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Italy at the extraordinary session of the Council in London, and with the Permanent Delegate of Ethiopia, whom they had asked to proceed thither.

It appeared from the conversation with the Ethiopian Delegate that his Government's views were set out in the declaration of March 20th, 1936, addressed to the Committee of Thirteen (document C.142.M.81.1936.VII).

With regard to the method that the Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, proposed to follow in order to obtain information as to the views of the two parties, the Delegate of Ethiopia said that he would remain at the Chairman's disposal.

Referring to conversations to which the Chairman, in order to expedite the process of obtaining information, might think it useful to invite the representatives of both parties simultaneously, the Ethiopian Delegate said that he would state his attitude as soon as he received an assurance that Italy intended to negotiate within the framework and in the spirit of the Covenant, as he had asked in the aforesaid letter to the Committee of Thirteen dated March 20th, 1936.

Further, the Ethiopian Government forwarded on April 1st, a declaration addressed to the Council and the Committee of Thirteen and which has been distributed as document C.131.M.70.1936.VII.

It appeared from informal conversations with the representative of Italy at the extraordinary session of the Council that the proper procedure for the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen was to communicate direct with the Italian Government and ask it to designate a delegate to get into touch with the Chairman, who would be assisted by the Secretary-General. On March 27th, the Chairman sent the Italian Government a letter, copy of which is appended to this report. The reply to this letter which reached the Chairman on April 2nd, is also appended.

The Chairman thinks it proper to send this report to his colleagues at the present stage for their information. At the same time he has requested the Secretary-General to invite the Committee to meet in Geneva on April 8th.

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C 117837

ANNEX I.

To the Italian Minister
for Foreign Affairs,
ROME.

(Translation)

LONDON, March 23rd, 1936.

Your Excellency,

On taking cognisance, this morning, of the communications received from the Italian and Ethiopian Governments, the Committee of Thirteen observed that several of those communications contained charges alleging the violation of international undertakings intended to ensure respect for the wounded, the dead, and prisoners, or the regular operation and safety of Red Cross ambulances, or the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or similar gases in warfare.

In connection with violations of the Geneva Conventions concluded under the auspices of the Red Cross, the Committee noted that, when, on January 16th, your Government alleged abuses of the Red Cross emblem and various atrocities, it intimated that they were being "reported to the International Committee of the Red Cross for necessary action." The provision of the aforesaid Geneva Conventions would seem to apply likewise to the bombing of Red Cross ambulances, which the Ethiopian Government has reported, and concerning which your Government has already sent observations to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the League of Nations.

The Committee on the other hand felt bound to call your Government's attention to the Ethiopian Government's allegations that the Italian Army has been using methods of warfare prohibited by the Protocol of June 17th, 1925, to which the Italian and Ethiopian Governments are parties.

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee would be happy to receive any observations your Government might wish to make in regard to the Ethiopian Government's allegations of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or similar gases by the Italian Army.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) S, de MADARIAGA,
Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen.

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C 117838

ANNEX 2.

To the Italian Minister
for Foreign Affairs,
ROME.

PARIS, March 27th, 1936.

(Translation)

Your Excellency,

At its meeting on March 23rd, the Committee of Thirteen took note of your Government's communication dated March 8th, in accordance with which "the Italian Government, in response to the appeal which has been addressed to it, agrees in principle to the opening of negotiations concerning the settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict".

After likewise taking cognisance of the reply from the Ethiopian Government, the Committee adopted a resolution which was communicated to you by telegram by the Secretary-General. In accordance with this resolution, the Committee requested " its Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, to get into touch with the two Parties and to take such steps as may be called for in order that the Committee may be able, as soon as possible, to bring the two Parties together and, within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, to bring about the prompt cessation of hostilities and the final restoration of peace."

As I am very anxious to carry out as soon as possible the task entrusted by the Committee to its Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, I should be grateful if you would let me know when I could meet at Geneva the delegate appointed by your Government.

I should be very glad to be informed of Your Excellency's decision at the earliest possible moment. Your reply to the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen has encouraged the hope that an early peace may be possible, and I feel certain that the Italian Government will do its utmost to facilitate the realisation of this hope.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) S. de MADARIAGA,

Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen.

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C117839

ANNEX 3.

COMMUNICATION SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN ON APRIL 2nd, 1936.

(Translation)

"The Italian Government has received on April 1st the letter from M. de Madariaga dated March 27th. It is prepared to send a representative to Geneva immediately after Easter for the purpose of a first exchange of ideas as to the procedure for the conversations desired by M. de Madariaga in accordance with the mandate conferred upon him by the Committee of Thirteen. In view of the importance of the problem of determining the method of initiating contacts for the purposes of the above-mentioned conversations - and M. de Madariaga emphasised in his letter the delicate nature and importance of the problem - it would seem convenient and desirable, if M. de Madariaga considers it useful and is agreeable to do so, that a first exchange of ideas of a general character might take place with the head of the Government at Rome. M. de Madariaga will be welcome at whatever time is convenient to him, the exact date to be fixed by joint agreement."

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ANNEX 4.

LETTER FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN.

(Translation).

Rome, April 3rd, 1936. XIV.

Sir,

I have received the letter dated March 23rd addressed to me by Your Excellency as Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen.

The Italian Government, while it is anxious to establish the truth regarding the facts of which a tendencious version is put forward in the Ethiopian statements, feels bound, first of all, to make every reservation regarding the competence of the Committee of Thirteen to deal with the questions referred to in your communication under reply.

I must further observe that there seems no justification for the view that charges made by the Italian Government to the League of Nations - for example, those relating to the use by the Ethiopians of dum-dum bullets, and to the atrocities practised on prisoners and non-combatant Italian civilians - could be considered as requiring no further action on the ground that they were brought at the same time to the attention of the International Red Cross Committee.

As a matter of fact, since the procedure contemplated in Article 30 of the Geneva Convention of July 27th, 1929, relates only to violations of rules laid down in that Convention itself, the charges of the Italian Government to which I have just referred, and which relate to violations of other conventions, and rules of a humanitarian character, could not normally be examined in any enquiry which the International Red Cross Committee might set on foot, and in fact are not at the present time, the object of any study on the part of that Committee.

In these circumstances, the Italian Government would be grateful if Your Excellency would be good enough to inform it whether the attention of the Ethiopian Government has been drawn - in a manner corresponding to the action taken by your letter of March 23rd above referred to - to the charges of the Italian Government relating to the use by Ethiopia of methods of warfare forbidden by International regulations, and to the atrocities practised on prisoners and non-combatant Italian civilians, and whether that Government has been requested to put forward such observations as it may desire to make on the subject.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) SUVICH.

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C 117841

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and the Members of the League.

C.134.M.73.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 4th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

To the Secretary-General.

Addis Ababa, April 4th, 1936.

(Translation)

The Ethiopian Government protests in the most formal manner to all the States Members of the League against the attack on Addis Ababa by five Italian military aircraft this morning at about 8 o'clock. During the attack numerous shots were fired from machine-guns from a very low height. As the town is completely devoid of troops and of means of defence, so that enemy aircraft have been able to fly over it at a very low height with impunity, this hostile act constitutes an act of aggression against an open town and affords incontestable proof of the enemy's intention to bombard it in flagrant violation of Article 25 of the regulations laid down in the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.

(Signed) BELATENGUETA HEROUY,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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C117842

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.146.M.85.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 6th, 1936.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

(Translated from the Italian).

Rome, April 6th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

On March 30th last during action Mai Cheu near Lake Ashangi Ethiopian artillery bombarded a small Italian field hospital causing heavy casualties. In denouncing this violation of the Geneva Convention I beg you to inform States Members of the League of Nations.

SUVICH.

Rome, April 6th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

Reference Ethiopian Government's telegram of March 28th* last I beg to inform you that according to information received report bombardment British ambulance ..arch 20th last is devoid of all foundation. Further communications regarding other Ethiopian allegations will follow.

SUVICH.

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* See document C.129.M.68.1936.VII.

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C117848

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.147.M.86.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 7th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

Paris, April 6th, 1936.

(Translation)

To the Secretary-General.

I am directed by my Government to request Your Excellency to communicate the following declaration to the Committee of Thirteen, the Council, the Committee of Eighteen, and all the Members of the League of Nations.

1. At the moment when the Committee of Thirteen is meeting to consider the situation now existing after its appeal to the belligerents, the Ethiopian Government addresses a supreme appeal to all the organs and all the Members of the League of Nations.

For the past fifteen months the League has had under its consideration a conflict deliberately sought by the Italian Government, and one which, it can now no longer be denied, has the character of a long-premeditated aggression.

At the beginning of 1935, the Rome Government, counting upon the indifference, or even support of certain Powers with which it had lately concluded agreements for the settlement of European questions, thought that it could succeed in bringing Ethiopia under its domination, if not with the formal consent of the League of Nations, at all events without arousing any opposition other than an academic protest. It multiplied its diplomatic manoeuvres, conducted a costly press campaign throughout the world, and raised incidents of procedure so as to make the utmost use of the influence of its friends, in order to gain the necessary time to complete its military preparations and also to discourage the Ethiopian Government from trusting as it did in the Covenant of the League.

To a great extent these tactics were crowned with success. Ethiopia's urgent and repeated appeals to the League, and the denunciation of the Italian Government's warlike preparations, did not prevent the Rome Government from securing by manoeuvres and threats the postponement of such effective decisions as might have prevented the aggression. In vain did the Ethiopian Government agree to every sacrifice, all the Council's suggestions, all the procedures of the Covenant, while the Italian Government received every proposal for pacific settlement with a contemptuous refusal. At the beginning of October 1935, emboldened by these initial successes, it felt that the time was ripe to fling aside the

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Must the Ethiopian Government renounce the hope of obtaining from the League of Nations the assistance to which it is entitled under the terms of the Covenant? Will the barbarous activities of the aggressor meet with no other obstacle than a platonic invitation to the two belligerents to accept negotiations for the termination of hostilities? Will dilatory procedures follow one another as if Ethiopian blood were not flowing like water, as if the Rome Government had not daily announced through the press under its inspiration its unshakable determination to seize Ethiopia? Does there remain the least doubt in the minds of any Member of the League of Nations as to the true intentions of the aggressor Government?

III. The moral confusion created throughout the world by the practical impunity of the Italian aggression is beginning to produce its terrible consequences.

Small States are now asking themselves what protection is afforded them by the collective security promised in the Covenant. Some of them, who are also victims of a breach of treaties, fear an aggression in the near future; they are consulting together to guard against the peril, should the selfish interests of a few Powers deprive them of the security which the League of Nations was to give them.

The Great Powers are now experiencing the effects of the spirit of aggression. They are appealing to the League of Nations and to the collective security which is its essential purpose. They assert that peace is indivisible. But can there be any collective security if all the States Members neglect or refuse their support? Does collective security consist only in making platonic protests against the aggressor, and in addressing words of compassion to its victim?

Such is the problem which is now before the Committee of Thirteen, the Committee of Eighteen, the Council and the Assembly. The war of conquest undertaken by Italy has imperilled the peace of the world. The Ethiopian Government expresses the hope that the League of Nations will not remain unmoved before the destruction of the Ethiopian people, and that it will not postpone any longer the effective assistance which is due to any State Member victim of an unjustified aggression. Ethiopia's independence is not alone at stake.

I have the honour to be,

etc.,

(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM

Minister of Ethiopia.

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C117845

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.148.M.87.1936.VII.
Geneva, April 8th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

Rome, April 8th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translated from the Italian)

Ethiopian telegram regarding alleged Italian attack on Addis Ababa of April 4th* is as usual tendencious and false. The facts are that a flight of five machines under Captain Falconi, while making one of the usual reconnaissance flights, observed an Ethiopian aeroplane on its way from Dessye to Addis Ababa and pursued it, pushing as far as the aerodrome at the capital, where with machine-guns, these being their sole weapons, they attacked it, together with another machine standing there. The Italian aeroplanes underwent heavy anti-aircraft fire which hit them in several places but did not prevent them from duly returning to Sardo. The Abyssinian fire also hit Captain Falconi, who was wounded by a dum-dum bullet in the left side of the jaw, and Sergeant-Mechanic Di Cristo, who was wounded, also by a dum-dum bullet, in the left knee. The wounded men were immediately conveyed to Asmara, where it was found necessary to amputate Sergeant Di Cristo's left leg above the knee owing to the comminuted nature of the wound produced by the dum-dum bullet. This correct and full statement of the facts shows:- (1) That no attack was made on Addis Ababa, but only on military aircraft in the aerodrome of that city under the circumstances above stated. (2) That from the alleged open and undefended city of Addis Ababa there was violent anti-aircraft fire which hit all the machines and seriously wounded two airmen. (3) That the Abyssinians are continuing to use inhuman ammunition forbidden by the international Conventions.

Please communicate this telegram to all States Members of the League.

SUVICH.

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* See document C.134.M.73.1936.VII.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.151.M.89.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 9th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Ethiopian atrocities committed upon Italian prisoners.

Charge brought by the Italian Government before the League of Nations.

Rome, April 7th, 1936.
Year XIV.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translated from the Italian).

Following on previous communications, I have the honour to transmit to you copies of the following documents:

1. Deposition made on February 11th, 1936, in the presence of the Italian Consul at Jibuti, by the Secretary of the Greek Consulate at Dire-dawa, in which he refers to the slave trading noted by him in that town in November 1935, and to the torture and killing of Italian prisoners by Ethiopians (Annex I.).

2. Statement made at Cairo on March 10th, 1936, on oath and in the presence of witnesses, by three members of the Egyptian Medical Mission in Ethiopia, concerning the atrocious tortures inflicted at Bolali on December 1st, 1935, on an Italian prisoner who was impaled on an iron bar and then burnt. (Annex II).

The originals of these depositions can be produced, if necessary.

The names of the Egyptian sick attendants concerned are included in the list of the staff of the "Egyptian Committee for Medical Aid in Ethiopia", which was duly communicated to the Italian Government by the Egyptian Legation in Rome.

I would request you to be good enough to bring to the notice of the States Members of the League of Nations these facts, which form a continuation of the series of unheard-of crimes committed in Ethiopia on Italian prisoners in violation of all conventional and humanitarian rules of conduct.

I have the honour etc.

(Signed) SUVICH

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(Translated from the Italian) ANNEX I.

TORTURE AND KILLING OF ITALIAN PRISONERS

Deposition by the Secretary of the Greek Consulate at Dire-dawa.

ROYAL ITALIAN CONSULATE AT JIBUTI.

Certified true copy of report No.11.
(Register of Records page 21).

In the year 1936, the fourteenth of the Fascist era, on this eleventh day of February, we, Dr. Bivio Luigi Sbrana, Royal Italian Consul, in the presence of MM. Stefano Micciché and Guiseppe Colleoni, witnesses hereby affirm that we have received from M. Spiro G. Makalonas, merchant, resident in Ethiopia and Secretary of the Greek Consultate at Dire-Dawa, the following evidence:
(Translated from the French)

"I, the under-signed Spiro G. Makalonas, Secretary of the Greek Consulate at Dire-Dawa, hereby affirm before God that the following declarations are spontaneous and have not been evoked by any external influence, and that the occurrences hereinafter set forth in regard to slavery and prisoners of war did actually take place in Ethiopia during my stay there.

"Slavery. I certify that in the month of November 1935, during the passage of Abyssinian troops proceeding towards Harrar and Ogaden, the Ethiopian soldiers attacked the villages of the Danakils and the inhabitants of Cercer whom they met on their road, and after having forcibly seized young people of both sexes, they took them away as slaves to Mangalla. I myself saw these unfortunate people in chains and shut up in a Zeriba (a kind of pen) which had been set up on a plain quite near the municipal police station. The Ethiopian soldiers at once organised a slave market.

"In the month of November alone more than 50 slaves were sold in this market, both men and women, at a price of 30 to 60 Maria Theresa thalers each. At the same time a man, a Galla of the Arussi, the father of one of the slaves, appeared before the chief of the Dire-Dawa municipality, Ligg Tafarra, and claimed his son. The reply given to the unfortunate father was that 200 Maria Theresa thalers would have to be paid for the court of the municipality to accede to his request. The poor man was forced to abandon his unfortunate son to his fate.

"In my opinion the request for 200 M.T. thalers was made in order that the claim might not be granted.

"Italian prisoners of war. I further certify that the Italian soldiers who were drivers of tanks and Italian aviators who fell into the hands of the Ethiopians were killed on the spot without mercy, despite the fact that the Italians, at the time of capture, specifically declared that they considered themselves prisoners of war.

"The Abyssinian soldiers massacred the prisoners in a most barbarous manner, cutting up the bodies into small pieces after subjecting the victims to the most atrocious tortures, and vieing for the choice bits, which they then kept as mascots.

"The above facts have been confirmed by several European and Abyssinian eye-witnesses."

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For information we have drawn up the present record, which is signed by the declarant, by the witnesses, by myself, Royal Italian Majesty's Consul, and by the Secretary, M.Dominici.

THE ROYAL ITALIAN CONSUL

(Signed) B. Luigi SBRANA
" S.G. MAKALONAS - declarant.
" Stefano MICCICHÉ - witness.
" Guiseppe COLLEONI - witness.
" Luigi DOMINICI - secretary.

Stamp of the Royal Italian Consultate, Jibuti.

(Translation from the Italian) ANNEX II.

TORTURE AND KILLING OF AN ITALIAN PRISONER

Deposition by three Members of the Egyptian Medical Mission.

On March 10th, 1936, at the editorial offices of the Giornale d'Oriente there appeared Ali el Masri, Egyptian National, living at Cairo, a sick attendant attached to the Egyptian Medical Mission in Abyssinia, who made the following declaration in the presence of witnesses.

The authenticity of his declarations is vouched for by the other two members of the mission, Abdel Mohsein el Wishi and Labib Salamah. The former of these was present at the occurrence described by Ali el Masri, and his companion affirms that he obtained information confirming its authenticity from reliable Abyssinian sources.

Ali el Masri, having taken an oath affirming the correctness of his declaration, made the following statement:

"On December 1st, 1935, at about 2 p.m., I was seated in the tent of the Egyptian ambulance at Bolali and heard from some Abyssinians that they had taken an Italian prisoner and proposed to torture him.

"Shortly afterwards I heard the Abyssinians' cries and realised that they had actually begun to torture their prisoner.

"When my duties were finished, I went out with Mahmad el Mahdi and Abdel Mohsein el Wishi and met a crowd of Abyssinians at a distance of about 300 metres from the abulance. We drew near and saw the horrible scene around which they were gathered. Across the backs of two camels standing about 5 metres from each other there lay a long iron bar about 1½ centimetres thick, which was run through the body of a man who had been emasculated and was completely naked. The bar entered the anal aperture of the body and emerged from the head, and a quantity of cerebral matter was spilt from a large hole in the centre of the skull.

"The Abyssinian torturers had tied the arms of the body (which were mutilated in various parts) round the head with wire, and had bound the feet to the bar, so as to keep the back towards the ground.

"Shortly afterwards there arrived some Somali camel-drivers who had fetched a tin of petrol and poured it on sticks of wood which were tied to the centre of the bar. The wood was then set alight and the Abyssinians among whom was Manghestu, the murderer of Minmiti, and another old man named Seyum, danced around the flames uttering loud cries.

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"We could no longer bear to witness this horrible scene and we hurried away quite nauseated. The next day we learnth that the Abyssinians, shortly after we had left, had removed the bar from the backs of the camels in order not to burn them, and had then thrown the corpse into the flames and afterwards buried it."

I, Ali el Masri, swear that my declarations are authentic.

(Signed) ALI EL MASRI.

(Translation)

I, Abdel Mohsein el Wishi, assistant sick attendant attached to the Egyptian Medical Mission in Ethiopia, hereby swear that I witnessed the torturing of the Italian prisoner as described by Ali el Masri, and hereby confirm the authenticity of his statements.

(Signed) ABDEL MOHSEIN EL WISHI

I, the undersigned, Labis Salamah, hereby swear to the authenticity of the statements made by Ali el Masri and Abdel Mohsein el Wishi, and I hereby assert that I have received confirmatory evidence of the correctness of their contents from reliable Abyssinians.

(Signed) LABIB SALAMAH

We, the undersigned, hereby swear that we have heard the testimony of Ali el Masri, Abdel Mohsein el Wishi and Labib Salamah:

In faith whereof:

(Signed) (In Latin characters): SHEHATA EBEID, March 10th, 1936.

do. (In Arab Characters) : SHEHATA EBEID, c/o Dinitri, via Ibrahim Pasha,

do. (In Arab characters) : SUBHI WEHEDAH

do. (In Latin characters): M. BOCTOR, Correspondent de l'Echo de Paris, 6, Rue Antikhana, Le Caire.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Co-ordination/Ctee.of XVIII/22.

Geneva, April 9th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant.

COMMITTEE OF XVIII.

Reply from the President of the Mexican Delegation to the letter of the President of the Co-ordination Committee dated April 2nd, 1936.

M. Estrada Cajigal, Permanent Delegate of Mexico to the League of Nations, has forwarded me your note dated April 2nd, in which you inform the members of the Committee of Eighteen that you consider that, since the Committee of Thirteen is taking steps with a view to conciliation between Abyssinia and Italy, it is expedient to await the outcome of that Committee's action before summoning a further meeting of the Committee of Eighteen, of which Mexico is a member.

I have received instructions from my Government on the subject of your note, and under those instructions I must begin by informing you that Mexico understood that, when peace negotiations were suggested in March, the intention was that they should not have the effect of paralysing, or even delaying, the progress of the operations and decisions tending towards the application of sanctions against the country declared to be the aggressor. Furthermore, when the suggestion of conciliation was accepted, it was borne in mind that it must achieve its objects within a brief period - indeed, almost immediately - so that a time-limit of forty-eight hours was at first contemplated for the two countries to give their reply, together with a suspension of hostilities while the negotiations were following their natural course.

In these circumstances, and bearing in mind, as it is bound to do, the de facto situation at the present moment in the armed struggle in Abyssinia, the time that has passed since the appeal to conciliation was made, and the prospective future course, from the standpoint of time, of the peace negotiations, my Government feels obliged to state, in all loyalty to the League of Nations and with a full realisation of the extent of the principles and undertakings it has accepted, that it does not desire to share the responsibility in the eyes of history for measures which, however seemingly justified on concrete grounds, may, in practice, nullify the application of the sanctions that have been decreed, thereby weakening the fabric of collective security which it is being sought to establish with the object of organising international life on firm foundations.

P.T.O.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 117851

My Government believes that, by giving honourable expression at the proper moment to the foregoing considerations, it is discharging its duty to the countries Members of the League, and adhering to the principles by which its foreign policy is guided; for it clearly realises that, within the machinery that governs the activity of the organs of the League, it is not in a position - nor, of course, does it claim - to go further than stating its attitude on a question of such gravity, which will so profoundly influence international life in the future.

(Signed) NARCISO BASSOLS,

Ambassador,
President of the Mexican Delegation.

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C117852 L-150 Vol 4(a)

League of Nations

April 10th, 1936.

Secretary General League of Nations transmits to Governments Members League on behalf of Committee Thirteen following text adopted by that Committee on April 9th, 1936:-

The Committee of Thirteen, having taken cognisance of the communications addressed by the Ethiopian and Italian Governments to the Secretary General on the subject of various failures to comply with International Agreements on the conduct of war and expressing the emotion which these infractions have caused to public opinion, addresses an urgent appeal to both belligerents inviting them to take all the necessary steps to prevent such failures to comply with the said Conventions and of the principles of International law. The Committee hopes to receive from the Powers to whom it addresses this appeal such assurance as will allay the emotion to which it has given expression.

Bulletin

Information Section League Nations.
April 10th, 1936.

Committee Thirteen instructed by Council League follow Italo Ethiopian conflict met April eighth, Chairman Madariaga, Spain, who presented report explaining action taken sincd last meeting. Conforming to Committee's instructions, Chairman, with Secretary General, got in touch with Italian Ethiopian representatives. Ethiopian delegate said his Government's view expressed in declarations twentieth March. Added he was at disposal Chairman to supply information.

As regards conversations to which Chairman, to hasten forward his task, desired invite representatives two parties

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simultaneously Ethiopian delegate said would state his views when assured Italy intended negotiate in framework and spirit of Covenant. On other hand, semi-official conversations between Chairman and Italian representative indicated Chairman should address Italian Government direct asking it appoint qualified delegate. Letter sent in this sense to Italian Government which replied second April ready send representative Geneva immediately after Easter for preliminary exchange views with Madariaga concerning procedure desired conversations, but added general preliminary discussion might well take place between Madariaga and head of Government at Rome.

Committee Thirteen had further sent Italian Government letter drawing special attention to allegations Ethiopian Government concerning use by Italian army of asphyxiating poisonous or similar gases prohibited by protocol June Seventeenth, 1925, to which Italian Ethiopian Governments parties. Italian Government had replied making reservations concerning competence Committee Thirteen deal with this question and asking if attention Ethiopian Government had also been drawn to use by Ethiopians of methods warfare prohibited by International Regulations and to atrocities committed on Italian prisoners and non-combatant civilians.

At session beginning April eighth Committee Thirteen instructed Chairman Secretary General get in touch soon as possible at Geneva with Italian Ethiopian representatives and further appointed legal sub-committee to consider various Conventions on conduct of warfare with reference to procure for examination and declaration of possible violations. Committee sent request

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to International Red Cross for information which Red Cross had obtained regarding allegations by belligerents of violation of International Conventions on conduct of warfare. Lastly, following appeal was addressed Italian Ethiopian Governments:-

> "Committee Thirteen, having taken note of the Ethiopian and Italian Governments' communications to the Secretary General regarding various breaches international agreements, conduct of war, desires to give expression to the emotion felt by public opinion and urgently appeals to two belligerents to take all necessary steps to prevent any breach of said Conventions and of principles of international law. Committee hopes to receive from the powers to which it addresses this appeal assurances that will tend to allay the emotion to which it has referred."

Executive Committee of International Committee Intellectual Cooperation of League met Paris sixth to ninth April, Chairman Gilbert Murray, United Kingdom. Considered various questions especially organization of a "Conversation" on the part played by the humanities in the training of contemporary man, certain educational questions, international conference on protection national artistic property, work recently done to prepare universal statute of authors' rights by harmonising Berne Havana Conventions, organization of conference Madrid on scientific study international relations and social science, problem intellectual (An --?), organization at Geneva of international Conference to conclude convention on use of broadcasting in interests of peace.

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C 117855

Information issued on League's financial situation end March shows that out of total credits twenty-eight million francs for 1936, Six million already received whilst expenditure for first quarter 1936 is about five and half millions,bank balance seven hundred thousand francs.

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C 117856 L-150 bl4(a)
APR 23 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.150.M.88.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 10th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY

Correspondence with the International Red Cross Committee.

I.

Geneva, April 8th, 1936.

To the President of the International Red Cross Committee.

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee of Thirteen, at this morning's meeting, instructed me to ask the International Red Cross Committee whether it would be able to communicate to the Committee of Thirteen information emanating either from officers of the International Red Cross Committee, or from impartial persons such as the Red Cross ambulance doctors in Ethiopia in regard to infringements of the international conventions on the conduct of war signed by the two belligerents.

The Committee of Thirteen has been informed in particular that the International Red Cross Committee should be in possession of a report drawn up by Dr. Junod in March, and also a report of December last by the doctors of the Swedish ambulance.

I should be greatly obliged if you would let me have your reply as soon as possible, as the Committee of Thirteen has to continue its work this afternoon.

I have the honour to be etc.,

(Signed) Avenol,

Secretary-General.

(Translation)

II.

Geneva, April 9th, 1936.

International Red Cross Committee.

To the Secretary-General.

The International Red Cross Committee has the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 8th which it received yesterday afternoon.

In view of the importance of the request made by the Committee of Thirteen our Ethiopia Commission met immediately. The International Committee also considered this question at its Plenary meeting to-day.

As stated in our Circular No. 324, the two Governments engaged in the present conflict expressed the desire that an enquiry should be instituted by the International Committee into the allegations made by both sides concerning violations of the Geneva Convention. The International Committee being desirous of affording all the aid in its power to both parties with a

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view to complying with this wish, immediately got into touch with them on the subject. Until a final decision - which we hope will achieve a positive result - has been reached, the International Committee cannot hand over its documentary material for the purposes of another enquiry bearing partly on the same facts.

Moreover, even apart from the negotiations now in progress in connection with our enquiry, the neutrality which the International Red Cross Committee is bound to observe, makes it necessary for the Committee to exercise very great discretion. In particular, the International Committee does not feel that it can communicate information received from its own delegates, or information confided to it as being an international organ of the Red Cross, for any enquiry other than that for which the Geneva Convention itself makes a provision in the matter of establishing the facts regarding alleged violations.

As regards other information that may be supplied to the International Red Cross Committee by Governments or by National Red Cross Societies, it is for these Governments or Societies to make such use of this material as they may think fit.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) GUILLAUME FAVRE,

Divisional Colonel,
Vice-President.

Annexed Circular No. 324.

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C 117858

ANNEX

International Red Cross Committee. Circular 324.

RED CROSS WORK IN ETHIOPIA

Geneva, February 10th, 1936.

(Translation)

To the Central Committees of the National Red Cross Societies.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There has been no diminution in the manifestations of solidarity by the National Red Cross Societies on behalf of the Ethiopian Red Cross. The assistance given during the past few weeks has consisted mainly of consignments of money and supplies.

Consignments of Money.

			Fr.Sw.
American Red Cross, (2nd and 3rd payments) transmitted by the League of Red Cross Societies	$6,544.45	=	19,633.--
Australian Red Cross	£ 4.19	=	75.--
Canadian Red Cross (handed over to the British Red Cross for its work in Ethiopia)	$ 300.--	=	900.--
Danish Red Cross	£ 500	=	7,500.--
Portuguese Red Cross	£ 40	=	600.--
South African Red Cross, transmitted by the League of Red Cross Societies	£ 26.11	=	406.--

The Ethiopian Red Cross has received direct 500 rupees from India and a few gifts from private persons in Austria, France and Switzerland.

On January 13th, the Australian Red Cross telegraphed to the International Committee to ask whether the Ethiopian Red Cross preferred the dispatch of a medical unit, or of funds. On the same day the International Committee telegraphed this question to the Ethiopian Red Cross, which replied on the 14th that it preferred funds.

Consignments of supplies.

The German Red Cross has decided to send to the Ethiopian Red Cross 100 folding stretchers; these will be transported in seven cases by the Stolzenfels, which left Hamburg on January 23rd and is due to reach Jibuti in from 26 to 28 days.

The Belgian Red Cross has sent to the Swedish Red Cross for its work in Ethiopia, 10,000 packets of individual dressings.

The Japanese Red Cross is sending a further consignment of twenty stretchers, five double tents able to hold 20 persons, each, and five ground sheets for tents.

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Second British Red Cross Ambulance.

In a letter dated February 5th the British Red Cross announced that the second British Ambulance Unit, consisting of two doctors, Dr. Percy James Kelly, C.B.E., and Dr. Robert Blackwood Robertson, a transport officer, Captain Leslie Hayward Sackville Strudwick, and three medical orderlies, Robert Morgan, John Henry Thake and Albert Percy Wheeler, is on the point of leaving for Ethiopia.

Dr. Kelly will leave Marseilles on the "Yorkshire" February 8th, arriving at Port Sudan on the 16th. There he will join up with Captain Strudwick, who is at present at Khartoum, where he arrived from Nairobi on December 24th, 1935.

They will then join up with the East African contingent, consisting of two Indian Surgeon sub-assistants and nine native orderlies arriving at Port Sudan from Mombasa in the "Madura" on the 17th, and will take this contingent to Gedaref to await the arrival of Dr. Robertson and his orderlies, who will leave London in the s.s. "Mantola" on February 8th, and will arrive at Port Sudan on the 27th.

This ambulance unit should be able to enter Ethiopia via Gallabat and Gondar at the beginning of March.

Fixed establishments.

In our Circular No. 322 of December 27th, 1935, we published a first list of fixed establishments of the Ethiopian Red Cross which are entitled to display the Red Cross emblem. Since then a further list with rectifications and additions to the first has been received by the International Committee. This list is as follows:

New List of Hospitals, etc. entitled to display the Red Cross Emblem.

Position as at December 26th, 1935.

Addis Ababa.

1. Headquarters of the Ethiopian Red Cross, Ras Makonnen Street.
2. Sudan Interior Mission at Fouri, Addis Ababa.
3. Zauditu Memorial Hospital at Filwoha (Adventist).
4. Taffari Makonnen Hospital at Gollale (American Hospital).
5. Hermannsburger Mission at Gollale (German Hospital).
6. Ospedale de la Consolata at Gollale (Italian Hospital).
7. Bete Saida Hospital (Dr. Hanner, near the Little Palace).
8. Menelik II. Hospital (Kabanna, near the German Legation).

Dessie.

1. Taffari Makonnen Hospital (Adventist).
2. Hospital of the Catholic Mission (French).
3. House reserved for the Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulances.

Harrar.

1. Gebi of the Duke of Harrar, situated outside the town (250 sick or wounded).
2. Gebi of the Ras Makonnen (Wireless station removed). (100 sick or wounded).
3. French Hospital (250 sick).
4. Taffari Makonnen Hospital of the Swedish Mission (250 sick).
5. Former Treasury Buildings near the French Hospital (120 sick.)

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C117860

Dire Dawa.

List of Buildings will be sent later.

Debre-Tabor.

Haile Selassie I Hospital (Adventist).

On January 16th, this list was communicated for information to the Italian Red Cross, which was requested to bring it to the notice of the Italian Government; it was emphasised that the said list is not exhaustive.

Correspondence concerning Bombing from the Air.

The damage done to fixed establishments and ambulances of the Red Cross by air bombing was referred to in our Circular No.323.

We were anxious to make no comment upon the letters thus published, leaving the National Red Cross Societies, and, in particular, those which have sent medical units to Ethiopia to draw the conclusions which ensue from this statement from the Italian point of view.

The International Red Cross Committee sent the Head of the Italian Government, on January 23rd, 1936, an acknowledgment of the receipt of his letter dated January 16th.

As for the letter of the General President of the Italian Red Cross, dated January 11th, (appended to Circular 323), this was answered by the International Red Cross Committee. That body stated that by the publication, in Circular 323, of the correspondence exchanged with the Head of the Italian Government, it had taken note of the assurances given.

From these assurances it may be inferred that, if an Ethiopian or foreign ambulance should be attacked from the air, this could only be due to a combination of exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the Italian Government which, deploring any such contingency, has been good enough to declare that it would make every effort to prevent its materialising.

The telegrams sent by the International Red Cross Committee to its mission in Ethiopia have been interpreted in this way. The heads of Ethiopian and foreign ambulances, who were inclined to abandon the use of any distinguishing signs, decided, with a consciousness of the great importance of the assurances received, to fly the Red Cross flag with complete confidence.

The International Committee in its letter to the General President of the Italian Red Cross took the opportunity of adding that it greatly appreciated the efforts of the Ethiopian Red Cross, recently founded under extremely difficult conditions, as well as the magnificent spirit of solidarity shown by the National Red Cross Societies, who have in various ways lent their assistance to their new sister society. It gave particulars of the composition of the Central Committee of the Ethiopian Red Cross and emphasised the results it had achieved in so short a time.

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Enquiry into the Violations of the Geneva Convention.

On January 3rd, the Central Committee of the Swedish Red Cross asked the International Committee to institute a juridical enquiry into the bombing of Malka Lidar. The International Committee replied on January 7th that, for an official enquiry to be undertaken, it would have to be requested by one of the belligerents, which had not been done so far.

In its letter of January 16th, the Italian Government declared that it could wish nothing better than that International Committee delegates, selected for the purpose, should proceed to the scene of operations, in order to ascertain whether, and if so how, the rules of the Geneva Convention are observed or violated by each of the parties.1)

This desire was also expressed by the General President of the Italian Red Cross.2)

The Ethiopian Government for its part, cabled on January 23rd, that it would welcome the sending of representatives selected by the International Committee to enquiry into the observance of the provisions of the Geneva Convention on both sides. The Ethiopian Government added that it would give our representatives every facility.

The International Red Cross Committee declared its willingness to accede to the desire expressed by the Italian and Ethiopian Governments and got into touch with both. A two-fold enquiry will call for the appointment of persons with legal and medical qualifications and entail expenditure which will greatly exceed the financial capacity of the Committee and which should be borne by the Governments concerned.

In contemplation of this enquiry, the International Committee is keeping before it the reports already received from its mission on the abovementioned bombing incidents, as well as on a number of facts of the same kind and on the alleged misuse of the Red Cross Emblem in Ethiopia.

Mission of the International Red Cross Committee.

The mission of the International Committee in Ethiopia has endeavoured to coordinate thework of the Red Cross in that country. In particular, it received the medical units sent by the National Red Cross Societies of neutral countries, and facilitated their organisation and their journey to the stations assigned to ther.

One of the International Committee delegates, Mr. Sidney H. Brown, proceeded to Dessie, where he saw the first Italian prisoners of war and satisfied himself that they were well treated and able to correspond with their families.

Another delegate, Dr. Marcel Junod, travelled on two occasions from Addis Ababa to Dessie and in a medical service aeroplane piloted by the Swedish Airman, Count de Rosen, to Muggelli and Malka Lidar, to collect evidence concerning the bombing on December 30th.

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1) Cf. Circular No. 323, p. 3.
2) " " " " p. 8.

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C 117862

The work carried out by the mission has been appreciated and, spontaneously, several National Societies have sent special contributions to the International Red Cross Committee, to assist it in defraying the heavy expenditure entailed by the despatch and maintenance of this mission as well as the daily expense of telegrams and radiograms.

The American Red Cross has increased its 1936 contribution from $3,000 to $6,000.

The Luxemburg Red Cross announces that it is sending 500 Swiss francs.

The Swedish Red Cross has made a special donation of 2,000 Swiss francs.

The International Committee is deeply grateful to the above National Societies for these contributions which partly cover its extra expenditure.

We have the honour to be, etc.,

For the International Red Cross Committee,

MAX HUBER,

President.

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C117863 L-750 d4(a)

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS APR 13 1936 CANADA

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.152.M.90.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 10th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Government.

(Translation)

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg you to be good enough to communicate urgently to the Committee of Thirteen, to the Council, to the Committee of Eighteen and to all Members of the League of Nations the following note.

I. The Ethiopian delegation learnt this morning, through the Press, of the decision taken on April 9th, 1936, by the Committee of Thirteen to make an urgent appeal to the two belligerents to take all necessary steps to prevent any breach of international conventions as to the conduct of warfare and of the principles of international law. The Committee adds that it hopes to receive from the Powers to which it addresses this appeal assurances that will tend to allay the emotion that is being felt by public opinion and to which it has given expression.

II. The Ethiopian delegation hastens to respond to this appeal as it has always done hitherto. It must, however, express its pained surprise at the fact that the Committee of Thirteen felt able to place on the same footing Ethiopia, the victim of an unjustified aggression, and Italy, aggressor unanimously condemned by the League of Nations. Is it a correct interpretation of world public opinion to make no distinction between agressor and victim and merely to make one more platonic appeal to both belligerents, as though this were a conflict in which the League of Nations was not itself concerned? Only a few months ago the Council of the League of Nations vigorously asserted that there was a dispute between Italy and Ethiopia and another dispute between Italy and the League of Nations. Has this situation now changed? Has the aggressor's violence succeeded in settling the latter conflict.

III. In response to the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen, the Ethiopian delegation would mention that, about a week ago, there was referred to that Committee copy of a report which the Ethiopian Government transmitted, on March 2nd, 1936, to the International Red Cross at Geneva. In this report, the Ethiopian Government has enumerated in precise terms, and with particulars of place and date, the violations of the laws of war of which the Italian Government has been guilty. The Committee of Thirteen makes no reference to this document. Does the Committee consider it negligible, or does it consider that it ought not to discuss it, just as the League of Nations has not considered that it should accede to the numerous requests for an enquiry submitted by the Ethiopian Government?

P.T.O.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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IV. To complete the evidence contained in its report, the Ethiopian Government has instructed its delegation at Geneva to lay before the Committee of Thirteen two new items of information.

1) The Ethiopian Government urgently requests the Committee of Thirteen to hear the evidence of Dr. BELAU, a Polish doctor, who was made prisoner by the Italian troops and, under threat of death, was compelled to sign a false statement regarding the bombing of the American Red Cross hospital at Dessie in December 1935. Dr. BELAU is now at Geneva, and that Ethiopian delegation is able to inform the Committee of his address.

2) A telegram in clear just received, from its Government by the Ethiopian delegation, states as follows: "Please inform the League of Nations immediately that the Italians have also begun to use asphyxiating gases on the Ogaden front. On April 8th they discharged gas on DAGABUR and SASSABANEH. Eighty persons were affected; they are suffering horribly in the eyes and lungs and from skin burns. Protest energetically against these inhuman and forbidden acts."

V. The Ethiopian delegation cannot believe that, in view of these systematic terrorising practices, the League of Nations will continue to preserve the impassiveness that has allowed the aggressor to reduce to despair a people that is being doomed to extermination.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM,
Ethiopian Minister.

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C117865

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la Société.

C.153.M.91.1936.VII.

Genève, le 10 avril 1936.

DIFFEREND ENTRE L'ETHIOPIE ET L'ITALIE.

Télégramme du Gouvernement italien.

(Traduction de l'italien)

Rome, le 10 avril 1936.

Au Secrétaire général,

Me référant à mon télégramme du 6 courant [1], je confirme et précise que l'hôpital de campagne italien N° 605 de Mai Cheo, portant les emblèmes réglementaires de la Croix-Rouge, a été atteint à de nombreuses reprises par l'artillerie ennemie dans la matinée du 31 mars dernier, vers 6 h.30. Deux hospitalisés furent tués, trois autres et un infirmier militaire furent blessés, une tente et des fournitures médicales furent détruites, d'autres tentes endommagées. Je vous prie de communiquer la présente aux Etats Membres de la Société.

SUVICH.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.153.M.91.1936.VII

Geneva, April 10th,1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Telegram from the Italian Government

(Translation from the Italian)

Rome, April 10th,1936.

Reference my telegram 6th instant [1] confirm and specify that Italian field hospital N. 605 at Mai Cheo bearing prescribed Red Cross emblems was heavily shelled by enemy artillery morning March 31st towards 6.30 . Two patients were killed, and three others and medical orderly wounded, one tent and medical stores destroyed, other tents damaged. Please communicate States Members League of Nations.

SUVICH.

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1) Voir document C.146.M.85.1936.VII
1) See document C.146.M.85.1936.VII.

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C117866 L-150 W4(a)

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA APR 28 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.156.M.94.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 12th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

Translation from Italian.

Rome, April 12th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

In its note to you dated the 10th instant the Ethiopian delegation mentioned inter alia a so-called Polish doctor BELAU, found by the Italian troops on the Amba Aradam, stating that that person is alleged to have been compelled by the Italians, under threat of death, to sign a false declaration regarding the bombing of the Dessié hospital in December 1935. It is true that in February last the so-called Dr. Belau made, and spontaneously handed to the Italian doctors treating him at the Massawah hospital, not one but two declarations (one extending to three pages) written entirely in his own hand and signed by him, in which he affirms inter alia that the contents of the declaration, also signed by him, which was transmitted to you by the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs in his telegram of December 7th, 1935, is false; that he signed the document without reading it, being compelled to do so by Dr. Zervos in presence of the Emperor; and that consequently he regards the document in question as counteracting the other. Despite the nature of these affirmations, the Italian Government refrained from bringing them to your notice, as in the meantime it had received from Warsaw an extremely bad account of the person in question. In 1922 the so-called Dr. Belau deserted from the Polish Army, in which he held the rank of sergeant, and went to Russia. His name is not Belau but Maximilian Stanislas Beloff. He obtained by fraud a temporary passport from the Polish Legation at Teheran. He holds no document authorising him to practise medicine. He has wandered about in Persia, India, Siam and Afghanistan, engaged in obscure and doubtful activities and wanted by the police of various countries. That is the person who was engaged as a doctor by the Ethiopian Red Cross; he is doubly a deserter, - from the Polish Army in 1922 and from the Abyssinian Medical Organisation in 1936. At Massawah he spontaneously disavowed a declaration he had signed at Dessié, and to-day in Switzerland he disavows the disavowal he made at Massawah. For your information I am transmitting under separate cover a photograph of the declarations made at Massawah by the so-called Dr. Belau, and I beg you to communicate the present telegram to the States Members of the League of Nations.

SUVICH.

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C 117867

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and the Members of the League.

C.157.M.95.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 12th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Translation from Italian.

Rome, April 11th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 9th instant, containing the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen to the Royal Italian Government and to the Ethiopian Government.* The Royal Government notes that the denunciation of the Abyssinian atrocities which it sent, together with confirmatory documents, as early as December 17th, 1935, and later by its notes dated December 31st, 1935, and January 18th, February 28th and March 9th, 1936, will be fully investigated by the competent bodies. The observance of the laws of war has been and is the constant rule of the Italian army, and the Royal Government desires by the present communication to give a full assurance on that point. The observance of these laws must be bilateral. The Italian military authorities cannot do otherwise than punish every inhuman atrocity committed by its adversary in contempt of every principle of law and morality.

SUVICH.

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* This appeal was as follows:

"The Committee of Thirteen, having taken note of the communications sent by the Ethiopian and Italian Governments to the Secretary-General in regard to various cases of failure to observe the international agreements relating to the conduct of warfare, and voicing the emotion felt in this matter by public opinion, addresses an urgent appeal to both belligerents to take all measures necessary to prevent any failure to observe the said Conventions or the principles of international law.

The Committee hopes to receive from the Powers to which it is making this appeal assurances calculated to allay the public feeling it has thus voiced."

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C 117868

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.158.M.96.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 12th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communications from the Ethiopian Government.

Translation.

Addis Ababa, April 11th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I.

By its resolution dated March 3rd the Committee of Thirteen sent an urgent appeal to the two belligerents for the immediate opening of negotiations. But, after having waited for more than five weeks, we note that the negotiations are still in the preliminary stage, that a further adjournment of the Committee of Thirteen has just been decided upon and that, in consequence, the question of additional sanctions has been in suspense since the beginning of March. During the whole of this period the enemy has carried on his war of aggression with impunity and has rendered it still more horrible by daily gas bombing. We protest vigorously against these constant postponements and we ask that steps be taken to prevent their further recurrence.

HAILE SELASIE I.

II.

In reply to your telegram of the 9th instant, I have the honour to state that, in her struggle against the aggressor, Ethiopia has strictly conformed to the international agreements regulating the conduct of warfare, despite flagrant and systematic acts of violation on the part of Italy. Ethiopia has even refrained from all measures of reprisal against these violations. It is possible, however, that in isolated cases individuals have reacted against the inhuman methods employed by the Italians. The Ethiopian Government has taken all steps to impose severe punishment for any such lapses.

HEROUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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C 117869
L-150

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.155.M.93.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 14th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ETHIOPIAN DELEGATION TRANSMITTING A MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED ON MARCH 2nd, 1936, BY THE ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETY TO THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE.

(Translation)

Geneva, April 10th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I would ask Your Excellency to be good enough to communicate to all the Members of the League of Nations the memorandum dated March 2nd, 1936, addressed by the Ethiopian National Red Cross Society to the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva, a copy of which I have to-day sent to the League of Nations Secretariat.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM,

Minister of Ethiopia.

MEMORANDUM

(Translation)

M. Max Huber,
President of the International Red Cross Committee,
Geneva.

Addis Ababa, March 2nd, 1936.

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your circular No.323 of January 23rd, 1936, to the Central Committees of the National Red Cross Societies containing the letter sent by you on January 7th, 1936, to His Excellency M. Benito Mussolini, Head of the Italian Government, together with his reply of January 16th, and two letters annexed thereto from the President of the Italian Red Cross, dated January 11th and 16th.

After a thorough study of these various documents, we beg to submit herewith a few comments on them and would ask you, as a reciprocal service, kindly to communicate them to the National Red Cross Societies. The Ethiopian Red Cross appeals to the impartiality and neutrality of the International Red Cross Committee and the sister Societies and asks them to judge who has violated the conventions - the Ethiopian Government or the Government which has just accused it of disloyalty to the lofty principles which it should be the sacred duty of us all to respect.

In your letter of January 7th, 1936, following upon the bombing at Dessie and Malka Didaka of Red Cross units, after asking the Head of the Italian Government to cause the necessary arrangements to be made to prevent the

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recurrence of incidents likely to do serious harm to Red Cross work, you mentioned that you would like to obtain such information as he thought he could supply you with on the point and as would reassure in particular the national societies concerned. We do not feel certain, however, that the particulars given in the above-mentioned letters from the Head of the Italian Government and the President of the Italian Red Cross are likely, in view of their vague and indefinite character, to reassure the national societies whose ambulances have suffered from Italian air attacks.

After stating that the airmen "make a point of respecting the Red Cross emblem" the Head of the Italian Government remarks that, at the same time, Red Cross units are often unintentionally involved in military operations, and he adds, to quote his own words: "No one deplores such a possibility more than the Italian Government. It will do its best to see that it does not recur". The Ethiopian Red Cross would point out that, actually, the Italian Government is merely promising to prevent accidental bombing but not to stop intentional bombing.

Passing over the few observations suggested by a perusal of this letter, let us examine the letter from the President of the Italian Red Cross.

He begins by saying, to use his own words, that he wishes to send the International Committee a note summarising and explaining incidents which have recently occurred in connection with the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. Yet it would be useless to look, in his letter, for the summary, explanations or information which are to be regarded as a reply to the very definite inquiry made by you. It must accordingly be concluded that certain definite undeniable facts have made it impossible for the Italian Government to offer any justification. In point of fact the President has not supplied the statement of facts which we would have been entitled to expect. To sum up, his arguments are based on the following allegations:

1. That the Ethiopians do not understand the meaning of the Red Cross. 2. That the Ethiopian Red Cross is non-existent and 3. that Red Cross units by their very nature run the risk of bombing from the air.

The argument that Ethiopians do not know the meaning of the Red Cross is so weak and illogical that the Ethiopian Red Cross need not reply to it at length. It will be sufficient to compare two passages which stand side by side in the Italian memorandum and which are mutually exclusive. After referring to the alleged use of the Red Cross emblem on brothels, it is claimed that, during air bombardments, certain Ethiopian troops took shelter under the Red Cross emblem. If this were true, though the Ethiopian Red Cross formally denies it, it would be precisely a proof of the Ethiopian troops' understanding of the immunity conferred by that emblem.

Referring to the alleged protest made by the French Consul at Harrar against abuses of the Red Cross emblem on the part of Dedjazmatch Nasibu, we are astonished that the Italian Red Cross, with the approval of the Head of its Government,

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should have ventured to attribute to this Consul a démarch which, as the following letter of February 14th, 1936, from His Excellency the French Minister in Ethiopia shows, he never made:

The Legation of the French Republic in Ethiopia to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Addis Ababa,
February 14th, 1936.

"Monsieur le Ministre,

"In letter No.154 of February 13th, Your Excellency was good enough to ask me to enquire from the French Consul at Harar how far the report that he (the consul) had urged Dedjazmatch Nasibu to remove the Red Cross emblem, placed on warehouses inside the Guebi and containing war stores, was correct.

"The French Consul at Harar has just assured me that he never addressed such a remark to Dedjazmatch Nasibu. The report in question doubtless arose from a distorted version of a conversation which a French medical man, Dr. Féron, Acting Consular Agent - not French Consul - at Harar, had with the Dedjazmatch last September. During this conversation our compatriot would appear to have pointed out to the Military Governor of Harar that he would do well to use the Red Cross emblem as little as possible, as it would only be respected in so far as it was not abused.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) A. Bodard,

French Minister."

In the second place, the Italian Red Cross reproaches the Ethiopian Red Cross with being a new organisation, founded only just before hostilities began. The Italian Red Cross modestly compares with it its seventy year old record and its experience acquired in previous wars. The Ethiopian Government, particularly since entering the League of Nations, has so constantly cherished illusions of a lasting peace that, until the recent menaces from Italy, it felt it unnecessary to accede to international conventions concerning the laws of war. This explains its delay in acceding to the Geneva Convention of 1929 and in creating a National Red Cross to help the wounded and sick of the armies in the field. When the President of the Italian Red Cross states that "the Italian Red Cross has no Ethiopian Red Cross opposite to it", this is perhaps meant to justify the numerous bombardments of our ambulances. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian Red Cross, which he says does not exist, is a properly constituted society recognised by the International Red Cross Committee.

Thirdly, the President of the Italian Red Cross points out that as they operate in the actual fighting area, the members of Red Cross ambulances and medical units inevitably

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run the risk of bombing from the air. He says that Red Cross missions should "be stationed at well-marked points away from places where troops are concentrated," and he adds - perhaps as an excuse for the shameful bombing by Italians of our Red Cross units - that "all the reports of the bombing of medical units from the air start off by being catastrophic, are then reduced by successive denials to much smaller proportions, and end up by admitting that these units were in the vicinity of military works". The President of the Italian Red Cross apparently overlooks the two bombardments of the Swedish Red Cross ambulance, which was five kilometres away from the nearest troops, and, inter alia, the two bombardments of No.1 Ambulance of the Ethiopian Red Cross, which was entirely outside the town of Dagabur and, further, the bombing at Waldia, an open town containing not a single soldier, and of the Liaison Unit of Ambulances Nos. 2, 3 and 5 of the Ethiopian Red Cross. We notice also that the President of the Italian Red Cross has himself destroyed his third argument by admitting in a previous paragraph of his memorandum that "the staff of the Red Cross is not a staff which conceals itself; it is a staff which does its duty at the point where the danger is greatest and the fighting hardest and is, therefore, inevitably exposed."

It is only in a second letter, dated January 16th, attached to the Italian memorandum, that the Italian Government at last comes to deal with the question of violations of the Red Cross. But the Italian Red Cross does not reply to the questions put to it or endeavour to disprove the charges against the Italian forces of committing the violations in question: on the contrary it passes over this issue in silence, while endeavouring to impute other violations to the Ethiopian forces. There are, however, two facts in this annex which are self-evident. The first is the very small number of cases - two, in point of fact,- where the Italian Red Cross accuses the Ethiopian forces of abuse of the Red Cross emblem. The two cases seem insignificant in comparison with the now habitual violations committed by Italy. Moreover, even in the case of the two alleged violations by the Ethiopian troops, it is easy to show that the charges are without foundation.

It is certainly astonishing that the Italian Government should cite as its first case of violation of the Red Cross the bombardment of Dagabur, the very place where Italian airmen ruthlessly bombed and machine-gunned the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulance which was two kilometres away from the nearest troops. It is also astonishing that the Italian Red Cross should venture in the teeth of these established facts to assert that "the airmen abstained from firing in the vicinity of the ambulance". The Ethiopian Red Cross formally denies that "armed Ethiopians" sought shelter in the ambulance encampment, which was in fact at a distance from any bodies of troops.

As regards the second alleged violation of the Red Cross, the Italian Government asserts that to the south of Lake Asharghi "armed Ethiopians", directly they perceived Italian aircraft, spread on the ground three large Red Crosses and collected round them. In the first place it is impossible for aircraft flying at the height from the ground at which the Italian aircraft were flying to know whether human beings

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on the ground are "armed" or mere peasants. In the second place, the Ethiopian Red Cross is in a position to say that (1) these so-called "armed Ethiopians" were Austrian and Irish members of Ambulance No.3 of the Ethiopian Red Cross and Ethiopian stretcher-bearers attached to the same, (2) the military escort was at the time two kilometres distant from the ambulance, and (3) it was not until the end of the day, after the Italian aircraft had gone, that messengers arrived from the Ethiopian forces on the other side of a mountain from the ambulance to ascertain whether the ambulance staff were friends or enemies. This latter circumstance is sufficient proof that up to this point there had been no contact between Ambulance No.3 of the Red Cross and the nearest Ethiopian troops. It also proves that the latter were entirely ignorant of the presence of the ambulance, and so disposes of the supposition that troops were present in the ambulance encampment.

The second fact brought out by the annex to the Italian memorandum is that the Italian Government, owing to the weakness of its arguments, has changed its tactics, and instead of examining the question which it had set out to deal with in this memorandum, namely the observance of the Geneva Convention of July 27th, 1929, it makes accusations as regards alleged violations of other conventions. Although drawing attention to this point, the Ethiopian Red Cross, confident in the justice of its cause, will not refuse to meet the Italian arguments even on this ground.

For example, an item of Annex 11 to the Italian memorandum concerns the use of dum-dum bullets by the Ethiopian troops. We do not pretend to deny absolutely the possibility that certain Ethiopian soldiers may, in isolated cases, have used cartridges containing dum-dum bullets, which before hostilities broke out may have been in the possession of hunters, afterwards enlisted in the Ethiopian army, or even, as we shall prove later, may have fired such cartridges captured from the enemy or taken from the bodies of Italian soldiers killed in battle. We categorically deny, however, that Ethiopia has ever imported such ammunition or supplied it to her army. Owing to the embargo imposed by the manufacturing countries on the despatch to Ethiopia of munitions of all kinds - an embargo which remained in force until after the invasion of our territory and which made it impossible for the Ethiopian Government to supply the troops going to the front with an adequate quantity of cartridges - it is not surprising that soldiers called to the colours should have procured cartridges of all kinds, or should have brought with them sporting cartridges which they had in their possession.

In the first paragraph the Italian Government makes an extremely vague allusion to small arms picked up in the Tigre. There is nothing to prove that these arms did not belong to the Italian troops or were not abandoned by the latter when they retreated, since they were not taken from the enemy as booty. This possibility appears the more likely inasmuch as the number of dum-dum bullets possessed by the Italian forces is known. The Ethiopian Red Cross is astonished that the Italian Government should have felt justified in accusing the Ethiopian armies of using dum-dum bullets on the strength of

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1358 cartridges found in the Tigre and mentioned in the paragraph in question, when the same Government sent in a single consignment on December 11th, 1935, in the "ANTONIETTA", which passed through the Suez Canal at 4.45 p.m., no fewer than 400,000 dum-dum bullets in cases marked "G.A.1931" proceeding to Massawa. Consequently, there is every reason to suppose that these few cartridges found in the Tigre belonged to the hundreds of thousands of cartridges with dum-dum bullets despatched by the Italian Government to East Africa. This conclusion is the more inevitable inasmuch as all the arms and ammunition sent to Ethiopia undergo extremely strict supervision in the adjacent countries, in accordance with the Convention of 1930. Consequently, the importation into Ethiopia of illicit ammunition such as dum-dum bullets of British manufacture as alleged in the Italian memorandum is quite out of the question.

The Ethiopian Red Cross draws attention to the United Kingdom Government's protest of February 4th, 1936, sent to the League of Nations and published by the latter on February 6th, 1936, as document C.86.M.31.1936.VII.

Paragraph 2 of this protest, which completely refuted the Italian accusations with regard to the supply of dum-dum bullets by British firms, reads as follows:-

> "I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to deny categorically that any firm in the United Kingdom has supplied the Ethiopian Government with so-called dum-dum or explosive ammunition for military purposes. In support of this statement I am to remind you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom exercise the strictest possible control over all exports of munitions and implements of war from the United Kingdom, each consignment of which must be covered by an export licence. As a result, the competent authorities of His Majesty's Government are in a position to see that such munitions as are exported for military purposes conform strictly to international regulations and standards."

Lastly, apart from the 1358 bullets alleged to have been dum-dum bullets, the Italian memorandum mentioned cartridges for Gras rifles with lead bullets, and other cartridges also with lead bullets. The Ethiopian Red Cross would point out that there is nothing in the Italian memorandum to show that these bullets were dum-dum bullets. The only description of these bullets is that they were lead bullets and therefore quite ordinary bullets - as if it could be regarded as an offence to employ even ordinary bullets against the Italian troops.

The Italian Government then gives a list of soldiers alleged to have been wounded by dum-dum ammunition. Here a preliminary observation must be made, namely that the alleged cases of wounds caused by dum-dum bullets and the alleged atrocities committed by Ethiopian troops under the following heading relate in exactly half the cases, namely six out of twelve, to the same encounters, and the four bodies of soldiers killed on December 3rd are counted twice, first, as regards wounds caused by dum-dum bullets and, secondly, as regards atrocities alleged to have been committed by the Ethiopian troops.

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After making this preliminary observation, the Ethiopian Red Cross begs permission to reply to these unjust accusations. The first refers to the case we have just mentioned, namely the four soldiers of the Second Blackshirt Division killed in the Tigre on December 3rd, whose bodies are alleged to have shown "wounds made by dum-dum bullets among other wounds". The Ethiopian Red Cross relies on the Italian Government to supply its own refutation, which it duly gives a few paragraphs later in the same memorandum, when it acknowledges that the bodies "were quite unrecognisable at first sight". Thus any ascertainment of wounds, and still more any distinction between wounds caused by dum-dum bullets and ordinary bullets, must have been absolutely impossible.

The second case reported deserves still less consideration. It is stated "that an Eritrean Askari was wounded by an explosive bullet". The memorandum does not venture to assert that this was a dum-dum bullet. It is probable that this explosive projectile was a shell, particularly as the 73rd Italian Communiqué dated December 15th and referring to the Dembeguina fight does not claim that dum-dum bullets were used. Hence it must be concluded that the Italian Government, after reproaching the Ethiopians with shooting at the Italian soldiers with ordinary bullets, is now reproaching them for having fired shells at them.

As regards the soldiers wounded in the Abbi Addi fights on December 18th and 22nd, it should be remarked that the Italian Government does not venture to assert that their wounds were caused by dum-dum bullets. Moreover, the wounds described are exactly the same as those caused by an ordinary bullet. We venture to quote the relevant passages of "Chirurgie de Guerre" by Mauclaire, Paris, 1918, pp. 15 and 17, with regard to the wounds caused by ordinary bullets:

> "There is a sort of shattering of all the tissues and a veritable focus of mortified tissue all along the track of the wound. This focus of necrosis of the soft and hard parts is complicated by infiltration of the blood in the thickness of the muscle and by bone splinters projected to a great distance through the soft parts; the zone of attrition thus extends very far and these mortified tissues become easily infected.
>
> "The study of the dynamic properties of bullets has shown that, at close ranges of 100, 200 and 400 metres, an ordinary projectile may cause a very serious 'explosive' wound."

As regards the three cases which follow and which relate to the battles of Tansoca, Hananlei and Areri, with the exception of the case of the soldier who is alleged to have had the top of his skull blown off by a dum-dum bullet "fired point-blank", the facts are reported too vaguely to deserve a reply. It is asserte , for example, that "during the battle of Hananlei on November 11th last, the Abyssinians made free use of dum-dum bullets." The number of killed or wounded is not given. As regards the exception mentioned, the photograph attached shows clearly that the gaping hole might just as well have been caused by a sword cut, a shell fragment or even an ordinary bullet. The Italian Government itself indicates that the wound might have been caused by an ordinary bullet, for it states that the projectile was "fired point-blank". According to the passage just quoted, however, an ordinary bullet fired at close range not exceeding 400 metres may cause a very serious "explosive" wound.

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Lastly, even assuming that all the cases of alleged wounds, 13 in number, mentioned in the Italian memorandum, were really caused by dum-dum bullets and even if the accusation regarding the 1358 dum-dum bullets alleged to have been picked up in the Tigré were admitted, which on the contrary the Ethiopian Government categorically denies, it would be excessive to conclude, as the Italian memorandum does, that "all these facts constitute a chain of indisputable evidence that cartridges containing prohibited bullets are being systematically used by the Abyssinian troops."

Before dealing with the third heading, namely the "other atrocities committed by the Abyssinian troops", the Ethiopian Government and the Ethiopian Red Cross venture to draw attention to a fact which the Italian Government had already brought to the attention of the League of Nations in a letter from M. Aloisi dated December 17th, 1935, Document C.505.M.273, but which it did not mention in its memorandum to the Red Cross, probably realising that the accusation would not stand even a superficial examination. This refers to a wound supposed to have been received by Sergeant Dalmazio Birago while returning on board machine Ca.101 after the bombing of the open town of Mai-Meshitch on November 18th, 1935 (see annex to the present memorandum, page 27). This wound was only received after the bombing and before returning to the Asmara aerodrome. According to this report, to which several photographs were attached, fragments of bone and lead were found in the sergeant's wound, the lead fragments "varying from 1 cm. in diameter to the size of a grain of corn". Although, according to the report, the wound in itself revealed nothing which could not be explained as the effects of an ordinary bullet, it nevertheless claims that no explanation could be given of the presence of the metal fragments. Accordingly it concludes that the wound received by Dalmazio Birago was caused by an explosive projectile. The Ethiopian Government and Red Cross entirely agree with this remark. The projectile in question was the shell of an anti-aircraft gun, a weapon everywhere employed against bombing aeroplanes. The Italian Government itself proved in its report that the projectile in question was "explosive" (cf. bottom of p.2 of the Italian report) i.e. a shell. The Italian Government states, in fact, that the fragments of metal varied from 1 cm. in diameter to the size of a grain of corn.

Since, however, the largest bullet at present employed in the Ethiopian armies measures 7.92 mm. in diameter, and since a single fragment in the case in question measured no less than 10 mm., it is quite obvious that the wound was inflicted by a small shell and that the hypothesis of dum-bum or explosive bullet is completely ruled out.

Lastly, we have the cases of the so-called atrocities committed by the Ethiopian troops. The first case concerns an Askari who is said to have been killed and afterwards to have been disembowelled and had his skull split by the Ethiopians. This requires only a brief reply. The photograph which the Italian Government attaches to its accusation suffices to show that, although the jaw, but not the skul may have been fractured in some way or other, time and the jackals have done their sinister work well, judging by the advanced state of decomposition of the body.

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Next comes the case of the four soldiers killed in an ambuscade on December 31st, 1935, in the province of Tigré, The Italian Government is indignant because the bodies were found naked and abandoned in a stream. From the very fact that the Italian military authorities found these bodies, however, they admit not only that they were in possession of the battlefield but also that as possessors they were responsible for burying all the bodies on the ground held by them. Consequently this accusation should be laid at the door of the Italian military authorities and not of Ethiopian forces.

As regards the mutilated body of a lieutenant killed on December 18th at Abbi Addi, the Italian communiqué No.76 of December 21st referring to this battle states that only a non-commissioned officer and not an officer was killed. Moreover, the Italian Government which, in the four cases that follow, sent photographs in support of its allegations, has not been able to do so in the case of this lieutenant, who, according to its official communiqué was not killed.

As regards the four cases mentioned above in which the Italian Government sent photographs, we refuse to admit that there were any mutilations. The photographs of the bodies of Privates Amato and Frangioso show that the ravages of the wounds and the decomposition which has occurred preclude any possibility of establishing the alleged mutilations. In the case of Private Mazzeo, it is not possible to tell from the photograph whether there has been any mutilation. Lastly, in the case of Corporal Ceroda, there is nothing to prove that the photograph was not faked. We recall the fact that the Italian Government did not hesitate to act in this way on the occasion of its memorandum to the League of Nations of June 21st, 1935, as was clearly shown in M. van Molle's letter of September 10th, 1935, sent to His Excellency Baron Aloisi and published in the official journal of the League of Nations of November 1935, p.1587. The same observations apply to the cases of the Italians said to have been mutilated after the battle of December 28th in the Makale district.

The Italian accusations in regard to atrocities cite finally the case of the Italian pilot Tito Minniti who is said to have made a forced landing at Dagabur, where he was taken prisoner by the Ethiopian troops, and decapitated, his head being carried in triumph to the headquarters of the officer commanding the military area. The following are the facts. The aeroplane in question landed at a distance from the town of Dagabur and at a distance from any military post or concentration of troops. The aviator Minniti was captured and killed on the spot by local nomads, who live by raising cattle. They do not belong to the Ethiopian army, and they are much incensed against the Italian airmen who never cease bombing and machine-gunning their peaceful villages and flocks (see Annex, page 28). Such incidents may be deplored, but they do not constitute any justification for the Italian attempt to saddle the Ethiopian army with the responsibility for their occurrence, or for the claim that the officer in question was at any time a prisoner of war. After the continual bombing of open towns and the burning of the peasants' tuculs - not to mention the hecatombs of herds and flocks for which the Italian airmen are responsible - is it not too much to ask of the most reasonable person not to lift a hand against the very individuals

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who have mowed down from the air with impunity by means of bombs and machine-guns every living creature within their reach? It is not even a question of reprisals, but of just indignation held up for months against the authors of such savage acts. If the Italian airmen propose to continue their atrocities, is it surprising that they should reap the consequences when they fall into the hands of peaceful peasants or shepherds? These peasants and shepherds may not have a profound knowledge of the rules of a modern and "civilising" war; but they are possessed with a profound and ineradicable conviction that people who make war in this way deserve punishment.

Having studied the alleged grievances of the Italian Government and Italian Red Cross, the Ethiopian Red Cross is constrained to protest in the name of the elementary principles of international law. In drawing the attention of its fellow Red Cross societies to the violations committed by the Italian forces against the immunity of the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulances, the Ethiopian Red Cross Society is protesting, not merely against the aggression from which its own ambulances have suffered, but also against the aggression inflicted on neutral ambulances which have endeavoured from humanitarian motives to alleviate the sufferings involved in the unjust war into which we have been forced.

On the morning of the day on which Italy began hostilities Italian airmen bombed the hospital in Adowa - as a precursor to the numerous violations of the Red Cross which they were subsequently to commit.

On December 6th nine aircraft bombed the hospital of the American Adventist Mission, together with the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulances at Dessie. The statement attesting this violation by Dr. Belau, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassios and Dr. Bayen as well as by a number of journalists and photographers and the representative of the International Red Cross Committee makes it unnecessary to dwell on the facts of this case. But the following circumstances should be borne in mind. In spite of the affiliation of this hospital to the Ethiopian Red Cross, which was duly notified to the enemy, and in spite of the big Red Cross emblems clearly painted on the roof of the building and the tents of the ambulances together with other Red Cross signs spread out on the ground, this hospital full of sick persons was hit by five bombs which did serious damage to one of the wards. Other bombs completely destroyed the operating tent of Ambulance No.2.

Nine days after the attack on Dessie the fourth bombing took place of the Ethiopian Red Cross at Neghelli.

This bombing was followed on December 22nd by a first attack on the Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka; and the same ambulance was again bombed eight days later on December 30th in the same place. On the morning of December 30th ten aeroplanes flying 200 metres high bombed and machine-gunned the Ambulance in question. Not less than 100 bombs were dropped, and they were followed by machine-gun fire. All the tents were destroyed. The operating tent alone was pierced by 450 machine-gun bullets: 28 patients were killed; and the Swedish mechanic Lundstrom

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was seriously wounded and died the following day. Dr. Hylander, the Head of the Ambulance, was also wounded. The nearest troops were 5 kilometres away. In spite of these undisputed facts, to which Dr. Hylander and the representative of the International Red Cross Committee bore witness, Italy has attempted to justify her aggression on the pretext that it was a case of reprisals for the alleged decapitation of an Italian airman. If so, it is hard to see why the Italian airmen should have directed their attacks against an ambulance of the Swedish Red Cross, which was a very long way from the place where the alleged decapitation is said to have taken place. Realising the weakness of its argument, the Italian Government subsequently asserted that only one bomb was dropped. But authentic evidence is available to prove that no fewer than 100 bombs were dropped on the Ambulance. The Italian Government also avers that the bombing was a matter of pure chance. The 450 machine-gun bullet holes in the operating tent made by shots fired at a height of 200 metres, and the fact that there were no troops within a radius of 5 kilometres that could have been the object of the bombing, are sufficient to refute such a contention. The Ethiopian Red Cross need not dwell further on these details, an official report of the attack having been drawn up by one of the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Red Cross ventures to express a hope that this report will be published and communicated to all national Red Cross societies.

On the same day when these atrocities were committed three Italian aeroplanes flew over and bombarded the Egyptian Red Crescent ambulance at Bulalé and again on the following day, December 31st. Five bombs were dropped near the Ambulance on the first occasion, the farthest being 100 metres away.

Quite oblivious to the disgust created by these attacks on December 30th, the Italian aeroplanes proceeded on January 4th following, i.e. five days later, to bombard No.1 Ambulance of the Ethiopian Red Cross at Dagabur, which consisted of one Egyptian medical officer, one Egyptian orderly, two English attendants and Ethiopian stretcher-bearers. After dropping their bombs the airmen machine-gunned the Ambulance in question. At least fifty bombs were thrown, not only on the Ambulance itself but also on the personnel which had taken shelter in the trenches at a distance from the Ambulance. The pince-nez of one of the doctors which he was holding when he jumped into a trench was pierced by a shell splinter. The Ethiopian Red Cross is in a position to assert that the Ambulance was 2 kilometres away from the town bombed and not near any collection of soldiers; furthermore, no shots were fired from the site of the Ambulance at the aeroplanes before, during or after the bombing.

On January 15th the Liaison Unit of Ambulances No.2, 3 and 5 of the Ethiopian Red Cross was bombed at Waldia. Though there were troops outside Waldia, which is an open town, there were none near the unit nor in the town which was also bombed on the same occasion and on several occasions later

Three days after this bombardment, i.e. on January 18th, No.3 Ambulance of the Ethiopian Red Cross was bombed south of Makale.

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The Red Cross camp was situated in a tiny valley forming a triangle with sides fifty metres long at the foot of the plateau which rises in front of Makale.

The Ambulance itself was situated at the apex of this small valley and marked by a Red Cross flag. A similar flag was fixed right in the middle of the valley and a third stood at the base of the triangle.

On January 17th, the day before the bombardment, a member of the Ambulance staff standing beside the middle flag suddenly noticed a big triple-engined plane flying about 200 ffet above the Red Cross camp. At this distance he discerned one of the crew looking out of the cabin. The member of the Ambulance staff immediately pointed out to him the flag beside him and signalled to the airman not to bomb the Red Cross camp. The l atter signalled an acknowledgment.

The following day, January 18th, at 7 a.m. three triple-engined planes proceeded to bomb the camp for an hour, The first plane which dropped bombs bore the number 7, and the airman aimed specially at the Red Cross flag in the middle of the camp, the very flag which had been pointed out to the plane the evening before. The various bombs and marks of machine-gun bullets round this flag are evidence of the fact. Furthermore, eight Ethiopian women who were in the camp were wounded.

Later, about 2 p.m. three triple-engined planes flew over and bombed the ambulance for two and a half hours. After they left, 30 bombs were found near the Red Cross flag in the centre of thecamp and there were also many traces of machine-gun bullets.

In this case there were two clearly premeditated bombardments. In the first place, the Italian airmen were undoubtedly aware of the presence at this place of a Red Cross Ambulance, since it had been pointed out to them during their reconnaissance flight on the previous day. Further, there were no troops in the neighbourhood to excuse the bombing. On the contrary, a member of the staff of the Ambulance in question had seen and heard Ras Mulugheta before the first bombardment formally forbid any soldier to go near the Red Cross camp. It should be observed that throughout both bombardments not a single shot was fired on the planes from any firearm in the neighbourhood. There can only be one conclusion: both bombardments of this ambulance were effected with the deliberate object of annihilating the Red Cross Ambulance and its staff.

On the morning of February 9th the hospital plane of the Ethiopian Red Cross, parked in a field several kilometres away from the town of Dessieh was bombarded by Italian planes from a height of 200 metres. It should be noted that a description and photograph of this hospital plane had been sent to Rome through the International Red Cross Committee.

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Finally, on February 11th and 12th, two days after the last-named bombardment, the Ambulance of the Egyptian Red Cross was bombed at Bulale. Five planes dropped eleven bombs on it during the first, and twenty-two during the second, bombardment. These bombs fell within five metres of the ambulance, which was also hit by machine-gune fire. It should be observed that the ambulance was flying not only the Egyptian flag but also the flags of the Red Cross and the Egyptian Red Crescent. The bombing of this Ambulance were thus deliberate.

These are the attacks made not only on the Ambulances of the Ethiopian Red Cross but also on those of the neutral countries which have come to the aid of Ethiopia under Article II of the Geneva Convention. The Ethiopian Red Cross would be failing in its duty if it did not register a formal protest against these savage violations of the immunity granted to the Red Cross, violations which have been deliberately and cynically organised and carried out in the most barbarous fashion.

Relying on the devotion and impartiality which have always characterised the International Red Cross Committee, the Ethiopian Red Cross requests you to convey to national sister societies its reply to the unjust attacks made upon it.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Bélaton Gueta HERROUY,

President of the Ethiopian Red Cross.

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BOMBING OF RED CROSS UNITS.

The Ethiopian Red Cross does not profess, in the following list, to enumerate all the occasions on which hospital formations of the Ethiopian and foreign Red Crosses were bombed. A complete list would also have to include the occasions on which hospital formations were bombed without suffering damage. In that category mention should be made of the bombing of the Ambulance of the Netherlands Red Cross on February 9th at Dessie, and that of the Ambulance of the British Red Cross on its way to Kworam on February 11th.

ADOWA	October 3rd	Red Cross Hospital
DESSIE	December 6th	American Adventist hospital attached to the Ethiopian Red Cross for the duration of hostilities.
NEGELLI	December 15th	Ambulance No. 4 of the Ethiopian Red Cross.
MALKA DIDAKA	December 22nd	Ambulance of the Swedish Red Cross.
MALKA DIDAKA	December 30th	Ambulance of the Swedish Red Cross.
BULALE	December 30th	Ambulance of the Egyptian Red Crescent.
BULALE	December 31st	Ambulance of the Egyptian Red Crescent.
DAGABUR	January 4th	Ambulance No. 1 of the Ethiopian Red Cross.
WALDIA	January 15th	Liaison unit of the Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulances on the northern front.
MAYALE (to the south of)	January 18th	Ambulance No. 3 of the Ethiopian Red Cross.
DESSIE	February 9th	Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane.
BULALE	February 11th	Ambulance of the Egyptian Red Crescent.
BULALE	February 12th	Ambulance of the Egyptian Red Crescent.

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BOMBING OF OPEN TOWNS.

The Ethiopian Red Cross calls the attention of National Red Cross Societies to the following facts:

The Press Secretary of the Italian Embassy in London stated on October 4th, 1935:

> "I can assure you that Mussolini gave express instructions to our armies that centres of civilian population were on no account to be bombed."

According to a message broadcast from Berlin on October 24th, 1935, Count Ciano, Minister of Propaganda, stated at Asmara that:

> "The Italian army has always endeavoured to spare the civilian population and it is easy for Italian armies to recognise the Ethiopian fighting forces, which usually camp outside the inhabited areas."

The following passage is part of a telegram sent to the League of Nations by the Italian Government on December 15th, 1935:

> "The Italian Government formally denies that any open town has ever been bombed by the Air Force in East Africa, since every action has always been directed solely against military columns and concentrations."

The Ethiopian Red Cross does not claim that the following list enumerates every instance of the bombing of open towns. Apart from such attacks, the Italian aircraft have flown everywhere, both over and behind the fronts, discharging explosive and incendiary bombs haphazard on peaceful peasant villages, massacring livestock by means of machine gun fire, even in provincial districts remote from all military operations or concentrations.

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BOMBING OF OPEN TOWNS (Contd.).

ADOWA	October 3rd.
ADIGRAT	October 3rd.
AMBA ALAJI	October 14th.
KEBRI DEHARI	October 25th.
MAI-METCHITCH	November 18th.
GONDAR	December 5th.
ZELEO	December 28th.
ADI REMOZ	December 28th.
KEBTIA	December 28th.
DEBNAT	January 2nd.
AMBA BIRAUTA	January 3rd.
DABAT	January 10th.
SOKOTA	January 10th.
AMBA BIRAUTA	January 14th.
WALDIA	January 15th.
KWORAM	January 16th.
KWORAM	January 18th.
KWORAM	January 19th.
KWORAM	January 30th.
CHILGA	January 30th.
DABEITO	February 4th.
MEGALO	February 5th.
COMBALCHA	February 9th.
SOLELE	February 9th.
WALDIA	February 9th.
KWORAM	February 9th.
ASHANGI	February 9th.
MAI CHOW	February 9th.
KWORAM	February 10th.
ASHANGI	February 10th.
WALDIA	February 10th.
WALDIA	February 11th.
WALDIA	February 12th.
KOBBO	February 12th.
MERTHO	February 13th.
COMBALCHA	February 13th.
LAKE HAIK CONVENT	February 13th.
DONKA MIKAEL	February 13th.
WALDIA	February 13th.
JARRE GUILBO	February 14th.
DONKA MIKAEL	February 14th.
SEGERAT	February 14th.
WARTIA	February 14th.
WALDIA	February 14th.
MEGALO	February 15th.
MEGALO	February 16th.
GUERO	February 16th.
GINNIR	February 16th.
KWORAM (twice)	February 17th.
KWORAM	February 18th.

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BOMBING AND BURNING OF CHURCHES.

DAGABUR	November 14th.
DAGABUR	November 23th.
Churches in the Shire	during the retreat after the defeat of Eda Selassie.
Churches in the Tembien	during the retreat from Tembien.
SOKOTO	January 10th.
ABBI ADDI	January 20th.

The Ethiopian Red Cross begs to draw attention to the fact that the Italian authorities themselves admit to such bombing and incendiarism in the following leaflet, copies of which were scattered on January 15th and 16th during the air attacks on the open towns of Kworam and Waldia;

"Peoples of Eritrea and the Tigre, hearken!

"War brings both good and evil. That being so, it even happens that churches are damaged and destroyed. But do not imagine that such damage or destruction does not cause regret and pain to the Italian Government, which hereby announces that, when by the grace of God peace is restored, every church damaged to whatever extent or destroyed, will be completely restored to an even better state than before.

"(Signed) Commander of the Italian Army
Marshal of Italy."

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USE BY THE ITALIAN TROOPS OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS AND OTHER GASES AND PROHIBITED WEAPONS.

Asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases were employed, more particularly, at the following times and places in violation of the Geneva Protocol of June 17th, 1926, which declaration has been ratified by Italy.

TAKKAZE	December 23rd.
AMBA ALAJI	December 26th.
BORANA	December 30th, neighbourhood of,
MAKALE	December 31st.
SOKOTA	January 10th,
MAKALE	January 21st.
MEGALDO	February 16th.

The Ethiopian Red Cross draws attention to the following consignments of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and prohibited arms, sent from Italy to Eastern Africa.

Between June 25th and December 25th, 1935, there passed through the Suez Canal:

45 tons of mustard gas (Jost-yperite)
265 " " asphyxiants.
7483 gas bombs.

all consigned to Massowa.

On January 4th, 1936, at 6.35 a.m. the vessel "Sicilia" passed through the Suez Canal transporting

4700 bombs containing asphyxiating and tear gases,
3227 incendiary bombs in cases marked T.U.7., all consigned to Massowa.

On January 19th, 1936, at 9.25 p.m. the vessel "Madda" passed through the Suez Canal transporting 185 flame throwers consigned to Massowa.

On December 11th, 1935, the vessel "Antonietta" passed through the Suez Canal at 4.45 p.m. transporting 400,000 dum-dum bullets in cases marked C.A. 1931, consigned to Massowa.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.160.M.98.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 14th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Rome, April 14th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General,

(Translation from the Italian)

In a letter dated March 2nd last[1] the Italian Government already had occasion to inform the League of Nations of decree No.7373 issued by the High Commissioner for East Africa, on October 14th, 1935, formally proclaiming the abolition of slavery in the territories of Tigre which, in circumstances that are well known, Italy has found it necessary to occupy. The same letter also gave notice of an edict to the same effect issued by his Excellency the Governor of Somaliland for the Ethiopian territories adjacent to Italian Somaliland and occupied in the same circumstances by Italy. In this connection, and further to the said communication, I have the honour to inform you that on April 12th His Excellency Marshal Badoglio promulgated at Makalle the following edict: "Peoples of the Tigre, Amhara and Godjam, listen: slavery is a relic of ancient barbarism, and there can be no slavery where the Italian flag flies. Accordingly, in Tigre, Amhara and Godjam, wherever the Italian flag flies, slavery is abolished. I have prohibited the purchase and sale of slaves. The slaves who are in your territories are freed. Let those who need help apply to the Italian authorities: they will receive help and protection. Anyone disobeying the provisions of the present decree will be punished in accordance with law."

I would ask you to be good enough to communicate the present telegram to all the Members of the League of Nations, the members of the Committee of Thirteen and the members of the Slavery Commission.

SUVICH.

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1) This letter has been transmitted to the Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery convened for April 15th.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.161.M.99.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 14th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Government.

(Translation)

Geneva, April 13th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

The Ethiopian Delegation has the honour to transmit to Your Excellency for immediate communication to the Committee of Thirteen, the Committee of Eighteen, the Council and all the Members of the League of Nations the following telegram dated April 12th, 1936, which has just been received from the Ethiopian Government:

"Herewith list, with dates, of the towns attacked with poison gas:

Takkaze	December 22nd, 1935.
Amba Alaa	December 26th, 1935.
Borena	December 31st, 1935
Sokota	January 10th, 1936
Makale	January 21st, 1936
Megalo	February, 1936 (as the date cannot be exactly deciphered confirmation has been asked for).
Waldia Road,	February 27th, 1936
Kworam	March 16th, 1936
Ylanserer	March 17th, 1936
Kworam	March 17th, 18th, 1936.
Irga Alem	March 19th and 21st, 1936.
Indomahoni	March 29th and 30th, 1936.
Kworam	April 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 1936.

During these last four bombardments of Kworam (April 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 1936), the town was literally drenched with gas. The gas most frequently used is mustard gas (yperite).

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Wolde MARIAM,

Minister of Ethiopia.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.159.M.97.1936. VII.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

Geneva, April 14th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Government.

Geneva, April 13th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translation)

I have the honour to request you to communicate urgently to the Committee of Thirteen, the Council, the Committee of Eighteen and all the Members of the League of Nations, the two following documents:-

1. A letter from Dr. Belau, dated April 13th, 1936, sent to the Minister of Ethiopia at Geneva in reply to M. Suvich's communication to the League of Nations dated April 12th, 1936.

2. The evidence given by Dr. Belau at Geneva on March 23rd, 1936, in the presence of two members of the International Red Cross Committee (copy certified correct by Dr. Belau).

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM,
Minister of Ethiopia.

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ANNEX 1.

Geneva, April 13th, 1936.

H.E. The Ethiopian Minister,
GENEVA.

Dear Sir,

I have seen the communication of Mr. SUVICH, to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and I find that the communication is completely false.

I. My name is Maksymilian Stanislas BELAU, not BELOFF, and I have a passport given to me by the Polish Consulate in Bombay. The number of my passport is 17/34, and the passport has been delivered to me by the Consul of Poland in accordance with a letter from the Warsaw Municipality (Evidence Office of the Warsaw people No. 7032/XII/M dated 11/7.1932.

II. The declaration alleging that I am a deserter from the Polish army is false. I served as a volunteer in the Polish-Bolsheviks war in the Regiment No. 8 of Infantry 3rd Company machine guns. I am decorated for courage. And secondly I was not a sergeant. I was Corporal volunteer.

III. I am a graduate and diplomed doctor of medicine for which I can present my documents and certificates.

IV. I am not a deserter from the Ethiopian medical Organisation, I have never deserted from it (See my deposition of the 23/III/1936 to the Red Cross International Committee.

V. The two declarations which I have signed in Massauah, were never written by my own hand. One of the declarations (three pages) was written by the Italian officer, and the second declaration was the copy of the Ethiopian protestation to the League of Nations and was typewritten and below the second declaration I wrote some words, because at the time, my hand was in the bandages after receiving many hits by the Italian soldiers. The declaration I have only signed and it was to save my life.

VI. I beg the League of Nations to ask the Italian Government to produce the originals to be examined by experts.

VII. I maintain all the terms of my deposition before the Red Cross International Committee and I am ready to renew my deposition before such authority as the League of Nations may decide upon.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) DR. M.S. BELAU.

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ANNEX 2.

(Translation)

EVIDENCE GIVEN BY DR. BELAU AT 9 a.m. ON MARCH 23rd, 1936, AT THE "CLINIQUE GENERALE", GENEVA, IN THE PRESENCE OF MLLE. ODIER AND M. BOISIER, MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE.

Dr. Belau produced his various papers, including:-

1. His Red Cross identity card dated November 11th, 1935, drafted in French and Amharic and signed by the War Minister, Ras Mulugueta.

2. His contract with the Ethiopian Government for a period of two years from July 15th, 1935, to July 15th, 1937.

3. The Act of the Ethiopian Government under which the latter transfers all doctors of foreign nationality to the Ethiopian Red Cross, foreign doctors not being allowed to be Government doctors, but only Red Cross doctors.

Dr. Belau has not been paid by the Ethiopian Red Cross since and including November, December, January, February and March. He left Addis Ababa on November 26th, Dr. Lambie wished to pay him his salary before his departure, but Dr. Belau preferred this sum to remain on deposit with the Red Cross, as he was going into the interior where he needed no money. A sickness insurance policy is mentioned in Dr. Belau's contract in a special clause, No. 9 and 5.

Dr. B. was born at Warsaw on November 29th, 1900. He studied medicine at Riga University, and holds a diploma from that faculty. He also studied with Professor Nocht at the Hamburg Institute of Tropical Medicine, of which he also holds the diploma.

Dr. B. left Europe in 1926 for the East: Iran, India and China. He has been in Ethiopia since September 21st, 1934, where he first of all worked in the Mission directed by Dr. Lambie before being Secretary-General of the Ethiopian Red Cross. Dr. B. then opened a private nursing home at Addis Ababa, where he worked until he joined up. He entered the Medical Service of the Ethiopian Army on July 15th, 1935. At the beginning of November, the Negus himself talked to him and urged him to adopt Ethiopian nationality, which Dr. B. refused to do. He was later attached to the Red Cross, having been transferred from the Government to the Red Cross owing to his foreign nationality.

All Dr. Belau's papers, engagement, identity card, act of transfer to the Red Cross, are in perfect order. He was appointed Chief of No.5 Ambulance at the outbreak of war. He remained at Addis Ababa long enough to organise his ambulance and receive the necessary medical material. He left Addis Ababa on November 26th with three lorries of medical supplies.

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Dr. Belau made the acquaintance of M. Medynski, who introduced himself as a fellow-countryman, and who asked if he could go with him as his assistant. Dr. B. went to see Mr. Brown, asking him to recommend M. to the Ethiopian Red Cross, in order that he should be attached to him as assistant. This was done. M. Medynski did not tell Dr. B that he was a journalist, but that he had studied medicine. Dr. B. did not think of asking him for his papers.

On November 30th, Dr. Belau arrived at Dessie with his ambulance. He pitched a camp of ten tents at the very spot where the Taffari Makonnen Adventist Hospital was situated.

Dr. B. left Dessie on December 13th. He set out with a column of 120 to 140 mules in the direction of Kworam, where he remained fifteen days. He had received from the Government a paper granting him mules from Dessie to Kworam.

Dr. B. and M. were captured at Ambaradam, 4 kilometres from Antalo. Part of the cave in which Dr. B had established his ambulance was set aside for the wounded, another part as operating room, another for himself, and the fourth for the ambulance service. Dr. B. had been unable to use tents to shelter his ambulance, as the Italians systematically bombarded everything displaying the Red Cross emblem. Dr. B occupied exactly the same spot as that which Dr. Schuppler had chosen for his ambulance No. 3. The Italians told Dr. B that the Red Cross units were stationed too near the front lines. Dr. B. performed a large number of operations. He chiefly attended soldiers of Ras Mulugueta, and only two Italian Eritrean prisoners with thigh wounds. When Ras Mulugueta's army received orders to retreat, Dr. B. was unable to do the same, having no mules. He was obliged to negotiate at great length with Ras Mulugueta in order to induce the latter to obtain money from the Emperor to buy mules for the ambulance.

It was at Ambarada that Dr. Belau saw yperite casualties,1) and then casualties caused by a second gas with which he was not familiar. M. Medynski, who suffered from the latter gas, thought it was phosgene, but Dr. Belau is not of the same opinion. It was a gas smelling of hyacinth. A third gas noticed was lachrymatory and sneeze-producing. When Dr. B. was at Ambarada, a large number of yperite casualties came to the Antalo district for treatment, chiefly civilians - women and children. A certain place in this district in which yperite had been used, and which was reported to Dr. B. by the population, was disinfected under his direction with calcium chloride.

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1) The first yperite casualty I saw was at Kworam.
(Signed) Dr. Belau

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On February 15th, while he was performing an operation in the cave, a medical attendant came and told Dr. B. that Ras Mulugueta's army had left. At first he thought that this was untrue, but subsequently found it to be the case. At 6 o'clock in the evening Dr. B. saw the Abyssinian troops evacuating the district and fleeing towards the mountains. Dr. B. offered to let M. go and remain alone at the ambulance, where there were about 30 to 35 severely wounded patients who had been operated upon. All the light casualties had gone. M. preferred to stay with Dr. B. and two or three Abyssinian attendants. At 5.30 next morning they heard Italians calling to them. They went out and found several rifles levelled at them. It was then that M. said he was a journalist. Dr. B. and M. were taken before the Divisional Commander. Hostile demonstrations were made against them all the way. An officer asked Dr. B. where drinking water was to be found, and in exchange offered Dr. B. a mule, seeing that he was ill. In addition to Dr. B. and M.M. a boy (Chifarra, Red Cross attendant), a cook (Kabbada), and two Abyssinians were also taken prisoners. They were jeered at, and when they came before the Divisional Commander, they were struck and fell to the ground. Dr. B. even received a blow from a rifle butt, which sprained his hand.

From Makale they were conveyed to Massawa handcuffed. Once more they believed their last hour was come; a soldier threatened them with his rifle. An officer intervened and freed them from their handcuffs, at least from the chains with which Dr. B. was tied to the Abyssinians. He remained chained to M. They were brought into a tent where a certain number of officers were sitting. Dr. B. here had a nervous attack. An officer reassured him with the words "We are not Boches, we are Italians. Don't be frightened!" A little cognac was brought for Dr. B. but he could not lift the glass to his mouth.

At Makale, B. and M. were taken to the staff tent. M. was interrogated first, alone, for a period of two or three hours. It was then Dr. B's turn. He was questioned as to the army of Ras Mulugueta and as to details of the operations. Dr. B. returned the shortest possible answers, having no knowledge of what was happening with the army. He merely gave the figure of 200,000 to 300,000 men as the numbers of Ras Mulugueta's army. In the evening a small tent was erected for Dr. B. and M; but the site chosen was dirty. They were given neither mattresses nor blankets and were compelled to lie on the ground. After two or three hours carabinieri came to look for them. They were again intimated; their captors made a show as if they wished to shoot them.

On the following day they were questioned by the staff as to the Red Cross organisation in Ethiopia and were

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asked for particulars of the bombardment of Dessie on December 6th. Dr. B. said that aeroplanes had come and dropped from 40 to 50 "candle-bombs" (bombes-bougies), that the ambulance tents were in part destroyed, and that bombs fell on the operating room and on a sick ward. The Italians replied: "That is not true." Dr. B. maintained his statement, pointing out that he was on the spot at the time. An officer then asked him to sign a document withdrawing the statement which he and all the other doctors had signed with regard to the bombing of Dessie. He said to Dr. B: "You are an intelligent man. You must realise what may happen to you if you refuse to sign this retractation. You will come before a military court in which you will be charged with being an enemy of Italy, and you will be shot." Dr. B. refused to sign the retractation at Makale. On the following day a lorry brought B. and M. to Massawa in 26 hours, starting at half-past ten in the morning. Dr. B. was suffering from fever and his hand was swollen as a result of the blows received.

On arrival at Massawa B. and M. were put into the prison of the carabinieri. A lieutenant treated them very well, giving them food and a bath. They arrived at Massawa at 8 o'clock. A corporal of carabinieri came to take them to prison wth criminals. There was no mattress and the floor was made of cement. B. and M. protested against being imprisoned along with criminals. They were told that that did not matter and that they were themselves negroes. They had no hot food for three days, but only bread and water. During these three days M. continued to ask for a doctor for B., but without result. On the third day a corporal came for Dr. B. and brought him to the Umberto Hospital at Massawa. The doctor who saw him paid more attention to his damaged hand than to his fever, and was curious to know why the hand was swollen. Dr. B. did not say that he had been struck with the butt of a rifle: he said he thought it was a case of rheumatic trouble. He had to make a cold water compress. M. made him a wooden splint, which he kept in position with his tie. Dr. B. was sent out of hospital with 40 degrees of fever, as he could not receive treatment there without the authorisation of Marshal Badoglio. Subsequently a telegram allowing him to be received there arrived, and Dr. B. was brought to the hospital, but was not given either quinine or aspirin. He was suffering from persistent malaria. When he asked the doctor for quinine, the latter replied that it was not necessary. He was guarded in the hospital ward by two carabinieri, and was forbidden to speak to the other patients.

One day the hospital doctor, with whom were senior officers, showed Dr. B. a paper. It was a copy of the protest sent to G. against the bombarding of Dessie. Dr. B. was asked to sign a retractation and was told that if he did not do so, he would be detained in Massawa and would not be allowed to go on boardship with M. on February 26th. He was again threatened with being brought before a military court and was told he was an enemy of the Italians. He was described as "Enemy No.6" on the ground of his having signed the statement.

In the end, being weak and desiring at any cost to leave Massawa, Dr.B. agreed to sign a retractation to enable him to leave. He did so under constraint and in order to save his life.

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On February 26th he was taken on board ship and given treatment in the sick bay. Throughout the passage the medical officer refused to give him any kind of drug, but he obtained two small packets each containing 2 grammes of quinine from a sick-berth attendant. He took one gramme and the fever went down. At Naples, B. and M. were confined in the prison with criminals - drinkers. They left Naples for Rome the same evening.

In Rome Dr. B. was given some treatment for the first time. He was taken to the hotel with M, where they were given food and drink, etc. There they saw the Polish Ambassador in Rome, who gave them money, but only for their journey as far as Berne. Dr. B., who on his arrival in Rome was wearing his field uniform with solar helmet, was given clothes by a journalist.

In Rome the Chief of Police made Dr. B. sign a statement in which he undertook not to return to Ethiopia. Dr. B. was prepared by that time to sign any statement which would enable him to leave Italy.

Dr. B.left all his possessions behind in Ethiopia. He is the owner of a house, a plantation, etc, and had been settled in Addis Ababa for a year past.

Dr. B. wishes a copy of his deposition to be sent to Addis Ababa. He also wishes a telegram to be sent to Mr. Buxton in Addis Ababa to ask the latter to send him money. His personal possessions were deposited with Mr. Buxton.

<u>List of articles belonging to Dr. B. which were requisitioned by the First (March 23rd) Division of Black Shirts of the Italian Army.</u>

		<u>Value in pounds Sterling.</u>
1	leather case with surgical instruments and medicaments for general operations	45
1	medical pouch for operations and examinations on the eyes (nickel case)	40
1	pouch for examinations and operations on the ears (nickel case)	40
1	pouch for examinations and operations on the nose (nickel case)	20
1	Tavannes gold wrist watch (with gold wrist strap)	20
1	gold cigarette case with inscription from patients	25
1	sporting gun (14 mm. calibre) in leather case with 500 cartridges	20
1	Browning pistol, the personal property of Dr. Belau, F.N.9 mm. calibre with 50 cartridges	15

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		Value in Pounds Sterling.
10	medical books in various languages (English German, Polish)	10
1	Contax photographic camera	25
1	altimeter	12
1	compass	5
2	saddles, complete, private property of Dr. Belau	30
1	camp bed consisting of a copper frame, 2 pillows, 4 woollen blankets and 6 white sheets	25
3	pairs of shoes	10
4	woollen suits	40
1	overcoat of medium thickness	15
1	waterproof	8
12	shirts	12
12	pairs of drawers	6
4	silk pyjamas	6
	More than 30 pairs of ordinary and sporting socks	10
1	copper dressing case	10
18	cases of tinned foods and provisions sufficient for 3 months	41
200	silver dollars	
		£520

"24/III/36. Geneva. Before the date I cant signed the deposition because I was very seak (sick).

"Dr. Maximilian Stanislas Belau.

A Medical Officer in charge of the Ambulance No. 5 Ethiopian Red Cross Society."

Done at Geneva in duplicate.

(signed) Dr. M. S. BELAU.

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C117897 74(a)

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la Société.

C.166.M.102.1936.VII.

Genève, le 16 avril 1936.

DIFFEREND ENTRE L'ETHIOPIE ET L'ITALIE.

Communication du Gouvernement italien.

Au Secrétariat général.

Rome, le 15 avril 1936.

(Traduction de l'italien)

Les très mauvais renseignements sur le compte du soi-disant Dr Belau reproduits dans mon télégramme du 11 courant* sont confirmés par l'état-major général de l'armée polonaise. Je prie de bien vouloir communiquer le présent télégramme aux Etats membres de la Société des Nations.

SUVICH.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.166.M.102.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 16th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

(Translation from the Italian).

Rome, April 15th, 1936.

To the Secretariat.

The very unsatisfactory account of the self-styled Dr. Belau reproduced in my telegram of 11th instant* is confirmed by the General Staff of the Polish Army. Kindly communicate the present telegram to the States Members of the League.

SUVICH.

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* Voir document C.156.M.94.1936.VII.
* See document C.156.M.94.1936.VII.

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C 117898
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
1936

L-150 vol 4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.168.M.104.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 17th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Government.

(Translation)

Geneva, April 16th, 1936.

To the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen,

I would ask you to communicate to the Committee of Thirteen the following declaration, confirming and amplifying the reply already given to the Italian proposals transmitted by you.

1. On March 3rd, 1936, at Geneva, at the very moment when the Committee of Eighteen was about to apply the oil sanction to the aggressor, it was proposed, and agreed by the Council, that a final urgent appeal should be made to the two belligerents, with a view to securing, within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, the prompt cessation of hositlities and the definite restoration of peace.

The Ethiopian Government at once responded to this appeal in the very terms in which it had been issued.

The Italian Government merely accepted in principle.

The Ethiopian Government promptly called the attention of the Committee of Thirteen and of the League to the ambiguity of the Italian reply (Declaration of March 21st, 1936, at London; Verbal Declaration of March 24th, 1936, at London). The Ethiopian Government emphasised the fact that the Italian Declaration was contradicted by Italian action and had been followed by redoubled atrocities in the conduct of the aggression.

At the beginning of April, the Ethiopian Government once more presented a historical survey of the conflict, in order to show that the Italian Government's constant policy for sixteen months past had been to delay and prevent the effective intervention of the League, until it could fling aside the mask and confront the League with a fait accompli.

II. At its meeting on April 10th, 1936, the Committee of Thirteen deferred until after Easter, as requested by the Italian Government, its hearing of the delegate of that Government who should give its reply.

III. To-day the Italian Government feels strong enough to announce that reply openly. 1. It proposes that negotiations be open directly between Italy and Ethiopia, without the active co-operation of the League, which would merely be informed of their progress. 2. It propos that the negotiations take place elsewhere than in Geneva. 3. It will not state its peace terms until the first two conditions have been accepted by Ethiopia.

IV. The Ethiopian Delegation relying upon the actual terms of the appeal addressed to it by the Council, has rejected and still rejects these proposals. It protests most strongly; it denounces the dangerous precedent which threatens to be thus created, and which would seriously influence the destinies of all States, especially the small States Members of the League.

In asking that the Ethiopian people be abandoned to its aggressor, the Italian Government is in reality merely fixing its price for a bargain, whereby Italy would give her support in a European dispute in return for the removal of sanctions and for the League's indifference to the Italian aggression. Was it to bring about such a bargain that, in October 1935, fifty-two nations declared the Italian Government guilty of aggression in breach of the Covenant, and proclaimed their fidelity to that instrument?

P.T.O..

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The time has come for all the organs of the League of Nations to assume their responsibilities.

V. The principles of which the Ethiopian Government respects the application are the actual principles of the Covenant, as many times proclaimed and as re-stated in perfectly clear terms by the French Government in its Declaration of April 8th, 1936:

"1. The first basis of international relations should be the recognition of the equality of right and independance of all States, as well as the respect of contracted engagements.

"2. There is no durable peace between nations if that peace remains subjected to the fluctuations of the needs and ambitions of each people.

"3. There is no real security in international relations if all conflicts which can arise between States are not resolved according to international law, obligatory on all and interpreted by impartial and sovereign international jurisdiction, and guaranteed by the forces of all the associates of the international community.

"4. The inequality in fact existing between peoples should be compensated within the international community by mutual assistance against any breaking of international law."

As long ago as March 3rd, 1932, the Delegate of France, speaking as President of the Council of the League, said to the Assembly:

"If it depended on sympathies, on community of interests or on friendships, whether the Council could exercise discretion as to whether one of the essential articles of the Covenant should be set in motion, the common guarantee of the League of Nations would have ceased to exist.....
"The League's first duty is to safeguard that supreme asset described as the territorial integrity of Members of the League and the political independence of those Members. The Council repeatedly recalled the fact that no final settlement of the dispute which failed to respect that principle could be approved by it."

Only yesterday, again, the Prime Minister of France proclaimed the ideal of peaceful peoples:

"That ideal, "he said, "is clear, loyal, and logical. It is incarnated in the system of collective security, of peace for all and through all. It calls upon all who desire such a peace to join together against war, to assemble their forces against anyone who seeks to let war loose. Its aim is to unite all the police forces of order against such malefactors. Equality of rights among nations, treaties freely entered into between them, mutual assistance to safeguard and enforce the observance of such treaties and to help to diminish the international burden of armaments - such is the simple but strong framework of the edifice of peace, which offers a common shelter to all peoples of good faith, without exception."

VI. Since the outbreak of the conflict, since its first appeal to the League in January 1935, the Ethiopian Government has never ceased to appeal to these principles. It cannot believe that at this supreme moment, when it is threatened with extermination, the Ethiopian people will be refused the benefit of those principles because an aggressor Government, master of forty-five million subjects, has resolved, relying upon the superiority of its war material and of its economic and financial resources, to appropriate a territory it covets and to stamp out the political independence of a people that stands in the way of its ambitions.

The Ethiopian Government asks the Committee of Thirteen, as it will ask the Council of the League of Nations:

1. To find that the Italian Government has not agreed to negotiate within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant;

2. To find that the time has come to apply to the aggressor all the sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, and thus to discharge the obligations assumed by all the Members of the League to come promptly and effectively to the assistance of the victim of aggression.

I have the honour, etc.
(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM
Ethiopian Minister.

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C 117900
L-150
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY 4 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and the Members of the League.

C.165.M.101.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 17th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the United Kingdom Government.

London, 15th April, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to transmit to you, herewith, for the information of all States members of the League of Nations, translation of a semi-official letter, as well as of the aide-memoire referred to therein, addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome by the Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 12th March last concerning the bombing by Italian aircraft of British Red Cross Ambulance unit No.I in the neighbourhood of Quoram, Ethiopia, on the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th March of this year.

2. I am also to enclose a copy of the note which Sir Eric Drummond handed to Signor Suvich on the 10th April replying to the two Italian communications above mentioned.

I am, etc.

(Signed) G.H. THOMPSON.

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COPY
(J. 2628/4/1).

Letter from Signor Suvich to Sir E. Drummond.

TRANSLATION.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
208997/20.

My dear Ambassador,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of the 10th March.

Your Excellency had already sent me on the 7th and 9th instant two Aide-Mémoires to which I am replying in a corresponding Aide-Mémoire of to-day's date.

As Your Excellency will observe, it appears from the detailed information supplied by the General Headquarters in East Africa that fire was opened on the Italian aeroplanes on three successive days, the 3rd, 4th and 5th instant, from the British ambulance; in the attack on the 4th the Italian aeroplane was struck in the fusillage; in the attack on the 5th instant the aeroplane was in danger of being disabled. Information is lacking, however, about the occurrence on the 6th instant and it is being immediately asked for.

The information supplied by the Italian Headquarters shows the occurrences in their proper light and illustrates their logical development.

The Italian aircraft have as their objective the Abyssinian bands in the Quoram area; they cannot avoid flying over the area in which the ambulance is situated since this constitutes the only normal route of transit in the Enderta sector; but as they are flying over the Ambulance they are made the target for shots coming from the latter.

In the present circumstances the responsibility for the occurrence does not fall upon the Italian authorities, who have, on the contrary, every reason to regret it; but on the unit of the British Ambulance.

It is unnecessary to assure you that no one more than the Italian Government sincerely desires that incidents of this nature should not occur and should not be repeated. Their cause would automatically be removed if, as I hope will be the case, the strictly neutral and humanitarian character of the mission to which they belong were observed by all the members of the Ambulance.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador, etc.

(Signed) SUVICH.

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C 117902

Copy.

Enclosure No.2 in Sir E. Drummond's despatch No.326 (267/181/36) of March 13th, 1936.

(Translation)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
208998/21.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

In reply to the Aide-Mémoires of the 7th and 9th instant the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the British Embassy that His Excellency Marshal Badoglio has reported that an Italian aircraft on the 3rd instant sighted to the south of Quoram, in the immediate neighbourhood of an Abyssinian encampment, a column consisting of about 30 lorries which were discharging boxes, and also a large baggage train which was equally loaded with boxes; in the centre was a large sheet stretched on the ground bearing the Red Cross emblem. On descending in order to ascertain what was the true nature of the above-mentioned transports, the Italian aeroplane was met, in the neighbourhood of the sheet bearing the Red Cross, with a violent anti-aircraft fire. The machine returned to the camp on the 4th instant, and on this occasion it was made the target of anti-aircraft fire and struck in the fusillage. In consequence of this they proceeded to the bombardment of the camp from which dense smoke arose so as to lead one to think that there was a munitions dump there, as had been already suspected.

The Air Force Headquarters have formally declared that the lorries and the tents belonging to the encampment were unprovided with any Red Cross sign, which, as has been said, was only on the sheet placed on the ground.

On the 5th instant also an Italian aeroplane was struck and almost disabled by shots coming from the same locality.

The coincidence of locality and dates leads one to believe that the bombardment in question is the same as that in which, according to the statements of the British Embassy, a section of the British Ambulance in Ethiopia was involved.

In this case, on the basis of the information supplied by the Headquarters in East Africa, the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs must energetically protest against the most grave repeated and flagrant violations of the fundamental principles of the Geneva Convention, constituted by the fact that Italian aircraft in the neighbourhood of the insignia of neutrality were repeatedly fired on.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses the hope that His Britannic Majesty's Government will urgently take steps by all possible means to ascertain how the British Ambulance can have been thus gravely compromised in the repeated attacks against the Italian aircraft and that they will in the meantime see to it that the strictest measures are taken in order that incidents of this nature may not be repeated. It is not a question, as the director of the ambulance claims, of abandoning the Red Cross emblem, which is sacred among all civilised nations; it is a question of preventing provocative acts of war from being carried out from localities protected by this emblem.

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The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be grateful if the British Embassy will be so good as to communicate to them as soon as possible their reply in regard to the points raised in the present Aide-Mémoire, and in particular as to the measures which it may be possible to take to prevent the repetition of incidents which are all the more deplorable at the present moment.

The British Embassy may be perfectly sure that no unit of the British Ambulance in Ethiopia will ever run any abnormal risk so long as it takes care to conform perfectly to conditions corresponding to the rules of the Geneva Convention.

ROME, 12th March, 1936, Year XIV.

COPY.
(J 3107/4/1).

BRITISH EMBASSY,

No. 99.
(65/70/36)

ROME.

April 10th, 1936.

Excellency,

I did not fail to communicate immediately to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom translations of the letter which Signor Suvich addressed to me on March 12th, and of the aide mémoire referred to therein, dealing with the several attacks made in the first week of March by Italian military aircraft on the British Red Cross Ambulance No.1 operating in Ethiopia. I regret to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, after carefully considering the statements contained in these documents and comparing them with the reports furnished by the Medical Officer in charge of the Ambulance, are unable to accept the Italian version of the facts as having any relation to what actually occurred.

2. Before proceeding to explain the reasons which have influenced His Majesty's Government in arriving at this conclusion, I have been directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to remind Your Excellency that on January 18th last Mr. Ingram, at that time His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government, drew Signor Suvich's personal attention to the fact that the British Red Cross Ambulance, the formation and despatch of which to Ethiopia had been officially notified to the Italian Government on the 16th November last, had been diverted from service on the Ogaden front to the northern zone, and was then actually established at Dessie. As Mr. Ingram explained at the time, this information was conveyed to Signor Suvich in the belief that the Italian Government would be glad, in the light of certain then recent and unfortunate incidents (such as the bombing of the Swedish Ambulance near Dolo in December) to know the locality of the British Ambulance in case the military authorities

His Excellency
The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Rome.

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were not already aware of its movements. It will be recalled that, having noted Mr. Ingram's communication, Signor Suvich took the opportunity to urge that, in view of the aforesaid recent occurrences, the Ambulance should be placed at a reasonable distance from military concentrations. The observations made by His Excellency on this occasion were telegraphed on January 20th to His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa with instructions that they should be brought to the notice of the Medical Officer in charge of the Ambulance in order that all possible precautions might be taken, and Signor Suvich was informed accordingly on January 21st with the intimation that the Ambulance had left Dessie for Waldia with the probable intention of proceeding shortly to Quoram. Later, on February 20th, I handed Signor Suvich an aide-mémoire showing inter alia the precautions taken by the Ambulance while in the vicinity of Waldia. Its camp was placed about two miles by air, or three miles by road, from that village, and one and a half miles from the nearest Ethiopian encampment. There were displayed Red Cross ground flags 36 feet and 46 feet square; Red Cross, British and Ethiopian national flags were flown from three flag staffs, and all tents and lorries were marked with the Red Cross emblem; at the same time I requested that the Italian military authorities should be so informed in order that all possible care might be taken to avoid an incident. At that date I was unaware that the Ambulance either had moved, or was then about to move, to Quoram. Since, however, the Medical Officer in charge of the Ambulance was careful, on establishing his camp at the latter place, to repeat all the precautions enforced at Waldia, this fact is of no particular importance, more especially as the Italian Government had been notified a month earlier that Quoram was likely to be the Ambulance's ultimate objective.

3. I have dealt with the above points in some detail in illustration of the fact that His Majesty's Government exerted themselves to the utmost to acquaint the Italian Government with the movements of the Ambulance. This was the only foreign hospital unit actually operating with the Ethiopian forces in the northern advances zone; it was also very considerably larger than any purely Ethiopian Red Cross unit on that front. In these circumstances, and in the light of the information supplied to the Italian Government His Majesty's Government are unable to understand how any trained military air observer can ever have harboured illusions as to the identity of so plainly marked and substantial an Ambulance encampment as that noted in patrols over the Quoram area.

4. According to the reports furnished by the Medical Officer in charge of the Ambulance, three of his Red Cross lorries were deliberately bombed at 10 a.m. on March 3rd between Quoram and Alamata. At noon on March 4th the camp of the British Ambulance, two miles east of Lake Ashangi and two miles from the village of Quoram, was deliberately bombed, four patients being killed and several wounded. Such serious material damage was done that the Ambulance has since had to be withdrawn for reorganisation and re-equipment. On March 5th the camp site, on which tents were still pitched and which was plainly marked by Red Cross flags, was again bombed, although patients, personnel and stores had by that time been moved elsewhere, the Commanding Officer considering it desirable to refrain from displaying their position by use of the Red Cross

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On March 6th the derelict camp site, on which lorries and tents had been abandoned, was heavily bombed for the fourth time. The categorical nature of Dr. Melly's statements on the deliberate and unprovoked nature of these attacks leaves no room for doubt as to their accuracy. Allegations that fire was opened against the aircraft, or that the camp was being used as cover for Ethiopian combatants, are denied emphatically, as is the allegation that Ethiopian anti-aircraft guns were in position in close proximity to the Ambulance. In short, on the reliable evidence available to them - evidence which it is understood has been substantiated by photographs taken on the spot at the time of the first raid - His Majesty's Government can only regard the pretentious advances in Signor Suvich's letter and the aide mémoire which accompanied it as due to the not unnatural desire of the officers responsible for the raids on the British Ambulance to present excuses for their actions.

5. Apart, however, from the actual facts of the attacks, it is suggested in the communications under reply that no unit of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia would ever run any abnormal risk so long as it took care to operate in complete conformity with the rules of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929. The implication clearly is that, in various ways which will be dealt with in detail below, the British Ambulance laid itself open to hostile action on the part of Italian aircraft through its neglect of the rules laid down in the above-mentioned Convention. The provisions which appear to apply to this case are Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Convention in question. Article 6 provides that medical formations which accompany armies in the field shall be respected & protected by the belligerents; Article 7 lays down that the protection to which medical formations are entitled shall cease if they are made use of to permit actions harmful to the enemy: and Article 8 provides that the following conditions are not to be considered to be of such a nature as to deprive medical formations of the protection guaranteed by Article 6, viz., (1) that the personnel of the formation is armed, and uses its arms in its own defence, and (2) that, in the absence of armed orderlies, the formation or establishment is protected by a picket or sentries.

6. In the present instance, the Italian Government do not dispute that the Ambulance was bombed by Italian aircraft, that is to say that the bombs were aimed directly at the encampment which Italian air observers had noted was marked with a Red Cross. An attempt is however made to justify the attacks under Article 7 of the Red Cross Convention, that is to say, it is suggested that the Ambulance had been made use of to permit actions harmful to Italy. In these circumstances, it is necessary to examine the acts which are alleged to have produced this result. It is stated in the first place that certain lorries in the baggage train were unloading boxes at the Ambulance. Assuming this to be a fact, it is impossible to argue that it involved any improper activity on the part of an Ambulance, which might well require, and does in fact require, many stores packed in boxes. It is then alleged that when the Italian aircraft concerned descended in order to investigate what was happening, it encountered violent anti-aircraft fire. While it is emphatically denied that any such fire was in fact directed against the aircraft, His Majesty's Government are not aware of any rule of international law which provides that aircraft flying

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over enemy territory must not be fired at when they descend low to inspect encampments, even should the latter be marked with Red Cross emblems. It is, indeed, confidently assumed by His Majesty's Government that any Ethiopian aircraft which indulged in similar scouting activities over an Italian hospital area would be greeted with anti-aircraft fire from all sides. Secondly, it seems to be suggested that illegal use is made of a Red Cross Ambulance to perform acts harmful to Italy within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of 1929 if there should be situated close to the Ambulance either anti-aircraft artillery or Ethiopian troops. While again reiterating that neither Ethiopian forces nor anti-aircraft artillery were in a position of any proximity to the Ambulance (the nearest Ethiopian troops on March 4th being two miles away), His Majesty's Government cannot accept any such interpretation of the legal issue raised. In this connexion I am to emphasise that no evidence is produced in the aide mémoire purporting to show that any of the Ambulance's personnel, or the wounded or sick under their charge, were engaged in manning the anti-aircraft gun alleged to be close to the Red Cross insignia. Even if it were admitted, which it is not, that such a gun had been placed close to the Ambulance, and that the bombs which struck the latter were intended for the former, it is nowhere suggested in the aide mémoire that the Ambulance camp was struck by accident. Moreover, I am instructed to observe that whatever the circumstances on the occasion of the first attack against the Ambulance, it might well be argued that on the second, third and fourth occasions on which it was attacked, the Ambulance personnel might be entitled under Article 8, Section 1, of the 1929 Convention to fire at the aircraft, since in this case they would only be acting in self-defence, seeing that the Ambulance had been deliberately bombed by Italian aircraft on the preceding day or days. However, no such firing by the Ambulance personnel or from the camp of the Ambulance took place. For all these reasons, His Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the Italian aide mémoire embodies any valid legal defence for the action of the Italian air force against the British Ambulance, even on the supposition that the facts as set forth in that document are correct.

7. In conclusion, I have been instructed to request that Your Excellency will be so good as to furnish His Majesty's Government with a categorical assurance that clear and definite instructions have been issued to the Italian military authorities in Ethiopia that the air force operating under their command will in future exercise the utmost care to avoid attacks upon British Red Cross hospital and Ambulance units operating with the Ethiopian forces. In making this request, I am directed to add that His Majesty's Government reserve the right, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner, to claim compensation for the heavy material losses suffered by the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia as the result of the deliberate attacks which form the subject of this correspondence.

I avail myself etc.,

(Signed) ERIC DRUMMOND.

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SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la Société.

C.172.M.108.1936.VII.
Genève, le 17 avril 1936.

DIFFEREND ENTRE L'ETHIOPIE ET L'ITALIE.

Communication du Gouvernement éthiopien.

Addis-Abeba, 17 avril 1936.

Au Secrétaire général.

Ce matin à 8 heures deux avions de bombardement italien ont longuement survolé la ville ouverte d'Addis-Abeba en tirant des coups de mitrailleuses et des fusées. Le Gouvernement éthiopien s'attend à ce que l'ennemi prétende que lors de cette attaque lesdits avions auraient été criblés de balles et ce dans le but de fabriquer un prétexte mensonger pour bombarder la ville. Le Gouvernement éthiopien déclare que lors de cette agression aucun coup de feu n'a été tiré contre ces avions. Le fait que des avions italiens ont à quatre reprises survolé la ville et le fait que lors de ces attaques des coups de mitrailleuses et des fusées ont été tirés démontrent bien l'intention de l'ennemi de bombarder cette ville ouverte.

BELATENGUETA HEROUY,

MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.172.M.108.1936.VII.
Geneva, April 17th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Government.

(Translation)

Addis Ababa, April 17th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

This morning at 8 a.m. two Italian bombing aeroplanes flew over the open town of Addis Ababa for a long time, firing machine-guns and discharging rockets. The Ethiopian Government expects the enemy to allege that during this attack the said aeroplanes were riddled with bullets, the purpose being to fabricate a false pretext for bombing the town. The Ethiopian Government declares that during this aggression no shots were fired at the aeroplanes. The fact that Italian aeroplanes have flown over the town on four occasions and the fact that during these attacks machine-guns were fired and rockets discharged, clearly show the enemy's intention of bombing this open town.

BLATENGETA HERUY,

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League

C.169.M.105.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 17th 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY

Communication from the Italian Government.

Rome, April 17th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General,

(Translation from the Italian)

Somaliland authorities report that in an encounter which took place on March 8th at Garbahagi there were 10 casualties among the Italian native soldiers (Dubats), 9 of whom were horribly mutilated by the Abyssinians. Chief Baradle Mohammed of the Ogaden Somali tribe of Rer Abdulla had his hands cut off, 8 other soldiers were disembowelled and suffered other horrible mutilations. Natives of the Rer Coshen tribe have asserted that these cruelties were practised on the Italian soldiers while they were still alive. I shall later forward the numerous statements of witnesses already announced, amply confirming these new Ethiopian atrocities. Please communicate the present telegram to the States Members of the League of Nations.

SUVICH.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.176.M.112.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 18th, 1936.

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN.

Since the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the Members of the League, though the great majority of them have applied the economic and financial measures concerted in the Co-ordination Committee, have continually emphasised their desire to expedite the settlement of the conflict by agreement between the Parties within the framework of the Covenant.

On December 19th, 1935, the Council instructed its Committee of Thirteen, "bearing in mind the provisions of the Covenant, to examine the situation as a whole, as it may appear in the light of the information which the Committee may procure". On January 23rd, 1936, the Committee submitted a report to the Council, in which it observed that circumstances were not favourable for a settlement of the conflict within the framework of the Covenant. It also expressed its intention of seizing any opportunity that might occur to facilitate such a settlement.

On March 3rd, it decided to send to both Parties an appeal in the following terms:

"The Committee of Thirteen,

Acting in virtue of the mandate given to it by the Council in its resolution of December 19th,

Addresses to both belligerents an urgent appeal for the immediate opening of negotiations in the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant with a view to the prompt cessation of hostilities and the definite restoration of peace.

The Committee of Thirteen will meet on March 10th to take cognisance of the replies of the two Governments."

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On March 5th, the Ethiopian Government agreed "to the opening of negotiations, subject to the provisions of the Covenant being respected". It noted "that the Committee of Thirteen's proposal is made, and that the negotiations will be conducted, in the spirit of the Covenant and in the framework of the League of Nations". On March 8th, the Italian Government, "in response to the appeal which has been addressed to it", agreed "In principle to the opening of negotiations concerning the settlement of the .... conflict."

The Council having been convened in extraordinary session in London, it was in that city that the Committee of Thirteen, meeting on March 23rd, considered the replies of the Ethiopian and Italian Governments. It requested its Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, "to get into touch with the two Parties and to take such steps as may be called for in order that the Committee may be able, as soon as possible, to bring the two Parties together, and, within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, to bring about the prompt cessation of hostilities and the final restoration of peace."

The first attempts made in virtue of this resolution to ascertain the views of the two Parties were set out in the report of the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen dated April 4th, circulated under No.C.133.M.72.1936.VII.

The Committee, having again met at Geneva, took note of this report at its meeting on April 8th, and it was decided that the conversations between the Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, and the two Parties should be resumed at Geneva after Easter. The Ethiopian delegation was already in Geneva, at the Chairman's disposal. The Italian Government was informed that the Committee regarded it as one of the highest importance that contact should be made

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immediately after Easter with the delegate whom that Government was prepared to send, as the Committee had decided to meet again on April 16th. As to the invitation that M. de Madariaga had received to go to Rome, the Committee agreed with its Chairman that it was undesirable to come to any decision on the point until after the conversations that were to take place at Geneva.

Pending the arrival of the representative of Italy, the Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, had a further interview with the Ethiopian delegation, which has itself summarised the declarations which it then made, as follows:-

"1. Ethiopia is the victim of an unjustified aggression. She is engaged in a war which has been forced upon her and which is conducted under conditions of atrocity which arouse among the Ethiopian people a feeling of stupefaction at Italian barbarity and of astonishment at the dilatory methods which have hitherto succeeded in preventing the action of the League of Nations and the application of Article XVI to the aggressor.

"2. Since the beginning of the conflict Ethiopia has expressed her desire to submit to all the procedure of the Covenant and of the Treaty, She renews this declaration.

"3. Though Ethiopia agrees to respond to the appeal of the Council and of the Committee of Thirteen, this must not be regarded as the confession of an alleged defeat or the recognition of an alleged Italian victory. Ethiopia is not the first nation subject to aggression whose territory has been invaded. She has the firm determination to fight against the aggressor and to bring about the triumph of her just cause as other nations have done before her. The Ethiopian Government and people have always placed their confidence in the League of Nations and continue to hope that the support of the League of Nations will not be withdrawn from them.

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"4. Consequently Ethiopia does not agree to negotiate directly with Italy. She points out that, apart from the aggression committed by Italy against Ethiopia, there is a conflict between Italy and the League of Nations. Ethiopia only agrees to negotiate with Italy within the framework of the Covenant, that is to say with the active assistance of the League of Nations.

"5. The Ethiopian Government has already denounced the Italian manoeuvres, the aim and effect of which have been to postpone the assistance promised by the Covenant to the State Member victim of an aggression, that is to say the application of the sanctions imperatively laid down in Article XVI. It protests against the manoeuvre which is at present being carried out with the same object and declares definitely and firmly that it will not lend itself to that manoeuvre.

"6, In the view of the Ethiopian Government the question of procedure raised by M. de Madariaga is a secondary one. The essential point is to put an end immediately to the Italian manoeuvre by compelling the Government at Rome to state forthwith clearly and openly what are its warlike aims. The Ethiopian Government is moreover surprised that the slightest doubt can still exist on this subject in the minds of any of the Members of the Committee of Thirteen. The repeated statements of the Italian Government are categorical and its desires are imperative. No-one in the world has the slightest illusion as to the irrevocable decision of the Italian Government to subject Ethiopia to its domination.

"7, Not more than one hour's conversation between the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the Ethiopian delegation and the

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representatives of the Italian Government will be required to show without fear of contradiction that the negotiations cannot be carried out in the spirit of the Covenant. The Italian Government is endeavouring by methods of procedure to postpone the moment when it must make known its claims, because it is convinced that world public opinion will reject them with indignation and that the League of Nations cannot accept them. In thus delaying the time for giving explanations, the Rome Government is endeavouring to consolidate the fait accompli and to render it irrevocable.

"8. The Ethiopian Government does not doubt that the League of Nations, with the support of world public opinion, will succeed in frustrating the Italian manoeuvre. For this reason the Ethiopian delegation urges that the proposed interview may take place without delay in order that a categorical Italian reply may be obtained.

"9. The Ethiopian Government stated as far back as in September 1935 that it accepted the suggestions of the Committee of Five as a basis of negotiation under certain reservations. It refers to the detailed statement which it submitted in September 1935 in reply to the suggestions of the Committee of Five.

"10. The time has come when each must assume his responsibilities without further delay. Each of the States Members of the League of Nations bears heavy responsibilities in the present conflict. The Ethiopian Government is not prepared to allow them to be declined. It has carried out its entire duty by maintaining an unequal war for six months. It is determined to defend the territorial independence and political integrity of the Empire until the Ethiopian people have been completely exterminated. It cannot think that the

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Members of the League of Nations will refuse to do their duty and to keep the undertakings which they assumed towards Ethiopia by placing their signature under the Covenant.

In conclusion the Ethiopian delegation affirms that it is indifferent to the procedure to be followed. It is concerned only with the substance. It refuses energetically on behalf of its Government to lent itself to any dilatory procedure. It earnestly requests that the Committee of Thirteen should take note of the refusal or silence of the Italian Government, and that the Committee of Eighteen should be called upon to decide. "

On April 15th, the representative of the Italian Government arrived in Geneva. The conversation that he had on the same day with the Chairman of the Committee, assisted by the Secretary-General, has been summarised as follows :

I. "With reference to the Italian Government's telegram of March 8th, 1936, the Italian delegation informs the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen that its Government definitely agrees to the immediate opening of negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities. The cessation may be the outcome of the signature either of an armistice or of preliminaries of peace. An armistice could only be negotiated between military commanders. Inasmuch as its main object would be to ensure the safety of the armies during the suspension, the guarantee that would be demanded would doubtless exceed the scope of the demands in connection with preliminaries of peace. Moreover, the negotiation of an armistice might take as long as that of preliminaries of peace.

"Being anxious to emphasise the Italian Government's desire to respond as effectively as possible to the invitation of the Committee of Thirteen, the Italian delegation accordingly pronounces in favour of the immediate opening of negotiations for preliminaries of peace.

II. "The Italian delegation feels bound to point out that such negotiations could not be based on any situation other than the actual situation as it presents itself after six months of military operations. In taking its stand on the ground of conciliation, the Committee of Thirteen no doubt agrees that there is a de facto situation.

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"The Italian delegation does not ask the Committee of Thirteen to recognise that situation, but merely not to ignore it.

III. "For these reasons, the Italian delegation considers that the only method suited to that situation is the method of direct negotiations. It is prepared to consider any means of enabling the Committee of Thirteen to be kept informed of the negotiations.

"It would suggest that the venue of the negotiations should be fixed at Ouchy.

IV. "The Italian delegation takes this opportunity to express its hope that the outcome of these negotiations will be such as to enable the Italian Government to resume active participation with the League of Nations in consonance with the general situation."

The information thus obtained as to the attitude of the Italian Government was conveyed to the Ethiopian delegation, which, relying on the actual terms of the appeal that had been addressed to it by the Council, rejected Italy's proposals. It asserted that "in asking that the Ethiopian people be abandoned to its aggressor, the Italian Government is in reality merely fixing its price for a bargain, whereby Italy would give her support in a European dispute in return for the removal of sanctions and for the League's indifference to the Italian aggression." The Ethiopian Government asked the Committee of Thirteen:

1. To find that the Italian Government had not agreed to negotiate within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant;

2. To find that the time had come to apply to the aggressor all the sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, and thus to discharge the obligation assumed by all the Members of the League to come promptly and effectively to the assistance of the victim of aggression.

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The Ethiopian delegation set forth the point of view of its Government in a Note dated April 16th, which has been circulated under No.C.168 M.104.1936. VII.

Meanwhile, a further conversation with the Italian delegation had afforded a more definite idea of the meaning attached by that delegation to the formula that it was "prepared to consider any means of enabling the Committee of Thirteen to be kept informed of the (direct) negotiations".

The Italian delegation expanded that formula as follows :

> "In its view, the quickest way would be for conversations to be entered into between the Italian delegation and the Ethiopian delegation. The Italian delegation agrees that the Committee should be kept abreast of the progress of the conversations.
>
> "The Committee would thus be informed of the results as and when they were obtained. It would remain at the disposal of the two delegations to afford any co-operation they might think desirable."

The Committee of Thirteen would, of course, report to the Council when agreement was reached.

Informed by its Chairman of the outcome of the conversations with the two delegations, the Committee of Thirteen decided that the Italian delegation's amplification of its statement should be communicated to the Ethiopian delegation.

The Ethiopian delegation replied to the Chairman in the following terms.

> "Having carefully considered your communication, the Ethiopian Government does not see that any substantial change has been made in the original Italian proposal. It therefore maintains in full the terms of its previous declaration. It repeats its loyal and unreserved acceptance of the appeal which was addressed to the Ethiopian Government by the Council. It declares itself ready to negotiate immediately within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, as it has been invited to do.
>
> "The Ethiopian Government earnestly requests the Committee of Thirteen to find that the Rome Government has not agreed to negotiate within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant, in order that the application of all the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant may be no longer delayed."

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On considering the situation as a whole at its meeting on April 17th, the Committee could not but find that the mission of obtaining information which it had entrusted to its Chairman, assisted by the Secretary-General, must be regarded as fulfilled. It also noted that, although the appeal it had addressed on March 3rd to the Ethiopian and Italian Governments had received replies which offered a prospect of the prompt cessation of hostilities and the final restoration of peace, such hopes must for the moment be abandoned.

In the report approved by the Council on January 23rd, the Committee of Thirteen said:

> "When, on December 19th, 1935, the Council instructed the Committee to examine the situation as a whole, it had primarily in view the necessity of putting an end to the war, a question which has been the constant preoccupation of the Members of the League since last October. In accordance with their international undertakings, they have concerted economic and financial measures, being animated by an earnest desire to re-establish a just peace as speedily as possible. They have always been resolved to neglect no opportunity of facilitating and hastening the settlement of the dispute through an agreement between the Parties within the framework of the Covenant. The Committee of Thirteen, for its part, declared that, if such an opportunity had existed to-day, it would have at once submitted suggestions to the Council. It will not fail to do so, should more favourable circumstances arise. At present, it can only decide to watch the situation carefully, in accordance with the mandate which it received from the Council on December 19th".

As the situation was on that date, so it remains to-day.

* * * *

This is the more regrettable because the Members of the League are continually receiving, through the Secretary-General, denunciations from each of the Parties of the opposing army's violations or alleged violations of the principles of international law and morality.

In every case, these denunciations have been duly transmitted to the other Party, so that the latter has had an opportunity of submitting any observations it might wish to make.

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At the meeting which it held in London on March 23rd the Committee of Thirteen, noting that its competence was determined by the terms of reference which it had received from the Council, namely "bearing in mind the provisions of the Covenant, to examine the situation as a whole, as it may appear in the light of the information which the Committee may procure", considered that it was entitled to procure such information on any element of the conflict as would be useful in the accomplishment of its task. The Ethiopian Government's charges regarding the use of asphyxiating gases by the Italian army became, in particular, more numerous and more urgent and, while the Government at Rome had submitted observations regarding especially the bombardment of ambulances reported by Ethiopia, it had not thought fit to reply to the charges relating to the use of asphyxiating gases.

The Committee therefore requested its Chairman to address a letter to the Italian Government in the terms reproduced in the Annex to Document C.133.M.72.1936.VII.

The Italian Government's reply dated April 3rd is also annexed to that document. The Government states that, while it is anxious to establish the truth regarding the facts of which a tendencious version is put forward in the Ethiopian statements, it feels bound, first of all, to make every reservation regarding the competence of the Committee of Thirteen to deal with the questions referred to in the communication from the Chairman of that Committee. It further asks whether the attention of the Ethiopian Government has been drawn to the charges of the Italian Government relating to the use by Ethiopia of methods of

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warfare forbidden by international regulations and to the atrocities practised on prisoners and non-combatant Italian civilians, and whether that Government has been requested to put forward such observations as it may desire to make on the subject.

As mentioned above the transmission to each Government of the charges made by the other Government normally furnishes them with an opportunity of submitting observations. But on resuming the consideration of the question on April 9th the Committee of Thirteen felt bound to address an appeal in the following terms to the two Parties:

"The Committee of Thirteen, having taken note of the communications sent by the Ethiopian and Italian Governments to the Secretary-General in regard to various cases of failure to observe the international agreements relating to the conduct of warfare, and voicing the emotion felt in this matter by public opinion, addresses an urgent appeal to both belligerents to take all measures necessary to prevent any failure to observe the said Conventions or the principles of international law.

The Committee hopes to receive from the Powers to which it is making this appeal assurances calculated to allay the public feeling it has thus voiced."

The replies of the two Governments, both dated April 11th, are as follows:

Reply from the Italian Government:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 9th instant, containing the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen to the Royal Italian Government and to the Ethiopian Government. The Royal Government notes that the denunciation of the Abyssinian atrocities which it sent, together with confirmatory documents, as early as December 17th, 1935, and later by its notes dated December 31st, 1935, and January 18th, February 28th and March 9th, 1936, will be fully investigated by the competent bodies. The observance of the laws of war has been and is the constant rule of the Italian army, and the Royal Government desires by the present communication to give a full assurance on that point. The observance of these laws must be bilateral. The Italian military authorities cannot do otherwise than punish every inhuman atrocity committed by its adversary in contempt of every principle of law and morality."

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Reply of the Ethiopian Government:

"In reply to your telegram of the 9th instant, I have the honour to state that, in her struggle against the aggressor, Ethiopia has strictly conformed to the international agreements regulating the conduct of warfare, despite flagrant and systematic acts of violation on the part of Italy. Ethiopia has even refrained from all measures of reprisal against these violations. It is possible, however, that in isolated cases individuals have reacted against the inhuman methods employed by the Italians. The Ethiopian Government has taken all steps to impose severe punishment for any such lapses."

The Committee had also thought it desirable to ask the International Red Cross Committee whether it could furnish the Committee of Thirteen with any information in its possession as to infringements of the international conventions to which the two belligerents are parties. The International Committee's negative reply has been published in document C.150.M.88.1936.VII. In response thereto the Committee of Thirteen decided to address to the International Red Cross Committee a letter, a copy of which is appended to this report (Annex 1).

Having received the replies of the Ethiopian and Italian Governments to its appeal, and having taken the advice of a Committee of Jurists, the Committee of Thirteen is of opinion that in the present case the Council, being seized of the dispute in all its aspects, possesses in virtue of its general competence the power to undertake enquiries on the basis of the documentary material into the application of conventions concerning the conduct of war.

The competence of the Committee of Thirteen is determined, as has already been observed, by the Council's decision of December 19th, 1935. In virtue of the instructions it received on that date, the Committee of Thirteen can undertake enquiries on the basis of the documentary material, taking account of the fact that "when, on December 19th, the Council instructed the Committee to examine the situation as a whole, it had primarily in view the necessity of putting an end to the war." (Report of the Committee of Thirteen, dated January 23rd, 1936).

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By an enquiry on the basis of the documentary material is to be understood an enquiry in which information and explanations are collected and examined and the resulting conclusions are stated, but which would not include deciding questions of fact which continued to be contested or on which the documents did not throw sufficient light.

Accordingly, the Committee of Jurists appointed by the Committee of Thirteen was asked to analyse the documents concerning the conduct of the war that had been submitted to the Secretary-General of the League up to April 16th, 1936.

Their analysis, which is appended to this report, (Annex 2) has been communicated to the Ethiopian and Italian Governments. The covering letter to the Italian Government, a copy of which is also appended (Annex 3), constitutes the reply of the Chairman of the Committee to that Government's communications of April 3rd and April 11th on the question of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases.

The Secretary-General was also instructed to address a copy of this analysis to the Norwegian and Swedish Governments, since it mentions the existence of reports drawn up by the Norwegian and Swedish Ambulances in Ethiopia.

The Governments, as also the two Governments specially concerned have thus an opportunity to furnish the Secretary-General with any information and observations which might allow the Committee to complete the analysis of the documentary material that the Committee of Jurists have made, and to decide what further steps it might appear proper to take.

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ANNEX 1.

Letter from the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen to the President of the International Red Cross Committee.

Geneva, April 18th, 1936.

(Translation)

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee of Thirteen has considered the letter of April 9th by which you were good enough to reply to the letter addressed to you by the Secretary-General on behalf of that Committee on April 8th.

In that letter, the Committee of the Council had requested the International Red Cross Committee to communicate to it information emanating either from officers of the International Red Cross Committee, or from impartial persons such as the Red Cross ambulance doctors in Ethiopia, in regard to infringements of the international conventions on the conduct of war signed by the two belligerents; and referred in particular to reports which it was understood had been received by the International Red Cross Committee from Dr. Junod and from the doctors of the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia.

In reply, the International Red Cross Committee states that until a final decision has been reached in regard to the enquiry requested by both Governments concerned, into the allegations made by both sides relating to violations of the Geneva Convention, the International Committee cannot hand over its documentary material for the purposes of another enquiry bearing partly on the same facts. The Committee of Thirteen cannot but express its profound regret at this decision, all the more so inasmuch the Secretary-General's letter of April 8th made it clear that the subjects in regard to which it asked for the communication - there was no question of handing over - of documentary material in the possession of the International Red Cross Committee, include a considerable number of important matters which fall outside the scope of the Geneva Convention.

It would further appear from your letter that the International Red Cross Committee considers itself unable to communicate information received by it, even in regard to matters falling outside the Geneva Convention, on the ground that the neutrality which that Committee is bound to observe makes it necessary for it to exercise very great discretion.

The Committee of Thirteen can only express its surprise that such a reason should be invoked as a ground for declining to communicate information to an organ which is acting on behalf of the Council of the League of Nations.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) Salvador de MADARIAGA,

Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

ANNEX 2 TO DOCUMENT C.176.M.112.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 18th, 1936.

COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN.

ANALYSIS BY THE COMMITTEE OF JURISTS OF THE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN ETHIOPIA WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOWN TO APRIL 16th, 1936.

The Committee of Jurists, in accordance with the request made to it by the Committee of Thirteen on April 10th, 1936, has proceeded to examine and analyse the documents concerning the conduct of the war in Ethiopia which were officially transmitted to the Secretary-General down to April 16th, 1936.

This analysis has consisted in comparing the allegations made in the documents in question. Its results are set out in the present memorandum.

The Committee of Jurists is not to be understood as prejudging either the value of the allegations made on either side as to failure to observe the rules governing the conduct of war or the authority of the evidence invoked.

The Committee of Jurists hopes that its work may be of value to the Committee of Thirteen and assist it in its decisions as to how this question should be dealt with.

I.

Both belligerents have formulated their protests on a broader basis than that of observance of the conventions concerning the conduct of war which are in force between them. Thus the Italian Government's first protest (alleged use of dum-dum bullets) denounces "this violation... of a high humanitarian principle universally recognised and forming part of the moral heritage of all civilised States" (C.480.M.256.1935.VII). Similarly that Government's letter of February 28th, 1936 (C.104.M.45.1936.VII) complains of "violation ... of the rules of the Geneva Convention and of other international rules and principles".

The Ethiopian Government refers in general terms to the "laws and usages of war" and protests against "inhuman practices" (C.506.M.275.1935.VII) and "violation of the laws of war and of international conventions" (C.16.M.14.1936.VII).

The present analysis, therefore, deals with all the allegations made from either side irrespective of whether a convention forbidding the alleged practices is in force between the two belligerents or not.

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As regards international conventions:

a) The Italian Government refers specifically to:

The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (July 27,1929)

The Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (July 27,1929).*

The Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.**

b) The Ethiopian Government refers specifically to:

The Protocol on Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare (July 17th, 1925).

The Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

II.

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ETHIOPIA

A. USE OF DUM-DUM BULLETS.

Casualties said to be due to such bullets.

a) Actual cases of casualties are mentioned in:

Document.	No. of cases
C.480.M.256.1935 (telegram of 18.xii.35)	3 occurring in two different engagements.
C.35.M.13.1936 (telegram of 16.i.36)	17 occurring in 5 different engagements and free use in another engagement alleged.
C.63.M.22.1936 (letter of 28.i.36)	Produces medical evidence and photographs for some of the above cases.
C.104.M.45.1936 (letter of 2.ii.36)	States that dum-dum bullets continue to be employed everywhere by the Ethiopian troops.
C.123.M.62.1936 (letter of 9.iii.36)	States that dum-dum bullets used in massacre at labour camp.
C.500.M.269.1935 (letter of 21.xii.35)	States that 5 foreign newspaper correspondents (Reuter's, Excelsior, Paris-Soir, Intransigeant, Gringoire, telegraphed to Secretary-General on Nov.27 alleging use of dum-dum bullets and offering to produce exhibits.

* Ethiopia has not acceded to this Convention.
** Italy has not ratified this Convention.

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b) Captures of dum-dum bullets.

Document.	Number of cases.
C.501.M.270.1935 C.7.M.6.1936.	Capture at Ethiopian post of Tafare Chatema of large numbers of cartridges with dum-dum bullets bearing the label of Eley Bros. Ltd. London.
C.35.M.13.1936 C.63.M.22.1936	Capture in the Tigré down to Dec.5,1935, of 1,100 dum-dum bullet cartridges marked as coming from Lynoch, Ltd., and 258 dum-dum bullet cartridges without mark of origin and cartridges for Gras rifles with leaden bullets.

The Government of the United Kingdom (C.86.M.31.1936) has declared that it is able to affirm categorically that no ammunition of the kind in question has ever been supplied to the Ethiopian Government for military purposes by firms in the U.K. and has quoted statements from the firms concerned showing that ammunition labelled as described would necessarily be in the first instance 22 and in the second instance 9 years old.

B. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE RULES REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF WAR.

The Italian Government (C.104.M.45.1936) classifies its charges under the following heads:

1. Torturing and killing of prisoners.

Document.	Number of cases.
C.104.M.45.1936 (letter of 28:ii:36)	5 specific cases: general statement that prisoners' throats are cut.
C.151.M.89.1936 (letter of 7:iv:36)	Evidence concerning one of the above cases: general statement that prisoners are tortured and killed.

2. Emasculation and maltreatment of killed and wounded.

Document.	Number of cases.
C.35.M.13.1936 (letter of 16:i:36)	36 cases occurring after a number of engagements.*
C.104.M.45.1936(letter of 28:ii:36)	Numerous cases said to have occurred.

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* The cases mentioned in C.63.M.22.1936. are included in this number.

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3. Killing and wounding of stretcher-bearers.

Document.	Number of cases.
C.104.M.45.1936	1 case is reported.

4. Killing of an army Chaplain.

C.104.M.45.1936	1 case is reported.

5. Misuse of the Emblem of the Red Cross.

The following abuses are alleged to have occurred:

a) Employment of the emblem to cover military objectives.
b) Placing guns or troops near real Red Cross stations.
c) Troops taking cover in Red Cross stations.
d) Firing from under cover of real or bogus Red Cross stations.

Documents: C.481.M.257.1935.
C.104.M.45.1936.

6. Bombardment of Red Cross field hospital.

Under this category (not mentioned in Doc.C.104.M.45) falls one case stated to have occurred at Mai Cheu on March 30-31st (Documents C.146.M.85.1936 and C.153.M.91.1936).

Part of the statements made under the present general heading (B) are put forward on the authority of the army in the field. This is the case as regards certain instances of the use of the Red Cross emblem as a mere protection against bombardment (C.481.M.257.1936 and C.104.M.45.1936, para. 19), finding of ammunition in an ambulance (ibidem para. 18), the killing of the stretcher-bearers and of the Army Chaplain (ibidem para. 7), ill-treatment of killed and wounded (ibidem paras. 4-6).

The remainder of the allegations in question - in particular the charges of torturing prisoners and certain general allegations of systematic and officially commanded abuses - emanate from the following unofficial sources:

a) Members of the Egyptian medical mission.

The appendices to Doc. C.104.M.45.1936 contain seven statements by persons said to be returned members of the Egyptian medical mission. An eighth statement of the same kind appears in the Italian letter of April 7th, 1936, reproduced in doc. C.151.M.89.1936. Four allegations of torture or killing of prisoners are based on a statement by the assistant dresser Labib Hassan. The statement of March 10th refers to one of these four cases. The torture and decapitation of air pilot Minniti is described by the assistant dispenser El Wishy, who says he was an eye witness. Moqbel, Riad, Labib Salamah and another Egyptian, Sami Georges, state that the Ethiopians slaughter Italian prisoners. Three of the statements made by members of the Egyptian mission speak of misuse of the emblem of the Red Cross. One statement appears to be irrelevant. (Incident of Dr. Hachman.)

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b) A Monsieur Lipmann, said to be a French Officer on leave, (document C.35.M.13.1936, para. (f)) is said to have stated in writing to the Italian consul at Djibouti that he was told at Dire-dawa in the presence of witnesses that the airman Minniti had been tortured.

c) A statement from an ex-instructor officer in the Ethiopian army, Josef Jonka, of Austrian nationality, is produced as authority for the charge of maltreatment of the killed and wounded by the Ethiopians and for abuse of the emblem of the Red Cross.

d) The charge of misuse of the emblem of the Red Cross is supported by production of a statement from the special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Mr. Evelyn Waugh, novelist, and by references to articles by the correspondent of Excelsior, Mr. Jean Constantinesco; of l'Illustration, M. Pierre Ichak; the correspondent of Daagens Nyhetur, M. Sven Ahlstrom, and a statement made to the Italian consul at Djibouti by M. Roth, photographer to the Associated Press, a statement made to the Piccolo of Trieste by the cinema-operator of Paramount News, Mr. Frank William Purnell, and a statement to the consul at Djibouti by a "responsible person well-known to him".

e) A statement made by the Secretary of the Greek Consulate at Dire-dawa before the Italian Consul at Djibouti (C.151.M.89.1936) states that Italian tank-drivers and aviators who were taken prisoners were tortured, killed and mutilated, but does not show that this statement is based on personal experience.

C. ALLEGED ATROCITIES COMMITTED AGAINST ITALIAN WORKMEN.

Document C.123.M.62.1936 contains a letter of March 9th, 1936, declaring that after an Ethiopian band had captured a road-builders' labour camp sixty-eight persons, including one women, were killed and some of them mutilated. Twenty-seven photographs are attached as illustrating the worst brutalities perpetrated by the Ethiopians.

III.

ETHIOPIAN ANSWER TO ITALIAN ALLEGATIONS.

By a letter of January 3rd, 1936 (C.12.M.11.1936) the Ethiopian Government demanded an enquiry by the Committee of XIII into the conduct of hostilities by the two belligerents, offering all facilities to any mission entrusted with such enquiry. It repeated this demand on January 6th (C.16.M.14.1936).

On January 20th the Ethiopian Government stated that such an enquiry would now be of less value. It has been made by the Swedish Government and its results have been set out in the note of protest sent by that Government to the Italian Government. It now remains for the League to consider, on the basis of the Swedish enquiry, whether collective intervention is not desirable and whether energetic steps should not be taken to prevent any repetition of such atrocities. (Para. VI of Doc. C.51.M.21.1936.VII).

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On January 22nd the Council adopted the report of the Committee of XIII stating that "the Ethiopian Government therefore does not press its request and the Committee, for its part, does not think that it is for it to comply with the request in the present circumstances."

In a telegram of April 11th, 1936 (C.158.M.95.1936) the Ethiopian Government, while admitting it to be "possible that in isolated cases individuals have reacted against the inhuman methods employed by the Italians" and alleging that measures have been taken to punish such lapses severely, declares that Ethiopia "has strictly conformed to the international agreements regulating the conduct of warfare.

The memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (C.155.M.93.1936) replies on the following lines to Italian charges which seem to coincide to a certain extent with those made to the League down to that date.

1. Dum-Dum bullets (pp.5-8).

Isolated cases of use of such bullets may have occurred. Dum-dum bullet cartridges may have been in the possession of hunters who were incorporated in the army or (since Italy imported large quantities to Massawa in December 1935) may have been found on bodies of Italian soldiers, but the Ethiopian Government never imported or supplied such cartridges to the army. The strict control to which Ethiopian imports of arms are subjected would have made such an import impossible.

The memorandum gives reasons for questioning whether the alleged cases are really casualties from dum-dum bullets.

Finally, the memorandum comments on the fact that so far as 13 alleged cases of casualties due to dum-dum bullets and the alleged capture of only 1358 dum-dum cartridges are put forward as proving systematic use of such ammunition.

Document C.9.M.8.1936 reproduces a letter from Major Dothée of Brussels stating that when in November 1934 he inspected the machine-gun and ammunition depot at Tafari Katamy (where discovery of dum-dum bullet cartridges is alleged) there was no such ammunition there.

Atrocities.

The memorandum points out that several of the alleged casualties from dum-dum bullets are also put forward as victims of atrocities. It reviews certain cases mentioned in C.35.M.13.1936 and C.63.M.22.1936 for the purpose of showing that the charge of mutilation is not proved. As regards the pilot Minniti, the memorandum states that he was never a prisoner of war but, having to make a forced landing, was seized and decapitated by the local nomads who were exasperated by the bombing and the machine-gunning of their flocks.

. . . . . .

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C117929

Abuse of the Emblem of the Red Cross.

The memorandum pp. 2-5 seeks to show the weakness of the Italian attack upon Ethiopian practice in regard to the Red Cross and discusses the two cases in which the Italian documents sent to the International Committee imputed misuse of the Red Cross to Ethiopian troops. In the first case an Ethiopian ambulance was bombed and subjected to machine-gun fire, although no troops were nearer than two kilometres. In the second, troops said to have been seen from Italian aeroplanes spreading red crosses on the ground and gathering round them were the personnel of an ambulance. In its account of the bombing of hospitals and ambulances the memorandum on several occasions states that no troops were near at the time.

IV.

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ITALY.

A. ALLEGED DELIBERATE BOMBING OF RED CROSS (RED CRESCENT) HOSPITALS AND AMBULANCES.

See Documents C.470.M.247.1935 (telegram of 30.xii.35), C.8.M.7.1936 (telegram of 1.1.36), C.16.M.14.1936 (letter of 6.1.36), C.107.M.48.1936 (telegram of 5.III.36), C.116.M.55.1936 (telegram of 11.III.36), C.122.M.61.1936 (telegram of 18.III.36), C.127.M.66.1936 (telegram of 22.III.36), C.129,M.68.1936 (telegram of 28 and 29.III.36), C.155.M.93.1936 (memorandum of 2.III.36 addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The following is a summary of cases reported:-

1.	Adowa	October 3rd.	Red Cross Hospital.
2.	Dessie	December 6th	American Red Cross Hospital seriously damaged; witnessed by foreign doctors and journalists. 5 bombs on hospital, others on operating tent of ambulance.
3.	Negelli	December 15th.	Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No.4.
4.	Malka Didaka	December 22nd.	Swedish ambulance.
5.	Malka Didaka	December 30th.	Swedish ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; 100 bombs; all tents destroyed and 27 patients killed; Dr. Hylander, head of ambulance, wounded. Report said to have been drawn up by representative of International Red Cross.
6.	Bulale	December 30th.	Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; 5 bombs dropped near ambulance.

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7.	Bulale	December 31st.	Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance.
8.	Dagahbur	January 4th.	Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No.1. At least 50 bombs and machine-gun fire.
9.	Waldia	January 15th.	Ethiopian Red Cross Liaison Unit.
10.	Makale	January 18th.	No.3 Ambulance, Ethiopian Red Cross; bombing and machine-gunning; 8 wounded; special pains had been taken to indicate presence of this ambulance to the Italian aeroplanes.
11.	Dessie	February 9th.	Ethiopian hospital plane bombed.
12.	Bulale	February 11th.	Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; 11 bombs and machine-gun fire.
13.	Bulale	February 12th.	Renewed bombing on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; 22 bombs.
14.	Quoram	March 4th.	British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.
15.	Quoram	March 5th.	British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; finding it necessary thereafter to discard Red Cross insignia.
16.	Quoram	March 17th.	Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane destroyed; witnessed by representative of International Red Cross.
17.	Ilylan Serer.	March 17th.	Swedish Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned and destroyed.
18.	Chilga	March 20th.	British Field Ambulance No.2.*
19.	Harrar	March 29th.	Egyptian Red Crescent hospital 15 bombs; Ethiopian Red Cross hospital and French hospital.

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* Information received from British official sources indicates that though bombs fell near the ambulance there was no intention to attack it.

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According to the memorandum of March 2nd 1936, (pp.10-14) a representative of the International Red Cross witnessed (or investigated) some of these attacks (Dessié 6.XII.35 - Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka 22 and 30.XII.35) - in which case he made a report to the International Committee.

In 4 cases (Malka Didaka 30.XII.35 - Dagahabour 4.I.36 - Makallé 18.I.36 - Dessié 9.II.36) an attack with machine-guns from a very low elevation of bombing from a very low elevation is alleged to have occurred. In the instance of the bombing of the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulance at Makallé on January 18th, 1936, it is stated that reconnaissance on the preceding day had shown the Italians the presence of the ambulance and the absence of troops. The bombing at Quoram on March 17th of the Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane is said to have been described as intentional by the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Regarding the bombing of Dessié hospital and dressing-stations on December 6th, 1935, stated to be contained in an enclosure outside the town, the Ethiopian Government forwarded by telegram on December 7th (Doc.C.474.M.250.1935) a declaration signed by six doctors. There is a controversy between the Italian Government and one of the doctors, Dr. M.S.Belau, who is alleged to be a person of very doubtful character. The character of the others has not been impugned.

B. ALLEGED BOMBING OF OPEN TOWNS.

See Documents C.470.M.247.1935 (telegram of 6.XII.36), C.107.M.48.1936 (telegram of 5.III.36), C.116.M.55.1936 (telegram of 11.III.36), C.119.M.58.1936 (telegram of 17.III.36), C.129.M.68.1936 (telegram of 29.III.36), C.134.M.73.1936 (telegram of 4.IV.36), C.155.M.93.1936 (memorandum of March 2nd, 1936 to the International Committee of the Red Cross).

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The following cases are reported:

	ADOWA	October 3rd.
	ADIGRAT	October 3rd.
	AMBA ALAJI	October 14th.
	KEBRI DEHARI	October 25th.
	MAI-METCHITCH	November 18th.
	GONDAR	December 5th.
	ZELEO	December 28th.
	ADI REMOZ	December 28th.
	KEBTA	December 28th.
	DEBNAT	January 2nd.
	AMRA BIRAUTA	January 3rd.
	DABAT	January 10th.
	SOKOTA	January 10th.
	AMBA BIRAUTA	January 14th.
	WALDA	January 15th.
	QUORAM	January 16th.
	QUORAM	January 18th.
	QUORAM	January 18th.
	QUORAM	January 30th.
	CHILGA	January 30th.
	DABEITO	February 4th.
	MEGALO	February 5th.
	COMBALCHA	February 9th.
	SOLELE	February 9th.
	WALDIA	February 9th.
	QUORAM	February 9th.
	ASHANGI	February 9th.
	MAI CHOW	February 9th.
	QUORAM	February 10th.
	ASHANGI	February 10th.
	WALDIA	February 10th.
WALDIA -	WALDIA	February 11th.
	KOBBO - -	February 12th. - February 12th.
	MERTHO	February 13th.
	COMBALCHA	February 13th
	LAKE HAIK CONVENT	February 13th.
	DONKA MIKAEL	February 13th.
	WALDIA	February 13th.
	JARRE GUILBO	February 14th.
	DONKA MIKAEL	February 14th.
	SEGERAT	February 14th.
	WARTIA	February 14th.
	WALDIA	February 14th.
	MEGALO	February 15th.
	MEGALO	February 16th.
	GUERO	February 16th.
	GINNIR	February 16th.
	QUORAM (twice)	February 17th.
	QUORAM	February 18th.
	QUORAM	March 4th.
	QUORAM	March 5th.
	QUORAM	March 17th.
	HARRAR	March 29th. (town stated to have been demilitarised as notified to the League in 1935.)

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Apart from the bombing of open towns the memorandum accuses the Italians of using aeroplanes to bomb mere villages and mow down the flocks and herds of the peasants in places far from any military operations or concentrations.

C. USE OF POISONOUS GAS.

1) Ethiopian allegations of use of gas.

See Documents C.506.M.275.1935 (telegram of 30.XII.35), C.8.M.7.1936 (telegram of 1.I.36), C.9.M.8.1936 (letter of 31.XII.35), C.16.M.14.1936 (letter of 8.I.36), C.119.M.58.1936 (telegram of 17.III.36 alleging use by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases all along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country), C.152.M.90.1936 (letter of 10.IV.36 alleging use of gas on Ogaden front), C.155.M.93.1936 (memorandum of March 2nd to the International Committee of the Red Cross); C.159.M.97.1936 and C.161.M.99.1936.

Document C.161.M.99.1936 gives the following list of towns attacked with poison gas:

Takkaze	December 22nd, 1935
Amba Alaa	December 26th, 1935
Borena	December 31st, 1935
Sokota	January 10th, 1936
Makale	January 21st, 1936
Magalo	February 1936 (as the date cannot be exactly deciphered confirmation has been asked for).
Waldia Road	February 27th, 1936
Quoram	March 16th, 1936
Ylanserer	March 17th, 1936
Quoram	March 17th, 18th, 1936
Irga Alem	March 19th and 21st, 1936
Indomahoni	March 29th and 30th, 1936
Quoram	April 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 1936.

During the last four bombardments of Quoram (April 4th to 7th) the town is said to have been literally drenched with gas. The gas most frequently used is said to be mustard gas (yperite).

Use of gas against the troops is alleged to have occurred in the Takkaze region on December 23rd, against the southern army on December 30th, in the northern section of operations in January, continuously all along the northern front in March, on Dagabur and Sassabaneh (on the Ogaden front on April 8th) with resulting injury to 80 persons.

2) Alleged import of gas to Massawa.

The memorandum reproduced in C.155.M.93.1936 states that between June 25 and December 25, 1935, 45 tons of jostiprity, 265 tons of asphyxiating materials and 7,483 gas bombs, and on January 4th, 1936, 4,700 gas bombs passed the Suez Canal on their way to Massawa.

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3) Statements from non-Ethiopian sources regarding actual cases of casualties from gas.

The note (unnumbered) circulated by the United Kingdom delegation to the Committee of XIII under date April 8th, 1935, refers to the following:

a) Statement of Dr. Melly of the British Red Cross that on March 1st, 2nd and 3rd he treated about 100 serious cases of mustard gas burns, a statement supported by photos showing gas burns which were taken on March 4th and are in the possession of the British Minister at Addis-Ababa.

b) Signed statement by Dr. J.W.C. Macfié of the British Ambulance that between March 1st and March 8th, 1936, he personally saw and treated several hundred men, women and children who were suffering from mustard gas burns.

c) Report that there exists an authenticated report of the Norwegian ambulance proving that on March 19th 21 cases of mustard gas burns were caused by one bomb.

d) Report that the Swedish ambulance has reported treating cases in December on the south front.

e) Report that Dr. Junod of the International Red Cross and Count von Rosen (Swedish Red Cross Pilot) saw gas used at Quoram on March 17th and suffered from it. Dr. Junod sent a report to the International Committee.

f) Report that Dr. Brophill, an Irishman attached to the Ethiopian army sanitary service command and serving with the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulance No.3 has made a statement at London that in the last week of December and the first week of January about 30 cases of mustard gas burns were treated by that ambulance.

D. BOMBING OR BURNING OF CHURCHES.

The Ethiopian memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, to the International Committee (p.18) gives the following six instances of bombing or burning of churches by the Italian forces and quotes as corroborative evidence an Italian proclamation dropped during air-bombing operations on January 15th and 16th

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promising that any churches damaged in the course of the war will be restored:-

DAGABUR	November 14th
DAGABUR	November 28th
Churches in the Shire	During the retreat after the defeat of Eda Selassie
Churches in the Tembien	During the retreat from Tembien
SOKOTO	January 10th
ABBI ADDI	January 20th.

V.

ITALIAN ANSWERS TO ETHIOPIAN ALLEGATIONS.

A communication of April 11th, 1936 (C.157.M.95.1936) says:

"The Royal Government notes that the denunciation of the Abyssinian atrocities which it sent, together with confirmatory documents, as early as December 17th, 1935, and later by its notes dated December 31st, 1935, and January 18th, February 28th and March 9th, 1936, will be fully investigated by the competent bodies. The observance of the laws of war has been and is the constant rule of the Italian army, and the Royal Government desires by the present communication to give a full assurance on that point. The observance of thes laws must be bilateral. The Italian military authorities cannot do otherwise than punish every inhuman atrocity committed by its adversary in contempt of every principle of law and morality."

As regards particular charges:

Bombing of Red Cross hospitals and ambulances.

A specific denial of an early charge of this kind appears in C.481.M.257.1935 (letter of 13.XII.1935) where it is said inter alia in reference to alleged bombing of the American hospital of Dessié on December 6th that Dessié was a large military centre and that "if the Ethiopian sanitary forces wish to avoid any risk they must place themselves at a sufficient distance from military objectives and remain completely isolated".

In its memorandum of February 28th, 1936 (Document C.104.M.45.1936, p.5) the Italian Government argues that the evidence there given proves "that throughout the whole territory of Ethiopia Abyssinian leaders and troops systematically misuse the Red Cross emblem, transforming it into a veritable arm of military defence and attack". It considers that it is faced with systematic misuse resulting from the low level of civilisation of the troops and from deliberate calculation on the part of the Ethiopian leaders. It adds that nevertheless the Italian higher command has "not yet had recourse -

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as it would have been fully entitled to do - to Article 7 of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of wounded which lays down that 'la protection due aux formations et établissements sanitaires cessera si l'on en use pour commettre des actes nuisibles à l'ennemi '."

On April 6th, the Italian Government (Doc.C.146.M.85. 1936) denies having bombed a British field ambulance at Chilga on March 20th. (See footnote on this case in list at IV A of this memorandum).

Bombing of open towns.

A specific denial that this has occurred is given in a letter of December 13th, 1935 (C.481.M.257.1935).

Use of gas.

On March 23rd, 1936, the President of the Committee of XIII at the request of the Committee sent to the Italian Government a letter in which he stated that the Committee "would be happy to receive any observations your Government might wish to make in regard to the Ethiopian Government's allegation of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases by the Italian army". In its reply dated April 3rd, 1936, the Italian Government made no statement as to whether such gases had or had not been employed, although it referred to "the facts of which a tendencious version is put forward in the Ethiopian statements." No other communication on the subject has been received from the Italian Government (See C.133.M.72.1936, Annexes 1 and 4).

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C 117937

ANNEX 3.

Letter from the Chairman of the Committee of XIII

to the Italian Government.

Geneva, April 18th, 1936.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee of XIII has duly considered the communications addressed to me by Your Excellency on April 3rd and 11th.

I must observe that, under the Council Resolution of December 19th, 1935, the Committee of XIII was instructed, "bearing in mind the provisions of the Covenant, to examine the situation as a whole". In virtue of that Resolution, the Committee can obtain information regarding any factor in the conflict the knowledge of which might be of use to it in accomplishing its task.

With reference to the question raised by the final paragraph of your Excellency's note, the Committee finds that all the communications received from either of the belligerents alleging infringements of international conventions have been duly transmitted to the other party in each case, thus giving the latter an opportunity of submitting any observations it might desire to make.

That the Committee of XIII has thought fit to call your Government's attention to the Ethiopian Government's allegations of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases by the Italian army, is due to the fact that it has observed that your Government, although it has furnished details regarding, inter alia, the bombing of ambulances, has not as yet given any information as to the allegations of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases.

The Committee of XIII does not desire to make any legal distinction among the different international obligations relating to the conduct of hostilities. It has not failed to note that, apart from allegations of infringements of the Geneva Conventions of July 27th, 1929, concluded under the auspices of the Red Cross, infringements of certain of the Hague Conventions have been reported by both parties. It has thought fit to call the Italian Government's attention to the desirability of furnishing information also with regard to the allegations of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, because it has been bound to refer to the Protocol of June 17th, 1925, concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, which reads as follows:

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy,
Rome.

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"WHEREAS the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of all the civilised world; and

WHEREAS the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

TO THE END that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations:

DECLARE:

That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration."

The Committee accordingly thinks it proper to give the Italian Government an opportunity of stating whether the facts alleged by the Ethiopian Government are correct. Referring to the telegram of April 11th, the Committee is of opinion that the observation in the final sentence to the effect that "The Italian military authorities cannot do otherwise than punish every inhuman atrocity committed by its adversary in contempt of every principle of law and morality" cannot justify the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases.

I have the honour to enclose an analysis of the documents relating to the conduct of the war which had been submitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations up to April 16, 1936.

I have the honour, etc.:

(Signed) S. de MADARIAGA

Chairman of the Committee
of XIII.

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C117939
L-150
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.174.M.110.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 18th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

I.

(Translation from Italian). Rome, April 18th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that a Decree of Marshal Badoglio dated yesterday prohibits the employment of native boys under fourteen for manual labour which might be injurious to their physical development. The Decree also prohibits the employment of native boys under fourteen in service or at work of any kind (whether paid or not) at a distance from their respective families. I shall send you later the text of the Decree, which put an end to the barbarous exploitation of children prevalent in Ethiopia, and request you meanwhile to notify the States Members of the League of Nations and the International Labour Office.

SUVICH.

II.

(Translation from Italian). Rome, April 18th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

General Graziani reports that Air Lieutenant-Colonel Liberati has been hit by a dum-dum bullet, which very seriously wounded him, and a Dubat has been castrated. I shall forward (as soon as they have arrived) photographs in evidence of these new Abyssinian atrocities. In requesting you to notify the foregoing to the States Members of the League of Nations, I feel obliged to draw your attention to these facts, which prove that all the rules of conventions and of humanity continue to be violated by the Ethiopian troops.

SUVICH.

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C 117940
MAR 4 1936
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

L-150
64(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League

C.173.M.109.1936.VII

Geneva, April 18th 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Government

Addis Ababa, April 17th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General,

(Translation)

By its reply of March 8th the Italian Government accepted the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen that it should negotiate within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant. Its proposals communicated to the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen on March 16th prove once more however that the Italian Government does not intend to keep its word. It has so little intention of negotiating within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant that it refuses all competence to the League and to the Committee of Thirteen, first by insisting upon direct negotiations, secondly by refusing to negotiate at Geneva and thirdly by refusing to communicate its peace proposals until it is satisfied that the principles of the Covenant will not be respected. In her struggle against the agressor Ethiopia has for seven months vainly awaited measures to put an end to this aggression. Despite the good will of the States Members of the League, the sanctions that have been applied have proved ineffectual, and the time that has been allowed to elapse without the imposition of additional sanctions has enabled the enemy to pursue with impunity his aggression and his flagrant violations of the laws of war. After this long period of waiting Ethiopia is now entitled to ask herself whether the principle of collective security is not really a dead letter. For seven months past Ethiopia has resisted her powerful aggressor by her own resources, and in the face of this latest manifestation of Italian bad faith Ethiopia is more resolute than ever to repulse the unworthy invader of her territory. Ethiopia has strictly conformed to the obligations of the Covenant and has always been prompt to welcome any proposal for a settlement within the framework of the League of Nations and in the spirit of the Covenant. But on the other hand th. Covenant of the League imposes specific obligations on its Members to put an end to an aggression established by them against any Member. Relying upon the Covenant, Ethiopia firmly and formally invokes the rights that the Covenant confers upon her and appeals to all the States Members for immediate measures to be taken to stop this invasion, which is contrary to the Covenant and is unanimously condemned.

HAILE SELASSIE I.

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W4(a)

C 117941

MAY 4 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.165.M.101.1936.VII.
Erratum to English text.

Geneva, April 18th 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the United Kingdom Government.

On page 6, line 12, read

"His Majesty's Government can only regard the pretentions advanced in Signor Suvich's letter ...."

instead of

"His Majesty's Government can only regard the pretentious advances in Signor Suvich's letter ....."

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C 117942

Information Sections Bulletin

Friday, April 24th, 1936.

Weekly wireless telegram of the Information Section. Council League held Extraordinary Session this week on Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Report was submitted by Committee Thirteen on negotiations between Chairman, Madariaga, Spain, assisted by Secretary General. This report stated that though replies of Ethiopian Italian Governments to appeal made them on March third had offered prospect prompt cessation hostilities, and final restoration peace, such hopes must for moment be abandoned. Report Committee Thirteen further mentioned steps taken concerning use poison gas and atrocities committeed in Tehiopian war. Council, with Bruce, Australia, presiding, heard statements Italian and Ethiopian arguments submitted respectively by Baron Aloisi and Wolde Mariam concerning this report. After statements by various Members, Council adopted resolution of which summary follows:-

"Council takes note of report Committee Thirteen, approves and renews appeal addressed to two parties for prompt cessation hostilities and restoration peace in framework of League and in spirit of Covenant, notes replies of Ethiopian and Italian Governments, regrets that Committee Thirteen's efforts conciliation had no further result and that war is continuing under conditions declared contrary to Covenant and involving execution of obligations laid down upon Members League in such a case by Covenant, addresses to Italy Supreme Appeal that she should bring to settlement of her dispute with Ethiopia that spirit which League is entitled to expect from one of its original Members and a prominent member Council, recalls that Italy and Ethiopia are bound by Protocol of 1925 (Unuse ?) Asphyxiating Gases, and by Conventions

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regarding conduct of war."

This resolution was adopted by Council unanimously save for a reservation by representative Ecuador. Votes of parties not counted in ascertaining unanimity but Italian representative voted against resolution whilst Ethiopian merely expressed regrets that resolution did not show clearly enough that Italian regrets Government had, for seven months, been carrying on war extermination against her people, whose only crime was to defend its political existence and life of its inhabitants against an aggressor who is violating all treaties and in particular Convention 1925, which prohibited use poison gases. Concerning application sanctions against Italy, Chairman Committee Eighteen, Vasconcellos, Portugal, considered Committee should not be summoned at present. But Vasconcellos pointed out information obtained showed that effects sanctions becoming more and more evident. Said that figures of imports from Italy and Italian colonies to third countries and exports from those countries to Italy show considerable decrease Italian trade. During meeting, Committee Experts instructed follow application sanctions. Chairman, Westmann, Sweden, also gave figures showing that according to information from third countries, Italian exports have diminished 45% and imports 39% compared with January, 1935. Figures now available show progressive effect sanctions for February. Westmann also gave information concerning export gold from Italy showing that gold and foreign currency reserves Bank Italy, which were 4,316 million gold lire October 20th, 1935, have decreased by almost half since that date. Experts also considered replies from various Governments concerning application sanctions and noted statistics trade with Italy and Italian colonies which have since been published.

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C 117944

Secretary General received from United Kingdom Government for communication States Members note giving reply of Great Britain to Turkey concerning application revision Statute Dandanelles. United Kingdom Government recognizes request for discussion is one which Turkey fully entitled to make and regard it as valuable proof fidelity Turkish Government to principle that International Treaties cannot be modified by unilateral action.

Committee Traffic Women and Children has begun Seventeenth Session, Chairman, Madame Estrid Hein, Denmark. Account of work will be given at end session.

Secretariat League has just published April number monthly nulletin statistics giving, besides usual tables, information world trade, world gold reserves, movement prices raw materials and manufactured articles.

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C 117945 L-150 WT4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS PRESS

April 24th, 1936.

Secretary General of the League of Nations communicates to Governments States Members League the text of a statement made on April 21st, 1936, by the President of the Committee of Experts on the Effect of Sanctions:-

The President of the Co-ordination Committee has the honour to communicate to the Members of the Committee an extract of a statement made by M. Westmann, the President of the Committee of Experts, in a meeting of that Committee on April 21st, 1936;

> The statistical information received concerning the trade with Italy was commented upon as follows by the President of the Committee of Experts: (1) owing to the time required for legislation to be passed and the exceptions allowed under the various proposals of the Co-ordination Committee, Proposal Three did not become effective until about the new year. (2) In January, 1936, Italian exports fell off by nearly one-half forty-six per cent and Italian imports by well over one-third thirty-nine percent as compared with January, 1935. (3) The figures so far available for February show the progressive effect of sanctions. I quote the following figures for Italian exports to third countries -
>
> November, 1935 - 17.03 million gold dollars.
> December, 1935 - 11.27 million gold dollars.
> January, 1936 - 6.52 million gold dollars.
> February, 1936 - 5.86 million gold dollars.
>
> These figures include imports into colonies which do not apply Proposal Three. (4) If these are

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an estimate, the exports from Italy to those countries which do apply that proposal have become negligible, while in January they still amounted to over 16% of the exports in January 1935, in February they had fallen to some 6% of the exports of a year ago.

(5) It is essential to remember that the figures are the statistics of the countries from which information is available, i.e., that Italian exports are shown as imports of those countries and Italian imports as exports of these countries. This is particularly important in estimating the Italian trade balance. The value indicated by the other countries as imports from Italy is higher than the price Italy obtains for her exports for that value includes the costs of transport insurance and other costs which fall on those exports, in fact the difference between F.O.B. and C.I.F. Similarly, Italy has to pay more for her imports than is indicated by the statistics of the exporting countries. Those differences are usually estimated on an average of 10% of the value of the goods. If this adjustment is made throughout to the figures available, Italy's unfavourable balance is considerably increased. It will be noticed that the Italian gold exports during recent months greatly exceed the apparent unfavourable trade balance. The reason just advanced may in part explain these heavy gold losses.

(6) The Governor of the Bank of Italy stated recently that the gold holdings of the Bank were reduced by 909 million gold lires, corresponding to 47.8 million gold dollars, between October 20th and the end of 1935. The replies to the questionnaire show that during a somewhat shorter period, namely, during November and December, 1935, gold imports from Italy, amounting to 579.1 million

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gold lire (30.5 million gold dollars) were registered by the countries for which we have information.

(7) The export of gold continued in January with what would appear to be increasing rapidity. In that month the total net imports of gold from Italy by the countries given amounted to 517.6 million gold lire (27.2 million gold dollars). Gold imports amounting to 315 million gold lire (16.6 million gold dollars) in February have already been reported to Geneva. Information from a number of countries is still lacking. For March no replies are available as yet but according to press reports 260 million gold lire, equalling 13.7 million gold dollars, were exported in one single consignment, during that month, from Italy to Switzerland. This incomplete information seems to show that during the first three months of 1936 Italy has exported gold amounting to at least 109.2 million gold lire (7.5 million gold dollars). The gold and foreign assets reserve of the Bank of Italy on October 20th, 1935, amounted to 4,316 million gold lire (227.2 million gold dollars). The Bank seems to have lost since that date nearly one-half of this amount. What amount of gold and foreign assets the Government has been able to collect domestically since October is not known. ~~Nexxxtransmission~~

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C 117948 L-150 6 P4(a)
THE DEPARTMENT OF ... CANADA MAY 11 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.184.M.118.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 25th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the International Red Cross Committee.

Geneva, April 24th, 1936.

To the Chairman of the Committeeoof Thirteen.

(Translation).

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 18th* concerning our reply of April 9th** to the request addressed to us by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on behalf of the Committee of Thirteen on April 8th.

The International Red Cross Committee considered, at its meeting on April 23rd, your letter informing us that our reply had been received with profound regret and that the reasons given by the International Red Cross Committee had surprised the Committee of Thirteen.

Being anxious to avoid any misunderstanding on a question affecting the very nature of its mission, the International Committee would point out that, according to its statutes (Article 4), its object is "to be a neutral intermediary whose intervention is recognised to be necessary, especially in case of war, civil war, or internal disorders", and "to receive any complaint of alleged infringements of the international Conventions and, in general, to study all questions, the examination of which by a specifically neutral body is essential." It is also the duty of the International Committee "to uphold the uniform fundamental principles of the institution of the Red Cross, namely, impartiality, political, religious, and economic independence, the universality of the Red Cross, and the equality of the national societies."

This function of the International Committee was explicitly recognised by Article VII of the Statutes of the International Red Cross adopted at the Hague International Conference in 1928 by all the national societies and by the delegates of the States parties to the Geneva Conventions for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the field.

Such being its functions, the International Red Cross Committee is obliged to hold aloof from any action which might have a political character.

It was this that the International Committee intended to indicate when it wrote to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in its letter of April 9th, that the neutrality which it is bound to observe makes it necessary for it to exercise

* See Document C.176.M.112.1936.VII, Annex I.
** See Document C.150.M.88.1936.VII.

P.T.O.

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very great discretion. It is, too, for that reason - quite apart from the enquiry that the Ethiopian and Italian Governments have asked it to make - that it could not see its way to comply with the wishes of the Committee of Thirteen, even though its attitude might be misinterpreted, the observance of the international Conventions designed to protect humanitarian interests in time of war being always one of its fundamental concerns.

The International Red Cross Committee has, of course, a special interest in the observance of the Geneva Conventions. But its neutrality, in the sense in which we have just defined it, necessarily obliges it to adopt the same attitude towards alleged violations, not only of the Geneva Convention, but also of other international Conventions designed to protect humanitarian interests in time of war.

The aims of the International Red Cross Committee are exclusively humanitarian and non-political; its primary function is to endeavour to alleviate the sufferings of the victims of war. In order to attain those aims, it must adhere scrupulously to a line of conduct that will enable it to maintain relations of mutual confidence with the contending parties, even in cases where the Geneva Conventions are not legally applicable. The International Committee likewise considers that it cannot depart from the principles stated above even in conflicts in which the right to wage war is denied.

As the correspondence between the League of Nations and the International Red Cross Committee on the subject of your request of April 8th has been made public by the League, we consider ourselves entitled to take similar action when this letter has reached you.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Max HUBER,

President.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.191.M.120.1936.VII.

Geneva, April 29th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Rome, April 27th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translation from the Italian)

With reference to the telegrams from the Ethiopian Government dated March 29th last (Document C.129.M.168.1936.VII), I have the honour to inform you that His Excellency General Graziani reports that Italian headquarters had learned from numerous reliable sources of the existence at Harrar of large depôts of arms and ammunition, various military stores, and emplacements for machine-guns and artillery, especially anti-aircraft guns.

The existence of military objectives having been ascertained, orders were given for the bombardment of March 29th last, which was limited to those objectives. The Italian airmen took every care to avoid hitting places which ought to be left unharmed.

In any case, it is quite certain that the medical establishments of the Egyptian Mission suffered only casual and unimportant damage, and that the Swedish Mission sustained no damage whatever.

It is further stated that the operations, having as their objective numerous military depôts scattered over the neighbourhood, had to be carried out from a high altitude and under particularly difficult conditions, especially owing to the heavy anti-aircraft fire from Ethiopians.

The Ethiopian assertion that Harrar is a completely demilitarised and undefended town is absolutely false, as witness the existence, as aforesaid, of large depôts and military works, and the fact that the Italian aircraft came under heavy fire, some of them being hit.

Further, since the Ethiopian Government refers to the French hospital and Consular agency so as to give the impression that the reference is to two separate buildings in Harrar, I would point out that the French Consular agency is under the management of Dr. Feron, who is also Director of the French hospital at Harrar, and that the Consular agency has no separate premises, but is situated in the French hospital.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) SUVICH.

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C117951

Memo by Mr. Shelton
Re application of Sanctions without Consulting
Parl. & the 1926 Resolution.

On June 21,1926, the Prime Minister of Canada moved a resolution approving the 1923 Imperial Conference resolution regarding the negotiation,signature and ratification of treaties. He added that it was considered "important that Parliament should feel assured in regard to all these great obligations of an international character which involve military and economic sanctions, that a government should not have the opportunity of binding Parliament in advance of its own knowledge to the obligations incurred thereby". The resolution was carried unanimously. The last sentence of the resolution reads as follows:

> "This House approved of the procedure proposed for the negotiation,signature and ratification of treaties and conventions, and considers further that before His Majesty's Canadian Ministers advise ratification of a treaty or convention affecting Canada, or signifies acceptance of any treaty,convention or agreement involving military or economic sanctions, the approval of the Parliament of Canada should be secured."

It is contended that the present Canadian administration violated this resolution by undertaking, without Parliamentary authority,in the statement of October 29th, to commit Canada to participation in economic sanctions, and by putting the sanctions into force a fortnight later.

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It might be answered that the resolution referred only to future treaties or agreements, and that the action which the Canadian Government took was based on an existing treaty(the Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant),which went into force in 1919, seven years before the resolution in question was adopted by the House of Commons.

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GENEVA

June, 1936.

I. Position of the Government.

It has been contended that the Government has not made clear its policy on the important problems, immediate and future, which have been raised by the outbreak and progress of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.

It is true that the Government has declined to make a statement at some critical stages when a statement would be premature and would complicate rather than advance a solution.

It is undoubtedly essential that in Parliament and outside of it, there should be full and responsible discussion of the vital questions of Canada's relations to other states. There has not been sufficient discussion in the past. That has been due to:

(1) our slow emergence from the colonial attitude of mind;

(2) our relative immunity from any serious danger of war on our own account;

(3) the real difficulties inherent in our preoccupation with the tremendous, absorbing and paramount tasks of achieving economic development and national unity, which with us take the place of the preoccupation

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with the fear of attack and the dreams of glory which beset older and more crowded countries; and

(4) the unparalleled complexity of our position as a member of the League, and one of the nations of the American Continent.

The situation is changing. Informed and serious consideration of Canada's external relations is being given by the press and by organized groups of citizens throughout the country. There is a much more realistic appreciation of our position than prevailed thirty years, even ten years ago. I cannot say there has been a crystallization of opinion in any final or clear cut form, but there is an increasing realization of the complexity of the problem and of the special Canadian factors involved.

So far as the general policy of the Government in the present conflict is concerned, it has been made clear from the beginning. That policy was set forth definitely in the statement issued on October 29, within a week after the present Administration assumed office. It is a policy by which we have abided and a policy to which we still adhere.

See White Paper p. 165

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That statement set forth, first, the attitude which the Government proposed to take on the immediate question of the application of sanctions to Italy, and second, the line of approach to the wider question of the aims and methods of the League of Nations. May I deal with each of these two questions in turn?

First, as to the immediate question. It was stated that while reserving consideration of the feasibility and desirability of making the League's central purpose the guarantee of the territorial status quo and the reliance upon force for the maintenance of peace,

> "in the present instance, when an earnest effort is being made with wide support to test the feasibility of preventing or at least terminating war by the use of economic sanctions, and when there is no room for doubt as to where the responsibility rests for the outbreak of war, and having regard also to the position taken by Canada at the recent Assembly, the Canadian Government is prepared to co-operate fully in the endeavour."

It was further added that steps would be taken to secure the effective application of the economic sanctions proposed by the Co-ordination Committee, and that the Canadian Government did not recognize any commitment binding Canada to apply military sanctions and that no such commitment could be made without the

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prior approval of the Canadian Parliament.

I think that was a definite and clear statement of policy. How far has that policy been carried out?

First, "the effective application of the economic sanctions recommended by the Co-ordination Committee", representing all the members of the League which had concurred in finding Italy the aggressor. What were those sanctions? They were:

1. The prohibition of exports of arms and munitions to Italy.
2. The prohibition of the export to Italy of certain key products useful for the prosecution of war and controlled by the members of the League, including transport animals, rubber, bauxite, aluminium, iron ore, manganese, chromium, nickel, tungsten, vanadium and tin.
3. The prohibition of all imports from Italy, except gold and silver coin and bullion,
   goods en route,
   (later) books and newspapers,
   (later) goods purchased though not shipped before October 19.
4. The prohibition of loans or credits to Italy.

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These were the sanctions, and all the sanctions, recommended by the League Committee. All were put into effect by Canada at or before the time agreed upon, November 18. All are still in effect. All have been enforced strictly and effectively.

As some question has been raised as to whether the sanctions are actually being enforced, it may be well to state the facts briefly. Any doubt on that score is based, I think, on misunderstanding either as to what the recommendations as to sanctions actually were, or as to the actual facts of their application.

The first recommendation for the prohibition of the export of arms and munitions raised relatively few difficulties for Canada, as we produce these wares only in a very minor degree. There has been no indicatiom of evasion.

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The second recommendation, for prohibition of the export of certain key minerals, touched Canada more closely. We are the outstanding producer of nickel, one of the most important minerals included in the list, though it does not hold the decisive place which is sometimes attributed to it. Special care was therefore taken to ensure against not only direct but indirect shipment of Canadian nickel - to prevent, in the words of the League Committee, "any abnormal increase in the export of prohibited commodities by indirect routes."

Some misunderstanding has also arisen in this case because of the mistaken notion that all exports were prohibited. This of course was not the case. There was no reason why wheat or codfish should not be exported, so far as the exporter was concerned. Our general export trade was of course affected by the retaliatory steps taken by Italy which endeavoured to find substitutes at home or to divert purchases to non-sanctionist countries. Aside from direct steps taken by the Italian authorities, the decreased purchasing power resulting from the inability to sell Italian goods abroad of course reduced Italy's power to buy abroad.

The Department of National

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Revenue vigilantly checked direct export. As to indirect export, the fact is that practically all Canadian nickel bought by Comtinental Europe is bought from Great Britain; London is the dominant centre in the metal trade for Europe. In 1935, for example, Canada sent 140,800 cwt. of fine nickel to the United Kingdom, and only 380 cwt. direct to the Continent of Europe. As a party to sanctions, the United Kingdom has of course been equally concerned with Canada in ensuring that no nickel should reach Italy after the export ban went into effect. The other important possible channel is the United States. The position in that regard is simplified by the fact that for some years the International Nickel Company has followed the practice of selling to consumers in the United States for their own use only: no nickel has been sold in the United States for export to other countries. The exports to and from the United States have been carefully followed; some nickel has been and is being exported from the United States to Italy, but the amount is not sufficiently large to constitute a substantial evasion.

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The third recommendation, prohibition of imports from Italy, was relatively simple to enforce, which was one of the reasons for its adoption. The recommendation in this respect has been fully and faithfully carried out. Some misunderstanding has arisen from two sources. First, certain exceptions were included in the recommendation, none of great importance, the chief being goods en route at the time the sanctions were applied, and goods paid for but not shipped before October 19; rigid care was taken to compel complete proof before goods of either category were admitted: the total was slight. Second, the ordinary statistics of importation give rise to misunderstanding. Our Customs returns of imports do not comprise goods entering the country, but goods passing through the Customs, and consequently the returns show as "imports" goods which entered the country before sanctions were imposed, but not drawn from Customs warehouse until some months later.

The fourth recommendation, the prohibition of loans and credits, like the first, created no special problem for Canada. The co-operation of banks and investment companies, was early secured by the Minister of Finance. The recommendation, it may be noted, did not prohibit making payments due for goods or services, or the making of gifts.

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In several cases inquiry was made as to the detailed procedure adopted by the United Kingdom and other countries.

It cannot be denied that Canada has enforced the sanctions agreed upon as fully and effectively as any other country, and more so than a number of countries which agreed to sanctions "in principle".

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Proposals for further export sanctions.

As regards the proposals to add coal, iron and steel, and oil to the list of prohibited exports, it is not necessary to make any extended comment. The criticisms of the Canadian Government's attitude on these proposals which were voiced in some quarters last December did not survive a clearer appreciation of what the Canadian Government's attitude was and of the position taken by other countries. These commodities have not been included in the prohibited list for two reasons. In the early stages of the conflict, the prohibited exports were confined to articles which were substantially controlled by members of the League and trade in which therefore could not easily be diverted to non-sanctionist countries. When at a later stage their inclusion came up for review, a second consideration came into play, namely, whether their application would or would not lead to war. There is no inherent reason why these commodities should not be embargoed, why nickel or iron ore should be prohibited and steel or oil continue to be shipped. The difficulty arises from the inevitable dilemma which the application of sanctions presents: if moderate, they may fail to deter or halt the aggressor; if extreme, they may drive an aggressor to prefer the gamble of sudden battle to the prospect of slow strangulation. There is no blinking the fact that

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economic sanctions may lead to war. They mean the application of force. They are not mere commercial measures. They are in intention and reality a means of imposing the will of one nation or group upon another nation or group. In modern times they have always, in different forms, been an important part of the technique of war, from the Berlin decrees to the Trading with the Enemy Acts and the blockades of neutral countries in the Great War. Whether they will progress into military measures is not necessarily within the control of the powers that impose them; that may depend on the calculation of advantage and disadvantage made by those against whom the test of will is directed.

In the present conflict, one of these commodities assumed critical importance. In modern military operations, with aviation and mechanized transport playing so decisive a role, a continuous supply of oil may be vital. How vital is a question in dispute; the authoritative inquiry made by the League Expert Committee resulted in the finding that if applied by all countries, it would become fully effective in three or three and a half months, but that if applied only by League members, the effect would be merely to render the purchase of petroleum more difficult and expensive; in other words, the co-operation of the United States was essential, a co-operation which could not easily be secured, in view of the reaction in United States

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opinion following the Hoare-Laval episode. Whether the enforcement of an oil sanction would, in fact, have led to war is also in dispute: the Italian threats may have been genuine or may have been bluff. In any case they were sufficient to cause some great countries to conclude that if it would not involve new wars, it would at least make impossible a peaceful settlement of the existing war.

During November, the European press were full of assertions that Canada was initiating and urging the imposition of an oil sanction. It became imperative to correct this serious misapprehension. The Canadian Government had not urged the step in question. Further, it did not consider that Canada should initiate such a step: Canada had no special power, no special interest in the present conflict which would warrant such a pretentious gesture. It was not upon Canada, but upon countries nearer the conflict that the chief brunt of possible consequences would fall. This was made clear in the statement issued on December 2. This statement, of course, referred to the origin and not to the merits of the proposal. It was explicitly stated that the Canadian Government would be prepared to consider, with other members of the League, any proposal for the revision of economic sanctions.

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I may add that on two later occasions, in December and in March, when it was expected that the question of oil, coal and steel canctions would come before the Committee of Eighteen, the Canadian Government instructed its representative to concur in the proposal if generally supported.

(To continue)

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IV. Application of Sanctions.

1. Appointment of Committee of Co-ordination.

October 11: In pursuance of the vote taken in the Assembly on October 10, the delegations concurring in that vote met on October 11 to advise and co-ordinate the measures to be taken under Article XVI; 49 States were represented(including Canada, by Mr.Ferguson). It was and is not a Committee of the League, but a guiding Committee of such League members as have approved the application of sanctions. It set up a smaller Committee, later known as the Committee of Eighteen, to carry on preparatory work and report to the larger body.

Members: (selected on proposal of Chairman, M. de Vasconcellos of Portugal):-

Union of South Africa, Argentine, Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Greece, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

2. Proposals of Committee of Eighteen:

This Committee utilized various exploratory reports made by previous League bodies; particularly the Resolutions of 1921, which had materially watered down the provisions of Article XVI, and the reports of the Committee of Thirteen, which had been appointed in 1935 to consider the French proposal that sanctions might be applied against a country which had broken a treaty and thereby threatened the peace of Europe, even though it had not gone to war.

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As a result of its deliberations, four measures or sanctions were proposed, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee and put into force by nearly all the participating States, as follows:-

Proposal No. 1:

Embargo on export to Italy of arms, ammunition and implements of war, generally agreed upon as the first step to be taken; articles included were based on the embargo proclamation of President Roosevelt of October 5th, with the addition of powder and explosives; proposal made on October 11th, adopted the same day by the Co-ordination Committee, as a recommendation to all the Governments concerned for application forthwith; rapidly adopted; accepted by Canadian Government, and enforced by Order-in-Council P.C.3461 under Section 290 of Customs Act, on October 31, modified on November 15 by P.C. 3594 to conform in procedure with Orders applying other sanctions. Reported on November 18th as in force in 51 States.

Proposal No. 2.

Prohibition of loans or credits to the Italian Government or any corporation, public authority, or individual in Italian territory; does not prohibit transfer of funds to Italy, such as interest on Italian investments abroad, remittances by emigrants, or payments for Italian shipping services, and thus falls far short of the complete severance of financial relations set forth in Article XVI;

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Drafted by a Sub-Committee for Financial Measures,(representatives of South Africa,United Kingdom,France,Greece,Netherlands,Poland and Rumania),which was appointed on October 11th; reported by Committee of Eighteen on October 14th, after considerable debate on difficulties raised particularly by Switzerland and Argentina; adopted by Committee of Co-ordination on October 14th,as a recommendation to the Governments concerned,with invitation to put in force by October 31st if possible; applied by Canada on October 31st by informal arrangement between Minister of Finance and banks; formally enforced by Order-in-Council P.C.3594 of November 15th.

Proposal No. 3: Embargo on Imports from Italy:

Originated in discussion in Committee of Eighteen on October 12th,in which United Kingdom representatives urged it as immediately effective, and preferable to prohibition of key exports,on which agreement would require considerable time; French representative urged priority for consideration of the direct form of pressure by embargo on key exports, e.g. metals,minerals,chemical products,oil,coal,transport animals.

Both proposals referred on October 14th to an Economic Sub-Committee(on which Belgium,United Kingdom,Canada,France,Mexico,Netherlands,Poland, Rumania,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,Turkey and the U.S.S.R. were represented; Canada by Messrs.Riddell, Renaud and Rive); draft proposal for embargo of imports proposed in Sub-Committee by United Kingdom representative on October 16th; difficulties raised

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by Switzerland, Poland, Rumania and other countries as to goods due under barter or exchange control or other agreements, contending qualifications should be made in their favour in same way as it was claimed Proposal No. 2 had taken account of interest of France and United Kingdom; Switzerland's position criticized by Riddell.

Proposal voted substantially as drafted, exempting gold and silver coin or bullion and goods en route at time of adoption, by Committee of Eighteen, and by Committee of Co-ordination, on October 19th, with recommendation that Governments should state by October 31st date on which they could apply it; by October 31st forty-nine Governments had replied they were prepared to apply proposal, with or without amendments, usually at a November date; prolonged discussion in Committee of Eighteen and Economic Sub-Committee October 31st to November 6th, on exemptions suggested by Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Switzerland, Poland, Norway, etc. for goods under contract or clearing agreements, rejected for the most part; Committee of Co-ordination recommended application on November 18th, which was done by Canadian Government under P.C.3594 of November 15th; supplementary recommendations by Committee of Co-ordination exempting books and newspapers, and goods paid for before October 19th, were applied by Canada by P.C. 164 of January 16.

Proposal No. 4: Embargo on Exports of certain key products to Italy:

Originated as indicated under previous heading; on October 15th French representative in Economic Sub-Committee urged immediate discussion of embargoes and suggested inclusion of transport animals, bauxite and aluminium, iron ore, manganese, chromium, tin

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molybdenun, tungsten, vanadium, and also nickel if export through United States did not present difficulty; all of which were important for war purposes and were controlled by League States; embargoes on coal, petroleum and copper, and possibly iron and steel should be postponed until non-participating producing countries joined in; proposals for including ships, motor vehicles, and, with some exceptions, machine tools, were dropped; difficulty of controlling exports through non-participating countries, e.g. Germany, was considered; Canadian representative urged necessity of including advanced products as well as raw materials; on October 19th, the Committee of Eighteen considered a sub-committee draft; the Spanish and Russian delegates protested against inclusion of iron ore which Spain exports, unless the finished product, iron and steel, which other members exported, were also included in the embargo; Riddell repeated point raised in sub-committee.

Resolution, however, approved substantially as drafted; on October 19th Committee of Co-ordination adopted proposal, and recommended Governments to state when they could apply it; later, suggested November 18th as date; put into force by Canada on November 15th by P.C.3594.

The above constitute all the sanctions proposals recommended by the Committees and enforced by any member of the League. All are enforced by Canada.

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Proposal No. 5: Mutual Assistance:

A fifth proposal, not for sanctions, but for assistance to States injured in applying the above sanctions, was also drawn up. On October 14th a sub-committee was appointed (representatives of South Africa, United Kingdom, France, Greece, Poland, Rumania, Spain, U.S.S.R. and Jugo-Slavia). Neighbouring countries whose trade with Italy bulked relatively large, and which claimed they would therefore be particularly hard hit by interruption of trade, such as Yugo-Slavia, Rumania and Greece, pressed for compensation.

The proposal finally adopted by the Committee on Co-ordination on October 19th recommended the Governments to take steps to replace imports from Italy by imports of similar goods from participating countries and be prepared to negotiate to give to participating countries new opportunities for sale to offset the loss of Italian markets, and made further suggestions for study. No request for a reply was made, but the proposal has been accepted in principle by some 49 States. Canada accepted on November 27th, pointing out that some of the suggestions were more appropriate for countries with quota and exchange control systems than for Canada. In December the Canadian Government concurred in the granting by the United Kingdom of quota and duty concessions to Jugo-Slavia on eggs and poultry items covered by the United Kingdom-Canada Trade Agreement. In negotiations with Spain, Canada has suggested increased opening for our codfish to make up for loss of Italian market, but no conclusion yet reached.

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Proposed Extension of Proposal 4.

In drafting proposal 4, embargo on export of certain key products, consideration of its application to certain commodities not wholly or mainly controlled by League members, was postponed. The question came up again in the Committee of Eighteen on November 2nd. The discussion on this occasion, and in the Committee of Co-ordination on November 6th, was extremely brief and casual, whether as compared with the long and bitter discussions during the same period on exemptions of imports, or as compared with the significance later attached to the action taken.

When the Committee of Eighteen met on the morning of November 2nd, the discussion was begun by the Spanish delegate, who repeated the objection previously raised against preventing the export of iron ore but permitting the export of iron and steel. The French delegate contested this position. The Canadian delegate (Dr. Riddell) then referred to the fact that important products, petroleum and its derivatives, coal, iron and steel, were not included in the embargo list. He therefore moved that they be added to the list in principle, to come into effect when the Committee found that an embargo could be made effective. The Netherlands delegate suggested adding all the articles tentatively included in the supplementary list, e.g. cotton. The proposal was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee.

~~(?)~~ [Shall add note later re sub committee]

The revised draft reached the Committee of Co-ordination on November 6th, and was adopted as IVa, after very brief discussion about toluol and coal derivatives. Not a word was said about oil, which slipped in undiscussed and fatherless.

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NOTE:

The above summary follows the published committee records. Dr. Riddell supplements this by further information. When he reached the Committee on November 2nd, he states he found that the French representative had a proposal ready to move, to add oil, iron and steel, coal and copper to the prohibited list (doubtless subject to arrangements with non-participating States), and the Netherlands was prepared to go further. The Chileans pointed out to Riddell their objection to including copper; a Spanish delegate spoke to him about adding iron and steel to balance iron ore. Riddell then telegraphed for instructions, but the question came up immediately afterwards and he therefore acted on his own judgment. He decided, in order to limit the obligations of Canada, and to meet the Spanish-Chilean point of view, to head off the wider proposal by moving for the inclusion of four items only. He consulted Eden of the United Kingdom and Coulondre of the French delegation. That was all.

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COMMENT

1. Merits of the proposal. It is unnecessary at this point to discuss the expediency of the proposal, particularly as to oil, or the part it played in the December flare-up, when Hoare and Laval attempted to work out peace at the sacrifice of Ethiopia as an alternative to a war in Europe brought on by Mussolini's threats in case of oil embargo.

2. The internal administrative point: Was Dr. Riddell justified in acting as he did? He was undoubtedly acting with the best of intentions. His part in the general Committee discussions was a creditable one. The task of a representative at a great distance from his Government, in meeting rapidly changing issues is not an easy one. He was, however, not warranted in moving on so important an issue as this without definite instructions. It is true that there was much to be said for the general position of including manufactured products with the raw materials from which derived, and that in the hypothetical discussions on Sanctions in the Committee of Thirteen this position had been upheld by Canada. But this could cover only the inclusion of iron and steel, and could not apply to oil or copper or coal. Prudence and restraint were particularly called for in view of the fact that a change of Administration was taking place in Canada and no opportunity had been afforded the new Government to consider details. The general position of the Government on sanctions set forth in the Prime Minister's statement of October 29th, had immediately

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been cabled to Dr.Riddell. The only inquiries received from Geneva were contained (i) in a letter of Dr.Riddell's of October 22nd, which was not received until November 1st, and (ii) in a cabled request on October 14th for instructions as to economic sanctions, to which a reply was cabled on October 15th by Mr.Bennett referring to the change of government and instructing Riddell not to take a position on any new proposals, and (iii)a cable from Dr. Riddell on November 2nd(after the change of government) asking as to attitude to take on proposal for adding iron and steel and derivatives generally; (nothing was said about himself moving a proposal); reply sent within an hour instructing him not to raise question of finished products further; to make no statement as to inclusion of oil and copper but might support if majority approved; and in general to take no position on any question of importance without definite instructions. Before this was received, in fact immediately after despatch of Dr.Riddell's telegram, the discussion arose and Dr.Riddell decided to intervene. On Monday November 4th the press played up his action; further warning cables were immediately sent. Here the matter would have rested, if it had not been for the emergence of a third angle:-

3. Wide Public Misapprehension as to Canadian Government Action.

The press, particularly in England, referred to the proposal as Canada's proposal. As the implications, particularly of oil sanctions, became clearer, increasing press emphasis was placed upon the alleged initiative and insistence of the Canadian Government on the point. In view of the fact that (1) the Canadian Government had had no part whatever in the moving of the resolution and (2) that Dr.Riddell himself in moving it had been animated by a desire to cut down the number of commodities likely to be

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added to the embargo list, this interpretation was absurd. It became necessary, after a month had elapsed, to clear up the position; further silence would have made the Canadian Government a party to a false interpretation of the facts, and responsible for the consequences of a policy it had not adopted.

(To be followed by comments on merits, actual Canadian instructions later to its representative on Committee of Eighteen, etc.)

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CANADIAN ADVISORY OFFICER

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

GENEVA

3rd December, 1935.

My dear Dr. Skelton,

In the following I have attempted to give an impression of the meetings of the Committee of Eighteen and the Economic Sub-Committee on October 31st and November 1st and 2nd. I have made no attempt to cover all the subjects discussed - these are adequately given in the minutes - nor have I attempted to report the work of the various Sub-Committees.

2. I have again been looking over the provisional minutes of these meetings and note that the Secretariat have succeeded in making what were in truth discursive and frequently heated discussions appear quite ordinary and almost logical debates. Throughout the meetings, the delegations of France, Spain and the United Kingdom made a persistent effort to keep the discussion within bounds by defining terms in the debate and by conversation with the various delegations, in an effort to find some course of action agreeable to all, and to speed up the work of the committees.

3. The Committee of Eighteen resumed its sittings in the morning of Thursday, October 31st, and note was taken of the replies of the Governments to the five proposals. No important question arose on the

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replies of governments to proposals I and II, except a legal one arising out of the Swiss interpretation of the Declaration of London. The replies to Proposal III, however, revealed great differences of opinion and were the cause of most of the debate. The Polish and Norwegian governments, in their replies to the proposal, raised the question of existing contracts and opened a tortuous and heated debate which lasted for two days. At times in the course of the discussion which ensued such a wide divergence of opinion was revealed that one almost despaired of eventual agreement. That a compromise was finally achieved is evidence of the determination of all delegations to make effective the scheme of sanctions set up by the Co-ordination Committee.

4. Throughout the discussion in both Committees the questions of clearing agreements and uncompleted contracts were constantly confused by the speakers, despite the efforts of the Chairman and other delegates, who insisted that they should be dealt with independently. The Committee first attempted to dispose of the question of existing contracts. Mr. Eden said that the Government of the United Kingdom would not raise strong objection to the fulfilment of contracts where payment had already been made, but certainly would not agree in principle that all current contracts should be exempted. Mr. Coulondre, Delegate of France, having discussed the problem informally with various delegations, presented a classification of existing contracts on the basis of which he felt the discussion might more profitably be continued. These were :

(1) contracts in course of execution in respect of which no payment had been made;

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(2) contracts in course of execution in respect of which total payment had been made.

(3) contracts in course of execution in respect of which partial payments had been made.

5. As regards the first, it was agreed that a definite decision had already been taken and such contracts were ultra vires, although special cases might be examined by the Committee. On the second, M. Coulondre and Mr. Eden agreed that a derogation from the general rule should be allowed and that these contracts should be carried out. As regards the third group, it was felt that no general derogation should be allowed, but individual cases should be dealt with on their merits.

6. The Spanish Delegate, M. de Madariaga, brought up the whole question of clearing agreements, and suggested their immediate suspension, it being understood that the obligation should be resumed as soon as sanctions were removed, and that the debit and credit positions should then be the same as existed at the moment when the clearing agreements were suspended. This solution was eventually adopted, but only after three days of debate.

7. The Chairman made little attempt to control the discussion, and the Yugoslav, Norwegian Rumanian and Polish delegates all jointed in a scramble for special consideration and exemptions. M. de Madariaga then pointed out that, with regard to countries having debit or credit balances with Italy, proposals such as the Polish, which amounted to the approval of barter trade, would permit Italy to save some of her foreign credits for goods urgently needed and would, therefore, to some extent, negate the efforts of the

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participating states to weaken her credit position.

8. At this meeting and in the Economic Sub-Committee where the debate was continued, the Rumanian delegate was M. Visoianu, who adopted a truculent and inflexible attitude and had none of the persuasiveness of Titulesco. He argued at some length the thesis that Rumania, having a claim on Italy for goods already delivered by Rumania, could be permitted to accept from Italy goods in payment of these claims without any weakening of Proposal III. The feeling of other delegations was that, while in theory this argument might be valid, in practice Italy would not continue to export goods in payment of such claims, unless in doing so she secured for herself some compensatory advantage, that is to say, was able in some way to ease the burden of sanctions imposed against her.

9. With regard to M. Coulondre's second point, the Committee concluded that contracts for which payment had been made in full by October 19th should be permitted to stand. The question of contracts for which partial payment had been made was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee. The debate in the sub-committee and again in the Committee of Eighteen was little more than a repetition of the foregoing. M. Visoianu continued to present the Rumanian case with vehemence and at great length.

10. Again, Coulondre of France joined the debate and took issue with Visoianu. M. Subbotitch of Yugoslavia asked for a decision in principle. Mr Coulondre felt the M. Madariaga's proposal as regards payments under clearing agreements met the situation and that individual cases should be submitted to a sub-committee for investigation.

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Other countries having credit balances against Italy; the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, then stated that if the Rumanian thesis was adopted they would be forced to claim similar treatment.

11. De Madariaga then interfened to propose a compromise, saying that, if for any reason the continuation of the admission of Italian goods into any country had to be allowed, the general measure which had been adopted would lose some of its efficacy. Consequently, that solution should be resisted in every possible way. At the same time, he had been much struck by one of the Rumanian delegate's arguments. If a country was Italy's creditor and refusedby way of sanctions to accept a payment in goods, the debtor country might ipso facto regard itself as discharged from its debt. The Rumanian delegate was therefore right in asking that some action should be taken to preserve the creditor country's rights. M. Visoianu still resisted any solution short of his own, but M. Soubbotitch gave evidence of a willingness to consider M. de Madariaga's suggestion.

12. The Economic Sub-Committee, which met the following morning struggled with the problem. The Rumanian delegate again asked the question, in the form whether Italian goods might be accepted by participating States in payment for goods delivered to Italy prior to the embargo. He was again supported by the delegates of Yugoslavia and Norway, the latter pointing out to the Committee that certain States had put a very elastic construction on contracts on which payment had been made

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in advance, quoting from the United Kingdom Order-in-Council as given in their reply to Proposal IV providing for an exemption in the case of payment in lira on or before the delivery of goods (Co-ordination Committee document 10 (d) and from the French reply to Proposal II. At this point in the debate, the Rumanian delegate, Visioanu, was joined by M. Stucki of Switzerland who, with apparent satisfaction, pointed out that his forebodings of evil when Proposal III had first been put forward were now being realised. He discussed at some length the legal position of the Committee as he saw it: that, while the Committee of Co-ordination might make proposals, it must leave their interpretation and application to the several Governments, and finally concurred in the Rumanian view that the acceptance of Italian goods in liquidation of debit balances could not be considered as counter to the object of Proposal III. He held, however, that this should only apply where countries had clearing agreements with Italy. In his judgment, the Committee should not express any opinion on these questions, but only note the explanations given by certain governments in their replies. All Governments, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, would be free to take whatever decision they saw fit.

13. M. Coulondre of France agreed with M. Stucki that the Co-ordination Committee was a conference of Governments and that each Government was sovereign judge of the undertakings it was prepared to assume, and pointed out that these Governments had set up the Co-ordination Committee for the very purpose of directing collective action, and to guarantee the efficacy of the measures adopted.

14. Up to this point, theBritish and French delegations

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with some support from South Africa and Spain on the previous day, had borne the full brunt of the attack on Proposal III. It was here that I intervened, feeling that the Canadian Government would not view with equanimity attempts to weaken and render ineffective a proposal to which they had agreed without reservation. I pointed out that Proposal III had been the one sanction which had been feared by the country now the aggressor in the debates in the Committee of Thirteen on sanctions. I agreed with Stucki and Coulondre that the members of the Committee were present as individuals representing sovereign states whose Governments had the final word on any proposal - this view had always been strongly held by the Canadian Government. The function of the Committee was not to say whether or not the countries were carrying out their duties under Article 16, but to decide whether their replies corresponded to the texts of the proposals. In my mind, the third paragraph of the proposal: "Goods the subject of existing contracts will not be exempted from the prohibition" was clear to all. I failed to see how debts under a clearing agreement differed from debts under any other agreement. Believing that the Canadian Government would consider I was betraying them if I permitted the weakening and widening of Proposal III or any other, I could not agree to the point of view expressed by the Rumanian and Swiss delegations. The debate continued for a time, but it was evident that the majority of delegations would permit no general weakening of Proposal III and that, while special consideration might be given some countries for specified contracts, no decision on principle favourable to the Rumanian point of view could be reached. The debate in the Economic Sub-Committee was therefore closed.

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15/ In the discussion in the afternoon meeting on October 31st, the Committee of Eighteen took notice of a letter from the Siamese delegation relating to a contract in course of execution, and the Committee were of the opinion that such contracts, also referred to in the replies from U.S.S.R., Norway, and any others which might arise should be considered later on their merits. This task was later assigned to the Economic Sub-Committee.

16. The delegate of Belgium M. Bourguin, said that, in acceding to Proposal III, Belgium had made no reservation but her attitude would depend on the solution adopted for the special cases referred to. If the solution of these cases appeared to make a breach in the principles laid down by the Committee, he would be forced to reseve his Government's attitude on special cases of the same nature which might include Belgium. The Mexican and French delegations associated themselves with this reservation, I also associated myself with the Belgian Delegate's remarks on behalf of Canada, but expressed the hope that the Governments which had already made reservations would try to reconsider the situation as, if there were going to be reservations, all Governments might want to reconsider their positions. The discussion of the Swiss reply to the proposals brought M. Motta to his feet, and he made a general statement to the effect that the Committee had met to work in common and to attune their Governments' efforts. The Swiss Government would take account as far as possible of all the suggestions which might be submitted. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the Co-ordination Committee was in the nature of a Government conference, and that the last word always rested with the Governments. Consequently, he could

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not accept offhand the Co-ordination Committee's proposals as regards methods of application, since these were of great importance to the Swiss Confederation owing to its special position. The Swiss delegation would furnish all the necessary explanations; it would state the reason for its attitude, but, after stating that in principle it fully accepted the proposal regarding financial sanctions, it must reserve to the Federal Council the right of examining certain individual cases of application, regarding which, however, explanations could be supplied to the Co-ordination Committee.

17. Panama: the debate on the reply from Panama was the occasion of some warm discussion and a few undiplomatic remarks which the Secretariat appear wisely to have overlooked in their transcript of the provisional minutes. The Panama Delegation recognised that they were bound to apply sanctions in accordance with the Covenant but the delegation nevertheless did not feel, in view of the improbability of any important cases occurring in its territory, that it would be reasonable for the Government of Panama to take any measures forthwith, although if any cases arose as from the date of the application of sanctions, such steps as were necessary would be taken - having in mind existing legislation and the special geographic situation of Panama. Express reservations were made in respect of:

(a) Application of sanctions in respect of private contracts, commercial treaties and treaties of friendship and non-aggression;

(b) Application of the most-favoured-nation clause and

(c) Application of sanctions and international conventions concerning freedom of communications.

Further, it reserved its Government's right to submit

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observations regarding the compulsory legal force which the application of the specific measures recommended by the present Co-ordination Committee may have for each State. It concluded by saying that, in the case of a conflict between the obligations of the Republic of Panama contracted under the League Covenant and the obligations resulting from any other public treaty concluded by the Republic of Panama, the delegation reserved its Government's right to fulfil both classes of obligations in so far as they were compatible and, should they be incompatible, to decide which obligation or obligations should legally prevail.

18. Had this strange document been presented by the delegation of any important country it is probable that in the existing tension in the meeting, it would have brought the work of the Committee to a standstill. It was received, however, after the first few indignant remarks during the reading of the first part, as a piece of comic relief and a satire of the Swiss, Rumanian and Yugoslav replies. The remarks changed to witticisms, and the meeting continued in a somewhat more cheerful mood.

19. At the next meeting of the Committee, the delegate of Panama came to the table and opened his discussion by informing the Committee that the reservations he had put forward were not reservations by his Government, but had been put forward by himself subject to a further decision by his Government. A discussion ensued between the Chairman and M. Solis in which the Chairman reminded the Panama delegate of Article 20 of the Covenant, and the latter denied its applicability. As he

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was speaking only for his delegation and not for his Government, the Chairman felt the Committee could not properly discuss personal opinions. M. Solis withdrew until such time as he could receive instructions from his Government, which had not yet occurred when the Committee ended its second session.

20. Towards the end of the second day, claims for special consideration had become so numerous that the morale of the committee appeared to be badly shaken. Rumania, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Poland were leading a scramble for special consideration, which threatened to become general. The French, British and Spanish delegations, while prepared to agree that each single claim should be considered on its merits as an exception to a rule, were not prepared to modify the rule. M. Madariaga called for:

(1) a Solemn categorical decision adopted by the Governments to stop Italian imports absolutely;

(2) a study of the concrete cases from the technical point of view, leisurely, without haste, accurate, with all necessary details and statistics, in order to solve these cases with the greatest possible comprehension and sympathy.

He was supported by the Belgian delegate.

21. Mr. Te Water of South Africa then made a strong speech in which he said that he must confess that, after two days' debate, he could find only a considerable amount of doubt, hesitation and lack of collective action. At the present stage, delegates must take their courage in their hands. They knew that many of the proposals were not perfect, and that they would damage each of their countries, without exception. His own country would be materially damaged by the enforcement of the proposals, probably as much as the country which M. de Madariaga

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represented. That, however, was no answer to the whole question. At some moment members must take decisive action with the knowledge of what damage that action would cause their countries. If he might put the matter brutally, the purpose of the present meeting was to bankrupt the aggressor nation, for that was the meaning of sanctions, the object of which was to force the aggressor nation, by economic measures, to weaken her attack upon an innocent nation. It was not a question of a particular nation, but of a principle. He feared that the hesitation shown in the debates during the last few days did not tend to strengthen either the Committee's position in the eyes of the world or the League and the theory which underlay the Covenant. In conclusion, he agreed with Mr. Eden that the question of a date was one with which the Committee was immediately faced. The difficulties which certain countries had put before it could be examined, but there was no reason for hesitating to decide on the question of a date. The sooner its proposals were put into effect the better, and it would, he suggested, be valuable if that particular point were not postponed by the Chairman much longer. If the decisions of the sub-committee upon consideration of the difficulties of five or six countries were to delay the date on which the proposals were to be put into effect, nothing would be achieved. The South African Government was prepared to accept the earliest date upon which the Committee decided. It was prepared fully to accept Proposal III and did not desire to bring forward any special case. It fully realised that Proposal III would cause damage to South Africa, but it also realised that behind that proposal there was the possibility of the achievement of security, which was, after all, the raison d'etre of all the Committee's debates and its proposals.

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22. Mr. to Water's intervention marked a turning point in the work of the committee. It may be said that he expressed the feelings of the majority, and his remarks were gratefully received by Messrs. Coulondre and Eden, who had been bearing most of this burden of pressing forward with the work of the Committee, assisted frequently by de Madariaga and occasionally by the Belgian and Netherlands delegates, against the obstructionist tactics of the Swiss, Rumanian and Yugoslav delegations, in particular, and the equivocal attitude of many other delegates in face of the vigorous speeches of Motta, Visoianu and Soubbotitch.

23. Mr. Titulesco, having returned to the Committee at this point and taken the place of his colleague, Mr. Visoianu, arose and asked the Committee: "Is there anyone here who will say that Titulesco is against sanctions? That Titulesco, who has been in Geneva for --- years, since the beginning of the League, is a saboteur?" "No! Never!" shouted Mr. Visoianu. Mr. Titulesco then went on to say that the Rumanian delegation had no desire but to support sanctions and make them effective. There must be a deep reason of equity to explain why a delegate who for sixteen days had co-operated with the Committee in order to evolve a system of sanctions, should at the last moment raise this question. What was the point at issue? Rumania's trade with Italy amounted to £7,200,000. A date had been mooted for the application of the sanctions, November 15th. On behalf of the Rumanian Government, he stated officially that on today's date, November 1st, the treaty with Italy had been denounced and £7,200,000 of profits sacrificed on the altar of the League fifteen days before it had been asked for. The Rumanian delegation had, quite normally, proposed the following system: not to purchase in future Italian products,

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against goods, but to purchase in order to liquidate arrears, for that was the only means of recovering the debt owing to Rumania. And the answer had been in the negative on the ground that the impression might be created that trade was continuing between the two countries, which would be contrary to the idea of sanctions, and the very terms of Article 16 of the Covenant. He accepted that point of view. But in that case, let the Committee give him something instead, so that he might tell his country that its claim on Italy had not vanished into thin air, or that it had simply had to be deferred, but that it would have the backing of the commonwealth of nations, so that ~~it would~~ upon the termination of sanctions Rumania would find general support in demanding payment of her claim from Italy. It was also admissible that a special section should be allotted in the mutual support system to countries which had claims of the same kind, that is to say, claims deriving from the clearing system.

24. He then proposed a small committee to work with himself that very evening to draft a formula. This should be done before anything further was done to set a date. The Committee agreed to this, and a committee of representatives of France, Greece, Rumania, Spain, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom was asked to begin work at once. The members of the committee accepted Mr. Titulesco's invitation to dine with him and, after dinner, with the assistance of four bottles of 1810 Cognac, also provided by Titulesco, they hammered out a compromise resolution, which was completed at two in the morning and presented to the Committee next day. It was quite innocuous and unnecessary, but Mr. Titulesco probably felt that it saved the face of his delegation somewhat.

25. On arriving at the meeting of the Committee of Eighteen on Saturday morning, I learned that a number of delegations had in mind to put before the Committee proposals

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for the extension of Proposal IV. The French delegate, M. Coulondre, had come prepared with a mimeographed proposal for the addition to the list of prohibited materials of certain of the products on the supplementary list, including oil, iron and steel, coal and copper, and the Netherlands delegate was ready to propose the inclusion of the whole list.

26. The Chilean delegation were much disturbed about the proposed inclusion of copper, and M. Porto Seguro came over to discuss the question with me. He said his Government were very anxious that copper should not be included as they were already very seriously affected by Proposal III, and by the freezing of Chilean credits in Italy. He thought that the Canadian Government would agree with the Chilean that copper should be excluded from the list.

27. A member of the Spanish delegation also approached us. He said his Government was much disturbed at the injustice of an embargo on iron ore, when iron and steel were not included in the embargo. The Spanish Government had been very much interested in the point of view put forward by the Canadian delegation on October 15th. They felt that a strong case could be made for the extension of the embargo to the products and derivatives of prohibited materials, and, if I intended to repeat my suggestion that these should be added, they would be prepared to support me. If not, they would bring up the question themselves and assumed that they would have my support. Whatever happened, it was unfair to prevent them from exporting the ore when other nations could supply the metal.

28. As I had received no instructions either on the addition of the other materials to the list, or on the inclusion of products and derivatives, and did not know whether or not the Canadian Government would share the Chilean view on copper

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I found myself in a quandary. I therefore sent off at once my cables Nos. 185 and 186, hoping to receive a reply in time for the afternoon meeting, at which it seemed probable the question would arise. In the meantime, I discussed the matter further with the delegates interested, and when I learned that the question of extension of Proposal IV was coming up at once and that de Madariaga intended to speak, I drafted my proposal that coal, petroleum and iron should be added to the list, and embargo to be placed on them as soon as it should appear that it would be effective. This compromise was sufficient to satisfy the Spanish delegation, as it gave them something to take back to their Government, and the Chilean because, by forestalling the French proposal, it prevented the inclusion of copper. It seemed a moment when an immediate decision had to be taken, if I were to limit the obligations of Canada. While it extended the list to three products, it was in no sense as comprehensive a measure as some members would have desired, and it prevented the adoption of a proposal which would have extended the list to products of great importance to Canada. I should have been interested to hear the opinions of the other delegations on the question of extending the list to products and derivatives of prohibited materials, as it appeared from random conversation that a number of the delegations were coming round to the point of view that this was desirable, but I did not feel that you would want me to press for it, as you had not replied to my reports. After drafting this proposal, and assuring myself that it met the Spanish and Chilean wishes, I showed the draft to Coulondre and Eden, and secured their support, although Coulondre felt that copper at least should be included.

29. Madariaga, as I have mentioned, got his speech in much earlier than I had anticipated. He could not see the logic

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and utility of placing an embargo on iron ore, when iron and steel could freely be exported to Italy. "If Italy was to be prevented from obtaining iron, she should also be prevented from obtaining the material required for its manufacture; but iron and steel should figure at the head of the embargo list. In saying this, he was not expressing an opinion either for or against the embargo, but was raising the question as a whole."

30. My remarks are summarized in the Provisional Minutes as follows:

"....that in Proposal IV, concerning the embargo on certain exports to Italy, they were entrusted with the task of making suitable proposals to Governments on this subject. He imagined they were all agreed that the list of key products was far from complete, inasmuch as such important products as petroleum and its derivatives, and coal, iron and steel were not on the list. The Committee had been successful in obtaining acceptances regarding the embargo as far as it went, and he thought all the states members of the League were to be congratulated on that. He now ventured to propose that the substances he had named should be added to the list in principle, and that measures with regard to them should come into effect whenever the Committee find that an embargo can be made effective. He accordingly moved the following proposal (Doc. Co-ord.Cttee /83)

"In execution of the mission entrusted to it under the last paragraph of Proposal IV, the Committee of Eighteen submits to Governments the following proposal:

"It is expedient to adopt the principle of the extension of the measures of embargo provided for in the said proposal to the following products:

Petroleum and derivatives
Coal
Iron, cast iron, and steel.

"As soon as it appears that the acceptances of this principle is sufficiently general to ensure the efficacy of the measures thus contemplated, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Governments a date for bringing them into operation."

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31. M. van Rappard, (Netherlands), without expressing any opinion on my proposal, pointed out that a second list of products had been compiled, including, inter alia, those mentioned by me. For his part, he would prefer that the export to Italy of all the products included in the second list should be prohibited. He did not see why, for instance, an exception should be made in the case of cotton, which seemed to him just as important as coal.

32. This proposal was referred to the Committee on Economic Sanctions.

33. Mr. te Water of South Africa then raised the question of transit. His Government anticipated considerable difficulty in devising means to prevent the export of prohibited goods to Italy when such goods were consigned in the first instance to other countries, owing to the impossibility of controlling acts committed outside the South African jurisdiction. The French delegate agreed in the importance of the question, and pointed to the need of precautions in the export of prohibited materials to non-participating countries. There were also the questions of transit of goods from participating or non-participating countries to Italy or non-participating States to be considered. Mr. van Rappard raised also the question of transit of goods from Italy, and the Chairman replied that the whole subject of transit would be before a sub-Committee and the delegations could submit whatever proposals they wished.

34. The Committee of Eighteen then considered the report of the Legal Sub-Committee, and a technical discussion ensued on Swiss neutrality and the interpretations of the Declaration of London. I am asking Mr. Renaud to prepare a report on this subject and shall forward it under separate cover.

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35. The report of the Legal Sub-Committee was adopted, and the meeting arose. In the afternoon it sat again to consider the Financial Sub-Committee's report, which was also adopted. The Bulgarian and Esthonian representatives made general reservations in respect of reservations made by other Governments, should their Governments find themselves in similar positions.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) W.A.Riddell.

Canadian Advisory Officer.

Dr.O.D.Skelton,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa.

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CANADIAN ADVISORY OFFICER

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Personal

7th December, 1935.

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I appreciate very much your personal telegram asking me for a statement regarding Proposal 4 (a). As I did not get the telegram until nearly noon and I must leave tonight in order to catch my ship, I regret that it will have to be hurriedly prepared. Last night I mailed a long report to you on the work of the Committee, and as I have given certain explanations in it, it will be necessary for me to cover some of the same ground in this letter.

I realised, of course, that it was impossible for the Government to provide any explicite instructions to the Delegation in the first and second weeks of October because of the election of the 14th of that month. At the same time it was necessary for the Delegation to have some guiding principles if it was to perform its functions of co-operation with other Delegations and of safeguarding the Canadian position for the future.

The members of the Delegation discussed their position very fully and came to the conclusion that while they should not take any leading part in the debate they should, if Canadian interests appeared to be affected, take the stand that if sanctions were to be imposed they should be comprehensive in order to be effective, and that the burden of sanctions

should/

Dr. O. D. Skelton,

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should be spread as widely and equitably as possible among the participating countries. With these principles in mind they considered that an embargo on imports from Italy should parallel any embargo on exports of goods to Italy, and that an embargo on raw materials should apply also to the products and deriv atives of such materials. The argument for the inclusion of derivatives and products was first put forward by Coulondre in the case of nickel. He pointed out that an embargo on nickel would be virtually ineffective if Italy could import at will the manufactures of nickel or nickel alloy. The Canadian Delegation felt that it would also be inequitable. With regard to the control of the trade in prohibited materials in order to prevent their being shipped to Italy, the Delegation were of the opinion that the Canadian Government, in view of its relations with the United States, would desire that each country should be responsible for the sources and supplies of those materials within its own borders, and that it should not be called upon to take the responsibility for those supplies once they had passed out of its territory.

The Delegation informed the Department of External Affairs of the position they felt forced to take by the above circumstances in their telegrams No. 170 and No. 171 of 17th and 18th October, and subsequently in my report of 22nd October. No comments were received from Ottawa on these telegrams, although later in your telegram No. 76 of 2nd November and No. 90 of 29th November this point of view was confirmed.

Dr. O. D. Skelton

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When the Committee of Eighteen met again on 31st October no comments had been received from Ottawa on the stand taken by the Delegation in the earlier debates on Proposal 4. It was not the desire of the Delegation to press their arguments. They found themselves, however, in a difficult position because some of the other Delegations, who in the meantime had swung round to the viewpoint expressed by the Canadian Delegation in October, looked to that Delegation again to put before the Committee their arguments, particularly in favour of the inclusion of derivatives and products of prohibited materials.

On arriving at the Committee of Eighteen on Saturday morning, I learned that a number of delegations had it in mind to put before the Committee proposals for the extension of Proposal IV. The French delegate, M. Coulondre, had come prepared with a mimeographed proposal for the addition to the list of prohibited materials of certain of the products on the Supplementary List, including oil, iron and steel, coal and copper, and the Netherlands delegation was prepared to propose the inclusion of the whole list. The Chilean delegation were much disturbed about the proposed inclusion of copper, and M. Porto Seguro came over to discuss the question with me. He said his Government were very anxious that copper should not be included, as they were already very seriously affected by Proposal III, and by the freezing of Chilean credits in Italy. He thought the Canadian Government would agree with the Chilean that copper should be excluded from the list.

A member of the Spanish delegation also approached us. He said his Government was much disturbed at the

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injustice of an embargo on iron ore, when iron and steel were not included in the embargo. The Spanish Government had been very much interested in the point of view put forward by the Canadian delegation on October 15th. They felt that a strong case could be made for the extension of the embargo to the products and derivatives of the prohibited materials, and, if I intended to repeat my suggestion that these should be added, they would be prepared to support me. If not, they would bring up the question themselves and assumed that they would have my support. Whatever happened, it was their intention to raise the question of an embargo on iron and steel, as the people of Spain felt that it was unfair to prevent them from exporting the ore when other nations could supply the metal.

As I had received no instructions either on the addition of the other materials to the list, or on the inclusion of products and derivates, and did not know whether or not the Canadian Government would share the Chilean view on copper, I found myself in a quandary. In view of the procedure followed in the Committee, there was no doubt but that the French proposal would be adopted without vote, and consequently unanimously, unless something was done. I therefore sent off at once my cables 185 and 186, hoping to receive a reply in time for the afternoon meeting, at which it seemed probable the question would arise. In the meantime I discussed the matter with the delegates interested, and when I learned that the question of extension of Proposal IV was coming up at once and that de Madariaga intended to speak, I drafted my proposal that coal, petroleum and iron should be added to the list, and an embargo to be placed on them as soon as it should appear that it would be effective. This compromise

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was sufficient to satisfy the Spanish Delegation, as it gave them something to take back to their Government, and the Chilean because, by forestalling the French proposal, it prevented the inclusion of copper. It seemed a moment when an immediate decision had to be taken, if I were to limit the obligations of Canada. While it extended the list to three products, it was in no sense as comprehensive a measure as some members would have desired, and it prevented the adoption of a proposal which would have extended the list to products of great importance to Canada. I should have been interested to hear the opinions of the other delegations on the question of extending the list to products and derivatives of prohibited materials, as it appeared from random conversation that a number of the delegations were coming round to the point of view that this was desirable, but I did not feel that you would want me to press for it, as you had not replied to my reports. After drafting this proposal, and assuring myself that it met the Spanish and Chilean wishes, I showed the draft to Coulondre and Eden. I asked Eden if he saw any objection to my making this proposal and he said "No" and then, after a moment, "I wish you would". (This is the only conversation I had with Mr. Eden or any member of the United Kingdom delegation, before presenting this proposal). Coulondre, although willing to support the proposal felt that copper should be included.

Madariaga, as I have mentioned, got his speech in much earlier than I had anticipated. He could not see the logic and utility of placing an embargo on iron ore, when iron and steel could freely be exported to Italy. "If Italy was to be prevented from obtaining iron, she should also be prevented from obtaining the material required for its manufacture; but iron and steel should figure at the head of the embargo list. In saying this, he was not expressing an opinion either for or against the

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embargo, but was raising the question as a whole".

At the conclusion of this speech, it seemed necessary, if I were to secure a modified proposal, that I should intervene, and I am quoted in the Minutes as follows:

".... that in Proposal 4, concerning the embargo on certain exports to Italy, they were entrusted with the task of making suitable proposals to Governments on this subject. He imagined they were all agreed that the list of key products was far from complete, inasmuch as such important products as petroleum and its derivatives, and coal, iron and steel were not on the list. The Committee had been successful in obtaining acceptances regarding the embargo as far as it went, and he thought all the States Members of the League were to be congratulated on that. He now ventured to propose that the substances he had named should be added to the list in principle, and that measures with regard to them should come into effect whenever the Committee find that an embargo can be made effective. He accordingly moved the following proposal (Doc. Co-ord. Cttee /83):

"In execution of the mission entrusted to it under the last paragraph of Proposal IV, the Committee of Eighteen submits to Governments the following proposal:

"It is expedient to adopt the principle of the extension of the measures of embargo provided for in the said proposal to the following products:

Petroleum and derivatives
Coal
Iron, cast iron and steel.

"As soon as it appears that the acceptance of this principle is sufficiemtly general to ensure the efficacy of the measures thus contemplated, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Governments a date for bringing them into operation".

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No decision was taken in the Committee of Eighteen, it was merely referred to the Committee on Economic Sanctions.

All the discussion of this proposal, as far as I was concerned, took place in the Committee room during the meeting.

It may be worth remarking that the form in which this proposal was put forward was ad referendum to Governments and that, while all proposals were made in this form the others called for immediate acceptance while this provided that a date for its application should be set by the Co-ordination Committee only after consultation had shown that a sufficient concurrence was assured.

While my immediate reasons for making the proposal were to cut short the debate and to satisfy Chile and Spain while limiting the burden on the Canadian Government, other major considerations operated, which at the risk of repetition I should like to stress.

First I was strongly of the opinion, which I felt was that of the Canadian Government, that a comprehensive and diversified list of prohibited products under Proposal 3 was desirable - one chosen to spread the burden as fairly as possible among the States Members; including products of which Canada was not a producer. I felt that the list I submitted was in conformity with these requirements.

Secondly, it was my conviction that once the States Members had declared Italy the aggressor and admitted that Article XVI was applicable, the only way to prevent the transition from economic to military sanctions was to render

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economic sanctions effective. This was, and still is, my conviction. To make the economic sanctions effective, within a reasonable time, I was convinced that the list I submitted was a necessity. Subsequent events have served only to strengthen these convictions.

Since then the French Government made it appear that it had been forced to accept more drastic action against Italy than it desired - this may have been good politics but the fact remains that the French delegation took the initiative at the very beginning in putting forward the embargo on the export of key products to Italy. It was the French delegation again which was prepared to propose the extension of this embargo to products of which the States Members had not absolute control, including oil and coal.

Unfortunately it is the usual practice in Committee meetings and Assemblies for silence to be taken as consent. The Chairman puts the question in the phrase "If there is no objection I shall consider the proposal adopted". And so the only alternative left to those who wished to avoid making objections which would put them in a wrong light, and yet not bind their Governments by their silence, was to put forward alternative resolutions. It is this course I followed.

It is largely because of this method of procedure that it has been possible for the States Members to show a common front in applying sanctions, and at the

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C 118004

same time to build up a system which is not only milder and better adapted to circumstances than that provided for in Article XVI, but also one which is being applied gradually.

Had there been the least opportunity of securing your advice in time I should not have acted as I did on my own responsibility. The Committee acted with such rapidity that, although I sent off two cables to you shortly after the beginning of the morning meeting forecasting the course of the discussion and asking urgently for immediate reply, the question of extending Proposal 4 came up within the next hour. I felt that I had no alternative to the course followed, to safeguard the interests of Canada.

Yours sincerely,

W.A. Riddell.

Canadian Advisory Officer.

Dr. O.D. Skelton,

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,

Ottawa, Canada.

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C118005

AVIZ HOTEL
Avenida Fontes
Lisboa Portugal

COPY PERSONAL

December 11th, 1935

Dear Dr. Skelton,

Before sailing I desire to thank you for your telegram wishing me success in my mission to South America. I am looking forward to it with great anticipation. It will be another new experience in a continent which has always interested me very much.

What I shall say at the opening of the Conference is still on the lap of the gods as I was too busy before leaving Geneva to even get started on an address. I shall have to hope the sea is kind and await the inspiration of the voyage.

By this time you will have had my personal letter explaining my participation in proposal IV(a). The letter was prepared in too much of a rush to be entirely satisfactory.

It is evident from the criticism I received from the Department that I must have misunderstood the significance of the Government's acceptance of first four "proposals" and the Prime Minister's declaration to the Press.

Both the acceptance of these proposals and the declaration convinced me the new Government was then solidly behind economic sanctions and as solidly opposed to military sanctions. Rightly or wrongly I thought I should use my influence to strengthen the former in order to make the latter unnecessary.

Again thanking you and wishing you the season's greetings,

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) W.A. RIDDELL

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C118006.
THE DEPARTMENT OF CANADA 1936 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.208.M.130.1936.VII.
Geneva, May 8th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Rome, April 30th, 1936.

To the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen.

(Translation from the Italian).

I have received the letter which you addressed to me on April 18th* in reply to my communications of April 3rd** and 11th.***

1. In connection with the reservations already made by His Majesty's Government in regard to the competence of the Committee of Thirteen to deal with questions relating to the violation of the rules for the conduct of war, you refer to the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations dated December 19th, 1935. I cannot but point out that the instruction "bearing in mind the provisions of the Covenant, to examine the situation as a whole", as given to the Committee by the aforesaid resolution of December 19th, can only be understood in relation to the fundamental duty assigned to the Committee - to promote conciliation between the Parties.

2. Furthermore, if the Committee considers it to be its duty to devote attention to questions relating to the conduct of the war with the sole object - as stated in your letter - of obtaining information regarding any factor in the conflict the knowledge of which might be of use to it in accomplishing its task, it is difficult to see how the Committee came to conclude that it could assume the responsibility of pronouncing upon the interpretation of the 1925 Protocol in its relation to the right of reprisal.

3. Such an opinion cannot possibly be accepted by His Majesty's Government. The Protocol contains no provision excluding the exercise of the right of reprisal by way of exception to the general principles which admit that right. By the clause in the Protocol referring to the use of chemical weapons, the signatory Powers merely declared that they recognised the prohibition of the use of the gases therein mentioned as embodied in international law, but added no clause modifying the existing legal situation in regard to the right of reprisal. In any case, neither the Committee of Thirteen nor any other organ of the League of Nations would be competent to give an interpretation of the 1925 Protocol, which, moreover, as appears from its formal clauses, has no connection with the League, and has also been signed by Powers that are not Members of the League.

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* See document C.176.M.112.1936.VII, Annex 3.
** " " C.133.M.72.1936.VII.
*** " " C.176.M.112.1936.VII. p.11.

P.T.O.

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4. It must also be pointed out that in my letter of April 3rd I was already obliged to draw your attention to the necessity for placing the alleged violations of the 1925 Protocol concerning the use of gas on the same footing as and examining them in conjunction with the violations of other international Conventions and rules for the conduct of war. Subsequently to the despatch of that letter and your reply dated April 18th, the League Council adopted on April 20th a resolution in the last paragraph of which the 1925 Protocol and the other Conventions regarding the conduct of war are in fact placed on the same footing.

The Italian Government - although it did not accede to that resolution as a whole - accordingly regards it as settled that there can be no discussion of the alleged violations of the Protocol concerning the use of chemical weapons without the discussion at the same time of the breaches of any other international rule for the conduct of war.

5. While repeating the assurance that it intends to comply with the provisions of the 1925 Protocol, the Italian Government cannot agree - as stated above - that this Protocol precludes the exercise of the right of reprisal in punishment of such abominable atrocities as those committed by the Ethiopian forces (torture and decapitation of prisoners; emasculation of the wounded and killed; savagery towards and the killing of non-combatants, systematic use of dum-dum bullets etc.). The Government responsible for such atrocities - which would be inconceivable in civilised countries - has shown that it has no respect for the humanitarian spirit on which the Conventions and rules regarding the conduct of war are based. Ethiopia having been the first to violate the Conventions and rules of war and having done so time and again has placed herself in the legal position of being unable to appeal to them.

6. The foregoing considerations in no way affect the Italian Government's firm resolve, already expressed in my letter of April 3rd, to establish the truth of the facts, which cannot fail to prove that the Italian charges are fully justified and that the Ethiopian allegations are false and tendentious. The truth regarding all the facts alleged by the Parties concerning breaches of the various Conventions and rules for the conduct of warlike operations must, however, be ascertained by suitable means and as a whole, because the question itself must be considered as a whole, through some organ competent to carry out tasks of this kind. This organ might be the International Red Cross Committee, a body of a neutral and humanitarian character which not only enjoys, by reason of its noble tradition, undisputed moral prestige and affords the necessary guarantees of competence and impartiality, but is already conducting an enquiry into some of the alleged violations.

I have the honour etc.

(Signed) SUVICH.

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C 118008
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THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY 22 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.216.M.131.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 11th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from His Majesty Haile Sellassié 1.

(Translation)

Jerusalem, May 10th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

We request you to be so good as to convey the following to the Member States. We have decided to put an end to the most sweeping, the most unjust and the most inhuman war of modern times by leaving the country in order to avoid the extermination of the Ethiopian people, and to be able to devote ourselves freely and peacefully to the preservation of the age-old independence of Ethiopia and the principles of collective security and the sanctity of international obligations, all of which are threatened by Italy. From the outset we have made every effort to avoid the disturbance of peace, we have loyally defended our soil until as a result of Italy's raining of gas it became obvious that our resistance could not be continued, and that in any case that resistance could only lead to the extermination of the Ethiopian people, and we now ask the League of Nations to pursue its efforts to ensure the respect of the Covenant and to decide not to recognise territorial extensions or the exercise of an alleged sovereignty resulting from illegal recourse to armed force and many other violations of international obligations.

HAILE SELLASIE 1, EMPEROR.

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C118009 L-150 Ad(a)
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MAY 22 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council.

C.217.M.132.1936.

Geneva, May 11th, 1936.

REPRESENTATION OF ETHIOPIA ON THE COUNCIL.

Letter, dated May 8th, 1936, from the Permanent Delegate of Ethiopia to the Secretary-General.

(Translation).

Paris, May 8th, 1936.

Sir,

I should be glad if you would kindly communicate to the Council and all the Members of the League of Nations the following declaration:

In my capacity of Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations by the Government of the Empire of Ethiopia, a Member of the League of Nations, I ask the Council to summon me to sit in the Council whenever it is dealing with Ethiopian affairs.

I have the honour, etc.....

(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM,

Ethiopian Minister.

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C 118010
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY 22 1936



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.220.M.134.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 11th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Latvian Government.

Geneva, May 9th, 1936.

(Translation)

To the Secretary-General.

In Annex 2 to Document C.159.M.97.1936.VII, it is stated that a certain Dr. Belau had studied medicine at the University of Riga and had obtained its medical degree.

I am officially informed from Riga that no Maximilian Stanislas Belau or Belov ever studied at the University of Riga or - a fortiori - obtained its medical degree.

(Signed) J. FELDMANS,

Permanent Delegate of Latvia.

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C 118011
THE DEPARTMENT OF ... CANADA MAY 1936 ... AFFAIRS
L-150 bt 4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.219.M.133.1936.VII.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

Geneva, May 11th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY

Communication from the Ethiopian Delegation.

Geneva, May 11th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I request you to be so good as to communicate to the Council and all the Members of the League of Nations the following statement:

I. The crime has now been consummated. The Covenant has been torn up. Article 10 has been outrageously violated. Article 16 is not applied. In this unequal war, the Ethiopian warriors fought with a few antiquated weapons, provided with inadequate munitions; the Government was unable to supply its troops with means of defence owing to the refusal of financial assistance, the embargo pronounced against it before the aggression, and certain obstacles placed in the way of the importation of arms into Ethiopia after the aggression. Despite this crushing inferiority, the Ethiopian troops stubbornly resisted the aggressor and kept him in check, until the Italian command, despairing of victory if it respected the laws of war, decided to resort to terrorism and the extermination of the population by the most dreadful methods of modern civilisation.

II. The Ethiopian population and troops were plunged into despair by the use of poison gases and by an innumerable air force which took a contemptible pride in the bombardment of ambulances, the burning of defenceless towns and the massacre of innocent populations. As one of the Italian chiefs stated, it was a hunt without danger to the hunter.

The desperate appeals launched by the Ethiopian Government did not succeed in arousing against the criminal aggressor the active co-operation of the signatories of the Covenant.

The abandoned Ethiopian people felt infinite despair when at the beginning of March 1936 it realised that it must renounce the hope and faith which it had placed in the support of the League of Nations. The Council's last session dealt it a further blow.

III. Will Ethiopia now be abandoned to her pitiless aggressor, who has already, on his sole authority, declared her name struck off the roll of States, although Ethiopia is the most ancient empire in the world?

P.T.O.

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I stand at this table to address to all the peoples of the world the Ethiopian people's protest against the triumphant aggressor. The Italian Government has issued an insolent defiance to over fifty nations, and expects them to quail before its threats. To-day, stained with its victim's blood, it takes its seat, proud and contemptuous, at the table of the Council of the League of Nations to offer the shameful bargain of its co-operation in Europe in return for the express or implicit sanction of its crime.

The Empire of Ethiopia, Member of the League of Nations, once again denounces this bargain.

IV. The Ethiopian people is not tamed.

The greater part of its territory to the west of its capital remains free and independent. It is continuing to defend itself. It refuses to recognise the Italian army's illegal occupation of the other part by force.

It cherishes the recollection of other peoples who before it have been through the horrors of invasion and have rid themselves of it by patient and continuous effort.

Will the League of Nations, which is also a victim of Italian aggression, bow its head to violence?

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) WOLDE MARIAM,

Minister of Ethiopia.

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C118013 L-150 vt4(a)

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA. MAY 22 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.221.M.135.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 11th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to distribute to the Council and Members of the League the following communication, received on May 11th, 1936.

Rome, May 7th, 1936. Year XIV.

Translation from Italian.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

With its note dated April 15th last*, the British Foreign Office transmitted to you a copy of correspondence exchanged between the British Embassy in Rome and this Ministry, concerning incidents in which the British ambulance at Quoram was involved at the beginning of March last.

In connection with this correspondence, I have the honour to send you herewith, for the information of all States Members of the League of Nations, copy of a note on the matter sent to the British Ambassador in Rome on the 6th instant.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) ALOISI.

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* See Document C.165.M.101.1936.VII.

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C 118014

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Rome, May 6th, 1936/XIV.

Your Excellency,

I have received and carefully examined your note of April 10th last, concerning the regrettable incidents in which the British ambulance at Quoram was involved at the beginning of March last.

I would point out, however, that the data contained in the above-mentioned communication do not appear to be either well-founded or convincing.

The note states that the Ambulance encampment was provided with all the emblems normally employed to indicate a Red Cross unit. The Italian military authorities state, on the other hand, that the only emblem, which was barely visible, consisted of a white sheet bearing a red cross in the centre. which was stretched on the ground among tents and motor-lorries, the latter being without any Red Cross emblem.

The note then affirms that the Italian aeroplanes were not fired at from the Ambulance; that no armed Ethiopians had taken refuge in the Ambulance camp; and that no anti-aircraft guns were posted in the immediate vicinity of the Ambulance. The Italian military authorities assert, on the other hand, that on March 3rd an Italian aeroplane was hit by violent anti-aircraft fire coming from the place where the sheet bearing the red cross was stretched, and that on that occasion the aeroplane did not reply to the attack; that on March 4th, in the same place, another aeroplane was again made the target of anti-aircraft fire and struck by two projectiles, one of which carried away the key of the wireless apparatus; that on March 5th, once again in the same place, another Italian aeroplane was hit and almost disabled by Oerlikon tracer shells, fired from one or more guns posted in the immediate vicinity of the above-mentioned sheet bearing the red cross. Again, on March 6th, as I have already informed you in my letter of April 6th last, armed bodies of men, among which were motor vehicles not bearing any Red Cross emblem were bombed in the neighbourhood of Quoram.

Although the Italian Government has no need to appeal to foreign testimony for confirmation of the truth of the statements made by its own military authorities, yet, in order to complete the evidence, we cannot refrain from mentioning the statements which were made, both publicly and privately, to the interpreter of the Italian Consulate at Jibuti by the native medical orderlies of the British Ambulance, when they passed through Jibuti on April 11th on their way home. They stated that armed Abyssinians had taken refuge among the tents of the Ambulance on the approach of the Italian aeroplanes, and had thence opened fire on those aeroplanes, which had taken no action until after that provocation.

The note to which I am replying also puts the hypothesis of those aeroplanes' having been fired on from the Ambulance and its vicinity, and, while denying that anything of the kind took place, asserts that "His Majesty's Government are not aware of any rule of international law which provides

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that aircraft flying over enemy territory must not be fired at when they descend low to inspect encampments, even should the latter be marked with Red Cross emblems". This argument is not convincing, since in the case in question firing came from the Ambulance unit itself (this occurred on March 3rd and 4th), so that Article 7 of the Geneva Convention, which lays down that medical units lose all right to protection if they commit acts injurious to the enemy, is here applicable; and since firing also came from the immediate vicinity of the Ambulance (this occurred on March 5th), so that the Ambulance obviously could not be sure of not being involved in the effects of the reply to such provocative action.

Nor can His Majesty's Government accept, in this particular case, Your Excellency's argument that an Ambulance that has been bombed one day is entitled to fire on aeroplanes on succeeding days in self-defence. In the present case, indeed, it was not the Ambulance that was acting in self-defence, but the Italian aeroplanes, since the first shots came from the site of the Ambulance.

It is a matter of fact that the British Ambulance was not involved in any incident so long as it maintained its neutral character as prescribed by the Geneva Convention, and remained at a distance from the Abyssinian armed forces, as I advised the British Embassy on January 18th last that it should.

Hence the responsibility for the deplorable incidents that have occurred falls entirely upon the persons in charge of the Ambulance, who did not prevent the commission of hostile acts against the Italian aeroplanes from the Ambulance itself and its immediate vicinity, in violation of the Geneva Convention.

As I have already had occasion to observe to Your Excellency, the British Ambulance - and, indeed, any other Ambulance, foreign or Ethiopian - will never incur any abnormal risk as long as it strictly maintains its neutral character, and takes the elementary precaution of keeping at a reasonable distance from armed forces engaged in military operations.

Since Your Excellency's note to which I am now replying has been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, my present note is also being communicated to him, and to the International Red Cross Committee.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) SUVICH.

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C 118016
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.224. M.136.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 11th 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council and Members of the League the following communication, received on May 11th.

(Translation from the Italian).

Rome, May 9th, 1936 - XIV.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to the Note dated the 4th inst.[1] sent to you by the Swedish Government concerning incidents which occurred on December 30th last and in which the Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka was involved, I have the honour to inform you, for communication to the States Members of the League of Nations that, on January 12th last, the following Note was handed to the Swedish Minister in Rome :

"The High Command in Somaliland, which was consulted regarding the conditions under which the bombardment took place on December 30th last, in the course of which the Swedish Red Cross ambulance was hit, has communicated the following information :

1) On the morning of December 30th, there were dense clouds between the Italian aeroplanes and the military objectives to be reached, which made it impossible to distinguish ground signals;

2) The aviators were not aware that they had hit the Swedish ambulance;

3) The aviators consider that the bombs which fell in the neighbourhood of the ambulance did not hit the tents of the field hospital directly, but that they may have been struck by splinters;

4) The aviators did not notice that any damage had been done to the ambulance; after the bombardment all the hospital tents were still standing ;

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1) See document C.207.M.129.1936.VII.

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5) In the opinion of the aviators, the distance between the ambulance tents and those of the encampment of Ethiopian troops did not exceed 100 metres;

6) The bombardment was directed not against the ambulance but against the tents in its immediate vicinity, containing the chiefs of the army of Ras Desta Damtù, according to the statement made by a native arrested on the charge of espionage in favour of the Ethiopians;

7) The Italian Command in Somaliland has learned of the wounding of Swedish doctors through the intercepted despatches of correspondents from Addis Ababa and through the wireless communications from the camp of Ras Desta Damtù; no special news has reached it from informants regarding the effects of the bombardment."

The Swedish Minister's Note of March 4th was answered on the 17th of that month by the Note copy of which is attached.

I consider it advisable to communicate these documents to you because they are not attached to the Swedish communication you have received.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) ALOISI.

C O P Y.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Rome, March 17th, 1936-XIV.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of March 4th and the documents appended thereto.

On a first summary examination, it does not seem that the arguments contained in this note and the details set out in the documents transmitted therewith are of a nature to modify the Italian Government's point of view, set out in its previous note No.806 of January 17th, last. As, however, Your Excellency's last note and its appendices contain details which have not yet been examined, these documents have been brought to the notice of the Supreme Command in Somalia in order that it may furnish the relative elucidations as soon as possible.

It may therefore be necessary for me to write to you again on this subject. In the meantime I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) SUVICH.

To His Excellency
Monsieur Erik SJÖBORG
Swedish Minister,
ROME.

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O.D. Skelton ty ✓ Ethiopian Crisis

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER: 12 May, 1936 C 118018

The Italian Consul-General called today to bring to the attention of the Secretary of State for External Affairs the text of the Italian Decree declaring sovereignty over Ethiopia. A copy is attached, together with a copy of the oral statement which Mr. Petrucci made.

Mr. Petrucci referred, at some length, to the reprimand administered to him in the House of Commons for his public reference to sanctions. He said he had reported it to his Government, which had left it to his discretion whether he should proceed with the matter. In view of the great deal of personal friendship with which he had been received in Canada, he had concluded to swallow his amour propre and not raise the question further. He still considered that his reference was harmless, and was in fact done with the object of restoring good relations between Canada and Italy. He felt that the relations between Great Britain and Italy had drifted into a most unfortunate and unreal position, and had hoped that Canada would be able to do something to restore them to the essential friendliness that used to prevail and should prevail if the forces of civilization were not to be divided in Europe. He still hoped Canada could do something in this way.

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Mr.Petrucci referred further to the attack which had been made upon him by Mr.Woodsworth as being responsible for Fascist propaganda in Montreal and elsewhere. He said this was wholly untrue. Any influence he had was exercised in the other direction. He had intervened in 1933 when a Fascist Secretary had been engaging in what he considered improper propaganda,and had had him expelled from the society. During his term of office in the Italian Legation in Switzerland during the war,he had seen something of the activities carried on by the Italian War Department,Interior Department and other Departments,quite without the knowledge of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and it was quite conceivable something like this might develop in Canada,but it was against his wishes if it did.

In referring to the campaign in Ethiopia,Mr.Petrucci said the Italian achievement had been largely due to the engineers and workmen who had the old Roman faculty of road building. I said he should not forget to pay a tribute to the chemists who had produced,and the aviators who had scattered,bombs with mustard gas. Mr.Petrucci replied that gas had been used in very restricted amount,usually in cases where machine guns could not be employed - in fact,he assumed it had been used largely for experimental purposes,to determine its availability in case of a real war. I remarked that in a European war there was no certainty as to just which State would first suffer if the prohibitions on the use of poison gas were to become a dead letter.

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C 118020

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.244.M.141.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 13th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

Rome, May 13th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translation from the Italian).

For the retrospective information of the States Members of the League of Nations I have the honour to inform you that Belgian Lieut. Armand Frère passing through Jibuti on April 22nd last made the following written and signed declaration to three Italian journalists:

"I make the following statement on my honour as an officer: In January, at the time of the Italian offensive against Kolmaye, on the Somale front, as military adviser to Ras Desta, I was present at a celebration held by the Abyssinian soldiers in honour of Ras Desta, in front of three severed heads of Italian soldiers who had at the same time been emasculated: to increase the effect of this macabre celebration they went through the motions of cutting up the corpses and eating them; knives and swords were stuck into the cold and stiff corpses.

Twelve Eritrean soldiers taken prisoner by Ras Desta's soldiers were decapitated and emasculated; I was powerless to intervene.

I am able to state that Ras Desta had given orders not to take any prisoners, and a present of ten thalers was given for each tangible proof of emasculation.

By order of this cruel warrior, I daily saw his soldiers engaged in transforming their bullets into dum-dum bullets. As regards the ammunition found at Wadara in the lorries of the Swedish Red Cross, Ras Desta alone gave the order that this ammunition should be hidden in the lorries in question."

I shall send you later a copy of this document, legalised by the Italian Consul at Jibuti.

SUVICH.

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C 116021

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA MAY 27 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the Lea ue.

C.246.M.142.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 13th 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Delegation.

Geneva, May 12th 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translation)

I have the honour to enclose copies of two letters, one dated March 13th 1936 and the other May 2nd 1936, from Prince Esmail Daoud, President of the Egyptian Medical Mission in Ethiopia, to H.E. Blatengeta Heruy, President of the Ethiopian Red Cross.

I should be obliged if you would kindly communicate copies of these two documents to all the States Members of the League of Nations.*

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) WOLDE MARYAM,
Ethiopian Minister.

P.T.O.

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* Note by the Secretariat. The letter from Prince Ismail Daoud, dated March 13th, was communicated to the Members of the League in document C.201.M.126.1936.VII (page 4).

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C 118022

Cairo, May 2nd, 1936.

To His Excellency Blatengeta Heruy,
President of the Ethiopian Red Cross,
Addis Ababa.

Your Excellency,

In my letter of March 13th last, copy of which I enclose, I have already answered all the allegations - which are not merely erroneous, but bear the most obvious marks of bad faith - made by Elias Makbel Effendi and Labib Hassan and confirmed by Labib Salam, Mohammed Riad, and Sami Georges. Having questioned some of these orderlies, I am absolutely convinced that they made those statements purely for gain; indeed, I can state the actual sums they received by way of reward, or rather compensation.

In addition to the wretches I have already named, the Italian Government's memorandum to the League of Nations* quotes the testimonies of Abdel Rahman Abdel Hamid Effendi and Abdel Mohsen El Uisci. May I ask the first-named where he saw what he relates? He was only at Addis Ababa and Harrar, as a clerk under the orders of the Captain of the Egyptian Medical Mission. Who are the Ethiopians who robbed or maltreated him? What medical stores were ever taken from him? How can he know what took place in the other Missions, and to what other Missions does he refer? I now understand how he was able to sail from Jibuti to Port Said without any orders from me and without my sending him any money.

The second of these gentlemen, Abdel Mohsen El Uisci, has already published a denial in the Egyptian newspapers, but his denial has no more value than his original statement. This orderly, who was acting as mess waiter to the doctors at Harrar, never left that town except to return to Egypt on February 12th last. On December 24th, 1935, he was at Harrar (not at Bulale), and waited on me at dinner before the midnight mass said by Mgr. Jarosseau, which Iattended at the head of all the Mission doctors. I did not leave Harrar until December 26th, and I can state categorically that none of these scenes of bloodshed took place there.

The other two orderlies who support him, by name Kamel Ahmed and Labib Salam, were in Egypt from December 27th onwards, having left Harrar on the 20th and sailed from Jibuti on the 22nd on the S.S. "D'Artagnan". All three of them are inventing stories in support of the case.

I regret to have to point out once more that the passion for controversy leads to excesses which harm even those who make use of them, for sooner or later the truth, if not justice, always prevails.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) DAOUD,

President of the Egyptian Medical Mission.

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* See document C.104.M.45.1936.VII.

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C 118023

BULLETIN

May 15th, 1936.

Weekly wireless telegram of the information section ninety-second session Council League began May 11th, Eden, United Kingdom, President, and after finishing most items on agenda adjourned on May 13th deciding to meet again June 16th next for two important questions, which present political circumstances rendered it impossible discuss immediately. These are dispute Italy Ethiopia and Treaty Mutual Guarantee of Locarno between Germany, Belgium, France ~~an~~ Great Britain and Italy.

Concerning Ethiopian question, Baron Aloisi, Italy, said during discussion on agenda that "Italian delegation cannot agree to so-called Ethiopian delegate being present Council Table, there is nothing resembling an organized Ethiopian State and the only sovereignty in Ethiopia is Italian Sovereignty, any discussion on Italo Ethiopian dispute would, accordingly, be purposeless and Italian representative could not take part." Baron Aloisi then left Council Table whilst Wolde Mariam, representing Ethiopia, declared that Ehtiopia a Member of the League is not the author but the victim of aggression, she has not violated international law and remains firmly attached to League of Nations".

President of Council proposed Italo Ethiopian dispute should remain on agenda. This proposal supplied by Spanish Danish representatives was adopted unanimously. Following day Council returned to Ethiopian question, in absence of Italian representative but with Ethiopian representative participating. The latter declared, "unshakeable determination of Ethiopian Government to defend integrity of Empire, requested Council to condemn new blow by Italian

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Government and its claim to suppress by violence a State Member of League, Ethiopian Government requested that Article XVI Covenant, in all its provisions, should at last be applied so that all States weak or powerful, which may be threatened, may be reassured."

A resolution was submitted in which Council, recalling conclusions reached and decisions taken, was of opinion that further time necessary to permit consideration of situation created by grave new steps taken by Italian Government, decided to resume deliberations on dispute on June 16th and considered that meanwhile there was no cause for modifying measures adopted in collaboration by Members League. This resolution adopted unanimously, save for reservations by representatives Argentine, Chile, Ecuador, concerning either adjournment discussion or maintenance sanctions against Italy.

On question Locarno Treaty, mutual guarantee Council, on motion of President and in absence Italian representative, but in presence of Belgium representative, unanimously decided psotpone discussion till June 16th in accordance with wishes principal Governments concerned.

Council considered steps to be taken following resignation Wang Chung Hui, Judge, Permanent Count International Justice.

Council decided in presence of Grease, President Danzig Senate, to renew, for one year from January 15th, 1937, office of Sean Lester as League High Commissioner Danzig. Representatives Poland, United Kingdom, France paid warm tribute to Lester's services to League.

Council considered report on question of its own composition and decided refer matter to Assembly, which will pronounce on suggestion for creating additional seat for Asia and maintaining the existing seat for non grouped European States.

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C 118025

Council considered reports on recent work various technical organisations concerning finance, health, child welfare, repression of traffic in women and children, campaign against narcotics. Decided to forward to Governments draft Convention on punishment of persons who exploit prostitution of others and draft multilateral Convention on assistance indigent foreigners, to organise Conference Central police authorities middle and far East in Netherlands Indies February 1937, to open for signature of States the Agreement prepared at Lisbon Conference by Communications and Transit Organisation concerning unification of certain rules Maritime buoyage.

Council received report constitution practise procedure League Committees and decided to adjourn final decision concerning composition Advisory Commission Protection and welfare of children and young people.

Council considered a question concerning protection of minorities in Albania and expressed appreciation of Albanian Government for promulgating law authorising establishment and working private schools in accordance with Albanian declaration 1921 regarding education. Fuat Aslani representing Albania thanked Council and matter closed.

RADIO NATIONS.

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C 118026

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA. 27 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.248.M.144.1936.VII.

Geneva, May 15th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the International Red Cross Committee.

(Translation) Geneva, May 14th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General,

In our letter of April 9th, replying to yours of April 8th*, we ventured to draw your attention to the enquiry which the Ethiopian and Italian Governments asked us to undertake in regard to the allegations made on either side concerning violations of the Geneva Convention. His Excellency M. de Madariaga's letter dated April 18th** and our reply to that letter dated April 24th*** both allude to this enquiry. Our Circular No. 325, dated April 27th, copy of which we attach, reproduces this correspondence and describes the reasons entirely outside our control that have delayed the opening of an enquiry, the details of which should, according to Article 30 of the Geneva Convention of July 27th, 1929, have been fixed in agreement between the parties concerned, but the possible conditions of which - in practice and in spite of our repeated representations - have only been stated by one of the parties.

Since then the situation has changed owing to the recent military and political events which have occurred in Ethiopia. The possibility of an enquiry answering to the wishes recently expressed by the Ethiopian Government and the Italian Government now seems to be essentially modified. At the same time it appears from the note sent by His Excellency M. Suvich to the Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen on April 30th last - which the Italian Red Cross communicated to us on May 9th - that the Italian Government persists in its desire to establish the truth of the facts as regards the violations of the different conventions and rules on the conduct of warlike operations. "The truth", says M. Suvich, "regarding all the facts alleged by the Parties concerning breaches of the various Conventions and rules for the conduct of warlike operations must, however, be ascertained by suitable means and as a whole, because the

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* See Document C.150.M.88.1936.VII.

** See Document C.176.M.112.1936.VII, Annex 1.

*** See Document C.184.M.118.1936.VII.

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C 118027

question itself must be considered as a whole, through some organ competent to carry out tasks of this kind. This organ might be the International Red Cross Committee, a body of neutral and humanitarian character which not only enjoys, by reason of its noble tradition, undisputed moral prestige and affords the necessary guarantees of competence and impartiality, but is already conducting an enquiry into some of the alleged violations."

The International Red Cross Committee, which immediately placed itself at the disposal of the Ethiopian and Italian Governments when the latter expressed the wish that an enquiry should be conducted on the observance of the provisions of the Geneva Convention by the two parties, remains ready to undertake the enquiry referred to in M. Suvich's note, if such an enquiry can be organised in conditions offering the necessary guarantees. The International Committee in no way solicits such a mission, which would lay a heavy burden on it. But it would not refuse a task which is in keeping with the spirit of its Statutes, if its assistance is required in the present circumstances.

The International Committee wishes, however, to say that although its members work without any remuneration, the enquiry in question might occasion expenses which the Committee cannot undertake to defray.

At the same time, if an enquiry does not take place in the circumstances stipulated above, the International Committee reserves the right to make use - in accordance with the Red Cross's interests and in a manner which seems to it compatible with its duties of impartiality - of the few documents which it already has in its possession.

A communication similar to the foregoing has been sent to His Excellency M. Suvich.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) Max HUBER.

President.

Annex: Circular 325.

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C 118028

Translation

International Red
Cross Committee.

Circular No. 325.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN CONFLICT

(Investigation and Correspondence)

GENEVA
April 27th, 1936.

To the Central Committees of the national Red Cross Societies.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

As stated in our Circular No. 324, the Ethiopian and Italian Governments have expressed the desire that an investigation be made into the observance of the terms of the Geneva Convention by both sides.

In order to clear up certain questions relating to the organization of this investigation, the International Committee requested the Ethiopian Government on February 1st to appoint a plenipotentiary with whom these questions could be discussed, if possible in Geneva.

Further, in agreement with the Italian Government, the International Committee sent to Rome at the end of March a delegation which thus had the opportunity to exchange views with the Italian Government and Italian Red Cross in regard to other questions (safeguarding of the Red Cross emblem, air ambulance services prisoners of war, etc.)

Immediately upon the return of the delegation, the International Committee instructed Dr. Junod, its delegate in Addis Ababa, to inform the Ethiopian Government that, on the Italian side the provisional conditions under which it is thought an inquiry might be opened have been stated, that these conditions seemed reasonable to the International Red Cross Committee, and that the latter was still awaiting the appointment of a plenipotentiary of the Ethiopian Government as requested.

The International Red Cross Committee has not yet received a reply on this point.

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With further reference to the respecting of international conventions in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the following letters, which the international Committee feels it its duty to bring to your knowledge, have passed between the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Senor de Madariaga, Chairman of the Committee of Thirteen of the League of Nations, and the International Red Cross Committee. The International Committee feels sure that the national Societies will understand - in view of the statutes of the International Red Cross and the Committee's own statutes - the prudence which it is bound to observe in all matters which may have a political complexion.

Here follow the letters already circulated to the Members of the League in Documents C.150 M.88.1936.VII; C.176.M.112. 1936.VII (Annex 1) and C.184.M.118.1936.VII.

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C 118029

The alleged use of asphyxiating, poisonous and similar gases in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was the main reason of the exchange of letters reproduced above. It goes without saying that this question has been given the closest attention by the International Committee. Indeed, whatever the stipulations governing its co-operation and work, the International Red Cross Committee, even from the purely humanitarian standpoint, could not ignore the gravity of a problem which has so often formed the object of its preoccupations and deliberations.

For this reason, the Committee wishes to explain to the national Red Cross Societies the present situation in regard to this point, as far as the Committee is concerned.

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On March 23rd, 1936, the International Red Cross Committee received a request from the Ethiopian Red Cross asking that national Red Cross Societies should be requested to send large quantities of gas masks and manuals dealing with technical protection against asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases.

The International Committee did not feel justified in acceding to this request in the form presented. A general appeal for gas masks on behalf of one of the parties, without specifying for what purpose these masks were to be used, would have caused the International Red Cross Committee to go outside its proper rôle. As the Geneva Convention at present stands, the only gas masks which the International Committee would be entitled to ask national Societies to supply to a sister Society are masks intended exclusively for the use of medical personnel or for patients under the care of such personnel.

The International Committee therefore confined itself to informing of this request the national Red Cross Societies which, in varying degrees, had already responded to the appeals of the Ethiopian Red Cross. It also notified these Societies that it had requested its delegation in Addis Ababa to ascertain how many masks the Ethiopian Red Cross required for the exclusive use of the category of persons above defined. The Committee has not yet received a reply from its delegation on this point, nor has it received any positive answer from the national Societies consulted.

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The reserve which the International Committee has felt bound to show in this circumstance must not be interpreted as a tacit acceptance of a method of warfare which for eighteen years past it has never ceased to condemn. It is not necessary to remind the national Red Cross Societies of the International Committee's circular of February 6th, 1918, stigmatizing the use of poison gas. On November 22nd, 1920, the International Red Cross Committee requested the League of Nations, inter alia, to prohibit the use of asphyxiating gases in warfare.

The signing of the Protocol of June 17th, 1926, "concerning the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and similar gases and of bacteriological methods as weapons of war" was consequently welcomed by the International Committee with deep satisfaction and, in full agreement with the International Committee, the XIIth, XIIIth, XIVth and XVth International

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C118030

Red Cross Conferences (at Geneva, The Hague, Brussels and Tokyo) stressed the importance of this Protocol and the necessity of its universal ratification.

In virtue of the mandates entrusted to it by different International Conferences, the International Committee arranged at Brussels in 1928, and again in Rome the following year, conferences of experts for the purpose of studying methods of protecting civilians against chemical warfare. The conclusions reached by the experts were published in two volumes, in 1928 and 1929.(1) In addition, for more than ten years past, the Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge has published each month a section on the protection of civilians against chemical warfare.

On February 10th, 1932, the International Committee submitted to the Disarmament Conference a memorandum summarising its activities and setting forth the views of the Red Cross in general in regard to chemical and bacteriological warfare.(2)

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So far as the Italo-Ethiopian conflict is concerned, the International Committee was apprised at the end of 1935 of the use which - in one specific case - the Italian forces were alleged to have made of poisonous and similar gases. In the course of the ensuing months, the International Committee examined with the utmost care the successive reports which reached it. A letter which the Committee addressed to the Italian Red Cross on this subject on April 12th, simultaneously with the first formal protest of the Ethiopian Red Cross dated April 11th, has not yet elicited a reply.

In view of the investigation which the Ethiopian and Italian Governments have asked the International Committee to undertake (3), it is our duty not to anticipate the conclusions which the proposed Commission of Enquiry might be led to draw as the result of its labours.

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(1) Commission internationale d'experts pour la protection des populations civiles contre la guerre chimique, 1st session, Brussels, January 16-19, 1928. Geneva, 1, Promenade du Pin, 1928. 8vo. (227x160), pp.32.

Commission internationale d'experts pour la protection des populations civiles contre la guerre chimique, 2nd session, Rome, April 22-26, 1929. Geneva, 1, Promenade du Pin, 1929. 8vo. (227x160), pp.165.

(2) Documents relatifs à la guerre chimique et aérienne présentés aux membres de la Conférence pour la réduction et la limitation des armements par le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, Geneva, 1, Promenade du Pin, 1932. 8vo. pp.42.

(3) A decision as to the object of the proposed enquiry (alleged violations of the Geneva Convention, and possibly other alleged violations of international law) has not yet been definitely reached.

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CANADA

C 118031

The International Committee is convinced that the distressing questions raised by the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in regard to the observance of the rules of warfare are a cause of deep preoccupation to the national Societies as well as to the Committee.

It would be deeply grateful if the national Societies would proceed at once to collect data relating to their own experiences in the present conflict, with a view to permitting a better solution, in future, of the humanitarian problems interesting the Red Cross.

Faithful to its duty of co-ordinating efforts for mitigating the sufferings of war victims, the International Committee expects to notify the national Societies, as soon as it is in a position usefully to do so, of the points on which, in its view, an effort might be made to improve and render more efficient the work of the Red Cross in wartime, and to suggest appropriate methods for achieving this aim.

We have the honour, etc.....

For the International Red Cross
Committee:

Max HUBER,

President.

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C 118032 L-150 Vol 4(a)

(Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League)

Official No. C.256(1).M.150(1).1936.

Geneva, June 8th, 1936.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY

COMMUNICATION

from the Government of the Argentine Republic

Geneva, June 2nd, 1936.

(Translation).

To the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Sir,

At the Council meeting on May 12th last, I entered a formal reservation on behalf of my Government against the postponement of the discussions regarding the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia. My motive in so doing was to safeguard the basic principles of the Covenant of the League, while at the same time maintaining the spirit of constant co-operation in the high purposes of the League by which my Government is actuated.

As a logical consequence of that attitude, and in consonance also with the ideas expressed at various Assemblies regarding the desirability of democratising the functions with which the Council is invested, I beg to confirm, in accordance with my explicit instructions, the request which I have already made verbally for the summoning of the Assembly on or about the date of the next meeting of the Council, which has been convened for the 16th of this month.

This request is based upon the conviction that it is essential that all the States Members of the League of Nations, which is founded upon the principle of equality, should have an opportunity of considering the problems arising out of the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia, which are of such overwhelming importance in the present international situation, thus assuming their responsibilities and expressing their judgments upon the course to be followed in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Covenant.

My Government is of opinion that for this purpose it will be sufficient to reopen the Assembly which, as was made clear by its President, M. Benes, at the meeting on October 9th, 1935, was not closed but adjourned, out of consideration for the state of public opinion in the various countries; a fact which, in my Government's view, would in itself justify the matter's being submitted to the Assembly's consideration.

This attitude should be considered in the light of Article 10 and other articles of the Covenant, the principles of which are in keeping with the unchanging tradition on which Pan-Americanism has for half-a-century been based in the mutual relations of all the peoples of America - a tradition which has been brought down to the most recent times in international declarations and documents.

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C 118033

It is my Government's view that the purpose of the Assembly, the summoning of which it requests, should be to consider the situation brought about by the annexation of Ethiopia and also the position in regard to the sanctions enacted by the League.

(Signed) E. Ruiz Guinazu

Argentine Minister,

Permanent Delegate accredited to the
League of Nations.

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O.D. SKELTON TO WLMK

C 118034

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

June 6th, 1936.

ETHIOPIAN CRISIS

In view of the approaching debate in our House of Commons on the League, in which I understand quite a number of people are preparing to take part, and the fact that it will be necessary for Canada to take part in the Special Assembly called for on June 29th to deal with the Ethiopian situation, I have been making some notes and collecting material.

With regard to the criticism made that the Government has not indicated its position, I think it is easy to reply to that, making the Press statement of October 29th the starting point. The attached notes deal with the first question -"What was the Government's policy regarding Italian sanctions and how far has this policy been carried out?" I shall have by the first of the week notes on two other phases: the present position and the advisability of continuing, expanding or dropping sanctions against Italy, and our policy toward the League in general, again using as a starting point the statement of October 29th and indicating what experience has had to teach and what the trend of opinion in England and elsewhere on the subject has been in the last few months.

I enclose, also, for convenience an extra copy of our Ethiopian White Paper, practically all of which I think is worth reading, also photostat copies of a speech by Mr. Baldwin and of a letter by J.M. Macdonnell and a statement by Sir Norman Angell who

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C 118035

who gives the most effective statement of the pro-intervention side. I am having copies made of some extremely interesting correspondence in the London Times, particularly by Sir Norman Angell and Lord Lynton on the pro-intervention side and by J. A. Spender, Lord Lothian and Lord Charnwood against emphasizing the coercive phase of the League's activities.

O.D.S.

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CANADA

C 118036 L-150 bl 4(a)
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA. JUL 9 1936

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Comité de Coordination/74(b)

Genève, le 26 juin 1936.

DIFFEREND ENTRE L'ETHIOPIE ET L'ITALIE.

Coordination des mesures à prendre en application de l'article 16 du Pacte.

COMITE DE COORDINATION.

Toutes les propositions.

Télégramme, en date du 23 juin 1936, du Ministre des Relations extérieures de Haïti, au Secrétaire général.

Le Gouvernement haïtien, estimant que les sanctions contre l'Italie n'ont plus leur raison d'être dans l'état actuel des choses, a l'honneur d'informer le Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations qu'il y a lieu de considérer comme étant désormais sans objet l'adhésion contenue dans mon câble du 30 octobre 1931, relatif aux sanctions.

(signé) CHATELAIN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Co-ordination Ctte/74(b)

Geneva, June 26th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant.

CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE.

All the Proposals.

Telegram dated June 23rd, 1936, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haïti to the Secretary-General.

The Haitian Government, considering that in the present circumstances sanctions against Italy have no longer any object, has the honour to inform the Secretariat of the League of Nations that the acceptance contained in my cable of October 30th, 1935, in the matter of sanctions should be regarded as no longer operative.

(signed) CHATELAIN.

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CANADA

C 118037

THE DEPARTMENT OF CANADA JUL 9 1936 EXTERNAL

L-150 vol 4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.271.M.161.1936.VII.

Geneva, June 26th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Government of Uruguay.

Translation.

Paris, June 18th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

In view of the meeting of the Assembly which has been fixed for June 30th, I am directed by my Government to inform you that, on consideration of the question of the economic and financial measures taken against Italy under Article 16 of the Covenant, it has decided to support any proposals made by States Members of the League for the withdrawal of those measures. For various reasons, which I shall have the honour to explain, my Government considers that in the present circumstances the measures in question should not continue in operation.

At the same time, my Government is prepared to consider at the proper moment any reforms of the Covenant of the League that may be proposed with the object of adapting the Covenant to the present realities of international life.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) A. GUANI,

Permanent Delegate of the Republic to the League of Nations.

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L-150
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DEPARTMENT OF
JUL 9 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.272.M.162.1936,VII.

Geneva, June 26th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Haitian Government.

Port-au-Prince, June 23rd, 1936.

Translation.

The Haitian Government, considering that in the present circumstances sanctions against Italy have no longer any object, has the honour to inform the Secretariat of the League of Nations that the acceptance contained in my cable of October 30th, 1935, in the matter of sanctions* should be regarded as no longer operative.

CHATELAIN,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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* Circulated under No. Co-ordination Committee/74.

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C 118039

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA. JUL 9 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.273.M.163.1036.VII.

Geneva, June 27th, 1936.

L-150
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DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Polish Government.

(Translation).

Geneva, June 26th, 1936.

To the President of the Council.

At its May session the Council decided to meet again towards the middle of June in order to resume discussions concerning certain special measures adopted jointly by the members of the League of Nations in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Pending this further meeting, the members of the Council agreed not to modify these measures.

In the meantime the Government of one State member of the Council has asked that the Assembly be convened. I reserve the option to take part in the discussion in the Assembly after the State which has called for its convocation has explained its views to the Assembly.

I desire, however, to inform the other members of the Council forthwith of the attitude of my Government towards collective measures. Sanctions were applied by each Government in virtue of its sovereign decision concerning the applicability of Article 16 of the Covenant. It cannot therefore be denied that the decision to abolish sanctions is also a decision for each member of the League to take as a sovereign State.

The members of the League undertook joint action with a view to stopping hostilities and in the hope that the dispute would be settled by pacific means. In view of the most recent developments we are obliged to recognise that our joint effort has met with collective failure. The measures we took have not achieved their aim, and having in the present case proved to be inoperative, have become useless. If, notwithstanding this, sanctions were maintained, they would in the opinion of the Polish Government assume the character of punitive measures, and this would be going beyond the spirit of Article 16 of the Covenant.

All these considerations have for some time past led the Polish Government to think that the measures which had been taken had no further object. Nevertheless, it has hitherto abstained from abrogating them out of deference to the other members of the Council, in view of the last resolution of the Council. The Polish Government considers, however, that time has come to inform the other members of the Council of its decision to terminate the measures it adopted under Article 16.

I desire furthermore to state that this policy of collective action will not in any case weaken the determination of my Government to take part in all the efforts of the League of Nations as an instrument for international co-operation.

I have the honour, etc...

(Signed) J. BECK,
Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Polish Representative on the Council.

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C 118040
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THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA JUL 9 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.274.M.164.1936.VII.

Geneva, June 27th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Ethiopian Delegation.

Geneva, June 26th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

I am commanded by His Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, to request Your Excellency to communicate to the Members of the Council and the Assembly the following declaration:

I. The Emperor informs the League of Nations of the true political situation in Ethiopia at the present time.

1. It is common knowledge that less than half the territory of Ethiopia is at present occupied by the Italian armies, and even that part is not in their possession. The enemy forces are merely encamped at certain points, and it is only at those occupied points that the Ethiopian peoples suffer the yoke of the oppressor, though without acknowledging its legitimacy. The Italian authorities are endeavouring to obtain the submission of Ethiopian notables by threats of confiscation and maltreatment against their families, women and children.

The Ethiopian warriors have not at present enough arms or ammunition to conduct continuous military operations. This temporary inaction must not be regarded as implying that the struggle has been abandoned and the accomplished fact recognised. The history of Europe shows that victory finally deserts only those peoples which have themselves renounced their independence. Some years ago, other States had to suffer the total or almost total occupation of their territories. They did not renounce their independence. In the end, justice rewarded their efforts and crowned their perseverance.

2. In the unoccupied part of the territory of Ethiopia, there exists a regular Government, constituted by the Emperor himself, on which the Emperor has conferred the necessary powers to administer the country and maintain its authority. The Emperor is in communication with that Government.

II. The Emperor has retained all his rights. He has never ceased to exercise them, nor does he now do so. He therefore affirms the will of the Ethiopian Empire, a Member of the League of Nations, to protest yet once more against the aggression of which it has been the victim, and to claim at all times and places, and by all the means at its command, respect for its territorial integrity and political independence.

III. The Emperor has never ceased, and does not now cease, to demand of every one of the States that have signed the Covenant of the League of Nations the execution of the promises made to Ethiopia, which are clearly set out in the articles of the Covenant bearing the signature of every State Member.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) NASIBU ZAMANUEL,

First Delegate of the Empire of Ethiopia.

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C 118041

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS JUL 15 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.279 M.169.1936.VII.

Geneva, July 1st, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

(Translation from the Italian)

ROME, June 27th, 1936. Year XIV.

To the Secretary-General.

I would request Your Excellency to be good enough to communicate to the States Members of the League of Nations the following letter dated June 15th 1936 from the President of the Italian Red Cross to the International Red Cross Committee, with the memorandum annexed thereto.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) CIANO.

ITALIAN RED CROSS.

The President General.

Express Registered Letter.

ROME, June 15th, 1936. XIV.

To the International Red Cross Committee,
Geneva.

In its note of March 25th 1936 the International Committee communicated to me the reply, dated March 2nd, 1936, of the Ethiopian Red Cross to Circular No. 323. *

In view of the new situation which has arisen in Ethiopia, the Italian Red Cross considers that it is no longer called upon to reply to the above-mentioned note of the Ethiopian Red Cross, the latter having ceased to exist, even in the fictitious and purely outward form in which it had hitherto existed.

Nevertheless, as a matter of courtesy towards the Committee and in order to inform the other Red Cross Societies of the actual situation in Ethiopia before the present state of affairs, the Italian Association considers it desirable to send to the Committee the following memorandum containing certain comments on the note of the ex-Ethiopian Red Cross.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) F. CREMONESI.

1 annex.

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* See document C.155.M.93.1936.VII (Official Journal, April 1936, page 465).

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 118042

ITALIAN RED CROSS

The President General.

MEMORANDUM OF THE ITALIAN RED CROSS IN REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE EX-ETHIOPIAN RED CROSS DATED MARCH 2nd 1936.

A) GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The biassed and captious Ethiopian note endeavours to mislead public opinion. The author of the note, lacking arguments derived from the actual facts as they occurred and on which the Italian allegations were directly based, has endeavoured to minimise those facts by dialectical exercises, the only effect of which is to prove that he is a lawyer skilled in pettifogging.

For its part the Italian Red Cross declines not merely to adopt such methods, but even to consider and refute the many grotesque insinuations contained in the said note.

1. Ethiopia's incomprehension of the underlying spirit of the Geneva Convention has been so amply proved by the Italian Red Cross in its note of January 11th 1936, and in the following notes, that it is useless to revert to this point. The improper use of the Red Cross emblem in Ethiopia has been noted by the Italian military authorities and fully confirmed by numerous and various witnesses, as mentioned in my note of February 28th 1936.

The ex-Ethiopian Red Cross thinks it has discovered a contradiction in the statements of the Italian Red Cross, arguing inter alia that even if evidence were forthcoming of Ethiopian troops having placed themselves under the protection of the Red Cross emblem, this would imply that they had understood the value of that emblem. The comic side of this statement is obvious. It was precisely because they knew that Italy respected this emblem that the Ethiopian soldiers used it for their own advantage and consequently for purposes quite different from those contemplated in the Geneva Convention.

2. As regards the actual non-existence of the Ethiopian Red Cross, the arguments put forward in the note of March 2nd 1936 merely confirm in the eyes of other Red Cross Societies the complete incomprehension of the scope and work of a national Red Cross, because it is said that only in face of the imminence of a conflict had Ethiopia felt the necessity of acceding to the Geneva Convention and setting up a national association since, previous to this conflict, the Ethiopian Government had "constantly cherished the illusion of a permanent peace." Though I must make every reservation regarding this affirmation of the peaceful intentions of the ex-Ethiopian Government, I would merely observe that no country had greater need than Ethiopia for the development of Red Cross institutions even prior to the conflict. The Red Cross carries on its work not only in time of war, and,

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furthermore, in no country more than in Ethiopia was the evil of domestic warfare and armed frontier conflicts so widespread. It should be noted moreover that the very Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 25) imposes on States Members the obligation to assist and encourage the establishment of Red Cross organisations in time of peace.

Moreover, the notorious and proved ill-treatment of Egyptian hospital orderlies, the barbarous attack on the Netherlands ambulance during which Dr. van Schelven was wounded and Dr. Melly was killed, are some of the many proofs of Ethiopia's incomprehension of the assistance afforded her by other countries.

3. With regard to the possibility that sanitary units may have been exposed to risks (of which the Italian units themselves had some experience when our field hospital No. 605 was bombarded on March 31st, 1936), the letter of March 2nd, 1936, without excluding in principle such a possibility, claimed that the Abyssinian troops were always kept at a distance from the hospital units, whereas in fact abundant documentary material and the testimony of many witnesses had proved the contrary.

B) OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE JUSTIFICATIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE EX-ETHIOPIAN RED CROSS.

1. As regards the Italian accusation concerning the widespread and continual use of dum-dum bullets by the former Ethiopian army, the Ethiopian note refers inter alia to the small number of bullets captured by the Italian troops, but passes over in silence the fact that these bullets were collected in one small sector of the front only, and that the report consisted of nothing more than first impressions.

The subsequent discoveries, however, and the numerous fresh cases of wounds, of which ample evidence is available, prove that the use of such bullets by the Ethiopians was constant and general.

In an attempt to evade the weight of so serious and well-attested a charge, the Ethiopian note went so far as to turn it back upon its authors, suggesting that the Italians themselves had sent 400,000 dum-dum bullets to Massawa through the Suez Canal, and mentioning the date - December 11th, 1935 -, the name of the S.S. Antonietta, and the mark G.A.1931 on the ammunition-boxes. According to the formal statements of the Italian military authorities, this report is a complete fabrication. No dum-dum bullets were ever sent from Italy to East Africa or manufactured in Italy; Italian troops here never had such bullets in their possession and the mark G.A. 1931 does not correspond to any kind of Italian war material. The suggestion that the dum-dum bullets discovered might have belonged to the Italian troops themselves is not merely intrinsically ridiculous, but without any technical foundation, because the bullets were made for Mauser, Martini, and Gras rifles, which are in use in the Ethiopian army, and they therefore could not have been used in Italian rifles.

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In the same connection, the Ethiopian note declared that the use of leaden bullets was perfectly in order, and admitted it, whereas in point of fact such bullets are prohibited, inasmuch as they "readily expand or flatten in the human body", as the Hague Declaration of 1899 puts it.

The Ethiopian note continued with a series of otiose and ingenuous arguments of the usual tortuous and cavilling type. It alleged, for example, that Sergeant Birago could not have been wounded by dum-dum bullets because some of the fragments found in his wounds were 10 mm. across, whereas the largest calibre of any bullets used by the Ethiopians was 7.92 mm., and therefore smaller than the fragments found. This is not evidence at all, because the 7.92 mm. refers to the diameter of the base of the bullet, whereas its length is several centimetres.

2. With regard to our denunciations of the atrocities committed by the Abyssinian troops on our dead and wounded and prisoners, the Ethiopian note attempted to invalidate them by laboured and, indeed, puerile observations.

The various notes from the Italian Government and the Italian Red Cross, handed both to the League of Nations and to the International Red Cross Committee, which contained impressive evidence of the emasculation of soldiers and workmen, and, more recently, the statements of the Belgian Lieutenant Armand Frère, are such that I need not dwell upon this dreadful subject.

As to the torture and killing of the airman Minniti, the Ethiopian note did not merely seek to deny that he, an Italian airman brought down in action in the enemy lines, was a prisoner of war, but also warned other Italian airmen that they might expect similar treatment if they fell into Abyssinian hands. To discuss such assertions is repugnant to our whole outlook.

C. <u>OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARGES BROUGHT BY THE EX-ETHIOPIAN RED CROSS</u>.

1. <u>Alleged bombing of medical units</u>.

The Ethiopian note gave a list of bombardments of medical units, which either never took place, or have already been formally denied, or were cases in which no Red Cross emblem was visible, or were purely accidental, occurring in the course of legitimate military operations. I may refer to my various communications upon the subject.

2. <u>Alleged bombing of open towns and churches</u>.

No open and undefended places were ever bombed, but only military concentrations and posts. It is common knowledge, moreover, that the so-called "towns" in Ethiopia are mainly collections of tukuls, chiefly built of wood and mud; in these settlements the armed men concentrated and kept up a sustained rifle and anti-aircraft fire against the Italian aircraft flying over the area.

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C 118045

In any case, the long list of so-called towns bombed was completely imaginary. Many of them do not exist, and on most of the dates given no bombing took place. In some cases, such as those of Adowa, Amba Alaji, Mai Mashish, Gondar, Dabat, Waldia, Kworam, Ashangi, Mertho, and Seguerat, bombs were dropped upon concentrations of armed men outside the inhabited areas, and often some kilometres distant from them.

The same remarks apply to churches, which, in Ethiopia, are often merely tukuls surmounted by a cross.

3. Alleged use of gas.

The statements in the Ethiopian note were a tissue of falsehoods. I would refer to my note of May 11th, 1936, but may at the same time point out, as an illustration of the reliability of those statements, that:

Complaint was made of the bombing of Makale with asphyxiating gas on December 31st, 1935, and January 21st, 1936, at which times the town was in the possession of the Italian troops, having been occupied since November 8th, 1935;

Complaint was made of the transport of gas by the S.S.Sicilia - a ship which, according to information received, was used exclusively for the transport of troops, and therefore could not carry explosives, for which special equipment is necessary.

Complaint was also made of the transport of gas by the S.S. Madda, which was alleged to have passed through the Suez Canal on January 19th, 1936, whereas it has been ascertained that the vessel in question sailed on her first voyage to East Africa from Naples on February 27th, 1936, carrying nothing but motor-vehicles and foodstuffs.

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C 118046
RECEIVED CANADA JUL 15 1936 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.280.M.170.1936.VII.

Geneva, July 2nd, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Communication from the Italian Government.

(Translation from the Italian).

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

ROME.

June 27th, 1936, Year XIV.

To the Secretary-General.

In a note dated May 16th[1] last the Italian Government sent you a copy of a statement made at Jibuti on April 22nd last by the Belgian lieutenant Armand Frère, formerly military adviser to Ras Desta.

With reference to this communication I beg to send you another statement made at Brussels by the above-named Belgian officer on June 10th, 1936, in which, confirming and amplifying his previous statements, he deals with the state of Abyssinia under the past régime, the Ethiopian military preparations against Italy, the suspicious death of the Belgian lieutenant Roger Cambier, the mutilation and decapitation of Italian prisoners, the use of prohibited projectiles by Ras Desta's troops, and the abuse of the Red-Cross emblem by the above-named Ras in having munitions loaded on the Swedish Red-Cross lorries (Annex No.1). The original of this statement, with Lieutenant Frère's signature, legalised by the Burgomaster of Anderlecht, is at present in the keeping of this Ministry and can be produced if required.

I take the same opportunity of sending you a reproduction of a picture by an Abyssinian artist, representing an Ethiopian raid on an African village, which was brought to Europe by the above-mentioned Belgian officer (as proved by the autographed statement attached to the photograph), as a document on Abyssinian customs under the past régime (Annex No.2).

I request you to be so good as to communicate these documents to the States Members of the League of Nations as a matter of historical and retrospective interest.

I have the honour to be etc...

(Signed) CIANO.

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1) See document C.258.M.152,1936.VII.

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C 118047

Annex 1.

BRUSSELS, June 10th, 1936.

To Count Renzo Cardelli Rinaldini,
Chief of the Services of the Stefani Agency,
BRUSSELS.

Dear Sir,

In reply to the questions which you put to me concerning my mission with the Abyssinian Government, I have pleasure in informing you of the following:

I was engaged to go to Abyssinia as Officer-Instructor in the mission formed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Léopold Reul (passed Staff College).

Never, during the conversations preceding the signature of the contract, nor in the minds of the other subalterns who went with me, nor in our contracts with the Abyssinian Government, was there any question of war or of going to fight the Italians; it was merely provided that in case of war there would be an increase of pay for the two field officers who might be attached to one or other General Staff.

On setting out for Abyssinia we were all convinced, as a Belgian official mission had been working there for years, that we should find at least an embryonic state of civilisation which we could have continued to develop. On the contrary, it did not take us many days to discover that the country and the capital itself lived in a atate of almost complete barbarism, in which any form of civil organisation was almost entirely lacking, and in which the native population lived under the rule of a handful of cruel and venal Abyssinian chiefs, against whom even the authority of the Negus was absolutely powerless.

We also soon discovered that the presence of Europeans was simply a vague attempt to give the outside world the impression that the Abyssinians wished to accept the principles of European civilisation, and after a few conversations with the Abyssinian chiefs and a few indiscretions on their part, we soon learnt that there could be no doubt that their military preparations were exclusively directed against Italy.

This hatred of Italy and the Italians was cunningly maintained and propagated among the population, and particularly among the trained troops and the recruits called up in the interior of the country.

What struck us most was the confidence and absolute conviction which prevailed among the chiefs and soldiers that if one day Italy dared to invade their country, an Abyssinian victory was certain, together with the extermination of the Italians to the last man, as a prominent chief said to me one day at Addis.

Contrary to our contractual obligations and despite

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my protests, I was forced by order of the Negus to leave Addis after one month's stay there, and to go to Irga-Alem (Sidamo), as military adviser to the army of Ras Desta (the son-in-law of the Negus).

At that time hostilities had not yet begun; but this did not prevent the Ras from leaving his residence at Irga-Alem and setting out with 12,000 warriors, including a battalion of the Guard consisting of 1,000 to 1,200 trained men, towards the Somali frontier in the Dolo district, where I had to go and join him on the Ganale Doria.

On my arrival at Irga-Alem, Fitaorari Ayele, the representative of the Ras, allotted to me as quarters the house that had been occupied by Lieutenant Roger Cambier, who had died a few days before my arrival and whom I was to replace. This Belgian officer had belonged to Major Dothée's military mission.

On arriving at the house indicated I was amazed to find the bedroom in which he had died in an appallingly filthy condition; the ground near the bed was still covered with vomit, and the bed itself was soiled with excrement and the remains of the vomiting which had preceded his death.

In different quarters, Abyssinians confessed to me that this officer had been poisoned by Ras Desta, who apparently liked him still less than the other Europeans - which was saying a great deal.

I learnt from his very faithful interpreter Nagache, who lived with him and was his confidant and who was mine sfterwards, that the lieutenant's last meal had been taken with Ras Desta; next day he fell ill and took to his bed, from which he never rose again. He suffered terrible pains in the abdomen and stomach. He even said to Nagache at a certain moment: "The swine has poisoned me".

This same Nagache told me one day that the lieutenant was so suspicious that he systematically declined all Ras Desta's invitations, and it was only on the day before his departure that he accepted, being morally obliged to attend a farewell dinner, which unfortunately cost him his life.

When I joined Ras Desta towards the middle of December, hostilities had already begun.

I had been on the spot for a few weeks when General Graziani's tremendous offensive routed the army of the Ras, and having no desire to fight myself, I immediately took advantage of this rout to leave the army and go to Addis.

Unfortunately I had to be a witness fo the following scenes:

The first Italian detachment, consisting of three tanks and a thousand Eritrean soldiers, had got into touch with the Abyssinians in the second week of January at Kol Naye: a fierce fight followed; a tank which had been held up and surrounded was found without occupants.

During the fight the Abyssinians had taken fifteen prisoners, three whites and twelve Eritreans.

These prisoners were taken to the rear, where I was in the mountains, towards 9 p.m.

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Desta sent for me: on my arrival I saw some prisoners lying on their backs bound hand and foot. Around them soldiers were dancing and shouting war cries.

After a few moments the curved Abyssinian swords began to slash at the bodies of these unfortunate wretches.

Realising what was going to happen, I protested to the Ras against such atrocities. His only reply was : "It is the Abyssinian custom. Do not try to prevent the soldiers from rejoicing, because if you do I cannot answer for your life. If it makes you sick to see your 'frengi' brothers killed, go away!"

Nevertheless I remained and was a witness of the horrible mutilation of these miserable prisoners.

The three whites, who were the main targets of the sword cuts which prepared the way for their mutilation, were then decapitated and their heads were shown to the soldiers in triumph, while the twelve Eritreans took about an hour and a half to die.

Three of them who held out longest against this lingering death, begged their tormentors to finish them off. As no one seemed willing to perform this act of mercy, and as I was unable to restrain myself before the horrible spectacle, I took advantage of Ras Desta's departure to put these unfortunate victims out of their misery. I believe I did right in answering their supplication and ending their atrocious sufferings by instant death.

In my statement to Italian journalists at Jibuti I said that the Eritreans also had been decapitated. I had not at that time made up my mind to reveal the sad facts related above.

Naturally I confirm all the rest of the statement made spontaneously at Jibuti, which is nothing but the absolute truth.

In addition, I may say with regard to the dum-dum bullets in the strict sense of the term, that this ammunition was on sale in an armourer's shop at Addis, where anyone could buy it.

From contact with soldiers at the front, I can confirm the fact that all the bullets were put out of shape by order of the Ras, so that the wounds they caused made it even less likely that his orders would be disobeyed, these being that no prisoners should be taken.

I declare that I have seen Desta, the leading chiefs, and even priests, present at the bodily torture of prisoners. It revolted me - but I could do nothing - to behold their cynical ferocity, which they said was an Abyssinian custom, and see them leering and rejoicing at these ghastly proceedings.

I have never seen or been present at the bombardment of villages or groups of civilians from the air.

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Only villages like Neghelli that were crowded with warriors and commissariat caravans were attacked by the airmen.

I desire above all to assert that, during the whole of my stay on the Somali front and during my return by road to Addis Ababa, I never saw any victims of gas attacks; I was present at at least seventy or eighty bombardments.

On many occasions the Abyssinians tried to make me believe that the bombs were gas-bombs; I can definitely say that they were not, for the simple reason that I never saw any gas victims and, as I myself had no mask, I could not have escaped the poisonous or other effects of the gases with which I am only too well acquainted, as a result of my experiences during the World War of 1914-1918.

On many occasions I spoke of gas to the doctors of the Swedish ambulance which accompanied us: none of them had ever had to attend a gas victim.

What the Abyssinians took for gas bombs were merely incendiary bombs which after exploding left greenish-yellow traces giving off a smell of slow combustion powder; this had nothing to do with gas and was quite harmless to the touch.

The cases of ammunition found by the Italians at Wadara in the lorries of the Swedish ambulance were part of the ammunition reserves of Desta's army. They had been loaded on his express orders notwithstanding repeated protests by the heads of the ambulance.

On my return to Belgium I had every opportunity to read the absurd stories spread by certain newspapers concerning what they called the real situation in Abyssinia and the various phases of the war.

I was particularly pained to see that some writers had reached a point at which they compared our heroic King Albert and the situation of our army on the Yser with the inglorious figure of the Negus surrounded by his gold-chests and the evaporation of his army commanded by Rases and other slave-drivers and torturers. I say slave-drivers although this word "slave" has for some time past been banned from the Abyssinian language and replaced by the truly European term "servants".

I make this statement entirely of my own free will considering it to be my duty in the name of international military honour and justice to help to reveal the whole truth.

I am prepared on my honour as an officer to confirm these statements in the presence of anyone and authorise you to make such use of them as you think best in the interests of truth.

I have the honour, etc.
(Signed) A. FRERE.

Seen for the legalisation of the above signature of Monsieur Frere, Armand Julien,
Anderlecht, June 11th, 1936.
(Signed) illegible
Burgomaster.

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C 118051



[*Translation.*]

I certify that this is a photograph of an oil-painting that I bought from an Abyssinian Chief and that I brought back from Addis Ababa as irrefutable evidence of Abyssinian culture.

(Signed) Armand Frère,
Commandant de Réserve.

Brussels, June 10th, 1936.

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C118052

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.283.M.172.1936.

Geneva, July 3rd, 1936.

L-15-0
4(a)

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations has the honour to communicate to the Members of the League the following declaration, received on July 3rd, 1936.

CONQUERING LION OF THE TRIBE OF JUDAH

HAILE SELASSIE THE FIRST
ELECT OF THE LORD EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA.

To His Excellency Monsieur J. Avenol,
Secretary-General of the
League of Nations, GENEVA.

Peace be with you.

To supplement the declaration made to the Members of the League of Nations on June 26th, 1936, We communicate to you, for transmission to all the competent authorities of the League of Nations, the names of the Public Authorities upon whom We have conferred powers to administer the Empire of Ethiopia in Our absence.

They are:

Betoded Wolde Sadik,
Ras Emeru.

The present seat of these authorities is at Gore. All communications to be forwarded to these authorities may be addressed until further notice to Our Legation in London, 5, Princes Gate.

(Signed) HAILE SELASSIE THE FIRST
Emperor.

By His Majesty the Emperor
By order and by authority:
(Signed) W. GIORGIS,
Secretary.

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C 118053

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Co-ordination Committee/53(c).

Geneva, July 3rd, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant.

CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE.

All Proposals.

Letter from the Permanent Delegate of Liberia accredited to the League of Nations to the Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee, dated July 3rd, 1936.

In accordance with instructions received from my Government I have the honour to inform you as follows:

In its desire strictly to comply with the provisions of the Covenant, the Liberian Government supported the application of sanctions under Article 16 with a view to joint action for the purpose of putting an end to hostilities and bringing about a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Having since noted the failure of these measures, the Liberian Government now declares itself in favour of discontinuing the said collective sanctions.

(Signed) O. de BOGAERDE,

Permanent Delegate of the Republic of Liberia.

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C 118054 L-150 T4(a)

Information Sections Bulletin
July 3, 1936

Assembly League, which adjourned November eleventh, 1935, resumed sixteenth session Tuesday, June 30th on demand Argentine Government to examine situation brought about by Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Benes, having become President Czechoslovakia Republic, had resigned Presidency Assembly and session opened under provisional presidency Eden, United Kingdom, Foreign Secretary, who arranged for election new president. Van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium, elected forty-seven votes out of fifty-one. He made communication which Italian Government, having abstained from sending delegation Assembly, would make regarding its views. This communication referred to Italian Government's attitude towards League in various circumstances concerning dispute, declared that organized Government Ethiopia had no longer existed even before entry Italian troops Addis Ababa, that it was Italy's duty assume responsibilities involved by this state things, that population would be favourable to changed regime, indicated how Italy regarded her mission in Ethiopia and mentioned certain guarantees Italy ready to give and pointed out conditions under which Italy might resume cooperation with other states, pointing out, however, that it was necessary absolute which in Italian view prevented international cooperation should be eliminated. Cantilo, Argentine, said his Government had asked summon Assembly, thinking that moment all nations members League should have opportunity stating views on respect due territorial integrity states and on fate of international institutions. Then Negus Haile Selassie, First Delegate Ethiopia, came to platform and put forward appeal Ethiopian people. Protested against Italy's aggression in

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Ethiopia, recalled engagements entered into by Italy towards Ethiopia and resolution taken within League to assist latter country, protested against intention certain Governments raise sanctions and asked states members League take all measures for securing respect for Covenant. Representatives following countries then gave Government's views:-

Bolivia, Uruguay, France, Panama, Union South Africa, Canada, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Australia, Switzerland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Chile Denmark, /Austria, China, Hungary, Iran, /Sweden, Ireland, New Zealand/

Discussion continuing. Amongst delegates present at Assembly are Negus Haile Selassie, representative Ethiopia. Following countries represented by Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers:-

France, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey.

Council League met June twenty-sixth, President Eden, United Kingdom. On proposal Chilean representative, Council held preliminary discussion on reform League. Representatives of following countries spoke:

U.S.S.R., Roumania, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Turkey and finally, on motion President, Council decided await discussion in Assembly before making any decision, and to submitting this reform for Tuesday.

~~Council~~ Conference on Suppression Illicit Traffic Dangerous Drugs ended June 26th, having concluded a Convention which immediately signed by twenty-three states.

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C118056 L-150 14(a)

League of Nations Press

July 4th, 1936.

Secretary General League Nations communicates to Governments Members League the following texts:

Recommendations adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its sixteenth session on July 4th, 1936.

1. The Assembly, (1) having met again on the initiative of the Government of the Argentine Republic and in pursuance of the decision to adjourn its session taken on October 11th, 1935, in order to examine the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, (2) taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on this subject, (3) noting that various circumstances have prevented the full application of the Covenant of the League of Nations, (4) remaining firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as the declaration of the American States, dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force, (5) being desirous of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations by adapting the application of these principles to the necessary lessons of experience, (6) being convinced that it is to strengthen the real effectiveness of the guarantees of security which the League affords to its members, recommends that the Council,

(a) should invite the Governments of the Members of the League to send to the Secretary General, before September 1st, 1936, if possible, any proposals they may wish to make in order to improve in the spirit or within the limits laid down above the application of the principles of the Covenant.

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(b) should instruct the Secretary General to make a first examination and classification of these proposals.

(c) should report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the state of the question.

2. The Assembly, taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on the subject of the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, recalling the previous findings and decisions in connection with this dispute, recommends that the Co-ordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant.

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C 118058 L-150 VI-4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

July 6th, 1936

A. On behalf of Chairman Co-ordination Committee, Secretary General League Nations communicates to Governments Members League following texts.

Proposals Adopted by Co-ordination Committee on July 6th, 1936.

1. The Co-ordination Committee set up consequence of the Assembly recommendation of October 10th, 1935, with regard to the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, proposes that the Governments of the Members of the League should abrogate, on July 15th, 1936, the restrictive measures taken by them in conformity with its proposals Ia, 2, 2a, 3 4 and 4b.

2. In order to complete the documentation in the possession of Governments with reference to the application of the various proposals made by it, the Co-ordination Committee suggests that Governments should

(a) continue to complete and forward to the Secretary the questionnaire concerning their trade with Italy and Italian possessions up to and including that relating to the month of June, 1936,

(b) furnish, before October 31st, 1936, to the Secretariat, for circulation to Governments, a memorandum setting out their experience with reference to the application of the measures enforced and such conclusions as this experience would seem to suggest,

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(c) appoint experts to serve on a committee to study this documentation and submit a report to Governments.

B. Repetition of the Texts transmitted on July 4th, 1936.

Recommendations a dopted by Assembly League of Nations on July 4th, 1936, at its sixteenth session:

1. The Assembly, (1) having met again on the initiative of the Government of the Argentine Republic and in pursuance of the decision to adjourn its session taken on October 11th, 1935, in order to examine the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, (2) taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on this subject, (3) noting that various circumstances have prevented the full application of the Covenant of the League of Nations, (4) remaining firmaly attached to the principles of the Covenant which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as the Declaration of the American States dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force, (5) being desirous of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations by adopting the application of these principles to the lessons of experience, (6) being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen the real effectiveness of the guarantees of security which the League affords to its Members,

Recommends that the Council

(a) should invite the Governments of the Members of the League to send to the Secretary General, before September 1st, 1936 if possible, any proposals they may

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wish to make in order to improve in the spirit or within the limits laid down above, the application of the principles of the Covenant,

line below ----

(b) should report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the state of the question.

2. The Assembly, taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on the subject of the situation arising out of the Ethiopian-Italo dispute, recalling the previous findings and decisions in connection with this dispute,

Recommends that the Co-ordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant.

line -----

(b) should instruct the Secretary General to make a first examination and classification of these proposals.

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C 118061

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Comité de coordination/130(1)

Genève, 6 juillet 1936.

Différend entre l'Ethiopie et l'Italie.

Coordination des mesures à prendre en application de l'article 16 du Pacte.

COMITE DE COORDINATION.

Proposition adoptéele 6 juillet 1936.

Le Comité de coordination, institué en exécution de la recommandation de l'Assemblée du 10 octobre 1935 au sujet du différend entre l'Ethiopie et l'Italie; propose que les gouvernements des Membres de la Société abrogent à la date du 15 juillet 1936 les mesures restrictives qu'ils ont prises conformément à ses propositions IA, II, IIA, III, IV et IVB.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Co-ordination Committee/130(1)

Geneva, July 6th, 1936.

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY.

Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant.

CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE.

Proposal adopted on July 6th, 1936.

The Co-ordination Committee set up in consequence of the Assembly recommendation of October 10th, 1935, with regard to the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, proposes that the Governments of the Members of the League should abrogate on July 15th, 1936, the restrictive measures taken by them in conformity with its Proposals IA, II, IIA, III, IV and IVB.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANADA
JUL
15
1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

Third Session

Meeting held at Geneva, Monday, July 6th, 1936.

(Public)

Chairman L M. de VASCONCELLOS

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The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: A short time ago I received a letter from the representative of Chile asking that the Co-ordination Committee should be convened for the consideration of a proposal the object of which was the raising of sanctions against Italy. The representative of Chile added, at the same time, that he would accept whatever decision might be taken by the League of Nations. As the Council at that stage had adjourned any decision on this matter, I was not in a position to take action at once in compliance with the request made by the representative of Chile. The situation has now changed, however. We have before us a Recommendation by the Assembly, and we have to take account of that Recommendation and take our decisions accordingly.

The Recommendation is to the effect that the Co-ordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant.

I do not propose to make any comments of a political character on the work that has been done by this Committee. In refraining from doing so I am following the course which I have consistently pursued throughout the existence of the Committee. Such comments and criticisms as are made are made in the Assembly, as delegates will have noticed. I desire to make only a short and impartial report on the work that this Committee has done, and I propose to submit a draft resolution for your consideration.

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This Committee was set up by a Recommendation adopted by the Assembly on October 10th, 1935. The Committee started its work on October 11th, 1935. The Committee has had the character of a conference of delegates of sovereign States met to co-ordinate the measures which should be taken with regard to a State regarded by other Members of the Assembly and Council as having infringed the obligations imposed upon it by the Covenant. The obligations of Members of the League devolve directly from the Covenant, and they were put in force in accordance with the observance that is due to Treaties. The Committee, therefore, had not itself to take decisions: it merely had to adopt proposals for submission to the various Governments concerned for their consideration.

The measures which the Co-ordination Committee had to recommend were those contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant. At the outset, however, political and military sanctions were set on one side for reasons that I am not called upon to go into at the present time.

When this Committee was convened, about nine months ago, it had at its disposal no precedents which might guide it; it had to attempt a first experiment in the application of Article 16. The Assembly Resolutions of 1921 recognised that it might be necessary to make a certain choice as regards the economic and financial measures that should be applied in any particular case. Those Resolutions also recognised that it might happen that all those measures would not be applied at once and simultaneously. The Co-ordination Committee was called upon to examine a series of measures that were regarded

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as possible, and had to study each of them in detail. The League of Nations is not universal, and it was therefore clear at the outset that the system of sanctions to be applied under Article 16 could not be complete. We should, however, recall the fact that the attitude of certain non-Member States, to whom, for the purposes of information, all the proposals drawn up by the Co-ordination Committee were communicated, was in several cases distinctly encouraging. One of those States associated itself with Members of the League in applying the measures proposed. Other States, without directly associating themselves in those measures, nevertheless adopted certain provisions which facilitated the work of the Co-ordination Committee.

From the outset of the Committee it was, moreover, emphasised that the measures taken should be such as to be rapidly applied. In this respect the Committee was bound to note that all the States Members of the League had not accepted the invitation that had been put forward so long ago as the time of the Assembly Resolutions of 1921 to the effect that the Governments of the different States ought to take the necessary preparatory measures, more particularly of a legislative character, to enable them, without loss of time, to apply the necessary measures of economic pressure. It is true that certain countries, being faced for the first time by the practical question of the application of Article 16, were in a very short period of time in a position to take the necessary practical measures. Other Governments found considerable difficulties of a constitutional character in this respect, and this fact, to a certain degree, influenced

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both the progress of the Co-ordination Committee's work and the results that it finally achieved.

Quite apart from any considerations based on paragraph 2 of Article 16 - that is to say military measures - it may be noted that the proposals framed by the Co-ordination Committee were not intended to set up, and did not in fact set up, a complete system of sanctions. The measures of an economic and financial character contemplated in the Covenant were not, in this particular case, implied in their entirety. It could scarcely be asserted that, taken as a whole, the proposals adopted were the equivalent of that severance of all trade or financial relations which is contemplated in Article 16. Moreover, the Committee did not propose any plan the object of which would have been, in a general way, to prevent, as is provided in Article 16, all financial and commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and other Members, and did not take any measures affecting persons residing in the Covenant-breaking State. When it had prepared one of its chief proposals - that is to say, the one relating to the prohibition of imports of Italian goods - the Committee, in large measure, respected acquired rights, both as regards orders that had in fact been paid for and also as regards goods that were already en route. Further, the time limit of one month between the adoption and the entry into force of the proposal - a time-limit which obviously was inevitable, since this is the first time that measures of this character were being applied by about fifty States - made it possible

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not only for legitimate traders but also for speculators to increase their purchases from Italy, and consequently the real effects of the prohibition on exports were considerably retarded. It may be that hesitation as regards the application of other measures was in part due to reasons of a practical character, but it was doubtless due in part also to the desire that measures should not be taken of a character to prevent a continuation of efforts directed to securing a satisfactory settlement of the dispute by conciliation.

At the Council on April 20th the Spanish representative emphasised what he called the contradictory procedure that was being followed. On the one hand there was the overlapping of attempts at conciliation by the Council with, on the other hand, the development of measures taken in application of Article 16 of the Covenant.

In the foregoing observations I have mentioned the circumstances in which the Co-ordination Committee had to discharge its work, and also I have laid before you certain considerations which affect the proposals submitted to Governments.

In conclusion I may perhaps say a few words as to the results that were in fact achieved. As regards the financial measures, Proposal II, it is obviously difficult to make any precise statement. Nevertheless, all the information available tends to indicate that these proposals were applied in such a way as to make them extremely effective. The clearest proof of the results of the economic measures

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is furnished by the statistics of trade with Italy. I have asked the Secretariat to prepare a document giving the latest figures available. Despite the circumstances to which I have referred, and which led to a certain delay in the application of this proposal by various States, considerable results were achieved. Quite apart from the figures relating to November and December 1935, which are influenced both by considerable imports effected before the entry into force of the proposals and also by the subsequent execution of orders that had been paid for before November 18th, there will be found, in the table which I have had circulated, the statistics at present available for the period January to April 1936 as compared with the corresponding figures for 1935. The imports from Italy into countries for which we have figures up to the end of April - countries which, in normal years, received ninety per cent of Italian exports - had decreased by practically fifty per cent. If we do not include in our calculation statistics relating to countries which have not applied Proposal III, the percentage amounts to 90.7.

Another proof of the total result of Proposals II and III is to be found in the statistics showing the losses of gold by Italy. On October 20th 1935 the reserve in gold and foreign exchange held by the Bank of Italy amounted to 4,316 million lire. According to public statements by the Governor of the Bank, the latter lost, between October 20th and December 31st, 909 million lire. During the period January to April 1936 the States for which we have information showed gold imports from Italy

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to the extent of 1,282 million lire. Thus, in six months and ten days, there was a total loss of some 2,091 million lire - that is to say, about half the original reserve.

These are obvious proofs that the results of this first attempt to apply Article 16 were by no means negligible. As the President of the Assembly so rightly said in his admirable closing speech the day before yesterday: "In another conflict, in which the opposing forces happen to be less unequal, such a system, through the application of economic and financial measures, might be of the greatest importance to the State victim of aggression."

I now have the honour to invite the Committee's consideration of the draft Proposal laid before you in document 130:

"The Co-ordination Committee set up in consequence of the Assembly recommendation of October 10th, 1935, with regard to the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, proposes that the Governments of the Members of the League should abrogate on July..... 1936, the restrictive measures taken by them in conformity with its Proposals IA, II, IIA, III, IV, and IVB."

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M. TURBAY: (Colombia):

Interpretation: With reference to the second proposal adopted by the Assembly at its meeting on July 4th, 1936, I desire to emphasise my Government's opinion with reference to the collective character of the measures taken in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant. My Government, indeed, having taken these measures in pursuance of a Resolution by the Assembly and the Council which it considered binding upon it in virtue of its international undertakings in con formity with Article 16 of the Covenant, did not regard itself as free to relieve itself of these obligations and duties until a vote of the Assembly or the Council should have restored its liberty. My Government considers that since these measures have lost their collective character owing to the abandonment announced by certain States, the maintenance of those measures in a unilateral fashion would constitute an act of hostility contrary to the spirit of the Covenant. For this reason my Government will support the raising of sanctions by the Co-ordination Committee should that Committee decide in the affirmative.

M. OLDINI (Chile):

Interpretation: My Government, faithful to its international undertakings, has loyally applied the sanctions decided upon in common and ratified by that Government in the free exercise of its sovereignty. Once the war had terminated, my Government was of opinion that sanctions no longer had any object and should therefore be raised. This view was

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communicated to the League of Nations in a letter from my Government dated May 12th, 1936. We now note that this view has been adopted by several Governments and that the Assembly has made a recommendation along the same lines. We therefore express the hope that a decision may rapidly be taken in the sense indicated by my Government in the letter to which I have referred.

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M. MAYARD (Haiti):

Interpretation: I carefully refrained from speaking at the plenary meetings of the Assembly. I took this course for the good reason that my Government had already stated its attitude in a letter which it sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. My Government, in fact, informed the Secretary-General that in its view sanctions no longer served any useful purposes and that it was therefore ceasing to apply them.

Now this decision of my Government represented what was indeed a necessity from the national point of view. I have just listened with great interest to the excellent report on the work of the Co-ordination Committee, and I noted the effects on Italy of collective sanctions applied by Members of the League of Nations. Unfortunately, up to the present moment the League of Nations has not had brought before it the painful situation in which several sanctionist States now find themselves. It was contemplated that as the counterpoise of sanctions the Co-ordination Committee ~~will~~ would consider the introduction of measures with a view to recompensing those countries which suffered loss through their application of sanctions. Now my country had a very large part of its trade with Italy; some 23% of our exports went to Italy. The application of sanctions therefore affected us much more seriously, so far as our own trade is concerned, than it affected Italy. Italy has achieved her object, but our budget has been entirely upset through the application of sanctions.

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At the meetings of the Assembly various speakers expressed regret that sanctions had not proved effective - regret, that is to say, from the standpoint of the ideals of the League of Nations. Indeed, this view is reflected in the recommendations adopted by the Assembly. Now I should like to make certain observations, from the technical point of view, solely for the consideration of the Co-ordination Committee from that point of view. I feel that this is a matter of great importance, and I would like to express the hope that in future none of us may have to suffer the application of sanctions and that the League may not be called upon soon to consider any further application of them. Nevertheless, it is important that we should consider means of improving the weapon that is thus placed in the hands of the League in accordance with Article 16, and from that point of view it is essential to consider most carefully this question of possible compensatory action.

Consideration must be given to the fact that in the application of sanctions there are some Members of the League who stand to suffer very much greater losses than would appear at first sight, and very much greater losses proportionately than are experienced by other Members of the League. I think, therefore, that our painful experience should be carefully noted by any Committee that may be set up with a view to further consideration of this matter, and that when September comes we should be in a position to take the necessary decisions. I do hope that careful attention will be given to this question with regard to any sanctions that may in future be recommended for

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application by Members of the League, and I think it is essential that sanctions should in practice be such that the rupture of commercial relations does not develop into a rupture of diplomatic relations. I am thinking solely of the position in my own country. We have experience which shows that we suffered severely through the present application of sanctions and may suffer through such application in special cases. My country has suffered the cessation of its commercial relations with a country which took a very large part of its exports. Now I propose to say no more upon that point, for two reasons: first of all, because we are in a very special situation as regards the country in question; and secondly, because I think the general situation is now on the way to improvement. Nevertheless, from the technical point of view, and from that point of view solely, I do urge that careful consideration should be given to this question of the possibility of providing compensation in connection with the application of sanctions, and I would above all recommend that this weapon should be so wielded that commercial rupture does not lead to diplomatic rupture; that is to say, the result of sanctions should not be that the sanctionist countries in their turn find that they are suffering the application of sanctions. I am speaking solely from the point of view of my own country, but of course I feel that the position is one in which any country might find itself. We were compelled, for the reasons I have stated, to abandon the application of sanctions.

What I have said, of course, in no way affects

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our assertion that we are still devoted to the objects of the Covenant and the ideals set forth by the League of Nations, and also adhere to the rule adopted by American countries to the effect that recognition would not be given to any settlement of territorial questions brought about by force.

I would ask that the observations which I have made should be recorded and considered in due course by the competent body.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: The representative of Haiti has in fact raised two questions, one of which - the question o compensation - does come within the province of this C ttee. As Members of the Committee are aware, a special sub-Committee, the Committee on Mutual Support, was set up to consider such matters. So far, however, no claims have been submitted to that Committee. If that Committee had received claims, no doubt it would have met and would have considered the questions laid before it. It seems, however, a little late to raise the question now, and I did not understand that the representative of Haiti was in fact raising the question with regard to this particular case; I understood that he was speaking rather with a view to the future.

The other question - that of the methods to be adopted for the application of Article 16 - is not a question which comes within the province of the present Committee. The representative of Haiti is of course aware that he may at any time apply to the Secretariat of the

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League of Nations and bring to its notice any question which he desires to raise with regard to the modification of existing procedure.

M. MAYARD (Haiti):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, I hope you will be good enough to let me make a short explanation.

I was not, of course, directing any criticism at the Committee with regard to the work it has done. I spoke solely from the technical point of view, as I hope I made clear. It was stated here, however, that sanctions had been collectively undertaken and collectively applied, and therefore should be collectively raised. That is a point of view with which I am in agreement in a general way. Nevertheless, I felt it necessary to explain the reasons - practical, national, urgent reasons - why my Government felt that it was impelled to depart from the undertaking which it had assumed collectively with other countries. My only object was to raise this question so that Members of the Committee would be able to consider the importance from the point of view of the application of Article 16 of improving the sanctions weapon, and also the importance of seeing that such measures are taken that Members applying sanctions as the result of a collective decision should not in due course find themselves suffering the imposition of sanctions against them. Therefore I suggested that it would be well that a modification should be considered with a view to all these matters being taken into account and if necessary, in particular cases, with a view to ensuring the possibility of the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice being sought. I desired merely to make these observations with a view to their future consideration.

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The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I thank the representative of Haiti for his explanation.

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland):

Interpretation: I consider that the object for which we have been convened here is exclusively a practical one in keeping with the technical nature of this Committee, because my country has already, exercising its sovereign judgment with regard to its obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, taken its decision in this matter. Since the volume of our trade exchanges with Italy is not very considerable, the very slight difference of time as between that decision and the abrogation by others of the measures taken against Italy is not calculated to impair in any way the interests of the other countries concerned. My country, in acting in this way, was not endeavouring in any way to seek any special economic advantages, despite the sacrifices it has made over many months in discharging its duty as a Member of the League. It has been anxious in its action to safeguard the spirit and the letter of the Covenant and to maintain the regularity of procedure within the League. This had been explained in the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council. For these reasons I shall abstain from voting.

(France):

M. de la BAUME:

Interpretation: I had asked to speak a moment ago when the representative of Haiti was speaking, but I do not wish to speak now because in the statement you, Mr. Chairman, have made, you have anticipated the remarks I had intended to put forward.

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M. TUDELA (Peru):

Interpretation: In its declaration of June 18th my Government expressed the opinion that there was no purpose in continuing sanctions once hostilities in Ethiopia had ceased. It was not isolated in this attitude which it took up and although it recognised the full sovereign rights of States to decide their own action it nevertheless respected the decisions taken by other States believing that the principle of collective action is of the highest importance for the League of Nations. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we agree to the proposal which is now before us, and for the rest we would merely confirm the statement made on Friday at the Assembly.

M. PARDO (Argentine):

Interpretation: The first delegate of the Argentine has, for material reasons, found it impossible to reach here in time for the present meeting. He desires, however, to make an important statement and I would therefore ask the Chairman to be good enough not to close this discussion for a few minutes as I confidently hope that M. Guinazu will be here within a quarter of an hour.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I gladly comply with the request made by the Argentine representative, as we have other matters to deal with.

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M. de MADARIAGA (Spain):

Interpretation: I had not intended to take part in this discussion which I would venture to describe as a posthumous discussion, nevertheless the statement made by the representative of Poland impels me to make certain observations. I should not like the silence of my delegation to be interpreted as signifying agreement with the statement which was made by the representative of Poland. In so far, of course, as that statement represents the full action of an independent sovereign State, it deserves and receives our respect, but in so far as it affects the application of the provisions of the Covenant I feel that other Members of the League in exercise of precisely the same right are called upon to make such comments as they think necessary and to discuss a statement of that character.

We consider that the measures adopted in application of Article 16, namely economic and financial measures, depend upon the direct exercise of individual State sovereignty, and on that point I am in full agreement with what was said by the representative of Poland. The essential feature of the application of those measures is, however, that that application must be co-ordinated, simultaneous and co-operative in character. There is no longer absolute sovereignty of individual Members of the League of Nations once they have collectively taken the decision to apply sanctions. They have, thereby, entered into a contract for the application of sanctions and it is an essential feature of that contract that the same methods as those employed for the application of sanctions should be employed for the removal of those sanctions when the time comes.

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Otherwise, and I agree with the representative of Colombia, there might be a very real danger of sanctions being raised by individual States one after the other, as indeed has already unfortunately happened in the present case towards the end of the period in which sanctions were applied. This may lead to the strange situation in which we find that a collective decision that aggression has taken place has been reached, that States enter into a contract to apply sanctions against the aggressor, and then in a few days one State or more reaches a decision that sanctions are useless and decides therefore to apply them no longer. The result would be that we should find ourselves back in the same place as that from which we started.

States exercise their absolute sovereignty when they take the decision to apply sanctions, but once that decision has been taken it is essential that action should be co-operative, and there is therefore a kind of contract - indeed I think this is implied by paragraph 3 of Article 16 - and it is of the nature of that contract that the sanctions applied co-operatively should remain a co-operative act until the very last minute, that is to say, until it is co-operatively decided to raise them.

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M. RUIZ GUINAZO (Argentine):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, the Argentine Republic has followed an invariable line of conduct in the difficult circumstances of the hour. It is conscious that it has maintained that line of conduct notwithstanding the existing intricacies of the present situation, for it can be said that none can be held responsible for the failure to apply in full the Articles of the Covenant, since that situation arises more especially out of the absence of any regulations governing this question.

I have already taken occasion to say, in the course of the Council meeting in April, that the League lacks experience and any established practice in the matter, and that such a lack, which is always felt very seriously in juridical matters, is a result of the long period of peace through which the world passed up to the time when, after the Great War, we set up this great institution of the League of Nations which we constitute; and an attempt was made to supply this lack, so far at all events as Article 16 is concerned, by the regulations of 1931.

These guiding rules, which we proposed at the first meeting of the Council, which took place on October 11th last and which, although some held that their application would be doubtful, were applied by numerous states, were probably a less practical solution to apply than the provisions of the Covenant to which I have referred.

At the present moment, certain circumstances have changed. Article 16 provides that should any Member of the League resort to war, in disregard of its covenants under

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Articles 12, 13 and 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against other Members of the League.

I have already said that the circumstances which now confront us are different. There is no further question of war or threat of war, but of the declared annexation of a State Member of the League, or, rather, of an attack upon the territorial integrity and political independence of another Member of the League. Here we have the case of Article 10.

The violation in question has no reference to the action decided against Italy which was based upon Article 16, but is connected with the questions of the means of carrying out the obligations provided for in Article 10. I have already said that we desire to maintain a rigorously logical attitude and to confine our action to what depends upon us in view of the fact that we have not thought of the possibility of changing the course of a situation which is foreign to us. The new conditions in which the facts present themselves abrogate and suppress the previous sanctions, which were related to different juridical causes and must be replaced by others.

Such, in brief, is the legal reason why the Argentine has voted in favour of the suppression of sanctions. The Argentine Republic had in mind higher motives, and was guided by these in the meeting of the Assembly which was convened at its request.

Our delegate explained that the position which we took up was a matter of conscience, and was connected with irrevocable and unquestionable principles. We do not conceive the life of States in their relations among

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themselves as possible without absolute equality. We have maintained that from the very first Assembly, and we are happy that this principle has received acknowledgment, thereby meeting the considerations that we put forward. We have been honoured by the fact that our attitude has been acknowledged by various countries, and that until recently the principle has been ratified. It was our duty to maintain the principles which go back to the earliest history of America, and without which it is impossible for us to maintain our relations with other States upon their present lofty plane, since we cannot admit any difference between nations.

We desired that the Declaration of August 3rd, 1932, which, according to the recent vote of the Assembly, remains linked up with the principles of the Covenant, just as it is recognised as excluding the solution by force of territorial questions, should remain in close connection with the Covenant and that it should constitute a single unit of juridical principles with Article 10 of the Covenant with regard to the measures which, according to the contents of this clause, depend upon the Council.

That was the decision of the Assembly in connection with the Sino-Japanese dispute concerning Manchuria of March 11th, 1932, which stated that it was the duty of the members of the League not to recognise any situation, any treaty or any agreement which had been obtained by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris. At the same time, the Assembly decided that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought by means of military coercion exercised by one of the parties.

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In that way it framed the logic of our work. We believe that a different juridical situation has removed the motives and brought about the abolition of the sanctions which corresponded to Article 16, and that we ought at present to formulate a Declaration similar to that which was put forward in the case of Manchuria, and that this duty rests with the Council.

To that end it is important that we should establish clearly that Wilson, who was the author of Article 10, defined that Article, before the Senate gave to it this interpretation, as meaning that the measures to be taken could in no case be of a military character, as, indeed, was recognised by the 1923 Assembly at the time when the reform proposed by Canada was considered. It is for this reason, and on the basis of this criterion, that we voted the abolition of sanctions.

I take this occasion to express our deep regret that no special vote was taken when the representatives of Ethiopia presented their special case to the Assembly. Of course we appreciate and we have the greatest respect for the rules of procedure and the interpretation which the Assembly placed upon the vote of the General Committee's draft, but I feel it is my duty to declare on this occasion that if this vote had taken place the Argentine delegation would have cast its vote according to its principles.

We have already said, at the time when we asked for the convocation of the Assembly, that we were impelled by a desire of sincerity, a hope that we might contribute to a supreme effort in the cause of peace. We would like to think that we have done so for the benefit of all and for the

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benefit of the great Latin nation which we hold in such great affection. We are confident that the necessary cooperation will be available for the restoration of law. My country, as always, will bring its collaboration, and is prepared to study the ways and means of reinforcing the authority of the League of Nations with a view to adapting the application of its principles to the lessons of this bitter experience.

M. SANDLER (Sweden):

Interpretation: I had certainly not intended to take part in this discussion. I fully realise that speeches made at this stage can change nothing in the sad realities of the situation. I do desire, however, warmly to associate myself in principle with the observations made by the representative of Spain. It is perfectly true that the soverign rights of States remain whole and unaffected. Nevertheless, it is in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant that collective measures should not be raised prior to a collective consultation and decision here in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I shall now call on the representative of Poland, who quite naturally wishes to reply to certain observations that have been made. I feel bound, however, to point out that the subject under discussion is one that lies rather outside the limits of the work of the present Committee. Out of a desire, however, in no way to limit freedom of speech, I have not prevented these observations being made. Nevertheless, I must point out that if discussion on the point raised should continue

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it would be rather outside the scope of the present meeting.

Since the question has been raised, however, I feel that, as representative of Portugal and in entire agreement with my colleagues, I should say that we associate ourselves with the observations made by the representative of Spain.

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that the statement I made was merely intended to explain my attitude at the time of the vote, but since M. de Madariaga has felt called upon to speak on this subject I feel that I ought to reply. I agree with regard to the coordination of the application of measures under Article 16 that they should remain in force so long as the object sought remains, but that they must cease as soon as the circumstance which called for that action has ceased to subsist. Members of the League remain free to judge individually with regard to these matters and to take their responsibility in the matter individually.

I think it would be out of place for me to go too deeply into this matter with M. de Madariaga, but I would like to say that I cannot accept the view that he has taken of the Covenant and its obligations, nor can I even formally take note of the statements that have been made in this meeting and which go beyond the scope of the technical business of this Committee.

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The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: There will doubtless soon be opportunity for discussing those points in another place.

M.COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia):

Interpretation: In the spring of 1935 there was a grave conflict in which my country was concerned before the Assembly for consideration. It then happened that, as a result of various circumstances into which I do not propose to enter in detail at the present moment, the League of Nations showed an inertia and an indifference that were perfectly obvious with regard to the literal application of the Covenant. In the autumn of the same year, 1935, the League of Nations showed unexpected vigour and rigour in the application of the Covenant with regard to another conflict, and I was therefore led to say at that time that my country could not understand this fluctuating and seasonal policy which led to the adoption of two weights and two measures. Nevertheless, faithful to the Covenant and to the obligations it had assumed, and stifling its feelings of real affection for Italy, my country, in a collective spirit, accepted the application of sanctions against that country. Now, in the spring of 1936 - and it would seem that the seasons exercise considerable influence in these matters - we noted a change in the criterion adopted by various States. Once more, that is a matter into which I do not propose to enter in detail. Nevertheless, it was suggested that sanctions should be raised. Now, my country does not intend to prove itself more royalist than the King and therefore we are prepared to raise sanctions.

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Nevertheless, I must make it perfectly clear that this decision does not in any sense, either directly or indirectly, imply any readiness to recognise the acquisition of territories by the exercise of force, nor does this decision indicate any indifference or any disaffection with regard to the Declaration of August 3rd, 1932, by the American States; and in this connection I should like to say that I associate myself entirely with what has been said from this place by the representative of the Argentine this morning.

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China); Mr. President, I had no intention originally to make any statement at this meeting, but after hearing the various speeches and delcarations made this morning I feel that it is my duty to make the following statement.

China has always remained faithful to the principle of the collective action of the League. Just as the Chinese Government accepted the decision of the Assembly to apply sanctions in the first instance last October, so they will accept the decision to raise such sanctions in the same spirit; but it is on this very clear understanding, that in so doing, such acceptance on their part will in no way prejudice either the principles of the Pact, especially those of Article 10, or the principle of non-recognition of the settlement of territorial questions by force of arms, such as was heretofore adopted in the Sino-Japanese dispute, or their attitude with reference to the status of territories involved in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.

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C 118089

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: There are still two speakers on the list. I feel bound to say, however, that the statements which have just been made relate to a question which I think has been decided in reality elsewhere, and on which the Assembly has already expressed its opinion. We are not called upon in the present meeting to express our views on these matters.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium):

Interpretation: I merely want to say that we are ready to vote this text, but in order that there may be no misunderstanding we desire to make it clear that in voting it we have no intention of pronouncing any opinion upon the political arguments which have been brought forward by certain members of this meeting this morning in their individual capacity.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I think that what I have already said meets that point fully. It is not for us to discuss these matters.

M. de la BAUME (France):

Interpretation: I would have preferred this Committee to confine itself to the technical matters for which it was convened, but since the discussion has led the honourable representative of Spain to interpret the scope of the obligations that arise out of Article 16 of the Covenant, I cannot fail to express my concurrence in the views he has laid before you.

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Mr. STEVENSON (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I rise to associate myself with the remarks just made by the French delegate.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I think the time has now come when we can take a vote upon the draft resolution before you. You will note, however, that there is a blank in that draft as regards the exact date. What date does the Committee suggest?

Mr. STEVENSON (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, for reasons of constitutional and administrative procedure in the United Kingdom, I have been instructed to propose to the Committee that the date should be July 15th.

M. SANTOS (Portugal):

Interpretation: The Portuguese delegation proposes the date of July 10th for the raising of restrictive measures taken against Italy by the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations in conformity with the proposals made by this Committee.

M. GORGÉ (Switzerland):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, I should like to support the proposal that the date be fixed at July 10th.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: Are there any further observations?

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C 118091

M. de la BAUME (France):

Interpretation: I support the proposal of the United Kingdom delegation that the date should be July 15th.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: Are those delegations who propose July 10th prepared to agree to the proposal that the date should be July 15th?

M. GORGÉ (Switzerland):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, I venture to suggest that the debate has shown that it would be desirable for us to act as speedily as possible. Reference has been made to the fact that this is a posthumous debate; and my colleague on the left has referred to the funeral. In the circumstances, we may say that virtually and morally sanctions are already raised, and therefore I wonder whether it is really necessary to take more than 10 days to put into practical effect a result which morally has already been reached.

May I also point out that it has been urged that we should all raise sanctions at the same time, and therefore in order to preclude the possibility of a race in the raising of sanctions I would suggest that it is desirable that the intervening period should be as short as possible. In view of all the circumstances, therefore, I venture once more to urge the date of July 10th.

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Mr. BRUCE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I merely want to suggest that in the case of countries as far away as Australia it is very difficult to make all the arrangements necessary for the lifting of sanctions within the period of four days. I therefore think it would be very much better if, remembering these difficulties, we fixed the date as July 15th.

M. TUDELA (Peru):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that we might decide that States should abrogate sanctions between July 10th and July 15th.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I would like to point out that the proposal just made might involve certain difficulties, since both the Assembly and this Committee have always taken the view that a common date should be fixed for all.

The AGA KHAN (India): I should like to associate myself with the representative of Australia. For faraway countries the date of July 15th would be much more suitable.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I note that those countries whose representatives have proposed July 15th as the date have good reasons, connected with the constitution of their country and geographical distance. It seems to me we must recognise the validity of those reasons. I would

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Therefore venture to ask the delegations who have suggested July 10th whether they would be prepared not to press their proposal but to accept the date of July 15th.

(This was agreed).

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I therefore propose the date of July 15th. If there is no objection, I shall take it that this proposal is adopted.

(The proposal was adopted).

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: The proposal before us then reads as follows:

"The Co-ordination Committee set up in consequence of the Assembly recommendation of October 10th, 1935, with regard to the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, proposes that the Governments of the Members of the League should abrogate on July 15th, 1936, the restrictive measures taken by them in conformity with its Proposals IA, II, IIA, III, IV and IVB."

If there are no other observations, I shall consider that proposal adopted.

(The proposal was adopted.)

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M. de la BAUME (France):

Interpretation: Mr. Chairman, the French delegation, in agreement with the United Kingdom delegation, considers that it might be well for us to draw from the experience we have gained such practical lessons as it might afford, and we propose to do that by submitting to the Governments for study in the first place, and thereafter to a Committee of Experts to be appointed by the Governments, the question of the measures which have in fact been applied. In making this proposal, I want to make our purpose quite clear. We do not intend to enquire whether sanctions have been applied, in this or that country, more or less sincerely. We are prepared to believe that the measures have been applied sincerely everywhere. Nor do we desire to have a study made of the influence that these measures have had upon the economic position of Italy; that is the past, and we have not to go back to it. But we think that each country might review what has been done within its own territory, with a view to examining what difficulties have been encountered with regard to laws and regulations in the measures that have been adopted. In saying this, I am alluding to the indirect traffic, to the rule of 25 per cent, and to the exception which was made with regard to contracts completely paid up before October 10th, because it does seem that, in connection with these various exceptions, there may have been a certain amount of leakage in regard to the trade movement as between Italy and sanctionist countries.

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Having said that, I will now read the proposal which the French delegation, in agreement with the United Kingdom delegation, puts forward:

"In order to complete the documentation in the possession of Governments with reference to the application of the various proposals made by it, the Co-ordination Committee suggests that Governments should -

(a) continue to complete and forward to the Secretariat the questionnaire concerning their trade with Italy and Italian possessions up to and including that relating to the month of June 1936;

(b) furnish before October 31st, 1936, to the Secretariat for circulation to Governments a memorandum setting out their experience with reference to the application of the measures enforced and such conclusions as this experience would seem to suggest;

(c) appoint experts to serve on a Committee to study this documentation and submit a report to Governments."

Mr. STEVENSON (United Kingdom): His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers it most important that a clear technical study should be made of the machinery of the application of measures taken under Article 16. Such a study will be of very great value in the future. The United Kingdom delegation therefore decided, in conjunction

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with the French delegation, to put forward the proposal you now have before you, and we hope that it will meet with the approval of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: I think everyone agrees that this purely technical study should be made, and I shall therefore consider the proposal adopted.

The proposal was adopted.

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The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: There is still one duty left for us to fulfil, and it is the only really pleasant duty in our hard and thankless task. It is the duty of thanking you for the confidence and support with which you have been good enough to assist me throughout this time of work and anxiety which has lasted many months. Without this generous assistance it would have been impossible to organise and set in motion by rapid improvisations such a complex piece of machinery. This confidence and this constant support have constituted the best of compensations for the bitter and unjust attacks which I have not been spared, although of course those have not diverted me for a single instance from the path of duty and impartiality. We have always worked without hatred, without bitterness, with a single desire to respect and apply the provisions of the Covenant within the limits that had been laid down for us and according to the interpretations that you had adopted. This was the only reason for the participation of my country, which, through my agency, desired only to honour its international undertakings, and that, I am sure, was the reason for the various decisions which you have taken.

I have already said we were working rather for the future. These great lessons will not lose their value. It has enabled us to note, by a great general movement which has surprised the whole world, that the collective spirit is a living reality, and that though economic and financial sanctions are not able to stop the advance of

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a great army in war, they did nevertheless constitute a very powerful weapon against any possible aggressor.

It remains to me now to thank all our collaborators who have worked so admirably: the technical committees and also the members of the Secretariat who have given us co-operation and support, the devotion and confidence of which are above all praise. Allow me, therefore, to mention in the front rank of those to whose tireless work we are indebted, our Secretary, Mr. Loveday, and his chief collaborators.

M. MADARIAGA (Spain):

Interpretation: I am sure that everybody will agree with the words you have addressed from the Chair, words of thanks to our collaborators and in particular to that admirable technical expert in the person of my old friend, Mr. Loveday. There is however one point which despite your excellent memory, you have overlooked, and that was the necessity for thanking the Chairman for the way in which he has directed our work. For a task such as you have assumed, Mr. Chairman, we needed someone with rare capacities of leadership. First of all we needed someone who was an expert in the technicalities of Chairmanship at such meetings as those of the League of Nations. To occupy the Chair in a League of Nations organ is a task that calls for very many high qualities since it is a task of very great difficulty.

The League has already had many occasions to recognise your great value in such a capacity. We have admired the perseverance and tirelessness with which you

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MW/HH

acted as President of the Disarmament Committee on Budgetary Questions, and indeed, since I myself was President of another Committee in the Disarmament Conference I feel entitled to recall the fact that yours, Mr. Chairman, was the only Committee which left behind it any durable piece of work; a piece of work which might with advantage to all be inserted at once and as it stands in the body of international law. But for the task you have assumed, other abilities were needed. Above all we needed a President who should be above all possibility of suspicion, who no one could say was moved by hatred or by any base motives. Indeed we recognise that the two most difficult and the most disagreeable tasks which the League has ever had to assume were undertaken by representatives of Portugal. It was a representative of Portugal who was Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the Council which found that aggression had been committed, and it was a representative of Portugal in the person of our own Chairman who directed the Committee for applying the measures which became necessary in view of the aggression thus found.

In discharging this work our Chairman has displayed a fine courage and has given an outstanding evidence of the spirit of the League of Nations. In his country we have had the valuable support of two very great workers in the persons of M. de Vasconcellos and the Foreign Minister, M. Monteiro. They accepted responsibilities that were of the hardest possible character to attempt; they have shown themselves above being affected by any base considerations.

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There has been no suggestion in what has been done of any influence by hatred or other passions. Work has been done which, although apparently directed against Italy, we feel was ultimately for the good of that country itself. I am sure therefore that my colleagues desire to pay a well-deserved tribute to our Chairman, who, we feel, has merited well of the international community,

M. de la BAUME (France):

Interpretation: My Government is happy to pay a tribute to the activity and devotion with which you Mr. Chairman have directed our work. I am therefore pleased to associate myself with what has been said by M. de Madariaga.

Mr. STEVENSON (United Kingdom): I wish to associate the United Kingdom delegation most cordially with the words just spoken by the representative of Spain. The complete devotion and courage of our Chairman are known to us all. Speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation I beg him to accept an expression of our sincerest appreciation amd thanks.

The CHAIRMAN:

Interpretation: Gentlemen, I am deeply touched at these expressions of appreciation. I had no idea that I should finish this session covered with flowers. The epidemic of crises which has swept the world has not spared the League of Nations, but the lofty character of its ideals and the principles upon which it is based will ensure its survival in a stronger and sounder form. The cause of peace is not lost ; sursum corda. The session of the Co-ordination Committee is closed.

The Committee rose at 12.35 p.m.

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C118101 L-15-0 W.4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS PRESS

July 7th, 1936.

A. Secretary General League of Nations informs Governments Members League that no new transmission in prospect at present.

B. Repetition of texts transmitted July 6th.

On behalf of Chairman Co-ordination Committee Secretary General League Nations communicates to Governments Members League following texts:-

Proposals adopted by Co-ordination Committee set up in consequence of the Assembly recommendation of October 10th, 1935, with regard to the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy, proposes that the Governments of the Members of the League should abrogate on July 15th, 1936, the restrictive measures taken by them in conformity with its proposals IA, 2, 2A, 3, 4 and 4B.

2. In order to complete the documentation in the possession of Governments with reference to the application of the various proposals made by it, the Co-ordination Committee suggests that Governments should:-

(a) Continue to complete and forward to the Secretary the questionnaire concerning their trade with Italy and Italian possessions up to and including that relating to the month of June, 1936;

(b) Furnish,before October 31st, 1936, to the Secretariat for circulation to Governments, a memorandum setting out their experience with reference to the application of the measures enforced and such condlusions as this experience would seem to suggest;

(c) Appoint experts to serve on a committee to study this documentation and submit a report to Governments.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.L. 124. 1936.VII.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COVENANT

—

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations has the honour to draw the attention of Members of the League to the following recommendation adopted by the Assembly on July 4th, 1936:

"The Assembly,

"1. Having met again on the initiative of the Government of the Argentine Republic, and in pursuance of the decision to adjourn its session taken on October 11th, 1935, in order to examine the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute;

"2. Taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on this subject;

"3. Noting that various circumstances have prevented the full application of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

"4. Remaining firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as the declaration of the American States dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force;

"5. Being desirous of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations by adapting the application of these principles to the lessons of experience;

"6. Being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen the real effectiveness of the guarantees of security which the League affords to its Members;

"Recommends that the Council:

"(a) Should invite the Governments of the Members of the League to send to the Secretary-General, so far as possible before September 1st, 1936, any proposals they may wish to make in order to improve, in the spirit or within the limits laid down above, the application of the principles of the Covenant;

The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA.

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"b) Should instruct the Secretary-General to make a first examination and classification of these proposals;

"c) Should report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the state of the question."

On July 4th, 1936, the Council instructed the Secretary-General to give effect to the above recommendation.

In order that he may carry out the first examination which he has been instructed to undertake under paragraph (b) of the recommendation, the Secretary-General would be grateful to the Government of Canada if it would send to him, if possible before September 1st, 1936, any proposals which that Government might wish to make in conformity with paragraph (a) of the recommendation.

Geneva, July 7th, 1936.

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Information Section's Bulletin

July 10th, 1936.

Weekly Wireless Telegram of the League Information Section July 10th, 1936.

Assembly League ended July 5th ... with adoption of report by general committee on Ethiopian Affair. Main conclusions are contained in two recommendations with following content:-

In first Assembly, mentioning that it met again on Argentine initiative, taking note of communications made, noting that ... various circumstances have prevented full application Covenant, remaining firmly attached to principles of Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as Declaration American States August, 1932, excluding settlement of territorial questions by force, being desirous of strengthening League's authority by adapting application of the principles to lessons of experience, being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen real effectiveness of guarantees of security which League affords to Members, recommends that Council:-

(1) should invite Governments to send in proposal for improving (in spirit and within limits laid down above) application of principles of Covenant;

(2) should instruct Secretary General to make a first examination of these proposals and report to next Assembly on State of the question.

In second recommendation Assembly suggests that Co-ordination Committee should make proposals to Governments in order to bring to end the measures taken by them in execution Article 16 Covenant. This report adopted by Forty-four votes to one with four abstaining. Argentine's ... did not adopt two resolutions proposed by Ethiopian delegation, one of which asked for financial assistance for Ethiopia.

.....

In closing speech, President Van Zeeland emphasized that "Assembly had brought League through one of darkest days.... encountered on its path since its creation."..... that it should not be too much set back.....
had/saved Ethiopia they are none the less a valuable help. In decisions taken and loyally applied to help victim of aggression, new spirit .... in international relations. Sure considerations said President are but without value for .. in... to guarantee peace it... not sufficient to rely on political ... but ... considerations must not be neglected. President ended by insisting that League must recover from this setback and after remaining confident...

P. S. The reception of the last part of the message from Geneva was rendered practically impossible through interference by storm.

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C.L. 1936.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ITALY

CO-ORDINATION OF MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 16 OF THE COVENANT

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations has the honour to communicate herewith two proposals* which were unanimously adopted by the Co-ordination Committee on July 6th, 1936.

In the first of these, the Co-ordination Committee proposes that the Governments of the Members of the League should abrogate, on July 15th, 1936, the restrictive measures taken by them in conformity with its Proposals IA, II, IIA, III, IV and IVB.

In the second proposal, the Co-ordination Committee suggests that Governments should:

(a) Continue to complete and forward to the Secretariat the questionnaire concerning their trade with Italy and Italian possessions up to and including that relating to the month of June 1936;

(b) Furnish before October 31st, 1936, to the Secretariat for circulation to Governments a memorandum setting out their experience with reference to the application of the measures enforced and such conclusions as this experience would seem to suggest;

(c) Appoint experts to serve on a committee to study this documentation and submit a report to Governments.

An extract from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Co-ordination Committee of July 6th, dealing with the second proposal, is transmitted herewith.

The Secretary-General would be glad to learn whether your Government desires to designate an expert to serve on the committee referred to above. The date of the meeting will be arranged later.

Geneva, July 13th, 1936.

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* These proposals (documents Co-ordination Committee 129(1) and 130(1)) were distributed to Governments on July 7th, 1936.

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA JUL 24 1936

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THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA JUL 24 1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.L.127.1936
Annex

Extract from the Minutes of the Third Session of the Coordination Committee, held at Geneva on Monday, July 6th, 1936.

JOINT PROPOSAL BY THE FRENCH AND UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATIONS.

M. de la BAUME (France) said that, in agreement with the United Kingdom delegation, his delegation considered it might be useful to turn the experiment which was now drawing to a close to the fullest practical account by subjecting the measures applied to investigation, in the first place, by the Governments and subsequently by a Committee of Experts appointed by the Governments.

Before reading the joint proposal he would like to explain what it implied. It was not intended that Governments should be asked to enquire into whether sanctions had been faithfully applied by any given country. It was not intended to call any country to account. All countries had applied sanctions with a great deal of goodwill. Nor was the purpose to investigate what had been the effect of the measures adopted on Italy's economic life. All that belonged to the past, on which nothing more need be said. The proposal was merely to ask each Government to ascertain, in so far as its own territory was concerned, to what difficulties the application of sanctions had given rise, for example in the matter of legislation or regulations, and to find out where the weaknesses of the measures adopted lay. What he had more particularly in mind was the matter of indirect traffic, the 25 per cent rule, and the exception made in regard to contracts prior to October 10th. It would appear that these various exceptions and derogations might have permitted certain leakages in the traffic from Italy to the sanctionist countries.

In the light of the above qualifications, he would read the joint proposal of the French and United Kingdom delegations (Document Co-ordination Committee/129).

Mr. STEVENSON (United Kindom) said His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considered it of the first importance to make an accurate technical study of the machinery for the application of the measures taken under Article 16. Such a study would be very useful for the future. The United Kingdom delegation had accordingly decided, in agreement with the French delegation, to submit the proposal in question; and he hoped the Committee would approve it.

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Prepared by Mr. Fredenburgh
July 31, 1936, in connection with
the Record of Liberal Government
since October 23, 1935.

C118107

Italo - Ethiopian Conflict - Sanctions

1. **Situation when Liberal Government took office:**

War had broken out between Italy and Ethiopia (Oct. 2, 1935);

Italy had been declared to be aggressor -

On Oct. 7, 1935, League Council had accepted conclusion of Committee report that "the Italian Government had resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article XII of the Covenant of the League of Nations";

Action of Canadian delegation at Geneva:

i. Concurred in Council decision naming Italy aggressor, October 11, 1935;

ii. Participated in Committee of Co-ordination to advise on sanctions to be applied, October 11, 1935;

iii. Participated in Committee of Eighteen appointed to prepare recommendations for Committee of Co-ordination;

Imposition of 4 economic and financial sanctions recommended by Committee of Co-ordination and Committee of Eighteen, October 11 - 19, 1935:

i. Embargo on export of arms to Italy,

ii. Prohibition of credits to Italy,

iii. Embargo on imports from Italy,

iv. Embargo on exports to Italy of certain key products,

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Prepared by Mr. Fredenburgh July 31,1936,
in connection with the Record of Liberal
Government since October 23, 1935.

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2. Policy of the Liberal Government on assuming office:

At once gave attention to policy to be pursued re sanctions;

No practical alternative to participating in imposition of sanctions -

Canada had previously participated in recommending sanctions;

Duty-bound to support any pacific measures that would be generally enforced;

Statement of Government's policy, October 29, 1935:

Government expressed intention of applying sanctions recommended:

i. Because no doubt existed as to responsibility for conflict;

ii. " of position already taken by Canadian delegates;

Government stated explicitly it recognized no commitment to apply military sanctions;

" stated no such commitment could be made without prior approval of Parliament;

" stated application of sanctions against Italy not to be taken as necessarily establishing a precedent for future;

Only 4 sanctions recommended by League;

These loyally and fully carried out by Canada;

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3. Application of Sanctions:

i. Embargo on export to Italy of arms, ammunition and implements of war;

Presented no difficulty - Canada has no production of arms of any importance;

Enforced by Canada on October 31, 1935 - by order-in-Council (P.C. 3461) under Section 290 of Customs Act;

Modified on Nov. 15, 1935, by order-in-Council (P.C. 3594) to conform in procedure with Orders applying other sanctions;

ii. Embargo of loans or credits to Italian Government or to any corporation, public authority or individual in Italian Territory:

Did not prohibit transfer of funds to Italy, such as interest on investments, remittances, etc;

Adopted, after long debate, by Committee of Co-ordination, on Oct. 14, 1935;

Governments invited to enforce prohibition by Oct. 31, if possible;

Applied by Canada on Oct. 31, 1935, by informal arrangement between Minister of Finance and banks;

Formal application by Canada - order-in-Council (P.C. 3594) Nov. 15, 1935;

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iii. Embargo on Imports from Italy:

Gold and silver coin and bullion, and goods en route not affected;

After initial difficulties, Committee of Co-ordination recommended application on Nov. 18, 1935;

Enforced by Canada on Nov.18 by order-in-Council (P.C.3504) of Nov. 15, 1935;

iv. Embargo on Export to Italy of Certain Key Products:

Attempt only to prohibit key products which were controlled by "sanctionist" countries;

Prohibition recommended by Committee of Co-ordination on Oct. 19 - Governments asked to state when they could apply it;

Later suggested Nov. 18 as date of application;

Enforced by Canada on Nov. 15 - (P.C. 3504);

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C 118111

4. Proposed Extension of Sanctions:

November 2, 1935, Canadian delegate (Dr. Riddell) moved that petroleum and its derivatives, coal, iron and steel, be added to list of prohibited exports;

Canadian delegate acted on his own initiative:

Retiring Government had (Oct. 15) instructed Riddell to take no position on new proposals in view of pending change of Government;

Nov. 2 (morning) Riddell cabled for instructions - Government immediately cabled Riddell to take no position without definite instructions;

Canada placed in a false position:

Proposal at once became known as "Canadian proposal";

General assumption that Riddell had taken initiative on instructions from Government;

Serious dilemma re sanctions:

i. If moderate they fail to deter or halt aggressor;

ii. If extreme may drive aggressor to "mad-dog" act;

Real danger of sanctions leading to war -

Economic sanctions = force, compulsion;

Mussolini appeared ready to fight rather than fall;

Added difficulty in that oil could be prohibited only with co-operation of non-League countries;

U.S. appeared not prepared to prohibit oil exports;

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Throughout November, European press filled with discussion of "Canadian proposal" re extension of sanctions;

Canadian Government felt obliged to correct this misapprehension:

i. Because Canadian Government had not initiated step;

ii. " " " did not feel Canada should be one to take initiative -

Canada had no special interest in conflict to warrant such a gesture;

Duty to do so, lay with countries more directly concerned, upon whom brunt of consequences would fall;

Statement of Canadian Government, Dec. 2, 1935 (Lapointe):

Canada's position made clear - initiative had been of Canadian delegate, contrary to Government's instructions;

Promised full support of any collective action -

Stated explicitly Canada would consider, with other nations, question of revision of economic sanctions;

No attempt to withdraw from commitments made re 4 sanctions generally agreed upon;

Canada enforcing sanctions completely;

Statement clarified whole situation re extension of sanctions:

Statement of Prime Minister, Dec. 7, 1935:

Reiterated Canadian Government's intention to continue full application of sanctions agreed upon;

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Pointed out previous statement (Dec. 2) referred only to origin, not to merits, of new proposals;

Subsequent policy of Canadian Government:

Twice (late in December and again in March) when it was expected question of oil, coal, iron and steel sanctions would come up at Geneva, Canadian representative instructed to concur in proposal if generally accepted.

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8. Policy of Government re imposition of sanctions:

Canada continued full application of sanctions until July 15, 1936;

No country effected more complete enforcement;

Government avoided discussion of External Affairs in H. of C. between early days of session and June 10th;

Not attempting to evade responsibilities or neglecting to take Parliament and public into confidence;

Delicate situation in Europe (especially re Italo - Ethiopian dispute) led Government to postpone discussion;

Debate in H. of C. would probably have complicated international situation most seriously;

Might have added to difficulties already existing;

Bennett agreed on wisdom of Government's postponing debate;

Later events justified decision of Canadian Government in postponing discussion;

Statement of Prime Minister in H. of C. June 10, 1936:

Question arose should sanctions -

i. be increased,

ii. continued in existing form,

iii. discontinued;

Greatest divergence of opinion in Canada and elsewhere;

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C 118115

Arguments used in support of (i) and (ii):

Italy must be prevented, at all cost, from annexing Ethiopia and thereby defying collective system;

Nations acting collectively must protect helpless nations;

Arguments used in support of (iii):

League is not at stake but a mistaken conception of League policy;

Article XVI designed to save the victim, not to punish aggressor;

Canadian public men of both parties had sought to remove status quo guarantees of Article X;

Canada took lead at Geneva in attempting to secure elimination or modification of Article X at Assembly of 1930 and of succeeding years;

Situation completely changed by success of Italian armies and fall of Addis Ababa (May 5, 1936);

Time for "preventative" measures past;

Height of folly to risk an imminent war in order to avert a hypothetical one in future;

Collapse of Ethopian defence and Government left nothing on which to rebuild;

"Collective bluffing cannot bring collective security";

Necessary for Canadian Government to make decision in view of League Assembly on June 30, 1936;

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Canadian Government policy decided upon -

After full discussion and agreement in Council;

Independent of British policy -

Statement of Eden, June 18; Britain would take lead at Geneva for lifting of sanctions;

No practical alternative to policy adopted by Canadian Government:

To make sanctions successful - especially after Italian victory - they would have to be increased;

No half-way policy possible at that stage;

Only alternative to ending sanctions would be members of League explicitly undertaking to resort to any measures of compulsion - including war - necessary to secure speedy and certain compliance on part of Italy;

War almost a certainty if such a policy adopted;

No possibility of any appreciable number of countries being prepared to undertake such a policy;

In view of this, Government was unwilling -

i. to commit Canada to such a course,

ii. to urge upon those members of League upon whom main burden and risk would fall, to undertake such action, if they were not themselves convinced of its necessity;

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Means no practical alternative for Canada but to support raising of sanctions;

Meeting of League Assembly, June 30 to July 4, 1936:

Question of future of sanctions dealt with;

Assembly voted to recommend lifting of sanctions;

Canadian delegates: Hon. Philippe Roy,
Hon. Vincent Massey,

advisers - Dr. W.A. Riddell,
Mr. Loring Christie,

Policy of Canadian Delegation:

Favoured lifting of sanctions on grounds set forth in Mr. King's speech, H. of C. June 18, 1936;

Sanctions lifted by Canada,

July 15, 1936 (P.C. 1715, July 9, 1936);

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C 118118

4. Policy of the Government re League of Nations:

Successive Canadian Governments -

have supported League loyally;

* opposed view of Geneva as an "international war-office";

* expressed belief that emphasis should be upon prevention of war - not punishment of wrong-doer;

"Anglo-Saxon - Scandinavian view" versus "Continental view" of League;

* urged disarmament as a necessary preliminary to peace;

Attitude of Present Government set forth in Statement, October 29, 1935:

The League constitutes "an essential instrument of peace";

"It regards the League as an indispensable instrument for organizing and strengthening the forces of peace and goodwill in the world and for effecting the adjustment of conflicting national aims if the advance of science and the closer contact of peoples are to make for the advantage and not the destruction of mankind";

- Mr. King's statement, Oct. 29, 1935;

Need of International Clearing - House such as League;

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Canada's External Affairs not confined to League:

Most important relations with rest of British Commonwealth - especially United Kingdom - and with United States;

An historic tie, also, with France;

Canada supports League principles as a means of ensuring peace;

Peace of vital interest to Canada;

War, or even danger of it, disrupts trade,
endangers democracy,
strains our relations with other countries;

Isolation not possible for Canada;

The world an inter-dependent unit;

Canada must trade in order to live;

Canada has participated in every League move for extending facilities of conciliation and pacific settlement;

Supported acceptance of Optional Clause of Permanent Court of International Justice;

Prime Minister to attend Assembly of League, September 1936;

Practical evidence of importance present Government attaches to continuance and reform of League;

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C 118120

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA 8 1936

L-150 W4(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.414.M.256.1936.VII.

Geneva, September 26th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

Geneva, September 26th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

In the course of the meeting of the Credentials Committee I gave information of the receipt of two communications in the form of petitions which had reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom from representatives of certain Galla tribes in Western Abyssinia. In order that the position in connexion with these petitions should be placed on record I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter to all members of the League of Nations.

(1) Certain Galla chieftains sought the assistance of His Majesty's Consul at Gore and the Sudan District Commissioner at Gambeila in June and July last in petitioning the League of Nations to confer a mandate over Western Abyssinia upon His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. As is well known, however, the whole policy of His Majesty's Government in the Italo-Abyssinian question has been to fulfil the obligations of the United Kingdom as a member of the League of Nations without seeking, or seeming to seek, any advantage for themselves; and the Galla chieftains were consequently informed that His Majesty's Government were not in a position to accept a mandate over Western Abyssinia.

(2) Towards the end of July very serious disorders unhappily broke out between Galla and Amhara elements in another part of the country in Jimma, in South-West Abyssinia, the immediate cause of which is believed to have been the attempt of the Amhara garrison to collect tribute from the Galla population. The Sultan of Gumai, Aba Jobir, petitioned His Majesty's Consul at Gore to move His Majesty's Government to inform the League of Nations of these events. In this petition it was stated that Amhara soldiers at Jimma had crossed the Gibbe river, which divides the old town of Jimma from the new, and had attacked a peaceful Galla country, burning more than two thousand houses, capturing women and children and cattle, and killing all the men. The document concluded with an appeal to His Majesty's Consul to bring these facts to the notice of the League of Nations, and asserted that the League of Nations knew that the Abyssinian Government had not protected and did not now protect the population.

When reports were received of these events, a British consular agent was, at the request of the British community, temporarily appointed for the Jimma area with the duty of protecting foreigners. The latest report from this officer, dated September 9th, shows that on that date the situation continued very uneasy owing to the strained relations between the Amhara garrison and the Galla population. Missionaries and other foreigners in the locality were, however, safe under the protection of native chieftains.

I have the honour to be, etc. ,

(Signed) Anthony EDEN.

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CANADA. OCT 16 1936 EXTERNAL

C 118121

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.415.M.257.1936.VII.

Geneva, September 28th, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ETHIOPIAN DELEGATION.

(Translation).

Geneva, September 28th, 1936.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to the communication from the United Kingdom delegation, dated September 26th, 1936, No.C.414.M.256. 1936.VII, I should be very grateful if you would kindly communicate the present letter to all the Members of the League.

1. The Gallas preserve the same sentiments and the same loyalty towards the Ethiopian Government as the other sections of the Ethiopian people. From the beginning of the conflict, most of the foreigners living in Ethiopia endeavoured to convince the Ethiopian people that they could not defend themselves against Italy's superior armament and must not reckon upon effective support from the League, and hinted that it would be better either to ask for British protection or to submit to Italy. Events ultimately proved them right, after the invaders had sprayed the country with mustard-gas and the League's assistance - much less than was provided for by the Covenant - had been found insufficient. In view of this disaster, a number of Ethiopian chiefs (whether Gallas or not is a matter of no importance whatever) did think fit to approach the British authorities in the sense indicated above. They saw no other way of escaping from the oppressive Italian occupation and saving their independence, at all events for the future, since any mandate of that kind must eventually lead to emancipation.

The Ethiopian Government, though apprised of this action, preferred to do nothing to prevent its success. The British Government's refusal was sincerely regretted by His Majesty the Emperor.

2. We have not received from the Imperial officials in Ethiopia any information whatever about the incident alleged to have occurred in the Gumai district. The Regent of the Gore Government and Belata Deressa, Governor of Gumai, make no allusion to it in their reports. The self-styled "Sultan" of Gumai, Aba Jobir, the author of the "petition", is the family head of a fraction of a tribe; he has no official authority and holds no office, either at Jimma or at Gumai, nor has he any personal influence there.

The Ethiopian delegation further notes that the part of the British consular agent's report which has been communicated to you merely states that relations are strained between the garrison and the population, and in no degree confirms Aba Jobir's allegations of depredations on the part of the garrison. Inasmuch as, during the two months that elapsed between the date of Aba Jobir's petition and the enquiry, the only event reported was the development of "strained relations", and order and safety are still preserved, so that the missionaries and other resident foreigners are not being disturbed, the natural conclusion would seem to be that the original report was false; indeed, it would be more proper to congratulate the local chiefs and the troops of the Imperial Government on their conduct, in view of the admittedly difficult circumstances in which they continue to perform their duties.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) Lawrence TAEZAZ,
Delegate of Ethiopia.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA
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1936

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.452.M.268.1936.VII.

Geneva, October 23rd, 1936.

TELEGRAM FROM H.M. HAILE SELASSIE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

London, October 22nd, 1936. L-150 vol 4(a)

Request you to convey the following to the States Members of the League of Nations: With reference to our communication regarding the admission of the Ethiopian delegation the public authorities whom we have empowered to administer the Empire of Ethiopia in our absence have telegraphed to us the following appeal for communication to the League of Nations: "We have received Your Majesty's telegram of September 26th. It is perfectly true that the Imperial Government remains sovereign throughout Western Ethiopia, where it is at present discharging its duties peaceably with diligence, supported by the strength inspired by its complete confidence in the League of Nations. We learn, however, that Italy, our aggressor, has sworn to terrorise and pitilessly exterminate the Ethiopian people through the strength of her air force, and to wipe out the Western Government. Large forces of troops are also on the march. Without resources and without sufficient arms we cannot maintain our resistance. Is a peaceful people which loves its independence and has placed its whole trust in the League of Nations to be abandoned to its aggressor and to be exterminated by poison gas and bombs? The blood of this terrorised people calls out for justice to the Almighty and to the League of Nations and are confident that its cry will be heard. We earnestly beg Your Majesty to ask the League of Nations to consider the cause of Ethiopia urgently in a spirit of justice and to grant her its aid. We implore Your Majesty to renew your appeals to the League.

Gambela, October 16th, 1936, BITWODED WOLDE SADIK.
RAS IMRU."

HAILE SELASSIE I,
Emperor.

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C118123

THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA DEC 1936

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.506.M.318.1936.IIA

Geneva, November 18th, 1936.

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 16 OF THE COVENANT SUPPLIED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE ON JULY 6th, 1936.

Memorandum by the ESTONIAN Government.

In reply to the Secretary-General's letter No.C.L. 127.1936, dated June 13th, 1936, communicating to the Estonian Government a proposal adopted by the Co-ordination Committee, suggesting that Governments should apprise him of their experience with reference to the application of the measures enforced and such conclusions as that experience would seem to suggest, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to submit the following information:

The application in Estonia of the Co-ordination Committee's proposals for restrictive measures against Italy in regard to trade, finance and traffic in arms and war materials necessitated the removal of certain legal difficulties, particularly in the matter of restrictions on trade. Although the Covenant authorises Member States to introduce various internal restrictions, their application in Estonia was somewhat difficult, as the laws in force afforded no basis on which the Co-ordination Committee's proposals Nos. III and IV could be carried into effect. Such a basis had to be created and this was done by the Law of November 8th, 1935, amending the Law of November 6th, 1935, regulating the import of goods. It was under this Law that restrictions were placed on trade with Italy by the Decree of November 13th, 1935, which was communicated to the Co-ordination Committee in the Secretary-General's note No.185/R, dated November 21st, 1935. Although the restrictions came into force on the date fixed by the Co-ordination Committee - i.e. November 18th - the delay in their enactment on account of legal difficulties made it necessary to allow traders a reasonable time in which to organise their business dealings in accordance with the measures enforced. The Estonian Government was thus compelled to select January 28th, 1936, as the last date for the arrival of goods.

The enforcement of the prohibition of traffic in arms and war material involved no legal difficulties, as such traffic was already subject to a special régime under which arms, ammunition and implements of war could not be exported without an authorisation obtained in advance. All that the Government had to do in order to carry out its obligations was to refuse such authorisations.

Similarly, there was no difficulty in applying the restrictions on financial dealings with foreign countries, as the latter were already under the control of the Eesti Pank. A few financial transactions relating to sums owing between insurance companies were authorised in accordance with the spirit of the proposals.

P.T.O.

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The application of the restrictions on the import and export of goods alone was attended by certain difficulties due to the exception made in regard to contracts concluded before October 19th. This was the case, for example, in regard to one contract for the purchase of goods concluded in August 1935, the sums due in respect of which, as was proved by documents supplied to the Ministry of Economic Affairs had been fully paid in September 1935. The contract included a special clause to the effect that delivery was to be spread over a period of months, in accordance with the Estonian importer's requirements. The import restrictions were inapplicable to this particular case and the import of the goods in question could not be refused - a circumstance which is reflected in the statistics of trade with Italy for the first five months during which the restrictions were in force.

The figures for the eight months during which restrictions were in force, when compared with those for the corresponding months of 1934-35, show a decline of 50 per cent. (i.e., from 703,000 Estonian crowns to 350,000 Estonian crowns) in goods imported from Italy, whereas exports fell by 41.5 per cent. (1,068,000 Estonian crowns to 638,000 Estonian crowns).

These figures show that a certain quantity of Estonian goods, usually disposed of in Italy, were without a market. As the Italian share in Estonia's total export trade is relatively small, the Estonian Government succeeded in disposing of the goods in question in other markets. But, if, in future, sanctions were to be applied against a country which took a larger share of Estonian trade, such measures would involve difficulties which would not only be greater, but much harder to surmount.

The Estonian Government considers that, were sanctions again to be applied, the possibility of a juster division of the resultant losses between the various countries should be given careful consideration, with a view to preventing more serious dislocation of the economic life of certain of the countries concerned.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League.

C.510.M.322.1936.VII.

Geneva, November 23rd, 1936.

COMMUNICATION FROM H. M. HAILE SELASSIE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah,

HAILE SELASSIE I,

Elect of the Lord, Emperor of Ethiopia,

To His Excellency M. AVENOL,

Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Peace be with you.

I would ask you to communicate the following to all the States Members of the League of Nations:

In October 1935, immediately after the Italian Government had invaded Ethiopian territory, the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations pronounced that an aggression had been committed upon a Member of the League, and protested against the violation of Article 10 of the Covenant, whereby every State Member explicitly undertakes to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States Members. In July 1936, the Assembly proclaimed its resolve not to recognise any territorial acquisition brought about by force.

In violation of the Covenant and of the League's decisions, the Governments of Austria and Hungary have now officially announced that they recognise the occupation of Ethiopian territory by Italy as lawful and permanent, and the head of the aggressor State as Emperor of Ethiopia.

I strongly protest against this new violation of the Covenant and international conventions, of which the Austrian and Hungarian Governments have been guilty. I once more proclaim the inalienable rights of Ethiopia as a Member of the League of Nations. I affirm my unshakable resolve, and that of my Government and people, to spare no effort to put an end to the Italian adventure in Ethiopia and to restore the territorial integrity and political independence of the Empire. It is the will of God that forcible dominations should collapse with the same force as they were imposed.

I remind every Member of the League of Nations of the solemn undertaking he has given to every other Member by Article 10 of the Covenant. No aggressor can discharge the Governments of that obligation.

P.T.O.

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At a time when international morality and mutual confidence between States have been so severely undermined by the Italian aggression, and when the disastrous consequences of a policy of ignoring promises are making themselves felt in Europe, threatening to bring about a general war which would drench the world with blood, it is the duty and the interest of every Government belonging to the League not to bow down to violence, and not to recognise any territorial occupation effected by force, especially the occupation of part of the territory of Ethiopia, which has been secured, and is maintained, only by a horrible system of confiscation, torture, murder, and terror.

Given at Bath, November 20th, 1936.

(Signed). HAILE SELASSIE I,

Emperor.

(Signed). HERUY W. S., Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Abyssinia

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F 48/20

PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM

Circular

To the Governments of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State (by bag)

Sent 8.30 p.m., 26th April, 1937.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Circular B. No. 41. Secret.

Following message is for Prime Minister. President of the Executive Council. Begins:- Further examination is now being given here to question of relations between this country and Italy. Anglo-Italian Declaration of January last has not resulted in permanent improvement of relations and Italian press has recently been indulging in bitter attacks on this country for which pretext has been views expressed here on subject of recent massacre in Addis Ababa. Strong protests following on these attacks have been made to Italian Government by His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome. Such press campaigns are not only potentially dangerous but create a situation both in Italy and in Ethiopia in which local British interests are the first to suffer. Recent Italian order for expulsion from Ethiopia of long established British-Indian firm of Mohammed Ally is case in point. One cause of tension is anomalous position in Ethiopia which is also causing increasing difficulties in neighbouring British territories. Conclusion of satisfactory agreements with Italian Government for regulation of trade between Ethiopia on the one hand, and Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the other, for the adjustment or demarcation of certain frontiers between these territories, and the regulation of migration of nomadic tribes on frontier zones, is becoming an urgent necessity. Continuance of existing position is liable to give rise to border incidents at any time. Practical responsibilities in these respects of His Majesty's Government in

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in the United Kingdom widely differentiate their position from that of other Members of the League.

In the immediate future a further serious difficulty is likely to arise. Presentation of new letter of credence will be necessary by His Majesty's Ambassador. Under existing conditions this would be addressed to the King of Italy and no mention would be made of the title of Emperor of Ethiopia which the latter has assumed. The Italian Government have however refused to accept similar credentials from representatives of certain other countries, and if they should adopt a similar course towards His Majesty's Ambassador there would be no option but to withdraw latter from his post for the time being. The effect of such a development could only be further and more serious deterioration in Anglo-Italian relations.

Other countries are experiencing somewhat similar difficulties in their relations with Italy, and it is probable that among League members at the Special Assembly in May there will be some feeling that the present anomalous situation should not be allowed to continue.

Having regard to their obligations as a member of the League His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have therefore been considering whether any sequence of events might arise that would make such recognition possible for individual members of the League. The following is a brief outline of the position as it at present appears to them. (It will be realised that the course of events may cause this appreciation to be modified).

On the alternative hypotheses (a) that an Ethiopian Delegation presents itself to the Assembly and (b) that no Ethiopian Delegation puts in an appearance, one of the following courses might be taken. On hypothesis (a) the credentials of

the

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the Ethiopian Delegation would be examined by the Credentials Committee of the Assembly which would either accept them or reject them. In the latter case it is to be hoped that rejection will not be based on a simple statement that the document is not in proper form, but that the Committee will explain rejection on the ground that the Emperor does not in fact control any part of Ethiopia and is therefore not in a position to appoint a delegation to represent Ethiopia at the Assembly.

An opportunity might be afforded by this for a discussion of the whole Ethiopian question. Such a discussion might be guided to the conclusion that for practical reasons the time has come for individual members of the League to face the question of recognising the existing Italian conquest of Ethiopia and for the Assembly to admit that in view of the certainty that the present position in Ethiopia will not change, members must regard themselves as being free to recognise the Italian conquest de jure if and when they may think fit.

On hypothesis (b), the Italian-Ethiopian dispute might be brought before the Council who might request the Assembly to consider it at the May Session. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be ready to associate themselves with such a request.

But it would evidently be preferable that the first initiative should originate with the Credentials Committee.

Government here feel that the meeting of the Imperial Conference would afford a suitable opportunity for the discussion of this important question between His Majesty's Governments in advance of the meeting of the Assembly, and they hope that this course will be generally agreed. Any preliminary indication of the views of Dominion Governments would also be appreciated. Message ends.

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C118129

Mr. Mackenzie King.

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vol. 1

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MOST SECRET.

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COPY NO. 3

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1937.

ABYSSINIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

(E.(A.L.)(37) 1st Meeting.)

Sir Maurice Hankey presents his compliments and begs to forward for favour of approval or amendment the accompanying draft Notes of a Meeting of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1., on Friday, 21st May, 1937, at 3.0 p.m.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
22nd May, 1937.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

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- S E C R E T -

COPY No. 3

E.(A.L.)(37) 1st Meeting.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1937.

ABYSSINIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

. . .

Notes of a Meeting of Ministers held in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street, London, S.W.1, on FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1937, at 3 p.m.

P R E S E N T:-

UNITED KINGDOM.

The Right Hon. Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

AUSTRALIA.

The Right Hon. J.A.Lyons, M.P., Prime Minister.

The Right Hon. S.M. Bruce, C.H., M.C., High Commissioner in London.

SOUTH AFRICA.

General the Hon. J.B.M.Hertzog, M.P., Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.

The Hon. N.C.Havenga, M.P., Minister of Finance.

CANADA.

The Right Hon. W.L.Mackenzie King, M.P., Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Hon. E. Lapointe, K.C., M.P., Minister of Justice.

NEW ZEALAND.

The Right Hon. M.J.Savage, M.P., Prime Minister.

Mr. W.J. Jordan, High Commissioner in London.

INDIA.

The Most Hon. The Marquess of Zetland, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for India.

Sir Zafrullah Khan, Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

Colonel Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. ... Secretary to the Conference.

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This Meeting had been arranged the same morning at the Meeting of the Principal Delegates at the Imperial Conference.

. . .

Mr EDEN said that everyone agreed that the situation was a very difficult one. He had prepared an appreciation of the difficulties, setting out the present position, and had hoped to circulate it at the outset of the Meeting. Unfortunately copies had not reached him as yet. The present situation as regards recognition of the Italian occupation of Abyssinia was rather complicated. Seven nations had recognised the Italian occupation de jure, including a few States Members of the League of Nations. Eleven nations, including Great Britain and France, had recognised the de facto position. There appeared to be three alternative policies: the first was to refuse to recognise what had happened and to maintain that Article 10 of the Covenant made it impossible to recognise the Italian occupation of Abyssinia. The result of that course would be that Abyssinia would remain represented at Geneva, although in fact the Abyssinian representatives would represent no Government exercising authority. Logically the sequel to that course would be to say that the aggressor nation ought to be/ made to leave the League. In this connection he read the following extract from Article 16 of the Covenant:-

> "Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon".

Apart from the political question of whether it would be wise to expel Italy, it was certain that unanimity could not be obtained on such a course.

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Some of the South American States, Austria, Hungary and Switzerland, which had already recognised the Italian occupation of Abyssinia, could never be persuaded to agree. So far as concerned Article 10, which was always a difficult Article, he recalled that action against Italy had been taken not under Article 10 at all, but under Article 12. There was no doubt that Italy had broken Article 10, but it was arguable what action ought to be taken. There was nothing in the Covenant which prescribed that nations had to go to war for Article 10. The Article had been interpreted to signify that States had to use every means in their power to maintain Article 10, but nowhere was it stated that they were bound to go to war. In short, no breach of Article 10 was committed if the action taken under Article 16 had failed in its result.

GENERAL HERTZOG asked if we should not be going rather further if we said to the Abyssinian Delegates "You should not be here: your country has been taken from you". Should we not thereby be recognising the Italians as owners of the country?

Mr EDEN said the only possible way to put it would be to say that we did not recognise the Italian occupation of Abyssinia, but that the Abyssinian Delegates did not represent a Government. An alternative would be to leave it to the Members of the League to decide what action they should take. He gathered that M. Avenol's suggestion was somewhat on the following lines, namely, that if the Abyssinian representatives did not attend the Meeting, the League should pass a voeu to the effect that in the exceptional circumstances now existing it reaffirmed the action taken previously, but that in the light of the present situation it wished that theStates Members of the League should be free to take such action as they wished.

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The League would have to say in effect that Italy had violated the Covenant, that the League had taken action, that this action had failed, and that in those circumstances each State should be free to adopt such attitude as it thought fit.

GENERAL HERTZOG asked if that was not very unsatisfactory? Ought not the league itself to decide what action should be taken and not leave it to the Member States?

Mr EDEN asked whether the League was not in much the same position as the Imperial Conference itself? Could the League in fact decide?

Mr BRUCE said that the course Mr Eden proposed would indicate that in the particular circumstances the Members of the League were not excluded from taking such action as they wished.

Mr EDEN recalled that at a Meeting of the League last July the failure of the action taken under the Covenant had been admitted.

There was a third possible course, namely, to allow the whole question to stand over until September. Personally he did not like that course. All the world knew that the League had failed, and it would not help the League to postpone matters. ~~Moreover, the Italians might seize/the postponement as a pretext for leaving the League, which would/get the worst of both worlds.~~ on then

Mr SAVAGE asked whether it amounted to turning Italy out of the League if we were to say "We recognise that Abyssinia has been violated and we intend to keep her in the League, but we are also prepared to recognise Italy." The course proposed in the second alternative, namely, to reaffirm the previous decisions but allow States to recognise the Italian position, did not appear a consistent one.

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Mr EDEN then explained that the second course he had suggested would involve a definite reaffirmation of the action that had been taken by the League, but in the light of the situation the League would leave Members free. In reply to General Hertzog he said that it would put the League in the same kind of position as we were in now, namely, a *de facto* but not a *de jure* recognition.

GENERAL HERTZOG asked if such *de facto* recognition did not really amount to *de jure* recognition, since it was an acknowledgment that a nation was compelled by the facts of the situation to recognise? If that were true he could not help feeling that the Covenant had been dealt so heavy a blow that Articles 10 and 16 would have to be looked upon as non-existent for the purposes of the smaller nations. That might not be true to the same extent of the bigger nations which had alliances and so forth, and managed to maintain the position; but was it not likely that the smaller nations would consider that the fate of Abyssinia was typical of what was likely to happen to them, at any rate until such time as all States recognised and were prepared to give effect to their responsibilities, - which seemed a long way off. Ought not that fact to be recognised, and ought not the League of Nations to be reduced to something that corresponded with the facts of the situation, leaving to the future the work of building up towards the aspirations of those who had drawn up a Covenant that included Articles 10 and 16 ? At present something was so wrong in the working out of the Covenant that some such consideration as he had suggested appeared desirable.

Mr CHAMBERLAIN asked whether the smaller nations had not already arrived at the position depicted by

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General Hertzog. It seemed to him that those nations had already discovered that a League which left out three or four of the greatest nations could not afford very much help to them. He agreed with General Hertzog. He would like to see the realities of the position realised and the League recognised as a moral force rather than one to be relied on in case of aggression.

(Mr Mackenzie King and Mr Lapointe indicated assent.)

On the other hand, Mr Chamberlain continued, Mr Eden had told him that many of the nations would not like to alter the Covenant, and especially Articles 10 and 16. We had to work with nations as they were, and it might be better to take as the only course open the second alternative proposed by Mr Eden.

GENERAL HERTZOG said the difficulty was that if we did not recognise the facts and we continued as though the Covenant were quite workable, a situation might arise in which the League would again be called upon to take measures under Article 16. It might then be found that not only the big nations but the smaller nations would not undertake effective action. In that event the League would be in an impossible situation. It would be like relying on a piece of wood which had already proved rotten and which broke every time a strain fell on it. He thought that all agreed that the League of Nations was a very desirable institution, but it ought to be put on a secure basis on which to develop.

Mr LYONS asked what was the present position as regards our own Ambassador.

Mr EDEN said he agreed in principle with much that General Hertzog had said. His innermost conviction was that the League would be stronger if it included all the nations, even though there were no sanctions.

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(Mr Mackenzie King indicated assent.)

But at the moment a statement to that effect would come as a great shock to many of the League's members. Some States like Roumania, for instance, thought that what had been done for Abyssinia had only failed in its result because Abyssinia was incapable of offering any resistance to Italy, and that if similar assistance were given to them it would prove effective.

Mr BRUCE recalled that Article 16 had laid down certain propositions, but these had been watered down by the commentary of 1922. The result was that when something serious happened the League came together to see what course ought to be taken. He suggested that that obligation to meet should be preserved.

Mr CHAMBERLAIN remarked that under that procedure the League was supposed to meet early and say what would be done in certain eventualities. For example, if Italy had been warned that countries A, B and C were prepared to take such-and-such action if the Covenant were broken, the Italians would have known their position. The criticism was that the Italian Government did not know what would happen until the moment for the application of sanctions arrived. He gathered that the idea had been that both the possible aggressor and the possible victim were to know what to expect and to decide their respective courses accordingly.

Mr HAVENGA asked if that course was practicable.

Mr CHAMBERLAIN agreed that the query was justified. He doubted whether in fact nations could go far in saying in advance what they would do in certain circumstances.

LORD ZETLAND said that he had been thinking the matter over for a long time and found himself rather near to General Hertzog's view. Indian opinion had

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been disappointed by the failure of the League, and a body of opinion had existed in India which wanted to leave the League. The position of the League was now so bad that perhaps it required heroic measures to rescue it. Possibly the best plan would be to scrap the League and to invite the Powers to form a new League on a new basis. The question was how best the question could be tackled. He gathered Mr Eden to hold the view that dissolution of the League would be going too far and that the best way was to go on on the second alternative.

Mr EDEN said he had certainly never contemplated dissolution of the League. Its re-birth might be very difficult.

GENERAL HERTZOG recalled that the League had done very good work.

Mr EDEN said that it was still doing good work. He recalled the case of the dispute between France and Turkey over Syria, which had come forward at the last Meeting of the Council and was to come up again next week. It was a mistake to assume that the League as now constituted could <u>enforce</u> peace, but it certainly could help the cause of peace, and was constantly doing so at almost every Meeting.

LORD ZETLAND asked if it was not a mistake to maintain a procedure that could not be enforced?

Mr EDEN repeated that some States claimed that what had been done for Abyssinia would be enough, if they became the victim of an aggression, to save them.

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LORD ZETLAND sympathised with Mr Savage's attitude that it was illogical to admit Italy and not Abyssinia.

Mr EDEN pointed out that if a Government failed on occasions to enforce a law effectively it did not scrap that law.

Mr SAVAGE recalled that the League had condemned the action of Italy, and in these circumstances he objected to put a seal on that action. His suggestion was to admit the credentials of Abyssinia, but also to admit the credentials of Italy.

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MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that we did not want the League to get us involved in a war. At present, the League was in an impossible position and the question was how to extricate it. It would never do for the sake of a theoretical and a logical position to endanger the peace.

MR. SAVAGE said there was more in it than that. We might easily find ourselves admitting that wrong was right.

MR. MACKENZIE KING then read the following note which he had prepared before the meeting that morning but which was applicable to the present stage of the discussion:-

> May I at this point refer to the question of recognition of an Ethiopian Delegation, which may come before the special Assembly next week? Certainly, as the Foreign Secretary has said, there can be no question of withdrawing the League's condemnation of Italy's aggression. But neither is there now any possibility of saving her victim. Any such hope passed with the breakdown of Ethiopian resistance more than a year ago, and the unwillingness of any members of the League which were in a position to make their action effective, to resort to war to dislodge Italy from the position she had then secured. The League has failed and Ethiopia has perished. When the substance is gone, I can see no merit in clinging to the form. We may save our own reputation for consistency but we cannot save that hapless country. It is not a question upon which Canada would take any initiative, but if the question is raised, we could not, as at present informed, see any valid reason for refusing to recognise the <u>de facto</u> situation.

He reiterated that that had been written before the discussion began. Having in mind what he had heard of the present attitude of Italy and the possible consequences of what might happen as a result of the meeting of the Assembly, what he had said appeared pertinent. He thought that all agreed that the

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condemnation of Italian action must be maintained. It could not be denied, however, that it would be impossible to restore Abyssinia or redress the wrong that had been committed. If the policy were pushed further, it might hasten the risk of a conflagration in Europe. Canada had stood with the other nations for the sanctions that had been applied, but the circumstances were such that the nations of the world had found that they could not go further. That was not the fault of the Governments represented at the meeting. It was necessary, however, to avoid any possible calamity.

MR. JORDAN who supported his statement by reading an extract from Article XVI of the Covenant pointed out the risk that the Covenant itself might be destroyed.

MR. MACKENZIE KING asked why reference had only been made to the case of Abyssinia. Why were Manchuria and the Chaco not referred to? All members of the League had to recognise the de facto situation. The League had failed three times: that was not a condemnation of the member states but a failure of the Covenant itself.

MR. JORDAN said that if that attitude were adopted, we might as well say at once that no notice would ever be taken of the Covenant.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the United Kingdom Government so far from taking no notice, had spent £150,000,000 on sanctions.

MR. JORDAN pointed out that to bring the matter up at the League now was tantamount to taking no notice of the Covenant. Was it possible for the

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Credentials Committee to recognise the situation that had been brought about by a breach of the Covenant?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN asked what was the alternative.

MR. JORDAN pointed out that under the last part of Article XVI of the Covenant, a member remained a member until there was a contrary vote by the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the League represented thereon. The Covenant had been broken. What was to be done next?

MR. MACKENZIE KING suggested that this was an opportunity to convert the League into a world organisation in accordance with the original conception which was to make the League a power in the world by means of world-wide publicity. A declaration by a League which included every nation in the world could not fail to exercise great influence. It might even happen that the tragedy of Abyssinia might be used to bring about a really effective world organisation. If the matter were approached in the right way, there might be a possiblity of achieving a great result. He could not speak about the European nations, but the United States of America might be willing to join a great new organisation to deal with the root troubles of world unrest. If that could be accomplished, it would be better than ~~action calculated~~ pursuing a course which might only secure to drive ~~out~~ some of ~~the existing~~ the present members out of the League.

GENERAL HERTZOG believed that something could be done on these lines to secure the co-operation both of the United States and Germany, but it would be necessary to remove in the United States the misgivings that had been aroused in 1919 and, so far as Germany was concerned, to avoid the mistake of 1919 of linking up the world organisation to the Treaty of Versailles.

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That mistake must never be repeated, for the position had been reached where Article X and Article XVI had come to be regarded practically as part of the Treaty of Versailles. If we recognised them as dead, other great nations would be far more likely to come into a world organisation: then something might be done of real value. We ought to be willing to admit that such an organisation, existing even as a consultative body, would by force of unanimity exercise enormous force.

MR. EDEN agreed that if the United States of America could be brought in by those means, a great advance would be made.

MR. JORDAN asked how far progress had been made in consulting outside States, as contemplated by the League Committee.

MR. EDEN said that he was not a member of the Committee and did not know the precise situation. He agreed that it was vital to obtain the views of these States.

MR. MACKENZIE KING said that in Canada the people had been much disillusioned by what had happened at the League. With this latest failure and with the United States remaining outside, it would be very difficult (if sanctions were insisted upon) to keep Canada in the League. The neutrality law had given the people of the United States of America a great feeling of security. In Canada, people were saying that membership in the League ~~was the only~~ constituted a real risk of their becoming involved in ~~the~~ war.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN called attention to the fact that the Committee of Principal Delegates would be assembling in a few minutes' time. The present conversation was of great importance and ought to be

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continued. He believed that all those present were convinced that the League ought to be reorganised, but hasty steps might alarm Europe. Possibly, therefore, the matter might be considered with a view to some action in September. As regards the Abyssinian Delegation, his feeling was that no solution could be regarded as really satisfactory. It was clear that we must avoid any admission that the League was wrong and Italy right. It was necessary, however, to get the League out of its present predicament with as little loss as possible. He rather liked Mr. Eden's idea of reaffirming the previous action and leaving the members of the League to take their own course. That would avoid committing the League to a reversal of policy. It was an easier way out than any joint action by the League itself.

MR. BRUCE asked if this course was to be taken whether Abyssinia sent Delegates or not.

MR. EDEN said that some action was necessary because of the position of the different nations towards Italy. Some already had no Ambassador at Rome because they could not recognise the Italian occupation of Abyssinia. The question would arise for the United Kingdom very shortly as the Ambassador required new credentials owing to the accession of a new king. This had been postponed for six months, but must be dealt with before September. Other nations which were in an even worse position would have to raise the question. If the question were left an open one, some nations might recognise Italy de jure and aim at improving their position with Italy by doing so. If the second course were adopted, he did not say that France or ourselves would recognise Italy right away, but he thought that both France and the United

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Kingdom would start negotiations with Italy and insist on certain conditions. All he suggested was that the League should give the nations freedom to negotiate. The procedure at the League would be first to reaffirm the previous attitude of the League: second, to admit that the action had failed; and third, to leave the nations free to negotiate.

MR. BRUCE recalled that it had been represented in certain discussions that a competent authority, namely, the Italian Parliament, had pronounced that Abyssinia formed part of the Italian Empire. At the Montreux Conference, it had been found possible for the nations to sign a Convention notwithstanding that the Italian Delegate claimed that he represented the King of Italy as Emperor of Abyssinia. The Greek representative, M. Politis, had evolved an ingenious theory that a Delegate could declare that he represented anything, but that other countries, by signing the Convention, did not recognise his claim.

MR. SAVAGE asked whether the question of Abyssinian representation could not be left unsettled until the Covenant had been overhauled.

MR. EDEN said there was something to be said for that course.

MR. SAVAGE said that the basis of the League had to be altered. Why, therefore, should the nations not face it? Why should they not say that the matter had to be discussed with the nations inside as well as with the nations outside the League, and that in the meantime the question of Abyssinia's representation must wait.

MR. MACKENZIE KING agreed that that would be the right course if the situation in Europe were not so difficult. As things were, however, was there not a risk of precipitating a dangerous situation? If the

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matter was not raised at once, the Abyssinian complication might have dangerous results.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that the discussion should be continued on the morrow for an hour before the main Committee met.

The Committee agreed:

(a) To meet on Saturday, the 22nd May, at 10.0 a.m.

(b) That the Principal Delegates should be asked to meet at 11.0 a.m.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

21st May, 1937.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 10, line 22.

After "condemnation of" insert "all".

Page 11, line 25.

Delete the words "action calculated" and substitute "pursuing a course which might only serve".

Line 26.

Delete the words "the existing" and substitute "the present".

Page 12, penultimate paragraph.

Mr. Mackenzie King s statement should read:

MR. MACKENZIE KING said that in Canada the people had been much disillusioned by what had happened at the League. With this latest failure and with the United States remaining outside, it would be very difficult, if sanctions were insisted upon, to keep Canada in the League. The neutrality law had given the people of the United States of America a feeling of great security. In Canada, people were saying that membership in the League constituted a real risk of their becoming involved in war.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY,

Secretary to the Conference.

Done

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

4th June, 1937.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 3, lines 24, 25 and 26.

Delete the sentence beginning with the word "Moreover" and ending "both worlds".

Page 5, last paragraph, first sentence.

This should read: "Mr. EDEN said he agreed in principle with much that General Hertzog had said."

Page 7, line 21.

After the word "League" insert "as now constituted".

Page 13, penultimate line.

After "France" insert "or ourselves".

Done

(Signed) M.P.A. Hankey,
Secretary to the Conference.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
31st May, 1937.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 2, line 13.

After "representative" insert "sponsored by Italy".

Page 9, line 25.

Delete the word "desperately".

done

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY,
Secretary to the Conference.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
31st May, 1937.

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JUN 1937

Mr Mackenzie King

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 7, line 10.

After "together" insert "if possible".

Line 14.

This should read: "reorganisation. That seemed to him to lie at the root of the".

Page 8, penultimate paragraph.

Mr. Mackenzie King's statement should read:

"MR. MACKENZIE KING recalled that after the meeting at Geneva last Autumn, he had felt that if Germany, Italy, and the United States of America had been present, some progress might have been made. As it was, some of the countries not represented were thinking of how many countries might be drawn into conflict with themselves, and were pursuing as a consequence a policy of increased re-armament on a scale which otherwise would probably never have been thought of. If only all the nations had been represented, it might have been possible to get together, along with others, the nations outside of the League, and effect something out of a difficult situation."

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY,

Secretary to the Conference.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,

4th June, 1937.

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Mr Mackenzie King

C 118150

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SECRET.

E.(A.L.)(37) 2nd Meeting. COPY NO. 3

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1937.

ABYSSINIA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

NOTES of a Meeting of Ministers held in the Cabinet Room at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W.1., on SATURDAY, May 22nd, 1937, at 10.0 a.m.

PRESENT:

UNITED KINGDOM.

The Right Hon. Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer. (In the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

AUSTRALIA.

The Hon. R.G. Casey, D.S.O., M.C., M.P., Treasurer.

The Right Hon. S.M. Bruce, C.H., M.C., High Commissioner in London.

SOUTH AFRICA.

General the Hon. J.B.M. Hertzog, M.P., Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.

The Hon. N.C. Havenga, M.P., Minister of Finance.

CANADA.

The Right Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, M.P., Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Hon. E. Lapointe, K.C., M.P., Minister of Justice.

NEW ZEALAND.

The Right Hon. M.J. Savage, M.P., Prime Minister.

Mr. W.J. Jordan, High Commissioner in London.

INDIA.

The Most Hon. The Marquess of Zetland, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for India.

Sir Zafrullah Khan, Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

Colonel Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. ... Secretary to the Conference.

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Mr EDEN handed round an appreciation entitled "De jure Recognition of the Italian Conquest of Abyssinia" (Appendix). This was read by those present before the opening of the discussion.

LORD ZETLAND drew attention to the following passage on page 3 of the Memorandum:-

> "It is believed by the League Secretariat that even in the absence of any resolution being put down or any vote being taken, the view would be generally expressed that the present situation was altogether out of harmony with the facts of the case, and that the result of such discussion would be to leave it open to individual members of the Assembly, in a way in which it is not at present open, subsequently to grant or to continue to withhold de jure recognition in accordance as their individual interests dictated."

He asked whether, as stated on page 4 of the Memorandum, seven countries had not already recognised the Italian occupation de jure?

Mr EDEN said that only three out of seven were members of the League. Moreover, they were countries that had not applied sanctions. In the Foreign Office their action was regarded as inconsistent with the Covenant.

Referring to the plan of the Secretary-General, he said that the French view was that it should be expressed in the form of a voeu. The advantage of this was that it did not require a vote.

Mr CASEY said that the Commonwealth Delegation's legal advisers made out a strong case that there was no difference between de jure and de facto recognition.

Mr EDEN supplemented the Foreign Office Memorandum by some remarks on the attitude of other Powers. He recalled that at a meeting of the League's Committee in September last the small Powers had been against any action in the direction of recognition.

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He thought the position was now reversed. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr Sandler, had recently visited London and had indicated a change of view. Mr Eden himself had replied that we did not intend to take a lead in the matter. Mr Sandler then said that it was his intention to consult the Scandinavian group. The result of this consultation, he gathered, was that they were prepared to support action in favour of recognition, but not to take a lead themselves. Mr Sandler's own view had been that by doing so we should get rid of an anomalous position which reacted on the prestige of the League. Failing such action Mr Sandler apprehended that an Abyssinian representative sponsored by Italy might put in an appearance at the September Meeting of the Assembly, which would be embarrassing.

Turning to the general question, Mr Eden said that he had thought it over and realised how difficult it was to reach a decision.

Mr JORDAN interpolated with a question as to whether an Abyssinian representative might not present himself at the Assembly next week?

Mr EDEN said that he had not thought it desirable to consult the Abyssinian Legation on the subject, but he learned that various people had advised the Abyssinians not to be represented, for the reason that their delegate would represent no territorial entity. His own view was that the best plan for the Assembly would be as follows: First, to repeat its previous declarations on the Italian action; second, to recognise the failure of the action taken in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant; third, to leave it open to individual members of the Assembly to take what action their individual interests dictated; and, fourth, to add a rider that this emphasised the need to push on with the examination of the future of the Covenant.

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Mr MACKENZIE KING said that that course appealed to him.

Mr HAVENGA asked if there would be a Resolution?

Mr EDEN said either a Resolution or a voeu; it did not matter much which.

Mr CHAMBERLAIN said that if the Assembly wanted a Resolution it could take the form suggested by Mr Eden. It appeared, however, that the easier method would be by means of a voeu.

LORD ZETLAND agreed with Mr Chamberlain and thought that the view of the Government of India would be similar to his own. It was necessary to accept the facts of the situation and to bring the position into line with realities. It was also important to consider the future of the League, and it was because of that suggestion by Mr Eden that he found himself in agreement. He asked his colleague whether he thought that view would be acceptable in India.

SIR ZAFRULLAH KHAN said that in his view those people in India who supported the League of Nations would agree, but not those who opposed the League altogether.

Mr MACKENZIE KING said it was important to bring the situation into line with the facts, otherwise the present situation would be prolonged and might become dangerous.

Mr BRUCE said that in a difficult situation the course proposed appeared to be the least difficult. He was anxious to avoid any course which would lead to a reopening of the Japanese situation. The course now proposed would be generally recognised as a way of getting out of the present awkward position, and it would enable the future of the League to be brought up.

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Mr CASEY asked what would be the effect of the proposed course on Japan.

Mr EDEN thought there would be no effect. The attitude of the League towards Manchuria had not damaged the Japanese. It had occasioned some difficulties for ourselves; for example, in the matter of the status of the Consuls. The French Government was particularly anxious to avoid the mistakes that had been made over the Manchurian incident.

Mr BRUCE referred to the Chinese grievances.

Mr EDEN said that in Manchuria we did not give exequaturs to Consuls.

In reply to a question by Lord Zetland as to why the French were so anxious to clear up the situation as regards recognition of Italy, he said that a year ago the French had decided to change their Ambassador. Owing to the difficulty of the Ambassador's credentials they had remained without an Ambassador in Rome for a year. We ourselves were now in the same position. It was unusual to allow the Ambassador to remain in that position for more than six months.

Mr CHAMBERLAIN said there was also the danger of prolonging the present state of irritation in Italy.

Mr EDEN agreed. He recalled that in the case of negotiations over the Italian action against an Indian firm in Abyssinia it had been found that the only way to secure redress was by threatening retaliation. The same had occurred in the question of missionaries. When it had been discovered that it was impossible to retaliate, for the reason that we did not recognise Abyssinia as part of Italy.

Mr SAVAGE said that he would like, as far as possible, to confine matters to discussion at Geneva for the present. Resolutions would present difficulties. If the question could be postponed, for any

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legitimate reason, that would be the least objectionable course in a situation where every course was open to objection. The future of the League should be brought into such discussions. He wanted to avoid the danger of invalidating the principles which had hitherto been subscribed to. He wanted the discussions on the future of the League to include the grievances of nations outside as well as those inside the League.

GENERAL HERTZOG thought that the courageous course was the best. It ought to be admitted that sanctions had failed. Non-recognition would only amount to sanctions in another form. It was clear that the League had failed once more, since several of its members had recognised the Italian occupation de jure, and still more de facto. We should acknowledge that it was no use burking the facts. To do so would only be to admit that a course had been adopted that was unavoidable and that Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant could not be enforced. It should be recognised that for the future these Articles were abrogated. The League ought, therefore, to decide to recognise the Italian position.

Mr CHAMBERLAIN asked what chance there was of unanimity in such a course.

Mr EDEN said that it would not be possible to get a decision to cut out Articles 10 and 16. The countries that had on the previous day been spoken of as the "Versailles Powers", that is to say those who wanted to keep what they had got, would not agree to abandon these Articles. There was a fundamental difference between the respective groups of Powers.

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Those who wanted Article 16 did not like Article 19. It would be a great shock to them to speak on the lines suggested by General Hertzog, but he did not see why the members of the League should not be brought up against the fact that the League, as now composed, could not apply sanctions to a Great Power -- like Germany, for example. If the United States of America were a member of the League it would be stronger than it was today, even though it could only exercise moral force.

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MR. SAVAGE asked how Mr. Eden viewed the idea of a conference to consider the future of the League.

MR. EDEN said that if the United States of America could be brought in, he would like it.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said it would be rather premature to propose it just now, but he thought it very desirable to work towards it.

MR. MACKENZIE KING suggested that the best plan would be if the countries outside the League could get together under the Presidency of the United States of America to consider the root causes of world unrest. Unless they could be brought together in some such way, they would probably refuse to take any part in League reorganisation. That seemed to him to be the root of the problem.

GENERAL HERTZOG reverting to a previous statement said that his intention had not been to try and force recognition of Italy through, but merely to raise the considerations he had mentioned.

MR. EDEN agreed with Mr. Mackenzie King that reform of the Covenant could not be achieved until the nations outside the League had made their position clear.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that soundings might be made.

MR. BRUCE pointed out that the universality aspect of League reform for which the United Kingdom provided the rapporteur was very important. Other aspects were linked up to it, but these could be held up until progress had been made on universality.

MR. EDEN said that some European nations would be strongly opposed to the abrogation of Article XVI.

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MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that these nations did not realise that they were deceiving themselves if they thought its retention would be of any value.

GENERAL HERTZOG said his idea was merely to open these questions in order to put those nations up against the real position.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed that it would be valuable to ventilate the whole question.

MR. SAVAGE said that if all the nations could be got to consider each others needs instead of discussing guns which they never intended to use, some advance might be made. He had no personal acquaintance with the atmosphere of Geneva, but if it were in any way similar to what existed in that room and these issues could be discussed without bias, some big questions might be solved. A conversation at Geneva on the same lines as those he was now taking part in might be very valuable and produce results far better than a resolution that achieved nothing and did not please 50 per cent. of the people concerned.

MR. MACKENZIE KING recalled that after the meeting at Geneva last Autumn, he had felt that if Germany and the United States of America had been present, some progress might have been made. As it was, many of these present were thinking only of how they were likely to be forced to fight some other nation. If only all the nations had been represented, it might have been possible to get something out of a difficult situation.

MR. SAVAGE asked what Mr. Eden thought of the plan of postponing the question of recognising Italy's

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position in Abyssinia pending the discussions on the big issue.

MR. EDEN said that the effect of a postponement on Italy would be the same as keeping Abyssinia inside the League. He thought it would be amply sufficient if the League could get an indication that the nations were free to do what each thought fit. If that could be secured, he had no intention of taking precipitate action. The question would be discussed with other Powers and with Italy who would be asked a number of questions, for example, what was to be their future attitude towards the League? Germany might be asked the same question. All he asked for was some freedom to negotiate.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN added that postponement of the question would also increase the irritation of Italy.

MR. HAVENGA asked what was gained by not facing up to the real issue.

MR. EDEN said that he would hope for a détente which would form a good basis for an approach to other powers. In reply to Lord Zetland, he said that the French Government were ~~desperately~~ anxious to get the question settled, but were in a real difficulty in raising it owing to their internal situation.

MR. JORDAN asked whether Abyssinia might not perhaps give notice to leave the League.

MR. EDEN said that if the position of Italy was recognised before the September Assembly, Abyssinia could not be received.

M. LAPOINTE remarked that if Italy remained in the League, she would be there convicted in the eyes of the world of an aggression.

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Nevertheless, what he asked was what was to be gained by forcing her outside the League to join Germany, Japan and the United States of America? The course proposed might not be ideal, but it was the only practicable one.

MR. EDEN said he did not intend to take a lead in this matter at Geneva as it would be liable to misunderstanding. He thought, however, that someone might start the discussion.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN suggested that someone might perhaps ask a question.

MR. EDEN said that the position was even more difficult for France than for ourselves. The French owned the railway in Abyssinia but found that, owing to non-recognition of the Italian position there, it was impossible to negotiate effectively on such matters.

MR. JORDAN thought the matter could not be carried much further.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that, so far as he could judge, there was general agreement among those present as to the most hopeful line to be taken next week at Geneva on the very difficult question of recognition, arising out of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. As he understood the matter, the course favoured was that the Assembly should, if possible, avoid formal resolutions, but should in discussion re-affirm its previous attitude towards the Italian occupation of Abyssinia; that the failure of the action taken under Article XVI of the Covenant should be admitted; that the States Members of the League should be freed to take such steps as each should deem

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appropriate to regulate its future attitude towards the Italian occupation; and that advantage should be taken of the opportunity offered for emphasising strongly the bearing of these events on the importance of pressing forward with the examination of the future organisation of the League of Nations, including consultation with nations outside the League as well as with Member States. He thought also that there was a general preference that the question should, if possible, be brought before the Assembly from some quarter other than the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

This summary was generally accepted.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

22nd May, 1937.

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APPENDIX.

De jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia.

At the end of 1936 the Italians were in effective control of the whole of Abyssinia excepting for certain districts in the South and South-west. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires as head of a mission accredited to a Government which had ceased to exist in Abyssinia consequently found himself in a very invidious position which would have proved weak in law had the Italian authorities decided to challenge it. This position was inconsistent with the adequate protection of British interests and the conduct of local business with the Italian authorities and it was therefore decided to reduce the status of the Legation to that of a Consulate-General, thereby conferring de facto recognition on the Italian conquest of those parts of Abyssinia of which the Italians were in effective control. This was done without prejudice to de jure recognition.

The difficulties caused by not having recognised the Italian conquest of Ethiopia de jure may be summarised as follows:

(1) As a consequence of the accession of His Majesty King George VI His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome must present fresh credentials to the Italian Government. The latter have made it perfectly plain that no credentials will be accepted which are not made out to "The King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia". Credentials made

out.....

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out in this form confer de jure recognition ipso facto. It is because the French and Belgian Government have not so far felt able to give de jure recognition that their Governments are at present represented in Rome by Chargés d'Affaires. The presentation of Sir E. Drummond's new credentials cannot be indefinitely deferred. His Majesty's Government will therefore, before very long, be faced with the necessity either of leaving the Embassy in Rome in the hands of a Chargé d'Affaires or of giving de jure recognition. (2) Until de jure recognition has been accorded, it is impossible to proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of various agreements regarding the frontiers between Abyssinia on the one hand and Kenya, the Sudan and British Somaliland on the other, and in regard to Lake Tsana and British rights and interests in Abyssinia generally.

Apart from these more or less technical considerations the absence of de jure recognition has been made the subject of grievance and complaint by the Italian Government and people.

Tentative.....

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Tentative views as to the way in which this situation might be dealt with have already been communicated to the Dominion Governments. It has been suggested to them that since it is unlikely that an Ethiopian Delegation will present itself at the forthcoming Assembly meeting in Geneva, and since, consequently, it is unlikely that the credentials of an Ethiopian Delegation will be formally examined by the Credentials Committee, the dispute between Italy and the League might be brought before the Council by some Government or group of Governments with a request that the Assembly should be asked to include it in the Agenda of the Special Session. The United Kingdom Government would be unwilling to take this initiative. Moreover, since the last telegram on the subject was addressed to the Dominion Governments, it has become increasingly clear that neither France nor any of the small States would be ready to do so either. A suggestion has emanated from the League Secretariat that one way out of the difficulty described above would be as follows, namely, that some member of the Assembly should, without putting down any definite resolution on which the vote would have to be taken, invite the Assembly to have a discussion about the position of Ethiopia. It is believed by the League Secretariat that even in the absence of any resolution being put down or any vote being taken, the view would be generally expressed that the present situation was altogether out of harmony with the facts of the case, and that the result of such discussion would be to leave it open to individual members of the Assembly, in a way in which it is not at present open, subsequently to grant or to continue to withhold de jure recognition in accordance as their individual interests dictated.

Apart

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Apart from the purely political difficulties which in varying degrees prevent individual Governments from taking the initiative, the following special considerations must be borne in mind: (1) the feeling that it would be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by Article 10 of the Covenant and (2) the resolution adopted by the Assembly on March 11th 1932, in regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute.

As regards (1), as is well known Article 10 has been the subject of some difference of opinion and much debate ever since the foundation of the League, and it was not the basis of the Assembly's action in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. Action in this case was taken under Article 16 in virtue of Italy's violation of Article 12. This action was not successful in preventing Italy from conquering and overrunning Ethiopia. The failure of the League to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of Ethiopia was recognised in July 1936 by the Assembly, which noted "that various circumstances have prevented the full applica-"tion of the Covenant of the League of Nations" and recommended that measures taken by governments in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant should be brought to an end. Since then the actual situation, i.e. the effective occupation of Ethiopia by Italy has been recognised de facto by eleven countries and de jure by seven countries. In the circumstances League Members can hardly be held as bound not to recognise the existing situation since, in a case where Article 16 has in fact been applied, it cannot be contested that Article 10 imposes any further obligation on the Members of the League.

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As regards (2). in the resolution of March 11th, 1932, the Assembly referred to the provisions of the Covenant and to the appeal addressed by 12 members of the Council to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared "that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by Members of the League of Nations;" proclaimed, pending any steps which it might ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute in question, "the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above"; and declared that it was "incumbent on Members of the League not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris." This resolution stands as a general statement of principle, but the application of it to the case of Manchuria is of interest. In its final resolution of February 24th, 1933, on the Manchurian dispute, the Assembly, without expressly declaring that the Covenant or the Pact of Paris had been violated, made recommendations, and declared that "In view of the special circumstances of the case the recommendations do not provide for a mere return to the status quo existing before September, 1931. They likewise exclude the maintenance and recognition of the existing régime in Manchuria, such maintenance and recognition being incompatible with the fundamental principles of existing international obligations and with the good understanding between the two countries on which peace in the Far East depends. It follows that in adopting the present report the Members of the League intend to abstain, particularly as regards the existing régime in Manchuria, from any act which might prejudice or delay the carrying out of the recommendations of the said report. They will

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will continue not to recognise this régime either de jure or de facto". It is important to note the stress laid on the carrying out of the practical recommendations of the Assembly as the aim of this resolution. Although it has caused a certain amount of administrative difficulty, which has been overcome by one expedient or another, this resolution has on the whole been faithfully observed by the countries which subscribed to it. It will be seen that its wording is general. It has, however, been regarded by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as having been adopted by the League in connexion with the particular case of the Sino-Japanese dispute and not as being of general application. In reply to a Parliamentary Question on December 16th, 1936, the Secretary of State said: "His Majesty's Government adhere to the principle enunciated in the declaration referred to by the Honourable Member which was made in connexion with the particular case of the Sino-Japanese dispute. But in its application to any case His Majesty's Government must be entitled to take account of the facts of the situation and of the necessity - where the protection of British interests is involved - of dealing with the actual authorities on the spot. Any such action on their part does not imply approval of the methods by which the situation was brought about."

No resolution regarding non-recognition was adopted by the League of Nations in the case of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, although in its resolution of July 4th, 1936, the Assembly declared that it remained "firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments, such as the Declaration of the American States dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force." In this case, therefore, it would seem that the hands of League Members are not tied in regard to the question of

recognition

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recognition as they were in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute. It cannot, however, be denied that in practice the de jure recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia might not be without eventual influence on the question of Manchuria, though for reasons of her own Japan is, at any rate for the moment, content that the present position should remain unchanged.

The following States have recognised the Italian Government de facto as the Government of the part of Ethiopia under Italian control.

Japan (i)
Czechoslovakia
United States of America (i)
United Kingdom
France
Belgium
Roumania
Greece
Turkey
Poland
Bulgaria

The following States have recognised the Italian annexation of Ethiopia de jure.

Austria
Hungary
Switzerland
San Marino (i)
Germany (i)
Chile *
Yugoslavia *

May 21st, 1937.

(i) Not members of the League of Nations.

* The Chilean Ambassador in Rome last year presented credentials addressed to The King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. The Yugoslav Government recently signed a treaty with Italy in which the King of Italy was similarly described. The Chilean and Yugoslav Governments deny that by so doing they have accorded de jure recognition, but the United Kingom Government are advised that, at any rate in the Chilean case, it is difficult to see how this contention can be maintained.

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VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA
OTTAWA, Wednesday, 2nd March, 1938.

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G-100
Vl.1

MR. CHURCH - On Friday next - Inquiry of Ministry -

1. Will the Government prepare another white paper similar to the one they issued regarding Italy and Ethiopia, giving all correspondence in relation to the Government of Great Britain and its external affairs, as far as related to Canada since the last white paper was issued here?

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Vl.1

2. Would it be possible for the Government to secure copy of the British white paper said to have been laid on the table by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, London, today, covering foreign affairs with references as they relate to the Dominions in this matter?

3. If these two white papers are prepared or received by the Government, will they be laid on the table of the House and a copy distributed to the members?

ANSWER.

1. It is not considered practicable to furnish a document of the scope suggested.

2. Copies of the white paper tabled in the House of Commons at Westminster ~~yesterday~~ by the Government of the United Kingdom, which dealt with defence questions, will be available in the Library of Parliament shortly.

3. Answered by No. 1 and No. 2.

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Jw29 C118170 L-150 bl4(a)

VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS

March 3rd, 1938.

Mr. Church - On Monday next - Inquiry of Ministry.

On January 27th and February 9th, pursuant to an Order of the House, a Return was laid on the table in answer to my inquiry: "Has Canada approved, or been asked to approve, of the conquest of Ethiopia by Italy." In view of the statement yesterday by the Prime Minister of Great Britain that they have recognized this conquest de facto, has the Government of Canada approved of the action taken since the return mentioned was tabled?

Answer

The Canadian Government is not aware of any statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on March 2nd that the United Kingdom has recognized de facto the conquest of Ethiopia by Italy. A statement of March 2nd respecting this question was, however, made by the Foreign Office in connection with litigation at present before the Courts in London. This statement is reported in press despatches as follows:-

> "His Majesty's government recognize the Italian government as the government de facto of the part of Ethiopia which they control, and according to their information the Italian government now is in control of virtually the whole of Ethiopia. His Majesty's government therefore recognize the Italian government as the government de facto of virtually the whole of Ethiopia."

The Foreign Office statement does not purport to indicate that recognition of the Italian Government as the de facto Government of the part of Ethiopia

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which they control has only recently been asserted. The de facto recognition, to which reference is made, may be considered to have taken place during the latter part of 1936 or early in 1937, when the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and certain other countries, after securing from the Italian authorities formal assurances of the grant of adequate facilities, decided to reduce their respective Legations at Addis Ababa to Consulates.

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Italian-Ethiopian Situation
Sanctions.
Extracts, memo
External

C 118172

November 15, 1937.

NOTE ON QUESTION OF PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL BEFORE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

SESSION OF 1936

During the session of 1936, upon the External Affairs Vote, Mr. Cahan raised this question and challenged the validity of the Orders in Council imposing sanctions upon Italy under the Treaties of Peace Act 1919 (Hansard 1936, Vol. IV, pp. 4097-4103).

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) explained the special circumstances in which these sanctions against Italy had been undertaken. The Government had just taken office following the 1935 Election. The previous administration had already consented to the Resolution of the League Assembly in Geneva, which declared that Italy had violated her obligations under the Covenant of the League. The following extract from the Prime Minister's statement may be quoted here (Hansard 1936, Vol. IV, p. 4103):

> May I point out further that the British government took the action it did by order in council while its parliament was in session. In the case of the other dominions I think most of their parliaments were in session at the time. We were faced with a situation which was one of great reality. It required to be viewed in a realistic manner. The problem with respect to the imposition of sanctions for the most part had presented itself before this administration came into office. To a certain extent it might be said that our hands were tied with respect to the action it would be possible to take. I prefer to say that we had to consider very carefully how parliament would view our action in imposing sanctions by order in council. Considering

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> all the circumstances we felt that, having regard to the situation itself, to the position of hon. gentlemen opposite when they themselves were in office and the support which we as an administration had received from the country and would have in this parliament there was little doubt that, as soon as parliament did assemble, our actions would receive the support of hon. members on all sides. I think we were fully justified in making that assumption and acting in the light of it. The fact that this is the first time this question has been raised in parliament since parliament assembled some five months ago is the best evidence that the administration has a right to feel that it did act wisely and wholly in accordance with the wishes of hon. members of the House of Commons in this matter.

In conclusion the Prime Minister indicated that the action taken in this case should not be regarded as a precedent. His statement was as follows (p. 4106):

> ' I agree with my hon. friend when he says that the action of the government at this time should not be regarded as a precedent. I feel as strongly as he does that parliament should, in all of these matters, have its voice heard before the country is committed to anything that may involve us in a war.

SESSION OF 1937

On January 25, 1937, Mr. Woodsworth moved a resolution on foreign policy. In reply to one aspect of Mr. Woodsworth's speech the Prime Minister indicated that it was the present administration's policy that the imposition of sanctions by Canada would require parliamentary approval. The following extract from the Prime Minister's statement may be noted here (Unrevised Hansard, Jan. 25/37, pp. 274-5):

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Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Let me now read the statements of Canada's position which I made at Geneva. They ought surely to be an answer once and for all as to where Canada stands on this subject, so far at least as the present administration is concerned. There may be--I am not quite sure that there are not--some who will differ from the statement of policy, but it is a statement of the present administration's policy, and it is the policy which the present administration intends to follow as long as it remains in office. These quotations are from a speech delivered at the seventeenth session of the assembly at Geneva on September 29, 1936.

MR. CAHAN: Is it published separately for distribution?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Yes. I shall be glad to send my hon. friend a copy if he has not one. I thought he had one. This is the first statement:

> The nations of the British commonwealth are held together by ties of friendship, by similar political institutions, and by common attachment to democratic ideals, rather than by commitments to join together in war. The Canadian parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members of the commonwealth may be engaged.

There was also the following:

> The Canadian House of Commons by unanimous resolution has made the adoption of undertakings to apply either military or economic sanctions subject to the approval of parliament.
>
> What I have said and quoted does not mean that in no circumstances would the Canadian people be prepared to share in action against an aggressor; there have been no absolute commitments either for or against participation in war or other forms of force. It does mean that any decision on the part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the parliament or people of Canada in the light of all existing circumstances; circumstances of the day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved.

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Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Let me now read the statements of Canada's position which I made at Geneva. They ought surely to be an answer once and for all as to where Canada stands on this subject, so far at least as the present administration is concerned. There may be--I am not quite sure that there are not--some who will differ from the statement of policy, but it is a statement of the present administration's policy, and it is the policy which the present administration intends to follow so long as it remains in office. These quotations are from a speech delivered at the seventeenth session of the assembly at Geneva on September 29, 1936.

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(O.D. SKELTON) C118178 MAY 11, 1938

Ethiopian Crisis

THE QUESTION OF RECOGNIZING THE ITALIAN CONQUEST OF ETHIOPIA

On May 9th, 1936, four days after the occupation of Addis Ababa, the King of Italy signed a legislative decree in which he assumed for himself and his successors the title of Emperor of Ethiopia.

The question of whether or not recognition should be refused to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia came up at the Special Assembly of the League which met at Geneva at the end of the following month. The delegate of Argentina referred to the Declaration made at Washington August 3rd, 1932, by nineteen American states that "no territorial arrangement shall be recognised which has not been obtained by peaceful means, nor the validity of the occupation and acquisition of territories obtained by force of arms" and asked the Assembly to re-assert the principle. Mr. Eden stated it was the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that "the Assembly should not in any way recognize Italy's conquest over Abyssinia". There was general agreement among the members of the Assembly that the principle put forward by the Argentine delegate should be maintained. They were not prepared to set it forth in unambiguous language in a Resolution and voted down an Ethiopian

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draft Resolution which provided as follows:-

> "The Assembly recalls the terms of Articles X, and XVI of the Covenant to which it declares its faithful adherence. Accordingly it proclaims that it will recognise no annexation obtained by force."

Eventually, the principle was embodied in the Preamble to the Resolution of July 4th, 1936, inviting Governments to submit to the Secretary-General of the League proposals they might wish to make with a view to improving the application of the principles of the Covenant. The relevant paragraph is as follows:-

> The Assembly,
>
> "Remaining firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as the declaration of the American states dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force."

Ethiopia voted against this method of dealing with the question so that the Resolution while adopted 44 to 1 with 4 abstentions, did not have the effect of a decision of the Assembly, for which unanimity was necessary under the rules, but simply had the effect of a <u>voeux</u> for which a majority vote was sufficient.

No direct action has been taken by the Assembly or the Council with respect to the matter since the

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Resolution of July 4th, 1936, except that the decision of the Credentials Committee of the League Assembly of 1936 that Ethiopian delegates were entitled to sit in the Assembly might be considered, in effect, as a notification that the Italian conquest of Ethiopia was not recognized by the Assembly. The Ethiopian delegates did not attend the Assembly of 1937.

Since 1936, the following States may be considered, by having accredited representatives to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, or by other formal acts, to have accorded "de jure" recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia:-

Albania, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Nationalist Spain, Japan, Manchukuo, Poland, Latvia, Eire, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Chile, Panama, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.

Between fifteen and twenty States, including the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, have accorded "de facto" recognition of the Italian Conquest of Ethiopia.

The exact object of the Government of the United Kingdom in placing the question of "consequences arising out of the existing situation in Ethiopia" on the Agenda of the Council which is meeting at Geneva this week, will not be clear until the public session of the Council tomorrow (Thursday, May 12th).

In a despatch of April 22nd, received a few days

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ago, Mr. Wrong states that the United Kingdom objective is clear, namely, to devise some means whereby the United Kingdom and the other Members of the League, who are so minded, can, with a clear conscience regarding their League obligations, recognize the Italian Government as the lawful sovereign of the territory formerly ruled by the Emperor Haile Selassie. The phrase "with a clear conscience" would, however, seem to defy any ingenuity they may be able to bring to bear on the problem.

In informing the Canadian Government of their intention to bring the question before the Council, the United Kingdom Government stated that they did not seek to cause the League to modify in any way the attitude which it has assumed in the past with reference to the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia, nor did they desire to cause any State Member of the League of Nations to violate its own principle. They desire merely to clarify the situation of those Members of the League of Nations who have not yet regularized their relations with Italy.

To sum up, there is ~~nothing~~ apparently no legal barrier to prevent the United Kingdom from recognizing the Italian conquest of Ethiopia; the arguments against such action are more general, e.g. ~~except~~ (1) that it would be for her, as for the others which have already done so, a further admission that they will pay no heed to obligations under the Covenant if they are deemed

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to conflict with British interests; (2) that it would leave the United States, strongly committed to the principle of non-recognition of territory acquired by force, more isolated than ever; and (3) that it might re-open the whole question of the recognition of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria with respect to which the League Resolutions of March 11th, 1932, and February 24th, 1933, are much stronger than the Resolution of July 4th, 1936, above-mentioned.

Department of External Affairs,

May 11th, 1938.

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O.D. SKELTON

ODS/ET
21 Dec., 1938 C 118183 J-400
V.1
✓Spanish Civil War
✓Ethiopian civil
✓Imperial Relations

RECOGNITION OF ITALIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER ETHIOPIA.

On November 16th, 1938, the British Ambassador in Rome communicated to Count Ciano new Letters of Credence accrediting him to "the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia". A declaration recording the entry into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th was signed by the British Ambassador and Count Ciano the same evening.

In a telegram of Saturday, November 12th the Canadian Government was advised that this decision had been made. No request was made for our concurrence, and no communication was sent to London on the subject. Earlier, on October 26th, a circular telegram had been sent, indicating that the United Kingdom Government had concluded that it would be advisable to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force primarily for the purpose of detaching Mussolini from the Rome-Berlin axis, and following a debate in the House of Commons it was probable that new credentials would be sent to the British Ambassador accrediting him to the 'King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia".

In the debate in the British House of Commons on November 2nd, Mr. Chamberlain defended the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, pointing out that every other country in Europe except Soviet Russia had already

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granted recognition and that the Council of the League, by a majority vote, had expressed the unqualified view that it was for each nation to decide for itself whether it should or should not accord this formal recognition. He went on to say that the Dominions had been kept fully informed. He quoted a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia urging that the Anglo-Italian Agreement be brought into operation forthwith, and one from the Prime Minister of South Africa stating that he considered the steps that the British Government were taking were wise and necessary and would materially contribute to appeasement in Europe. In response to questions, Mr. Chamberlain indicated he had had no communication from New Zealand or from Canada.

The Irish Free State had anticipated the action of the United Kingdom by accrediting its Minister to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia several months earlier.

In response to enquiries, we have been informed that the Australian Government on November 16th requested the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to instruct the British Ambassador in Rome to inform the Italian Government that His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia accord de jure recognition of the incorporation of Abyssinia into the Royal Italian Empire. On the same day Mr. Lyons made

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a statement in Parliament in which he referred to the intention of the United Kingdom Government to accredit the British Ambassador in the above way, mentioned the interest of Australia in the preservation of a peaceful and friendly situation in the Mediterranean, and announced the Commonwealth's decision as set out above. A letter was forwarded as a matter of courtesy only to the Italian Consul-General in Sydney, indicating the Commonwealth Government's decision.

So far as Canada is concerned, two points arise.

1. The desirability of according recognition.

I gather it is the view of the Government that recognition should now be accorded. As pointed out above, every country in Europe except Russia has now granted recognition, including both the United Kingdom and Ireland. Australia has taken separate action, and South Africa will doubtless take action by giving new Letters of Credence to the South African Minister to Italy. The statements made by the Imperial Conference and by the League of Nations Council support the view that there is no longer any reason for shutting our eyes to established facts, much as we dislike them.

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2. Procedure to be followed in recognition.

The most explicit precedent is in the recognition of the Republic Government in Spain following the overthrow of King Alfonso. We were asked if we wished to concur with the United Kingdom in the recognition of the new Government and replied we were, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid addressed separate notes on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the Irish Free State. It is somewhat surprising that the United Kingdom did not propose similar action in the present case. They may have assumed that our attitude at the Imperial Conference in 1937 and the fact that we had not replied in the negative to their note of November 12th, implied concurrence, or possibly some feeling because we had not rallied round to the support of the Anglo-Italian Agreement as Australia and South Africa had done, may have been responsible for this course. Incidentally, there has been a marked tendency on the part of Mr. Chamberlain of late to make the wholly unwarranted assumption that when the United Kingdom informs us of a policy on which it has already made a decision, an absence of any statement on our part involves concurrence and approval of that policy.

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The following courses appear open:

(1) To assume that the action of the British Ambassador on November 16th involved recognition on our part. (This position does not seem in accordance with precedent or with existing constitutional practice. It is quite true that Canada has nothing to do with the appointment of United Kingdom Ambassadors or Ministers, and that we use their services where we have no representatives by courtesy only. That is not the question at issue here, however. The point is whether Canada is to be assumed, without any explicit authorization on its part, to have reversed the attitude of non-recognition taken by all League members who joined in sanctions. In any case the fact that Australia and the Irish Free State have already taken separate action and South Africa doubtless will very shortly, makes it impossible to adopt this interpretation.)

(2) Some advantage might be taken of some concrete issue arising between Italy and ourselves which could be made the occasion of a statement on our part. No such question has arisen, however, and further delay does not appear advisable.

(3) An informal communication might be sent the Consul-General of Italy. This, however, would not appear to be suitable in a matter of such formal importance.

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(4) The British Ambassador at Rome London might be requested to send a note to the Italian Foreign Office indicating Canada's recognition.

This seems about the only course open. A draft telegram is attached and also a draft press statement.

(See despatch WLMK to MALCOLM MACDONALD, Dec. 21, 1938) H.

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Press

(This is possibly the draft press statement referred by O.D. Skelton in his memo of Dec 21, 1938 herewith)

The question of recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia has been under consideration by members of the League of Nations and other countries for the past two years. Following action by a number of states in according de jure recognition, the Government of the United Kingdom placed the question on the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations in May, 1938. After discussion it was recorded that "the great majority of the members of the Council feel that it is for the individual members of the League to determine their attitude in the light of their own situation and their own obligations".

The United Kingdom accorded recognition last month through the presentation by His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome of new Letters of Credence accrediting him to the "King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia". A similar course was taken some months earlier on the presentation of Letters of Credence of the Irish Minister to Rome. The Australian Government has conveyed its recognition through a note from His Majesty's Ambassador, and the Government of the Union of South Africa has also indicated its approval of the granting of recognition. All the European Governments with the exception of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have accorded recognition.

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The Canadian Government has requested that His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome should notify the Government of Italy that His Majesty's Government in Canada recognize the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia.

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Even out Dec 20 C118191 File L-150 V.4(a)

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S.10

P.C. 3253

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File

C 118193

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 22nd DECEMBER 1938

PRIVY COUNCIL
CANADA

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 22nd December, 1938, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs representing that the question of recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia has been under consideration by members of the League of Nations and other countries during the past two years;

That during the proceedings of the Imperial Conference in 1937, members of the British Commonwealth represented in the Conference registered "their view that differences of political creed should be no obstacle to friendly relations between governments and countries, and that nothing would be more damaging to the hopes of international appeasement than the division, real or apparent, of the world into opposing groups", and that the view was further expressed in the course of the discussions that no objection should be taken if the presentation of new Letters of Credence in Rome should appear to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to be a contribution to European appeasement.

The Minister further represents that at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in May, 1938, it was recorded that "the great majority of the members of the Council feel that it is for the individual members of the League to determine

their/

The Right Honourable
the Prime Minister.

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their attitude in the light of their own situation and their own obligations".

The Minister has further ascertained that all European countries, with the exception of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have accorded de jure recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, and that as regards the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United Kingdom on November 16th accorded recognition through the presentation of new Letters of Credence for His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome, addressed to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, that the Government of Ireland took similar action some months previously, that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia has conveyed its recognition through His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, and that the Government of the Union of South Africa has indicated its approval of the granting of recognition.

The Minister also represents that, in the light of established facts, recognition would appear to serve the cause of peace more effectively than a continuance of the present anomalous situation, and proposes to request that a note be sent through His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome to the Government of Italy indicating that His Majesty's Government in Canada recognize the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for Your Excellency's approval.

E. J. Lemaire

Clerk of the Privy Council.

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A. D. P. Hees C118195 E. 300
1938

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: December 29th, 1938.

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. Euler as Postmaster General.

REMARKS:

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL:

ACTION TAKEN: Mr. Lemaire to prepare Orders-in-Council for Mr. Elliott's resignation and Mr. Euler's appointment as Postmaster General, for Council meeting when Mr. Euler is present.

A.D.P.H.

DISPOSED OF:

Lemaire to draft s.w.c's for resign of J.C.E. & appointment of E. for Council when Euler here

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J.W. PICKERSGILL TO T.A CRERAR

C118196 C-300 1938

Ottawa, September 17th, 1938.

FOR MR. CRERAR IN COUNCIL:

Mr. Elliott has indicated to the Prime Minister's Office that it is his wish that Mr. Euler should be re-appointed Acting Postmaster General. Mr. Elliott stated that he had communicated with Mr. Euler and with Mr. Howe who, during Mr. Euler's absence in Europe, replaced him as Acting Postmaster General, and that they have both agreed that Mr. Euler should be re-appointed.

J.W.P.

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(Keep attached to memo J.W.P. to T.A. Crerar, Sept 17, 1938 file)

C 118197

MR. CRERAR

FOR THE ~~PRIME MINISTER~~

FOR COUNCIL: September 20th, 1938.

SUBJECT: Acting Postmaster General,

REMARKS: Mr. Pickersgill's memorandum of September 17th re, attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL: September 20th, 1938.

ACTION TAKEN: Mr. Euler was reappointed Acting Postmaster General.

J.W.P.

DISPOSED OF:

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E. J. LEMAIRE
P.C.2337

118138

(Keep attached to memo of J.W.P. to T.A. CRERAR, Sept 17, 1938) 1938

PRIVY COUNCIL

CANADA

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Administrator on the 21 st SEPTEMBER 1938

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, advise that the Honourable W. D. Euler, Minister of Trade and Commerce, be appointed Acting Postmaster General, during the absence of the Postmaster General, vice the Honourable C. D. Howe.

Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Right Honourable
the Prime Minister.

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MEMORANDUM

The Government have been following closely the critical situation which has developed in Europe and the efforts that are being made to find a solution.

We have been informed by the Government of the United Kingdom of the general trend of the discussions between the signatories of the Locarno ~~Powers~~ Treaty, and of the action that has been taken from time to time, most of which has appeared in the press. Negotiations, as Members are aware, are still proceeding. They are of a difficult and delicate character and the situation is changing from day to day. Under these circumstances I do not think that any statement by the Canadian Government would be advisable. If at a later stage in the discussions questions arise which call for a presentation of the Canadian position, I shall be glad to make a statement in the House.

OTTAWA, March 23, 1936.

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C118200

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

FEBRUARY 23, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL
FUTURE RELEASE
NOTE DATE

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THE RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE

Address by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to the Council on Foreign Relations, Ritz Carlton Hotel, New York City, Thursday evening, February 25, at 7:15 o'clock.

It is with unusual satisfaction that I avail myself of this opportunity to review briefly the results and the significance of the Buenos Aires meeting. I welcome the opportunity especially, because to those who, like myself, were privileged to take an active part in the work of the Conference, the experience remains a vivid and inspiring memory.

The work of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace touched the very heart of the tangled complex of problems which today plague the responsible statesmen of the world and upon the solution of which depends so greatly the future welfare of the nations. The twenty-one American Republics have forged among themselves new ties of friendship and peace. More than that, they have, in my opinion, made a genuine contribution not only to the safeguarding of peace, but to the strengthening of democracy and of international order as well. While dealing with regional problems, the conference pointed straight at the frightful deterioration of many essential international relationships everywhere and vigorously proclaimed a basic program for their restoration.

I.

The Buenos Aires meeting was one of a succession of inter-American Conferences which have been, for nearly fifty years, a factor of ever-growing importance in the international life of

the

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the Western Hemisphere. There were, however, two features of outstanding importance which distinguished it from its predecessors and invested it with the character of a truly extraordinary occasion. The first of these was the subject-matter of the Conference itself, its all-embracing concentration upon the problem of safeguarding the maintenance of peace. The second was the dismal world setting in which the representatives of the American Republics assembled for their arduous and momentous labors.

The problem of peace was never absent from the thoughts of those statesmen who had in the past gathered together in major inter-American conferences. Step by step, foundations were laid for the organization of pacific relations.

A feeling of mutual trust, an attitude of the good neighbor, for some years have been steadily growing among the American Republics. I well recall how completely and how gratifyingly that accumulated feeling permeated the atmosphere of the Seventh International Conference of American States, held at Montevideo in 1933. More than any other factor, it was responsible for the constructive achievements which made that meeting a memorable occasion in the annals of American history.

But even there, opportunity was still lacking for a comprehensive effort to build a complete structure of enduring peace in the Western Hemisphere. It was primarily to launch this vast undertaking that the convocation of the Buenos Aires Conference was proposed by President Roosevelt in his letter, addressed on January 30, 1936, to the Chiefs of State of the other twenty American Republics.

President Roosevelt's proposal met with prompt, unanimous, and enthusiastic response. The character of the response and the readiness and vigor with which the American Republics engaged in the preparation of the proposed conference made it abundantly clear that the time was ripe for the effort which was in contemplation.

All of us had watched with increasing apprehension the swelling of the angry stream of recent events in world affairs. The tendency almost everywhere was steadily in the direction of international anarchy. Religion and morals, constituting the entire foundation of normal and worthwhile international relations and of civilized intercourse itself, were breached, and often flouted, with impunity. International or domestic strife was in progress in some parts of the world and in undisguised preparation in others. The construction of armaments was proceeding on a scale, unparalleled in history, and more and more nations were being drawn into the suicidal race - notwithstanding that the late world war and the recent world panic had not been liquidated.

The régime of international law was honored more in the breach than in the observance. Unilateral departure from treaties or, to put it more bluntly, the policy of breaking a given word - endangered the whole structure of international agreements.

Combined with this, economic policies were being evolved by various governments, supposedly for their individual advantage,

devised

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devised to restrict and confine trade and to burden commerce with almost medieval restrictions and discriminations. The resulting destruction and artificial diversion of trade were creating, among nations, animosities and resentment and were provoking economic aggression and retaliation. They were causing, within nations, acute economic distress, with declining standards of living and deepening dissatisfaction.

All these conditions and tendencies were breeding widespread unrest, were undermining governmental structures and impairing political stability. They were disrupting democratic institutions and, by correspondingly encouraging and strengthening autocratic rule, were hopelessly handicapping the forces of peace and international order.

All of us knew only too well the destruction and misery which the onrushing stream of all these discordant elements was leaving in its wake. All of us realized only too acutely the even more fearsome consequences that would emerge if the stream were to overflow and widespread military conflict were to engulf our entire civilization.

It was with a clear visualization constantly before them of these unprecedented difficulties and critical conditions that the responsible statesmen of the American Republics went to the Buenos Aires Conference.

II.

From the very first interchange of views among the delegates, it became manifest that all the American Republics are determined in their desire that peace prevail among them, as well as between each of them and the rest of the world. There was no mistaking the concerted will of the twenty-one nations for an effective renunciation of war as a means of policy and action and for the enthronement of peaceful means as the sole instrument for the adjustment of differences. As the work of the Conference progressed, this solidarity of purpose and unity of determination became more and more crystallized.

The whole Conference was not one in which rival governments sought exclusive national advantages or purposes. Instead, throughout, a similarity of thinking and of outlook demonstrated itself and made our meetings a truly joint effort for a mutually desired purpose. The Conference drew from all present a willing contribution towards a general result which corresponded to the underlying purpose of all.

This was the real condition that made possible a successful conference. This was the fact which explains why the major agreements were brought before the Conference as drafts supported and presented unanimously by the participating governments. What was sought and attained was not a diplomatic victory by any of the nations represented, but full understanding, friendly cooperation, and long-range planning.

Three main premises were accepted by all. The first was that the American hemisphere has a distinct and peculiar contribution to make, because no nation in it is driven by any compulsion or professes any right to threaten the peace of its neighbors. The second was that the only safety for all nations is loyal acceptance

of

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of a rule of law under which the integrity of every country, large or small, will be assured. The third was that renunciation of war and other similar declarations must be implemented by a method of action which can set into operation almost instantaneously the cooperative effort of the hemisphere in the direction of pacific settlements.

With this in mind, various proposals for implementation were advanced. But they swiftly merged into a single dominant idea: any threat to the maintenance of peace on this continent must lead to an immediate consultation between all of our governments with a view to seeking common policies and taking common measures which may end a conflict in progress, or prevent a conflict not yet begun.

It was out of these considerations that emerged the major treaties and agreements negotiated at the Conference. These instruments provide a complete consultative system. They are designed thus to bring into active cooperation all twenty-one governments whenever the peace of the hemisphere is menaced either from within or without, or whenever a sufficiently grave situation arises elsewhere in the world which may create a threat to the peace of the western world.

(more)

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III.

Of the numerous accords reached at Buenos Aires, there were three which, if universally ratified, will constitute an effective organization for the maintenance of peaceful and cordial relationships between the American Republics. These were:

First. THE CONVENTION TO COORDINATE, EXTEND AND ASSURE THE FULFILLMENT OF THE EXISTING TREATIES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN STATES. In this agreement, the American Governments reaffirm the obligations they had previously accepted in five international pacts and accords, (among which are the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1933). These comprise the obligation of the nations to settle, by pacific means, controversies of international character that may arise between them.

The nations furthermore agree to consult and cooperate to make available effective means of pacific settlement. They further pledge themselves that, while such consultation is in progress, the parties in dispute for a period of at least six months will not have recourse to hostilities or any military action whatever. And those American nations which may be involved in a controversy, likewise obligate themselves to report to the other American Governments the methods of pacific settlement which they select, as well as the progress made in the adjustment of their dispute.

Lastly, the agreement provides that in the event that, despite these pledges and arrangements, war should occur between any American Republics, the other American Republics will attempt through consultation to adopt, in their character as neutrals, a common and solidary attitude in order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities.

Second. THE CONVENTION FOR THE MAINTENANCE, PRESERVATION, AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. This agreement is based on the conviction expressed in its text, "that every war or threat of war affects directly or indirectly all civilized peoples and endangers the great principles of liberty and justice which constitute the American ideal and the standard of American international policy." In its five brief articles the various American Governments pledge themselves to consult with each other in three different types of circumstances which might threaten their peace. First, in the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced; second, in the event of war between American States; and third, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics.

I have faith in the usefulness of this prospective process of consultation. I believe that if and when crises of the kind envisaged should arise, the peoples of the American continent will demand of their governments

that

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that they find in consultation the means of avoiding or ending conflict.

In adhering to this agreement, the American Republics accept and demonstrate a joint concern for the "peace of the American Republics". This concern was also recognized and set forth in the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation adopted at the Conference which declares "that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation...". In this promise of concerted obligation small States will find assurance. The Government of the United States welcomes this action as completely in line with the historic concern which it has always had for the independence and territorial integrity of this hemisphere.

Third. THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL RELATIVE TO NON-INTERVENTION. This agreement reaffirms the convention signed at Montevideo in 1933 which embodies the fundamental principle that "no State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of others". In the continued reaffirmation of this principle and continued pledge of its observance, the American Republics see a guarantee of full equality and complete freedom to manage their own affairs.

What a boon to humanity it would be if other groups of nations were, at this crucial stage in world affairs, to give their plighted faith to a similar undertaking, — if they were, in a spirit of peace, unity and moral consecration, to re-assert and revitalize the law of nations, international morality and treaty obligations, and to pledge solemn observance of the doctrine of the equality, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the liberty of all nations.

IV.

In addition to the three accords just described, the Conference adopted a number of significant and far-reaching agreements and resolutions calculated to increase the flow of trade, to stimulate cultural interchange, and to improve the methods of communication.

There was general and emphatic agreement that all countries must work toward a system of freer economic interchange, so that the standards of living in the various countries may be gradually raised and the commercial necessities of each country adequately recognized, and that thereby the economic compulsions towards war and domestic strife may be removed. There was equally emphatic agreement that rising economic prosperity, resulting from growing and mutually beneficial international trade, is an essential condition for freedom and for the preservation and strengthening of democratic institutions, and that such institutions constitute a most effective peace insurance.

The Conference unanimously affirmed the necessity and desirability of lessening the present excessive obstacles

to

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to international trade and of conducting trade relations on principles which assure equality of treatment. It asserted the necessity of shaping governmental policy to the end that trade will not be diverted into artificial channels created by narrow and forced political arrangement, but will flow along lines of economic benefit. It recognized that trade should not be disrupted and handicapped by the discriminatory effects of various systems of control, clearing and compensation devices. The Conference recommended that these declarations of economic policy be followed by quick and vigorous action on the part of the American Republics. This liberal commercial policy should be the central point in the economic program of every nation.

By means of still other agreements and resolutions, the Conference perfected plans and arrangements for increasing the educational and cultural interchange between the American countries. These look towards a growing exchange of students and teachers between our various countries and a greater cooperation in scientific work. They aim to assure a steady, fuller, and better-proportioned movement of current news in this Hemisphere and a proper utilization of the facilities of the radio to spread a continuous picture of life throughout the continent. They are designed to promote deeper mutual understanding and to provide a broader basis for friendly relations founded upon a growing knowledge of, and respect for, each other's views and aspirations.

V.

These were the immediate results of the Conference. They represent far more than a mere beginning. The agreements and arrangements negotiated at Buenos Aires are interconnected segments of a structure of permanent peace in the process of creation.

In a world in which cynics scoff at all efforts to banish war, the twenty-one American Republics have boldly declared their determination to keep alive the spirit of peace. They have affirmed their trust in each other and their faith in the sacredness of treaty obligations. At Buenos Aires there was no cynical dismissal of the idea that a nation's pledged word is a valid obligation. There was a determination among these nations that their relations with each other should be conducted on the basis of friendly cooperation, of law and justice, and not by the rule of force.

At Buenos Aires the American nations, speaking through their governments, demonstrated their conviction that the maintenance of peace requires the re-establishment of profound respect for international law and a sincere concern for the higher principles of international relationship. It is my firm belief that the agreements, resolutions and

recommendations

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recommendations formulated and adopted at Buenos Aires represent an important step in the direction of the re-establishment and revitalization of international law.

This profession of faith in the desirability and possibility of a world organized for peace and advancing civilization, rather than for war and degrading savagery, is applicable not only to our Hemisphere but to all other parts of the world. In other regions external conditions may be different from those which prevail in the American continent. The agreements and arrangements adopted by the American Republics may not, in all their detail, meet the requirements of the other continents. But the principles underlying the instruments of peace forged at the Buenos Aires Conference are universal in their application. They, within themselves, constitute an appealing invitation to all nations to accept them without delay.

The right of each country to manage its own affairs free from outside interference; the principle of sovereignty and of equality of states, irrespective of size and strength; sincere respect for law and the pledged word as the foundation of an international order; friendly and cooperative effort to promote enduring peace, mutually advantageous economic intercourse based upon the rule of equal treatment, and mutually broadening and uplifting cultural relationships --all these are indispensable if the governments of the world are to fulfill the sacred trust involved in the task of planning and providing for the safety and welfare of their peoples.

The future of our entire civilization is bound up with the acceptance by all governments of these fundamental tenets of constructive statesmanship. The longer important nations delay their adoption, the graver will be the jeopardy into which all worthwhile international relationships will be plunged, and with them the welfare, the happiness and the civilized existence of all nations. A government which substitutes for these principles policies based upon extremes of national pride, ambition, aggrandizement and ever-increasing armaments, renders the greatest possible disservice not only to the world at large, but to its own people as well.

VI.

The issue which confronted the American Republics at the Conference, the issue which confronts today every nation of the earth is clear. In the portentous future which lies immediately ahead, will the nations move further in the direction of increasing distrust and suspicion, of destructive commercial policy, of growing economic antagonism, of unprecedented races in armaments, of the worst extremes of militarism - and thus inevitably plunge many

parts

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parts of the world either into a military catastrophe or a crushing economic collapse? Or will the nations, as at Buenos Aires, embrace a program of understanding and trust, of friendly and peaceful relations, of fair-dealing and cooperative effort for the restoration of conditions of economic well-being?

So far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the answer has thus been given. Our own country is prepared to do its full part to bring it about that, on the basis of the arrangements reached at Buenos Aires, the nations of this continent will order their lives upon a sane balance of national freedom and practical international cooperation. We are confident that our sister republics will act likewise.

If we succeed, this will remain a healthy and hopeful Hemisphere. And its twenty-one nations, with their quarter of a billion inhabitants, freed by their common action from the dread and scourge of war, should be able to encourage and, to the extent consistent with their traditional policies, cooperate with other nations to surmount their difficulties by similar methods.

There is every reason to believe that friends of peace, all over the world, hitherto laboring under the utmost discouragement, have taken increased hope from what was said and done at Buenos Aires. It is not too much to say that the acts and utterances of the Conference are at once a challenge to the statesmanship of the world and a heartening symbol to the peoples of all nations.

I cannot believe that it is beyond the power of the statesmen of today to check and reverse the drift toward international anarchy, in the direction of which some parts of the world find themselves moving. The work of the recent Conference proves, in my judgment, that no part of the world needs to reconcile itself fatalistically to the inevitability of war. Upon the same basic principles that were implemented at Buenos Aires, the entire world can -- and, I hope with all my heart, <u>will</u> -- build a structure of enduring peace.

3

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THE CANADIAN PRESS

J. F. B. LIVESAY, *General Manager and Secretary*

R. K. CARNEGIE, *Superintendent*,
Citizen Building, OTTAWA, Canada

May 22, 1937

Mr. Mackenzie King:

Mr. Henry asked that we send these copies of our European coverage tonight to Laurier House. He will call you later about them.

Fulford
Night Editor

Left by Messenger Laurier House 10 pm.
read 10,10 - 10-40
May 22-38

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95 LEAD CZECH

BY WADE WERNER

ASSOCIATED PRESS FOREIGN STAFF

PRAHA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MAY 22-(AP)-CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S MILITANT GERMAN MINORITY TONIGHT REFUSED AGAIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OVER AUTONOMY DEMANDS THAT RAISED EUROPE'S TEMPERATURE AND BROUGHT NEARLY 500,000 CZECH TROOPS TO GUARD THE 1,300 MILE FRONTIER FACING GERMANY DURING TENSE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

THE SUDETEN GERMAN PARTY, SUPPORTED BY CHANCELLOR HITLER OF GERMANY, ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE IN THIS CZECH CAPITAL DECLINING ANY NEGOTIATIONS "UNDER THE EXISTING UNCONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION."

IT ACCUSED THE CZECH GOVERNMENT OF THROWING TROOPS INTO THE SUDETEN GERMAN REGIONS "ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST EVIDENCE ANY REVOLT WAS IN PREPARATION THERE."

USE OF TROOPS WAS CALLED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

THIS NEW REFUSAL TO ARBITRATE DID NOTHING TO ALLAY TENSION THAT SPREAD TO ALL EUROPE'S CAPITALS AS FEAR WAS EXPRESSED NAZI SUPPORT OF THE GERMAN MINORITY DEMANDS MIGHT PROVOKE CONFLICT.

MORE635P

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NU3O XX CONFLICT. C 118211

THE ELECTIONS PASSED QUIETLY WITH NO REPETITION OF DISORDERS IN WHICH TWO GERMANS WERE KILLED EARLY SATURDAY, BUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA PARTICULARLY WATCHED THE FRONTIER OF GERMANY WHOSE FUEHRER HAS PROCLAIMED HIMSELF THE PROTECTOR OF ALL GERMANS EVEN OUTSIDE HIS NATION.

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN XX PICKING UP THIRD BOH FREY.

JM638P

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95 NITE LEAD CZECH

BY HADE WERNER

ASSOCIATED PRESS FOREIGN STAFF

C 118212

PRAHA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MAY 22-(AP)-CZECHOSLOVAKIA GUARDED HER FRONTIER TODAY WITH HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS WITH HER EYES FOCUSED ON GERMANY AS THE DEMANDING GERMAN MINORITY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TESTED ITS STRENGTH IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

THE COUNTRY WAS ALERT ON THE 1,300-MILE STRETCH OF BORDER WITH GREATER GERMANY WHOSE CHIEF, ADOLF HITLER, HAS PROCLAIMED HIMSELF PROTECTOR OF GERMANS EVEN OUTSIDE HIS NATION.

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, REITERATING THE WARNING CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S BOUNDARIES WOULD BE DEFENDED WITH IRON DETERMINATION AGAINST ALL ODDS, SAID THEY SAW A RELAXATION OF TENSION SINCE SATURDAY.

"THIS EMERGENCY WILL PASS OFF PEACEFULLY," ONE OFFICIAL SAID.

THE CABINET'S POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSED THE SITUATIONS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND OF THE 3,500,000 SUDETEN GERMANS CLAMORING FOR AUTONOMY AND OTHER CONCESSIONS.

MORE514P

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NUS XX CONCESSIONS. LATER, PREMIER MILAN HODZA RECEIVED THREE SUDETEN GERMAN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN THE HOPE OF CREATING A MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE PROPOSED NATIONALITIES' STATUTE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HOPES WILL SATISFY MINORITY DEMANDS.

THE POLLS IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS CLOSED AT 4 P.M. (10 A.M. EDT) AFTER QUIET BALLOTING. TODAY'S ELECTIONS WERE THE FIRST OF THREE IN WHICH APPROXIMATELY 7,000,000 CITIZENS OF THIS WAR-CREATED REPUBLIC WILL VOTE FOR NEW COMMUNAL REPRESENTATIVES.

ONLY A FEW TOWNS WITH LARGE GERMAN POPULATIONS VOTED TODAY OUT OF THE TOTAL OF 1,500 COMMUNITIES. THEY INCLUDED THE BOHEMIAN COMMUNITIES OF BOEHMISCH-LEIPA, LEITMAERITZ, AUSSIG AND TESCHEN. IN NEXT SUNDAY'S BALLOTING AND ON JUNE 12 AN AGGREGATE OF 8,500 ADDITIONAL COMMUNITIES WILL VOTE.

THE APPEARANCE OF ANY SORT OF A PLEBISCITE THUS WILL BE AVOIDED AND KONRAD HENLEIN, LEADER OF THE NATION'S SUDETEN GERMAN MINORITY, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE ANY COMPLETE FIGURES ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF HIS FOLLOWERS UNTIL MID-JUNE.

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NUG XX MID-JUNE.

C 118214

VOTING IS COMPULSORY--WITH NON-VOTERS SUBJECT TO FINES--FOR MEN AND WOMEN OVER 21. THE AGED AND ILL ARE AMONG CITIZENS EXEMPTED.

FIRST ELECTION RETURNS--IN AUSSIG--SHOWED THE SUDETEN GERMANS POLLED 19,874 OUT OF A TOTAL OF 28,292 VOTES CAST. THEY POLLED 17,832 VOTES IN THE 1935 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS THERE.

(EDS: 6TH PARA READ XX AT 4 P.M. (11 A.M.EDT)
(NOT ("10 A.M.EDT)") (SOURCE)

MORE 3M519P

NAT CIN 8 BKLYN 3

95 NITE LEAD MEXICAN (NEW)

MEXICO CITY, MAY 22-(AP)-THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, DETERMINED TO SMASH A RIGHTIST REBELLION IN SAN LUIS POTOSI STATE BEFORE IT FLARES INTO CIVIL WAR, REINFORCED ITS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION TODAY AND MAPPED A CAVALRY MOP-UP OF SATURNINO CEDILLO'S PEASANT ARMY.

MORE521P

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NWO 3/2

AND PRAHA NITE LEAD CZECH XX ELECTIONS THERE.

C118215

SEVENTY THOUSAND MEN—ONE CLASS OF RESERVES AND SECONDARY RESERVES—WERE CALLED TO THE COLORS SATURDAY AND THE FRONTIER STRENGTHENED AFTER TWO SUDETEN GERMANS WERE KILLED BY BORDER GUARDS.

NOVEMBER

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NUTO XX GUARDS.

THESE RESERVES, TOGETHER WITH AN UNDISCLOSED NUMBER OF TECHNICAL TROOPS AND THE ARMY OF 190,000 SOLDIERS, GAVE THE NATION AN ESTIMATED TOTAL OF NEARLY 500,000 MEN UNDER ARMS.

WHILE THE PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS DESCRIBED AS PRIMARILY FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER--ESPECIALLY IN SUDETEN GERMAN DISTRICTS--IT WAS NOTED MANY TANKS AND OTHER HEAVY MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT ROLLED TOWARD THE BORDER SATURDAY AND TODAY.

AUTHORITIES INSISTED THE FRONTIER HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED TO TRAFFIC--THAT TRAVELERS COULD PASS FREELY IN EVERY DIRECTION. IT WAS SUGGESTED THE BASIS FOR FREQUENT REPORTS THAT BORDERS HAD BEEN CLOSED WAS THE FACT MINOR ROADS IN A NUMBER OF PLACES--PARTICULARLY THOSE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE--WERE BLOCKED. BORDER AUTHORITIES REGULATED MOVEMENTS OF CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS FAR MORE STRICTLY THAN FOREIGN TOURISTS.

GOVERNMENT OFFICES AS WELL AS FOREIGN LEGATIONS IN PRAHA WERE STAFFED AS FOR A WEEKDAY AS DIPLOMATS KEPT ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS.

MORE535P

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NUMBER XX DEVELOPMENTS. SOME OBSERVERS POINTED OUT THAT WHILE OFFICIAL CIRCLES FELT "THE WORST IS OVER--AT LEAST FOR THIS WEEK-END" THE CONTINUANCE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS MAINTAINED AN EXPLOSIVE SITUATION WHICH POSSIBLY COULD BE TURNED INTO A CATASTROPHE BY A SINGLE BORDER INCIDENT.

IT WAS ADMITTED FRANKLY IN OFFICIAL QUARTERS THAT THE COUNTRY'S SOLDIERS WERE READY ON OR NEAR ALL BORDERS--ESPECIALLY THE GERMAN BORDER. INTERNATIONAL ANXIETY HAD BEEN AROUSED BY MOVEMENTS TOWARD THE CZECHOSLOVAK BORDER OF GERMAN TROOPS.

ON THE INNER SIDE OF THE HORSESHOE FRONTIER BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS LIES THE MAIN BULK OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S 3,500,000 GERMAN MINORITY.

THE CABINET SATURDAY NIGHT WAS CLOSETED WITH PRESIDENT EDUARD BENES UNTIL MIDNIGHT. AFTERWARDS THE CABINET CONTINUED ITS DELIBERATIONS UNTIL DAWN.

FOREIGN MINISTER KAMIL KROFTA MEANWHILE WAS VISITED BY THE BRITISH, FRENCH, GERMAN AND POLISH MINISTERS AND EXPLAINED TO THEM THE PURPOSE OF CALLING OUT RESERVES. THE POLISH MINISTER ASKED PARTICULARLY ABOUT A CONCENTRATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK TROOPS ON THE POLISH BORDER.

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NU12 XX BORDER.

ROFTA WAS UNDERSTOOD TO

C 118218

KROFTA WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE TOLD HIM THE SOLDIERS WERE CONCENTRATED ONLY ON A 30-MILE STRETCH OF THE POLISH BORDER NEAREST GERMANY--IN OTHER WORDS, A PRECAUTIONARY STRENGTHENING NOT EXTENDING OVER THE WHOLE FRONTIER FACING POLAND.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS MODERN FORTIFICATIONS ALONG HER FRONTIER WITH GERMANY BUT IN THE SOUTH, ADJOINING AUSTRIA WHICH GERMANY ANNEXED MARCH 13, HER DEFENCES ARE RELATIVELY WEAK.

UP TO NOON TODAY (7 A.M.EDT) RAILWAY TRAFFIC ACROSS THE HUNGARIAN BORDER WAS NORMAL ALTHOUGH THE NIGHT TRAIN FROM BUDAPEST WAS DELAYED MORE THAN AN HOUR AT THE FRONTIER BEFORE RECEIVING THE SIGNAL TO BROCEED. TRAVELLERS BUYING TICKETS IN PRAHA WERE ASSURED THEY COULD CROSS ANY BORDER BY RAIL.

THERE WERE FEW EVIDENCES OF THE REINFORCING OF THE ARMY IN PRAHA. MANY THOUSANDS OF AUTOMOBILES AND TRUCKS WERE COMMANDEERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY SATURDAY BUT THEY HEADED TOWARD BORDER DISTRICTS.

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C 118219

XXX DISTRICTS.

IN THE CAPITAL ITSELF A FEW SOLDIERS WERE SEEN AND ONLY OCCASIONALLY A FEW ARMY TRUCKS LOADED WITH SUPPLIES. ALTHOUGH THE SKY WAS GLOOMY AND THERE WERE OCCASIONAL LIGHT SHOWERS, PRAHA CITIZENS PLACIDLY ENJOYED USUAL SUNDAY STROLLS.

AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE THE SITUATION WAS DESCRIBED AS UNCHANGED FROM SATURDAY. SOME OFFICIALS PROFESSED TO BE MORE OPTIMISTIC. THE CONVICTION EXPRESSED IN SOME CIRCLES WAS THAT HITLER KNEW FULL WELL THE CZECHOSLOVAKS WOULD FIGHT TO DEFEND THE INTEGRITY OF THEIR BOUNDARIES AND THEREFORE HE WOULD NOT PRECIPITATE A CONFLICT LIKELY TO INVOLVE ALL EUROPE.

SO FAR AS THE SUDETEN GERMANS ARE CONCERNED, IT WAS STATED THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY COULD HANDLE THEM. IF GERMAN TROOPS SHOULD CROSS THE FRONTIER, PERSONS CLOSE TO THE GOVERNMENT SAID THE CZECHOSLOVAKS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW TO A LINE OUTSIDE OF THE SUDETEN GERMAN DISTRICT BORDERING GERMANY BUT WOULD ATTEMPT TO FIGHT OUT THE CONFLICT ON TERRITORY WHERE THE MINORITY GERMANS ARE CONCENTRATED. JM544P

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NW16

C 118220

95 NITE LEAD GERMAN (NEW)

BERLIN, MAY 22-(CP)-THE INSPIRED GERMAN PRESS CONTINUED TODAY TO EXPRESS ITS WRATH OVER WHAT IT CALLED "OUTRAGES" BY CZECHOSLOVAKS AGAINST SUDETEN GERMANS IN THE NEIGHBORING REPUBLIC.

OFFICIALS KEPT THEIR VIEWS TO THEMSELVES BUT FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WERE REPRESENTED AS FEELING MORE OPTIMISTIC OVER THE TENSE SITUATION WHICH DEVELOPED OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S MINORITY DIFFICULTIES.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY INSTRUCTED MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COLONY IT WAS "UNNECESSARY" FOR ANYONE TO LEAVE GERMANY. THIS WORD WENT OUT AFTER A GROUP OF BETWEEN 30 AND 40 WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ALARMED OVER THE CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION, MADE PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TODAY.

A SPECIAL RAILROAD CAR HAD BEEN CHARTERED TO TAKE THE GROUP OUT OF GERMANY BUT THE RESERVATIONS WERE CANCELLED AFTER THE EMBASSY'S ASSURANCES.

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NMRT XX ASSURANCES.

C 118221

REICHFUEHRER ADOLF HITLER TURNED THE FIRST SPADE OF DIRT FOR A NEW SUBWAY PROJECT IN MUNICH AND IN A BRIEF TALK GAVE NO HINT OF WHAT HE HAD IN MIND REGARDING THE SUDETEN GERMAN FERMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

KONRAD HENLEIN, LEADER OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HAS REPORTED TO HAVE VISITED HITLER AT BERCHTESGADEN WITHIN THE LAST TWO DAYS--BUT THIS REMAINED UNVERIFIED.

~~UNCONFIRMED REPORTS HERE DECLARED A LARGE~~ ETC PICKING UP ADD SENT PREVIOUSLY.

~~JAEGER~~

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AND BERLIN NITE LEAD GERMAN XX UNVERIFIED.

UNCONFIRMED REPORTS HERE DECLARED A LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY LEADERS GATHERED AT BERCHTESGADEN TONIGHT TO CONFER WITH CHANCELLOR HITLER.

NO CONFIRMATION WAS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE OF SUCH A MEETING. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER JOACHIN VON RIBBENTROP HAD LEFT BERLIN FOR A CONFERENCE WITH THE FUEHRER AT HIS BAVARIAN MOUNTAIN RETREAT.

THE WESTDEUTSCHER BEOBACHTER, NATIONAL SOCIALIST (NAZI) PARTY ORGAN, DECLARED:-

"FROM THE PEOPLE'S POINT OF VIEW, AS THE FUEHRER HAS PROCLAIMED, IT IS INSUFFERABLE THAT GERMAN PEOPLE ON OUR BOUNDARIES ARE EXPOSED TO PERSECUTION AND HUMILIATION FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR GERMANDOM IN THEIR AVOWAL OF GERMAN WELTANSCHAUUNG (WORLD PHILOSOPHY).

"WHEN A CZECH GENDARME THRASHES A SUDETEN GERMAN, THEN HE THRASHES A NATIONAL OF GREATER GERMANY.

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NAZI XX GERMANY. WHEN A SUDETEN GERMAN IS PERSECUTED FOR THE SAKE OF HIS NATIONAL SOCIALISTIC WELTANSCHAUUNG, THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OF THE GERMAN NATION AND GREATER GERMANY IS PERSECUTED WITH HIM.

"BOTH CONDITIONS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT REACTION ON NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS. AS LONG AS THE CZECHS REGARD IT THEIR HISTORICAL TASK TO BE A MORTAL ENEMY OF GERMANS THEY ARE A LASTING DANGER."

THE NEWSPAPER SAID IT WAS LOGICAL THAT HENLEIN SHOULD SEEK A CHANGE IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY---FOR CLOSER CO-OPERATION WITH GERMANY AND BREAKING OF TIES WITH SOVIET RUSSIA WITH WHICH CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS A MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY.

IT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THE TIME WOULD COME WHEN THE CZECHO-SLOVAK PEOPLE "WILL ONCE MORE REALIZE ITS PLACE IS WHERE IT HAS BEEN FOR CENTURIES, NAMELY, SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND THE GERMAN REICH."

JM530P

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OPPONENTS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO WRITE IN A VARIATION OF HAGE SCALES FOR WORKERS IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN INDUSTRIES, BUT EVEN THEY WERE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR CHANCES.

UNSOP

AMU NEW YORK THREE CLEVELAND EIGHT

ADD BERLIN NITE LEAD GERMAN XX REICH."

THE OFFICIAL GERMAN NEWS AGENCY, D.N.B., REPORTED A BORDER INCIDENT OF SATURDAY. IT STATED A SQUAD OF CZECHOSLOVAK SOLDIERS CROSSED THE FRONTIER, CARRYING EXPLOSIVES, AND HAD IT SET IN PLACE UNDER A BRIDGE BEFORE GERMAN BORDER GUARDS DROVE THEM OFF.

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NUSD XX OFF.

HITLER IN HIS MUNICH SPEECH SAID PROJECTS SUCH AS THE SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION "ARE POSSIBLE BECAUSE BEHIND US STANDS THE FORCE OF A PEOPLE OF 75,000,000 MEN. IT IS NOT MUNICH WHICH IS BUILDING THIS SUBWAY, IT IS ALL GERMANY, TO WHICH WE ARE DEVOTED BODY AND SOUL."

OFFICIAL CIRCLES SAID BRITISH AMBASSADOR SIR NEVILE HENDERSON CALLED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE SATURDAY NIGHT FOR THE THIRD TIME IN TWO DAYS TO EXPRESS BRITAIN'S UNEASINESS. RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATED FOREIGN MINISTER VON RIBBENTROP TOLD SIR NEVILE THAT IF "GERMAN BLOOD FLOWED" ON CZECHOSLOVAK SOIL, GERMANY WOULD ACT "WITH THE SPEED OF LIGHTNING."

FIELD MARSHAL HERMANN GOERING'S NEWSPAPER ISSUED A "LAST AND URGENT APPEAL" SATURDAY NIGHT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO GRANT AT ONCE THE DEMANDS OF ITS GERMAN MINORITY.

THE DEMAND, PRINTED IN THE SUNDAY EDITION OF THE ESSEN NATIONAL ZEITUNG, ORGAN OF THE NUMBER TWO NAZI LEADER, CAME IN THE MIDST OF THE WEEKEND TENSION THAT FOLLOWED THE KILLING OF TWO SUDETEN GERMANS.

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NU40 XX GERMANS.

C118226

"THE GERMAN REICH (REALM), WHICH AS THE ONLY BIG POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE BEARS THE SUPREME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD X X X IS VIEWING RESULTS OF THE PRAHA CATASTROPHE WITH THE GREATEST SORROW AND DEEP CONCERN," GOERING'S PAPER SAID.

IT WAS STATED THAT NO OFFICIAL STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED IN ANSWER TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ACTION IN CALLING TO THE COLORS ONE CLASS OF ARMY RESERVES.

A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, SAID "GREATEST ASTONISHMENT" PREVAILED IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES THAT THE CZECH GOVERNMENT HAD THOUGHT THE MOMENT OPPORTUNE TO CALL IN RESERVES TO INSTRUCT THEM IN THE USE OF NEW WEAPONS.

IN A DISPATCH UNDER A BRNO DATELINE, THE NEWSPAPER DER ANGRIFF ASSERTED: "IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND DOUBT THAT FOUR CLASSES OF YOUNG RESERVES HAVE BEEN CALLED IN AND RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO DEPART FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE GARRISONS IMMEDIATELY."

(IN PRAHA IT WAS ANNOUNCED ONE CLASS OF RESERVES WAS CALLED TO THE COLORS.)

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NW41 XX COLORS.)

C 118227

THE BERLIN PRESS SATURDAY PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED REPORTS OF DISTURBANCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIAN COMMUNITIES IN WHICH SEVERAL HUNDRED SUDETEN GERMANS WERE STATED TO HAVE BEEN INJURED.

EDITIONS CARRIED HEADLINES SUCH AS: "PRAHA, WHERE DO YOU GO?" "UNBEARABLE CHALLENGES" AND "CZECH PROVOCATION CREATES SERIOUS SITUATION."

THE GENERAL TONE OF EDITORIALS AND ACCOUNTS IN THE GERMAN PRESS ECHOED THE FREQUENTLY VOICED SENTIMENT OF CHANCELLOR HITLER THAT HE WOULD NOT STAND IDLY BY IF GERMAN BLOOD WERE SPILLED.

SUNDAY'S BERLINER TAGEBLATT IN GLARING FRONT PAGE ACCOUNTS TOLD OF "STRONG TROOP MOVEMENTS IN SUDETEN GERMAN TERRITORY," THE AREA IN WHICH CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S GERMANS LIVE.

EDITORIALLY IT CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRAHA GOVERNMENT THAT "THE HOUR IS SERIOUS. RESPONSIBILITY WHICH PRAHA STATESMEN HAVE TAKEN ON THEIR SHOULDERS IS GIGANTIC. THE FIRST VICTIMS OF THE FALSE POLICY HAVE FALLEN."

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NW42 XX FALLEN."

DISCUSSING DISTURBANCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IT STATED CZECH BOLICE AND SOLDIERS AT KOMOTAU AND EGER HAD DONE THEIR COUNTRY A BAD SERVICE "THROUGH WHICH A SITUATION WAS CREATED, THE SERIOUSNESS OF WHICH CAN NOT EVEN BE OVERLOOKED BY THE CZECH GOVERNMENT."

THE DEUTSCHE DIENST, A SUPPLEMENTAL NEWS SERVICE, IN A STATEMENT RELEASED THROUGH DEUTSCHES NACHRICHTENBUERO, OFFICIAL GERMAN NEWS AGENCY, DECLARED THE OFFICIAL CZECH VERSION OF THE KILLING OF TWO GERMANS AT CHEB WAS "BASELESS LYING."

THE CZECH GOVERNMENT HAD SAID THE TWO MEN HAD FAILED TO HALT AT THE COMMAND OF BORDER GUARDS.

THE DEUTSCHE DIENST STATEMENT SAID THAT AN "ENDLESS MANHUNT FOR GERMANS" HAD BECOME "SPORT FOR CZECH POLICE."

DER ANGRIFF, ORGAN OF DR.PAUL JOSEPSH GOEBBELS, MINISTER OF PROPAGANDA, ISSUED A SPECIAL EDITION IN WHICH IT BANNERED DISPATCHES FROM PRAHA:

"PRAHA NO LONGER IS MASTER OF THE SITUATION."

JM714P

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NU14 THI1 (1,000)

C 118229

NITE LEAD ANGLO-CZECH (NEW)

BY GEORGE HAMBLETON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MAY 22-(CP CABLE)-ALL THROUGH AN ANXIOUS WEEKEND GREAT BRITAIN WORKED STRENUOUSLY IN BOTH BERLIN AND PRAHA FOR PEACE. THE SITUATION WAS A LITTLE QUIETER TONIGHT BUT IN THE VIEW OF A HIGH BRITISH AUTHORITY IT STILL REMAINS EXTREMELY CRITICAL.

THE FULL CABINET MET IN EMERGENCY SESSION FOR AN HOUR FOR THE REPORTED PURPOSE OF PUTTING THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT BEHIND FRANCO-BRITISH MOVES TO BLOCK A GERMAN MARCH INTO CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN, WHO LEFT LONDON ON FRIDAY TO SPEND THE WEEKENDED WITH FRIENDS, DECIDED AT 10:30 P.M. SATURDAY TO SUMMON THE URGENT MEETING OF THE CABINET.

THE USUAL CURIOUS CROWDS GATHERED IN DOWNING STREET AS THE CABINET MEMBERS, WITH ANXIOUS FACES, APPEARED THIS AFTERNOON.

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NUGS XX AFTERNOON. THE MEETING WAS SUMMONED, HOWEVER, C118230
NOT WITH A VIEW TO TAKING GRAVE DECISIONS OF POLICY BUT TO LEARN THE FACTS FROM VISCOUNT HALIFAX, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

DURING MOST OF THE SESSION, IT IS UNDERSTOOD, THE CABINET REVIEWED INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY LORD HALIFAX. THIS INFORMATION REVEALED THE SITUATION IS SO CONFUSED AS TO MAKE DETERMINATION OF THE EXACT TRUTH EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

HOWEVER, TENSION HERE DECREASED HOURLY WITH THE GROWING CONVICTION THAT BRITISH-FRENCH "STOP SIGNS" HAD TURNED HITLER TO A BLOODLESS COURSE TO GET WHAT HE WANTS FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S 3,500,000 SUDETEN GERMANS.

ASSERTIONS AND DENIALS OF FRONTIER INCIDENTS CAME FROM BOTH BERLIN AND PRAHA. REPORTS DIFFERED IN REGARD TO THE RELATIVE TIMING OF TROOP MOVEMENTS.

IN HER ROLE OF PEACEMAKER, BRITAIN TAKES THE GROUND IT WOULD BE UNPROFITABLE AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE TO ATTEMPT TO APPORTION BLAME. THE FIRST STEP MUST BE TO TRY TO SECURE A CALMER ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT CAN BEGIN BETWEEN KONRAD HENLEIN, LEADER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S SUDETEN GERMAN MINORITY, AND THE CZECH GOVERNMENT.

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ADD LONDON NITE LEAD ANGLO-CZECH XXX GOVERNMENT.

C 118231

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTED MANY PEOPLE BELIEVED MR. CHAMBERLAIN HAD INFORMED CHANCELLOR HITLER, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED GERMANY WAS TRYING TO INTIMIDATE CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH AN IMPLIED THREAT OF ARMED INVASION AND THAT BRITAIN COULD NOT BE COUNTED OUT OF ANY ARMED CONFLICT THAT MIGHT ENSUE.

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NU18 XX ENSUE.

C 118232

FRANCE REAFFIRMED HER PLEDGE TO HELP CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE UTMOST, UNDER THEIR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT, IF GERMANY MARCHED TO THE EAST. BOUND BY NO SUCH TREATY, SOME WEEKS AGO BRITAIN REFUSED THE PRAHA GOVERNMENT A SIMILAR PRIOR PLEDGE OF IMMEDIATE AID, BUT INFORMED QUARTERS TOOK PAINS TO RECALL PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS MARCH 24, WHEN HE SAID:-

"IF WAR BROKE OUT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHERE IT WOULD END AND WHAT GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF TWO COUNTRIES LIKE GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE."

INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO BRITAIN'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AT BERLIN AND PRAHA WERE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT FOR SETTLEMENT. IN PRAHA THE BRITISH MINISTER, BASIL C.NEWTON, WAS INSTRUCTED TO IMPRESS ON THE CZECH GOVERNMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING INCIDENTS AND TO URGE THE NEED OF A FORWAD STEP TOWARDS A

INCIDENTS AND TO URGE THE NEED OF A FORWARD STEP TOWARDS A

REAL SETTLEMENT.

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C 118233

XXX SETTLEMENT.

IN BERLIN SIR NEVILE HENDERSON, BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WAS INSTRUCTED TO URGE THE IMPORTANCE OF PATIENCE AND MODERATION IN PRESS CIRCLES. REPORTS RECEIVED IN LONDON TONIGHT INDICATE THE GERMAN PRESS IS ALREADY TAKING A CALMER ATTITUDE.

IT IS SUGGESTED HERE THAT ARBITRATION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA MIGHT BE INVOKVED. BUT GERMANY, IT IS THOUGHT, MAY TAKE THE GROUND THE FRONTIER INCIDENTS HAVE ALREADY RULED OUT ARBITRATION.

IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT TOMORROW THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION.

THE AFTERNOON CABINET SESSION FOLLOWED A WEEKEND OF INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. BOTH ROGER CAMBON, COUNSELLOR OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY, AND DR.HERBERT VON DIRKSEN, THE NEW GERMAN AMBASSADOR, HAD LONG TALKS WITH SIR JOHN SIMON, CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, AND LORD HALIFAX. CHARLES CORBIN, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, RETURNED TO LONDON FROM LEEDS DURING THE AFTERNOON.

MORE605B

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(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

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CANADA

NM20 AMN WASHN 2 CHGO 9

XX AFTERNOON.

ALL 22 MEMBERS OF THE CABINET ATTENDED THE SPECIAL MEETING, ONE OF THE RARE SUNDAY SESSIONS. IN THE PAST 12 YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY SIX SUCH MEETINGS SUMMONED.

PARIS, BERLIN AND PRAHA ALL TONIGHT REPORTED SOME EASING IN THE SITUATION. THE PARIS PRESS PAID TRIBUTE TO REPRESENTATIONS BY SIR NEVILE HENDERSON TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE.

FRENCH PAPERS EMPHASIZE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS ARE AT ONE IN THEIR EFFORTS FOR PEACE. "OUR GOVERNMENT IS UNSPARING IN ITS EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE INCIDENTS FROM LEADING TO CONFLICT," SAYS THE PETIT PARISIEN (INDEPENDENT). "WHILE BRITAIN SHOWERS COUNSELS OF MODERATION ON BERLIN, FRANCE IS EXHORTING CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A FRIENDLY NATION, TO PRUDENCE."

THE PRAHA CORRESPONDENT OF THE PARIS JOURNAL (RIGHTIST) OBSERVED THAT IT IS NOT CHANCELLOR HITLER'S PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA BUT TO OBTAIN ADVANTAGES FOR THE GERMAN MINORITIES BY MEANS OF MAXIMUM MILITARY PRESSURE.

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THE BERLIN CORRESPONDENT OF THE SAME PAPER POINTED OUT THAT NEWS OF THE NEW BRITISH DEMARCHE TO WHICH GERMAN TROOP MOVEMENTS GAVE RISE HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED IN GERMANY.

BERLIN DESPATCHES STATE "A SLIGHT DETENTE" OCCURRED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

IT IS FELT IN PRAHA THE SITUATION IS EASIER AS A RESULT OF BRITISH DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. PRAHA WAS QUIET EVEN FOR A SUNDAY. INTERMITTENT SHOWERS KEPT CROWDS OFF THE STREETS. RESERVISTS OF THE 1898 CLASS, CALLED TO THE COLORS BY SATURDAY'S ORDER, TRICKLED INTO THE CAPITAL WITH BUNDLES ON THEIR SHOULDERS.

AUTHORITATIVE CZECH QUARTERS STATE NO FURTHER MILITARY MEASURES ARE CONTEMPLATED. THOSE ALREADY TAKEN, IT IS FELT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER.

DR.KAMIL KROFTA, CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER, ASSURED THE HUNGARIAN AND POLISH MINISTERS THE TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST EITHER HUNGARY OR POLAND.

CZECH RADIO STATIONS REPORTED TODAY'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT IN AN ORDERLY MANNER.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS, HOWEVER, CLAIMED NEW INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED OUTSIDE PRAHA. JM613P

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NU54

C 118236

95 LEAD CZECH

PARIS, MAY 22-(CP)-THE OFFICIAL FRENCH SPOKESMAN TONIGHT ASSERTED FRANCE WOULD MOBILIZE IN THE EVENT OF ANY GERMAN AGGRESSION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HER MID-EUROPEAN ALLY WHOSE INTEGRITY SHE HAS PLEDGED TO PROTECT.

RELIEF WAS FELT HERE AT ABSENCE OF NEW OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE FAILURE OF GERMANY TO MAKE ANY MOVE AGAINST HER NEIGHBOR.

THE SPOKESMAN INDICATED THE FRENCH BELIEF THAT THE PRESENT EXCITEMENT OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS DUE LARGELY TO NAZI TUB-THUMPING TO ROUND UP VOTES IN THE CZECH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

BOTH FRENCH OBSERVERS AND SEMI-OFFICIAL SOURCES, HOWEVER, DECLARED THE ANGLO-FRENCH BLOC HAD "RETREATED FAR ENOUGH" AND WOULD TAKE ACTION IN CASE OF ANY GERMAN MOVE AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

FRENCH STATESMEN WATCHED MID-EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY, KEEPING IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH LONDON.

MORE843P

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NUSS AMN PHILA 8 STL 5

C 118237

XX LONDON.

PREMIER EDOUARD DALADIER REMAINED IN HIS OFFICE IN THE WAR MINISTRY WHERE HE TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGES BONNET.

THE FRENCH VIEW OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN QUESTION WAS THAT IT WAS UP TO FRANCE ALONE TO DECIDE WHEN AND IF TO GO TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S AID IN CASE OF TROUBLE. SOVIET RUSSIA IS PLEDGED TO FOLLOW FRANCE IF SHE BACKS UP THE CZECHS WITH MILITARY SUPPORT.

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY XX PICKING UP SECOND PGH.

JM74 P

CORRECTION

IN NEW YORK SATURDAY INTERNATIONAL BALL SECOND PARA READ XX MAPLE LEAFS SCORED TWO RUNS IN THE NINTH XX ETC (NOT "FOUR-RUN RALLY")

(ED) CP NU JM744P MAY 22.

N

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NUBI XX NEGOTIATION.

C118238

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY HERE CONTINUED AT A FEVERISH PITCH. FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGES BONNET TODAY RECEIVED THE POLISH AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, JULJUSZ LUKASIEWICZ, FOLLOWING CONFERENCES SATURDAY WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF GREAT BRITAIN, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SOVIET RUSSIA.

IN TALKS WITH STEPHAN OSUSKY, CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER, AND SIR ERIC PHIPPS, BRITISH AMBASSADOR, BONNET OUTLINED THE "PERMANENT POSITION OF FRANCE IN THE CZECH PROBLEM," OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID.

BONNET, IT WAS AUTHORITATIVELY STATED, TOLD THE VARIOUS AMBASSADORS THE FRENCH-CZECH MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT WILL BE CARRIED OUT FAITHFULLY IF NECESSARY.

DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS ATTACHED MUCH SIGNIFICANT TO THE CONFERENCE WITH THE POLISH ENVOY. RECENT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS HAD SUGGESTED POLAND MIGHT ADOPT A POLICY OF FRIENDLY NEUTRALITY TOWARD GERMANY IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

MORE640P

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NUMB XX CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

(THE LONDON SUNDAY TIMES SAID BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION WAS DISSATISFIEDWITH THE ROLE POLAND WAS PLAYING IN THE CRISIS. THE INDEPENDENT PAPER SAID POLISH TROOPS WERE CONCENTRATED NEAR THE CZECH FRONTIER AND THE CONCLUSION COULD BE DRAWN THAT POLAND WOULD OCCUPY CZECH DISTRICTS WITH A LARGE POLISH MINORITY IN THE EVENT OF WAR.)

HOWEVER, FOLLOWING TODAY'S CONFERENCE, AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES SAID THAT IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES POLAND WOULD MAINTAIN STRICT NEUTRALITY.

PREMIER MIRON CRISTEA OF RUMANIA IS IN WARSAW AT BRESENT AND THIS, IT WAS ARGUED HERE, SHOULD TEND TO AVOID ANY DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. RUMANIA, FRIENDLY WITH POLAND, IS LINKED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE LITTLE ENTENTE, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES YUGOSLAVIA.

FRENCH OBSERVERS DECLARED THERE WAS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE KILLING OF TWO SUDETEN GERMANS SATURDAY AND THE CALLING TO THE COLORS BY THE CZECH GOVERNMENT OF RESERVES. IMPORTANCE WAS ATTACHED HERE TO THE FACT MEMBERS OF MINORITIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA RESPONDED TO THE MILITARY CALL.

MORE644P

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NITE LEAD FRENCH (NEW)

PARIS, MAY 22-(CP)-FRANCE, WHICH IS BLEDGED TO AID CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN CASE SHE IS VICTIM OF UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY GERMANY, TONIGHT FELT RELIEF AT ABSENCE OF NEW OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE FAILURE OF GERMANY TO MAKE ANY MOVE AGAINST HER NEIGHBOR.

AN OFFICIAL EXPRESSED THE HOPE ANGLO-FRENCH PRESSURE WOULD BRING A SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S GERMAN MINORITY BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION.

HOREG30P

C 118240

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NUMS INT 2ND JC 10 NMK 15

C 118241

XX CALL.

IT HAS STILL HOPED THAT IN THE EVENT OF NEW DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA THEY COULD BE ADJUSTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE BERLIN-PRAHA TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP OF 1935.

P JH646P

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NU26 C 118242

95 CZECH SEPARATE

BERLIN, MAY 22-(CP-HAVAS)-THE GERMAN NEWS AGENCY (D.N.B.) TONIGHT CHARGED CZECHOSLOVAK SOLDIERS PENETRATED REICH TERRITORY SATURDAY AND ATTEMPTED TO DYNAMITE A BRIDGE.

THE NEWS AGENCY SAID A GERMAN POLICE POST AT MISTELBACH REPORTED GERMAN FRONTIER GUARDS ROUTED A CZECHOSLOVAK SQUAD OF SOLDIERS WHICH TRIED TO SET EXPLOSIVES UNDER A WOODEN BRIDGE NEAR BERHARSTALL.

MORE JM628P

NITE LEAD CHINESE (NEW)

SHANGHAI, MAY 22-(AP)-THE JAPANESE HIGH COMMAND REPORTED TODAY AN UNBROKEN CIRCLE OF STEEL WAS BEING SLOWLY COMPRESSED AROUND CHINESE FORCES ON THE CENTRAL CHINA WAR FRONT AND THAT "COMPLETE ANNIHILATION" OF THE DEFENDERS WAS UNDER WAY.

THE JAPANESE ESTIMATED 250,000 DISORGANIZED CHINESE WERE TRAPPED IN AN AREA 25 MILES LONG AND 15 MILES WIDE, JUTTING OUT FROM THE FALLEN RAILWAY JUNCTION TO SUCHOW, WITH JAPANESE TROOPS POURING IN FROM ALL DIRECTIONS.

MORE629P

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C 118243

AND BERLIN BRIDGE XX BERHASTALL.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOLDIERS, D.N.B. REPORTED, SMUGGLED SO SMALL CASES OF EXPLOSIVES PAST THE GERMAN FRONTIER AND PLACED THEM AT VARIOUS POINTS ON THE BRIDGE, WHICH POINTS TOWARD THE CZECHOSLOVAK FRONTIER. THE EXPLOSIVES WERE EQUIPPED WITH FUSES AND ARE STILL ON THE BRIDGE, THE AGENCY SAID.

JM646P

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ODS/ET
19 Feb, 1938

C118244

E.a.P. file

shown to Mr King

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

European Situation

G-100 vol. 1

I learn from the British High Commissioner's Office that they expect a telegram tonight or tomorrow morning from the Dominions Office, presumably on the European situation. There was no indication that it required any answer from the Canadian Government, and as Mr. Eden is to speak on the question on Monday, obviously consideration by the Canadian Government before that time could not be expected. I have, however, asked our Code Department to deliver a copy of the telegram to you at Laurier House at a convenient hour. I am going to Toronto this afternoon, returning Sunday night, so I have asked them to send a copy to Mr. Read in the unlikely contingency that any action was necessary before Monday morning.

O.D.

O.D. SKELTON

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European Situation ✓
League of Nations ✓

J-100 vol. 1

C 118245

J-100 1938

L-15-0 vol. 1

Memorandum to Mr. Pickering:

It is most important I should have pasted on a stiff sheet, for purposes of quick reference in the House of Commons, that part of Mr. Chamberlain's speech on Monday which relates to the necessity for good relations with Italy, et cetera, as a means of averting war. All the parts, in fact, referring to the immediate danger of war. Also particularly those parts of Mr. Chamberlain's speech on Tuesday with reference to the League of Nations. One should be headed "re: League of Nations", and the other "Critical European situation".

Please bring together, with Mr. Chamberlain's speech, what was said by myself in our House of Commons, last year and the year before, and also at Geneva, the year before.

No doubt Dr. Skelton will be having this material assembled in External Affairs but I am anxious to have these cuttings at once so that I may put them among papers at Laurier House.

W. L. M. K.

February 23, 1938.

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European Situation

C 118246

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM for the Prime Minister:

G-100
Vol. 1

March 1, 1938

MR. KING:

As requested, extracts have been made from Mr. Chamberlain's speeches from February the 21st and the 22nd, as well as from the Prime Minister's own speeches since January, 1936, dealing with the League, neutrality, war, etc.

E. A. P.

E. A. PICKERING

P/LAM

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C 118247

(2)

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

MR. KING:

Mr. Turnbull has just telephoned the following message for Mr. King's information:

"The Canadian Press has just advised that official Austrian announcement reports resignation of Schuschnigg.

Further press reports state German troops have crossed Austrian border."

FM.

March 11, 1938

2.30 p.m.

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O.D. SKELTON European Situation

MEMORANDUM

ODS/ET
12 March 1938

C 118248

Graham Towers has just telephoned that he has been in touch with London by trans-Atlantic telephone to ascertain the financial reactions to the European disturbance.

The London and Paris stock exchanges are both closed. The franc has resisted pressure in the expectation that a national government representing all the important parties will be formed. In Brussels the belga is weak and Belgium seems to be more disturbed than any other of Germany's neighbours. The Swiss franc is weak because of the amount of refugee money there which is now being drawn out. Amsterdam is steady and Prague surprisingly shows no unusual excitement. The dollar is up with European funds again being transferred to the United States.

Austria is said to be quiet. Reports were current in London that Hitler was flying from Munich to Vienna.

The French Minister was just in. He had no word of the formation of a new government, but expected it shortly. His advices from Paris have been that the Chautemps Radical-Socialist government was regarded as a transition between the Front Populaire (Radical-Socialist and Socialist, with Communist support) and a coalition ranging from Moderate Right to Socialist and probably Communist. /S

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NU44 C118249

BULLETIN MATTER

ADD VIENNA LEAD AUSTRIAN XXX NEARED.

THE NAZI, STABBED LAST NIGHT IN A MINOR NAZI-FATHERLAND FRONT AFFRAY IN FLORISDORF, A WORKERS' SUBURB OF VIENNA, SUCCUMBED THIS MORNING.

HANS LALITSCH, 25-YEAR-OLD TEACHER AND SUPPORTER OF CHANCELLOR KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG, DIED OF INJURIES RECEIVED LAST WEEK IN A POLITICAL ATTACK ON HIS SCHOOL.

DISORDERS SPREAD THROUGH THE AUSTRIANPROVINCES, WHILE IN VIEANNA THE WAR MINISTRY ORDERED MOBILIZATION OF 100,000 TROOPS OF THE RESERVE, CALLED 30,000 NATIONAL GUADSMEN TO IMMEDIATE DUTY AND STRENGTHENED THE BODYGUARD AROUND CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCH-NIGG BECAUSE OF NAZI THREATS AGAINST HIS LIFE.

MORE821A

95

LEAD MOBILIZATION

MUNICH, MARCH 11-(AP)-MOBILIZATION OF GERMAN TROOPS IN THE SEVENTH ARMY CORPS AREA NEAR AUSTRIA'S BORDER WAS IN FULL SWING TODAY. MUNICH IA ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

MORE822A

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NU45 XX HEADQUARTERS.

PLACID, IMPERTURBABLE BAVARIANS BELIEVED THE PURPOSE WAS TO SCARE CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG, WHO HAS CALLED FOR A PLEBISCITE SUNDAY ON AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENC , A MOVE REGARDED BY NAZI LEADERS AS UNFRIENDLY TO THEIR CAUSE.

BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EFFORT TO HIDE MOBILIZATION, BAVARIANS BELIEVED IT WAS NOT INTENDED ACTUALLY TO SEND TROOPS INTO AUSTRIA.

MORE825A

ADD HOLLYWOOD DAY LEAD MOVIE STARS XX EARTH."

LAST YEAR SHE ALSO WON FOR HER IMPERSONATION OF ANNA HELD IN "THE GREAT ZIEGFELD." HER DOUBLE VICTORY IS UNPRECEDENTED IN 10-YEAR HISTORY OF THE ACADEMY ACTING AWARDS.

THE AWARD FOR THE BEST PICTURE OF 1937, AS DETERMINED BY A POLL OF 15,000 FILM WORKERS INCLUDING EXTRAS, WENT TO WARNER BROTHERS' "THE LIFE OF EMILE ZOLA." THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL MOTION PICTURES EVER TO DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE.

AWARDS FOR BEST SUPPORTING PERFORMANCES WERE GIVEN JOSEPH SCHILDKRAUT, THE MARTYRED CAPTAIN DREYFUS OF "ZOLA," AND ALICE BRADY, THE HEROIC MOTHER OF "IN OLD CHICAGO."

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ADD MUNICH LEAD MOBILIZATION XXX AUSTRIA.

EVIDENCES OF MOBILIZATION WERE THE FOLLOWING:

1. ABLE BODIED MEN WERE BEING CALLED TO THE COLORS AND THEIR PRIVATE CARS COMMANDEERED.

2. MUNICIPAL BUSES AND PRIVATE TRUCKS WERE REQUISITIONED.

3. OWNERS WERE FRANKLY TOLD THESE VEHICLES WOULD BE USED ON THE AUSTRIAN BORDER.

RUMORS CIRCULATED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIANS WERE MOVING OVER THE AUSTRIAN BORDER TO VOTE IN SUNDAY'S PLEBISCITE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THAT FRANCE ALSO WAS SUPPORTING THE ANTI-NAZI AUSTRIANS.

THERE WAS KNOWN TO BE A LARGE CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS NEAR STERNBERG, 20 MILES SOUTH OF MUNICH, ALONG ONE OF THE MAIN ROADS INTO AUSTRIA.

REGULAR ARMY UNITS AND BROWN SHIRTED S.A. AND BLACKSHIRTED S.S. (NAZI GUARD UNITS) WERE MOVING TOWARD FREILASSING, NEAR SALZBURG, GARMISCH AND FUESSEN.

ROADS OUT OF MUNICH WERE CONTROLLED.

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NU61 XX CONTROLLED

C 118252

TRAINS TO THE SOUTH WERE STILL RUNNING "FOR THE TIME BEING," AS RAILWAY AUTHORITIES PUT IT.

THE AUSTRIAN CONSUL AT MUNICH DEPARTED, TRAVELLING TOWARD VIENNA BY AUTOMOBILE EARLY THIS MORNING.

BG931A

TREND OF STAPLE PRICES:

NEW YORK, MARCH 11-(AP)-THE ASSOCIATED PRESS WEIGHTED WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX OF 35 COMMODITIES TODAY (INSERT TO COME)

PREVIOUS DAY 70.75, WEEK AGO 71.26, MONTH AGO 71.12, YEAR AGO 94.69.

RANGE OF RECENT YEARS:

	1938	1937	1936	1933-35
HIGH	74.57	98.14	89.22	79.68
LOW	70.75	75.85	71.31	41.44

(1926 AVERAGE EQUALS 100)

BG932A

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NUBO

C 118253

95

ADD PARIS WARNING XX BORDER.

FOREIGN MINISTER YVON DELBOS TOLD GERMAN AMBASSADOR JOHANNES VON WELCZECK AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY THAT FRANCE REGARDS THESE MOVEMENTS WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS.

PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE GERMAN ENVOY, DELBOS CONFERRED WITH PREMIER-DESIGNATE LEON BLUM. VON WELCZECK CALLED ON BLUM AFTER HIS TALK WITH DELBOS.

IT WAS REPORTED GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, WHO HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THE DAY'S DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRIA, WERE CONSIDERING A JOINT APPROACH TO ITALY IN AN ATTEMPT TO INVOKE ITALY'S PLEDGES TO MAINTAIN AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE.

X1035A

UNDATED INTERNATIONAL

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

THE STRUGGLE OVER AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE TODAY BROUGHT DEATH AND STRIFE, TENSE MOBLIZATION OF AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN TROOPS AND A CAUTIOUS BRITISH "WARNING" AGAINST GERMAN INTERFERENCE IN AUSTRIA'S SUNDAY PLEBISCITE.

MORE1034A

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NU31 XX PLEBISCITE.

C 118254

TWO MEN DIED OF INJURIES SUSTAINED IN AUSTRIA'S NAZI AND ANTI-NAZI POLITICAL RIOTING AND MANY OTHERS WERE INJURED AS AN ACCOMPANIMENT TO GROWING FEAR OF ATTEMPTS ON THE LIFE OF CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG FOR HIS STAND AGAINST NAZI ENCROACHMENT.

THE VIENNA WAR MINISTRY ORDERED MOBILIZATION OF 100,000 SOLDIERS OF THE RESERVE, CALLED 30,000 NATIONAL GUARDSMEN TO IMMEDIATE DUTY AND STRENGTHENED THE CHANCELLOR'S BODYGUARD.

MOBILIZATION OF GERMAN TROOPS NEAR THE AUSTRIAN BORDER WAS IN FULL SWING BUT THE VERY OPENNESS OF THE MOVEMENT SEEMED TO INDICATE CHANCELLOR HITLER PLANNED A SCARE--NOT AN INVASION.

BERLIN, CONFIRMING THE SOUTHERN MOBILIZATION, SAID HITLER WOULD NOT USE FORCE BUT IT WAS UP TO VON SCHUSCHNIGG TO DECIDE WHETHER AUSTRIA WERE TO BE "MADE OVER" IN PEACE OR WITH BLOODSHED. IT WAS APPARENT ANY GERMAN RESTRAINT ON AUSTRIAN NAZI HAD BEEN REMOVED.

OFFICIAL BRITISH SOURCES SAID BRITAIN'S "WARNING" WAS MERELY AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE ONLY TO PRESERVE ORDER ON THE GERMAN FRONTIER.

MORE1038A

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NUB2 XX FRONTIER.

C 118255

ITALY KEPT ALOOF EXCEPT FOR THE OFFICIAL COMMENT THAT THE PLEBISCITE WOULD "CLARIFY" AUSTRO-GERMAN RELATIONS.

X1039A

FINANCE

LIVERPOOL, MARCH 11-(AP)-CLOSING: HAMS, CANADIAN LONG CUT, 12-18 LBS. 95S. TURPENTINE SPIRITS, SPOT AMERICAN, DUTY PAID 34S 6D. OTHER PRODUCE UNCHANGED.

X1039A

WASHINGTON, MARCH 11-(AP)-PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT OPENING THE ANNUAL COMMUNITY CHEST CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES, DECLARED TODAY THAT "ONLY IN JOBS AND MORE JOBS, AT GOOD PAY, SHALL WE FIND NATIONAL STABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL SECURITY."

ADDRESSING A MEETING OF THE MOBILIZATION FOR HUMAN NEEDS IN THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT APPEALED FOR A "UNITED FRONT" IN MAKING THE 1938 PRIVATE CHARITY PROGRAM A SUCCESS.

MORE1041A

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NUS (3)

C 118256

ADD MOSCOW NITE LEAD RUSSIAN XX SARCASM.

HE CALLED THEM UNSCRUPULOUS TOOLS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, HAMMERING INSISTENTLY ON THEIR FOREIGN TIES. HE DEMANDED THEY BE SHOT TO PROTECT WORLD PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIZATION.

THIS WAS THE BURDEN OF HIS DETAILED REVIEW--THAT THE SOVIET EXISTS WITHIN A RING OF ENEMIES AND THE PLOTTERS SOUGHT TO HAND OVER TO THEM THE KEYS TO RUSSIA'S FRONTIERS.

THE ONLY TWO SPARED THE DEATH DEMAND WERE SIGNIFIED CHRISTIAN RAKOVSKY, ONCE AN ESTEEMED SOVIET DIPLOMAT, AND S.A. BESSANOFF, A FORMER RUSSIAN TRADE DELEGATE.

MORE X428P

95

PMS IN AUSTRIAN

LONDON, MARCH 11--(CP)--A REUTER NEWS AGENCY DISPATCH FROM VIENNA SAID REICHSFUEHRER HITLER'S SENIOR AIDES, FIELD MARSHAL HERMANN GOERING AND RUDOLPH HESS, WERE DUE TO REACH VIENNA TONIGHT.

IT WAS SAID THEY WOULD ADDRESS THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE IN THE KARLSPLATZ IN FRONT OF THE RAILWAY STATION. X429P

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NP9

C 118257

95

PMS IN AUSTRIAN

LONDON, MARCH 11-(CP)-REUTERS NEWS AGENCY REPORTED TONIGHT THAT UNCONFIRMED ADVICES FROM VIENNA SAID GERMAN TROOPS HAVE ALREADY OCCUPIED SALZBURG AND OTHER CITIES ON THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER.

BRITISH PRESS ASSOCIATION DISPATCHES SAID THE TROOPS WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE AUSTRIAN NAZIS POURING INTO THEIR FATHERLAND IN MILITARY FORMATION FROM GERMANY.

MOSCOW AMS

ADD MOSCOW NITE LEAD RUSSIAN XX DELEGATE.

MOST OF VISHINSKY'S FURY WAS HEAPED ON NIKOLAI BUCHARIN, CHRONICLER OF THE RED REVOLUTION ON WHOM FELL MOST OF THE BLAME FOR THE CONFESSED "RIGHTIST-TROTSKYIST" PLOTS.

HE ALSO DEMANDED THE "EAD" OF GENRIKH G. YAGODA, ONCE CHIEF OF SECRET POLICE AND THE MOST FEARED MAN IN RUSSIA, WHOM HE COMPARED TO AL CAPONE.

MORE431P

M

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NMCO

C 118258

PMS IN BULLETIN LEAD DAY GOERING

LONDON, MARCH 11-(AP)-THE AUSTRIAN LEGATION SAID IT HAD BEEN INFORMED THE REICHSFUEHRER HITLER'S RIGHT HAND AIDE, FIELD MARSHAL HERMANN GOERING, WAS IN VIENNA TONIGHT AND WOULD MAKE A PUBLIC ADDRESS.

X433P

BGT

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NUM 1

C 118259

PMS IN BULLETIN LEAD DAY AUSTRIAN

VIENNA, MARCH 11-(AP)-AUSTRIA'S NAZI LEADER, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, TONIGHT ANNOUNCED THE RESIGNATION OF KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG AS CHANCELLOR AND CALLED ON ADOLF HITLER TO SEND GERMAN TROOPS "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" TO PREVENT "THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD."

MORE X459P

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NO 2

C 118260

CLOSE-PD 5.01 1/8, 00 7/16, 00 3/4. DLR 3/64 DIS.

FR 5.47 1/4.

CP NU MCH 11 X440P

RMS IN

BULLETIN MATTER ADD VIENNA SIXTH LEAD AUSTRIAN XX FATE.

SEYSS-INQUART IN A BRIEF TALK FROM THE CHANCELLERY BALCONY SAID:

"I WISH AUSTRIA A FORTUNATE, HAPPY RETURN TO THE GERMAN FATHERLAND.

"MAKE NO DISTURBANCE TONIGHT. MARCH HOME IN AN ORDERLY MANNER."

IT WAS SAID GERMAN TROOPS MIGHT WITHDRAW AS SOON AS AUSTRIA'S NAZIS WERE IN COMPLETE CONTROL. DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE BY NEW NAZI MASTERS OF AUSTRIA WAS EXPECTED.

TWO JEWS WERE INJURED IN NAZI DISORDERS IN THE VIENNA SECOND DISTRICT, LARGELY POPULATED BY JEWS.

EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE STURMKORPS, SCHUSCHNIGG SUPPORTERS, WERE HURT WHEN THEIR BARRACKS WERE STORMED.

X442P

GNM

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(4) NUCO 1 1 Rec'd 6:30

C 118261

PMS IN EOS BULLETIN MATTER AUSTRIAN

VIENNA, MARCH 11-(AP)-WIDESPREAD REPORTS THAT CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG HAD RESIGNED THE AUSTRIAN CHANCELLORSHIP IN FACE OF NAZI PRESSURE WERE COUNTERED TONIGHT BY THE STATEMENT OF A GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICIAL THAT PRESIDENT WILHELM MIKLAS HAD REFUSED TO LET HIM TAKE THAT STEP.

HOWEVER, THE OFFICIAL WHO MADE THE STATEMENT AT 10:05 P.M. (4:05 P.M. EST) SAID THAT WHILE VON SCHUSCHNIGG WAS STILL IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT, HIS RESIGNATION WAS IMPENDING.

X509P AMS

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NU26

C 118262

EOS BULLETIN AUSTRIAN

LONDON, MARCH 11-(CP-HAVAS)-THE BRITISH CABINET WILL HOLD AN EMERGENCY SESSION TOMORROW AT 10 A.M. (5 A.M. EST) IT WAS ANNOUNCED TONIGHT.

MORE X526P

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NU22

95

C 118263

PMS IN SCHUSCHNIGG TEXT (200 WORDS)

VIENNA, MARCH 14-(CP)-FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG'S RADIO BROADCAST:

"TODAY WE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH A DIFFICULT AND DECISIVE SITUATION. I AM AUTHORIZED TO REPORT TO THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE ON THE EVENTS OF THE DAY.

"THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT PRESENTED THE FEDERAL (AUSTRIAN) PRESIDENT WITH AN ULTIMATUM WITH A TIME LIMIT ACCORDING TO WHICH HE HAD TO APPOINT AS CHANCELLOR A CANDIDATE WHO WOULD BE PROPOSED TO HIM AND APPOINT A GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO THE DICTATES OF THE GERMAN REICH.

"OTHERWISE GERMAN TROOPS WOULD MARCH INTO AUSTRIA AT THE HOUR NAMED.

"I DECLARE BEFORE THE WORLD THAT REPORTS WHICH WERE SPREAD IN AUSTRIA THAT THERE HAVE BEEN LABOR DISPUTES, THAT STREAMS OF BLOOD WERE FLOWING, THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT MASTER OF THE SITUATION AND COULD NOT KEEP ORDER, WERE INVENTED FROM A TO Z.

MORE517P

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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NU23 XX Z.

C118264

"THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES ME TO INFORM THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE THAT WE YIELD TO FORCE.

"BECAUSE EVEN IN THIS GRAVE HOUR WE ARE NOT MINDED AT ANY PRICE TO SHED GERMAN BLOOD, WE HAVE GIVEN OUR ARMED FORCES AN ORDER THAT IN CASE INVASION IS CARRIED OUT THEY ARE TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT RESISTANCE AND AWAIT DECISIONS OF THE HOURS WHICH ARE TO COME.

"THE PRESIDENT HAS ENTRUSTED GENERAL S. SCHILHAWSKY, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF TROOPS, WITH COMMAND OF ARMED FORCES. THROUGH HIM FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE GIVEN TO THE ARMED FORCES.

"SO, IN THIS HOUR, I SAY GOODBYE WITH THE HEARTFELT WISH THAT GOD WILL PROTECT AUSTRIA."

(END OF TEXT)

(EDS: PLS RELEASE QUOTES FROM ABOVE--UNNECCY. ED)

[redacted]MS

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EOS BULLETIN AUSTRIAN

MUNICH, GERMANY, MARCH 11-(AP)-GERMAN TROOPS TONIGHT CROSSED THE FRONTIER INTO AUSTRIA.

THEY MOVED OVER THE BORDER AT 10 P.M. (4 P.M. ESTD.

IN CLOSE FORMATION, THEY MARCHED INTO AUSTRIAN TERRITORY AT SALZBURG, KUFFSTEIN AND MITTENWALD.

X536P

C 118265

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NU27

C118266

EOS BULLETIN SECOND LEAD DAY AUSTRIAN

VIENNA, MARCH 11-(AAP)-THE CHIEF OF THE AUSTRIAN PRESS BUREAU ANNOUNCED TONIGHT THAT AUSTRIA'A NAZI LEADER, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, HAS BEEN APPOINTED CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA.

MORE NU27P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 118267

NSSC

EOS BULLETIN MATTER ADD VIENNA SECOND LEAD AUSTRIAN XX AUSTRIA.

HE ANNOUNCED ALSO THAT GERMAN TROOPS WOULD START CROSSING THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT.

(MUNICH DISPATCHES SAID GERMAN TROOPS CROSSED INTO AUSTRIA SOME TWO HOURS BEFORE MIDNIGHT.)

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENT MIKLAS' APPOINTMENT OF SEYSS-INQUART CAME SHORTLY AFTER THE CHANCELLOR-DESIGNATE HIMSELF HAD ANNOUNCED RESIGNATION OF CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

X535P

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CANADA

Ottawa 5 O'clock
Journal - Mar.11 /38

C118268

Italy Refuses To Join France or Britain

5 O'Clock Edition Service.

PARIS, March 11.—(AP)—High officials of the Foreign Office declared today that Italy had refused to join France and Great Britain in "any action whatsoever" to defend Austrian independence.

The officials said Jules Blondel, French Charge d'Affaires at Rome, had conferred with the Italian Government on instructions from Paris and then telegraphed the Quai d'Orsai that such joint action was deemed "impossible" by Italy.

A spokesman for Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos said that, even without Italy, France was determined to act in a "most vigorous manner", providing Great Britain supported her. He ruled out protests as "worse than useless".

The spokesman added Count Johannes Waleczeck, German Ambassador to France, whom Delbos had called in earlier, had told the Foreign Minister flatly that "Germany will not make the slightest concession in regard to Austria".

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CANADA

Ottawa 5 O'clock
Citizen - Mar.11/38

C118269

Schuschnigg Quit Under Pressure

Associated Press.

LONDON, March 11.—The Austrian legation announced tonight that Chancellor Kurt Von Schuschnigg had resigned.

The legation statement said:

"We have received official news from Vienna that Von Schuschnigg, yielding to pressure, had resigned.

"The power now rests in the hands of Miklas (President Wilhelm Miklas) who in the normal way at any rate would appoint a new chancellor."

The legation said the Austrian cabinet still was in session at 7.30 p.m. (1.30 p.m. E.S.T.) and that it did not know whether any other members had resigned or intended to do so.

Austrians had termed first reports of Von Schuschnigg's downfall as the natural consequence of the postponement of the plebiscite on independence.

These earlier, unconfirmed reports said Von Schuschnigg had been succeeded by Dr. Otto Ender, elderly lawyer and legislator, a moderate anti-Nazi and a chancellor of the pre-Dolfuss era. Ender drafted the famed "Dollfuss constitution."

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NU1 BULLETIN

Mu ch 12th Saturday

C118270

BERLIN, MARCH 12-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER LEFT BERLIN BY PLANE TODAY AND WAS BELIEVED ON HIS WAY TO VIENNA. IN A PROCLAMATION HE DECLARED GERMAN TROOPS WERE "MARCHING OVER ALL THE FRONTIERS OF GERMAN AUSTRIA."

(SKED COVERS) X602A

BULLETIN

VIENNA, MARCH 12-(AP)-GERMAN AIRCRAFT FLEW OVER VIENNA TODAY. NAZIS TOOK OVER CONTROL EVERYWHERE. THERE WAS NO SERIOUS DISORDER.

(SKED COVERS) X603A

BULLETIN

BUDAPEST, MARCH 12-(AP)-THE OUTLAWED HUNGARIAN NAZI PARTY RESUMED ACTIVITY TODAY. THE GUARD ON THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER WAS STRENGTHENED.

(WILL BE LEAD) X604A

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NU2

95

C118271

DAY LEAD GERMAN

BERLIN, MARCH 12-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER, FLYING TO MUNICH AND THENCE TO VIENNA, TOLD THE WORLD IN A BROADCAST PROCLAMATION TODAY THAT "SOLDIERS OF THE GERMAN DEFENCE FORCE ARE MARCHING OVER ALL THE FRONTIERS OF GERMAN AUSTRIA" TO CARRY ON AUSTRIAN NAZIFICATION.

THE PROCLAMATION WAS READ BY PROPAGANDA MINISTER JOSEPH GOEBBELS.

LEAVING FIELD MARSHAL HERMANN GOERING AS ACTING HEAD OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT DURING HIS ABSENCE, THE FUEHRER DELEGATED GOEBBELS TO TELL WHY GERMANY WENT TO WHAT WAS TERMED THE RESCUE OF A SUFFERING AUSTRIA, HELD IN THE GRIP OF A SMALL MINORITY LACKING EVEN THE SLIGHTEST LEGAL STATUS.

"I HAVE NOW DECIDED TO EXTEND THE AID OF THE REICH TO THE MILLIONS OF GERMANS IN AUSTRIA," HITLER PROCLAIMED.

"SINCE MORNING SOLDIERS OF THE GERMAN DEFENCE FORCE HAVE BEEN MARCHING OVER ALL THE FRONTIERS OF GERMAN AUSTRIA."

MORE610A

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NUS XX AUSTRIA."

AS THE PROCLAMATION WAS READ MORE THAN 100 THREE-MOTORED GERMAN TRANSPORT PLANES CROSSED THE AUSTRIAN BORDER SOUTH OF FRASDORF.

C 118272

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THEY CARRIED TROOPS TO VIENNA.

"I MYSELF AS FUEHRER AND CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE SHALL BE HAPPY AGAIN TO BE ABLE TO ENTER AS A GERMAN AND A FREE CITIZEN THIS LAND WHICH IS MY OWN LAND," HITLER'S PROCLAMATION SAID.

[redacted]

"THE WORLD, HOWEVER, SHALL CONVINCE ITSELF THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE IN AUSTRIA EXPERIENCE IN THESE DAYS, HOURS OF DEEPEST JOY AND EMOTION.

"THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE SEE IN THE BRETHREN WHO HAVE HURRIED TO THEIR AID SAVIORS FROM DIRE DISTRESS.

"LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN REICH.

"LONG LIVE NATIONAL SOCIALIST AUSTRIA."

MORE X612A

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CANADA

NU4

95

C118273

DAY LEAD AUSTRIAN (NEW)

VIENNA, MARCH 12-(AP)-GERMAN SOLDIERS SWUNG INTO AUSTRIA TODAY TO THE CHEERS OF THE POPULACE, AS CHANCELLOR HITLER AND THE NAZIS DOMINATED THE NATION.

GERMAN BOMBERS FLEW OVER VIENNA AT 10:50 A.M.

CITIZENS, FACE UPWARDS, SHOUTED STORMY GREETINGS AS THE MACHINES CIRCLED SLOWLY OVER THE CAPITAL.

GERMAN OFFICIALS, TOO, WERE THERE.

THE TRIUMPHANT ENTRY OF HITLER HIMSELF, RETURNING TO THE LAND OF HIS BIRTH, WAS AWAITED EXPECTANTLY.

AUSTRIA OVER NIGHT BECAME GERMAN AND NAZI.

HITLER'S CLOSE FRIEND, 45-YEAR-OLD BESPECTACLED SANDY-HAIRED ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART WAS THE NEW CHANCELLOR, AS WELL AS WAR MINISTER AND MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR WITH BOTH THE NATION'S ARMY AND POLICE UNDER HIS CONTROL.

GERMAN OFFICIALS HERE INCLUDED THE GERMAN POLICE AND SECRET SERVICE HEADS, RUDOLPH HESS, HEINRICH HIMMLER AND KURT DALEUGL.

MORE616A

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NU5 XX DALEUGL.

EVERYWHERE JUBILANT NAZIS WERE TAKING OVER CONTROL OF C118274 PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG AND HIS FIGHT FOR AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE WERE GONE, YIELDING TO GERMAN PRESSURE.

A REGIMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS PASSED THROUGH BRAUNAU, HITLER'S BIRTHPLACE, AT 8:29 A.M. THEY STOPPED AND PAID SOLEMN OBEISANCE AT HITLER'S HOUSE.

ESTIMATED AT 1,000, THE SOLDIERS HAD GONE THROUGH SCHAERDING AT 7 A.M., WHILE GERMAN PLANES CIRCLED ABOVE NEARBY AUSTRIAN LINZ.

THE TROOPS MOVED TOWARD A VIENNA BEDECKED WITH NAZI SWASTIKAS, AND AS THEY PASSED THROUGH SMALL TOWNS ON THE WAY THEY WERE GREETED WITH CHEERS. THERE WAS NO INDICATION ANYBODY REGRETTED THEIR ENTRANCE. SEYSS-INQUART HAD ASKED FOR THEM.

AND AS THE GERMAN TROOPS CAME, ANOTHER ARMY TOO WAS MARCHING INTO AUSTRIA--THE THOUSANDS OF AUSTRIAN LEGION MEN WHO FLED THE NATION IN 1934 AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE NAZI REVOLT IN WHICH CHANCELLOR ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS WAS KILLED.

MORE620A

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NUG XX KILLED.

MEETINGS STARTED EARLY IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS TO C 118275 REORGANIZE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS IN 100 PER CENT NAZI FASHION, BEGINNING WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS AND WORKING DOWN.

IN STYRIA PROVINCE, WITH ITS CAPITAL OF GRAZ THE CENTRE OF NAZI STRENGTH, THIS BUSINESS WAS COMPLETED QUICKLY. HANS HELFRICH WAS NAMED GOVERNOR AND A STORM TROOP BATTALION LEADER BECAME POLICE CHIEF. GRAZ BUILDINGS WERE DRAPED WITH NAZI EMBLEMS. EVEN CATHOLIC CLOISTERS DISPLAYED SWASTIKA FLAGS.

THERE WERE FEW POLICE IN THE STREETS. TROOPS REMAINED IN BARRACKS.

FACTORIES AND STORES WERE ORDERED CLOSED TO ALLOW FOR CELEBRATION, BUT THE CITY HAD CELEBRATED ALL NIGHT.

GERMAN TROOPS ARRIVED AT KUFSTEIN AT 9 A.M. WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY MOTORIZED UNITS REACHED SCHARNITZ. AUSTRIAN TROOPS STATIONED FOR BORDER DUTY JOINED THE GERMAN SOLDIERS AND THEY MARCHED TOWARD INNSBRUCK AT 10:30 A.M.

A NAZI COURIER WENT ON AHEAD WITH THE NEWS THE TROOPS WERE APPROACHING FOR A MARCH THROUGH INNSBRUCK'S MAIN STREET, MARIATHERESIENSTRASSE.

MORE624A

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NU7 XX MARIATHERESIENSTRASSE.

THE INNSBRUCK BURGOMASTER, MOERR, FLED THE COUNTRY EARLY TODAY AND NAZI OCCUPATION OF THE CITY WAS PEACEFUL. AUSTRIAN NAZI TROOPERS TOOK OVER ALL VIENNA FACTORIES THIS MORNING. THEY CARRIED CAT-O'-NINE-TAILS WITH WHICH THEY BEAT FORMER SOCIALIST WORKERS WHO SHOWED RECALCITRANCE OR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM.

C118276

THE FACTORIES WERE RUNNING IN THE MORNING BUT CLOSED LATER FOR A PARADE IN WHICH WORKERS WERE FORCED TO MARCH WILLY-NILLY WEARING THE SWASTIKA EMBLEM.

THE OUTGOING VIENNA POLICE CHIEF TOLD THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 1,100 PERSONS WERE ARRESTED DURING THE NIGHT, MOSTLY VON SCHUSCHNIGG STURMKORPS AND FATHERLAND FRONT OFFICIALS.

TWENTY-EIGHT GERMAN BOMBERS HAD ARRIVED AT ASPERT AIRDROME NEAR VIENNA DURING THE NIGHT FOR THE SQUADRON FLIGHTS OVER THE CITY'S OUTLYING DISTRICTS THIS MORNING.

MORE X626A

M

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CANADA

NU8

95

C 118277

LEAD HUNGARIAN

BUDAPEST, MARCH 12-(AP)-A NAZI MOVEMENT STARTED IN HUNGARY TODAY, POLICE AND THE ARMY WERE PUT ON THE ALERT, AND THE GUARD AT THE AUSTRIAN BORDER WAS STRENGTHENED.

HUNGARIAN NAZIS, EXCITED BY THE AUSTRIAN NAZIFICATION, STARTED TO REORGANIZE THEIR ILLEGAL FORMATIONS AND DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF ARRESTED COLLEAGUES.

THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ANNOUNCED THE GUARD AT THE AUSTRIAN BORDER HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED. INTERIOR MINISTER SZELL HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A VIGOROUS ANTI-NAZI CAMPAIGN.

X629A

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C 118278

ADD BERLIN DAY LEAD GERMAN XX AUSTRIA.

"MOTORIZED UNITS, INFANTRY DIVISION, AND S.S. FORMATIONS ON THE GROUND, AS WELL AS THE GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE BLUE SKIES," HITLER SAID, "CALLED BY THE NEW NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT IN VIENNA--SHALL BE THE GUARANTOR, THAT NOW AT LAST, WITHIN THE SHORTEST TIME, THE POSSIBILITY WILL BE GIVEN TO THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE BY MEANS OF A REAL PLEBISCITE TO SHAPE THEIR OWN FUTURE DESTINY.

"BEHIND THESE UNITS, HOWEVER, STAND THE WILL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ENTIRE GERMAN NATION."

THE FUEHRER REVIEWED THE COURSE OF AUSTRIAN HISTORY, DWELLING ESPECIALLY UPON THE SUFFERINGS OF MEN AND WOMEN WHICH HE SAID EXISTED UNDER KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG, THE OUSTED AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR.

HITLER CHARGED VON SCHUSCHNIGG WITH HAVING PERPETUATED HIS REGIME BY BRUTE FORCE, WITHOUT THE SHADOW OF A MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE.

MORE631A

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NU10 XX PEOPLE.

C 118279

HE ALSO POINTED TO VARIOUS EFFORTS HE MADE TO COME TO AN ARRANGEMENT WITH VON SCHUSCHNIGG, WHICH HE SAID FAILED.

GOEBBELS, HANDING OUT AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE PROCLAMATION, USED THE OCCASION TO DENY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF ISSUED ANY ULTIMATUM TO THE VON SCHUSCHNIGG CABINET.

"WHATEVER ULTIMATUM WAS ISSUED CAME FROM MEMBERS OF THE VON SCHUSCHNIGG CABINET, WHICH REALIZED AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION HAD DEVELOPED," GOEBBELS SAID.

AS THE PROCLAMATION WAS READ, HITLER LANDED AT MUNICH, ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL WILHELM KEITEL, CHIEF OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND, AND AIR FORCE GENERAL SPERRLE, COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH AIR DISTRICT.

TWENTY-SEVEN HEAVY BOMBERS LEFT MUNICH FOR AUSTRIA AT 10 A.M. MOTOR ROADS TO THE AUSTRIAN BORDERS WERE JAMMED WITH MILITARY TRUCKS.

THE FUEHRER HAD LEFT BERLIN AT 9:15 A.M.

MORE X635A

M

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NU11

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118280

DAY LEAD INTERNATIONAL (NEW)

LONDON, MARCH 12-(AP)-THE CABINET MET TODAY TO FACE THE FACT THAT "PAPER PROTESTS" HAD BEEN TRAMPLED UNDER THE MARCHING FEET OF THE GERMAN ARMY IN AUSTRIA AND MIGHT MEET THE SAME FATE WITH RESPECT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

MINISTERS FILED PAST A SMALL, SILENT CROWD IN DOWNING STREET TO ENTER PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S RESIDENCE.

ARTHUR HENDERSON, LABOR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, SERVED NOTICE HE WOULD ASK THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS MONDAY WHETHER GREAT BRITAIN WOULD PLEDGE ARMED AID TO FRANCE IN THE EVENT FRANCE IS ATTACKED WHILE TRYING TO SAVE CZECHO-SLOVAKIA FROM GERMAN DOMINATION.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN ARRANGED TO CONFER WITH THE FRENCH AMBASS-ADOR AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN MINISTER.

FOREIGN MINISTER JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, THE GERMAN STATESMEN WHO WAS HANDED THE BRITISH PROTEST AGAINST SUBJUGATION OF AUSTRIA, REMAINED AT THE GERMAN EMBASSY AWAITING RESULTS OF THE CABINET MEETING. SPECIAL POLICE PATROLLED THE STREET OUTSIDE.

MORE639A

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CANADA

NU12 XX OUTSIDE.

C 118281

GERMANY'S FORCEFUL NAZIFICATION OF AUSTRIA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE UPSET ALL PLANS FOR ENSURING EUROPEAN PEACE THROUGH SPEEDY DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

THE ABRUPT TRANSFORMATION OF AUSTRIA INTO A 100 PER CENT NAZI STATE WAS GENERALLY REGARDED AS AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT.

CONCERN OVER AUSTRIA'S FATE WAS OVERSHADOWED IN THE MINDS OF MANY DIPLOMATS BY FEAR OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN NEXT TO CZECHO-SLOVAKIA OR SOME OTHER UNFAVORABLY-LOCATED SMALL NATION IN SEETHING CENTRAL EUROPE.

FRANCE, CAUGHT HELPLESS WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT, WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER THE SAFETY OF HER DEMOCRATIC ALLY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WHILE LEON BLUM STRUGGLED DESPERATELY TO FORM A CABINET WITH STRENGTH SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE GREAT WAR NATIONAL UNION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCE SOUGHT TO LEARN HOW FAR THE BRITISH CABINET WAS WILLING TO GO.

PERHAPS THE WORST BLOW TO GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE WAS EMBODIED IN ITALY'S SILENT ACQUIESCENCE TO THE NAZI COUP IN AUSTRIA.

MORE642A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU15 XX AUSTRIA. UNLIKE FOUR YEARS AGO, WHEN PREMIER C118282
MUSSOLINI DISPATCHED TROOPS TO THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF ITALY IN THE FACE OF A NAZI THREAT TO AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE, MUSSOLINI'S REACTION WAS INTERPRETED AS APPARENT CONSENT TO GERMAN DOMINANCE.

THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CABINET MET IN SPECIAL SESSION TO STUDY THE CHANGED SITUATION IN AUSTRIA. PRESIDENT EDUARD BENES PRESIDED. THE CABINET WAS REPRESENTED AS VIEWING THE SITUATION CALMLY.

X644A

95

SACRAMENTO, CALIF., MARCH 12-(AP)-TOM MOONEY WON THE FIRST STEP OF HIS NEWEST FIGHT FOR FREEDOM FROM SAN QUENTIN PRISON EARLY TODAY WHEN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION INTENDED TO GRANT HIM A LEGISLATIVE PARDON.

APPROVAL OF THE UNIQUE MEASURE CLIMAXED TWO TEMPESTUOUS DAYS IN WHICH MOONEY AND POLICE CAPT. CHARLES GOFF OF SAN FRANCISCO PERSONALLY TOLD THE ASSEMBLY THEIR DIVERGENT STORIES OF MOONEY'S CONVICTION FOR THE 1916 PREPAREDNESS DAY BOMBING THAT KILLED 10 AND INJURED 40 PERSONS HERE.

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU31 XX TROUBLE.

THE PRESENCE OF AIRPLANES AT VIENNA RECALLED FIELD MARSHAL GOERING'S STATEMENT RECENTLY THAT GERMANY NEEDED HER AIR FORCE TO PROTECT GERMANS BEYOND HER BORDERS. IT WAS SAID THE PLANES MADE UNNECESSARY THE SENDING OF LARGE MILITARY UNITS INTO AUSTRIA.

C 118283

THE FORMATION OF 28 HEAVY BOMBERS DROPPED LARGE HANDBILLS BEARING THE DOUBLE EAGLE AND SWASTIKA AND READING, "NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY GREETS ITS NATIONAL SOCIALIST AUSTRIA AND NEW NATIONAL SOCIALIST ADMINISTRATION! IN TRUE AND UNCHANGING CONFEDERATION! HEIL HITLER!"

"THIS MEANS ANSCHLUSS," PEOPLE EXCLAIMED.

NAZI LEADER JOSEF TAVS ANNOUNCED NEWSPAPERS WOULD BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY INTO LINE WITH NAZI IDEAS. IT WAS ANTICIPATED TWO PROMINENT VIENNA PAPERS CONTROLLED BY JEWS WOULD BE BANNED. AN ISSUE OF THE OLD CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC REICHSPOST WAS CONFISCATED.

MANY WINDOWS IN WHICH VON SCHUSCHNIGG'S PICTURE HAD BEEN DISPLAYED WERE SMASHED DURING THE NIGHT. HIS PICTURES LAY IN SHREDS ON THE SIDEWALKS, TRAMPLED BY THOUSANDS OF FEET.

MORE748A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU32 XX FEET.

THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS WERE ENGAGED IN MAKING A NEW AUSTRI[A] FLAG, SEWING HUGE SWASTIKAS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE THREE WIDE RED, WHITE AND RED HORIZONTAL STRIPES OF THE OLD FLAG.

C 118284

A BIG OVATION WAS GIVEN AN ENTERPRISING MAN WHO BICYCLED DOWN THE KAERNTNERSTRASSE, HIS LITTLE TERRIER SEATED ON AN IMPROVISED HANDLEBAR. THE PUP WORE A NAZI FLAG.

HITLER GIRL ORGANIZATIONS APPEARED SUDDENLY IN UNIFORMS.

AUSTRIAN S.S. MEN PARADING, GOOSESTEPPED PERFECTLY. THEY APPARENTLY HAD BEEN PRACTISING BEHIND BARNS FOR MONTHS.

POLICE SANG THE HORST WESSEL SONG IN THE STREETS AND CAFES, DRINKING TOASTS IN BEER TO THE HEALTH OF HITLER, "OUR FUEHRER," THOUGH A FEW HOURS BEFORE THEY HAD ARRESTED HUNDREDS FOR DOING THE SAME THING.

VIENNA RADIO STATIONS EARLY THIS MORNING STARTED BROADCASTING WITH "HEIL HITLER" GREETINGS.

FRESH EVIDENCE OF GERMAN MASTERY OF AUSTRIA WAS SEEN IN SWASTIKA FLAGS FLYING OVER VIENNA'S ROYAL PALACE WHERE THE EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEPH LIVED.

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NU55 XX LIVED.

CENSORSHIP WAS ESTABLISHED.

C 118285

WILHELM MIKLAS REMAINED IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY, BUT KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG, THE CHANCELLOR WHO FOUGHT FOR AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE AND AGAINST THE NAZIS, WAS GONE.

HE HAD RESIGNED, YIELDING TO THE AUSTRIAN-BORN HITLER.

SIX POLICEMEN WITH NAZI SWASTIKA ARMBANDS STOOD AT THE GATES OF BELVEDERE CASTLE, WHERE VON SCHUSCHNIGG HAS LIVED ALONE WITH HIS SON SINCE THE DEATH OF HIS WIFE.

THE POLICE WOULD NOT SAY WHETHER HE WAS UNDER ARREST. "OUR DUTY IS MERELY TO SEE NOTHING HAPPENS TO HIM," THE POLICEMEN SAID, SMILING BROADLY.

THERE WERE THREATS YESTERDAY AGAINST HIS LIFE.

AUSTRIA REMAINED A SOVEREIGN STATE IN NAME, BUT IT HAD BECOME THROUGH THE NIGHT A NAZI STATE.

VON SCHUSCHNIGG'S CALL FOR A NATIONAL PLEBISCITE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PEOPLE BACKED HIS STAND AGAINST TH NAZIS BROUGHT THE CHANGE.

MORE749A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU34 XX CHANGE.

ANGERED NAZIS HELD THE PLEBISCITE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, DIRECTED AGAINST THEM AND UNFAITHFUL TO THE SO-CALLED FRIENDSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN HITLER AND VON SCHUSCHNIGG, DRAFTED AT BERCH-TESGADEN LAST MONTH AND THROUGH WHICH NAZIS GAINED FIRST ENTRANCE INTO THE AUSTRIAN CABINET WITH SEYSS-INQUART'S APPOINTMENT AS INTERIOR MINISTER.

VON SCHUSCHNIGG CALLED OFF THE PLEBISCITE AND QUIT, BOWING TO GERMAN POWER AND THE THREAT OF INVASION TO FORCE REORGANIZATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

WHILE NAZIFICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMPLETE WITH ONLY TWO NON-NAZIS IN THE CABINET OF SEYSS-INQUART, INTIMATE POLITICAL ADVISERS OF THE NEW CHANCELLOR SAID THERE WOULD BE NO FORMAL "ANSCHLUSS" OR UNION WITH GERMANY.

THE SPONTANEOUS ENTHUSIASM LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION FOUND READY RESPONSE IN THOUSANDS OF HEARTS.

VON SCHUSCHNIGG, ADMIRED FOR HIS COURAGE AND DESCRIBED EVEN BY SOME OF THE NAZIS AS A "GREAT AUSTRIAN" MADE HIS HISTORIC DECISION TO QUIT IN THE CHANCELLERY ROOM IN WHICH THE BODY OF ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS LAY FOUR YEARS AGO--HIS LIFE ENDED IN THE UNSUCCESSFUL NAZI COUP OF 1934.

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DETERMINED "NOT TO SPILL GERMAN BLOOD IN SOMETHING AKIN TO CIVIL WAR," THE CHANCELLOR IN A DRAMATIC RADIO MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE SAID HE WAS TAKING THE DECISIVE STEP UNDER GERMAN PRESSURE.

HE CONCLUDED HIS FERVENT "GOOD-BYE" WITH THE HOPE "GOD WILL PROTECT AND BLESS AUSTRIA."

THE BRUSQUE PRESIDENT MIKLAS RESOLUTELY WANTED VON SCHUSCHNIGG TO RESIST HITLER'S DEMANDS AND TO HOLD THE ARMY IN READINESS.

VON SCHUSCHNIGG HAD ORDERED MOBILIZATION OF 130,000 RESERVES, POLICE AND MILITIA FORCES TO SUPPLEMENT THE REGULAR ARMY, BUT HE CHOSE TO RESIGN RATHER THAN RISK WIDESPREAD BLOODSHED.

THE PRONOUNCED NAZI CHARACTER OF SEYSS-INQUART'S CABINET WAS CLEARLY APPARENT.

FOREIGN MINISTER WILHELM WOLF FOR ALL HIS LIFE HAS BEEN AN EXPONENT OF GERMAN-AUSTRIAN COOPERATION.

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NU36 XX DEPARTMENT. C118288

A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE GERMAN LEGATION SAID THE GERMAN TROOPS WOULD NOT MARCH FAR INTO AUSTRIA.

"IT'S A GESTURE," IT WAS EXPLAINED.

AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN OFFICIALS SAID THERE WAS NO UNREST OR DISORDER IN THE COUNTRY AND MILITARY OCCUPATION WAS UNNECESSARY.

A LEGATION SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT HEINRICH HIMMLER, CHIEF OF THE GERMAN SECRET POLICE, ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL KURT DALEUGL AND REINHARD HEYDRICH, GERMAN POLICE OFFICIALS, MADE A NIGHT DASH FROM BERLIN.

IT WAS SAID REORGANIZATION OF AUSTRIAN POLICE AND GENDARMES ALONG NAZI GERMAN LINES WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATELY.

DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO S.S. (BROWN SHIRTS) AND S.A. (BLACK SHIRTS) MEN WAS STARTED AT THE CHANCELLERY AT 8 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING.

MANY OF THE S.S. MEN WERE WITHOUT UNIFORMS BUT THEY WERE SENT OUT ON POLICE DUTIES. CHOSEN AS S.S. MEN WERE A GREAT NUMBER OF AUSTRIAN NAZIS WHO SERVED PRISON TERMS FOR NAZI ACTIVITIES DURING THE REGIMES OF DOLLFUSS AND VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

MORE804A

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NUSS XX ADDED:

"WE WILL HAVE TO SEE THAT AUSTRIA REALLY REMAINS INDEPENDENT."

C 118289

VICTOR KIENBOECK, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL BANK, SAID IMMEDIATE MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT WITHDRAWALS OF BANK DEPOSITS AND EXPORTATION OF CURRENCY DROM THE COUNTRY.

HE DECLARED THE SCHILLING, ALTHOUGH FALLING SOMEWHAT IN VALUE, WAS "THE SAFEST MONEY IN EUROPE."

THE CURRENCY WOULD REMAIN SAFE AS LONG AS AUSTRIA WAS INDEPENDENT, HE SAID.

HUNDREDS OF TERROR-STRICKEN JEWS WERE ENDEAVORING TO FLEE THE COUNTRY. TORCHLIGHT PARADES OF CELEBRATING NAZIS THAT WOUND THROUGH THE JEWISH QUARTER FOUND MOST JEWS REMAINING STRICTLY INDOORS. TWO JEWS CAUGHT OUTSIDE WERE INJURED.

X809A

95

ADD ROME DAY LEAD ITALIAN XX TODAY.

AN EMISSARY OF THE FUEHRER, IT WAS LEARNED, ARRIVED IN ROME YESTERDAY BY AIRPLANE BRINGING A PERSONAL LETTER TO MUSSOLINI BEFORE THE TROOPS MARCHED.

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NU89 XX MARCHED.

C 118290

THE DUCE EVIDENTLY LOOKED ON PLACIDLY WHILE NAZIS ENGULFED INDEPENDENT AUSTRIA, ONCE THE FOUNDATION STONE OF FASCIST FOREIGN POLICY.

ITALIAN OFFICIALS REFRAINED FROM COMMENT ON THE COUP.

UNDER THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS, HITLER AND MUSSOLINI HAVE AGREED TO INFORM EACH OTHER BEFORE MAKING IMPORTANT MOVES.

MORE X812A

ADD BERLIN DAY LEAD GERMAN XX 9:15 A.M.

HITLER ASSERTED THAT "THANKS TO THE VICTORY OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST IDEA," GERMANY AGAIN FOUND "THE WAY TOWARD PROUD SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS" BUT THERE BEGAN IN AUSTRIA "A NEW PERIOD OF BITTEREST TRIALS."

"A REGIME WHICH WAS LACKING IN EVERY LEGAL MANDATE TRIED TO MAINTAIN ITS EXISTENCE, ALTHOUGH REJECTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE, BY THE MOST BRUTAL METHODS OF TERROR, OF BODILY AND ECONOMIC CHASTISEMENT AND DESTRUCTION."

MORE814A

NU40 XX DESTRUCTION."

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NU40 XX DESTRUCTION

C 118291

HTE FUERHRER SAID THAT "WE AS A GREAT PEOPLE HAD TO GO THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE OF SEEING OVER 6,000,000 BEINGS OF THE SAME ORIGIN AS OURSELVES SUPPRESSED BY A NUMERICALLY SMALL MINORITY, WHICH SIMPLY KNEW HOW TO BRING ITSELF INTO POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OF POWER NECESSARY THERETO.

"TO THIS POLITICAL DISFRANCHISEMENT AND GAGGING THERE CORRESPONDED AN ECONOMIC DECAY WHICH STOOD IN TERRIBLE CONTRAST TO THE BLOOMING OF NEW LIFE IN GERMANY.

"WHO COULD BLAME THESE UNHAPPY MEMBERS OF OUR RACE IF THEY DIRECTED THEIR GLANCES YEARNINGLY TOWARDS THE REICH?"

ASSERTING HE HAD TRIED TO CHANGE THE DESTINIES OF AUSTRIA REPEATEDLY DURING RECENT YEARS, HE CONTINUED:

"ONLY A MADMAN COULD BELIEVE THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, HE COULD BY SUPPRESSION AND TERROR ROB THE PEOPLE OF THEIR LOVE FOR A RACE TO WHICH THEY BELONGED BY HEREDITY.

"EUROPEAN HISTORY PROVES THAT IN SUCH CASES FANATICISM IS BRED THAT IS ALL THE GREATER IN CONSEQUENCE."

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NU41 XX CONSEQUENCE."

C 118292

HE SAID GERMANY TOOK OVER MORE THAN 40,000 AUSTRIAN REFUGEES WHILE 10,000 ADDITIONAL WENT TO JAIL AND PRISON CAMPS IN AUSTRIA, AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS "WERE REDUCED TO POVERTY."

"NO NATION COULD IN THE LONG RUN STAND FOR SUCH CONDITIONS ON ITS BORDERS, EXCEPT IT DESERVED TO BE DESPISED," THE FUEHRER AVOWED.

PRECEDING HITLER TO MUNICH WAS A SPECIAL TRAIN FILLED WITH HITLER'S PERSONAL CRACK S.S. BODYGUARD.

AFTER A BRIEF HALT THE TRAIN PROCEEDED TOWARD AUSTRIA.

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THE S.S. BODYGUARD WOULD BE USED FOR SPECIAL PROTECTION OF THE FUEHRER WHILE IN AUSTRIA.

ADDITIONAL TROOPS WERE ARRIVING AT THE AUSTRIAN BORDER, SAID REPORTS FROM MUNICH.

TODY NAZI CHIEFTAINS GLORIFIED HITLER AS THE CREATOR OF THE "GRAND GERMAN REALM" ENVISAGED AND PREPARED BY THE IRON CHANCELLOR, BISMARCK.

IN NAZI CIRCLES IT WAS FELT AUSTRIA NOW WOULD BE ANOTHER "LITTLE GERMANY," INDEPENDENT GEOGRAPHICALLY BUT RESPONDING TO NAZI IDEOLOGY IN ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER FIELDS.

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NU42 XX FIELDS. THEY COMPARED AUSTRIA'S FUTURE STATUS T C118293
THAT OF THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG, WHICH ALREADY TAKES ORDERS FROM THE REICH, THOUGH THEORETICALLY INDEPENDENT.

THUS WAS ADDED TO REICH CONTROL MORE THAN 32,000 SQUARE MILES OF TERRITORY AND 7,760,000 OF THOSE 10,000,000 GERMAN-SPEAKING PEOPLES OUTSIDE GERMAN BORDERS OVER WHOM HITLER HAS CLAIMED AN INTEREST.

IT WAS EMPHASIZED HERE THAT GERMAN TROOPS WERE NOT SENT AGROSS THE BORDER UNTIL ASKED FOR BY THE NEW AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR TO HELP PRESERVE ORDER AND PREVENT BLOODSHED.

ADMITTING SOME "ANXIOUS HOURS," A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN NEVERTHELESS SAID, "WE DIDN'T EXPECT HINGS TO GO SO SMOOTHLY" DURING THE COUP. "THANK GOD, NO SHOTS HAD TO BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN GERMANS AND AUSTRIANS," HE ADDED.

VON SCHUSCHNIGG WAS BRANDED A "TRAITOR" BY ONE SPOKESMAN.

THE NATIONAL ZEITUNG, ORGAN OF FIELD MARSHAL HERMANN GOERING, EMPHASIZING IT WAS SPEAKING AUTHORITATIVELY, REFERRED TO FOREIGN PROTESTS AND SAID: "THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION IS NOT A MATTER OF DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATION. IT IS SOLELY AN INTERNAL GERMAN AFFAIR."

MORE824A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU43 XX AFFAIR."

"DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRIA WILL NOT LEAVE IN THEIR WAKE C118294
ANNEXATION OR RAPE OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE," THE PAPER SAID,
"BUT INSTEAD THE REALIZATION OF ALL THE WISHES AND HOPES NOURISHED
BY THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE FOR A LONG TIME."

THE VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, PERSONAL ORGAN OF CHANCELLOR
HITLER, TOOK THE LEAD IN SCOLDING VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

"THE MAN WHO HITHERTO PLAYED HIMSELF UP AS A DUTIFUL,
COURAGEOUS FIGHTER OF A SMALL, WEAK NATION DIDN'T EVEN SHOW
ENOUGH COURAGE AND TACT TO DISAPPEAR DECENTLY FROM THE POLITICAL
STAGE," THE PAPER SAID.

THE PAPER CALLED THE DAY "THE BLACK FRIDAY OF FORMER RULERS
OF THE DANUBE."

X826A

AUSTRIAN

LONDON, MARCH 12-(AP)-THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
WHICH ALWAYS SHUTS DOWN AT MIDNIGHT, STAYED ON THE AIR EARLY
THIS MORNING WITH BULLETINS ON THE AUSTRO-GERMAN SITUATION.

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NU45

C18295

EDITORS

THE TEXT OF CHANCELLOR HITLER'S PROCLAMATION ON AUSTRIA WILL BE STARTED SHORTLY. IT RUNS APPROXIMATELY 1,000 WORDS.

CP NU MCH 12 X844A

BULLETIN DAY LEAD FRENCH (NEW)

PARIS, MARCH 12-(CP-HAVAS)-PREMIER-DESIGNATE LEON BLUM, STRIVING TO FORM A NEW FRENCH CABINET IN THE MIDST OF THE EUROPEAN CRISIS, IN A RADIO ADDRESS TODAY APPEALED FOR A "UNION OF ALL FRENCH REPUBLICANS" TO "DEFEND REPUBLICAN LIBERTIES AND THE VITAL INTERESTS OF PEACE."

MORE X845A

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NU46

C118296

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LEAD INTERNATIONAL

BY GEORGE HAMBLETON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 12-(CP CABLE)-A GRAVELY ANXIOUS CABINET GATHERED AT 10 DOWNING STREET THIS MORNING, FACED WITH ONE OF THE GRAVEST CRISES SINCE THE GREAT WAR.

ANGLO-FRENCH REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST THE COUP IN AUSTRIA AVAILED NOTHING. PROTESTS AVAILED NOTHING. "TWENTY YEARS TOO LATE," IS THE CONTEMPTUOUS COMMENT IN BERLIN.

AND CHANCELLOR HITLER MARCHES ON. TODAY GERMAN TROOPS ENTERED PICTURESQUE INNSBRUCK, WHICH LIES HALF WAY BETWEEN THE BAVARIAN FRONTIER AND THE BRENNER PASS.

WHEN HITLER LAST THREATENED AUSTRIA PREMIER MUSSOLINI MOBILIZED TROOPS AT THE HEAD OF THE BRENNER PASS. TODAY ITALY MAKES NO MOVES. ROME NEWSPAPERS EVEN EXPRESS APPROVAL.

AND PARIS IS WATCHING THE STRANGE ITALIAN CHANGE WITH PUZZLED EYES AND ANXIOUSLY WONDERS WHAT HITLER PROMISED MUSSOLINI IN RETURN.

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NU47 XX RETURN.

HITLER'S SEIZURE OF AUSTRIA MEANS MORE THAN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE. IN THE VIEW OF MANY OBSERVERS IT MEANS CENTRAL EUROPE WILL BE DOMINATED BY GERMANY.

IT MEANS GERMAN INFLUENCE STRETCHING INTO THEFERTILE WHEAT FIELDS OF HUNGARY AND INTO THE OIL FIELDS OF RUMANIA— OIL WHICH GERMANY VITALLY NEEDS FOR WAR. IT MEANS HALF OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL LIE IN GERMAN NUTCRACKERS. IF HITLER INVADES CZECHOSLOVAKIA HE MAY EASILY PRECIPITATE A EUROPEAN WAR.

GREAT BRITAIN HAS GIVEN NO SPECIAL GUARANTEES TO EITHER CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR AUSTRIA. IN A JOINT DECLARATION OF FEB. 3, 1935, BRITAIN AND FRANCE STATED THEY CONSIDERED THEMSELVES TO BE AMONG THE POWERS WHICH WOULD CONSULT TOGETHER IF THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF THOSE COUNTRIES WERE MENACED.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS DECLARATION THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS CONSULTED YESTERDAY. THEY ARE CONSULTING AGAIN TODAY. BUT IN THE VIEW OF SIR JOHN SIMON, THE SENIOR MEMBER OF PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S CABINET, BRITAIN HAS GIVEN NO SPECIFIC GUARANTEES.

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NU48 XX GUARANTEES.

"THE OBLIGATIONS OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TOWARDS AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA," HE TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FEB. 21, "ARE THOSE WHICH EVERY MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ASSUMES TOWARDS HIS FELLOW MEMBERS. APART FROM THESE HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN NO SPECIAL GUARANTEES TO EITHER COUNTRY."

BUT FRANCE HAS GIVEN A SPECIAL GUARANTEE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. UNDER THE FIRST ARTICLE OF THE TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. UNDER THE FIRST ARTICLE OF THE TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADE AT LOCARNO SEPT. 16, 1925--THE TREATY IS STILL OPERATIVE--THE TWO COUNTRIES UNDERTAKE TO "LEND EACH OTHER MUTUAL AID AND ASSISTANCE" IF GERMANY SUBJECTS EITHER OF THEM TO UNPROVOKED ATTACK.

THUS, IF GERMANY ATTACKS CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE IS BOUND TO GIVE ASSISTANCE. BOTH FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ALSO HAVE TREATIES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH OF MORE GENERAL TERMS, WITH SOVIET RUSSIA.

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NU49 XX RUSSIA.

C 118299

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN TURN HAVE GIVEN RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES. THESE ARE CONTAINED IN NOTES EXCHANGE APRIL 1, 1936. THEY PROVIDE THAT IN THE EVENT OF EITHER BEING SUBJECTED TO UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION BY GERMANY THE OTHER WILL IMMEDIATELY GIVE ASSISTANCE.

FROM THIS TANGLE OF GUARANTEES IT IS CLEAR THAT IF GERMANY ATTACKS CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE IS BOUND TO GIVE ASSISTANCE. BUT BRITAIN DOES NOT ENTER INTO THE PICTURE UNLESS GERMANY FIRST ATTACKS FRANCE.

ARTHUR HENDERSON, LABOR, HOWEVER, HAS GIVEN NOTICE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT ON MONDAY HE WILL ASK THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER, WITH THE OBJECT OF PRESERVING EUROPEAN PEACE, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIDER THE ADVISABILITY OF GIVING AN UNDERTAKING THAT BRITAIN WILL ASSIST FRANCE IN THE EVENT OF ANY ATTACK OR INVASION OF FRENCH TERRITORY AS A RESULT OF FRANCE, IN THE APPLICATION OF HER LEAGUE AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS, ASSISTING CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO RESIST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION.

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NH50 XX AGGRESSION.

THE SWISS PRESS REGISTERS THE INDIGNATION OF SMALL NATIONS. "ONCE AGAIN," SAYS THE JOURNAL DE GENEVE, "ANGUISH GRIPS ALL THOSE WHO WOULD WISH TO SEE JUSTICE REIGN AMONG NATIONS." THE TRIBUNE DE LAUSANNE COMMENTS: "PERHAPS PEACE WILL NOT BE DISTURBED. BUT IT WILL BE A PAX GERMANICA--THE CRUSHING OF RIGHT BY MIGHT. MARCH 11 WILL RANK AS ONE OF THE SADDEST DAYS OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY."

X902A

WOMEN ESPY WEST

NEW YORK, MARCH 12-(CP)-THE ALBANIAN PRINCESSES MYZEJEH, RUHIE AND MAXHIDE WERE IN STRICT RETIREMENT LAST EVENING FOLLOWING AN EXTENSIVE SHOPPING AND SIGHT-SEEING TOUR. DESPITE EFFORTS OF MANY WOULD-BE INTERVIEWERS THE RETIREMENT REMAINED UNBROKEN UNTIL A YOUNG CANADIAN STUDENT OF JOURNALISM, CALAIS CALVERT OF SASKATOON, SUGGESTED THEIR ROYAL HIGHNESSES MIGHT BE CONSIDERING A CANADIAN VISIT AND REQUESTED AN INTERVIEW.

MORE903A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU57 March 12th Saturday C 118301

95

INSERT

IN LONDON LEAD INTERNATIONAL BY HAMBLETON AFTER FIRST PARA XX GREAT WAR.

FOR 2 1/2 HOURS THE MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE CRISIS IN MIDDLE EUROPE. ON MONDAY THEY WILL MEET AGAIN TO CARRY THE DISCUSSIONS FURTHER. OVER THE WEEKEND THE MINISTERS ARE TO REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH LONDON IN READINESS FOR ANY EMERGENCY CALL.

IT WAS ANNOUNCED AFTER THIS MORNING'S MEETING THAT A PROTEST "IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS" HAD BEEN MADE TO BERLIN AND THAT PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HALIFAX HAD PREVIOUSLY INFORMED JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT IT WAS FELT THE ACTION OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS BOUND TO HAVE A MOST DISTURBING EFFECT UPON ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND UPON PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

MORE921A

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NUSS XX EUROPE.

C118302

AFTER THE CABINET SESSION CLEMENT ATTLEE, LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WHERE LORD HALIFAX GAVE HIM THE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION. IT WAS BELIEVED HE WAS CONSULTED ON IMPORTANT DECISIONS PENDING.

BARON GEORG (CORRECT) FRANCKENSTEIN, THE AUSTRIAN MINISTER, ALSO WAS CALLED INTO CONSULTATION WITH LORD HALIFAX.

THIS COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED AFTER THE CABINET MEETING:

"THE CABINET DISCUSSED THE EVENTS IN AUSTRIA AND IT WAS REPORTED TO THEM THAT A PROTEST IN THE STRONGEST TERMS HAD BEEN MADE IN BERLIN.

"PREVIOUSLY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD MADE SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS TO HERR VON RIBBENTROP.

"THEY FELT THE ACTION OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS BOUND TO HAVE THE MOST DISTURBING EFFECT ON ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND ON PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE KEEPING IN CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND GIVING CONTINUOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE SITUATION.

MORE924A

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NU59 XX SITUATION.

"THE MINISTERS ARE REMAINING WITHIN REACH OF LONDON OVER THE WEEKEND AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THE CABINET WILL IN ANY CASE MEET AGAIN MONDAY."

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS PROBABLY WILL DEBATE THE CRISIS MONDAY.

ANGLO-FRENCH REPRESENTATIONS ETC., PICKING UP THIRD PARA.

(DEVTS) X925A

ADD ROME DAY LEAD ITALIAN XX MOVE.

DESPITE OFFICIAL SILENCE, THE REACTION OF MANY ITALIANS WAS TO RECALL THAT ITALY'S GREAT ADRIATIC PORT--TRIESTE--FORMERLY AUSTRIAN, IS LESS THAN 60 MILES SOUTH OF THE AUSTRIAN BORDER. THEY REMEMBERED GERMANY'S HISTORIC AMBITION TO HAVE A SOUTHERN PORT.

THEY REMEMBERED, TOO, THAT 250,000 ITALIANS OF GERMAN EXTRACTION LIVE IN THE SOUTHERN TYROL, WHICH ITALY RECEIVED FROM AUSTRIA AS HER SHARE OF THE WAR SPOILS.

FOUR YEARS AGO MUSSOLINI SENT ITALIAN TROOPS HURRYING TO THEIR NORTHERN BORDERS WHEN A SIMILAR NAZI PUTSCH RESULTED IN ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS.

MORE928A

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NUGO XX DOLLFUSS.

C 118304

IN HIS DILEMMA--WHETHER TO UPHOLD THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS OR ASSERT ITALY'S PREDOMINANT INTEREST IN AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE AS DEMONSTRATED IN 1934--THE DUCE APPARENTLY CHOSE TO TAKE THE FORMER COURSE.

UNDER MUSSOLINI'S DIRECTION THE FASCIST GRAND COUNCIL MET FOR NEARLY 3 1/2 HOURS LAST NIGHT WHILE RADIOS POURED OUT THE NEWS OF THE FALL OF CHANCELLOR VON SCHUSCHNIGG, THE AUSTRIAN CHAMPION OF INDEPENDENCE, BEFORE NAZI ULTIMATUMS.

AT THE CLOSE THE COUNCIL ANNOUNCED THE LONG-SUSPENDED SWORD OF DAMOCLES HAD FALLEN ON THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT, WHICH WILL BE REPLACED BY A NEW CHAMBER OF FASCIOS AND GUILDS.

BUT IT DID NOT MENTION FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE CONTROLLED FASCIST PRESS PUBLISHED STRICTLY OBJECTIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE AUSTRIAN SITUATION, WITH LITTLE COMMENT. THE TONE OF THE ARTICLES WAS FRIENDLY, HOWEVER, TOWARD THE NEW BERLIN-DOMINATED AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART.

MORE931A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU61 XX SEYSS-INQUART.

118305

BOLZANO, IN THE TYROLEAN MOUNTAIN REGION, TOOK THE NEWS OF AUSTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS WITH OUTWARD CALM. BY RADIO AND OTHER MEANS MOST CITY DWELLERS IN BOLZANO, TRENTO AND OTHER NORTHERN TOWNS KNEW OF THE TURBULENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THEIR MOUNTAINS.

MANY OLDER INHABITANTS OF THE REGION, WHO ONCE WERE AUSTRIANS, RECEIVED THE NEWS WITH MINGLED EMOTIONS. CATHOLICS AMONG THEM WATCHED ANXIOUSLY AS NAZIS TOOK CONTROL IN VIENNA. OTHERS FELT THEIR GERMANIC PRIDE RISE AS THEY DREAMED OF A NEW, POWERFUL GERMANY.

ITALIANS IN THE REGION AWAITED NEWS FROM ROME TO LEARN THE ATTITUDE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. ALL WHO HAD RADIOS TURNED THEM ON FOR NEWS FROM VIENNA. LITTLE GROUPS GATHERED IN THE COFFEE HOUSES AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION EARNESTLY.

(THE ITALIAN TYROL, FORMER AUSTRIAN TERRITORY, WAS CEDED TO ITALY AT THE CLOSE OF THE GREAT WAR. IT COMPRISES A HUGE MOUNTAIN TRIANGLE IN NORTHERN ITALY REGARDED BY ITALIANS AS NECESSARY FOR DEFENCE OF THE VENETIAN PLAIN.)

X934A

M

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NU62

95

ADD PARIS DAY LEAD FRENCH XX PEACE."

THE SOCIALIST LEADER, HEAD OF THE LARGEST PARTY IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, IS STRIVING TO FORM A CABINET TO REPLACE THE RESIGNED MINISTRY OF CAMILLE CHAUTEMPS.

AFTER MEETING PAUL RENAUD, CENTRIST LEADER, IT WAS ANNOUNCED A MINISTRY WOULD PROBABLY BE FORMED BY TONIGHT. PRACTICALLY EVERY FRENCH POLITICAL FACTION HELD IMPORTANT MEETINGS IN RAPID SUCCESSION.

A CONCENTRATION CABINET OF ALL SHADES OF OPINION WAS WHAT BLUM WAS TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER.

DEFENCE MINISTER EDOUARD DALADIER SAID HE WAS CONVINCED ALL FRENCHMEN WOULD "FLY TO THE FRONTIER AS THEY DID IN 1914 IN CASE OF A MENACE FROM ABROAD."

"AN EVENT THE IMPORTANCE OF WHICH CANNOT BE EXAGGERATED OCCURRED THIS MORNING," BLUM SAID IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

MORE937A

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NU63 XX PEOPLE. "THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY DECIDED--VIRTUALLY WITHOUT DEBATE AND WITH A SURGE OF ENTHUSIASM --TO URGE ALL REPUBLICAN PARTIES TO UNITE FOR THE DEFENCE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTIES AND THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE NATION AND PEACE.

C118307

"I DID NOT SEEK UNDULY TO STRESS THE GRAVITY OF THE CIRCUM-STANCES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION SINCE THE COUNTRY AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES MUST REMAIN CALM AND KEEP THEIR NERVES UNDER CONTROL. HOWEVER, THESE CIRCUMSTANCES FULLY JUSTIFY THIS APPEAL AND I DECLARE THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE RESISTED.

"ASSIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO FORM A GOVERNMENT IN SUCH A SERIOUS HOUR, I ADDRESSED MYSELF TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN ELEMENTS. I NOW MAKE THE SAME APPEAL TO THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WHOSE WILL I SHALL NOT FAIL TO INTERPRET IN A JUST FASHION."

THE PREMIER-DESIGNATE CONFERRED WITH LOUIS MARIN, RIGHTIST, FOLLOWING HIS RADIO ADDRESS. HE LATER PROCEEDED TO THE ELYSEE PALACE TO INFORM PRESIDENT ALBERT LEBRUN OF THE RESULTS OF HIS CONFERENCES.

MORE941A

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CES.

SHAKEN BY THE STARTLING NAZI MARCH INTO AUSTRIA, NEWSPAPERS AND OFFICIALS STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND NATIONAL UNITY TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION.

MORE X941A

BULLETIN AUSTRIAN

BERLIN, MARCH 12-(CP-HAVAS)-FIRST CONTINGENTS OF GERMAN TROOPS MARCHING INTO AUSTRIA ARRIVED AT THE BRENNER PASS ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER AT 1 P.M. TODAY, IT WAS REPORTED HERE. BRENNER PASS IS IN THE TYROL, IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF GERMANY ACROSS THE NARROW AUSTRIAN PANHANDLE.

X942A

ADD PARIS DAY LEAD FRENCH XX SITUATION.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY GAVE BLUM A HUGE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE TO CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO FORM A BROAD GOVERNMENT. THE DELEGATES VOTED AFTER THE PREMIER-DESIGNATE TOLD THEM HIS PLANS TO INCLUDE COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN "UPSET" BY AUSTRIAN EVENTS.

MORE944A

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NU66 XX EVENTS.

C 118309

THE LAST "SACRED UNION" CABINET, FORMED AUG. 26, 1914, WAS HEADED BY RENE VIVIANI. IT INCLUDED ARISTIDE BRIAND, ALEXANDRE MILLERAND AND GASTON DOUMERGUE. THE ONLY MEMBER OF THAT GOVERNMENT, WHICH LASTED UNTIL AUG. 10, 1915, ACTIVE IN POLITICS NOW IS ALBERT SARRAUT. HE SERVED THEN AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

X945A

ADD WALL ST (OPEN TO COME)

WITH WAR CLOUDS GATHERING OVER EUROPE AS A RESULT OF THE LATEST AUSTRO-GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS, BOARDROOM SENTIMENT WAS DEPRESSED BEFORE THE START OF TRADING. AT THE SAME TIME THE STUDY OF DOMESTIC BUSINESS NEWS WAS CONTINUED BY ANALYSTS.

ON THE SIDE OF MERCHANDISING STOCKS WERE REPORTS FROM MOST BRANCHES OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTION INDICATING THAT, WHILE PUBLIC SPENDING IS CURRENTLY RUNNING UNDER LAST YEAR, IT IS SHOWING MUCH LESS CONTRACTION THAN ACTIVITIES IN PRODUCTIVE INDUSTRIES.

MANY CONSUMER AND DURABLE GOODS LINES ARE AT PRESENT SAID TO BE OPERATING BELOW 1934 LEVELS WHEREAS FEW RETAILERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AUTOMOBILE DEALERS, WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE YET EXPERIENCED VOLUMES LESS THAN THOSE OF 1936.

BG946A

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NU66

C 118310

BULLETIN ASUTRIAN

BERLIN, MARCH 12-(CP-HAVAS)-GERMANY TODAY REJECTED BRITISH AND FRENCH PROTESTS AGAINST THE USE OF COERCION TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, THE OFFICIAL GERMAN NEWS AGENCY ANNOUNCED TODAY.

MORE946A

OPEN-DOLLAR 1/16 DIS, POUND 4.99 1/2, FRANC 3.20.

CPNUMAR12BG947A

ADD BERLIN LEAD GERMAN (AT 707A) XX PROCLAMATION.

HITLER DECLARED A "REAL PLEBISCITE" WOULD BE HELD IN AUSTRIA "WITHIN THE SHORTEST TIME" TO CONVINCE THE WORLD THAT THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE REALLY DESIRE A NATIONAL SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT.

HITTING AT EUROPEAN APPEASEMENT SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD INVOLVE COLONIAL QUESTIONS WITH THE AUSTRIAN ISSUE, HE SAID:

MORE948A

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NU67 XX SAID:

"IF EVEN SOLUTIONS OF COLONIAL QUESTIONS ARE TODAY MADE DEPENDENT UPON THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION OF LOWER RACES INVOLVED, THEN IT IS UNBEARABLE THAT SIX AND A HALF MILLIONS MEMBERS OF AN OLD AND GREAT CULTURED NATION, DUE TO THE CHARACTER OF THEIR REGIME, SHALL ENJOY EVEN LESS RIGHTS THAN THESE."

LEAVING FIELD MARSHAL ETC PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

BG950A

OPEN

NEW YORK, MARCH 12-(CP)-THE POUND STERLING DROPPED 1 1/4 CENTS TO $4.99 1/2 IN RELATION TO UNITED STATES FUNDS DURING OPENING DEALINGS HERE TODAY ON THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET.

THE CANADIAN DOLLAR DECLINED 1/64 CENT TO A DISCOUNT OF 1/16 CENT WHILE THE FRENCH FRANC GAINED 2 3/4 POINTS TO 3.20 CENTS.

BG950A

M

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NU68

C 118312

HITLER TEXT (1300 WORDS)

BERLIN, MARCH 12-(CP-HAVAS)-THE TEXT OF CHANCELLOR HITLER'S PROCLAMATION FOLLOWS:

IT IS WITH PROFOUND SORROW THAT WE HAVE FOR YEARS FOLLOWED THE DESTINIES OF OUR AUSTRIAN COMPATRIOTS. AN ETERNAL HISTORIC BOND, WHICH WAS BROKEN ONLY IN 1866 BUT WHICH WAS NEWLY STRENGTHENED DURING THE GREAT WAR, HAS FOR EVER ENVELOPED AUSTRIA IN THE COMMUNITY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND THEIR DESTINY.

THE SUFFERING INFLICTED ON THIS PEOPLE, FIRST FROM ABROAD, THEN FROM WITHIN, WE HAVE FELT AS IF IT WERE OUR VERY OWN, JUST AS FOR MILLIONS OF GERMAN AUSTRIANS THE MISFORTUNES OF THE REICH WERE THE CAUSE OF SIMILAR CONCERN.

WHEREAS IN GERMANY, THANKS TO THE VICTORY OF THENAZI IDEA, THE PROUD, PERSONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF A GREAT PEOPLE WAS RECOVERED, IN AUSTRIA A NEW PERIOD OF SUFFERING AND GRIEVOUS HARDSHIP BEGAN.

MORE955A

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NU69 XX BEGAN.

A REGIME WHICH WAS LACKING IN EVERY LEGAL MANDATE TRIED TO MAINTAIN ITS EXISTENCE, ALTHOUGH REJECTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE AUSTRIANPEOPLE, BY THE MOST BRUTAL METHODS OF TERROR, OF BODILY AND ECONOMIC CHASTISEMENT AND DESTRUCTION.

WE, AS A GREAT PEOPLE, HAD TO GO THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE OF SEEING MORE THAN 6,000,000 BEINGS OF THE SAME ORIGIN AS OURSELVES SUPPRESSED BY A NUMERICALLY SMALL MINORITY, WHICH SIMPLY KNEW HOW TO BRING ITSELF INTO POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OF POWER NECESSARY THERETO.

TO THIS POLITICAL DISFRANCHISEMENT AND GAGGING THERE CORRESPONDED AN ECONOMIC DECAY WHICH STOOD IN TERRIBLE CONTRAST TO THE BLOOMING OF NEW LIFE IN GERMANY.

MORE958A

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NU7095

C 118314

ADD BERLIN PROTESTS XX TODAY.

THE BRITISH AND FRENCH PROTESTS, DESCRIBED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS "INADMISSIBLE," WARNED "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORETELL THE CONSEQUENCES" OF THE GERMAN ACTION.

BG959A

95

HITLER

LONDON, MARCH 13-(AP)-A REUTERS DISPATCH FROM VIENNA SAID CHANCELLOR HITLER TODAY PASSED THROUGH BRAUNAU, HIS AUSTRIAN BIRTHPLACE, AND CONTINUED ON TOWARD LINZ.959A

ADD BERLIN HITLER TEXT XX GERMANY.

WHO COULD BLAME THESE UNHAPPY MEMBERS OF OUR RACE IF THEY DEVOTED THEIR GLANCES GLOWINGLY TOWARD THE REICH---TOWARD THIS GERMANY WITH WHOM THEIR ANCESTORS HAD BEEN LINKED DURING SO MANY CENTURIES, WITH WHOM THEY HAD ONCE FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE IN THE MOST TERRIBLE WAR OF ALL TIME, AND TO WHOSE CULTURE THEY HAD MADE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUCH GREAT VALUE IN SO MANY DOMAINS?

MORE1001A

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NU71 XX DOMAINS?

C 118315

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSONS WERE BEING SUBMITTED TO ATROCIOUS SPIRITUAL TORTURE. BUT IF THESE SUFFERINGS WERE PATIENTLY SUPPORTED DURING THE YEARS, WITH THE GROWING PRESTIGE OF THE REICH THE WILL TO BRING AN END TO THESE PERSECUTIONS GREW STRONGER AND STRONGER.

I HAVE TRIED DURING THE RECENT YEARS TO TURN THE FORMER AUSTRIAN LEADERS FROM THIS ROAD. ONLY A MADMAN COULD BELIEVE THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, HE COULD BY SUPPRESSION AND TERROR ROB THE PEOPLE OF THEIR LOVE FOR A RACE TO WHICH THEY BELONGED BY HEREDITY.

EUROPEAN HISTORY PROVES THAT IN SUCH CASES FANATICISM IS BRED THAT IS ALL THE GREATER IN CONSEQUENCE. THIS FANTICISM LEADS THE OPPRESSORS TO MORE AND MORE SEVERE METHODS OF VIOLENCE, WHICH IN THEIR TURN AUGMENT THE HATE OF THE OPPRESSED.

I HAVE TRIED MOREOVER TO CONVINCE THE RESPONSIBLE LEADERS THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A GREAT NATION, BECAUSE IT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH HER DIGNITY, TO SEE HOW MEN BELONGING TO THE SAME PEOPLE ARE OPPRESSED, PURSUED AND IMPRISONED SOLELY BECAUSE OF THEIR ORIGIN, BECAUSE THEY PROCLAIM THEIR ATTACHMENT TO THIS PEOPLE OR THEIR FAITH IN AN IDEA.

MORE1005A

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NU72 XX IDEA.

C118316

GERMANY HAD TO GIVE ASYLUM TO MORE THAN 40,000 REFUGEES. TEN THOUSAND OTHERS IN THIS LITTLE COUNTRY HAVE GONE INTO PRISON CELLS AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS WERE RUINED AND REDUCED TO POVERTY. NO NATION COULD IN THE LONG RUN STAND FOR SUCH CONDITIONS ON ITS BORDERS, EXCEPT IT DESERVED TO BE DESPISED.

I TRIED IN 1936 TO FIND SOME WAY PERMITTING HOPE FOR ALLEVIATING THIS TRAGIC DESTINY OF OUR BROTHER GERMAN PEOPLE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A REAL CONCILIATION. BUT THE ACCORD OF JULY 11 WAS ONLY SIGNED TO BE IMMEDIATELY VIOLATED THEREAFTER.

THE GREAT MAJORITY REMAINED WITHOUT RIGHTS, AND THEIR IGNOBLE STATUS OF PARIAH IN THIS STATE WAS IN NO WAY IMPROVED. WHOEVER DECLARED HIMSELF FAITHFUL TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE REMAINED PERSECUTED, WHETHER HE WAS A NAZI RAILWAY WORKER OR AN ARMY CHIEF DISTINGUISHED IN THE GREAT WAR.

I NEVERTHELESS TRIED A SECOND TIME TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING. I ATTEMPTED--I, THE ELECTED FUEHRER OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE--TO MAKE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIS REGIME, WHO PRESENTED THEMSELVES TO ME WITHOUT ANY LEGAL MANDATE, TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND THAT THIS SITUATION FINALLY BECAME INSUPPORTABLE,

MORE1010A

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NU73 XX INSUPPORTABLE, THAT THE INCREASING INDIGNATION OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE COULD NOT ALWAYS BE RESTRAINED BY MEANS OF EVER-GROWING VIOLENCE, THAT AT A CERTAIN MOMENT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE REICH TO WATCH SUCH VIOLENCE WITHOUT SAYING A WORD.

IF EVEN SOLUTIONS OF COLONIAL QUESTIONS ARE TODAY MADE DEPENDENT UPON THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION OF LOWER RACES INVOLVED, THEN IT IS UNBEARABLE THAT 6,500,000 MEMBERS OF AN OLD AND GREAT CULTURED NATION, DUE TO THE CHARACTER OF THEIR REGIME, SHALL ENJOY EVEN LESS RIGHTS THAN THESE.

I THEREFORE WISHED TO ARRIVE AT A NEW UNDERSTANDING SO THAT ALL GERMANS OF THIS COUNTRY WOULD ENJOY THE SAME RIGHTS AND HAVE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS. THIS ACCORD SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TREATY OF JULY 11, 1936.

A FEW WEEKS LATER WE WERE FORCED TO NOTE, UNFORTUNATELY, THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT EVEN DREAM OF APPLYING THAT AGREEMENT IN THE SPIRIT WHICH PRESIDED OVER ITS NEGOTIATION.

MORE1013A

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NU76

C118318

FINANCE

LIVERPOOL, MARCH 12-CAPO-AUSTRIAN DISTURBANCES INDUCED SHORT COVERING IN WHEAT FUTURES TODAY AND LAST PRICES WERE 1 1/2 TO 1 5/8D HIGHER. GREECE BOUGHT AUSTRALIAN WHEATS.

COTTON OPENED EASY AND DECLINED FURTHER TO CLOSE 12 TO 13 POINTS NET LOWER. SENTIMENT WAS UNSETTLED BY EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS AND WEAK FAR EASTERN MARKETS. PERSISTENT CONTINENTAL, BOMBAY AND GENERAL LIQUIDATION FOUND SUPPORT LACKING, EXCEPT FOR A LITTLE BUYING AGAINST ARBITRAGE SALES IN NEW YORK.

BG1023A

ADD BERLIN HITLER TEXT XXX NEGOTIATION.

...EN, IN ORDER TO SET UP AN ALIBI IN THEIR CONTINUAL TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE VERY RIGHTS OF THE GERMANS OF AUSTRIA THEY THOUGHT OF A PLEBISCITE WHICH WOULD FINALLY OUTLAW THE MAJORITY IN THAT COUNTRY.

MORE1025A

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THE FRAMEWORK OF THAT STEP WAS TO HAVE BEEN UNIQUE: A COUNTRY WHICH HAD NOT SEEN AN ELECTION FOR YEARS, WHICH HAD NO SERIOUS BASIS FOR DESIGNATING ELECTORS, PROCLAIMED AN ELECTION WHICH WAS TO TAKE PLACE IN HARDLY 3 1/2 DAYS.

THERE WAS NEITHER AN ELECTORAL LIST, AN ELECTORAL MAP, NOR PUBLIC CONTROL OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE. THERE WAS NO OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT, NO GUARANTY OF IMPARTIALITY IN COUNTING THE VOTES, AND SO FORTH.

IF THOSE ARE THE METHODS TO GIVE A REGIME A LEGAL BASIS, THEN WE, GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISTS, WERE STUPID FOR 15 YEARS.

WE ORGANIZED HUNDREDS OF ELECTORAL CONTESTS TO SECURE THE APPROVAL OF THE GERMANPEOPLE WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY.

WHEN THE LATE PRESIDENT OF THE REICH FINALLY CALLED ME TO THE GOVERNMENT, I WAS THE FUEHRER OF WHAT WAS FAR FROM THE MOST POWERFUL PARTY IN THE REICH.

SINCE THEN I HAVE ALWAYS TRIED, ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS, TO CAUSE THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO CONFIRM THE LEGALITY OF STEPS AND OF MY POSITION. THEY WERE CONFIRMED FOR ME.

BUT IF THOSE WERE GOOD METHODS WHICH VON SCHUSCHNIGG (FORMER AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR) WISHED TO ADOPT, THEN THE SAAR PLEBISCITE WAS ALSO IN ITS TIME, ONLY A TRICK TOWARDS A PEOPLE AGAINST WHOM

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C118320

NU77 1-2 XXX WHOM

[redacted]

THEY WISHED TO BAR THE BATH OF RETURN TO THE REICH.

MORE1029A

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NU78 XX REICH. C 118321

BUT HERE, WE ARE OF ANOTHER OPINION. I BELIEVE WE MAY ALL BE PROUD THAT ON THE OCCASION OF THE SAAR PLEBISCITE WE WON THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE IN SUCH AN INDISPUTABLE MANNER.

AGAINST THIS UNIQUE ATTEMPT TO FALSIFY A VOTE THE GERMAN PEOPLE OF AUSTRIA ITSELF FINALLY AROSE. BUT IF THIS TIME THE REGIME AGAIN HAD THE INTENTION OF REPRESSING THIS MOVEMENT OF PROTEST WITH EXECUTIVE MEANS, THE RESULT COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN A NEW CIVIL WAR.

BUT THE REICH COULD NOT TOLERATE THIS ON GERMAN TERRITORY, BECAUSE IT IS PART OF OUR NATION, AND THE PEOPLE HAVE PROCLAIMED THEIR FAITH IN CERTAIN OF OUR CONCEPTIONS. THE REICH WANTS PEACE AND ORDER. THAT IS WHY I HAVE RESOLVED TO EXTEND THE AID OF THE REICH TO THE MILLIONS OF GERMANS IN AUSTRIA.

SINCE MORNING SOLDIRS OF THE GERMAN DEFENCE FORCE HAVE BEEN MARCHING OVER ALL THE FRONTIERS OF GERMAN-AUSTRIA.

MOTORIZED UNITS, INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND S.S. (SCHUTZSTAFFEL, BLACKSHIRTED GUARDS) FORMATIONS ON THE GROUND, AS WELL AS THE GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE BLUE SKIES, CALLED BY THE NEW NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT IN VIENNA SHALL BE THE GUARANTOR, THAT NOW AT LAST,

MORE1084A

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NU79 XX LAST, WITHIN THE SHORTEST TIME, THE POSSIBILITY WILL BE GIVEN TO THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE BY MEANS OF A REAL PLEBISCITE TO SHAPE THEIR OWN FUTURE DESTINY.

C 118322

BEHIND THESE UNITS, HOWEVER, STAND THE WILL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ENTIRE GERMAN NATION.

I MYSELF, AS FUEHRER AND CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, SHALL BE HAPPY AGAIN TO BE ABLE TO ENTER AS A GERMAN AND A FREE CITIZEN, THIS LAND WHICH IS MY OWN LAND.

THE WORLD HOWEVER, SHALL CONVINCE ITSELF THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE IN AUSTRIA EXPERIENCE IN THESE DAYS HOURS OF DEEPEST JOY AND EMOTION. THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE SEE IN THE BRETHERN WHO HAVE HURRIED TO THEIR AID, SAVIORS FROM DIRE DISTRESS.

LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN REICH.

LONG LIVE THE SOCIALIST AUSTRIA!"

(END TEXT) BG1036A

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B37.RA.GI. PAID D.P.R. 319 C118323

CP. TORONTO ONT. MARCH 13TH. 38 1138AM.

CANADIAN PRESS, OTTAWA, ONT 319

VIENNA, - HITLER WAS ACCLAIMED BY 40,000 HYSTERICAL AUSTRIANS TODAY AS HE RODE THE TEN MILES FROM LINZ TO LEONDING, WHERE HE VISITED HIS PARENTS' GRAVE. HIS PROGRAMME FOR THE DAY WAS UNCERTAIN BUT IT WAS BELIEVED HE WOULD MAKE ANOTHER ADDRESS TO THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE IN WHICH IT WAS EXPECTED HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THE DATE OF A PLEBISCITE TO CLEAR AUSTRIAN GERMAN RELATIONS. IT WAS THOUGHT IF HE UNDERTOOK THE DRIVE TO VIENNA TODAY HIS PROGRESS WOULD BE SO SLOW HE COULD NOT ARRIVE UNTIL NIGHT.

THE DEPOSED AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR SCHUSCHNIGG WENT TO TATE, HUNGARY, A FEW MILES FROM BUDAPEST AS THE GUEST OF A FRIEND TODAY.

A RUMOR CIRCULATING IN LINZ THAT HITLER HAD ARRANGED WITH MUSSOLINI FOR THE RETURN OF SOUTH TYROL TO AUSTRIA WAS ANNOUNCED TO BE ENTIRELY UNFOUNDED.

CANADIAN PRESS.

1211PM. MARCH 13.

-GI-

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B50 TO 55 INC. PD D.P.R.

C 118324
334

CP TORONTO MAR 13TH. 38

CANADIAN PRESS, OTTAWA:

334

LONDON.- AS AUSTRIAN NAZIS STARTED A THOROUGH PURGE OF WHAT THEY TERMED "TRAITOROUS ELEMENTS" TODAY ACTING CHANCELLOR GOERING OF GERMANY AT BERLIN PREDICTED AUSTRIA SOON WOULD VOTE "PROBABLY UNANIMOUSLY" TO BECOME PART OF GERMANY.

IT WAS ESTIMATED 1,250 FORMER GOVERNMENT WORKERS, POLICE, MILITARY OFFICERS HAD BEEN JAILED IN VIENNA ALONE. ANTI-JEWISH MEASURES STARTED ON A NATIONAL SCALE AND IT WAS ANNOUNCED THEY COULD NOT JOIN SPORTS SOCIETIES. AS VIENNA RECEIVED WORD THAT CHANCELLOR HITLER WOULD NOT ARRIVE UNTIL TOMORROW ADDITIONAL GERMAN TROOPS ARRIVED BY PLANE AT THE CAPITAL.

AT THE SAME TIME FRANCE'S THREE DAY CABINET CRISIS ENDED WITH FORMATION OF A FOURTH PEOPLES FRONT GOVERNMENT UNDER LEON BLUM.

IN REGARD TO THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN SITUATION FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS REVEALED FRANCE PLANS TO STRENGTHEN THE CZECH TREATY TO PROVIDE FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST GERMANY EVEN IF HITLER SHOULD ATTEMPT PEACEFUL NAZIFICATION OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

CANADIAN PRESS,

3PM. -GI-

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CANADIAN PACIFIC TELEGRAPHS. 345 C 118325

B58RA GK PAID DPR

TORONTO ONT MARCH 13 348PM

CANADIAN PRESS 345

O T T A W A

VIENNA - PRESIDENT MIKLES RESIGNED ON DEMAND OF THE NEW NAZI GOVERNMENT TODAY AND ANSCHLUSS, ECONOMIC UNION OF AUSTRIA AND GERMANY, WAS ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, SEYSS INQUHART, WHO REPLACED SCHUSCHNIGG AS CHANCELLOR, TOOK OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL DUTIES.

IT ALSO WAS ANNOUNCED A PLEBISCITE WOULD BE HELD APRIL 10 TO PERMIT AUSTRIANS TO APPROVE OF THE UNION.

PARIS - FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL CHARGED TODAY THE NAZIS PLANNED TO DISPATCH AN ULTIMATUM TO CZECHO-SLOVAKIA'S PRESIDENT, BENES, ORDERING HIM TO AUTONOMIZE NAZIS WITHIN THAT REPUBLIC.

CANADIAN PRESS.

439 P. M.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

C 118326

3 of 1

Mr. King:

Mr. Turnbull informs me that unconfirmed radio reports have been received to the effect that:

(1) the Czechoslovakian Government are reported to have sent a note to London demanding some assurances, or else they will have to revise their whole foreign policy;

(2) Russia has troops on Czechoslovakian border to assist should any trouble develop;

(3) the British Cabinet is standing by for an emergency meeting.

E.H.

March 13, 1938

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NU2

March 13th (Sunday)

C 118327

EOS

BULLETIN

NITE LEAD AUSTRIAN

BY ALVIAN J. STEINKOFF

ASSOCIATED PRESS FOREIGN STAFF

VIENNA, MARCH 13(AP)-AUSTRIA CEASED TO BE A NATION TONIGHT AND BECAME PART OF ADOLF HITLER'S GERMAN REICH, EXTENDING FROM THE NORTH SEA ALMOST TO THE ADRIATIC.

MORE JM505P

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NU3

C118328

EOS

BULLETIN MATTER

ADD VIENNA NITE LEAD AUSTRIAN XX ADRIATIC.

THE END OF THE POLITICAL FREEDOM OF ANCIENT AUSTRIA WAS ACHIEVED BY TWO LEGAL STEPS:

FIRST, PRESIDENT WILHELM MIKLAS RESIGNED. HE HAD OPPOSED THE NAZIFICATION OF HIS COUNTRY.

THEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, THE HITLER-CHOSEN CHANCELLOR, TOOK CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY PROVIDED FOR SUCH EMERGENCY AND ANNOUNCED DECREES LEGISLATING AUSTRIA OUT OF EXISTENCE.

MORE JM507P

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C 118329

NITE LEAD FRENCH

PARIS, MARCH 16-CARD-FRANCE CONSIDERED TONIGHT MEANS TO STRENGTHEN HER TREATY WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO GUARD THAT REPUBLIC FROM ANY GERMAN MOVE AS FORMATION OF A NEW POPULAR FRONT CABINET BY SOCIALIST LEON BLUM WAS ANNOUNCED.

MORE JM508P

95

ADD PARIS NITE LEAD FRENCH XX ANNOUNCED.

THE TREATY WOULD BE REVISED, FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS SAID, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ACTION EVEN IN THE EVENT CHANCELLOR HITLER OF GERMANY SHOULD ATTEMPT PEACEFUL NAZIFICATION OF THE WAR-CREATED REPUBLIC, WITH ITS 3,500,000 GERMANS, AS WITH AUSTRIA.

EDOUARD DALADIER, MINISTER OF NATION DEFENCE AND WAR IN THE CABINET OF RADICAL-SOCIALIST CAMILLE CHAUTEMPS WHICH FELL LAST THURSDAY, ANNOUNCED BLUM SUCCESSFULLY CONSTITUTED A POPULAR FRONT MINISTRY SHORTLY BEFORE 5 P.M.

(NOON EST).

MORE JM509P

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NUS THT1 (200)

C 118330

95

NITE LEAD BRITISH (NEW)

BY GEORGE HAMBLETON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 13-(CP CABLE)-EUROPE WAITS ON PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN.

IN A SPECIAL CABINET MEETING TOMORROW THE GOVERNMENT FINALLY WILL DETERMINE ITS COURSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

AT THE END OF QUESTION TIME IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DURING THE AFTERNOON---THREE WEEKS ALMOST TO THE MINUTE SINCE ANTHONY EDEN ROSE TO TELL WHY HE RESIGNED AS FOREIGN SECRETARY--MR. CHAMBERLAIN WILL GIVE GREAT BRITAIN'S ANSWER TO GERMANY.

INDICATIONS ARE THAT IT WILL BE EMPHATIC AND TO THE POINT. IF CHANCELLOR HITLER ORDERS HIS GOOSE-STEPPING BATTALIONS INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA EUROPEAN PEACE WILL BE CHALLENGED AS IT HAS NOT BEEN CHALLENGED SINCE AUGUST, 1914.

MORE512P

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NU6 XX 1914.

C 118331

REPORTS TONIGHT ARE THAT MR.CHAMBERLAIN WILL DECLARE GREAT BRITAIN CANNOT BE DISINTERESTED IF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS ATTACKED. IF FRANCE, UNDER HER TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, HAS TO GO TO WAR TO DEFEND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREAT BRITAIN CANNOT STAND IDLY BY.

THESE REPORTS LACK OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION. IF CORRECT, THEY REPRESENT A SHARP HARDENING OF MR.CHAMBERLAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMANY.

MORE JM514P

95

SATURDAY HOCKEY SCORES

BY THE CANADIAN PRESS

NATIONAL LEAGUE

TORONTO 3 CANADIENS 3

AMERICANS 3 MAROONS 1

MORE515P

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EDITORS

C 118332

FOLLOWING STORIES FOR AM'S WERE CLEARED IN ADVANCE SATURDAYS CLEVELAND STEEL REPORT; NEW YORK DOMINION DRAM FESTIVAL ADJUDICATOR HOPES TO SEE MANY CANADIAN PLAYS; EW YORK SWING MUSIC FEUD; NEW YORK U.S.STEEL REPORT; DETROIT HAGEN SCORES VICTORY OVER MALARIA; LONDON CAT O' NINE TAILS.

CR NU MAR.16JM521P..

ADD VIENNA NITE LEAD AUSTRIAN XX EXISTENCE.

ANSCHLUSS (UNION) OF AUSTRIA TO GERMANY WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE HEIGHT OF A GREAT WAVE OF NAZI SENTIMENT, STIMULATED BY HITLER'S PRESENCE ON THE SOIL OF HIS NATIVE AUSTRIA.

HE SPENT THE DAY AT LINZ, 100 MILES WEST OF HERE, DEFERRING THE CLIMAX OF HIS TRIUMPHAL HOMECOMING, HIS ENTRY INTO VIENNA. NEAR LINZ HE VISITED THE GRAVES OF HIS PARENTS.

MORE (END EOS) JM522P

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NU9

C 118333

95

NITE LEAD CZECH (NEW)

PRAHA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MARCH 13-(AP)-OUTWARDLY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA MAINTAINED AN UNRUFFLED FRONT TODAY OVER HER PRECARIOUS POSITION IN THE JAWS OF A STRENGTHENED GERMAN VISE.

GERMAN DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES THE REICH SEEKS NO QUARREL WITH THIS WAR-CREATED REPUBLIC WERE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE. IT ALSO WAS ARGUED CZECHOSLOVAKIA MIGHT PROVE A HARDER NUT TO CRACK THAN HER NEWLY NAZIFIED NEIGHBOR, AUSTRIA, BECAUSE OF MILITARY ALLIANCES WITH SOVIET RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

ALTHOUGH CHANCELLOR HITLER'S AUSTRIAN COUP DEEPLY CHAGRINED RADICAL LEFTISTS PARTIES, IT HAS BEEN SEIZED UPON BY MORE CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS AS AIDING THEIR ARGUMENT FOR CULTIVATION OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH GERMANY.

CONSERVATIVES HAVE LONG SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH FRIENDSHIP WITH GERMANS OUTSIDE CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE 3,500,000 SUDETEN GERMANS WITHIN HER BORDERS.

MORE525P

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NUMO XX BORDERS. IT WAS HITLER'S PUBLICLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THESE GERMANS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH LED TO SPECULATION WHETHER HIS NEXT MOVE WOULD BE IN THIS DIRECTION.

JM526P

ADD VIENNA NITE LEAD AUSTRIAN XX PARENTS.

THE DEATH BLOW TO AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE WAS ADMINISTERED IN THE HISTORIC CHANCELLERY WHERE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA WAS HELD IN 1814-1815 AND WHERE IN 1934 ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS, THE LITTLE CHANCELLOR WHO FOUGHT NAZI DOCTRINE, WAS ASSASSINATED.

IT WAS A PROSAIC BUT TENSE SESSION OF THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT. MIKLAS STEPPED OUT AT SEYSS-INQUART'S DEMAND. THEN SEYSS-INQUART TOOK CHARGE AND IT WAS ALL OVER IN A MINUTE.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN BORDER HAD BEEN WIPED OUT.

MESSAGES IMMEDIATELY WENT TO HITLER AT LINZ AND TO HIS ALLY, PREMIER MUSSOLINI IN ROME. IN A FEW MINUTES IT BECAME KNOWN IN THE STREETS, WHERE DELIRIOUSLY HAPPY NAZIS WENT WILD. IN THE FIRST EXCITEMENT THERE SEEMED TO BE NO MOURNING FOR THE OLD AUSTRIA. A NEW DAY WAS BEING HAILED BY A UNITED GERMAN PEOPLE--AND THE WORLD WONDERED WHAT NEXT.

MORE528P

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NU11 XX NEXT.

THEN THE NEWS WAS FLASHED TO THE ENDS OF THE EARTH. C 118335
THE ABSORPTION OF AUSTRIA SEEMED TO BE FINAL AND COMPLETE, BUT PROVISIONS WAS ANNOUNCED FOR SOME SORT OF PLEBISCITE APRIL 10.

THE EXACT QUESTION TO BE PUT TO THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE WAS NOT KNOWN, BUT IT WAS ASSUMED THEY WOULD BE ASKED MERELY TO APPROVE AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT. THERE SEEMED NO DOUBT THE NEW NAZI AUSTRIA WOULD APPROVE.

AUSTRIA, IT WAS MADE CLEAR, WILL BE DRAWN IMMEDIATELY INTO THE GERMAN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ARTICULATED TO GERMANY'S FOUR-YEAR PLAN FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

THE AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN ARMIES ARE TO BE MERGED AND OTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE TWO STATES, NOW ONE, WERE BEING DRAWN TOGETHER.

GENERAL POLICIES OF THE GERMAN STATES WERE TO BE TAKEN OVER INTO AUSTRIA. ONE SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT WAS THAT AUSTRIAN JEWS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO WEAR THE SWASTIKA.

MINISTERS OF THE OLD CHANCELLERY SAID THE NEW GERMAN NATION WAS TO BE A LAND OF YOUTH AND VITALITY.

MORE531P

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NU12 XX VITALITY. THUS PERSONS OF BOTH SEXES WHO HAVE REACHED THE AGE OF 20 WILL BE PERMITTED TO VOTE IN THE COMING PLEBISCITE.

C118336

A BROADCAST STATED THE ANSCHLUSS DECREE, IN FIVE ARTICLES:

"1. AUSTRIA IS A LAND OF THE GERMAN REICH.

"2. ON APRIL 10 THERE WILL BE A FREE AND SECRET PLEBISCITE IN WHICH GERMAN MEN AND WOMEN (THIS MAY EXCLUDE JEWS) MAY VOTE.

"3. THE PLEBISCITE SHALL BE DECIDED BY A SIMPLE MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST.

"4. TO CARRY OUT OTHER MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORM OF THE STATE NEW DECREES WILL BE ISSUED.

"5. THESE LAWS BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON ANNOUNCEMENT (AT ONCE).

"THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS ENTRUSTED WITH CARRYING OUT THESE MEASURES."

THERE WERE INDICATIONS THIS UNION OF GERMAN-SPEAKING STATES CAME SOONER EVEN THAN HITLER HAD HOPED. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD HE HAD SEEN THIS STEP AS A VENTURE TO BE UNDERTAKEN WITHIN A FEW MONTHS, BUT DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH IT WHEN HE VISITED LINZ, WHERE HE ARRIVED YESTERDAY FROM BERLIN, AND SAW THE ALMOST FANATICAL ENTHUSIASM OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE.

MORE555P

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NU30

ADD VIENNA NITE LEAD AUSTRIAN XX PLAN."

IN VIENNA MICHAEL SKUBL, SECRETARY OF STATE, RESIGNED FROM THE HITLER-CHOSEN AUSTRIAN CABINET, LEAVING FINANCE MINISTER RUDOLF NEUMAYER THE ONLY NON-NAZI MEMBER.

SKUBL WAS PLACED IN "PROTECTIVE CUSTODY," ALONG WITH FORMER POLICE CHIEF WEISER AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE FALLEN REGIME OF KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

VON SCHUSCHNIGG HIMSELF FOUND A REFUGE AT TATA, HUNGARY, NEAR BUDAPEST.

RICHARD SCHMITZ, FORMER CATHOLIC BURGOMASTER OF VIENNA, WAS UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, SKUBL'S ASSISTANT, WAS APPOINTED SEYSS-INQUART'S REPRESENTATIVE IN PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS. SKUBL, IN A SIMILAR POST UNDER VON SCHUSCHNIGG, HAD BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO THE NAZI CAUSE.

BEFORE QUITTING MIKLAS NAMED MAJOR HUBERT KLAUSNER, NAZI LEADER, MINISTER OF POLITICAL EDUCATION.

MORE631P

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NU31 XX EDUCATION.

C 118338

AUSTRIA'S NEW NAZI MASTERS BEGAN A THOROUGH PURGE OF THEIR BEATEN ENEMIES.

NAZI SOURCES SAID HITLER HAD NOT WANTED TO COME TO VIENNA WHILE MIKLAS WAS PRESENT.

FROM LINZ HITLER SENT THIS TELEGRAM TO PREMIER MUSSOLINI:

"I SHALL NEVER FORGET THIS DAY. ADOLF HITLER."

THIS WAS CONSIDERED THANKS FOR ITALY'S SUPPORT OF THE AUSTRIAN COUP; NAZIS SAID IT WAS A REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM MUSSOLINI AGREEING TO HITLER'S MOVES, ESPECIALLY ANSCHLUSS.

TEMPORARILY AUSTRIA WILL HAVE ITS OWN OFFICIALS AND LAWS, UNTIL THE PLEBISCITE. THE QUESTION OF CURRENCIES, RE-CONCILING GERMANY'S MARK WITH AUSTRIA'S SCHILLING, WILL BE HANDLED LATER.

ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, AUSTRIA WILL HAVE A STATUS IN THE REICH LIKE BAVARIA AND SAXONY, WITH ONLY THE NAMES REMAINING TO SHOW THEIR IDENTITY.

THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR, EXCEPT FOR A 10-MILE DRIVE TO THE ~~NE~~METERY AT LEON

CEMETERY AT LEONDING, REMAINED AT LINZ, 100 MILES WEST OF THE CAPITAL. (MORE634PD)

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NU32 XX CAPITAL. THERE LAST NIGHT HE PROCLAIMED THE UNITY OF HIS "BELOVED FATHERLAND"---AUSTRIA--AND THE GERMAN REICH.

ANTI-JEWISH MEASURES ON A NATIONAL SCALE STARTED WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT JEWS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BELONG TO SPORTS SOCIETIES.

A RELIABLE ESTIMATE WAS THAT 4,350 FORMER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYES, POLICEMEN AND MILITARY OFFICERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN VIENNA ALONE AS SEYSS-INQUART MOVED TO WIPE OUT "TRAITOROUS ELEMENTS" STILL SUPPORTING THE FALLEN REGIME OF KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

JAILS, NEARLY EMPTIED RECENTLY BY THE AMNESTY WHICH HITLER ORDERED AT BERCHTESGADEN FEB.12, WERE BEING FILLED AGAIN BY THOSE WHO HAD BEEN JAILERS TO THE NAZIS.

VIENNA WAS A CHANGED CITY--CHANGED EVEN FROM ITS CELEBRATING ASPECTS OF YESTERDAY. GERMAN TROOPS WERE ARRIVING CONSTANTLY. FORMATIONS OF GERMAN BOMBERS FILLED THE SKIES. THERE WAS A GROWING FOREST OF NAZI BANNERS, AN INCREASING NUMBER OF GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLICE OFFICIALS ARRIVING.

HITLER, IN A PERSONAL LETTER TO MUSSOLINI SNUBBING HIM OF HIS D

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NU33 XX AND POLICE OFFICIALS ARRIVING. C 118340

HITLER, IN A PERSONAL LETTER TO MUSSOLINI GNOTIFYING HIM OF HIS DECISION TO TAKE AUSTRIA, PLEDGED THE BRENNER PASS, HISTORIC ALPINE GATEWAY, WOULD REMAIN THE BOUNDARY OF ITALY AND PAN-GERMANY. (MORE641P)

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NU33 XX PAN-GERMANY. THIS DISCOUNTED RUMORS HERE OF A TRANSFER OF LAND IN THE TYROL.

HITLER'S DRIVE AT NOON TO LEONDING WAS A REPETITION OF HIS ACCLAIMED PROGRESS OF YESTERDAY FROM THE FRONTIER, WHICH HE CROSSED AT BRAUNAU, HIS AUSTRIAN BIRTHPLACE, TO LINZ, CAPITAL OF UPPER AUSTRIA, WHERE HIS SPEECH PROCLAIMED AUSTRO-GERMAN UNITY AND DEFIED OTHER POWERS TO INTERFERE.

IN VIENNA THE FORMER HEADQUARTERS OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT, VON SCHUSCHNIGG'S ONE LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY, BECAME A NAZI HEADQUARTERS. A NAZI BECAME HEAD OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT ATHLETIC ORGANIZATION.

GERMAN SOLDIERS AND NAZI POLICE OCCUPIED THE GOVERNMENT BROADCASTING STATION, WHICH HENCEFORTH WILL BE CALLED THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN RADIO. AUSTRIAN NEWSPAPERS WERE BEING TAKEN IN CHARGE BY GERMAN EDITORS.

UNITS OF THE GERMAN ARMY CONTINUED THEIR STEADY SWEEP INTO AUSTRIA. AN INFANTRY FORCE WAS IN VIENNA, BROUGHT YESTERDAY BY BOMBING PLANES. THIRTEEN PLANES ARRIVED AT THE THALERHOF AIRPORT AT GRAZ, CAPITAL OF STYRIA.

MORE644P EDS MAKE ABOVE BOOK NU640

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NU35 (CORRECTD X X STYRIA. C 118342

IN VIENNA TIT WAS ANNOUNCED ALL SCHOOLS WOULD CONTINUE CLOSED TOMORROW TO CARRY ON THE CELEBRATION OF NAZI TRIUMPH.

NAZI LEADERS IN LINZ SAID THE PURGE OF "UNFRIENDLY ANTI-NAZI ELEMENTS" WAS IN FULL SWING. AMONG THOSE IN CUSTODY WERE COLONEL VOGELBUBER, SAID TO HAVE MUTTERED A DISLOYAL REMARK AFTER LAST NIGHT'S FRENZIED RECEPTION TO HITLER, AND JOHAN AIGNER, SON OF A FORMER SOCIAL CHRISTIAN LEADER, WHO WAS ACCUSED OF FIRING THE FIRST SHOT IN A LINZ AFFRAY FRIDAY IN WHICH EIGHT PERSONS WERE HURT.

AMONG THOSE WHO SUCCEEDED IN ESCAPING THE COUNTRY WAS KARL VAUGOIN, WAR MINISTER IN THE DOLLFUSS CABINET, WHO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN BUILDING UP THE AUSTRIAN ARMY AFTER THE WAR.

AUSTRIAN ARMY UNITS, IT WAS STATED, WILL LEAVE SOON FOR GERMANY "ON A FRIENDLY VISIT TO RETURN THE GERMANS' VISIT."

SWASTIKA BANNERS WERE FLOWN FROM THE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP'S PALACE IN VIENNA. AUSTRIAN CATHOLICS USED TO PROCLAIM, "THERE NEVER CAN BE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE SWASTIKA AND THE CROSS."

MORE647P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU36 XX CROSS."

ANTON REINTHALER, AGRICULTURE MINISTER IN AUSTRIA'S NEW NAZI CABINET, TOLD FARMERS HENCEFORTH THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THE ENTIRE GERMAN NATION "IN GOOD AND BAD TIMES." PRICE FLUCTUATIONS, HE SAID, WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.

THE DREAD WITH WHICH AUSTRIA'S JEWS FACED THE FUTURE INTENSIFIED. JEWISH LEADERS POINTED OUT AN ANTI-JEWISH PROGRAM COULD BE CARRIED OUT HERE MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN IT WAS IN GERMANY AFTER HITLER CAME TO POWER BECAUSE OF THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN GERMANY.

OF AUSTRIA'S 6,750,000 POPULATION, SOME 200,000 ARE JEWS BUT ABOUT 600,000 MORE, ACCORDING TO JEWISH ESTIMATES, HAVE SOME JEWISH BLOOD.

STYRIA, HOTBED OF NAZI AGITATION BEFORE THE TRIUMPH, WITNESSED DEMOLITION OF MONUMENTS OF THE FALLEN REGIME. MORE THAN 30 MONUMENTS TO DOLLFUSS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN STYRIA OUTSIDE GRAZ, WHERE THE BIG DOLLFUSS MONUMENTS WAS DESTROYED YESTERDAY.

MORE651P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU67 XX YESTERDAY.

THE NAME OF GRAZ' MOST BEAUTIFUL PARKWAY, THE DOLLFUSS RINT, HAS BEEN CHANGED TO ADOLF HITLER RINT. OTHER STYRIAN TOWNS HAVE CHANGED THE NAMES OF THEIR MAIN STREETS FROM DOLLFUSS STRASSE TO HITLER STRASSE.

NAZI LEADERS LONG UNDER A CLOUD WERE COMING INTO THEIR OWN. JOSEPH NEMETZ, NAZI, WAS MADE CHIEF OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN AUSTRIA WITH THE SPECIAL TASK OF CURING AUSTRIAN LABOR OF SOCIALISTIC TENDENCIES. HANS LUKESCH, WHO ONCE SERVED A JAIL SENTENCE FOR ILLEGAL NAZI ACTIVITY, WAS NAMED LEADER OF THE BROWN-SHIRTED S.A. TROOPERS.

JM653P.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU20 XX AGGRESSION.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE FORM OF FRANCE'S MILITARY ACTION, SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO GO TO THE AID OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A PREVIOUS STATEMENT BY DALADIER WAS RECALLED.

LAST DECEMBER HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED A LIGHTNING ATTACK INTO FOREIGN TERRITORY, USING FRANCE'S BORDER BARRIERS AS THE SPRINGBOARD, WITHOUT BEING CONTENT TO SHELTER "OURSEVES BEHIND FORTIFICATIONS."

JM6P..

95

INSERT

IN VIENNA NITE LEAD AUSTRIAN AFTER 13TH PGH XX SELF-SUFFICIENCY."

AT LINZ WHERE HITLER AND HIS AIDES CONSULTED IT WAS ANNOUNCED GERMANY HAD ADOPTED LAWS--WITH THE SAME PROVISIONS AS AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS--MAKING EFFECTIVE THE UNION OF THE TWO STATES.

MORE6:03P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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NU21 XX STATES.

A SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT SAID HITLER HAD BECOME CHIEF OF THE MERGED AUSTRO-GERMAN MILITARY FORCES AND THAT AUSTRIAN SOLDIERS IMMEDIATELY WERE TO TAKE AN OATH OF LOYALTY TO THE REICH AND HITLER.

OTHER FUNCTIONS XX ETC PICKING UP 14TH PGH.

CDEVTSO JM604P

95 FRENCH SEPARATE

PARIS, MARCH 13-(CP-HAVAS)-THE NEW FRENCH CABINET PRESENTED TONIGHT TO PRESIDENT ALBERT LEBRUN, FOLLOWS:

PREMIER AND FINANCE MINISTER--LEON BLUM, SOCIALIST.

DEFENCE AND VICE-PREMIER--EDUARD DALADIER, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

MINISTERS OF STATE--PAUL FAURE, SOCIALIST; VINCENT AURIOL, SOCIALIST; THEODORE STEEG, LEFT DEMOCRAT; ALBERT SARRAUT, RADICAL SOCIALIST; MAURICE VIOLETTE, SOCIALIST.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS--A-JOSEPH PAUL-BONCOUR, UNITED SOCIALIST.

PROPAGANDA--LUDOVIC FROSSARD, UNITED SOCIALIST.

INTERIOR--MARX DORMOY, SOCIALIST.

PUBLIC HEALTH--FERNAND GENTIN, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

MORE606P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU22 XX SOCIALIST.

C 118347

JUSTICE--MARC RUCART, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

AIR--GUY LA CHAMBRE, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

EDUCATION--JEAN ZAY, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

COMMERCE--PIERRE COT, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

PUBLIC WORKS--JULES MOCH, SOCIALIST.

COMMUNICATIONS--J.B.LEBAS, SOCIALIST.

AGRICULTURE--GEORGES MONNET, SOCIALIST.

LABOR--ALBERT SEROL, SOCIALIST.

COLONIES--MARIUS MOUTET, SOCIALIST.

PENSIONS--ALBERT RIVIERE, SOCIALIST.

BUDGET--CHARLES SPINASSE, SOCIALIST.

NAVY--CESAR CAMPINCHI, RADICAL SOCIALIST.

JM607P

THT

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU26 THT1

C 118348

ADD LONDON NITE LEAD BRITISH BY HAMBLETON XX GERMANY.

HITLER'S DESTRUCTION OF AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE HAS STUNG BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION TO THE QUICK. THE CHAMBERLAIN GOVERNMENT HAD JUST OPENED A SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH ITALY AND GERMANY. THE AIM WAS BY RESTORING CONFIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PEACE ON A FIRM BASIS.

THE VALUE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW IS DESTROYED.

"ONE PURPOSE FOR WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH HITLER WAS APPEASEMENT," COMMENTED THE SUNDAY TIMES (INDEPENDENT) IN AN EDITORIAL.

"THAT PURPOSE COULD BE ATTAINED IN ONE WAY ONLY--BY THE REMOVAL OF SUSPICION AND DISTRUST, BY CONCILIATION, BY JUST DEALING WITH GENUINE GRIEVANCES, BY DISPELLING THE FEAR THAT ALL OVER EUROPE NOW PARALYSES EVERY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

"HITLER'S VIOLATION OF AUSTRIA IS A NEGATION OF ALL THAT. X X X TO PROCEED NOW WITH THE TALKS WITH BERLIN ABOUT APPEASEMENT WOULD BE MOCKERY."

MORE61OP

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU24 XX MOCKERY."

HER EFFORTS TO SECURE CONCERTED ACTION TO RESTORE AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE REJECTED BY ITALY, FRANCE NOW IS PRESSING FOR A JOINT ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION THAT THE INDEPENDENCE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BE SAFEGUARDED.

THE FRENCH PRESS TODAY MAKES A DIRECT APPEAL TO BRITAIN.

"AS HITLER MAKES NO MYSTERY ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS," WRITES LUCIEN BOURGUES, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT OF THE PETIT PARISIEN (INDEPENDENT), "EVERYTHING WILL NOW BE PUT INTO MOTION FOR THE GUARANTEEING OF THE PRAGUE GOVERNMENT AGAINST AN ULTIMATUM WHICH THIS TIME WOULD SIGNAL A EUROPEAN CONFLICT.

"BERLIN MUST KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT BEHIND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE REICH WOULD MEET STERN DETERMINATION AND INVICIBLE FORCE.

"IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS IF BRITISH HESITATION, ON A PAR WITH THAT WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR OF 1914, SHOULD ALLOW GERMANY TO CHERISH THE HOPE OF A SECOND SUCCESS."

FRANCE REINFORCED HER TROOPS ALONG THE MAGINIT LINE, THE RIBBON OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS ALONG HER GERMAN FRONTIER.

MORE614P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

C 118350

BRITISH, FRENCH AND CZECH DIPLOMATS WERE IN CLOSE CONSULTATION DURING THE DAY. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, VISCOUNT HALIFAX, RECEIVED CHARLES CORBIN AND JAN MASARYK, FRENCH AND CZECH ENVOYS, AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

FOREIGN MINISTER JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP OF GERMANY, WHO WAS IN LONDON THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD WHEN GERMAN TROOPS ENTERED AUSTRIA, TOOK OFF FROM CROYDON AIRDROME IN A SPECIAL PLANE FOR BERLIN.

HE CAME TO LONDON LAST WEEK FOR FRIENDSHIP TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND LORD HALIFAX, AND TO TAKE FORMA LEAVE OF HIS POST AS AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN.

JM616P.

ADD BERLIN NITE LEAD GERMAN XX FOLLOWS."

GOERING SHARPLY REJECTED PROTESTS BY OTHER NATIONS. GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE HAD SHARPLY PROTESTED GERMAN COERCION OF AUSTRIA.

MORE617P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

C 118351

"THIS QUESTION," HE SAID, "IS SOMETHING WHICH THE GERMAN PEOPLE ALONE IN THEIR ENTIREY MUST DECIDE.

"WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE WHEN GERMANS WISH TO JOIN GERMANS?

"WHAT STATE HAS BEEN INJURED OR HARMED?

"WHAT OTHER INTERESTS COULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED WHEN THERE IS BUT ONE INTEREST--THE GERMANS?"

HE SPOKE WITH GRATITUDE ON THE ATTITUDE OF PREMIER MUSSOLINI OF ITALY ON THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION.

"WORDS ABOUT FIDELITY AND FRIENDSHIP WHICH IL DUCE ADDRESSED TO US LAST YEAR," GOERING SAID, "HAVE BEEN TRANSLATED INTO A SHINING DEED.

"HIS CHIVALROUS BEARING AND HIS DEEP UNDERSTANDING FOR GERMANY'S HONOR, PROVEN ONCE AGAIN JUST NOW IN A DECISIVE AND EXALTED HOUR, WILL EVER REMAIN UNFORGOTTEN."

THE ACTING CHANCELLOR REITERATED GERMANY'S DESIRE FOR PEACE WITH HONOR AND HER INSISTENCE ON PROTECTING "THE RIGHTS OF ALL GERMANS, EVEN THOSE BEYOND THE BORDERS."

MORE621P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU27 XX BORDERS."

C118352

HE ALSO REITERATED THE REICH'S DETERMINATION TO FIGHT BOLSHEVISM AND THE DECISION "FURTHER TO EXPAND ITS DEFENCE FORCE AND KEEP IT STRONG AS A GUARANTOR FOR THE PEACE OF THE WORLD."

GOERING POINTED OUT HOW THE MONTH OF MARCH OFTEN WITNESSED GREAT MOMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF GERMANY, OF WHICH THE MORE RECENT EVIDENCES WERE THE FIRST ENTRANCE OF NAZIS INTO THE REICHSTAG IN 1933, REARMAMENT IN 1935, REMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND IN 1936 AND AUSTRIAN ANSCHLUSS IN 1938.

THE GATHERING AT THE OPERA HOUSE WAS THE FIRST SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE THIRD REICH FROM WHICH HITLER WAS ABSENT. ABSENT ALSO WERE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS AND THE AUSTRIAN MINISTER. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED CHIEFLY BY OFFICERS OF THE LATE IMPERIAL AND PRESENT NAZI ARMIES, MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, LEADERS OF THE NAZI PARTY AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.

"WHOEVER ATTACKS GERMANS ATTACKS GERMANY, AND WILL FACE GERMAN GUNS READY FOR FIRING," GOERING SAID. "THIS IS THE LESSON OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE RED FORTIFICATIONS OF ALMERIA."

MORE624P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU28 XX ALMERIA."

(A SCORE OF CIVILIANS WERE KILLED AND 150 WOUNDED AT ALMERIA, SPANISH GOVERNMENT SEAPORT, WHEN GERMAN WARSHIPS BOMBARDED IT IN REPRISAL FOR THE BOMBING OF A GERMAN VESSEL)

ITALY, JAPAN AND GERMANY WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT BOLSHEVISM TO THE BITTER END, GOERING DECLARED. REPEATING THE CLAIM THAT THE GERMAN ARMY WAS NOT DEFEATED IN THE GREAT WAR, GOERING SAID THAT "TODAY WE KNOW THAT ALL THESE SACRIFICES WERE NOT IN VAIN."

GOERING PRAISED THE FUEHRER, "THEN A SIMPLE SOLDIER, TODAY THE SUPREME CHIEF OF THE GERMAN ARMIES, OUR BELOEVED CHIEF."

DECLARING THAT KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG, FORMER CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA, HAD DOUBLE-CROSSED HITLER IN SETTING A PLEBISCITE ON AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE FOR TODAY, GOERING SAID THAT ARTHUR VON SEYSS-INQUART, NEW NAZI CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA, HAD ASKED THE GERMAN ARMY TO ENTER THE COUNTRY "NOT AS CONQUERORS, BUT AS LIBERATORS."

"WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE," HE ASKED, "WHEN GERMANS ARE REUNITED TO GERMANS?"

JM626P

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CANADA

NU29

95 AUSTRIAN SEPARATE

C 118354

BERLIN, MARCH 13-(CP-HAVAS)-CHANCELLOR HITLER TONIGHT ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY AND INCORPORATED IT IN THE REGULAR GERMAN ARMY.

IN A DECREE SIGNED BY HITLER AT LINZ AND MADE PUBLIC HERE, THE GERMAN LEADER DECLARED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSCHLUSS PROCLAMATION UNITING AUSTRIA AND GERMANY, THE AUSTRIAN ARMY, EFFECTIVE TODAY IS PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE FUEHRER AND BECOMES PART OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

GENERAL FEDOR VON BOCK, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH GERMAN ARMY, WAS PLACED IN COMMAND OF ALL AUSTRIAN TROOPS. ALL MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL ARMY IMMEDIATELY MUST TAKE AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE FUEHRER, "THEIR SUPREME LEADER," THE DECREE SAID.

AT ZURICH IT WAS REPORTED SEVERAL BATTALIONS OF AUSTRIAN TROOPS LEFT VIENNA BY TRAIN FOR GERMANY IN THE FIRST MOVE OF A PLAN TO EXCHANGE AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN REGULAR ARMY DETACHMENTS.

JM629P

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CANADA

NU83

C 118355

BULLETIN LEAD AUSTRIA

LONDON, MARCH 14-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN OPENED AN OUTLINE OF HIS RESHAPED EUROPEAN POLICY TODAY BY CHALLENGING THE GERMAN STATEMENT THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAD "NO RIGHT" TO INTEREST HERSELF IN AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE.

MORE X1114A

M

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CANADA

NU83

C 118355

BULLETIN LEAD AUSTRIA

LONDON, MARCH 14-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN OPENED AN OUTLINE OF HIS RESHAPED EUROPEAN POLICY TODAY BY CHALLENGING THE GERMAN STATEMENT THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAD "NO RIGHT" TO INTEREST HERSELF IN AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE.

MORE X1114A

M

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CANADA

NUBG XX TENSELY.

THE PRIME MINISTER DISCLOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT GERMANY HAD REPLIED SHARPLY TO "GRAVE" BRITISH PROTESTS OVER THE ABSORPTION OF AUSTRIA.

C 118356

THE REPLY HAD COME FROM BARON KONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, HEAD OF GERMANY'S NEW SECRET COUNCIL. HIS LETTER SAID "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT WITHIN ITS RIGHT IN CLAIMING THE ROLE OF PROTECTOR OF AUSTRIA."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN COMMENTED:

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE AND MUST ALWAYS BE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE."

MORE X1121A

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CANADA

NU88

C 118357

BULLETIN MATTER ADD LONDON LEAD AUSTRIA XX EUROPE."

DIPLOMATIC GALLERIES WERE JAMMED FOR THE HISTORIC SESSION.

HIS SUPPORTERS CHEERED HIM LOUDLY WHEN HE ARRIVED FROM BUCK-INGHAM PALACE AFTER LUNCHEON WITH THE KING.

ONE LABOR MEMBER, HOWEVER, SHOUTED:

"WHAT ARE THE CHEERS FOR?--IT'S A GREAT DISASTER."

VON NEURATH'S LETTER TO SIR NEVILE HENDERSON, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN, SAID:

"THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER LEFT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN DOUBT THAT THE FORM OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REICH AND AUSTRIA CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE WHICH IS NO CONCERN OF THIRD POWERS.

"THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MUST FROM THE OUTSET REJECT AS INADMISSIBLE THE PROTEST LODGED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, EVEN THOUGH ONLY CONDITIONAL."

TO CHEERS MR. CHAMBERLAIN ASSERTED:

"THE METHODS ADOPTED THROUGHOUT THESE TENSE EVENTS CALL FOR THE SEVEREST CONDEMNATION AND HAVE ADMINISTERED A PROFOUND SHOCK TO ALL WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THE PRESERVATION OF EUROPEAN PEACE.

MORE X1128A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU90

C 118358

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD AUSTRIA

LONDON, MARCH 14-CAPO-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TODAY PLAINLY WARNED GERMANY THAT GREAT BRITAIN WOULD EXPAND HER VAST REARMAMENT PROGRAM TO MATCH FORCE WITH FORCE IN ANSWER TO CHANCELLOR HITLER'S ABSORPTION OF AUSTRIA.

MORE X1152A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU91

C 118359

BULLETIN MATTER ADD LONDON LEAD AUSTRIA (CORRECTD XX PEACE.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID "THE DEFENCE PROGRAM WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES"--A VIRTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE NATION'S £1,500,000,000 ($7,500,000,000) REARMAMENT DRIVE WOULD BE EXPANDED EVEN FURTHER.

"THESE EVENTS CANNOT BE REGARDED BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WITH INDIFFERENCE," THE PRIME MINISTER SAID, REFERRING TO HITLER'S SWIFT COUP IN AUSTRIA.

"THEY ARE BOUND TO HAVE EFFECTS WHICH CANNOT YET BE MEASURED.

"WE HAVE ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR DEFENCE PROGRAMS WERE FLEXIBLE AND THAT THEY WOULD BE REVIEWED AT ANY TIME IN THE LIGHT OF ANY DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

"IT WOULD BE IDLE TO PRETEND THAT RECENT EVENTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE OF THE KIND WE HAD IN MIND.

"WE MUST CONSIDER THE NEW SITUATION QUICKLY, BUT WITH FULL JUDGMENT XX.

"IT IS UNTRUE TO SUGGEST THAT WE EVER GAVE GERMANY OUR ASSENT OR ENCOURAGEMENT TO ENFORCE THE ABSORPTION OF AUSTRIA INTO THE GERMAN REICH.

MORE1156A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU92 XX REICH.

"THE HARD FACT IS THAT NOTHING COULD HAVE ARRESTED THE C 118360
ACTION BY GERMANY UNLESS WE AND OTHERS WITH US HAD BEEN PREPARED
TO USE FORCE TO PREVENT IT.

"ACCORDINGLY WE HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE FRESH REVIEWS AND IN
DUE COURSE WE SHALL ANNOUNCE WHAT FURTHER STEPS WE MAY THINK IT
NECESSARY TO TAKE."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN CONCLUDED AMID CHEERS.

X1138A

FINANCE

EAST BUFFALO, N.Y., MARCH 14-(AP)-HOGS 2,000;
FAIRLY ACTIVE TO ALL INTERESTS; GOOD AND CHOICE 160-250
LBS. USUALLY AVERAGING 180-220 LBS. 10.15; 120-150 LBS.
9.25-9.75; TRUCKED INS 160-240 LBS. 9.75-10.00; PACKING SOWS
7.90-8.25.

MORE1138A

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CANADA

FOR TORONT

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C 118361

NU94

BULLETIN MATTER ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD AUSTRIA XX AUSTRIA.

HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER, IN A VITAL STATEMENT OF POLICY BEFORE A HOUSE OF COMMONS PACKED AND TENSE, DID NOT PROMISE BRITISH BACKING TO FRANCE IF SHE SHOULD GO TO WAR TO SAVE CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM PAN-GERMANISM.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD BEEN IN CONSULTATION WITH GREAT BRITAIN BUT HE REFUSED TO DISCUSS WHAT BRITAIN WOULD DO TO GUARD THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REPUBLIC FOR WHOSE 3,500,000 SUDETEN GERMANS HITLER HAS PROCLAIMED HIMSELF PROTECTOR.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN BLUNTLY REJECTED A GERMAN STATEMENT THAT BRITAIN HAD NO RIGHT TO INTEREST HERSELF IN AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE, THE GERMAN ANSWER TO BRITISH PROTESTS OVER THE ANNEXATION.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN INSISTED BRITAIN "MUST ALWAYS BE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE."

BARON KONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, HEAD OF GERMANY'S NEW SECRET COUNCIL, HAD WRITTEN "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT WITHIN ITS RIGHT IN CLAIMING THE ROLE OF PROTECTOR OF AUSTRIA."

(MORE) X1148A

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118362

ADD PARIS LEAD FRENCH XX CROSSED.

THE AIRCRAFT TO BE SENT BY FRANCE AND RUSSIA WOULD ACT AS A BUFFER FOR THE CZECH ARMY WHILE IT WAS BEING MOBILIZED.

RUSSIA, IT WAS SAID, INFORMED FRANCE THAT SOVIET RAILWAY LINES RECENTLY HAD BEEN CONNECTED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S TRANSPORTATION NETWORK THROUGH AN INTERVENING RUMANIAN RAILWAY.

BOTH FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION--THEMSELVES BOUND BY A MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT--HAVE TREATIES DIRECTLY WITH PRAHA, PLEDGING MILITARY AID. TODAY'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE PLEDGE BETWEEN THEM WAS CONSIDERED BY DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES TO HAVE REINFORCED THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT.

MORE X1112A

BULLETIN

ROME, MARCH 16-(AP)-THE MAP OF EUROPE HAS BEEN CHANGED BY THE EVENTS IN AUSTRIA, PREMIER MUSSOLINI DECLARED IN HIS ADDRESS TODAY IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

MORE X1113A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU95

C118363

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME DUCE XX DEPUTIES.

TUMULTUOUS CHEERS GREETED IL DUCE AS HE MOUNTED THE ROSTRUM FOR WHAT WAS EXPECTED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SPEECHES OF HIS CAREER.

DIPLOMATIC GALLERIES IN THE CHAMBER WERE FILLED WITH ENVOYS OF FOREIGN POWERS.

MORE X1116A

ADD PARIS LEAD FRENCH XX BLUM.

POLITICAL QUARTERS INDICATED PREMIER BLUM WOULD MAKE A MINISTERIAL DECLARATION TOMORROW IN THE CHAMBER AND SENATE, THIS TO BE FOLLOWED BY DEBATE.

THE PREMIER WAS EXPECTED TO ASK FOR A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE ONLY IN THE CHAMBER, FEARING THAT A SENATE VOTE MIGHT BE AN UPSET.

PREMIER ETC., PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

X1118A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU96

FINANCE

118364

EAST BUFFALO, N.Y., MARCH 16-(AP)-HOGS 400; ACTIVE 15 UNDER MONDAY AND STEADY WITH TUESDAY'S DECLINE; GOOD AND CHOICE 160-240 LBS. AVERAGING 180-220 LBS. 10.00; SIMILAR WEIGHT TRUCKED INS 9.60-9.75.

MORE X1119A

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME DUCE XX POWERS.

MUSSOLINI ENTERED THE CHAMBER A FEW MINUTES BEFORE 5 P.M. (11 A.M. EST), PRECEDED BY ACHILLE STARACE, SECRETARY OF THE FASCIST PARTY, AND COUNT GALEAZZO CIANO, HIS FOREIGN MINISTER.

THE DUCE DECLARED, AFTER A REVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA, THAT THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES THAT AUSTRIA MUST REMAIN FOR EVER INDEPENDENT WAS "ABSURD AND PRECARIOUS."

X1120A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118365

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME DUCE XX PRECARIOUS."

HE RECALLED AUSTRIA'S ASSASSINATED CHANCELLOR, ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS, HAD PROCLAIMED AUSTRIA A "CHRISTIAN AND INDEPENDENT STATE."

FROM THAT MOMENT, SAID THE DUCE, STRIFE BETWEEN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT AND NAZIS BEGAN.

MORE X1122A

ADD EAST BUFFALO LIVESTOCKS XX 9.75.

CATTLE 450; STEERS AND HEIFERS FULLY STEADY; COWS AND BULLS SLOW, WEAK; MEDIUM STEERS, MAINLY CANADIANS, 7.50-7.75; HEIFERS TO 7.75; FLESHY COWS 5.50; CUTTER GRADES 4.00-5.00; LIGHTWEIGHT BULLS 5.40-6.00.

CALVES 200; VEALERS RATHER SLOW; WEAK TO MOSTLY 50 LOWER; GOOD AND CHOICE 11.00; SOME HELD 11.50; PLAIN AND MEDIUM 7.00-9.50.

SHEEP 700; LAMBS 25 LOWER; LOCAL DEMAND NARROW; GOOD AND CHOICE 95 LBS. DOWN 9.25-9.50; MEDIUM AND MIXED 7.75-9.00; FAT EWES 5.50 DOWN.

X1123A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU98

C 118366

BULLETIN LEAD DUCE

ROME, MARCH 16-(AP)-PREMIER MUSSOLINI DECLARED TODAY BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IT WOULD HAVE BEEN "AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ABSURDITY" FOR AUSTRIA, A GERMAN STATE, TO HAVE REMAINED INDEPENDENT AND ANTI-GERMAN.

MORE X1125A

BULLETIN LEAD INTERNATIONAL

BY GEORGE HAMBLETON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 16-(CP CABLE)-RISING AT THE END OF QUESTION TIME IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY, CLEMENT ATTLEE, LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, MOVED ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE TO DISCUSS SPAIN.

MORE X1126A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU100

C 118367

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME LEAD DUCE XX ANTI-GERMAN.

IL DUCE REFERRED TO HIS DISPATCH OF ITALIAN TROOPS TO THE BRENNER PASS WHEN AUSTRIA'S CHANCELLOR ENGELBERT DOLLFUSS WAS ASSASSINATED JULY 25, 1934--A GESTURE TO PREVENT NAZIFICATION OF AUSTRIA.

"NO AUSTRIAN EVER THANKED ME FOR THAT," HE SAID.

HE DECLARED THE VERSAILLES TREATY PROVISION THAT AUSTRIA MUST REMAIN FOR EVER INDEPENDENT WAS "ABSURD AND PRECARIOUS."

MORE X1A

95

ADD LONDON LEAD INTERNATIONAL BY HAMBLETON XX SPAIN.

THE WHOLE LABOR PARTY AND PRACTICALLY ALL THE OPPOSITION LIBERALS LED BY SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR ROSE TO SUPPORT THE LABOR LEADER.

THUS THE MOTION WAS ACCEPTED. DEBATE WILL BEGIN AT 7.30 P.M. (2.30 P.M. EST).

SMALL GROUPS ETC., PICKING UP FIRST PARA OF DAY LEAD.

X1131A

M

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU101

C 118368

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME LEAD DUCE XX PRECARIOUS."

HE DENIED ITALY EVER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO GUARANTEE PERMANENTLY AUSTRIAN INDEPENDENCE.

"WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS SHOWS THAT THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE WERE OVERWHELMINGLY FOR ANSCHLUSS," MUSSOLINI DECLARED.

HE ASKED WHETHER THE WORLD COULD BE "SO IGNORANT AS TO BELIEVE THAT ITALY COULD BE IMPRESSED BY FIGURES OF THE NUMBER OF GERMANS" NOW UPON THE BORDERS OF ITALY.

X1133A

ADD NY WHITNEY XX INSOLVENCY.

THE OTHER INDICTMENT, TO WHICH WHITNEY PLEADED GUILTY MONDAY, CONCERNED THE LARCENY OF $105,000 IN SECURITIES BELONGING TO THE ESTATE OF HIS FATHER-IN-LAW, GEORGE R. SHELDON, WHICH WHITNEY WAS ACCUSED OF USING AS COLLATERAL FOR A BANK LOAN.

X1134A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU108

C 118369

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME LEAD DUCE XX ITALY.

WHILE THE DEPUTIES CHEERED, MUSSOLINI RECALLED THAT "DURING THE ETHIOPIAN WAR WE WERE NOT EVEN INTIMIDATED BY 52 NATIONS" WHICH APPLIED SANCTIONS AGAINST ITALY.

HE TOLD THE ITALIAN PEOPLE, WHO HAD SHOWN UNEASINESS BY THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY TO THE ITALIAN FRONTIER, TO HAVE NO ALARM OVER THE MAINTAINENCE OF ITALY'S PRESENT BORDERS.

"OUR FRONTIERS ARE SACRED," HE DECLARED. "WE WON'T DISCUSS THEM. WE WILL DEFEND THEM."

X1138A

M

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU104

C 118370

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD DUCE

ROME, MARCH 16-(CAPO-BENITO MUSSOLINI TODAY PROMISED HIS PEOPLE THAT THE PAN-GERMAN EXPANSION NEVER WOULD PENETRATE ITALIAN FRONTIERS BUT AT THE SAME TIME PRONOUNCED A BENEDICTION ON ADOLF HITLER'S ABSORPTION OF AUSTRIA.

MORE X1140A

95

INSERT

IN BERLIN LEAD GERMAN AFTER THIRD PARA XX TODAY.

HE ARRIVED HERE AT 5:02 P.M. (11:02 A.M. EST)

THE ARMY SOURCE ETC., PICKING UP FOURTH PARA (DEVTO

CP NU MCH 16 X1141A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU406

BULLETIN MATTER ADD ROME SECOND LEAD DUCE XX AUSTRIA.

C 118371

"OUR FRONTIERS ARE SACRED," THE DUCE SHOUTED TO AN ASSEMBLAGE THAT FILLED THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

"WE WILL NOT DISCUSS THEM. WE WILL DEFEND THEM."

HIS PROMISE WAS BROADCAST TO ALL ITALY. IT WAS THE PREMIER'S REPLY TO DOUBTS OF HIS OWN PEOPLE ALARMED OVER THE EXTENSION OF A MIGHTY GERMAN STATE TO THE BRENNER PASS, GATEWAY BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND ITALY.

MORE X1147A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

mar 22/38

C118372

NU97

WITH LONDON BRITISH

Note - re assurance present crisis

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND, MARCH 22-(CP-HAVAS)-THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN TODAY SAID THE SUPPORT LIKELY TO BE GIVEN BY CANADA AND OTHER DOMINIONS TO BRITISH EFFORTS TO RESIST GERMAN AGGRESSION DEPENDS LARGELY ON THE SINCERITY WITH WHICH THIS COUNTRY PURSUES ITS EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

ANALYZING DOMINION REACTION TO THE BRITISH MOVES, THE NEWSPAPER SAID THAT THUS FAR IT HAD GENERALLY CONFORMED TO EXPECTATIONS.

"THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER QUICKLY ASSURED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA'S WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT," IT CONTINUED. "EIRE KEEPS QUIET BUT PRIME MINISTER EAMON DE VALERA STATED THE INEVITABILITY OF HER POSITION CLEARLY ENOUGH. SHE WILL HOLD HERSELF FORMALLY ALOOF WITH THE PRACTICAL SENSE THAT HER FORTUNES HANG ON OURS.

"SOUTH AFRICA TEMPORIZES AND ALTHOUGH THE MASS OPINION IS FOR A STRONG BRITISH POLICY THE SENTIMENT FOR NEUTRALITY IS TOO POWERFUL TO BE OVERCOME IN A MOMENT. SOUTH AFRICA WILL WORK OUT HER OWN POLICY WITH DELIBERATE INDEPENDENCE.

MORE1115A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU98 XX INDEPENDENCE.

"IN CANADA THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MORE DEFINITE. PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING HAS ANNOUNCED THAT CANADA WOULD LIKELY REGARD AN ATTACK ON GREAT BRITAIN AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION MENACING FREEDOM IN ALL PARTS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH BUT ADDED 'IF IT WERE A CASE OF DISPUTE ON TRADE OR PRESTIGE IN SOME FAR CORNER OF THE WORLD THAT WOULD RAISE QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION.'

"THE DECLARATION IS AN INTERESTING ONE FOR ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT SEEM TO COMMIT CANADA PRETTY FAR IT ALSO RETAINS THE RIGHT OF CANADA'S FREEDOM OF DECISION UPON WHICH MR. MACKENZIE KING ALWAYS HAS INSISTED.

"IT IS PRETTY CERTAIN THAT IN CANADA AND IN ALL OTHER DOMINIONS THE SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN WILL RISE IN PROPORTION AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PURSUES A GENUINELY COLLECTIVE POLICY AND NOT MERELY A SELFISH IMPERIALISTIC ONE. THE DECISION WILL BE DETERMINED BY EVENTS."

X1118A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU106 XX CLOSE.

THE POUND STERLING WAS UNCHANGED FROM THE OPENING AT $4.68 5/16, 1/16 CENT OFF YESTERDAY'S CLOSING RATE WHILE THE FRANC PICKED UP 1/16 POINT FROM THE MORNING TO 2.64 7/8, EQUAL TO THE PREVIOUS CLOSE.

X1144A

INTERNATIONAL AT A GLANCE

BY THE CANADIAN PRESS

KAUNAS--LITHUANIA GIVES MEMEL BACK TO GERMANY; PROCLAIMS STATE OF EMERGENCY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY AS TROOPS WITHDRAW FROM CEDED BALTIC AREA.

BERLIN--HITLER LEAVES FOR BATTLESHIP JOURNEY TO MEMEL; DANZIG EXPECTS RETURN OF FREE CITY TO GERMANY; POLAND WORRIED.

LONDON--BRITAIN SAYS GERMANY THREATENED FORCE TO GET MEMEL; CONSIDERS CALLING SPECIAL LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING TO CONSIDER GERMAN EXPANSION.

PARIS--CONVERSATIONS FOR FRENCH-ITALIAN RECONCILIATION REPORTED UNDER WAY; FRENCH FRIEND OF MUSSOLINI ARRIVES IN PARIS ON SECRET MISSION.

MORE1146A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU107 XX MISSION.

C 118375

ROME--ITALY PICTURED BY HIGH FASCIST AS WITH GERMANY BOTH IN WAR AND PEACE; DEMOCRACIES WARNED THAT JOINT ACTION AGAINST AXIS MIGHT BRING WAR.

REYKJAVIK--PREMIER OF ICELAND SAYS GERMANY SEEKING COMMERCIAL AIR BASES IN ICELAND.

COPENHAGEN--PREMIER DECLARES DANISH NAZIS WANT GERMANY TO TREAT DENMARK AS SECOND CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

X1148A

BULLETIN THIRD LEAD LITHUANIAN

KAUNAS, MARCH 22-(AP)-THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA SURRENDERED MEMEL, THE SEAPORT SHE ACQUIRED AFTER THE GREAT WAR, TO THE ADVANCING GERMAN REICH TODAY IN ANSWER TO WHAT SEMI-OFFICIAL SOURCES SAID WAS A THREAT THAT HER ENTIRE STATE WOULD BE TAKEN OVER IF SHE DID NOT COMPLY.

MORE X1148A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU107

C 118376

DENVER, MARCH 22-(AP)-COUNT JEAN DE BEAUMONT SAID TODAY HE WAS BREAKING A FRIDAY APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO SPEED TO PARIS TO SIT WITH THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ON EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS.

COUNT BEAUMONT, SECRETARY OF THE FRENCH AIR COMMISSION, WAS ENROUTE BY AIR TRANSPORT FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO NEW YORK.

HE SAID WAR WOULD COME SHORTLY IN EUROPE UNLESS CHANCELLOR HITLER STOPPED TO "DIGEST HIS MOST RECENT GAINS."

X1150A

95

INSERT

IN LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH AFTER FIRST PARA XX TO HER TODAY.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE, HOME SECRETARY, MADE IT CLEAR IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION WAS THAT IF LITHUANIA HAD REJECTED BERLIN'S ULTIMATUM GERMANY INTENDED TO OCCUPY ALL OF LITHUANIA, NOT MEMEL ALONE.

SPEAKING AS SUBSTITUTE FOR PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN, SIR SAMUEL SAID:-

"THE LITHUANIAN XX PICKING UP THIRD PARA (ELIMINATING SECOND) (LATER INFO) CP NU MCH 22 X1151A

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CANADA

C 118377

NU110

BULLETIN

NEW YORK, MARCH 22-(APO-JOHN L. LEWIS FIRMLY DECLARED HIMSELF TODAY AGAINST ANY DISSOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS "AS THE PRICE FOR LABOR UNITY" IN THE UNITED STATES.

MORE X1158A

95

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX ECONOMIC AID.D

ASKED IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD APPROACH TURKEY "WITH A VIEW TO PASSAGE OF NAVAL FORCES INTO THE BLACK SEA" IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO RUMANIA, MR. BUTLER REPLIED:-

"I AM SURE THAT SUCH AN IMPORTANT QUESTION WILL BE IN THE MIND OF THE GOVERNMENT."

SIR SAMUEL HOARE INDICATED THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED AGAINST CONSCRIPTION TO MATCH GERMANY'S GROWING MILITARY MIGHT. A QUESTIONER ASKED IF SUCH A STEP WOULD BE TAKEN "IN VIEW OF THE ATTITUDE OF GERMANY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, WHICH MENACES THE ULTIMATE SECURITY OF THIS COUNTRY XX."

MORE1201P

M

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU111 XX COUNTRY XX."

"I AM NOT SATISFIED THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL REGISTER WOULD ADD ANYTHING SUBSTANTIAL TO THE STEPS ALREADY TAKEN," HE SAID.

SIR SAMUEL XX PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

X1202P

95

ADD KAUNAS THIRD LEAD LITHUANIAN XX COMPLY.

THUS GERMANY GOT BACK A BALTIC SEAPORT SHE LOST UNDER THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND LITHUANIA WAS LEFT WITHOUT ONE.

THE SEMI-OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER LIETUVOS AIDAS SAID:-

"IN THE FACE OF DIRE NECESSITY LITHUANIA WAS PLACED BEFORE THE CRUEL DILEMMA--EITHER TRANSFER MEMEL TO GERMANY OR ENDANGER THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ENTIRE STATE."

ARGUING THAT THE BEST POSSIBLE COURSE HAD BEEN FOLLOWED IN CAPITULATING TO GERMAN PRESSURE, THE NEWSPAPER SAID:-

"THE GERMAN DEMAND WAS BASED ON FORCE AND LITHUANIA MUST HEROICALLY SUBMIT."

A STATE OF XX PICKING UP FIRST PARA SECOND LEAD.

X1205P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU98 XX PRESENT."

THE CABINET HAD MET TO CONSIDER WHAT COMMITMENTS BRITAIN MUST UNDERTAKE TO CHECK GERMAN EXPANSION BY FORMATION OF A BLOC AGAINST AGGRESSION.

ALTHOUGH XX ETC PICKING UP SECOND PGH OF LEAD.

LD1102A

BULLETIN THIRD LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 22-(APD-THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SAID GERMAN HAD THREATENED LITHUANIA WITH ACTION "IN A MILITARY SENSE" IF SHE REFUSED TO SURRENDER MEMEL TO HER TODAY.

MORE1106A

ADD BERLIN SECOND LEAD GERMAN XX CORRIDOR.

HITLER LEFT BERLIN SHORTLY AFTER LITHUANIA CAPITULATED TO GERMAN PRESSURE AND AGREED TO CEDE MEMEL, GERMANIC TERRITORY ACQUIRED IN THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, BACK TO GERMANY.

MORE1108A

[redacted]

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

Re Memel 118380

March 22. 39

DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Prime Minister

No information
taking over
regarding ~~occupation~~ of Memel
today has been received
~~et~~ beyond what is in
this afternoon's press.

O.D.?

Ottawa, March 22

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C 118381

Memel

Lithuania, along with other Baltic republics, was established in 1918 out of territory previously forming part of Russia. Six years later it was given access to the sea by the addition of the territory of Memel. This territory, a thousand square miles in area, had formed part of Germany but was relinquished under the Treaty of Versailles. In 1924 Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan transferred it to Lithuania by a convention with that State, and under elaborate provisions for a measure of local autonomy. Provision was made whereby any member of the Council of the League of Nations could refer any infraction of the Convention to the Council, and any dispute as to law or fact between Lithuania and the Allied Powers to the Permanent Court.

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THE GERMAN MAP: AN EPIC QUARTER-CENTURY

C118382







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THE GERMAN MAP: AN EPIC QUARTER-CENTURY

C118382







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Extract from Foreign Office memorandum of March 31, 1938, on the German-Czech problem:

"Talking to Sir N. Henderson" (the British Ambassador in Berlin) "on the 3rd March, 1938, Herr Hitler said that he was prepared to risk general war if foreign states refused his pretensions to safeguard the interests of Germans living outside the Reich. He was prepared to go to war at any cost for these 10,000,000 Germans. He added that Germany would not allow third parties to interfere in the settlement of her relations with countries of the same nationality or countries with large German populations. He added that, if there were shooting of Germans in Austria or Czechoslovakia, Germany would be at hand, and that, if internal explosions took place there, Germany would act like lightning. Sir N.Henderson gave it as his opinion that Herr Hitler proposed to proceed with his prepared policy regardless of circumstances and would only be prevented by force."

Extract from Dominions Office telegram of May 22:

"You will no doubt have seen press reports of statement made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to press conference last night to the effect that France sincerely hopes for an amicable settlement and has urged on Czechoslovakia the utmost prudence but that in the event of German aggression she will respect her treaty obligations."

Extract from Dominions Office telegram Circular B.133 of May 21:

"His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has been instructed to represent to German Minister for Foreign Affairs that all those who are anxious for a peaceful and orderly settlement of Sudeten German question, and we assume German Government desire this as much as we ourselves do, would desire that everything possible should be done to reduce present state of tension. . . .

"Sir N. Henderson was instructed to urge that German Government should use their influence with Henlein in order to promote an early opening of negotiations.. . .

"His Majesty's Ambassador's representations will continue in sense of following paragraphs. . . .

> "'If in spite of His Majesty's Government's efforts a conflict arises the German Government must be well aware of dangers which such a development would involve. France has obligations to Czechoslovakia and will be compelled to intervene in virtue of her obligations if there is a German aggression on Czechoslovakia. Indeed, French Ministers have repeatedly stated to His Majesty's Government that France would certainly so act. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in such circumstances could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstances to become involved also.'"

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CANADA

ODS/ET
10 August, 1938 C118384

G-100
vol 1

R-902
1938

Memorandum for Mr. Henry:

European Situation ✓
Radio - CBC ✓
Radio - British Broadcasting Corp. ✓

Enclosed is a copy of a note from Mr. Pickering of July 6th, and two copies of the commentaries which we obtained in consequence through the High Commissioner's Office in London.

OD

O. D. SKELTON

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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COPY

C 118385

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER:

July 6th,1938

For Dr.Skelton:

The Prime Minister thinks it would be well to procure,from England, copies of the commentaries on international affairs, delivered over B.B.C.,on April 25th, under the headings:

The Anglo-French talks;

The Political State of Czechoslovakia.

(See Mr.Pearson's letter,May 19,1938)

E.A.P.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118386

B.B.C. COMMENTARIES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, April 25,1938.

WORLD AFFAIRS

(1) FRANCO-BRITISH DISCUSSIONS, BY CHARLES TOWER

(2) POLITICAL STATE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BY DAVID STEPHENS (FROM BRISTOL)

Monday, 25th April, 1938, at 9-20 p.m. (National)

(1) CHARLES TOWER:

When the French Premier and Foreign Minister begin their talks with the British Ministers in London next Thursday morning, it now seems pretty certain that they will have to bring the affairs of Central Europe right into the foreground of political discussion. You know, of course, the general line of the talks, anyhow.

The two countries have some common obligations and many common interests. Take an example: since Great Britain is bound by Treaty to defend France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression, it is necessary to be clear whether any recent developments appear likely to bring that event nearer, and if so whether it can be avoided by similar diplomacy in both countries. In the same way, the freedom of traffic in the Mediterranean is essential to both countries, so they naturally look for a common policy most likely to assure it. That is broadly the general line of the talks. Of course, some discussion of Central Europe was in any case expected, but at the moment though the agenda has not been settled as far as I know, it looks as though the position of Czechoslovakia might almost take precedence in the discussions even over Mediterranean problems.

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This sudden emphasis arises from a demand made upon the Czechoslovak Government by Herr Hennlein, the leader of the Sudeten Germans. Some of the demands as they are reported might perhaps be taken only as asking for sort of local govemmment areas for Germans in Czecho-Slovakia, rather like those of the German-speaking cantons in Switzerland.

But the Czechoslovak Government's reluctance to grant this measure of local autonomy is due partly to suspicion that Herr Hennlein would promptly proceed to organise this autonomy so as to set up a kind of Chinese Wall between the Germans and the Czechoslovaks in the State. If his demands were fully granted the virtual effect would be to establish a State within the State. Other minorities would make the same demands as the Germans, with perfect justice, and thus it is feared there would be a disintegration of the whole Czechoslovakian Republic. Moreover, Herr Hennlein's ideas of self-govdrnment are not held by the Czechoslovak Government to respond to the general democratic principles of administration in the country. His party presented six Bills in the Chamber of Deputies in April of 1937. These suggested that his real aim is to organise the German minority to a so-called National Corporation. This would be governed authoritatively and would be built up again on local corporations with such elastic powers that these could take almost all the executive power out of the hands of the State.

Some of Herr Hennlein's conditions on the face of them seem in fact to require for the German areas liberty to pursue a policy external and internal which is inconsistent with a united country. Let me give an example: there is No.8 (eight). This requires for the German areas full liberty to profess German nationality and German political philosophy. Well, if you think what means you will see what it bears out.

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German political philosophy today, as you know means Nazi-ism; therefore it must mean violent anti-Semitism at home, and abroad the union of all Germans in one great Reich. It seems obvious that such a demand, if it is seriously intended, could not be granted. The question would at once arise whether the Government of Czechoslovakia is even in essentials to be as much master in the country as the Federal Government, for example, is in Switzerland. You may remember, however, that after the occupation of Austria certain assurances were given by the Reich Government to the Czech Government. These were re-affirmed to the British Minister in Berlin at the request of the British Government.

So it had been hoped, both in this country and in France, that the Sudeten-Germans would not be encouraged from Berlin to present impossible demands. Still with that hope, it was suggested today in Prague that Herr Hennlein's demands might have been put forward rather as a rallying programme for his followers in the forthcoming municipal elections than as a minimum whose rejection in any detail by the Czech Government would bring about an immediate crisis. But even if this interpretation is right the demands still look like a very disagreeable rebuff to the Czechoslovak Government, especially after the recent offers of the President, Dr. Benes, and the Prime Minister in an effort to produce a calmer political atmosphere.

In any case, it has to be admitted, I am afraid, that the early outlook for Czechoslovakia has not been made less uncertain. The British Government may be moved accordingly to ask what line of conduct the new French Government would expect to follow if there were developments in Czechoslovakia which took a really grave turn involving questions of foreign as well as domestic policy.

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M. Bonnet, the new Foreign Minister, is reported as a matter of fact though rather vaguely to have certain novel ideas of his own on the subject. On the other hand, M. Daladier and M. Bonnet might with good reason ask perhaps for some clearer, confidential exposition of the British Government'sgeneral attitude to Central European affairs. This would follow up Mr.Chamberlain's statement of policy in the House of Commonson March 24th. No passage in that statement, as you may remember, attracted more attention than that which concerned Czechoslovakia.

After stating that we could not be committed in advance to specific action the Prime Minister added: "The inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true," he continued, "in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty and determined to uphold them."

He then ended this part: "So far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned, it seems to His Majesty's Government that now is the time when all the resources of diplomacy should be enlisted in the cause of peace."

But Central Europe, important as it is, is far from being the only subject for which time must somehow be found in the London conversations this week. There is, for example, the settlement of the Ethiopian question, which is to be brought up, as you know, at the meeting of the League Council on May 9th. However, both countries are apparently prepared to recognise the Italian conquest of Ethiopia; so the discussion in London is likely to relate, I suppose, chiefly to the delicate and perhaps

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embarrassing question of procedure at Geneva rather than to policy.

On the other hand, future developments in Spain are of vital political importance to the French Government. They are believed to look upon the clauses relating to Spain and the Franco-Italian agreement as satisfactory only so far as they go; and M. Bonnet might be expected to seek close co-operation between France and Britain in relation to political and economic developments in Spain after the withdrawal of the Italian troops and after the end of the Civil War.

Finally, it may be supposed that there will be some discussion in principle regarding exchange of information and such other co-operation as is necessarily implied by Great Britain's obligations towards France. It is conceivable, for example, that mutual assistance in respect of the supply of raw materials or other necessities for national defence might be mentioned. It has been suggested, I believe, that eventually a co-ordinated policy of the two countries regarding mercantile tonnage might be advantageous; but it is pointed out that no experts will accompany the French Ministers. Therefore, if the conversations touch at all upon such technical features of Anglo-French co-operation it could only be to establish general principles upon which the experts might work afterwards.

(2) DAVID STEPHENS:

The peculiar difficulty of the problem of the Sudeten-Germans lies in the fact that they have ceased to be a purely domestic national problem - like, for instance, the Croat question in Yugoslavia - and have become part of the general German problem in Europe. They cannot, therefore,

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be treated in complete isolation. That does not mean that nothing can be done, until the general German problem in Europe is solved, but it does mean that the Czechs are obliged to consider how any concessions that they may make are likely to affect their external position vis-a-vis German. One cannot expect the Czechs voluntarily to make concessions that would involve forfeiting their independence.

There have been considerable changes in the position of the Sudeten-Germans in the last few months. At the end of last year Herr Hennlein's position was not particularly good. His own party was divided, some members of the Radical wing had been expelled, but the position was radically altered by the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich.

The news of the German occupation of Austria stimulated the Sudeten-Germans to heights of the wildest enthusiasm. Party differences were forgotten and there was a general rush to join the Sudeten-German party. That party published the picture of a clock pointing to five-minutes to twelve, and announced that the party lists would be closed at an early date.

The three activist parties who had been co-operating with the Czech Government resigned from the coalition and with the exception of the Social Democrats their members went over solidly to the Sudeten-German Party. For all practical purposes the Sudeten-Germans may now be said to be followers of Herr Hennlein. That, anyhow, clarifies the position.

The Czechs are now faced with great pressure both from within and without to grant autonomy to the Sudeten-Germans. The Czechs have always affirmed their willingness to go to any lengths to meet the grievances of the German minority, provided that the independence, moral and political, of the Czechoslovak State was not thereby endangered. At the present moment there is a great gulf fixed between the maximum that the Czechs would be prepared to grant and the minimum that would satisfy the Sudeten-Germans.

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The Czechs say 'We must have proof of loyalty before we put people in key positions in our State,' and the Germans reply 'How can we be loyal to a State that does not give us a square deal?' The question is, what does a square deal mean? To Herr Hennlein's party it apparently means freedom to set up a kind of Danzig within Czechoslovakia.

The solution of this problem is terribly difficult in the present states of tension in Central Europe. Much more is at stake than the right of three-and-a-half-millions Sudeten Germans. If one considers what rights those Sudeten-Germans have today it will be seen that they are better off than most other minorities, than, for instance, the Germans in Hungary or the Germans in Poland. They have elementary schools, and secondary schools, and universities and technical high schools; they have complete liberty of expression, and liberty of association, and full parliamentary representation proportionate to their numbers, and a wide measure of local autonomy. But, of course, the status of a minority, however favourable, and however well-protected does not altogether satisfy them. What really irks is that they are a minority at all. They want, in the words of a recent letter of one of their deputies to the Daily Telegraph, full and unrestricted partnership in the Czechoslovak State.

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CANADA

Department of National Defence

QUOTE NO. C 118393

Ottawa, Canada,

SECRET. IMMEDIATE

Commander in Chief, Home Fleet; Commander in Chief, Mediteranean; Commander in Chief, East Indies; Commander in Chief, Africa; Command er, in Chief; America West Indies; Commander in Chief China, Commander in Chief Portsmouth; Commander in Chief Plymouth; Commande r in Chief The Nore; Flag Officer Commanding Reserve Fleet; Commanding Officer Coast of Scotland; Flag Officer in Charge Malta; Flag Officer in Charge Gibralter; Rear Admiral Battle Cruiser Squadren; Commodore Malaya Singapore; Navy Office Melbourne; New Zealand Navy Board; Commodore South American Division; Rear Admiral Second Battle Squadron; Rear Admiral Submarines; From Admiralty.

The situation now regarded as extremely critical, and it is possible general mobilization will be ordered tomorrow Tuesday. This will be taken as a precautionary measure against Germany.

Italy's attitude is uncertain at present, and as she has not yet mobilized it seems probable that there will be some delay before she enters war, if this is what she decides to do. It has been represented here that it is important to delay Italian intervention as long as possible on account of Mediterranean and Red Sea communications, and especially the reinforcement of Egypt. As soon however as there were any indications of Italy coming in, precautionary measures would be ordered against her. We have no repitition no information with regard to probable attitude of Japan, and that we have got to take her into account in our dispositions and Singapore would be reinforced.

D.N.I.&.P.
O.C.S.R/

THE HONOURABLE THE MINISTER

This is the clear copy which you desired earlier this evening, please.

26-9-38. (2220 hrs.)

L. R. LaFleche.
Deputy Minister.

Nat. Def. A-168

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SECRET

C 118394

IMMEDIATE

Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean; Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; Commander-in-Chief, Africa; Commander-in-Chief, America West Indies; Commander-in-Chief, China; Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth; Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth; Commander-in-Chief, The Nore, Flag Officer Commanding Reserve Fleet; Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland; Flag Officer in Charge, Malta; Flag Officer in Charge, Gibraltar; Rear Admiral, Battle Cruiser Squadron; Commodore, Malaya, Singapore; Navy Office, Melbourne; New Zealand Navy Board; Commodore, South American Division; Rear Admiral, Second Battle Squadron; Rear Admiral, Submarines; from Admiralty.

The situation now regarded as extremely critical, and it is possible general mobilization will be ordered tomorrow Tuesday. (This) will be taken as a precautionary measure against Germany.

Italy's attitude is uncertain_____, and as she has not yet_____it seems probable that there will be some_____before or whether enter war, if this Is what she decides to_____.

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It has been represented here that it is_____ to delay Italian intervention as long as possible on account of Mediterranean Red Sea communications, and especially the reinforcement of Egypt. As soon as_____as_____ any indication.

As soon however as the _____ any indications Italy coming in, Precautionary Measures would be ordered (against) her. We have no, repetition No, information with regard to probable attitude of Japan, involving - We have got to take _____ within our dispositions Unable Singapore would be reinforced.

The Honourable,
The Minister.

Copy as desired by you over telephone this afternoon, please.

L. R. Laflèche

26-9-38. Deputy Minister.

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Ottawa, September 14th, 1938

C118396

Statement from Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King.

I have conveyed to Mr. Neville Chamberlain the deep satisfaction with which my colleagues and I have learned that his proposal for a personal conference with Herr Hitler, of which I was advised this morning, has been agreed to and that a meeting is being arranged tomorrow. I am sure the whole Canadian people will warmly approve this far-seeing and truly noble action on the part of Mr. Chamberlain. Direct personal contact is the most effective means of clearing away the tension and misunderstandings that have marked the course of events in Europe in recent months. Mr. Chamberlain has taken emphatically the right step. The world will hope that tomorrow's conference will create an atmosphere in which at last a solution may speedily be found of the problems which have threatened peace.

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SECRET

ODS/ET
3 Sept. 1938

C 118397

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

European Situation

A further telegram has just arrived 208 of 2 Sept.

There has been no communication from London since the telegram of September 1st, which you saw, regarding Runciman's conversations with Benes and the message which he conveyed through Henlein to Hitler.

With the final decision in the hands of a paranoiac mystic, it is impossible to forecast the outcome. The decisions of a proved realist like Mussolini, who weighs the pros and cons, are much easier to forecast. There is no doubt of Hitler's intention to dominate the Danube Valley, and to break up or neutralize Czechoslovakia as the next step in this process. The military and naval manoeuvres may be preparations for a strike, but they may be equally part of a game of bluff.

I still think the chances are 60-40 that sufficient concessions will be shaken out of Czechoslovakia in the course of the next week or two to avert the likelihood of an armed invasion of Czechoslovakia by Germany.

Even if Germany invades Czechoslovakia, it by no means follows that Britain will be in the war. While this is a matter on which the utmost secrecy must be maintained, and while it would be fatal to Britain's constructive game of bluff if

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Germany were to have ground for thinking that Britain would not intervene, I think there is no question that is the British attitude. It is emphatically the attitude of Sir Neville Henderson and you have noted Halifax's statement in the telegram of August 31st - "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the French Charge d'Affaires that if once preventive efforts had failed to defer the German Government from aggression against Czechoslovakia, no degree of support that the French Government or we or the Soviet Government could give Czechoslovakia would in fact be likely to prevent her from being overrun. From this point of view we could not think a European war would be justifiable if by any means this could be avoided".

Aside entirely from the question of whether Canada would be drawn in if Britain were, I think the 60-40 chance that Germany will not strike, and the 90-10 chance that Britain would not be drawn in even if Germany does strike, should prevent us from worrying unduly at the present moment.

057

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WLMIL. √European situation

C118399

Ottawa, September 17th, 1938.

In view of some inquiries as to the position of the Canadian Government in regard to the situation in Central Europe, the Prime Minister issued the following statement to the press today:-

"The Canadian Government have been giving unremitting consideration to the European situation, in the light of the confidential information which they are receiving. The position is changing from day to day. The present and essential task is to avert recourse to force by finding a peaceful and agreed solution of the present clash of interests in Central Europe. The Government of the United Kingdom have undertaken this task with a courage and vision which I have stated the people of Canada unanimously appreciate. If unfortunately that effort and other efforts to preserve the peace of Central Europe fail, it will become necessary for the governments and parliaments of all countries which may be directly or indirectly concerned to determine the course to be followed. The Canadian Government are examining all possible contingencies and will be prepared in accordance with the undertakings repeatedly given in Parliament, if occasion arises, to summon Parliament forthwith and submit their recommendations to it. In the meantime we do not consider in the the light of all the circumstances known to us that public controversy as to action in hypothetical contingencies would serve the interest of peace or of Canadian or Commonwealth unity. It will have been noted that the Government of the United Kingdom, striving for peace, and knowing the situation, have considered it desirable to exercise restraint in any public statements at this stage regarding the course to be taken if peace fails. I am sure that all Canadians will join with me in the fervent hope that the fine endeavours of the British Government to preserve peace will be crowned with complete success".

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C118400

Canadian Press Despatch

4:30 P.M.

It was officially announced in London tonight that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain would fly to Germany tomorrow to see Chancellor Hitler on the European crisis. The Prime Minister himself announced that he intended to see Hitler and "try and find a peaceable solution of the crisis which is menacing European peace."

Room 309
September 14th, 1938

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Ottawa,
September 13, 1938
4 p.m.

MR. KING:

The European situation has taken a sudden serious turn for the worse. Widespread disorders in the German Sudeten regions led to a proclamation of martial law by the Czechoslovakian Government in certain districts.

At noon today (our time) the Sudeten German leaders sent the Czech Government an ultimatum, demanding withdrawal of all emergency measures within six hours, otherwise they will not be responsible for consequences. Negotiations with the Czech Government have, apparently, been suspended.

One report states that in Eger, a town in Czechoslovakia, on the German border, Sudetens took over the public buildings, and later marched in to the nearest town in German territory, where they were greeted with a tumultous reception. The police, eventually, fired on the crowd, and nine lives are reported lost, eight being Sudeten Germans. A British observer has gone to Eger to inquire into these disturbances. The Czech police claim to have ~~ceased~~ seized a circular calling uoin Sudeten Germans to provoke attacks on Czech officials.

This morning and this afternoon Mr. Chamberlain saw Lord Halifax, the War and Air Secretaries, and Mr. Attlee.

The above is radio news. There has been no cable from the British Government.

Mr. Massey telephoned me from London at 3.40 this afternoon (8.40 London time), to say that the situation has been deteriorating all day and is now very grave. The latest reports are that even more grave developments are taking place in Czechoslovakia tonight, though the nature of anything is not specified.

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C 118402

The British Cabinet is meeting at ten o'clock tonight, London time. All the High Commissioners have been asked to see Malcolm MacDonald at eleven o'clock - six o'clock our time.

Mr. Massey said that due to circumstances he did not consider it possible to ask for a separate and distinct interview. He said he would telephone me immediately after this meeting

I have informed Mr. Crerar, in Council, of the foregoing.

O.D.S.

Telephoned to Miss Zavitske at Kingsmere.

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Passed on to
Mr Crerar
Mr Mackenzie

C 118403

5.30 p.m.

Ottawa, 13th September, 1938.

MEMORANDUM

European situation.

Mr. Massey telephoned that the British Cabinet Meeting had been postponed until eleven o'clock tomorrow.

He stated that the latest reports indicate twelve deaths in Czecho-Slovakia today, of whom eight were Czechs and four Sudeten Germans.

The Czech. Government had refused the Sudeten ultimatum for withdrawal of the emergency measures.

Halifax had made a statement on the B.B.C. this evening pointing out that Hitler's references to Great Britain in his speech had been unfortunate in that they made efforts for negotiation more difficult. He repeated Simon's statement as to the difficulty of Great Britain standing aside in the case of a conflagration in somewhat stronger terms, but gave no indication of any commitment any more than Simon had done.

There is no report as yet of any violation by Germany of the Czech. frontier and Whitehall does not anticipate such a development at this stage.

Opinion in Government circles in London is continuously pessimistic, but they are not without hope that an open conflict between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia can be avoided.

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To Mr Grear in Council

ODS/ET
13 Sept.,1938
3.40 p.m.

C 118404

Mr.Massey telephoned that the situation in Czechoslovakia has been deteriorating all day. Serious riots have taken place in the Sudeten area and word has just been received in London that even more grave events are taking place tonight(8.40 p.m. in London). A pessimistic feeling prevails in British Government circles as to thelikelihood of German intervention.

Mr.Massey stated the British Cabinet was meeting at 10 o'clock London time tonight(5 o'clock in Ottawa). After that, all the High Commissioners had been asked to see Malcolm Macdonald at 11. Mr.Massey said that in view of the circumstances, he had felt it would not be possible to ask for a separate and distinct interview. He added that he would telephone between 6 and 7 tonight.

I am telephoning the substance of this memorandum and of my previous memorandum to Mr.King's Secretary at Kingsmere.

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Ottawa, September 14th, 1938. C 118405

Statement from Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King.

I have conveyed to Mr. Neville Chamberlain the deep satisfaction with which my colleagues and I have learned that his proposal for a personal conference with Herr Hitler, of which I was advised this morning, has been agreed to and that a meeting is being arranged tomorrow. I am sure the whole Canadian people will warmly approve this far-seeing and truly noble action on the part of Mr. Chamberlain. Direct personal contact is the most effective means of clearing away the tension and misunderstandings that have marked the course of events in Europe in recent months. Mr. Chamberlain has taken emphatically the right step. The world will hope that tomorrow's conference will create an atmosphere in which at last a solution may speedily be found of the problems which have threatened peace.

Give to Canadian Press + C.B.C. for immediate release.
6.20 p.m.

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C 118406

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON

IMMEDIATE
CODE
Telegram No. 45

Ottawa, 14th September, 1938.

No.45. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister, Begins:

May I express my profound admiration for the vision and courage shown in your decision to have a personal interview with Herr Hitler, and convey my heartfelt wishes for your success. I am issuing the following statement to the press of Canada tonight:

"I have conveyed to Mr. Neville Chamberlain the deep satisfaction with which my colleagues and I have learned that his proposal for a personal conference with Herr Hitler, of which I was advised this morning, has been agreed to and that a meeting is being arranged tomorrow. I am sure the whole Canadian people will warmly approve this striking and noble action on the part of Mr. Chamberlain. Direct personal contact is the most effective means of clearing away the tension and misunderstandings that have marked the course of events in Europe in recent months. Mr. Chamberlain has taken emphatically the right step. The world will hope that tomorrow's conference will create an atmosphere in which at last a solution may speedily be found of the problems which have threatened peace".

Ends.

Sent

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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To be destroyed. Paraphrase of this very secret cypher message will be sent tomorrow / S.

C118407

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

TO: ~~H.B.M.~~ AMBASSADOR, BERLIN.
His Britannic Majesty's

Ottawa, 14th September, 1938

Telegram No.

Cypher

Immediate

If you consider it would be helpful I should be glad if you would have the following message from me conveyed immediately to Herr von Ribbentrop. Begins. Strictly personal. I recall at this time with deeper appreciation than ever your good offices in facilitating the arrangements for my visit to Germany in June of last year and the memorable interviews which I had with Herr Hitler and others at that time. Should opportunity permit, I should be deeply grateful if you could let Herr Hitler know how thankful I am that he and Mr. Chamberlain are to meet each other tomorrow and have a conference together, and how sincerely I hope and believe that their joint efforts may serve to preserve and further the peace of the world and the wellbeing of mankind. Mackenzie King. Ends.

~~SECRET~~

PRIME MINISTER.

Sent

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C118408

Ottawa, September 17th, 1938.

I am in receipt of your telegram of September 15th stating that the Governors and Council of your Association consider that the Government of Canada should take steps to indicate their stand in connection with the European crisis.

The Canadian Government have been giving unremitting consideration to the European situation, in the light of the confidential information which they are receiving. The position is changing from day to day. The present and essential task is to avert recourse to force by finding a peaceful and agreed solution of the present clash of interests in Central Europe. The Government of the United Kingdom have undertaken this task with a courage and vision which I have stated the people of Canada unanimously appreciate. If unfortunately that effort and other efforts to preserve the peace of Central Europe fail, it will become necessary for the governments and parliaments of all countries which may be directly or indirectly concerned to determine the course to be followed. The Canadian Government

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are examining all possible contingencies and will be prepared if occasion arises to submit its recommendations to Parliament. In the meantime we do not consider in the light of all the circumstances known to us that public controversy as to action in hypothetical contingencies would serve the interest of peace or of Canadian or Commonwealth unity. You will have noted that the Government of the United Kingdom, striving for peace, have refrained from issuing public statements as to the action to be taken if peace fails.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

C 118410

MEMORANDUM

MR. KING:

Dr. Skelton telephoned at 2.45 p.m., and asked me to convey to you the following message:

"The Reuters despatch of 12.40 today, stating that there has been an invasion of Czecho-Slovakia by Sudeten Germans supported by German Nazi Storm Troops, has now been killed by the Canadian Press, evidently as not authenticated."

FM.

Sept. 23, 1938

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
Regret very much to hear of your illness!

Sir Richard Turner

C 118411

Ottawa

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

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Lauren to [illegible] C 118413
Sept 23rd 1937
1.15 pm

Whether men or nations are to be governed by Violence or Reason

Whether the brute or the god is to be uppermost in man

Whether might or Right is to control

Whether Force or Persuasion is to the method employed in human relationships - industrial or international

Whether materialism is to triumph or spiritualism

Whether matter or spirit is to reign supreme

Whether paganism or ~~[illegible]~~ Christianity ~~[illegible]~~ is to be the basis of our civilization

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W.J. TURNBULL TO WLMK

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

file
European Situation
Can. Foreign Policy

C118414

Saturday,
Sept. 24, 1938
10.50 a.m.

MR. KING:

The Hon. Ian Mackenzie 'phoned to say that The Halifax Herald has sent a wire to all newspapers asking them to give their opinion as to the necessity of Canada taking a definite stand with regard to the European situation. This is intended to force the Government to make a declaration.

Mr. Mackenzie felt that you would wish to know of this at once.

W.J.T.

W. J. TURNBULL

Re Interview

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Translation

C118415

Press Clipping from Le Journal (Quebec)
September 23, 1938

MR. CHAMBERLAIN HAS GONE FROM LONDON, NOT OTTAWA

Let us leave Mr. Chamberlain to talk peaceably (it is a manner of speaking) with Mr. Hitler. All Europe is convinced that the game will be played otherwise. The British premier will do well to show himself generous, consenting to every concession however hard, since Hitler will give away nothing. Perhaps the Führer will content himself, for the moment, with a moral victory; perhaps he will accept a simple dismemberment of Czechoslovakia - this is still uncertain - but what is sure is that he will try to egg on the allies to make war. Let us not be afraid, for that is no part of these present weeks. For us a single thing is certain, and that is that one day or other - and let us hope it may be the latest possible - Canada will have to reply to the anguishing question: Are we, or are we not, to be participants in the next war?

The Imperialists have not waited, for themselves, to be backed up to the foot of the wall. Even before the French-Canadian newspapers expressed themselves, they have said, without hesitation, Yes. Last week the "Globe and Mail" decidéd that Canada was to support England, and on Saturday the "Gazette" took up the position of saying that our country must sacrifice everything "to the last man and to the last dollar" to come to the aid of what is called the Mother Country.

Today the Imperialists find themslves in a ridiculous position. In their eyes the whole of Canada must participate, in order to defend democracy. What, exactly, do they think is menacing democracy? It is Germany, evidently. Then, what has England decided? And not only England, but what has France, that earthly paradise of liberties, decided? As by a common agreement, the two countries have allowed Adolf Hitler to despoil Czechoslovakéa as he despoiled Austria but five months ago. Since England is permitting Germany to dominate the centre of Euwppe, she appears not to consider the cause of democracy so menaced! To what point, then, is the crusade of our Imperialists directed? How does it happen that they have decided that Canada should make war before England, however deeply interested, arrives at the same decision? Should we not

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have had some right to say, a few days ago, that the "Gazette" and the "Globe and Mail", far from reflecting the opinion of Canadian believers in democracy, had simply become the mouthpieces of armament merchants and of those who, in one way or another, have a material interest in Canadian participation in Empire wars?

French-Canadians have not given a great deal of attention to the armament question. Government has said it was a question of protecting the country, and, for the most part, they believed it. They were not concerned that, by their very nature, these armaments applied much more to England than to Canada. But it would be criminal on their part, when it comes to the defence of men, to show themselves equally unconcerned. When war is declared, it will then be too late. It is now, today, that we must say to Ottawa that we are Canadians, that we wish very much to be a part of the British Empire, but that, under no pretext will we consent to be killed in battle for foreigners. Let Europe solve its problems; let it try, if it can, to make good the errors of 1918 and of the post-war years; for our part, we are living in America, and we intend to concern ourselves with our own affairs, and only with our own.

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Coll - European Situation
File Canada at War
C118417

6. Chamberlain's commitments for the future.

Mr. Chamberlain did not make commitments at Munich nor for the war that didn't happen last week, but for the war that may happen later. He agreed, as foreshadowed in his House of Commons speech of last week, to join in a four power guarantee of the territorial integrity of what will remain of Czechoslovakia. This is a very serious extension of British liabilities. Mr.Baldwin declared Great Britain's boundary lay on the Rhine; Mr. Chamberlain has not extended it to the Danube. Presumably Canada will not be asked to join in the guarantee; but presumably also Mr. Chamberlain, unless corrected, will continue to assume that we would be bound nevertheless, as he calmly indicated in his September 28th speech we would be bound by his action now - "a step involving the whole British Empire in war". And even if Chamberlain would be cautious, for his own country's sake, in carrying out these commitments, his time may be short, and a Churchill or a Duff Cooper may succeed.

Clearly if the European situation has been cleared up, however unsatisfactorily, the British Commonwealth situation has not. Our position remains ambiguous and dangerous. It is not easy to effect a clear-cut solution at present, but one thing is certain, the generation of young Canadians now developing a political interest, irrespective of race, will not stand permanently for their destinies being determined by irresponsible bodies in London.

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CANADIAN PRESS BULLETIN - 12 and 12.02 p.m.

RADIO BULLETIN - 12.40 from Canadian Press

Reuter's news agency in London today quoted official sources in Prague as saying an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Sudeten Germans, supported by German Nazi Storm Troops, started at 1:00 P.M. The invaders, the despatch said, have already occupied several towns and districts on the frontier and efforts are being made to dislodge them.

2.00 P.M. Canadian Press state that Reuter's Agency had asked that above message should be "killed" - no further explanation was given.

September 23, 1938.

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C 118419

Ottawa, 24th September, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

A glance at this morning's news suggests two points that have a bearing on the question of statements at this time by the Canadian Government as to its attitude in case of war.

1. The British Government have not yet departed in any degree from their position as mediator between the Germans and the Czechs. As far as we are informed, there has been thus far, in spite of the fact that war between Germany and Czechoslovakia seemed imminent, no threat to Germany nor guarantee to Czechoslovakia. Instead of giving an ultimatum to Hitler, Mr. Chamberlain, with extraordinary persistence and patience, is forwarding to the Czechs a demand for further concessions. There is, of course, no question that British hostility to Hitler is rising and will rise still further, though it may be deflected against the Czechs if they reject this last proposal. For the present, however, there is no talk of war on the part of the British Government whatever newspapers and private individuals may say.

2. As regards the struggle for democracy, it is very significant that this very week the Oslo powers, Norway, Sweden,

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C 118420

Denmark, Holland, etc., which are quite as democratic and devoted to freedom as we are, have emphatically indicated their intention to keep out of any European struggle, whatever the cause and whatever the declared objects. If war breaks out between Germany & Czecho Slovakia, if France goes in, and Britain to help France, and we go in then, it will be to help Britain - as L'Evenement said the other day, 'Is there one interventionist in Canada, however much he dislikes Hitler, who would be an interventionist if Great Britain were not in the war?' ~~Sympathy~~ There is (a) dislike of Hitler increasingly, but it would be (b) sympathy for Britain that would be the determining force if we went in. Of course both factors are present, but ~~both~~ (b) would work without (a) conceivably but not (a) without (b).

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C118421

Ottawa, 24th September, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

The telegrams which arrived last night and which were left at Laurier House about 10.30 were not very promising. The later news in the press this morning is better in that the door has not been slammed and if the Czechs are prepared to make still further concessions peace may be preserved.

A whole flock of telegrams, one or two in code, but nearly all in cypher and some in particularly complicated re-figured cypher, have come in this morning. Our Code staff, who have been working every night for weeks, are hard at work on them, and I have for the past 10 days had all the junior members of the staff working in relays. The telegrams in this morning include Hitler's reply to Chamberlain, two other long telegrams which have just arrived from the Telegraph Office and a telegram from Mr. Lapointe in answer to yours of last night. As soon as the first of these are decoded they will be sent out.

O.D.S.

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Special Radio Bulletin - Associated Press. C 118422

12:28

In London the British Government has decided to recall Parliament to hear the report which the Prime Minister will make after his return. The exact date of the meeting will be fixed later. It is understood that Mr. Chamberlain will remain at Berchtesgaden at least until Saturday. In the meantime in Prague Henlein has issued a statement confirming his demand for the annexation of Sudeten region. This statement was broadcast throughout Germany.

Canadian Press

12:30

Munich The British Prime Minister arrived here at 7:30 A.M. E.D.T. He was met by Sir Neville Henderson and Herr von Ribbentrop.

London. British Ministers held an anxious meeting today with officials of Governments departments and fighting services at the offices of the Committee for Imperial Defence. Sir John Simon left immediately after for Buckingham Palace to talk with The King. He deputized for Mr. Chamberlain in keeping his Majesty informed of the crisis.

Room 309
September 15th, 1938

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C 118423

Special Radio Bulletin - Canadian Press.

11 A.M.

On his departure from London this morning the Prime Minister gave out the following statement.

"I am going to see the German Chancellor because the existing situation demands it and in the hope that the talks between myself and the German Chancellor may have useful consequences ."

A report has been received from Prague that Herr Henlein has demanded the annexation of the German Sudeten region into Germany and this demand is expected to bring a reply from the Czechoslovak Government within a few hours.

A proclamation has been issued by the Czechoslovak Government extending Martial Law to two more Sudeten districts, making thirteen in all.

Today the Prague Government despatched more troops and tanks to various border towns to suppress demonstrations.

One faction at Geneva holds that Hitler cannot fail to understand that the conversations to be held today between the German Chancellor and the Prime Minister must be the Prime Minister's last effort to maintain peace.

In London circles it is believed that on his return from Germany the Prime Minister may convene Parliament to receive a report of his conversation.

At 11:00 A.M. (EDT) the conversations had not yet started.

Room 309
September 15th, 1938

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ODS/ET
26 Sept.19[illegible] C118424
11.10 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Mr.Massey telephoned from London. He asked if we had received word of Sir Horace Wilson having left Berlin. I said we had. He said he had no further word to add in the way of news, but would like to give some idea of the general attitude. He found the most tremendous pessimism in nearly every quarter. The publication of the full text of Hitler's proposals this morning did not modify the prevailing opinion which is against the possibility of their acceptance.

A powerful war spirit is growing in England. A point of view frequently expressed in public is that if there has to be a war, then it would be better to come now, and even some say it would be better to have war than a constant threat of war. There is of course an element in this chorus which has political motives and desire to embarrass Chamberlain.

Mr.Massey said his own feeling was that the larger considerations of the inevitable death of millions of men and women and children, the intensified hatreds, the threat to civilization

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which a large-scale war would involve,were for the time being overcome by the immediate desire to remove the menace which Hitler afforded. There is a large section of public opinion which believe that having accepted the principle of self-determination and the cession of the Sudeten area in the interests of peace,this chance of settlement should not be thrown away because of demands for cutting down the time for carrying out the cession by a few days or adding a few miles to it. He himself had much sympathy with this view,but he feared the over-simplification of the issue was leading to an almost hysterical desire to strike out.

Mr.Roosevelt's appeal had been well received and might make some people hesitate before accepting the doctrine of a preventive war. He had,however,not very much hope of war being averted in Europe.

Mr.Massey said he was going to see Mr.Chamberlain at 7 o'clock London time(2 o'clock Ottawa time),and would call if anything of importance developed.

He asked whether the Prime Minister would wish him to call him up on the telephone any time.

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ODS/ET
26th Sept.1938

C 118426

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Pearson has supplemented the Dominions Office telegrams by a useful day by day analysis, attached, of further information gleaned at the Foreign Office. A good deal of the material has already been contained in the telegrams, but there is some interesting additional material, particularly perhaps on pages 7 to 18.

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EUROPEAN SITUATION

Report C118427

SECRET

Saturday, September 10th

The telegrams this morning throw little additional light on the situation. There is, however, an interesting report in of a conversation yesterday between Daladier and Phipps. Daladier emphasised that if Hitler could only be convinced that aggression would be followed by a general war, he would abstain. Unfortunately, he is not convinced. The French Premier declared positively that if German troops passed the Czech frontier, the French would arm to a man. Not, he said, for the "beaux yeux" of the Czechs, but for their own skins, because they knew what the German conquest of Czechoslovakia would mean to them. Phipps replied that a multitude of tough Slavs might be indigestible and weakening, but Daladier did not agree. He said that in the event of war French action would consist not merely of air attacks, but limited offensives on the ground. He was confident it would be successful. The French Ambassador in Berlin had reported a "state of alert" had been declared in Germany. Daladier added that if this were true it was most serious and the French would reply in kind, so that you would have virtually mobilisation for war. Daladier stated that the internal situation of France was good; that the French public were calm and that reservists were joining the colours gayly and without a murmur. He said that Germany had made a big mistake in concentrating troops on the French frontier. They should have restricted their concentrations to the Czech borders, in which case the effect

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C118428

on French opinion would have been different.

Daladier added that they would keep Great Britain informed of any action that they were forced to take. He was more of an optimist than Bonnet in respect of Russian assistance, saying that the Russians were concentrating on the Rumanian frontier and could send their planes up by night to Czechoslovakia. The Polish Ambassador at Bucharest had told his colleague that undoubtedly there were many who would turn a blind eye to this in France. Phipps thought that the French would undoubtedly move very soon after a German attack on Czechoslovakia.

Major Sutton-Pratt had made his report on recent "incidents". The Moravska Ostrava one he found to have been greatly exaggerated and did not justify the breaking of negotiations. Deputies May and Kollner appeared to have intervened unwarrantedly and got what they deserved. The police acted impetuously, but were justified. There was no foundation for the charge that Herr Knoll had been murdered. On the other hand, Major Sutton-Pratt thought that some Sudeten prisoners had been badly treated by the Czechs.

Sir Nevile Henderson joins Runciman in opposing any appeal to Hitler by him at Nuremberg. Henderson also said that opinion is being prepared in Germany for an anschluss.

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C 118429

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, September 12th.

Newspapers are comparing the present tense situation to that of August, 1914. There is one respect, however, in which there is no comparison. Events moved so swiftly in 1914 that war occurred almost before the European crisis had driven cricket and holiday news off the front page. The 1938 crisis, however, is a continuing one. It has now entered its third and what may prove to be its decisive week.

This morning the crowds in Downing Street were so great that the police had to clear the street and put barriers at the Whitehall and Horseguards end. I had to produce my credentials before I was allowed into the Foreign Office. The size and demeanour of the crowds there constitute a pretty accurate barometer of the state of public feeling. The onlookers were today not only numerous, but intensely serious; not merely idle loiterers waiting to see celebrities.

Lord Runciman replying to Friday's query stated that if the latest Czech proposals, which followed the general line of his own ideas, should fail, he realised that he might have to produce his own scheme. Everything, however, depended on the circumstances. Previously M.Bonnet had urged that Lord Runciman should have his own plan ready in order to forestall a proposal of Hitler's, such as one for a plebiscite, which was known in advance to be unacceptable to the Czechs.

M.Corbin on instructions from the Foreign Minister, Friday afternoon impressed on the British Government

the need/

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SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL C118430

the need of a definite and strong stand. He expressed surprise that certain doubts seemed to be felt here as to what France might do in case of an attack on Czechoslovakia. Lord Halifax explained that it had not then been decided whether to make any further representations to Hitler or not, but he repeated, "whatever we may feel about any action that Germany might take in Czechoslovakia, I do not think that British opinion would be prepared any more than the British Government would be prepared to enter upon hostilities with Germany on account of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, suppose Hitler demanded a plebiscite, was a European war to be fought to prevent people voting as to what their future position should be?" M.Corbin replied that that was not suggested; that France would only fight after Czechoslovakia were actually attacked. Lord Halifax made the obvious point, what would happen if Benes refused a plebiscite. A confusing and perplexing situation would then result. M.Corbin said that the question at issue was not merely an attack on Czechoslovakia, but, that if German aggression succeeded there, then it would be France's turn next. Halifax expressed no sympathy with this view which implied that it might be wise to fight a preventive war.

Sir Eric Phipps stated that he found M.Leger much perturbed over what he considered to be a British refusal to enter upon hostilities with Germany, over any aggression by Germany against Czechoslovakia. The source of Leger's perturbation was Halifax's report of his conversation

with/

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C 118431

with Corbin,mentioned above. When Phipps read this report to Leger in French and in English, the French official said that it represented a distinct change for the worse in Britain's attitude and was incompatible with Great Britain's desire to be previously consulted before the French Government should take any measure which might involve France in war. Phipps replied that there was no change in the British attitude,but Leger would not be consoled. At the British Ambassador's request,he read Corbin's account of the interview in question which in certain vital points did not wholly agree with that of Lord Halifax. For instance,Corbin's report said that Halifax had merely stated that "Great Britain was not under any treaty engagements to help Czechoslovakia as France was,but that if France had to go to war,Great Britain would face a situation which would,doubtless,lead to her participation after a delay the length of which could not be fixed in advance. Circumstances would play an important part in the decision which the British Government and the Dominions would be called to make. (Translation mine).

The British position is becoming clearer. While every step possible is taken to frighten Germany in one direction; equally strong steps are being taken to frighten France in another. Of course,France herself is,I think, to some extent bluffing in the alarmist interpretation of the situation which she is pressing on the British Government. For instance, on Saturday Phipps wired certain almost panicky long reports which he had received from M.Leger to the effect that Herr Hitler

was/

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was going to strike about September 24th as he was convinced Great Britain would do nothing. The occasion might be murderous attacks on Henlein or Runciman made by agents provacateurs to ensure British neutrality. The German army would go right down the Danube to Bucarest. Leger felt that if Hitler's speech Monday was indefinite, it was essential to summon at once a Four Power Conference of Great Britain,France,Germany,and Italy as the last hope of preserving peace,though he recognised that left elements in France would oppose this.

Major Sutton-Pratt's full report now makes it clear that the Moravsak incident was entirely a put-up job.

Newton wires from Prague that if Hitler's speech indicates increased danger the Czechs are likely to mobilise. He reports that the Czech General Staff is getting restless.

Newton also reported a conversation which he had had with Dr.Krofta, the Czech Foreign Minister,who explained to him why a plebiscite "was quite impossible". Any Czech Government supporting it would be swept away at once. A plebiscite of this kind in time of peace was unprecedented, and if the right of a population to secede was recognised in this way it would produce political anarchy in Europe. The example would be infectious and would be followed by similar demands in Poland,Rumania and Yugo-Slavia,etc.

(2) A plebiscite was impossible because no compact and homogeneous area adjacent to Germany existed. Would the whole country vote? How could an area be delimited in

advance/

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advance? In any event, large numbers of Germans would be left dissatisfied in Czecnoslovalia.

(3) The existing frontiers with one small exeeption had belonged to Bohemia for a thousand years or more. The country formed a natural,geographical,economic and historical unity.

(4) If this amputation was performed, Czechoslovakia would be placed in an impossible position and completely at the mercy of Germany.

(5) Would a plebiscite in fact be worth anything? The plebiscite in Austria, for instance, under Schussnigg, would have had entirely different results from that conducted by the Nazis. Terrorisation was already present in Sudetenland, of those who were anti-Henlein. A demand for a plebiscite at this time would increase the danger of war, as the Czechs would fight to the last man rather than agree to the dismemberment of their country.

There is a report on the United States Ambassador's visit on Saturday. He had been kept fully informed of developments. Saturday morning Mr.Kennedy expressed himself as in favour of sending an official warning to Hitler. He entirely approved of British naval measures. He wondered whether it would not be possible for the Soviet Government to take measures over the week-end which would compel attention - such as concentrating aeroplanes near the frontier.

Mr.Kennedy said that American opinion was "twenty

times/

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times as excited against Germany as in 1914". If war broke out isolation feeling would be strong at first but if, eventually, Great Britain were dragged in and London were bombed, there would be a revulsion of feeling and the history of the last war repeated. But intervention would be much quicker this time. His own personal opinion was that it would be difficult for the United States to keep out, but difficult also to predict which she would do owing to the complete uncertainty as to how events would develop and public opinion move.

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C118435

SECRET

On Friday evening the Foreign Secretary forwarded to Henderson, for delivery to Hitler, the text of a proposed statement which would serve as a warning that an attack on Czechoslovakia would mean a general conflict "from which Great Britain could not stand aside".

Both Ogilvy-Forbes and Henderson advise most strongly against making any such demarche. Henderson argued that even if a peaceful solution could not be arranged locally at Prague the Nazis had not decided what course of action to take. Von Neurath had told him that it was most unlikely that Herr Hitler would go very far in his speech Monday, or "burn his boats". Henderson believed this to be true. He added that he had made the British position as "clear as daylight" to the people in Nuremberg who counted, and that he could do no more in that respect. Messages to Hitler, such as suggested, would start stories which would drive Hitler straight off the deep end. Von Neurath had definitely advised against any such message.

The position as Henderson saw it was that, in the opinion of many, Hitler was convinced that Great Britain would not move if force were used against Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, it was agreed that any demarche of the May 21st type would be fatal to the prospects of peace. How

then

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then was it possible to convince Hitler that Great Britain, in certain circumstances, could not stand aside while, at the same time, ensuring that this warning would not have the opposite effect on Hitler to that which was intended. If too little was said, Hitler would remain unconvinced of British intentions; if too much was said the prospects of peace might be destroyed.

Henderson also said that Goering, whom he had found friendly, had assured him that Germany would not be aggressive except under the most extreme provocation. At the same time, Henderson had made clear what France and Great Britain would do if she were aggressive. Henderson had also found Goebels far from unfriendly. Of the Germans Henderson had been seeing, Weiszacker alone thought that Henderson should see Hitler, though his message should be couched in the most friendly terms. Weiszacker still felt that Hitler was convinced that Great Britain would not intervene in any circumstances. Henderson reported that he had found Ribbentrop "not truculent", and added that the German Foreign Minister was studying France's latest proposals. In short, Henderson is convinced that if no genuine solution is achieved by negotiations, Hitler is still undecided what to do or when to do it, but "in the unbalanced state of his mind" a warning of the kind indicated might well drive him to the very action which the warning was meant to prevent.

As a result of Henderson's views, Lord Halifax agreed that no further communication need be addressed to Herr Hitler and that the Ambassador might return to Berlin. The French Government have been informed of this position.

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Ogilvy-Forbes wires that feeling in Berlin is most apprehensive and strong against war, but public opinion is helpless in the grip of the Nazi system. He regarded Goering's speech as more or less bluff, for Goering himself, no matter what he may have said, does not regard Germany's position in a general war too optimistically.

In a later telegram Ogilvy-Forbes added that Goering's truculence was probably due to anger at the assumption of the British Press that peace would be saved if Great Britain's attitude was made clear. In other words, that Germany would yield to British threats. The speech indicates, however, according to Forbes, that Goering is apparently reckoning now on the possibility of war against England.

The German Naval Attache called Saturday on the Director of Naval Intelligence to express his alarm at the reports of British naval measures and to ask for information. He felt that it was "an extraordinary thing that such measures should have been taken", and added that no one in Germany believed that Great Britain would come in against Germany in any circumstances. Now, for the first time, the Naval Attache seemed to understand this possibility and, according to the Director of Naval Intelligence, was deeply moved at the prospect.

Ogilvy-Forbes, in answer to an enquiry from the Foreign Office, said that the general reaction in Berlin to the naval measures already taken was one of "pained surprise" at preparations which were considered to be unnecessary. Ogilvy-Forbes was also asked to secure confirmation or otherwise of a report made by his colleague the French Ambassador in Berlin that a "state of alert" existed. He saw

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the French Ambassador in question who said he based his report mainly on information received through the domestic staff of one of his Consuls! The British Military Attache in Berlin said he could secure no evidence of a "state of alert", nor could he secure any specific confirmation of charges that special military measures were being taken on the Czechoslovakia-Austrian border. He reported that war feeling was strongest in Bavaria and Austria and that conditions in Vienna, from the point of view of industry, were already like war-time.

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SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Tuesday, September 13th.

The telegrams at the Foreign Office do not indicate that Herr Hitler's speech has alleviated the situation - on the contrary, the news from Czechoslovakia indicates deterioration. Newton wires that the situation at Eger and Carlsbad is ugly; that six are dead and twenty seriously injured as the result of riots last night. The Czech Government say that they have evidence that Hitler's speech was, by order, to be followed by Sudeten demonstrations accompanied by acts of violence against State authorities. Dr. Hodza said that the Government must maintain control but that he would try to arrange with the Sudeten leaders for a joint announcement to be issued in favour of refraining from all provocation. Newton is trying to persuade the Sudeten leaders to cooperate in this way. Herr Kundt told Ashton-Gwatkin that he would do his best to preserve order but it is feared that the situation may soon be out of the hands of Sudeten leaders.

There are some interesting telegrams in from Henderson which will provide fascinating reading for the historian of the future. If this crisis is solved, that historian will be amazed at the falsity of Henderson's judgement of personalities; if it is not solved, he will be equally amazed that the British Government, with these

reports

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reports to hand, did not take more drastic action.

Henderson reports the following impressions from his sojourn at Nuremberg. Hitler's abnormality is greater than ever. He is in a condition of extreme nervous tension and unable to relax at any time. Henderson is convinced, that, irrespective of his Monday speech, he contemplates action of some kind. He said that Hitler's attitude is "that of the deaf adder who stoppeth her ears". Neurath told Henderson, however, that, in his opinion, Hitler was not as confident as he appeared to be. The German Foreign Office officials are in a state of "blank pessimism". The language they use about their chief, Ribbentrop, is violent to the point of danger to themselves. No one trusts him. Henderson found him not unfriendly, but had no respect for him as merely a "yes-man". Herr Himmler is also an extremist. Goering and Goebbels are less so, but are obedient to Hitler and would follow him blindly in any course of action that he ordered.

Henderson himself still thinks that Hitler may be bluffing to some extent, but he added these startling words, "He may have already crossed the borderline of insanity". Henderson explained at length the attitude he took at Nuremberg in his conversations and especially why he opposed a personal warning to Hitler, "a megalomaniac".

Goering had told him that Czechoslovakia, if it existed at all, must come within Germany's political and economic orbit. He said that the German food and supply situation was most favourable and that a blockade would be useless.

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Both Weiszacker and Neurath say that a plebiscite is now essential. All Germans in Nuremberg believed that Moscow is behind all Czech "uncomprisingness".

The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Butler, reports a conversation with M. Bonnet in Geneva, whom he found very discouraged at recent developments, British inaction, Roosevelt's latest statement, etc. French information is that Italy would join Germany in war. For France, said M. Bonnet, this would mean a war on three fronts, "a suicide," which she had no intention of commiting.

Lord Halifax has asked Phipps to clear up the situation re Léger's interpretation of the Halifax-Corbin interview. The Foreign Secretary is distressed and not a little surprised at his interpretation. There has been no change and there is no ground for misconception of the British position. They have not altered their view that they would probably have to help France if she got into trouble.

Phipps states that French opinion, in its anxiety to avoid war, is becoming more and more ready to accept even the solution of a plebiscite for Sudeten autonomy outside the Reich. Bonnet telephoned at lunch today begging the Foreign Secretary to ask Runciamn to issue at once a statement that he is about to produce a plan of his own calculated to bridge over differences between the two parties. Bonnet, who seemed intensely nervous, said that the whole question of peace or war might now be only a matter of minutes instead of days.

Mr. Kennedy called at the Foreign Office Sunday to secure the latest information. He said he thought that the visit of the two United States cruisers might

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have a useful effect politically and added that it might also be useful if he called on the Prime Minister the same evening, "in order to encourage German speculation regarding the fact that the two countries were, apparently, keeping in close touch. Lord Halifax welcomed this suggestion. Kennedy also said that he had had the German Naval Attache camping on his doorstep about the visit of the United States cruisers. He had had the German told that they agreed it was unusual that these vessels should put into British ports now, but that being disturbed about general conditions in Europe at the moment he was going to hold them here. The German was impressed.

The Ambassador wires from Warsaw his appreciation of the state of Polish opinion on the crisis. He finds the Poles anti-Czech, but not pro-German. For external and internal reasons they will be neutral as long as possible - will wait and see. If, however, France and Great Britain are involved public opinion would probably lead to the eventual association of Poland with these countries, if Russia did not complicate matters. The one eventuality which might throw Poland into the German camp would be Russian efforts to send help to the Czechs across Poland. Steps should be taken at Moscow to ensure that Russia would not drive Poland into the German camp.

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SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Wednesday, September 14th.

The temperature is lower this morning after a depressingly exciting night when every kind of rumour was floating about. For a time, apparently, it looked as if the die was cast; the casting appears to have been postponed. The most startling rumour that came into the Foreign Office last night was a report from Berlin that the German Army had actually been ordered to march over the Czech frontier, but that Hitler was explaining to Paris and London that they were going merely for purposes of police protection and that no invasion was contemplated.

This morning things seemed to be quieter; there was a better spirit in the Foreign Office. The most interesting development seemed to be a loss of nerve in Paris. Daladier, talking to Phipps, suggested that the French would not automatically go to the help of the Czechs, if attacked, but that circumstances would decide. He is also reported to have spoken bitterly of Benes. Bonnet said that if Lord Runciman put forward the full Carlsbad programme, the French, in order to maintain peace, would be ready to assist it and press it upon the Czechs. Phipps said that Bonnet seems completely to have lost his nerve and is ready for any solution to avoid war.

The Foreign Office, I gather, feel a bit contemptuous about this French attitude, though, naturally, relieved

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that it may assist in avoiding trouble. It would not, however, increase their respect for their friends across the channel.

In a further conversation Bonnet returned to the idea of a Four Power Conference, emphasising that this need not bring Lord Runciman's efforts to an end. Such a conference, if it could settle the Czech business, might go on to wider problems. Daladier prefers a Three Power Conference with Italy left out. Phipps told him that Hitler would be very unlikely to agree to this.

The Military Attaché at Berlin reports conversations with his colleagues from other nations at Nuremberg, most of whom he found to be reasonably optimistic. He thinks that the officers of the German War Office who were at Nuremberg, were much less worried over the week-end than they had previously been and that the general atmosphere was better.

On the other hand, the Military Attaché at Prague reports an interview with the Czech General Staff who claim that they have authoritive information that the Germans will call up twelve classes of reservists between October 8th and 16th, when the situation will become critical. At the present moment the Czech staff did not think it necessary to go beyond the declaration of martial law in border

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districts effected by rioting.

Major Sutton-Pratt reports on the rioting at Eger Monday night and Tuesday morning. On the morning, Czech tank troops fired indiscriminately (though much of it was blank) in order to clear the streets of demonstrators. "They quite lost their heads". It appears that their Captain even fired at Sutton-Pratt when he approached him, but the Major, not to be daunted, returned a few minutes later with a police escort and remonstrated with the Czech officers. Apparently, some of the Czech troops on the spot are not keeping their heads, or acting too well, in the face of what must be admitted to be provocation.

Lord Halifax is doubtful of the wisdom of Lord Runciman bringing forward, at this moment, a plan of his own. It might not offer a solution, it would undoubtedly be labelled "a British plan", and might prejudice other possibilities. Is he thinking of a plebiscite?

A telegram from Sir Ronald Lindsay in Washington gives the Ambassador's general agreement with Kennedy's diagnosis of United States feeling. He thought isolationist feeling would be strong in any conflict. At the same time, public opinion is at the moment urging Great Britain to take a strong stand against aggression. If the British compromise it may forfeit American good opinion. This, however, Lindsay considers not to be important against

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the supreme advantage of a wise accommodation. Any ground that may be lost in the United States by compromise with Germany would soon be recovered. Roosevelt, a few days ago, said to a French visitor, "You may count on us for everything but troops and loans," but, Lindsay says he should have added, "subject to the dictates of our own public opinion and our own domestic political problems". Lindsay feels that if war broke out the United States would not take two and half years this time to come in, but they would take some time, "And it will seem very long to us!" The reason for ultimate American intervention he thinks would be disgust. They are disgusted with German diplomatic methods now, and would, undoubtedly, be even more disgusted with German military methods.

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Thursday, September 15th.

Foreign Office telegrams to-day do not throw much light on developments in Czechoslovakia beyond that which has appeared in the Press. Dr. Hodza has told Newton that there is no question yet of mobilisation; though in a later telegram Newton reports that Dr. Krofta said that they might have to mobilise later but would not do so until it was absolutely necessary. Newton warned Krofta of the danger of this and referred to those passages in Hitler's speech of Monday in which he condemned so bitterly Czech mobilisation of May 21st. Newton also emphasised how essential it was that the Czech police officers in the Sudeten districts should keep cool and act in as unprovocative a fashion as possible.

Dr. Hodza said that it is not quite accurate to state that martial law, in the ordinary sense, is in force. The measures taken might look serious, but so was the need for them. These measures would be revoked only if the Sudeten leaders would join with them in an agreement to maintain order. Hodza had asked Lord Runciman to send someone to persuade the Sudeten leaders to discuss with him the existing circumstances, the possibility of repealing the measures, of maintaining order, and of continuing negotiations for a settlement. Dr. Frank's reply to this intervention was that the Sudetens would guarantee to assure peace and order if their demands (embodied in their ultimatim) were accepted. Hodza replied that they might be able to agree to this if the Sudeten leaders would come to Prague and discuss the question.

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The situation seems now to be that Henlein and his aides will not talk until the measures are withdrawn; the Czechs will not withdraw the measures until a discussion as to the possibility of maintaining order has taken place. But Dr. Frank has gone further now in stating that even if they do begin to negotiate agin, it could not be on the considered basis so far, but on "self-determination". No reply has been returned by the Czech Cabinet to the Sudeten demands and Newton says that "in this case no reply is a reply".

Newton wires that he saw Benes yesterday afternoon, and found him very doubtful and anxious as to German intentions. Benes feels that it is difficult for a country organised as Germany is to remain passive. Extremists are in the ascendant and he feared they did not want a peaceful settlement. Hitler was furious at the Czechs because it was the first case in which he had met determined resistance. Nevertheless, Benes was nd sure that recent incidents and attacks were organised from the Reich, or even by the Sudeten leaders. He thought they might be spontaneous, under reckless local leaders, though it was true that the Reich had been sending arms. This moderation on Benes' part as to the responsibility for recent outbreaks is rather interesting and receives support also from Dr. Hodza who said that he was not himself clear as to what was behind Tuesday's outbreak.

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Lord Runciman reports a most significant discussion he had had with Dr. Preiss, a prominent Czech banker. Preiss had seen the German Minister and had pointed out to him the disadvantage of a plebiscite, from the German point of view, in that the removal of the German districts would leave a united Czechoslovakia, attached by race to Russia, and by sentiment to social democracy. Such a state would be a continuing anxiety for Germany. Dr. Eisenlohr agreed. Preiss then asked him which he thought Hitler would prefer, (a) a plebiscite or (b) the Carlsbad programme plus the suppression of the Communist Party, plus the denunciation of the Soviet Treaty. Dr. Eisenlohr thought that he would prefer (b). Preiss then suggested that he, Preiss, should bring it to Hitler's attention through his friend Schacht. The German Minister, however, demurred at this as he thought it would be suspect as coming from the Czech quarter and that it would be better for the idea to be put forward by the British. Dr. Preiss then saw Hodza who also felt that alternative (b) was better than (a) or war. Hodza then, however, according to this report, made the startling statement that much pressure would have to be brought on Benes to accept it as the Czech President felt that war now, with Great Britain and France on their side, would be successful.

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Newton and Lord Runciman have forwarded Dr. Preiss' suggestion to the British Government.

The Military Attache at Prague has been informed by the General Staff of recent precautionary military measures taken in Czechoslovakia. Some reservists to man light fortifications had been called up and certain classes due for dismissal have been retained with the colours. Colonel Stronge considers that the measures taken have been "most moderate" in view of the circumstances.

Newton reports an official list of casualties in recent disturbances. There have been 21 killed and 75 wounded. 12 of the killed and 61 of the wounded have been Czechs.

Lord Runciman, in reply to yesterday's telegram agreed that the publication of a plan of his own would be of no use in present circumstances, as the immediate problem is one of maintaining law and order. If the right moment comes, he could produce his own plan, but at present it would have no chance of acceptance by the Sudetem Party.

Phipps wires from Paris that French public opinion would hail with relief the grant of autonomy to the Sudetens outside the Reich.

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Phipps has also sent a telegram to the effect that Daladier did not look too pleased last night when he heard of the Chamberlain Mission from the Ambassador. He hoped it would do good, but his own proposal had been for a conversation "a trois". He had more than once been asked to meet Herr Hitler, but would not have done so without Chamberlain. (M. Daladier, apparently, feels slighted and is somewhat peeved.)

Lord Halifax has wired Phipps protesting against Corbin's report of their interview the other day; the one where the English and French versions of a vital point did not agree. The English report is accurate and Halifax asks that it be given to Bonnet as expressing the view of the British Government.

The French Ambassador at Moscow has told the British Ambassador that the Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister gave him emphatic assurances that the Soviet Government "would intervene with all its resources" in the case of a conflict. The French Ambassador, however, has some reserve about the value of these assurances.

The British Minister in Rumania wires that King Carol has been lulled into a state of false security on account of misleading or inaccurate messages from his Minister at Berlin to the effect that there is little risk of German aggression.

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There is an interesting report by Lord Halifax of a conversation which he had on Tuesday with the Polish Ambassador. The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that it had been made clear that if Germany used violence against Czechoslovakia, as the result of which war ensued with France, "it would be almost certainly impossible for this country to keep out of it. British feeling was hardening, and, more and more, coming to feel that it was quite intolerable that the whole world should be upset and kept in suspence by Herr Hitler, and that the transition from this feeling to one of real anger leading to very vital decisions was not a long one." Lord Halifax enquired whether it would be possible for Colonel Beck to exercise a moderating influence at Berlin. The Ambassador was sceptical; he felt that the Poles would be told to mind their own business. Lord Halifax enquired what would be the Polish attitude if war broke out? He was told that they would desire to keep out, but would probably in the end be drawn in. It had always been Colonel Beck's desire to orient his policy as closely as possible to London.

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C 118453

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16th.

I was not able to secure any information in the Foreign Office on the one subject that is exercising everyone's attention this morning; namely, the reason for Mr. Chamberlain's sudden return. Apparently, he is bringing back his own report.

There are, however, a few interesting telegrams in. Si Nevile Henderson wires his conviction that if there is a conflict Germany will remain strictly on the defensive in the West, so that, if France intervenes, she, Germany, can pose as the attacked nation and not as the aggressor; thereby keeping Great Britain neutral. She would expect to crush Czechoslovakia at once and then propose an armistice on the basis of the incorporation of the Sudeten areas. Henderson adds that Goering told him most positively that if Czechoslovakia provoked an incident which compelled Germany to take action, the latter would not attempt to move against France by land or air.

On Wednesday evening Lord Halifax, through Phipps, explained the purpose of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Hitler. It was two-fold in character; (1) to discourage the German leader from resorting to force by emphasising the necessity of a peaceful solution, and his cooperation in securing the same; (2) to encourage and strengthen moderate elements in Germany. There was increasing evidence of growing discontent with the present regime in Germany and at Hitler's

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conduct of Foreign Affairs. If the Prime Minister finds Hitler intractable, then he will repeat and emphasise the warnings already given. The French are to be assured that he will never loose sight of the common aims and policies of the two governments and that he is resolved to maintain the cooperation so effectively pursued in the present crisis. Phipps informed Daladier accordingly.

Phipps wired back that the Prime Minister's initiative had received enthusiastic support from Bonnet and Leger. Herriot and Renaud, who had called, also approve of it, but are somehwat frightened less it might unduly increase Hitler's prestige. Bonnet told Phipps that British M.P.s were ringing him up asking if it were true that the French Government was changing its attitude. Bonnet complained that it was difficult enough to answer the questions of his own M.P.'s without being subjected to those of the members of another Parliament!

Ashton-Gwatkin wires Strang that he found Henlein not unfriendly before he left for Germany. The Sudeten leader said he wished his lieutenants to keep in touch with Lord Runciman, but that a plebiscite was now the only basis on which negotiations could be continued. The Sudetens denied all responsibility for recent incidents and were enraged at the defense measures taken by the Czech Government.

Newton wires further details of his interview with Benes on the 14th. The Czech President argued that a plebiscite would mean disintegration and civil war for

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his country. The Reich, he felt, did not want a peaceful settlement; the moderate elements in the Sudeten Party would have accepted his latest scheme for self-government but were not allowed to do so by Hitler, or their own extremists. The Czech Parliament and public opinion would demand as a principle the maintenance of the integrity of their frontiers.

On Wednesday night Lord Runciman and Newton wired their own appreciation of the situation. They believed that the Czech Government would reject a plebiscite in any circumstances, though they added they might "just possibly accept it" if it were strongly urged on them by the French as well as the British Government. The Czech attitude was still remarkably restrained despite the casualties they had suffered. But the atmosphere was highly charged on the Czech as well as on the German side. They, Runciman and Newton, agreed with the Czechs that a plebiscite would not solve the main problem which was the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Germany. In fact, it would merely prejudice for Czechoslovakia the eventual settlement of that problem. Unless under the control of an overwhelming international force, a plebiscite might easily provoke wide-spread bloodshed. If the Czechs were to be forced to surrender the German provinces as a last

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means of preserving peace Runciman would prefer to use as a rough-and-ready guide the results of the recent communal elections. The Czechs, however, might well fight, in any event, against a solution which they would consider an outrage.

Newton states that the blame for refusing to reopen negotiations should be attributed to the Sudetens.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C118457

MEMORANDUM

September 26, 1938
4.25 p.m.

MR. KING:

Mr. Fredenburgh telephoned to say that the Canadian Press have just received the following despatch:

"It was officially announced in London by the British Government tonight that Great Britain and Russia would join France in a triple front to aid Czechoslovakia in the event of a German invasion."

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Not official - one of our staff made notes on radio translation.

Hitler's Speech

September 26th, 1938

. . . . . .

. . . . . Self-determination has produced Treaty of Versailles. You know what that means. If Germany has grown strong again she owes it to herself.

No grudge against other peoples.

Small unscrupulous gang responsible.

Germany demands equal rights under all circumstances.

Germany ready to limit army to 300,000, provided other nations do the same.

Hitler enumerated past proposals -

- reduction of army
- abolition of heavy artillery, etc.
- air force, etc.

Now we have armed to such an extent as world has never seen - (Loud cheers).

German people now must know purpose of huge expenditures. Instructed Goering to create air force able to protect Germany against any force. We have best tanks and anti-aircraft in world.

I've made every effort to carry on peace. policy. I am a front soldier myself. I know what war is.

One of greatest probs.- Poland vs. Germany. I dealt with one man not a democracy. Result - 10 year treaty. Poland had to have access to sea. Polish treaty great act of peace. Much

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more important than all that League of Nations babble from Geneva.

We have tried to establish similar peaceful relations with other nations. Guarantees established in the west will prevent trouble there.

To England, hand of peace. Have voluntarily offered never to compete with British Navy.

One party cannot say that he will limit navy to 35 per cent and never go to war, and other say she will go to war when she pleased. Hope people of similar opinion will gain upper hand in England.

After Saar, told France permanently renounced Alsace-Lorraine. No further territorial differences between Germany and France.

Next problem was relation with Italy - easier because of similar ideology. Some credit to Mussolini. Relationship has become real bond to the heart beyond any treaty. Insoluble friendship.

Only one interest now - to work in peace.

There were 10,000,000 Germans in two states who wanted to return to Germany as to their home. We have right to uphold their claims.

Somewhere there is a boundary to be drawn beyond which we cannot yield. I owe it to German people not to give up the 10,000,000. There was a limit beyond which I could not go. Austrian plebiscite has proven that I was right.

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C118460

Sudeten problem is the last territorial demand which I have to make in Europe. But it is a principle which I will not yield.

Central Europe was torn apart after war by crazy statesmen. Czechoslovak state began with a lie, and father of that lie was Benes. Benes invented the lie that there was such a thing as the Czechoslovak state. Anglo-Saxon Statesmen did not consider it necessary to examine the question. There are 3,500,000 Germans; and there are Magyars and Poles in this state. I sympathise with suppressed of all nations; but I speak only for suppressed Germans.

Benes promised to divide country into cantonal system.

Almost 600,000 Germans had to leave Czechoslovakia in early days of peaceful development.

In years 1918-38 one thing is clear: Benes was determined to eradicate Germans in Czechoslovakia. He has succeeded in suppressing millions of Germans.

Bolshevism used Czechoslovakia to open channel into Europe.

People may sympathise with their race brothers.

Conditions in Czechoslovakia - especially in German areas - are horrible. Unemployment, Suicides.

When one traitor is shot democratic nations get excited. But when thousands suffer they are unconcerned.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C118461

My great friend, Benito Mussolini (long cheers). There is only one statesman today - Mussolini. You will never forget attitude of Italian people. If they ever need us they can count on us. Italy and Germany will stand side by side.

In February I stated that things would have to be changed. They have changed. Benes introduced more oppression. German people have been patient. Benes found means of carrying out plans by military occupation of Sudeten area. Benes thinks he is protected by England and France and can therefore do as he pleases.

I finally demanded that after 20 years self-determination should be carried through.

There is only one solution now and I have decided no longer to stand aside. German impatience is not inexhaustible. An end must be made of this situation. I have made final request to England (sic) to cede this territory to Germany.

Benes agreed that these territories would have to be ceded. He has gone back on his promises.

Today there are over 100,000 fugitives from Czechoslovakia.

Czechs using hand grenades and gas against Germans.

Benes thinks England and France behind him.

Truth must be told now.

Our patience finally exhausted. Benes has 7,000,000 Czechs. We have many more.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118462

Final German proposal - realization of what Benes has agreed to. Return of Germans to their own country. Not after Benes has succeeded in driving out one or two millions, but now and immediately. (Loud cheers).

I have nevertheless decided that people should have a plebiscite, and that system used in the Saar should be used here.

I was willing to have a plebiscite in all the territory. Benes was not satisfied. Suggested international commission, then a German-Czechoslovak commission. Refused. Was willing to withdraw troops during plebiscite. Was willing to let British come in to maintain order. Was willing to allow German Czechoslovak commission to draw new frontier.

Benes says new memorandum creates new situation. I demand he stick to his promises. What has not Benes promised in his life, and what promises has he kept?

Benes wants to withdraw from his duty. He thinks he can persuade Daladier and Chamberlain to agree with him, but I stand between.

I, as a decent German, have to fulfil my duty.

I am grateful fo Mr. Chamberlain. I have assured him that German nation wants nothing but peace. Have assured him that when this problem is solved there will be no further territorial demands.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C118463

We don't want any Czechs. We hope minority problem in Czechoslovakia will be settled peaceably.

My patience is at an end.

Benes now has choice between <u>war</u> and <u>peace</u>. If he does not accede to this request and fulfil his former promises, <u>we shall take Sudetenland.</u>

In all years of my political life nobody has been able to say I am a coward. I now lead my people as their first soldier. Behind me there now marches a nation, different nation than that of 1918.

We are no longer letting democratic lies influence our people today. Whole people now united. We are absolutely confident of victory. Man for man and woman for woman. We are now decided to follow one will.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 165, pages C117603-C118550)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118464

Sept 27th 1938

7.30 pm

For Immediate Release from the Prime Minister's Office

The Canadian government is continuing to keep in the closest touch with the grave developments in the European situation.

The government is making preparations for any contingency and for the immediate summoning of Parliament if the efforts which are still being made to preserve the peace of Europe should fail.

For our country to keep united is all-important. To this end, in whatever we say or do, we must seek to avoid creating controversies and divisions that might seriously impair effective and concerted action when Parliament meets.

The government is in complete accord with the statement Mr. Chamberlain has made to the world today.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

/

C 118465

1. Is Canada to be regarded as at war, formally, as soon as a British proclamation of war is issued?

Should a separate Canadian proclamation be issued then? (something will depend on the scope and terms of the United Kingdom proclamation).

2. Issues which will arise immediately upon a British proclamation include the following:

Advisability of putting into force -

censorship aliens enemy shipping air raid precautions	)	Committee recommendations and Orders-in-Council

Military defence measures at coast, railways, plants, etc.

Control of exports - munitions, contraband.

Expulsion of German consuls.

Trading with the Enemy, etc.

3. Should War Measures Act be proclaimed at once to give legal basis for Order-in-Council's or other action, or this deferred until meeting of Parliament?

4. Financial measures to consider:

Exchange control
Preparation of special war estimates
Bank loan at low rate
Control of investment
Refinancing of war industries
Control of profits - or excess profits tax
Stock exchanges - set limits

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CANADA

C118466

5. Should a War Purchasing Commission be set up?

6. Economic measures:

Priority board, railway shipment coordination
Price or Wage control?
Control of wheat, metals and other war necessities being exported abroad.

7. Regulation of political and economic relations with United States with special reference to neutrality legislation.

8. Appropriate ~~[illegible]~~ form of war cooperation;

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C118467

Need for unity -- [illegible] to
keep united -- avoid controversies
that may lead to discussion
before
Cooperation - Dorant (Spec 1)

Nature & extent of cooperation
Chow it can be made
Most effective will
be for felt to decide

People of Canada can trust
these representatives to
see that Canada does
her full duty to herself
and to others in whatever [illegible] Education
[illegible] may develop

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C 118468

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

LONDON, Sept. 27-(AP) THE text of Prime Minister Chamberlain's speech today follows:-

Tomorrow Parliament is going to meet and I shall be making a full statement of the events which have led up to the present anxious and critical situation.

An earlier statement would not have been possible when I was flying backwards and forwards across Europe and the position was changing from hour to hour.

But today there is a lull for a brief time and I want to say a few words to you men and women of Britain and the Empire, and perhaps to others as well.

But, first of all, I must say something to those who have written to my wife or myself in these last few weeks to tell us of their gratitude for my efforts and to assure us of their prayers for my success.

Most of those letters have come from women - mothers

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C118470

or sisters of our own countrymen- but there are countless others besides from France, Belgium, and Italy, and even from Germany, and it has been heart-breaking to read of the growing anxiety they reveal and of their intense relief when they thought, too soon, that the danger of war was passed.

If I felt my responsibility heavy before, to read such letters has made it seem almost overwhelming.

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and fitting gas masks because of a quarrel in a far away country.

It seems still more impossible that a quarrel which is already settled in principle should be the subject of war.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

I can well understand the reasons why the Czech Government have felt unable to accept the terms which have been put forward by the German memorandum, yet I believe that, after all the talks by Herr Hitler, if only time will allow, it ought to be possible to reach a settlement by agreement under conditions which would ensure fair treatment to the populations concerned.

You know already that I have done all that one man can do to compose this quarrel. After my visits to Germany, I realize vividly how Herr Hitler feels that he must champion every German whose grievances have not been met before this.

He told me privately, and last night he repeated publicly, that after the Sudeten German question is settled that is the end of Germany's territorial claims in Europe.

After my visit to Berchtesgaden, I did give to the Czech Government the proposals which gave the substance of what Herr Hitler wanted, and I was taken completely by surprise when I got back to Germany and he insisted that the territory he wanted should be handed over to him immediately and immediately occupied by German troops without previous arrangements for safeguarding the people within the territory who are not Germans and do not want to join the German Reich.

I must say I find that attitude unreasonable.

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CANADA

If it arose out of any doubt that Herr Hitler feels about the intentions of the Czech Government to carry out their promises and hand over that territory, I have offered, on behalf of the Czech Government, to guarantee their words.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118473

I shall not give up the hope of a peaceful solution or abandon my efforts for peace as long as any chance for peace remains.

I would not hesitate to pay even a third visit to Germany if I thought it would do any good.

But at this moment, I see nothing further that I can usefully do in the way of mediation.

Meanwhile there are certain things that we can and should do at home.

Volunteers are still wanted for air raid precautions, for the fire brigade and police services, and for territorial units.

I know that all you men and women alike are ready to play your part in the defence of the country, and I ask you to offer your services, if you have not already done so, to the local authorities who will tell you if you are wanted and in what capacity.

Do not be alarmed if you hear of men being called up to man anti-aircraft defences or ships.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118474

These are only precautionary measures such as a Government must necessarily take in a time like this, but they do not necessarily mean that we have determined on war or that war is imminent.

However much one may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful nation, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in a war simply on that account.

If we have to fight, it must be on larger issues than that.

"I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me.

But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted.

I believe that life without liberty would not be worth living, but war is a fearful thing and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really very great issues that are at stake and that we should risk everything in their defence.

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CANADA

At present, I ask you to await as calmly as you can the events of the next few days. As long as war has not begun, there is always hope that it may be prevented and you know I am going to work for peace to the last moment.

Good night.

(End text)

SECOND LEAD CHAMBERLAIN

London, Sept. 27 (CP) - Prime Minister Chamberlain declared tonight that if he were convinced "any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force" he would feel "it must be resisted."

In an address broadcast to the far-flung British Empire and many other parts of the world he declared that "However much one may sympathize with a small nation confronted with a big and powerful nation, we can not in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on that account."

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CANADA

C 118477

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C 118479

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118480

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118481

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118482

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C 118483

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Sept 27

Prime Ministér.

The issue of statements to the press at frequent intervals is going to make it difficult to say the same thing in different words, if that is what must be done for the present. ~~Would~~ There are a big flock of pressmen in your outer office now. Do you wish to make a statement before Chamberlain broadcasts at 2?

If anything were to be said ~~so~~ probably the briefer the better. I do not know if this draft would meet your wishes in that case.

S

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CANADA

LAC C 118483-A

The Canadian Government is continuing to keep in the closest touch with the grave developments in the European situation. ~~It hopes that even at this hour a peaceful solution may be found. At the same time~~ ~~it~~ the Government is making preparations for any contingency and for the immediate summoning of Parliament if ~~peace fails~~. the efforts

(1) ~~to find a peaceful solution fail,~~ ~~[illegible] to press~~

which are still being made to preserve the peace of Europe should fail

(2) ~~The members of the Government~~

The Government is in complete

(3) with the statement Mr Chamberlain has made to the world today

(4)

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118484

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118485

First need: Unity.

For our country to keep united is ~~the~~ all important ~~need at present~~. To this end, in whatever we say or do, we must seek to avoid creating controversies and divisions that might seriously impair effective and concerted action ~~at a time when~~ Parliament ~~has declared what, in its opinion, is the course this nation should pursue.~~

Second need: Co-operation.

(Speech at Toronto - July 30th).

What these times most need is a co-operating Canada, a co-operating Empire, co-operating democracies, and a co-operating world.

~~Consultation and co-operation go hand in hand.~~ The Canadian Government has kept and is keeping closely in touch with the British Government, and is anticipating measures necessary to meet whatever situation may arise. The nature and extent of further co-operation and how it can be made most effective will be for Parliament to decide.

Parliament to decide.

~~(See statement H. of C. - May 24 - pages 34 and 21.)~~

The people of Canada can trust their representatives to see that Canada ~~does her full duty~~ by herself and to others in whatever situation may develop.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118486

The European situation is grave but not yet hopeless. Mr.Chamberlain is continuing his task as mediator under conditions that would deter any less courageous and determined statesman. The world will hope that even at the eleventh hour a solution will be found. The reports which the Canadian Government have been receiving from the British Government give a full and frank appreciation of developments from day to day. In the light of these reports and other information, the Government is preparing for every contingency.

See other party leaders?

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

G-100
V-1
Ed.

C118487

The following statement was handed to the press by the Prime Minister, after a meeting of the Cabinet on September 27th, 1938.

The Canadian government is continuing to keep in the closest touch with the grave developments in the European situation.

The government is making preparations for any contingency and for the immediate summoning of Parliament if the efforts which are still being made to preserve the peace of Europe should fail.

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The government is in complete accord with the statement Mr. Chamberlain has made to the world today.

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CANADA

C118488 File European situation G-100 v.1 E.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 27, 1938
No. 449

Reports reaching the Department from nearly all sections of Europe emphasize the increasing difficulties of travel and the delays being experienced by Americans in obtaining immediate passage home. In the circumstances, the Department of State strongly advises all American citizens for the time being to forego travel to Europe, except in cases of absolute necessity.

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118489

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1938
No. 446

The American Chargé d'Affaires at Budapest, Mr. Howard K. Travers, reported to the Department last night that the Legation is advising Americans to leave Budapest if they have no urgent business or other reasons to hold them there. He stated that he had not advised all Americans to leave as had been reported on the radio. He added that all members of the staff and their families are remaining in Budapest.

The American Minister at Praha, Mr. Wilbur J. Carr, reported to the Department last night that American citizens are experiencing great difficulty in leaving Czechoslovakia. He stated that the German frontier is closed and that trains only go as far as the frontier. Reports received from there are to the effect that there are no German officials or trains on the German side of the border. Americans having German visas, tickets to Paris and steamship tickets were unable to cross the border at Eger yesterday and have returned to Praha. He reported that he had telephoned the American Embassy in Berlin urgently to endeavor to effect some arrangement whereby American citizens could enter Germany and reach a seaport. The American Embassy and Consulate General in Berlin are giving the matter attention. Mr. Carr added that the only outlet from Czechoslovakia at the moment is by means of trains which run to the Hungarian and Polish frontiers, where passengers must then connect with whatever transportation is available on the other side.

***

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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C118490

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

September 23, 1938
No. 440

The American Minister at Prague, Mr. Wilbur J. Carr, has reported to the Department of State that beginning yesterday he has been notifying Americans that conditions were such that at any time it might become impossible for them to leave Czechoslovakia. He pointed out that it was therefore of the utmost importance that every American citizen should take steps without delay to insure his safety by being prepared for immediate departure. The great risk which would be run by remaining was emphasized.

The American Minister was naturally authorized to issue such a warning at any time and in any way thathe judged wise on the basis of the local situation.

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C118491

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

September 26, 1938
No. 441

The President this morning sent the following message direct to the President of Czechoslovakia and the Chancellor of Germany, and through the Secretary of State to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France:

"The fabric of peace on the continent of Europe, if not throughout the rest of the world, is in immediate danger. The consequences of its rupture are incalculable. Should hostilities break out the lives of millions of men, women and children in every country involved will most certainly be lost under circumstances of unspeakable horror.

"The economic system of every country involved is certain to be shattered. The social structure of every country involved may well be completely wrecked.

"The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed its civilization.

"The supreme desire of the American people is to live in peace. But in the event of a general war they face the fact that no nation can escape some measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe.

"The traditional policy of the United States has been the furtherance of the settlement of international disputes by pacific means. It is my conviction that all people under the threat of war today pray that peace may be made before, rather than after, war.

"It is imperative that peoples everywhere recall that every civilized nation of the world voluntarily assumed the solemn obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to solve controversies only by pacific methods. In addition, most nations are parties to other binding treaties obligating them to preserve peace. Furthermore, all countries have today available for such peaceful solution of difficulties which may arise, treaties of arbitration and conciliation to which they are parties.

"Whatever may be the differences in the controversies at issue and however difficult of pacific settlement they may be, I am persuaded that there is no problem so difficult or so pressing for solution that it cannot be justly solved by the resort to reason rather than by the resort to force.

"During the present crisis the people of the United States and their Government have earnestly hoped that the negotiations for the adjustment of the controversy which has now arisen in Europe might reach a successful conclusion.

"So

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"So long as these negotiations continue so long will there remain the hope that reason and the spirit of equity may prevail and that the world may thereby escape the madness of a new resort to war.

"On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity everywhere I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking to a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement of the questions at issue.

"I earnestly repeat that so long as negotiations continue, differences may be reconciled. Once they are broken off reason is banished and force asserts itself.

"And force produces no solution for the future good of humanity.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1938
No. 442

The Secretary of State today received the following message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain:

"Please convey the following message to the President:

"His Majesty's Government hail with gratitude the weighty message that the President of the United States has addressed to them and to certain other Governments in this critical time. It is indeed essential to remember what is at stake and to weigh the issues with all gravity before embarking on a course from which there may be no retreat.

"His Majesty's Government have done and are doing their very utmost to secure a peaceful solution of the present difficulties and they will relax no effort so long as there remains any prospect of achieving that object. The Prime Minister is even today making a further earnest appeal for settlement by negotiation in which His Majesty's Government would be ready to lend their good offices. The President's words can but encourage all those who sincerely desire to cooperate in this endeavor. His Majesty's Government, for their part, respond to the President's appeal in all sincerity and without reserve, and they most earnestly hope that the other Governments to which it is addressed will do likewise.

(Signed) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN."

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C 118494

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1938
No. 443

The following reply to the President's message of this morning to the Prime Minister of France, was telephoned to Ambassador Kennedy at London today:

"Your moving appeal has reached me in London at the very moment when, in close cooperation with the British Government France makes a supreme attempt with a view to safeguarding all possibility of an amicable settlement of the conflict that is threatening peace, it is of special value to me that under your high moral authority the devotion of the entire American nation to the principles which have been recognized and publicly acknowledged by all the parties to the Kellogg Pact is now solemnly reaffirmed.

"Remaining faithful both to the spirit and the letter of the pledges, we continue with unfailing tenacity to look for any procedure or form of agreement which may be compatible with the dignity and the vital interests of the nations involved.

"We trust thus to serve to the last the ideal of justice and peace which has always been a link between our two nations.

DALADIER"

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1938
No. 445

REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE MORNING OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1938

Praha
September 26, 1938

His Excellency
Franklin Roosevelt,
President of the United States of North America
Washington.

Mr. President:

I am deeply moved by your cable message. It reached me at a moment when our country and our nation are feeling so intensely the menace of war. For twenty years our successive governments have pursued a policy of peace. They have abided by the principle of settling all international disputes by peaceful means. They have concluded treaties of arbitration. They have supported the peace policy of the League of Nations and they have never offered(?) against all that line of conduct. Our Government also signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact and will in no case do anything that would violate it. Although Czechoslovakia has already made greatest sacrifices in the negotiations up to now sacrifices which touch the country's vital interests it does not break off negotiations, desirous of seeing the conflict solved by peaceful means by agreement. Czechoslovakia has also signed a treaty of arbitration with Germany, has already proposed to settle the present dispute under its terms and is ready to renew this offer. Czechoslovakia is grateful to you, Mr. President, for your message, a message which in these grave moments can contribute towards a just solution of the dispute. I believe that even today the dispute could be settled in a spirit of equity without resort to force and the whole Czechoslovak nation still hopes this will be the case. The Czechoslovak nation would defend itself were it attacked but it is profoundly convinced with you that in the end war solves no problem and that this is a case in which reason, a sense of humanity and and principle of justice should triumph.

DR. EDUARD BENES.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 27, 1938
No. 447

The President has received a reply to his message of September 26, 1938, to the Chancellor of Germany, of which the following is a translation:

"His Excellency the President of the United States of America,
"Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
"Washington.

"In your telegram received by me on September 26th, Your Excellency addressed to me an appeal in the name of the American people, in the interest of the maintenance of peace not to break off the negotiations regarding the dispute which has arisen in Europe and to strive for a peaceful, honorable and constructive settlement of this question. Be assured that I can fully appreciate the lofty intent on which your remarks are based, and that I share in every respect your opinion regarding the unforeseeable consequences of a European war. Precisely for this reason, however, I can and must refuse all responsibility of the German people and their leaders, if the further development, contrary to all my efforts up to the present should actually lead to the outbreak of hostilities. In order to arrive at a fair judgment regarding the Sudeten-German problem under discussion, it is indispensable to consider the incidents, in which, in the last anlaysis the origin of this problem and its dangers has its cause. In 1918, the German people laid down their arms, in the firm confidence that by the conclusion of peace with their enemies at that time the principles and ideals would be realized which had been solemnly announced by President Wilson and had been just as solemnly accepted as binding by all the belligerent powers. Never in history has the confidence of a people been more shamefully betrayed, than it was then. The peace conditions imposed on the conquered nations in the Paris suburbs treaties have fulfilled nothing of the promises given. Rather have they created a political regime in Europe which made of the conquered nations world pariahs without rights and which must be recognized in advance by every discerning person as untenable. One of the points, in which the character of the dictates of 1919 was the most openly revealed was the founding of the Czechoslovakian state, and the establishment of its boundaries without any consideration of history and nationality. The Sudeten land was also included therein, although this area had always been German, and although its inhabitants, after the destruction of the Hapsburg monarchy, had unanimously declared their desire for annexation to the German Reich. Thus the right of self determination, which had been proclaimed by President Wilson as the most important basis of national life, was simply denied to the Sudeten Germans. But that was not enough. In the treaties of 1919, certain obligations, with regard to the German people, which, according to the text were far-reaching, were imposed on the Czechoslovakian state. These obligations also were disregarded from the first. The League of Nations has completely failed to guarantee the fulfillment of these obligations in connection with the task assigned to it. Since

then

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then the Sudeten land has been engaged in the severest struggle for the maintenance of its Germanism. It was a natural and inevitable development that after the recovery of strength by the German Reich and after the reunion of Austria with it, the urge of the German Sudetens for maintenance of their culture and for closer union with Germany increased. Despite the loyal attitude of the Sudeten German party and its leaders, the difference with the Czechs became ever stronger. From day to day it became ever clearer that the Government in Prague was not disposed really to consider seriously the most elementary rights of the Sudeten Germans. Rather did it attempt with ever more violent methods the Czechization of the Sudeten land. It was inevitable that this procedure would lead to ever greater and more serious tensions. The German Government, at first did not intervene in any way in this development of things, and maintained its calm restraint, even when the Czechoslovakian Government, in May of this year, proceeded to a mobilization of its army, under the purely fictitious pretext of German troop concentrations. The renunciation of military counter measures at that time in Germany, however, only served, to strengthen the uncompromising attitude of the Government in Prague. This has been clearly shown by the course of the negotiations of the Sudeten German party with the government, regarding a peaceful adjustment. These negotiations produced the conclusive proof that the Czechoslovakian Government was far from thoroughly grasping the problem of the Sudeten Germans and bringing about an equitable solution. Consequently conditions in the Czechoslovakian state, as is generally known, have in the last few weeks become utterly intolerable. Political persecution and economic oppression have plunged the Sudeten Germans into extreme misery. To characterize these circumstances it is enough to refer to the following. There are at present 214,000 Sudeten German refugees who had to leave their house and home in their ancestral country and flee across the German border, as they saw therein the last and only possibility to escape from the revolting Czechoslovakian régime of violence and bloodiest terror. Countless dead, thousands of injured, ten thousands of persons arrested and imprisoned, desolated villages are the accusing witnesses before world opinion of an outbreak of hostilities carried out for a long time by the Prague Government which you in your telegram rightly fear. Entirely aside from the German economic life in the Sudeten German territory for 20 years systematically destroyed by the Czech Government, which already shows all the signs of ruin, which you anticipate as the result of an outbreak of war these are the facts which compelled me in my Nuernberg speech of September 13th to state before the whole world that the deprivation of rights of the three and one-half millions of Germans in Czechoslovakia must be stopped and that these people if they of themselves cannot find justice and help, must receive both from the German Reich. However, to make a last attempt, to reach the goal in a peaceful way, I

made

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made concrete proposals for the solution of the problem in a memorandum delivered on September 23rd to the British Premier, which, in the meantime has been made public. Since the Czechoslovakian Government had previously declared itself already to be in agreement with the British and French Governments that the Sudeten German settlement area would be separated from the Czechoslovakian state and joined to the German Reich, the proposals of the German memorandum contemplate nothing else than to bring about a prompt and equitable fulfillment of that Czechoslovakian promise. It is my conviction that you, Mr. President, when you realize the whole development of the Sudeten German problem from its inception to the present day, will recognize that the German Government has truly not been lacking either in patience or a sincere desire for a peaceful understanding. It is not Germany who is to blame for the fact that there is any Sudeten German problem at all, and that the present unjustifiable circumstances have arisen from it. The terrible fate of the people affected by the problem no longer admits of a further postponement of its solution. The possibilities of arriving at a just settlement by agreement, are therefore exhausted with the proposals of the German memorandum. It does not rest with the German Government, but with the Czechoslovakian Government alone, to decide, whether it wants peace or war.

ADOLF HITLER"

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1938
No. 448

The following is a translation of a telegram received by President Roosevelt from the President of Argentina:

Buenos Aires
September 26, 1938

Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

The call to peace which the President has just addressed to Chancellor Hitler and President Benes has found in the Argentine people and Government a warm and sympathetic adherence as an expression of an ideal of right which is the traditional basis of our international policy. The whole Republic supports the gesture with which the great American Democracy joins the forces of peace and expresses its wishes that it may be definitively strengthened, thereby saving the future of Europe to whose destinies it feels that it is intimately bound. Accept Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

ROBERTO M. ORTIZ,
President of the
Argentine Nation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 27, 1938
No. 453

The following is an exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the President of Brazil:

"Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
September 26, 1938

"Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

"I earnestly congratulate my eminent friend for your noble appeal in favor of peace expressing the sentiments, traditions and hope of all the peoples of America which you so well interpreted in this hour of universal anxiety. Please accept the appreciation of the Brazilian people and the expression of my highest esteem and consideration.

"GETULIO VARGAS,
President United
States of Brazil."

"THE WHITE HOUSE

September 27, 1938

"His Excellency
Getulio Vargas
President of the United States of Brazil
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)

"I am most grateful for your message. It is heartening to know that you believe that the appeal for peace which I have made represents the sentiments, traditions, and hopes of the peoples of America. I have believed, as do you, that the supreme desire of all of the American nations is the maintenance of peace and the solution of controversies by pacific methods.

"Please accept my most sincere thanks and the assurances of my highest personal regard and consideration.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 27, 1938
No. 454

The following is an exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the President of the Republic of Cuba:

"Havana
September 27, 1938

"Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
Washington

"I hasten to transmit to Your Excellency the congratulations of the Cuban Government and people on your message to Europe counselling the pacific solution of the existing serious difficulties, a splendid document which reflects the noble and pure aspirations of an entire continent that desires to consolidate its institutions within the strictest order and respect for the rights of all peoples.

"FEDERICO LAREDO BRU,
President of the Republic
of Cuba."

"THE WHITE HOUSE

September 27, 1938

"His Excellency
Federico Laredo Bru,
President of the Republic of Cuba,
Habana, Cuba.

"I sincerely appreciate Your Excellency's telegram of September 27. The Cuban Government and people make it evident that they, too, stand firmly behind the American ideal of the pacific settlement of international controversies and that they recognize the necessity of a regime of order and mutual respect if the true welfare of all peoples is to be served.

"Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and personal esteem.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 27, 1938
No. 455

The following is an exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the President of Peru:

"Lima, Peru
September 26, 1938

"Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

"Will Your Excellency please accept my heartiest congratulations on your noble and high action in directing yourself to the heads of the states of Germany and Czechoslovakia urging them to avoid the catastrophe of a war in Europe. I am sure that I express the sentiments of the Peruvian Government and people in affirming that Your Excellency has once more beenable to interpret the genuine tradition of our America and has succeeded in translating exactly the wishes and hopes of this part of the world.

"GENERAL O. R. BENAVIDES
President of Peru."

"THE WHITE HOUSE

September 27, 1938

"His Excellency
General Oscar R. Benavides,
President of the Republic of Peru,
Lima, Peru

"I have received Your Excellency's telegram of September 26 and I am deeply grateful and pleased by your statement that I expressed the sentiments of all of our American Republics. It is a source of encouragement and deep satisfaction to know that the Government and people of Peru stand so firmly in support of the principle of pacific settlement of disputes between nations and realize so clearly what the catastrophe of war means to all peoples.

"Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and of my personal regard.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 27, 1938
No. 456

The following is an exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the President of Uruguay:

"Montevideo, Uruguay
September 26, 1938

"Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

"The Uruguayan Government and people adhere to the terms of the message that Your Excellency has caused to reach the Chancellor of Germany, Señor Hitler, and the President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benes, due to the threats of war which hang over Europe. Our country to the full extent of its forces supports always the pacific solution of international controversies and judging now that a war would represent for the world the most tremendous catastrophe that could be imagined desire to express to you through me their feelings of solidarity with the noble initiative that Your Excellency has just made known.

"Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high and distinguished consideration.

"ALFREDO BALDOMIR
President of Uruguay."

"THE WHITE HOUSE

September 27, 1938

"His Excellency
Alfredo Baldomir
President of Uruguay
Montevideo (Uruguay)

"I have received Your Excellency's message of September 26 and am deeply grateful for it. No assurance was needed of the genuine and loyal devotion of the Government and people of Uruguay to our American principle of pacific settlement of international disputes. This fact does not lessen the encouragement and gratification that this further evidence of inter-American solidarity affords me.

"Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and the expression of my personal esteem.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

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WLMIC. √European situation

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The following statement was handed to the press by the Prime Minister, after a meeting of the Cabinet on September 27th, 1938.

The Canadian government is continuing to keep in the closest touch with the grave developments in the European situation.

The government is making preparations for any contingency and for the immediate summoning of Parliament if the efforts which are still being made to preserve the peace of Europe should fail.

For our country to keep united is all-important. To this end, in whatever we say or do, we must seek to avoid creating controversies and divisions that might seriously impair effective and concerted action when Parliament meets.

The government is in complete accord with the statement Mr. Chamberlain has made to the world today.

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Canadian Foreign Policy

STATEMENT OF CANADA'S POSITION

With respect to External Affairs

BY THE

RIGHT HON. W. L. MACKENZIE KING
Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs

HOUSE OF COMMONS, OTTAWA, MAY 24, 1938

OTTAWA
J. O. PATENAUDE, I.S.O.
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1938

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C 118506

Canadian Foreign Policy

STATEMENT OF CANADA'S POSITION

With respect to External Affairs

BY THE

RIGHT HON. W. L. MACKENZIE KING

Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs

HOUSE OF COMMONS, OTTAWA, MAY 24, 1938

AS hon. members of the house are aware, I had intended to make a statement on external affairs at about the time of the Easter recess. One circumstance or another has rendered it inconvenient or inadvisable to make that statement until to-day.

In view of the very serious condition of affairs in Europe and the grave unrest that exists in many parts of the world, I am not going to attempt this afternoon to rely upon my memory for what I have to say. Rather I shall follow somewhat closely what I intended to say in a statement which I had prepared several weeks ago. It may be that the statement will be the more significant in the light of the events of the last few weeks. I shall endeavour in what I say to be as concise and at the same time as comprehensive as possible. By that I mean I shall endeavour not to omit any of the subjects which I believe hon. members will wish to consider in discussing foreign policy or, better, external affairs. I use the words "external affairs," because our relations with different parts of the British Empire are affairs which lie beyond the dominion; they could hardly be called foreign affairs, but they are external affairs, while our relations with other countries come under the heading of foreign affairs. I shall endeavour, as I say, to anticipate what may be in the minds of hon. members in the way of ques-

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tions as to the attitude and policy of the government with respect to situations that have arisen in which Canada may be expected to have some interest or to take some part.

THE WORLD SITUATION

It may be desirable at the outset to make some observations of a general character in view of the concern which events abroad have caused in all our minds. We look out upon a disturbed and seemingly chaotic world. Bitter and destructive wars are being waged in two continents. Force is openly glorified. Solemn pledges are disregarded. Armaments are mounting to fantastic heights. A war of propaganda is filling the air. We ask ourselves, how, within twenty years after a war to end war, is the war spirit so strong in many quarters? Why, after a war to make the world safe for democracy, has dictatorship attained such acceptance and momentum?

It is not possible to give a short answer to such questions. It is clear that no one factor and no single country can be held responsible. The fact is the great war never completely ended; the world is still suffering from its consequences. The effects of four years of world struggle and destruction and convulsion did not end in 1918. The results of a great war are usually entirely different from the intentions and the objectives of any of the peoples who embark upon it.

Peace or Conflict?

For a time after the war it appeared that a stable world might shortly be attained. A genuine passion for peace spread through all the countries engaged in the war, the losers as well as the nominal victors. In great part this new will to peace found embodiment in the League of Nations, but it found expression in many other movements as well. No one who visited Europe in the middle twenties could doubt the strength or the genuineness of that desire. But meanwhile other forces had been at work which in time overcame this will to peace in many quarters. Over a great part of Europe, except the democratic states fronting on the Atlantic, political and social revolutions were in

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progress. Countries which had not been fortunate enough to work out political freedom and economic progress by gradual effort found themselves compelled to face these belated tasks through revolution. The war had broken down the accepted social structure, the habitual conventions and restraints. The new controls were established by violence, by dictatorship of a class, dictatorship of an individual. New men, with new ambitions and new methods, were thrown up in the conflict; masters of violence and propaganda were given free hand. Inevitably the revolutions and class conflicts which have dominated the internal affairs of three countries out of four in central, eastern and southern Europe found reflection in their foreign relations as well. The new religions of race or class or social doctrine were as explosive, as expansive, as intolerant as Islam was a thousand years ago. The world was called upon to subscribe to their new creeds of communism or fascism or other isms.

The peace settlement had left problems and grievances which these explosive forces turned to account. It solved some territorial grievances, some nationalist aspirations, but it created new problems. Some countries or minorities when given freedom denied that freedom to others. Some countries which had lost territory or prestige were stirred up to plan for vindication and revenge. Some of the victors could not forget their fear or their pride. The fact that the earthquake of the war had disturbed the existing balance of world power, had given America and Asia new power relatively to western Europe, further complicated the organization of peace.

I do not believe these forces would have reached the explosion point if economic depression had not swept the world in 1929 and the years that followed. Depression sharpened every problem, shook the individual's security, increased the tension of international intercourse, provided the unemployed and discontented recruits for the new gospels. That depression, at least in its magnitude, was also a delayed consequence of the war, the war which left a crushing burden of debts and reparations, which broke down international credit and currency arrangements which created new customs boundaries and new vested economic interests.

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Lost Opportunities.

It may be that if the world had the last ten years to live over again the present breakdown might have been averted. A realistic settlement of war debts and reparations might have been effected. Trade barriers might have been reduced. Some would say the league should have attempted more strenuously to put down force by force, notably in Manchuria in 1931, while others would say the trouble lay in the very attempt to use collective force to maintain the Versailles settlement. Perhaps if any single cause and time might be isolated, it would most reasonably be held to be the failure, during the disarmament discussions in the early thirties, to recognize the futility of maintaining against Germany the one-sided policy of disarmament prescribed by the treaty of Versailles, the failure to make moderate concessions to a democratic regime in Germany, which later were grasped and far exceeded by a dictatorial regime.

It is a dark outlook, but not one that calls for despair. Some measure of internal stability survives even in states that have suffered many shocks. It may be years, however, before freedom and tolerance revive. The equilibrium of military force, which might have been secured at a moderate height five years ago, will be secured at a much higher level. Where resort to arms appears to be inevitable, every effort should and, I believe, will be made to circumscribe the area of conflict. The reversion to pre-war or pre-modern age standards of internal and external conduct has not materially affected the western or north Atlantic world. No country in which democracy was firmly established has given up its ideal and its practice of liberty at home, its ideal and its practice of peace abroad, even if that peace has had to be assured by new outlays for defence.

CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The question is asked, What is Canada's foreign or external policy in such a world? In some quarters it is contended that Canada has no foreign policy, a contention which on analysis usually turns out to mean that the Canadian government does

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not make weekly announcements about other countries' foreign policies. Too often it is assumed that foreign policy is something that must be made in Geneva, or in London, or in Moscow, according to the centre of the speaker's interests, and that Canada should line up in support of or opposition to other countries' foreign policies.

May I refer to some observations on this subject which I made at a conference in England some years ago. I intend to embody in what I have to say quotations from speeches made at Imperial Conferences in Great Britain and at Geneva, and some references to statements of policy made in this house at different times in the past. I do that lest it be assumed that what I am setting forth at this time is set forth in the light of conditions as we see them and know them to be to-day. I prefer rather that what has been set forth in the past as a statement of our position should be made clear at this time, particularly as I have had reason to say with pride and satisfaction that our foreign policy has remained to the present what it has been in the past.

This statement was made at the Imperial Conference of 1923:

> Foreign policy I conceive as simply the sum of those dealings or relationships or policies which the government of one country carries on with other countries. It is in large part an extension of domestic policy. It depends upon the balance of social and political forces, upon the industrial organization, upon the whole background of the people's life . . . Foreign affairs nowadays have to do largely with economic questions, trade or tariff, oil or railway concessions, international debts, migration, fishery or power or navigation rights in boundary waters. They are largely neighbours' disputes, arising naturally most frequently with the countries with which there is most intercourse. The question whether a certain matter in dispute will lead to friction, or even to war, is frequently not so much a question of the character of the specific issue, as of the spirit and traditions and supposed general interests of the countries concerned.

No two countries have the same neighbours, the same relationships; no two countries can have the same questions to deal with, the same policies for their solution. Argentina and Finland, China and Switzerland, have widely different preoccupations. There are of course world movements, trade, cultural, military, which affect every country, affect all countries increasingly, but they affect no two countries alike or in the same degree. And so

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even in times of world disturbance, the policies of no two countries can be alike, provided they are rooted in their own interests or the ideals in which their interests are sublimated, and are not merely echoes of the policies of other countries.

Various aspects of external relations.

So far as Canada is concerned, the question of foreign or external policy is at once extremely simple and extremely complex. Our direct and individual relations with other countries are important; they involve difficulties and differences of opinion; but the issues are issues within our knowledge and competence, issues for which we can find our own solution. Our indirect relations, as a member of the League of Nations, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, present issues of a more varied and complicated character.

Our direct relations with other countries are increasingly important. In large measure they are relations with one or other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Questions which arise with these communities are frequently difficult, frequently involve, particularly in trade matters, conflicts of opinion between different sections or interests in our own country; but the frank and friendly attitude which exists, the understanding based on similar political and social and ethical standards and ways of life, ensure a settlement.

In large measure also our external relations consist of our relations with our great neighbour. These relations are so intimate and continuous that some people in Canada seem to imagine they are not foreign relations at all, that they do not constitute foreign policy at all; they unconsciously assume that foreign policy should mean to us the relations and issues involved in some other country's foreign policy, or that our foreign policy should mean only relations with distant countries with which we have little contact and connection.

These relations with the United States, which constitute and always will constitute by far the most important part of our foreign policy in the strict sense, have not always been easy to carry on. Real differences of interest arise from time to time; these differences are expressed with an openness and frankness

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that leave nothing concealed; constitutional divisions of authority complicate agreement. Within our memory a good deal of friction has existed, exclusive trade policies and pin-pricking attitudes have roused resentment. But that attitude has largely disappeared. On both sides of the border there is a realization of common ideals and common interests, a genuine friendliness and increasing understanding, which facilitate agreement on most issues that arise and make it no serious calamity if for the moment agreement is not reached on others.

Incidentally, I may say from my experience, and I am sure the right hon. the leader of the opposition would say the same from his experience, the existence of a Canadian legation at Washington and a United States legation at Ottawa have greatly aided in the growth of this understanding and the prompt and effective consideration of questions that arose. It is one of our national assets—and we need all our assets to offset some of our liabilities—that we have a good neighbour—a neighbour which any free country in the continent of Europe or elsewhere would thank its stars to have.

I need not refer to our increasingly close relations with other lands in Europe, particularly France, and in Latin America and Asia. They are largely, but not wholly, relations of trade. Here I might point out that the increasing intervention of the state in business in many countries abroad, the growth of exchange controls, of quota regulations, of state monopolies, make it increasingly difficult for the business man to do business in the old way, require the intervention of his government with the government of the other country to ensure a reasonably fair and definite opportunity to carry on business.

Our foreign policy—one of peace and friendliness.

The Secretary of State of the United States, in the significant address which he delivered a few weeks ago on the foreign policy of the United States, declared:

> The primary objectives of our foreign policy are the maintenance of the peace of our country, and the promotion of the economic, the social and the moral welfare of our people.

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Within our more limited range of activity, we could, I think, say much the same thing. Our foreign and external policy is a policy of peace and friendliness, a policy of trying to look after our own interests and to understand the position of other governments with which we have dealings. It is a policy which takes account of our political connections and traditions, our geographical position, the limited numbers and the racial composition of our people, our stage in economic development, our own internal preoccupations and necessities—in short, a policy based on the Canadian situation. It is not and cannot be under these conditions a spectacular head-line policy; it is simply the sum of the countless daily dealings with other countries, the general resultant of an effort to act decently on every issue or incident that arises, and a hope of receiving the same treatment from others.

Canada, it is hardly necessary to say, cherishes no design of aggression or expansion or revenge. We have no ancient grudges, no envy for others' possessions, no ambition for controlling others' destinies. We know and the world knows that we have neither the power nor the will to attack any other land for our own ends.

Nor are we inclined to organize or join in crusades in other continents. We are a part of the modern world. We cannot help but be affected in some measure by the policies and actions of other countries. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of democratic institutions, the suffering of unfortunate minorities elsewhere. But we must keep a sense of perspective. Resolutions or speeches on affairs in Austria or Spain or Santo Domingo may afford an emotional outlet, but they do not give our country any power to shape the destiny of other peoples. We have a tremendous task at home. Our eleven million people are trying to develop half a continent, to find a decent livelihood, to build up a distinctive national life. We have neither the power nor the knowledge to settle the destinies of countries thousands of miles away. We are no more likely of our own motion to intervene in Europe than Sweden or Bulgaria or Switzerland is to intervene in America. It is sometimes forgotten that in Canada itself we have an area as large as Europe, with problems of communication, of development, of adjust-

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ment of sectional and cultural groups quite as difficult to deal with as many of the problems of adjustment which the different parts of Europe are facing, and which constitute a great part of European "foreign affairs". We are not asking and will not receive any help from outside in meeting these difficulties, and we are unlikely to have any surplus of statesmanship or good fortune to bestow elsewhere.

Need to safeguard possibilities of attack.

If we are unlikely of our own motion to take part in wars of conquest or wars of crusade, it is equally unlikely that at the moment, with the world as it is to-day, any other country will single out Canada for attack. The talk which one sometimes hears of aggressor countries planning to invade Canada and seize these tempting resources of ours is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours and our lack of neighbours; it ignores the strategic and transportation difficulties of transoceanic invasion; it ignores the vital fact that every aggressor has not only potential objects of its ambition many thousands of miles nearer which would be the object of any attack, but potential and actual rivals near at hand whom it could not disregard by launching fantastic expeditions across half the world. The truth of this is recognized in every country. At present danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and second-hand in origin. It is against chance shots that we need immediately to defend ourselves. What may develop no one can say.

Thus while it is well we should see our country and its security as viewed from other lands we should also have a clear vision of how dangers that threaten in other parts of the world may expand under circumstances which lie beyond any control of our own, and be prepared to meet any situation which may arise in a world of the character that our world is to-day.

CANADA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

If we are not likely to be directly involved in a conflict, are we likely to be drawn into European conflicts indirectly, for

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example, through our connection with the league? That is an important question which I think many Canadians are asking at the moment. I have pointed out that so far as we ourselves are concerned, being a country by ourselves, if we were confined to looking after ourselves we have little to fear. But we have other associations and out of those associations arise obligations. The question naturally arises as to what, in determining our attitude, the significance of those associations may be.

We are a member of the League of Nations which was founded for the purpose of advancing international co-operation and world peace. From the beginning, wide differences of opinion have existed as to the means by which those ends were to be sought and achieved. Successive Canadian governments have supported one of those views. In this house in June, 1936, and at the assembly of the league in September of that year, I restated that view. Developments since that time have only served to confirm the soundness of the position then taken.

Briefly, the Canadian government believes that the only feasible and constructive basis of league activity under present conditions is to develop all its possibilities of conciliation, all its possibilities of co-operation in agreed tasks, all its possibilities of shaping and focusing world opinion. As indicated in a statement made on behalf of the present government in October, 1935, we are convinced of the value and necessity of the league "as an indispensable agency for organizing and strengthening the forces of good will in the world, and for effecting the essential adjustment of conflicting national aims." As Lord Curzon declared at the first session of the council of the league, which has just held its hundredth session:

> The League of Nations is the expression of a universal desire for a saner method of regulating the affairs of mankind.

That desire, that need, continues. In some way we must adjust our international relations to the economic forces, the scientific inventions which have made all nations neighbours, adjust our theories and practices of national sovereignty to the requirements of world co-operation. It is not a task which can

be performed in a day. It is not an end which can be attained by shutting our eyes to facts, by assuming that nations are ready to-day to resign their sovereign right of decision to a world superstate. We must build on what exists, must extend the habit of co-operation in steadily wider fields, must seek to remove the causes of friction and fear.

Sanctions recognized as leading to war.

Equally definite is our belief that at the present juncture of world affairs it is not possible to make the league an international war office, an instrument of force, military or economic.

As I said at Geneva in 1936:

> There is a general unwillingness of peoples to incur obligations which they realize they may not be able in time of crisis to fulfill, obligations to use force and to use it at any place, any time, in circumstances unforeseen, and in disputes over whose origin or whose development they have had little or no control. This difficulty of automatic intervention increases rather than decreases when conflicts tend to become struggles between classes, between economic systems, between social philosophies, and, in some instances, between religious faiths, as well as between states.

In recent years the peoples have become more aware of the difficulty of localizing and restricting a war once it has begun. They have come to realize that the consequences of wars are different from either their real or their alleged objects, that war is war regardless of the labels and the slogans devised at the outset. They have become more aware of the horrors and suffering involved for any people at war from indiscriminate air and gas attack. They have become aware of the strain on national unity and social order a long struggle may involve. They have become aware of the uncertainty, the very grave uncertainty, whether in any country engaged in a long war individual liberties can be maintained. They realize more clearly the difficulty of putting on economic sanctions unless the countries doing so possess overwhelming force and are firmly bound to apply military sanctions if the occasion arises, and prepared to exchange firm and explicit territorial and military guarantees among each other in advance.

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In Mr. Eden's words in the British House of Commons last December:

> There are two possible forms of sanctions, the ineffective, which are not worth putting on, and the effective, which mean the risk, if not the certainty, of war.

After stating:

> I say deliberately that nobody could contemplate any action of that kind in the far east unless they are convinced that they have overwhelming force to back their policy.

Mr. Eden continues:

> Do right hon. gentlemen opposite really think that the League of Nations to-day, with only two great naval powers in it, ourselves and France, have got that overwhelming force?

In other words, Mr. Eden recognized that a league which fell far short of the universality contemplated by its founders, could not hope to carry out the role of universal policeman.

No automatic commitments.

In the statement at Geneva from which I have quoted, I made it as clear as possible that Canada could not accept the theory of automatic commitment to the application of force, economic or military.

The covenant as originally drafted provided alternatively for peace by conciliation and peace by collective coercion.

In its original conception the covenant was predicated upon the practically universal acceptance of its provisions. Without this assumption, the latter alternative of seeking peace by collective coercion, embodied in articles 10, 16 and 17, would not have found place. It was recognized that formal amendment of the covenant by the removal of those articles was not possible in view of the difficulty in securing action by the requisite two-thirds of the members even on amendments on which there is general agreement in principle. Nor was it necessary:

> The powers and duties of the league—

I quote now from what I said at Geneva.

> —develop by usage and experience as well as by explicit amendment. What its members will and will not do can be read more clearly from what they have done and not done than from the text of the convenant. What is now called for is to register in the light of actual facts the position which has developed during sixteen years of league history by the interpretations given and the action taken or not taken as occasion for decision arose.
>
> It is a fact, as has been indicated by representatives of the Scandinavian countries and other members of the league, that many provisions of the covenant have not been observed, or have been applied unequally or ineffectively. The pledge of reduction of armaments in article 8 has not been honoured. The provisions for the revision of treaties "which have become inapplicable," contained in article 19, and which were in form and fact an essential complement to the provisions of article 10 for the maintenance of the territorial status quo, have not yet been applied. The sanctions provisions of article 16 were tacitly recognized at an early stage as unworkable in their entirety, and were modified by the assembly resolutions of 1921. Modified, or unmodified, sanctions against an aggressor have never been tried when the conflict took place in Asia or America. Applied once in an Afro-European conflict, they failed and were abandoned because of general unwillingness under the conditions of the day to press force to the point of war.

Realities of situation.

It has been alleged by some strong advocates of the collective coercion theory in Canada that Canada is responsible for wrecking this conception of the league. That view is part and parcel of the exaggerated idea of Canada's power and duty and the unwillingness to face the realities as to the attitudes of other states that underlies the advocacy of the 100 per cent sanctions doctrine. The influence of any small state at Geneva is definitely limited, except occasionally when it acts in the direction of one or another of the great powers' wishes. Every member of the league, whether from Europe, or from South America, or from Asia, has its own approach to the problems of the league, its own views of its interest or the league's interest. The Canadian government did not cause those countries to take the action or lack of action they have taken. It did in some measure realize what that course of action was likely to be. It was

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apparent years ago that in the opinion of many of the countries most influential in the league, the covenant was intended to be a one-way street, operating toward Europe, not from Europe. Chaco and Manchuria only confirmed that analysis. Ten years ago, the Canadian government, in a communication to the government of the United States on the relation between the covenant and the Kellogg pact, declared:

> It is plain that the full realization of the ideal of joint economic or military pressure upon an outlaw power, upon which some of the founders of the league set great store, will require either an approach to the universality of the league contemplated when the covenant was being drawn, or an adjustment of the old rules of neutrality to meet the new conditions of cooperative defence.

Not all the forecasts we and others made in 1928 have required as little alteration as that one.

As relatively little attention has been given the matter in Canada—itself a significant fact—it may be worth while to refer to the latest occasion on which the varying views of members of the league on this question of sanctions were set forth.

Question of sanctions reviewed by League.

The whole question was reviewed in the January meeting of the council, this year, and in the proceedings of the committee of twenty-eight in January and February. This committee, it will be recalled, was appointed by the 1936 assembly to explore the whole question of the application or reform of the covenant. Every phase of that question—the problem of universality, co-operation with non-member states, regional or continental organization of the league, methods of amending or interpreting the covenant, article 10 (territorial integrity), 11, 12, 13, 14 (intervention in disputes), 16 and 17 (sanctions), and separation of the covenant from the peace treaties, were studied by special rapporteurs.

The first question, the possibility of securing the participation of all states in the league, was surveyed in a report by Lord Cranborne, who envisaged three types of league, (1) a coercive league, (2) a non-coercive league, and (3) an intermediate league,

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in which any members would retain the right to apply sanctions in cases where they considered it advisable. This report on universality was the only one which was formally before the committee on January 31 and February 1, but the discussion covered the whole range of the covenant and particularly the question of article 16; it was impossible to consider whether it was desirable to bring all states into the league without considering what changes would be necessary to accomplish that end, and whether such changes were desirable or practicable.

The discussion brought out radically different points of view, but on one point there was little dissent—namely, that article 16 had never been enforced in its entirety and only once partly attempted; that there was no proposal in any quarter to apply it in the conflicts now waging, and that member states are not now prepared to regard the provisions of article 10 and article 16 as binding. The delegates of Sweden declared:

> The league in practice has ceased to be a coercive league. . . . By the force of events, without any amendments to the covenant, the practice has been established according to which members of the league do not consider themselves bound to undertake coercive action against an aggressor state.

That position was not seriously challenged. There was, however, wide difference of opinion as to whether a coercive league was or was not desirable, and whether or not the existing practice should be translated into amendments to the text of the covenant. Mr. Paul Boncour admitted there was some ground for the fear of certain small powers that the great powers which had shown little zeal for article 16 might demand its strict observance in conflicts in which they themselves were concerned. Some small states also appeared desirous of maintaining the possibility of sanctions being used in their support, though not ready to pledge their use when others were in need.

Broadly speaking, the U.S.S.R., France, Spain, China, Iran (or Persia), Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Colombia, New Zealand, indicated they were convinced that ultimately, if not now, sanctions might be workable, and that it would be a mistake to take article 10 and article 16 out of the covenant in response to what might prove a temporary difficulty. Sweden, and in other

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connections the other Scandinavian states, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, emphasized the danger of the present ambiguous position. Sweden and Holland proposed that article 16 be formally recognized as being at present optional and not obligatory in character. Poland indicated definite qualifications. Chile urged the removal of all sanctions to facilitate the entry or return of all countries to the league.

Canadian position regarding sanctions.

The Canadian government, through its representative on the committee, indicated its belief in the necessity of attaining substantial universality for the effective working of the league. It did not consider, however, that it was now possible to obtain universality by putting through formal amendments to the covenant. Some members of the league had indicated they were not prepared to consent to the explicit changes in the sanctions article necessary if some great countries were to enter. On the other hand, some countries outside the league had indicated their unwillingness to enter or re-enter the league, whether organized on a coercion or on a conciliation basis. The Canadian government therefore believed it desirable to keep the league operating as effectively as possible within the scope which experience had shown to be practicable, and to seek at a more opportune time such formal adjustments as may be required to secure the cooperation of all states which are prepared to renounce aggression and to cooperate in the peaceful settlement of international problems. Meanwhile, it was stated, the position of the Canadian government as to sanctions and the sanctions articles remained as set forth by the Prime Minister in the assembly in September, 1936. As has been indicated, no one in the recent discussion at Geneva ventured to hold that the sanctions articles were now in force. It would have taken considerable hardihood to make such a contention in view of the absolute refusal of league members, great and small, to invoke sanctions in the present conflict between Japan and China.

In fact, the present situation as to the interpretation of the sanctions articles was well summed up by the representative of Belgium in the committee of twenty-eight:

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To-day in a grave conflict, the anxiety is to avoid procedures that might lead to the application of article 16, because account is taken of the obstacles that would be met with in its application.

At the same time, the possibility must be taken into account, that, in the phrase of another speaker, the article may be resurrected, or, as it has been put elsewhere, may be taken out of cold storage when it suits the interests of some of the members that now completely ignore its existence.

To avoid any possibility of ambiguity or misunderstanding, it is therefore desirable to repeat that the position indicated in the assembly of 1936 and in this house earlier in the same year remains the position of the Canadian government. We recognize the honesty and the idealism of those who call for a universal and automatic application of sanctions. We do not consider that it would make for honesty or decency or good will among nations to attempt an in-and-out interpretation of the covenant, based on the varying interests of some of the members of the league. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, the sanctions articles have ceased to have effect by general practice and consent, and cannot be revived by any state or group of states at will.

CANADA AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Now may I pass to the question of our relationship to the foreign policy of other members of the British commonwealth of nations, and particularly the United Kingdom. The task of the United Kingdom in the field of foreign affairs has been an extraordinarily difficult one of late years. Its own position has been modified by shifts in the balance of power throughout the world and the invention of weapons of war which have ended its own insularity, and introduced new factors into the Mediterranean area. As one of the great powers, it has had to consider not only its own protection, but the maintenance of peace throughout the world and particularly on the continent of Europe. There may be differences of opinion as to the wisdom of some of the policies adopted to secure these ends in the twenty years since the war, but I think there can be little ques-

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tion of the unremitting care and anxiety which those responsible for the foreign policy of Britain have devoted to their task, or of their strong and determined effort to establish peace and maintain respect for solemn pledges and the principles of law.

No course of action adopted by the United Kingdom in foreign affairs can fail to have repercussions, great or small, upon Canada and the other members of the commonwealth of nations. The problem of adjustment this fact presents is one of the most difficult and complicated that faces Canada and other parts of the commonwealth as well. A number of courses have been urged or practised. It may be helpful to review these briefly. I believe that all of them have been mentioned in this house in the course of discussions on defence matters and other questions. They have been mentioned by one or another member who has been prepared to support the point of view he urged.

Various courses of action proposed.

One attitude that has been proposed is to say that we will accept any policy adopted by the British Government of the day, and give it our support, regardless of our own views and interests, and regardless of consequences.

It is only necessary to spell out the implications of this view to make it clear that even its exponents would hesitate to adopt it in all cases. The goal of United Kingdom policy may remain the same, but the paths by which that goal is sought vary widely. The view which I have mentioned would involve being prepared to follow every variation in the trend of British policy due to changing situations on the continent, changing party fortunes or changing ideas of national advantage. It would mean one year following a Conservative government, next year a Labour government; one year leaning toward collective security, next year perhaps toward isolation.

A second course would be to say that we will accept the policy of Great Britain whenever she acts through the league and in accordance with the covenant.

It was held in some quarters some years ago that the fact that all parts of the commonwealth were members of the league and that Great Britain would not go to war except under a league decision and in accordance with a covenant binding all parts equally and automatically, had conveniently and permanently solved the question of intracommonwealth war relations. Experience has shown that no such automatic solution is afforded by the league, that it does not operate automatically, and that the question whether an attempt is to be made to set its sanctions or war provisions in action depends in last analysis on whether influential European members of the League wish to invoke these provisions.

A third course that might be advocated is to say we will advise Great Britain as to what course she should follow, so that we will not be involved in the consequences of a policy we thought wrong. I believe that position has been stated many times in this house.

This attitude has more to be said in its favour. Occasions arise where consultation is both necessary and possible, and where it will be open to each government and sometimes necessary for each government to indicate its attitude. The difficulty, however, is that a United Kingdom government, for example, must be responsible to its own people for its actions. The direct and main responsibility for its policy must rest with its own parliament. They are closer to the danger point, and must bear the main brunt of any misjudgment or failure. They might be prepared to take advice which fell in with their own views; but otherwise they would find it difficult to do so unless the adviser could guarantee them against the consequences. It could not be anticipated that Canada and South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland would always advise the same way. The necessity of the United Kingdom consulting certain other powers in Europe would not be affected. The danger would arise of intervening in controversies between the government and the opposition in Westminster. In many cases, there is not time or opportunity for such consultation or advice. A policy is not adopted at one stroke; it is the sum of

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many actions, accumulating decisions on what often appear points of detail, ordinary routine. Daily and sometimes hourly new situations must be faced, conversations held, decisions taken.

Again, it has been urged that we should say we will declare here and now our neutrality in any future conflict, decline to take part under any circumstances in any conflict in which the United Kingdom may be engaged.

I stated the government's position on this proposal last session in the following terms. I have stated it in similar terms in other sessions:

> This would amount to tying the hands of parliament regardless of the circumstances of the war or the participants, what interests of Canada may or may not be involved. Over and over again we have laid down the principle that so far as participation by Canada in war is concerned, it will be for our parliament to decide. Having taken that attitude in respect to participation, I think we might well take a similar attitude with respect to neutrality. At the present time there are no commitments, so far as Canada is concerned, to participate in any war. Equally there are no commitments . . . whereby we agree to remain neutral under all circumstances. The policy of the government with respect to participation and neutrality is that parliament will decide what is to be done.

That position has not been changed. To make such a declaration would be unjustified by the policies of British governments. It would be an unwise encouragement to potential aggressors.

Parliament will decide.

Finally, we may take the position that parliament will decide upon our course when and if the emergency arises, in the light of all the circumstances at the time. In the meantime we should endeavour to keep informed upon the situation, to keep in touch with the United Kingdom and other countries striving for peace, to carry through a reasonable and effective defence program of our own, to support any constructive program of conciliation and removal of economic barriers to peace, and to strive in our own relations to build up friendships which will serve our need and the need of others.

I made a statement at Geneva in September, 1936, in the presence of British ministers and representatives of other

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nations, which later, on January 25, 1937, I declared was "a statement of the present administration's policy and the policy which the present administration intends to follow as long as it remains in office." It was as follows:

> The nations of the British commonwealth are held together by ties of friendship, by similar political institutions, and by common attachment to democratic ideals, rather than by commitments to join together in war. The Canadian parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members of the commonwealth may be engaged.
>
> The Canadian House of Commons by unanimous resolution has made the adoption of undertakings to apply either military or economic sanctions subject to the approval of parliament.

What I have said and quoted—

> I am still quoting what I said at Geneva two years ago.

—does not mean that in no circumstances would the Canadian people be prepared to share in an action against an aggressor; there have been no absolute commitments either for or against participation in war or other forms of force. It does mean that any decision on the part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the parliament or people of Canada in the light of all existing circumstances; circumstances of the day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved.

Impossible to forecast issues.

It will be argued, it has been argued, that it is not satisfactory to postpone decision until the eve or the fact of an outbreak of war, that under such circumstances calm decision will not be possible, that the decision should be made in advance.

I do not agree with that view. In the first place it would be impossible to frame to-day the questions which might have to be decided later. Many "inevitable" wars have never happened. The opponents of one year may be the friends of the next. It is impossible to forecast what the issues abroad, the alignments abroad, the situations at home, may be in a year or five years from now. In Mr. Hull's address on foreign policy on March 17, to which I have already referred, after indicating his country's firm adherence to the faithful observance of international agreements, the settlement of international issues by

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peaceful negotiation, the scrupulous observance of the rights of others, and the maintenance of international law and order, he continued:

There is one thing that we cannot do. And that is, to prepare and place before every government of the world a detailed chart of the course of policy and action which this country will or will not pursue under any particular set of circumstances. No man, no nation, can possibly foresee all the circumstances that may arise. Moreover, to attempt to make such a detailed chart of future action would merely result in impairing our effectiveness in working for the one objective toward which we constantly strive and on which, I am certain, there is not a vestige of disagreement among the people of our country—the establishment of durable peace.

In Mr. Chamberlain's speech of March 24, referring to suggestions of assurances to France regarding Czechoslovakia, or assurances of military assistance direct to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Chamberlain declared:

From a consideration of these two alternatives it clearly emerges that under either of them the decision as to whether or not this country should find itself involved in war would be automatically removed from the discretion of His Majesty's government, and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of circumstances by which it was brought into operation, and over which His Majesty's government might not have been able to exercise any control.

Again, it should be plain to everyone, it is explicitly recognized by some of those who urge a decision now, that to force an issue like this upon the country would bring out deep and in some cases fundamental differences of opinion, would lead to a further strain upon the unity of a country already strained by economic depression and other consequences of the last war and its aftermath. To invite this risk on a hypothetical question would be as great a disservice to Canada as any government could render.

It must be recognized that this policy is not wholly satisfactory, not free from difficulties, not a completely logical position. Like many other policies it is not an ideal solution; it is only the best of the available solutions. That, however, is not the fault of the policy. It is the inevitable outcome of the present stage in the relations between the several parts of the British commonwealth. It is inherent in the contradiction between the recog-

nized independent responsibility of the several members of the commonwealth, "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs," to quote the declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926, and the possibility that war proclaimed by the King as regards part of his dominions may involve other parts in the conflict. In other words, we have worked out a satisfactory and enduring solution of the relations between the several members of the British commonwealth in peace time; we have not yet worked out a completely logical solution of the position in war time.

CANADA AND THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

Now may I turn briefly to some more specific comments on developments abroad, and first, the Sino-Japanese conflict. The terrible war now raging on the soil of China has aroused intense interest and concern in Canada. It is a conflict of great moment for the future of the Pacific and of the relations between the countries that border on the Pacific. It is a clash between two ancient and distinctive though allied civilizations, in which all the powers of destruction and terror which western civilization has made available to the whole world are being employed. Canada has many close ties with both countries—cultural and church and trade associations. The immediate tragedies have stirred deep feeling. Similar conflicts, with similar losses of life, have been waged in Asia over many thousands of years, but to-day the telegraph and the camera and motion pictures have brought home to millions on this continent a direct and poignant knowledge of the suffering and the horrors such a conflict involves, both for the tens of thousands who die in battle and for the tens of millions who are driven from their homes to wander and to starve. A distinguished Chinese visitor to Canada recently stated that he did not wish to dwell upon charges of atrocities in the conflict. It is true that, once the die is cast and war is entered upon, the difference between a humanely conducted war and an inhumanely conducted one may not be very great, though it will still be significant. Some armies may show greater arrogance, greater callousness in battle,

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greater recklessness as to attack on civilians, but with airplanes and bombs and gasses available, no modern war can be anything but mass slaughter, mass destruction, mass suicide.

It is natural that many Canadians have asked what they could do, what the government and parliament could do, in the face of this calamity.

So far as the government's action is concerned, Canada has a direct interest as a member of the League of Nations and as a signatory of the nine-power treaty. The covenant of the League of Nations provides under article 10 that the members of the league agree to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. Article 11 provides that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole league, which shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Articles 12 to 15 of the covenant providing for means of peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the league, and article 16 providing for sanctions in the event of a member of the league resorting to war, do not directly apply, as Japan is not now a member of the league. Article 17, however, provides that in the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member, the non-member shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership. If it does not accept and resorts to war against a member of the league, the provisions of article 16 shall be applicable against it.

China's appeal to the League.

On September 12, 1937, the Chinese government appealed to the league under articles 10, 11 and 17. The assembly was then in session, with Senator Dandurand, Mr. Ilsley and Mr. Massey representing Canada. The council referred the question direct to a far eastern advisory committee of twenty-two members which had been set up in 1933 to deal with the previous Manchurian conflict. Canada is a member of that committee. On September 27 the advisory committee, which included the United States, passed a resolution, which was accepted the following day by the assembly, condemning airplane bombing of open

towns and cities in China by Japanese aircraft. On October 1 a sub-committee was set up, on which Canada was not represented. Four days later the sub-committee brought in two reports, the first setting forth the facts of the present situation in China, and declaring that the action by Japan was a breach of its treaty obligations and could not be justified. The second report expressed moral support for China, recommended that members of the league should consider how far they could individually extend aid to China, and further recommended that the signatories of the nine-power treaty should be asked to examine the situation. The report and resolutions were adopted by the assembly on October 6 with the approval of all members represented except Siam and Poland, which abstained.

It must frankly be recognized that the league's treatment of the situation has not proved of very material benefit to China. The question whether the sanctions provisions of article 16 should be invoked was studiously avoided. The plain facts were, first, that with more than half the great powers outside, there was not the concentration of potential force within the league that had been contemplated when the covenant was framed, and, second, that given the unrest and the threats to peace in the Mediterranean and central Europe, the European countries that were in the league were not prepared to weaken their own position at home by taking steps which might involve having to despatch a large and possibly still inadequate part of their forces to the other side of the earth.

The league assembly, as has been noted, proposed that the question be further considered by the signatories of the so-called nine-power treaty. That treaty was one of the series of interrelated treaties and agreements signed at Washington in the winter of 1921–22, with the object of bringing about stability and security in the far east. It was signed for the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Japan and China, and was later accepted by other powers. The contracting parties undertook to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, to seek to maintain the open door in China and refrain from seeking for special privileges, or spheres of influence. Article 7 provided that when

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in the opinion of any signatory a situation arose involving the application of the treaty, there should be "full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned." In view of some misunderstanding on the subject, it is necessary to remember that this treaty, unlike the covenant, included no provision for sanctions against a signatory which broke its pledges. It bound each party to refrain from aggression and intrigue, it provided for consultation if peace was threatened, but it did not involve joint action against a violator.

The Brussels Conference.

The conference met in Brussels early in November, on an invitation by the Belgian government issued at the request of the British government and with the approval of the government of the United States, for the purpose "of examining, in accordance with article 7, the situation in the far east and to consider friendly peaceable methods for hastening the end of the regrettable conflict now taking place there." All the countries which signed or adhered to the treaty were represented, with the all-important exception of Japan. Earnest and repeated efforts were made to bring the warring parties into consultation. The services of the other signatories, or alternatively of a small group of states, were offered in an effort to suspend hostilities and work out a lasting settlement. Japan refused to take part, declared she was acting in self-defence and that the conflict therefore lay outside the scope of the treaty, and that a solution could be attained only by efforts between the two parties directly concerned. The conference found itself at an impasse. The members of the conference, with Italy definitely opposing and the three Scandinavian countries, while sympathetic, abstaining from voting on account of their limited direct interest, declared their right and interest to intervene in the issue, their condemnation of force and breaking of pledges, their rejection of the view that direct negotiation between the two parties could achieve a settlement, and their readiness to continue further efforts for suspension of hostilities and negotiation. They then adjourned at the call of the chairman. In the circumstances,

nothing more was possible; it was probably worth while holding the conference to determine whether more was possible. Canada concurred in the action taken. It did not think less could be done; it did not urge the great powers represented to do more.

There is another phase of this question about which a good deal has been said in Canada. I have received a good many communications protesting against the shipment to Japan of munitions and of raw materials available for war purposes. Many of those communications reveal a common inspiration from sources more concerned with the welfare of certain other countries and systems than with Canada's welfare. But many are genuine, based on an honest hatred of war, disgust at atrocities, unwillingness to see profit made out of others' misery. Those views I respect. I think we all share the feelings that lie behind them. But they are also based on erroneous ideas as to the facts both of Canada's position and the position of other countries, and erroneous assumption as to what action by Canada alone would effect.

CANADA AND THE SPANISH CONFLICT.

Perhaps before I give the facts with regard to shipments of munitions and the like I had better touch on the other conflict, the civil war in Spain, because what I have to say with regard to the shipment of munitions has a direct bearing on both. In Spain, the conflict is in form at least a civil war, not a war between independent states. It is not the first conflict that has marked the history of that unhappy country. The transition from mediaeval feudalism to a modern social order has been a slow process, marked by more than one civil war, more than one armed revolt. The conflict which began in July, 1936, has been particularly destructive because of the nature of modern weapons of warfare, and because of the intervention of outside governments in the struggle, the Italian and German governments directly assisting the insurgents and the Soviet government assisting the government. There was imminent danger of the conflict spreading into a war of isms, of class conflict and of conflict of national strategic interests. On the initiative of the

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governments of France and Great Britain, a non-intervention committee of twenty-seven European states was formed to endeavour to prevent or restrict outside participation in that war. The committee has not succeeded in preventing continued extensive participation by outside states, all members of the committee. Its critics in England and France contend that it was unfair to put an unrecognized insurgent force on a par with a recognized government, that the committee has merely furnished a veil, an excuse for shutting one's eyes to a flagrant invasion of Spain with plane, tank, and heavy artillery, and that a serious danger exists of a threat to British and French communications in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coast. Its sponsors contend that it has lessened the amount of such intervention, that it has prevented an open break which would have led inevitably to a general European war, and that whatever the outcome and whatever the assistance received, no Spanish government, when firmly in power, will tolerate outside control.

Control of export of munitions and of recruiting.

Canada of course did not take part in the establishment or the work of this European committee, nor did any other non-European country. But when the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries had prohibited the export of munitions to Spain, the possibility arose that orders for munitions might be diverted to Canada, and in order that the efforts to localize the conflict in Spain might not be frustrated in this manner, an order in council prohibiting such imports was passed in July last, under the authority of the amendment made last year to the Customs Act.

Similarly, in order to prevent Canada from being drawn into this European struggle by the recruiting of Canadians for service in Spain, an order in council was passed in July, applying the Foreign Enlistment Act to the Spanish conflict, as had previously been done in the United Kingdom and administratively in the United States, and early in August the issue of passports to Canadian nationals proposing to go to Spain for the purpose of participating in the conflict was prohibited.

As there is some misunderstanding on the subject of both these measures, it may be advisable to refer briefly to their scope and subsequent application. The purpose of both measures was to prevent Canada from being drawn into foreign conflicts by the actions either of manufacturers of munitions or of organizers of recruiting.

The provision for the control of exports was based upon the reports of a Geneva committee, and an examination of the practice of other countries. An amendment to the Customs Act, which took the place of an old section which was comprehensive but not adapted to present conditions, empowered the governor in council to set up a system of permits or licences for the export of munitions or food or raw materials; to provide publicity for exports or imports of munitions; to register persons engaged in manufacturing or exporting munitions, and to prohibit the exportation of munitions or war materials. Under this authorization a system of permits was subsequently set up to regulate the export of arms and munitions, the definition of which was based substantially on the recommendation of a League of Nations committee.

No exports of munitions to any country can be made without a permit, and statistics of such exports are made public by the enforcing agency, the Department of National Revenue, every month. The licence system, it will be noted, applies to arms and munitions only. Further, the discretionary power given the government to prohibit exports, has, as I have already indicated, been applied to exports of munitions in the case of Spain. The prohibition in this case does not apply to raw materials or any other class of goods—solely to arms and munitions as defined. The power thus given has not been applied by Canada, or any other country, as regards either munitions or any other materials, in the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

The Foreign Enlistment Act of last session, which took the place of an old act of the parliament of the United Kingdom extending to Canada, made it unlawful for a Canadian national to enlist anywhere for service against a friendly state, or for any person within Canada to induce any other person to enlist.

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This act contains many collateral provisions and empowers the governor in council to provide for its application to a civil war, and to facilitate these purposes by passport control.

An organized campaign for recruiting Canadians and foreigners living in Canada was under way, and a substantial number of persons had left Canada and proceeded to Spain. Since August no passports for Spain have been issued to Canadian nationals, though a small number of Canadians and of foreigners have made their way to that country by indirect routes.

CONCERNING CANADIAN EXPORTS OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

I now come to a consideration of the shipment of munitions. First, as to Canadian exports. Arms and munitions are not made in Canada in any appreciable degree, and our export trade in this field is still more negligible. So far as exports to Japan are concerned, I am informed that the only shipment has been a single plane ordered before the war; to China, a few planes ordered since the war.

It is, however, the trade in raw materials and particularly in non-ferrous metals, against which complaint is mainly directed. Our exports of lead, zinc, aluminum and nickel to Japan are substantial, and take a leading place in the list of our exports to that country. They have increased since the war broke out, though in some cases they are again declining. The exchange restrictions introduced by the Japanese government before the war, in the endeavour to conserve its declining gold supply, have given that government a power of discrimination, and altered the proportions of the commodities imported into Japan. To China, our exports of these commodities are much smaller.

It has been contended in some quarters that Canada's supplies and Canada's supplies alone are vital to the continuance of Japan's war effort, and that it is our duty as it is within our power, to take action to end this effort. Let us first get the facts in perspective.

Our total exports to Japan have increased rapidly, but they are still far below the total of 1929. The recent increase in

that trade is part of the general improvement in exports as a result of the industrial revival of recent years. Our exports to all countries are much nearer the high water mark than our exports to Japan:

	Canadian exports to Japan	Canadian exports to all countries
1929	$ 37,504,692	$1,182,412,313
1932	11,995,887	493,808,841
1935	14,915,577	729,293,800
1937	25,851,829	1,110,192,151

In our exports, as in our production, and in fact in the revival of prosperity and stability in Canada, minerals have come to hold a relatively greater place in recent years as the result of new discoveries mainly in the pre-Cambrian shield. We are now among the world's important producers and exporters of gold, silver, platinum, copper, lead and zinc, as we long were of nickel. In many cases, as is generally known, these are joint products, lead or copper or zinc being found in the same veins with silver or gold, and recovered in the same operations.

So far as our exports of lead, zinc, aluminum, copper and nickel are concerned, there is nothing special in our shipments to Japan. Of nickel, in the last two years we exported ninety-eight millions in all, of which only five millions were to Japan; of aluminum twenty-five millions, of which five millions were to Japan; of lead, twenty-one millions, of which seven were to Japan; zinc, twenty-two, of which two were to Japan; of copper, over ninety-one millions, of which less than one million was to Japan. Incidentally, over 75 per cent of all these exports went to the British Empire and the United States less than 10 per cent to Japan, Italy, and Germany, and the balance to other foreign countries. It is true we are the largest exporters of nickel to Japan as to most other countries, and important suppliers of aluminum and zinc. But it also is true that of iron and steel and scrap, and of copper, we supply only an insignificant fraction. One single country's exports of iron and steel and scrap alone are three times in value our total exports of all goods whatever to Japan. It is also true that of the oil, coal,

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cotton and rubber which are equally necessary for mechanical operations, whether in war or in peace, we supply nothing whatever, nor of the wool necessary to clothe the armies in the field.

Proposals as to embargo.

Some misconception exists regarding certain figures given out at Brussels by the Chinese delegation to the conference, showing the percentage of certain materials—oil, coal, cotton, rubber, wool, iron, aluminum, antimony, manganese, tungsten, chrome, copper, zinc, tin, etc., exported in 1936 to Japan, with the object of showing that an embargo on exports would be effective if imposed by all parts of the British commonwealth, the United States, France, Holland and a few other countries. Canada was said to have supplied 71.7 per cent of Japan's imports of aluminum, 97 per cent of the copper and 34.5 per cent of the zinc. It may be pointed out first that the figures referred to 1936, a period of peace; that only three items were listed affecting Canada, and that as regards copper, the statistics were highly erroneous, the percentage from Canada being one-half of one per cent instead of 97 per cent. These misconceptions formed the basis of much of the demand for a Canadian embargo on raw materials.

Having noted the facts in some perspective, the implications that are drawn may next be considered. In the first place, it is erroneous to assume that metals such as lead, zinc and nickel are used only for armament purposes; quite the contrary is the case; the vast bulk of these three metals is used for industrial purposes, though it is of course true that when a country is at war, the industrial uses will be rationed and restricted. In any case, an embargo would be economically futile. It must be evident to anyone familiar with foreign trade that no system of administrative control which we could devise in peace time could hope to prevent Canadian nickel, lead, zinc, copper, aluminum, scrap-iron, and the rest, sold to purchasers in third countries, from reaching Japan. Once these commodities leave Canadian territory and enter into the commerce of another country, this parliament has not and cannot have any further control over them.

It is equally evident that, except in the case of nickel, of which Canada produces about 90 per cent of the world's annual production, this country has no monopoly, nor even an approach to a monopoly of production. There are, with respect to all these commodities, including nickel, other producing countries, alternative sources of supply, to which Japan, or any nation desiring to place an order, could easily turn. In addition to other sources of production, there are—and this aspect of the question is frequently overlooked—enormous stocks of all these metals readily available, stocks far more than sufficient to fill any possible Japanese demand. It is clear, therefore, that an embargo on the export to Japan of nickel, lead, copper, zinc, aluminum, and other commodities necessary to the production of war supplies, on Canada's part alone, would not achieve the ends proposed.

As to concerted action for that purpose, there is no present prospect of such a policy being adopted. No proposal for an embargo either on munitions or on war materials was made either by the league assembly or by the Brussels conference. No country has placed an embargo on shipments to Japan or to China. In the circumstances it would appear there is nothing in Canada's position which would make isolated action on our part either necessary or effective. It has been stated that New Zealand has placed an embargo on exports to Japan. This is not correct. Last year a New Zealand labour union refused to load scrap-iron on a vessel sailing to Japan. The New Zealand government induced the union to abandon this action. Later, the government prohibited the export of scrap-iron to any country. No embargo has been imposed on the export of wool or any other commodity to any country.

CANADA AND THE NATIONS OF EUROPE

I have spoken of the conflict in the orient and of the civil war in Spain. But Spain is not the only troubled area in Europe. There are few countries on the continent that are not undergoing a social and political revolution. In some, the revolutionary forces of the left or of the right have already attained

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power more autocratic than the regimes they have displaced; in others, the struggle still continues; and even in those countries that still seek progress by ordered freedom, the repercussions of the upheavals elsewhere spread fear and confusion. No country, however distant and however preoccupied by its own problems, can be unconcerned with the revival of violence, intolerance and disregard of the rights of weaker states. To countries in the whirlpool or on its verge the situation is particularly disturbing and of overwhelming import. It is not surprising that in democracies such as Britain and France the imminence of these threats to national and social and individual security, and the close association and sympathy of groups in each country with one or other of the forces and theories warring in central and eastern Europe, have led to a wide and violent conflict of opinion as to the policy that should be adopted to meet these new conditions. There are many shades and variations of opinion, but two main tendencies have developed.

In the opinion of one group, Armageddon has already come, the forces of light and darkness are irrevocably swinging into battle line for the final test of destiny. Europe and liberty, it is contended, can be saved only if the democracies firmly and unitedly call a halt here and now. The other widespread attitude is to recognize the situation as dangerous, but to insist that the policy of dividing Europe or the world into two antagonistic camps, organizing a holy alliance against fascism, would be still more dangerous, and is neither possible nor necessary. There is no warrant, it is urged, for fighting a preventive war or for seeking to form a hard and fast alliance against the authoritarian states. If such an alliance could be formed, it would only drive the fascist countries into firmer alliance and put any possibility of peaceful settlement out of the question. The wiser policy, it is urged, is to try to bring all Europe back to sanity, to emphasize and strengthen the points of agreement, not of difference, to seek to adjust each specific difficulty in turn. In what I have just been saying I am not stating my own views, I am stating the views which I believe are contending against each other in Europe to-day.

I am sure that every government in Great Britain since the war, and certainly not least the present government, has striven for peace. Differences of opinion may exist as to the wisdom of the policies adopted toward that end at different times. Governments may have failed to appreciate the strength and trend of changing forces, but taken broadly they have shown a realism and a patience that few if any other countries can equal.

I do not consider we are called upon to pass judgment or to take sides in United Kingdom discussions. Inevitably the rise of such contentious issues, such party cleavages, lead to efforts to secure or to claim the support of Canada or Australia or South Africa or New Zealand for one or other view. Statements appear in the British press that "the dominions" demand this or that, that Australia supports the government or that New Zealand supports the opposition view. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, it does not consider that it is in the interest either of Canada or of the commonwealth to tender advice as to what policy the United Kingdom should adopt week by week, or become involved in British political disputes. We have expressed no opinion on that policy, and no one in London is authorized or warranted in interpreting us as doing so.

Incidentally, may I say that the time has come to cease speaking of "the dominions" as if they were some peculiar half-fledged type of community, and all alike in their interests and views. Such a usage leads to confusion at best, and to alibis and misrepresentation at worst. South Africa is South Africa, New Zealand is New Zealand, Australia is Australia and Canada is Canada, and it will help to good understanding if that elementary fact is borne in mind.

Canada's position clear.

We have made clear our own policy as regards the league. We have indicated our own attitude toward the frequent demands that we should thrust ourselves into the European picture, take sides in the struggle of ideologies, make commitments in advance. We have equally made it clear that we are opposed

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to making in advance proclamations of neutrality or abstention that would be used to encourage aggressive designs. We shall try to maintain old ties and old friendships and at the same time be ready to enter into friendly relations with every country that will reciprocate. We shall try to keep in mind the difficulties and dangers that other countries are facing, but we shall not assume that it is our duty or within our power to work out their problems for them, to make over their social structure or their political ideas or their racial attitudes. In seeking within our own country, which constitutes half a continent, to build up a genuine democracy, to promote sound social relationships, to develop a tolerance and readiness to work together in achieving unity and furthering and maintaining the ties with the other members of the commonwealth, and the most friendly relations with our immediate neighbour and with all other countries, we shall be doing the task that lies to our hands, our Canadian task.

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The Struggle For Enduring Peace

ADDRESS

BY

THE RIGHT HON. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada

AT THE CANADIAN CORPS REUNION
TORONTO

July 30th, 1938

OTTAWA
J. O. PATENAUDE, I.S.O.
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
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THE RIGHT HON. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, M.P.,
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AT THE CANADIAN CORPS REUNION, TORONTO
July 30th, 1938

IT is most appropriate that the opening proceedings of a reunion of the Canadian Corps should take the form of a Memorial Service. Many memories are awakened by this occasion; memories of the outbreak of war, almost a quarter of a century ago; memories of the peace which ended the titanic conflict; memories of the hopes, the hardships, and the heroisms of the years that intervened.

Memories awakened by Canadian Corps Reunion

There is one memory ever present to the minds of all, especially of those who survived,—the memory of the comrades whose lives were sacrificed in the perils, the terrors, and the agonies of the war. They went forth from the land they loved, never to set foot upon its soil again. They hold the first place in our minds today. Like the sky overhead, they embrace all else that in memory we hold most sacred. They constitute the cloud of invisible witnesses which surrounds this ceremony. We seem to be conscious of their living presence.

That vast company has greatly increased as the years since the war have added to it, numbers of those who survived the perils, but not the pains and penalties of war. The heroes were not all of them left on the fields of battle. Many have since fallen in the less spectacular struggles of civil life, to which they had returned, weakened in body or spirit by the sufferings of war. They, too, are much in our thoughts as we stand today at the side of this symbolical tomb.

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Others there are who are especially near to us at this hour. They are those who, through pain, penury, or other privation, or because of the insistent demands of their daily tasks, are prevented from being present in person. They are, however, in thought and imagination, sharing with us the many memories which this great reunion serves to recall.

I have said it is most appropriate that the proceedings of the reunion should open with a Memorial Service. It seems to me scarcely less fitting that the service itself, should be held, as it is being held, in Toronto, beside the Cenotaph and immediately in front of the City Hall. We recall with pride that four years ago the city celebrated the one hundredth anniversary of its incorporation. In importance, as well as in point of time, it stands today the first of the cities of this old province. Like the city of London, at the heart of our great Empire, it has, time and again, been the exponent and defender of the rights and liberties of a free people.

To the welcome which the city of Toronto has extended the members of the Canadian Corps Association, may I add that of the Government of Canada. My colleagues join with me in wishing you one and all, days of memorable association together, and a reunion worthy of the place you hold in the hearts of the Canadian people.

The Canadian Corps, a body of citizens in arms.

What I should like, above all else, to emphasize today is that the army which crossed the seas from Canada and went into battle on the continent of Europe was essentially a citizen soldiery. The Canadian Corps was composed not of professional soldiers, but of men who left their peaceful occupations to discharge, at the scene of conflict, what they conceived to be the duties and obligations of citizenship. The Corps was not so much a military establishment, as a body of citizens in arms. When the war was over, its members returned to the ways and tasks of peace. The very strength of the Corps, as a fighting body, was derived from those ideals by which its members were inspired. It is true that they gave or risked their lives in the defence of their country, and of the Empire.

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I believe it to be even truer that their lives were imperilled and sacrificed for conceptions of liberty and democracy which were challenged in those years.

We do well to think deeply upon the meaning of those two words. Liberty and Democracy are the very foundations upon which all the nations of the British Commonwealth are based, and of none can this be said more than of our own Dominion. Centuries of struggles are but a part of the cost at which Liberty and Democracy have been obtained. Eternal vigilance is the price by which alone they can be maintained. They cry out anew for preservation, not in distant and foreign lands alone, but in many parts of our own,—for preservation, not with arms, but in the hearts and lives of men.

A spirit of co-operation and a sense of solidarity essential to solution of Canada's problems.

The tasks which confront us as a nation today call for the same self-denying service which characterized the days of the war, and equally for joint effort. The problems of civil life demand no less a spirit of co-operation, and a sense of solidarity. The forces which seek to divide, and to create misunderstanding and strife, are ever active. In these times, they seem especially so. It is the forces which unite, and which make for tolerant understanding and friendly co-operation, which are more than ever needed in community and national life, as in international relations, if the perplexing problems of our day are to be solved.

Who, in our country, has not become conscious of factions which have been sowing seeds of dissension, and which are seeking to assert as their own, an authority which belongs to the people of Canada as a whole. Such was not the spirit which inspired the men of the Canadian Corps. They suffered, they endured, in the conviction that out of their sufferings and sacrifices would arise a new order in which sectional interests, and prejudices of race and creed, of class and country, would give place to a brotherhood of man. They glimpsed the dawn of an era of greater security and freedom, based upon understanding and good-will, between all men and all nations.

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Co-operation, not conflict, is the key to the solution of problems today. What these times most need is a co-operating Canada, a co-operating Empire, co-operating democracies, and a co-operating world. Sooner or later, it will be found that all are inter-dependent, that, apart from the others, none can be permanently secure.

Enduring peace to be sought by peaceful means.

The disappointments of the last two decades, and the realities of the world situation today, have taught us that this goal was far from reached in 1918. Despite the disillusion of our times, the hope of enduring peace must not be permitted to grow dim. We are beginning to understand how great is the illusion that war can produce peace. An enduring peace must be sought by peaceful means. Peace cannot be attained or maintained by the methods of war, by the fostering of hatreds, by the setting of peoples or nations against one another. Peace can only be achieved through the substitution of Reason for Force, and of Good-will for Ill-will. There is I believe, only one thing, which will serve that great end. I believe it with all my heart. It is that men and nations in their relations one with the other should strive to the utmost of their powers to follow the precepts of the Prince of Peace.

This means that what we seek to effect of betterment in our own and the world's affairs must be by methods of persuasion and reason, not by coercion and violence. It does not, however, mean that we can afford to be indifferent to dangers which threaten all that, as a people, we hold most precious in belief, and in possession. Neither does it mean that, in order to maintain our heritage, we may never again be called upon to risk our all for our convictions.

Conflict between pagan and Christian conceptions of life.

We should not be surprised, nor should we be discouraged, if a change in human attitude cannot be made universal through a sudden transformation, or be completed in a single generation. It must be remembered that what we seek is nothing less than a practical realization of the Christian ideal for the conduct of the

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world. So great an ideal calls for unremitting effort, and for all the ingenuity and patience which mankind may possess.

Nineteen hundred years have not sufficed wholly to change the hearts of men. But human behaviour, human motives and ideals are in many important particulars and in many parts of the world, different today from what they were two thousand years ago. Today, the heart of mankind is undergoing further change. Conflict between pagan and Christian conceptions of life lie at the root of the world's unrest. Men are realizing, as they have never realized before, that whether it be spoken of an individual, a class, a race, or a nation, each is his brother's keeper; that suffering, injustice and wrong, wherever they exist, are the common concern of mankind.

Civilization itself dependent upon peace and good-will among men and nations.

In the struggle for enduring peace none will be more zealous than the men who experienced, at first hand, the horrors of the Great War. For you, who fought in France and Flanders, war has no glamour and no romance. The recurrence of strife between nations would be to you the starkest of tragedies. It is for this reason that, revived in spirit by these few days of happy association, I appeal to you, and through you to all our fellow-citizens, to renew your faith, and re-dedicate your energies to the cause of peace and good-will among men. It is at once the noblest and the most urgent of duties. It is one which, happily, can evoke only the highest qualities of men and women of every race and creed. As I have already said, it is a crusade on which depends the existence of civilization itself.

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ADD LONDON LEAD INTERNATIONAL BY HAMBLETON XX CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

LABOR'S MOTION TO ADJOURN CHALLENGED "THE LACK OF ANY MINISTERIAL POLICY TO COUNTER THE GRAVE MENACE TO BRITISH INTERESTS DUE TO THE ARMED INTERVENTION IN SPAIN BY CERTAIN FOREIGN POWERS."

IT CAME AFTER SERIOUS, STORMY PASSAGES. MR. ATTLEE QUESTIONED WHETHER ANY COMMUNICATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE SITUATION IN SPAIN AND WHAT WAS ITS CHARACTER.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: "HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR (SIR ERIC PHIPPS) RECEIVED YESTERDAY FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT A COMMUNICATION OF THE ANXIETY WITH WHICH THEY (THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT) VIEWED THE SITUATION IN SPAIN. HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE FULLY ALIVE TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ARE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT."

MR. ATTLEE PRESSED THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAD ANY INFORMATION AS TO THE NON-INTERVENTION AGREEMENT BEING VIOLATED AND WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONFER WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO RESTORING TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE EQUIPMENT.

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NU121 XX EQUIPMENT. C 118549

"WE ARE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT," MR. CHAMBERLAIN GUARDEDLY REPLIED.

"BUT ARE THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERING ANY QUESTION OF ACTION?" MR. ATTLEE DEMANDED.

IN A STORM OF LABOR PROTESTS MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID RECENT EVENTS IN SPAIN WERE DUE TO MEN, ARMED AND EQUIPPED, ALREADY IN SPAIN.

THE PRIME MINISTER WAS IN A SHARP BRUSH TOO OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. REPLYING TO A QUESTION CONCERNING THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE, MR. CHAMBERLAIN REFERRED TO SIR JOHN SIMON'S STATEMENT OF THREE WEEKS AGO IN WHICH THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER SAID THE GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATIONS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, BUT THAT THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

WAS THE HOUSE TO UNDERSTAND, SHARPLY QUERIED MISS ELLEN WILKINSON, LABOR, THAT IF GERMANY TREATED CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS SHE TREATED AUSTRIA NOTHING FURTHER COULD BE EXPECTED THAN SIR JOHN SIMON'S REPLY.

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NU122 XX REPLY.

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MR. CHAMBERLAIN: "I DID NOT SAY THAT. I SAID THE PRESENT SITUATION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION."

MISS WILKINSON RETURNED TO THE CHARGE. WERE THE GOVERNMENT, SHE QUESTIONED, PREPARED TO GIVE A GUARANTEE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR NOT?

BUT THE PRIME MINISTER DECLINED TO ADD ANYTHING TO HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT.

X1228P

CORRECTION

IN CAIRO OLYMPICS FIRST PARA READ XX HELD IN TOKYO SEPT. 21 TO OCT. 6. (NOT SEPT. 9 TO OCT. 26.) (SOURCE)

CP NU MCH 16 X1228P

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Recent events in Europe and subsequent debates in the House of Commons have given rise to some criticism of Government policy, which deserves attention. The Prime Minister and his colleagues have already clarified British actions and intentions to the satisfaction of an overwhelming majority in Parliament, but it is only natural that many of those who take part in public and private debates on the subject of foreign policy, outside Parliament, have not had the benefit of hearing all the arguments from the Front Bench. Inadequate press reports, garbled versions from many political platforms, sometimes confuse the issue rather than clarify it. It is, therefore, the more important for recent events to be briefly summarised and British policy more fully explained.

It must first be understood that Great Britain had no commitment of any sort to Czechoslovakia excepting a general one under the Covenant of the League, which was collective in character and most indefinite. This commitment at no time became a matter of interest because Czechoslovakia did not appeal to the League.

At no stage of the dispute between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech Government or between the Government of the Reich and that of Czechoslovakia did Great Britain become associated with any specific plan for the settlement of the minority problem until the Anglo-French conversations following the Berchtesgaden meeting between the Prime Minister and the Reich Chancellor.

The non-acceptance by the Sudeten Germans of various schemes produced by the Czech Government in no way involved either our interests or our prestige. The fact that an unofficial mission visited Czechoslovakia in order to facilitate negotiations between various minority leaders and the Czech Government neither

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morally nor materially affected the British position.

In addition to these consideration it must be borne in mind that British policy has never been associated with a determination to uphold the status quo in Central Europe and it has been well known that far from adhering rigidly to all the provisions of the Versailles Treaty we have been generally in favour of peaceful revision if and where such a policy would be contributive to European appeasement and collaboration between the great powers. The peaceful revision of frontiers by negotiation is not, therefore, a reverse for British policy or a blow to British prestige. On the contrary, where such revision can be justified it is generally welcomed in authoritative circles and by the public.

Shortly after the refusal by the Sudeten German leaders to accept what is known as "The Fourth Plan", the Czech problem became clearly international in character. That in origin and nature it may always have been international is scarcely open to doubt, but in diplomatic practice it became so only after the incidents which led to the breakdown of conversations between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak Government. At this stage Germany took a direct interest in the problem and subsequently, through the speech of the Reich Chancellor, notified her intention of solving it on lines acceptable to her and the Sudeten Germans.

Significant troop movements both in the East and West of Germany made it clear that the Reich contemplated a forcible solution of the question at an early date. In such circumstances France notified her intention of going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia if she was attacked. The British position was then carefully considered and a specific declaration was made

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both privately and publicly to the following effect:-

1. That if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia we understood the French would go to the assistance of that country.

2. That if our principal ally became endangered as a result of carrying out treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia we could not remain aloof.

Expression of this Anglo-French view was not taken seriously in the Reich in the early stages though it is understood that in due course neither the French nor the British position was in any way misunderstood.

Despite these declarations and because the Czech Gevernment was unprepared to accept any solution of the problem remotely resembling the minimum German terms, on the Wednesday following Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech it became clear that hostilities must shortly commence. Our position remained constant but became more clear at this stage. It has always been understood that any threat to the independence of Europe by one power or by a coalition must involve the British interests forthwith. British opinion hardened to the conclusion that if Germany refused to negotiate a settlement and insisted upon military invasion, such a threat to Europe would arise. We therefore, became interested, not only in respect of our obligations to France but also in respect of European freedom. We, at no time regarded a far-reaching diplomatic solution of the Czechoslovak problem as constituting such a threat. It was only the forcible solution by military means which in our view involved this wider issue.

Faced with the certainty of European war the Prime Minister decided to visit Berchtesgaden in order first to

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clarify the British position further, and secondly to discover what, if any, peaceful solution would be acceptable - (a) to the German Government and (b) to the Czech Government.

As a result of this conversation the German position became clear and certain recommendations were subsequently produced after Anglo-French discussions, which were in due course transmitted to Prague. The submission of these proposals was followed by an Anglo-French demarche and were eventually accepted.

As soon as the acceptance was in the hands of His Majesty's Government the Prime Minister arranged to visit the Reich Chancellor at Godesberg. On the occasion of this visit it became clear that Germany felt certain anxiety as to the conditions likely to prevail in Sudeten areas in the period which must necessarily elapse between the acceptance of the terms and cession of the territories. The Fuhrer in these circumstances made further demands involving the occupation of certain areas by German troops on October 1st. The areas involved were more extensive that those originally contemplated and the time-limit factor amounted to an ultimatum. We know from the Prime Minister that he bitterly reproached the Chancellor and conversations broke down.

Europe was then faced once again with the imminent peril of war. Germany categorically refused any compromise and showed a determination, the seriousness of which was confirmed by all the information reaching London from authoritative quarters, to march on or before October 1st.

The Prime Minister was successful in enlisting the services of Signor Mussolini for the reopening of negotiations. It must be stressed that our interests remained unchanged. We

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were concerned in two matters, first support of France in the event of her going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia, and secondly the preservation of European independence. Signor Mussolini requested the Reich Chancellor to agree to a four-power conference and the meeting took place at Munich. As a result of it Germany, in response to diplomatic representations of the most pressing character, agreed in principle to a negotiated settlement in place of the application of immediate force. It may, therefore be stated that the application of diplomacy on the initiative of Great Britain and Italy triumphed over the threatened application of force.

This is an accurate account in broad terms of the British position from first to last in respect of commitments, obligations and procedure. At no time did we accept a reverse because at no time did we accept any commitments except in respect of the Berchtesgaden meeting. It is not unusual in diplomatic practice for the most powerful nation to accept a modification of what has been given as the final position, and therefore it cannot be said that in agreeing to a slight advance on the Berchtesgaden terms, that Great Britain accepted a defeat; nor because Germany accepted a modification of the Godesberg Memorandum can it be said that she had to abandon any position which vitally affected her prestige. The instrument of policy which Germany did abandon was the use of military force. She abandoned the recommendation of a small, though powerful group of her leaders, in submission to the views of an overwhelming mass of the German people, which it must be recollected found expression principally in response to the spontaneous and statesmanlike generosity of Mr. Chamberlain. Had he not created an opportunity for the German people to express their feelings

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the Reich Chancellor might never have become aware of them.

Certain general considerations arise, It has been said that if we had taken a stronger line at an earlier date Czechoslovakia might have been saved. Those who make this suggestion have not clarified their position. What do they mean by "saved"? If the Fourth Plan had been agreed to, or indeed any internal arrangement within the old frontiers, the only result would have been another Spain, leading to intervention by this and that power according to their several interests. Alternatively, the State might have survived as a weak and divided force of no use to any power as an ally and unable to maintain internal economic stability, thus leading to a long-drawn-out agony both for the minorities and the Czechs.

Another view is that we should have deliberately accepted the situation created by extremist forces in Germany taking the opportunity, together with France, of going to war with Germany. This would have been morally unjustifiable. First it would have been sacrificing all the peoples of Czechoslovakia to an appalling slaughter in the mere interest of a diplomatic theory. Secondly, we might have had to take the awe-inspiring and appalling decision of firing the first shots in Western Europe. We should have been responsible for commencing aerial bombardment on a large scale in thickly populated European areas. We should, in fact, have been commencing a preventative war and it is doubtful whether either history or this generation would have returned a verdict in our favour.

If, however, this war had been fought, and won, no statesman at the end of it would have recreated the existing frontiers of the Czechoslovakia State, and in the end we should have made a state geographically very similar to that

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which we have created by negotiation. It seems impossible to justify the sacrifice of some eight million souls for such a fantastic proposition. Moreover, by waging a preventative war we might well have destroyed civilisation.

Had Germany on the other hand refused all negotiation and had the Munich Conference broken down, then she would have been responsible for all the calamities to which the preventative war party in other countries would in other circumstances have been guilty.

It is argued that by allowing Germany this measure of frontier revision to her advantage we have gravely weakened Czechoslovakia as an ally of France and that the way is now open for the Reich to dominate Central and South-eastern Europe. The reply to this is perfectly straightforward. It was French influence which shewed the greatest anxiety to revise the Czech frontiers, and as that country was France's ally and not ours it would have been absurd of us to be "plus royaliste que le roi". Moreover, to maintain in being a country containing turbulent minorities cannot be to preserve a very valuable ally.

Now in respect of German expansion eastwards, unless we are prepared for a war, the object of which is the destruction of the present German government, nothing in the world is going to stop this drive to the east, except successful economic competition, more skilful diplomacy, more adequate propaganda and greater strength by the Western Powers; and even then it is doubtful whether the time has yet come for calling a halt. Many changes may take place if we wait. Even the most brilliant specialist with a fever patient to treat cannot prevent that fever from reaching its crisis,

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unless he wants his patient to die in any event. He can, of course, kill his patient off in order to avoid the agony of treatment, but it is difficult to understand what good this can do to anybody. This is exactly the case with Germany. No responsible European power wants a state of anarchy in the centre of Europe neither can it want to destroy civilisation now because a little later it may be gravely endangered. If we allow Germany to pursue her path a little longer the temperature may drop. If it does not, then we may be obliged to act. If in the mean time Great Britain undertakes impossible commitments which she cannot honour one small country after another will fall into the German camp. If, on the other hand, we show ourselves strong and powerful enough to maintain moderately aloof without getting flustered when another power appears to be developing, these smaller powers themselves may resist the overtures of Germany, feeling that her strength is not permanent while ours has been tested and proved over centuries.

Our immediate task is to try to bring about peaceful adustments in Europe which are long overdue. At the same time we must build up an immense strength so that no power or concert of powers can suggest that we are agreeing to adjustments in certain areas because of a military weakness. A powerful nation can afford concession, a weak one cannot.

We must, moreover, see to it that in future no ally of ours has commitments which are inconsistent with the broad lines of our own policy. Further than that, we must prevent allied and associated powers from undertaking obligations which we in our wisdom feel they are either too weak to honour or to which their public opinion is opposed.

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Perhaps most important of all, Great Britain must while fully recognising the immediate dangers of the European situation, learn to think in centuries and continents and not in decades and Provinces. Our strength has persistently grown for a thousand years and for us to alter the whole course of our diplomacy and shatter the whole system of our Empire - and even more, risk civilisation - because certain passing figures in Europe appear threatening, would be the height of madness. There are times when it is wisdom to stand still for a little, concentrating more upon building up military strength and the pursuit of long-term diplomacy. Only a great power can afford such a policy. Since we are the greatest in the world's history, presumably we can take such a course.

Obviously, we must conduct some diplomatic policy. The League, collective security, bilateral and unilateral conversations having collapsed and proved dangerous, a fair chance must be given to four-power conversations or a re-creation of Europe's concert. Only Great Britain and Italy have it in their power to achieve this. The Munich experiment must, therefore, be taken a step further. In making this experiment we are not giving in to the Dictators or showing a predilection for Fascism. We are simply conducting normal diplomacy. Is it to be suggested that because we have an entente with France the Government of this country has a predilection for Republicanism? Is it to be suggested that because we have a longstanding alliance with Portugal that the Prime Minister is anxious to institute here a system of government similar to that which prevails in Lisbon? Did anyone ever suggest that because we had an entente with Russia, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith were sympathetic to the particular monarchical

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system which existed in Russia before the Great War? Then why, because Mr. Chamberlain, in common with France, is trying to negotiate a general settlement with Germany and Italy, is it suggested that he is a Fascist, or that he has the slightest desire to see the triumph of a dictatorial system as against democracy?

If Mr. Chamberlain <u>is</u> a Fascist because he is trying to bring Germany and Italy into Europe's concert, then Mr. Atlee, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are Communists, for their desire to collaborate with Russia is sometimes very marked indeed.

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THE CRISIS IN RETROSPECT.

Industry and Foreign Policy.

This memorandum first sets out the sequence of recent events, secondly some of the reasons why British policy took the course it did and thirdly some reflections upon the relation between foreign policy and the fortunes of industry and commerce.

(1) It must first be understood that Great Britain had no commitment of any sort to Czechoslovakia except a general one under the Covenant of the League, which was collective in character and most indefinite. This commitment at no time became a matter of interest because Czechoslovakia did not appeal to the League.

At no stage of the dispute between the Sudeten-Germans and the Czech Government or between the Governments of the Reich and Czechoslovakia did Great Britain become associated with any specific plan for the settlement of the minority problem until the Anglo-French conversations following the Berchtesgaden meeting between the Prime Minister and the Reich Chancellor.

The non-acceptance by the Sudeten Germans of various schemes produced by the Czech Government in no way involved either our interests or our prestige. The fact that an unofficial mission visited Czechoslovakia in order to facilitate negotiations between various minority leaders and the Czech Government neither morally nor materially affected the British position.

In addition to these considerations it must be borne in mind that British policy has never been associated with

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a determination to uphold the status quo in Central Europe and it has been well-known that far from adhering rigidly to all the provisions of the Versailles Treaty we have been generally in favour of peaceful revision if and where such a policy would be contributive to European appeasement and collaboration between the great powers. The peaceful revision of frontiers by negotiation does not, therefore, constitute a reverse for British policy or deal a blow to British prestige. On the contrary, where such revision can be justified it is generally welcomed in authoritative circles and by the public as a whole.

Shortly after the refusal by the Sudeten-German leaders to accept what is known as "The Fourth Plan", the Czech problem became clearly international in character. That in origin and nature it may always have been international is scarcely open to doubt, but in diplomatic practice it became so only after the incidents which led to the breakdown of conversations between the Sudeten-German and the Czechoslovak Government. At this stage Germany took a direct interest in the problem and subsequently through the speech of the Reich Chancellor, notified her intention of solving the problem on lines acceptable to her and the Sudeten Germans.

Significant troop movements both in the East and West of Germany made it clear that the Reich contemplated a forcible solution of the question at an early date. In such circumstances France notified her intention of going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia if that country was attacked. The British position was then carefully considered and a specific declaration was made both privately and publicly to the following effect:-

1. That if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia we understood the French would go to the assistance of that country.

2. That if our principal ally became endangered

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as a result of carrying out treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia we could not remain aloof.

Expression of this Anglo-French view was not taken seriously in the Reich in the early stages, though it is understood that in due course, neither the French nor the British position was in any way misunderstood.

Despite these declarations and because the Czech Government was unprepared to accept any solution of the problem remotely resembling the minimum German terms, on the Wednesday following Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech it became clear that hostilities must shortly commence. Our position remained constant, but became more clear at this stage. It has always been understood that any threat to the independence of Europe by one Power or by coalition of Powers must involve the British interests forthwith. British opinion hardened to the conclusion that if Germany refused to negotiate a settlement and insisted upon military invasion such a threat to Europe would arise. We therefore, became interested, not only in respect of our obligations to France but also in respect of European freedom. We, at no time, regarded a far-reaching diplomatic solution of the Czechoslovakian problem as constituting such a threat. It was only the forcible solution by military means which in our view involved this wider issue.

Faced with the certainty of European war the Prime Minister decided to visit Berchtesgaden in order first to clarify the British position further, and secondly to discover what - if any - peaceful solution would be acceptable (a) to the German Government and (b) to the Czech Government.

As a result of this conversation the German position became clear and certain recommendations were subsequently produced after Anglo-French discussions, which were in due course

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transmitted to Prague. The submission of these proposals was followed by an Anglo-French demarche and they were eventually accepted.

As soon as the acceptance was in the hands of His Majesty's Government the Prime Minister arranged to visit the Reich Chancellor at Godesberg. On the occasion of this visit it became clear that Germany felt certain anxiety as to the conditions likely to prevail in Sudeten areas in the period which must necessarily elapse between the acceptance of the terms and cession of the territories. The Fuhrer in these circumstances made further demands involving the occupation of certain areas by German troops on October 1st. The areas involved were more extensive than those originally contemplated and the time-limit factor amounted to an ultimatum. We know from the Prime Minister that he bitterly reproached the Chancellor and conversations broke down.

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The Prime Minister was successful in enlisting the services of Signor Mussolini for the reopening of negotiations. It must be stressed that our interests remained unchanged. We were concerned in two matters, first support of France in the event of her going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia, and secondly, the preservation of European independence. Signor Mussolini requested the Reich Chancellor to agree to a four-power conference, and the meeting took place at Munich. As a result of it, Germany - in response to diplomatic representations of the most pressing character - agreed in principle to a negotiated

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settlement in place of the application of immediate force. It may, therefore, be said that the application of diplomacy on the initiative of Great Britain and Italy triumphed over the threatened application of force.

This is an accurate account in broad terms of the British position from first to last in respect of commitments, obligations and procedure. At no time did we suffer a reverse because at no time did we accept any commitments except in respect of the Berchtesgaden meeting. It is not unusual in diplomatic practice for the most powerful nations to accept a modification of what has been stated to be their final position, and therefore it cannot be said that, in agreeing to an advance on the Berchtesgaden terms, Great Britain accepted a defeat; nor, because Germany accepted a modification of the Godesberg attitude, can it be said that she had to abandon any position which vitally affected her prestige. The instrument of policy which Germany did abandon was the use of military force. She abandoned the recommendation of a small though powerful group of her leaders in submission to the view of an overwhelming mass of the German people, which it must be recollected found expression principally in response to the spontaneous and statesmanlike generosity of Mr. Chamberlain. Had he not created an opportunity for the German people to express their feelings the Reich Chancellor might never have become aware of them.

(2) Certain general considerations arise. It has been said that if we had taken a stronger line at an earlier date Czechoslovakia might have been saved. Those who make this suggestion have not clarified their position. What do they mean by "saved"? If the Fourth Plan had been agreed to, or indeed any internal arrangement within the old frontiers, the only result would have been another Spain, leading to intervention by this and that power according to their several interests.

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Alternatively, the State might have survived as a weak and divided nation, of no use to any power as an ally and unable to maintain internal economic stability, thus leading to a long-drawn-out agony both for the minorities and for the Czechs.

Another view is that we should have deliberately accepted the situation created by extremist forces in Germany whereby we would have taken the opportunity, together with France, of going to war with Germany. This would have been morally unjustifiable. First, it would have been sacrificing all the peoples of Czechoslovakia to an appalling slaughter in the mere interest of a diplomatic theory. Secondly, we should have had to bomb and destroy a very large number of German men and women who feel the warmest friendship for Great Britain and France and who hate war as much as we do. Thirdly, we might have had to take the awe-inspiring and appalling decision of firing the first shots in Western Europe. We should, in fact, have been commencing a preventive war and it is doubtful whether either history or this generation would have returned a verdict in our favour.

If, however, this war had been fought, no statesman at the end of it would have recreated the existing frontiers of the Czechoslovak State and at the end of hostilities we should have made a state geographically very similar to that which we have created by negotiation, and it seems impossible to justify the sacrifice of eight million souls for such a fantastic proposition. Moreover, by waging a preventive war we might well have destroyed civilisation.

Had Germany on the other hand refused all negotiations and had the Munich Conference broken down, then she would have been responsible for all the calamities of which the preventive

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war party in other countries would, in other circumstances, have been guilty.

It is argued that by allowing Germany this measure of frontier revision we have gravely weakened Czechoslovakia as an ally of France and that the way is now open for the Reich to dominate Central and South-Eastern Europe. The reply to this is straight-forward. It was powerful French influence which shewed the greatest anxiety to revise the Czech frontiers in order to avoid war, and as that country was France's ally and not ours it would have been absurd for us to be "plus royaliste que le roi".

(3) We are faced with two immediate problems, first our future attitude to the European situation, secondly our attitude to an important body of Government critics at home. Both these questions vitally affect industry. Obviously, trade cannot recover if the world is to be left in its present restless condition or if there is confusion in domestic politics. The issue must be clearly faced.

The policy of His Majesty's Government is based on certain fundamental principles. We should resist with every means in our power any threat to the integrity of the British Empire. Moreover, if a nation was clearly using certain just grievances as a mere pretext for the pursuit of an expansionist policy which knows no limit, we could not remain for ever disinterested. The continuance of Europe's independence is of vital interest to the British Empire and it would be impossible yet to assume that Germany's plea for the removal of certain European injustices is in fact, a preparation for wider demands. Although some people feel they have evidence to suggest this, no responsible Government could base high policy on such an assumption at present. All efforts to find

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a European settlement through the League, collective action, unilateral and bilateral conversations have failed. Great Britain still cannot abandon her task until the one means not yet fully employed has been given a chance, namely four-power diplomacy, which would not exclude consultation and collaboration with other nations.

If the settlement of outstanding European grievances could be achieved by peaceful means, and we could be assured that that would bring the present tension to an end, the benefits to industry would be immeasurable.

In the process of four-power diplomacy we shall quite soon discover whether or not there is a genuine desire for appeasement or whether on the other hand we are in fact faced with a challenge to the world. The great difference between the policy of the Government and that advocated by the critics is that the latter would give conciliation no further chance and would assume forthwith that Germany and Italy cannot be dealt with on any basis other than that of preventive war. If they argue that this is not their policy, then it may be asked why they are critical of the Government, because there are at present only three courses open.

(1) Diplomatic action. (2) Preventive war. (3) Isolation.

The critics refuse the first and scorn the third.

We must, however, examine the position of the critics more closely. If we assume, for the sake of argument that they are right in their suspicions of Germany, what good purpose could their policy serve? First, it would irritate Germany and Italy beyond endurance, thus greatly diminishing the time factor which is always in favour of Great Britain. Secondly, it would alienate many nations whose support would be most essential to us if the critics estimate of German

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intentions is correct, especially that group of countries which, while not attached to the Rome-Berlin axis, is gravely suspicious of anything in the nature of a left-wing alliance of powers, the success of which in their view would inevitable lead to a Communistic Europe. The Government's policy on the other hand, is such that we shall have a special claim on the friendship of many of these nations should the worst come to the worst.

Thirdly, if we do not give conciliation another chance there will be a grave doubt in the mind of a large section of world opinion as to whether or not the war which would inevitably follow was really necessary or merely the product of an incredible folly.

Another and most important consideration arises. If the critics are successful in persuading public opinion that no further negotiations should be conducted with totalitarian states, there must inevitably follow a grave political crisis in this country, probably leading to the formation of a Left-Wing National Government, which would pursue a policy of provocation abroad and far-reaching Socialist legislation at home. We have already seen the result of such a policy in France. What Happened? French Diplomacy collapsed completely and her internal situation became desperate. Exactly the same thing would happen in a milder form. In our case, moreover, we might alienate the Dominions to such an extent that even Imperial trade would suffer and the unity of the Common wealth be gravely endangered.

It is the vital concern of industry and commerce to see to it first that the Government has full support in the pursuit of a conciliatory policy; secondly, that in undertaking another effort at appeasement we must not forget

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the grave dangers which face us. In pursuing a conciliatory policy we must not fail to face the hardest and most unpleasant facts. Above all, we must not forget that our diplomacy will be useless unless we enter four-power conversations with military strength equal if not superior to that of other powers. We must make our position so clear that if four-power diplomacy fails it will not be a reverse for British diplomacy. We must make our contribution to appeasement in such a way that the whole world knows that our eyes are open to the ever-present possibility of failure, and that we have undertaken the task in a sense of duty and not necessarily in conviction that success is certain.

If we take the course of abandoning everything it is difficult to know how any form of trade relations can be maintained in certain areas of Europe and how war can be averted beyond a few weeks or months.

In respect of Germany we have also to face the problem that she may prove intransigeant in regard to Europe generally but at the same time not challenge us directly, and we have to consider what our policy should be in those circumstances. It is probable that our efforts will have to be bent towards the reorganisation of France, the consolidation of relationships with that great block of neutral countries which show no disposition to succumb to German influence and above all the exposition of the British position to the United States of America - so that if a direct challenge ever came either to us or to any country the continued existence of which is essential either to the preservation of the British Empire or the independence of Europe, we should not be found in a helpless position.

It is to be regretted that the fundamental problems of Europe and the objectives of our foreign policy are only very

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imperfectly understood by the public as a whole, and in consequence large sections of opinion are easily misled by Government critics who over-simplify the problems and confine themselves to attractive catch-phrases, especially suitable for modern propaganda. It is not difficult to stir the whole British Empire on the plea that we ought to stand up to the Dictators and unless a more balanced view is well presented and the public are educated by propaganda not less attractive and far-reaching than those employed by the critics, we may expect in the near future the development of an unpleasant political situation here, leading to the formation of a Government which would plunge us into an impossible position abroad and a dangerous crisis at home.

Industry, and commerce are profoundly concerned in this matter and it is to be hoped that responsible bodies which supply the life-blood of Great Britain will study the situation with the profoundest care and attention before we reach a more critical phase either at home or abroad.

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Strictly Confidential

HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE:

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:

As you are only too well aware, all efforts to maintain the peace of Europe have failed. The United Kingdom in honouring pledges given as a means of avoiding hostilities has become engaged in war with Germany. You have been summoned at the earliest moment in order that the Government may seek authority for the measures necessary for the defence of Canada, and for co-operation in the determined effort which is being made to resist further aggression and to prevent continued threat and use of force instead of pacific means for the settlement of international disputes. Already the Militia, the Naval Service and the Air Force have been placed on active service, and certain other provisions have been made for the defence of our coasts and our internal security under the War Measures Act and other existing authority. Proposals for further effective action by Canada will be laid before you without delay.

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:

You will be asked to consider estimates to provide for expenditure which has been or may be caused by the state of war which now exists.

HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE:

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:

I need not speak of the extreme gravity of this hour. There has been none more critical in the history of the world. None more decisive has ever been known. The

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people of Canada are facing the crisis with the same fortitude that today supports the peoples of the United Kingdom and other of the nations of the British Commonwealth. My Ministers are convinced that Canada is prepared to unite in a national effort to defend to the utmost liberties and institutions which are a common heritage.

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Prime Minister

C118574 No 1.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). January 2. 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 15/15/18] Copy No. 036

Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January 2, 1939.*)

(No. 1417.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 29, 1938.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1319 of the 6th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith an interesting memorandum by the military attaché on possible military action by Germany in 1939. In general, I agree with Colonel Mason MacFarlane's conclusions as set forth in paragraph 16. It is, of course, impossible to foretell what action Herr Hitler will take in the coming year, for his decisions are made by sudden intuition, which has so far not failed him. What is certain is that the military and civilian resources of the country are being prepared for an emergency.

2. There are in Germany to-day factors to which one cannot be blind, and which point to the necessity of relieving by some foreign excursion the present political and economic discontents. Resentment at Nazi intolerance and interference in private life exists in wide circles; there is shame and disgust at the excesses committed against the Jews, and real hardship and suffering caused by high taxation, party exactions and the war-time economic restrictions imposed both by the Four-Year Plan and the present failure of Germany economically to absorb Austria and the Sudetenland. In view of the ruthless and efficient methods of the secret police and the complete control of the press by the Ministry of Propaganda, all opposition is stifled. But this state of affairs cannot last indefinitely, and according to reports which have reached me there are already signs of dissension in the party leadership. For example, there are indications that Field-Marshal Göring, who is popular with the masses, may be becoming a focus for the moderate elements in the party, who, in turn, as conditions for the private individual become more intolerable, may drift into a clash with the extremists. If internal dissensions threaten to assume serious proportions, a natural consequence would be to drive Hitler into a foreign adventure. In that eventuality it is probable that it would be in an easterly direction. The likelihood of German action in the west depends on the German Government's appreciation of the situation in France and in particular on the attitude to be adopted by the French Government towards their treaty obligations in the east. I observe that no mention was apparently made of these commitments on the occasion of Herr von Ribbentrop's visit to Paris. I cannot yet say whether Herr Hitler, as a result of this visit, is relyng on France taking no military action in support of Poland or Soviet Russia against German aggression, but, with the completion of the western defences and French preoccupation over Italy, I think that he would be prepared to repeat the risk which he accepted last September.

3. With regard to the Italian demands for Tunis and Corsica, another danger point, the French Ambassador recently informed me that he had no evidence that Italy was being actively instigated by Germany.

I have, &c.

GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1.

Colonel Mason MacFarlane to Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires,

I SUBMIT herewith a memorandum on the subject of military possibilities in 1939. This is based on such evidence as I have been able to obtain, and I have necessarily treated the subject on broad lines.

[504 b—1]

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2. There is as yet insufficient military evidence on which to make definite prophetic deductions. Most of the confident forecasts which have latterly come to my notice are little more than flagrant speculation. It is perfectly possible that Herr Hitler has not yet decided irrevocably whether, and how, to employ his army next year. In the meantime the army, and as far as my information goes the air force too, are preparing themselves for whatever may be demanded of them at full throttle.

F. N. MASON MacFARLANE,
Military Attaché.

Berlin, December 26, 1938.

Enclosure 2.

Memorandum respecting the Military Possibilities in 1939.

IT is impossible as yet to forecast with any certainty the extent to which Herr Hitler intends to employ his armed strength to further whatever may be his foreign political aims during the coming year; neither is it yet clear which of various possible courses he is likely to pursue. It is, however, to be anticipated that he may well be tempted to profit by a world situation which must appear to him temporarily very favourable, even if he is not forced to embark on a major distraction by the financial and economic difficulties with which he is now faced. Most responsible people with whom I have latterly discussed these difficulties have been abnormally despondent, and many state that some sort of collapse cannot be averted for more than another few months.

2. Information has recently been received by the embassy from a source which deserves the most serious attention, that it is intended to commence progressive mobilisation in February so as to be prepared to take action eastward in the early summer. Last summer, when this same source foretold the military measures against Czechoslovakia which commenced in August, I was soon able to corroborate the information as the German War Ministry had no desire to risk a major conflict and was anxious that England should be made aware of the dangerous situation. Now that the German War Office seems to be convinced that the possibility of Franco-British intervention in German action eastward can be excluded, I am most unlikely to receive similar warnings, and the greatest secrecy will doubtless be maintained over all military intentions and preparations.

3. The situation is complicated by the fact that many preliminary measures which have to be taken in connexion with the commencement of progressive mobilisation can be explained away as normal routine in connexion with the organisation and administration of an army in such a fluid state of expansion as that of Germany. This fact makes is very difficult to deduce German intentions from information of a military nature. In May last year reasonably normal moves were wrongly interpreted as being a concentration against Czechoslovakia. After May it was some time before it became clear that moves and measures which were capable of normal explanation were definitely preparatory to military action against the Czechs.

4. The source of our information regarding the commencement of military preparations in February for action in an easterly direction is too good to warrant our taking it anything but seriously. I must, however, point out that with the discharge from the colours of a whole annual class at the end of October, and with the expansion programme which has come to light since that date, most extensive alterations to the German mobilisation plan must inevitably be necessary. These will now be entailing the issue of very numerous instructions of all kinds, and may naturally give rise to the deduction that something definite is in preparation. It is doubtful if the final edition of the mobilisation scheme in all its details can be expected to appear before about March, and such papers as give dates in February as the time-limit of their validity may well be temporary instructions pending the issue of the final 1939 scheme.

5. Apart from information regarding warning orders to reservists and the requisitioning of transport, there are other indications that military action may be contemplated at an early date. There have been reports of stoppage of leave as from the 1st January in the German Air Ministry. There are other rumours

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that this is to extend to the whole air force. With very few exceptions, officers that I know in the German War Ministry are contenting themselves with a very short spell of Xmas leave, and are renouncing their usual practice of getting away for a short ski-ing holiday in January or February. I have no direct information that any plan has been definitely decided upon, as reported in the Embassy's recent information, but practically all the evidence I have been able to obtain indicates that action at a comparatively early date is very possible, and there is certainly no evidence to the contrary. The intention to withdraw a large number of German domestic servants from England and Holland in the immediate future is also significant.

6. From the technical point of view it is certain that the army is unlikely to *encourage* any policy likely to involve it in hostilities before June at the earliest. In a normal year it will in some ways be to Germany's advantage to commence a war earlier in the year, as Germany's recruits come to the colours with much better para- and pre-military training than the recruits of those conscript armies with which Germany might have to fight, and they therefore have a considerable start of the others. This year, however, the German recruits did not join until about the first week in December, and the advantage has been largely lost. Futhermore, during the present winter expansion is still in full swing. I have, however, been at some pains latterly to point out that although the German Army High Command will doubtless point out their technical and " domestic " objections to any proposed action by Herr Hitler, they are extremely unlikely to supplement these by opposition to an inspired Führer, who has so far proved them wrong in every major situation where their opinions have clashed.

7. There are obvious disadvantages for Germany in starting a war before the harvest. In 1939, however—if the situation should turn out as Herr Hitler may very possibly hope—this consideration may not prove of paramount importance. It is perfectly possible that it may be intended to fight a short war terminating before the harvest. A long war is most assuredly not envisaged. Furthermore, this year's harvest has been exceptionally good, stocks of essential food-stuffs are above the average, and provided Germany can localise her conflict, the Arbeitadienst and importable foreign labour should do much to reduce agricultural difficulties, even if war continued through the harvest season.

8. I have recently reported information from an intimately interested source of troop movements into East Prussia. I have as yet no confirmation of these. Developments in the situation in Memelland are doubtless probable at a very early date, but there is little reason to suppose that they would need entail immediate consequences involving military operations.

9. My Lithuanian colleague informs me that the new Lithuanian Minister in Berlin, who has good contacts in the inner circles of the party dating from his previous activities here as military attaché, has latterly obtained what would appear to be inspired information from several good sources. This is to the effect that the Germans are pressing the Poles to take joint military action against White Russia in the spring. If, however, the Poles refuse to co-operate, the Germans intend to take military action against the Poles at an early date. There is nothing inherently improbable about this information, although it would appear most unlikely that the Poles would at the moment be prepared to fall in with such a German proposal. It must, however, be noted that operations of the type involved would be most favourable to the Germans either before the spring thaw or in the late summer. The question remains, why should the Germans take the Lithuanians into their confidence? They can hardly regard them as trustworthy, and it is perfectly possible that the information has been given them with intent to mislead.

10. For some time past there have been many rumours of intended German action in the Ukraine next year, and reports of preparations for commercial penetration and exploitation have been circulating. Our recent information regarding the commencement of progressive mobilisation in February gives the occupation of the Ukraine as the military objective.

11. Logically, there are many reasons for supposing that Herr Hitler's eyes may be fixed on this area. In spite of assurances there are still many Germans and much German territory which he must wish to reincorporate in the Reich, and action with the object of seizing the Ukraine would not only give him some increased " Lebensraum " which he so badly needs, but also a situation by which he might easily profit to regain his lost Germans and territories.

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12. No specific indications have as yet come to my personal notice that military preparations against the Ukraine are, in fact, about to commence. I have, however, had a definite report of a senior German air force officer reconnoitring in Slovakia and Ruthenia, and I have heard rumours that a close military understanding between the German and Czech Governments is shortly to be discussed.

13. Until comparatively recently it has seemed safe to assume that any German military adventures next year would inevitably be in an easterly direction. It is still extremely probable that this will be the case, and Franco-Italian tension, provided it does not come to a head, may well provide Herr Hitler with an even clearer field than he might expect to have. We cannot, however, afford to disregard the possibility that under certain circumstances he might be tempted to take advantage of a temporarily advantageous situation—both in the air and in the grouping of the Powers—to endeavour to strike a really heavy and surprise blow in the West against us. His information on the possibility of England's cracking under severe bombing is presumably largely derived from Herr von Ribbentrop, and is probably as biassed as are all his Foreign Minister's views on matters English. As far as the press is concerned England is at the moment Public Enemy Number One, and recent attacks upon Holland are not without significance. Occasional rumours have been heard that action against England is definitely in preparation. At least two of these have emanated from sources that cannot be dismissed out of hand.

14. There are many logical arguments against the probability of Herr Hitler's provoking hostilities against England at an early date. But however improbable it may seem, there is a sufficiency of valid argument and of fact to warrant our taking such a possibility very seriously. It is a possibility which we cannot under any circumstances afford to exclude.

15. In another memorandum I have discussed the possibilities of action in the near future by the party against reactionary elements in the army. There is evidence that something of the sort may be in preparation, and there are sound reasons for anticipating such a possibility. My conclusions are that, however much such a purge may be desired by Herr Hitler and the party for inner-political reasons, drastic action is unlikely as long as the possibility of war on a *major* scale cannot be excluded.

16. I have outlined very broadly several of the more probable ways in which Herr Hitler may contemplate taking advantage of his present favourable military situation during the ensuing year. As far as my personal military information goes, it is as yet impossible to isolate any sound forecasts from the mass of speculation and rumour now current in Germany. The prolific nature of the latter, the economic and financial situation, and the frenzied tempo with which military development is continuing, lead to the inevitable conclusion that military action is being prepared for an early date. There is, however, no definite military evidence to indicate the area or scope of whatever may be contemplated. There is, indeed, no military evidence to show whether or no a decision has yet been taken. This may be the case, but it is equally possible that several military plans are in preparation, and that the one to be employed will depend upon developments in the general situation. My conclusions at the moment can be summarised as follows :—

(*a*) We can be very nearly certain that military action for next year is contemplated and in preparation.

(*b*) We can rely upon the Army High Command to represent to Herr Hitler that, as far as the army is concerned, there are grave objections to commencing operations before the summer, and to embarking upon a war of greater scope than one with a comparatively limited objective in the East. The extent to which the army's technical advice will be followed is, however, extremely doubtful.

(*c*) Provided there is no intervention from the West, Herr Hitler is probably —and in my opinion rightly—convinced that he is strong enough to deal with Poland and any opposition to be anticipated from Russia, provided his objective in the Ukraine is a limited one. It must be remembered that the biggest, if most uncertain, military factor in all appreciations is at the moment the German air force.

(*d*) It is true that Herr Hitler has renounced any claim to further territory from Poland. He may, however, easily provoke hostilities with Poland without initially invading Polish soil, and going back on his word.

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(*e*) From the military point of view Germany should logically devote the coming year to the consolidation of her position and the training of her army, which has expanded prodigiously during the past year under great difficulties and handicaps. The state of the country's economics and finance, and the internal situation generally indicate, however, that Herr Hitler will be forced to provide some major distraction, and it is difficult to see how this can take a form other than military aggression.

(*f*) There is as yet no definite military evidence to show in what direction action may be contemplated. Doubtless preparations are being made for more than one eventuality. There are, however, indications that such action is being planned for a comparatively early date.

(*g*) There is the possibility that if the report of the commencement of progressive mobilisation in February is true, Herr Hitler may envisage gradually building up his mobilised forces and concentrating them with the object of bringing off some *coup* not by fighting, but by menace, as he did last autumn. Admittedly this seems unlikely, as there is evidence to show that Herr Hitler is bitterly disappointed at having been deprived of his "small war" against Czechoslovakia in September.

(*h*) As regards designs against the Ukraine and/or Poland there is no direct military evidence to confirm this possibility. On the other hand, there is *much evidence consistent therewith, and none to refute it.*

We, naturally, cannot be certain that Herr Hitler might not be contemplating the military occupation of Czechoslovakia to round off his recent success. The weight of evidence and recent developments are, however, against this possibility.

The internal situation in Roumania and the temptations which the resources of this country provide might conceivably lead to a military adventure in a south-easterly direction. But, unless events take an unexpected turn, I do not believe that 1939 will see a German-cum-Hungarian campaign in Roumania. It might be difficult in this case for the Germans to ensure the localised type of operations which they desire.

(*i*) Finally, I would again stress that in spite of all appearances to the contrary, we would be ill-advised to assume that Herr Hitler's expected "distraction" for 1939 must *inevitably* be an easterly one. In discussing this subject at great length with my Dutch colleague and with the Counsellor of the Dutch Legation we placed the odds on action in the East as against action in the West at about 10 to 1.

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O.D. SKELTON TO WLMIK.

C118579

SECRET

27 Jan. 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

European Situation ✓
Can. Foreign Policy ✓

Dominions Office telegram, Circular B.20, on the European situation, is alarming, both in its guesses as to Hitler and in its revelation of the jittery mood of London. But it is not a statement of facts, on which definite policy could be based. The rumors and reports on which it is based are too numerous to be neglected, but too fantastic to be accepted without further confirmation.

The charges of megalomania and unreliability which the telegram brings against Hitler are undoubtedly true. But their appearance now is almost as much a condemnation of the British Government's policy since 1930 as of German policy. It is particularly hard to reconcile this appreciation of Hitler's character and motives with the interpretation which has been the basis of Mr. Chamberlain's policy for the past year. The truth is that the British Government was very complacent about Hitler's further plans for expansion as long as they were directed against the Russian Ukraine. The thought that the Western Powers might be first instead of second in Hitler's nightmare plans has shaken their judgment and in fact given them the jitters.

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Given conditions as they were last September, I have never thought that Chamberlain had any alternative but to throw Czechoslovakia to the wolves. The developments in Central Europe and Spain today are, however, a crushing indictment of the policy dominant in France and England since 1930 - a policy of unenlightened selfishness, of shortsightedness, of inefficiency in defence administration, and an extraordinary cynicism in dealings with the electorate; (at what other time in modern British history could a government elected on a policy of one hundred per cent enforcement of sanctions against Italy have turned around immediately after the election and made the Hoare-Laval deal, or could a Prime Minister have stated that he had withheld the truth about the defence situation for over a year because his government could not have been re-elected if the truth had been known?)

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C118581

It is by no means certain that the apprehensions as to attack in the West are correct. The British Military Attache in Germany, on whose report in the Foreign Office Print of January 2nd a good deal of the telegram is evidently based, states in his final paragraph that the odds on Hitler striking in the East in 1939 as against action in the West were placed by himself and his Dutch colleague at ten to one. Germany has, of course, been greatly strengthened by the events of the summer, but her army is still far inferior to that of France and her navy much more inferior relatively to its position in 1914. Her superiority in the air would enable her to strike terror and do wide damage, but most experts seem to doubt whether such action would be decisive from a military standpoint. Italy, which has a tremendous nuisance value in the Mediterranean in peacetime, is extremely vulnerable in wartime both from the economic and the military standpoint. As to Japan, her people know very well that, while Russia would be very careful to avoid conflict with her at the risk of bringing Germany in, the situation will be entirely different if Germany is already engaged with the Western powers. The United States would be definitely more responsive to the deal regarding the Dutch West Indies, referred to in this telegram, than to territorial changes in Europe.

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C 118582

With, as I said a couple of years ago, one European dictator dreaming he is Caesar and another certain he is God, no one can afford to ignore any rumor, however fantastic. But neither should we be stampeded into any panicky step. What is needed is to take stock and be ready for developments as they take actual shape out of the fog of conjecture.

My own guess is that the talk of a sudden and unprovoked air attack on England is baseless or a bogey to force acquiescence in a raid in other directions; that German-Italian pressure for African colonies is highly probable, and that the Ukraine is still the main object of Hitler's ambitions, but for the moment he may make threats in the West to ensure that no help will be given the East. He won Austria and Czechoslovakia by open threats, without spilling a drop of blood; he may carry this technique further, and seek his ends by secret rumors and rumblings. It may be he will prove to be not only a megalomaniac but a blood sadist. It may be that all Europe is crazy too. But for the moment we may give Europe - and ourselves - the benefit of the doubt.

28-1-39

Revised 19.3.39

(For Dominions Office telegram circular D 20, see Malcolm Macdonald to King, Jan. 25th, 1939)

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Secret

C118583

Feb. 23, 1939.

To the Prime Minister:

Attached are photostat copies of Foreign Office prints of special interest recently received. They are reports of the conversations held in Paris and Rome during the visit of Chamberlain and Halifax last January; reports by the British military attaches in Paris and Berlin on the chances of German military action in the near future; and a discussion by the Swiss Minister in London on possible German aggression against Switzerland.

The numbers of the prints enclosed are as follows:

R367/1/22, copy 036a
R434/1/22, copy 036a
C835/15/18, copy 036a
C1023/15/18, copy 036a
C1100/244/18, copy 036a.

These prints may be retained.

O.M.

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C118584

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SOUTHERN (ITALY). January 14. 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[R 367/1/22] Copy No. 036a

Sir E. Phipps's record of the meeting with the French Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay on the afternoon of January 10, and enclosing the communiqué issued after the meeting.

(No. 50. Confidential.) *Paris, January 11, 1939.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to place on record that the conversations between the Prime Minister and your Lordship, on the one hand, and M. Daladier and M. Bonnet, on the other, took place yesterday afternoon from about 6·15 to 7 o'clock. M. Léger, Sir Alexander Cadogan and I were present.

2. The proceedings were of course of a quite informal character, not even round a table, and no notes were taken, but it may be well if I forward the gist of what passed in the memorandum enclosed herein.

3. It will be noticed that the only action to be taken by your Lordship's Department is to sound the German Government regarding their guarantee of Czechoslovakia.

4. I enclose, herein, the text of the agreed communiqué issued to the press after the conversations were over.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

Memorandum.

France and Italy.

M. DALADIER made it quite clear that the French Government would not make any concessions at all to Italy. Indeed, even if he wished to do so he would not be able, since the Italian Government had succeeded in producing an "union sacrée"; any French Government attempting in these circumstances to make concessions would be swept away ("serait balayé"). The whole attitude of the Italian Government and press had been intolerable, and was quite incomprehensible in view of the fact that the French Government had done all they could for their part to put relations on a better footing and had appointed a French Ambassador to Rome, thus recognising the Italian Empire of Ethiopia without exacting any Italian concession in exchange. No sooner had M. François-Poncet arrived in Rome, however, than he had been insulted by hostile demonstrations instigated by the Italian Government.

The Prime Minister said that His Majesty's Government had of course noted and regretted the sudden change which had come over the Italian attitude. He wondered what was its true significance. Had it any connexion with the project which Herr Hitler was said to have in his mind in regard to the Ukraine? M. Bonnet agreed that this might very well be the case and that the design was to keep France occupied in the Mediterranean, thus leaving Germany free to attain her objective in Eastern Europe.

M. Bonnet said he had made it clear to Herr von Ribbentrop when the latter came to Paris that the French Government had no intention of making any concessions to Italy. He had spoken in similar, though even stronger, terms to the German Ambassador on the 31st December.

M. Léger remarked that, from highly placed circles in Berlin, the Quai d'Orsay had derived the impression that the Germans wished France to stand firm in this matter. If, however, France were to weaken, then the Germans would come down heavily on the Italian side in order to claim the credit for any French concessions to Italy.

Lord Halifax asked whether the French Ministers approved the attitude that the Prime Minister and he proposed to adopt in Rome in the matter of

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Franco-Italian relations (as set forth in the memorandum handed by Sir Eric Phipps to M. Bonnet on the 9th January, in accordance with the instructions contained in Foreign Office telegram No. 5, Saving, to Paris of the 6th January). The French Ministers expressed entire agreement. The Prime Minister explained that questions not contemplated in the above memorandum might arise in the course of the Rome conversations, and the French Ministers said they quite understood this. In illustration of his point the Prime Minister observed that, although he had no information to show what Signor Mussolini might be intending to propose, it might be, for instance, that he would offer to withdraw all his Italian troops from Spain in exchange for the grant of belligerent rights to General Franco.

Spain.

The French Ministers expressed concern at Mussolini's refusal to give the same assurances regarding the territorial inviolability of Spain, her islands and her colonies as he had given to Great Britain. Did this mean that he regretted the assurances given to Great Britain in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and that he meant to violate them? It might be well to ask the Duce in Rome to repeat those assurances. M. Bonnet went on to say that, although it was true that the Italian Government had undertaken at the close of the hostilities to withdraw entirely from Spanish territory, there was no assurance that this pledge would be carried out, and he enquired what His Majesty's Government would do in the event of the Italian Government failing to keep their word. The Prime Minister observed that that was a difficulty that would have to be faced if and when it arose; but M. Bonnet at least did not seem satisfied and reverted to the point at a later stage of the conversation, when the Prime Minister assured him that His Majesty's Government attached not less importance to the point than did the French Government.

The Prime Minister and Lord Halifax thought that this would not get us much further. To ask the Duce to repeat his assurances would merely elicit verbal promises in the same sense as the assurances already obtained in writing. It would appear to be better on this particular point to wait and see. It seemed difficult to believe that Mussolini, who had shown such anxiety to put the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force, should intend flagrantly to violate it by any permanent military occupation of Majorca, or any other part of Spanish territory.

The French Ministers thought it would be highly desirable to urge Mussolini in Rome to withdraw at any rate all his soldiers from Spain. They were being subjected to growing criticism from their Left for the continued closing of the Pyrenean frontier despite the sending of Italian reinforcements and supplies of arms, munitions, &c., to Franco Spain. Negrin had set the good example in this respect, for he had sent away large numbers of foreigners.

M. Léger observed that a couple of days previously the Spanish Ambassador had addressed a note to the French Government, pointing out that the Spanish Government did not, once hostilities had ceased, wish to follow an anti-Italian policy. On the contrary, their aim was to be friendly to all the Mediterranean Powers. The Spanish Ambassador had, it seemed, informed the Quai d'Orsay that a similar note had been addressed to His Majesty's Government. Lord Halifax and Sir A. Cadogan replied that, though they had not seen any such note, the Spanish Ambassador in London had spoken in the same sense more than once.

Czechoslovakia.

The French Ministers indicated that they would like a *joint* guarantee of Czechoslovakia by the four Munich Powers. This would only come into play if three of the four guaranteeing Powers were in agreement. The inconvenient, and, indeed, dangerous, situation now obtaining would then come to an end. At present Great Britain and France were bound by their guarantees of Czechoslovakia, whilst Germany and Italy were quite free. It was then agreed that the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax would raise this question in Rome and that it should also be raised at Berlin by the British and French representatives.

M. Léger thought it would be well to clear away certain German doubts and suspicions in this matter, and to point out to the German Government that a guarantee such as was now suggested would not in any way be directed against them.

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M. Bonnet remarked in this connexion that Herr von Ribbentrop in Paris had shown great reserve in this matter of a guarantee, and had objected that Czechoslovakia might some day be hostile again to Germany and might even be governed by "another Benes."

Communiqué Officiel.

De passage à Paris, se rendant à Rome, le Premier Ministre et Lord Halifax ont saisi cette occasion pour s'entretenir au Quai d'Orsay avec M. Daladier et M. Georges Bonnet.

Cette conversation a permis de confirmer pleinement l'identité générale de vues antérieurement établie entre les deux Gouvernements.

10 *janvier* 1939.

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The Department of External Affairs
FEB 14 1939
Canada

SOUTHERN (ITALY). January 14. 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[R 434/1/22] Copy No. 036a

Conversations between British and Italian Ministers, Rome, January 11–14, 1939.

(1)

Record of the First Conversation with Signor Mussolini and Count Ciano at the Palazzo Venezia on the afternoon of January 11.

THE meeting took place in the Duce's room in the Palazzo Venezia, in the corner of which stands his writing desk. He sat on one side of this desk; on the other side, from left to right, sat Count Ciano, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The Duce had before him a double sheet of foolscap, on which he had written in his own hand some notes, which he appeared to consult.

After expressing his pleasure at the visit of the British Ministers, he observed that he wished to make a declaration, and preferred to speak in Italian, which would be translated by Count Ciano. He then proceeded with the declaration, beginning by a statement that the policy of Italy was peace, which was necessary to them for internal reasons, including the development of their African Empire, as well as for the general stability of Europe. He said that this policy of peace was one which they intended to pursue, and that he himself would gladly use his influence in favour of it if at any time the necessity arose. He then remarked that another European war would mean the destruction of civilisation. Signor Mussolini said that the Berlin–Rome Axis was an essential point of Italian policy, but this did not imply that he could not have, as he hoped to have, the most friendly relations with Great Britain and with other Powers when circumstances were favourable or that good relations were not possible between Germany and France. He alluded to the Four-Power Pact which he had previously supported in vain. He said that he would not again take the initiative in suggesting such a pact, although he did not disapprove of it in principle. The Prime Minister interjected that the Duce had already given proof of his willingness and ability to intervene in favour of peace, and he had no doubt that his services could be relied upon again in case of need.

The Duce then proceeded to speak of the Mediterranean, as to which he remarked that Italy was quite satisfied with the Anglo-Italian Agreement on this subject, by which they intended to stand, and that they did not consider it necessary or desirable to bring in other nations in a general Mediterranean Pact. He repeated emphatically that they intended to stand loyally by their obligations under the Agreement, and rather went out of his way to stress that when the Spanish conflict was over they would have nothing to ask from Spain. He spoke with satisfaction of the exchange of military information which had taken place the day before.

Speaking of Franco-Italian relations, he said that the Italian Government did not consider that the Agreement of 1935 was still in force. The great barrier between France and Italy was the Spanish question, on which they took opposite views, and, until that was out of the way, no negotiations would be possible. He complained that the French were sending assistance to the Republican Government, but did not enter into any detail as to the nature of this assistance, except that several times he repeated that the French were sending in flour. He said that Franco should be given belligerent rights at once; that it was quite absurd to treat as a rebel a man who was in possession of three-quarters of Spain's territory.

Signor Mussolini then spoke of disarmament. He said he was of opinion that a general disarmament was not practical politics, but that, on the other hand, it should be possible to obtain agreement on qualitative limitation of armaments, to be followed later on by quantitative limitation. This, however, would be conditional upon agreement among the Four Munich Powers. On this the Prime Minister asked whether the Duce would consider the agreement of Russia would be essential to the working of such limitations, and the Duce said that if

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the Four Powers were in agreement, Russia would not matter. The Prime Minister interjected that if, say, a qualitative limitation upon the size of bombing aeroplanes were agreed to by the Four Powers and Russia paid no attention to it, but continued to construct machines outside the agreed limit, would not this break up the agreement between the Four Powers? He added that he had asked the question because he had put a similar question to Herr Hitler, who had replied that disarmament agreements must be world wide; it would be with the air as it had been with the Navy. Once Japan refused to agree to Naval limitation, the agreement between the other Powers was broken up and so it would be with the air. Signor Mussolini looked as if he was somewhat shaken by this, but did not make any further comment at variance with what he had said before. He again repeated that if any proposal for limitation were made by others, he would support it.

At this point, the Duce folded up his notes and appeared to have come to an end. The Prime Minister asked if he would say anything about the refugee problem. The Duce said that the Jewish refugee problem was not a local one, but one of general application. It was already not a problem in Germany only, and he thought probably it would be bound to arise in many other countries, including the United Kingdom. At this point he broke into a broad smile and said that that was his opinion.

The best permanent solution would be the establishment of an independent Sovereign Jewish State, which would not require that all Jews should live in it, since, as subjects of such a State, they would have their status and their official representation in whatever country they lived, like other people. To find a place for such a State, one must look to the countries that had large areas of territory such as the United States of America, Soviet Russia or Brazil. He said, with some indication of irony, that it might be some time before such a solution was practicable, but it must be regarded as a long-term aim. The Foreign Secretary then enquired whether it would not be possible to persuade the German Government to make some effort to facilitate the departure of the Jews from Germany by allowing them to take some money out with them. Signor Mussolini thought it would be so possible, but that it would not be of much use to ask for a great deal as the Germans had suffered great hardships and had become very poor in consequence of the actions of the Jews. He thought, however, that they were quite determined to get rid of them and would be very ready to do anything they could that would expedite their departure, provided a large-scale plan could be formulated. He himself would be prepared to use any influence he might have in that direction. The Prime Minister asked how the Duce contemplated that the next step should be taken; would it not be for Mr. Rublee of the International Commission to approach the German Government in the first instance? The Duce agreed, especially as this was an international affair which could not be solved by any one State alone.

The Prime Minister then said he would like to make a few comments upon the Duce's observations. To begin with, he wished on behalf of himself and the Foreign Secretary to thank Signor Mussolini very warmly for his invitation, which it had given them great pleasure to accept. He had felt that, when he parted with Signor Mussolini at Munich, he had not seen enough of him, and was extremely glad to have an opportunity of renewing the acquaintance which was then begun. He and the Foreign Secretary were gratified by what the Duce had said on the subject of peace and the Italian desire for a peaceful policy. The Duce would know how warmly he agreed with the view which he had expressed. He had been obliged to suffer the disappointment of seeing the result of his careful finance over many years dissipated in building armaments instead of in making improvements in public health and in the conditions of the people, and it was therefore natural that he earnestly desired to see the time come when this form of spending money could be exchanged for something more reasonable. The Duce gave strong signs of assent while the Prime Minister was saying this. The Prime Minister at this stage said that after Munich he had hoped that it would be possible to continue conversations with the German Government towards the end of last year, but he had been very disappointed in their attitude. Herr Hitler had made no response whatever to the friendly observations which he, the Prime Minister, had made, and then incidents had occurred which had rendered it quite impossible to carry on any negotiations whatever for the moment. Nevertheless, he did not despair, but thought it would be necessary to wait some time and then perhaps it might be possible to find a better atmosphere

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in which to resume talks. The Duce gave no indication of his view as to the behaviour of the German Government after Munich, but he stated that the reactions of British public opinion on the subject of what was after all a matter of internal policy in Germany, namely, the persecution of the Jews, had provoked natural reactions. At the same time he agreed that it should be possible later on to resume conversations, and he hoped that this would be done.

The Prime Minister then went on to express his pleasure at the renewed assurance given by the Duce of his intention to stand by the Anglo-Italian Agreement. He had never doubted his intention in this respect, but, of course, it was pleasant to hear the assurance renewed and he knew that the Foreign Secretary would be as glad as he was.

Coming to relations with France, the Duce would understand his deep regret that they did not seem to be progressing very well. He was puzzled at the objection to the 1935 Treaty, which he had understood was considered satisfactory in every respect, except in regard to Spain. He recognised that the Spanish question was extremely important, and he would be very glad if it were possible to see some way of putting an end to that conflict. The Duce had spoken about the assistance being given to the Government side from France, but the French told us equally of assistance being given to the Nationalist side by Italy and Germany. The Duce said he had withdrawn 10,000 men, to which the Prime Minister said " but not aviators or artillery." The Duce then said that they had not increased their artillery, or their aviators, or their aeroplanes for several months past. The Prime Minister asked Count Ciano to repeat this last observation, which he did in the same words.

The Foreign Secretary then observed that it would be very difficult to see how the conflict was going to end when each side continually asserted and believed that the other side was receiving assistance which it was their duty or necessity to counter. The Duce said that he had always intended to stand by the British plan which had been adopted by the Non-Intervention Committee, and that if that were made operative the question would be settled. If, however, the French were to begin a large scale intervention on the side of the Government he would have to reconsider his position. The Prime Minister asked whether he had any reason to suppose that such a move was in contemplation as he had heard nothing of it. The Duce said there had been some talk of it. The Prime Minister then observed that it was General Franco who had declined to accept the plan and so made it impossible. The Prime Minister added that, whilst he understood that it would be of little use to ask General Franco to accept the British plan or to consent to the withdrawal of foreign volunteers while he was actually in process of carrying out an extensive military operation, he would like to know whether the Duce was of opinion that, supposing his present drive to be successful, it would then be possible to get him to agree to the British plan? The Duce replied that if Franco succeeded in taking Tarragona and Barcelona the war would be practically finished, and in that case he thought the British Non-Intervention Plan could be accepted by General Franco, provided that withdrawal was properly controlled on both sides.

In reply to a question as to how long the drive was likely to continue, the Duce expressed the view that, whilst it depended upon the penetrative power of the Nationalists, it should be over in the course of a few weeks. Asked by the Foreign Secretary whether, if all foreign troops were withdrawn, Franco would win by himself, Spaniard against Spaniard, the Duce reflected for a minute or two, and then, saying that this was a very difficult question to answer, concluded that, on the whole, he would. The Prime Minister asked whether Franco's forces were not a good deal divided, having different aims; for instance, the Requetes and the Falangists seemed to have very different purposes. The Duce thought that, if Franco won, his prestige would be so much increased that it would be possible for him to bring these two parties together, each one abating something of their extreme demands. He thought that, if Franco won, he would have to modify his policy to some extent, as he would have to rule the whole country. He (the Duce) had always used his influence with Franco on the side of humanity to prisoners and civilians. He had repeatedly sent him letters and telegrams, and he considered that he had saved the lives of 50,000 persons in Bilbao, of whom otherwise very few might have escaped.

The Prime Minister then suggested that the meeting should be adjourned, and it was agreed to resume conversations at 5·30 the following day.

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(2)

Record of Secretary of State's Conversation with Count Ciano at the Palazzo Chigi on the Morning of January 12.

A MEETING took place between Count Ciano and the Foreign Secretary on the morning of the 12th January.

After a little general conversation, Count Ciano asked Lord Halifax whether he had received the latest news from Spain, and proceeded to tell him that the Italian Government had just received an intimation that General Franco had captured a further important strategic point that might be expected to exercise considerable influence on the future progress of his offensive. He went on to say that, though he was loth to make precise prophecies about dates which had so frequently been falsified, it could now surely be taken for certain that within six weeks, or six months or six years, General Franco would win, and accordingly it seemed to him inexplicable that the French should insist on maintaining an attitude of such hostility to General Franco, and he could discern no intelligible reason for it. The Italian Government saw no reason to anticipate the emergence of any dangerous complications from Spain unless the French Government was so ill-advised as to resort to intervention on a really substantial and organised scale, in which event the Italian Government would be obliged to re-examine their whole attitude towards the situation.

The Foreign Secretary said that he had no reason to suppose that the French had any such step in contemplation, and would not be at all likely to take any such action, unless on the Italian side anything was done on such a scale as would strongly excite French public opinion in such a sense. As to the French attitude to General Franco, Lord Halifax said that he had no doubt that the French Government were constantly in great difficulty from their own public opinion, just as in varying degree the Prime Minister and His Majesty's Government were in England, and that for the rest the anxiety that was very firmly rooted in the French mind was lest at the conclusion of hostilities General Franco might be found to pursue a policy of hostility to French interests and the Italian Government might be found anxious to maintain their position at points of great strategic disadvantage to French interests. If, therefore, it was in any way possible for the Italian Government to have regard to these natural anxieties, firstly, by not advertising more than was necessary the help that they were giving to General Franco, and, secondly, by giving any assurance to the French Government similar to that which they had given to us, Lord Halifax would suppose it would be likely that the French attitude arising from their present anxiety might be so far modified.

To all this Count Ciano replied that, as Signor Mussolini had assured us last night, the Italian Government would have no demands to make on Spain at the conclusion of hostilities, that they would certainly try to get back anything they could through the channels of legitimate trade, but they would seek no privileged position, and certainly, as they had frequently assured us, had no territorial designs. If, indeed, they had had any such, would it not have been an obvious policy for them to endeavour to secure the division of Spain in order the more easily to extract advantages, territorial or other, for themselves? The fact that they had not done this but had directed all their efforts towards the maintenance of a united Spain might surely be taken as a convincing proof that they harboured no such ulterior ambitions. While the Italian Government had always recognised the correctness of the position we had adopted, and while, therefore, they were prepared to be cross-examined by us as to what they were doing and to give us assurances, they were not prepared to be put in the dock by the French Government, which, they thought, as he added with a smile, had behaved every bit as badly, if not worse, than themselves. It was on this point that the conversations with the French had broken off in May, and the Italian Government was not disposed to recede from that attitude.

The Foreign Secretary told Count Ciano that he had been greatly surprised to hear him say last night that the Italian Government had not sent any further troops or artillery or aeroplanes since (as he, Lord Halifax, had understood) the beginning of December. It was impossible for us to check with certainty any information coming to us in a different sense, but he thought it right to tell him that in many quarters it was

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strongly asserted that they had in fact sent very considerable supplies of ammunition and aeroplanes within the last few weeks. This Count Ciano strongly denied, saying that they had at the present time one effective division in Spain, and altogether an Italian personnel of something like twenty or twenty-five thousand. As regards artillery and aviation, concerning which Lord Halifax had asked him whether what had been said last night implied that no further supplies had been sent or that such further supplies as had been sent represented only legitimate replacements, Count Ciano said that certainly no additional supplies had been sent, and that what had been sent amounted to, in his estimate, not much more than a third of what would have been capable of being held as legitimate replacement. It might well be that aeroplanes were flown from Palma to Sardinia in order to have some replacement of spare parts, and these were quite possibly reckoned by those giving information as new machines when they returned to Palma.

Count Ciano warmly agreed with Lord Halifax that, if only the Spanish problem could be settled, much of the difficulty of foreign affairs in Europe to-day would be removed, but in reply to a suggestion of his that, with General Franco now occupying three-quarters of the country, it should not be impossible to reach some compromise solution by which the future could be assured against the establishment of a Communist Government, he said that he thought General Franco would have an immense task at the conclusion of hostilities in the way of reconstruction of Spanish national life, and that to enable him to discharge this successfully it was important that he should not lack the prestige that would attach to a victor in the civil war. He agreed with Lord Halifax that the social programme of the two sides was on paper very much the same, but it was significant that, during all the months of campaigning, the Government forces had never been able to recapture any territory, whereas during the last offensive General Franco had captured territory which included 400,000 inhabitants, which gave him "on a division," as compared with the Government forces, an additional population of 800,000.

HALIFAX.

Rome, January 12, 1939.

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(3)

Record of the Second Conversation with Signor Mussolini and Count Ciano at the Palazzo Venezia on the afternoon of January 12.

THE second conversation took place on Thursday, the 12th, at 5·30 P.M.

Signor Mussolini began by saying that at this second conversation he wished to put before the British Ministers the attitude of the Italian Government on Franco-Italian relations. He had already informed them that they did not consider the Treaty of 1935 to be in force. They had given the reasons for this in a despatch to the French which had been shown to Lord Perth and at the end of this despatch they had offered to discuss their difficulties with the French. The French Government, however, had not accepted this invitation and in the meantime there had taken place the demonstration in the Italian Chamber which was entirely spontaneous and with which the Government had not associated itself. They had not taken any notice of the demonstration, but since the French had not accepted their offer they would not now take the initiative in any further negotiations or enter upon them until after the Spanish affair was settled. Then it might be possible to talk things over, but, in the meantime, a dangerous situation existed on account of the violent attacks made by French papers about the Duce, the Italian Army and everything Italian. The Prime Minister said it was not all the French papers, but only a few of them that were thus attacking Italy, but the Duce said most of them were. The Prime Minister then repeated what he understood to be the account which had just been given to him in order to make sure it was correctly understood and thanked the Duce for explaining so clearly what his position was. He also thought that the situation might be dangerous if the termination of the Spanish conflict were delayed and he hoped very much that the Duce on his side would restrain any activities on the part of the press or elsewhere which might tend to exacerbate feelings. He pointed out that the British position with regard to France was just like that which existed between Italy and Germany, and that these acute differences between Italy and

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France would be a source of grave embarrassment to the British Government which wanted at the same time to be improving relations with Italy. Finally, he remarked that, while the Governments of Italy and of Great Britain were stable, no one could say the same of the French Government, and he was anxious that nothing should be done which would weaken M. Daladier's position and give an opportunity for the Left Wing to take control. Signor Mussolini appeared cordially to agree with the last sentiment. He did not think himself that the Spanish affair would take long, since General Franco's drive was progressing very favourably, whereas the counter attack was a failure, but in the meantime he would not make it harder for France, and he intended to stick by his agreement with us.

The Duce then enquired whether there was any point which British Ministers wished to raise. The Prime Minister replied that he would like to elicit the Duce's opinion upon a matter of some delicacy, although if Signor Mussolini felt that he preferred not to answer the question, no doubt he would say so. As he had said yesterday, he had hoped that after Munich, and particularly after the Declaration signed by Herr Hitler, it would be possible to proceed with discussions designed to put relations between Germany and Great Britain on a better footing. Unfortunately, this had not been found practicable, and the attitude of Germany was giving rise to a great deal of anxiety and doubt, not only in his mind but all over Europe. Armament was proceeding not only unchecked, but at an increased pace. There was talk of massing troops, and a general suspicion that Herr Hitler had it in mind to make some further move in the near future which would be likely to upset a great part of Europe. There were different suggestions as to the nature of such a move. Some people thought it would be in the direction of the Ukraine; others that, although that might be the ultimate aim, it would be preceded by a sudden attack in the West. Here Signor Mussolini shook his head emphatically. Probably most people thought that the move, if made, would be towards the East, and they feared that it might mean a war between Germany and Poland, or Germany and Russia, or Germany with Poland and Russia combined. The Prime Minister would not say that such a war would necessarily involve Western Powers also, but once war began one never could tell when or where it would stop.

Here Signor Mussolini indicated his assent. Therefore, the Prime Minister concluded, these rumours and suspicions were undermining all confidence in Europe; they were driving every country into increased programmes of rearmament and as long as they continued there seemed little hope of improvement in the situation. What he would like to know was whether the Duce could give him any assurances which would do something to mitigate his anxiety on this very important matter. Signor Mussolini appeared to consider his answer carefully and then he replied slowly and with pauses between the sentences. He said that it was true that Germany had rearmed and was still rearming, but that he was convinced that this was only for defensive purposes and that Herr Hitler desired a long period of peace in order that he might fuse together the component parts of the expanded Reich and develop its productive forces. He thought it was very possible that these rumours were being spread about by propagandists anxious to make mischief and to put Germany in the wrong. He did not believe that Hitler had any intention of setting up an independent Ukraine or of attempting to bring about the disruption of Russia, although he, Mussolini, would not feel that it would be a bad thing if an independent Ukraine were created and it certainly would not be to the disadvantage of the Russians. He would like to mention that Italy did not favour a common frontier between Hungary and Poland because the frontiers had been laid down on ethnical principles and the Ruthenians were neither Poles nor Hungarians. The interview which Hitler and Beck had had recently at Berchtesgaden had improved the situation as between these two parties and again he repeated that in his view these stories about a move eastward by Germany were without foundation and probably started deliberately by propagandists. As to any idea of a German attack in the west, such a thing was absolutely out of the question. Hitler would never send the youth of Germany to fall on the frontier which he regards as already decided.

The Prime Minister observed that these views of the Duce were good so far as they went, but, nevertheless he did not feel that they were quite sufficient to account for the uneasy situation or to exclude further suspicion. There was the overwhelming fact that German military forces were now so strong as to

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make it impossible for any Power or combination of Powers to attack her successfully. She could not want further armaments for defensive purposes; what then did she want them for? Russia could not be an enemy to be feared by Germany for she was far too weak internally to take the offensive, although she might put up a very good defence if she were attacked. It was such considerations as these which continually bred suspicion among other countries. To this the Duce replied that the Germans had to take into account the possibility that there might be another anti-German coalition like that which had crushed her in 1918. Moreover, in measuring armaments one must take account of the size of the population to be defended and with 80 million of people, the Germans naturally wanted larger armaments. Moreover, they had been entirely disarmed and they had had to start from the very bottom. The Prime Minister then asked whether if Herr Hitler's intentions were really so peaceful and his preparations entirely defensive, he could be induced to say something to that effect which might help to restore confidence. Signor Mussolini added a further consideration which had occurred to him as proving the defensive nature of the German preparations, namely, the fortification of the Siegfried Line. He said that it was not impossible that Hitler might some time make some pacific declaration and, indeed, he had just said something of the sort when receiving the Diplomatic Corps. He said the Prime Minister would have to remember that there were people who wanted the defeat of Germany in other countries and that he, the Führer, was responsible for the lives of Germans. There were people, for instance, in Britain and in France, like Blum, who had openly declared that they would like to have an alliance against Germany and there was talk of France supplying the Army and Britain the Navy to effect her defeat. The Prime Minister observed that M. Blum spoke only of a defensive and not of an offensive alliance and that, though he would not speak for France, he could say with the utmost confidence that in his own country no single person, not even Churchill himself, ever thought of taking the offensive against Germany. The Duce retorted that no one doubted Mr. Chamberlain's will for peace, but the Führer had to take account of the fact that there were other views which might some day prevail, but he was sure that Germany would never attack either France or Great Britain and that Hitler wanted good relations with Great Britain as was shown by the Naval Agreement under which he had voluntarily accepted the position of inferiority at sea. He, Mussolini, would never accept such a position in regard to France. Here he thrust out his chin for the only time during their interviews and looked aggressive. He concluded by saying that, after all, France had still got a military alliance with Poland and with Soviet Russia and Hitler must reckon with these things.

The Prime Minister then turned again to disarmament. Yesterday they had discussed the question of disarmament, and to-day the Duce had clearly stated that it would be impossible for good relations to be restored between Italy and France until the Spanish affair was out of the way. Supposing then that the Spanish affair were settled and that good relations were once more established between France and Italy, would the Duce think that a suitable moment to initiate discussions about qualitative disarmament? The Duce replied that very possibly it might be, but he did not think it advisable to have any conference without previous preparation, as it was a matter that wanted a good deal of thought. He had been thinking about it, but he was not at present ready to make a move, although he had some ideas. The Prime Minister responded that he, too, was against conferences entered upon without previous preparation. They were apt to fail and do more harm than good, but all he had meant was to enquire whether, in the opinion of the Duce, the moment that he had alluded to would be suitable for this preliminary exchange of views. The Duce said yes, he thought it would be, and he had been thinking a great deal about limitation in various ways. You could have ships limited to not more than a certain tonnage, guns limited to certain calibres, aeroplanes not allowed to carry bombs of more than a certain weight, prohibition of gas or the bombing of civilians, &c. The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with this method of approach to the problem, and hoped that when the time did come the Duce would be prepared to exchange views with the British Government in the preliminary stages, as he thought some discussion between the two Governments might be very fruitful. The Duce said he was quite prepared to do this, and that when the time came he would formulate a draft which he would be prepared to discuss with a view to an exchange of ideas.

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The Prime Minister then said he wished to raise the question of the guarantee to Czechoslovakia. This had been discussed and settled in principle at Munich, but since then it had remained in a rather vague form and he would like to know what views Signor Mussolini had upon the subject. The Duce said that he was not unfavourable in principle to such a guarantee, but he did not think the time had yet come, for Czechoslovakia was now a national State, and it really must be neutral before the guarantee could be given. The Prime Minister said this had always been the idea of the British Government, and he fully recognised that only by neutrality could Czechoslovakia hope to preserve her position. The question, however, was, when that was settled, by whom would she be guaranteed? He rather assumed that the Duce was thinking of the four Powers. Signor Mussolini said he was quite agreeable to the idea of the four Powers giving a guarantee. Clearly, however, to be effective, the guarantee must be given by the limitrophe Powers. Powers which did not adjoin Czechoslovakia might come in, but their effect would be moral rather than material. The Prime Minister said that another practical question would, however, arise. The guarantee was not a guarantee of frontiers, but a guarantee against unprovoked aggression. If it became effective, it must be embodied in a clause in the treaty, and this clause must define the procedure and conditions under which the guarantee came into operation; thus someone must decide whether an aggression, if it took place, was or was not unprovoked. Who was to make this decision? The guarantee might be either joint or several. If it were joint, a decision by all four Powers would be necessary, but supposing that one of the Powers itself was the aggressor? If unanimity were necessary in order to establish the guarantee, obviously that unanimity could not be obtained by the agreement of the aggressor, and consequently the guarantee would become ineffective. For these reasons, it had occurred to the British Government that the nature of the aggression might be decided by a majority of the Powers, viz., three out of four. What did the Duce think of this idea? The Duce said this was a matter which was of considerable importance and no doubt it would have to be settled, but it would require some thought and consideration before a decision could be arrived at. In the meantime, it might be considered who was likely to attack Czechoslovakia. Not Poland; she was not likely to make any attack; nor Roumania, who had nothing to gain by it; nor Hungary. He did not think Russia would attack, and Germany had shown that she regarded herself now as the protector of Czechoslovakia; so that he did not think it was likely that there would be an attack on her from any side.

The Prime Minister then asked whether, in Signor Mussolini's view, it was desirable to leave this question of the guarantee open for the present. The Duce replied that before a guarantee could be considered he thought three questions must be settled.

1. The internal constitution of Czechoslovakia itself.
2. The establishment of her neutrality, and
3. The demarcation of her frontiers on the ground, for hitherto they had only been shown on maps.

When these conditions were fulfilled, a guarantee might be considered but, in the meantime, owing to the actions of Germany and Italy it was considered that Central Europe would remain quiet.

The Duce then asked whether the British Government were ready to discuss the adjustments of boundaries between Ethiopia and British Somaliland and the Sudan in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. The Prime Minister said that they were and that the procedure which had suggested itself to them was that a memorandum should be sent through Lord Perth of the adjustments desired. The Italian Government could then make proposals for any adjustments desired on their side and His Majesty's Government would then send out to Rome a commission of experts who could discuss with the Italian experts the final method of adjusting the frontiers. The Duce said he was quite agreeable to this proposal, but observed that these were all quite minor matters.

The Prime Minister then said that there were no further questions which he wished to raise, but he would like to inform the Duce that His Majesty's Government would be delighted to be represented at the Rome Exhibition in 1942.

The Duce then asked about the prospects of a general election in the United Kingdom; when was it likely to take place? The Prime Minister said it was

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not due until the Autumn of 1940, and he saw no reason to suppose that it would take place, at any rate, before the Autumn of the current year.

The Duce then said that he would like once again to thank the British Ministers for coming to Rome. He had been very pleased with the conversations which he hoped would further establish good relations and lead the way towards general peace.

The Prime Minister responded in turn by thanking the Duce again for the pleasure which he had given to the British Ministers in giving them the opportunity of making this visit. They had been greatly gratified at their cordial reception, and he himself felt that the personal contact which they had established with the Head of the Government and his Ministers was of supreme value as would be shown in their future relations. The interview them terminated.

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(4)

Record of the Prime Minister's Conversation with Signor Mussolini after the Dinner at the British Embassy on January 13.

IN the course of a short conversation with Signor Mussolini after dinner at the British Embassy on the evening of Friday, the 13th January, I said there was one point upon which I was still rather unhappy in spite of the assurances which the Duce had given me, and that was upon Herr Hitler's intentions. I did not feel that what he had said as to the defensive nature of his rearmament was altogether convincing, and moreover we had since had further information which indicated the calling-up of reservists in the neighbourhood of Munich. The Duce asked whether that was to-day and I said yesterday. He said that this was contrary to his information, which was that the reservists who had been called up in Austria had since been dismissed. I then said that the German press had on more than one occasion been somewhat contemptuous about the fighting qualities of democracies, indicating that in no circumstances would they be prepared to come to the test of war. Such an attitude betrayed a grave misapprehension; democracies would fight under certain circumstances and had been ready to fight last September, and it would be a terrible tragedy if aggressive action were taken under a misapprehension as to what lengths the democracies might be prepared to go to. The Duce made no direct reply to this remark, but said that the polemics of the German press were only an answer to the polemics of the press in other countries. I said that I was aware that there were faults on both sides, but that, after all, our press was free whereas the press in Germany was controlled. The Duce said he did not consider that the press was free anywhere, since even in England it was under the control of the proprietors.

The conversation then became more general, but Signor Mussolini impressed upon me that there was a good deal of misapprehension as to the control exercised over the Italian press. It was often supposed that no matter appeared in that press without having first been approved by the Government authorities. This was not the case; it would take too much time to read all the matter that was printed, but if the Government were not satisfied with what had been printed they could always confiscate the press, and this had happened even in the case of his own paper.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). January 21, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 835/15/18] Copy No. 036a

Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 91. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Paris despatch No. 27 of the 7th January, 1939, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of memorandum, Serial No. 5, by the military attaché, dated the 18th January, 1939, respecting Germany's air superiority, and the possibility of her striking a blow at the Western Powers.

Paris, January 19, 1939.

Enclosure

Colonel Fraser to Sir E. Phipps.

(No. 60. Serial No. 5. Secret.)

Sir, *Paris, January 18, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 16 (Serial No. 3), dated the 4th January, 1939, and to say that this morning I saw Colonel Gauché, who reverted again to the possibility that Germany might avail herself of her present superiority in the air to strike a blow at the Western Powers. His theory, as I have already described to your Excellency, is that the Germans, acting possibly in co-operation with the Italians, might occupy Holland as a base for air and submarine operations against Great Britain, and having done so, might remain on the defensive on the whole of their western front and continue the war in the air only. He said that Germany had created an "army of the air," that this army had not been created for nothing, and that some of the most influential members of the "party" in Germany considered that by the threat, or if necessary by the use, of this army, Germany and Italy could obtain what they required from Great Britain and France, as, for example, Tanganyika, Tunisia or Corsica. Colonel Gauché did not maintain for a moment that a war "à outrance" could be won in the air. On the contrary, he said that if Great Britain and France refused to capitulate, the final defeat of Germany was certain, but that enormous material damage would undoubtedly be inflicted on both countries before the air attack spent itself. Germany, however, had certain grounds for considering that she might gain her ends without war. In September last it was the threat of the air which determined the issue, and both Göring and the head of the German air force, General Milch, had emphasised this point in a very special way in recent speeches, and had reiterated that it was the power of the German air army which had in the past, and would again in the future, enable Hitler to achieve his political ends. I suggested to Colonel Gauché that political ends could not be attained without a military decision, and that I could not believe that responsible Germans should disagree with this view, since even if Paris and London were destroyed and enormous damage inflicted on various other centres of commercial and industrial importance, the French army would still be holding the Maginot Line, and the French and British navies would still be keeping the seas, and it was not likely that a French army and a French navy which not only had never been beaten, but had never even been attacked, would consent to the surrender of territory which they regarded as a part of France. To this Colonel Gauché replied that a decision in the old sense might no longer be necessary, or rather he suggested that such was the view of some people in Germany. The intention would not be to gain a military victory in the old sense.

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but simply to force the French and ourselves to surrender some of our overseas possessions, and in the German view it was quite conceivable that the British public, for example, might prefer to surrender some ex-German colony, rather than to see London laid in ruins. As I have stated already, he did not suggest for a moment that such a policy would succeed; but he said that at the present time when the German army was still by no means equal to the French, it was the only form of offensive which they were in a position to undertake in the west, and that if war came this year he was convinced that the German air force was the offensive weapon which it was intended to use. I have discussed this question with the A.A., and although it may be objected that an offensive of the type suggested would be extremely unlikely to produce the desired results, that if it failed it might well lead to the almost certain defeat of Germany, or that even the German people might be expected to react against pure "attilism" of this nature, yet it still remains a possible source of danger to our country, and it is for this reason that, at the risk of being a bore, I have thought it worth while to refer to it again. As has been pointed out already, it was really a threat of this nature which decided the issue in September; in other words, it has been tried successfully on the dog, and it is not unreasonable therefore to suggest that it may now be tried on the man. And if it is tried as a bluff, and if the bluff is called, can a dictator afford to draw back?

I have, &c.

WILLIAM FRASER,
Military Attaché.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). January 27, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 1023/15/18] Copy No. 036a

Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received January 27.*)

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 26, 1939.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1417 of the 29th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the military attaché giving a résumé of the military situation of Germany as it appears at present to be developing.

2. It will be observed from the military attaché's despatch, with which I am in general agreement, that the recent trend of events, especially the present rather more conciliatory attitude towards Poland, would seem to make active German intervention in the Ukraine unlikely in the near future, and that it is at present believed that the Germans are preparing some military concentration in an area in the south of the country which would be convenient for exerting pressure on the south-east of Europe or for supporting Italy, with regard to whom I have noticed that mutual consultation has been closer than ever. It is very likely that, until the Spanish situation clears up, Herr Hitler wishes the armed forces of Germany to be in a state of readiness to assist Italy at short notice.

3. The situation is obscure and the atmosphere generally uneasy. Herr Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on the 30th January may throw some light on his future intentions.

I have, &c.

GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure.

Colonel Mason-MacFarlane to Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 24, 1939.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following brief résumé of the way in which the military situation in this country appears to be developing :—

Events have moved rapidly since my memorandum of the 26th December, and, although the situation is still most obscure, one or two pointers are beginning to emerge. I give my opinions with due reserve, but they reflect generally those of the more responsible of my colleagues, and of other observers with whom I have been in contact :—

(*a*) There is a general impression that active German intervention in the Ukraine is now unlikely in the *near* future. It would appear that Germany is coming to some temporary understanding with Poland with the obviously possible object of leaving herself a freer hand elsewhere. The attitude of my Polish colleague is not inconsistent with this.

(*b*) There are indications of which I myself have obtained comparatively few, but which appear none the less to be fairly numerous and credible, that preparations are being made for some form of military concentration in South Germany and Austria. It is held in several quarters that the Germans intend to create a "centre of force" in this area which will enable them the better to pursue their policy in South-East Europe, or, if need be, support Italy.

(*c*) Reservists have undoubtedly been called up in several areas. It is not yet clear what proportion of these can be explained by the calling up of men for normal short-term training. The latter has undoubtedly commenced, and in at least one case the men involved are all Sudeten who are being trained in Prussia.

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(*d*) There are many reports from different sources of the movement of troops into Austria, and of military goods rail activity in this direction and also over the Brenner. These are all consistent with the possibility referred to in paragraph 5.

(*e*) The events of the past week, including the transfers of Dr. Schacht and of Captain Wiedemann, and the decree regarding the S.A.'s closer co-operation with the army over military sport, have gone far to alarm moderate opinion in the country. On the other hand, I have so far discovered nothing in either the attitude or the actions of German officers definitely portending immediate military activity on a large scale. There is no doubt whatever that the whole army is working at very high pressure. Minor signs that something is in the air are not wanting. There have recently been far fewer soldiers about in Berlin over the week-end. The chief of the Operations Section of the Oberkommando der Hehrmacht has been unexpectedly ordered away on duty at the end of this week. Officers are refusing invitations, stating frankly that they are too overworked to be able to go out in the evening. There is, however, as yet nothing definitely to confirm the reports that partial mobilisation is to commence next month, although, from the purely military point of view, only domestic military considerations indicate that it ought to be unlikely. Information regarding the very indifferent condition of the railway system as a whole keeps coming in.

(*f*) It is possible that matters may clarify somewhat by the end of the month, and, should there be a Führer speech on the 30th, it may give an idea as to future military possibilities. In the meantime, there is a general impression that a very great deal depends upon the speed with which matters develop in Spain. It seems unlikely that Germany will embark on a policy which may involve her militarily in one direction at a time when Italian action might well force complications in another area.

So far as the German army is concerned, it is only possible to reiterate once again the following points :—

The German army is working at highest pressure.

There is no sign at the moment—apart from rumour in civilian circles—that there is likely to be any slackening of the armament programme. But the appointment of Herren Funk and Brinkmann to the Reichsbank does not *necessarily* imply that we should exclude this possibility.

Domestic details of mobilisation as far as the Wehrkreise are concerned are apparently to be completed by the 1st February.

There is nothing yet either to confirm or to contradict the rumours of mobilisation at an early date. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that a start is possibly being made with effecting a gradual military concentration in Bavaria and Austria, and that the possibility of a policy *vis-à-vis* the Ukraine, involving military action against Poland, has at any rate been averted for the moment.

The army is logically clamouring—under its breath—for a breathing-space. It is not getting it.

I have, &c.
F. N. MASON-MacFARLANE,
Military Attaché.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). January 27, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 1100/244/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir G. Warner (Berne).

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1939.*

THE Swiss Minister asked to see me this evening, and said that he would be grateful if I could tell him whether we had any precise information in regard to the rumours of possible German aggression on Switzerland. His own Government were naturally disturbed by such rumours, but were not disposed to anticipate any direct and unprovoked attack by Germany on Switzerland or Holland, though they did not exclude the possibility either of this or what they thought, if anything happened, was much more likely, namely, that the Germans might be tempted to violate Swiss neutrality after they had found themselves in general war. The Swiss Government would certainly defend their frontiers to the utmost of their ability, and the Minister, therefore, would be grateful should we at any time have information, if we would place the Swiss Government in possession of it.

2. I told M. Paravicini that at present I had seen nothing but rumours of possible German intentions, and we could not regard these as certain. I felt we were living in times when one could not safely regard anything as impossible, and when we had to have regard to all kinds of ugly possibilities. Should we at any time get any information that we were able to consider as evidence of German intention, I would gladly see that it was transmitted to the Swiss Government.

3. M. Paravicini said that there was always a possibility of trouble in that there were differing interpretations of what was implied by neutrality. The conception of political neutrality as held by the Swiss Government was very plain; in certain quarters in Germany, however, which he identified with the Nazi party rather than with the German Government, attempts might be made to excite prejudice on the ground that all the individual members of the neutral State had not completely foregone their right to think, and, if necessary, criticise another Government.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[504 dd—1]

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C 118601 ODS/AH

March 9th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM

European situation

D.O. telegram, B. 86 of March 7th is a very interesting document.

It indicates that the view of the United Kingdom now is that Hitler has no intention of precipitating an immediate crisis. This view is entirely different from that contained in Circular B. 20 of January 25th. Two explanations of this difference are possible. The first is that projects for a sudden attack on Britain or Holland were really under consideration, but that the German Government has modified its view. That is the explanation given in the current telegram which indicates that the firm attitude of the French Government, the progress of British re-armament, firmer speeches, the attitude of the United States Government are responsible for the change. I think it is undoubtedly true that the above factors have been a brake on German-Italian plans, whatever they were. Among the retarding factors, however, there should also be included the resistance of Poland and Rumania and the other members of the hundred million neutral bloc from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and not least the evidence of suspicion that exists between Berlin and Rome and particularly

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Mussolini's unwillingness that the axis should grind out meal for the senior partner only.

There is, however, a second factor in the situation, namely, there never was any valid ground for the jittery and extreme forecasts of an unprovoked and direct attack on Britain or on Holland. There has been nothing in the developments since January 25th to confirm the soundness of the fears then expressed. The Prime Minister of the Netherlands has both publicly and privately expressed his disbelief in the rumours so far as his country is concerned.

The new developments do not mean that tension will entirely cease or that danger of war is entirely past. It does mean, however, that there is no positive ground for anticipating an immediate crisis, and every month gained now puts the danger off several months further.

O.D.7.

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Prime Minister 118603 1.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). March 10, 1939.

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Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 280. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 6, 1939.

AS your Lordship is aware, unforeseen circumstances made it impossible for me to contribute, as I had intended to do, to the annual report furnished by this embassy on Germany for the year 1938. Yet the year was such a momentous one, not only in the history of the Third German Reich itself, but in that of Europe in general, that I feel it incumbent on me to furnish your Lordship with a personal if somewhat belated record of the events of the past year while the facts are still comparatively fresh in my memory.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure.

Report on Events in Germany during 1938.

I MAKE no excuse for describing this record as a personal one, since we are living in an age of personalities, and particularly is this the case in Germany to-day. We may talk and think wishfully of the German people and of its desire to live in unity, order and peace and be friends with its Anglo-Saxon cousins. But it is Hitler alone who counts in Germany to-day and his will which alone prevails.

2. Nor need I apologise unduly for repeating much that has already been written elsewhere of a year in which Herr Hitler completed the work begun by Frederick the Great and Prince Bismarck and, by consummating at long last German unity through the incorporation in the Reich of Austria (the Ostmark) and the Sudeten lands, completely modified the strategic and economic structure of Europe to the great advantage of Germany herself and to the detriment of Western Europe generally, but of France in particular. How serious this modification will be for Great Britain and the British Empire depends on our ability to see these changes in their true perspective, to adjust ourselves to the new conditions which were inaugurated as a consequence of the World War of 1914–18, and to shape our policy and our activities accordingly. But France's position henceforward *vis-à-vis* Germany cannot well be anything but a defensive one and the final reversal of that which existed prior to the Napoleonic period.

3. Remarkable though Hitler's achievements sound in the twentieth year after Germany's complete defeat in 1918, history will, I feel convinced, regard them as the inevitable consequences of that war and of the peace which ended it. In 1937, when I went for the first time to Nuremberg, General Göring, as he then was, asked me whom, taking the long view, I regarded as the principal beneficiary of the World War. I replied Italy and the Slav States. Göring's reply was: "No, Germany: since without such a war and without such a defeat German unity would have been impossible."

4. Nor did I even then think that he was wrong. Nationalism was one of the features of the age which followed Napoleon, who was its supreme, if unconscious, patron. Italian unity and the Second Reich were the two principal examples of it in the 19th century, and Ireland, no less than the recreation of Poland, Bohemia, the Baltic States, &c., the post-war fruits of it. Even the Jewish question, which is likely to prove one of the problems of the 20th century, is in itself merely a by-product of nationalism driven to excess. What is, indeed,

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almost more remarkable than Hitler's achievements is the fact that the realisation of German unity was so long delayed. Volumes could be written on this subject, but a brief, yet necessary, glance at the salient features of the background of German history is sufficient to support the truth of this assertion. To begin with, it was the German Emperors of the First Reich (or Holy Roman Empire) who, by pursuing the shadow of universal power, threw away the substance of national German unity. Thus the Habsburgs forfeited their chance and it fell to the Hohenzollerns of Prussia to be the champions of pan-Germanism. The Austrian Empire was built up at the expense of German unity and the rivalry between Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns split Germany in two. It was the heterogeneous elements of the Austrian Empire which alone prevented Bismarck from completing in his Second Reich the full union of the 19th century. The defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 freed the Poles, Czechs, Roumanians, Croats, Slovenes, Italians, &c., from the Government of Vienna and left the Ostmark isolated and the Sudeten Germans under the rule of the always hated and despised Czech. It could never have been but a question of time before these 9 or 10 million Germans should gravitate by the mere natural force of attraction into the Germany of the Third Reich. The weakness of Germany alone prevented this occurring immediately after the war and the unattractiveness of the Nazi system alone delayed it after Germany had become strong again. But the evolution in itself was inescapable, and not even the restoration of the Habsburg Empire could have done more than postpone its ultimate consummation. It is unfortunate that it could not have been consummated peaceably and with less misunderstanding instead of in the teeth of vain British opposition.

5. Before embarking on the story of events themselves, I would like to observe here that it was largely the above conviction of evolutionary inevitability which accentuated the impression which was constantly present in my mind during the months from February to October that Europe last year was moving steadily and inexorably through the pages of a Greek tragedy. For, inevitable though the final end might be, one could not but regard, both sentimentally and politically, the final extinction of Austria and the dismemberment of even the artificial Czecho-Slovakia as created at Versailles otherwise than as a deplorable tragedy. Yet the only real question was in regard to the extent of the tragedy and the date of its consummation. That the latter was precipitated was due partly to a domestic incident in Germany itself and partly to the mistakes of Hitler's principal adversaries, Herr von Schuschnigg and Dr. Benes; that the first was limited was due to the pertinacious courage and initiative of the British Prime Minister. This latter fact is one which the German people fully realises.

Prologue.

6. It is no exaggeration to say that a domestic incident constituted the prologue of the two-act tragedy which was to follow, and the curtain for that prologue rose on the 12th January, 1938, when the German press announced that Field-Marshal von Blomberg had been married on the previous day to a certain Fräulein Eva Gruhn with Adolf Hitler and General Göring as sole witnesses of the ceremony. I had been dining the night before at the Ministry of Propaganda and our host, Herr Funk, then Under-Secretary of that Ministry and to-day Minister for Economics and president of the Reichsbank, announced the fact at the end of dinner to some sixty guests, including many Cabinet Ministers, military officers and Nazi officials as well as a number of diplomats. All, without exception, learnt the news with amazement, and everyone at once asked who Fräulein Gruhn was without finding anyone to answer. Speculation continued to centre round that question until it gradually became public property that her profession was the oldest in the world and that she was inscribed on the police records as a lady of the lighter virtues.

7. The shock of this disclosure to Hitler's personal feelings and public prestige was immense. Not only was Blomberg one of his most trusted advisers, but also his most intimate and probably most beloved friend. And this best friend had deceived him. On discovering the truth Hitler's first step was to endeavour to persuade the marshal to allow the marriage to be dissolved on the ground that he had been inveigled into it under false pretences. Blomberg's refusal to agree to this course shook Hitler's faith in the loyalty of his followers both to himself and to Germany. But worse was to follow. Blomberg had probably never, as a political marshal and as too subservient to the Nazi

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civilians, been very popular with the army chiefs. Incidentally he was equally unpopular with the Nazi extremists as not being one of themselves. Without waiting for Hitler to find his own way out of the *impasse*, the Commander-in-chief, General von Fritsch, supported by other generals as well as by the sole surviving and highly-respected marshal of the world war, von Mackensen, notified the Führer that army discipline could not tolerate the retention of Blomberg, married to such a woman, in his post as Minister for War. If there is one thing which a dictator dislikes it is being dictated to. Partly out of repugnance to having his hand forced and partly out of loyalty (one of Hitler's virtues) to his old friend, he demurred at first to Blomberg's removal. Whereupon General von Fritsch took occasion not only to insist on the point of military discipline, but also severely to criticise the Führer's foreign policy. This was going further than Hitler would tolerate. As Field-Marshal Göring said to me a month or so later: "What would Mr. Chamberlain have done if your C.I.G.S. had come to him and said: 'Quite apart from army matters, I entirely disapprove of your foreign policy.' He would have said: 'Thank you, good-day,' and dismissed him as Hitler did General Fritsch."

8. That was, in fact, what happened. And, with Fritsch, Blomberg also. The only question then was how to effect these two main changes with profit or at least without loss of face to himself. In the end, three weeks later, on the 4th February and after the first of Hitler's brainstorms of the year, these two removals were announced under a vast camouflage of other changes and retirements, not only in the army, but also in the navy, air force and diplomacy. Except, however, in the field of diplomacy, nothing mattered except Blomberg and Fritsch, and at least 90 per cent. of the changes would have taken place in the normal course of events a few months later. Hitler himself became Supreme War Lord with General Keitel, a serving soldier and a gentleman, but without much character, performing most of Blomberg's executive functions but under the nominal supervision of the Führer. General von Brauchitsch, a thoroughly competent and able officer, succeeded Fritsch as Commander-in-chief. General Göring, an appointment which was not viewed with much pleasure by the army, became a field-marshal, thereby becoming the only one on the active list in Germany. Generally speaking, it may be said that Hitler succeeded in manœuvring himself out of his difficult position with marked adroitness. He put the leaders of the army in their place and kept the party in theirs. The party had hoped for more drastic action against the army, and the army, though it had met with a decided if inconclusive defeat, was relieved that nothing worse had occurred. But the seeds were sown of the absorption of the army within the party structure, and they have been germinating ever since.

9. It has been necessary to lay great stress on the incident of the Blomberg marriage. Both morally and materially its consequences were of the utmost importance. Not only did it—as mentioned above—cause Hitler his first brainstorm of the year, but there is good reason to believe that it radically altered his entire outlook on life. Thenceforward he became less human. His faith in the fidelity of his followers was gravely shaken and his inaccessibility became greatly accentuated. To whom does Hitler listen? That is a question which I have repeatedly asked in the course of last year, and the reply has always been "No one." Moreover, the upshot of the incident was to remove from Hitler's entourage two of his most moderate and respectable advisers, Blomberg himself and Baron Neurath. The replacement of Neurath by Herr von Ribbentrop was a major disaster. The failure of the latter's mission to London had long been apparent, even to Hitler himself, and there is little doubt but that he would have been removed sooner if any other suitable post had been immediately available to Germany's "Ambassador at Large." The reconstruction gave Hitler the opportunity of giving him the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, albeit directly, as in General Keitel's case, under his own supervision, and I am inclined to believe that, in making the appointment, the Führer felt that von Ribbentrop, who as a yes-man was sympathetic to him, could do less harm in Berlin than in London. Though I am not yet convinced that Ribbentrop, whose original intentions were admirable, has become so uncompromising and irrevocably hostile to Great Britain as some believe, there is no doubt that his vanity and his resentments and his erroneous conceptions of England and English psychology and mentality are a serious bar to a better understanding between the two countries. Foreign politics are Hitler's main preoccupation, and in his position as Foreign

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Minister Ribbentrop has to-day more constant access to, and consequently more chance of exercising an influence on, the Führer than any other German Minister. In September Ribbentrop and Himmler were the leaders of the war party. But at that time Hitler himself belonged to that party and Ribbentrop is essentially an echo. Therein he has a certain utility. One can judge from Ribbentrop on what lines his master is really thinking.

10. Finally, there is no doubt that the Blomberg incident and the necessity which it imposed on a dictator to obliterate its memory by some striking external success accelerated the *tempo* of what may be described as "Austria," Act I of the 1938 European drama.

Act I.

11. The curtain for that act rose on the invitation to Herr von Schuschnigg to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the 12th February. To have gone to Berchtesgaden at all was the first of Schuschnigg's mistakes; yet the idea was not a new one, and Baron Neurath told me afterwards that it had been decided in principle as far back as the previous December. The 1936 agreement between Austria and Germany had never been honestly implemented on either side. Nazi propaganda had never ceased in Austria, and as a result there were still between 30,000 and 40,000 Austrian Nazis living in Germany whom the Austrian Government naturally refused to allow to return to their homes. But there is no doubt that the actual summons to Berchtesgaden was part of the camouflage under which Hitler sought to conceal the shock and the deceptions which the Blomberg marriage had caused him. He was consequently in a far from equable or conciliatory frame of mind, and Herr von Schuschnigg, according to his own account, was threatened and browbeaten, and under menaces accepted an arrangement of which he certainly disapproved, though it required the consent of the Austrian President and Government at Vienna. This was obtained on the 16th February, and Herr von Schuschnigg made the second of his mistakes by remaining in office after an acceptance which he always intended as far as possible to circumvent. The news of the acceptance reached Berlin in the course of the banquet which the Reich Chancellor gives annually to the Diplomatic Corps, and gave occasion to the only real dispute which I ever had with Baron Neurath, who, in front of a number of other German Ministers, vehemently accused His Majesty's Government of having encouraged the Austrian Government to repudiate the arrangement. To a lesser degree I was attacked by the Chancellor himself later on the same grounds.

12. I am inclined to regret to-day the irritation with which I answered him, as I know now that Neurath was genuinely disappointed at the British attitude of disapproval, because he feared that, if the ultimate result—of which no German ever doubted—could not be obtained by subterranean propaganda and intrigue, the end would be forcible action with incalculable complications. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Hitler's *original* plan was gradually to undermine Schuschnigg's position, to provoke his overthrow and to secure his aims comparatively peacefully and unobjectionably by means of a pro-Nazi Austrian Government.

13. It was very soon evident that Schuschnigg, who was at heart a loyal servant of the Habsburgs, had no intention to lend himself to this plan, and the realisation of this fact caused Hitler his second brainstorm of the year. I visited him in the midst of it on the 3rd March, when I discussed with him the possibility of Anglo-German co-operation. Herr Hitler, however, took the line that, if His Majesty's Government could not see their way to recognise Germany's just pretensions elsewhere, then the colonial question must wait two, four, six or even ten years, if necessary, *i.e.*, until after Central Europe had been settled in accordance with Germany's desires.

14. I was with the Chancellor on that occasion for nearly two hours, Ribbentrop being also present, and during the first hour he remained in a vile temper, which he betrayed by his scowls rather than his language, except for a violent attack on the British bishops for their interference in the Niemöller affair. I have little doubt but that he was far more preoccupied as to what action to take as regards Austria than in listening to anything which I had to say to him.

15. Herr von Schuschnigg settled the Austrian problem for him by his third and final great mistake. On the night of the 9th March the Austrian Chancellor suddenly announced to the world by radio that he proposed to hold a plebiscite in Austria on the following Sunday, the 13th March, to vote as to whether the

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country wished to remain independent or to be incorporated in Germany. As no voting lists had been drawn up for several years only persons over the age of 24 would be entitled to vote.

16. It was the throw of a desperate gambler and it failed. Schuschnigg's decision was taken without prior consultation either with his Cabinet as a whole or with Mussolini, who alone was possibly in a position, as he had been in 1934, militarily to support the Austrian Government. The Duce's only reply, when he was eventually informed of it, was to the effect that such a proposal was a bomb which would inevitably burst in Schuschnigg's own hand. The Duce was, in fact, wise enough to put a good face on the inevitable, and his attitude thereby earned him Hitler's gratitude, a gratitude which, incidentally, was extremely useful to all of us in the greater crisis of September and which is probably of little permanent value to Italy.

17. The news of the proposed plebiscite reached Berlin about midnight of the 9th March. On the following day Hitler summoned his advisers and his generals, and late that afternoon took the decision to cut the Gordian knot with the sword and to occupy Austria by force in order to prevent a plebiscite which, according to him—and he was undoubtedly correct, for German propaganda would have ensured that he was—would merely lead to bloodshed and the loss of German lives. I would mention here that I do not for a moment believe now, any more than I did at the time, that the rape of Austria in the form which it finally took was premeditated. Humanly speaking, I know as a fact that it was not. Hitler would infinitely have preferred to incorporate his native Austria into Germany by what he regarded as peaceful means. There had, of course, always been since 1934 plans in existence for armed support to Nazi rebels in the event of revolution in Austria. These were doubtless rapidly revised, and the concentration of the army on the border of Austria was completed by dawn on the 12th March with very great speed and secrecy. Once it became clear that there would be no opposition the "invasion" degenerated into spreading troops all over Austria as rapidly as possible with little regard to service conditions. But it served the army a useful lesson as a curtain-raiser for possible subsequent forcible action in the case of Czecho-Slovakia. Moreover, it predisposed the world to believe that what had happened in Austria would be repeated in Czecho-Slovakia.

18. News that troops were on the move against Austria reached me in the early morning of Friday, the 11th March. I at once asked my military attaché to go round to the Ministry of War to ascertain the facts. Colonel Mason-MacFarlane received the answer that there was no information to give and that no troop movements were taking place. He immediately motored to Leipzig and obtained abundant evidence that military operations were afoot, but it was not until 6 P.M. that the War Ministry admitted to his assistant that Colonel Mason-MacFarlane had been deliberately misinformed in the morning. Twice later in the year was this prevarication to be turned to some account.

19. Herr von Ribbentrop was at the time in London, whither he had proceeded to present his letters of recall, another fairly evident proof of the unpremeditated nature of the "rape." As Minister for Foreign Affairs he would never have absented himself from Berlin at that moment if he could have foreseen it, and he, in fact, endeavoured to return immediately, but was told to remain where he was. Indeed, the big question which all Germans asked themselves was: "What will England do?" England, however, left it to words to carry conviction, as Hitler on the 10th March had doubtless foreseen. Nor, indeed, were His Majesty's Government in a position to have saved Austria by their actions. I saw Neurath in the course of the day, and made him two strongly-worded communications, but protests were not going to stop the German troops, who were already on the march.

20. As it happened, Göring had arranged to give a big reception to some thousand guests on the night of the 11th March at the "Haus der Flieger," followed by a performance by his State opera company. As it afforded me my only opportunity to see the field-marshal, I decided to attend it. The party began at 10 o'clock, and when I got there the air was electric, though the field-marshal had not yet arrived and was known to be attending a full Cabinet meeting with Hitler. The Schuschnigg and Seyss-Inquart radio messages were being anxiously discussed on all sides, and it was quite obvious that every German present was wondering what His Majesty's Government was going to do. When

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Mr. Kirkpatrick gate-crashed with a telegram instructing me to make an immediate communication to Baron von Neurath one could have heard a pin drop in the great hall, while 2,000 eyes watched me reading it. Shortly after, Göring himself appeared and, after shaking hands with a few guests, sat down at the central table and the music began, followed by a ballet. It was one of the most painful performances at which I have ever assisted. Every diplomat and a great number of the Germans themselves were conscious of the tragedy of music and dance at a moment when all that which had been left in 1919 of the old Austrian and Habsburg Empire was crashing to final extinction. I had myself shaken hands with Göring very curtly and hostilely. He was obviously nervous and taken aback, and as soon as we had sat down he tore off the blank half of his programme, wrote on it in pencil : " As soon as the music is over I should like to talk to you and will explain everything to you," and handed it to me across the American Ambassador's wife. The last five words were underlined thrice, and, in fact, as soon as the performance came to an end, he got up precipitately and waited for me outside. After a suitable interval I followed him, and for the next three-quarters of an hour the field-marshal's guests were left wondering what was happening.

21. The field-marshal's promised explanation consisted in a diatribe against Schuschnigg's lack of good faith and the impossibility of any other course being taken other than that which was being taken. Our conversation, which took place in Göring's private room in the building, was a stormy one, but the only point that mattered was that the German troops and aeroplanes were already crossing the frontier. Nothing, in fact, could have saved Austria or even have restored her to independent existence except a resort by the Western Powers to a war in which probably the greater part of Austria would have been on Germany's side. After fighting Schuschnigg's battle for him to the bitter end, I finally said to Göring that " even supposing the Austrian Chancellor had been a fool, that was no excuse for Germany to be a bully." I also took occasion strongly to urge the field-marshal to do his utmost to see that the anti-Nazi Austrians were treated with the decency which their loyalty to their country and their emperor merited. Had Göring been left to his own devices in Austria, I believe that he would have done his best to carry out such a policy. As it was, Himmler's secret police and S.S. very soon undid that which Göring attempted to do during his brief visit to Vienna after the occupation. My last remark to Göring as we returned to the great hall was, if he did not wish that Herr Hitler should read what British public opinion would think of his actions, he had better arrange that the English newspapers should not be shown to him for a fortnight.

22. I have quoted this incident at some length because it throws some light on Göring's psychology. His nervousness and the comparative docility with which he listened to my diatribes were indicative of a lesser measure of resoluteness and uncompromisingness than is generally credited to him. The pacific assurances which he gave to the Czech Minister at the same party are equally illustrative of this. He was to display a somewhat similar frame of mind in September when he came down decisively at the last and critical moment on the side of peace. His faith is not as great as Hitler's, and that is perhaps the explanation of the depth of his loyalty and devotion to the latter. He recognises in Hitler the firmer soul.

23. The die of the fate of Austria had, in fact, been cast on the 10th March. The rest is a matter of simple history. No opposition of any kind was offered to the German troops, who entered Austria on the morning of the 12th March. On Sunday, the 13th, Hitler himself reached Vienna, and the curtain for Act I fell to the cheers of the Austrian crowd or mob, which welcomed their new Führer and applauded his announcement of the final incorporation of the Ostmark in the German Reich. However much they may be, and are, regretting it to-day, there is no doubt that the youth of Austria was solidly in favour of that incorporation in principle.

Interval.

24. The interval between Act I and the first part of Act II lasted a little over two months. It was by no means a peaceful one. Until the date of Hitler's plebiscites in Germany and Austria, which produced the usual overwhelming majorities in both countries in favour of the Führer, German ears were deafened by daily speeches and nightly broadcasts to such an extent that the population

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itself became sick to death of the whole business and voted "yes" with relief in order to be done with it. But, behind Austria, already loomed the spectre of the problem of the Sudeten Germans, and Hitler's reference in his Reichstag speech of the 18th March to his 10 million unredeemed Germans (of which Austria only accounted for 6½ million) gave a clear warning to the world as to Germany's next objective.

25. Nor could there have been any shadow of doubt at all on the subject. In the years between 1933 and 1938 it was a common question to hear: "What does Hitler really want?" It had always been answered—and notably by my predecessor, Sir Eric Phipps, in his valedictory despatch of 1937—in the same sense: first Austria; then the Sudeten lands and after that the colonies and the liquidation of the Corridor, Memel, Danzig and other minor questions. From the beginning of my mission here I had never found any reason to disagree with the accuracy of this judgment.

26. Czecho-Slovakia was the keystone of the French alliance system and a bulwark against German expansion south-eastwards. But after the *Anschluss* she was left—*vis-à-vis* Germany—in a completely helpless position both strategically and economically, and it was clear that the integrity of her Versailles frontiers could only be maintained if France and England were prepared to fight for their maintenance. It was equally evident that something had to be done quickly if Germany was not once more to take matters into her own hands regardless of the Western Powers. When therefore His Majesty's Minister at Prague, in a sober and reasoned telegram, urged His Majesty's Government to intervene together with France before it was too late with a view to persuading the Czech Government to readjust their relations with Germany, I had no hesitation in telegraphing immediately that I concurred wholeheartedly and unreservedly in the wise counsel which Mr. Newton had given.

27. Nor, in doing so, was the only consideration that which one realistic glance at the map of Europe would have sufficed to prove, namely, the indefensibility of Czecho-Slovakia's strategic and economic position, once Austria had become Germany. Quite apart from the artificiality of this creation of Chicago and Versailles, Czecho-Slovakia suffered from one fatal defect: her minorities, Polish and Hungarian no less than German, were situated on her very frontiers and contiguous to the nations which claimed them as their own subjects.

28. Morally, it would thus have been difficult to justify the refusal of the right of self-determination to the 2¾ million Sudeten living in solid blocks just across Germany's border. Its denial would have been contrary to a principle on which the British Empire itself was founded and would consequently never have rallied to us the wholehearted support of that Empire. Its only plausible excuse was strategic, and Dr. Benes in the months which followed was quick to take advantage of this point and to make it the main plank of his reluctance to grant autonomy to the Sudeten.

29. But there was a further consideration which carried much weight. If Germany was not always to be allowed to settle everything in her own way by the display or use of force, then the Western Powers had got to show courage and to effect by diplomatic and peaceful action those drastic revisions of the Versailles Treaty which might alone be calculated to ensure permanent solutions. The situation afforded the Western Powers an opportunity to prove that they would not oppose peaceful evolution any more than they would condone forcible expansion. It seemed to me that with the Sudeten, as with Austria, the case was one for the application of the Palmerstonian system, which might be roughly summed up as "nothing in the world shall happen against England's wishes—so long as England can prevent it. If she cannot, then we must put a good face on the matter." Some sympathy on the part of Britain for Germany's comprehensible, and not even unworthy aspirations for unity might, in fact, have served the useful purpose of showing the Germans that it was not Britain's sole policy to stand in their way everywhere regardless of whether their aims were legitimate or not. The constant and not always unjustifiable reproach, which even the friendliest Germans have consistently made to me in Berlin, has always been on the lines of Göring's remark: "Germany can't pick a flower but England says, 'Forbidden.'" There might be more utility in it if, when Germany did try to pick it, we could effectively prevent her from doing so. There is little when we cannot.

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30. There was, indeed, only one point in British intervention at Prague which, in principle, gave rise to uneasy reflection. It was Czecho-Slovakia who would have to pay the piper. If Britain, a Great Power, insisted—and without insistence the proposition was bound to fail—on a small country revising her position under the Versailles Treaty, then we were placing ourselves under the obligation to revise later our own position under that treaty. When the day comes for a reopening of the colonial question this argument is one which will have considerable moral force.

31. Nearly two months elapsed before His Majesty's Government and the French Government agreed to intervene, and in the meantime the position had been clarified to some extent. On the one hand Herr Henlein had rallied under his banner practically the whole of the Sudeten Germans, the Karlsbad programme had been published and German propaganda on behalf of their "unredeemed" compatriots had become intensified and was crescendo. On the other, Dr. Benes had already given indications of that fatal hesitation to appreciate facts which was to cost him and his country so dear. Only one solution had any prospect of success and that was the conversion of Czecho-Slovakia from a national State, governed solely by Czechs, into a State of nationalities where all and especially the Sudeten as the biggest minority had equal and autonomous rights. Dr. Benes undoubtedly felt that such a new creation could not long survive as an entity, and rather than submit to it he resolved to shelter himself behind the optimistic belief that in the last resort France, England and Russia would save him from the necessity of what he regarded as excessive and dangerous concessions to the German minority.

32. It was at a meeting in London of the British and French Ministers in the last days of April that the two Governments agreed to take joint action at Prague. Thereat His Majesty's Government made it quite clear to the French Government that in the event of a German attack on Czecho-Slovakia they could not commit themselves beyond the statement defining their attitude which had been made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 24th March. After pointing out that Great Britain had no treaty obligations *vis-à-vis* Czecho-Slovakia, Mr. Chamberlain had concluded his speech on that occasion with the remark that "where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are not alone involved, and if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations, &c." This formula was that used in the various warnings given to the German Government in the course of the next five months.

33. The Anglo-French joint intervention at Prague began at the end of the first week in May and on the same day (the 7th May) acting in Berlin alone, as had been agreed in London, I notified the German Government of the action which the two Powers were taking at Prague. Actually Herr Hitler was at Rome on that date and the Foreign Minister was with him. Immediately on his return, however, a few days later Herr von Ribbentrop informed me that our *démarche* had been warmly welcomed by the Führer ("*herzlich begrüsst*"), who regarded the Sudeten problem as a purely internal question for the Czechs to settle with Henlein. Self-determination in some form or another was, however, essential.

34. I do not propose in this personal record to refer, except in the broadest lines, to the negotiations at Prague. One main cause of their ultimate failure was the inability of the French Government to put that brutal pressure on Dr. Benes which, as has been said before, was a prerequisite for the success of our intervention. The French, who should have been foremost at Prague, were always lagging behind the British, and more than anything else this encouraged Benes in his fatal procrastination. The French cannot be absolved from the reproach of having led their ally up the garden path. Nevertheless, it is probable that Benes himself was not, and never had been, a big enough statesman to put through a reconstruction which could alone have saved his country from humiliation and Europe from the abyss of war.

35. It is from the German angle alone that I am competent to speak with authority, and I feel bound in fairness to express here again my absolute conviction as to the pacific intentions of Hitler at the outset. He was in no great hurry: Austria was a considerable mouthful for the German anaconda, and he was quite prepared to wait for the Sudeten to slip later of their own accord peacefully into the German jaws. Even the invasion of Austria had not been

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effected without misgiving, since the fact was that the German army was still far from ready. There it had been received with open arms and garlands, whereas in Czecho-Slovakia it would be met with those shells and bullets which might so easily lead to European complications. Though he had little faith in the value of French intervention and none at all in Benes, Hitler was, moreover, at first inclined to trust in the efficacy of His Majesty's Government's action. He was accordingly sincere when he said that he cordially welcomed the Anglo-French *démarche*, which he regarded, indeed, as the first step towards the accomplishment of his own aims. That he altered his tactics was entirely due—as in the case of Austria—to the mistakes of his adversaries.

Act II, Part I.

36. The second act of the 1938 drama falls naturally into two parts and the curtain for the first scene rose on the 20th May. Benes's procrastination and our own hesitation to insist strongly enough at Prague had fortified the facile suspicions of Germany. The situation in the Sudetenlands was gradually deteriorating, incidents of a more or less serious nature had become matters of daily occurrence, and a German press campaign, based on these incidents, had reached such a pitch that it was but natural to believe, especially after the recent example of Austria, that another German *coup* was impending. All the materials for an explosion were thus present when both the British consular representatives at Munich and Dresden reported to me on the 19th May, vaguely but in a similar sense, rumours of a German concentration on the Czech frontier. When, therefore, similar but more definite reports were received from Prague on the 20th May, I immediately called on the Secretary of State, Baron von Weizsäcker, and asked him to tell me whether there was any truth in these stories. He denied them but, taking the incident of the 11th March as a precedent, I asked him to telephone to General Keitel on my behalf, to remind him of the false information supplied to my military attaché on that date, and to ask him to acquaint me authoritatively with the facts of the case. An hour later Baron von Weizsäcker assured me, categorically on the word of General Keitel, that the tales of troop concentrations were absolute nonsense.

37. Similar assurances were given to the Czech Minister here as well as to the Czech Government in Prague. But the latter remained, or, as the Germans said later, pretended to be, unconvinced; the reports from Prague in regard to German troop movements became more and more detailed, and I was actually shown at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 21st May a telegram from the German Minister at Prague stating that the Czech War Office had announced that eight to ten German divisions were on the march across Saxony. In fairness to the Czechs, it must be realised that much abnormal military activity—judged by normal standards—is continually going on in present-day Germany and that unskilled agents and observers can be easily misled.

38. On the morning of the 21st May, I accordingly sent my two military attachés on an extensive military reconnaissance through Saxony and Silesia (Colonel Mason-MacFarlane actually covered 700 and Major Strong some 500 miles by car between one dawn and the next). They could discover no single sign of unusual or significant German military activity, nor, indeed, could any of those military attachés of other foreign missions here who were engaged similarly in scouring the country. But the fat was in the fire; full credence was attached abroad to the Czech stories, and I spent most of the 21st May at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs registering protests on behalf of His Majesty's Government and officially confirming the warning given in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister on the 24th March as quoted above.

39. My first interview with Herr von Ribbentrop on the 21st May proved the occasion for a certain amount of acrimony on both sides. Owing to an indiscretion some of the British press had quoted General Keitel by name as having denied to me the reports of German troop movements. Ribbentrop began by complaining of this, and said that no military information would in consequence ever in future be communicated to me. I retorted that I could only infer from his attitude that General Keitel's information to me had been incorrect and that I would feel obliged to report so to my Government. He thereupon turned in wrath to the unfortunate murder of two Germans near Eger, and used as regards the Czechs the most reprehensible language. They

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would, he assured me, be exterminated, women and children and all. When I observed that while the death of two Germans was greatly to be deplored, it was better that two should die rather than hundreds of thousands in war, his only reply was that every German was ready to die for his country. Incidentally, I have reason to know that the unsuitability of his language on this occasion earned for him a severe reprimand from his master and for some time thereafter he remained out of favour. He was to get back again into it when later in the crisis his comforting assurances that England would never fight were to give that master the encouragement which he needed for the prosecution of his policy in September.

40. In any case, Ribbentrop's attitude on the morning of the 21st May did nothing to ease the strain, and on the same afternoon I saw him again, on instructions from your Lordship, and, after notifying him of the action which His Majesty's Government were taking in Prague with a view to inducing the Czech Government to come to a settlement direct with Henlein, I warned his Excellency that France had definite obligations to Czecho-Slovakia, and if these had to be implemented His Majesty's Government could not guarantee that they would not be forced by events to become themselves involved. Ribbentrop, who had been highly excitable in the morning, had become sullen in the afternoon. His attitude (doubtless on instructions from Hitler, for whom the point continued to be a bitter one till the end) was that all remonstrances should be addressed to Prague, and not to Berlin, and he declined to give to Henlein any advice on the lines of that which we were giving to the Czech Government. "If a general war ensued, it would," he said, "be a war of aggression provoked by France, and Germany would fight as she had done in 1914." He repeated this phrase constantly in September. Finally, on the Sunday I conveyed to him through the State Secretary (Ribbentrop having left Berlin by then to report to the Führer at Berchtesgaden) a personal message from yourself drawing his attention to the risk of precipitate action leading to a general conflagration, the only result of which might prove to be the destruction of European civilisation.

41. So far as official action went, this ended the so-called 21st May incident at Berlin. By the Monday morning all but the most intractable had become convinced that the stories of German troop concentrations were, in fact, quite untrue; the municipal elections in Czecho-Slovakia on the Sunday had passed off without further bloodshed and to the complete satisfaction of the Henlein party, and things might have been expected to resume a normal course.

42. Before explaining why they did not, it is necessary here to mention a minor feature of this crisis, a feature which, utterly unimportant in itself, was given wide publicity and which I quote because it actually had a certain bearing on subsequent events. I refer to the story of the special train. As it happens, the naval attaché to this embassy was proceeding on the 21st May on normal leave with his whole family. A member of my staff regarded this as a good opportunity to send his own small children away under charge of Mrs. Troubridge. He was informed by the railway company that there was no room on the train, but that an extra coach would be added if it could be filled. Two other members of my staff were accordingly persuaded to enrol their families for the exodus, and thus the coach was filled and ordered. I first learnt of this development when I returned from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about midday and found the French Ambassador on my doorstep enquiring whether it was true that I was evacuating the whole of the British colony. The news had by this time even got as far as London, and I received simultaneously an urgent telephonic message from the Foreign Office requesting me to cancel the arrangements to this effect. I had hardly put the telephone down when the State Secretary rang me up from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs telling me that he had received a number of embassy passports for visas and begging me not to be alarmist. I told Baron von Weizsäcker that I had just learnt myself of this unfortunate coincidence, that one of the last persons whom I would allow to leave in a crisis would be one of my service attachés, that he was going on normal leave of absence, and that I did not propose to stop him doing so, but that I would certainly decommand the extra coach and the departure of any other members of my staff.

43. Looking back in the light of subsequent events and of the real crisis of September, all this seems rather childish now, but I should like to take this opportunity to disclaim any attempt in the May crisis to emulate Disraeli's *coup*

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at the Berlin Congress. The fact was that everybody's nerves were already worn pretty threadbare even at that early stage. I cannot refrain from quoting another small story in evidence of this. I dined on the night of the 21st with a Frau von Dirksen, stepmother of the present German Ambassador in London and a friend of Hitler's. The French Ambassador was also there, and in the course of dinner the municipal authorities suddenly began nearby to demolish with dynamite a small hotel, the removal of which was included in Hitler's scheme for the rebuilding of Berlin. I leant across my hostess and remarked to François-Poncet that the war seemed to have begun. It is doubtful if the remark was a well-chosen one at that moment, and it was possibly a poor example of humour. Several months later Göring said to me: "You were yourself pretty scared during the May crisis." I asked him why he believed this. Whereupon he repeated the above story, which had been seriously retailed to him at the time. I explained that I had only meant it as a joke. Whereupon Göring replied that he happened himself to be in Berlin that night and had forgotten that the demolition was to take place. "When," he said, "I heard the first explosion my immediate reaction was: 'Those damned Czechs have begun it!'" If Göring could have jumped to such a conclusion, it is not strange that other people should have had misgivings. The story is at the same time an illuminating one in regard to German mentality. When we were thinking only that Germany was on the point of attacking the Czechs, the Germans were apprehensive lest the latter meant to provoke a European war before they themselves were ready.

44. As I said before, things might have been expected to resumé a normal course after the scare of the May week-end. That they did not was principally due to the attitude of the foreign press. The publicity of the impressive warning given without due cause at Berlin was unfortunate enough. The defiant gesture of the Czechs in mobilising some 170,000 troops and then proclaiming to the world that it was their action which had turned Hitler from his purpose was worse. But what Hitler could not stomach was the triumphant outcry of the foreign press, and particularly the British, to which he is above all susceptible. The protagonists of collective security proclaimed the victory of their system. Every newspaper in Europe and America joined in the chorus. Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic Powers had brought the totalitarian States to heel, &c., It is to-day a painful memory, but the moral is of great significance. If a free press is allowed to run riot without guidance from higher authority, the damage which it may do is unlimited. Even war may be one of the consequences.

45. It was thus, above all, the foreign press which gave Hitler his third and worst brainstorm of the year and pushed him over the borderline from peace to war. From the 23rd May to the 28th May the brainstorm lasted, and on the latter date he gave orders for a gradual and progressive mobilisation of the army which should be prepared for *all* eventualities in the autumn. At the same time he initiated the monumental work on his western defences. I believe that he gave the 1st October as the actual date for the crisis. I cannot guarantee that, but the rest is historical fact.

46. Looking back on the past one realises how completely unjustified was this attitude on the part of the press. The so-called victory of the 21st May was an entirely Pyrrhic one. We had put ourselves in the wrong and we never admitted it. For this I blame partly those sources on whose reliability it is never wise to place excessive reliance. The Germans had never mobilised nor, though their own newspapers were greatly responsible for the illusion, had they any intention at that time of a *coup* for which, as they realised, infinitely greater preparations were necessary than in the case of Austria. Moreover, the upshot of this press campaign was unfortunately twofold: not only did it induce Hitler to come down on the side of his extremists and to approve once again of solutions by force, but it also fatally encouraged the Czechs to believe that their position was secure, and Benes in his unwillingness to go far enough to satisfy the Sudeten Germans.

47. In the light of wisdom after the event, it seems most improbable, as it happens, that anything which Benes could have done after the 28th May would have sufficed to pacify the offended Dictator. In point of fact, however, more optimistically than ever he refused to listen to reason. British remonstrances fell on deaf ears, and in any case were neither fully supported by the French nor received the same publicity such as had been given to the Berlin *démarche*. The negotiations dragged on at Prague through May, June and July, when they

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reached the inevitable deadlock. My own task during this period was chiefly that of endeavouring to persuade the German Government that Dr. Benes's intentions were honourable and that he really meant business. As I told the Czech Minister in Berlin with whom I had many frank conversations and who shared my consternation at the manner in which things were shaping, I perjured myself —for I never personally believed that Benes would ever agree to go far enough except under direct compulsion—over and over again in this task. My perjuries, however, were remarkably unsuccessful.

48. Diplomatic action having failed, the question then arose as to what the alternative should be. The question of an independent mediator had already been mooted, and in July I had telegraphed to your Lordship that, since it was obvious that Dr. Benes was determined to preserve the national character of the Czech State and since there was not the slightest prospect of the Sudeten being willing to accept an agreed settlement on those lines, I had little confidence in the likelihood of the efforts of an independent mediator proving more successful than diplomatic action. I accordingly put forward the suggestion that the Italian Government should be invited to join with His Majesty's Government in proposing to the French and German Governments a Four-Power Conference to settle the problem. At that moment, however, it was feared that it would be difficult to exclude Russia or even Poland from such a conference, and the decision of His Majesty's Government to invite Lord Runciman at the request of the Czech Government to proceed to Prague in a personal capacity as an independent mediator was announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 26th July. I was instructed on the same day to notify the German Government and to invite their co-operation in advocating patience and moderation on Henlein and his adherents. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was an ill-tempered comment to the effect that, since the announcement of the mission had been made before any communication had been made to the German Government, the latter reserved its attitude and regarded the matter as one of purely British concern. Hitler had by then other views in mind.

49. The decision in favour of forcible action had, in fact, been taken on the 28th May, and the German Government were in no mood for conciliation. The mutterings of the storm grew in volume throughout July, and the reports of steady but unceasing military preparations in Germany had reached such a pitch by the 1st August that on that date I again asked the military attaché to go round to the War Office and enquire on my behalf what was on foot. Unlike what had occurred on the 11th March and despite Ribbentrop's truculence on the 21st May in regard to military information, Colonel Mason-MacFarlane was given enough facts to convince him of the seriousness of the preparations. I have little doubt that the German War Office, who were undoubtedly apprehensive of world-wide complications, gave him as much as they dared. There were several occasions in August on which the German War Office in one way or another endeavoured to bring home the gravity of their preparations to England. The only question was as to how far these military measures should be regarded as bluff or as a real menace. My own view at that time was that the army was being prepared for all eventualities. If bluff failed to achieve its German object then, but only then, would force be resorted to. I think now that Hitler meant to use force in any case so far as Czecho-Slovakia was concerned.

50. The Runciman Mission constituted a brief respite, during which I made it abundantly clear that if he failed to achieve the practically impossible before the Nuremberg Party Rally, we would lose the initiative, which would then and there be seized by Hitler. The Hobson's choice, in fact, which lay before us was whether we were to impose a solution by force on the Czech or the German Government.

51. Lord Runciman arrived at Prague on the 3rd August. Again in the light of wisdom after the event it may confidently be stated that his mission was doomed to failure before it began. Nothing now would have satisfied the Germans' and Hitler's prestige except such a surrender as it was impossible to expect. His negotiations dragged on throughout August with some superficial appearance of an unreal goodwill on both sides. The sands were running out and September came without any real advance having been made. My repeated appeals for a personal pronouncement by Lord Runciman or at least a report from him to His Majesty's Government recommending the adoption of the principles of self-determination and the Swiss cantonal system as the only possible basis for

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negotiation remained without effect. When such a report was eventually published Munich had come and gone.

52. So far as Berlin is concerned, but two more episodes need recording before the curtain fell on the first part of Act II. The first was our attempt to sidetrack Ribbentrop and to get at Hitler direct. Your Lordship will recollect my sending my military attaché to London early in August to discuss the extent and significance of German military preparations. I was consequently instructed to communicate through Herr Lammers, the Head of the Reich Chancery, for direct transmission to the Führer, a memorandum from the Prime Minister and yourself drawing his earnest attention to the apprehensions caused in Europe by these measures. The memorandum led to no apparent result except to arouse Ribbentrop's strong resentment, and it was he and not the Chancellor who replied direct to your Lordship to the effect that the German Government could not discuss any internal measures which they thought fit to take. But in an indirect sense the communication which I had been instructed to make paved the way for the personal contact which came later.

53. The second episode to which I refer was my own later visit, under instructions, to London, in the course of which the idea of actual personal contact took concrete shape.

Act II, Part 2.

54. There was no pause between the two parts of Act II. The curtain merely fell on Prague in order to rise again immediately at Nuremberg, whence the scene shifted rapidly in succession to Berchtesgaden, to Godesberg, to the big scene at Munich, to come down finally at Berlin itself. From the moment that the Nuremberg Congress opened, Prague, as had always been foretold, ceased to be the centre of interest and Benes a figure of importance.

55. I am personally not likely to forget in a hurry my visit to Nuremberg in 1938, cooped up for five days in the diplomatic train, without privacy and practically without means of communication. I was already feeling very unwell at the time, sleep at night in a wagon-lit compartment was hardly possible and rest during the day there was none. I had left Berlin on the night of Tuesday, the 6th September, meaning to stop a mere thirty-six hours. In the event I stopped five full days. A railway compartment scarcely lends itself to writing, and I had foolishly omitted to take any materials for that purpose. Owing to the absence of security even a cypher was out of the question. When eventually I had to send a letter to London by special aeroplane, I was obliged to use the blank pages torn from books which I happened to have taken with me.

56. My vocal activities were, on the other hand, immense. I had two long conversations with Göring, three with Goebbels, one or two with Ribbentrop, two or three with Neurath, half a dozen with Weizsäcker. I conveyed besides an endless succession of warnings to a host of others of scarcely lesser note, the cumulative effect of which, since talking there was almost the equivalent of broadcasting, I hoped would be useful. To all except Hitler, with whom I merely exchanged banalities in the midst of my diplomatic colleagues, the sum of my remarks was the same. If Germany makes an aggressive attack on Czecho-Slovakia, France is in honour bound to come to the aid of the Czechs, and if France is engaged in war, Great Britain will inevitably be drawn in also. I felt that the most immediate matter of importance was so to impress this on the German minds that Hitler, in the great political speech which he was to make at the end of the Congress, would think twice and would not adopt therein an attitude from which afterwards, as a dictator, he could not afford to recede.

57. It is only fair to mention that I found an unexpected ally in Dr. Goebbels. After my first talk with him he sought me out on two subsequent and public occasions. He told me that people in England held an entirely erroneous opinion of him. He was one of those who had from the beginning always sought good relations with England and he still desired them. He undertook faithfully to repeat what I had said to the Führer, and on the last day that I was there he gave me a hint that things would not be as bad as would be expected. Goebbels has certainly shown before and since strange proofs of his desire for good relations, but since he had nothing to gain and something to lose by publicly displaying himself with me, as he did, at such a juncture, his attitude was not without interest. Ribbentrop, who was undoubtedly (together with his great friend Himmler) one of the leaders of the war party at the time, carefully avoided any similar demonstration.

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58. It was clear from the beginning that Hitler himself was determined to avoid any political contact with the foreigner at Nuremberg. At the diplomatic reception my French colleague, as doyen, had tentatively sought his views on the situation by referring to the fall of the political barometer. Hitler had curtly replied that weather forecasts were always wrong turned the subject. He was in the midst of his whole Nazi army and after the 21st May he was not going to allow it to be thought that he was subject to any external dictation. It was my absolute conviction then, and with the enlightenment of time it is even more so, that firstly he would have refused to receive me, if I had asked for a special audience and that secondly, if I had given him, through Ribbentrop, any official warning—which must have become public property—the effect would have been to drive him right off the deep end and have made an aggression on Czecho-Slovakia unavoidable.

59. I was consequently dismayed when I learnt by telephone from Berlin that His Majesty's Government contemplated instructing me to make a communication direct to Hitler on the lines which I feared. The text was brought to me the following day by a secretary from the embassy. Before his arrival I had, however, already received and replied to the letter from Sir Horace Wilson sent out to me by special messenger by air. Nuremberg was not the scene either for a repetition of the 21st May or for any direct contact. I forget now what I wrote on those slips of paper in my answer to Sir Horace Wilson for I kept no record of them. But I remember saying that I had made the position crystal clear and that further action at that moment would have the opposite effect to that desired and was calculated finally to slam the door on even the faintest prospect of peace. I still regard the decision of His Majesty's Government to accept this view as providential in the truest sense of that word. Of all the five horrible days I spent at Nuremberg last year, that Saturday, waiting for the decision of His Majesty's Government, was for me the blackest.

60. My relief at avoiding the pitfall of another public warning to Hitler, particularly at Nuremberg in the midst of the multitude of his most devoted adherents, was shortlived. On the following afternoon (Sunday) the ubiquitous *Daily Mail* correspondent, Ward Price, telephoned to me the news of the communication which had been given by the Prime Minister to the united British press conveying just such a warning, though admittedly in a far less objectionable form than by means of an official *démarche* in Nuremberg itself. Only a few hours previously I had been informed privately by two sources in close touch with the Führer that his speech on the Monday would be on comparatively moderate lines. When I left Nuremberg that same midnight I was filled with a foreboding which was justified by events, for I subsequently learnt from an unimpeachable source that Hitler, on hearing of the communication to the press, had torn up large passages of the speech which he had already prepared and had rewritten them in more violent language.

61. History will be the final judge of the Prime Minister's subsequent actions. I take it for granted that those who to-day deny that what he did was the only sane and possible course and that any other would have been the limit of foolishness if not of crime, are honest in their convictions. The future may even conceivably prove that a war between the Western democracies and the totalitarian States was inevitable, and, if so, it may consequently be argued that it would have been wiser to accept the challenge, unprepared though we were, in September 1938 rather than to wait till Germany had established her predominance in Central Europe. One cannot be dogmatic on such points. But what I have to-day no hesitation as stigmatising as completely erroneous was the belief held in some quarters at that time and even persisted in to-day that it was possible, with so little behind us and on such weak moral ground as the refusal of the right of self-determination to the Sudeten, to call by mere words what was alleged to have been Hitler's bluff last September. Every attempt that we did make to do so —and we made several—merely stiffened his determination to push things to extremes. If ever the day comes when it will be necessary for us definitely to say "No" to a dictator, I trust that His Majesty's Government will carefully consider the best form in which it is to be said. It is not enough merely to be guided by the facilely popular argument that the only thing in principle to say to a dictator is "No" and to say it as publicly as possible. Moreover, if we aspire later to call Hitler's bluff, let us first be quite prepared to face the consequences.

62. The most that can be said about Hitler's speech on the 12th September at Nuremberg was that it did not actually slam the door finally on a peaceful

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solution. It was truculent and aggressive; it claimed self-determination for the Sudeten and promised them Germany's full support, but it set no time-limit and demanded no plebiscite. Nevertheless, it set the torch to the inflammable material in the Sudeten lands and was the signal for an outburst of demonstrations, rioting and serious disturbances. The Czechs replied with martial law, and Henlein retorted by abandoning the Karlsbad points as no longer sufficient.

63. In these circumstances the Prime Minister decided to set into operation his plan for personal contact with Hitler and I received instructions on the 14th September to arrange it accordingly. I did so through Ribbentrop, and Hitler at once agreed. He was undoubtedly touched (his sentimentality is a characteristic which we have failed hitherto to exploit), and I was given to understand that his first reaction was to save the elder man fatigue of the journey by going himself to London or at least half-way there. His second was to invite Mrs. Chamberlain to accompany her husband. There was, however, no time to consider counter-proposals and the Prime Minister left London at 8·30 on the morning of the 15th and reached the Munich aerodrome four hours later. After a tiresome journey and lunch in the train and a motor drive up the mountain, the actual meeting took place at Berchtesgaden at 5·30 in the afternoon. My idea had been that it would be better for the Prime Minister to see Hitler alone (with the reliable interpreter Dr. Schmidt) and not in the company of Ribbentrop, as would have been inevitable if Mr. Chamberlain had been accompanied by Sir Horace Wilson or myself. It was so arranged, but in the event this was unfortunate, as, thanks to Ribbentrop, the interpreter's record of the conversation was not communicated to the Prime Minister, thereby causing him much extra trouble and worry as well as rendering the procedure of conversations *à deux* subsequently impossible. I have always regretted this, as Ribbentrop's interventions were never helpful and often the reverse.

64. This first conversation lasted for three hours, in the course of which Hitler made it clear that the only terms on which he would agree to a peaceful solution by agreement was on the basis of the principle of self-determination. The Prime Minister accepted that principle for himself and undertook to consult his Cabinet and to endeavour to secure its consent, and likewise that of the French Government, to it. Hitler, for his part, declared his readiness to discuss thereafter ways and means.

65. The Prime Minister accordingly left for London again on the following morning. Lord Runciman was recalled from Prague for consultation and the French Premier and M. Bonnet were invited to London on the 18th September. Mr. Neville Chamberlain loyally executed his side of the bargain and even more, since His Majesty's Government and the French Government agreed to persuade the Czecho-Slovak Government, in the cause of peace and the maintenance of the vital interests of Czecho-Slovakia herself, not only to grant self-determination but to cede without plebiscite to the Reich all the Sudeten areas in which the population was over 50 per cent. German.

66. In the meantime, however, the internal situation in Czecho-Slovakia after Berchtesgaden had gone from bad to worse. Thousands of Sudeten refugees had begun to pour over the frontiers, undoubtedly at Nazi instigation, but also out of real fear of being caught in the event of war between two fires. Ultimately there were about 250,000 of these unfortunate people in Germany. The able-bodied were enrolled as "free corps" and started to raid back into Czecho-Slovakia. The casualty lists began to mount up. The Hodza Government resigned and was succeeded by a Government of national concentration at Prague led by General Syrovy. A press campaign of unprecedented violence was set loose in Germany and the Poles and Hungarians joined in the hunt. If the German eagle was going to take his share of the spoils, the Polish and Hungarian jackals were not going to be left unfed. The Hungarian Regent and the Polish Foreign Minister hurried to Berchtesgaden. On the other side of the fence Soviet Russia talked of supporting the Western Powers, while the Czechs themselves were asking for advice whether they should not at once mobilise in self-defence against the German concentrations.

67. At Berchtesgaden the Prime Minister and Hitler had agreed to meet again so that the German press campaign was particularly indefensible. But admittedly the situation was getting out of hand, though Göring at this time gave me his word that Germany would take no action before a second meeting had

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taken place. Nevertheless, as the field-marshal pointed out, there was no time to waste, and I remember that he warned me that Germany was not bluffing.

68. Such was the position when I was instructed to arrange the second meeting between the Prime Minister and Hitler. It took place this time at Godesberg, on the Rhine, between Bonn and Cologne, on the 22nd September. The German populace demonstrated its unconcealed and spontaneous pleasure at seeing the British Minister, whom they recognised as the harbinger of peace, but Hitler himself was in an uncompromising mood. He had doubtless been encouraged by assurances of Polish and Hungarian support; he was equally doubtless sincerely distressed at the plight of the Sudeten refugees, and he possibly honestly believed that the London proposals would involve protracted delays, which in the existing state of confusion would be intolerable. In any case, this master of turning circumstances to suit his purpose was not prepared to execute his part of the bargain at Berchtesgaden and to discuss quietly the ways and means of a settlement. He consequently demanded the immediate occupation of the so-called German-language areas. Mr. Chamberlain was bitterly disappointed. After doing all and more than he had promised, he felt that he had been badly let down by Hitler. He informed the latter that not only British but world opinion would not permit him to accept the proposal of immediate occupation. The interview ended without any reference to a subsequent meeting and, until the late afternoon of the following day, it looked as if there might be none. Two written communications were exchanged without producing any modification of the respective positions. The British press even reported that the negotiations had definitely broken down, and in the interval London informed Prague that it could not advise against a Czech mobilisation, while pointing out, nevertheless, that mobilisation might precipitate a conflict.

69. Eventually about 5 P.M. the Prime Minister instructed Sir Horace Wilson and myself to see Ribbentrop and to suggest to him that Hitler should put his proposals in writing. Mr. Chamberlain's refusal to renew contact had provoked the liveliest consternation in the German camp, and Hitler readily undertook to prepare a written communication as soon as possible. At 10·30 that evening the conversations were resumed. Nor was the atmosphere thereat improved at the start by the announcement by Ribbentrop of the Czech mobilisation. The memorandum of the German proposals as submitted to the Prime Minister had all the appearance of an ultimatum, and Mr. Chamberlain at once said so. Hitler denied the impeachment, but it was clear that, provided the principle of more or less immediate occupation were admitted, he was very ready to be conciliatory in other respects. Instead of an occupation beginning on the 26th September, he agreed to postpone the date till the 1st October, and in various ways he modified in a moderate sense the text of the memorandum. His relief when the Prime Minister undertook, in his rôle as intermediary, to submit the memorandum as altered to the Czech Government was obvious; he had no desire that the German people should think that negotiations had broken down as the result of his own intransigency. He was, none the less, bent on having his own way.

70. Such was the position when the Prime Minister left the next morning again for London. Thanks to the energy and drive of the military attaché to this embassy, the memorandum and the map with the Godesberg line marked on it were in the hands of the Czech Government the same night. It had meant flying back to Berlin, motoring to the Czech frontier and then walking for 10 kilom. on foot in the dark through Czech barbed wire and other entanglements at the constant risk of being shot as a raider by either Germans or Czechs.

71. The peak of the crisis was reached after Godesberg. The French mobilised half a million men and the Admiralty the British fleet. The French Ministers in London boldly reaffirmed their intention to support Czecho-Slovakia if attacked, and His Majesty's Government similarly reasserted their position in accordance with the Prime Minister's statement of the 24th March. Staff talks between the British and French army chiefs were resumed, and the Czech Government, encouraged by these demonstrations of solidarity with them, naturally refused to accept the Godesberg memorandum. It looked as if war was inevitable over the point as to the date and manner in which the territories, which the Czechs had agreed to cede to Germany, were to be handed over.

72. The Prime Minister refused once more to slip over the abyss. On Monday, the 26th, he sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin with a personal letter

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to Hitler in which he again urged the latter, since the difference was one of form and not of principle, to agree to negotiate rather than to resort to force, and suggested a direct meeting between Germans and Czechs with a British representative as intermediary. Hitler was in no mood for compromise, and his attitude remained the same as at Godesberg. He agreed to the proposed meeting, but only conditionally on the Czechs' prior acceptance of the Godesberg memorandum and line and on the handing over of the territories involved on the 1st October. On the same evening he made a speech in the Sportpalast which was cheered to the echo by his enthusiastic claque of Nazi supporters. It contained a savage attack on Benes personally and in it he finally burnt his boats by declaring that, if the Czech Government themselves had not ceded all the Sudeten lands by the 1st October, Germany would occupy them by that date with himself as the first soldier of the Reich. At the same time he made an appeal for British neutrality by friendly references to Mr. Chamberlain's efforts for peace and to his own desire, as evidenced by the Naval Treaty, for good relations with England. After that speech it seemed impossible for him to go back on his words. The Roosevelt appeal for peace, which was made on the same day, was not even reported in the German papers. It was feared that it might have a depressing effect on the people, who were being worked up for war.

73. Sir Horace Wilson spent that night in the embassy, and in the course of it received instructions to deliver yet another personal message. Therein Mr. Chamberlain, while expressing appreciation of the references to himself in Hitler's speech, guaranteed, if Germany refrained from force, to see that the Czech promises were fully implemented. Sir Horace Wilson and myself accordingly visited Hitler once again on the morning of Tuesday, the 27th. The Führer thanked the Prime Minister for his efforts, but obstinately declared that only one of two courses was possible. The Czech Government must either accept or reject the Godesberg plan. The first meant peace and the second war. Sir Horace pointed out that, if war ensued, France could not do otherwise than honour her obligations. And once France was engaged in hostilities, Britain would be obliged to support her. Hitler leapt from his chair in the utmost excitement at this last statement. "That means," he said, "that England proposes to attack Germany. If that is so we shall be at war in six days solely because Czecho-Slovakia refuses to honour obligations which she has already undertaken." Sir Horace argued the point, but Hitler refused to regard it as implying anything else than an unprovoked attack by England on Germany. The conversation closed on that note and Sir Horace flew back to London early the same afternoon.

74. Nevertheless Sir Horace's two conversations had had their effect, and I was officially informed the same evening by Baron Weizsäcker that Hitler had addressed through the German Embassy in London an immediate and important personal letter to the Prime Minister attempting to justify his attitude and begging Mr. Chamberlain to continue to use his good offices with a view to inducing the Czech Government to see reason. It constituted a perceptible attempt at conciliation and was indicative of a certain nervousness. A chance episode, staged according to some stories by Göring, had, as it happens, produced a big revulsion in Hitler's mind. In the afternoon of that Tuesday a mobilised division had rumbled through the streets of Berlin and up the Wilhelmstrasse past the Chancellor's window and those of the embassy. For three hours Hitler stood at his window and watched it pass. The Germans love military display, but not a single individual in the streets applauded its passage. The picture which it represented was almost that of a hostile army passing through a conquered city. Hitler was deeply impressed. At that moment he realised for the first time that the cheers of his sycophants in the Sportpalast were far from representing the true spirit and feelings of the German people.

75. Late in the afternoon of the 27th September I had been advised by the Foreign Office by telephone that instructions were on their way to me for yet another communication to the Chancellor. I accordingly made arrangements to meet the State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 11 P.M. and handed to him a note for immediate translation and submission to Hitler. It contained proposals, agreed to by the French Government and transmitted to Prague, pressing the Czech Government to agree to the immediate transfer of the Sudeten territories on the basis of a time-table guaranteed by His Majesty's

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Government. The first areas were to be handed over on the 1st October and the creation of an international boundary commission for the settlement of details was also therein suggested. The proposals went far to meet Hitler's demands, and in the end they constituted the main basis of the final settlement at Munich. Baron Weizsäcker was non-committal but helpful; and with this faint hope one retired to bed on the Tuesday night realising that, if nothing new intervened, the announced general mobilisation of the German army would take place the following day at 2 P.M. Since the army was already concentrated and mobilised, in effect this meant the beginning of the march into Czecho-Slovakia.

76. I was aroused at 7 A.M. the next morning (Wednesday) by the French Ambassador, who informed me by telephone that his instructions to make a similar communication to mine had reached him at 4 A.M.; that in some respects they went even further than mine and that he had been requested to see Hitler himself. He said that he had already asked for an audience.

77. Three hours later, at 10 A.M., he rang me up again to say that he feared the worst since he had had no answer to his request for an audience and probably would not now receive one. I told M. François-Poncet that I would come and see him at 10·30. I then asked to speak to Göring by telephone, and was able to get into immediate touch with him. Fortunately, the telephone was working well everywhere on that critical day. I told the field-marshal that the French Ambassador had asked for an audience, that no reply had yet been vouchsafed him, that it was a question of fresh proposals and that peace or war depended on it. I began to describe the proposals, but Göring cut me short. "You need not," he said, "say a word more. I am going immediately to see the Führer."

78. I then went round to the French Embassy, and while we were discussing the new proposals a message came from the Chancery that Hitler would see Poncet at 11·15. Simultaneously, a secretary brought round to me a telegram from London instructing me to give immediately a final personal message from the Prime Minister to Hitler himself. Its gist was that, after reading Hitler's letter of the previous evening, Mr. Chamberlain was still convinced that Germany could obtain her essential requirements without resort to war, that he was ready to come to Berlin at once himself and to discuss the whole question with Hitler and with representatives of France and Italy. Did Hitler, it concluded, wish to take the responsibility of starting a world war for the sake of a few days' delay in settling the problem?

79. It is worth recalling the exact sequence of events on that critical day. Göring went round to see Hitler between 10·15 and 11·15 and was joined there by Neurath, who had forced his way in uninvited. At a meeting of Hitler and his advisers there had been some plain speaking, in which Göring had vehemently accused Ribbentrop of inciting to war. Among other things he called the latter a criminal fool ("verbrecherische Narr"). The common account, since it is the truest to type, is that Göring shouted that he knew what war was and he did not want to go through it again. If, however, the Führer said "march," he would go himself in the first and leading aeroplane. All that he insisted upon was that Ribbentrop should be in the seat next to him. He did say this or something like it, but it was not in the Führer's presence. Nevertheless, of the various factors which induced Hitler to abandon his idea of a Czech war, Göring's intervention was not the least important.

80. Then came the Poncet interview, in the middle of which at 11·40 A.M. Hitler left the room to see the Italian Ambassador, who had arrived with a preliminary urgent appeal from Mussolini for the postponement of the so-called general mobilisation for twenty-four hours. The Italian intervention proved the final and decisive factor for peace. It enabled Hitler to climb down without losing face. His first remark to me when I saw him at 12·15, immediately after Poncet, was: "At the request of my great friend and ally, Mussolini, I have postponed mobilising my troops for twenty-four hours."

81. Before actually seeing Hitler himself I had, however, realised that the situation had taken a turn for the better. When I entered the Chancellery, there was an atmosphere of relief in the faces of most of the crowd of Nazi hangers-on who filled the hall. I was at once ushered into Hitler's Cabinet room, but on the way General Bodenschatz, Göring's confidential liaison officer with Hitler, managed to murmur in my ear: "Das geht besser; halten Sie nur fest" (things are going better: only stick to it). When I entered the room Göring and Neurath

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were both present and greeted me with smiling faces as they passed me on their way out. Only Hitler remained with an unsmiling Ribbentrop. I gave the Prime Minister's message, and Hitler replied that he must consult again with Mussolini before giving me a definite answer. With Bodenschatz's hint in my mind I spoke very openly. We discussed fairly amicably the latest proposals of the French and British Governments, and the Chancellor, though a little distrait, was not unreasonable. My interview with him, which lasted over an hour, was also interrupted by, as I learnt later, a second visit from the Italian Ambassador, this time to say that Mussolini was prepared to accept the British proposal for a four-Power meeting.

82. Hitler, on this occasion, asked Signor Attolico for the exact terms of the British communication to Mussolini, which he said that he must consider before replying. Attolico returned to his embassy, and came back for the third time half an hour later with the text. On reading it Hitler's first remark was: "What guarantee have I that I shall not be let down again as I was after Godesberg?" (Hitler's point of view). Attolico promised Mussolini's full support and asked Hitler what conditions roughly he would regard as satisfactory. Hitler stated them and Attolico took them down on a sheet of notepaper. They were, as it happens, largely in conformity with the latest Anglo-French proposals. Nor was this a mere chance coincidence.

83. Of all this I was, of course, unaware till much later. I had been left to argue desultorily with Ribbentrop, and when Hitler rejoined us I failed to notice any particular change in his attitude. Neither before nor after was he other than comparatively amicable, though he shouted once or twice when he described the orders which he would give to Göring's air fleet, if compelled to do so. I was, however, told afterwards that those who listened anxiously within earshot on the other side of the door had feared from the noise that things were going badly.

84. But, as a matter of fact, everything was settled before I ever reached the Chancellery that morning. Peace had been ensured when Hitler agreed at Mussolini's request at 11·40 A.M., two hours and twenty minutes before zero hour, to postpone his so-called general mobilisation. Though other factors combined to give Hitler cause for reflection, nothing but the Italian intervention could well have forced open again the door which Hitler had slammed behind him at the Sportpalast on the Monday. The importance attached by Hitler to Mussolini's personal attendance at Munich is a further proof of this. On that supremely critical Wednesday the Italian Ambassador paid four visits to Hitler in three hours (the fourth was to notify Mussolini's personal attendance at Munich), and was about twenty times in telephonic communication with Rome. The lady telephonist, who put through the calls in Rome, was given later 2,000 lire by Mussolini in appreciation of the services she had rendered! As Attolico said to me on the way down to Munich: "The Communists have lost their chance; if they had cut the telephone wires to-day between Rome and Berlin there would have been war!"

85. I feel that I must here pay a tribute to my Italian colleague, Attolico. No one could have co-operated more loyally than he did with me throughout, and particularly during, those last two months. Wherever and whenever he was in a better position than I was to have information he never failed to give it to me. Peace was his only consideration, and when we left by train for Munich, Mme. Attolico flew to Italy to her favourite shrine to pray for it. He had, moreover, by his telegrams to his Government largely prepared the way for the immediate acceptance by Mussolini of the four-Power proposal.

86. The Italian Ambassador was to render one last and not unimportant service. In the train that night to Munich he was informed by a sure source that Ribbentrop intended to put forward as a basis for discussion German proposals of his own quite different from the latest Anglo-French proposals. Attolico thereupon showed me the headings for a settlement which he had taken down at Hitler's dictation in the morning. As stated above they conformed closely to the Anglo-French proposals. Having verified this, Attolico undertook to show them to Mussolini immediately on his arrival at Munich. He did so, and Mussolini, appreciating the position, at once adopted them as his own and put them forward as such. Thereby was Ribbentrop short-circuited.

87. For the third time in a fortnight the Prime Minister flew out to Germany, on Thursday, the 29th September, and the meeting of the four statesmen at Munich began at 1·30 P.M. that afternoon. Mussolini had arrived by

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train from Rome and Daladier by air from Paris shortly before the Prime Minister. Their discussions ended at 2·30 A.M. on the Friday morning. At no stage of the conversations did they become heated. The presence of Mussolini acted as a brake on Hitler, and the fact that the former had put forward as his own a combination of Hitler's and the Anglo-French proposals made general agreement easier all round. It was largely the necessity for translation into three languages, English, French and German, which, together with the difficulties of drafting, delayed the conclusion. The final agreement was reached substantially on the lines of the Godesberg memorandum as modified by the final Anglo-French plan. Four areas of progressive occupation by Germany were established, with dates. Rights of option were guaranteed, plebiscite areas foreshadowed and an International Commission nominated to deal with the execution of the final agreement. A possible further four-Power meeting was adumbrated, and the British and French Governments declared their intention to abide by their previous offer of a guarantee of the diminished Czecho-Slovakia. The German and Italian Governments undertook to participate in this guarantee once the claims of Hungary and Poland had been satisfied.

88. Germany thus incorporated the Sudeten lands in the Reich without firing a shot. But she had not got all that Hitler wanted and what she would have got, if the arbitrament had been left to war, namely, the strategical frontier which so many Germans desired and which would have included Prague, the seat of the first German university. Czecho-Slovakia had lost—and a bit more—territories which should never have been included at Versailles in the Czech State, and which could never permanently have remained therein. The humiliation of the Czechs was a tragedy, but Dr. Benes must be held largely responsible for the form of it. Difficult though it admittedly was, a far-sighted statesman should have realised the obvious and made timely concessions, even though, in his heart, he knew that autonomy would ultimately mean secession. To some extent the responsibility must be shared by Czecho-Slovakia's ally France, who abounded in assurances of help until menaced herself by war. It was solely thanks to Mr. Chamberlain's courage and pertinacity that a futile and senseless war was averted, and possibly averted for ever. As I wrote to him, when all was over: "Millions of mothers will be blessing your name to-night for having saved their sons from the horrors of war. Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism of your action." Both statements were correct, but the criticism can be ignored, while it is to be hoped that the blessings will endure. The verdict of history will, in any case, assuredly be that the course which the Prime Minister took was the only right and sane one in the circumstances as they existed. The day may come when we shall have to fight Germany again, though I am not one of those who regard this as inevitable. If we do have to do so, I trust that the motive and the opportunity will be better chosen than those of last autumn, and that the cause may be one in which the honour and vital interests of Britain are really so much at stake as to ensure us the full support of the united British people, of the empire and of world public opinion. This would not have been the case in September 1938.

89. I had left Munich before the Prime Minister had his final meeting alone with Hitler and drew up and signed the Anglo-German declaration of the 30th September. Early that morning the French and Italian Ambassadors, together with the German State Secretary and myself, flew back to Berlin, and the first meeting of the International Commission set up under the Munich Agreement was actually held the same afternoon at 5·30 P.M. Its meetings constituted the final scene of the Czecho-Slovak drama.

90. The task delegated to the ambassadors was ungrateful in principle and distasteful in detail. I had made up my mind before the first meeting began that the best hope for Czecho-Slovakia lay in direct negotiation where possible with Germany, and that plebiscites, which could only lead to trouble, should be avoided at all cost. I did my best to ensure both those objectives. I saw Göring and secured an assurance from him that Germany would not be unconciliatory if Dr. Benes were removed and if a new Czech Government frankly sought co-operation with, rather than antagonism to, Germany. I arranged a meeting between the field-marshal and the Czech delegate on the commission, M. Mastny, the Czech Minister at Berlin, with whom I had maintained throughout the friendliest relations, and who had shared to a great extent my horror of Benes tergiversations and shiftiness. From the moment that Benes resigned

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the position became easier, though the Germans, as usual, did little to modify their demands. Nevertheless, it did help matters and certainly saved them from becoming worse.

91. There were two major crises in the course of the discussions of the International Commission. The first arose out of the question as to the extent of the areas to be handed over without plebiscite to Germany and as to the meaning of the 50 per cent. majority provision. The German attitude towards the latter was in accordance with the text of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-French proposal which preceded it. The Czechs refused to accept the German view and Hitler retorted with an ultimatum demanding occupation up to the language line drawn in the Austrian maps of 1910. No maps existed for any later year until after the institution of the Czecho-Slovak Government in 1923, by which time the pre-war position had been considerably modified. My French and Italian colleagues accepted, and I was left to decide whether to do so also or to say that I could not do so without prior reference to your Lordship. I decided on the former course, mainly because I hoped thereby firstly to avoid plebiscites, and secondly to pin the Germans down to a line of their own choosing, which they would find it difficult afterwards to modify again to their renewed advantage, and thirdly because the German contention seemed to me to be the better founded of the two. At the same time at a meeting of the ambassadors with Ribbentrop I made it clear that I deeply resented the method employed and would, if it were resorted to again, seek the authority of my Government to resign from the commission rather than submit to it. In fact the Germans did attempt later to get the commission to agree to an extensive modification in their favour of the line they had chosen. In an interview which I had with Baron Weizäcker I threatened to resign, and told him that I would never consent to it. The Germans abandoned their intention at the time, but only to secure their object, or at least part of it, later by direct negotiation with the Czechs.

92. The acceptance of the 1910 boundary rendered plebiscites superfluous, and by the 10th October direct co-operation and negotiation between Czechs and Germans were sufficiently advanced for the meetings of the political section of the International Commission to be discontinued *sine die*. Since that date, though still in being, it has not met again, and I sincerely trust that there will be no occasion for it to do so.

Epilogue.

93. With the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia the curtain fell on the last act of the drama. There was yet, however, an epilogue, together with one episode which had very considerable consequences. I refer in this latter connexion to the November pogrom of the Jews. In revenge for the murder by a young Jew of a German diplomat at Paris, at the instigation of Dr. Goebbels's propaganda machine and with the connivance of the police and the extreme section of the Nazi party, organised squads of German hooligans reverted to the barbarism of the Middle Ages and indulged in an orgy of persecution and ill-treatment of the Jews such as even the Middle Ages could scarcely equal. One of the main characteristics of the Germans is their lack of balance, and this was a striking example of it. The motives of this disgusting exhibition, which shocked all decent Germans as much as it did the whole outside world, were twofold. One was utterly ignoble and revolting, namely, the opportunity which the murder afforded to plunder the Jews and expedite their expulsion. The second, within limits, might have been comprehensible. The German authorities were undoubtedly seriously alarmed lest another Jew, emboldened by the success of Grynszpan, should follow his example and murder either Hitler or one of themselves.

94. The exaggerated and inhuman revenge which the Germans took was, however, from their own point of view, an act of incredible stupidity comparable in its effects to the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the shooting of Nurse Cavell in the war. Thereby they turned the whole of world opinion definitely against them and particularly in the United States of America. The most ingenious propaganda of their enemies could not have achieved a similar success. The November pogrom provoked a revulsion abroad which induced President Roosevelt to come out openly on the side of the Western democracies and rendered the more or less active co-operation of the United States in any new war on their side far more probable than it had ever been before.

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95. I have mentioned this episode on account of its possibly lasting effects, though being at that time no longer a spectator of events it does not really enter into this personal narrative. What I am more specifically concerned with is what I would describe as the reactions of Hitler after Munich.

96. It must firstly be clearly realised what Hitler's objectives in September were. Quite apart from his legitimate desire as a German to complete the unity of Germany by the incorporation of the Sudeten, he was bent on humiliating the Czechs and particularly Benes. After the May crisis the Czechs had announced "urbi et orbi" that it was their mobilisation which alone had prevented Germany from marching. It was they who had put Hitler in his place and had taught him what "No" meant. Such an attitude, quite apart from its lack of justification, was enough to infuriate any dictator, and from that date Hitler was determined to get his own back and teach Benes a lesson. In spite of his antipathy to dead Germans, Hitler sought an opportunity after the 21st May to crush Czecho-Slovakia by force. A small war would give his new army that confidence and experience which he felt that it required. But, anything more than a local war was something quite different. What he certainly did not want was another world war in which his régime and his position as Führer of the German people would be at stake. But he did not believe that, when it came to the point, the French nation would be ready to fight for the Czechs or that England would fight if the French did not. He argued, as I happen to know, as follows: Would the German nation *willingly* go to war for Franco in Spain if France intervened on the side of the Republican Government at Valencia? The answer which he gave himself was that it would not; and he consequently was convinced that no democratic French Government would be strong enough to lead the French nation to war for the Czechs. That was the basis for his calculations and his policy was in accordance therewith. The repeated British warnings had consequently little effect. Nor, in fact, did His Majesty's Government officially ever go further than to say that we would support the French once the latter were involved in hostilities.

97. Munich thus deprived him of the great satisfaction—to which he was ardently looking forward—of crushing Benes and the Czechs by force. In one sense he was possibly grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for having prevented a world war; in another, he was resentful at having been compelled to change his mind and at being deprived of his local war. That he subsequently "foamed at the mouth" when Mr. Chamberlain's name was mentioned I beg leave to doubt. But his resentment was undoubtedly far more vivid than his gratitude for a doubtful favour—since he doubted, and still doubts, whether a world war would have ensued. The unanimity with which the French Chamber (so unlike the House of Commons in this respect) approved of the Munich Agreement certainly helped to confirm him in this opinion.

98. Nor was Munich in itself an agreeable experience for him. He found himself for once in the company of three men who were his equals, instead of being surrounded by sycophants obedient to his slightest gesture. He did not appreciate being obliged to suffer the experience, and I doubt if he wishes to renew it.

99. Moreover, the evident popularity of Mr. Chamberlain with the German people was not only a blow to his own personal prestige, but also gave him food for uneasy reflection. He could dragoon his people and they would always follow him; but could he count on their willing devotion in all circumstances? It was the first unpleasant rift between him and his people, and it was the peace efforts of Mr. Chamberlain which had started it.

100. It is certainly a fact that ever since Munich he has felt ill-will towards those who had argued with him against pushing things to extremes. His Voice had told him that there would be no general war, and for once he had been obliged to disregard that Voice and to listen to counsels of prudence. Since Munich those whom he regards as the faint-hearts in Germany, beginning with Göring, and possibly Goebbels, and passing through many strata of the party and of the Government officials, have fallen from grace. This is the main cause of the rise to favour of Ribbentrop and Himmler and of his subsequent measures for the reinforcement, by means of the S.A., of the party *vis-à-vis* the army, which had also been anti-war. But it was his own faint-heartedness which probably irritated him more than anything else; for the first time he had failed to obey his Voice.

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C118625

101. One is obliged to theorise to a certain extent in endeavouring to arrive at an accurate estimate of these underlying forces, since the world problem to-day starts with individuals. What exactly is Hitler? He is labelled as a mystical dreamer, a neuropath, a pathological subject, a paranoiac, even as a madman, &c. He may be any or all of these strange things, but he has certainly achieved marvellous results for Germany, and, though his followers may be disliked, it is not surprising that the great majority of Germans should venerate him for his achievements. Is he most like Mahomet, with a "Sword in one hand and *Mein Kampf* in the other"; or like Joan of Arc, with her voices and her spiritual faith; or like an Old Testament Moses chosen to lead his people to the promised land? He may well be a mixture of all three, with unlimited faith in himself and in his mission as the leader of a regenerate Germany as his chief outstanding characteristic. He literally has the faith which moves mountains, and it is this latter quality which sets him above all his followers and ensures their devotion to him as their leader. He is not an administrator like Mussolini; his power is mystical rather than political. To the Germans he is the reflection of their subconscious mind, and from the very first he has expressed in words and deeds what that subconscious mind has felt and wanted. The virtue for which his principal followers most admire him is summed up in the word "Fingerspitzgefühl" (tip of the fingers feeling) or instinctive judgment as to what can or cannot be done and as to the right moment to do it. He had on so many occasions decided on action contrary to the advice of his followers and had always been right. Until Munich. There, for the first time, he was compelled to yield to contrary opinion and his own faith in his Voice was for the first time shaken.

102. Much of his outbursts of spleen after Munich was, in my opinion, due to this psychology. Hitler is slow to decide, but, once his decision taken, nothing had hitherto turned him from his purpose. Yet he had decided in May to occupy Czecho-Slovakia by force last autumn and in the end he did not. Mr. Chamberlain saved Czecho-Slovakia from utter ruin and destruction, and it is amazing that there should be people who honestly believe the contrary or who would have witnessed her destruction in order to have the satisfaction of making war on a dictator for a cause which was ethically unsound. I am aware that such people continue to argue that a more categorical attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government would have deterred Hitler from aggressing the Czechs. It is difficult to see how our attitude could have been made more definite than it was—and yet Hitler was not deterred. The latter, for his part, was convinced that the Czechs could have been crushed in a few days, or at most weeks, and that this result could have been achieved long before France or England could have brought them any effective assistance. He would never have attacked either France or England, and by waiting to be attacked by them he could have rallied behind himself the whole of Germany, as the victim of Western aggression or preventive war. Once Prague had been occupied, he would then have offered peace in the belief that the British and French peoples would have been loth to continue a world war for an object which had already been lost and which, even after victory, would have had to be settled more or less in accordance with German desires. Is it so certain that his calculations in this respect would have been ill-founded? Hitler still believes that they would not have been, and it was that which rankled after Munich.

103. He had, moreover, a further deception. He had hoped that the Anglo-German declaration, which had been signed at Munich, would be accepted in England at its face value and with relief, if not with enthusiasm. The result was just the contrary. Unlike in Paris, there was a considerable noisy and hostile minority in Parliament itself and outside it. Mr. Chamberlain was violently attacked not only by his political opponents but even by members of his own Cabinet and party. There was no *détente* in Anglo-German relations but an aggravation of ill-will. Instead of peace, the universal cry in England was for warlike preparations. With Ribbentrop as his Foreign Minister, it is not strange that Hitler took this to mean, or was induced to believe, that these preparations were not for defence but for offence, in order to obliterate the blow to British prestige which, as Mr. Chamberlain's opponents so loudly and so mistakenly proclaimed to the world, had been suffered at Munich. Instead, therefore, of possibly making his own plans for disarmament, as Göring told me that he had wished to do, orders were given for an intensification in Germany

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C 118626

of the rearmament programme. We are still suffering from the result of this misunderstanding. The war party here continues to justify its existence on the argument that, when the British rearmament is completed, a favourable opportunity will be taken to declare war on dictators. The recent attitude of Mr. Roosevelt and the United States of America has reinforced this apprehension.

104. It was the above considerations which inspired the tone of Hitler's speeches last October and November. He was irritated and resentful. His tributes to the Prime Minister's efforts were lukewarm, while his ill-advised attacks on Churchill, Eden and Duff Cooper were violent and voluminous in the extreme. At Saarbrücken on the 9th October he showed clearly what was in his mind when he referred to the possibility, under the British Constitution, of Mr. Chamberlain being shortly replaced by those who did not desire peace. Therefore, he said, I must continue to take steps for the defensive protection of the Reich and to guarantee both Germany's security and her freedom from foreign interference in her internal affairs (one of Hitler's sorest and most sensitive points). He repeated these declarations at Weimar and Munich in November. Material disarmament was, he said, impossible without moral disarmament. To-morrow, he asserted, Churchill might easily be Prime Minister of England; and he drew material for his arguments from misquoted statements in the House of Commons in regard to "aeroplanes carrying bombs to Berlin" and members of Parliament "welcoming the destruction of dictatorships."

105. "The resentments of a petty mind may ruin an enterprise which would have profited an empire." Germany was led to the brink of war last September in order to satisfy the resentments of a dictator. Nothing shook the confidence of the German people in their leader more than the realisation of this fact. Every German approved in principle of the incorporation of their fellow-countrymen in the Reich, but they did not see the point of going to war for something which could so easily be got without war. That is why the rumour spread last year in Germany itself that Hitler was mad.

106. Though it would be absurd to regard Hitler's mind as a petty one, nevertheless his petty susceptibility to British opinion, regardless of its value or importance, its irresponsibility or its influence, is one of the characteristics of this abnormal and remarkable individual. It may yet lead to disaster, for himself and for all of us. It certainly constitutes one of the main obstacles to the improvement of Anglo-German relations and cannot on that account alone be disregarded. Unfortunately the circle is a vicious one. The acts and behaviour of the National Socialist Government are constantly adding fuel to the flames of hatred and disgust in England of nazism and its leader. Every outburst against himself and his régime produces a counter-attack in Germany and makes Hitler himself more difficult to deal with. Since I have been in Berlin I have been told by such different types as Göring and Schacht, Blomberg, Neurath and Goebbels that Hitler's resentments against England are feminine and due to the *spretæ injuria formæ*. England is the old-established, aristocratic Aryan country whose recognition Hitler desires more than that of any other: and it is the one which spurns him and his new doctrines most.

107. Hitherto, Hitler has had two uneradicable complexes: the Jews and Communists. I often wonder whether Britain has not become the third, or, if not, when it will become so. If every British criticism of him and all his works were fair-minded and just, one would have less concern. Right or wrong, Germany is always to blame (because she is so often) is a facile and popular doctrine, but it is not always true and it does not help to get us any further. I do my best to be objective, and am often driven by the violence of anti-German prejudice to express a more lenient judgment of German actions and motives than I would otherwise do. I am aware that this serves little purpose. Nevertheless, unless we wish to go piling up armaments till the next crash comes something will have to be done to mollify the "fury of the woman scorned."

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C 118627

ODS/ET
10 March, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

European Situation

J-100
V-1
C.S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

In commenting on the recent telegram from the United Kingdom to the effect that it was not now considered likely that Hitler would precipitate an immediate crisis, you referred to this being a confirmation of Chamberlain's appeasement policy.

I think that undoubtedly has been a factor. On looking at the telegram again today, however, I was interested to note that this was not included in the list of factors set forth as having changed Hitler's attitude. They include the firm attitude of the French Government to Italy, the progress of British re-armament, the Prime Minister's undertaking to support France, the recent attitude of the United States Government, and the deterioration of the German railway system. There is no reference to Munich. That may mean that Mr. Chamberlain has changed his mind as to Munich having meant peace in our time, or it may mean simply that the Foreign Office, or part of it, takes a different view.

O. D. SKELTON

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ODS/ET C118628
17 March, 1939 V.1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

European Situation E-S.

European Situation

The scramble in Eastern Europe continues. The latest cable reports indicate the possibility of German action in Memel or Dantzig. As regards the Hungarian policy, supported by Poland and Roumania, of attempting to ~~split~~ swallow up the little Carpatho-Ukraine west section of Czecho-Slovakia, this appears to have succeeded for the moment. It has of course the secret support of Italy. It may, however, be countered by German pressure to secure control of Hungary itself.

There appears no likelihood that French or British action will go beyond a protest or the temporary withdrawal of Ambassadors. The recent developments have, however, knocked the bottom out of Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy and may lead to still more vigorous armament, the introduction of conscription and stronger efforts to get the support of other countries.

O. D. SKELTON

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(O. D. SKELTON?)

20th March, 1939

9c

Statement to Parliament

C118629

Imperial Relations - Meetings of Hegs Commissioners

Can. Foreign Policy

As to a Statement on the International Position

European Situation

Chamberlain, Neville

U. S. - Foreign Policy

As the Canadian Parliament is now in session, and the European situation has been spectacularly upset this past week, the Prime Minister will be expected to make a statement the beginning of the week.

It would not be possible to postpone making a statement until the External Affairs Estimates come up. In making any statement, it would not be possible to omit expressing the concern which Canada would feel if the next stroke were directed against London or Paris. It would appear equally impossible that any statement made now should take the form of a final and definite pledge as to Canada's action, before it is known where and what action may be proposed.

(1) No other head of a government has made a definite and explicit engagement as to his country's policy.

(2) No such statement could be made here at this stage consistently with the repeated pledge that the Canadian Parliament will decide.

(3) It is not yet clear either what moves on Hitler's part, if any, are to be anticipated, or what policies or proposals will be put forward for countering them.

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(O.D. SKELTON?) 20th March, 1939

9c Statement to Parliament C 118629

Imperial Relations - Meetings of High Commissioners
Can. Foreign Policy

As to a Statement on the International Position

European Situation
Chamberlain, Neville
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(4) As therefore no definite issue has arisen, and no indication given of an attack on Great Britain which would be the prospect that would rouse Canadian opinion, it would not be possible to set forth in a sentence or two what Canada's policy will be in the months to come.

Mr. Chamberlain's personality and convictions have become a vital factor in the situation. His speeches carry weight because they make clear his simplicity, sincerity, courage and genuine desire for peace. But he has other qualities which make it dangerous to give him a blank cheque. He is self-confident to the point of arrogance, intolerant of criticism, and at the moment sore because he thinks in the eyes of the world Hitler has made a fool of him. Mr. Chamberlain believed it was not worth while going to war last September in what would be a vain effort to save Czecho-Slovakia: and most people agreed with him. But he also believed or stated that the September deal was a victory of reason over force, a sure promise of peace in our time, of settlement by discussion; most people disagreed with him in this, and now his anger at Hitler's deceit may drive him far in the other direction. He is also a Chamberlain, born and bred in a Tory imperialist school, and cannot imagine that any part of the British Empire has any choice but to halt when he says halt and march when he says march. Hence his references, unconscious or deliberate, to turning to our partners in the

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British Commonwealth, to having the approval of the whole British Empire for declarations of which they knew nothing in advance, and his summoning, without consultation, the Dominion High Commissioners collectively to Downing Street to discuss the situation.* Hence also other British Ministers calmly announcing what "our Dominions" will do. He is not a man to whom blank cheques may safely be given.

There is little doubt that some members of the British Government will press for a hard and fast alliance with the eastern European powers. Where they were unwilling six months ago to lift a finger for a fine democratic state, they are now prepared to fight for the rotten feudal autocracy of Rumania, all in the sacred name of liberty and democracy.

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* Sir Gerald Campbell on Saturday was obviously uneasy about these references.

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(These notes were clipped to the memo with C118632
O D Skelton, March 20, 1939 entitled
"As to a Statement on the International Position" JC)

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S SPEECH AT BIRMINGHAM, MARCH 17:

First.- He denied that the events of the week prove his Munich policy was wrong: war in September could not have saved Czecho-Slovakia, and Hitler's promises gave good ground for believing future European problems would be dealt with by consultation and peaceful means.

Second.- He denounced Hitler's breach of faith, his flagrant disregard of solemn promises, and pointed out that the latest absorption was not of men of German blood but of alien and unwilling peoples.

Third.- He asked what would come next, was this a step in the direction of trying to dominate the world by force.

Fourth.- He declared that he would not sacrifice liberty for peace, that he would consult with the Dominions, France and others, that he was "not prepared to engage Great Britain by new and unspecified commitments under conditions which cannot now be foreseen", but he was convinced his declaration to resist a challenge of world domination by force would have the approval of his countrymen, the whole British Empire, and all other freedom loving nations.

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Mr. Lyons' statement, Canberra, March 18.

(1) We must look at the situation with deep misgivings, diaappointment, alarm.

(2) Peace loving nations must exercise utmost vigilance and make it plain that attempts by one nation to achieve wide domination by force or threat shall be resisted.

(3) Hope there is a way to open the door to renewed effort to regulate relations by conciliation; need not regard what has happened as irreparable; the masses desire peace; on this foundation must work to avoid the catastrophe of war.

U.S. Action.

State Department attacks Hitler's action as "wanton lawlessness threatening world peace."

The President, earlier, urged use of means short of war to check aggression; also urged revision of the Neutrality Act giving him discretion to permit export of munitions and war materials to one belligerent and refuse it to another.

Senator Pittman, acting for the Administration is introducing an amended Neutrality Act which does not give the President any discretion but permits export of munitions on the cash and carry basis, which would give the advantage to the countries with financial resources and sea power: also permit shipment to Canada in war time.

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Ottawa, March 20th, 1939.

C118634

DRAFT STATEMENT prepared by Skelton

1. The international developments of the past week render it desirable that I should make a brief statement on the situation. Many of the factors in the situation are not yet clear. I shall take advantage of the introduction of the External Affairs estimates shortly to go fully into the many questions which the happenings of the past few months have created for Canada as for other countries.

2. I have been taken to task for undue pessimism in some guarded references I made last month to the European situation. It will be realized now that those apprehensions had some foundation; so, I believe, had the feeling that the outlook was improving, to which I referred early this month. I made no claim to any exclusive sources of information or to any ability to forecast the future. The form and place of the latest disturbance was a surprise to me, and a surprise to many governments more nearly concerned and more minutely informed. I am sure this House will always be desirous alike of facing unwelcome realities, and of avoiding giving way to panic or propaganda. I have myself no desire

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either to ignore the serious shock the events of the past week have given to the world's hope of peace, or to exaggerate the imminence or extent of danger, as if Armageddon was just around the corner.

3. We have witnessed this past week the forcible occupation by Germany of the greater part of what remained of the Czechoslovak republic. Following this example, whether or not with German approval, Hungary has occupied the remaining fragment, small but racially and strategically important. After Munich, what was left of the republic had come increasingly within the German orbit: its foreign policy, its political organization, its economic relations, its attitude toward racial minorities, were increasingly dictated by its powerful and embracing neighbor. It is clear that nothing stood in the way of complete absorption, of the second bite of the cherry - nothing but a promise. Now the world regrets the disappearance of a gallant and vigorous small nation.

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It regrets still more the evidence a great country has given that it does not consider itself bound by pledges freely exchanged a few short months before, and that it looks to force as the sole basis of relations with its neighbors. The occurrences of the week cannot find any defence, as was the case in some measure in the case of earlier strokes, in reaction against excessive terms of the Treaty of Versailles, or in the principles of self-determination and racial unity.

4. What has been done, cannot now be undone. No country in all Europe plans to reverse the result of force by counter force. It is rather a question of weighing the results of an accomplished fact, and considering what further moves may lie in the future.

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5. Mr. Chamberlain, in his frank and moving speech at Birmingham, asked, was this the end of an old adventure or the beginning of a new, the last attack on a small state or the beginning of an attempt to dominate the world by force? He did not attempt to answer those questions, but declared they would require consideration not only by Germany's neighbors but by others even outside of Europe, and that the Government of the United Kingdom would consider them in consultation with the members of the British Commonwealth, France, and various other powers.

6. So far as Canada is concerned, the government is ready at any time to take part in this consideration, to consult with the United Kingdom and with such other countries as would be appropriate. The first necessity is to sift rumour from fact or at least intelligent anticipation, to examine whether there is a probability of further drives, and if so in what direction and in what form. It is essential to clarify the actual issue that may arise, what country or countries may be concerned, whether it is a case of agitation and propaganda, or of economic pressure, or of military force, what policies are suggested to meet the situation, what measure of support and feasibility those policies receive, what attitude the Canadian Government could propose to this parliament to take in any of these contingencies. Clearly, in any considered and responsible view, the need or the

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feasibility of this small North American country intervening in the affairs of Europe or Asia would depend on the specific issue. If there were a prospect of an aggressor launching an attack on Britain, with bombers raining death on London, I have no doubt what the decision of the Canadian people and parliament would be. Fortunately, there appears no present ground for apprehension on that score. If it were a case, on the other hand, of a dispute over trade or prestige in some far corner of the world, that would raise quite different considerations. Canada, I am certain, is prepared to co-operate with other freedom loving countries in defence against aggression. The form of such co-operation and the contingency in which it may arise, are questions which this government proposes to examine, in consultation with other governments, and therefore to report its findings and any proposals that may result to this parliament, which has the sole and responsible authority to speak for Canada in such grave issues. I may add that no proposal for consultation and no statement of the policy the United Kingdom government has in mind, has yet been received from London.

7. In spite of the shock to the world's confidence, there is no reason to despair of peace, or to cease working for peace. The world has come to be able to stand shocks, to make readjustments, which a few years ago would have made open conflict

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inevitable. No people today in any of the camps wants war. No government of any democratic country has any thought or intent of making war. No government of any totalitarian country can hope for passive acquiescence as their demands come nearer home to the great powers, or anticipate easy victory over the limitless moral and material resources that would be arrayed against them. It is a time for standing on guard, and equally for holding open the door of conciliation and cooperative effort to all peoples.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

C118640 file

MEMORANDUM

March 21st, 1939.

For the Prime Minister in Council:

These are the more important of the Canadian Press despatches, just received.

A. D. P. H.

A. D. P. H.

Seen by P.M.

Mar. 21 [illegible]

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NUMOO

LEAD GERMAN

BERLIN, MARCH 21-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER MADE DOUBLY SURE TODAY THAT HIS ITALIAN PARTNER, PREMIER MUSSOLINI, UNDERSTANDS DEVELOPMENTS OF LAST WEEK WHEN GERMANY ABSORBED PARTS OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

THE FUEHRER GAVE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR BERNARDO ATTOLICO A PERSONAL LETTER TO MUSSOLINI, PERSONS CLOSE TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY SAID, BEFORE THE ENVOY LEFT LAST NIGHT FOR ROME TO REPORT TO IL DUCE. HE WAS EXPECTED BACK IN A FEW DAYS.

IT WAS BELIEVED THE NEXT EXPANSIONIST MOVE WOULD COME FROM MEMEL THIS WEEKEND.

FIELD MARSHAL HERMANN GOERING AND HIS WIFE LEFT FOR SAN REMO, ITALY, THIS AFTERNOON TO RESUME THEIR VACATION, INTERRUPTED LAST WEEK WHEN HE WAS CALLED BACK TO BERLIN. LATER GOERING IS TO SEE MUSSOLINI AND POSSIBLY ALSO MARSHAL ITALO BALBO, GOVERNOR OF LIBYA, IN AFRICA.

JAPAN SENT HITLER CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ABSORPTION OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA, BUT THE ABSENCE OF SIMILAR FELICITATIONS FROM ROME WAS INTERPRETED AS A POSSIBLE INDICATION THAT MUSSOLINI DID NOT APPROVE OF IT.D

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NJN 101 XX IT.D

FOREIGN OBSERVERS FELT HITLER'S PERMISSION TO GOERING TO CONTINUE THE HOLIDAY WAS AN INDICATION THAT THE QUESTION OF THE RETURN TO GERMANY OF MEMEL--A 1,099-SQUARE MILE BALTIC STRIP UNDER LITHUANIAN SOVEREIGNTY--HAD BEEN SETTLED AND THAT LITHUANIANS HAD PROMISED NOT TO ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THAT FORMER GERMAN DISTRICT FROM GETTING "HOME TO THE REICH."

AMBASSADOR ATTOLICO SAW BOTH HITLER AND FOREIGN MINISTER JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP LAST NIGHT. SOURCES CLOSE TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY BELIEVED THE REPORTED LETTER TO MUSSOLINI EXPLAINED THE VARIOUS STEPS HITLER TOOK REGARDING CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AND THE NECESSITY FOR EACH STEP.

REPORTS THAT GERMAN TROOPS HAD ASKED PERMISSION FROM HUNGARY TO MARCH TOWARD RUMANIA WERE DENIED CATEGORICALLY BY GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN.

THE GRAVITY XX PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF DAY LEAD.

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NU102 XX IT.)

C118643

95

LEAD LITHUANIAN

KAUNAS, LITHUANIA, MARCH 21-(AP)-ERNST NEUMANN, NAZI LEADER IN MEMEL, ANNOUNCED TODAY HE EXPECTED "LITHUANIA TO SURRENDER THE MEMEL TERRITORY IN THE NEAR FUTURE."

THE STATEMENT CAME AS LITHUANIAN OFFICIALS WERE RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE MOVING THEIR FAMILIES OUT OF THE LITTLE BALTIC DISTRICT--WHICH WAS GERMAN BEFORE THE GREAT WAR AND IS NOW UNDER LITHUANIAN SOVERENGITY. A WIDESPREAD BELIEF WAS HELD THAT MEMEL'S RETURN TO GERMANY WAS IMMINENT.

DR. NEUMANN DECLARED THE CONTINUED ASSOCIATION OF LITHUANIA AND MEMEL WAS "ECONOMICALLY AND CULTURALLY IMPOSSIBLE." IN RETURN FOR ANNEXATION TO GERMANY, HE SAID, MEMEL WAS PREPARED TO GRANT LITHUANIA HARBOR RIGHTS.

A SECRET XX PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF DAY LEAD.

X1135A

CORRECTION

IN LEAD DUBLIN SWEEPS FIRST PARA READ XX AND 78 (NOT 58) OTHER CANADIANS XX ETC (DECTS)

CP NU MCH 21 X1136A

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ADD BUCHAREST LEAD RUMANIAN XX HOSPITAL.

OFFICIALS MEANWHILE SAID TRADE DISCUSSIONS WITH GERMANY WOULD NOT BE CONCLUDED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. RUMANIA, THEY SAID, HAS NOT GRANTED GERMANY ANY MONOPOLISTIC RIGHTS, BUT INSTEAD WILL ADHERE TO A FREE COMMERCIAL POLICY.

AS FOR HUNGARY, GERMANY'S ANTI-COMINTERN PACT PARTNER, AUTHORITIES SAID RUMANIA'S RELATIONS WITH THAT STATE WERE "AS GOOD AS CAN BE EXPECTED." HOWEVER, A SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT RUMANIA WAS PREPARED TO DEFEND EVERY INCH OF HER TERRITORY AND REGARDED THE PRESENT FRONTIER WITH HUNGARY AS FINAL.

BY MANOEUVRING XX ETC PICKING UP FIRST PARA OF DAY LEAD.

X1158A

DAY LEAD NIAGARA CNEWD ESPY WD

WASHINGTON, MARCH 21-(AP)-THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION ADMITTED TO EVIDENCE TODAY CHARTS SHOWING THAT ELECTRIC SERVICE RATES CHARGED BY THE NIAGARA-HUDSON POWER CORPORATION OF BUFFALO, N.Y., IN MANY INSTANCES WERE 100 PER CENT HIGHER THAN THOSE CHARGED IN ADJACENT TERRITORY BY THE PUBLICLY-OWNED CANADIAN POWER SYSTEM.

MORE1159A

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CANADA

NDM07

C 118645

EUROPEAN

CLEVELAND, MARCH 21-(APP-NORMAN DAVIS, FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE IN EUROPE, PREDICTED TODAY GERMANY WILL "SEIZE MEMEL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, POSSIBLY SOONER, WITHOUT QUESTION." DAVIS WAS A MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COMMISSION WHICH PLACED THE LITTLE BALTIC COUNTRY UNDER LITHUANIAN SOVEREIGNTY WITH A MEASURE OF AUTONOMY AFTER IT HAD BEEN DETACHED FROM GERMANY BY THE VERSAILLES TREATY.

X1150A

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX VISIT.

OLIVER STANLEY, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE, ANNOUNCED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT GREAT BRITAIN WOULD RE-EXAMINE, "IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS OF LAST WEEK," A TRADE AGREEMENT MADE LAST WEEK BETWEEN THE FEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES AND REICHSGRUPPE INDUSTRIE, A GERMAN MANUFACTURING GROUP.

"I HAVE ASKED THE FEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH ME," MR. STANLEY SAID IN RESPONSE TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS.

MORE1152A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NUMOP XX QUESTIONS.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAD TERMED ITS PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE "PREMATURE" WAS INTERPRETED IN SOME DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS AS MEANING RUSSIA MIGHT COUNTER WITH A REFUSAL TO JOIN IN A NON-AGGRESSION DECLARATION, SUCH AS BRITAIN IS ADVOCATING.

THOUSANDS OF SPECTATORS WHO GATHERED ALONG THE ROUTE FROM VICTORIA STATION TO BUCKINGHAM PALACE CHEERED THE FRENCH PRESIDENT AND HIS WIFE. KING GEORGE WORE A SCARLET FIELD MARSHAL'S UNIFORM AND HIS MINISTERS WERE IN COURT DRESS.

FROM BUCKINGHAM PALACE THE LEBRUNS ENT TO MARLBOROUGH HOUSE NEARBY TO PAY A FORMAL CALL ON QUEEN MARY. AFTERWARD, M. LEBRUN RECEIVED AN ADDRESS OF WELCOME FROM THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF WESTMINSTER AT ST. JAMES'S PALACE.

THE STEAMSHIP COTE, ETC PICKING UP THIRD PARA OF LEAD.

X1155A

FINANCE

NEW YORK, MARCH 21 (CAPD)-SUGAR FUTURES NO 3 OPENED UNCHANGED. MCH UNQUOTED; MAY 1.92B; JLY 1.97B; SEP 2.00; JAN 1.96B.

X1156A

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NU89

BULLETIN LEAD RUMANIAN

C 118647

BUCHAREST, MARCH 21-(APD-THE SHOOTING OF A GERMAN CITIZEN BY A JEW AT BRASOV CAUSED CONCERN TODAY IN THE RUMANAIAN &R CAPITAL, WHERE KING CAROL HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN A BALKAN STRUGGLE TO ESCAPE COMPLETE GERMAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOMINATION.

MORE1052A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU93 XX EDISON. C118648

BONDS ACCOMPANIED STOCKS TO HIGHER GROUND. COMMODITIES WERE A TRIFLE MIXED.

MARKET OBSERVERS XX PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

X1104A

95

ADD BUCHAREST LEAD RUMANIAN XX DOMINATION.

THE GERMAN WAS REPORTED IN A GRAVE CONDITION.

SOME SOURCES BELIEVED GERMANS MIGHT REGARD THE SHOOTING AT BRASOV, WHICH IS 100 MILES NORTHWEST OF BUCHAREST, AS AN "INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT."

THE WOUNDED GERMAN, DR. HJALMAR KRARZT, HAD GONE TO A JEWISH COMMUNITY HOUSE AT BRASOV, REPORTS FROM THAT CITY SAID, AND AN ARGUMENT BETWEEN HIM AND THE DOORMAN'S WIFE DEVELOPED, WHEREUPON HER HUSBAND APPEARED AND SHOT HIM. DR. KRARZT WAS TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL.

X1106A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU6O XX EXPANSION.

ALTHOUGH GREAT BRITAIN WAS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE MEMEL CONVENTION OF 1924 BY WHICH LITHUANIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER MEMEL WAS RECOGNIZED, THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT ANY ACTION WAS PLANNED HERE SPECIFICALLY TO COMBAT THE RETURN OF THE TERRITORY TO THE REICH.

IT LONG HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN BRITAIN THAT EVENTUALLY GERMANY WOULD REGAIN THE MEMEL REGION, DETACHED FROM HER BY THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES.

M PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN AND HIS MINISTERS HAD BEFORE THEM TENTATIVE REPLIES FROM SEVERAL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO A BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR AN ANTI-AGGRESSION DECLARATION.

THE CABINET, FORCED XXX ETC PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF DAY LEAD.

BG909A

LEAD GERMAN

BERLIN, MARCH 22-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER HAD ANOTHER STRIP OF EUROPEAN SOIL HANDED TO HIM TODAY, BY LITHUANIA, AND SIGNIFICANT REPERCUSSIONS WERE IMMEDIATE IN DANZIG AND POLAND.

MORE910A

C118649

P-850
1939

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NUF9 XX UNITS.

THIS AFTERNOON THE MEMEL RADIO STATION WAS BROADCASTING GERMAN MILITARY MARCHES. NAZIS IN MEMEL CITY WERE RUSHING PREPARATIONS FOR A TRIUMPHAL ENTRY OF GERMAN TROOPS WHENEVER THEY ARRIVE.

LITHUANIA'S "NAVY"--THE CONVERTED GERMAN MINESWEEPER PREZIDENTAS SMETONA--LEFT MEMEL FOR AN UNDISCLOSED DESTINATION. THE SHIP NOW HAS NO LITHUANIAN PORT TO WHICH IT CAN GO.

THERE WAS XXX ETC PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

BG906A

LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 22-(AP)-THE BRITISH CABINET, MEETING TODAY IN THE FACE OF A NEW TERRITORIAL SURRENDER TO GERMANY--THAT OF MEMEL ON THE BALTIC--CONSIDERED WHAT COMMITMENTS GREAT BRITAIN MUST UNDERTAKE TO MAKE POSSIBLE QUICK FORMATION OF A BLOC TO HALT GERMAN EXPANSION.

V MORE908A

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU?7 XX 51.

KIRK, PHILADELPHIA 14 36 50

LOCKING, SYRACUSE 20 30 50

BARTON, PHILADELPHIA 21 28 49

STARR, PROVIDENCE 16 33 49.

C118651

BG9A

INSERT

IN KAUNAS SECOND LEAD LITHUANIAN AFTER FOURTH PARA XXX FRONTIER.

THE LITHUANIAN PARLIAMENT IN AN EMERGENCY SESSION THIS MORNING APPROVED THE CESSION OF MEMEL.

M THE OFFICIAL LITHUANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT SAID: "THE CESSION OF MEMEL, WHICH HAS BEEN FORCED ON THE LITHUANIANS, HAS DEPRESSED THE POPULATION BUT THERE IS DETERMINATION TO FIGHT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF LITHUANIA HERSELF."

THERE WERE RUMORS ETC. PICKING UP FIFTH PARA.

CPNUMCH22BG901A (DEVTS)

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NU44

ADD KAUNAS SECOND LEAD LITHUANIAN XX PORT.

C118652

THE REGULAR TROOPS OF THE GERMAN ARMY, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY HAD NOT YET CROSSED THE FRONTIER.

THERE WERE RUMORS THAT CHANCELLOR HITLER WOULD GO TO MEMEL TO CELEBRATE HIS LATEST CONQUEST--ONE WEEK AFTER THAT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA--BUT HE REMAINED IN BERLIN TO SEE AN OFFICIAL LITHUANIAN DELEGATION WHICH IS TO CONFER ON DETAILS OF THE GERMAN ANNEXATION.

2

THE GERMAN STORM TROOPERS HALTED THE FRENZIED FLIGHT OF JEWS AND OTHER REFUGEES FROM THE TERRITORY.

THE LITHUANIAN ARMY BEGAN GRADUAL EVACUATION OF MEMEL.

THE STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE GOVERNMENT RESEMBLES MARTIAL LAW. OFFICIALS SAID ONE REASON IT WAS PROCLAIMED WAS TO FACILITATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LITHUANIAN TROOPS.

THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT, BY ITS DECISION TO SURRENDER MEMEL, MADE IT PLAIN IT DID NOT EXPECT ANY HELP FROM THE SIGNATORIES OF THE MEMEL CONVENTION. THIS CONVENTION WAS SIGNED MAY 8, 1924, BY LITHUANIA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN. IT PLACED THE TERRITORY UNDER LITHUANIAN SOVEREIGNTY BUT WITH A LARGE MEASURE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY.

MORE810A

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NU[illegible] XX ILL.

C 118653

AFTER TODAY'S 18-HOLE ROUND THE FIELD WILL BE TRIMMED TO THE LOW 60 AND TIES FOR THE FINAL 36 HOLES TOMORROW.

BG743A

95

ADD KAUNAS SECOND LEAD LITHUANIAN XX MEMEL.

THE LITHUANIAN CABINET ANNOUNCED THE RETURN OF MEMEL--1,099 SQUARE MILES OF TERRITORY WITH 150,000 MOSTLY GERMAN POPULATION--EARLY THIS MORNING.

GERMAN STORM TROOP FORMATIONS AND MEMEL NAZIS AT ONCE BEGAN TAKING OVER PUBLIC BUILDINGS, THE RADIO STATION AND OTHER POSTS IN THE CITY OF MEMEL, WHICH HAS BEEN LITHUANIA'S ONLY PORT.

BG744A

DAY LEAD BRITISH (NEWISH)

LONDON, MARCH 22-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN SUMMONED HIS MINISTERS TODAY TO REVIEW DIPLOMATIC DISPATCHES FROM EUROPEAN CAPITALS SOUNDED OUT IN GREAT BRITAIN'S CAMPAIGN FOR AN "ANTI-AGGRESSION DECLARATION" TO HALT GERMAN EXPANSION.

MORE745A

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CANADA

NU84

C118654

2

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD LITHUANIAN

KAUNAS, LITHUANIA, MARCH 22-(CAP)-A STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT LITHUANIA TODAY, SHORTLY AFTER THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED FORMALLY THE RETURN TO GERMANY OF THE BALTIC TERRITORY OF MEMEL.

MORE789A

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CANADA

NU82

C118655

3

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 22-(CAPD-GREAT BRITAIN IS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF CALLING A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO CONSIDER GERMANY'S MARCH TOWARD EUROPEAN DOMINATION, HOME SECRETARY SIR SAMUEL HOARE TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY.

MORE1021A

95

ADD LINCOLN LEAD RACING XX SEASON.

STARTING AT 40 TO 1, THE GREY SON OF MR. JINKS FINISHED THE MILE 1 1/2 LENGTHS IN FRONT OF MRS. G.A. MONKHOUSE'S HALCYON GIFT, WHO STARTED AT 100 TO 6, WITH SIR ABE BAILEY'S DARK TOLLY, A 25 TO 1 CHANCE, IN THIRD PLACE A NECK BEHIND HALCYON GIFT.

A FIELD OF 38 STARTED IN THE BIG HANDICAP.

X1022A

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CANADA

NUT(XX CLOSER.

"RECKONING ALL THESE EXPECTATIONS TOGETHER, THE STEEL INDUSTRY CALCULATES THAT SECOND QUARTER STEEL PRODUCTION WILL AVERAGE NOT LESS THAN 60 PER CENT AGAINST A PROBABLE AVERAGE FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF ABOUT 54 PER CENT."

BG939A

ADD KAUNAS SECOND LEAD LITHUANIAN XX GO.

THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT CALLED UP RESERVISTS TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE ARMY, DEPLETED BY THE RELEASE OF MENEL CONSCRIPTS FROM SERVICE. THE FINANCE MINISTRY SUSPENDED TEMPORARILY THE WITHDRAWAL OF BANK DEPOSITS.

THERE WAS XXX ETC PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

M BG940A

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX DECLARATION.

THE REPLIES GENERALLY CALLED FOR INDICATIONS FROM GREAT BRITAIN THAT SHE IS PREPARED TO GIVE MORE THAN MORAL SUPPORT TO ANY MOVE AGAINST GERMAN EXPANSION.

4

MORE942A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NUTS

C118657

WITH KAUNAS LITHUANIA

COPENHAGEN, MARCH 22-(AP)-PREMIER THOVALD STAUNING DECLARED TODAY THAT THE DANISH NAZI LEADER, FRITZ CLAUSE, HAD USED EXPRESSIONS "WHICH MUST BE REGARDED AS AN APPEAL TO GERMANY TO DEAL WITH DENMARK IN THE SAME MANNER THAT SHE DEALT WICH CZECHO-SLOVAKIA."

"IF THERE ARE ANY DANISH CITIZENS WHO WISH TO JOIN SUCH A PERSON THEY WILL BE REGARDED AS TRAITORS TO THEIR COUNTRY," STAUNING WARNED.

(GERMAN NEWSPAPERS FREQUENTLY HAVE DENOUNCED FOREIGN REPORTS OF GERMAN DESIGNS ON NORTH SCHLESWIG, FORMER GERMAN TERRITORY NOW PART OF DENMARK.)

M BG903A

ADD KAUNAS SECOND LEAD LITHUANIAN XX TROOPS.

THE CUSTOMS HOUSE AT POGEGEN IN MEMELLAND, JUST ACROSS THE EAST PRUSSIAN BORDER, WAS OCCUPIED BY GERMAN STORM TROOP UNITS.

MORE904A

M

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CANADA

NU46 XX REICH."

C118658

TELEPHONE LINES FROM DANZIG TO WARSAW WERE JAMMED WITH "STATE CALLS," INDICATING THERE WAS A LIVELY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN POLISH DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN DANZIG AND THE WARSAW FOREIGN OFFICE.

GERMANS OF DANZIG ON HEARING THE NEWS OF MEMEL'S SEVERANCE FROM LITHUANIA IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT OUT NAZI FLAGS. CHILDREN AT SCHOOL WERE GIVEN A HOLIDAY.

BG814A

LONDON, MARCH 22-(CP-HAVAS)-AN ORIGINAL COPY OF ENGLAND'S HISTORIC MAGNA CHARTA HAS BEEN INSURED FOR £100,000 ($470,000) PRIOR TO ITS SHIPMENT TO NEW YORK FOR DISPLAY AT THE WORLD'S FAIR, IT WAS ANNOUNCED TODAY. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE TRANSPORTED FROM LINCOLN CATHEDRAL TO NEW YORK IN A SPECIAL CASKET.

BG815A

DAY LEAD LEBRUN (NEW)

LONDON, MARCH 22-(CP-HAVAS)-ACCLAIM GREETED FRENCH PRESIDENT ALBERT LEBRUN AND MME. LEBRUN AS THEY DROVE TO THE GUILDHALL TODAY TO LUNCH WITH THE LORD MAYOR OF LONDON, PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN AND MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. MORE817A

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NUMS XX AUTONOMY.

THE DECISION TO HAND BACK MEMEL TO GERMANY FOLLOWED A DAY OF INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, T.H. PRESTON, WAS AMONG CALLERS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY.

LITHUANIANS HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR TODAY'S SHOCK BY RUMORS CIRCULATING FOR SEVERAL DAYS. RAILWAY STATION COACHES IN MEMEL WERE LOADED WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT LAST NIGHT, THE FIRST INDICATION OF THE EVACUATION OF LITHUANIAN TROOPS.

THERE WAS XXX ETC PICKING UP FOURTH PARA OF LEAD.

BG812A

WITH KAUNAS LITHUANIAN

DANZIG, MARCH 22-(CAP)-NEWS THAT MEMEL HAD BEEN RETURNED TO GERMANY SPREAD QUICKLY THROUGH THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG TODAY AND RAISED HOPES OF THOUSANDS OF GERMANS HERE THAT REUNION OF DANZIG WITH GERMANY MIGHT BE ONLY A SHORT TIME OFF.

WHILE ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO THE GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT DANZIG MUST BIDE ITS TIME, AUTHORITIES NOW EXPECT DIFFICULTY IN RESTRAINING THE GERMAN POPULACE FROM RAISING THE FAMILIAR CRY, "WE WANT TO RETURN HOME TO THE REICH."

MORE813A

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N 92 (CORRECT)

C118660

EDITORS:

NU80 AT 1049A, NU81 AT 1053A, AND NU82 AT 1056A, SHOULD BE NU89, 90 AND 91 INCLUSIVE.

CP NU MCH 22 X1059A

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX CAMPS."

GEOFFREY MANDER, OPPOSITION LIBERAL, ASKED IF THE GOVERNMENT "WERE CONSIDERING IMMEDIATE STEPS WITH A VIEW TO ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FRANCE, BRITAIN AND RUSSIA FOR JOINT ACTION IN RESTRAINT OF AGGRESSION IN ASSOCIATION ALSO WITH POLAND, RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, TURKEY, HOLLAND AND DENMARK."

SIR SAMUEL REPLIED THAT "THE GOVERNMENT ARE IN COMMUNICATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS."

RICHARD BUTLER, UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANNOUNCED "IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT CZECHO-SLOVAK DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN LONDON SHALL REMAIN UNCHANGED FOR THE PRESENT."

MORE1101A

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C118661

95

ADD REYKJAVIK AIR BASES XX TODAY.

PREMIER JONASSON SAID GERMANY INVOKED OLD TREATIES, DECLARING THAT THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE ENTITLED IT TO BUILD AIR BASES ON THE ISLAND.

HE DECLARED ICELAND COULD NOT GRANT GERMANY RIGHTS NOT ACCORDED TO ANY OTHER NATION AND SAID THE ISSUE WOULD BE TAKEN UP WHEN THE GERMAN CRUISER EMDEN COMES HERE FOR A SCHEDULED VISIT.

X1058A

95

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX TODAY.

SIR SAMUEL SUBSTITUTED FOR PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN IN REPLYING TO QUESTIONS FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THE CABINET AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED TO TAKE NO ACTION BECAUSE OF GERMANY'S ACQUISITION OF MEMEL.

IN REPLY TO PHILIP NOEL BAKER, LABOR, THE HOME SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION "REGARDING STATEMENTS THAT 20,000 CZECHS WERE NOW IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS."

X1039A

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C 118662
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1939

file

Mr. Heeney!

Here's copy I phoned you about. Rgds
RKC.

Rec'd for File
March 22, 1939.

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NUM

FINANCE

NEW YORK, MARCH 21-(APD-SANTOS COFFEE FUTURES OPENED 5-6 HIGHER. MCH UNQUOTED; MAY 5.82; JLY 5.87; SEP 5.92; DEC 5.95B. RIO FUTURES 2 HIGHER. MCH UNQUOTED; MAY 4.11; JLY, SEP UNQUOTED; DEC 4.07B.

X1250P

95

ZAGREB, YUGOSLAVIA, MARCH 21-(APD-VLADKO MATCHEK, PRESIDENT OF THE CROAT PARTY, ASSERTED TODAY THAT CROATS WERE DETERMINED TO WIN AUTONOMY AND THAT IT WAS IMMATERIAL TO THEM WHETHER SUPPORT CAME FROM THE DEMOCRACIES OR FROM GERMANY.

"A RAPID SOLUTION IS IMPERATIVE," DECLARED THE CROAT LEADER.. "AS FAR AS THE CROATS ARE CONCERNED, IT IS IRRELEVANT WHETHER THEIR CAUSE OF SELF DETERMINATION IS ESPOUSED BY HITLER OR ROOSEVELT."

CROATIA GENERALLY IS ORDERLY, THOUGH IN THE PAST FEW DAYS SEVERAL SMALL GROUPS OF EXTREMISTS HAVE HELD PRO-HITLER DEMONSTRATIONS.

MORE1232P

M

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NW118 XX DEMONSTRATIONS.

C(YUGOSLAVIA, A KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, WAS FORMED LATE IN 1918 BY THE UNION OF SOUTH SLAV PARTS OF THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE WITH SERBIA AND LATER WITH MONTENEGRO. THE CATHOLIC CROATS OF CROATIA-SLOVANIA AND DALMATIA NUMBER MORE THAN 5,000,000 IN YUGOSLAVIA'S POPULATION OF 14,000,000.D

X1254P

AND LUCKY DUBLIN SWEEPS CONSOLATION LIST XX THREE."

KS 05562 "MARIE JAMES."

QB 14796 "HOPE SOON."

RM 59162 "BETTY LOU."

LL 28772 "MOTHER."

JD 72586 "PIMPERNEL."

HN 70250 "HAPPY CANY."

KA 16305 "YELLOW CHOCOLATE."

LX 14084 "LUCKY."

HS 80259 "SHALL COME TO ALL."

BM 86588 "LUCKY 13."

ZM 71072 "DAELMAN."

MORE X1235P

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NUMBER 3

BULLETIN THIRD LEAD BRITISH

C118665

BY G.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 21(CP CABLE)-A DRAFT OF AN ANTI-AGGRESSION DECLARATION IS BEING CIRCULATED IN THE CAPITALS OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN AN EFFORT TO RALLY INTO COLLECTIVE SECURITY THOSE NATIONS OPPOSED TO GERMANY'S NEW IMPERIALISM.

MORE X1250P

95

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH BY SANDERSON XX IMPERIALISM.

SINCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TOOK THE INITIATIVE YESTERDAY AS A COUNTER TO RUSSIA'S SUGGESTION OF AN IMMEDIATE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, THERE HAS BEEN GREAT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY BEHIND THE SCENES. IT IS ALSO BECOMING CLEARER THAT THE DECLARATION WILL HAVE MORE TEETH IN IT THAN ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED. IT MAY TAKE THE FORM OF A MUTUAL DEFENCE PACT.

MORE X1251P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NO12"

95

C 118666

LEAD U.S.-GERMAN

WASHINGTON, MARCH 21-(AP)-A NOTE TO GERMANY, RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY, SAID THE UNITED STATES "DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THAT ANY LEGAL BASIS EXISTS" FOR GERMANY'S PROTECTORATE OVER BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA.

ENCLOSED WITH THE NOTE WAS A COPY OF THE STATEMENT THAT SUMNER WELLES, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, MADE LAST FRIDAY CONTAINING THE UNITED STATES' "CONDEMNATION" OF WHAT WERE DESCRIBED AS GERMANY'S "ACTS OF WANTON LAWLESSNESS AND ARBITRARY FORCE."

THE UNITED STATES' NOTE ACKNOWLEDGED THE RECEIPT OF THE GERMAN NOTE OF LAST FRIDAY ANNOUNCING THE TERMS OF THE DECREE ISSUED MARCH 16 BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF THE REICH AFTER THE ASSUMPTION OF A PROTECTORATE OVER THE PROVINCES OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA.

MOR 1255P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

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NO[illegible]7 XX REPUBLIC."

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THE PURPOSE OF THE BILL WAS TO PREVENT SUCH CZECH CREDITS FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF GERMANY WHICH HAS PROCLAIMED A PROTECTORATE OVER THE MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE FORMER CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC.

C118667

S LD103P

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ABD WASHINGTON LEAD US-GERMAN XX SO INDICATED.

THE NOTE THEN SAID THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WERE MADE KNOWN LAST FRIDAY AND FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT A COPY OF WELLES STATEMENT WAS ENCLOSED.

THIS LAST PARAGRAPH HAD THE EFFECT OF PLACING WELLES STATEMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN MADE TO THE PUBLIC, ON A DIPLOMATIC BASIS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASED THE TEXT OF THE MARCH 17 GERMAN NOTE WHICH CONSISTS ALMOST ENTIRELY OF A TEXT OF THE MARCH 16 DECREE.

MORE105P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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ACTION.

IT HAD BEEN RELIABLY REPORTED THAT GERMAN TROOPS WERE BEING HELD IN READINESS TO MOVE INTO CZECHO-SLOVAKIA IF SLOVAK SEPARATISTS FAILED TO WIN A SECESSION VOTE TODAY IN THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT AT BRATISLAVA. THE PARLIAMENT WAS CONVOKED AT THE INSISTENCE OF HITLER.

(PRAGUE ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THE INDEPENDENCE MOVE WOULD CARRY.)

THE WILHELMSTRASSE SPOKESMAN SAID TWO QUESTIONS WERE AT ISSUE:-

MORE745A

BULLETIN LEAD SLOVAKS

BRATISLAVA, MARCH, 14-(CAPD-SLOVAKIA DECLARED ITSELF AN INDEPENDENT STATE A FEW MINUTES AFTER NOON TODAY.

MORE745A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118669

ADD BERLIN DAY LEAD GERMAN XX ISSUES=

1. AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVAKIA WHICH IN TURN INVOLVES THE FATE OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE, ANOTHER AUTONOMOUS SEGMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC.

2. SECURITY OF GERMANS IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA WHICH CONSTITUTE THE CZECH PART OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, THE THIRD MAJOR PROVINCIAL DIVISION OF THE REPUBLIC.

"GERMANY CANNOT STAND TO HAVE HER 'LEBENSRAUM', OR SPACE FOR LIVING ENDANGERED," THE SPOKESMAN SAID. "AT PRESENT GERMANS ARE COMPLETELY AT THE MERCY OF THE CZECHS IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA."

TROOP MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS SINCE SUNDAY NIGHT. AN INFORMANT USUALLY WELL-INFORMED SAID AN ESTIMATED 14 DIVISIONS WAS READY TO MOVE, IF NECESSARY, AS FOLLOWS=-

ONE GROUP TO PROCEED VIA DRESDEN AND AUSSIG TO PRAGUE, ANOTHER FROM LEIPZIG VIA CHEMNITZ TO PILSEN AND PRAGUE, THE THIRD FROM VIENNA TO BRNO, AND THE FOURTH FROM VIENNA TO BRATISLAVA.

MORE649A

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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[illegible] XX BRATISLAVA.

RESERVISTS OF THE CLASS OF [illegible]13 IN MUNICH WERE CALLED ON SHORT NOTICE YESTERDAY. SEVERAL TROOP TRAINS LEFT MUNICH FOR VIENNA. A NUMBER OF AUTOMOBILES WERE COMMANDEERED. IN AUSSIG IN THE FORMER SUDETENLAND, 25 MILES FROM THE CZECH FRONTIER, RESIDENTS SAID TRAINS HAD CARRIED AT LEAST 16 CARLOADS OF TROOPS TOWARD THE BORDER SINCE SUNDAY.

BG750A

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ADD BRATISLAVA LEAD SLOVAKS XX TODAY.

A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT WAS DECIDED UPON BY THE PARLIAMENT IN ITS EXTRAORDINARY SESSION AND DR. JOSEPH TISO WAS NAMED FIRST PREMIER OF INDEPENDENT SLOVAKIA.

TISO WAS OUSTED LAST FRIDAY BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF SLOVAKIA ON CHARGES OF TOLERATING A SLOVAK SEPARATIST MOVEMENT.

PROSPECTS WERE THAT TISO ALSO WOULD BECOME PRESIDENT OR CHIEF OF STATE. NO FORMAL CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN DRAWN UP SO THE NATURE OF THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT WAS STILL TO BE SPECIFIED.

BG753A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NOSS

DAY LEAD POPE (NEW)

C118671

VATICAN CITY, MARCH 1(AP)=POPE PIUS TODAY RECEIVED RODRIGUE CARDINAL VILLENEUVE, ARCHBISHOP OF QUEBEC, AND THREE CANADIAN BISHOPS IN AUDIENCE.

THE BISHOPS WERE RT. REV. MARTIN JOHNSON, BISHOP OF NELSON, B.C., RT. REV. ANASTASE FORGET, BISHOP OF ST. JOHNS, QUE., AND RT. REV. E.A. DESCHAMPS, AUXILIARY BISHOP OF MONTREAL.

BG759A

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ADD BRATISLAVA LEAD SLOVAKS (WHICH CARRIES BYLINES BY ALVIN STEINKOPF, ASSOCIATED PRESS FOREIGN STAFF) XX SPECIFIED.

"OUR SEPARATION FROM THE CZECHS IS COMPLETE," TISO TOLD THE ASSOCIATED PRESS CORRESPONDENT A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE HISTORIC SESSION OF PARLIAMENT.

"VAST PROBLEMS REMAIN AND OUR NEXT CONCERN WILL BE TO DRAFT A CONSTITUTION. SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES ARE SUGGESTING THAT I LEAD THE STATE BUT THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE FUTURE."

BG801A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU35

C118672

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SECOND LEAD HUNGARIAN

BUDAPEST, MARCH 14-(CP-HAVAS)-A HUNGARIAN ORTHODOX PRIEST AND TWO HUNGARIAN FARMERS WERE SHOT DOWN TODAY BY CZECH SOLDIERS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE PRIEST WAS KILLED BY A CZECH SOLDIER NEAR BERECSENY. THE TWO FARMERS WERE SHOT DOWN BY A CZECH PATROL NEAR ORMOD, SOUTH OF MUNKACS.

BG805A

ADD NEW YORK WILL XX THEIR ESTATES.

MRS. WOOD, THE WIDOW OF BENJAMIN WOOD, PUBLISHER OF THE OLD NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, WAS A REIGNING FIGURE IN THE COLORFUL SOCIAL LIFE OF THE 90'S. AFTER THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND IN 1900, SHE FORSOOK THE BRILLIANT LIFE SHE HAD ALWAYS LED AND DECIDED TO CARRY ON HER HUSBAND'S BUSINESS ENTERPRISES.

WITH THE ACUMEN OF A WALL STREET GENIUS, SHE PRESERVED THE FORTUNE LEFT TO HER AND GRADUALLY ADDED MORE AND MORE.

MORE806A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118673

ADD BRATISLAVA LEAD SLOVAKS BY STEINKOPF XX FUTURE."

THE PARLIAMENT MET BEHIND CLOSED DOORS TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF CUTTING SLOVAKIA LOOSE FROM THE SHRUNKEN CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND CREATE A NEW EUROPEAN NATION UNDER THE PROTECTION OF GERMANY.

IT HAD BEEN CONVOKED AT GERMANY'S INSISTENCE. TISO FLEW BACK FROM A BERLIN CONFERENCE WITH CHANCELLOR HITLER TO PRESIDE.

THE PEACE OF MUNICH MADE SLOVAKIA AUTONOMOUS WITHIN THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE. TODAY'S DECISION BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND CONTINUED CONNECTION WITH THE PRAGUE GOVERNMENT WAS DECIDED BY A STANDING VOTE AND WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION EVEN BEFORE PARLIAMENT MET.

THE NEW SLOVAK NATION HAS A POPULATION OF 2,600,000, MOSTLY SLOVAKS.

AN UNANSWERED QUESTION IMMEDIATELY CONFRONTING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS ITS RELATION TO CARPATHO-UKRAINE--THE THIRD AND EASTERNMOST POLITICAL DIVISION OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER MUNICH.

MORE843A

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NU46

C118674

DAY LEAD CHINESE (NEW) WITH TOKYO

SHANGHAI, MARCH 14-(AP)-DOMEI, JAPANESE NEWS AGENCY, REPORTED TODAY FROM NANKING THAT THE NANKING REFORMED AND PEIPING (JAPANESE-DOMINATED) GOVERNMENTS WILL DISCUSS ADOPTION OF A COMMON FRONT AGAINST "POWERS EXTENDING ASSISTANCE" TO THE CENTRAL CHINESE GOVERNMENT. MEMBERS OF THE TWO GOVERN-MENTS ARE TO MEET AT NANKING MARCH 29.

MORE855A

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SECOND LEAD SLOVAKS

BRATISLAVA, MARCH 14-(AP)-THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC WAS TORN APART TODAY BY A SLOVAK PARLIAMENT ACTING UNDER THE PROTECTION OF CHANCELLOR HITLER AND WITH A PLEDGE OF GERMAN TROOPS TO AID IN CASE OF TROUBLE.

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE CENTRAL SECTION OF THE THREE-PART REPUBLIC DECLARED THE INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVAKIA AND CREATED A NEW NATION UNDER GERMANY'S WING SHORTLY AFTER NOON.

MORE856A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NOT XX NOON.

C118675

CARPATHO-UKRAINE, THE ISOLATED EASTERNMOST SECTION REGARDED NOW AS LOST TO PRAGUE, WAS REPORTED PARTIALLY OCCUPIED BY HUNGARIAN TROOPS.

(IN PRAGUE, THE CZECHO-SLOVAK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS SAID TO HAVE RESIGNED IN THE CRISIS. THERE WERE REPORTS OF LARGE TROOP MOVEMENTS IN GERMANY.D

A REPUBLICAN XXX ETC PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF LEAD.

BG857A

ADD SHANGHAI DAY LEAD CHINESE XX MARCH 29.

DOMEI SAID IT UNDERSTOOD THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN SINGLED OUT "FOR PARTICULARLY VIGOROUS COUNTER-MEASURES."

(LAST WEDNESDAY, THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, SIR JOHN SIMON, ANNOUNCED TWO BRITISH BANKS HAD CONTRIBUTED £5,000,000 TO A CURRENCY STABILIZATION FUND SET UP BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. ON DEC. 15 THE UNITED STATES MADE A $25,000,000 CREDIT AVAILABLE TO CHINA.D

BG859A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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ADD BRATISLAVA LEAD SLOVAKS (AT 845AD XX PLAN.D

MEMBERS OF TISO'S GOVERNMENT INCLUDED:-

FOREIGN AFFAIRS---DR. FERDINAND DURCANSKY, WHO HAD BEEN COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER IN THE TISO CABINET OUSTED BY PRAGUE FRIDAY.

VICE-PREMIER--PROF. BELA TUKA.

WAR MINISTER--M. CSALTOS.

MINISTER OF EDUCATION--JOSEF SIVAK, WHO WAS PREMIER FOR A DAY LAST WEEK.

THE LAST PREMIER UNDER CZECH DOMINANCE, KARL SIDOR, WAS DROPPED FROM THE PICTURE.

BG905A

ESSY WEST

BUENOS AIRES, MARCH 14-(AP)-ARGENTINA IS CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY, UNOFFICIAL BUT RELIABLE SOURCES SAID TODAY, TO BARTER 100,000 TONS OF WHEAT IN EXCHANGE FOR GERMAN-MADE RAILWAY EQUIPMENT. AT THE PRESENT WHEAT PRICES HERE, THE DEAL WOULD AMOUNT ROUGHLY TO $175,000.

BG906A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NO 2

95

SECOND LEAD CZECH

PRAGUE, MARCH 16-(CP)-THE SHRUNKEN REPUBLIC OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA FELL TO PIECES TODAY AFTER LESS THAN SIX MONTHS OF TROUBLED EXISTENCE.

IT APPARENTLY COULD NOT SURVIVE THE AMPUTATIONS OF LAST OCTOBER, WHEN LARGE PARTS OF WHAT WAS ONCE A THRIVING REPUBLIC WERE TAKEN BY GERMANY, POLAND AND HUNGARY FOLLOWING THE MUNICH CONFERENCE.

THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED TODAY:-

PRESIDENT EMIL HACHA, UNDER PRESSURE FROM CHANCELLOR HITLER, CONVENED THE SLOVAK PARLIAMENT;

THE SLOVAKS DECLARED THEMSELVES AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITH DR. JOSEPH TISO AS THE NEW PREMIER;

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK CABINET OF PREMIER RUDOLF BERAN DREW THE CONSEQUENCES FROM THIS SECESSION AND RESIGNED.

MORE910A

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NU54

C118678

BULLETIN

BERLIN, MARCH 14-(CP-HAVAS)-REPORTS REACHING HERE SAID CARPATHO-UKRAINE TODAY PROCLAIMED ITS INDEPENDENCE AND APPEALED TO CHANCELLOR HITLER AND PREMIER MUSSOLINI FOR "PROTECTION."

MONE915A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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G 95

C 118679

ADD BERLIN CARPATHIAN XX "PROTECTION."

THE APPEALS WERE SENT BY MONSIGNOR AUGUSTIN VOLOSIN, PREMIER OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE, DISPATCHES SAID.

OTHER REPORTS SAID THAT CARPATHO-UKRAINE, WHICH HUNGARY SEEKS TO ANNEX, HAD RECEIVED AN ULTIMATUM FROM BUDAPEST, AND THAT HUNGARIAN TROOPS HAD CROSSED THE FRONTIER.

BG919A

ADD SYDNEY AIRCRAFT XX £30,000,000.

THE BALANCE OF THE OUTPUT NOT REQUIRED BY THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE WILL BE PURCHASED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR DELIVERY TO STRATEGIC AIR BASES AT ADEN, CEYLON, HONG KONG, FIJI, AND OTHER CENTRES IN INDIA, BURMA, AND MALAYA, THE HERALD CORRESPONDENT SAID. ORDERS MAY ALSO BE RECEIVED FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND NEW ZEALAND. THERE ARE GOOD GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING, HE ADDED, THAT THE PROGRAM CAN BE ACCELERATED TO ENABLE THE FIRST MACHINE TO TAKE TO THE AIR WITHIN A YEAR.

BG921A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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WU 84

TREND OF STAPLE PRICES

NEW YORK, MARCH 14--THE ASSOCIATED PRESS WEIGHTED WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX OF 35 COMMODITIES TODAY (INSERT TO COMED

PREVIOUS DAY 66.23, WEEK AGO 66.59, MONTH AGO 66.07, YEAR AGO 70.54.

RANGE OF RECENT YEARS

	1939	1938	1937	1933-36
HIGH	67.39	74.37	98.14	89.22
LOW	65.93	63.86	73.85	41.44

(1926 AVERAGE EQUALS 100)

BG933A

ADD PRAGUE SECOND LEAD CZECH XX AND RESIGNED; (SEMI-COLON)

THE CZECH UNITY PARTY WAS SUMMONED FOR A CONFERENCE TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT IN THE CONFUSED STATE;

TISO APPEALED TO HITLER FOR HELP AGAINST THE CZECHS; WHOSE TROOPS STILL WERE OCCUPYING BRATISLAVA ANB OTHER SLOVAK CENTRES;

MORE935A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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WU62 XX CENTRES

HUNGARIANS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE PENETRATED 18 MILES INTO CARPATHO-UKRAINE, EASTERNMOST SECTION OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

FROM GERMAN LANGUAGE "ISLES"--SECTIONS WITHIN THE CZECH PART OF THE REPUBLICA WHERE GERMAN IS THE CHIEF LANGUAGE--CAME APPEALS TO HITLER FOR "DELIVERY FROM THE CZECH TERROR."

ALL THIS HAPPENED JUST A YEAR AFTER HITLER JOINED AUSTRIA AND GERMANY.

THUS HITLER, WHO YEAR AFTER YEAR HAS SURPRISED THE WORLD DURING THE MONTH OF MARCH, USED THIS MONTH TO CHANGE THE MAP OF EUROPE STILL FURTHER AND TO EXTEND GERMAN DOMINATION EASTWARD.

WHILE CZECHO-SLOVAKIA WAS CONVULSED WITH HER INTERNAL CRISIS, GERMAN TROOPS BEGAN TO MARCH TOWARD HER BORDERS--READY TO ENFORCE HITLER'S WILL BY ARMS. THEY WERE CLOGGING THE MAIN MILITARY ROADS LEADING FROM DRESDEN AND LEIPZIG TOWARD BOHEMIA, AND FROM VIENNA TOWARD BRATISLAVA AND BRNO.

JEWS IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA--THE SECTION OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA UNDER DOMINATION OF PRAGUE--WERE ASKING WHETHER THEY HAD BETTER GET OUT IN A HURRY BEFORE HITLER TOOK CHARGE. QUARTERS CLOSE TO THE CZECH GOVERNMENT SAID HITLER HAD ASKED FOUR THINGS FROM PRAGUE-

MORE959A

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NU XX PRAGUE-

1. THAT NO OBSTRUCTION TO SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE BE MADE;

2. THAT BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA FORM A CUSTOMS AND MONETARY UNION WITH GERMANY;

3. COMPLETE DISARMAMENT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK MILITARY FORCES;

4. INTRODUCTION OF GERMANY'S NUREMBERG ANTI-JEWISH LAWS.

MORE940A

WOMEN

NEW YORK, MARCH 14-(CP)-IN A DOWNTOWN LAW OFFICE TODAY, A 25-YEAR-OLD GIRL LAWYER IS PORING OVER HER LAW BOOKS TODAY, PREPARING TO MATCH WITS AND LEGAL KNOWLEDGE IN TWO WEEKS AGAINST GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS IN ATTEMPT TO WIN ACQUITTAL FOR JAMES PRYOR, 25-YEAR-OLD NEGRO CHARGED WITH MURDER.

SHE IS MISS ESTELLE BARB, A GRADUATE LAST YEAR FROM BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL, WHO CREATED A STIR IN COURT YESTERDAY WHEN SHE STEPPED FORWARD TO ANNOUNCE SHE WAS REPRESENTING PRYOR, ACCUSED OF SHOOTING AND KILLING ANOTHER NEGRO LAST JANUARY.

MORE946A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU98

FINANCE

BUFFALO, N.Y., MARCH 28-CAPO-HOGS 200; GOOD AND CHOICE 200 LB WEIGHTS 8.15; TRUCKED-INS 140-220 LBS 7.65-8.00.

CATTLE 150; GOOD YEARLING STEERS 10.75; FLESHY DAIRY COWS 5.75-6.65; MEDIUM 7.00-7.25. CALVES 100; VEALERS 12.00 DOWN.

SHEEP 200; LAMBS FIRM; GOOD AND CHOICE 90 LBS DOWN 9.40-9.60; OTHERS CLASSES UNCHANGED.

X1126A

BULLETIN LEAD SLOVAK

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 28-CCP CABLED-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THERE HAD BEEN NO CIRCUMSTANCES IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COMPELLING GREAT BRITAIN TO IMPLEMENT THE GUARANTEE OF THE CZECH FRONTIERS PROPOSED AT MUNICH.

MORE X1127A

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NU94 CORRECTION
IN LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH FIRST PGH READ XX "GOVERNMENT SAID GERMANY (NOT GERMAN) ETC (MECH)

C118684

CP NU MARCH 22 LD1104A

ADD BERLIN SECOND LEAD GERMAN XX GERMANY.

SWINEMUENDE IS GERMANY'S BALTIC SEA-BASE 120 MILES NORTH OF BERLIN.

THE CHANCELLOR PRESUMABLY LEFT IN THE HANDS OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, DEALINGS WITH A DELEGATION OF THREE LITHUANIAN CABINET MINISTERS DUE HERE AT 6 P.M. (NOON EST).

THEY ARE TO ARRANGE DETAILS OF THE TRANSFER OF MEMEL BACK TO GERMANY AND GIVE IT LEGAL FORM.

HIS NEW ACQUISITION XX PICKING UP SECOND PGH OF LEAD.

LD1106A

ADD LINCOLN LEAD RACING XX HANDICAP.

THE GOING WAS FAIRLY GOOD AND THE FIELD GOT AWAY QUICKLY TO A FINE START. OVER THE FIRST FURLONG THE FIELD WAS CROWDED ON THE STAND SIDE OF THE COURSE AND THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF SCRIMMAGING.

MORE1107A

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NU[illegible] XX SCRIMMAGING.

DOMAHA AND MICKIE BULGER WERE LEADING AFTER 1 1/2 FURLONGS. AT THE HALF MILE DOMAHA WAS OUT IN FRONT, LEADING MICKIE BULGER AND TEMERAIRE, WITH HALCYON GIFT, ALDINE, GALSONIA AND SQUADRON CASTLE, WHO WAS GOING EXCEPTIONALLY WELL AND MAKING FOR THE RAILS, IN PURSUIT.

MORE1108A

ADD FAIR GROUNDS SCRATCHES DECLARED OFF.

CLEAR AND FAST.

LD1108A

95

[illegible]D LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX TODAY.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, SIR SAMUEL HOARE, HOME SECRETARY, SUBSTITUTING FOR PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN, SAID:-

MORE1109A

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[illegible]96 XX SAIDS-

"THE LITHUANIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO WAS RECENTLY IN BERLIN, RECEIVED WHILE THERE DEMANDS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR IMMEDIATE CESSION OF MEMELLAND TO THE REICH, COUPLED WITH A THREAT THAT IN THE EVENT OF RESISTANCE OR APPEAL FOR SUPPORT ELSEWHERE THE MATTER WOULD BE DEALT WITH, NOT DIPLOMATICALLY BUT IN A MILITARY SENSE."

X1110A

ABERDEEN, SCOTLAND, MARCH 22-CCP CABLED-COLIN N. THORNTON-KEMSLEY, NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE, AND A.J. IRVINE, LIBERAL, WERE NOMINATED TODAY FOR THE KINCARDINE AND WEST ABERDEEN BY-ELECTION.

THE VACANCY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WAS CREATED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF SIR MALCOLM BARCLAY-HARVEY AS GOVERNOR OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA. IN THE 1935 GENERAL ELECTION SIR MALCOLM POLLED 12,477 VOTES AGAINST 9,841 FOR MR. IRVINE, GIVING THE FORMER A MAJORITY OF 2,636.

J X1112A

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NU99

C118687

FINANCE

LIVERPOOL, MARCH 22-(CAPO-CLOSING) PRODUCE PRICES UNCHANGED.

X1119A

FINANCE

NEW YORK, MARCH 22-(CAPO-SANTOS COFFEE FUTURES OPENED 5-5 LOWER. MCH UNQUOTED; MAY 5.82; JLY 5.84; SEP 5.91; DEC 5.98. RIO FUTURES 1 LOWER. MCH UNQUOTED; MAY 4.15A; JLY UNQUOTED; SEP 4.07A; DEC 4.07.

X1120A

LEAD ITALIAN

ROME, MARCH 22-(CAPO-THE FASCIST GRAND COUNCIL'S RENEWED ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS WAS SAID BY THE AUTHORITATIVE EDITOR VIRGINIO GAYDA TODAY TO MEAN THAT ITALY WOULD BE WITH GERMANY IN WAR AS WELL AS IN DIPLOMACY.

THE GRAND COUNCIL THIS MORNING ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT BY WHICH ITALY, IN EFFECT, WARNED THE DEMOCRATIC POWERS THAT JOINT ACTION TO CHECK THE ROME-BERLIN ALLIANCE MIGHT INCUR THE RISK OF WAR.

MORE X1121A

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NU100

95

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX SENSE."

PREVIOUSLY SIR SAMUEL HAD TOLD THE HOUSE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING CALLING A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COUNCIL TO CONSIDER GERMANY'S RAPID EXPANSION, CONTINUED TODAY BY THE ABSORPTION OF MEMEL, YIELDED BY LITHUANIA.

A GOVERNMENT WHIP, PATRICK MUNRO, DISCLOSED GREAT BRITAIN IS CONDUCTING MILITARY STAFF TALKS, THROUGH MILITARY ATTACHES, WITH FRANCE, RUSSIA, DENMARK, SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, RUMANIA, TURKEY, GREECE AND THE NETHERLANDS.

MR. MUNRO ANSWERED "NO" TO A QUESTION BY JOSIAH WEDGWOOD, LABOR, AS TO WHETHER "ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STAFF TALKS WILL BE INITIATED WITH THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING SUPPLY THEY COULD MAKE TO THIS COUNTRY AND OUR ALLIES IN CASE OF WAR BEING FORCED UPON US."

SIR SAMUEL XX PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF SECOND LEAD.

X1124A

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NU131

C118689 file

P-850
1939

EOS BULLETIN FIFTH LEAD BRITISH

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 20-(CP CABLE)-AN ANTI-AGGRESSION DECLARATION BY GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND RUSSIA, AIMED AT GERMANY'S MILITARY ADVENTURES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE, MAY BE PUBLISHED TOMORROW.

MORE1254P

EOS BULLETIN MATTER

ADD LONDON FIFTH LEAD BRITISH BY SANDERSON XX TOMORROW.

IT MAY TAKE THE FORM OF A DIPLOMATIC DECLARATION WHICH BY IMPLICATIONS WOULD INVOLVE MUTUAL DEFENCE AGAINST AN AGGRESSOR NATION.

SMALLER EUROPEAN POWERS SUCH AS POLAND, RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, TURKEY AND POSSIBLY BULGARIA WILL BE ASKED TO SUBSCRIBE TO ITS TERMS.

LD1255P (END EOS)

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NU108

[1939]

C118690

FINANCE

NEW YORK, MARCH 22-(AP)-SUGAR FUTURES NO 6 OPENED 1 HIGHER. MCH UNQUOTED; MAY 1.94B; JLY 1.98B; SEP 2.02; JAN 1.98B.

X1152A

98

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX QUESTION."

DEALING WITH THE GERMAN THREAT TO LITHUANIA, SIR SAMUEL SAID THAT THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT "WERE TOLD THAT IF THEY ACCEPTED THE ULTIMATUM NO FURTHER DEMANDS WOULD BE MADE."

AT THIS STATEMENT OPPOSITION MEMBERS BROKE INTO LAUGHTER. THE HOME SECRETARY CONTINUED:-

"THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

"THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT WERE REQUIRED TO TAKE A DECISION WITHIN FOUR DAYS. XX

MORE1154A

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N 09 XX DAYS. XX

"AT THE SAME TIME I WOULD WISH TO SAY THAT WE HAVE NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT FROM THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER SOURCE. THEREFORE I THINK I HAD BETTER NOT BE DRAWN INTO FURTHER DETAILS BEFORE WE HAVE A REPORT."

REPLYING TO QUESTIONS ON RUMANIA, SIR SAMUEL SAID "THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE OFFICIALLY DENIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY ULTIMATUM FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT XX

"AT THE SAME TIME THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IS CAUSING THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE CERTAIN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES."

HE DECLINED TO REPLY WHEN GEOFFREY MANDER, OPPOSITION LIBERAL, ASKED, "ARE NOT THESE ULTIMATUMS ALWAYS DENIED OFFICIALLY UNTIL OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY HAS TAKEN PLACE?"

MR. BUTLER SAID THE QUESTION OF RUMANIA EXPORTING OIL TO BRITAIN "OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS" WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY A BRITISH COMMERCIAL MISSION WHICH IS GOING TO BUCHAREST SHORTLY.

(TRADE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS BETWEEN A GERMAN MISSION AND THE BUCHAREST GOVERNMENT IN RECENT WEEKS AS GERMANY SPURRED HER CAMPAIGN FOR AT LEAST ECONOMIC DOMINANCE OVER SOUTHEAST EUROPE. TO CHECK GERMANY'S PROGRAM, KING CAROL TURNED TO BRITAIN FOR ECONOMIC AID.) MORE X1157A

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INSERT

IN BERLIN SECOND LEAD GERMAN AFTER FIRST PARA XX BALTIC SEAPORT.

THE DEUTSCHLAND HAD BEEN UNDER STEAM SINCE NOON AT SWINEMUENDE AWAITING HITLER'S ARRIVAL. HE WAS EXPECTED TO BOARD THE BATTLESHIP THIS EVENING.

BY CHOOSING XX PICKING UP SECOND PARA (LATER INFO)

CP NU MCH 22 X1205P

ADD REYKJAVIK GERMAN AIRBASES XX OF LABRADOR.

THE COASTLINE OF ICELAND IS 3,730 MILES LONG. OWING TO THE RIGORS OF ITS CLIMATE, ONLY ABOUT ONE-QUARTER OF ITS 40,437 SQUARE MILES IS INHABITED BY ITS POPULATION, WHICH TOTALS A LITTLE MORE THAN 100,000.

IT WAS IN 1918 THAT DENMARK RECOGNIZED ICELAND AS A SOVEREIGN STATE, UNITED WITH IT UNDER THE RULE OF THE DANISH KING.

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER RESTS WITH THE ALTHING, OLDEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY IN THE WORLD, HAVING EXISTED FOR MORE THAN 1,000 YEARS. THE ALTHING HAS 14 MEMBERS IN THE UPPER HOUSE AND 28 IN THE LOWER HOUSE.

MORE1207P

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MEMORANDUM
Office of the Prime Minister C118693 File

Ottawa, Mar 23

Mr. Turnbull 22

principal news despatches for the P.M. after leaves

Seen by Prime Minister

Ast.

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1939

CP 39

BULLETIN

C 118694

PARIS, MARCH 23-(CP)-HAVAS NEWS AGENCY TODAY SAID IT WAS OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED IN LONDON THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS UNRESERVEDLY AGREED TO SIGN A JOINT DECLARATION AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION IN EUROPE.

MORE LT1112A

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C 118695

CP240 ADD PARIS DECLARATION X X EUROPE.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SUBMITTED THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED DECLARATION TO FRANCE, POLAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION.

POLAND WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE DEMURRED AND THE DECLARATION, IF ISSUED, WOULD BE SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF LONDON, PARIS, AND MOSCOW, IT WAS BELIEVED.

LT1113A ..

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N[illegible]2 XX BLOC. C118696

DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS IN PARIS SAID IMMEDIATE CALLING OF A CONFERENCE OF FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE BALKAN STATES WOULD SHOW ITALY THAT THE WESTERN POWERS MEANT BUSINESS. SUCH A PLAN WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN LONDON.

BUT AT THE SAME TIME PARIS OBSERVERS SAID FRANCE MIGHT MAKE A GENERAL OFFER TO ITALY TO DISCUSS ANY PROBLEM SEPARATING PARIS AND ROME AND, THEREBY, GIVE PREMIER MUSSOLINI AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER TO FRANCE'S SIDE.

MORE X1116A

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 26-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THAT GERMANY'S RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER GERMANY "WERE PERHAPS PLANNING TO GO EVEN FURTHER" THAN TO TRY TO DOMINATE EUROPE.

MORE X1117A

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CANADA

C118697

N[illegible]3

96

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX EUROPE.

THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED: "WERE THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO PROVE CORRECT, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FEEL BOUND TO SAY THAT AS SIMILAR ATTEMPTS HAVE DONE IN THE PAST THIS WOULD ROUSE THE SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE OF THIS AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHO PRIZE THEIR FREEDOM."

X1119A

ADD UNDATED INTERNATIONAL XX FRANCE'S SIDE.

POLAND, HEDGED IN BY GERMANY ON THREE SIDES, WAS RELUCTANT TO JOIN THE WESTERN POWERS WITHOUT GUARANTEES OF MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF GERMAN REPRISALS. IN LONDON, FOREIGN SECRETARY VISCOUNT HALIFAX HOPED TO CONVINCE POLAND GREAT BRITAIN WAS READY FOR MILITARY COMMITMENTS FAR-REACHING ENOUGH FOR POLAND TO LINE UP WITH THE DEMOCRACIES.

MORE1120A

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Secret

ODS/ET
23 March, 1939
C118698

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

1. With the disappearance of Memel without a shadow of resistance from any quarter, the most immediate ~~positive~~ possible danger point appears to be the relations between Hungary and Roumania. Hungary of course has for twenty years sought to recover the territories stripped from it during the war, and particularly the Transsylvania area settled predominantly by Hungarians and Germans which was taken over by Roumania as part of the loot of the last war. Hungary's attitude, summed up in the popular cry, "No, No, Never", was one of the reasons for the formation of the Little Entente between Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Yugo-slavia, all of which were beneficiaries of Versailles, and naturally banded together against Hungarian reprisals.

The present Roumanian danger arises from heavy mobilization by Hungary and the alleged presence of twenty-five German divisions on the Hungarian frontier as possible support. The British and Polish Governments are urging the Hungarian Government to halt, and the Polish Government is proposing to Hungary and Roumania a joint commission to consider how far each can demobilize at once.

2. The British proposals for an anti-Hitler front are meeting with very heavy going. We were informed yesterday that the Governments of Turkey, Greece and Yugo-

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C118699

slavia,when sounded as to their attitude in the event of a German attack on Roumania,replied to the effect that they were not able to indicate their own attitude without information of the reported German action and without further reflection and some indication of the probable attitudes of other Governments. The Soviet Government,which still resents the way in which it was cold-shouldered by Great Britain and France last September, has thus far declined to join in a declaration,and proposes a public conference instead.

The Poles indicate doubts as to lining up in military or political co-operation with Russia,and,in brief,are reluctant to get down from the fence on which they have been sitting so skilfully the past three or four years.

Roumania,while believing that the western powers should indicate that they will not permit any change of frontiers, is herself unwilling to enter any general pact of mutual assistance as being provocative to Germany and because opinion in Poland,Yugoslavia and to some extent Roumania,would be opposed, at any rate for the present,to the inclusion of Russia.

This covers all the Eastern countries.

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Coll - European Situation
C118700

Hitler's Acts of Aggression prior to invasion of Poland.

1938

March 15 — Extinction of Austria.
(Text of Hitler's decree)

Sept. 30 — Czecho-Slovakian crisis;
Pact of Munich:
Prime Minister's statement to House of Commons, March 30th, 1939.

1939

March 15 — Hitler orders troops to march into Bohemia and Moravia.

March 23 — Seizure of Memel
Prime Minister's statement, March 30th, 1939.

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O.D. SKELTON TO WLMK.

C 118701
ODS/AH

Ottawa, 24th March, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Can Foreign Policy ✓
European Situation ✓

European Situation.

The chief developments since yesterday appear to be as follows:

1. As regards points of conflict. There has been no further developments in the antagonism between Hungary and Rumania, but there has been a significant movement by Hungary against Slovakia, on the frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine section of Czecho-Slovakia, which Hungary swallowed last week. It is particularly significant that the Polish Government is reported as defending the movement as it is necessary to secure control of the ~~U.N.G.~~ Ung Valley railway, which connects Hungary with Poland. It is, therefore, a further step in the objective which was one of the forces behind the seizure of Carpatho-Ukraine, namely to develop a common border between Hungary and Poland, so that each could aid the other if need be against German attack. This policy has been favoured not only by Hungary and Poland but by Italy ever since last September. It is not yet certain what the German reaction will be. They have taken Slovakia under their military protection and cannot be pleased with this development unless they are confident that in future they may be able to absorb Hungary and all that Hungary has absorbed.

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2. As regards the anti-Hitler front.

The Soviet Union has changed its position since yesterday by expressing agreement with the proposed declaration and accepted the text ~~of the signature~~. They have, however, imposed a very important condition, namely, that they would not sign until Poland as well as France had accepted.

Poland has not agreed to sign the declaration, but would be prepared to make a secret agreement with the United Kingdom to consult. They would be willing that France be informed of this secret agreement. This would not meet the Russian demand.

The smaller Eastern European powers, Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia have not altered their refusal to enter a general pact for mutual resistance against Germany.

It will be recalled that the declaration which the British asked the French, Soviet and Polish Governments to join in making provided for immediate consultation as to what steps should be taken to offer resistance to action affecting the independence of any European state.

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C 118703

3. The Dominions and the Anti-Aggression Agreement.

An Associated Press report from London yesterday stated - "It is understood here today that Canada and the other Dominions, while acquainted with full details of diplomatic moves, have not been asked to sign the Anti-Aggression Pact which Britain is trying to promote. In the past the Dominions have not been committed by Great Britain's military alliances in Europe, and no exception is expected to be made to this general principle.

This of course is merely a press statement, but it has earmarks of having had some official foundation, and it is consistent with the negative evidence that in spite of Lord Halifax' statement in the House of Lords on Monday, not the slightest suggestion of consultation on the Anti-Aggression Pact or any other policy has been put forward to Canada, or presumably to any other Dominion.

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O. D. SKELTON

C118704
24 March, 1939

League of Nations
European Situation
Can Foreign Policy

EUROPEAN SITUATION
AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Sir Samuel Hoare stated the other day that the United Kingdom was considering the possibility of calling a meeting of the Council of the League to deal with Hitler.

Most observers have had no doubt that Great Britain and France, while reluctant to accept themselves the obligations of the League in any quarrel in which they were not directly involved, would be quite ready, in a case in which they became themselves involved, to call upon other countries to honour their solemn obligations.

The declaration by the Oslo powers - Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands - that they did not consider themselves bound by Article 16, has made such an appeal to the Assembly rather futile, as these countries were the moral backbone of the League - the idealistic countries that were not looking for something for nothing. For quite other reasons, the Latin American countries might also be counted out of the picture in any meeting of the Assembly.

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C118705

If we turn to the Council, the futility of attempting to find in it a body which can speak for the world and is prepared to marshal world forces, is immediately apparent. The membership of the Council is as follows:

Belgium	Italy
Bolivia	Latvia
United Kingdom	New Zealand
China	Peru
Dominican Republic	Sweden
France	U.S.S.R.
Greece	Yugoslavia.
Iran	

In other words, the Council consists of Belgium and Sweden, which have definitely indicated their intention to remain neutral in the quarrel among their big neighbours; China, which seems to have enough on her hands; Latvia, which would no more venture to raise its voice than its equally small neighbour Lithuania; Bolivia, Peru and the Dominican Republic, which can't speak for Latin America, much less for themselves, all three of which are controlled by reactionary dictatorships; Iran, or Persia, which can equally be counted out; Greece and Yugoslavia, which have already indicated privately that they do not wish to enter any League against Germany - they are certainly not likely to be any more aggressive in public. That leaves Italy, which has given notice of withdrawing from the League and has not attended a meeting

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Notes in Mr. King's handwriting C118796 read:

"Read – WLMK, MARCH 25, 1939"

"evidence of hopeless floundering on present situation. K."

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C 118707

of the Council since May,1936, and the three Great Powers, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union,which are consulting in any case quite irrespective of the League.

Read MMMc 25-3-39

Evidence of Hopeless floundering on present situation

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Anonymous

C 118708 L-150 6b7(a)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS' INFORMATION SECTION'S BULLETIN

March 27th, 1936.

European Situation ✓ ✓
Locarno - Can. & the Locarno Pact

A series of measures and proposals provisionally agreed to by Belgian, British, French and Italian Governments were laid before Council League Extraordinary Session London Friday, March twentieth by British delegation. Plan thus communicated may be summed up as follows:-

Signatories Treaty Locarno other than Germany note unanimous resolution adopted by Council declaring breach Article Forty-three Treaty Versailles committed by Germany. Referring to principles International Law whish render inadmissible Germany's action in violation Treaty Locarno and assert that German Government thereby conferred upon itself no right but introduced into international situation a new disturbing element which must appear to be threatening to European security. They declare signatories Locarno Treaty not freed from obligations or guarantees which subsist entirely and they undertake instruct their general staffs enter into contact to arrange technical conditions for carrying out, if need arise, their obligations in case unprovoked aggression. Series of measures then envisaged especially reference to Permanent Court International Justice undertaking by Germany not to strengthen military measures in demilitarized zone, creation international force to be stationed in German territory near French Belgian frontiers, immediate negotiations between signatories Locarno Treaty to consider German proposals relating to conclusion Pact Non Aggression with France and Belgium,

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C118709

western Air Pact, Pact Non Aggression between Germany and Netherlands, if Netherlands consent, revisions Statute Rhineland and lastly drafting of Mutual Assistance Pacts open to all signatories Treaty Locarno and designed increase their security. Further, in endeavour reach final settlement European situation, authors of proposals recommend Council League invite all States concerned to International Conference to examine: (1) agreement organizing system collective security and Laying down conditions application Article Sixteen Covenant, (2) agreement to ensure effective limitation armaments, (3) international agreements for extension economic relations and organization commerce between peoples, (4) German Government's proposals regarding pacts to be made by it with several negotiators (?) States. Signatories Locarno Treaty, other than Germany, announce intention bring before Council under Article Eleven Covenant Germany's unilateral action, which appears danger to European security and threat to peace. They have already prepared preliminary draft resolution to ensure Council's intervention when rendered necessary by various measures mentioned above. Finally, United Kingdom, Italy, Locarno guarantor States, will inform France Belgium that, if above effort for conciliation fails, they will immediately take various steps to carry out their guarantee. Council, March twenty-fourth, adopted resolution thanking British Government for its communication but expressing view that negotiations between Government's signatory Locarno should have first place. Council invited these Governments keep it informed and decided meet again at appropriate moment.

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C118710

Various commications received from Government Ethiopia regarding hostilities that country. Committee Thirteen appointed by Council follow Italo-Ethiopian dispute met London and was informed of replies sent by two parties to Council's appeal for cessation hostilities and restoration peace. Committee instructed Chairman and Secretary General get in touch with parties and take all suitable steps for settlement dispute within framework of League.

Twenty-fourth instant Permanent Central Opium Board began twenty-sixth session Geneva. Lyall, English and May, American, respectively, reelected Chairmand and Vice Chairman current year. Committee today begins considering Secretary's Progress Report.

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C118711

P-850
1939

THIRD LEAD OCCUPATION

MEMEL, MARCH 23-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER FORMALLY WELCOMED MEMEL TERRITORY INTO THE EXPANDING GERMAN REICH TODAY AFTER RECEIVING A TREMENDOUS WELCOME.

A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE FUEHRER LANDED AT HIS NEW BALTIC PORT HE TOLD MEMELLANDERS FROM A THEATRE BALCONY:-

"IN THE NAME OF THE ENTIRE GERMAN PEOPLE I GREET YOU AND ACCEPT YOU INTO THE GREAT GERMAN REICH. XXX EVEN IF OUR COURSE DOES NOT PLEASE ANOTHER WORLD, FOR THIS NEW GERMANY SOME EIGHTY MILLIONS STAND SPONSOR.

"YOU ARE A FRONTIER LAND AND WILL BEST APPRECIATE HAVING A GREAT NATION BEHIND YOU.

"A NEW COMMUNITY HAS SPRING FROM NEED AND ADVERSITY.

"THAT NO OTHER POWER SHALL EVER SUBJUGATE US--FOR THIS WE SHALL LOOK OUT.

"SO I GREET YOU TODAY AS OLD VOLKSGENOSSEN--MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN COMMUNITY--AND AS THE YOUNGEST CITIZENS.

MORE906A

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[illegible]4 X X CITIZENS.

"AND JUST AS IN THIS MINUTE THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE [illegible] GERMAN REICH, SO TOO WE HERE WANT TO GIVE - - EXPRESSION TO OUR FAITH AND OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE WORDS, 'SIEG HEIL!'"

THE FUEHRER FINISHED SPEAKING AT 2:39 P.M. (8:39 A.M. EST). ENTHUSIASTIC SINGING OF THE REICH'S NATIONAL ANTHEMS FOLLOWED.

BG907A

PITTSBURGH, MARCH 23-(AP)-T ME NATIONAL MANUF

PITTSBURGH, MARCH 23-(AP)-THE NATIONAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION IS QUIETLY CONDUCTING A SURVEY OF THE CAPACITY OF INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES TO PRODUCE WAR MATERIALS, A.W. ROBERTSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY DISCLOSED TODAY.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSOCIATION'S COMMITTEE OF MOBILIZATION OF INDUSTRY FOR DEFENCE, ROBERTSON ORGANIZED THE SURVEY WITH THE APPROVAL OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS.

BG908A

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C118713

ADD MEMEL SECOND LEAD OCCUPATION XX MARINES.

THE FUEHRER NEXT REVIEWED THE MEMEL SECURITY SERVICE AND THANKED THE FORMATION'S LEADER FOR ITS SERVICES. A BAND MEANWHILE PLAYED DEUTSCHLAND UEBER ALLES AND THE HORST WESSEL SONG.

HITLER THEN TOOK THE SALUTE OF THE MEMEL POLICE AND ENTERED AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE AT 2:11 P.M. (8:11 A.M. EST) TO PROCEED SLOWLY THROUGH THE NEWLY OCCUPIED PORT.

THE FIRST GERMAN XXX ETC PICKING UP FIRST PARA OF LEAD.

BG847A

LEAD ITALIAN

ROME, MARCH 23-(AP)-KING VICTOR EMMANUEL TOLD THE NEW LEGISLATURE TODAY THAT ITALY HAD NOTIFIED FRANCE OF QUESTIONS DIVIDING THEM, GIVING SOME OF HIS LISTENERS THE IMPRESSION HIS GOVERNMENT WAS AWAITING FRENCH MOVES TOWARD SETTLEMENT.

MORE848A

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C118714

IN A SPEECH FROM THE THRONE IT WAS ALSO SAID THAT ITALY WANTED PEACE TO LAST "AS LONG AS POSSIBLE" SO SHE COULD DEVELOP HER AFRICAN POSSESSIONS. BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE REARMING "IN THE SKY, ON THE LAND AND ON THE SEA."

BECAUSE THE SPEECH HAD THE APPROVAL OF PREMIER MUSSOLINI, DIPLOMATS CONSIDERED IT OF HOPEFUL SIGNIFICANCE.

"REGARDING FRANCE," IT SAID, "MY GOVERNMENT HAS MADE KNOWN THE QUESTIONS WHICH DIVIDE THE TWO COUNTRIES AT THIS MOMENT IN AN OFFICIAL NOTE OF LAST DEC. 17."

WHILE THE KING WAS SPEAKING POPE PIUS XII AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR "PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE AND MUTUAL COOPERATION," A VATICAN NEWS SERVICE ANNOUNCED. THIS CAME IN AN AUDIENCE FOR 700 HUNGARIAN PILGRIMS.

KING VICTOR'S SPEECH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE HAD BROUGHT UNEASY TIMES, CONTINUING:-

"EUROPE HAS NOT YET AND WILL NOT HAVE TIMES WHICH CAN BE CALLED EASY, AND THE RECENT COLLAPSE OF SOME OF THE ARTIFICIAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES BORN AFTER THE GREAT WAR DEMONSTRATES IT.

MORE851A

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NU49 XX IT.

"BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TIMES WHICH REVEAL THE CHARACTER OF PEOPLES AND IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT NO DOUBT CLOUDS MY MIND WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE, A FUTURE GUARANTEED BY THE ARMS AND BY THE EVER MORE PROFOUND UNITED NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS TEMPERED BY THE HARD TESTS OF WAR AND THE NO LESS ARDUOUS DUTIES OF PEACE."

THE KING SAID ITALY WAS ARMING TO "SAVE PEACE FOR US AND EVERYBODY."

AS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE FASCIST STATE, "THEY CONTINUE TO BE INSPIRED BY THE MOST CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN THE SPHERE OF RECIPROCAL ATTRIBUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES." IT WAS NOT EXPLAINED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT BIFFERENCES WITH THE VATICAN OVER RACIAL RESTRICTIONS ON MARRIAGE HAD BEEN EASED.

CITALIAN CLAIMS ON FRANCE HAVE NOT YET BEEN PUBLICLY FORMULATED. CLAMOR IN THE FASCIST PRESS HAS CENTRED ON THE FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN PROTECTORATE OF TUNISIA, DJIBOUTI, THE ADDIS ABABA-DJIBOUTI RAILWAY AND CORSICA.)

THE KING XXX ETC PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF DAY LEAD.

BG855A

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C 118716

NU 5

BULLETIN LEAD SLOVAKIA

BUDAPEST, MARCH 23-(AP)-HUNGARIAN TROOPS MOVED INTO SLOVAKIA TODAY AT SEVERAL POINTS ALONG THE SLOVAKIA-CARPATHO-UKRAINE FRONTIER, SAID RELIABLE REPORTS FROM THAT REGION, AND DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS HEARD HUNGARY WAS OCCUPYING SLOVAKIA ON GERMANY'S INVITATION.

MORE X1127A

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C118717 ODS/AH

Ottawa, 31st March, 1939.

MEMORANDUM

British Declaration of Military Action
in Eastern Europe.

The British Government states this morning that they propose to make today a declaration to the general effect that in the event of pressure by Germany on Poland, which the latter would regard as a threat to their independence and would accordingly resist, the Polish Government would receive the full support of the United Kingdom. They have also indicated that it will not be possible to draft or cable the declaration until just before it is made.

This proposal, of which the first intimation was received last evening, is the ~~third~~ fourth in the series of anti-Hitler moves made by the British Government since the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia on March 15th.

No attempt was made, or was possible, to prevent the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia or the cession of Memel by Lithuania.

March 19th

The first attempt of organized resistance in Eastern Europe against further German penetration was based on the threat to Rumania, acting on the information later stated by the Rumanian Government to be false, that Germany had given an ultimatum

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C118718

demanding a monopoly of Rumanian exports and other exclusive privileges. The British Government enquired as to the attitude of Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey and Russia in the event of German aggression. Now the countries must prepare to declare their own attitude without confirmation of reported German action and without further reflection and some indication of the probable attitude of other Governments.

March 20th

In view of this attitude, the British Government next decided to endeavour to arrange a four-power declaration by Great Britain, France, Russia and Poland to the effect that they would undertake to consult as to what steps should be taken to offer resistance to any threat to political independence of any European state. France agreed. The Soviet Union, while preferring a conference, indicated their willingness to sign if both France and Poland would do so. Poland, however, remained reluctant to sign any public declaration, particularly in association with the Soviet Union. The British Government admitted that it was now clear that any attempt to consolidate the situation would be frustrated if the Soviet Union were openly associated with the initiation of the scheme. They stated that recent telegrams from abroad had warned them that the inclusion of Russia would not only jeopardize the efforts but would tend to consolidate the relations

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of the anti-Comintern Pact as well as excite anxiety among a number of other governments.

March 28th.

The third proposal was therefore launched, namely to state to Poland and Rumania that if either were attacked, or its independence undermined by economic penetration or other pressure, and if Poland and Rumania were prepared to resist, Great Britain and France would come to their help. It would be assumed that Poland would undertake to support Rumania and attack Germany if Great Britain or France were attacked by Germany or went to war to resist German aggression in Western Europe or in Yugoslavia. Efforts were made later to secure some co-operation from Soviet Russia or, at least at benevolent neutrality.

In the past few days the Poles have stated that while they had no threat from Germany as regards Danzig they believed it would be necessary to make some concessions and they had asked the German Government whether it wished to discuss modification of the Danzig regime but had received no reply. They had been prepared to make some concessions in Danzig and also to agree to a German motor road across the Polish corridor.

Last night the British Government ~~stated~~ informed us before that it was possible to complete the negotiations outlined above, there was a possibility of an immediate German stroke against Poland -

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at least it was reported that Ribbentrop was urging this on Hitler. It was, therefore, proposed, if France and Poland agreed, to make an immediate public declaration, which would leave no doubt in the mind of the German Government that in the event of admonition(?) by them which the Polish Government would feel obliged to regard as a threat to their independence, and accordingly resist, the Polish Government would receive the full support of the United Kingdom. A declaration would make it clear the policy was not directed against any legitimate aims or interests of Germany, and would be so drafted as to make it possible for Germany to draw back without loss of face.

The British Government today have stated that the French and Polish Governments have expressed agreement with the declaration in the general form proposed, though neither had received any indication of menacing action by Germany in relation to Poland in the immediate future. The declaration was being drafted to be made later in the day.

It will be recalled that arrangements were made some time ago for Colonel Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to visit London on April 3rd.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C 118721

MEMORANDUM

March 31st, 1939.

For the Prime Minister:

-- Attached are copies of flimsies just received from the Canadian Press, describing Mr. Chamberlain's announcement in the House of Commons today, regarding British assistance to Poland.

A. D. P. H.

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C118722

NU73

EOS BULLETIN THIRD LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 31-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN PLEDGED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY BRITAIN WOULD FIGHT IF POLAND'S INDEPENDENCE WERE THREATENED.

MORE X1005A

NU74

EOS BULLETIN

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX THREATENED.

CHAMBERLAIN SAID HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO STATE FRANCE ALSO WOULD FIGHT IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.

MORE X1005A

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NU75

SANDUSKY, O., MARCH 31-(AP)-FIRE STARTING IN THE M.R. HERB DEPARTMENT STORE DESTROYED BUILDINGS IN TWO CITY BLOCKS IN THE DOWNTOWN BUSINESS DISTRICT TODAY WITH DAMAGE ESTIMATED BY FIRE CHIEF WILSON MCLAUGHLIN AT MORE THAN $2,000,000.

MORE THAN 100 PERSONS LIVING IN APARTMENTS OVER THE BUILDINGS WERE DRIVEN TO THE STREET. NO ONE WAS INJURED.

THE FIRE SPREAD FROM THE HERB DEPARTMENT STORE ON EAST MARKET STREET WASTWARD TO WAYNE STREET AND NORTH TO EAST WATER STREET.

MOST OF THE BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED. IT WAS THE WORST FIRE IN SANDUSKY'S HISTORY.

X1009A

EOS BULLETIN

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX CIRCUMSTANCES.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN, IN BEGINNING HIS MOMENTOUS STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECLARED:-

"THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE CONSTANTLY ADVOCATED ADJUSTMENT BY WAY OF FREE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED OF ANY DIFFERENCES THAT MAY ARISE BETWEEN THEM.

MORE X1010A

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NU77 XX POWER.

"THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVEGIVEN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AN ASSURANCE TO THIS EFFECT."

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE DMINIONS "ARE BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED."

(END EOS) X1014A

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NU77 XX POWER.

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THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE DOMINIONS "ARE BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED."

(END EOS) X1014A

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NU76

OPEN

C118725

NEW YORK, MARCH 31-(CP)-THE POUND STERLING EASED 1/8 CENT TO $4.68 1/8 IN TERMS OF THE UNITED STATES DOLLAR IN OPENING FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEALINS TODAY. THE FRANC WAS UNCHANGED AT 2.64 7/8 AND THE CANADIAN DOLLAR UNCHANGED AT A DISCOUNT OF 7/16 PER CENT.

S1011A

EOS BULLETIN

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX THEM.

"CERTAIN CONSULTATIONS ARE NOW PROCEEDING WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. IN ORDER TO MAKE PERFECTLY CLEAR THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN THE MEANTIME BEFORE THOSE CONSULTATIONS ARE CONCLUDED, I HAVE TO INFORM THE HOUSE THAT DURING THAT PERIOD IN THE EVENT OF ANY ACTION WHICH CLEARLY THREATENED POLISH INDEPENDENCE AND WHICH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT ACCORDINGLY CONSIDERED IT VITAL TO RESIST WITH THEIR NATIONAL FORCES, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD FEEL THEMSELVES BOUND AT ONCE TO LEND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT ALL SUPPORT OF THEIR POWER.

MORE1014A

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ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX INFORMED."

REFERRING TO THE VISIT TO LONDON NEXT WEEK BY THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, COLONEL JOSEPH BECK, MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID:-

"THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING WITH HIM THE VARIOUS FURTHER MEASURES THAT MAY BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO ACCUMULATE THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF COOPERATION IN ANY EFFORTS THAT MAY BE MADE TO PUT AN END TO AGGRESSION AND TO SUBSTITUTE FOR IT THE MORE REASONABLE AND ORDERLY METHODS OF DISCUSSION."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN MADE THE DECLARATION OF NEW BRITISH POLICY IN A STATEMENT LASTING LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES.

ASKED BY ARTHUR GREENWOOD, LABOR, IF AN EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO BRING SOVIET RUSSIA INTO THIS STAND BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE, MR. CHAMBERLAIN REPLIED:-

"THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAW THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING AND HAD A FULL DISCUSSION WITH HIM ON THIS SUBJECT. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE ACTING WERE FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT."

MORE1024A

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European Situation ✓

C 118727 file

March 31st, 1939.

G-100
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E.S.
P-850
1939 v. 1.

For the Prime Minister:

The following is the text of Mr. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons today, as given in a Canadian Press Despatch just received:

"I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have constantly advocated the adjustment by way of free negotiation between the parties concerned of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that this is the natural and proper course where differences exist.

In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means and they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation.

As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments in order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government.

In the meantime, before those consultations are concluded I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.

They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government.

The Foreign Secretary saw the Soviet Ambassador this morning and had a very full discussion with him on the subject.

I have no doubt the principles on which we are acting are fully understood and appreciated by that Government.

The visit of Colonel Beck will provide an opportunity of discussing with him the various further measures that may be taken in order to accumulate the maximum amount of co-operation in any efforts that may be made to put an end to

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aggression--if aggression were intended--and to substitute for it the more reasonable and orderly method of discussion.

The question of a conference is simply a matter of expediency. We have no theoretical views about conferences if they prove to be the best way.

If there are other and more effective ways of achieving our object we might dispense with conferences.

The Dominions are being kept fully informed."

A.D.P.H.

A.D.P. HEENEY

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Collateral - European situation

C118729

1939

Second Czecho-Slovakian Crisis
Excerpts from Editorial Comment on
Canadian Foreign Policy

Statements and Speeches by the
Prime Minister.

ALBERTA:

Edmonton Journal, April 1st:

"Many Canadians have differed sharply over the very vital matters which were discussed at Ottawa on Thursday. But there was no disagreement of any importance in the pronouncements made by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Conservative Opposition. ..... In making such definite commitments against conscription for overseas service, it does seem to The Journal that both leaders went too far at this stage. This is a matter that must be settled at the time the emergency arises and in the light of all the circumstances surrounding it."

Calgary Herald, April 1st:

"The House of Commons at Ottawa on Thursday showed evidence of coming to grips with serious reality..... The Prime Minister indicated that apart from ties of sentiment the question of self-interest also is of vast importance to the Dominion. Canada cannot afford to stand aloof. Apart from these considerations, the Canadian parliamentary leaders are recognizing that any evidence of division within the Empire at this critical time would be an incentive to enemies to precipitate hostile action."

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ALBERTA

C118730

Edmonton Bulletin, April 3rd:

"The statement of Prime Minister King on Thursday as to Canada's external responsibilities was free from heroics, posing and dogmatism. It was a studied presentation of the position of this Dominion as a self-governing country in relation to world affairs..... This statement of Canada's position will not satisfy the extremists. It will seem too indefinite to those who would give Mr. Chamberlain a blank cheque; and it will incur the displeasure of those who talk neutrality in terms which suggest a desire to have the Dominion break away from the Empire and adopt the role of a hermit. There is strong reason in this, as in the statement itself, to suppose that it expresses the views of the overwhelming mass of Canadians, who are neither sycophants nor separatists."

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BRITISH COLUMBIA:

Vancouver News-Herald, March 21st:

"People of Canada, except the separatists of Quebec, and the isolationist groups in Central and Western Canada, will not be proud of the statement of the Prime Minister on the international crisis."

Vancouver News-Herald, March 31st:

"There is a large body of opinion--and opinion friendly to this nation taking its share in international responsibilities--that will echo what he says on the danger of Canada risking itself in bankruptcy every second decade for the European agreements in which Canada had precious little to share..... We expected the statement on overseas participation without conscription, because this principle is in keeping with the Liberal policy, and moreover, Canada may be of far more service in the next war without a large expeditionary force draining her lifeblood, as was the case in the Great War."

Vancouver Province, March 21st:

"Why the everlasting emphasis on the point that the measure of Canada's participation in war is a question for Parliament to decide? ..... The British Government can not declare war. It can not appropriate money for the purposes of war. Declaration of war is the sole prerogative of the British Parliament and the appropriation of money for war purposes is equally so..... Our Parliament alone has power to commit the country to participation in war and to determine to what extent the country shall participate..... In Canada it appears to be the fashion for the government to have no policy in issues of peace and war till Parliament has made one for it."

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BRITISH COLUMBIA

Vancouver Sun, March 22nd:

"It is in times like these, after years of wrangling over irrelevant detail, that men in office speak out and say what is in their hearts. This week Mr. King and Dr. Manion spoke out in a fashion to touch the imagination and pride of every Canadian. There was no word of disagreement between them, no tinge of party politics."

Vancouver Sun, March 23rd:

"A Canadian foreign policy capable of keeping up with the international events of this period would be more changeable and elusive than quicksilver. One can only predicate one's actions on the behavior of others. When the behavior of others is uncertain and unpredictable, one cannot foretell one's reactions to it."

Victoria Colonist, March 28th:

"Whatever academic discussions on the subject may arise from time to time at Ottawa regarding the possibility of this Dominion's neutrality in an Empire war, are so much waste of verbal energy. It is not the fact of Canada's participation, but the extent, that will be decided by Parliament....."

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MANITOBA

Winnipeg Free Press, March 22nd:

"Mr. King has modified his declaration of Liberal policy of January 16 by affirming his belief that the Canadian Parliament is supreme in dealing with war or peace for this country. ..... Contrasting these two statements, it is clear that in January, Mr. King made a definite, binding declaration of Government policy. ..... The Monday speech, all things considered, is regarded as an effort by Mr. King to get back to the pre-January position--the supremacy of Parliament."

Winnipeg Free Press, April 1st:

"The problem of our foreign policy is a difficult one, the difficulties of which are increased by the fact that this country is not a homogeneous state, occupied by persons of a single race of common background and tradition. This necessarily conditions the attitude of this country towards the outside world, and Mr. King is right in rejecting as completely as he has done the colonialism implicit in his speech last January when he contented himself by stating his foreign policy in the terms used by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1910. The Prime Minister reaffirmed the supremacy and responsibility of Parliament, in the issue of war and peace, in explicit terms. ..... The manner of his exposition of the theory, however, leaves little doubt that he believes that the Canadian Parliament, if it so wished, could declare this country's neutrality in a British war. ..... Mr. King and Dr. Manion were united on their refusal to consider conscription a practical issue in this country in time of war. ..... Though it may be difficult to envisage any circumstances in which conscription would be applied, the fact that it remains a potential weapon of national policy cannot be ignored, and to make unqualified rejection of it, in time of peace, may have mischievous consequences in the future."

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MANITOBA

Winnipeg Free Press, April 1st:

Quoting the Prime Minister's words:

"'Often times criticism may seem too free, too reckless, too malicious, but I believe democracies survive too free criticism much more effectively than dictatorships will survive the lack of criticism.'

This is a remark pregnant with the faith of a true democrat, ringing true to the principles of government as Canadians know them. The Prime Minister, when he uttered that sentence, spoke from his heart and to the hearts of his supporters all across this country who have sometimes feared lest this cardinal principle of freedom was in danger of being forgotten."

Winnipeg Tribune, March 21st:

"Mr. King's statement to the House on Monday afternoon has a certain value as revealing the helplessness and ineptitude of mere politicians in facing facts of the brutal kind displayed in last week's coup. ..... There are certain things in the mind of the British government which are perfectly well known to Mr. King and everyone else. The passionate desire for peace and the titanic efforts being made to preserve it, for one thing. When Mr. King speaks of war to defend some minor British trade route he speaks merely for effect, for he knows that if Great Britain goes to war it will be a struggle in which the very existence of the democracies will be at stake."

Winnipeg Tribune, March 29th:

"Mr. King appears to have displayed again a remarkable capacity for harboring two contradictory ideas at the same time, or perhaps a capacity for wavering between the two ideas."

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MANITOBA

Winnipeg Tribune, April 1st:

"Mr. Mackenzie King in a two-hour speech on Thursday made the first clear-cut and comprehensive statement of his government's foreign policy which has been made since the present government took office in 1935. ..... Mr. King's statement is not characterized by boldness or by any attempt to assert Canadian leadership in world affairs. Rather he has done the type of thing of which he is past master--has sized up moderate Canadian opinion and in some degree reconciled opposing points of view."

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MARITIME PROVINCES:

Charlottetown Guardian, March 22nd:

"Having thus clearly defined the issue and emphasized Canada's attitude in the case of Britain being attacked, Mr. King went on to spoil the whole effect of his words by an ambiguous reference to 'quite other considerations' that would be raised if it were 'a dispute over trade or prestige in some far corner of the world'."

Charlottetown Guardian, April 5th:

"Prime Minister King's statement has already given rise to some confusion in Liberal newspapers. This is because it is so difficult to reconcile with his previous statements."

Charlottetown Patriot, April 6th:

"In the matter of Canada's foreign policy Prime Minister King has again demonstrated his unquestioned leadership of Parliament and of Canada."

Halifax Chronicle, March 21st:

"Mr. King is not one given to hysterics or spell-binding. His is the disappassionate and calm approach. So calm is he, indeed, that he brings on his head frequent reproaches for not making louder and more binding commitments. ..... Mr. King made it quite clear this his government stands ready to co-operate with other governments

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in any common discussions of the question. But he emphasizes the stand which he has consistently held that, in Canada, Parliament is supreme.

St. John Telegraph-Journal, March 22nd:

Those who hoped that the prime minister would make use of the present opportunity to announce clearly to the world Canada's unhesitating participation in the event of an Empire war are disappointed. If ever a chance was given to the leader of a Canadian government to emphasize Empire solidarity this was one. The Canadian government had an opening to proclaim its trust in British character and all Mr. King has done is to say that, if an enemy were 'raining death on London,' he has 'no doubt what the decision of the Canadian people and Parliament would be'."

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ONTARIO

Ottawa Citizen, March 22nd:

"Neither Mr. Mackenzie King as prime minister nor Mr. Manion as leader of the opposition blazed any forward trail in last Monday's statements in the House of Commons. ..... The Canadian prime minister's position is difficult. He is confronted with the necessity of subscribing to British policy, to co-operation with the United Kingdom in Imperial policy without knowing where it is likely to lead."

Ottawa Citizen, April 1st:

"Mr. King said while he was opposed to any move to declare Canadian neutrality in advance, he was nevertheless opposed to the doctrine that Canada should follow Britain into war regardless of the character of the government in London and the nature of the dispute. ..... The trouble, as already suggested, is that Mr. King or any other Canadian political leader, is bound to think of foreign policy in terms of political considerations. And he cannot escape the necessity under present circumstances. Nor can he make commitments as extremists on both sides demand without jeopardizing unity, such as it is."

Ottawa Journal, March 22nd:

"The extremely careful speeches which were made in the Dominion House of Commons Monday about the international situation will not likely offend anybody--not even Hitler. .... For the present, our Parliament does not have even the nerve to declare voluntarily that this country is one of the British Commonwealth of Nations and that we propose to do our part in it without benefit of clergy."

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Ottawa Journal, March 22nd:

"Mr. King and Dr. Manion said that what was needed at this time was a united front by the democratic nations. They failed to speak of a united front by the British nations--of a united British Empire. It is what they should have said. What they were challenged to say. What the Canadian people, we think, would have had them say. .....What was called for from the leaders of Canada was a clear and unequivocal declaration of the complete unity of the British Empire; testimony, at all events, to that unity so far as Canadians are concerned. What we got was a pious hope for the unity of democracy! Canada can't do much about the unity of democracy. She can do something about the unity of the British Empire."

Ottawa Journal, April 1st:

"In the main, and with some minor qualifications, what was said expressed pretty accurately what we believe to be the heart and thought of the majority of Canadians .....the great thing is the rejection by both leaders of the doctrine of neutrality. ..... What needs to be said as well is that we are determined to stand with the Empire in a helpful, effective way. In other words, we must not merely content ourselves with a declaration that we would fight. We must be able to show that our declaration means something; that we are in a position to fight."

Ottawa Journal, April 12th:

Referring to editorial comment on Mr. King's speech in American and English newspapers:

"Statements such as these, printed in responsible United States and British newspapers ..... are deplorable. ..... they misrepresent, in the Journal's belief, the real position of Prime Minister King himself. The Journal is convinced that should Great Britain find it necessary to

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go to war tomorrow, Mr. King would put Canada by her side instantly and vigorously. But Mr. King, for some reason best known to himself, does not say so, or does not say so clearly, prefers to use 'weasel' words that bring nothing but confusion and weakness at home and misunderstanding and misrepresentation abroad. Is it yet too late to have a clear statement telling where Canada does stand?"

Toronto Star, March 21st:

"Canada is an integral part of the British Commonwealth and ready to share in the risks and costs of the partnership as well as in its privileges. She cannot be in the Commonwealth when the wind blows fair and out of it when storms arise. She is proud of the bond that unites her to other British nations and will not fail in fulfilling every obligation that attaches to her position in the British family. The declaration made by Premier King in parliament yesterday may not have contained these assurances in so many words because of the premier's oft-repeated pledge that parliament would determine Canada's policy in an emergency. But it is a right assumption that his declaration had that meaning."

Toronto Globe and Mail, March 21st:

"Although Prime Minister King's statement in the House of Commons yesterday was far from being a rallying cry for the Empire and other democracies, it struck a note of encouragement in which realists can find comfort. ..... The shaping of events shows the necessity of strength through unity. Only thus can defeat be brought to the totalitarian countries as promised by Canada's Premier. Axis has to be met by axis. A united Empire as a segment of a united democracy must be the answer to a united dictatorship to preserve the liberty which Mr. King declares, along with Mr. Chamberlain, will never be surrendered. ..... The words of the two leaders are encouraging, but we still wait to hear them say that Canada's heritage would be a poor thing indeed to count on if the strong protective arm of Britain failed."

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Hamilton Spectator, March 21st:

"Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, has come a good deal closer than he ever has been before to an emphatic pronouncement on Canada's obligations as a partner in the British Empire. .....Neither Mr. King nor Dr. Manion sounded notes of alarm. But they accepted a possible challenge less as politicians--and that is significant--than as Canadians."

Hamilton Spectator, March 31st:

"These are days of humiliation for Canada. A mighty world Empire was caught napping, because of a benevolent but, as it turns out, a sadly mistaken idea that the lead it gave in policies of conciliation and non-aggression would be followed by other nations. ..... What is Canada's official attitude at this time of crisis? Our Prime Minister, for obvious political reasons, makes the announcement that he is not 'prepared to support any action that may be decided upon by the government at Westminster'."

Quoting Sir Wilfrid Laurier's words in 1914, the Spectator continues: "What majesty and vision were in these words! What forthright leadership, compared to the miserable equivocations of Messrs. King and Manion, damned in the eyes of all decent Canadians by the approval of Mr. J. S. Woodsworth. Such obvious politicial fiddling by the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition while civilization burns will never be forgiven by the Canadian people."

Windsor Star, March 21st, 1939:

"It needs no official statement from our Prime Minister to make this point clear. Everyone with the slightest appreciation of the temper of the country knows

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what is in Canadian minds so far as empire defense and devotion to the broad cause of democracy are concerned. ..... At the same time, the Prime Minister's speech indicates that he has no doubt as to what Parliament would do in any genuine emergency."

Windsor Star, March 25th:

"It may be politically expedient, at the moment, for the Mackenzie King Government to promise that there shall be no conscription in Canada in the event of war. It would be fatuous, however, to argue that a policy set down in black and white today could be adhered to, say, a year from now. ..... No one can give definite assurance that the same extremity might not arise again. And no one would be so foolish as to attempt it--except those who'll promise anything in return for votes."

Woodstock Sentinel Review, March 23rd:

"It is pointed out, of course, that Mr. King gives no undertaking that Canada will go to the aid of Britain unless enemy bombers 'rain death over London.' An attack by Germany upon France, for example, in repelling which Britain would be bound to aid, would evidently not come within the purview of the Canadian government. ..... Mr. King's statement, long delayed for fear of alarming Quebec, has brought the inevitable protest from that quarter, though it is too vague to be of value in moral support to the British government. ..... The Quebec idea of national unity is that eight provinces should repudiate British connection in order to keep on good terms with the ninth. The price is too great."

Financial Post, April 1st:

"There is evidence that Mr. King has at last sensed the reality of this situation; that he is willing to fling narrow nationalism out of the window and place Canada openly alongside Great Britain, United States and other democratic countries in the present emergency.

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If so, that policy should be frankly and firmly stated at the earliest possible opportunity."

Financial Post, April 8th:

"As for the Prime Minister's speech, it was a complete and scholarly exposition of Canada's position and indeed of the whole sequence of events leading to the Munich and Czecho-Slovakian crises. It was a statement which deserved a much better press than it got; a statement which would probably have received more popular acclaim if it had not been hedged about by much prolixity. ..... They will sense Mr. King's inherent desire to do or say nothing which might divide this country, his sincerity in formulating a policy which would retain unity in Canada as far as foreign affairs are concerned."

Sudbury Star
Woodstock Sentinel Review, March 24th:

"The people were looking, as they did last September in vain, for some definite assurance, a more acceptable and unmistakable pledge to the seat of Empire that if the time came this Dominion would not be found wanting in lining up with the other units of the commonwealth in united defence of democracy. ..... Premier King was frank in his condemnation of German aggression against Czecho-Slovakia. ..... But there was lacking in his statement that definiteness for which all Canadians looked. The hope that the prime minister would announce a bold and solid stand against the aggressors did not materialize. His attitude was barely lukewarm in a situation that justified a more courageous and satisfying expression of policy."

St. Mary's Journal-Argus
Woodstock Sentinel Review, March 25th:

"The utterances of both these men in Ottawa this week were unsatisfactory to all but a handful of Canada's citizens. They were garbled with if's and but's vague and unconvincing, and in no way in tune with the strenuous times through which our Empire is passing."

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QUEBEC:

Montreal Gazette, March 21st:

"Prime Minister Mackenzie King in the House of Commons yesterday took a stand regarding the European situation which will surely meet with the approval of the Canadian people. .... The important thing, however, is that the Prime Minister has definitely asserted this country's Imperial relationship in a manner calculated to please patriotic Canadians, just as does the resolution in Queen's Park, Toronto, express the feelings of the people of Mr. Hepburn's province."

Montreal Gazette, April 1st:

"Nobody is going to take the Prime Minister to task for his assertion that Parliament is supreme in deciding for peace or war. None the less, nobody but a dreamer will pretend that a policy of neutrality for this or any other Dominion is a practical possibility if Britain goes to war. Indeed, it is more than likely that, in such an eventuality, the issue might be taken out of our hands in the event of inaction on our part."

Montreal Star, March 31st:

"Mr. King could have said in five minutes, or in ten minutes at the very outside, what the great majority of Canadians wanted him to say. He spoke for two hours, and at the end of that time he had not said it. At one point and in one respect only could his statement be classed as satisfactory. He declined to have anything to do with neutrality—and neutrality, of course, is impossible."

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QUEBEC

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Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, March 31st:

"In the light of the declarations made yesterday by Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Hon. R. J. Manion, Leader of the Opposition, at Ottawa a good deal of premature and hysterical agitation looks decidedly silly. ..... Mr. King tries to admit and deny this in one breath by a hair-splitting logic which contends that although Canada may be in a state of war when Britain is at war, she is not actually at war until Parliament so decides. If the Prime Minister can make any political capital out of such a niggardly distinction, he is welcome to it."

Le Canada, March 31st:

"The statement made yesterday by Mr. King will not please everybody, but it will satisfy the great majority of our population if they are truly Canadians. ..... Mr. King's speech is that of a statesman and the destinies of Canada are in good hands."

Le Canada, April 11th:

"The discontent aroused among the Imperialists by Mr. King's attitude is only equalled by that of our own Nationalists, who would like to have obtained the promise that Canada would never participate in any war where, by force of circumstances, the British Commonwealth would find itself involved. ... The moderation of Mr. King, the wisdom of his words, are the expression of this spirit of conciliation which, while awaiting the unfolding of events, allows public opinion to crystalize."

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C118746

QUEBEC

L'Echo du Nord, March 24th:

"The news from Europe is less alarming than the speeches of our political leaders in the House of Commons. It is extraordinary to hear them proclaiming themselves as supporters and defenders of peace and at the same time entering into an anti-German coalition which, if it ever becomes a fact, cannot help but lead us into war. 'We must not cease to work for peace' says Mr. King, the while preparing the minds of his hearers to accept the idea of war, possible only if public opinion is prepared for it."

Le Devoir, March 22nd:

"Mr. King admits now that Canada's first line of defence is nothing less than the English Channel. How can the Liberal membership from Quebec continue to support a leader whose ideas it does not approve on such an important point of his policy? As a matter of fact, either that membership approves the idea that Canada's first line of defence has been extended to the English Channel, or it disapproves Mr. King. ..... What is grave, is the statement that an attack on London would constitute, in Mr. King's opinion, an attack against our own liberty, consequently an attack that would justify Canada to wage war."

Le Droit, March 24th:

"The attitude of ths Prime Minister has rendered the position of the Liberal Party in the Province of Quebec more difficult than ever. The possibility of a third party, 'a Canadian Party', still looms on the horizon. The declaration of the Prime Minister will tend to hasten the formation of this new party."

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QUEBEC

Le Droit, April 5th:

"The two Liberal chiefs have had to recourse to a compromise. In addressing themselves to Quebec they have pronounced against conscription. The doctrine that 'Parliament will decide' what help will be given when the time comes is seen as an attempt to satisfy the English Canadians. This formula will not assure Canadian unity, and is contrary to our direct and immediate interests."

La Presse, March 21st:

"The remarks of Mr. King are very opportune. They have made clear to the Canadian people the line of action which their leaders propose to follow through all the difficulties of the moment. They have at the same time served to strengthen in many ways the fidelity of Canada to the imperial link with Britain, to mark no less strongly the solidarity of the Empire and the determination of all to allow no encroachments against the liberties and the national rights of any member of the great British family."

La Presse, March 31st:

"We do not believe there is anyone in Canada who would recoil before the obligation of defending the country if we are attacked. History has proved that we know how to defend our country when it is necessary. Today nothing would justify conscription and Mr. King has made himself very clear on this point."

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SASKATCHEWAN:

Regina Leader-Post, March 23rd:

"The statements in the House of Commons by Premier King and Dr. Manion on the situation rising out of Hitler's seizure of Czecho-Slovakia attest to unity of purpose in Canada and behind Great Britain in the event of war."

Regina Leader-Post, April 3rd:

"Prime Minister King in his contribution to the debate again revealed himself a man of middle course position. In the matter of a war that might not be carried to the shores of Canada, the Dominion may have to proceed on a voluntary basis if Canadian unity is to be preserved..... Mr. King is a Canadian nationalist to some extent but British to the point that he would have Canada fight to the last man and the last dollar if there is to be danger to liberties and other prized traditions that we associate with the British picture."

Regina Star, March 21st:

"Prime Minister Mackenzie King's statement referring to the Czecho-Slovakian aftermath will not inspire his countrymen..... It is the customary cold analysis characteristic of the Prime Minister, full of dialectical twists and founded on the determination not to say anything not justified by critical reasoning..... In spite of these defects of sentiment the statement does go far to assure Great Britain that Canada will not stand by idly in case of attack or unwarranted aggression..... It is sufficient to indicate perhaps without committing us too far, that we are as one with all other nations who deplore and condemn the outrage."

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SASKATCHEWAN

C 118749

Regina Star, April 1st:

"Mr. Mackenzie King's foreign policy speech poses an important question for Canada. The Prime Minister made it clear that conscription and similar effort will not be made for the assistance of Great Britain beyond Canadian borders. ..... By the same token, then, Britain would be entitled to think that the United Kingdom should concentrate entirely on other defence and let independent Canada handle its own affairs. Such, indeed, is likely to be the attitude forced upon Britain if war comes soon. The question, therefore, is: What is Canada preparing to do to preserve this 'independence'?"

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BAY LEAD ITALIAN (NEW)

ROME, APRIL 3-(AP)-VIRGINIO GAYDA, AUTHORITATIVE FASCIST EDITOR, ADDRESSED ADVICE TODAY TO FRANCE AND POLAND IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE PARTNERS OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS.

MORE X1017A

BULLETIN LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, APRIL 3-(AP)-THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INDICATED TODAY IT WAS PREPARED TO MAKE RUMANIA A LOAN FOR REARMAMENT.

MORE X1018A

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C118751

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX REARMAMENT.

RICHARD BUTLER, UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANNOUNCED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

"THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE AT ALL TIMES PREPARED TO GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING REARMAMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS IN NAVAL AND OTHER SPHERES."

X1020A

ADD ROME DAY LEAD ITALIAN XX AXIS.

GAYDA ADVISED FRANCE THAT ITALY'S WAIT FOR SATISFACTION OF HER COLONIAL AMBITIONS MIGHT BE BRIEF.

PREMIER MUSSOLINI'S REMARKED LAST WEEK THAT ITALY WAS READY TO WAIT, GAYDA WROTE IN THE NEWSPAPER IL GIORNALE DAJLITALIA, "CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS MEANING UNLIMITED WAITING UNTIL IT BECOMES TACIT RENUNCIATION."

HE COUPLED THIS WITH A "FRIENDLY REMINDER" TO POLAND OF WHAT HAPPENED TO CZECHO-SLOVAKIA DESPITE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN PROMISES AND CAUTIONED THE WARSAW GOVERNMENT AGAINST ENTERING ANY ANTI-GERMAN ALLIANCE. X1022A

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C 118752

CORRECTION

IN ADD ROME DAY LEAD ITALIAN SECOND LAST PARA READ XX GIORNALE D'ITALIA, (NOT DAULITALIA), "CANNOT ETC. (TF) CP NU APR 6 X1024A

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX SPHERES."

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, MR. BUTLER ADDED "THE QUESTION OF DANZIG WILL NO DOUBT BE DISCUSSED WITH COLONEL BECK (THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER WHO ARRIVES THIS AFTERNOON) DURING HIS STAY IN LONDON."

X1025A

BOWIE SCRATCHES

2-MASTER HOWARD. 3-BARRACA. 4-SUN DROPS, GOANTELL. 5-CORNWALLIS. 7-CHILLY EBBIE, BEAUFAST, JOANEY B. CLEAR AND FAST.

X1026A

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BULLETIN

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, APRIL 3-(CP CABLE)-VISCOUNT HALIFAX, FOREIGN SECRETARY, TOLD THE HOUSE OF LORDS TODAY THAT "NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH" THAN GERMAN CHARGES THAT GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE WERE TRYING TO ENCIRCLE GERMANY.

MORE X11A

ADD NEW YORK LEAD WALL ST XX OBSERVED.

PROMINENT SHARE GAINERS INCLUDED U.S. STEEL, BETHLEHEM, GENERAL MOTORS, CHRYSLER, DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT, AMERICAN TELEPHONE, WESTERN UNION, SANTA FE, GREAT NORTHERN, WESTINGHOUSE, DU PONT, ALLIED CHEMICAL, JOHNS-MANVILLE, MONTGOMERY WARD AND ANACONDA.

BONDS FOLLOWED STOCKS ON THE FORWARD SHIFT. COMMODITIES WERE SLIGHTLY IRREGULAR. SECURITIES AT LONDON, PARIS AND AMSTERDAM EXHIBITED STRENGTH.

NOTED WAS THE XX PICKING UP FOURTH PARA PREV.

X1101A

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ADD BELFAST LEAD SABOTAGE (AT 625A) XX ARMY.

TWO BELFAST METAL POLISHERS, JOSEPH WALSH AND ARTHUR MCGOVERN, WERE SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT FOR POSSESSING A PARCEL CONTAINING EXPLOSIVES.

X1103A

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX LONDON."

PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN AGAIN REJECTED A REQUEST FOR COMPULSORY REGISTRATION OF MANPOWER.

"A COMPULSORY REGISTER AT THIS STAGE," HE DECLARED, "WOULD HINDER THE VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT SCHEME WHICH WE ARE PRESSING FORWARD TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION."

IN THE DISTINGUISHED VISITORS' GALLERY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WERE THE RUSSIAN, FRENCH, UNITED STATES, BELGIAN AND CHINESE AMBASSADORS AND THE MINISTERS OF RUMANIA, SWITZERLAND AND TURKEY.

INFORMED CIRCLES SAID EARLIER THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAD OFFERED RUMANIA A PLEDGE TO HELP DEFEND HER INDEPENDENCE SIMILAR TO THE ONE PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED FRIDAY FOR POLAND.

MORE1105A

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C 118755

NU88 XX POLAND.

THESE SOURCES CONSIDERED IT CERTAIN THAT RUMANIA WOULD ACCEPT AND SAID MR. CHAMBERLAIN PROBABLY WOULD ANNOUNCE IT IN TODAY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IF WORD OF BUCHAREST'S ACCEPTANCE CAME IN TIME.

MR. BUTLER HAD BEEN ASKED BY MORGAN PRICE, LABOR, WHETHER "IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT GERMANY IS TO PROVIDE LAND ARMAMENTS TO RUMANIA UNDER THE GERMAN-RUMANIA TREATY, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CONSIDERED ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUMANIA WITH A VIEW TO STRENGTHENING HER NAVAL FORCES?"

"BECAUSE VIRTUALLY ALL HER ARMAMENTS IN THE PAST HAD BEEN PURCHASED FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA'S SKODA MUNITIONS WORKS, NOW IN GERMANY'S POSSESSION, RUMANIA IS ALMOST WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON GERMANY FOR HER ARMS.

BRITISH LOANS, CREDITS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE WOULD BE ONE WEDGE TO PREVENT A GERMAN STRANGLEHOLD ON RUMANIA, INFORMED SOURCES SAID, AND ENABLE BUCHAREST TO COOPERATE IN A "HALT HITLER" BLOC.

COLONEL JOSEPH BECK XX PICKING UP FOURTH PARA OF DAY LEAD.

X1109A

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BRITISH SEPARATE

LONDON, APRIL 3-(CP)-THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ATTACHES "GREAT IMPORTANCE" TO RELATIONS WITH ICELAND, RICHARD BUTLER, UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANNOUNCED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY WHEN QUESTIONED REGARDING GERMAN ACTIVITY THERE AND IN DENMARK.

(IT WAS DISCLOSED IN MARCH THAT THE ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT HAD REFUSED GERMANY PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH A CIVIL AVIATION BASE ON THE ISLAND.)

MAJOR J.R. MACNAMARA, (SMALL N) CONSERVATIVE, ASKED IF THE GOVERNMENT "WERE AWARE OF NAZI ACTIVITIES IN DENMARK AND ICELAND" AND IF THE GOVERNMENT "WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF ICELAND IS VIEWED BY OURSELVES IN THE SAME LIGHT AS THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRANCE?"

MR. BUTLER REPLIED: "VARIOUS REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT FROM HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES. HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ICELAND. HOWEVER, I DO NOT FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE COMPARISON AS SET FORTH IN THE QUESTION."

X1119A

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P.85-0
1909

LONDON, MARCH 29-(CP-HAVAS)-ANTHONY EDEN IN A BROADCAST TO AUSTRALIA TODAY DECLARED THAT FACED WITH "THE RACKETEERING OF POWER POLITICS" THE DEMOCRACIES MUST REORGANIZE THEIR NATIONAL LIFE WHILE PRESERVING INTACT THE ESSENTIALS OF THEIR FAITHS.

THE FORMER FOREIGN SECRETARY, WHO HAS BEEN LEADING A CAMPAIGN FOR A BROADER NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND TIGHTER CONTROL OVER THE NATIONAL LIFE, MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY OPINIONS OR JUDGMENTS HE EXPRESSED WERE ENTIRELY HIS OWN AND HAD NO WIDER AUTHORITY.

THE BROADCAST WAS MADE "WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE DOMINIONS OFFICE," IT WAS ANNOUNCED PREVIOUSLY.

LAST YEAR HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MOST ANXIOUS AND CRITICAL IN BRITISH HISTORY, MR. EDEN SAID. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE FULL CONSEQUENCES, HE CONTINUED, NOR WOULD ANYTHING BE GAINED BY ARGUING THE RESPECTIVE MERITS OF THE DIVERGENT POINTS OF VIEW.

SIX MONTHS AGO, HE DECLARED, THERE WERE SOME WHO BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE ENTERING UPON A NEW ERA OF PEACEFUL COLLABORATION IN EUROPE. OTHERS, HOWEVER, COULD NOT TAKE THAT VIEW. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF BOTH MEN AND METHODS, HE SAID, SEEMED TO THEM TO BELIE SUCH OPTIMISM.

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P.85-0
1939

LONDON, MARCH 29-(CP-HAVAS)-ANTHONY EDEN IN A BROADCAST TO AUSTRALIA TODAY DECLARED THAT FACED WITH "THE RACKETEERING OF POWER POLITICS" THE DEMOCRACIES MUST REORGANIZE THEIR NATIONAL LIFE WHILE PRESERVING INTACT THE ESSENTIALS OF THEIR FAITHS.

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CANADA

NI[illegible] XX OPTIMISM.

C 118758

TODAY THESE DIFFERENCES HAD BEEN "BLACKENED OUT." THE EVENTS OF THE PAST MONTHS "BY THEIR STARK AND SUDDEN TRAGEDY HAVE IMPOSED THEIR LESSON UPON ALL STATESMEN AND ALL LANDS."

"THERE IS NOW UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT AS TO THE PERIL WHICH CONFRONTS US ALL," HE ASSERTED. "IT IS A PERIL BASED ON TYRANNICAL ABUSE OF POWER IN THIS SMASH AND GRAB NEW WORLD.

"THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH CONDITIONS MUST UNDERMINE ALL INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND SHATTER THAT RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS UPON WHICH CIVILIZATION DEPENDED. IF A MAN HAS PLAYED YOU FALSE, WHETHER IT BE IN PRIVATE LIFE OR BUSINESS, YOU WOULDN'T THINK IT WISE TO TRUST HIM AGAIN WITHOUT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS. SUCH PRECAUTIONS ARE ALL THE MORE NECESSARY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

"THE STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT CONFRONTS US NOW ADMITS UNFORTUNATELY OF NO DISGUISE. FOR SOME POWERS FORCE IS THE ONLY DETERMINING FACTOR OF POLICY. WHILE SUCH A STATE OF MIND EXISTS NO COURSE IS LEFT TO THE PEACE-LOVING NATIONS BUT TO UNITE IN RESISTANCE TO FURTHER AGGRESSION.

MORE943A

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NUGO XX AGGRESSION.

"IF WE EMBARK UPON THAT COURSE WITH VIGOR AND DETERMINATION C118759 WE CAN YET MAKE IT PLAIN TO THOSE WHO WORSHIP FORCE THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY.

"IF SOME OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY HAVE STOOD TO UPHOLD A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND MAINTAIN CERTAIN STANDARDS IN WORLD AFFAIRS, IT WAS BECAUSE THEY REALIZED THAT FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD ULTIMATELY INVOLVE EVERYONE, ROBBER AND VICTIM, AND THEY REGARDED ENDURING PEACE AS THE GREATEST BENEFIT THAT COULD BE CONFERRED ON MANKIND.

"IT IS SMALL WONDER THAT IN SUCH CONDITIONS AS NOW OBTAIN IT APPEARS TO SOME THAT THE WORLD IS RETURNING TO THE SAVAGERY OF THE DARK AGES.

"A FORMIDABLE TASK CONFRONTS THE FREEDOM-LOVING DEMOCRACIES IF THEY ARE TO SURVIVE. NO COMPARABLE CHALLENGE HAS NEVER BEEN OFFERED IN SCOPE AND CHARACTER THAN NOW. IT HAS NO PARALLEL IN HISTORY.

MORE945A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU61 XX HISTORY.

"TO FACE THE RACKETEERING OF POWER POLITICS NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND SELF-DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE STATE ARE ESSENTIAL. THUS WE MAY EVEN AT THIS LATE HOUR BE ABLE TO REBUILD INTERNATIONAL ORDER, RESTORE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS AND SAVE CIVILIZATION FROM THE CATASTROPHE THAT THREATENS OUR OWN TIME."

C118760

BG946A

ADD NEW YORK WALL ST (OPEN TO COME)

HESITATION CONTINUED EVIDENT IN STEEL AND CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES WHERE A REVIVAL OF DEMAND HAD GOTTEN UNDER WAY BEFORE THE MID-MARCH CRISIS IN EUROPE.

THE "IRON AGE" SAID, HOWEVER, STEEL MEN STILL WERE CONFIDENT THEY WOULD EXPERIENCE BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECOND QUARTER.

FURTHER JAPANESE PURCHASES OF SCRAP ARE EXPECTED, THE TRADE PUBLICATION SAID. ITS COMPOSITE PRICE OF SCRAP HAS RISEN TO $15.29 A TON, HIGHEST SINCE OCTOBER, 1937.

MORE948A

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S8 XX WINDOWS.

THE DEAD MAN, ROY SPENCER, WAS AMONG THOSE WHO RUSHED FOR SECOND-STOREY WINDOWS. HIS CLOTHING CAUGHT IN A HEAVY SCREEN.

X1013A

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 29-(AP)-REUTERS NEWS AGENCY SAID THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ANNOUNCE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS AFTERNOON A DECISION TO DOUBLE THE STRENGTH OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY, WHICH IS NOW SLIGHTLY OVER 200,000 MEN.

MORE X1014A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NUC9

C118762

WALL ST OPEN

NEW YORK, MARCH 29-(AP)-MINOR LOSSES WERE IN THE MAJORITY IN EARLY STOCK MARKET DEALINGS TODAY.

STARTING FRACTIONALLY LOWER WERE ANACONDA, CHRYSLER, GENERAL ELECTRIC, GENERAL MOTORS, LOEW'S, N.Y. CENTRAL AND U.S. STEEL. AMERICAN TELEPHONE WAS AMONG THE FEW GAINERS.

HESITATION CONTINUED XX

X1015A

FINANCE

LONDON, MARRCH 29-(AP)-BAR GOLD 148S 6D, UP 1/2 PENNY. (EQUIVALENT $34.77.)

BAR SILVER 19 7/8D, OFF 1/16.

X1016A

LEAD FRENCH

PARIS, MARCH 29-(AP)-THE FRENCH CABINET TODAY APPROVED FRANCE'S ANSWER TO ITALIAN COLONIAL DEMANDS, WHICH Ppremier DALADIER WILL BROADCAST TONIGHT.

MORE1017A

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NO XX TONIGHT.

EXTRAORDINARY PRECAUTIONS WERE TAKEN TO PREVENT ANY LEAK OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PREMIER'S SPEECH BEFORE IT IS DELIVERED AT 7:45 P.M. (2:45 P.M. EST). ASIDE FROM CABINET MEMBERS AND CONFIDENTIAL EXPERTS THE ONLY PERSON BELIEVED TO HAVE SEEN A COPY WAS THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR ERIC PHIPPS.

SOURCES CLOSE TO THE GOVERNMENT SAID THAT THE TWO-HOUR CABINET MEETING WAS DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE SPEECH AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO REBROADCAST THE SPEECH IN FIVE FOREIGN LANGUAGES--GERMAN, ITALIAN, ENGLISH, ARABIC AND SPANISH.

DALADIER WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET PREMIER MUSSOLINI'S SUNDAY ADDRESS ON THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN FRANCE AND ITALY.
IL DUCE MENTIONED DJIBOUTI, TUNISIA AND THE SUEZ CANAL.

X1020A

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N1173

95

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX MEN.

REUTERS PUBLISHED ITS PREDICTION SHORTLY AFTER A CABINET MEETING.

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY IS A VOLUNTEER FORCE.

X1031A

WILHELMSHAVEN, GERMANY, MARCH 29-(AP)-WORD SPREAD HERE TODAY THAT CHANCELLOR HITLER WOULD DELIVER A SPEECH ON THE CITY'S LARGEST SQUARE ON SATURDAY.

HE IS TO ATTEND LAUNCHING OF THE 35,000-TON BATTLESHIP VON TIRPITZ AND FROM THE TONE OF THE GERMAN PRESS IN PAST WEEKS IN ITS REFERENCES TO GREAT BRITAIN IT WAS ASSUMED HITLER WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT DECLARATION CONCERNING GERMAN NAVAL POWERS.

THE QUESTION WAS RAISED WHETHER IT WERE POSSIBLE HE WOULD SERVE NOTICE ON BRITAIN THAT THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL ACCORD OF 1935 WOULD BE CANCELLED.

X1033A

M

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C118765

RANGOON, BURMA, MARCH 29-(CP-REUTERS)-NO ARMS HAVE YET BEEN SHIPPED TO CHINA BY TRUCK ON THE BURMA-CHUNGKING ROAD, H.H. CRAW, CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA, SAID IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TODAY IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS.

IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT JAPANESE PLANES HAD BOMBED ARMS-LADEN LORRIES. MR. CRAW SAID NO INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT ANY TRUCKS CARRYING ARMS HAD BEEN DRIVEN, NOR HAD ANY LORRIES BEEN BOMBED, HE SAID.

THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO INFORMATION OF INJURY OR DEATH TO ANY BRITISH SUBJECTS.

X1046A

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX FORCE.

PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, TOLD THE COMMONS THAT COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE IN BRITAIN WAS DISCUSSED WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS DURING PRESIDENT ALBERT LEBRUN'S RECENT STATE VISIT, BUT ADDED, "I CANNOT DIVULGE WHAT TOOK PLACE AT A PRIVATE CONVERSATION."

MORE1044A

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V7 XX CONVERSATIONS."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN WAS ASKED BY ROBERT BOOTHBY, CONSERVATIVE, FOR ASSURANCE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD "MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST CONTACT AND COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION." HE REPLIED THAT LONDON WAS "IN TOUCH" WITH MOSCOW. HE WAS EXPECTED TO MAKE A FULLER STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES LATER TODAY.

X1046A

NEW YORK, MARCH 29-(AP)-NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED PARK COMMISSIONER ROBERT MOSES' PLAN FOR A $41,200,000 SUSPENSION BRIDGE CONNECTING THE BATTERY IN LOWER MANHATTAN AND BROOKLYN.

OVERRIDING OPPONENTS WHO FAVORED AN $86,000,000 TUNNEL PROJECT, THE COUNCIL VOTED FOR THE SPAN YESTERDAY. THE PROPOSAL STILL MUST BE APPROVED BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE.

X1047A

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C118767

WASHINGTON, MARCH 29-(AP)-SENATOR NORRIS (IND-NEBRASKA) SAID TODAY HE HAD "GAINED THE IMPRESSION" IN CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT WANT TO RUN FOR A THIRD TERM. NORRIS, AN ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTER, EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT NEVER HAD ACTUALLY TOLD HIM WHETHER HE WOULD RUN AGAIN.

X1048A

BRITISH SEPARATE

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, MARCH 29-(CP CABLE)-THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TODAY TURNED DOWN A SUGGESTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS BE SUMMONED IN VIEW OF THE GRAVITY OF THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.

REPLYING TO A QUESTION BY GEOFFREY MANDER, LIBERAL, RICHARD BUTLER, UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF THE VALUE OF THE LEAGUE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION, BUT COULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CALLING A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL NOW.

MORE1051A.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NUZ9 XX NOW.

THE UNDER-SECRETARY DECLINED TO ANSWER WHEN ASKED IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT OTHER COUNTRIES IN SUMMONING A MEETING.

REPLYING TO ANOTHER QUESTION, MR. BUTLER SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR GREAT BRITAIN TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE FRANCO-SOVIET MUTUAL DEFENCE PACT BECAUSE IT HAD NO PROVISION FOR ITS EXTENSION.

X1052A

WEATHER ESPY WELLAND

WESTERN NEW YORK: RAIN AND WARMER TONIGHT AND THURSDAY.

X1053A

LEAD JAPANESE

TOKYO, MARCH 29-(CAPD-PREMIER KIICHIRO HIRANUMA REFUSED TO COMMENT TODAY ON A REPORTED MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY AND ITALY BUT DECLARED JAPAN'S POLICIES WERE NOT OPPOSED TO THOE OF THE DEMOCRACIES.

MORE1054A

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N"30 XX DEMOCRACIES.

"I CAN NOT DEFINITELY EXPLAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS REGARDING A THREE-POWER ACCORD AMONG GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN," HE TOLD JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS. "JAPANISM IS NEITHER TOTALITARIAN NOR DEMOCRATIC IN PRINCIPLE. THEREFORE IT DOES NOT CLASH WITH THOSE (THE DEMOCRATIC) STATES."

THE PREMIER DESCRIBED THE PROBLEM OF READJUSTING RELATIONS WITH DEMOCRACIES AS "DIFFICULT," BUT SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE CONCRETE DETAILS OF WHAT JAPAN PROPOSED TO DO.

MORE X1055A

BULLETIN THIRD LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, MARCH 29-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE TERRITORIAL FIELD ARMY WOULD BE DOUBLED, GIVING IT A TOTAL OF 340,000 MEN.

MORE X1056A

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C 118770

ADD TOKYO LEAD JAPANESE XX TO DO.

A FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ADMITTED THE GOVERNMENT WAS PLANNING TO STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT IN WHICH JAPAN IS ASSOCIATED WITH ITALY AND GERMANY. WHETHER A MILITARY CLAUSE WOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT OR A SEPARATE ACCORD BASED ON JOINT MILITARY ACTION WILL BE DRAWN UP WAS UNDISCLOSED.

LIKE THE PREMIER, THE SPOKESMAN EMPHASIZED THAT AN ALLIANCE WOULD NOT BE AIMED AT THE DEMOCRACIES. HE SAID IT WOULD BE ONLY AGAINST THE COMINTERN--THE WORLD COMMUNIST BODY.

X1058A

WEATHER ESPY EAST

WASHINGTON, MARCH 29-(AP)-FORECAST FOR NEW ENGLAND: INCREASING CLOUDINESS TONIGHT FOLLOWED BY SNOW OR RAIN THURSDAY, SLOWLY RISING TEMPERATURE THURSDAY AND IN NORTH PORTION TONIGHT.

ATLANTIC COAST, EASTPORT TO SANDY HOOK: INCREASING NORTHEAST SHIFTING TO EAST OR SOUTHEAST WINDS BECOMING FRESH TO STRONG THURSDAY AND WEATHER BECOMING OVERCAST TONIGHT FOLLOWED BY INTERMITTENT RAIN THURSDAY.

X11A

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NU85

95

C 118771

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX MEN.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT CAME SHORTLY AFTER A CABINET MEETING AT WHICH CONSCRIPTION AND OTHER MEASURES TO FIT BRITAIN TO TAKE THE LEAD IN EFFORTS TO BLOCK GERMAN EXPANSION WERE CONSIDERED.

PREVIOUSLY HE HAD TOLD THE HOUSE THAT COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE IN BRITAIN HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH FRENCH LEADERS DURING PRESIDENT ALBERT LEBRUN'S STATE VISIT, BUT ADDED:-

"I CANNOT DIVULGE WHAT TOOK PLACE AT A PRIVATE CONVERSATION."

X1110A

SAN FRANCISCO, MARCH 29-(AP)-S.W. FENTON, MARINE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE MACKAY RADIO COMPANY HERE, EXPRESSED FEAR TODAY FOR THE SAFETY OF RICHARD HALLIBURTON, AND 10 OTHER MEN ABOARD THE CHINESE JUNK SEA DRAGON, EN ROUTE FROM HONG KONG TO SAN FRANCISCO AND UNHEARD FROM SINCE LAST FRIDAY.

FENTON SAID HIS COMPANY HAD BEEN OPERATING ON A REGULAR CONTACT SCHEDULE WITH THE HALLIBURTON PARTY AND THE LAST CONTACT WAS MADE FRIDAY MORNING WHEN THE JUNK WAS 2,400 MILES FROM HONG KONG BOUND FOR MIDWAY ISLAND.

MORE1113A

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NUS1 XX ADDED.

C 118772

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1937

DR. W. KENDRICK PURKS, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL MEDICINE OF THE VICKSBURG, MISS., HOSPITAL AND CLINIC, REPORTED IT WAS POSSIBLE FAINTING WAS CAUSED BY ENLARGEMENT OF ONE OF THE GREAT NECK ARTERIES.

HE SAID STIMULATION OF THE CAROTID SINUS (ENLARGEMENT OF THE NECK ARTERY) WAS FOUND TO SLOW DOWN THE HEART AND, IN SOME INSTANCES, EVEN STOP IT.

IN INDIVIDUALS IN WHICH THE HEART WAS STOPPED MOMENTARILY, HE SAID, THERE DEVELOPED A TEMPORARY MENTAL CONFUSION OR TEMPORARY UNCONSCIOUSNESS. MEN WERE FOUND TO BE MORE AFFECTED THAN WOMEN.

BG857A

BULLETIN LEAD HUNGARIAN

BUDAPEST, MARCH 28-(AP)-BOUNDARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN HUNGARIAN AND SLOVAK COMMISSIONS WERE BROKEN OFF TODAY AS FIGHTING BROKE OUT ANEW ALONG THE DISPUTED FRONTIER BETWEEN SLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY'S NEWLY ACQUIRED CARPATHO-UKRAINE.

MORE858A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU[illegible]S XX CLOSE.

C 118773

THE SPOKESMAN, GEORGE SCHAEFER, PRESIDENT OF R.K.O. RADIO PICTURES, SAID THE STRIKE, PLUS PICKETING WHICH KEPT OUT EMPLOYEES BESIDES OPERATORS, ALREADY HAD HANDICAPPED THE NEW YORK FILM EXCHANGE SEVERELY.

THE DISTRIBUTOR AGENCIES MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTE FILMS FROM THE HOLLYWOOD MASTER NEGATIVE.

UNION OFFICIALS CALLED THE STRIKE SUNDAY IN THE NEW YORK DISTRIBUTING CENTRES OF ALL MAJOR MOTION PICTURE CONCERNS AFTER THE DISTRIBUTORS HAD REJECTED A DEMAND THAT THEY DENY FILMS TO THEATRES EMPLOYING OPERATORS NOT MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL.

BG912A

96

ADD BUDAPEST LEAD HUNGARIAN XX CARPATHO-UKRAINE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE INTERRUPTED SUDDENLY WHEN THE SLOVAKS DECIDED TO RETURN TO BRATISLAVA, THEIR CAPITAL.

ARTILLERY ENGAGEMENTS BROKE OUT AGAIN IN THE LABORC RIVER VALLEY AND AT LEAST TWO MEN OF THE HUNGARIAN FORCES WERE MARCHED INTO THE DISPUTED AREA LAST WEEK WERE REPORTED KILLED.

MORE914A

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7 XX KILLED.

ALTHOUGH CLOTHED WITH FULL POWER TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH HUNGARY, THE SLOVAK DELEGATION REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE TERMS OFFERED BY HUNGARY BEFORE FIRST CONSULTING WITH THEIR GOVERNMENT.

LD915A

LONDON, MARCH 28-(CP-HAVAS)-A FRIENDLY DISPUTE OVER THE ORIGIN OF A DRAWING DISPLAYED IN THE FITZWILLIAM MUSEUM, CAMBRIDGE, AS THE WORK OF AUGUSTUS JOHN WAS SETTLED TODAY WITH THE PAINTER CONCEDING IT WAS THE WORK OF ANOTHER ARTIST, ROBERT GUTHRIE.

JOHN REVEALED HE HAD AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE TO THE DRAWING UNDER THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION IT WAS ONE OF HIS EARLY PEN AND WASH WORKS. PASSING THROUGH THE MUSEUM, GUTHRIE NOTED THE EXHIBIT--A PORTRAIT OF A GIRL SEATED ON THE GROUND--AND CLAIMED IT WAS HIS WORK. IN A FRIENDLY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS JOHN THEN RELINQUISHED ALL CLAIM TO THE PICTURE.

MGRE917A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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NU XX FIRST. I WAS ONLY 18 WHEN I DID THE PICTURE AND I FEEL RATHER PLEASED THAT MR. JOHN SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED IT AS SOMETHING HE HAD DONE."

C118775

BG920A

ADD BUDAPEST LEAD HUNGARIAN XX GOVERNMENT.

ONE REPORT HERE WAS THAT THE SETTLEMENT SUGGESTED BY HUNGARY WAS "DICTATORIAL" AND INVOLVED THE CESSION TO HUNGARY OF LARGE SECTIONS OF THE NEW SLOVAK STATE, FORMED A FORTNIGHT AGO WHEN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAPSED AND LATER PLACED ITSELF UNDER GERMAN MILITARY PROTECTION.

THE SLOVAK COMMISSIONERS SAID THEY WOULD RETURN TO BUDAPEST AFTER CONSULTING LEADERS IN BRATISLAVA. THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE HUNGARIAN PROPOSALS AT ONCE CAUSED MANY DIPLOMATS TO SPECULATE ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FRONTIER FIGHTING MIGHT BE INTENSIFIED AND THAT THE HUNGARIAN ARMY MIGHT PENETRATE FURTHER INTO THE AREAS HUNGARY IS CLAIMING.

REGARDING THE LABORC VALLEY FIGHTING THE HUNGARIAN COMMAND SAID ITS GUNS HAD SILENCED A SLOVAK BATTERY NEAR THE VILLAGE OF KISKOLON.

ADVANCING IN A XXX PICKING UP THIRD PARA OF DAY LEAD.

BG925A

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NUS XX CONFLICT.

CHANCELLOR HITLER AND PREMIER MUSSOLINI HAVE SEEN GENERAL FRANCO THROUGH TO VICTORY. THERE HAVE BEEN FEARS THAT THEY MAY USE THIS VICTORY FOR NEW DEMANDS ON BRITAIN AND FRANCE WHICH MIGHT PRECIPITATE A CRISIS.

MORE X1041A

95

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX GERMANY.

OLIVER STANLEY, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE, IN DISCUSSING THE AGREEMENT RECENTLY REACHED BETWEEN THE FEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES AND ITS CORRESPONDING ORGANIZATION IN GERMANY, TOLD THE HOUSE:-

"I HAVE INFORMED THE FEDERATION THAT WHILE THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT REGARDING THE VALUE OF THE PRELIMINARY WORK WHICH THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED, RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CREATED A SITUATION WHICH WHILE IT LASTS HAS MADE FURTHER PROGRESS IMPOSSIBLE."

X1043A

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NU78

BULLETIN LEAD BRITISH

C118777

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P-850
1139

LONDON, MARCH 27-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THAT RUMANIA "HAS NOT SIGNED AWAY HER ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE" IN HER NEW TRADE TREATY WITH GERMANY.

MORE X1032A

95

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX GERMANY.

"WE MUST AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE COMING TO ANY DEFINITE CONCLUSION," MR. CHAMBERLAIN ADDED, HOWEVER, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION PUT TO HIM BY VYVYAN ADAMS, CONSERVATIVE.

X1032A

ADD BUDAPEST GOEBBELS VISIT XX WEDNESDAY NIGHT.

HUNGARIAN FOREIGN OFFICE SOURCES INDICATED THE VISIT WOULD BE OF PRIVATE CHARACTER AND GOEBBELS WAS NOT EXPECTED TO MEET ANY HUNGARIAN POLITICAL LEADERS. IT WASS SAID HE INTENDED TO SPEND AN EASTER VACATION IN ATHENS AND POSSIBLY WOULD VISIT BUCHAREST BEFORE GOING TO GREECE.

MORE1034A

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MEXICO CITY, MARCH 27-(AP)-IRATE FANS BURNED STANDS IN THE ASTURIAS PARK YESTERDAY IN PROTEST AGAINST AN UMPIRE'S DECISION WHICH GAVE THE ASTURIAS SOCCER TEAM A 3-TO-2 VICTORY OVER THE NECAXA ELEVEN. THE DAMAGE WAS ESTIMATED AT $10,000.

X1040A

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX CONSERVATIVE.

"THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE AGREEMENT CONTAINS NO POLITICAL CLAUSE AND RUMANIA HAS NOT SIGNED AWAY HER ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE," THE PRIME MINISTER SAID.

X1041A

TAMPICO, MEXICO, MARCH 27-(AP)-THE ITALIAN TANKER CASCO LEFT TAMPICO TODAY WITH 60,000 BARRELS OF OIL, CONSIGNED TO ITALY AND SHIPPED BY THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED OIL ADMINISTRATION. ANOTHER ITALIAN SHIP WAS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE THIS WEEK FOR MORE OIL.

X1042A

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N 4

C 118779

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX SAID.

HE ADDED THE BUCHAREST GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED GREAT BRITAIN THAT THE ACCORD "IS DIRECTED AGAINST NO THIRD PARTY."

IN THIS, IT WAS BELIEVED, MR. CHAMBERLAIN WAS REFERRING TO THE BRITISH TRADE MISSION TO RUMANIA WHICH OLIVER STANLEY, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE, ANNOUNCED JUST A WEEK AGO WOULD BE SENT TO BUCHAREST. THE MISSION HAS NOT GONE BUT MR. CHAMBERLAIN WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE INDICATED THAT ITS PURPOSE HAD NOT BEEN THREATENED BY RUMANIA'S PRIOR COMMITMENT TO GERMANY.

X1054A

FINANCE

NEW YORK, MARCH 27-(AP)-SANTOS COFFEE FUTURES OPENED 3 LOWER TO 3 HIGHER. MAY 5.95B; JLY 5.95; SEP 6.00; DEC 6.07; MCH 6.09. RIO FUTURES NOMINAL, NO SALES. MAY 4.15B; JLY 4.20A; SEP 4.15A; DEC, MCH UNQUOTED.

X1055A

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NU86

C118780

ADD LONDON LEAD BRITISH XX GERMANY.

THE PRIME MINISTER MADE HIS STATEMENT AFTER RICHARD BUTLER, UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOLD SIR ALFRED KNOX, CONSERVATIVE, THAT BRITAIN WAS NOT CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AGAINST GERMANY.

RUMANIA, MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID, INFORMED BRITAIN THAT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY BEGAN FEB. 22 "AND PROCEEDED ALONG NORMAL LINES UNTIL AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED."

LD11A

WITH ROME ITALIAN

BERLIN, MARCH 27-(AP)-DEUTSCHE DIPLOMATISCH-POLITISCHE KORRESPONDENZ, GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE SEMI-OFFICIAL MOUTHPIECE, DECLARED TODAY "IT WILL BE DIFFICULT" FOR FRANCE TO REMAIN UN-YIELDING TO PREMIER MUSSOLINI'S "COMMON-SENSE" DEMANDS.

IN COMMENT ON YESTERDAY'S ADDRESS BY THE ITALIAN PREMIER THE ORGAN SAID:-

MORE1101A

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NUS XX SAID:-

"IL DUCE GAVE FRANCE A CHANCE TO CLEAN THE SLATE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH ITALY IN A FAIR MANNER CORRESPONDING TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE NEW EMPIRE.

"IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE TO REMAIN UNYIELDING TOWARDS SUCH COMMON-SENSE DEMANDS OR EVEN TO MAKE THEM A MATTER OF ANY KIND OF POLITICAL TRADING."

THE "TASKS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AXIS HAVE NOT CHANGED," THE ORGAN SAID. IT DECLARED THAT IN THE PAST OTHER POWERS HAD DIVIDED THE WORLD AMONG THEMSELVES AND SAID GERMANY AND ITALY HAVE GIVEN THE WORLD TO UNDERSTAND THAT "THEY LIKEWISE WANT TO LIVE, AND LIVE INDEPENDENT FROM THE GOOD WILL AND GRACES OF OTHER EMPIRES."

WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THE OTHER EMPIRES, IT CONTINUED, IS THAT THEY "GIVE UP THOUGHT OF MAKING LIGHT OF THE VITAL INTERESTS OF OTHERS."

LD1104A

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Collateral

European Situation C(1187)82

NU28

PMS IN

EOS BULLETIN

PRECEDE PORTSMOUTH ANTI-AIRCRAFT

LONDON, APRIL 4-(AP)-TENSENESS OF THE EUROPEAN SITUATION CAUSED THE ADMIRALTY TONIGHT TO PUT INTO FORCE EMERGENCY ANTI-AIRCRAFT PRECAUTIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN'S FLEET.

X545P

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NU30

EOS BULLETIN MATTER

ADD LONDON PRECEDE PORTSMOUTH ANTI-AIRCRAFT XX BRITAIN'S FLEET.

LORD STANHOPE, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, DISCLOSED SUCH PRECAUTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN WHEN SPEAKING AT WHAT HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO BE A ROUTINE FUNCTION ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ARK ROYAL AT PORTSMOUTH.

LORD STANHOPE SAID "SHORTLY BEFORE I LEFT THE ADMIRALTY IT BECAME NECESSARY TO GIVE ORDERS TO MAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE FLEET SO AS TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN."

HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT MADE THE ORDERS "UNNECESSARY."

552P

NU31

EOS BULLETIN MATTER

ADD LONDON PRECEDE PORTSMOUTH ANTI-AIRCRAFT XX "UNNECESSARY."

AUTHORITATIVE BRITISH QUARTERS SAID THERE HAD BEEN FEARS EVER SINCE PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN PLEDGED ARMED AID TO PRESERVE POLISH INDEPENDENCE THAT SOME SWIFT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN BY GERMANY TO BLOCK BRITISH PLANS.

(END EOS) X554P

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NU19

C118784

PMS IN BULLETIN

PORTSMOUTH, ENGLAND, APRIL 4-(AP)-EARL STANHOPE, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, ANNOUNCED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE BRITISH FLEET WERE ORDERED MANNED TONIGHT "SO AS TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN."

MORE X519P

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NU2

C 118785

BULLETIN MATTER ADD PORTSMOUTH STANHOPE ANTI-AIRCRAFT XX HAPPEN."

LORD STANHOPE MADE THE STATEMENT ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ARK ROYAL AT A FUNCTION MARKING THE INSTALLATION OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER'S MOTION PICTURE APPARATUS.

"SHORTLY BEFORE I LEFT THE ADMIRALTY IT BECAME NECESSARY TO GIVE ORDERS TO MAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE FLEET SO AS TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN," LORD STANHOPE SAID.

HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT MADE THE ORDERS "NECESSARY."

~~(ED: SLUG ABOVE "PMS ENG")~~

X526P

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NU25

C 118786

95

PMS IN

ADD PORTSMOUTH STANHOPE XX NECESSARY."

LORD STANHOPE TOLD HIS AUDIENCE:-

"LONG BEFORE GUESTS CAME ABOARD THIS SHIP, 16 ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS COULD HAVE GIVEN A WARM WELCOME TO ANYONE WHO HAPPENED TO COME THIS WAY."

LORD STANHOPE SAID TONIGHT'S ORDERS TO MAN GUNS ACCOUNTED FOR THE ABSENCE OF A NUMBER OF OFFICERS.

X435P

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C 118787

NU3

EOS BULLETIN

SUB ANTIAIRCRAFT

LONDON, APRIL 4-(CP)-A DRAMATIC STATEMENT BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY AT PORTSMOUTH THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE BRITISH FLEET HAD BEEN MANNED "SO AS TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING," WAS IMMEDIATELY CLARIFIED TONIGHT BY AN ASSERTION FROM 10 DOWNING STREET THAT NO SUCH GENERAL ORDER HAD BEEN ISSUED.

MORE JM605P

file

Telephoned to the PM at 6.50 pm. 4.IV.39

J-100 V.1 C.8

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NU38

95

EOS

C118788

ADD LONDON SUB ANTIAIRCRAFT XX ISSUED

RELIABLE SOURCES SAID STILL ANOTHER STATEMENT GIVING FURTHER CLARIFICATION PROBABLY WOULD BE MADE BY A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN LATER TONIGHT.

THE FIRST STATEMENT OF CLARIFICATION FROM PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S DOWNING STREET RESIDENCE CAME SHORTLY AFTER A REPORT FROM PORTSMOUTH THAT LORD STANHOPE, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, HAD DECLARED DURING A ROUTINE CEREMONY ABOARD THE AIR-CRAFT CARRIER ARK ROYAL:-

"SHORTLY BEFORE I LEFT THE ADMIRALTY IT BECAME NECESSARY TO GIVE ORDERS TO MAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE FLEET SO AS TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN."

WHILE HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT MADE THE REPORTED ORDERS "NECESSARY," AN AUTHORITIATIVE BRITISH SOURCE EXPLAINED THERE HAD BEEN FEARS SINCE MR. CHAMBERLAIN PLEDGED AID TO PRESERVE POLICY INDEPENDENCE THAT SOME SWIFT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN BY GERMANY TO BLOCK BRITISH PLANS.

MORE611P

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C 118789

NU3? XX PLANS.

AUTHORITATIVE QUARTERS INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT WITH DUE ALLOWANCE FOR THE PRESENT UNCERTAINTY, IT APPEARS ANY THREAT--IF IT EXISTED AT ALL--WAS LESS STRONG TONIGHT THAN YESTERDAY.
R JM614P

OK DUJLEXPIRES MAY 1.

THE PRINCIPAL AMENDMENT PENDING WAS PROPOSED BY CHAIRMAN PITTMAN (DEM-NEVADA) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND IS EXPECTED TO FURNISH THE NUB OF THE CONTROVERSY. IT WOULD MAKE ARMS AND MUNITIONS, AS WELL AS OTHER SUPPLIES, AVAILABLE TO BELLIGERENTS ON A "CASH AND CARRY" BASIS.
MORE626P

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MEMORANDUM
Office of the Prime Minister

C118790

Ottawa, April 5th, 1939.

For the Prime Minister:

Attached are recent flimsies from the Canadian Press.

A.D.P.H.

A.D.P.H.

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C118791 P-850 1939

NOW

THIS IS GO ON THE DAY REPORT.

CP NUMBER 5 XXP

PMS IN BULLETIN PRECEDE ROME ALBANIAN DAY

BELGRADE, APRIL 5-(CAP)-INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN USUALLY RELIABLE QUARTERS IN THIS YUGOSLAV CAPITAL THAT ITALY INTENDS TO BEGIN OCCUPATION OF ALBANIA SOMETIME TONIGHT.

MORE XXXSP

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NU

95

C118792

PMS IN

ADD BELGRADE ALBANIAN XX TONIGHT.

OFFICIAL CIRCLES IN BELGRADE DECLARED, IN COMMENT ON THIS INFORMATION-

"WE ARE NOT FRIGHTENED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS WE ARE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH ITALY."

IT WAS ASSERTED THAT ITALY ALREADY HAD INFORMED YUGOSLAVIA OF HER INTENTION TO OCCUPY ALBANIA AND TO PLACE HER UNDER ITALIAN PROTECTION.

THIS WAS SAID TO BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE MUTUAL CONSULTATION PACT OF 1937 BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ITALY.

XXIIP

ADD BERLIN NOTE LEAD HITLER YOUTH XX THE ARMY.

AFTER LEAVING THE ARMY, MEN ARE ENLISTED IN RESERVE UNITS AND IN ONE OF THE NAZI PARTY'S MANY AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS. ALMOST FROM THE CRADLE TO THE GRAVE THEY ARE UNDER STATE TUTELAGE.

MORE4AM 2P

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NU90 BULLETIN LEAD ELECTION

C118793

file

P-850
1939

VERSAILLES, FRANCE, APRIL 5-(CP-HAVAS)-ALBERT LEBRUN TODAY WAS RE-ELECTED PRESIDENT OF FRANCE FOR A SECOND SEVEN-YEAR TERM BY BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, SITTING AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IN HISTORIC VERSAILLES PALACE.

MORE X1142A

[redacted]

NOON

NEW YORK, APRIL 5-(CP)-THE POUND STERLING SLIPPED 1/16 CENT TO $4.68 1/8 IN TERMS OF UNITED STATES FUNDS IN NOON FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEALINGS TODAY. THE FRANC WAS UNCHANGED FROM YESTERDAY AT 2.64 15/16 CENTS WHILE THE CANADIAN DOLLAR HELD AT THE OPENING DISCOUNT OF 28/64 PER CENT, 1/64 CENT OFF THE PREVIOUS CLOSE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

M

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C118794

Bulletin third lead British

London, April 5-(AP)-Prime minister Chamberlain told the House of Commons today that Earl Stanhope's "man the guns" speech was "unpremeditated."

(more)

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NU[illegible] XX WORDS."

STIMSON TESTIFIED AS THE FIRST COMMITTEE WITNESS ON A HALF DOZEN PROPOSALS TO REPEAL OR REVISE THE NEUTRALITY ACT. CHIEF OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES IS AN AMENDMENT BY CHAIRMAN KEY PITTMAN (DEM-NEVADA) TO PERMIT THE SALE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO BELLIGERENTS ON A "CASH AND CARRY" BASIS. SUCH SALES NOW ARE PROHIBITED UNDER THE ACT.

MORE X1106A

95

ADD LONDON THIRD LEAD BRITISH XX UNPREMEDITATED."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT LORD STANHOPE, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, HAD ASKED THE PRESS TO GIVE SPECIAL PROMINENCE TO HIS STATEMENT THAT THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE ROYAL NAVY WERE ORDERED MANNED.

X1107A

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W179

ADD WASHN LEAD NEUTRALITY XX THE ACT.

NOTING THAT THE UNITED STATES PRODUCES ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE WORLD'S RAW MATERIALS, STIMSON ASSERTED:-

"FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS WE HAVE BEEN BUSY USING THESE MATCHLESS RESOURCES IN VERY LARGE PART TO STIMULATE THE ACTIVITIES AND AGGRESSION OF OUR POTENTIAL ENEMIES. THIS DOES NOT STRIKE ME AS VERY INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOR.

MORE X1108A

BULLETIN FOURTH LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, APRIL 5-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THAT HE PERSONALLY GAVE DIRECTIONS THAT BRITISH NEWSPAPERS SHOULD SUPPRESS OR DISCOUNT EARL STANHOPE'S "MAN THE GUNS" SPEECH BECAUSE IT GAVE AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION.

MORE X1109A

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NO81

95

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH XX IMPRESSION.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID HE HAD ACTED TO "SPARE THE PUBLIC UNNECESSARY AGITATION" OVER THE DECLARATION MADE BY LORD STANHOPE, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, LAST NIGHT.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID AMID LAUGHTER AND CHEERS: "APPARENTLY MY EFFORTS TO SPARE THE PUBLIC UNNECESSARY AGITATION WERE NOT ALTOGETHER SUCCESSFUL BUT THE INCIDENT WILL AT ANY RATE HAVE SERVED TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONSTANT READINESS OF THE NAVY FOR ALL EVENTUALITIES."

XM1115A

LEAD WALL ST

BY VICTOR EUBANK

ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WRITER

NEW YORK, APRIL 5-(AP)-THE HEAVY SELLING BARRAGE LIFTED IN THE STOCK MARKET TODAY AND RALLYING EFFORTS WERE STARTED.

NUMEROUS GAINS WERE MINGLED WITH MODERATE LOSSES NEAR THE SECOND HOUR BUT TRADING WAS QUIET.

MORE1117A

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U86 XX 10.00.

SHEEP 500; LAMBS FIRM; GOOD TO BARELY CHOICE WOOLSKINS 9.75; GOOD AND CHOICE SHORN LAMBS 8.50 TO MAINLY 8.65 AND 8.75.

X1120A

95

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH XX EVENTUALITIES."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID LORD STANHOPE'S STATEMENT WAS "UNPREMEDITATED" AND DENIED THAT THE FIRST LORD HAD ASKED THE PRESS TO GIVE SPECIAL PROMINENCE TO HIS STATEMENT.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S TENDENCY TO TREAT THE INCIDENT AS A MISUNDERSTANDING LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT LORD STANHOPE'S POSITION IN THE CABINET WOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED.

IN A SPEECH LAST NIGHT THE FIRST LORD DECLARED THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS OF THE FLEET WERE MANNED "TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING."

THE DECLARATION PROVOKED SHARP REPERCUSSIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED A DENIAL. THE ADMIRALTY ASKED THE PRESS TO SUPPRESS THE STATEMENT.

MORE1122A

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NU84 XX STATEMENT.

C 118799

MR. CHAMBERLAIN WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE SOUGHT THE ADVICE OF HIS CABINET MINISTERS ON WHETHER TO ASK FOR LORD STANHOPE'S RESIGNATION. HE WAS SAID TO TAKE A GRAVE VIEW OF THE SPEECH BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT IT MIGHT HAVE UPON THE DELICATE EUROPEAN SITUATION DURING THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS WITH POLAND--WHICH ALREADY HAVE INSPIRED GERMAN CHARGES OF AN ATTEMPT TO "ENCIRCLE" GERMANY.

X1124A

95

BERLIN, APRIL 5-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER ISSUED A DECREE TODAY MAKING IT COMPULSORY FOR ALL GERMAN BOYS AND GIRLS FROM 10 TO 18 YEARS TO BELONG TO THE HITLER YOUTH.

THE ORGANIZATION GIVES TRAINING IN NAZI PRECEPTS AND PRE-MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BOYS.

GERMAN BOYS HENCEFORTH WILL BE OBLIGED TO SERVE EIGHT YEARS IN THE HITLER YOUTH, THEN SIX MONTHS IN THE LABOR SERVICE AND TWO YEARS IN THE ARMY.

MORE1125A

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C118800

13th April

Note - no word of Roumania said to be [illegible] after announcement made in Gr. Hoffe. - as it was said at desire of France [illegible]

Special Bulletin - 12 P.M.

Prime Minister Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons today pledging the support of Great Britain to Greece or Roumania if either is threatened by armed aggression. The Prime Minister declared that both France and Great Britain will give the two nations all the support in their power if the independence of either is threatened. He thought it was in the interest of the country as a whole that the House should be called together in view of the events that had taken place. He declared that the events had clouded the atmosphere and had caused wide-spread uneasiness throughout the world, particularly in the Mediterranean area.

The Duke of Kent occupied a seat in the Gallery as well as Belgian and Russian Ambassadors.

The Prime Minister stated that the Italian occupation of Albania had profoundly shocked public opinion throughout the world. He stated that Albania had appealed to Great Britain to aid a small nation unable to defend its own territory. It was apparent, he stated, that a powerful nation had imposed its will on a military defenceless country. The Prime Minister maintained that the action of Italy must naturally be the cause of further uneasiness, and he made it plain that Britain felt that

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Mussolini has clouded the Agreement signed with regard to the status quo in the Mediterranean, but he, the Prime Minister, did not denounce the Agreement.

The British Foreign Secretary opened the Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Lords. He stated that the declaration to Greece and Roumania was being communicated to both Governments and to others.

The Prime Minister touched briefly on the Spanish situation. He stated that the Italian Government had given assurances that Italian planes and pilots will leave for Italy shortly. He expressed a desire for good relations with Italy. He hoped that Mussolini shared his desire. He announced that the Government was keeping in the closest touch with Soviet Russia.

Premier Daladier, acting in concert with the Prime Minister, declared today that France would go to the aid of Roumania and Greece in the event of aggression. He stated that France had taken all necessary military measures to secure the frontiers of France against any surprises.

Room 309
13th April, 1939

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ODS/LC 118802
14 April, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Read to Council 18-4-39

Visit of German Consul-General

Mr. Windels called this afternoon on his return from leave abroad. We had a long conversation on the European situation.

Mr. Windels said that he was naturally much upset and disheartened at the turn of events in Europe. He had read the Prime Minister's statements and had noted the evident readiness to have Canada participate in the war if war broke out. It was of course not for him to comment on any decisions of the Canadian Government. He had noted one sentence in the Prime Minister's statement of March 30th that he thought was particularly worthy of mention, and that was a reference to the present period not as a breakdown of civilization, but one of profound readjustment both domestic and international, a period of development of new forces and new tendencies which must have their way. This he considered was a recognition of the necessity for expansion on the part of the vigorous countries whose development had been hampered in the past by internal disunity. I told him that he was reading something into the Prime Minister's statement that was not there.

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Mr.King of course recognized the necessity of change; this was not a static world but neither should it be a lawless world. Mr.King was speaking primarily on our internal economic and social change,but he recognized also the necessity of international adjustments,not by force or threat of force,but by agreement.

I shall not take space to record my own part in the conversation. In addition to endeavouring to meet some of the individual points referred to below, I took the obvious line of regretting the present impasse, insisting on the genuineness of the desire in the United Kingdom,France and Canada for friendly relations with Germany, contending that the responsibility for the deterioration in good relations rested partly on Germany's internal policies and particularly on the breach of faith and the proclamation of the old imperialist doctrine that "might gave right to one's neighbours' vineyards"; contending that the armament and alliances which the United Kingdom and France were organizing were wholly defensive,and that if war started,it would not be from any attack on the part of the Western powers.

The points worthy of note which Mr.Windels made were as follows:

(1) His visit to Germany. He had been on a

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C118804

motor trip in Italy most of his time, and had spent only three days in Berlin,at the beginning of March. His Minister and the Fuehrer were away, and a great many of his friends were ill with flu. However, he saw the responsible people in the Foreign Office. There was not in Berlin at that time the faintest expectation of any international difficulty arising. He asked in the Foreign Office if they could tell him, in view of the stories and rumours in the international press, what the outlook was. They had,Mr.Windels said, "no reason for lying to me". He was informed that so far as Germany was concerned, there was not the slightest prospect of conflict in the next two years. There might be some slight frontier readjustments, none that could produce international tension. He asked as to the Ukraine and was told that rumours about attacking the Ukraine were nonsense. Had not the Fuehrer said "I had not lost anything in the Ukraine; what should I go there to search for?" Franco-Italian relations were a source of friction,but Italy had given Germany an assurance that she did not intend to press her demands to the point of war,and Germany had advised her to take that course. The only likely sources of trouble were international Jewry and the re-armament race.

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(2) Explanation of Czecho-Slovakia occupation.

Mr.Windels declared this action was taken in self-defence. The Czech attempt to rule Slovakia by force was a breach of the arrangement made after Munich and an evidence that countries outside were stirring the Czechs up to prepare themselves as a basis for attack on Germany. Germany could not stand idly by and see a plot developing against her safety.

(3) Defence of German Policy.

Germany had not been able to accept at their face value the British statements after Munich that they wanted peace with Germany. Mr.Chamberlain himself, on returning,had said he wanted peace,but had also said in the same breath that they had to double their efforts for rearmament. Practically everybody else in England implied that Britain and France had accepted the Munich arrangement not because it was just,but because of necessity - that they would have acted otherwise if they had been stronger from a military standpoint. This was a plain intimation that when they had completed their rearmament, they intended to fight against any plans or demands of Germany's development, however just and reasonable they were.

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C118806

The whole German people definitely believed now that they are being throttled and encircled. It was nonsense to say that nobody wanted to attack Germany. Poland wanted France to join a preventive war at the time of the Rhineland affair. Russia had always regarded Hitler as a bar to the Bolshevizing of Europe. They were the allies that Britain and France were seeking.

An industrious and vigorous people of eighty million, living in a small, not naturally rich country, must have access to food and raw materials. They had asked for their colonies back and had been told they were unfit to have any. Any time they tried to assure themselves of a definite and reliable supply of vital necessities by a friendly agreement with neighbours for whom she supplied the chief market, Germany was told she must not make any such bargain. If she used barter, a device rendered absolutely essential by her position and limited resources, she was informed in Washington that was an economic and moral crime, but when this past week the United States proposed a scheme of barter on a vastly greater scale than anything Germany had ever contemplated, this of course was a godly and holy act.

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The recent charges of German ambitions were based on rumour and deliberate lying. There had been no ultimatum to Rumania and the Rumanian Minister in London who had alleged it, had been disavowed by his own government. It was only the organization of a reasonable economic arrangement with a country naturally complementary to Germany. There had been no threat to Poland. There had been a mild and friendly suggestion for a revision of the Danzig arrangement, and of a road across the Corridor between the main part of Germany and East Prussia, which was cut off by the Corridor.

There was absolutely no difference morally between seizing a strategic vantage point, if that was what Italy had done in Albania, and other countries continuing to hold strategic points which had been seized years before. It was difficult to understand how a country which held Spanish Gibraltar, Greek Cyprus, Italian Malta and the Egyptian Nile, and so on, could object to Germany or Italy taking parallel steps to safeguard their own life and security.

Regarding "Mein Kampf", that was not an official programme of German policy today. The book had been written sixteen years ago when France was invading

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the Ruhr, as a cry to waken the lethargic German people to resist the brutal dominance of France. It was written by a young man without position or responsibility. It did contain a vigorous criticism of France. However, Herr Hitler had said he would not rewrite his book - any revision could be read from his acts, and his act had been one without parallel in European history.- the assurance he had given France that he did not desire one inch of French territory, even though Alsace Lorraine was predominantly German in blood.

The action of the United Kingdom in the past week had handed over the destinies of Europe and of the British Empire and civilization to the reckless rulers of Poland and Rumania. England had automatically committed herself to follow where they led. She had wrecked the finest and most constructive contribution to peace made in the last decade - the German-Polish Treaty of Friendship of 1934, and now people were urging an alliance with Russia that would let loose a flood of Bolshevism throughout Europe.

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C118809
ODS/AH

Ottawa, April 15th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

Attached is a cable in last night's Citizen, which is the first cabled report I have seen of the uneasiness that is felt in London over the unilateral commitments that Great Britain has been making.

If Mr. Chamberlain concludes that Italy is going to commit herself irrevocably to following Germany and that there is no use angling for her support or neutrality, that may remove one reason for the hesitancy in trying to bring Russia into alliance. Now that the United Kingdom has gone so far in its declaration and commitments, its Government will probably feel a desire to go further and try to get some support from the only power that could count with any effectiveness in Eastern Europe.

O.D.S.

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Date Apr. 14/39 Publication Ottawa Citizen C 118810

Britons Uneasy Over Task Facing Nation in Filling Pledges Made by Premier

Approval, However, Given to Change in Foreign Policy. Opinion Is Not United Though in Face of Difficulties That May Be Encountered in Carrying Out Promises While France Is Encircled on Three Sides by Potential Enemies and Spanish Troops and German and Italian Guns Surround Gibraltar.

By A. C. CUMMINGS
From The Evening Citizen's London News Bureau; Copyright, Southam Co.

LONDON, April 14.—The United Kingdom cabinet which eight months ago would not guarantee against dictators' aggression the democratic bastion of Czecho-Slovakia in the heart of Europe, has now guaranteed, with all its armed forces, three eastern European dictatorships, Poland, Greece and Rumania, and has offered a fourth security pact to Turkey.

Full approval is registered today in Britain of this revolutionary departure in foreign policy. But Premier Chamberlain has no longer behind him the united opinion which a fortnight ago greeted his government's pledge to fight for Poland. One reason is uneasiness at the difficulties in carrying out the new pledges while France is encircled on three sides by potential enemies, while Spanish troops and German and Italian guns surround Gibraltar, while hundreds of Italian planes massed in Albania can bombard Athens and Bucharest, and while Italian naval air bases in Sicily, Sardinia, Libya, Pantellaria and Leros in the Dodecanese Islands have transformed the Mediterranean Sea strategically to the detriment of British and French naval power.

Want Russian Pact.

Failure also of the cabinet to make an immediate reciprocal security pact with Russia is an additional cause of criticism from believers in collective security. Moreover, the premier's decision to give Mussolini yet another chance to withdraw his troops from Spain is felt to be opening the door to further duplicity on the part of that student of Machiavelli.

The Italian dictator, it is recalled, withdrew ten thousand troops last November, promising soon to remove the remainder. Now, with the German fleet maneuvering off the Spanish coast, he may readily be tempted once more to deceive those who rely on his pledges.

More significant than all these facts, however, is the question of whether the new Anglo-French undertakings to fight for the independence of Poland, Rumania, Greece and Trukey have impressed Hitler and Mussolini to a point they will be deterred from further attacks on small nations.

Apparently Not Impressed.

The unequivocal answer from European capitals today is that the dictators completely fail to realize that Britain means business. Actually Germany is speeding up all her military preparations against Poland in the hope of securing Danzig. She is intensifying her propaganda against other countries at the same time as Rome crowds are shouting "Down with France. On to Paris."

Moreover, it is no secret in Berlin that Hitler and Mussolini hope to use Franco to make Gibraltar untenable for Britain and to equip Spanish ports as air bases for bombing the United Kingdom's naval towns, as Hitler threatened to do only twelve days ago.

Now or Never?

The dictators know it is now or never and they are not going to be deflected from their plans for European domination.

In this connection, Winston Churchill's suggestion in parliament that British ministers do not receive adequate information of what is happening in Europe has aroused widespread remarks.

"I cannot believe it is the fault of the British secret service," he says. "The whole time-table is laid down before the dictators act and the press reports it. We sneer at the newspapers but they give us a clearer and truer picture of what is happening than we receive from the ministers of the Crown. How is it that on the eve of the Bohemian outrage ministers were indulging in sunshine talk and golden age prospects. Evidently the news when it reaches the cabinet from the secret service is sifted, colored and reduced in importance. Facts, apparently, do not reach the ministers until filtered so as not to present an alarming impression."

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[APRIL 18-20, 1939]

Has the Canadian Government been consulted on the question?

No. We were informed last evening of the decision that had been taken and received today a declaration that had been made.

Has the Canadian Government earlier information as to such a declaration?

The Canadian Government had been advised of various consultations which were proceeding on other phases of the European situation, but had no indication until last evening of the decision to which the British Government had come as a result of new developments.

Has the Canadian Government joined in the declaration?

No proposal or enquiry in this respect has been made. It will be noted, in any case, that the declaration is put forward as a temporary measure.

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C118812

The Canadian Government received information last evening that the Government of the United Kingdom had decided to make a public declaration of policy today regarding possible action threatening Polish independence. We were also informed that it would probably not be possible to indicate the terms of the declaration in advance. We have today received a text of the statement which was made by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons at Westminster today.

It may be observed that the declaration by the British Government covers the period of consultation now proceeding between the United Kingdom and other governments.

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C 118813

WEEKLY REVIEW OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
April 22, 1939

1. Roosevelt's Pan-American Day Address.
2. Roosevelt's Appeal to Fascist Powers.
3. Australian Government Reorganisation.

Summary of Despatches.

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1. Roosevelt's Pan-American Day Address.

The principal feature of President Roosevelt's address to the diplomatic representatives of the Latin American countries on Pan-American Day, April 14, was his pledge of economic support to any American nation whose independence or institutions might be threatened by economic pressure. Aside from this, it was in the main an indirect appeal to European states to follow the example of the American nations and live in peace and goodwill, free from suspicious fears of encirclement and abhorring the thought of war.

While correctly impartial in form, it was in fact an attempt to persuade the Latin American states not to become Fascist satellites. In Germany it gave rise to the usual extravagant denunciations called forth by any lack of subservience abroad to Nazi foreign policy, and, more reasonably, to reminders that the use of armed force in dealing with its Latin American neighbours was by no means infrequent in recent United States history. In reply to Roosevelt's reference to his previous guarantee of Canada against overseas attack, the Nazi commentator contended that the real menace to Canada was annexation by the United States.

The pledge of economic support, if it could be carried out, would at least retard the spread of European Fascism in Latin America, which will be a serious embarrassment both to the United States and to the British Commonwealth in the event of war. Constitutional restrictions on the President's power and the shortness of his remaining term of office make its fulfilment obviously uncertain.

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2. Roosevelt's Appeal to Fascist Powers.

On April 15 President Roosevelt sent a personal appeal to Hitler and Mussolini to give assurances that they would not invade a list of countries which includes practically all the remaining independent states of Europe and the Near East. He offered to transmit their assurances to the countries concerned, and to invite the latter to give reciprocal guarantees. In the more peaceful atmosphere resulting from this exchange he would propose to hold discussions on disarmament and revival of trade; political negotiations could also, he indicated, be undertaken by the governments desiring them.

The countries to which Roosevelt asked that pledges should be given were Great Britain and Ireland, Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran (Persia). Danzig and Iceland were not included; it was later explained that Danzig was not considered a separate state, and that Iceland was not on or adjacent to the continent of Europe. Italian critics pointed out that Vatican City, San Marino, and Andorra had also been omitted.

The British, French, and Russian governments have made statements approving Roosevelt's proposals, and so have the bulk of the Latin American governments; some of the smaller European countries affected have also expressed a more guarded approval. Mussolini has turned the proposals down; Hitler has called a special meeting of the Reichstag for April 28 and will give his answer then.

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3. Australian Government Reorganisation.

The selection of a successor to Premier Lyons of Australia has led to a dispute between the two parties in the government coalition, resulting in the withdrawal of the Country Party under Sir Earle Page, who has been Acting Prime Minister since Lyons' death. R. G. Menzies, the former Attorney-General who recently resigned from the cabinet when a national old age insurance scheme was suspended to save money for defence, was chosen by the United Australia Party to succeed Lyons as its leader. The Country Party declined to accept Menzies as Prime Minister and withdrew from the coalition, but will probably support any Menzies government in the House rather than vote with the Labor Party. Standing of parties in the House is: United Australia Party, 26; Country Party, 17; Labor Party, 29; 2 vacant seats.

W. M. Hughes, R. G. Casey, and T. W. White were defeated candidates in the contest for the United Australia Party leadership. Stanley Bruce, the present High Commissioner for Australia, was apparently sounded out about accepting the nomination, but replied that he would only accept if given a free hand to form a national government, including Labor Party members. As the Labor Party was against entering any coalition and the other parties were against having it, this plan was deemed impracticable.

A general election is considered likely in the near future. Meantime Menzies is trying to form a cabinet.

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Summary of Despatches.

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From Dominions Office:

April 14, tel. Circ. B.155. Attitude of various countries.

April 14, tel. Circ. B.156; April 17, tel. Circ. B.159; April 20, tel. Circ. B.164. Negotiations with Turkey.

April 14, tel. Circ. C.3. Chamberlain's statement in Commons; excerpts.

April 15, tel. Circ. B.157; April 18, tel. Circ. B.162. Negotiations with Soviet Union.

April 15, tel. Circ. B.158. Proposed approach to Bulgaria.

April 17, tel. Circ. B.160. Polish assurances.

April 18, tel. Circ. B.161; April 20, tel. Circ. B.163. Various aspects of European situation.

April 20, tel. Circ. E.9. Empire air services, proposed wartime modifications.

From High Commissioner's Office:

April 6, No. A.80. Chamberlain's declaration on Poland: British press comment.

From Washington Legation:

April 14, No. 601; April 19, No. 639. U.S. consultation with Bank of Canada on financial stabilisation measures.

April 15, No. 604. Senate debates on foreign policy.

April 15, No. 611. Roosevelt's message to Hitler and Mussolini.

April 19, No. 631. Final Congressional reduction of work relief appropriation.

From Paris Legation:

April 8, No. 136. Reelection of President LeBrun.

April 11, No. 137. British guarantee to Poland; French views.

April 14, No. 148. French attitude on European situation.

From Geneva Office:

April 5, No. 71. European situation.

From United States Legation, Ottawa:

April 20, No. 943. Proposal to appoint Hugh Guthrie on Peace Treaty Commission between United States and Portugal.

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C118818

TRANSLATION JWP/LAM
April 28, 1939

Extract from Le Devoir, April 27, 1939.

Translation of the concluding paragraphs of an article on "Conscription in England"

To read or to listen to many people, one would say that the distinction between the two policies, the policy of England and the policy of Canada, so familiar to an earlier generation, exists no longer.

It seems to be accepted that whatever the English do, whatever embarrassments and difficulties the defence of their interests may result in, we have no choice but to follow them and to take the consequences.

"Neutrality is impossible" our Leaders say cheerfully, "but we will not accept conscription for service abroad".

Mr. Chamberlain too, whose sincerity is the equal of that of our Leaders, stated scarcely four weeks ago that he would not impose, without applying to the electorate, compulsory service in time of peace. He has decided that circumstances obliged him to reverse his decision, maintaining that one cannot describe the present period as a time of peace. Those who tell us: "we will not enact conscription" will perhaps decide that they cannot imitate the example of Mr. Chamberlain and reverse their public statements; but for how long will they be able effectively to oppose the complete and logical development of a policy of which they have accepted the principle?

Conscription, we must not cease reiterating, is only one of the modes of applying a general policy.

If it is accepted that Canada must participate in the extra-american wars of England, how, if the situation becomes more serious, if the supply of volunteers seems inadequate, if voluntary service seems to result in too serious imbarrassments, how can they indefinitely and successfully combat conscription?

Mr. King, Mr. Lapointe and Mr. Manion may in such circumstances retire; but will that prevent the stone from rolling to the bottom of the fatal slope and young Canadians from being crushed under its terrible weight?

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Remember 1917, the repudiated promises, the futility of the opposition of those who, after having approved the principle of participation to the limit, wishes to limit the consequences of it.....

No! The opposition should concentrate first on the right to neutrality; then on neutrality in fact.

We have no interest in sacrificing in the frightful imbroglio in which the Europeans, the Asiatics and the Africans are engaged, the force and resources of our country.

The first of our interests is that of Canada; it is in the light of this interest that we should determine our policy -- external as well as domestic.

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[1939]

EOS

C 118820

ADD BERLIN SECOND LEAD HITLER XX AGAINST POLAND."
HE ASSERTED HIS OFFERS TO POLAND HAD BEEN REJECTED.
THESE OFFERS, HE PUBLICLY REVEALED FOR THE FIRST TIME, WERE:-

RETURN OF DANZIG AS A FREE STATE INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GERMAN REICH; A SOVEREIGN GERMAN ROUTE ACROSS THE POLISH CORRIDOR TO EAST PRUSSIA AND A RAILWAY LINE ACROSS THE CORRIDOR AT GERMANY'S DISPOSAL; A FREE HARBOR AT DANZIG FOR POLAND; ACCEPTANCE OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AS FINAL; A 25-YEAR NON-AGGRESSION TREATY, AND A GUARANTEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVAKIA BY GERMANY, POLAND AND HUNGARY.

TO FRANCE HITLER REPEATED HIS GUARANTEE TO RESPECT ALSACE-LORRAINE AS FRENCH TERRITORY. THE TERRITORY WAS WON BY GERMANY IN THE WAR OF 1870 AND REGAINED BY FRANCE IN THE GREAT WAR.

MORE736A

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NU[redacted] XX WAR. C118821

ANSWERING PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S NON-AGGRESSION PROPOSALS

HE DECLARED HIMSELF WILLING TO GIVE TO OTHER NATIONS ASSURANCES OF NON-AGGRESSION ON THE CONDITION OF ABSOLUTE RECIPROCITY, AND PROVIDED THE STATES IN QUESTION DESIRED IT.

"[redacted]

MORE737A

EOS HITLER

WARSAW, APRIL 28-(AP)-CHANCELLOR HITLER'S RENUNCIATION OF THE 10-YEAR 1934 NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH POLAND WAS CHARACTERIZED AS A "BLUFF" IN AUTHORITATIVE POLISH CIRCLES TODAY.

"HE IS JUST TRYING TO SCARE POLAND," SAID ONE WELL-INFORMED OBSERVER. "HE WON'T GET AWAY WITH IT."

IT WAS STRESSED THAT POLAND IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH GERMANY ON THE ISSUE OF THE FREE STATE OF DANZIG, WHICH GERMANY WANTS TO ABSORB, BUT THAT HITLER'S ORIGINAL DEMANDS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE "IMPOSSIBLE."

SOME FOREIGN DIPLOMATS SAW THE POSSIBILITY THAT POLAND MIGHT BE DRAWN CLOSER TO SOVIET RUSSIA BY THE GERMAN ACTION.

BG740A

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NU51

EOS BULLETIN HITLER

G1188?2

LONDON, APRIL 28-(AP)-BRITISH NAVAL QUARTERS ASSERTED THEY WERE "UNSURPRISED AND UNDISTURBED" BY CHANCELLOR HITLER'S REPUDIATION OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL TREATY TODAY, BUT THEY CLAIMED HE COULD NOT LEGALLY REPUDIATE IT WITHOUT BRITAIN'S CONSENT.

(END EOS) BG733A

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NUBI XX WORLD.

DECLARING THAT FRANCE CONCURRED IN THE PLEDGE, MR. CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED:-

"THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL LEND TO GREECE OR RUMANIA IF THEIR INDEPENDENCE IS THREATENED ALL THE SUPPORT IN THEIR POWER."

OF THE ANGLO-ITALIAN ACCORD HE SAID IT HAD "BEEN JUSTIFIED AND SHOULD NOT AT THIS MOMENT BE ENDED."

AS MR. CHAMBERLAIN XX PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

X1049A

ADD LONDON BRITISH RUNNING XX FRIDAY)."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID IN THE HOUSE: "THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TAKEN DUE NOTE OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN SPAIN AFTER THE VICTORY MARCH IN MADRID."

REGARDING TURKEY THE PRIME MINISTER SAID:-

"WE ARE COMMUNICATING THIS DECLARATION (THE ASSURANCES TO GREECE AND RUMANIA) TO THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND TO OTHERS, ESPECIALLY TO TURKEY WHOSE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ARE WELL KNOWN."

MORE1050A

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C118824

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH XX ENDED."

THE PLEDGE TO RUMANIA HAD NOT BEEN EXPECTED TODAY. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER DECLARED IN MEASURED TONES THAT THE GOVERNMENT ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO AVOIDING DISTURBANCE "BY FORCE OR FEARS OF FORCE" OF THE STATUS QUO EITHER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN OR THE BALKAN PENINSULA.

IT HAD BEEN EXPECTED THAT SUCH A PLEDGE WOULD BE MADE TO TURKEY, BUT OF THAT COUNTRY MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID:-

"WE ARE COMMUNICATING THIS DECLARATION (THE ASSURANCES TO GREECE AND RUMANIA) TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND TO OTHERS, ESPECIALLY TO TURKEY, WHOSE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ARE WELL KNOWN."

BY HIS PLEDGES THE PRIME MINISTER EXTENDED BRITAIN'S COMMITMENTS OF PROTECTION CLEAR TO THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE BALTIC TO THE BLACK SEA.

HE CONCLUDED HIS SPEECH AT 3:29 P.M. (10:29 A.M. EST).

WHILE HE WAS SPEAKING VISCOUNT HALIFAX, FOREIGN SECRETARY, WAS MAKING A LIKE DECLARATION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

AS MR. CHAMBERLAIN XX PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

X1106A

M

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C 118825

95

MEXICO CITY, APRIL 13-(AP)-MEXICAN RAILROAD OFFICES HERE SAID THEY HAD REPORTS OF 32 PERSONS KILLED AND 42 INJURED IN A PASSENGER TRAIN COLLISION NEAR QUERETARO EARLY TODAY.

X1146A

95

FIFTH LEAD BRITISH

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, APRIL 13-(CP CABLE)-GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE WILL PLACE ALL THEIR RESOURCES BEHIND GREECE AND RUMANIA IF THE INDEPENDENCE OF EITHER IS THREATENED, PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY.

THIS PLEDGE OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOLLOWED SIMILAR GUARANTEES GIVEN A FEW DAYS AGO TO POLAND AND WAS ANOTHER STEP IN THE UNITED FRONT AGAINST AGGRESSION IN EUROPE.

PREMIER DALADIER OF FRANCE MADE A SIMILAR STATEMENT IN PARIS AND ANNOUNCED HIS COUNTRY HAD REINFORCED ITS DEFENCES "TO GUARANTEE THE FRONTIERS OF FRANCE AND ITS EMPIRE AGAINST ANY SURPRISE." MORE1148A

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NU102 XX SURPRISE."

PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ROUNDLY CONDEMNED THE ITALIAN INVASION OF ALBANIA BUT ANNOUNCED BRITAIN WOULD NOT DENOUNCE THE ANGLO-ITALIAN TREATY.

BRITAIN'S LATEST COMMITMENT IN EUROPE WAS OUTLINED BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN THESE WORDS:-

"I THEREFORE TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE AVOIDANCE OF DISTURBANCE BY FORCE, OR FEARS OF FORCE, OF THE STATUS QUO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKAN PENINSULA.

"CONSEQUENTLY THEY HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IN THE EVENT OF ACTION BEING TAKEN CLEARLY THREATENING THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE OR RUMANIA, AND WHICH THE GREEK OR RUMANIAN GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER IT VITAL TO RESIST WITH THEIR FORCES, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FEEL THEMSELVES BOUND AT ONCE TO LEND THE GREEK OR RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT ALL THE SUPPORT IN THEIR POWER.

MORE1154A

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NU103 XX POWER.

"WE ARE COMMUNICATING THIS DECLARATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND OT OTHERS, ESPECIALLY TO TURKEY, WHOSE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ARE WELL KNOWN. I UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE MAKING A SIMILAR DE-CLARATION THIS AFTER.

THE DOMINION GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ALL PHASES OF THE SITUATION.

BRITAIN LOOKS TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO GIVE PRACTICAL EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH IN THE FUTURE, THE PRIME MINISTER DECLARED. THIS COULD BE DEMONSTRATED BY PROMPT OBSERVANCE OF FRESH ASSURANCES FROM ROME THAT ITALIAN TROOPS, PLANES AND PILOTS WOULD BE EVACUATED FROM SPAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER GENERAL FRANCO'S "VICTORY PARADE" IN MADRID MAY 2.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH WAS PUNCTUATED BY DERISIVE LAUGHTER FROM THE OPPOSITION BENCHES AT HIS RECITAL OF ITALIAN PROMISES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH ALBANIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

MORE1157A

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NU1D4 XX SOVEREIGNTY.

C 118828

THE HOUSE WAS CROWDED TO OVERFLOWING. MANY MEMBERS HAD RESERVED THEIR SEATS HOURS BEFORE DEBATE STARTED. ONLY ONCE WAS THE PRIME MINISTER THROWN OFF HIS MAIN THREAD OF ARGUMENT. NEAR THE END OF HIS SPEECH LABOR AND LIBERAL MEMBERS DEMANDED SOME REFERENCE TO RUSSIA, WITH MISS ELLEN WILKINSON SHOUTING: "DEAL WITH RUSSIA! CUT OUT THE BLAA!"

THE PRIME MINISTER HASTENED TO DECLARE HIS OMISSION OF A REFERENCE TO RUSSIA DID NOT MEAN THE SOVIETS WERE NOT BEING KEPT INFORMED. BRITAIN'S DIFFICULTY WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DEAL NOT ONLY "WITH WHAT WE WISH, BUT WHAT OTHERS WILL DO."

ONCE AGAIN THE PRIME MINISTER DECLARED THERE WERE NO PREJUDICES OR IDEOLOGICAL NOTIONS IN ATTEMPTING TO LINE UP THE PEACE-LOVING FORCES AGAINST EUROPEAN AGGRESSION.

MORE X1159A

NOON-DLR 9/16 DIS, PD 4.68 1/8, FR 2.64 7/8.

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118829

NU 7

ADD LONDON FIFTH LEAD BRITISH BY SANDERSON XX AGGRESSION.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX, FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIMULTANEOUSLY TOLD THE HOUSE OF LORDS ABOUT AN EXCHANGE WITH GUIDO CROLLA, ITALIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CONCERNING CORFU.

IN THE COURSE OF A STATEMENT PARALLELING MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID CROLLA ON APRIL 8 "ASSURED ME THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WERE CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO THREATEN GREEK INDEPENDENCE AND THAT ANY BRITISH OCCUPATION OF CORFU WOULD CREATE MOST DANGEROUS REACTIONS."

LORD HALIFAX SAID HE TOLD CROLLA THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF OCCUPYING CORFU BUT "WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE A VERY GRAVE VIEW IF ANYBODY ELSE OCCUPIED IT."

CORFU IS A GREEK ISLAND FACING THE HEEL OF THE ITALIAN BOOT AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE ADRIATIC. IT IS OF GREAT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.

THE PRIME MINISTER AROSE XX PICKING UP FOURTH PARA OF RUNNING.

X1209P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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EOS

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH XX RUMANIA.

HE DECLARED BOTH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND FRANCE WILL GIVE GREECE AND RUMANIA "ALL THE SUPPORT IN THEIR POWER" IF THEIR INDEPENDENCE IS THREATENED.

END EOS X1034A

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ADD LONDON BRITISH RUNNING XX CONCERNED."

HE DISCLOSED THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO ITALY, THE EARL OF PERTH, HAD REMINDED THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT "THE SITUATION MIGHT RAISE IN ACUTE FORM THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE STATUS QUO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN."

X1038A

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH XX THREATENED.

THE PRIME MINISTER, HOWEVER, REFUSED TO DENOUNCE THE ANGLO-ITALIAN ACCORD OF 1938 BECAUSE OF ITALY'S GOOD FRIDAY INVASION OF ALBANIA.

BUT HE MADE IT PLAIN THAT BRITAIN FELT PREMIER MUSSOLINI HAD FLOUTED THAT PACT AND DISTURBED THE STATUS QUO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

X1041A

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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FINANCE

C 118832

CHICAGO, APRIL 13=(AP)=GRAIN OPEN:=

WHEAT: MAY 68 7/8-69; JLY 68 3/8; SEP 68 7/8-69.

CORN: MAY 48-47 7/8; JLY 49 1/2-5/8; SEP 50 5/8.

OATS: MAY 29 5/8; JLY 27 1/2; SEP 27-26 7/8.

SOY BEANS: MAY 87 7/8; JLY 85 3/4; OCT 72 1/2.

RYE: MAY 42 1/2; JLY 43 5/8; SEP 44 3/4.

LARD: MAY 6.17; JLY--; SEP 6.47; OCT 6.50.

X1046A

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH XX THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THE TWO NATIONS IN THE 1938 PACT AGREED THE STATUS QUO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH PLEDGE OF AID FOR GREECE AND RUMANIA FOLLOWING ITALY'S INVASION OF ALBANIA WIDENED THE NON-AGGRESSION FRONT WHICH GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE BEGAN BUILDING WITH A SIMILAR PLEDGE TO POLAND AFTER GERMANY TOOK MEMEL.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE ITALIAN INVASION HAD "PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED" THE WORLD.

MORE1047A

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CANADA

C/18833

~~118833~~

EOS BULLETIN FOURTH LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, APRIL 13-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY PLEDGED THE SUPPORT OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE EVENT OF ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE OR RUMANIA.

MORE X1028A

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P-850
1939

C118834

BULLETIN SECOND LEAD BRITISH

LONDON, APRIL 10-(AP)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN WAS RELIABLY REPORTED TODAY TO HAVE WARNED ITALY AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE STRATEGIC GREEK-OWNED ISLAND OF CORFU.

MORE934A

95

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX CORFU.

THIS REPORT, FOLLOWED AN URGENT SESSION OF THE CABINET, CONCERNED WITH MOVEMENTS OF BRITISH WARSHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

REPORTS WHICH WERE WITHOUT CONFIRMATION CIRCULATED IN DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS THAT BRITAIN HAD OFFERED TO GUARANTEE THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE.

MORE935A

LINEUP AND TEN

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NW58

C 118835

WITH TIRANA ALBANIAN

ROME, APRIL 10-(CAP)-A WIDELY EXPECTED AIRPLANE DASH TO TIRANA BY PREMIER MUSSOLINI APPEARED UNLIKELY TO MATERIALIZE TODAY.

IL DUCE WAS REPORTED TO BE STILL IN ROME LATE THIS AFTERNOON. SOME DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES BELIEVED HE STAYED HERE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GENERAL EUROPEAN SITUATION.

LD947A

LEAD SCHACHT

BOMBAY, INDIA, APRIL 10-(CAP)-HJALMAR SCHACHT, GERMANY'S FORMER ECONOMICS MINISTER, SAID TODAY OF GREAT BRITAIN'S PROPOSED STOP-HITLER ALLIANCES: "WE WILL DO OUR BEST WHEN THE TIME COMES X X X WE WILL GIVE THEM A GOOD FIGHT."

DR. SCHACHT, WHO IS HERE ON A VACATION, ADDED THAT GERMANY WOULD NOT FIGHT IF THE DEMOCRACIES WERE "REASONABLE."

LD948A

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ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX GREECE.

C118836

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECALL PARLIAMENT THURSDAY.

ISSUANCE OF FLEET ORDERS AT MALTA AND THE SAILING OF THE BATTLESHIP MALAYA FROM MENTON, FRANCE, INDICATED TO SOME OBSERVERS THAT BRITAIN MIGHT BE PREPARING TO PROTECT THE GREEK COAST. ALL BRITISH NAVAL OFFICERS ON HOLIDAY IN TANGIER, [redacted] MOROCCO, WERE ORDERED BY TELEGRAPH TO RETURN TO THEIR SHIPS IMMEDIATELY.

A GREEK SPOKESMAN HERE SAID BRITAIN HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO SEND SHIPS TO PROTECT GREEK PORTS, WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO THE SAFETY OF ANGLO-FRENCH TRADE ROUTES THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN.

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OPENM-DLR 9/16 DIS, PD 4.68 6/16, FR 2.64 7/8.

CP NU APRIL 10 LD95MA ..

C118837

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX MEDITERRANEAN.

MR. CHAMBERLAINS MESSAGE TO PRESMIER MUSSOLINI, SAID TO HAVE BEEN CONVEYED BY THE EARL OF PERTH, BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ROME, WAS REPORTED TO BE THAT BRITAIN WOULD "CONSIDER ANY ATTEMPT TO SEIZE CORFU AS A CASUS BELLI (CAUSE FOR WAR)."

AT THE SAME TIME RUMORS THAT BRITAIN INTENDED TO OCCUPY CORFU, WHICH IS OFF THE SOUTHERN TIP OF ALBANIA AND GUARDS THE GATEWAY TO THE ADRIATIC, WERE DENIED.

THE CABINET XXX ETC PICKING UP FOURTH PARA (PREVIOUSLY INSERTED).

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118838

SUB

CANTON, CHINA, APRIL 10-(CP-HAVAS)-DR. O. LEATON, A NEW ZEALANDER, OF THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION AT KONGCHUEN, KWANGTUNG PROVINCE, WAS KILLED BY BANDITS LAST NIGHT. HE WAS 33.

XI026A

ADD LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH XX WERE DENIED.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND HIS MINISTERS MET AT 10 DOWNING STREET IN THE FIRST BANK HOLIDAY CABINET SESSION SINCE THE GREAT WAR.

THOUGH THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT 200 SPECTATORS OUTSIDE THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE EARLY IN THE MORNING, THE CROWD HAD INCREASED TO ABOUT 800 AND SPECIAL POLICE HAD TO BE PROVIDED BY THE TIME THE MEETING ADJOURNED. LONDON WAS SHUT TIGHT FOR THE HOLIDAY.

DURING THE CABINET MEETING CHARALAMBOS SIMOPOULOS, THE GREEK MINISTER, PACED UP AND DOWN OUTSIDE, WAITING FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, VISCOUNT HALIFAX, TO COME OUT.

MORE1028A

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N 35 XX OUT.

DEFENCE MINISTERS WERE SAID TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT BRITAIN'S POSITION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND PARTICULARLY HER DEFENCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY ANY ITALIAN DOMINATION OF GREECE.

THE MINISTERS ALSO WERE SAID TO HAVE DISCUSSED GIBRALTAR. IT WAS FEARED HERE THAT GENERAL FRANCO'S ADHERENCE TO THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT MIGHT BE THE START OF A SPANISH POLICY OF COLLABORATION WITH ROME AND BERLIN.

THE CABINET XX PICKING UP AS BEFORE.

X1030A

FINANCE

NEW YORK, APRIL 10 (AP)-SUGAR FUTURES NO 3 OPENED 1-4 HIGHER. MAY 1.97B; JLY 2.02; SEP 2.07; JAN 2.00; MCH 2.02B.

X1030A

M

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BRITISH SEPARATE

BY EDWIN JOHNSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

C 118840

LONDON, APRIL 10--(CP CABLE)--IN THE FIRST GENERAL HOLIDAY SESSION SINCE THE GREAT WAR THE BRITISH CABINET FOR 2 1/2 HOURS TODAY GRAPPLED WITH DETAILS OF THE LATEST HAMMER BLOW OF THE DICTATORS--THE INVASION OF ALBANIA AND THE GROWING CRISIS IN THE BALKANS--BUT ADJOURNED WITHOUT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF WHAT POSITIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO RESIST AGGRESSION.

NO FURTHER MEETING OF THE CABINET WILL BE HELD TODAY BUT PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN, WHO CUT SHORT HIS EASTER HOLIDAY PERSONALLY TO DEAL WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION, CONFERRED WITH CLEMENT ATTLEE AND SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, LABOR AND LIBERAL LEADERS RESPECTIVELY, THIS AFTERNOON ON THE QUESTION OF RECALLING PARLIAMENT.

THE PRESENCE OF HENRY MARGESSON, CHIEF GOVERNMENT WHIP, AT THE CABINET COUNCIL STRENGTHENED THE BELIEF THAT PARLIAMENT, WHICH ADJOURNED FOR ITS HOLIDAY RECESS APRIL 6, WILL BE RECONVENED EITHER WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY.

MORE1035A

M

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NU67 XXX THURSDAY.

A MEETING OF THE DOMINION HIGH COMMISSIONERS ALSO MAY BE C118841
HELD LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW MORNING. MEANWHILE THE DOMINIONS ARE BEING KEPT CLOSELY POSTED CONCERNING THE QUICKMOVING DEVELOPMENTS.

AS THE MINISTERS LEFT DOWNING STREET THEY WERE APPLAUDED AND CHEERED BY A LARGE CROWD WHICH HAD BEEN GATHERING SINCE EARLY MORNING. MANY CAME WITH LUNCH BASKETS OR SANDWICHES WRAPPED IN PAPER AND WAITED PATIENTLY WHILE THE CABINET DISCUSSED THE MOST CRITICAL SITUATION SINCE THE GERMAN THRUST AT CZECHO-SLOVAKIA LAST FALL.

AN OUTWARD AIR OF CALM, HOWEVER, PERVADED THE COUNTRY WITH THE MAN IN THE STREET STILL ENJOYING WHAT REMAINS OF THE HOLIDAY IN PEACE AND QUIET AT THE COUNTRYSIDE OR SEASHORE.

ALL CABINET MINISTERS WERE PRESENT AT TODAY'S MEETING EXCEPT VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN, LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, WHO IS VOYAGING FOR HIS HEALTH, AND MALCOLM MACDONALD, COLONIAL SECRETARY, WHO IS RECUPERATING IN SOUTHERN FRANCE FROM A RECENT ILLNESS.

MORE1069A

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU( ) XX ILLNESS.

C 118842

WHETHER OR NOT PARLIAMENT IS RECALLED, OBSERVERS WERE GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ONLY REVIEW THE JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF PREMIER MUSSOLINI'S ALBANIAN MOVE AND ITS EFFECT ON ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONS BUT WILL CONSIDER ACTION IN REGARD TO THE VITAL STRATEGICAL AND POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

WHAT POSITIVE ACTION IS LIKELY TO BE TAKEN BY BRITAIN IN CONCERT WITH HER ALLIES AT PRESENT IS UNDISCLOSED. INFORMED CIRCLES, HOWEVER, HINTED THE FOLLOWING STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO HALT THE "SMASH AND GRAB" CHALLENGE OF THE DICTATORS:-

1. DENUNCIATION OF THE ANGLO-ITALIAN FRIENDSHIP PACT;

2. IMMEDIATE GUARANTEES TO GREECE AND OTHER BALKAN COUNTRIES AGAINST UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION;

3. AN ANGLO-FRENCH NAVAL DEMONSTRATION IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN;

4. EXTENSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE ANTI-AGGRESSION FRONT WITH RUSSIAN ADHERENCE.

MORE1042A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NTS9 XX ADHERENCE.

C 118843

C

WHILE THE CABINET MEETING WAS IN PROGRESS THERE WAS UNUSUAL DIPLOMATIC BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACTIVITY IN WHITEHALL. MEMBERS OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE RESUMED CONFERENCES WHILE THE MINISTERS OF RUMANIA AND GREECE CALLED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

SPECULATION ALSO WAS REVIVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE RESHAPED ON A BROADER BASIS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATION OF A MINISTRY OF SUPPLY UNDER WINSTON CHURCHILL. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN DECLINED TO DISCUSS THESE POSSIBILITIES.

THE PRESS GENERALLY AGREED THAT URGENT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO HALT TOTALITARIAN "TRUCULENCE AND TREACHERY."

THE STAR (LIBERAL) DECLARES IT WOULD BE AN OSTRICH-LIKE FOLLY TO REFUSE TO ADMIT THE ITALIAN THRUST IS ANOTHER STRATEGIC REVERSE FOR THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES.

"THE SANDS ARE RUNNING OUT," THE PAPER SAID. "THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO A PEACE FRONT BASED ON A GREAT TRIANGLE OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND RUSSIA, IS NOT MERELY RENEWED AGGRESSION BUT A SLIDE INTO GENERAL WAR."

MORE1046A

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NITO XX MAR."

DECLARING THE BRITISH PEOPLE ARE READY TO MAKE ANY SACRIFICE TO ENSURE THEIR OWN SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE AND THAT OF THOSE IN ALLIANCE WITH THEM, THE EVENING NEWS (INDEPENDENT) ADDS: "REFLECTION, HOWEVER, WILL HARDLY CONVINCE THE MOST INVETERATE OPTIMIST THAT ALL BRITAIN'S DEFENCE MACHINERY IS YET MOVING AT THE PACE WHICH TIMES OF EMERGENCY REQUIRE."

X1048A

FINANCE

CHICAGO, APRIL 10-(AP)-GRAIN OPENS-

WHEAT: MAY 69 1/4-69¢; JLY 68 5/8-1/2¢; SEP 68 7/8-69.

CORN: MAY 48-47 7/8¢; JLY 49 5/8-5/8¢; SEP 50 5/8-5/8.

OATS: MAY 29 5/8¢; JLY 27 1/2¢; SEP 26 7/8.

SOY BEANS: MAY 87 7/8¢; JLY 85 1/2¢; OCT 72 1/2.

RYE: MAY $2 1/2¢; JLY $3 3/4; SEP--.

LARD: MAY 6.55¢; JLY 6.42¢; SEP 6.57; OCT 6.65.

X1048A

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INSERT

IN LONDON SECOND LEAD BRITISH AFTER THIRD PARA XX OF GREECE.

IT WAS ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD BE CONVENED ON THURSDAY, BREAKING THE EASTER RECESS WHICH BEGAN LAST THURSDAY AND WAS TO HAVE EXTENDED UNTIL APRIL 18.

ISSUANCE OF XX PICKING UP FIFTH PARA (ELIMINATING FOURTH) (DEVTS) CP NU APL 10 X1116A

ABB BUFFALO HOGS XX 6.25.

CATTLE 2,700, INCLUDING 1,800 CANADIANS; TRADE ACTIVE, STEADY; GOOD NATIVE STEERS AND YEARLINGS 9.75-11.25; BETER GRADES CANADIAN STEERS 1150-1300 LBS 9.60-10.00; FEW LOADS 10.10 AND 10.25; LESS ATTRACTIVE OFFERINGS SLOW; COWS AND BULLS STEADY; FLESHY DAIRY TYPE COWS 5.60-6.00; MEDIUM BULLS 6.50-7.00.

CALVES 600; GOOD AND CHOICE 10.00 TO LARGELY 10.50; PLAIN AND MEDIUM 7.00-9.00.

SHEEP 2200; GOOD TO CHOICE WOOLSKINS 95 LBS DOWN 10.10 TO MOSTLY 10.25 AND 10.55; COMPARABLE SHORN LAMBS LARGELY 9.00.

X1118A

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C118846

INTERNATIONAL-AT-A-GLANCE

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

LONDON--CHAMBERLAIN REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD MUSSOLINI BRITAIN WOULD REGARD ANY ATTACK ON GREEK ISLAND OF CORFU AS INVITATION TO WAR.

TIRANA--PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ALBANIA PLEDGES LOYALTY TO MUSSOLINI, ACCEPTS ITALIAN RULE.

ATHENS--GREECE ON GUARD TO DEFEND TERRITORY; REFUGEE ALBANIAN ROYAL FAMILY CONTINUES FLIGHT.

ROME--FASCISTS DISCLOSE ITALY HAS REINFORCED TROOPS IN DODECANESE ISLANDS IN AEGEAN SEA, NEAR GREECE.

PARIS--FRENCH WORK CLOSELY WITH BRITAIN; MAY JOIN MILITARY, NAVAL DEMONSTRATIONS TO BACK UP EASTERN ALLIES AGAINST FURTHER ITALO-GERMAN EXPANSION.

MALTA--BRITISH OFFICERS AND SEAMEN ORDERED TO REPORT AT ONCE TO SHIPS.

TANGIER--BRITISH NAVAL OFFICERS ON LEAVE ORDERED TO RETURN TO SHIPS IMMEDIATELY.

X1121A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118847

EOS Second Lead Hitler

Berlin, April 28-(AP)-Adolf Hitler summarily ended the Anglo-German Naval pact and 10-year peace agreement with Poland today and offered to give purely reciprocal assurances of non-aggression to those countries which come to him and ask for them.

In reply to President Roosevelt's reeent a peal for at least a decade of peace he gave the United States government direct assurances for the territories of the american continent.

"I should NOT like to let this opportunity pass," he told the German Reichstag, "without giving above all to the President of the United States an assurance regarding those territories which would after all give him the most cause for apprehension, namely the United States itself and the other states of the american continent."

All assertions concerning and impending German attack or invasion on or in american territory, the Fuehrer classed as "rank frauds and gross untruths."

He laid the blame on "British war mongers" and on Poland's calling up of troops for his cancellation of the Anglo-German naval treaty and the 10-year peace agreement with Poland. He contended Poland had rejected a just offer for the solution of the problem of Danzig and the Polish corridor.

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The Chancellor declared the basis for the ~~xxxi~~ naval treaty, Limiting Germany's navy to 35 per cent of the British fleet, had been removed "by the policy of encirclement."

He said he hoped to avoid an armaments race with Britain and added:/

"Should the British government wish to enter once more into negotiations with Germany on this problem NO one would be happier than I."

In announcing his decision that the 10-year non-aggression agreement of 1934 with Poland had been infringed, Hitler ominously referred to the fate of Czecho-slovakia by saying:-

"The worst is that now Poland, like Czecho-slovakia a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign that it must call up troops although Germany on her part has NOT called up a single man and has NOT thought of proceeding in any way against Poland."

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

very confidential
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO C118849

These papers to be
placed with other
despatches re
foreign affairs
in red bag
Lauren Hanna
Holding
the Hold till
Return & fax at
[illegible]
[illegible]

29-4-39

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C118850

FOREIGN OFFICE PRINTS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ITALY, LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Attached are photostat copies of the six foreign office prints dealing with phases of the September crisis and related matters which the Prime Minister recently returned to External Affairs in order that copies might be made. These copies, which are numbered 036a in each case, are for the Prime Minister's personal files.

The numbers of the prints are as follows:

R7253/899/22

C9218/1941/18

C9408/1941/18

C9415/1941/18

W11948/3/98

W11949/3/98

M. McK.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 118851

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[R 7253/899/22] Copy No. 036 a

Sir N. Charles to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 785.)

My Lord, *Rome, August* 24, 1938.

IN view of the complexity of the present international situation, I feel that some kind of brief appreciation of the present trend of Italian foreign policy, even though it must be largely speculative, is necessary.

2. This policy is a mysterious one, and I think some kind of explanation might be found by an endeavour to reconcile the three following known factors :—

(i) Italy's evidently sincere desire to implement the agreement with Great Britain.
(ii) Italy's equally evident intention of maintaining the Rome–Berlin axis.
(iii) Italy's clear determination to have nothing whatever to do with France in present circumstances.

3. (i) Italy's chief reason for desiring an accord with Great Britain was probably the need she felt of support in her diplomatic struggle with Germany. She still desires to see it implemented, for without this accord she is isolated *vis-à-vis* Germany. She knows she is not strong enough to cope with Germany single-handed; hence she feels that discretion is the better part of valour and that an understanding with Great Britain is essential in order to strengthen her hand with her stronger partner.

4. (ii) Italy at the same time desires to maintain at all cost the Rome–Berlin axis. It is better to have a " friend " on the frontier than an open enemy. Not having the accord with England and not even really feeling sure whether Great Britain will ever ratify it, Italy, in her weakness, is inevitably being carried along by the impetus of Germany. At the same time she is making every endeavour to find support in other directions by agreement with Yugoslavia, by strengthening her ties with Poland and Hungary and by improving the relations between Budapest and Bucharest. Although these activities proceed ostensibly all with the knowledge and approval of Berlin, there cannot be much doubt that Italy is, in fact, playing for her own hand and trying to create friendly groups in Central Europe which might come in useful if the German end of the axis wags too vigorously.

5. (iii) Italy's apparent implacable hatred of France is due probably, in the first place, to her belief that France is responsible for the needless prolongation of the Spanish War, which is a monstrous drain on already depleted resources. There is, also, I think, and in this view my French and Soviet colleagues concur, some definite understanding between Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler to the effect that Italy will come to no arrangement with France until the Czechoslovak problem is settled. The French Chargé d'Affaires says that he first noticed a distinct chill in Count Ciano's attitude towards him when he saw him on the 8th May (last day of Herr Hitler's visit to Italy). Signor Mussolini's speech at Genoa followed on the 14th May, and after that any immediate prospect of an Italo-French understanding disappeared.

6. The position of the Italian Government at the present moment is thus hardly one to be envied, with Germany, an uncomfortable partner, on the frontier, with relations unsettled with France and with no certain prospect of an agreement with Great Britain. As regards the internal situation, there have been undoubted signs of discontent over the fact that no wealth has been coming in from the new empire in Ethiopia, the Spanish war seems to be interminable and is unpopular in the country, the financial outlook is bad, the harvest has not been good. Indeed, it is difficult to find a redeeming feature in the whole outlook. It seems clear that Italy, if she follows her own inclination, has no desire for any

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further military adventure for the time being. Indications go to show that she is diminishing her production of the sinews of war, and it is difficult to believe that she would willingly lend Germany military aid at any juncture in the more or less near future. Whether in the future she will join in on the side of Germany in a European struggle is a question which Italy herself has probably not yet decided. If her present state of isolation, which she dislikes, continues, she may be forced to throw in her lot unreservedly with the one Great Power whom she finds ready and eager to cultivate her friendship. Though the French and Soviet Embassies in Rome feel certain that Italy will fight on the side of Germany, I venture to think that unless there is some definite accentuation of her present isolation, it is more probable that Italy will do what she did in the last war, and sit on the fence until she decides which side she should join in order to obtain the maximum of profit.

7. If the foregoing analysis is even approximately correct, it is hardly necessary to emphasise how important an effect the entry into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement would have on Italy's present situation. The liquidation of one of the three factors mentioned above would certainly find a reaction in the other two factors. As regards Germany, the agreement with Great Britain would strengthen Italy's hand and would dispel the feeling of isolation which, I have suggested, constitutes the chief danger of her being driven irremediably into the German camp. While I should not expect the entry into force of our agreement to result in any ostensible weakening of the axis, it would, I think, have the effect of strengthening the Italians in a determination, of which evidence is not lacking even at present, to maintain it on an " ideological " basis, and to resist German importunities for more concrete commitments.

8. As regards France, the effect on Franco-Italian relations of the entry into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement could hardly fail to be beneficial. The added feeling of security which Italy would have gained would tend to lead to the dissipation of her present mood of irritation against the French, and since, *ex hypothesi*, the Spanish situation would have become clearer by the time our agreement came into effect, the real stumbling-block in the way of an understanding with the French would have been eliminated.

I have, &c.

NOEL CHARLES.

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C118853

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). September 5, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 9218/1941/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2002.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1938.*

THE French Ambassador called to see me this morning and began by asking me whether we had any information concerning the interview of Herr Henlein with Herr Hitler. It so happened that Mr. Newton's telegram No. 509 came in while I was speaking to the Ambassador and I read it to him. I told him that we would let him have the information it contained in more convenient form later.

2. At the outset of our conversation the Ambassador referred to what his Government imagined to be the German state of mind at the moment. There appeared to be a general suggestion in Berlin that everything was going to be all right and that there was no danger of war. But this feeling, if it existed, prompted the question of what might be the basis on which such relief from anxiety might be based. Was it to be on the footing of some compromise between the respective points of view, or was all concession to come from the Czechoslovak side? The reports that had reached the French Government of the Hungarian visit had appeared to show that considerable anxiety had been left in the Hungarian mind by the atmosphere they found in Berlin, and Herr von Ribbentrop had been thought to be exercising very unhelpful influence. It also seemed possible from their information that Italy was not giving wise counsel. The French Government also feared that the effect of the Lanark speech might be wearing off.

3. These speculations, as the Ambassador recognised them to be, were, of course, not disconnected with the aspect of affairs as they saw it from the Czechoslovak end. The French Government were slightly puzzled by the sequence of events. We had first of all asked them to join with us in exerting pressure on Dr. Benes, which at the time, so they understood, Lord Runciman did not, in fact, consider necessary. For some reason which was not plain to them there had been a change of attitude on the part of both Lord Runciman and Mr. Newton, which had led to Mr. Newton's very frank conversation with Dr. Benes on Saturday. In the French view the Czech Government had come a very long way, but there had not been much sign of compromise at present from the Sudetendeutsch side. Meanwhile, the German attitude seemed to be to rely very much on the false analogy of Ireland, an analogy devised, no doubt, to impress English opinion. The French Government, while feeling that it was necessary for Dr. Benes to show complete good faith and make proposals with complete sincerity in the sense of great concessions and autonomy, were bound to rely entirely upon Lord Runciman's spirit of impartiality and justice to see that the Czech Government were not forced into an impossible position. This might yet be the issue if concessions were wholly one-sided and were not met by a genuine spirit of constructive co-operation on the other.

4. In reply to M. Corbin, I said that we also, if I remembered the telegrams right, had been somewhat puzzled by the change of attitude at Prague which had eventuated in Mr. Newton's frank talk with Dr. Benes on Saturday. We, not less than the French Government, felt it very difficult to express an opinion about the details of any proposals made in Prague and, like them, felt that the only possible course was to trust Lord Runciman's appreciation of the position from day to day and give him all the support that we could. I fully recognised the necessity of doing all we could to hold a rough balance in our pressure at the two ends of the scale and the danger of allowing the German end to feel that the only way of solution was by complete surrender at the other end. I thought much would depend upon the results of the Henlein–Hitler interview when we had had time to give these detailed examination. I had been considering the possibility of making some speech in public to avoid the danger that he had feared of the

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Chancellor's speech at Lanark being overlaid and forgotten. I was, however, disposed to be very doubtful about the wisdom of this in present circumstances, and the Ambassador agreed with me that public warnings were by no means certain to have a good effect as we would desire. It was no doubt very difficult for Herr Hitler to adopt a moderate course if this had the appearance of being imposed upon him by outside pressure. The Ambassador thought, however, that there might be a good deal to be said for a private repetition at the appropriate moment of a plain warning to Herr Hitler, because it seemed from the report that had reached the French Government of Sir N. Henderson's interview with Baron von Weizsäcker that Herr von Ribbentrop was certainly not to be relied upon to transmit any unpleasant representations made to him. I told his Excellency that what he had said was very much in our minds and we must continue to watch the situation in case it should appear opportune to do something on that line. The Ambassador expressed the view that, however clear the situation might be to us, it was not necessarily certain that it was equally clear to Herr Hitler, for all people tended to reach decisions by a process of instinctive reasoning that might be faulty and from which they could only be shaken by very plain speech.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

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C118855

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). September 7, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

The Department of External Affairs 1938 Canada.

[C 9408/1941/18] Copy No. 036 a

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2032.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1938.

THE French Ambassador asked to see me to-day. His Excellency began by telling me that he had reported to M. Bonnet the doubts that I had expressed a few days ago as to the wisdom of taking further action at Berlin by way of repeating warnings that had been more than once delivered. M. Bonnet fully appreciated these considerations, but none the less still thought that it was important, especially after the conciliatory offer made by the Czechoslovak Government, to dispel an illusion that appeared to prevail in Berlin that in no circumstances would any move be made by this country in the event of Germany resorting to force. M. Bonnet himself had again defined the French position in conversation with the German Ambassador and in his recent speech at Bordeaux. It was, therefore, he thought, important to remove any ambiguity as regards the position of this country, and by a clear warning to make our position very plain to Herr Hitler himself. When European peace was in the balance nothing, in M. Bonnet's view, should be left undone that might possibly dispel dangerous misunderstanding or bring Herr Hitler to a serious appreciation of the risks involved in the adoption of extreme courses.

2. I asked the Ambassador whether, by his suggestion that it was important to remove any ambiguity, M. Bonnet intended to suggest that this country should go further than the position defined by the Prime Minister on the 24th March. M. Corbin disclaimed any such intention on the part of M. Bonnet, but suggested that the same thing might be said again in such a way as to be of great service.

3. I said that I would certainly consider this, and naturally His Majesty's Government would wish to give full weight to the suggestion that M. Bonnet had made. It was, indeed, one that we had always before our minds. I told the Ambassador that, as I had more than once said to M. Bonnet, we were constantly obliged to have regard to public opinion in this country and in the Empire. As I saw this at present, and making full allowance for the wider issues that public opinion might recognise to be involved in any attack on Czechoslovakia, I thought that there was a distinction to be drawn. I did not think that British public opinion, although it might change as the situation developed, would be willing to contemplate being involved in war on direct account of Czechoslovakia. While this was certainly true, I thought it was also probable that if France was obliged to act in discharge of her obligations, British public opinion would realise that we could not allow France to be in trouble, without wishing to do our best to help her. This distinction meant that, although Great Britain might feel obliged to support France in a conflict, if only because it would recognise that British interests were involved in any threat to French security, it did not mean that we should be willing automatically to find ourselves at war with Germany, because France might be involved in discharge of obligations which Great Britain did not share, and which a large section of British opinion had always disliked.

4. It was impossible to predict events, but it was perhaps not other than useful, though I recognised that what I said was purely speculative, to attempt to picture what might possibly occur. Let us suppose that at some point Herr Henlein, under dictation from Berlin, were to say that he had finished with the Prague negotiations, that he was setting up his own home rule Government, that he invited Herr Hitler to support him against oppression by Prague, and that, in such an event, Herr Hitler were to march in from the Austrian frontier, and after some short period were able to say that he had achieved his immediate purpose of giving protection to the Sudetendeutsch and was prepared to stop any further hostilities. In any such event I scarcely supposed that the French people would, and I was quite sure the British people would not, wish to embark upon protracted hostilities against what would have appeared to be a

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secession movement on the part of the Sudetendeutsch. It was, of course, impossible for anyone to predict how the situation would develop, but, if, as I could not help feeling, it was in Herr Hitler's mind, on some pretext or other, and in some form or other, to make a quick cut if he moved at all, I doubted whether any warning given by this country, even if we had been able, which we were not, to go so far as to assert that, in the event of any aggression on Czechoslovakia, we should immediately declare war, would be effective for the reason that Herr Hitler's premises would be of a different character.

5. It was for this reason and because, as we had always recognised, any French action bore so directly upon our own that I did earnestly hope, if and when the situation arose, that the French Government would still be prepared to consult us before taking any action involving them in hostilities with Germany. M. Corbin said in reply to this that he was sure the French Government would have this much in mind, and, as I would agree, they had acted, and he could assure me that they would continue to act, with the utmost prudence. We both agreed that in such a situation as I had described, the setting would be very different from that which prevailed in the case of Austria. There would be battles and a small people would be defending its independence, and it might well be that popular feeling would be very quickly and deeply moved.

6. From the French side M. Corbin repeated the gravity of the obligations under which they lay by treaty, and said that, even from the point of view of French interests, it had to be very carefully weighed whether the best way to peace was to refrain from taking up a challenge if such were nakedly thrown down. One had always to revert to the actual situation of the moment. This was a situation in which great external pressure from Germany was being exercised upon Czechoslovakia, based upon a conviction that in the event nobody would seriously move against any action that Germany might take. Moreover, the extent to which the Czechoslovak Government had been willing to go under the joint pressure of Lord Runciman and of the French and ourselves clearly made the French position very much more difficult. I told M. Corbin that I would certainly bring what he had said to the notice of my colleagues.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

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C118857

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). September 8, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 9415/1941/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Viscount Chilston (Moscow).

(No. 548.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1938.

THE Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request. I told his Excellency that I had wished to let him know that, owing to the international situation, I had felt obliged to abandon my visit for the present to Geneva, though I still hoped, if circumstances permitted, to go later. M. Maisky said that he understood my position and would convey my regrets to M. Litvinov.

2. The Ambassador then referred at some length to the leading article in *The Times* yesterday upon the possibility of the secession of the Sudetendeutsch from the Czechoslovak State. He said that, in his judgment, this article had had the worst possible effect. I told him that I did not in any way disagree with his judgment in this matter, and added that he would no doubt have noticed the official *démenti* of any Government connexion with the idea that the leading article contained. M. Maisky asked whether we could not reinforce this official *démenti* by some more personal *démenti* through the mouth of some Minister. I told him that it was not our habit to repeat contradictions, nor, indeed, did I think that repetition in such cases did any good.

3. The Ambassador then asked me whether I had anything further to tell him concerning the position of Great Britain as regards Czechoslovakia. I said that this had been more than once defined, and I was not prepared to add to what had been said. We were watching the situation very closely, and were fully alive to the necessity of taking any action without delay that the circumstances might appear to demand and that might be within our power. M. Maisky proceeded to develop at some length the general Soviet view about aggressors and aggression. In the course of some conversation on this topic, I reminded M. Maisky that the position of the Soviet Union and of France differed from that of this country in respect of treaty obligations towards Czechoslovakia, though we shared with them the general obligations of the Covenant.

4. Finally, M. Maisky told me that M. Litvinov had again suggested to the French Government that the Soviet Union would be willing to co-operate with France and the United Kingdom in a joint note to Berlin. Such joint action might be expected to enlist the support of the United States. The matter, therefore, lay with the French Government and ourselves. I thanked M. Maisky for his information, of which I said I had already learned from the French Government through our Ambassador in Paris.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[404 h—1]

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C118858

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Canada. 1938

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. September 6, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[W 11948/3/98] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Snow (Helsingfors).

(No. 153.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 6, 1938.

THE Finnish Minister called on me to-day in order to leave with me the attached memorandum. He said that his Government hoped that their attitude was closely akin to what they believed to be the attitude of His Majesty's Government as stated on more than one occasion by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons. It was desirable, in the view of the Finnish Government, that the Assembly should in some form take note of the statement made on behalf of the Powers meeting at Copenhagen last July, although he was disposed to agree with me that it might not be possible or even desirable to try to get a formal interpretative resolution out of the Assembly.

2. I told the Minister that I thought, as he said, the position of our two Governments was very similar and that I had no doubt we should be able to find ourselves working very closely together at Geneva.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

Enclosure.

Mémorandum.

A LA suite d'une réunion qu'ils ont tenue à Copenhague les 23 et 24 juillet 1938, les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique, du Danemark, de la Finlande, du Luxembourg, de la Norvège, des Pays-Bas et de la Suède se sont, dans un communiqué commun, prononcés sur l'application éventuelle de sanctions en conformité de l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, dans les termes suivants :

" Persuadés qu'il y a lieu pour leurs pays de continuer leur collaboration à l'œuvre de la Société des Nations, ils ont constaté que leurs Gouvernements respectifs sont décidés à maintenir la ligne de conduite qu'ils se sont tracée en déclarant qu'ils considèrent le système de sanctions comme ayant acquis, dans les conditions actuelles et par la pratique suivie pendant les années passées, un caractère non-obligatoire. Ils estiment que ce caractère non-obligatoire des sanctions ne vaut pas d'ailleurs pour un groupe particulier d'États, mais qu'il existe pour tous les membres de la Société des Nations. Ils sont convaincus qu'il est dans l'intérêt de la Société des Nations que soit explicitement constaté ce droit de libre appréciation. C'est dans cet esprit qu'ils se préparent à l'examen du rapport que le Comité des XXVIII a soumis à l'appréciation de l'Assemblée."

Cette déclaration ne fait que confirmer et préciser les déclarations faites antérieurement, à diverses occasions, au nom de chacun des sept pays, soit collectivement, soit à titre individuel.

Le Gouvernement finlandais a l'honneur de signaler à l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique la partie précitée du communiqué du 24 juillet 1938, en exprimant l'espoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, lors de l'examen du rapport du Comité des XXVIII au cours de la prochaine session de l'Assemblée, se verra en mesure de prêter son concours à fin d'obtenir que dans cet examen l'on tienne compte des considérations énoncées par les sept Gouvernements dans ledit communiqué.

Londres, le 6 *septembre* 1938.

[410 f—1]

[P.T.O.

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(Translation.)

FOLLOWING a meeting held at Copenhagen on the 23rd and the 24th July, 1938, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden issued a common communiqué, stating in the following terms their view with regard to the possible application of sanctions in conformity with article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations:—

> "Convinced that there is scope for the continued collaboration of their countries in the work of the League of Nations, they noted that their respective Governments are resolved to maintain the line of conduct which they had set themselves in declaring that they regarded the system of sanctions as having acquired, under existing conditions and through the practice followed during past years, a non-obligatory character. Further, they consider that this non-obligatory character of sanctions does not apply only to a particular group of States, but exists for all members of the League of Nations. They are convinced that it is in the interest of the League of Nations that this right of free decision should be explicitly recognised. It is in this spirit that they are approaching the examination of the report submitted by the Committee of Twenty-Eight for the consideration of the Assembly."

This declaration merely confirms and defines the declarations previously made, on different occasions, in the name of each of the seven countries, either collectively or individually.

The Finnish Government have the honour to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the passage of the communiqué of the 24th July, 1938, quoted above, and to express the hope that, at the examination of the report of the Committee of Twenty-Eight during the course of the forthcoming session of the Assembly, His Majesty's Government will see their way to lend their assistance with the object of ensuring that, in this examination, account is taken of the considerations set forth by the seven Governments in the said communiqué.

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C 118860

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Department of External Affairs Canada 1938

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. September 6, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[W 11949/3/98] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Monson (Stockholm).

(No. 189.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 6, 1938.*

THE Swedish Minister called to see me this morning on the instructions of his Government, to hand me the attached memorandum(1) on the subject of the attitude of his country towards League reform. In doing so, M. Prytz said that, although the position of Scandinavian countries had been made sufficiently plain in regard to the coercive articles, public opinion in Sweden was disposed to feel this was not quite enough and would like to obtain, if possible, some general expression of opinion from the League in the same sense. The Minister had been pleased to observe from a memorandum communicated to him by the Foreign Office that there did not appear to be any great difference of opinion on the main question between the Swedish Government and His Majesty's Government.

2. I told M. Prytz that this was also my impression. At the same time, I was rather doubtful whether it would prove possible to secure a resolution at Geneva in this sense. When I had seen M. Maisky a week or so ago, the latter had intimated to me, if I had understood him right, that his Government would be reluctant to see the League adopt any general resolution in the sense of placing on record their recognition in present circumstances of the non-obligatory character of the coercive articles. The fear of the Soviet Government seemed to be that, however much in form such a resolution was protected, it must, in fact, have the effect of detracting more permanently from the conception of collective security than would follow from unilateral declarations of the attitude of particular States members.

3. If, accordingly, it turned out at Geneva that there was such difference of view, it was likely to be difficult to get a resolution, and we should, therefore, have to fall back upon the procedure of unilateral statement. To His Majesty's Government it seemed that it was important to maintain the principle of collective interest in any case of aggression, from which ought to follow the obligation of mutual consultation, but, secondly, to recognise that the action to be taken by any State member in any particular case must be dependent upon the circumstances of each case as judged by the State member concerned. M. Prytz said that he also did not think the question of the precise action to be taken at Geneva was of first importance, provided we were all in substantial agreement as to the end to be reached. I assured the Minister that, unless I was prevented from going to Geneva, I should much look forward to meeting M. Sandler again, and that I had no doubt we should be able to work closely together.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

(1) Enclosure in September 6, Section 1, *mutatis mutandis*.

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

Associated Press Photo

The Pacific naval stations on which Congress's attention has been focused—and Admiral Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations.

U.S. until 1946.

Guam, which the President and some of his naval advisers wanted to make a great fortified outpost — i.e. get out on the end of a limb. Tie yourself there + make faces. The U.S. House of Representatives has rejected the proposal.

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

Associated Press Photo

The Pacific naval stations on which Congress's attention has been focused—and Admiral Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations.

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EXTRACT FROM OFFICIAL REPORT OF

3rd May, 1939.

Mr. Arthur Henderson asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that Herr Hitler has recently charged His Majesty's Government with having adopted a policy of encircling Germany, and that guarantees on a reciprocal basis were proposed by President Roosevelt in his recent peace appeal, His Majesty's Government would be willing to give a guarantee to Germany similar to that given to Poland on a reciprocal basis?

The Prime Minister: In recent statements I have made it quite clear that there is no foundation whatsoever for the charge that His Majesty's Government have adopted the policy of encircling Germany. What President Roosevelt proposed, and what I understand Herr Hitler to have offered, is the exchange of assurances of non-aggression, rather than a guarantee on a reciprocal basis such as that recently given by His Majesty's Government to the Polish Government. His Majesty's Government would certainly be ready to consider proposals for an exchange of reciprocal assurances with the German Government.

Mr. Henderson: In view of the importance of the statement which the Prime Minister has just made, will the Government take proper steps to ensure that it is brought to the notice of the German public?

Lieut.-Commander Fletcher: Is it not the case that reciprocal assurances were exchanged at Munich and have since been found to be worthless?

Mr. Lipson:

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Mr. Lipson: Will the right hon. Gentleman see whether the statement which has just been made by him can be included in the broadcast in German?

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the Government make it plain that the arrangements they are now making are guarantees against aggression and may be participated in by any Government which is prepared in good faith to renounce aggression?

The Prime Minister: Certainly they are guarantees against aggression solely; and as regards any extension, I have no doubt that the Government will be glad to consider any proposals for their extension.

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O.D. SKELTON to WLMK

ODS/ET
9 May, 1939

J-100 v.1 Eur.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

C118864

J-800 v.1.

European Situation ✓

J-300 v.1

Trade - Can Trade with Switzerland ✓

J-400 v.1

Dr. Felix Somary of Zurich, who is with the Swiss economic mission now in Ottawa, stated in conversation today that Switzerland was believed to be the best protected of the European countries. The United States military authorities had told them they considered that their 400,000 men could not be overcome by an opposing force of less than one and a quarter million.

He said there was a widespread feeling in Europe that nothing but war would get rid of the dictators and the economic self-sufficiency now so prevalent. Many think too that a war would be much shorter than the last one. Dr. Schacht, a friend of his for twenty years, told him a short time ago that the only chance of breaking down the present regime in Germany would be through a war.

He considers Germany in economic difficulties, but able to carry through under peace requirements for two or three years more. He does not think that their economic difficulties are sufficiently insoluble to bring a breakdown or a war for the present.

Italy's position in war he considers absolutely hopeless. While strong in airplanes and some naval fields, she would crumple like an eggshell under British and French attack by air and see. The present regime

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is highly unpopular in Italy, though there is no alternative leadership around which disaffection might gather, and no likelihood of a breakdown unless through a war. English people tend to exaggerate the criticism of the existing regime and of the Axis which they hear from the King and the Crown Prince, neither of whom has any influence in Italy. The Pope today has much influence and is the only immediate alternative rallying figure. Mussolini is a tired and finished man; the paralytic trouble which affects him is increasing, though it might unfortunately make him more irresponsible. He follows now rather than leads. He is, unfortunately, much under the growing influence of Count Ciano, an unprincipled and irresponsible person. Grandi or Balbo would be much sounder. Mussolini is friendly towards England, but has a virulent and fanatical hatred of a number of individual Englishmen, particularly Eden. The inclusion of Eden in the Cabinet would be absolutely conclusive as regards Mussolini's attitude. Both England and France have been poorly served by their Ambassadors in Rome. Drummond had been a complete failure.

He doubted if in the event of war, the Swiss Government would suggest that the League should leave Switzerland, but it was inevitable that its functions and personnel would dwindle for the period of the war. The new buildings would doubtless be used for Red Cross purposes.

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CANADA

C 118866

THE POLISH CORRIDOR



Specially drawn for the R.I.I.A

[*This Map shows approximately the areas in which the German-speaking minority lives, without, however, indicating variations in proportion to the local population.*

According to the Polish Census of 1931, *out of a total population of* 1,086,144 *in the Corridor,* 976,499 (89·9 *per cent.*) *were Poles* (*and Kashubs*), *and* 109,645 (10·1 *per cent.*) *were Germans. According to the German Census of* 1910, *out of a total population of* 990,145, 552,733 (56·0 *per cent.*) *were Poles, and* 437,414 (44·0 *per cent.*) *were Germans.*

The Polish Minority in the southern part of East Prussia is Lutheran and voted for union with their co-religionists in East Prussia in the plebiscites of 1920.]

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C 118867

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

FAR EASTERN (CHINA). May 15, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

[F 4576/150/10] Copy No. 036g

Sir R. Craigie to Viscount Halifax.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 228.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Tokyo presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a note of the 28th March, 1939, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the bombing of Pingkiang.

Tokyo, March 28, 1939.

Enclosure.

Sir R. Craigie to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency, *Tokyo, March 28, 1939.*

YOUR Excellency will recall that in my note of the 13th March I had the honour to protest against the bombing by Japanese aircraft on the 8th March of the (English) Baptist Mission at Sian. I regret to have to inform your Excellency that a further case of bombing of a British mission by Japanese aircraft occurred on the 15th March, when eighteen aircraft bombed the town of Pingkiang in Hunan. Ten bombs fell in the compound of the (English) Methodist Mission, killing eight persons, one of whom was a British missionary, the Rev. Albert G. Leigh.

2. The compound of the mission is on the boundary of the city, and is clearly marked by large British flags and by white letters on the ground, which are easily visible from the air. The position had been inspected by Japanese aircraft on a number of occasions previous to the raid, and as recently as the 28th October, 1938, a serious bomb attack on the mission had been made the subject of representations to his Excellency Mr. Tani, at Shanghai. It is thus clear that the Japanese authorities were well aware of the existence and position of the mission —a fact which renders still graver the normal responsibility of the Japanese forces for establishing the military character of their objectives before delivering an attack.

3. I have been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter a strong protest against this unwarrantable attack on a clearly-marked British property, which has resulted in the death of a British subject. I shall be grateful if your Excellency will cause immediate enquiry to be made into the circumstances, and will take the necessary steps to ensure that these attacks on British property will not be repeated. I trust that I may also be placed in a position to inform my Government at an early date of the regret with which the Japanese Government have, I feel sure, learnt of this tragic occurrence.

4. In the meantime, I reserve the right to submit to your Excellency a claim for full compensation as soon as it has been possible accurately to assess the amounts due both in respect of injuries to persons and damage to the site and buildings.

I have, &c.
R. L. CRAIGIE.

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C 118868
Rec'd June 19/39

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

[N 2463/64/63] Copy No. 036b

Consul-General Bowering to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 49. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Reykjavik, May* 5, 1939.

WITH reference to Mr. Collier's letter of the 15th April last, I have the honour to report as under on the various phases of German activities in Iceland as known to me.

Aviation.

2. It may be said that German interest in aviation in Iceland began as early as 1928, when the German company Luft-Hansa undertook to maintain an air service in Iceland with two passenger hydroplanes. This experiment, for it must be regarded as such, was not successful, and in 1931 it was abandoned after the company had suffered considerable losses.

3. The executive management of this first air service was entirely in the hands of representatives of the Luft-Hansa, and at first the pilots and mechanics were Germans, but later on at least one of the hydroplanes was handed over to an Icelandic pilot who had qualified in Germany.

4. When the Luft-Hansa discontinued its activities in Iceland in 1931, German interest in these matters was not quite so active for a few years; and, except for some calls made by German aviators (von Gronau, two trips made by the *Graf Zeppelin*, &c.) on their way to America, no direct propaganda seems to have been carried on until the past two years.

5. In the summer of 1938 a German flying expedition was sent to Iceland to teach gliding and flying, and to investigate the possibilities of constructing landing grounds in various parts of the country. With a view to this, one of the German pilots, Herr Baumann, made several trips in his aeroplane, and, according to reports, found more than forty places that could be made into landing grounds with very little trouble.

6. This flying expedition was largely financed by the Aero-Club von Deutschland in Berlin by lending and presenting the necessary materials, paying the flying instructors, &c. This club sends here regularly various technical publications on aviation and gliding, and it has been reported that it frequently sends purely political propaganda literature. These publications are very popular among the members of the flying and gliding clubs, who seem to be able to understand them with ease.

7. This flying expedition, followed up by all this literature and propaganda, seems to have made a very strong impression on both the younger and the older members of the clubs. It is understood that, with the exception of a few persons, the atmosphere in the flying clubs is distinctly pro-German. It should be noted that there are at present in Iceland two aeroplanes and one hydroplane.

8. In March of this year (1939) representatives of the Luft-Hansa came to Iceland with a view to negotiating with the Icelandic Government for permission to have landing places in Iceland on a proposed air route between Germany and America, and it was hoped to inaugurate during this coming summer experimental flights between Lübeck and Reykjavik. This visit occurred shortly before the arrival of the German cruiser *Emden*, and consequently caused considerable uneasiness in view of recent happenings in Europe. At the same time there also arrived three other Germans, two meteorologists and a wireless operator. According to the press, it was stated that an International Conference of Meteorologists decided last year that Germany should support meteorological observations in Iceland this year. Originally it was intended that Germany should only supply the equipment required, but later on the Germans were also asked to send experts to be in charge of the observations. The equipment brought

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this time is understood to be a so-called "Radiosonde," which is a balloon equipped with radio transmitting apparatus automatically sending signals at changes in moisture content, air pressure and temperature.

9. The negotiations by the representatives of the Luft-Hansa were unsuccessful, and in a public statement the Icelandic Government expressly said that they had decided not to grant permission to any foreign flying company to maintain an air service to Iceland. The reasons for this decision were stated to be, first and foremost, the great uncertainty and uneasiness in international relations, and, secondly, to avoid creating a favoured position for any foreign State regarding aviation in Iceland.

10. In connexion with this visit I understand from a reliable source that the representatives of the Luft-Hansa desired, for the installation of the air service between Germany and Iceland, to have their own radio station here, and also one or two representatives attached to the meteorological office.

Naval Visits.

11. The Germans normally send patrol boats every year for fisheries inspection, &c., off the coasts of Iceland, as a fairly large number of German trawlers come here for the fishing.

12. In 1935 the German survey ship *Meteor* visited Iceland and stayed here a long time. Officially the *Meteor* was supposed to be here for fisheries inspection, but she is understood also to have carried out survey work around the coasts, &c. This was looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion by the population, and rumours (they spread rapidly in Iceland and also increase rapidly in magnitude) soon began spreading that the *Meteor* was surveying for submarine bases.

13. In 1937 short visits were made by two German ships, the armed yacht *Aviso Grille* and the training ship *Horst Wessel*. The cruiser *Emden* visited Iceland in the summer of 1938, when a certain amount of unfriendly feeling was created by the sailors marching through the streets of Reykjavik singing Nazi songs.

14. The *Emden* visited Reykjavik again in April of this year, but this time the visit was quiet and without incident. Originally her visit to Iceland was supposed to be for one month on fisheries protection, but her arrival was delayed, and when finally she did arrive on the 6th April she only remained here until the 11th April, when she is understood to have returned direct to Germany. There was considerable uneasiness amongst the local population in connexion with the arrival of the *Emden* this year, as the Communist papers had circulated all kinds of rumours to the effect that the object of her visit was to force the Icelandic Government to give Germany permission to have air bases constructed in various parts of the country (see paragraphs 8–10 above).

15. In the case of German naval visits here, there are always rumours as to their objects, whereas the visits of French, Danish and British naval units are barely commented upon.

Other Visits.

16. A comparatively large number of German tourists have always visited Iceland every summer, and even before the Great War German travellers frequently came to this country. But during the last two years or so there seems to have been a considerable increase in their number, especially of students and scientists. Last summer an unusually large number of German scientists were reported to have been in the north and north-eastern parts of Iceland. The reports do not indicate what kind of investigations these visitors were making.

17. In the summer of 1938 a German scientific expedition investigating Dr. Wegener's "Theory of Continental Draft" was visiting Iceland. The work of this expedition was looked upon with a certain amount of scepticism by the Icelanders. There have also been several other German visits during the past two or three years, and in 1936 some German Nazi officials came here and travelled about the country. Several German football teams have also visited Iceland and Icelandic teams have been to Germany.

Propaganda.

18. Germany is the only foreign country which has conducted propaganda to any extent in Iceland. This has been done, and is still being done, by means

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of publications of various kinds, by inviting Icelandic scientists, scholars and teachers to Germany, by donations of books to schools and libraries, by maintaining and paying Icelandic lecturers at German universities, by keeping big Icelandic libraries in Germany, &c. In addition to this, there is in Germany a "Verein für Islandsfreunde," which arranges excursions to Iceland for German students, school-teachers, scholars and scientists and helps Icelanders who go to Germany. This society also issues a periodical.

19. All these things are intended to create a friendly feeling and to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries, and undoubtedly they have succeeded to a certain extent.

20. In 1937 there appeared a book which was supposed to be the story of a cycling tour through Germany, but which, I understand, was nothing but a glorification of the present régime in Germany. The author, M. Knútur Arngrímsson, who is a schoolmaster in Reykjavik and incidentally also the president of the local Germania Society, had spent the preceding year at the University of Munich on a German scholarship. Towards the end of last year the same author published another book about the annexation of Austria; it is strongly suspected that the cost of publication was paid for from a German propaganda fund. These two books, the former especially, were on the whole severely criticised in the local press.

21. A large number of Icelandic students have studied in German universities and technical schools, where they have been very well received and have even enjoyed privileges not accorded to other foreign students. The same applies to Icelandic doctors who have been to Germany for advanced studies.

Trade.

22. German trade with Iceland is almost as great as that of the United Kingdom, but it is based on a one-to-one "clearing" agreement. Although Iceland would much prefer to trade with countries where she can get free foreign exchange, such as the United Kingdom, she is compelled to trade with Germany on this basis, as otherwise she would have great difficulty in finding a market for a large portion of her exports. The extent of this German trade provides, of course, a strong economic influence in the country.

23. It may be safely said, however, that on the whole the population favours British goods, as they are, generally speaking, both cheaper and of better quality. They cannot buy in the United Kingdom all that they would like to buy there owing to the acute shortage of free foreign exchange.

24. The trade agreement between Iceland and Germany is renewed annually, and, although details are not published, I understand that at the time of the last renewal (February 1939) additional benefits were given to Iceland. These benefits are believed to have been extra quotas for certain Icelandic exports to the value of 330,000 reichsmarks.

The Local German Colony, &c.

25. The German colony in Iceland (about 120) is larger than that of any other nation except Denmark and Norway. Immigration of Germans into Iceland began immediately after the Great War and has been going on steadily on a very small scale ever since. Some of these people have become naturalised Icelandic citizens (this is now more difficult), some are allowed to stay here because they have Icelandic wives, &c. Not all are supporters of the present régime in Germany.

26. The Germans living in Iceland are mostly of the lower middle class, such as shopkeepers, clerks, technicians, mechanics, a few labourers, &c. In addition to these, there are usually a few students staying for longer or shorter periods and several German women married to Icelanders.

27. At the University of Iceland, at Reykjavik, there are four foreign lecturers, British, French, German and Swedish. The first three each receive 1,000 kronur from the university, but in the cases of the French and German lecturers their salaries are augmented by a further 1,000 kronur from the Governments of their respective countries, who incidentally appoint them. The Swedish lecturer is also appointed by, and paid by, the Swedish Government. In the past the university authorities and the German Government have not always agreed on the candidates for this post, but so far the latter have had their will in this matter.

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28. The Germania Society was founded to maintain the cultural and friendly relations between Iceland and Germany. The president is M. Knútur Arngrímsson (see above under "Propaganda"). It is understood that the society receives financial assistance from the German Propaganda Ministry.

29. There are similar British, Danish, Norwegian, French and Swedish societies.

Summary.

30. That Germany is keenly interested in Iceland there can, I think, be no doubt, as she appears to be doing everything possible to ingratiate herself with the population. But I am very doubtful whether her advances are being reciprocated here to any large extent. In general, I would say that the Icelandic attitude is one of suspicion, as recent events in connexion with the visit of representatives of the Luft-Hansa have shown. On the whole it is probably correct to say that the country is more pro-British than pro-German; but a large number of people are, of course, indifferent. Iceland desires, first and foremost, to be left in peace, and not to be interfered with by any foreign Power. Her responsible leaders realise, I feel sure, that in time of war whoever controls the sea controls Iceland.

31. Germany's motives for ingratiating herself with Iceland are, however, not so easy to explain. One can only assume that she may look upon Iceland as a possible aviation and/or submarine base. In this connexion it cannot be too strongly emphasised that Iceland is without any defences whatever and consequently would be at the mercy of any organised armed force, whether that force came from abroad or from within the country. A small armed force within the country would, for instance, seize with comparative ease the wireless station and the telegraph services.

32. Amongst the Icelandic political parties sympathy with Germany would be most likely to appear among the more extreme elements in the Independence party (Extreme Right), particularly amongst the younger members. But during the September crisis last year sympathy with the United Kingdom was general. Even newspapers of the Extreme Right, which had previously been thought to be pro-German, openly favoured the democracies, while Mr. Chamberlain was widely described as a national hero. This pro-democratic attitude is still definitely dominant.

33. As regards the Icelandic Nazi party, it is doubtful whether they are at all numerous. At all events, they have kept very quiet for a long time and no Nazi papers have appeared for a considerable period.

34. In conclusion, it should be mentioned that, as I was first appointed to this post towards the end of 1936, information in this report prior to that date has been obtained from other sources.

35. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen.

I have, &c.
J. BOWERING.

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ODS/HMP.

May 18th, 1939.

C118872

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

PRIME MINISTER -

DOMINIONS OFFICE TELEGRAMS ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Only two telegrams have been received since B.191 of May 13th, which you took with you to Quebec.

Copies of these telegrams for the King are being sent to Government House. Your copies will be sent to Laurier House as usual.

In the meantime, I enclose two copies of a summary of the more important items - one for the King.

There is nothing in either telegram that opens up any points beyond those touched on in the two memoranda sent you last week.

It is conceivable that if the United Kingdom should agree to specific naval commitments as to precisely what naval, military or air force are to be sent to Eastern Europe, suggestions will arise in various quarters as to similar or supplementary Dominion undertakings. In this connection the recent statements by Australian and New Zealand Governments indicate that they expect to have their hands full at home in the event of war.

O.D.S.

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118873

SECRET

Office of
The Secretary of State for External Affairs
Canada

Dominions Office Telegrams
on
International Situation

Summary, May 16, May 17.

1. German Non-Aggression Pacts.

The German proposals to the Scandinavian and Baltic states are reported to provide not only that neither party will enter into war or use force against the other, but also that neither will support a third state taking such action against the other. (Press reports forecast replies from Scandinavian states, Denmark accepting, Sweden, Norway and Finland rejecting).

2. Negotiations with Soviet Union.

Soviet note of May 14 maintains objection to latest United Kingdom proposals, on the ground they do not provide any reciprocal guarantee for the Soviet Union or protect the Baltic approaches, and insists that an effective arrangement is possible only on the basis of:-

(1) A United Kingdom - France - Soviet Union Mutual Assistance Pact.

(2) Guarantee by the above powers to the Baltic States as well as the other Central and Eastern European states.

(3) Specific pledges in advance by each of the three main parties as to method and degree of assistance to be provided.

The British Ambassador at Tokyo reports that an alliance with Soviet Union would lead inevitably to Japanese alliance with Germany and Italy.

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C118874

SECRET

Office of
The Secretary of State for External Affairs
Canada

Dominions Office Telegrams on International Situation

Summary, May 16, May 17.

1. German Non-Aggression Pacts.

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C118875

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). May 19, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 7387/16/18] Copy No. 036

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).

(No. 1002.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 19, 1939.

DURING the course of a conversation with the German Ambassador yesterday, Herr von Dirksen referred to the question of the press. On both sides much harm was being done by press attacks. Could we not have a press truce? If we did agree to do so, the German Government could, of course, implement it 100 per cent., and we might implement it perhaps 75 per cent., if I were able to exercise influence upon newspaper owners. I told the Ambassador that I should always be willing to consider this, but that the problem would largely solve itself if the German Government could take action and pursue a policy that would allow things to become more normal. I was, however, quite ready to try to go further, and, if the Ambassador could feel himself authorised to write me a letter saying that, if our press were able to moderate its tone, he could guarantee the German press would do the same, I would see whether I could do anything with the owners of the principal newspapers. The Ambassador promised to explore this suggestion.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[604 t—2]

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Prime Minister

C 118876 1.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). May 19, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 7386/15/18] Copy No. 036

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).

(No. 1000.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 19, 1939.*

I HAD an opportunity yesterday of a private conversation with the German Ambassador. I began by asking him to give me his impressions as frankly as he liked of feeling in Germany and as he had found it in this country on his return.

2. The Ambassador started off by speaking on familiar lines in regard to the predominant German feeling about encirclement. They so interpreted British policy, both in its political and its economic implications. There were two fears always present to the German mind: encirclement and inflation. They were genuinely alarmed at the activity that this country seemed to be displaying in the sense of the first. It was also felt in Germany that we were concerned to put all the difficulties we could in the way of German trade. Action that we had taken or were taking in the Balkans was so interpreted; they had also evidence that in other countries—he mentioned Iraq—we were doing our best to make it difficult for German trade to maintain its position.

3. He had also felt since returning to England that there was a definitely war atmosphere being established here. He quoted some conversation that he had had since his return, in which his interlocutor had said: " We have all made up our minds that war is unavoidable, and the only question is when it comes." All this, he thought, was in the highest degree dangerous.

4. I replied that he could entirely dismiss from his thought the idea that anyone in England or in France had the smallest desire to initiate a war against Germany. The feeling here was very different. The action of Germany in Czecho-Slovakia had given a profound shock to English opinion, and everybody had begun to ask themselves whether it was not possible that the German Chancellor did, in fact, cherish wider designs of establishing Germany in a position of complete domination on the Continent by the destruction of one country after another, at the end of which he would be in a position to challenge Great Britain or France, or anybody else he liked. While the last thing the British people desired was war, they were absolutely determined that they were not going to be dominated by Herr Hitler and were not going to see the destruction of the independence of any more States, because, if this were to take place, they realised that they were confronted with something much more far-reaching and fundamental. It was for that reason that Great Britain had naturally and inevitably drawn together with other countries who wished for an orderly Europe. It might be, as he had suggested, that all this policy was founded on a tragic misunderstanding and that Herr Hitler had no such intention in his mind. If this was indeed so, there would then be no war, but no responsible person in Germany should be under any illusion that, if Herr Hitler were to take action that threatened the independence of those European States to whom we had given guarantees, we should unhesitatingly fulfil our obligation, and that would mean war.

5. The Ambassador commented on this by saying that he was certain that the German Chancellor had no such ideas in his mind. He was a very sensible man and he could realise as well as anybody else how formidable was the combination that we had succeeded in creating. The Ambassador recapitulated it—" Great Britain, France, Poland, Russia, Turkey, with the United States just behind. If Germany had been unable to win the last war because of the odds with which she was then confronted, it was quite certain that she could not be assured of winning another one against the present combination, certainly not of winning it without imposing disaster upon herself. To this, I repeated that if this in truth was Herr Hitler's mind, there was no cause to fear that any breach of the peace would come from ourselves or those with whom we were associated.

[604 t—1]

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6. The conversation then turned to Danzig, which the Ambassador recognised to be the point of greatest present anxiety. He said that he knew the Danzig problem well, and felt that we had invested Poland with dangerous powers of decision upon so grave an issue. It was essential that the question should be settled, but there was no reason, if the Poles would be reasonable, why a settlement should not be found which would challenge neither their independence nor their security.

7. I told the Ambassador that on this affair also I conceived that German action in Czecho-Slovakia had exercised a most unhappy influence. After the Berchtesgaden conversation between Herr Hitler and Colonel Beck, the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia had no doubt had the result of making the Polish Government feel that German pledges were of small account, and that the proposals made in regard to Danzig by the German Government were accordingly merely an approach to some further development that would directly menace the position of Poland. I could very well understand the anxiety of the Poles lest at some future time the Germans, having secured possession of Danzig, should proceed to fortify it as they were doing with Memel. My own view about the Danzig situation was plain. It seemed that at the present time and in the present atmosphere it was out of the question to expect any reasonable settlement and immediate negotiations were therefore probably not possible. There seemed accordingly to be only two alternatives. One was that the Germans should attempt to solve the question by force: that would mean war. The other was that time should be gained during which the temperature might drop, and during which preparations might be quietly made for securing free and reasonable discussion of this very thorny subject. We were as anxious as anybody else to see the Danzig question settled and it ought to be possible to find a peaceful solution of it. But if the German Government were going to attempt either to settle it by force or to insist upon 100 per cent. German settlement with the German army mobilised behind the frontier to further the conduct of the negotiations, a catastrophe was bound to follow. So far as the British people were concerned, they had come to the end of their willingness to take part in negotiations dictated under threat of force. To any free and reasonable effort at negotiation, on the other hand, they would always lend full support. I felt pretty sure that no settlement that involved the complete return of Danzig to German sovereignty was likely to be acceptable to Poland. But while Poland must recognise the obvious fact that Danzig was predominantly German, Herr Hitler seemed from his speech willing to realise that Poland must have secure access to the sea. The two interests in Danzig had somehow to be reconciled, and in this connexion I had constantly asked myself what exactly Herr Hitler had had in mind when he had spoken in his speech of Danzig as a "free State within the German Reich."

8. Whether or not, however, it might be possible at some future time to reach a measure of agreement on this matter, it was certainly not possible immediately, and, therefore, all those concerned who wished to avoid war must apply their efforts to gain time and reduce tension. I told the Ambassador that some time ago, before we had given our guarantee to Poland, I had told the Polish Ambassador quite frankly what our position in regard to Danzig would be. That position was that no one would be more pleased than ourselves to see a friendly settlement arrived at between Poland and Germany. We recognised the special interest of the German Government in the matter, but, if out of any unilateral attempt at action by the German Government on Danzig a threat were to emerge to Polish independence, that would inevitably bring us into war.

9. The Ambassador agreed that time was essential, and that he felt pretty sure that Herr Hitler did not mean to take any forcible action.

10. In the course of some discussion upon the possibilities of taking any action to improve Anglo-German relations, two or three subjects were mentioned of which it is perhaps worth while making a brief note. The first was the attitude of the press in Germany and Great Britain, which I have recorded separately. Another was the matter of industrial and trade exchanges, in regard to which the Ambassador told me that he understood German industrialists to be coming over to this country in June for some further discussion with British industrial representatives. It was, I think, in the Ambassador's mind that out of these unofficial contacts something more valuable might grow, but he invited no expression of opinion from me, and I gave none. During the conversation on

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these topics I said that I hoped the German Government might be able themselves to show some evidence of intention that would bring a measure of reassurance to the world. If the intentions of the Chancellor were as he had portrayed them, was it impossible for him to find an opportunity of making a speech that would, without the usual accompaniment of insults to democracy, make it plain, so far as words could, that he did not look any longer to forcible solutions, but was content to seek a solution of any outstanding questions with free and *bona fide* methods of negotiation. If he would do something of the kind there would, of course, be plenty of people who would say that it was nothing but empty words on which no reliance could be placed, but I could guarantee him that any such step on the part of the Chancellor would immediately evoke a favourable response in official quarters on this side, and I thought that, if something on these lines could be done both in Germany and in England, it might have a valuable effect in reducing present anxiety by opening the door to further improvement later.

11. When the Ambassador undertook to transmit what I had said to Berlin, I asked him to whom he would transmit it. Was it possible for him to get it direct to the highest quarter? This, he said, was difficult, but he would do his best. He observed, incidentally, that Herr von Ribbentrop was not so bad as he was painted in this country.

12. The whole conversation throughout was most friendly and, as will be gathered from my record of it, we both spoke to each other with complete frankness. Whether it will have any practical result of value is no doubt a matter on which it is impossible to feel any great confidence.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

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ODS/ET
23 May, 1939
C 118879

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER:

No communication from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on the international situation has been received since Sunday.

Mr.Massey telegraphs,however,that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has today telegraphed London from Geneva to the effect that the United Kingdom must now choose between the two alternatives - a three-power alliance such as the Soviet Union has insisted upon, or a breakdown of the negotiations. Mr.Massey is under the impression that the British Government will choose the first alternative.

Mr.Massey further states that a telegram received by the Foreign Office from the British Consul at Danzig reports certain disquieting developments which might indicate an intention on the part of Germany to use force shortly. He does not give the nature of the developments.

O.D.S.

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ODS/ET
23 May, 1939

C 118880

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER:

In Mr. Massey's telegram referred to in the accompanying memorandum, he states that the Australian Government has indicated to London its view that the aid of Russia must be secured on its own terms.

O.D.S.

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C 118881

SECRET

Paraphrase of Telegrams on International Situation
From Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London,
To Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.
May 25, 1939

1. Soviet Union

United Kingdom Government are informing Soviet Government they are now prepared to agree that effective co-operation between United Kingdom, French and Soviet Governments could be established by mutual guarantees conforming generally to League of Nations principles. Such a system would have to include both direct attack on any of these three countries by a European state and hostilities with a European state which had committed aggression against another country in Europe. Care will have to be taken to work out the conditions covering the latter contingency. When worked out, the formula will be communicated to the Soviet Government.

In reply to the British soundings of Rumania and Poland last week as to possible methods of overcoming their objections to the three-power mutual assistance pact, Rumania indicates it cannot take the responsibility of making any suggestion as the British negotiations with Russia are independent of the unconditional and direct guarantees of assistance which Britain and France have given Rumania, while Poland has suggested some slight modification of the British proposals.

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2. Baltic.

Finnish Foreign Minister strongly objects to a three-power guarantee of Finland. It would damage the unity of the Scandinavian countries which both Russia and Germany desired to break up. It would also furnish a handle to domestic critics of his action in rejecting Germany's proposal for a pact of non-aggression.

Danzig reports of local preparations for a coup cannot yet be considered conclusive.

3. Balkan.

Yugo-Slav Foreign Minister advises that his country, while necessarily having to be prudent in its relations with the Axis powers, has not really modified its policy and still seeks Balkan solidarity. He adds that substantial British economic assistance will be necessary if Yugo-Slavia is not to be forced to accept German offer to exchange armament for Yugo-Slav exports, of which Germany already takes five times as much as Britain.

Bulgaria. Turkish Minister thinks in spite of Bulgarian rejections thus far, it will be possible to draw Bulgaria eventually into the Balkan entente.

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Turkish Secretary-General states Turkey had rejected proposal of a German guarantee to Turkey, and had stated that Anglo-Turkish declaration could not apply against Germany unless she were the aggressor, and further that Turkey would consider she was the aggressor if she accepted a demand from Danzig for union with Germany following a plebiscite, and would act accordingly if Italy were drawn in. Turkish Government expects an early agreement with France provided Anglo-Turkish co-operation is given (no indication as to how).

4. Italy

Anxiety has been expressed by the French Ambassador to Italy over the failure of his own Government to revive discussions on the Italian demands regarding Jibuti, Tunis and the Suez Canal, to which Ciano had confined demands.

5. Belgium.

Prime Minister has indicated to British Ambassador that the primary concern of his country remains the maintenance of her neutrality, that he believes Germany would be led by her own interest to live up to her guarantee of Belgium since the latter country was not interested in any war which might arise out of Eastern European disputes, but that in the event of German troops or aircraft seeking to cross Belgian territory, Belgium would mobilize for defence and could defend herself for some weeks. He also expressed the view that France should start negotiations with Italy.

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NOTE:

In Circular Telegram of May 23rd, of which paraphrase was sent on May 24th, under heading "Baltic and Scandinavian States", we are informed that "Latvia" was an error for "Finland".

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SECRET

C118885

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAMS

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON

TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

Received May 26, 1939

1. Background of Mr. Chamberlain's Statement re Three-Power Alliance.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after discussions with M. Daladier in Paris, went fully into the situation at Geneva with M. Maisky. The latter made it very clear that the Soviet Government considered (1) that in any understanding they must be placed on a par with the United Kingdom, France and Poland, all of which had definite and reciprocal agreements with each other, and (2) that they must be protected against the possibility, in the event of the collapse of Rumania or Poland, of being abandoned to attack without any aid from Great Britain. Accordingly nothing short of a definite and fully reciprocal agreement between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union would be acceptable to them. The Foreign Secretary could not induce M. Maisky to modify this stand. In the meantime, Poland and Rumania had indicated that they would make no great objection to acceptance of the Russian proposals, provided no mention of them was made in any agreement reached with Russia.

The British Cabinet on May 24th concluded that in the circumstances, in spite of the objections in many quarters to association with the Soviet Government and doubts as to the effectiveness of their aid in

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war time, it would be better to enter into an agreement on the lines upon which they insisted, than to risk the complete breakdown of negotiations with them and the unfortunate consequences which would follow. It is, however, suggested that the agreement might be put forward as a specific application of the principles of the Covenant of the League rather than as a military alliance. The term in mind is five years. It is proposed to take up these proposals direct with Moscow, after further consultation with Paris.

The Foreign Secretary is considering making a statement of positive proposals for settling existing causes of disagreement, but would not consider this desirable until an agreement with Russia had been reached, and time given for realization of the strength of the anti-aggression bloc. An opportunity for such a statement may be found toward the end of June.

2. Relations of Other Countries to Anglo-Russian Negotiations.

(a) France will be consulted before the formula is submitted to the Soviet Government.

(b) Polish and Rumanian position and representations will be kept in mind.

(c) Latvia, Estonia and Finland will not be mentioned by name, and their susceptibilities will be kept in mind. It will be proposed that they be assisted only when they are resisting violation of their neutrality and ask for assistance.

3. Baltic States.

Finland threatens to resign from the League of Nations if the Council accedes to the Soviet demand for delay in dealing with the Swedish-Finnish proposals for fortification of the Aland Islands in the Baltic. An endeavour is being made at Geneva to work out a compromise.

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAMS

From Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London

To Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.

Received May 27, 1939

1. Proposal which British and French Governments have agreed to make to Soviet Union.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with the principles of mutual support against aggression to which as members of the League of Nations they adhere, agree as follows:

(a) If France and the United Kingdom are at war with a European power as result of aggression by that power against either, or aggression against another European state which they had promised to assist or which asked for their assistance, then the Soviet Union, in accordance with Article XVI of the Covenant, will give both all possible support and assistance.

(b) If the Soviet Union is at war with a European power in similar circumstances, France and the United Kingdom will similarly in accord with Article XVI render it all possible support and assistance.

(c) The three governments will concert as to most effective means of giving such mutual support in case of need.

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(d) They will consult together if developments appear to call for action.

(e) The giving of such support is without prejudice to the rights and position of other states.

(f) The three governments will inform one another of any undertakings already made under (a) or (b) above,and will consult before any of them gives any similar undertakings in future.

(g) The agreement will last for five years, with provision for consultation as to renewal, six months before the end of that term.

2. Memorandum explaining reasons for United Kingdom Government's action as proposed.

(i) They consider it desirable in view of British public opinion to link the Agreement with the League of Nations,but as Article XVI could not be made applicable effectively to Germany or Italy and it is not desired to appear to involve other members of the League in these commitments,the references to the League are made incidental.

(ii) The provisos in (a) and (b) are meant to cover both cases such as Poland where a guarantee has been given,and cases such as Switzerland or Holland,where it has not.

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(iii) In view of the reciprocal character of the Pact it is immaterial whether the Soviet Union gives guarantees to Poland or Rumania, as it would be brought in to any such conflict if France or Britain was in.

(iv) The purpose of paragraph (e) is to avoid any appearance of making use of the territory of other powers without their consent.

3. Communication of above proposals.

The British Ambassador at Moscow has been instructed to present the draft Agreement to the Soviet Government, pointing out that the draft meets the indispensable conditions laid down by the Soviet Government and that the execution of obligations under the Agreement does not depend on League action, though in conformity with its principles.

British Ministers in Poland, Rumania, Finland and Estonia will be informed of the text and instructed to show how the susceptibilities of these countries have been taken care of. Portugal will be given reassuring message, while British representatives in Yugo-Slavia, Japan, Spain and the Vatican are instructed to speak in the same way at their discretion.

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ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THIS DESPATCH.

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C 118891

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SOUTHERN (ITALY). May 30, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[R 4436/7/22] Copy No. 036a

Sir P. Loraine to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received May* 30.)

(No. 463. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Rome, May* 23, 1939.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 476 of to-day's date, to inform you that the French Ambassador called on me yesterday evening and in the course of conversation implied that he was rather in despair over the evident determination of the French Government not to treat with the Italians. Although he fully appreciates the difficulties of M. Daladier's position *vis-à-vis* of the Chamber and important sections of public opinion, he nevertheless believes that it would be the wisest course to open up conversations with the Italian Government. He also let me understand that, if there were any exchanges proceeding through channels other than the French Embassy, he had no knowledge of them or, of course, responsibility for them.

2. M. François-Poncet said that he had missed no opportunity lately in expressing the view to the Quai d'Orsay that some gesture should be made towards the Italian Government, and twelve days ago he had telegraphed to say that he had, in course of conversation with Count Ciano, received from the latter an outline of the terms on the basis of which the Italian Government were ready to talk with the French Government. These terms have already in one form or another been disclosed, and are as follows :—

(1) Free port at Jibuti, and the sale of the part of the Jibuti Railway that lies in Ethiopia.
(2) French support in obtaining representation on the board of the Suez Canal.
(3) Substantiation of the present status of Italians in Tunis.

3. As regards (3), the French Ambassador had replied to Count Ciano that he could not say whether the French Government would agree to a permanent arrangement, but that it might be possible to prolong the present arrangement for, say, five years, during which time some agreement might be discussed. M. François-Poncet said that he had received no reply from the Quai d'Orsay, and he was much distressed about the situation, as he felt that the circumstances demanded that his Government should take immediate action towards a reconciliation with Italy.

4. It seems pretty certain that Signor Mussolini is annoyed that no notice has been taken by France of this definite sign from the Italian side that he was prepared to hold out his hand to France on, to his mind, reasonable terms, and I may remind you that I have heard these terms described as Italy's *minimum* conditions. Yet, in his speech at Turin on the 14th May, Signor Mussolini was moderate and made no blatant attack on France. " There are knots in European politics, but to undo these knots it is perhaps not necessary to have recourse to the sword. Nevertheless, these knots must be undone, because sometimes hard reality is preferred to too long a period of uncertainty ! " These words sum up possibly the sincere feelings of the Duce, and, by them, he wished to tell the French Government that, if they wished for a reconciliation, they must not delay. A week later, on the 20th May, the Duce spoke again in (for him) measured terms, but there was more of a threat in his words. " I spoke clearly at Turin, and this speech at Cuneo can be considered a postscript. Now I shall preserve silence."

5. It seems to me that the situation is serious. The Italian Government may now have concluded that France, for her own reasons, is bent on war. I do not know whether this possibility can be definitely excluded. Lord Perth expressed the opinion that the Italian Government probably held this view, and he agreed, too, that some direct action on our part with Signor Mussolini might be useful (see his telegram No. 362 of the 19th April). M. François-Poncet, as I have said

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above, is strongly in favour of the French Government taking immediate measures to improve their relations with this country. I share these expressions of opinion. The reasons for French inaction may be sound, having regard to their internal situation, but French inaction is undoubtedly aggravating the position of Signor Mussolini, who, even though he has himself to blame for the fix he is in, does not want war and would probably like to have the means to act as a check on Herr Hitler. On the other hand, M. Daladier is the prisoner of his own statement that France will never yield an inch of her territory, &c. If, therefore, it is possible in any way to ease the tension, it can best be done, I think, by the Prime Minister or your Lordship, and these are the conclusions on which the recommendation which I addressed to your Lordship in my telegram under reference is based.

6. The French disinclination to accept anything in the way of British mediation in Franco-Italian difficulties debarred me from suggesting that you should bring further and possibly unwelcome pressure to bear on M. Daladier which would not be necessarily effective and is likely to use up some precious days. I have therefore attempted to indicate a course which should give some personal satisfaction to Signor Mussolini, and to that extent lessen the strain, without exposing us to any reproach from the French side of interfering in an essentially Franco-Italian issue.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Paris.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

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PARAPHRASE OF A REPORT RECEIVED MAY 31st,1939

REGARDING ANGLO-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

The negotiations between the British Ambassador in Moscow and the new Soviet Foreign Minister, M.Molotoff, have not progressed rapidly.

In an interview on May 27th the Foreign Minister informed the British Ambassador and the French Chargé d'Affaires that his personal reaction to the new British proposals was negative, and that the references to the League of Nations showed that the United Kingdom was not prepared to arrange effective co-operation since the League procedure would inevitably involve delays and uncertainty.

On instructions from Lord Halifax two days later, the British Ambassador emphasized to M.Molotoff that the references to the League in the British proposals could not occasion any delay as it was a question of League principles rather than League procedure. It was further emphasized that the proposals were designed to give the complete reciprocity and the assurance of effective and immediate support which it was understood the Soviet authorities desired.

The British Ambassador reported that some impression had been made and the more obvious misunderstandings cleared up. M.Molotoff, however, still complained about lack of clearness and definiteness in the proposals, and insisted on the necessity of prevention of German absorption of small states even with their consent. The Ambassador's impression is that the new Minister is not familiar with foreign affairs, nor accustomed to give and take negotiation.

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SECRET

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAMS

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

received June 1st and June 2nd, 1939

I. ITALY

Mussolini enquired, at the first official meeting with new British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Percy Loraine, whether, in view of encirclement of Axis powers by alliances with Turkey and Russia, the United Kingdom Government considered the Anglo-Italian Agreement had any further value. He declared further that any encirclement of Germany was in his opinion directed equally against Italy; that Germany was entitled to take over Danzig in view of the fact that Poland had built up Gdynia; that a development of Communism was likely to follow a British Agreement with the Soviet Union, and that the United Kingdom had gone out of its way to give an undesired and unnecessary guarantee to Rumania. The British Ambassador endeavoured to answer these opinions. He considers that denunciation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement would result in consternation in Italy, but he also feels that the only argument likely to carry weight with Mussolini is an overwhelming show of strength.

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II. THE VATICAN.

The Papal Secretary of State indicates that the Vatican is prepared to assist the negotiations for a Franco-Italian settlement and to support efforts on the part of the United Kingdom or other countries for a solution of the German-Polish controversy.

III. YUGO-SLAVIA

M.Gafencu,Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, reports that Yugo-Slav Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to him that if the Balkan Entente powers(Turkey, Greece,Rumania,with Yugo-Slavia) were to abandon the policy of complete independence(as,for example,by Turkey forming an Anglo-Turkish alliance), Yugo-Slavia,under German and Italian pressure,would give no assistance to the other members of the Balkan Entente and would maintain strict neutrality. The two Ministers agreed on the desirability of strengthening the Balkan Entente and of avoiding either hostility to or fear of the Axis powers. They considered further it was desirable that Turkey should not make any reference to the Balkans in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement. The Rumanian Minister's view was that an adequate defence system already existed without bringing in any additional powers. The above views were communicated to Turkey.

In a later discussion with Turkey, Yugo-Slav authorities stated that M.Gafencu's account of the Yugo-Slav attitude in the above conversation is not accurate.

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IV. TURKEY.

The Turkish Government -

(1) proposes to declare its obligation to assist Greece if that country is attacked by Bulgaria alone or by Bulgaria acting in concert with other powers;

(2) declines to guarantee Rumania against attack by the Soviet Union; and

(3) suggests that any Anglo-Turkish co-operation in the Balkans should be made only in case of aggression by the Axis powers leading to a Balkan war which threatened the security of Turkey.

V. BALTIC POWERS.

Estonia has indicated it is satisfied with the British discussion of the Agreement with the Soviet Union, but adds that the Scandinavian countries threaten to resign from the League of Nations if this Agreement were linked up with the League.

Latvia continues to be opposed to any Russian help to the Baltic States unless they ask for it.

The Scandinavian countries are still concerned over Soviet attitude to Aaland Islands fortification, but Swedish Foreign Minister still hopes for Soviet agreement.

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VI. RUSSIA.

Reference is made to report previously forwarded that M.Molotoff's reaction to Anglo-French draft agreement was negative. His misconceptions,which may be partly cleared up, dealt with three points -

(1) inevitability of delay if League procedure were utilized;

(2) delay in concluding the three-power agreement itself; and

(3) the vagueness of the Anglo-French proposals regarding military consultations.

His chief insistence was upon the necessity of action to prevent German control of Baltic States,even with their nominal consent.

A further despatch summarizes M.Molotoff's statement in the Supreme Council on May 31st,which has already appeared in the press - the following main points being indicated:

(a) Admitted, British assistance to Poland and Turkey has changed international situation. In United Kingdom itself public opinion was recognizing a need for sweeping changes in its foreign policy.

(b) Soviet co-operation with Britain and France in resisting aggression must be on a strictly reciprocal basis. Reference to the Covenant of the League might make such reciprocity fictitious.

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(c) Russia was not going to pull other peoples' chestnuts out of the fire.

(d) Russia would not give guarantees to five countries without corresponding guarantees to the three Baltic countries on its own borders.

(e) Russia would continue trade relations with Italy and Germany, including discussion of German offer of financial credits.

It is added that no official reply has been received from the Soviet Union to the Anglo-French proposals presented on May 27th.

VII. POLAND.

The United Kingdom Government have recently suggested to the Polish Government, with a view to preventing war, that in the event of a sudden coup at Danzig, Poland should not take precipitate action, but might hold on until the United Kingdom had issued a warning to Germany, accompanied by appropriate military preparations. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, while agreeing in general, asked for details of preparatory military measures contemplated, and emphasized the necessity of assuring public opinion in Poland that British intervention would not end in forcing upon Poland an undesirable compromise. He was also doubtful as to Russian co-operation in any such representations to Germany because of reaction in Germany.

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C 118899

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). June 3, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 7936/3356/18] Copy No. 036

Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 156.)

My Lord, *Moscow, May* 28, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Payart, the French Chargé d'Affaires, and I proceeded yesterday afternoon to present to M. Molotov the proposals of our respective Governments for an agreement providing for mutual support by the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union in the event of aggression in Europe. The interview took place, exceptionally, in the Kremlin, with M. Molotov sitting at a large desk on a raised dais, and M. Potemkin (who acted as interpreter), M. Payart and I at his feet below.

2. I handed in the English draft, and stated that I was happy to present a proposed form of agreement which His Majesty's Government had prepared in the conviction that they were now able to meet the wishes of the Soviet Government. M. Payart presented the French text with the remark that his Government associated themselves fully therewith. M. Potemkin then proceeded, using the French text, to translate aloud the draft into Russian. I noticed that M. Molotov had before him a paper on which he seemed to be checking M. Potemkin's translation.

3. When the latter had ended, M. Molotov said simply and clearly that he had already been able to study the draft, of which he had received a text direct from Paris, and that it seemed to him unacceptable. The words he actually used do not translate well into English ("a negative impression" is the dictionary rendering), but in Russian they convey a definite rejection. In view of what we considered the generous and far-reaching nature of the Anglo-French proposals, neither M. Payart nor I could believe our ears, and thought that we must have mistaken the word, but M. Potemkin's translation put it beyond a doubt. We looked our astonishment, while M. Molotov went on to say that the text of the proposals showed the clear intention of the British and French Governments to continue conversations indefinitely and not to bind themselves to any concrete engagements.

4. I protested strongly and asked him on what he based this remarkable statement, which would shock His Majesty's Government as much as it astounded me. He said that the object of the allusion in the draft to the League of Nations was unmistakable. The cumbrous procedure of the League was a guarantee that the agreement would never come into operation, and he put it that the British and French were prepared to visualise Moscow being bombed by the aggressor while Bolivia was busy blocking all action in Geneva.

5. I said that this was a complete misapprehension. I had been specially authorised to say that the allusion to the principles of the Covenant in no way implied that the entry into operation of the agreement was to depend on any action whatever by the League of Nations. The emphasis was on the principles of the Covenant, which constituted the fundamental basis of the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government; it was our intention to base all the pacts, all the guarantees, we were now negotiating on those same principles; apart from the question of settled policy, it was obviously desirable—and British public opinion would certainly insist—that the principles of collective security against aggression, in the spirit of the Covenant, should be clearly stated so as to take any conceivable sting out of an agreement which might otherwise be construed as disguised aggression on our part. Your Lordship had, I said, publicly proclaimed this fundamental principle of British policy in a speech at Geneva on the 23rd May, and had added that all our international engagements, when concluded, would be laid before the League of Nations.

6. This last statement led to a renewed homily on the cumbrous machinery of Geneva, and M. Payart and I again pointed to the word "principles" in our draft. I proceeded to say that in the present case and in existing circumstances

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it would, in fact, not be practical politics to consider having recourse to the League machinery. For one thing, Germany and Italy were not members. That means article 17, said M. Molotov, and more delays. I pointed out that for that very reason the article in question was not mentioned in our draft. Nor were the remaining portions of article 16, in order to safeguard the susceptibilities of other nations who, as members of the League, might feel that they might be brought in; I specially cited the omission of that part of the article which deals with the passage of troops. All this showed that the text of our proposed agreement was carefully drafted to avoid any suggestion that the operation of the pact would involve setting the regular mechanism of the League to work.

7. But I regret to say that quite palpably my words produced not the slightest effect; they seemed not to be heard or understood, although I could check M. Potemkin's interpreting as being excellent; M. Molotov had his mind made up, and at intervals again told us about Bolivian obstruction and the defects of League procedure.

8. Passing then from what he considered our limitations and reserves in the matter of the League, and of the safeguarding of the susceptibilities of other Powers under article 16 of the Covenant, M. Molotov invited our attention to point 5 of our draft, and made the fantastic statement that the words " without prejudice to the rights and position of other Powers " constituted yet another reserve, this time in favour of the aggressors who were apparently the Powers in question. I patiently explained that the clause was designed to meet the fundamental necessity of strictly respecting the independent rights and sovereignty of the countries whose safety against aggression we were trying to ensure. Why was this necessary, asked M. Molotov, would we not be helping them in their own interests? I answered that we recognised their right to limit even friendly intervention in such matters as, for instance, the passage of troops.

9. M. Molotov next reverted to his original theme that we were deliberately making no serious contribution towards concrete action. I again protested, saying that, in deference to Soviet views, we had abandoned our original proposal for a unilateral declaration by the Soviet Government, and had now substituted a pact of complete reciprocity, covering both direct and indirect aggression, which His Majesty's Government honestly regarded as meeting the three essential points specified in the last reply from Moscow. M. Molotov retorted that we were confining ourselves to words; points 1 and 2 of our proposals were vitiated by the allusions to the League, but, above all, there was no provision for what he called " effective action." M. Payart here stepped into the fray and pointed out that clause 3 fully covered effective action in the sense of examining methods, military and otherwise, of mutual support and assistance. To this M. Molotov retorted that the clause was vaguely worded and referred to some distant future and unending conversations; the Soviet Government wanted immediate and effective action, and this evidently the British and French Governments wished to avoid; we had evaded the third of the three essential points, the conclusion of a concrete agreement as to the forms and extent of assistance to be rendered mutually.

10. Finally, after further inconclusive argument, he said that his views remained unchanged, but they were, of course, only personal; he would report to his Government, and we would receive a reply in due course. I said I would immediately report to your Lordship on the regrettable misunderstandings which had arisen in regard to the allusion to the League Covenant, and I suggested that perhaps the definite Soviet reply could be held up pending receipt of further views of His Majesty's Government. But he did not answer this suggestion.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM SEEDS.

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C 118901

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). June 3, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 7939/3356/18] Copy No. 036 a

Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Moscow, May* 30, 1939.

IN accordance with your Lordship's telegram No. 126 of yesterday I immediately requested an interview with M. Molotov, who received me in the Kremlin at 10·30 the same evening. M. Potemkin was not present on this occasion, but a satisfactory interpreter was provided.

2. I handed to M. Molotov a Russian translation of practically the entire text of paragraphs 2 to 4 of your telegram, and said that this clear statement should be sufficient to remove the misunderstandings which had marked our last interview. We went carefully through it, and I think it carried conviction to a great extent so far as the allusions to the League Covenant were concerned. I need not trouble your Lordship with a detailed report on this part of the conversation which was on sadly familiar lines. The only new point raised was that, according to M. Molotov, His Majesty's Government had been at pains last year at Geneva to improve or modify procedure under article 16, which must therefore be one of considerable—and therefore suspicious—importance. But he seemed satisfied when I pointed out that a desire to improve the general shape of an instrument one year did not imply any intention to use that instrument a year later in totally altered conditions.

3. As regards military conversations M. Molotov gradually became less suspicious of the honesty of our intentions. But he still went on maintaining the necessity for an immediate concrete arrangement. He frankly repeated what M. Litvinov had said to me weeks ago that the Franco-Soviet Pact had turned out to be merely a paper delusion; experience in that respect had taught the Soviet Government the absolute necessity in practice to conclude, simultaneously, both a political and a military agreement. I asked him whether his Government had really thought out the implications of this contention in the present case. Military conversations for negotiating such a concrete agreement would have to cover an enormous stretch of frontier, the co-ordination of assistance by air, land and naval forces on a gigantic scale, questions of supplies and transport, and above all an examination of the delicate problems affecting military assistance to and in the neighbouring countries, each of whom had their own individual wishes and, I would add, suspicions. A concrete agreement was, I said, doubtless possible, but it could quite certainly not be immediate. What was, in fact, possible was the immediate initiation of military conversations which we were offering them here and now.

4. I had meant the conversation to stop at this point, but he insisted that our last interview had not exhausted the questions to be considered, especially that of our insistence on assuming the protection only of such States as desired our aid. Take, he said, a case such as that of Czecho-Slovakia whose President, contrary to the national will, had delivered his country into the hands of Germany: nominally, Czecho-Slovakia had not asked for assistance against aggression, but, in fact, she had not only been a victim of aggression, but would also have welcomed aid from outside. Was British policy, as interpreted by our draft agreement, directed to allowing such aggression to proceed with no regard to neighbouring States who might find the aggressor on their frontier? The Soviet Union could not view with equanimity the prospect of Germany appearing in such circumstances within a few miles of Leningrad.

5. I said that an aggressor appearing on the Soviet frontier would, under our proposals, have to reckon with our immediate assistance to this country were he to proceed further. But as regards the general principle to which he had alluded, I said bluntly that neither His Majesty's Government nor British public

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opinion were prepared to consider forcing guarantees of protection on independent nations which did not desire them; such unwanted guarantees were menaces, not assurances of protection; we had adhered to that principle from the outset, and any change in that attitude would be repugnant to the fundamental spirit of the British people.

6. M. Molotov retorted that we might well argue in that spirit where the Baltic States were concerned, but he was quite convinced that in the case of Belgium, for instance, compounding with Germany the British Government and people would not remain loftily indifferent. Would we keep aloof until the aggressor had reached the shores of Belgium as being the British frontier? Or within 10 kilom. of the sea? I said that it was impossible to foresee, and fruitless to discuss, what might happen, or how public opinion would react, in what I thought most improbable circumstances. Personally I thought that States, which in times of peace were inclined, for historical and other reasons, to hesitate asking for Soviet assistance, would take a different line when actually menaced by German aggression. And I begged M. Molotov to consider the effect on world opinion if the Soviet Union, whose leader had proclaimed the principle of supporting victims of aggression, were to be held up to opprobrium by malevolent propaganda as something not far from an aggressor itself. M. Molotov protested the firm adherence of the Soviet Union to the principle announced by M. Stalin and to that of peace and international amity, but he argued at length and with emphasis that the question at issue was vital to his Government.

7. From this high level (high in the sense that from the Soviet point of view it presented a reasonable argument) the conversation relapsed into wranglings on what M. Molotov considered the lack of clearness of the wording of our draft. The exact amount of assistance implied by the words "in its power" (points 1 and 2), the remarkable concession to the rights of the aggressor under point 5, the clear allusion to the Greek Kalends in point 4 with its talk of "consultation" and "further discussion," were again debated on the lines of those pursued in our interview on the 27th May.

8. Point 6 of our draft was not touched on. With that exception I felt, on leaving M. Molotov, that the ground had been thoroughly explored and that there was some reason to hope that the grosser misunderstandings had been in a measure cleared up. But the question of German aggression through the Baltic States constitutes a fundamental difference between the Anglo-French and Soviet points of view, which mere argument may well be unable to remove.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM SEEDS.

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C 118903

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). June 3, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 4.

036a

[C 7943/16/18] Copy No.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 613.)

My Lord, *Berlin, May 28, 1939.*

I PAID a short visit to Field-Marshal Göring at Karinhall yesterday.

2. Field-Marshal Göring, who had obviously just been talking to someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything German and particularly in respect of the gold held there on behalf of the National Bank of Czecho-Slovakia. Before, however, I had had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his return did not revert to this specific question. He complained instead of British hostility in general, of our political and economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he described as the war party in England, &c.

3. I told the field-marshal that, before speaking of British hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew quite well the basis of all the discussions between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his "wild men" and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich Agreement rested.

4. At this point the field-marshal interrupted me with a description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. Though it was probably highly coloured, it conformed generally with what I had heard from others, notably Baron Weizsäcker and Dr. Mastny. Certainly President Hacha played no heroic part at his meeting with Herr Hitler. Be that as it may, I told Field-Marshal Göring that it was not possible to talk of free will when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard Prague with his aeroplanes, if Dr. Hacha refused to sign. The field-marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point had arisen. According to him Dr. Hacha had from the first been prepared to sign everything but had said that constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to Prague. After considerable difficulty telephonic communication with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed, while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech battalion at least would not fire on the German troops. It was, he said, only at that stage that he had warned Dr. Hacha that, if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The field-marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the story that the advance occupation of Witkowitz had been effected solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first opportunity.

5. I thereupon reminded Field-Marshal Göring that, while I had always appreciated the necessity for the Czechs, in view of their geographical position, to live in the friendliest political and economic relations with Great Germany, he had personally assured me last October that this was all that his Government desired. The precipitate action of Germany on the 15th March, which I again ascribed to the wild men of the party, had consequently, apart from everything and everybody else, been a great shock to me personally and had undone all that I had sought to achieve during my two years at Berlin. Moreover, however

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indifferent this might seem to him, I could not but regard the destruction of the independence of the Czechs as a major political error, even in Germany's own interests.

6. The field-marshal appeared a little confused at this personal attack on his own good faith, and assured me that he himself had known nothing of the decision before it had been taken. He would not, he said, have gone to San Remo if he had; nor had his stay there profited him, as he had hoped, owing to the unexpected amount of work which had in consequence been thrust upon him. He then proceeded to give a somewhat unconvincing explanation, though similar to that which Baron Weizsäcker had furnished me with last March, of the German attempt to come to a satisfactory arrangement with the Czechs and of its failure owing to Czech obstinacy and the revival of what he called the Benes spirit as the result of American encouragement.

7. As my time was limited, I told Field-Marshal Göring that I was well aware of the reasons adduced by his Government to justify its action, but I thought it more important that he himself should understand the British point of view in consequence of it. As the result of the Prague *coup* His Majesty's Government and the British people were determined to resist by force any new aggression. No one desired an amiable arrangement between Germany and Poland in respect of Danzig and the Corridor more than ourselves. But, if Germany endeavoured to settle these questions by unilateral action such as would compel the Poles to resort to arms to safeguard their independence, we and the French as well as other countries would be involved, with all the disastrous consequences which a prolonged world war would entail, especially for Germany, &c. (see your telegram No. 150). Field-Marshal Göring did not appear to question our readiness to fight and restricted his reply to an attempt to prove that circumstances in 1939 were different to those in 1914, that no Power could overcome Germany in Europe, that a blockade this time would prove unavailing, that France would not stand a long war, that Germany could do more harm to Great Britain than the latter to her, that the history of Germany was one of ups and downs, and that this was one of the "up" periods, that the Poles had no military experience and that their only officers of any value were those who had acquired their training in the German army, that they were not and never had been a really united nation and that, since France and ourselves could not, and Russia out of self-interest would not, give them any effective military assistance, they would be taught a terrible lesson, &c. The field-marshal used, in fact, all the language which might be expected in reply to a statement that Germany was bound to be defeated. While I was perturbed at his reference to the unreality of Polish unity, which resembled the German arguments last year in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, he gave me the impression, by somewhat overstating his case, of considerably less confidence than he expressed.

8. At the end of this tirade, moreover, he asked me whether England, "out of envy of a strong Germany," was really bent on war with her and, if not, what was to be done to prevent it. I said that nobody in their senses could contemplate modern war without horror, but that we should not shrink from it if Germany resorted to another act of aggression. If, therefore, war was to be avoided, patience was necessary and the wild men in Germany must be restrained. Admittedly present-day Germany was in a dynamic condition, whereas England was by tradition the land of compromise. But compromise had its limits, and I did not see how the situation could be saved unless his Government was prepared to wait in order to allow excited spirits to calm down again and negotiations to be resumed in a better atmosphere.

9. At this point Field-Marshal Göring remarked that if the Poles tried to seize Danzig nothing would stop the Germans from acting at once. As my time was short, I made no comment on this but continued that neither the Prime Minister nor yourself had yet abandoned hope of a peaceful solution either as between Germany and Poland or between Germany and Great Britain, but that everything now entirely depended on Germany's behaviour and actions.

10. As I had already got up to go, the conversation then took a more amicable turn. Though I was in a hurry, he insisted on showing me with much pride the great structural alterations which he is making to the house at Karinhall and which include a new dining-room to hold an incredible number of guests

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and to be all of marble and hung with tapestries. He mentioned incidentally that the rebuilding would not be completed before November. He also produced with pride drawings of the tapestries, mostly representing naked ladies labelled with the names of various virtues, such as Goodness, Mercy, Purity, &c. I told him that they looked at least pacific, but that I failed to see Patience among them.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAMS

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

Received June 6th, 1939.

I. RUSSIA

M. Molotoff has handed to the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow a revised text of the Anglo-French proposed agreement, embodying Soviet views. The most important differences in the two drafts appear to be -

(a) Specific inclusion of Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Belgium, together with Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Poland, in list of countries which Great Britain, France and Soviet Union have agreed or will agree to defend against aggression; each is to agree also to render immediately all possible assistance to either of the other two powers in the event of its being engaged in hostilities with a European country as a result of aggression by that country against any of the above eight states.

(b) The three powers are to agree as soon as possible as to the form, method and extent of the assistance which would be rendered in the event of any of them being attacked, and the agreement as a whole will not come into force until this subsidiary agreement as to measure of military assistance comes into force.

(c) The assistance is to be independent of any League of Nations procedure.

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II. THE BALTIC

(a) Latvian Minister requests United Kingdom to refrain from any statement regarding Anglo-Soviet negotiations altering the position so far as the Baltic states are concerned.

(b) Sweden is endeavouring to reach an understanding with the Soviet Government regarding the Aaland Islands.

(c) Sweden and Germany are alleged to have begun negotiations for bartering Swedish iron ore for German coal as war reserve in each country against contingency of Russian seizure of Swedish ports in war time in the event of Anglo-Soviet alliance.

(d) The President of Danzig Senate demands reduction of Polish Customs inspectors and is appointing Danzig Customs officials in their stead. League of Nations High Commissioner on June 1st saw Ribbentrop, who stated that if tone of Polish press were moderated and no further incidents occurred, Germany would do everything possible to lessen tension over Danzig.

III. TURKEY

Turkish Foreign Minister states deadlock in French negotiations over Hatay, the northern section of French mandated territory in Syria, as the result of increased French demands.

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IV. ITALY

In response to Signor Mussolini's question as to Anglo-Italian Pact, British Ambassador in Rome is being instructed to state that British Government value Anglo-Italian Agreement, and while seeking to prevent aggression, will endeavour to develop solid and lasting co-operation with Italy.

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SECRET

C118909

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAMS

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

Received June 7th, 1939

British Ambassadors in Paris and Moscow are being brought to London for discussion preparatory to agreeing with French Government on reply to Russia. British Ambassador will explain before leaving that British Government hope to be able to clear up difficulties and reach three-power agreement at an early date.

Bullitt, United States Ambassador at Paris, believes Russian agreement necessary, but that it will not be effected if British Government gives impression of running after Soviets. It is his view that British Government should proceed with Polish Agreement and not be in any particular hurry in answering any Soviet proposals. Bullitt, who was formerly United States Ambassador in Russia, has been summoned to Washington by his Government for consultation.

LATER:

As British Ambassador in Moscow is indisposed, it has now been decided to send a representative of the Foreign Office to Moscow to advise the British Ambassador fully as to the United Kingdom attitude on all points at issue.

The Prime Minister is to make an announcement in the House of Commons this afternoon.

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON,

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA,

Received June 8th, 1939.

I. RUSSIA (continued)

The United States Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Bullitt, suggests close scrutiny of Soviet proposals in the light of a note which French authorities allege was sent to Estonia by Moscow the end of March. Mr. Bullitt describes it as a monstrous attempt to establish a Soviet protectorate. The note was to the effect that the Soviet Government would regard any agreement, voluntary or compulsory, which would diminish the independence of Estonia, involve economic or political domination by a third state, or accord a third state exclusive privileges in its territories or ports, as a violation of existing treaty arrangements with all the consequences which must follow. The note was further alleged to add that the Soviet Union would not remain passive in the face of any attempt, whether open or concealed, to suppress Estonian neutrality or independence.

II. BALTIC STATES.

Latvia and Estonia are signing non-aggression pacts with Germany similar to the German-Danish Agreement.

III. JAPAN

Japanese casualties in the clash on the Outer Mongolian border are said by Japanese General Staff to have numbered 120, and the Russian losses 300. Some quarters in Tokyo not supported by General Staff, insist that the Russian aggressiveness is due to Anglo-Russian negotiations.

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OUS/ET
8 June, 1939

Prime Minister

In visiting the Department today before sailing for Japan, Baron Tomii said that one purpose of his visit was to ascertain more definitely than he could at a distance, which of the various elements and policies contending for the mastery in Japan itself was gaining the upper hand; to learn the present stage and the probable next developments in the China conflict; and to learn also the latest developments in the attitude towards Japan of the United Kingdom on the one hand and of Germany on the other.

Baron Tomii said he understood that the present Japanese Government was opposed to any military alliance with Germany or Italy. An alliance between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Russia on the other, even if the Far East was technically excluded, might strengthen the elements in Japan which favoured an alliance with the Axis powers, and possibly upset the present Government.

Baron Tomii said he had been pleased to note that there had been less criticism of Japan in the Canadian Parliament and press this year than last, and expressed appreciation of Mr. King's efforts at good international relations in that direction. He realized that a General Election was possible and that if it came, there might be

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a temptation in various quarters,particularly in British Columbia, to attack Japan or Japanese policy. He hoped that the Prime Minister would be able to restrain this development,which would have an unfortunate effect on Canadian-Japanese relations.

On this latter point I confirmed Baron Tomii's understanding of the Prime Minister's desire to avoid irresponsible abuse and unnecessary criticism of other countries. It must,however, be recognized that something of the decline in criticism of Japan was due to the temporary greater absorption with Europe. Baron Tomii's own familiarity with Canadian opinion as expressed through many channels must have made him realize that there was little question in any part of Canada as to the responsibility for the conflict which had developed in China, and as to the deplorable character of many of the incidents, notably the recent bombardment of Chungking. (Baron Tomii frankly admitted that he considered the latter incident was inexpedient in its effect on public opinion on this continent). The Prime Minister would of course continue his policy,but we had no censorship of either press or politicians here. In so far as he referred not to attacks on our own "inadequate immigration policy",but to criticism of Japanese

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policy in China, he must remember that the primary responsibility for any worsening in relations, which I did not anticipate, and certainly hoped would not come, would rest on the country which carried on the action against which the criticism was directed.

Baron Tomii was anxious that I should convey his representations on this matter to the Prime Minister, and I stated that I would do so.

Read W.L.M.K.

O.K.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). June 8, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 8149/32/18] Copy No. 0369

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 603 E.)

My Lord, *Berlin, May* 24, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Annual Economic and Financial Report on Germany for 1938.(1)

2. In many ways the developments described therein are more serious, because more inexorable, in their results than even the epoch-making political events of last year. The report shows Germany heading with a kind of demoniac persistence for her autarchic goal, but—what is much graver—it shows her to be so far embarked along her chosen course that retreat is scarcely conceivable. Whatever the roseate figments of Dr. Schacht's, or for that matter Dr. Funk's, imagination, an easy or speedy return by Germany to free currency and economic co-operation seems now to have receded out of the domain of practical politics. The degree of autarchy implied by the Four-Year Plan must be achieved or the Nazi experiment must perish in the attempt. But for even the Four-Year Plan to succeed—complete autarchy is demonstrably impossible—Germany must broaden the base of her economy; in particular, her foreign trade must expand.

3. The incorporation of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia has added to the industrial superstructure, but has done nothing to solve the raw material and other economic problems; in fact, these political "successes" have aggravated the complexity of economic difficulty. The application of the German economic strait-jacket to the new territories has destroyed the remunerative elements represented by existing organisation, especially export trade and the tourist traffic in Austria and the Sudetenland, and there is still only a comparatively remote prospect of these territories acquiring positive economic value to the Reich economy. The ruthless elimination of Jews from economic life in the new territory as well as in Germany proper has also reduced, for the time being at least, the economic assets of the Reich. Feverish efforts are being made to control the economies of the Danubian States, and so to secure a balanced *Lebensraum*, but at bottom everyone feels that such success as may attend these efforts will only be a palliative, and that sooner or later further territorial expansion will be necessary. The shadow of war, it is now realised, overhangs the prospect of such expansion.

4. The Chancellor is faced with a fatal dilemma and, what is more, a dilemma with a time-limit: either he must accept some modification of the autarchic tendency, encourage exports, slacken arms production, and hope for a settlement with Great Britain which will give him not only colonies, but also economic collaboration in many fields where Germany will need it if disaster is to be avoided, or he must risk the supreme throw of a war, the prospects of which are daily becoming less attractive. He must make his choice apparently while his dwindling stock of foreign exchange still enables him to keep the wheels of his titanic machine in motion. Superficially, the first alternative does not seem to present any fatal difficulty; in fact, however, any attempt to change the pattern of German economy at the present moment would be full of danger. It must involve initially a good deal of unemployment, and that in the present state of internal tension might well prove the last straw. Moreover, there is no doubt that Hitler himself, having started the armament race, must have strong fears that advantage would be taken by his enemies of any slackening. Finally, prestige is so overwhelming a factor for the régime that it is very difficult to conceive its conducting the measure of retreat involved.

5. In the circumstances, I would hazard the prophecy that the Chancellor will show his humanity to the extent of shirking the dilemma as long as he

(1) The report will be printed in the Annual Report, Economic (A), series.

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possibly can. He has always avoided war before, and he certainly hopes, if desperately, to avoid it now. Disaster has been confidently and constantly predicted for the Nazi economic régime, and yet after six years it still moves. The pressure is, however, now so great that it is fair to entertain the foreboding that only a conjunction of willingness on the part of Hitler to retreat from the full Nazi programme and willingness on the part of those nations whose confidence he has forfeited to help Germany over the extremely critical stage which any peaceful interruption of her present economic policy must entail will prevent the Chancellor from having to seek a desperate solution to the problem of continuing his rule by taking the risk of a general war.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

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SECRET

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

Received June 9th, 1939.

I. TURKEY.

Germany is endeavouring to persuade Turkey that her intentions are pacific and that she is ready to discuss outstanding questions with the British Government.

II. BALTIC STATES.

Speaking in the Diet on June 7th the Finnish Foreign Minister stated the Government would not accept any guarantee given by Russia without its consent and would regard any assistance so given as constituting aggression. In a Press conference at Stockholm the Finnish Minister of Defence declared that Finland was ready to fortify the Aaland Islands and in protecting its neutrality it had the right to choose its allies and that it was ready to explain its position to the Soviet authorities.

III. GERMANY.

1. The British Ambassador at Berlin has indicated his personal views on the German attitude towards Danzig, which may be summarized as follows:

(a) Hitler may decide either to await developments in the expectation that

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Polish difficulties will increase, or else, in the belief that German defences in the west can resist any attempt, he may decide to try soon for a sudden and overwhelming defeat of Poland, to be followed by an offer of peace terms sufficiently generous to place upon the Western Powers the responsibility for any continuance of the war.

(b) He might be tempted to try to embark upon adventure if the British negotiations with Russia failed.

(c) In any case, even if compelled to negotiate or to temporize, his minimum aims will continue to be return of Danzig to Germany and a passage across the Polish Corridor completely free of control by Poland. In these aims he has the complete backing of the whole German people.

(d) Unless some definite step is made towards the solution before August, it may be that the holding of the annual Nuremburg Rally in September may compel some such device as a declaration by Danzig of its re-union with Germany without, however, any immediate armed intervention by Germany.

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2. From August 23rd to 25th a German cruiser will visit Danzig in connection with the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the loss of a German war-ship there.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). June 12, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 8357/3356/18] Copy No. 036

Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Seeds (Moscow).

(No. 450.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 12, 1939.*

THE Soviet Ambassador called to-day on instructions and said that the Soviet Government noted the departure of Mr. Strang for Moscow.

2. M. Maisky then said that in order to avoid misunderstanding he wished to emphasise that the problem of the three Baltic States, namely, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, was the fundamental problem without which negotiations could not be brought to a successful conclusion. It was an indispensable condition for any agreement that steps should be taken to meet the indirect menace to Soviet security. The crux of the matter lay not in the skilful drafting of ingenious formulæ, but in securing agreement on the substance of the problem raised by direct or indirect aggression against the Baltic States. If agreement could be reached on this, it would not be very difficult, in the Ambassador's opinion, to reach an agreed formula.

3. I assured his Excellency that His Majesty's Government were well aware of the importance of this problem and fully appreciated the necessity for the Soviet Government to safeguard its security in this respect. On the other hand, as the Ambassador knew, it was not our wont to impose assurances on States which did not want them. To show, however, how much we realised that the difficulty was not one which could be simply met by a skilful formula, I could tell him that Mr. Strang had not taken with him any formula and therefore I had not any text to give him as I had told him previously I might have; it had been left to Mr. Strang, who was fully acquainted with the way in which our minds were working, to place your Excellency in a position to discuss all the aspects of the question in the frankest manner with the Soviet authorities with a view to reaching an agreement which would take account of the difficulties of both parties.

4. M. Maisky then referred to point 6 of M. Molotov's draft providing that the agreement should enter into force simultaneously with the conclusion of the military arrangements, and observed that this matter could be discussed in the negotiations. I said that I hoped this meant that it would not be allowed to delay their conclusion.

5. His Excellency and I then had some general talk in the course of which the Ambassador asked my opinion as to what was likely to happen during the summer. I said that it seemed to me that Herr Hitler would find it difficult to face the Nuremberg Conference without first having made an attempt to solve the Danzig problem, and that, if this were so, we must expect that July and August would be disturbed months. I thought, however, that much would depend on whether or not Herr Hitler had decided in his own mind on war. If he had not so decided, then I could not think he would put himself in an impossible position from which he could not withdraw.

6. M. Maisky then mentioned my recent speech in the House of Lords and expressed some regret that it should have been necessary to make it before the Anglo-Russian Agreement had been reached. I replied that the dates for debates in Parliament were not, as he knew, decided by the Government, and that in the circumstances I did not see that the Soviet Government need have cause for objection to anything which I had said. They would no doubt agree with His Majesty's Government in feeling that if we could, by speech or otherwise, get the German people to appreciate that nobody wished to oppress or restrict them so long as their Government did not resort to aggressive action, it would be all to the good. To this M. Maisky assented, but said that he would still have preferred that we should have got our agreement with the Soviet Government first.

7. In conclusion M. Maisky remarked that it would be a good thing if, when things were quieter, I were to go to Moscow myself, to which I replied that, whilst nothing, of course, would give me greater pleasure, I did not feel that it was possible for me at present to absent myself from London.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[629 m—1]

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CENTRAL (GERMANY) June 23, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 3.

[C 8840/3356/18] Copy No. 036a

Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received June* 23.)

(No. 181.)

My Lord, *Moscow, June* 20, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. Strang arrived in Moscow during the morning of the 14th instant and handed me your Lordship's instructions on the subject of the negotiations with the Soviet Union. After examining them with Mr. Strang I invited M. Naggiar, the French Ambassador, to come to His Majesty's Embassy for a consultation the same evening. A further interview with M. Naggiar took place the next morning, the 15th, when he had had time to examine your Lordship's memorandum of instructions, of which we had given him a copy. We agreed that no verbal modifications seemed necessary, except that it would be tactically inadvisable to stress the Baltic States' objections to quite the bellicose extent of, for instance, the Estonian Foreign Minister's public statement quoted in the memorandum. Mr. Strang also pointed out to us that it was not now the intention to put before the Soviet Government the argument expressed in paragraph 8 of my instructions. To facilitate the conversations with M. Molotov and M. Potemkin, where French would be the only possible language, French translations of all the most important portions of your Lordship's memorandum were prepared. We agreed that it was most important that the Soviet Government should have the views of His Majesty's Government in your Lordship's own words on paper, having regard to the misunderstandings inevitably to be expected both from the cumbrous procedure of a conversation in two languages and from the tendency of Soviet negotiators to read their suspicions into imperfectly understood verbal statements.

2. At 5 o'clock the same afternoon M. Naggiar, Mr. Strang and myself proceeded to the Kremlin, where we were received by M. Molotov, with M. Potemkin as interpreter.

3. I began the conversation, as provided for by your Lordship's instructions, by stating the pleasure with which His Majesty's Government noted the great extent to which agreement had already been reached as shown by the various points specified in paragraph 3 of your memorandum, which I proceeded to read. In most circumstances this should have formed a most promising gambit leading to an atmosphere of friendly understanding, but unfortunately M. Molotov was inclined to fear an attempt at compromising the Soviet position, and to examine with some distrust whether my allegation that we were basing this declared measure of agreement on the Soviet Government's own proposals was justified by the Russian text. This led to an exchange of questions and answers, with repeated assurances on our side that we were only talking on general lines and were not formulating a text.

4. I then proceeded to express the hope of His Majesty's Government that it would now be possible to reach an agreement on the whole question of a treaty with no undue delay, adding that such a treaty should in our view be as short and simple as possible. There were, of course, a number of points in the Soviet draft —notably, articles 1, (2); 5 and 6—which caused His Majesty's Government some difficulty, and we proposed to examine these points round the table one by one, instead of the procedure hitherto followed of telegraphing between London and Moscow complete drafts of a treaty.

5. The most important point still at issue between us arose, I continued, out of sub-paragraph (2) of article 1 of the Soviet draft relating to aggressive action against certain countries therein specified by name. His Majesty's Government thought it undesirable that there should be any such specific enumeration of the countries in whose defence the three signatory Powers would collaborate: I had discussed that point so fully in previous interviews with M. Molotov that it was unnecessary for me now to do more than remind him that the three Baltic States had strong objections not only to receiving guarantees under the treaty, but also

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to being mentioned in the treaty at all. I would also point out that Poland and Roumania had made it quite clear—especially the latter—that they did not wish to be cited in such a treaty.

6. At this stage of the interview it became clear that in order to facilitate translation of the views of His Majesty's Government the best procedure would be for M. Potemkin to take our French text of the relevant portions of the memorandum of instructions and to translate orally direct therefrom. I therefore handed him the French translation of paragraphs 9 to 13 inclusive of the memorandum, but I made it clear that the English text (of which we also handed in a copy) was alone to be regarded as authoritative (copy enclosed, Enclosure 1). I would add here that, to make the expression of our instructions complete, we subsequently gave M. Molotov the text of paragraphs 1 to 3 of the memorandum (copy enclosed, Enclosure 2).

7. When M. Potemkin had finished M. Molotov said that he was disappointed at the tenor of our communication: he had expected from all he had seen in the British and French press that we would be the bearers of something much more positive and more in accordance with the views of the Soviet Government. We in return naturally deprecated undue reliance on unauthorised and ill-informed press comment, but M. Molotov said that his expectations had been, in fact, based to a considerable extent on other than press sources. He did not specify what these were.

8. M. Molotov then put a series of questions with a view to elucidating the exact implications of the suggestion contained in paragraph 12 of the memorandum. I need not enter into details of this part of the conversation beyond stating that we made the intention and the effect of the proposal absolutely clear. Eventually we handed him the text of articles 1 and 3 of the draft agreement dated the 6th June, omitting the left-hand variant of article 1 (2). I enclose copy herein (Enclosure 3).

9. M. Molotov then proceeded to put a number of questions about the international background of these negotiations.

10. His first question was whether His Majesty's Government and the French Government would be prepared to guarantee Finland, Estonia and Latvia if these three countries were willing to receive a guarantee. M. Naggiar and I replied that we had no instructions on this point: we had to deal with the situation as we found it, and the present attitude of these three Baltic States was well known.

11. M. Molotov then questioned us as to the respective attitudes adopted by the Polish and Roumanian Governments towards our negotiations with the Soviet Government. We based our replies on the communications made to your Lordship at Geneva on behalf of the Roumanian Government by M. Cretzianu, and on the account of the Polish Government's attitude given to Mr. Strang by the Polish Ambassador in London on the 10th June. He asked how we thought the Polish Government would regard our present proposals. We told him that His Majesty's Government had understood, after enquiry in Warsaw, that the Polish Government would not be likely to raise objection to the system foreshadowed in the Anglo-French draft of the 25th May, and that the general idea of our present draft was the same as that of the earlier draft. We could not recall whether similar enquiries had been made in the Baltic capitals. He then reverted to the attitude of the three Baltic States, and suggested that their respective views were by no means identical: the Latvian Foreign Minister had, for example, carefully refrained from associating himself with the violent statements recently made by the Finnish and Estonian Foreign Ministers. The drift of his remarks was that, since there were already shades of difference in the attitudes of the three Governments, the three Governments might be brought in time to change their views. We told him of the line taken by the Latvian Minister at his interview at the Foreign Office on the 12th June, and said that, if there were shades of difference, the attitude of the three countries was still that they did not wish to be mentioned in the proposed treaty or to be made the object of a guarantee without their consent.

12. He then asked whether in the guarantees which we had given to other States (Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Turkey) we had made provision for joint assistance to third States. We gave him an outline of the arrangements so far made with those countries. He asked whether our arrangement with Poland dealt with the case of an attack on Lithuania. We repeated to him what

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the Polish Ambassador in London had said to the Soviet Ambassador on this point, namely, that when the Anglo-Polish declaration spoke of an indirect threat to the independence of Poland, what the two Governments had had in mind was possible action against Danzig, which was not, of course, Polish territory. The question of assistance to Lithuania had not been discussed with M. Beck. He then said that he understood that Poland would help Great Britain in the event of an attack on the Netherlands. Was this so? Bearing in mind that M. Beck had wished that his assurances to His Majesty's Government on this point should remain confidential, Mr. Strang confined himself to saying that the question of dealing with an indirect threat to either country would no doubt have to be discussed during the negotiation of the formal treaty foreshadowed in the Anglo-Polish declaration, but that nothing definite had yet been settled.

13. It was somewhat irritating to be interrogated in this way, but we thought it well to reply as fully as we could, in order to give M. Molotov an impression of frankness on our part, and because His Majesty's Government would in any event be obliged in due course, by the treaty itself, to inform the Soviet Government fully of the terms of their guarantees to other States. I would add that the entire burden of this part of the interview was borne by Mr. Strang alone and I wish to put on record my appreciation of the skill and discretion with which he reinforced his knowledge and grasp of the various points involved.

14. I had thought of confining the interview to this question of the guarantees and other States, but M. Molotov expressed his desire to learn the views of His Majesty's Government on all other debatable points. We consequently read out to him, as before, a French rendering of paragraphs 15 to 17 inclusive of the memorandum of instructions, and left with him a copy of the English text (copy enclosed—Enclosures 4 and 5). Paragraph 18 of the memorandum was only put verbally as a point of purely juristic or technical nature. M. Molotov asked a few questions but made no particular comment. Finally, he said he would study the material supplied to him and would summon us to another meeting in due course.

15. The next day, the 16th June, we were again summoned to the Kremlin and M. Molotov handed us, in Russian, the text of the Soviet reply of which I have the honour to enclose a translation (Enclosure 6). My telegram No. 127 of that date contained so full a summary of the conversation that I hope I may be excused from repeating it now. But in view of the last sentence in paragraph 2 of your Lordship's telegram No. 142 of to-day's date, I would like to state that, amongst the points made by Mr. Strang, the argument that our guarantees to Poland and Roumania constitute a substantial protection to the Soviet Union, was most clearly brought out.

16. It is worth noting, as typical of the atmosphere with which we have to contend, that M. Motolov was most emphatic in his anxiety to make us understand that, in his view, the British and French Governments were treating the Russians as simpletons (" naivny ") and fools (" duraki "). It became necessary for M. Potemkin to assure him that he had well and truly rendered the word " duraki " as " imbéciles."

17. On the other hand, when we brought up the question of issuing communiqués to the press (on the line that whereas our two Embassies had maintained absolute silence here we had been somewhat surprised by a " Tass " communiqué stating that the impression produced in Soviet circles by the previous conversation had not been entirely satisfactory), M. Molotov had his own quite legitimate grievance in this matter of atmosphere. He pointed out that the Soviet Government had been continually shot at for weeks past by British and French journalists and also by parliamentary questioners, but that a remarkable reticence had on the whole been shown by Soviet organs of publicity. My French colleague and I are of opinion that, in fact, our interests have even more suffered from the publicity in question, but M. Molotov was technically in the right. We confined ourselves to repeating that we would continue to abstain from giving any impressions to journalists; and we were glad to note next day that the Soviet press published nothing beyond the bare announcement that a meeting had taken place.

18. Finally, I would pay tribute to the valuable assistance rendered by the French Ambassador in both these conversations. His clear and logical mind,

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together with his ability to sum up a situation or a problem in concise and limpid terms, helped on many an occasion to dispel the mist of understanding and suspicion. I should add that M. Naggiar took occasion to lay stress on the earnest desire of his Government to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM SEEDS.

Enclosure 1.

Observations on Article 1 (2) *of the Soviet Draft.*

(Paragraphs 9–13 of the Memorandum of Instructions.)

WHILE His Majesty's Government are unable to accept the proposal in article 1 (2) of the Soviet draft, since they cannot agree to impose a guarantee on Powers which are unwilling to receive it, they fully sympathise with the desire of the Soviet Government that the military support which the three Powers would agree to extend to one another should not be confined to a case of actual aggression upon their own territory. They have already met the desire of the Soviet Government for a direct guarantee to cover the case of direct aggression, and they have given much thought to the question how best to devise means of dealing with a threat to the security of the contracting Powers caused by action other than direct aggression.

2. Part of this difficulty would be met if the treaty were to include a clause to the effect that the three Powers would undertake to assist each other in the event of one of them becoming involved in hostilities with a European Power as the result of aggression by that Power against another European State which had, with its own consent, received an undertaking of assistance from the contracting country. It would be unnecessary to mention these States by name in the treaty, and by another article in the treaty it would be agreed, as indicated in article 4 of the Soviet draft, that the three Governments would communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of this kind which they had given to other States.

3. There would still remain, however, the case of aggression against or through States which have not received any such guarantee, some of whom have declared that they would refuse to receive a guarantee. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate, for example, that the military occupation of one of the Soviet Union's north-west neighbours, whose resistance might be quickly overborne or who might even acquiesce in the occupation, might be regarded by the Soviet Union as a menace to the security of the Soviet Union. A similar situation in Holland or Switzerland would be a menace to the security of Great Britain and France. His Majesty's Government have been giving much thought to the question how best to meet such a situation through common action by the three Powers, while at the same time not forcing a direct guarantee on the States concerned, or provoking undesirable reactions on the part of their Governments.

4. His Majesty's Government would be glad if the Commissar for Foreign Affairs would examine this question with His Majesty's Ambassador. His Majesty's Government are inclined to think that the best solution would be found by applying to this case the procedure which they understand to be contemplated in article 3 of M. Molotov's draft. They suggest accordingly that it should be agreed that the three Powers should immediately consult together if one of them considered that its security was menaced by a threat to the independence or neutrality of any other European Power. If the other two Powers agreed that such a menace existed, and if the contracting Power in question was involved in hostilities in consequence, the other two Powers would go to its assistance.

5. The foregoing suggestions seem to His Majesty's Government to cover the case of what might be called indirect aggression against the three contracting Powers through (*a*) other Powers who have already received a guarantee from one or other of the contracting Powers (*i.e.*, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Roumania and Poland); (*b*) other Powers who have not received such a guarantee or do not wish to receive it (Latvia, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland are the most obvious examples). The proposed provisions would thus take the place of sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 in article 1 of M. Molotov's draft.

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Enclosure 2.

Points on which there is Agreement.

(Paragraphs 1–3 of the Memorandum of Instructions.)

HIS Majesty's Government have examined the draft agreement communicated to the British and French Ambassadors on the 2nd June.

2. His Majesty's Government are glad to note that a substantial measure of agreement has now been reached as to the general lines of the proposed agreement.

3. It is agreed :—

(1) That a treaty should be concluded between the three Powers on an equal footing, in which each of the three would undertake similar obligations towards the other two.

(2) That the three Powers would render each other immediate assistance—

(*a*) In the event of one of them being the object of a direct attack by a European Power.

(*b*) In the event of one of the three Powers going to the assistance of certain European States which it had undertaken to assist against aggression.

(3) That the treaty should be in harmony with the principle of mutual assistance against aggression adopted by the League of Nations, but that assistance should be given under the treaty without it being necessary to await action by the League.

(4) That there should be immediate consultation between the three States with a view to settling the methods, forms and extent of the assistance to be rendered under the treaty.

(5) That in the event of a threat of aggression by a European Power, there should be consultation between the three Powers and, should the necessity arise, a decision by them as to the moment and manner of application of the mechanism of mutual assistance.

(6) That the three States should communicate to each other the terms of the undertakings given by them to other States, and consult each other before assuming further obligations.

Enclosure 3.

Anglo-French Draft of June 6, 1939.

ARTICLE 1.

THE United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. undertake to give to each other immediately all the support and assistance in their power should one of these countries become involved in hostilities with a European Power as a result either of—

(1) Aggression by that Power against any one of these three countries.

(2) Aggression by that Power against another European State which the contracting country concerned had, in conformity with the wishes of that State, undertaken to assist against such aggression.

(3) Action by that Power which the three contracting Governments, as a result of the consultation between them provided for in article 3, considered to threaten the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a menace to the security of the contracting country concerned.

Such support and assistance will be given in conformity with the principles of article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but without its being necessary to await action by the League.

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ARTICLE 3.

Without prejudice to the immediate rendering of assistance on the outbreak of hostilities in accordance with paragraph 1, in the event of circumstances arising which threaten to call into operation the undertakings of mutual assistance contained in paragraph 1, the three contracting Governments will, on the request of any one of them, immediately consult together to examine the situation. Should the necessity arise, they will decide by common agreement the moment at which the mechanism of mutual assistance shall be put into operation and the manner of its application.

Enclosure 4.

Observations on Articles 2 *and* 6 *of the Soviet Draft.*

(Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Memorandum of Instructions.)

IN article 2 of M. Molotov's draft it is provided that the three States will come to an agreement as soon as possible as to the methods, forms and extent of the assistance to be rendered by them. In article 6 of that draft it is further provided that the proposed treaty is not to come into force until the conclusion of this proposed military agreement.

2. His Majesty's Government entirely agree that there should be immediate consultation between the three Governments as to the methods, forms and extent of the assistance, provided for in the treaty, since this furnishes the best means of making sure that such assistance shall be as effective as possible. They will accordingly be prepared that these conversations should be inaugurated at the earliest possible date and that they should be both frank and exhaustive. They doubt, however, whether it would be possible within any reasonably brief period to reach a concrete military agreement to cover every possible contingency. They are anxious to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Government without any further delay, and they view with dismay the effect on the European situation which would be produced by the postponement of the entry into force of any such agreement until the conclusion of a military agreement. They think that the only practical course would be to make it clear in the treaty itself that the three States would concert together, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, with a view to settling the methods, forms and extent of the assistance to be rendered, and it might indeed be understood between the three parties that the staff contacts would be inaugurated within a specified time from the conclusion of the treaty.

Enclosure 5.

Observation on Article 5 *of the Soviet Draft.*

(Paragraph 17 of the Memorandum of Instructions.)

ARTICLE 5 of M. Molotov's draft provides that the three States will undertake only to conclude an armistice or peace by joint agreement. His Majesty's Government see serious objection to such a provision. His Majesty's Government would, of course, loyally carry out the obligations of any treaty into which they entered, and they would count on the other two parties to do the same. But they doubt whether on practical grounds this kind of provision would, in fact, achieve its object. An essential condition of an undertaking not to conclude peace except on terms which had been jointly agreed is that agreement should have been reached as to the objects which the peace is to achieve, and no such agreement is possible before the circumstances which produced the war are known. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider some provision in this direction if agreement were reached on other points still outstanding.

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Enclosure 6.

Translation of Soviet Reply of June 16, 1939.

HAVING acquainted themselves with the Anglo-French formulas handed to Molotov on the 15th June, the Government of the Soviet Union have come to the following conclusion :—

1. As regards paragraph 1 of article 1 (Soviet Government's draft), the attitude of the Soviet Government coincides with that of the English and French Governments.

2. As regards paragraph 2 of article 1 (Soviet Government's draft), the views of the Soviet Government are rejected by the English and French Governments.

The latter consider that the Soviet Union should render immediate assistance to Poland, Roumania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey in the event of an attack on them by an aggressor and in the event of England and France being involved in hostilities in connexion therewith, whereas England and France would not assume obligations to render immediate assistance to the Soviet Union in the event of the U.S.S.R. being involved in hostilities with an aggressor in connexion with an attack by the latter on Latvia, Estonia and Finland, which border on the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government cannot possibly agree to this inasmuch as they are unable to reconcile themselves to the position of inequality, humiliating for the Soviet Union, in which the Soviet Union would thereby be placed.

The Anglo-French proposals justify their refusal to guarantee Estonia, Latvia and Finland by the unwillingness of these countries to accept such a guarantee. If this argument is insurmountable, and if the Soviet Government, as already mentioned above, are unable to participate in assistance to Poland, Roumania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey without the receipt of equivalent assistance in the defence of Estonia, Latvia and Finland from an aggressor, the Soviet Government are compelled to recognise that the whole question of a triple guarantee to all the eight States above-named, as well as the question forming the subject of paragraph 3 of article 1, will have to be postponed as not being ripe for solution, and that paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 1 will have to be excluded from the agreement.

In this event article 1 would only consist of paragraph 1, and the obligations of England, France and the U.S.S.R. as regards mutual assistance would enter into force only in the case of direct attack by an aggressor on the territory of one or other of the contracting parties, but they would not extend to cases in which one of the contracting parties might be involved in hostilities as the result of having rendered assistance to any third Power which was not a party to the present agreement but which was the object of an attack by an aggressor. In this connexion the drafting of paragraph 1 of article 1 would clearly have to be altered accordingly.

3. In view of the existence of differences of opinion, further discussion is necessary on the question of the simultaneous entry into force of the general agreement and the military agreement.

4. As regards the question of not concluding an armistice or peace except by general agreement, the Soviet Government maintain their attitude, inasmuch as they are unable to contemplate that any of the contracting parties should have the right, at the very height of defensive military operations against an aggressor, to conclude a separate agreement with the aggressor behind the back of and against its allies.

5. The Soviet Government consider the reference to article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations to be superfluous.

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C118927

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). June 23, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 8979/3356/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Seeds (Moscow).

(No. 488.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 23, 1939.

I ASKED the Soviet Ambassador to come to see me to-day in order to discuss with him the present position of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations now proceeding in Moscow. I showed the Ambassador our last draft of article 1 as given in our telegram to Moscow No. 141. The Ambassador had evidently not seen it and studied it with great attention. I told him that it seemed to us to meet all M. Molotov's requirements, but we were now told that M. Molotov had rejected it in a note in which he gave no reasons. I asked if M. Maisky could explain exactly in what respect our draft was unsatisfactory, but M. Maisky declined to commit himself and merely said that this was surely a matter which Sir William Seeds would be able to ascertain in Moscow. I replied that I should naturally have hoped that this would have been the case, but as a matter of fact it seemed impossible to obtain much enlightenment from M. Molotov on the subject. I, of course, was aware of the fact that he attached importance to the treaty containing a list of the countries whose independence the signatories had undertaken to defend, but I could not make out why he attached particular importance to this naming of the States. M. Maisky could offer no explanation except to suggest that what was aimed at was a sort of Monroe doctrine in Eastern Europe, and that it was presumably necessary for this purpose to enumerate the States to be covered by this doctrine.

2. I then asked M. Maisky point-blank whether the Soviet Government wanted a treaty at all; to which M. Maisky said that of course they did, and why did I ask the question? Because, I replied, throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government had not budged a single inch and we had made all the advances and concessions. When I met M. Maisky at Geneva he had told me that, if His Majesty's Government accepted the principle of a treaty of mutual guarantee, the rest would be easy. This had certainly not been the case.

3. M. Maisky's only answer to this was that his Government had probably made a mistake in frankly stating at the outset what was their irreducible minimum. Perhaps they ought to have asked for more than they wanted so as to be able subsequently to make concessions. In any case, he could not understand why we were so reluctant to agree to a list of countries to be defended. To this I said that saying "No" to everything was not my idea of negotiation, and that it had a striking resemblance to Nazi methods of dealing with international questions.

4. In spite of a good deal of sparring on M. Maisky's part, the conversation was carried on in a most friendly spirit, and I concluded it by asking the Ambassador to tell his Government that we wanted a treaty, and that, if they wanted one too, we ought to be able to reach a settlement without further difficulty.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[629 z—2]

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C 118928

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FAR EASTERN (CHINA). June 27, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[F 6469/1/10] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 647.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1939.*

THE United States Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon in order to give me two letters from President Roosevelt for the King and Queen which he begged me to deliver.

2. We had some general conversation about the position in the Far East, in the course of which I explained very frankly to the Ambassador all our difficulties and the several conflicting considerations of which we had to take account. The Ambassador said that he had done what he could on the suggestion I made to him a day or two ago as to encouraging the American press to draw the right moral for their readers from Japanese treatment of British subjects at Tientsin. It might be the case that we were the principal people to suffer from Japanese policy to-day, but anything that was calculated to undermine British interests was not good for those of any other of the treaty Powers. The Ambassador said he had acted in this sense, and that strong articles had appeared in one or two important papers which he was taking steps to see were well distributed both in the Far East and, so far as possible, in Germany and Italy. He undertook to do his best to secure that the United States would continue to put all pressure they could upon the Japanese behind the scenes, both through the press and through their Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo. This, Mr. Kennedy thought, he could get done.

3. The Ambassador recognised, of course, how different would be the naval position if the United States Government were able to promise co-operation with this country, but he thought this, as I readily recognised, in present circumstances was out of the question. He said that M. Bonnet's speech had set the general cause for which we were all working back by six months. The two sets of circumstances, in which he thought American action would immediately follow, were if something should happen in the Far East that directly involved the American navy before it was possible for the Government to be consulted, and, secondly, if Germany made any attack on Great Britain. As things stood to-day, Mr. Kennedy had no doubt in his mind that we should be wrong to weaken our position in Europe by sending a substantial fleet to the Far East, though he did not in any way underestimate the damage that was being inflicted on our prestige by the present state of affairs, for which it was obviously not in our power to find direct remedy. He fully agreed that the only course immediately open to us was to make the best we could of the way of negotiation.

suggests an Anglo-French-American alliance

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[633 dd—1]

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C 118929

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CENTRAL (POLAND). June 29, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 9155/1110/55] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).

(No. 420.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 29, 1939.*

THE Polish Ambassador called on me at his request on the 29th June in connexion with the negotiations for financial assistance to Poland. Count Raczynski explained that he fully realised the great difficulties with which His Majesty's Government were faced, and that there were many other countries which were also appealing to them for financial assistance. Very real practical difficulties had to be met and important decisions to be taken. He had, nevertheless, felt it his duty to inform me that Colonel Koc and the members of the Polish delegation were worried about the lack of progress. They had now been in London for some time, and yet no meeting had taken place during the last ten days with the exception of a purely nominal contact which was only intended to show that the negotiations had not been interrupted. He had understood eight days ago in conversation with a member of this Department that a general decision on principle would be reached by the end of last week, but another week had almost passed without any such decision. Although the Ambassador did not anticipate a blank refusal of the Polish request, he feared that Poland might not after all be granted the assistance which was absolutely necessary for perfecting her defences. He emphasised the urgency of the problem, since we might be faced with a crisis at any time in the near future.

2. Count Raczynski went on to add, as a purely personal suggestion, that he had heard it argued that the cause of the delay lay in our conversations with the Soviet Government. If this were so, it occurred to him that the Soviet Government might well be awaiting the result of the present Anglo-Polish negotiations. If it were satisfactory, the Soviet Government would then realise that His Majesty's Government were definitely prepared to take serious and practical steps to meet the present danger, and this might well influence them in favour of an early conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. It was not without interest that an article had appeared in Paris in the Communist paper the *Humanité* on the 27th June on the above lines. Count Raczynski finally said that he would be grateful to receive some indication of the trend of the deliberations of His Majesty's Government on the Polish request and to know approximately when he might expect to learn the result of these deliberations in order that he might set at rest the anxieties of his Government and of the Polish delegation in London.

3. I assured Count Raczynski that I entirely appreciated the concern and the anxiety which he had expressed on his own behalf and on behalf of Colonel Koc at the slow progress of the negotiations. This concern was fully shared by myself and by all members of His Majesty's Government. I was fully alive to the urgent necessity of making rapid progress. At the same time, there were certain difficulties, such as our own financial situation, and also technical questions which had arisen in connexion with certain detailed Polish requests. There were also many other claims which had to be weighed by His Majesty's Government. The Ambassador could, however, rest assured that His Majesty's Government were doing their utmost to press on with these negotiations and, although I could give him no definite date, I hoped that it would not be necessary to keep him waiting much longer. I could not be precise as to the exact amount and form of the assistance which His Majesty's Government would be able to give, but they would do the best they could. I undertook to inform the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the Ambassador's observations. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government were fully alive to the urgency of the situation.

4. In reply to the Ambassador's remarks regarding the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, I said that there might well be something in his theory that an early

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C 118930

conclusion of the Anglo-Polish discussions might encourage the Soviet Government to reach an early agreement. I went on to say that there was no foundation whatever for a suggestion which I had seen recently in the press that the Anglo-Polish negotiations had been deliberately held up in order that His Majesty's Government might conclude their negotiations with the Soviet Government in the first place. Our obligations to Poland existed at this moment and were quite clear and firm. We should, of course, honour them and it was therefore in our own interest to settle all outstanding questions with the Polish Government as soon as possible.

5. I took the opportunity of the Ambassador's visit to inform him that I had seen the report of your conversation with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th June, contained in your telegram No. 61, Saving. I said that, although you had very rightly pointed out that it was not your business to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland, you had felt it your duty to emphasise the importance of avoiding any provocation in dealing with the German minority in Poland. I said that I had approved your Excellency's language, although, of course, I had no desire to intervene in any way in Polish internal questions. I added that I had recently seen a large *dossier* of cases concerning the German minority which had been communicated to me by the German Embassy. This communication had merely been acknowledged and I had refrained from expressing any opinion upon it. The German technique in these matters was, of course, familiar to us and I had no doubt that the Polish Government could probably produce an equally long *dossier* of cases concerning the Polish minority in Germany. The Ambassador pointed out that owing to the greater ruthlessness in Germany there were probably no means of expressing the grievances of the Polish minority. I concluded by emphasising how important it was that the Polish Government should not give any handle to the German Government in this connexion, and his Excellency undertook to convey my message to his Government.

6. In reply to a question on my part, Count Raczynski said he had no recent news from Danzig bearing upon the reports just published in the press. He had, however, heard that his Government took a calm view of Dr. Goebbels's speech in Danzig on the 17th June, and that in their eyes the only serious feature of this speech was that it should have been made by a German leader who was not only a propagandist but also a Minister of the Reich. The Ambassador added that he had received no indication that his Government expected any serious developments in the near future. He thought that the present rumours were intended to lead up to a test of nerves, and that there would probably be at least two or three similar crises. He had noticed that the German Government made no attempt to minimise any information of a suspicious character, and he had reason to believe that many of the more alarming stories had been put about from German sources.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

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WEEKLY REVIEW OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
June 30, 1939

1. Tientsin.

2. Anglo-Russian Negotiations.

3. Appeasement of Spain.

Summary of Despatches.

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1. Tientsin.

The Japanese Government has agreed to negotiations in Tokyo for a settlement of the Tientsin dispute, at the same time making clear that it will back the demands of the military authorities and that it expects the British to drop Chiang Kai-shek and adjust their policy in China to that of Japan. The British outline of their intentions sounds as if they were going to do something along the line of suppressing anti-Japanese activities in the concession but try to stall off the currency cooperation proposal.

Tokyo denies that there have been any indignities to British subjects, and adds that if there were the British brought it on themselves. Among those stripped and slapped by Japanese guards during the week was the honorary agent for New Zealand.

The Mayor of Tientsin has sent in a series of demands much like those of the army, with a notice that the British and French have knocked the bottom out of their concession rights by non-cooperation with the local authorities, and that if the demands are not granted something will be done about it. The communication is being ignored.

France is urging caution. The local United States authorities are being helpful by issuing warnings against interference with United States rights, and are ready for any possible cooperation with the British and French. Hull is said to be working on a strong statement which he means to hold till a time when it will do the most good. The British Ambassador at Washington has warned his Government that surrender of principles or undertaking to reduce support of Chiang Kai-shek will have an adverse effect on United States opinion.

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2. Anglo-Russian Negotiations.

The Soviet Government turned down the latest Anglo-French suggestions, which proposed not to name the states to be guaranteed under the mutual assistance pact, but is open to discussion of another suggestion that the names of the guaranteed countries might be communicated in a separate document. As its idea of limiting the pact to one against direct aggression was unacceptable, it has reverted to its previous proposals, which would provide assistance for a signatory who was involved in hostilities either by direct aggression against it, by aggression of a third power against Belgium, Freece, Turkey, Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, or Finland, or by assistance to a third power which had requested it in defence of its neutrality. The British Government has told its Ambassador to try to find out what is really at the back of Molotoff's mind. Meantime it is offering to negotiate a new naval treaty with Germany.

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C118934

3. Appeasement of Spain.

The British Government has assured Franco it has no intention of attempting economic encirclement of Spain, and is offering to send a high official to negotiate a settlement of outstanding trade problems and restore commerce to normal proportions.

France and Spain have come to an arrangement whereby France will return to Franco the Republican gold deposited in France, and Spain will take back 50,000 Republican refugees at once and the other 230,000 by the end of June, and perhaps later on pay for their maintenance.

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Summary of Despatches.

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From Dominions Office:

June 23, tel. Circ. B.229. Anglo-Russian negotiations. Spain.

June 24, tel. Circ. B.230. Tientsin. Russian negotiations. Turkish troops near Bulgaria.

June 27, tel. Circ. B.231. Negotiations with Japan.

June 27, tel. Circ. B.232. Russia, Spain, Franco-Turkish agreement.

June 27, tel. Circ. B.233. China.

From High Commissioner's Office, London:

June 16, No. A.145. Far East.

June 16, No. A.147. Negotiations with Balkan countries.

June 26, tel. 244. Far East: U.S. attitude.

From Brussels Legation:

June 14, No. 33. Visit of Dutch Queen to Belgium.

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Re War

C118936

ODS/HMP.

July 3rd, 1939.

European Situation
WW II - Canada's Participation

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

PRIME MINISTER -

Sir Gerald Campbell referred this morning to a despatch which was being sent out by the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, regarding arrangements with some neutral power for the representation of British interests in the event of war. The number of powers that would be willing to undertake such responsibility was definitely limited under present circumstances. The United Kingdom Government had already approached the United States. If they were not willing, Argentina and possibly Brazil were the most likely alternatives. They would like to know as soon as possible whether we wished to take action in this matter and, if so, through what channels.

O.D. SKELTON

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C118937

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: July 12th, 1939.

SUBJECT: Arrangements regarding representation in the event of war.

REMARKS: Dr. Skelton's memorandum of July the 3rd, attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL:

Read & Council

ACTION TAKEN: Council felt it was inadvisable to take action until obviously necessary to each other in case might be to assume in advance of action by parliament that Canada had definitely decided to participate in war since expected soon do to do

[illegible]

12-7-39

DISPOSED OF:

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

C118938

July 14th, 1939.

For Dr. Skelton:

Your memorandum of July the 3rd to the Prime Minister, concerning representation in the event of war, was read in Council, by the Prime Minister, on July the 12th.

Mr. King has made the following comments on the Council slip:

"Council felt it was inadvisable to take action until obviously necessary to act, otherwise might be to assume in advance of action by Parliament that Canada had definitely decided to participate in war or was expected soon so to do."

A. D. P. H.

AH/R

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C 11893

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). July 3, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1.

[C 9296/54/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Norton (Warsaw).

(No. 433.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1939.*

IN the course of conversation with the Polish Ambassador on the 3rd July, his Excellency mentioned the question of Danzig, and said that he had had the personal idea that it might be a good tactical move were the High Commissioner to give a warning to the Senate. If he understood the position aright, the Council of the League had decided in 1921 that, in case of danger to Danzig, the High Commissioner would be entitled immediately to ask for military assistance from outside, and it had been agreed that Poland, as the neighbouring country, would be the obvious country from which to seek assistance. The Ambassador thought that, if M. Burckhardt could be persuaded to ask for help from Poland, it would place Herr Hitler in a difficult position. The request would be an entirely legal one and, if the Germans were to raise difficulty, the breach would not come from the Polish side.

2. His Excellency said that he had mentioned his suggestion to Sir H. Kennard, but the latter doubted if it could prove practicable, as M. Burckhardt would certainly not move without the Committee of Three and it was difficult to believe that the Swedish member would consent to such a course.

3. I promised to think the matter over.

4. Finally, I suggested that his Excellency should take the opportunity of his forthcoming visit to Warsaw to consult with Colonel Beck as to what possible action the Polish Government had in mind to meet a threat to the present status of Danzig from within.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[654 c—1]

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C 118940

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TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN CHINA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. RECEIVED 26TH JUNE, 1939.

No.601.

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No.598 (not to Hongkong and Commander-in-Chief)

It is the fashion of Chinese and of most foreign observers in China to claim that the Japanese have now made their maximum military effort and have fulfilled the prophecy that it would end in their being bogged and thwarted in the interior of China. There is much in military history of the last nine months to reinforce this claim.

2. In their turn however the Japanese can point to a long series of victories which, according to rules of the game, ought to have been enough to subjugate the country attacked. Nevertheless they confess to being baffled because, in spite of this, the Chinese remain unbeaten, defiant and aggressive and, regardless of war, are setting about building up a new China. Before the fall of Hankow the Japanese were confident once the town was taken the war would be virtually over, the Central Government would break up and plenty of reputable Chinese (without whose co-operation they know their plans must fail) would be willing to work with them. In this they have been disappointed. They have put a very large measure of their strength and treasure into this enterprise and so far they have failed, and now they are looking about for an explanation.

3.

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3. They cannot or will not recognize that until recently failure of their plans has been almost entirely due to forces for creation of which they themselves have been mainly responsible. I mean the unquestioned acceptance by China of leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, unity it has brought, growth of national spirit and resultant determination of Chinese to oust Japanese, which is all the stronger for the conviction that it is bound to come.

4. Few of the many Japanese I have met during past year have been willing to admit this. They cling to their old belief that China has always been like this or like that and cannot have changed by herself. What has happened does not correspond with these beliefs and there must be something wrong. Some extraneous forces must be to blame.

5. For obvious reasons of expediency they brush aside the Americans and they fix upon us. To a certain extent they are right. When some months ago the Chinese were wondering how they could carry on it was our help on top of credits from America that put new heart into them. To that extent we are to blame and that is why the onus of the struggle now tends to shift from them to ourselves, for our financial help to China has checked one of most important moves in Japanese game and as such has been a challenge to Japan.

6. Thus so far Japanese have been frustrated on both sides by Chinese in the field and by ourselves in currency war.

7. As this has been borne in on the Japanese mind two distinct reactions seem to have followed. (1) A desire in

commercial

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commercial circles to stop the war and save themselves from ruin, and (2) a fear among the military that failure, which they could not survive, lies before them and an urgent wish to retrieve it. At present it is the military who prevail.

8. Inasmuch as recent thrusts at Kulangsu and Shanghai proved too dangerous they decided that we were easiest to attack and they are trying it at Tientsin. Much will depend upon outcome of this.

9. Few will argue that integrity of our whole position in the Far East lies in failure of present Japanese adventure. It may be said that the first round of the war is over and that it is we in common with the Chinese who will have to bear the brunt of the second, and that it is upon the way in which the second round is fought out that the outcome of the war will depend. If we fail to hold our ground Chinese will be beaten and dominated by Japanese. If on the other hand we can continue to support the Chinese as we have done and to block each attack the Japanese make upon our rights and interests they will end by giving up the struggle and China will emerge as an independent nation. In other words Chinese so far have been fighting almost unaided a war in the result of which we are deeply interested and it seems that henceforward we shall have to stand or fall together.

10. There are two ways of blocking the Japanese, offensive and defensive. Offensive means full and effective economic reprisals. It would be swift but it must I presume be rejected, unless we have, as Sir R. Craigie has always mentioned, full support of Americans. But the desired result can I think be

achieved

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achieved by little more than purely defensive tactics. We should meet and draw the sting of each successive Japanese attack. That is to say we should continue our resistance to Japanese attempts to break Chinese currency, to establish commercial domination over the areas they hold, to rob us of territory and administrative integrity of concessions and of our share in Settlements, and we should continue to help China how and when we best can. It will be a slow process but in the long run it will be effective and it has the merit of exposing us to the least risk of war.

11. I do not mean to exclude all idea of reprisals against Japan, for we might see ourselves obliged to resort to them in the case of Tientsin but these would be reprisals of defence and they should be specific.

12. We need not expect to see Japanese attacks upon ourselves cease with disposal of Tientsin affair. Far from it. But if each one is met with firm and determined defence they will I think end by defeating themselves.

13. Meanwhile both our nationals and our trade must inevitably suffer but the former will at any rate be able to look with some confidence to the future.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Tokyo Saving No.173 figures by air mail to Mission No.398, Hongkong Saving No.4 Commander-in-Chief Saving at Weihaiwei telegram No.5.

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C 118944

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CENTRAL (POLAND). July 3, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 9297/1110/55] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Norton (Warsaw).

(No. 434.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1939.*

THE Polish Ambassador visited me at his own request on the 3rd July, and stated that he would be glad to discuss a number of questions with me before he returned for a brief visit to Warsaw on the following day.

2. He began by saying that Colonel Koc had already returned to Warsaw to discuss with the Polish Government the memorandum which had been handed to him by Sir F. Leith-Ross on the 1st July (a copy of which was sent to you on that date) in reply to Poland's request for economic assistance. The colonel had left in a state of depression and alarm. What appeared to have particularly depressed him was that though, on being asked a fortnight before for further information as to Poland's requirements (which he had duly supplied), he had been given to expect that the reply when it came would cover the total sum which could be allocated to Poland, including that for cash credits, nevertheless when Colonel Koc was summoned to receive the reply the impression he obtained was that His Majesty's Government did not regard the question as one of any great urgency, and he gathered that they were not prepared to consider the grant of cash credits without attaching a number of conditions such as devaluation and a satisfactory solution of the coal question.

3. The Ambassador went on that he and Colonel Koc both recognised that the allocations promised to Poland in the memorandum of the 1st July would have been a very valuable contribution to the extension of commercial relations in normal times, but in the present times of anxiety the total sum was, indeed, a modest one. Not only that, but only a small portion of it was directly related to the immediate armament programme. The allocations, for example, to the Polish key industries and the electrification scheme, while of great value for the future from a military as well as a commercial point of view, were not of immediate value. So far as the conditions to be attached to the granting of a cash credit were concerned, the Ambassador continued, Colonel Koc was not clear as to the precise attitude of His Majesty's Government. Was devaluation a *sine qua non?* The Ambassador agreed that there were excellent arguments for devaluation, but if it had to be put through before the granting of the credit it might be many weeks before a credit was granted.

4. Count Raczynski said that he and Colonel Koc would both have a difficult time in Warsaw trying to explain the reasons why so little had been granted and why so much time had been required to offer so modest a sum. He would be grateful if I could offer him any explanations which would help to placate his Government. In any case, it would be most undesirable from the point of view of Polish public opinion, and, indeed, from the effect it might have on the world situation, to allow anything to leak out that the negotiations had hitherto yielded so small a result.

5. This led him to add two further points. In the first place, though he was happy to observe that the general tone of the British press with regard to Poland was now satisfactory, the attitude of the Beaverbrook press could only be described as disastrous. From the way it attacked Poland, the articles might almost be written in Berlin. Secondly, the Ambassador had reason to fear that the great efforts now being made by the more responsible organs of the British press to counter the German encirclement propaganda were having the effect of weakening the belief in Germany as to Great Britain's determination.

6. I informed the Ambassador in reply that he need have no fears as to the determination of His Majesty's Government. I referred in this connexion to my own speech on the 29th June and to the statements inspired in Saturday's press on the Danzig question. I added that, in any case, no other attitude would to-day

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be tolerated by the House of Commons. So far as the Beaverbrook p[illegible] concerned I agreed that it was mischievous, though His Majesty's Government would, of course, take no responsibility for it. I promised, however, to take any opportunity that might present itself of trying to say something in the proper quarter.

7. As to the main question on which the Ambassador had approached me, I said that I had realised, as indeed had every member of His Majesty's Government, that the answer would be disappointing to the Poles. But, as I had said to his Excellency last week, we had immense difficulties of our own to meet, and it was our unpleasant task to adjust many conflicting claims. One reason for the delay in answering the Polish demands was, I understood, that the Chiefs of Staff had attempted to appraise the distribution in the common cause of the rather limited material available. As regards the actual sum allocated to Poland, we realised that it was smaller than she had hoped, but it was, at any rate, something to go on with immediately. We might be able to do a little more later, as was said in the memorandum, and we were pressing on with an examination of that question with the French as quickly as possible. I would also ask his Excellency to bear in mind that we were very sensible of the immensely important part which would be played, in the event of war, by the economic strength of this country. For my part, I did not believe in a war of a few weeks. Should war unfortunately break out I believed it would be a long war, and in that event the reserve economic strength of Great Britain would be a factor of enormous importance in the common cause. That was the true explanation of the modesty of the credits granted to Poland, but his Excellency could rest assured that we should put every ounce of our strength into the common effort.

8. Finally, I drew the Ambassador's attention to the coal question, which he had also mentioned in his statement to me. I said that while there had been no connexion between this question and the amount granted to Poland under the export credit scheme, at the same time. it would be unfortunate to leave this matter as it stood and for a rupture to take place outside the terms of the agreement. I begged his Excellency to do what he could in Warsaw to exhort the Polish coal-owners to resume negotiations and reach an agreement. His Excellency agreed that this was a matter which must be cleared up.

I am, &c.

HALIFAX.

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C 118946

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). July 5, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[C 9461/3356/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Snow (Helsingfors).

(No. 140.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 5, 1939.*

THE Finnish Minister called on the 5th July saying that he had been instructed by his Government to seek for an interview in order to enquire how the position of Finland was likely to be affected as a result of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. He recalled the conversation he had had with me on the 11th May, in which I had told him that His Majesty's Government fully appreciated the position of Finland and would not discuss it without consultation with the Finnish Government. He also quoted the statement of the Prime Minister of the 7th June that it was manifestly impossible to guarantee the independence of a country which did not desire guarantees. In the circumstances the Finnish Government did not believe the reports which were appearing in the press that His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government were negotiating an agreement in which His Majesty's Government would recognise the Soviet Government as a guarantor of the independence and neutrality of Finland, or as having the right to guarantee and take steps to protect Finland, or in which they would admit that Finland was within the Soviet sphere of influence.

2. On the other hand, the Finnish Government could not ignore the persistent press reports that His Majesty's Government were engaged in negotiating an agreement having a direct or indirect influence on the status of Finland, and he had accordingly come to enquire what were the true facts of the position. He would therefore like to know whether an agreement was contemplated which directly or indirectly affected the position of his country as an independent State or in which provision would be made for what would happen if the Soviet Government considered that the independence and neutrality of Finland were threatened by a third Power.

3. I replied that I was grateful for this opportunity of a conversation on this matter. I had not forgotten our previous conversation or the statement of the Prime Minister to which M. Gripenberg had referred, and I could assure him that I was very sensible of the obligation of His Majesty's Government to take into account the views of the Finnish Government. Throughout the present negotiations with the Soviet Government His Majesty's Government had been fully aware of the views of Finland and the other Baltic States, of Holland and of Switzerland, and His Majesty's Government considered that the attitude of these countries had a strong claim to recognition. On the other hand, the consequences of a failure to reach an agreement must be borne in mind. I wished to be entirely frank with him and I would accordingly tell him as plainly as I could what was the position of His Majesty's Government in this very difficult matter.

4. We were disposed to draw a distinction between the giving of a direct guarantee and a more general reference to countries whose independence was essential to the signatory Powers. To take an example, he would know that the Netherlands were very susceptible with regard to anything affecting their independent status, but spokesmen of His Majesty's Government had said on more than one occasion that the independence and neutrality of the Low Countries were of vital importance to the United Kingdom. I thought that the position as between Finland and the U.S.S.R. was somewhat similar and our aim must be to reconcile the anxieties of the Finnish Government with the Soviet attitude. We were accordingly endeavouring to reach an agreement which would not mention any other countries by name in any published document. Provision might, however, be made for the possibility that the independence and neutrality of other Powers might be threatened in such a way as to affect the safety of the signatory Powers. This line of approach was in accordance with a sugges-

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tion that had been made to me by a representative of one of the Baltic States at Geneva, that we should avoid any reference to direct guarantees but should mention instead the preservation of the neutrality and independence of other States.

5. I then said to M. Gripenberg that I felt that it was essential that there should be complete confidence between our two Governments. I thought the Finnish Government would appreciate the great importance, taking a broad view, of our being able to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R., and I hoped that they would, at any rate, give us credit for doing our best to take their susceptibilities into account in so far as was possible. I could not, of course, say whether any agreement on the lines I had indicated would be reached or whether possibly we might in the long run confine ourselves to some simpler agreement.

6. I also told M. Gripenberg that, as he might have read in the press, the Soviet Government had recently put forward a fresh proposal which would provide for the possibility of "indirect aggression." I appreciated that this was a question of particular interest to Finland, and that his Government would object to any provision which might give the Soviet Government an opportunity to maintain that they were entitled to intervene in the Finnish internal affairs. His Majesty's Government would do their best to take into account their anxieties on this point.

7. M. Gripenberg then said that, speaking personally, he did not consider that the Netherlands formed a very good analogy since the Dutch had complete confidence in the intentions of His Majesty's Government, whereas all Finns were deeply suspicious of the policy of the Soviet Government. To take one example, M. Molotov had recently more or less intimated to the Finnish Minister at Moscow that he could not allow Finland to fortify the Åland Islands, though the latter were, of course, Finnish territory. Moreover, according to the press, we were prepared to agree to help Russia if she went to war on the ground that the independence and neutrality of Finland were threatened; who would decide whether the Soviet Government were entitled to take action? I replied that in all the drafts which had hitherto been considered the condition of any assistance being granted to the Soviet Government was that she should be involved in hostilities, and it seemed to me that this was not likely to occur unless there was a direct threat to her security.

8. M. Gripenberg then asked whether it would be true to say that in some document it would be laid down that Finland's integrity was a matter of vital interest to the U.S.S.R. I reaffirmed that I did not anticipate the public mention of any State by name, and I again emphasised the distinction which we sought to draw between a direct guarantee and a reference to circumstances which would constitute a threat to the integrity of other Powers.

9. M. Gripenberg enquired whether he could take it that there would be no reference to the possibility of "indirect aggression" as a result, say, of some internal upheaval. I replied that it seemed to me that it should be possible to differentiate between a case such as the summoning to Berlin of President Hacha of Czecho-Slovakia, which I thought must be regarded as a clear case of "indirect aggression," and, on the other hand, action taken by the State concerned which might be the consequence of pressure, actual or anticipated, but which could not properly be classed in any category of aggression.

10. In conclusion, I asked M. Gripenberg to assure the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs that I was fully alive to his anxieties and that I should always be glad to listen to his difficulties. I hoped that he would have complete confidence in the purpose and intentions of His Majesty's Government, and would appreciate that, if ultimately an agreement were reached which was not entirely in accordance with what the Finnish Government felt to be desirable, it would only be because we considered that higher issues were at stake.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). July 5, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

[C 9474/15/18] Copy No. 036a

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Hoare (Bucharest).

(No. 338.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 5, 1939.*

IN the course of a conversation with the Roumanian Minister this afternoon he referred to the general situation and propounded the view that there were indications, not only from the recent activities on the part of the Axis Powers, but from the recent Hungarian *démarche* with regard to minorities in Roumania and from the Bulgarian attitude during M. Gafencu's visit to Angora, which led his Government to think that the intention of the Axis Powers was to make a dead set for the Balkans. Everything went to show that Berlin and Rome were anxious that the Danzig question should be settled by some such method as, perhaps, making the citizens of Danzig German nationals while leaving the Statute of the State unchanged. The Italian Minister at Bucharest had recently been almost insolent to M. Gafencu, and his Government feared that more pressure would soon be exercised on them by Germany and Italy, particularly as Roumania had recently made it clear that she could not go much further in trade matters to meet the German and Italian requirements. What was behind all this? Did I share the Roumanian apprehensions that the real intention behind the screen of Danzig was to launch an attack on Roumania either directly or indirectly through Hungary and Bulgaria?

2. I told the Minister that, so far as M. Gafencu's visit to Angora was concerned, I was not yet certain whether the Bulgarian Minister was speaking under instructions or not. As to Hungary, I had recently had a good deal of information which went to show that that country was a great deal less anxious to be under German domination than was generally supposed. Apart from this, however, if one took a general survey of the last few months one would see that there was an interesting succession of scares: first it was the Ukraine, then Roumania, then Holland and now Danzig, which was supposed to be the object of a sudden *coup de main*. It was difficult to resist the impression that the Axis Powers were deliberately creating tension in the hope thereby of inducing political concessions in order to relieve the strain. While it was right to have regard to every possibility, I thought experience went some way to support the view that we were traversing a period of a war of nerves.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[654 e—2]

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5 July, 1939
ODS/ET

C 118949

F. Ayers

DANZIG COUP

There is a definite possibility of the City of Danzig proclaiming its adherence to the German Reich and of the German Government accepting this gesture of self-determination, while carefully and ostentatiously abstaining from any open recourse to force, thus throwing upon Poland and her allies the onus of initiating recourse to force. The question arises, whether Britain and France should definitely state in advance that they will make war on Germany in such a case.

PRO:

1. If Britain and France fail to accept the direct challenge thus made, every state in Europe, large or small, will lose what faith they have left in British pledges, the Grand Alliance against Hitler will dissolve, every Eastern European state will hasten to make terms with him, his failing credit among his own people will be restored, and the name of England and France will be mud.

2. While the absorption of Danzig may be defended on the basis of self-determination (95 per cent a German community), the Czecho-Slovak experience shows it would be only the first step, that it would sharpen, not cloy,

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Hitler's appetite and weaken Poland against the next demand.

3. While Germany has claims based on history and race, Poland has claims based on other selected portions of history and on its geographic and economic needs. The present position is itself a reasonable compromise and any substantial alteration would be unjust to Poland.

4. To fight in Danzig would not be fighting for Danzig, but for England and freedom. It is an accident that Hitler's present challenge and try-on is in Poland; it might have been some place else, but it has to be met in the spot it is made, not some place else.

CON:

1. If Britain and France encourage Poland to fight in case of a peaceful return of Danzig to the Reich, they will forfeit the good will and support of other countries, convince the German people they are really being encircled, and give Hitler the advantage of claiming to be the aggressee, not the aggressor.

2. Granted the necessity of halting Hitler, why try to halt him in an area strategically difficult to defend and on the last remaining issue where it can plausibly be maintained that it is a question of redressing the wrongs of Versailles on the basis of the self-determination of an

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ancient German community. (95per cent German,though far from 95 per cent Nazi).

3. Why be maneuvered into a position where there is no possibility of adjustment or settlement, no chance of intervening with a compromise suggestion, a position where either Hitler or Beck can determine Britain's fate by pressing a button?

4. More broadly,what hope is there of permanent peace or even permanent strengthening for war, in an alliance with Poland or Rumania, backward feudal countries, controlling and misruling huge minority races, pouncing(in Poland's case) on Czecho-Slovakia in her direst stress, and never faithful long to any ally?

Her Cross's work it
7-7-39

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C 118952

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CENTRAL (GERMANY). July 6, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

036a

[C 9511/3356/18] Copy No.

Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Seeds (Moscow).

(No. 537.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 6, 1939.*

I ASKED the Soviet Ambassador to call on the 6th July to discuss recent developments in our negotiations with the Soviet Government. I said that I was glad to note that agreement had been reached on certain important points. We had informed M. Molotov that we were willing to agree to a list being drawn up and he had agreed that this list should not be published. Although we did not expect the list would remain a secret we thought this procedure preferable.

2. Unfortunately, two further difficulties had arisen during the last exchange of views at Moscow. In the first place, the Soviet Government had objected to the inclusion of the Netherlands and Switzerland in the list. This caused us very great difficulty as we had always supposed that the Soviet Government were in favour of complete reciprocity. As we had now agreed to guarantee the east of Europe, we expected that the Soviet Government would be prepared to give a similar guarantee for western Europe. M. Molotov had taken the line that he only had authority to guarantee eight States—Poland, Turkey, Roumania, Greece, Belgium, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Therefore, unless two of the States were left out, he was not in a position to include two additional States. He had therefore suggested that his difficulties might be removed if the Soviet Government were to negotiate pacts of mutual assistance with Poland and Turkey. This seemed to us a curious argument and did not meet our difficulty regarding the question of reciprocity. M. Molotov's attitude also seemed to us to be a departure from what we had understood to be the general aims of Soviet policy as defined by M. Stalin on the 10th March.

3. Our second difficulty was that M. Molotov now desired the words "indirect aggression" to be added in the text of the published treaty and a definition of the meaning of these words to be included in the unpublished annex. The suggested Soviet definition was quite unacceptable to us, since it could be represented as authorising almost unlimited interference in the affairs of the Baltic States. We had gone as far as we possibly could in dealing with the Baltic States and we could not accept a formula of this nature. We had therefore redrafted it in such a way as to meet the sort of case which M. Molotov seemed to have in mind, *e.g.*, conduct such as that of Dr. Hacha and the Czecho-Slovak Government in submitting to a threat of force last March. We hoped it would be possible to reach agreement on the basis of our redraft. I intended to send fresh instructions to Moscow to-night if the French Government agreed, but I could not conceal from M. Maisky that it would be difficult for us if M. Molotov still felt unable to include the Netherlands and Switzerland in the list.

4. M. Maisky thanked me for my information and said that, although he was kept informed by his own Government, it was helpful to have the views of both sides. He reminded me, however, that the negotiations were being conducted in Moscow, and that it was therefore difficult for him to say anything definite. He saw the difficulties but did not think they were insurmountable.

5. I then asked M. Maisky for his personal advice on the following question. I thought all delay was most regrettable and I had no doubt we were in agreement that it was important to get something settled quickly. I therefore wanted, if the French Government agreed, to send a telegram to Moscow laying down the limits within which a settlement could be reached and giving a certain latitude to our negotiators to reach agreement within those limits, thus putting an end to the perpetual exchange of telegrams and consequent delays. If, however, there were still further difficulties, I wondered whether it might not be better to fall back upon a purely tripartite agreement as an immediate possibility and then pursue our discussions afterwards with regard to the questions concerning other States.

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6. M. Maisky replied that he could only express his personal opinion on this point, but it occurred to him that M. Molotov had suggested such a solution on the 16th June. If we wanted to reach a quick result he thought we might, however, include in the treaty the eight States about which we were already agreed. This would give a far wider basis than the purely tripartite agreement and other questions could be left over for discussion. I pointed out that there would still remain the difficulty about the definition of "indirect aggression" and that it might take considerable time to find a formula to meet this difficulty.

7. I asked M. Maisky some questions regarding the method of negotiation in Moscow, but could only elicit from him that M. Molotov had to refer back to a Committee of the People's Commissars, similar to our own Foreign Policy Committee, although he himself had the usual authority of a Foreign Minister in conducting negotiations.

8. I finally informed M. Maisky that the Finnish Minister had called on me the day before to register a very sharp reaction to the reports which had appeared about the intention of His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government to guarantee Finland. I asked M. Maisky whether he thought there was any danger, if the Baltic States were too much annoyed by our activities, of their going over to the other side. He replied that in his opinion the fuss made by the Baltic States was about 75 per cent. for purposes of show. He had heard from prominent people in those countries that, although they could not ask for a guarantee or accept one openly, they would not really object if one were arranged.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

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HITLER'S WAR PLANS

[Dr. Otto Strasser, the author of this article, and his brother, Gregor Strasser, who was murdered on June 30th, 1934, were among the most prominent of the Left Wing Nazis, until Otto quarrelled with Hitler in 1930, and his brother became involved in intrigues with General von Schleicher in 1932 and was dismissed from his offices in the party. Otto Strasser was a Social-Democrat until 1923, when, despairing of the Party as a revolutionary force, he resigned. In 1926 he joined the Nazis and soon became one of their most prominent publicists. When Hitler began his close collaboration with Hugenburg and the industrialists, Strasser became dubious of his sincerity and asked him to explain his attitude to Socialism. After discussion lasting all day, Strasser resigned and tried to form a new militant National Socialist party, but with small success. The record of this discussion, published under the title *Ministersessel oder Revolution ?* has become a *locus classicus* for Hitler's philosophy and political tactics. Strasser is now living in exile, but still retains the closest contacts with Germany.—ED. *N.S.&N.*]

THE political situation at the beginning of the month of July, 1939, is dominated by the fear that the "Danzig problem" may be the starting point of another world war. If we examine the grounds for this fear the following three facts are apparent :

(1) In his speech in the Reichstag on April 28th, 1939, Hitler declared his irrevocable determination to reincorporate Danzig in the Reich (and thereby to settle the "Corridor" question). This determination has been repeated and stressed in the speeches of German ministers and Party leaders. Only the moment has not been decided ; there is no doubt about the intention.

(2) According to the declarations of Polish ministers—in particular the speech of the Foreign Minister, Beck, in the Sejm and the broadcast of President Moscicki on Naval Day—Poland will resist the reincorporation of Danzig in the Reich with all her forces.

(3) In view of the terms of the British-Polish guarantee and the Franco-Polish pact, and taking into account the declarations of the British and French Governments—especially those of M. Daladier and Lord Halifax—there is no doubt that armed resistance on the part of Poland would be the signal for military help from France and England and therefore for general European war.

It is obvious that there can be no alteration of the first factor without considerable damage to Hitler's prestige and therefore to his power ; and there can be no alteration of the third factor without very great harm to the reputation of England and France in the eyes of the world. Therefore the only slender possibility of peace depends on Poland giving in. The example of Prague has taught us that this kind of suicide (suicide from fear of death) is not impossible. It seems, however, very improbable that Poland will yield, in view of the character of the Polish people and of the Polish Government, and, above all, because of the promise of international support. This means quite simply that a European war is almost inevitable (and it would quickly develop into a new world war).

Before attempting any further analysis, it must be realised that the foreign policy of the Western Powers has given Hitler two strong trump cards—the opportunity to decide the place and the moment. The first is an inestimable advantage for him, for the mentality of the German people demands an excuse for war which will quickly "catch on." This is especially the case with Danzig, though an attack on Prague would have had a different effect. A war against Poland would be just as popular as a war on Italy's behalf—possibly against Albania—would have been unpopular. The Governments in Paris and London seem to ignore the great political advantage that this choice of ground gives to Hitler, but their General Staffs can have no doubt about the much greater advantage he will have if the choice of the moment to strike is left to him.

These important initial advantages must not be forgotten when we consider the further development of Hitler's political and military operations. According to certain reports, Hitler will make a great effort—in the case of Polish resistance to the "settlement" of the Danzig and the Corridor question—to smash Poland completely within three weeks. The German General Staff hope that they will be able to effect this by a concentrated attack by four German armies at once. The first army will march from the Vienna-Mährisch-Ostrau area, to Krakow ; the second from the Dresden-Breslau area to Lodz ; the third from the Berlin-Frankfurt on Oder area to Posen ; and the fourth, somewhat later, from East Prussia to Warsaw. This should result in a Polish Cannae at Warsaw, and if, all goes well, in the complete destruction of the Polish army or, at the very least, the conquest of the industrial areas of Poland and the occupation of the Narew-Vistula-San line for the Germans. In view of the very great superiority of the German forces, especially in the air, and the impossibility of any effective help arriving immediately from England and France (or from Russia, whose offensive powers are weak just as her defensive powers are strong), it can be assumed that at least some of the hopes of the German General Staff will be fulfilled.

Hitler then intends to make the Western Powers an offer of a 50 years peace pact, in return for the Polish districts of Danzig, the Corridor, and parts of Posen and Upper Silesia, and the "peaceful" settlement of German and Italian claims in Africa. Hitler is here reckoning on the love of peace in the nations, the fear of revolution in the hearts of their leaders, and finally on the difference between the "defence" of Poland and the "reincorporation" of Poland.

If these hopes of Hitler are fulfilled—and we have not forgotten that his hopes for the occupation of the Rhineland, the occupation of Vienna, the destruction of Czechoslovakia and the annexation of Prague, have all been fulfilled—he will be master in Europe and a "rounding off" in Africa will be a certain consequence. His strategic position, flanked by Mussolini and Franco, would be so overwhelmingly strong that Nazi acquisition of the heritage of England and France would be accomplished simply through union with the Axis Powers. As this is doubtless realised in Paris and London, the German General Staff, unlike Hitler, are reckoning on a rejection of this peace proposal by the Western Powers, and also on a rejection by Russia of the plans to be submitted to her for the breaking up of Poland.

This is a situation that might be called "Hitler's Battle of the Marne." The war, beginning with a conflict between Germany and Poland, will develop into a European war and then into a world war. Italy will take Corsica with a lightning stroke, a German-Italian army will march against Egypt and the Sudan in order to gain possession of the Suez Canal, while at the same time Spain will demand the surrender of Gibraltar, and the Mediterranean will be closed at both ends by the Axis Powers. Germany will try to get past the Maginot Line, threaten England directly from Holland, and thus force the acceptance of every "peaceful" proposal that she makes after the conquest of Warsaw.

This, according to all reports from Berlin, is an approximate outline of the plan, which provides further for the occupation of Denmark and Rumania for economic reasons, and for the instigation of a revolt among the Arabs and Indians ; it is hoped that Russia will be held in check by Japan.

It is useless to speculate further. According to Clausewitz, only the beginning of a war is known to us ; this is even more true to-day when the internal situation may spring great surprises on us. The German opponents of the Hitler regime see in this the deciding factor in the future and the main objective of their work. Because they consider the downfall of Hitler without war to be a sheer illusion in view of the present material and pyschological situation in Germany, they consider it all the more necessary to precipitate a war as soon as possible to save Germany and Europe from destruction.

At the very moment when Hitler's hopes of a "local war" can no longer be fulfilled, when the German General Staff begin to realise that they are in the same position as Ludendorff after the defeat of Russia—a position that made tactical results possible but involved a strategical final defeat ; when the German people begin to realise that Hitler brings not peace, but a destruction which takes the form of terrible air raids day and night—at this moment the fruits of years of work by the opposition will suddenly mature and a state of revolution will suddenly develop in Germany. The sooner this happens, and the sooner the German people embark on a course of peace policy under new leadership, the greater is the certainty that the war will be quickly and completely ended, before chaos spreads over Germany and Europe.

OTTO STRASSER

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C118956

Despite a constant clamor in the press, Mr. Chamberlain has refused to invite into his Cabinet any of the dissident Conservatives—Churchill, Eden and Duff-Cooper—who represent, at home and abroad, a policy of no unilateral concessions. The Prime Minister apparently hesitates to take this vital step, both because he dislikes to close the door completely on Germany and to reorganize his government. The Cabinet is hardly large enough — particularly in an election year — for both Chamberlain and Churchill, or for Simon, Hoare and Eden. Although the present term of Parliament does not expire until November 1940, Mr. Chamberlain is expected to call a general election in October or November of this year, providing that his diplomatic and military policies have eliminated the possibility of war. Meanwhile, Lord Halifax is being widely mentioned as a desirable Prime Minister in a new coalition of younger and more active leaders.

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President Roosevelt's message to Congress on July 14, transmitting a final plea for neutrality revision by Secretary Hull, has failed to break the stalemate accentuated last week by the 12 to 11 vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferring all consideration of neutrality legislation until the next session of Congress. Barring an overwhelming expression of public opinion in support of the Administration's demand for repeal of the arms embargo, it is likely that Congress will adjourn without further action.

The situation created by this impasse is embarrassing to the Administration and possibly dangerous to the best interests of the United States. It is embarrassing to the Administration because it represents a direct blow to the Executive foreign policy pursued by the President and the State Department for the past six months. It is dangerous because it widens the gap between the legislative and executive branches of the government at a time when unity and consistency in foreign relations are sorely needed.

Since the President's opening message to Congress in January, the Executive foreign policy pursued by the Administration has rested on four basic convictions: (1) that there is a grave danger of general war in Europe; (2) that the vital interests of the United States will be jeopardized if war comes; (3) that the best, if not the only way, of keeping the United States out of such a war is to make its outbreak less likely; and (4) that the surest method of prevention is to convince potential aggressors that they cannot afford to ignore the economic and financial influence of the United States, which may be used against them. These convictions were reiterated by Secretary Hull in his statement last week. After citing points of agreement and disagreement on American foreign policy Mr. Hull declared that the arms embargo not only "plays into the hands of those nations which have taken the lead in building up their fighting power," but works "directly against the interests of peace loving nations."

Despite the fact that party politics have undoubtedly influenced the attitude of Congress, the reaction following Mr. Hull's appeal demonstrated again that Congress has never fully accepted the Executive thesis that a balance of power policy is necessary to defend the vital interests of the United States or is capable of preventing war in Europe. The first action of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after its postponement of neutrality legislation, was to delay action on a resolution introduced by Senator Pittman authorizing an embargo on war materials to Japan. The same majority which blocked repeal of the arms embargo succeeded in postponing consideration of the Pittman resolution by a move to request Secretary Hull's opinion on whether a prohibition on exports to Japan would violate the treaty of amity and commerce signed by the two nations in 1911.

DANGERS OF IMPASSE. The danger of the present impasse, in the opinion of many impartial observers, is not only that it widens the breach between Congress and the Executive, but that it may even increase the likelihood of American involvement in war. By refusing to repeal the arms embargo, Congress has not shaken the convictions of the President or altered the objectives of the State Department, although it has made the position of the Executive more difficult. The Executive policy will continue, with or without Congressional support. But if war should break out and the arms embargo should then be repealed, the United States would be charged with unneutral action and exposed to reprisals which might easily involve the country in hostilities.

While it may not be possible to secure action on neutrality legislation at this session, there are many compelling reasons for establishing a more effective basis for cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of the government. Such a basis might yet be found in a suggestion for a joint Congressional-Executive committee to report to the next session of Congress.

W. T. STONE

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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff

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VOL. XVIII, No. 39 JULY 21, 1939

C 118955

Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879.

EUROPE'S DIPLOMATIC TUG OF WAR

by Vera Micheles Dean

How would Europe line up in case of war? This report summarizes the new European alignments, and analyzes the official commitments on which they rest.

July 15 issue of **FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS** *. . . 25 cents*

BRITAIN PREPARES FOR A SHOWDOWN

DURING the ominous quiet that has prevailed in Europe for the past several weeks, statesmen and soldiers appear to be setting the stage for another September melodrama. The Rome-Berlin axis is tentatively advancing its demands, seeking allies, and testing the nerves of its opponents in almost exactly the same fashion as last year. After Albert Foerster, Danzig Nazi leader, had conferred with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden on July 13, forty German army trucks and 1,000 boys from the Hitler Youth organization were reported to have entered the Free City. The British-Polish alliance was reinforced on July 17, when the Inspector General of British Overseas Forces, Major General Sir Edmund Ironside, arrived in Warsaw for staff conversations and frontier inspections.

Meanwhile, the visit of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, to Spain apparently did not result in an open military alliance, as General Franco declared in a press interview that Spain would be neutral in wartime unless its vital interests were affected, and would remain independent of Germany and Italy. No explanation was offered for the evacuation of the German-speaking population in the Province of Bolzano, where all foreigners have been ordered to leave immediately. The resistance of the Italianized Austrians, many of whose families have inhabited the South Tyrol for generations, was reported to have resulted in considerable bloodshed. There was likewise no confirmation for the many reports that Italy had leased the former Austrian port of Trieste to Germany for ten years, in order to strengthen the strategic position of the axis and facilitate German commerce.

BRITISH REARMAMENT. Great Britain has emphasized the reversal in policy that occurred since Germany's occupation of Prague on March 15. Following Prime Minister Chamberlain's address of July 11, filling the gaps in the guarantee of Poland, the Government sent more than 100 bombing planes on a 1,200-mile return trip across France. On Bastile Day, July 14, British and French troops were reviewed in Paris by the British War Minister, Mr. Leslie Hore-Belisha, and the Chief of the Imperial Staff, Lord Gort. The Government introduced a supplementary arms budget on July 13, raising the April estimates of £630 million to almost £730 million, or 82 per cent more than last year, and bringing the expected deficit for 1939-1940 to over £480 million.

In contrast to last summer, when the British postponed naval mobilization until the last minute and were admittedly unprepared to defend London, the Government expects to have almost a million men under arms during August and September. While announcing special army and air force maneuvers, the Government is calling up the Territorials and reserves during this critical period and summoning the first group of 30,000 conscripts for their six-months' training. A test mobilization of the navy will take place in early August, when over 12,000 reserve officers and men and 60 vessels will be added to the Home Fleet for the summer review and North Sea maneuvers. Airplane production, now estimated at 750 planes per month, is believed at present to be surpassing Germany's in both quantity and quality.

Whether these elaborate diplomatic and military precautions will deter the axis powers from attempting another peaceful conquest this summer depends on two factors—diplomatic and political—that remain as yet uncertain. The Soviet-British alliance, without which Britain and France cannot hope to intimidate their opponents, is still conspicuous by its absence, despite months of negotiation. In addition to disagreement over such specific issues as guarantees for the Baltic states, the delay has resulted in part from Soviet distrust of British good faith.

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(WLMK)
Mr. King

WWII - Canada's Participation
" - Mr. King's Leadership
European Situation

N.306
V.18

C118957

approved by P.M.

PRESS RELEASE

August 24, 1939

6.50 pm

The Government are continuing to give the closest attention to the grave developments in the European situation in the light of information being received.

As stated yesterday, should it become apparent that the efforts to preserve the peace of Europe are likely to be of no avail, parliament will immediately be summoned.

The Government have been proceeding with complete unanimity in outlining the policy which they will announce the moment parliament is summoned, should that step become necessary. Meanwhile, all possible precautionary measures are being taken to meet whatever eventuality may arise.

Today's sessions of the Cabinet have been devoted largely to the further consideration of such measures as would require to be put into effect in the event of emergency both in relation to actual defence and in relation to trade and industry.

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MEMORANDUM

Office of the Prime Minister

Ottawa, August 1939

C 118958

Prime Minister

These two paragraphs which Dr. Skelton & I have just drafted may be of some help

A.D.M.

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C118959

(2)

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

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N-300

C118959-A

Draft Press Release

~~At the conclusion of today's Cabinet~~ meeting ~~the Prime Minister stated that~~ the government ~~were continuing~~ has been primarily concerned to give the closest attention to the grave developments in the European situation in the light of information ~~which is~~ being ~~continuously~~ received.

(1)

Further consideration was given at sessions of the Cabinet held both this morning and this afternoon to ~~such~~ measures as would require to be put into effect in the event of an emergency, both in relation to defence and in relation to trade and industry.

(3) devoted largely to today's sessions of the Cabinet were the further consideration of these such

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Ed.

C118960

Statement to the Press by
Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister of Canada.

August 24, 1939.

European Situation

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NU103

C 118961 file

ADD BASEBALL SCHEDULE (AUG. 24)

INTERNATIONAL

SYRACUSE AT JERSEY CITY, PARTLY CLOUDY, 530 & 730PM.

ROCHESTER AT BUFFALO, CLOUDY, 745PM.

(NO OTHER GAMES SCHEDULED).

P-852
1937

X1110A

CHAMBERLAIN TEXT

LONDON, AUG. 24-(AP)-THE TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S SPEECH TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (ABOUT 2,500):-

IN THE LAST DEBATE WE HAD UPON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHICH TOOK PLACE JULY 31, I OBSERVED THAT THE DANZIG SITUATION REQUIRED VERY CAREFUL WATCHING. I EXPRESSED MY ANXIETY ABOUT THE PACE AT WHICH THE ACCUMULATION OF WAR WEAPONS WAS PROCEEDING THROUGHOUT EUROPE. I REFERRED TO THE POISONING OF PUBLIC OPINION BY PROPAGANDA WHICH WAS GOING ON, AND I DECLARED THAT IF THAT COULD BE STOPPED, AND IF SOME ACTION COULD BE TAKEN TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE, I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY QUESTION WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL DISCUSSION.

MORE1113A

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C 118962

I AM SORRY TO SAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS SINCE OF ANY SUCH ACTION, BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION HAS STEADILY DETERIORATED UNTIL TODAY WE FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH THE IMMINENT PERILS OF WAR.

AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST A DISPUTE AROSE BETWEEN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE DANZIG SENATE AS TO THE POSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF CERTAIN POLISH CUSTOMS OFFICIALS. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. MANY MORE ACUTE DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN EASILY SETTLED IN THE PAST IN LESS TENSE CONDITIONS AND EVEN IN THIS CASE DISCUSSIONS HAD ACTUALLY BEGUN BETWEEN THE PARTIES LAST WEEK.

WHILE THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE IN PROGRESS THE GERMAN PRESS OPENED A VIOLENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. THEY DECLARED THAT DANZIG COULD NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF ANY CONFERENCE OR ANY COMPROMISE BUT THAT IT MUST COME BACK TO THE REICH AT ONCE UNCONDITIONALLY.

MORE X1115A

M

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ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX UNCONDITIONALLY.

THEY WENT FURTHER, AND LINKED UP THE QUESTION WITH THE QUESTION OF THE CORRIDOR AND ATTACKED THE WHOLE POLICY AND ATTITUDE OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND PUBLISHED CIRCUMSTANTIAL ACCOUNTS OF ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF GERMANS LIVING IN POLAND. WE HAVE NO MEANS OF CHECKING THE ACCURACY OF THESE STORIES, BUT WE CANNOT HELP BEING STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT THEY BEAR A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS THAT WERE MADE IN RESPECT OF THE SUDETEN-GERMANS IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

WE MUST ALSO REMEMBER THAT THERE IS A LARGE POLISH MINORITY IN GERMANY AND THAT THE TREATMENT OF THAT MINORITY HAS ALSO BEEN THE SUBJECT OF BITTER COMPLAINT BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. THERE IS NO SUBJECT WHICH IS CALCULATED TO AROUSE ILL-FEELING IN ANY COUNTRY MORE THAN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ILL-TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF THEIR OWN RACE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.

MORE X1124A

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C 118964

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX ANOTHER COUNTRY.

THAT IS A SUBJECT WHICH PROVIDES THE MOST INFLAMMABLE OF ALL MATERIALS--MATERIAL MOST LIKELY TO CAUSE A GENERAL CONFLAGRATION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ONE CAN BUT DEEPLY REGRET THAT SUCH INCIDENTS, WHICH IF THEY WERE ESTABLISHED BEYOND A SHADOW OF DOUBT, WOULD NATURALLY EXCITE SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIMS AND INDIGNATION AGAINST THE AUTHORS OF THIS ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT, SHOULD BE TREATED IN A WAY WHICH IS CALCULATED STILL FURTHER TO EMBITTER THE ATMOSPHERE AND TO RAISE THE TEMPERATURE TO DANGER POINT.

IT MUST, I THINK, BE AGREED THAT IN THE FACE OF THIS CAMPAIGN, DECLARATIONS BY THE POLISH STATESMEN HAVE SHOWN GREAT CALM AND SELF-RESTRAINT. THE POLISH LEADERS, WHILE THEY HAVE BEEN FIRM IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESIST ATTACK UPON THEIR INDEPENDENCE, HAVE BEEN UNPROVOCATIVE. THEY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN READY, AS I AM SURE THEY WOULD BE READY NOW, TO DISCUSS DIFFERENCES WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, IF THEY COULD BE SURE THAT THOSE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE CARRIED ON WITHOUT THREATS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE AND WITH SOME CONFIDENCE THAT IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, ITS TERMS WOULD BE RESPECTED AFTERWARDS BOTH IN THE LETTER AND IN THE SPIRIT. MORE1130A

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C 118965

THIS PRESS CAMPAIGN IS NOT THE ONLY SYMPTON WHICH IS OMINOUSLY REMINISCENT OF PAST EXPERIENCE. MILITARY PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN GERMANY ON SUCH A SCALE THAT THAT COUNTRY IS NOW IN A CONDITION OF COMPLETE READINESS FOR WAR. AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK WE HAD WORD THAT GERMAN TROOPS WERE BEGINNING TO MOVE TOWARDS THE POLISH FRONTIER. IT THEN BECAME EVIDENT THAT A CRISIS OF THE FIRST MAGNITUDE WAS APPROACHING, AND THE GOVERNMENT RESOLVED THAT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN THEY MUST SEEK THE APPROVAL OF PARLIAMENT FOR FURTHER MEASURES OF DEFENCE.

THE RISE IN THE BANK RATE TODAY WAS A NORMAL PROTECTIVE MEASURE ADOPTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENDING OUR RESERVES IN A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY.

IN VIEW OF THE ATTITUDE IN BERLIN THE GOVERNMENT FELT IT THEIR DUTY TO LEAVE NO POSSIBLE LOOPHOLE FOR MISUNDERSTANDING.

THE GREATEST CALAMITY THAT COULD OCCUR WAS NOT DESIRED EITHER BY OUR OWN PEOPLE OR BY THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

WE CANNOT AGREE THAT NATIONAL INTERESTS CAN ONLY BE SECURED BY THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD OR BY THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER STATES.

MORE1133A

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NU111 XX STATES.

C 118966

THAT WAS THE SITUATION ON TUESDAY LAST. THEN, IN BERLIN AND MOSCOW, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE AND WERE LIKELY TO BE SOON CONCLUDED FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. I DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL FROM THE HOUSE THAT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT CAME TO THE GOVERNMENT AS A SURPRISE--A SURPRISE OF A VERY UNPLEASANT CHARACTER.

FOR SOME TIME PAST THERE HAD BEEN RUMORS ABOUT IMPENDING CHANGES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, BUT NO INKLING OF THAT CHANGE HAD BEEN CONVEYED EITHER TO US OR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

THE HOUSE MAY REMEMBER THAT ON JULY 31 I REMARKED THAT WE HAD ENGAGED UPON A STEP THAT WAS ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED IN CHARACTER. I SAID THAT WE HAD ALREADY SHOWN A GREAT AMOUNT OF TRUST AND A STRONG DESIRE TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSIONWHEN WE AGREED TO SEND OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN TO RUSSIA TO DISCUSS MILITARY PLANS TOGETHER BEFORE WE HAD AN ASSURANCE THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL MATTERS.

MORE1137A

M

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NUMBER 12 XX MATTERS.

NEVERTHELESS, MOVED BY THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THAT IF WE COULD COME TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR MILITARY DISCUSSIONS, A POLITICAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT PRESENT ANY INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTY, WE SENT THE MISSION.

THE BRITISH MISSION ARRIVED ON AUG. 7. THEY WERE WARMLY RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION AND DISCUSSIONS WERE ACTUALLY IN PROGRESS AND PROCEEDING ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL TRUST, WHEN THIS BOMBSHELL WAS FLUNG DOWN.

TO SAY THE LEAST, IT WAS HIGHLY DISTURBING TO LEARN THAT WHILE THESE CONVERSATIONS WERE PROCEEDING ON THAT BASIS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS SECRETLY ENGAGED WITH GERMANY FOR PURPOSES WHICH, ONTHE FACE OF IT, WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTS OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY AS WE HAD UNDERSTOOD IT.

MORE1140A

M

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NU113 XX IT.

C 118968

I DO NOT PROPOSE THIS AFTERNOON TO PAS ANY FINAL JUDGMENT UPON THE INCIDENT. THAT, I THINK WOULD BE PREMATURE UNTIL WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY OF CONSULTING WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AS TO THE MEANING AND CONSEQUENCES OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH WAS ONLY PUBLISHED THIS MORNING, BUT THE QUESTION WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO CONSIDER WHEN THEY LEARNED OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, THIS CHANGED SITUATION WOULD HAVE UPON THEIR OWN POLICY.

IN BERLIN THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS HAILED WITH EXTRAORDINARY CYNICISM AS A GREAT DIPLOMATIC VICTORY WHICH REMOVED ANY DANGER OF WAR SINCE WE AND THE FRENCH WOULD NOT LONGER BE LIKELY TO FULFIL OUR OBLIGATIONS TO POLAND. WE FELT IT OUR FIRST DUTY TO REMOVE ANY SUCH DANGEROUS IMPRESSION.

MORE X1143A

M

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118969

NU 16 XX PLACE.

OFFICIAL SOURCES EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NO DIRECT RESPONSE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM ANY MAJOR POWER TO THE FORCEFUL APPEAL FOR PEACE DELIVERED LAST NIGHT BY KING LEOPOLD ON BEHALF OF SEVEN SMALL NATIONS.

THE KING'S XX ETC PICKING UP SECOND PARA OF DAY LEAD.

X1151A

ADD LONDON BRITISH SEPARATE BY RHOADES XX OF SAFETY.

THE SAILING TO SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA OF THE UNION CASTLE LINE MOTOR VESSEL, DUNNOTOR CASTLE, WAS CANCELLED OWING TO GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS. ANOTHER SHIP WILL TAKE THE PASSENGERS.

MORE X1151A

BULLETIN

ROME, AUG. 24-(AP)-UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR WILLIAM PHILLIPS DELIVERED A PERSONAL MESSAGE TODAY FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO KING VICTOR EMMANUEL "ON BEHALF OF THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE."

MORE X1152A

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C118970

NO 20

WEATHER ESPY EAST

WASHINGTON, AUG. 24-(AP)-FORECAST FOR NEW ENGLAND: MOSTLY CLOUDY TONIGHT AND FRIDAY, NOT MUCH CHANGE IN TEMPERATURE; SOME FOG ALONG THE COAST.

ATLANTIC COAST, EASTPORT TO SANDY HOOK: MODERATE SOUTHEAST AND SOUTH WINDS, MOSTLY OVERCAST TONIGHT AND FRIDAY, SOME FOG.

X1204P

95

ADD ROME ROOSEVELT XX PEACE."

THE MESSAGE, DELIVERED TO THE KING ORALLY AT THE ROYAL SUMMER RESIDENCE AT SANT'ANNA DI VALDIERI, NEAR TURIN, EXPRESSED THE HOPE THE KING WOULD FIND SOME WAY OF EXERTING HIS INFLUENCE ON BEHALF OF PEACE.

MR. PHILLIPS LEFT AN AIDE MEMOIRE WITH THE KING AFTER HIS AUDIENCE WHICH TOOK PLACE SHORTLY AFTER 2 P.M. AFTER AN ALL NIGHT TRIP THE AMBASSADOR MADE FROM ROME BY TRAIN AND MOTOR CAR.

MORE1205P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU121 XX CAR.

A COPY OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ROME AFTER THE AUDIENCE WITH THE KING.

NOTHING WAS AVAILABLE TO INDICATE THE KING'S RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE BUT HE WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD GIVE IT HIS CONSIDERATION.

IT WAS EMPHASIZED THE MESSAGE WAS ADDRESSED SOLELY TO THE KING.

X1206P

BERLIN, AUG. 24-(AP)-THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY THIS AFTERNOON OFFICIALLY ADVISED AMERICANS TO LEAVE GERMANY.

X1207P

PARIS, AUG. 24-(AP)-THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY TODAY FORMALLY ADVISED ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS TO ARRANGE TO LEAVE FRANCE "IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN EUROPE."

X1208P

C 118971

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 118972

NO 28

FINANCE

NEW YORK, AUG. 24-(AP)-SANTOS COFFEE FUTURES OPENED 3-9 HIGHER. SEP 5.81; DEC 5.94; MCH 6.04; MAY 6.12; JLY 6.15.

RIO FUTURES COLD UNQUOTED.

X1225P

95

FOURTH LEAD BRITISH

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, AUG. 24-(CP CABLE)-PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY THAT ADOLF HITLER HAD DEMANDED A FREE HAND IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SAID GREAT BRITAIN "FINDS HERSELF WITH AN IMMINENT PERIL OF WAR."

HE MADE THE STATEMENTS IN ASKING PARLIAMENT, SUMMONED TO SPECIAL SESSION AS THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION RAPIDLY DETERIORATED, TO CLOTHE THE GOVERNMENT WITH SWEEPING POWERS TO MEET ANY EMERGENCY.

MORE1226P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

NU129 XX EMERGENCY.

C 118973

"NEW AND DRASTIC STEPS ARE REQUIRED BY THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION," THE PRIME MINISTER SAID GRIMLY IN PRESENTING AN "EMERGENCY POWERS BILL" WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE GOVERNMENT TO PUT INTO OPERATION ANY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE NATIONAL SAFETY. THESE WOULD INCLUDE SUCH STEPS AS:-

1. TAKING OVER RAILWAYS AND OTHER TRANSPORTATION.

2. CONTROL OF FOOD SUPPLIES.

3. DEFENCE AGAINST AIR ATTACK.

MEMBERS, PACKING THE CHAMBER TO CAPACITY, ROSE AND CHEERED THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER HE DECLARED:-

"IF ALL OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION--AND GOD KNOWS I HAVE DONE MY BEST--FAIL AND WE FIND OURSELVES FORCED TO EMBARK UPON A STRUGGLE BOUND TO BE FRAUGHT WITH SUFFERING AND MISERY FOR ALL MANKIND AND THE END OF WHICH NO MAN CAN FORESEE, WE SHALL NOT BE FIGHTING FOR THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF A FAR-AWAY STATE IN A FOREIGN LAND.

"WE SHALL BE FIGHTING FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THOSE PRINCIPLES, THE DESTRUCTION OF WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL POSSIBILITY OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD. I TRUST THOSE WITH WHOM THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES WILL REMEMBER THE MILLIONS OF MANKIND WHOSE FATE DEPENDS ON THEIR ACTIONS MORE1230P

M

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

C 118974

NP130 XX ACTIONS."

AS FOR GREAT BRITAIN, MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID, "WE HAVE A UNITED COUNTRY BEHIND US."

THE CHEERING HE RECEIVED FROM ALL SIDES AS HE COMPLETED HIS 33-MINUTE SPEECH--CAREFULLY WORDED AND SPOKEN SOLEMNLY--SEEMED TO EVIDENCE THE BURIAL OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AT THE HOUR WHEN WAR CLOUDS OVER EUROPE SEEMED STEADILY TO DARKEN.

IT WAS A DRAMATIC SESSION IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER DELIVERED HIS MESSAGE. MEMBERS STOOD AND SAT IN THE AISLES, SO CROWDED WAS THE TINY COMMONS CHAMBER. AMONG THE MEMBERS SUMMONED FOR THE EMERGENCY SESSION WERE 87 WHO HAD INTERRUPTED MILITARY TRAINING TO RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY DUTIES.

EVERY SEAT IN THE GALLERIES WAS TAKEN. A NOTABLE ABSENTEE FROM THE DIPLOMATIC GALLERY WAS AMBASSADOR IVAN MAISKY OF RUSSIA, USUALLY A REGULAR ATTENDANT.

IN THE GALLERY WERE HON. VINCENT MASSEY, CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON, AND HON. CHARLES DUNNING, CANADIAN FINANCE MINISTER WHO IS ABROAD FOR HIS HEALTH.

OUTSIDE IN THE STREETS THOUSANDS OF GRIM-FACED MEN AND WOMEN MILLED AROUND WHITEHALL AND DOWNING STREET, WHILE WITHIN THE BIG GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS WAR PREPARATIONS WERE BEING PUSHED TO PERFECTION. MORE1235P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
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NU131

BULLETIN LEAD U.S.-EUROPEAN

C 118974-A

WASHINGTON, AUG. 24-(AP)-PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RENEWED TODAY HIS EFFORTS TO AVERT A EUROPEAN WAR, BY APPEALING TO KING VICTOR EMMANUEL OF ITALY "TO FORMULATE PROPOSALS FOR A SPECIFIC SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS."

MORE X1236P

ADD LONDON FOURTH LEAD BRITISH BY SANDERSON XX PERFECTION.

A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER SAT DOWN THE UNITED SPIRIT OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE WAS DEMONSTRATED WHEN ARTHUR GREENWOOD, ACTING LEADER OF THE LABOR OPPOSITION, AND SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, LIBERAL LEADER, PLEDGED THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PARTIES TO THE GOVERNMENT.

GEORGE LANSBURY, LABOR, ONE OF THE GRAND OLD MEN OF BRITISH POLITICS AND A CONFIRMED PACIFIST, SAW THE COMMONERS SHOW SIGNS OF RESTLESSNESS WHEN HE PLEADED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO GIVE "LEADERSHIP IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE INSTEAD OF MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR WAR." HE URGED MR. CHAMBERLAIN TO FLY TO MOSCOW AND SEE JOSEPH STALIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET LEADER TO INFLUENCE HITLER.

MORE1238P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU152 XX HITLER.

WHILE MR. CHAMBERLAIN SPOKE IN THE COMMONS HIS FOREIGN SECRETARY, LORD HALIFAX, MADE A STATEMENT ALONG SIMILAR LINES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

[redacted]

THE PRIME MINISTER REVEALED THE GERMAN FUEHRER'S CLAIM TO A FREE HAND IN EASTERN EUROPE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM ANYWHERE CAME AS A REPLY TO A MESSAGE DELIVERED TO HITLER YESTERDAY THROUGH SIR NEVILE HENDERSON, THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN. THIS MESSAGE RESTATED BRITAIN'S OWN POSITION--DETERMINATION TO STAND BY THE POLES AGAINST GERMANY'S INCREASED DEMANDS.

"WE STILL HOPE REASON AND SANITY WILL FIND A WAY OUT," HE WENT ON. BUT, HE ADDED WITH EMPHASIS, "THE ISSUE OF PEACE OR WAR DOES NOT REST WITH US."

AS THE MEMBERS AND GALLERIES CHEERED, MR. CHAMBERLAIN SAID, "NATURALLY OUR MINDS ARE TURNED TOWARD THE DOMINION AND I APPRECIATE VERY WARMLY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS MADE BY MINISTERS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

MORE1242P

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU135 XX WAR."

C118976

"ANY GENERAL WAR WOULD CAUSE TO SUFFER ALL NATIONS WHETHER BELLIGERENT OR NEUTRAL, WHETHER VICTORS OR VANQUISHED, AND WOULD CLEARLY BRING DEVASTATION TO THE PEOPLES AND PERHAPS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOME NATIONS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED."

X1249P

CARLOADINGS

WASHINGTON, AUG. 24-(AP)-THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS REPORTED TODAY 674,237 CARS OF REVENUE FREIGHT WERE LOADED DURING THE WEEK ENDING LAST SATURDAY.

THIS WAS AN INCREASE OF 9,040 CARS, OR 1.4 PER CENT, COMPARED WITH THE PRECEDING WEEK; AN INCREASE OF 76,353, OR 12.8 PER CENT, COMPARED WITH A YEAR AGO, AND A DECREASE OF 102,913, OR 13.2 PER CENT, COMPARED WITH 1937.

X1250P

FINANCE

NEW YORK, AUG. 24-(AP)-BAR SILVER 39 5/8, UP 2 3/8 CENTS.

X1251P

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NO143 XX PACIFIC.

DOWN THE GREATER PART OF THE TIME WERE EASTMAN KODAK, UNION CARBIDE, AMERICAN TELEPHONE, U.S. GYPSUM, DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT, AMERICAN SMELTING AND PHELPS DODGE.

DOMINION 4S TUMBLED MORE THAN A POINT. OFF MORE THAN A POINT IN THE STOCK MARKET WERE MCINTYRE PORCUPINE AND HIRAM WALKER. SMALLER LOSSES WERE NETTED BY DOME, DISTILLERS AND LAKE SHORE.

D104P

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX IMPRESSION.

THE HOUSE WILL RECOLLECT THAT THE UNDERTAKING WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN TO POLAND WAS GIVEN BEFORE ANY AGREEMENT WAS TALKED OF WITH RUSSIA AND THAT IT WAS NOT IN ANY WAY MADE DEPENDENT ON ANY SUCH AGREEMENT BEING REACHED. HOW COULD WE, WITH HONOR, GO BACK UPON SUCH AN OBLIGATION WHICH WE HAD SO OFTEN AND SO PLAINLY REPEATED? THEREFORE OUR FIRST ACT WAS TO ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT OUR OBLIGATIONS TO POLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES REMAINED UNAFFECTED.

MORE107P

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CANADA

NU144 XX UNAFFECTED.

THESE OBLIGATIONS REST UPON AGREED STATEMENTS MADE TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO WHICH EFFECT HAS BEEN GIVEN IN TREATIES WHICH ARE AT PRESENT IN AN ADVANCED STAGE OF NEGOTIATION. THESE TREATIES, WHEN CONCLUDED, WILL FORMALLY DEFINE OUR OBLIGATIONS, BUT THEY DO NOT IN ANY WAY ALTER, ADD TO OR SUBTRACT FROM THE OBLIGATIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED.

THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH WE ISSUED TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING OF THE CABINET THIS WEEK SPOKE ALSO OF CERTAIN FURTHER MEASURES OF DEFENCE WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN. AS I HAVE SAID, GERMANY HAS AN IMMENSE ARMY OF MEN ALREADY UNDER ARMS AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF ALL KINDS HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING CARRIED ON ON A VAST SCALE IN THAT COUNTRY.

THE MEASURES THAT WE HAVE TAKEN UP TO NOW ARE OF A PRE-CAUTIONARY CHARACTER. NOTHING CAN AFFECT THE DETERMINATION TO PUT THIS COUNTRY IN A STATE OF PREPAREDNESS TO MEET ANY EMER-GENCY, BUT I WISH EMPHATICALLY TO REPUDIATE ANY SUGGESTION, IF SUCH SUGGESTION SHOULD BE MADE, THAT THESE MEASURES IMPLY AN ACT OF MENACE. NOTHING THAT WE HAVE DONE, OR THAT WE PROPOSE TO DO, MENACES THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF GERMANY.

MORE11OP

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

NU145 XX GERMANY.

C118979

IT IS NO ACT OF MENACE TO PREPARE TO HELP FRIENDS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST FORCE. IF NEIGHBORS, WISHING TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS, FIND THAT ONE OF THEM IS CONTEMPLATING APPARENTLY AN AGGRESSIVE ACT OF FORCE AGAINST ONE OF THEM AND MAKING OPEN PREPARATIONS FOR ACTION, IT IS NOT A MENACE IF THE OTHERS ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION OF AIDING THE ONE WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS THREAT.

THERE IS ANOTHER ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN TODAY IN THE FINANCIAL SPHERE. MEMBERS WILL HAVE SEEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE BANK RATE HAS TODAY BEEN RAISED TO FOUR PER CENT.

THE HOUSE WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A NORMAL PROTECTIVE MEASURE ADOPTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENDING OUR RESOURCES IN A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY.

THERE IS IN THIS CONNECTION A CONTRIBUTION TO BE MADE BY CITIZENS GENERALLY.

MORE113P

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

NU146 XX GENERALLY.

C 118980

THE PUBLIC CAN BEST COOPERATE BY REDUCING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, ANY DEMANDS, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE PURCHASE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. NEXT, BY SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVING THE CHANCELLOR'S REQUEST THAT CAPITAL SHOULD NOT AT PRESENT BE SENT OR MOVED OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AND FINALLY BY HOLDING NO MORE FOREIGN ASSETS THAN ARE STRICTLY REQUIRED FOR THE NORMAL PURPOSE OF THE BUSINESS.

IN VIEW OF THE ATTITUDE IN BERLIN TO WHICH I HAVE ALREADY REFERRED, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FELT THAT IT WAS THEIR DUTY AT THIS MOMENT TO LEAVE NO POSSIBLE LOOPHOLE FOR MISUNDERSTANDING AND, SO THAT NO DOUBT MIGHT EXIST IN THE MIND OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN WAS INSTRUCTED TO SEEK AN INTERVIEW WITH THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR AND HAND HIM A MESSAGE FROM ME FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THAT MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED YESTERDAY AND THE REPLY WAS RECEIVED TODAY.

MORE115P

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NUM148

C118981

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX RECEIVED TODAY.

THE OBJECT OF MY COMMUNICATION TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR WAS TO RESTATE OUR POSITION AND MAKE QUITE SURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING. HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FELT THAT THIS WAS ALL THE MORE NECESSARY HAVING REGARD TO THE REPORTS WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED AS TO THE MILITARY MOVEMENTS TAKING PLACE IN GERMANY AND AS TO THE THEN PROJECTED GERMAN-SOVIET AGREEMENT.

I THEREFORE MADE IT PLAIN, AS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE CABINET MET ON TUESDAY, THAT IF THE CASE SHOULD ARISE, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WERE RESOLVED AND PREPARED TO EMPLOY WITHOUT DELAY ALL THE FORCES AT THEIR COMMAND.

ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS I HAVE STATED MY CONVICTION THAT WAR BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, ADMITTED ON ALL SIDES TO BE THE GREATEST CALAMITY THAT COULD OCCUR, IS NOT DESIRED EITHER BY OUR OWN PEOPLE OR BY THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

WITH THIS FACT IN MIND I INFORMED THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR THAT IN OUR VIEW THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE QUESTIONS ARISING BETWEEN POLAND AND GERMANY WHICH COULD NOT, AND SHOULD NOT, BE RESOLVED WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE IF ONLY A SITUATION OF CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESOTRED.

MORE121P

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NØ1 XX RESTORES.

C118982

WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH SUCH NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE, BUT THE PRESENT STATE OF TENSION CREATES GREAT DIFFICULTIES, AND I EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT IF THERE COULD BE A TRUCE ON ALL SIDES TO PRESS POLEMICS AND TO ALL INCITEMENT, SUITABLE CONDITIONS MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND UPON THE POINTS BETWEEN THEM.

THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD, OF COURSE, DEAL ALSO WITH COMPLAINTS MADE ON EITHER SIDE ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES, BUT THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR'S REPLY INCLUDES WHAT AMOUNTS TO A RESTATEMENT OF THE GERMAN THESIS, THAT IN EASTERN EUROPE GERMANY SHOULD HAVE A FREE HAND. IF WE, OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY HAVING LESS DIRECT INTEREST IN THIS THESIS, CHOOSES TO INTERFERE, THE BLAME FOR THE ENSUING CONFLICT WILL BE OURS. THIS THESIS ENTIRELY MISAPPREHENDS THE BRITISH POSITION.

MORE124P

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NU150 XX POSITION.

WE DO NOT SEEK TO PRLCLAIM A SPECIAL POSITION FOR OURSELVES IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE DO NOT THINK OF ASKING GERMANY TO SACRIFICE HER NATIONAL INTERESTS, BUT WE CANNOT AGREE THAT NATIONAL INTERESTS CAN ONLY BE SECURED BY THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD OR BY THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER STATES.

AS REGARDS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND GERMANY, THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR IN HIS REPLY TO ME HAS REFERRED AGAIN TO THE SITUATION IN DANZIG, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE POSITION OF THAT CITY, AND TO THE CORRIDOR, AND TO THE OFFER HE MADE EARLY THIS YEAR TO SETTLE THIS QUESTION BY METHODS OF NEGOTIATION.

I HAVE REPEATEDLY REFUTED THE ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS OUR GUARANTEE TO POLAND THAT DECIDED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO REFUSE THE PROPOSALS THEN MADE. THAT GUARANTEE WAS NOT, IN FACT, GIVEN UNTIL AFTER THE POLISH REFUSAL HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

MORE127P

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NU151 XX GOVERNMENT.

IN VIEW OF THE DELICACY OF THE SITUATION, WE HAVE REFRAINED FROM ANY COMMENT UPON THE COMMUNICATION WHICH HAS JUST PASSED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THAT CATASTROPHE HAS NOT YET COME UPON US. WE MUST THEREFORE STILL HOPE THAT REASON AND SANITY MAY FIND A WAY TO REASSERT THEMSELVES. THE PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT WERE MADE RECENTLY AND WHAT I HAVE SAID TODAY REFLECT THE VIEWS, I AM SURE, OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH WHOM WE HAVE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE CUSTOMARY CLOSE CONTACT IN PURSUANCE OF OUR WELL-ESTABLISHED CORDIAL RELATIONS.

NATURALLY OUR MINDS TURN TO THE DOMINIONS. WE APPRECIATE VERY WARMLY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS MADE BY MINISTERS IN EVERY PART OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, AND THE INDICATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN FROM TIME TO TIME, IN SOME CASES AS RECENTLY AS YESTERDAY, SHOW THEIR SYMPATHY IN OUR EFFORTS IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. AND IN THE UNHAPPY EVENT OF THEIR PROVING UNSUCCESSFUL, ARE A SOURCE OF PROFOUND ENCOURAGEMENT TO US IN THESE CRITICAL TIMES.

MORE130P

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C118985 M-100 v.1 Ed.

Press Release from the Office of the Prime Minister.

Ottawa, August 26th, 1939.

After the meeting of the Cabinet, yesterday afternoon, the Prime Minister sent for the Consuls General of Germany, Poland and Italy, and on behalf of the Government of Canada handed to them, personally, communications to be sent to the heads of the governments in their respective countries. Communications in identical terms were sent to Herr Hitler and Monsieur Moscicki, as being the parties immediately concerned in the present crisis. The communication sent to Signor Mussolini was similar in purpose but somewhat differently worded.

The Prime Minister intimated that publication of these communications had been withheld yesterday in order to assure of their being received by the governments concerned before being made public in Canada. The texts of the communications in question, follow:

Copies sent to:
C. P.
Press Gallery.
O. Citizen
O. Journal
J. A. Fortier.
11.15 am. Aug. 26/39. - R.T.

(See catalogue for texts of communications)
JE.

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European Situation

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

PRIME MINISTER -

The Polish Consul General called this morning at ten-thirty to state that he had received instructions from the Polish Foreign Office to deliver an oral message to you. I said that you would not be in town until the afternoon. He then gave the message orally and gave me an aide memoire of his communication, which I enclose.

Reading between the lines, the Poles may possibly seem to be a little nettled by having been sent a message identical with that sent to Hitler. I am not sure that it is necessary to give the reply to the press immediately.

O.M.K.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

August 29,1939

Tyle

C 118987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

The Polish Consul-General called this morning at ten-thirty to state that he had received instructions from the Polish Foreign Office to deliver an oral message to you. I said that you would not be in town until the afternoon. He then gave the message orally and gave me an aide memoire of his communication, which I enclose.

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The Government of Poland appreciate the efforts of the Prime Minister of Canada for maintaining of the peace and is sure that the Canadian Government has no doubts as to the fact that it is not the Government of Poland who makes the aggressive demands and provokes the international crisis.

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CANADA

O.D. SKELTON TO WLMK

ODS/ET
30th August, 1939

C118989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER:

European Situation ✓
Can. Foreign Policy ✓

A telegram summarizing Hitler's reply was received late last night. After noting that no immediate action was being taken, I did not think it desirable to disturb you at midnight about it. Copies of this telegram, Circular B.298, and of the subsequent one, Circular B.299, are being sent out by special car.

Hitler's reply is undoubtedly clever, and what is more important, it may represent some approach to a settlement. He accepts, after previously rejecting it, the method of direct negotiation between Germany and Poland. He requests his good friends the British to deliver a Polish plenipotentiary at Berlin today, which is a pretty tall order, and indicates he still demands the return of Danzig and the Corridor, and security for lives of German nationals and minorities in Poland, which might in the traditional way, give excuse for interference. No specific reference is made to his former demand for the return of Upper Silesia.

more important is statement that he does not intend to attack on vital interests of Poland

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C118990

The difficulty facing the Poles will be that in a conference for the purpose of changing the status quo", they admit the inevitability of making some territorial concessions to Germany. This is doubtless why the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs refers to the German reply as unpromising. It proposes negotiation instead of unilateral seizure, but still negotiation at the pistol point - in other words the change lies in the abandonment of the Prague technique for the Munich technique. It does, however, definitely increase the possibility of peace.

O.D. SKELTON

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[1939] C 118991

BDS BULLETIN

LONDON, AUG. 31-(AP)-GREAT BRITAIN TODAY CALLED TO THE COLORS ADDITIONAL THOUSANDS OF SEAMEN, ARMY RESERVES AND AIR FORCE RESERVES IN A STEP TOWARD MOBILIZATION OF HER FIGHTING FORCES.

MORE X1124A

P-850
1939

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NU96

EOS

96

C118992

ADD LONDON MOBILIZATION STEP XX FORCES.

FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE STEP WAS MADE FROM THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN.

(END EOS) X1125A

M

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NU97

C118993

ADD BUFFALO LIVESTOCKS XX 6.25.

CALVES 100; GOOD AND CHOICE 11.50-12.00; COMMON AND MEDIUM 8.00-10.00.

SHEEP 300; SPRING LAMBS 9.00 TO LARGELY 9.25, FEW 9.50; MEDIUM AND MIXED GRADES 7.50 DOWN.

X1127A

BULLETIN LEAD MOBILIZATION STEP

BY J.F. SANDERSON

CANADIAN PRESS STAFF WRITER

LONDON, AUG. 31-(CP CABLE)-THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TODAY ANNOUNCED THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRY WERE BEING PLACED PRACTICALLY ON A BASIS OF MOBILIZATION.

MORE X1128A

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ADD LONDON LEAD MOBILIZATION STEP BY SANDERSON XX MOBILIZATION.

THE COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING THE STEP READ:-

"IN CONTINUATION OF MEASURES ALREADY ADOPTED IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO COMPLETE NAVAL MOBILIZATION AND TO CALL UP THE REMAINDER OF THE REGULAR ARMY RESERVE AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY RESERVE.

"A FURTHER NUMBER OF ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE WILL ALSO BE CALLED UP.

"OFFICERS AND MEN SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL BE MADE PUBLIC IMMEDIATELY BY EACH OF THE THREE SERVICE DEPARTMENTS."

X1134A

WEATHER ESPY WELLAND

WESTERN NEW YORK: FAIR TONIGHT. FRIDAY PARTLY CLOUDY FOLLOWED BY SCATTERED SHOWERS AND SLIGHTLY COOLER IN NORTH PORTION.

X1134A

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NU101

95

C118995

ADD LONDON LEAD MOBILIZATION BY SANDERSON XX DEPARTMENTS."

BRITAIN'S SUDDEN MOVE CAME THE DAY AFTER POLAND PUT HER FORCES IN PRACTICALLY THE SAME STATE OF READINESS FOR WAR AND AFTER OFFICIAL CIRCLES HAD EXPRESSED PESSIMISTIC VIEWS OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTLING THE POLISH-GERMAN DISPUTE BY NEGOTIATION.

THE ORDER MEANS THE FLEET WILL BE MOBILIZED AND THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE WILL BE BROUGHT UP TO FULL STRENGTH. OFFICIAL SOURCES DENIED IT MEANT GENERAL MOBILIZATION.

X1139A

SIMLA, AUG. 31-(CP-REUTERS)-EIGHTEEN REIGNING INDIAN PRINCES TODAY PLEDGED THEIR SERVICES AND WEALTH TO THE CROWN. THE PLEDGE WAS CONTAINED IN A JOINT MESSAGE TO THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW, VICEROY OF INDIA.

(HV) X1140A

M

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C118996

NU[illegible]

FINANCE

LONDON, AUG. 31-(AP)-THE UNITED STATES DOLLAR CLOSED AT $4.34 TO THE POUND TODAY, AN ADVANCE OF 7 1/2 CENTS IN TERMS OF STERLING, IN A FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET AGAIN DESCRIBED AS ERRATIC AND NERVOUS FOLLOWING THE LATEST POLITICAL NEWS. THE RATE FOR THE UNIT COMPARED WITH $4.40 FOR STERLING IN NEW YORK LATE YESTERDAY.

THE FRENCH FRANC SLIPPED OFF TO 175.37 TO THE POUND AGAINST 175.25, THE PREVIOUS CLOSE.

X1142A

95

LEAD POPE

VATICAN CITY, AUG. 31-(AP)-A SUDDEN NEW PEACE MOVE BY POPE PIUS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED TODAY WITH THE HANDING OF NOTES TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE PRINCIPAL POWERS INVOLVED IN EUROPE'S CRISIS.

LUIGI CARDINAL MAGLIONE, PAPAL SECRETARY OF STATE, HURRIED BACK TO THE VATICAN FROM A PAPAL AUDIENCE AT CASTEL GANDOLFO TO CONSIGN NOTES TO THE ENVOYS OF ITALY, FRANCE, GERMANY, POLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN. MORE1144A

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NU103

C118997

BULLETIN

PARIS, AUG. 31-(CP-HAVAS)-THE FRENCH CABINET TODAY WAS CALLED TO MEET AS A MINISTERIAL COUNCIL TONIGHT.

X1145A

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NOON-PD 4.29, FR 2.46, DLR 2 1/2 DIS.

C118998

CP NU AUG 31 X1145A

9S

ADD VATICAN CITY LEAD POPE XX GREAT BRITAIN.

AN INFORMED PRELATE SAID THEY CONTAINED A PEACE APPEAL.

CARDINAL MAGLIONE ALSO TALKED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY AND RUMANIA.

THE PRELATE INDICATED THE NOTES TO THE FIVE POWERS WEE IDENTICAL.

HE SAID THEY CONTAINED "NEW AND MORE PRESSING INSISTENCE AND THE POPE'S PRAYERS THAT THE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION BE SOLVED THROUGH PACIFIC MEANS AND NOT BY RECOURSE TO ARMS, WHICH IN ANY EVENT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DISASTROUS."

VATICAN SOURCES SAID THEY THOUGHT THE PRESENT STATE OF CRISIS COULD NOT ENDURE BEYOND SUNDAY.

MORE1147A

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NU105 XX SUNDAY.

C118999

ADRIAN NIEUWENHUYS, NEW BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE, WHOSE KING HAS JOINED WITH THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS IN A MEDIATION OFFER, ARRIVED IN ADVANCE OF HIS SCHEDULED TIME TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS TO THE PONTIFF. PRELATES SAID THE GRAVE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAD HURRIED HIS ARRIVAL.

A SCHEDULED PILGRIMAGE TO ROME OF 20,000 MEMBERS OF THE YOUNG CATHOLIC WORKERS' ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING 20 NATIONS WAS SUSPENDED.

X1149A

SECOND LEAD WALL ST

BY VICTOR EUBANK

ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WRITER

NEW YORK, AUG. 31-(AP)-EUROPEAN PEACE HOPES WANED A BIT TODAY AND STOCK MARKET TRADERS SHOWED AN INCLINATION TO LIGHTEN COMMITMENTS.

WHILE LOSSES RAN TO A POINT OR SO FOR LEADERS AT THE WORST, THE TRADING PACE WAS EVEN SLOWER THAN IN YESTERDAY'S LISTLESS PROCEEDINGS. NEAR MID-DAY EXTREME DECLINES HAD BEEN REDUCED IN MOST INSTANCES.

X1150A

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ADD MOSCOW SOVIET XX RESPECTIVELY.

C119000

THE SOVIET UNION WILL ABOLISH EXEMPTION FROM MILITARY SERVICE OF PERSONS WHO OBJECT ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS, VOROSHILOFF SAID, ADDING THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH OBJECTIONS FROM ANY OF THE 1937 OR 1938 CONSCRIPTS.

WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD MEDICAL TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE IN COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE INCLUDED IN MILITARY RESERVES OF THE SECOND CATEGORY, AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO MOBILIZATION IN TIME OF WAR.

"OUR PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN THOROUGH AND ON A LARGE SCALE," SAID VOROSHILOFF. "NOW WHEN THE ENTIRE WORLD IS FEVERISHLY PREPARING FOR WAR WE SHALL NOT BE CAUGHT UNAWARES."

X1153A

EOS BULLETIN SECOND LEAD FRENCH

PARIS, AUG. 31-(AP)-PREMIER DALADIER TODAY SUMMONED THE CABINET TO AN URGENT MEETING AT THE ELYSEE PALACE AT 6 P.M. (1 P.M. EDT) IMMEDIATELY AFTER A CONFERENCE WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR SIR ERIC PHIPPS AT THE WAR MINISTRY.

MORE X1153A

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C119001

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NU85

CHAMBERLAIN TEXT (1,600)

LONDON, AUG. 29-(AP)-THE TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN'S REMARKS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:-

SINCE THE HOUSE MET ON THURSDAY THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE SITUATION.

THE CATASTROPHE, AS I SAID THEN, IS NOT YET UPON US.

I CANNOT SAY THAT THE DANGER OF IT HAS YET IN ANY WAY RECEDED.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT MIGHT PERHAPS SEEM IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO ASK THE HOUSE TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE DAY WHICH HAD BEEN FIXED, BUT IN TIMES LIKE THIS, WE HAVE FELT THAT IT WAS RIGHT THAT THE HOUSE SHOULD BE KEPT INFORMED--AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, CONTINUOUSLY INFORMED--OF ALL THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SITUATION AS THEY TAKE PLACE.

THAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE PRINCIPLE WHICH WILL GUIDE US FOR FURTHER MEETINGS OF THIS HOUSE. THERE IS ONE THING I

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NU85 1/2 XX ONE THING I

C119002

WOULD LIKE TO SAY AT THIS MOMENT WITH REGARD TO THE PRESS. I THINK IT IS NECESSARY ONCE MORE TO URGE THE PRESS TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT.

MORE1111A

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C119003

AT A TIME WHEN IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR A FEW THOUGHTLESS WORDS IN A PAPER NOT PERHAPS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO WRECK THE WHOLE OF THE EFFORTS WHICH ARE BEING MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION.

I HAVE HEARD THAT AN ACCOUNT PURPORTING TO BE A VERBATIM DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMUNICATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO HERR HITLER WAS TELEGRAPHED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY LAST NIGHT OR THIS MORNING. SUCH AN ACCOUNT COULD ONLY BE AN INVENTION FROM BEGINNING TO END."

INDEED, I THINK IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT JOURNALISTS, IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR PROFESSION, SHOULD TAKE SUCH RESPONSIBILITIES UPON THEMSELVES, RESPONSIBILITIES AFFECTING NOT ONLY THEMSELVES BUT THE INHABITANTS OF THE WHOLE WORLD.

I HOPE IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY THIS AFTERNOON TO HAVE ANY LONG DEBATE. I WILL ATTEMPT TO GIVE THE HOUSE AN ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS BUT OF COURSE THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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NUS. XX GOVERNMENT.

C 119004

THEREFORE THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY NECESSITY FOR ANY LENGTHY DISCUSSION. ON THE DAY AFTER THE HOUSE ADJOURNED, THAT IS ON FRIDAY, WE RECEIVED INFORMATION IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING THAT THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR HAD ASKED THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN TO CALL UPON HIM AT 1:30 THAT DAY.

MORE X1117A

BASEBALL SCHEDULE (AUG. 29)

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

(TIME IS EASTERN STANDARD)

NATIONAL

CINCINNATI AT NEW YORK, THREATENING, 2:15 P.M.

PITTSBURGH AT BROOKLYN, THREATENING, 2PM.

ST. LOUIS AT BOSTON, CLEAR, 2PM.

CHICAGO AT PHILADELPHIA, CLOUDY, 215PM.

AMERICAN

NEW YORK AT DETROIT, CLEAR, 3PM.

BOSTON AT CLEVELAND, CLEAR, 3PM.

PHILADELPHIA AT CHICAGO, PLAYED FORMER DATE.

WASHINGTON AT ST. LOUIS, PLAYED FORMER DATE.

MORE1118A

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C119005

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX DAY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE AFTERNOON WE WERE TOLD BY TELEPHONE THAT SIR NEVILE HENDERSON HAD HAD AN INTERVIEW LASTING ABOUT ONE HOUR AND A HALF WITH HERR HITLER AND THAT HE WAS SENDING US AN ACCOUNT OF THAT INTERVIEW; THAT HERR HITLER HAD SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF HE WERE TO FLY OVER TO THIS COUNTRY THE NEXT MORNING IN ORDER TO GIVE US A VERBAL AND MORE EXTENDED ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION.

WE RECEIVED A RECORD OF THE INTERVIEW WITH OUR AMBASSADOR ON FRIDAY NIGHT, AND IT WAS NOT COMPLETELY DECIPHERED UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT. I MYSELF DID NOT SEE THE WHOLE OF IT UNTIL SATURDAY MORNING. ON SATURDAY SIR NEVILE HENDERSON ARRIVED BY AIRPLANE FROM BERLIN SHORTLY BEFORE LUNCH.

WE UNDERSTOOD FROM HIM THAT IN BERLIN IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY THAT HE SHOULD GO BACK THE SAME DAY AS THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WERE ANXIOUS THAT WE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL STUDY TO THE COMMUNICATION HE WOULD MAKE TO US.

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C 119006

ACCORDINGLY WE DEVOTED THE WHOLE OF SATURDAY AND SUNDAY MORNING TO A VERY CAREFUL, EXHAUSTIVE AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH WAS BROUGHT TO US AND OF THE REPLY WHICH WE PROPOSED TO SEND BACK, AND OUR FINAL ANSWER WAS TAKEN BY THE AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHEN HE FLEW BACK TO BERLIN AND DELIVERED IT TO THE CHANCELLOR LAST NIGHT.

I SHOULD BE GLAD IF I COULD BISCLOSE TO THE HOUSE THE FULLEST INFORMATION AS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE COMMUNICATION EXCHANGED WITH HERR HITLER BUT THE HONORABLE MEMBERS WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IN A SITUATION OF SUCH EXTREME DELICACY, AND WHEN ISSUES SO GRAVE HANG PRECARIOUSLY IN THE BALANCE, IT IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO PUBLISH THESE COMMUNICATIONS OR COMMENT ON THEM IN DETAIL.

I AM, HOWEVER, ABLE TO INDICATE, IN QUITE GENERAL TERMS SOME OF THE MAIN POINTS WITH WHICH THEY DEAL.

HERR HITLER WAS CONCERNED TO IMPRESS UPON HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HIS WISH FOR AN ANGLO-GERMAN UNDERSTANDING OF A COMPLETE AND LASTING CHARACTER. ON THE OTHER HAND HE LEFT HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN NO DOUBT AS TO THE URGENCY OF SETTLING POLISH-GERMAN QUESTIONS.

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NU93 XX QUESTIONS.

C 119007

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO FREQUENTLY STATED THEIR DESIRE TO SEE THE REALIZATION OF SUCH AN ANGLO-GERMAN UNDERSTANDING AND, AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT THEY WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING WITH GERMANY THE SEVERAL ISSUES, A SETTLEMENT OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO FIND A PLACE IN ANY PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

BUT EVERYTHING TURNS UPON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE IMMEDIATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND CAN BE HANDLED AND THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE FOR ANY SETTLEMENT, FOR WE HAVE MADE IT PLAIN THAT OUR OBLIGATIONS TO POLAND CAST INTO FORMAL SHAPE BY THE AGREEMENT SIGNED ON AUG. 25 (FRIDAY LAST) WILL BE CARRIED OUT.

MORE X1136A

WEATHER ESPY EAST

WASHINGTON, AUG. 29-(AP)-FORECAST FOR NEW ENGLAND:- INCREASING CLOUDINESS SHOWERS WEDNESDAY AND IN EXTREME SOUTHWEST PORTION TONIGHT. NOT MUCH CHANGE IN TEMPERATURE.

MORE1137A

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C 119008

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX CARRIED OUT.

BUT AS THE HOUSE WILL REMEMBER HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID MORE THAN ONCE PUBLICLY THAT GERMAN-POLISH DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SOLUTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS. MEANWHILE THE FIRST PREREQUISITE, IF THERE IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF USEFUL DISCUSSION, IS THAT THE TENSION CREATED BY FRONTIER CLASHES AND BY REPORTS OF INCIDENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER SHOULD BE DIMINISHED.

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ACCORDINGLY HOPE THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WILL USE THEIR BEST ENDEAVOR TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS, THE CIRCULATION OF EXAGGERATED REPORTS, AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT RESULT IN DANGEROUS INFLAMMATION OF OPINION.

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD HOPE THAT IF AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF POLISH GERMAN DIFFERENCES COULD BE REACHED BY FREE NEGOTIATION, THIS MIGHT IN TURN LEAD TO A WIDER AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ACCRUE TO THE LASTING BENEFIT OF EUROPE AND OF THE WORLD AT LARGE.

MORE X1151A

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N'109

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX LARGE.

C 119009

AT THIS MOMENT THE POSITION IS THAT WE ARE WAITING FOR THE REPLY OF HERR HITLER TO OUR COMMUNICATION. ON THE NATURE OF THAT REPLY DEPENDS WHETHER FURTHER TIME WILL BE GIVEN TO THE EXPLORATION OF THE SITUATION AND FOR THE OPERATION OF MANY FORCES WHICH ARE WORKING FOR PEACE.

A WAITING PERIOD OF THAT KIND IS OFTEN VERY TRYING. NOTHING, I THINK, CAN BE MORE REMARKABLE THAN THE CALM WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE ATTITUDE OF THE WHOLE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE TWO EXPLANATIONS FOR THAT HAPPENING. THE FIRST IS THAT NONE OF US HAVE ANY DOUBT AS TO WHERE OUR DUTY LIES. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AMONG US. THERE IS NO WEAKENING OF OUR DETERMINATION AND THE SECOND IS OUR CONFIDENCE THAT WE ARE READY FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.

THE HOUSE MIGHT LIKE TO KNOW ONE OR TWO PARTICULARS OF THE PREPARATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE. OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE MANY THINGS WHICH I COULD NOT VERY WELL SAY HERE BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT BE CONFINED TO THOSE I SEE AROUND ME. WHAT I SAY, THEREFORE, MUST BE IN SOMEWHAT GENERAL TERMS.

MORE1157A

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NU100 XX TERMS.

C119010

SOME OF THE MEASURES WHICH WE HAVE TO TAKE, SUCH AS THOSE IN CONNECTION WITH REQUISITIONING, NECESSARILY MUST CAUSE SOME DEGREE OF INCONVENIENCE TO THE PUBLIC. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY GENERALLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE NATION'S NEED MUST NOW BE PARAMOUNT AND THAT THEY WILL SUBMIT WILLINGLY, OR EVEN CHEERFULLY, TO ANY INCONVENIENCES OR HARDSHIPS THAT MAY BE INVOLVED.

AT ANY RATE, WE HAVE NOT HAD TO BEGIN HERE BY ISSUING RATIONING CARDS.

TO DEAL FIRST WITH THE ACTIVE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY, THE AIR DEFENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN HAS BEEN PLACED IN A STATE OF INSTANT READINESS. THE GROUND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED AND ARE MANNED BY THE TERRITORIAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS.

THE REGULAR SQUADRONS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP TO WAR STRENGTH BY THE ADDITION OF THE NECESSARY RESERVISTS, INCLUDING A PROPORTION OF THE VOLUNTARY RESERVE.

THE FIGHTER AND GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS OF THE AUXILIARY AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN CALLED UP AND ARE STANDING READY AND THE BALLOON BARRAGE IS IN POSITION.

MORE12P

M

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NU101 XX POSITION.

C119011

THE OBSERVER CORPS ARE AT THEIR POSTS, AND INDEED THE WHOLE WARNING SYSTEM IS READY NIGHT AND DAY TO BE BROUGHT INTO INSTANT OPERATION. THE COAST DEFENCE UNITS ARE READY AND ARE MANNED BY THE COAST DEFENCE UNITS OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

ARRANGEMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE FOR PROTECTION BY NATIONAL DEFENCE COMPANIES AND BY MILITIA AND BY UNITS OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY, OF A LARGE NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS WHOSE SAFETY IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL WAR EFXORT.

MORE X1202P

NAT PGH AT BKN PPD RAIN X1203P

FINANCE

BUFFALO, N.Y., AUG. 29-(AP)-HOGS 500; GOOD AND CHOICE 195-205 LB AVERAGE, 7.50; 165-185 LBS 7.35-7.40; TRUCKED-INS 160-230 LBS 6.90-7.25.

CATTLE 100; COMMON TO MEDIUM GRASS STEERS AND HEIFERS 7.50; LIGHT-WEIGHT TRUCKED-IN BULLS 5.35-6.25.

CALVES 50; GOOD AND CHOICE 11.50.

SHEEP 100; SPRING LAMBS, GOOD TO CHOICE 9.00-9.25; MEDIUM AND MIXED GRADES 7.25-8.50. X1204P

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N 1104

C 119012

FINANCE

NEW YORK, AUG. 29-(AP)-SANTOS COFFEE FUTURES OPENED 6 HIGHER. SEP 5.80B; DEC 5.99; MCH 6.12; MAY 6.16B; JLY 6.21B. RIO FUTURES (OLD) INACTIVE, NO SALES; SEP 4.00B; DEC, MCH UNQUOTED.

X1212P

ADD LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT XX WAR EFFORT.

AS FOR THE NAVY, THE HOUSE WILL REMEMBER THAT IN JULY LAST IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE RESERVE FLEET WOULD BE CALLED UP AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST IN ORDER TO TAKE PART IN COMBINED FLEET AND AIR EXERCISES.

FOR THAT PURPOSE A NUMBER OF RESERVISTS WERE CALLED UP UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES ACT AND AS A RESULT THE NAVY WAS IN AN ADVANCED STATE OF PREPAREDNESS WHEN THE PRESENT CRISIS AROSE AND THE WHOLE OF OUR FIGHTING FLEET IS NOW READY AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE TO TAKE UP THE DISPOSITION WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY IN WAR.

MORE1214P

M

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NU105 XX WAR.

C 119013

A NUMBER OF OTHER MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE PAST WEEK TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF OUR NAVAL PREPAREDNESS. NAVAL OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF VARIOUS COMMERCIAL PORTS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED AND HAVE TAKEN UP THEIR DUTIES, AND NAVAL PORT AND BASE DEFENCES HAVE BEEN PUT IN AN ADVANCED STATE OF PREPAREDNESS.

THE ADMIRALTY HAS ALSO ASSUMED CONTROL OF MERCHANT SHIPPING, ACTING UNDER THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON THEM BY THE EMERGENCY POWERS ACT. APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED TO MERCHANT SHIPS IN VARIOUS ROUTES, TO UNITS OF THE FORCES AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BOTH AT HOME AND OVERSEAS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS FORM PART OF A PREARRANGED PLAN TO ENSURE A GREATER STATE OF READINESS AND A NUMBER OF UNITS COULD BE MOVED TO WAR STATIONS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS AND THEIR STAFFS ARE AT THEIR WAR STATIONS. THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL DEFENCE MEASURES RESTS WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO TAKE PRELIMINARY STEPS SO THAT ACTION COULD BE TAKEN AT THE SHORTEST NOTICE.

MORE1218P

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NU[illegible]06 XX NOTICE.

C 119014

PLANS FOR THE EVACUATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN, MOTHERS AND YOUNG CHILDREN, EXPECTANT MOTHERS AND BLIND PERSONS FROM CERTAIN CONGESTED AREAS HAVE BEEN EVOLVED. REHEARSALS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EVACUATION OF SCHOOL CHILDREN WERE CARRIED OUT YESTERDAY AND NEARLY A WEEK AGO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WERE WARNED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EXTINCTION OF PUBLIC LIGHTS AND TO PREPARE THE NECESSARY AIDS TO HAVE THE LIGHTING EXTINGUISHED.

ARRANGEMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE CALLING UP AT SHORT NOTICE OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE AIR-RAID PRECAUTION SERVICES AND DUTY OFFICERS WILL BE AVAILABLE. THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PREPARE HOSPITALS FOR THE RECEPTION OF CASUALTIES.

I HAVE GIVEN THESE INSTANCES OF THE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER AND ABOVE THE MEASURES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUT IN OPERATION. COMPLETE SURVEYS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT OVER THE WHOLE RANGE OF OUR DEFENCE PREPARATIONS.

PREPARATORY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, IF AND WHEN NECESSARY, COULD BE READILY GIVEN EFFECT TO AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

MORE1222P

GPO

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C 119015

CORRECTION

IN LONDON CHAMBERLAIN TEXT, JOIN FIFTH AND SIXTH PARAS OF TEXTUAL TO READ X X URGE THE PRESS TO [redacted] EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT, AT A TIME WHEN IT IS QUITE ETC. (SOURCE)

CP NU AUG 29 X1138A

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C119016

Oil Imports
Waterpower Export &
Electric Power
to U.S.A.

February 15, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re Export of Fluids

There is only one licence in existence at the present time for the export of oil, and in fact no export takes place under the licence. Briefly put, the situation is this: The Imperial Oil has a field at Red Coulee, Alberta, which is just north of the international boundary. A related oil company in Montana has a pipe-line just south of and parallel to the boundary, and the licence permits the Imperial Oil to pump oil into this American pipe-line and along it for some distance and out of the pipe-line again back into Canadian territory. There is no question of exporting the oil in any permanent sense, and the licence is secured merely as a precautionary measure. Normally the oil is transported by motor truck and remains in Canada, but in certain years, at certain seasons, the roads in that part of Alberta become impassable, and the American pipe-line is capable of providing an alternative method of transport. The quantity involved in the licence is very small (about 300 barrels a day).

There are two licences for the export of natural gas. The Vanalta Oil Company has a licence to export small quantities of gas which are used to provide power for drilling purposes in Montana in the same field. The export takes place from wells situated within 200 or 300 feet of the boundary.

The Range Oil and Gas Company of Calgary has a licence to export up to 25 million cubic feet per day. The field is isolated from settlement in Canada, and the only market for the gas is in Montana. The exporter states that the gas is obtained from an 'international structure', i.e. presumably the gas could be procured by drilling into the same deposit just to the south of the boundary.

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No licences have been issued for the export of water, although, strictly speaking, it is illegal to export water without a licence. Water is exported mixed with pulp, not only at Edmundston, N. B., but also at Fort Frances, Ontario. At Fort Frances it is also imported at times through a similar channel. The paper mills on both sides of the Rainy River belong to the same company and the exports and imports depend upon the exigencies of the company's internal economy.

It appears that water is also exported qua water at Fort Frances, Ontario.

E. A. P.

E.A. DICKERING

JWP-MP

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(R.L. FREDENBURGH TO W.L.M.K.) SEPT 3, 1936

C 119018

Trade - Can. Trade Policy

Mr. King's Fourth Administration

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Re: Canada's Export Trade, Month of July, 1936.

"Domestic exports at $83,899,000 in July were the highest in any month since November, 1935, when they amounted to $94,484,000. November is one of the great wheat exporting months. However, the July exports of this year were higher than any July since 1929, when the total was $102,219,000. The record July was in 1928 with $127,647,000.

The July exports to the United Kingdom, amounting to $37,433,000 were the highest July since 1926 when they reached $39,619,000. In 1929 the amount was $27,025,000. The July exports to the United States at $59,021,000 were the highest since 1930 when the total was $85,902,000. In 1929 it was $121,720,000. The July 1936 total was $4,534,000 greater than a year ago." X

The increases, both in Canada's total exports, and exports to United States, for the month of July, are actually more significant than the figures imply, since the figures for July 1935 include $7,047,000. of non-monetary gold, whereas no gold went out of the country in July 1936, although as much or more gold was produced this year, which could be exported at any time.

(X - From Dominion Bureau of Statistics Monthly Summary of Canada' Trade.)

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C119019

Canada's Total Domestic Exports, excluding Gold:

	1935	1936	Increase over 1935	Percentage Increase
To all countries:	$56,239,000	83,899,000	27,660,000	49.2%
To United States:	21,125,000	29,517,000	8,392,000	39.7%

The most noteworthy increase occurred in respect to wheat:

Canada's Exports of Wheat for Month of July:

Total Exports		To United Kingdom		To United States	
1935	1936	1935	1936	1935	1936
$7,214,000	21,885,000	$5,920,000	13,874,000	$ 288,000	4,361,000

Substantial increases occurred, both in total exports and exports to the United States, with respect to the following items:- Planks and boards, wood pulp and pulp wood, shingles, paper, alcoholic beverages, barley, cattle, cheese, meats, nickel, and asbestos.

Total exports of farm implements for July 1936 amounted to $622,000 as compared with $1,124,000 a year ago, of which United States took $173,000 as compared with $379,000 in July 1935.

R.L.F.

September 3, 1936.

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C119020
H-100-8
V. 13

November 3, 1938

Memorandum for file

Mr. Gordon Studd, accompanied by a Mr. Applejohn, called at the office today, with reference to the former's letter to Mr. Heeney, dated October the 25th. He explained that they were inquiring into outlets in Great Britain and elsewhere for merchandise manufactured in Canada, but which, at present, is not exported in large quantities. He added that their intention was to undertake delivery in England at competitive prices by going direct to producers in Canada and arranging to take delivery of material for disposal in England at the best possible price.

I questioned Mr. Studd at some length as to details of his proposal, without inquiring into such things as capital structure or directors, since the main purpose of his visit, he suggested, was for information. He admitted, also, that there were many commodities which could not be handled on the basis he suggested. I discovered that they had consulted the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner at Montreal, but they declared they had not found him particularly interested in Canadian exports to the United Kingdom.

I suggested that Mr. Studd might call at the Service office of the Commercial Intelligence in the Department of Trade and Commerce, and later telephoned, privately, to inform Mr. Cheney, acting head, of the substance of Mr. Studd's statement.

I also emphasized that the Prime Minister had always found it advisable that any matter relating to a government department should in the first instance, be discussed with the Minister directly concerned. I added, with reference to Mr. Henry's letter to Mr. Studd, dated October the 29th, that if he would prefer to communicate any views in writing, they would receive careful consideration.

J.A.Gibson

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Pulp and Paper Industry
Prairie Provs.

T-160
1938

MEMORANDUM FOR FYLE:

C 119021

Exports of Pulpwood, Saskatchewan,
Complaint re increased freight charges on:

Mr. H. J. Oss, interested in the export of pulpwood to U. S. mills, represents that an increase of 10% in freight rates since March, 1938, has resulted in tying up of many thousands of cords of pulpwood, cut from burnt-over timber that in a short time will be valueless for anything else except local fuel-wood. He asks whether it would not be possible for the railway companies to agree to transport at 1937 rates wood contracted for and cut before March, 1938. It would now be possible, he adds, to make any future contracts on a basis of the increased freight rates if the Railway Companies insist on maintaining them; but the present situation has tied up a sum represented at $1.00 per cord on some 15,000 tons and, by implication, anticipated profits from any further cut.

It must be remarked, that although 20,000 cords probably represents a considerable revenue in the local communities immediately concerned, it is a very small proportion of the total cut in Canada which is exported, in raw form as pulpwood. In the fiscal year 1936, for example, the 1,235,754 cords of Canadian pulpwood exported unmanufactured, represented 17.6% of the total Canadian production (ten year average 21.9%). The Exports from Saskatchewan and Manitoba during 1938 to date appear to have been only 585 cords.

Mr. Oss' contention regarding diminished provincial revenues from stumping fees is open to question, as, by law, pulpwood cut on Crown lands must, in every province, be manufactured into pulp in Canadian pulp mills, and cannot be exported except under special permit. (1) Pulpwood exported to United States is in consequence largely cut from private lands; but as the cut from private lands in Saskatchewan is relatively small (because very little timber-bearing land is privately owned), the provincial government can scarcely be interested unless special permits cover the business of the firms in which Mr. Oss is concerned.

No communications on this subject have, as yet, been received in this office from Mr. J. A. MacMillan, M.P., of Wadena.

November 8, 1938 J. A. G.

(1) Canada Year Book, 1938, p. 297.

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E. A. PICKERING TO W. J. TURNBULL

C118982 P-652-2 1938

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Farm Relief

February 17th, 1938.

For Mr. Turnbull:

I have brought to the attention of the Department of Agriculture, Mr. Bennett's remarks about distress at Ravenscrag, Sask. The Department is looking into the matter immediately and will send, before Council tomorrow, an indication of what reply the Prime Minister might make in the House.

E. A. P.

P/R

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C119023

RAVENSCRAG, SASK., FARMERS

Lack of Feed for Live Stock and Need of Relief

Following receipt of complaint by Dominion Department of Agriculture from Ravenscrag, Sask., it has been ascertained that six hundred and twenty tons of fodder have been delivered to the Local Improvement District in which Ravenscrag is located, and the one adjacent to the north to which deliveries have been made from Ravenscrag. Three carloads have been delivered to date to Ravenscrag in the month of February and one hundred and forty tons are on order for delivery to that point.

Complaint received on February 17th from Ravenscrag by the Provincial Government of Saskatchewan, by whom the fodder is distributed, was signed by farmers who did not reduce their live stock to the basis on which feed is being supplied, when given an opportunity to do so with assistance from the Dominion Government.

Dominion Department of Agriculture,
February 18th, 1938.

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C 119024

P-652-2
1938

a-204
1938

H-100
W7(a)
see 1936.

February 17, 1938

Unrevised Hansard, page 587

RAVENSCRAG, SASK., FARMERS

LACK OF FEED FOR LIVE STOCK AND NEED OF RELIEF

On the orders of the day:

Right Hon. R. B. BENNETT (Leader of the Opposition): Before the orders of the day are proceeded with, may I draw the attention of the government—I note the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner) is not in his place—to the fact that I have been informed by a group of farmers in the Ravenscrag district in Saskatchewan that they have had no feed or fodder except two cars of feed since the first of February, their stock are starving, there is three feet of snow in that locality, and relief is very urgent. I draw attention to the fact in order that the government may take the steps that are necessary for dealing with the situation.

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): I thank my right hon. friend for drawing the attention of the government to this matter, and if it has not already received attention, I can assure him that it will.

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FILE: WLMK TO ERNEST LAPOINTE

C119025 P-306

Debt Adjustment

Farmers Creditors Adjustment Act V.6(a)

Copy.

Strictly Confidential.

Memorandum for Mr. ERNEST LAPOINTE Lapointe:

Yesterday Premier Bracken asked me to say that inasmuch as the Creditors Arrangement Bill had been defeated in the Senate, he would like to renew his request for the introduction of a measure establishing a Land Court for Manitoba. I promised Mr. Bracken I would bring the matter before Council immediately, as I did yesterday. Mr. Bracken, however, will wish to have some definite information as to a decision of the Cabinet. As it was not possible to reach this stage yesterday, the matter should be taken up anew immediately.

(Sgd.) W. L. M. K.

Ottawa, April 26, 1939.

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C 119026

Ottawa, April 27th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LAPOINTE:

Re: Manitoba "Land" Court

Attached is Mr. Bracken's original letter regarding the Land Court, and a copy of the Prime Minister's reply, together with a memorandum embodying a brief summary of the proposal and summaries of the comments by the various Ministers, on the proposal.

A. D. P. H.

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C119027

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: May 1st, 1939.

SUBJECT: Land Court legislation requested by the Premier of Manitoba;

REMARKS: Copy of Prime Minister's memorandum to Mr. Lapointe, and Mr. Heeney's memorandum attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL: May 12th

ACTION TAKEN: to be brought up by Mr Lapointe who is to write

DISPOSED OF: to Mr Bracken.
See telegram sent out May 12th
W.L.P.

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P-300
Dup.
see P-306
1939

C 119028

September 15th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Farm debt situation in Manitoba.

The Premier of Manitoba has written again insisting upon the urgency of action being taken by the Federal government:

1. To set in operation the Central Mortgage Bank Act in respect of rural mortgages in Manitoba, or

2. To extend the Farmers Creditors Arrangement Act to Manitoba, or

3. To provide legislation to permit of the operation of Manitoba Land Courts.

A copy of Mr. Bracken's second letter is attached. Copies have been sent to the Ministers interested.

A. D. P. H.

AH/R

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 119029

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

For file:

Re: Farm indebtedness in Manitoba

Spoke with Pickersgill over the 'phone today. He advised me that the matter has been receiving the attention of the Finance Department and himself. Have asked that it be brought before Council for final decision on Tuesday (October 3).

W.L.M.K.

September 30, 1939

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E. J. LEMAIRE

Nov. 18, 1935

Farmers Creditors Arrangement C119030
B.A.A. act.

P. C. 3578

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 18th November, 1935.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 13th November, 1935, from the Minister of Justice, referring to The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, Chapter 53 of the Statutes of Canada, 1934, being An Act to Facilitate Compromises and Arrangements between Farmers and their Creditors, and to its amending Act, The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act Amendment Act, 1935, Chapter 20 of the Statutes of Canada, 1935, the principal of which Acts was enacted as appears from the preamble thereof upon the recital that in view of the depressed state of agriculture the present indebtedness of many farmers was beyond their capacity to pay; that it was essential in the interest of the Dominion to retain the farmers on the land as efficient producers and for such purpose it was necessary to provide means whereby compromises or rearrangements might be effected of debts of farmers who were unable to pay.

The Minister states that doubts exist or are entertained as to whether the Parliament of Canada had jurisdiction to enact the said Acts, or either of them, in whole or in part, and that it is expedient that such question should be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for judicial determination.

The Committee, accordingly, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, advise that the following question be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing and consideration, pursuant to Section 55 of the Supreme Court Act:

> Is the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, as amended by the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act Amendment Act, 1935, or any of the provisions thereof, and in what particular or particulars or to what extent, ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada?

E. J. Lemaire

Clerk of the Privy Council.

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C 119031

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Mr. King.

a-202 Vol. 1

Attached are Mr. Pattullo's letter re the operation in British Columbia of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, and a draft reply to same.

Mr. Dunning will be prepared to discuss the matter in Council today. Pending a decision of Council as to the policy to be adopted regarding the representations of Mr. Pattullo, Dr. Clark, with whom I discussed the matter, feels that a non-committal reply should be sent.

E. A. P.
(E.A. PICKERING)

February 15, 1937.

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C119032 2309 vol. 1

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

CANADA.

OTTAWA, February 27, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Mr. Pattullo's letter re Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act.

You sent Mr. Pattullo's letter of February the 12th to me, with instructions to prepare a formal draft and give it to you at the next meeting of Council. I discussed the letter with Dr. Clark who thought the letter prepared for your signature, dated February the 15th, was all that could be sent, without a discussion in Council. I gave him a copy of Mr. Pattullo's letter for Mr. Dunning to take into Council, and placed our fyle with your papers for Council. On Wednesday afternoon you signed the letter. As Mr. Pattullo was returning to town, Thursday, I sent the letter, by hand, to the Chateau Laurier. I have again spoken to Dr. Clark who will mention the matter to his Minister. If the question has not been discussed in Council, Dr. Clark is of the opinion the question requires consideration by your colleagues, as well as the Minister of Finance and yourself.

E.A.P.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C119033 Eap for Council

MEMORANDUM

MR. KING:

Colonel W. P. Mulock, M.P. came in this morning to protest against the continuance of the Farmers Creditors Arrangement Act. He said that he had mentioned this to you when you were visiting Sir William.

He wanted you to know now, however, that during the campaign he was astonished at the feeling against the Act throughout the whole of his constituency, and he says the same applies to a number of other Liberal Members in Ontario, with whom he has communicated.

He said that large numbers of Liberals were threatening to refrain from voting in the next Federal election, unless this legislation was removed.

Colonel Mulock said that he had seen Mr. Gardiner, and was seeing Mr. Dunning.

HH

(H. R. L. HENRY)

October 15, 1937

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C119034 file A-302 vol. 1

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: October 19th, 1937.

SUBJECT: Farmers Creditors Arrangement Act - Colonel Mulock's protest against continuation of;

REMARKS: Mr. Henry's memorandum of October 15th, attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL: November 9, 1937

ACTION TAKEN:

DISPOSED OF: Filed

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Read by Mr King

C119035

Kyle

Explanatory Notes on
The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act

Purpose and Statutory Tenure:

The purpose of the Act may be briefly stated as an attempt to bring the indebtedness of farmers throughout the Dominion within their capacity to meet these obligations. The necessity for the Act was heightened, particularly in the Prairie provinces, by a succession of meagre harvests and the incidence of conditions of unprecedented drought. When the Act came into force, by proclamation, at intervals during the autumn of 1934, it was designed to apply during a limited period. The Act will in fact cease to have effect (in the sense that no new proposals will be entertained) in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island as from December 31, 1938. In the case of Manitoba and British Columbia, the operation is continued exceptionally until June 30, 1939. No statutory limit has yet been fixed to the application of the Act in Saskatchewan and Alberta.[1] The terms of the Act as it was first introduced, and as it has since stood, contain by

1 - 2.Geo.VI.c.47 (11.(3)); An Act to amend the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, assented to July 1, 1938. This section does not apply to farmers who are soldier settlers within the meaning of the Soldier Settlement Act.

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implication an additional limiting factor. The Act provides that no bills incurred by farmers after 1935 are cognizable unless a creditor so requests the Board of Review dealing with an application under the Act, and in ordinary practice therefore the Act would eventually become inoperative.[2]

Ordinary Procedure under the Act:

A farmer may make application to the official receiver in his district for a consideration of his outstanding debts either as to

(a) secured claims or

(b) unsecured claims or (c) both together.

In the case of secured claims (i.e. mortgages against land or liens on equipment), a Board of Review, after careful enquiries involving an independent valuation of the farmer's assets and an examination of the nature and amounts of the claims of the creditor (or creditors) may order a reduction of (i) the principal of the mortgage; (ii) the rate of interest payable; or (iii) principal and interest with an extension of time for full payment and, occasionally, a suspension of actual payments for two or three years.

2 - See Senate Debates (1938), p. 518.

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As regards unsecured claims, (i.e. accounts payable to merchants, professional men, etc.) Boards of Review have ordinarily attempted to arrange for a basis of payment which will satisfy, contemporaneously with retirement of secured claims, as large a percentage as possible of unsecured claims. In some instances the disparity between accrued obligations on secured claims and the farmer's capacity to meet them has been so great that unsecured claims have been wholly erased.

In this connection, two points must be emphasized,

(1) The Act affords every facility for an agreed settlement between a farmer and his creditors on a friendly basis. Of the more than 35,000 settlements effected during the operation of the Act to date, involving obligations of over $200,000,000, 7 out of every 10 have been reached on this voluntary basis. Failing such an agreement, the Board of Review has power to make an order which is not subject to appeal.[1] It is, however, always open to a creditor to appeal on the ground that the Board has exceeded its powers.

(2) The distinction between the secured and the unsecured creditor relates in principle to a farmer's

1 - Without this finality the volume and continuity of litigation might be expected to be excessive.

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C119038

ability to continue active operations. It is not set up with a view to giving any preference to the unsecured at the expense of the secured creditor. In other words, the reduction of a secured claim in the interest of an unsecured claim would not benefit the farmer in any obvious way.[1]

It may be added, that in the hearings before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it was argued that any interference by a federal Act with the right of a secured creditor might be construed as an invasion of provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. Lord Thankerton's judgment, however, denies this contention, from which it must be concluded that constitutionally there is nothing unusual in the provisions of the Act.[2]

Divided Opinion on Operation of the Act:

Any Act pertaining to money matters is likely to excite both public and Parliamentary controversy. In the case of this Act, two main streams are evident:

(1) Throughout the farming communities of Eastern Canada, it has been claimed, the Act has

(a) undermined the morale of the farming community

1 - Cf. statement by Senator Farris, Senate Debates(1938),p.514.

2 - See 1936 S.C.R. 388; Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, delivered January 28,1937, In the matter of a Reference (Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act); Ottawa, King's Printer, 1937, p. 33.

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by encouraging a too-facile escape from contractual obligations;

(b) applied to a small part (roughly 2½%) of this community in such a way that the credit standing of the remainder has been adversely affected.

(2) Especially in Western Canada, it has been represented that the Act has

(a) enabled thousands of farmers to remain on the land in useful occupation;

(b) by this means the savings in charges for direct relief have been appreciable.

As to (a), representatives of unsecured creditors claim that the interests of small merchants and tradespeople have been unwarrantably sacrificed.

So far as these issues have been joined, it must be stated that opponents of the Act have not in any degree matched the arguments advanced by the supporters, and, to a large extent, the converse is equally true.[1] It may, however, be useful to add a few general comments arising from these conflicting claims.

General Observations:

(1) In some cases it has been alleged that farmers, unable to meet their obligations but not actually being

1 - The Senate Debate of June 9, 1938, reflects this disparity.

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C119040

pressed to make a settlement, have been encouraged to come under the operation of the Act. Some evidence was brought forward that unwarrantable "canvassing" had taken place; but it cannot reasonably be charged that the Act has been in this sense an "escape mechanism". It will be noted (from the schedule annexed below) that the number of consultations between farmers and official receivers greatly exceed the number of proposals actually formulated. The figures do not suggest any unrestrained enthusiasm for jumping into litigation. Some cases are on record in which farmers have been able to make payments greater than those agreed upon in proposals confirmed by the Boards of Review.

(2) With respect to the complaints of unsecured creditors that their claims are being disregarded or in extreme cases totally extinguished,

it is certain that if foreclosure proceedings were instituted in default of payments, these creditors would receive little if anything from the proceeds. The operation of the Act in fact has secured at least partial payment on accounts which otherwise would have been quite valueless.

(3) In this and in other directions the Act provides considerable safeguards to creditors. If a farmer defaults

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C119041

in carrying out any of the terms of a composition or extension or other scheme approved by a Board, and if such a default does not arise from causes beyond the control of the farmer, the appropriate Court, on the application of any creditor, secured or unsecured, may annul the scheme. In any such event the farmer then becomes liable to bankruptcy proceedings, and it does not appear to be necessary at this point to recognize a distinction between a farmer and, e.g., a merchant involved in bankruptcy.[1]

Again, only exceptionally, and then in cases where interest rates were as high as 10% or more, has any Board of Review reduced the principal of any secured debt without the consent of the creditor, and in no instance has the principal been reduced below the present-day fair valuation of the property. In cases where the rate of interest has been reduced (reduction to 5% has been a general practice) and / or the time of payment extended, the applicant has, almost invariably, been required to apply at least a part of his payments to the unsecured claims against him. Excluding Prince Edward Island, the spread between the average total debt per case (some $6,000) and

1 - Cf. statement by Senator Meighen, Senate Debates (1938), p. 391.

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the average unsecured debt per case (roughly $900) suggests that by far the more important problem has been that touching the secured creditors.[1]

The action of Boards of Review has given, on occasion, a positive value to certain holdings which they might never otherwise attain. In cases where diminished fertility, small harvests, and arrears of payments have alike contributed to attach a debt greater than the present-day value of the land, it might be argued that the security has disappeared except for the value which a Board may have fixed.

(4) The principle of voluntary settlement has been amply justified by the operation of the Act. It has been represented that the unusual number of applications in Ontario have been attended by difficulties in administration. It appears that out of 9,457 applications (rather more than 25% of the total for Canada), a settlement by voluntary agreement was reached in 5,793 cases.[2] As over 1,000 cases are still pending, it will be observed that the number of settlements by arbitrary order has been relatively small in proportion.

1 - See the schedule for the relevant figures.

2 - Figure as at August 30, 1938.

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(5) Nothing in the foregoing is intended to detract from the fact that the Act is a <u>temporary</u> measure and, as indicated, its operation will cease in the five eastern provinces at the end of the present calendar year. At the same time, it may be fairly mentioned, that the Act has been responsible for a reduction of nearly $60,000,000 in the accrued farm debt of more than 35,000 farmers, and there is a question whether the reduction of interest charges (amounting to some $4,500,000) has not constituted in effect an equivalent amount of purchasing power with important consequences to the business interests of the Dominion.

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C119044

SCHEDULE

Farmers' Creditors' Arrangement Act

(Figures corrected to August 1, 1938)

Farmers interviewing Official Receivers	157,702
Proposals submitted	36,703
Settlements effected	30,824
" " by Official Receivers	11,938
" " by Boards of Review	18,886
Average debt per case	$5,771.92
Average reduction per case (33.07%)	$1,908.85
Average reduction - secured debt	30.90%
" " - unsecured debt	48.41%

Percentage reduction on Secured Loans

P. E. I.	13.20%	Manitoba	38.76%
N. S.	34.15%	Saskatchewan	34.97%
N. B.	35.31%	Alberta	37.01%
Quebec	16.54%	B. C.	34.91%
Ontario	24.50%	All Canada	30.90%

Approximate average of Unsecured debt

In Prince Edward Island	$900.00
In all other Provinces	$700.00

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C 119045

Ottawa, September 2, 1938

a-202
vol. 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Farmers-Creditors Arrangement Act

Attached is a fairly comprehensive brief on the operation of the Act prepared by Mr. Gibson, after consultation with Mr. Gordon of the Department of Finance who has been directing its operation. Mr. Gordon took the view that it would not be possible to answer the letter which appeared in the Globe and Mail and which was sent to the Prime Minister by Mr. McMillan, without more precise details than are given there. A draft reply has been prepared in which no attempt has been made to enter into the details of the operation of the Act.

J. W. P.

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C119046

Farm Credit Loan
(4) Senate-Procedure

A-202
Vol. 2

P-652-2
1938

Ottawa, June 23rd, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act

The Senate has sent a message to the House insisting upon its amendment for the reason, "that there is no further necessity for the Act in any of the other provinces after the 31st December, 1938". Prior to his indisposition, the Minister of Finance was informed, confidentially, by Senator Dandurand, that it was the expectation of the Senate that the House would propose a conference and that, if this were done, there would be some possibility of compromise. Senator Dandurand has asked that, in Mr. Dunning's absence, Council be made aware of this. He would appreciate knowing whether it will be Mr. Crerar (Acting Minister of Finance) or some other Member of the Government who will take charge of the measure while Mr. Dunning is away.

Brewster to prepare what Dr. Cantz say managers — Bruce Euler Mesley

E.A.P.

Mr. Dunning's secretary reports this morning that the Minister is feeling considerably better & has asked for some of his papers. His not expected he will be about until the beginning of the week. EAP

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C 119047

No. 95

VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

OF CANADA

OTTAWA, WEDNESDAY, 22ND JUNE, 1938

PRAYERS.

Mr. Mackenzie (Vancouver Centre), a Member of the King's Privy Council, presented,—Partial Return to an Order of the House of February 14, 1938, for a copy of all contracts made by or for the Department of National Defence from the beginning of the present fiscal year (April 1, 1937) to date, as well as a copy of all tenders with respect to each such contracts.

The following Order of the House was issued to the proper officer under subsection 4 of Standing Order 44:—

By Mr. Brooks—Order of the House for a Return showing:—

1. (*a*) Contracts awarded since January 1, 1938, for the supplying of coal to federal public buildings in the Province of New Brunswick. (*b*) The names and locations of such buildings.

2. Tenders received in each case, their amounts, and to whom the contracts were awarded.

On motion of Mr. Mackenzie King, it was resolved,—That the provision of Standing Order 28, respecting the Committee of Ways and Means, be suspended for the sitting of June the 23rd, 1938.

The House resumed the adjourned Debate on the proposed motion of Mr. Dunning,—That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair for the House to resolve itself again into Committee of Ways and Means, and on the proposed motion of Mr. Lawson in amendment thereto, and on the proposed motion of Mr. Coldwell in amendment to the said proposed amendment.

And a Debate still continuing, the said Debate was, on motion of Mr. Marsh, adjourned.

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C 119048

A Message was received from the Senate informing this House that the Senate do insist upon its second amendment to the Bill No. 25, An Act to amend the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, to which the House of Commons had disagreed, for the following reason:—

"That there is no further necessity for the Act in any of the other provinces after the 31st December, 1938."

The House then adjourned at 10.57 o'clock, p.m., until to-morrow, at three o'clock, p.m.

PIERRE F. CASGRAIN,
Speaker.

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C119049

NOTICES OF MOTIONS AND QUESTIONS

*Mr. Mulock**—On Friday next—ADDRESS—For a copy of the agreement between the Government and John Inglis Company, of Toronto, for the manufacture of Bren machine guns.

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C 119050

MEETINGS OF COMMITTEES

Room	Committee	Hour
	Thursday, June 23	
368	Printing	10.30 a.m.
429	Electoral Matters	11.00 a.m.
268	Civil Service Act	11.00 a.m.
	Friday, June 24	
429	Miscellaneous Private Bills	10.30 a.m.
497	Civil Service Superannuation Act (In camera)	11.00 a.m.

OTTAWA: Printed by J. O. PATENAUDE, I.S.O., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1938.

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Farm Credit Policy A-202
Senate - Procedure II 2

C119051

Ottawa, June 24th, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The Clerk of the House states that it is not necessary, in requesting the conference with the Senate, to prepare a statement of reasons therefor for the approval of the House. This would be the case if the conference were not a "free" conference. Since 1906, however, the practice has been, under ss. 2 of Standing Order 25, for conferences to be "free", that is the managers of the House are not bound by previously approved instructions passed by the House itself and are free to negotiate a compromise.

Dr. Beauchesne says that the only written documents that are necessary are the motions which he has already prepared - a set of which are in the Prime Minister's possession. When the item is reached on the Order Paper, Mr. Crerar will make his explanation of the House's position. The motion asking the Senate for a conference is made following this explanation and, in the opinion of the Clerk, should preferably be made by the Minister in charge of the Bill. Immediately after a message is received from the Senate, agreeing to the conference, the second motion is passed naming the managers.

E.A.P.

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C119052 P.306 V.6-(2) File

Debt Adjustment ✓
Farmers' Creditors Adjustment Act ✓

Ottawa, February 15th, 1939.

For the Prime Minister:

-- Attached for the Prime Minister's signature or revision, is a draft reply to a letter from the Premier of Manitoba, setting out at some length the wishes of the Manitoba Government with respect to the operation of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, in the Province.

Mr. Bracken's contention is that the Act should remain in effect, in Manitoba, until a "Land Court" can be set up for the adjustment of farm debts. Adequate jurisdiction by such a Court would require Legislation by the Parliament of Canada and the appointment of a Judge by the Federal Government. The Premier of Manitoba requests the government's assurances on these points.

Mr. Bracken's letter is accompanied by a long report (152 pages) by a Committee of the Manitoba Legislature, a précis of which I am having prepared by Mr. Gibson.

Does the Prime Minister approve of copies of Mr. Bracken's letter, and the precis of the report, when it has been prepared, being forwarded to Mr. Lapointe, Mr. Dunning, Mr. Crerar, Mr. Gardiner, and possibly Mr. MacKinnon, for their comments, the matter subsequently to be brought up in Council.

Please K
16-2-39

A. D. P. H.

A. D. P. H.

A.D.P. HEENEY

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C119053 AG/MP 15.4.39

P.300
Dup
see P.306 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Manitoba: Proposed "Land Court" Legislation

1) A committee of the Manitoba Legislature in 1938 recommended the creation of a "Land Court", a division of the Court of King's Bench, under a judge to be specially appointed. Its jurisdiction was intended to cover all actions and proceedings on agreements for sale and mortgages upon farm lands, as well as postponement, supervision and, as an ultimate resort, debt reduction.

2) In forwarding a report of this committee on February 8th, Premier Bracken requested the government's assurances

   (a) that the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act should be continued in effect in Manitoba until such time as the Land Court could be placed in operation;

   (b) that enabling legislation would be introduced to give the proposed Court valid power to adjust (i) debt principal and (ii) interest;

   (c) that a competent judge would be appointed when necessary.

   (All of the foregoing concern matters outside the competence of the Manitoba Legislature).

3) Mr. Bracken's communication was acknowledged on February 15th. Copies of it, together with a precis of the report of the Committee of the Manitoba Legislature, were circulated, with a request for comments, to the Ministers of Justice, Mines and Resources, Finance, Agriculture, and the Honourable J. A. MacKinnon.

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4) Mr. Lapointe was of opinion that the proposed legislation represented an attempted duplication, under provincial auspices, of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act provisions, and that, if augmented, it would unquestionably result in non-uniformity in dealing with questions in which uniformity was highly desirable.

Mr. Crerar was in favour of continuing the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, and thought the Land Court idea a sound one.

Mr. Gardiner mentioned he inclined to the opinion that it was a mistake for the Senate last year to treat Manitoba differently from Alberta and Saskatchewan.

Mr. MacKinnon regarded the facilities afforded by the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act as adequate to deal with the debt adjustment situation.

5) By the terms of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act Amendment Act 1939 (passed April 11, 1939), the operation of the Act in Manitoba is extended to June 30, 1940.

6) The legislation is now before the Manitoba legislature and, as prorogation is expected within a few days, Mr. Bracken has requested some definite word concerning his proposals.

A. D. P. H.

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Debt Adjustment ✓
Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act

C119055
306
V. 6(a)

Ottawa, September 14th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Farm debt situation in Manitoba

Mr. Bracken has raised, in a recent letter to the Prime Minister, the question of the farm debt situation in Manitoba, consequent upon the refusal of the Senate, at the last session, to agree to the extension of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act.

According to Mr. Bracken, the matter is urgent, and he wishes to call a special session of the Manitoba Legislature as soon as he is able to obtain information from the government as to what legislation should be enacted so that the provisions of the Central Mortgage Bank Act may be available for agricultural debt adjustment in Manitoba.

Copies of Mr. Bracken's letter have been sent to Colonel Ralston, Mr. Lapointe, Mr. Ilsley, Mr. Crerar, and Mr. Gardiner.

A.D.P.H.

A. D. P. H.

A.D.P. HEENEY.

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CANADA

file

C119056

P-306

v.6(a).

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: September 14th, 1939.

SUBJECT: Farm debt situation in Manitoba;

REMARKS: Mr. Heeney's note and relevant correspondence with Premier of Manitoba attached.

This is for the Minister of Finance -

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL:

Farmers Creditors Arrangement Act comes under Finance -

ACTION TAKEN:

Please see that it is understood Finance Department has matter in hand - better speak with Clark. [illegible]

DISPOSED OF:

Sept. 21st 39

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Debt Adjustment C119057
Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act

P-306
V.6(a)

September 15th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Farm debt situation in Manitoba.

The Premier of Manitoba has written again insisting upon the urgency of action being taken by the Federal government:

1. To set in operation the Central Mortgage Bank Act in respect of rural mortgages in Manitoba, or

2. To extend the Farmers Creditors Arrangement Act to Manitoba, or

3. To provide legislation to permit of the operation of Manitoba Land Courts.

A copy of Mr. Bracken's second letter is attached. Copies have been sent to the Ministers interested.

A.D.P.H.

A. D. P. H.

A.D.P. HEENEY

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C 119058

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: September 15th, 1939.

SUBJECT: Farm debt situation in Manitoba.

REMARKS: Mr. Heeney's memorandum and a copy of Mr. Bracken's letter attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL:

ACTION TAKEN: Suspended for consideration by the Department of Finance.

DISPOSED OF:

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P-306

C 119059

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: September 18th, 1939.

SUBJECT: Farm debt situation in Manitoba.

REMARKS: Mr. Heeney's memorandum attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL:

ACTION TAKEN: Suspended for consideration by the Department of Finance.

A.D.P.H.

DISPOSED OF:

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B 2.

C119060

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: September 25th, 1939.

SUBJECT: Farm debt situation in Manitoba.

REMARKS: Mr. Heeney's memoranda and correspondence with Mr. Bracken attached.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL:

ACTION TAKEN:

DISPOSED OF:

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Fascism
Cole - Fascism

C119061

Results of Dictatorship

In Italy -

Fascism - State Supreme.

Communism is parent of Fascism and Naziism.

Fascism is in nature of a counter revolution.

Neutralizes religion.

Development one of a highly nationalistic form.

Different from Bolshevism - which is international.

Preaches an undisguised militarist doctrine.

Creates an atmosphere of war possible.

Parliament, Liberalism, free opinion, free press, all regarded as "rotten corpses" which virile countries should scorn.

Italians held up as heirs to Roman Empire.

Propaganda insane.

Perpetual self-assertion.

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C119062

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

N-300
V.7(B)
P-850
1938
N-300
1938

For Mr. King:

Mr. Cote, of the Liberal Federation, sent over the attached extract from "L'Illustration Nouvelle", -- Montreal, which reproduces a story which appeared in the "Daily News" of New York, to the effect that if war had broken out, the "Queen Mary" had orders to put into Halifax to discharge her passengers and take eight thousand Canadian troops on board for immediate transport to England. "L'Illustration" which is edited by the Fascist Adrian Arcand and is reputedly financed by the Government of Quebec, suggests that this is evidence of a secret understanding to send Canadian troops abroad.

The extract from the "Daily -- News", containing the original story, is also attached.

J. W. P.

6.x.38

See clipping sewn for extract.

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C 119063

Memorandum - To Mr. Dunning

Re Powers of Expropriation
in the Province of Quebec

It is our understanding that section 13 of the Federal District Commission Act as amended in 1928 (18-19 Geo. V. Chap. 26) vests the Federal District Commission with the necessary powers to expropriate lands in the Province of Quebec, as elsewhere, without co-operation by the provincial legislature. This might be referred to the Dept. of Justice for confirmation or otherwise.

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MEMORANDUM C 119064

Office of the Prime Minister

Ottawa, March 17/37.

Letter from Mr. Bronson re Gatineau Parkway removed from file for Mr. Pickering for Council. Letter dated March 5, 1937.

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C 119065

Department of the Interior, Canada
Honourable T. A. Crerar, Minister
J. M. Wardle, Deputy Minister
FOREST SERVICE
E. H. Finlayson, Director of Forestry

LOWER GATINEAU WOODLANDS SURVEY

INTERIM REPORT

Ottawa, 1935

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C 119066

LOWER GATINEAU WOODLANDS SURVEY

INTERIM REPORT

Purpose of Survey

Within the past five years wood has replaced coal as a fuel to a considerable extent, with a consequent expansion of the fuelwood market. Owing to their easy accessibility from the markets of Hull and Ottawa, the woodlands of the Lower Gatineau region have been subjected to greatly increased cutting activities. In some locations cutting has been so severe that wood supplies have been seriously depleted, and scenic values have been impaired.

In view of the possible future inclusion of parts of the Lower Gatineau in a federal district, this devastation has occasioned serious concern. At the request of the Federal District Commission, the Department of the Interior instructed the Forest Service to make a fact-finding survey so that basic data would be available for consideration and analysis in the determination of possible remedial measures.

Area Examined

The area selected for examination comprises the wooded section of that part of the province of Quebec lying within a radius of twenty miles of the Ottawa Post Office. Owing to the lateness of the season before the party could be placed in the field, it was necessary to confine actual examinations on the ground to that section lying west of the Gatineau river as far northwest as the head of Meach lake, including roughly the Meach lake and Kingsmere area. Fortunately, as the timber types are comparatively uniform, the data obtained from the ground survey may be applied to areas and types identified from

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C 119067

a study of aerial photographs covering the balance of the area. This interim report, however, is concerned wholly with the area bounded by the Mountain road, the Mine road, and the Meach lake road as far northwest as the head of Meach lake, comprising some 15,360 acres.

Forest Conditions

The woodlands of the Lower Gatineau watershed provide an excellent illustration of man's influence in changing fundamentally the character of the forest. Records indicate that in the early years of the past century, these hills bore splendid stands of white and red pine, and even as late as forty years ago extensive logging operations for such softwood timbers were carried on. Incidentally many of the old logging roads remaining as a result of these operations are now utilized as ski trails and in recent years some of them have been repaired for fuelwood operations.

Coincident with and subsequent to logging, extensive forest fires occurred. As a consequence of these combined factors, the pineries and their associated soft-woods have practically disappeared and have given place to an almost pure hardwood stand. The present woodlands, therefore, consist of shade enduring hardwoods of many species, with the hard or sugar maple predominating. As a matter of interest, it may be recorded that these present stands of maple are probably unique throughout eastern Canada both with regard to the predominance of that species and the excellent growth conditions observed. Associated with the maple are yellow birch, basswood, beech, elm, ash, oak, butternut and hickory.

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The primary cause for the change in type from softwoods to hardwoods may probably be attributed to fires which swept over the area during the decade 1860-1870. The effect of these is clearly recorded in the character of the forests on the hill tops where the burn was most severe and where the soil itself was largely destroyed. In such locations the principal species are red oak and maple of very suppressed and stunted growth. The condition of the whole escarpment facing the Mountain Road and visible for miles along the highway to Shawville is a monument of these early fires. Some sections which have escaped subsequent devastation are now partially clothed with scattered timber. Many areas of bare rock still remain.

In 1914 a destructive fire occurred near Old Chelsea. The same area was reburned in 1920, and the serious effects are still visible in sparse growth of defective hardwoods and rocky areas still unclothed.

With the exception of white pine, the area covered by the ground survey reveals little abnormal damage to the forest from insects or from fungous diseases. Wherever white pine is growing in the open it is subjected to serious attack by the white pine weevil which destroys the new leaders each year. Consequently the tree develops in a scrubby and distorted form and while the general health is not seriously affected, the bole becomes so deformed as to become worthless except for low-grade fuelwood. On the other hand, white pine coming up in the shade of other species is little affected by the weevil.

A more serious menace to the better stands of white pine is the white pine blister rust which is

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prevalent throughout the area. About 15 per cent of all the trees are now visibly infected and the species as a whole is doomed unless control measures are instituted within a reasonable length of time. As the blister rust is dependent upon an alternate host at one stage of its life cycle, control may be effected by eradicating the alternate host within a specified distance of the timber to be protected. This alternate host may be any species of the genus ribes, namely, gooseberries, black currants, or skunk currants. These plants are to be found on dry hilly sites, in gardens and in swampy areas, respectively.

The area covered in this report comprises some 15,360 acres. Of this, 20.4 per cent, or 3,133 acres, is non-forested, consisting of cleared land, roads, lakes, or recently burned areas. Of the forested land, the records of the survey show the following classification:

Clear cut, 1-5 years ago	6.0 per cent
Clear cut, 6-10 years ago	3.3 per cent
Clear dut, 11-20 years ago	11.7 per cent
Partially cut, 1-10 years ago	5.2 per cent
Partially cut, 11-20 years ago	6.6 per cent
Young growing timber, 21-40 years old	12.1 per cent
Merchantable timber, 41-60 years old	19.4 per cent
Merchantable timber, 61-100 years old	13.9 per cent
Merchantable timber, over 100 years old	1.4 per cent

Summarizing the above, some 27.6 per cent of the area has been so completely cut over during the last twenty years that no more merchantable timber will be available for many years to come. An additional 11.8 per cent has been partially cut over, with sufficient stand remaining to provide another profitable cut in ten to twenty years.

The important point is that over one-third of the area now carries timber overmature or approaching maturity, and which under present operating conditions is classifiable as merchantable. These are the areas that

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call for immediate consideration in any scheme to provide for the protection of scenic values.

With regard to timber content, it has been found that the young stands, 21 to 40 years old, contain approximately fifteen cords per acre; the stands 41 to 60 years old have approximately twenty-two cords; the stands 61 to 100 years old, twenty-eight cords, and the stands over 100 years old, thirty-three cords per acre. In all cases the timber is 65 to 70 per cent hard maple.

Land Tenure and Cutting Operations

No Crown lands occur within the area covered by this report. Although there are a number of large parcels of 500 acres or more each, in the main the properties have been transferred and subdivided so frequently that many of the original 200-acre lots are divided between two or more owners. Small portions fronting on the lake shores have been sold as cottage sites.

With regard to the large holdings, the owners of these (with one exception) are not dependent upon their woodlands for financial returns. On the contrary they are largely maintained for recreational purposes, so that so long as they remain in the present ownership there is little doubt that they will be amply protected.

The owner of the average size property is generally a farmer. Of these, some who have no pressing need for financial returns from their woodlots have restricted their cutting operations to amounts necessary to supply their own fuelwood requirements and have cut with some thought for obtaining such a supply in perpetuity. The actual areas cut over may be clear cut, but the total area covered in any year is small--around five acres.

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This in fact assumes the character of the group cutting method in silviculture. The disfigurement to the landscape is trivial and very temporary, since these small cut-over areas are fully restocked with seedlings and sprouts within a year.

Unfortunately, a large proportion of the farmers in the area have suffered so severely during the depression that they find it necessary to convert their woodland assets into cash. The business which has arisen as a result of this situation is largely in the hands of wood dealers in Hull or Ottawa. Their procedure is to purchase the entire timber stand on a woodlot outright from the farmer. The sale may be either on a stumpage basis, or the land itself may be purchased practically for the value of the timber thereon. The purchaser in such cases is concerned only with the maximum volume of fuelwood removable and the faster it can be cut the sooner will returns be obtained. In practice cutting is usually let by contract to small jobbers who operate the year round on the basis of payment of so much per cord. These jobbers believe that it is to their interest to cut every stick acceptable for fuelwood, in consequence of which the entire area is stripped of every tree over one inch in diameter, with the exception of such species as basswood and butternut which are considered unsuitable for fuelwood. The result is devastation and disfigurement of the landscape for a decade or more until the prolific regeneration, which, fortunately, is a feature of this area, can repair the ravages.

The returns to the jobbers are meagre, averaging not more than $1.00 to $1.25 a day gross. Out of this,

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they must feed and clothe themselves and their families. The accelerated cutting of the last few years has been a by-product of the depression. Unless the price of fuelwood is low enough to compete successfully with coal, the market is limited and small. On the other hand the price can only be kept at the present low level while the labour market is disturbed and wages are low. With improvements in economic conditions, wood prices will automatically advance and the market consequently diminish.

Changes in fuelwood market conditions are reflected in changes in the acreage cut over during the last twenty years. During the decade, 1916-25, there was a period of coal shortage and consequent high prices. In the area examined we find that for that period the average area cut over amounted to 281 acres annually. Although coal prices continued high during the subsequent five-year period, there was no shortage. At the same time, wages were also high and labour scarce, so that wood cutting operations dropped 50 per cent and the area cut over annually during that period amounted to only 140 acres per year. During the last five years, while wages have dropped to subnormal levels, the price of coal has not fallen correspondingly. As a result, wood cutting operations have increased year by year until an average annual cut of 224 acres has been reached, with prospects of even greater activities during the coming year.

It is of interest to note that although the area cut over annually during the decade, 1916-25, was somewhat larger than the average for the past five years, the volume removed during the first-mentioned period was little more than half of that of recent operations.

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In fact the average annual cut per acre has increased from ten to eighteen cords.

Productivity of the Area

The records of the survey show that almost 40 per cent of the area has been completely or partially cut over within the last twenty years, and approximately 9 per cent within the last five years. Naturally the earlier cuttings were confined to the more accessible areas--of late years operations have extended up the valleys to the hill tops. This has been particularly evident in the recent practice of clear cutting entire lots irrespective of location. As a result, the proportion of denuded area visible from far and near is rapidly growing. An examination of the map accompanying this report will indicate this trend (see also plates 21 and 22).

While the computation of the rate of growth for the timber on the area has not been completed to date, information obtainable from rate of growth surveys in the Lower Gatineau region indicates that the forests are producing around one-half cord per acre per annum. This would mean a possible annual cut of over 6000 cords under sustained yield management. While reliable statistics are not available with respect to the cordage of fuelwood removed from the area, it is believed to be less than 4000 cords. Consequently it cannot be said that cutting from the area, as a whole, has been excessive. The weakness of the present practice is in the irregular distribution of the cutting which is concentrated in certain sections resulting in denudation of these areas, while at the same time timber on other sections is becoming overmature. With the application of proper forestry principles, the

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area could probably be made to produce up to three-quarters of a cord per acre per year without denudation.

Forest Protection

Reference has been made to the occurrence of fires in the past and the depressing effects have been described. No plan for the rehabilitation of the area and the preservation of scenic values will be effective unless adequate fire protection is provided. Responsibility for protection is at present vested in the Hull District Office of the Quebec Forest Service. A local supervisor at Wakefield enforces the burning of slash of coniferous species, issues permits to settlers for fires for land clearing purposes, and has responsibility for fighting any fires started. Inasmuch as the timber on the area is almost entirely hardwood, the natural hazardous season is largely confined to the early spring and late autumn when there is no green vegetation and the dry leaves constitute a complete floor of highly inflammable material. Occasionally there may be summer hazard through long protracted periods of drought.

In view of the particular value of the area and of the ever-increasing number of visitors, it is felt that the fire protection measures should be strengthened.

Protection of the existing stands of white pine from the ravages of the white pine blister rust is a further necessity. It is understood that the Quebec Forest Service are contemplating initiation of action in this connection during 1936.

Impairment of Scenic Values

As mentioned above, one of the most encouraging aspects of the situation in the region under consideration

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is the fact that cutting is immediately followed by prolific regeneration of hardwoods, particularly hard maple. Except on the tops of the ridges, growth is unusually rapid with the result that at ten years of age the trees have reached a height of from sixteen to twenty feet. Consequently from the purely forestry standpoint no serious criticism can be directed against the practice of the owners in clear cutting. It is true that instead of assuring themselves a continuous return from their land, they are accepting a periodic one as they are forced to wait for a period of around 40 years before further financial benefits can accrue. Viewing the matter from a long term standpoint, the owner may be justified in the policy followed. The point to be stressed is that devastation in the usual sense of the word, namely, impairment of the productive capacity of the soil, is not evidenced here.

From the standpoint of scenic values, the disfigurement due to clear cutting over extensive areas is temporary in character so far as the observation of the tourist traversing highways is concerned. The regrowth following cutting which has reached 16 to 20 feet in height at ten years, presents a closed canopy which from a comparatively short distance possesses almost equal attractions with a mature stand. For those who wish a more intimate association with the woods the detrimental effects of cutting as at present practised are more serious. The desire of this class of user is primarily for forests of the older age-classes. The trees should have fairly clear boles, providing pleasing vistas and easy walking conditions. Essentially the trees must be large enough to provide an unbroken

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crown cover; the spacing and distribution of the species must be natural and the grouping irregular. In particular, the devastating effect of insects, disease and human agencies are to be avoided. Above all, the irreparable damage caused by fire and by logging practices resulting in erosion to the thin soil and exposures of bare rock are deplored.

For the area under consideration, the present practices in cutting operations present several important features of vital concern. From a distance the distinct break in the crown cover is sharply defined on hillside or sky line. Although the new stand starts immediately, it will be 20 to 40 years before the young trees will attain a height that will blend in with the surrounding crown cover. Immediately after cutting the near view presents an unsightly combination of stumps, slash, bared rocks and disturbed mineral soil. The worst features of this unsightliness are removed within two years by regrowth. At ten years of age there are 3000 or more trees 16 to 20 feet high. Such stands are, however, so dense as to obstruct view or passage. The prospect along trails through the area is converted from an open stand of clean boled trees to an impenetrable thicket of saplings.

These difficulties would be avoided if arrangements could be made to have cutting operations conducted under a selection system by which approximately one-half of the trees would be left for a return cut in 10 to 20 years. Under this system the general contour of the crown cover would remain intact. Stumps, slash, rocks and mineral soil would be obscured or entirely hidden. Regeneration would be of more normal density and the contrast between cut and uncut forests less pronounced.

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Possible Remedial Measures

The opinion has been expressed that for the present at least, consideration of remedial measures should be restricted to those areas which are visible to the public from main highways, lakes or ski trails. An examination of the map shows that the forest nowhere extends more than one mile from one or other of the roads or trails. Excepting for the interior valleys, almost the entire area from the Gatineau river to the Mountain road is visible from some viewpoint. Almost every interior hill and valley is traversed by some part of the network of trails covering the area. Consequently, it has been decided that there would be little use in attempting to segregate any area as being invisible from any direction. It follows that the suggestions included herein must be considered as applicable to the entire area under consideration.

In view of the fact that all the lands in the area are privately owned, the problem of instituting a system of management whereby cutting would be carried out under a selection system is complicated. Private owners cannot be expected to forego personal gains or returns for the general public benefit. Keeping this primary factor in mind the following alternatives suggest themselves:

1. Educational Method

This would involve an energetic campaign to convince owners that selective cutting methods whereby only an amount of timber equivalent to the annual growth on their woodlands would be taken, would be to their own ultimate profit. The cutting would consist, of course, in the removal of the mature timber.

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This method would involve placing the advice of a capable consulting forester at the disposal of the owners.

The particular advantage lies in the comparatively small outlay involved, but there are several distinct disadvantages. In the first place, the ultimate effectiveness of the method is uncertain. Obviously some years would lapse before appreciable results would be noticeable. Existing economic conditions militate against present value of the method as owners are in urgent need of immediate cash returns.

2. Protective Strip Method

A strip of forest land three chains wide on both sides of every highway might be purchased. The amount involved would be comparatively small and returns from selective logging could be applied against the cost. However, areas visible beyond the roadsides would not be protected, and locations where new roads may be constructed in the future might be denuded before final locations could be made and protection strips secured.

3. Bonus Method

A plan might be formulated whereby owners who cut under a selection system might be recompensed for the additional cost and deferred returns. While the immediate outlay under such a scheme would not be large, it would recur annually and the amount ultimately involved would go far towards financing outright purchase. In addition there is the probability of complications and dissatisfaction amongst owners, and a cumbersome machinery would have to be set up to provide proper supervision.

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4. Stumpage and Ground Rental Method

Timber might be purchased from the owners on a basis equivalent to that under which it is sold on Crown lands. By this method the government would take over the timber. An annual ground rental would be paid to the owners and they would be recompensed at a specified rate per cord for any timber removed by the government. Responsibility for timber disposal would rest with the government. This method would probably not be attractive to the owners unless an advance payment on account of stumpage were made. The ultimate outlay would probably be comparable to a complete land purchase scheme.

5. Mortgage Method

Loans might be offered to owners on the basis of mortgages at a very low rate of interest. The timber removed would be under selection system with government supervision of operations, the returns being credited to the owners in reduction of mortgages. This would involve taking up mortgages bearing a low rate of interest to the extent of possibly $50,000. Refunding operations would cover a long period of time and supervision costs would amount to $5,000 per annum.

6. Land Purchase Method

This would involve purchase, parcel by parcel, of land necessary for protection of scenic values with the object of ultimately securing all the lands suitable for inclusion in a federal district. Under such a scheme only such areas as bear merchantable timber and are immediately required for scenic purposes would be purchased immediately. Additional areas would be purchased when conditions were favourable or as the timber approached

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maturity. Such a method would tend to curb unrestricted cutting, since cutting by the owner would exclude the lands from the present purchase plan. Management of the areas for the removal of timber under selection system would provide financial returns as a partial offset to carrying charges.

7. National Park Method

This would involve purchase by arbitration or expropriation of the entire area. Compared with the average sized national park the lands covered by this report are quite small in extent, and to be a success, additional areas would probably have to be secured. Such a scheme would involve a large immediate expenditure.

8. Provincial Legislation Method

The Province of Quebec might be requested to pass legislation similar to that in general effect in European countries whereby owners are required to cut their woodlands under the direction and control of forest officers. It should be noted, however, that while the purpose in Europe is to provide for sustained yield, any legislation passed with respect to the area under consideration would require special provisions relating to conservation of scenic values.

RECOMMENDATION

Of the measures outlined above, the Land Purchase Method seems to offer the most suitable medium of dealing with the situation. The plan could be started immediately dealing first with areas which are most important, and extending purchases as funds and time permit. The lands could either be handled entirely under a parks scheme, or could be managed under forestry principles and timber ripe for removal marketed under proper supervision, the returns being credited against the purchase price.

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While the lands purchased would in the main comprise only those bearing merchantable timber, and important from the scenic value standpoint, certain denuded areas in strategic locations might also be included and planting operations carried out thereon.

Costs

Of the area examined some 5,330 acres are estimated to be covered with timber over 40 years of age. It may be estimated that an expenditure of approximately $100,000 would suffice to purchase all the lands between the Mountain road, the Mine road, and the Meach lake road as far northwest as the head of Meach lake, which are necessary to be secured at the present time in order to prevent further devastation.

Ultimate Extension of Plan

The above area, being that covered by this report, constitutes approximately one-tenth of the wooded area in the Province of Quebec lying within a 20 mile radius of the capital. While the detailed figures with respect to the balance of the area will not be available for some months yet, owing to the delay occasioned by the necessity of working up information from aerial photographs, there is reason to believe that the figures given herein may be applied pro rata to the larger area.

Provincial Co-operation

It is understood that no Dominion authority exists to-day for the acquisition of land by expropriation in the Province of Quebec for purposes such as those referred to in this report. Consequently, if the suggested land purchase plan were to be adopted, the co-operation of the provincial government of Quebec would have to be obtained to arrange for the expropriation under the Quebec Railway Act of lands required to be purchased and which may not be obtainable by direct negotiations. Alternatively, the Quebec Government might be requested to amend their legislation to grant expropriatory authority to the Dominion.

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Employment

The adoption of remedial measures such as those suggested herein would confer certain benefits. In the first place, devastation cuttings would cease. The management under forestry principles by government of the lands purchased would give employment to local labour at least equal to that now given by wood-cutting operations. Employment could be largely extended by undertaking the improving of timber stands through cultural operations; by the installation of fire protection facilities; by white pine blister rust control operations; and by road construction for tourist purposes. These classes of work would provide employment of a nature eminently suitable for the young men who have been such heavy sufferers in the depression and whose rehabilitation constitutes an urgent problem under present conditions.

Respectfully submitted,

W. M. ROBERTSON
Chief of Party

Forest Service, Ottawa,
December 12, 1935

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Ottawa, June 1st, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

re Federal Woodlands Preservation League

This is a subject which you said you wished to deal with before the end of the Session.

Mr. Baldwin has telephoned to say that the Officers of the League have delayed the annual meeting almost as long as they feel they can. The meeting will have to be held some time in June. The Officers do not wish to call the meeting if they are unable to make some reference to plans for the future. In view of your support of the League and your participation at its first meeting, Mr. Baldwin would like to have, before proceeding with the meeting, some indication of your views on the present situation.

As you know the Forest Service of the Department of Interior made a survey last year. In its report of December 1935 it recommended that "the land purchase" method be employed to buy up strategically located areas of merchantable timber. The report estimates that -

> "an expenditure of approximately $100,000 would suffice to purchase all the lands between the Mountain road, the Mine road, and the Meach lake road as far northwest as the head of Meach lake, which are necessary to be secured at the present time in order to prevent further devastation."

At the time of the Dominion-Provincial Conference you discussed this matter with Mr. Taschereau and with the Minister of Lands and Forests. So far no action has been taken.

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Mr. Baldwin has reports from time to time of continuing cutting and devastation. If there is any way in which the Officers of the League can be of assistance he would appreciate being told. He and others have been doing what they can to have the Quebec Government take some initiative in the matter.

E. A. P.

EAP/MGR

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, June 9th, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

re Federal Woodlands Preservation League

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> "an expenditure of approximately $100,000 would suffice to purchase all the lands between the Mountain road, the Mine road, and the Meach lake road as far northwest as the head of Meach lake, which are necessary to be secured at the present time in order to prevent further devastation."

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E. A. P.
E. A. PICKERING.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

As directed, I have discussed with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Baldwin the reference of the report on tree destruction in the Ottawa area to the National Employment Commission. Both agree that this step may be a valuable one.

Mr. Bowman and the Ottawa Citizen are preparing to advocate at a luncheon today and in the Citizen on Saturday a scheme to extend the Federal District Commission driveways through the wooded areas concerned. The project to be recommended will apparently be an elaborate one.

Mr. Baldwin thinks it would be just as well to wait for a day or two to see how this scheme relates to the report of the Interior Department, before referring the latter to the Commission.

E.A.P.

E.A. PICKERING.

June 18, 1936.

re Matthews
H-B to fr Wed. 26

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
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Ottawa, June 22nd, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

re Extension Federal District Driveway into Gatineau Hills.

-- I attach Mr. Bowman's article setting forth his proposal. It suggests the extension of the Driveway from the end of the Champlain Bridge near the Golf Club, up the Mountain Road, the Hermit Trail across the end of Kingsmere Lake, up Murphy's Hill, and along the Ridge Trail, to McCloskey's Hill, thence down the Trail to Meach Lake.

article returned to clipping section Sept. 17/36

It is suggested the project may serve:

To provide employment;

To serve as the commemoration of the accession of Queen Victoria who selected Ottawa as the capital, or the coronation of King Edward VIII, or the events of 1837;

To open up the Hill Country thereby enlisting support for the Federal Woodlands League in its campaign to stop tree destruction.

Have you any direction as to the desirability of having the Employment Commission study this proposal, as well as the report of the Forestry Branch re tree cutting?

E. A. P.

E. A. PICKERING

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM for File

C 119089

I telephoned Mr. Baldwin yesterday morning, who informed me that the Federal Woodlands Preservation League was proposing to suggest to the Federal District Commission that it ask the Employment Commission to study the proposal which has been made to stop tree-cutting in the Gatineau District, as one which might be properly included in any programme of the Commission to provide work and at the same time to preserve the natural assets of the country.

E.A.P.

E. A. PICKERING

July 3, 1936.

Mr. Henry,
The reference to the Commission was done on Mr. K.'s suggestion to Baldwin & Rogers via me.
E.A.P.

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✓ Federal District Com.
✓ Employment - Nat'l Employment Com.

119090

.304
at 4

file 214.

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KING:

Re Gatineau Woodlands and Driveway

Mr. Baldwin telephoned me yesterday morning to tell me that Mr. Bowman, Mr. Sparks (an officer of the Federal Woodlands Preservation League), and himself had discussed informally and without any reference to you, with the Federal District Commission, the possibility of the Federal Commission asking the Employment Commission to study the various proposals which are currently being put forward regarding the preservation of tree life and the construction of a scenic driveway in the Gatineau Hill region. At the close of the session, you will recall that on your direction I told Mr. Rogers and Mr. Baldwin that you would approve the National Employment Commission studying the report of the Forestry Branch, with the view to recommending it to the Government for inclusion in a programme of projects to provide work and to preserve the natural assets of the country.

I told Mr. Baldwin that you had not had an opportunity to go into the merits of Mr. Bowman's proposal, and that, to ~~that~~ extent you ~~added~~, you were not altogether sure that it was a wise one. He quite understood, and said that in no way would you be committed by any action the Federal District Commission might take; that all the Federal Commission might ask would be that the Employment Commission give consideration to these proposals.

E. A. P.

E.A. PICKERING.

July 9, 1936.

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C119091 P-304
P-304 see vol. 4 (a) (Confl)
Dup.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, July 21, 1936.

Memorandum for Mr. King:

re - Preservation and development
Gatineau Woodlands.

Mr. Matthews called this morning to give me, for you, an account of the action of the Federal District Commission in this matter. In order to avoid placing you in any embarrassing position, because of possible association of your property at Kingsmere with the project, the Commission made its recommendation to the Employment Commission without formally discussing the matter with you. He wishes you to understand, however, that the whole project is in a tentative and confidential stage, and that Mr. Purvis has been advised of the necessity of your approval before any definite scheme can be proceeded with.

As the Federal District Commission reports to the Minister of Finance, copies of the correspondence were forwarded to Mr. Crerar, who is today sending this correspondence on to you.

Mr. Matthews emphasized that, to prevent a rise in the cost of land, it would be necessary for the project to be kept secret until the Commission could obtain options. The newspapers are pressing for information on the subject, and Mr. Matthews would like to release, for publication, the report of the Forest Service of the Department of the Interior, dated December 12, 1935. He thinks the publication of the report would do much to keep alive public interest in the matter, and to prepare public opinion for any project which may be eventually agreed upon. I told Mr. Matthews that at the time the report was completed last year, you did not wish to have it reach the hands of Quebec Ministers, because the paragraph re Provincial Co-operation, page sixteen, implied that the purchase would be made exclusively out of federal funds.

E. A. P.

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C 119092 4-304 wt4

COPY

Ottawa, August 24, 1936.

REPORT

To: The Chairman and the Members of the National Employment Commission.

Subject: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme, submitted by the Federal District Commission, through the Chairman, Mr. W.E. Matthews.

From: Alan Chambers, Chairman, Youth Employment Committee.

The above proposal, summarized into a communication to the National Employment Commission, dated August 24th, 1936, was referred to me for investigation and a second opinion, by Commissioner McLean, after he had looked into the matter himself.

At the earliest opportunity I obtained the file in regard to this matter and after carefully perusing it, I met Mr. G.A. Mulloy, Assistant Chief, Research Division, Dominion Forestry Service of the Department of the Interior, and Mr. Percy Sparkes of the Federal Woodlands Preservation League, the first for consultative purposes and the second to hear arguments in support of the proposal by the Federal Woodlands Preservation League. Mr. Sparkes argued the undertaking of the Project on two grounds:

1. That the Project, by reason of the annual yield of cordwood could be classified as self-liquidating, and

2. That if the present uncontrolled cutting of cordwood were allowed to continue without the proper supervision, this woodland area would be destroyed and the water supply from its streams seriously affected by denuding.

The same afternoon, I proceeded with Mr. Cram, the Secretary of the Federal District Commission, and Mr. Hay, Consulting Engineer to the Federal District Commission, to the scene of the proposed Project,

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H-100 Vol 10(c)
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covering the full length of the area which it is proposed to expropriate and make into a Federal District Commission Park area, by car.

From evidence submitted and from personal observations, there can be no doubt that the present methods of cutting will result in the rapid destruction of this area, both as a beauty spot and as a means of income. There is also no doubt in my own mind from observations and from the relief maps submitted, that should this Project be undertaken and completed, that the proposed roadway along the ridge of the Gatineau Hills, providing as it does, a magnificent view for a number of miles of the water sheds of the Ottawa River and the Gatineau River, would provide, under the Federal District Commission, a distinctly valuable asset to the attractions of the Capital, not only as a beauty spot but also for the better enjoyment of winter sports by both visitors and inhabitants of the Capital.

While, in my estimation, these angles of the Project are of prime importance, from the point of view of the National Employment Commission the question of the labour which would be utilized on this Project is of paramount importance.

The estimated cost of the Project over a period of say three years, is approximately $750,000 of which all but $125,000 would be spent for labour. The item of $125,000 is for the purchase of twelve thousand acres of woodland from the present owners at the approximate rate of $10.00 per acre. The remaining $650,000 of the required appropriation would be spent on the two main developments on the acquired property, which are:

1. The construction of a twenty foot wide gravelled road, thirty miles in length, along the ridge of the area at a cost of approximately $300,000 or $10,000 a mile, the greatest part of which would be labour, and

2. The silvicultural treatment of twelve thousand acres over a period of three years, practically all of which cost would be labour.

The number of men to be employed upon these two sides of development of this Project would depend in large measures upon the season of the year and the policy settled upon, that is to say: if it were the intention to push the completion of the road before undertaking silvicultural operations, less men would be employed per

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C 119094

dollar at the outset. On the other hand, were the silvicultural operations to be undertaken first, or in conjunction with the road construction, more men could be employed per dollar.

I would recommend the proposal to employ only persons on relief or in extremely necessitous circumstances in the Hull District generally.

After looking carefully into the proposal, as requested by Commissioner McLean, I would recommend as follows:

1. That the National Employment Commission approve the Project and request the Minister of Labour to set aside $750,000 for carrying it out.

2. That the administration of this Project be under the direct supervision of, and direction of, the Federal District Commission and that the moneys to carry out this Project, as appropriated, be turned over to, and expended only through, the Federal District Commission.

3. That available staffs of the Federal District Commission, of the Quebec Department of Lands and Forests, and of the Forestry Service Branch of the Federal Department of the Interior, be called upon to co-operate in carrying out this Project so as to reduce the administration cost to the absolute minimum, thereby ensuring at the same time, that the most expert advice is obtained and yet the greatest amount of ordinary labour, per dollar expended, is employed.

4. That the employees be taken from the Hull District generally, and be selected by the Quebec Relief Officials charged with the administration of relief in this particular area, acting with and under the supervision of a designated officer of the Federal District Commission.

5. That so far as is possible, the following regulations be complied with, in the selection and employment, of all men upon this Project:-

(a) Preference to be given to married men.

(b) Length of period in receipt of public relief to be a governing factor in employment.

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6. That wages be at the rate of 25¢ an hour for an eight hour day and that men be transported from a central point, to, and from, the work in hand, and be not resident other than in their own homes.

7. That the supervising engineer of the Federal District Commission, upon approving the selection by the Quebec Authorities of an employee, shall then have full jurisdiction during working hours over the conduct and work of the employee and, if in the opinion of this official for the time being, it be that the employee is not fulfilling his duties properly and adequately, the said official may, upon his authority alone, cause the said employee to be dismissed and obtain another employee from the same source. Further that any employee so discharged be not eligible for re-employment on this Project.

8. As the whole of the necessary silvicultural operations on this Project are of a winter nature, I would recommend to the National Employment Commission that should they approve of this Project, the necessary action be taken immediately as the work could be commenced this Autumn.

N.B. In discussing the moneys necessary for the completion of this project, I pointed out to the officers of the Federal District Commission that the only objection that I could fine to the scheme from the point of view of the National Employment Commission was, that in the first year's expenditures only 41% of the total appropriation of $280,000 was for labour. This seemingly disproportionate ratio is due, however, to the fact that although this is a three year Project and mainly a winter Project, wherein, in my opinion its great value lies, there is no question that it is unavoidably necessary to purchase the full twelve thousand acres under consideration at the outset of the scheme which causes the disproportion between what might be termed labour expenditure and capital expenditure, and although it will be necessary therefore, in the first year's appropriation to expend between $120,000 and $125,000 for the purchase of the twelve thousand acres, nevertheless it is unquestionably necessary that this be done at the beginning.

For the purpose of the whole three year project, however, (although this sum of money must be paid at the outset) it should be charged in the cost of the scheme over a period of three years.

May I take this opportunity of pointing out that it would

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be advisable if the National Employment Commission were to request the Federal District and its associates not to make public, as they have been doing, any details of schemes which they are about to propose to the National Employment Commission, until they have been considered by the National Employment Commission. One of the main reasons for this is that, as in the case of this Project, the Gatineau Park Development Scheme, undue publicity was given to the proposals before they were submitted to the National Employment Commission, as a result of which there is no doubt in my mind that there are a number of the land holders who, if they had not been warned that this proposal might be approved and their land purchased, would have been prepared to sell their land at a lower price than will not probably prove to be the case.

Sgd. Alan Chambers

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Federal District Com.
Employment - Nat'l Employment Com. P-304

Copy

FEDERAL DISTRICT COMMISSION

C119097

Proposed development of a National Parkway in the Gatineau district adjacent to Ottawa as an unemployment project, and for the future beautification and improvement of Ottawa and environs in connection with its ultimate development as the Capital City of Canada.

The importance of this project was strongly recommended by the Federal District Commission in 1915 and has been further stressed before the National Employment Commission.

The Commission having examined this scheme, recommends its approval by the Dominion Government.

Attached to this recommendation and as explanatory thereto, is a letter dated the 24th day of August 1936, from the Federal District Commission.

While the National Employment Commission has made no extended independent investigation of the facts, it has analyzed carefully the statements of the Federal District Commission.

Approval is recommended because the project will employ a large number of men in the winter months, it does not require the operation of expensive camps, it is in a measure self-liquidating and it will improve and conserve the national resources and will bring substantial indirect benefits through the tourist industries.

The Commission recommends that, in employment of labour for the project, men be drawn from the ranks of the necessitous unemployed and that wages and hours of work be those prevailing for similar work.

The Commission recommends that if possible the project be authorized immediately so that some work may be done this Winter.

Ottawa, Ont.
September 2nd, 1936.

CHAIRMAN

A.B PUROIS

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C 119098

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM for Mr. King.

I attach a copy of a recommendation of the National Employment Commission, endorsing the proposal of the Federal District Commission for a National Park in the Gatineau District.

Mr. Matthews' letter to the Employment Commission requesting endorsation of the project, referred to in the recommendation, was brought to your attention by the Acting Minister of Finance during the summer.

A copy of the recommendation is submitted for your information . As the Minister through whom the Employment Commission reports, Mr. Rogers proposes to bring it to the attention of Council.

E. A. P.

September 5th, 1936

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C119099

MEMORANDUM

September 8th, 1936.

For Mr. King:

Re: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

For your reference when this subject is brought up for discussion in Council, by Mr. Rogers, I attach;

-- (1) a copy of Mr. Matthews' letter to Mr. Purvis, of July 16th, recommending the scheme to the National Employment Commission, and

-- (2) a report on the subject to the National Employment Commission, prepared at its request by Mr. Chambers, endorsing the proposal.

E. A. P.

Re - [illegible]

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Federal District Com
Employment - Cattle
Employment Com

C 119100

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

I attach a precis (2 pages) of the scheme based on Mr. Matthew's letter to the Employment Commission, and Mr. Chambers' report to that body. (Also attached).

Mr. Purvis has, on his own initiative, written to Mr. Duplessis advising him that the Employment Commission has recommended the scheme to the Federal Government, and recommending it for his consideration with a view to the scheme being included in the programme of works to be carried out in co-operation between the Dominion and Quebec governments. If Quebec is willing to co-operate, the Dominion Government can, perhaps, find funds in Vote No. 335, referred to in the precis. Mr. Rogers would like to know if, in the event of Mr. Duplessis being willing to go into the matter, the Parkways Scheme has your general approval.

E.A.Pickering

September 10, 1936

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C 119101

PROPOSED GATINEAU PARKWAY SCHEME

1. The Proposed Scheme:

(a) Parkway - The project involves the extension of the Federal District Parkway system from the end of the Champlain Bridge in Quebec to the hills in the vicinity of Fairy Lake, thence following the sky-line, via Old Chelsea, Camp Fortune, McCloskey's Hill, etc., to Masham and Wakefield. (Map attached).

(b) Preservation of Woodlands - To preserve the wooded hillsides the proposal includes the purchase of approximately 12,000 acres.

(c) Employment possibilities - It is estimated that 200 men can be employed this fall and winter on the construction of parts of the roadway; that 200 men can be employed annually for six months' period in wood making and thinning of forest growth.

(d) Cost - The estimated cost over a period of three years is approximately $750,000. $125,000 of this is for the purchase of land. Approximately $300,000 is for labour for the construction of the roadway, and the balance for the silvi cultural treatment of the wooded land, over a period of three years, all of which would be for labour. The estimated cost of the project for 1936-37, including the purchase of the 12,000 acres, is $280,000. It is estimated that 6,000 cords

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of wood can be cut in pertuity from the land to be purchased, and that a profit of $6,000 a year can be made from the wood. This would represent a return of 4% on the $150,000 needed to purchase this land.

2. Endorsement by the National Employment Commission:

On August the 24th the Employment Commission formally recommended to the Minister of Labour that the scheme be included in the government's programme and that $750,000. be set aside for it.

3. Urgency of Problem:

If another year's destruction of the woods is to be prevented, and employment in the area afforded, this winter, action must be taken immediately. No specific vote was passed by Parliament for the purpose; it might, however, be possible through agreement with the Quebec Government, on the score that the project would afford employment in the Hull area, to use Vote No. 335 - "$9,200,000 - amount required for new works to be undertaken in co-operation with the Provinces".

September 10th, 1936.

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COPY C119103

Ottawa, August 24, 1936.

REPORT

To: The Chairman and the Members of the National Employment Commission.

Subject: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme, submitted by the Federal District Commission, through the Chairman, Mr. W.E. Matthews.

From: Alan Chambers, Chairman, Youth Employment Committee.

The above proposal, summarized into a communication to the National Employment Commission, dated August 24th, 1936, was referred to me for investigation and a second opinion, by Commissioner McLean, after he had looked into the matter himself.

At the earliest opportunity I obtained the file in regard to this matter and after carefully perusing it, I met Mr. G.A. Mulloy, Assistant Chief, Research Division, Dominion Forestry Service of the Department of the Interior, and Mr. Percy Sparkes of the Federal Woodlands Preservation League, the first for consultative purposes and the second to hear arguments in support of the proposal by the Federal Woodlands Preservation League. Mr. Sparkes argued the undertaking of the Project on two grounds:

1. That the Project, by reason of the annual yield of cordwood could be classified as self-liquidating, and

2. That if the present uncontrolled cutting of cordwood were allowed to continue without the proper supervision, this woodland area would be destroyed and the water supply from its streams seriously affected by denuding.

The same afternoon, I proceeded with Mr. Cram, the Secretary of the Federal District Commission, and Mr. Hay, Consulting Engineer to the Federal District Commission, to the scene of the proposed Project,

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covering the full length of the area which it is proposed to expropriate and make into a Federal District Commission Park area, by car.

From evidence submitted and from personal observations, there can be no doubt that the present methods of cutting will result in the rapid destruction of this area, both as a beauty spot and as a means of income. There is also no doubt in my own mind from observations and from the relief maps submitted, that should this Project be undertaken and completed, that the proposed roadway along the ridge of the Gatineau Hills, providing as it does, a magnificent view for a number of miles of the water sheds of the Ottawa River and the Gatineau River, would provide, under the Federal District Commission, a distinctly valuable asset to the attractions of the Capital, not only as a beauty spot but also for the better enjoyment of winter sports by both visitors and inhabitants of the Capital.

While, in my estimation, these angles of the Project are of prime importance, from the point of view of the National Employment Commission the question of the labour which would be utilized on this Project is of paramount importance.

The estimated cost of the Project over a period of say three years, is approximately $750,000 of which all but $125,000 would be spent for labour. The item of $125,000 is for the purchase of twelve thousand acres of woodland from the present owners at the approximate rate of $10.00 per acre. The remaining $650,000 of the required appropriation would be spent on the two main developments on the acquired property, which are:

1. The construction of a twenty foot wide gravelled road, thirty miles in length, along the ridge of the area at a cost of approximately $300,000 or $10,000 a mile, the greatest part of which would be labour, and

2. The silvicultural treatment of twelve thousand acres over a period of three years, practically all of which cost would be labour.

The number of men to be employed upon these two sides of development of this Project would depend in large measures upon the season of the year and the policy settled upon, that is to say: if it were the intention to push the completion of the road before undertaking silvicultural operations, less men would be employed per

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dollar at the outset. On the other hand, were the silvicultural operations to be undertaken first, or in conjunction with the road construction, more men could be employed per dollar.

I would recommend the proposal to employ only persons on relief or in extremely necessitous circumstances in the Hull District generally.

After looking carefully into the proposal, as requested by Commissioner McLean, I would recommend as follows:

1. That the National Employment Commission approve the Project and request the Minister of Labour to set aside $750,000 for carrying it out.

2. That the administration of this Project be under the direct supervision of, and direction of, the Federal District Commission and that the moneys to carry out this Project, as appropriated, be turned over to, and expended only through, the Federal District Commission.

3. That available staffs of the Federal District Commission, of the Quebec Department of Lands and Forests, and of the Forestry Service Branch of the Federal Department of the Interior, be called upon to co-operate in carrying out this Project so as to reduce the administration cost to the absolute minimum, thereby ensuring at the same time, that the most expert advice is obtained and yet the greatest amount of ordinary labour, per dollar expended, is employed.

4. That the employees be taken from the Hull District generally, and be selected by the Quebec Relief Officials charged with the administration of relief in this particular area, acting with and under the supervision of a designated officer of the Federal District Commission.

5. That so far as is possible, the following regulations be complied with, in the selection and employment, of all men upon this Project:-

(a) Preference to be given to married men.

(b) Length of period in receipt of public relief to be a governing factor in employment.

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6. That wages be at the rate of 25¢ an hour for an eight hour day and that men be transported from a central point, to, and from, the work in hand, and be not resident other than in their own homes.

7. That the supervising engineer of the Federal District Commission, upon approving the selection by the Quebec Authorities of an employee, shall then have full jurisdiction during working hours over the conduct and work of the employee and, if in the opinion of this official for the time being, it be that the employee is not fulfilling his duties properly and adequately, the said official may, upon his authority alone, cause the said employee to be dismissed and obtain another employee from the same source. Further that any employee so discharged be not eligible for re-employment on this Project.

8. As the whole of the necessary silvicultural operations on this Project are of a winter nature, I would recommend to the National Employment Commission that should they approve of this Project, the necessary action be taken immediately as the work could be commenced this Autumn.

N.B. In discussing the moneys necessary for the completion of this project, I pointed out to the officers of the Federal District Commission that the only objection that I could fine to the scheme from the point of view of the National Employment Commission was, that in the first year's expenditures only 41% of the total appropriation of $280,000 was for labour. This seemingly disproportionate ratio is due, however, to the fact that although this is a three year Project and mainly a winter Project, wherein, in my opinion its great value lies, there is no question that it is unavoidably necessary to purchase the full twelve thousand acres under consideration at the outset of the scheme which causes the disproportion between what might be termed labour expenditure and capital expenditure, and although it will be necessary therefore, in the first year's appropriation to expend between $120,000 and $125,000 for the purchase of the twelve thousand acres, nevertheless it is unquestionably necessary that this be done at the beginning.

For the purpose of the whole three year project, however, (although this sum of money must be paid at the outset) it should be charged in the cost of the scheme over a period of three years.

May I take this opportunity of pointing out that it would

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be advisable if the National Employment Commission were to request the Federal District and its associates not to make public, as they have been doing, any details of schemes which they are about to propose to the National Employment Commission, until they have been considered by the National Employment Commission. One of the main reasons for this is that, as in the case of this Project, the Gatineau Park Development Scheme, undue publicity was given to the proposals before they were submitted to the National Employment Commission, as a result of which there is no doubt in my mind that there are a number of the land holders who, if they had not been warned that this proposal might be approved and their land purchased, would have been prepared to sell their land at a lower price than will not probably prove to be the case.

Sgd. Alan Chambers

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FEDERAL DISTRICT COMMISSION

W.E. Matthews, Chairman
H.R. Cram, B.Sc., Secretary
A. Chevrier, Asst. Secretary

Alan K. Hay, A.M.E.I.C.,
Consulting Engineer
A. Stuart, Superintendent

Ottawa, July 16th, 1936

Arthur B. Purvis, Esq.,
Chairman,
National Employment Commission,
Ottawa.

Dear Sir,

Re: Proposed development of a National Parkway in the Gatineau district adjacent to Ottawa as an unemployment project.

In the plans and proposals for the beautification and improvement of Ottawa and environs in connection with its ultimate development as the Capital city of Canada, the creation of a National parkway in the Gatineau hills adjacent to Ottawa to embrace forests, lakes, paths for hikers, scenic drives, wild animal life, etc. was suggested as early as in 1903 by the late Sir Wilfred Laurier. In 1915 the Federal Plan Commission appointed by the Dominion Government to submit a plan for the development of Ottawa and Hull and district, pointed out the importance of this project and strongly recommended its adoption. And in 1935 the late Dominion Administration in response to decided public opinion, that the forest cover of these hills was being ruthlessly destroyed and hillsides permanently disfigured and scarred almost at the doorstep of the Federal Capital, carried out a field investigation and survey in this district to determine full data of forest cover, soil conditions, land ownership, etc.

In view of the foregoing the Federal District Commission at its meeting on the 10th instant unanimously decided to recommend hereby,-

That the Dominion Government should create a national parkway in the Gatineau district adjacent to Ottawa, and that the initial stages in connection with its development should be commenced this fall by the Federal District Commission as an unemployment project under the purview of the National Employment Commission, as the nature of

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the work which would be furnished thereby is precisely the kind needed to provide for the class of men in the Ottawa and Hull districts who are most in need of it, particularly during the winter seasons.

Scope and description of project.

The project involves the extension of the parkway system of the Commission from its present northerly terminus at the Champlain Bridge and Aylmer Road, Quebec, to the hills and mountains commencing in the vicinity of Fairy Lake, thence following, in so far as is practicable, the skyline thereof to a point near Masham whence it will branch right to the Gatineau river and highway at Wakefield and left to the Ottawa river and highway in the vicinity of Eardley. The attached key plan indicates its location with reference to Ottawa and Hull; the land affected being coloured green and the driveway in red.

The project shown on the plan embraces a range of beautiful mountains and lakes and might be considered as the first unit to be developed in the possible future development of additional units in the area of 75,000 to 100,000 acres of park land, which is largely contained in the province of Quebec within a radius of 20 miles from Ottawa.

The length of this projected parkway is approximately 35 miles, and the two highway loops each of about 60 miles that would result would afford unexcelled scenic drives and furnish magnificent vistas of the beautiful Gatineau and Ottawa river valleys that are largely inaccessible at present.

It is estimated that the road making proper could be carried out for $350,000.00 to provide a gravel surface twenty feet wide.

The Commission considers that the development of this project as an unemployment scheme is one deserving of full and sympathetic consideration by the National Employment Commission for the Dominion Government, as the class of work entailed in its construction is of exactly the nature most suitable to the type of men in this district who are suffering from lack of employment. It will be apparent also from particulars hereinafter set forth that this project differs from the ordinary unemployment scheme wherein capital is expended on public works only to have established recurring financial obligations, in that definite annual returns may be expected in the immediate future that will provide reasonable interest on the investment, and that from indirect returns in the course of a few years that the full outlay will be more than returned to the taxpayers.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

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CANADA

C 119110

Scope and description of project (cont'd.)

To preserve and protect the beauty of the wooded hillsides contained in the proposed parkway and to maintain it in all its natural attractiveness, it is considered essential that an area of approximately 12,000 acres, shown coloured green on the attached map, be purchased immediately. It is estimated that this will cost approximately $150,000.00. The land immediately adjoining this area to the north-west need not, it is felt, be acquired at present as a considerable portion of it is held in private estates and maintained in its natural state by two or three land owners. Where the right of way for the driveway lies outside of the area recommended for immediate purchase, it is believed as has been found to obtain in similar circumstances, that the owners will gladly donate the small areas required when the location does not follow existing highways.

Employment possibilities.

(a) Road making:

It is estimated that 200 men can be profitably employed this fall and winter on such parts of the roadway as will be ready for construction at that time.

(b) Wood cutting and silvicultural operations on lands to be purchased for parkway:

It is estimated by the Forest Service, Department of Interior, that 200 men can be employed annually for a six-months period - October to March - in wood making and thinning of forest growth on the area to be purchased, and that 6,000 cords of hardwood fuel will be available annually for disposal as a result thereof.

Estimated cost of project for 1936-37.

(a) Wages:

(1)	Road making - 200 men @ 25 cents per hour - 8 hour day - 6 months period (24-day month) October to March	$ 57,600.00
(2)	Wood cutting and thinning: 200 men @ 25 cents per hour - 8 hour day - 6 months period (24-day month) October to March ...	57,600.00
	Total forward	$115,200.00

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Estimated cost of project for 1936-37 (cont'd)

	Note - The Department of Labour might set a higher hourly rate of pay.	Forward $ 115,200.00
(b)	Land purchase; Approximately 12,000 acres	150,000.00
(c)	Supervision, legal expenses, etc. Salaries of foresters, draftsmen, lawyers, transportation of workers, etc.	15,000.00
		$ 280,200.00

Public benefits of project.

(a) Summer:

It would provide beautiful scenic motor drives, paths for pedestrians and equestrians, public picnic grounds and bathing beaches and unlimite d attractions generally for tourists.

(b) Winter:

Nature has dealt so generously with the Federal Capital and environs that it is not difficult to believe in the development of this project that Ottawa will become the leading centre for winter sports in North America. Motorists would be enabled to enjoy the beauties of the forests under winter conditions from well maintained driveways, and to reach conveniently in this range of mountains locations where winter sports are being engaged in.

(c) The protection of the existing forest cover and the reforestation of the denuded hillsides will conserve the water resources of the portions of the watersheds affected, and prevent erosion of hillsides and cultivated lands by the too rapid run-off of precipitation; will prevent wells and other sources of water supply from drying up and will tend to regulate the flow of tributary streams of the Ottawa and Gatineau rivers within the compass of the proposed development.

(d) It will lower the forest fire hazards by supervised control of wood cutting operations in this district.

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C119112

Estimated revenue from project.

From the appeal that such a Parkway would have it is adjudged by competent authorities that tourist traffic - summer and winter - would be stimulated in this district to the extent that at least an additional $100,000.00 in indirect returns would reach the pockets of the taxpayers. It is believed in a few years time that the total of the indirect returns from this project would exceed the capital expenditure.

In addition there is a definite annual revenue that would be available from the cutting of fuel wood off certain sections of the 12,000 acres which are essential for the proper development of the Parkway. It is estimated by the Forest Service that 6,000 cords of wood can be cut in perpetuity from the land to be purchased, and that a profit of $6,000.00 can be made in disposing of this wood at the roadside. On this basis there would be the very favourable annual return of 4% on the outlay of say $150,000.00 for the purchase of the land that forms an integral part of the Parkway.

The nature of the annual financial returns to be expected from this project would seem to place it in a preferred class for consideration as an unemployment scheme as above referred to.

Suggestions as to name of Parkway.

In 1937 occurs the 100th anniversary of the birth of national unity between Upper and Lower Canada. It is also the 100th anniversary of the accession of Queen Victoria to the throne who selected Ottawa as the Federal Capital. The same year will witness the coronation of King Edward VIII. In this connection it has been suggested that these salient historic events so closely linked with the development of Canada, might be commemorated in naming this Park and Parkway "Gatineau National Memorial Parkway". Alternately there is the suggestion of naming it in honour of King George V. as the "King George National Memorial Parkway".

Federal District Commission control.

To permit the Federal District Commission to purchase the lands required and to expend money on their development and on the construction of driveways, it will be necessary, presumably, to obtain the approval of the Governor in Council under the provisions of the Federal District Commission Act 1927 and amending act of 1928.

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C 119113

Any expropriation of lands by the Commission in this area will, it seems, require the co-operation of the Province of Quebec.

Any further details required will be gladly furnished.

Yours faithfully,

Sgd. W.E. Matthews.
Chairman.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 119114
Federal Districts Commission
Employment - Nat'l Employment Comm.
304
Vol 4

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Memorandum for file.

Re - Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

This subject was considered in Council on September the 10th.

The Prime Minister drew to the attention of the Cabinet the fact that he had carefully avoided making any recommendation on this subject because of the circumstance that he owned property at Kingsmere and did not wish to appear to be personally interested on that account. It was pointed out to the Prime Minister that if the scheme were proceeded with there might be some objection on his part arising out of regulations which it might be necessary to lay down, in the event of any of the district being regarded as in the nature of a park area. To this Mr. King replied that he would gladly submit to any regulations which were advisable or necessary.

It was decided that the National Employment Commission should take the matter up with the Quebec Government with a view to ascertaining whether the latter would be prepared to accept the scheme as one which might be carried out in cooperation between the Dominion and Quebec Governments.

If such cooperation is forthcoming, Council is agreeable to the scheme being proceeded with at the earliest possible date this Fall.

September 11, 1936

E.A. PICKERING

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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FILE: E.A. PICKERING TO WLMK.
Federal District Commission
Employment - Nat'l Employment Commission

C 119115

Copies - Mr. MacLachlan, Labour Dept.
Mr. Purvis, National Employment Commission.

Confidential **Ottawa, September 14th, 1936.**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

Before leaving the city, Friday night, the Prime Minister asked me to let his colleagues, generally, and the Acting Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Labour in particular, know that he was genuinely interested in the scheme and would appreciate everything possible being done to further it. Having in mind the possibility of criticism, on the score that the Prime Minister owned property in the district to be developed, Mr. King feels that it is particularly desirable to have the project undertaken while he is out of the country. It will be recalled that this scheme had its origin in the activities of the Federal Woodlands League, at the organization meeting of which the present Prime Minister made a speech. Mr. Bennett, the Prime Minister, made special provision for the surveys, without which the project would not be possible. Mr. King's final comment on the subject was that "this whole matter is very near my heart".

For your information I attach a copy of a memorandum which, on the direction of the Prime Minister, I have prepared for our records, relating to the discussion in Council, on September the 10th, on this subject, and a memorandum which I prepared for the Prime Minister, on the same date, enclosing a summary of the scheme.

As the Employment Commission is meeting this afternoon, and as there is a possibility of representatives of the Quebec Government coming to Ottawa, tomorrow, to discuss their unemployment works programme with the Federal Government, I have, this afternoon, in your absence and in the absence of the Acting Minister of Labour, given a copy of my present memorandum, and a copy of the memorandum re the discussion in Council, to Mr. Purvis. I have also sent copies of these memoranda to Mr. MacLachlan.

EAP/MBR

E. A. P.
E. A. PICKERING.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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FILE : E. A. PICKERING TO C 119116 P. 304 vl. 4

Federal District Com.
Employment - Nat'l Emp. Com.

Memorandum for the Acting Prime Minister:

Re Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

Mr. Rogers' secretary telephoned to me this morning to say that the Quebec Minister of Labour was not interested in including the Gatineau scheme in the Quebec programme of relief works. I understand Mr. Dickson is coming to discuss the whole programme with you this morning.

Mr. Maclachlan has put forward a suggestion which you may wish to discuss with Mr. Dickson. In the ordinary course, if the Quebec Government accepted the project, the cost (for the fiscal year 1936-37 - $280,000) would be divided between the Dominion and Quebec Governments. Mr. Maclachlan puts forward for discussion the possibility of the Dominion offering $75,000 out of the emergency labour estimate, which would not be matched by an equal sum from Quebec. This would leave approximately $205,000 to be divided between the Dominion and Quebec. The Dominion's share would, therefore, be $17~~9~~,500, and Quebec's share, $102,500. The granting of this extra amount might be justified on the score that this is really a Federal District Commission enterprise.

E.A.P.

E. A. PICKERING.

September 16, 1936.

EAP/MP

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Federal District Com.
Employment - National Emp. Com.

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

C119117

September 17th, 1936.

For Fyle:

Re: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme.

Mr. MacLachlan tells me he was informed by Dr. Clark, this morning, that the only possible chance of purchasing land for this scheme would be to use funds out of Vote 336 "$500,000, amount to provide for unforeseen contingencies". Of this, $170,000 has been definitely set aside; the balance is being saved to supplement the Vote for the Farm Placement Scheme.

E. A. P.
E.A. DICKERING.

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FILE: E. A. PICKERING TO WLMK C119118
✓ Federal Districts Comm.
✓ Employment - Nat'l Emp. Service P. 304
K. 4

Ottawa, September 17th, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

Mr. MacLachlan tells me that Mr. Hereford has ascertained that Mr. Tremblay was not aware of the fact that Mr. Purvis had asked Mr. Duplessis to include this scheme in the Quebec programme. Mr. Hereford believes that Mr. Tremblay will discuss the matter in Quebec, today, with Mr. Duplessis, and may on his return, tomorrow, be willing to include the scheme. If such is the case it will be possible to finance it and commence it this fall.

E. A. PICKERING

EAP/MGR

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

C 119119
see P. 304
1936

Confidential

Memorandum for the Prime Minister

Re - Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme

I followed this matter up carefully with Mr. Lapointe, as well as Mr. Maclachlan and Mr. Purvis, who asked me to see him about it. I think every appropriate effort was made to have the Quebec authorities include this as an item in their relief programme. Had they done so it would have been possible for the Dominion Government to provide funds for it. There was, unfortunately, no other way in which money could be found. The Quebec people were simply not interested and Mr. Lapointe thought it undesirable to press them in the matter.

Mr. Moore has told me that the Employment Commission propose to bring the matter again to the attention of the Minister of Labour. Mr. Maclachlan has informed me that Mr. Rogers will see that the matter is again brought up in Council with the end in view that the necessary funds be voted in the estimates. While being a special project to aid employment, it may be desirable to vote the funds to the Federal District Commission and give the undertaking over completely to it.

Mr. Lapointe and Mr. Purvis appreciated the desirability of beginning the scheme, if possible, while you were away in order to avoid any embarrassment on the score of the Kingsmere association. For the same reason, Mr. Lapointe told me that if the matter came up in Council again he would be glad to sponsor it.

E. A. P.

November 4th, 1936
EAP/PM

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

C 119120

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

November 10th, 1936.

For Mr. King:

Mr. Boulanger's letter may serve to re-open the Gatineau proposal, although it is more likely that he is unaware of the fact that the matter was considered, and turned down, by the Quebec government.

E. A. P.

EAP/MGR

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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Employment - National Employment Commission
Federal District Commission

C 119121 304 bl 4

E-302 INT

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, February 22nd, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re Gatineau Parkway Scheme

The position regarding the Gatineay Parkway Scheme is that the Minister of Labour has recommended the inclusion, in the special supplementary estimates, of an item to be administered by the Federal District Commission. Mr. Dunning subsequently asked for an opportunity to discuss with you, this and other proposed Federal District Commission appropriations.

E. A. P.
E. A. PICKERING

Read by Mr King
Feb. 22/37

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C 119122

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

March 2nd, 1937.

For Mr. King:

Paul Horsdal telephoned to say that this weekend he had been up beyond Kingsmere and found the wood cutting, this winter, shocking beyond description. He said that a very fine stand of old pine, located to the west of the Ridge Road, about three-quarters of a mile from the Lake, had been completely wiped out. He estimates over 200,000 board feet have been slashed away. The timber stood most conspicuously on a height of land, near which the proposed parkway would run. Mr. Horsdal told me that another winter like this would serve pretty much to destroy any scenic or timber value in that area of the country.

E. A. P.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

C 119123

MEMORANDUM

March 4th, 1937.

Memorandum dated September 10th, 1936,
re Proposed Gatineau Parkway Scheme,
taken from fyle by Mr. Pickering.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C (119124) 119124

P-300 Dup see P-304 1937

Copy

FEDERAL DISTRICT COMMISSION

F. E. Bronson, Chairman
H. R. Cram, B.Sc., Secretary,
A. Chevrier, Ass't Secretary

Alan K. Hay, A.M.E.I.C.
Consulting Engineer
A. Stuart, Superintendent

Fyle #190

Ottawa, March 5, 1937.

Honourable C. A. Dunning, P.C.,
Minister, Department of Finance,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Sir:

Re: Proposed development of a National Parkway in the Gatineau Valley adjacent to Ottawa.

In the plans and proposals for the beautification and improvement of Ottawa and environs in connection with its ultimate development as the Capital City of Canada, the creation of a national parkway in the Gatineau Hills adjacent to Ottawa to embrace forests, lakes, paths for hikers, scenic drives, wild animal life, etc., was suggested as early as 1903 to the late Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In 1915 the Federal Plan Commission appointed by the Dominion Government to submit a plan for the development of Ottawa and Hull and district pointed out the importance of this project and strongly recommended its adoption. And in 1935 the government of the day, in response to decided public opinion that the forest cover of these hills was being ruthlessly destroyed and hillsides permanently disfigured and scarred almost at the doorstep of the Federal Capital, carried out a field investigation and survey in this district to determine full data of forest cover, soil conditions, land ownership, etc. Furthermore, the development of this national parkway would form a very desirable and logical extension of the present system of parkways that have been constructed by the Federal District Commission since 1900 in the beautification of the Federal Capital and adjoining areas.

In view of the foregoing the Federal District Commission at its meeting on July 10, 1936, unanimously decided to recommend that the Dominion Government should create a national parkway in the Gatineau District adjacent to Ottawa and that the initial stages of its development should be undertaken by the Federal District Commission as soon as possible.

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C119125

Scope and Description of the Project

The project involves the extension of the parkway system of the Commission from its present westerly terminus at the Champlain Bridge and Aylmer Road, Quebec, to the hills and mountains commencing in the vicinity of Fairy Lake, thence following, in so far as is practicable, the skyline thereof to a point near Masham whence it will branch right to the Gatineau river and highway at Wakefield and left to the Ottawa river and highway in the vicinity of Eardley. The attached key plan indicates its location with reference to Ottawa and Hull, the land affected being coloured green and the driveway in red. A further plan herewith shows in colour the classification of the wooded lands which it is desired to preserve.

The project shown on the plan embraces a range of beautiful mountains and lakes and might be considered as the first unit to be developed in the possible future development of additional units in the area of 75,000 to 100,000 acres of park land, which is largely contained in the province of Quebec within a radius of twenty miles from Ottawa.

The length of this projected parkway is approximately thirty-five miles, and this, in conjunction with existing provincial highways, will furnish two loops each of about sixty miles. They would afford unexcelled scenic drives and furnish magnificent vistas of the beautiful Gatineau and Ottawa river valleys that are largely inaccessible at present.

To preserve and protect the beauty of the wooded hillsides included in the proposed parkway and to maintain it in all its natural attractiveness, it is considered essential that an area of approximately 12,000 acres contained in the block coloured green on the attached map be purchased. The land adjoining this area to the north-west need not, it is felt, be acquired at present as a considerable portion of it (approximately 4,500 acres) is held in private estates and maintained in its natural state by two or three land owners. It is not altogether unlikely that these large privately held estates may some day be transferred to the Dominion as gifts in trust. Where the right-of-way for the driveway lies outside of the area recommended for purchase, it is believed, as has been found to obtain in similar circumstances, that the owners will gladly donate the small areas required when the location does not follow the existing highways.

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C119126

Estimated Cost

It is estimated that the cost of purchasing the land above referred to (approximately 12,000 acres) and of making the necessary engineering surveys and investigations in connection with the locating of the proposed driveway will amount to approximately $800,000. As the acquiring of all the land parcels affected will entail considerable time, it is thought that not more than $100,000 would be required in the fiscal year 1937-38. The latter amount would be sufficient, it is considered, to obtain early control of the more important wooded lands from the point of view of forest conservation and to provide the necessary funds for the surveys.

Recommendation

To prevent the ruthless destroying of the forest cover on the hills at the very doorstep of the Federal Capital and to check a situation that would result in a man-made desert, the project herein outlined is strongly recommended and, accordingly, application is hereby made for the necessary approval thereof by the Governor in Council under the provisions of the Federal District Commission Act.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd) Frederic E. Bronson

Chairman.

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Federal Districts Com-
Employment - Nat'l Emp. Com. P. 304

C 119127

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, March 17th, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Gatineau Parkway

As instructed by you I spoke to Mr. Lapointe and Mr. Dunning about this matter. At Mr. Lapointe's suggestion I asked Mr. Bronson to re-submit the proposal as a scheme to be carried out entirely as a Federal District Commission enterprise. Mr. Bronson was able to establish two helpful features:

(1) that the cost for the scheme, for the fiscal year 1937-38 could be reduced to $100,000; (Estimated total cost $750,000)

(2) that the Federal District Commission Act vested in the Commission the necessary powers to expropriate land without co-operation by the Quebec Legislature.

Mr. Lapointe brought the matter up for discussion in Council. The general opinion was that to proceed with the scheme would expose you to criticism on the score that the Parkway was to enhance your own Kingsmere property, unjustifiable as this line of comment would be. Mr. Lapointe suggests that you introduce the matter for further consideration on your return.

Shall I give these papers to you for Council?

E. A. P.

E. A. PICKERING.

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file C 119128

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FOR COUNCIL: April 3rd, 1937.

SUBJECT: Gatineau Parkway

REMARKS: For consideration in connection with Supplementary Estimates.

CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL: April 3rd, 1937.

ACTION TAKEN: Council decided not to include item in Supplementary Estimates.

DISPOSED OF:

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C 119129

Miscellaneous Data re Early Development of Ottawa.

(Compiled from "The Charm of Ottawa", by Blodwen Davies, and "Ottawa, Past and Present" by A. H. D. Ross).

Ottawa started out to be three settlements, two of them laid out in the fall of 1826, and the third developed a few years later. Upper Town, west of Parliament Hill, was the residential district; Lower Town, east of the canal, was there the working people lived; and New Edinburgh, east of the Rideau River, was where Thomas MacKay set up something like a feudal state. There were natural barriers between these settlements - New Edinburgh was separated from Lower Town by the Rideau River; Lower Town from Upper Town not merely by the canal, but more effectively by Parliament Hill, or, as it was then called, Barrack Hill, which was kept mostly in its original wildnerness as the site of proposed fortifications. The only access from Upper to Lower Town was the roadway over the hill that led to Sapper's Bridge across the canal. (During the 85 year period between 1827 and 1912, the Sapper's Bridge ((constructed by the Royal Sappers and Miners)) connected Rideau Street, first with "the foot path that curved round the base of Barrack Hill and the Old Graveyard to the corner of Wellington and Bank Streets" and, since 1849, with the east end of Sparks Street. Previous to this, Sparks Street extended only from Bronson Avenue to Bank Street - the part between Bank Street and the Sapper's Bridge being a bleak and desolate hill abounding with boulders. In 1872, James Goodwin was the contractor for the widening of the Sapper's Bridge and in 1873 a steel structure known as the Duffering Bridge was built a short distance north of it, to connect Rideau and Wellington Street, and to lessen the traffic over Sapper's Bridge.

In the middle of the century, in the face of uninterrupted peace, the idea of fortification was given up. "After receiving Lord Dalhousie's instructions to lay out and lease lots for the erection of buildings, one of By's first acts was to reserve what is now known as Parliament Hill, because he felt certain that it would be required some day for the erection of public buildings. For many years, it was known as "Barrack Hill" because the military barracks and hospital were located there. His faith in the future of the town was also shown by his payment of £1,200 for the McQueen estate - bounded by Laurier Avenue, the Rideau River, Somerset Street, and Bronson Avenue". ①

The Rideau Canal was built as a military canal, and was maintained by British troops for purposes of defence. It was begun in 1826. "Colonel By sailed from Quebec in the summer of 1826. The inauguration of the canal was considered so important that Lord Dalhousie decided to accompany Colonel By up the Ottawa so that he could be on the spot when final plans were adopted, and no time would

① Ottawa. Past & Present. Pages 89-90

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C 119130

be lost in setting to work. When the steamer from Grenville tied up at the dock at Hull with the viceregal flag flying, most of the eleven hundred population of Wright's township were down by the shore to give the party a royal welcome. The Lord of the Manor of Hull, the lean, weatherbeaten Philomen Wright, was there to greet them. Impatient to begin, the newcomers, once they had settled their party at the Columbia Inn, set out up the River to look the wild scene over ..... As they walked along the river edge and looked across to the palisades of the south shore, each had an extraordinary vision. Not only could they see the mounting locks that would carry ships up over the height of land to the waters beyond, not only did they see a town, with slender spires among the tree tops and roads across the grey locks of the bold headlands, but they each and all dreamed of the day when that tree-covered promontory, still in its primeval state, would be the capital of a nation. It is strange that here and there in scattered memoirs and records we can trace the fact that each of these men, at different times, individually conceived the notion that the capital to be would be in the Basin of the Chaudiere".

The first thing definitely agreed upon was that a bridge across the Ottawa must be built as the initial step toward the canal. The entire route lay through a swampy wilderness and some better means than a ferry-boat service across the Ottawa River had to be found before supplies of food, fodder, and equipment could be transported from Hull to the scene of operations, Colonel By and Philomen Wright suggested the bridging of the Ottawa River at the Chaudiere Falls, a plan which was heartily endorsed by the Earl of Dalhousie. The series of bridges over the Chaudiere today cover the sites of the bridges begun in 1826 and completed the following year, after which work was commenced on the canal.

"Ottawa today has to thank Colonel By that the town which was born out of the construction camp was blessed with wide streets and public spaces. Everything north of Wellington Street he reserved for public buildings. Wellington Street was named, of course, for the man who interested himself in the building of the canal, the Great Duke. Sussex bore the name of By's own homeland, George, York, and Clarence for royal Dukes, and Dalhousie for the Governor.

Some years before the canal was begun, the government had purchased the front lots, comprising all that lies between Richmond Landing, and the Rideau River, and between Wellington and Rideau Streets and the Ottawa. South of Wellington Street was another grant which was lying idle when Nicholas Sparks purchased it early in 1826. The chief street, paralleling Wellington Street, he named for himself, Sparks Street. Sparks immediately had his lands surveyed. The big

(2) Cham of Ottawa - P. 79-81
(3) " " " P. 94

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stone bluff overlooking Le Breton flats, where Sparks Street ended, was laid out for the homes of wealthy merchants, and Sparks set aside enough land for a church. (Now Christ Church Cathedral). The next streets south of Sparks Street were named, in due time, Queen and Albert for the young Victoria and her Prince Consort, and Kent Street for the young queen's father. Anyone who had the least pretense to social standing settled west of the Hill on government lots or Sparks' new streets. The poorer classes settled in Lower Town across the canal.

The first man to build a cabin on the actual site of Ottawa was an Englishman, John Burrows Honey. Sometime about 1819, he built a log cabin on the heights above the Chaudiere in the vicinity of Lyon and Wellington Streets of today.

In 1823, the Earl of Dalhousie took an active part in forwarding the Rideau Canal project, when he purchased from Hugh Fraser, the property now bounded by the Ottawa River and Cathcart Street, the Rideau River, Rideau and Wellington Streets and Bronson Avenue "as a proper place for a depot for such stores as may hereafter be transported through the country by this route".

In Upper Town, Colonel By persuaded Nicholas Sparks (about 1828) to donate a strip of land 66 feet wide to form Wellington Street and added a strip of 33 feet from "the Dalhousie property " - thus accounting for the unusual width of Wellington Street, and making it conform to Rideau Street. (4)

Following the influx of canal workers, a post office was opened on the north side of Rideau Street, between Mosgrove and William. Later, the office was moved to a site now known as 357 Wellington Street, where it remained until 1850. Then it was in a building on a part of the Russell House property, and later in a building erected by the postmaster. In 1876 it moved into its present quarters.

The most important figure in industrial Bytown was MacKay, who secured for himself a thousand acres of land just east of the Rideau River, which he planned to settle and develop. In 1837, he built himself a beautiful home and called it Rideau Hall. In 1868 Rideau Hall became the official residence of the Governor General. It was not until twenty years later that New Edinburgh was incorporated as Rideau Ward of the city of Ottawa. An old map of the city shows that the original intention was to build the Governor General's residence in Major Hill Park.

An Ordnance map of 1831 shows that Colonel By's house was about 160 feet from Entrance Bay, and that the north line of Murray Street ran through the centre of it. After his return from England, in 1832, Colonel By's house was occupied by Major Daniel Bolton; hence the name of the locality was changed from that of "Colonel's Hill" to that of "Major's Hill" and quite recently to that of Major Hill Park.

(4) Ottawa. Past & Present. P. 98

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In 1840, the land held in reserve since By's day (1827) for possible fortifications to protect the canal, was restored to its original owner, Nicholas Sparks. It was an important event, for Sparks extended Sparks Street from Bank Street to the canal and added a series of streets to the southward, so that now, for the first time, Upper Town and Lower Town were welded into one. The 140 acres consisted of low swale or swamp and a small wooden lock, and waste-weir, were constructed, the overflow going down Mosgrove Street, across Rideau to Dalhousie, diagonally across to the corner of York and Cumberland Streets, along York to King Edward Avenue, and northward along King Edward Avenue - thus accounting for the extra width of this avenue - to St. Andrew Street and thence into the Rideau River.

In 1842, the Bank of Montreal bought the Royal Exchange Hotel at 201 Wellington Street, where it transacted business for almost 80 years. In 1848, the year Bytown was incorporated as a Town, Sparks Street was opened up from Sapper's Bridge to Bank Street and Sussex Street was extended southward from Rideau Street to the Canal Basin.

In the last month of 1857, Victoria designated Ottawa as the capital of the United Canadas. The stone barracks that had stood for three decades on Barrack Hill were torn down and the erection begun of the series of buildings which were to house the Parliament of Canada. The plan was a great quadrangle. The principal building contained the two chambers, the House of Commons and the Senate. It stood along the brow of the cliff. To east and west were separate blocks of administrative offices. The fourth side was open to Wellington Street.

Ottawa,
August 14, 1937.

/D.

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Dupuis Ottawa.

C 119133

"Until 1828 the dead had to be ferried across the Ottawa River and buried on the Hull side, but in that year so many deaths occurred amongst the canal workers that half an acre of land between what are now Elgin and Metcalfe Streets (in the neighborhood of Sparks and Elgin Streets) was cleared and fenced in with a stockade of stout cedar posts about ten feet high, sharpened at the upper end, spiked to longitudinal stringers about two feet from the ground, and further secured by bands of strap iron nailed to them two feet from the top. This enclosed ground was divided into three parts, furnishing a graveyard apiece for the Presbyterians, Anglicans and Roman Catholics. Later on John Burrows established a fourth for the Methodists, but only a few bodies were ever buried there. By 1844, these cemeteries extended south and west so as to cover the ground enclosed by Sparks, Elgin, Albert and Metcalfe Streets". (Ottawa, Past and Present, Pages 101-102.)

"During the summer of 1828, Bouchette visited Bytown and thus describes its appearance. ""The streets are laid out with much regularity and of a liberal width that will hereafter co tribute to the convenience, salubrity and elegance of the place. The number of houses now built is about 150, most of which are constructed of wood; frequently in a style of neatness and taste that reflects great credit upon the inhabitants. On the elevated banks of the Bay, the Hospital, an extensive stone building, and three Barracks stand conspicuous; nearly on a level with them, and on the eastern side of the bay, is the residence of Colonel By, Commanding Royal Engineer at that station". (Ottawa, Past & Present, Page 98).

"After receiving Lord Dalhousie's instructions to lay out and lease lots for the erection of buildings, one of By's first acts was to reserve what is now known as "Parliament Hill" because he felt certain that it would be required some day for the erection of public buildings. For many years it was known as "Barrack Hill", because the military baraccks and hospital were located there". (Ottawa, Past & Present, Page 90).

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E.A.P.

Read & returned by Mr King Dec. 16/37.

Federal District Com.
Employment & National Employment Com.

C119134

P. 304
vol. 4

Ottawa, December 14, 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Federal Woodlands Preservation League.

Mr. R. P. Sparks has sent the attached memorandum which he thinks would be of interest to you.

Because of your immediate association with Kingsmere, Mr. Sparks has thought you would prefer his approaching Mr. Dunning direct, and seeking to enlist his support, rather than making representations to the Government through the Prime Minister.

E. A. P.

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Confidential

C119125

OFFICE OF THE P...

MEMORANDUM

Radio - CBC
The Press

May 13/38

R-901
vol. 18
(Confd)

Mr. Henry at 212 tonight

Norman Lambert suggests that it might be a useful gesture on the Prime Minister's part if he were to have a word with Geo. V. Ferguson (CBC Commentator) who is at the C.L. Room 459 today & tomorrow. Mr. Lambert thinks a word

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MIN

C119136

MEMORANDUM

with the chief wd. do much to remove any misunderstanding which may develop & which may become of political importance in view of Fergusons increasing share in control of editorial expression of Free Press.

(E. A. PICKERING)

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C119137

Honourable G. H. Ferguson

Date	Place	Occasion
1930		
Oct. 21.	London, England.	Opening of Ontario House.
" 24.	" "	Royal Empire Society - Luncheon.
Dec. 2.	Toronto, Ontario.	Annual Dinner of Provincial Conservative Association (an on occasion of 10th Anniversary of accession to leadership of party in Ontario).
Dec. 4.	Toronto, Ontario.	Second Annual Dinner of the Executive of The Technical Service Council. (Re Interference British politics).
Dec. 5.	Brampton, Ontario.	Peel County banquet in honour of Col. Thos. L. Kennedy, M.P.P. - appointment to Cabinet as Minister of Agriculture.
Dec. 16.	Kemptville, Ontario.	Statement re remarks as to telling England what to do when he got over there as High Commissioner had been misinterpreted.
Dec. 16.	Spencerville, Ontario.	Valedictory speech when resigning seat in Legislature.
Dec. 18.	Ottawa.	Sworn in as High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain.

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C119138

Date	Place	Occasion
1931		
Jan. 6.	Toronto, Ont.	Empire Club banquet.
Jan. 7.		British Government makes recommendation to His Majesty the King re: precedence of High Commissioner.
Jan. 7.	London, Ontario.	Farewell banquet by Conservative party of Ontario.
Jan. 9.	Toronto, Ontario.	Joint Annual Banquet of The Ontario Municipal Electrical Association and the Association of Municipal Electrical Utilities.
Jan. 14.		Sworn in as Privy Councillor.
Jan. 14.	Kemptville, Ont.	Public reception and presentation to Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson.
Jan. 19.	Toronto, Ontario.	Albany Club opening banquet.
Jan. 22.	"	Leaves Toronto for England.
Jan. 23.	Saint John,	Farewell message from Saint John.
Jan. 31.	Liverpool, Eng.	Arrived at Liverpool, England.
Feb. 10.	London, England.	Canada Club dinner.
Mar. 2.	"	Lyceum Club dinner.
Mar. 10.	"	Canadian Chamber of Commerce - Luncheon.
Mar. 12.	"	Tea with Their Majesties at Buckingham Palace.
Mar. 13.	"	Statement re: Ontario deficit.
Mar. 24.	"	Reception at Canada House in honour of new Governor General, Lord Bessborough.
Mar. 25.	"	Canada Club dinner in honour of new Governor General.

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C119139

Date	Place	Occasion
1931		
Mar. 26.	Rome, Italy.	Opening of Wheat Conference.
Mar. 29.	"	Wheat Conference - speech.
Mar. 31.	"	Wheat Conference - Motion re holding of further conference.
Apr. 20.	London, England.	Opening of Empire Shopping Week - Statement re trade treaties.
" 23.	"	Annual Dinner of British Chambers of Commerce.
" 27.	Leeds, "	Leeds Luncheon Club.
May 18.	London, "	Opening of Wheat Conference in London.
May 28.	Geneva.	Opening of International Labour Conference - Mr. Ferguson heading Canadian delegation.
July 1.	London, England.	Dominion Day Dinner.
" 18.	"	Statement re Beauharnois contributions.
" 20.	"	" " " "
Aug. 4.	Quebec, P. Q.	Statement re John Aird, Jr., and Ontario Hydro Commission.
" 4.	Arrival at Quebec.	
" 20.	York, England.	Introduction to special Canadian supplement of Yorkshire Post - re defined basis of trade relations between Great Britain and Canada.
" 28.	Toronto, Ontario.	Convention of Confederation Life Association.
" 29.	"	Canadian National Exhibition - directorate luncheon.
Sept. 4.	"	Banquet by City of Toronto in honour of Earl Jellicoe and members of the British Empire Service League.
" 11.	"	Luncheon - by Members of the Provincial Legislature.
" 25.	London, Ontario.	Degree of Doctor of Laws conferred by University of Western Ontario.

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C119140

Date	Place	Occasion
1931		
Sept. 25.	London, Ontario.	Joint Dinner Meeting of the London Women's and Men's Clubs.
" 26.	Toronto, "	Interview re "More Authority to Commissioner in Canada House".
Oct. 12.	Ottawa, "	Statement re new Order-in-Council giving control over all Canadian Government officials in United Kingdom.
" 13.	Toronto "	Interview on eve of departure for England.
" 20.	London, England.	Arrival - Statement re Empire trade agreement.
Nov. 4.	Manchester, "	Imperial Fruit Show - Luncheon.
" 14.	London, "	London District Institute of Journalists.

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C119141

Date	Place	Occasion
1932		
Mar. 21.	London, England.	Statement re: prospects of Ottawa conference.
Apr. 1.	Halifax, N. S.	Arrival on "Duchess of Athol".
" 3.	Toronto, Ontario.	Statement re "Importance of Imperial Economic Conference to be held in Ottawa July"
" 6.	Ottawa, "	Evidence before Senate Special Committee re Beauharnois.
" 20.	Toronto "	Gathering assembled under auspices of Empire Club.
" 24.	Montreal, Que.	Return to England on SS. "Montclare".
May 1.	Southampton, England.	Arrival.
" 16.	London, "	Interview - London Financial Times.
" 17.	" "	Statement re interview with Hubert Osborne - re leaning towards a U.S. Canadian connection.
Jul. 1.	London, "	Farewell Dinner to Delegates to Imperial Economic Conference.
Aug. 22.	Ottawa.	Speech opening Central Canada Exhibition.
Aug. 29.	Toronto.	Speech at Directors Luncheon, Candian National Exhibition.
Sept. 4.	Brantford, Ont.	Interview - re British trade and art of salesmanship.
Sept.12.	London, Ont.	Lunch - Western Ontario Exhibition.
Sept.13.	Oshawa, Ont.	Opening of Fair - Ontario Agricultural Society.
Oct. 29.	Duchess of Atholl (Returning to England after 2 month's visit to Canada).	To a representative of Canada he spoke of Canadian conditions and British trade.
Nov. 11.	London, England.	Interview to Financial Times re new $80 million internal loan in Canada and Ottawa Conference agreements.
October	Vol. V. No. 10.	Article entitled "The Aftermath of Ottawa in Oct. issue of 'The Commerce of the Nation' published in Montreal.

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C119142

Date	Place	Occasion
1932		
Nov. 3.	London, England.	Interview to representative of the Canadian Gazette.
Dec. 20.	" "	Private dinner pary in honour of Rt. Hon. R. B. Bennett, Prime Minister of Canada.
Dec. 21.	" "	Letter to London Times re position of Canada and payment of war debts.

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C119143

Date	Place	Occasion
1933		
Jan. 9.	London, England.	The Authors' Club.
Feb. 6.	" "	Denial of "Being at odds" with P.M.
Mar. 28.	" "	Denial of "Return to Ontario".
Apr. 15.	" "	Writing on Anglo-Canadian trade in the British Export Gazette.
Aug. 1.	" "	Canadian loan in England.
Aug. 17.	Quebec, P.Q.	On return to Canada - press interview re "Premiership ideas", etc.
Aug. 18.	Toronto, Ontario.	Press interview re visit and world conditions.
Aug. 18.	" "	The Globe interview re "Empire's Future".
Aug. 20.	Ottawa.	Tribute to work of P.M.
Aug. 21.	"	Central Canada Exhibition.
Sept. 5.	Toronto.	Canadian Club luncheon re "exporting system".
Sept.14.	London, Ontario.	Directors' luncheon at the Western Fair.
Sept.26.	Toronto.	Toronto Board of Trade, Young Men's Section, - Lunch meeting.
Sept.29.	"	Departure for England - Sept. 30.
Oct. 1.	Quebec.	En route to England.
Oct. 9.	London, England.	Interview to representative of "Canada".
Oct. 31.	"	Issue with British Board of Trade re documents sent to Moscow.

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C119144

Date	Place	Occasion
1934		
Jan. 10.	London, England.	Financial Times report re denial Canadian Government had agreed to reported scheme of British Government to restrict imports of Soviet timber to U.K.
Feb. 27.	"	Appointment as head of Imperial Economic Committee.
Mar. 1.	Birmingham, Eng.	British Industries Fair Luncheon - re Ottawa Agreements.
Apr. 11.	London.	British Luncheon Club - re Progress towards Empire co-operation.
Apr. 25.	"	Central Chamber of Agriculture - re stabilizing Empire's postion best way to recovery.
July 2.	"	Dominion Day reception and dinner.
July 9.	"	Exhibition of Canadian products - speech re desire of Canada to trade with Old Land.
Aug. 2.	Montreal.	Remarks upon arrival from England.
" 7.	Toronto.	Canadian Club - praising tenacity of the British.
" 31.	Ottawa.	Press interview - re political probe T.& N.O. Railway.
Sept. 5.	Toronto.	Canadian National Exhibition Luncheon - re great prospect for increasing Canadian trade in British market.
" 21.	Quebec.	Sailed "Empress of Australia" for England.
" 23.	Halifax.	Kiwanis lunnheon held aborad "Empress of Australia".
" 30.	Southampton.	Interview upon arrival.

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C119145

Date	Place	Occasion
1934		
Oct. 12.	London, Eng.	Sailed for Canada.
" 26.	London, Ontario.	Annual Dinner of the City of London Wholesale Linen Trade Association.
1935		
Jan. 2.	London, Eng.	New Year message.
Feb. 6.		Submission - British Board of Trade, re lumber contract between British firm and Russia.

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C119146

HIGH COMMISSIONER, LONDON

Ferguson, The Hon. G. Howard

Appointed High Commissioner by O.in C. of 28th Nov. 1930

(Date of Resignation as Premier of Ontario - 15th Dec/30)

Salary paid from 15th Dec/30 at $12,000 ($10,000 by Statute, $ 2,000 by O.in C.fr.Vote

Allowances paid from 1st January, 1931 to 31st March,1931:-

Living and Representation -	$5,000
House -	5,000
Car -	3,000

Allowance paid from 1st April, 1931 to 7th Nov., 1935, inc:-

House, Living and Representation and Car - $28,000

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C119147

Extract from London Free Press
March 4th, 1937.

Hon. G. Howard Ferguson speaks to
Canadian Club here.

"I am more pleased than I have ever been with the action of any Liberal Government by two acts of the present Ottawa administration," said Mr. Ferguson. "One is that the new trade agreements provide for increased trade with Great Britain. The other is the increase in defence estimates."

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C 119148

FIELDING

Extract from "THE STANDARD", Montreal, Saturday, July 20, 1935:
Article by Fred Yorston - "The Little Gray Man"

. . . . .

One of the last of Mr. Fielding's budgets, the delivery of which I was privileged to hear, was that of 1922.

. . . . .

Fielding Arrives.

Mr. Fielding has slipped into the House almost unnoticed and is at his seat by the time the cheers break out. There he is: members take a good look at him, because they well know they won't see many more like him in their time.

His Great Day.

There was not a moment lost. He had a big job ahead and he tackled it without delay. In one minute he and the Prime Minister had left their desks and had moved down to others more in the centre of the House: in another minute Mr. Fielding was on his feet, with the famous basket of fifteen former Budgets before him, fumbling with his glasses and bowing to the thunderous applause with which he was greeted.

The Finance Minister's voice, somewhat weak at first, doubtless with excitement and emotion, steadily gained strength and was heard clearly in all parts of the Chamber. At three-thirty-two he started his speech and he had concluded at four-forty-one in a hurricane of cheers, his voice becoming much louder when he delivered his peroration. The Prime Minister was all the while at his side and "fagged" for him inderatigably, arranging notes and keeping his basket of papers in order, retiring the documents used as the various sections of the speech finished.

Inspiring Spectacle.

Two considerations struck me forcibly as I heard Mr. Fielding that day deliver his Budget: I remembered the long sequence of years in which he annually told of abounding prosperity. If his performances were admirable during the Golden Age of Laurier, how much more to be admired was the spectacle of a statesman full of years and honors, after an absence of eleven years, during which the greatest of all wars had blasted mankind - how much more to be admired was theman, who, now beyond the allotted span of life, grappled bravely with deficits and falling revenues in an endeavour to inspire hope and courage in the breasts of his countrymen.

. . . . .

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C 119149

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

M-750-d
1936

MEMORANDUM

MR. KING:

Mr. Sullivan who saw you yesterday also saw me, and has sent me the attached letter, in which he mentions the Departments he would wish to interest in the production of his picture. He has also telephoned me this morning. I have told him that I can only act on instructions.

Is there anything you wish me to do in the matter?

HH

January 2nd 1936

Mr Henry:
Please pass on to Dr Skelton to deal with further.
[illegible]

1/3/36

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C 119150

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

DR. SKELTON:

I had a long talk with Frank Badgeley, of the Motion Picture Bureau, late yesterday afternoon, regarding this proposition. He told me that, in the light of his previous experience in such matters, there should be little difficulty in arranging for co-operation by the R. C. M. P., Meteorological Department and the Department of Indian Affairs. Mr. Sullivan would, of course, be expected to pay any expenses which might be incurred.

In so far as the bringing in of equipment is concerned, Mr. Badgeley said, in the past, there had been no difficulty, and that the Department had merely charged a nominal sum by way of duty, it being understood that the equipment could not be obtained in Canada, and would be taken out of the country as soon as it had served its purpose.

As to the requests affecting the National Parks Branch, and the Department of National Defence, it would appear to be a matter of policy to be decided by the Government. In this connection, Mr. Badgeley mentioned that, in the past, similar requests from the Department of National Defence for the loan of tents, stoves, blankets etc. had been declined.

HH

January 8 1936

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C119151

MEMORANDUM

MEMO FOR FILE:

Senator Lambert sent over Mr. Jack Burns, who is head of a motion picture enterprise, and two associates, in the development of " Canadian Cavalcade" mentioned in the attached memorandum.

Senator Lambert and Mr. Burns both said that this proposition has been formulated, in view of the fact that the Prime Minister, in discussion with Mr. Grierson of the British Broadcasting Corporation, had asked why it was that more publicity was not given to the Canadian scene in news reels. Mr. Grierson, I was informed, is coming to Canada very shortly, and is to make a report.

Mr. Burns says that he and his associates have seen the members of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on publicity, as well as other Ministers whose departments would be interested in giving publicity to their activities.

They will also see the Acting Minister of Finance, in view of the fact that their proposals involve a grant from the Federal treasury.

A communication will be sent to the Prime Minister within a few days, outlining in full detail the proposals.

HH

November 2, 1938

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C119152

MEMORANDUM for the Prime Minister:

A motion picture film "The Democratic Way" was prepared by the Associated Screen News for the Canadian Corps, the cost being defrayed by Colonel McLaughlin, of Oshawa. A 16 mm. print of this film has been forwarded to the Prime Minister. Has the Prime Minister any wishes in the matter of seeing the picture? It may be shown at some suitable opportunity at the Motion Picture Bureau, or arrangements could be made to show it at Laurier House or elsewhere.

The picture was brought to the office by Mr. Cowan, of Toronto, with the word that it has been made available by Colonel McLaughlin. The appreciation of the Prime Minister was expressed to Mr. Cowan but perhaps a letter of thanks should go to Colonel McLaughlin. Does the Prime Minister wish to have one drafted?

November 28, 1939. W. J. T.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C119153 M-750 1939 Dup

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

December 6, 1939

see M-753 1939

For Mr. Heeney:

Re Overseas Film Unit

The subject matter of the attached papers has been discussed fully with Mr. Grierson and with Mr. McLarty. If we are to have the film and still picture record of the Canadian military, naval and air force war effort from the outset, then the establishment of this unit is of some urgency. What is suggested is that, under the Information Service, an overseas film unit function, and that the duties of this unit commence at once so that such important events as the present training of troops and the despatch of the first forces overseas should be recorded. In the last war, because of inadequate planning, it was found impossible to obtain a complete record.

While I have not been able to make any check on the proposed expenditures, I do agree, in principle, with the need for the establishment of the unit and with the advisability of having it come under the Information Service, the photographers to be treated as war correspondents.

It is unfortunate that this idea was not brought forward at an earlier date, because already valuable time has been lost. I would suggest that it be brought before the War Committee at the earliest possible moment.

W. L. M. K.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

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CANADA

C 119154

M-750
1939
Dup
see M-753
1939

Ottawa, December 7th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Overseas Film Unit

I have received, from the Minister of Labour, a letter with supporting memoranda relating to a recommendation put forward by Mr. McLarty and Mr. Rogers, at Council on December the 1st, upon the recommendation of The National Film Board, that an Overseas Film Unit be organized, to keep a complete photographic record of Canada's military effort Overseas.

Mr. McLarty states that the Prime Minister felt that this was a matter that should be referred to the War Committee for decision. I am holding Mr. McLarty's letter and supporting documents, pending the Prime Minister's instructions.

Mr. Turnbull, who has made some study of the project, feels that the recommendation is important, and if it is to be put into effect it will have to be dealt with very soon.

Would the Prime Minister wish to have a meeting of the War Committee called, perhaps next Tuesday morning, to consider the matter?

A. D. P. H.

AH/R

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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~~WJT to hold~~

C 119155

December 18, 1939

M-750
1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

The Dominion Film Commissioner, Mr. Grierson, at the request of Colonel Ralston, is preparing a short motion picture film to advertise the forthcoming loan. In order to give this film greater appeal by getting away from the usual stereotyped form, Mr. Grierson would like to use a scene showing the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and other members of the War Committee at a meeting in the East Block, discussing the purposes of the loan.

Colonel Ralston tells me that he approves of the idea.

Only a few words would have to be said by each Minister, the whole scene not taking more than a minute or two.

As the completion of this film is a matter of some urgency, perhaps the Prime Minister will indicate if he is willing to join with Colonel Ralston and the others in a scene as suggested. It could, if the Prime Minister so wishes, be run off immediately before or after the recording of part of the Prime Minister's speech for the newsreels.

W. J. T.

T/MP

Foreign Office
N305-29
1939

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CANADA

Coll - Finance C119156

Note on control over grants by HoVC.
based on
"Parliamentary Grants" - Durell

1. The principle of maintenace by Parliament over control of grants it makes - the bedrock on which the English system is built. p. 2.

2. Appropriating supplies in the general sense first.
Appropriating supplies to the specific purposes for which they are granted.
Appropriating the grant of supply, and the control of public expenditure therewith, belongs inalienably to Parliament, and pre-eminently to the House of Commons.

3. The supreme control of Commons over public grants necessarily demands complete right of control over manner in which grants are spent.

This second right must be inseparable from the first, if the control over the grants is to be effective - claim to control expenditure.

4. The control of the House of Commons over expenditure, as well as over issues, is now recognized as supreme.

Whether control is effective or not depends on two main factors:

(1) Constitutional and parliamentary procedure and practice.
(2) Machinery which Parliament sets up to see that its will is carried out.

Are all expenditures to be subject to audit by Auditor General's Department - not merely as to monies paid out by to use made of them.

Specific Purposes:
(1) Technical Education.
(2) Highway Construction.
(3) Old Age Pensions.
(4) Health promoting activities.
(5) Unemployment Relief.
(6) Grants for Agriculture -
(7) Housing.

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CANADA

APPLICATION BLANK

THE NATIONAL BOND COMPANY, INC.
Royal Bank Building
Montreal, Que.

C119157 193

I/We hereby apply for.....(.....) shares of the Treasury Stock of Cumulative Investment Foundation, Limited at $5.00 per share, and enclose herewith my/our cheque for..... dollars ($.....) in payment therefor. Certificate to be issued in my name.

Name .....
(Please write Christian Name in full)

No. of Shares .....
Amount .....

PLEASE WRITE PLAINLY

Street No. .....
City or Town .....
Province or State .....

It is understood that the Company have the right to refuse this application if the issue is oversubscribed.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

C 119158

NEW ISSUE

700,000 Shares

($5.00 per share)

Cumulative Investment Foundation Limited

(Incorporated under the laws of the Dominion of Canada)

NO PAR VALUE STOCK.

TRANSFER AGENTS: The Montreal Trust Co. REGISTRAR: The Eastern Trust Co.

CAPITALIZATION

(On completion of present financing)

	Authorized	*Issued*
Capital Stock, no par value	1,000,000	700,000

Option given on remaining 300,000 shares @ $5.00 per share.

THE COMPANY: Cumulative Investment Foundation, Limited, Head Offices Montreal, has been organized under the laws of the Dominion of Canada as an investment corporation with powers to buy, sell, trade in, pledge and hold securities of any kind and every nature either foreign or domestic. To invest money at interest, to participate in enterprises, syndicates and underwriting, thus affording its shareholders an opportunity to invest in a broad diversification of selected securities and underwritings.

MANAGEMENT: The management of the funds is in the hands of a capable Board of Directors.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COMPANY: To invest the capital supplied by the shareholders in a scientifically selected list of securities, with a view to profiting through present financial conditions by the selection of securities that should show future appreciation, dividends and interest.

To apply to these securities the constant care of an expert investment analysis, from time to time, disposing of those whose market value appears high in relation to prospective earnings and substituting others whose prospects seem to justify more than the market price.

The foregoing is subject to the more complete statements contained in the charter.

Application will be made in due course to list this stock on either the listed or the unlisted section of a recognized stock exchange.

We offer, subject to prior sale or advance, 700,000 of the above referred to shares at a price of $5.00 per share.

Price: $5.00 per share.

The National Bond Company, Inc.

THE ROYAL BANK BUILDING

MONTREAL

GOVERNMENT, MUNICIPAL, PUBLIC UTILITY AND INDUSTRIAL BONDS AND SHARES

Statements contained in this Circular, while not guaranteed, are based upon information which we believe to be accurate

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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CUMULATIVE INVESTMENT FOUNDATION, LIMITED

CAPITALIZATION

Capital Stock, no par value

Authorized,	1,000,000
Issued,	700,000

The National Bond Company Inc.

THE ROYAL BANK BUILDING

MONTREAL

C 119159

C 119160

Among the Directors of the Cumulative Investment Foundation Limited, are:—

SENATOR W. L. MCDOUGALD, President - - - MONTREAL, QUE.
ex-Chairman, Montreal Harbour Board.
Chairman of Board, Beauharnois Power Corporation.
Director, Hollinger Consolidated Mines, Limited.

EDWARD D. DEVINE - - - - - - - - - DETROIT, MICH.
Attorney at Law,
Past President, Detroit School Board, Detroit, Mich.

COLONEL RALPH H. WEBB - - - - - - WINNIPEG, MAN.
Mayor of Winnipeg, Man.

EDWARD D. TURNER - - - - - - - - NEW YORK, N.Y.
Financier

DR. JAMES RUTHERFORD, M.P. - - - - - - CHATHAM, ONT.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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C119161

Increases in National Debt

Speaking at Saskatoon, October 11, 1933, Mr. Bennett said with reference to the national debt of Canada, "that the great burden of debt was incurred before his government took office". (Ottawa Citizen, Oct. 12, 1933).

If Mr. Bennett intends to infer that the increases took place under the late Liberal Government, he is quite mistaken. The Mackenzie King administration reduced the total net debt; the Conservative government from 1911 to 1921, and the present Conservative government both have increased it.

Fiscal Year ending Mar.31	Net Debt	
1912	$ 340,000,000	
1922	2,422,000,000	
1931*	2,261,000,000	(reduction over 1922 of $161,000,000)
1933	2,599,000,000	(increase over 1931 of $339,000,000.)

(*-The Liberal Administration was in office for only four months of the fiscal year 1931. The Special Session of 1930, which authorized unemployment expenditures up to $20,000,000, which is included in the fiscal year 1931, was held while the Conservative government was in office.)

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939
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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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Comparative Condensed Statements of Dominion of Canada and Provinces

A. E. Ames & Co. Limited

C 119162

INTRODUCTORY

Owing to the delay in the publication of some provincial public accounts it is not possible to present a summary of the detailed accounts near the close of the fiscal years. In all cases the information below has been selected from the official public accounts relating to the 1933 fiscal year.

With the passage of time it becomes increasingly evident that the most difficult period in Canadian public finance was experienced in the 1932 fiscal year when the sharp drop in the current revenues and the rapid rise in special expenditures necessitated borrowings to tide over the emergency at the very time when the financial situation was most disturbed. The period of strain, however, was successfully overcome without any default by the Dominion or any Province.

The accounts set out below reflect a general easing of the situation which first became apparent in the third quarter of 1932 and has developed rather steadily to the present time. The figures also indicate the sources and amounts of the current revenues and their relation to the provincial debt charges. The emphasis upon different sources of revenues varies as between provinces and an examination of the statistics will indicate the extent to which debt charges are being covered as well as the extent to which revenues could be augmented to meet any changes in fiscal requirements.

Further information relating to Dominion or Provincial financial positions and to the public securities outstanding will be gladly furnished on request.

A. E. Ames & Co., Limited.

PROVINCIAL DEBT

	Dominion and Provinces	Per Capita	Dominion of Canada	Per Capita	All Provinces	Per Capita	British Columbia	Per Capita	Alberta	Per Capita	Saskatchewan	Per Capita	Manitoba	Per Capita	Ontario	Per Capita	Quebec	Per Capita	Nova Scotia	Per Capita	New Brunswick	Per Capita	Prince Edward Island	Per Capita
Date			March 31, 1933						March 31, 1933		April 30, 1933		April 30, 1933		Oct. 31, 1933		June 30, 1933		Sept. 30, 1933		Oct. 31, 1933		Dec. 31, 1933	
Gross Funded Debt	$3,855,358,778	$372.01	$2,607,929,651	$251.66	$1,247,229,127	$120.35	$145,511,561	$209.74	$133,837,260	$182.93	$109,209,641	$118.47	$ 90,938,906	$129.89	$523,764,824	$152.63	$110,237,892	$38.36	$ 67,939,880	$132.48	$ 61,935,165	$151.71	$ 3,754,000	$42.64
Treasury Bills	231,564,017	22.35	110,000,000	10.61	121,564,017	11.74	11,705,224	16.86	6,721,052	9.19	30,810,092	33.42	22,795,849	32.56	36,820,000	10.67	13,000,000	4.52	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	4,086,809,795	395.36	2,717,929,651	262.27	1,368,885,144	132.09	157,216,785	226.60	$140,560,312	192.13	140,019,733	151.90	113,734,755	162.45	560,584,824	163.30	123,237,892	42.88	67,939,880	132.48	61,935,165	151.71	3,754,000	42.64
Less: Sinking Funds	147,048,257	14.19	86,030,717	6.37	81,017,540	7.82	26,681,241	38.29	4,993,533	10.11	9,804,017	6.73	7,151,658	10.19	7,297,416	2.21	13,046,235	4.54	5,566,324(13)	10.85	6,721,429(16)	16.49	758,707	8.61
Net Total(1)	$3,939,764,538	$380.17	$2,631,898,934	$255.90	$1,287,865,604	$124.27	$130,535,544	$188.31	135,100,779(8)	$182.01	$130,214,716	$145.17	$106,602,917	$152.26	$552,787,408	$161.09	$110,191,657(11)	$38.34	$ 62,373,556	$121.65	$ 55,203,734	$135.22	$ 2,995,293	$34.05
Contingent Liabilities(2)	1,162,831,713	112.21	1,024,424,154	98.85	138,407,559	13.36	7,820,000	11.26	9,992,912	13.66	9,540,569	10.64	5,037,032	7.19	102,103,331	29.75	4,864,300(18)	1.69	698,405	1.36	1,351,210	3.31	-	-
Total	$5,102,596,251	$492.39	$3,656,323,088	$354.76	$1,426,273,163	$137.63	$138,355,544	$199.57	$145,153,691	$195.67	$140,155,285	$156.86	$111,639,949	$159.45	$654,890,739	$190.84	$115,055,957	$40.03	$ 63,071,961	$122.98	$ 56,554,944	$136.53	$ 2,995,293	$34.05

PROVINCIAL CURRENT REVENUES

Federal Grants and Subsidies	$ 16,118,139	$ 1.55	$ -	-	$ 16,118,139	$ 1.55	$ 874,561	$ 1.26	$ 2,702,317	$ 3.69	$ 2,112,803	$ 2.29	$ 1,694,195	$ 2.42	$ 2,941,424	$ .86	$ 2,464,553	$ .86	$ 1,533,652	$ 2.99	$ 1,297,452	$ 3.18	$ 497,182	$ 5.65
Taxation:	$ 326,502,888	$ 31.50	$ 252,683,861	$ 24.38	$ 73,819,026	$ 7.12	$ 11,265,748	$ 16.23	$ 5,075,917	$ 6.93	$ 4,848,298	$ 5.26	$ 4,769,684	$ 6.81	$ 30,586,808	$ 8.85	$ 12,549,434	$ 4.37	$ 2,661,072	$ 5.19	$ 1,759,692	$ 4.31	$ 504,375	$ 5.73
Customs Import Duties	70,972,328	6.76	70,972,328	6.76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Excise Duties (3)	37,833,958	3.65	37,833,958	3.65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Excise Taxes	82,191,576	7.93	82,191,576	7.93	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Income Taxes	69,777,370	6.73	62,066,697	5.99	7,710,673	.74	5,512,460	7.94	649,554	.89	403,857	.44	1,144,802	1.64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gasolene Taxes	25,926,496	2.50	-	-	25,926,496	2.50	2,041,729	2.94	1,517,034	2.07	1,394,244	1.51	1,483,368	2.12	12,629,057	3.68	4,919,522	1.71	947,954	1.85	804,178	1.97	189,050	2.15
Corporation Taxes	15,516,439	1.50	(4)	-	15,516,439	1.50	-	-	771,861	1.05	1,369,649	1.48	1,692,241	2.42	6,249,872	1.82	3,960,246	1.38	801,556	1.56	545,972	1.34	125,040	1.42
Amusement Taxes	1,496,152	.14	-	-	1,496,152	.14	170,339	.24	117,887	.16	-	-	182,195	.26	827,249	.24	-	-	134,680	.26	59,458	.14	4,544	.05
Succession Duties	13,155,425	1.27	-	-	13,155,425	1.27	535,888	.77	470,741	.64	177,376	.19	267,078	.38	8,081,322	2.35	3,070,138	1.07	262,985	.51	259,324	.65	30,725	.34
Other Taxation	10,533,640	1.47	518,799	.50	10,014,841	.97	3,005,612	4.33	1,546,780	2.11	1,502,872	1.63	-	-	2,599,308	.76	599,528	.21	533,955	1.00	96,760	.22	152,126	1.76
Motor Licenses	20,006,193	1.93	-	-	20,006,193	1.93	1,888,448	2.72	1,552,613	2.12	1,536,130	1.67	893,504	1.28	7,219,808	2.10	5,027,355	1.75	1,044,877	2.08	758,450	1.86	95,008	1.08
Liquor Profit	15,955,052	1.54	-	-	15,955,052	1.54	2,321,713	3.34	1,427,000	1.95	1,964,857	1.15	1,094,387	1.56	2,215,000	1.61	2,700,000	1.85	287,142	.56	845,621	1.33	-	-
Other Revenues	87,136,125	8.40	53,953,128	5.20	33,182,997	3.20	4,039,482	5.82	4,670,418	6.38	5,273,000	5.72	3,935,248	5.59	5,310,012	1.55	7,282,548	2.53	1,710,168	3.33	825,621	2.00	166,500	1.80
Total Current Revenues	$ 465,718,397	$ 44.94	$ 306,636,990	$ 29.59	$ 159,081,407	$ 15.35	$ 20,389,952	$ 29.37	$ 15,426,265	$ 21.09	$ 14,834,888	$ 16.09	$ 12,366,918	$ 17.66	$ 51,373,052	$ 14.97	$ 31,023,890	$10.79	$ 7,226,911	$ 14.09	$ 5,176,468	$ 12.68	$ 1,263,061	$14.35

PROVINCIAL CURRENT EXPENDITURES

Interest on Debt	$ 178,188,915	$ 17.20	$ 129,503,635	$ 12.50	$ 48,685,280	$ 4.70	$ 7,007,606	$ 10.09	$ 5,591,303	$ 7.64	$ 5,014,964	$ 5.44	$ 5,820,857	$ 8.31	$ 15,322,917	$ 4.46	$ 4,633,992	$ 1.61	$ 2,400,171(14)	$ 4.68	$ 2,686,103(17)	$ 6.58	$ 207,367	$ 2.36
Debt Retirement	4,171,727	.40	-	-	4,171,727	.40	1,243,000(6)	1.79	748,019	1.02	175,836(9)	.19	-	-	-	-	1,714,683	.60	- (14)	-	181,364(17)	.44	108,805	1.24
Other Current Expenditures	350,851,290	33.86	229,024,635	22.10	121,829,655	11.76	14,975,724(7)	21.58	11,194,464	15.30	10,222,785	11.10	8,490,626	12.33	35,573,709	10.37	31,516,125(12)	10.96	6,041,682	11.78	2,738,498	6.71	1,076,104	12.22
Total Current Expenditures	$ 533,214,932	$ 51.46	$ 358,528,270	$ 34.60	$ 174,686,662	$ 16.86	$ 23,226,330	$ 33.46	$ 17,533,786	$ 23.97	$ 15,413,585	$ 16.72	$ 14,311,483	$ 20.44	$ 50,896,626	$ 14.85	$ 37,864,798	$13.17	$ 8,441,853	$ 16.46	$ 5,605,985	$ 13.73	$ 1,392,276	$15.82
Debt Charges as a Percentage of Revenue	39.6%		42.2 %		33.2%		43.5%		41.1%		34.9%		50.1%		32.5%		20.5%		38.8%		55.4%		25.0%	
Taxation as a percentage of Revenue	70.1%		82.4%		46.4%		55.2%		32.9%		28.5%		38.6%		59.1%		40.4%		36.8%		34.0%		39.9%	

SUMMARY

Current Account Deficit	$ 67,496,335	$ 6.52	$ 51,891,280	$ 5.01	$ 15,605,055	$ 1.51	$ 2,836,378	$ 4.08	$ 2,107,521	$ 2.88	$ 578,637	$ .63	$ 1,944,365	$ 2.78	$ 476,426(10)	$ .14	$ 6,840,908	$ 2.38	$ 1,214,942(15)	$ 2.37	$ 429,517	$ 1.05	$ 129,213	$ 1.46
Principal Capital Account Items:																								
Unemployment Relief	$ 77,661,138	$ 7.49	$ 36,908,777(5)	$ 3.56	$ 40,752,361	$ 3.93	$ 3,648,004	$ 5.25	2,092,934	2.86	8,536,304	9.26	4,415,578	6.31	13,379,347	3.90	6,174,347	2.15	1,724,879	3.36	780,974	1.91	-	-
Highways, Bridges, etc.	24,467,387	2.36	8,769,248(19)	.85	15,698,141	1.51	544,043	.78	943,997	1.29	55,498	.06	152,488	.22	3,282,498	.96	6,614,057	2.30	1,751,960	3.42	2,301,486	5.64	52,234	.59
Public Buildings	3,055,271	.29	279,683	.03	2,775,588	.17	41,358	.06	88,551	.12	1,564	.002	77,189	.11	599,891	.17	500,321	.18	-	-	246,732	.60	289,982	2.61
C. N. R. Deficit	53,422,662	5.15	53,422,662	5.15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Increase in Net Debt	$ 223,240,004	$ 21.54	$ 150,061,500	$ 14.48	$ 73,188,502	$ 7.06	$ 6,426,890	$ 9.26	$ 2,650,277	$ 3.62	$ 10,488,157	$ 11.38	$ 4,606,186	$ 6.58	$ 20,679,163	$ 6.03	$ 19,535,316	$ 6.80	$ 5,600,078	$ 10.91	$ 3,096,499	$ 7.58	$ 105,936	$ 1.20
Population	10,362,869		10,362,869		10,362,869		694,263		731,605		921,785		700,139		3,431,683		2,874,255		512,846		408,255		88,038	

(1) Excluding open accounts payable.
(2) Excluding duplicated contingent liabilities.
(3) Includes such taxes as sales tax, tax on cheques, etc.
(4) Included in income taxes.
(5) Includes farm relief and wheat bonus.
(6) Not including additional requirement of $1,208,652.
(7) Including uncapitalized unemployment relief of $212,814.
(8) Excluding liability for Provincial Savings Certificates.
(9) Not including capital repayments credited.
(10) Current Account Surplus.
(11) Excluding $6,510,533 warrants authorized but unpaid.
(12) Including warrants authorized but unpaid.
(13) Including Nova Scotia Power Commission sinking funds.
(14) Not including interest and sinking fund paid by Nova Scotia Power Commission.
(15) Before charging sinking fund of $403,948.
(16) Including New Brunswick Electric Power Commission sinking fund.
(17) Not including interest and sinking fund paid by New Brunswick Electric Power Commission.
(18) The contingent liabilities do not include promises to pay from the Public Charities Fund to certain institutions annual amounts over definite terms to be applied in payment of bonds and interest thereon.
(19) Principally railways and canals.

E. & O. E.

C 119163

Comparative Condensed Statements of Dominion of Canada and Provinces

Fiscal Year 1933.

A. E. Ames & Co. Limited

Finance
Financial

CANADIAN DOLLAR - Finance

Coll - Finance.
- by W.T. Hamburg Mss

Nov. 1932 - Jul. 1933

C 119164

CON	PRO
Nov. 1932 Government adopts "credit Easing policy by issuing $35,000,000 in Federal notes to the Banks, causing a rise in the premium for U.S. funds in Canada from 8% to 15%	**1932** After allowing for seasonal borrowings by Banks under Finance Act only $20,000,000 of this amount has "taken" so far.
1933 Canadian payments in New York for year 1933 principal and interest: Federal Government $108,244,576 (a) Provincial 70,600,073 Municipalities 25,136,536 Corporations 62,142,915 $266,124,100	(a) Includes 1 year notes issued for $60,000,000 which will be renewed. Gold shipments 1933 estimated to amount to $75,000,000.
Budget for 1933 $383,000,000	Reduction of $11,000,000 over 1932.
Deficits 1930 - 1931 (March 31) $ 65,000,000 (a) 1931 - 1932 $161,000,000 (b) 1932 - 1933 $160,000 000 (C) estimated (including C.N.R. deficit, wheat loss and expenditure for unemployment relief)	(a) Met by additional taxation and loans negotiated in New York. (b) Met by additional taxation and by National Service Loan (c) To be met by increases in and tightening up of income tax and by borrowing.
Indebtedness Dominion of Canada Direct $2,597,676,637 Guaranteed 1,000,285,413 $3,597,962,050 ($359.per capita) Provinces 1,411,796,635 Municipalities 1,323,094,066 $6,332,852,751 ($633.per capita) Corporations 1,427,215,481 $7,760,068,232	**1932** Favorable balance of $50,000,000 in foreign trade. Curtailment of purchases from United States. Development of export trade as result Imperial Conference. With the general contraction of business the favourable balance may not seem so much , as Canada was more prosperous when it had large unfavourable trade balances in the United States, meaning good credit.
Federal Loans Interest and principal payable Canada 1933 $390,162,066	Federal Loans Of this amount approximately $200,000,000 is represented by tax free loan which matures in November, which will be replaced by taxable issue, leaving only one tax free issue outstanding in Canada, maturing 1937.
Government Financing 1932 Last National Service Loan - in effect a loan of coercion.	Government Financing 1932 Return too low: 4% coupon not popular, unattractive commission to dealers.
Jan. 1933 - Inflation Demand of agricultural communities, as well as debtors generally, for further depreciation Canadian dollar.	Sound Money Jan.1933 Prime Minister in public statement announces policy sound money - no inflation- no linking Canadian dollar with pound sterling.. Bankers firm against inflation. Prime Minister hopeful results of World Economic Conference, and that if inflationary movement becomes sufficiently powerful that it will first find expression in U.S.
Feb. 1933 Taxation - Expenditure " . Limit of taxation in Canada has nearly been reached" - Bennett. " Canada cannot much longer stand C.N.R. drain on Federal treasury" - Beatty.	
Feb.1933 - Heavy selling Canadian securities and withdrawal balances caused Canadian dollar in London to drop from $4. to $4.20 bringing premium on N.Y. funds in Montreal up from 18⅜% to 22 - 23%.	Feb. 1 Apparent Canadian Government support of funds in N. Y. Market reducing premium from 22 - 23% to 18⅛%.
Feb. 10th Premium on N. Y. funds rises from 19⅛% to 20-5/16% - market nervous and not normal.	Feb. 10th False rumours circulated Ottawa New York of secret session Parliament credited to bear exchange operators.
No provision for calling various issues of Government before maturity. Patriotic appeal would not apply to large foreign holders.	Feb. 1933 Canadian high grades strong on rumour Canadian banks will reduce interest rates on savings deposits from 3% to 2½% or 2% thus forcing bank deposits into Government bonds and paving way for lowering interest rates and effecting possible saving of $20,000,000 per annum.
Unknown Exchange Factors Amount of balances of American firms and individuals on deposit with Canadian banks which may be withdrawn. Extent of liquidation by London, Continent and U. S. of Canadian securities. Effect of municipalities other than Calgary refusing to pay bond interest in U.S. funds. Extent of further inflation.	Unknown Exchange Factors Amount of Canadian balsnces or securities to be repatriated. Possibilities of Canadian borrowings in New York and London. Movement of U.S. dollars to Canada for deposit in Canadian banks. Result of tourist traffic 1933 (1932 - $150,000,000). New gold discoveries. Possibility that Canadian holders of securities payable in U.S. funds will be paid in Canadian funds only. An early settlement of war debt question.

Memo prepared by Hamburg.

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(M.G. 26, J 4, volume 166, pages C118551-C119254)

Col - McLaughlin Opposition 1930-35

Received from Arthur Thompson, Esq., 583 Concord Ave., Toronto
with letter dated March 12, 1933.

C119165

NATIONAL POLICIES

Dominion Government is a dual control of matters "Interior" and "Exterior" between which there are definite lines drawn such as

Interior currency vs International Gold Value,
Interior Banking vs International Banking,
Interior Wages vs Various world rates,
Interior Trade vs International trade,
Interior Living standards vs Various world standards,
Interior debts vs International gold debts,
Interior production values vs World market values.

1. Interior Currency is not based upon a gold standard but is a paper currency issued by the Bank of Canada operating with a Board of Governors under the Treasury Department to facilitate the exchange of products between citizens and obviate the otherwise necessity of trading by barter as there is not sufficient gold for such purposes. The amount of such issue of currency is not based on Government holdings of gold but is based upon the basic standard of living in the Dominion. Therefore, if an unskilled labor man requires $1200 annually to ensure a fair living under present conditions and we assume that currency completes its cycle annually we can estimate the amount of currency to be issued if not already issued. Subsequently, if 10% of such currency is saved individually or by being placed in capital industrial reserves or otherwise taken out of circulation then it becomes obvious that we are going to be 10% short to handle the next year's production, therefore the Bank of Canada will issue the amount of such 10% (through wages) and the Government will collect it in taxes by individual, unmarried, surplus profit and death estates taxes. Completing such a cycle by taxing extra profits and replacing the amount taken out of circulation in the basic labor as wages we are assured that there is always sufficient currency in circulation to change the annual production into ownership and use. Only according to our own productivity and the currency to change production to

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ownership and usefulness can we raise our own standards of living and as our production increases so must our scales of wages and currency issue be increased to absorb it.

2. Banking. The issue and control of Interior currency naturally necessitates the operation of a Bank of Canada and branches. The Treasury Department under which such Bank of Canada would operate through a Board of Governors should exercise control over all private banks. There is no doubt but that large private banks at present are actually monopolies controlling currency and so great has been the absorption and control of currency by such banks that at present the basic labor workers have no funds, are out of employment and industry is at a standstill with the further result that private banks themselves find much of their funds tied up in loans and the security of such loans steadily depreciating. The Government Bank should accept deposits of currency for safekeeping without payment of interest rates, then the amount of such deposits could be withdrawn without inconvenience as would occur if a run were made on a private bank. Private Banks must issue currency notes on a $ for $ gold basis. They should deposit the collateral of their capitalization with the Treasury Dept. who will issue them an equal value in gold which amount shall be kept up by issue of further gold in exchange for Interior currency so that private citizens going abroad may obtain gold credit through the private banks. The Treasury Dept. through the Government Bank must retain control of currency and accept deposits of such currency without interest and available for immediate withdrawal whereas Private Banks accept deposits for the purpose of investing these deposits therefore such deposits are not available for immediate withdrawal without seriously affecting the Bank business.

3. Minimum Wages. In order to maintain purchasing power of citizens and prevent their exploitation it is necessary to have Dominion

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Minimum Wage scales for unskilled labor, to be followed by wage scales for all skilled labor such rates to be fixed in conference with labor officials. Suggested minumum wage for unskilled workers 18 years of age or over are: men $25 for 44 hour week, 50¢ hour part or extra time

women $15 " " " 35¢ " " "

board at $6.50 and room at $3.50 weekly if provided.

4. Surplus Profits Tax: A minumum wage to workers is less than useless if exhrbitant or raised prices could be charged for products meaning profiteering so in order to protect the workers a surplus profits tax should be levied against all organizations annually doing a staple business (some exceptions). The maximum profit on paid up capital (if they are not overcapitalized) should be 10% net or 15% gross and all profit in excess is forfeit to the Treasury Dept. Other similar taxes are individuals in private business, unmarried tax and death duties and graded personal income tax over a definite figure.

5. Valuation of Agricultural and Fisheries Products: Industrial control and support includes definite wage scales to workers and definite profit limit to capital. Next we have food values to control to ensure the agricultural classes and workers (and fisheries) from depressed prices or cutthroat competition and give them also fair return for their labor and investment, therefore such labor shall be classified and paid similar rates to industrial labor but the values of agricultural and fisheries products shall be fixed prices at elevator warehouse or town where disposal or delivery is made. Each product shall be investigated by a commission who will ascertain costs including fertilizer, seed, labor, packing, etc., and will allow the farmer, grower, rancher, etc., a skilled rate of pay plus a 10% profit on his investment and from these estimates a definite figure will be fixed as the producer price on all products of grade 1 quality irrespective of

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world prices. All persons engaged therein will receive a fair return for their labor and investment and where surpluses are apparent the Dominion Government will control the marketing of such surplus and dispose of same where possible and at the best price obtainable. For instance, if a wheat grower requires 70¢ a bushel to obtain a fair return and living he shall be paid that amount and if the surplus is dumped on the world market at 50¢ a bushel there is actually no loss to Canada rather there is a profit of 50¢ a bushel payable in gold for wheat which was surplus to requirements in Canada. However, the difference shall be collected in taxes similar to money taken out of circulation. Such surpluses may however be used as a basis to negotiate trade treaties.

6. National Debts. Canada at present owes foreign creditors several billions (not millions) in gold which it cannot pay. This debt has accumulated for two reasons, one the unthinkable public borrowings from exterior sources which must be paid in gold and two the optimistic ideas of those same creditors. Where they imagined we could possibly obtain this enormous sum in gold no one knows. Municipal, county, provincial and federal authorities are all debtors and the results of their practices are apparent. All such debts should be taken over by the Treasury Dept. as they represent international finances and should be paid off as gold is available, and further gold loans negotiated to pay off issues due if payment cannot be made. Canadian Gold Mines must remain Canadian in ownership and all Government resources should be utilized to rapidly increase our gold production. Counties, municipalities and provinces must borrow in Canada only.

7. International Trade (like international debts) trade is and should be on a gold basis. Trade between nations must be in gold

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terms as the practice of exchange rates on fluctuating currencies lead to chaotic conditions. On a gold basis there will be no exchange money rates as almost every nation can pay a trade balance in gold through the established clearing houses.

8. Stock Markets control: Stricter control should be exercised on exchanges which are for the purpose of buying and selling not for gambling on fractional increases in values. The percentage on marginal purchases should be set by Government and at a figure that will tend to discourage the use of savings or bank loans for the purpose of marginal trading. Government inspectors should carry out periodical inspection of brokers books and force them to have stocks as called for in books.

9. Industrial Capitalization: This requires overhauling and increases in capital out of profits prohibited by law (such as watering stock). Industries wishing to increase capital should reincorporate at the higher figure and pay for additional stock out of personal funds or sell the stock on the public market. Over capitalization should be carefully watched as it is often a way of profiteering at public expense.

10. Foreign Investments in Canada: The Government should take cognizance of foreign investments in Canada as interest and profits of such investments must be met in gold. The amount of such investments should be controlled unless we want our natural gold deficit to keep on increasing. There is no doubt that we could borrow funds to carry on such ventures as is being made by foreign investments therefore the return allowed on such should be comparable to the interest rates we would pay did we borrow funds for such purposes.

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Government should represent all the people and be according to the divisions of the Dominion therefore there should be at least one member from each county. Government in control by an elected committee in the interests of all the people leaving the individual free to select his own standard of living and occupation and not interfere with the individual's private rights of ownership. State ownership, commissions, and other similar socialistic ideas are governmental forms of the past which have already outlived their usefulness by many centuries.

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Finances
Budget & funds

Coll - Finances

C119171

Estimate of money to be financed during
1933-34

by Harry Baldwin.

Operations for 1933-34 -

Expenditures as per Main Estimates (page 4)		
Interest on Public Debt	$142	millions
Pension Payments	47	"
National Defence Department	11	"
Public Works Department	12	"
Subsidies to Provinces (amelioratory)	13	"
Capital Expenditure, Canals and Railways	7	"
Post Office Department	31	"
Other Departments	95	"
	358	"
Supplementary Estimates (estimated)	5	"
Statutory Expenditure not included in Main Estimates -		
Old Age Pensions	12	"
Unemployment Relief	20	"
Maritime Freight Rates	9	"
	404	"
Less		
Estimated Revenue (not including any new taxes)	270	"
Deficit for 1933-34 to be financed	134	"
Additional financing		
Loans to Harbour Commissions	6	"
" " C.N. Steamships	2	"
" " Provinces re Relief	20	"
" " C.N.R. for 1933-34	90	"
New financing	252	"
Re-financing		
Maturing Loans (Estimates page 6)	280	"
Treasury Bills (Hansard March 6)	145	"
Total	677	"

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Coll - Finance

Use of "Consols" in Canadian Financing C119172

Nature:

3% perpetual bonds (no stated maturity), callable at any time after 30 years, priced at 96.50, to yield approximately 3.11%.

Amount of Issue:

$65,000,000 on subscription lists opening September 10th.

Purpose:

To provide for a simplification and consolidation of Canadian debt structure, to fit in with Government plans for setting up a sinking fund.

Nov. 5, 1936

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Dom. Prov. Relations - financial
Finance C119173 h-117
1908

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re Delegates to meeting of National Finance Committee, Ottawa, December 9, 1936.

I have just received from the Deputy Minister of Finance the attached list of delegates who plan to be present for this meeting.

Dr. Clark has not as yet received official notice of the delegates coming from Quebec and Ontario. He points out, however, that this morning's Gazette states that the Quebec delegation will probably include:

Premier Duplessis,
Honourable Martin D. Fisher, Provincial Treasurer,
Mr. Edgar Vezina, Provincial Auditor,
Arthur Foster, Assistant Treasurer;

and possibly:

Honourable William Tremblay, Minister of Labour,
Honourable Oscar Drouin, Minister of Lands and Forests.

As for Ontario, Dr. Clark understands that the Honourable H. C. Nixon and Mr. Chester Walters will be here.

E.A. PICKERING

December 5, 1936.

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C 119174

PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO WILL ATTEND
NATIONAL FINANCE COMMITTEE MEETING
DECEMBER 9, 1936.

British Columbia - Hon. T.D. Pattullo, Premier.
Mr. B. Hethey, Secretary to Premier.
Hon. John Hart, Minister of Finance.
Mr. J.V. Fisher, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.

Alberta - Hon. Wm. Aberhart, Premier.
Hon. C. Cockroft, Provincial Treasurer.
Hon. W.N. Chant, Minister of Agriculture.
Mr. J.F. Percival, Deputy Provincial Treasurer.
Mr. A.A. MacKenzie.
Mr. L.C. Charlesworth.

Saskatchewan - Hon. W.J. Patterson, Premier and Provincial Treasurer (Delegate).
Hon. Thos. C. Davis, Attorney General (Delegate).
Mr. Lax (Advisor).

Manitoba - Hon. John Bracken, Premier (Delegate).
Hon. W.J. Major, K.C., Attorney General and Municipal Commissioner (Delegate).
Hon. Stuart S. Garson, K.C., Provincial Treasurer. (Delegate).
Mr. Ralph Pearson, Deputy Provincial Treasurer. (Delegate).

Ontario -

Quebec -

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New Brunswick	- Hon. A.A. Dysart, Premier (Delegate). Hon. C.T. Richard, Provincial Secretary-Treasurer. (Delegate). Hon. F.W. Pirie, Minister of Lands and Mines. (Delegate). Mr. A.W. Barbour. Mr. J.H. Conlon.
Nova Scotia	- Hon. Angus L. Macdonald, Premier and Provincial Treasurer (Delegate). Mr. C.D. Dennis, Deputy Provincial Treasurer (Delegate).
Prince Edward Island	- Hon. Thane A. Campbell, Premier and Provincial Treasurer (Delegate). Hon. Bradford W. LePage, President of Council. (Adviser). Mr. W.E. Massey, Provincial Auditor (Adviser).

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

C 119176

MEMORANDUM

✓ Com. for Relations-provincial
✓ Finance

For Mr. King:

Re: Meeting of the National Finance Committee, Ottawa, December 9th.

I attach a list of the delegates from the provinces, based on information just received from Dr. Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance.

E. A. P.
E.A. PICKERING

December 8th, 1936.

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C119177

f-117
1936

PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO WILL ATTEND
NATIONAL FINANCE COMMITTEE MEETING
DECEMBER 9, 1936.

British Columbia - Hon. T. D. Pattullo, Premier,
Mr. B. Hethey, Secretary to Premier,
Hon. John Hart, Minister of Finance,
Mr. J. V. Fisher, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.

Alberta - Hon. Wm. Aberhart, Premier,
Hon. C. Cockroft, Provincial Treasurer,
Hon. W. N. Chant, Minister of Agriculture,
Mr. J. F. Percival, Deputy Provincial Treasurer,
Mr. A. A. MacKenzie,
Mr. L. C. Charlesworth.

Saskatchewan - Hon. W. J. Patterson, Premier and Provincial Treasurer (Delegate),
Hon. Thos. C. Davis, Attorney General (Delegate),
Mr. Lax (Advisor).

Manitoba - Hon. John Bracken, Premier (Delegate),
Hon. W. J. Major, K.C., Attorney General and Municipal Commissioner (Delegate),
Hon. Stuart S. Garson, K.C., Provincial Treasurer (Delegate),
Mr. Ralph Pearson, Deputy Provincial Treasurer (Delegate).

Ontario - Hon. Paul Leduc, Minister of Mines,
Mr. Chester S. Walters, Deputy Minister Treasury Department,
Mr. Harold Chater, Secretary, Budget Committee, Treasury Department.

Quebec - Hon. M. Duplessis, Premier,
Hon. O. Drouin, Minister of Lands and Forests,

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C119178

Quebec (Cont'd) - Hon. M. B. Fisher, Provincial Treasurer,
Mr. H. Foster, Assistant Provincial Treasurer,
Mr. Edgar Vézina, Provincial Auditor,
Mr. René Garneau, Secretary of the Attorney General's Department.

New Brunswick - Hon. A. A. Dysart, Premier (Delegate),
Hon. C. T. Richard, Provincial Secretary-Treasurer (Delegate,
Hon. F. W. Pirie, Minister of Lands and Mines (Delegate),
Mr. A. W. Barbour,
Mr. J. H. Conlon.

Nova Scotia - Hon. Angus L. Macdonald, Premier and Provincial Treasurer (Delegate),
Mr. C. D. Dennis, Deputy Provincial Treasurer (Delegate).

Prince Edward Island - Hon. Thane A. Campbell, Premier and Provincial Treasurer (Delegate),
Hon. Bradford W. LePage, President of Council (Adviser),
Mr. W. E. Massey, Provincial Auditor (Adviser).

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C 119179

Saskatchewan Debt Adjustment Scheme

Based on Crop Production:

Debt Adjustment a blanket one for areas where average annual crop production less than six bushels to acre over past six years; one hundred and seventy-four municipalities covered by adjustment scheme.

Voluntary Co-operative Effort:

Dominion and Provincial Governments, municipalities and mortgage companies participating by voluntary co-operation following joint meetings of representatives, September 15-17, 1936.

Background of Adjustment:

From 1914-1930 the Provincial Liberal Government in Saskatchewan learned the following about debt adjustment,-

1. People do not voluntarily ask for debt adjustment;
2. Sixty-five percent of the people never get before a court or tribunal to have their debts dealt with; creditors and debtors settle between themselves;
3. Large loan companies, banks and corporations are prepared to consider cases on their merits.

In 1934 the Liberal Party of Saskatchewan realized the inadequacy of the single tribunal method of dealing with debt adjustment;

For instance in the drought area of Saskatchewan alone, there are 30,000 mortgages and agreements of sale.

A tribunal can deal with only five a day.

It would be an endless job;

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When the Liberals were returned in 1934 a debt survey was commenced immediately and finished by the spring of 1936;

The Dominion Government was approached and $10,000,000 worth of notes charged against crops of farmers were lifted.

Negotiations continued with mortgage companies from December 1934 and culminated in September, 1936.

Nature and Extent of Debt Adjustment to Date (May 31, 1937):

(a)	Provincial cancellation of amounts owing on relief and seed grain	$ 5,000,000
(b)	Dominion Government under Mr. Bennett cancellation of	10,000,000
(c)	Dominion Government (present) relief and seed accounts	18,000,000
(d)	Municipality cancellation of taxes	22,000,000
(e)	Mortgage companies and individuals have written off	14,000,000
	Estimated further reduction	12,000,000
	Total	$ 81,000,000

(f) As well as the above, interest rates on all mortgages to be reduced to 6% as from January, 1937; this will amount to about four million dollars annually; this applies over the whole province.

This will, during the new contracts, bring the entire benefits up to well over the $100,000,000 mark as an estimate of the advantage.

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Further Advantages of Scheme:

Debt Adjustment automatically operative in areas affected;

New Agreements covering mortgages written up whether individuals apply for adjustment or not;

No Court action necessary;

Immediate relief of approximately eighty-one million dollars with further annual advantage of four million dollars, under (e) above;

Ready Acceptance of Agreement:

Over 95% of the people reached to date in the open prairie section of Saskatchewan have accepted the new agreements;

Under the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act it required two years and four months to arrange an adjustment of $5,657,000;

Under the latter plan the above results were obtained in less than two years.

No Weakening of Credit:

Voluntary action with automatic provisions assures no weakening of credit standing or of public confidence.

A definite, comprehensive scheme.

June 30, 1937.

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Friday, August 20, 1937.

TAXATION REVENUE NEARLY DOUBLED SINCE 1933

Total of $190,852,000 for 4 Months Up $92,000,000 From 1933 Figure of $98,582,000--Income Tax $86,000,000 as Against $41,000,000 4 Years Ago--Sales Tax Likely to Exceed Income Tax--Customs Gaining Slowly

Final figures covering taxation revenue of the Dominion of Canada for the first four months of its current fiscal year(April, May, June and July) continue to be encouraging in a continuance of the substantial gain over last year. The total for the current year to date is $190,852,978, an increase of nearly $36,800,000 over last year and more than $92,000,000 above the depression low of $98,582,602. As the table below shows, there has been a steady improvement in the past 4 years, with the current figures ahead of those of 1931 by no less than $74,000,000.

Income Tax Leads So Far.- In the sources of revenue, Income Tax is an easy leader, with over $86,000,000, up nearly $16,000,000 from last year. This tax has shown a rather surprising increase, being more than double the 1933 total of $41,705,588, and by far the largest amount so far this year ever collected in the period. It is up $33,000,000 above the Sales Tax, which, with some other items, has been responsible for over $53,000,000 for the 4 months. Most of the Income Tax, however, came in during May in the initial payment, and the Sales Tax should gradually gain on the other and by the end of the fiscal year (March 31, 1938) might bring in a total of well over $140,000,000, with the Income Tax reaching $110,000,000 or slightly more.

Customs Duties Disappointing.- The leader of some years ago, Customs Duties, is making a rather disappointing gain, up only $6,372,000 since 1934, and representing less than one-sixth the total revenue, at $31,151,553. The source, of course, is the imports of merchandise into Canada, and the revenue, over $8,000,000 below the total even of 1931, indicates how far Canada and world trade still has to go.

($)	1937-38	1936-37	1935-36	1934-35	1933-34	1931-32
CUSTOMS DUTIES	31,151,553	26,422,959	24,410,512	26,779,308	19,183,209	39,572,827
EXCISE TAX....	53,095,987	39,434,198	32,175,101	34,385,279	25,350,170	12,216,173
EXCISE DUTIES.	17,886,675	15,488,410	15,141,205	13,857,574	12,069,187	17,596,880
INCOME TAX....	86,455,385	72,483,174	54,407,905	42,632,981	41,705,588	47,131,583
SUNDRY COLL...	263,378	247,068	241,894	252,930	274,448	368,649
TOTALS.....	190,852,978	154,075,809	126,376,617	117,908,072	98,582,602	116,886,122

GREAT LAKES PAPER CO.

Allocation Agreement Ends Next Year

Allocation of tonnage between the trustees of the Minnesota and Ontario Paper Company and The Great Lakes Paper Company has been modified and the agreement will now terminate at the end of 1938. It will be recalled that as of Nov. 1, 1932, an arrangement was made by the trustees of "M. & O." with the receiver and liquidator of "Great Lakes" under which the trustees were obligated to allocate to the Great Lakes mill for manufacture certain portions of the newsprint requirements of M. & O. This allocation had been upwards of 20,000 tons per year. Recently the trustees of M. & O. entered into a further arrangement with the new Great Lakes Company whereby the agreement was modified to provide for continuance of the agreement for the balance of 1937, with an allocation of newsprint for 1938 of 10,000 tons, the entire agreement to terminate at the end of next year.

COMPARISON BY MONTHS NICKEL-COPPER EXPORTS

	COPPER 1937		COPPER 1936		NICKEL 1937	NICKEL 1936
JAN....	278,443 cwt.	$ 2,810,000	197,016 cwt.	$ 1,607,000	$ 3,656,000	$ 3,541,000
FEB....	265,250 "	2,881,000	334,800 "	2,680,000	4,290,000	4,120,000
MAR....	412,446 "	5,280,000	359,227 "	2,927,000	6,281,000	5,278,000
APR....	239,245 "	3,641,000	296,959 "	2,534,000	3,289,000	3,001,000
MAY....	355,147 "	4,987,000	428,870 "	3,577,000	5,354,000	3,192,000
JUNE...	372,452 "	5,118,495	252,337 "	2,150,043	5,376,806	3,517,651
JULY...	440,131 "	5,959,019	360,901 "	3,080,981	4,672,131	3,423,723
TOTALS	2,363,114 cwt.	$30,676,130	2,229,190 cwt.	$18,556,635	$32,919,329	$26,073,192

BELL TELEPHONE CO.

Toronto Ahead of American Cities.

According to official figures of the Bell Telephone Co. of Canada on residence telephone development in the larger cities of Canada and the United States (750,000 population and over), Toronto leads all other metropolitan centres by a good margin, with 68.8 home telephones per 100 families. Chicago comes next with 58.2 telephones, then Los Angeles with 55.4, Boston with 53.7, and Pittsburgh with 48.9. For the first 6 months of 1937 there was a net increase in telephones in service in Toronto of 3,747, compared with a net increase of 1,238 for corresponding period of 1936.

INTERNATIONAL NICKEL During the first half of 1937, earnings of International Nickel Co. of Canada showed a surplus of 58½ percent over the dividend r[illegible] $1 a share. With large holdings of cash and other working resources, [illegible] to capital expenditures well in hand, discussion of further

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WHEAT CROP UNLIKELY TO REVERSE BANK EARNINGS

Demand for Current Loans Improving Slowly but Steadily With General Business Betterment

While the failure of most of the Canadian chartered bank stocks to show any appreciable recovery from their low points of the year to date is apparently attributable, in some part at least, to disappointment over the small wheat crop to be financed this Fall, it may also be presumed to reflect the continued extreme ease of short-term money. The reduced supply of wheat to be carried undoubtedly removes a potential source of loans that would have helped the banks' earnings considerably, but the consensus of opinion among leading bankers is that absence of this revenue will not be sufficient to reverse the moderate upward trend of bank earnings, in view of the gradually improving demand for other loans with general business going ahead vigorously.

ABNORMALLY LARGE LOW-INTEREST, SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS

On the other hand, the banks are continuing to carry an abnormally large volume of short-term security investments at insignificant rates of interest. This situation is reflected by yields on Dominion 3-month treasury bills. The latest issue was sold at 0.636%, which, while slightly better than the July 15 low of 0.632%, is still considerably below the 0.805% rate set on March 15, just about the time the bank stocks were selling at the highest prices of the year to date, after a substantial advance during January and February. This plethora of funds on which no appreciable interest return can be obtained is still a major problem of the Canadian banks from the standpoint of earnings, although it is being alleviated by the slow but steady pick-up in loans.

UNITED STATES BANKS' INVESTMENTS DECREASING

In this respect the position of the Canadian banks is less favourable than that of institutions in the United States, where loans have risen more rapidly, and where, moreover, investments have declined as loans have risen. The latest Canadian bank statement, as at June 30, showed total loans up $115.4 millions, or 11% over the preceding year, while the August 4 returns of Federal Reserve member banks in 101 leading cities in the United States showed total loans up $1,592 millions, or 19%. Still greater was the contrast between an increase of $73.8 millions, or 5% in security investments of Canadian banks, as against a drop of $1,559 millions, or 15%, in the investments of the United States banks during the 12-month period. A similar declining trend of short-term investments would be warmly welcomed by Canadian bankers. There does exist a school of thought which holds that bank investments will not decline materially from current levels, but that increasing loans and deposits will tend to balance each other, increasing total volume of outstanding credit. In any case, it is obvious that there is wide scope for expansion of loans and the trend is pointing gradually in that direction.

BRAZILIAN TRACTION

July Adds $480,862 to Gain in Net

After a sharp increase in net earnings for Brazilian Traction, Light & Power Co. for the month of June of $494,359--the best showing in years--a July gain of almost an equal amount, $480,862, will be regarded as most encouraging for the balance of the year. The July increase brings the total gain in net for 7 months to $2,343,346, which is equivalent to well over 30 cents a share.

Gross Up $4,110,091.- As in net, the gain in gross for July was not quite equal to that of June, but nearly so, and the second highest this year--$798,961, compared with $811,862 the previous month--bringing total gain so far to $4,110,091.

McCORMICK'S LIMITED

Earnings Up on Eve of Merger

In a statement to FINANCIAL COUNSEL, Nathan Cummings, President of McCormick's Limited, declares that the Company is enjoying more profitable operations for 1937 than it did last year. There is now being prepared a statement covering the first 28 weeks of the current year and this will be presented to security holders at a special meeting to be held in Toronto on August 24. On this occasion, bondholders and shareholders will be asked to approve a plan of reorganization and merger with George Weston Limited. Under this plan, holders of the 5½% prior lien bonds will be offered new 4½% guaranteed prior lien bonds of the Weston Company in addition to cash of $2.50 per $100, while mortgage bondholders (5½%) will receive 90% new 4% bonds.

SPECIAL ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE

GAINS IN RAILWAY GROSS.....Almost All From Freight
LONDON INTEREST IN CANADA...Stocks Chiefly Attractive
DONNACONA PAPER COMPANY.....Newsprint Output Up 38%

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B R A Z I L ' S P R O G R E S S : I N D U S T R Y , T R A D E , A N D E X C H A N G E

Fairly Rapid Industrial Progress in Past Few Years--Output of Coal, Pig Iron and Cement Sharply Up--Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Brazil

The issue by the Banco de Brazil of a Statistical Bulletin covering records to the end of 1936 is of interest to shareholders of Brazilian Traction in supplying details of Brazil's steady industrial progress for some years past. Since 1928, for instance, domestic production of coal has increased by 100 percent, output of pig iron and sheet iron by 200 percent, and cement by about 400 percent (some indication of this appearing in the development of Brazilian Portland Cement Co. in which there is a large Canadian interest through "Canadian Foreign Investment"). At the same time, there has been a substantial increase in imports of iron and steel manufactured goods, including machinery, motor vehicles, etc.

Lower Relative Importance of Coffee.- While coffee still continues to represent nearly one-half the total exports of the country, its relative importance (and percentage) has decreased. Other exports have been growing, such as cotton, meat, and fruit--bringing a greater diversity and less dependence on the single commodity.

German and Japanese Trade.- The sharpest increase in foreign trade has been with Germany, the value of imports from that country growing from £1,959,000 (on a gold basis) in 1932 to £7,056,000 in 1936. The balance of trade with Germany has been reversed, however, from £1,300,000 in favour of Brazil in 1932, to £1,900,000 in Germany's favour in 1936. Brazil has largely increased its cotton exports to Japan in recent years, its total exports rising from £60,000 in 1933 to £1,683,000 in 1936 (chiefly cotton, it is indicated).

Brazil's Debt Service.- In connection with a favourable balance for 1936, estimated by the Bank at £9,000,000, it is interesting to note that, under the Niemeyer Plan, total service on funded debt held in foreign countries is about £5,450,-000 (in gold) for 1937. Adding service in respect of arrears of commercial indebtedness to Great Britain and the United States of about £2,500,000, total annual payment on present basis would amount to approximately £7,950,000. This does not take into account the "invisible" trade balance of Brazil, which is difficult to estimate.

Agreement With U. S.- In commenting on these figures, the Quarterly Review of J. Henry Schroder & Co., London, refers to changes in the situation this year through the amount of new foreign investments that is liable to increase rapidly in a period of prosperity such as Brazil has recently been enjoying, and adds that "there is reason to believe that a not inconsiderable amount of flight capital from France has found its way to Brazil". The Review also comments upon the "important agreement" that was reached last month, involving the sale of up to $60,000,000 worth of gold by the United States to the Brazilian Government, for the purpose of promoting exchange equilibrium and facilitating the establishment of a central bank for Brazil.

H A M I L T O N U N I T E D T H E A T R E S

Dividend Suggests Increase in Earnings

Increase in the annual rate of dividend from $5 to $6 a share on the preference stock of Hamilton United Theatres at this time would suggest that the company is enjoying the improvement general to the industry in the Province of Ontario. This improvement is due in large measure to the betterment in general conditions and resultant larger attendances, and to the elimination of the amusement tax in the Province of Ontario, which was in the nature of a nuisance tax. The cumulative fixed dividend rate on Hamilton United preferred is $7 annually. At the beginning of 1935 the dividend disbursement was cut to a $4 basis, increased to $5 in December, 1936, and to $6 with the current declaration. Arrears of dividend approximate $16 per share.

C O L L A P S E N E A R O F " T E X T I L E " S T R I K E I N M O N T R E A L

With increasing numbers of employees returning to work at the mills in the Montreal area that have been reopened, the main foundation of the strike organized by officials of the National Catholic Syndicate against Dominion Textile Company appeared to be on the verge of collapse late yesterday. It is expected now that, with the protection that is being afforded to workers, the number returning will increase day by day. The effect of the situation in Montreal naturally would be extended to the areas outside the city, such as Magog and Montmorency. The sentiment in favour of the Company's declared policy, namely, to abide by the results of a settlement under the Fair Wage Act of the Province of Quebec that comes into operation on Sept. 1, has been strengthened by the vigorous denunciation of Premier Duplessis a few days ago of the tactics of the officials of the Syndicate, and also by the cool reception accorded the Syndicate in its appeal to the Montreal Trades Council for co-operation.

Reopening of Outside Mills.- Probably a few days will pass before any attempt is made to reopen the outside mills, four of them connected directly with Dominion Textile, and a fifth, at Valleyfield, operated by Montreal Cottons, a subsidiary. Once the strike has faded in Montreal, it is not anticipated that much opposition would be offered by officials of the Union to the outside mills starting to operate under normal conditions.

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RAILWAY GROSS GAIN ALMOST ENTIRELY FREIGHT

Revenue From Freight Up $11,483,500 Against Rise Of $712,600 In Passenger Revenue For 5 Months

Passenger revenue has contributed little to the improvement in gross operating revenues of the Canadian railways to date this year, according to data now available covering the period to the end of May. More than 83% of the aggregate rise of $13,818,900 in gross operating revenue was due to freight revenue which improved $11,483,500 in the first five months of the year. Against this the increase in passenger revenue was only $712,600.

Revenue Gain Less Than In Number Of Passengers.- The small increase in passenger revenue is due to the fact that growth of revenue has not kept pace with expansion in the number of passengers carried. In the first five months of this year the two roads carried 8,890,707 passengers which was an increase of 4.9% in contrast with the gain of only 0.5% in passenger revenue. This in turn reflected a substantial increase in the average passenger receipt per passenger per mile, a trend which is shown in the following table:

Year	January	February	March	April	May
1937..	2.173c	2.030c	2.037c	2.139c	1.985c
1936..	2.379c	2.305c	2.249c	2.253c	2.052c

Freight Traffic More Remunerative.- The trend in passenger receipts per passenger per mile was thus exactly opposite to the average freight receipt per revenue ton mile. The upward tendency in this item is illustrated in the following table:

Year	January	February	March	April	May
1937..	.939c	.987c	.990c	.979c	1.079c
1936..	.949c	.951c	.960c	.963c	1.047c

Comparative Figures.- Comparative record of freight and passenger revenue for May and the first five months of the current year follows:

	--- FREIGHT ---		--- PASSENGER ---		---- TOTAL ----	
(In Thousands)	1937	1936	1937	1936	1937	1936
May.....	$22,697.5	$20,838.4	$2,852.6	$2,617.8	$29,256.9	$27,022.2
5 Months.....	106,081.5	94,598.0	14,464.3	13,751.7	137,257.0	123,438.1

WOODS MANUFACTURING

No Prospect Early Settlement Of Arrears

Business of Woods Manufacturing Company Limited continues to register moderate progress in the current year but there is no likelihood of action being taken with respect to preferred dividend arrears for some time yet FINANCIAL COUNSEL understands. No dividend has been paid since January, 1931, on the 7% cumulative issue with the result that arrears amounted to $45.50 per share as of June 30th, 1937. In 1936 earnings equalled $4.75 per share on the preferred but the objective of the board, it is understood, is to build up stronger liquid position before resuming dividends. At the end of 1936 net working capital amounted to $1,078,181 with current assets 3.8 times current liabilities but current assets consisted almost entirely of inventories and receivables. Cash was only $27,710 and was almost balanced by a bank loan of $26,000.

LAKE SULPHITE PULP

Interim June 30th Balance Sheet

Interim balance sheet of Lake Sulphite Pulp Company Limited as at June 30th, 1937, shows cash of $1,790,534 with $865,084 due from underwriters on subscriptions to capital stock. Investment in and advances to Nipigon Corporation Limited are carried at $502,500 while expenditure on account of real estate and construction stands at $340,269. Other smaller items bring total assets to $3,595,567. The main liability item is $250,000 due on purchase of shares of Nipigon Corporation. Accounts payable and accrued expenses totalled $45,546, the issued capital stock of 150,007 shares representing the only other liability items.

ASSOCIATED TEL. & TEL.

Improvement In Six Months' Earnings

A moderate increase in gross revenue and reduced charges are reflected in a considerable improvement in net income of Associated Telephone & Telegraph Company (parent company only) for the six months ended June 30th, 1937. With gross revenue up from $555,606 to $571,088 and miscellaneous deductions down from $91,563 to $10,000, net income rose from $16,495 to $105,855. On the combined 7% and $6 1st preferred stock earnings per share jumped from 21c to $1.32. This indicated coverage of first half dividends of 98c on the 7% and 84c on the $6 preferred. Arrears as of July 1st amounted to $34.51 on the former and $29.58 on the latter. A decrease in net working capital from $793,118 to $439,929 in the six months reflected a reduction in the amount due from subsidiaries from $436,689 to $134,115. This was partly balanced by an increase in investments from $43,803 to $201,572.

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Saturday, August 21st, 1937.

L O N D O N I N T E R E S T I N C A N A D I A N S

Chief Attention Being Directed To Papers, Utilities, Constructions And Industrials

A Canadian who has been stationed in London for the past year or so and who is presently paying a visit to his connections on this side has some interesting things to tell of conditions in Great Britain and the marked turn of investment interest there to American and Canadian securities. In regard to Canadian issues he stated that the greatest interest is being displayed in corporation shares, especially those representing situations that hold special promise for the future.

Effect Of Changed Conditions.- This is due largely to the fact that, in a speculative sense, new conditions that have arisen in England have acted as a discouragement to home shares. The building boom that has been in progress in recent years is regarded as having passed its peak which implies lowering rather than expanding earnings and dividends of contributory industry. The British defence programme and the taxes emplaced upon excess profits is a further restrictive condition that has reacted upon the stock market situation. Interest in gold mining has been diminishing for some months past.

Seeking Progressive Situations.- With large funds accumulating available for profitable investment and speculation, it is natural that the individual looks to outside fields more and more, and this is now being done. Considerable accumulation of Canadian pulp and paper shares, sound utilities, construction issues and heavy industrial issues has been in progress, but this observer believes that the trend in this direction will continue to develop for some time to come. On this basis he feels that the Canadian market situation is bound to reflect the force of London and other overseas buying for some time to come with, perhaps, considerable new leadership from this direction becoming effective.

Definite Quality Required.- English traders are looking for certain things in their search for attractive outside securities including (a) immediate and prospective attractive yield; (b) excellent possibilities for capital enhancement; and (c) the reasonable assurance of continued forward movement in business, not only for a few months but for an extended period.

More Bullish Than In Years.- English interest in Canadian shares is usually based upon sound observation and close knowledge, and investigations for individual organizations and whole groups are being made continuously both by visitors to Canada as well as by correspondents and connections on this side. This visitor states that English opinion on Canada is more bullish today than at any time since before the Great War.

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D o n n a c o n a P a p e r C o m p a n y

PRODUCTION UP--ROUNDING OUT OF PLANT PROGRAMME MEANS CONTRIBUTION TO EARNING POWER

FINANCIAL COUNSEL learns that for the first seven months of the current year newsprint production tonnage of Donnacona Paper Company shows an increase of about 38% as compared with the corresponding period of last year, while total sales of insulating board have advanced approximately 10%. The month of July registered gains in both departments. The outlook for the balance of the year is good.

Plant Plans Complete Next Month.- With the programme of capital expenditures on improvement and betterment of physical plant now nearing completion--final machinery installations expected by September 15--the company's operation takes fuller shape than at any other previous time. From now forward earning effectiveness is expected to more generously reflect the advantages in the operating picture that have been introduced. Officials of the organization are reported to be thoroughly satisfied with what has been accomplished so far, and already the expansion in earnings during the current year gives to the broadened activities a background of much greater assurance than when the betterment plan was devised.

Encouraging 1938 Position.- Steadily from month to month this year sales and earnings of the organization have advanced considerably in comparison with a year ago, but through the coming year, with new contracts and business effected and in sight the position for sale volumes, gross and net figures will be substantially better.

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D o m i n i o n S t e e l & C o a l

SOFT COAL PRICES ADVANCING IN UNITED STATES SUGGESTS PROBABLE TREND IN CANADA

One of the factors presently at work in the soft coal industry in the United States is the move that is being made by the Washington Administration to advance the price of soft coal produced in that country, in order to extend improvement to the coal mining industry and expand employment. The trend on the other side is interesting to Canadians in view of the large production industry in this country, particularly in Nova Scotia. Rising prices across the border would no doubt find at least some reflection on this side which would prove beneficial to Dominion Coal Company as well as to Dominion Steel & Coal Corporation.

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F I N A N C I A L C O U N S E L
Royal Bank Bldg., 360 St. James W., Montreal, Que.

C 119187

Saturday, August 21st 1937

THE STOCK MARKET PENDULUM

THE DAY ON THE CANADIAN STOCK MARKETS

	Aug. 20 1937	Aug. 19 1937	Aug. 18 1937	Aug. 21 1936	Aug. 23 1935
Montreal Corporations	23,310	22,400	31,100	22,821	15,924
Montreal Mining	57,400	128,200	117,300	603,812	20,445
Total (Montreal)	80,710	150,600	148,400	626,633	36,369
Toronto Corp. and Mining	384,000	513,000	666,000	1,573,100	488,590
TOTAL Montreal - Toronto ..	464,710	663,600	814,400	2,199,733	524,959

ANOTHER SAG IN STOCK MARKETS

Interest Of Bulls Dampened By Continued Sino-Japanese Complications--Canadians Dull

The Wall Street market took a further step downward yesterday as increased hesitancy was evidenced by the bulls who, for reasons other than the Sino-Japanese situation, appear to be in constructive mood on industrial, utility and other selected shares. New York leaders were again the heaviest losers and chart followers began to take the swing seriously and profer predictions that further recession would become necessary before support became effective. This, however, is the usual type of opportunist gossip of market analysts anxious to prove themselves right irrespective of all other considerations. Their views, while interesting to tape followers have time and again proven incorrect, and are usually entirely ignored in any event by the investment type of buyer or trader interested only in the broader rather than day to day swings. As a matter of fact, there has been little alteration in market fundamentals in the week, but buyers--already having substantial commitments--are desirous of waiting for further definition of conditions that might have strong market influence in due course.

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Orderly Price Movements.- Canadian share action was orderly and if values shaded lower there was no sign of a developing desire to liquidate but, rather, to simply hold back on buying until the outlook cleared a little.

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Abitibi.- The preferred shares continue to meet what looks like confident demand. They ruled firmer yesterday at 61, up 1. The common eased back a fraction to 6.

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General Steel Wares.- Directors met yesterday and approved the principles of the plan for liquidation of preferred stock dividend arrears. In due course, after details are finalized and all legals attended to, notices will go forward outlining the proposals and indicating when they will be submitted to shareholders for approval. The preferred at 106 to 104⅞ and common at 17 to 16 worked somewhat lower on the session, largely in general market sympathy, as indications were forthcoming that the director's proposals will be favourable to the shareholders.

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Dosco.- Recent good demand was present although buyers made no effort to advance the price which continued at around 23¾ to 23¼.

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Paper Shares.- Moderate heaviness continued in the leaders and others but without any great development in pressure. As a matter of fact, followers of this group continue bullish and regard periodic setbacks as presenting fresh buying opportunities.

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Consolidated Paper.- On a moderate fractional easing of ⅝ to 18 the stock was quite active and seemed to act well.

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Lake St. John.- Giving one of its typical market demonstrations the stock was strong and quite active in respect of its small floating supply. It advanced from 83 to 89, a new high, and closed at 85, still up 2½ net on the session. Since its listing a few weeks ago the issue has risen from around 67. A highly satisfactory corporate background is the factor in the situation, plus the sensitivity of the stock marketwise.

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Base Metals.- Prices again moved lower. There were no special developments recorded.

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Asbestos.- Recent heaviness is due to some fears that the company's business in the Orient may be at least temporarily disrupted by the Sino-Japanese situation. It closed at 85, off 3.

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Brazilian.- Market trends as well as disappointment over the result of the second Pan-American coffee conference affected the issue which eased back 1 to 24¾. While price parity and export quotas were not settled other matters decided were constructive and progressive.

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Coll Mr King's Fourth Administration

C 119188

1938

Finance

Budgets
Bank of Canada
Tariff Reductions
Housing & Home Improvement Plan
Assistance to Municipalities.

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FINANCE C119189

Budget 1936 (May 1) (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 1.A.)

Substantial reductions in duties; (vol III sec 1.A.3)

Increases in British preference; (vol III sec 1.A.4)

Budget 1937 (February 25) (vol III, sec 1.B.)

Previous year's deficit cut over 50%; anticipated deficit not to exceed $35,000,000;

Extensive improvements in financial position through refinancing of funded debt at lower rates of interest;

U.K. agreement negotiated on basis of tariff reductions;

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Budget 1938 (June 16) (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 1.C)

Nearest approach to balanced budget since 1929/30;
(previous year's deficit reduced by almost 5/6);

No changes in customs tariff (first time since 1912);
(see also vol III, sec 3)

All major products used in building of houses exempted from sales tax;

Revenue highest in history; enhanced national income;

Average interest rate on total outstanding funded debt reduced to approximately 3½%;

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Bank of Canada Act, 1934: (See Record of Govt. vol III sec 2.A.2)

created private institution to which was transferred control of currency issue, of national gold reserves, and of certain government securities;

Board of Directors elected by private shareholders;
Governor and Deputy-Governor by Government (7 years)
Deputy Minister of Finance non-voting director;

Bank of Canada Amendment Act, 1936: (vol III, sec 2.A3

Government assumed predominant share in ownership by acquiring new issue of $5,100,000 Class B shares representing 50.5% of share capital (original capital of $5,000,000 Class A shares still held by public);

Tenure of Directors in office not affected; 6 directors to be appointed by holder of B shares, each to have 2 votes for time being;

Bank of Canada notes to be printed bilingually (replacing outstanding notes printed either in English or in French);

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Vote of Governor (or Deputy Governor) to be subject to approval by Governor-in-Council;

Bank's power to hold long-term securities enlarged;

Gradual retirement of note issue of chartered banks to involve increase in issue of Bank of Canada notes;

Bank of Canada Amendment Act, 1938: (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 2.A.7)

Government assumed 100% ownership of capital stock by purchase of all Class A shares; capitalization reduced to $5,000,000 (now wholly owned by Government);

Henceforward 11 Directors:
Governor, Deputy Governor, Deputy Minister of Finance (ex-officio, non-voting), as previously;

Directors elected by original private shareholders to remain in office until end of terms, but are now Government directors;

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There has been no intention of making the Bank merely a department of government, or a political arm of government. The Bank is intended:

to regulate credit and currency;

to control and regulate the external value of the national monetary unit;

to mitigate fluctuations in general level of production, prices, trade and employment;

to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada.

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Saskatchewan Debt Adjustment: (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 2.B)

Tariff Reductions under Liberal Government (vol III, sec 3; vol III, sec 1.A.3)

1936 reductions under <u>all</u> tariffs	37	items
reductions under B.P. tariff only	30	"
reductions under B.P. and Intermediate only	20	"
reductions under Intermediate only	11	"
reductions under Intermediate and General only	6	"
	104	"

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1937 over ¼ of total imports from U.K. entered duty free;

In implementing Liberal policy, U.S. and U.K. trade agreements were important factors;

U.S. agreement (November 15, 1935)
duty reduced on 68 items
" removed entirely on 20 "

77 items bound to intermediate rate
15 items " " free list

(See also Record of Govt. vol III, sec 4.B)

U.K. agreement (Feb. 23, 1937)
duty reduced on 179 items
duty bound against increase on 246 "

In no case was increase in British preference secured by increasing duty against another country.

(See also vol III, sec 4.C)

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C119196

For Department of Finance connection with Housing and Home Improvement and National Housing Act - (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 6.D)

Assistance to Municipalities (See vol III, Sec 6.Q)

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Housing and Home Improvement Plan (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 6.D.)

with co-operation of lending institutions, plan for repairing and modernization of homes instituted November, 1936;

Legislation of 1937 session guaranteed approved lending institutions against losses up to 15% of aggregate value of loans granted (limit of Government risk, $7,500,000);

Loans to be made solely to owners of property for purpose of repairs, improvements and additions to rural and urban homes;

Loans not to exceed $2,000 on any single property; 3-year term for loans of $1,000 or less, 5 years for loans over $1,000, at maximum charge of 3½% discount;

Plan approved by Parliament February 25, 1937; (See vol II, sec 11.B.1)

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As at July 23, 1938, over 46,000 loans, aggregating nearly $18,250,000;

The Dominion Housing Act showed certain defects in practice (appearing to favour urban as against rural communities through operation of lending mechanism). There were in many areas quite inadequate housing conditions, and a revived activity in the construction industry still was of primary importance. To deal with this situation -

The National Housing Act, 1938, (See Record of Govt. III.6.D.5 II.11.C (5)) was passed;

I. (primarily for families wishing to own their own houses)

Mortgage loans for high proportion total cost at low rate of interest and long-term monthly repayments;

Some $14,000,000 made available to prospective home-owners at 5%;

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Provision for advancing of loans jointly, 25% by Government, 75% by approved lending institution, up to 80% of "lending value" of new construction;

For low-cost homes not exceeding $2,500 assistance up to 90% of "lending value" made available;

Loans limited to construction of new homes complying with minimum standards of construction.

II. Low Rental Housing:

Provides for loans up to $30,000,000 to local housing authorities (private or municipal) to assist in construction of houses to be leased to families of low income;

Government contribution 80% of capital requirements in case of private (limited dividend) corporations; 90% in case of municipal authorities;

Provincial Governments to guarantee repayment of loans made to municipal authorities;

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During period of low rental project under the Act, and while money is owing Dominion, municipalities required to agree rate of local taxation shall not exceed 1% annually on total cost of project.

III. Dominion Assistance in Local Taxation: (See Record vol III, sec 6.D.7)

Provides for payment by Dominion government of following proportions of municipal taxes on new homes of which construction was begun between June 1, 1938, and December 31, 1940:

1st taxing year, up to 100%
2nd taxing year " " 50%
3rd taxing year, " " 25%

(Municipal taxes defined to include general municipal tax and school tax, but not local improvement or special taxes).

Municipalities to undertake to sell building lots at agreed minimum figures provided house is built for person who will own and occupy it, within one year, at construction cost not exceeding $4,000.

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C119201

The operation of this Act is expected to give renewed stimulus to the construction industry, to contribute to the lessening of unemployment, and gradually to improve housing conditions, especially for home-owners (and lessees) in low-income groups. As against every $1,000 paid in wages, the "tax-subsidy" (III, above) will cost Dominion government about $54.70, i.e., an amount much less than straight relief.

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Assistance to Municipalities in making Self-Liquidating Improvements: (See Record of Govt. vol III, sec 6.0.)

Municipal Improvements Assistance Act, 1938

to create employment on productive self-liquidating undertakings by providing municipalities with funds at low rate of interest;

basis anticipated increased net revenue sufficient to retire loan on amortization plan during useful life of project;

held that Dominion assistance which had effect of increasing burden of municipal taxpayers unjustifiable, hence aid restricted to self-liquidating projects.

Authorized aggregate principal of loans, $30,000,000;

Interest 2% per annum, payable half-yearly; security represented by securities of municipality, in form approved by Dominion, equal to amount of loan.

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Conditions of application for loans: (See Record of Govt. vol III; sec 6.C.3)

Municipality must satisfy Minister of Finance that proposed projects are self-liquidating;

Municipality must present certificate, approved by province, demonstrating urgent need and and that relief of unemployment locally will be assisted;

Project and loan application require approval of Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council of province in which municipality is situated;

Province so concerned must undertake to guarantee payment by municipality of principal and interest;

This Act provides means for undertaking much-needed municipal projects and improvements on terms more advantageous than any previously available;

To date, five provinces have undertaken to guarantee loans for important projects; the Government of Ontario, claiming "unfortunate experiences" in the past, has refused to guarantee loans under the Act.

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Coll. Finance.
Finance: General C119204
243.

Federal Grants to Assist in Centenary Celebrations

1934-35 Vote 361 Main Estimates

Grant in aid of the Four Hundredth Anniversary Celebration of the Landing of Jacques Cartier and to assist celebrations at Gaspe, Three Rivers, Ottawa and Niagara, to be disbursed under direction of the Treasury Board	$100,000
Tercentenary Committee of Three Rivers to assist the celebration in commemoration of the founding of that City	28,000

1936-37 (O.C.) 1657 of July 9, 1936 -
Committee in charge of the Vancouver Golden Jubilee
Paid from vote to assist in promoting tourist business in Canada - Vote 241, M.E. 1936-37 — 25,000

1937-38 (O.C.) 1228 of May 29, 1937 -
Eastern Townships and Sherbrooke Centenary
Paid from vote to assist in promoting tourist business in Canada - Vote 102 M.E. 1937-38 — 20,000

(Information furnished by Department of Finance, according to which these are the only cases of federal grants for such purposes).

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C 119205

Federal Grants to Assist in Centenary Celebrations

1934-35	Vote 351 Main Estimates	
	Grant in aid of the Four Hundredth Anniversary Celebration of the Landing of Jacques Cartier and to assist celebrations at Gaspe, Three Rivers, Ottawa and Niagara, to be disbursed under direction of the Treasury Board	$100,000
	Tercentenary Committee of Three Rivers to assist the celebration in commemoration of the founding of that City	28,000
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LIBERAL PARTY
Liberal Government Record
Finance

Comparison of Liberal and Conservative records - "Finance", prepared in case Mr. King had to speak on Budget.

1936
C 119206

Lawson Amendment an echo of Sir Henry Drayton - Ex. 1

cf. Amendment of Drayton, 1925 - (attached) Ex. 2

both imply failure of government

to retrench;

to reduce public debt;

to reduce taxes;

In both cases, Amendments moved at a time when broad effects of Liberal policies just beginning to be felt;

Record of Liberal Regime, 1922-1930 disproved claims of Drayton Amendment:

Public debt reduced -

Conservative (Meighen) budget of 1921 showed deficit of $81,000,000

Under Liberal Government (1921-1923) deficit reduced yearly -

balanced in 1924 (when net debt reduced by $36,000,000);

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Net reduction of public debt in years 1922-1930, under Liberal government - $276,000,000;

Surpluses in seven successive years.

Taxes reduced (1922-1930) -

Sales tax from 6% to 1%;

Income tax reduced and increase of exemptions for moderate incomes;

Cheque tax reduced;

Receipt tax abolished (1926);

Railway tickets, telegram, insurance premium taxes reduced;

Tariffs - substantial reductions on:

implements and machinery of production;

articles of domestic consumption;

(See Exhibit) 103.

Trade:

During Liberal years, 1922-1930, Canada's export trade attained new levels -

in 7 of 9 years Canada was fifth largest trading nation;

Canada led world in export in per capita exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods;

In 8 of 9 years favourable trade balance -

Total favourable balance 1922-1930 -

$1,500,000,000;

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C119208 Ex. 1

Budget Amendment

Votes and Proceedings
June 21st, 1938, page 471.

Mr. Lawson, seconded by Mr. Cahan, moved in amendment thereto,—That all the words after "That" in the said Motion be struck out, and the following substituted therefor:—

"this House regrets that the financial proposals submitted by the Minister of Finance for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1939, fail to make adequate provision for reduction of the excessive burden of taxation now borne by the Canadian people."

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C 119209 Ex. 2.

BUDGET DEBATE, 1925

Amendment moved by Sir Henry Drayton;
Revised Hansard, March 26, 1925 - page 1568

"That all the words after the word 'that' be struck out and the following subtituted therefor:

'Conditions in Canada urgently demand reductions of taxation, especially of the sales tax and other levies which have been increased by the present government; and the House regrets that the financial statements now presented show no evidence of the economy necessary to make such reductions possible, but rather disclose an alarming increase in the public debt'".

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1.3

C 119210

Record of Bennett Government:

Public debt increased -

deficits in every year 1931-35;

total net increase in public debt for 5 year period - $668,000,000;

Taxes increased -

Sales tax from 1% to 6%;

Income taxes increased and exemptions reduced;

Tax on cheques and money orders increased and exemptions reduced;

Tax on sleeping car and parlour car tickets re-imposed;

Excise taxes levied on many articles (soap, sugar, automobile tires, etc.)

Gold tax;

Special import taxes;

Tariff increased enormously -

Shackling of international trade accentuated forces of economic depression;

Valuations for duty purposes;

Currency dump duties;

Canada's total trade in fiscal year 1932-33 slightly more than 1/3 of level attained in 1928-29;

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p. 4.

Policies of Present Liberal Government :

Reduction of Deficits ~~Retrenchment~~ must of necessity precede reduction in taxation and in public debt;

Progress already achieved:

deficits (Fiscal Years ending Mar.31) 1936 - $160,000,000;
1937 - 78,000,000;
1938 - 14,000,000;

Tariffs reduced substantially -
in budgets of 1936 and 1937;
Can.U.S. Trade Agreement;
Canada-U.K. " " ;

Emphasis has been on reduction in implements and machinery of production and consumers' goods;
Present negotiations with U.S. - hopeful of general lowering of tariffs;

Trade has increased enormously under present government - notwithstanding world conditions and unprecedented drought;

Next step is reduction in taxation and in public debt -
Beginning re reduction of taxation envisaged in present plan of exempting from sales tax all materials used in construction of houses;

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C119212 Ex. 3

Liberal Record - 1921-1930

Finance

1. **Expenditure:**

   All expenditures during the time the Liberal Government was in office - on current or capital account - were met out of current revenue.

2. **Surpluses:**

   Budget balanced in fiscal year 1923-24. Surpluses in 7 succeeding years. Total surpluses of $273,000,000.

3. **Debt:**

   Total reduction (fiscal years 1921-22 to 1929-30) of $276,000,000.

4. **Taxation:**

   Income Tax:

   Rate reduced and exemptions increased for people of moderate income.

   Sales Tax:

   Reduced from 6% to 1%.

   Postage:

   2 cent rate in Canada restored.
   Penny postage to Empire restored.

   Cheque Tax:

   reduced to flat rate of 2 cents on cheques over $10.00.

   Nuisance Taxes:

   Abolished.

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Tariff:

Substantial reduction on:
Implements and machinery of production.
Articles of consumption.

Remission of Taxation:

Estimated that the reductions in taxation from 1926 to 1930 inclusive, meant a remission of $116,000,000, which otherwise would have been paid in 1930, had former rates been maintained.

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C 119214

Mr. Lawson claims Government has no Achievements to its Record in Solving Domestic Problems

Restoration of trade effected through government's policies
basis of national economy;
effect on business, employment,
railways, revenues &c.;

Total trade of Canada for calendar year 1937 highest since 1929;

For fiscal year ending March 31, 1938, aggregate external trade within $54,000,000 of two billion dollar mark;

Employment -
employment created through restoration of trade and stimulation of exports;
Farm Employment Plan;
Home Improvement Plan,
Youth Training Programme;

Bureau of Statistics Index of Employment,
May 1, 1938, higher than at same date any year since 1930;

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Bureau of Statistics Estimate of Unemployment in April, 1938, lower than same month in any year since 1931;

Total number afforded direct relief, May, 1938, lower than in same month in any year since 1932;

Drought -

Successful efforts to meet great national calamity of prolonged drought in Western Canada;

Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Programme (long-range shceme);

Relief on unprecedented scale - total number on direct relief in Saskatchewan, April 1938, 400,000 or 40% of total number on relief throughout Dominion -

(estimated population of Sask: 940,000);

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