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**RENEWING PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE
PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT:
OPTIONS TO ENHANCE RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND
INITIATE A UN STANDING EMERGENCY CAPABILITY**


A Policy Paper Submitted to the CCFPD


by

H. Peter Langille

Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives

Fall 2000





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Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing
Emergency Capability

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Even here there is a fire: we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them,
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on makeshift, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay.*
Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan

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Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate A UN Standing Emergency Capability

A Policy Option Paper

Prepared for the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

H. Peter Langille, PhD

Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives

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Our system for launching United Nations peace operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last-minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay...

Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan,

We the Peoples: The Role Of the United Nations In The 21st Century

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After fifty-five years, the United Nations has a rudimentary foundation for the prevention and management of deadly conflict. Attempts are underway to provide the Organisation and member states with worthy ideas and options for peacekeeping, rapid deployment and a UN standing emergency capability. Already, as a result of the multinational initiative in 1995-97, there are indications of modest progress, including complementary reforms at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. For example, by May 2000, eighty-eight member states had confirmed their willingness to provide resources to the UN Standby Arrangements System, including 147,900 personnel. The multinational UN standby high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG) attracted wider participation and it has now been declared available to the UN. Next year, a permanent, albeit skeletal, UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) should be ready to assume the task of managing the critical early stages of UN operations.

Combined, these arrangements hold wider promise. They have the potential to prompt corresponding political and financial returns, with a higher degree of confidence and commitment among the various member states. Of equal importance, the UN finally has a foundation upon which to establish more ambitious 'building blocks'. They will be needed.

There are inherent limitations in the existing arrangements. They depend upon national approval and appropriately trained national units -- conditions that have frequently stymied and slowed responses. As constituted, these arrangements are for Chapter VI peacekeeping only -- a stipulation that could constrain their use in fast-breaking crises that necessitate humanitarian intervention or preventive deployments that require a Chapter VII mandate, permitting the limited use of force. There are options!

Success, however, will necessitate a far more comprehensive, integrated approach. This report provides a brief overview of the national studies and initiatives launched to enhance UN rapid deployment capabilities. It reviews existing arrangements such as the UNSAS, the SHIRBRIG and the RDMHQ, identifying the limitations of each, as well as the options for improvement. To revitalise and accelerate the process of adaptation, this

study calls for a more inclusive 'soft power' approach, initially to educate and inform interested parties, but also to generate new partnerships and a broad-based supportive constituency. How might we facilitate the elusive development of a reliable UN capability for rapid deployment to diverse emergencies? A vision-oriented, ongoing cumulative development process that builds on, and beyond, the foundation provided by existing arrangements toward a composite UN Standing Emergency Capability is feasible. This proposal entails a sequence of four stages that include:

- reinforcing existing arrangements;
- consolidating capability in a sound operational environment at a dedicated UN base;
- co-location of national SHIRBRIGs and civilian elements into a multinational standing capability; and,
- initiation of a composite standing emergency capability, integrating UN volunteers and multinational elements under a static operational HQ coordinating two mission HQs and tactical units.

To paraphrase the co-chairs of the 'Friends', let's team up to make UN rapid deployment work.

INTRODUCTION

Efforts to enhance the United Nations' capacity for rapid deployment were intended to ensure that both the Organisation and the members could respond reliably and effectively to armed conflict. Empowering the UN - providing it with the capacity to fulfil assigned tasks in the prevention and management of violent conflict - remains a daunting challenge. If the process is to succeed, it will require a new approach, expanded partnerships and forward-thinking options, as well as adaptation at a far faster rate. Despite the prevailing cynicism, it is noteworthy that there have been occasions when much of the support, if not the consensus, required was close at hand.

In the early years of the past decade there were promising high-level indications of assistance for some form of UN rapid reaction force.¹ Four leaders of the permanent five members of the Security Council actually declared support for related efforts. Regrettably, when confronted by the combination of costs, institutional intransigence and mixed results from an unprecedented number of new missions, the major powers quickly lost the will to back their rhetoric with meaningful reforms. Prior commitments tended to be followed by carefully nuanced retractions.²

In 1992, *An Agenda for Peace* prompted a wide-ranging discussion of the UN's options for responding to violent conflict.³ Among the various catalysts for the debate were the Secretary-General's call for peace enforcement units and Article 43-type arrangements, as well as Sir Brian Urquhart's efforts to revive Trygve Lie's proposal for a UN Legion.⁴ As these ideas began to attract a constituency, they also generated apprehension and a search for less ambitious options in many national capitals.

Opinion on the subject of any UN capability is always mixed. The initial debate here tended to follow two perspectives: the "practitioners" who favoured strengthening current arrangements, and the "visionaries" who desired a dedicated UN standing force or standing emergency capability.⁵ With notable exceptions, the official preference focused on pragmatic, incremental reform within the structure of the UN Secretariat and available resources.⁶ Such an approach was also assumed to entail fewer risks, fewer obligations and more control. As the rapid deployment initiatives of 1994-97 demonstrated, even supportive governments were worried about moving ahead of public opinion, fellow member states, the international defence community and their own capacity to secure more ambitious reforms. By 1996, a third opposing perspective arose among several

sovereignty-sensitive governments within the larger Non-Aligned Movement. Four member states mobilized wider resistance to the rapid deployment process, further intervention and the use of gratis personnel provided by wealthier states. Demands followed for equitable representation within related arrangements.

Yet, the rationale for improving rapid deployment and for more ambitious reforms remains compelling. The failure to stem genocide in Rwanda prompted concern and supportive change, but little assurance that such a catastrophe would not be repeated. Five years later, an inappropriate response to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo revealed the limitations of the most advanced of regional military alliances. Similarly, the belated response to organised mass murder in East Timor demonstrated the inadequacy of hastily improvised lead-nation coalitions. The inability to counter savage violence in Sierra Leone exposed the limitations of poorly trained and insufficiently equipped troops, the double standards of many member states, as well as the limitations of available arrangements. Frequent delays, vast human suffering and death, diminished credibility, opportunities lost, escalating costs - just some of the tragic consequences of slow and inappropriate responses.

In short, the international 'community' remains unprepared for complex armed conflicts. Demand for prompt UN assistance continues to highlight the deficiencies of existing arrangements, challenging the Organisation, as well as member states. From the slaughter in Srebrenica to the atrocities in Sierra Leone, there arise legitimate fears that the international community will exhaust every dubious option before member states return to their obligations as set forth in the UN Charter. This need not and should not be the case. Most recognise the UN was denied sufficient resources, as well as appropriate mechanisms with which to respond. These gaps will have to be addressed if we are to advance human security, conflict prevention and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Yet, a number of encouraging, preliminary steps were also taken in the past decade.

Approximately twenty-seven member states, designated "Friends of Rapid Deployment," (FORD) co-operated with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to secure support for developing a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ). As well, since 1994 a DPKO team has organised the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) to expand the quality and quantity of resources that member states might provide. To complement this arrangement, the Danish government, in co-operation with thirteen regular troop contributors, has organised a multinational Stand-by High Readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG). SHIRBRIG is improving

the tactical foundation by promoting further co-operation in multilateral planning, establishing training and readiness standards, and furthering the pursuit of inter-operability. Those participating in this multinational brigade informed the UN that it was available in January 2000. By year's end, the void at the operational level within the Secretariat may be partially filled by a permanent, albeit skeletal, UN rapid deployment mission headquarters. Once funded and staffed, it will simply enable the prompt co-ordination and control of diverse missions authorised by the Security Council. At the strategic level, the Security Council has agreed to provide further consultation with troop contributors.⁷

Thus, as the tactical, operational, and strategic foundation is strengthened, participants still hope for a corresponding response at the political level. These arrangements may combine to inspire a higher degree of confidence and commitment among member states. That should gradually lead to more stable funding. In short, these various "building blocks" are gradually forming the institutional foundation for future peace support operations in response to complex political emergencies.⁸

How are we to assess such initiatives? Within the Secretariat, one focus is on reducing response times.⁹ Other considerations must address whether these measures, when combined, contribute to:

- providing a widely-valued service;
- increasing confidence in the UN's capacity to plan, deploy, manage and support at short notice;
- alleviating the primary worries of potential troop contributors and other member states;
- generating wider political will and adequate financing;
- encouraging broad participation;
- ensuring sufficient multidimensional and multifunctional elements for modern conflict prevention and management;
- enhancing the training, preparation, and overall competence of potential participants; and
- instilling a unity of purpose and effort among the various participants.¹⁰

We must also ask whether the measures under way are sufficient to build an effective and reliable UN capability. Are these initial efforts likely to build a solid foundation with the capacity for modernisation and expansion? Alternatively, is there a risk of being locked into another ad hoc, conditional system requiring last-minute political approval and improvisation prior to each mission? Can we identify national defence reforms that would complement UN rapid deployment and conflict prevention? Further, what additional measures will be necessary to institutionalise and consolidate a dedicated UN standing capability? Could related efforts help to introduce a new security system? Clearly, a number of issues warrant further effort and scrutiny.

Identifying the strengths and limitations of existing arrangements, as well as potential improvements, is a relatively simple exercise. A more challenging question pertains to how supportive parties might stimulate further developments, particularly in effecting a transition from national standby arrangements to a dedicated UN standing capability.

There appear to be four approaches with at least some potential for generating wider support and possibly the pursuit of more ambitious measures. First, officials could pursue further incremental changes and improvisations to existing arrangements. Gradually, this might inspire wider confidence and political will. Second, a vision-oriented, cumulative development process could begin to attract even wider assistance. Third, more favourable conditions would also stem from supportive public diplomacy and civil society working through partnerships and transnational coalitions. Information, education and advocacy are among the keys to mobilising broad-based support. Fourth, although regrettable, favourable conditions may ensue in the immediate aftermath of another global tragedy. Over the past century, there were at least five occasions when deadly conflict generated what might be described as 'ripe' moments. Rather than await the international consensus that stems from another tragedy, it is time to conduct an in-depth review of the options and requirements for a UN standing emergency capability.

If pursued independently, each approach might generate modest progress. If pursued simultaneously, as part of a co-ordinated and integrated plan, the prospects would definitely improve. Therefore, this paper provides a preliminary blueprint of options corresponding to each approach. Success on this rather elusive endeavour will necessitate a far more comprehensive approach. Given the stakes involved, supportive parties must be at least prepared to consider and refine the options. As Minister Axworthy noted in February 2000,

The capacity of the UN to manage complex missions is under great strain. A co-ordinated and integrated approach is required nationally and internationally to ensure that we are prepared. Rapidly identifying and mobilizing the necessary military and civilian resources is fundamental to the success of a decision to intervene for humanitarian purposes.¹¹

Section II of this study provides a brief overview of the national studies and initiatives launched to enhance UN rapid deployment capabilities. Section III reviews existing arrangements such as the UNSAS, the SHIRBRIG and the RDMHQ. It addresses the limitations of each and identifies potential options for improvement. Political and diplomatic efforts must be renewed to restore confidence in these preliminary arrangements. Section IV suggests the need for a more inclusive

'soft power' approach to build the necessary partnerships and supportive coalitions. A broader constituency will be needed to revitalize the vision and the potential of this initiative. Section V proposes an ongoing, cumulative development process outlining the stages necessary to build on and beyond the current foundation. Section VI briefly overviews the need for, and requirements of, a dedicated UN standing emergency capability.

SECTION II

OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL STUDIES

Prior to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, the Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark commenced studies and consultative processes to develop options for a UN rapid reaction capability.

In 1994, The Netherlands began to explore the possibility of creating a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade at the service of the United Nations Security Council. The Netherlands Non-Paper, "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study," identified a critical void in the UN peacekeeping system: dedicated units that were instantly deployable.¹² The focus, the Dutch stressed, should not be on the further development of the UN Standby Arrangements System¹³ so much as a military force along the lines advocated by Robert Johansen¹⁴ and Brian Urquhart¹⁵ - a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade that would guarantee the immediate availability of troops when they were urgently needed. The brigade would complement existing arrangements for peacekeeping, crisis management and emergency humanitarian situations. Its chief value would be as a 'stop-gap' measure when a crisis was imminent¹⁶, and its deployments would be of strictly limited duration.

In September 1995, the Government of Canada presented the UN with a study entitled, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*¹⁷, with twenty-one recommendations to close the UN's capability gap in the short to mid term.¹⁸ The report also offered five recommendations to stimulate further research and development over the long term.¹⁹ A range of problems spanning the political,²⁰ strategic,²¹ operational, and tactical levels were identified and addressed. The intent was to "create an integrated model for rapid reaction from decision-making at the highest level to the deployment of tactical levels in the field."²² The report made a case for building on existing

arrangements to improve the broader range of peacekeeping activities. However, one new mechanism was imperative to fill the void at the operational level -- a permanent, operational-level rapid reaction headquarters.²³ A 'vanguard' concept was also highlighted as "the most crucial innovation in the UN's peace support operations over the next few years."²⁴ It would "link the operational level headquarters with tactical elements provided by Member States to the Secretary-General through the standby arrangements system."²⁵ The Canadian study reaffirmed "broad support for the general directions of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat in building its peace operations capability for the future."²⁶ Recommendations were refined to appeal to a broad range of supportive member states. This would be an inclusive, co-operative building process with the objective of developing a unity of both purpose and effort. Charter reform would be unnecessary, nor would there be additional expenses for the organisation. In many respects, it was a compelling case for pragmatic, realisable change within the short to medium term. A UN Standing Emergency Capability was overviewed as a long-term option worthy of further exploration should the political landscape evolve and available arrangements prove inadequate.

In January 1995, the Danish government announced that it would be approaching a number of nations for support in establishing a working group to develop a UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).²⁷ The guiding assumption of the study was that a number of countries could, "by forming an affiliation between appropriate contributions to the [UNSA], make a pre-established, multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade available to the United Nations, thus providing a rapid deployment capability for deployments of a limited duration."²⁸ It noted that the brigade should be reserved solely for providing an effective presence at short notice, and solely for peacekeeping operations, including humanitarian tasks.²⁹ National units would be required on fifteen to thirty days notice and be sustainable for 180 days. With an agreed focus on being "first in" and "first out," participants would have some assurance of the limited duration of their deployment. Agreement would still be required from individual participating nations. To address the concerns of countries that might have reservations over a particular operation, a relatively broad pool of participants would provide sufficient redundancy among units.³⁰ States could, therefore, abstain from an operation without jeopardising the brigade's deployment.

The Netherlands' non-paper succeeded in stimulating an international exchange of views. It was clear, however, that only a less binding, less ambitious arrangement would be acceptable, at least

for the immediate future. A few member states were supportive of the Dutch initiative, but the majority opposed a standing UN force, and even the modest expenditures outlined. By contrast, the Danish-led SHIRBRIG proposal soon attracted a supportive constituency within the UN Secretariat and among regular troop contributors, including Canada and the Netherlands. The Canadian study, similarly, generated considerable enthusiasm among member states.³¹ Owing to its comprehensive approach, the UN MILAD, Major-General Frank van Kappen, referred to the Canadian study as the "red wine that linked the other studies together."³²

It is noteworthy that these three national studies were not viewed as mutually exclusive but as compatible by their respective Foreign Ministers.³³ In 1995, UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Ismail Kittani, categorised them under "(a) what the UN can do now, (b) what member states can do, and (c) what is still in the future."³⁴ Enhancing the UN's capacity for rapid deployment was to be an ongoing process with efforts over the short-, mid- and long-term. These studies were followed by concerted diplomatic efforts to organise a wider coalition of member states and secure the co-operation of the UN Secretariat. The initiative was instrumental, first, in narrowing the range of short-term options - allaying official fears of a potentially large and expensive supra-national intervention force - and second, in informing others as to how they might best contribute to the process. As Kofi Annan wrote, "the initiatives taken by these countries have been valuable both for what they have achieved in themselves and for the way in which they have refocused the debate among peace-keeping contributors at large." He went on to note: "in the context of that wider group, however, a number of further actions will need to be taken if we are to intervene more effectively in either a preventive or curative capacity."³⁵ Fortunately, both the UN and member states now have a base foundation on which to take further action.

SECTION III

EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS

The Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD)

On the occasion of the United Nations' fiftieth anniversary, Canadian Foreign Minister, André Ouellet and his counterpart from the Netherlands, Hans Van Merlo, organized a Ministerial meeting to generate political support for enhancing UN rapid deployment capabilities.³⁶ To promote the initiative, especially among the major powers, Canada and the Netherlands announced the creation of an informal group called the "Friends of Rapid Reaction", co-chaired by the Canadian and Dutch permanent representatives in New York. Although they used the Canadian study as a baseline for their discussions, they agreed that this would henceforth be a multinational effort.³⁷ As a Canadian briefing paper on the status of the initiative acknowledges, "...the recommendations that are being implemented are, therefore, no longer just Canadian, but part of discussions and input from many different nations world-wide."³⁸ Indeed, by the fall of 1996, the group had expanded to include the following twenty-six member states: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Senegal, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine, and Zambia. The Friends also succeeded in attracting the co-operation of the UN Secretariat, particularly officials in DPKO.

Initially, they concentrated on building the base of support for an operational-level headquarters, expanding standby arrangements and explaining the vanguard concept. As it became apparent that the Danish proposal included many of the objectives of the vanguard concept, and the technical details had already been researched and agreed upon through an extensive multinational study, interest in the vanguard concept was superseded by a wider interest in the SHIRBRIG model.³⁹ After the first meeting of Foreign Ministers to establish the 'Friends', it was reported that "what was most important to Kofi Annan was an implementation plan, where the proposals of various countries could be structured into achievable pieces and pushed to a useful conclusion."⁴⁰

Over the next two years, the Friends' efforts continued to focus on improving the Stand-by Arrangements System, but they also began to assist DPKO in implementing the Rapidly

Deployable Mission Headquarters. A number of technical working groups were established to refine plans and proposals to improve logistics, administration, financing, sustainability and strategic lift.⁴¹

The United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, otherwise known as the Committee of 34, also continued to meet each spring to consider new requirements and forward related recommendations to the wider membership through the General Assembly. Over the past decade, the Committee expanded beyond the traditional troop contributors to include representation from a core of approximately 110 member states. Although the Committee hardly represents a vanguard of new thinking on peacekeeping, it provides an important consultative forum for discussing proposals and generating the base of consensus necessary to implement changes.⁴²

Rapid deployment featured prominently in their recent reports with strong endorsements of both standby arrangements and the rapid deployment mission headquarters.⁴³

Limitations of the FORD

The FORD is now dormant. Political controversy and official neglect diminished the momentum of the 'Friends', the Special Committee on Peacekeeping and, to a lesser extent, the Secretariat.⁴⁴ The 'Friends' have yet to decide whether they will re-convene. They did not meet in 1998 or 1999. A promising, albeit contentious process stalled. Despite having secured a relatively broad base of international support, it is apparent that the consultative process of the 'Friends' could have been more thorough. Several representatives of the non-aligned movement, including a few of the larger troop-contributing member states, were annoyed at having been excluded. In October 1996, for example, Pakistani ambassador Ahmad Kamal said that he "supported the concept of a rapid deployment headquarters team but was concerned at the action of a self-appointed group of 'Friends of Rapid Reaction' operating without legitimacy, and having half-baked ideas developed without broad consultations with the countries most concerned".⁴⁵ In turn, the Friends' agenda would be delayed as some members of the non-aligned movement (NAM) challenged specific arrangements. As the NAM included 132 member states, they had the potential to limit progress on several related reforms. Within the Special Committee on Peacekeeping dissension arose over equitable representation in the RDMHQ and the wider use of gratis personnel within DPKO. Some member

states were also initially reluctant to support the SHIRBRIG on the grounds that it appeared to be an exclusive coalition that had no authority to present their arrangement as a 'UN' brigade.⁴⁶

The absence of committed political and diplomatic champions was apparent. There were also concerns that ideas emanating from the FORD might be actively opposed. A number of government officials simply used the evidence of opposition as an excuse to avoid the challenge of continuing with a demanding initiative. They argued that the only remaining option was to leave rapid deployment to the UN Secretariat; that a restructuring from within might gradually occur on the basis of pragmatic evaluations and lessons learned. Such an approach may represent an easy 'out' for some officials and member states, but it is unlikely to be sufficient in advancing further reforms.

Recommendation 1

A concerted effort must be made to revitalize supportive political and diplomatic activity. The Friends of Rapid Deployment should be promptly re-convened with the objective of encouraging a broad base of support, expanded membership and an inclusive process. There would be advantages in coordinating related efforts within a multinational forum such as the FORD and the more recent Human Security Network.

Even in its initial composition the FORD represented considerable potential. As there are now indications of wider interest, it would be beneficial to draw on the pool of newer troop contributors, particularly from the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as several of the major powers that have expressed a willingness to provide assistance. It is noteworthy that efforts to develop a UN rapid deployment capability were not confined solely to the 'Friends'. For example, Britain, France and the United States have worked on improving the peacekeeping capabilities of numerous African member states through the African Crisis Response Initiative, which focused on training and capacity building through sub-regional organisations. Italy and Argentina have promoted the creation of a rapid response capability for policing and humanitarian purposes. South Africa and Japan have also expressed interest in improving both peacekeeping and rapid deployment.

More recently, the Human Security Network has indicated its commitment to increase the UN's capacity for rapid deployment.⁴⁷ Their medium-term focus will be "...to meet the requirements within the UN Secretariat for improved contingency planning, oversight capacity, and indigenous capacity to collect, analyse and disseminate intelligence or information." They have expressed interest in building on the Canadian study, *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations* and the intent to explore practical ways of increasing the UN's capacity to address situations such as Sierra Leone, as well as future challenges. As the thirteen countries participating in this network include, Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand, they represent the potential to generate wider support for further reforms.

Recommendation 2

The Governments of Argentina, Japan, Norway and South Africa should be approached to share responsibility for co-chairing an expanded FORD or a similar body within the Human Security Network. These member states appear well-placed to assume this task as they are increasingly capable of mobilizing the required resources, as well as other interested parties.

THE UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO)

Over the past decade, the UN Secretariat worked to organize the military and civilian contributions of member states and to establish basic functions within UN headquarters. It was also a key partner in the wider rapid deployment initiative.

In 1992, the office responsible for peacekeeping was reorganised as the Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage operations. This restructuring served to co-locate, and co-ordinate within one department the political, operational, logistics, civil police, de-mining, training, personnel and administrative aspects of peace-keeping operations.⁴⁸ A Situation Centre was established within DPKO in May 1993, to maintain round-the-clock communications with the field and to provide information necessary to missions and troop contributors. At the same time, a Civilian Police Unit was developed in DPKO's Office of Planning and Support, assuming responsibility for all matters affecting civilian police in peacekeeping operations.

A Training Unit was established within DPKO in June 1993 to increase the availability of trained military and civilian personnel for timely deployment.⁴⁹ DPKO also established the Mission Planning Service (MPS) for the detailed planning and co-ordination of complex operations.⁵⁰ A small Policy and Analysis Unit was created in 1993 to serve as a think tank and to conduct in-depth research. To enhance analysis, evaluation and institutional memory, the Lessons Learned Unit was instituted in early 1995. DPKO's work was increasingly integrated with that of the Secretariat's political, humanitarian and administrative offices. To improve logistics, especially in the start-up phase of an operation, the Field Administrative and Logistics Division was incorporated into DPKO. Approval was given to utilise the Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy as a centre for the management of peacekeeping assets. Aside from maintaining an inventory of UN material, it is to oversee the stockpiling and delivery of supplies and equipment for missions.

Mission Start-up Kits are assembled at the Logistics Base. Despite limited financial and personnel resources, DPKO achieved a professional level of planning and co-ordination across a challenging spectrum of tasks. In 1997, Brigadier General Mono Bhagat noted that, "the Department has managed a structured, prudent, and gradual expansion in order to meet these demands in a concerted and coherent manner. It began by establishing a sound skeletal structure to which, bit by bit, flesh has been added."⁵¹

Limitations of DPKO

Shortly after establishing a relatively sound organisational structure, DPKO was downsized, reducing the prospects for rapid deployment. With budgetary constraints and the elimination of all gratis personnel, DPKO also suffered the loss of numerous professionals and numerous key positions.⁵² The absence of free military expertise strained the Department's capacity for professional and competent planning, leaving personnel in an 'uphill struggle' to do more with less. To cite one example, the reduction of DPKO's training unit from fifteen to two personnel would put many of their announced programmes on hold. UN training assistance teams were unlikely to be available for the newer troop contributors and DPKO was not well positioned to participate in the development of training programmes, doctrine or standard operating procedures for the newer peace support operations that included Chapter VII mandates.

Frequently, DPKO officials argued that they retained a critical mass, but were no longer capable of managing additional responsibilities. One direct effect was that as the faith of UN officials diminished, the officials of formerly supportive member states lost faith in the Secretariat, particularly with the DPKO. In turn, the level of cooperation between these parties began to unravel as neither was inclined to make the effort to provide the requisite assistance. DPKO remains understaffed with approximately 470 personnel (260 professionals and 210 support staff). It continues to function under extreme pressure, albeit at a reduced capacity. The potential consequences are worrisome. It is now attempting to run four new operations on three continents -- East Timor, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone -- without adequate personnel to effectively plan, manage and maintain these missions or support more ambitious developments in rapid deployment. As U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke recently warned, "the risks to the UN of failure are very great if they don't do it right. This is not a secret; it is widely

understood."⁵³ What some have apparently failed to understand is DPKO's vital role within the UN system and its efforts to prevent and manage violent conflict.

Recommendation 3

A greater effort must be made to provide DPKO with the level of professional expertise, staff and resources required to manage its assigned tasks. This Department will need external assistance if it is to be strengthened and placed on a firmer institutional foundation. Immediate measures are also needed to bolster DPKO in periods of intense activity. Further arrangements are necessary to provide military and civilian expertise on short-term loan to DPKO as required. Moreover, it would be beneficial to expand and reassign DPKO's Policy and Analysis Unit to provide direction in the development of a UN rapid deployment capability.

Recommendation 4

Member states should be encouraged to assign personnel within their own defence establishments and peacekeeping training centres to aid DPKO in meeting short-notice requests for the training and planning assistance, as well as further help in the deployment of multidimensional peace support operations.

Recommendation 5

Efforts within the UN Secretariat and within member states are needed to restore the collegial cooperation and partnerships necessary for rapid deployment to complex political emergencies world-wide.

UNITED NATIONS STANDBY ARRANGEMENT SYSTEM (UNSAS)

In 1993, Boutros-Ghali identified the need for a system of standby arrangements to secure the personnel and material resources required for peacekeeping.⁵⁴ This system was specifically intended to improve the capability for rapid deployment. The Standby Arrangements system (UNSAS) is based on conditional commitments from Member States of specified resources that could be made available within agreed response times. The resources range from military units, individual civilian, military and police personnel to specialised services, equipment and other capabilities.⁵⁵

UNSAS serves several objectives. First, it provides the UN with an understanding of the forces and other capabilities a member state will have available at an agreed state of readiness. Second, it facilitates planning, training and preparation for both participating Member states and the UN. Third, it provides the UN not only with foreknowledge of a range of national assets, but

also a list of potential options if a member or members refrain from participating in an operation. Finally, although the arrangements are only conditional, it is hoped that those members who have confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources will be more forthcoming and committed than might otherwise be the case. In short, UNSAS provides an initial commitment to service, and a better advance understanding of the requirements, but is in no way a binding obligation.

In 1994, a Standby Arrangements Management Team was established within DPKO to identify the UN requirements in peacekeeping operations, establish readiness standards, negotiate with potential participants, establish a data-base of resources, and assist in mission planning. They also reformed procedures for determining re-imburement of member's contingent-owned equipment. All member states have the option to participate at four levels of the UNSAS, with each level providing a more precise indication of commitment. The initial level simply entails an expression of interest in participation. Level two is achieved by providing the UN with a list of potential national capabilities including, the tasks they are capable of performing, their response times and restrictions. The third level is achieved when participants provide the UN with precise 'volumetrics', a planning data sheet outlining the details of particular units, personnel and equipment, including their level of self-sufficiency, transportation data and state of organisation. Finally, member states are asked to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UN that formalises participation and ensures that the Organisation is provided with the information necessary to plan accordingly. In 1997, it was the opinion of one senior DPKO official that, "this is now the maximum feasible option." The progress to date, in terms of representation and numbers assigned appears relatively encouraging.

By May 2000, eighty-eight member states had confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources, representing a total of 147,900 personnel that could, in principle, be called on.⁵⁶ Sixty-six member states provided a general list of capabilities with forty-four offering additional detail on their specific contributions. Thirty-three members signed the requested MOU. Response times were registered according to the declared national capabilities.⁵⁷ Resources were divided into four groups on the basis of their potential. UN officials estimated that 40% of the overall pool fall into the first two categories of (1) up to 30 days, and (2) between 30 and 60 days. In other words, it was assumed the UN had a conditional commitment of over 50,000 personnel on standby assumed to be capable of rapid deployment. While UNSAS cannot guarantee reliable response, UN planners now have the option of developing contingency and 'fall-back' strategies when they anticipate delays.

Member states are also more familiar with the system and with what they are expected to contribute. As the numbers infer, there was also a wider willingness to at least participate in the system.

Limitations of the UNSAS

Standby arrangements for nationally-based units do not provide an assurance of their immediate availability. As noted, these are conditional agreements and all participating member states retain a veto over any use of their personnel and equipment. In short, each government has independent authority to decide whether its resources can be used in a UN operation. As the former Secretary-General acknowledged in 1995, "a considerable effort has been made to expand and refine standby arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation."⁵⁸ He noted further that, "the value of the arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency."⁵⁹ With respect to UNSAS there are few, if any, certainties. The promptness with which national contingents are provided will depend on the discretion of participating member states, the risks perceived, and the level of interests at stake.⁶⁰

Reliability will be a key determinant of rapid deployment. In the case of UNSAS, there is no assurance that the political will exists, as reflected in the mixed record to date. Critics frequently point to the refusal of member states to provide adequate forces to avert the 1994 catastrophe in Rwanda. Not one of the nineteen governments that had undertaken to have troops on standby for UN peacekeeping agreed to contribute to the UNAMIR mission under these arrangements.⁶¹ Since 1996, some mission success has been partially attributed to UNSAS.⁶² Conversely, there have been several prominent violent conflicts such as East Timor and Sierra Leone, which again demonstrated the difficulty of arranging the necessary assistance. Proponents of UNSAS have grounds to argue that the system has been expanded and improved, but commitment to the system will have to be far more comprehensive and binding if it is to succeed.

As it stands, UN officials have lost much of their former confidence in the UNSAS. A sense of despair with the current arrangement was reflected in Secretary-General Kofi Annan's recent statement that, "Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with Member

States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness."⁶³

The UNSAS entails another constraint that may limit its future viability. It specifies that personnel and resources will only be used for peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, foreclosing on any deployment to missions requiring a Chapter VII mandate. Notably, in the past year, all of the four new UN missions required a Chapter VII mandate, permitting the limited use of force. Additional arrangements will have to be promptly negotiated. Alternatively, supportive member states may wish to press the UN to create a fifth level within the UNSAS specifying those personnel and resources capable of responding to an operation that entails a Chapter VII mandate. While this might constitute an improvement on current arrangements it is still a far step from their actual Charter obligations. As specified under Article 43 of the Charter, "all members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities...".⁶⁴ There are now a number of sound reasons for establishing Article 43 as the sixth and highest level of the UNSAS.

An increasing number of countries are earmarking specific elements of their armed forces and conducting UN training programmes to prepare their contribution. Unfortunately, these member states remain a supportive minority. Moreover, the former Secretary-General wisely cautioned, while national readiness is a necessary pre-requisite, it does not in itself, give the UN a capacity for rapid deployment.⁶⁵ Several other limitations remain. For example, many participants lack a capacity to provide their own support functions. The Organisation is still confronted with shortages in a number of critical areas, including logistics, civilian police and both sea and air transport.

Once approved for deployment, standby units will have to stage independently and assemble in-theatre. For some, this will be their first experience working together, and it will likely occur under conditions of extreme stress. Some military establishments are reluctant to acknowledge the need for prior training of their personnel beyond a general combat capability. Thus, high standards of cohesiveness and interoperability will be difficult to assure in advance. Moreover, the UN will continue to confront the complex task of co-ordinating lift capabilities for participating elements across the world. This, too, can only slow deployment. Logistics and sustainment arrangements are

gradually improving, but the UN is still coming to grips with the challenge of supplying different national contingents with a wide range of equipment.

In addition, the UNSAS provides the primary recruitment pool for civilian police (CIVPOL). As of 22 February 2000, the UN was required to deploy 8,415 civilian police to peace operations, primarily in Kosovo (4,718), Bosnia (2,057) and East Timor (1,640). Member governments, at that point, had contributed a total of 5,122 personnel -- leaving a shortfall of just under 3,300. Further compounding the problem, some of the personnel provided for the mission were sent back as unqualified. These figures illustrate two clear trends. First, the demand for UN civilian police is increasing as a wider array of tasks are undertaken; their former role as trainers has been expanded to include criminal investigation (including war crimes), customs and migration, and human rights monitoring. Second, the Organisation faces persistent problems in securing enough well-trained police even at current levels of activity. Additional CIVPOL elements will be required for rapid deployment.

There is considerable merit in an Argentinian proposal that calls for the organization of CIVPOL units as companies, in order to simplify liaison at the tactical level between civilian police and military forces.⁶⁶ This slightly oversized company of 130 personnel would consist of: 110 lightly armed police with riot control skills; 15 police experts, focussing on criminal investigation and forensics, training, human rights monitoring and international humanitarian law; and 5 members in a planning and command cell. In order to meet personnel requirements, it is suggested that one-quarter of UNSAS members make CIVPOL a priority, with the goal of providing at least one company group.

The UNSAS is one step in a promising direction. However, as the numbers indicate, it has yet to attract the majority of UN member states; only half of those participating have provided detailed information; and only a third have signed the requested MOU. In short, the UNSAS needs to attract additional participants with a stronger commitment to the system. If it is to facilitate rapid deployment, it also needs to become a less conditional and more binding arrangement.

Recommendation 6

All member states need to be encouraged to participate in the UNSAS. Participants should strive to provide a commitment to all levels of the UNSAS, with special recognition accorded to those that finalise the commitment by signing the appropriate Memorandum of Understanding.

Recommendation 7

It is imperative that member states earmark well-trained forces, personnel and appropriate resources for the UNSAS. Pre-identified military and civilian elements, as well as equipment must be prepared and retained on short-notice specifically for rapid deployment to UN operations.

Recommendation 8

The UNSAS must be promptly re-negotiated to facilitate rapid deployment to UN operations that include a Chapter VII mandate. This might be accommodated by the addition of a fifth level within the arrangement that specifies the personnel and resources that Governments are willing to commit to more demanding Chapter VII operations.

Recommendation 9

The UNSAS must be addressed both as an urgent requirement for generating prompt responses to contemporary armed conflict and as an important transitional measure facilitating a renewed commitment to Article 43. It is time to explore the prospects of resurrecting Article 43 as the sixth and highest level of obligation within the UNSAS.

SHIRBRIG

The Danish-led initiative to develop a Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) complements the UNSAS with a complete, integrated unit that has a projected response time of 15-30 days. Once deployed, the SHIRBRIG will consist of 4,000-5,000 troops, comprising a headquarters unit, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, as well as engineering and logistical support. The brigade is to be self-sustaining in deployments of up to six months' duration and capable of self-defence.⁶⁷ A steering committee and a permanent planning element are in place, as are vague arrangements for its operational headquarters and logistics.

On December 15, 1996, seven countries signed a letter of intent to co-operate in establishing and maintaining this high readiness brigade.⁶⁸ This initial group has expanded, as has the number of members providing a commitment to the actual brigade pool.⁶⁹ There are now thirteen full participants, including Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Jordan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. Each has conditionally agreed to provide the equivalent of an infantry battalion and several officers for the headquarters and planning. As well, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia are

participating as observers but have yet to sign a Memorandum of Understanding indicating their specific commitments.

The objective, and the basis for co-operation, is to provide the UN with a well-trained, cohesive multinational force to be deployed in Chapter VI operations mandated by the Security Council and with the consent of the parties.⁷⁰ Participants would thus have a mutual understanding of their combined capabilities, as well as their specific roles and requirements:

This would enhance the efficiency of a possible deployment and would enhance the safety of the troops when deployed. Common procedures and interoperability would be developed to allow for better operational planning, to insure common assessment of the operational requirements, optimise movement planning and reduce costs.⁷¹

SHIRBRIG is likely to provide a number of advantages. First, it is more cost-effective to pool defence resources in co-operative arrangements, particularly when they are designed to assist the United Nations. Second, there are indications that coalitions in other regions are thinking of adopting a similar model.⁷² From its inception, SHIRBRIG was intended to encourage similar partnerships elsewhere.⁷³ The idea is attractive and it appears to be spreading. Third, SHIRBRIG has the potential to offer the UN relatively prompt access to a pre-established, versatile force. As the Danish Chief of Defence Staff suggests, it should provide the UN Stand-by Arrangements with a 'jump start capability' to deal with the first phases of an emerging or spreading conflict.

Deployments are to be limited to six months. Hopefully, this will mean fewer excuses and faster responses. If all goes smoothly, response times (from initial notification to actual deployment) will be within 15-30 days, rather than the 1990's average of 3-to-6 months. Nations can still decide whether they will participate in any specific mission, but there will be more flexibility and a larger pool to draw from. Gradually, with a wider commitment to standardised training and operating procedures, familiar equipment and joint exercises, national decision-making processes may also speed up in times of crisis. Finally, the SHIRBRIG may eventually facilitate the development of a more ambitious, dedicated UN mechanism. In the words of its initial commander, Brigadier-General Finn Saermark Thomsen, the brigade "is the most realistic step towards a standing UN force."⁷⁴

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has repeatedly expressed enthusiasm for this initiative. As he stated,

I truly believe that SHIRBRIG is a model arrangement that finally can begin to address the need and the potential that we all recognise: a small, well-trained, well-equipped force rapidly

deployed with an adequate mandate and sufficient support can stop a conflict before it engulfs an entire society.⁷⁵

In January 2000, the participating member states informed the UN that the SHIRBRIG was available for deployment.

Limitations of the SHIRBRIG

SHIRBRIG is a military force. While this facilitated the brigade's organisation, planners would be wise to expand its composition with civilians in both planning and deployable elements. It is widely recognised that there are limitations to what military force alone can achieve. To secure respect, legitimacy, and consent (e.g., host nation approval) it is increasingly important, even in rapid deployment, to provide a broader range of incentives and services in the initial stages of a UN operation.

Both the SHIRBRIG and the UNSAS depend upon national approval and appropriately trained national units -- conditions that have frequently stymied and slowed responses. National military units are to remain in their home bases. UN officials will still face the onerous task of negotiating with each national government selected for a particular operation. Once deployment is authorised by the UN Security Council and approved by participating members, national units will stage independently from various locations and assemble together for the first time in close proximity to armed conflict. Operational command of the brigade will then be passed to a special representative of the UN Secretary-General. Obviously, the multinational planning of the past four years will help, but it may still be difficult to assure sufficient interoperability and a cohesive response.

The deployment of the SHIRBRIG might also be delayed by several other factors. For one, some of the participating countries require the approval of a sitting parliament before sending their personnel abroad. A few of the SHIRBRIG members have been unwilling to designate or earmark forces specifically for this commitment. If tasked to other defence priorities, any contribution to the SHIRBRIG is unlikely. It also appears that some armed forces are not providing adequate prior training for UN operations, thus necessitating a long period of mission-specific training, which will delay authorization and deployment. There are already indications that a few governments have argued against using the SHIRBRIG, partially because their own contribution was not ready and they desired a prominent role in the first deployment for domestic political purposes.

Moreover, as currently stipulated, these arrangements are also solely for Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, constraining their use in fast-breaking crises that necessitate humanitarian intervention or preventive deployments that require a Chapter VII mandate permitting the use of force. As noted, over the past year, all UN Security Council resolutions for new missions have included Chapter VII mandates.

While there are exceptions, the majority of nations participating in the SHIRBRIG are white, wealthy and from the North. It does not sufficiently reflect a universal composition. Moreover, although the SHIRBRIG has already been declared available, some defence officials are concerned that it is not operationally ready. There remains a need for additional communications and logistics, as well as strategic air and sea lift. A few supportive nations may have to take the lead in forming a multinational unit. In short, there remains an urgent need for additional 'building blocks' to enhance the effectiveness and the reliability of the SHIRBRIG.

Recommendation 10

To ensure legitimacy, impartiality and consent, political efforts should be devoted to attracting broad regional representation and additional SHIRBRIG participants. While a further measure of redundancy is not a pre-requisite to deployment, it would help.

Recommendation 11

Partnerships should be encouraged to facilitate political and military support, as well as training assistance for additional SHIRBRIG-type arrangements in other regions.

Recommendation 12

While the initial planning of the brigade has focused on the development of a multinational force, plans should now be expanded to include civilian peacebuilding elements that address 'human needs', providing hope and further incentives for co-operation.

Recommendation 13

Given the evolving nature of UN peace support operations, SHIRBRIG participants will have to re-negotiate the terms under which they may accept more demanding operations, including those that entail Chapter VII mandates and the potential use of force.

Recommendation 14

To help ensure the availability of national contingents, Governments participating in the SHIRBRIG must be encouraged to earmark units specifically for this commitment. Combat readiness must also be supplemented with comprehensive prior training for diverse UN peace support operations.

Recommendation 15

SHIRBRIG members should be encouraged to pursue functional role specialisation in several of the areas that require additional resources. For example, rather than have each carry a long independent national logistics train, such a task can be either shared or selected by one or two participants as their contribution. Similarly, one country might provide modern communications while another provided air or sea-lift.

Recommendation 16

Participating member states must attempt to streamline national decision-making to ensure that the SHIRBRIG, and their potential contribution to the brigade, is not delayed by unduly slow political and legislative procedures.

Recommendation 17

Within the next three years, it would be beneficial to co-locate military and civilian SHIRBRIG elements at a dedicated UN base.⁷⁶

Aside from the likelihood of faster and more sophisticated responses stemming from prior training and staging out of one location, common basing might foster the political confidence necessary to speed up decisions, as well as consideration of more ambitious arrangements. In effect, co-located national elements would represent a multinational standing capability - an arrangement similar to units assigned to NATO's former central front, although with the emphasis on conflict prevention and the protection of civilians. This option would not incur great expense for either the UN or participating member states. Supportive members would simply re-locate national elements in service and assign them to a UN base for a one-to two- year period. In the event of a national crisis, they would be subject to recall. As they would remain multi-tasked to national and UN service, their governments would retain primary responsibility for their administration, pay and benefits. The UN might assume responsibility for incremental costs, including transportation to and from the site, maintenance of facilities, as well as provision of accommodation. Participation in such a UN capability might provide a degree of recognition and prestige for the contributing nations and the various services involved.

UNITED NATIONS RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE MISSION HEADQUARTERS

As a complement to the UN Standby Arrangement System, Secretary-General Annan decided to pursue the Canadian proposal to create a rapidly deployable mission headquarters (RDMHQ).⁷⁷

This is a multidimensional core headquarters unit of military and civilian personnel tasked to assist rapid deployment and manage the initial phases of a peacekeeping operation.⁷⁸ The RDMHQ is designed as an operational unit with a tactical planning function.⁷⁹ Current plans entail a

multidimensional RDMHQ of both civilian and military personnel. This is to be encouraged, as it has grown out of the requirement to address the diverse needs of people in desperate circumstances.

Owing to budgetary constraints, the RDMHQ is officially described as the 'skeleton' of a mission headquarters. Once financing and staffing are approved, eight individuals are to be assigned to the RDMHQ on a full-time basis including a Chief of Staff and specialists in fields such as operations, logistics, engineering and civilian police. They are to be based in New York. The UN has received approval for their deployment into a mission area without further authorisation at the national level.

Aside from 8 full-time staff, an additional 24 personnel are to remain earmarked in their home countries until required for training or deployment. Twenty-nine personnel in the Secretariat are also to be double-tasked and assigned to the RDMHQ, but will continue with their regular assignments until needed.⁸⁰ This initial team of 61 personnel is to co-ordinate rapid deployment and manage an operational-level headquarters, even in missions with the broadest, multidisciplinary mandates. Once deployed, this headquarters is to be in a mission area for three to six months pending the arrival of and transition to a normal headquarters. Major-General Frank Van Kappen, has detailed the five primary tasks of the RDMHQ:

- translating the concept of operations prepared by the mission planning service into tactical sub-plans;
- developing and implementing RDMHQ preparedness and training activities; providing advice to the Head of Mission for decision-making and co-ordination purposes;
- establishing an administrative infrastructure for the mission;
- providing, during the early stages of the operation, essential liaison with the parties;
- working with incoming mission headquarters personnel to ensure that, as the operation grows to its full size and complexity, unity of effort to implement the Security Council mandate is maintained.⁸¹

The Friends Group has stipulated that the RDMHQ will require the following capabilities:

- a. It must be deployable at very short notice.
- b. It should be able to deploy for up to six months.
- c. It should provide initially the nucleus of a headquarters for a new PKO.
- d. It must be integrated into DPKO as a core function in order to retain its interoperability with the UN headquarters in New York.
- e. It must be capable of undertaking technical reconnaissance missions prior to deployment.
- f. It must have undertaken operational deployment preparations prior to its commitment. This must include such things as the production of Standard Operating Procedures and the completion of pre-deployment training.⁸²

When the RDMHQ was initially proposed, it attracted broad support in the UN Secretariat. In welcoming the proposal, Boutros-Ghali stated that the idea fostered a "culture of prevention" and that, "even if it will not be used it is a kind of dissuasion."⁸³

RDMHQ Limitations

A UN RDMHQ of some sixty-one personnel could provide the necessary impetus for developing and co-ordinating headquarters arrangements, but there are legitimate doubts about its ability to fulfil its five primary tasks in any period of intense activity where it may face multiple operations. Even in its full composition, it is still only the shell of an operational mission headquarters. In particular, concerns arose over the initial plans for the RDMHQ -- whether it might be a 'silver bullet' -- a single-mission mechanism that once deployed could leave DPKO with insufficient personnel to manage ongoing departmental and mission requirements. Many recognised the need for both a surge and a steady-state capability if the new mission headquarters was to succeed in meeting wider expectations. As presently constituted, it is best seen as a necessary improvisation, an arrangement that may need to be rapidly augmented. Some of the earlier plans will have to be adapted.

Recruitment and staffing of this headquarters was also far more controversial than initially anticipated. Only 2 posts have been established to date.⁸⁴ The remaining 6 positions were approved in the fall of 1999, but without the additional funding required to staff these positions. A number of member states assumed that these 6 posts might be filled through redeployment within the UN Secretariat. However, this entailed an unmanageable burden upon staff at Headquarters, particularly when start-up of more than one mission had to be explored concurrently.

To expedite the process, in March 2000, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping reiterated its 1995 request for the RDMHQ and demanded that the remaining 6 positions be established and filled as quickly as possible.⁸⁵ Yet, in response to persistent fears of extending already over-tasked personnel, officials within DPKO released a compromise plan in the same month for a smaller Rapid Deployment Management Unit (RDMU). As proposed, this would entail a static planning element of 4 civilians to identify required skills and develop a roster of individual expertise who might be called on short notice to fill diverse headquarter functions.⁸⁶

The optimum compromise in the short-term is to pursue both the RDMHQ and the RDMU as complementary mechanisms that would provide the operational and planning capacity, as well as the surge and steady-state requirement, with only an additional 10 personnel. This could represent a 'win-win' solution, addressing the NAM's insistence on broader representation and the 'Friends' desire for an effective operational headquarters. The importance of satisfying both these requirements and objectives is evident. The issue, nevertheless, remains unresolved. It has lingered for far too long, and threatens to undermine confidence in, as well as wider support of, the rapid deployment initiative. The RDMHQ is still not operational, but it is also clear that numerous member states expect that it will be within the year.

Recommendation 18

Given that the combined staffing of the RDMHQ and RDMU would only entail an additional 10 personnel, and that these arrangements are relatively cost-effective and complementary, they deserve the full support of all parties. Member states should call on the Secretariat to arrange the immediate staffing of the RDMHQ and RDMU.

MODEST SUCCESS IN THE SHORT-TERM:

TIME TO REVISE THE PRAGMATIC, INCREMENTAL APPROACH

The rapid deployment initiative was premised on an approach that emphasized reform and adaptation through pragmatic, incremental measures. Within five years, this helped to prompt changes at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. As noted, more countries are participating in the UNSAS, a significant proportion at a high level of readiness. The SHIRBRIG is now declared to be available, having attracted additional participants and a sufficient brigade pool. Member states in several other regions appear interested in emulating this model.⁸⁷ Planning for the UNRDMHQ has been underway for five years and several of the core positions have been staffed. Its design reflected the need for diverse multidimensional participation in both the headquarters and among field-deployable elements. The importance of combining incentives and credible disincentives is recognised and now incorporated into mission mandates. Prior to the reduction of gratis personnel, several prominent defence establishments began to acknowledge marked progress in DPKO's planning and management of operations. Training also gradually improved with the support of DPKO and national peacekeeping training centres. Contributing states developed a

better understanding of the various requirements, and many remain confident of their ability to participate in demanding operations. Improving the wider unity of effort and purpose is on the agenda of civilian and military participants, member states, NGOs, and the UN. In short, it was hoped that these arrangements would combine to establish a preliminary foundation for the prevention and management of armed conflict. With further reform and several successful trials, this foundation retains the potential to inspire wider support and confidence.

Initially, it appeared that there were good reasons for developing this UN capability in the context of prevailing practices, resources and structures. Considering the impediments of limited political will, insufficient funding, and overworked personnel answerable to 188 bosses with divergent interests, the progress between 1995 and 1997 should not be under-estimated. It was attained in the absence of powerful national champions. Moreover, most observers recognise that the larger UN system is not altogether amenable to rapid modernization. Indeed, the various efforts were somewhat akin to constructing a multi-faceted, evolving capability through a fractious committee operating by consensus.

Shortly after launching the initiative, Canadian officials assumed that the task was well underway, with seventy-three per cent of their recommendations either accomplished or in the process of being implemented. As early as 1996, they noted that, "between the Group of Friends and the initiative of the Secretariat, 19 of the 26 recommendations have been acted upon in the past nine months."⁸⁸ In the same year, Kofi Annan claimed that the lead-time of the UN's rapid deployment capabilities would be reduced by 50 per cent during the next two years.⁸⁹ The expectations were high and they were not easily sustained as the process moved beyond the short-term.

A year later, Hans van Mierlo, co-chair of the Friends of Rapid Deployment, conceded that progress has been modest; "...given the complexities, this is going to be an incremental process, but one where we cannot afford to let up."⁹⁰

Limitations of the Approach

Regrettably, several of the key member states did 'let up' and the incremental process has largely stalled. There is little indication that further steps are being actively pursued at the political level. In hindsight, moreover, the former assessments appear to have been overly optimistic. By the spring

of 2000, UN officials had scaled back their expectations to the point where they suggested rapid deployment would have to be conceived of as a response within four to six months. In June, the Secretary General acknowledged the problem when he stated,

Where the will is not there and the resources are not available, the UN peacekeepers will arrive late. It takes us on the average 4-5 months to put troops on the ground because we have no troops. The UN doesn't have an army. We borrow from our governments. So we can put on the ground the troops the governments offer. And as fast as they come, and not always with the equipment they promised. If those with the capacity were to cooperate, the UN can do the job, we would arrive on time, not late.⁹¹

Yet those with the capacity seldom cooperate fully. When assessed on the basis of the aforementioned criteria, the initiative's results are definitely mixed. For example, it is apparent that the UN is still denied sufficient resources, well-trained personnel and adequate mechanisms. Questions about reliability and effectiveness continue to confront the Organisation. As well, there are legitimate concerns about an increasingly unrepresentative, two-tiered system that is far too selective and slow. Rather than address these problems within the UN system, there has also been an alarming tendency to search for alternatives that range from regional military alliances to private mercenary forces.

It is evident that the rapid deployment initiative and more recent arrangements reflect the pursuit of agreement only slightly above the level of the lowest common denominator. The context placed a priority on modest short-to-mid term changes that could be promoted among diverse states without major controversy, major funding or major national contributions. Few can be heralded as visionary, courageous gestures that correspond to the wider human security challenges of the new millennium. While the pragmatic, incremental approach adopted worked relatively well in the short-term, it gradually encountered problems sustaining cooperation among the Friends, the Secretariat and other member states. The wider partnerships deemed necessary were increasingly difficult to encourage as the political and diplomatic commitment to the process declined. In turn, the sense of purpose, potential and urgency diminished. Moreover, in an era characterized by increasing complexity and unprecedented change, a pragmatic, incremental approach runs the risk of being simply too slow to cope. Reform in such a process is prone to setbacks from unsustained efforts, inattentive officials and relatively minor obstruction. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has acknowledged the UN's past pattern of incremental adaptations will not suffice in this rapidly changing context, that to succeed, the Organisation will need fundamental, not piecemeal, reform.⁹²

Further, when pursued solely in the quiet, official fora of international politics, an incremental and piecemeal approach also tends to be insufficient for attracting a broad constituency or inspiring more ambitious steps. Notably, few efforts were made to build a coalition among NGOs, related agencies and the interested public, effectively limiting the leverage and political pressure that would be needed to launch further reforms.

Irrespective of the modest, short-term success, public and political expectations have yet to be met. In this respect, it appears that two distinct but complementary objectives have compounded frustration and confusion.⁹³ Initial interest in developing a rapid-deployment capability was premised on the need to improve peacekeeping. But expectations were also raised at the prospect of a mechanism which would be capable of prompt, decisive responses to desperate situations, even those which necessitated humanitarian intervention and limited enforcement. In the near term, these latter hopes are unlikely to be fulfilled. Moreover, in the absence of a compelling vision, there is little chance of satisfying either interest.

It should be acknowledged that there are also far more ambitious aspirations similar to those outlined in the UN Charter, including the development of a UN standing force, a dedicated UN Legion of professional volunteers or a composite UN Standing Emergency Capability. Notably, both Canada and The Netherlands announced in-depth studies into the requirements of a UN standing force, as well as a commitment to maintain efforts over the long-term. This was hardly a novel development. In the latter stages of World War II, the statesmen who founded the United Nations strove to create an Organisation that might give us a second, and perhaps final chance -- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Their collective vision was that of an empowered United Nations; one that might help transform a war-prone international system through collective security, committing all member states to assist in war prevention, with the provision of adequate forces, if necessary. That vision was premised on the assumption that the 'international community' had learned a critical lesson: that security, if not survival, in the future would require a far more cooperative system supported by a legitimate, universal institution. Both were viewed as prerequisites for a wider disarmament process that would gradually free up resources for other pressing problems. Clearly, it did not transpire as hoped.

After fifty years, similar objectives continue to motivate both the human security agenda and the more ambitious proposals for a rapid deployment capability that might gradually empower the UN. Unfortunately, at the official level, these ideals remain largely ignored with bold proposals

being frequently downplayed as unviable, premature and unworthy of concerted effort. A common vision of complementary and mutually reinforcing initiatives has not been sufficiently articulated or endorsed by representatives of supportive member states. As a result, the earlier sense of opportunity and hope has faded, replaced by heightened cynicism and the perception that there are no options. Few recognise the potential to transform the wider security environment through an expansion of these capabilities. If we hope to inspire a broader base of support, there will be a need to demonstrate the benefits.⁹⁴ In the near-term, this capability should help to prevent and limit some violent conflicts, not all. That is progress, as well as an indication of potential.

Yet the larger task is far from finished. If rapid deployment is a demanding concept, it is an even more difficult reality to achieve. The Organization must be sure of each critical element in the process. As the Secretary-General confirmed, missing components and conditional agreements lead to delays. Increasingly, it is understood that delays not only risk lives, they incur the additional expense of later, larger efforts.

The development of a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability will continue to challenge both the Organisation and its member states. Neither will be able to escape the need for a common vision, innovative practices and new mechanisms.⁹⁵ There are options.

Recommendation 19

Supportive parties must work to restore a compelling, long-term vision of an empowered UN -- one that guides and inspires the further development of UN rapid deployment capabilities as an integral component of the human security agenda.

SECTION IV

Soft Power as a Catalyst

The experience of the past few years has demonstrated that the UN needs help to develop a rapid deployment capability. Similarly, even supportive member states need help to revitalize related efforts. The task is simply too demanding and too urgent to be relegated solely to the Organisation and interested Governments. It is time for a far more inclusive and co-operative approach that draws on the respective strengths of all supportive parties.

A new soft power approach may have the potential to attract wider assistance, mobilize a broad-based coalition and constituency of support, prompt further partnerships and restore political will.⁹⁶ Both the Security Council and other member states are likely to need powerful encouragement to resume and expand this process. In this respect, there are several preliminary, yet critical, requirements.

First, the need for a wider educational process is now evident. A few unsupportive parties have managed to generate suspicion and a unique degree of paranoia over the UN rapid deployment initiative. To allay such concerns and restore wider support, there is a need for an explanation of the costs and benefits regionally, as well as universally. Progress will depend on the extent to which further efforts are organized, informed and democratized. Information technology, the transnational network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the global media provide new means for directing related educational efforts at the governments of UN member states and civil society. New partnerships in and between each level will be necessary to stimulate forward momentum, as well as new ideas and approaches. While public diplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon, it has already demonstrated remarkable influence, particularly on initiatives such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the International Criminal Court.

Reliable information will be a key component in any such campaign. In this respect, the academic community also merits further involvement, as independent analysis will be necessary to generate the ideas that can move events.⁹⁷ By encouraging a clearer appreciation of the issues and current arrangements, there is also the prospect of increasing confidence and a commitment to continue building on the current foundation with more far-reaching measures. These are necessary steps toward acquiring wider political influence and leverage, as well as attracting powerful political champions. The latter can only lead as far as their constituents are prepared to provide

support. As the Carnegie Commission noted, "although the prevention of deadly conflict requires many tools and strategies, bold leadership and an active constituency are essential, fundamental requirements for these tools to be effective."⁹⁸

Moreover, if rapid deployment is to succeed as a legitimate and widely valued mechanism for conflict prevention, there will be a need to ensure a far more comprehensive and sophisticated approach. Whereas much attention has been devoted to ensuring sufficient 'hard power' (military forces) capable of restoring security, greater efforts will have to be devoted to ensuring they are accompanied by civilian elements that can restore hope and address human needs. Complex political emergencies will demand prompt attention from both. The promising work to develop a greater unity of effort in field operations now needs to be accompanied by a similar unity of effort to influence the political level.

In this respect, there is increasing evidence that the importance of revitalizing and expanding upon UN rapid deployment capabilities has attracted wider interest and started to establish a common bridge between those within the peace and security communities, the new peacekeeping partnership, the peacebuilding network and those concerned with social justice issues. Numerous prominent bodies such as the Commission on Global Governance, the World Federalists' Association, the Campaign For United Nations' Reform, Refugees International, the Center for Defense Information, the Carnegie Commission and the recent Millennium Forum have called for a UN rapid deployment capability, including some form of permanent UN standing force. Cora Weiss, President of the Hague Appeal for Peace, recently identified several of the key problems, as well as the need for a more concerted effort from civil society:

The UN needs a voluntary international military force under a single command and control.

What is lacking is the political will and funding. Civil society needs to organize to muster that will and those funds...The Secretary-General's proposal for a rapid intervention force needs our support.⁹⁹

Clearly, if informed and coordinated, civil society could accelerate this process. Among the challenges that warrant consideration are:

- Identification of interested parties on a transnational basis;
- Preparation and circulation of a background paper to solicit general agreement and support for enhancing UN rapid deployment capabilities as a foundation for the development of a permanent UN standing emergency capability;
- Development of an institutional base of expertise with working groups directed to specific requirements;
- Encouragement of further cooperation and partnerships at all levels of civil society, and;

- Preparation of the groundwork for national, international and transnational initiatives.

Recommendation 20

Official support is needed to generate a broader public and professional understanding of current UN rapid deployment initiatives and the various options available for enhancing these efforts. Assistance for developing a focused research programme and a series of conferences addressing the issues of rapid deployment would be a tangible commitment to the process.

Recommendation 21

Co-ordinate a 'soft power' approach not only to focus the Security Council and revitalize the 'Friends', but also to empower a transnational coalition and constituency of support among citizens, non-governmental organizations, related agencies and academic communities.

SECTION V

Expanding On and Beyond The Foundation¹⁰⁰

The development of a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability will take time, vision and a coherent, goal-oriented plan. If guided by a long-term sense of purpose, there is the prospect of contributing to a critical mechanism for conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance, as well as an empowered United Nations.

Rapid deployment presents an array of demanding requirements. Missing components, whether in personnel, supportive infrastructure or equipment, cause delays and lead to failures. Four generic components will demand sustained efforts. First, all deployable personnel, equipment and supplies must be adequately prepared for prompt staging. Second, all require a unique degree of self-sufficiency -- a capacity to operate on their own for a period of up to 90 days. Third, it is essential that there be prompt transportation to the mission area, as well as within the specific theatre of operations. Finally, there is a need to ensure appropriate replacements or rotations for steady-state operations, as well as augmentation and reinforcement in the event of serious escalation.

As we look ahead, it is evident that there will be a need for further measures that complement and build on the existing foundation. The prospect of immediately initiating some form of UN standing capability may be remote, however, an ongoing cumulative development process of four

stages appears feasible. As capabilities are consolidated at each stage, one can anticipate a parallel expansion in the scope and scale of potential activities. The UN will require a capability commensurate with the tasks it is likely to be assigned.

There are several cost-effective options that merit consideration by the United Nations, its member states, and interested parties. The following sequential proposals are intended to stimulate further discussion and analysis.

Stage One: Reinforce Existing Arrangements

- Revitalise and expand the consultative process of all supportive parties with the following objectives:

SHIRBRIG

- launch a concerted effort to promote establishment of similar arrangements in other regions;
- negotiate new MOU facilitating deployment to operations necessitating a mandate within Chapter VII;
- integrate civilian elements to ensure provision of necessary services; and,
- initiate research into the financing, administration, basing, equipment, and lift arrangements necessary to ensure immediate responses from co-located, standing national SHIRBRIG units.

UNSAS

- given the promising quantitative foundation established, promote standby political commitments whether through expanded Memoranda of Understanding or via additional levels of the agreement facilitating deployment in response to Chapter VII mandates or Article 43.¹⁰¹

UN Standing Emergency Capability

- initiate a parallel inquiry into the option of dedicated UN volunteer elements with particular emphasis on administration, financing, recruitment, terms of service, remuneration, training, basing and command.

Stage Two: Consolidate Capability In A Sound Operational Environment

- **establish a UN rapid deployment base.**

A dedicated UN base would facilitate preparation, training, rapid deployment and management of future operations. A review of redundant military bases might help to determine a cost-effective location capable of providing existing infrastructure for training and equipment stock-piling, as well as nearby access to air and sea lift for prompt staging.

- **develop a permanent, operational-level headquarters at the UN base.**

Experienced officers, civilian experts, and qualified planners can be seconded to the base and co-assigned responsibility to expand the operational and tactical foundation for future efforts. To manage a variety of complex tasks effectively, it is in the interests of all parties to shift from a skeletal RDMHQ within UNHQ, to a static, expanded operational-level headquarters at a UN base. It would also be prudent for cost-effectiveness, as well as for the obvious benefits from a military, doctrinal, and administrative perspective, to co-locate two field-deployable tactical (mission) headquarters at this base. Each of the two headquarters would include military and civilian staff, political and legal advisors, a translation cell, an NGO liaison team, a communications and signals unit and, a defence and security platoon. A multinational, multidimensional headquarters of this nature would be quite large with approximately 275 personnel assigned for limited durations as a vanguard HQ, a sector HQ, or a mission HQ.

- **launch an ongoing process of doctrine development for the range of diverse elements.**

New organizational practices, new methods and new skills will be required in future multidimensional peace support operations. Doctrine provides the guidance and fundamental principles for the organization, planning and training of units, as well as the conduct of operations. It will be essential to synchronize diverse elements into a cohesive capability. As such, an emphasis must be accorded to integrating and coordinating assigned personnel to achieve the necessary unity of purpose and effort for advancing UN objectives.

Stage Three: Co-locate National Contingents

- **assign the national elements of a SHIRBRIG group to the UN base for a one- to two-year period of duty;**

The general reluctance to move quickly can be partially overcome by stationing multinational elements in a sound operational and tactical structure. Response times of standing multinational elements should be considerably quicker than the projected thirty-day response from home-based national SHIRBRIG elements. At this stage, tactical units and civilians would still remain under national political control and operational command. Locating these elements under the operational control of the permanent headquarters would improve multinational training, exercises, lift, and logistics co-ordination. Standing, co-located national units would enhance overall effectiveness, increase the prospect of timely national approval and lead to faster responses. Several multinational SHIRBRIGs might also fill a large void in the current system of conflict prevention and management.

As projected in **Figure 1**, the deployable military elements assigned to each mission headquarters at the base would include: high-readiness, technical reconnaissance units; a light armoured reconnaissance squadron; motorized infantry battalions; light-armoured (wheeled) infantry battalions; a helicopter squadron; an engineer unit; a logistics battalion and a medical unit. The deployable civilian police support elements recommended include: civilian police, a peacebuilding advisory team, a conflict resolution team, medical teams, a disaster relief and humanitarian response team, a public affairs team, an environmental crisis response team and a transport team.

- **provide two company formations of civilian police at the company level (2X 125), with representation in the headquarters, as an adjunct to the brigade structure.**

This could be expected to have similar benefits in terms of efficiency and cohesion. Further, it provides an organic peacebuilding component, improving community relations at a tactical level during deployments. As initial tasks would focus on restoring law and order and the investigation of war crimes, the presence of CIVPOL personnel might help sustain public confidence, thereby reducing the burden on military units.

- **identify five appropriately-dispersed regional facilities to serve as UN bases for the preparation and deployment of other SHIRBRIG groups.**

Aside from reducing response times, the gradual consolidation of UN bases in Africa, Southern Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America could encourage wider participation and foster additional partnerships. Among the benefits would be improved access and familiarity, as well as a UN centre for regional training, equipment stockpiling and staging. This would represent a universal commitment and help to expand the pool of qualified personnel.

Stage Four: Initiate A Composite Standing Emergency Capability

- **recruit and co-locate professional UN volunteers into distinct capability component groups of both the headquarters and field-deployable elements at the initial UN base.**

In effect, these would be personnel recruited from volunteers of all countries and directly employed by the United Nations. Each would be expected to meet high qualifying standards. They would remain exclusively under the command and control of the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General and his designated Special Representative. The integration of UN volunteers into this composite group should be viewed as a complementary and mutually reinforcing stage in the development of an increasingly effective UN rapid deployment capability.

- **integrate volunteers into a dedicated UN Standing Emergency Capability of 6,000 personnel under one of the two field-deployable mission headquarters.**

The size and structure of this new formation should approximate that of the multinational, multidimensional standing capability noted above. By co-locating UN volunteers alongside national contingents, one might advance the prospects of appropriate selection, individual and joint training, as well as a higher degree of standardisation and interoperability. At this stage, the UN would assume sole control and responsibility for one of the two mission headquarters and its deployable elements. Volunteers would be developed into cohesive units under this headquarters.

- **provide personnel with advance training and two complete, modern equipment kits (one for training and one pre-packed for immediate staging).**

Prior comprehensive training for diverse UN operations will be a pre-requisite for rapid deployment as there will be far less time for an extended period of mission-specific training. Two standard and interoperable equipment kits would ensure access, reliability and familiarity, as well as an added measure of safety. Re-supply could be promptly arranged out of reserve or training stocks at the UN base.


- **recruit and train company-level formations of UN volunteer civilian police to mirror the modified brigade structure of the standing national contingents.**

Dedicated UN police contingents would reflect the Organisation's commitment to maintain international humanitarian law, particularly the protection of civilians.

- **ensure UN elements have a credible stand-alone strength for emergency deployments of approximately 5,500 civilian and military personnel.**

Five thousand, five hundred well-trained personnel are viewed as the minimum necessary to achieve a balance between rapidity and operational effectiveness. This number reflects the requirement for security and self-defence within a volatile environment, as well as support for humanitarian assistance, basic services and preliminary peacebuilding efforts.

Figure 1: Composition of Deployable Elements for Standing SHIRBRIG or UN Volunteers assigned to UN Base under Static Operational HQ and 2 Mission HQs



(N.B. This is a modular capability that can be tailored for the specific demands of diverse assignments.)

SECTION VI

The Case for a Composite UN Standing Emergency Capability

The proposed composite UN Standing Emergency Capability would include diverse multinational elements and dedicated UN volunteers. Both could be co-located at a UN base in a formation similar to the SHIRBRIG, albeit with modifications to include civilian and police personnel.

The case for a multidimensional capability rather than simply a military force is premised on the need to address wider human needs, as well as security with a sophisticated combination of incentives and disincentives. Aside from corresponding to the diverse operational requirements of contemporary UN peace missions, the proposed composition of this capability is indicative at the outset of an ongoing commitment to, and assistance for, conflict resolution and peacebuilding over the short-, mid- and longer-term. While this capability is primarily to address short-term needs and operate as the first into, and the first out of, an operation, its reception will depend on the extent to which it establishes the groundwork for further efforts. By including a wider range of emergency services there is the prospect of appealing to a wider range of parties, in theatre and abroad.

Standby arrangements and even a standing multinational force provide critical contributions, however, they are unlikely to be sufficient. Expanding the operational and tactical structure of this capability to include dedicated UN personnel volunteering for service would expand the range of options at the political and strategic levels. It would help to offset the political pressure many contributing Governments face when confronted with decisions over participation in demanding and potentially high-risk operations. The 1995 report of the US Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations sheds light on this concern and on a similar solution:

To strengthen the U.N.'s peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities the Commission proposes the creation of a 5,000 to 10,000-(man) blue helmet rapid deployment force of volunteers...The Commission believes that a UN rapid-reaction force is necessary because no nation likes to send its soldiers into potential combat zones when its own interests may not be directly affected by the outcome...On its own (a small international force) has limited value if a large-scale conflict breaks out, but a UN legion would...be a useful arm of the Security Council for deterring conflict or providing early on-site reconnaissance. It could also be used to give the U.N. an immediate presence in a troubled region while a larger force is formed using units contributed by member nations.¹⁰²

Canada's 1995 study of the related requirements noted, "UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response times significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision."¹⁰³ "Ultimately", as the Government of Canada acknowledged, "a UN rapid reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on member states of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations."¹⁰⁴

This idea has already attracted support. As the Commission on Global Governance reported in 1995, "the very existence of an immediately available and effective UN Volunteer Force could be a deterrent in itself. It could also give important support for negotiation and the peaceful settlement of disputes."¹⁰⁵ The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations expressed its preference for a standing UN Volunteer Force to enhance the UN's performance in both time and function.¹⁰⁶ The Carnegie Commission reported that, "a standing force may well be necessary for effective prevention".¹⁰⁷

This proposal attempts to demonstrate the approach and stages necessary to accelerate, and expand upon, recommendations contained in the 1995 Canadian study. It also builds on The Netherlands proposal for a Permanent UN Brigade and the Danish-led multinational initiative, which established the SHIRBRIG. The Netherlands study demonstrated that many of the technical obstacles are surmountable. The Danish study did not rule out permanently assigning military units to the UN, but acknowledged that it was a long-term option.¹⁰⁸

As projected, a UN Standing Emergency Capability should also be compatible with the U.S. House of Representatives Bill 4453 submitted by Congressmen James McGovern and John Porter in May 2000.¹⁰⁹ This bill calls on the President to use America's "voice, vote and influence" to encourage the establishment of a UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force consisting of 6,000 international volunteers employed by the UN and under the authority of the Security Council. It is a thoughtful and courageous effort to address the 'time gap', the 'training gap' and the 'political will gap' with well-trained military and police units that can be deployed within 15 days of a Security Council resolution for up to six months, with the primary objective of containing a crisis and casualties until member states are ready to assume the task.

It is evident, moreover, that there are other options which share similar objectives. Over the past five years, there have been several noteworthy attempts to model the composition of a larger UN Legion.¹¹⁰ After conducting a needs-analysis derived from a review of five UN operations, Carl

Kaysen and George Rathjens concluded that a UN Legion of 15,000 volunteers would be the optimal mechanism given prevailing resource constraints.¹¹¹ At this size, it was noted that the Legion could rapidly deploy a total of 11,000 personnel with the potential to manage two concurrent operations. While designed for a wide array of UN operations, including deployments under Chapter VII, the size and structure of this force also preclude any large-scale enforcement or war-fighting operations. This option is a 'streamlined' model of a considerably larger UN Legion proposed in extensive detail by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight.¹¹² Their initial assessment called for a four brigade Legion of approximately 43,750 personnel.¹¹³ As the unit types foreseen are virtually identical, it is a modular force that can be tailored to diverse deployment packages as the need arises. In this respect, it is quite similar to the Canadian vanguard concept and the notion of specific elements selected according to the context of an emergency, as proposed above. The Vital Force option would allow for short-term deployments of up to 30,000 military personnel representing a modest enforcement capability or continuous deployment of 15,000 indicative of a capacity to manage three concurrent peacekeeping operations. While a very useful model, the practical limitations are in the UN's operating cost of approximately \$3.5 billion U.S., the exclusion of civilian elements, and basing the entire force at one central location rather than building via duplication of national and UN standing elements at a regional level.

For purposes of comparison, a composite UN Standing Emergency Capability with 5,500 deployable multinational personnel and 5,500 deployable UN personnel, would likely be sufficient to conduct two operations, although not concurrently. Both have sufficient strength and assets to manage the critical early stages of a peace support operation, but it would likely be necessary for one to provide support and act as a primary reserve for the group in active service. Each would have a capacity for self-defence and tactical offensive manoeuvres, but neither is intended to, nor capable of, war-fighting or intervention without consent among well-armed combatants in a high-threat environment. However, given their rapid deployment nature, neither should be considered as another mechanism for the tasks of managing steady-state operations.

Dedicated UN volunteers, supported, trained and backed up by multinational military and civilian elements might also be a relatively cost-effective option. Aside from the humanitarian benefits of conflict prevention, the costs of major peace support operations and the expense of reconstructing war-torn societies would likely be substantially reduced.¹¹⁴ While expressing a preference for a volunteer UN Legion, Sir Brian Urquhart writes that, " a rapid response group,

whatever its basis and nature, should be seen as a vital investment for the future, and one which by its very nature, is designed to act at the point where action can be most effective, thus eliminating or reducing the necessity for later, larger, less effective, more costly options."¹¹⁵

Although the proposed UN volunteer elements would put approximately 6,500 new personnel on the UN payroll, and entail considerable expenditures for new equipment, administrative and managerial requirements, the overall costs incurred would decrease with the ongoing participation of national elements. Acquiring a redundant military base capable of hosting 14,000 personnel might also reduce the start-up costs. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide even an estimate of total costs, it is noteworthy that The Netherlands' study estimated the recurring costs for a permanent UN brigade of 5,000 personnel at \$380 million US per annum. Standardisation of equipment and vehicles would also cut overall costs in terms of manpower and overhead. To acquire equipment for a UN volunteer capability of brigade size would likely entail an expenditure of approximately \$700 million U.S. Financing will inevitably be construed as a significant problem in the prevailing environment; yet, when compared to global military expenditures exceeding \$670 billion annually, the financial burden would be modest if shared proportionally among 188 member states.¹¹⁶ As noted, the potential cost-returns of the investment are increasingly apparent, as are the costs of 'too little', 'too late'.

Obviously, a host of related issues will have to be addressed before any standing capability becomes a reality. Financing is one major concern. Developing the organisational and operational capacity of the United Nations to the point where it has the confidence of member states is another. Securing appropriate national capabilities and a political commitment to the process appears to pose a far greater challenge. But these issues hardly preclude the need to consider new approaches or the need to design a compelling sequence of steps that will facilitate the transition to a viable, permanent UN capability.

CONCLUSION

The failure to avert organized mass murder in Rwanda prompted a reappraisal of contemporary approaches, as well as a multinational initiative to enhance the United Nations capacity for rapid deployment. That led to supportive innovation at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. However, in the aftermath of Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is apparent that those initial efforts must now be revitalized, expanded and accelerated.

Rather than await the next catastrophe, it is time to consider how additional SHIRBRIGs and dedicated UN elements might be introduced as a complementary expansion on current arrangements.¹¹⁷ A composite UN Standing Emergency Capability, including these personnel, would be a cost-effective and more reliable option; one that merits serious consideration and action.

Both pragmatists and visionaries are aware that the recent political environment was not conducive to the immediate establishment of a UN standing force. Nor, in the earlier period of unprecedented activity, was the Organisation prepared to manage additional, controversial capabilities. As well, by 1997 the former political and diplomatic enthusiasm dissipated quickly when it encountered concerns related to sovereignty, risks, representation, limited support and insufficient financing. Yet rapid changes, ongoing conflicts, and the wider challenges of interdependence, are now altering the former context. Many are already reviewing contemporary approaches and mechanisms for preventing and resolving violent conflict, including the option of a UN standing emergency capability or force. In the earlier words of Stephen Kinloch, "driven back, the idea will, as in the past, ineluctably re-emerge, Phoenix-like, at the most favourable opportunity."¹¹⁸

This report attempts to address two critical questions frequently overlooked in academe and official circles. How do we revitalize and accelerate political momentum? First, it recommends a more inclusive soft power initiative to educate and inform interested parties. This approach could prompt renewed efforts and generate a broad-based constituency of support. There are new opportunities for developing partnerships between supportive member states, non-governmental organizations, departments, institutes and individuals. Second, how might supportive parties facilitate the elusive development of a reliable UN capability for rapid deployment to diverse

emergencies? A vision-oriented, ongoing cumulative development process that builds on and beyond the foundation provided by existing arrangements toward the objective of a composite UN Standing Emergency Capability is feasible.

Hopefully, this report will stimulate further thought and supportive effort. It is not intended to preclude the pursuit of more ambitious arrangements should the political context change. As previously noted, there have been occasions when the necessary consensus was close at hand. The challenge remains, as does the need. There has also been modest progress since William R. Frye made the case for a planned evolution in his seminal 1957 study, A United Nations Peace Force. Whether the appropriate lessons have been learned or spurned will now depend on the extent to which there are further ambitious efforts from interested parties, here and abroad. We have yet to achieve Frye's objective, but it is worth recalling his words:

Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one, could be the first step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next.¹¹⁹

There are promising options and, with further co-operation, we can do better.

Acknowledgements

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Endnotes

¹ This was evident as early as August 1992, when US presidential candidate Bill Clinton expressed support for a voluntary UN rapid deployment force. In February 1993, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed the UN Secretary-General that the US would back proposals for a UN rapid deployment force. On various occasions, Russian statesmen endorsed UN standby forces, negotiation of Article 43 agreements, and even their readiness to commit forces to a UN army. In 1992 French President Francois Mitterand called for revitalising the UN Military Staff Committee and offered to commit 1,000 French soldiers at its disposal on forty-eight hours' notice with another 1,000 ready for UN service within a week. See the section on "Presidential Support" and "International Support" in Capt. Edward I. Dennehy, LTC William J. Droll, Capt. Gregory P. Harker, LTC Stephen M. Speakes, and LTC Fred A. Treyz, III, A Blue Helmet Combat Force, (Policy Analysis Paper 93-01, National Security Program, Harvard University, 1993), pp. 9-10.

² A number of the early commitments of member states such as the United States and France were overlooked in their subsequent responses to the UN General Assembly and to the Secretary-General's An Agenda for Peace. See "Statement of France," 28 July 1993 in response to An Agenda for Peace, in "Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General-Addendum, UN doc. A/48/403/Add. 1/Corr. 1, Nov. 2, 1993; and US Presidential Decision Directive 25, or The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Washington, DC, US Department of State Publication 10161, May 1994; cited in Adam Roberts, "Proposals for UN Standing Forces: History, Tasks and Obstacles," in David Cox and Albert Legault (eds.), UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects, (Cornwallis: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), pp. 1-15.

³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 Jan. 1992, New York, 17 Jun. 1992, (A/47/277-S/2411), paras. 42-44.

⁴ See, Brian Urquhart, "For A U. N. Volunteer Military Force," The New York Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 11, 10 June 1993, pp. 3-4. For an early response to the Urquhart proposal, see Lord Richard Carver, "A UN Volunteer Military Force: Four Views," The New York Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 12, Jun. 24, 1993, p. 59.

⁵ For a more thorough overview of these diverse perspectives see, Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Volunteer Force", International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, pp. 166-190.

⁶ See for example, Canada, DND, "Report on Consultations UN Rapid Reaction Capability Study", May 1995, Prepared by LTC Joe Culligan, DIPOL 3.

⁷ As noted in a Canadian briefing paper, "the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement which strengthens the consultations between the Council and troop contributor nations. The two key changes which enhance this process are: that consultations will be chaired by the Security Council Presidency alone rather than jointly with the UN Secretariat. This advance should allow for future meetings to focus on policy issues and political aspects of new or existing Security Council mandates. The UN Secretariat will continue to chair separate troop contributor meetings to discuss operational issues. The second change is that the Security Council, when considering peacekeeping operations, will now hold meetings with prospective troop contributors that have already been approached by the Secretariat." See Canada, DFAIT, "An Update on the Canadian Study, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations," prepared by Daniel Livermore, Director of Regional Security and Peacekeeping, Summer 1996, p. 5.

⁸ The term 'peace support operations' is an elaboration on the former concept of 'wider peacekeeping' involving tasks beyond those associated with traditional peacekeeping to "cover a wide range of potential operations from conflict prevention to peacemaking, and to provide a doctrine which is relevant to the post-Cold War geo-strategic environment". See, British Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication 3.01, Peace Support Operations, Sept. 1997, thereafter issued as Joint Warfare Publication 3.50. For a thoughtful review see, Tom Woodhouse, "The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies", International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 24-37.

⁹ United Nations Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping", S/1996/1067, 24 Dec. 1996, p. 3.

¹⁰ A number of these criteria are drawn from the Government of Canada's report, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability, Ottawa, Sept. 1995. See, for example, chapter 2, "Principles of the Study," pp. 8-16.

¹¹ . The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Notes for an Address at the New York University School of Law, The Hauser Lecture on International Humanitarian Law, "Humanitarian Interventions and Humanitarian Constraints", New York, February 10, 2000, p. 6.

¹² Government of The Netherlands, The Netherlands Non-Paper, "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A preliminary study," (revised version), April 1995, p. 3.

¹³ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁴ See Robert C. Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping: The Changing Utility of Military Force," *Third World Quarterly*, 12 Apr. 1990, pp. 53-70.

¹⁵ Brian Urquhart, "For A UN. Volunteer Military Force."

¹⁶ The Netherlands 'Non-Paper', p. 5.

¹⁷ *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, Sept. 1995. The report was formally tabled on September 26, during the UN's fiftieth anniversary. The rationale for the study was outlined by Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, André Ouellet: "the experience of the last few years leads us to believe that we need to explore even more innovative options than those considered to date. Recent peacekeeping missions have shown that the traditional approach no longer applies. As we have seen in Rwanda, rapid deployment of intervention forces is essential. In light of the situation, the Government of Canada has decided to conduct an in-depth review of the short-, medium- and long-term options available to us to strengthen the UN's rapid response capability in times of crisis. Among these options, we feel the time has come to study the possibility, over the long term of creating a permanent UN military force. We will ask the world's leading experts for their input and will inform all member states of the results of the study." Notes for An Address by André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, Sept. 29, 1994, p. 7.

¹⁸ See Chapter 5, "A Practical Agenda for Reform: The Short to Medium Term," pp. 36-54.

¹⁹ See Chapter 6, "A Vision of the Future: The Long-Term Prospects for Rapid Reaction," pp. 55-65.

²⁰ Among the proposals for reform at the political level were the establishment of a troop contributors' committee for each operation; a troop contributors' forum to consider general issues of an operational nature, and; convening informal groups of "friends" to deal with related issues. Five recommendations pertained to improving various financial procedures. Ibid, pp. 37-42.

²¹ At the strategic level, there were calls for refining the early-warning capabilities of the Secretariat and advancing co-operation with member states toward the development of an "early-warning alert" system. The report advised strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with additional staff, enhancing the office of the Military Advisor, initiating rosters of senior military commanders, developing standing contractual arrangements with suppliers, particularly with respect to the provision of strategic movement, and producing packages of equipment for generic missions. Both the Secretary-General and member states were urged to continue refining and strengthening the Standby Arrangements System established in 1993. The Secretary-General was encouraged to use new techniques such as the "peacekeeping services agreement" to facilitate more rapid deployment and efficient support services. Member states were asked to explore the advance identification of personnel with expertise in relevant areas to assist the UN in responding to urgent situations. Ibid, pp. 43-46.

²² Ibid, p. 54.

²³ Ibid, p. 51.

²⁴ The report noted that the vanguard concept "is based on the principle of linking all of the levels of the UN system, especially an operational headquarters and mission groups provided by member states at the tactical level, for the purpose of deploying a force as rapidly as possible for a brief period, either to meet an immediate crisis or to anticipate the arrival of follow-on forces or a more traditionally-organised peacekeeping operation." p. 52.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Denmark, Chief of Defence, "United Nations Stand-by Arrangements for Peacekeeping: A Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade," 25 Jan. 1995. Denmark conducted four international seminars between May and August 1995. Participating nations were Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Sweden. The DPKO was also represented.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 9. It was noted that Allied nations with a tradition of peacekeeping were a natural choice when forming the core and setting the standards for a future brigade. Others would have to be encouraged to participate to secure impartiality.

²⁹ "Report by the Working Group on a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade," pp. 10-11.

³⁰ A nation's right to decide whether or not to participate on a case-by-case basis would thus be protected. It was assumed "this would be accomplished through the maintenance of a brigade pool of 'extra' units which would 'back up' those units which might not be made available due to national decision."

³¹ Canada, DND, "Report on Consultations UN Rapid Reaction Capability Study," May 1995, prepared by LTC. Joe Culligan, DIPOL 3.

³² Cited in the briefing summary of WKGR8708 - Friends of Rapid Reaction Meeting, December 4, 1995 prepared by Canadian MILAD, Col. Michael Snell.

³³ Lloyd Axworthy, Hans van Mierlo, and Niels Helveg Petersen, "Let's Team Up to Make UN Peacekeeping Work," *International Herald Tribune*, 22 Oct. 1996. Available @ (<http://www.undp.org/missions/denmarkpolicy/article.htm>)

³⁴ Briefing summary of WKGR8708 - Friends Meeting, 4 Dec. 1995.

³⁵ Kofi Annan, "The Peacekeeping Prescription," in Cahill, *Preventive Diplomacy*, p. 186.

³⁶ Among the other participants attending this meeting were Ministers of Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Senegal, Nicaragua, Ukraine and Jamaica.

³⁷ See, Canada, DFAIT, "An Update on the Canadian Study, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations", Prepared by Daniel Livermore, Director of Regional Security and Peacekeeping, Summer, 1996, p.4.

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Opinion on the future of the vanguard concept varies with some suggesting it had been replaced and others arguing that it is still being pursued through related arrangements such as the SHIRBRIG.

⁴⁰ Cited in Canada, DFAIT, IDC1286, "Report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on a Rapid Reaction Capability for the UN", September 27, 1995.

⁴¹ The emphasis for 1997 was initially to be on developing a mechanism to co-ordinate the activities of peacekeepers, UN police forces, NGOs and other UN agencies, but the need to arrange clear guidelines for logistics emerged as a more urgent priority.

⁴² Many acknowledge that the Committee of 34 is an exceptionally slow vehicle that does not lend itself to quick action. This was a determining factor in the establishment of the 'Friends' as some member states wanted an informal body to act as a catalyst for change and to stimulate the work of the Committee of 34.

⁴³ See, United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, "Comprehensive Review Of The Whole Question Of Peace-keeping Operations In All Their Aspects", A/50/230, June 22, 1995, Section 3, p.12. Also see, A/51/130, May 7, 1996, Section 5, p.13.

⁴⁴ Regrettably, some initiatives were deliberately stymied. For example, despite the Secretary-General's authorisation to establish the RDMHQ, Pakistan succeeded in mobilising wider resistance to this development. In 1998, Cuba denied approval of the necessary funding for RDMHQ staff in the accounts and budgetary committee (ACABQ). Attempts to secure funding and wider political support for the RDMHQ's eight core positions were insufficient and repeatedly stymied. Several nations agreed to supply personnel, as well as a percentage of start-up costs in a specific trust fund. However, gratis personnel raised concerns over equitable opportunity for personnel of developing nations and the trust funds did not attract sufficient money. Some officials remain confident the required resources will eventually clear the committee approval process.

⁴⁵ Cited in "Daily Highlights", October 25, 1996, Central News Section, Department of Public Information, United Nations.

⁴⁶ See, for example, "Concerns Over High Readiness Brigade Expressed At Special Committee On Peacekeeping Operations", United Nations, GA/PK/152, March 31, 1998.

⁴⁷ See, Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and Norway To Promote Increased Capacity For Rapid Reaction For UN Peacekeeping Missions", New Release no. 102, May 12, 2000.

⁴⁸ For a useful review of the related changes in DPKO see Brigadier General Mono Bhagat, "Trends In UN Capabilities: Standby Arrangements, Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, Regional Arrangements", available @ <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/No.%2021/Bhagat.html>

For a more critical perspective on DPKO, see Trevor Findley, "Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution", *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 53-60.

⁴⁹ DPKO's Training Unit has written training guidelines, manuals and other materials to assist Member States in preparing military, civilian and police personnel for UN assignments. Aside from its numerous publications, the Training Unit has also helped to improve and standardise peacekeeping training through seminars, workshops and training assistance teams.

⁵⁰ The Mission Planning Service is the focal point for all peacekeeping planning. Its activities include: generic guidelines and procedures to streamline the process of mission planning; generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries, from which mission-specific guidelines are formulated; the preparation of standard operating procedures for essential functions; and in-house studies pertaining to important issues such as command and control, rules of engagement, structure of mission headquarters, etc. See "General Framework", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, (<http://hwww.un.org:80/Depts/dpko/MP.HTM>)

⁵¹ Brigadier General Mono Bhagat, "Trends in UN Capabilities: Standby Arrangements, Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, Regional Arrangements".

⁵² The elimination of all gratis personnel meant a loss of 100 individuals to DPKO.

⁵³ Cited in Barbara Crossette, "The UN's Unhappy Lot: Perilous Police Duties Multiplying", *New York Times*, February 22, 2000.

⁵⁴ It should be noted that the UN began to construct a system of stand by forces in 1964, but only a small number of member states demonstrated a willingness to enter into any related arrangement with the UN.

⁵⁵ See United Nations, DPKO, "United Nations Standby Arrangements System Description". Also see United Nations, Security Council, "Progress Report Of The Secretary-General On Standby Arrangements For Peacekeeping", (S/1996/1067) 24 December 1996.

⁵⁶ See, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Monthly Status Report: United Nations Standby Arrangements", Status Report as of May 23, 2000. (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/str.htm>)

⁵⁷ As previously noted, response time is defined by the UN as the period between the time the request to provide resources is made and the time these resources are ready for airlift/sea-lift to the mission area.

⁵⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, p. 11, para 43.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 11, para. 44.

⁶⁰ The former Secretary-General previously cautioned, "the system of standby arrangements does not so far ensure the reliability and speed of response which is required in such emergencies. It is essential that the necessary capabilities are reliably available when they are needed and can be deployed with the speed dictated by the situations. It is evident that member states possess such capabilities; what is needed is the will to make them available for the execution of Security Council mandates." Cited in, "Peace-keeping in a Changing Context". (<http://www.un.org>)

⁶¹ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, p. 18, para 43.

⁶² As reported, the information available under the standby arrangements proved most helpful in the planning for and subsequent deployment of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia, in particular the successful United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). These arrangements also helped officials co-ordinate the preventive deployment operation (MINURCA) for the Central African Republic. Favourable circumstances in this instance also facilitated a rapid deployment.

⁶³ Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, *We the Peoples: The Role Of The United Nations In The 21st Century*, (New York: United Nations, 2000), para. 225.

⁶⁴ *United Nations Charter*, Article 43 (1).

⁶⁵ Among the other determining factors noted are "political approval and support at the national level, availability of airlift/sea-lift, a capacity for mission management and logistic sustainment in the field, as well as the conclusion of the necessary administrative procedures".

⁶⁶ Major Cesar G. Zorzenon, "UN CIVPOL Rapid Deployment Unit", paper presented to the International Peace Academy, Experts Seminar on United Nations Rapid Deployment, New York, April 1, 2000.

⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, "Background Paper about establishing a Multinational UN Standby Forces Brigade at High Readiness (SHIRBRIG), Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in the 'Friends of Rapid Deployment' Group, New York, 26 September 1996. (<http://www.undp.org/missions/denmark/policy/shirbrig.htm>)

⁶⁸ The countries that initially signed the 'Letter of Intent' are Austria, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. The Czech Republic, Finland and Ireland participated in the signing ceremony as observers. See "Status in the establishment of the Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade", Danish Ministry of Defence, December 19, 1996. (<http://www.undp.org/missions/denmark/policy/standby.htm>)

⁶⁹ Among the new members of the SHIRBRIG are: Argentina, Italy, Jordan, Romania and Spain. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia are also participating as observers but have yet to sign a Memorandum of Understanding indicating their specific commitment. (See, <http://www.shirbrig.dk>)

⁷⁰ Moreover, Danish officials write that when SHIRBRIG is deployed it will be "subject to UN command and control arrangements and operate exclusively under the direction of the Secretary-General or his Special Representative and under the operational control of the Force Commander for the operation." Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, "Background Paper About Establishing a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces Brigade at High Readiness (SHIRBRIG)", pp. 1-2.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.2.

⁷² Although the arrangements are preliminary, there has been related progress in Central and South Eastern Europe, as well as in the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

⁷³ As Danish officials informed the Friends Group, "the conceptual work done so far on the establishment of a multinational UN [SHIRBRIG] carries a relevance far beyond the group of nations participating in the present project. The concept could inspire other groups of nations to take a similar initiative."

⁷⁴ Cited in Arslan Malak, "The beginnings of a UN army?", *Behind the Headlines*, Summer 1999, pp. 14-17.

⁷⁵ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in UN Press Release, SG/SM/6310, September 2, 1997, p.2.

⁷⁶ This option was proposed in a former context by Peter Langille, Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes and James Hammond, "A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability, in David Cox and Albert Legault, (eds.), *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects*, (Cornwallis: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), pp. 179-190.

⁷⁷ Notably, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations also urged the Secretary-General to develop a rapidly deployable headquarters team in their spring 1995 report. This request was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in Resolution 50/30(1995). The proposal for such a headquarters was also at the forefront of the priorities of the Friends of Rapid Deployment. It was reported that the Friends Group also submitted a similar proposal to the Secretary-General. See "Rapid-reaction headquarters possible by fall: Canadian led proposal calls for small group to assess world crises", *Ottawa Citizen*, July 23, 1996.

⁷⁸ See Major-General Frank Van Kappen, Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, "Presentation on the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)", to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 24 October 1996. Also cited in "Peacekeeping Operations Committee - 5 - Press Release PK/144 140th Meeting, 24 October 1996.

⁷⁹ Once operational, the UNRDMHQ should begin to fill the gap in DPKO's initial management of UN operations. In the past, there was a risk of serious operational difficulties and complications arising when military contingents and other components arrived in the mission area to operate over extended periods without a proper mission headquarters.

⁸⁰ Major-General Frank Van Kappen, "Presentation on the RDMHQ", October 24, 1996, pp. 5-7.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

⁸² Friends of Rapid Deployment, Technical Working Group Paper, "A Rapidly Deployable Headquarters: Roles, Functions and Implementation", March 26, 1996. As this paper noted, "this headquarters would be multinational, drawing its personnel widely from contributing member states of all regions. It would also be multidimensional, reflecting the requirements of the more complex operations of the 1990s, with a substantive civilian staff of diverse experience in the areas of civilian police, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and legal affairs. This headquarters would be a 'first-in, first-out' operation, moving into an area rapidly but capable of being removed equally quickly. It should be capable of directing at least 5,000 personnel, possibly more if it is augmented at the time of deployment. This staff, seconded or loaned by Member States to the UN Secretariat, could be deployed into a theatre of operations under the authority of the Security Council and at the direction of the Secretary-General but without further authorisation at the national level."

⁸³ "At the UN, A Proposal to Speed Aid During Crises", *New York Times*, July 21, 1996. Cited in, Patrick A. McCarthy, "Towards an Independent United Nations Peacekeeping Capability", paper presented at the eleventh annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), The Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, June 18, 1998.

⁸⁴ The two RDMHQ positions that received approval for funding in 1998 were in civilian police and humanitarian affairs.

⁸⁵ United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping, Draft of "Proposals, Recommendations and Conclusions", March 2000.

⁸⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Review of the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters Concept", (Excerpt from the Report of the Secretary-General on the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations, March 9, 2000), March 2000.

⁸⁷ For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is pursuing a co-operative arrangement similar to that of the SHIRBRIG, albeit without sufficient funding to effectively organise their brigade. There are also indications that a coalition of states in South Eastern Europe are engaged in related plans.

⁸⁸ Canada, DFAIT, "An Update on the Canadian Study: Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations", Briefing Paper, p.4.

⁸⁹ Cited in "Daily Highlights", October 25, 1996, Central News Section, Department of Public Information, United Nations.

⁹⁰ Statement by Hans van Merlo, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Kingdom of the Netherlands, "The United Nations: Joining Forces", September 23, 1997, p.3.

available @ <http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/speeches/52ndga.htm#rapid>

⁹¹ Quoted from the Secretary-General's appearance in CNN's "Global Forum", Atlanta, Georgia, June 1, 2000. See, The Secretary-General Off The Cuff, available @ <http://www.un.org?News/oss/sgcu0500.htm>

⁹² See, Kofi Annan, "The Quiet Revolution", *Global Governance*, no. 4, 1998, p. 128.

⁹³ Confusion was partially compounded by the announcement that the Government of Canada would be conducting an in-depth study into the option of a UN Standing Force.

⁹⁴ Even prior to the League of Nations, it was understood that an effective collective security system would provide states with more than simply a security guarantor. For one, it would reduce tensions, thereby, allowing all to reduce their national defence expenditures and devote those resources to other pressing challenges. It would also restore the conditions necessary for wider, if not universal, disarmament. In short, an empowered UN holds considerable promise to introduce further co-operation in a mutually-reinforcing and progressively positive manner. For a more contemporary assessment of the potential of UN rapid deployment capabilities see, The Centre for Defense Information, "The United Nations At Fifty: A Force For The Future", *The Defense Monitor*, vol. XXV, no. 1, January 1, 1996.

⁹⁵ Fortunately, the arrangements now being implemented are not a "done deal." They represent a relatively promising start, yet they need not, and should not, be viewed as having achieved sufficient reliability or sophisticated capability.

⁹⁶ The term 'soft power' has been interpreted as entailing the ability to communicate, negotiate, mobilise opinion, work within multilateral bodies and promote international initiatives. It is essentially about increasing political leverage to advance peaceful change by building new partnerships and coalitions not only between governments, but also with other elements of civil society such as NGOs, related agencies, the media and interested parties. The term was coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990). It has since become a foreign policy strategy for a growing number of small and middle powers. For a Canadian perspective see, Lloyd Axworthy, "Why 'soft power' is the right policy for Canada", *Ottawa Citizen*, April 25, 1998.

⁹⁷ Unfortunately, at least in the near term, there is unlikely to be further research of this evolution within government, and there is little evidence of government assistance for related research. Neither is a research programme of this nature on the agenda of the UN Secretariat or DPKO. Major-General Frank van Kappen, suggested that a study of a UN Standing Emergency Group would have to be conducted in co-operation with other UN Departments. Yet, one should not be overly optimistic about the prospects of these departments engaging in a co-operative inquiry that many member states do not support. van Kappen acknowledged, however, that "further studies could be done by establishing Working groups to present their reports to DPKO. Working Groups could either be established within UNHQ and/or Member States could sponsor a Working Group. Studies could be conducted in a sponsor country with participants from Member States, as well as from UNHQ." See, Major-General Frank van Kappen, MILAD, DPKO, "Implementation of the Canadian Recommendation on Rapid Reaction Capability," Summary of Presentation on 4 Dec. 1995, pp1-4.

⁹⁸ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report*, (Washington D.C., Carnegie Commission, 1997), p. 156.

⁹⁹ Cora Weiss, speech to Millennium Forum, United Nations, NY, May 23, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ This section draws on the previous work of Peter Langille, Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes, and Major James Hammond, "A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability," in Cox and Legault, *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities*, pp. 179-200.

¹⁰¹ Article 43 (1) of the United Nations Charter states that, "All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities..."

¹⁰² See James A. Leach and Charles M. Lichenstein (co-chairs), Final Report, "Defining Purpose: The UN and the Health of Nations", U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993), p. 6 and 20. Cited in John G. Heidenrich, "Why U.S. Conservatives Should Support A U.N. Legion", unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994, p. 21.

¹⁰³ *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁴ *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability*, p. 60. A Canadian discussion paper on the issue also acknowledges that, "it would provide the UN with a small but totally reliable, well-trained and cohesive group for deployment by the Security Council in urgent situations. It would break one of the key log-jams in the current UN system, namely the insistence by troop contributing nations that they authorise the use of their national forces prior to each deployment. It would also simplify command and control arrangements in UN peace support operations, and put an end to conflicts between UN commanders and contingent commanders reporting to national authorities." DFAIT, "Improving the "UN's Rapid Reaction Capability: Discussion Paper," 29 April 1995, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 112.

¹⁰⁶ The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, The United Nations In Its Second Half-Century, (A project supported by Yale University and the Ford Foundation) 1995, pp. 21-23.

¹⁰⁷ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, p.66. It should be noted that this report did not endorse UN volunteers but proposed the establishment of rapid reaction force of 5,000 to 10,000 troops to be drawn from sitting members of the Security Council.

¹⁰⁸ "Report by the Working Group on a Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade," p. 7.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, Bill 4453, "United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force Act of 2000", May 15, 2000.

¹¹⁰ Aside from the Netherlands "Non-Paper" and a section of the Canadian study, see Sir Brian Urquhart, "Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability," in Cox and Legault, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities, pp. 30-35. Also see, Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "A New Perspective on Peacekeeping: Lessons from Bosnia and Elsewhere", Global Governance, vol. 3, no. 1, Jan.-April 1997, pp. 1-15.

¹¹¹ Carl Kaysens and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force, (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, 1996).

¹¹² Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, "Design for a 15,000-person UN Legion", Project on Defense Alternatives, October 1995. available @ <http://www.comw.org/pda/unlegion.htm>

¹¹³ Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion, (Cambridge, MA, Commonwealth Institute, 1995).

¹¹⁴ For a recent variation of this argument see, Lionell Rosenblatt and Larry Thompson, "The Door Of Opportunity: Creating a Permanent Peacekeeping Force", World Policy Journal, Spring 1998, pp. 36-42.

¹¹⁵ Brian Urquhart elaborates on this point: "experience of recent UN operations shows that even a small, highly-trained group, with high morale and dedication, arriving at the scene of action immediately after a Security Council decision, would in most cases have far greater effect than a larger and less well prepared force arriving weeks or even months later. The failure to come to grips with a situation before it gets completely out of hand usually necessitates a far larger, more expensive and less effective operation later on." See Urquhart, "Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability," in Cox and Legault, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities, pp. 3-35.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 196. For further detailed analysis of similar projected expenses see, Jean Krasno, "A United Nation's Rapid Deployment Permanent Force: Cost Analysis", (paper prepared for the Yale University United Nations Study Program, 1994).

¹¹⁷ For a thoughtful example of recent work that encourages building on current UNSAS arrangements with article 43 agreements, leading to a UN Volunteer Force see, Patrick A. McCarthy, "Towards an Independent United Nations Peacekeeping Capability". For an earlier attempt at outlining this stage-by-stage process, see Langille, Faille, Hughes, and Hammond, "A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options".

¹¹⁸ Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Volunteer Force", International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, p.185.

¹¹⁹ William R Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), pp. 106-107.

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