


6"



# Photographic Sciences Corporation

**23 WEST MAIN STREET  
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580  
(716) 872-4503**

**CIHM/ICMH  
Microfiche  
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH  
Collection de  
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

**© 1985**

# Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- ☐ Coloured covers/  
Couverture de couleur
- ☐ Covers damaged/  
Couverture endommagée
- ☐ Covers restored and/or laminated/  
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- ☐ Cover title missing/  
Le titre de couverture manque
- ☐ Coloured maps/  
Cartes géographiques en couleur
- ☐ Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/  
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- ☐ Coloured plates and/or illustrations/  
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- ☐ Bound with other material/  
Relié avec d'autres documents
- ☒ Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion  
along interior margin/  
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la  
distortion le long de la marge intérieure
- ☐ Blank leaves added during restoration may  
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these  
have been omitted from filming/  
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées  
lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,  
mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont  
pas été filmées.
- ☐ Additional comments:/  
Commentaires supplémentaires:

- ☐ Coloured pages/  
Pages de couleur
- ☐ Pages damaged/  
Pages endommagées
- ☒ Pages restored and/or laminated/  
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- ☒ Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/  
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- ☐ Pages detached/  
Pages détachées
- ☒ Showthrough/  
Transparence
- ☐ Quality of print varies/  
Qualité inégale de l'impression
- ☐ Includes supplementary material/  
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- ☐ Only edition available/  
Seule édition disponible
- ☐ Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata  
slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to  
ensure the best possible image/  
Les pages totalement ou partiellement  
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,  
etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à  
obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/  
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	12X	14X	16X	18X	20X	22X	24X	26X	28X	30X	32X
					✓						

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



National Library of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol ➡ (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ▼ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole ➡ signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ▼ signifie "FIN".


Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

aire  
détails  
ues du  
t modifier  
ger une  
filmage

ées

errata  
d to  
t  
e pelure,  
on à

32X



A N  
Examination of the Principles,  
AND AN  
ENQUIRY into the CONDUCT,  
OF THE  
TWO B \* \* \* \* R S;

In Regard to

The Establishment of their Power, and their Prosecution of the War, 'till the Signing of the Preliminaries.

---

*In a LETTER to a Member of Parliament.*

---

The THIRD EDITION, reviewed and corrected.

---

• Nimirum, ut quidam morbo aliquo, et sensus stupore, suavitatem cibi  
• non sentiunt: sic libidinosi, avari, facinorosi, veræ laudis gustatum  
• non habent—sed si vos laus allicere ad recte faciendum non potest,  
• nec metus quidem a fædissimis factis potest avocare? Judicia non  
• metuitis? Si propter innocentiam, laudo: si propter vim, non intel-  
• ligitis, ei qui isto modo judicia non timeat, quid timendum sit? Quod  
• si non metuitis viros fortes, egregiosque cives: vestri, vos mihi  
• credite, diutius non ferent, nisi vero majoribus beneficiis obligatos,  
• quam ille quosdam habuit ex iis, a quibus est perditus—An vos estis  
• ulla re cum eo comparandi? Fuit in illo ingenium, ratio, memoria,  
• literæ, cura, cogitatio, diligentia. Multos annos regnare meditatus,  
• magno labore quod cogitavit effecerat, muneribus, monumentis, con-  
• giariis, multitudinem imperitam delenerat; suos præmiis, adver-  
• sarios clementiæ specie devinxerat—quid multa; attulerat jam liberæ  
• civitati, partim metu, partim patientia, consuetudinem serviendi.  
• Cum illo ego vos dominandi cupiditate conferre possum, cæteris vero  
• rebus nullo modo estis comparandi—sed ex plurimis malis quæ ab illo  
• Reipublicæ sunt inusta, hoc tamen boni est, quod didicit populus  
• Romanus, quantum cuique crederet, quibus se committeret, a quibus  
• caveret.

CIC. ORAT. PHILIP. 2da.

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. PRICE, near Temple-Bar.

M.DCC.XLIX.

DA 501

N5

E3

1749

th  
th  
as  
ap  
Pr  
the  
ber  
lift  
Car  
finc  
din  
own  
earn  
and  
the



AN  
**EXAMINATION**  
**OF THE**  
**PRINCIPLES, &c.**

SIR,

**T**HE same Motives which determined you to retire into the Country, and to give no farther Attention to public Business for the four last Years, produced, as you well know, the like desponding Sentiments in me. Worn out as I was with an Opposition of Twenty Years, disappointed by the Impotence of those, upon whose Prudence we relied, to obtain some Advantage for the Nation, from the Success of that Opposition; betrayed by the new Leaders, under whom we lifted the second Time, and duped by the affected Candor and Moderation of the *Two Men*, who have since improved every Weakness, and all the Wick- edness of this Age, to the Establishment of their own absolute and unconstitutional Power, I most earnestly desired to concur in the same Resolution, and to withdraw from that infected Abode, where the Contagion was become too rife and too ma-  
A  
lignant,



lignant, either to be cur'd or escap'd. But the Situation of my Affairs could not permit me to retreat: I was still confined to this Capital; where I have lived in a daily Observation of some new Apostacy in private Men, some new Imposition upon the Public, and some new Insult upon the  
\* \* \* \*

Yet anxious and uneasy to me, as this State has been, I have no Reason to repine.—I have thence had Opportunities, which I could never otherwise have had, to discover my own Errors, and the Errors of the Nation, in Regard both to Measures and to Men; and to be thoroughly convinced, that we have fatally imputed the Original of all our present Misfortunes, to a false Cause; ascribing that to a Want of Integrity, which proceeded only from a Want of Power in our first Leaders; not arising from their Folly, or their Fault, but created by yourself, by me, by the whole Nation, blinded by Passion and Impatience, enflamed and infatuated by the infamous Misrepresentations, and treacherous Professions of a few false and interested Men, to whom, combining for our own Destruction, we resigned our Understandings at that Time.

I have frequently had Occasion to review the Folly of this Conduct, and to reflect on the strange Circumstances of that Event.—How an Administration of our own chusing, who, in the short Space of three Weeks, while we remained united to support them, had not only routed the obnoxious Minister of that Time, but changed the pacific Measures, and induced both the Parliament and his M——y to espouse the national Plan, who had already put the Treasury, the Army, and the Fleet, in a Word, the whole Force and Power of his Government, into the Hands of Men determined to pursue that Plan:—How these Men,  
who

who, till that Hour, had been the Favourites of the whole People, were deserted, in a Manner, by the whole People, by that Desertion were rendered incapable of doing any Thing farther for the People, and then finally delivered up, on Account of that Incapacity so created, to the groundless Rage and unjust Aversion of the People.

I have seen that Aversion managed with such Villany and Art, as to become a firm Support to a profligate Administration; who by Means of that, and that alone, have established themselves in a Kind of Power, as excessive as unknown, in this, or I might add, in any other Kingdom; running every Length of Insolence and Oppression; impudently counter-acting, backwards and forwards, again and again, every Principle they had formerly professed, just as it might serve the temporary Purposes of their own Ambition and Security; consuming the Strength and Substance of the Nation in a War, which they *purposely* rendered unsuccessful, because it was not *their own War*;—concluding that War with an in—P—e, which they have *wilfully* made precarious, shameful, and destructive, in the single View, to discredit the Measures of their Rival.

I have seen these Men uninterrupted in this wicked Course; and I still see you, and all Mankind, submissive to all this; tame, abject, passive, with your Eyes but half opened to your Condition;—stupidly insensible of the Misery you have undergone, or the Ruin that must ensue; and to this Hour doubtful, whether any Opposition should be made, or any Endeavours used, to redeem the Nation out of this Bondage, or to rescue your S—n out of the Hands of those treacherous Servants, who have taken him C—pt—e in his Cl—t, and still detain him Prisoner on his T—e.

In this State of Things, I think myself bound in

Duty to my King, my Country, and my Conscience, to correct the Consequences of my former Errors, as far as I am able to do it. Nor can it be done in a more effectual Manner, than by extending those Lights to you and others, which have undeceived me. I therefore send you, in these Sheets, a Deduction of such Facts, as will open the whole Secret of our m — Management, as well at Home as Abroad, from the Removal of the Earl of Orford, to this Day.

The two B——s, who had joined, and had long endeavoured to betray that Minister, had, by *that Merit* (with which the Public were not acquainted at that Time) recommended themselves as Coadjutors to the Opposition: They had played their Parts so well, as to conceal that Fact from the major Part of that Minister's Friends: They secured his \*\*\*\*\* upon that Change, under a Supposition, that they were necessary in his Councils to balance the Weight of his new Minister: — They had very early sown so great a Jealousy between the different Parties of the Opposition, by treating *seperately* with them *all*, that they soon became too strong to be removed by *any*: And they acted at first with so prudent a Submission to the new Minister, that he was scarce *desirous* to remove them: — They professed in the C—b—t, the same Zeal to pursue the same Measures, and promised to support them with all the Influence they had: In a Word, they then exercised upon the \*\*\*\*, and upon the new Minister, the same Talents of Imposition and Deceit, as they have since done upon every Individual, who has fallen in their Way; upon every Party, in their Turn; and at length upon the whole Nation. — By these Means they were suffered to remain in the same Stations, which they held before the Change.

But it was not *sufficient* for them to stand, in that

that Manner, in those Stations. They knew, that the Success of the War (which began to appear early, by the *Disunion* of *Prussia* and *Saxony* from *France*, by the Conquest of *Bavaria*, and the Expulsion of the *French* Armies out of *Germany*) in Despite of popular Impatience, or — Prejudice, would, in Time, give Credit to the new Minister and his Measures, both with the People and the K — ; and that, whenever that Credit was established, it would be more *natural*, that the *Revolters* from his Connection should reunite with him, than that They should be continued in the Posts they held ; And that, as the Difference had been occasioned *only* by the Want of those Employments, which at *first* the new Minister had not Power to give, it might be easily made up by the Disposal of those Employments, whenever that Minister should obtain the *Power of taking them away*.

It was necessary for the B — rs, by early Precautions, to prevent the Possibility of this Re-union : In Order to which End, they cultivated the Acquaintance they had lately made, and at length entered into actual Engagements with the Leaders of the *new* Opposition ; expressly stipulating in a proper Time to declare for them ; binding themselves, in the strongest Manner, and in all Events, either by Management, or Distress, to prevail upon, or to compel his \* \* \* \* \* to make Room for them, by the Removal of the Earl of G — le (then Lord C — t) and his Friends.

To prepare the Way for the more plausible and effectual Execution of this Plan, the *new* Opposition were *instructed*, what Part to take, and advised to declare openly (in dependance upon the passionate Temper, and perverted Opinion of the Times) for those *pacific* Principles, which till that very Moment, they had condemned themselves ;  
and

and for the Pursuit of which, they were even in that very Instant, impetuously driving at the Head of the Earl of Orford; while the two B——rs, without any Difficulty, continued to profess the same Principles (every where else but in the C——t) which they could do without any Suspicion, as having fostered the late Minister in all his Measures upon that System.

The Opposition were *instructed* farther to proceed with the utmost Indecency and Rage, to improve the Heat and Prejudices of the People, to a personal Attack upon the — himself; assured of Protection from the ill Consequences which otherwise would have attended their Manner of writing and speaking both without Doors and within, by the Power of the two B——rs in the C——t and in both H——s.

In farther Consequence of this *secret Union*, it was resolved, That the B——rs should sound forth the Praises, and scatter Terrors of the Abilities of these *new* Leaders; discouraging, at the same Time, with their best Advices, all spirited Attacks or Answers of the ——'s Servants, and his Friends, in either IJ—— of P——: While the Others, on their Part, should maintain an *affected* Distinction of Respect for the two B——rs in all the Excesses of their Fury against the Person and Measures of his ——: They were, likewise, to promote a favourable Opinion of the Candor, Integrity, Moderation, and true *English* Intentions of the two B——rs, in Contradiction to the *foreign* Intentions, which they were pleased to attribute to the new Part of the Administration; both which they were to inculcate upon the Underlings of their Party, and at the factious Meetings in the City of *Westminster* and *London*, and in every Corner of Sedition where they corresponded in the Kingdom.

When

When, by these unsuspected Arts, they were grown sufficiently popular, and had puffed one another into sufficient Credit; when their Rivals were sufficiently run down; when the Nation was sufficiently inflamed by the Impunity and Countenance of Faction, not to be able to judge coolly of the Measures of the Minister, or impartially of the Conduct of private Men; and when they had engaged the Opposition to that Degree of public Rancour and Abuse of the new Minister and his Friends, that there was no Probability they could ever reunite; they began to open in the C—b—t with that Kind of Language, which, tho' long used in every other Place, they had never ventured to use there before; obstructing, thwarting, and disputing every Measure of the War, which they had flattered his ———, and assured their Colleagues in the Beginning, they were *equally* determined to support.

His ——— observed the first Symptoms of this Difference of Sentiments, without much Concern at the Contests they created; which he thought natural enough, considering the different Schools of Politics in which they had been bred; satisfied besides they were too much his Creatures, and owed him too many Obligations, not, upon the whole, to support his Measures; and, perhaps, secretly pleased with the Notion, That this clashing of Interests among some of his M——s, might render him more independent of them all.

But he quickly found his Error: — The youngest of the B——rs had no sooner obtained the T——y, which, in the same unfortunate Idea, his ——— had preferred him to, but, like *Sextus Quintus*, who threw away his Crutches the Moment he was elected *Pope*, he put off all that humble Devotion, which he had ever before expressed, and by which he had so fatally deceived, and



and openly set himself up to oppose every Opinion of his R—l M—r.

The Observation of this Conduct, naturally moved his ——— to entertain more favourable Sentiments of G——le and B——. The Success at *Dettengben* improved that Disposition; and the wonderful Amendment in our foreign Affairs from the Commencement of the War to that Time, increased his Opinion of their Abilities, and augmented his natural Contempt for the inconsistent *Half-Measures*, and *Middle-Principles*, contended for by the two B——rs.

But what effectually extinguished the Remains of his ———'s Regard for them, was their Conduct in respect to the Propositions made by the Emperor at *Hanau*. Till then their Obstructions to the Measures of the War admitted some Possibility of doubt, whether it might not proceed from real and honest Opinion: But when the *pacific M—rs* were the Men to oppose this *Pacific Measure*, in which both the ——— himself and G——le would have willingly concurred; if it had not been rejected by them, to whom it was sent over for their *Approbation*, it was evident, That they acted upon no *Principles* either as to Peace or War; and that their sole Object was to defeat *any Measures*, whether of Peace or War, whether right or wrong, by which the new Minister might establish his Credit with his Master, or his Interest in the Nation.

It is now known, That this Accommodation might have been obtained at that Time, for the single Condition of furnishing an annual Subsidy, to support the Emperor, of about 100,000 l. Sterling, for six Years, or thereabouts, till *Bavaria* could recover the Desolation and Devastation of the War: And, on the other Part, the Emperor offered to withdraw his Forces from the *French*, to give his Daughter in Marriage to the Arch-Duke, and to secu.

secure the Imperial Dignity in Reversion to the House of *Austria*, by procuring the said Arch-Duke to be elected King of the *Romans*.—As to *France*, she was then willing to put an End to the War, without any Stipulation of any Kind whatsoever, in favour either of herself, or her Allies, upon the Terms of the *uti possidetis* only.

You, who must well remember the Clamour raised against Lord G——lle, and against his \* \* \* \* \* himself, on Account of this Transaction, will undoubtedly stand amazed, nay, will hardly think it possible, for the *two B—rs*, to have been, in fact, the Authors of *continuing* the War, which might have been happily and honourably ended at that Time; in Consequence of which, so many Thousands of Lives, and above thirty Millions had been *saved* to this Nation; much less that they should be able, at the same Time, not only to conceal this Fact, but to charge it on their Rival with Success. But the Storm was then raised so high against that Minister, and the Arts of the *two B—rs*, and their Allies of the Opposition, had so effectually imposed upon all Denominations of Men, that there was no Absurdity or Untruth, which as they still stood *unsuspected of Collusion*, they were not able, in Concurrence with each other, to impose upon Mankind.

But his \* \* \* \* \* saw the whole of this disingenuous Conduct; and saw it with that Abhorrence, which every Man of his honest Character must feel upon an Occasion of that Kind: Seeing also, that this was followed by the strongest Opposition to the Treaty of *Worms*, by which the King of *Sardinia* was secured to the Allies, (a Measure that, as the War was to be continued, was of the utmost Consequence to its Success, and without which, in Truth, it could not have been continued at



all) he could not help suspecting, that the Opposition both to this Treaty, and to the *Hanover* Troops in P——t, was secretly encouraged by the *two B——rs*; and, consequently, it is no Wonder, that when he found, they would neither give him Leave to get out of the War, nor suffer him to carry it on, he should cease to favour Men, so devoid of all Gratitude or Principle, so detestably combined against the Honour and Interest of his Family and Kingdom; who laboured to sacrifice the Nation in the Course of every public Measure; who betrayed him, while entrusted with his Councils; and who, tho' foster'd in his Bosom, instead of employing that Power (which, in Regard to Domestic Affairs, he had left entirely in their Hands) to the Support of his Government, unnaturally and ungratefully turned it against himself, by prostituting it to the Encouragement of a Faction, which they had nursed and trained up to such a dangerous Personality against his M\*\*\*\*\*, and his Family, that it shrewdly threatened, even then, the very Consequence, which it actually produced soon after; that is to say, an Attempt from the *Pretender*, and from *France*, to remove him from the T——e.

For in Proportion as the *two B——rs* observed this Wane of Favour, they incited their Allies, of the *Broad-Bottom*, to the more desperate Behaviour, the more abusive Language, and more violent Opposition to the Measures of the War. The \*\*\*\*\*'s Family and Ancestors were reviled, and treated with the utmost Contempt by the E—— of \*\*\*\*\* in the H—— of —, and by P\*\*\*\* and Others, with the same Indignity and Outrage in the H—— of —. His ———'s Message to the H—— of —, acquainting them with the Preparations for an immediate Invasion from *Dunkirk*, in Favour of the *Pretender*, was treated as a Joke, and ridiculed

Opposition  
ver Troops  
by the two  
Wonder,  
er give him  
ffer him to  
Men, so de-  
detestably  
erest of his  
to sacrifice  
ublic Mea-  
d with his  
his Bosom,  
in Regard  
ely in their  
nt, unnatu-  
himself, by  
a Faction,  
such a dan-  
\*, and his  
n then, the  
luced soon  
*Pretender*,  
T—e.  
r observed  
Allies, of  
Behaviour,  
olent Op-  
ar. The  
viled, and  
e E— of  
\*\*\* and  
age in the  
the H—  
eparations  
n Favour  
and ridi-  
culed

euled accordingly ; every Man was bullied and insulted, who dared to suppose, That there was one Man in *Britain*, who would take on in that Cause, if the Descent should be made ; and every Man was branded as a Fool, who manifested a Belief, that any Invasion was intended at all : — Nay this impudent *Affectation*, was carried to such an Extent, that there were Few, I believe, of the Leaders of the *Broad-bottoms*, (tho' not long after brought into the first and most considerable Employments in the Kingdom,) who did not persevere in this monstrous Disbelief of the most notorious Fact, till the breaking out of the Rebellion, made it impossible to deny it any longer : And by these Means, the poor, deluded Nation, were not only put off from their Guard in that critical and dangerous Conjunction, but such an utter and universal Discredit was given to the Design, that the Bulk of the People were inflam'd to greater Resentment against Lord G—e than ever ; upon a Supposition, That he intended by this Artifice, to cast a Slur of *Jacobitism* upon the Violences of the Faction, and to derive an Argument from thence, to be the better justified in a farther Prosecution of the War.

In this passionate and frantick Manner, the whole Sessions of 1743-4, or 1744, passed away ; every Day producing new Motions of Absurdity, for discarding the *Hanoverians*, for recalling all our national Troops, for abandoning our Allies, for giving up the Continent, for entrenching ourselves in our Island, &c. till, at length, the *French*, upon the Miscarriage of their intended Invasion, and upon the Action before *Toulon*, declared War against *Great Britain*, which was followed by a Declaration of War from *Great Britain* against *France* : And this falling out at the latter End of the Ses-

sions, when the Faction found it was become not a little difficult to urge any longer, that we were not *Principals* in the War, or to set themselves as strongly against it, as they had hitherto done, the Recess most opportunely furnished them with Time and Leisure, to concert some new Pretence to keep up the Spirit of their Opposition.

By this Management, however, the Nation had been wrought into so passionate a Temper, that his — did not think it prudent to make any Change in his Administration: And, at once conscious of the Effect of their own Operations, and presuming on the Strength they had thus wickedly acquired, the two B——rs steadily pursued the same Conduct of obstructing every Proposition in the C——t, for the effectual Prosecution of the War; of which it will be highly proper to furnish the World with three notable Instances.

First, at the latter End of the Year 1743, the new Part of the Ministry, after the *French* had attacked the Allied Army, commanded by his Majesty in Person, finding Hostilities commenced, and being certain, that the *French* would lose no Opportunity to attack us in every other Part, proposed to send a strong Squadron to the *East-Indies* under Commodore *Barnet*, to protect our Trade and Settlements there, and to be beforehand with *France*: But this Measure, which none of the Arts of Misrepresentation could give a *foreign Compection* to, was, by the two B——rs, absolutely rejected; because it must be supposed, recommended by their Rival: So that it may be truly said, That the *E—t-l—a C——y* stands indebted to *Them* for the Favours they have since received at the Hands of *M. de la Bourdonnais*.

The new Part of the Administration, in the next

become not  
that we were  
themselves as  
erto done, the  
them with  
new Pretence  
tion.

e Nation had  
Temper, that  
to make any  
at once con-  
erations, and  
thus wicked-  
adily pursued  
ery Proposi-  
l Prosecution  
highly pro-  
three notable

ar 1743, the  
rench had at-  
ded by his  
commenced,  
would lose  
y other Part,  
to the East-  
protect our  
be before-  
which none  
ould give a  
ro B——rs,  
e supposed,  
t it may be  
y stands in-  
ave since re-  
nnais.  
ion, in the  
next

next Place, being appriz'd of the great Differences subsisting between *Matthews* and *Lestock* in the *Mediterranean*, and very justly apprehending some ill Consequences from that Disunion, between the First and Second in Command, so fatally verified by the Event, earnestly desired to recall *Lestock*; and were so much the warmer in their Instances, because Suspicions had been entertained of his Fidelity: — And it is certain, that it was the current Report in *France*, of which we had repeated Advices here, that *Lestock* would not fight, if an Action was to happen: — But the two B——rs opposed this Motion also, and carry'd their Point as before: Which Conduct of theirs must appear infamous enough, when it is recollected with what a furious Malignity they afterwards carried on their Attempt to ruin *Matthews*, and with how much Art, and by what odious and unwarrantable Means they saved and protected *Lestock*; but infinitely more so, when it is known, that *Matthews* had declared, before he accepted the Command, That he could not trust him; That he accepted it at first, upon the absolute Condition, that the Other should be recalled, as soon as he arrived there; and that he constantly and earnestly press'd, to be permitted to lay down his Commission, when he found the Influence of the two B——rs prevented the Execution of that Promise.

But the third Instance is yet more glaring than either of the other two: — In the Campaign of 1744, the Allied Army, commanded by Marshal *Wade*, was Composed of 22,000 *English*, 16,000 *Hanoverians*, 12,000 *Austrians*, and 35,000 *Dutch*, consisting in the whole of 85,000 Men, the finest Troops that were ever brought into the Field: — An Army fresh, and flush'd with the Victory of the preceding Year. — The *French*, indeed,

indeed, by taking the Field before us, had gain'd a Place or two of the *Dutch* Barrier in *Flanders*; but upon the assembling our Army, and the Passage of the *Rhine*, which was effected by Prince *Charles* of *Lorrain*, in the middle of the Summer, with a Body of 60000 *Austrians*, the *French* were thrown into the utmost Confusion, and obliged to detach so great a Part of their Forces to oppose that Prince, that they left *Flanders* to be maintained by Marshal *Saxe*, with a Body only of 38,000 Men; their Garrisons being almost totally drain'd of Troops, and wholly unprovided for a Siege. In this State of Superiority, it was propos'd to attack Count *Saxe*: But Marshal *Wade*, who received his Orders from the two *B——rs*, either pretended, or really thought, that the *French* were too advantageously posted: And this, with other Difficulties and Misunderstandings between the *Dutch* and *Austrian* Generals, not yet thoroughly clear'd up, prevented any Attempt of that Kind. What then remain'd to be done, for it was obviously shameful, to reap no manner of Advantage from such a Circumstance in our Favour? It was evident, that, if you could not fight, from the strong Situation of the Enemy, you had nothing to do but to invest some of the fortified Towns of *France*, which must either fall into your Hands with great Ease, in the Condition they were then in; or oblige the Enemy to change his Situation, and expose himself to a Battle for their Relief; in which Case our great Superiority, and the Goodness of your Troops, ensured, in all human Probability, their absolute Defeat.

The Generals, *Ligonier* and *Somerfeld*, propos'd to undertake the Sieges of *Maubeuge* and *Landrecy*; two Places of prodigious Importance, which open'd

us, had gain'd  
er in *Flanders*;  
rmy, and the  
as effected by  
middle of the  
*Austrians*, the  
most Confusion,  
Part of their  
that they left  
hal *Saxe*, with  
their Garrisons  
ps, and wholly  
e of Superiori-  
unt *Saxe*: But  
orders from the  
really thought,  
ciously posted:  
and Misunder-  
*Austrian* Gene-  
up, prevented  
then remain'd  
shameful, to  
a such a Cir-  
evident, that,  
strong Situati-  
to do but to  
s of *France*,  
ads with great  
en in; or ob-  
ation, and ex-  
ief; in which  
Goodness of  
n Probability,  
eld, proposed  
nd *Landrecy*;  
ance, which  
open'd

open'd the Way into the very Heart of *France*; and which were then garrison'd but by two Battalions each: The said Generals engaged to effect this Service with Twenty Battalions, and Thirty Squadrons, which could have weaken'd the main Army, then Superior to the Enemy by 50000 Men, but by 7 or 8000 Men: All they desired more was a few Battering Cannon: And the whole *English* Train, (the finest which this Nation ever had abroad, and which had cost us as much again, as any Train had cost us in the late War, though never once used in this) lay then no farther off than *Ostend*; consisting, as I remember, of Sixty Twenty-Four-Pounders, Forty Twelve-Pounders, and Thirty or Forty Mortars: Not one of them, however, was permitted to be brought up: The *B——rs* would not suffer it; the War was not *their* Measure; they had *foretold*, it would be unsuccessful; and, in order to make their Words good, they had resolved, that unsuccessful it should be.

But it was necessary to colour this fatal Step by some plausible Pretence; and, at the same Time, if they could, to throw the Blame of their own Guilt upon their Allies, according to the usual Course of their Endeavours, through the whole of the War.

Upon this Requisition therefore of the Artillery, the Younger *B——r* shrugg'd his Shoulders; harangu'd upon the Virtues of Oeconomy; complain'd of the vast Burthen of the War; insisted, that the Expence was impossible to be borne, unless the *Dutch* could be brought to pay their Quota; urg'd, That we must try, whether they would not content to pay a Third, or at least a Fourth Part of the Charge; and concluded, That he could not justify his Conduct to his Conscience, or to Parliament, if he did not wait to see, what was possible to be done with them.

And



And, now, new Negotiations were set on Foot to regulate this important Point, which he well knew must consume, as it did, the whole Summer; or at least as much Time, as was necessary to prevent the Execution of this Plan.

And thus, under this affected Air of Prudence, and a false Regard to an Object of 18, or 20,000 *l.* Value at most (for the whole Expence proposed was but 70,000 *l.* for bringing up the Cannon, and about 7000 *l.* for opening the Ground before those two Places) this inviting Opportunity of carrying the Arms of the Allies, in the second or third Year of *this* War, whither they could never penetrate, till the last Year of *That*, conducted by the Great Duke of Marlborough, was lost.

The *two B——rs*, now become sensible that his ——'s Patience could not endure any longer; conscious that he must have determined within himself to abandon them, and to throw the entire Management of his Affairs into the Hands of the new Part of the Administration; and aware, that he had no other Expedient to save the Nation from being sacrificed in the Prosecution of the War, or to redeem himself out of those Fetters, which his old Servants, whom he had not only raised, but saved, were ungratefully preparing for him, The *B——rs*, I say, thus circumstanced, now thought it incumbent on them, to perform their Contract with the *Broad-Bottoms*: And, accordingly took that desperate Step, of forcing his —— to dismiss every Person in his Administration, for whom, after what had passed, he could retain the least Regard, or in whom he could repose any Confidence or Trust, in order to make Room for an equal Number of their *Confederates* in the Opposition: — All of them Men who had render'd themselves personally obnoxious to his——, either by promoting or countenancing such *personal*

*sonal* A  
Family  
upon h  
As

Tender  
will not  
But ther  
singular  
Silence.  
Practice  
that Gu  
decent  
fession o  
his Atta  
and put  
of declar  
ciples, c  
countena

His  
ing how  
believe,  
sufficient  
who ma  
good Pa  
the first  
tinues wi  
than alm

But t  
Persons v  
peared f  
It was th  
not worl  
vern by l  
they cou  
over the  
Understa  
most info  
Nothing  
unpreced

sonal Attacks on his Character, his Conduct, his Family, as had a Tendency to shake the C— upon his Head.

As I do not desire to enflame; as I have a Tenderness for some, and Charity for others, I will not be over particular in my Recollections: But there is one of the Number whose Case is so singularly black, that I cannot pass him over in Silence. He had been long guilty of treasonable Practices, and he knew his—had so many Proofs of that Guilt before him, that he thought it the most decent Part he could act, to make a frank Confession of all:—Accordingly, he did so; avowed his Attachment to the *Pretender* and his Cause, and put in for a Court-Absolution, on the Merit of declaring, that he had renounced his former Principles, quitted his former Party, and would never countenance either again.

His —, on the other Hand, not knowing how to help himself, and being prompted to believe, that he ought to esteem this Declaration a sufficient Security for the future Allegiance of him who made it, not only took all he had said in good Part, but suffered him to be placed in one of the first O—s about the C—n; where he still continues with greater Marks of Influence and Favour, than almost any other Man.

But the more obnoxious and dangerous these Persons were, so much the more proper they appeared for the Purpose of this audacious Attempt. It was the Business of the *B—rs*, as they could not work upon the Inclinations of their S—n to govern by his Fears; and, upon the same Principles, as they could not hope to establish their Authority over the People, by any longer Delusion of their Understandings, to confirm it by the proudest and most insolent Demonstration of their Power.

Nothing else can account for the irregular and unprecedented Manner, in which these Men were



introduced to him : — They were introduced in public, in a Body ; not by the proper Officers about the —'s Person, always in waiting for that Purpose, but by one of the B——rs himself, with all the Pomp and Ostentation that could attend the Glory of a Triumph : — Standing like a Pr—t—ct—r at the Elbow of an Infant K——, bloated with Pride, purpled and inflamed with the inward Workings of those various Passions, which may be supposed to agitate a Man in the very Act and Execution of such a Measure : — A Measure, which raised, in the same Instant, Amazement, Abhorrence, and Compassion in the Breast of all the Spectators of this unexampled Scene ; — who beheld, what had never been seen before in such a Light, and in one View, the Arrogance of a M——r, the Impudence and insolent Carriage of a F——, and the Fortitude of a distressed P——, forced out of his C——t to receive the L——w from his S——ts, in the Face of his People ; and yet, in Appearance, the only Man unmoved, throughout the whole Course of this unparalleled Transaction.

To look back upon this Event, and to know, that his M—— endured it, that the Nation connived at it, and that no fatal Confusion immediately followed from it ; is a Matter of Astonishment to us, the living Witnesses of this Conduct, and will surpass the Comprehension of all Mankind, who shall hereafter read the Story of these Times.

Ministers have been torn from Kings, and Kings have been obliged to stoop to the Power of great Subjects. — This was done in the Reigns of King *John*, of *Henry III.* of *Edward II.* and *Richard II.* But it was never done till the Tyranny of those Princes, by attempting openly the Laws and Liberties, and trampling upon all the Rights of the People and Mankind, had justified and reconciled that

that C  
Laws,  
but by  
Nation  
the Lo  
their P  
greater  
P——  
a mild  
mitted,  
Injustic  
such a  
such a  
that ev  
other C

And  
have ev  
tion, an  
cessary  
parent  
P——e  
own ;  
first Pri  
be, of  
against  
all toget  
their —  
the Pow  
neither  
their ow  
Abilities  
and Gen

The  
long loo  
may it  
this, and  
ruption,  
strument

that Conduct, by the great and superior Law of Laws, *Necessity* : — Nor even then was it ever done but by Force of Arms : The Force of the whole Nation armed against the Prince, and united with the Lords : — But that a Cabal, in the C——ls of their P——, of a P—— commanding Armies greater than any this Country ever paid before ; a P—— entitled to the Affections of his People, by a mild and just Government ; who had never committed, or attempted to commit, a single Act of Injustice, against any one private Man : — That such a Cabal should obtain such a M——y over such a P——e, is the first Instance of the Kind that ever dishonoured the Annals of this or any other Country.

And yet neither the Body of the People, who have ever loved their old monarchical Constitution, and that Prerogative, which they know is necessary to its Support ; nor the Peers, whose apparent Interest it is, to maintain the Honour of the P——e inviolate, from whom they derive their *own* ; nor the Commons, jealous, as, from the first Principles of Preservation, they must naturally be, of all *aristocratical* Encroachments, interposed against This, the worst *Species* of that *Genus*. — But all together, supinely, meanly, servily, suffered both their —, and Country, to sink prostrate under the Power and Insolence of a Faction, founded neither upon the Merit of their Fore-fathers, or their own ; upon an Extraction superior, or upon Abilities equal, to those of a thousand other Lords and Gentlemen in this Nation.

The secret Cause of this, however, cannot be long looked for, but it must be found. — And may it be a Lesson to all future Princes, in this, and every other Country, That though *Corruption*, in the Beginning, may be a proper Instrument to destroy the Liberties of a People, it

will become, in the End, an Engine to enslave the Prince himself !

But that baneful Influence had now shed its Venom upon all Orders of Men ; and, agreeable to the Virulence of the Humour, were the Eruptions it caused.

That putrid Body, of which the E— of O—— had been the Head, poisoned the very Air with the pestilential Breath they uttered on this Occasion : For though they looked on the Promotions of that Day, as so many Injuries to the Members of their own rotten Corps, the Interest they had in the *Cause*, made Amends for the *Effect*. Hitherto, the *two B——rs* had been considered but as the Rump of the C—b—t, but now they were become manifestly the Head : All Things were in their Power ; for they had subdued h—m who had the Distribution of all Things ; and hence they were led to extol this atrocious Outrage to the R—l Dignity, with an Impudence that was scarce surpassed by the Outrage itself : According to the Language they publicly used, in every public Place of Resort, it was a more glorious Illustration of the Excellency of Whig Principles, than ever had been displayed before ; not excepting the noble Stand made by *Hampden* in the Ship-Money Affair, or the united Efforts of the Nation against the Tyranny of King *James*.

In transferring, therefore, their Allegiance from the T—— to these pretended Supporters of it, we are to suppose, that they put in for a Share of the Patriotism they so highly praised : And we are sure, that in Return, they promised themselves every Boon and Gratification their greedy Appetites could crave, the Power of their Patrons bestow, or the Plunder of the whole Nation furnish.

The interested Part of the poor Tories, who had been drawn in to give their helping Hands to this

this C  
Bottom  
assigne  
the n  
come,  
was a  
the R  
about

Ev  
rable  
forese  
View  
joyce  
who  
and C

For  
ready  
to da  
appo  
And  
ders  
Few  
teref  
and  
ness,  
had

A  
them  
Men  
ther  
Cla  
Qu  
wh  
less  
thro  
gra  
spe  
Nu

this Confusion, by the cant Word of the *Broad-Bottom*, and the avowed Cause which had been assigned for the Renewal of the Opposition against the new Ministers, now thought the Day was come, when the partial Distribution of Emoluments was at an End; and that they should likewise attain the Reward of their Labours, in assisting to bring about this glorious Change.

Even the *Jacobites* rejoiced also in this memorable Event; which they had Sense enough to foresee, would contribute greatly to advance their Views:—And they were the only Party that rejoiced with Reason; for they were the only one who were not disappointed in their Expectations and Conclusions from it.

For as to those of the first Class, they already possess'd too large a Proportion of the Spoil, to dare, as a Body, to resent any Neglect or Disappointment, for fear of losing what they had:—And, as Individuals, they had made their Leaders too strong to apprehend the Mutiny of a Few; or to stand in Fear of the Abilities or Interest of any One, or of any Ten among them; and were, therefore, the very first to feel the Coldness, the Ingratitude, and Contempt which they had so many ways deserved.

As to the Second, they were obliged to content themselves with the Advancement of two or three Men, whom they had suffered to take Shelter amongst them, tho' more properly belonging to the third Class, than to theirs; and with a Bill for the Qualification of Justices of the Peace, which, when granted, they found impracticable and useless: To which, by way of Make-Weight, were thrown in certain hungry Church-Livings, to gratify a very few Country Clergymen of their respective Neighbourhoods, and about the same Number of Tide-waiters Places, to dole about  
among

among those who were of Consequence to them in their Ele—ns.

But even these Scraps and Fragments which had been scattered amongst them from the M——— Table, they were not long suffered to partake of : On the contrary, the more weak and miserable they appear'd, the less Compassion they found ; till at length, finding every Door of Preferment shut against them, and overcome with Shame and Vexation, they absented themselves from the Service of P——, which had been so little serviceable to them ; and retiring to their Country Seats, wisely bethought themselves, that Frugality and Oeconomy, were a surer, if not a nearer Way to Affluence, than that which led to the Exchequer itself.

And, as to the Nation in general, hurried as they had been from Principle to Principle, drawn from one Attachment to another, and withdrawn at last from all Attachment whatsoever, by the reiterated Disappointments they had met with, they had hardly any Idea left of what was Right ; they saw no Person in whom they could confide ; they were as much at a loss as to Facts, as Characters ; they knew not what to believe or disbelieve ; and under this cruel Uncertainty, they could neither settle any Opinion, replace any Confidence, nor form any Judgment either of this, or any other public Affair.

Hence, therefore, it was, that a Proceeding of so shocking a Nature, serv'd rather to confound them yet further, than to clear the Way for Conviction ; and, that a profound Calm succeeded to the loudest Storm, which had ever agitated this Nation in the Remembrance of any Man alive.

From the Extremity of an intemperate and inconsistent Fury, tho' proceeding from honest Intentions, and pointed to just and honourable Views, they sunk at once into a senseless Stupidity, into a  
total

total Inattention to every Step or Measure of their Government ; to an Insensibility of every Abuse in the Conduct of their Affairs ; and of that most fatal and ignominious Train of Events, which soon follow'd, without any Interruption, one upon the other ; to the Shame, Distress, and almost Ruin of the Community. So fatally did the Resentment of having resign'd their Sense and their Principles to a Set of Men, by whom they had been so cruelly betray'd, operate ! And so frantick was the Resolution they came to, never to respect, to follow, or to trust any Man, or any other Set of Men, again !

This was the State of Things and Men, which enabled the two *B——rs* and their *Allies* to establish themselves in that exorbitant, that unconstitutional, and that usurped Power, which they have enjoyed from the Beginning of the Year 1745, to this Day.

And such a State of Men and Things, one would have thought, was very sufficient, for that Purpose, or any other Purpose, without any farther Provision.

But their Possessions, and the Profits of them, were so great, that they believed the Risk was suitable ; and, therefore, that they could not insure too high, or extend their Precautions too far.

Accordingly, they set themselves in the next Place, to take such a Part of the Citizens of *London* into their Connection, as should enable them to trample upon the rest ; and to obtain such an additional Strength in the *C—b—t C—l*, as should render them as secure within, as they were strong without.

First, then, as to the City, they made *sure* of such among the leading Citizens, as were fittest for their Purpose, by the Means of Remittances, Contracts, Subscriptions, and Benefits of Embargoes ; and they



they made a Push for Popularity, by giving up the Point, so long in vain solicited by the Common-Council, that the Lord-Mayor and Aldermen should have no Negative on their Proceedings: And as to the C—b—t, they not only introduced the D—— into it, but to engage him still stronger to their Interests, entrusted him with the Command of the *English* Troops, then worried the *Dutch*, and at last compelled the *Q. of Hungary*, to consent to the Extension of that Command over the whole Confederate Army.

The D—— was, at that Time, popular; and he was undoubtedly brave: The second is a Quality essential to a *Soldier*; and the first was a Circumstance convenient for them: But there were other Circumstances attendant upon the Choice, which were yet more convenient to the *B—rs*, than either of These, and which deserve the most serious Attention of the whole People of *Great Britain*.

By investing the D—— in this Command, they naturally fixed him in their Interests, and at the same Time rendered him, in some Points dependant upon them.

They were aware, that a Time might come, how long soever the Interval might be, when a Leader of his high Rank and Character, might be their only Resource, and under whose Shadow they might once again force themselves into Power, and give the Law in the C—b—t, if all other Means should fail. They also flattered themselves, that to carry so great a Point for a favoured *S—n*, might be no disagreeable thing to a *F——r*, very tender of that *S—n*: And, omnipotent as they had rendered themselves, they were not above taking such a Step, to recover some Portion of the Favour they had lost, as, at the same Time, essentially served their own peculiar Interests.

There

Th  
sultin  
they  
their  
much  
Hard  
cised  
shewn  
then  
so far  
the  
Odiu  
tion  
yet,  
in re  
it wa  
divid  
flower  
latter  
be ad  
Power  
upon  
by di  
knew  
distre  
unsuc  
as a  
Bu  
deriv  
how  
estab  
rema  
in B  
hend  
later  
natur  
deba  
pole  
meri

There was, besides, another Convenience, resulting from this Destination of the D—e, which they had in their Eye ; namely, that it rendered their Domination over the Officers of that Army, much more effectual and less obnoxious.—For any Hardship, Severity, or Revenge, might be exercised by them, any unjust Preference might be shewn under the Colour of his Authority, and then imputed to him : By which they were eased, so far as it occasionally suited their Inclinations, of the Burden of Solicitations, discharged from the Odium of all Denials, screened from all Conviction of Partiality, Influence, or Oppression ; and yet, upon the whole, they remained equally Masters in reality of all Rewards and Punishments.—And it was no Ways difficult, when proper, to let Individuals understand, that the Sweet of the former flowed from the two B—rs ; and the Bitter of the latter, from the D—e himself : To which may be added, that they had it at all Times in their Power, to prevent the D—e from taking more upon him, than they thought proper to permit, by directing, or causing him to do, that which they knew must render him obnoxious as a Man ; or by distressing him on the Head of Supplies, render him unsuccessful, and, by Consequence, contemptible, as a Commander.

But to exemplify, yet farther, the Advantage they derived from this Measure in favour of the D—, and how admirably it was adapted to remove their Fears, establish their Power, and gratify their Revenge, it remains to be told, That there was but *one* Person in Br—n, from whom they had any Thing to apprehend : A Person, whose natural Interest, sooner or later, was likely to be too mighty for them ; whose natural Inclinations were too noble and too good to be debauched by any Temptations ; who having no Purposes to serve, but such as were both innocent and meritorious, was out of the Reach of Terror ; and who



had too reverential a Regard for his R— F—, too tender an Affection for his Posterity, too high a Value for his own Glory, too warm a Zeal for the Splendor of the *British* Monarchy, and too passionate a Concern for the Welfare of the *British* Nation, to make the smallest Sacrifice to so infamous a Cabal : A *strict Union* in the R—l F—y must have plac'd that Person where he ought to be plac'd, at the Right-Hand of the T—e ; a Situation too close to his —'s Ear, for any wicked M—r to suffer an H—r ap—t to occupy ; especially an H— ap— with so much Application to learn what was right, such superior Opportunities of knowing what was wrong, and so honest a Heart to rectify the one, and to prosecute the other. That, therefore, this *strict Union* might be rendered as hopeless as their Management could render it, they not only followed the Foot-Steps of their great Original, the E— of O—, in making or widening a Breach, as they followed him in every Thing else that was weak or ill, but they improved upon his Practice, by bringing forward the y—r B—r on the Stage of Action, with all the Advantages they could heap upon him ; that by some dazzling Exploit, he might eclipse the E—r, that they might create a Jealousy between both ; or nourish an *improper* Arrogance in the one, which they imagined would not fail to beget an *improper* Resentment in the other : And that from every one of these Consequences, they might draw some considerable Advantages to themselves, by playing upon the Passions or Prejudices of their R—l M—r.

It is no Breach of Charity to say, such was their Purpose : And it is out of all Question, that this Purpose of theirs hath been effectually defeated : For such was the good Sense, and such the happy Temper of the P—, that he betrayed no Resentment, he entertained no Jealousy, and he received

ceiv  
tuni  
to h  
B  
sure  
their  
N  
Tim  
than  
into  
fort  
be  
not  
wou  
chie  
R—  
I  
it sh  
feld  
Pap  
pro  
tion  
tion  
Ab  
wit  
reac  
D—  
dar  
crec  
Wi  
rior  
felf  
not  
not  
the  
aga  
Cal

ceived his *B——r*, as often as he had an Opportunity to receive him, with all the Distinction due to his Birth and Services.

But if in this one Particular, this notable Measure has fail'd, in every other it has answer'd their most sanguine Expectations.

Nothing hath been more frequent in former Times, or is in its own Nature more reasonable, than *P——y* Enquiries, and more particularly into the Conduct of a long, expensive, and unfortunate War:—But if any such Motion should be made under the present Dispensation, may we not expect to be told, that the complying with it would be injurious to the *D——*, who had the chief Command in it, and ungracious to the whole *R—— F——* ?

If, to shew the Necessity of such an Enquiry, it should be urg'd, that our Musters in the Field seldom exceeded half the Number given in upon Paper, or stipulated for, in our Conventions, or promis'd in ———, or provided for by the Nation ; and if, in support of this Fact, the free Declarations of every Officer without Doors who had served Abroad, or even the Intimations of some of them within, should be cited ; would not the Answer be ready ? The *D——* has muster'd them complete : The *D——* has certify'd them complete : Will any Man dare to dispute what the *D——* asserts ? Will you credit common Fame against the *D——*'s Report ? Will you countenance the Intimation of any Inferior Officer against the Authority of the *D——* himself ? &c.

There is no Man who reads this, who does not feel the Force of such a Battery ; and who will not acknowledge, That the Virtue and Spirit of these Times, are abundantly too feeble to bear up against it, unless with the Weight of the whole Cabal for their Support.

In the Reign of Queen *Anne*, indeed, we meet with a Parliamentary Arraignment of our Naval Conduct ; when his Royal Highness Prince *George of Denmark*, Her Majesty's Consort, was Lord High Admiral of *England* : But what was difficult then, would, perhaps, be found impossible now ; and' it would be in vain to quote a Precedent which no Body would dare to make use of.

I would not, however, be understood to draw the least Inference from what has been said, to the Disadvantage of his R—— H—— : If both the Declarations of Officers without Doors, and the Intimations of those within, are untrue, that Untruth ought, for his sake, to be manifested : If otherwise, it cannot, I think, with Decency be expected, that any Name, how respectable soever, should be interpos'd between the Public, and those who have betray'd it.

We all know the Payments did not pass thro' his Hands : It cannot be imagin'd that our Allies would be so unreasonable, or so immodest, as to insist on being paid for Troops they did not furnish : It cannot be imagin'd that our Thrifty M——rs would comply with their Demands if they did : But when we know that no *Saving* hath ever occur'd to the Nation, on this or on any other Article whatsoever ; and, therefore, it is to be wish'd, that such Methods might be taken to set this Affair in as a clear Light, as would serve to evince, That amongst the Motives of setting the D—— at the Head of the Army, that of preventing, or defeating P——— Enquiries, was never once thought of.

In Tenderneſs to his R——— H———, I am also as unwilling to suppose, that another of the Motives for conferring this High Trust upon him, was, for the sake of ruining the War with so much the more Facility ; which, however incredibly wick-  
ed

ed in  
deav  
jutor  
min'  
ceed  
who  
in th  
unw  
rid I  
I can  
horr  
viou  
wher  
tions  
ist,  
His  
any  
Prad  
the  
to le  
Miss  
avoi  
Bu  
up a  
more  
the f  
the  
cept  
impr  
quen  
once  
them  
lic in  
nestl  
such  
and l  
curre  
men

ed it may seem, was not only their constant Endeavour, while they were Under-Actors or Co-adjutors, in the C—b—t, but the settled, determin'd, nay stipulated Plan, upon which they proceeded with their new Allies, when they got the whole Power of this Country into their Hands, as in the Sequel will be made sufficiently plain: But, unwilling as I am to suppose, that any such horrid Practices was try'd on a P—— of such Hopes, I can scarce avoid it, when I reflect upon the more horrid Practices, which the same Cabal had previously try'd both on S—v—n and Subject, and when I also reflect upon the obvious Considerations, which might serve as Inducements to it: As 1st, His natural Temper, which was warm; 2d, His Rank, which put him above the Controul of any Colleague; and 3d, His Inexperience in the Practice of War: All of them such Ingredients in the Composition of a General, as could not fail to lead him into some Errors, and to create such Misunderstandings and Diffentions, as had an unavoidable Tendency to ruin the War.

But, as if these Simples were not likely to work up a Ferment sufficiently strong, we find them, moreover, insisting, on his, the D——'s, having the supreme Command of the *Dutch*, even after the *Stadholder* had been chosen; refusing to accept of any Temperament; rendering it thereby impracticable for the two Armies to join, consequently rendering both Armies unserviceable, and at once furnishing the States with Pretences to excuse themselves from putting the Power of the Republic into such Hands, as would have exerted it honestly against the common Enemy, and sowing such Seeds of Animosity between his R—H— and his B——er the P—— of O——, as, in Concurrence with all the other Parts of the Management, could not fail to operate to the Ruin of the

the War ; but still in so artful a Manner as to screen themselves from all Possibility of Accusation on that Head ; as having that plausible Pretence always at Hand, That it was for the Honour of the Nation, and for the Honour of His ———, that they had insisted upon this Point ; and thereby so involving the D—— in the visible and more immediate Misfortunes of the War, as to make it impossible to charge *Them* indirectly, without charging his R—— H—— directly ; and by Consequence rendering themselves invulnerable, but through the Side of a favourite P—— of the Blood R——.

If it should be urg'd, That, according to this Representation, the D—— himself hath as much Reason to complain of their Perfidy, as either the \* \* \* his F——, the P—— his B———r, or the whole Nation in general, it would be readily granted *he hath*: But then, had the War prosper'd under his Direction, he would have owed his Establishment to his own Importance, and must have reduced *Them* to a Dependance upon *Him* ; whereas the Case being as it is, *They*, as the only Conquerors, consider *Him* but as a Dependent upon *Them*, and make Provision for *his* Greatness only to support their *own*.

And here let us pause a Moment, to reflect on the Danger of too close a Connexion between the Military Power, and That of a Cabal, not only in the usurp'd Possession of the Civil, but so desperately tenacious of it, as to put all Things to the Hazard, rather than suffer it to be torn out of their Hands, even by him who gave it.

It is needless to say, that the very Notion of an Army in Time of Peace, is abhorrent to the Genius and Constitution of this Kingdom ; and that even, to this Hour, the Military is rather *tolerated* from Year to Year, than made a Part of the National Establishment : These are Facts known

know  
know  
ing a  
is at  
Day  
made  
'tis t  
under  
sure,  
create  
did n  
some  
with  
that  
differ  
lected  
of co  
Open  
Irela  
ever  
is art  
Num  
easy  
to 60  
singl  
cepta  
of re  
T  
and  
speci  
whic  
almo  
\* \* \*

In  
to gu  
if for  
we f

known to every Body : But every Body does not know, or does not consider, how peculiarly alarming any *Extension* of that *unconstitutional* Power is at this Crisis, or what Convulsions it may one Day give rise to. It is the *Use* only that is made the Pretext for any such *Extension* : But 'tis the *Abuse* we ought to guard against : What under a *mere* Subject might only create Displeasure, under one that is *something more*, may both create and warrant Suspicion, if his *known Virtues* did not forbid us to *entertain* it : That, however, some very strange Attempts have already been made with regard to *Court-Martials* cannot be deny'd ; and that the present Plan of reducing the Army is very different from Those formerly observ'd ; may be collected by any Body, who will be at the Trouble of comparing them : According to That now in Operation, the Establishment, both in *England* and *Ireland*, will consist of many more Regiments than ever were admitted before ; and while the Public is artfully taught to measure the Reduction by the Numbers of *private Men* discharg'd, it will be easy for those in the Command, to augment them to 60, or 70,000 Men, without the Addition of a single Officer, without any extraordinary or perceptible Movement, and by the common Method of recruiting only.

These, it must be owned, are ugly Symptoms ; and these, perhaps, are not the worst that might be specified : *Tam Marte quam Mercurio*, is a Saying which may be applied with as much Propriety, almost to every Officer who has a S— in either \* \* \* \*, as to *Cæsar* himself.

In vain, therefore, do we clamour for *Place-Bills*, to guard against an *unnatural* Influence in P—, if for every Door we shut, we open two ; and if we suffer the brave Man who had acted the Part  
of

of a *Hero* abroad, to be exposed to the Necessity of acting the Part of a *Prostitute* at Home.

In short, the Continuance and Growth of that Influence is at all Times to be dreaded ; but never more so, than when it is liable to the Direction of the Military, or of such an Association of Interests, as amounts to the same Thing, or as may be pressed into the same Service : 'And on the other hand, when the Military is put on as high a Footing, as the Legislative, we may be sure the *Hand of Esau* will soon prevail against the *Voice of Jacob*. A Body of Men that bore the sacred Name of Parliament, (whether they were justly entitled to it or not) were once ejected by the Creatures of their own Power ; and if we do not apprehend, that the like Violence can be ever again committed, we ought to recollect, that our Ancestors did not apprehend it could ever be committed at all.

Upon the whole, then, let me have Leave to say, with all imaginable Respect for the illustrious Person we have been discoursing of, with the most grateful Sense of his Merit and Services, which ought to be acknowledged, encouraged, and rewarded in every Way but this ; let me have Leave to say, and I hope every brave and honest Man in the Kingdom will say with me, 1st, That the vesting the D—— with the chief Command of the Army, was a Measure which arose from the most insidious Advice, which was calculated to serve the most unjustifiable Purposes, and which hath already produced the most tragical Effects : And 2dly, That the continuing him in the said Command, after the Conclusion of a *Definitive Treaty* had taken away all reasonable Pretence for so doing, and under the Domination of a Faction potent enough to concenter in themselves all the essential Powers of the M—re—y, cannot be regarded, but as an Attempt to perpetuate the

the A  
M—n

We  
the Sh  
Steps  
and w  
expect

Fro  
Close  
Passion  
actions  
guise  
of man  
someti  
create  
one A  
during  
can be  
Praise,  
the Cu  
Those  
Affairs

I ha  
nay I  
their  
Asserti  
that I  
were n  
of the  
had ne  
Sheets  
knowl  
and a  
famous  
Condi  
charge  
dared,  
But



the Acquisition they have made, and to hold the M--n--rc--y in perpetual Vassalage.

We have now seen the B—rs mounted on the Shoulders of the — : We have shewn the Steps they took to attain that monstrous Elevation; and we have pointed out the Means, by which they expect to secure their Stability.

From the Removal of the E— of O —, to the Close of the Year 1744, it was but natural for the Passion of the Times, the Variety of the Transactions, the infinite Arts that were used to disguise the Truth of Facts, and the intricate Nature of many of those Facts, which do not immediately, sometimes never, come into the publick View, to create a Doubt, on whom to fix as Author of any one Act in the motly and mixed Administration, during the Interval: But from that Period there can be no longer any Doubt, to whom to give the Praise, if any Praise is due; and on whom to bestow the Curses of the Nation, if any Curses are due to Those who have had the Conduct of our public Affairs.

I have already said, that They had determined, nay I have said more, that they had stipulated with their new Allies to ruin the War: Both which Assertions have something in them so extraordinary, that I should not expect them to find Belief, if they were not uniformly supported by the whole Tenor of their Management; if some undeniable Proofs had not already occurred in the Course of these Sheets; if the Matter of Fact had not been acknowledged, nay gloried in by some of the greatest and ablest of those, who were Parties to the infamous Contract, of which this was the principal Condition; and if the B—rs themselves, though charged with it, both in public and private, had ever dared, either in public or private, to deny it.

But in Cases of such enormous Guilt as this, such



is the Weakness or Generosity of Mankind, that after the strongest Proofs, and even after Confession of the Fact, either they have some Remains of Diffidence, or Returns of Curiosity; and for that Reason it may be expedient to offer such farther Evidence, as may serve both to illustrate and account for such a Proceeding, at once so desperate in its own Nature, and seemingly so contradictory to the Interests of those who put it in Practice.

First then, The two *B——rs* had been brought up at the Feet of *W——* (who was their *Gamaliel* in Politics) and had acted an Under-Part in every pacific Measure, which had been the Disgrace of his Administration. When he refused to assist the Emperor in the War of 38, and for Want of that Assistance, the House of *Austria* was deprived of the Two *Sicilies*, as also of other States in *Italy*, and *Borrain* was ceded to *France*, they were of his Cabal in private, and in public his Advocates; when nothing but a War could secure us from the Piracies of the *Spaniards*, they countenanced him in his *Convention*, and every other wretched Subterfuge he had Recourse to, with a Purpose to avoid it; and when it could be no longer avoided, they also countenanced him in all the feeble, dilatory, ruinous Measures he took to render it ineffectual, and thereby justify his own Backwardness to enter into it.

When, therefore, *W——* was remov'd, and they were suffered to continue, it was but natural that his Followers should fill up their Train; for, how much soever they were pleas'd with his Removal, or had contributed to it, they had kept the Secret, so well, that it was scarce suspected: In this Following consisted their Strength, not in their Parts, or Characters: They knew it, and they made their Dispositions accordingly: The new *M——'s*  
Plan

Plan  
Old :  
more  
these  
Neig  
lead,  
View  
to sup  
in Co  
Prete  
obser  
Time  
Bu  
than  
their  
Peace  
and  
justly  
had F  
obstin  
Wor  
TH  
cution  
Allies  
fect  
for th  
call'd  
recon  
it wa  
pursu  
those  
rary  
signe  
in th  
never  
nor  
by, a  
the F

Plan was diametrically opposite to That of the Old : The — had embraced it, because it appeared more agreeable to his own Glory, and the Figure these Nations had used to make amongst their Neighbours : He that propos'd They knew would lead, which was by no means favourable to their Views and Interests ; and the Method they took to supplant him, was to recommend the *Old System*, in Contradistinction to the *New* ; and under the Pretence of that *Consistency*, which they had not observ'd themselves, to engage the *Phalanx*, when Time should serve, to avow it.

But this Affectation of Consistency was no other than the Gloss which they endeavour'd to set on their own Rottenness : They had been fond of Peace, only because they were fonder of Corruption ; and as a steady Perseverance in the *Right* was justly *rank'd* among the Virtues, they knew they had Partizans firm and intrepid enough, to pass an obstinate Prosecution of the *Wrong*, upon the World, for the *same Thing*.

They were, moreover, encouraged in this Prosecution by the almost incredible Change which their Allies, in the Opposition, had found Means to effect in the Opinions and Behaviour of the People ; for tho' the War was a Measure which they had call'd for themselves ; tho' it had been advis'd, recommended, and supported by Parliament ; tho' it was consistent with all the Principles of Policy, pursued by all wise Nations, and in particular with those of This ; and tho' it was certain, that the contrary Measure, would, in the present Case, have resign'd the World to *France*, that an Acquiescence in the Grandeur of that dangerous Neighbour, had never been countenanc'd by any upright Parliament, nor endured by the Nation, nor ever avow'd by any Minister, till both Minister and K——, in the Reign of *Charles II.* were bought and sold by

those of *France*, not ever made a Point of Opposition, till the discarded Ministers of that and the next infamous Reign, set it up against the Measures of King *William*; I say, tho' all these Facts were notorious and undeniable, the new Ministers were rendered unpopular, by following the very Maxims which had render'd all other Ministers popular: In proportion as their Credit grew tarnish'd, that of the War did the same; and, intoxicated with the Draught they had swallow'd, the Public were induc'd to forgive the Tools of *W—*'s hated Administration, rather than confide any longer in the Efforts of those whose Glory it had been to remove him.

This is sufficient to account for the Obstacles rais'd by the two *B—rs*, and the Clamour they made against the War, while they acted only an Under-Part in the carrying it on: And without stopping to wonder, that the same Pretences, which had operated so forcibly upon the Public against their Rivals, and which ought to have operated with double that Force against them, had, from the Moment they carry'd their Point, no Operation at all; or to ask, as others have done, Why when they found themselves Masters of the *C—b—t*, they did not act as cavalierly in it, with Respect to *Measures*, as they had presum'd to do with respect to *Men*? I shall proceed to explain, first the Motives which induc'd them to take that preposterous Determination to ruin the War, which, in contempt of their Notions of Consistency, they had promis'd to support; and then the several Steps and Gradations by which they obtain'd their Ends.

On the first of these Articles little need be said; for nothing can be more evident, than that, if the War had been successful, even in their own Hands, the Honour of that Success would have redounded to the *first Advisers* of it; in which Case it was reasonable to expect, that the Tide of *Popularity* would

would once again have turn'd in *their* Favour: Not a *City-Recorder*, or a *Corporation-Town-Clerk* could *then* have made a congratulatory *Speech*, or drawn up an *Address*, but the Eyes of the People would have been turn'd upon *them*; whatsoever had been said in favour of those National *Topics*, the Obligation of *Treaties*, the Reasonableness of supporting our Allies, and Necessity of asserting the Honour of the Nation, and the indispensable Duty of retrieving our commercial Interest, rivalled by *France*, and invaded by *Spain*, would have been said in Favour of *Them*: And it would have been utterly forgot, that ever *They* had been considered as *Fools*, or *Tools*, or *Hanoverians*.

Not was this the *worst* which the *B——rs* had to expect from a prosperous Issue of the War; for they had the same Reason to expect, that the *Power* of their Rivals would have return'd with their *Popularity*, and that the Negotiations for a Peace would have been entrusted to them; in the Course of which they might have display'd such Parts and Abilities, and realiz'd so many Advantages to the Nation, as had put them out of the reach of Opposition for the Time to come: Under *their* Direction, No SEARCH would have been the *first* Preliminary we had sign'd with *Spain*; and the *absolute* Demolition of *Dunkirk* (not such a *Collusive* Stipulation, as that which at present so highly and so justly offends the Public) had been the *first* we had sign'd with *France*: Instead of obliging our Allies to *dispense* with our Engagements, we had *fulfill'd* them; instead of gratifying our Enemies at *their* Expence, we had gratified *them* at the Expence of our Enemies; and as to *Cape-Breton*, instead of prostituting the Honour of the Nation, by sending *Hostages* to *France* by Way of *Pawn* for its *Restitution*, it had remained to the *British* Empire, as an *eternal Proof* of the Rectitude of a System,

System, which had been ennobied by the Efforts of King *William*, and the Triumphs of the Duke of *Marlborough* ; and which had never been discountenanced, but when a *French* Mistress had the Ascendency in the Bed-Chamber, or a *French* Minister in the Cabinet.

These would have been the Fruits of their Labours, with respect to foreign Affairs ; and, in virtue of the Importance which they must have unavoidably derived from so many important Services, they would have been able to disperse those *Locusts* which had so long devoured the Land ; and to promote those *Reformations*, which the Public had once so impatiently demanded, and which *They* had never been able to promote effectually before.

This is sufficient to shew, what *personal Inducements* the two *B——rs* were directed by : And now it is fit to shew farther what additional Strength this left-handed Bias of theirs received from their new Allies of the *Broad-Bottom* : The Latter, it seems, had suffered themselves to be so jockey'd in their Treaty, had come in upon such *low* Terms, in Comparison to the *Height* of their Demands, and were, moreover, so *disjointed* by their *Infidelities* to each other ; that they found themselves at *first* more uneasy in the Possession, than ever they had been in the Pursuit. As they had never esteemed the *B——rs*, after this Treatment, they could not help distrusting them ; and they had no Way to be secure in their Employments, but by putting them, the *B——rs*, on such Measures, and driving them on such Difficulties, as should at the same Time expose them yet farther in the *C—b—t*, and render their own Services so much the more necessary for their Support : With this double View, they insisted on the Necessity of saving Appearances for a Session at least, and in order thereto, of acting in such a Manner, as should seem to reconcile the

two

two  
Pla  
rag  
yiel  
it w  
ding  
Bot  
rate  
app  
and  
mer  
mer  
seen  
mon  
Pho  
aga  
F  
with  
the  
ame  
no  
nan  
by  
had  
Elo  
Th  
of t  
afte  
he  
rais  
of t  
the  
sho  
\*\*  
T  
and  
oste  
ties.

two seemingly-opposite Characters of *Patriot* and *Placeman* : This the *B——rs*, wanting either Courage to deny, or Skill to obviate, were forced to yield to, tho' aware of the Perplexities and Mischiefs it would unavoidably bring upon them : Accordingly, during that whole *S——n*, the *Broad-Bottoms* acted in such an ambiguous Manner, alternately opposing and supporting, condemning and approving, flattering and abusing both Measures and Men, as confounded all Principles of Judgment, or Probability of Conjecture. Such Placemen, such Patriots, such Politics, had never been seen in this Country before ; and the Nation was more intent on gaping at this incomprehensible Phenomenon, than in attending to, or guarding against, the Dangers it foreboded.

But we ought not to hurry over this Scene without throwing a due Degree of Distinction on the principal Actor in it. There was one Man among the *Broad-Bottoms* of affected Candour, but no Principle ; fluent Tongue, and steady Countenance ; who, on the Merit of having been ill-used by *W——*, and too well used by the *P——* of —, had set himself up as the *Cicero* of the Times for Eloquence ; and as another *Cato* for Inflexibility : This Man, this great Man, was purposely left out of the general Promotion, that he might come in afterwards with so much the more Weight ; that he might be at Liberty to use such Language, and raise such Difficulties and Obstructions in the Course of the *S——n*, as, on the one Hand, should oblige the *B——rs* to perform Articles ; and, on the other, should furnish them with Pretences, to oblige the \* \* \* \* to do the same.

These Articles were two : The one ostensible and peculiar to the *Broad-Bottoms* : The other non-ostensible and common to both the contracting Parties. The first comprehended the Dismissal of half the



the *Hanoverian* Forces, by way of Tub to the Populace : And the other, the Ruin of the War. The *Br—rs* were willing enough to comply with the former, when they considered its Operation with respect to the latter : But when they considered farther, of what more immediate Importance it was to them, to recover if possible some Degree of Favour in the *C—b—t*, just for the Sake of making the Time they spent there, so much the more easy to themselves, they were for postponing the Experiment ; at least they so pretended ; and in Actions of this double Nature, it is impossible to know when Men are sincere : The *Broad-Bottoms*, on the contrary, would hear of no Delay ; and their *Undertaker-General* debated the Matter so fiercely with the *younger*, that he who had talked up his Abilities so high, for the Sake of terrifying others, grew frightened for himself ; and rather chose to comply with his Demands, than remain any longer the *But* of his abusive Oratory ; which, frivolous as it was, he could neither bear or repel.

But though the *B—rs* had not Courage enough to interpose themselves between the \* \* \* \* and this *Anti-Dimmock*, they had Artifice enough to take off the Edge of his Weapon, before they suffered him to strike a Blow. For they not *only* induced him to give *Leave*, that his \* \* \* \* \* should have 57,965*l.* Dismission-Money, for the said Moiety of his Forces in *British* Pay, under the Pretence of defraying the Charge of their March Home ; but that the said Moiety, instead of marching Home, should pass into the Service of the Queen of *Hungary* ; who was, moreover, complimented with an additional Subsidy of 200,000*l.* for their Pay, till the Temper of the Times would permit their being replaced on the same Footing as before.

It was in this manner the *Broad-Bottoms* justify'd all the Licence they had taken, in treating of

H—r



*H—r Jobs*; and, in particular, of the Dangers and Distractions to be apprehended from the *H—r Troops*. But, not to lose Time in exposing so glaring an Affront to the Common Sense of Mankind; and which no Language is strong enough to expose as it deserves, I shall now proceed to remind you of such other Measures, as were the Growth of this Year, and which had as manifest a Tendency to ruin the War.

The Campaign of this Summer 1745, being the first in which his R— H—the D— had the Command, it was natural to expect, as well because he was a favourite S—n, as because he was their own *Elect*, That they would either have furnished him with such *Assistance* and *Advices*, as should have enabled him to make his first Effort with Honour to himself, and Advantage to the Common Cause; or, at least, with such *Cautions*, as should have secured him from any remarkable Repulse; and no doubt they would have observed this Direction, if the *Success* of the War had been their Object; but opposite Views, requiring opposite Conduct, it appears, 1st, That no Thought was ever entertained of procuring an equal Body of Troops to replace the 8000 *Hanoverians* transferred to the *Austrian Service*: 2dly, That under the Notion of 80000 Men, they suffered him to take the Field with no more than 50000; that is to say, 20000 *English*, 8000 *Hanoverians*, and 22000 *Dutch*: 3dly, That it was an avowed Article of their own Belief, that the *Hanoverians* could not fight; and of all the World's that the *Dutch* would not fight; whence it follow'd, that the suppos'd effective Part of this Army amounted to no more than 18000 Foot, and 4000 Horse, or thereabouts: 4thly, That the *French*, which were rated here at 120,000, did really amount to 70000, and were moreover entrenched up to the Teeth, under the Countenance

of their Sovereign, and the Conduct of their ablest General: And 5thly, that tho' the Disparity was so notorious, instead of directing their young Hero to act on the *defensive*, which seemed to be the only sensible Part he could act, They, the very Men (who the Year before would not permit the Allied Army, which was then as much superior to That of *France*, as that of *France* was to the Allied Army, to make any Effort at all,) directed the D — to attack the Enemy in their Lines.

On what Principle, therefore, can we account for such extravagant and inconsistent Conduct, but That which hath been already so often inculcated? (For tho' the Raising the Siege of *Tournay* furnished the Pretence, no sufficient Reason could be assigned to justify that Pretence :) And yet such was the intrepid Behaviour, both of our National and Electoral Troops, that notwithstanding all Disadvantages, they had like to have made a *capital Mistake*, and ruined the *French Army*, instead of ruining the War. Our Soldiers were in earnest, whatever our M — rs were: Fighting was their Business: Conquest their Purpose: And that they did not obtain it, was far from being any Fault of theirs. They had driven the whole Force of the Enemy before them, and had only a small Reserve, much inferior to the 8000 *Hanoverians*, who had been dismissed, to master: But this Reserve, small as it was, was more than sufficient to repel the feeble Attempts of Men wearied out with the Slaughter they had made, and oppressed with the Burden of so many Victories. In fine, the *Arms* of the two B — rs, not the *Arms* of *France*, prevailed; and the Issue of the Day was altogether as fatal, as the Efforts of it were glorious.

From the Time of the Battle of *Dettingben*, till this fatal Period, *France* had proceeded in the most cautious Manner, as if more apprehensive of being subdued herself, than intent on subduing the Allies:

But,

But,  
duct  
or an  
posi  
arole  
feren  
a con  
only  
*Broad*  
expl  
and

T  
of t  
*Ghent*  
*Nieu*  
these  
were  
the  
been  
Batta

It  
talion  
verfa  
his N  
wher  
emba  
tive  
it wa  
poste  
to sen

It  
the B  
as ru  
mem  
to a  
were  
ment  
or the

But, having now obtained the Clue to our new Conduct (by what Means will, probably, at one Time or another, be brought to Light) made such Dispositions to improve the Opportunities which daily arose in her Favour, that the War took a very different Bias from what it had hitherto done; and a continued Series of ill Success on our Side, not only seemed to confirm all the Foreboding of the *Broad-Bottom* Faction, but to authorise the long-exploded Schemes of *Clifford*, *Rocheſter*, *Bolingbroke*, and *Walpole*.

The Loss of *Tournay* was the first Consequence of this rash Attack, and hard-earn'd Victory: *Ghent*, *Bruges*, *Dendermonde*, *Oudenarde*, *Aeth*, *Nieuport*, and *Ostend*, followed in Train; and with these cruel Aggravations, that no less than 6000 Men were cut off, by our ill-concerted Project to save the first of those Places (which cou'd not have been saved by less than a whole Army) and two Battalions of Guards in the last.

It is moreover observable, that one of these Battalions was transported from hence, tho' it was universally known, the Place was *indesensible*; tho' his M\*\*\*\*\* had sent Advice from *H——r*, where he then was, that the young *Pretender* was embarked for *Scotland*; tho' not above 4000 effective Men were left in the whole Island; and tho' it was in a Manner impossible for the *D——*, posted as he *then* was, behind the Canal of *Brussels*, to send a Man to our Assistance.

It would be held too invidious, perhaps, to charge the *B——rs* with fomenting the Rebellion, as well as ruining the War: But every Man must remember, that they *connived* at the very Growth of it, to a Degree that amazed all *Europe*; and that they were infinitely more attentive to their own Establishment in Power, than to the Security of the Nation, or the Maintenaace of that Succession, upon which,

under God, our Civil and Religious Liberties depend: The most early, the most zealous, and the most disinterested Offers of the most loyal and disinterested Men, to extinguish the Flame as soon as it broke out, or to hinder its spreading afterwards, were rejected; and, in diametrical Opposition to the late affected Creed of their *Broad Bottom*-Allies, they not only took Occasion to charge the *Whole* of Scotland, most unfairly and unjustly, with *Jacobitism*, because a *Part* of the *Higlands* had rose in Arms for the *Pretender*, but used such suspicious Language, and took such diffident Measures with Regard to *England*, as if the same Spirit had the Predominance here; though every Day, and almost every Hour, furnished the most illustrious Proofs to the contrary.

This alone is sufficient to prove, That they *conniv'd* at the Growth of the Rebellion: But if there was Occasion, so many other Proofs might be collected as would render Doubt impossible: And to prove, that, while this Vulture was thus suffer'd to prey on our very Heart-Strings, they were attentive only to their own Establishment; we need only open another Vein of their Conduct, at that Time, which carries Demonstration along with it. They knew, for Instance, the \*\*\*\* could neither make any Alteration in his C—b—t, nor attempt to make any in the Completion of P——. The Young *Pretender* was become *Returning-Officer* for Scotland: And while they held their Places, they were sure of acting in the same Capacity for *England*: — Thus the Crisis, which was so alarming both to P—— and People, was favourable to them, because the Interest they had to serve was *seperate* from that of either: And such was the desperate Use they made of it, that his \*\*\*\*\* found himself under a Necessity, either to take the Law from them, or  
to

to see the Way render'd smoother than ever from Scotland to St. James's.

Yes: Those, who, under the Pretence of a *Coalition*, had before obliged His — to receive a whole *Faction* into his Service, now insisted on his receiving —, the *Orator* and *Stoic*, who had both stood in the Front and brought up the Rear of that *Faction*, into his *Court*, tho' he was the most disagreeable to him of all his Subjects, by conferring on him an Office, which render'd his Attendance *there* indispensable: And when his —, with the Spirit which became him, refus'd to submit to such an Indignity, they not only declar'd their Resentment, by resigning their Employments, but discovered the Malignity of their Purpose, by *articing* with every other Person, from the Highest to the Lowest, to do the same; to the End, that the —, finding himself universally deserted, the *Supports* in Suspence, the money'd Men alarm'd, public Credit shock'd, and the whole Nation bewilder'd, might have no other Resort, but to them; nor Alternative, but to submit to their good Will and Pleasure.

Posterity will scarce think it possible, that such a *Mutiny* amongst the *Servants* of a great —, (*Servants* that stood obliged to his Favour and Protection, not only for the very Importance they made use of against him, but almost their very *Existence*) could be productive of any Thing but Disgrace and Ruin to themselves; will scarce believe the Information they receive, That, such was the Effect of their *traitorous* Artifices, that but one noble Lord, who had the Honour to hold an Employment under him, had the Courage to persist in holding it, till his *Royal Master* required him to lay it down: and that for this meritorious Refusal to countenance so wicked a *Combination*, he was turn'd out in the most imperious Manner, almost

almost as soon as they were re-instated in their former Supremacy.

But to resume the Course of our Foreign Affairs, for the Sake of shewing, Step by Step, the Completion of the great m——l Design to ruin the War. The Death of the Emperor, and the Disposition which was soon manifested, by the young *Electör* his Son, to emancipate himself out of the Hands of *France*, and to embrace the true Interests of the Empire, were Circumstances extremely favourable to the Common Cause: But what Use soever was made of the Former, by the indefatigable Care and superior Knowledge of his —, the Latter was overlook'd; tho' the Interest of that Prince, in the Electoral College, the Situation of his Dominions, and the Troops he had to furnish, made it evident that he was no inconsiderable Acquisition. These Troops of his were in Number 12000: How much we stood in need of them, has already been made apparent: And yet tho' offer'd, they were refus'd, under the same Pretence of *Oeconomy*, which had been urg'd to defeat the Measures of the preceeding Year.

But the true Reason was this: Pr—— W—— of H—— had condescended to act the low Part of a T——l to the Cabal; by assisting to screen them from the Imputation, of having rejected the Tr——y of H——n——u, and openly laying the Blame of the whole Miscarriage on the E—— of G——: This was a seasonable Service; the Obligation remain'd undischarg'd; and it being impracticable, or said to be so, to retain both the *Bavarians* and *Hessians*, we chose to take 6000 of the Latter into our Pay, tho' they had deserted us the Year before. preferable to 12000 of the Former, together with the whole Interest of the Prince they belonged to.

From



From these, and the like Omissions, it follow'd of Course, That the Allies were in no Condition to make Head against the victorious *French*, during the Residue of this Campaign, or the whole Winter following; all which Time the Enemy continued to push the Advantage they had obtain'd, insomuch that in *January* even *Brussels* itself fell into their Hands, and the whole Garrison, which consisted of 10000 Men, were made Prisoners of War.

I am aware, that the Progress of the Rebellion, the Draughts we were then oblig'd to make from *Flanders* for our own Defence, and the Ferment the Nation was in, will be urg'd in excuse of our Inattention, during this Period, to the Affairs of the Continent: And I should have been as ready as any Body to have admitted that Plea, if it were possible for me to forget in what Manner the Rebellion had been *nurs'd* up, or not to suppose, that the furnishing this *very Excuse* was one of the great Purposes which it was so *nurs'd* up to answer.

However this may be, it was the 14th of *April*, 1746, (on which very Day the *Bill* to enable *G—* *E—* of *C—*, and *W—P—*, Esq; to qualify in *England*, for the Office of Vice-Treasurer of *Ireland*, was return'd to the *C—s* from the *L—s*) before the *Budget* was open'd, and the Supplies voted for the War; and this Backwardness at Home, could not fail to create a like Backwardness Abroad: It is true, the *Broad-Bottoms*, who had now answer'd all the Purposes of their Opposition, and had no farther Practices to try upon the People, condescended to drop the Mask, to receive the Whole 16000 *Hanoverians* into *British* Pay, and even to augment them with 2000 more: But then the seeming Vigour of the Measure was defeated by the ill-timing of it: It was the middle of *June*, before this Body of 10000 (that is to say of the 8000 transferr'd



transferr'd to the Q. of *Hungary* and the additional 2000) could come up : It was the middle of *July*, before the 10000 *Austrians* under Count *Palsy*, could do the same : Both were Effects of the same Cause : The Queen of *Hu—ry* could never recruit her Forces Time enough to render them complete, against the ensuing Campaign, unless favour'd with a very early Advantage of her Subsidies ; which was a Fact, that the *B—rs* were no Strangers to : And hence it unavoidably follow'd, that till the Beginning of *August*, the Allies could bring no Army into the Field, that was fit for *P—C—s* of *L—n* to command, or to endure the Sight of the Enemy.

On the other Hand, the most *Christian King* had taken the Field on the 24th of *April* ; had in the Course of the Summer reduced *Antwerp*, *Mons*, *St. Guilain*, and *Charleroy* ; and, discovering no Danger of any material Opposition, had ventured to sit down before *Namur*.

The Siege of that important Place, had been carried on, as usual, by one Army, under the Protection of another ; and this was the only Crisis, when *P—C—* had any Chance of attacking them, with any Prospect of Advantage : But, while he still waited for the Reinforcements he expected, and particularly the *Bavarians*, who, by this Time, were received into the Number of our Dependants, if not of our Allies, his most *Christian Majesty* carried both the Town and Citadel ; and having rejoined his two Armies, fell upon the Confederates at *Racoux*, and, by the Dint of superior Numbers, defeated them.

I am now come, in the natural Course of Things, to the Year 1747 : But, as our Conduct during that Year seemed to have taken a different Turn, and actually did wear a different Aspect, it will be necessary to account for that seeming Alteration,

by

by the previous Mention of such Circumstances as gave Rise to it.

In the first Place, then, the \*\*\*\*, growing weary of struggling any longer with a Power, which, in so many notorious Instances, he had found superior to his own, came to a Resolution, to give the B—rs such Assurances as might serve to remove the Apprehensions they had entertained of a *Back-Stair Favourite*: And they, on the other Hand, who found it as *convenient* to have him for their *Ally*, whom they had refused to follow as a *Master*, by Way of Acknowledgment, not only agreed to take 4000 more of his E—l Troops into the Pay of G—B—, but prevailed with their *Broad-Bottom-Allies* to do the same: For those Gentlemen were such thorough Politicians, that they could sail with every Wind: It was for the Sake of *Places* they had raised the Cry of *No Hanoverians!* And it was for the *same Considerations*, that they were now for entertaining the whole Force of the E——c.

But the \*\*\*\* was not the only Person considered in the *Turn* we are now discoursing of. The Laurels which the D—— had gathered at *G-l-d-n*, were yet green; his Popularity was at the full; and the additional Provision made for him by the P——t, had, in some Measure, set him free from the Leading-Strings of the two B——rs: As he was become of more Consequence, than they ever designed he should be, so he was also become more sensible of it, and more resolute to derive all possible Advantages from it: They had made him a Soldier; he was fond of the Character; and he longed for nothing so much, as to confirm the Glory he had acquired in *Scotland*, by some signal Exploit in *Flanders*: In Compliment to him, therefore, they not only were obliged to proceed with the War, but with more seeming Vigour than ever: For he had now acquired some Experience;

the People had not only Prepossessions in his Favour, but were now more exasperated than ever against France; and it surpassed their Art, to send him upon such another *childish* Errand; as he had been sent upon in the Year 1745.

Thus he who was at first made use of as an Instrument to drive on a Peace, became as considerable an Instrument to drive on the War; and what greatly increased their Perplexity on this Account, many of their *Broad-Bottom-Allies*, partly to palliate their Conduct with Relation to the *Hanover* Troops, and partly to make their Court, openly renounced their late pacific System, and distinguishing themselves in both *H—s*, by Speeches and Motions in Favour of the War: Nay, the very Men who, in the Course of their Opposition, had made themselves so merry with the Words *take and hold*, now adopted the Sentiments they were intended to enforce, and would be satisfied with nothing less than a War of *Acquisition*.

Nor did even This contain the whole of the *B—r's* Uneasiness at this Crisis: In the Division of Power which had followed the *Broad-Bottom* Treaty, they had been forced to part with the Marine to their Allies; but then they flattered themselves, that in putting the Direction of it in the Hands of a certain great *D—*, who was so far from having any Experience in Naval Affairs, that he had no Experience in any Affair but *his own*; and who was abundantly more eminent for the Largeness of his Possessions, than the Brightness of his Parts, they should still maintain such an Ascendancy at that Board, as might enable them to give what Bias to the Machine they pleased: But in this they were most grievously disappointed: For his Ambition was to be thought a Man of Business; and at once to convince the World of his Abilities, and them of his Independency, he took the whole Direction  
so

to absolutely upon himself, that he would not suffer them to interfere in the smallest Branch of it; nor even to make a Lieutenant, without a Permit from him: They might recommend, if they pleased; but he was not always in a Humour to grant: If they were importunate, he was sure to deny; and what was more provoking than all (because it seemed to trench on the M———'s Prerogative, which they looked upon to be their *peculiar*) tho' he made no Difficulty of giving a Repulse himself, he would brook none from any Body else.

Besides, what served to render him yet more upwieldy and untractable, as many of the *Broad-Bottoms* as preserved any Connection with each other, affected to consider, and follow, him as a Sort of Chief; and what completed both his Establishment, and his Authority, all the Successes of the War arose in his Province. Our Fleets had, indeed, been superior to those of the Enemy from the Beginning; and, notwithstanding all Miscarriages and Misfortunes, had considerably impaired their Strength, and reduced their Commerce: But then our M——rs had hitherto thought it their Duty, to confine their Projects as close as possible; within the Bounds prescribed by P——t: Whereas, when this great Dictator came to the Head of the B——d, he made no Difficulty to rush into such Expences, as exceeded the Grants annually made for that Service, to the amount of a Million and an half; and to the amount of a Million, what his Predecessors had dared to demand, notwithstanding the outrageous Abuse they had incurred on that Head: And yet that these extraordinary Expences (which has brought so immense a Debt on the Nation) produced any extraordinary Effect, was more owing to the good Fortune, than the Prudence or Foresight of those who had the Boldness to incur it. It is true, that two of their Squadrons did

fall in with two of the Enemies, and were victorious; but how truly those Actions may be called *Rencontres*, and how much we stood obliged to our Superiority in Point of Strength, it would, perhaps, be thought too invidious to explain. Then as to the Affair of *Cape-Breton*, which was an Acquisition of such Moment, that it may be truly called the *Price* of the *Peace*, the chief Merit of it, belongs to the People of *New-England*, and the neighbouring Colonies; who formed the Design, made the Preparations, and had the Happiness and Honour of carrying it into Execution.

As, however, these lucky Incidents had happened under the Ad—n of his G—, he was for centering all the Importance and all the Glory of them in himself; not, indeed, upon the old, sound, and acknowledged Maxim, *Qui facit per alium, facit per se*; but upon a new one of his own, *Quod factum est per alium, factum est per me*; which as Nines in Ten do not, perhaps, understand *Latin*, served to countenance his Pretensions, so far at least, as answer'd his Purpose: And therefore, we are not to wonder, That when Sir *William Pepperel* had conquered *Cape-Breton*, it was asserted the D— of — had conquered it; nor that this Conqueror, like all other Conquerors, would not hear a Word of restoring the Acquisition he had made; but on the first Whisper of such a Purpose, instead of the sneaking Language of a *Broad-Bottom-Leader*, who was for *hanging* all Those, who durst entertain a Thought of *taking* or *holding* from the Enemy, pronounced, in the Stile of an *Alexander* or a *Cæsar*, *That if the French were Masters of Portsmouth, he would hang the Man who should give up Cape-Breton in Exchange for it.*

Men that are necessary to us, are to be treated as they think of themselves, not as the World thinks of them: The B—rs therefore were not only forced

forced to admit the high Pretensions of his G——, but to bear with the rough and *ominous* Language he had used, (which they knew was a Menace, that regarded them *only*, because they were the *only* two Persons in *England*, who, at *that Time*, entertained a Thought of so fatal a Concession, under any Extremity whatsoever;) and even to humour him occasionally, when he quitted what was now become his *own Element*, and took upon him to *dictate* elsewhere.

The very hint which had escap'd from the B——rs, That *Cape Breton*, would serve to purchase a Peace in all Events, had convinc'd his G—— how vain a Thing it was, to place our *Whole* Dependance on the Successes of a Sea War: To be Masters of the Sea, as we now absolutely were, and to be in a Condition to make new Acquisitions, without a Possibility of maintaining them, which was what had been suggested, was a Reflection that he could not bear: In hope, therefore, to secure what we had got, as also for the Sake of making new Acquisitions, he became, all at once, a most vehement Advocate for pushing the War, with equal Vigour, both by Sea and Land; both in *Europe* and *America*: Want of Money which cost him nothing, but the asking, or rather ordering, was the least of his Consideration: And no Arguments, or the Intreaties of the B——rs, could either convince him of the Impracticability of his Notions, or prevail with him to relinquish them.

It followed, that the Shock of two such opposite Principles had like to have been fatal to the Coalition: *Obstinacy* was the principal Ingredient in his G——'s Composition, as *Cunning* was in theirs: And They could not be more *afraid* of *Ruin*, than he was *fond* of being the *foremost* Figure on the Stage. At length, however, the B——rs luckily bethought themselves that the  
most



most effectual Way to obviate the Violence of a Torrent which they could not withstand, would be, to yield, for a while, to its Impetuosity; and by so doing, to have it in their Power to give it such a Direction, as, instead of bearing Them down, should assist them to bear down such other Obstacles as encumber'd their Way.

Accordingly, after an infinite Number of Squabbles, they gave way to a Project of his G—'s, to reduce *Quebec*, and all the other Colonies held by the *French* in *America*, by the Assistance of our own, which were call'd upon to co-operate in it, (and actually did make such Preparations for it, as had like to have prov'd almost ruinous to themselves): The more Money was expended, and the more Troops were employ'd in this Expedition, the less of either they knew would remain for the Continent-Service: So that, thus far his G—'s Project coincided perfectly with their own: And when they had carry'd on the Farce, as far as they thought proper, they were sufficiently Masters of the *Old Trick*, to delay, to procrastinate, to send Orders for *Marches* and *Counter-Marches*, *Embarkations*, and *Debarbations*, till it was too late to make any other Use of the vast Expenditure incurr'd upon this Occasion, but to render us the Derision of *Europe*, first by our Preparations for an Attempt that we did not make; and then for making such an Attempt, (that of *Britany*) as we ought to be forever asham'd of.

I do not call this a Digression; because it contains a new Proof, That the only Point the Two B——rs had at Heart, was the Ruin of the War. But, as I suggested above, whatever their Inclinations or Purposes were, the breaking out of this New Spirit in the C—b—t; the additional Importance which his R—H—— the D—— had acquir'd; and the Expediency of putting on a fighting



fighting *Face*, by Way of making their Court to his ———, did prevail with them to entertain a much greater Army for the Service of the Year 1747, than they had ever entertain'd before: And either because it suited *better* with the former Character and Conduct of the E—— of S——, than that of any other Man, to be the first Instrument in the Concert, by which a *Land War* was to be carried on with *greater Vigour* than ever, and when the *greatest* Number of *Hanoverian Troops* were to be taken into *British Pay*, or because he should have an Opportunity to try his *Talent* at *Negotiation*, the Convention with the Allies for the Year, was referr'd to him.

By this Convention *Great Britain* was to furnish 40000 Men; the *States General* 40000, and the *Empress-Queen* 60000, in all 140000: These were to be exclusive of Garrisons: Her *Imperial Majesty*, moreover, oblig'd herself to keep no less than 10000 Men in *Luxemburg*, and, over and above all this, it was not only stipulated, That there should be a Junction of 60000 *Austrians*, and 30000 *Piedmontese*, in Order to make a Diversion in *Province*, but that 15000 should be posted near the *Panaro*, by way of Check on the King of *Naples*.

Of the Expediency of the last of these Articles, I shall not stay to make any Remark; but of the *Indiscretion* shewn in making it an avow'd Part of the Convention, I cannot be wholly silent. His *Catholick Majesty*, in Resentment of the repeated Neglects which had been thrown upon *Spain*, by the *French Ministers* in the Course of the War, had not only manifested a Disposition to repay those Neglects in Kind, but had actually made several Overtures to us, which had been listen'd to with an affected Cordiality, though never embrac'd: But this Measure seem'd to indicate, that those  
Overtures

Overtures would not be embrac'd at all ; and that they had been listned to rather as Matter of Amusement, than the Basis of an Accomodation. Princes have their Prejudices and Resentments as well as private Men : And if it should appear, that this indirect Behaviour created that *ill Humour* which has since thwarted our *commercial Interests*, and the *Freedom of Navigation*, which, both by *natural Justice*, and the *Letter* of former Treaties, we were entitled to, who ought to be answerable for it, but the young, forward, rash *Novice*, who was entrusted with the making this Contract ; and the *B——rs* from whom he received his Instructions ?

But to return : When this Convention was laid before the H—— of ——, it soon appeared, That they were abundantly more disposed to provide for the Expence of it, than to censure any Part of it : And indeed so artful was the Language made use of by the *younger B——r*, who was Lord of the Ascendant there, concerning it, that they could scarce do otherwise : For such as were zealous for the Prosecution of the War, he amused with an Account of the prodigious Preparations making for that End ; and to such as were impatient for a Peace, he pledg'd his own Honour, and the Reputation of his *B——r's* Abilities, (who was to be the *Undertaker-General* in that Province) as a sufficient Security, That they would soon be gratified to the Height of their Expectations.

The *P——m-Dialect*, it ought not to be forgot, has been sneered at by *certain Persons*, as an equal Mixture of the *Perplex'd* and the *Unmeaning* ; and yet so persuasive did it prove to Some, so forcible to Others, and so convincing to All, that on the 27th of *January*, the Supplies, exorbitant as they were, were granted without any Difficulty ; and the Issues of War and Peace, were once more left under the Direction of the two *Heads* of that illustrious Family.

And

A  
dert  
havi  
for t  
and  
the  
wou  
secu  
to M  
thing  
Que  
strat  
mys

B  
abov  
Con  
may  
that  
of F  
how  
to r  
fail

B  
unde  
and  
126  
(wh  
644  
253  
100  
der  
talic  
the  
ders  
whi  
Con  
this  
all t

And now it might be supposed, that having undertaken so boldly for the Service of the Year ; having been furnished so early with all they asked for the Accomplishment of their own Measures, and having provided a Force *superior* to That of the Enemy, for the Operations of the Field, it would no longer be in their *own Power*, to prosecute their grand Purpose of *ruining the War* : But to Men of Genius and Resolution, like them, nothing is impossible : This the Discomfiture of the *Quebec Expedition* hath, already, in Part, demonstrated ; and what remains to be told, I flatter myself, will render that Demonstration complete.

But first, I must justify what I have advanced above, That the Force they had provided by the Convention, was superior to that of *France* ; which may seem a little difficult to those who recollect that it consisted but of 140000 Men, whereas that of *France* was said to consist of 160000 : I am not, however, unfurnished with sufficient Authorities to remove this Difficulty ; and of These I shall not fail to make the most fair and honest Use.

Be pleased then to know, 1st, That the Army under Marshal *Saxe*, was composed of 75440 Foot, and 25300 Horse, and no more ; that is to say, 126 Battalions of Regulars, and 12 of Militia, (which at 500 to a Battalion, amounted to 69000) 6440 *Grassins*, *Companies Franches*, &c. and 253 Squadrons, at 100 to the Squadron : In all, 100740. And 2dly, That the separate Army under the *Comte de Clermont*, was composed of 19 Battalions, and 31 Squadrons ; in all, 12600 : So that the whole Force of *France* on the Side of *Flanders*, consisted of no more than 113340 Men, which fell short of the Numbers, provided by the Convention, 26660 : And even to swell it up to this Bulk, they (the *French*) were forced to draw all the Troops they could spare from the *Rhine* and

the three Bishopricks ; and, in a Manner, to drain their Garrisons ; which they ventured to do, on a Presumption, That their Army would be able to cover them.

I am aware it will be urged, That Abatements ought to be made on the Part of the Allies, as well as on the Part of *France* : But when these Abatements come to be handled, it will appear that they deserve to be ranked amongst the most considerable of those Artifices, made use of by the two *B—rs* to ruin the War, which I now proceed to particularise.

That I repeat the Nomination of the D——, to the chief Command, is Matter of extreme Regret to me : But Truth compels me to insist on what I should otherwise have been glad to omit : Perhaps the Victory he had obtained over the Rebels, had rather enflamed his Ardour, than matured his Judgment : And the Experience of the General, who was the next in Subordination to him, was no Match for the Superiority, which he derived from his high Birth and Quality.

In the second Place, as in the preceding Campaign, the Allies had suffered so prodigiously, by their not being in a Condition to take the Field, till the Campaign was almost over, and every Corner of the Kingdom had rung with the Clamours it occasioned, it was now resolved, under the plausible Pretences of preventing the like Clamours, and of giving such Proofs of Zeal and Vigour, as should deserve the Admiration of *Europe*, to reverse that Conduct, and to take the Field before it was possible for the Business of the Campaign to begin : Thus though the Means were different, the End was the same : The Soldiers had now as much to apprehend from the Rigour of the Season, as before from the Enemy : And, as if the Name of an Army was all that was wanting to recover our Credit, retrieve our Losses, and repel the Enemy, as  
little

little Care was taken to subsist, as to employ, them. In short, the establishing Magazines was one of the last Things attended to, which ought to have been one of the first: and when they were established, they were so ill served, that they rather served to mock the Necessities of the Soldier, than to supply them.

The effects of this wild Conduct, I shall discourse of more at large in the Sequel; and, as a farther Exemplification of the notable Skill and Address of the two *B—rs*, I am, in the mean while, to discourse of those *Abatements* as to Number, on the Side of the Allies, which had so manifest a Tendency to the Ruin of the War.

The *M—rs* of the Empress Queen, as I have already suggested, had, over and over again, informed our *C—t*, That if a good Part of the Subsidy was not paid in *December*, it would be impossible for them to fulfil the Engagements they might be obliged to make: The Reason of this was manifest: They were under a Necessity to recruit in the *Imperial Towns*; the hereditary Countries being too remote from the Scene of Action: In the Winter these Towns swarmed with Handicrafts-men, and Labourers, who were glad to follow the Drum, for Want of Employment: And unless they were enlisted then, it was impossible they should be armed, cloathed, and disciplined, so as to be fit for Service in *March*: These Reasons had been always in Force: But now they were abundantly more forcible than ever: The Losses of the last Year had fallen so heavy that they were scarce supportable: It was out of her *I—M—’s* Power to supply those Losses, except by the Subsidies she was to be furnished with from hence: And, therefore, it was, that she had been uncommonly urgent to carry that Point now, which she had never been able to carry before. But the Incompetency of her Troops was the very Sheet-Anchor

of the two *B—rs* : It served to make the Court of *V—a* accountable for every Miscarriage, and every Misfortune ; and for that Reason, they were not only resolved to leave that Door open against her, as it had hitherto been, but even to derive to themselves some Degrees of Credit, amongst the Ignorant, at least, from an affected Endeavour to shut it. What I refer to is, 1st. that *fraudulent* Article in the Convention, by which it is provided that 100,000 *l.* should be detained, to answer such Deficiencies, as should be found in her Musters : And 2dly, the Method they took to render them deficient ; by withholding the greatest Part of those Sums, which were intended for Levy-Money, till *April* ; whereas, according to the Obligation of the Treaty, her Forces should have been in the Field in *March*.

Thus, after the Nation had been induced to grant such immense Sums, under a Persuasion of meeting the common Enemy upon equal Terms, and after having been amused with this solemn Proviso to render the Service effectual, it appears the very Foundation was purposely undermined on which their Hopes were built ; and that when the Train was fired, nothing but Ruin could follow.

Our wild Conduct, before spoken of, and the Effects of it in the Field, come next under Consideration ; and if I barely glance at the several Particulars, it will, I think, be sufficient to prove all that hath been already asserted : For so early as *February*, our Troops were put in Motion : Towards the latter End of *March*, they took the Field in three several Bodies ; and having so done, they rested upon their Arms for six Weeks together, without making any Attempt of any Kind, to excuse this otherwise inexcusable Bravado, tho' they had no Enemy to oppose them For all this while, Marshal *Saxe* continued his Forces in their Cantonments,

tonments  
and Ter  
Contem  
Course  
self wit  
this Occ  
— *be*  
*convince*  
*provide*

But if  
make V  
doing so  
the En  
say to o  
M. Lou  
five Squ  
more of  
Space of  
of *Duta*  
we reco  
posted  
heard al  
the *Aust*  
And wh  
pears, u  
thus ear  
Enemy,  
against  
sion, by  
Army th  
or any c  
and vain  
I say, w  
ter be,  
was owi  
had ope  
the Ruin



tonments, and thereby manifested as much Regard and Tenderness for those under his Command, as Contempt for his Enemies: Through the whole Course of the War he had, indeed, conducted himself with the same Air of Superiority; and upon this Occasion he was known to say, *That when the — had sufficiently weakened his Army, he would convince him, that the first Duty of a General was to provide for its Preservation.*

But if the Vanity of taking the Field, only to make War against the Elements, or the Folly of doing so, without any Project of Enterprize against the Enemy, appears thus inexcusable; what shall we say to our remaining in a State of Inactivity, while M. Lowendahl, with twenty-three Battalions, and five Squadrons, and M. de Contade, with as many more of each, left their Cantonments, and, in the Space of a Month, made that surprising Conquest of *Dutch Flanders*? What must we think, when we recollect, that the Commander in Chief was posted so near the Theatre of Action, that he heard almost every Gun that was fired; and, that the *Austrians* were no farther off than the *Meuse*? And what Conclusion must we make, when it appears, upon the whole Matter, that, instead of being thus early in Readiness to act offensively against the Enemy, we suffered the Enemy to act offensively against us, without endeavouring to create a Diversion, by advancing towards *Saxe*, enfeebled as his Army then was, by the Detachments he had made, or any otherwise interposing, except by the feeble and vain Assistance of nine Battalions sent to *Hulst*? I say, what must our Conclusion on the whole Matter be, but that all we did, and all we left undone, was owing to the same leading Principles, which had operated invariably, though imperceptibly, to the Ruin of the War?

At



At last, however, (on the 1st of May, N.S.) the Allies began to bestir themselves ; and talked of nothing less than the reducing *Antwerp* : But then this notable Project was not entertained till *Lowendabl* had not only finished his Business in *Dutch Flanders*, but also had been allowed Time and Leisure enough to strengthen the Outworks, which had lain all this while so totally in Ruins, that they had even no Communication with the Body of the Place.

That, however, it was entertained so late, is not so much to be wondered at, as that it was entertained at all : A Town they could not invest, they could scarce hope to carry : But *Antwerp* was besides under the Cover of the whole *French Army* : And out of this very Circumstance arises a Question or two, which I am of Opinion, cannot be easily answered, namely, If our Army was inferior to the *French*, as in *England* it was the Fashion to assert, how came we to think of attempting *Antwerp*, so fortified and protected, as has been described ? If superior, as according to the *Convention* it ought to have been, how can we account for its lying idle six Weeks before, and two Months afterwards ? And how, in either Case, can we help recurring to the old Principle and its invariable Tendency, to the Ruin of the War ?

Foreigners, who can talk with more Freedom on certain Subjects, than it becomes us to do, have been very severe in their Censures on this Occasion ; and much severer still, in discoursing of the unfortunate Action of *Laffeldt*, in which we both suffered ourselves to be surprized, and exposed the *British* and *Electoral* Troops, to bear, singly, the whole Brunt of that bloody Day.

But if it does not become us to adopt, or even to repeat those Severities, we may, at least, be allowed to ask, Why the Allied Army was at all exposed to the Hazard of an Action, during this Campaign ?

paign ?  
begun to  
greeable  
zard til  
very w  
and Ad  
ed by M  
to his l  
Measur  
and Ber  
terest in  
an Ever  
Cause v  
why hi  
less to e  
lem inf

Thu  
rous M  
selves  
could n  
the Di  
But no  
Queen  
her S  
of mak  
she ex  
and no  
into th  
imagin  
Howe  
got th  
*Bergen*  
what  
ration  
agreea  
the R  
But  
Issue,

N.S.) the  
 ked of no-  
 t then this  
 Lowendabl  
 Flanders,  
 re enough  
 ain all this  
 d even no  
 ace.  
 late, is not  
 s entertain-  
 they could  
 besides un-  
 my : And  
 Question or  
 e easily an-  
 rior to the  
 n to assert,  
 Antwerp, so  
 escribed ? If  
 it ought to  
 s lying idle  
 afterwards ?  
 recurring to  
 dency, to the  
 Freedom on  
 o, have been  
 cation ; and  
 e unfortunate  
 suffered our-  
 e British and  
 whole Brunt  
 opt, or even  
 least, be al-  
 was at all ex-  
 ing this Cam-  
 paign ?

paign ? The Revolution in *Holland* had already begun to take Effect : And certainly it seemed agreeable to Prudence ; to put nothing to the Hazard till that was rendered *complete*.—The B—s very well knew, that it was the *earnest Entreaty* and Advice of the P— of O—, communicated by M. de Grovestein, his Master of the Horse, to his R— H— the D—, to confine his Measures to the single View of covering *Maëstricht* and *Bergen-op-Zoom*, till he had established his Interest in the Provinces, and to risque nothing, while an Event of so much Importance to the Common Cause was still *depending*.—And as to the Reason why his Instances were rejected, it is wholly needless to explain it : *Stultum est mortale Lumen in Solem inferre*.

Thus the great Work of *countermining* the vigorous Measures of this Year, which the B—rs, themselves had been forced to countenance, and which could not have failed, but by the Methods, and under the Direction, already specified, was accomplished : But not without some Difficulty ; for the Empress Queen, notwithstanding the ill-timed Payment of her Subsidies, was so sensible of the Necessity of making an extraordinary Effort this Year, that she exerted herself in a Manner as extraordinary ; and not only brought her Contingent more early into the Field, but more compleat, than the B—rs imagined it had been in her Power to have done. However, by the Loss of this Battle, *their* Efforts got the better of *her's* ; and the Reduction of *Bergen-op-Zoom*, which every Body remembers with what *Impatience* they expected, finished the Operation of the Campaign, in a Manner, perfectly agreeable to their Plan, and the great Object of it, the Ruin of the War.

But tho' I have brought the Campaign to an Issue, I have not brought forward all the Evidence  
 it

it produced: For in order to be *consistent* in the whole of their Proceedings, that is to say, that no Means to exhaust the Nation might be left untried, and that all the Fruit of those Means might be blasted, the 4000 *additional Hanoverians* were not taken into our Pay till *July*, when they knew it was impossible, that they should reach the *Low Countries*, till the Business of the Campaign was over.

But if They were equally blameable for taking these Troops into our Pay, when they could not be of Use; and if these Troops were necessary, for not taking them into Pay, the Winter before, when they might have been had with as little Trouble, how much more so will they appear through the whole Course of their Negotiations with the Court of *Russia*, which it is now Time to explain?

The Object of these Negotiations, as All know, was the Hire of such a Body of Troops, as, by transferring the Superiority to the Allies, should enable them, not only to repel the Power of *France*, but to overwhelm it. This was a Measure which the E—— of G—— had some Years before recommended, and which, for that Reason, the B——rs had then rejected. When, however, it became expedient for themselves to adopt it, or rather to make a Shew of adopting it (for it will be made evident enough, that they never intended to reflect any Lustre upon *him*, by suffering the Nation to derive any Benefit from it) they called upon the States General, to take their Share both of the Engagement and the Expence: They (the *States*) demurred, as it was reasonable to think at that Time they would; we had our Scruples as well as they; and in Proposals, Answers, Replies, and Rejoinders, the whole preceding Winter (of 1746, that is to say) was lost: In short, it was not till *June*, that the Affair was brought to any Decision; when a Treaty was concluded,

cluded  
Sum  
Men,  
emplo  
first R  
ceded  
dition  
agreea  
9th of

Th  
was ta  
as, or  
ment;  
And,  
to affe  
supre  
Judg  
Profe  
Vigou  
hang  
Econ  
from  
shoul  
not be  
the c  
preter  
essent  
incon  
accou  
found  
critic  
upon  
Diffic  
and  
Notic  
preve  
better  
and t  
by fig

issent in the  
say, that no  
left untried,  
ght be blast-  
s were not  
they knew  
ch the *Low*  
ampaign was

e for taking  
could not be  
ffary, for not  
e, when they  
trouble, how  
gh the whole  
he Court of  
n?

as All know,  
roops, as, by  
Allies, should  
er of *France*,  
easure which  
efore recom-  
the *B—rs*  
became expe-  
ther to make  
made evident  
ect any Lustre  
o derive any  
States Gene-  
agement and  
murred, as it  
ey would; we  
in Proposals,  
whole preced-  
was lost: In  
ne Affair was  
eaty was con-  
cluded,

cluded, by which it was provided, That for the Sum of 100,000*l.* the *Czarina* should hold 30000 Men, and 40 or 50 Gallies, in readiness to be employed in the Service of the Allies, upon the first Requisition: And to this Treaty the *States* acceded on the 11th of *July* following; on the Condition of paying one fourth Part of the said Sum, agreeable to a Resolution which they had taken the 9th of *January* before.

Thus it appears, that every Measure we took, was taken at such a Time, and in such a Manner, as, on the one Hand, served to continue the *Amusement*; and, on the other, to defeat the *Service*: And, if there is any Person foolish or hardy enough to assert or believe, That the *B—rs*, who had the supreme Direction, did make the *best* use of their Judgment in all; That They were *sincere* in their Professions to carry on the War with the utmost Vigour, and that They suffered this Negotiation to hang thus long in Suspence, *merely* on a Principle of *Æconomy*, and for the Sake of saving the Nation from the *whole* Burden of it, in Case the *States* should refuse to ratify their own Resolution; may it not be asked, How it was possible for Men, who had the common Interest so much at Heart as they pretended, to hesitate so long, on a Matter so essential to the Common Cause, for the Sake of so inconsiderable a Sum as 25000*l.*? How is it to be accounted for, that all the Proofs which can be found of their *Thrift*, should be found on such critical and important Occasions as these? And that upon any other Occasion, they should make no Difficulty to *job away* half a Million among *Brokers* and *Usurers*, in defiance not only of repeated Notices and Warning, but actual *Endeavours* to prevent it? And, finally, how they came to get the better of their own Diffidence and Frugality *at last*, and to *leave* themselves at the *Mercy* of the *States*, by signing the Treaty *without* their Participation?

But that this Measure was indeed calculated to be a Measure of Amusement, not of Service, becomes self-evident from this farther Consideration, *viz.* That even *after* the Accession of the States, no Requisition was made of these Troops, nor any Conditions settled for their being actually employed, till the 19th of *November*, 1747 ; which is so much the more extraordinary and remarkable, because Count *Bentinck* was sent by the P—— of O—— to press that Measure, so early as the first Week in *September*.

Thus it was contrived, that this magnificent retaining Fee of 100,000*l.* should produce no one favourable Consequence, during that Year, to those who gave it : And it is easy to prove, that all imaginable Care was taken, through the whole Course of the Proceeding, with Regard to the next, to render it as burdensome as possible on the one Hand, and as little useful as possible on the other.

Thus, for Instance, instead of making use of the Gallies, which had been kept in Readiness at our Expence, ever since the *July* before, (and by the Means of which, the Troops might have been transported, before the Summer was over, to *Lubeck*, or some other Port in the *Baltick*, from whence they would have had little farther to march than the Troops of *Hanover*, and consequently might have reached the Allied Army by the latter End of the very Campaign we have been treating of) they gave over all Thoughts of transporting them by Sea, and preferred an almost immeasurable March over Land, at the Expence of no less than 6 or 700,000*l.* according to their own Computation : A March that could not be undertaken till *January* or *February*, 1748 ; a March that no Body could be sure would be performed without Interruption ; and not be performed at all in less than five Months : Whence it was apparent, that, unless accompanied by the Weather

ther  
Dee  
of  
well  
Fren  
wha  
rity  
I  
ing  
man  
sidy  
paid  
tals,  
all  
Pro  
four  
sent  
pres  
Dec  
Mo  
man  
ceed  
thes  
the  
grea  
for,  
hav  
duc  
tha  
serv  
wh  
mu  
the  
lig  
Cou  
the  
174

ther of the Pole all the Way, and drawn by Rain-Deer, they could not join the Allies till the latter End of *June*, or Beginning of *July*: And the *B——rs* well knew, that as we were always *weakest*, and the *French strongest*, at the *Opening* of the Campaign, whatever was to be apprehended from their *Superiority* that Year, would be effected *before* they arriv'd.

I might farther enforce all I have said, by entering into a Discussion of the Treaty itself, and the many lavish Articles it contains; such as the Subsidy, over and above the 300,000 *l.* to be annually paid; the Article for Provisions, Quarters, Hospitals, Loss of Horses upon the March, Ransom of all Prisoners, and a Thousand other *Douceurs*; the Provisos, that they should not be dismiss'd under four Months Notice, and that they should not be sent back, but on a convenient Season, with an express *Exception* to the Months of *October*, *November*, *December*, *January*, and *February*; tho' the two last Months were judged the most proper for their marching to our Assistance: I might, I say, proceed to aggravate my Charge, on every one of these Heads: But as the subsequent Behaviour of the Court of *Russia*, has been truly generous and great, in performing more than they had engag'd for, and being contented with less than they might have claimed; and as the Measure itself, if conducted as it ought to have been, would have more than balanc'd the Expence of it, I shall only observe in general, That the *B——rs*, through the whole Course of the Negotiation, manifested as much *Incapacity*, as *Disinclination* to the Cause they pretended to serve.

The Court of *Russia* was already under the Obligation of very close Engagements, both to the Courts of *London* and *Vienna*; to the Former, by the Treaty of 1742; to the Latter, by that of 1746; and what, perhaps, would have weigh'd more



with any Court, had an *Interest of her own* to serve, by enabling the Allies to continue the War, till they might have it in their Power to prescribe the Peace.

These were, surely, Considerations which might have been reasonably and successfully urg'd, in Mitigation of the hard Conditions of this Bargain: And, if the Bargain had pass'd thro' any Hands, but those of the Two *B——rs*, or even if they had not predetermin'd, that the exhausting their own Country was the only Way to ruin the War, those Conditions would surely have been mitigated accordingly.

But there is still an Article in this Treaty, which I cannot pass over without bestowing upon it a more particular Animadversion; I mean the 16th; by which it is provided, That, in case *Holland* should fail in her Part of the Engagement, *England* should fulfil the *Whole*; and which, therefore, serves to shew, That the Pretences of Oeconomy formerly urg'd in the C—b—t, by the Two *B——rs* against this Measure, when it was originally propos'd by the *E—— of G——*, and while they suffer'd so much Time to be lost, in waiting for the Resolution of the *States* upon it, were alike false and frivolous: For they not only admitted, as we have seen, every Circumstance of Expence, on the highest Footing, but made their own Country liable to the *Whole*, at a Crisis, when it was more than probable, that the *Whole* would have fallen upon it, and when that Pretence might have been urg'd with more Reason than ever, as well because of our own *exhausted Condition*, as because the State of the War was become more *desperate* than ever.

But the more lamely, the more prodigally, the more ruinously, the Public Business was prosecuted, the more securely and effectually the *B——rs* prosecuted *their own*. Thus, at the End of the Campaign



to serve,  
War, till  
scribe the  
ich might  
d, in Mi-  
Bargain :  
y Hands,  
n if they  
ting their  
the War,  
mitigated

ty, which  
n it a more  
16th ; by  
and should  
and should  
serves to  
y formerly  
rs against  
os'd by the  
d so much  
olution of  
frivolous :  
seen, every  
ft Footing,  
e Whole, at  
le, that the  
when that  
ore Reason  
n exhausted  
ar was be-

ligally, the  
prosecuted,  
rs pro-  
of the Cam-  
paign

paign (of 47,) there remained not one single Town of the *Austrian Netherlands* unreduc'd, and only *Maestricht* to cover the interior Barrier of *Holland* : On the Side of *Dutch Flanders*, all was lost likewise : And that *Bergen-op-Zoom*, the Maiden-Fortress, which had never till then been violated, was in the Hands of *France*, has already been specified : One would have thought, therefore, That, as both the Enemy and their Commanders, were fated with Success, and had made the *first Advances* towards an Accommodation, the *B——rs* would have *re-lented* too, and *excus'd* their Country from any *far-ther* Expence, and any *farther* Ignominy.

But their System it seems was not as yet complete : To blast the Measures of their Rival effectually, it was necessary, that the Peace should be ruinous like the War ; and as the *French* were as yet *too moderate* in their Demands, it was their Purpose to proceed in the same Track, till *new Advantages* on the Side of *France*, should authorise her to exact *new Concessions* from the Allies.

To render this almost incredible Fact so much the plainer, it is necessary to observe, That, from the Time the Grand Duke had been elected Emperor, and the King of *Prussia* had confirm'd himself in the Possession of *Silesia*, by the *last Peace*, which he had oblig'd the Queen of *Hungary* and the Elector of *Saxony*, to accept of, after the *Peace of Dresden* ; *France* had not only not profited on one side, but had not even profited on the other.

embrace the same Party, and pursue the same Purposes for an Age or two to come: For these Considerations therefore, and for Others yet more cogent, such as the ruin'd State of her Commerce, Navigation and Naval Strength, the Distress and Danger of her Colonies, the Wants and Miseries which began to rage in her own Bowels, &c. she consented to open Conferences at *Breda*; and at any one Period in that Time, would have sheath'd the Sword, on these short Principles; Nothing for herself; and very little for her Allies.

That in the very Hour of Victory, his Most Christian Majesty himself, had discover'd a passionate Inclination for Peace to G——l L——r, when brought before him as a Prisoner, after the Battle of *Laffeldt*; that the said G——l was very soon after dismiss'd on his Parole, to communicate certain formal Propositions on that Head; that those Propositions were rejected; that *Spain* was at the same Time so impoverish'd by the Captures we had made, the Expences of the War, and the detaining her Treasures in the *Indies*, that she also discover'd the same Inclination; and that on the Death of the late King, which was followed by some Alterations in her Councils, she actually did make Offers of the like Tendency, (in the Month of *September*, 1746, to the Marquis de *Toderniga*, then in *Portugal* that is to say) has been already acknowledg-

been really of

their own

interest

to

be

for

the

ca

fu

Or to  
with  
ther  
The  
Spain  
fall v  
Part  
Fran  
part  
B  
inco  
Ma  
the  
had  
rier  
been  
I  
Col  
whi  
ly  
it;  
rig  
Op  
and  
gro  
De  
Th  
in  
B  
th  
ge  
fo  
fo  
te  
th  
ca  
fu

Or to make their Words and Actions correspond with each other? More particularly, when we farther recollect, that till these Offers were made, They had discours'd of an Accommodation with *Spain*, as the most favourable Event which could befall us; as an Event which would have reconciled all Parties to a vigorous Prosecution of the War with *France*; and which would have induced them to part with the last Shilling in Support of it.

But, the Truth of the Matter is, That mutable and inconsistent as they appeared, they adher'd in the Main, to the grand Principles of their Plan, and the Ends it was to answer: For the *softer* our Fall had proved, after so violent and ill-directed a Career, the less obnoxious would that M——r have been held, who *first* put us in Motion.

It was, nevertheless, necessary, to find out some Colour to set on this Inconsistency and Mutability, which was so glaring, that the Public began not only to take Notice of it, but even to clamour against it; and the *Blind* they chose to spread for this righteous Purpose, was a *pretended Difference* of Opinion as to the great Pursuits of War and Peace; and a *pretended Quarrel*, which was said to have grown out of this Difference of Opinion, and the Debates it had given Rise to.

Few Expedients answer, in all Respects; but This was of the happiest Kind, and was managed in the happiest Manner: For while the Two *B——ts* continued to act these *opposite Parts*, the *Farce* not only served to amuse the World in general, but every Individual, of what Principle soever, knew where to find a Leader: Hence, it followed, that those of the most *sanguine* and *enterprising* Turn, attached themselves to the *Elder*; the *Timorous* and *Desponding* to the *Younger*; and each were, from Time to Time, furnished with such Professions and Assurances, as served to justify  
the

the *Confidence* they repos'd in, and the *Subserviency* they shew'd to, the joint A———n of *Both*. Nor was this all: For as they were to make their *Appearance* in different Theatres, they chose their Parts accordingly: The *Younger* was most obnoxious to Clamour and Opposition, and therefore thought it most advisable to affect *Consistency* and *Popularity*; but the *Elder* was not afraid of being *Inconsistent*, because his Auditory was too *polite* to *expose* him; and because he hop'd to succeed to the *Favour*, which his Predecessor in the C——t had enjoyed, by affecting to adopt his Politics.

At the same Time also, as it had been thought proper in the Year 1746, (when the Bias of the *Coalition* was still understood to be towards Peace) to pass the *Younger* upon the Public for the Chief M——r, and as such to give him the Credit of bestowing the Seals on the E—— of C———, who had been ever number'd amongst the Advocates for the pacific System; so now, in order to thicken and diversify the Plot, and establish a Belief, That our Measures had taken a new Turn, and that a vigorous Prosecution of the War was the only Object in View, the *Elder* was said to be predominant; and as a Proof of his Supremacy, the S——s which L—— C——— had *resign'd*, were transferred to his G—— of ———, who had performed such mighty Exploits at the Head of the A——— B———d, and who was now intent on nothing but Victory, Conquest, Triumph, and Glory.

But how well soever this Interlude was play'd, or what Success soever they expected from it, the great Scope of their Performance was to make *sure* of Seven Millions more, and then to lay aside their *Mask*, and *drop the Curtain*: Their Rivals were, by this Time, no more consider'd at C——t, than

the *Subserviency*  
—n of *Both*.  
to make their  
ney chose their  
as most obnox-  
and therefore  
fect *Consistency*  
was not afraid  
Auditory was  
cause he hop'd  
his Predecessor  
affecting to a-  
d been thought  
he Bias of the  
towards Peace)  
c for the Chief  
the Credit of  
of C———;  
gth the Advo-  
w, in order to  
establish a Be-  
a new Turn,  
the War was  
was said to be  
is Supremacy,  
— had resign'd;  
—, who  
s at the Head  
o was now in-  
est, Triumph,  
e was play'd,  
d from it, the  
was to make  
en to lay aside  
Their Rivals  
ered at C——t,  
than

than amongst the People: By a notable Exertion of their Power, They had, more cunningly, than fairly, dissolved that P——t, which had worn so many various Complexions, and which had concurred in such various Measures and Operations: A new one had been happily chosen; in which a great many of those who had seen the whole Course of these Transactions, and who had been known Advocates for the War, were not *admitted* to sit: New Men were under no Obligation to countenance a Measure they had not been concerned in; nor were even supposed to *know* what had been said, or done, exceptionably, inconsistently, or factiously, *before* their Time. Such a P——t might, therefore, take any *new Direction*, without being exposed to any *Censure* without Doors, or creating any violent *Ferment* within: And as to the *Conqueror of Cape Breton*, he was become a *Peace-Officer*; his *Friend* was not only to be his *Successor*, but to have the principal Share of the Merit, and and Glory of the *Negotiation*; and to *initiate* him yet farther into the *Mystery* of Treaty-making, the Convention of this Year was entrusted to his *Management*, in the same manner as the last.

I have already insinuated, That, tho' the Offers of *France* and *Spain* had been rejected, Peace had been resolved upon: And I have shewn, that the proper Measures had been taken to render all Opposition ineffectual: But, notwithstanding this was the *secret Purpose*, all *Appearances* were against it. By this new Convention, our Armies were to consist of such incredible Numbers, that I scarce can venture to specify them, for fear of being suspected of wilful Misrepresentation: But whether I am believed or not, it is fit to be known, That according to the Treaty, the Allied Army in *Flanders*, for the Year 1748, was to consist of one hundred and

K

ninety-

ninety-two Thousand effective Men ; viz. 60,000 *Austrians*, 66,000 *Dutch*, and 66,000 in the Pay of *Great Britain* : That Garrisons were not to be comprehended in this Calculation : And that, in the like manner, exclusive of Garrisons, the Force to be employed in *Italy*, was to consist of 60,000 *Austrians*, and 30,000 *Piedmontese* : The latter to be in the Field the 1st of *May*, and the former by the 1st of *March* ; with an Exception to 10,000 *Austrians*, who were to come up in *April*, and the 30,000 *Russians*, who were to come up as soon as they could ; tho' no Partisans of the *B——s* would then suffer it to be doubted, That even the *Russians* would be in the Field by that Time.

But how confident soever they were in their Assertions, the most intelligent M——b——rs, who had attended to all the former Propositions of the same kind, who had observed the iniquitous Use which had been made of them ; and who had remembered the Failures and Miscarriages which had been deduced from them, were neither to be satisfied nor seduced by the *Craft* of the Leaders, nor the *Credulity* of the Led : On the contrary, even on the very Face of the *Convention*, they discovered such Symptoms as served to indicate the inward Rottenness of the whole : For Instance, with regard to that *fraudulent* Clause, which provided, That 100,000 *l.* should be reserved out of the Subsidies allowed to the Empress-Queen, by way of Check upon the Musters of her Troops, they not only discovered the Impolicy of a Proviso which had only served as a *Pretence* to excuse the very Defect it was calculated to prevent ; and the Absurdity of stipulating for a Forfeiture, which, tho' always made, had never been taken ; but also the real Hardship imposed on her M——s——y, by extending the said Proviso to her Forces in *Italy*, as well



well as those in the *Low Countries*, when the latter were requir'd to be in the Field by the 1st of *March*, and the former not till the 1st of *May*.

And in the second Place observing, that the Payments were also settled in the same manner as before ; that is to say, 150000*l.* before the Ratification, 100000*l.* upon the Exchange of the Ratifications, and 50000*l.* per Month afterwards ; and that the *Convention* had not been sign'd at the *Hague* till the 26th of *January*, they foresaw, That not above 250000*l.* could be paid, and they had Reason to apprehend not a Shilling *would* be paid before this very 1st of *March*, when the Army was to take the Field : Whence, and from the other Considerations above specify'd, in relation to the *Time* and *Manner* of Recruiting the *Austrian* Forces, it was notorious, That the necessary Levies could not be made by the stipulated Time, or indeed for some Months after ; and, consequently, that the Subsidy itself, would, in a manner, be *thrown away*.

In short ; when all these Circumstances are compar'd with what hath been already said concerning the *Russian* Affair, it will become evident almost to Demonstration, That the *two B—rs* had levied so enormous a Sum upon the Nation, not only with a Fore-Knowledge, That the Allies would be forc'd to take the Field in as feeble a State as they had left it, at the Close of the last Campaign, but with as settled a Resolution to manage in such a manner, as should render it *impossible* for them to do otherwise.

But that they may not say I have mistaken Presumption for Demonstration, I will take upon me to shew that this Resolution of theirs, became more and more manifest, after that prodigal, but fruitless Measure had receiv'd the Sanction of P— : Or, at least, I will ask a few such Questions



as may enable every Man to reason and judge for himself, viz.

Why was not the D——, when the *Dutch*, Barrier, on the one Hand, lay so expos'd to the Insults of the Enemy, and, on the other, was so ill provided for a Defence, why was not his R—— H——, I say, prevail'd upon, to spend *one* Winter abroad, in order to concert the best Measures which the present Exigence would admit of, to cover and protect it? Or if his R—— H—— took no more Delight in the Society of his —— on *this*, why was not G——l L——g——r discharged from the Obligations of his Parole, and order'd to concert those necessary Measures in his stead? Why, on the contrary, was the Liberty of that G——l, whose signal Services had deserved such signal Acknowledgment, so little regarded, that M. *Saxe*, had it in his Power to *redemand* him as his *Prisoner*, in that Interval, when his Abilities might have been so useful to our Allies? Was his Election for the City of B——, or his Attendance on P——, of more Consequence, than his Presence and Advice in the Conferences, whichevery Day rendered more and more necessary, to prevent the Designs of the Enemy? Why also, where so many *other* Officers, whose Duty required them to be at their respective Posts, and in Readiness to enter into Action at a Moment's Warning, suffered to be absent? Was it because there was *War* between the *Towns* of *Buckingham* and *Aylesbury*, as well as between the *Houses* of *Austria* and *Bourbon*? Because they had Commands in *both*? Because they could not be every where at once? And because the *Former* was as much *more important* as the *Latter*, as *two Towns* are of *more Importance* than *two Houses*? And lastly, why was so little Regard  
shown

shewn to *Balbani's* Letter of the 31st of *January*, O. S. in which he urges the absolute Necessity of his R— H—'s immediate Presence and Influence at the *Hague*; declares that he can do nothing without him; that the *French* were in great Forwardness; and that as it was of great Importance for them to take the Field soon, not a Moment was to be lost; that the great Point to be attended to, was the Security of *Maastricht*, which would effectually put a Stop to the Progress of the Enemy; that with a Body of 25,000 Men, posted upon Mount St. *Pierre*, and another of 45,000 Men on the other Side of the *Maese*, he would undertake to cover it, at the Peril of his Head; and pronounces, that this could not be done, unless the D— came over in Person, and acted in concert with the P— of O—: I say, why was so little Regard shewn to a Letter of such infinite Moment? And lastly, Why was his R— H—, notwithstanding, detained in *England*, till the Month of *April*, a Month after the Time stipulated for the Armies to take the Field?

These are Questions that none but *Majorities* can answer; and to their Mercy I leave them.

It remains, however, to be observ'd, That notwithstanding this Warning, this Proposal, this Requisition of *Balbani*, our O—s, G—s, and M—rs, remained in as much Tranquility as if they had no Enemy in the World to fear, nor any Campaign to provide for, but that which was to be prosecuted *at Home*. At length, however, the *French* Army was put in Motion; and, as if it was an Event which could neither have been foreseen or imagin'd, or as if they had lain, 'till then, *incog.* at some such Place as *Knightsbridge*, on our Side all seem'd to be Surprise and Confusion; Numbers of Men were immediately employ'd in repairing the Works of *Maastricht*: The scatter'd Troops

Troops of the Allies were order'd to assemble, as fast as possible, and as well as they could: And every other Measure was taken which could help to *expose* that *Weakness*, which we had *predetermined* not to remedy.

As in a Play, when every Scene and every Incident serves to unravel the Plot, and hasten the Catastrophe; so every Event now serv'd to unfold and accomplish the great Purpose of ruining the War.

The *Austrians*, tho' not only unrecruited, but still *unsupply'd* with the Money necessary for the raising them, tho' quarter'd as far up the Country as *Cologne* and the Dutchy of *Luxemburgh*, and Part of them in a Manner cut off from the Place of Rendezvous, by the Interposition of the Enemy, nevertheless, were the first that took the Field in any considerable Body; which was owing to the indefatigable Endeavours of *Bathiani*: And if *Chanclos*, contrary to the Treaty subsisting with his Mistress the Empress-Queen, and without waiting farther Orders, had not gallantly risk'd her Favour, and perhaps his Head, by throwing twelve Battalions into *Maestricht*, that Town, so long threaten'd, so well known not only to be the first Place destin'd to be attack'd, but to be attack'd as early as it was, would have been surprized without a Garrison, and must have surrender'd as soon as the Enemy appear'd before the Gates.

I should have specified, that the Body of *Austrians*, brought into the Field by *Bathiani*, consisted of 31 Battalions and 60 Squadrons: And, notwithstanding all that was given out here at Home concerning the *Dutch*, and all the Variety of Discouragements which the P—— of O—— then labour'd under, his H——s assembled a Body of 20,000 Men under the Cannon of *Breda*.

But as for us, (who, Year after Year, had abus'd  
our

our Allies for Deficiencies and Delays, which we ourselves had help'd to cause, and refus'd to help in removing, and who had none of those *Exeuses* to alledge, which the *Austrians* had so often alledg'd) our *Hanoverian* Troops were not order'd out of their Winter-Quarters, till within a few Days before *Maestricht* was actually invested by the Enemy : And as to the 20,000 *English*, which, by express Stipulation, ought to have been in the Field by the first of *March*, they were deficient to the Amount of 7000 ; and the four Battalions and 3000 Recruits appointed to render them complete, did not actually join the Allied Army till after the 19th of *April*, O.S. when the Preliminaries were sign'd, and the Measure of the War was *completely ruin'd*.

Thus, Sir, I have in *Part* discharg'd my *own* Mind, and I hope satisfy'd *your's* : When I am more at Leisure, I may, perhaps, take up the Pen again : And if I do, you may expect a like *Series* of Evidence, to shew, That the Nation is not more oblig'd to the *B—rs* for the *Conduet of the War*, than the *Conduet of the Peace*.

F I N I S.

