







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


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**SUGGESTIONS ON THE DEFENCE OF CANADA,**  
**By the Formation of Flank Companies from the Seden-**  
**tary Militia, on the Cheapest and most Efficient**  
**Principles, taking Time and Money**  
**into consideration.**

**BY A. W. PLAYFAIR, LIEUT.-COLONEL LANARK RIFLES, C. W.**  
*Author of a Letter to the Volunteers of England, in 1860, &c. &c.*

PERTH, December 3, 1861.

"Peace," says Sogny, "is the dream of the wise; war is the history of man."

Without contradiction, we ought to be the happiest people on this continent, and I may add, perhaps of any other. We enact our own laws, have less taxes than our neighbors, one of the sweetest countries in the world, and the largest navy that floats on the bosom of the ocean to protect our commerce on every sea, without it costing us a farthing. Under such favorable circumstances, what is to prevent our happiness? And so soon as a cloud appears in the political horizon of the neighboring republic, threatening to disturb the peace, than the monarch of the ocean is chartered for the purpose of bringing out troops—giving a sure pledge of British solidarity again to pour out her blood and treasure to defend us, for which every true British subject must feel unfeignedly thankful.

A nucleus of British regulars will ensure confidence on our part, and intimidation to our enemies. Happily for us that while the United States are threatening to pour out the vial of their wrath, Great Britain is at peace and can spare some regiments to be quartered in Canada; but who can tell the moment they may be required for her own defence, or some of her numerous colonies? In the war of 1812, Britain had no troops to spare; those regiments which were stationed in British North America, with the aid of the Fencible and Militia, had to bear the brunt, and some of them were soon reduced to skeletons. The war broke out in June, 1812, and it was late in 1814, before part of the Wellington army made its appearance at the theatre of war in Canada; in the following February peace was proclaimed, and the troops were wanted again at home, but arrived too late

for Waterloo. In the present state of Europe some event may require the withdrawal of some part of Her Majesty's forces; however the British Government may lament it, they must take a page from the history of the world and attend to the greatest emergency first. Is not the Cabinet of England now acting on the very principle, in sending reinforcements to Canada as the part of her possessions supposed to be the most in danger? With her it is like a game of chess upon a grand scale, in which colonies, crowns and sceptres, are at stake. These are the true circumstances of the case. If England does not need the troops, and is disengaged, we will have little trouble with our calculating neighbors, although the desire of their hearts is, "America for the Americans," and "The broad Atlantic for a boundary;" but their policy is "wait until England has her hands full like 1812," then "England's necessity will be America's opportunity." I have carefully watched the United States for half a century, and have invariably noticed the tone of the press towards England to be like the mercury in the graduated scale of the thermometer. When England was in trouble the mercury was up, and when England was disengaged it fell. It never rose so high as in 1812, when England was physically exhausted through a long war; and it never fell so low as when peace was proclaimed in Europe in 1814, and part of the Wellington army came out to Canada. Their deviation from the general practice of their press, by insulting England lately, in time of profound peace, is through intoxication by the large army, or rather number of men enrolled into their service, called by them "the United States Grand Army of the North." Thus inflated, they fancy themselves a great military

power, and are weak enough to think they can crush the South, and then take Canada. They do not know that undisciplined men can defend a country, but it requires a regular army to invade and conquer an enemy's territory. They have forgotten the severe lessons they received in their invasion of Canada in 1812; but their signal defeat at Bulls' Run, we would suppose, would refresh their memory.

But suppose England always to be at peace, although her history tells us she was engaged during little more than the last century in thirteen wars, besides the Indian mutiny, the Cape of Good Hope, and New Zealand, and spent £795,495,113 stg.; she has forty-two colonies to protect, and *Her Indian Empire never can be left with as few European troops as formerly.* That on the continent of Europe the three great military powers, alone of Russia, France, and Austria have 1,600,000 men (not on paper only, I write from official documents,) standing, well equipped, disciplined armies, ready to take the field on a short notice, and England's army is small in proportion, when we consider her proximity to the continent of Europe, and the protection of her vast colonial possessions. The troops she can spare as cannot protect our long line of frontier. An army must have an open rear,—they could not exist without it any more than a fish out of water, and unfortunately for us, our communication must be kept open by our left flank. And no small portion of Sir George Prevost's army was occupied last war in this absolute necessity. It is true the Rideau Canal will be safer for stores, but our public improvements, such as our St. Lawrence navigation (with its Beauharnois Canal and lock-monuments of folly or treason)—our frontier cities with our Grand Trunk Railway, will absorb more troops to effectually protect them than was necessary last war, when the country was almost in a state of nature between Montreal and Kingston, only a few villages and straggling settlements. The protection from Kingston upwards depends mainly on the preservation of the St. Lawrence navigation. If it is kept safe, as also the Welland Canal, gun boats can be brought up that will protect everything on the lakes. Lake Ontario was the stay of the Upper Province in the last war, though the short period Commodore Chauncey had the ascendancy on

Lake Ontario, Toronto, the then capital of Upper Canada, was taken, and the Government property, House of Assembly, &c., burnt in the spring of 1813. The British fleet being better prepared then came out of harbour, and the two fleets spent whole days almost within gun shot of each other. Perhaps in the morning the British, under Sir James Yeo, striving to bring the American to action, and in the afternoon of the same day the Americans striving to bring the British to action. So vital was the consequence of the sovereignty of Lake Ontario to the safety of both frontiers, that neither of the Admirals would risk an action unless they had the weather gage; and thus ended the summer of 1813, without a naval engagement; and the summer of 1814, also; but the fleets were not so equal in the first part of the summer. The Americans were too much strengthened for the British to risk an action, and in the latter part of the summer the British were strengthened by a 104 gun ship and a frigate; but still each commander considered some decided advantage was necessary to justify the momentous results that must have accrued from an engagement which would have terminated so fatal to either one side or the other. I merely mention this to shew the necessity of protecting our St. Lawrence artificial navigations and our Grand Trunk Railway, and their importance in the defence of the country, as well as their consequence in a commercial point of view. Sir Archibald Allison confirms my statement, for he says:—“The last war has clearly demonstrated, that the command of the Lakes is decisive of a campaign in the Canadian frontier, and without it the best laid plans of defence may fail. Both the disasters sustained at land in our North American possessions—the defeat of Proctor at the Moravian village, and the retreat of Prevost from Plattsburgh—were the immediate consequences of the disaster on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain.” For, we must remember that Canada is one of the hardest countries to defend, and the easiest to assail of perhaps any country on the face of the globe, being the mathematical definition of a line—length without breadth. Her wind-pipe is by the St. Lawrence. Once cut that and all vitality must cease, or in plain terms, the whole depends on protecting effectually our communication, for every single cartridge to expel



an invading foe must come that way. Again not only may England be engaged, as in 1812, but war may break out so late in the fall of the year that England could not get out troops until navigation opened in the spring; then we would have to depend upon the few troops left in the country and our 5000 volunteers. The common opinion is that a railway from Halifax to Quebec would obviate this difficulty. I beg most decidedly to dissent from this problematical scheme. A railway from New Haven, the eastern part of Nova Scotia, 120 miles nearer the British Isles than Halifax, in time of peace would shorten the mail route 90 miles (any two sides of a triangle must be greater than a third side) and save from 12 to 24 hours' time, enabling the mails to be 240 miles on their route to Quebec by the time they would arrive at Halifax; and a Railway from St. Andrews in New Brunswick would be the shortest for the conveyance of goods on British territory. But a railway in time of war for troops, from Halifax to Quebec, would only augment our line of frontier, and to protect it from this incendiary kind of warfare would require a very strong force, if it could be kept open at all, and it would encircle nearly 200 miles of the enemy's frontier, with its 80,000 enrolled militia (thanks to the capacious brains of the Ashburton treaty). If England depends on a Halifax railway in time of war with the United States, for reinforcements to Canada, she will depend on a broken reed. A military highway for troops, mails, &c., in time of war must be north of the Straits of Belle Isle, to Quebec, and this will be the first link in the Pacific Railway and ultimately the HIGHWAY OF THE WORLD BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA. Steamers can be built for the exclusive use of the mails and passengers that will cross from the western coast of Ireland in four days, and six days more will convey troops by rail to the Pacific. Under these circumstances it becomes necessary that we examine our position, and compare it with that which may become our enemy's. The State of New York, one of the United States, immediately opposite to us, has 380,000 enrolled militia, many of them uniformed, armed, and equipped. In their arsenals are artillery, camp equipage, and military stores. Old muskets have been sold, and new percussions put in their place, and the long range rifle introduced. There is a fund

of \$200,000 a year for military purposes, and a quantity of ammunition expended yearly for Artillery and rifle practice. Vermont and Ohio are much on the same footing. The total of enrolled militia, from 18 to 45 in the bordering States, is 1,843,000. On our side, besides the British regulars, we have 5000 volunteers, armed and clothed. In Upper Canada we have 126,769 from 18 to 45. In Lower Canada we have 75,769 of the same age, all without arms and clothing, except what rifles and fowling pieces they may have of their own, which of course in an emergency could not be provided with suitable ammunition; with the exception of the 2nd and 3rd Lincoln, and the Lanark rifles, the latter under my command, who have 300 stand of arms and a yearly allowance of ammunition.

The Northern States have upwards of 20,000,000 of inhabitants, while Canada has only 3,000,000. This is the true state of the case; and nothing but the walls of the Assembly being battered about the ears of the Opposition, or a bombshell lighting in their midst, could awaken their drowsy powers to the necessity of a new and effectual Militia Bill, with a suitable expenditure. I was chairman (the House in Committee) in passing the last Militia Bill, and all the new clauses introduced by the hon. the Attorney General West and myself had to be struck out, and the present Bill, far inferior to the one in force in 1808, carried. The sedentary militia have deteriorated since 1812, not in loyalty, but in efficiency. There is not the number of rifles in their possession; consequently not the rifle practice which they had in those days, when a rifle was a necessary article on a bush-farm, and when they had to parade with arms and ammunition sometimes four days in the year. Flank companies were formed, and when the war broke out they did duty, and got the necessary drill for militia-men, and in every battle-field the militia of Canada bore their part. The ashes of many war-buried in the same grave, or burned on the same pile, with the regulars who fell in defence of the country.

From what has been shown, all the troops that Britain could spare even in time of peace is not sufficient to protect our long line of frontier from the incendiary kind of warfare that would take place upon the lines. Are we, then, entirely to depend on Britain for our defence, after

her making over so much valuable ordnance lands for the express purpose of raising a formidable force? Are we not bound in honour as well as interest to make a movement? I hope she will insist on the understanding being carried out to the letter; and that no part thereof be applied to any other purposes whatsoever. Are we, like in 1837, to live in nightly fear from ruthless mobs, when we have the blood, bone, and sinew, in the country; free, able and willing to defend it, if the proper means are put in their power? The sedentary militia have an interest in the soil; they fight to protect their own fireside, their families, their all! If it is said—no necessity; I ask why the British Government are incurring so great an expense in sending out troops and munitions of war? From the Gulf of Mexico to the St. Lawrence, men are being enrolled for the purpose of war. The Northern States of America are using every exertion to raise an army of 500,000 men. They have a complete network of Railways, capable of pouring in their forces simultaneously at various points. It is said by some they don't want Canada. Why, then, did they squander so much blood and treasure to obtain it in 1812? Have they changed their policy since? No, they have not! Look at Texas! Look to the violation of all truth and national honour in the Eastern boundary question! Look to the death-like tenacity with which they cling to a small Island in the Pacific, which shews their policy to be the same—they only want opportunity. But, be it remembered, as yet to the honour of the peace society, (the red-coats and blue-jackets of old England, assisted by our Militia), the Americans have never gained one inch of territory by the bayonet. It is to the pen of diplomacy we have to attribute the loss of 4,500,000 acres, and ninety miles greater distance from the Atlantic to Quebec;—in the notorious and deplorable Ashburton treaty, not mentioning wholesale Oregon, and their endeavour to claim all the land to the Russian territory, and shut us out entirely from the Pacific. And is there nothing in Canada to excite their love of power and dominion? Can any man doubt for a moment that they would not invade Canada if they thought they would be successful? Have they not for some years past been making every exertion to break our centre by penetrating British territory

at the Red River, drawing off the trade to St. Paul's, and as far as in their power Americanizing the half-breeds—the best raw material for mounted riflemen on this Continent. Are our fertile fields, our exhaustless forests, our unlimited water-power, our spacious hunting-grounds, with valuable fur-bearing animals, our boundless coal-fields, our oil-springs, our geographical position which commands the shortest highway between Europe and Asia, our noble St. Lawrence with its magnificent artificial navigation, our unrivalled Grand Trunk Railway; in fine, the site of a great Empire, with the ore of every metal struggling through its surface; the sale of which, to European emigrants, would bring untold millions to the coffers at Washington!—is this no temptation to a nation as aggressive as the Northern States of America, when they have half a million of men in arms? I no more doubt it than I doubt my existence. And if Canada is worth fighting for, she must be worth defending. I will, therefore, propose a systematic plan for the formation of flank companies from our Sedentary Militia, and some new clauses in the Militia Bill.

The non-commissioned officers of the sedentary militia (unless called out) have no pay for doing duty as such; and in some instances the distance is so great within the limits of a company that many escape from year to year the General Muster; consequently a correct roll is not obtained, and good men that attend regularly are much dissatisfied. To obviate this, I propose that blank lists, for the purpose of being filled, be transmitted in due season to the commanding officers of battalions, whose duty it shall be to deliver the same to the clerk or clerks of the municipalities within the limits of his battalion; which lists are to be given by them to the assessors of their respective township, town, city, or ward, as the case may be; and each and every assessor should be obliged, at the time of assessing the taxable property, to fill up in said blank the names and ages of all persons liable to serve in the militia from the age of sixteen to forty-five, and likewise the concessions and lots on which such persons reside; and upon the said lists being taken, should be returned with the assessment roll to the clerk of the municipality, and within ten days sent by him to the officer which delivered him the blanks, and the com-



manding officer shall within ten days send to each captain or commanding officer of a company a muster-roll from said assessor's list, which shall be the one used at the general muster, and signed and delivered to the commanding officer before the parade is dismissed, with such remarks on absentees, etc., as may be necessary, from which the commanding officer shall make his yearly return.

And if any municipal clerk or assessor should neglect or from any cause omit to perform his duties, or shall wilfully make any false return in said lists, he should be liable to a fine of not more than \$50, besides the expense of some other persons to be appointed by the said commanding officer of the division, who shall be a non-commissioned officer of the militia, for doing the duty of said assessor. All tavern-keepers, keepers of boarding-houses, persons having boarders in their families, and every master and mistress of their dwelling house, shall, upon the application of every assessor, or such persons as may be appointed on account of default, give information of the names of all persons residing or lodging in such house liable to be enrolled, and all other proper information concerning such persons as such assessors, &c., may demand. And if any person of whom such information is required refuse to give such information, or should give false information, he or she should forfeit or pay not more than \$10 for each offence, with costs; and any person refusing to give his own name and proper information when applied to, or should give a false name or information, should forfeit and pay a like sum: such penalties to be recovered in any competent court, or before any magistrate of the county, town or city where such has been committed. And it should be the duty of every assessor or person appointed as aforesaid, to report the names of all defaulters who may incur any penalty to said commanding officer, in order that the said person or persons may be prosecuted in the name of the Queen; and all moneys collected under such action to be paid into the County Treasury, and go into the militia fund of the Province.

First: I propose that the service men of the sedentary militia should be enrolled from the age of sixteen to forty-five, instead of eighteen to forty-five which is the law at present. To this change I anticipate a multitude of objections,

from those who have not studied the subject. It may be necessary, therefore, in endeavoring to turn the tide of popular opinion to advance some proofs in favour of the alteration. The first objection will be that they are too young.—By the Act of the Imperial Parliament, passed in 1803, the Monarch of England is empowered to call out all men from seventeen to fifty-five, in the levy en masse to repel invasion. In the British service lads were enlisted into the Horse Guards at seventeen, if they were 5 ft. 10 inches in height; and arms were given to boy companies in different regiments of the line, before that age, during the French war. The conspiracy in France in 1813 called them out in advance two years under the legal age; consequently they were only seventeen. Marshal Ney, after gaining the battle of Lutzen by young conscripts, exclaimed, "French infantry can never be too young!" The above refers to offensive warfare; ours is for defensive, and therefore not liable to the privations, fatigue, etc. It will next be said that mere boys, as some of them would appear, would not have strength to hold out a rifle. I would inform them that the proper way to defend Canada, if commanded by judicious officers, will be battles of position, in which a rest will always be obtainable for the rifle, and not of manoeuvre. Napoleon I. said—"No one would attempt to fight a battle with undisciplined men; that is, offensive, and requiring to manoeuvre in presence of an enemy. The French General, Dumourier, after some reverses with his undisciplined levies, said "he would not risk the open field, but make the war one of position;" and this is the way Canada must be defended by the sedentary militia.

The advantages of my scheme, if carried out in the first place, adds 15,000 more valuable men for the defence of the country, or three times the number of our present volunteer force. From the service men I propose to form flank companies by volunteers, forty or fifty strong, according to the strength of the battalion, as quickly as the best description of rifles can be obtained, and arrangements for their drill entered into with a yearly allowance of ball and blank cartridge for practice. These companies to drill four days in the year of eight hours each day—i. e. three consecutive days and the Queen's Birthday for company drill and target practice, under a drill sergeant, as will hereinafter be described. Each of these companies to fire at the target each day, and on the Queen's Birthday for a small silver medal to each company, furnished by the Province and given to the best shot; and in the event of the same person continuing the best shot in his own company, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,

and 5th years he should receive a bar for each year in addition, and be entitled to compete for a gold medal, the gift of the Province to each Military District every five years to those who have gained from three to five bars. They will be required to clothe themselves as hereafter described.

It will be asked how these men are to be remunerated for their time given up to the service of their country? Each young man without property has, by law, to give two days in the year statute labor, of eight hours each day and on the Queen's Birthday he must attend the muster; he is likewise liable to be called for juror or constable. I propose, that the captain's certificate of his due attendance should exempt him from road duty for two days, jury, or any other civil duty already mentioned; and after five years' faithful attendance of eight hours in each day, on a proper certificate from his Captain and Lieut.-Colonel, to which such company is attached, shall be entitled to a free grant of 100 acres of land, subject to the regulations of other free grants of actual settlement and settling duties. At the end of the five years they may remain in the company, remove to the land, or join the battalion, and muster as usual on the Queen's Birthday. Some may object to the quantity of land this may take from the public domain. I would ask the question, who are more deserving than those who are willing and ready to defend their country? Their claims are paramount to all others. In old settlements the young men have to move away when they become of age, and this grant would be an inducement for them to settle in Canada, which would be a most desirable object. Many of the young men go to the United States when they leave their parental roof, which is a national loss. One man from us is two against us. And if the flankers did not do the settling duties, they could not get the land, therefore there could be no loss to the Province.

Emigrants get free grants without any previous service, some of whom left their country for their country's good, and why not our farmers' sons, who have prepared themselves as living bulwarks for the defence of the country. It is only carrying out the wise policy of England to a much greater extent than it is possible for her to do. The ranks of the militia of England are all poor men, and have not an interest in the soil; but a man cannot be a captain of the militia in England unless he be a landed proprietor. Here, more than nine-tenths of our rural militia, that are of the age of twenty-one, are landed proprietors, like the field-officers and captains of the militia at home, and the moment any one enters as a flanker, he becomes in a measure interested in the soil, for it is, to all intents and purposes, a contract made and entered into for the purchase of 100 acres of land of the public domain to his own benefit and behoof on certain condi-

tions as above stated. In the next place, I would ask, who are likely to make better settlers than the farmers' sons, born in the country, acquainted with its climate and capabilities, also know how to overcome obstacles that would discourage emigrants in new settlements? In the State of New York, a reduction on the rate bill of \$500 is made to enrolled militia, so long as they strictly perform their duty.

But it will also be objected—the expense. This puts me in mind of what Lord Palmerston said to Mr. Bright in the Imperial Parliament (for we have our Brights and our Cobdens in Canada with their Manchester tactics): if the hon. member for Salford was sure that England was going to be invaded, he would take a sheet of paper and reduce the question to pounds, shillings, and pence; and if the defence of England would cost more than he thought would be the damage, he would let them take it. Of course our rifles and accoutrements would cost \$16 per man, as it would be extreme folly to arm them with muskets, which cost within 22s. 6d. as much, — a far inferior weapon, especially for militiamen, who must fight in position, and seldom come to close quarters; there would also be the cost of a place to keep them in where there is no public building, and a small sum for cleaning and keeping them in order. How many rifles would have been furnished for the sum expended in bringing out the troops and taking them back again? and how much will the British Government lose by desertion? They deserted during the last war, although the punishment was death; and, when in front of the enemy, our pickets had to be chequered so as to plant double sentries—men of two different regiments put together with orders to each to shoot the other if he attempted to desert. And now there is such a chance for enlisting in the American service at high wages, and a large bounty, with a promise of land, many poor ignorant fellows will be tempted to desert, as there will be no want of agents in time of peace, to encourage, instruct, couceal, and convey them over the lines. I have served on the lines in war and in peace, and am acquainted with the subject on which I am writing.

The best British troops for service in this country are the Canadian Rifles; a second and a third battalion, if they have the men of the certain description, would be the most economical and efficient on the lines. A black corps might likewise be enrolled for frontier service; they would not desert, but swear enmity to the Americans like young Hannibal to the Romans. Seventeen hundred were enrolled and disciplined and proved of no small service to the British on the attack at Washington and New Orleans, in 1814. The value of a man drilled and equipped in the field is a problem no man can solve; but in time of peace, men frequently get their discharge for £20 stg. Thus, each man who de-

serts is equivalent to the cost of arms and accoutrements of the best description for six militiamen. History tells us that 400 deserted on the retreat of the army from Plattsburgh, which at £20 stg. each, would have armed 2,400 militiamen with rifles. And I have no reason to doubt the number above mentioned to be correct, as some officers of that division told me that the men went off in sections; and if so, my estimate of the loss is below the mark, for when men desert towards the enemy on a retreat, their arms and accoutrements are either carried with them, or thrown away and lost to the nation that furnished them.

Look at the contrast between the flank companyman and one in the battalion. The flanker enters at 16; he escapes his 10 days' road work, jury and constable duty, and at 21 is entitled to 100 acres of land, and perhaps a medal and bar on his breast. The battalion man has done nearly as much public duty, the same time passed over, and not entitled to any land. For a farmer who has three or four sons this would be a great object. Say three became flankers and did their duty faithfully, they could draw land together, and the youngest inherit the homestead as is usual in this country. Let it be only known thoroughly in Britain and it would be a great inducement to men with rising families to come to Canada. This system would give us a regular defence at all times and in all places for time to come, ready to meet invasion of the American forces, or private speculators in the shape of sympathisers; and any check from the Militia to intruders will have a far more salutary effect to stop these feelers, preludes to a Texan game, that have an idea that we wish to dissolve the union with Britain, and that we are infatuated with republicanism—than if effected by British troops. A thousand men shot by the regulars in 1838 would not have the effect that the shooting of three of them had by the Militia. This showed them in more than plain English the mistake they labored under, that "we wished to be delivered from the bondage of the British yoke."

A number of young men of sober and steady habits could be sent out from Hythe, also from the Canadian Rifles and 60th Regiment, who have been instructed in company drill and target practice, with the rank of Sergeant, to drill and instruct the flank companies, accompanied by a private well instructed in the bugle which he must bring with him, he could also assist in squad drill as well as teach them the necessary sounds on that instrument. It could be so arranged that they could drill several companies, the three days' drill, leaving time enough between for their removing from one company to another. Their travelling expenses would be the largest item; but it would be carrying out the project on the most scientific principle. To obtain a desirable object we should make use of the best

means, and spare no reasonable expense to accomplish methodically the safety of the country; and I will forfeit all my experience in the regular service as well as my knowledge of the Canadian Militia if they will not find the young men in Canada apt scholars with fire-arms, of which I could give incontrovertible proof (100th Regt. to wit); suffice it to remark, that young men brought up in a country, where wild animals are an annoyance, learn the use of fire-arms in early life, quite different to many of the recruits entering the British army, who all their lives were subject to Game Laws, and required a license to carry a gun. The only license in Canada to carry a gun is the purchase money. And I am happy to be enabled to add that the youths sent home from this country to finish their studies for professions, have been found to be no way behind their trans-Atlantic competitors, in the various branches of learning; and I am proud to say, that some of them that entered the regular service are now adorned with the Victoria Cross for their distinguished gallantry. Here then is intellect and valor, with metal of such calibre, what is to prevent our raising a respectable Provincial force sufficient to repel all intruders?

Hitherto I have said nothing about the clothing in the rural districts. The wool is either spun at home or sent to the factory to be made into cloth and to be dyed various colors. The flankers could get a sufficient quantity dyed green for a short frock coat, trowsers and cap, made perfectly plain (though with uniformity) without facings, which for service in the field would be a better rifle uniform than can be found in the regular army; the less contrast the less attractive, and the less attractive the less killed and wounded. The coat costs no more than an ordinary one which they wear every day on their farms, and would look quite as well as some of our wealthiest M.P.'s who walked the streets of the City of Toronto, and sat in the House of Assembly in whole suits of home manufacture, and perhaps look a little better than the Emperor Napoleon in his old drab coat worn by him at some of his most splendid victories; or, the Duke of Wellington when reconnoitering in an old round hat and a private soldier's great coat. The dress could be worn upon any occasion, and if we have peace, it would only be the worse of 20 days' wear in the service of the country, when their military apprenticeship would be ended, and the flanker entitled to 100 acres of land. He would be required to find it himself. Ten to twelve dollars would be the outside of the expense. In the event of his being called out, of course he would get his day's pay and an allowance for the use of his clothing, with great coat and blanket. I am decidedly of opinion that grass green is the best color for the uniform of the rifleman, without any shining substance, such as breast plate, whistle, chain and steel scabbard.

Our Rifle Brigade and other regiments are green although I lament to say too dark—almost black. A grass green is the most invisible. Black is almost as conspicuous as scarlet; hence the bull's-eye of a target is generally painted black. I would ask the question, which would be the most visible in a grass field, a crow or a green parrot? Again, if nature changed the coat of the deer to green in place of grey, in the fall of the year, could the hunter as easily discern them? Many of the American riflemen in the last war wore pea-green uniform, and were enabled to mow down our men with impunity. Sir John Johnston in the old American war raised two battalions called from their dress "Royal Greens," that caused no small terror on the frontier of the State of York. It is true some of the volunteers of England, destitute of actual experience, and fond of apeing foreigners, have adopted a grey uniform, but their predecessors during the old French war wore grass green like their forefathers, the national color of the Royal Archers of England, who also carried terror to their enemies. Grey uniform, unless very tastily made, and a great display of black lace, has a convict look, or a runaway from a lunatic asylum. Green looks well though perfectly plain, hence it must be the cheapest. See how well and soldier-like the men of the 60th look in their plain undress green uniform, walking through the streets.

No doubt some of the European Officers will look with sovereign contempt on Militia with only four days in the year of company drill and ball practice; but let me ask them if these flank companies, formed, dressed, and drilled, as above would be inferior to the raw Militia that twice repulsed the regular troops at Bunker's Hill with such fatal effect? or the new levies to whom Gen. Burgoyne surrendered his army with well supplied artillery? or to whom Lord Cornwallis and his army succumbed? or to those who stopped Sir Edward Pakenham at New Orleans, with immense slaughter, with an army flushed with victory and crowned with laurels gained in the Peninsula? "The British General forgot that the American rifle," says Sir Archibald Allison, "though unable to withstand the shock of the English bayonet, in regular combat, is a most formidable weapon when wielded by experienced hands behind trees, or under shelter, which so rapidly, and often fatally, equalizes the veteran and experienced soldier." Or would they be inferior to our Canadian Militia in the last war who distinguished themselves so gallantly at Queenston Heights, Chateaugay, Lundy's Lane, and many other places? Or, are they inferior to the Portuguese peasantry who repulsed Marshal Soult with that same army that followed up Sir John Moore in his celebrated retreat to Corunna? Or, the guerillas in Spain that kept 30,000 of the French army from the field to keep open the communications between the

Divisions? Or, the Vendean peasants, against whom Napoleon, in the midst of his campaign in Flanders, was compelled to send 20,000 of his troops? Who can tell, says the historian, what effect these 20,000 veterans might have had if thrown into the scale when the beam quivered on the field of Waterloo?

And have not the best troops of France been repeatedly beaten by Tyrolean peasants? How did the French army suffer in Algeria? Not from well-drilled European troops—but from the undisciplined children of the forest. We might multiply quotations from European history, but suffice it to remind my readers of the Vendean peasantry in the French Revolution; and the Circassians withstanding for years the armies of Russia, one of the great military powers of Europe. They must blot from the page of history the above truths, written in characters of blood, before they can deny the power of undisciplined men in defensive warfare; and differ in opinion from Napoleon, who, meditating on the battle field of Lutzen, and observing the slender figures and long hair of the peasant youths of Prussia, clothed as they left the plough, with two-thirds more of his own conscripts cold in death, exclaimed,—"The might that slumbers in a peasant's arm!"

The purport of this letter is to *awaken the might that slumbers in the arm of the yeomanry of Canada, and our leaders to a sense of our present weakness and consequent danger.*

But to recapitulate the advantages gained by the system proposed in these pages: 1st. A correct roll of the men liable to serve in the sedentary militia at the least possible expense to be done correctly, without surrendering the power of the military commander to warn out all the men liable by law to serve in the Militia. 2nd. 15,000 more youths liable to serve at an age the most likely to learn with avidity the use of fire-arms and take pride in military exercise, with memories the most susceptible to retain instruction. 3rd. A defensive force resident in the country with arms and accoutrements, instructed in company drill, ball practice, and calls on the bugle, clothed, &c. 4th. The flank companies would be schools from which officers and non-commissioned officers could be promoted not only in the flank companies but into the battalion. 5th. A certain number of men in the battalion companies that have served their time in the flankers, to whom arms might be distributed in case of invasion. 6th. The gift of land, an inducement for young men to settle in Canada, instead of going to the United States, as at present a portion do. 7th. Have a beneficial influence on the tide of emigration when known in Europe. 8th. Create more military knowledge and spirit throughout the Province in the young men, who would be curious to witness the target shooting for the prize medals on the Queen's birth day.

