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## CANADA AND WESTERN SECURITY

An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, at Quebec City, June 8, 1952.

I should like to congratulate the Institute on nearly a quarter century of service to Canada in the field of public education in international affairs, a field more important now than ever before. When the Institute was founded Canada was venturing on its first cautious steps on the international stage. In the years that have intervened, Canada has advanced to a more influential role in the drama of world affairs. In part this has been the accident of circumstances: the phenomenal internal expansion that has occurred in our country. This, with the changed pattern of world politics would have brought about a more active role for us in any case. But it was public opinion that made this certain in a democratically-governed society. No government can go far in advance of, or stay far behind, public opinion. If Canada, in discharging this new role, has been able to exercise an effective and useful influence in world affairs, it has been due in large measure to the education of public opinion to the importance of matters which previously had caused it little concern.

In this development the Canadian Institute of International Affairs has done yeoman service. Your research studies have added greatly to the public knowledge of Canada's external relations. I can assure you that they are well-thumbed volumes in the Department of External Affairs, as I am sure they are in our universities. We often learn from the experts what our policy has been as well as what it should be. Your speaker-programmes have contributed in an important way to the development of informed opinion in various centres from coast to coast. Let me add, at the risk of being misunderstood, that I strongly approve of your practice of closed meetings. I am sure that it adds to their value when those present can speak their minds without hope of being quoted, or fear of being misquoted. Study meetings such as you have been holding here the past few days are, I think, particularly helpful. There is nothing like continuous discussion of a problem from various points of view to clear or to empty one's mind on it, and to help separate the consequential from the inconsequential. So in all its varied activities, may the Institute continue to grow and flourish in service to our country.

The main topic discussed here has been the North Atlantic community. You will expect me, therefore, to say something on this subject. Before doing so I should like, however, to say a word or two about our wider associations through the United Nations. For one thing, if I don't, it will be suggested that I should.

It has become fashionable in some quarters to belittle the United Nations, and even to consider it as a complete failure. This defeatist attitude results, I think, from an unduly pessimistic interpretation of developments in and out of the United Nations, and is, in my view, unwarranted. The United Nations remains of very great importance as the only universal centre for international co-operation in a wide variety of fields of international concern. In this interdependent day and age, if our United Nations did not exist, we should have to try to create another one. But, paradoxically,

under the present tensions of international society, it would probably be impossible to operate a world association in any sense like the present one. The United Nations is, moreover, a platform where the oppressed peoples of the world, and those who feel they are oppressed, can--unless they are under Communist control, and this is an important though often forgotten exception--voice their grievances, or have them voiced. It is also a medium through which the more materially-advanced nations of the world can co-operate to assist under-developed countries. It is a forum where tensions between at least the lesser powers can be held in check and prevented from resulting in war. The tensions between the world powers can at least be exposed, though I admit the exposure is often painful and exposure can easily be turned to exaggeration and panic. Finally, the United Nations is almost the only remaining institution where free and totalitarian states can meet together and can speak to, or perhaps I should say speak at, one another face to face: a process of which I have some personal experience and which is not always as exhilarating or at least as civilizing as I understand it used to be under the old diplomacy, where the best of manners concealed the foulest intentions.

It is, of course, unfortunate that the United Nations has become to such a large extent an arena for controversy, rather than co-operation; for propaganda, rather than progress. But words, however vitriolic, are less immediately destructive than bullets. It is better to be shouted down than shot down. As long as the totalitarian and the free world can keep on talking together there is some hope that they can avoid fighting. I think, therefore, that it would be gratuitous folly to abandon the United Nations because circumstances have conspired against its success, or to drive out of it those who are largely responsible for those circumstances. That would indeed be a policy of despair.

I admit at once that the primary objective of those who framed the United Nations Charter - collective security - has not been achieved. Yet the Korean incident has shown that the United Nations can, in certain circumstances be an effective instrument for organizing ad hoc collective resistance to aggression. Moreover, the experience of Korea should help us to improve United Nations procedures and to strengthen the means of collective resistance to aggression from any quarter. We have recognized this in our Uniting for Peace Resolution in the Assembly of 1950, the response to which, however, has not yet been such as to counsel the abandonment of other security arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The reason for United Nations weakness in the security field, is not, of course, the veto in the Security Council but the nature of contemporary international society. So long as world power remains concentrated in two great blocs, with opposing interests and ideologies, collective resistance to the aggression of a great power, or a small power openly and actively supported by a great power, is almost certain to mean a general conflict rather than limited police action. The veto in the Security Council is merely the procedural recognition of these facts of international life. From the beginning of the United Nations it was clear that only if the great powers could at least partially co-operate to preserve peace would the United Nations be an adequate method for providing general collective security. So far this condition has not prevailed.

The judgment of history, I am confident, will be that the free world made a sincere effort to accommodate and work with its old ally, the Soviet Union. At the outset of the United Nations we tried to understand her, and to make allowances for the fears and neuroses of the Russian people who had suffered so terribly in the war and who had resisted so heroically. It was only after repeated refusals on the part of the Kremlin to co-operate in re-establishing a free Europe, only after it had become clear that there could be no liberation for peoples occupied by the Red Army, only after there was unmistakable evidence that the Kremlin's imperialistic ambitions extended far beyond the territories over which it already had control, and finally, only after we learned beyond any doubt that the subversive and divisive forces of international Communism were the agents of Soviet imperialism, only then were we reluctantly driven to the conclusion that additional measures to those provided by the United Nations for the collective defence against aggression

were essential. Otherwise, peaceful co-existence could be achieved only by the free world accepting the domination of Moscow. This was the genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty. If the Kremlin was not its architect, it was certainly its inspiration. It is well to remember these things when the North Atlantic Treaty is now criticized as being either unnecessary in its political origin or exaggerated in its military demands.

It is also well to recall the military situation when the North Atlantic Treaty became effective in September 1949. As General Eisenhower has pointed out in his recent report, there were some thirty Soviet divisions within the shadow of the Iron Curtain, and behind them the enormous military power of the Soviet Union. In all, there were, and still are, about one hundred and seventy-five Soviet divisions under arms, half of them mechanized or armoured, and an air force of about twenty thousand planes. These forces were being rapidly re-equipped with the most modern arms. In addition, satellite states on the European front were being militarized and brutalized.

Western Europe, in comparison, was almost a power vacuum. Nature may abhor a vacuum, but potential aggressors do not. There were not more than fifteen divisions ready to take the field and there were few trained and equipped reserves. In the air the situation was even worse - there were less than 1,000 operational aircraft available in all Western Europe, many of them obsolescent. The free nations were slowly struggling back from the terrible effects of war, and sub-normal standards of living persisted. Morale was at a low ebb. Heavy industry was turning over again but most of its products were needed to rebuild and restore civilian economies. British and American armies which had liberated Western Europe had largely been disbanded. The great munitions and armament industries of Britain, the United States and Canada had been largely converted to peacetime use or closed down. There had been little effort to re-equip armed forces and much of the equipment that was available was out of date. Well, then, did we have no protection at all against an aggressor? We did. We had - or rather the U.S.A. had - the atom bomb and means to deliver it far away from this continent. But, as John Foster Dulles said in New York a few weeks ago, "We must bear in mind that our growing stockpile of atomic weapons - subject to our unpredictable use or abuse - is not everywhere reassuring."

So far as I am personally concerned, if the possibility of atomic war had to be faced, I slept more comfortably in the knowledge that these bombs were on this continent. But if I were a European, I might not have felt quite the same, in the knowledge that North American atomic retaliation for aggression against Europe was my only protection.

But now in 1952, thanks largely to the collective effort and the collective resolve represented by NATO, our situation is better and the temptation to aggression which derives from the assurance of an easy victory over isolated enemies has been substantially minimized. In NATO we have assessed the danger and drafted agreed plans to meet it. We have established unified commands in Western Europe and more recently on the Atlantic. Every member has greatly increased its defence activities and expenditures. Gradually the NATO commands are getting forces and equipment. The foundation of strength as the basis for negotiation is being established; not strength as an end in itself, but strength as a means to the end of settlement of issues with those who think only in terms of force.

All this has entailed and will entail a very heavy burden for all North Atlantic nations. These burdens will, moreover, rest most heavily on those members of the alliance whose standards of living are relatively low, and especially on those who have not fully recovered from the effects of the war. Also, and we are beginning to forget this, the burdens will seem to be even heavier than they are if we begin to doubt the reality of the danger which, in the first place, made them necessary. The real testing time for our determination and our steadiness and our belief in our policy will come when the results of that policy, in terms of the easing of tension, begin to make themselves felt. After the first sprint, will we have the discipline and resolution to settle down to the long, steady pull which may have to be kept

up for a long time before we reach the goal of security and peace?

There are some who worry that the pace in terms of military preparation, in the face of the menace against us, will be too slow. There are others who argue that the pace from the beginning has been too fast; that re-armament has gone forward too rapidly; that we have tried to do too much too soon. They blame this on the fact that the military are now firmly in control of NATO, especially the military of the Pentagon. Military commanders and chiefs of staff naturally ask for the maximum forces they feel are required for defence. They would, I suppose, be failing in their duty and unfaithful to the military tradition if they ever openly admitted that they had enough to make peace secure or victory certain. It is the duty of governments, however, to reconcile military with economic and political factors. The North Atlantic alliance is an alliance of democratic peoples and in the last analysis it is the peoples who will decide what burdens they can bear. I can assure you, however, that the military leaders, who do not control NATO, are themselves by no means blind to the economic and social problems involved in re-armament. In this connection, may I quote again from General Eisenhower's report, a great state paper, full not only of military but of political wisdom. "Military strength", says General Eisenhower, "is of little worth unless backed by healthy expanding economies." And again speaking of the problem of the build-up:

"Everywhere we turned, we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear: nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale - the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate."

At the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council, for the first time, a procedure was found to assess NATO military plans in relation to the economic and political capacities of member nations. A special committee of the Council headed by the so-called "Three Wise Men" was appointed for this task. It reported at the Lisbon meeting in February last, and its report, except in some relatively minor details, was accepted by all governments. This kind of review will now be standard practice in NATO. Henceforth we shall have annual surveys of requirements and capacities. In this procedure I think we have a safeguard that our military programmes will not out-run our collective economic capacities.

We are now embarking on another and important stage in the development of NATO, the proposal to include the German Republic in the Western defence system, and, I hope, to include her also in the developing Atlantic Community. Admittedly, the proposal involves grave risks. It was not put forward in any light-hearted manner, but only after a full and indeed anxious examination of all the possible alternatives. Germany has written some bloody chapters in the recent history of Europe. We cannot forget that. To make the problem more difficult, the German people themselves are now divided by the Iron Curtain and the demand for the union of all Germans will grow, not lessen, in intensity as Germany is given freedom and acquires power. But if the risks of including Germany in Western defence are great, the risks of leaving her out are even greater. In the military sense the first line of defence of Western Europe must be kept as far east of the Rhine as possible. The human and industrial resources of Western Germany make her strength of great importance. We dare not risk that strength falling into the Soviet orbit, as it might so easily do if Germany were left free, neutral and united. But if Western Germany must be defended, the German people must themselves participate in that defence. How, therefore, can this best be done with the least risk to peace?

Thanks to the imaginative statesmanship of France, the plan for a European Defence Community which will include Germany as part of that Community and not as a separate military entity has shown us the way. Under this plan, German forces, as part of the European Army, will serve under a NATO command. The plan, of course, has as yet only been signed by the various governments concerned, and it remains to be ratified.

The Kremlin, of course, will do its utmost to prevent this ratification. This has become the first objective of Soviet foreign policy. So we may expect abuse and threats and intensification of the cold war during the months ahead until ratification is achieved. They are months which will call for strong nerves and steady judgment on the part of the Western peoples; we must not get panicky over the firecrackers or be unduly impressed by the rockets that explode in the form of a dove.

So much for NATO as a defensive alliance. This was and remains its primary, but certainly not its sole purpose. If NATO is to survive, it must become much more than a defensive alliance and, indeed, Article 2 of the Treaty foreshadows such a development. But the threat to the free world is still so great that we do not need to be apologetic about saying that the strengthening of the alliance must be our primary concern.

While pursuing this immediate and concrete objective, we must not forget the ultimate goal of a North Atlantic community, closely co-operating in social, economic and political questions. This remains the long-term objective which we must continue to pursue. But it is one which does not lend itself to 3-or 5-or 10- year plans, and the progress, which will often express itself intangibly, will be difficult to measure. The impatience of those who would build the North Atlantic community in a year is understandable in the light of the crisis of our times, but the criticism, the proposals that this impatience sometimes inspires should also be judged against the background of history.

Out of the habits of consultation and co-operation which we are now acquiring, concrete political results will, I hope, come; but they will come slowly and gradually - at times almost imperceptibly.

In co-operating for defence now we are, I hope, laying the firm foundations of later co-operation in other fields. Historically the needs of defence have always been a profound influence in the development of political communities. Fear of aggression by European states was a powerful influence in creating the United States in 1789. Apprehension that some of the British North American colonies would fall into the lap of the United States was an important influence leading to Canadian confederation in 1867. Common dangers may prove to be the compelling impetus in creating a firm North Atlantic community.

This, then, is our dual purpose in NATO: first, to acquire, as quickly as possible, the military strength adequate for defence. We should resist proposals to establish defence levels higher than absolutely necessary and therefore we should in the NATO civilian agencies scrutinize with a critical eye, the programmes set before us by the military committees. Moreover, we should give the necessary weight to social and economic considerations in deciding the level of defence programmes which should also be continually reviewed in the light of such considerations.

Finally, while we are concentrating, and rightly so, in my opinion, on the short-term problem of adequate collective defence, we should at least lay the foundations for that longer term non-military co-operation which may well determine whether NATO will or indeed should survive the emergency which brought it about.

When I was thinking of what I should say tonight, I recalled that I spoke to your annual meeting in Vancouver four years ago. I thought I had better read what I said then. I did, and discovered that though the date was nearly a year before the Atlantic Pact was signed, I advocated a regional defence agreement under Article 51 of the Charter, the members of which would be willing to accept greater responsibilities for co-operative defence in the

interest of greater security.

Then I went on to give my opinion on the principles on which such an association should be based.

I'm going to do something I don't think I have done before - repeat - that is, deliberately repeat part of a speech which I had previously made to the same group. It will give you a chance to see whether I was a good or bad prophet - and also to check the development of NATO in the first years of its existence against these advocated principles.

I said this about the proposed regional security organization:

"The Canadian official policy on this matter is well known and I need not elaborate it. May I mention very briefly, however, what, in my opinion, such an association of free states should and should not become.

- (1) It must not be a provocative, aggressive alliance against any one state. It must be purely defensive, not exclusive, acting solely within the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter.
- (2) It must not become the instrument of power-nationalism or of the imperialistic policies of any of its members.
- (3) It must not be merely a military alliance -- purely negative in character, with provisions for defence only against the old form of armed aggression, which may be as futile as defence against a muzzle loader in the atomic age.
- (4) It must include provisions, as does the Brussels Pact, for dealing, at least by consultation, with indirect aggression against states, carried on through the spreading of subversive, soul-destroying ideological germs as the prelude to revolution inside and conquest from without. This is, of course, a far more difficult problem than throwing back battalions of soldiers who have crossed frontiers. There is no effective Maginot line against ideas.
- (5) Our security association, therefore, must include provisions, as the Brussels Pact does, not merely for defence against armed aggression, but for peacetime co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields.

In the development of this kind of association lies our best hope for peace. Through it, we can ensure a decisive superiority of physical, economic and moral power on the side of those who do not believe in power, but will use it if there is no alternative.

It is in this kind of association that Canada can best exert its influence for peace and progress. Indeed, it may be that in the future this will be about the only really effective way in which we can exercise such influence, internationally.

Such a development towards democratic collective action on a wider than national scope, in order to succeed, will require great qualities of political, economic and moral leadership.

It should be the first principle of Canada's external policy to provide such leadership within the measure of its own resources, to follow it when others with greater resources give it, and to insist, in and out of season, that only by such leadership and by the acceptance of the ideas which inspire it, is there any hope for stability and for peace."

I still think that these views are sound and I hope that we will continue to strive to realize them.