



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





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





THE

Re-Annexation of British Columbia

TO THE UNITED STATES

RIGHT, PROPER AND DESIRABLE.

AN ADDRESS

DELIVERED BY

HON. ELWOOD EVANS,

Before the Tacoma Library Association.

Olympia, W. T., January 18th, 1870.

PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.

CORRESPONDENCE.

OLYMPIA, W. T., Jan 18, 1870

HON. ELWOOD EVANS:

Dear Sir:—The undersigned, knowing the long and careful study you have given to the subject of the claims of sovereignty by various nations to the Northwest Coast, and in view of the fact that a petition has been presented to President Grant by the citizens of British Columbia in favor of annexation to the United States, and that such subject may enter into the negotiations between Great Britain and the United States, deem this a fitting occasion, and therefore request you to deliver an address on the propriety and right, and the advantages growing out of, the annexation to the Union of British Columbia, thereby securing a continuity of Pacific boundary. While this is requested by us as your friends and fellow citizens, on a national question, yet would we suggest that you name such time as will enable you to deliver the address as one of the course of lectures for the benefit of the Tacoma Lodge Library and Reading Room.

Very respectfully yours, &c.,

N. G. TENNY,	T. M. REED,
JAS. S. LAWSON,	E. P. FERRY,
C. B. BAGLEY,	R. A. ABBOTT,
E. L. SMITH	CHAS. PROSCH

OLYMPIA, W. T., Jan. 20, 1870.

MESSRS. R. A. ABBOTT, E. P. FERRY, J. S. LAWSON, AND OTHERS:

Gentlemen:—It would be most ungracious in me to decline the very complimentary request I have just received, to deliver an address on the question of the necessity and propriety of an exclusively American Northwest Coast, and a *continuity* of Pacific boundary to the Polar Seas —*Pacific*, because the Great Ocean is our ultimate western limit—*Pacific*, because it must divest the Territory of adverse claims of sovereignty, and remove forever any occasion for strife with a foreign power. Such a *continuity* brings power and grandeur to the nation, and guarantees continuity of peace.

Doubly grateful am I that you have suggested that my efforts may be rendered beneficial to the Tacoma Library and Reading Room—I am always ready to do my little to contribute to such worthy objects. Fix any evening next week, and if health and life are spared me, I am cheerfully at your service.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

ELWOOD EVANS.

ADDRESS.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I appear before you in response to a very complimentary invitation to occupy your attention on a subject of deep interest to citizens of the Pacific States and Territories, now beginning to attract that attention elsewhere its vast importance merits. It involves the policy and right of an expansion of our National area, the propriety and desirability of a re-annexation of British Columbia to the United States. At first blush the query arises whether the integrity of our Pacific boundary, an uninterrupted and continuous coast line to our Northern territorial possessions, may not be regarded as an essential element in the successful mission and the destiny of the United States of America.

That genial writer, Frederick Whymper, an Englishman of observation and talent, in his very readable and entertaining narrative of "Travel and Adventure in the Territory of Alaska," struck the key note of the spirit of the times when he wrote so truthfully in regard to the motive or result of the acquisition by the United States of Alaska Territory:

"There are, however, many, both in England and America, who look on this purchase as the first move toward an American occupation of the whole continent, and who foresee that Canada, and British America generally, will sooner or later become part of the United States. Looking at the matter without prejudice, I believe that it will be better for those countries and ourselves when such shall be the case. *We* shall be released from an incumbrance, a source of expense and possible weakness; *they*, freed from the trammels of periodical alarms of invasion, and, feeling the strength of independence will develop and grow; and, speaking very plainly and to the point, our commercial relations with them will double and quadruple themselves in value. No one now supposes that, had the United States remained naught but 'our American Colonies,' they would have progressed as they have done; and it is equally obvious that our commerce with them must have been restricted in equal ratio. That it is the destiny of the United States to possess the whole Northern Continent, I fully believe."

In this quotation is furnished my text. Our destiny, which must not, cannot be altered—a fiat which has the potency of irrevocable law—the forward march of Americanization until the whole Continent shall be but one nation, with one sovereign government, one flag, one people. The name United States of America will then have a consistency of nationality. History will be rendered consistent with itself. We will have no such contradiction of terms as British America. We will indeed be *E Pluribus Unum*.

This is no new theory, no vainglorious hope. It is the lesson of

the future, taught by our hallowed past, by our living present. It is the realization of the great work of the Fathers; it is the fulfilment of the promise of the charter of our liberties, "that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men." It was enunciated in London, in 1787, by the orator of American Independence, the elder Adams, in his defence of American Constitutions: "Thirteen Governments founded on the National authority of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind."

Those thirteen governments have almost trebled in number in little over three-quarters of a century since that prediction was made, that destiny foretold. The "spreading" has extended westward across the Alleghanies and Blue Ridge, occupied the valley of the Mississippi, crossed the Rocky Mountains and Sierras, and is now limited by the broad Pacific. The task has been accomplished in a Western direction, but progress never halts while work remains to be done. So, taking another departure, we have inaugurated the movement at the extreme North. From thence we now propose to spread this magical government, "founded on the natural authority of the people alone over the northern part of the whole continent." And between Alaska on the north, and Washington Territory on the south, as the two spreading influences of Americanization approach each other, when they meet, will it not be like two great clouds on a summer day? Whilst they must neutralize and crush the intervening negative element, still will they

"Consign their treasure to the fields,
And let all their moisture flow
In large effusion o'er the freshened world."

But there will not then remain a British possession or power sandwiched between our territories on the Pacific. Then will we have secured a continuous Pacific boundary from the Gulf of California to the Arctic Sea.

Our object now is to contribute something in spreading those Constitutions, those benign influences which result, as Whymper says, from independence. Because it will prove "a great point gained in favor of the right of mankind"—because it will enhance the grandeur and glory of our country—because it will diffuse innumerable blessings both to ourselves and to those whom we bring within the ægis and protection of our free institutions. Because it will reduce to compact form the territory of the nation, without a severance by the presence of a European monarchial power. Because it will wipe out and efface the humiliation of the treaty of 1846, by which we are reminded that our nation was worried out of British Columbia by mere British persistency of claim, without basis of right. It is needless to regret that in 1846, our nation yielded its best opportunity to realize the prophetic vision and vindicate the patriotic sagacity of the elder Adams. It is true that the so-called Treaty of Limits brought with it the *quasi* assurance that as cause of rupture was for the time allayed, so friendly relations were once more renewed between two great nations, whose best interests were promoted by amity. For the time being it smoothed our past differences. As it averted war, it may be claimed that it afforded time and opportunity for cool reflection, which has enabled both nations thus long to preserve peace. At best it

temporized matters of controversy. But it cost the United States five degrees and forty minutes of British foothold on the Pacific, with territory of that breadth eastward to the Rocky Mountains. In the Oregon as reserved to the United States it permitted the most eligible portions of the Territory to be retained by a British company, and the present Congress will be called upon to appropriate $650,000 as a bonus to the Hudson Bay Company to withdraw from American territory after twenty odd years' enjoyment of the same, since it became relieved of the joint occupancy incumbrance. That treaty yielded all of Vancouver Island, a part of which, lying south of 49° north latitude, would have remained in the United States, had such parallel been carried as the boundary westward to the ocean. But solely with the view of avoiding a partnership or joint-tenancy in that Island by the two nations, the boundary line upon leaving the continent deflected southward through the main channel of the Gulf of Georgia to the Straits of Fuca. And the United States ceded so much of said Island of Vancouver as was south of said parallel. That and that alone was all the land or territory, south of said 49th degree, surrendered or intended to be relinquished by the United States, by that Convention. And yet before the ink had scarcely had time to dry with which that ignominious treaty was ratified, England asserted claims to the Archipelago de Haro, including San Juan and other islands. For twenty-four years has she defiantly maintained this position, and upon the flimsy basis, would you believe it? Lest you would suspect me of making ridicule of serious things, I'll quote from the dispatch of her Commissioner:

"In support of my proposition that the Rosario Strait should be the channel of the treaty, I advance that it is the only channel that will admit of being considered the channel, according to the treaty, which 'separates the continent from Vancouver's Island.' You state that 'while the other channels only separate the islands in the group from each other, the Canal de Haro for a considerable distance north of the Straits of Fuca, and where their waters unite, washes the shores of Vancouver's Island, and is, therefore, the only one which, according to the language of the treaty, separates the continent from Vancouver's Island.' Surely this would prove the converse of the proposition. It appears to me a direct proof that the Canal de Haro is the channel separating Vancouver's Island from the continent, and, therefore, so long as other channels exist more adjacent to the continent, cannot be the channel which 'separates the continent from Vancouver's Island.' I would ask your best attention to this most peculiar language of the treaty, in which the usual terms of expression appear to be designedly reversed, for the lesser is not separated from the greater, but the greater from the lesser—not the island from the continent, but the continent from the island; and, therefore, it would seem indisputable that where several channels exist between the two, that channel which is the most adjacent to the continent must be the channel which separates the continent from any islands lying off its shores, however remote those islands may be."

Hudibras aptly said of such captions subterfuges:

"He'd undertake to prove, by force
Of argument, a man's no horse,
He'd prove a buzzard is no fowl,
And that a lord may be an owl—
A calf an Alderman, a goose a Justice
And rooks Committee-men and Trustees."

But seriously, Great Britain has

ignored the treaty of 1846. She has violated its plain letter by an utter disregard of the boundary line therein defined and established. She violated its spirit in 1863, (at a time our nation was struggling with a gigantic rebellion, when so many feared Great Britain was about to recognize the independence of the so-called Southern Confederacy) to secure for her subjects a recognition of and compensation for claims under that treaty, which identical claims in her portion of this same territory, arising under this same grant, she had herself most solemnly ignored and disavowed in 1858.

If a contract intended as a settlement between individuals, of all past differences, may become a nullity because of violation by either of any of its material features, why may not a treaty be set aside for non-performance of its stipulations by either of the contracting parties? A boundary or a party line is essentially an entirety. If 24 years have elapsed and the boundary prescribed by a treaty remain undetermined, is not that boundary an open question? And as the area of territory is contingent upon the boundary, it follows, as a sequence, that the territory also is a legitimate matter for negotiation. True, there is no court in which to try these issues—no international statute of limitation. But if ever a treaty was made which might be avoided for non-performance of its stipulations within a reasonable period, surely, in this instance, Great Britain has furnished the amplest justification for the United States to disavow that Convention. Again, that treaty, as its preamble recites, was intended to remove "the state of doubt and uncertainty which has hitherto prevailed respecting the sovereignty and government of the territory on the northwest coast of America." It was intended to be a final settlement. As Great Britain has persistently refused to recognize such settlement as final, the sole moving consideration of the cession of Territory by us is defeated.

I use the word cession advisedly. The United States acquired the whole region watered by the Columbia River and its tributaries, by right of discovery of the mouth of that mighty river by Gray, the exploration of its sources by Lewis and Clarke, and settlement upon its banks by Astor and other Americans, subsequently fortified by the adverse claim of Spain by her right of discovery of the coasts, which the United States by the Florida treaty secured in 1819. Up to 54°40′, it was truly maintained our title was "clear and unquestionable," and through Spain we might have claimed still farther north. It may be added here that Great Britain, in restoring Astoria, conquered by a British frigate during the war and named Fort George, was formally surrendered by Great Britain under the Treaty of Ghent, as an American territory. Thus was our sovereignty fully recognized. In 1818, and prior to the Florida treaty, the United States and Great Britain, who made pretensions adversely to Spain's exclusiveness of claim, entered into a Convention to continue ten years, whereby it was agreed that the territory should be free and open to citizens and subjects of both nations, the object as expressed between the two parties "being to prevent disputes and differences between themselves." There was a saving clause, that no acts under and in regard to such treaty should prejudice the claims of Spain or any other power.

In 1826, the Convention of 1818 approaching its termination, negotiations were renewed between Great Britain and the United States. It

must be borne in mind that in 1819, by the Florida treaty, the Spanish title had been merged into that of the United States. At that date (1826) Great Britain maintained no title, no right of sovereignty to the territory on the northwest coast. She wanted it, and that was all sufficient to justify the effort to secure it. Hear her claims as defined by her most eminent publicists of that day:

"Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any portion of that Territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any part, but to the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance. In other words, the pretensions of the United States tend to the ejection of all other nations, and, among the rest, of Great Britain, from all right of settlement in the district claimed by the United States. The pretensions of Great Britain, on the contrary, tend to the mere maintenance of her own rights, in resistance to the exclusive character of the pretensions of the United States."

Strip this of its diplomatic cloak and it may be fairly stated that Great Britain had no title and asserted none, but she proposed to secure and rely upon possession. Being in possession, she could hold till a better affirmative right or greater force appeared. But she herself would be the judge of that superiority of right, and she could elect whether or not she would be ousted without resort to the last argument of the powerful over the weak—paramount force. Just such a title, in all ages of the world, might alone has made right.

The negotiation in which the above British claim was avowed, terminated in the Convention of 1827, which continued the occupancy permitted by the treaty of 1818, to citizens and subjects of both nations, until twelve months' notice of its abrogation should be given by either. Observe this difference in the two treaties. By the latter it is provided "that nothing in either of said Conventions should impair or affect the claims which the two contracting parties may have to said territory." It was *non-occupancy* by the two nations as such, a covenant that no claim or right should accrue to either government through citizens or subjects of either embracing the privileges conferred by such treaties.

It therefore follows that Great Britain bound herself, by the Convention of 1827, not to avail herself of any claim which might accrue from settlement—that such settlements by her subjects should not secure to her any territorial right, nor such possession be set up by her as evidence of claim or title. By it she covenanted that any act of her subjects under that treaty should not impair or affect the claim of the United States, nor increase or vest in her any right, other than such as she possessed prior to 1818. If, as said by her negotiators in 1826, she had no title, all she could possibly acquire subsequently thereto had been obtained through the concession or permission of the United States. The occupancy by her subjects jointly with Americans, an occupancy from which the government as such was especially enjoined, is the only possessory right Great Britain ever enjoyed. She never did jointly or severally occupy the Oregon Territory or any portion of it, save alone through the presence therein of her subjects under those non-occupancy conventions, so often glaringly miscalled Joint-Occupancy Treaties.

Such was the *status* of the parties in the early stages of the Oregon

controversy, and that such were the measures of respective title or claim cannot be successfully denied. Yet, in 1844, British claim on the northwest coast of America had grown into territorial right. Sir R. Pakenham was then the accomplished British Minister to Washington. How boldly he sets forth possession as evidence of title, of right to the territory or some portion thereof, and with what overweaning confidence, not to say effrontery, he urges a division of the territory as a convenient mode to compensate Great Britain for that possessory right, she asserted in violation of treaty, which she solely acquired through an occupancy graciously permitted by the United States not to her, but to her subjects. Grant, for the sake of the illustration, that the presence of British subjects in the territory put that Government in possession, and it is very like A consenting that B may enter upon his lands during A's pleasure. And then A, having graciously favored B, finds himself compelled to surrender a portion of his property to B, in order to secure a peaceable enjoyment of the remainder. But let us read Sir R. Pakenham's statement of British claims in 1844:

"The present state of the question between the two governments appears to be this: Great Britain possesses and exercises, in common with the United States, *a right of joint occupancy* in the Oregon Territory, of which right she can be divested with respect to any part of the territory only by an equitable partition of the whole between the two powers. It is for obvious reasons desirable that such a partition should take place as soon as possible, and the difficulty appears to be in a line of demarkation which shall leave to each party that precise portion of the Territory best suited to its convenience."

Mr. Pakenham then defends the British offer of the Columbia river as a boundary:—"As regards extent of Territory, they would obtain acre for acre nearly half of the entire territory divided. As relates to the navigation of the principal river, they would enjoy a perfect equality of right with Great Britain, and with respect to harbors, it will be seen that Great Britain shows every disposition to consult their convenience in every particular. On the other hand, were Great Britain to abandon the line of the Columbia as a frontier, and surrender her right to the navigation of that river, the prejudice occasioned to her by such arrangement would beyond all proportions exceed the advantage accruing to the United States from the possession of a few more square miles of Territory. It must be obvious to every impartial investigator of the subject that, in adhering to the line of the Columbia, Great Britain is not influenced by motives of ambition with reference to extent of Territory, *but by considerations of utility, not to say necessity, which cannot be lost sight of*, and for which allowance ought to be made in an arrangement proposing to be based on considerations of mutual convenience and advantage."

Thus it will be seen that Great Britain pressed claim on the ground that what she asked seemed to her to be a matter of "utility, not to say necessity," which could well be surrendered by the United States, as it sacrificed but little territory, and left to the latter the same convenience and advantage that Great Britain desired to enjoy. Let us apply that doctrine *now*. British Columbia has ceased to be an advantage or source of profit or benefi

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to the British Empire. Indeed it will hardly be denied that such colony has really become a burden to the home government. As a colony of England, it is a source of expense to the inhabitants — a mill-stone about their necks, retarding their advancement. They pay largely for the honor of being an appendage to Britain, without any corresponding benefit. To them the privilege of being British subjects is ornamental rather than useful. The completion of the Suez Canal, the condition of affairs in the British provinces east of the Rocky Mountains have forever dispelled the idea that a Pacific port and highway across the Continent will be a necessity or even a benefit to British commerce. Indeed, nothing now remains to justify Great Britain's retaining her Pacific American possessions but a love of territory and an unwillingness to yield an inch to another nation, which is one, or has been one of the most darling English traditions. On the other hand, the time has arrived when this territory is a matter of "utility, not to say necessity," to the United States, which considerations, as Sir R. Pakenham so aptly remarks, "cannot be lost sight of, and for which allowances ought to be made in arrangements to be based on considerations of mutual convenience and advantage." In other words, the preservation of *good neighborhood*, the securing of "mutual convenience and advantage" by powers owning contiguous territory, are engrafted into international law as elements to be considered in the adjustment of territorial claims. And why should not such relations as subsist between neighbors holding contiguous estates apply equally between contiguous nations? For the latter are but grand aggregates of individuals, and the best international law is that which compels nations in their dealings with each other strictly and equitably to adhere to the relation of *meum* and *tuum*.

I am not permitted to pursue in detail that never-to-be-forgotten Oregon controversy and adjustment. In 1844 the people of the United States elected a President, and one of the planks in the platform of the successful party was the following graphic and most truthful version of American claim to the whole of Oregon Territory. The Democratic platform declared: "Our title to the *whole* of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other power; and that the re-occupation of Oregon at the earliest practicable period is a great American measure." Henry Clay was the candidate of the Whig party for the office of President. His views on the question of American title had been history, since May, 1826, when, as Secretary of State, he had uttered the memorable sentiment in his instructions to the Panama Commissioners: "From the north-eastern limits of the United States, in North America, to Cape Horn, in South America, on the Atlantic Ocean, with one or two inconsiderable exceptions; and from the same Cape to the fifty-first degree of north latitude, in North America, on the Pacific Ocean, *without any exception*, the whole coasts and countries belong to sovereign resident American powers." During the same year, and when instructing our Minister, Albert Gallatin, who conducted the American side of the negotiation which led to the convention of 1827, in referring to the measure of claim acquired by the United States from Spain, Mr. Clay asserted "our right extended to the 60th degree of north latitude." Through this broad land

the Shibboleth of political parties was the "whole of Oregon," "54–40 or fight," and the people of the United States unmistakably and with hearty enthusiasm declared that war with England was preferable to the surrender of any portion of Oregon. And yet, inside of two short years, this great uprising was followed by the treaty of 1846. "Oh, lame and most impotent conclusion!"

It must therefore be apparent that Great Britain acquired the territory now known as British Columbia solely as a compensation for the withdrawal by the British Government of all claim to the territory south of 49°, based upon the presence of British subjects by permission of the United States in the two Conventions of 1818 and 1827. England embraced the opportunity presented by our war with Mexico to renew negotiations. She presented the drafted treaty of 1846. We accepted it without so much as dotting an I or crossing a T, in the belief that the territory was too worthless to justify further contention. Worried out of a forty years' controversy, with a foreign war upon our hands, popular but not enthusiastically endorsed by the people, we accepted it as the end of a protracted contest, a seemingly interminable diplomatic war. We surrendered all north of 49°. We agreed that British subjects should be recognized to claim from the United States Government the same rights they could successfully and lawfully assert against the British Crown—but no more. We ceded certain territory upon certain expressed considerations. Those considerations were:

I. A certainty of boundary, to remove cause of contention. This has utterly failed, for still the boundary is unsettled.

II. Exclusive sovereignty of the territory south of 49°. This was a gross fraud, and has been entirely ignored. The government is about to pay $650,000 for a release of British claims to land, but a very small portion of which had been reduced to possession before the treaty of 1846, and for rights under a license revoked by the British Government in 1858.

III. Our Government was beguiled into surrendering the territory by representations derived through English channels of its utter worthlessness, the English Government well knowing its value and resources, and a party to our deception.

If the above deductions be just, it is not coveting our neighbor's property, to wish to regain that territory; it is merely the seeking of a restoration of that we formerly parted with, the consideration upon which we disposed of our interest or claim having entirely failed. For it is not claimed that a nation more than an individual should violate the Divine injunction, "Thou shalt not covet." Neither is it right that a nation should forfeit its contract, or falter in a treaty stipulation, when once faith is plighted. But what is true as applicable to individuals, is equally true as to nations. Will it be denied that if A deceive B in acquiring a piece of property from the latter through false representation, he being well advised in the premises, and imposing on B's ignorance, that it is covetous or dishonest in B to avoid the bargain? Suppose the property thus acquired while in A's possession is enhanced in value and rendered more desirable to B than formerly; indeed, it has become a matter of importance to B to regain it, in order to give additional value to his estate in proximity; would it be wrong for B to seek its recovery? Equity, common sense, and wholesome law all say B has a right thereto, if he can establish fraud in A. True, the law strictly construed may say, "ignorance was no excuse," "Caveat emptor." But equity says if A has

committed fraud, B must be relieved. The obligation may be imposed upon B, in regaining the possession of his own, to pay to A any increased value which the property may have attained while held by him, but deducting a proper allowance to B for his damages of privation, and A's profit by enjoyment.

Is not this the condition of affairs between the United States and Great Britain, in regard to the territory of British Columbia? If it be, then the United States owes it to itself to recover what was lost. It is commendable patriotic pride—not covetousness, nor ambition of territorial expansion, nor lust for power, which justifies—commands the effort. The treaty of 1846, and the events which have followed in the region divided between England and the United States by that treaty, establish the fact that such was the character of the dealings between the two nations. Let one plain example illustrate. It must have been known to the English Government and its accredited diplomatic agent that there was no such association as the Puget Sound Agricultural Company. This suggestion acquires more force when we call to mind the fact that the draft of the treaty was handed to Louis McLane, the American Minister at London, by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by Mr. McLane was submitted to our Secretary of State as acceptable to the British Government. Our Government was bound to believe such a Company existed, and that they had acquired landed possessions in the Oregon territory, or why would the British Minister have named them? And yet that myth till then was breathed into corporate life by treaty recognition to enable the Hudson's Bay Company under such an *alias* to acquire lands which, by its License of Trade, was expressly prohibited. This is one only of the frauds in that negotiation, but it aptly exemplifies British claim to Oregon.

How usefully may the American student of the current history of his beloved country pause and dwell upon the lesson taught by this event and its surroundings. The consent to the establishment of British power on the northwest coast of America by that convention by illustrious American publicists receives no commendation now from any quarter. Its only explanation may be found in a sublimity of ignorance alike of the vast future importance of the Pacific, as of the wealth and resources of British Columbia and Vancouver Island. The "derelict of nations," that which was repudiated because of *alleged* worthlessness, "the stone which the builders rejected, is become the head" of this northwest corner. Its acquisition by Great Britain exemplified the prescience and statesmanship of that wary government. That England knew what she was securing, that she had a motive from 1818 down to 1846, in inducing the United States to consent to a "joint occupancy," while she ripened *naked possession* into *title*, cotemporaneous history fully establishes.

Through vigilant sentinels upon those *then* remote outposts, Douglas, Simpson, McLaughlin, Ogden, Tolmie, *et id omne genus*, the efficient managing men of the Hudson's Bay Company, the British government were thoroughly advised of the value and importance of the region. Indeed, as early as the close of the last century that renowned voyageur, Sir Alex. Mackenzie, had foreshadowed the importance of Pacific commerce, and invoked the British government to take the necessary steps to establish *here* its prestige and power. How full of significance is the opinion expressed by a distinguished member of the British Parliament, Hon. E. Ellice, one of the largest shareholders in the Hudson's Bay Company! Of

Vancouver Island he thus remarks:

"It is a kind of England, attached to the continent of America. I think it should not only be on the ordinary system of English colonies, but that it should be the principal station of your naval force in the Pacific. It is the only good harbor to the northward of San Francisco, as far north as Sitka. You have in Vancouver Island the best harbor, fine timber in every situation, and coal enough for your navy; the climate is wholesome, very like that of England; the coast abounds with fish of every description; in short, there is every advantage in the Island of Vancouver to make it one of the first colonies and best settlements of England. Political questions are connected with making a settlement in that quarter, which I will not enter into."

But those *Anglicising* missionaries, who occupied the region to perfect the title, or secure the possession for England, did not stop with instructing the British government as to the value, to that power, of a foothold in northwest America. From them emanated another character of representations as to its *inadaptability* to white settlement. Remoteness, inaccessibility, except by the transit of a broad continent, high northern latitude, with a supposed corresponding rigorous climate, and hordes of barbarous natives, all furnished the *data* by which to damnify the country for colonial or political purposes. This course had its twofold effect: it tended to delay settlement till the fur-producing animals were exhausted, which must have disappeared with the advent of settlers. It thus assured to the Hudson's Bay Company a profitable remuneration for exclusively enjoying the country and serving the British government in the making of title by actual occupancy.

Through such means, non-adaptability to settlement was assiduously and indelibly stamped upon Northern Oregon, now British Columbia. The laborious Benton, proverbial for his critical correctness, was entirely wrong for once. He had drank too deeply that *information* as to the country injected by Hudson's Bay Company officers into official reports of Americans sent to explore the country. How naturally the explorers thought old residents could give *reliable* information; how all impossible that such hospitable men, who so freely volunteered details, could garble, deceive or suppress truth. Yet, where did the studiously careful Benton acquire that data, which even palliates that remarkable speech which brought about the advice and consent of the United States Senate to the treaty of 1846, before the signing of the same by the ministers of the respective governments? Two-thirds of an American Senate would never have advised that humiliation, but they placed reliance in Mr. Benton's industry in acquiring information, and his usual and thorough correctness. They believed that speech, and its cost to the nation was British Columbia and Vancouver Island. That Mr. Benton believed it then, as the world has since too long continued to believe it, is the best evidence of how greatly we were deceived, how grossly that country was misrepresented, how well that part of the programme was performed, how thoroughly through English channels and by English representations the territory was damnified, until it came to be regarded as utterly worthless. That Mr. Benton would make such statements, is the best commentary; hear him:

"I knew the Straits of Fuca, and that these Straits formed a natural

boundary for us, and also divided the continent from the islands, and the fertile from the desolate regions. I knew that the continental coast and the inhabitable country terminated on the south shore of those Straits, and that the northwest archipelago—the thousand desolate and volcanic islands, derelict of all nations—commenced on their shore; and I wanted to go no farther than the good land and continental coast went. I had expected the deflection to have commenced further back, on the continent, so as to have kept our line a little further off from Fort Langley, at the mouth of Frazer's river, almost in sight of which it now passes. If this had been asked, I, for one, would have been willing to grant it; but the British did not ask it, probably for the same reason that I would have granted it, namely, *the entire worthlessness of the desolate region about the mouth of Fraser's river*. The deflection leaves out Vancouver Island, and I am glad of it. *It is one of the most worthless* of the thousand worthless islands which the northwest archipelago presents, and is the derelict of all nations. It is now vacant and desert, and I want none of it. I would not accept it as a present, nor would the poorest Lord of the Isles that ever lived upon the western coast of Scotland."

In this anathema against Vancouver Island and the basin of Fraser's river is found one of the leading excuses for the relinquishment by the United States of British Columbia, as at present defined. When the Fraser's river excitement led to the establishment of Victoria and partial development of British Columbia, how truly we learned we had been cruelly deceived. It is not with any disposition to indulge in vain regret that Britain then overreached us in diplomacy, or pang of humiliation that the United States sacrificed her prestige, power or territory, that these facts are recounted. History has been truthfully defined as "philosophy teaching by example," and in this connection between links in the past, what duty to the future enjoins is made apparent. England still intervenes to keep dissevered our continuity of Pacific possessions and boundary, and that great fact is full of interest to every American, especially to such as dwell upon the Pacific slope.

Nor should we be unmindful that but too lately there were some, claiming to be ranked as American statesmen, who, disregarding those lessons of the past, would have reenacted the error of 1846; who did endeavor to defeat the acquisition of Alaska, upon the old and fallacious plea of worthlessness of territory, the only excuse for the surrender of the present British Columbia. Let us recur for a moment to the stirring times on this magnificent inland sea in the years 1858, '59 and '60. You, that were here, will heartily concur that, had the then bustling city of Victoria been on American soil, here, to-day, on Puget Sound, would be an emporium of population and commerce second only to San Francisco, if not its successful rival. State it otherwise: had not the southern portion of Vancouver Island belonged to Britain, Victoria might not have been the site of such emporium, but Whatcom, Seattle, Port Townsend, or some other of the numerous eligible harbors on Puget Sound, would, to-day, have been the headcenter of Pacific commerce. No one will dare to assert that, had the United States in 1846 owned Alaska, any American statesman would for a moment have thought of allowing the Pacific continuity of northwest

America to be destroyed, however worthless the territory. The homogeneity of that coast line would have been preserved inviolate at any cost. History and posterity would have approved any expenditure of blood and treasure in its maintenance. Nor will any one urge that, had the existence of the wealth and importance of British Columbia or Vancouver Island been as well understood by the United States as by the British government, any part or such territory or island would have been relinquished. Had we then possessed our present knowledge, there would not, to-day, be stretched along the whole extent of our northern frontier, from ocean to ocean, with a highway of travel across the continent, an European power which may only cease when succeeded by a rival American nationality. Those *soi disant* statesmen forget that what charity may condone as a blunder in 1846, on the plea of ignorance or misapprehension, is crime at this later day of our progress and destiny.

Concede that regions are valueless, and the reason becomes more cogent why European powers should relinquish them, for the motive of retention is reduced to the mere desire to exercise jurisdictional rights upon the American continent. Maintaining upon it a foothold with such motive, but likens such power to the famous "dog in the manger," and a nation, actuated by such policy, is, at best, a bad neighbor, and should be excluded on general principles. The exorcism of any European sovereignty from the American continent is a valuable consideration to the United States, and no territory upon the continent is so worthless but it possesses political value to the national Union. It is freely admitted that the character of land, climate, accessibility and adaptability to settlement should each have due weight in regulating the price.

The history of British Columbia has exploded forever the theory of yielding any portion of this continent to an European sovereignty because of worthlessness. It is lasting testimony against the resort to such an argument to delay the forward march of the nation to its future destiny. That plea has always proven error. When Jefferson led the way for American empire to cross the Mississippi river, by the purchase of Louisiana, though that secured the inestimable boon of the exclusive navigation of several of the great rivers of the world, an internal navigation unequalled in any portion of the earth, yet how unsparingly was he derided. But posterity has accorded to him undying gratitude, and stamped the Louisiana purchase as the crowning act of his glorious career. California was equally damnified as worthless, and yet she has a future of wealth and grandeur second to no State in the American Union. Vancouver Island, so scoffed at by the illustrious Benton, exhibits her Victoria, her Esquimalt, her Nanaimo, as evidence of the absurdity of such policy.

Unsatisfactory, not to say humiliating, as is this recurrence to the treaty of 1846, yet, even in that dark picture of our past, there is occasionally relief from gloom. There were those in the councils of the nation, who understood the real situation, who, even then, appeared dissatisfied with the *damnifying* process by which the people of the United States were to be stimulated to and reconciled with the surrender to Great Britain of a part of Oregon. John Quincy Adams, in the American House of Representatives, in that eventful year (1846) which marks the eagerness of the general government to go to war to *acquire*

territory] on the southern border of the Union, and an equal willingness to *relinquish* territory on its northern frontier, urged the passage of a bill directing the President to abrogate the Convention of 1827, by giving to Great Britain the requisite twelve months' notice. He spoke of British pretension, claim and motive as to Oregon. With him, Oregon was the Oregon of history, before it was shorn of its fair proportions, and half of it ceded to Great Britain. These were his sentiments:

"But at this day she claims no exclusive jurisdiction over the whole country. She claims to have the country free and open, that is, to keep it in a savage and barbarous state for her hunters, for the benefit of the Hudson's Bay Company, for hunting. Now, she knows that it would have no value to her at all from the day that it is settled by tillers of the ground. We claim that country—for what? To make the wilderness blossom as the rose, to establish laws, to increase, multiply and subdue the earth, which we are commanded to do by the first behest of God Almighty."

The "old man eloquent" foresaw it all. His mind had received the impressions from the reports representing the savage and barbarous state of the country, i. e., its unfitness for settlement, but, notwithstanding such representations, yet would it be ultimately Americanized by the class he so eloquently alluded to in that same memorable speech: "I want the country for our Western pioneers, to afford scope for the exercise of that quality of man which is most signally exemplified in the population of our western territory, *for them to go out to make a great nation that is to arise there, and which must come from us, as a fountain comes from its source, of free, independent, sovereign republics.*" That is what *we* want with British Columbia, and it is not claiming too much to assert that that gifted and prescient statesman well appreciated, that however important Pacific commerce might become to England, still, with an ocean and continent between it and Great Britain, British influence and power would not be in the way of our nation's dedication of "*the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe*" to free, independent, sovereign republics."

How completely is his prophetic judgment vindicated in 1869 by the petition of the citizens of British Columbia to the President of the United States, imploring that they may be brought within those *influences* which are contributing so steadily to making that great nation which is to arise there, the wilderness to blossom as the rose, the establishment of laws, obedience to the first behest of God Almighty.

May I read to you that petition, the earnest yearning for republican life and vigor alike of British subjects and American residents now domiciled in British Columbia:

To His Excellency, the President of the United States:

Your memorialists beg leave most respectfully to represent that we are residents of the Colony of British Columbia, many of us British subjects, and all of us deeply interested in the welfare and progress of our adopted country; that those who are British subjects are penetrated with the most profound feelings of loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty and her government, and all entertain for her feelings of the greatest attachment, and to the country; that while we thus indulge such feelings we are constrained by the duty we owe to ourselves and families, in view of the contemplated severance of the political ties which unite this colony to the mother country, to seek for such political and commercial affinity and connection as will insure the immediate and continued prosperity and well-being of this, our adopted home; that this colony is now suffering great depression, owing to its isolation, scarcity of population, and other causes too numerous to mention; that we view with feelings of alarm the avowed intention

of her Majesty's Government to confederate this colony with the Dominion of Canada, as we believe such a measure can only tend to still further depression and ultimate injury, for the following reasons, viz: That confederation cannot give us protection against internal enemies or foreign foes, owing to the distance of this colony from Ottawa; that it cannot open to us a market for the produce of our land, our forests, our mines, our water; that it cannot bring us population, our greatest need, as the Dominion itself is suffering from a lack of it; that our connection with the Dominion can satisfy no sentiment of loyalty or devotion; that her commercial and industrial interests are opposed to ours; that the tariff of the Dominion will be the ruin of our farmers and the commerce of our chief cities; that we are instigated by every sentiment of loyalty to Her Majesty, by our attachment to the laws and institutions of Great Britain, and our deep interest in the prosperity of our adopted country, to express our opposition to a severance from England and a Confederation with Canada. We admit that the Dominion may be aggrandized by Confederation, but we can see no benefit, either present or future, which can accrue to us therefrom. That we desire a market for our coal and lumber, and our fish, and this the Dominion seeks for the same produce of her own soil. She can take nothing from us and supply us with nothing in return. That confederating this colony with Canada may relieve the mother country from the trouble and expense of fostering and protecting this isolated distant colony. But it cannot free us from our long enduring depression owing to the lack of population as aforesaid, and the continued want of a home market for our produce. The only remedy for the evils which beset us, we believe to be in a close union with the adjoining States and Territories. We are already joined by a unity of objects and interests. Nearly all our commercial relations are with them. They furnish the chief markets we have for the products of our mines, land and waters. They supply the colony with most of the necessaries of life. They furnish us the only means of communication with the outer world, and we are even dependent upon them for the means of learning the events in the mother country or the dominion of Canada. For these reasons we earnestly desire the acquisition of this colony by the United States. It would result at once in opening to the United States an unrestricted market for our products, bring an influx of population, and with it induce investment of capital in our coal and quartz mines, and in our forests. It would insure us regular mails and communication with the adjoining States and Territories, and through them with the world at large. It would lessen the expense of our Government by giving us representative institutions and immediate control of our domestic concerns, besides giving us protection from foreign enemies, and with all these we should still be united to a people of our own kindred, religion and tongue, and a people who for all time must intimately affect us in all our relations for weal or woe. That in view of these facts we respectfully request that your Excellency will cause this memorial to be laid before the Government of the United States, and that in any negotiations that may be pending or undertaken between your Government and that of her most gracious Majesty for the settlement of territorial or other questions, that you will endeavor to induce Her Majesty to consent to the transfer of this colony to the United States. We believe Her Majesty earnestly desires the welfare and happiness of all her people in view of the circumstances that for years she has consented to the annual exodus of tens of thousands of her subjects to the United States, and that she will not let political traditions and sentiments influence her against a measure so earnestly desired by the people of this poor, isolated colony.

Dated British Columbia, November, 1869.

This petition demonstrates two propositions: I. That the *spirit* of free institutions, like the *gospel*, conquers peoples, and forces them to covet the "spreading" of its influences, that they, too, may enjoy its vitalizing power.

II. That deeply imbued as is the feeling of a Briton in favor of his native land and its institutions, in favor of its peculiar national tradition against the diminution of territory, yet the contrast between the success of the American Pacific States and Territories, side by side with British Columbia, gifted with as great resources and advantages, showing that the former depends alone upon *Americanization*, forces the conviction in the mind of the British Columbian, "not that I love England less, but my adopted country more." To advance her best interests, to avoid her future insignificance, "the only remedy for the evils which beset us we believe to be in a *close union* with the adjoining States and Territories."

It does seem that there can be no doubt as to the *right* and *propriety* of the United States Government at once taking steps to secure the *re-annexation* of British Columbia to the Union. *Right*, because it was

once ours, and the consideration upon which it was relinquished has entirely failed. *Right*, because fraud and misrepresentation were used in extorting its cession to Great Britain. *Right*, because it has become a *necessity* to our country, its commerce, its future, its destiny. *Right*, because it restores self-respect, wipes out the wounds of humiliation, and effaces inglorious memories. *Right*, because it will benefit humanity and *spread* the blessings of free institutions. *Proper*, because it is *right*, and because the people of that colony have asked the measure; and every principle of our institutions recognizes that they are the *only* competent judges of whom they will have to rule over their destinies.

Let us now advert to the *desirability* of re-annexation. This seems so palpable as hardly to justify extended notice. To the United States it is *desirable* in every point of view. To the people of British Columbia so desirable that it is urged by themselves as a *sine qua non* for future well-being. To Great Britain, as affairs are now being developed, it would seem *desirable*, at least beneficial, to part with this colony.

Briefly only am I permitted to make a passing notice of each of these three elements of desirability, invoking immediate action in the necessary measures to bring about this re-annexation, this restoration of the integrity of our former Pacific territory.

The leading reason for the United States to respond at once to the petition of the citizens of British Columbia, is that the granting of the prayer will contribute to the success of the true mission of the United States of America. American destiny means the entire, exclusive, homogeneous Americanization of North America, with but one nationality exercising sovereign powers, without the intervention, or right, or necessity, to intervene by any foreign power in affairs upon this continent. Such a condition of things would seem to have been in the mind of Washington when he so aptly depicted the necessities for the *oneness* and *exclusiveness* of the United States of America.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, *under the impossibility of making aggressions upon us*, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel."

The exclusive Americanization of the North American continent is *desirable* because it is the harbinger of peace, because it removes from the list of causes of international jealousy or strife one great element of contention between powers struggling for supremacy. It is one great step towards that universal peace the world is destined to enjoy when it shall have attained that highest civilization to which it is steadily advancing.

Foremost among the agencies to effect this "consummation so devoutly to be wished," is the exclusive mastery of the commerce of the Pacific, constituting the United States as the great western power without a contestant. This would of necessity interpose a continent as the barrier between the eastern or European seas and the riches of India and the south Pacific, except by the transit of eastern continents and seas. That great triumph of

the age, the Suez Canal, will soon afford a channel of communication between European States and the East Indies, and relieve all European commercial or maritime powers from the excuse of a necessity to retain a foothold on the Pacific coast, for facilities of communication with Asiatic countries. All temptation to acquire or disposition to hold territory in this region, as a measure of commercial advantage, is now removed. No reasonable excuse remains for European intervention in American affairs. The exclusion of England as a sovereign power from the American continent accomplished, and we will have attained that true condition of national independence, "when," as the good Washington has expressed it, "we may choose peace or war, as our interests, guided by justice, shall counsel."

The *Monroe doctrine*, enunciated in regard to, and stamped upon the great Northwest, will not be theory, but practice. That doctrine is near its realization. "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth *not* to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

We lost sight of this principle, this *animus* of our Americanization, in the abortive treaty of 1846, but British subjects, in 1869, invite us back to our principles, to practice that theory; they implore us to shed abroad, to spread again, and still further, the healthy influences of American institutions, and revivify a colony which was attempted to be built up and breathed into being as an appanage of European power and policy on this American soil: but it proved a paradox, and has already dwindled to decay, while yet in its minority. In 1846 we could not quite reach up to 54°40′, but a year or two ago we made that historic landmark our boundary, and already is British Columbia becoming *reconstructed* by gravitating to the American Oregon, of which it was formerly a constituent portion. That good old line our people were willing to fight for in 1844 now bounds American territory. With Alaska as a top weight, it will be pressed downward, meeting the upward expansion of Puget Sound development. Between these two *strata* of Americanization, British supremacy will be squelched out, and the continuity of American Pacific boundary be attained, bringing with it the exclusive control of the empire of the Pacific, and the commerce of eastern Asia and the southern oceans.

An inspection of the map of the world affords the most ample proof of this desirability of exclusiveness of Pacific coast line. By the acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, our possessions have been pushed, as it were, across the Pacific, and we are at the very doors of Japan and China. Take the coast line from Panama to our northwesternmost limit, representing almost the two sides of a spherical triangle, and, subtended within the area of the completed triangle, are the Sandwich Islands, which must naturally come to us, England and France withdrawn from these seas. Then bear in mind the great fact that a voyage is shorter from San Francisco to Japan and China, *via* our northwest possessions, than by way of the Sandwich Islands; shorter still from Fuca Straits or Puget Sound; shorter still from Sitka;—in fine, shorter from any intermediate point on the Pacific coast of the American continent. So it must be plain as the sun at noon-day how great a figure the control of that whole coast and its innumerable harbors must cut in this problem of absorb-

ing the vast and wealthy commerce of this ocean.

This proposition is not new; its solution led to the exploration and settlement of the great Northwest. England and the United States, during the last century, in these seas, contended for that commerce; and centuries before they had been preceded by Spain and Russia. To attract the wealth of eastern Asia to the Pacific coast of this continent and carry it to the Atlantic, and from thence distribute it to other parts of the world, stimulated, hastened and insured the construction of the great continental railroad, which of necessity makes the Pacific port of that road the magnet for and absorbent of the character of commerce which will be found profitable by speedy land transportation to eastern marts, such as valuable fabrics and wares, when rapidity of transmission and light weights neutralize freight charges. Furs, teas, silks, jewelry, and such articles, are the illustration. In the present condition of things, it is improbable that an interoceanic road will cross the American continent in British territory. The necessity for a British Pacific port is therefore dissipated and removed. Besides that great triumph of engineering, the Suez Canal, has brought India, the richest jewel of the British Crown, much nearer England. How vastly has its completion enhanced the value and importance of her East India possessions, and her attention will be exclusively needed in securing it, for both France and Russia seem to believe that "balance of power" in international matters is essential to the peace of the world, and current events would indicate that, if an opportunity occurs, an attempt will be made to weaken the British empire by a division of her Indian possessions. Every indication justifies the assertion that England will find it to her interest to withdraw entirely from this field. British Columbia is inhabited by a people, as the petition asserts, "of our own kindred, religion and tongue; a people who for all time must intimately affect us in all our relations 'for weal or woe.'" Besides a large number are our own people, and by all the ties of blood and consanguinity, by the sacredness of our mission to Americanize the continent, it is duty to them, and desirable to us, to mankind and posterity, that British Columbia be re-annexed to the United States.

But *desirable* as it may be to the United States, to the people of British Columbia this *desirability* intensifies into a question of actual necessity. We here might content ourselves by re-reading the petition of the citizens of that interesting colony; but the history of Victoria, its rise, its early brilliant career, its premature subsidence, not to say decay, is the speaking illustration of every feature of the subject.

Its establishment vindicates the judgment which prompted the location of a commercial emporium on the Pacific coast. Its rapid growth shows how spontaneously, as it were, cities may be built by American population and energy.

The early years of Victoria illustrate the vastness and value of Pacific commerce, and the inherent strength and advantage of the situation. Its subsidence is the best evidence that on these continents, settlements to continue successful, to grow, to prosper, need more than natural advantages, more than capital, more than population. All these are essentials; but there must be present also the leaven of American institutions, the energy, the reliance, the dependence on *future* which grows out of what Wbymper

calls "independence."

The whole argument is embraced in this single proposition, plainly stated, and which will not be denied: Had British Columbia, including Vancouver Island, been an American territory, Victoria, if such port had been selected as the port for British Columbia, with the *impetus* it received in 1858, '59 and '60, would, to-day, have been a flourishing city, instead of a "deserted village."

The most insidious and potential essay to acquire a British foothold in the Northwest, and to control Pacific commerce and power, was set on foot in 1857-58 by Governor (now Sir) James Douglas, in a series of measures, chief among which, for its boldness of conception, successful initiation, wide spread attractiveness, universality of response and important subsequent results, was the Fraser's river excitement. A careful examination of the events of which it is the historical aggregate, will satisfy the most skeptical that that vigorous-minded Briton, the able far-seeing statesman, had determined to make Victoria a British rival of San Francisco, and to establish as its base or feeder a province or colony in British Oregon, as then known, but now the continental portion of British Columbia. It will likewise appear that Fraser's *river gold* did not "*pan*," that the country was proclaimed as a gold region, and license fees established for working it, on statements of native Indians, and because the Governor knew no good reasons why gold should not be *diffused* throughout British Oregon as well as elsewhere on the Pacific slope. True, the *color* did appear in all the tributaries of Fraser's river. Here and there were rich diggings: but the wealth of Cariboo and other even richer gold fields was unknown, unanticipated. Their existence became ascertained after the Fraser's river bubble had bursted. When British Columbia and Vancouver Island, with its numerous and suddenly accumulated population, had settled down to quiet and regular routine of life, the Cariboo mines became known and proved rich indeed. They were a godsend to the authors of the "Fraser's river excitement." But for them that memorable gold stampede would have found its place in history, side by side with the great "South Sea bubble." The "Douglas scheme" was not intended for the *benefit* that might accrue from gold seeking. Had it been really known that gold was there in such quantities as it afterward proved, the Hudson's Bay Company, who knew its value as well as the honest miner, would have been content to have appropriated it. That memorable excitement was but the allurement to draw population, erect a British colony, and perpetuate British lodgment and empire on the Pacific.

Had his very able and ingeniously devised efforts been seconded by the British government, as zealously as their *intention* would seem to have warranted, England, to-day, might have better justification for a *desire* to continue to divide American territories on the Pacific. She might yet have some reason to desire to retain a seat of empire in these seas for the purpose of commerce and power. But the sceptre has departed from Judah. That ever-watchful government was once found napping. She was guilty of as fatal an omission to improve her opportunity as was the United States in 1846. The wise and sagacious founder of British Columbia, and projector of Victoria commerce and British supremacy in these regions, received the compliment of being commissioned as First Governor,

and also the honors of Knighthood. The British government had notified Governor Douglas "that the government were not prepared to increase any expense on account of a revenue derivable from such a source (gold license) from that distant quarter of the kingdom." Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, then colonial Secretary, restricted Governor Douglas's movements by instructing him that British Columbia was expected to be "self-sustaining." Douglas was left without encouragement, and, finally, supplanted. He had lived long upon the frontier: he had breathed that vital air of the Pacific slope which seems to impart energy and snap; he had been invigorated by seeing a wide expanse of territory develop into States; to see cities in a day spring into prominence. He rose to his full stature of native character when he felt: "If this can be done in America, why cannot it succeed in British Columbia?" For more than a quarter of a century he had been autocrat of these regions, and overlooked one idea. He had no knowledge or appreciation of the strength of a government dependent upon the will and consent of the governed. Here was his mistake: he wanted English institutions, English discipline and English circumlocution. He eschewed the American element present in the country, by his invitation. Jealousy of American ideas, the real secret of American progress, marked his administration. As the English government refused to be at the expense of supporting English institutions, and as the American system was repudiated, the consequence is natural. As a governmental scheme, as a colony, British Columbia is a failure: Victoria, its city, is but a reflex of the colony.

A parallel between Victoria and San Francisco, truthfully drawn, making due allowance for the more favorable agricultural resources of California over British Columbia, and the only feature in which there is an advantage, in favor of the former, (and it may be claimed that the gold, coal, timber, lime and fisheries of the latter ought to compensate for the better cultivable character of the lands of California) demonstrate the reason of the premature decay of Victoria, and points to the remedy by which she may be re-invigorated with healthy strength, experience, a hopeful future, and yet attain the place in the roll of Pacific cities to which she is entitled by her many natural advantages.

In 1848 San Francisco made her debut as the American city of the Pacific. Her pretensions were quite as humble, her *then* as insignificant as the beautiful little Hudson's Bay Company town of Fort Victoria in 1858. In 1849 the discovery of gold attracted a large advent of population to California. At the beginning of 1849 the population of San Francisco had attained to the number of 2,000; by midsummer it had probably increased to 5,000. During the year 1850, 36,000 persons arrived by sea at San Francisco; in 1851, 27,000 arrived by sea. I am not taking into consideration the overland immigration into California, but it is fair to state that in neither of the above years did it exceed the similar immigration to the gold-fields of British Columbia in 1858 and 1859.

With the foregoing exhibit of the *start* of San Francisco, let us now compare that of Victoria in 1858 and 1859. In the official despatch of Governor Douglas to the British Colonial Office, July 1st, 1858, he states that from May 19th to date "the custom House books show a return of 19 steamships, 9 sailing ships and 14 decked boats, entered with 6,133 passengers. The ascer-

tained numbers sailing from San Francisco alone for Victoria, between the early days in May, 1858, to June 15th, 1858, were 10,573. That this unparalleled state of things continued for several years is evidenced by the following statistics: In Victoria, the customs received in 1859 amounted to £18,164—over $90,000. In 1860 it rose to £58,980—nearly $300,000.

In 1861 the imports to Victoria from San Francisco, Oregon and Washington Territory, amounted to $1,733,212; from other places $601,877. Total import 1861, $2,335,089.

In 1862 the imports from San Francisco, Oregon and Washington Territory had increased to $2,645,229; from other places, $910,248. Total, $3,555,577.

In 1863 the imports from San Francisco, Oregon and Washington Territory were $2,230,501; from other places $1,657,311. Total, $3,887,812.

The exports during the same period make an excellent showing. These figures demonstrate two things: American trade, or trade from American states and territories, was greatest, and exhibits the presence of American merchants. The *foreign* trade increasing marks the advent of the growing excess of British traders and merchants, and leaves the inference, which is borne out by the facts, of the withdrawal of Americans, American capital and American merchants. Victoria, in other words, started with American impetus, but has now become a British port, with British trade and British ideas. In 1866 the Governor of British Columbia thus speaks of the condition of the colony: "The yield of gold this year is estimated at £600,000, and as there were certainly not more than three thousand miners engaged, the average product reached £200 per man, *far exceeding any average ever reached in California or Australia.*" While it cannot be pretended that British Columbia can compete with California, in agricultural products, as an item of exportation, still it may be claimed that she is not dependent on the outside world, but has facilities within herself to be "self-sustaining." In the last report referred to, the Governor says: "The most important advance made by British Columbia in 1866 was the rapid development of agriculture, occasioned by the increasing number of wagon roads and other communications. Home manufactured flour is already taking the place of the imported article. Use is being made of the magnificent timber covering the sides of the harbors and inlets." Let us add to this that during the year 1863 there was exported to San Francisco alone Nanaimo coal to the amount of 22,000 tons, paid for at the mines at $6 per ton.

From this showing, is it saying too much that, in the early part of the decade just closed, Victoria had a fair start; that she possessed great advantages; that her early *stimulus* was full as great as that of San Francisco, that her future was full of hope? Yet how changed the picture! In 1869 San Francisco has become the third city of the United States, as the representative of American progress, advancement and commerce, though not in wealth and population. Connected now with the Atlantic by a continental railroad, her future progress must be as steady and glorious as her past career has been wonderful and speedy. In 1869, with all the natural advantages of Victoria, the vast mineral wealth of British Columbia, the coal and lumber of Vancouver Island, the *stimulus* of British capital and prestige, she has tottered to her fall, and her citizens,

together with those of the whole colony, forget their traditional love of English empire, their jealousy of her successful rival; in language of deep seated feeling they recount the causes of their adversity and implore aid from the President of the United States, "for the people of this poor, *isolated* colony." Save them from "isolation!" It is *desirable* for them to be relieved.

Those two systems stand side by side—*Old England* and *Young America*. While the one is fast verging into senility, the other's "youthful veins are full of enterprise, courage and honorable love of glory and renown." One cannot hold the even tenor of its way, nor even stimulate a hope for the future; the other has insured progress, advancement and power. Let us not deny to our English brethren across the border the encouragement, the hope they seek. Re-annexation to the United States is the panacea for their ills. They now pine away for mere want of the pure invigorating influences of healthy Americanization.

Already has much been anticipated in support of our last proposition, that it is *desirable* to England to relinquish British Columbia. I have already wearied you, and I shall but hastily refer to passing events to show that the time has passed when to England it is a matter of political or commercial moment to retain her territorial possessions in America, and especially on the Pacific side of the continent.

> "The spider's most attenuated thread
> Is cord, is cable—"

compared to the tie or bond really holding British Columbia or any of the British American provinces to the British Crown. That government would hardly put forth the effort to save them, if either of them asserted independence.

Ever since that model government, oblivious of all her past history, sacrificed her prestige and integrity of empire by giving countenance and sympathy to rebellion against a friendly rival, Ireland and her American Colonies and Provinces have been a fruitful cause of anxiety, distrust and alarm. Ever since she failed in expelling American commerce from the seas by the assistance of anglo-rebel pirates, for whose acts she is morally accountable and legally liable, she knows the day of retribution ought to be at hand, and she dare not enter into conflict with any maritime power. The law she established will be meted to her, and as she sanctified piracy and recognized it as legitimate belligerency, so has she indicated the method by which war can lawfully be made upon her. She will find that now, as of old, nations, like individuals, shape their own destiny, invite their own doom. From the date of the triumph of the Union and freedom over slavery and secession, with British sympathy thrown into the scale, she has seen the handwriting on the wall, that she is powerless to throw any serious obstacle in the onward career of the American Republic. Her Provinces everywhere were sanctuary, asylum and rendezvous for rebels in their operations against the Government. British Provinces on the North American Continent will never again be used for such a purpose, and to-day, so soon after this bad faith to a friendly nation, this dishonor to her whole past history, this glaring anomaly, a monarchy forgetful of every element in the *policy of empire*, she appears stripped of her *morale*, and it is apparent she could not for a moment retain a single one of those Provinces, were they to throw off the yoke, or rebel against her authority. Knowing all this, she has abandoned the idea of expending either men or money in their retention or defence. She is resolved on saving her East India possessions, of defeating Irish independence. With

these two projects, she has all-sufficient to engage her whole and undivided attention. The announcement or indication that the American Colonies must take care of themselves, finds a fitting, prompt response in the petition of the citizens of British Columbia, the Red River rebellion, the preference, so marked, of the people of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia for annexation to the United States, rather than confederation with Canada. These are the out-croppings of that change so early to be realized. All show that it is desirable for England to be ridden of these sources of expense and division of her power which the maintenance of British rule in these Provinces of necessity involves. They show more—they demonstrate that it is essential for her to make up her mind to let them go and "stand not upon the order of their going."

Two great nations, with a common ancestry, speaking a common language, professing the same religion, are now the leading powers of the world. In many respects they have a similar mission, the redemption of the world from barbarism, its enlightenment by Christianization and free institutions. In each hemisphere abundance of room is found for each to work out its separate and successful destiny or mission. Confined to such sphere, each would of necessity co-operate with the other in giving to the world better institutions, more freedom, more light, more liberty. Between them now is deep seated feeling, liable at any moment to rankle into hate, to burst into hostility, to bring a clash of arms. The causes of that feeling have already been recounted. That peace-loving, philosophic, England-admiring, but unswerving American patriot and Senator, Charles Sumner, thus eloquently sums up our real heart-burnings, our grievances, our occasions of offence:

"They stand before us mountain high, with a base broad as the nation and a mass stupendous as the rebellion itself. It will be for a wise statesmanship to determine how this fearful accumulation, like Pelion upon Ossa, shall be removed out of sight, so that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries."

The times are fitting, and circumstances favor the peaceful and amicable solution of the difficulty. It was England's interference in American affairs, her disposition to neutralize the influence of the United States and retard her onward destiny, that caused this fearful account against her. Let her now gracefully withdraw from the American Continent her territorial claims. She can do it without sacrifice—indeed it is reasonable to believe that by such an act she would be greatly benefitted and relieved from a weight of expense and responsibility. Let the United States assume the Alabama claims and accept the withdrawal of England as "indemnity for the past, security for the future." In due time, if the people of those Provinces desire admission into the Federal Union, they will be free to express their opinions, or, if they prefer, let them remain independent American Republics. The end will be the same. No European monarchial power will encroach upon these Continents. In no distant future these people will find it to their advantage and best interest to seek and receive the blessings of our free institutions. The prophecy of the elder Adams will have been fulfilled. This free and glorious Republic will be co-extensive with the Continent. We will have fully attained to the boundaries ascribed by the master-hand of the immortal Webster:

"The two great seas of the world wash the one and the other shore. We realize on a mighty scale the beautiful description of the ornamental edging of the buckler of Achilles:

> Now the broad shield complete, the artist crowned
> With his last hand, and poured the ocean round,
> In living silver seemed the waves to roll,
> And beat the buckler's verge and bound the whole.