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# **Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

## **Human Rights Issues Management**

### **Bilateral Case Study**

**March 1996**

#### **Note on the Anonymity of the Bilateral Case**

The overseas names in this case have been changed in order to protect the Canadian government sources of information. The following is a glossary of invented place names:

- Parador (country)
- South Solo (province 1)
- Delgado (capital of province 1)
- Campo Verde (province 2)
- City University (Canadian university)

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## **Bilateral Case Study**

### **Purpose**

The case study focuses on how DFAIT's political and economic officers performed in managing human rights issues in a bilateral context. It is meant to stimulate discussion on the following questions:

1. What does the case say about the adequacy and consistency of human rights policy?
2. What does it contribute to our understanding of performance?
3. Given the case, what management problems and issues still need to be addressed?

### **Definition of the Case**

The case examines the human rights element in Canadian-Paradorian relations from November 1991 to January 1996. It treats Parador and South Solo as part of the same context. Four key events have been selected for analysis: (1) the suspension of three planned aid projects following the Delgado massacre in November 1991; (2) the termination of the City University's Campo Verde project; (3) the 1993 resolution on South Solo at the UNCHR; and (4) the Team Canada trade mission to Parador in January 1996.

### **Canadian-Paradorian Bilateral Context**

The Canadian perspective on our bilateral relations with Parador is based on domestic and foreign policy priorities, and conditions in the socio-economic environment in Parador. At home, the government is committed to creating jobs and alleviating 'national unity' problems. Canadians value equitable development, basic human rights, and greater transparency and accountability in public institutions.

Our current foreign policy objectives tend to converge with Paradorian domestic priorities. Canada wishes to promote prosperity and employment through enhanced economic linkages with Parador, while the latter pursues an outward-looking economic liberalization strategy. Canada values national security and international dialogue within a stable global framework, while Parador plays an increasingly central role in its region. Canada values tolerance, good governance and the rule of law, while Parador builds greater equity among its people, modernizes its administrative structures, and experiences an urgent need for national stability.

### **Bilateral Human Rights Context**

Human rights monitors have indicated that the situation in South Solo remains fragile, grave and complex. The Soloese have long resisted being integrated into Parador, and characterize their struggle as one of self-determination. Acting with impunity, the Paradorian security forces deployed in the province are seen as a main cause of human rights abuse. They are also deeply involved in the economy and other areas of Soloese society.

The Paradorian government continues to believe that political compromise is not necessary because the military can suppress the opposition. Some argue that this stance only increases the level of suppression. The Western media have paid close attention to the situation, delivering images to audiences which routinely condemn human rights abusers. In Canada, the South Solo situation has caught the attention of a growing and vocal minority.

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## ***The Suspension of Planned Aid Projects to Parador***

<b>Synopsis of the Event</b>	
<p>In October 1991, the Prime Minister delivered a speech in Harare, Zimbabwe, linking Canadian aid to the recipient's human rights record. A month later, a group of Paradorian soldiers opened fire on a crowd of 1,500 Soloese in a Delgado cemetery, killing upwards of 100 people. Parador emerged as a 'test case' for the new policy as the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced the suspension of three planned bilateral aid projects on December 9, 1991.</p>	
<b>Management of the Event</b>	<b>DFAIT Divisions' Value-Added</b>
<p><b>Policy-makers</b> — The Minister reacted quickly to the killings by meeting with the Paradorian foreign minister, calling for an aid review, and announcing the suspension of projects as per the PM's policy. The policy evolved in this case, and there was great activity among DFAIT, the PCO and OGDs in Ottawa, as policy-makers and stakeholders held differing views on the most effective course to follow.</p>	<p>The lack of consistency in the human rights policy for the Paradorian case limited the value that DFAIT divisions could add in managing the event.</p>
<p><b>PSE</b> — The PSE managed Canada's relationship with Parador, oversaw the mission, and attempted to coordinate the efforts of the OGDs in containing the crisis. The PSE provided information services (e.g. studies, briefings, communications packages) tailored to the situation. It reported on the economic and political dimensions in our bilateral relations with Parador.</p>	<p>Without a focused agenda among OGDs, the PSE was hampered in managing the relationship during the crisis. Their information services provided a basis for a constructive departmental dialogue and for communicating with Paradorian officials.</p>
<p><b>Mission</b> — The Ambassador worked with Canadian and locally-engaged staff at the post to ensure coherency in the message delivered by mission personnel. Ambassador and senior officers intervened with appropriate ministers in host government and with local business contacts to explain thrust and scope of Canadian policy.</p>	<p>The post had previously laid the groundwork for effective management of the event by building a team among mission personnel, and by establishing good relations with local stakeholders. The post ensured effective crisis management by building consensus around the Canadian position, and coordinating the efforts of mission personnel in nurturing relations with Paradorian. They also added value by communicating effectively among themselves about headquarter's orders and what their contacts were saying.</p>
<b>Performance</b>	
<p><b>Impact</b> — The decision to suspend planned aid projects was meant to encourage Parador to adopt policies that respect human rights. However, it proved an obstacle to the Canadian aim of influencing the situation through advocacy and diplomacy in bilateral relations. Paradorian policy on South Solo did not change as a result of the Canadian action.</p>	
<p><b>Client satisfaction</b> — The full range of Canadian stakeholders tended to see the policy decision in an unfavourable light. The strong reaction of the Canadian public to events in Parador made DFAIT's work with policy-makers more difficult. Most clients appeared satisfied with the work of DFAIT officers at the mission and headquarters in managing the event. DFAIT's internal clients spoke highly of the effectiveness of the embassy team in preserving some of the credibility of Canada's voice in the human rights discussion in Parador, and in preventing the entire aid program from being shut down.</p>	
<p><b>Success in achieving objectives</b> — The Paradorians did not close down the Canadian aid program.</p>	

## **City University's Campo Verde Regional Development Project**

<b>Synopsis of the Event</b>	
<p>In 1984, the City University began a \$25.5 million rural development project in Campo Verde. In 1989, a university committee was formed to review the implications of running aid projects in countries where human rights were violated. Following the 1991 Delgado massacre, the University Senate recruited three Canadian consultants to review the project from this perspective. When the controversial draft report was tabled, the University formally distanced itself from the authors' conclusions. Various Paradorian ministers reacted swiftly and strongly to the criticism, implicating the Canadian government in the views expressed in the report. In May 1994, the Paradorian government decided to remove the university and terminate the Campo Verde project just over a year away from its completion.</p>	
<b>Management of the Event</b>	<b>DFAIT Divisions' Value-Added</b>
<p><b>Policy-makers</b> — The event took place in the human rights policy context that first emerged in the PM's Harare speech, which was tested in Parador following the Delgado massacre in November 1991. Some Paradorian ministers may have taken action here in response to Canada's decision to suspend planned aid projects in December 1991.</p>	<p>DFAIT may have missed an opportunity to influence thinking on the value of such projects in promoting human rights, as well as to advocate on behalf of project stakeholders who were trying to put their human rights concerns into practice.</p>
<p><b>PSE</b> — PSE officers were not directly involved in the management of the event until just weeks before the decision to terminate the project was made.</p>	<p>As the PSE was not involved from the start, it could not add significant value to the process.</p>
<p><b>CIDA</b> — CIDA more than DFAIT was involved in the management of the event. When the Paradorians responded unfavourably to the report, CIDA attempted to ensure that damage was not done to other aid projects.</p>	
<p><b>Mission</b> — The Ambassador was involved in the situation before it became an 'issue.' Development officers at the embassy communicated more directly with City University personnel and were more directly involved than officers at DFAIT headquarters.</p>	<p>The mission provided value in their support of the project personnel during the termination period. Although the mission read the local environment well, the PSE officers were not informed of the situation early enough to manage the event proactively.</p>
<b>Performance</b>	
<p><b>Impact</b> — The aid project was closed down, and the issue remains sensitive in our bilateral relations with Parador.</p>	
<p><b>Client satisfaction</b> — Some stakeholders felt that DFAIT, CIDA and the embassy could not reach agreement on what was within their realm of influence and control, and what was effectively beyond them.</p>	
<p><b>Success in achieving objectives</b> — The event threatened to revive the range of bad feelings among some Paradorian ministers toward Canada following the suspension of planned aid projects in December 1991. Canada's objective of maximizing project benefits and minimizing negative effects during the disengagement of the project was mostly achieved.</p>	

### The 1993 Resolution on South Solo at the UNCHR

<b>Synopsis of the Event</b>	
<p>Over the past 20 years, Canada has either abstained from voting or voted against UN resolutions in favour of the self-determination of South Solo. Since 1982, we have favoured supporting a trilateral discussion among the UN Secretary General and the governments of Parador and Portugal. At the UNCHR, Canada has supported consensus declarations calling on Parador to improve the human rights situation in South Solo. In 1993, however, the chief antagonists could not agree on a Chairman's statement, and a more strongly-worded draft resolution was put forth by the European Union. When Parador's 'no-action' motion was voted down, Canada voted with the majority and the resolution was passed.</p>	
<b>Management of the Event</b>	<b>DFAIT Divisions' Value-Added</b>
<p><b>Policy-makers</b> — In the wake of the 1991 Delgado incident, Canada reaffirmed its policy of encouraging a credible and effective role for the UN in South Solo by focusing on the human rights situation and laying secondary emphasis on issue of self-determination.</p>	<p>PSE and AGH personnel advised the ministers to affect change on human rights issues through consultation and the education process. Consistency and clarity in Canada's multilateral position allowed DFAIT to manage relationships, build consensus and exert influence.</p>
<p><b>AGH</b> — AGH coordinated the Canadian position at the UN as regards to different resolutions and decisions to take. It worked with members of the Canadian delegation, including functional experts and people from other government departments. Canada did not coordinate action on Parador or South Solo at the UN.</p>	<p>AGH managed DFAIT's involvement in the UNCHR sessions by planning, scheduling, budgeting and carrying out the project. It coordinated with OGDs and maintained a dialogue with NGOs. It provided expertise in the thematic area and monitored events at multilateral fora. Members of Canadian delegation helped build consensus among states, and exert influence to support Canadian position.</p>
<p><b>UN-based personnel</b> — UN-based personnel attended UN fora leading up to UNCHR, communicated with Ottawa around developments, and promoted Canadian values and interests in multilateral context.</p>	<p>UN-based personnel added value through providing the expertise that results from a longer-term involvement in human rights themes in the UN context. They exerted influence and provided information from events at multilateral fora. They also planned and provided logistical support to visiting delegation.</p>
<p><b>PSE</b> — PSE managed the relationship with Parador; conducted bilateral consultations and negotiated the process in reaching consensus at UN forum. PSE worked with AGH at headquarters to review the language of texts sent to them by DFAIT personnel in Geneva, to clarify Canadian positions, and to make recommendations.</p>	<p>PSE added value through managing the bilateral relationship, and providing the expertise that results from a longer-term involvement in the Paradorian human rights context.</p>
<p><b>Mission</b> — The mission was recruited to provide information and advice on Canadian position. They monitored the Paradorian reaction to other countries on the bilateral front. They reviewed language of texts sent to them by DFAIT Geneva personnel, making recommendations.</p>	<p>Mission added value by providing relevant information on events and reactions in the Paradorian context.</p>
<b>Performance</b>	
<p><b>Impact</b> — The human rights situation in South Solo has deteriorated since the 1993 resolution was passed.</p>	
<p><b>Client satisfaction</b> — Canadian stakeholders tended to be satisfied with DFAIT consultations and performance at the UNCHR. Canadian support of the 1993 resolution did not directly impact our bilateral relations with Parador.</p>	
<p><b>Success in achieving objectives</b> — Canada was not implicated in what some observers believe was a poorly-handled effort by Portugal in adopting measures that would have the most influence on the government of Parador.</p>	

### Team Canada Trade Mission to Parador

Synopsis of the Event	
<p>In September 1995, a Task Force was created within DFAIT to organize the Team Canada trade mission to four Asian countries. In January 1996, the Prime Minister, seven premiers and 300 business leaders visited India, Pakistan, Parador and Malaysia over a 3-week period. In the process, they signed \$8.7 billion in deals with their Asian partners.</p>	
Management of the Event	DFAIT Divisions' Value-Added
<p><b>Policy-makers</b> — The PM's visit to the countries addressed commercial and political priorities in Canada's foreign policy and domestic agendas. The PM also raised the subject of human rights with his Paradorian counterpart, who made a firm commitment to improving the situation.</p>	<p>PSE added value to the human rights dimension of the Team Canada mission by preparing the talking points the PM followed in his statements on human rights in Parador.</p>
<p><b>PPM</b> — A task force was created to manage the project and provide a central link within DFAIT and among other government departments involved in the mission. PPM delegated matters of substance to various divisions including PSE and AGH.</p>	<p>The PPM task force provided organizational expertise to the overall management and logistics of carrying out the mission.</p>
<p><b>PSE</b> — PSE provided substantive information on the human rights situation, eliciting assistance from AGH as needed. The officers worked upwards of 14 hours daily over a 3-month period managing information and providing services linked to Canada's objectives.</p>	<p>PSE provided services and substantive information within the context of managing our bilateral relations with Parador. They also helped 'stage manage' the PM's interaction with various Paradorian officials.</p>
<p><b>AGH</b> — AGH helped produce materials for the trade mission.</p>	<p>AGH added value to the process through its knowledge about the trade-human rights relationship.</p>
<p><b>Communications</b> — Communications people worked with PSE and AGH officers in preparing a 'briefing book' and various other outputs linked to Canada's objectives.</p>	<p>DFAIT's communications department provided expertise in producing press releases and other materials.</p>
<p><b>Mission</b> — It provided logistical support to stakeholders involved in coordinating or participating in the trade mission.</p>	<p>The support was invaluable given the scope and importance of the trade mission.</p>
<p><b>PMO/PCO</b> — The PMO and PCO worked closely with the PPM and tasked the PSE, CIDA etc to provide information services as required. The PMO also worked with the PSE to 'stage-manage' the PM's interaction with Paradorian hosts, officials and business people.</p>	
<p><b>CIDA</b> — CIDA was tasked by DFAIT to provide information about the Canadian aid program to Parador.</p>	
Performance	
<p><b>Impact</b> — The Team Canada trade mission signed \$2.76 billion worth of business deals while in Parador. It also provided opportunities for human rights concerns to be discussed at the highest levels.</p>	
<p><b>Client satisfaction</b> — The PMO, PCO, Ambassador, and Paradorians were all very happy with PSE's work. The PMO indicated in writing that they were pleased with the services provided by PSE in this context.</p>	
<p><b>Success in achieving objectives</b> — The work was successfully carried out according to a well-made plan. The PCO is looking at this as model for future Team Canada trade missions.</p>	

## **Conclusions**

The case study was meant to stimulate discussion on the questions identified at the outset of the report. A draft report was reviewed by DFAIT officers, who then met in a focus group to discuss the human rights policy framework, performance, and the issues and value-added in managing events in the case. The following conclusions emerged from the case and the focus group discussion.

### **DFAIT Human Rights Policy Framework**

- Canada's human rights policy lacked consistency across bilateral contexts and over time in the context of the case, which made it more difficult for DFAIT officers to manage human rights issues in Parador.
- Canada used bilateral and multilateral instruments in implementing its human rights policy in the case, which suggests that the policy is adequate.

### **DFAIT Performance**

- Canadian efforts to encourage Parador to adopt policies that respect human rights in South Solo had very little impact on the overall human rights situation in the province during the period under review.
- DFAIT did not collect information on the extent to which its clients were satisfied with its services in managing human rights events. However, anecdotal evidence suggested that clients were generally satisfied with the quality of the information-related services that DFAIT officers provided.
- DFAIT successfully achieved its objectives when they were clearly articulated by senior personnel, and accepted and viewed as attainable by stakeholders.

### **DFAIT Issues Management and Value-added**

- DFAIT officers tended to add more value to managing human rights issues when they worked together in teams in a planned and coordinated fashion.
- The value the political and economic officers added in managing these human rights issues extended beyond providing expertise and information services to include managing relationships, exerting influence, and building consensus among stakeholders around common positions. During the crises, the demand for officers' information services increased dramatically, limiting their ability to add value in other ways.
- DFAIT officers added more value in issues management when they successfully managed their relations with foreign governments, Canadian OGDs, and members of the Canadian public.

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