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







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

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The Future of Canada

A Perplexed Imperialist

The Canadian Flag, &c.

BY

JOHN S. EWART, K.C.

THE FUTURE OF CANADA

An address delivered before the Canadian Club, Ottawa, December, 1907, by John S. Ewart

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With Mr. Ewart's Compliments.

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Canada's future will most probably be one of the five following:

1. Union with the United States.
2. An independent Republic.
3. Union with the United Kingdom.
4. An independent Monarchy, with a Canadian King.
5. An independent Monarchy, with the same Sovereign as the United Kingdom—which of these we do not know; but nevertheless, as the very enumeration of the possibilities will suggest, we may reason and form some opinion as to their respective probabilities.

And let us reason rather than proceed upon mere sentiment. I do not deny the importance of sentiment. I should be foolish to do so, for it is undoubtedly one of the greatest impelling forces of the



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THE FUTURE OF CANADA

An address delivered before the Canadian Club, Ottawa, December, 1907, by John S. Ewart

I have accepted the invitation of our Committee to address the Club upon the political future of Canada, and yet I feel compelled to admit that I do not know what that future will be.

I believe, nevertheless, that study and analysis will enable us to discriminate among the various possibilities that our imaginations may conceive, and to form some opinion as to probabilities. All that I shall attempt to do tonight is to offer to you such suggestions as seem to me to be of chiefest importance in the consideration of this most interesting subject.

Perhaps we may assume, as a point of commencement, that we shall not indefinitely remain in our present political position. We are a Colony—at least a British Dominion "beyond the Seas" (that is our official title); we are not a nation; we are in a position of subordination to a Government and Parliament in which we have no representation; we have to ask for permission to do many things; our foreign relations are beyond our own control.

I am not complaining of that situation; I am not even arguing that any present change should be made in it. All that I am saying is that a position of subordination is one that cannot last forever. Canada must some day rise to the dignity of full nationhood, and either alone or in some partnership have, and exercise the highest powers of government.

Canada's future will most probably be one of the five following:

1. Union with the United States.
2. An independent Republic.
3. Union with the United Kingdom.
4. An independent Monarchy, with a Canadian King.
5. An independent Monarchy, with the same Sovereign as the United Kingdom—which of these we do not know; but nevertheless, as the very enumeration of the possibilities will suggest, we may reason and form some opinion as to their respective probabilities.

And let us reason rather than proceed upon mere sentiment. I do not deny the importance of sentiment. I should be foolish to do so, for it is undoubtedly one of the greatest impelling forces of the

world. But it is changeable. It is the result of conditions, and changes with them. Individual feeling frequently undergoes modification, and we can have no security that the sentiment of the present generation in Canada shall be that of fifty years from now. In my boyhood, we always spoke of the British Isles as "home". Now we never do. We have learned to think of Canada as our home. That alone indicates a most important change in sentiment. Many of us still speak of the "old country". Probably those words too, will gradually drop out of use. And no one can pretend to predict what the prevailing Canadian sentiment will be fifty years from now, when we have assimilated some millions of Americans, Swedes, Germans and others, further than to say that probably it will not be the same as ours. My own idea is (but I am as likely to be wrong as anybody else) that fifty years from now the prevailing Canadian sentiment will be Canadian—very strongly Canadian.

But how are we to reason about Canada's future? Well there is only one way that I know: You must study the past, and try to comprehend the present. You will thus see in what direction Canada is moving—upon what ROAD she is travelling, and you may be able to form some opinion as to whether she will probably cease to go forward, or will probably deflect and go some other way.

In such an examination as this we proceed as mere students examining phenomena, and while we exclude our personal desire that the solution shall be this or that, we do not and must not exclude the sentiments of the Canadian people, for that is one of the factors which we must take into account.

Very well. But before commencing our examination of the political road which Canada has thus travelled, let me call attention to the very important distinction between the King (our titular head) and the King's Government—that is, the Ministry of the day.

Prior to the establishment in England, of what we call constitutional government, the King was a sort of German Kaiser—he took an active public part not only in administration but in legislation; and in the House of Commons, there were the King's friends and those opposed to the King. Situations of that sort sometimes led not merely to rebellions against the King, but even to his deposition, or decapitation.

Now, as you are aware, the King takes no public part in the discussion of political affairs, and opposition is always directed therefore, not against him, but against the Government that represents for the moment the verdict of the last elections. The King holds himself aloof from all discussion. He devotes himself to the good of the people in a hundred other ways, and he is revered by everybody.

Looking back upon the road which Canada has travelled we see but few and insignificant disloyalties to the King, and what we here

and there see were but the expressions of a feeling that relief from some grievances could be obtained only by separation from him. Those episodes were always short-lived. Most of us are not old enough to remember one of them. Good Queen Victoria always received Canadian acclaim, and for her worthy son, we have the greatest admiration and affection. The present road—the road which Canada has travelled for one hundred and fifty years—has not, then, taken us a single step from Monarchy—from the Monarch that wears the British crown.

Turning now to the British Government as distinguished from the British King, observe that in the United Kingdom during these one hundred and fifty years sharp criticism and strenuous opposition have been directed against every Government that has ever been formed; and that every Government, but the present one, has been deposed and turned out of office by the votes of the people.

Every British Government encountered opposition not only "at home" (Is the expression familiar to your ears?) but in Canada also; and, curiously enough, while British opposition to these Governments was thought to be quite right, Canadian opposition to them was often described as not merely presumptuous but as disloyal.

Note now the difference between the power of the two oppositions—the British and the Canadian. The British could turn the Government it disliked out of office and substitute one that it approved. But the Canadian could do nothing. It had no vote, and it sent no member to parliament to represent it there. Canada merely waited until, for reasons of their own, British electors condemned the Government.

And the Canadian situation was a great deal worse than that, for a change of Government in the United Kingdom meant nothing to Canada. The new one was no more acceptable to Canada than its predecessor; for, Canadians having no votes, the attitude of the Ministers of the day was not affected by the elections. A change meant, merely, that a new man became Colonial Secretary—usually one who knew nothing about the Colonies. The old Colonial Office officials pursued the same old methods, and the same old despatches went out over the signature of a man, who lacked the experience of his predecessor. That was all.

Canadian opposition, therefore, was not directed against one or other of the political parties in the United Kingdom, but against the Colonial Office; and with that institution, Canada was in perpetual conflict over the great question of the right to govern Canadians.

Canada and the Colonial Office were engaged in a tug-of-war. Each was hauling at the end of a rope called "Government". At first Canada had but a precarious grip—she had few people and but a short piece of the rope. What she had, however, was well belayed

round her sturdy maples, and she never lost an inch of it. On through the years she struggled, gaining a little here and there, and always deftly taking in the slack.

A great man arose in the Colonial Office, James Stephen, first Counsel and afterwards Under-Secretary—a remarkable member of a remarkable family. Now and then he willingly (an Upper Canada Governor said traitorously) let go a few more fathoms of the rope, and Canadians gladly gathered it in. Lord Durham came in 1838, and on his return issued his famous report, the "charter of Colonial liberties"; responsible government was voted unanimously in the first session of the first Assembly of United Canada; and since that date (1841) Canada has had the long end of the rope. From 1867, when the Canadian Federation took joint hold of it, eventual possession of every foot of it has never been doubtful. In 1870, the North-West joined us, and in 1871 our end of the rope was long enough to give British Columbia a grip of it. I may again be wrong, but my notion is that no part of that rope will ever recross the ocean.

It is a grand story, that of Canada's fight for freedom—for the great British right of self-government, and it is full of interesting and even exciting dramatic incident. All Canadians should know it well. It is the chiefest part of Canadian history. And when we know it, we know the political road which Canada has persistently and with the most unswerving determination pursued, from the commencement of her history down to the present day.

That road, need I say, is the road which leads to completest self-government. At every stage of it there have been many of our own people (often some of the best of them) who thought that we had gone far enough and who deprecated any further advance. But Canada as a whole, has never faltered and never hesitated. As she grew stronger, the feeling—the sentiment (Let us note it) has also grown stronger, that Canadians, better than anybody else, know what is best for themselves.

Observe now that the road of Canada's political development has not led us an inch from the British King, but that it has led us towards completest self-government.

What now is our present position? You know it, and I shall not dwell upon it. We are very near the end of the road. Practically, although not theoretically, we enjoy legislative independence and administrative independence; we make our own tariffs; we tax the British manufactures as we please and do not now receive official remonstrance; we negotiate with foreign States for reciprocity arrangements; and by sending Mr. Lemieux to Japan we have added a long step to our previous advance toward the management of our own foreign affairs.

We are so very nearly independent that the British Government itself has given us (at the recent Conference) the clearest and most

satisfactory acknowledgement of that fact. Take the language of the British Prime Minister:

"We found ourselves, gentlemen, upon freedom and independence—that is the essence of the imperial connection—freedom of action on the part of the individual states, freedom in their relations with each other, and with the Mother Country."

The Colonial Secretary (the first of his kind) said that he concurred

"in the principle which the Prime Minister laid down, that is to say, the freedom and independence of the different Governments which are part of the British Empire."

And the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Under-secretary of State for the Colonies spoke to the same effect. After those speeches, gentlemen, let no Canadian be afraid to speak of Canadian independence. It is "the essence of the Imperial connection"! Not everyone understands that, but to those who have studied the question it is now very clear. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has again and again given expression to it. I am not aware that Mr. Borden has done so in precise language, but all that he has said has been in hearty accordance with it.

We are now probably agreed that the road which Canada has been following leads to complete self-government, that is, to independence under the British Sovereign; and also that there is no appearance of halting upon that road. Now what precisely in such case, would be our position?

We should be free from control by anybody but ourselves; we should cease to be subordinate; we should be upon a footing of political equality with the United Kingdom itself; and we should not be a British Dominion "beyond the seas", but a Canadian Kingdom on this side of the seas in connection with the British Empire "beyond the seas." We should be what the fathers of our Federation looked forward to and hoped that we should be. We should have worked out the destiny which they foretold and of which they laid so well the foundations. It was Sir John A. Macdonald, himself, who wished for the title "The Kingdom of Canada" and it was he who said that he had in view

"the noble object of founding a great British monarchy in connection with the British Empire and under the British Queen . . . . . recognizing the Sovereign of Great Britain" (not the Colonial Office you will observe) "as its sole and only head."

We should be, as the Marquis of Lorne somewhat prophetically said to us when leaving Canada:

"You are not the subjects but the allies of a great country, the country that gave you birth."

The language may be unfamiliar but the fact nevertheless is that King Edward is today the King of Canada. Shall not the future make us a Kingdom? Or shall we always be some sort of an inferiority?

Gentlemen, I think that we now see the end of the present road. Let us consider the chances of deflection from it.

One word only as to the alternative between a Kingdom under the British Sovereign and a Kingdom under separate Sovereignty. For my own part a desire to remain in connection with "the old country"; a feeling that the full blaze of Royalty would be something unaccustomed, and possibly for a time not a little irksome; and a perfect contentment with our Governors-General, more especially may I say with the present most genial and popular occupant of Rideau Hall—all these ,as I think, contribute to the conclusion that in this respect we shall not diverge from the present road of our political development.

Another possibility is that we may unite with our neighbors to the south. I do not know the future. In some far off year, under some unforseen circumstances, such may be the destiny of Canada. A racial war with the Asiatic millions may throw us into war-union with the United States, and battle-comradeship may lead, as it often does, to political partnership. I am not a prophet. All that I say is that the present road does not lead to union with the United States, and I see no tendency to turn in that direction.

The second possibility—an independent Republic—is a result less probable than the one we have just considered. We may discard it.

But what of our third possibility, Imperial Federation?

In 1884 the Imperial Federation League was formed,declaring, as its fundamental assertion:

"that in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire, some form of federation is essential."

But the League could not suggest any form. It lectured and published, and finally went to Lord Salisbury (1891) asking him to call a Colonial Conference to consider the question. In reply Lord Salisbury declined to do so until he had some proposal to lay before the Conference:

"We are almost come" he said "to the time when schemes should be proposed . . . . without them we should not get very far."

Not being able to agree upon any scheme the League dissolved in 1893, and no other such league has ever since been formed.

The truth was that discussion had proved that Imperial Federation was impracticable. Imagine the reception which would be given in the United Kingdom to any proposal that the Colonies should have *pro rata* representation in the British Parliament—a representation that would soon outnumber the British members! What would they do with us? And more particularly what should we do with them? Federation is impossible.

The "New Imperialists", as I believe they call themselves, have completely abandoned the idea of a present Federal Parlia-

ment. Sir Frederick Pollock, for example, who came here as their spokesman a short time ago, after pointing out that it would involve modifications in the jurisdiction of the existing Legislatures, continued in these words:

"I am not aware of any reason for thinking that the parliament of the United Kingdom would easily be persuaded to reduce itself by a solemn act to a mere State Legislature, or that the Colonial Governments would be willing to surrender any substantial part of their autonomy to some new Federal Senate or Council."

And speaking of the other alternative, he said:

"No one I believe is now found to advocate a direct representation of the Colonies in Parliament."

Mr. Chamberlain at the outset of his imperialistic efforts recognized the same thing, and admitted the hopelessness of even framing a proposal for Imperial Federation. In 1896, referring to the history of the League, he said:

"During its career it was again and again challenged to produce a plan, and it was unwilling or unable to answer the challenge. Sir, I think we may, at all events, learn from its experience that the realization of our hopes, if they are in the direction of a federation of the Empire—their final realization—is a matter of such magnitude and such great complication that it cannot be undertaken at the present time."

What could not be done in the lump, so to speak, Mr. Chamberlain set himself to accomplish by instalments. With great courage, versatility and persistence he proposed one bit of federation after another, only to meet defeat and failure upon every point. He failed, if for no other reason than because at the very outset he told us quite frankly that his object was:

"to create a new government for the British Empire—a new government with large powers of taxation and legislation over countries separated by thousands of miles of sea."

Taxation from thousands of miles across the sea, was something which had a rather unpleasant sound in Canadian ears, and our statesmen did not at all agree that it was as Mr. Chamberlain said:

"a desirable consummation to be approached by a process of gradual development."

As a first instalment of federation, Mr. Chamberlain endeavored to bring about a Commercial Union of the Empire—that is, to provide for some joint control over the making of customs' tariffs for the whole Empire. This, he said, was the preliminary step to German consolidation, and it would lead to political union of the British Empire. But Mr. Chamberlain at once antagonized all the Colonies, and proved the hopelessness and impracticability of joint control, by insisting that Commercial Union must be based upon the abandonment of protection within the Empire. In the speech already quoted from, he said:

"But the principle which I claim must be accepted if we are to make any, even the slightest progress, is that within the different parts of the Empire protection must disappear.

Mr. Chamberlain soon became convinced that protection would not disappear, and he abandoned the attempt to create his Com-

mercial Union. He is now a strong believer in the Canadian system of preferences—each part of the Empire maintaining control of its own tariff, but giving, either voluntarily or by agreement, the benefit of preferential rates to other parts of the Empire (*a*).

The difference between this system and Commercial Union is the difference between co-operation and incorporation—the same difference that marks all contrasts between Chamberlain Imperialism and Canadian Imperialism. Co-operation not incorporation, is a short but correct description of Canada's conception of all Imperial relations.(*b*).

Another of Mr. Chamberlain's proposals was the institution of an Imperial Council. Feeling that he could not propose the admission of Colonials into the British Parliament, he suggested at the Conference of 1907 that it might be

"feasible to create a great Council of the Empire to which the Colonies would send representatives . . . persons who . . . would be able to give really effective and valuable advice", adding that "If such a Council were to be created . . . it is perfectly evident that it might develop into something still greater".

Sir Frederick Pollock called it a Council with "persuasive author[illegible]"

The Conference declined to approve the proposal, resolving instead

"that the present political relations between the United Kingdom and the self-governing Colonies are generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things."

What a great advisory Council of the Empire would be, may be judged to some extent by the proceedings of the late Conference, when, with the exception of Canada, the Colonies expressed disapproval of the British Government's attitude to protection and preferences. Canada offered no criticism; nor would she be inclined to pay much deference to the judgments of Australian, South African, or even British Premiers should they agree in condemning some policy which we had approved. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was undoubtedly right when he said at the Conference, that imperial relations must rest upon this:

"that every community knows best what does for itself."

Canada would not tolerate "persuasive authority" from any gathering outside of Canada.

The proposal of a Council is dead. At the last Conference, Mr. Lyttleton, Mr. Chamberlain's successor, endeavored to change the

(*a*) In "Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform" for April, 1905 (Mr. Chamberlain's special publication) it is said "that a central Imperial Parliament or Council, with power to control tariffs, is no part of Mr. Chamberlain's scheme. What is proposed is a preferential arrangement by conference and treaty between the United Kingdom and the several Colonial Governments, neither Government surrendering parliamentary control of taxation, except in the sense in which such control is limited by any commercial treaty between nations—*e. g.*, by the Cobden treaty between England and France.

(*b*) An Australian newspaper (The Bulletin) suggests the phrase "Alliance not Independence", saying that it "welcomes the British alliance, but detests the British supremacy."

word "Conference" to "Council", but as soon as Sir Wilfrid pointed out the connotations of the word "Council", the Conference unanimously declined to make the change.

Another instalment of federation attempted by Mr. Chamberlain was the establishment of an Imperial Court of Appeal. In 1900, the Australian Colonies requested the grant of a federal constitution. No objection was offered by Mr. Chamberlain (then Colonial Secretary) except to the clause limiting appeals of law-suits to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Upon this point he was somewhat obstinate because, as he said,:

"it would be a retrograde measure so far as it affects the larger question of Imperial Federation."

and it would interfere, he said, with proposals

"for amalgamating the Judicial Committee with the House of Lords so as to constitute a Court of Appeal for the whole British Empire."

That proposal, however, was almost immediately abandoned. Mr. Chamberlain found that his own people would not give up their appeal to the House of Lords, and his reason for denying to the Australians the right to settle for themselves such of their own law-suits as they pleased, disappeared.

In announcing the withdrawal of this proposal Mr. Chamberlain put forward another, and called a special Colonial Conference in 1902 to consider it. Asserting, erroneously, that the Colonies desired a

"more effective and continuous representation on the Judicial Committee"

than they then had, Mr. Chamberlain proposed to appoint from the Colonies

"four additional Law Lords with seats in the House of Lords as well as on the Judicial Committee".

Seats in the Lords were, however, not a sufficient bait, and Mr. Chamberlain had to report that

"The result of the Conference has been to show that no far-reaching alteration in the present tribunal is desired or would be considered by the Colonies generally."

Contributions from the over-seas parts of the Empire in support of the British Navy was an instalment of federation upon which Mr. Chamberlain was especially insistent. Before his time (in 1887) Australia had commenced what has been called subscriptions to the British Navy, but what was really payments of money in exchange for the permanent stationing of certain British war ships in Australian waters. Other Colonies followed Australia's lead, and by 1902, Canada was left alone as a non-subscriber. Canada was upbraided, but she continued her own course, founding herself upon the principle that any money available for naval defence she would herself disburse upon her coast defences, and the commencement of a naval force. Canada spends large sums annually upon her land forces. Will any one say that it would have been better had she

always subscribed to the British Army, rather than equip soldiers of her own?

The last Conference was remarkable for many things, but for nothing in so great a degree as the conversion, not only of Australia but of the Admiralty itself to the Canadian idea (*a*). Some people, unaware of the result of Australian and other experience, still speak as though Canada ought to subscribe to the British Navy. But no one can help sympathizing with the view of Natal, for example, whose Premier spoke of her subscriptions as

"simply a cold lump sum voted on our estimates, for which we have no actual evidence as concerning the people we represent."

In this matter, as in all others, Canadian policy is co-operation and not incorporation—development of her own forces, military and naval, so that when the time comes she may be ready to co-operate with the other parts of the Empire in such wars as the Empire may undertake.

Summarizing what I have said, observe that

1. The road of our political development has not led us away from Monarchy nor from the British Sovereign;
2. It has led us to almost complete independence.
3. The termination of that road is not far off, and it is the Kingdom of Canada under the British Sovereign.
4. Probably we shall not turn from that road to join the United States.
5. Nor shall we become a Republic by ourselves.
6. Imperial Federation, either in the lump or by instalments, is impracticable and impossible.

It will be observed that although I have said that we are near the end of the road, I have not asserted that there is any general desire to hurry to its termination. We have little reason to complain of the usual course of our ordinary political life. But there is one feature of our relations to the Empire which is in a most unsatisfactory position and ought to be settled before it brings us embarrassment. I refer to the eventuality of war.

At present, in case of hostilities, we are under no legal or constitutional obligation to aid other parts of the Empire, and they are under none to help us. No Colony has any forces enrolled for oversea service, and Canada has no statute under which her men can be ordered out of Canada.

Further, Canada has no voice, is not even consulted, as to the propriety or necessity for war. It has been assumed that the making of peace and war shall be settled in London, and that the Colonies shall have nothing to do but fight when told to.

(*a*) Even "The Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee seems to have accepted the same idea: see "The Times", 23 November, 1907.

That situation is, I say, intolerably unsatisfactory. I am not arguing what Canada would do to-morrow if called upon. My own notion is that, as in the Boer war, more men would volunteer than could be accommodated with places. But I do say that Canada cannot be satisfied with an arrangement which gives her no voice whatever, in the matter which is of all others the most important to her.

Remember for example the Fashoda incident. Lord Salisbury's prompt and peremptory ultimatum to France brought the two nations to the very verge of war, and Canada would have been expected to send her men. But Lord Salisbury probably never imagined what that might mean to Canada. With statesmanlike tact, British and French descendants have in Canada been almost welded into one people. But not entirely so. If Canada is to take part in a war against France it should be in pursuance of arrangements well thought out and agreed to under unexciting circumstances.

Look too at the British-Japanese war alliance, by which each party guarantees the eastern territory of the other. Should Japan and the United States go to war, and should the United States take Formosa (as from Spain she took the Phillipines) the United Kingdom and the United States would be at war. And Canada? Well, all that I say is that eventualities of that sort ought to be provided for. If Canada had had any voice in the making of war-treaties for the Empire she would never have agreed to the Japanee alliance. No one who has had the pleasure of visiting the Japanese Islands can fail to have been impressed alike with the beauty of the country and the energy and capacity of the people. But we do not wish Japanese jurisdiction established either in Alaska or Puget Sound. It would alter our whole domestic economy; and we cannot agree to help them as against the United States.

But what can be done? We cannot expect to be kept informed upon every step in British foreign negotiation, even though it may be such as to involve the possibility of war? Why then speak of being consulted? War comes suddenly, and consultation by cable is impossible.

Quite true. But is there one alternative only, namely that, for all time, Canada is to be a mere appendage and to have no voice at all in matters of peace and war? If so, I for one vote against being an appendage.

There is fortunately another alternative. There is the usual method of procedure when two nations wish to act together in case of war. They make an agreement about it. They do not interfere with one another's foreign affairs. One does not, usually, consult the other, one agrees merely to support the other in certain eventualities.

Are we ready to agree to engage in war with France, or the

United States, or Japan? Are we ready to send contingents to fight with Germany? Are we willing—no matter what the cause of the war, even though it be one wholly opposed to Canadian interests? Are we willing—although, at the same time, settlement of our own quarrels is taken out of our hands and hushed down by generous diplomatic concession "in the interests of the Empire at large", as goes the customary phrase? If so, let us deliberately say so. For my part I think we shall not say so.

And if we think such a position too humiliating, altogether too unworthy of a people twice the size of the United States on its first Independence Day, let us say that too; and let us, if we can, enter into some well-defined arrangement with the United Kingdom. Let the promises, and the powers, and the advantages be mutual. Canada must, some day, have something to say upon the greatest of all national questions—the question of peace and war.

We cannot accept Mr. Chamberlain's idea of our duty. At the Colonial Conference of 1902, through the Colonial Defence Committee, he asked the Colonies

"to give some assurance as to the strength of the contingents which they should be able to place at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for extra-colonial service in a war with an European power."

He said nothing, you will see, as to the cause of the war, or the Power against which we were to fight, or as to consulting us beforehand. He merely wished to know how many men we would send. Canada and Australia replied that that matter should be left

"to the Colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to what extent it should render assistance."

Under present circumstances that was the proper reply; but it was proper only because of the ambiguity of our situation. It is a direct assertion of Canada's right to settle such matters for herself. But my idea is that she should settle them, not under pressure but during some period of tranquility.

It is sometimes suggested that Canadian independence would speedily result in enforced engulfment in the United States. Sir, I believe that one of the greatest benefits derived from independence is that by it we should be compelled to place our war-relations upon some satisfactory basis. If we are willing to agree to supply men and money for every British war, and under all conditions, we should have to say so, instead of returning evasive answers. And if, in return for such help, the humiliating period of ever-recurring kow-towing to the United States is to cease, then that also should be specifically agreed to.

The advent of Canadian Independence will necessitate some definite arrangement. If an agreement can be made, we shall be stronger against the United States than we are today. And if none be possible, we shall all know, what, indeed, is already sufficiently

apparent, that our present situation, while it involves our participation in foreign wars, affords us no security against United States aggression.

Now, do not take me as advocating independence in this address. I am doing nothing, at the moment, but pointing out to you the road that we are on, and suggesting what its termination will be if we do not turn from it. I am not going, either, to pretend that independence under the British Crown is a position free from objection. There are indeed examples, but not of the most encouraging character, of two countries with no other organic union than a common King—such as England and Scotland under the Stuarts, and Great Britain and Hanover under the Georges. The first of these ended in political union, and the second in complete separation. How long the United Kingdom and Canada would continue to acknowledge the same Sovereign, no one can venture to say. Some untoward incident might speedily terminate the situation; but if the Canadian schemes of Imperial co-operation are allowed free play, a vast increase in sympathy and interest might prolong it indefinitely.

I have no time to dwell upon these schemes, or to trace the difficulties which Canada has encountered in getting them into operation. I can do little else than mention them:

First there is the Canadian system of imperial preferences. Canada has converted the Empire with the sole exception of the United Kingdom to that great idea, and by converting Mr. Chamberlain has so impressed the sole dissentient that, a strong political party is now advocating colonial preferences. Imperial co-operation in trade.

Secondly, there is the Canadian idea of imperial cables—direct and cheap communication with all parts of the Empire, with landings upon territory of the Empire only. Thanks to Sir Sandford Fleming's persistence, we have already a large instalment of such cables owned and managed by various parts of the Empire. Imperial co-operation in telegraphy.

Thirdly, there is the Canadian idea of cheap imperial postage. Thanks very largely to Sir William Mulock, an ounce letter may now go to any part of the Empire for two cents; and the rate of postage upon British periodicals has been reduced from last year's rate of 8d. a pound to this year's rate of a penny a pound. What that means may be imagined, but not I think fully appreciated, when we know that its immediate effect was to increase the number of bags of British mail by Canadian steamers (the only ones affected) in May and June of this year by 146 per cent. over the corresponding months of the previous year. Imperial co-operation in cheap postage.

And fourthly, there is the Canadian idea of an all-red route of transportation, which is meeting with the usual opposition but which we shall have. Imperial co-operation in transportation.

We now see clearly the difference between Chamberlain Imperialism and Canadian Imperialism. Canada has successfully opposed all attacks upon her powers of self-government. Imperial Federation in the lump has been given up. The instalment plan has been rejected. No statesman and no organization now suggests Commercial Union; or an Imperial Council with "persuasive authority"; or an Imperial Court of Appeal; or subscriptions to the British Navy (even the Navy League, and the Admiralty have abandoned that idea); or ready contingents for over-sea service under all conditions.

Canada has resisted all attempts at political incorporation, and when I say "Canada" I do not mean merely the present Government of Canada. They indeed have, by necessity, been our representatives; but that they represented us fairly, is well attested by the fact that no word of complaint or criticism of their actions has been offered by the political party opposed to them.

Last July, Sir Wilfrid Laurier returned from the recent Colonial Conference. Since then Mr. Borden has delivered a most interesting series of addresses throughout the Dominion. He has attacked Sir Wilfrid upon every point, except his conduct at the Colonial Conference. Mr. Borden has never given us the slightest reason to suspect that he is less of a Canadian than the very best of us. (a).

Gentlemen, I have finished, and my last word must be that if, in some proximate or some far off day, the future of Canada shall be as I have indicated: nationhood; self-control; equality with the United Kingdom, instead of subordination and subserviency to the Colonial office; the Kingdom of Canada, instead of one of many "Dominions beyond the Seas"; imperial co-operation in all matters of mutual advantage; co-operation in war under agreed conditions; co-operation in trade; co-operation in communications, by cable, by post, by speediest methods of travel; the increase and advancement by these means, of imperial sympathy, and friendship, and brotherhood: if this be our future, then I say that we shall yet reach the goal aimed at by Sir John A. Macdonald forty years ago; we shall yet be

"a great British Monarchy, in connection with the British Empire, and under the British King; recognizing the Sovereign of Great Britain as its sole and only head."

Gentlemen, that is, I think, a future of which we need neither be afraid nor ashamed.

(a) Since the delivery of the above address Parliament has met and the debate upon the Speech from the Throne has taken place. In none of the speeches was there a word of criticism of Sir Wilfrid's conduct at the Conference.

CRITICISM OF THE ADDRESS.

In a letter to the "Ottawa Citizen", Mr. Wickham said:

"Having read the report of Mr. Ewart's paper on Canada's future in your columns, I ask space to say that the picture drawn by him falls far short of the ideal which I venture to think will appeal to a vast majority of Canadians—namely, an ultimate combination, federation, or agreement—call it by what name you will—which will provide for mutual defence and adequate machinery for dealing with foreign relations. The future of Canada as a probably dominant factor in such a world-wide empire, is far brighter than any other that I can conceive.

During the period which must ensue in which the self-governing dominions are growing to a full and equal nationhood, there should be a working arrangement to provide for mutual defence. The ultimate combination would amount to an offensive and defensive alliance between the different parts of dominions of the empire of a permanent character sufficient to ensure the stability of the empire. Whether or not the foreign relations of the empire shall be handled from a common centre must, it appears to me, from sheer necessity be left to the future. Time and the occasion will no doubt produce the statesman of sufficient calibre to deal with this question; but with the forces of the empire (naval and military) organized on a preconcerted plan, to ensure their working together harmoniously in any emergency, we shall be free to work out our destiny without fear of molestation. In the meantime, what is the position of Canada? Canadians are (relatively to other world-powers) a sparse population, occupying a vast territory full to the brim of those natural resouces and national riches for which other world-powers are hungering, and which we at present are permitted to enjoy unmolested solely by reason of the strong protecting arm of the British navy. We do not sufficiently realize this fact. We are like hothouse plants, unaware that the atmosphere in which we live is, metaphorically speaking, artificially heated, It is sometimes said that we are justified in relying on the Monroe doctrine and the protection of the United States. I, for one, repudiate this suggestion, not only as unworthy, but as suicidal to our own interests. I have no idea that we shall be allowed to lean upon this support without payment of the full price—namely, the loss of our national status as a separate nation, besides which, it is not long since the United States themselves felt grateful that the existence of the British navy made it possible for them to work out one phase of the Monroe doctrine, without interference from other European powers.

But Canada must develop along all national lines, otherwise she will grow up lopsided. For this reason alone it would be wrong for Canada to contribute in cash to the upkeep of the British navy, a

course which has for the last twelve years been consistently opposed by the Toronto branch of the Navy league. No nation ever amounted to anything that simply paid some other power to take care of it. The spending of Canadian money by the Canadian government in preparation to take our own part in naval warfare is essential to our national growth, and we cannot afford to forego it. It should be made to go hand in hand with the building up of our Canadian mercantile marine as part of a broad national maritime policy. The question, however, as to just what we should provide in the way of men and material is a highly technical one, to be arranged between experts appointed by Canada in consultation with experts appointed by the other parts of the empire. The Australian naval authorities are now exchanging views with the Admiralty with beneficial results. When we speak of a separate Canadian navy, as a distinct fighting unit, we require to consider just what class of ship or character of training will best fit in with the other requirements to give the best results. At the conference in May last, the first Lord of the Admiralty expressed the desire of the British government to meet the wishes of the self-governing dominions in every respect, leaving to each to do little or much, or nothing at all, according to their own will in the matter, and invited them to make such expenditures under the control of their own legislatures along such lines as they thought best suited their respective conditions.

The position taken by Canada's representatives at the conference, namely, that we cannot undertake to do more than we are doing, has been very disappointing to Canadians who wish to see their country take up its proper stand along with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and who desire to see the adoption of a maritime policy for Canada worthy of the name. The fact is that as between the two political parties in Canada the only difference between their attitude on the question of Canadian naval defence is that one is funky, whilst the other is afraid. What are they afraid of? Why, the French-Canadian vote. If our statesmen could forget partizanship for a sufficient time to make it clear that it is our duty to our own national interests that demands our attention, I have sufficient confidence in my French-Canadian fellow-citizens to feel sure that they will support a movement to co-operate with the British navy, an institution which has been in the past, is at the present time, and will no doubt in the future, be the bulwark under Providence, of their civil and religious liberty.—

Yours truly,

H. J. WICKHAM,
One of the Vice-Presidents of the Navy League.

REPLY TO THE CRITICISM.

My reply to Mr. Wickham must be the same as that already given to some other critics: "Please re-read the address criticized."

I said that the road of Canada's political development (now nearly 150 years long) had led in the direction of self-government. No one denies that.

I said that Canada was very near the end of that road. No one doubts that.

I said that there is no appearance of halting upon the road. No one questions that.

I said that there is no symptom of deflection from that road, either towards union with the United States, towards a separate republic, towards political incorporation with the United Kingdom, or towards separation from the British crown. No one says that there is.

I said that the end of that road is complete emancipation from the Colonial office, perfect self-government, political equality therefore with the United Kingdom. No one thinks otherwise. Mr. Wickham does not.

I said that for such a political situation the proper designation was not a "Dominion beyond the seas," but "the Kingdom of Canada"—the title desired by Sir John A. Macdonald forty years ago. Does any one doubt that?

I said that Canada ought not to subscribe to the British navy. Canada has converted almost everybody to her opinion upon that point, including the British government, the British Admiralty, Australia (the originator of the practice), and the Navy League itself, of which Mr. Wickham is a vice-president.

These are the main propositions of my address, and my critics thus far have found fault with none of them. Now let me copy Mr. Wickham's complaint, and a paragraph from the document that he complains of. Mr. Wickham says that the picture which I drew falls far short of his ideal, namely, an ultimate "combination, federation, or agreement—call it by what name you will—which will provide for mutual defence and adequate machinery for dealing with foreign relations."

Calling it an "agreement," I said that "one of the greatest benefits to be derived from independence is that by it we should be compelled to place our war-relations upon some satisfactory basis. The advent of Canadian independence will necessitate some definite arrangement." The picture and the ideal appear to be very much alike.

To one other point of Mr. Wickham's letter I make short reply. He says that "the position taken by Canada's representatives at the

conference, namely that we cannot undertake to do more than we are doing, has been very disappointing to Canadians who wish to see their country take up its proper stand along with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa." My reply is that Canada's representatives took no such position; that, on the contrary, Australia took its stand with Canada in its refusal to send contributions to the British navy; that South Africa intimated a similar intention; and that the New Zealand agreement to contribute, fell with the Australian.

I have never been quite able to understand why Imperialists so frequently base their arguments upon misrepresentation and disparagement of their own country.

JOHN S. EWART.

FOOT-NOTES TO ADDRESS.

Quotation in the address from Sir John A. Macdonald has shown that Canadian independence is no new idea. Extracts from speeches of some other statesmen, British and Canadian, may be interesting.

THE RIGHT HON. MR. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN.

In a speech at the Westminster Palace Hotel (17 May, 1905) Mr. Chamberlain said:

"Ours is an Empire by itself—an anomalous Empire. It really is a collection of States which are not bound together by anything more than mere sentiment."

Speaking at Birmingham (26 June, 1905) Mr. Chamberlain said:

"What are we all? We are sister States in which the mother-country by virtue of her age, by virtue of all that she has done in the past, may claim to be first, but only first among equals. Now the question is, How are we to bring these separate interests together—these States which have voluntarily accepted one Crown and one flag, and which IN ALL ELSE ARE ABSOLUTELY INDEPENDENT ONE OF THE OTHER."

In a speech at Birmingham (2 January, 1906) referring to the self-governing Colonies, Mr. Chamberlain said:

"The time has gone by when we could treat them with indifference, when we could speak of them as though they were subject to our dictation. They are self-governing nations. They are sister-States. They are our equals in everything except population and wealth; and very quickly you will find that they will equal and surpass us in these respects."

THE RIGHT HON. MR. A. J. BALFOUR.

Speaking of military and naval relations between the different parts of the Empire, Mr. Balfour said (Ottawa Citizen, 3 August, 1906) that he

"was perfectly certain that the self-governing Colonies would never allow any representative of their's to come to a Defence Committee if the committee with that addition had the smallest authority to impose obligations, financial, political, military or naval, on the Colonies they represented. With a Defence Committee so constituted they could give advice, and advice would likely be taken by the home department."

In a speech before "The 1900 Club" (Albert Hall, April, 1907), Mr. Balfour testified to the existence and necessity for Colonial independence in the following language:

"We have, therefore, a great experiment to carry out, the experiment of retaining in our Empire communities which must each be left unhampered, untrammelled, unimpeded, to follow its own laws and destiny and development. We have to combine those and to keep them bound in our great Empire. That is the problem of the British Empire, and do not let us conceal from ourselves that as time goes on it must involve, like everything else which is worth doing, difficulties of its own.

If I am asked how I think those difficulties should be faced, how the centrifugal forces which may not be powerful, which are not powerful, but which exist, are to be neutralized, then I say it cannot be done by the old method of control by this country of its children. That has long been abandoned by every British statesman of every school. Neither can it be done, I think, by a reciprocal intervention in each other's affairs on the part of all these great self-governing communities.

The connection is, and must remain, so far as paper constitutions are concerned, a loose connection, but which need not and must not be loose so far as these bonds are concerned which cannot be put on paper, cannot be embodied in a constitution, but which are written in the hearts of men.

I have heard the British Empire compared to an alliance, a close alliance, of Independent States. I do not agree with the parallel. I do not think that is the ideal we ought to look to. Mere treaties or the substitute of treaties framed in order that a common end may be obtained by independent communities, are useful things, but they are not the bonds which are going to unite us for all time to our children beyond the seas.

Again, I have heard the British Empire compared to a commercial corporation, a partnership, but here also I think the parallel is poverty-stricken and falls far below the reality at which we should aim. We are not partners in a commercial concern in which each partner has to consider nicely whether he gets his proper share of the common profits of the firm, and in which each is prepared to transfer himself and his capital to some other firm if he thinks he can get better terms. That is not the way in which any member of our Empire should look upon the great body of which he is a member. That is not the mode in which he should represent his relationship either to the Mother Country or to the other Colonies.

No. The true parallel is not that of an alliance or of a partnership. It is that of a family. We have to feel, and I think we do feel, that the bonds that unite us—in almost all cases the bonds of blood, and in all cases without exception bonds, of common institutions and common love of freedom—carry with them, and must carry with them more and more, feelings of obligation and of mutual service which cannot be put down in black and white, which cannot be added up by any arithmetical process, but which bind us together as members of a united family are bound together, pleased when they give to each other some service which differentiates them as a family from the rest of the world, and anxious to do that service without too close calculation of what they are to get by it. A family between whom there may be and must be business relations, but with whom, though business be business, it is yet something more. That is the ideal we have to look to."

LORD CURZON.

Speaking at Birmingham (11 Dec., 1907) the former Viceroy of India said:—

"The constituents were there; the spirit was there; but the problems were still involved and the plan had yet to be produced. We had so to work that the concentric rings should continue to revolve around the central star, not merely because it had hitherto been the law of their being, but because it was their interest and their voluntary choice. In the economy of the imperial household we were dealing, not with children, but with grown men. At our table were seated, not dependants or menials, but partners as free as ourselves, and with aspirations not less ample or keen. That they were bound to us by sentiment was a priceless asset; to throw it away would be a criminal blunder. . . . Of one thing he was certain, namely, that in proper hands the Crown would become, if not more powerful, at all events more indispensable and more important. He looked forward to the day when the Sovereign would visit his Dominions in person and hold his court in Calcutta or Quebec. Nor could he imagine any stronger cement of Empire than that its government and unity, as typified by the Sovereign, should from time to time be incorporated in the allied States or Dominions. The capital of the Empire would probably never leave London; but there was no stationary necessity or obligation in the Crown."

THE HON. SIR RICHARD CARTWRIGHT.

In a speech reported in the Toronto Globe, 18 October, 1888, Sir Richard said:

"It is known to every man who has played any important part in Canadian politics—it is known perfectly well—that before Confederation was accomplished, and since Confederation has been accomplished, the English Government have in the most unmistakeable fashion given the Government of Canada to understand that from that time forth we must not expect that the British people or the English Government should be called upon to take any very active part in the defence or protection of Canada; that we were strong enough and populous enough to rely on our own resources; that if we should unhappily come into collision with any power, and especially with the power of the United States, it was to our own arms and our own stout hearts that we must look for protection. I have no quarrel with the English Government for taking this action. On the contrary, I say frankly that it would have been no kindness, but rather a cruel mockery to have allowed us to suppose that they could render us any considerable assistance when they knew that it would, in all probability, be beyond their power to afford it. But that being so, it follows as a necessary consequence, that when a paramount State has ceased to be able to protect a Dependency, it is not in a position to exact obedience from that Dependency, at any rate as far as regards the dealings of that Dependency with another State from which the superior will not undertake to defend it. And that, in plain English, is the precise position which we now occupy towards England and the United States. That is the exact state of the case; that is the logic of the case; that is in accord with international law and common sense. Great Britain has, by her own deliberate acts, and by intimations conveyed again and again by her statesmen to ours, shown Canada that were she to come into collision with the United States, she must trust to herself, must defend herself as best she can."

THE HON. MR. CHAPLEAU.

In a speech at Providence, R. I. (December, 1891) Mr. Chapleau said:

"There are those who say, and they are not far from telling the truth, that every native-born Canadian is Canadian first and last, and that every day the proportion of native-born Canadians increases as against the native Britons forming the Dominion. It is true, and I admit it, that every Canadian wants at maturity a country of his own to live for, to fight for, and if necessary to die for. Nobody is so deaf to the teachings of history as not to realize the natural fact that Colonies, like shoots from the parent tree, gradually but surely tend towards independent life. The only question is a question of time . . . I believe in that mysterious and natural growth of nations towards independence, which alone can give them the full development of their strength and resources . . . With such a parentage, with such traditions of courage, of intelligence, of glory, are Canadians to be denied the noble ambition, the sure destiny of being a people by themselves?"

SIR OLIVER MOWAT.

In a speech at "The Liberal Club" (January, 1893) Sir Oliver Mowat said:

"But British connection cannot last forever. No one in the old land or in this land imagines that British connection can be permanent. There must be some change. Some would have Imperial Federation; but most men, both in this land and there, regard Imperial Federation as out of the question.

Annexation to the United States, Sir Oliver also discarded and proceeded:

"Then for those to whom annexation is distasteful, there is that other alternative which comes to the hearts of most Canadians. They look forward—almost all people look forward, if they regard Imperial Federation or annexation as undeniable—they look forward to Canada some day becoming a separate and independent nation. There is no desire in regard to our future, stronger than that desire is; and I apprehend that the probable destiny of our Colony is to become an independent nation."

THE HON. MR. HONORE MERCIER.

In a speech at Sohmer Park, Montreal, (4 April, 1893) Mr. Mercier said:

"Malgré tous les avantages matérials et autres que nous procurerait l'union avec les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, je conseille à mes compatriotes—Français, Anglais, Irlandais et Ecossais de demander l'indépendance, et cela pour quatre raisons principales: 1re, par nécessité; 2e, par patriotisme; 3e, à cause des avantages matérials d'indépendence; 4e, parce que nous sommes capables de vivre comme peuple indépendant. (Brochures Politiques, 187[illegible]92, vol. 11, Library of Parlt, Ottawa.)

THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES TUPPER.

In a communication to the "London Daily News" (30 July, 1897), referring to the suggestion of "a great Imperial Parliament" Sir Chas. Tupper said that such a

"plan is hopelessly behind the times, and could not succeed. Some years ago the Imperial Federation League, consisting of such men as Lord Rosebery, the Marquis of Ripon, the Hon. Philip Stanhope, the Right Hon. W. H. Smith, and others considered the matter in all its bearings. With only one dissentient, we concluded that the idea of an Imperial Parliament was right out of practical politics, and Lord Rosebery voiced our verdict at a meeting at the Mansion House.

There are two reasons why an Imperial Parliament cannot be. In the first place, such a body would have to include in its powers, taxation for imperial purposes, and so its membership would have to be framed somewhat on the population basis. This means that in a few years the voice of England would be utterly swamped by the more populous Colonies. England would never submit to it. Secondly, the Colonies would never consent to surrendering their autonomy, and handing over a large part of their powers to a body three or more thousand miles away."

THE HON. MR. G. W. ROSS.

Speaking at a banquet of "The Manufacturer's Association" ("The Globe", 23 September, 1906) Mr. Ross, then Premier of Ontario, said:

"A treaty based upon mutual preference between the Colonies and the Empire would partake of the same dangerous elements of irritation and misunderstanding as a treaty between Canada and the United States. Independent action by the mother country and any of her Colonies by customs duties would be the only proposition by which Canada, at least, could fully preserve the right of self-government, which cost us so much and for the loss of which no mere commercial advantage would compensate."

THE HON. MR. EDWARD BLAKE.

In a speech in the British House of Commons (1893) Mr. Blake after saying that the difficulties in suggesting

"a reasonable and practicable plan which would settle in a permanent manner the relations of the country (Canada) with this Empire."

had enormously accumulated and would probably be "entirely insurrmontable", added

"With regard to questions of defence and offence, I believe there is a feeling growing, that the people of Canada are not concerned with the transactions which may involve England in those little wars in which she so frequently indulges; but that they are willing and anxious to find some practical plan which would enable them to remain in connection with you, and to complete their development, national and economic in those lines."

Speaking in the British House of Commons (21 May, 1900) in favor of the Australian Commonwealth Bill, Mr. Blake said:

"I ask myself by this transaction in which we are engaged, are we really facilitating the management of Imperial problems between ourselves and Australia? I say we are, and why? Because this transaction, entered into at their instance, strengthens the only real ties of union between the great Colonies and this Kingdom—the ties of good-will, the sentiments of affection and contentment, pride, and patriotism, springing no doubt in great part from common blood, but really maintained and strengthened, mainly everywhere and exclusively in very important quarters where the tie of blood does not exist, by virtue of the local freedom they have obtained, by virtue of the autonomous growth of their nationalities, by virtue of the development, the peace, security and progress enjoyed under local self-government by these great communities within this Empire. Again, it is helpful to the disposition of the imperial problems between us and Australia, because the Commonwealth, with a greater area, larger and more varied interests, wider views, and unified political powers, will obviously deal with imperial matters in a higher and broader spirit than could be expected of smaller and separated States, and will thus greatly ease imperial negotiations. I would appeal only to successive Ministers concerned in this country as to whether that has not been the case with regard to Canada. I know it to have been the case from the Colonial side. I know the spirit that has pervaded when questions arose of this description, and I know how far that spirit was due to the consideration I have referred to. I have said imperial negotiations, because for many years, I, for my part have looked to conference, to delegation, to correspondence, to negotiation, to quasi-diplomatic methods, subject always to the action of free Parliaments here and elsewhere, as the only feasible way of working the quasi-federal union between the Empire and sister-nations like Canada and Australia. A quarter of a century past I dreamed the dream of Imperial Parliamentary Federation, but many years ago I came to the conclusion that we had passed the turning that could lead to that terminus, if ever, indeed, there was a practicable road. We have too long and too extensively gone on the lines of separate action here and elsewhere to go back now. Never forget—you have the lesson here today—that the good-will on which you must depend is due to local freedom, and would not survive its limitation. Never forget what has passed in the course of this brief controversy. It is another evidence that the real link is good-will, and that the root and foundation of that good-will is the local freedom which you give so freely everywhere except in one small part of the Empire. I do not think Pan-Imperial Parliamentary federation is within the bounds of possibility. And this conviction it was that made it impossible for me, with every sympathy, to join in the efforts of the late Imperial Federation League. I do not in the least degree think this Bill is a step towards Imperial Parliamentary Federation. On the contrary, I believe it is distinctly a step the other way. Because the greater the power, the larger the success, the higher the ambition of United Australia, the less the likelihood of her surrendering to a Parliament sitting on the other side of the globe in which her representation would now be scanty, the powers you give to her to wield at home. That great problem of finally reconciling the national aspirations, as they may develop, of these distinct communities with British connection, the great problem of reorganization remains inscrutable. Let us maintain, at any rate, the essential element of goodwill. I believe the condition to be not as the Colonial Secretary said in his speech on the first reading. I do not believe, as he said, that the links that bind you to your Colonies are slight and slender. I do not believe, as he said, that they could be snapped by a touch. I believe them to be strong and real. But I believe them to be absolutely impalpable, not founded on costly appeals, not on your clauses of reservation, not on your powers of disallowance, and not on the paramount legislative power of this Parliament. I am not complaining of these things; but they are not the real links that bind the whole. You frankly agree that if the great Colonies say "Let go"; you will let go. Thus your coercive powers, useful in their little measure, are useless here. What then, are these impalpable links on which alone you can depend? I warn you once again, from the deepest conviction of my soul that while these links are strong and real they are links of good-will, founded on local freedoms. That this is so is exemplified today in the concessions you have freely made to the principle of nationality, the principle of self-government and of local freedom, which will enable this people, under the aegis of the Empire, to go their own way according to their own view in all those matters which concern their own interests."

THE RIGHT HON. SIR WILFRID LAURIER.

As Premier of Canada in the House of Commons, upon the eve of his departure for the Colonial Conference (15 April, 1902) Sir Wilfrid Laurier made one of the most impor[illegible] policy-making

speeches ever delivered in Canada. Referring to the previous speaker's criticism of the Government's attitude towards imperial defence, Sir Wilfrid said:

"It would be a most suicidal policy for the Canadian people to go into any scheme of that nature. It would be the most suicidal policy that could be devised for Canada to enter into the vortex in which the nations of Europe, England included, are engaged at the present time, and which compels them to maintain great military armaments. Sir, what is the relative position of Great Britain and Canada. Great Britain is one of the foremost nations of the world in many ways, perhaps, the foremost nation, certainly the greatest Empire which exists to-day, or perhaps which has existed since the supremacy of Rome.

Great Britain, by reason of her situation, has to maintain a large and permanent army. Hon. gentlemen are aware how repugnant to the British people is the necessity of maintaining a standing army. Hon. gentlemen are aware how the British people have constantly fought against that idea. But they have been forced by events, forced by the position which the Empire occupies in the world to maintain a standing army, and to-day the principal items in the British budget are the expenditures for naval and land armaments. Now, my hon. friend says that Canada should follow in the same course, that we should take part in a scheme of military imperial defence. Sir, Canada is in a different position. Canada is a nation with an immense territory, but with a sparse population of five and a third millions of souls, scattered over an area 3,000 miles in extent from east to west. The principal items in the budget of Canada are what?—public works the development of the country needs, the construction of railways and harbors, the opening up of ways of transportation; that is the work to which we have to devote our energies, and I would look upon it as a crime to devote any part of that necessary expenditure to the supply of guns, cannons and military armament generally."

The Opposition probably agreed with this proclamation of a partial "Canadian Monroe Doctrine", for no resolution condemnatory of it was moved. (And see an extract from Mr. R. L. Borden's speech in reply to Sir Wilfrid, infra).

MR. R. L. BORDEN, K. C.

As leader of the Opposition, and following Sir Wilfrid Laurier on the occasion just referred to, Mr. Borden said:

"I, for one, shall always maintain that , so far as Canada is concerned, Canada must herself deal with the subject of imperial defence. I say that this country must deal with that subject and must control that subject, but I do not agree with the Right Honorable gentleman that it is out of the question altogether to discuss it when we are invited in a courteous way to do so."

Speaking at Vancouver (24 September, 1907) upon the delicate question of exclusion of the Japanese—the United Kingdom's war-partners in the east, Mr. Borden said:

"While recognizing our duty to the Empire, we respectfully maintain that Canada in all essential details must be accorded freedom of judgment, as free and unfettered as that exercised by any other portion of the Empire—even by Great Britain herself."

Speaking in the House of Commons, 18 April, 1906, Mr. Borden said:

"It has been truly observed by more than one recent constitutional writer that the Crown is to-day the strongest bond between the motherland and the dominions of the British Empire beyond the seas. That has come about through a curious process of constitutional development. As the various portions of the Empire have gradually attained greater powers in respect to their internal affairs, the parliament of Great Britain and Ireland has to a certain extent lost that influence as a central body which it formerly possessed. The Crown at the present time represents more truly the dignity and the greatness of the Empire to all those who live in the dominions beyond the seas than does the parliament of the United Kingdom. This is the natural course of constitutional development; it has been proceeding for years and it undoubtedly will continue in the future."

THE RIGHT HON. SIR WILFRID LAURIER.

Speaking in the House of Commons (7 April, 1892) Sir Wilfrid said:

"The honorable gentleman has tried to make some fun out of the statement that nations were not made in a day, and he says, there is nothing very new in that. I admit there is nothing new in that, but the honorable gentleman would imply that nations are never formed at all. He speaks as if Canada were to remain forever a Colony, but I say, that Canada is not always to remain a Colony. Light as our dependence may be on the Mother Country, that dependence is not to remain forever. If we were to admit that, if we were to say that we were always to remain in a dependent condition, we would be the scorn of the world, and it would be scorn well deserved. We have self-government, we have a constitution of our own, we have interests which are separate and distinct from those which we hold in common with the Empire of which we form a part, and our energies must seek wider fields abroad. Perhaps, the next step may be said to be complete independence, but there is no desire to have complete independence in Canada to-day. Even with those who, like myself, look to independence as the supreme goal, there remains a love for the Motherland, and a desire to remain in connection with it; but in the nature of things, as I said in the speech the honorable gentleman has done me the honour to quote, our relations must be compatible with our interests.

The honorable gentleman has said, there was no grievance felt in any part of the country. I take direct issue with him on that point. While no one desires to change the allegiance which exists, at present, there is a great and growing feeling, not only amongst Reformers but even amongst Conservatives, that the colonial relationship must be changed, because at present it is unsuited to our wants, and is an impediment to our progress. What I assert I will prove by the organization to which my honorable friend referred a moment ago, the League for the Federation of the British Empire. I affirm that the very idea which underlies this organization for the Federation of the Empire is, as I have stated, the feeling, the knowledge, the consciousness, that colonial citizenship, such as it is to-day, is inferior to British citizenship. Every friend of Imperial Federation in this House will admit, I am sure, that no one in this country has spoken with greater authority than the honorable member for North Simcoe (Mr. MacCarthy) of the aspriations of the Imperial Federationists, of the motives which animate them. I have endeavored to follow the utterances of that honorable gentleman whenever he has spoken upon this subject, and if I have gathered his views correctly, the underlying idea in his advocacy of Imperial Federation, is this very idea that our colonial citizenship as it is to-day, is inferior and must be reformed. Speaking at Peterborough, in the month of January, 1889, the Hon. member Mr. Simcoe is reported to have said:

"He contended that Canada had a right of access to the imperial councils. Canada was growing out of childhood, and it was time it should share the burdens of manhood. Imperial Federation was not impracticable, but its consummation, like the growth of the British constitution, would necessarily be slow. He wanted—no matter how it was done—to have all Canadians admitted to the full duties of British citizenship."

While it is not my good fortune to agree very often with the member for North Simcoe, upon this occasion I say that I altogether agree with him in his premises; I agree with him that our colonial citizenship at the present moment is inferior, and must be reformed. But I do not agree with him in his method of securing that reform; I do not believe in Imperial Federation. If colonists are to be represented at Westminster in the same way that Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotchmen are represented, then, of course, colonists must assume the duties and responsibilities which are borne, by Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotchmen, to carry on the wars in which they are almost perpetually engaged throughout the civilized and uncivilized world. I think these are consequences before which the people of Canada will recede."

"Now, therefore, every man must admit in this House that the policy of Imperial Federation is no remedy whatever for the inferiority of our colonial citizenship. It is the destiny of the Colonies to become nations, as it is the destiny of a child to become a man; and while ,no doubt, the idea of separation from the Motherland causes a pang in the heart of everyone, yet there is not a child who leaves his father's house who does not do so with a pang, if his heart is in the proper place.

There is a grander idea yet. John Bright truly said that Britain is the living mother of nations, and we may yet hope to see British communities dotting the earth's surface, which I hold to be a grander idea than that of welding together a gigantic British Empire on the face of the earth. For my part, that is the view I favor. No doubt, at this moment it excites alarm, as every such movement excited alarm before the event, but it will be as other great movements have been, a cause of admiration when it is completed. There is not a country on the face of the earth which ever achieved its independence except at the cost of blood and war and enmity

with the parent state. I hold out to my countrymen the idea of independence, but whenever the day comes it must come by the consent of both countries, and we shall continue to keep the good feeling and good-will of the motherland. If we are true to our record we will again exhibit to the world the unique, the unprecedented example of a nation achieving its independence by slow degrees and as naturally as the severing of the ripe fruit from the parent tree.

The honorable Minister of Finance reproached me a moment ago, that I had stated at Boston that the Canadian people have interests altogether at variance with the interests of the mother country. Sir, I said so at Boston, and I say so now, on the floor of this House. Will the honorable gentleman deny that the Canadian people have interests altogether at variance with the interests of the mother country? I have again and again repeated that the goal of my aspiration is the independence of Canada, to see Canada an independent nation in due course of time. Where, I ask, is the pride of the Canadian name? The activity and energy of this young nation are frittered away in useless and even dangerous bickerings of race against race and creed against creed. Sir, for this fatal state of things there is out one remedy; it is to elevate the standard, to show to the young and hopeful that Canada has a future, and towards that future steadily to advance, with faith never wavering, with enthusiasm never flinching."

Speaking at a Convention of the Liberal Party (Toronto, 20 June, 1893) Sir Wilfrid said:

I am loyal to the British Crown. I have often repeated in the Province of Quebec, and I am happy to repeat it to-day, when so many of my fellow-subjects of French origin are present, that we owe a debt of gratitude to the British Crown for the way it has treated us in the last 50 years. Loyal although I am, I do not think it would be my part to say that the interests of a Colony are the interests of the Empire. Take the best families in the land: there is often a diversity of interests between members of that family and there is a diversity of interests between members of an Empire. The commercial interests of England are not the interests of Canada, and the commercial interests of Canada are not the commercial interests of England; and there is no Conservative who can say that; for the fact that England is free trade and the Canadian Conservatives protectionist shows that there is at least a diversity of interests between England and Canada.

Sir, I want now to say this, if the interests of Canada clash with the interests of England, is it any part of my loyalty or yours that we should make the interests of Canada give way to the interests of Great Britain? What is the reason, I want to know, that my ancestors left the shores of France to come to the savage country? Simply because they were not satisfied with their condition in France and thought they would better it in Canada. What is the reason that your own fathers left the shores of Great Britain, of England, Ireland and old Scotland? Simply because your own fathers were not satisfied with their conditions upon their native soil, but believed that by coming to this country they would build up for themselves and their families a better and more prosperous condition of things. And are we, their descendants, to be told when we find our interests clashing with those of the motherland we must stand by the motherland? I do not attempt any such loyalty, and I am quite sure of the position that would be adopted in any part of Great Britain. I would not hesitate to go upon any platform there and state the same thing that I say to-night. I am a British subject, and if it were my lot to have been a member of the British House of Commons, I would speak like an Englishman and stand up for England in preference to Canada any time.

But I am a member of Her Majesty's House of Commons of Canada, and I leave it to Englishmen who represent the interests of Her Majesty's subjects in the Imperial Parliament to deal with the interests of the English nation, and I call upon the people of Canada to stand up for the interests of Canada; and if there be any man in this audience—no, there is no one in this audience—but if there be any man outside of this audience who says he stands up in preference for the interests of England, I tell him "go back to England." And in speaking as I do, I claim I am perfectly loyal, because Her Majesty the Queen does not expect that any of her Canadian subjects should abase themselves or should refuse to stand up for the interests of their country; but she expects from us upon every occasion that the interests of Canada should be p mount. Again, I say, this is loyalty such as I understand it."

SIR G. BADEN-POWELL.

Discussing imperial relations in the Nineteenth Century (June, 1893) Sir G. Baden-Powell well said that popular will

"can only grow to be an overwhelming force by reason of its being broad-based upon the true economic necessities of the case. Sentiment, pride, love of power—all those are great forces,

leading men to great actions; but they are the auxiliary rather than the main army; they are the assistants rather than the principals; they are accompaniments rather than essentials, which always remain and will remain the exclusive necessities of the case. Material interests, measurable in £., s., d., are what pervade and regulate the public judgment and rightly so. Society is but an aggregation of individuals, and it is the material interest of each individual which leads him to his political judgments. Prosperity is, when all is said and done, the one real aim of every man's politics; and therefore, it is truly said in public affairs that the way to a man's heart is through his pocket."

A PERPLEXED IMPERIALIST

An article contributed by Mr. Ewart to the Queen's Quarterly, October, 1907

Preachers of Imperialism cannot expect to make very much progress until they are able to announce what it is they want us to do. Christian, and all other missionaries, must be able to tell their heathen at least that much. And the apostle set apart by the Rhodes trustees to preach the federation of the Empire (Professor Leacock) is no exception. He, also, ought to have some conception of what it is he is preaching about—some notion, vague or otherwise, of what it is he wants us to do.

Probably it is an altogether heathenish suggestion, too, but one cannot suppress the thought that, when attempt is being made to arrange new relationships between peoples, it might be advisable to speak politely of them, the one to the other; to propitiate them; to bring them into agreeable and agreeing humor. Even if you cannot tell them what they ought to do, you can at all events refrain from trying to make them contemptuous of one another.

The Rhodes apostle is of contrary opinion upon both of these points. Preaching imperialism, he admits that he does not know what ought to be done; and raising resentments, seems to be his idea of the best way to produce concord and union.

Mr. Winston Churchill's characterization of the apostle's recent communication to the London Morning Post as mere "offensive twaddle" was well deserved. A long contemptuous sneer at John Bull—representing him as foolish, effete ("too old, getting too set in his ways") and given to little but feeding ("saying between the munches, 'I am a free fooder, I am a free fooder'") is Professor Leacock's method of approaching Englishmen with a proposal of political union with them. Indeed in one particularly insolent paragraph he suggests that Britishers are altogether too stupid to unite with colonials, and ought to be relegated to a subordinate position:

> "The old man's got old and he don't know it, can't kick him off the place, but I reckon that the next time we come together to talk things over, the boys have got to step right in and manage the whole farm."

One would be afraid that impertinent arrogance of that sort might possibly be ascribed to more Canadians than the one who

wrote it, were it not that for us, too, the professor has little but contempt—we, also, if not too stupid for union with other people are much too sordid and too base. Asking what position we should take at the approaching (now the past) Colonial Conference, the professor said in a recent article in the University Magazine:

"We—the six million people of Canada, unvoiced, untaxed in the Empire, unheeded in the councils of the world,—we, the six million colonials sprawling our over-suckled infancy across a continent—what shall be our message to the motherland? Shall we still whine of our poverty, still draw imaginary pictures of our thin herds shivering in the cold blasts of the north, their shepherds huddled together in the log cabins of Montreal and Toronto? Shall we still beg the good people of England to bear yet a little longer, for the poor peasants of their Colony, the burden and heat of the day? Shall our ministers rehearse this wornout fiction of our 'acres of snow,' and so sail home agian, still untaxed, to the smug approval of the oblique politicians of Ottawa?"

For ridiculous, slanderous absurdity that paragraph can be equalled only by one other ever written in Canada. It is from the same reckless pen, and in the same article:

"The mud-bespattered politicians of the trade, the party men and party managers, give us in place of patriotic statescraft the sordid traffic of a tolerated jobbery. For bread, a stone. Harsh is the cackle of the little turkey-cocks of Ottawa, fighting the while as they feather their mean nests of sticks and mud high on their river bluff. Loud sings the little Man of the Province, crying his petty gospel of Provincial Rights, grudging the gift of power, till the cry spreads and town hates town, and every hamlet of the country-side shouts for its share of plunder and of pelf. This is the tenor of our politics, carrying as its undertone the voice of the black-robed sectary, with narrow face and shifting eyes, snarling still with the bigotry of a by-gone day." (*a*)

Harsh cackling from little turkey-cocks; loud cries from little men of the province; snarls from black-robed sectaries; town hating town—what a lovely country to go into political partnership with! Is this, Professor Leacock, really the best way to make your appeal to John Bull? Is he really such an illimitable fool as to desire union with such a people? And if that is his peculiar form of idiocy, are you not a little apprehensive that he may have just sufficient glimmer of sense to suspect that your account of Canada is absurdly untrue?

Probably you have no such apprehension. More probably you do not care whether John Bull finds you out or not, for immediately after villifying your own people you describe his politicians in a way that you must have known he would certainly disclaim and resent—for its untruth as well as for its vulgarity:

"Jangling are they, these twenty years, over little Ireland that makes and unmakes ministries, and never a thought of Canada; jangling now over their Pantaloon Suffragettes and their swaddled bishops, wondering whether they shall still represent their self-willed lords, nose for nose, in the councils of the Empire or whether they may venture now to scale them down, putting one nose for ten."

Passing from personalities to his subject, the professor puts the question: "What can be done?" and the professor admits that he cannot answer:

"So there we stand, we and you, pitched fast upon the horns of a dilemma. You cannot tax us, since you will not represent us. We cannot be represented because we will not be

(*a*) The same University Magazine refused to publish the present reply to Prof. Leacock's articles upon the ground that some of the expressions in it would not look well in type!

taxed. So we stand stock still, like the donkey in the philosophic fable, balanced between two bales of hay, nibbling neither right nor left. So are we like to stand, till some one of us, some of you and us, shall smite the poor donkey of our joint stupidity, there where it most profits that a donkey shall be smitten, and bid it move."

Now, to a heathen, this is just the sort of a situation for an apostle. Here is a donkey wasting away because he does not know enough to eat; none of the spectators can help the poor brute; a passing apostle suggests that somebody better smite it and "bid it move"; but curiously enough admits that he as well as the others are too stupid to apply this seemingly very simple but somewhat curious remedy for starvation.

Too witless to "smite the poor donkey," either in "the most profitable" or any other place, the apostle helplessly turns to the "turkey-cock" Canadians and the "jangling" Englishmen, and thus apostrophizes them:

"Yet is the difficulty perhaps not impossible of solution. The thing to be achieved is there. The task is yours to solve, men of the council table. Find us a way whereby the burden and the power shall fall on all alike; a way whereby taxed, we shall still be free men, free of the Imperial citizenship, and your historic constitution unshattered in the progress . . . . . "At it then like men, shrewd representatives of Ottawa and Westminster, trained in the wisdom of the ages. Listen not to those who would block the way with a non possumus on this side, a non volumus on that. Find us a way, show us a plan, a mere beginning if you will, a widow's mite of contribution, a mere whispering of representation, but something that shall trace for us the future path of the Empire."

To encourage the "turkey-cocks" and the "janglers" (now changed to "shrewd representatives of Ottawa and Westminster, trained in the wisdom of the ages"), the professor assures them not only that the thing can be done, but that it must be done, and that guidance is not "altogether lacking in the task."

It must be done because, as the apostle declares, there is nothing else to do, for there are but four possible futures for Canada, and in this very easy way disposes of them:

1. Union with the United States? "Our future lies elsewhere."

2. Independence? "Not thus our path."

3. Half-in, half-out of the Empire with a mimic navy of our own? "No."

4. Imperial Federation—"An Empire, Permanent and Indivisible"' "Yes". Not that any "turkey-cock" knows enough to "smite the poor donkey," profitably or otherwise, but simply because nothing else can happen.

Arguing in the same way—a very childish way—one might easily prove that union with the United States is our future. For there are still only the four possibilities, and the three others we may eliminate, if we choose, with three sniffs.

Let us consider independence a little. Professor Leacock says: "Not thus our path," for "we could not survive a decade". Why we should die so soon, he does not say. And inasmuch as in

the world there are, and always have been, very many nations with populations less than six millions of an intelligent sort of people, the reason is not very apparent. Let us think of two points: (1) To what extent are we already independent? and (2) Is it possible (unless somebody very soon "smites the poor donkey") to keep us away from complete independence?

Political independence is the freedom of one State from subordination to another. Canadian political history is the relation of our rise from complete subordination to almost complete independence. Does anyone regret the elevation?

Does anyone yearn for the days when our affairs were managed from Downing Street? when our taxes were imposed by imperial statutes, and collected and spent by imperial officials? when the net profit of post-office facilites (exceeding sometimes £15,000 a year) were remitted to London?

For more than half our colonial lifetime, our trade and commerce and manufactures were regulated and thwarted by Imperial legislation. Does anyone propose that our freedom from such subordination should be surrendered?

Until 1849, our tariffs respected the traditional right of the British manufacturer to exploit the colonial markets. Since that date, and more particularly since 1879, we have had more regard for the Canadian than the British manufacturer, and our fiscal independence is now established and admitted. Is the loss of our former subordination deplored?

Not so long ago all commercial treaties were made for us—without even consultation with us. Now, no treaties bind Canada unless she assents to them; and Canada negotiates for tariff-concessions as she pleases. Is independence in that respect regretted?

Formerly our Governors ordered out our militia, and did with them as he thought right. Now the militia are under our own control—although it is not always easy to convince the Governors or British officers who happen to be in our service of that fact. Ought we to return to military subordination?

Until 1842, the administration of our government was largely in the hands of our Governors and their appointees; and since then we have had occasional tiffs with Their Excellencies upon that point. Upon the whole, however, they have ceased to try to govern us, and now our own men administer the affairs of our country. Is adiministrative independence to be given up?

There survive, no doubt, theories of the subordination of our parliament to the parliament of the United Kingdom; of the subordination of our Executive to Downing Street; of the supremacy of the War Office and the Foreign Office, and so on; but our independence is so well advanced that although, in a technical sense, we are not a nation, yet Canada has to-day (thank heaven and our

own efforts) many more of the characteristics of a nation than of a colony. Are we really sorry for it?

I fancy that Professor Leacock agrees with the rest of us upon all these points, for he says:

"This colonial status is a worn-out, by-gone thing. The sense and feeling of it has become harmful to us. It limits the ideas, and circumscribes the patriotism of our people. It impairs the mental vigor and narrows the outlook of those that are reared and educated in our midst."

Very well said. Now if the colonial status is really a "by-gone thing" (and very largely that is quite true) what is our present status? Clearly we are not part of an Imperial Federation; and clearly too we never shall be, unless someone wise enough to "smite the poor donkey" shall soon appear. If so, we must be either independent, or something very close to it. If independence means that we are untrammelled by direction and control; that we can do as we like; that our freedom is so far advanced and so well recognized that we have only to declare it in order to make it a legal as well as an actual fact, then we are to-day independent. We have already in that condition survived the decade.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mr. Chamberlain have accustomed us to speak of Canada as a nation. In some respects we still fall short; but Professor Leacock is right in his refusal to be called a "Colonial," and he might well join with Imperialists such as Mr. Balfour and Lord Milner in attributing to Canada that independence, that freedom from subordination, which are the principal characteristics of nationhood. That we still tolerate a merely nominal subserviency, seems to be sufficient to blind the eyes of the professor to the fact that Canada is to-day mistress of her own destinies and can exericise that greatest right of independence—the right to do as she pleases.

Our independence then is almost complete. We have made it so, and probably no Canadian regrets what we have done. Professor Leacock at all events does not. Already is our virtual independence recognized; already are we given the name of a nation; already we meet in conference with our "sister nations" on a footing of complete equality—arguing and bargaining for our respective interests. Does anyone wish that instead of Imperial Conferences, at which the Canadian Prime Minister should be the chief personage, we should return to the time of Governor Sir Francis Bond Head, Governor Lord Metcalf, or even Governor Lord Dufferin? Does any Canadian propose to repudiate the language of the British Prime Minister at the recent Conference:

"We found ourselves gentlemen upon freedom and independence—that is the essence of the imperial connection. Freedom of action in their relations with one another and with the mother country."

Lord Elgin said that he concurred in:

"The principle which the Prime Minister laid down, that is to say the freedom and independence of the different governments which are parts of the Empire."

And Mr. Asquith (Chancellor of the Exchequer), said:

"The special feature of the British Empire has been that it has combined, and succeeded in combining in a degree unknown in any other combination in history, a loyal and affectionate ttachment between the centre and the parts of the Empire, and between the various parts themselves, with complete practical independence."

Are Canadians ashamed of this "special feature of the British Empire"? Of all peoples on the face of the earth, are they the only ones who insist upon eternal dependence upon somebody else?

Canada's independence being virtually complete, the only other question is whether the form and appearance of subjection shall remain to all eternity? Shortly we shall have a population larger than that of the British Isles, shall we, nevertheless, continue to ask London whether we may rearrange our provincial subsidies? Already we think we know more than anybody else about our own affairs, shall we forever submit proposed legislation to Downing Street approval before making it law? Shall we eternally pretend that Downing Street may veto it at any time within two years of its enactment? Shall we never, never, never rise to the dignity of acknowledged nationhood? Shall we through all succeeding ages be a somebody's Colony, or somebody's "Dominion beyond the seas"—be something subordinate? Canada's history is the assertion of her right to independence. She has thrown off and repudiated all real interference with her will. Shall she forever be content to wear the halter, even though well assured that no one dare touch it? She would look better, I think, without it.

The effect of declared Independence would mean (unless some sensible arrangement were made to avert it) some slight inconvenience or expense through the loss of the British Consular Service; but that loss would be richly requitted by the loss of the British Diplomatic Service—from Oswald to Alverstone. We should have the same service of the British army and navy as heretofore, namely none. We should be relieved from contribution to British wars, which in the past have cost us heavily. We should gain in self-respect. We should be free from the colonial status which "impairs the mental vigor and narrows the outlook." And we should realize more clearly our defencelessness, and take some serious steps to improve our fighting condition.

Our neglect in this respect has been due to our fancied security. Does not the British navy defend us? Every now and then we were made aware that the British navy did nothing of the sort; but our disinclination to spend money, soon sent us back to the British navy idea. Were we legally independent, we should have to face the fact instead of dodging it; we should have to formulate our policy and live up to it; and our policy might be (who can tell) that in exchange for the use of the British navy now and then, we should agree to some scheme of mutual defence. I say nothing as to what we should

do with our independence. The present point is: Shall we do as we wish?

The British Empire is lacking in the most essential characteristic of an Empire—not only is there no central control of its forces, but there is no agreement among the "sister-nations" as to what is to be done in case of war. Canada will never put her forces beyond her own control. If they are to be used in Imperial wars, it will be because she so decrees. Canada is to-day independent (that is, she may do as she likes) with reference to British wars. Does anyone wish it otherwise? Her obligations must come, if at all, by agreement—by alliance between sister-nations. Canada's independence (her right to do as she likes) in this respect, too, must be recognized.

But Professor Leacock would say:

"If this be our policy and plan, let us complete our teaching to our children. Let us inscribe it upon the walls of our schools, let us write it in brass upon our temples that for the navy which made us and defends us, we pay not a single penny, we spare not a solitary man. Let us add to it, also, that the lesson may bear fruit, this 'shelter theory' of Canada now rampant in our day; that Canada by some reason of its remoteness from European sin and its proximity to American republicanism, is sheltered from that flail of war with which God tribulates the other people of the world, sheltered by the Monroe Doctrine, by President Roosevelt and his battleships, sheltered, I know not how, but sheltered somehow so that we may forget the lean, eager patriotism and sacrifice of a people bred for war, and ply in peace the little craft of gain and greed."

What a curious jumble! Where does the professor get the idea that the British navy "made us?" Our growth has been rapid in proportion to the extent to which we have ousted Downing Street, and been permitted to manage our own affairs. The navy has had no share in the making of us. And if the suggestion intended is that the British navy took Canada from France, the Professor is very much mistaken. Our forefathers who used to live in the American Colonies had much to do with that. The British army, too, had some share in it, but should we still pay tribute to the British army?

In what sense does the British navy defend us? Twice only in the history of British North America has the British navy taken part for us or against us, and on both occasions it was against us—siding once, illegally, with the French against the Newfoundlanders, and siding again with the Americans against the British Columbia sealers.

"Defend us!" When and where? Not in time of peace. And not in any war that we were in the slightest degree responsible for.

We have never had a war, although we have fought several (including two in Canada) which the United Kingdom got itself into. We have had indeed various quarrels with the United States, but the British navy never helped us in one of them—British diplomacy always settled them for us, and usually by the easy process of concession of our rights.

"We pay not a single penny" for the British navy! Certainly not. Why should we? We get no abuse for failure to subscribe to

the British army. Spending our money upon our own war preparations seems to escape condemnation, when applied to land-defence. Why is it reprehensible in connection with war-ships?

Some forty years ago Australia became anxious (with much reason) about naval defence. European powers were establishing themselves in the neighboring islands—might they not seek to divide up Australia as they succeeded afterwards in dividing New Guinea? Australia, too poor to provide for her own defence, in 1887 made a definite agreement with the United Kingdom—so much money for so many ships, not to be removed from Australian waters. That was the commencement of what has been called subscriptions to the Briitsh navy. It was payment for contracted defence and in no sense a subscription—the ships were provided and the money was paid.

Afterwards all the other self-governing colonies, except Canada, agreed to send in their annual cheques, some of them upon written bargains, some of them upon mere understandings; and from 1897 until the present time there have never been wanting foolish people to deride Canada for her meanness.

The proceedings of the late Colonial Conference have changed the situation. Australia, realizing her mistake, has given notice of intention to discontinue her remittances; Cape Colony and Natal are ceasing payments; and New Zealand's arrangement falls with Australia's. This could easily have been foreseen; but what is somewhat surprising is that the Admiralty itself acknowledges conversion to the Canadian idea. Instead of the appeals to the Colonies for contributions (of the Conferences of 1897 and 1902) we have now the complete acceptance by the Admiralty of the only true and practicable principle, that colonial money available for colonial defence shall be spent by the Colonies themselves.

Most of us have felt little hurt at the jibes of the last ten years. They will now probably cease. Canada, through Sir Charles Tupper, broke up the original Imperial Federation League (1884–1893) because of its insistence upon Colonial subscriptions to the British navy. Canada has had to stand alone as against the Admiralty and all the other Colonies. She has never swerved. Behind Sir Wilfrid Laurier were both political parties. In this and various other contests in which the great principle of colonial self-government has been recently attacked, Sir Wilfrid has grandly guarded Canadian rights.

Professor Leacock suggests that Canada ought to forego its geographical advantages ("its remoteness from sin and its proximity to American republicanism," is his mode of expressing the idea), and the advantage which may be derived from the Monroe Doctrine, and should become imperialistic—"aye, for the very danger of it."

For the same reason, I suppose, the United Kingdom should

throw off, as far as possible, its island security; and build tunnels and bridges (if can be) to connect it with the continent—"aye, for the very danger of it." With what envy ought John Bull to regard the geographical situation of Germany—"for the very danger of it."

"Sheltered by the Monroe Doctrine!" By one half of the Monroe Doctrine the United States has declared that American territory, in both its continents, shall be exempt from annexation by foreign powers. European and Asiatic nations may quarrel and grab as they please in other parts of the world, but these continents shall develop undisturbed, so far as possible, by outside rivalries. Were it not for this Monroe Doctrine, the old-world struggles for the balance of power, for markets, for mere territorial expansion, would long ere this have brought European nations face to face in America, as in Africa and other parts of the world.

It is a doctrine extremely beneficial to Canada, one in support of which Canada ought to be ready at any time with her whole strength to aid the United States. If Germany were to try to get foothold in Maine, or Japan to endeavor to establish itself in California, then Canada, I say, should for her own safety, to the extent of her whole power, uphold the Monroe Doctrine.

And why, in considering our international arrangements, should we ignore the fact that were we assailed by European or Asiatic we should have an ally close at hand? Is there anything derogatory in concurrence of interests, or anything shameful in mutual help in support of them?

Every month some English publicist discusses the European situation, argues as to the likelihood of support or antagonism, and proposes foreign policy based upon known or assumed attitude of other powers. England has not thought it reprehensible to enter into a treaty with Japan for the defence of their common interests in the East, or to arrange with France and Spain to maintain the present situation in the Mediterranean.

Discussing Canada's future, why must we omit international interests and considerations? We know that our territory is safe from European and Asiatic aggression, partly because of ourselves, and partly because of the declared policy of the United States. To keep Russia out of India, the United Kingdom does not disdain help from Japan, why should we be humiliated if, for its own interests (not for ours) the United States should refuse to permit Germany to occupy Nova Scotia. We should do the same for the United States were Maine attacked—not "for the danger of it," but for the safety of it. The professor will never persuade Canada to spend much time in looking for dangers.

THE CANADIAN FLAG

A Suggestion for Canadian Clubs (a)

The Union Jack is the jack or symbol of the union of England, Scotland and Ireland. It is a compound of the individual jacks of the three kingdoms. When England and Scotland united, the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew were amalgamated; when Ireland joined the Union, the cross of St. Patrick was compounded with the other two; and now all three may be seen upon the Union Jack. If by any other adhesion, the union were further expanded, the flag of the newcomer would be incorporated with the Union Jack. A flag should denote correctly the sovereignty which it represents. And if Imperial Federation should ever be consummated,—if instead of a British Empire, consisting of one dominant State and a conglomeration of subservient States, we should ever have a federal union of all or many of these States,—the flag which had symbolized the union of England, Scotland and Ireland would be quite inappropriate and altogether inadequate for the representation of the new Sovereignty.

The flag of a country is properly used not only within its own geographical limits, but wherever its ownership and jurisdiction extend. Over every subject-country the metropolitan flag is properly flown. When the United Kingdom takes possession of some hitherto unappropriated territory, her officers hoist her flag in assertion of her sovereignty. The flag symbolizes ownership and jurisdiction. Where these are absent, the flag has no right to fly.

At one time Canada was within the ownership and jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. The Union Jack was then her fitting flag—it truly indicated her subjection to the country whose flag it was. But it is not now as appropriate as it was. It is rapidly becoming still less so. And instinctively—to almost all of us quite unconsciously—our national aspirations have been urging us to the adoption of some symbol which would represent our Canadian nationality.

Almost immediately after our federation in 1867—that great union which made Canadian nationality possible—our ship-owners commenced the practice of placing the heraldic arms of Canada

(a) This article appeared in the January number of *The Canadian Magazine*. Pursuing its imperialistic propaganda, *The University Magazine* declined to publish it.

as a badge upon the fly of the red ensign (*a*). They had no right to do so. Their ships were British ships, and ought to have carried the flag prescribed by the Admiralty (*b*). But the Admiralty at first made no objection to the practice. On the contrary, a notification was sent by its Board to the Colonial Office (May 22, 1874) to the effect that

"no objection would be raised to any vessel registered as belonging to one of Her Majesty's Colonies flying the red ensign with the badge of the Colony in the fly."

The Admiralty soon changed its mind, and on the 25th of July of the following year intimated to the Colonial Secretary that the only proper flag for the colonial mercantile marine was "the ensign without any badge."

Canadian ship-owners took little notice of this inhibition, and finally an imperial statute (*c*) was passed to put us straight:

"1. The red ensign usually worn by merchant ships without any defacement or modification whatsoever, is hereby declared to be the proper national colours for all ships and boats belonging to any subject of Her Majesty, except in the case of Her Majesty's ships or boats, or in the case of any other ship or boat for the time being, allowed to wear any other national colours in pursuance of a warrant from Her Majesty or from the Admiralty."

Canada was notified of the passing of this statute (October 3, 1889), and at the same time was informed that there would

"be no objection to colonial merchant vessels carrying distinguishing flags with the badge of the Colony thereon, *in addition* to the red ensign."

That was not, however, what Canada wanted, and an application was made (June 30, 1890) under the provisions of the statute

"for the issue of a general warrant which will permit Canadian registered ships to fly the red ensign usually worn by merchant ships with the Canadian coat-of-arms."

Objection being made, the Canadian Government passed an Order-in-Council (October 31, 1890) in support of the previous application, and Sir Charles Tupper wrote to the Governor-General (Lord Stanley) on November 13, 1890, saying that:

"Since about 1869 our ships have been encouraged by the Government of Canada to use the red ensign with the Canadian coat-of-arms in the fly. . . . . These ships are in every quarter of the globe."

Afterward (November 7, 1891) Vice-Admiral Watson, then stationed at Halifax, wrote to the Governor-General:

"I have read with much interest the correspondence relating to the Canadian flag. It will certainly be a great pity if the Home Government insist on its abolition. As a matter of feeling

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(*a*) The red ensign is the flag of the British mercantile marine. It is a red flag with the Union Jack in the upper left-hand corner.

(*b*) It must not be thought, however, that there was no precedent for defacing (to use heraldic phrase) a national flag with a private badge. For example, in 1868 (December 16) the Colonial Secretary notified the Governor-General that Colonial Government ships sailed under 28 Vic., c. 14, c. 3, "shall use the blue ensign with the seal or badge of the Colony in the fly thereof." By an Imperial Order in Council of August 7, 1869, it was provided that Colonial Governors were "to fly the Union Jack with the arms or badge of the Colony emblazoned in the centre thereof."

(*c*) 52, 3 Vic., c. 73.

and sentiment, I know for certain it will cause very great dissatisfaction in the Colony, and I can see no good result from the enforcement of the order; but on the contrary, I think a change enforced might give rise to trouble and will certainly cause general ill-feeling. They are proud of their flag, and their pride, in my opinion, should be encouraged and not dampened."

The Governor-General took the same view, and in writing to the Colonial Secretary (December 12, 1891) referred to the use of the red ensign with the Canadian badge not only at sea, but on shore, where its appearance had become somewhat general:

"It has been one of the objects of the Dominion, as of imperial policy to emphasize the fact that by Confederation, Canada became not a mere assemblage of Provinces, but one United Dominion, and, though no actual order has ever been issued, the Dominion Government has encouraged by precept and example the use on all public buildings throughout the Provinces of the red ensign with the Canadian badge in the fly."

"Of course it may be replied that no restriction exists with respect to flags which may be hoisted on shore, but I submit that *the flag is one which has come to be considered as the recognized flag of the Dominion, both ashore and afloat*, and on sentimental grounds I think there is much to be said for its retention, as it expresses at once the unity of the several Provinces of the Dominion and the identity of their flag with the colours hoisted by the ships of the mother-country."

Lord Stanley added that the enforcement of the order

"would be attended with an amount of unpopularity very disproportionate to the occasion, and at a moment when it is more than usually important *to foster rather than to check an independent spirit in the Dominion* which, combined with loyal sentiments toward the mother-country, I look upon as the only possible barrier to the annexationist feeling which is so strongly pressed upon us by persons acting in the interests of the United States." (*a*)

Thus urged, the Admiralty gave way (February 2, 1892), at the same time retaining its opinion that

"there are not unimportant objections to interference with the simplicity and uniformity of national colours. Whatever is conceded to Canada will almost certainly be claimed by the other Colonial Governments."

The warrant issued by the Admiralty (February 2, 1892) is as follows:

"We do therefore by virtue of the power and authority vested in us hereby warrant and authorize the red ensign of Her Majesty's fleet with the Canadian coat-of-arms in the fly, to be used on board vessels registered in the Dominion."

The Admiralty's warrant was, of course, limited to the use of the flag on vessels. The Admiralty has no contract over its use on shore. That is a matter for Canadians themselves. From their own flagstaffs, they may fly what they please.

Disrespect to the Canadian flag has been exhibited on two occasions. In 1895, at Bermuda, the master of the Canadian schooner *Emma S.* received the following note from the Colonial office there:

"I have to inform you that your ship having entered Hamilton harbour with a red ensign with a badge thereon flying, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of the Imperial Merchant Shipping (Colonial) Act 1889, the officer of the Customs at this port ordered the flag to be hauled down and handed to him, which was accordingly done."

An equally ill-informed official—Her Majesty's Consul at Rio Grande do Sol, Brazil— compelled the master of the *M. J. Taylor*, in

(*a*) At the Dominion elections of 1891, the question of closer trade relations with the United States was the principal issue, the Liberals strongly advocating a policy of unrestricted reciprocity.

1904, to remove the Canadian badge from his red ensign. Upon both occasions the officials underwent correction; the *Emma S.* got back her flag, and the Consul sent an apology.

The Canadian flag—the only flag authorized for distinctively Canadian use—is this red ensign with the Canadian badge in the fly. Its first appearance on Canadian vessels was an irregularity. With some difficulty imperial sanction for its use at sea was obtained. Improperly, but with an increasing frequency, it has appeared upon land; has been displayed upon our public buildings; has been encouraged by our Government both "by precept and example;" and has at length been referred to by a Governor-General as "the recognized flag of the Dominion both ashore and afloat."

This Canadian flag very appropriately symbolizes and expresses Canadian constitutional position, for the Union Jack in the corner indicates our political origin and present affiliation, while the Canadian coat-of-arms in the fly denotes the severance of the umbilical cord and the commencement of independent national life.

The equivocal use of the flag on shore has its parallel and its explanation in the ambiguity of our political status. Were we, in fact as well as in theory, a part of the British Empire, we should of course fly the flag of the Empire alone,—the Union Jack, the symbol of our subordination. And were we, in theory as well as in fact, an independent nation, we should fly no flag which did not clearly express our status and our nationality.

In 1776, after the thirteen American Colonies had commenced concerted action, but prior to the Declaration of Independence, Washington (January 2) hoisted a flag indicative at once of continued allegiance and of independent action—a flag of thirteen stripes of alternate white and red on a blue ground, with the Union Jack in the upper left-hand corner. Six months afterward, the Union Jack disappeared, and the "new constellation" of thirteen stars took its place. The greater freedom which Canada enjoys, the easy concession to her in more recent years of her every wish, the frank acknowledgement of her independence in every department of political life, and her admission to the councils of the Empire upon terms of perfect equality, have deferred indefinitely, if not removed forever (who can say?), all thought of any flag which failed to indicate Canadian veneration for the flag of their youth—the flag of the greatest and the best of all historic empires.

On the other hand, Canada's self-respect requires that her acknowledged right of independent self-government, her accession to national rank, and her admission to a footing of equality with the United Kingdom itself, should not only be amply recognized at Imperial Conferences, but should be evidenced by her flag—by the flag of the Dominion of Canada.

Canadians who see something sinister, if not altogether disgraceful and abominable in the suggestion of a Canadian flag, may be helped by perusal of a press despatch from London of 8th. of July last:

"Premier Botha and the Colonial Office have approved the new Transvaal flag, which is the Vieurkleur with the Union Jack in the corner."

The Vieurkleur wa. the Transvaal flag before the war !

A JAPANESE INVASION

The following letter was published in the Toronto Globe, on 2nd January, 1908. Professor Wrong's letter, to which it is a reply, appeared in the same journal on 26th December, 1907.

EDITOR "GLOBE."—Prof. Wrong's letter to "The Globe" may be divided into the part he agrees with and the part that he dissents from.

The part that he cannot "accept," or some of which (he does not say how much) he cannot "accept," consists of a long quotation (over half a column) from "a military friend in England," written for the purpose of proving that "the record of the diplomatists of Great Britain in so far as Canada is concerned . . . . . is one of astuteness and foresightedness on the part of Great Britain, exercised in favor of Canada, but rewarded by prejudice and abuse." Why a friend of the writer's, and a Canadian who thinks that at least some of it is untrue, should send such absurd misrepresentation of well-known facts and such scandalous disparagement of Canada to The Globe for publication, is more than can easily be divined. The reward given to Great Britain for all her diplomatic surrenders of Canadian interests has been the most surprising and unswerving loyalty—American revolutionary war to Boer war inclusive. Of all Prof. Wrong's friends, his military chums especially ought to know that much.

The part of the professor's letter with which he agrees, declares "that (unless we are content with the ignoble status of being dependent upon a foreign country, the United States, for protection) . . it is only the naval power of Great Britain which can prevent a probably successful and permanent occupation by Japan of our Pacific coast . . . Our people ought to be told this over and over again until they see what it really means."

In the summer of 1886, when Canadian vessels were being seized by United States crusiers, for no cause in the world but taking seals in the open ocean among the waves that Britannia rules, "military friends" and others were not wanting to point out what a very comfortable possession the British navy was—what would Canada do without it? The answer, apart from familiarity with Canadian history, was difficult; but to those who knew the past, the situation was perfectly simple—it was but another case to be settled, not by British warships at all, but, once more, by British diplomacy.

And so the seizures went on, and the British navy bobbed comfortably at anchor at Esquimalt. Our schooners were swept from the sea and sent to Sitka and the captains fined and imprisoned, while Lord Salisbury protested, and the Rear-Admiral sent him such news as came to his ears.

In the following year (1887) the Rear-Admiral telegraphed that the seizures had re-commenced. Lord Salisbury expressed surprise, and told his Ambassador at Washington to "make a representation to the United States Government;" while Canadians did as best they could without the British navy.

By 1888, diplomacy had gone so far towards surrender that the United States cruisers were instructed not to seize, but to threaten merely, and that they did, while the British navy bobbed at Esquimalt.

Diplomacies having halted a little, the seizures began again in 1889, the British navy still continuing to enjoy itself at Esquimalt. Canada, however, was becoming a little restive, and her Minister of Marine and Fisheries (Sir C. H. Tupper) told Lord Salisbury that he failed "to appreciate not merely any reason for the long delay in obtaining satisfaction for the aggressive and hostile action exercised against British subjects and British property by the United States, but also for the wanton continuance of this treatment." Lord Salisbury was immovable, and told Canada that he "proposes to wait Sir Julian's report before deciding as to what further steps should be taken in the matter," beyond "discussing the question with Mr. Blaine."

Diplomacies proceeded, and Canadians, becoming at length thoroughly exasperated, openly threatened to defend themselves as well as they could, in that way hoping to put some end to an intolerable situation. Lord Salisbury thereupon formally warned the United States that he would "leave to the United States Government the responsibility of the consequences of further interference," and the United States in return entered a protest against the course of the British Government. Diplomacies were hurried, and, surrender being well in sight, the United States crusiers were once more told to frighten us (if possible), but not to seize. Out again, in 1890, went the sealers and the United States cruisers; while the British navy continued to bob at Esquimalt.

By 1891 diplomacies produced a British Act of Parliament enabling Lord Salisbury to prohibit Canadian sealers from operating in certain parts of the ocean, and away went the British warships to help the United States cruisers to seize our schooners. The British navy had at last been called into active service—probably it was not as active as it might have been, for the job was a mean one, and the Nymph reported that "the fogs greatly aided the sealing schooners in escaping observation."

The rest of the diplomacies are well known. Lord Salisbury agreed that the question of British rights in the open ocean (a matter too clear for argument) should be referred to arbitration, and he agreed, too, mark this, that if the arbitrators held that the United States had no right to interfere with Canadians on the high seas, then that the arbitrators should regulate the manner in which Canadians should exercise their rights. (I was going to say, "Was there ever such a surrender?" But I should have had to add, "Yes, several of them.")

The arbitration proceeded. Of course, it was held that Canadians had perfect freedom to do as they wished on the open ocean; but, of course, the British arbitrator agreed in imposing limitations upon the way in which Canadians should behave themselves—limitations against which the Canadian arbitrator fruitlessly protested.

Now, observe the result of all this diplomatizing. To-day Canada cannot go sealing at certain seasons of the year, or in certain places, or with certain apparatus; but Japanese, with a fleet half the size of the United States, and quite negligible as compared with the British navy, can do as they please, and do it.

"One wonders," the professor says, "how long this young nation will be content to remain a passive recipient of bounty, and not an active sharer in the cost of naval defence." Canada's naval defence never cost the British Government a single shilling. There never has been any defence. All her quarrels have been settled by diplomacies, which have cost Canada enormously. Canada could build a dozen British navies out of her lost territory. There is no necessity for telling this to "our people . . over and over again," for they already know "what it really means."

Now, let me answer still more directly Prof. Wrong's present-day appeal to Canadians as to what they would do to prevent Japan seizing Canadian territory, if they had not the protection of the British navy. There are three very simple replies:—

(1) There is not the slightest danger in the world of a Japanese invasion. The Japs are not an aggressive people, and if they were they are certainly not excessively stupid.

(2) We have not the remotest reason to think that, should we quarrel with Japan, Great Britain would declare war against her war-ally. We know perfectly well that she would not. British diplomacy would intervene, and our rights would be surrendered. British and Japanese diplomatists would agree that Canada ought to do so-and-so—would agree that Canada should adopt the British and Japanese view of Oriental freedom of immigration; and, if Canada refused to conform, Canada would be left to take the consequences. That has always been our alternative. There is nothing new in the situation. The British navy is not a factor in the question.

(3) Now, supposing I am wrong in my first answer—supposing that Japan should propose invasion, and that Great Britain presented to us the alternative of diplomacies concerning free admission of Japanese to Canadian territory or abandonment, I for one would vote to shoulder the consequences of refusal to enter upon diplomacies of any kind. We have been diplomatized off a large part of the ocean. We have been diplomatized out of huge slices of our territory. I think we are big enough to say that we intend to exercise exclusive control over that which remains—to say that diplomacies shall not touch us in that respect.

And in thus voting, I own that I do not disregard the fact that the United States, very fortunately, agrees with us on this Japanese question. I see nothing "ignoble" in identity of interest or in community of support. There is nothing "ignoble" in the war-alliance between the United Kingdom and Japan, and no Britisher believes that, because of it, he occupies "the ignoble status of being dependent upon a foreign country for protection."

The United Kingdom, entirely disregarding Canadian interests, has agreed to side with Japan in certain eventualities, even against the United States. In such a quarrel Canadian sympathies would be with the United States, and if necessary Canadians would help to keep Japanese jurisdiction out of Alaska and Puget Sound. The British navy might be engaged in convoying Japanese troops to Sitka or Seattle. If so, Canadians, in their own interests, and not because of any love for the United States, would help to turn those troops back again. If the Japanese were coming to Vancouver, the United States would do the same thing. I see nothing "ignoble" in that. It is merely community of interest and reciprocal support against common danger.

Ottawa, Dec. 28.

JOHN S. EWART.

HERMAN MERIVALE.

Herman Merivale, for many years Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and author of "On Colonization and Colonies", (reproduction of his Oxford lectures), as long ago as 1841, said:—

"BUT THE MERE POLITICAL LINK OF SOVEREIGNTY MAY REMAIN, BY AMICABLE CONSENT, LONG AFTER THE COLONY HAS ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO STAND ALONE. EXISTING RELATIONS MAY BE PRESERVED, BY VERY SLIGHT SACRIFICES, ON TERMS OF MUTUAL GOOD-WILL. BUT THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE GRADUAL RELAXATION OF THE TIES OF DEPENDENCE. THE UNION MUST MORE AND MORE LOSE THE PROTECTIVE, AND APPROXIMATE TO THE FEDERATIVE CHARACTER. AND THE CROWN MAY REMAIN, AT LAST, IN SOLITARY SUPREMACY, THE ONLY COMMON AUTHORITY RECOGNIZED BY MANY DIFFERENT LEGISLATURES, BY MANY NATIONS POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY DISTINCT.

SUCH, AT LEAST, ARE THE REVERIES OF SPECULATIVE POLITICIANS. WHETHER SUCH A FUTURE IS TO BE EXPECTED, AS WITHIN THE RANGE OF REASONABLE PROBABILITY FOR OUR OWN MAGNIFICENT AND DAILY EXPANDING EMPIRE, IS A QUESTION ON WHICH I FORBEAR TO DWELL. IF THE ANTICIPATION OF IT BE ONLY A DREAM, IT IS ONE WHICH ELEVATES AND INSPIRES THE IMAGINATION." (*a*).

(*a*) Vol. 2, p. 292.