## External Affairs Supplementary Paper

unification of Korea were

be supervised by an inter-

## called also for an international commission to super-vise the elections. This recognition of the principle of international supervision was welcome, but No. 54/38/UN9/15 THE KOREAN QUESTION

Text of a statement on December 3, 1954, by Mr. David M. Johnson, Canadian Representative in the First Committee of the minth cossion of the United Nationa Committee at the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, on agenda item 17(a) -Report of the United Nations Commission for the United Science Percentilitation of Konon Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

Note: The text of a resolution adopted by the Committee and the results of the voting are included at the end of the statement.

oldsigesos and acceptable By resolution No. 711 of August 28 last year, the General Assembly recommended that those member states which would participate in the Political Conference on behalf of the United Nations should report back when agreement was reached or as appropriate. back when agreement was reached or as appropriate. It is therefore appropriate that the Korean problem should again be under consideration here, though we have regretfully to report that no agreement was reached at Geneva on the Korean question. This problem remains a United Nations problem, and the concern of my Govern-a United Nations that of a responsible member of the United Nations. Insofar as the United Nations has been seized Nations. Insofar as the United Nations has been seized of the Korean problem so has Canada.

of the Korean problem bo had Thus, when the United Nations decided that armed aggression should be repelled by collective armed aggression should be repelled by collective ilitary measures, Canadian servicemen went to Korea to fight and some to die. When the United Nations undertook fight and some to die. When the United Nations undertook fight and some to relief and rehabilitation of a Korea a programme for relief and rehabilitation of a Korea devastated by the conflict foisted on it, Canada devastated by the conflict foisted on it, Canada responded in cash and kind. When the Geneva Conference seemed to provide an opportunity to convert the Armistice responded in cash and kind. When the Geneva Conference seemed to provide an opportunity to convert the Armistice Agreement into a lasting peace settlement which would ensure a free, united and democratic Korea in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, Canada accepted an invitation to participate.

At Geneva the other side confronted us with a

plan for the unification of Korea which, if we had accepted it would have required us to repudiate the accepted of the United Nations and to orclude the accepted it would have required us to repudiate the objectives of the United Nations and to exclude this organization from any part in the substance and super-organization of the settlement. Their unification plan was vision of the settlement. Their unification plan was based on elections to be conducted throughout the peripsula by an all-Korean commission on which the based on elections to be conducted infoughout the peninsula by an all-Korean commission on which the aggressor and the victim of aggression were to have equal aggressor and despite the very unequal numbers of aggressor and the victim of aggression were to have equal representation despite the very unequal numbers of people involved on both sides. It was all too clear that the purpose of this commission was not to assist the that the purpose of Korea to express their free will that the purpose of this commission was not to assist the people of the whole of Korea to express their free will but to provide the North Koreans, after their failure to win control by force of arms, with another means for implementing their programme. The representatives for implementing their programme and the Societ Union of North Korea, Communist China and the Societ Union

called also for an international commission to supervise the elections. This recognition of the principle of international supervision was welcome, but unfortunately the type of commission then proposed would have been inhibited by so many restrictions that it would have had little real power. Both the old Korean commission and the international elections commission would have been so composed as to ensure that there would be a permanent deadlock, a situation of which we have already had unfortunate experience in Korea, as our distinguished colleague, the representative of Sweden, told us yesterday in reporting on the difficulties of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

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The Canadian Delegation at Geneva argued that if elections for the unification of Korea were to be free, they must be supervised by an international agency genuinely neutral and acceptable to the United Nations. This agency might consist of nations which did not belong to the Communist bloc and which did not participate in military operations in Korea. However, the other side were not disposed to accept a supervisory commission which would be truly impartial and capable of taking effective decisions and carrying them out.

When it was made abundantly clear that the other side were not prepared to see a Korea united in freedom, our delegations agreed that no useful purpose would be served by further meetings at Geneva.

My delegation regrets very much that it has been necessary for those member states represented at Geneva to report failure. The differences which existed between the proposals of the North Koreans and the minimum conditions which we consider necessary to protect the democratic rights of Koreans in the process of reunification were so broad that we had no alternative but to admit the failure of the negotiations. Certain concessions were made during the course of the Conference but the conditions on which the North Koreans insisted remained unacceptable. This being the case, the Canadian Delegation at Geneva agreed that it was far better to acknowledge our differences than to mislead the public of the world by merely suspending our discussions or by pretending that there had been agreements in principle. In our view, the Geneva negotiations lasted longer than the North Koreans had any good reason to expect or deserve. The deserve to expect or deserve to expect or deserve. The democratic countries represented there showed infinite patience in considering all the proposals put forward by the North Koreans and by the Chinese and Soviet representatives. The Canadian Delegation and the transferres and the construction of Delegation among others did its utmost to explore all possible methods of conciliation and agreement in accordance with the responsibility we had accepted under the General Assembly resolution of August 28, 1953 As any objective analysis of the record will show, it was not the fault of our side that agreement could not people of the whole of Korea to express , bedaes gewill

We and our associates have carried out our duties under the Assembly resolution. Nevertheless, my delegation does not consider that every effort to achieve peaceful reunification has been exhausted. We ourselves are quite prepared to try again. We are quite prepared to see further negotiations of any kind which may have a possibility of success. We do not think, however, that any useful purpose would be not think, however, that any useful purpose would be and we are by no means certain that the best method of and we are by no means is to reassemble that particular renewing negotiations is to reassemble that particular Conference at any future time.

The Soviet Delegation, however, now calls on us to support a resolution which would convene another conference, along the lines of the Geneva Conference, in the immediate future. However, there has been no in the immediate future. However, there have moved for the failure of the Geneva Conference have moved for the failure of the Geneva Conference have moved from the position regarding freedom which caused that from the position regarding freedom which caused that from the position regarding freedom which caused that for the failure of the Geneva conference have moved for the failure of the Geneva conference have moved for the failure of the Geneva conference have moved for the failure of the Geneva conference have moved for the failure of the Geneva conference have moved for the position regarding freedom which caused that from the position freedom which caused that failure. If there had been any indication from the failure of the failu

come soon. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the sincerity with which the Canadian Government the sincerity with which the long-suffering Korean and people seek to help the long-suffering Korean people to peace and unity in a free and democratic people to peace and unity in a free and democratic people to peace and unity in a free and democratic people to peace and unity in a free and democratic people to peace and unity in a free and democratic people to peace and unity in a free and democratic people to peace by a foreign aggressor. We are also again submerged by a foreign aggressor. We are also doing our best to help in United Nations efforts to doing our best to help in United Nations of the largest Government was the earliest and one of the largest contributors to the great work of the United Nations contributors to the great work of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Some of our soldiers Korean Reconstruction Agency. Some of our soldiers korean finterest in making sure that this great strongest interest in making sure that this great effort has not been in vain and in bringing freedom effort has not been in vain and in bringing freedom

and peace to the entry I think I have said enough to explain our I think I have said enough to explain our position on the Geneva Conference and the reasons which position on the Geneva Conference and the reasons which position on the Geneva Conference and the reasons which have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join in co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the co-sponsoring the have led my delegation to join the co-sponsoring the c

draft resolution I do not see how those countries which took I do not see how those countries which took up arms in defence of United Nations could do less up arms in defence of the United Nations could do less under the flag of the United Nations could do less under the flag of the United Nations could do less than ask the General Assembly to approve our report on than ask the General Assembly to approve our report on than ask the General conference, to reaffirm United than objectives, and to express the hope that it the Korean political conference in the progress towards these Nations objectives, and to express to make progress towards these will soon prove possible to make progress to secure a the United States, I sympathize with the desires which objectives. Like the distinguished Representative of have been expressed by previous speakers to secure a the United States, I sympathize and the resolution of have been expressed by previous speakers to secure a the United States, I since the texts are not far apart. Like marriage of the Indian resolution and the resolution of Senator Smith I regret that it was not possible despite the Fifteen, since the texts on both sides to Senator Smith I regret entirely. Since that is the very stremuous and patient efforts on both sides to the resolve these difference entirely. Since that is the case, and since as I have said, I do not see how the

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Fifteen could ask less of the Assembly, we naturally ers stand by our resolution reserving our right to speak on the resolutions at a later date. Detergency et la

ed bluew scolt is, however, quite clear from what I have said that my delegation regards the Geneva Conference 10 bas having ended in failure and in present circumstances will therefore oppose the Soviet resolution which would reconvene at an early date a conference of this type.

The Soviet Delegation, however, now calls on us to support a resolution which would convene another conference, along the lines of the Geneva Conference, in the immediate future. However, there has been no

Voting<br/>ResultsFollowing is the text of a resolution<br/>(U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.119) adopted by the First<br/>Committee on December 8, 1954, by a vote of<br/>50 in favour (including Canada) to 5 against<br/>(Corrict bloc) with b absentions: and by the (Soviet bloc), with 4 absentions; and by the 38th plenary meeting on December 11, 1954, by a vote of 50 in favour (including Canada) to 5 against, with 4 abstentions (Burma, India, -Jedw Saudi Arabia and Syria): Text of Resolution

## The General Assembly,

Having noted the report of the UNCURK (A/2711) signed at Seoul, Korea on 17 August 1954, and algoing ba

Having received the report (A/2786) on the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva from 26 April to 15 June 1954, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953,

Noting that the negotiations in Geneva have not resulted in agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the United Nations objective in Korea, émain still on guard in strongest interest in mal

<u>Recognizing</u> that this objective should be achieved by peaceful methods and constructive efforts on the part of the governments concerned,

Noting that article 62 of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 provides that the Agreement "shall remain in effect working by remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides",

1. Approves the report on the Korean Political Conference (A/2786);

2. <u>Reaffirms</u> that the objectives of the United Nations remain the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in oxit the area;

3. Expresses the hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress toward these objectives; I stnce as

4. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to place this item on the provisional agenda of its tenth regular session.



4. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to place this item on the provisional agenda of its tenth regular session.