be the case, notwithstanding the initial expectation that NATO's invocation of article 5 would reveal it to be an "Alliance of equals."

Instead, what had emerged was a reconfirmation of prior signs that America would practice, at best, a very selective "multilateralism," one in which the utility of international institutions would be assessed according to their usefulness for securing American objectives. As a result, "although we are convinced the Americans need us to preserve a stable international system, we are increasingly worried that the Americans do not realize this." What this implied, in turn, was nothing other than a reversal of the conventional manner in which transatlantic relations had been conceived. In the past, the challenge had been to maintain America's commitment to Europe; today, "the challenge is to ensure that we remain engaged with the United States, and retain a capacity to influence its actions."

More than ever, preserving a healthy transatlantic relationship presupposes that the Allies demonstrate an equal concern for American security. Ambassador April noted that Canada had for many decades played an integral part in America's "homeland security," even if no one actually employed that rubric until very recently. There could not be any question of Canada's choosing to be seen by the US as anything other than a reliable partner. All the same, Canada remained as concerned as any European ally about US unilateralism. As a result, he continued, a "redefined bridging role" was emerging for Canada, one in which the country's efforts would be bent to the task of showing Washington that Europe could make a worthwhile contribution to American security. "Rather than being the other 'outsider' encouraging them to commit to Europe, we will be the other 'insider' encouraging them to engage with Europe on issues of global security." And whoever said "global security" was often as not heard in the US to be saying "American security."

What had to be done, said Ambassador April, was for the Allies to begin to make progress in shrinking the capabilities gap, and in this respect there was a danger that an overconcentration on ESDP would absorb energies that was needed for the urgent task of once again "reinventing" NATO. Here the Dutch could play a very important role, by "keeping NATO high on the European agenda." NATO remained needed, but it also was necessary for it to be reformed, so as to become equipped to respond to the emergence of new and unconventional threats. Although he did not specifically mention Iraq, the Ambassador clearly had that country in mind when he cautioned that the Allies would have to develop a coherent policy to govern their response to the challenge of WMD programs in countries viewed with suspicion.

Another area in which they need to make progress concerned ESDP, not only in terms of endowing it with the capability to assume its self-assigned (yet ill-defined) "Petersburg" tasks, but also to move beyond those responsibilities, and in doing so continue to enable Canada to play a meaningful role in European security. Here the Ambassador was frank in expressing his (and Canada's) dismay at what could appear to be

the country's marginalization: "[Q]uite apart from our sense that after six decades of helping defend Europe it is a bit unfair to put us on the same footing as Russia and Ukraine ... we have yet to be reassured that if we did participate in an operation, we would have adequate input on how it was run."

On the matter of bilateral cooperation between the militaries of Canada and the Netherlands, the Ambassador noted experience had shown that they could and did work very well together (viz., the Multinational Division Southwest in Bosnia, and UNMEE). On the basis of this experience, it was only reasonable to imagine there would be further such opportunities, perhaps as part of the struggle against terrorism, for the two countries to work together militarily.

Even more "robust" had been the pattern of bilateral cooperation on political matters, with Canada considering the Netherlands very much to be one of the "like-minded" countries, and this in some measure accounted for the decision to initiate a new emphasis (nouvel élan) in the relationship, so as to provide some means of assuring continuity in bilateral ties in light of the corroding effect that time's passage inevitably had upon some of the foundational pillars of Dutch-Canadian cooperation.

Discussion:

- It is sometimes forgotten the extent to which the Netherlands, as a kingdom, is also a land of the Western hemisphere, one for whom Venezuela is a neighbour. This means that the Netherlands shares some of Canada's hemispheric political and economic concerns, and as a European country it also shares the commitment to transatlantic links.
- One possible focus of joint endeavour stems from the way in which the "new multilateralism" is putting a premium on bilateral diplomacy, and inheres in the possibility of Dutch-Canadian initiatives both on EU and on Canada-US issues.
- There are three ways of regarding ESDP: 1) as a vehicle for redressing intra-Alliance burdensharing difficulties; 2) as a counterweight to US influence (and some in the Netherlands worry that this is really what the French are promoting); and 3) as a "counterfeit, a fake, a Potemkin village"; if the latter image is the most accurate one, then there is nothing really for Canada to be involved with.
- Canada was initially more supportive of ESDI/ESDP than the US, but began to have difficulty with the concept(s) in 1999, when it looked as if the European project would necessarily exclude Canada.

- Canadians will for some time be preoccupied with the implications of the new North American military command. There will likely be better opportunities for Dutch-Canadian initiatives outside of Europe rather than inside it.
- From a Dutch perspective, cooperation with Canada outside Europe gets handicapped by Ottawa's habit of cutting spending on ODA.
- From a Canadian perspective, Canada's access to the EU, and hence its ability to cooperate fully with the Netherlands, is likely to be affected negatively by new visa requirements in the Schengen group, limiting Canadians to three-months maximum of visa-free entry; nevertheless, since 11 September, there may be more potential for bilateral efforts on Third Pillar items.
- Perhaps working together on a joint threat assessment, say on WMD, might prove worth doing?
- Another possible area for cooperation: the Caribbean region.

CLOSING REMARKS

From the Dutch side, Prof. Siccama observed that much of the focus of the seminar over the two days had been the US in the aftermath of 11 September, which led him to remark upon a major difference between Canada and the Netherlands: the former was part of America's "strategic space," the latter was not. By implication, Canada's ability to influence US thinking had risen, while the Netherlands' had declined. Indeed, compared with the height of the Cold War, when all reinforcements destined for the Central Front would have had to pass through Belgian and Dutch ports, you could even say that Dutch strategic standing vis-à-vis the US had changed "drastically."

Less explicit as a focus of the discussion was a theme that intruded several times at the margins of the debate: the question of Europe's finalité. This, suggested Prof. Siccama, would have great bearing on the quality of Dutch-Canadian relations in the future. The EU's future constitutional order was more likely to reflect French and British, rather than German, preferences, in that it was doubtful that future constitutional order would much resemble "federalism." As for the Netherlands, "we have to admit that we have abandoned the supranational, federal position ourselves." Only Germany and Belgium appeared today still to be committed to a federal Europe.

To state the obvious, he continued, no one could say where all of this was leading. The best way of thinking about Europe's future might be to rely on the familiar bicycle metaphor, whereby the goal of remaining in motion was, in itself, as important as, if not more important than, determining where one should be headed; for, not to remain in motion on a bicycle meant to fall. The metaphor's logic suggested we study closely three tests currently or soon to be put to the EU: 1) European Monetary Union -- could we count on it remaining workable, or would it succumb to pressure brought to bear by inflationist members of the currency group?; 2) EU enlargement on a large scale -- would this prove too much for the EU to digest?; and 3) Second Pillar issues -- could ESDP be made effective, and made to function cooperatively with NATO?

Prof. Siccama proffered his own list of items that might constitute an agenda for Dutch-Canadian bilateral diplomacy: 1) human security, 2) peacekeeping, 3) linking development cooperation with security, 4) regional conflict management, and 5) working with the US to get it once again to see multilateral arms control as being in its own best security interest.

With hardly anything left unsaid during the two days of candid, constructive, and always thought-provoking discussion, Ms. Cartwright concluded by expressing her thanks to all the participants for their contributions, and observed, with some irony, that it was "always a challenge to have an irritant-free relationship." Still, she said, it would be wrong to infer from the lack of bilateral irritants any cause for complacency, and she likened the bilateral relationship to a marriage, which regardless of how solidly established it might be, always required and deserved ongoing attention.

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31 March 2002

ANNEX

SUGGESTIONS FOR BILATERAL FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS

- Working with the US to try to persuade it to regard multilateral arms control as being in its own security interests.
- Promoting research into the political and strategic impediments to securing compliance with NPT commitments.
- Working with other "like-minded" states to strengthen efforts to stanch bio-weapons proliferation.
- Establishing a dialogue on outer space, with a prospect of debating the merits of a weaponization ban.
- Furthering efforts to promote human security, including reducing levels of small arms in global circulation.
- Developing a joint threat assessment on WMD and other urgent security issues.
- Collaborating on peacekeeping and regional conflict management.
- Studying the prospects of joint procurement initiatives for military equipment.
- Fostering discussion of fruitful bilateral initiatives in the Caribbean, a region of importance to both Canada and the Netherlands.
- Linking development cooperation with security.

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