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CANADA AND ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY

THE NORTH PACIFIC COOPERATIVE SECURITY DIALOGUE

RECENT TRENDS

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The logo for the Government of Canada, featuring the word "Canada" in a stylized, serif font with a small crown above the letter 'a'.

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RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE**Synopsis:**

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have fundamentally challenged accepted definitions of national and global security, although it will take some time before this is fully understood by governments and appropriate policy responses are developed.

The traditional definition of security, the need for protection against armed invasion or foreign-supported insurrection, is still valid - as continuing armed conflicts around the globe clearly illustrate. What is needed is an expanded notion of security (or stability) which takes into consideration questions of economics, environment and resource management, uncontrolled and "illegal" demographic flows, human rights and international criminal activity which has destabilizing effects of producing and receiving states. This expanded notion of security, which Canada defines as a "cooperative security" concept, will be an essential tool for policy-makers in the coming years.

The Canadian initiative for establishing a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) was first introduced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in speeches in Victoria, Tokyo, and Jakarta in July 1990.

The NPCSD has two tracks - a non-governmental and a governmental element - and focusses on the North Pacific countries of China, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Japan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Canada. This focus was determined following an analysis of the four Asia Pacific sub-regions: South Asia, where SAARC has the potential for developing regional consensus on a wide number of issues; South East Asia, where ASEAN continues to evolve; the South Pacific, with the emerging South Pacific Forum; and the North Pacific. Only in this last sub-region, where there is a significant concentration of conventional and nuclear forces, which is not fully represented in APEC, and where growing instability - centred on the Korean Peninsula - would have an adverse effect on Canada's political, economic, social and environmental interests, is there no multilateral forum for policy discussions.

The NGO track of the Canadian initiative is designed specifically to explore issues and prospects for dialogue and to focus knowledge and awareness on the North Pacific. York University organized an NPCSD colloquium in Victoria in April, 1991 to discuss with academic and NGO experts various research approaches to North Pacific cooperative security issues. A series of workshops will be held throughout the year, leading to a more formal NPCSD conference in the fall of 1992 or spring of 1993.

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The official, or governmental, track of the Canadian initiative is an open-ended process intended to explore the merits of establishing a regional dialogue encompassing all relevant themes and issues. The Canadian view is that such a dialogue must not be the result of an attempt to transplant European models or institutions. The sources of tension and the nature of the regional challenges in the North Pacific do not lend themselves to such an approach. Rather, approaches to enhancing stability must accommodate the specific traditions, history and geopolitical dynamics of the region. The continuing emphasis is on consultation, not negotiation; and on seeking consensus on how best to address the need for a North Pacific dialogue.

I Cooperative Security

The Canadian initiative to explore the merits of establishing a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) is based on the concept of "cooperative security"; specifically, it seeks to examine how the global post-Cold War security environment could most effectively contribute to improved relations among the seven countries of the North Pacific.

In the Canadian definition, security is more than the absence of war; it is the presence of a stable and prosperous peace. It is now conventional wisdom that security can no longer be achieved unilaterally or attained exclusively through military means. Security has become multi-dimensional - some would say "multiplex"¹ - and requires a shared commitment on all sides to work cooperatively towards building trust and confidence.

The application of the concept of cooperative security to the North Pacific is not an alternative to traditional security arrangements (collective and mutual defence arrangements will remain central to the preservation of national sovereignty); it is intended first to address all issues of concern and then to focus on those areas where it is agreed that progress in developing multilateral approaches is possible.

While no one can or should deny the continuing importance of traditional security issues and approaches, there is a growing recognition that security can no longer be defined only in those terms. Challenges to security and stability increasingly come in more diverse forms including, *inter alia*, economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, overpopulation, irregular migration and refugee movements, environmental degradation, political oppression, human rights abuses, terrorism and the illicit trade in drugs.

Cooperative security takes as its point of departure the fact that security is both complex and indivisible: no one state can "be secure" either at the expense of, or in isolation from, others. Cooperative security is the development of working relationships and functional links across a broad spectrum of issues (political, economic and social) at all levels of interaction (official and unofficial) through regular and systematic dialogue which will permit and promote transparency, confidence, knowledge and reassurance. Cooperative security seeks to develop the habit of dialogue through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and compromise. This cannot realistically be guided by a grand strategic design, but is constructed by putting into place many different instruments which, although arrived at separately, contribute to cooperative security. It is by definition evolutionary in nature and regional (or sub-regional) in approach.

Individual states may reject multilateral approaches to specific issues as contrary to their national interests; others may reject any effort at all to construct a more

cooperative international order. However, a cooperative security dialogue means that one can build on what is realistic and possible. Obviously, military confidence will continue to play a central role in a cooperative security system. Bilateral or multilateral collective security arrangements, if they are truly defensive in nature, are fully compatible with a regional cooperative security framework. The evolution of a comprehensive military component of a regional cooperative security framework will follow. A finely balanced, judgmental treatment of the military component, including arms control and confidence building - or "reassurance" - measures can be neither ignored nor accelerated.

While it is possible to speak of building global cooperative security, it is more realistic to focus first on developing cooperative security at the regional (or sub-regional) level where shared values, interests, experiences and problems can contribute to the development of workable approaches, networks and mechanisms. Regional frameworks, successfully established and implemented, can and should then interact to contribute to broader cooperative security frameworks.

Multilateral arrangements often have a functional, as well as regional, common denominator. Regional cooperative bodies such as development banks, economic and environmental agreements, and dialogue mechanisms consistent with global norms (e.g., the GATT, the IMF, the UN) are evidence that more countries are realizing that membership or involvement in such mechanisms serves their national security interests. Within their defined domains, these institutions can secure their members' broader interests through cooperation and, perhaps more importantly, ensure that issues that arise among states do not have effects which lead to tension and conflict.

States do not base their security on altruistic, unfounded notions of cooperation. It is only through an appeal to national interests that the building blocks of a cooperative security system will be put into place. Cooperative security is not a theory but a practical method of dealing with important issues. For example, a principle source of future conflict in the Middle East may well be water rights. The Gulf War has brought home the problems of economic inequalities and even the impact of oil pricing policies on what we call "national security". The ability to cooperate on issues such as management of water rights may well have more to do in the future with "security" in the truest sense of the word. Similar problems can be identified in other regions.

As already mentioned, cooperative security is an approach, not an institution or organization. Its ability to succeed is completely dependent upon the recognition by states that their participation in the sort of legally or politically binding arrangements that would result from such dialogue and negotiation would contribute in identifiable and concrete ways to their national security. This is why cooperative security offers so many possibilities: it is fundamentally rooted in developing dialogue that will enable states to deal with their real and practical concerns - their national interests.

A cooperative security dialogue cannot succeed in isolation. At one level, it can provide a broader context for the wide range of intersecting bilateral relationships which naturally take place between states, and can bring consistency and coherence to these bilateral relationships. On another level, it can contribute to the complex of multilateral and international mechanisms that comprise the broader global security framework.

Cooperative security is a comprehensive approach to national security in its broadest sense, an approach which encourages cooperation and dialogue between states in a region or issues of direct interest. As such it requires an evolutionary and issue-sensitive application in each region; progress in one field can contribute to eventual progress on other, more difficult issues. This is the fundamental challenge for efforts to promote cooperative security frameworks in different regions around the world.²

II Issues of Good Governance

Democracy and respect for human rights are values that Canadians hold closely and profoundly, and have sought to promote through the conduct of bilateral relations and the exercise of multilateral diplomacy - in the United Nations, the G-7, the Commonwealth and la Francophonie, the CSCE and the Organization of American States (OAS), the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and now through the establishment of an NPCSD.

Canadians promote universal, not western, standards for human rights issues. Human rights considerations are also inextricably linked to Canadian foreign and development assistance policy (although here our intent has been more to rectify problems rather than to punish for past sins).

It could be argued that, with the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, there is a minimum standard in place which assumes that human rights are inherent; that they are not the property of nation states to be bestowed or withheld by fiat. (Admittedly, this view would be contested by several participants in the UN system.)

In the broadest sense, democracy cannot exist without fundamental respect being given to a wide range of human rights, to the rule of law, and to the freedoms that are the bedrock of a democratic state. Unfortunately, of the seven North Pacific countries, only Canada and the United States would appear willing to discuss such issues in a regional, open forum.

Japan does not view traditional western approaches to human rights issues to be particularly productive. In the Japanese view, the most effective method of encouraging a state to increase its respect for human rights is through the provision of economic incentives (the carrot) and the threat of economic privation (the stick). South Korea may

be relatively free of ethnic discrimination, but its record on human rights issues in areas pertaining to political freedom has been problematic. The situations and problems in the former Soviet Union and China have been well-documented. The extent of the protection of human rights in North Korea continues to be suspect.

With due respect to the G-7, not all participants in the NPCSD have recognized the 1990s as the "Decade of Democracy", and the Houston Economic Summit plan of action to assist all who are interested "in the drafting of laws, including bills of rights and civil, criminal, and economic framework laws; in the fostering of independent media; in establishing training programmes in government, management, and technical fields; to develop and expand people-to-people contacts and exchange programmes to help diffuse understanding and knowledge", would not appear to be of great attraction to all in the North Pacific.

How then to approach the question of human rights and social issues in an NPCSD context? One suggested approach is to broaden the definition, to include environmental threats to security, and to address relevant issues under the title "Issues of Good Governance".

At the Victoria NPCSD colloquium, North Pacific policy planners agreed that there were environmental issues that could be considered threats to regional stability, but there was no agreement on how to define such threats. Scholars attending the colloquium suggested fisheries issues, airborne pollution, and global warming. Other scholars suggested adding population movement, depletion of ocean-based foodstocks, loss of arable land through desertification and deforestation, toxic waste management, issues relating to migratory species and transboundary pollution. Other participants, citing events in the Gulf, made further suggestions: disputes over trans-boundary resources, environmental security, and ecological terrorism - the use of the environment as a weapon of war.

It has been suggested that Canada should seek agreement on the legitimacy of discussing environmental issues within the NPCSD under the umbrella of "social issues" as a means of providing a lever with which to open the NPCSD to include traditional human rights issues. These are recognized in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document that Canada helped fashion and that draws heavily on the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the American Bill of Rights, but does not benefit from the teachings of Islam, Buddha, or Confucius on the role and obligations of the individual within society.

Bernard Wood of the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security pointed out at the Victoria colloquium that "...since 1945 the world has codified a wide range of human rights, and even countries that show little respect for human rights now feel a need to pay lip service to them". Codes alone have not been enough; it also has been necessary to develop international institutions to implement them.

In 1945, the United Nations Charter was adopted, enshrining human rights both as a basic objective of the organization and as a universal obligation. Article 55 of the Charter states that the United Nations shall promote "human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". Article 56 obliges member countries "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the (United Nations)" to achieve these purposes.

In 1946, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights was established, followed in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic - though non-binding - declaration of principles of human rights and freedoms. This was followed by the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the preparation of two separate human rights covenants - one on political and civil rights and the other covering economic, social, and cultural rights (both adopted by the United Nations in 1966).

All this to say that there is sound international (and, important for a North Pacific audience, pre-CSCE) precedent for discussing human rights in a multilateralist framework. (More recently this has been a subject for discussion in the Commonwealth, the OAS, and la Francophonie.) The key would be initially limiting discussion to those areas which all North Pacific countries agree, avoiding the nebulous area of, as a Chinese scholar at Victoria termed it, "cultural infringement", in favour of "people-to-people" contacts and exchanges and cultural interaction.

It is argued here that the issues of human rights and environmental concerns be treated separately within the NPCSD, and that priority be given to developing the environmental dialogue. This would avoid the appearance of developing a "basket three" approach which, in turn, would lead to charges of attempting to impose a CSCE-style agenda on the North Pacific. Human rights issues are a legitimate concern of the NPCSD and, as has been illustrated, there are precedents and structures in place which would allow for a sub-regional multilateral dialogue.

III The Geographic and Two-Track Rationales

This paper accepts the definition of Asia Pacific as comprising four sub-regions. Consultative arrangements exist in South Asia through the (admittedly imperfect) South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation - SAARC; in South East Asia through the Association of South East Asian Nations - ASEAN - and the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference; and in the South Pacific through the emerging South Pacific Forum. In the North Pacific, where there is a significant concentration of conventional and nuclear forces, which is not fully represented in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC), and where growing instability - centred on but not exclusive to the Korean peninsula - would have an adverse global political, economic, social and environmental effects, there is no

multilateral forum to allow the timely discussion of policy. Existing bilateral mechanisms in the North Pacific would be usefully complemented by a wider dialogue, and accepted multilateral processes developed to enhance North Pacific stability could serve as exemplars for other regions.

The NPCSD has a non-governmental (NGO) and a governmental (official) track, and focusses on the North Pacific countries: China, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Japan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Canada.

The NGO track of the initiative, while encouraging an exchange of views by regional experts, is designed specifically to explore issues and prospects for dialogue and to focus knowledge and awareness on the North Pacific. York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies is coordinating research activities. An NPCSD colloquium was held in Victoria in April 1991, attended by experts from North Pacific and other interested countries, which identified research themes and suggested a series of workshops to explore these further. These workshops, which will be held in North America and Asia, will examine:

- evolving security perceptions and national responses in the North Pacific;
- the prospect of arms control and CSBMs in the North Pacific;
- unconventional security threats in the North Pacific; and,
- the history, culture and prospects of multilateralism in the North Pacific.

In addition to academic involvement, the participation of other non-governmental organizations with relevant expertise in a number of areas has been sought. These workshops, and the subsequent NPCSD Conference to be held in the fall of 1992 or spring of 1993 will have a direct influence on the development of the Government's policy agenda.

The official track of the NPCSD is intended to explore the merits of establishing a multilateral, governmental, dialogue in the North Pacific. The continuing emphasis of the NPCSD is on consultation and consensus building to ensure that all avenues leading to a more prosperous and stable Asia Pacific are explored. Although the NPCSD is directed specifically to the North Pacific, Canada's concerns are not limited to this sub-region; neither is the NPCSD exclusionary, and Canada continues to exchange views on Asia Pacific security issues with concerned states. The focal point for NPCSD discussions has been the Policy Planning Staffs of the various Foreign Ministries.³

IV Recent Trends in Asia Pacific Security

The end of the Cold War and the more recent dissolution of the Soviet Union has transformed the strategic architecture in Asia Pacific. The disappearance of a near to mid-term strategic threat has brought with it both opportunities and challenges for regional actors, and has obliged governments to rethink the means and ends of regional security arrangements. Among the results of this rethinking have been a series of proposals designed to address regional security issues, including a restructuring of Asia Pacific institutions to take into account the changed strategic environment.

The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation

The first glimmering of what would lead to a fundamental shift in strategic thinking in the Asia Pacific was Gorbachev's July 28, 1986 Vladivostok speech.⁴ This was the first of a series of speeches, interviews and initiatives by Union officials and academicians which came to be known as the "Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk track",⁵ elements of which included the creation of a pan-Asian forum to be developed through:

- a series of meetings of foreign ministers from countries in the region with "major military capabilities";
- a pan-Asian foreign ministers' meeting, to be held in Vladivostok in 1993 and followed by a pan-Asian summit;
- regional consultations to be held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly;
- the establishment of an international centre for ocean communications;
- the establishment of a regional environmental cooperation mechanism;
- the establishment of an international tropical cyclone early detection and early warning centre for the Pacific;
- agreement on a multilateral convention on the conservation of biological resources, leading to a convention on environmental protection in the Pacific;

From 1986 until mid-1991, Soviet Asia Pacific regional security proposals were at best challenged and at worst dismissed by Western and most Asian governments, among the most resistant being the Japanese. The long-expected visit to Japan by Gorbachev in

April 1991 did not produce the anticipated breakthrough in bilateral relations that might have led to Japanese agreement - at least in principle - on the need for regional security discussions. Neither Gorbachev nor Kaifu had the domestic political backing necessary to overcome the institutional and political obstacles blocking a World War II peace treaty.⁶ Gorbachev's new security proposals (the establishment of a five nation forum - USSR, USA, China, India and Japan - to discuss broad Asia Pacific issues; and USSR-USA-Japan trilateral discussions on regional security) were described by the Japanese as premature.

The Russian Federation has yet to deliver a major policy statement on Asia Pacific security matters, and it is unlikely to do so in the near future.

South Korea

Seoul has had a North Asia security dialogue proposal in play since October 1988, when President Roh Tae-Woo proposed a six nation (North and South Korea, Japan, China, USA and USSR) Consultative Conference for Peace during his address to the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal was general in nature and did not go into details. The President did say that the Conference could "...deal with a broad range of ideas concerning peace, stability, progress, and prosperity within the area." According to Korean sources, the initiative failed to receive support from North Korea and China, and was not pursued at the time.

President Roh referred to his proposal during an interview with TASS⁷ shortly before his December 1990 trip to the Soviet Union. In March 1991 the Korean newspaper Kukmin Ilbo reported the Government's moves to establish a six nation "international security body" to study Peninsular security issues.⁸ In his 29 June 1991 speech to the Hoover Institution, President Roh stated:

"...it is now time to design and frame a structure of cooperation which will ensure a higher dimension of peace, prosperity and happiness to people (of the Asia Pacific region)".⁹

There was some speculation that Seoul would use the occasion of its entry into the United Nations as an opportunity to flesh out the "six country" proposal, but the initiative, having been bypassed by events in the former Soviet Union and developments in North-South Korean relations, is no longer being pursued.

Mongolia

During the period 1986-1991, events in Mongolia reflected the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Their emergence from the Soviet shadow coincided with an

attempt by the Mongolians to develop an independent diplomatic profile in Asia Pacific. This double evolution was evident in Ulan Bator's changing stance on regional security issues. At the time of the Second Vladivostok Conference in September 1990, Mongolia fully supported the Soviet Union's regional security agenda, an attitude which led many observers to discount Mongolia's own 1989 initiative to establish an eight country forum (Mongolia, USSR, USA, China, North and South Korea, Japan, and Canada) to create:

"A mechanism of political dialogue between the countries of the region as well as the development of effective and mutually advantageous cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology, culture and education, ecology and humanitarian links."¹⁰

After hosting a small regional security conference in Ulan Bator in the fall of 1990, and participating in the Second Vladivostok Conference and the Canadian North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) Colloquium in April 1991, there appeared a hiatus in Mongolian strategic thinking. Ulan Bator, understandably preoccupied by domestic concerns, now seems to place emphasis on being a consultative party rather than an initiator of policy.¹¹

Australia

Australian strategic thinkers have for some time been concerned with political, economic and social trends in Asia Pacific; particularly about the potential for a power vacuum to develop which emerging regional powers may seek to fill. An additional concern was the increased sophistication of weapons being acquired by countries in the region and the emergence of new sub-regional power relationships. The latter development was seen as a result of a reduced American security profile in Asia Pacific. Under Foreign Ministers Bill Haydon and, later, Gareth Evans, Australia had also embarked on a more activist foreign policy agenda designed to raise Canberra's profile in the region and to prove Australia's credentials as an Asia Pacific country.

In his 12 August 1987 speech to the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific,¹² Foreign Minister Haydon suggested the time was ripe for regional CBMs, serious examination of naval arms limitations proposals, and "a superpower dialogue on Pacific issues". This speech was followed by a number of semi-official conferences and seminars dealing specifically with Asia Pacific and North Pacific military CBMs. On 27 July 1990, Foreign Minister Evans submitted to the International Herald Tribune an article entitled "What Asia Needs is a Europe-Style CSCA" which included the statement:

"It is not unreasonable to expect that new Europe-style patterns of cooperation between old adversaries will find their echo in this part of the world".

Evans expanded on this idea at the August 1990 ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC). The initiative was referred to as "APSD" (Asia Pacific Security Dialogue) by its supporters but promptly dubbed "CSCA" (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia/Pacific) by its detractors, the latter far outnumbering the former, especially in Japan and the United States.

Tokyo disapproved of the entire CSCA approach, arguing that it granted the Soviet Union regional respectability without requiring it to reduce its forces in Asia Pacific, and that it ran the risk of providing the Soviets with greater leverage in advance of the planned visits to Japan by Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. Underlying the Japanese antipathy was the belief that the Soviet Union would seize on support for a regional security dialogue as an opportunity to multilateralize the unresolved USSR-Japan "Northern Territories" border dispute.

Washington's icy reception of CSCA was less nuanced and easier (for the Americans) to explain. At a time of decreasing Soviet influence in Asia Pacific, there was no reason to replace the successful model of USA-directed bilateral military alliances with some as yet to be determined multilateral forum where United States influence would necessarily be diluted. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" became a favourite refrain of American policy makers.

The Australian response was to expand on their initiative (to differentiate it from CSCE) and to distance it from earlier Soviet proposals.¹³ Australian regional security policy, as redefined in the wake of American and regional opposition, was explained by Prime Minister Hawke in a speech entitled "Australia's Security in Asia," given to the Asia-Australia Institute on 24 May 1991. Among Hawke's main points were:

- "Australia's security requires an active policy beyond the military and strategic areas. These include diplomacy, economic cooperation, development and disaster assistance, and exchanges of peoples and ideas."
- "Australians have traditionally feared Asia. The security they have sought has been security from Asia....Instead of seeking security from Asia, we should seek enhanced security through enmeshment in an Asian security system, as we have sought enhanced prosperity through enmeshment in Asia's economic system," and, perhaps most telling:

- "...when I use the term 'Asian security system' I do not mean an organization, or even an ordered group of organizing principles. I mean rather a set of arrangements and relationships which together maintain regional security. Some of these arrangements will be formal, others informal, some will be bilateral, others trilateral or multilateral. Some of the relationships will have no explicit manifestation, they might be inactive in nature but nonetheless effective."

This nuanced approach was further developed by Foreign Minister Evans in the lead up to the July 1991 ASEAN-PMC, with emphasis placed on canvassing ideas from other regional actors rather than proposing further initiatives. Evans also lowered Australia's profile (while protecting its flanks) by deferring to ASEAN's views that ASEAN be the preferred vehicle for regional security discussions. This seeming withdrawal was somewhat compensated by more activist studies by Australian research institutes on traditional military CSBMs, and through enhanced bilateral security discussions with several Asia Pacific countries.

It appears that the Australian CSCA initiative as originally proposed is no longer being pursued, and has been replaced with a policy of ensuring Canberra is fully involved with ASEAN-based security discussions and fostering closer political-security relations with the United States and with regional actors.

Canada

The Canadian NPCSD initiative received mixed reviews from Asia Pacific states. The Soviet Union and Mongolia supported it, claiming - inaccurately - that it was an extension of their own regional security proposals. Australia and New Zealand supported the concepts, but argued that the geographic focus was skewed in that it excluded participation from important South Pacific actors. ASEAN initially viewed the Canadian proposal as an unwelcome, out-of-region initiative. The United States and Japan remained the last to be convinced of the utility of the Canadian approach. The NPCSD initiative, as refined and with its emphasis firmly on the NGO track, is now viewed as a useful process which will contribute to the development of a multilateral dialogue on traditional and non-traditional threats to North Pacific stability.

ASEAN

While each ASEAN member country has its own military security arrangements (bilateral alliance structures with the United States, intra-ASEAN bilateral and trilateral military exercise arrangements; membership in the Five Power Defence

Arrangement), this paper deals with ASEAN as a regional organization and examines that organization's responses to the changing strategic situation in Asia Pacific.

Asia Pacific-security issues have been a major preoccupation for ASEAN since the founding of the Association. The often disparate views of member countries have made formal discussion of regional security at the Association level problematic, and ASEAN-level consideration of traditional security matters was often left to government-affiliated research organizations (most notably the Malaysian Institute for Strategic and International Studies-ISIS, the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies-CSIS, and the Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies-ISEAS).

These institutes have held regular, well-attended symposia, roundtables, and conferences to discuss various aspects of regional security, with emphasis on traditional military security issues.¹⁴

ASEAN as a group was not in favour of either the Soviet, Australian, or Canadian forays into Asia Pacific security (the Mongolian and Korean initiatives were not seriously considered). While ostensibly discussing issues of regional scope, ASEAN's focus was understandably on South East Asia, particularly Indo-China, the growing influence of Japan, and the necessity of maintaining a stabilizing American military presence in the region.

The decline of the Soviet threat, the anticipated resolution of the Cambodian conflict, and the perceived willingness of the United States to reduce its military presence in the region contributed to a growing certainty within ASEAN that the Association should exert more influence on regional issues.¹⁵

A collective decision was reached (driven by Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) that some serious re-thinking of ASEAN's approaches to regional security was needed and that ASEAN should counter "out-of-region" security initiatives with its own proposals. The result was an increase in government-directed research by the major think-tanks, paralleled by policy papers from several foreign ministries. This, coupled with ASEAN's determination to assume a higher regional profile, in turn lead to an invitation to the Soviet Union and China to attend the 1991 ASEAN-PMC.¹⁶

Through this action, the entire diplomatic equation in Southeast Asia changed. ASEAN Foreign Ministers announced that the Association was now in favour of using ASEAN as a forum to discuss Asia Pacific security issues, and was contemplating changes in the PMC structure to allow participation not only from the Soviet Union/Russia and China but, possibly the Indo-China states and Myanmar.¹⁷

ASEAN's current work plan (being considered in the lead up to the 1992 ASEAN Summit) includes initiatives for an Asia Pacific political dialogue and for a new regional order in Southeast Asia by:

- contributing to the process of reducing conflict and resolving contentious problems;
- contributing to the enhancement and enrichment of understanding, trust, goodwill, and cooperation; and,
- contributing to the constructive management of the emerging international processes in the region, with a view to the establishment of a multilateral framework of cooperative peace.

The explanatory text prepared for the 1991 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and currently being considered by ASEAN foreign ministers, warrants quoting at length:

"The well-established ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference already regularly brings together the six nations of ASEAN and five dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. The Republic of Korea has become a sixth dialogue partner.

"We propose that at the end of each PMC an 'ASEAN-PMC-initiated conference' be held at a suitable retreat which will also provide the appropriate ambience for the constructive discussion of Asia Pacific stability and peace. It is suggested that the agenda and arrangements for each ASEAN-PMC-initiated 'conference on stability and peace in Asia Pacific' be prepared by a senior official's meeting comprised of senior officials of the ASEAN states and the dialogue partners.

"It is envisaged that such states as the Peoples Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, and Vietnam should be invited to participate on a regular basis. Other governments should be invited according to the specific issues that will be on the agenda of each conference.

"We strongly urge the senior officials meeting of ASEAN preparing for the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN Ministerial Meeting to deliberate on this proposal, that it be discussed at the coming AMM, and that it be adopted at the fourth ASEAN Summit Meeting to be held in Singapore.

"We similarly urge the Singapore Summit Meeting of ASEAN to address the issue of advancing towards a new regional order in Southeast Asia. There has

been and there will be a proliferation of proposals for multilateral processes and mechanisms involving the Asia Pacific aimed at enhancing stability and securing a richer peace in the region. ASEAN must play a central role in whatever processes and mechanisms arise. It must do more. It should be a creative initiator as well as active participant.

"Asia Pacific must certainly learn from the experience of other regions. But in the process of establishing the appropriate processes for regional political dialogue for cooperative peace and stability in our region, we should not be encumbered by unnecessary intellectual baggage, terminologies, preoccupations and fixed notions that are either inappropriate, irrelevant, or counter-productive.

"It is extremely important that ASEAN's initiative should build upon existing processes and institutions. The processes that we build for Asia Pacific must be established in the context of the specific characteristics of Asia Pacific and must respond to the specific needs of Asia Pacific.

"We believe that any such process of an Asia Pacific political dialogue should have at least the following purposes:

- guided by the aspirations of the Bangkok Declaration and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the desire to enhance regional resilience and strengthen the foundation for peace, stability and constructive cooperation, ASEAN should aspire to secure the accession of other regional states to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for Southeast Asia that was adopted at the first ASEAN summit held in Bali in 1976;

- just as ASEAN should initiate the process of constructive Asia Pacific political dialogue, the Association should initiate at the appropriate time the process of constructive dialogue among all the signatories of the treaty;

- whilst ASEAN must not become a military or security pact, we also believe that it is both appropriate and necessary to expand and enrich the ASEAN process into the appropriate fields of politics, security and defence issues."¹⁸

Japan

Since the end of the Pacific War, Japan has relied exclusively on the United States for its security. The Japanese economic miracle was a direct result of enlightened Occupation policies and the economic benefits of supplying material and entrepot facilities to UN forces in Korea. Japan, not Korea or the Philippines (certainly not Thailand or Vietnam), was the essential component of United States security policy in Asia Pacific.

Every aspect of Japanese Asia Pacific foreign policy is related to maintaining harmonious relations with the United States. Although there are serious economic and trade difficulties between the two countries, both Tokyo and Washington have striven to keep the security relationship beyond reproach. (The Toshiba-COCOM scandal and the FSX imbroglio of the late Eighties did much to damage this aspect of bilateral relations. It is uncertain if the recent visit to Japan by President Bush was successful in focussing public attention on Japan's generous host nation support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.)

Japanese views of the various regional security proposals were almost uniform in their disapproval. Suggestions from Mongolia and Korea were commented on favourably but not pursued. Tokyo dismissed the Soviet proposals as self-serving and hollow, and criticised Australia and Canada for their naïveté in appearing to follow the Soviet's regional agenda (views which were echoed in a gentler way by Washington) or to impose European models on Asia. The revolutionary approach taken by ASEAN in the leadup to the 1991 PMC obliged Japan to reconsider its attitude towards discussion of regional security arrangements.

Virtually all Asia Pacific governments have vivid memories of Japanese militarism, and many regional actors' determination to retain a stabilizing American military presence was designed as much to keep a lid on Tokyo's suspected military aspirations as to guard against Soviet encroachment. These suspicions had made much more difficult Japan's attempts to satisfy American requests for greater burden-sharing and those international critics who demanded that Japan assume a greater and more activist political role in world affairs. Increases in the Japanese defence budget (necessary to provide increased host nation support to American forces in Japan) were criticized by China, Korea and others. Debates in Tokyo over Japanese participation in United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping operations were viewed suspiciously and commented on disparagingly by many in Asia Pacific.

By the time news of ASEAN's intentions had reached Tokyo, much rethinking had already been done,¹⁹ and a decision was taken to support calls for a multilateral forum to discuss security. To ensure that the Soviet Union would continue to be isolated from the region, it was decided to support ASEAN's proposals but with the proviso that the existing PMC be the preferred forum. This would allow discussions on "regional reassurance" to take place among like-minded countries while deferring participation by the Soviet Union.

Having launched the "Nakayama initiative"²⁰ at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC, Japan appears to have committed itself to participation in a multilateral dialogue on regional security issues.²¹ It remains to be seen, however, whether Foreign Minister Watanabe will continue to support this approach.

The United States

Once again, the United States finds itself in a situation where action or inaction will have an enormous effect on Asia Pacific security. To date, the United States has been steadfast in its expressed preference for bilateral security arrangements over multilateral discussion and its reluctance to allow the issue of naval arms control to become the subject of multilateral discussion. Suggestions of broadening the concept of security to include non-traditional, non-military threats have fallen on deaf ears. Yet there are indications that a change of policy is slowly taking place and that Washington is in the process of recognizing that cooperative security discussions in Asia Pacific are, in many respects, already occurring.

There are indications that current thinking in some Washington circles is that an institutionalized APEC may, sometime in the future, offer an alternative vehicle for multilateral discussions of a broadened security agenda. The benefits of such an arrangement are that, while China will soon be a member of APEC, the Russian Federation and other regional non-market economies are not; the United States would be in a better position in APEC (rather than in an ASEAN-PMC, CSCA, or NPCSD framework) to influence the security agenda; that participation by the Russian Federation and Indo-China could be timed to coincide with Western interests. The down side of this approach is that ASEAN may well view any such proposal as running directly contrary to ASEAN's stated preferences, which have received public support from both Australia and Japan, and that China (who with Hong Kong and "Chinese Taipei" have recently become members of APEC) may be unwilling to see the three Chinas involved in multilateral security issues. The United States may well determine that its interests would be best served if it was to support, or at least not to criticize, the ASEAN-PMC forum idea.

Conclusions

It appears that Asia Pacific (or at least Southeast Asia and the North Pacific) will soon be engaged in a formal multilateral dialogue which will consider both traditional and non-traditional security issues. No one country can take credit for this. The Soviet Union, by its handling of relations with the United States more than its various Asia Pacific initiatives, contributed most to the relaxation of tensions in the region (and observers hope the Russian Federation continues this trend). The initiatives by Mongolia and Korea show that countries often considered peripheral (the dangers of the DMZ notwithstanding) can

play a catalytic role in regional affairs. And Canberra and Ottawa can each claim authorship of many of the principles taken on board by ASEAN. Japan, while slow and appearing at times inflexible in the past, has accepted that open discussion of Japanese security concerns is, for its neighbours, a serious and far-reaching CBM. The participation of the United States, the paramount military, economic, and diplomatic power in Asia Pacific, will be essential to the success of the emerging regional cooperative security dialogue.

V North Pacific Multilateral Institutional Cooperation

The seven countries of the North Pacific share membership in fifteen multilateral institutions (see annex) yet the sub-region remains virtually undefined in institutional terms, particularly in comparison with the South Asia, South East Asia, and South Pacific sub-regions, and with the Asia Pacific region as a whole.

Only two international governmental institutions are designed specifically to address North Pacific issues. Of these, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, is comprised of only three countries (the United States, Japan, Canada) while the North Pacific Maritime Sciences Organisation (PICES), was established only in 1990. In contrast, international governmental institutions span a number of functional areas in each of the neighbouring Asia Pacific sub-regions.

Most regional international governmental institutions in which the North Pacific countries are members include a significant number of countries from outside the sub-region, and no institution includes all of the seven North Pacific states. Many are subsidiaries of United Nations institutions (e.g. subsidiaries of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the FAO, UNESCO, the ILO) and are not autonomous regional organizations.

Among the factors that have contributed to the relative lack of multilateral institutions and multilateralist inclinations in the North Pacific are: a lingering animosity towards and suspicion of Pacific War belligerents; continued political and military tension among several states in the North Pacific, most notably but not exclusively on the Korean peninsula.

Opportunities for functional co-operation in the Asia Pacific region as a whole can be expected to increase as the region comes increasingly to be identified as a single economic entity. The Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) has pursued collaboration on the regional macro-economic outlook and on trade policy, agricultural policy, investment, resource processing, fisheries and, more recently, telecommunications and technology transfer. More recently, APEC has embarked on co-operation in trade and

investment data; programmes and mechanisms for regional trade promotion and cooperation; the expansion of investment and technology transfer; human resource development; regional energy cooperation; marine resource conservation; and telecommunications.

Further progress in functional cooperation across Asia Pacific will strengthen links among some North Pacific countries; however, given resolved questions of membership in functional cooperative institutions, it is uncertain whether it will contribute to the development of a North Pacific identity or open avenues for enhanced dialogue.

The list of functional mechanisms in the South Asia, South East Asia, and South Pacific sub-regions provides some indication of areas of functional cooperation which might be developed in the North Pacific, as do the work programs of PECC and APEC. The list of areas for functional cooperation is potentially limitless, and possibilities include:

- the environment and natural resources (including energy conservation and development of sources of renewable energy; management of natural resources; conservation of flora and fauna both in general and with regard to particular species; environmental education; waste management; regional sustainable development post-UNCED 1992; driftnet and other fishing controls; aquaculture and coastal resource management; environmental planning and administration; regional effects of climate change; transboundary air pollution and other forms of environmental degradation);
- emerging unconventional security issues including international terrorism, the illicit traffic in narcotics, and international criminal activity;
- disaster relief co-operation including both natural and human disasters;
- development and harmonization of communications and transportation technology;
- development of regional tourism;
- agricultural development and animal health (including rural livestock, agriculture and resource development and the eradication or control of livestock diseases);

- the management of trade issues (including the challenge to economic growth posed by protectionism and tariff and non-tariff barriers to international commerce); and,
- social development (including human rights issues; issues relating to children and youth; the provision of adequate health care; harmonized approaches to health pandemics (narcotics dependency, AIDS)).

VI The Path Ahead

Where all this leads us in the next 12 months will depend as much on the changing strategic environment in the North Pacific as on the energies of governments and academics. Recent trends in Asia Pacific security thinking indicate that a regional or sub-regional dialogue is recognized by most countries as a stabilizing and confidence-building measure. While traditional security issues remain of central concern, they must neither be ignored nor over-emphasized by those involved in broadening the definition of cooperative security.

Canadian efforts to contribute to stability and security in the North Pacific, will be focussed on the NGO track of the NPCSD. The research and recommendations provided by concerned academics will be essential if policy makers are to know which areas of cooperative security offer the most promising avenues; where the obstacles appear insurmountable (at least at present); and which existing institutions or organizations might offer enhanced avenues for dialogue and consultation. The official track will be advanced through consultation within the North Pacific seven and with other interested states wherever and whenever opportunities arise. The two tracks, while not parallel, are complementary, and will contribute immeasurably to the evolution of Canadian academic and official thinking on North Pacific and Asia Pacific issues.

ANNEX

The seven countries of the North Pacific (Canada, the United States, Japan, South and North Korea, China, and the Russian Federation/former Soviet Union) share membership in fifteen multilateral institutions

- the International Civil Aviation Organization;
- the International Maritime Organization;
- the Inter-Parliamentary Union;
- the International Hydrographic Organization;
- the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- the International Organization for Standardization;
- the International Telecommunications Union;
- the Food and Agricultural Organization;
- the UN Conference on Trade and Development;
- the UN Industrial Development Organization;
- the Universal Postal Union;
- the World Health Organization;
- World Intellectual Property Organization;
- the World Meteorological Organization; and,
- the World Tourism Organization

END NOTES

1. A term coined by Yukio Satoh when he served as Director General, Information, Analysis, Research and Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. See below (16).
2. Much of the material in this section was drawn from a paper entitled "Cooperative Security", a background document prepared by the Policy Planning Staff for the April 1991 NPCSD Colloquium held in Victoria, B.C.
3. In the Department of External Affairs, the North Asia Relations Division (PNR) has responsibility for coordinating both the official and the NGO tracks of the NPCSD. PNR is supported by other divisions in various Bureaux. The Policy Planning Staff (CPP) contributes "idea pieces" and background documents, in addition to holding discussions on NPCSD and related issues with its counterparts or equivalents in other foreign ministries.
4. Although it is worth recalling Brezhnev's 1969 call for collective security in Asia.
5. This term was applied by western diplomats to describe the overall Soviet Asia-Pacific security initiative. The term took its name from Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk (1988) and from Shevardnadze's speech at the Second Vladivostok Conference in September 1990. One major element of the Soviet initiative not reflected by this term was Gorbachev's widely quoted interview in Merdeka, July 21, 1987, when he stepped back from the parallel with Helsinki and offered more concrete suggestions for arms control and confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific region.
6. There had been widespread speculation, both in the media and in Embassy Row in Tokyo, that Gorbachev would bring with him a "present" (a major concession on the islands issue), and that Kaifu would be in a position to offer a considerable financial assistance package to the Soviets during the visit (that is, one that had been agreed to by the LDP, MFA, and Ministry of Finance). As it turned out, both leaders had their negotiating positions undercut - Gorbachev by Yeltsin's sudden intransigence on the question of reversion; Kaifu by his erstwhile factional supporters within the LDP who declined to use their influence with the bureaucracy.
7. 11 December 1990, and covered widely in the Korean press.
8. The item appeared in the 26 March 1991 edition, and was confirmed by the Canadian Embassy in Seoul.

9. "Korea's Emerging Role in a New Pacific Order", 29 June 1991, Palo Alto, California.
10. Speech by President Z.H. Batmunkh, 18 August 1989
11. There has been some confusion concerning Mongolia and the NPCSD. There appeared to be a consensus among the academics who participated in the April 1991 NPCSD Colloquium that Mongolia be included in NGO track activities. There has been no change in the definition of North Pacific countries for the purposes of the official track of the NPCSD, with the obvious exception of accepting the Russian Federation as the successor state to the Soviet Union.
12. Given at Australia National University, 12 August 1987.
13. There were also attempts to disassociate Australia from the term "CSCA", at times going so far as to repudiate the authenticity of the International Herald Tribune headline. A more convincing argument was that early references to the value of the guiding principles of the CSCE were misconstrued and misinterpreted as a suggestion to transfer, holus-bolus, the European experience to Asia-Pacific.
14. These events have provided regional governments with an "unofficial" forum for floating regional security initiatives. At the Malaysian ISIS-organized Fifth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Vietnam proposed the establishment of a new Southeast Asia security relationship which would focus initially on confidence-building.
15. Individual ASEAN members have offered suggestions to enhance regional security. In June 1989, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir, in addressing the Malaysian ISIS-organized Third Asia-Pacific Roundtable, called for modest regional CSBMs such as prior notification of military exercises and transparency.
16. To preclude having to discuss this matter with the Dialogue Partners, Malaysia, as host country, invited the Soviet Union and China to observe the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) which immediately preceded the PMC.
17. Cited in conversations with the author and ASEAN diplomats.
18. Recommendations submitted by the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS) to ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the 1991 AMM in Kuala Lumpur.
19. Much of this thinking was reflected in Yukio Satoh's impressive paper "Asian Pacific Process for Stability and Security" presented at the Fifth Asia-Pacific Roundtable: Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific, Kuala Lumpur, 10-14 June 1991.

20. The Nakayama initiative consists of two tiers: an enhanced political and security dialogue using all available fora; an ASEAN senior officials meeting on security, with participation by officials from Dialogue Partners.
21. The Nakayama initiative has received mixed reactions. ASEAN remains to be convinced of the necessity of holding Senior Officials Consultations on security on the margins of the ASEAN-PMC. There has been little follow up by Japanese diplomatic missions.

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