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Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

THE patent intervention of Communist Chinese forces in the Korean war dominated the military and diplomatic efforts of the United Nations in December. For United Nations forces the month meant retreat before numerically superior forces. The retreat took the Eighth Army 120 miles south to points below the Thirty-eighth Parallel where, relieved of the immediate pressure of Chinese and North Korean units, its consolidation along a 140 mile defence line was accomplished. The evacuation of the Tenth Corps from the Hungnam sector on Christmas Eve considerably relieved the gloomy picture. An army of 105,000 men and complete equipment was moved in an amphibious operation to the Pusan-Pohang concentration area.

In a war summary issued late on Christmas Eve, General MacArthur said that Communist troops were "deploying into attack positions" at several points and generally building up their strength along a line facing the United Nations forces. Elements of Communist troops were reported from the front to have crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel, a line which the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister declared on December 22 had been "obliterated forever". Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea was once again being evacuated and thousands of refugees poured south into Pusan.

United Nations forces suffered a further blow in the accidental death of Lt. Gen. Walton Walker on December 24. Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway flew immediately from the United States and assumed command of the Eighth Army on December 26. At the same time the Tenth Corps, which had operated independently in the north-eastern campaign, became part of the United States Eighth Army.


Communists Attack

The New Year was inaugurated with attacks by Communist forces all along the United Nations line. These attacks were launched on New Year's Eve and unofficial estimates set the attackers' numbers at 200,000 Chinese and 85,000 North Koreans. Holes were punched in the United Nations line, one wedge extending to within twenty miles of Seoul. Many competent observers saw in these attacks a co-ordinated offensive by Chinese and North Korean forces with its objective the destruction or expulsion of United Nations forces. A tightening up of security regulations in the last few weeks of the year, reduced the flow of newspaper coverage of troop movements and battle progress. It will be sometime, therefore, before the details of the year-end offensive are complete.

Canadians in the New Year are likely to have an even greater interest in the Korean war than heretofore. In mid-December the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry arrived in Korea. The Battalion immediately got down to a schedule of intensive training. Nothing concerning future activities of the force had been made public at the year's end.

Throughout the month of December, diplomats of the free nations grappled with the problems raised by Chinese intervention in Korea—problems which were global in their implication. At their Washington conference, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee discussed fully the international issues presented by the Communist menace throughout the world, and major policy decisions were taken to meet the threat of more general war. At Lake Success, consideration was being given to the possibility of arranging a cease-fire in Korea and eventual negotiation of the crisis.

During their important Washington talks, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee laid the groundwork for the policy they would pursue in the critical days ahead. Following their final meeting on December 8, they issued a communiqué which did not deal with Korea in isolation, but set the Korean war in the framework of the world crisis. In that communiqué President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee



—United Nations

UNITED NATIONS CEASE-FIRE GROUP ON KOREA

The United Nations Cease-Fire Group is made up of, left to right, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; His Excellency Nasrollah Entezam, President of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly; and Sir Benegal N. Rau, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.

affirmed their determination to build up the defences of the West and to strengthen the Atlantic community. At the same time, however, the communiqué expressed the will to hold on in Korea, reaffirming that United Nations forces were in the field to halt aggression, and that they were there on the recommendation of the United Nations. There could be "no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression", they emphasized, but they were ready, they pointed out, "to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation". The communiqué did not specify whether negotiations should be limited to Korea or cover Far Eastern problems as well.

With reference to Formosa, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee said "we agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends". Differences were noted, however. The communiqué stated: "on the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People's Government, and considers that its representatives should occupy China's seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations".

The communiqué also treated the question of the atomic bomb. It declared that "the President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation".

Most important, the communiqué indicated what general course would be followed should negotiations with the Peking government fail. In such event, the communiqué stated "it will be for the peoples of the world acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the charter can best be maintained". Thus,

whether any further action, either economic or military, should be taken against Communist China, will have to be determined in and by the United Nations.

Immediately following the Washington conference, Prime Minister Attlee paid a brief visit to Ottawa, where he conferred with Canadian government leaders. Both Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Attlee expressed great satisfaction with their meetings. In a radio broadcast Mr. Attlee declared that he was "comforted and inspired once more by the acknowledgment that the desires of (Canada) are identical with our own".

Cease-Fire in Korea Proposed

While President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee were meeting in Washington, thirteen Asian and Middle Eastern countries, led by India, were attempting to pave the way for a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement in Korea. As was pointed out in the December issue of *External Affairs*, these nations, at the same time that Mr. Pearson was suggesting a cease-fire agreement, appealed to the Peking government and North Korean authorities to declare that their forces would not cross the 38th parallel. On December 12, these countries, pursuing the same initiative, submitted two resolutions to the Political Committee. The first resolution requested "the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible". The second resolution, which was sponsored by twelve nations, (the Philippines only co-sponsoring the first resolution), recommended the appointment of a committee to meet as soon as possible and "make recommendations for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations". The cease-fire resolution was immediately given priority by the Political Committee, and was approved on December 14, by a vote of 52-5, the Soviet bloc opposing and China abstaining. In accordance with this resolution, President Entezam named Sir Benegal Rau and Mr. L. B. Pearson as the two other members of the cease-fire committee.

In introducing the cease-fire resolution, Sir Benegal said General Wu had assured him that the Peking government did not wish a war with the United Nations or the United States. Sir Benegal Rau added that Peking "seemed to be moving toward a kind of Monroe Doctrine for China", considering any foreign intervention in territory adjoining China as an unfriendly act. Mr. Malik, however, made clear that the proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. He stated that the Anglo-American bloc only wanted a cease-fire to gain time to re-attack and had no serious intention of going through with the negotiations. He reiterated that the only solution to the Korean crisis was to be found in the Soviet draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the peninsula. This draft resolution, introduced on December 9, did not however, make it clear whether "foreign forces" would include the Chinese Communists, and if so, whether Chinese Communist troops would be withdrawn at the same time as United Nations forces. Mr. Malik in a later statement ambiguously declared that the withdrawal of the Anglo-American forces would dispose of the need for the Chinese "volunteers".

A few days later, following Moscow's lead General Wu held a press conference to announce Peking's answer to the cease-fire proposal. He rejected it flatly as "a trap", and endorsed instead the Soviet suggestion for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. General Wu also demanded that United States troops be withdrawn from Formosa, and that the Peking government be given its seat in the United Nations. Then he added ambiguously, "we are willing to try to advise the Chinese volunteers to bring to an early conclusion the military operations which they have been forced to undertake together with the Korean People's Army in their resistance against the United States armed forces of aggression". General Wu then announced that he intended to fly home on December 19, with the rest of his delegation.

Despite General Wu's statement, the Cease-Fire Group continued its efforts to end hostilities in Korea. On December 18, it cabled Premier Chou En-lai a message offering to discuss cease-fire arrangements with the Chinese Communists either at Lake Success or any other place that would be mutually convenient. The telegram said:

"The purpose of this cease-fire in Korea will be to prevent the conflict from spreading to other areas, to put an end to the fighting in Korea, and to provide an opportunity for considering what further steps should be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The above committee has now met representatives of the Unified Command in Korea and has discussed with them, in an exploratory manner, possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might be established. Since the Government of the Communist People's Republic of China has expressed strong views on the future of Korea, and about the present state of warfare in that country, and since Chinese are participating in that warfare, the committee wishes also to discuss with your Government or its representatives, and with the military authorities in command of the forces operating in North Korea possible conditions upon which a cease-fire might be established.

Proposal Rejected

Despite the Cease-Fire Group's telegram the Chinese Communist delegation left New York on December 19. On December 22, Premier Chou En-lai notified the United Nations of his government's rejection of the cease-fire proposal. Premier Chou's telegram was addressed to Mr. Entezam as President of the Assembly and not as head of the Cease-Fire Group, which he refused to recognize. The telegram stated that the Chinese Communist representative had not participated in the discussion setting-up the Cease-Fire Group, and that the Chinese Communist Government regarded as "illegal, null and void", all major resolutions concerning Asia which were adopted by the United Nations without the participation of the Peking representative. It also stated that United States forces in crossing the 38th parallel had "obliterated forever this demarcation line of political geography". Finally the telegram reiterated the conditions which had been laid down by General Wu for negotiating a possible settlement—withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, withdrawal of United States forces from Taiwan, and the seating of the Peking Government representative in the United Nations. "To put aside these points" the reply concluded "would make it impossible to settle peacefully the Korean problem and the important problem of Asia".

As the year ended the United Nations awaited the report of the Cease-Fire Group which it was expected would be made early in the New Year. According to published reports, Mr. Gross of the United States delegation at the United Nations informed Sir Benegal Rau on January 1 that the United States would not take part in any "cease-fire" negotiations with the Chinese Communist government if its forces continued their reported drive below the Thirty-eighth Parallel. It was expected that, following the report of the Cease-Fire Group, the Political Committee would reconvene to consider the Far Eastern problems still outstanding on its agenda.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AT THE END OF 1950

On December 18 and 19 historic joint meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Defence Committee and Council were held at Brussels. Three important decisions emerged: establishment of an integrated force for Western Europe and the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander; an agreement as to the manner in which the German Federal Republic might participate in the integrated force; and the re-organization of the production and supply structure of NATO. These decisions are the latest steps in the effort of North Atlantic countries to build up sufficient collective forces in the North Atlantic area to deter aggression.

The appointment of General Eisenhower is the latest in a series of important decisions in the military field. At the Council meeting in London in May 1950, it was agreed in principle that the forces of NATO countries should be developed and expanded on the basis of a collective balance of forces for the whole area rather than balanced forces for each nation. Only thus did it appear possible for North Atlantic countries to afford the armaments essential for their security without impairing severely the living standards of their people and thus sowing the seeds of discontent behind their military lines. In the September meeting of the Council in New York, the principle was agreed to of an integrated force under a single command for Western Europe. Even more important was the offer of the United States at this meeting to strengthen substantially its forces stationed in Western Europe on the condition, among others, of effective defence efforts by European members and of the participation of Western Germany. Implicit in the offer was acceptance of the thesis of certain European members that the first line of defence for Europe should not be the line of the Rhine, but the eastern frontiers of Western Germany.

Significant Appointment

The appointment of General Eisenhower precedes the organization of a unitary command structure. It is anticipated that he will establish his headquarters in Europe early in the new year. He will be supported by a staff drawn from the nations contributing to the integrated force. The appointment is highly important psychologically and practically. To European members it is an earnest of United States intention to participate in the defence of Western Europe and not merely in its liberation. From a practical standpoint, if aggression comes in the near future it is of enormous advantage that the Commander-in-Chief who will be responsible for fighting the initial battle should be able to build his own organization, should be in a position to take an effective hand in planning, and should have over-all direction of training forces which must be prepared to operate effectively together if collective defence is to be a reality. On personal grounds, no one could be more acceptable for the post of Commander-in-Chief than General Eisenhower.

The decision on the re-armament of West Germans was reached with great reluctance and much misgiving, especially on the part of France and Belgium, where memories of German militarism are still particularly vivid. But there appeared to be no alternative. Immediately beyond the Iron Curtain are vast forces in being; the re-armament of Eastern Germany and other satellites proceeds apace. Faced with this threat, there has arisen the military necessity of denying to the Soviets the use of West German industry and manpower, and of securing, to this end, the assistance of the Germans themselves. Moreover, if Western Germany had to be included in the area of defence it was only fair that the Germans should share the common burden. The decision is also in line with the policy announced in September by the three Occupying Powers of Western Germany of a "progressive return of Germany to partnership in Western Europe".

From the outset there was full agreement that there should be no re-creation of a German General Staff or of a German national army, and no revival of heavy war industry in Germany. The original plan proposed by the United States in September was that German units on a divisional scale should be incorporated in a Western European integrated force. This plan was unacceptable to the French, and although they were prepared to recognize, in principle, the importance of incorporation of Germans in Western defence, deadlock developed over the form, timing, and scale. The French proposed instead that Germans should be organized in units no larger than battalions, and that no Germans should be re-armed ahead of the European members of NATO; and as an additional safeguard, that they should be included only in a European army which would form part of the integrated force. The European army would be under European political control. Further, no steps should be taken to re-arm Germans until further progress had been made towards the integration of German coal and steel industries with those of Western Europe, and hence towards European rather than German control of these industries, as proposed in the Schuman Plan.

Agreement Reached

Under the stress of events unanimous agreement was reached at the Brussels meeting to a compromise plan by which Germans would be incorporated into the integrated European force in units smaller than divisional strength. The French in turn were to be free to call a meeting early in the year of the governments concerned with the establishment of a European army.

In the meantime, the Occupying Powers are authorized to begin negotiations with the West German Government. Effective co-operation by Western Germany in the common defence will require the willing support of the West German people. To date there has been little indication that this will be forthcoming. Indeed, the evidence is that rearmament has little appeal for most West Germans, except possibly on terms of full equality. The Germans are likely to seek the best bargain possible; and German units, even for training purposes, cannot be expected for several months.

It generally takes much less time to turn raw recruits into soldiers than to produce modern military equipment from scratch. There is urgent need for production to keep pace with expanding forces. Under the best of circumstances we could scarcely have expected much more equipment to be available by the end of 1950 than is actually the case. In addition to the inevitable delay normally involved in producing new equipment, or in converting peacetime industries to wartime production, certain problems arose out of the nature of the collective enterprise on which North Atlantic Treaty countries are engaged. Some of these questions could only be answered after preliminary planning for the defence of the whole area. For example: What items of equipment were most urgently needed and in what quantities? What types of equipment were militarily most suitable for national forces who would have to operate together? Among other questions involving economic and financial considerations are: Where could the items required be most economically produced? How could equipment, or raw materials for production, from dollar areas, be paid for by European members short of dollar exchange?

In December 1949, a Military Production and Supply Board, on which all NATO Countries were represented by senior officials, was established. This Board, with its Permanent Working Staff, did useful service in estimating needs, in deciding what items should have high priority and in surveying possible sources of production. To co-ordinate production more effectively, the meeting in Brussels decided to replace the Military Production and Supply Board by a new organization with wider powers: the Defence Production Board. Its functions will be to expand and accelerate production and to further the mutual use of the industrial capacities of all member

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
Sixième Session

Bruxelles, 19 décembre 1950.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Sixth Session

Brussels, 19th December, 1950.

Le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord ayant pris conformément à la recommandation du Comité de Défense les dispositions nécessaires pour l'établissement sous un Commandant Suprême de la force unifiée pour la défense de l'Europe, et ayant demandé au Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique de désigner un officier américain pour remplir les fonctions de Commandant Suprême, le Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ayant désigné le Général d'Armée Dwight D. Eisenhower, le Conseil déclare en conséquence que le Général d'Armée Dwight D. Eisenhower est nommé Commandant Suprême avec toutes les fonctions et pouvoirs spécifiés au document sur les forces qui seront affectées à ce commandement.

The North Atlantic Council having made provision, in accordance with the recommendation of the Defence Committee, for the Integrated Force for the defence of Europe under a Supreme Commander, and having requested the President of the United States to designate an officer of the United States to fill the position of Supreme Commander, and the President of the United States having designated General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Council therefore declares that General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower is appointed the Supreme Commander, with the powers and functions specified in over the forces to be assigned to his command.

BELGIQUE

BELGIUM

CANADA

CANADA

DANEMARK

DENMARK

ETATS-UNIS

UNITED STATES

FRANCE

FRANCE

ISLANDE

ICELAND

ITALIE

ITALY

LUXEMBOURG

LUXELBOURG

NORVEGE.

NORWAY

PAYS-BAS

NETHERLANDS

PORTUGAL

PORTUGAL

ROYAUME-UNI

UNITED KINGDOM

The signatures on the North Atlantic Council resolution reproduced above are those of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the various countries, as follows: Mr. Paul van Zeeland and Colonel E. V. G. A. De Greef (Belgium); Mr. Brooke Claxton (Canada); Mr. Bjorn Kraft (Denmark); Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Frank Pace (United States); Mr. Jules Moch and Mr. Robert Schuman (France); Mr. B. Benediktson (Iceland); Count Carlo Sforza and Mr. Randolph Pacciardi (Italy); Mr. J. Bech and Mr. Pierre Dupong (Luxembourg); Mr. H. M. Lange and Mr. Jens Chr. Hauge (Norway); Mr. D. U. Stikker and Mr. H. L.'s Jacob (the Netherlands); Mr. P. Cunha and Lt. Col. Fernando dos Santos Costa (Portugal); Mr. Ernest Bevin and Mr. Emanuel Shinwell (United Kingdom).

nations. The Board will have a full-time director who, it is understood, will be an outstanding American industrialist.

The production of modern military equipment and the maintenance of modern fighting forces are very costly. Some countries are better placed than others to provide men and supplies quickly. Different countries have different standards of equipment and maintenance for their armed forces. Under the North Atlantic Treaty, the signatories are committed to "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" in order to be able to resist attack. The question of "mutual aid" naturally leads to a consideration of the abilities of the several countries to support the economic and financial loads of common defence. In some countries the whole foundation of post-war recovery might be shaken by too heavy a load. Political as well as economic factors have to be considered. No country can be expected to shoulder new and heavy burdens if others are hanging back. Thus co-operation in defence implies co-operation in wider fields.

Simplification of Structure Needed

A further problem under discussion in NATO is that of simplification of its committee structure, particularly at the political level. The organization was originally set up with three Ministerial committees: the Council, which was the over-all directing authority, consisting of Foreign Ministers; the Defence Committee, consisting of Defence Ministers; the Defence Finance and Economic Committee, consisting of Finance Ministers. This arrangement undoubtedly had the advantage that it directly interested various Ministers in every government and the officials of their departments in NATO problems, but it was not designed for speedy action. At the meeting in May 1950 it was decided to set up a standing body of Deputies of Council members in order to give continuous direction to the activities of the organization. However, it is still felt in many quarters that the political structure is unduly cumbersome. The Canadian Government has accordingly suggested that the three Ministerial Committees should be consolidated in one body, which would be in effect a Council of Governments, and that at any meeting governments should be entitled to be represented by whatever Ministers they deem appropriate. This proposal was favourably discussed at the Brussels meeting and was referred back to the Council Deputies for study and report.

Progress in strengthening the North Atlantic community depends, however, more directly on actions taken by governments and parliaments than on agreement on principles or plans reached at NATO meetings. In this connection the enormously enhanced defence programme of the United States adopted since aggression in Korea is perhaps the most significant event of the year in NATO circles. Under the leadership of the United States, virtually every member of NATO raised its defence sights. The United States programme included quadrupling appropriations for the year under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act, and a considerable volume of military equipment and supplies has begun to flow across the Atlantic.

To this volume Canada is contributing. The special appropriation for assisting the re-armament of NATO countries passed by Parliament in September made it possible for Canada to offer to transfer from its reserve military stocks, armament, ancillary equipment and ammunition of United Kingdom type for two divisions, the Canadian Army to be re-equipped by the purchase of United States types. This equipment for one division has already been transferred to the Netherlands, in accordance with the recommendations of NATO Council Deputies; that for the second division, it is expected, will be made available shortly.

Large orders for new equipment have been placed by the United States and the United Kingdom, mainly with their own producers, for their own needs and those of their allies. Canadian productive capacity, as well as that of other NATO countries,

is beginning to be used. But there is still a long way to go before existing facilities in the whole North Atlantic area will be fully employed or potential capacity converted to the extent required. It will be longer still before finished equipment in sufficient volume will be coming off assembly lines.

The first stage in the effective development of the North Atlantic Alliance was one of setting up a working organization, and of preliminary military planning. The second resulted in decision, in principle, to establish an integrated European force. The next stage must be one of action: to build up national forces; to establish an integrated force in Europe adequate to deter aggression and, if aggression comes, to resist it effectively; to produce modern equipment in quantity. The realization of these objectives will demand the efforts of all North Atlantic Treaty countries.

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

(The following statement was made for the newsreels by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, on December 26, 1950, immediately after his return from the Brussels meetings. Mr. Claxton represented the Canadian Government at both the Council and Defence Committee meetings at Brussels. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, who had expected to attend the Council, was unable to do so because he had been appointed a member of the United Nations Cease-Fire Group on Korea.)

This is ordinarily the festive season, but as we are beginning a New Year there is in the minds of all of us the realization of hard work to be done in the months ahead. The increasing threat of aggression continues to give cause for profound anxiety. The free nations everywhere must push on with their preparations to defend themselves and so deter aggression.

Shortly before Christmas I returned from a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations in Brussels. At that meeting all twelve of the member nations agreed that we should press forward at a much greater speed to attain the goal of security.

To this end it was my honour to propose the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the integrated force of Europe. It is his job to organize that force to defend Western Europe against the threat of Communist aggression. At the present time the government is considering how we can best do our part to build up that integrated force. Our decision will be subject to the approval of Parliament when it meets later this month. Strong enough forces will preserve the peace by deterring aggression. What we are spending on defence should be regarded as the premium of insurance for peace, and because the risks are greater we are going to spend much more.

The reverses suffered by the United Nations in Korea, and China's refusal to accept the Cease-Fire proposal of the United Nations emphasize the urgent need for action now.

Canada's future lies in our hands. The Canadian people have never failed in resolution or in effort.

We shall need men and money and materials in increasing quantities. We shall want a good deal more than business as usual.

1951 will be a difficult and challenging year but I am sure we'll meet the challenge, provided each does his part.

THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN COLONIES

During the past ten years, increasing attention has been paid to the political problems of the British Caribbean Colonies. These colonies, some of which were acquired by England as long ago as the early 17th century, now appear to have started on the road leading to a greater measure of political autonomy. This movement, which has made rapid progress since the Second World War, is the outcome of a long political evolution, dating from the era of colonial conquest. In studying this evolution, it may be useful to recall where the British Caribbean Colonies are situated, what elements comprise their population, and what are the main problems, economic and social, confronting their governments.

Some Geographical Notes

It is sometimes assumed, even in Canada, that the British Caribbean Colonies consist of a small group of obscure islands in the Caribbean Sea. Their actual extent is considerable. To the west, in the Greater Antilles, lie the islands of Jamaica and the Caymans; to the east, in the Lesser Antilles, lie the British Virgin Islands, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, St. Christopher, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and Dominica*; to the south of them lie the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, near the coast of Venezuela. Also included in the British Caribbean Colonies are the Bahamas, an archipelago consisting of a cluster of small islands situated on the edge of the tropics, north of Cuba and Haiti and close to the coast of Florida; the Turks and Caicos Islands, geographically part of the Bahamas, but politically dependencies of Jamaica; British Honduras, wedged between Mexico and Guatemala, south of the Yucatan Peninsula; and finally, British Guiana, situated on the north coast of South America and bordered by Venezuela, Brazil and Surinam (Dutch Guiana).

It will thus be seen that these colonies are far from constituting a geographical entity and are separated by great distances. Jamaica is a thousand miles from Trinidad and seven hundred miles from British Honduras, while four hundred miles separate Port of Spain (Trinidad) from Georgetown (British Guiana).

Population

The British Caribbean Colonies contain about three million inhabitants, unevenly distributed among the various territories. Some islands are over-populated (Barbados, for example, has a population density of 1,190 per square mile); but other colonies, such as British Guiana with only 5 inhabitants per square mile, are thinly peopled. The population is extremely heterogeneous. The great majority of the inhabitants (over 90% in some colonies) are of the Negro race, but there are also a minority of whites, important Indian communities, (mainly in British Guiana and Trinidad) and a few small groups of Chinese, Syrians, and aborigines. Miscegenation makes the picture even more complex: in Jamaica and Barbados, for instance, it is estimated that groups of mixed races make up about 20% of the population.

In addition to the mixture of races there is a wide diversity of customs and traditions. During the course of their history, most of the colonies were submitted to the influence of different cultures, and this can be seen in the speech and manners of the people. Thus, in Jamaica, Barbados and the Leeward Islands, the social atmosphere is predominantly English, whereas in Dominica, St. Lucia and Grenada the influence of French culture is still apparent. In Trinidad, an island which, before passing into the hands of the British, was first colonized by the Spanish Government

* For purposes of administration, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada and Dominica comprise the Windward Islands. St. Christopher and Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands constitute the federal colony of the Leeward Islands.



with French settlers, the culture and customs implanted by the latter are still evident in a society whose traditions are fundamentally English. These varied influences, together with ethnic differences, help to explain the divergencies among these various colonies.

Economic and Social Problems

One of the gravest problems confronting the governments of the various British Caribbean Colonies is that of raising the standard of living. Natural resources are not sufficiently developed and public revenue is often inadequate, the main source of revenue of the colonies being the collection of customs duties. Some colonies have to rely on annual subsidies from the United Kingdom.

Further, the trade balance of the colonies is unfavourable*; and as a result of hurricanes, drought and disease affecting agricultural production, the volume of exports varies from year to year. This fluctuation sometimes creates serious problems since even when exports fall in volume, imports of such essential commodities as flour, salt-fish and meat, cannot be correspondingly reduced. In spite of these difficulties, notable progress has been made throughout the whole area in the extension and improvement of social services.

The very existence of the British Caribbean Colonies is closely connected with the prosperity of their agriculture. In the past, the staple and indeed almost the only crop was sugar. Now the colonies grow and export on a large scale other products, such as coffee, cotton, spices, citrus fruit and bananas. The standard of living naturally remains dependent on the prices obtained for agricultural products on the world market; and the whole economy is affected by a poor crop or a reduction in prices.

However, the natural resources of the colonies, although limited, are far from depleted. Thus, Trinidad produces oil and natural asphalt, the exploitation of which is a valuable source of revenue for the colony. British Guiana possesses forests, only now being exploited on a large scale, as well as bauxite, gold and diamonds. British Honduras exports mahogany and chicle. In short, each of the colonies has certain resources, the development of which could be intensified and improved.

* This refers to the visible trade balance and does not include revenue from tourist trade.

Industry and Tourist Trade

Although most of the colonies possess plants for processing their primary products, they have to import almost all the manufactured products they require. Industrialization on a small scale has taken place in Jamaica, Trinidad and British Guiana, and measures are being taken to increase its scope.

The tourist trade plays an important part in the economy of the island colonies, especially the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Barbados, whose favourable climatic conditions attract thousands of visitors each year. Many airlines, including Trans-Canada Air Lines, contribute their share to the development of this trade, although the bulk of the traffic continues to be carried by the various steamship companies, including the Canadian National Steamship Lines, which serve the region.

Political Evolution

The British Caribbean colonies have a lengthy political history, and their legislative assemblies have long maintained the parliamentary tradition of Westminster. Some of these institutions date back a century or more, and Barbados has had representative institutions since the 17th century.

Before the Second World War many statesmen, both in the United Kingdom and in the colonies, believed that the political evolution of the colonies was too slow, and asked for wider constitutional reforms. Slavery had been abolished as long ago as 1838, when the Emancipation Act was enforced; but electoral franchise had been granted only to a minority. Moreover, legislative assemblies were in practice reduced to the role of critics and exerted little real influence on the conduct of public affairs, power being wielded by the governor and his executive council. Protests against the political conditions reached their peak during the years immediately preceding the Second World War. The colonies at this time still felt the effect of the depression of the thirties; the standard of living was too low and wages were inadequate. These factors generated political discontent, which in turn gave rise to a series of strikes, demonstrations, and riots.

The Royal Commission

To meet this emergency and to deal with the various requests of the Colonies for political and social betterment, the United Kingdom, in July 1938, appointed a royal commission to investigate and report on local social and economic conditions of the Colonies.

In December 1939, the Commission submitted a report recommending action to improve social services and economic conditions generally. With regard to constitutional reform, the Commission recommended that representatives elected by the people be admitted to the executive councils, and that a universal franchise be adopted either immediately or gradually. While stating that political union was not in itself a solution for the Colonies, the report indicated that it was nevertheless an ultimate goal. As an experiment, the Commission proposed the federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands, in order to find out the advantages of such a union.

Carrying Out Its Recommendations

In order to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the Government of the United Kingdom set up, in September 1940, an organization for the development and welfare of the British West Indies, under the direction of a controller responsible for preparing and submitting plans to extend social services. The United Kingdom Parliament, under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act—1940, also voted the credits required to carry out a comprehensive programme of technical and financial aid to the Colonies. (Later, in 1945 and 1949, Parliament voted supplementary estimates to cover increased requirements.) While all the

British Colonies took advantage of these credits, the British Caribbean Colonies had a large share of them, and plans for development have already been approved for Jamaica (including Turks and Caicos Islands), Barbados, St. Vincent, British Guiana, Grenada and other colonies.

The British Government did not limit its action to the economic field. Various measures granting the British Caribbean Colonies a greater degree of self-government have also been put into effect since the end of the Second World War. These measures have varied according to the needs and aspirations of the colony concerned. Jamaica and Trinidad now have universal franchise, while in most of the other colonies the franchise has been enlarged. There has also been a reduction in the number of "official" appointments to the legislative assemblies, and in Jamaica and Barbados members of the assembly are now elected by the people. In certain colonies, members elected by the people are now admitted to the executive council. This has for some time been the practice in Jamaica and Barbados, and was extended this year to the colony of Trinidad and Tobago. Jamaica and Trinidad now have new constitutions, both much advanced in the direction of self-government; Barbados also has a modified form of responsible government.

The Montego Bay Conference

Beginning in 1945, the United Kingdom gave the various colonial legislatures an opportunity to discuss the plan of political union brought up by the Royal Commission, and to express their views. As a result of these discussions, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones, convened a meeting of the representatives of all the Colonies at Montego Bay (Jamaica), on September 11, 1947, for the purpose of discussing officially the proposed plan for federation.

The conference, presided over by Mr. Creech-Jones, lasted until September 19. The Bahamas were the only colony not represented. Most of the delegates were in favour of the broad lines of the federal scheme, but claimed more extensive powers for each of the local governments prior to the establishment of a federal government. The conference also proposed the establishment of several committees to study the problems involved in the proposed union, in particular the unification of customs tariffs and of public utilities and shipping services, the establishment of one currency for the whole region and the setting up of a federal constitution.

Standing Closer Association Committee

The most important of all these Committees was the Standing Closer Association Committee, whose members were selected by the legislature of each of the Colonies and whose chairman and secretary were appointed by the Colonial Secretary. This Committee, the first to be organized, held meetings at Barbados in November 1948, at Trinidad in March 1949, again at Barbados in July 1949, and finally at Jamaica, in October 1949. Sir Hubert Rance, present governor of Trinidad and Tobago, was chairman. On March 10, 1950, the Committee published its recommendations in a lengthy report.

The Rance Report

The report first notes that the establishment of the Standing Closer Association Committee was the result of a resolution adopted by the Conference held in Montego Bay, and then outlines the proposed federal structure. After stating that financial stability is essential to achieve real political independence, the Committee concludes that the economic stability and, as a result, the political independence of the British Caribbean Colonies can only be achieved through federation. For even if the financial situation of the region is now relatively good, a closer analysis shows that the economy of the Caribbean Colonies remains highly vulnerable. Some colonies still depend



MONTEGO BAY, JAMAICA, B.W.I.

—Jamaica Official

upon the subsidies of the British Treasury to balance their budget, while others, even if more prosperous, do not have sufficient income to improve social conditions, or to maintain the research facilities necessary to increase their agricultural and industrial production.

Allotment of Powers

In a special chapter, the Rance Report deals with the allotment of powers between the proposed federal government and the constituent parties. Taking the Australian constitution as a basis, the Report adopts the principle of "unallotted powers" (according to which certain powers are transferred to the central government, while the unallotted powers remain with the constituent territories), and divides into two categories the problems falling within the scope of the federal government. It recommends an "exclusive" list of matters which may be dealt with only by the central authority, and a second list of matters on which the central authority and the local governments may both legislate. Defence, external affairs, exchange control, and foreign loans, for example, are assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authority; while banks, currency, industrial development, immigration, criminal law, marriage and divorce, postal services, transport, communications and labour matters, will fall under the jurisdiction of both the federal and local authorities, with federal legislation prevailing in case of dissent. The other unallotted powers, relating mainly to agriculture, education and the maintenance of peace and order, will remain under the authority of the local governments, but the federal government shall act as adviser in such matters should it wish to do so. The allotment of powers is not final, but is to be subject to revision in the light of experience.

Finance

It is further recommended in the report that the federal government shall have its own sources of revenue. For this purpose, it will take 25% of the customs revenue,

the remainder going to the local governments. Postal matters under the contemplated union will come under the central government, but the colonies which derive benefits from postal services may claim subsidies in compensation for losses sustained through the transfer of administration.

The report also points out that all colonies shall have the right to float loans in their own territory, but that foreign loans shall come under the jurisdiction of the central authorities. The latter shall also distribute any special subsidies granted by the British Treasury to those colonies whose revenues are inadequate. These grants which, it is expected, will be continued, even under the federal system, for a period of at least ten years, will take the form of an annual subsidy equal to the average of all subsidies granted during the five years prior to the federation. Should such subsidies prove inadequate, the central authorities may supplement them by drawing from their own revenue; should the latter be inadequate, the central authority may then apply directly to London. It is expected that this provision may induce the federal government and, therefore, each of the constituent parties, to practice economies and to depend first of all upon themselves. The federal government will, however, continue to receive the assistance provided by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. According to the Report, the annual cost of the federal plan will be about £180,000 for the first years.

Legislature

It is recommended that the federal legislature be composed of two chambers, a legislative assembly and a senate. The legislative assembly, whose members will be elected directly by the people*, shall be composed of fifty deputies, divided as follows: Jamaica, 16; Trinidad, 9; British Guiana, 6; Barbados, 4; other colonies, two each; (except Montserrat which shall have one). The senate shall be composed of twenty-three members (two for each territory, except Montserrat which shall have one), appointed by the head of the state.

The legislative assembly shall legislate on all matters, except those reserved to the governor general. The senate, on the other hand, shall not postpone the adoption of a bill beyond a period of twelve months. The assembly will have priority over the senate, whose main function will be to protect the interests of each of the colonies making up the federation.

The Executive

According to the recommendations of the Report, the executive shall consist of a governor general appointed by the King and of a state council (or executive council) of fourteen members. The members of the legislative assembly shall elect one of their members to the post of "prime minister", who shall then select seven other "ministers" or members of the Council, either from the legislative assembly or the senate. The governor general shall then appoint the six other members of the executive council, but shall, however, select three of them from the members of either chamber. The state council shall formulate the policy of the government and shall be responsible to the legislature for carrying it out. The governor general shall follow the advice of his ministers on any bill previously adopted by both chambers, except for certain matters submitted to his right of veto and dealing with defence, external relations, some financial matters, as well as the maintenance of law and order and of public utilities in case of emergency.

The Report also provides for the establishment of a federal supreme court which shall hear certain cases as determined by the constitution, as well as appeals from local or regional courts.

* Except for the first election which shall be held according to the regulations in effect in each colony.

Finally, the federation shall be known officially as the "British Caribbean Federation" and its seat of government shall be Trinidad.

Pro-federative Action

The Rance Report concludes its recommendations by requesting the different committees established following the Montego Bay conference to carry on their work vigorously, without waiting for the realization of the contemplated political union, since, in some cases, there is great need for common and immediate action. This invitation is not directed to the Commission on the Unification of the Public Services, because the latter, which sat from December 1948 until August 1949, under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice Holmes, issued its report at the same time as the Standing Closer Association Committee, on March 10, 1950. The Committee for the Unification of Customs tariffs have also held several meetings, but has not yet submitted any reports. Progress is also being made in the study of several other problems, including the establishment of a single currency and other economic questions.

In the meantime, the legislatures of the different colonies* have begun to study the recommendations of the Standing Closer Association Committee. So far, the report has, in general, met with a favourable reception. Some colonies have received it with caution, others with enthusiasm. Still others, without being entirely hostile, have rejected some of its recommendations. It will, of course, be necessary to adjust differences and to smooth away many difficulties before an agreement can be reached. The responsibilities of the proposed federation, especially in matters of defence and foreign relations, will be limited, but there is every reason to believe that the plan, if brought into being, will be an outstanding event in the political evolution of the British Caribbean Colonies towards dominion status and, eventually, independence within the Commonwealth.

* The plan of federation does not include the Bahamas.

"EXTERNAL AFFAIRS": TWO YEARS OF PUBLICATION

The issue of *External Affairs* for December 1950 completed the second year of the bulletin's publication in printed form. This issue contained an index for Volume I, January-December 1950, listing by titles, and in some instances, by subject matter the articles carried. "Canadian Representation at International Conferences" and similar reference matter which is listed each month or quarter has not been separately noted in this index.

The increasing gravity of the international situation since June 25, 1950, has been reflected in a corresponding emphasis in *External Affairs* on articles of a topical nature. "The Korean Crisis" has been a feature of each issue since July, and the December issue provided full official texts of the two important statements of policy made by Mr. Pearson on December 4 and 5.

That *External Affairs* is serving a useful purpose is suggested by the fact that its monthly circulation has been maintained at about nine thousand copies for more than a year. It is the hope of the Department that, as the continuing pressure of events stimulates interest among Canadians in international relations, this figure, which includes both the French and English editions, will increase in the months to come.

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES

Many of the baffling problems with which the Western democracies have been faced since the last war have been met with imagination and determination. Nowhere has this imagination and determination been displayed more appropriately than in the acceptance of the obligation to extend technical assistance to less fortunate under-developed countries in their efforts to better their economic and social conditions.

The newly-won political independence of many economically retarded countries has thrown into harsh relief the misery of their people, who produce too little food and too few goods, because they are undernourished and illiterate and because they lack the technical knowledge and the capital. These peoples are no longer willing to accept the conditions of grinding poverty which have so frequently been their lot in the past. Many of these countries, however, have been hampered in their peaceful development since the War by disruptive forces which have been quick to utilize such conditions as breeding grounds for discontent. Only if their willingness to help themselves by mobilizing their material resources to improve the lot of their peoples is matched by the sympathetic and disinterested concern of the free countries of the West for their welfare can they lessen the risk of their achievement of political independence becoming a chimera. The Canadian Government, along with other western democracies, shares a common concern for the material progress of the peoples of these under-developed areas of the world, both as a humanitarian end and because it is convinced that this progress will further the advance of human freedom and secure the ground for a democratic way of life and the development of international understanding.

This concern was recently underlined by Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in his review of the current international situation delivered at the Federal-Provincial Conference on December 4, 1950, when he said:

"The forces of Communist aggression in Asia have in the past successfully allied themselves with the forces of national liberation and social reform. The task of the Western democratic powers is to assist the democratic governments in those areas to break that unnatural alliance. For this purpose, it is essential that the Western countries help the Asian democratic countries in their plans for economic development, in order to relieve the distress and poverty there, on which international communism feeds. Within the measure of its resources Canada should, I think, do its part to help in this great effort to promote human welfare and hence to ensure peace."

Canadian Contribution

The extent to which the Canadian Government is already implementing this policy of "enlightened self-interest" by its participation in programmes of technical assistance to under-developed countries has perhaps been overshadowed by the urgency of political and military developments of the past few months. In a previous issue of *External Affairs* (Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1950, pp. 269-271) reference was made to the setting up of the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and to the Canadian financial contribution of \$850,000 to the fund for the first eighteen months of its operation. At the same time, the Canadian Government made a contribution of \$400,000 for the first year's operation of a Commonwealth sponsored programme of technical assistance for the countries of South and South-East Asia, which has since been so much broadened in scope as to lose its exclusively Commonwealth character and is now known as the Colombo Programme for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia. The programme is designed to

supplement the United Nations Programme and to provide immediate assistance to an area where the needs are most urgent. Countries which have participated in the drawing up of the Colombo Report for Co-operative Economic Development of South and South-East Asia have realized that an effective programme to provide expert advice and assistance to these countries both by training and by lending trained manpower is essential if any large scale financial assistance which might be made available to them is to be used to advantage.

Progress has been made during the past six months in putting into practical effect plans for these ambitious programmes. The constitution of the Council, which is made up of representatives of all countries co-operating in the Colombo Programme and designed to supervise this technical assistance programme in South and South-East Asia, had been approved; and the first series of meetings was held during December to deal with specific requests for technical assistance from countries in the area. The actual administration of the programme will be carried out by a Bureau which is being established in Colombo*. The Canadian Government approved the constitution of the Council on November 10, 1950, and has designated Mr. Paul Sykes, Canadian Trade Commissioner in Colombo, as Canadian representative on the Council.

Activities Co-ordinated

Under the United Nations Expanded Programme, much has been accomplished to co-ordinate the technical assistance activities of the specialized agencies and organizations participating in the discharge of their responsibilities under the Programme. The United Nations, which itself is responsible for the more general aspects of the programme, has set up a Technical Assistance Administration to provide technical assistance through comprehensive exploratory surveys, technical advice, research and administrative services and training under Fellowships in Public Administration, Economic and Social Affairs. In September, Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, formerly Canadian Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, who, earlier in the year, had headed a United Nations Technical Assistance Mission to Bolivia, was appointed Director-General of the Administration.

The Canadian Government has recognized the importance of co-ordinating, insofar as practicable, the activities of these technical assistance programmes, both in the administration of the programmes and in the fields where technical assistance is being extended. It has also recognized the desirability of co-ordinating Canadian participation in these programmes in order that this participation might be as effective as possible.

A Technical Assistance Service has therefore been established to co-ordinate all Canadian activities with regard to technical assistance either with the United Nations or its Specialized Agencies, with the Bureau of the Co-operative Plan for Technical Assistance to South and South-East Asia, or in response to direct requests from foreign governments. This Technical Assistance Service, which is situated in the Department of Trade and Commerce, commenced its operation with the New Year. The Director, who reports to an inter-departmental group drawn from interested government departments, the chairman of which is an officer of the Department of External Affairs, is responsible for recruiting Canadian experts and advisers from the Civil Service, industry and universities as well as for making arrangements for the recep-

* During the interval between the approval of the plan in principle by the announcement of financial contributions from co-operating countries and the setting up of the Council, a preliminary survey of availabilities and requirements was undertaken, liaison was established with officials of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, and details of the constitution of the Council and the Bureau were worked out by a standing Committee of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee which met in Colombo.

tion of students, trainees and observers who come to Canada under these programmes to train in our universities or government departments or to become acquainted with our industrial techniques. The Canadian Government is prepared to make provision for federal civil servants who are recruited under these programmes and has drawn to the attention of all federal government departments and agencies that their co-operation both in respect of encouraging employees to accept temporary positions abroad under these programmes and in making available to trainees facilities in their fields of activity is essential for effective Canadian participation in the technical programmes.

Fellowship Holders Placed

Until the Technical Assistance Service was established, requests of the Canadian Government to provide technical assistance were handled by the Department of External Affairs. During the past few months since the United Nations Expanded Programme has come into operation, this Department has handled twenty-five requests from the U.N. for the placement of United Nations Fellowship holders in Canadian Government departments, industry and universities. In only two cases was it found impossible to make suitable facilities available. There are at present studying in Canada under the U.N. Fellowship Programme government officials or senior civil servants from such widely scattered countries as Iraq, Haiti, Pakistan, Mexico, Brazil, Cambodia, India, Malta, Siam and Burma. Their interests lie in such divergent fields as veterinary services, taxation assessment, industrial development, forestry, hydro-electric power development, public administration, geological surveys, censustaking and civil service personnel administration. Some progress has been made in recruiting Canadian experts and technicians to serve abroad. In addition to lending the services of Canadian Government officials and civil servants to FAO, WHO and ILO for special technical assistance projects, assistance has been given to the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration in recruiting experts for a technical assistance mission for Colombia as well as a survey mission to make recommendations with regard to administrative, economic and social problems which will face the new Libyan government of the former Italian colonies.

Canada has already demonstrated her willingness to meet requests for technical assistance from the under-developed countries. The machinery for handling a much greater flow of such requests has been set up. The Canadian Government has accepted this obligation at a time when there are great and urgent demands upon its own skills, techniques and resources of trained manpower in the immediate interests of international security because the events which have brought about this situation have themselves demonstrated both the immediate necessity and the long-range importance of demonstrating, in a practical way, our interest in the welfare of the people of under-developed countries where economic and social conditions create political uneasiness and unrest.

JOINT CANADA-UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING COMMITTEE

The Joint Canada-United States Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee was established by an exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States on April 12, 1949, following a series of discussions that began the previous June when international conditions again appeared threatening.

The Joint Committee was founded on the realization of the common interests of the two countries in defence. Their proximity and the complementary characteristics of their resources clearly indicate the advantages of co-ordinating their plans for industrial mobilization. Only in this way can the most effective use be made of their productive facilities.

It was agreed in the Committee to exchange information with a view to co-ordinating plans for industrial mobilization, and to consider what recommendations in the areas of common concern in this field should be made to each government.

The Joint Committee is empowered to organize sub-committees from time to time to facilitate the discharge of its functions and is responsible for co-operation with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in matters of industrial mobilization. This Board was established in 1940 by President Roosevelt and Mr. Mackenzie King, then Prime Minister of Canada.

The Canadian members of the Joint Committee are the Minister of Trade and Commerce and the Chairman of the Industrial Defence Board; the United States members are the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and the Chairman of the Munitions Board.

First Meeting Held

The first meeting of the Joint Committee took place in Washington on June 1, 1949, and the discussions were primarily limited to questions of organization. It was at that time recommended that both Governments, bearing in mind the magnitude and scope of subjects for possible consideration and exchange of information, should give careful study to the priority of approach in exploring those problems of mutual interests to Canadian and United States industrial mobilization planning.

There have been meetings of a number of sub-committees set up by the Joint Committee to examine particular production and supply questions of mutual concern to the two countries in their planning. In the course of these meetings the Canadian and United States representatives exchange information and prepare recommendations to be submitted to the Joint Committee.

On August 8, 1950, the Joint Committee held its second meeting in Ottawa. The reports of the sub-committees were reviewed and plans were made for their work during the coming year. The Korean war gave added impetus to consideration of the problems of industrial mobilization. It was recommended that studies should be made of the basic industrial programmes of the two countries and of the steps necessary to meet the production and supply requirements involved. Closely associated with these studies was the question of regulations pertaining to priorities, allocations and export controls. To facilitate this work it was decided to establish a set of principles which would define and motivate the joint use of materials and resources by Canada and the United States.

On October 20, 1950, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. H. H. Wrong, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Dean Acheson, signed in Washington an exchange of notes which gave formal effect to the resulting "Statement of Principles for Economic Co-operation" between Canada and the United

States. This Statement, which sets forth general principles for the guidance of the two Governments in achieving a co-ordinated economic programme for their common defence, was reported on pp. 414-415 of the November issue of *External Affairs*.

The "Principles" are very much in the spirit of the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941 under which Canada and the United States co-ordinated for mutual benefit their efforts in such matters as military procurement, economic controls and the use of raw materials. The arrangements worked out under the Agreement proved so satisfactory that it was decided to re-affirm the underlying principles in this Statement of the Joint Committee which now becomes an inter-governmental agreement.


The two governments declare that, in the interests of mutual security and to assist them in the discharge of their obligations under the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, it is their belief that they should extend their co-operation in the field of industrial mobilization. It is recalled that a high degree of co-operation has been maintained during and since World War II through the co-operation of the concepts embodied in the Hyde Park Agreement and their extension into the post-war period.

It is agreed that, as it becomes necessary, co-ordinated controls will be instituted over the distribution of scarce raw materials and supplies to assure an optimum production of goods essential to the common defence and that there shall be developed a co-ordinated programme of requirements, production and procurement.

The emergency controls brought into effect are to be mutually consistent in their objectives and so designed and administered as to achieve comparable results in both countries. In this connection each country will consult, as far as possible, with the other prior to instituting controls which affect the other country.

Provision is made for the free exchange, where feasible, of the technical knowledge and productive skills involved to facilitate essential production.

It is recognized that the barriers which impede the flow of goods essential for the common defence effort between Canada and the United States should be removed as far as possible and that the two governments will consult concerning any financial or foreign exchange problems which may arise as a result of the implementation of the agreement.



UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK

—United Nations

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

General Progress Report

The General Assembly, on December 15, completed the consideration of the agenda of its Fifth Regular Session, with the exception of four items which still remained on the agenda of the First (Political) Committee. The work of this Committee was suspended, pending the submission of a report by the Cease-Fire Committee on the result of its efforts to bring the fighting in Korea to a halt. It was anticipated that this report would be available in the early part of January, at which time the Political Committee was scheduled to resume its deliberations.

Merging of Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commissions

In recognition of the fact that any effective system of armaments control must comprehend weapons of all kinds, including atomic weapons, the General Assembly approved a resolution aiming at the eventual merging of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The resolution, which was adopted by a majority of 47 to 5, with 3 abstentions, provides for the establishment of a committee of twelve, consisting of the representatives of the members of the Security Council on January 1, 1951, together with Canada, to consider and report to the next regular session of the General Assembly on ways and means whereby the work of the two existing commissions may be co-ordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission.

A Soviet proposal to instruct the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to resume its work and to proceed immediately with the preparation of simultaneous draft conventions for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and international control of atomic energy, was rejected by the General Assembly by a vote of 32 in favour, 5 against, with 16 abstentions.

Prisoners of War

The General Assembly adopted, by a majority of 43 to 5, with 6 abstentions, a resolution calling upon all governments still having control of prisoners of war to act in conformity with recognized standards of international conduct, which require that these persons be afforded an immediate and unrestricted opportunity of repatriation. Governments concerned are requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, before April 30, 1951, information concerning the names of all prisoners of war still held by them, the reason for their continued detainment and the places in which they are being detained.

The original resolution, jointly sponsored by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, was based on a specific complaint of failure on the part of the Soviet Union to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war detained in the Soviet territory. As a result of a series of amendments put forward in the Social Committee, however, the scope of the item under discussion was broadened to comprise measures for the peaceful solution of the problem of prisoners of war in general. The Canadian delegation, like many others, would have preferred to see the resolution adopted in its initial version as more adequately responsive to the realities of the situation in respect of prisoners of war not yet repatriated to their homes. However, inasmuch as the original sponsors were prepared to accept the majority of the amendments submitted, the Canadian delegation supported the resolution in its amended form.

The resolution, as finally adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, further provides for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Commission composed of three

impartial persons chosen by the International Red Cross or the Secretary-General to convene after April 30, 1951, and examine the information furnished by governments still having prisoners of war in their custody, and to assist these governments in arranging for the repatriation of such prisoners. Under the resolution, all the Governments concerned are requested to co-operate fully with the Commission, to supply the required information and to grant the Commission the right of access to their respective countries and any areas in which prisoners of war continue to be detained. The results of the Commission's work are to be submitted to the Secretary-General for transmission to the members of the United Nations.

Jerusalem

In the last week of the session a committee of the Assembly discussed three possible ways of dealing with the stalemate which had resulted from the inability of the Trusteeship Council to enforce its statute providing an international regime for the Jerusalem area.* Sweden suggested that the Assembly should appoint a Commissioner for Jerusalem who might ask Israel or Jordan either to introduce or to suspend particular measures whenever he considered this to be necessary for the protection of the Holy Places or to ensure freedom of access to them or to maintain existing rights of religious denominations. Jordan opposed the Swedish draft resolution but, along with Israel, accepted an amendment offered by the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. This provided that the United Nations should limit itself to sending to Jerusalem a representative who would report on the observance by Jordan and Israel of pledges concerning Holy Places, human rights, rights of religious denominations and reduction of armed forces. Those members of the Assembly, however, who thought a fuller degree of international control was possible supported a Belgian proposal that the Trusteeship Council should name four persons to study, in consultation with the states, authorities and religious bodies concerned, the conditions of a settlement to ensure United Nations supervision of the protection of Holy Places and spiritual and religious interests in the Holy Land. In the Assembly on December 15 this proposal failed to secure the requisite two-thirds majority, the vote being 30 in favour and 18 against. Nine, including Canada, abstained. No other resolution was brought forward, but Jordan and Israel have voluntarily undertaken to protect the Holy Places and to guarantee the recognized rights of religious denominations and freedom of access to Holy Places in areas under their respective control.

Palestine Refugees and a General Peace Settlement

The Conciliation Commission has so far failed to secure the settlement of the refugee problem, chiefly because the Arabs have insisted that the refugees should be repatriated, in accordance with the Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948, while Israel has maintained that they will have to be resettled in Arab lands. The Assembly defeated a Soviet proposal that the Conciliation Commission should be dissolved, leaving the parties to settle all their differences by direct negotiation. On December 14, after the issues had been warmly debated in committee, it adopted a resolution which was opposed only by the Soviet bloc. This provided (a) that negotiations for a final settlement of outstanding issues should be conducted either with the Conciliation Commission, as the Arabs desired, or directly, as Israel wished, and (b) that the Commission should establish an office to make arrangements for the assessment and payment of compensation to refugees for loss of their property and to work out practicable arrangements for implementing other provisions of an Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948 which had dealt with repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees. Five Arab states voted for this resolution, although Israel and Iraq abstained along with two other members.

* See *External Affairs*, January, May and July 1950.

Pending settlement of the refugee problem the refugees themselves are being supported through voluntary contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. On December 2 the Assembly adopted by 46 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions, a joint resolution initiated by the four states which serve on the Agency's advisory commission. For 1951-52 this provides a fund of \$20,000,000 to be voluntarily subscribed for direct relief and a reintegration fund of at least \$30,000,000 to be similarly subscribed for projects proposed by Near Eastern governments and approved by the Agency with a view to the permanent re-establishment of refugees. Canada was appointed on a negotiating committee of seven to secure firm commitments from member states and others to finance the Agency's current operations and its work from July 1, 1951 to June 3, 1952.

Former Italian Colonies

On December 2 the Assembly approved by 46 votes to 10, with 4 abstentions, the proposal for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia outlined in the December issue of *External Affairs*. On December 14 it elected Mr. Eduardo Anze Matienzo of Bolivia as United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea to facilitate the process of federation, which is to be completed by September 15, 1952.

On December 2 the Assembly formally approved the trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland negotiated with Italy last January by the Trusteeship Council. Ethiopia having decided not to carry out its earlier plan, reported in our December issue, of pressing for advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice on the interpretation of Article 79 of the Charter.

On December 15 an extended draft resolution of a technical nature was accepted providing for the transfer to Libya of various types of Italian state and para-statal property with the assistance of a United Nations tribunal. The Assembly also recommended that the Secretary-General should report at the next regular session on the degree to which the repair of war damages in Libya might be related to technical assistance.

Undelimited portions of the boundaries of Italian Somaliland and Libya are to be fixed by procedures outlined in a further resolution adopted by the Assembly on December 15. After Libya has become independent it will negotiate its own boundary settlement with France, with or without the aid of "a third person". Italy will negotiate boundary settlements for Italian Somaliland with Ethiopia and the United Kingdom administration in British Somaliland. In case of difficulty recourse may be had to a United Nations mediator or to arbitration.

Canada voted in favour of all these resolutions. All except the resolution concerning war damages in Libya were opposed by the Soviet bloc.

South-West Africa

On July 11, 1950, the International Court of Justice handed down its opinion on certain questions relating to the international status of South-West Africa. The Court was unanimous in its opinion that South-West Africa is a territory under international mandate. It also found that South Africa continues to have international obligations to transmit annual reports on its administration of the territory and to forward petitions from local inhabitants there, the supervisory functions in this connection to be exercised by the United Nations. While the International Court was of the opinion that South Africa has no legal obligation to submit a trusteeship agreement in respect of South-West Africa, it was equally satisfied that South Africa, acting alone, has not the competence to modify the international status of that territory. Such competence, the Court found, rests with South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations.

Two main types of resolution emerged in the debate on South-West Africa at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly: those dealing with the implementation of the Court's opinion and those relating to the submission of a trusteeship agreement.

In the first category a proposal was adopted by a narrow majority in the Fourth Committee, sponsored by a number of Latin American and Asian delegations, headed respectively by Brazil and India. This resolution requested the South African Government to submit reports on its administration of South-West Africa for the years 1947 to 1950 and, in due course, for subsequent years. It also requested the South African Government to transmit all petitions relating to South-West Africa to the Secretary-General, and proposed the establishment of a commission for South-West Africa to assist the General Assembly in the consideration of annual reports, petitions and all other matters relating to the mandated territory.

The Canadian delegation opposed the resolution because the delegation preferred a proposal sponsored by eight powers which endorsed the International Court's opinion and proposed to set up a committee to confer with South Africa concerning the measures necessary to implement that opinion. The eight-power proposal was not voted on in Fourth Committee, however, in view of the adoption of the Latin American-Asian resolution.

The position resulting from the debate in the Fourth Committee was satisfactory neither to the sponsors of the Latin American-Asian resolution nor to the supporters of the eight-power draft. It was accepted that, under Article 18 of the Charter, any resolution on South-West Africa, in implementation of the Court's opinion, would require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting in plenary session. The Latin American resolution had carried only by the narrowest majority. A compromise proposal was, therefore, worked out between the sponsors of the two resolutions for submission to the plenary session of the Assembly. The new proposal accepted the basic provision of the eight-power draft that the committee to be established by United Nations resolution should be a "negotiating" rather than a "supervisory" committee. At the same time the new resolution contained provisions relating to petitions, reports and "other matters" which had not been dealt with in the eight-power draft.

When the General Assembly considered the question of South-West Africa in plenary session on December 13, it adopted the compromise (six-nation) proposal by a vote of 45 in favour (including Canada), 6 against and 5 abstentions. The Assembly also adopted an additional "trusteeship" resolution supported jointly by India and a number of Latin American delegations. The vote on this resolution was 30 in favour, 10 against (including Canada) and 16 abstentions.

The Canadian delegation supported the compromise resolution as it thought the setting up of a negotiating committee offered best promise of a solution to the difficult South-West African question. Canada opposed the trusteeship resolution in the light of the Court's opinion that the South African Government was not legally obliged to submit such an agreement, and in view of the immediate importance of working out arrangements to give effect to the Court's opinion as a whole.

Admission of New Members

The only state to secure admission to membership in the United Nations in the course of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly was the Republic of Indonesia, which was formally admitted on September 28. Although there is now a marked trend in favour of universal membership, in recognition of the fact that the United Nations should be an organization representative of the widest possible stratum of international opinion, no further progress was made toward the admission of the 14 other outstanding applicants.

The principal reason for the continuing impasse over this question in the Security Council is that a number of the Soviet-sponsored candidates are not generally considered to be in a position to comply with the conditions of membership stipulated in Article 4 of the Charter. For its part, the Soviet Union appears to be unwilling to give favourable consideration to the applications of the remaining candidates, except in the context of a general move by the Security Council to approve the admission of all the states whose applications for membership are still outstanding. On the basis of Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Charter and the advisory opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice on March 3, 1950, the admission of those states cannot be effected by the General Assembly on its own initiative unless there has been a specific and prior recommendation for admission by the Security Council.

In the light of these circumstances the General Assembly could do no more than approve, on December 4, a resolution sponsored jointly by Brazil, Canada, Philippines, Sweden and Syria, which requested the Security Council to keep the outstanding applications under consideration in accordance with the terms of the resolutions passed by the General Assembly at its Fourth Session. The joint draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 46 in favour, 5 against, with 2 abstentions. The General Assembly also had before it two further proposals relating to the admission of new members: a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union recommending that the Security Council review the applications of all candidates for admission to membership with the exception of the Republic of Korea; and a draft resolution introduced by El Salvador which would have conferred observer status upon all the applicants sponsored by the Western Powers pending their eventual admission to full membership. Neither of these proposals commanded the required support in the General Assembly. The Canadian delegation voted against the Soviet proposal on the ground that it excluded the Republic of Korea from the list of outstanding applicants. It was also unable to support the proposal put forward by El Salvador which implied substantial modifications in the structure of the United Nations and could not be regarded as entirely compatible with the provisions of the Charter.

Administrative

Place of Meeting of the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

On December 14 the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 31 in favour, 16 against, with 11 abstentions, a proposal sponsored jointly by Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, to convene the Sixth Regular Session of the Assembly in Europe. The proposal instructed the President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General to select the city most suitable for the purpose and to make the necessary arrangements with the host government.

The Canadian delegation voted against the joint proposal on the ground that adequate facilities existed at Headquarters in New York, while the convening of the next session in Europe would involve not only serious difficulties of a technical nature, but an estimated additional expenditure of \$1,750,000 if the session were held in Paris, and \$1,600,000 if it were held in Geneva. These, moreover, represented minimum estimates based on the assumption that the host government would provide the greater part of the conference facilities required by the General Assembly.

On the other hand, it was contended that there were substantial political advantages in a reasonable decentralization of the work of the principal organs of the United Nations. It would acquaint the Organization with the problems and needs of diverse regions of the world and, conversely, allow local public opinion to gain a fuller understanding of the purposes and goals of the United Nations. More specifically, the decision to convene the 1951 session of the General Assembly in Europe would be interpreted by Europeans as a testimony of solidarity and a message of

faith in the ability of the nations of the world to surmount the crisis with which they are confronted at the present moment.

Budget and Contributions

On December 15 the General Assembly approved the budget estimates for the year 1951 submitted to it in the Report of the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. The total appropriation, on the basis of which member states will be assessed, amounts to \$42,829,335. This figure takes into account the expenditures and miscellaneous income envisaged for 1951 as well as certain supplementary appropriations submitted for the previous financial year.

The Working Capital Fund will be maintained at \$20,000,000, and the Secretary-General has been authorized to make advances from the Fund to meet unforeseen expenditures or expenditures whose extent cannot be precisely determined at the present moment, including loans required to finance assistance to Palestine refugees and the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea.

The scale of assessment of 23 member states has been slightly revised during the course of the current session of the General Assembly. The revision affects principally the countries of the Soviet bloc, whose contributions have been increased by 10 per cent. Under a working rule previously adopted by the Committee on Contributions, this is the maximum increase which can be made in the assessment of a member state in any single year. A corresponding revision has been effected in the United States contribution which was reduced from 39.78 to 38.92 per cent. The Canadian contribution has been increased from 3.2 to 3.3 per cent. This increase reflects, in part, the substantially higher level of economic activity in Canada in the past year.

Economic and Social

Refugees and Stateless Persons

At its Fifth Session, the General Assembly devoted a great deal of time to the consideration of important questions which probably will affect the lives of refugees and stateless persons for some years to come. The Canadian delegation was very active in these discussions and, in particular, in the moulding of satisfactory compromise definitions of the term "refugee" which will determine the scope of the responsibilities of the new High Commissioner for Refugees and of the proposed convention of refugees.

In brief, the Assembly decided what persons should be the responsibility of the High Commissioner for Refugees who will commence operations on January 1, 1951. It was agreed that certain broad groups of refugees would be entitled to his legal protection and assistance, the definition approved for this purpose being much broader than that stipulated, for example, in the terms of reference of the International Refugee Organization. At the same time, the Assembly approved a detailed statute which outlines the general principles, organization, powers, functions and competence of the High Commissioner's Office. Finally, the Assembly elected Dr. G. J. Van Heuven Goedhart of the Netherlands as its first High Commissioner for Refugees. The only other candidate was Mr. J. Donald Kingsley, the present Director-General of the IRO.

The Assembly also adopted a more restrictive definition of "refugee" which it suggested might be included in the proposed convention on refugees that was drafted in 1950 by the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons. A decision was also taken to convene a special conference of plenipotentiaries for the final establishment and signature of this convention and of the protocol relating to the status of stateless persons. This conference will be held in Geneva during 1951.

The discussion of material aid to refugees was postponed until the next session of the Assembly because of the extension of the life of IRO until the end of September 1951. At the same time, the Assembly urgently appealed to all states to assist the IRO in its efforts to resettle refugees remaining under its care before it ceases operations.

Aid for Korea

On December 1, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which embodied the recommendations submitted by the Economic and Social Council for a long-term programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea. The resolution includes both organization plans for the programme and a statement of policy to govern its execution. A United Nations Korean Reconstructive Agency (UNKRA) is to be established under the direction of a United Nations Agent-General responsible to the General Assembly. Careful provision is made for co-ordination with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, with the designated Korean authorities and with appropriate specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. An advisory committee consisting of representatives of five member governments, including Canada, is to advise the Agent-General on major economic problems relating to his planning and operations. Certain categories of priorities of supplies and services are laid down for the initial period of the programme, which was intended to extend from January 1, 1951 until early 1952. First priority is to be given to the provision of the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter, and measures to prevent epidemics. Second highest priority relates to projects, like the reconstruction of transport and power facilities, which will yield early results in the domestic production of basic necessities. As the programme develops emphasis will be shifted to the provision of other materials, supplies and equipment for the reconstruction or replacement of war-damaged facilities.

The statement of policy approved by the General Assembly provides, *inter alia*, that United Nations assistance is to supplement the general recovery effort to be undertaken by the Korean people; that United Nations assistance must not be accompanied by any conditions of a political nature; that the programme, while it should be consistent with the pattern of long-term economic development in Korea, is itself necessarily limited to relief and rehabilitation; and that the supplies provided under the programme shall be equitably distributed to all classes of the population without discrimination as to race, creed or political belief.

In a separate resolution the General Assembly requested the President to appoint a negotiating committee for the purpose of consulting with member and non-member states on the amount which governments might be willing to contribute towards the financing of the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme. The resolution provides that at a later date a meeting of members and non-member states would be called at which governments might commit themselves to their national contributions. Canada was one of the seven members appointed by the President to the Negotiating Committee.

While the exact requirements of relief and reconstruction in Korea are not known, the Economic and Social Council estimated that the costs of the programme for the initial period, that is, from January 1, 1951 until early 1952, would be in the neighbourhood of 250 million dollars. Since these plans were drawn up, the military situation in Korea has changed to such an extent that the commencement of the programme will now have to be delayed until the political and military situation is clarified.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. J. B. Seaborn was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy in the Netherlands, effective December 12, 1950.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

His Excellency Urho Toivola, Minister of Finland, left Ottawa on December 13 for a vacation. During his absence, Mr. Olavi Lahonen, Second Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

The Honourable A. A. Roberts returned to Ottawa on December 16 and resumed his duties as High Commissioner for South Africa.

Mr. P. K. Banerjee, Second Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for India, was promoted to the rank of First Secretary, October 30. Pending the appointment of a new head of mission, Mr. Banerjee is Acting High Commissioner.

The address of the Legation of Denmark is now: Suite 115, 56 Sparks Street, telephone: 4-0704.

New Appointments

Mr. Franco Cancellario d'Alena, Secretary,

Embassy of Italy, December 5. He was previously Vice-Consul of Italy at Toronto.

Count Guy Charles Guillaume Marie de Lestrang, Secretary, Embassy of France, December 5.

Mr. Kwei Chung-chun, Attaché, Embassy of China, December 9.

Mr. Ole Mjelde, Agricultural Attaché, Legation of Norway, December 18. Mr. Mjelde is concurrently Agricultural Attaché at the Embassy of Norway in Washington and resides there.

Departures

Mr. Richard W. Byrd, Counsellor of Embassy, Embassy of the United States of America, December 2.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Kotzé, Military and Air Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for South Africa, December 18.

CONSULAR

Exequaturs were issued to:

Mr. Joseph René Ascoli, Honorary Consul of Ecuador at Montreal, December 9.

Mr. Roland K. Beyer, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Vancouver, December 9.

Mr. Cabot Coville, Consul General of the United States of America at Halifax, December 9.

Mr. Roberto Korner, Honorary Consul of Uruguay at Toronto, December 9.

Mr. Charles C. Sundell, Consul of the United States of America at Windsor, December 9.

Mr. T. W. Thompson, Honorary Consul of Haiti at Halifax, December 9.

Mr. Sebastian Emilio Valverde, Consul General of the Dominican Republic at Ottawa, December 9.

Mr. Casimir T. Zawadzki, Consul of the United States of America at Halifax, December 9.

Definitive recognition was granted to:

Mr. Thomas A. Kelly as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, December 16.

Mr. Raymond J. Swanson as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at St. John, N.B., December 20.

Mr. Paul Fregosi as Vice-Consul of France at Vancouver, December 27.

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Dr. Werner Dankwort as Consul General of Germany at Ottawa.

Mr. Juan J. De Soto as Honorary Consul of Venezuela at Toronto, December 8.

Mr. Santiago Hernandez A. as Consul General of El Salvador at Montreal, December 8.

Mr. Eugene L. Padberg as Consul of the United States of America at Calgary, December 15, during the absence of Mr. Augustus C. Owen, Vice-Consul. Mr. Padberg will return to his post at Winnipeg at the end of his temporary assignment in Calgary.

Mr. Eduardo Prado Meyer as Consul of Mexico at Toronto, December 27.

Departures

Dr. Mauricio Martinez Larin, Consul General of El Salvador at Montreal, in November.

Mr. Rudolph Hefti, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Saint John, N.B., December 14.

Mr. James R. Riddle, Consul of the United

States of America at St. John's, Nfld., December 22.

Mr. Emil Skarin, Honorary Vice-Consul of Sweden at Edmonton, December 31. Mr. Olof Sigurd Franzen is Acting Vice-Consul pending the appointment of a successor to Mr. Skarin.

Mr. H. M. El Hakeem, Consul General of Egypt at Ottawa, left on December 5 for a visit to Cairo. During his absence, Mr. Choukry A. Fadel, Vice-Consul, is in charge of the Consulate General.

VISITS OF OFFICIALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

The Right Honourable Clement Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, visited Ottawa, December 9-11. Among those who accompanied Mr. Attlee to Ottawa were: Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief Planning Officer, United Kingdom Treasury, and Sir Roger Makins, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, United Kingdom Foreign Office.

The following members of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation visited Ottawa, December 17-19: Mr. Robert Marjolin, Secretary General; Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, Chairman of the Executive Committee; Mr. M. H. Schmid, Chairman, Pulp and Paper Committee; Mr. S. J. Gross, Secretary, Non-ferrous Metals Committee; Mr. G. von Giannelia, Secretary, Pulp and Paper Committee.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a List of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during December 1950, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs".)

CONTINUING BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

1. *International Boundary Commission (Canada-United States)*. Place: as required—J. L. Rannie, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
2. *International Joint Commission (Canada-United States)*. Place: as required—Canadian Section: Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Chairman; George Spence; J. L. Dansereau.
3. *Commonwealth Shipping Committee*. London—R. P. Bower, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
4. *International Fisheries Commission (Halibut) (Canada-United States)*. Place: as required—J. W. Nickerson and C. R. Clark, Department of Fisheries.
5. *Commonwealth Economic Committee*. London—F. Hudd, R. P. Bower, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
6. *Executive Council of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux*. London—Dr. H. J. Atkinson and Dr. M. I. Timonin, Department of Agriculture; J. G. Robertson, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
7. *Permanent Joint Board on Defence (Canada-United States)*. Place: as required. Canadian Section: Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Chairman; Rear-Admiral F. L. Houghton, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff; Maj. Gen. H. D. Graham, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and A/V/M A. L. James, Air Member for Air Plans, N.D.H.Q.; C. C. Eberts, Privy Council Office.
8. *Far Eastern Commission*. Washington—H. H. Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to the United States; Cmdr. F. J. D. Pemberton and P. G. R. Campbell, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
9. *Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan*. Washington—J. H. English, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
10. *Inter-Allied Reparation Agency*. Brussels—A. C. Smith, Canadian Embassy, Brussels; Alternate: R. Chaput, Canadian Embassy, Brussels.
11. *International Whaling Commission*. London—S. Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries.
12. *Restitution Advisory Committee*. Tokyo—J. C. Britton, Canadian Liaison Mission, Tokyo.

13. *ICAO Council*. Montreal—Brig. G. S. Booth, Council Member for Canada.
14. *Air Navigation Commission of ICAO*. Montreal—S. Graham, Commission Member for Canada.
15. *International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (Canada - United States)*. New Westminster—Senator T. Reid; O. Hanson and A. G. Whitmore, Department of Fisheries.
16. *Joint United States-Canada Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee*. Washington-Ottawa—Canadian Section: C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, Chairman; H. J. Carmichael, Industrial Defence Board.
17. *Commonwealth Telecommunications Board*. London—J. H. Tudhope, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
18. *Canada - United Kingdom Continuing Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs*. Ottawa-London—M. W. Mackenzie, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce; Dr. J. G. Taggart, Deputy Minister of Agriculture; J. J. Deutsch, Department of Finance; A. F. W. Plumpre, Department of External Affairs.
19. *Permanent Committee of the International Copyright Union*. Berne—Dr. V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland.
20. *Surplus Commodity Committee of FAO*. Washington—Dr. G. S. H. Barton, Special Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture.
21. *North Atlantic Council of Ministers*. Place: as required—L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Alternate: H. H. Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.
22. *North Atlantic Defence Committee*. Place: as required—B. Claxton, Minister of National Defence.
23. *North Atlantic Defence Financial and Economic Committee*. Place: as required — D. C. Abbott, Minister of Finance.
24. *North Atlantic Defence Financial and Economic Committee, Permanent Working Staff*. London—A. E. Ritchie, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
25. *North Atlantic Military Committee*. Place: as required—Lt. Gen. Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff.
26. *North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board*. Place: as required—S. D. Pierce, Permanent Representative of Canada to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris.
27. *North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board, Permanent Working Staff*. London—E. W. T. Gill, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
28. *North Atlantic Council Deputies*. London—L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom.
29. *Organization for European Economic Co-operation*. Paris—S. D. Pierce, Permanent Representative of Canada to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; L. Couillard, Deputy; Advisers: A. R. Kilgour and W. J. van Vliet.
30. *Council of Technical Co-operation*. Colombo—P. Sykes, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Colombo.

CONFERENCES ATTENDED IN DECEMBER, 1950

1. *Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations*. New York—September 19-December—Chairman: L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Vice-Chairman: H. Lapointe, Minister of Veterans' Affairs; Representatives: Senator J. G. Turgeon; J. Dickey, M.P.; J. Lesage, M.P.; Alternates: A. D. P. Heeney, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; C. F. Elliott, Canadian Ambassador to Chile; R. G. Riddell, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York; C. S. A. Ritchie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1st part of Assembly); L. Mayrand, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (2nd part of Assembly); Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare; Parliamentary Advisers: M. J. Coldwell, M.P.; J. Décore, M.P.; G. Graydon, M.P.; G. F. Higgins, M.P.; S. Low, M.P.; V. Quelch, M.P.; Advisers: Appropriate Advisers from the Department of External Affairs and other Government Departments will be appointed to the Delegation at such time and for such period as their services are required.
2. *Multilateral Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Torquay, England—September 28-December—Chairman: L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom; Deputy Chairman: H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board; Representatives: J. J. Deutsch, W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Permanent Canadian Delegation to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade

- and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
3. *Eleventh Session of ECOSOC. (Special Meeting on Korean Relief)*. New York—October 14-December—Representative: J. Dickey, M.P.; Alternate: R. G. Riddell, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York; Advisers: J. H. Cleveland, Canadian Consulate, New York; A. R. Crépault, United Nations Permanent Delegation, New York; S. Pollock, Department of Finance.
 4. *Fifth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Torquay, England, November 2-December—Chairman: L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, London; Deputy Chairman: H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board; Representatives: J. J. Deutsch, W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Permanent Canadian Delegation to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
 5. *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association*. Wellington, November 13-December 10; Canberra, December 11-December 13—Federal Parliament Delegates: A. W. Roebuck, K.C.; J. G. Diefenbaker, M.P.; W. Bryce, M.P.; L. R. Beaudoin, M.P.; J. W. McNaught, M.P.; G. T. Fulford, M. P.; L. J. Raymond, Clerk of the House of Commons; Members from Provincial Legislatures.
 6. *Third Session of the Textile Committee of ILO*. Lyon, France, November 28-December 9—Government Delegates: R. Trepanier and H. C. Hudson, Unemployment Insurance Commission; Employers' Delegates: H. F. Irwin, Primary Textile Institute; L. A. Lyons, Montreal Cottons Ltd.; Workers' Delegates: R. Gosselin, Canadian Catholic Confederation of Labour; L. Tessier, Textile Workers' Union of America.
 7. *Seventeenth National Conference on Labour Legislation*. Washington, November 29-December 1—H. Walker and W. Thomson, Department of Labour. (Observers).
 8. *Fifth Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. (ECOSOC)*. Lake Success, December 1-16—Col. C. H. L. Sharman, Department of National Health and Welfare.
 9. *Fourth Inter-American Agricultural Conference*. Montevideo, December 1—W. B. McCullough, Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires. (Observer).
 10. *Second Regional Meeting on Food and Agricultural Programmes and Outlook in Latin America*. Montevideo, December 1—W. B. McCullough, Embassy, Buenos Aires. (Observer).
 11. *Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth*. Washington, December 3-7—Dr. E. Couture, Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, R. B. Cutty, Miss M. Fleming, Miss M. E. Coke and Mr. E. Lee, Department of National Health and Welfare; Representatives from other Governments and various organizations.
 12. *Legal Committee of ICAO*. Paris, December 4—A. B. Rosevear, Air Transport Board.
 13. *North Atlantic Military Committee*. London, December 12-13 — Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff; Maj. Gen. F. C. Clark, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London; A/V/M H. Campbell, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington; G/C C. Annis, Acting Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.
 14. *Committee of Experts on the Exchange of Persons (UNESCO)*. Havana, December 13-15—Dr. J. A. Gibson, Chairman, Executive Committee of C.C.R.U.
 15. *North Atlantic Defence Committee*. Brussels, December 18—B. Claxton, Minister of National Defence; Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff; Maj. Gen. F. C. Clark, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London; A/V/M H. Campbell, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington; G/C C. Annis, Acting Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee; P. Paré, Department of National Defence; J. George, Department of External Affairs.
 16. *Conference of Institute of Radio Engineers*. Atlantic City, December 9-15—W. J. Battell, I. L. Fowler and W. D. Howell, National Research Council.
 17. *North Atlantic Council*. Brussels, December 18-19 — B. Claxton, Minister of National Defence; A. D. P. Heeney, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom; Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff; Maj. Gen. F. C. Clark, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London; A/V/M H. Campbell, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington; G/C C. Annis, Acting Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee; P. Paré, Department of National Defence; J. George, Department of External Affairs.

CONFERENCES TO BE HELD IN JANUARY 1951

1. *Legal Committee of ICAO.* Mexico City, January 2.
2. *Indian Science Congress.* Bangalore, India, January 2.
3. *Pan-Indian Ocean Congress.* Bangalore, India, January 2.
4. *Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.* London, January 4.
5. *Centenary of Geological Survey of India,* Calcutta, India, January 10.
6. *Twenty-Fourth Session of the Executive Board of UNESCO.* Paris, January 15-28.
7. *First Session of the ILO Committee on Indigenous Labour.* LePaz, Bolivia, January 16-27.
8. *Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Bird-Banding Association.* Boston, January 26.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY CANADA

Multilateral

North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement. Signed at Washington, November 15, 1950.

Costa Rica

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Costa Rica constituting a Commercial *modus vivendi* between the two Countries. Signed at San Jose, November 17 and 18, 1950.

Ecuador

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Ecuador constituting a Commercial *modus vivendi* between the two Countries. Signed at Quito, November 10, 1950.

Venezuela

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Venezuela constituting a Commercial *modus vivendi* between the two Countries. Signed at Caracas, October 10, 1950.



—National Defence

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY PILOTS TRAIN IN CANADA

As part of the Canadian contribution towards mutual defence under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, pilots from member nations are being trained in Canada. Above, left to right, are pilots from Norway, Belgium, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands at Centralia, Ontario.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 1: Agreement between Canada and Norway for air services between the two countries. Signed at Ottawa, February 14, 1950. Price, 15 cents. (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 6: Exchange of notes between Canada and Denmark constituting an agreement concerning settlement of claims arising out of the war. Signed at Copenhagen, March 24 and 25, 1950. Price, 10 cents. (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 8: Exchange of notes between Canada and Norway constituting an agreement concerning settlement of claims arising out of the war. Signed at Ottawa, March 7 and 18, 1950. Price, 10 cents. (Bilingual).

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STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 50/50—*Review of the Current International Situation*, a statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered at the Federal-Provincial Conference in Ottawa, on December 4, 1950.

No. 50/51—*Canadian Policy in the Present International Crisis*, the text of a broadcast by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered over the Trans-Canada network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, on December 5, 1950.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 50/49—*The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway*, an address by Mr. Lionel Chevrier, Minister of Transport, delivered over the Trans-Canada network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, on November 21, 1950.

No. 50/52—*The Canadian Economy in 1950*, a statement by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, issued in Ottawa on December 29, 1950.

† French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, Lake Success, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September 1950, p. 359.



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Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, Canada

BASIS OF CANADIAN FAR EASTERN POLICY

Excerpts from a statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made in the House of Commons on February 2, 1951.

Faith in Freedom

... The first consideration (affecting Canadian policy) seems to me to be absolutely fundamental: Our belief that freedom is valuable and precious in itself, and that the loss of freedom anywhere in the world means an impairment and indeed endangering of our own freedom. We may not always be in a position to defeat attempts to reduce the area in which men can breathe freely, but we should never voluntarily give our consent to that process, because we know that by so doing we would be betraying the principle which is one of the chief inspirations of all free men. Freedom cannot be cloistered in one country, in one continent, or indeed in one hemisphere. To the limit of our resources, therefore, we must try to maintain and even hope to extend the jurisdiction where the writ of freedom runs. Only in that way can we be true to ourselves and to the inheritance we have received.

Realistic Faith in the United Nations

The second general consideration which I should like to mention is our faith in the United Nations. The aggression against the Republic of Korea has tested the United Nations in a searching way and has led to a re-appraisal of its role in maintaining the peace of what it can and cannot do in a divided world of two super-states around which all others tend to group, on the one side willingly and on the other side by compulsion. It has certainly been made clear by recent events that our world organization is not yet in a position where it can safely undertake all the tasks which may be imposed on it by resolutions, and I think it is dishonest to pretend that it can. Whatever may be result of this re-examination, however, it is certain that the United Nations still fulfils a number of functions which are indispensable if peace is to be maintained on any tolerable basis. For one thing, it holds out the promise of freedom to all. Second, it provides a framework in which men of goodwill can work for their collective defence and for the coming of the day when the rule of law will replace the rule of force in international relations. Third, by reason of its universal character it keeps alive the idea of the human community.

Dangers to the Free World

... Moving westward from Korea we must, I think, take into account the danger that overshadows Indo-China. The Chinese guerrillas and volunteers—"volunteers", an ominous word—have long been assisting the Viet Minh in their attacks on the three new associated states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. Such indications as we had before June 25 of the possibility of an attack on the Republic of Korea are now appearing in the case of Indo-China; and a full-scale attack on that country must be regarded as a real possibility. If the valiant efforts now being made by France to defend and complete the independence of Indo-China were to fail, the whole of South-East Asia, including Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, with their important resources of rubber, rice and tin might well come under communist control, and the position of India and Pakistan in that event would in the long run, or in the not so long run, be precarious indeed.

Persia and the Middle East are also vulnerable. At the present time the armed forces of the Soviet Union face this area and those vital oil fields, in strength sufficient, I think, to overrun it without too much difficulty.

Across the Mediterranean another country immediately threatened is Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito's government is facing great economic difficulties, partly as a

result of the serious drought there last year, and partly as the result of the economic blockade imposed on that country by the Cominform. Moreover, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania are now, contrary to the provisions of the peace treaties, in possession of sufficient military forces to make them collectively powerful, as well as threatening and aggressive, neighbours.

But the danger to the free world is still greatest in Western Europe itself. Recognition of that fact was the reason for the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in the spring of 1949. Since that time progress has been made in increasing the military strength of the countries associated in that pact; but this progress, although it is being accelerated, has not been swift enough to remove anxiety. Western Europe is still relatively weak, and still stands open to Soviet conquest. It is a glittering prize. Its capture would put the Soviet Union in possession not only of the source and centre of western civilization, but also of industrial capacity which would enable them to rival the productive resources of the whole of the western hemisphere. We over here would then be in a desperate position indeed.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that our involvement in other areas of the world should not prevent us from recognizing that Western Europe is the key point for the defence of the whole of the free world—which includes, incidentally India and Pakistan as well as Canada and the United States; and we should co-operate with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty in building up forces large enough to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack in that area.

Respect for Asian Opinion

... These western European dangers and developments must, then, never be forgotten in determining our Far Eastern policy. In formulating that policy—and this is another general consideration—I think we should bear in mind also that there is a new and great tidal movement of nationalism sweeping Asia. In some countries, China for example, it is mingled and confused with, and possibly it is at the moment dominated by, the aggressive forces of Soviet communism. But it is operative in other Asian countries besides China, and it has a vitality of its own. It is something which I believe is deeper and more lasting than communism. Indeed, nationalism—alleged to a restless and insistent demand for a better life—is the most important political phenomenon in Asia today. Therefore in framing our policies we must try to avoid offending the legitimate national and social aspirations of Asian peoples, or their desire to have a chief part in the determination of Asian affairs.

Improvement of Economic Conditions in Free Asia

We must also do what we can to improve the economic conditions and human welfare in free Asia. We must try to work with rather than against the forces struggling for a better life in that part of the world. Such co-operation may in the long run become as important for the defence of freedom—and therefore for the defence of Canada—as sending an army to Europe, in the present immediate emergency. Economic and technical assistance is one form of such co-operation. Many members in the house will have read the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. This imaginative, and, I think, well-founded report, which was published last November as the result of the work of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, points the way to the kind of effective assistance which we in the west can offer to the free peoples of Asia. They stand in very great need of capital for economic development, and of technical assistance. For Canada to supply either the capital or the technical assistance in any substantial volume would mean considerable sacrifice, now that the demands of our defence programme are imposing new strains on our economy.

Solidarity With Our Partners in the Commonwealth and in the North Atlantic Alliance

... In dealing with these Asian problems we sometimes run the risk of differences with tried and dependable allies. And that brings me to another of the cardinal considerations which I think we must keep in mind, the necessity of preserving solidarity with our friends in the west—above all, of preserving unity of purpose and action between the United States and Canada and the Commonwealth of Nations.

During the past few months we have had some differences of opinion with our friends in Washington on Far Eastern questions. While I do not gloss over these differences, I should like to warn against exaggerating their importance, because they have not weakened the basic good understanding between us, resting as it does upon a harmony of abiding interest, and on the recognition of common values and common rights, one of which is the right to disagree as friends with each other and the other the obligation, again as friends, to resolve these disagreements peaceably.

In spite of certain differences there is complete agreement between the Canadian and the United States Governments on, among other things, four fundamentals; we agree that peace is now in jeopardy; we agree that the extension of Soviet imperialism must be opposed; we agree that the principles of collective resistance to aggression must be maintained; and we agree that the main front which must be defended is Western Europe.

Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations

... Now I come to our policy on certain specific matters concerned with Korea and the Far East.

Almost the first issue which arose in this field after the House adjourned last September concerned the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. This presented itself in a concrete form at the General Assembly on September 19 last. A draft resolution was presented that day by the Indian Delegation calling upon the Assembly to decide that the Chinese Government in Peking should represent China at the United Nations Assembly. Persuasive arguments could be adduced both for and against such action.

... It may be asked why, if our abstention on the Indian resolution showed that we did not actively object to China being represented in the United Nations by the People's Government in Peking, we had not taken previous action in Canada to recognize that government. We had in fact, as the House knows, given serious consideration to such action. We had been impressed by the argument that recognition by Canada and other countries would facilitate the representation of China within the United Nations, and consequently might make easier the peaceful settlement of certain Far Eastern issues. We had nevertheless also been influenced by what still seem to me to be valid views about making such a change at that time, and by advice which we had received from many quarters, including many quarters in this House, to proceed very cautiously in this matter. Furthermore, a number of countries which had recognized the Chinese Communists had had great difficulty in getting the Chinese Communists to recognize them, at least to the point of entering into effective diplomatic relations with them. For example, the United Kingdom had recognized the regime in Peking but it was far from clear that that regime in any effective sense recognized the United Kingdom. Then came the attack on Korea in June. There was much evidence that that attack had been prepared with the approval, and indeed with the support, of the Chinese Communists, and we did not feel justified in taking any action toward recognition until the circumstances sur-

rounding the aggression in Korea had become clearer. I need hardly add that when late last year the Chinese government in Peking joined in the aggression in Korea, it was inconceivable that countries which had hitherto withheld recognition would at that time decide to change their policies.

I feel, however, that the Far Eastern problems could be more readily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the Government of China, which has the whole of the mainland of China under its control. But the Peking Government can hardly expect recognition now from those member states of the United Nations against whom they are fighting in Korea. The remedy for the situation now lies with the Communists themselves. They should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the United Nations.

The Crossing of the 38th Parallel

The next specific and controversial issue which arose at Lake Success on Far Eastern questions, and which I want to discuss, was whether or not General MacArthur should be authorized by the United Nations to extend military operations beyond the 38th parallel in Korea. The 38th parallel was not important from the military point of view, but it was obvious that its crossing would have political and symbolic significance, indeed as its re-crossing would have even more significance. At this time I do not need to remind the House that it was never intended by the United Nations that Korea should be cut in two along the parallel. In resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations the objective of a free, independent and united Korea had been clearly laid down. Nevertheless, in spite of those resolutions this line, which had originally been merely a line of military convenience, had become a Rubicon, the line which marked in that part of the world a division between the Soviet world and the free world. The decision to authorize the United Nations forces to cross that line could not be taken lightly, and it was not taken lightly.

There were strong reasons at that time for giving such authorization. Although the North Korean forces had been badly defeated by General MacArthur's skilful campaign, large elements had escaped, and those remnants could not be made harmless unless the United Nations commander had the opportunity of pursuing them into North Korea. If they were not overpowered, the risk would remain that, after they had regrouped and been re-equipped, they might once again fall on Southern Korea after the United Nations had been withdrawn. Moreover, as I have stated already on a number of occasions, the United Nations itself had passed resolutions in favour of a united and independent nation in Korea.

The members of the Canadian Delegation were impressed by these arguments, and by certain military information given to us, and we agreed, along with a great many other delegations, with the resolution proposed in the United Nations Assembly authorizing the United Nations forces to take any action which was necessary to unify the whole of Korea. We, along with others, realized that risks would be involved, and efforts were made in the United Nations to reduce those risks to the minimum. For that purpose we proposed sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to the North Korean Government to give up the fight before the line had been crossed, but we were not successful in establishing communications for that purpose.

After that line had once been crossed, the possibility of an early settlement depended on the campaign in North Korea itself. During the discussions which were held on the crossing of the parallel we had reason to believe that it was not the intention of the Unified Command to pursue the North Korean forces right up to the Manchurian border. We had reason to believe that a defensive line could be established across the narrow waist of North Korea, and that the two northern provinces of Korea

would be left, for the time being at least, as a kind of unoccupied frontier area. That scheme seemed sensible to us, and we hoped it could be carried out.

With many other Delegations, including indeed the Delegation of the United States of America, we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized, on this and on other occasions, that the Unified Command was responsible for the operations of a force which was very largely composed of soldiers of the United States. That command and those soldiers were bearing the brunt of the responsibility and of the fighting, and they had the full right to make the military decisions within the limits of the authority given them by the United Nations. When those decisions turned out well, we all rejoiced with them. When they were wrong, I think it would have been improper and ungrateful to be unfairly critical and emphasize our own lack of responsibility. However, all of us who supported the action of the United Nations in Korea had not only the right but the duty to make our views known to the Unified Command through the positions we took at Lake Success, and also through our contacts with the United States Delegation there.

Cease-Fire Discussions

... Intervention by China in this war in North Korea on an increasing scale throughout the whole of November brought sharply into view the third of the critical issues with which we have been asked recently to deal. Should we at once condemn this as aggression, or should we enter into discussions, on certain conditions, with the Chinese Communists in an effort to bring it to an end? It seemed pretty clear that a stable settlement in Korea could hardly be achieved without some agreement, even though a tacit one, with the Central People's Government of China; but after the Chinese Government at Peking had intervened in force and were driving back the outnumbered forces of the United Nations at the end of November, some voices—and this is quite natural—were immediately raised in favour of whatever United Nations military action against China itself might be necessary in order to end the war.

We have joined from the beginning those who urged the conflict in Korea should be limited and localized as far as possible; and we still believe that the arguments in favour of that course are as strong as ever.

If, then, a war with China, in which a decision could hardly be achieved, had to be averted by every means possible, what alternative methods were there for reaching a settlement in Korea? Speaking over the air on December 5, I stated my own belief that nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. I went on to say:

If, for example, provided the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations—possibly covering more subjects than Korea—in which the Chinese Communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement. At least we would have done our best and the responsibility for failure could be placed where it would belong.

In that same speech, however, I insisted that a cease-fire must precede and not follow peace negotiations, and that is the position from which we have never wavered. I believe we in this government, in this House and in this country are as anxious as anyone to secure a peaceful settlement in Korea, but I think we know that such a settlement would be bought at too high a cost if it denied and betrayed the obligations we, as a member of the United Nations, had already undertaken in respect to Korea.

... If those of us who have advocated negotiations of this kind with the Chinese Communists are appeasers we are in very good company. It will not, I think, be

argued in his house that Mr. Churchill is a man likely to truckle to or appease aggressors. What are his views on the present situation? Speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster on December 14, he said:

The only prudent course open to the United States and ourselves is to stabilize the local military position . . .

That is in Korea.

. . . and if the opportunity then occurs, to negotiate with the aggressors. . . .

Later in the same speech he said:

Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.

. . . I should like to point out that the resolution to establish the cease-fire committee secured the support of all members of the United Nations with the exception of the Soviet bloc. The United States in particular actively assisted and encouraged the members of our committee in their work. The task of the committee was an up-hill one, and often a frustrating one. In one article which I read not long ago we were referred to as three men in search of a cease-fire. Our search was not successful. After we had secured from the Unified Command in Washington a basis for stopping the fighting which we thought reasonable, we tried to enter into effective contact with the People's Government at Peking. But for a long time our efforts were unavailing, and I must say were not treated even with very great politeness.

Statements of Principles

However, on December 21, the Chinese foreign minister broadcast a reply to our approaches in which he claimed the cease-fire committee had been illegally constituted. He demanded that negotiations for a political settlement should precede rather than follow a cease-fire in Korea. Such a procedure, of course, was totally unacceptable to us, and to the United Nations. Nevertheless, in spite of this somewhat sharp rebuff it was felt by the United Nations that it might be worth while for the cease-fire committee to make another attempt to convince the regime at Peking of the genuineness of our offer, to which the United States completely subscribed, to enter into negotiations on a wide range of Far Eastern issues if a cease-fire could only be established. After considerable difficulty, we drew up a statement of principles which was presented to the Political Committee of the Assembly on January 11. This statement combined proposals for ending the fighting in Korea with others for political negotiations of outstanding Far Eastern problems. The proposal secured the approval of fifty of the sixty member nations, including the United States and India.

A great deal of the credit for securing such widespread approval of the statement of principles must be ascribed to the fact that, at the time it was being prepared, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were meeting in London. This was an occasion on which the Commonwealth association was extremely valuable in harmonizing the views of the free nations of the east and west. The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, played a central role in the discussions in London to reconcile the various points of view.

The first reply from Peking to our statement of principles was certainly ambiguous, though it seemed to be a rejection since it contained an apparent reaffirmation of the theory that a cease-fire must follow rather than precede negotiations. In order to try to remove what we thought might be ambiguity, and indeed turned out to be ambiguity, our Prime Minister suggested to the Prime Minister of India, in a message on January 18, that since the Government of India maintained an embassy

in Peking it would be helpful if clarification could be sought through Indian channels to ascertain points in the reply which the Chinese Communists had returned to our statement of principles. It was in answer to this initiative on the part of our Prime Minister and Mr. Nehru that the Chinese Government provided the clarification requested, in their message of January 22. That clarification seemed more hopeful, since it stated for the first time in fairly clear language that a cease-fire could be agreed upon in the first meeting of a conference called to discuss Far Eastern issues and that this discussion of political issues would not take place until after the cease-fire had been agreed on. That reply was considerably encouraging to some of us.

China As An Aggressor

During the time that these cease-fire discussions were going on, proposals to name the Chinese Communists formally in the United Nations as aggressors had remained in abeyance.

... Last week we had two resolutions before us at the United Nations and we were faced with a decision as to what we should do about them. We realized that that decision might indeed have far-reaching consequences. The first of these two resolutions was the Asian resolution providing for a seven-power conference in which both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China would be represented, a seven-power conference not only for political discussions but for cease-fire discussions, and a seven-power conference the terms of the invitation to which seemed to us to be couched in a form which might have made possible protracted discussion with Peking before the conference ever met. For that reason we did not find that resolution satisfactory, and in a speech last Friday, January 26, we suggested certain points which we thought would remove the danger from the Asian resolution if those points could have been included in it, because they would have laid down in a resolution a concrete and definite programme for talks without delay. In those points we even suggested a date for the convocation of a conference, a place where it might be held and a time limit after which, if Peking did not reply, we would assume that they would not accept it. In those points we tried to remove from the aegis of this seven-power conference—which included a good many states who were not joining in the police action in Korea, including the U.S.S.R., which had refused to support action from the beginning—the negotiations for a cease-fire and send them to a more appropriate body of three: the United Nations Commission in Korea and the United States and the Peking Governments. If those points which we put forward and had discussed previously with the Indian delegation and the United States had been included in the Indian resolution, we would have voted for it. One of them was included. The others were not, I presume because it was felt that the inclusion of those other points might have made it more difficult for Peking to accept the resolution.

The United States' position with regard to our points was a simple one. They felt that the time for any further approach to Peking was over until the resolution of condemnation and setting up the good offices committee had been passed. So when the Asian resolution came to the vote, we could not vote for it, for the reasons which I have indicated. We could not vote against it because the principle of negotiation was one which we had stood for. Therefore we abstained from voting. In our attitude on this matter, so far as Canadian policy is concerned, I do not think anybody in India has any reason to feel that they were let down.

The United States Resolution

The second resolution was submitted by the United States. We had been unsuccessful in our efforts to secure postponement of that resolution. We had been successful in our efforts to get that resolution changed and also to get it clarified

and interpreted by the United States Delegate, which interpretation removed most of the doubts we had had with regard to it at the beginning. Our first objective, postponement, was not successful. Our second objective, to get the proper kind of resolution voted on, I think was reasonably successful. We were anxious to make clear beyond any possibility of doubt that any resolution which the United Nations passed on this subject would be exceedingly clear indeed on the following points. We were anxious that it would not establish any new aggression but would emphasize that the Chinese Government at Peking had merely participated in an old aggression and therefore was guilty of that but not of starting a new aggression in any other part of Korea. We were also anxious that the paragraph of condemnation should be couched in unprovocative terms, and it was. That paragraph does not brand anybody as an aggressor. It is a finding of fact that, by assisting the aggressors in Korea and by invading North Korea from China, the People's Government in Peking had itself engaged in aggression. That was a finding of fact which we certainly could not deny. The third point we were anxious to make clear was that the collective measures committee set up by this resolution and as to which many delegations had grave doubts, would not be a vehicle for rash and unwise action but might indeed become a brake on such action; and that this collective measures committee, far from jumping into resolutions and reports on sanctions at once, should not even report to the United Nations General Assembly as long as there was any possibility of the good offices committee completing its work satisfactorily. That was made clear by an amendment to the United States' resolution proposed by the Delegate for Lebanon. Fourth, we were anxious to make it quite clear in this resolution that the work of mediation and conciliation could go on after the resolution passed, and indeed that that work would be given priority over any enforcement. We wanted to make it clear beyond doubt that, so far as the United Nations was concerned, we had not slammed any doors on anybody. And then finally we wanted to make it quite clear that this resolution did not give anybody any authority to take any action which he did not already possess. It certainly does not give the United Nations, or any agent of the United Nations in Asia, any power or right to use United Nations forces to liberate Asia from communism. The mandate of the United Nations in this operation remains the same, namely, to defeat aggression in Korea, and nothing else.

The Canadian Vote

Having had these amendments put forward, and having received these clarifications from the United States Delegation, which removed most of our doubts, we felt that to vote against this resolution, or to abstain in regard to it, would have been to refuse to accept as true the statement that the Chinese Government had participated in aggression—something we had no right to do without denying the justice of United Nations action in Korea. Furthermore, it would have meant breaking the unity of the western nations on an issue of timing and tactics. We did not take that course. We voted for the resolution, and I think we were right in doing so. Forty-four other countries, including every member of the North Atlantic alliance, agreed with us.

But we have made our view abundantly clear that this resolution does not give anyone on one side any shadow of excuse for rash and adventurous courses, or anyone on the other any shadow of excuse for refusing to discuss an ending of hostilities or a peaceful solution of this problem. Why should it? It was said at Lake Success by the Indian Delegate, and it was said yesterday by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell): "You have now branded them as aggressors. How can you expect them to talk to you?" Well, they have been branding us in the United Nations as aggressors steadily for the last two or three months, and they have shown no reluctance to talk with us on their terms, or any feeling that we should not talk with them because they have called us aggressors in very rude and uncivilized tones. So

I am optimistic, and I hope my optimism is justified, that the passing of our resolution will not be followed by the catastrophic consequences that some people sincerely believe will result.

We do not believe that by passing this resolution we are slamming the door to subsequent negotiation, or that the Government in Peking should have any justification for interpreting our action in this way. I hope, and I expressed this hope in my last statement at the United Nations before I came back to Ottawa, that whatever happened to this resolution—and it is now part of the law of the United Nations—the work of cease-fire, discussion and peaceful settlement, through the machinery provided in the resolution, will proceed with a view to ending the war in Korea and removing the causes of war in other areas of Asia.



GENERAL EISENHOWER VISITS OTTAWA

—*National Defence*

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the new Supreme Commander, Atlantic Forces-Europe, visited Ottawa on January 27 and discussed defence problems of the North Atlantic Treaty nations with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Above, left to right: Vice-Admiral H. T. W. Grant; Lt. General Charles Foulkes; General Eisenhower; and Air Marshal W. A. Curtis.

THE KOREAN CRISIS

One vital truth . . . is self-evident. The armed forces of the People's Government of China continue their invasion of Korea. We think there is no shadow of a doubt about this continuing participation in aggression, and we believe that the action of the Chinese People's Government in this matter has been morally wrong, and that the United Nations cannot ignore such a defiance of the principles on which it was founded. . . . The responses of the Peking government to the attempts made so far (to find a peaceful and honourable solution to the conflict in Korea) have been enough to try the patience of us all. Nevertheless, we are ready to hold open the door to further negotiation if the People's Republic of China gives us any reason to believe these negotiations can be successful.

In these terms the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, described the situation on January 26 during the concluding debate in the Political Committee at Lake Success on the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in Korea. The problem before the Committee was one which threatened seriously the unity of the free world in dealing with the seven month old Korean crisis. In its simplest terms, it was whether to make one more effort to arrange for a settlement through negotiation with the Chinese Communist regime, or, as advocated by the United States, formally to recognize that regime as participating in the aggression in Korea, while leaving the way open for negotiations if the opportunity arose. As was noted in the January issue of *External Affairs*, the first efforts of the Cease-Fire Group which had been established in December to attempt to determine a satisfactory basis for a cessation of hostilities in Korea and to make further recommendations to the General Assembly had met a completely negative response from the Chinese Communist Government. This failure was reported to the General Assembly on January 3, when it was pointed out that, although the Group had explored every means of ending hostilities, it had been "unable to pursue discussions of a satisfactory arrangement".

Referring to these initial efforts of the Cease-Fire Group, Mr. Pearson commented in his statement on January 26:

(This) first attempt failed because the proposals for a cease-fire which we made were not even examined by the Peking Government. . . . It would, of course, have been easier for us to explain our purposes and our proposals to the Peking Government if the representative of that government, who was in New York at the time, had been willing to meet and co-operate with the Group. He had, however, been told by his government to adopt a completely un-co-operative and negative attitude to us on the grounds that our Group was illegally constituted. . . .

A more serious reason for the refusal of the Peking Government to co-operate in the earlier stages of the cease-fire work seems to have been the alleged fear that they would be lured into a cease-fire arrangement which would be followed, not by a discussion of Far Eastern issues in which they would participate, but by a new United Nations offensive in Korea. In this respect, our cease-fire proposals appeared to them as a trap. We accepted the possibility of genuine fear and misunderstanding on this score, and attempted to remove it by further assurance to Peking on December 19. All our efforts, however, to remove misunderstandings were summarily rejected in the telegram from Peking of December 21 to the President of the General Assembly.

Cease-Fire Group Report

In the circumstances, the Cease-Fire Group was forced to conclude in its first report of January 3 that no recommendations in regard to a cease-fire could usefully be made at that time. Nevertheless, in presenting the report, Sir Benegal Rau of India emphasized that despite the initial failure, the United Nations should continue to make every effort to bring about an end to hostilities. In the debate which followed, the Norwegian representative asked the Cease-Fire Group whether it had

"given any consideration to the problem of what principles would have to be laid down as a basis for possible negotiations subsequent to the envisaged establishment of a cease-fire." On behalf of the Group, Mr. Pearson assured the Political Committee that serious consideration had been given to this question, and on January 5 he announced that it was hoped such a statement of principles could be submitted by the Cease-Fire Group in the near future.

Also on January 5, Mr. Eban of Israel, picking up the idea of a "statement of principles", suggested that this approach to the problem might be incorporated in a new resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire but laying down the principles governing subsequent negotiations for a peaceful settlement of all issues affecting peace in the Far East. This would involve an orderly sequence, specifying a cease-fire first, then the progressive withdrawal of troops, and finally the negotiation of outstanding issues.

While the Cease-Fire Group was drafting its statement of principles in New York, the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers opened in London on January 4. As a result of their discussions, the Prime Ministers issued the following communiqué dated January 12 setting forth their unanimous views on Korea in the context of the developing international crisis:

Commonwealth Prime Ministers Statement

We must do what we can to understand those who appear to differ from us. The great antidote to war is hope: its greatest promoter is despair. When we say that war is not inevitable we do not just mean that we shall prepare and be strong, and that our strength may deter aggression. We also mean that, in a world worn out and distorted by war, there must be an overwhelming majority of the people of all lands who want peace. We must not despair of reaching them. In all our discussions we have made it clear to each other, as we now do to the world, that as Commonwealth Prime Ministers we would welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or with Mao Tze-tung. We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds.

We do not seek to interfere in the affairs of the Soviet Union or China or any other country; we are simply determined to retain the mastery of our own affairs, without fear of aggression.

It is with these considerations in mind that in the last few days we have directed our efforts to the securing of a cessation of hostilities in Korea, so that around the conference table the great powers concerned may compose their differences on a basis which will strengthen the United Nations and fulfil the purposes of the Charter.

The statement of principles itself was finally presented to the Political Committee on January 12 as a "Supplementary Report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea". Introducing the report on behalf of the Group, Mr. Pearson stated:

Agreement on a statement of this kind has, of course, been no easy task. Anything we proposed had, naturally, to be in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with the resolutions previously accepted by our General Assembly on Korea. Also, our statement had to be realistic enough to have a good chance of being accepted by those concerned without the betrayal of any principles or disloyalty to any obligations which had been previously accepted. Our statement also had to recognize the relationship between a cease-fire and political settlement, and the importance of proceeding from one stage to another with a minimum of delay but with an understanding of the fact that one stage depended on another, and that each should be implemented under the supervision of appropriate international machinery.

Above all, as we saw it, any statement of principles for a settlement of this kind must be such as to remove fears, suspicions and distrust which poison peace and make security impossible. It was in that spirit that the group of three approached this task. The result is before the committee in the form of a supplementary report made by the

three members of our group. This statement deals in a broad way with principles only and with a programme based on those principles.

The "Supplementary Report" read as follows:

The objective shall be the achievement, by stages, of the programme outlined below for a cease-fire in Korea, for the establishment of a free and united Korea, and for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems.

1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property, and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.

2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.

3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign State with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.

4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

5. As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations.

Following Mr. Pearson's statement, Sir Benegal Rau of India explained his interpretation of paragraph 5 above. He said that, so far as India was concerned, the reference to settling the problem of Formosa "in conformity with existing international obligations" meant on the basis of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations.

Statement of Principles Approved

On January 13 the Political Committee approved the statement of principles contained in the Supplementary Report of the Cease-Fire Group by a vote of 50-7 (Soviet bloc, Nationalist China, El Salvador). The Philippines abstained. The Committee then adopted an additional proposal asking the Chairman, through the Secretary-General, to transmit these principles to the Peking Government, and to ask Peking whether it accepted them "as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems".

There had been some doubt whether the United States would be able to support a further approach to Peking after the rejection of the original cease-fire proposal. Explaining his vote on this occasion, Mr. Austin pointed out that the statement of principles appeared to have won the support of a large number of delegations, and that it was "a principal objective of the United States to maintain the strength of the

United Nations by promoting the unity of the members who are genuinely dedicated to the support of the collective security system". He then added, "if this effort fails to produce the hoped for result, I have a strong feeling that we shall be firmly united in opposing aggression".

Thus, as Mr. Austin indicated, the desire to maintain a united front partly explained the overwhelming support for transmission of the statement of principles to Peking. Despite this decision to act together, it was evident that there were serious differences of view regarding the way in which the Korean problem should be handled. As Mr. Pearson explained in his speech of January 26, there were three broad divisions of opinion among the free nations:

There were many members of this committee who felt that in making this further effort to bring about a negotiation of Far Eastern difficulties with those who were intervening in great force in Korea to assist the aggressor, we were weakening, indeed, humiliating the United Nations, and that we should proceed at once to a condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor.

There was a second group who felt that almost everything should be subordinated to the necessity of stopping the fighting and getting those most concerned, including the People's Government in Peking around the council table with a view to a peaceful and honourable settlement of Korean and other Far Eastern questions. This viewpoint was, I think, based in part at least on a feeling that United Nations actions in Korea on and after the crossing of the 38th parallel gave some reason for the Chinese in Peking—cut off as they are from normal contacts with so much of the outside world—to fear for the security of their position in Manchuria and of their regime generally.

There was a third group which agreed that, whatever might be the rights or wrongs of the matter, we should further prove our goodwill and our unswerving desire and, indeed, determination to bring about a peaceful solution, by making one further effort at peaceful settlement, before proceeding to any condemnatory resolution; that without such further effort it would be difficult to preserve the unity of the free world in the United Nations in regard to action in Korea. Some of the members of the Committee, while taking this view, were frankly pessimistic about the result.

The statement of principles represented a sincere and earnest effort to reconcile these three points of view, and at the same time to meet all Peking's legitimate objections to the first cease-fire proposals. Peking's reply was received in a cablegram of January 17 from Mr. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which appeared to constitute another rebuff.* It was, however, somewhat ambiguous, especially with regard to the crucial point of the relationship between a cease-fire and the negotiation of a general settlement, and it did advance counter-proposals for consideration. With reference to the cease-fire, it stated that "regardless of what the agenda and subject-matter of the negotiations may be if a cease-fire comes into effect without first conducting negotiations to fix the conditions therefore, negotiations after the cease-fire may entail endless discussions without solving any problems." If this meant that discussion of political issues should precede a truce, it was clearly incompatible with the United Nations statement of principles. Prior discussion of basic conditions for the cease-fire itself, however, was a condition that could undoubtedly be met.

Chinese Counter-Proposals

The Chinese Communist counter-proposals presented a similar difficulty. These proposals read:

A. Negotiations should be held among the countries concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of

* For complete text of reply, see item 22 in the Canadian Government publication *Documents on the Korean Crisis*.

Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves, in order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea at an early date.

B. The subject-matter of the negotiations must include the withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and Far Eastern related problems.

C. The countries to participate in the negotiations should be the following seven countries: The People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, India and Egypt. The rightful place of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be established as from the beginning of the seven-nation conference.

D. The seven-nation conference should be held in China, at a place to be selected.

Reaction to Chinese Reply

The initial reaction to the Chinese Communist reply, particularly in the United States, was that it could not be accepted as a basis for continued negotiation. On January 17 the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, declared:

The reply of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations' cease-fire proposal is still further evidence of their contemptuous disregard of a world-wide demand for peace. Their so-called "counter-proposal" is nothing less than an outright rejection.

Once again, the Peiping regime has shown a total lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

There can no longer be any doubt that the United Nations has explored every possibility of finding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now we must face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the United Nations:

I am confident that the United Nations will do that. The strength of the United Nations will lie in the firmness and unity with which we now move ahead.

The following day, Mr. Austin, speaking before the Political Committee, announced that the United States would urge the United Nations to find Peking guilty of aggression. The finding of aggression, Mr. Austin said, "would decide in principle that collective measures should be taken to meet aggression". If the United Nations did not take action to meet this aggression, he concluded, "we should destroy here and now the principle of collective security on which the safety of our nations rest". The following day, Mr. Austin's position was strongly supported by the United States House of Representatives, which by a large majority adopted a resolution calling upon the United Nations to brand Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

Although there was considerable evidence that this clear-cut view of the situation was not fully shared by many members of the United Nations, and was, in fact, sharply disputed by a significant group of Asian and Arab states, the United States on January 20 introduced, without co-sponsors, a resolution naming Communist China an aggressor in Korea and requesting consideration "as a matter of urgency" of "additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression". At the same time, the draft resolution affirmed the policy of achieving United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requested the President of the Assembly to designate two persons "who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end".

The debate which ensued centred around three main questions:

- (1) Whether the Chinese Communist reply of January 17 had, in fact, been an outright rejection of the principles initiated by the Cease-Fire Group or whether, in the words of Sir Benegal Rau, it had been

“partly acceptance, partly non-acceptance, partly a request for elucidation, and partly a set of counter-proposals”;

- (2) whether, in any event, a useful purpose would be served by the formal declaration of Communist China as an aggressor; and
- (3) whether, even if it were necessary to make such a declaration, it would be advisable to pursue, at this stage, the further question of possible sanctions.

Although the United States' draft resolution was supported by the Latin American countries and a number of others, including Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, and Australia, doubts in connection with one or more of the three questions enumerated above threatened to create a serious division on this issue among other nations of the free world.

Against this background, Sir Benegal Rau on January 22 read to the Political Committee a second communication from the Chinese Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs which was a reply to questions suggested by Mr. St. Laurent to Mr. Nehru in an effort to obtain from Peking further clarification of the Chinese Communist position. A similar request for clarification was made by the United Kingdom government through their mission in Peking. These questions, as subsequently made public by Sir Benegal Rau, were as follows.

1. Do foreign troops referred to in paragraph 1 of the Chinese reply include Chinese volunteers?
2. Timing of negotiations. Do the Chinese insist that negotiations on broad political issues should precede cease-fire?
3. Representation in the United Nations. Is formal recognition of Chinese Communist Government as spokesman of China in the United Nations a precondition to agreement to a conference?

Second Chinese Communication

The following was the reply:

- (1) If the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea has been accepted and is being put into practice, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China will assume the responsibility to advise the Chinese volunteers to return to China.
- (2) Regarding the conclusion of the war in Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, we think that we can proceed in two steps. First step: A cease-fire for a limited time-period can be agreed upon in the first meeting of the seven-nation conference and put into effect so that the negotiations may proceed further. Second step: In order that the war in Korea may be concluded completely and peace in East Asia may be ensured, all the conditions for the conclusion of the war must be discussed in connection with the political problems in order to reach agreement upon the following: The steps and measures for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; the proposals to the Korean people on the steps and measures to effect the settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves; the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits in accordance with Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration; and other problems concerning the Far East.
- (3) The definitive affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be ensured.

Sir Benegal Rau then requested a 48-hour adjournment of the Committee to permit study of this reply. Mr. Austin attacked this motion for adjournment, declaring that this communication was "not much more than a postal card", and urged that the Committee continue discussion of the United States resolution. After a somewhat bitter debate, however, the Indian motion was approved by a vote of 27 in favour, including Canada, 25 against, and 6 abstentions.

Meanwhile public pressure for United Nations action continued in the United States, and on January 23 the Senate followed the House of Representatives in calling upon the United Nations to brand Communist China an aggressor in Korea. By a unanimous vote, the Senate also recommended that the Peking Government should not be allowed to represent China in the United Nations. A third Senate resolution calling for economic, diplomatic and military sanctions against China was referred by a voice vote to the Foreign Relations Committee for study.

On January 25, twelve Asian and Arab countries, including India, presented a resolution to the Political Committee as an alternative to the United States proposal. It recommended "that representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt and India and of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China meet as soon as possible for the purpose of securing all necessary elucidations and amplifications of the above-mentioned reply and of making any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems."

Debate on Resolutions

It was around these two draft resolutions that debate centred for the remainder of the week. Mr. Pearson, in his speech before the Political Committee on January 26, reviewed the history of the attempts to achieve a cease-fire in Korea and outlined the views of the Canadian Delegation. Speaking first of the Asian-Arab resolution, he stated: "Though I approve of the objective of this resolution, I regret that I cannot regard the procedure suggested in this resolution as the best method of reaching that objective. The terms of reference of the conference proposed in the Asian resolution are very wide and do not specifically embody the conception of an orderly sequence of events. . . . It is even possible that under the Asian resolution the conference might find itself involved in a discussion of general questions before any progress whatever had been made toward arranging a cease-fire. . . . For these reasons my delegation are not able to support this resolution".

Turning to the United States resolution, Mr. Pearson declared: "We think the putting of such a resolution at this stage and in this form when the possibilities of negotiation with the People's Government of China are not in our opinion completely exhausted, to be premature and unwise". Nevertheless, the Canadian delegation would vote for the resolution:

. . . because the main purport of this resolution as we understand it and certainly as the public in our own country will understand it, is to condemn the Chinese People's Government for the assistance they have given the aggressor in Korea. We think that there is no shadow of doubt about this continuing participation in aggression and we believe that the action of the Chinese People's Government in this matter has been morally wrong, and that the United Nations cannot ignore such a defiance of the principles upon which it is founded.

In the consideration of the question involved in this resolution, the Canadian Government has honestly differed with the Government of the United States on some points. We have made our position clear and we shall continue to press for those policies which, in our judgment, would be most conducive to a peaceful settlement in the Far East. We consider, however, that, though holding these views, we should

support the United States resolution as a whole. We shall do that while reserving our position in regard to any amendments which may be submitted to it. If the resolution is voted by paragraph, my delegation reserves its position in regard to paragraph 2, (which, in the draft United States resolution, noted that Peking had "rejected all United Nations proposals").

At the same time, Mr. Pearson stated that examination of the various replies from Peking had led the Canadian delegation to the view that it would have been preferable if the Political Committee could first have considered "a specific programme for a negotiated settlement . . . which would be a conclusive test of the real intentions of the Chinese Government in Peking", along the following lines:

(1) Immediate convening of a conference that might consist of the United States, United Kingdom, France, U.S.S.R., India, Egypt, and the People's Republic of China.

(2) Appointment by the conference as its first order of business of a cease-fire committee consisting of representatives of the United States, People's Republic of China, and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to arrange an immediate cease-fire.

(3) After completion of arrangements for a cease-fire, consideration by the conference of a peaceful solution of Korean problems and withdrawal of foreign troops in accordance with the United Nations' Statement of Principles.

(4) Discussion of Far Eastern problems in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Statement of Principles, the first item being Chinese representation in the United Nations. (The conference could only express a view on this subject, which can only be decided by the United Nations itself.)

(5) Participation in the discussion of particular Far Eastern problems by governments with special interests, as appropriate.

(6) Transmission of this programme by the United Nations to Peking with a request for an answer within forty-eight hours after its receipt.

Shortly after Mr. Pearson presented his programme, the Arab and Asian nations agreed to broaden their resolution to incorporate the Canadian suggestion that arrangement of a cease-fire be the first order of business of the seven-nation conference provided for in that resolution.

Efforts continued to be made to narrow the differences between the delegations of the free world and to find a basis for unity of action. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, speaking for the United Kingdom, had stated on January 25 that while his delegation was broadly in agreement with the United States draft resolution, it had grave doubts about the wisdom of considering further measures (i.e. the imposition of sanctions) before the intentions of the Peking Government had been fully explored. Mr. Pearson, in his statement, had stressed the point that in Canada's view the United States resolution would not give the Unified Command any authority which it did not already possess. Speaking to these two points on January 27, Mr. Austin clarified the intentions of the draft resolution, stating that the United States did not interpret the naming of Communist China as an aggressor as granting any new authority to the United Nations military command, and that the proposed good offices committee should continue to seek a negotiated settlement with Peking at the same time as the Collective Measures Committee considered possible punitive action. If the good offices committee achieved any positive results, consideration of punitive action could be postponed or abandoned.

In a further effort to ensure that adoption of the United States draft resolution would not close the door on a negotiated settlement if Peking had any genuine

intention to bring this about, the delegation of Lebanon submitted two amendments, which were accepted by Mr. Austin. The first modified the reference to Peking's response to the cease-fire proposals, stating that Peking had "not accepted" them rather than that it "had rejected all" such proposals. The second provided that the Collective Measures Committee, in considering possible sanctions, "is authorized to defer its report if the good offices committee . . . reports satisfactory progress in its efforts".

United States Resolution

The final version of the United States resolution therefore read:

The General Assembly

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has not accepted United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there;

Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

Calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea.

Requests a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

Despite these modifications, and the evidence of increasing support for the United States resolution, India continued to warn against the dangers of adopting such a course, and on January 30, before the votes were taken, Sir Benegal Rau told the Political Committee that "some delegates have spoken as if the door would be

open for a peaceful settlement after the resolution is passed. My government has been informed on the highest authority that once there is a condemnatory resolution there can be no hope for a peaceful settlement. It will finally extinguish all hope for a peaceful settlement". He then pressed for a vote on the Asian-Arab draft resolution.

After an unsuccessful attempt by several Arab, Asian and Soviet Bloc states to postpone the vote for one day while instructions were sought on a Soviet amendment, the Political Committee, in its evening session on January 30, rejected the Asian-Arab resolution in a paragraph by paragraph vote, (Canada abstaining). It then proceeded to adopt the amended U.S. resolution in five separate votes, the vote on the resolution as a whole being 44 to 7 (Soviet bloc, Burma and India) with 8 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia). Saudi Arabia did not participate.

The next day the Security Council by unanimous agreement dropped the item dealing with Chinese Communist aggression from its agenda, thus clearing the way for final action by the General Assembly, which was taken on February 1.

Canadian Position Reviewed

Canada's position was briefly reviewed by Mr. Pearson in a final statement on January 30 explaining the votes of the Canadian delegation. Expressing his support of the underlying principles of the Asian resolution, and paying tribute to the "sincerity of purpose and high idealism of those who have sponsored it", he regretted that he would not be able to give it his support, even though it now embodies the "essential principle that there must be an end of fighting before there can be a discussion of political questions". Among the reasons given were its lack of precision, giving too much room for further long-drawn-out and inconclusive discussion before a cease-fire could be arranged, and the absence of recognition of previous United Nations resolutions or actions in respect of Korea. In this respect it might "be interpreted as placing the Peking Government and the United Nations itself almost on the same moral and political footing". Moreover, "reasonably satisfactory machinery for cease-fire and political negotiation is included in the United States draft resolution".

Mr. Pearson then went on to say:

"We cannot vote against the Asian resolution however because, although it does not embody, as we see it, a suitable and definite programme for a cease-fire and effective discussion which would minimize delay and evasion, it nevertheless does emphasize the necessity of discussion and peaceful settlement and it does embody the principle that a cease-fire must precede discussion. Therefore my delegation will abstain on this resolution either as a substitute for or as supplementary to the United States draft resolution.

"We shall vote for the United States draft resolution for the following reasons:

- (1) Because the Lebanese amendments, which we strongly support, remove our doubts about the wisdom of certain provisions of the unamended draft;
- (2) Because its finding that the Peking Government, by helping those already designated as aggressors in Korea, has engaged in aggressive action itself in Korea, states in moderate terms facts which we cannot reject without condemning our own intervention in Korea; nevertheless we still feel that it is premature and unwise to confront the Committee with the necessity for a decision on these facts at this particular moment and, as we see it, the methods of peaceful negotiation before condemnation have not yet been completely exhausted;

(3) Because this resolution with the Lebanese amendment does not close the door to peaceful negotiation; on the contrary it very rightly emphasizes that even a report on collective measures is to be subordinated to the work of the Good Offices Group; it supports the doctrine of the Charter that mediation, conciliation and peaceful settlement should always have priority over enforcement action;

(4) Because the statement of the United States representative last Saturday was frank and unequivocal in agreeing that this draft resolution gave no one any authority in Korea or the far east which he did not already possess under United Nations resolutions;

(5) Finally, because, we do not believe that by passing this resolution we are slamming the door to subsequent negotiation or that the Government in Peking would have any justification for interpreting our action in that way.

"This draft resolution is a very mild condemnation indeed compared to that which has been hurled at the United Nations in general and the United States in particular in respect of its actions in Korea. Denouncing us as aggressors in Korea has not prevented the Peking Government from expecting those of us who have been so denounced to sit with it and negotiate; nor has it prevented that Government itself from agreeing to participate in such negotiations. If the passing of this resolution ends, in the eyes of the Peking Government, all hope of peaceful discussion and settlement, then this can only strengthen the view, which I do not necessarily share, of those who have felt that that Chinese Government was not sincere at any time in agreeing to negotiations.

"I hope, therefore, that whatever happens to this resolution, the door will remain open for negotiation and peaceful settlement."



—National Defence

WELCOME EXTENDED TO STUDENT PILOTS

A group of student pilots from the United Kingdom arrived in Canada as part of the air-training programme for North Atlantic countries. Above, the student pilots are welcomed on their arrival at Dorval Airport by Air Commodore H. M. Carscallen, Deputy Air Member for Operations and Training.

MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS

At the invitation of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth took place in London from January 4 to January 12, 1951. Announcement of the intention to hold this meeting was made by Mr. Attlee in the House of Commons on November 22, 1950, when he stated:

I have recently been in correspondence with my fellow Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth about the possibility of a meeting between us to discuss questions of common concern, including aspects of the present international situation.

We have all agreed that there should be a meeting in London early in January next. In accordance with the customary practice, the meetings will be private to enable a confidential exchange of views to take place.

The Prime Ministers of eight Commonwealth countries attended the meeting: Mr. Attlee, who presided at the sessions; Mr. R. G. Menzies; Mr. L. S. St. Laurent; Mr. D. S. Senanayake; Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru; Mr. S. G. Holland; Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Sir Godfrey Huggins. Owing to the illness of Dr. Malan, the Union of South Africa was represented by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. T. E. Dönges.

At the opening session on January 4, Mr. Attlee, as chairman, welcomed the other Commonwealth representatives on behalf of the United Kingdom Government. He recalled that since the previous meeting, death had deprived the Commonwealth of three distinguished statesmen—Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Field-Marshal Smuts of South Africa, and Mr. Peter Fraser of New Zealand.

Press Release

The following press release issued at the close of the conference on January 12 indicated the subjects discussed, and, so far as appropriate, the position taken:

The final session of the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was held at No. 10 Downing Street this afternoon.

The Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth had agreed that at this critical time it was desirable to supplement and reinforce by personal discussions the regular exchange of information and views which is maintained at all times through the High Commissioners in Commonwealth capitals. Against the background of the common understanding thus secured, decisions can be reached more readily by Commonwealth Governments on specific questions of policy. The discussions which the Prime Ministers have held during the past ten days over a wide range of topics have once again revealed a harmony of view that gives a sense of confidence and strength in this time of international tension.

The main purpose of the present Meeting was to review the international situation, and to consider what further positive action Commonwealth Governments could take to secure and preserve world peace.

There was agreement on the urgency and importance of promoting a satisfactory settlement in the Far East. The current discussions on this question in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations were kept under daily review during the course of the Meeting; and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were able to exchange views regarding the means by which their representatives in New York could best advance those discussions towards a successful conclusion. It is their earnest hope that the fresh approach which has now been made in the First Committee may lead to a settlement of outstanding issues in the Far East.

The Prime Ministers discussed the terms of a peace settlement for Japan and the safeguards which it might include. They affirmed their belief that the early conclusion of a Japanese Peace Treaty was an urgent need.

The Prime Ministers considered the situation in the Middle East. They agreed that the stability and welfare of this area, and its maintenance as a vital artery of communications, are of deep concern to all Commonwealth countries.

The Meeting also reviewed the situation in Europe. The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada, whose Governments are signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, explained their obligations under the terms of that Treaty and the measures which are being taken to meet them. The Prime Ministers took note of the progress made in re-establishing the economy of Western Europe on a sound basis. By strengthening the ability of the European democracies to maintain their national integrity, this has made a valuable contribution to the security of the free world.

The Prime Ministers examined the economic problems arising from current shortages of raw materials. They agreed that, apart from any comprehensive international organization for handling raw materials problems, there was need for closer and more regular consultation between the Commonwealth countries on all questions of supply and production. They agreed to recommend to their respective Governments that the existing Commonwealth machinery for consultation on economic questions should be strengthened for this purpose.

In a separate declaration the Prime Ministers have affirmed the common purpose of the Commonwealth countries to preserve world peace.

Several of the Prime Ministers will be remaining in London for a few days longer and will take this opportunity of discussing matters lying outside the scope of the Meeting now concluded.

Declaration

The declaration referred to above is as follows:

The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Southern Rhodesia, and the South African Minister for the Interior, representing the Prime Minister of South Africa, desire, before concluding the present London Meeting, to state in simple terms some of the great principles which have inspired the discussions and strengthened mutual understanding.

Our historic Commonwealth, which comprises one-fourth of the world's population and extends over all the continents and oceans of the world, is singularly well constituted to enable it to study and in some measure to comprehend the vexed questions which beset the world. These do not fit neatly into old patterns. In Europe there are grave and urgent problems which must be solved, and in Asia the rise of new nations and new national unities must be recognized, if peace is to be secured on a basis of justice and prosperity.

The Commonwealth has the unique quality of embracing nations and peoples from every continent. Our own meetings have, therefore, given us special knowledge, and have left us with a special sense of responsibility.

We are, both jointly and severally, pledged to peace. This is not merely a pledge given to other nations; it is solemnly given to our own.

We believe that there are certain courses which must be pursued if real peace is to come.



PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND VISITS OTTAWA

—*Capital Press*

Mr. S. G. Holland, Prime Minister of New Zealand, paid a brief visit to Ottawa on January 30 on his way home from the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London. Above, Mr. Holland, left, and Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada.

First, the wounds of the last war must be healed; settlements with Germany and Japan should be made with speed.

Second, we must do what we can to understand those who appear to differ from us. The great antidote to war is hope; its greatest promoter is despair. When we say that war is not inevitable, we do not just mean that we shall prepare and be strong, and that our strength may deter aggression. We also mean that, in a world worn out and distorted by war, there must be an overwhelming majority of the people of all lands who want peace. We must not despair of reaching them. In all our discussions we have made it clear to each other, as we now do to the world, that as Commonwealth Prime Ministers we would welcome any feasible agreement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or with Mao Tse-tung. We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds.

We do not seek to interfere in the affairs of the Soviet Union or China or any other country; we are simply determined to retain the mastery of our own affairs, without fear of aggression.

It is with these considerations in mind that in the last few days we have directed our efforts to the securing of a cessation of hostilities in Korea, so that around the conference table the Great Powers concerned may compose their differences on a basis which will strengthen the United Nations and fulfil the purposes of the Charter.

We all have deep within us, a faith in the existence of a purpose of justice in this world, and we believe it to be our duty to forward it by everything we do. Indeed, this sustaining faith derives added strength from the fact that at our meeting it has been simply and sincerely expressed by men of widely different races, traditions and creeds.

We think it proper to declare once more that the Commonwealth countries, though they have a special and precious association which they value profoundly, do not regard themselves as some sort of exclusive body. They welcome co-operation with other nations. It has been their privilege to be able to work closely with the United States of America, whose efforts in the direction of assisting many war-stricken nations are warmly regarded, and whose practical support of the United Nations has contributed much to the strength of that organization. We will at all times seek, by process of discussion, to promote the utmost harmony among ourselves and to arrive at common international policies with the United States, and with all other friendly and co-operative nations.

Our support of the United Nations needs no re-affirmation. The Commonwealth and the United Nations are not inconsistent bodies. On the contrary, the existence of the Commonwealth, linked together by ties of friendship, common purpose and common endeavour, is a source of power behind the Charter.

We of the Commonwealth recognize that the peace and prosperity of the free world cannot be assured while millions live in poverty. We are therefore resolved, while keeping our own economies strong, to promote economic and social development in the under-developed countries, by providing such financial and economic assistance as we can command and by making full use of our resources of scientific and technical experience. The Colombo Plan is practical evidence of this intention. The Commonwealth countries concerned will continue to contribute, to the full extent of their ability, towards the execution of this and similar schemes for developing economic resources and raising social standards.

In brief, the problem of peace is that of removing the causes of war; of easing tension and promoting understanding; of assisting those less-developed nations which need our aid; of being at all times willing to discuss our differences without foolishly assuming that all attempts to secure peace are a form of "appeasement". We will cultivate the friendships we now have, and hope that with wise approaches differences may become less and ultimately disappear.

But, while we say these things with a full heart, we are bound to add that, so long as the fear of aggression exists, we will have to strengthen our defences with all speed and diligence. This may well result in placing heavy burdens upon our peoples. It is our firm belief that the rule of law should govern human conduct; and we are prepared to accept whatever sacrifices may be necessary to uphold, with all other nations, those principles of international law and order which are essential conditions for world peace and progress.

Informal Discussions on Kashmir

The meeting of Prime Ministers afforded an opportunity to hold informal talks on matters outside the official scope of the conference, in particular the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kashmir. Mr. St. Laurent was present at two of these informal discussions, but his visit to France at the conclusion of the Commonwealth meeting made it impossible for him to attend the third discussion. Suggestions put forward in the course of these talks succeeded in narrowing the points of difference between India and Pakistan although agreement was not reached.

Speeches by Mr. St. Laurent

On January 8 when speaking at a dinner given by the Canada Club Mr. St. Laurent said that the inclusion within the Commonwealth circle, as absolutely equal partners, of three great Asian nations might prove to be as important a landmark in the development of the Commonwealth as the recognition of complete self-government was in 1926. There were differences in attitude and experience between the nations of the East and West, but differences and variety were the essence of life itself, and within the Commonwealth there was no desire to impose any standard of uniformity. Commonwealth membership was based upon a conviction of mutual advantage, mutual respect and genuine friendship. The Commonwealth nations could do much, through technical assistance, capital development and increased trade and commerce to help the nations of Asia overcome widespread poverty, but it would have to be clear that what was intended was genuine and friendly help, not a new form of economic imperialism to replace the old political imperialism. While it might be necessary for many years to come to maintain the armed strength of the peace-loving nations to prevent aggression, Mr. St. Laurent said "there would never be enduring peace and real security in the world until we can achieve something of this mutual respect and understanding among all nations which we are striving to maintain within the Commonwealth".

In a broadcast over the B.B.C. on January 10 Mr. St. Laurent said that the meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers "are giving those of us from the Western countries an opportunity to explain, in a friendly atmosphere, our real aims and the real motives behind our policies. They also give us the opportunity to learn from the Prime Ministers of Asian members of the Commonwealth what are the real motives and implications of their aims and their policies".

THE ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The story of OEEC during the past two years is largely an account of how Western Europe has tackled the economic problems which have confronted it since the last war. Undoubtedly the main accomplishment of OEEC has been the division of Marshall Aid between participating countries. This involved the examining and processing of annual country programmes of recovery, scaling their total foreign aid requirements to the level of the annual United States grant. The second general function of OEEC has been the development of co-operation between the countries of Western Europe. In 1948 the focus of the work of OEEC was on the increase of production from the low levels to which it had fallen after the war. In 1949, as production increased, the emphasis shifted to the encouragement of internal financial stability. In 1950 attention again shifted and a determined effort was made to liberalize European trade and payments. During the whole period the aid supplied by the United States enabled the OEEC countries to maintain minimum standards of living and to secure raw materials and other essential imports from abroad. Without this aid the European economy would almost certainly have collapsed; with it, the countries of Europe have been able to restore their economies in an orderly and progressive manner.

OEEC Activities in 1949 and 1950

During the spring and summer of 1949 the United States' economy suffered a slight recession and there was a fall of 30 per cent in Western Europe's exports to the United States between the first and third quarters of the year. This development tended to effect adversely the European trade balance with the United States. To compensate for this deterioration, OEEC began to direct its attention to raising the level of trade within Europe. With this object in view, the participating countries agreed in May 1949 to study measures for removing restrictions on intra-European trade and to draw up a liberalization programme. At the same time OEEC commenced inquiries into each country's internal financial and monetary situation. Though the more serious aspects of inflation had disappeared in most countries, high prices persisted and inflationary forces remained. European industry remained non-competitive. Special studies were also initiated on the possibility of increasing agricultural production, for it was estimated that an annual dollar saving of 1.25 billion dollars could be obtained in this sector.

Efforts were also made to liberalize intra-European payments. After prolonged difficulties the 1949-50 Intra-European Payments Agreement was signed. It permitted a certain degree of multilateralism which was lacking in the scheme of the previous year. Then in October 1949, Mr. Paul Hoffman, the ECA Administrator, addressed the OEEC Council and called for the economic integration of the Western European economy. He suggested that increased attention be given to the liberalization of intra-European trade, but he was careful to point out that the object of such efforts was not to obtain self-sufficiency and a reduction in the volume of international trade, but rather increased production, lower prices, and a stronger competitive position so that total trade would be increased.

The results of these new pressures were two-fold. At a November 1949 meeting of the Council of OEEC a proposal was adopted that all countries should progressively reduce quantitative restrictions on imports from other participating countries. From this proposal developed the OEEC scheme for the progressive removal by each country of quantitative restrictions on imports from other participating countries. In the first instance countries were required to remove by December 15, 1949, quantitative restrictions on at least 50 per cent of their total imports on private account

from other member countries taken as a group, the target to be met separately for food and feedingstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods. By October 1950, most countries had reached the 60 per cent level. In December negotiations were taking place under OEEC auspices towards the 75 per cent level.

The second major development was the striking progress in obtaining multilateral arrangements within Western Europe. With the end of the 1949-50 payments scheme in June 1950 the OEEC countries agreed to set up a European Payments Union. Under the EPU, countries are able to use their current surpluses in any one European currency for the settlement of current deficits in any other European currency. A general clearing takes place at established intervals leaving each country in a net position either of creditor or debtor with the Union. Countries are given overdraft facilities at EPU, roughly in proportion to their transactions with other members, to cover unforeseen deficits with the group as a whole. But, unlike the previous payments schemes, the EPU contains a system of incentives to encourage debtors and creditors to restore a balance. Debtors can obtain credit freely up to 20 per cent of their quota and thereafter must make simultaneous gold payments to EPU to cover a steadily rising proportion of their deficits until, when their quota is exhausted, 100 per cent gold must be paid to cover further deficits. Creditors give credit up to 20 per cent of their quota without receiving gold, and thereafter are obliged to give \$1.00 of credit for every dollar of gold received. They have thus some incentive to reduce their surplus. The original resources of EPU were made available by ECA which set aside 350 million dollars of ERP funds for this purpose. This multilateral payments mechanism was a substantial step toward setting the financial conditions necessary for an extension of intra-European trade liberalization.

But in some of the efforts of the European countries to solve their dollar problem, some Canadians perceived certain inherent dangers. The early efforts simply to pare dollar expenditures were disappointing, especially as there was a potential dollar earning power in Western Europe. Many European manufactured goods were readily marketable in Canada if offered at competitive prices. As OEEC countries sought the development of intra-European trade through special payments and trade relations, Canada and the U.S.A. were faced not merely with the problem of Western Europe's reduced purchases of North American goods owing to a shortage of dollars, but with a possible longer term problem in the building up of a separate and higher priced trading economy in Western Europe which might permanently discriminate against North American goods.

Canadian Association with OEEC

Canada has always followed the political and economic fortunes of Western Europe, with the greatest interest. The post-war loans to Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Norway, not to mention the very much larger one to the United Kingdom, were granted with the sincere desire that these countries would soon regain economic health. In the summer of 1948 Canada sent a special Mission to Paris to make contact with the newly established Organization for European Economic Cooperation in order to ensure that the problems facing the participating countries were solved in a way that took account of the interests of Canada and other overseas countries with long established trade relations with Western Europe. This Mission was withdrawn early in 1949, but Canada maintained an active interest in the policies of OEEC.

In the spring of 1949 the interest of both Canada and the United States in the economic progress of Western Europe was reinforced by a profound concern over the lack of defensive preparedness in that area. Canada joined with many of the OEEC countries and the United States in signing the North Atlantic Treaty, thus committing us to the defence of Western Europe. Article 2 of the Treaty, which

Canada was largely instrumental in getting into the Treaty, provides for economic co-operation between the Treaty members.

Although the principle of North Atlantic economic co-operation was established by Article 2 of the Treaty, no economic bodies were set up under NATO for the sole purpose of implementing its objectives. Economic co-operation was made easier between Western Europe and North America on an informal basis through OEEC. In May 1950, following a meeting in London of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, an announcement was made that the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom had expressed a hope that OEEC would invite Canada and the U.S.A. to become associated in the work of the Organization. Subsequently a proposal of the United Kingdom and France was adopted by the OEEC Council that Canada and the United States be invited to associate themselves with the Organization. In October a Canadian Permanent Delegation to OEEC was established in Paris headed by Mr. S. D. Pierce, O.B.E.

The Impact of Aggression in Korea

In June 1950, as OEEC was tackling the problems of international trade and payments, and its participating countries were making progress toward a trade balance with the rest of the world, peace was shattered by the outbreak of war between North and South Korea. One facet of the effect of this war was a change in the climate of economic activity in North America and Western Europe. The implication for Western Europe was not just the diversion of resources to rearmament but a threat to previous hopes of a steady improvement in the standard of living, an expanding programme of investment and the raising of productivity. Old dangers, though in a new form, quickly appeared. With the sharp increase in prices of essential raw materials and the diversion of resources from investment and consumer goods to rearmament, the problems of inflation and an increasingly adverse balance of payments reappeared. It was clear that the need for external aid would continue.

OEEC is now examining the impact of rearmament on the economy of Western Europe. With the active participation of the Canadian Mission, studies on the scarcity of raw materials already have been made. The Third Annual Report of the Organization will be issued early in 1951. It will embrace the three related questions of continuing economic recovery, rearmament and the need for external aid.

Although Western Europe's economy is much sounder than it was in 1948, current problems point up the need for a further substantial expansion in production. Through the forum provided by OEEC these countries are now tackling the new problems. That useful results can be obtained from these efforts can perhaps be anticipated from the way in which the recent problem of Western Germany's trade balance was handled. During the first four months of the operations of the EPU, Western Germany developed an acute and persistent adverse balance of payments which threatened to exhaust her EPU quota before the end of the year. To meet this crisis Germany took measures to restrict credit and cut down on the number of import licenses; and OEEC considered what steps could be taken to maintain Germany as a member in good standing of EPU. The Economic Director of OEEC and an official of the Bank of International Settlements proceeded to Bonn and, with the whole-hearted co-operation of the German Government, they made a comprehensive survey of Western Germany's economic position, with special reference to the balance of payments problem. Based on their report to OEEC, the OEEC Council agreed to an extension of credit to Western Germany provided the West German Government submitted for OEEC's approval a suitable programme of action. This programme was subsequently approved and was a distinct success for OEEC as the measures proposed avoided any retreat from the degree of trade liberalization so far attained under the OEEC programme. Though much credit is due to Germany for

the energetic efforts she herself took, the way in which the problem was handled was a solid achievement for OEEC.

In the crisis now facing the free world, encouragement can be found in the economic strength which Western Europe has gained in the last two years. The improved position cannot be ascribed entirely to OEEC, but the Organization has provided a useful and important forum where the economic problems of Western Europe as a whole have been carefully examined and where country programmes have been scrutinized and publicly criticized. OEEC itself might therefore be termed one of the important resources of the West for pursuing the two fundamental goals of greater rearmament and an overall increased level of production so that standards of living can be increased.

The economic problem for Europe, and indeed for the North Atlantic community as a whole, is no longer dominated by the Marshall aid programme in the successful administration of which OEEC has been of such great assistance. The problem today is rather one of the impact on the economies of North Atlantic countries of their defence programmes. For this reason, it is obviously in the interests of all countries concerned to relate the work of OEEC with the economic side of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The exact relationship between OEEC and NATO has not yet been worked out, but is under active study. When an agreement satisfactory to all concerned has been reached, the countries on both sides of the Atlantic will advance together towards a solution of their broader economic problems which, it is becoming increasingly evident, are not capable of satisfactory long-term solution in a European context alone.



PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE VISITS OTTAWA

—Capital Press

The Prime Minister of France, Mr. René Pleven, visited Ottawa on February 2 for consultation with the Canadian Government. Mr. Pleven is seen above seated with the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent. Standing, left to right, are the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney; the French Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Hubert Guérin; the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe; the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton; the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson; and Mr. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The Speech from the Throne

The Speech from the Throne, which opened the Fourth Session of Canada's twenty-first Parliament on January 30, 1951, contained the following references to external policy:

Honourable Members of the Senate:

Members of the House of Commons:

Since you met in Special Session in the autumn of last year, there has been a further deterioration in the international situation. The intervention of Chinese forces in active opposition to the United Nations forces in Korea has increased the danger of a general conflagration.

So far the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Far East have not succeeded. While aggression cannot be condoned and will continue to be resisted, it is the view of my Ministers that the door to negotiation at any time a cessation of hostilities in Korea can be arranged must be kept open.

The increased menace in the Far East reinforces the mounting evidence that Communist imperialism is determined to dominate the world by force or the fear of force, and that the only hope of maintaining peace with freedom lies in the rapid increase of the combined strength of the free nations. It is equally important that the free nations should make it abundantly clear that they have no aggressive designs and that they are resolved to aid in constructive endeavours to improve the standards of human welfare in under-developed countries.

My Ministers have endeavoured to uphold these international objectives in the deliberations of the United Nations, at the recent meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries, and in our diplomatic relations with all nations and governments.

Units of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force have shared from the outset in the United Nations action in Korea. One battalion of the Canadian Army Special Force is now in Korea, and the rest of the force is at Fort Lewis, Washington, where it is available for service in Korea or for other employment in discharge of our international obligations.

Progress has been made in the organization of an integrated force in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, has recently visited Canada to consult with the Government and the Chiefs of Staff. You will be asked early in the session to authorize Canadian participation in this integrated force as part of our programme for national defence and security. You will also be asked to approve substantially increased expenditures for defence.

The urgent need of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project in relation to the security of this continent is becoming increasingly apparent. It is the view of my Ministers that the Canadian authorities should be kept in a position to co-operate promptly in undertaking construction of the project once affirmative action has been taken by the appropriate United States authorities.

Your approval will be sought for an appropriate Canadian participation in the Colombo plan and in technical assistance to under-developed areas.



—Capital Press

NEW SESSION OF PARLIAMENT OPENS

The fourth session of the Twenty-First Parliament, in which international affairs and defence were expected to be of paramount importance, opened at Ottawa on January 30, 1951. Above, Their Excellencies, Lord and Lady Alexander, preceded by the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, Major C. R. Lamoureux, and Major General H. F. G. Letson, are seen leaving the Senate Chamber followed by Miss Anstice Gibbs, Lady-in-Waiting to Lady Alexander; Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada; Senator W. McL. Robertson, Leader of the Government in the Senate; the Chiefs of Staff, Lt. General Charles Foulkes, Air Marshall W. A. Curtis and Vice-Admiral H. T. W. Grant; and the Adjutant General of the Army, Major General W. H. S. Macklin.

The policies of the government are designed to prevent war, but the dangers of the international situation and the magnitude of the defence effort required as a deterrent have, in the opinion of my Ministers, created an emergency situation. You will accordingly be asked to approve legislation vesting in the Governor in Council additional powers to ensure adequate defence preparations to meet the present emergency and to prevent economic dislocation resulting from defence preparations.

You will also be asked to approve a Bill to establish a Department of Defence Production to act as a procurement agency for the defence forces of Canada and also for such defence requirements of our allies as may be met from Canadian production.

Amendments to legislation relating to the armed forces will also be submitted for your approval.

. . . . Appropriate amendments to the Canadian Citizenship Act will be introduced to prevent retention of Canadian citizenship by persons who have renounced their allegiance or shown by their conduct that they are not loyal to Canada.

The high level of employment and production within our country give our people increased capacity to meet the demands of national and international security.

Members of the House of Commons:

You will be asked to make provision for national defence and the meeting of our obligations under the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as for all essential services. . . .

St. Lawrence Waterway

In response to a question asked on January 31 by Mr. Gordon Graydon (P.C., Peel) as to whether it was the intention of the Canadian Government to proceed alone with the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway if the United States Congress does not within a reasonable time offer its co-operation in that regard, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, made the following statement:

The prospects of co-operation between the two governments in the construction of the project as a whole, both for navigation and for hydro-electric power development, appear quite good at the present time, and we are hopeful that within a short time there will be some constructive action in that regard.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Eighth Session of the Trusteeship Council

The Eighth Session of the Trusteeship Council opened at Lake Success on January 30, 1951, and is expected to last until approximately the middle of March. As in its previous meetings, the Council will be confronted with four main tasks: the consideration of reports submitted by those nations which administer trust territories; the examination of petitions from inhabitants of the territories; the organization of visiting missions; and the consideration of recommendations adopted by the General Assembly.

The present membership of the Trusteeship Council consists of the six administering powers (Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States); the U.S.S.R and China (permanent members of the Security Council which do not have the responsibility for administering trust territories); and four other member states, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Iraq and Thailand. Of these the only new member is Thailand, which succeeded the Philippines on January 1, 1951. Canada has never held membership in the Council.

Relationship Between Council and Assembly

The most debatable matters on the Council's agenda relate to certain recommendations made by the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, all of which touch upon the delicate question of the constitutional relationship between the Council and the Assembly. The extent to which the Council is obliged to abide strictly by recommendations of the Assembly has already aroused controversy in the past, notably with regard to the Council's attempts to frame a satisfactory statute for the internationalization of Jerusalem. The problem arose again at the Fifth Session of the Assembly when the administering powers and their critics were often in disagreement over the degree of flexibility which the Trusteeship Council should be permitted in its interpretation of, and action on, Assembly recommendations.

In view of these differences considerable interest will attach to the Trusteeship Council's response to three resolutions adopted by the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. The first of these requests the Council to make certain alterations in the form of its future annual reports and recommends that each such report should contain an account of the manner in which the administering authority has carried out the recommendations of the Assembly or of the Trusteeship Council, together with a statement of the measures which, in the Council's view, should be adopted. The second resolution, which deals with the procedure concerning the organization and functioning of visiting missions, recommends that the Council should review its methods in this field with a view to reducing the number of trust territories to be visited by a single mission and to extending the duration of visits without diminishing their frequency. The third resolution requests the Council to study measures for the improvement of its present procedure for the examination of petitions. When these proposals were voted on in the Trusteeship Committee of the Assembly, the Canadian Representative abstained in each case on the ground that the Trusteeship Council should be permitted as much flexibility as possible in its procedure and operations.

The Council will also discuss at its current session the revision of the provisional questionnaire which is submitted to the administering powers for the preparation of their reports on the trust territories. The provisional questionnaire consists of a series of questions concerning the status of each territory and its population in the political, economic, social and educational fields, and concerning the measures taken by the various administering authorities to promote the progress of the people of the trust territories towards self-government or independence. At its last session the

Council set up a committee of four members (Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Iraq and the United Kingdom) to undertake the revision of the questionnaire with a view to eliminating duplications and ambiguities. A revised questionnaire, embodying suggestions and comments submitted by the committee, is expected to be examined by the Council.

In addition to the procedural and organizational items outlined above, the Council will consider a large number of substantive questions. These include: a study of the annual reports for the Pacific trust territories (Western Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Nauru and New Guinea); consideration of the arrangements for the visiting mission to proceed to the trust territories in East Africa in 1951; and an examination of the report of the visiting mission which went to the Pacific trust territories in 1950. Resolutions adopted by the Fifth Session of the Assembly on educational advancement, rural economic development, technical assistance and the abolition of corporal punishment in the trust territories, will also be examined.

A further item on the Council's agenda concerns the former Italian colony of Somaliland. At its Seventh Session in 1950 the Council drew up a trusteeship agreement for this territory, which was adopted by the Fifth Session of the Assembly. At its current session the Trusteeship Council will transmit the regular provisional questionnaire to the Italian Government, which has been designated by the Assembly as the administering authority for the territory for a period of ten years from the adoption of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Italian Government (represented by an Administrator) will be assisted by a United Nations Advisory Council composed of representatives from Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines.

CURRENT PUBLICATIONS

Report of the Department of External Affairs, Canada, 1950.
King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada (Price 25 cents).

This Report was recently tabled in the House of Commons. Its contents reflect the organization of the Department, and descriptions of the work done at home and abroad during 1950 appear under the geographical headings "Commonwealth", "Europe" and "America and the Far East"; and under the functional headings "United Nations", "Defence Liaison", "Economic", "Legal", "Protocol", "Information", "Consular", "Personnel", and "Administration". Canadian participation in the United Nations has been noted only briefly, since this subject will be covered in a report to be issued later by the Department, *Canada and the United Nations, 1950*.

In a Foreword surveying the critical events of the past year, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, states that "the paramount Canadian interest abroad is the maintenance of international peace and security", and the detailed information in the Report is seen in relation to this general objective. Thus, certain constructive results of Commonwealth relations and important practical developments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are described; the work of the Council of Europe, "in giving expression to growing united European opinion", is outlined; and various sections of the Report refer to Canadian participation in international economic co-operation—with the United States, through OEEC and under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The situation in the Far East which has threatened the achievement of peace is summarized in a section which outlines events in Korea and shows briefly Canadian policy in relation to them.

The section on legal matters includes a review of the work of the International Joint Commission during the year. The report of the Protocol Division notes changes which have occurred in diplomatic and consular representation in Canada, and the chapter on consular work suggests briefly some of the contingencies with which consular officers abroad have to deal.

The Report concludes with two appendices, the first listing international agreements entered into by Canada in 1950, and the second providing a summary of Canadian representation at international conferences and meetings during the past year.

Documents on the Korean Crisis.
King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada, (Price 15 cents).

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, tabled in the House of Commons on January 31, 1951, the White Paper entitled "Documents on the Korean Crisis". These documents provide valuable background and source material for the articles on "Canada and the Korean Crisis" which have been published in *External Affairs* each month since July 1950. This White Paper may also be regarded as a sequel to that tabled on September 1, 1950, on the same subject.

The collection begins with the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, followed by a relevant excerpt from the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945. Official statements of Canadian policy, the first of which is the Note of September 26, 1950 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the recruitment of the Canadian Army Special Force, make up the bulk of the 38-page booklet. The most important Resolutions regarding Korea of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of certain of its Committees are included, as well as related messages from the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Appropriate docu-

mentation is provided up to and including the Draft Twelve Power Resolution introduced before the First Committee on January 24, 1951: "Peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems". A list of offers of assistance for Korea, made by countries other than the United States, up to January 2, 1951, is also included.

Other Publications

(Obtainable from the King's Printer at the price indicated).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 7: Exchange of Notes between Canada and France constituting an Agreement modifying the Visa Requirements for Canadian and French Citizens visiting France and Canada respectively. Signed at Ottawa, April 6 and 17, 1950. (Price, 10 cents). (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 9: Exchange of Notes between Canada and Yugoslavia constituting an Agreement concerning Settlement of Claims arising out of the War. Signed at Belgrade, March 25 and 29, 1950. (Price, 10 cents). (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 11: Exchange of Letters between Canada and the United States of America providing for the Renewal of the Arrangement of 1942 for the Exchange of Agricultural Labour and Machinery. Signed at Ottawa, June 29 and July 6, 1950. (Price, 10 cents). (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1949, No. 16: Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement regarding the Settlement of Claims and Accounts arising out of the Disposal of War Surpluses. Signed at Ottawa, June 17 and 18, 1949. (Price, 10 cents). (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1949, No. 26: Exchange of Notes between Canada and the Netherlands constituting an Agreement regarding Visa Requirements for Non-Immigrant Travellers of the two countries. Signed at The Hague, December 9 and 14, 1949. (Price, 10 cents). (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1948, No. 28: Supplementary Financial Agreement between Canada and Belgium. Signed at Ottawa, October 24, 1947. (Price, 10 cents). (Bilingual).



—Canadian Army

GENERAL MARK CLARK VISITS OTTAWA

General Mark Wayne Clark, Chief of United States Army Field Forces, arrived in Ottawa on January 22 for a five day visit. Above, General Clark, right, accompanied by Lt. General Charles Foulkes, at that time Chief of the General Staff, and now Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, visits the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, in his office.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. W. Holmes was posted from the General Assembly, New York, to Ottawa, effective December 18, 1950.
- Mr. F. Tovell was posted from the General Assembly, New York, to Ottawa, effective December 18, 1950.
- Mr. K. Goldschlag was posted from the General Assembly, New York, to Ottawa, effective December 18, 1950.
- Miss A. M. Ireland was posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in New Zealand, to Ottawa, effective January 5, 1951.
- Mr. M. Wershof was posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, to Ottawa, effective January 12, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

His Excellency Urho Toivola, Minister of Finland, resumed charge of the Legation, December 28. Mr. Toivola was married on January 5, 1951.

Mr. Zygfryd Wolniak, Second Secretary, Legation of Poland, left Ottawa, December 26, for a vacation in Poland. During his absence he is being replaced by Mr. Jan Sztuk, of the Polish Consulate General in Chicago.

Lieutenant-Colonel Janko Susnjar, Military, Naval and Air Attaché, Legation of Yugoslavia, was promoted to the rank of Colonel, January 10.

New Appointments

Mr. Tomas Vuksanovic, Commercial Attaché, Legation of Yugoslavia, December 19. Mr. Vuksanovic is married.

Mr. Vaclav Piech, Third Secretary, Legation of Czechoslovakia, December 27. Mr. Piech is married.

Mr. B. P. Adarkar, Commercial Counsellor, Office of the High Commissioner for India, December 27. He will reside in Toronto. Mr. Adarkar is married.

Mr. John H. Morgan, Counsellor of Embassy, Embassy of the United States of

America, January 11. Mr. Morgan was previously Consul at Quebec. Mr. Morgan is married.

Mr. Leonid Teplov, Counsellor, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 11. Mr. Teplov is married.

Mr. Serguei Roudtchenko, First Secretary, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 11.

Colonel José Kahl, Jr., Assistant Air Attaché, Embassy of Brazil, January 18.

Mr. Farnçois René Antoine de Laboulaye, Counsellor, Embassy of France, January 20. Mr. de Laboulaye is married.

Mr. M. J. van Schreven, Counsellor, Embassy of the Netherlands, January 22. Mr. van Schreven is married.

Departures

Mr. Henryk Kessler, Attaché, Legation of Poland, December 6.

Mr. G. E. B. Shannon, Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, end of December.

Mr. H. F. Eschauzier, Counsellor, Embassy of the Netherlands, end of January.

CONSULAR

Executurs were issued to:

Mr. Santiago Hernandez Aljaro, Consul General of El Salvador at Montreal, January 24.

Mr. Mulford A. Colebrook, Consul of the United States of America at Winnipeg, January 24.

Mr. Edgar Enrique Perez Colman, Consul of Argentina at Quebec, January 24.

Mr. Milton Faria, Consul of Brazil at Montreal, January 24.

Mr. A. Eugene Frank, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, January 24.

Definitive recognition was granted to:

Mr. Gustaf Lundh as Vice-Consul of Sweden at Montreal, January 6.

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Horatio T. Mooers as Consul of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, January 4. Mr. Mooers is in charge of the Consulate General.

Mr. Fernando Olivie as Consul of Spain at Montreal, January 16.

Mr. Ralph Fratzke as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Windsor, January 24.

Mr. George H. Wilson as Honorary Consul General of Peru at Vancouver, January 31. Mr. Wilson is married.

Mr. Norman E. Lamb as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, January 31. Mr. Lamb is married.

Departures

Mr. Sidney A. Belovsky, Consul General

of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, December 27.

Mr. Charles F. Johnson, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, December 30.

Mr. Pedro Bonnefon, Consul General of Argentina at Montreal, December 31.

Mr. James MacGregor Davison, Honorary Vice-Consul of Sweden at Halifax, end of December.

Mr. D. W. Ledingham, Honorary Vice-Consul of Sweden at St. John, New Brunswick, end of December.

Mr. Philippe Cantave, Consul General of Haiti, resumed charge of the Consulate General, January 8, on his return from a visit to Haiti.

VISITS OF OFFICIALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, visited Ottawa, January 26 and 27.

The Right Honourable S. G. Holland, Prime Minister of New Zealand, visited Ottawa, January 30 and 31.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a List of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of January, 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier Conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs").

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually; next date of publication of complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions, January, 1952. See "External Affairs", January, 1951, for a complete list of these).

Conferences Attended in January 1951

1. *Multilateral Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* Torquay, England—September 28. L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, Chairman; H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board, Deputy Chairman; J. J. Deutsch, W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Department of External Affairs; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarret and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
2. *Legal Committee of ICAO.* Mexico City—January 2. Delegates: Brig. C. S. Booth, Council Member for Canada; A. S. McDonald, Air Transport Board.
3. *Indian Science Congress.* Bangalore, India—January 2. Dr. B. R. MacKay, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
4. *Pan-Indian Ocean Congress.* Bangalore, India—January 2. Dr. B. R. MacKay, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
5. *Commonwealth Prime Ministers.* London—January 4-12. Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada; Advisers: N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet; J. W. Pickersgill, Office of the Prime Minister; and J. Léger, Department of External Affairs.
6. *Centenary of Geological Survey of India.* Calcutta—January 10. Dr. B. R. MacKay, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
7. *Permanent Joint Board on Defence.* Washington—January 10. Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Chairman; Rear-Admiral F. L. Houghton; Maj-Gen. H. A. Spar-

ling; A/V/M A. L. James; C. C. Eberts, Office of the Privy Council.

8. *Annual Meeting to Discuss Plans for Arctic Weather Programme.* Ottawa — January 11. W/C F. H. Pearce; W/C W. Murray; A/C A. D. Ross; A/C R. A. London; S/L A. Rosenthal; S/L F. H. Nichols; Lt. Col. R. A. Klaehn; F. A. Brinkman; and G. Rowley, Department of National Defence; Lt. J. H. MacLean and Lt. W. V. A. Leslie, R.C.N.; G/C Z. L. Leigh, R.C.A.F.; Dr. G. S. Hume, Dr. C. S. Beals, R. G. Madill, E. Fry and N. L. Nicholson, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys; Dr. D. C. Rose, National Research Council; J. G. Wright, J. W. Burton and J. C. Jackson, Department of Resources and Development; Inspector H. A. Larsen, R.C.M.P.; A. Thomson, D. C. Archibald, R. W.
9. *Twenty-Fifth Session of Executive Board of UNESCO.* Paris—January 15-28. Dr. V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland.
10. *First Session of the ILO Committee on Indigenous Labour.* LaPaz, Bolivia — January 16-27. D. F. Brown, M.P.
11. *Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Bird-Banding Association.* Boston—January 26. H. R. Webster, Dominion Wildlife Officer for the Maritimes.
12. *Twelfth Session of ICAO Council.* Montreal—January 30. Brig. C. S. Booth, Council Member for Canada.

Conferences to be held in February and March

1. *Tenth Plenary Meeting of Cotton Advisory Committee.* Lahore, Pakistan — February 1.
2. *Third Session of the Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee of ILO.* Geneva—February 12-24.
3. *Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia.* Colombo — February 12.
4. *Agenda Committee of ECOSOC.* Santiago—February 16.
5. *Twelfth Session of ECOSOC.* Santiago —February 20.
6. *114th Session of Governing Body of ILO.* Geneva—February 26-March 10.
7. *Medical Conference.* Pakistan — February.
8. *First South American Congress on Petroleum.* Montevideo—March 12-16.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY CANADA

France

Agreement between Canada and France relating to the Terms of Compensation for Canadian Interests in Nationalized Gas and Electricity. Signed at Paris on January 26, 1951.

India

Exchange of Notes between Canada and India constituting an Agreement concerning the Entry to Canada for Permanent Residence of Citizens of India. Signed at Ottawa, January 26, 1951.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

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| No. 51/1— <i>The Commonwealth and the World Today</i> , an address by Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, delivered to the Canada Club in London, England, on January 8, 1951. | No. 51/2—Statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, made in the First (Political) Committee on January 26, 1951. |
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Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

THE adoption by the General Assembly on February 1 of the United States resolution condemning China as an aggressor closed a crowded chapter in the story of the Korean crisis. In the next chapter, which opened with the month of February, the search for a settlement of the dispute was pressed forward in a less dramatic manner.

The dominant fact of the month from the United Nations point of view was the marked improvement in the military situation. Late in January, United Nations forces embarked on a limited offensive from their line of farthest retreat 35 miles south of Seoul. Slowly and at disproportionate cost to the Chinese forces they moved forward 30 miles. At the end of the month it seemed improbable that they could be driven back unless the Chinese People's Government sent large additional forces to the battle area. This new military situation appeared likely to provide a new and firmer basis for the search for a peaceful settlement in Korea.

The General Assembly resolution of February 1 provided for the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee to consider additional measures to meet the Chinese aggression. It also requested the President of the General Assembly to form a Good Offices Committee by designating two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices in bringing about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and in achieving United Nations objectives by peaceful means.

The Additional Measures Committee met on February 16 for the first time to organize its activities and discuss its relationship with the Good Offices Committee. It constituted part of its membership as a bureau to study the main lines and principles followed in previous applications of collective measures. When the bureau has completed its work, the full Committee will meet again to consider the next step in carrying out its part of the General Assembly resolution.

The President of the Assembly had hoped that Sir Benegal Rau and Mr. Pearson would continue to work with him on the Good Offices Committee as they had done on the Cease-Fire Committee. In view of the stand which India had taken against the United States resolution, Sir Benegal did not believe that he should accept appointment on a committee set up under its terms. Mr. Pearson declined an invitation to serve on the Good Offices Committee because one member of the Cease-Fire Group, Sir Benegal Rau, had been unable to serve on the new committee, and because he himself did not think his duties in Ottawa would enable him to give sufficient time and attention to the work of the Committee. Mr. Entezam therefore invited Mr. Sven Craftstrom of Sweden and Dr. Luis Padillo Nervo of Mexico to join him on the Good Offices Committee. On February 19 the Committee met formally for the first time to consider how it could best promote a peaceful settlement of the Korean war. The same day it met with the bureau of the Additional Measures Committee to determine a working arrangement for the two committees that would facilitate the United Nations objective of peaceful settlement. On February 23 the Good Offices Committee was reported to have made its first approach to the Chinese People's Government to see if the latter would discuss Korean peace terms with it. At the end of the month the Chinese Government had not yet responded to this approach.

The slow advance of United Nations forces northward focused attention once more on the 38th parallel. There was widespread speculation that a movement across the line might provoke the Chinese Government to intervene on a larger scale and might destroy what seemed to be a growing awareness on their part of the necessity of accepting a negotiated settlement.



—United Nations

CANADIAN TROOPS IN KOREA

In a ceremony held at Pusan, the United Nations flag was presented to Lt. Col. J. R. Stone, Commanding Officer of the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry, 2nd Battalion, by Mr. James Plimsoll, Australian Delegate to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

Responding to a question about the 38th parallel in the House of Commons on February 13 the Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed the opinion that any decision on crossing the parallel should be a collective one including particularly those governments participating in United Nations operations in Korea, of which the most important was the United States of America. Mr. Pearson told the House that as a result of recent discussions among representatives of governments with forces participating in Korean operations, the political significance of any move across the parallel deep into North Korean territory was fully appreciated.

On February 21 two announcements were made which highlighted Canada's participation in the first attempt of the United Nations to apply the principle of collective security. It was announced that the Canadian infantry battalion which had been training in South Korea for three months was fighting as a part of the Commonwealth Brigade on the central front in the limited offensive announced the day before by General MacArthur at Wonju, Korea. The same night, in the House of Commons, the Minister of National Defence announced that two more infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, and supporting service units, from the Special Force in Fort Lewis would proceed shortly to Korea to join with the battalion already fighting there in forming a full Canadian brigade group.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC CONTROL*

It has been amply demonstrated through the years that when a commodity in international trade has both a legal and illegal use, national control alone, without international collaboration, is not fully effective; that the smaller the bulk and the higher the value of the commodity, the greater the difficulty of control; and that where there is no national interest to resist international control, control will be easier. Narcotic drugs have a legal and illegal use, are small in bulk and high in value, and, in so far as most countries of the world are concerned, there is no national interest to resist control. Such national interest can, however, exist when, as in Japan prior to the close of the Second World War, drugs are used as an implement of policy to weaken an enemy; when the tax revenue derived from the commodity is a considerable proportion of the country's budget income; or when cultivation or manufacture or trade is an important part of the country's economy.

In its simplest form, international control of narcotic drugs consists of this: international conventions require governments to ensure, through administering appropriate legislation, that the drugs can be used for medical and scientific purposes only, that no unlicensed person, from the grower or manufacturer down to the ultimate user, may possess the drugs, and that records of all transactions shall be kept, summarized and sent to an international organization. This body is thus enabled to determine whether a government has fulfilled its obligations. Enforcement by the international control bodies depends upon certain permissible embargoes, and upon the pressure of public opinion. In essence, therefore, international control is supervision of the performance of national administration.

The first international step was taken in 1909 when an International Opium Commission met in Shanghai. Representatives of thirteen governments participated, the late Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King being a member of the British delegation. The representatives recognized that "the use of opium in any form otherwise than for medical purposes is a matter for prohibition or for careful regulation", that "the unrestricted manufacture, sale and distribution of morphine already constitute a great danger", and that "drastic measures should be taken by each government to institute a proper control over this drug and also of such other derivatives of opium as may appear on scientific enquiry to be liable to produce similar abuse and . . . like ill effects."

First International Convention Negotiated

Three years later, delegates from twelve States met at The Hague and negotiated the first international narcotic convention. Production and distribution of raw opium was to be controlled. Only authorized persons were to be allowed to import or export, and contracting parties undertook to limit the number of ports and harbours through which such traffic was permitted.

In 1920 the first Assembly of the League of Nations created an Advisory Committee "to exercise a general supervision over the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs and to secure the full co-operation of the various countries in this field", while the Secretariat was charged with the duty of collecting information concerning the arrangements made in various countries for carrying out the Hague Convention, as well as information about the production, distribution and consumption of narcotic drugs. Canada was appointed to this Advisory Committee in 1934 and remained a member until it was replaced in 1946 by the Narcotic Commission of the United Nations. In 1924-5 there was a Conference at Geneva, attended by thirty-six States, from which emerged the 1925 Convention. Voluntary control was transformed into

* By Col. C. H. L. Sharman, Department of National Health and Welfare.

a legal obligation, and in addition to raw opium and its derivatives, the Convention covered coca leaves, crude cocaine, ecgonine and Indian hemp. The most important feature, however, was the creation of the Permanent Central Opium Board, and the acceptance of compulsory arbitration for all disputes arising out of the convention which could not be settled by other means. International trade in the substances covered was to be effected through a system of compulsory import certificates and export authorizations, the latter only issuable upon production of the former. A copy of the export authorization was to accompany the consignment and was required to quote the number and date of the import certificate so that it could be linked with it. By these means a strict check was made possible over the international narcotic trade, and in the subsequent twenty-five years has continued to work well.

Fifty-eight countries have ratified the 1925 Convention, which came into effect in 1928, and after it had been in operation for a few years it was possible to determine the actual legitimate needs of the world, and to effect considerable reduction in world manufacture. In 1929, 58 tons of morphine for all purposes had been manufactured, while in the period 1931-35 the legitimate needs of the world had been completely satisfied by an annual production averaging 29 tons. In 1929, 3.6 tons of heroin and 6.4 tons of cocaine had been manufactured, while in 1935 the percentage of reduction effected in relation to these drugs was 82 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.

The next Convention, that of 1931, extended the scope of the control, particularly of manufactured drugs, each country supplying detailed estimates of its medical and scientific requirements and of its requirements for manufacture and subsequent export. These estimates are examined and endorsed by a Supervisory Body, set up by the Convention, which is empowered to draw up an estimate for any country which has failed to furnish one. This Convention has been ratified by 68 States, 16 of which are not members of the United Nations.

In 1936 an Illicit Traffic Convention was formulated, but only came into force in October, 1939, one month after the outbreak of the Second World War. The Convention defines the specific offences, which are to be punishable by adequate penalties and which should be included as extradition crimes in any extradition treaties negotiated between parties.

In 1948, during the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris, a Protocol was signed by many member-countries and some non-members, by which was reached an agreement to bring synthetic narcotics under controls similar to those applying to opium-based products.

The present functioning organs in the field of international control are described below.

The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs

This is composed of fifteen members of the United Nations which are important producing or manufacturing countries or countries in which illicit traffic constitutes a serious social problem. Ten countries, including Canada, are permanent members, while the remaining five are appointed for three years. It meets annually, usually at New York, and constitutes the policy-formulating body on all questions relating to Narcotic Control, besides being the advisory organ to the Economic and Social Council in its task of applying and supervising the application of the various international narcotic instruments. The Commission receives and reviews annual reports from all countries and territories. It also examines the seizure reports, received from all over the world, submitted under the terms of the 1931 Convention. The Commission is also the appointing authority for one member of the Supervisory Body. At the present time it is, in addition to its regular duties, engaged in the consideration

of proposals for the establishment of International Monopolies in relation to both opium and manufactured drugs, and for the preparation of a single unified Convention to replace and, where possible, improve the existing Conventions and Protocols. It is also studying the report of a Commission of Enquiry sent to Bolivia and Peru to investigate the situation in respect of the chewing of the coca leaf and the economic aspect of the limitation of coca production.

The Permanent Central Opium Board

This Board operates under the 1925 Convention to "watch the course of international trade in narcotic drugs", and employs a system of statistical control based on the detailed quarterly and annual returns received from practically every country and territory. It is empowered to call for an explanation from any country, to undertake an investigation, to communicate its reports to the Economic and Social Council, and in certain circumstances, to apply an embargo against an offending country, a power which it has been necessary to exercise on over sixty occasions during the last twenty-five years, of which five occurred in 1949. If the imports and exports of any country show that the estimates of the importing country are, or will be, exceeded, the Board immediately informs all Parties to the Convention "who will not during the currency of the year in question authorize any new exports to the country in question, except under special circumstances". The members of the Board, eight in number, are appointed for five years by the Economic and Social Council. They include persons who possess a knowledge of the drug situation, both in producing and manufacturing countries, as well as in consuming countries. The PCOB has a joint secretariat with the Supervisory Body and the required administrative services are furnished by the United Nations. It holds two meetings each year, and joint meetings with the Supervisory Body, at Geneva, which is its headquarters.


The Supervisory Body

The main function of the Supervisory Body is to examine the estimates furnished annually by governments, showing their legitimate requirements for narcotic drugs. Such estimates for 1951 were received from sixty-nine countries and eighty-three territories, while the Supervisory Body itself prepared estimates for six countries and five territories which had not submitted any. An annual statement is issued on December 15 of each year, this being the basis upon which the whole machinery of the international control of the manufacture of and trade in narcotic drugs now rests.

The Supervisory Body consists of four members, two eminent medical men, appointed by the World Health Organization, and two experienced narcotic administrators appointed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Permanent Central Opium Board. The Canadian representative to the Narcotic Commission was nominated to the Supervisory Body in 1948 by the Commission. Two meetings are held annually in Geneva, as well as joint meetings with the Permanent Central Opium Board. It is expected that if and when the proposed Unified Convention is ratified, both the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body will disappear as separate entities and be replaced by an International Drug Board of nine members. This has already been anticipated to as great an extent as possible by having three of the four members of the Supervisory Body also serving as members of the Permanent Central Opium Board.

No claim is made that the existing international machinery of narcotic control is in every aspect perfect, but it has been pointed out on several occasions that such machinery might serve as a useful example for those concerned with the problems of controlling even more dangerous substances than narcotic drugs. The example may be particularly valuable where the need is for control of substances in relation to which the main problem arises not from proper use but from abuse. Narcotic drugs

are not in themselves harmful. They have legitimate and useful purposes which bring great benefits to mankind, and are indispensable to modern medicine, but experience has shown that their abuse can cause enormous havoc. One of the valuable lessons that can be learned from experience with the agreements on narcotic drugs is that there can be universal application of control without universal acceptance of a limiting convention. This is due to the fact that the sources of supply exist in only a small number of countries. The wider significance of the Limitation Convention of 1931 was well emphasized by M. de Brouckère, the President of the Conference which drafted it, when he stated "if a similar system could be established . . . for far more dangerous drugs and far more murderous weapons, we men would have made a considerable advance".



—National Defence

CANADIAN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR BELGIUM

A 17-pounder self-propelled gun is prepared for shipment to Belgium as part of Canada's programme of providing arms to other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY*

A Summary of Recent Statements by the Government of Pakistan

Perhaps the clearest definition of Pakistan's foreign policy was given by its Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, in a series of speeches during his tour of North America in May and June of 1950. On May 4, speaking to the National Press Club in Washington, he described his country's foreign relations in terms of three fundamental interests: the integrity of Pakistan, the faith in Islamic culture, and the desire and great need for economic development. "Given these, any student of international affairs can appreciate our foreign relations and their trends", added the Prime Minister. In this and subsequent speeches Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan expanded on the policies by which his Government hoped to serve these basic interests.

Above all, Pakistan wants peace in the world "not merely as an ultimate aim but equally urgently as an immediate aim". Peace is needed if the under-developed countries, like Pakistan, are to satisfy their urge to shed as quickly as possible the inadequacy and under-development which for centuries have kept their peoples in poverty, ignorance and ill-health. Immediate peace will depend, however, not on anything that the Asian countries can do but "only on those who can make immediate war". The Government of Pakistan is resolved to make the greatest possible contribution to the maintenance of peace but it considers that its efforts will be fruitless without international co-operation on the part of the great powers in the world. This same spirit of co-operation must exist if the under-developed countries are to achieve their aims for economic development. It is only by eradicating the causes of war — poverty, ignorance, economic and racial inequality — that the world can hope for permanent peace and this can only be accomplished — like the achievement of immediate peace — through international co-operation on a comprehensive scale.

"Natural Affiliation with Muslim Countries"

Facing as it does both East and West, Pakistan has a vital interest in developments in the Middle East and in South-East Asia. Culturally, Pakistanis feel a "natural affiliation with other Muslim countries" and for this reason "are keenly interested in the progress and development of the Middle East countries and in the maintenance of their independence". The Prime Minister made it quite clear in discussing this point that he was not thinking in terms of a Muslim power bloc. As for South-East Asia, Pakistan, having achieved independence from colonial rule, has "the greatest sympathy for and understanding of resurgent nationalism in that part of the world". Pakistan stands for stability in Asia. In the Prime Minister's words, "the belief is growing in our minds that peace and stability in Asia are essential for peace and stability in the world". With these objectives in mind, Pakistan has established friendly relations with Burma, Indonesia and the countries of the Middle East; has recognized the Central People's Government of China while withholding recognition of the Bao Dai regime in Indo-China; and would welcome a treaty of peace with Japan at an early date and the restoration of Japan's economy.

Pakistan considers that its contribution to stability in Asia is significant. The Prime Minister pointed out on several occasions in America that Pakistan was "one of the few countries in the new Asia whose people are unified and surprisingly free from doubts and clashes". This was all the more surprising "in a world of conflicting ideologies" for a nation that had recently achieved full sovereignty was likely to be the victim of mental confusion and consequent instability. In Pakistan the Government was pledged to pursue as "an irrevocable article of faith" the Islamic way of

* It is expected that an article on Indian foreign policy will be published in a forthcoming issue of *External Affairs*.

life, which as a matter of tradition stood for "clear-cut and easily intelligible principles of democracy and social and economic justice". This was a good beginning for the new state and augured well for continuing stability, but the great need for supplementing these pledges with practical steps for raising living standards must not be overlooked. "We firmly believe that if Asia is allowed to stagnate and fester, the whole world will be perilously pushed to the brink of unpredictable upheavals". The importance of stability in Pakistan was underlined by its strategic position in South Asia. "Pakistan, therefore, politically, ideologically and strategically holds a position of great responsibility".

Relations with Europe

Pakistan has established diplomatic relations with most of the countries of Europe where its interest is mainly commercial. A number of trade agreements have been concluded during the past year, including those with Austria, Hungary, Poland, Spain and Switzerland. Recently the Government of Pakistan announced its decision to terminate the state of war with Germany with effect from January 5, 1951. This action coincided with a strengthening of commercial bonds with the West German state. In the past Pakistan has had differences of opinion with one or two countries of Europe over colonial questions

Attitude to the United States

Pakistan looks to the United States for mutual goodwill and co-operation. Throughout his tour last year the Prime Minister spoke in the warmest terms of the friendly relations between the two countries, of the genius and energy of the people of the United States and of his admiration for their material achievements. In his last major speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on May 26, 1950, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan gave voice to his hopes in the United States for future constructive leadership toward world peace. He also said something of his anxieties:

... Looking at this great country and then thinking of countries like my own, I have been painfully conscious of the disequilibrium that exists in the world today... I see the United States as... a fabulously prosperous island. And round this island I see the unhealthy sea of misery, poverty and squalor, in which millions of human beings are trying to keep their heads above water... With monotonous reiteration during my days in America I have appealed for international co-operation... I do not ask for charity (but) for the help of the more experienced countries of the world to put our own men to work and make our own resources yield their wealth... Democracy in the world today cannot remain isolated and flourish. It must go ahead and spread itself or else it will wither away. Prosperity too cannot remain isolated. It too must go ahead and spread itself...

With such thoughts in mind Pakistanis look to the New World to carry democracy to its logical conclusion and, with the resources, the great experience and the technical knowledge it commands, to be among the leading architects of a new internationalism; and to enter with vigour into the vast constructive fields which are open in the world "and where alone the foundation of lasting peace can be had".

Pakistan and India

On several occasions during the North American tour, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan spoke about Pakistan's relations with India, which he said had not been "as free from anxiety as we earnestly desire". He pointed out that two fundamental facts which influenced these relations were that India was much larger than Pakistan and that some sections of the Indian population had not reconciled themselves to the partition of the old British India. The preponderant size of its neighbour and the resentment felt by some Indians has caused an uneasiness in Pakistan about the maintenance of its independence and its freedom to follow the Islamic way of life. The existence of a



PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN

The Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Begum Liaquat Ali Khan visited the Parliament Buildings when they were in Ottawa in May 1950. With them is the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, right, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. W. Ross MacDonald; in the background is the High Commissioner for Pakistan and the Begum Mohammed Ali.

number of major disputes between the two countries has only served to disturb their relations and has led to a substantial expenditure on defence, which Pakistan can ill afford in the face of its need for economic development. In spite of the tension — which has eased considerably since the signing of the Delhi Pact on minorities — the Government of Pakistan is fully aware that a relationship of mutual confidence with India is essential for the peace of Asia and of the world.

Kashmir

Pakistan's position as regards Kashmir and the other disputes with India has been stated on many occasions both inside and outside Pakistan. The underlying thesis on Pakistan's side of the prolonged correspondence between the two Prime Ministers concerning a No-War Declaration has been that "there should be tangible action to match the spirit of the declaration, since peoples and governments are judged by their actions rather than by their words". In a letter to the Prime Minister of India on November 21, 1950, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said: "The solution to our problems will come, I am earnestly convinced, when each side accepts adjudication on all issues that are justiciable, and arbitration of other issues. My Government are prepared to do this on every issue". More specifically, Pakistan would refer the canal waters dispute to the International Court of Justice, and, should negotiations and mediation be unsuccessful after a given period, would accept arbitration in the disputes over evacuee property and the claims relating to assets.

On Kashmir, Pakistani representatives make the following points: there is an international agreement between India and Pakistan that a free and impartial plebiscite shall be held in Kashmir to let the people of the State decide for themselves whether they would like to join India or Pakistan. The difficulty lies in securing agreement regarding the demilitarization of Kashmir which is to precede the plebiscite. Pakistan has already agreed to have outstanding points of procedure settled by arbitration. Further, at the conclusion of the recent conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan indicated that Pakistan was prepared to accept any of the various proposals suggested by the Prime Ministers for the demilitarization of Kashmir but that India had rejected them all. Pakistani spokesmen therefore proceed to the conclusion that it is now up to the Security Council to take the next step to secure the implementation of the agreement for a plebiscite. At his press conference in New York on November 28, Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, expressed the opinion that the deadlock could only be resolved if the Security Council could itself pronounce upon the points of disagreement, or appoint an impartial person of high standing to do so, and call upon both parties to carry out their undertakings under the various United Nations resolutions, more particularly the resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan.

The crisis which occurred late in December over the attendance of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference arose, not because the Government of Pakistan expected, or wished to force, a decision on Kashmir in London, but because in Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's view "the Kashmir dispute affects vitally the relations between India and Pakistan and peace and security in Asia. It would be unrealistic and futile to consider the situation in this part of the world without first seeking a solution of the Kashmir dispute". The other Prime Ministers recognized the importance of a solution of the Kashmir dispute to the stability of South and South-East Asia and the matter was discussed informally on three separate occasions in London. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has since publicly expressed his appreciation of the efforts of the Commonwealth leaders.

Pakistan's attitude toward the Western democracies is influenced by two other factors, namely the continuation of colonialism in Asia and North Africa and the speed and effectiveness with which economic aid from the West is forthcoming. On November 12, 1950, speaking at Miami Beach, Florida, Sir Zafrulla Khan warned that "one-third of the world's population is prepared to risk communism to gain independence from the colonial yoke of the Western powers." This third, he added, was principally Muslim and not definitely committed to either Soviet or Western ideologies. In an earlier address on October 22, speaking about the non-self-governing territories in the world, he called for "sustained action, both on the part of the United Nations and what are called the Colonial Powers, to push forward the setting up of all these peoples as independent sovereign states". On the question of economic aid the Foreign Minister, addressing the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 1950, repeated the warning which his Prime Minister has sounded often on his North American tour:

A man who is hungry, ill-clad, exposed or disease-ridden will not long cherish ambition or sustain hope and will soon become desperate. He will fall easy prey to disorders and diseases of the mind, intellect and spirit that destroy more widely and effectively than hunger and disease of the body . . . Call a system what you will, give it any name you please, mankind is bound ultimately to adopt that which fulfils its needs and is beneficent in its operation.

The United Nations

Consistent with its overriding interest in world peace, Pakistan has publicly expressed a determination to play its part in the United Nations, although the con-

tinuing deadlock over Kashmir has put a strain on popular thinking about that body, which sometimes finds reflection in the utterances of Pakistani public men. The representatives of Pakistan at Lake Success have given their country's full support to the Security Council's resolutions on Korea. On other issues they have consistently expressed concern for the welfare and championed the rights of the inhabitants of trust and non-self-governing territories; they have also displayed an active interest in the development of plans for economic aid and technical assistance for under-developed areas.

Pakistan stands for universality of membership in the United Nations as was made clear by the Foreign Minister in an address last September. Accepting this principle and having recognized the Peking regime, Pakistan has pressed for recognition of the representatives of Communist China. Moreover, it has joined with those nations which have been urging a policy of caution in dealing with the Chinese intervention in Korea, and abstained from voting on the resolution passed in the Political Committee which named China an aggressor.

Late in 1950 there was a suggestion that the Government of Pakistan might be re-examining its attitude toward the United Nations, as a result of the delay in the Security Council's dealing with the Kashmir question. On December 16 Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs, in an interview with Reuters' diplomatic correspondent, intimated that if the United Nations continued to postpone the Kashmir issue, the Pakistan Government would have "seriously to consider the recall of the Pakistan delegation from the United Nations". He stressed that inside Pakistan the failure of the United Nations to act was resulting in a tide of criticism, both among the friends and opponents of the Government.

The Commonwealth

Perhaps the clearest statement of Pakistan's attitude toward the Commonwealth was given by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on May 31, 1950, when he spoke to the joint session of both Houses of the Parliament of Canada. He declared that he was not one of those "who would demand that the bond which exists between the various members of the Commonwealth be minutely defined". He paid tribute to the continuing value of the Commonwealth association:

In the uneasy, apprehensive world of today, such a large group of nations with so much identity in their declared aims should be a heartening spectacle to mankind. No practical person would therefore wish wantonly for its disintegration.

The Prime Minister developed these remarks by commending to the attention of his listeners, first, that the Commonwealth ties were no longer mainly religious, historical or racial and that therefore the Commonwealth had an opportunity to lead the world in establishing the brotherhood of man irrespective of race, creed and colour; and, secondly, that since the greatest fear in the world was the fear of war, the Commonwealth should do its part in raising the hopes of mankind by outlawing war as a method of settling disputes among its own members.

On the latter point, it is interesting to note that in an interview last April with Mr. Cyrus Sulzberger of the *New York Times* Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan suggested that the Commonwealth should issue a collective guarantee of the territorial integrity of Pakistan in an effort to ease the tension between them. Although the proposal has never been formally raised, it is one of several indications that the Government of Pakistan would favour the creation of some machinery in the Commonwealth for settling disputes between members. It need hardly be added that the Government's thinking about the Commonwealth is greatly influenced by its anxiety over relations with India.

Afghanistan

Pakistan's desire for friendly relations with all countries and especially with Muslim countries, has not been realized in its relations with Afghanistan. For some time the Government of Pakistan has complained about propaganda emanating from Kabul, aiming at the establishment of an autonomous state of Pushtoonistan carved out of territory in West Pakistan. The Pakistan Government holds that the boundary between the two countries established by the Durand Line is not a matter for discussion. The embittered relations between the two countries have led to unrest along the border and to a number of border clashes. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, in a statement made on October 7, 1950, gave some indication of the Pakistan feeling on this subject. He then said:

I am glad to be able to say (of the people of the tribal territory on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line) that their devotion to Pakistan is as strong as ever in spite of the most insistent propaganda by the Afghanistan Government to wean them away from their loyalty. The tone of the Afghan Government-controlled radio and press, which was already violent and vituperative, has steadily become worse and now they are openly concentrating on incitement and war-mongering . . . I repeat what I have said before, namely that the Government of Pakistan are still willing to discuss questions of common interest both economic and cultural but I would like to impress upon the Government of Afghanistan with all the emphasis at my command that the feeling of anger and resentment against their hostile and un-Islamic policy towards Pakistan is mounting in the tribal area and indeed throughout Pakistan. The disturbance of peace in an area of such strategic importance is fraught with grave consequences. We desire peace and have no territorial ambitions but neither the threat of force nor force itself will make us yield one inch of the soil of Pakistan.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

To prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are now pending between the United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise . . .

In these altruistic words is set forth the preamble to a treaty which is, without doubt, unique in the history of the United States and Canada and, indeed, in the conduct of relations between any two independent states.

This treaty, the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, so farsighted and wide in its scope, was but the natural outcome of the desire of two friendly neighbouring nations, possessing a common heritage and striving for the same ideals, to settle in an amicable and informal manner any of the differences and disagreements, which are bound to arise between even the closest of friends. The means of implementing this common purpose was the International Joint Commission, the establishment of which was provided for in this treaty.

International Joint Commission Established

To review the events leading to the establishment of the International Joint Commission we must go back to 1894, the year in which the Irrigation Congress of the United States was held in Denver, Colorado. At this Conference a resolution, put forward by a Canadian delegate and unanimously passed, asked that steps be taken for the appointment of an international commission, to act in conjunction with the authorities of Mexico, Canada and the United States, in adjudicating the conflicting rights which had arisen, or might thereafter arise, on streams of an international character. This suggestion was adopted by the Canadian Government and in 1896 the British Ambassador at Washington informed the Government of the United States that Canada would be glad to co-operate in the appointment of an international commission.

No action, however, resulted until the Rivers and Harbours Act was passed by the United States Congress in 1902, requesting the President to invite Great Britain to join in the establishment of an international commission, to be composed of three members from the United States and three representing Canada. This led to the establishment of the International Waterways Commission, whose functions were limited to the consideration and preparation of reports and recommendations on all waters adjacent to the Boundary, from the head of the Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence River and so into the Atlantic Ocean, regarding suitable levels to be maintained, diversions for power purposes and improvements in navigation.

Although the International Waterways Commission was purely an advisory body the work it achieved did prove of value. Its investigations clearly demonstrated, moreover, as early as 1907, that certain principles, regarding the use of boundary waters, ought to be determined in advance as applicable to all questions which might arise, and that a body with broader powers would be required. Thus, the International Waterways Commission paved the way for the present International Joint Commission.

As a result of these and other suggestions from various quarters, negotiations were entered into at Washington between Lord Bryce, British Ambassador to the United States, and Elihu Root, Secretary of State. Both these men possessed in a high measure the qualities of statesmanship and selfless endeavour which have produced enduring monuments to international peace and stability. Although the chief negotiators were Lord Bryce and Secretary Root, Canada played a prominent part

in the negotiations and was at all times in direct contact with the proceedings through the media of Dr. W. F. King, of the International Boundary Commission, Sir George Gibbons, of the International Waterways Commission, and the Honourable William Pugsley, then Minister of Public Works and later Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick, all of whom assisted Lord Bryce in the negotiations.

The treaty was signed at Washington on January 11, 1909 and in 1911 an Act of Parliament was passed approving its ratification. This Act further provides that:

The laws of Canada and of the several Provinces thereof are hereby amended and altered so as to permit, authorize and sanction the performance of the obligations undertaken by His Majesty in and under the said treaty . . .

Agreement on Practices Governing Boundary Waters

Besides providing for the establishment and operation of the International Joint Commission, the Treaty also lays down certain practices to be followed on various matters concerning boundary waters.

By the terms of Article I, freedom of navigation on all navigable boundary waters is guaranteed to the inhabitants and ships of both countries, subject to any regulations of either country, within its own territory, which shall apply equally to both parties.

Article II reserves to the signatories to the Treaty exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion of waters on their own side of the line flowing across the boundary, or into boundary waters, but it is provided that:

any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs.

This Article is of prime importance in that its provisions give Canadians the right to go into the courts of the United States to seek redress for injury sustained in Canada, and give Americans similar rights in Canadian courts.

The pollution of boundary waters, or waters flowing across the boundary, to the detriment of health or injury of property on either side is expressly prohibited by Article IV.

Article V determined the authorized diversion from the Niagara River, above the Falls, for the power purposes of both countries. However, the Niagara Diversion Treaty of 1950, concluded between Canada and the United States, allows for an increase in the authorized diversion to both countries, consonant with preserving the beauty of the Falls.

Article VI of the Treaty makes provisions for the apportionment of the waters of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers and their tributaries and stipulates that they are to be treated as one stream for the purposes of irrigation and power development.

Establishment and Composition of the Commission

The establishment of the International Joint Commission itself, is provided for in Article VII and the composition of the Commission and the method of appointment thereto is laid down. The Commission consists of six members, three appointed by the President of the United States and three by the Governor General in Council. These six Commissioners are pledged to a viewpoint that is American in the continental sense. They must regard the people on both sides of the boundary as equally

entitled to their best possible judgment. All of the Commissioners represent the same broad international constituency and it is a very significant fact that in all cases so far dealt with the decisions of the Commission have been practically unanimous.

Although the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 sought the settlement of all outstanding questions and disputes, which had up to that time arisen between Canada and the United States, it also envisaged, and no doubt this was the prime purpose of those who had conceived of the idea, the solution of all future questions of difference which might arise thereafter. The complicated, and often lengthy, diplomatic negotiations between Canada and the United States, through the medium of Great Britain, attendant upon the settlement of differences, were cut to minimum. Here was a tribunal, vested by the treaty in many cases with final authority, to which grievances arising on either side of the border could be referred for amicable settlement, in the knowledge that they would receive impartial judgment from men who were not bound by sectional interests. Questions of differences which, under the old system of protracted and involved negotiations, would have festered and perhaps inflamed national passions, could now be settled in a speedy and neighbourly manner.

Jurisdiction of Commission

The jurisdiction of the International Joint Commission is governed by five specific articles of the Boundary Waters Treaty. The first of these five specific articles, Article III, states that the High Contracting Parties agree that there shall be no further use, obstruction or diversion, "affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on the other side of the line", without the authority of either Canada or the United States on their respective side of the line and the approval of the International Joint Commission. Remedial works to improve navigation and harbour facilities may be undertaken by either party within their own territory, provided that such works do not "materially affect" the flow of boundary waters on the other side of the line nor interfere with domestic or sanitary uses of such water.

For the purpose of the treaty, boundary waters are defined by a preliminary article as

the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, . . . along which the international boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers and waterways, or waters flowing from such lakes, rivers and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary.

Boundary waters, therefore, include the international portions of the St. Croix River and St. John River, between the State of Maine and the Province of New Brunswick; the St. Lawrence River from Cornwall to Kingston; Lake Ontario, the Niagara River, Lake Erie, the Detroit River, Lake St. Clair, St. Clair River, Lake Huron, St. Mary's River, Lake Superior, the series of small rivers and lakes from Lake Superior over the height of land to Rainy Lake, Rainy Lake and Rainy River to the Lake of the Woods.

By the terms of Article IV any works contemplated in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the effect of which is to raise the natural level of waters on the other side of the boundary, must have the approval of the International Joint Commission.

Article VIII empowers the Commission to pass on all applications coming to it under Articles III and IV. This article also provides the order of precedence of uses to be taken into consideration by the Commission:

- (1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;

(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purposes of navigation;

(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes.

It will be seen that this order of precedence recognizes the supreme importance of public health. Navigation interests come next. These interests on the Great Lakes are of immense and ever increasing importance. Not only is an enormous capital tied up in navigation and transportation on these waters, but the communities, large and small, along their shores are to a considerable extent dependent thereon, and to a lesser degree those communities farther afield but connected by transportation lines with the Lakes.

The scope of the Treaty and the jurisdiction of the International Joint Commission are greatly extended by Articles IX and X. According to the terms of Article IX, the High Contracting Parties agree that any questions of difference arising in the future along the common frontier shall be referred to the International Joint Commission for examination and report whenever either government requests that a question be so referred. Furthermore, it must be noted that in this case the decisions of the Commission are in the nature of recommendations to the two governments and in the words of the treaty "in no way have the character of an arbitral award".

The terms of Article X enlarge the area within which the Commission may adjudicate problems, stipulating that any question of difference arising in the future between Canada or the United States may be referred to the International Joint Commission for decision, providing that both governments consent to this move. The question of difference need not, in this case, be connected with the common frontier, as it must in Article IX. The Commission is empowered to render a decision on any matters that may be referred to it under Article X and it is provided that in the event of the Commissioners being equally divided or unable to reach a decision, an umpire is to be chosen, as prescribed under Article XLV of the Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Up to the present, all references to the Commission, as distinct from applications under Articles III and IV, have been under Article IX and the practice has developed whereby they are submitted jointly by the two governments.

References Submitted to the Commission

The procedure for referring a question to the Commission is designed to ensure the minimum amount of delay and the maximum co-operation from both countries. As soon as either country has decided to refer a question to the Commission, the two governments consult one another to determine the exact scope and terms of the reference. When this has been determined and the text drawn up to the satisfaction of both governments, it is submitted jointly to the International Joint Commission. The Commission then considers the reference and appoints an International Engineering Board, composed of an equal number of technical experts from both governments, to study and report to the Commission on the engineering aspects of the reference. This board in turn, has adopted the practice of appointing an Engineering Committee of local experts, including engineers representing the provincial and state governments concerned, to supervise the necessary investigations in the field.

The Engineering Board transmits a series of progress reports, at intervals of six months, to the Commission which are considered at its executive sessions. The Commission may decide to hold hearings at the locale of the reference to give all interested parties the opportunity to present their views and, at the same time, to afford the Commission an opportunity of hearing the views of all concerned. If need be, the Commission may subpoena witnesses to appear at these hearings. When the final

report of the International Engineering Board has been submitted, hearings held, and briefs submitted, the Commission studies the whole matter and submits a report to the two governments.

The majority of references concern boundary waters and waters flowing across the international boundary. As a general rule the Commission's task is to make recommendations on such questions as apportionment, conservation and regulation of the waters in rivers, for the purpose of facilitating irrigation, power production, navigation and flood and low water control. The scope of some references is indeed very broad and we have only to study the Columbia River reference to appreciate this fact. By the terms of this reference the Commission is called upon to make recommendations concerning the development of the water resources of the entire watershed of the Columbia River, having in mind domestic water supply and sanitation, navigation, efficient development of water power, the control of floods, the needs of irrigation, reclamation of wet lands, conservation of fish, and wildlife and other beneficial public purposes.

Of a more unusual nature are two references submitted recently to the Commission, the first of which requested the Commission to recommend measures to reduce the pollution of boundary waters. The second reference called on the Commission to recommend remedial works to enhance the beauty of Niagara Falls by ensuring an unbroken crest line in the Falls.

Passamaquoddy Bay Reference

Although the Commission is usually concerned with rivers flowing along or across the international boundary, or lakes through which the boundary runs, it has recently dealt with a reference in the vicinity of Passamaquoddy Bay where the tidal range, in common with other portions of the Bay of Fundy, is abnormally large. In 1926 a project was sponsored to make use of the great tidal range in Passamaquoddy Bay for generating electrical energy, but after a preliminary survey the project was abandoned. The recent reference requested the Commission to make an estimation of the cost of a full scale investigation of this project, using any of the existing plans, but further stipulating that it was not to make recommendations regarding the desirability of a further reference to carry out the complete investigation which would be necessary to decide whether the project was feasible. In its report to the two governments the Commission stated that additional information was required to decide if any existing plan for development of tidal power at this location was practicable and desirable from the point of view of public convenience and interest, and that the costs of the full scale investigation would amount to \$3,900,000.

More recently a reference, which in no way concerns itself with boundary waters, has been submitted by the Canadian and United States Governments to the Commission. This reference concerns the pollution of air in the Detroit-Windsor area by smoke from factories, ships and other sources. As well as ascertaining the amount of smoke, from what sources it may originate, and to what extent public health is menaced by it in the Detroit-Windsor area, the Commission is to recommend what remedial measures should be taken, the probable cost of these measures and by whom the costs should be borne.

As distinguished from references to the Commission are applications, which are made under Articles III and IV. Applications may come from private concerns or either of the two governments and request the Commission's approval of works and projects contemplated in waters on either side of the boundary, the effect of which would be to raise the level of water on the other side of the boundary.

One instance of a private application is a recent one of the Creston Reclamation Company which sought, and was granted, the Commission's approval of works de-

signed to reclaim 3,200 acres of Duck Lake in British Columbia and to store water in the remainder of the lake for wildlife purposes and winter release. An instance of an application by one of the governments is that of the United States Government for approval of the proposed Libby Dam on the Kootenay River in Montana. The approval of the Commission is required under the Boundary Waters Treaty because the building of this dam will raise the natural level of the river on the Canadian side of the international boundary.

The Commission Appoints International Waterways Board

In handling the various projects which have been submitted to it by public and private bodies, the Commission has at times found it necessary to provide for the creation of International Boards of Control to implement the provisions contained in its orders of approval. These Boards, in each case, consist of two engineer members, one appointed by the Government of Canada and the other by the Government of the United States. The functions of the Board are to ensure that the provisions of the Commission's orders of approval are observed. The Boards form the effective machinery in the field to ensure the international obligations which are embodied in the Commission's orders and they report directly to the Commission. In the event of disagreement between their members, the decision rests with the Commission. Among these Boards may be mentioned the International Lake Superior Board of Control. Another control board, the International Lake of the Woods Control Board, in the operation of which the Commission is concerned, was established by the Lake of the Woods Convention and Protocol of 1925.

Personnel of the Commission

The Commissioners of the Canadian Section are General the Honourable A. G. L. McNaughton, who is Chairman, J. Lucien Dansereau, Consulting Engineer of Montreal, and the Honourable George Spence of Regina, former Director of the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act. The Chairman of the United States Section, the Honourable A. O. Stanley, has been with the Commission since 1930 and is a former United States senator and governor of Kentucky. The remaining members of the American section are R. B. McWhorter, Chief Engineer of the Federal Power Commission, and Eugene William Weber, special assistant to the Director of Civil Works, Chief of Engineering, Washington, D.C.

From the times of Lord Bryce and Secretary Root to the present day many eminent statesmen, both Canadian and American, have supported and acclaimed the work and aims of the International Joint Commission. It remained for the late William Lyon Mackenzie King, attending, in company with the late President Roosevelt, the dedication of the Thousand Islands Bridge, to say:

The decision never to arm against each other was taken, as I have indicated, over a century ago. In our time we have crowned that decision by the construction of other bridges of international friendship and understanding. By far the most important of them is the International Joint Commission. It was created to adjudicate all questions of difference arising along our four thousand miles of frontier. In the quarter of a century of its existence, by substituting investigation for dictation, and conciliation for coercion, in the adjustment of international disputes, the Commission has solved many questions likely to lead to serious controversy. This bridge of peace has been the more significant in that while countries on the continents of Europe and Asia have been increasing their frontier armaments, the United States and Canada have settled all their boundary differences by the method and processes of reasoned discussion.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

Canadian Contribution to the Colombo Plan

On February 20, 1951, Mr. G. F. Higgins (PC, St. John's East) asked how the proposed expenditures under the Colombo Plan, which were recently announced, were to be made. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, on February 21 made the following statement in reply to this question:

A little over a year ago the foreign ministers of the Commonwealth countries met in Colombo, Ceylon, to consider many of the urgent political and economic problems then facing Asia. Out of their discussions a consultative committee on South and South-East Asia was created which was charged with examining economic problems of the area and preparing appropriate recommendations. This committee, which drew its original membership from seven countries, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Canada, met in Sydney, Australia, last May and in London last September. Its most recent meeting in Colombo, Ceylon, ended yesterday.

The United States, with unanimous agreement of the seven original members, recently joined the consultative committee. In announcing his government's acceptance of this invitation, the Secretary of State in Washington said on January 24 of this year that it afforded his country the opportunity "for further co-operation with the countries of South and South-East Asia in their efforts toward economic and social development". Representatives of the following non-Commonwealth countries also attended the recent meeting in Colombo: Burma, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

During 1950, when the United States was continuing to carry such a heavy burden of foreign aid, it was, I think, appropriate that the Commonwealth countries should examine together some of the pressing economic problems of South and South-East Asia. These were not new problems, but they were ones to which the free world had not previously given adequate attention. The Commonwealth countries did good work, therefore, in bringing together in one report an analysis of the needs of the countries which comprise four-fifths of the area of South and South-East Asia.

Since the plan was drawn up, there have already been significant economic changes which are bound to affect its progress, at least in its initial stages. The burden of rearmament which the western countries have been forced to take on is having major economic consequences. The prices of many of the raw materials produced in South and South-East Asia have gone up sharply. This advantage to producers in the area has been offset to some extent by the rising cost of the goods which the Asian countries must import. Even more serious are the difficulties in obtaining delivery of critically needed goods. Most regrettable, there has been a serious falling off in India's food supply owing to drought in some regions, floods in others and locusts in still others. This has imposed a very real human and economic problem upon India.

The Colombo Plan calls for a capital development programme in Commonwealth countries of South-East Asia totalling about \$5 billion over a six year period starting this year. Of this \$5 billion it is expected that about \$2 billion will be raised internally and about \$3 billion will come from external sources. Private capital is one source, though in the present international situation it cannot be as important as it should be. We also hope that the International Bank will be another source for financing some of the larger projects. So far as government contributions are concerned, the United Kingdom has announced that its contribution over the six-year period will take the form of sterling balance releases, at a high and fixed rate, grants for colonial development, and loans floated in London, amounting to well over 300 million pounds sterling, or more than 900 million Canadian dollars for the six years. Australia has announced that it will provide 7 million pounds sterling, which is nearly 21 million Canadian dollars in the first year, and that over the six-year period its contribution

will be not less than 25 million pounds sterling, that is nearly 75 million Canadian dollars.

The Canadian Government has been giving very serious consideration to the course of action which should be recommended to Parliament. We have been conscious that Canadians, as individuals—and this has been clearly reflected in the press from one end of the country to the other—wish to contribute to the success of this plan. This desire of the people of Canada to extend assistance has also been clearly shown in the debate on the speech from the throne. It was reflected by the remarks of the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) when he expressed his confidence that members of the house would support all practical measures which will bring hope and encouragement to those who are in such great distress in so many parts of the world. It was reflected also in the remarks of the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), when he called the Colombo Plan the most imaginative ever adopted by the Commonwealth countries.

The Government therefore authorized Mr. David Johnson, our High Commissioner in Pakistan and our delegate to the recent meeting of the consultative committee, to state that the Canadian Government would ask Parliament to appropriate \$25 million as its contribution to the first year of the plan, provided it was clear that other contributing countries would be making appropriate contributions so that the broad objectives of the Colombo Plan might be realized.

The United States representative at the Colombo meeting said that his government welcomed the initiative of the countries participating in the Colombo Plan; that the Plan itself appeared to offer a basis for genuine economic progress, and that the United States intended to co-ordinate to the greatest extent possible the programme it had undertaken or might undertake in the area with those programmes under the Colombo plan.

I should also inform the house that we are immediately opening discussions with the Indian Government to see whether they would wish that some of the funds we provide this year under the Colombo Plan should be spent on Canadian wheat for their famine-stricken country. As yet we do not know exactly what types of wheat, available in Canada, will be of use to India; nor, of course, do we know what next year's crop will be. However, it is our hope that some wheat may be provided to the Government of India in connection with the Plan. This wheat, I imagine, would be sold by the Indian Government to the people of India under its rationing system, where possible, and the money so raised could then be voted to capital developments. In the Colombo report it is clearly recognized, especially in the case of India, that imports of food as well as imports of capital goods may serve in attaining the objectives of the plan. At the same time that we open discussions with the Indian authorities we shall open parallel discussions with the Pakistan authorities.

In conclusion . . . perhaps I might read to the house the last sentence of the Colombo report, which summarizes so eloquently our hopes for the success of the Colombo Plan:

In a world racked by schism and confusion it is doubtful whether free men can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human resources of the countries of South and South-East Asia which could help so greatly, not only to restore the world's prosperity, but also to redress its confusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere.

On the conclusion of Mr. Pearson's statement, Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggar) asked whether the Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan were "contingent upon a substantial financial contribution by the United States." Mr. Pearson replied in part as follows:

. . . I would merely say that to carry out the original plan in its entirety, a contribution from the United States will be essential. The contribution we shall ask Parliament to make is not in a sense conditional upon anything; but if the plan could not be carried out in its entirety, naturally we would have to re-examine the whole position.

Recrossing of 38th Parallel by United Nations Troops

On February 12, 1951, Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggart) asked the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, whether members of the United Nations had been consulted about the reported recrossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations troops. Mr. St. Laurent said in reply "the answer is, not to our knowledge". To a supplementary question asked by Mr. Coldwell as to whether Canada made any representations to the Secretary-General or to the United Nations concerning reconsideration of the implied permission which was granted to the troops last October (to cross the 38th parallel) the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, replied the next day in part as follows:

... There is some doubt as to the exact details about the reported crossing of the 38th parallel by a South Korean detachment. Apparently it was a purely tactical movement and on a small scale, and does not indicate that any decision has been taken for a major crossing of the line, even if military conditions make that possible.

... Canada has not made any representations to the Secretary-General or to the United Nations concerning the question of the recrossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations forces. However, representatives of governments with forces participating in Korean operations have had informal discussions recently with the United States representatives in regard to this and other matters arising out of the Korean campaign. These discussions have included a Canadian representative. As a result of these discussions, I think I can state that the political significance of any new move across the parallel deep into North Korean territory is fully appreciated. At this moment I would not like to add anything to this observation beyond repeating my view that any decision taken in this matter should be a collective one, including particularly those governments who are participating in United Nations-Korean operations, of which the most important is the United States of America.

Proposal for Conference on International Federal Union

On February 26, 1951, Mr. Alistair Stewart (CCF, Winnipeg North) moved:

That, in the opinion of this house, the government should take into consideration the advisability of supporting the calling of a convention of delegates from the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty and representing the principal political parties of such democracies, for the purpose of exploring how far their peoples and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of federal union.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, spoke to this motion in part as follows:

... I should say at once that I support, and I think the government supports, the purposes and principles and the idealism which underlie this resolution. But I am not myself certain that those purposes could best be achieved or those principles best implemented by the procedure recommended in the resolution.

... The meaning of the resolution, then, is quite clear. It is interesting to note that a resolution in almost these same terms was discussed in Washington—last June, I believe it was—and also in the autumn of 1950, by the Senate of the United States. A resolution in these terms, or in terms very similar to this resolution, has also been discussed in the other place, here.

The discussion in Washington resulted in no decision being taken at that time by the Government of the United States. But a report on this very important matter was made by a Senate sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which set out very clearly and very effectively the pros and cons on action of this kind.

The administration in Washington, however, has expressed its views already on this matter; and possibly it might be of interest to the house if I read from a state-

ment made before the Senate sub-committee by the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States in which he gives the administration's point of view on the question. At that time, February 15, 1950, the administration's point of view was expressed by their spokesman, the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Hickerson, as follows:

We believe that progressively closer association, by limited and practicable steps on the basis of common interests, and in support of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, within as much as practicable of the free world, is both necessary and desirable.

And then he went on to say:

In the development of such closer association, care must be exercised not to set in motion forces which will render more difficult the maintenance of the solidarity of the free world in support of the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

In a number of countries in the Atlantic community progress in both the national and international fields has resulted from the willingness of certain groups to accept sacrifices primarily on the basis of national interest. It will take a very long time before similar strong loyalty to a new political unit emerges. We believe that under the present North Atlantic Treaty arrangements we are utilizing this force in the most constructive way at this stage of development in international relations. The establishment at this time of such a federation—

as is proposed in this resolution —

—far from providing additional strength, could be a source of weakness and greater internal divisions. Furthermore, the effective operation of democracy in some of the suggested participants is severely hampered by the system of splinter parties which might be carried over and even intensified in such a federation.

And then he ended in this way:

The proposed resolution—

that is, the American resolution —

—directs its attention primarily to calling a convention to explore the possibilities of Atlantic union. We believe that if the government should sponsor such a convention at this time it would raise false hopes. If the convention did not succeed it would lead to reactions unfavourable to the cause of collective security. Under present circumstances such a convention appears more likely to bring to light and emphasize the divisions among the proposed members of the Atlantic union than to lead to substantial progress in the desired direction. In view of these facts the projected convention would seem likely to weaken rather than to strengthen both the Atlantic community and the United Nations.

That . . . remains, as I understand it, the attitude of the United States Government toward a development of this kind. I think it is quite clear that without at least co-operation of, and I would hope in this case possibly leadership by, the United States Government, it is not likely to be practicable to convene a convention of the kind indicated in the resolution.

I am not suggesting for one moment, nor would I want to give the impression, that we disagree with the principle embodied in the resolution, or that we would minimize in any way the necessity in the present dangerous international situation of the closest possible kind of international co-operation, among all the nations of the free world—not only the seven supporting nations under the Atlantic Treaty. I would not take my stand for one moment in respect of a resolution of this kind on the desirability or essentiality of unrestricted national sovereignty.

National sovereignty has played its part—its very important and constructive part—in building up the nation-state out of feudalism, and in progress toward democratic liberty and social advancement. But I agree with the hon. member who has just spoken (Mr. Stewart) that we are living in an age today different from that in which national sovereignty emerged. We are living in an age, not so much of independence,

important though that may be, as of interdependence. It would be, not only unwise, it might even be disastrous, if we clung to any barren, negative, legalistic interpretation of national sovereignty . . . Every time we sign a treaty with some other country we give up some part of our national sovereignty—or, as I prefer to put it, we are making our sovereignty work for us in the interests of peace and security by pooling our sovereignty with other like-minded states; so that by giving something we get more.

. . . I think that this process from the single nation state based on the Austinian theory of legal sovereignty to groups of interdependent states is an important one and should go forward. It is going forward every month and every year. If this development is to be effective however, if it is to be constructive, I suggest that it must be gradual and not get too far in advance of public opinion in the various nation states of the world who would become part of any such federation as that which is visualized in this resolution.

Further, a world federation, such a Tennysonian concept, if I may call it that, is not an end in itself, but merely the means to an end. That end is peace and international co-operation. A federation itself is not any assurance that these ends will be met, either internationally or even domestically. The belief that federations inevitably prevent war domestically was shattered finally, I should think, in 1861 in the United States. The choice before us is not between federation and survival but between collective action and survival. I am not sure that in the present circumstances the latter is not even easier without forcing the former.

Certainly the problems inherent in international co-operation would not be exercised by taking our stand on anything like federal union, especially a federal union where power would be so unevenly divided between the dominant United States and a country like Luxembourg. I think our own Commonwealth of Nations offers the best example I can think of, of international co-operation on the closest intimate basis without federal institutions or without federal union of any kind being found to be necessary. As a matter of fact if we had had to institutionalize our co-operation within the commonwealth that co-operation might not be as close as it is today.

So there are difficulties in the way of carrying out an advance of this kind, because it would be an advance. If we do not understand those difficulties and if we plunge headlong into a conference of this kind without understanding them, we might very well find that far from having made progress we would have set back the wheels of progress. Some of the questions which would come before any convention of this kind leap automatically to one's mind. How far would the people of the various countries go in altering their own form of government and accepting the basic economic and social changes which must inevitably follow through the federation? For instance, how far would they go in giving up control over exports, imports, currency, taxation, finance and immigration?

A constitutional convention of the type visualized in this resolution, if it did anything at all, would have to deal with these matters at once. I suggest that in doing so it would raise far more problems than it would solve. It would raise hopes which could not in the nature of things be realized at this time. It might be followed by disappointment and disillusionment which would set back rather than advance the cause of closer union and more intimate co-operation.

A convention of this kind might even cause among the free nations which would be invited to it confusion and division and possibly even disunity. Far from assisting in the move toward federation itself, a premature attempt at this time might set it back. The hon. member who has just spoken (Mr. Stewart) pointed out that in the first instance a convention of this kind would include only the seven powers that have sponsored the Atlantic Charter. As he pointed out, it is true that provision could be made for inviting other countries to attend later.

The seven sponsoring powers are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada. We would inevitably run into difficulties when we began to pick and choose other powers to join us in this constitutional convention. That kind of discussion in a convention of that kind would not, as I see it, be conducive now to achieving the ends which are desired by us and which are expressed in this resolution.

I think it might be particularly confusing at this time to have a convention of this nature because of the steps that are being taken and the progress that has been made already in Europe toward a federation of European states. Very important discussions with far-reaching consequences are taking place looking toward European union and the creation of European machinery. While those discussions are important and I think filled with hope, they have indicated already some of the difficulties in the way of even a European federation. To superimpose at this time on those discussions the wider discussion of an Atlantic federation, or a federation even wider than the Atlantic, would not I think be helpful toward the very important movement which has developed in the way of European unity.

I pay a sincere tribute to the idea behind this resolution which I think we all hope will be realized one day, but I do not think to associate ourselves at this time with such a hypothetical invitation would be well advised. There is one further difficulty which I have not mentioned, the relationship of the Commonwealth countries to a convention of this kind. Would they all be included, or would only some be included? If only some were included, would not that mean a possible weakening of the links between all the Commonwealth countries?

I think I should mention to the house that this question is now once again before the United States Congress in its current session. A few weeks ago the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) received a letter from Senator Guy M. Gillette. He was writing on behalf of a number of senators who are sponsoring a resolution of this kind before the Senate. I am not going to read the whole letter but I should like to read a couple of paragraphs from it. It is addressed to our Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and it is dated January 24, 1951. In its opening paragraph it refers to the resolution now before the United States Senate. Senator Gillette goes on to say about that resolution that it represents—and I am quoting from the letter—

... an effort to improve upon our first essay in Atlantic collaboration. It proposes that the original seven sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty send delegates to a convention to explore how far the Atlantic community is willing to go in merging its political, diplomatic, military and economic resources for the common good.

In that sense it is almost the same kind of resolution we have before us this evening. Then Senator Gillette ends his letter as follows:

Some of us are engaged in forming, among members of the United States congress, an informal committee to advance this exploratory effort. It would be of great value if you would inform us how far your views on ways and means of meeting the present crisis accord with those set forth above and whether you would be prepared to form a similar group within your parliamentary body.

The Prime Minister replied to that letter on January 31, as follows:

Dear Senator Gillette:

I duly received your letter of January 24, regarding the concurrent resolution standing in the name of Senator Kefauver, yourself and a number of your colleagues, calling for exploration of the possibilities of forming an Atlantic union.

I think you will appreciate how embarrassing it might be for both countries if the head of the government of one of our countries were to express himself about the content or efficacy of a specific proposal which was under consideration in the other country, and on which a conclusion had not been reached. You may be assured, however, that should the resolution pass and the President carry out the request contained therein, it would receive the most careful consideration of the Canadian Government.

As for the possibility of forming a similar group in the Canadian Parliament, and particularly in the House of Commons, this is something which it would not be possible, because of our different constitutional structure, for the head of the administration to sponsor, unless and until the policy proposed had become a

definite policy of the administration. Since the success of the proposal contained in your resolution would clearly depend upon the initiative being taken by the United States Government, it would, I feel, be premature for our administration to take any initiative until a decision had been reached in principle in Washington. That, of course, would not preclude the advocacy of similar proposals by private members of our parliament; as was the case in respect of the resolution considered in our Senate last year.

I regret that I cannot be more specific in my reply, but I can assure you and your colleagues in the United States Senate that any action which will have the practical effect of strengthening the North Atlantic community, will, I believe, meet with a favourable response in Canada.

Before I sit down I should like to point out to the house that action is already being taken to strengthen the North Atlantic community under the North Atlantic Pact. It does not go as far of course as this resolution would have us go, and progress may not be as fast or as far as some of us would like, but progress is being made in implementing Article II, for instance, of the North Atlantic Treaty. Effective liaison arrangements have been worked out between members of the North Atlantic group in economic matters—especially, I admit, economic matters concerned with defence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the OEEC have established effective working relationships, and indeed I think it may not be going too far to say that some of the economic functions which are now being performed by the Office of European Economic Co-operation will be taken over by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are also discussing the building up under the North Atlantic Organization of a permanent international secretariat. So we are making some progress at this time under the North Atlantic organization toward the development of a North Atlantic community. I would suggest . . . that at this time that is the most effective way by which we can work towards achievement of the fine objective put forward in this resolution.

I said not very long ago "that our North Atlantic alliance may provide the foundation for a great co-operative economic commonwealth of the western world which one day may become a political commonwealth. You may say that this is unrealistic nonsense but I suggest that in this jet-propelled atomic age no plan less than this will be adequate, no vision less than this will do." So far as I am concerned I stand by those words, but I do not think that at this time the calling of a conference of the type indicated by the resolution would make any appreciable advance to the attainment of the ultimate objective, which remains a commonwealth of the free world. Therefore, in order that we in this house may not give the appearance of division and disunity on a matter as to which we are all fundamentally united, I would venture to express the hope that this resolution may not be pressed to a vote at this time.

On Mr. Stewart's request permission was granted to withdraw his resolution.

Japanese Peace Treaty

Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel) referred on February 26, 1951, to press despatches regarding the return of John Foster Dulles, the special representative of the United States government, who had been in the far east for six weeks in connection with Japanese and other problems. In this regard Mr. Graydon asked whether the Canadian Government had been kept closely in touch with Mr. Dulles' movements and whether a meeting might be expected soon with respect to a peace treaty with Japan.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, replied as follows:


We have kept in touch with United States government authorities in general, and with Mr. Dulles in particular, in regard to the possibility of an early Japanese peace conference and a Japanese treaty, and through our officers in the countries that he visited on this journey we have the discussions he had about these matters. We expect to be in touch with him directly in Washington within the next few days.

On the other question, about the possibility or otherwise of an early Japanese peace conference, I do not think it would be advisable for me to say anything at this time except there are indications that a Japanese peace settlement will be possible before very long.

The Termination of the State of War with Germany

On February 23 Mr. Donald M. Fleming (PC, Eglinton) asked whether the Government were taking any steps with a view to terminating the state of war with Germany. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, made this reply:

No special steps have been taken with respect to this matter since I spoke to the House about it last some time ago; but the possibility of a termination of the state of war with Germany by action other than through a general peace treaty is under consideration.



—RCN

H.M.C.S. "ONTARIO" LEAVES FOR SOUTH PACIFIC

The cruiser H.M.C.S. "Ontario" left Esquimalt on February 26 for a three month training cruise of the southern Pacific.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Trusteeship Council

During February the Trusteeship Council made rapid progress in considering the substantive items on the agenda of its current session. The Council, aided by a number of sub-committees, has examined annual reports submitted by the administering authorities for the trust territories of Samoa (New Zealand), the Pacific Islands (United States) and Nauru (Australia). Petitions from groups and individuals in Samoa, British Togoland and the Pacific Trust Territories were also scrutinized by an ad hoc committee of the Council.

Perhaps the most significant event of the month occurred in connection with the Council's revision of its rules of procedure. Among a number of supplementary rules adopted was a provision permitting Italy to participate without vote in the Council's proceedings on items affecting Somaliland, for which territory Italy has been assigned administrative responsibility. When this decision had been adopted the Italian observer, who had been invited to take his seat in the Council, immediately registered the additional request that Italy be allowed "full participation" in all aspects of the Council's work. His attitude was reflected in a resolution, adopted on the suggestion of Argentina, that the question of Italy's participation in the work of the Trusteeship Council be placed on the agenda of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly. As a result of this decision, the Assembly will be faced with the interesting constitutional question of whether a state which is not a member of the United Nations may nevertheless have voting rights in one of its main organs.

The Council is expected to conclude its session about the middle of March.

Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments

On October 24, 1950, in a statement to the General Assembly, President Truman suggested that it might be possible to break the existing stalemate in atomic and disarmament negotiations by discussing these two related problems together. After a lapse of some weeks this suggestion was taken up in a proposal, originating in the Australian Delegation, to establish a committee to consider the fusion of the present Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. On December 13, the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a committee "to consider and report to the next regular session of the General Assembly on ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments may be co-ordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission". The resolution specified that the committee should be composed of the members of the Security Council with Canada (as a member of the AEC).

This committee is an ad hoc body, with the assigned task of considering the subject outlined and presenting a report to the next General Assembly. The opening meeting of the committee, convened by Mr. Trygve Lie on February 14, was devoted to preliminary discussion. A Soviet resolution to seat a representative of the Peking regime was defeated on the ground that the question of Chinese representation on a committee set up by the Assembly should be decided by the Assembly itself. There was also an inconclusive discussion as to whether the committee should choose a permanent chairman or should adopt a system of rotating chairmanship. It was expected that the question of chairmanship and other procedural matters would be settled at the second meeting, scheduled for March 2, and that the committee would then draw up a programme of works.

Collective Measures Committee

Under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its Fifth Session, the Collective Measures Committee was established to study and report to the Security Council and the General Assembly by September 1, 1951, on methods of organizing collective security measures under the United Nations. The Committee is composed of fourteen member states, including Canada.

At the request of the United States Delegation the first meeting of the Committee was held on February 28, when organizational questions were discussed. Consideration is now being given by the Canadian Government, in consultation with other governments, to the planning of a suitable programme of work.

Economic and Social Council

The Twelfth Session of the Economic and Social Council opened at Santiago, Chile, on February 20. The Canadian Delegation is composed of: J. D. Kearney, Canadian Ambassador to Argentina (Representative); J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Embassy, Washington (Alternate Representative); Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa; (Principal Adviser); G. V. Beaudry, Canadian Embassy, Santiago; A. R. Crépault, Canadian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, New York (Advisers).

At its opening meeting the Economic and Social Council re-elected Hernan Santa Cruz of Chile as President, and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India as First Vice-President. Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia was elected Second Vice-President.

In view of the comparatively limited number of questions with which the Council will be called upon to deal at its present session, it is hoped that it will complete its agenda in approximately four weeks. Among the principal issues to be discussed are the United Nations programme of technical assistance, the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, the economic development of under-developed countries, forced labour and measures for its abolition. In addition the Council will hold its annual debate on the world economic situation during which, this year, there will probably be a good deal said about the effects of world-wide rearmament upon economic development programmes.

Executive Board of UNICEF

The newly constituted Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund held its first meeting at Lake Success from February 9 to February 13. The reorganized Board includes the eighteen members of the Social Commission as well as eight other members. These latter were elected last December by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation and the degree of their participation in the Fund's work, either as contributors or as recipients. As a result of this reorganization the combined Asian and Middle Eastern representation on the Board has been increased from two to eight.

As its first Chairman the Executive Board elected Mrs. D. B. Sinclair of Canada. Mrs. Sinclair had been a member of the retiring Executive Board since the inception of UNICEF, and had served as the Chairman of its Programme Committee since 1946. She holds the post of Executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Welfare in the Department of National Health and Welfare and, during the Second World War, was Director of the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service.

During the course of its current meetings the Executive Board considered the report of the previous Board, which outlines the operations of the Children's Fund during 1950. The report shows that, by the end of 1950, UNICEF had received contributions in the total amount of \$152,800,000. These resources had been allocated to aid governmental child-care projects in fifty-eight countries and territories, and to assist Palestine refugees. The aid extended by UNICEF had included supple-

mentary feeding, equipment and advisory personnel for maternal and child health services, support of training centres for child care personnel, an international anti-tuberculosis vaccination campaign as well as equipment for milk conservation plants and the production of anti-biotics.

The future activities of the Children's Fund will include emergency assistance, when special needs arise, in addition to long-range programmes designed to improve child health and welfare services. At its meeting on February 13, the Board approved plans for extensive child-aid programmes in Europe, Asia and Latin America. A total of \$1,083,000 in new funds was allocated by the Board for operations in Greece, Yugoslavia and Palestine refugee camps. The remaining appropriations of \$550,000 for programmes in South and South-East Asia, and \$285,000 for child health projects in Latin America will be taken from funds previously set aside as area reserves.

World Meteorological Organization

The World Meteorological Organization is holding its first Congress in Paris commencing March 19. This Organization is the newest of the Specialized Agencies, having come into existence in March 1950, after thirty countries had ratified the World Meteorological Convention. The Congress will be preceded by an extraordinary meeting of the directors of the International Meteorological Organization, which is winding up its operations and transferring its functions to the new organization. Like its predecessor, WMO is primarily concerned with the organization on an international level of a system which provides for an authoritative flow of accurate reports to and from all parts of the world. It will spend most of its time at the first session deciding what its administrative structure should be; how large a permanent secretariat it should have; its programme for the first four-year period between congresses; and how much money it should seek from participating governments. Canada ratified the World Meteorological Convention in 1950 and thus automatically became a member of WMO. A Canadian delegation will be attending the first Congress, headed by Dr. Andrew Thomson, Controller, Meteorological Division, Department of Transport.

Forthcoming Publications

It is expected that a report entitled *Canada and the United Nations 1950* will be available shortly after Parliament reconvenes following the Easter recess.

This publication will provide a survey of Canada's participation in the United Nations and the work of the Specialized Agencies during 1950; it continues a series of departmental publications on this subject which began with a report on the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Canada and the United Nations 1950 will be obtainable from the King's Printer, Ottawa; its price will be fifty cents per copy.

VISITS OF OFFICIALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

His Excellency René Pleven, President of the Council of Ministers of France, visited Ottawa, February 2 and 3.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of February 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier Conferences may be found in previous issues of "External Affairs")

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. See "External Affairs", January 1951, for the last complete list of these Boards and Commissions to which must be added the following commodity groups which, under present arrangements, will be in continuous session in Washington for as long as there is a raw material crisis)

Name	Place	Date Established	Canadian Representatives
1. Standing Committee on Rubber, Zinc and Lead	Washington	February 1951	S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington (Alternate).
2. Standing Committee on Sulphur	Washington	March 1951	S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington, (Alternate).
3. Standing Committee on Cotton and Cotton Liners	Washington	March 1951	S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington, (Alternate).
4. Standing Committee on Manganese, Nickel and Cobalt	Washington	March 1951	S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington, (Alternate).

Conferences Attended in February 1951

1. *Multilateral Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* Torquay, England—September 23. L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, London, Chairman; H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board, Deputy Chairman; J. J. Deutsch, W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Department of External Affairs; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
2. *Tenth Plenary Meeting of Cotton Advisory Committee.* Lahore, Pakistan—February 1. R. Grew, Commercial Counselor, New Delhi.
3. *Executive Board of UNICEF.* New York—February 9-13. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.
4. *Third Session of the Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee of I.L.O.* Geneva—February 12-24. Government Delegates: J. L. MacDougall and W. W. Dawson, Department of Labour; Employers' Delegates: J. N. Flood, St. John, N.B.; R. Brunet, Hull, P.Q.; Workers' Delegates: J. B. Delisle, Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, and J. Connolly, Toronto.
5. *Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia.* Colombo, Ceylon—February 12. Delegate: D. M. Johnson, High Commissioner for Canada in Pakistan; Alternate: P. Sykes, Canadian Representative to the Council of Technical Co-operation, Colombo; Advisers: C. Read, Department of Finance, and J. Thurrott, Department of External Affairs.
6. *Conference to Discuss Creation of German Army.* Paris—February 15. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political

Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn, Germany; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.

7. *Agenda Committee of ECOSOC*. Santiago, Chile—February 16. Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs.
8. *Twelfth Session of ECOSOC*. Santiago, Chile—February 20. Representative: J. D. Kearney, Canadian Ambassador to Argentina; Alternate: J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Embassy, Washington; Principal Adviser: Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs; Advisers: G. V. Beaudry, Canadian Embassy, Santiago; A. R. Crépault, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York, Secretary.
9. *114th Session of the Governing Body of I.L.O.* Geneva—February 26-March 10. Delegate: A. H. Brown, Department of Labour; Alternate: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations.
10. *U.S.-Canada Discussions on Frequency Assignment Plans for Bands below 4000 kc.* Washington, D.C.—February 26. C. J. Acton, Department of Transport, Chairman; A. J. Dawson, Department of Transport; Lt. R. M. Dunbar, Royal Canadian Navy; Capt. L. H. Wylie, Canadian Army; F/L. W. D. Benton, R.C. A.F.; Mr. G. E. Cox, Canadian Embassy, Washington.

Conferences to be held in March and April

1. *First South American Congress on Petroleum*. Montevideo—March 12-16.
2. *Inter-American Conference on Social Security*. Buenos Aires—March 12-31.
3. *Extraordinary Conference of Directors of International Meteorological Organization*. Paris—March 15.
4. *Seventh Session of Social Commission of ECOSOC*. Geneva—March 17.
5. *First Congress of World Meteorological Organization*. Paris—March 19.
6. *First Meeting of the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Commission*. Washington, April 2-14.
7. *Seventh Meeting of I.R.O. General Council and Executive Committee*. Geneva—April 4-18.
8. *Ad Hoc Committee of ECOSOC*. Geneva, April 16-27.
9. *Sixth Meeting of the Council of I.T.U.* Geneva—April 18.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the King's Printer, at the price indicated.)

Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in Ottawa, February 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (fifth session); 29 December 1950; document E/1889, E/CN.7/216; 84 pp.

United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance (Under General Assembly Resolutions 58 (I), 200 (III) and 246 (III))—Report by the Secretary-General; 9 January 1951; document E/1893; 99 pp.

Final Report of the First Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 11 December 1946—31 December 1950; 13 January 1951; document E/ICEF/L.8; 103 pp. and tables I to X.

(b) Printed Documents:

Catalogue of Economic and Social Projects 1950 (No. 2); 19 April 1950; document E/1670; 515 pp.; \$3.75; Sales No.: 1950.II. D.1.

Report of the International Monetary Fund (Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the fiscal year ended April 30, 1950); 8 December 1950; document E/1872; 160 pp. (Washington, D.C.)

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Fifth Annual Report 1949-1950); 13 December 1950; document E/1873; 64 pp. (Washington, D.C.)

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

World Health Organization:

a) *Third World Health Assembly, Geneva, 8 to 27 May 1950*—Resolutions and decisions, plenary meetings, committees, annexes; 603 pp.; \$3.25; Official Records of the World Health Organiza-

tion, No. 28. (December 1950).

b) *Executive Board, sixth session held in Geneva from 1 to 9 June 1950*—Resolutions and decisions, annexes; 53 pp.; 50 cents; Official Records of World Health Organization, No. 29. (December 1950).

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 51/3—Statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, made in the First (Political) Committee on January 30, 1951, explaining the Canadian vote on the Arab-Asian and the United States resolutions on Korea.

No. 51/4—*Review of the International Situation*, a statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made in the House of Commons on February 2, 1951.

No. 51/6—*Canada and the Colombo Plan*, a statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made in the House of Commons on February 21, 1951.

The following serial number is available abroad only:

No. 51/5—*Canada's Defence Programme*, a statement by Mr. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, made in the

House of Commons on February 5, 1951.

CBC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE

Quarterly Review of Activities

(December 1950-February 1951)


Canada Speaks Now in Fourteen Languages

The "Voice of Canada" has added Finland and Russia to its target areas. On December 3, 1950, the International Service transmitted its first half-hour programme to Finland. These weekly Sunday half-hour broadcasts (1530-1600 GMT) consist of Canadian news, material on basic Canadian industries, human interest stories and descriptions of Finnish-Canadian activities. It is interesting to note that after four weeks of broadcasting, 25 letters commenting favourably on this new venture were received from Finnish listeners. On February 4, 1951, the Russian Service was inaugurated and now broadcasts daily at 1415-1445 GMT and 2200-2230 GMT. The former Canadian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Mr. Dana Wilgress, was heard on the inaugural broadcast with a message to the people of the Soviet Union.

Reconnaissance Tour of Latin America

To assess the effectiveness of the present shortwave service in Spanish and Portuguese and to make recommendations for improving the service, Mr. H. W. Morrison, Supervisor of the Latin American Service, completed a reconnaissance trip through Latin America in November and December, 1950. He visited the major centres, including all Canadian diplomatic and trade missions. He travelled through 9 different republics and 13 cities, covering about 20,000 miles by air.

March, 1951



THE VOICE OF CANADA

A portion of the antennae system of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service shortwave transmitting station at Sackville, New Brunswick.

With assistance from the Canadian offices in the areas visited, Mr. Morrison brought back an interesting report. The present shortwave service is well heard in Latin America—a fact attested by 5,472 letters received from listeners in 1950, more than double the number of the previous year. The response is particularly noteworthy, in Mr. Morrison's opinion, when it is taken into consideration that both the BBC and the "Voice of America" can utilize from twice to five times as many frequency channels as CBC to broadcast at the same hours. CBC is limited to two frequencies.

Programme Notes

German Section

The German Section broadcast two outstanding programmes. In December it interviewed at the United Nations representatives of the German Republic who were concerned with the problem of prisoners of war. In January the section dramatized a visit to the asbestos mines in Quebec under the title "Asbestos"—a school broadcast for North-West German Radio in Hamburg.

Italian Section

The Italian Section had its quota of notables who appeared for interviews, including Professor Dordoni, guest of the Canadian Council for Reconstruction and Mr. Brusasca, Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Giuseppe Caraci, Professor of Geography, Rome University, attending the Geographical Seminar at Macdonald College under the auspices of UNESCO, did four broadcasts in December on "Canada and its geography through the eyes of an Italian scientist".

French Language Section

Camille Bernard, Canadian singer, former pupil of famed Yvette Guilbert, is being featured by the French Language Service in a series, "Chansons de France et du Canada"

every Sunday at 1745 GMT, accompanied by Marie-Thérèse Paquin at the piano. Another interesting programme, "Les grandes figures de l'histoire du Canada", 15-minute dramatic sketches broadcast every Monday, 1745 GMT, brings to life famous figures of Canadian history, such as Cartier, Champlain, Vancouver, Mackenzie, Hudson and D'Iberville.

English Language Service

Curtailement of air time due to Spanish transmissions to Latin America and Russian and Finnish broadcasts to Europe has resulted in the English Language Service concentrating on news and commentaries. A scheme — a kind of airmail order service — has been instigated whereby the CBC-IS English Language Service offers special talks programmes prepared here for presentation abroad. Radio Pakistan, Radio Ceylon, All India Radio, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, South African Broadcasting Corporation and the New Zealand Broadcasting Commission are among those stations contacted.

Dutch Section

In December the Dutch Service did an interview with Mr. P. Mijksenaar, Public Relations Officer of the City of Amsterdam, for relay to Radio NCRV, Hilversum. Various Christmas programmes were recorded: — three programmes in three different provincial dialects for Regional Broadcasting North; three programmes with greetings for Radio VARA, Hilversum; one programme on Christmas as celebrated by Protestant Dutch immigrants with a special Christmas message by Dr. A. Sevenster, Dutch Consul General in Montreal, for NCRV Hilversum; one programme on Christmas as celebrated by Roman Catholic Dutch immigrants for Radio KRO. Important coverage has been given in January and February on Canadian Industry, Federal supported air travel for immigrants and on the United Nations.

Czech Section

Czech broadcasts have been political in nature during the last few months. In December "The Rule of Law — Backbone of Democracy", a series by a well-known lawyer, outlined the Canadian democratic way as compared with that existing in Czechoslovakia. Professor J. Mallory of McGill University did a series entitled "Marxist Theory and Communist Propaganda". Other interesting commentaries were "Who are the Partisans of Peace" and "The Prague Congress of Czechoslovak Partisans of Peace". One intensely human broadcast dealt with Canada's acceptance of six blind DP's, among them one Czechoslovakian, who would have found no place in a Communist-run land.

Around the World by Transcription

Howard Cable's original Christmas Show, prepared and recorded by International Service's Transcription Service, was sent to 48 countries by transcription and used by all language sections in direct transmission. It was also used by the Trans-Canada Network as a special Christmas Eve Fantasy on December 24. Enthusiastic comments have come in from stations which have used the show.

A series of seven 15-minute programmes featuring Gisèle singing popular and traditional ballads to her own piano accompaniment has been released to some 40 Canadian missions abroad and to non-commercial radio stations. Healey Willan's "Symphony No. 2", played by the CBC Toronto Symphony Orchestra conducted by Geoffrey Waddington, will be released soon.

CBC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE

DAILY SHORTWAVE BROADCASTS FROM CANADA

Schedule effective March, 1951 (Subject to Change)

Greenwich Mean Time	Programme	Call-signs	
TO EUROPE			
1350-1400	Opening Announcement (except Saturdays and Sundays)	CKNC & CKCX	
1400-1415	Commentaries from the U.N. (except Saturdays and Sundays)		
1405-1415	Opening Announcements (Saturdays and Sundays only)	CKNC & CKCS	
1415-1445	Russian		
1445-1530	Commentaries from the U.N. (except Saturdays and Sundays)		
1445-1600	Programmes for Europe		
1445-1515	Swedish (Sundays only)		
1515-1530	Programmes for Europe (Sundays only)		
1530-1600	Finnish (Sundays only)		
1530-1600	Programmes for Europe (except Saturdays and Sundays)		
1600-1630	Czech		
1630-1645	German		
1645-1700	Dutch	CKCS & CKLO	
1700-1730	English		
1730-1745	Czech		
1745-1815	French		
1815-1845	Dutch		
1845-1900	English		
1900-1920	Swedish		
1920-1940	Norwegian		
1940-2000	Danish		
2000-2030	German		
2030-2100	Italian	CKCS & CKLO	
2100-2130	Czech		
2130-2200	French		
2200-2230	Russian		CKLO & CKRZ
2230-2245	English		
2245-2300	English		
2300-2315	Czech		
2315-2330	Czech (Saturdays and Sundays only)		
2315-2330	German (except Saturdays and Sundays)		

TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

2350-0040	Portuguese	CKCX & CKRA
0040-0145	Spanish	
0145-0200	French	CKCS & CKRA
0200-0230	English	
0230-0245	Dutch (Saturdays only)	
0230-0245	Spanish (except Saturdays)	
0255-0335	Spanish	

TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

0430-0505	Commentaries from the U.N. (except Sundays and Mondays)	CKLX & CHOL CKLO & CHOL
0840-0950	English programmes for listeners in the Southwest Pacific area (Sundays and Wednesdays)	

TO NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND ARCTIC REGIONS

0420-0500	Northern Messenger (Mondays only)	CKLO & CKOB
-----------	-----------------------------------	-------------

CKNC	17.82 mc/s, 16.84 metres	CHOL	11.72 mc/s, 25.60 metres
CKCS	15.32 mc/s, 19.58 metres	CKLO	9.63 mc/s, 31.15 metres
CKCX	15.19 mc/s, 19.75 metres	CKOB	6.09 mc/s, 49.26 metres
CKLX	15.09 mc/s, 19.88 metres	CKRZ	6.06 mc/s, 49.50 metres
CKRA	11.76 mc/s, 25.51 metres		

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
".....	Commercial Secretary.....	Melbourne (83 William Street)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Belgian Congo.....	A/Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Casier Postal 373)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (46, rue Montoyer)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
".....	Consul and Commercial Secretary.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Colombo (P.O. Box 1006)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Bank of London and South America Bldg.)
China.....	Ambassador.....	Nanking (147 Hankow Rd.)
".....	Consul General.....	Shanghai (27 The Bund)
Colombia.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Bogota (Edificio Columbiana de Seguros)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida de las Misiones No. 17)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Prague 2 (Krakowska 22)
Denmark.....	Minister.....	Copenhagen (Osterbrogade 26)
Egypt.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Cairo (Osiris Building, Sharia Walda, Kasr-el-Doubara)
Finland.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvagen 7-C)
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris 16e (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Head of Mission.....	Bonn (Zittelmannstrasse, 14)
".....	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Commonwealth House)
".....	Consul.....	Frankfurt (145 Fuerstenbergerstrasse)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 Queen Sofia Blvd.)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City (No. 20, 4th Avenue South)
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Hong Kong (Hong Kong Bank Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
".....	A/Commercial Secretary.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via Saverio Mercadante 15)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Canadian Bank of Commerce Chambers)
Japan.....	Head of Mission.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3 Chome, Minato-Ku)
Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 1A)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)
Norway.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole)
".....	A/Commercial Secretary.....	" (The Cotton Exchange, McLeod Road)
Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Tuason Bldg., 8-12 Escolta)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (Hotel Bristol)
Portugal.....	Acting Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Lisbon (Rua Rodrigo da Fonseca, 103)
Singapore.....	A/Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room D-5, Union Building)
Spain.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Madrid (Avenida José Antonio 70)
Sweden.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvagen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Minister.....	Berne (Thunstrasse 95)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (43 St. Vincent St.)

Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (211, Ayranci Baglari, Kavaklidere)
"	Commercial Secretary.....	Istanbul (Istiklal Caddesi, Kismet Han 3/4, Beyoglu)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (24, Barclay's Bank Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grande Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Building)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushny Pereulok)
"	Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.	
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Glasgow (200 St. Vincent St.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Avenue)
"	Consul.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
"	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
"	Consul.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Los Angeles (Associated Realty Bldg.)
"	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
"	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (503, 120 Exchange Street)
"	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
Venezuela.....	Consul General.....	Caracas (8° Peso Edificio America)
Yugoslavia.....	Minister.....	Belgrade (Sv. Markovica, 20)
"	Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.	
*OEEC.....	Representative.....	Paris 16e (c/o Canadian Embassy).
United Nations.....	Permanent Delegate.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
"	Permanent Delegate.....	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

MILITARY operations and leaders dominated the development of the Korean problem during March. United Nations forces drove steadily northward moving slowly and cautiously in an attempt to maintain contact with the enemy forces. Against diminishing enemy resistance they pressed close to the 38th parallel and at the end of the month had virtually liberated South Korea for the second time in six months.

In statements on the Korean situation the United States Commander and his deputy in Korea emphasized a trend towards a military stalemate. On March 7, General MacArthur said among other things, "assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and material to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves. He asserted that a solution to the stalemate would have to be found by an authority with greater powers than those delegated to him by the United Nations. On March 12, General Ridgway declared that a military stalemate appeared likely; however, he added that "it would be a tremendous victory for the United Nations if the war ended with our forces in control up to the 38th parallel". A significant point in his statement was the rejection of any obligation on the part of the United Nations to unify Korea by force. A few days later General MacArthur repeated his opinion about a stalemate and the necessity of new decisions "on the highest international levels".

Commenting on General Ridgway's remarks the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in the House of Commons on March 20 "I myself would prefer to think of the situation not so much as a military stalemate but as the stabilization of a military position. We might even reach a position where we have a sort of *de facto* cease-fire. What do we do then? All I would say on that point . . . is that if we do reach the position of a sort of *de facto* cease-fire roughly along the line of the 38th parallel I think we should take advantage of that position, that military stabilization, to reopen negotiations with the people of the other side provided there is any possibility of that being brought about — and I have no illusions as to the difficulties on that score". Although agreeing with General Ridgway that "it is not the obligation of the United Nations to unify Korea by force" Mr. Pearson declared: "but it is our obligation to do everything we can to bring about that unity. I should think that the best way in which it could be done would be by negotiation if that is possible."

General MacArthur's Statement

Recognition of a military stalemate and limitation of the military objective to the liberation of the Republic of Korea reflected a growing sentiment in those countries represented in the United Nations forces for an early political settlement and extrication from an apparently indecisive struggle. In a statement on March 24 General MacArthur said "I stand ready to confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to settle United Nations political objectives in Korea and end the fighting". At the same time, however, he said "the enemy must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse". This was interpreted by some as a threat that if the peace offer was refused United Nations military action would be taken against China. This was in fact the interpretation given to the statement by the Peking radio when it announced in the evening of March 28 that the peace offer had been dismissed as a "bluff" and an "insult to the Chinese people".

The statement by General MacArthur which provoked most controversy was: "there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations". This statement contradicted the decision taken by the Political Committee of the United Nations on January 13, 1951, when it adopted, with the concurring vote of the United States, a statement of principles in which the Korean problem was linked to Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations.

The State Department quickly made known its surprise at General MacArthur's statement. On March 24, after consultations on the highest levels, the following statement was issued: "General MacArthur is conducting United Nations military operations in Korea under military directives issued through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff which, as the President stated in a recent press conference, are fully adequate to cover the present military situation in Korea. The political issues, which General MacArthur has stated are beyond his responsibility as a field commander, are being dealt with in the United Nations and by inter-governmental consultations".

The Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to this problem in an address on March 31 in Ottawa. Speaking of the threats to the unity of the free world he said:

The other danger to our free world unity arises when those who have been charged by the United Nations with military responsibility make controversial pronouncements which go far beyond that responsibility, and create confusion, disquiet and even discord. It seems to me to be as unwise, indeed as dangerous, for the generals to intervene in international policy matters as it would be for the diplomats to try to lay down military strategy. This is a case, I think, where the specialist should stick to his specialty. Otherwise, unnecessary difficulties are created, and that whole-hearted co-operation between friends which is so essential is hindered.

Problem of the 38th Parallel


Discussion of a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem concentrated on the 38th parallel. From the beginning of the month as United Nations forces ground forward slowly, it became apparent that a decision would soon be required on the action to be taken when the parallel was reached. After the puzzling withdrawal of the enemy forces in the middle of the month, a decision on recrossing the boundary became a matter of first importance.

Responding to a question on this subject in the House of Commons on March 20, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said "there is a real difficulty from my point of view in dealing with this matter because at this moment, even this afternoon, informal discussions are going on in Washington with other countries participating in the Korean campaign on the subject of what might be a proper political directive if a directive should be issued for the United Nations Commander on this matter".

The following day Mr. Acheson, the United States Secretary of State, gave a negative reply to a reporter who asked whether the United Nations Commander needed any new authority to cross the 38th parallel. Mr. Acheson added however, that there was need for a common point of view on the question by the United States and its United Nations allies; he would not say that United Nations Forces would cross the parallel.

The United Nations Commander himself announced the immediate intentions of his forces on March 24 in Tokyo, after returning from a one-day visit to the fighting area. In a prepared statement which he read General MacArthur said:

No further comment would seem to be necessary with reference to the 38th parallel the status of which has been so thoroughly discussed in recent statements



CANADIAN DESTROYER IN KOREAN THEATRE

—National Defence

An ammunition barge replenishing at sea HMCS Cayuga's supply of four-inch shells after bombardment of enemy shore batteries at Inchon.

from Washington, London and other capitals. As a matter of fact it has never had any military significance. Our naval and air forces cross it at will and both ground forces (Red and U.N. troops) have done so in the past. I have directed the Eighth Army to do so again if and when its security makes it tactically advisable.

To this statement there was no objection from Washington; it was, in effect, in accord with President Truman's recent remark that crossing the parallel was a tactical matter to be determined by the United Nations Commander. Three days later the statement was confirmed by General Marshall, the United States Secretary of Defence, who said that the United Nations Commander would be guided by the necessity to safeguard the security of his command. He added that the question of a sweep across the parallel was a matter for political consideration.

In the United Nations the Good Offices Committee at the end of the month was still awaiting a reply from the Chinese People's Government to its offers of good offices in arranging negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Additional Measures Committee met on March 8 to consider the report of the Bureau appointed in February to draw up a tentative list of possible measures. The Committee appointed a sub-committee of five to consider the practicability of the measures suggested by the Bureau and the question of priorities.

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

A Summary of Recent Statements by the Prime Minister of India

Recent statements by Mr. Nehru, India's Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, assist in throwing light on the principles and fundamental attitudes upon which Indian foreign policy is based. Perhaps the most frequently recurring thoughts in the Prime Minister's public speeches over the past year have related to India's desire for peace and the unmitigated disaster that another general war would bring to the whole of civilization. Referring in Parliament on February 12, 1951, to the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, he said:

All of us had one primary purpose — the maintenance of peace in this afflicted world of ours. All of us realized that widespread war would be the most terrible of disasters and that we should strain every nerve to prevent it.

As to India's role in international relations, Mr. Nehru added in the same speech:

We do not claim to influence world affairs very much, nor have we any desire to do so. But fate and circumstances have cast a certain responsibility upon us . . .

In an earlier address on December 6, the Prime Minister emphasized this same thought when he said that the fate of the world depended fundamentally today on some of the great powers — the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China, but that India's counsel might be of moral and psychological value.

Mr. Nehru has made it clear in this connection that independence of action is regarded as an essential part of Indian policy. In answer to charges that India had abandoned "neutrality", Mr. Nehru told Parliament on August 4 that at no time had India been "neutral" and at no time did it propose to be. Indian policy was simply independence of action and an unwillingness "to commit ourselves to follow a certain line".

The Prime Minister has also spoken on a number of occasions of the importance he attaches to negotiation in the settlement of international disputes and his dislike of force or threats of force. In his speech of December 6, he appealed to the "great countries" to make every effort to solve the present tangle by "a peaceful approach, by negotiation, or by any other way they could find provided it was peaceful". . . . "I think that all of us", he added, "wherever we may be, more or less in some measure have to share the responsibility for this terrible state of the world today".

While deprecating the harsh words and recriminations between the great powers in their approach to international problems, Mr. Nehru has not rejected the use of armed force in certain circumstances. Broadcasting from London on January 12 last, he said:

I am not a pacifist. Unhappily, the world of today finds that it cannot do without force. We have to protect ourselves and prepare ourselves for any contingency. We have to meet aggression or any other kind of evil. To surrender to evil is always bad . . .

More specifically the Indian Prime Minister told the United States Congress on October 12, 1949, that "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral". At a press conference on October 16, 1950, Mr. Nehru said that to tolerate aggression leads to war, but that military means should be used only when other means are not available.

Korea

In applying these principles to the Korean question, Mr. Nehru said in Parliament on August 3, 1950:

April, 1951

It is perfectly clear that North Korea indulged in a full-scale and well laid out invasion and this can only be described as aggression in any sense of the term, so that when this matter came up before the Security Council it seemed to us quite inevitable that we should describe it as aggression.

After the initial collapse of the North Korean armies in South Korea, however, the Indian Prime Minister told a press conference on October 16, "we felt that the time had come for an effort to be made for a peaceful solution. . . . To cross the 38th parallel without making such an effort . . . appeared to us to be wrong and to involve grave risks of a conflict on a much wider scale".

Following the entry of Chinese troops into Korea and their advance down the peninsula, Mr. Nehru explained his Government's attitude in Parliament on December 6: ". . . it would serve little purpose, and indeed it would be very harmful, if this matter were considered in the United Nations in the formal way of passing resolutions of condemnation". The only possible approach should be one of negotiation among the parties concerned, including China, to cover "the whole question of Korea" and Formosa as well. The negotiations should be preceded by a cease-fire and the establishment of "some kind of demilitarized zone".

In conformity with this approach, India played a prominent part in the cease-fire negotiations in the United Nations. The Indian Representative, Sir Benegal Rau, was a member of the three-man Cease-Fire Group. India did not regard the Chinese reply to the U. N. Statement of Principles of January 13 as a rejection of the cease-fire proposals. Speaking in Parliament on February 12, Mr. Nehru said on the contrary it was clear that the reply was not a rejection: "in part it was acceptance and, in part, fresh suggestions. Subsequent clarification brought out still further that there was a very wide area of agreement and that the gap of disagreement had been very much narrowed. It was possible that this gap could also be closed if any earnest effort were made to that end." After explaining, in the light of this attitude, why India had opposed the U. N. resolution, naming China as an aggressor, the Prime Minister continued:

As we expected, the passing of this resolution has, for the time being at least, put an end to any attempts at negotiation or settlement. We hope still that it may be possible for events to take a better turn in future but, I must confess that, at the moment, that hope has grown very dim.


China and South-East Asia

Overriding the Indian attitude toward specific problems connected with the Korean war, is India's fundamental approach to China and South and South-East Asia. In his broadcast from London on January 12, Mr. Nehru said that the old equilibrium in Asia had been upset and could never come back. Asia was essentially peaceful, but in the exuberance of its newly-won freedom it might "go wrong occasionally". In any event it was no longer prepared to tolerate domination or the threat of domination or any behaviour "after the old pattern of colonialism". The countries of Asia, however, had tremendous problems to solve concerned with the primary needs of their peoples. They needed friendship and co-operation, and if "a new approach and understanding" were forthcoming, he felt sure they would respond "with all friendship".

Referring specifically to China, the Prime Minister said:

China has taken a new shape . . . But whether we like that shape . . . or not, we have to recognize that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength. China, in her new-found strength, has acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret.

But we have to remember the background of China as of other Asian countries — the long period of struggle and frustration . . . It is neither right nor practical to ignore the feelings of hundreds of millions of people. It is no longer safe to do so.



GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, NEW DELHI

These buildings, as viewed from the War Memorial Arch, consist of, in the centre, the former Viceroy's palace, now the residence of the President of India, with buildings of the central secretariat located on either side. The circular building on the right is the House of Parliament of the Republic of India.

We in India have 2,000 years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts, but . . . we endeavour to maintain friendly relations with this great neighbour of ours for the peace of Asia depends on these relations.

Mr. Nehru added significantly on another occasion: "if this unfortunate error of keeping out the new China from the United Nations had not been committed, much of the trouble that has subsequently occurred might have been avoided".

If Mr. Nehru has expressed himself with vigour on the subject of colonialism in Asia, he has also indicated that Asian countries admire Western democratic institutions and are fearful of communist expansionism. On October 16 he stated:

Generally speaking, the countries of Asia are developing or wish to develop democratic institutions. Most of them are opposed to totalitarianism as represented either by communism or fascism. The idea of social justice, as embodied in communism, attracts many people, but at the same time the ideology and the methods of Communist parties have been greatly disliked and have come into conflict with democratic nationalism. World communism, in its expansionist aspect, just as any other expansionist movement, is considered a danger to peace and freedom. It appears, however, sometimes in the guise of a liberating movement. This problem has at times its military aspects but fundamentally we feel that it is a problem of winning the understanding and goodwill of the masses of the people. Unless the people have some hope in the future held out to them, they seek other remedies.

Tibet and Nepal

The fact that India is not prepared to exclude force in the defence of interests which it considers vital is perhaps best illustrated by two statements of the Prime Minister relating to India's northern frontiers. On November 20, Mr. Nehru told Parliament, in answer to a question, that India considers that the McMahon Line defines the boundary between India and Tibet and that India "will not allow anybody to come across that boundary". On December 6, when discussing the need for constitutional reforms in Nepal, he said: "The principal barrier to India (the Himalayas)

lies on the other side of Nepal and we are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier to be crossed or otherwise leads to a weakening of our frontiers."

On December 6, Mr. Nehru told Parliament that the marching of Chinese armies into Tibet came as a "surprise and a shock" to the Government of India and that India had gone on pressing China to halt her advance and settle the matter peacefully.

Indo-Pakistan Relations: Kashmir

In the series of letters between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan over the course of last year, both Prime Ministers gave assurances of their will to peace and of their resolve to work for peace with one another. Putting this idea in more positive form, Mr. Nehru told Parliament on March 28 that partition of the sub-continent "was approved by, or accepted, by us and it must remain . . . Therefore, one should recognize the fact that Pakistan and India are two independent neighbouring countries. Now from the economic point of view, from the political or any point of view, they should have close contact with each other."

Among the disputes now separating India and Pakistan, the problem of Kashmir is the most difficult and conspicuous. In setting forth the Indian Government's position on this matter Mr. Nehru told Parliament on March 28 that the accession of Kashmir to India arose from the Indian Independence Act and the negotiations that preceded it. The action was fully in accord with all that had happened with regard to the accession of many other states. The act of accession was accepted on behalf of the Crown by the then Governor General. Nevertheless, from the very beginning it had been declared Indian policy that the people of Kashmir should decide their future. Mr. Nehru argued that the fact that Pakistan had "committed aggression" and removed part of Kashmir from India's "factual control" did not alter the proposition that Kashmir was juridically and politically an integral part of the State of India. Furthermore, the Indian Prime Minister told a press conference on March 13, that while his country stood by "every single word" of its agreements with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in regard to a plebiscite, "we cannot break our pledges or betray the confidence reposed in us by refusing to provide the minimum security necessary for Kashmir, when there is always a danger of barbarous invasion. We cannot permit foreign troops of any kind to enter Kashmir. We cannot set aside the lawfully established government of popular elements which at present controls the greater part of Kashmir: but we are prepared now, as ever, to give every opportunity for a free determination by the people of Kashmir of their future". Mr. Nehru has rejected arbitration as a means of settling outstanding points of difference with regard to the demilitarization of Kashmir, because this procedure ignores the "basic facts" of the dispute.

The Commonwealth and the United States

India's relations with the Commonwealth as a whole have seldom in recent months been the subject of special definition or comment. On August 3, Mr. Nehru said: "We are friendly with the countries of the Commonwealth . . . and there is a constant stream of information going from one to the other. We agree on many matters and we disagree on some matters and we can disagree without doubting the other's *bona fides*." On February 12 he stated, with reference to the recent Prime Ministers' Conferences: "It was natural that the approaches of the different countries represented should not be identical; to some extent, each . . . perhaps emphasized some one aspect (of the problems) more than the other. But I should like to make it clear that there was, during these discussions, a very large measure of community of approach and objective. This was indeed very gratifying . . ."

On the same date Mr. Nehru referred to "the United States of America, that great nation, on whom a vast burden of responsibility has fallen and which is playing such a decisive part in world affairs today." He continued:

We have endeavoured to maintain the friendly relations that have happily existed between India and the United States and, in spite of differences of opinion, we shall continue to do so. There has been a great deal of criticism of our policy in the press and statements of prominent men in the United States. We welcome criticism and try to profit by it. We have not allowed this criticism to come in the way of our friendly feelings towards America, just as we cannot allow it to influence us in a direction which we consider unwise or wrong.

The United Nations

India's support for the principles of the United Nations has been often expressed. Specific mention should perhaps be made, however, of recent statements by Mr. Nehru which underline his conception of how that organization is meant to function. On August 3, 1950, he told Parliament that the United Nations was established "to bring . . . all the nations of the world together. The United Nations was never intended to be a group of nations thinking one way and excluding other nations . . ." On October 16 he said: "Any attempt to change the basic provisions of the Charter or to exclude a particular nation, has far-reaching results and we are opposed to it . . . We also do not agree with proposals to create separate armed forces on behalf of the United Nations in each country. This seemed to us a wrong approach. It seemed like converting the United Nations into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact and making it a war organization more than one devoted to international peace."

In spite of the shortcomings of the United Nations in the eyes of the Indian Prime Minister, he has specifically rejected the idea of withdrawing from that body, because of Security Council action over Kashmir. On March 28, he told Parliament that this would be a gesture that would have no meaning and that although the United Nations might have "gone wrong often enough" it would be a disaster to the world if the organization ceased to function. "We have," he said, "from the very beginning, looked up to the United Nations organization . . . because we felt that it was an organization, the basis of which was right, the object of which was right."

The opposition of the Indian Prime Minister to colonialism, mentioned earlier, in this article, has been repeatedly expressed by Indian representatives in the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. India has also indicated its strong opposition to racial discrimination. It has shown a special concern in the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. On December 6, Mr. Nehru put the matter in Parliament in the following terms:

As (they are) South African citizens, we have nothing to do with them politically . . . but it involves this question of racialism, because it involves self-respect . . . not only of India and the Indian people, but of every people in Asia and every people in the world, it has become a vital matter.

The Prime Minister has also attacked colonialism directly, with reference to the French and Portuguese possessions in India and has said on several occasions that India can "never tolerate" any foreign footholds remaining on Indian territory. Mr. Nehru has emphasized, however, his intention of pursuing a peaceful approach in relation to the problem of foreign possessions in India as in other matters. "The way we have proceeded . . .", he said on December 6, "shows . . . our enormous patience."

GIFT TO CANADA OF A HOBBEEMA PAINTING BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT

In June 1949 Mr. Pierre Dupuy, Canadian Ambassador to the Netherlands, was informed by the Netherlands Minister of Education that his Government wished to express the gratitude of the Netherlands for the role played by the Canadian forces in the liberation of their country, by presenting a well-known work of art to the Canadian Government and nation. The gift was also intended to express the gratitude of the Dutch people for Canadian hospitality to the Dutch Royal family during the war. The Netherlands Government requested that the gift be hung in one of the rooms of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa where it might readily be seen by visitors.

The works of several well-known Dutch artists were mentioned as suitable for the presentation. After consultation between the Director of the National Gallery of Canada, the Clerk of the House of Commons and Netherlands art experts, it was decided that the Canadian Government should accept a landscape by the seventeenth century Dutch artist Meindert Hobbema. The title of the painting is "The Two Water-mills".

The choice of the Hobbema painting was unanimously approved by both Chambers of the Netherlands Parliament in April 1950. In closing the brief debate the Prime Minister, Dr. W. Drees, said that his Government considered it desirable to express Holland's gratitude to the Canadian people for what they had sacrificed in the liberation of the Netherlands and for their generosity after the war. The Prime Minister also remarked that although no gift could match the sacrifice offered by the Canadian people, relinquishment of the masterpiece by Holland meant a sacrifice for the Dutch people and should be understood as such.

On July 4, 1950, the Hobbema painting was officially presented to the Canadian Ambassador by Queen Juliana at the Soestdijk Palace in The Hague. Before it was shipped to Canada, arrangements were made by the National Gallery of Canada to have suitable reproductions of the painting prepared by a Dutch art printing firm. These will be made available to the Canadian public in due course.

The painting arrived in Ottawa during February and was held in the vaults of the National Gallery while arrangements were made for the holding of a suitable ceremony of acceptance.

On Wednesday, March 14, in the Hall of Fame of the Parliament Buildings, the masterpiece was unveiled by Lieut. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, C.H., C.B., D.S.O., in the presence of the Governor General, the Ambassador of the Netherlands, and other dignitaries. The Governor General accepted the Hobbema painting on behalf of Canada and expressed the gratitude of this country for so generous a gift. In handing the masterpiece over for safekeeping to the Speaker of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Commons, His Excellency said that it forms a "symbolic and tangible expression to the bond between our two peoples. . . . What was once the national treasure of one nation has become the national treasure of two nations."

The Netherlands Ambassador to Canada, Mr. A. H. J. Lovink, said that he hoped "that Hobbema's masterpiece will continue to hang in this place for centuries to come as a tangible symbol of the lasting friendship between two countries".



PRESENTATION OF HOBBEEMA PAINTING

—Capital Press

Unveiling the gift of the Netherlands to Canada, "The Two Water-mills" by Meindert Hobbema, in the Hall of Fame of the Canadian Parliament Buildings is, above, General H. D. G. Crerar, who commanded the Canadian army of liberation. His Excellency A. H. J. Lovink, Ambassador of the Netherlands to Canada, also appears.

This mellow masterpiece of Hobbema, who is estimated as one of the greatest of landscape painters, is well-known to connoisseurs. Simple in composition, it gives an impression of freshness in its inimitable sun-lit atmosphere which has persisted since the first half of the seventeenth century, when the picture was painted.

A recurring theme in the work of this artist of the country side was a water-mill, such as these, set in pleasant woods. Another "Paysage et Moulin à eau" hangs in the Louvre in Paris. Rich in attractive details, his pictures have a unique charm; this outstanding example of his work will mark most memorably the close and happy relationship of the peoples of the Netherlands and Canada.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The recrossing of the 38th Parallel by United Nations troops

On March 20 Mr. Angus MacInnis (CCF, Vancouver East) brought to the attention of the House "the fact that for the second time communist forces in Korea have been driven to or across the 38th Parallel. I should like to know," Mr. MacInnis went on to say, "what action is to be taken by the United Nations forces when they reach the 38th Parallel on this occasion." Mr. MacInnis then set forth his views on this question, referring to previous discussions of it which have taken place in the House. The debate was subsequently joined by Mr. J. H. Ferguson (PC, Simcoe North), Mr. Victor Quelch (SC, Acadia), Mr. Alistair Stewart (CCF, Winnipeg North), Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (PC, Greenwood), Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggar), and Mr. Clarence Gillis (CCF, Cape Breton South). The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, then spoke in part as follows:

... The question that is in our minds, the question that has been brought up this afternoon, is not, as has been pointed out, entirely a military question. While it certainly has military significance, it has political as well. It is a question, if I may put it that way, of whether to cross or not to cross the 38th parallel. More accurately it is a question of whether to recross or not recross the 38th parallel.

There is a real difficulty from my point of view in dealing with this matter because at this moment, even this afternoon, informal discussions are going on in Washington with the other countries participating in the Korean campaign on the subject of what would be a proper political directive, if a directive should be issued, for the United Nations commander in Korea on this matter.

Although I do not think the United Nations has any right to fight General MacArthur's war, nevertheless it is our duty as members of the United Nations to lay down the political directives which would govern his operations. He is the first one to accept that fact. This question has come up before. . . . It came up last October when we were at the United Nations Assembly. We then took a decision which authorized General MacArthur to use his own judgment whether to cross this particular line or not to cross it. We certainly have no right to complain of the decision although I think it is true to say that one of the factors in a good many minds at that time leading up to the United Nations resolution was the hope, indeed the expectation, that the crossing of this line might not result in a rush for the Manchurian or Russian border. I am not disposed to criticize that decision by virtue of hindsight because it might have been a very tempting idea at that time to clean up the war completely. It did not work out that way.

... It certainly would be unwise and unfair to the commander and to the men in the field to tell the enemy exactly what we were going to do in a military way when we reached that particular line. I think that that certainly would be playing into the hands of those whom we do not wish to help. No doubt when the decision is taken it will be governed by both military and political considerations. From the military point of view, the first responsibility of the United Nations to its commander and to its forces is not to prevent him from taking action which he may consider it necessary to take to safeguard his men. I am sure that none of us would wish to do that.

... Although military considerations are important, political considerations are equally important, possibly more important. When a decision was taken last October to authorize the United Nations commander to cross this line if he saw fit, there were political reasons behind that decision as well as military. The political reasons were that the United Nations felt that it should authorize necessary action to liberate and unify all of Korea. That is what we hoped would happen as a result of that decision, but unfortunately it did not happen.

I think most of us saw in our minds at that time certain dangers in that decision. Those dangers turned out to be much greater than we had realized. Possibly we were wrong in not realizing that. Well, we are up against the same kind of situation now and at least we have the advantage of experience. I hope that this time we will take all the factors into consideration so that the decision will be both militarily and politically wise.


It looks at the present time as if the situation in Korea may result in what General Ridgway, the United Nations commander in Korea, has called a military stalemate. He made that statement the other day and it was received with great interest in a number of countries. I myself would prefer to think of the situation, not so much as a military stalemate but as a stabilization of the military position. We might even reach a position where we have a sort of *de facto* cease-fire. What do we do then? All I would say on that point . . . is that if we do reach the position of a sort of *de facto* cease-fire roughly along the line of the 38th parallel I think we should take advantage of that position, that military stabilization, to reopen negotiations with the people on the other side provided there is any possibility of that being brought about — and I have no illusions as to the difficulties on that score.

But if this position is to be stabilized in a way which now seems possible, it would surely be statesmanlike to take advantage of that position to see if we can work out the kind of settlement which will make it possible for us to extricate ourselves, as the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Macdonnell) has said, "with honour", from Korea, because Korea is not the main danger front. For that purpose it might be desirable to try to negotiate something along the lines of the six point proposal which was put forward by our own delegation at Lake Success after consultation with a good many other delegations. I know that that idea is in the minds of people now, and I hope that possibly we might be able to utilize a favourable military situation to bring about a favourable political situation. But there again we must never forget that it takes two to make peace although it sometimes takes only one to make war.

We have not very much ground for optimism that the Chinese communist government will meet us more than halfway in any effort of this kind. However, I hope that the opportunity may present itself, and that we may be able to work out some kind of solution which will make it possible to bring this horrible conflict in Korea to an end with honour to ourselves and with freedom and unity to the Korean people. As General Ridgway pointed out, it is not the obligation of the United Nations to unify Korea by force, but it is our obligation to do everything we can to bring about that unity. I should think that the best way in which it could be done would be by negotiation if that is possible.

The Good Offices Committee of the United Nations has already taken action in this direction. It has made an approach to the government in Peking but it has received no reply whatever to that approach. I would think that it would be unwise for us to despair because of that fact. There may be other avenues of approach; there may be other ways in which this can be done. We should certainly, I feel, use every possible opportunity to exploit every military advantage to achieve a political result which will end this conflict. If we can do that the objective of the United Nations in Korea will have been achieved, and something may have been gained out of the horrible carnage that has gone on there because it will at least have shown that the United Nations can act effectively on the battlefield and in the council chamber.

The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggan (Mr Coldwell) has said that we should use the experience we have gained in the Korean operation to work out a system of control under the North Atlantic organization by which the military is brought under appropriate international civilian control, the kind of control we take for granted in our own country. There has been difficulty about this in Korea but I would point out to those who emphasize the difficulty — and at times it is a difficulty which leads to some exasperation — that its basis is the fact that in the United Nations Korean operation about 95 per cent of the actual fighting in the field has been done by the forces of one country. Naturally the government of that country is going to exercise a preponderating influence in that operation, and we should be the last to criticize that. I think that on the whole we have very little to complain about the consultation which we have managed to achieve at Lake Success and in Washington on this matter.



—United Nations

CANADA CONTRIBUTES TO KOREAN AND PALESTINE RELIEF PROGRAMMES

Mr. J. W. Holmes, Acting Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, presents to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, a cheque for \$8,000,000 as Canada's contribution to the United Nations relief and rehabilitation programme in Korea and Palestine. Of the total amount, \$7,250,000 is earmarked for Korea, and \$750,000 for Palestine.

The translation of the results of that consultation to the commanders across the Pacific is not always as effective or as easy as we would like it to be, but I suggest that is largely because of the nature of the operation. We are working along different lines in the North Atlantic Organization and we are building up not only a military organization which will be effective, we hope, in preventing war, but a political organization which will be able to control, as civilian governments should control, the military arm. . . . I should like to repeat once again that as we approach a decision on this matter in Korea—and we are approaching that—I hope that decision will be both politically and militarily wise.

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Korea

The House of Commons on March 19 went into committee of supply. Under the heading "Terminable Services", Item 582 concerned a contribution of \$7,250,000 for the United Nations relief and rehabilitation programme for Korea. Regarding this item, Mr. S. H. Knowles (CCF, Winnipeg North Centre) asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Is that the first amount that we have been asked to vote for rehabilitation in Korea? What is the total amount being undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations? Can the minister give some comment as to the nature of the programme and as to what progress is being made?

Mr. Pearson replied in part:

... At the last session of the General Assembly a resolution was passed providing for a programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea where of course the need is very great and getting greater every day. A committee of the Assembly discussed

this matter at great length and a United Nations Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea was set up. That organization drew up a plan of action and reported back to the United Nations. Its plan was also very carefully considered by the Economic and Social Council. It is estimated that about \$250 million will be required to meet the immediate needs. That of course will not begin to cover the whole problem of rehabilitation.

... This was some weeks ago. Of course there has been more damage done since that time, and there have been more refugees moving south. It was felt that \$250 million might see the organization through the immediate period of relief. Our delegation at that time thought it would be most desirable if this amount could be raised by assessment of all members on the basis of their proportions of contribution to the United Nations itself. We were not able to get sufficient support for that idea but a committee was set up to try to raise this money on some equitable and proportionate basis. As a result a high proportion of the \$250 million has now been earmarked by various governments.

We felt that as a government we might ask parliament to agree to appropriate an amount which would be roughly proportionate to our share of the United Nations budget. For that reason we are asking approval for this estimate of \$7,250,000 for Korean relief. The organization to supervise the expenditure of this money has been set up. The Director-General of the organization is Mr. Kingsley, who has been Director-General of the International Refugee Organization. He has been to Korea and has made arrangements that these relief supplies should be distributed through the Unified Command while operations are going on. We hope that this effort will be successful because there is no part of the world now where relief is more urgently needed than in Korea.

Mr. Pearson then provided a partial list of the different nations contributing to the fund. In response to a question asked by Mr. A. J. Brooks (PC, Royal) it was pointed out that the communist nations were not contributing to the fund. The following exchange then took place:

MR. KNOWLES: (CCF, Winnipeg North Centre): I take it that thus far the money has been spent mainly on medical supplies, food, clothing and other things necessary for immediate relief. Do the terms of the resolution voted by the United Nations envisage going on with a programme of rehabilitation if and when the shooting is over?

MR. PEARSON: Yes. This is a programme of relief and rehabilitation but the funds that are being raised now will not be sufficient even to cover the immediate cost of relief.

MR. LOW (SC, Peace River): Is there any possibility of Russia and her satellites making a contribution eventually to this rehabilitation fund?

MR. PEARSON: They have been given the opportunity but they have not seen fit to take advantage of it, and I think it a highly unlikely contingency that they will contribute.

Mr. J. F. Pouliot (L, Temiscouata) later asked on what basis the amount of \$7,250,000 had been computed, and Mr. Pearson replied:

The amount requested by the United Nations was \$250 million. Our proportion of the expenses of the United Nations has been laid down as 3.2 per cent, and the application of that principle to this amount gave us roughly this figure.

On other aspects of Korean relief Mr. Pearson said:

... (This relief and rehabilitation) will apply to all that part of Korea which is under United Nations and republican Korean control. At present, of course, that does not include any territory north of the 38th parallel.

... There is a very great deal of relief work being carried on for several hundred thousands of these people. That is being done by the military authorities as part of military relief. It is also true, I think, that there have been some voluntary contributions to Korea, and that the Red Cross is helping out there under arrangements with the Unified Command. So far the relief has been largely military, however.

... I ... know some thousands (of refugees) have been taken to islands not far from Korea and looked after there in relief establishments. There again, those establishments have been kept up by the military authorities at their expense, and by and large that means at the expense of the United States. So far relief has been almost entirely military, and it has covered many thousands in Korean refugees, some of whom are in these island camps.

... The U.S.S.R. and the satellite states were invited to appear before this committee which was arranging for relief contributions and give some assurance that they would participate in this work. Naturally they refused to take any part in it. That is what one might have expected. They disclaimed all responsibility for this work because, again as one might have expected, they claimed it was due to the aggressive policies of the United States and other countries that this relief was necessary. Therefore, in their estimation, that relieved them of responsibility.

... Any rehabilitation or reconstruction which is incidental to military operation no doubt will be carried on by the military. It is hoped that this United Nations agency will have responsibility not only for relief but for civilian rehabilitation and reconstruction afterwards, but of course that will depend upon the resources made available to the agency. At the present time they are seeking only \$250 million. That may seem a large amount of money, but it is not large in terms of the needs of the people of Korea, and I doubt very much if any great portion of that will be available for anything but immediate needs.

Canadians in China

On March 12 Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel) directed the following question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

... Can the minister tell us whether he has any late reports dealing with the subject of Canadian citizens still in Red China, and whether it is possible for Canadian citizens to leave that country freely for Canada if they so desire?

Mr. Pearson replied as follows:

We have information in my department through the United Kingdom authorities in Peking, which information has been transmitted to us through London, and also information from other sources, that certain Canadians have been detained by the government in Peking. We have asked the United Kingdom authorities in China to look into the cases that have been brought to our attention and to do everything they can to afford those Canadians protection. Since we ourselves have no diplomatic representation in China, on this occasion we are dependent upon the good offices of the United Kingdom diplomatic service; and, as always, they are only too anxious to help, as I hope we would help if the circumstances were reversed.

On the general question of the position of Canadians in China, I would not like to say anything at this moment without more consideration; but I can tell the hon. member for Peel that Canadians are leaving China at the present time. Delays have been put in their way but of those who wish to return to Canada some are getting out of China. I may be able to give him more particulars on that aspect of the matter shortly.

On March 19 Mr. E. D. Fulton (PC, Kamloops) asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs what steps were being taken by the Canadian Government in the light of the reported arrest by the present government of China of five missionary sisters on obviously trumped-up charges. Mr. Pearson replied in part that "on the face of it, it would appear the charges have been made for communist propaganda purposes of the kind with which we have become all too familiar in recent years".

The next day, March 20, the question was again raised by Mr. J. F. Pouliot (L, Temiscouata) and Mr. Pearson made the following statement:

... Attacks have recently been made in the Chinese communist press in Canton, Peking and Hong Kong against Canadian nuns of the Order of the Immaculate Conception who conduct the Orphanage of the Holy Child in Canton.

Typical charges made against the nuns are as follows:

1. Far from pursuing acts of charity they are guilty of inhuman acts against the children in their charge.

2. The orphanage is a typical example of an imperialist charity organization, operation of which would not be tolerated by the Chinese people.

3. Since the communist liberation of Canton the orphanage had admitted a total of 2,251 infants, of whom 2,116, or 94 per cent, have died in the institution to date.

4. This mortality rate reflects fully on the irresponsible attitude adopted by the sisters in the care of the infants.

This information, which we received from unofficial sources — that is the information as to these charges — has been confirmed by telegram from our high commissioner in London, who secured the confirmation from the United Kingdom authorities, who of course are represented in China.

A letter from the orphanage in Canton, dated March 5, has been received by the Mother Superior in Montreal. The nuns reported that the orphanage had been taken over by the Chinese authorities and that the Canadian nuns were to be deported to Hong Kong. There has been no official confirmation of newspaper reports of their arrest. The United Kingdom foreign office has been requested by the Canadian government to ask the United Kingdom chargé d'affaires in Peking to do everything possible to assist these nuns who apparently have been the victims of grotesque and unfounded charges.

The Passamaquoddy Tidal Project

In reply to a question asked by Mr. A. W. Stuart (L, Charlotte) on March 8, Mr. Pearson made the following reply concerning the report of the International Joint Commission, on this project:

... The International Joint Commission made its report to the two governments on October 23, 1950, recommending that a further investigation would be necessary to enable it to make recommendations concerning the feasibility of the Passamaquoddy project, and has estimated that such an investigation would cost \$3,900,000. The report suggests that the cost might be apportioned between the two countries in proportion to the benefits that each country would derive from the completed project. This report is still under study by the interested federal authorities, and has been referred to the Government of New Brunswick.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

On March 19, the House of Commons being in committee of supply, the following item was considered:

The Canadian government's assessment for membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, further amount required, \$109,000.

In the course of the ensuing debate, which was joined by Messrs. P. E. Wright (CCF, Melfort), H. H. Hatfield (PC, Victoria Carlton), G. C. Nowlan (PC, Annapolis Kings) and J. F. Pouliot (L, Temiscouata), Mr. Pearson spoke in part as follows:

... The Food and Agriculture Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations which deals with food and agricultural questions. Its membership consists of approximately 70 states, each with one vote in the conference or in the governing body which meets between conferences. The FAO is divided into technical divisions, of which I think there are seven. There are the divisions on agriculture, distribution, commerce, statistics, forestry and fisheries products, nutrition and rural welfare.

These divisions provide a wide range of fact-finding and advisory services designed to furnish information to the member states and to help them in the formulation of their agricultural policies. Canada has a real interest in the technical informa-


tion obtained from these various divisions. I believe the Department of Agriculture feels that useful services are being performed by them.

The FAO has been in existence for five years and during that period had established statistical services in the field of food, agriculture, forestry and fisheries which have been of use to our government and to the provincial agricultural services. The organization has also collected a great deal of technical information in these fields which has been made available to us and which has been of special assistance in the development of the agriculture of backward countries.

... I would point out that there are no countries behind the iron curtain which are members of the Food and Agriculture Organization. They have all withdrawn from that organization and are not now receiving any assistance from it.

... The budget of this organization has been fixed this year by the United Nations at \$5,000,000, and Canada's contribution is 4.11 per cent, which is slightly lower than the figure of 4.5 per cent, for last year. Our proportion on that basis would be roughly \$205,500 U.S. or \$217,000 Canadian.

The organization decided this year to move its headquarters from Washington to Rome and some additional expenditures must be made immediately. We, along with other countries, have been requested to make the contribution on next year's assessment available at as early a date as possible and this item is one-half of next year's contribution . . .



PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE VISITS OTTAWA

The President of the Republic of France, M. Vincent Auriol, visited Ottawa, Toronto, Quebec and Montreal, April 5-8. He is pictured above at a reception held by the Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons. Left to right: Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. W. Ross MacDonald; the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent; M. Auriol; Speaker of the Senate, Mr. Elie Beauregard; Senator Norman P. Lambert; and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Robert Schuman. It is anticipated that further material relating to the President's visit will appear in "External Affairs" for May.

THE INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS CONFERENCE

Soon after the outbreak of war in Korea, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other countries of the free world became acutely aware of the immediate necessity of increasing their military preparedness to a level which would discourage countries of the communist bloc from further aggression. In the ensuing nine months large rearmament programmes have been planned and an increasing percentage of national incomes have been allocated to defence. One of the most serious results of the rearmament programmes and the fear of war has been the emergence of a critical shortage of certain essential raw materials. A sharp rise in raw material prices has accompanied the shortages.

Initially, the shortages were caused partly by an increase in industry requirements, but to a large extent they were the result of speculative buying in the expectation of rising prices, and some stock-piling for strategic reasons. As defence production proceeded, however, real shortages began to appear.

The first countries to experience difficulties were the countries of Western Europe, as most of them had only very low stocks of most raw materials in the summer of 1950. Unless unemployment was to occur in Europe, with its accompanying political danger, working stocks had to be rebuilt and adequate supplies ensured for the future. For this reason the Organization for European Economic Co-operation began to take a very active interest in the world raw material shortage. Added to the problem of physical shortage was the danger that the excessively high prices paid for certain raw materials might upset the financial stability which, by June 1950, Western Europe had to a large degree achieved.

At the same time that OEEC was considering the problem, NATO also became concerned about the shortages because of their effect on rearmament. Because of their geographical limitations neither of these regional organizations was able to develop a comprehensive approach to the problem: it was evident the raw materials problem was a world problem.

Tripartite Group Established

When Mr. Attlee, after consulting the French Premier, flew to Washington in December 1950, he discussed the now critical raw materials problem with Mr. Truman. It was decided there that a Tripartite Group, to consist of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, should be established in Washington. This body, which has since become known as "The Central Group" of the "International Materials Conference" was given the task of determining which materials were in sufficiently short supply to warrant the setting up of standing committees to study them and to decide what countries should be members of each of the commodity groups. The membership of these commodity committees was to be determined on a statistical basis by which the leading producing and consuming countries which, in total, accounted for 80 per cent of the production and consumption of the individual commodities were to be invited. The position of countries which were not invited to attend the standing committees was not at first made clear, but such countries have since been informed that they may submit written memoranda on their requirements to the committees and attend meetings to support their memoranda. The reason for limiting the size of the committees was to keep them to a manageable size so that the commodity studies could be carried out expeditiously.

On February 24 the Central Group announced the establishment in Washington of the following standing commodity committees:

February 26, Copper, Zinc and Lead Committee,
March 1, Sulphur Committee,
March 5, Cotton and Cotton Linters Committee,
March 8, Tungsten and Molybdenum Committee,
March 12, Manganese, Nickel and Cobalt Committee,
April 2, Wool Committee.

Canada is a member of all but the Tungsten and Molybdenum Committee and the Wool Committee. An additional Committee on Pulp and Paper products will be established in the near future. Canada, as a major producer, has been invited to be a member.

The Canadian Government has appointed Mr. S. V. Allen, Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, as its principal representative to attend meetings of the commodity groups of the International Materials Conference. Mr. M. P. Carson, Assistant Commercial Secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, was named as his alternate. Commodity experts attend as required.

Towards the end of January proposals were put forward for an increase in the size of the Central Group. It was felt in some quarters that the Tripartite Group was not sufficiently representative of major producing and consuming areas. After some discussion it was agreed to expand the Central Group to ten members: to include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Italy and representatives from the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and the Organization of American States. The first meeting of the enlarged group took place on February 21. Although enlarged, the Central Group is still considered as a servicing mechanism for the standing commodity groups. It is not a policy-making group, and after setting up the standing groups, does not have any further control over them.

The terms of reference of the Standing Commodity Committees are to consider and recommend to governments the specific action which should be taken in the case of each commodity to expand production, increase availabilities, conserve supplies, and assure most effective distribution and utilization of supplies among consuming countries. The standing groups are entirely autonomous bodies which decide individually their method of procedure. They do not report to any existing international organization nor to the Central Group. They do not have any method of enforcing their decisions, but can only recommend action to governments.

It is too early to judge how successful this new machinery for solving the raw materials problem will be. Any success that it may have will depend on the co-operation of all producing and consuming countries. When the bulk of a particular commodity is produced in one or two countries with similar political and defence interests, a rational distribution is relatively easier than when commodities are produced in a large number of countries whose defence and political interests vary.

The International Materials Conference is an attempt to solve the raw materials problem in a comprehensive way. Country representation appears adequate, but not so broad as to make the committees unwieldy. The representatives of the member countries have before them the delicate problem of arranging international co-operation by mutual consent in a world where economic and political interests diverge widely. However, failure to reach a basis for co-operation may lead to serious dislocation of industry, to unemployment due to regional shortages of raw materials, to continuation of the threat to financial stability caused by excessive increases in the prices of these materials, and to interruption of defence programmes.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Twelfth Session of the Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council held its Twelfth Session in Santiago de Chile from February 20 to March 21. This was the first occasion on which the Council had met elsewhere than at the United Nations Headquarters in New York or in Geneva and the first time any major organ of the United Nations had held a session in Latin America. The tremendous publicity given in the local press to the Council proceedings indicated a high degree of interest on the part of the Chilean public in the work of the United Nations, and it was unfortunate that this particular session was marked by an aggressive propaganda campaign which not only delayed and hampered the conduct of business, but which distracted attention from the constructive economic and social work which is the function of the Council. The only interest of the Cominform members, the U.S.S.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia, was to make political capital out of every issue and to use the Council as a forum for their propaganda in Latin America. Their charges were so extreme and their tactics so obvious that they created an unfavourable impression among intelligent Chileans, and it seems quite likely that the cause of Communism in Latin America suffered from the over-zeal of its missionaries.

Many of the items on the agenda for the Twelfth Session, as is usual in the winter session of the Council, dealt with routine matters or were in the nature of progress reports on such continuing programmes as Technical Assistance and UNICEF. On the economic side, the most important items were those relating to the annual review of the world economic situation and the problem of the financing of economic development.

Resolution Adopted

The under-developed countries were clearly worried over the possible detrimental effects on their own economy of the accelerated defence programmes of the more advanced countries and were anxious that their problems in this regard be recognized and that adequate measures be taken to avoid serious disequilibrium. After an exhaustive general debate and considerable discussion in committee, divergent views were reconciled and a resolution adopted which received unanimous support except for the Soviet bloc. This resolution recognizes the difficulties being encountered by under-developed countries with regard to shortages of needed imports, lower levels of investment, scarcity of capital goods and new inflationary pressures resulting from the present international situation. At the same time it recommends to member governments increased production and equitable distribution of essential consumer goods and raw materials; the taking of necessary anti-inflationary measures as long as inflationary pressures exist; and the taking of measures, direct or indirect, to regulate at equitable levels and relationships the prices of essential goods.

The question of the financing of economic development is under constant review by the Economic and Social Council and one of its functional commissions, the Economic, Employment and Development Commission. At the Twelfth Session of the Council it was agreed that since subsidiary bodies were making special studies on related problems, definite action by the Council should not be taken until the findings of these bodies were available to governments, and it was therefore decided, after considerable discussion both in plenary session and in committee, that the problem should be deferred until the next session of the Council but that in the meantime the Economic, Employment and Development Commission which is scheduled to meet in May, should be requested to give priority to the consideration of the question of financing of economic development. Moreover, it was agreed that be-

cause of the importance of the subject, and in consideration of the very heavy agenda for the next session of the Council, the Economic Committee should meet one week before the opening of the Thirteenth Session for the specific purpose of examining this problem and drafting recommendations to the Council.

On the social side, the most important action of the Council was to agree to the establishment of a joint UN-ILO commission of enquiry to survey the field of forced labour. The subject of forced labour, which was first introduced by the American Federation of Labor some three years ago, has been on the Council agenda almost continuously since that time and a great deal of convincing evidence pointing to the existence of large-scale forced labour systems behind the Iron Curtain has been produced by the United Kingdom and United States Governments, by the A. F. of L. and subsequently the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. All efforts over the past years to induce the Soviet Union and other countries behind the Iron Curtain to co-operate in an impartial enquiry to establish the true facts by an on-the-spot investigation have failed. As a second-best alternative, the Council at its meeting in Santiago agreed to the establishment of a joint commission composed of three to five members to be appointed by the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the ILO, to conduct studies based first of all on legislative texts and administrative regulations and their application in practice. A great deal of documentary material of this type is already available, and when the Commission has examined these documents it can then determine whether further evidence, including oral testimony, would be useful. Although the most grave charges have been levelled against the Soviet Union and certain governments of Eastern Europe for the maintenance under government sponsorship of large scale forced labour camps, the UN-ILO commission of enquiry will, of course, not be restricted to any particular geographical area in its survey of the nature and extent of forced labour at the present time.

At the Santiago Session, the Council re-elected its President, Hernan Santa Cruz of Chile, and its First Vice-President, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India, and elected Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia as Second Vice-President, all three officers to serve for the year 1951. Canada, which served on the Agenda Committee for the year 1950, was elected to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organization for the year 1951.

Collective Measures Committee

The Collective Measures Committee, which was established under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, held its first three meetings during March. In the course of these meetings the Committee has dealt with such matters as the election of its officers, and has considered in general terms the best way of approaching the tasks allotted to it. Most of its fourteen members have set forth their views on the objectives which the Committee might usefully pursue, and a sub-committee of five members (Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia) has been set up to produce a plan of work and to advise on the priority to be given to the various projects before the Committee.

In establishing the sub-committee, the parent body drew attention to certain clearly defined projects which had been specified in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Among these was the provision in Section C of the resolution whereby member states were to inform the Collective Measures Committee of the military forces which they could make available for United Nations employment against aggression. The sub-committee is to consider the advisability of addressing a communication to member states asking them to report on the steps which they have taken to comply with this provision. A second requirement, which the sub-committee will presumably examine is also specified in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. It relates to the appointment by the Secretary-General of a panel of military experts who could be made available on request to member states wishing to obtain technical advice



—United Nations

UNICEF MILK FOR GUATEMALA

A barrel of powdered milk is supplied to the village of Argueta, Guatemala, by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, as part of its child feeding programme.

on the organization and training of their United Nations contingents. As the Collective Measures Committee is required to approve the appointments made by the Secretary-General, the sub-committee will presumably study the appropriate size of the panel's membership, the range of qualifications needed by its members, and whether recommendations on these details should be drawn to the Secretary-General's attention for his guidance in making the appointments.

In addition to these specific matters on which the sub-committee will be expected to report, is the broader question of sanctions. At the request of the full committee, the Secretariat has prepared a comprehensive list of the possible measures, moral, diplomatic, economic, financial, and military, which might be taken against an aggressor or in support of a victim of aggression. This list has been placed in the hands of the sub-committee, which has been asked to recommend the projects which should be given priority.

It is too early to predict on what particular topics the sub-committee will advise the Collective Measures Committee to concentrate its attention. Such problems as the formation of an international legion, and the question of the relationship between United Nations collective security arrangements and regional defence machinery,

will no doubt come under examination. Even at this early stage, however, it is clear that many members have misgivings as to the practicability of organizing a supranational military legion under the United Nations, and there are similar indications of reluctance to have the Collective Measures Committee enter the realm of strategic planning.

Nevertheless, there seems to be general agreement that the Committee will make a positive contribution to the United Nations collective security system if it can produce a set of papers reviewing the whole field of sanctions as they might be applied in the event of a future breach of the peace. Studies of this kind might serve as a timely reminder to member states of their responsibilities for collective action under the United Nations. Furthermore, with League of Nations research in this field and Korean experience to draw upon, the Committee could perform a valuable function by detailing, for the guidance of member states, the many different spheres in which useful national contributions could be made to United Nations action against aggression.

Location of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly

At a plenary meeting held on March 20, 1951, the General Assembly decided that its Sixth Session would open in Paris not later than November 6.

The Assembly had already adopted on December 14, 1950, a proposal to hold the Session in Europe and had instructed the Secretary-General and the President of the Assembly to select the city most suitable and to make the appropriate arrangements. Canada has voted against this resolution, principally for reasons of economy and administrative convenience.

In accordance with the Assembly's decision of December 14, and after consultation with the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-General personally conducted a survey of facilities in Geneva, Paris, London and a number of other cities in France and the United Kingdom. During his tour he held discussions with the Swiss, French and United Kingdom Governments. Geneva was soon removed from the list of possibilities, and early in February the United Kingdom Government announced its inability to make available London or any other city in the United Kingdom for the 1951 meetings. Meanwhile, the French Government also announced that it had decided against inviting the Assembly to meet in Paris.

Having been unsuccessful in finding a suitable site, the President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General made it known early in February that they favoured abandoning the original plan of holding the Session in Europe. When the Assembly met to discuss the problem on February 13, however, the Bolivian Representative announced that he had information that a resolution had been introduced in the French National Assembly asking the French Government to extend an invitation to the Assembly to hold its Sixth Session in Paris. The General Assembly thereupon decided to withhold final decision until March 10 to give the French Government an opportunity to consider the matter and make its decision known. This interval was later extended by approximately a week on account of the French political crisis. On March 17, the French Delegation in New York informed the Secretary-General that Paris would in fact be available, but on certain specific conditions: the Assembly should not meet before November 6, 1951; in case of a "split Session" the General Assembly should be continued in Paris until its termination in January or February, if necessary; and the United Nations should share the cost of the extra expenditure involved.

On March 20, a meeting of the General Assembly was called to study this new proposal. The President of the Assembly submitted a resolution according to which the Assembly would accept the French invitation to meet in Paris but not later than

November 6, and provided that the total estimated cost of the Session would not exceed the amount of \$2,350,400 already allocated for this purpose in the 1951 Budget, "plus such additional amounts as may be authorized by transfer from other sections of the 1951 Budget". The latter part of the resolution was questioned by a number of delegations on the grounds that it was too vague and did not give adequate assurances regarding the financial implications of holding the Session in Paris. However, the resolution was finally adopted by a roll-call vote of 24 in favour, 17 against (including Canada) and 12 abstentions. Canada did not intervene in the debate but voted against the resolution for the same reasons as it had opposed the earlier resolution of December 14, 1950.*

Trusteeship Council

The Eighth Session of the Trusteeship Council completed its work on March 16, 1951. The proceedings were marked by a less critical attitude on the part of the non-administering members and as a result, except for the usual attacks by the Soviet Representative, the Council has worked in a much improved atmosphere over previous sessions.

The question of granting to Italy, as the authority responsible for the administration of Somaliland, "full participation" in the work of the Council, is perhaps the most important issue which has been raised at the current session. After having voted to admit Italy to participate in the debate on items affecting Somaliland, the Council adopted an Argentine resolution pointing out the desirability of assuring the full participation of the Italian Government in all aspects of its work, and requesting the General Assembly to include the matter in the agenda of its Sixth Session.

Meanwhile the change of administration in the trust territory of Somaliland seems to be proceeding smoothly, and the Italian Administrator has already implemented many of the provisions of the trusteeship agreement. The Territorial Council, which has been appointed by the Administrator from lists submitted by competent bodies and the main political parties, held its first meeting in Mogadiscio on January 29, 1951. The Council is composed of 35 members, of whom 28 are Somalis, two Italians, two Arabs, one is a representative of the Indo-Pakistan community, and two are representatives of economic interests. It is appointed for one year and will hold three sessions, with a permanent committee sitting during the intervals. It will be consulted by the Administrator on all important questions, except foreign policy and defence, and will eventually be replaced by an elective legislature, which, it is intended, will form the nucleus of the future parliament of Somaliland when the territory becomes independent.


Among other steps taken at its recent session, the Council set up a Special Committee to study the prevailing policies, laws and practices relating to the question of land tenure in the trust territories. This problem is a very complex one; and in particular the policy of the administering authorities with regard to the transfer of land to non-indigenous inhabitants has in the past been severely criticized. The new Committee will take into account the present and future needs of the indigenous people as well as the economic requirements of the trust territories, and report before the end of the next session of the Council.

The Council also discussed a series of recommendations made by the Assembly, among them two resolutions concerning technical assistance for trust territories, and the form which the Council's annual reports should take. This latter question, contrary to expectations, was not debated at great length. The problem of corporal punishment in trust territories resulted in longer discussion and led to a debate on

*See *External Affairs* for January 1951, p. 28.

the constitutional relationship between the Council and the Assembly. The Soviet Representative availed himself of this opportunity to raise once more the question of whether the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly were binding on the Trusteeship Council. He stated that in his view the administering authorities were obliged to carry out the terms of the Assembly resolution on the abolition of corporal punishment. The representative of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, however, took exception to his interpretation and he then reversed his statement to say that "the U.S.S.R. had never taken the position that the Assembly resolutions were obligatory." The Council merely took note of the Assembly resolution.

The Council decided on the itinerary and composition of the visiting mission which will go this year to the trust territories in East Africa (Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika and Italian Somaliland). The mission will include representatives of the Dominican Republic, New Zealand, Thailand and the United States, and will probably visit the territories between August and October 1951. China, New Zealand, Thailand and the United States were appointed to serve on the Council's Standing Committee on Administrative Unions, established in July 1950.



SPECIAL FORCE AT FORT LEWIS

Six thousand troops of the Canadian Army Special Force led by Brigadier J. M. Rockingham, Commanding Officer of the 25th Infantry Brigade, took part in a ceremonial parade held at Fort Lewis, Washington, for Lt. General G. G. Simonds, Chief of the General Staff.

—National Defence

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

Canada and the United Nations, 1950, Department of External Affairs, Conference Series 1950 No. 1.
The King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada. (Price 50 cents).

Canada and the United Nations, 1950 is a comprehensive survey of the activities and accomplishments during 1950 of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, and of the participation by Canada in their work. It contains articles on each of the main political, economic and social subjects dealt with by the General Assembly and the Security Council. There are also articles on each of the Specialized Agencies, on the commissions of the Economic and Social Council and on legal, administrative and financial matters. The report is designed to give the reader an understanding of the kind of problems with which the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies have been faced during 1950; of the policies followed by Canadian representatives with respect to those problems; and of the reasons for the policies and the significance of the decisions reached. This book has been written as much for the general reader, who does not have a wide knowledge of United Nations affairs, as for the student or specialist.

Canada and the United Nations, 1950 opens with an analytical preface by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs. In this preface, Mr. Pearson assessed the achievements of the United Nations, as well as the limitations under which it operated during 1950, the most difficult period through which it has passed in its short lifetime. He concludes with these words:

In this time of crisis in the United Nations, it is essential that the Free World maintain its principles, while at the same time recognizing and making allowance for the limitations upon its power and resources. We must make clear that we are firmly opposed to aggression of all kinds and that if at times we are unable to meet aggression with the firmness we would wish, it is because we do not yet possess the arms to do so. We should not be ashamed to profess at the same time that the principal purpose of the United Nations is to make peace rather than wage war, and that we must, therefore, no matter how strong we may become, be prepared with patience and imagination to prolong our efforts to reach a settlement.

Undoubtedly the aggression in Korea, which directly affected the lives of so many people, has made the general public much more aware of the United Nations. Canadian troops are fighting in Korea side by side with those of many other countries. In its leading article on Korea this book tries to explain the background of the Korean crisis and the political and military developments which took place from the morning of June 25 until the end of 1950. Following the Korean article, there are articles on such subjects as Formosa, the former Italian colonies, Palestine, Greece, Spain and Kashmir. The first chapter of the report also includes a comprehensive article entitled "Peace and Security Proposals" which deals with the measures which the General Assembly took during its Fifth Session to ensure that the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace will not be abdicated because of the failure of the Security Council to agree on collective measures to resist aggression.

Chapter II of the report is concerned with economic and social matters. It opens with a survey of the work of the Economic and Social Council and this is followed by articles on what the United Nations has done, or is planning to do, to help the victims of the Korean war; to help other under-developed countries, through technical assistance and other means, to raise their standard of living; and to help to feed and clothe the children of poorer countries through the International Children's Emergency Fund.

The Specialized Agencies are each given individual treatment in an effort to show the reader how much valuable and often little-publicized work is being done

by these autonomous bodies operating within the United Nations system. The report is rounded out with chapters on dependent territories, and on the legal, administrative and financial questions with which the United Nations has been concerned during the past year. The appendix contains some of the more important resolutions and extracts from statements by Canadian representatives. In addition, there is a chart showing the structure of the United Nations and a list of members of the more important organs. To enable the reader to follow the Korean article, a map has been reproduced in the appropriate section. There are also maps of Kashmir and the former Italian colonies.

The French language version entitled "Le Canada et les Nations Unies" will be reviewed in the May issue of *Affaires Extérieures*.

Other Publications

(Obtainable at the King's Printer at the price indicated).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 5: Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Extension of Port Privileges to Halibut Fishing Vessels on the Pacific Coasts of the United States of America and Canada. Signed at Ottawa, March 24, 1950. Price, 10 cents. (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 14: Agreement between Canada and New Zealand relating to Air Transport. Signed at Wellington, August 16, 1950. Price, 15 cents. (Bilingual).

Treaty Series, 1950, No. 15: Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America giving Formal Effect to the "Statement of Principles for Economic Co-operation". Signed at Washington, October 26, 1950. Price, 10 cents. (Bilingual).

Canadian Representatives Abroad and Representatives of Other Countries in Canada, March 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

The: The King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada

I wish to receive (Copy) of:
(Copies)

Canada and the United Nations, 1950, Conference Series, 1950, No. 1
(Price 50c.)

Canada and the United Nations, 1949, Conference Series, 1949, No. 1
(Price 50c.)

Canada and the United Nations, 1948, Conference Series, 1948, No. 1
(Price 50c.)

Canada and the United Nations, 1947, Conference Series, 1947, No. 1
(Price 50c.)

I enclose a remittance in the amount of \$....., payable to the Receiver-General of Canada.

Name.....

Mailing Address.....

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. J. R. McKinney was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation in Yugoslavia, effective March 18, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Mr. Alfonso Arias-Schreiber, Third Secretary, Embassy of Peru, February 22. Mr. Arias-Schreiber is married.

Captain Luis J. Cornes, Naval Attaché, Embassy of Argentina, March 2.

Mr. D. R. Kawatra, Third Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for India, March 9. Mr. Kawatra is married.

Departures

Mr. B. P. Adarkar, Commercial Counsellor, Office of the High Commissioner for India, February 28.

Vice-Admiral Luis F. Merlo Flores, Naval Attaché, Embassy of Argentina, March 1.

Colonel José Kahl, Jr., Assistant Air Attaché, Embassy of Brazil, March 15.

Mr. Mikhail V. Degtiar, Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, left Ottawa on February 29 for the Soviet Union on leave. During his absence, Mr. Leonid Teplov, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

For reasons of economy, the office of the Commercial Counsellor to the High Commissioner for India located in the Royal Bank Building, Toronto, was closed effective March 1, 1951. Trade matters are now being dealt with by the High Commissioner's Office in Ottawa.

CONSULAR

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Dr. Joachim-Friedrich Ritter as Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa, March 12.

Dr. Wolf-Dietrich Weiss as Vice-Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa, March 12.

Mr. Cyrus B. Follmer as Consul of the United States of America at Calgary, March 14. Mr. Follmer was previously Consul at Ottawa.

Mr. Charles Francis Stoppani as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, March 14.

Mr. George A. Berkley as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, March 14. Mr. Berkley was previously Vice-Consul at Hamilton.

Mr. Warren L. Swope as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Saint John, N.B., March 20.

Mr. José Luis Ceron as Consul of Spain at Montreal, March 29.

Departures

Mr. William A. Mitchell, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Saint John, N.B., March 2.

Mr. Stanley T. Hayes, Vice-Consul of the

United States of America at Montreal, March 6.

Mr. J. William Henry, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, March 13.

Mr. Alfredo Teixeira Valladao, Consul of Brazil at Toronto, end of March.

Mr. Arnaldo Caviglia resumed his duties as Vice-Consul of Argentina at Halifax, March 2. Mr. Jose Vicente Ayestaran who was in charge of the Consulate during Mr. Caviglia's absence has returned to Quebec City and resumed his duties there as Vice-Consul.

Mr. Jorge Romero, Consul General of Peru at Montreal, left on March 10 for a period of three months on leave. During his absence, Mr. Mariano de Yturralde, Consul General of Spain in that city, will look after the consular interests of Peru.

Mr. Guillermo F. Mejia, Vice-Consul of Argentina at Montreal will be in charge of the Consulate General in that city pending the appointment of a successor to Mr. Pedro Bonnefon, former Consul General.

The address of the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa is now: 580 Chapel Street, telephone number 2-1102.

New Appointment

Mr. B. B. Rae, Trade Commissioner for New Zealand at Montreal, March 7.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of March 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier Conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs").

CONTINUING BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs" January 1951, for a complete List of Continuing Boards and Commissions).

CONFERENCES ATTENDED IN MARCH

1. *Multilateral Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* Torquay, England — September 28-April 21. L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, Chairman; H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board, Deputy Chairman; J. J. Deutsch, W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
2. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris — February 15. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
3. *Twelfth Session of ECOSOC.* Santiago—February 20-March 21. Representative: J. D. Kearney, Canadian Ambassador to Argentina; Alternate: J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Embassy, Washington; Principal Adviser: Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs; Advisers: G. V. Beaudry, Canadian Embassy, Santiago; A. R. Crépault, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York, Secretary.
4. *Standing Committee on Copper, Zinc and Lead.* Washington — February 26. Representative: S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; Alternate: M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy Washington.
5. *United States-Canada Discussions on Frequency Assignment Plans for Bands Below 4000 kc.* Washington—February 26-March 9. Chairman: C. J. Acton, Department of Transport; A. J. Dawson, Department of Transport; Lt. R. M. Dunbar, R.C.N.; Capt. L. H. Wylie, Canadian Army; Flt. Lt. W. D. Benton, R.C.A.F.; G. E. Cox, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
6. *114th Session of the Governing Body of ILO.* Geneva — February 26-March 10. Delegate: A. H. Brown, Department of Labour; Alternate: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
7. *Standing Committee on Sulphur.* Washington — March 1. Representative: S.V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; Alternate: M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
8. *North American Wildlife Conference.* Milwaukee, Wis.—March 4-7. Dr. H. F. Lewis, Chief, Canadian Wildlife Service; Dr. V. E. F. Solman, Canadian Wildlife Service; D. G. Colls, Dominion Wildlife Officer for Manitoba and Saskatchewan.
9. *Standing Committee on Cotton and Cotton Linters.* Washington—March 5. Representative: S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
10. *Study Groups Nos 9 and 10 of the International Telegraph Consultative Committee.* Geneva—March 6-22. Head of Delegation: K. B. Ralph, Department of Transport; J. R. Lamb, Canadian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation; T. D. Merrigan, Representative of C.N.R. and C.P.R.

11. *Standing Committee on Manganese, Nickel and Cobalt*. Washington—March 12. Representative: S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; Alternate: Mr. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
12. *First South American Congress on Petroleum*. Montevideo—March 12-16. C. S. Bissett, Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires. (Observer).
13. *Inter-American Conference on Social Security*. Buenos Aires—March 12-31. Delegate: Col. J. G. Bisson, Unemployment Insurance Commission; Alternate: L. Roy, Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires.
14. *Extraordinary Conference of Directors of International Meteorological Organization*. Paris—March 15. Dr. A. Thomson, Department of Transport, Toronto.
15. *Seventh Session of the Social Commission of United Nations*. Geneva—March 17. R. B. Curry, Department of National Health and Welfare.
16. *First Congress of World Meteorological Organization*. Paris—March 19. Delegate: Dr. A. Thomson, Department of Transport, Toronto; Alternate: Dr. J. Patterson, Department of Transport; Adviser: O. G. Stoner, Canadian Embassy, Paris.
17. *International Materials Conference (Central Group)*. Washington—March 21. Representative: J. H. English, Canadian Embassy, Washington; Alternate: S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce.
18. *Special Session of Contracting Parties to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Torquay—March 29-April 21. L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, Chairman; H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board, Deputy Chairman; W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.

CONFERENCES TO BE HELD IN APRIL AND MAY

1. *First Meeting of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission*. Washington—April 2-14.
2. *Ninth Session of the Executive Committee of IRO*. Geneva—April 4.
3. *Seventh Session of the General Council of IRO*. Geneva—April 9.
4. *Meeting of Special Committee to Study Draft International Sanitary Regulations (WHO)*. Geneva—April 9.
5. *International Conference on Rubber*. Rome—April 9.
6. *Sixth Session of the Narcotic Drugs Commission*. New York—April 10-May.
7. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Conference of Experts on Information*. London—April 12-14.
8. *Eighth Session of the International Rubber Study Group*. Rome—April 16.
9. *Ad Hoc Committee on Organization and Operation of ECOSOC*. New York—April 16-27.
10. *Sixth Session of the Administrative Council of ITU*. Geneva—April 16.
11. *North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping*. London—April 23.
12. *Fourth Session of the Coal Mines Committee of ILO*. Geneva—May 7-19.
13. *78th Annual Meeting of the Conference of Social Work*. Atlantic City, N.J.—May 13-18.
14. *Third World Petroleum Congress*. The Hague—May 28-June 6.
15. *Fifth Annual Conference of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers*. Mexico—May 28-June 8.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY CANADA

France

Convention between Canada and France for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on incomes. Signed at Paris on March 16, 1951.

Convention between Canada and France for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to succession duties. Signed at Paris on March 16, 1951.

United States of America

Convention between Canada and the United States of America relating to the operation by citizens of either country of certain radio equipment or stations in the other country. Signed at Ottawa on February 8, 1951.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS†

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

**World Report 1949-1950* (Preliminary edition)—Prepared by the Secretariat; 29 January 1951; document E/1910; 392 p.

a) *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa*; 5 February 1951; document E/1910/Add.1; 229 p.

b) *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East*; 31 January 1951; document E/1910/Add.2; 135 p.

Progress made by the United Nations in the field of social activities in 1950 (January to December 1950)—Report by the Secretariat; 17 January 1951; document E/CN.5/240; 49 p.; Annex 32 p.

(b) Printed Documents:

**Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950*; document A/1775; 80 p.; 80 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20.

**Review of International Commodity Problems 1950* (Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements); January 1951; document E/1907; 63 p.; 70 cents; Sales No.: 1951.II.D.1.

**Training for Social Work—An International Survey*; 23 October 1950; document E/CN.5/196/Rev.1; 248 p.; \$2.00; Sales No.: 1950.IV.II. (Department of Social Affairs).

**Methods of Social Welfare Administration*; 25 October 1950; document E/CN.5/224; 299 p.; \$2.50; Sales No.: 1950.IV.10 (Department of Social Affairs).

**Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49*; 1171 p.; \$12.50; Sales No.: 1950.I.11.

Statistical Yearbook 1949-50; (Second Issue); bilingual; 555 p.; \$6.00; Sales No.: 1950.XVII.3 (Department of Economic Affairs).

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 51/8—*The International Joint Commission*, an address by General A.G.L. McNaughton on the International Joint Commission, with particular reference to the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, delivered to the Electric Club of Toronto on February 28, 1951.

No. 51/10—*The Universities and International Understanding in the Free World*, an address by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, at a special Convocation at the University of Western Ontario, London, on March 7, 1951.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 51/7—*Canada's Role in the Defence of the Free World*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, delivered to the Commercial Club of Chicago, on February 27, 1951.

adian Economy, an address by the Minister of Transport, Mr. Lionel Chevrier, delivered to the Joint Annual Meeting of the Association of Municipal Electrical Utilities and the Ontario Municipal Electric Association, in Toronto, on February 27, 1951.

No. 51/9—*Hydro-Electric Power in the Can-*

*French version not available until noted in future issue of "External Affairs".

† Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations, Secretariat, Lake Success, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

EARLY in the morning of April 11 an announcement was issued on behalf of the President of the United States that General Douglas MacArthur had been relieved of all his military commands, including that of the United Nations Forces in Korea. In his statement to the public the President declared:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

The President's communication to General MacArthur was as follows:

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander-in-Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

President Explains Action

The same evening President Truman explained his action and enunciated United States policy in the Far East with particular emphasis on Korea. He expressed the government's policy, in the simplest terms, as the prevention of a third world war; to this end it was the Government's aim to localize the Korean War, repel aggression, and restore peace. He made it clear that the United States Government would not take the initiative in extending the war but said that it might be spread by the Communist rulers: "they have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow". He said that the door was always open to the Communists for a settlement of the Korean conflict on the basis of an end to the fighting, insurance against its resumption, and an end of the aggression. On these terms he declared the way would be open for the unification of Korea and withdrawal of all foreign troops.

For some time it had been apparent that there was a wide difference of view between General MacArthur and his Commander-in-Chief. Widespread surprise had been evoked by the General's statement of March 24, which was interpreted to mean that United Nations military operations would be extended to China if his offer to discuss an end to the fighting was rejected, and which asserted that the Korean problem should be settled apart from other Far Eastern issues.

Uncertainty Increased

Early in April the general uncertainty was increased by two or more indications of General MacArthur's opinions. On April 5 Representative Joseph Martin, Republican Leader in the House of Representatives, published a letter written to him by the General on March 20. In it General MacArthur advocated the use of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa to open a second front on the Chinese mainland. He went on to say:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's

war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war yet preserve freedom.

The special significance of this statement lay in its direct opposition to the decision of the United States Government that Western Europe should be considered the main front to be defended against Communist imperialism.

The publication of General MacArthur's letter to Representative Martin was followed two days later by the publication of an interview with the military correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph in which General MacArthur was reported as having said that if the politicians would "take the wraps off", the United Nations forces could defeat the Chinese Communists easily enough; that there should be a naval blockade of the coast of the Chinese mainland and attacks on the Chinese railway system; and that Russian intervention in such circumstances would be improbable.

Secretary-General's Statement

Without commenting directly on General MacArthur's statements, the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized at a press conference on April 6 that the United Nations had two objectives in Korea "and only two", firstly, to repel aggression and to restore peace and security, and secondly to make possible a united, independent, free and democratic Korea. He declared that the purpose of the United Nations in its armed struggle with the enemy was to diminish, not to increase, the danger of the conflict widening into a third world war. He asserted that the military commitment ended with the first objective; in the second it was replaced by the peaceful means of negotiation, conciliation and economic assistance.

A few days after General MacArthur's removal the North Korean Government sent a communication to the United Nations denouncing United States and South Korean atrocities in the same way as in its seventeen preceding communications. Apart from this major theme there was a minor reference to the means by which a peaceful settlement could be found for the Korean dispute, the chief points being withdrawal of United States and other armed forces, discussion of Far Eastern problems by the five major powers, and peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute by the Korean people themselves. The Asian-Arab group at the United Nations held several meetings to study the communication in the hope that its mention of peaceful settlement and its timing so soon after General MacArthur's dismissal might signify a desire to negotiate.

President's Policy Defended

President Truman's Far Eastern policy was defended before the United States public in an address by General Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on April 17, in Chicago, and in another by Mr. Acheson, the Secretary of State, the following evening in Washington. General Bradley warned that there was no early end in sight to the Korean war, he reaffirmed the Government's intention to limit the fighting to Korea, if at all possible, and thus prevent a third world war. Mr. Acheson likewise opposed extension of the war by United States initiative. He said that "it will be clear to the world that if there is an expansion of the conflict in Korea or if a world conflict should result from it the responsibility will rest square on the Kremlin and its agents in Peking".

MacArthur Addresses Congress

In addressing a joint session of both Houses of Congress on April 19 General MacArthur repeated the views which had brought about his dismissal and went a step further by claiming that the Joint Chiefs of Staff shared them. He advocated

the bombing of Manchurian bases, a naval blockade of the Chinese coast, an increased economic blockade, air reconnaissance along the coast, and support of an attack by the Chinese Nationalists on the mainland; he was emphatic that under no circumstances should Formosa fall under Communist control.

For the first three weeks of April there was little military activity on the Korean front. Lest the enemy's failure to launch its long-heralded spring offensive should produce a relaxation of effort in the United Nations and by its forces, General Ridgway, the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, warned in a statement of April 10:

The Communists won't call this thing off. As far as they are concerned this is an all-out life and death struggle; though they may vary their timing, tactics and strategy they never vary their objectives. There is no end of the war in sight unless there is a political settlement and I know of no negotiation for that.

During this period there were rumours of an impending offensive from Manchurian bases and some speculation on the counter measures which might have to be taken by the United Nations forces in this event.

Communists Launch Attack

On April 22, the Communist forces launched a heavy ground attack on the central front with supporting action along the entire line. United Nations forces withdrew slowly to prepared positions along and south of the 38th parallel. In view of the heavy casualties being inflicted upon the enemy and the strong resistance to his advance there arose the possibility that the offensive might be enlarged by air attacks from Manchurian bases. Speculation on possible counter measures to be taken increased. In reply to a question in the House of Commons on this subject the Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed the Government's view on April 26.

Some five months ago the government informed the United States Government in response to an inquiry from that government,—they brought the matter up—that, though a strong case could be made under international law that the United Nations Commander-in-Chief had the right to retaliate against any air attacks launched from Manchuria, we considered it important (as indeed did other governments) that no military operations take place outside Korean borders without specific authority from the United Nations.

Since that time various aspects of the Korean operations have been the subject of discussions in Washington, as indeed I have previously indicated in the House, between representatives of the countries having forces in Korea.

So far, however, the Canadian Government has received no request for concurrence in any proposal to authorize United Nations' retaliation upon enemy air bases outside Korea, probably for the very good reason that there has been no massive enemy air bombing from Manchuria. If there is such air intervention, for the consequences of which the Chinese Communists would have to bear full responsibility, it is our view that those countries with forces in Korea and participating in military operations there, should be consulted in regard to the implications of that action, that is air bombing, and in regard to any retaliatory action which may be required to meet it. However, it is of course possible to visualize a situation where immediate retaliatory action which may be required to meet it. However, it is of course possible to visualize a situation where immediate retaliatory action without consultation might be unavoidable in pursuing enemy bombers back to the Manchurian air bases from which they came. The decision on the spot to take such immediate retaliatory action would, presumably, be based on over-riding considerations of military security. In any discussions regarding more general retaliatory action against Manchurian air bases, the decision to authorize such action would, as we see it, have to balance very carefully local military considerations against the risk of precipitating a further extension of the war and the effect of such an extension on the security of United Nations forces in Korea, and the accomplishment of United Nations aims there.

At the end of the month United Nations forces were again south of the 38th parallel, holding a line which ran across the peninsula a few miles north of Seoul.

In the United Nations, the sub-committee of the Additional Measures Committee met on April 17 and again the following day. It agreed unanimously to recommend to the full committee that when new measures were considered against Communist China priority should be given to a study of economic sanctions.



ICAO HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT SIGNED

—Canada Wide

A Headquarters Agreement formalizing the status and establishment in Canada of the International Civil Aviation Organization, was signed at Montreal on April 14, 1951, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, and the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Dr. Edward Warner. Above, left to right: Mr. Pearson; Dr. Warner; Dr. Albert Roper, Secretary-General of ICAO; and, behind Mr. Pearson, Dr. E. Pépin, Head of the Legal Bureau, ICAO.

CANADA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A TWO-POWER WORLD

Statements made by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The United Nations and World Security*

... As we all know, the comparative harmony between the great powers which existed in the spring of 1945 has been shattered. The problem of what the role of the United Nations should now be in security matters — a problem which is troubling many who sincerely believe in collective action to prevent war as our only hope for peace — springs ultimately from that fact.

The issue has been raised in concrete and almost frightening form by the unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea which occurred last June. The Soviet Union at that time had absented itself from the Security Council; and that fortuitous circumstance allowed the issue to appear with particular sharpness. We all know what action was taken by the Security Council last June. On the initiative of the United States, the North Korean Government was declared an aggressor. That initiative we honour, but it came, I think, as a surprise to most observers and without it, let us not forget, any effective United Nations action, certainly any military action, would not have been possible or even, I think, attempted. Fifty-three members of the United Nations supported this decision, and resistance to the aggression was organized through the Security Council.

The Dilemma Implicit in Korea

... I am not being cynical, or lacking in admiration for the leadership given at that time, when I say that the United States decision to lead and help organize the United Nations in its resistance to North Korean aggression was perhaps somewhat easier than it might have been because at that time the possible consequences of the course on which we were embarking had not been fully revealed. That was only to happen in November when the intervention of the Chinese Communists showed unmistakably the degree of support which the puppet regime in North Korea could count on from its friends in China, and, indeed, in the Soviet Union. In general, it was possible, even easy to believe in June 1950 that this was *not* a case where a great power was involved or would intervene, and that if the aggression by North Korean forces were defeated those who had encouraged the attack in the hope of increasing the area in the world under Communist domination would be prepared to write off the defeat as a consequence of a miscalculation. Such a triumph for the United Nations in defeating an aggression would have been — and would still be — a tremendous development for security in other parts of Asia and the world. After all, this had happened on at least two other occasions. When the Greek Government had beaten off the attacks made across their borders by neighbouring Communist states and had shown that with financial assistance and arms from the United States and other Western countries they were prepared to resist similar attacks in future, those attacks gradually died away. Also, when the Soviet Union ultimately accepted the fact that they could not starve out Berlin without risking a general war, they abandoned the attempt and a settlement over Berlin became possible. Last spring it was thought that the Soviet Union and its friends and allies were still not prepared to run the risk of World War III. If that were true, United Nations action against

* The following passages are taken from an address delivered by Mr. L. B. Pearson to a meeting of the Canadian Bar Association on March 31, 1951. The complete official text is No. 51/13 of the Department's Statements and Speeches series and may be obtained on application to the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

the North Korean aggressors might be expected to lead to a settlement in Korea, and have a salutary effect throughout the Far East. These calculations, as we now know, were not well founded. But they were widely shared and seemed realistic on the basis of the information available to us at that time. It was only when it became plain towards the end of last year that the Soviet Union and the People's Government of China were prepared to run the risk of a general war over Korea that the dilemma of how far the United Nations could and should go in enforcing by military action collective security in a two-power world became most acute. We are still faced squarely with that dilemma.

The Principles Necessary for a Solution

... Our security machinery is now streamlined so as to circumvent the Security Council veto, and to permit quicker and more broadly based United Nations action, through the Assembly. But we are faced now indeed more directly than ever with the question whether the United Nations should try to take military enforcement measures against a secondary aggressor when that action might either dissipate our strength in the face of the main aggressor or lead to a new world war in which our strength would be so dissipated. What should we do if the main aggressor should exploit the provisions of the Charter for the maintenance of the peace everywhere, in order to weaken us so that one day the peace cannot be maintained anywhere? What can we do to prevent the principle of collective security being used to weaken collective security in practice? There is no doubt that this poses a serious problem and one which we should think over very carefully.

The outlines of a way out of this dilemma, what the role of the United Nations should be in trying to maintain general security in a two-power world, are beginning to emerge. Those outlines require acceptance of the following principles:

- (a) In every situation, our obligation under the Charter to do whatever we can to maintain the principle of collective security should be discharged. In other words, we must recognize unprovoked aggression, whether committed by great or small powers, for what it is, and take appropriate action. This action may have to vary, however, according to circumstances.
- (b) We should never formally condemn an aggressor until the fact of his aggression is clearly proven by impartial evidence, and until the mediatory and conciliatory functions of the United Nations have been exhausted.
- (c) Condemnation of aggression should not mean that in every case economic and military sanctions must follow. The enforcement action to be taken against an aggressor must be related to the practicability of such action; to the general strategic and political situation, and to the possibility of such enforcement action weakening the peaceful and law abiding powers in other areas, thereby tempting another and a far more serious threat to the peace.
- (d) We should recognize our limitations in this way, even when condemnatory action has to be taken. There is nothing immoral in this. It is immoral, however, when passing resolutions at the United Nations condemning aggressors, to give the impression that they will be followed by strong and effective economic and military action, when we know that, in fact, such action will not or cannot be taken. It was not, for instance, the reluctance of the League of Nations to condemn the aggression of Fascist Italy against Abyssinia, which so fatally weakened that organization. That condemnation was easy and it was given in ringing and defiant resolutions and speeches. The wrong done was in giving the impression that these resolutions would be implemented, and then doing nothing about it.

Canada and Communist Chinese Aggression

If we apply these principles to the present situation in Korea, what conclusions do we reach? We were right, I think, in voting for the U.S. resolution of February condemning Communist Chinese aggression. I still think, however, it was unwise to force a vote on that Resolution until we had made a further and final effort at negotiation along lines which would have picked up Peking's ambiguous reply to the Cease-Fire group's proposals, and confronted that government with a detailed and practical programme for implementing those proposals; one which would have had to be rejected or accepted, and which could not have been used for bargaining or delaying purposes.

We were right, I think, in refusing to allow the resolution of condemnation to be followed by immediate enforcement action against the Peking Government. This would not, in my view, have been effective in ending the war in Korea; it would have been effective in extending the conflict to the mainland of China, with all the political and military consequences of such extension. I am not one of those who think that the Peking regime would soon collapse from such a conflict. I *am* one of those who think that Moscow would be its main and possibly only beneficiary. We should not, therefore, in my view, take any avoidable action against China or in Korea which would weaken what is still the main front of the Free World — Western Europe.

The Conditions for a Settlement

From this it follows we should continue to localize the war in Korea and end it as soon as possible. We should do this, if we can, by negotiating terms of peace, which will be honourable and will not be a betrayal of our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. We must not forget, however, that while one side can begin a war it takes both sides to end it. If negotiation is not possible, we have no alternative but to do our best to stabilize the military position, force the aggressor to pay as high a price as possible for his crime, avoid rash actions and words and unnecessary provocation in doing this, and hope that the Chinese Communists will soon desire to extricate themselves from a dangerous and costly adventure.

The safety of those who are fighting in Korea is a first consideration. It should be possible, however, to maintain our military position in Korea while keeping the door open for every possible opportunity to negotiate a settlement. This means refusing to be stampeded into action, such as a massive attack towards the Manchurian border, if such action were possible militarily but felt to be unwise politically. The chances for a settlement in Korea are also not increased by the kind of talk which weakens the unity of action of those who are participating in that operation.

Two Threats to Unity of Action

There are, I think, two main threats to this unity of action. One is a feeling of impatience and even irritation in the United States, that, while they are bearing the brunt of the fighting, their friends in the United Nations do not give them sufficient backing, even in Lake Success. I think that we should recognize this feeling, just as we should gratefully recognize the special responsibility which the United States has accepted and the leadership it is giving in the struggle against Russian Communist imperialism. Such recognition carries with it the obligation to co-operate and to give support. But this support, if it is to have any value, does not mean an automatic response of "Ready, aye ready" to everything that Washington proposes. It may mean constructive criticism of, and even opposition to, courses or proposals which we in Canada may think are unwise and concerning which it is our duty to express our views. I know that such criticism and opposition will be exploited by our Communist

enemies for their own nefarious purposes. Because of this we should put forward our point of view, whenever we can, in private and try to persuade our friends as to its reasonableness. If we succeed, well and good. If we do not, we will have to decide whether to maintain our position in public or whether to abandon it because the acceptance of our view-point may not be so important as the maintenance of the united front.

The other danger to our free world unity arises when those who have been charged by the United Nations with military responsibility make controversial pronouncements which go far beyond that responsibility, and create confusion, disquiet and even discord. It seems to me to be as unwise, indeed as dangerous, for the generals to intervene in international policy matters as it would be for the diplomats to try to lay down military strategy. This is a case, I think, where the specialist should stick to his specialty. Otherwise, unnecessary difficulties are created, and that whole-hearted co-operation between friends which is so essential is hindered.

The Appearance of Disunity: a Comfort to the Enemy

These difficulties are, I hope and believe, only chips off the block of unity. We should try to prevent them, of course, but they cannot destroy or even dangerously weaken the structure itself. Their greatest danger lies in the hopes they may arouse in totalitarian minds, that the free democracies are divided and therefore becoming weaker. Dictators, as we know from grim experience, feed on, indeed often act on, such false hopes. They count on conquest by division. So in our international relations, as in our domestic policies, let us give Communist dictators no more of this comfort than we can help. . . .

Canada in the United Nations*

. . . What should our role be in the United Nations? Indeed, what should the role of the world organization itself be in the present conflict? I have tried to make my own views known in this matter in recent statements, and I do not wish to go over the ground again here. But I would say this: that we must be sure, so far as we can ever be sure, that the United Nations remains the instrument of the collective policy of all its members for the preservation of peace and the prevention or defeat of aggression, and does not become too much the instrument of any one country. I am not suggesting that this has happened or is going to happen, but it is something that we should guard against. If, however, the United Nations is to be such a genuine international organization in this sense, all of its members, except the Soviet Communist bloc who have no interest in it except as an agency for advancing their own aggressive purposes, must play a part in deed as well as in word. We must be careful not to be stampeded into rash decisions which cannot be carried out but we must *all* contribute to the implementation of decisions freely and responsibly made. I do not think that we in Canada have any reason to apologize for the part that we have played in this regard. Our record in the United Nations is a worthy one. However, I do not think that we should be asked, in the United Nations or elsewhere, to support automatically policies which are proposed by others if we have serious doubts about their wisdom. We must reserve the right, for instance, to criticize even the policy of our great friend, the United States, if we feel it necessary to do so. There are, however, two reservations to this. First, we must recognize and pay tribute to the leadership being given and the efforts being made by the United States in the conflict against Communist imperialism, and realize that if this

* The following are extracts from an address made by Mr. Pearson before the Empire and Canadian Clubs of Toronto on April 10, 1951. The complete official text is No. 51/14 of the Department's Statements and Speeches series and may be obtained on application to the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

leadership were not given we would have little chance of success in the common struggle. Secondly, we must never forget that our enemy gleefully welcomes every division in the free democratic ranks and that, therefore, there will be times when we should abandon our position if it is more important to maintain unity in the face of the common foe. This reconciliation of our right to differ and the necessity for unity, is going to be a tough problem for anyone charged with responsibility for foreign policy decisions in this, or indeed in any free country.

Canadian-American Relations

This brings me squarely up against a matter which is very much in my mind, as I know it is in yours, the question of Canadian-American relations in this two-power world of conflict. It is, I think, one of the most difficult and delicate problems of foreign policy that has yet faced the Canadian people, their Parliament and their Government, and it will require those qualities of good sense, restraint, and self-reliance which the Canadian people have shown in the past. It was not so long ago that Canada's foreign relations were of importance only within the Commonwealth, more particularly in our relations with the United Kingdom. These former Canadian-Commonwealth problems seem to me to have been now pretty well solved. At least the right principles have been established and accepted which makes their solution fairly easy. We have in the Commonwealth reached independence without sacrificing co-operation. We stand on our own feet, but we try to walk together. There is none or at least little of the touchiness on our part, which once must have complicated relations with Downing Street, and there is now certainly none of the desire to dominate which we used to detect in Whitehall. We have got beyond this in Canada-U.K. relations, and we deal with each other now, on a basis of confidence and friendship, as junior and senior partners in a joint and going concern. In our relations with the United Kingdom we have come of age and have abandoned the sensitiveness of the debutante. This has been made easier because any worry we once may have had, and we had it, that British imperialism or continentalism might pull us into far away wars not of our own making or choosing, has passed. We now accept wholeheartedly the Commonwealth of Nations as a valuable and proven instrument for international co-operation; as a great agency for social and economic progress, and possibly, at the present time, most important of all, as a vital and almost the only bridge between the free West and the free East. I think also that in the post-war years we have come to appreciate, as possibly never before, the wisdom, tolerance, and far-sighted steadiness of vision of the British people. As their material power has decreased, at least temporarily, because of the unparalleled sacrifices they have made in two world wars, I think that our need for these other British qualities has increased in the solution of international difficulties. This, in my mind, has never been shown more clearly than in the events of the last six months at the United Nations or in the Far East.

The Technique of International Friendship

With the United States our relations grow steadily closer as we recognize that our destinies, economic and political, are inseparable in the Western Hemisphere, and that Canada's hope for peace depends largely on the acceptance by the United States of responsibility for world leadership and on how that responsibility is discharged. With this closeness of contact and with, I hope, our growing maturity goes a mutual understanding and a fundamental friendliness. This makes it possible for us to talk with a frankness and confidence to the United States, which is not misunderstood there except possibly by a minority who think that we shouldn't talk at all, or who complain that if we do, our accents are too English! But we need not try to deceive ourselves that because our close relations with our great neighbour are so close, they will always be smooth and easy. There will be difficulties and frictions. These, however, will be easier to settle if the United States realizes that while we

are most anxious to work with her and support her in the leadership she is giving to the free world, we are not willing to be merely an echo of somebody else's voice. It would be easier also if it were recognized by the United States at this time that we in Canada have had our own experience of tragedy and suffering and loss in war. In our turn, we should be careful not to transfer the suspicions and touchiness and hesitations of yesteryear from London to Washington. Nor should we get unduly hot and bothered over all the pronouncements of journalists or generals or politicians which we do not like, though there may be, indeed *are* some on which we have a right to express our views especially when those pronouncements have a direct effect on action and policy which we have undertaken together. More important, we must convince the United States by action rather than merely by word that we are, in fact, pulling our weight in this international team. But this does not mean that we should be told that until we do one-twelfth or one-sixteenth, or some other fraction as much as they are doing in any particular enterprise, we are defaulting. It would also help if the United States took more notice of what we do do, and, indeed occasionally of what we say. It is disconcerting, for instance, that about the only time the American people seem to be aware of our existence, in contrast say to the existence of a Latin American republic, is when we do something that they do not like, or do not do something which they would like. I can explain what I mean by an illustration. The United States would certainly have resented it, and rightly so, if we in Canada had called her a reluctant contributor to reconstruction in 1946 because her loan to the United Kingdom was only three times as large as ours, while her national income was seventeen or eighteen times as large. In our turn, most of us resent being called, by certain people in the United States, a reluctant friend because Canada, a smaller power with special problems of its own, ten years at war out of the last thirty, on the threshold of a great and essential pioneer development, and with half a continent to administer, was not able to match, even proportionately, the steps taken by the United States last June and subsequently, which were required by United Nations decisions about Korea; decisions which, I admit, caught us by surprise.

A Joint Pursuit of Common Objectives

The leadership then given by the United States rightly won our admiration, and the steps that she has taken to implement them since, deserve our deep gratitude. The rest of the world naturally, however, took some time to adjust herself to a somewhat unexpected state of affairs. Canada, in my view at least, in not making the adjustment more quickly, should surely not be criticized more than, say, Argentina or Egypt, or Sweden.

There may be other ripples on the surface of our friendship in the days ahead, but we should do everything we can in Canada, and this applies especially to the Government, and in the Government particularly to the Department of External Affairs, to prevent these ripples becoming angry waves which may weaken the foundation of our friendship. I do not think that this will happen. It will certainly be less likely to happen, however, if we face the problem frankly and openly of our mutual relationship. That relationship, as I see it, means marching with the United States in the pursuit of the objectives which we share. It does *not* mean being pulled along, or loitering behind.

A Shift of Emphasis

Nevertheless, the days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbour are, I think, over. They are over because, on our side, we are more important in the continental and international scheme of things, and we loom more largely now as an important element in United States and in free world plans for defence and development. They are over also because the United States is now the dominating world power on the side of freedom. Our preoccupation is no longer

whether the United States will discharge her international responsibilities, but how she will do it and how the rest of us will be involved. You may recall that it was not many years ago that Colonel Lindbergh suggested that Canada should be detached from membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations because that international affiliation of ours might get the United States into trouble by involving the larger half of North America in European wars. That seems a long time ago. There are certain people in Canada (I am not one of them) who think that the shoe, if not already on the other foot, is now being transferred to the other foot.

The Responsibility of the Canadian Citizen

From what I have said, and I have only touched on the subject, you will appreciate that the days have gone when the problems of Canadian foreign policy can be left to a part-time Minister; to a small group of officials; to a couple of hours' desultory and empty debate each session, in Parliament, and to the casual attention of public opinion when it can turn from more important matters such as the Stanley Cup or the stock market. Foreign affairs are now the business of every Canadian family and the responsibility of every Canadian citizen. . . .

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN GERMANY

Post-War Background

At an early date after the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945, the Western Germans were reintroduced into positions of political responsibility. By 1946 the groundwork had been laid for the growth of civil government at all levels and the forms of democratic government re-established; the first elections were held under Allied control in the Laender (States) throughout that year and in the first months of 1947. Following the unification of the British and the United States zones in 1947 a Bizonal Economic Council was formed. The next step, in the light of the decisions of the London conference of the three Western Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1948, was to entrust a Parliamentary Council with the task of framing a Basic Law or constitution. This Council consisted of representatives of the British, United States and French zones. The Basic Law was finally proclaimed on May 23, 1949 after it had been ratified by all Laender except Bavaria which, however, in accordance with a previous undertaking accepted it as binding. The federal elections were held on August 14, and on September 21 the passage from military government to civilian control was effected with the promulgation of the Occupation Statute and the entry into force of the Charter of the Allied High Commission. For the first time since the days of the Weimar Republic a freely elected German Federal Government was in existence with real, if still limited, powers over 47.5 million people representing almost three-quarters of the population of Germany as a whole.

The Federal System

In drafting the Basic Law, the Parliamentary Council had to find a compromise between the centralist and federalist views of its members. Consideration had also to be given to the fact that the Allies generally favoured a decentralized state and to the fact that the individual Laender governments had had substantial responsibilities for almost three years. On the other hand it was obviously necessary for the central government to have adequate powers to carry out its functions. The formula set forth in the Basic Law was the best that could be achieved in the circumstances.

In the field of economic and financial policy the Basic Law has given wide powers to the Laender. The Federal Parliament votes all important tax laws, but the revenue from direct taxes on income, on corporations and on estates, goes to the Laender. The Federal Government has to be content with the turnover (sales) tax, and customs, excise and transportation taxes. The result is that, to meet its obligations, the Federal Government has had to receive subsidies from the Laender to the extent of one billion deutsche marks out of a budget of thirteen billion in 1950-51 (the deutsche mark being worth approximately 0.25 Canadian dollars). There is a further proposal of the Government at present for the surrender by the Laender of some 30 per cent of their tax revenue, raising Laender contributions to over three billion. The Government's capacity for manoeuvre in economic matters is therefore limited. This also helps to explain that, whatever may be the doctrinal interest in a liberal economic policy as pursued by the Government, it is the one which fits in most easily with the constitutional framework of the Republic.

Although the Federal Parliament otherwise has considerable legislative powers, the interests of the Laender are safeguarded by their representation in the Upper House of the Federal Parliament. The Bundesrat, or Senate, which is composed of forty-two representatives of the eleven Western Laender—three, four or five representatives for each Land according to size—has in legislation an almost equal voice with the Bundestag (Lower House). It can call for consideration of draft bills pre-

sent to it by a joint committee of members of both Houses. If this committee submits amendments, the Bundestag is required to vote on the new text. When the draft bill is again referred to the Bundesrat it can veto it. The Bundesrat can also veto a bill without calling for examination by a joint committee. In both cases the strength of the veto varies with the size of the majority which has decided it. If it has been decided by a majority vote, the Bundestag can override it by a decision of the majority of its members; if it has been decided by a two-thirds vote in the Bundesrat, a two-thirds vote or at least the vote of the majority of the members in the Bundestag is necessary to give effect to the bill. Furthermore, the Bundesrat possesses in effect an absolute veto over amendments to the Basic Law and over certain other types of legislation which affect the powers of the Laender.

The Federal Parliament

The Federal Parliament is in almost permanent session and only recesses for short periods, e.g. Christmas and Easter. It does not actually have as many sittings as the Canadian Parliament. In the course of the first eighteen months, for example, it had only 130 sittings or an average of less than two per week. It is in the innumerable Parliamentary committees that legislation is hammered out after a perfunctory first reading in the Bundestag. As in continental legislatures generally, there is much greater legislative initiative in both German chambers than in the Canadian Houses of Parliament. Initiative rests with members of the Bundestag or Bundesrat, as well as with the Government. As a result it is not uncommon to find motions or proposals presented by individuals or by non-Government parties emerging from committee with almost unanimous approval against the recommendations of the Government.

Despite the latitude that is allowed to individual parties and to their members, the stability of the Government is assured by the requirement that the Bundestag, in order to remove the Chancellor from office, must not only express its lack of confidence in him but also elect a successor by a majority of its members; it then submits a request to the President asking for the dismissal of the Chancellor and his replacement by the approved successor. Governmental stability is also assured by the provision that the Chancellor, if he is defeated on a motion of confidence, may request the President to dissolve the Bundestag. Finally, on the request of the Government and with the approval of the Bundestag, the President may declare a state of legislative emergency for a maximum of six months during which the Government may dispense with Parliamentary approval for legislation. This can only happen once during the term of a Federal Chancellor, and laws put into force during such a period must not affect the Basic Law.

The German Political Parties

The pattern of the parties in the Bundestag, which has 402 members, is continental rather than British or American. The Government coalition comprises the CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) with 139 members, the FOP (Free Democrats) with 52 members and the DP (German Party) with 17 members. Although the CDU could, like the MRP in France, be considered as left of centre because of its labour wing, the Government is often criticized as a right wing one. This is perhaps due to the conservative nature of the two parties associated with the CDU in the Governmental coalition, and also to the fact that the main opposition is provided by the SPD (Social Democrats) with 131 members, which stands to the left of the Christian Democrats. On the right and left of the Government coalition respectively are the particularist Bavarian Party and the Catholic Centre party, which has lost most of its pre-war supporters, including the Federal Chancellor, to the CDU; with only 10 members in the Bundestag, it is now but a shadow of the former great party of the

Weimar Republic. Several small extreme nationalist parties as well as a small Communist Party complete the picture.

Of the nation-wide parties, the SPD possesses the most highly integrated structure. This is due to its tradition and also to the personality of its leader. It is indicative that an SPD member of the Bundestag was recently designated to become the new Minister-President in Hesse, following the SPD success at the polls there. For most of its strength the party relies on working class votes, and therefore to a large extent on the labour unions. Thus, in the large unified trade union organization — the Association of the German Trade Unions (DGB) which was formed after the war with full Allied approval — the Social Democrats have a preponderant influence.

The CDU only achieved a formal national organization at its Goslar Congress last autumn, when Chancellor Adenauer was elected the first national President of the party. Nevertheless the CSU remains its associate in Bavaria, although on occasion it opposes CDU-sponsored federal measures which seem to it to endanger the decentralized federal conception of the state. The CDU is predominantly Catholic. It derives most of its strength from the Catholic peasantry of the Rhineland and Southwestern Germany; furthermore, through the Catholic trade unions now affiliated with the DGB and through its labour and social committees, the CDU retains a close association with large sections of the labour vote. It has, however, made a point of and succeeded in attracting members of other confessions. The former Minister of the Interior, Dr. Heinemann, was a pillar of the Lutheran Church and his successor, Dr. Lehr, is also high in its councils.

One party in Germany which was not in existence in 1949 has lately been acquiring prominence; it is the BHE, formed by German refugee groups who were dissatisfied with having to press their extensive economic and social demands through the medium of the existing political parties. The BHE has met with success in recent elections in the Laender which contain substantial numbers of the ten million refugees presently in Western Germany. Its potentialities are considerable unless the other parties succeed in solving the grave problems of this important minority.

The Voter

Almost as important as the political parties themselves is the attitude of the individual member of the community towards the system of parliamentary democracy. 78.5 per cent of the eligible voters participated in the federal elections, while similar high percentages were reached in recent Land elections in Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bavaria. The relations of the elector with his representative cannot be as close as they are under the Canadian, United Kingdom or United States electoral systems, since only 60 per cent of the members of the Bundestag are directly elected to represent a constituency; the remainder are elected on a Land basis proportionately to the votes cast for the party list in each Land.

The Germans, at least in Western Germany, remember the dangers of the Fuehrer principle. They are well aware of the lot of their fellow countrymen in the Soviet Zone. Against this background, the system of parliamentary democracy has made satisfactory progress. The young Federal Republic continues, however, to be faced with tremendous problems of reconstruction and of security in a dangerous world. It is the task of its political leaders to enlist the wholehearted support of the people, and especially the youth who will be the leaders of tomorrow, in solving these problems through democratic processes.

NATO RE-ORGANIZATION

A press release on this subject was issued in London on May 4, 1951, at a press conference called by Mr. Spofford, the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies. As the Canadian Government took the initiative in proposing the re-organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Canadian Deputy, Mr. L. D. Wilgress, was also present. The following is the complete text of this release:

The North Atlantic Council Deputies announce today the adoption by their governments of new terms of reference for the North Atlantic Council, which will hereafter incorporate the Defence Committee and Defence Finance and Economic Committee, and thus becomes the sole Ministerial body in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Council Deputies announce at the same time the creation of a Financial and Economic Board, located in Paris.

The North Atlantic Council, as originally established, was composed of the Foreign Ministers of the nations party to the North Atlantic Treaty. Two other Ministerial committees were organized, a Defence Committee composed of Defence Ministers, and a Defence Finance and Economic Committee composed of Finance Ministers. The only full-time agencies functioning during the early months of NATO were the Standing Group (made up of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the permanent working staffs of the Defence Finance and Economic Committee and of the Military Production and Supply Board, a subordinate agency of the Defence Committee.

Experience soon demonstrated the need for a central, continuously functioning body to ensure co-ordination between the work of the various treaty agencies and to facilitate the implementation of agreed plans. The Council in May 1950 therefore established the Council of Deputies, who first met in July of that year.

The Canadian Proposal


Experience also demonstrated the need, particularly as emphasis shifted from planning to the implementation of plans, for a simpler organization with clear lines of authority, for fewer committees and more full-time operating agencies. In the autumn of 1950 the Canadian Government proposed re-organization of NATO to meet this need, and in December the Council authorized the Deputies to study and recommend the necessary changes. The result is the structure announced today.

The Re-organized Council

As before, the Council is the principal body in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and is "charged with the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty". The re-organized Council, however, incorporates not only the Council envisaged by Article 9 of the Treaty but also the Defence Committee referred to in the same Article and the Defence Finance and Economic Committee. The latter cease to exist as separate entities. The Council will continue to be composed of persons of ministerial rank, although in exceptional circumstances member governments may be represented by other persons duly designated for the purpose. Heads of governments may attend meetings of the Council in person. Otherwise, governments will be represented by their Minister for Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defence, or by other competent Ministers, especially by those responsible for financial and economic affairs, according to the nature of the agenda.

The Council will meet annually in ordinary session and such other times as may be deemed desirable by the majority of the parties.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION



Location of Sessions

Location of each session will be determined by the Chairman after consultation with other parties. For general convenience, the ordinary annual session will normally be held at about the same time and in the same geographic area as the annual session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Other ordinary sessions will normally be held at some convenient location in Europe.

Chairmanship

The Chairmanship of the Council will continue to rotate in alphabetical order. Monsieur Paul Van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium, is the present Chairman.

The Council Deputies

In order that the Council may effectively carry out its responsibilities and exercise them continuously, each government is represented by a Council Deputy. Each Deputy represents all Ministers concerned with NATO matters in his government and is responsible to such Minister or Ministers as his government may determine. The Council Deputies constitute the permanent working organization of the North Atlantic Council.

When the Council is not in session, the Deputies carry out its policies, recommend to governments the measures necessary to this end, formulate issues requiring decisions by the Council or by member governments and otherwise constitute a body which may register the approval of their governments on matters before them for consideration.

The Deputies will also:

(a) Be responsible among other things for co-ordinating the activities of and giving guidance to all other permanent organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(b) Exchange views on political matters of common interest within the scope of the Treaty:

(c) Promote and co-ordinate public information activities in furtherance of its objectives.

The Chairman of the Council Deputies, in addition to presiding at their meetings, is responsible for directing the Permanent Working Staff of the Organization.

Military Structure

With the exception of the incorporation of the former Defence Committee into the Council, the military structure remains unchanged. The Council Deputies will deal directly with the Military Committee and, when that body is not in session, with the Standing Group on political matters having military implications. It will provide those bodies with political guidance upon which strategic decisions should be based. The Standing Group will maintain close liaison with the Council Deputies and provide that body with advice on military matters.

Defence Production Board

The Defence Production Board, which was established last December and has its headquarters in London, replaced the Military Production and Supply Board and the subsidiary agencies of that committee. It has as its general objectives the achievement of the maximum production of military equipment in the most efficient manner, at the least cost, and in the shortest time to meet the military material requirements of NATO. These objectives will be sought by co-ordinating national production programmes so that they will together fulfil NATO-wide production objectives. The Board is directed to concentrate its activities on those aspects of military production and procurement which involve major problems of international co-operation among the NATO members. A unified international staff has been organized to serve the Board under a Co-ordinator of North Atlantic Defence Production, who is ex-officio a member of the Defence Production Board.

Creation of the FEB

The creation of the Financial and Economic Board (FEB) is another step towards simplifying and making more effective the executive organization of NATO. In this respect it follows the precedent established in the setting up of the Defence Production Board.

According to its terms of reference, the new FEB "shall be responsible for considering and making recommendations upon financial and economic problems arising in connection with NATO defence programmes and upon the best use of financial and economic resources in member countries in support of the common defence effort. It shall advise the other NATO bodies under the Council Deputies on all relevant economic and financial questions arising out of their work." The FEB will ordinarily address its recommendations to the Council Deputies, but in specified cases these may be sent direct to member governments.

The FEB will succeed to the functions and responsibilities previously belonging to the Permanent Working Staff of the Defence Production and Economic Committee, the Advisory Group on Raw Material Problems, and the Economic and Financial Working Group, which was set up some months ago in Paris. Among its other tasks, it has been assigned the duty of reporting to the Council Deputies on the financial and economic aspects of the progress of defence programmes in member countries. It will also "maintain close contact with the work of other international organizations dealing with financial and economic problems and in particular with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), having in view the need to avoid duplication of effort".

The FEB will be based in Paris so that it will be able to draw on the experience and skills of the OEEC. It is expected that governments will be represented in the FEB by senior members of their delegations to OEEC, so that close co-ordination of the activities of these two bodies will be assured.

MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN STATES

A Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States was held in Washington, March 26-April 7. Such Meetings of Consultation are provided for in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) and are an integral part of the Organization.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held in Buenos Aires in 1936 and the eighth International Conference of American States held at Lima in 1938 established a procedure under which the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each of the 21 American Republics, or their personal representatives, should consult together whenever a state of emergency existed or whenever the peace of the Western Hemisphere was threatened. Because of the very nature of the meetings they are not held at regular intervals but are subject to call by the Chairman of the Council of the OAS or at the request of any member state to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States. The recent meeting was requested by the United States with a view to co-ordinating the common effort of the American Republics against "the aggressive activities of international communism". It was the fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the history of the Pan-American System.

The agenda of the Conference was limited to three main topics: political and military co-operation for the defence of the Americas; strengthening the internal security of the American Republics; and emergency economic co-operation.

Declaration of Washington Signed

At the close of the Conference on April 7 the representatives of the 21 American Republics signed the Declaration of Washington in which they reaffirmed their solidarity in the present emergency, their faith in the principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States and other inter-American Agreements and their support of the United Nations as the most effective agency for maintaining the peace, security and well-being of the peoples of the world.

Among the principal resolutions adopted were the following: a resolution on the preparation of the defence of the American Republics and support of the action of the United Nations; a resolution on inter-American military co-operation; a resolution on the strengthening of internal security; and a resolution on economic development.

The first of these resolutions includes the provision that "each of the American Republics should immediately examine its resources and determine what steps it can take to contribute to the defence of the hemisphere and to United Nations collective security efforts in order to accomplish the aims and purposes of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution of the General Assembly". This resolution also recommends that "each of the American Republics, without prejudice to attending to national self-defence, should give particular attention to the development and maintenance of elements within its national armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could, in accordance with its constitutional norms, and to the full extent that, in its judgment, its capabilities permit, promptly be made available, (1) for the defence of the hemisphere, and (2) for service as United Nations unit or units, in accordance with the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution".

The resolution on inter-American military co-operation reiterates the determination of the American Republics to strengthen and maintain in a state of readiness for collective hemispheric defence at any time, those of their armed forces best adapted to such a task. Under the same resolution the Meeting called upon the Inter-

American Defence Board to prepare "as vigorously as possible" the military planning of the common defence for the consideration and decision of the governments.

As regards the strengthening of internal security the American Republics, after reaffirming their resolve to condemn the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, agreed on the necessity of adopting laws and regulations against subversive activities and particularly of exercising an effective control over the coming and going of subversive elements from one national territory to another. The resolution also instructed the Pan-American Union (Secretariat of the OAS) to prepare technical studies for the information of the American governments with a view to facilitating the drafting and co-ordination of the desired legislation. Upon request by any one government, and following a favourable decision by the Council of the OAS, a special conference may be called by the Pan-American Union to develop further this specific aspect of inter-American co-operation.

Collaboration Necessary

On the question of economic development the main resolution, as embodied in the Final Act, expresses the common desire of the republics to adjust their economies to both their emergency needs and their long-term aspirations. It recognizes the desirability of collaborating actively in the programme of economic development and technical co-operation with a view to building economic strength and increasing well-being in the under-developed regions of the Americas. Subject to necessary allocations and priorities the American states undertake to supply one another with machinery, mechanical equipment and other materials needed to increase their respective productive capacity and diversify their production and distribution. During the present emergency period first preference among economic development projects shall be given to projects useful for defence purposes and those required to satisfy the basic requirements of the civilian economy. Steps are to be taken by each American state to co-ordinate individual programmes for economic development with the emergency economic plans.

Another resolution in the economic field recommends the increase of production and processing of basic and strategic materials. To this end the American Republics will extend to one another technical and financial aid and will be prepared "to enter into long-term or medium-term purchase and sale contracts at reasonable prices for these basic and strategic materials. . ." Under another resolution the American Republics undertake "to co-operate fully with one another in the adoption of effective measures of economic defence and security controls in the field of their international economic relations" and will consider means of increasing "the availability of products in short supply to the countries of the free world". The Foreign Ministers also approved a resolution recommending the adoption by member nations, in consultation with one another, of price stabilization measures to counteract inflationary tendencies which might endanger the defence programme and the economic stability of the Americas. Such measures should apply "so long as the threat of serious inflation persists" so that the purchasing power of the various member states be maintained for inter-American trade purposes. A number of other resolutions were adopted on such specific questions as co-operation with existing international agencies for the production and distribution of raw materials and other scarce essential products, transportation, shortage and distribution of newsprint, etc.

In expressing satisfaction at the results of the meeting, President Truman told the representatives of the 21 American Republics: "... in the signing of the final act of your meeting, you have proclaimed that the American Republics and their peoples will act in concert to mobilize the moral and spiritual, military and economic strength of this hemisphere. Further, you have affirmed our common determination to aid freedom-loving peoples everywhere who work for the defeat of communist tyranny."

DEDICATION OF UNITED NATIONS CEMETERY IN KOREA

On April 6 the Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Japan flew from Tokyo to Pusan to take part in the dedication of the first permanent United Nations cemetery in Korea, where twenty-five Canadian soldiers already lie buried. Lieutenant-General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Field Commander of U.N. Forces in Korea, had asked the heads of diplomatic missions in Japan of countries supplying forces in Korea to fly over to Pusan to join in the dedication ceremonies.

The flight to Pusan was made in three and one half hours in General MacArthur's aeroplane *Bataan*. 8th Army Rear Headquarters is located about a mile from the Pusan airstrip, and there the war in its Korean setting seemed relatively close at hand. Fighter planes were coming in from the front to refuel and load up with ammunition. In the bay, ships hung at anchor discharging cargo into barges. Truck convoys rolled along the muddy roads. The mountains descend abruptly into the sea at Pusan, giving the impression of the difficult terrain U.N. forces must contend with there. In the fields, Korean peasants in their traditional white garments toiled with hoes, while along the road womenfolk in colourful garments trudged bare-footed through the mud carrying tubs of vegetables on their heads and children on their backs. National guard units of Korean young men straggled along roads on training route marches. Everywhere there are military supply dumps, motor pools and encampments.

The cemetery is located about five miles northeast of Pusan on the level crest of a small hill overlooking the sea. An honour plateau rises five feet above the rest of the cemetery. On this raised area fifteen equal-sized plots are marked out in military precision for the fifteen countries now contributing forces in Korea. Before each plot is a flagpole for the national flag of the country represented there. In front is a spot for the U.N. flag representing the common effort of these countries.

Ceremony Simple

The ceremony was a simple one. On the terrace below the honour plot, American and Republic of Korea honour guards were lined up. Visiting officials formed four rows facing these honour guards. In the front row were Lieutenant-General Ridgway, President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea, James Plimsoll, Chairman of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, John J. Muccio, U.S. Ambassador, the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army and Colonel Hodgson, Head of the Australian Mission in Japan and Senior U.N. diplomatic representative there.


After the raising of the national flags of the contributing countries, wreaths were laid by chaplains representing the various national forces. Then Lieutenant-General Ridgway stepped forward to raise the U.N. flag and to deliver the dedication remarks. He said:

Surrounded by this scene of earth and sky, fashioned of Korea by our Creator, lie our comrades of land and sea and air forces.

Proudly they served, fearlessly they died, defending to the last the dignity of the individual, the rock on which our fight for freedom rests.

We have fought with heart and hand to add for them what we could of simple beauty to this sacred spot.

We seek today to express the honour in which they are held. We shall seek through all the future to keep the faith they so fully kept, and having kept, passed on to us in trust.



UNITED NATIONS CEMETERY NEAR PUSAN

—United Nations

After this, there was a minute's silent prayer. Then a firing party fired three volleys in honour of the fallen heroes. Two British buglers ended the ceremony by playing Taps.

The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was represented at the ceremony by Chaplain Captain Cunningham and three soldiers, proud to have been given this opportunity to take part in the dedication of this U.N. Cemetery. The sacrifices of their brothers-in-arms were an intimate experience for each of them.

In seeing his national plot of graves, each United Nations representative had brought home to him the cost of the fight to repel aggression in Korea. Five thousand American graves are marked in the cemetery. Many more are buried elsewhere. And in the Korean hills are the graves, often unmarked, of countless Koreans who died in defence of their national freedom. All these died to support the principles for which the United Nations stands, principles which have been given greater meaning by their sacrifices.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

Visit of the President of the Republic of France

The President of the French Republic, Monsieur Vincent Auriol, on April 5 addressed the members of the House of Commons and the Senate in the House of Commons chamber. His speech was broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In welcoming the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, after extending the greetings of the people of Canada to both Madame Auriol and Monsieur Schuman, the Foreign Minister of the French Republic, as well as to the President, said that he welcomed Monsieur Auriol not only on behalf of those "of my race and yours . . . but also on behalf of Canadians who from the Atlantic to the Pacific now make up a people bound by common national aspirations". The North Atlantic Treaty now united France with Canada and ten other countries more intimately than ever before in time of peace. The times through which the two countries were passing were difficult because "one of the great powers (was) bent on extending the domination of its dictatorial measures". Monsieur Auriol had come to Canada after spending a few days in the United States, and the President could not have failed to have been impressed by the "strength of that great country". "Canada is, I think, the best evidence, permanent and historic evidence, of the peaceful purposes of the United States". Speaking in English and then in French, Mr. St. Laurent proceeded:

These confident, friendly and co-operative international relations which we enjoy with our great southern neighbour we wish to share ultimately with the whole world, and in the meantime we expect to share them with all the nations of the North Atlantic community. We know we can count upon the people of France, and we wish to assure you the people of France can count upon the good will and effective co-operation of all the people of Canada.

I know that you share our convictions as to the means of warding off the danger which threatens us. This means is none other than the pooling of our forces in the face of any possibility of aggression and of any attempted domination or even intimidation.


As I have just pointed out, our generation has twice already seen Canadian soldiers fight as brothers-in-arms with French soldiers. Thousands of them rest side by side in the vast cemeteries of France.

It was not only your homeland that our Canadian soldiers went to defend, it was also their own, their physical as well as their spiritual homeland. Similarly, your own soldiers fought for an ideal greater than the defence of French territory. Neither you nor we could watch with indifference the fate of the glorious heritage which they preserved for us at the cost of their lives. Without a doubt, we wish to do everything possible to prevent a new disaster from sweeping down on our peoples, but we shall never give up the right to defend ourselves; we shall never try to escape the duty of helping to defend those who, like yourselves, are more immediately exposed than we.

Upon your return home, you may tell your compatriots that here in Canada you have met men of good will, a people anxious not only to prevent the iron curtain from falling on the shores of the Atlantic, but eager to ensure that the tricolour shall ever wave in the air of freedom, because the Canadian people realize that the free world would no longer be free if ever France or the Europe from which our ancestors came should lose their freedom . . .

The North Atlantic Treaty

The second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty at Washington was marked on April 4 by the following statement made by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent:



—NFB

THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE ADDRESSING MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF COMMONS AND SENATE.

... Today is the second anniversary of an historic event, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. We entered into the treaty because we believed it was necessary for the continuing preservation of the freedom and the heritage of the Atlantic nations. It was necessary because the Soviet Union had prevented the Security Council of the United Nations from discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, and because a grave atmosphere of disillusion, anxiety and tension had been created by the enforced transformation of one eastern European state after another into a satellite of the Soviet Union.

Against this background of the growing threat of communist imperialism, the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded. In the two years of its existence, by increasing the ability of the Atlantic powers to resist aggression, important steps have been taken to lessen the likelihood of war. In the military field an integrated force has been established under General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Europe. The principle of mutual aid has been revived, and Canada has shared in the mutual aid programme by transferring military equipment to a number of our European allies and by providing places for our North Atlantic partners in our military and air training establishments.

The strength and determination of the North Atlantic allies to resist aggression have been increased with the growth of their deterrent military strength and of their feeling of a community of interests, political, economic and cultural. While the primary purpose of the treaty is security, the development of mutual understanding which is taking place serves a deeper purpose which has a special appeal for Canadians: the ultimate creation of a great community of free nations working together for a lasting peace.

Korea

Certain newspapers on April 26 published a report of an announcement attributed to a spokesman for the United States Delegation at Lake Success to the effect that enemy air bases in Manchuria would be attacked if the Chinese communists used heavy air power against United Nation troops. Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggar) asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs whether Canada, as a participant in military action in Korea and as a member of the United Nations, had been consulted regarding that announcement. Mr. Pearson's reply is quoted in the article "The Korean Crisis", p. 152 above.

May, 1951

Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel) then asked:

Is there any continuing conference of representatives of nations whose forces are engaged in Korea, through which these matters can be cleared at very short notice; or do they have to go through the long procedure of conferring among the governments of the various countries?

Mr. Pearson replied:

No; the representatives of governments contributing forces to the Korean campaign meet almost daily in Washington, and on a level high enough to make it possible to get a decision almost immediately in respect of these matters.

The Canadian Offer of Wheat to India

On April 9 Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggar) addressed the following question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

In view of the decision of the Indian government not to accept the offer of Canadian wheat with strings attached tying it up to the Colombo Plan, will the government consider making an outright gift of low grade wheat to the Indian government?

Mr. Pearson replied:

The Canadian offer of wheat to India under the Colombo Plan had no strings attached, nor has India refused our offer. The only wheat now available for export from Canada is of low grade, No. 5 and 6 Manitoba. As this quality is unsuitable for India, where wheat is used directly in the government rationing system, the Indian government has preferred to wait until our next crop year when a better grade may be available.

This subject was again referred to by Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (PC, Lake Centre) on April 18 when Mr. Pearson indicated that the position remained substantially the same as indicated above. Mr. Diefenbaker then asked whether the Indian government had agreed to accept wheat from Canada later in the year as part of the Colombo Plan. Mr. Pearson stated that "they have agreed to accept wheat as part of the Colombo Plan, the proceeds from the sale of which would go into capital development in India".

Pacific Relations

Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel) on April 2 referred to an announcement which had been made by Mr. John Foster Dulles regarding a proposed treaty of peace or treaty of rearmament with respect to Japan. Mr. Pearson said:

... He (Mr. Dulles) spoke on behalf of the United States Government, and not on our behalf or, so far as I know, on behalf of any other government. It is quite true, however, that a draft treaty of peace with Japan has been worked out by the United States Government after informal consultations with certain other governments. That draft treaty has now been submitted to the Canadian Government and other governments for their consideration, and in due course we shall have some comments to make on it. So far, however, the consultation has been entirely informal, and the draft represents the views of the United States only.

Mr. Graydon then asked whether the draft referred to was what Mr. Dulles described in his speech as a "series of pacts". Mr. Pearson replied:

No, I was referring to the draft treaty of peace with Japan. However, during his speech I believe Mr. Dulles made reference to certain other possible security and mutual assistance arrangements between the United States and Australia and New Zealand. That may have caused some confusion in the minds of those who read press reports of his speech.

In response to a further question by Mr. Graydon, Mr. Pearson stated that he did not think these arrangements would be the forerunners of a defence pact for the

Pacific area, and went on to say that "this would be an arrangement that covered only the three governments I have just mentioned".

On April 17 Mr. L. T. Stick (L, Trinity-Conception) asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs whether he had anything to add to the foregoing. Mr. Pearson replied:

I have only this to add, that we have received a draft treaty from the United States government, and we have made a careful study of it. The observations of the Canadian government with respect to it will be forwarded shortly to Washington. I might also say at this time that there is a broad measure of agreement between our views and those of the United States government on the basic issues of the treaty. It is our expectation that after the views of the governments concerned have been submitted to the United States government there will be further consultation, with the object of concerting future procedure.

Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel) then asked whether it was the intention to have any kind of conference among the powers in connection with this matter, and Mr. Pearson said:

It has not yet been decided whether the Japanese treaty will be signed at a formal conference, or will be signed separately by governments, with the Japanese government, as a result of negotiations among themselves.

The following exchange then took place:

Mr. W. J. Browne (PC, St. John's West): I should like to ask a supplementary question. In today's *Ottawa Citizen* there is a statement to the effect that the United Kingdom had submitted a draft treaty to the United States. Has that also been submitted to Canada, and can the minister say whether the Government of Canada is in agreement with the terms of that draft treaty?

Mr. Pearson: I understand that the comments of the United Kingdom Government on the American draft have taken now the form of another draft treaty submitted by the United Kingdom Government. That United Kingdom draft has been submitted to us, but I have not yet had an opportunity to see it. In fact I am not sure whether it has actually arrived in the department.

Mr. Howard C. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra): Is the question of a Pacific defence pact included in these discussions?

Mr. Pearson: No, not in discussions of the Japanese peace treaty.

A further enquiry as to a security agreement by the United States, Australia and New Zealand was made on April 19 by Mr. Green, who brought to the attention of the House the fact that on the previous day President Truman had announced plans for working out such an agreement which apparently was to lead a full-scale Pacific pact comparable to the North Atlantic alliance. Mr. Pearson then spoke as follows:

The statement which was made by President Truman yesterday in Washington—and I believe statements were also made in New Zealand and Australia—referred to a proposed arrangement between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States for mutual security pursuant to articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter. The Canadian Government has been kept closely informed of those negotiations, and we have already indicated to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand that we welcome them as an important contribution to the defence of freedom by increasing stability in the area to be covered by these arrangements. That area was referred to by the Australian Minister for External Affairs in a statement to the House of Representatives in Canberra on March 14 last, when he said — and I am quoting from Mr. Spender's statement:

The objective has been to obtain an arrangement which will benefit the whole of the western Pacific area, guaranteeing friendly aid and protection in the event of a renewed threat of attack.

Yesterday in his statement President Truman did say that these arrangements constitute initial steps, not, as I understood him, necessarily to a Pacific pact, but initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area. If these negotiations are ex-

tended to cover anything like a Pacific pact analogous to the North Atlantic Pact, naturally the Canadian Government would be interested; but we have received no indication that these additional negotiations are going to take place.

General MacArthur

On April 3 Mr. Alistair Stewart (CCF, Winnipeg North) asked the following question:

Is it the intention of the government to take any official action over the latest rebuke by General MacArthur to the elected representatives of the people?

Mr. Pearson replied:

There may be some statements of General MacArthur which have been controversial in character, but I do not know of any particular statement of the General which could be considered a rebuke to the elected representatives of the people; therefore I am not able to deal with the question.

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggar) then asked this supplementary question:

Has the minister seen the letter that General MacArthur wrote to representative Martin regarding the Korean situation? If so, has he any comment to make on the proposals made by the general in that letter?

To this Mr. Pearson answered:

Yes, I have seen the letter, and have read it with considerable interest. Our views on the matters contained therein, and other relevant matters, have already been conveyed informally to the United States government, and I do not feel that I should say anything more at this time on the subject.

On April 11 Mr. E. G. Hansell (SC, Macleod) stated that the recall of General MacArthur on presidential authority raised the question as to whether Canada as one of the nations supplying United Nations forces in Korea should have been consulted. Mr. Pearson spoke then as follows:

I have no desire at this time, or even tomorrow, to comment on the nature of the action taken by the President of the United States in this matter. I can, however, briefly outline the procedure under which that action was taken.

When the Security Council, by its resolution of July 7, 1950, established a Unified Command to conduct the military operations in Korea, it requested the United States to designate the commander of the United Nations forces there. In response to this request of the Security Council, President Truman the following day designated General MacArthur as the commanding general of the military forces placed by the members of the United Nations under the Unified Command. I understand that the President of the United States has now decided that the conduct of the military operations in Korea should be entrusted to other hands, and, acting under the mandate given to him by the Security Council resolution to which I have referred, has appointed General Ridgway as the United Nations commander in place of General MacArthur. This decision is clearly one which falls within the sphere of authority which has been given to the President of the United States by the United Nations itself.

Reference was made by Mr. J. C. Diefenbaker (PC, Lake Centre) on April 16 to an address delivered by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Toronto on April 10 and Mr. Diefenbaker enquired whether Mr. Pearson had been aware at the time of his speech of the fact that General MacArthur was going to be dismissed. Mr. Pearson said:

I can answer that question very quickly — and I am glad to have the opportunity to answer it, because of reports which have appeared in the press. I had no knowledge whatsoever of General MacArthur's dismissal before that dismissal was announced in the newspapers.

Reported Arrest of Missionaries in China

Various members expressed their interest in the report that five Canadian missionary sisters had been arrested in Canton and on April 16 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, made the following statement:

The Canadian Government has learned with grave concern that five Canadian nuns of the Order of the Immaculate Conception, who have been operating with selfless devotion an orphanage in Canton, have been detained and that their orphanage has been taken over by communist Chinese authorities. The most atrocious and fantastic crimes have been attributed to the five sisters by press reports and radio broadcasts emanating from China. The Canadian Government deeply regrets that irresponsible accusations which, it is sure, are unfounded have been given so much publicity.

In the absence of a Canadian diplomatic mission in China the Canadian Government has availed itself of the good offices of the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires in Peking. This officer has been informed of the great concern of the Canadian Government for the five sisters and has assured us that he will lose no opportunity to do anything he can to help them.

There is no evidence that formal charges have so far been laid by the Chinese authorities. The agitation against the five sisters at the present time seems to be chiefly local. As I have already said, it is inconceivable that they could be considered guilty of the crimes which they are alleged to have committed, and the local communist officials must surely know this. I hope, therefore, that the Central People's Government will allow the sisters to return freely to Canada.

It may take considerable time before the case of these sisters can be cleared up, and the Canadian Government is anxious that nothing should be done or said at this time which could conceivably worsen their position.

I should like once again to assure the House that the Government is doing everything it can to watch over the interests of these five unjustly accused sisters, and to assure the House further that everything is being done and will be done which will help them without increasing the danger to them.

In response to a question asked by Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel), Mr. Jean Lesage, Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, provided on April 20 the following information:

The Department has no information as to the total number of Christian missionaries in China. However, there are now known to be 370 Canadians in continental China, of whom 332 are missionaries and their dependents.

On April 24 Mr. Lesage stated in response to a question which had been asked by Mr. E. D. Fulton (PC, Kamloops) that the Department of External Affairs was not in possession of any information on the reported arrest of further Canadian missionary sisters. "I have made thorough enquiries" Mr. Lesage said, "and find there is no information to that effect".

Passport Regulations

On April 24 the following question and reply were recorded:

Mrs. Ellen L. Fairclough (PC, Hamilton West): In the absence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister, in view of the announcement made on the radio today and in the morning paper with reference to statements of Benjamin Gitlow in the United States un-American activities probe. I wonder if the Prime Minister would give assurance that conditions which prevailed a few years ago, and which permitted Gitlow to procure a Canadian passport, although he was a United States citizen, do not now exist, and that such a thing could not now happen? Is there sufficient surveillance of applicants for passports so that this situation could not recur?


Mr. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister): I do not know just what may have happened a few years ago but I know that for the last four or five years close attention

has been given to tightening up the regulations with respect to the issuing of passports. I would hope that we have now closed all the loopholes that were discovered in the regulations which were in effect some years ago. I think that we now have pretty strict control, and the general indication is that in any case of doubt about an application the Secretary of State for External Affairs himself should be consulted.

Tabling of Reports

On April 2 Mr. Lesage tabled, on behalf of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, a report entitled *Canada and the United Nations 1950*.* A report on Canada's share in the work of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations during the year ended March 31, 1951, was similarly tabled by Mr. Lesage on April 6.

* See *External Affairs* April 1951, page 143.



—Capital Press

PRESIDENT AURIOL'S GIFT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The President of the Republic of France, M. Vincent Auriol, during his visit to Ottawa in April, presented to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, a gift of an 18th century volume describing the coronation of Louis XV. The text is adorned with rich borders and engraved cartouches and fleurons; it also contains several engraved plates representing, among other scenes, the king going to church, the coronation of the king, the king led to the throne, and, above, the ceremony of the anointment. Upon learning of M. Auriol's gift to Mr. St. Laurent, a French retired soldier from Champéy (Haute-Saône), very kindly offered to the Prime Minister a medal of the Coronation of Louis XV, which had been a family heirloom for over two centuries.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Collective Measures Committee

On April 12 the Collective Measures Committee, acting on recommendations made by a sub-committee, decided upon its programme of work and on methods by which it would approach the various items on its agenda. It approved the text of a communication to be sent to all member states of the United Nations inviting them to report on the steps which they had taken to designate units of their armed forces which could be made available to serve under the United Nations against an aggressor. This communication, which has now been despatched to member governments, is phrased in general terms. It does not specify a time limit by which replies should be sent, but it asks member states to reply with the least possible delay in order that the material received may be collated by the Committee and presented to the General Assembly and the Security Council by September 1, as required in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.

The Committee also established three sub-committees to examine other items on its agenda. Representatives of Canada, France and Turkey were appointed as a working group to consider the nature and general functions of a panel of military experts, the members of which can be made available on request to member states wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training and equipping of their United Nations units. This sub-committee, on which Canada is represented by Mr. J. W. Holmes, Acting Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, began work on April 25, but by the end of the month had not completed its examination of the size and terms of reference of the Panel.

The other two working groups of the Collective Measures Committee were assigned to broader fields of study. Representatives of Australia, Egypt, the Philippines, the United States and Venezuela were appointed as a sub-committee to consider the economic and financial measures which might be employed against an aggressor state or in support of a victim of aggression. Representatives of Belgium, Burma, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia were appointed as a sub-committee to consider political measures which might be employed under the aegis of the United Nations in case of aggression. There was general agreement that in approaching these assignments the two sub-committees should address themselves to the working out of techniques and procedures for the co-ordination by the United Nations of national policies in these fields and not to the relative efficacy of particular measures. This rule of guidance conforms to the view of the majority of members of the Collective Measures Committee that its work should be directed towards formulating general principles and methods of co-operation rather than towards establishing a collective security system with specific headquarters, bases and forces. In the view of the majority it would be for the General Assembly or the Security Council to give application to these principles in particular situations.

These, then, are the immediate targets at which the Collective Measures Committee is aiming. There remain further tasks which may eventually require similarly detailed examination. The Committee will, for example, be required to collate the offers of military forces made by member states; and it may also be suggested that it study the methods by which national military contributions could be satisfactorily co-ordinated under the United Nations. Some general guidance will also be required for the Panel of Military Experts to assist its members in performing their duties, and consideration will have to be given to the question of whether the Collective Measures Committee itself should be perpetuated as a standing body of the United Nations. These, however, are problems the solution of which must await the results of the studies which have recently been initiated.

International Refugee Organization

The Ninth Session of the Executive Committee and the Seventh Session of the General Council of the International Refugee Organization took place recently at Geneva, concluding on April 13. The Canadian Delegation was headed by the Canadian Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Victor Doré, and included representatives of the Departments of Labour and of Citizenship and Immigration.

As a result of the decisions taken at these meetings, IRO will continue its approved operational programmes for as long as the present resources of the Organization permit, and there remain any refugees within its mandate who require resettlement assistance and for whom resettlement opportunities can be found. The previous cut-off date was September 30, 1951. The Director-General estimates that funds are available to continue refugee resettlement until approximately the end of this year and that the Organization will be liquidated during the first quarter of 1952.

At the same time the Council decided to extend indefinitely the cut-off date of October 1, 1950, established at its last session, for resettlement assistance to eligible refugees in areas of IRO operation in Europe and the Middle East. It was possible to be more liberal in this respect because the number of applicants who had applied since the last session of the Council was substantially below the Director-General's previous estimate. The Director-General is authorized to give this assistance, including the payment of hard-core grants, to additional refugees if they are not already firmly established and if he is satisfied that their resettlement can be carried out without prejudice to the opportunities of those who were previously registered. The additional assistance will be carried out within the existing realizable resources of the Organization, and the Director-General will use the discretion granted to him to minimize the risk of encouraging persons not now in refugee status to enter that status.

Two other items of importance received the Council's attention. Mr. J. Donald Kingsley was invited to continue to serve as Director-General of IRO notwithstanding his appointment as United Nations Agent-General for Korea. Finally, the members of the General Council expressed their gratitude to the Allied High Commission for agreeing to take over the functions of the International Tracing Service, and thus ensuring that the records and the master card index of the ITS will still be available to governments wishing to use this service. The ITS was established over three years ago, on January 1, 1948, for the purpose of co-ordinating international tracing activities, and re-organizing the work of the former UNRRA Central Tracing Bureau. The importance of this humanitarian task of tracing missing persons cannot be over-emphasized and the work of IRO in this field has been the subject of much favourable comment.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. L. Mayrand has taken up his duties as Ambassador to Chile, effective April 18, 1951.
- Mr. J. A. Strong was appointed from Ottawa to Boston as Canadian Consul General, effective March 22, 1951.
- Mr. S. A. Freifeld was posted from the Canadian Consulate General at New York to Ottawa, effective April 30, 1951.
- Mr. E. R. Bellemare was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General at New York, effective March 31, 1951.
- Mr. E. P. Black was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy in the U.S.S.R., effective April 3, 1951.
- Mr. K. D. McIlwraith was posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva, effective April 3, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Lieutenant Stokes Lybrand Sharp, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air, Embassy of the United States of America, April 17.

Major R. S. Nicholson, Assistant Army Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, April 24. Major Nicholson is married.

Mr. Georges Aguesse, Attaché, Embassy of France, end of April.

Departures

Mr. S. C. Latif, Counsellor, Office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan, March 31.

Major K. S. Hamilton, Assistant Army Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, April 24.

Baron Michel de Warengien de Flory, Attaché, Embassy of France, end of April.

Mr. Alois Mohyla, Second Secretary, Legation of Czechoslovakia, left Ottawa on April 14 for a visit to Prague.

CONSULAR

Exequaturs were issued to:

Mr. Hanan Aynor, Vice-Consul of Israel at Montreal, April 21.

Mr. George F. Bogardus, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, April 21.

Mr. John M. Kavanaugh, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Saint John, N.B., April 21.

Mr. Muktar Mokaish, Consul General of Lebanon at Ottawa, April 21.

Mr. Orsen N. Nielsen, Consul General of the United States of America at Toronto, April 21.

Mr. Julio A. Ricord, Jr., Honorary Consul General of Panama at Vancouver, April 21.

Definitive recognition was granted to:

Mr. Knut Sivertsen as Honorary Vice-Consul of Norway at Edmonton, April 2.

Mr. Edward J. Lawler as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, April 3.

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Ellis A. Bonnet as Consul of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, April 11.

Baron Kurt F. J. Paumann as Honorary Vice-Consul of Austria at Ottawa, April 16, during the absence of Dr. Frederick Riedl-Riedenstein, Consul in charge of the Consulate General of Austria.

Mr. Horatio Mooers as Consul General of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, April 21. Mr. Mooers was previously Consul in that city.

Dr. Gerardo Zampaglione as Vice-Consul of Italy at Toronto, April 21.

Mr. Stefanos Rockanas as Vice-Consul of Greece at Toronto, April 24.

Departures

Mr. Alexis Anfossy, Consul of France at Vancouver, end of April.

Mr. L. G. Vieira de Campos de Carvalho, Consul General of Portugal, resumed charge of the Consulate General on April 19 on his return from a visit to Europe.

TRADE

New Appointments

Mr. Werner E. P. Gautier, Assistant Trade Commissioner for the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa.

Mr. Helmuth Vitzthum von Eckstaedt, Assistant Trade Commissioner for the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of April 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs").

CONTINUING BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs" January 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions).

CONFERENCES ATTENDED IN APRIL

1. *Multilateral Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* Torquay—September 28-April 21. Chairman: L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, London; Deputy Chairman: H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board; J. J. Deutsch, W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
2. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris—February 15-April. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
3. *Special Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* Torquay—March 29-April 21. Chairman: L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, London; Deputy Chairman: H. B. McKinnon, Canadian Tariff Board; W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. Couillard, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris; Dr. C. M. Isbister, A. L. Neal, B. G. Barrow, H. V. Jarrett and J. P. C. Gauthier, Department of Trade
- and Commerce; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; H. H. Wright, Department of External Affairs, Secretary.
4. *First Meeting of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission.* Washington—April 2-14. Commissioners: S. Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries; J. H. MacKichan, General Manager, United Maritime Fishermen, Ltd., Halifax; R. Cusshie, Chairman, Newfoundland Fisheries Board, St. John's; Scientific Adviser: Dr. A. W. H. Needler, Director, Atlantic Biological Station, St. Andrews; Adviser: C. E. Cox, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
5. *International Joint Commission (Executive Session).* Washington—April 3-6. Chairman: General A. G. L. McNaughton; Hon. George Spence; J. L. Dansereau.
6. *Ninth Session of the Executive Committee of IRO.* Geneva—April 4-18. Head of Delegation: V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland; Delegates: J. Boucher, Department of Citizenship and Immigration; R. Lamarre, Canadian Labour Officer, Karlsruhe-Durlach; N.F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
7. *Seventh Session of the General Council of IRO.* Geneva—April 9-18. Head of Delegation: V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland; Delegates: J. Boucher, Department of Citizenship and Immigration; R. Lamarre, Canadian Labour Officer, Karlsruhe-Durlach; N.F.H. Ber-

- lis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
8. *Meeting of Special Committee to study Draft International Sanitary Regulations (WHO)*. Geneva—April 9-May 5. Delegate: Dr. H. D. Reid, Department of National Health and Welfare; Alternate: Dr. J. B. Bundock, Canadian Embassy, The Hague.
 9. *International Rubber Conference*. Rome—April 9-21. Delegate: R. G. C. Smith, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; Advisers: J. R. Nicholson, Polymer Corporation, Sarnia; A. A. Caron and S. G. MacDonald, Canadian Embassy, Rome.
 10. *Sixth Session of the Narcotic Drugs Commission*. New York—April 10. Col. C. H. L. Sharman, Canadian Member, Narcotic Drugs Commission.
 11. *Eighth Session of the International Rubber Study Group*. Rome—April 16. Delegate: R. G. C. Smith, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; Advisers: J. R. Nicholson, Polymer Corporation, Sarnia; A. A. Caron and S. G. MacDonald, Canadian Embassy, Rome.
 12. *Sixth Session of the Administrative Council of ITU*. Geneva—April 16-May 12. Delegate: C. P. Edwards, Deputy Minister of Transport for Air; C. J. Acton, Department of Transport.
 13. *North Atlantic Technical Committee on Civil Requirements and on Shipping Availability*. London—April 16. Chairman: The Hon. Mr. Justice J. V. Clyne, British Columbia Supreme Court; Delegate and Alternate Chairman: L. C. Audette, Canadian Maritime Commission; Advisers: R. P. Boer and E. A. Côté, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; Lt. Cmdr. F. J. Jones, Department of National Defence.
 14. *Regional Congress on Tourism*. Mexico City—April 21. One Observer, Canadian Embassy, Mexico City.
 15. *North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping*. London—April 23. Chairman: The Hon. Mr. Justice J. V. Clyne, British Columbia Supreme Court; Delegate and Alternate Chairman: L. C. Audette, Canadian Maritime Commission; Advisers: R. P. Boer and E. A. Côté, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; Lt. Cmdr. F. J. Jones, Department of National Defence.
 16. *Standing Committee on Pulp and Paper*. Washington—April 30. Representative: S. V. Allen, Department of Trade and Commerce; Alternate: M. P. Carson, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
 17. *Meeting of Executive Board of UNICEF*. New York—April 30. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.

CONFERENCES TO BE HELD IN MAY AND JUNE

1. *International Social Security Association (Committee of Experts)*. Geneva—May.
2. *Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe*. Strasbourg—May 5-19.
3. *Sixth Session of Statistical Commission of ECOSOC*. New York—May 7-18.
4. *Fourth Session of the Coal Mines Committee of ILO*. Geneva—May 7-19.
5. *Fourth World Health Assembly (WHO)*. Geneva—May 7.
6. *Meeting of Committee on Commodity Problems*. Rome—May 8.
7. *78th Annual Meeting of the Conference on Social Work*. Atlantic City—May 13-18.
8. *Economic, Employment and Development Commission of ECOSOC*. New York—May 14.
9. *Third Session of the Fiscal Commission of ECOSOC*. New York—May 16.
10. *16th Session of the Joint Maritime Commission (ILO)*. Geneva—May 21-26.
11. *Third World Petroleum Congress*. The Hague—May 28-June 6.
12. *115th Session of the Governing Body of ILO*. Geneva—May 28-.
13. *Conference of Plenipotentiaries — Convention on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons*. Geneva—May 28-June 16.
14. *Fifth Annual Conference of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers*. Mexico City—May 29-June 8.
15. *First Session of the Commission on Improvement of National Statistics*. Washington—June 2-8.
16. *Fifth Session of the Assembly of ICAO*. Montreal—June 5.
17. *34th Session of the Conference of ILO*. Geneva—June 6-July 30.
18. *International Commission of Criminal Police*. Lisbon—June 11-15.
19. *Meeting of Budget Committee of General Conference of UNESCO*. Paris—June 11-17.
20. *4th Session of the Committee of the 1950 Census of the Americas*. Washington—June 11-15.
21. *12th Session of the Council of FAO*. Rome—June 11.

22. *15th Wildlife Conference*. Ottawa—June 15.
23. *13th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy*. Paris — June 17-23.
24. *Sixth Session of the General Conference*

- of UNESCO. Paris—June 18-July 11.
25. *14th Conference of International Office of Documentation on Military Medicine*. Vichy—June 24-25.
26. *Meeting of Copyright Specialists Committee of UNESCO*. Paris—June.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

Relief and rehabilitation of Korea—Report by the Secretary-General; February 12, 1951; document E/1913; 35 p.

Assistance to Indigent Aliens — Second Report by the Secretary-General — (Resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council on March 29, 1947 and July 13, 1950); January 10, 1951; document E/CN.5/235; 87 p.; and Addenda.

Recognition and Enforcement abroad of maintenance obligations (Report by the Secretary-General); January 19, 1951; document E/CN.5/236; 56 p.; and Addenda.

(b) Printed Documents:

†*Probation and Related Measures*; January 2,

1951; document E/CN.5/230; 407 p.; \$3.00; Sales No.: 1951.IV.2 (Department of Social Affairs).

Demographic Yearbook 1949-50; Second Issue; 558 p. (Bilingual: English and French); Sales No.: 1951.XIII.1 (Department of Social Affairs, Population Division and Department of Economic Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations).

World Health Organization:

(a) *Proposed Programme and Budget Estimates for 1952*; March 1951; 571 p. Official Records No. 31.

(b) *Executive Board, Seventh Session—Part II: Comments and Recommendations on the Proposed Programme and Budget Estimates for 1952*; March 1951; 134 p. Official Records No. 33.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 51/11—*Canada and the Atlantic Community*, an address by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, delivered to the Canadian Club of Montreal, on March 19, 1951.

No. 51/13—*The Role of the United Nations in a Two-Power World*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered to a meeting of the Canadian Bar Association, on March 31, 1951.

No. 51/14—*Canadian Foreign Policy in a*

Two-Power World, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered to the Empire and Canadian Clubs of Toronto, on April 10, 1951.

No. 51/15—*Canadian-American Arbitration*, an address by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, delivered at the Metropolitan Club, in New York, on March 30, 1951, on the occasion of a presentation to Mr. Claxton of an award by the American Arbitration Association.

The following serial number is available abroad only:

No. 51/12—*Air Training Plan*, a statement by the Minister of National Defence,

made in the House of Commons, on March 21, 1951.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, Lake Success, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

† French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

At a meeting of the Additional Measures Committee of the United Nations on May 7 a draft resolution for a selective economic embargo against the Chinese People's Republic was submitted by the United States Delegation. The draft was clarified at informal meetings of the Committee during the following week and was adopted at a formal meeting on May 14. Three days later it was adopted by the Political Committee and the following day by the General Assembly, the final vote being 47 votes to none with 8 abstentions. The five nations of the Soviet Bloc did not participate in the vote because they contended that the General Assembly did not have the right to deal with the resolution. The abstaining countries were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Syria, and Sweden.

Economic Measures Recommended

After recalling the General Assembly's resolution of February 1, and noting that the Additional Measures Committee had considered additional measures to meet the aggression in Korea and had reported that certain economic measures would supplement existing independent restrictions and support military action of the United Nations in Korea, the resolution went on to recommend that every state:

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic importance, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war;

(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo;

(c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other countries pursuant to this resolution;

(d) Co-operate with other countries in carrying out the purposes of this embargo;

(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within 30 days and thereafter at the request of the committee, on the measures taken in accordance with this resolution.

In the next section of the resolution, the Additional Measures Committee was requested:

(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;

(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress in its efforts.

Finally the resolution reaffirmed the continuing policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives there by peaceful means, and requested the Good Offices Committee to continue its efforts.

In explaining the Canadian Government's support of the resolution for a selective embargo, J. W. Holmes, the Acting Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, referred to the fact that Canada had long since taken measures to cut off strategic exports to China, and declared "nevertheless we consider that there are advantages in action by the United Nations to generalize restrictions and require some equality in the sacrifices involved in an embargo". He went on to say "if any


further action should be required we believe that this could be taken by extending or revising this embargo”.

Commonwealth Division Formed

The Minister of National Defence announced in the House of Commons on May 1, that the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group would join other Commonwealth forces in Korea in forming a Commonwealth division to be known as “The First (Commonwealth) Division, United Nations Forces”. In addition to the Canadian unit the division would consist of the 28th and 29th United Kingdom Infantry Brigades, the 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, the 16th New Zealand field artillery regiment and the 60th Indian field ambulance unit. Mr. Claxton said that the division would be commanded by a United Kingdom officer Major-General A. J. H. Cassels, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., and would have a Canadian, Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Danby, D.S.O., E.D., as its senior staff officer.

Spring Offensive Stopped

The Chinese Communists resumed their spring offensive on May 16. After four days of fighting, United Nations forces stopped the attack and launched a powerful counter offensive which quickly carried them beyond their initial defence positions and over the 38th parallel at several points. At the end of the month they had regained the line held on April 22 when the first phase of the Chinese offensive began.



FIRST NATO WINGS PARADE

—RCAF

Flags of Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Canada were displayed at the RCAF's first NATO wings parade for pilots held at Centralia, Ontario on May 18.

AN ADDRESS BY MR. TRYGVE LIE

Official text of an address delivered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Annual Meeting of the United Nations Association, at Ottawa, on June 1, 1951.

I am very glad to be able to come to Canada in response to the invitation of the United Nations Association.

The Canadian Government and the people of Canada have been strong and faithful supporters of the United Nations from its beginnings at San Francisco to the present.

At San Francisco I remember well the important part played by the Canadian delegation under the late Prime Minister Mackenzie King and including in its membership many distinguished representatives of your major parties. Your delegations to successive sessions of the General Assembly under the very able leadership of your Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, and your Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, have always exerted effective influence toward achieving constructive results.

Canada has sent so many able representatives to all the organs of the United Nations that I cannot mention them all.

I do wish, however, to pay a special tribute to your late Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. R. G. Riddell, whose untimely death cut short a brilliant career in the service of Canada and of the United Nations cause.

Canada has sought consistently to develop the capacity of the United Nations to prevent war, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations and to serve as the channel for co-operative efforts to achieve economic and social progress.

As Secretary-General I have shared with you these hopes and these efforts over the past five years. Equally I have shared with you the disappointments, the delays, the setbacks and the growing disquiet of these times.

There are not many people in the world who disagree with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. But there are many people who doubt the power of the United Nations to carry out its principles and to achieve its purposes in the present situation.

As they have watched the growing intensity of the present conflict between the West and the Soviet part of the world, many voices have been heard dismissing the United Nations as a weak reed upon which to lean in such a storm.

Industrial power and armed might, many say, speak with a more compelling voice than the Security Council and the General Assembly.

It is very necessary to make clear, I think, that the choice we must make today in our efforts to maintain peace and preserve freedom is not between the United Nations on the one hand and the use of power on the other hand.

That is not the issue.

The question is this: Will the Governments choose to develop and use their power through the United Nations, using other methods — the methods of direct action — of bilateral dealings — of alliances in support of national interests — not in substitution for the United Nations but in support of its influence and purposes.

Regional pacts and alliances, important as they are in times like the present when the national security of so many countries is felt to be gravely threatened, cannot by themselves alone prevent a third world war. They may be effective deterrents to aggression at particular times and in specified parts of the world.

But if we should ever be left only with these defenses against war, then the outlook would indeed be dim. Alliances alone have in the past led often to competing alliances and thence by stages to armed conflicts.

This is a lesson of history that has been repeated so many times in blood and tragedy, it ought by now to have been learned.

It seems to me, therefore, that the primary purpose of the Member countries in the present situation should be to use their power and influence to the fullest possible extent to preserve and strengthen the United Nations in three directions:

First, to make it work effectively for collective security against armed aggression in every part of the world.

Second, to use it, together with other appropriate methods, for the peaceful adjustment of the many conflicts of national interest that now or in the future endanger peace.

Third, to make it an effective instrument for international action to promote economic development and social progress.

With respect to the first point, it used to be argued that it was impossible to develop collective security within the United Nations because of the present grave conflicts between the majority and the Soviet-led minority.

The unanimity rule prevented the creation of the forces that the Charter said should be at the disposal of the Security Council. It prevented creation of a United Nations system of control of atomic energy and of other armaments.

Therefore, the United Nations was useless for collective security.

This was a short-sighted view.

During the past year we have had two demonstrations of what can be done to make the United Nations a strong force for collective security even in the existing situation of conflict.

The first demonstration is the United Nations action against armed aggression in Korea. The second is the action taken by the General Assembly last fall toward developing the capacity of the United Nations for effective collective action against future aggressions.

When the attack upon Korea was launched a year ago this month, Member Governments found that they could act with collective force under the Charter to meet the aggression. The power was there in the Charter. It had been there all the time, provided the Member Governments were willing to use it.

They have done so, with the United States leading the way and Canada taking an important and enlightened part. Thus, for the first time in history, nations have acted collectively with military force against aggression under the banner of a world organization — the United Nations flag.

This is an historic act of immense significance. As your Minister of External Affairs said last week, the men of 16 nations who are fighting in Korea are, in fact, fighting to prevent a third world war.

By this demonstration that it can act—and act effectively—against armed aggression, the United Nations has taken a great step toward the preservation of peace in the future.

The second demonstration during the past 12 months that the United Nations can become a strong force for collective security was the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolutions by the General Assembly last fall.

Member Governments have been asked to set aside part of their armed forces for United Nations action in case of any future acts of armed aggression. The possibility of creating a separate United Nations legion composed of volunteers is also being explored.

I have advocated since 1948, the creation of special United Nations forces. As Secretary-General, I feel it is of the utmost importance that the Member Governments agree to provide these forces and that a United Nations Legion also be established, composed of volunteers drawn especially from those countries unable to set aside special United Nations units of their own. These forces should be at the disposal of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Under the Uniting for Peace resolutions, a Peace Observation Committee has also been established to provide an international watch upon troubled borders whenever and wherever needed.

Studies are being undertaken of the problem of assuring overall United Nations direction of national forces committed to such collective actions as the one in Korea.

If the Security Council is unable to fulfil its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly can hereafter act to use this machinery on 24 hours notice.

It is essential that the promise of the Uniting for Peace resolutions be fulfilled. The responsibility rests with the Member Governments, for the Assembly cannot command them to set aside forces for United Nations action in defense of peace, nor can it compel their use in case of armed aggression.

The Assembly's power of recommendation can, nevertheless, become one of the most effective forces for peace in the world. But the condition is that the Member Governments and their peoples will give the United Nations the place in their foreign policies that their safety and their future clearly demand.

We should not forget that the whole action in Korea has been undertaken in response to recommendations, not commands, first by the Security Council then by the General Assembly.

The second way in which I believe the present crisis demands that a place of first importance be given to the United Nations is in renewed efforts to secure the peaceful settlement of the present conflicts by negotiation, mediation and conciliation.

The United Nations is almost the only place left in this bitterly divided world where all points of view are represented.

The history of the past five years has proved, I think beyond any shadow of doubt, that the best chance of settling conflicts by peaceful means, or at least keeping them within bounds, lies in the United Nations — and this includes Great Power conflicts. The list of cases in which the United Nations has intervened by peaceful means to prevent, settle or stop armed conflicts already is a good one: Iran in 1946, then Greece, Palestine, the Corfu Channel case, the Berlin blockade, Indonesia and Kashmir.

I believe that the time has come for a new effort to end the fighting in Korea. The United Nations forces there — as things stand today — have repelled the aggression and thrown the aggressors back across the 38th Parallel.

If a cease-fire could be arranged approximately along the 38th Parallel, then the main purpose of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 and July 7 will be fulfilled, provided that the cease-fire is followed by the restoration of peace and security in the area.

We should not forget that the United Nations has three objectives in Korea.

One is the military objective, dating from June 25 last year — to repel the aggression which the North Koreans started and restore peace and security.

The second is the political objective, and under the Charter this can be achieved only by such peaceful means as negotiation and conciliation. This second objective, which dates from 1947 — is the establishment of a free and independent Korea united under a democratic government freely chosen by the Korean People.

The third is the economic and social objective — the restoration with United Nations help of a land as terribly ravaged by war as any in modern history.

We must face the fact that the second objective, which was not accomplished in three years of effort before the attack last June, may take a long time before it is finally achieved.

But the first step, obviously, must be an end to the fighting. That in turn will make it possible to renew the efforts to achieve by negotiation and other peaceful means the unification and freedom of Korea and to begin the United Nations relief and reconstruction programme, for which over \$200,000,000 has already been pledged by the Member Governments.

It takes two sides to make peace. We do not know whether the North Koreans and their supporters are ready to agree to a cease-fire, to be followed by negotiations. Until we do know, the Members of the United Nations must continue to fight in Korea with all the forces that can safely be committed to the action.

If there is no cease-fire in the very near future, I think that it will be the duty of all Members of the United Nations to reconsider the situation and to contribute additional forces.

But the way is open for a cease-fire if the North Koreans and their supporters will now indicate that they are ready to join with the United Nations in stopping the bloodshed.

It is of immense importance for all concerned to bring the fighting to an end as soon as possible. This applies not only to the soldiers on both sides whose lives will be saved, and to the Korean people who have suffered so heavily, but to the world crisis as a whole.

No one can be sure if peace in Korea will open the way to amelioration of conflicts in other parts of the world. But we can be sure that so long as the fighting continues there, the possibility of reducing the present dangerous tensions both in Europe and the Far East is less than it would be if the fighting were ended.

Our desire to be firm in support of collective security against aggression must not lead us to lose any opportunity for honourable negotiation.

We must not confuse peace with appeasement.

We should also be alert to use every opportunity that may present itself inside the United Nations for negotiation and conciliation between majority and minority. If we bear in mind that the world situation is not rigidly static but is constantly subject to the shifting inter-play of all the forces and influences at work, we shall not despair even in the most apparently discouraging atmosphere.

The work for peace must go on in everyone of the many fields in which the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies are engaged.

Time does not permit me today to discuss all these other — and very important — aspects of United Nations work for a peaceful and better world.

But I wish, as Secretary-General, to express my thanks to the Government of Canada and to the Canadian people as a whole for their unfailing and active partici-

pation in all United Nations programmes in the political, economic and social fields.

I wish also to express my admiration for their great contributions toward constructive results.

I know of no Member country of the United Nations that has done so much in proportion to its resources and its population for relief and reconstruction, technical assistance for economic development, aid to refugees and children, and similar United Nations programmes.

Canada has never said "No" to any appeal from the United Nations to bring help to the suffering, the poor and the hungry anywhere in the world.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I urge upon all who desire to work for peace that they — as Canada has done — give their active support to all efforts to make the United Nations in fact as well as theory the primary instrument through which the power and resources of the Member countries of the whole world are used for the maintenance of world peace and for economic and social progress everywhere.

No one can be certain at this moment that we shall be able to avoid the disaster of a third world war — an atomic war that might send mankind back to the dark ages.

But we can be sure where lies the best chance of avoiding such a war — and of saving civilization if war should come in spite of all we do to prevent it.

Our best chance lies in preserving and strengthening the United Nations as the foundation of that peaceful world community which it must be our main purpose in this second half of the 20th Century to seek to build.



Asphoto

TRIBUTE TO CANADIAN SOLDIERS

The tradition of an annual tribute to the Canadian soldiers who fell in the liberation of the Netherlands was maintained on May 5 at the Canadian Military Cemetery at Holten on the sixth anniversary of the surrender of the German forces in the Netherlands to the Canadian Army. During the ceremony, children from the neighbourhood placed cut flowers on each grave.

THE TORQUAY CONFERENCE

At the third international tariff conference held since the war, the work done at Geneva in 1947 and Annecy in 1949 was enlarged and extended at Torquay last winter. The results of the Torquay Conference are an integral part of the total result of all three conferences which took place under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The innovation at these conferences of multilateral tariff negotiations between a large group of countries was, in a sense, a by-product of the extensive plans for future economic co-operation conceived during the war. A brief indication, therefore, of this background gives the setting for the work of the Torquay conference and also clarifies the role and status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, particularly its connection with the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization which is now expected to remain inoperative, since the United States Administration has decided not to submit the Charter to Congress.

Long before the end of the war consideration was given to the establishment of international agencies to deal with postwar problems of currency, investment and trade. The basic instruments for the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund were drawn up at Bretton Woods in 1944. While these steps were being taken the conception of an organization to deal with all matters pertaining to the international exchange of goods was kept clearly in view. After the completion of preliminary work in 1944 and 1945, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations passed a resolution early in 1946 calling for an international conference on trade and employment, and setting up a preparatory committee of eighteen nations to prepare the ground for such a conference.

The Preparatory Committee met first in London, and then in Geneva, to consider a draft charter for an international trade organization. During the London meeting in 1946 the participating governments felt that action to reduce tariff barriers should not be delayed. The basic idea behind the proposed tariff negotiations was that a major step forward in the reduction of tariffs would afford a good basis for the establishment of the new organization. Accordingly it was decided to combine the work of drafting the Charter for an ITO at the second session of the Preparatory Committee with a practical attack on tariff barriers.

Purpose of General Agreement

The tariff conference which followed at Geneva in 1947 led to the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was framed to give effect to the tariff concessions negotiated. The essential purpose of the General Agreement, which was regarded as an interim affair, was to protect the value of these concessions against measures of indirect protection (quota restrictions, etc.) and "invisible tariffs" (arbitrary customs procedures, etc.) pending the anticipated establishment of the International Trade Organization. Many of the commercial safeguards of the draft Charter were incorporated in the Agreement.

It was not expected, however, that governments would wish to ratify obligations which were still in draft form and liable to be changed at the full-dress 54 nation conference which was to open at Havana in November 1947, for the purpose of drawing up, in final form, the Charter for the International Trade Organization. Governments, therefore, undertook to apply the safeguarding provisions in the General Agreement "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation". On the basis of this arrangement it was possible to proceed with the conclusion of the Geneva tariff negotiations, and governments were able to make the agreed rates effective.

The General Agreement was, therefore, brought into being to fill an immediate and practical need. It has also provided a forum for the periodic discussion of commercial policy questions and the settlement of complaints brought before it by mem-

ber governments. These periodic meetings are concerned with commercial policy questions and they do not deal with other aspects of international economic relations which were included in the Havana Charter.

The more positive functions, however, foreseen for the International Trade Organization in fields other than that of commercial policy are now being taken up by existing international organizations. Thus, the Economic and Social Council is giving consideration to the principles of full employment. Economic development is also being dealt with by the Council and by its regional commissions as well as by other international agencies. Another important part of the Havana Charter concerned commodity agreements. The international machinery recently established in Washington to deal with commodity problems may, perhaps, ultimately promote the conclusion of commodity agreements.

The only important part of the Havana Charter which is not being dealt with by other agencies is that already embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The General Agreement is the sole international instrument in the field of commercial policy. As such, it has provided a code of conduct for the carrying on of world trade; it has served as an international forum for the discussion and settlement of commercial policy questions and, under its provision, three rounds of multilateral tariff negotiations have been concluded.

Value of General Agreement Increased

The tariff negotiations concluded at Torquay are expected to increase the overall value of the General Agreement in a number of important ways. First, arrangements were made to extend the Geneva and Ancey tariff concessions for a further period of three years. Secondly, the General Agreement and concessions under it were expanded to include the following six new members: Austria, the German Federal Republic, Korea, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey. Finally, new tariff negotiations took place between present members to cover a broader range of commodities and to provide for further reductions on many products. The new tariff concessions, together with the Geneva and Ancey concessions, are to remain in force at least until January 1, 1954.

As part of the undertaking to extend the previous agreements for a further period of three years, countries had a right under the General Agreement to make modifications or withdrawals of previous tariff concessions and a few concessions were withdrawn from Canada. In such instances, compensation was made by tariff concessions on other products so that the value to Canada of the previous agreements was not impaired. It is important to note that the original tariff concessions granted by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and a number of other important countries were maintained in their entirety.

Much importance was attached to the task of preserving at Torquay the structure of the concessions agreed on at Geneva and Ancey, and the Minister of Trade and Commerce said in the House of Commons on May 8 that "while the new agreements made at Torquay provide a signal contribution to Canada's external trade policy, by far the most important accomplishment was the prolongation of the Geneva and Ancey schedules of tariff concessions". The Geneva schedules included concessions on some 45,000 tariff items covering two-thirds of the foreign trade of the twenty-three participating countries. These countries account for three-quarters of total world exports and the Geneva agreements covered world trade to the value of many billions of dollars. Thus the concessions which Canada received at Geneva from the United States alone covered in some fashion almost 95 per cent of the total dutiable imports entering the United States from this country. Following the Geneva Conference some 5,000 further concessions were negotiated at Ancey in 1949. The main purpose, however, of the Ancey Conference was to provide for the accession of additional countries to the General Agreement.



—United Nations

CANADA SIGNS TORQUAY PROTOCOL TO GATT

Mr. John W. Holmes, left, Acting Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, signs the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. On the right, Mr. A. H. Feller, General Counsel and Principal Director of the United Nations Legal Department.

A specific indication of the actual effect of these two conferences is the percentage reduction which has taken place in the level of United States tariffs in the postwar period. Before the Geneva schedules became effective on January 1, 1948, the United States Government collected in customs duties about 25.5 per cent of the value of all dutiable foreign goods imported. Following the Geneva and Ancey Conferences this figure fell to 14.5 per cent, the lowest point since the Underwood Tariff Act, 1913.

With the rebinding of the Geneva and Ancey concessions and the accession of further governments to the GATT, the combined concessions resulting from the three tariff conferences will apply to some 58,800 items entering into the trade of some 38 countries which among them account for over 80 per cent of world imports and exports.

As the figures show, the largest part of the combined concessions were granted at Geneva. Agreements at Torquay on further tariff concessions on anything like the Geneva scale was never anticipated. In the first place many of the countries had to a large extent used up their bargaining power in 1947 and 1949 and were not in a position at Torquay to reduce their tariffs much further. Secondly, while measures for the liberalization of trade increase the importance of tariff reductions, they also make concessions more difficult to obtain. In addition, the tense international situation coupled with the changing world economic background did not facilitate the work of the Torquay Conference. Finally, the failure of the United States and members of the Commonwealth — with the exception of Canada — to conclude agreements at Torquay attracted much attention and was widely regretted. These negative elements in the Torquay situation did not, however, prevent the conclusion of important new agreements.

Mr. Howe's Statement

Speaking in the House of Commons on May 8, the Minister of Trade and Commerce said: "For Canada, these negotiations have been a marked success. The sixteen new trade agreements which we have made at Torquay will add strength to Canada's commercial position". Of the sixteen agreements to which Mr. Howe referred six were concluded with the new countries already named and the remaining ten with the United States, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, India and Indonesia. Under the most favoured nation principle the results of these bilateral agreements will be generalized. In this way all the concessions which Canada made are automatically extended to all the members of the group whether or not they were negotiated directly with Canada. Similarly, the concessions of the other countries are automatically extended to Canada.

In his review of the Torquay negotiations the Minister of Trade and Commerce dealt in some detail with the agreement concluded between Canada and the United States. He said:

The most important *single* agreement at Torquay was made by Canada with the United States. The policy of fostering joint trade between Canada and the United States was initiated by the trade treaties of 1935 and 1938, and greatly expanded in 1947 at Geneva. Torquay is now added, as a further and constructive milestone. The United States schedule of new tariff concessions resulting from Torquay contains 400 items of interest to Canadian exporters. Exports to the United States from Canada of goods in these categories amounted to \$120 million in 1949.

United States legislation provides that their tariffs may be reduced, by negotiation, to 50 per cent of the levels which prevailed on January 1, 1945. At Geneva, in 1947, Canada had received from the United States a large proportion of the tariff concessions which were negotiable under the powers of the President. These had included important concessions on agricultural products. The United States Administration still had power, nevertheless, to make a number of additional concessions of value to Canada. From our point of view, the Torquay negotiations were undertaken with the aim of obtaining for Canadian exporters as many of these additional concessions as possible. I am now in a position to inform Honourable Members that in this aim we have been eminently successful. We have, on our part, granted concessions in return . . .

Mr. Abbott's Statement

In supplementing Mr. Howe's statement, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Abbott, referred on May 8 to Canada's position with respect to the Commonwealth preferential system in relation to the Torquay Conference. He said:

It was clearly understood that no preferences need be reduced nor any tariff concessions granted except in return for reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions, and it was up to each country to decide what constituted a satisfactory agreement from its own point of view.

This government has never taken a rigid or doctrinaire position on the matter of preferences either with respect to their retention or modification. For that matter, as members of the House will recall, Canada took the lead many years ago in granting preferential treatment of Commonwealth countries. As hon. members know, we have used the device of Commonwealth preferences as a device for expanding trade. We have never regarded it as a device for restricting trade.

Our objective has always been to expand trade on as wide a basis as possible. Indeed, this is the only way in which we can find adequate outlets for the products of our expanding economy. For this reason, while the Government continues to attach a high importance to the development of inter-Commonwealth trade, it has never allowed our preferential arrangements to prevent us from taking advantage of new opportunities for expanding Canada's trade. In order to find adequate outlets for the products of the different regions and industries of this country, we must take advantage of such opportunities.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

A General Statement on International Affairs

On May 7 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, moved that the estimates of the Department be referred to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on External Affairs. In opening the debate Mr. Pearson spoke in part as follows:

... One of the cardinal facts in the world today is the emergence of the United States to a position of unquestioned leadership in the free world. A great shift of power and influence has occurred within the last few years, with the result that the United States now stands pre-eminent. By any test it is not only the most powerful of the free states of the world; it is immensely the most powerful. We in Canada know the United States so well that we can view this great and historic development without apprehension, and feel indeed relief and satisfaction that power is in the hands of a nation which has such a deeply rooted democratic tradition, whose people have no desire to dominate other countries, and which has shown its good will towards less fortunate peoples on so many occasions by acts of magnanimity and generosity.

This feeling, I think, is increased by a consideration of what our position would be today if the United States had not decided to assume the responsibilities throughout the world which its new position has thrust upon it. We have good reason to believe that it will discharge those responsibilities with conscience, courage, and respect for the interests of others. The predominance of the United States, however, is bound to raise new problems for all those countries which share its values, and which are associated with it, and proud to be associated with it, in the defence of freedom. These new problems must be understood and must be solved if friction is to be kept to a minimum and the forces of freedom are to be strong and united.

In considering, for instance, Canada's relations with the United States it is not enough to take refuge in thoughts or in words, as I see it, in the usual clichés of 135 years of peace or the unguarded boundary. Certainly in my view any spokesman for the Canadian Government or the Canadian people on external affairs has a duty to go deeper than this in the examination of this important question. Such an examination can also lead to a clarification of issues only if it is made within the wider framework of the position of the United States as the leader of our free alliance against the dangers which threaten us. The maintenance, let alone the strengthening, of an alliance of free nations is never easy, and requires tolerance, patience and great understanding. It is not easy in war; it is not easy in times of normal peace. It is especially difficult, I think, in a period such as the present of part war and part peace, with all its frustrations, tensions and anxieties.

Therefore I am sure we all agree that this imposes on the peoples of all free states a special obligation to face the problems of their mutual relationships with candour and frankness, but also with a firm resolve to understand each other's points of view. It seems to me that the unity of the free world would be in real jeopardy if there were no free discussion of our common objectives and of the possibly different means by which they can best be reached. Much of that discussion will and should be carried on confidentially between governments, but the people have a right to be kept informed of the problems involved and the principles of action which the government may think to be necessary for their solution. Therefore honest discussion of the issues before us, so long as it is conducted in cool and reasonable terms, will not weaken the free world. I am convinced on the contrary that it is an indispensable part of the process of developing our united strength, although of course in this kind of discussion one always runs the risk of misinterpretation and the placing of a wrong emphasis on what may have been said.

In all these relations between the governments in our alliance of free countries,

no single government can of course surrender its judgment into the keeping of any other government, however close and friendly that government may be. It may at times, however — and I have said this before, although it is sometimes forgotten — have to yield to the collective judgment of the group reached after discussion and consultation. That is the only way that democracy can be carried on within our own country. It is the only way that democracy can be carried on internationally. The decision when to hold out and when to yield is often a terribly difficult one to make. Yet it is on that decision that the unity and close co-operation among members of our alliance will so often depend; and on that so much else depends. Over-sensitiveness and obstinacy, on the one hand, over the maintenance of national rights and national sovereignty, and arrogance or carelessness, on the other, in over-riding them, might in either case produce serious and even dangerous division among the countries of the world.

The Danger of Disunity

That division, which would lead possibly to disunity and even disruption, gives the foe that threatens us his greatest comfort and his greatest opportunity. Particularly during these times — I am sure we all agree with this — must the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada maintain and strengthen their special ties of friendship within the larger group. It would be folly to think that any one of us can go it alone. It would also be a fatal error, made previously by two dictators, for any potential enemy to think that we intend to take that course, folly also for him to draw wrong conclusions from that mistaken interpretation of our democratic differences of opinion. On the big issues we stand together within our countries as well as between our countries, even though we may sometimes seem verbally separated. It is, I think, as much the responsibility of public and press opinion as of governments to keep these differing voices from resulting in different policies. Policy for the free world must be forged not on a shifting basis of emotion but on the hard anvil of facts. Only in that way can it be well-tempered and strong.

One of the most important of these facts is that of persistent Soviet communist hostility. Another is, as I have said, the new position of power and responsibility of the United States as the leader of the free world. This latter fact, as I see it, means that our own relations with the United States have entered upon a new phase within the last few years. It does not mean that they should not be or cannot be as close and friendly as they have been in the past. Canadians, with very few exceptions, indeed — and those exceptions mostly of the communist persuasion — all hope this will be the case and want to do what they can to make it possible and even easy. Certainly that is the policy of this government, as it has been throughout the years.

Relations with the United States

Well, what is the nature of this change I have been talking about, and not only inside the house? Hitherto questions which from time to time we have had to discuss and decide with the United States were largely bilateral matters between neighbours. They arose from such things as border disputes, differences over the diversion of water and so on, or had to do with commerce back and forth across the boundary. Of course they were often complicated and difficult enough. Now, however, we are not only neighbours but allies. I think perhaps that is the simplest way to indicate the change that has come over the nature of our relations with the United States. We have always been good neighbours, accustomed to settling our differences in a neighbourly spirit. Now we are good allies, and as allies we must do our best to settle, in our customary friendly way, such differences as may exist between us from time to time. But the questions we shall have to discuss in this way will often be of a character arising from our senior and junior partnership in a common association. They will often deal with the policies to be followed by that association in the North Atlantic Pact or within the United Nations, very often indeed within the United Nations.

It is perhaps not unnatural that many people in Canada and the United States have not yet realized this change. It has come about rather suddenly, and I doubt

if in either country we have yet completely adjusted ourselves to it. On Tuesday of last week, I believe, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) gave an illustration of one of the new categories of subjects under discussion between Canada and the United States when he announced in this House the recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which had been accepted by both governments, for the revision of the lease under which the United States holds certain bases in Newfoundland. The discussions on this subject between Canada and the United States were carried on in a friendly and co-operative spirit, as is our habit, and they have resulted in a compromise which I think will commend itself to the House as reasonable in the circumstances. The problem itself arises out of the defence requirements of the United States on Canadian soil, requirements not merely for its own security but for the security of the free world. It also arises, however, out of the necessity of the United States meeting these legitimate requirements in a way which recognizes Canadian jurisdiction and, even more important, Canadian self-respect.

In an age of atomic weapons and long range bombers Canada is obviously now of far greater importance to the defence of North America and the North Atlantic area than ever before. For that reason, and because we are now joined as allies in the North Atlantic Treaty, inevitably from time to time there will be other defence questions of very great importance to both countries which must be discussed. I have no doubt that we shall be able to find satisfactory solutions to those questions as well, but it will be easier to find them if we in Canada continue to remember the very heavy responsibility the United States has shouldered for the common defence, and if the United States continues to appreciate that the alliance in which we are joined with them will not be as strong as it should be unless the various defence arrangements which may be necessary on our soil are worked out in such a way that they will commend themselves wholeheartedly to Canadian public opinion.

Policy in Korea

Another — and I suppose at the moment the most pressing — problem we face with the United States, because it is indeed a phase of United States-Canada relations, though it is also of far wider and deeper significance, involving as it does the whole question of global war or global peace, is the policy to be adopted at the present time in Korea. For the time being I think the role of diplomacy in Korea is secondary, because the scene there is now dominated by the heavy fighting which has been going on for the past few weeks. The first wave of the new Chinese attack has been checked and broken by United Nations forces, but the attack is not yet spent — far from it. This is probably just a lull before another storm. So it seems to me that for some time to come, while this heavy fighting is going on, the task of upholding the purpose and will of the United Nations in Korea must rest upon the fighting men who have withstood so courageously the attacks made upon them by much more numerous enemy forces. One Canadian battalion, as we know, has had an important part in the recent fighting. Additional Canadian troops have now arrived in Korea, and before many more days have passed a full Canadian brigade group will be in action. These men, along with those of the other United Nations forces, and particularly the forces of the United States, will have more effect upon the course of events in Korea over the next few weeks than any diplomatic moves; and I know the thoughts of every one of us will be with them, and perhaps especially with those of our own men who are going into action for the first time.

In those circumstances perhaps it would not be appropriate for me to say too much about the actual situation in Korea, but there are a few things I should like to say. The present Chinese attack must be broken before we can again begin to entertain any hope of a peaceful and honourable settlement there. When it has been broken, as we hope it will be, and with heavy losses to the enemy, the Chinese communists may be in a mood to negotiate an honourable settlement — the only kind of settlement we have ever contemplated — or at least to desist from further attacks. I think it would be quite unrealistic to hold out hope of an early settlement in Korea, or even of an early end to the fighting, nevertheless we should always remember that the United Nations stands ready to negotiate, though not to betray its trust or yield to blackmail. The statement of principles adopted by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority on January 13 last, which would provide for a cease-fire to

be followed by a Korean settlement and by the negotiation of a wide range of Far Eastern problems, still represents the considered opinion of the United Nations. If the Chinese government and the North Korean government wish to take advantage of the offer contained in that statement, it is open to them to do so. Of their willingness to do so, however, there is no sign. Committees established by the United Nations Assembly have all been rebuffed. The North Korean government, in a broadcast message as late as April 18, has repeated its determination to drive the United Nations forces from the peninsula. We can only hope that the heavy losses which the aggressors are now suffering and will suffer in Korea may produce a more accommodating frame of mind.

The UN Objective

In the meantime, the United Nations forces are heroically and skilfully fulfilling the task which has been given to them, which is the defeat of armed aggression in Korea. This is — and it should not be forgotten — the sole military objective of the forces of the United Nations in Korea, the defeat of aggression so that a free, democratic and united Korea can be established. It is also worthy of note, I believe, that, as Mr. Warren Austin, the United States delegate to the Security Council, said on May 1 — I quote from his statement:

“The United Nations has not declared nor has it ever been asked to declare, that the political objectives — ”

That is, a democratic, free and unified Korea.

“ — must be achieved by military means. In fact, the emphasis has been quite the contrary.”

Furthermore . . . I suggest it is not an aim or objective of the United Nations in its Korean policy to interfere in the internal affairs of any Asian country, to replace one regime by another. Its aim, as I said, is to defeat aggression and so prevent other acts of aggression by proving that aggression does not pay. To some that may seem to be too limited an objective. On this point the well known columnist Mr. Walter Lippmann had this to say the other day — and I quote from his article:

“Only a limited objective can be obtained by a war which is limited. The question now is whether the country — ”

He was referring to his own country, the United States.

“ — will agree with reasonable unity that our military objective in Korea is the limited one of repelling aggression south of the 38th parallel and restoring the South Korean republic. We can, and we should, still hold it as a political and diplomatic objective that Korea should eventually be united by democratic means. But we cannot unify Korea by a war confined to the Korean peninsula, and we shall get nowhere in this controversy until we make the choice of limited objectives out of a limited war or unlimited objectives out of an unlimited war.”

Communism and Aggression

It is also sometimes loosely said that the United Nations forces are fighting in Korea to defeat communism. There is perhaps some colour for this mistake, since the aggression perpetrated is by communist states, and has its roots in the totalitarian communist nature of those states. Free men everywhere must be determined to resist communism. But it is a confusion, I think, of categories to think that communism as a doctrine or form of government must be fought by armed forces, or that such is the purpose of the United Nations military action in Korea. When communism, or indeed fascism, results in acts of military aggression, that aggression should be met by any form of collective action, including military collective action, which can be made effective. But the purpose of such action is to defeat aggression. Communism itself, as a reactionary and debasing doctrine, must be fought on other planes and in different ways; by the use of economic, social, political and moral weapons. As Sir Norman Angell put it in a letter to *The New York Times* the other day:

"The vital distinctions in this matter are not difficult or very obscure. We can overcome, and still better, deter, military aggression with military force But if we use military power to dictate or to appear to dictate to other nations, Asiatic or European, what social or political or economic system they may adopt for themselves, we shall awaken a nationalism which in the end will defeat us."

Since the United Nations objective in Korea, then, is to defeat aggression, it follows, I think, that the methods used should be designed to limit and localize the conflict and not to spread it. As long ago as August 31, 1950, I said in this House that it was not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which would extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea, a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; also that United Nations policy should be to avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending the conflict . . . That is still our view.

One way by which the conflict could be spread would be by authorizing the United Nations commander in Korea to conduct an aerial bombing of China. As I said on April 26 last in the House, it is possible to visualize a situation in which immediate retaliatory action without prior consultation might be unavoidable in pursuing enemy bombers back to, and in attempting to destroy, the Manchurian air bases from which they came. It is our view, however, that the bombing, as well as the blockading, of China should, if at all possible be avoided, since such action would involve grave risk of extending the fighting without, as we see it, any corresponding assurance that such extension would end the war. The history, the position, the social and economic organization, and the political situation in China would not seem to give much hope for any such decisive result from such limited action. Indeed, it may be felt, on the contrary, that this limited action which has been suggested would inevitably develop into unlimited action against China, about the possible result of which the Japanese perhaps are best fitted to give testimony. One result we can, however, expect with some certainty, and that is great satisfaction in Moscow over such a development. It may be that the Chinese communists, by indulging in massive air activity over Korea, will make some kind of retaliation necessary. They have, however, not yet taken such action, and in that sense have not yet conducted an all-out war against the United Nations forces in Korea. As General Bradley put it in an address in Chicago on April 17:

"Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has it been any serious threat to our air force."

If the Chinese communists change that situation, the responsibility for the consequences would rest entirely with them and not with the United Nations forces.

The Question of Extending the Conflict

I am, of course, . . . aware that this policy of restraint in which all the governments who have forces in Korea concur to the best of my knowledge, may complicate the problems facing the United Nations commanders in Korea. These problems, however, in the opinion of many, would be immensely more complicated if the fighting were extended to China.

The question, I think, above all other questions at the moment, is, in short, whether aerial bombardment of points in China, together with a naval blockade and the removal of all restrictions from Chinese forces in Formosa, would be sufficient to bring China's participation in the war in Korea to an end, without bringing about intervention by the forces of the Soviet Union. It was felt by many last November that if United Nations forces advanced to the very borders of Manchuria and cleared North Korea of the enemy, the war would then end; that there would be little risk of communist China intervening, or, that, if it did, the intervention could be contained and defeated. As we know, and as I said last February in the House, it did not work out that way, for one reason or another. In the light of that experience, we should, I think, before we take any new decisions which will extend the war, be reasonably sure that this extension will have compensating military and political advantages. Let us not forget we would be playing for the highest stakes in history.

Another way in which the conflict could be extended, in the hope that it would be ended sooner, would be by facilitating and assisting the return to the mainland of China of the forces at present in Formosa under the command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. We should remember, of course, that these forces, or forces under the same command, have been driven from China by their own countrymen. The question to be answered, therefore, is this: Is there any reason to believe that these Chinese nationalist forces now in Formosa would have greater success in China than they had previously, unless they were supported by troops and equipment from other countries which could ill be spared for such a hazardous venture, with all its possible long-drawn-out consequences?

The desire to localize the conflict and prevent it from spreading remains, then, our policy, though we must recognize that while it takes only one to start a fight, it takes two to limit, as well as two to settle, a fight.

Formosa

May I now say just a word in conclusion . . . about our views . . . on the situation in Formosa. I believe that this island should be neutralized while fighting is going on in Korea. I have expressed that view previously. Certainly the United States of America cannot be expected to permit the Peking government to take over Formosa while that government is defying, and fighting against, the United Nations. It does not follow, however, that if and when the Korean conflict can be ended satisfactorily, we should refuse to discuss the future of Formosa within the context of international agreements that have already been reached concerning it, and indeed within the context of the United Nations Charter. Any other course would, I think, result in implacable hostility between the United Nations and whatever government was in control of China at the time the war ended.

Until that war ends, however, and China abandons her attack against the United Nations in Korea, there can be, I think, no question of even discussing whether Formosa should be handed over to the Peking regime; at least that is our view. The same, I think, applies to recognition of that regime in Peking. There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea and fight against our forces there.

Nor do we think it realistic or right, while communist China is fighting in Korea, to include the Peking government in the current discussions of a Japanese peace treaty. In this regard, as in the case of the disposition of Formosa, the decision as to who shall talk and sign for China might well, I think — and even any discussion of this matter — be postponed until the Korean war is ended.

These are two questions which I know are uppermost in our minds these days. What is going on in the Far East? What is the policy of the alliance which has been built up, and which is getting stronger every day, to meet the dangers ahead, and within that alliance what is the relationship of a junior partner like Canada to its neighbour and its very senior partner in this association, the United States of America? It is not easy these days to be too optimistic about the course of events; but time is going on, and while time is going on we are getting stronger. In that sense, but only in that sense, time may be said to be on our side if we take advantage of it. If we do take advantage of it, and if we grow stronger militarily, economically and in every other way, then I think, as I have said before, that we have no reason to regard the future with panic or despair. But the remedy . . . rests with us.

The debate was subsequently joined by the following members of Parliament:

- Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of the Opposition)
- Mr. Gordon Graydon (PC, Peel)
- Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggart)
- Mr. Solon E. Low (SC, Peace River)
- Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (PC, Greenwood)
- Mr. L. T. Stick (L, Trinity-Conception)

Mr. Rodney Adamson (PC, York West)
Mr. H. W. Herridge (CCF, Kootenay West)
Mr. Howard C. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra)
Mr. Stanley Knowles (CCF, Winnipeg North Centre)
Mr. George H. Hees (PC, Broadview)
Mr. W. J. Browne (PC, St. John's West).

Aspects of Canadian Policy

The debate which had been initiated on May 7 was resumed on May 14. On this occasion it was joined by Mr. George Drew, Leader of the Opposition; and the following members of Parliament:

• Mr. M. J. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggart)
Mr. W. J. Browne (PC, St. John's West)
Mr. H. R. Argue (CCF, Assiniboia)
Mr. H. A. MacKenzie (L, Lambton-Kent)
Mr. John Decore (L, Vegreville)
Mr. E. G. Hansell (SC, Macleod)
Mr. Howard C. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra)
Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (PC, Greenwood).

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, closed the debate and spoke in part as follows:

Formosa and the Recognition of Communist China

The policy of the Government of Canada in regard to these matters has been made clear more than once in this House, outside this House and at the United Nations. . . . I would repeat . . . because I think it describes in a nutshell our policies in regard to these matters — the last paragraph of the statement of principles adopted by fifty-two members of the United Nations, including the United States of America. It deals with the Far East problem in general, Formosa and recognition in particular. We are bound by this paragraph because we accepted this statement of principles. The last paragraph read as follows:

As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly —

That is, the General Assembly of the United Nations

— shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China, with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including among others those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations.

Iran

. . . This would be one occasion, I think, when it would be inappropriate and inadvisable for one in my position to talk about this particular subject at this particular moment. It is one of the most difficult and dangerous problems, affecting not only Iran but many other countries as well. I think it would be unwise on my part to say anything about it at this time, except to express the hope that these problems can be settled in a way which would be consistent with the national aspirations of the Iranian people and the legitimate interests of other people who have ministered to the well being of Iran, in administering the oil industry of that country which they have been instrumental in developing.

. . . I should like to refer to the policy guidance paper communicated by the Department of External Affairs to the International Service of the CBC, under which these broadcasts to the behind-the-iron-curtain countries are being operated. I should like to quote a few sentences from this hitherto confidential paper, in order to deal with this point, because I know of no other way of dealing effectively with it than to quote from the policy guidance paper which is supposed to guide the operations of the CBC International Service in this field. In this paper it is stated that one of the purposes of these broadcasts is:

Unmasking the hypocrisy of communist democracy in elections, trade unions, labour camps and religion and the hypocrisy of Soviet peace propaganda and its inconsistency in view of Soviet aggressive foreign policy, rearmament and concentration on heavy industry to the detriment of the Soviet standard of living.

That is a quotation from the policy paper. Another one is as follows:

Keeping alive and if possible increasing a knowledge of and appreciation of democracy, the code of ethics which we have derived from Christianity and western civilization and thought.

Those are the general lines along which the international services are proceeding or are attempting to proceed in regard to the broadcasts to the behind-the-iron-curtain countries.

The St. Lawrence Seaway

. . . We want to see this enterprise brought to completion as a power and navigational project by the co-operation of the two governments most concerned; but we want to see it completed. If it cannot be completed on an international basis, naturally we shall have to examine the situation and see what other way it might be done. In discussing this matter the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) asked whether there were any treaty obligations which would prevent our charging discriminatory tolls on non-Canadian vessels as a way to pay the cost of construction of the canal and the power installations, if they were a Canadian enterprise exclusively. There are . . . no treaty obligations binding on Canada which would be an obstacle to the imposition of tolls on Canadian canals in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system. There are treaty provisions, however, which affect Canada's ability to establish toll schedules discriminating between ships of Canada and those of another country, or between the ships of different foreign countries; so, as I understand, discriminatory tolls would not be possible.

The Colombo Plan and Technical Assistance

During our discussion, . . . a good many members of the House made reference to international relief and rehabilitation problems, more particularly with reference to the Colombo Plan and to famine assistance for India. I announced in this House not so very long ago that the Government would ask Parliament to appropriate \$25 million as its contribution to the first year of the plan, provided that it was clear that other contributing countries would make appropriate contributions so that the broad objectives of the plan might be realized. Since that time we have been taking steps to make arrangements with recipient countries for the purpose of ensuring that so far as Canada is concerned the momentum of the plan is sustained.

The Colombo report contains in its appendices lists of projects for financing under the plan; and without waiting for the working out of the details of the plan, indeed without waiting for the plan to come into operation, we have asked the Indian and Pakistan governments to send over technically qualified representatives to discuss with our officials on a bilateral basis the projects in which we might assist, having in mind those items which Canada is best fitted to undertake; and in this connection we are doing all the preparatory work that we can to keep this movement going.

In the broader field of technical assistance we have played, I think, a useful part. We have participated, either through the headship of, or membership in technical missions, in United Nations missions to Bolivia, Ethiopia, Burma, Colombia, Egypt and India, and the filling of requests for technicians received from Libya, the Philippines, Indonesia and Ceylon under the United Nations programme is now currently under consideration; but it is not of course under present circumstances very easy to find suitable Canadian technicians for this purpose.

No technicians have yet been supplied under the Colombo Plan, but approximately 50 requests have been received from India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and are now being examined by the Technical Assistance Service. More has been accomplished in making Canadian facilities available for trainees from abroad.

We have notified the Bureau on Technical Co-operation in Colombo that we are prepared to accept twelve trainees from India, ten from Pakistan and six from Ceylon at an early date for placement in the following fields: road building, electrical engineering, pulp and paper, rail transportation and agriculture. The bureau in Colombo is being notified that we will accept three technical missions for a six to eight week tour of Canada during the summer in the fields of hydro-electric power, road building and agriculture respectively.

During the February meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee in Colombo the member countries were informed by our delegation that Canada was prepared to grant fellowships to interested recipient countries in such fields as agriculture, engineering, forestry, education and medical research. Subsequently we made a specific offer of sixty scholarships and fellowships to the countries of South and South-East Asia.

Famine Conditions in India

Then there is the question . . . of assistance to India to deal with the very distressing and developing famine situation there. So that the facts on this matter might be clear, I should like to put into the record that the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, announced on May 10 that 50 thousand tons of wheat, purchased on a cash basis from the Soviet Union, were on their way to India; 50 thousand tons only, purchased on a cash basis. He added that negotiations for the purchase of an additional 500 thousand tons of other wheat in exchange for certain Indian commodities were in progress. China has sent 50 thousand tons of rice as part of a barter deal, China receiving Indian jute in exchange; and India has also purchased from China 50 thousand tons of milo.

This afternoon reference was made to the United Kingdom contribution. It is true that the United Kingdom agreed to the diversion to India of some cargoes of Australian wheat out of its own purchases in Australia. Some 42 thousand tons of wheat have been so diverted to India and paid for by the Indian Government. It was suggested this afternoon that the Government were negligent in their appreciation of the terrible famine situation in India. It was suggested by an hon. member of the Opposition that we should make a contribution of \$100 million for famine relief to be spent in Canada, and that we could do it if we wanted to . . . It would be very difficult at this particular moment — and I am not sure that it would be the best way to proceed at this particular moment — to make any such contribution to India for famine relief. Hon. members will recall that the Government recognized as long ago as February of this year that a famine in India was likely to occur. At that time we offered wheat to India under the Colombo Plan, and the purpose and meaning of that offer has led to some misunderstanding. The only wheat of this year's crop that was not already fully contracted for by purchasers was grade 5. The Indian Government advised us last month that it wished to accept our offer of wheat under the Colombo Plan but that it preferred to wait until our next crop was harvested before obtaining the wheat in the hope that a better grade would be available.

I should like to assure the House of Commons at this time that the Government, as indicated by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) the other day, (May 2), is giving the closest attention to what Canada can do to ameliorate famine conditions which are rapidly developing in India. We are exploring every avenue, including some of

the helpful suggestions which have been made during the course of this discussion, through which help might be given. I am very hopeful that we shall be successful in finding a number of ways in which we can contribute to the relief of starvation and suffering in India.

Pacific Relations

. . . I should like to point out that the arrangements which are being negotiated now in the Pacific between Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America and possibly the Philippines do not constitute a Pacific pact of that type (i.e. along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty), and we have not been asked to participate in those arrangements.

We have not asked to be allowed to participate in this arrangement for reasons I have already indicated in the House. The situation in the Pacific at this time is not exactly the same as that in the Atlantic. It is not the same, in many ways. And the fact that we have participated in the Atlantic pact is no reason that we should take the initiative in working out a Pacific pact at this time. Those who would be most concerned with that pact do not feel that that would be the best way to proceed. I am thinking of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

They have decided to work out their own arrangements under Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, with the object of bringing about a mutual guarantee and security pact. We welcome those arrangements as a furtherance of general security. But I assure members of the House, though no assurance is needed, that this does not mean that we are not alive to the importance of general security in the Pacific. Our participation in the Korean campaign is surely sufficient evidence of that fact.

The Objectives in Korea

. . . I turn to consider once again what are our objectives in Korea and how those objectives can be reached . . . I realize that in such a confused situation as does exist in Korea it is difficult to have a clear objective or to see the objective that we have clearly. It is now more important than ever that we should have as exact an idea as possible of what we are trying to accomplish in Korea, along with other members of the United Nations. The Canadian brigade group will shortly be in action, so not only they but every other Canadian will want to know what is their purpose in Korea and what is the policy of the Canadian Government in regard to achieving that purpose.

Before I try to answer once again this crucial question, I should like to draw to your attention . . . the advantages which have already accrued to the cause of freedom from the United Nations action in Korea. In the first place, . . . the military danger to many other areas in Asia has been greatly reduced as a result of the courageous and skilful campaign which has been carried on in Korea. Many of the best formations of the Chinese communist army have been committed to battle in Korea and have suffered very heavy losses in the process. As a result, the number of trained troops facing Indo-China, Formosa, Hongkong, Burma and Malaya has been reduced, and the danger of successful attacks in those areas is now I think less than it was — although of course it has certainly not by any means been eliminated.

In meeting the onslaught of the Chinese communist forces, then, the United Nations forces in Korea have suffered heavy losses but they have inflicted immensely heavier losses on the enemy. They can take pride in the fact that their heroic resistance has lessened the danger in other parts of Asia. I believe that is something that has already been accomplished by way of benefit to the cause of freedom.

Another way in which the cause of freedom has benefited through United Nations action in Korea is that the whole of the free world is now aroused and alerted to the danger so that more rapid progress is now being made in increasing the armed forces in being in the free world. We have now some reason to believe that before long these forces may be large enough to deter any would-be aggressor. This improvement in our position we owe, I think, largely to the sense of urgency which the war in Korea brought us, and also to the energetic leadership of the United States of America.

This war in Korea has also been the occasion of another discovery which must be encouraging to free men everywhere. It is that collective military action against aggression is possible, and can be effective. It is certainly true even yet that three-quarters of the United Nations forces now fighting in Korea, apart from the South Koreans themselves, are being provided by the United States. But I think equally remarkable is the fact that no fewer than sixteen countries are now contributing contingents to the United Nations forces, and that all those contingents are being welded together in a strong and dependable United Nations army. It may be objected that all this is very well, but that if the United Nations army in Korea has not a clear mission which it can hope to fulfil, this whole grand exercise in international co-operation is futile. What, then, is the United Nations mission in Korea? Essentially, I think, . . . to defeat aggression, and by the lesson of that defeat to help prevent the outbreak of World War III.

If the aggression in Korea had been allowed to succeed without any attempt being made to resist it, other acts of aggression would certainly have followed. The strength of the free world would have been nibbled away piecemeal in accordance with the master plans of the Politburo. Eventually, a stage would have been reached when the remaining countries which were still free and independent would have realized that they had either to wage war with fewer resources and with much slighter hope of success, or else be engulfed under a wave of Soviet tyranny. Since they would certainly have chosen war rather than slavery, a third world war in those circumstances would have been inevitable.

To the infantrymen slogging over the muddy fields of Korea, it may seem odd to hear someone say that his mission is to prevent a third world war. He may well be forgiven for not seeing very much difference between a world war and the bloody business in which he is now engaged. I certainly sympathize with that view. But it is necessary to remember that in the present circumstances a new world war will be very different from the campaign now being fought in Korea. It would be an atomic war which would result in the death of hundreds of thousands of people at one stroke, and which would leave the earth pockmarked and infected with radioactivity for years to come, even if it did not, as is conceivable, result in something far worse. That is the nightmare we are trying by every means in our power to avoid. When viewed in that light I believe that our soldiers in Korea, and the soldiers from other countries of the United Nations, will see that their task, however disagreeable and dangerous it may be, is supremely worthwhile.

A Definition of "Communism".

. . . Communism is a dogma, a type of society and a military danger — all three. The dogma has influenced the type of society which has been created in Russia, in other Cominform countries and in China. The totalitarian nature of Soviet society has facilitated and perhaps even necessitated acts of aggression. But communism as a dogma, I repeat once again, in my view, cannot be destroyed in Korea or elsewhere by military means. If we think it can, and if we think it should be attempted, we should have intervened in Czechoslovakia when the communists took over there. Such armed intervention at that time, however, or in Greece, or in connection with the Berlin blockade, could have and would have received no sanction of any kind from the United Nations. Communism as a dogma must be fought with other weapons and in other ways. But when its noxious doctrines, and when its perverted form of society takes arms and commits aggression against other peoples, then we must answer the communists with collective action including, when it can be made effective, collective military action; and that is what we are doing in Korea today.

What we are fighting in Korea and what we may have to fight in other parts of the world is what William Pitt the younger called "armed opinions", but armed opinions which have expressed themselves in armed aggression. I therefore hope that it will now be understood what I mean when I say that the United Nations' objective in Korea is not, by arms, to fight communism as an idea. Our objective there is to offer successful resistance to communist aggression and thereby to prevent, we hope, a third world war.

The Great Debate

... What can we do about the present situation in Korea? If we do not adopt additional measures, how can we ever hope to win? At the present time the advantages of two alternative methods are being urged. That is, indeed, the great debate. On the one hand it is said that total military victory is indispensable and that it can be achieved by permitting the bombing of China, by imposing a naval blockade and by employing Nationalist Chinese forces outside Formosa. I do not want to repeat at this time why I believe that that policy would be a profound mistake — but I want to state my view that such a policy would not end the war in Korea at this time but might, on the contrary, lead from limited action to unlimited action, the result of which might bring in the U.S.S.R. If it did not, in my view it would almost certainly engulf us in a full continental war with 450 million Chinese people. I cannot myself think that that is the best way of ending the war in Korea. We would be playing for high stakes indeed if we took this kind of limited action in the hope that by such limited action we could end the war in Korea without going on, if it did not succeed, to unlimited action or without bringing in anyone else.

... It may be that, in spite of all our efforts, the catastrophe of a third world war may not be avoided. It may be that, in spite of all our efforts, this conflict will extend to (continental) China. We may not have the control of that extension. But if the conflict is so extended, let the responsibility for the error, the anguish and the devastation that it will cause rest in other hands than ours.

... What is the alternative policy? It is for the United Nations forces to continue inflicting heavy losses on the aggressors, as they are doing at the present time, and at the same time to avoid any measures which are not absolutely necessary from a military point of view, and which might lead to the spreading of the conflict.

The Possibility of a Negotiated Settlement

As I said a few days ago in this place, there have been no recent indications that these Chinese communists are in any mood to negotiate. I cannot believe, however, that the Chinese Government in Peking can be so blind to Chinese national interests as to continue indefinitely suffering the very heavy losses which are now being inflicted on their forces. So we must hope that a day will come when they will realize that it is not China but Russia which is being served by the aggression in Korea in which they have participated.

If that time comes, they may then be ready to enter into negotiations leading to a settlement in Korea and also to a settlement of other Far Eastern issues. Then, as now, the United Nations will stand ready to negotiate, as has been made clear many times, and most notably by the General Assembly when it approved overwhelmingly the statement of principles drawn up by the United Nations' cease-fire committee . . .

But it is necessary to remember . . . that all the recent efforts of the United Nations . . . have been, to say the least, rudely rebuffed by the Chinese communist regime. The approaches made by the Good Offices Committee have been rebuffed, and unofficial feelers by individual countries have not been any more successful. The hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge) suggested that we might propose to the Indian Government that they contact the Peking Government with a view to entering into negotiations. The Canadian Government has kept in constant touch with the Indian Government on this question, and the Indian Government in its turn has been vigilant in watching for any sign that the Peking regime might be willing to discuss a settlement in Korea and in the Far East generally on any terms that we could even consider. Although it would certainly be improper for me to reveal what the Indian Ambassador in Peking has been reporting to his own government, I can say that his inquiries in Peking have not given any grounds for believing that the Chinese communists are yet ready to negotiate on any terms that could conceivably be acceptable to the United Nations. And that is what I meant when I said that for the time being, especially while the Chinese military offensive is going on, it would appear that there are no further steps that could be taken either by the United Nations collectively, or by any other members individually, to bring the Chinese communists to the conference table on any conditions that we would consider.

. . . The possibility of securing an honourable settlement by negotiation is never being overlooked by any of the governments, any of the free governments, which are concerned with this matter; we will all continue to search for any indications that the Peking regime may be ready to discuss a settlement, and we will be energetic in taking advantage of any opportunity that we might be able to discover. Meanwhile, however, I can only repeat what I said the other day; namely, that until we get that indication in some form from Peking, and while the battle is going on, diplomacy must for the time being take a second place to arms. We can only hope that the use of those arms by the United Nations will be so effective and do so much damage to the forces of communist aggression that before long they will see reason. It may then be possible to negotiate with them on United Nations terms, and the danger of a third world war arising in that part of the world will, at least, have been avoided.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group

The Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, on May 4 made the following statement:

. . . Last December the twelve nations who were partners under the North Atlantic Treaty decided to set up an integrated force in Western Europe to deter communist aggression. General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander.

As a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and in the interest of the defence of Canada, our government indicated in the Speech from the Throne, that Parliament would be asked to authorize Canadian participation in the European integrated force.

In furtherance of this objective, I stated in the House on February 5 that it was proposed, if Parliament approved, to place in the integrated force in Europe elements of the Canadian army. The statement went on as reported at page 95 of Hansard:

The force we propose to send will initially be a brigade group or regimental combat team, and we hope that it may arrive at about the same time as the additional U.S. forces, but this may depend on events in Korea.

Since then developments in Korea resulted in the decision to send the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group to Korea. The situation in Korea does not warrant any assumption that that formation could be released to form part of the integrated force within a reasonable period.

Keeping our force in Korea up to strength will obviously continue to be the number one army priority so long as any of our troops are engaged in actual combat.

We are further expanding the Canadian army to meet that priority and other army tasks, including, subject to the approval of Parliament and the completion of firm arrangements in that regard with our North Atlantic associates, the provision of a force for Western Europe.

This expansion will include the formation of an additional Canadian Army Brigade Group with supporting units.

The new formation, to be known as 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, will be recruited around the framework of some of our famous reserve army units. It will be part of Canada's regular forces and its officers and men will serve under active force terms of service and conditions and thus will be eligible for service anywhere . . .

Mr. Claxton then described the composition of the new brigade group and listed the units of the reserve army which would participate. Later, in answer to a question asked by Mr. Howard C. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra) regarding the size of the new brigade group, Mr. Claxton said that "a brigade group of the kind described means from 5,500 to 6,500 men. It is a self-contained unit about one-third of a division".

The North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping

On May 28 Mr. Howard C. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra) stated that announcements in the press had indicated that Canada and the other nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had completed plans for a shipping pool in the event of war. Mr. Green then asked whether the Minister of Transport, Mr. Chevrier, had a statement to make with regard to those plans. Mr. Chevrier on May 31 referred to Mr. Green the official communiqué which had been issued by the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping after its meeting in London the latter part of April 1951. This communiqué is reproduced on page 220 of this issue of *External Affairs*.

The Leased Bases in Newfoundland

On May 1 the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, tabled in the House the recommendations made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, regarding a modification of the Leased Bases Agreement between the Governments of Canada and the United States. Mr. St. Laurent spoke in part as follows:


. . . In March 1941, . . . the United Kingdom leased to the United States for ninety-nine years land for naval and air bases in several colonies and territories including Newfoundland. This leased bases agreement empowered the United States to establish and operate naval and air bases, and also provided extensive rights and privileges for the United States forces to be stationed at these bases. These rights related to such things as the jurisdiction of courts, customs and excise taxes, income tax, and military postal facilities. Pursuant to this agreement the United States established and still maintains four bases in Newfoundland. These are: Pepperrell air force near St. John's; Harmon air force base near Stephenville; McAndrew air force base at Argentia; the naval operating base at Argentia.

On February 10, 1949, in the course of the debate on union with Newfoundland, I made a reference to these leased bases. It might be useful if I repeated what I said then. It is as follows:

If and when Newfoundland becomes a part of Canada, those leases will still be valid leases affecting the lands described in them. They contain provisions which go beyond the provisions to which the Canadian Government has agreed with respect to anything done by the United States Government in the territory of Canada, and we hope that it will be possible to get the Government of the United States to agree that it will not exercise those rights in a manner that would offend against our rights of sovereignty in Newfoundland. But that is something that will have to be brought about by negotiation and agreement with the Government of the United States. The situation is the same as if the hon. member, having a farm, leased a building lot on it for ninety-nine years and then sold his farm. The acquirer would have to take the farm and respect the agreement the hon. member had made with regard to the building lot. But he could go to the man who had the lease on the building lot and try to make a new deal with him. That is what we intend to try to do with the Government of the United States. But if they are not disposed to make any change in the arrangement, we shall be obliged to respect the rights that exist there, just as we shall be obliged to respect as a fact the existing situation in the territory of Newfoundland.

Before the union with Newfoundland we informed the United States Government that the Canadian Government hoped the United States would consider relinquishing some of the extraterritorial rights conferred by the 1941 agreement on United States forces in Newfoundland. The Canadian request said, in part:

In the opinion of the Canadian Government the prospective change in the status of Newfoundland justifies a modification of the 1941 bases agreement in respect of the Newfoundland bases in order to bring that agreement into accord with the principles which, for many years, have governed the defence relations between Canada and the United States.



Thus the joint statement issued by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States on February 12, 1947, refers to the "underlying principle" that "all co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory", and the recommendation of November 20, 1946, of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which has been accepted by both governments, states that defence co-operation projects in either country should be agreed to by both governments, should confer no permanent rights or status upon either country, and should be without prejudice to the sovereignty of either country.

In seeking the modification of provisions of the lease, the Canadian Government recognized, as I have indicated, that we were asking the United States to give up legal rights of undoubted validity. As is customary in our discussions with the United States, the request was considered by the United States authorities on a higher plane than the plane of strict legality.

Our two governments decided to ask the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to examine and report on the Canadian request. The Board undertook an exhaustive study of the complex questions involved, and the United States members, on behalf of their governments, co-operated in a spirit of friendship in the search for a solution.

In March 1950 the Board formulated a recommendation which has now been officially approved by both governments. This approval, which it is proposed to incorporate in an exchange of notes, will constitute a modification of the leased bases agreement. I am sure that all hon. members will share the appreciation felt by the Government of the decision of the United States to give up voluntarily certain rights which were legally conferred for ninety-nine years by the 1941 agreement, before Newfoundland became a province of Canada.

The recommendation of the Joint Board is in four parts which relate to income tax, customs and excise, postal privileges and the jurisdiction of the courts. I shall now table the recommendation and give a brief explanation of the effect of each part.

First: Income tax. On June 12, 1950, a new double taxation convention between Canada and the United States was signed. It has been approved by the Parliament of Canada but is awaiting ratification in the United States. When it comes into force it will replace certain exemption provisions now in the bases agreement. In addition the Board recommends that the United States waive the exemptions given by the bases agreement on contractors' profits, on United States civilian employees of such contractors and on the families of these employees. This part of the recommendation will place income tax exemption of United States personnel in Newfoundland on the same basis as in the rest of Canada.

Second: Customs and excise. The United States will also waive duty and tax exemptions given by the bases agreement on: (a) contractor-owned equipment; (b) personal belongings and household effects of contractors and their United States employees other than on first arrival, and (c) individual purchases in Canada by United States personnel.

Customs and excise exemptions for post exchanges and service clubs will continue, it being understood that the United States authorities will endeavour to increase purchases for these institutions in Canada and will take special steps to prevent abuse of privileges continued under the agreement.

Third: Postal privileges. Originally Canada asked for replacement of United States military postal facilities by Canadian post offices. Although the United States authorities were not prepared to accede fully to this request, under the Board's recommendation the United States will not establish normal civilian postal offices and will limit the use of their army post office system strictly to mail destined to United States territory or to other United States army post offices.

Fourth: Jurisdiction of the courts. This part of the recommendation covers four matters:

(i) The United States waives all rights of jurisdiction permitted under the bases agreement, over British subjects and over aliens other than United States citizens;

(ii) The United States suspends for five years exercise of rights of jurisdiction over United States civilian personnel and all other rights conferred by article IV of the bases agreement, subject to revival on notice thereafter or in event of war or other emergency;

(iii) The Canadian Government will seek to amend the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act to permit of compulsory attendance of witnesses at United States courts martial;

(iv) The Canadian Government will seek legislation to protect security interests of the United States forces in Canada, as required under the bases agreement.

The recommendation that the United States give up or suspend jurisdictional rights under article IV of the bases agreement is conditional upon the Canadian Government, with the concurrence of the Newfoundland Government, giving to the United States Government assurances that the new arrangements will in practice give United States officials in Newfoundland a degree of jurisdiction comparable to that which they have in fact exercised up to now. The Attorney General of Newfoundland has been consulted and he advises that there will be no difficulty about giving these assurances because, in fact, the United States officials have exercised in a reasonable manner their jurisdictional rights under the bases agreement. They have not, for example, attempted to exercise the jurisdiction over Canadian citizens which the bases agreement gave them.

What the condition and the assurances mean is that, in practice, members of the United States forces in Newfoundland will generally be dealt with by United States courts, which is a reasonable and sensible arrangement in the circumstances. Corresponding treatment is in fact given to Canadian forces which may be stationed from time to time in the United States.

The Board's recommendation will provide the occasion for the extension of the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act as revised to Newfoundland and remove what is perhaps the most objectionable feature of the bases agreement, namely, the right of jurisdiction by United States courts over Canadian citizens.

Referring to the recommendation as a whole, it meets most of the specific requests which the Canadian Government originally put forward. Obviously a negotiation of this kind required a willingness on both sides to give and take. In the view of the Canadian Government, the recommendation removes the features, most objectionable to us, of the taxation and jurisdictional rights conferred by the leased bases agreement.

The Government will in due course be making to the House five legislative proposals flowing in whole or part from the recommendation.

In connection with the customs tariff it has already been proposed, in the budget speech, that item No. 708 of the customs tariff should be revised. At present it deals with customs privileges for the United Kingdom Government only.

In connection with military post offices, an enabling clause will be included in the proposed bill to amend the Post Office Act.

In connection with the recommendation for security legislation, there will be two measures. First, a bill along the lines of the Official Secrets Act is proposed for the protection of allied governments. Second, a new section in the Criminal Code for the protection of property of allied forces is also under consideration.

It is proposed to add to the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act a new section under which the Governor in Council would have authority to provide by regulation for compulsory attendance of witnesses before United States courts martial, in the same manner as now applies to courts martial of the Canadian forces. This amendment will, for convenience, be included in a Canadian forces bill which will deal with a number of other subjects related to defence.

Of the five proposed legislative measures, only one will refer expressly to United States forces, and that is the amendment to the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act. When the time comes to examine the other four it will, I think, be agreed that, quite apart from the recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, they are useful and possibly necessary measures to enable Canada to discharge obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Government believes that on consideration, hon. members will agree that the solution which has been recommended by the Board is a reasonable compromise in an admittedly unprecedented situation . . .

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Canada participated in tariff negotiations at Torquay which were concluded on April 21, 1951. On May 8 the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Howe, and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Abbott, made statements regarding the trade agreements which had been concluded. On May 14 the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, gave notice of a motion to refer the subject matter and results of the Torquay negotiations to the Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce. This motion was put by the Prime Minister on May 21 when Mr. Abbott made a further statement. An article on the subject of the Torquay agreements appears on page 193 of this issue of *External Affairs*.

Trade Conferences

The Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Howe, made the following statement on May 29:

Last week . . . a meeting of the Canada-United Kingdom Continuing Committee was held here in Ottawa, and during the week-end my colleague, the Minister of Ex-

ternal Affairs (Mr. Pearson), issued a short summary of the profitable discussions which took place. Discussions with the British West Indies followed the United Kingdom talks and are now completed.

A delegation of officials of the French Government arrived in Ottawa this morning to discuss a number of problems pertaining to trade between our two countries. Members of this delegation spent yesterday in Toronto at the International Trade Fair, where they were welcomed as honoured guests and were able to see the merchandise of many countries now on display there. This afternoon the French delegation will begin meetings with officials of government departments concerned. It is expected that these discussions will be carried on for two or three days. The tariff agreement completed recently at Torquay between Canada and France was evidence of the desire which exists on both sides to create opportunities for trade.

Tomorrow, May 30, the Minister of Customs of New Zealand, who is also the Associate Minister of Finance of that country, will arrive in Ottawa to discuss trade problems with the Canadian Government. We welcome this timely visit of a distinguished minister of the Crown from a sister Commonwealth country. Canada has traditionally enjoyed valuable trade relations with New Zealand, and we hope that the groundwork will be laid at the present meetings for further expansion.

Conference of Commonwealth Defence Ministers

An announcement regarding plans for this Conference was made by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, on May 31, who spoke in part as follows:

The Government of the United Kingdom has today issued the following announcement . . .

It has been agreed to hold a conference of Defence Ministers from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. The Ministers have decided that London will be a convenient meeting place and the conference will open there on June 21. It will consider certain defence problems arising in regions of common concern to these countries including the Middle East and also consequential questions of equipment and training which are of mutual interest to them. Canada will be represented at the conference by an observer.

. . . The desirability of holding such a conference was discussed on the occasion of the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London last January. It was then the feeling of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia that it would be helpful to hold a conference of the Defence Ministers of those countries to consider problems arising in regions of special concern to them, including the Middle East.

Canada has, of course, special and direct defence responsibilities in the North Atlantic region. Our interests in the regional defence problems which will be under discussion at the forthcoming conference are less direct than those of the other Commonwealth countries which will be represented there. The Government has accordingly decided that it would be appropriate to be represented at the conference by a civilian and a military observer. Our position in this respect is fully appreciated by other Commonwealth governments concerned.

The Composition of Canadian Delegations to the United Nations

On May 28 the following questions and answers were reported:

Mr. G. A. Cruickshank (L, Fraser Valley):

1. When Opposition Members of Parliament are selected as delegates to the United Nations, who selects them?
2. What duties and responsibilities have they as delegates at the United Nations?

3. Do they serve on committees? If so, have they voice and vote?
4. Have Opposition Members of Parliament the right to initiate discussions and formulate policy?
5. Are they obliged to make any kind of report to the Government when they return from a United Nations meeting?
6. What remuneration do they receive by way of (a) *per diem* allowance; (b) living allowance; (c) transportation allowance?

Mr. Jean Lesage (Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs):

1. The Government. At the time of the San Francisco conference it was decided that the Canadian Delegation should be selected on an all-party basis. Accordingly, Opposition Members of Parliament were appointed by the Government, with the approval of the party leaders concerned, to serve in the capacity of delegates to the conferences. In August 1947, prior to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the practice of designating Opposition Members as "delegates" was discontinued on the ground that it was unfair to place members of Opposition parties in a position where they would appear to be acting as spokesmen for the Government. From that time Opposition Members appointed to Canadian delegations have been designated as "parliamentary advisers" and have thus been absolved of any appearance of responsibility for the formulation or expression of Canadian policy. In accordance with this arrangement Opposition Members of Parliament, selected by agreement with the party leaders concerned, have served as parliamentary advisers to the Canadian Delegations to the Second and Fifth Sessions of the General Assembly in 1947 and 1950 respectively.

2. Their function is to observe the proceedings of the General Assembly, to attend meetings of the Canadian Delegation, and to convey to the chairmen of the Delegation such views as they may care to express on matters before the Assembly.

3. They do not serve on committees and thus have no voice or vote.

4. They have the right to initiate and participate in informal discussions within the Canadian Delegation, but the responsibility for the formulation of policy rests with the Government.

5. No.

6. (a) Nil; (b) normal actual and reasonable hotel expenses, including meals; (c) first-class transportation to and from site of conference.

Strategic Exports to China

On May 7 Mr. G. J. McIlraith, Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Trade and Commerce and the Minister of Defence Production, in response to a question asked by Mr. G. K. Fraser (PC, Peterborough West) produced a statement showing exports from Canada to China during the period July 1950 to March 1951 inclusive. Mr. McIlraith said:

At the end of July 1950, all outstanding applications to export strategic material to communist China were reviewed and cancelled, and no further export permits have been issued since that date. Communist China is not separately classified in export trade statistics. The statement . . . shows Canadian exports to China, including Formosa, by commodities, during each month from July 1, 1950, to March 31, 1951. It is presumed that any commodity which might be considered strategic material was sent to Formosa.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Canadian Forces for United Nations Service

In the resolution entitled "Uniting for Peace", which the General Assembly adopted on November 3, 1950, at its Fifth Session, member states were asked to maintain within their national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service under the United Nations in the event of need. A further provision of the same resolution established the Collective Measures Committee, a body consisting of representatives of fourteen states, including Canada, and requested members to furnish the Committee with information on the forces which they could hold available for United Nations service.

Canadian Reply to Communication

On April 16, 1951, the Collective Measures Committee circulated a communication to member states asking them to supply this information with the least possible delay. Canada was the first country to reply in substance to this request. The Canadian Note, which is quoted in full below, was handed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time of the latter's visit to Ottawa on June 1, 1951.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the letter of April 16 from Colonel Katzin asking him to inform the Secretary-General of the measures taken by the Canadian Government in implementation of paragraph 8 of resolution 377(V) (Uniting for Peace) adopted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950.

The Secretary-General will recall that in a Note dated September 26, 1950, the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations referred to the recruitment and composition of the Canadian Army Special Force and stated that its use for service with United Nations forces in Korea had been authorized. This force has already been in action in Korea under the operational control of the Unified Command. As announced recently, it has been arranged that the Canadian Army Special Force should become a part of the 'First (Commonwealth) Division, U.N. Forces', under the Unified Command. Reinforcements for the Special Force are being maintained in Canada for use as they become necessary.

The Canadian Army Special Force has been provided and will be maintained for combat service with United Nations forces in Korea. A recommendation by the Canadian Government for the employment of the Force in any other capacity or in any other area outside the territory of Canada would of course require the approval of Parliament.

The Canadian Army Special Force is the only element of the Canadian Armed Forces which has been specifically recruited and trained for service with the United Nations and which has been made available to the United Nations in accordance with the terms of resolution 377(V) of the General Assembly. In addition, however, the Canadian Government considers that the Canadian naval and air units, which are now serving under the Unified Command in Korea, have been provided in accordance with the intent of the resolution.

While, in view of its commitments in Korea and its obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Canadian Government does not at present contemplate the recruitment and organization of further units of its armed forces specifically for service with the United Nations, the Secretary-General may be assured that Canada will continue, to the extent that its military resources and its existing defence obligations permit, to co-operate with other member states of the United Nations in collective action against breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

The World Health Organization

The World Health Assembly, which is the main constituent organ of WHO, held its fourth annual session in Geneva from May 7 to May 25, 1951. The Assembly was attended by 64 countries out of a total membership of 74, and by observers from several United Nations Agencies and non-governmental organizations interested in the work of WHO. Canada was represented by a small delegation headed by Dr. E. A. McCusker, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Health and Welfare.

The nine Cominform states (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R.), at one time active members of WHO, and Nationalist China, were absent. All the above states, with the exception of Poland, signified their decision to withdraw from the Organization a year or more ago. However, the third World Health Assembly, in 1950, resolved that while the resumption by the members concerned of full co-operation in the work of the Organization would always be welcomed, no further action at that stage was desirable. The fourth Assembly adopted a similar resolution with respect to Poland, which served notice of withdrawal in August 1950. The attitude of the Assembly on this question was largely based on the fact that the Constitution of WHO contains no provision for withdrawal from the Organization. This fact is interpreted by many members as an implicit recognition of the principle of universality of participation which underlies effective international action in the field of health.

Three new members, Spain, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, were admitted to WHO by the fourth Assembly. The Allied High Commission in Bonn and General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo have provided assurances that Germany and Japan are fully responsible for the conduct of their international relations in matters of health and consequently will be able to fulfil their obligations as WHO members. Following their admission, the three countries formally accepted the constitution of WHO, and accordingly became full members.

Annual Report Examined


The fourth Assembly also examined the annual report of the Director-General, Dr. Brock Chisholm, on the activity of WHO in 1950 and approved a programme and budget for the year 1952. The Director-General's report reviews by fields of activity, regions and countries, the projects undertaken by the Organization in 1950. It shows, for instance, that close to 100 countries benefited during that year from the technical services and assistance rendered by WHO such as the statistical and epidemiological intelligence services, health surveys, the organization of study groups and training courses, the award of fellowships, and the carrying out by teams of consultants and experts of health demonstration projects in under-developed countries. Several delegations expressed before the Assembly their appreciation of the advice and help which had been extended to member governments and their gratification for the substantial progress made by the Organization since its inception.

The 1952 programme adopted by the fourth Assembly represents the first integrated international health programme. It will be financed by the regular budget of the Organization, by supplementary funds which WHO expects to receive as its share in the expanded programme of technical assistance of the United Nations, and by the allocations which will be placed by UNICEF at the disposal of governments to assist them in developing their health and welfare programmes for children. The regular budget of WHO for 1952 was established at the gross figure of \$9,077,782.

This will represent an effective working budget of \$7,677,782, if, as expected, the inactive members fail to pay their assessments. Even in that event, it will constitute an increase of more than 20 per cent over the effective budget for 1951.

One of the most important achievements of the fourth Assembly was its unanimous adoption of new international sanitary regulations. These regulations consolidate and replace numerous existing international conventions designed to prevent the spread of infectious diseases by sea or air traffic. They will come into force on October 1, 1952. By that date all member governments will be automatically bound by the regulations unless they have notified the Organization of their reservations within nine months after the adoption of the regulations by the Assembly.

Finally, the Assembly elected Cuba, Belgium, Lebanon, Liberia, Ceylon and Greece to serve on the Executive Board for a term of three years in replacement of Brazil, India, the Netherlands, Poland, South Africa and Yugoslavia, who are due to retire in 1951.



—Capital Press

CHANDELIER PRESENTED TO CANADA

A chandelier presented to Canada by the United Kingdom Government as a token of the friendship between the two countries has been hung in the ballroom of Government House in Ottawa. The chandelier, a ton and a half of crystal and bronze, is made up of 12,650 pieces of crystal and has 80 lights. It was formally presented on Victoria Day by Sir Arthur Bromley, of the Commonwealth Relations office, in the presence of Their Excellencies The Governor General and Lady Alexander, and was accepted on behalf of the Government of Canada by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

NORTH ATLANTIC PLANNING BOARD FOR OCEAN SHIPPING

(The following information was released simultaneously in Washington and London on May 25, 1951.)

In accordance with its directive from the North Atlantic Council, the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping has agreed on an outline plan for the mobilization of ocean-going shipping in a single pool and its allocation on a world-wide basis in time of war or war-time emergency and for the establishment in such circumstances of an international organization of a civilian character to be named the Defence Shipping Authority.

The objective of the Defence Shipping Authority would be to ensure that shipping is so organized as to achieve the greatest possible economy in its employment and to render it effectively and readily available to meet the needs, both military and civil, of the co-operating nations according to approved priorities.

The main principles which would govern the operation of the Defence Shipping Authority are that each participating Government should in war or wartime emergency take all the ocean-going merchant ships of its own flag under its own control and place them in a central pool for allocation to employment by the Defence Shipping Authority. Each Government would ensure that the ships under its control carry out the tasks allotted to them by the Defence Shipping Authority. The arrangements between each Government and its shipowners would be the domestic concern of that Government, but would be of such a nature that individual owners would have no direct interest in the financial results of the employment to which their ships were allocated.

For the purposes of day-to-day operation two Branches would be established, one in Washington and one in London, with all participating Governments having the right to be represented in both Branches. While the pool of shipping would be operated as a single unit, the Branch in Washington would deal primarily with shipping and the demands for shipping services of the Western Hemisphere and the London Branch would deal primarily with shipping and the demands for shipping services of the Eastern Hemisphere.

It is intended that, should the Defence Shipping Authority be brought into being, non-NATO countries which participate in the common effort should be invited to place their ocean-going merchant ships in the pool and become members of the Authority

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. J. B. C. Watkins was posted from the Canadian Embassy in the U.S.S.R. to Ottawa, effective May 15, 1951.

Mr. A. F. Hart was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation in Poland, effective May 24, 1951.

Mr. J. A. Dougan was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy in Peru, effective May 15, 1951.

Mr. K. C. Brown was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy in Cuba, effective June 1, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Dr. Americo Cruz Fernandez, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Embassy of Cuba; May 1. He succeeds Mr. Orlando de Lara.

Mr. José Carlos Ribeiro Campos, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Brazil, May 9.

Colonel Jack Bollerud, Assistant Air Attaché, Embassy of the United States of America, May 9.

Mr. H. Mason Wade, Attaché (Public Affairs), Embassy of the United States of America, May 11.

Sir Andrew Jones, C.M.G., Adviser (Food), Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, May 26.

Mr. G. H. Bowler, O.B.E., Adviser (War Pensions), Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, May 26.

Captain Elbio G. Amorin, Naval Attaché, Legation of Uruguay, May 28.

Commander Julio C. Fisas, Naval Attaché, Legation of Uruguay, May 28.

Departures

His Excellency G. B. Holler, Minister of Denmark, relinquished his duties May 15. Pending the arrival of his successor, Mr.

Theodor Schultz, Consul of Denmark at Montreal, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Mr. Alois Mohyla, Second Secretary, Legation of Czechoslovakia, May 1.

Mr. Caio de Lima Cavalcanti, Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Brazil, May 4.

Mr. Pedro Rocha, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Brazil, May 9.

Mr. Svend Aage Holler, Attaché, Legation of Denmark, May 15.

Lieutenant Colonel Fazil Ciloglu, Military Attaché, Embassy of Turkey, was also appointed Naval and Air Attaché, April 28.

Mr. Zdenek Roskot, Second Secretary and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Legation of Czechoslovakia, left on May 14 for a vacation in his country. During his absence Mr. Vaclav Piech is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim. Mr. Piech was promoted from Third to Second Secretary on May 1.

Mr. Eugeniusz Markowski, Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Legation of Poland, left on May 24 for a visit to his country. During his absence, Mr. Zygfryd L. Wolniak, Second Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

CONSULAR

Exequaturs were issued to:

Mr. José Luis Ceron Ayuso, Consul of Spain at Montreal, May 30.

Mr. Horatio Mooers, Consul of the United States of America at St. John's, Nfld., May 30.

Miss Louise Schaffner, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, May 30.

Mr. Robert L. Smyth, Consul General of the United States of America at Vancouver, May 30.

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Ernest de W. Mayer as Consul of the United States of America at Quebec, May 4. Mr. Mayer was previously Consul at Montreal.

Miss Dorothy M. Barker as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, May 4.

Mr. Vernon V. Hukee as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, May 4.

Mr. Guy Radenac as Consul of France at Vancouver, May 5.

Dr. Hans Christian Halter as Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany at Montreal, May 18.

Mr. Ernesto Anselmo Nogues as Consul of Argentina at Montreal, May 19.

Mr. Helmuth Vitzthum von Eckstaedt as Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa, May 30. He was previously Assistant Trade Commissioner.

Mr. Werner E. P. Gautier as Vice-Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany at Montreal, May 30. He was previously Assistant Trade Commissioner at Ottawa.

Departures

Mr. Marcel Duranthon, Consul General of France at Quebec, May 10.

Mr. Hector J. Freytes, Vice-Consul of Venezuela at Vancouver, May 21.

Dr. Francisco Villagran, Consul General of Mexico at Montreal, left on May 2 for a holiday in Mexico. During his absence Mr. Paul R. Spindola, Consul, is in charge of the Consulate General.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of May 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier conferences are listed in previous issues of "External Affairs".)

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs", January 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions.)

Conferences Attended in May

1. *Sixth Session of the Narcotic Drugs Commission.* New York—April 10-May 25. Col. C. H. Sharman, Canadian Member, Narcotic Drugs Commission.
2. *Sixth Session of the Administrative Council of ITU.* Geneva—April 16-May 12. Delegate: C. P. Edwards, Deputy Minister of Transport for Air; C. J. Acton, Department of Transport.
3. *Meeting of Programme Committee of UNICEF.* New York—April 30-May 4. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.
4. *International Social Security Association (Committee of Experts).* Geneva—May 1. Dr. J. B. Bundock, Canadian Embassy, The Hague (Observer).
5. *Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.* Strasbourg—May 5-19. Hon. T. C. Davis, Head of Canadian Mission, Bonn; A. J. Andrews, Canadian Mission, Bonn (Observers).
6. *Sixth Session of Statistical Commission of ECOSOC.* New York—May 7-18. H. Marshall, Dominion Statistician.
7. *Fourth Session of the Coal Mines Committee of ILO.* Geneva—May 7-19. Government delegates: H. S. Johnstone and L. MacKinnon, Department of Labour; Employers' Delegates: J. A. Brusset, West Canadian Collieries Ltd., Alberta; J. M. Davidson, Lethbridge Collieries Ltd., Alberta; Workers' Delegates: R. Livett, United Mine Workers of America, Calgary; F. Jenkins, United Mine Workers of America, Glace Bay, N.S.
8. *Third Session of Fiscal Commission of ECOSOC.* New York—May 7-16. Representative: Dr. A. K. Eaton, Department of Finance.
9. *Fourth World Health Assembly (WHO).* Geneva—May 7. Head of Delegation: Dr. E. A. McCusker, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Health and Welfare; Alternates: Dr. P. Gauthier, M.P.; Dr. F. D. Mott, Dept. of Public Health, Regina, Sask.; Advisers: Dr. J. B. Bundock, Canadian Embassy, The Hague; N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; Miss E. MacCallum, Department of External Affairs.
10. *Economic, Employment and Development Commission of ECOSOC.* New York—May 14-25. H. Wolfson, Alternate

- Delegate, and S. D. Pollock, Adviser, Department of Finance.
11. *Programme Committee of UNICEF*. New York—May 17-18. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.
 12. *Air Standardization Co-ordinating Committee on Maps and Charts*. London—May 20-27. B. W. Waugh, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
 13. *Canada-United Kingdom Continuing Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs*. Ottawa—May 21-25. Chairman, W. F. Bull, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce; J. G. Taggart, Department of Agriculture; J. J. Deutsch and D. H. Fullerton, Department of Finance; A. F. W. Plumptre, Department of External Affairs; D. Harvey, C. M. Isbister and G. Smith, Department of Trade and Commerce.
 14. *Executive Board of UNICEF*. New York—May 22-25. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.
 15. *Meeting of Committee on Commodity Problems (FAO)*. Rome—May 22. W. Van Vliet, Canadian Legation, Copenhagen.
 16. *Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science*. Brisbane—May 23-30. Dr. L. E. Howlett, National Research Council.
 17. *B.W.I. Trade Liberalization Plan Conference*. Ottawa—May 25-29. A. H. Newman, Department of Trade and Commerce; R. G. C. Smith, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; M. B. Palmer, Canadian Trade Commissioner, Jamaica; T. G. Major, Canadian Trade Commissioner, Port-of-Spain.
 18. *115th Session of the Governing Body of ILO (and Committees)*. Geneva—May 28. N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
 19. *Canada-France Economic Committee*. Ottawa—May 29-31. M. W. Sharp, Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce; J. J. Deutsch, Department of Finance; A. F. W. Plumptre, Department of External Affairs; J. Léger, Department of External Affairs; C. M. Isbister, H. A. Gilbert, J. P. Manion, R. W. Rosenthal and M. Schwarzman, Department of Trade and Commerce; P. Pelletier, Privy Council Office, Secretary.
 20. *Conference on Civil Defence*. Brussels—May 21. Dr. E. A. McCusker, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Observer).

Conferences to be held in June and July

(The inclusion of the name of a Conference or Congress in the following list means only that the Government of Canada has received an invitation to participate. It does not follow that the invitation has been or will be accepted.)

1. *First Session of the Commission on Improvement of National Statistics*. Washington—June 2-8.
2. *Fifth Session of the Assembly of ICAO*. Montreal—June 5.
3. *34th Session of the Conference of ILO*. Geneva—June 6-30.
4. *26th Session of Executive Board of UNESCO*. Paris—June 7-16.
5. *International Congress of Actuaries*. Scheveningen—June 7-13.
6. *International Commission of Criminal Police*. Lisbon—June 11-15.
7. *Fourth Session of the Commission of the 1950 Census of the Americas*. Washington—June 11-15.
8. *12th Session of the Council of FAO*. Rome—June 11-25.
9. *The President's Highway Safety Conference*. Washington—June 13-15.
10. *15th Wildlife Conference*. Ottawa—June 15-16.
11. *13th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy*. Paris—June 17-23.
12. *Sixth Session of the General Conference of UNESCO*. Paris—June 18-July 11.
13. *Meeting of Copyright Specialists Committee of UNESCO*. Paris—June 18.
14. *14th Conference of International Office of Documentation on Military Medicine*. Vichy—June 24-25.
15. *Conference of Plenipotentiaries re Convention on Refugees and Protocol on Stateless Persons*. Geneva—July 2.
16. *Ninth International Management Conference*. Brussels—July 5-11.
17. *Commonwealth Survey Officers' Conference*. London—July 9-20.
18. *General Assembly of International Union of Pure and Applied Physics*. Copenhagen—July 10-14.
19. *Fourth International Congress of the Sea*. Ostend—July 20-22.
20. *13th Session of ECOSOC*. Geneva—July 30.
21. *Sixth International Lifeboat Conference*. Ostend—July.
22. *International Institute of Welding*. London—July.
23. *North Atlantic Council*. Rome—July.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY CANADA

Multilateral

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — Schedule V to Annex A to the Torquay Protocol. Signed by Canada at New York on May 7, 1951.

Third Additional Supplementary Protocol to the Brussels Agreement of December 5, 1947, relating to the Resolution of Conflicting Claims to German Enemy Assets, to the First Protocol, signed in Brussels on February 3, 1949, and to the Second Protocol signed in Brussels on May 10, 1950, additional to that Agreement. Signed in Brussels on January 24, 1951.

ICAO

Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Signed at Montreal on April 14, 1951.

Sweden

Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Establishment of Rules for Reciprocal Assistance in the Matter of Income Taxes. Signed at Ottawa on April 6, 1951.

Turkey

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement on the Issuance of Multi-Entry Visas to Diplomatic Representatives and Officials. Signed at Ottawa on February 9, 1951.

U.S.A.

Exchange of Notes providing for the Renewal of the Arrangement of 1942 for the Exchange of Agricultural Labour and Machinery. Signed at Ottawa on March 15 and 16, 1951.

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement on Civil Defence Co-ordination. Signed at Washington on March 27, 1951.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 51/16—*Canada and the United States: Neighbours and Allies*, an address by the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Escott Reid, delivered to the opening meeting of the Conference on Canadian-American Affairs, at the University of Maine, on April 19, 1951.
- No. 51/17—*Communism and the Peace Campaign*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered to the Sudbury and District Chamber of Commerce and Kiwanis Club, on April 20, 1951.
- No. 51/18—*Some Thoughts About Canadian-American Relations*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered to the St. George's Society of Baltimore, on April 23, 1951.
- No. 51/19—*Canada-United States Relations*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered to the Kiwanis Club at Ottawa, on April 27, 1951.
- No. 51/20—*A Statement on Canadian External Policy*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons on May 7, 1951.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

Mimeographed Documents:

Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance—Second Report of the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee; January 24, 1951; document E/1911; 82 p.

Plight of survivors of concentration camps (Progress Report by the Secretary-General); January 6, 1951; document E/1915; 50 p.

†*Report of the Transport and Communications Commission (Fifth Session) March 19-23, 1951*; April 6, 1951; document E/1980, E/CN.2/117; 44 p.

Report of the Social Commission to the Economic and Social Council (Seventh Session); April 14, 1951; document E/1982, E/CN.5/254; 113 p.

Economic Commission for Latin America, June 1948-March 1951 (Statement prepared by the Executive Secretary); March 15, 1951; document E/AC.34/6; 64 p.

Economic Commission for Europe, May 1947-February 1951 (Statement prepared by the Executive Secretary); April 6, 1951; document E/AC.34/12; 83 p.

†*Implementation of Full Employment Policies* (Replies of governments to the employ-

ment questionnaire covering the period 1950-51, submitted under resolutions 221 E (IX) and 290 (IX) of the Economic and Social Council and relating to full employment standards, economic trends and objectives, economic policies and balance of payments problems and policies); 26 March 1951; document E/CN.1/81; 243 p.

Women in Public Services and Functions (Report of the Secretary-General); January 23, 1951; document E/CN.6/158; 16 p.

Economic Commission for Europe (Sixth Session)—Reports of the Committees to the Commission on their activities over the past year, and a Note by the Executive Secretary; April 24, 1951; document E/ECE/127; Reports A to H.

Report of the administration of the British/United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, January 1 to 31 December, 1950 by Major General T. S. Abery, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E., Commander British/United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste; March 29, 1951; document S/2062; 42 p.

Decisions taken and resolutions adopted by the Security Council during the year 1950 (Prepared by the Department of Security Council Affairs); February 1, 1951; document S/INF/4; 24 p.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the King's Printer, at the price indicated.)

Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in Ottawa, May 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

Treaty Series 1951, No. 6: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Schedule V to Annex A to the Torquay Protocol. Signed by Canada at New York on May 7, 1951. Price, 15 cents. (Bilingual).

Treaty Series 1950, No. 3: Treaty between Canada and the United States of America, concerning the Diversion of the Niagara River. Signed at Washington on February 27, 1950. Price, 15 cents. (Bilingual).

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

† French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Melbourne (83 William Street)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Belgian Congo	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Casier Postal 373)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (46, rue Montoyer)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
".....	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Colombo (P.O. Box 1006)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Bank of London and South America Bldg.)
China.....	Consul General.....	Shanghai (27 The Bund)
Colombia.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Bogota (Edificio Columbiana de Seguros)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida de las Misiones No. 17)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Prague 2 (Krakowska 22)
Denmark.....	Minister.....	Copenhagen (Osterbrogade 26)
Egypt.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Cairo (Osiris Building, Sharia Walda, Kasr-el-Doubara)
Finland.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvagen 7-C)
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris 16e (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Head of Mission.....	Bonn (Zittelmanstrasse, 14)
".....	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Commonwealth House)
".....	Consul.....	Frankfurt (145 Fuerstenbergerstrasse)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 Queen Sofia Blvd.)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City (No. 20, 4th Avenue South)
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Hong Kong (Hong Kong Bank Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
".....	A/Commercial Secretary.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via Saverio Mercadante 15)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Canadian Bank of Commerce Chambers)
Japan.....	Head of Mission.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3 Chome, Minato-Ku)
Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 1A)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)
Norway.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole)
".....	A/Commercial Secretary.....	" (The Cotton Exchange, McLeod Road)
Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Tuason Bldg., 8-12 Escolta)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (Hotel Bristol)
Portugal.....	Acting Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Lisbon (Rua Rodrigo da Fonseca, 103)

Singapore.....	A/Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room D-5, Union Building)
Spain.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Madrid (Avenida José Antonio 70)
Sweden.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvagen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Minister.....	Berne (Thunstrasse 95)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (43 St. Vincent St.)
Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (211, Ayranci Baglari, Kavaklidere)
"	Commercial Secretary.....	Istanbul (Istiklal Caddesi, Kismet Han 3/4, Beyoglu)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (24, Barclay's Bank Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grand Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Building)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushny Pereulok)
"	Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.	
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Glasgow (200 St. Vincent St.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Avenue)
"	Consul.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
"	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
"	Consul.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Los Angeles (Associated Realty Bldg.)
"	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
"	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (503, 120 Exchange Street)
"	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
Venezuela.....	Consul General.....	Caracas (8° Peso Edificio America)
Yugoslavia.....	Minister.....	Belgrade (Sv. Markovica, 20)
	Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.	
*OEEC.....	Representative.....	Paris 16e (c/o Canadian Embassy)
United Nations.....	Permanent Delegate.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
"	Permanent Delegate.....	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

CBC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE

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Greenwich Mean Time	Programme	TO EUROPE	Call-signs	
1600-1630	Czech & Slovak	Daily	CKNC	CKCX
1730-1745		"	CKNC	CKCS
2200-2230		"	CKCS	CHOL
2300-2330		Sat. & Sun.	CKCS	CHOL
1940-2000	Danish	Daily	CKNC	CKCS
1645-1700	Dutch	"	CKNC	CKCS
1815-1845		"	CKNC	CKCS
1700-1730	English	"	CKNC	CKCS
1845-1900		"	CKNC	CKCS
2230-2300		"	CKCS	CHOL
1445-1530	Finnish	Sunday	CKNC	CKCK
1745-1815	French	Daily	CKNC	CKCS
2130-2200		"	CKCS	CHOL
1630-1645	German	"	CKNC	CKCS
2000-2032		"	CKNC	CKCS
2315-2330		Mon.-Fri.	CKCS	CHOL
2030-2045	Italian	Daily	CKNC	CKCS
2045-2100		"		CKCS
1920-1940	Norwegian	"	CKNC	CKCS
1415-1445	Russian	"	CKNC	CKCX
2100-2130		"	CKCS	CHOL
1530-1545	Swedish (to Finland)	Sunday	CKNC	CKCX
1900-1920		Daily	CKNC	CKCS

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

Desire for Cease-Fire Near the 38th Parallel

In an address before the United Nations Association in Canada at Ottawa on June 1, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a suggestion which was later commented upon favorably by a large part of the Canadian press. Mr. Lie said:

I believe the time has come for a new effort to end the fighting in Korea. The United Nations forces there, as things stand today, have repelled the aggression and thrown the aggressors back across the thirty-eighth parallel.

If a cease-fire could be arranged approximately along the thirty-eighth parallel then the main purpose of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and July 7 will be fulfilled, provided that the cease-fire is followed by the restoration of peace and security in the area.

The next day the United States Secretary of State referred to the same aspect of the Korean problem in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees investigating the dismissal of General MacArthur from his Far Eastern commands. In answer to questions on the United Nations objectives in Korea, Mr. Acheson recalled that the military objectives were to repel the armed attack and to restore peace and security in the area. He went on: "You have not restored peace and security if there are people on the other side of the parallel going over and fighting you . . . If the aggression would end and you had reliable assurances that it would not be resumed . . . I think that you have a real possibility of working out a stable situation".

The same day the Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea issued a statement in which he said:

The Eighth Army's pursuit phase has now ended with the clearing, again, of enemy units from southern Korea—less those in the former border area west of the Imjin River. The Eighth Army will continue, however, to stop the enemy's unwarranted aggression against South Korea and will, when necessary and profitable, meet such threats within North Korea.

On June 8, Mr. Lie told the United Nations Correspondents Association that he had been pleased with the response of the United Nations delegates to the suggestion he had made in Ottawa that a cease-fire should be arranged near the 38th parallel. He continued:

But, of course, a cease-fire cannot be brought about unilaterally. I have heard no expression from the other side—not so far.

We do not know what is in the minds of the North Koreans and their supporters. We do not yet know whether they would welcome or reject a cease-fire. In these circumstances the question arises as to what further steps, if any, the United Nations might take now towards bringing the fighting to an end.

This is, of course, a matter for the member governments to decide. I know they are consulting about the situation and I have had a number of talks with delegates about it too.

Malik Proposes Peaceful Settlement

The first indication of the attitude of the Communists to the announced desire of the Western nations for a cease-fire near the 38th parallel came in a United Nations radio broadcast by the Permanent Delegate of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations on June 23. At the end of a vituperative attack on the Western nations along the customary lines Mr. Malik said:

The Soviet Union will continue its struggle to strengthen peace and avert a new world war. The peoples of the Soviet Union believe that this is possible to defend the cause of peace.

The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of the armed conflict in Korea—could also be settled.

This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the thirty-eighth parallel.

Can such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea.

I think that, surely, is not too great a price to pay in order to achieve peace in Korea.

The official reaction of the United States Government to Mr. Malik's proposal was announced the same day in the following statement from the State Department:

If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are now willing to end the aggression in Korea, we are as we have always been ready to play our part in bringing an end to hostilities and in assuring against their resumption.

But the tenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to whether this is more than propaganda. If it is more than propaganda adequate means for discussing an end to the conflict are available.

Without mentioning Mr. Malik or his proposal specifically, President Truman referred to the question of a peace settlement in Korea in an address of June 25 on the first anniversary of the Korean war. He said:

We are ready to join in a peace settlement in Korea now as we have always been. But it must be a real settlement which fully ends the aggression and restores peace and security to the area and to the gallant Korean people.

In Korea and in the rest of the world we must be ready to take any steps which truly advance us toward world peace. But we must avoid like the plague, rash actions which would take unnecessary risks of world war or weak actions which reward aggression.

Mr. Lie's Statement

The Secretary-General of the United Nations was in Norway at the time of Mr. Malik's broadcast. Mr. Lie immediately issued the following statement:

In recent weeks, the qualified spokesmen of many of the governments whose forces are participating in the United Nations action in Korea and I, as Secretary-General, have expressed hope for a military cease-fire in Korea in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. The Delegate of the U.S.S.R., Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob A. Malik, now has also expressed his hope for such a cease-fire.

The United Nations forces have been fighting in Korea to uphold peace and security under the United Nations Charter. From the outset, the United Nations have made it clear again and again that the first step to the restoration of peace in Korea must be a cease-fire. Such a cease-fire should involve only the military arrangements necessary to stop the fighting and to ensure against its renewal.

I urge that negotiations for a military cease-fire now be entered into at the earliest possible date.

If such a cease-fire can be attained, the political issues involved in the restoration of peace and security in Korea can be appropriately discussed in the competent organs of the United Nations.

The general reaction in most Western capitals was reported to be that Mr. Malik's statement should be fully explored as a possible first step in ending the Korean fighting. The Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, assured Members of Parliament that "the language of this declaration is being carefully scrutinized and there is no indication anywhere that it is going to be brushed off. It is going to be explored with a sincere desire at least on our side to have it produce results". In London the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs commented that: "If Malik's statement should be a satisfactory basis for a proposal from Moscow then we should make the most of it. If the U.S.S.R. is anxious to end the fight in Korea on terms we can accept then we should certainly follow it up". He noted that there were ambiguities in Mr. Malik's statement and recalled that the West had had unhappy experiences in the past with certain Russian statements on issues of this kind; then he went on, "however it would be a great mistake not to follow it up so we can find out exactly what it means".

On June 25 the Peking radio quoted an editorial in the *People's Daily* saying that the Chinese people fully endorsed Mr. Malik's proposal for a Korean cease-fire. The editorial went on to say: "This is another test for America to see whether she accepts the lessons of the past and to see whether she is willing to settle Korean question peacefully. It is obvious that at present it is beyond America's strength to expand the war as she wants to do. If she is willing to stop the war she should therefore fall in at once with the just and reasonable measures for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question repeatedly proposed by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the other peoples who desire peace".

Although the major powers engaged in the war in Korea appeared willing to end the fighting where it began, some of the Koreans themselves were of a different mind. The President of the Republic of Korea stated:

Any cease-fire proposal short of complete reunification of the Korean peninsula will be unacceptable. This is our minimum requirement. Without our participation in all discussions regarding Korea they will be futile.

United Nations Forces Continue Advance

The United Nations advance north of the 38th parallel continued during June although at a slower rate than during the second half of May when a surprise counter offensive stopped a major Chinese attack and carried United Nations forces across the parallel to the line held when the enemy's spring offensive began on April 22. During the month of June the important "Iron Triangle" area based on Pyongyang in the north, Chorwon in the west and Kumhwa in the east was won by United Nations troops. Kaesong, the last major enemy outpost south of the 38th parallel, was entered shortly before the end of the month. The United Nations line thus ran from the 38th parallel on the west coast about 30 miles into North Korea in the centre, and thence eastward to the east coast.

Canadian Trade Policy with China Described

In its resolution of May 18, 1951, the General Assembly recommended that every state apply an embargo on war supplies to North Korea and China and report within 30 days on the measures taken in accordance with the resolution. On June 16, the Acting Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. J. W. Holmes, submitted the Canadian Government's report which said among other things that:

The export restrictions recommended in the resolution were less stringent than those which had already been imposed by the Canadian Government and the resolution therefore did not necessitate changes in Canadian export regulations.

From the beginning of the aggression in Korea there have been no shipments of arms, ammunition or implements of war from Canada to North Korea or China. On December 9, 1950, following the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in the Korean war, the Canadian Government broadened the scope of its export controls in such a manner that individual export permits were made a requirement for the export of all commodities without exception to China, Hong Kong, Macao and North Korea.

Not only are permits denied for the export to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation material of strategic significance and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as recommended in the General Assembly's Resolution, but in addition permits are denied for a very wide range of other goods which may be considered to be strategic.

The Canadian Government will prevent by all means within its power the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other states under the resolution and will co-operate fully with other states in carrying out the purpose of the embargo.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs described in considerable detail the Canadian Government's policy with respect to commercial relations with the People's Republic of China when he addressed a dinner meeting given by the City of Toronto on June 5 in honour of the foreign exhibitors at the Canadian International Trade Fair. Mr. Pearson declared that despite the justification apparently afforded by the aggressive intervention of the Peking Government in the Korean conflict there were good reasons for not cutting off all intercourse with China. He summed up his opinions on this problem as follows:

My own view is that we should not allow our commercial policy toward China at this time to become more stringent than our overall foreign policy toward her, and that we should not seek to put a complete embargo on all trade with her, unless the policy of the Peking Government gives us no alternative in the matter.

THE FRENCH GENERAL ELECTIONS

In the first general election since November 1946 the French electorate went to the polls on June 17 to choose a National Assembly.

A significant feature of the election was the electoral law enacted a short time before. Proportional representation, the system used in 1946, was modified in favour of a voting system designed to permit parties with mutual sympathies to form alliances, *apparentements*, and combine their forces at the polls. In contrast to Canadian single-member ridings, electors in France have been accustomed to vote for a number of deputies at a time in large multi-member constituencies. The new law provided that if a single party or an alliance of parties secured a majority of the votes cast, the winning party or alliance will carry all the seats in the constituency. Alternatively if no party or alliance secured a majority, the seats will be divided among all parties contesting the election on a basis of proportional representation.

Two theoretical and over-simplified examples may serve to show how such a system could work. In the first instance the Malcontents at one end of the political spectrum obtain 15 thousand votes, the Militants at the other end obtain 9 thousand, while a group of centre parties which have agreed to form an electoral alliance, the Modernists, the Moderates and the Mercantilists obtain 26 thousand. The alliance, having secured a majority, divide amongst themselves all the seats in the constituency while the Malcontents with 30% of the votes and the Militants with 18% obtain no seats. In the second instance the three centre parties run candidates independently and fail to form an alliance, obtaining 14 thousand, 8 thousand and 4 thousand respectively, so that no single party or alliance has a majority. The seats are then distributed on a basis of proportional representation with the Malcontents at the head of the list and the Militants third. In the first case these two latter parties obtain no seats; in the second case they do well.

This fictional example illustrates the importance which electoral alliances can have under the present law. Its framers, in discarding straight proportional representation, were consciously seeking to limit the representation in the next Assembly of extremist parties, and to provide a method whereby the parties of the centre could increase their parliamentary strength over the forces of the "double opposition", Communist and Gaullist. The wisdom of thus constructing electoral machinery designed to provide a desired result was widely discussed in France before the election and will undoubtedly be debated extensively in the future. At present it is sufficient to note that, by making possible the election of a majority for the moderate "republican" parties and by reducing the number of Communist members the electoral law achieved what was hoped from it.

Six Major Groups

French electors had to choose among six major groups. The important political formations were the Socialists and the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, which are both moderate leftists; the liberal Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines, which is a coalition of the Radicals and of smaller groups; the Independents and Peasants, a recently formed coalition of conservatives and moderate rightists, which has absorbed the former P.R.L. Party; the rightist Rassemblement du Peuple Français constituted in 1947 by General de Gaulle; and the Communists. It may be useful to recall that following the 1946 election, France was governed by ten successive political coalitions drawn mainly from the Socialists, the M.R.P. and the R.C.R., apart from the Communists who left the Government in 1947.

At stake were the seats of 627 Deputies, 574 representing Metropolitan France and Algeria and 53 representing French overseas departments and territories. The election results gave an almost equal number of seats to the six main political parties.

The distribution of seats were: Gaullists, 108; Socialists, 104; Communists, 103; Peasants and Independents, 98; R.G.R., 94; M.R.P., 85; various overseas independent and others, 23. A few seats are still subject to verification. Elections to fill the other two seats — New Caledonia and French Oceania — will be held later. The changes in the distribution of seats, as compared with the results of the November 1946 election, may be indicated as follows:

Parties	1946	1951	Difference
Socialists	99	104	+ 5
M.R.P.	145	85	- 60
R.G.R.	60	94	+ 34
Right-wing	111	98	- 13
R.P.F.	0	118	+118
Communists	189	103	- 86
Others	16	25	+ 9
Total	620	627	+ 7

Of the 25 million French citizens who were registered as voters, less than 19 million actually voted. Many types of alliances were found in constituencies by the moderate parties, and they were successful to a considerable extent in producing majorities which captured all seats in a constituency despite large minority votes obtained by Communists and Gaullists. The Communists because they could not, and the Gaullists because they would not, form alliances derived no benefit from the alliance system. One example will suffice to show how, because of alliances, voting strength did not necessarily correspond to seats obtained. The Communists with 26.4% of the total vote secured 103 seats, while the Socialists and M.R.P. with almost the same percentage, 26.8, returned 189. The distribution of votes as compared with that of the 1946 elections, and the effect of the electoral law, may be illustrated as follows:

Parties	1946		1951	
	Votes	%	Votes	%
Socialists	3,413,035	17.8	2,764,210	14.5
M.R.P.	4,992,985	26.1	2,353,544	12.3
R.G.R.	2,228,326	11.6	2,194,213	11.5
Right-wing	2,939,297	15.4	2,472,016	13.1
R.P.F.	4,039,889	21.7
Communists	5,516,763	28.8	5,001,616	26.4
Others	62,976	0.3	95,000	0.5
Votes cast	19,153,382	100.0	18,920,488	100.0
Abstentions	5,486,536		5,457,790	
Votes registered	25,052,233		24,973,148	

Government Parties Returned

The salient fact that emerges from the voting figures is that the Government parties obtained a majority of about 800,000 votes over the combined opposition vote. With all its imperfections the new electoral system has reflected this majority, even if it has somewhat magnified it, in the distribution of seats in the Assembly. The fact that approximately 75% of the voters supported parties which strongly oppose Com-

munism is also of significance, and it is worth noting that the Communists polled half a million fewer votes than in 1946. On the whole the election appears to represent a victory for moderation and an expression of dislike by the French electorate for adventure or radical changes in the methods of Government. Finally there has been a noticeable shift to the right in French opinion as expressed by the important vote in favour of the Gaullists and of the large group of Independents and Peasants.

Although an attempt has not yet been made, as this article goes to press, to form a French Government, certain important points emerge. The exclusion of the communists from the Government appears a certainty. Mr. René Pleven, head of one of the liberal parties forming the R.G.R., has said that three majorities are possible in the new Assembly:

- (1) A majority of National Union comprising all parties except the communists.
- (2) A majority composed of the Socialists, the R.G.R. and M.R.P., and the Independents and Peasants.
- (3) A majority of the Right, not comprising the Socialists.

On the other hand General de Gaulle, at a post-election press conference, clearly expressed his party's intention of staying out of any coalition government which he would not head or which would not adopt his methods of government. Should this attitude be maintained, it would mean that the R.P.F. will enter the new Assembly as a strong opposition force.

Need for Stable Government Recognized

The presence in the Assembly of two large opposition groups which both favour — although in different fashion — basic changes in the methods of government, may well induce the parties of the centre to submerge some of their differences in order to form a coalition government. Such a decision may, it is true, offer certain difficulties in the case of the Socialists and of the Independents and Peasants, since it is between these two groups that political differences are most evident. Nevertheless, and although repeated experiments may prove to be necessary, there is no reason to doubt that the republican parties of the centre will make serious attempts to reach an understanding. France's new Government will be faced, in domestic affairs as well as in international affairs, with urgent and difficult problems. The need for stable governments capable of meeting these problems is recognized. There are good grounds for believing that France will continue to be governed by coalitions of the moderate parties, not unlike the governments of recent years, which will provide an element of continuity and will not be disposed to make substantial changes in present French policies.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Excerpts from a Commencement Day address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered at Bates College, at Lewiston, Maine, on June 17, 1951.

... You in the United States and we in Canada with others of our friends are now joined together in an attempt to fashion a community on a larger scale than any of our national states. The North Atlantic Alliance, for instance, is an important instrument for maintaining the security and freedom of its members. But it is more than that. It is the foundation on which we are trying to build a wider society of free men.

It is well that we should do this. But in the process we should remember that the civilization of the West has now to be regarded as only one of the independent civilizations throughout the world. After a sleep of many centuries, the civilizations in the Far East, which had long lain quiescent or subdued are stirring. They have had glorious achievements. They still have their own values; and they are demanding the right to develop them in their own way. I believe that in the long run the re-emergence in a modern political form of these ancient civilizations, with their own individual traditions, will enrich the life of all men throughout the world. Certainly in framing our own policies, we must consider more than we have been accustomed to do the views and wishes of these awakening giants. Nor should pride and power dictate this consideration.

... The wealth of our common civilization, material, intellectual and moral, carelessly dissipated though some of it has been, is, nevertheless, immense. To work towards the establishment of a North Atlantic community of nations, all sharing in this great legacy from the past, all with their own special contributions to make in the future, all pledged to be of mutual assistance to one another, is surely a task worthy of our finest effort and of our greatest zeal. The goal of such a society, strong, varied and secure but not self-centered or exclusive; anxious to profit by contact with other civilizations, is an ideal, it seems to me, which can support and encourage us through all the difficulties of the present time.

The leader of our coalition, the United States of America, is, for instance, pre-eminent in power and authority by any standard of measurement. It has sincerely based its policy of association on the principle of "*primus inter pares*", which is, indeed, the only principle the rest of us would accept. The necessity, however, of reconciling fact and theory will require among all the members of the association qualities of restraint, comprehension, and tolerance. If the leadership which is exercised by the United States is to be accepted wholeheartedly and freely by all its allies, concessions will at times have to be made to meet the views and the special requirements of individual nations.

This point has been well put by Mr. Paul Hoffman, whose work as the Economic Co-operation Administrator did so much to restore prosperity and vigour to the free nations of the world. In his recent book *Peace Can Be Won* he has said:

If we are to lead effectively we must work with the rest of the free world on a basis of partnership and unity, founded on respect for views and interests other than our own. This is a matter of elementary psychology — an operating principle just as valid for heads of state as for the men in the street.

Mr. Hoffman, in these words, gives his conception of the way in which the United States should discharge its responsibilities if it is to be an effective leader

of the coalition. The other members, I hasten to add, have the equal and parallel obligation to recognize, frankly and ungrudgingly, the special contribution to the common effort which is being made by the United States and the heavy responsibilities which it is carrying. All free people must feel profoundly grateful that your country has assumed the task of leadership with such courage and decision. We can demonstrate that feeling most convincingly by the way in which we make our own contributions to the common and co-operative task. In doing this, the parts we may all be called on to play will, in many cases, be new and unaccustomed. The role of world leadership for the United States may, for instance, seem strange to a country accustomed for a century and a half to the protection of geography and possessed by the primary and, at times, almost exclusive interest of continental and national development. But this new role is possibly no more strange than that of Great Britain or France who must look across the Atlantic for the support necessary for their own survival in the struggle in which we are all engaged.

Problems in an Alliance

The responsibilities and the trials of leadership must, of necessity, often seem irksome to the American people. They will, I think, seem less so if the immediate problems of such leadership are considered in the perspective of the history of other countries which have been similarly situated in the past.

The problems now facing the United States as the leader of the North Atlantic alliance are in many respects those which have arisen in every previous alliance. Moreover, these same problems have given rise to reactions very like those which are sometimes current today in the United States. It is a penalty of leadership to feel overburdened and often misunderstood. This was certainly the feeling of the United Kingdom in the 19th century. You may remember how Matthew Arnold, replying to criticism of the Britain of that day, pictured it as "a weary Titan . . . staggering on to her goal, bearing on shoulders immense, Atlantean, the load, well-nigh not to be borne, of the too vast orb of her fate". The United States may today feel at times the same way, but I do not think there is much danger that she will stagger under the "too vast orb of her fate". I hope not, because that fate involves nothing less than the destiny of all mankind.

The problem I have mentioned is accentuated by the fact that the American people have not been prepared either by history or by their customary modes of thought for the unprecedented world role which they are now playing. This difficulty has been analysed with acuteness by a wise American commentator on international affairs, Mr. George Kennan. Writing in the introduction to *The United States in World Affairs 1949*, he pointed out how the American people "were unaccustomed to the sense of national insecurity. They were unprepared for the ordeal of sparring indefinitely and inconclusively with a force committed to the destruction not only of their own national power but also of the only sort of international context in which their ideals could be realized. Finally, they were reluctant to believe that there could be major international problems to which there would not be incisive and final solutions, if their policymakers could only find them — problems, in other words, which had to be lived with instead of solved. It fell to these American people to acquire suddenly the art of being patient and conciliatory without showing weakness, and conversely of maintaining strength, and using it, without being rash or provocative."

The Obligations of Leadership

There are, then, heavy obligations laid both on those who must bear the responsibility of leadership in the North Atlantic alliance and on those whose duty it is to co-operate effectively and wholeheartedly with that leadership. Above all, we

must avoid words or actions or reactions which will weaken the coalition, without any compensating advantage. The danger in which we all stand is so grave and the necessity to increase our collective strength so urgent that any careless, irresponsible action or talk which might divide us and so give aid and comfort to the enemy would be criminal folly. I do not mean by this that we should hide our differences by pretending that none ever exist. In any coalition there are bound to be honest differences and, unless they are examined and discussed honestly, they may fester under-ground and poison the partnership. It is of vital importance, however, that in discussing our differences we should use only the accents of good temper and good faith, and that we should display, always, a sense of responsibility and a sense of proportion, and indeed a sense of humour! Our effort should constantly be not to score points at the expense of our allies, but to come to agreed solutions. It is one of the glories of our democracy, both in the United States and in Canada, and, indeed, in other parts of the free world, that in our achievement of political democracy we have learned to settle our domestic problems by frank discussion, fairly and decently carried on. If we forget that lesson, — and there are some signs that we are — we may one day lose our system of free and popular government. Similarly, if we do not project this practice into the international democratic system which we are trying to build, our coalition may fail to meet the tests ahead; it may even break up.

In the Soviet system of alliance, differences are very quickly resolved. They are composed by the exercise of ruthless dictation, on the one hand, and slavish obedience, on the other. We in the free world will not be able to solve our differences — nor would we wish to — by any such arbitrary formulae. In accordance with our own traditions, we will have to engage in the more difficult, but infinitely more rewarding, process of attempting to compose them by compromise and goodwill. The irritations and perplexities with which we will be surrounded in doing this may sometimes bring our nerves very close to the surface. At such moments it will be tempting to look for scape-goats or to search for incidents outside our own boundaries in order to cover up our own mistakes. Unless we guard against this danger, suspicions may grow up among us and trust may be impaired. Whenever we are subject to these temptations, let us remember that this is no time for bickering, no time to bring out old prejudices or foster new suspicions. We now share a common danger and we face a common destiny. Everything that we say and everything that we do should take account of that cardinal fact.

The Special Role of Canada

In strengthening the coalition of free nations in the North Atlantic alliance, we in Canada may have a special role to play. We are bound to you in the United States by long standing ties of neighbourly friendship and understanding. The roots of our history and our affections are also deep in the soil of Great Britain and France. We are finally, a smaller country without the external political interests or commitments or pressures that go with world wide responsibilities. Because of this special position, Canada may be able, from time to time, to play some part in easing relations within the alliance. Certainly, no country has a greater stake in its success than my own, since no country has better cause than Canada to realize that it cannot live alone; though no country, I might add, is more anxious to establish and preserve its own particular national contribution to the coalition.

The tasks to which we are all called are then, manifold and challenging. We must quickly increase our collective strength within the United Nations and the North Atlantic alliance. We must look much further into the future than the immediate crisis and do whatever we can to encourage the growth of a genuine international community within the North Atlantic area. And always we must remember

that we are increasing our strength not primarily to win a war but to prevent one; not to defeat communism in war, but to contain it without war. The real test of our cause, will be how to use our increasing strength. To acquit ourselves well in that test, we will need both wisdom and steadiness. "The strong man armed keepeth the peace". But to do that, he must first keep his head!

Finally, if we are to discharge our full responsibility to the cause of freedom and to humanity, we must not lose sight of the idea of the human community, world-wide in scale, partially eclipsed though that community has been and although the Russians and other communist peoples have been alienated from it by the action of their rulers. Even when straining every nerve to meet the challenge to our own civilization which has been thrown by Soviet imperialism, we must not forget the human family from which such a large part of the world's population has been estranged. There are, therefore, many concentric circles defining our responsibilities — to our own countries, to the present coalition of countries in the North Atlantic alliance, to the emerging North Atlantic community, to the United Nations and to the world-wide community of all human creatures. To recognize and fulfil our responsibilities in all of these spheres, we must first have a clear image within our own minds of what constitutes a good community.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION AND CANADA'S CULTURAL RELATIONS ABROAD

The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences was established in April of 1949 to examine and to make recommendations upon the principles which should govern broadcasting and television policies in Canada and upon certain agencies of the government, including the National Film Board, the National Gallery, the National Museum, and the Public Archives. The Commission was also instructed to make recommendations concerning aid to research in Canada, including scholarships. The Commission further was to consider Canada's relations with UNESCO, and the relationship of the Government of Canada with various national voluntary bodies. In April of 1950 the Commission's terms of reference were extended to include methods for providing adequate information about Canada in other countries, and measures to safeguard historic sites and monuments in Canada.

The Report of the Royal Commission which was tabled in Parliament on June 1, although naturally concerned primarily with matters of domestic interest, discusses in some detail a number of points important to the problems of Canada's cultural relations abroad; these points it is proposed to review briefly.

"All nations" the Report states "now recognize as public responsibilities both the issue of information about themselves and cultural exchanges with other states . . . The promotion abroad of a knowledge of Canada is not a luxury but an obligation, and a more generous policy in this field would have important results, both concrete and intangible . . . Exchanges with other nations in the fields of the arts and letters will help us to make our reasonable contribution to civilized life, and since these exchanges move in both directions, we ourselves will benefit by what we receive. We are convinced that a sound national life depends on reciprocity in these matters". And the chapter entitled "The Projection of Canada Abroad" begins with the sentence "Ignorance of Canada in other countries is very widespread."

The Royal Commission, then, leaves no doubt as to the importance which it attaches to this matter; it recommends the continuance and the extension of existing means of making Canada better known abroad, and the adoption of new measures on a generous scale.

The Canada Council

The principal innovation recommended by the Royal Commission is a council for the encouragement of Canadian arts and letters, humanities and social sciences. This new body, the Canada Council, designed to be partly advisory and partly administrative in character, would have three separate though closely related responsibilities: to help voluntary societies concerned with these matters in Canada, to foster Canada's cultural relations abroad, and to serve as a national commission for UNESCO. With the first of these responsibilities we are not here directly concerned; the other two, however, call for some comment.

In summarizing the gaps in Canada's cultural equipment as a modern state, the Commission, among other matters, observes:

Unlike most countries of the world we have in Canada no advisory or executive body to deal with the question of our cultural relations abroad. Earlier in this Report we have suggested that Canadian creative and interpretative artists would benefit both themselves and our country if it were made possible for them to travel for study and experience. We can also well believe that it might be in the public interest, for example, that a Canadian orchestra go on tour abroad, that exhibitions of Canadian paintings be arranged in Europe or that a Canadian theatrical company perform in Edinburgh or London or Paris. At present we have no organization such as the British

Council or the French *Section des Oeuvres Françaises à l'Étranger* to arrange and to underwrite such ventures, although we judge it possible that a company of Canadian players or a Canadian orchestra might do as much for this country as has been done for Great Britain by the Sadler's Wells Ballet Company whose highly successful tours of the United States and Canada have been made possible by the British Council. These tours can be profitable, both financially and artistically; but they cannot be undertaken at all unless their expenses are guaranteed.

We do not possess in Canada a clearing-house or a centre of information on the arts, letters, humanities and social sciences. Inquiries from abroad often come to the Department of External Affairs which, unable to supply full and accurate information on all aspects of Canadian culture, refers the inquiries to one or another of the voluntary organizations, (The Canadian Music Council, the Social Research Council, the Dominion Drama Festival, the Canadian Arts Council). Most of these organizations operate on a very modest scale, and it is not generally appreciated that they find the burden of gathering the information and of answering inquiries, whether from abroad or from within the country, far heavier than their restricted resources can endure. We are informed, for example, that the Canada Foundation corresponded during 1949 with organizations and individuals in forty-two countries, and that its time is almost fully occupied in dealing with inquiries from Canada and from abroad. Very few of our voluntary organizations are affluent enough to employ a full-time secretary; but, as they reasonably point out, they are constantly invited to assume, particularly in the interest of Canada's cultural relations abroad, the role of an information centre which many of them feel is a national responsibility.

The Commission accordingly proposes that the "Canada Council proceed as rapidly as possible to establish a central office of information on those aspects of the arts, letters, humanities and social sciences which fall within its competence." The Commission also suggests that the Canada Council give thought to "the promotion of a knowledge of Canada abroad by such means as foreign tours, by Canadian lecturers and by performers in music, ballet and drama, and by the exhibition abroad of Canadian art in its varied forms."

A System of Fellowships

The Royal Commission recommends that the Canada Council have a further means at its disposal to foster Canada's cultural relations with other countries: a system of fellowships and scholarships which would permit talented Canadians to study and work abroad and would also enable a certain number of students from other countries to continue their advanced studies in Canada. In this matter of exchange scholarships the Report states that Canada has been singularly negligent, although other countries for many years have shown a generosity to Canadian students which might well have inspired us long since to extend a corresponding liberality. The system of scholarships, it is intended, would be designed to include Canadian workers in the creative arts, in music and letters, for example, or in painting and sculpture; the system of awards should, the Report states, "be broad enough to include journalists and those engaged in such activity as the production of drama, radio programmes or films." Exchange scholarships in these and in kindred fields would be available to gifted artists and men of letters from abroad for work in Canada.

Such then are the three principal ways by which the Canada Council would help in extending the knowledge of Canada in other countries: by an information centre, by the promotion of foreign tours and exhibitions, and by a system of fellowships and exchange scholarships. We turn now to consider the third responsibility of the proposed Council: its activities as a national Commission for UNESCO.

The reasons which prompted the Royal Commission to assign this third function to the Canada Council are expressed with clarity and force: "A council to stimulate the arts and letters in this country, particularly if it were also charged with the encouragement of Canada's relations abroad, would be doing exactly the kind of work which must be undertaken by a National Commission for UNESCO: it must maintain



MASSEY REPORT PRESENTED

Mr. Vincent Massey, left, presents to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. L.S. St. Laurent, the first English and French language copies of the Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences.

close relations with voluntary organizations in Canada; it must take an active interest in projects of general education; it must interest itself in all cultural affairs, and in these matters it must be prepared to exchange information with UNESCO and related international organizations. It might not, it is true, be designed to carry on the scientific exchanges which are an important part of the work of UNESCO. It could no doubt for this purpose secure the co-operation of the National Research Council which has numerous international affiliations. We believe therefore that if one agency were created to concern itself with voluntary effort in the arts, letters, and social sciences, to encourage cultural exchanges, and at the same time act as a

National Commission for UNESCO, wasteful duplication would be avoided and the influence and the prestige of the organization would be strengthened."

As the Commission sees it, the principal duty of the Canada Council in UNESCO matters would be "to extend the knowledge in Canada of UNESCO's purposes and programmes and in turn to ensure that those policies and practices best calculated to win the support and the confidence of the Canadian people are brought, through the Department of External Affairs, to the attention of the general conference of UNESCO."

Measures Proposed by Commission

These then are the new measures proposed by the Commission for the furthering of Canada's cultural relations with other countries. It was noticed earlier that the Commission has also recommended the continuance and the extension of existing means of making Canada better known abroad. Thus, the Commission proposes that the International Service of CBC be continued and expanded to increase the knowledge and understanding of Canada abroad; and adds that Canada should be represented abroad on these international broadcasts by the best and most representative talent available in this country. The Report similarly recommends that the National Film Board be provided with funds to increase its distribution of Canadian films abroad through commercial and others channels. Finally, the Report suggests that the information service of the Department of External Affairs needs to be expanded "even in such countries as Great Britain and the United States. The gravest lack is that of competent information or press officers. Compared with her neighbours, Canada is very inadequately represented. No amount of printed material or of special cables can take the place of able and experienced information officers. They know the newspapers and the newspapermen of the country to which they are posted; they understand what is wanted and how it should be presented. By gaining confidence and friendship they can do much to ensure a fair and accurate presentation of Canadian life, of Canadian policy and of the Canadian point of view." The Commission also suggests that the Department of External Affairs might well extend its activities in film distribution in other countries; the Department's present services in providing photographic and other illustrative material should also, it is proposed, be expanded.

In general, the Commission finds that Canadian activity in bringing to other countries a proper knowledge and understanding of Canada is inadequate. The work of voluntary societies interested in this question is not co-ordinated and is hampered by lack of funds; we have in Canada only very limited information facilities in cultural matters, and these in turn depend in large measure upon struggling voluntary organizations. We are moreover inadequately represented abroad by trained press and information officers. Our entire effort, in short, is not in keeping with the stature and dignity of this country. The Commission records its interest in the possibility that part of the blocked Canadian funds in Europe, notably in France, Italy and the Netherlands, might be made available for educational and cultural programmes. "If the plan is found to be practicable it would no doubt be possible to send post-graduate Canadian students, teachers and professors to pursue advanced work in at least these three countries in which the largest amounts of Canadian blocked funds are now held. Thought has also been given to the practicability of making possible tours abroad by Canadian participation in cultural conferences of a semi-official nature taking place in those countries."

The Commission notes that the total of the blocked Canadian funds in European countries amounts to a very considerable sum, and hopes that it may be found possible and desirable to use part of the sums available to help finance cultural exchanges which could do much to enhance the reputation of Canada abroad and which would be of great value to Canadian citizens.

THE PARTNERSHIP TO UPHOLD FREEDOM

Excerpts from an address by the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, delivered at Northwestern University, at Evanston, Ill., on June 11, 1951.*

. . . A hundred years ago, at the time this University was founded, the United States was entering upon one of the most difficult periods in the history of this country. For something over half a century your forebears had maintained, within this nation, an uneasy balance between two very different conceptions of human society, one insisting on human equality and the other tolerating human slavery. By 1851 it was becoming clear to most Americans both in the North and South that this uneasy balance could not be maintained indefinitely. Unless a way of life based on either freedom or slavery was accepted as the rule throughout the whole nation, it was apparent the nation itself would not survive.

During the first decade of the history of Northwestern University it was the supreme aim of American statesmanship to find a peaceful solution to that problem of national survival. Unhappily a peaceful solution was not found.

The American people had to wage a terrible civil war to maintain their unity as a nation. Whether greater statesmanship could have settled that issue without war is now an academic question and I am not going to try to answer it. But I am sure almost no one would quarrel with the assertion that slavery was bound to be abandoned sooner or later and that if slavery could have been extinguished without war, it would have been a great gain for the United States and a great gain for the human race.

The human race today faces a situation which in some respects is similar to the one this nation faced a century ago. The existence of this nation, like other free nations, is in danger; and the danger is one we are trying to overcome without a great war.

But the problem is no longer an exclusively American problem. On one side is Communist imperialism striving for the total enslavement of the whole world; on the other is a partnership of the free nations striving to maintain the freedom we believe to be the very essence of civilized life. At present there is an uneasy balance between the two. Of course, such a balance cannot be maintained indefinitely. Sooner or later, we must have a free world or what we will have is a world in chains. But, for the time being, I believe the first task of statesmanship is to maintain that balance, though it should be our supreme aim to try by every honourable means, to ensure the ultimate peaceful triumph of freedom in the world.

Now it is hardly possible to exaggerate the difficulty of achieving that aim. To succeed we, in the free world, have to create now, and then to maintain, military strength too substantial for our opponents to dare challenge it with any prospect of final victory.

At the same time we must continue to develop our free way of life and to demonstrate its superiority, not only for the favoured peoples of the western world, but also for those countless millions in other continents who are confused and uncertain in the present situation. And while that is being done we are also faced with the problem of living in one world with the great nations behind the iron curtain where long years of intellectual, social and political servitude have undermined the aptitude and perhaps even the desire of many for what we regard as freedom.

* The following passages are taken from the Commencement Address delivered by Mr. L. S. St. Laurent at Northwestern University, at Evanston, Ill., on June 11, 1951. The complete official text is No. 51/25 of the Department's Statements and Speeches series and may be obtained on application to the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

I say this is a hard programme. It is the most forbidding prospect which has faced any generation since our European ancestors first settled in the new world. One reason it is hard is that we cannot expect, and indeed, we dare not even hope for quick results.

There is no short and easy way to make the world free or even to make our own freedom secure. It may well be that the greatest of all the dangers we face — greater even than the danger from Russia or from China — is the danger of listening to those who think they have a quick and easy solution to this terribly difficult problem.

There is a great temptation to say: Communist imperialism is an evil thing bent on extinguishing freedom in the world. Let us extinguish it first. Let us get it over with. That temptation will grow greater as the military strength of the free world increases.

This danger is all the greater because acts of Communist aggression like that we are now opposing in Korea inevitably arouse strong feelings and a natural inclination to use our growing strength to hit back at the very source of the trouble.

But statesmanship does not consist in yielding to impulses, however righteous, without reckoning consequences. To hit back now at the source of the trouble is to start a world war. And that is what we are trying to prevent.

Ambassador Philip Jessup has said that "the United States will fight, if necessary, to preserve freedom and justice, but it will not make war merely because the road to peace is inevitably long and hard and tiresome". That I believe is the right attitude for all free nations.

Now I am personally convinced that our greater industrial strength, our greater initiative and know-how and the greater moral resources of free peoples would enable us to win a world war if such a war got started. But I am just as firmly convinced that the wholesale and appalling destruction of human lives and — perhaps even worse — of the institutions of civilization so patiently built up over the centuries, would set back human progress for generations, and possibly for centuries. There is no doubt we would face even these terrible consequences rather than accept the living death of world domination by Communist imperialism.

But our real aim must be to prevent either of these catastrophes. To do so we must build up and sustain the strength of the free world and maintain a fundamental unity of purpose among the free nations. That unity of aim and purpose must be strong enough to contain honest differences about means and methods and to permit us to resolve those differences by the give and take of discussion and negotiation.

No one country, not even the United States with all its power and all its wealth, can by itself alone provide for its security.

On the other hand, all the free nations everywhere recognize that there can be no security for any of them without the leadership of the United States.

In a very real sense, we do live in a two power world — the world of the free and the world of the subjected. That fact provides the Communist propagandists with one of their most effective weapons in the war of ideas. Fellow-travellers of Moscow — some of them possibly honest but very short-sighted pacifists — are peddling all around the globe their legend of a different kind of two-power world; one in which they claim there are two rival centres of imperialistic expansion. According to them, the Soviet Union and the United States are waging a gigantic struggle for world domination. These Communist fellow-travellers assert that both these powers are equally ruthless, equally unscrupulous, that both constitute the same terrifying threat to the real freedom of other nations; and they suggest that the part of wisdom

for other nations is to stand aside from the struggle and let the imperialist giants destroy each other's over-ambitious plans.

This proposition no doubt sounds as absurd to you as it does to me. And yet it would be a great mistake to think this myth does not appeal to many people in the free world who would be quite impervious to the direct appeal of Communism.

Now it seems to me that the very existence of Canada as an independent nation is the best of all demonstrations, an actual living demonstration of the falsity of that proposition. . .

. . . In the North Atlantic alliance, and in the resistance we are offering to aggression under the flag of the United Nations in Korea, the United States and Canada are engaged with a number of other nations in a partnership not to dominate others, but to uphold freedom in the world. In that partnership history and geography have combined to make the United States, inevitably, the predominant partner.

Of course, the success of any partnership depends upon the understanding and good will of the partners towards one another. In every successful partnership, each of the partners has to be prepared to overlook what he may regard as imperfections and shortcomings in the other partners, and to make the best of what each is able to do. This partnership is no exception. It would be easy at times to get worked up about whether others are doing their full share; but that, I am sure, would be the quickest way to destroy the common effort.

We must recognize that the very essence of freedom is variety and that, even in a partnership, free nations cannot be expected, all of them, to make their efforts in the same way nor to use the same methods. We in North America are so much more fortunate, in a material sense, than other nations that we must expect to contribute more proportionately from our abundance than can be expected from those of our partners who are still recovering from the dislocation and destruction of the last war which affected them much more deeply than it affected us.

We must realize, too, that even with a maximum of good-will the partners in an alliance like ours can never be expected to see eye to eye on every question that arises. There will inevitably be differences, debates, perhaps even misunderstandings.

Our Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said in a recent speech about Canada and the United States: "We have the right to disagree, as friends. We also have the obligation to resolve these disagreements, as friends and with a minimum of fuss and disturbance. This has not always been easy in the past, and is not going to be always easy in the days ahead, but our friendship will, I know, stand the challenge of the trials and turmoil of our time."

As Mr. Pearson said, there is no question that the friendship of Canada and the United States will stand that challenge. But we must take even greater care to see that the wider partnership of the free nations is able to meet the challenge of these difficult times. Because there are bound to be some, in every country who, from time to time, will say it is better to go it alone and take the consequences. That, I believe, is another of the great dangers to our partnership for freedom.

Still another danger is the danger of thinking the free nations can make themselves secure through military strength alone. Don't mistake me. It is indispensable to create sufficient military strength to remove the prospects of successful aggression. But we are not merely facing a test of material strength. We are also engaged in a struggle for men's minds, and, in that struggle, military strength is only one of the elements. We must re-arm, but we must also find the means to maintain and develop the measure of social justice we have already achieved in our own countries, and we must continue to work for the extension beyond our countries of that basic human equality which is the hallmark of a genuine free society.

All thoughtful people recognize the potential value to our partnership of the vast industrial capital and the skilled manpower of Western Europe which might well be decisive in turning the balance if war came. But we cannot afford to overlook, either, those vast areas in Asia and in Africa, and even in parts of this hemisphere, where under existing economic conditions mass poverty prevails and where it is quite useless to preach the abstract advantages of freedom to men and women who are starving or half-starved.

To these unfortunate peoples, Communism has an obvious appeal. The Communist doctrine of an economic and social revolution for the benefit of the masses has been just as potent a weapon in this so-called cold war as the subversive fifth column or the shadow of the Red Army. A defensive effort designed only to safeguard the material and moral advantages enjoyed by the inhabitants of this continent and of Western Europe will not give us the security we want. It is the essential first step. But if we hope to provide enduring safeguards of those moral and material advantages we must, in a true spirit of equality and co-operation, join with the less favoured areas of the world in a concerted effort to give their inhabitants greater material advantages and greater hopes for the future.

To strive to do all these things I have been suggesting, and to keep on striving to do them over even a generation or two, may seem to many of us a grim and uninviting prospect. Some of you are probably asking yourself: When can we hope to get back to normal? When can we return to living decent American lives without having to worry about the problems of the rest of the human race? Well, I am afraid the answer to those questions is: Not in my day nor in yours.

The United States today, the whole North American continent today, is directly concerned about what is happening in the rest of the world. What is even more important, the United States is, I repeat, inevitably the dominant factor in the free world. On your course as a nation, the fate of all mankind largely depends. That is true whether we like it or not.

I am sure there are many Americans who would cheerfully sacrifice this new position of leadership in world affairs for the comfortable isolation of the years between your Civil War and the First World War. But, as a nation you have no such choice. The only choice before you and before us is a choice between wise, patient and intelligent leadership of the free world by the United States, or a rapid shrinkage of the circumferences of free peoples, as your own and our lights of freedom grow dimmer and dimmer.

I think I am right about these alternatives and I know we can be confident about the leadership of the United States. Of course, there are some even in Canada who do not always understand the way your public affairs are managed, and who are anxious at times about what is going to be done next.

No doubt too some of you have periods when you wonder to what extent all your partners can really be depended upon. As I said before, there are in this country and in all free countries some voices preaching what seem to others to be strange doctrines and some who are always painting even stranger pictures of other nations.

But at every crisis in your affairs, you in the United States have shown yourselves capable of mobilizing great moral and material resources to uphold freedom. That has happened more than once to meet situations within your own country. Twice in our generation you have done it to uphold freedom in the world at large. Now never before, not even in 1861 or in 1941, has your role been so decisive or your leadership so important. We in Canada, who are your closest neighbours, know that you have never, in any crisis, failed to uphold the freedom which this nation was founded to preserve. We know you will not fail in this crisis to give our partnership the leadership it must have to uphold the freedom of mankind.

THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND

One of the most effective and rewarding efforts in international co-operation undertaken by the United Nations has been the positive achievement of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). While the controversies and frustrations so often characteristic of the United Nations have not been entirely absent, co-operation on behalf of children has kept them to a minimum, and over \$154,000,000 (U.S.) has been allocated in the last four and a half years to relieve the suffering of children in all areas of the world.

The Fund was established by a resolution of the First Session of the General Assembly in December, 1946 to carry on the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in the field of child welfare. As stipulated in its terms of reference, the Fund is to be utilized:

- (a) for the benefit of children and adolescents of countries which were victims of aggression and in order to assist in their rehabilitation;
- (b) for the benefit of children and adolescents of countries receiving assistance from UNRRA.

At the instigation of some countries which saw the long-term potentialities of such an international organization, a third clause entrusting UNICEF with the promotion of "child health purposes generally" was included in the terms of reference.

Contributions to Fund

Apart from residual assets amounting to about \$32,000,000 which is received from UNRRA, the Fund has been dependent on voluntary contributions from governments and private sources. Governments have to date contributed or pledged \$108,000,000. Canada's donations to the Fund have been exceeded only by those of the United States and Australia. Including the \$500,000 for which Parliamentary approval was obtained in the Session recently concluded, the total Canadian Government contribution since the establishment of UNICEF is \$7,475,050. In response to appeals for private donations, Canadian citizens have subscribed a further \$1,525,878, making a total Canadian contribution of \$9,000,928.

The Fund is governed by an Executive Board of twenty-six nations, of which Canada is a member. Canada was elected to the chairmanship of the ten-member programme committee each year from 1948 to 1950, inclusive, and in 1951 to the chairmanship of the Executive Board. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Welfare, has represented Canada on the Fund since its inception and now serves as chairman of the Executive Board. Some fifteen Canadians, or about one seventh of the total staff, serve in the Fund's administration, either at headquarters or in the field. The Fund is directed by an American, Mr. Maurice Pate.

UNICEF was confronted from the beginning with far greater needs than it could hope to meet. Varying conditions made flexibility imperative, but a few basic principles were laid down to cover all operations: aid must be given on the basis of need, without discrimination because of race, creed, nationality, or political considerations; UNICEF's contribution must be matched by the government of the receiving country; the programmes are to be designed to make a permanent contribution to child welfare; each government receiving assistance must permit UNICEF to send international staff into the country to assist in the development of the programme and to observe its operations.

The greatest importance is attached to the principle of self help. The receiving government must be prepared to develop and operate a plan which UNICEF can supplement. UNICEF funds are used for supplies and services not available within the country and for which the necessary foreign exchange is lacking. Exceptions to this rule are made in cases of disaster (such as the recent earthquake in Ecuador) where the emergency calls for immediate supplies to maintain life and health.

Programmes Started in 1947

The first programmes, beginning in 1947, consisted of large-scale feeding operations in European countries. At the peak of these operations, in 1949, UNICEF was contributing part of one meal a day to more than 6 million children. The Fund's share consisted of badly needed protective protein foods — milk, meat, fish, and cod liver oil. Large quantities of all these foods came from Canada. Local supplies of cereal and vegetables were used to make up the balance of the meal.

Some ingenuity was required in making use of contributions from fifty-three nations all of which, except for the United States contribution, had to be spent for goods and services in the donor countries. This presented no great problem in countries such as Canada where there were food surpluses, but in many countries, other uses had to be found for the money. The early clothing programmes of the Fund were introduced to meet this situation. Uruguay, for example, made a generous contribution, but lacked surplus foods. It had, however, quantities of hides, which eventually provided shoes for many bare-foot children. In the same way, wool from Australia became warm clothing. Denmark, where neither food nor raw materials were available, was prepared to offer substantial aid if UNICEF cared to consider a mass immunization programme against tuberculosis which was taking a terrible toll of children's lives in many parts of the world. From its own experience with BCG vaccination, Denmark was prepared to provide not only serum, but skilled doctors and nurses to start the campaign, and to train local teams. Norway and Sweden associated themselves with this campaign which spread far beyond Europe and which to date has tested twenty-seven million children and vaccinated thirteen million.

Following this first medical programme, assistance has been given in the prevention or control of other communicable diseases such as malaria, whooping cough, diphtheria, venereal diseases and yaws. A joint committee of representatives of UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) has been set up to deal with medical projects. These must all have the technical approval of WHO before being adopted, and technical personnel, where required, are recruited, and in many cases paid, by WHO. The same procedure is followed where UNICEF programmes lie in the field of interest of other specialized agencies such as Food and Agriculture Organization, or of the Social Affairs Department of the United Nations.

Local Production Assisted

UNICEF has also assisted in developing local production so that a country may become independent of outside sources of supply. For example, equipment for milk conservation or for the production of insecticides, antibiotics or BCG serum is being provided in a number of countries.

In many underdeveloped countries, the greatest need is for the establishment of child and maternal health and welfare centres where basic education in hygiene, nutrition and child care can be given. The provision of public health nurses, social workers, simple equipment and sometimes transportation, constitutes UNICEF'S share of this work. UNICEF has also provided training courses as part of its pro-

gramme. Some of these are organized within the country; others take the form of fellowships for training abroad.

As European conditions improved, there was a growing demand that UNICEF extend aid to underdeveloped areas where disease and undernourishment were chronic among children. As a consequence, the emphasis has gradually shifted to the third term of reference, "child health purposes generally". UNICEF now operates throughout the world, and since 1947 allocations have been made for 64 countries or territories in Europe, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. This record, while impressive, gives no indication of the plight of the children themselves, nor of the difficulties of transporting staff and supplies where conventional means must be supplemented by bicycles, donkeys and elephants, nor of the administrative problems confronting war-devastated, newly independent or underdeveloped countries, nor of the old customs and superstitions that sometimes stand in the way of modern techniques, — all of which are part of the daily life of UNICEF.

Future of UNICEF Debated

The Fifth General Assembly of the United Nations debated the future of UNICEF at some length, and decided that it should continue as a temporary organization for three years, when consideration would be given to making it a permanent part of the United Nations organization. The Fund will carry on its work under the direction of a new board which consists of representatives of the 18 countries on the Social Commission plus eight members elected by the Economic and Social Council. As in the past, the Fund will be dependent on voluntary contributions from government and private sources. To the extent that these are forthcoming, UNICEF, in co-operation with other organs of the United Nations, will continue to alleviate the sufferings of children.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

Korea

On June 25, Mr. George A. Drew, Leader of the Opposition, referred to a statement made by Mr. Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., regarding possible negotiations for a cease-fire and a dual withdrawal from the 38th parallel in Korea. The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, then spoke in part as follows:

... There is no doubt that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, like all the rest of us, regards that statement as an important development. It is one with which the United Nations will no doubt be dealing expeditiously, and I think it might perhaps be convenient to put on the record of this House the statement made by the Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie ...*

I am further informed that Mr. Entezam, President of the General Assembly, and also chairman of the Good Offices Committee, has come from Washington to New York in order to be in touch with the representatives of the United Nations there and to take such immediate action as may be appropriate and to do so in the hope that this is a statement of a real desire to see a cease-fire and a withdrawal of opposing troops on either side of the 38th parallel brought about at once.

I think hon. members would be interested to know that among the clippings I got was one referring to a radio broadcast in the capital of communist China reporting this statement of Mr. Malik and an editorial saying that if America was willing to stop the war she should bring in at once those just and reasonable measures for peaceful settlement which have been repeatedly proposed by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and other countries desiring peace.

Of course that statement was along the same line; even Mr. Malik's statement was much along the traditional line of having about fourteen minutes of violent vituperation and then a half a minute in which to make the statement that he thought the problem of armed conflict in Korea could be settled at this time. That is the usual manner in which such proposals are put forward by the U.S.S.R., but we have had former experience of their violent vituperation having been followed by something which was really serious and intended to be effective. I hope this may prove to be another such example.

... I may add that this morning the Secretary of State for External Affairs is conferring with Mr. Herbert Morrison, the United Kingdom Foreign Minister, and that our Ambassador in Washington was in touch yesterday and is in touch today with the Secretary of State there. The language of this declaration is being carefully scrutinized, and there is no indication anywhere that it will be brushed off. It will be explored with a sincere desire, at least on our side, to have it produce some results.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

An agreement was signed in London on June 19 by Canada and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. The agreement is entitled "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces" or, in abbreviated form, "The NATO Forces Agreement". The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, tabled the text of the agreement on that day for the information of the House and spoke as follows:

... This agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of North Atlantic Treaty countries in respect of their armed forces stationed in or passing through other

* See page 231.

North Atlantic Treaty countries. The agreement is subject to ratification, and, of course, the approval of Parliament will be sought prior to ratification. That will not be during the present session.

At the outset I should like to emphasize that this agreement does not deal with the question whether troops are to be sent abroad; and it has no connection with the question of command of integrated NATO forces. It is solely concerned with the laws and regulations which are to govern an armed force after it has been sent, by mutual agreement, into another North Atlantic Treaty country.

It is a fully reciprocal agreement and will give valuable protection to Canadian servicemen serving in the integrated force. At the same time the rights of the receiving country are fully respected. The agreement provides that "it is the duty of a force... to respect the law of the receiving state, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the receiving state."

General Eisenhower, in a statement issued today, says that it is a most important agreement, one of great significance to the integrated force under his command.

As there will be full opportunity for detailed discussion of the agreement in Parliament in due course, I do not propose to take up time now with a clause by clause explanation. I will, however, list the main subjects dealt with in the agreement. They are:

1. The criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction of the military courts of the visiting force and the jurisdiction of the civil courts of the receiving country;
2. The application of the tax laws and customs tariff of the receiving country to the visiting force;
3. The application of the immigration regulations of the receiving country to the members of the visiting force;
4. The settlement of claims for damage or injury arising out of the activities of the visiting force;
5. The procurement by the visiting force of goods, accommodation, labour and services from sources in the receiving country;
6. The wearing of uniforms and the carriage of arms.

From this brief description of the scope of the agreement, hon. members will realize, I am sure, that the twelve negotiating countries, with their differing laws and legal systems, had to be willing to compromise in order to arrive at any agreement. It was realized that many countries might have to modify their laws to take account of the presence of other NATO forces in their midst, but an attempt was made to reduce to a minimum the need for legislative change. The legal authorities of the Canadian Government are studying the agreement to determine whether legislation will be necessary and if so, its scope and extent. It is expected that the whole question will be brought before Parliament at the next session.

In conclusion I should like to quote the statement made today in London by the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies. He said:

The agreement on the status of armed forces which the North Atlantic Treaty governments have signed today is an important addition to the structural framework of NATO. We believe we have developed a multilateral charter that provides a uniform and administratively workable basis for an orderly, consistent, and fair relationship between forces from one NATO country and any other NATO country where they may be assigned to serve.

The agreement is part of the collective defence effort and is essential for the development of the integrated force under General Eisenhower's command. It gives the governments and the military authorities simple, practical

procedures for regulating a complex relationship. It guarantees the members of the armed forces adequate legal protection, and at the same time, without infringing on the authority of the military command, fully recognizes the peacetime rights and responsibilities of the civilian authorities in the host countries.

The development of collective defence in peacetime requires that forces of various countries which form part of the integrated force for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area be stationed in various other countries. They must be free to move from one country to another, in accordance with the demands of strategy and the orders of the supreme command. It is essential that there be uniformity of arrangements governing their status in countries other than their own and their relationship to the authorities and people of those countries. The conclusion of this agreement is an important step in our common effort to organize integrated strength adequate to keep the peace.

Foreign Trade

The House went into Committee of Supply on June 14 to consider estimates of the Department of Trade and Commerce. In the course of the debate the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Howe, made the following general statement regarding the trade policy of the Canadian Government:

I would like ... to offer a few comments on Canadian trade policy. Since the end of the war very great efforts have been made by the Government, and the Department of Trade and Commerce in particular, to enlarge the volume of Canadian trade. These efforts have taken many forms. The Trade Commissioner Service abroad has been strengthened. Canada has supported international action to reduce trade barriers. When this country was suffering from a serious shortage of dollars, the Government did everything possible to encourage exports to dollar areas and to encourage imports from soft currency countries. The establishment of the International Trade Fair in 1948 was another evidence of the Government's interest in an expanding volume of trade, both import and export.

The efforts have borne fruit. Canada's trade has expanded to an extent that few thought possible. It is in better balance vis-a-vis the dollar and sterling areas. The position now, however, is very different from what it has been in these last few years. We are once again in a seller's market, faced with the fact or the prospect of shortages of certain materials because of the competing demands of the defence programme. In the light of this change in the trade outlook, the Government has reviewed its policy to see whether the emphasis on trade is misplaced.

We have come to the conclusion that while the needs of defence are paramount, Canada continues to have a vital interest in foreign trade. The defence programme, and the high rate of consumer and business spending which accompanied it, have resulted in a high level of imports. These imports must be paid for. For that reason alone we cannot afford to neglect our export trade. But there is a longer-run reason as well. All of us hope and believe that the present emergency will pass. In so far as possible, therefore, trade contracts should be retained and developed, looking to the time when Canada will once again have to seek out buyers for its surpluses.

Accordingly, as I said at the opening of the International Trade Fair in Toronto this year:

There is to be no general let-down in our efforts to promote export trade. That is the policy of the Department of Trade and Commerce and of the Canadian Government. We are having special supply difficulties to meet in various lines of export business. We shall probably continue to have such difficulties. But the fact that we shall be giving first priority to defence production needs is not to be taken to mean that the servicing of our export business will be pushed into the background or left without the very closest attention that we can give it.

In May the United Kingdom-Canada continuing committee on trade and economic affairs met in Ottawa. As was announced at the time, the United Kingdom hopes to buy a very much increased volume of goods in Canada during the next year. We, for our part, are anxious that the United Kingdom and the sterling area generally should continue to ship as much as possible to Canada. The discussions were most useful, and it is our hope that they will result not only in a substantial increase in the volume of United Kingdom-Canada trade but in further progress towards the restoration of normal trading relationships between the sterling area and Canada, which is our ultimate goal.

The United Kingdom talks were immediately followed by discussions with the British West Indies. There have always been close commercial ties between Canada and the British West Indies, and the imposition of restrictions upon imports from Canada into these islands had undoubtedly been the cause of a good deal of inconvenience and disruption to both importers and exporters. The introduction of the trade liberalization plan at the beginning of this year was an important step forward, and we are hopeful that it will be followed in the near future by further progress in the same direction.

A French trade mission then met with Canadian officials. This is not the first time that such Franco-Canadian trade talks have been held. Indeed they may become a more or less regular event. While our trade with France is not very large, it is, I believe, capable of expansion and the discussions this year were concerned with how this could best be done. We have been particularly impressed by the growing interest of France in the Canadian market.

Finally came informal discussions with a New Zealand trade delegation led by Hon. C. M. Bowden. Like other sterling area countries, New Zealand has been imposing very strict limitations on imports from Canada and other dollar countries. During the talks with Mr. Bowden, it was evident that New Zealand shares our interest in the restoration of normal trade relationships, and that there is more likelihood of progress in that direction now than for some time.

Another evidence of the Government's continuing interest in trade was the decision to hold the Canadian International Trade Fair again in 1952. In many respects the fair held this year was the most successful since the first was held in 1948. But the extent of participation by Canadian manufacturers and industrialists is disappointing. Furthermore, there is a good deal of uncertainty about the effects of defence preparations upon trade. In deciding to hold a fair next year the Government is taking some risks. But, on the other hand, to abandon the fair this year might have been taken as evidence that the Government no longer attaches the same importance to the development of trade, which would have had unfortunate repercussions at home and abroad. Whether the fair will continue beyond 1952 depends upon the extent to which Canadian businessmen take advantage of the opportunity provided to sell their wares not only abroad but to their neighbours at home.

In response to a question by Mr. H. H. Hatfield (PC, Victoria-Carleton), Mr. Howe later said:

We have a large and growing trade with Venezuela ...

Exports to Venezuela in 1947 were \$12,988,625; in 1948, \$16,934,563; 1949, \$27,688,637; and 1950, \$25,456,741.

Our imports from Venezuela in 1947 were \$46 million; 1948, \$94 million; 1949, \$91 million and 1950, \$87 million. The imports of course from Venezuela are chiefly of oil. So it should be a good market for Canada because the balance of trade is in favour of Venezuela.

So far as Cuba is concerned, our trade relations there should be considerably better because of our agreement to take 75,000 short tons of sugar annually from that country.

Mr. Howard E. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra), referred during the debate to a publication entitled *Business Review* issued by the Bank of Montreal under the date of May 23, 1951. The statements in this publication, said Mr. Green, indicated

that "the unfavourable (trade) balance with the United States is a great deal higher in the first three months of 1951 than it was last year, and also that the unfavourable balance with regard to the world at large is a great deal higher than it was in 1950". In this connection, Mr. Howe spoke as follows:

Our trade with the United States is out of balance through abnormal imports from the United States. Our exports to the United States are running at a record level, considerably higher than at any former time in history. But with the purchase of war materials from that country, which have been coming in in volume, and the tremendous capital investment programme going on in Canada, which exceeds by far any previous record, we have been buying materials from the United States in excess of normal purchases. Aside from that the balance has not changed greatly. Our trade with Great Britain is in about the same balance as it was last year, and also our trade with the sterling area. Trade with South America has grown greatly but it is in fair balance. The balance has not changed much. Any change that has taken place is in our trade with the United States and is the result of greatly expanded imports from that country. I believe that this situation is abnormal. We are in a strong financial position to stand it, and I think it can be straightened out when our building boom settles down. The economic measures we have taken to check capital expansion in the country are designed to check the very circumstances my friend has called to my attention.

When Mr. Green asked whether Canada's position on merchandising transactions between Canada and the United States would be "a great deal worse this year than it was last year", Mr. Howe replied:

It will be further out of balance; in other words there will be a greater deficit in our account with the United States, and probably a deficit in our account with the world. The reason for that, of course, is our large investment programme. My hon. friend will appreciate that as more of Canada's production is invested at home less becomes available for export, and the greater the pressure for increased imports.

Mr. Rodney Adamson (PC, York West) then asked Mr. Howe whether he would comment on, first, the lack of reciprocal business in defence purchases by the United States, and, secondly, the difficulties in regard to currency restrictions. Mr. Howe replied:

I have no particular complaint to make as far as defence purchasing is concerned. The Americans were able to sell us certain war materials off the shelf, you might say, or out of stock; and those materials have been moving. We have had nothing to sell back in the way of war materials off the shelf, though we have taken contracts which will be productive as our production steps up and the goods are delivered. The contracts on both sides are not in balance, but there is a tendency for them to come into balance. I am not particularly worried about the upset in exchange due to war business between the two countries; I believe that situation will straighten out if there is the will to straighten it out, and I think everyone is doing his best along that line. I was just looking at the trade figures for the first three months, and in our account with the United States there was a deficit of \$100 million, which is very close to the amount of our deficit with the world. Well, that is not too serious. If it continues at that rate during the year we will have a deficit of \$400 million, and that is not anything to worry about. We have had far greater deficits. In 1947 we were losing a billion a year to the United States. However, that is a trend we do not like, but we think it is a trend that can be reversed whenever we are willing to curtail our investment programme and cut down on abnormal purchasing in the United States.

Regarding currency restrictions and Canada's trade with the sterling area, Mr. Howe said:

The currency difficulties are improving. Every time we bring trade with any country into balance we make it possible for them to relax the restrictions. In most countries with which Canada is accustomed to trade, restrictions are being relaxed to some extent. They are not being relaxed as quickly as we think they should

be, but we are constantly pressing for the relaxation of restrictive measures. Some progress is being made, and we think the trend is in the right direction.

I am happy to say that we finished 1950 with an adverse trade balance with the rest of the sterling area. In other words the rest of the sterling area sold us more goods than we sold them. There was a slight balance in our favour with the United Kingdom, as between the two countries, but it was very much smaller than ever before and showed a gap that presents no particular problem. As far as the balance of trade between Canada and any sterling area country is concerned, however, there is no good reason why the barriers cannot be taken down, and we think they should be taken down much faster than that is being done.

Departmental Estimates

Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty

Various questions were raised during the debate on estimates of the Department of External Affairs when the House was in Committee of Supply on June 15. Concerning the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, spoke in part as follows:

... Our position as a government in this matter has been pretty clear to the House: we are in favour—and I am sure the House is in favour—of the earliest possible conclusion of such a treaty so that Japan may be brought back into the family of nations and play her part as a strong democratic country, especially in Asian affairs. So we have welcomed the discussions which have taken place to that end. When we were consulted, as we were some months ago, as to the form which these discussions should take, we agreed with our friends in Washington and London that possibly diplomatic talks initiated by the United States with other governments interested, rather than a general conference, would be the best way to proceed in the present circumstances. . . These talks have been proceeding and are now reaching finality.

In all this process of consultation we have played our part and have been informed of developments as they occur. We certainly have no complaint to make in regard to the methods that have been adopted to keep us informed. Mr. Dulles has consulted with our representative in Washington and our representative in Tokyo. I was in Washington yesterday and had a discussion with the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Far Eastern affairs. There was an official discussion in Washington between United States, United Kingdom and Canadian officials a few weeks ago, which discussions were resumed in Ottawa a few days after they had finished in Washington. This question has also been discussed in London. I think it is true to say that we have been kept informed and have played a reasonably active part in the negotiations leading up to the present position.

In the early days of these negotiations a draft was circulated by the United States to the governments more particularly concerned. We made comments on that draft on May 1 and May 21 and gave our views in some detail on every single clause. Having received the United States draft, at that time the United Kingdom made certain counter-proposals of its own, and we also made known in London our views on those counter-proposals. In recent days there have been discussions in London between Mr. Dulles and the United Kingdom Government designed to remove the differences which had developed in the preliminary discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom approaches to certain of these questions. Those discussions have resulted in an almost complete measure of agreement between London and Washington, and I understand that as a result a combined United States-United Kingdom draft will now be submitted to the other governments concerned for their observations. Once those observations are received it is hoped that a peace treaty may then be speedily concluded.

I am in some difficulty in making known at this particular time our final views in respect of the agreement, if it is a formal agreement, reached in London. We have not yet received any formal text of the discussions in London, and I do not think it would be wise for me to express any final view in regard to this matter until that text is received. Of course the Committee and Parliament know that there have been one or two contentious points in these discussions. They have been men-

tioned here this morning. One concerns the association of China with the peace treaty, and the other is the disposition of the island of Formosa.

Our position in regard to the former is that this question of Chinese signature on a Japanese peace treaty should be postponed without prejudice to any eventual solution. I think the reason for that is obvious. I think it is known to all members of the Committee that the United States has recognized one Chinese government while the United Kingdom has recognized another Chinese government. Obviously it would be difficult indeed for them to agree at this time on a Chinese signature to a formal Japanese treaty. Therefore this device has been adopted which I presume will result in a postponement of this issue for the time being, I hope without prejudice to a final and satisfactory solution.

Similarly, with regard to the question of Formosa I think we are all agreed that Japanese sovereignty in Formosa must be brought to an end. I have no doubt that that will be done in the peace treaty. I think it is also pretty clear that the eventual disposition of Formosa cannot be made in any draft treaty at this time. I do not think I can say anything more at this time on this matter.

There were one or two other points that were raised in connection with the proposed Japanese treaty. The hon. member for Peel, (Mr. Graydon), called attention to the difficulty that we had had in pre-war times in trading with Japan, and stated that he hoped the treaty would take those difficulties into consideration. I can assure him that we have been much alive to the problem. We realize that in pre-war times there were certain difficulties in regard to Japanese trade, and I hope that the treaty will make that situation easier in the future. We have been particularly interested in the fisheries clauses of the treaty. In order to discuss those clauses the Minister of Fisheries, accompanied by some of his officials, visited Washington to take up the matter there with the United States and United Kingdom people. We hope that as a result the fisheries clauses of the treaty will be satisfactory to Canada.

Later in the debate Mr. Alistair Stewart (CCF, Winnipeg North), asked whether the proposed treaty contained any safeguard to assure that certain democratic rights would be retained by the Japanese. Mr. Pearson said:

I appreciate the point made by my hon. friend about the inclusion in the draft of certain safeguards which would guarantee democratic rights, freedom of assembly and that sort of thing; and while I do not want to go into the details now for obvious reasons I think I can say that matter has been taken into consideration in the discussions that have taken place.

United Nations Administration Costs

Perhaps I can now deal with one or two other questions that have arisen during the course of the discussion. Both the hon. member for Peel and the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggart, (Mr. Coldwell), stressed the desirability of continuing the struggle in the United Nations to increase the proportion of the cost of that organization to be borne by the U.S.S.R. We have taken a most active part in that agitation, as the hon. member for Peel pointed out, and will continue to do so. The present proportions are most unfair to other members of the organization, and we hope we shall be able to make further progress during the next Assembly in the direction of increasing the proportion of the cost to be borne by the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states. We made some progress in that direction in the last Assembly, but not sufficient. We will not give up that struggle. If hon. members are interested in this particular question they will find it dealt with at some length at page 150 of the report of the Department on *Canada and the United Nations, 1950*.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service


Some reference was made by both speakers who preceded me to the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. This subject was dealt with at considerable length before the Committee, and I made quite a lengthy statement on the matter, which will be found at page 85 of the proceedings. We are attempting to improve and develop our liaison with the CBC International Service. I think it is generally recognized by the two departments concerned that

that liaison is working effectively. So far as we in External Affairs are concerned, we have no complaint on that score. We are responsible for policy guidance in connection with the broadcasts, and our contact on policy matters is close and continuous. I hope it will continue that way.

The hon. member of Peel suggested that we extend our coverage behind the iron curtain. In view of the circumstances with which we are faced at the present I think the importance of that will be recognized by all hon. members. However, it would necessitate a considerable expenditure. It could not be done simply by transferring facilities now used for broadcasting, say to Latin America, for use for broadcasting to the Ukraine or Poland. An additional organization would have to be brought into the International Service which would be familiar with this particular kind of broadcasting. The broadcasting now carried on to Latin America is to create a background for an increase in and development of our trade. The persons engaged in that work would not be satisfactory for the kind of broadcasting which would be directed behind the iron curtain.

The St. Lawrence Waterway

The hon. member for Peel made some reference to the St. Lawrence waterway. I listened to his remarks with great interest, and all I should like to say about it now is that the Government still hopes that this great undertaking, which should be of benefit to both countries economically, and indeed politically and in other ways, can be carried out as the result of co-operative arrangements between the two countries. That is still our hope, and that is our objective. We shall be disappointed indeed if that cannot be achieved. I am inclined to agree with the hon. member that it is desirable for the Canadian Parliament and the Canadian Government to know as soon as possible if it can be done that way. It would be unfortunate if we were kept in a state of indecision indefinitely; therefore I hope



U.S. CONGRESSMEN INSPECT ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY SITE

Members of the Public Works Committee of the House of Representatives visit the locks at Thorold, Ont., during a six-day inspection tour of the proposed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway project.

our friends in Washington will be able to come to a decision on this matter before very long. What should be the proper course for Canada will depend no doubt on the nature of the decision reached in Washington, and I do not think it would be very wise on my part to anticipate that decision now by making suggestions for alternative courses of action. Therefore I would prefer to leave the matter at that.

Canadian Information Abroad

Mr. Alistair Stewart (CCF, Winnipeg North) described himself as having been "quite disappointed, and indeed alarmed" during a recent visit to Washington at the lack of knowledge of Canada which seemed to prevail. Mr. Pearson said:

I do not suppose any member of the Committee is more aware of that problem than I am, having served both in Washington and in Ottawa. It is a matter to which we have been giving very active consideration in the Department, and in that connection we have noted with considerable interest the chapter of the Royal Commission Report on Arts, Letters and Sciences devoted to the better understanding of Canada abroad, and the ways and means of achieving that. I believe that is a very important objective to be achieved. I for one... am not at all satisfied with what we have been able to accomplish. Within the limits of the resources made available to us by Parliament we do the best we can, but I hope we shall be able to strengthen that kind of representation abroad, representation devoted more particularly to the increasing of information about Canada in foreign countries, especially the United States of America. At the present time we are giving consideration to ways and means of strengthening the staff of the Canadian Embassy in Washington in that direction. I hope we shall be able to do something in that regard before very long.

Commonwealth Consultative Committee

Regarding Item III of the estimates, \$400,000 for the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia (for technical assistance), Mr. Pearson said:

As I think I have stated before, when this subject of economic assistance to South-East Asia was under consideration, a consultative committee has been set up and it is now in operation, with Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom participating in that work. This committee is concerned with the administrative and executive functions that flow out of our decision to give technical assistance to these countries—to check on the projects that they would like us to help them with, to exchange technical assistance and all that kind of thing.

... It has been an extremely difficult problem indeed to get adequate skilled technical help for these projects. As the committee will appreciate, that kind of help is in great demand in our own country at the present time. This consultative committee and the agencies of our own Government which are concerned with this matter are having real difficulty in securing the right of assistance; but we are hoping that we shall be able to make some progress in this matter.

... We expect that a substantial proportion of this fund will be spent for bringing students to this country and giving them technical engineering training in Canada. During the last eighteen months forty-six trainees from four countries, chiefly from India and Pakistan, were placed in Canadian industries as a result of arrangements made with the countries concerned. We also encourage the establishment of students from those countries in Canadian universities for technical assistance, and some progress has been made in that regard. We are paying the expenses of the students when they are here, as well as their transportation to Canada and back.

Western Germany

Mr. J. H. Blackmore (SC, Lethbridge) asked the following questions:

First, would the Minister tell the House what Canada is doing and has done to get upon something like a peacetime basis with Western Germany? Second, would

the minister consider it feasible and desirable to provide for such a state of cordiality of relations as would warrant the establishment in Western Germany of a Canadian embassy? Third, have any steps already been taken in contemplation of such a move?

Mr. Pearson replied:

The announcement was made on October 26 last* of the intention of the Government to terminate the state of war with Germany as soon as we were in position to do so in concert with our friends and allies. Since that announcement last autumn we have been in constant touch with the progress made both by the occupying powers and the German Federal Republic on this matter. Before we or the occupying powers could take further action it was necessary for the German Federal Republic to pass legislation eliminating from its laws all references to the state of war. That was done by the lower house, the Bundestag, on May 30, 1951, and by the upper house as recently as June 8. The promulgation of that German law is expected within a few days.

As soon as the new German law has been promulgated Canada, as well as other countries still technically at war with Germany, will be free to terminate that state of war; and in Canada this will take the form of a proclamation in the *Canada Gazette*.

I think I should recall here that the announcement of October 26, 1950, to which I have referred, makes it clear that such action will be quite different from any formal peace settlement with Germany. It will in no way affect Germany's obligations in respect of such matters as debts, claims and all that sort of thing. In order that the termination of the state of war may be related as closely as possible to similar action by the occupying powers, we are in consultation with London, Paris and Washington as to their intentions as soon as the Germans have taken their action. In any event it would appear that the necessary legislation will have been passed by the West German Government before the end of June, so it is only a question of days, I should think, before Canada would be in a position to terminate the state of war with Germany.

... Once that technical change has been made the Canadian Mission in Bonn will be raised to the status of an embassy, and the head of that mission will present his credentials as Canadian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Tax Agreements with Sweden and France

The Minister of National Revenue, Mr. J. J. McCann, introduced into the House on June 13 three bills respecting tax agreements with Sweden (Bill No. 372) and France (Bills No. 373 and 374). These bills were read for the second and third times, and passed, on June 18.

Council of Europe

On June 25 the Speaker made the following announcement:

I have the honour to inform the House that I have received a communication from Mr. P. H. Spaak, President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, inviting this Parliament to send observers to the session of the Council, commencing the 24th September next.

In reply to a question asked by Mr. Gordon Graydon, (PC, Peel) on June 27 regarding this invitation, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, said:

... This is an invitation which you, sir, stated had been addressed not to the Government of Canada but to the Parliament of Canada. Of course if the invitation were to be accepted I imagine that there would have to be some provision made for the expenses of any delegation that would go there representing this Parliament, and that the Government would have to take the responsibility of making the required recommendation to Parliament. Because of that, and because of the interest which

* Departmental Press Release No. 76 of October 26, 1950.

naturally attaches to this matter, it has been under consideration by the Government, but no decision has yet been reached. There are many factors about which we are seeking to obtain more enlightenment. We are in communication with our representatives, both in London and in Washington, in that regard.

One of the factors to which consideration has to be given is the apparent fact that this Council of Europe is made up not of representatives of the governments of the countries but of the national groups of several countries in Europe. This may be all to the good, but it is somewhat of a departure, because what they would be doing is something which would have a profound effect upon the foreign policies of the governments of all those countries. According to the manner in which our parliamentary institutions are set up, foreign policy is usually a responsibility of the government of the country, and is usually handled through the foreign office of the country. It would seem that this is a new way of going into matters that are of such great concern to the peoples and the governments of all the free countries of the world.

There is another matter which has given us some concern, and that is that the form of the invitation to this Parliament seems to differ from the form of invitation extended to the houses of the United States Congress. They have been invited to appoint a delegation to meet a delegation of the Council of Europe, and to have discussions with that delegation; whilst the invitation to this Parliament, through you, sir, has been to send observers to attend the sittings of the Council itself. We are curious to know if that is an intentional difference, or if it is just an accidental difference in the wording of the invitation. If it is intentional, we should like to know why the distinction is being made. We are also trying to ascertain whether invitations similar to the one addressed to this Parliament have been sent to the parliaments of other Commonwealth countries.

There is also the factor that it is nominally a council of Europe. For a long time there has been a Pan-American union of the republics of the western hemisphere, and they have never had observers from elsewhere attending their meetings. As a matter of fact we have not, because of our monarchical traditions, been included in that group. If the Council has for its purpose the setting up of a federation of European states, I would say that we had no observers attending the Charlottetown or Quebec conferences at the time we were discussing our confederation, or at the time we were discussing union with Newfoundland. We are seeking to explore all these possible implications of the invitation that has been addressed to this Parliament.

There would be some rather inconvenient features, in view of the fact that this meeting is scheduled for September 24, and we are contemplating an important session of our own Parliament early in October. But that would probably not be an insuperable difficulty, nor would the difficulty arising from the fact that at that time of the year we usually have to provide a representative delegation to the meeting of the United Nations.

These are matters about which we have not yet obtained all the information and enlightenment we would wish to have before deciding to recommend an appropriation to Parliament for official participation in the activities of this body. But the meeting will be taking place before Parliament reconvenes; and if it is felt that we should take the responsibility of a recommendation to Parliament, in supplementaries or otherwise when Parliament reconvenes, I would expect that it should be a delegation representative of the complexion of the House and not merely a delegation representing the government party in the House; and I would expect to discuss it with the Leader of the Opposition.

The Ming Sung Industrial Company

A very lengthy debate on the Ming Sung Industrial Company and on certain ships, Canadian built and of Canadian registry, plying in Chinese waters, was provoked by a question from Mr. G. R. Pearkes (P.C., Nanaimo) on June 14. Mr. Howe replied for the government and the debate was continued on June 15 by Mr. Pearkes, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Drew, Mr. Diefenbaker, Mr. Green, Mr. Graydon, Mr. Adamson, Mr. Fulton, Mr. Harkness and Mr. Browne (St. John's West). At

the request of Mr. Drew, correspondence was tabled by Mr. Howe on June 18 and further questions were raised by Mr. Pearkes on June 19. Later on June 19, the debate was continued at considerable length by Mr. Drew, Mr. St. Laurent, Mr. Pearkes, Mr. Green and Mr. Macdonnell. On June 20 the House divided on a motion of Mr. Green (for Mr. Diefenbaker), which was not sustained, by a vote of 28 to 143. Prior to the division, statements were made by Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Drew. On June 21 Mr. Chevrier reported that he had received from Hong Kong certain information requested by Mr. Pearkes. On June 25 Mr. McIlraith replied to a number of questions raised by Mr. Fulton concerning the building and financing of the vessels in question, and on June 29 Mr. St. Laurent replied to further questions from Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Pearkes. The debate concluded with a final statement by the Prime Minister on June 30.

Standing Committee of the House of Commons on External Affairs

This Committee examined the estimates of the Department during six meetings held between May 17 and June 6. The principal witnesses were the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Heeneey, accompanied on occasion by various officials of the Department.

On May 22, Mr. Pearson made a general statement on the world situation, and was questioned on:

1. Formosa.
2. Proposed Japanese Treaty.
3. The Korean crisis.
4. Membership in the North Atlantic pact.
5. The Iran question.
6. Western Germany, its armament and its relation to the defence of Europe.
7. CBC International Service broadcasts and personnel.
8. The Pan American Union.
9. Canada's relations with the United States.
10. Allocation of commanders under the North Atlantic Council.
11. Nature of the European Army.
12. Shipping of strategic goods to Hong Kong and China.

Mr. Pearson's examination was continued on May 25 on matters raised at the previous meeting. He was also questioned on:

1. Representation abroad.
2. Military reports emanating from Korea.
3. Offers of assistance to South Korea.
4. Organization of the North Atlantic Council.
5. United Nations Information Division.
6. Recognition of the Peiping Government.
7. United Nations resolution concerning the 38th parallel and the cease-fire proposals to Korea.
8. Nora Rodd's broadcasts from North Korea.
9. The St. Lawrence seaway project.
10. Russia's membership in the United Nations.
11. Landing facilities at Goose Bay and relevant proposed agreements.
12. United Nations' Rehabilitation Commission.

On May 28 Mr. Heeneey tabled for distribution copies of a comparative breakdown of the estimates under review. He made general comments and replied to

specific questions on External Affairs personnel and staff turnover, the Passport Office and accommodation abroad.

The Committee discussed at some length, Canada's representation at the United Nations, particularly the appointment of delegates and parliamentary advisers. The advantages derived by a group of parliamentarians in a visit made in May, 1947 at Lake Success in the course of the Second Session of the General Assembly were emphasized.

Mr. Pearson on May 30 was questioned on the International Service of the CBC, on the issuance of passports, and on a broadcast which he had made on May 26*, and a report of it published in *The New York Times*. He was examined on the Tibet situation, on communist China, on the appointment of the Head of the Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, in New York, and on the status of ambassadors.

Mr. Heenev was again called on June 6.

He tabled supplementary replies to questions previously asked on

1. The United Nations Information Division
2. The status of refugees and stateless persons. The International Refugee Organization and its relationship with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
3. Paid subscriptions to External Affairs monthly bulletin
4. The issuance of special passports.

Mr. Heenev read supplementary statements on passports to the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria and on the status of High Commissioners in the Commonwealth countries, and a statement on the International Joint Commission.

The Committee presented three reports to the House. The first dealt with Committee procedures, and the third was in the form of the minutes of proceedings and evidence. The second report, presented on June 13, read as follows:

The Standing Committee on External Affairs begs leave to present its second report

The House passed the following order on Monday, May 14:

That votes 84 to 111 inclusive, and vote 566 of the main estimates 1951-52, be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the said Committee, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.

Your Committee has given consideration to the aforementioned estimates and approves them.

Your Committee recommends that the Government continue its efforts to help relieve the food shortage in India with such foods as are available, and acceptable to India.

Your Committee also recommends that future Canadian Delegations to the United Nations General Assembly continue to urge that the budgetary contribution which the Soviet Union and associated countries make be increased to figures which more closely correspond to their capacities to pay.

Your Committee further recommends that a closer liaison be established between the Department of External Affairs and the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation with a view to ensuring, in the interests of the free way of life, the maximum effectiveness of broadcasts directed to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

J. A. BRADETTE,

Chairman.

* Published in the Department's *Statements and Speeches* Series No. 51/23, and obtainable on application to the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Trusteeship Council

The Ninth Session of the Trusteeship Council, which opened on June 5, is still in progress at Flushing Meadow, New York. While none of its reports has yet been published, this Session of the Council has so far given rise to a number of interesting developments. The Council has to date considered reports on Somaliland, Tanganyika and Ruanda Urundi.

The Council elected Sir Alan Burns, the Representative of the United Kingdom, as its president, and Awni Khalidy, the Iraqi Representative, as vice-president.

The Council welcomed to its meetings the Italian Representative, Gastone Guidotti, who took his seat by virtue of Italy's responsibility for the administration of the trust territory of Somaliland. Mr. Guidotti will take part in the discussions, but will not have the right to vote. This marks the first occasion that Italy has been represented on a major Organ of the United Nations.

The Council considered the first report submitted by Italy on the administration of Somaliland. It was recognized that in view of the extremely backward nature of the territory, the task of the administering power in Somaliland was most difficult. The Italian Representative drew attention in particular to the low cultural level of the Somalis, their lack of political maturity, the backward stage of their social structure and the extremely depressed economic condition of the territory. It was conceded by the majority of the Council that Italy had made an excellent beginning in its administration of Somaliland, and several delegations congratulated Mr. Guidotti on the able presentation of his report.

The report on Tanganyika submitted by the United Kingdom was considered next. The United Kingdom Representative emphasized that, while progress had been made in Tanganyika by the United Kingdom authorities, their efforts had been impeded by a severe drought in the territory. Several delegates commented on the failure of the United Kingdom Government's scheme for the growing of groundnuts and asked for relevant information. It was acknowledged that the territory had made further advances in the field of education and in the development of local government.

The Council then examined the report of Belgium for the administration of Ruanda Urundi. The Council's attention was drawn to the fact that in Ruanda Urundi, as in many parts of East Africa, one of the chief problems is that of controlling the number of cattle raised in the territory. The ownership of cattle is considered by the indigenous inhabitants as a mark of social prestige, consequently the ranges are frequently overstocked and the inhabitants are often poverty stricken because they insist on owning more cattle than they are able to provide for. The difficulty of implementing democratic processes among a partially illiterate population was also emphasized. The Belgian Representative described an election that had been held in the territory, and the ingenious devices the authorities had been forced to utilize in order to simplify the procedure and yet retain its impartial character. The majority of the Council agreed that the Belgian Government had made considerable progress in Ruanda Urundi.

In general, the discussions were tolerant in tone, the questions evocative and analytic and the criticism constructive. Although the usual differences of opinion were evident, there was nevertheless a general realization that the problems confronting the administering authorities were continuous and complex and that there were no rapid and simple solutions.

Economic and Social Council

The Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council will be held in Geneva from July 30 to September 21, 1951. Mr. Jean Lesage, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, will head the Canadian Delegation. The deputy head will be Mr. James Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance. They will be accompanied by advisers from the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Finance.

The agenda for this meeting of the Council is a heavy one. It comprises some fifty-seven items relating to a wide range of economic, social and humanitarian problems of international concern, and to the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

In the economic field, the Council will resume from its previous session consideration of the world economic situation. It will examine what steps Governments have taken, in accordance with a resolution which it adopted at the Twelfth Session, to bring about adequate production and equitable international distribution of commodities; to regulate the prices of essential goods moving in international trade; and to prevent the development of inflationary pressures in the present period of rearmament and defence planning. It will give special attention to sections of the World Economic Report for 1949-50, prepared by the Secretariat which deal with economic conditions in the Middle East and Africa, and it will consider the factors which bear upon establishment of regional economic commissions for those two regions. The Council will also receive progress reports on the implementation of the United Nations Programmes of Technical Assistance. It will study the recommendations for the acceleration and adequate financing of economic development recently submitted by a group of independent experts in a report entitled "Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries".

On the social and humanitarian side, several important questions of wide interest will be considered. One of these deals with a proposed convention on freedom of information, a draft of which has been prepared by an ad hoc committee set up by the General Assembly at its Fifth Session last fall. Several attempts have been made by the United Nations over the past few years to reach agreement on basic principles of freedom of information but a wide divergence of views, even among the free nations, on this important and controversial issue makes it extremely difficult to arrive at a generally acceptable text for a convention.

Another subject which can be expected to provoke considerable debate is the draft covenant on human rights. Here again, different concepts of what constitute fundamental human rights and freedoms and of the means by which these rights should be promoted and protected make general agreement on a common text difficult to achieve. The responsibility for drawing up a draft covenant rests with the Council's Commission on Human Rights which has been concentrating on this task for more than two years. During its recent session the Commission, at the direction of the General Assembly, added to the previous text, which was concerned only with civil rights, a series of articles defining social, economic and cultural rights. The widening of the scope of the covenant will, of course, enlarge the area of disagreement and, in all probability, cause further delay in arriving at a final text.

Other subjects with which the Economic and Social Council will have to deal at its next session include the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, the problem of food shortages and famine in many regions, methods of international financing of European emigration, problems relating to the work of the High Commissioner for Refugees, reports and recommendations of the Council's nine functional commissions and three regional economic commissions, reports of the specialized agencies and the question of co-ordination of their activities. The Council will also take action on the

report of an ad hoc committee which it set up last year to review the organization and operation of the Economic and Social Council and its commissions. This ad hoc committee is submitting a series of recommendations aimed at simplifying the structure of the Council and reorganizing its working methods along more efficient and economical lines.

Technical Assistance Programmes

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has now issued a report on the progress of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programmes for the first nine months of their combined administration. The report shows that, as experience is gained by the United Nations and by member governments, many of the difficulties inherent in the operation of an international programme involving negotiations with many governments and recruitment of specialists on a world-wide basis, are being overcome. Procedures are being developed and working relationships established. The report does not suggest, however, that the programmes are meeting the requirements in all respects. Two remaining problems are the delay in meeting requests for experts and in making facilities available, and the inadequacy of the development programmes of many of the requesting countries.

The extent of Canadian participation in the United Nations programmes is clearly shown in the report. Out of a total of 125 experts in the field in countries requesting technical assistance, 33 came from the United States, 14 from the Netherlands, 12 from the United Kingdom, and 9, the fourth largest number, from Canada. (Since the report was published, two more Canadian experts have been appointed to serve with the Technical Assistance Administration, Mr. George P. Melrose, who will head a new technical assistance mission to El Salvador, and Mr. Benjamin Higgins, who will be senior economist with the technical assistance mission to Libya.) Of the host countries in which facilities for the Fellowship Programme were made available, during the period from January 1 to May 31, 1951, Canada was again the country making the fourth largest contribution. Of 400 candidates referred to 24 countries, 108 went to the United Kingdom, 77 to the United States, 43 to France, and 33 to Canada.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. E. H. Norman was posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, effective June 25, 1951.

Mr. J. George was posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, effective June 29, 1951.

Mr. W. G. M. Olivier was posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, effective June 29, 1951.

Miss M. Gordon was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective June 12, 1951.

The following officers were appointed to the Department of External Affairs: Mr. F. H. Soward (June 11, 1951); Mr. René Garneau (June 15, 1951).

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

His Excellency R. R. Saksena, High Commissioner for India, June 11.

Mr. Frederick E. Farnsworth, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America, June 5.

Brigadier J. B. Kriegler, C.B.E., Military and Air Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for South Africa, June 11. He is concurrently Military Attaché at the South African Embassy in Washington and will reside there.

Commandant S. L. Bosch, A.F.C., Assistant Military and Air Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for South Africa, June 11. He is concurrently Air Attaché at the South African Embassy in Washington and will reside there.

Mr. M. P. Brancart, Attaché, Embassy of Belgium, June 11.

Mr. Alexandre Botchkarev, Attaché, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., June 14.

Departures

Commander Juan Manuel Castro-Hart, Naval Attaché, Embassy of Peru, May 28.

Mr. William L. Kilcoin, First Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America, June 1.

Mr. G. P. Hampshire, Secretary (Finance), Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, June 5.

Mr. Huseyin Kunter, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Turkey, June 15.

Captain Abel R. Trebino, Assistant Naval Attaché, Embassy of Argentina, June 25.

Mr. Kechin Wang, Second Secretary, Embassy of China, was promoted to the rank of First Secretary, effective May 1.

Mr. Emin Boysan, Assistant Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Turkey, was promoted to the rank of Commercial Attaché, June 15.

His Excellency Vicomte du Parc, Ambassador of Belgium, left Ottawa on June 20 for a holiday in Belgium until the beginning of September. During his absence, Baron Pierre de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Major Edouard de Vicq de Cumptich, Military and Air Attaché, Embassy of Belgium, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, June 25.

CONSULAR

Provisional Recognition was granted to:

Mr. Vinicio da Veiga as Consul of Brazil at Toronto, June 7.

Mr. Carl O. Hawthorne as Consul of the United States of America at Edmonton, June 7.

Mr. Frederick E. Farnsworth as Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, June 13. Mr. Farnsworth is also Second

Secretary at the Embassy.

Mr. François de Vial as Consul General of France at Quebec, June 14.

Mr. Albert E. Clattenburg as Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, June 25.

Mr. Robert A. McKinnon as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Halifax, June 25.

Departures

Mr. William L. Kilcoin, Consul of the United States at Ottawa, June 1. Mr. Kilcoin was also First Secretary at the Embassy.

Mr. Paul C. Seddicum, Consul of the United States of America at Edmonton, June 8.

Mr. Robert John MacQuaid, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, June 15.

Mr. Edward J. Prince, Vice-Consul of the

United States of America at Montreal, June 22.

Mr. Knut Orre, Counsellor of the Legation and Acting Consul General at Montreal, left on June 12 for a visit to Norway until the beginning of October. During his absence, Mr. Asbjorn Slordahl, First Secretary of the Legation and Vice-Consul at Montreal is in charge of the consulate general.

Mr. H. M. El-Hakeem resumed his duties as Consul General of Egypt at Ottawa, June 21, on his return from a visit to his country.

TRADE

Mr. E. A. Allen, Trade Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Toronto, June 16.

Mr. Allen will be stationed temporarily in Montreal before proceeding to Toronto.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of June 1951, and of those at which it will be represented in the future; earlier conferences are listed in previous issues of "External Affairs").

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs" January 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions.)

Conferences Attended in June

1. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris - February 15. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
2. *Conference on Civil Defence.* Brussels - May 31. Dr. E. A. McCusker, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. (Observer).
3. *Fourth Session of the Commission of the 1950 Census of the Americas.* Washington - June 2-8. D. H. Jones, Bureau of Statistics.
4. *Fifth Session of the Assembly of ICAO.* Montreal - June 5-10. Chief Delegate: C. S. Booth, Permanent Canadian Council Member for ICAO, Montreal; Delegates: A. L. Pattison, Canadian Representative on Air Navigation Commission of ICAO, Montreal; G. W. Nadeau, Air Transport Board; Advisers: S. Pollock and W. F. Stone, Department of Finance; J. A. Irwin, Department of External Affairs.
5. *34th Session of the Conference of ILO.* Geneva - June 6-30. Government Dele-

gate and Head of Delegation: A. Mac-Namara, Deputy Minister of Labour; Government Alternate and Alternate Head of Delegation: P. Goulet, Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Labour; Alternate Government Delegate: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; Advisers to Government Delegates: C. A. L. Murchison, Unemployment Commission; B. Wilson, Canada Labour Relations Board; J. W. Willard, Department of National Health and Welfare; Advisers to Government Delegates and Secretary to Delegation: J. Mainwaring, Department of Labour; Employer Delegate: H. Taylor, National Carbon Company, Toronto; Advisers to the Employer Delegate: J. H. Brace, Bell Telephone Company of Canada, Montreal; H. W. Macdonnell, Canadian Manufacturers' Association, Toronto; A. C. Ross, Canadian Construction Association; Worker Delegate: C. Jodoin, Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Montreal; Advisers to Worker Delegate: J. B. Ward, Dominion Joint Legislative Committee of Railway Transportation Brotherhoods; J. A. Whitebone, Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, St. John, N.B.; F. X. Légaré, Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, Rimouski, P.Q.; Observer from the Gov-

ernment of the Province of Quebec: A. Barrette, Minister of Labour, Quebec, P.Q.

6. *Technical Commission on Transit of the Universal Postal Union*. Entresina, Switzerland — June 8-19. W. J. Turnbull, Deputy Postmaster General; E. J. Underwood and H. N. Pearl, Post Office Department.
7. *26th Session of the Executive Board of UNESCO*. Paris — June 7-16. Dr. V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland.
8. *International Congress of Actuaries*. Scheveningen — June 11-16. K. R. MacGregor, Insurance Department.
9. *International Commission of Criminal Police*. Lisbon — June 11-15. Major J. A. Wright, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
10. *12th Session of the Council of FAO*. Rome — June 11-24. Dr. G. S. A. Barton, Special Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture; Adviser: S. G. MacDonald, Canadian Embassy, Rome.
11. *International Joint Commission*. (Executive Session). Montreal — June 15. Chairman: Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton; Hon. G. Spence, Regina; J. L. Danseureau, Montreal.
12. *13th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy*. Paris — June 17-23. Brig. W. L. Coke, Director-General of Medical Services; Col. E. M. Wansbrough, Director-General of Dental Services.
13. *Sixth Session of the General Conference UNESCO*. Paris — June 18-July 11. Chairman: Dr. V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland; Vice-Chairman: E. D. McGreer, Chargé d'Affaires, Canadian Legation, Warsaw; Delegates: Dr. W. K. Lamb, Dominion Archivist; W. P. J. O'Meara, Assistant Under-Secretary of State; Alternate Delegate: L.A.D. Stephens, Canadian Embassy, The Hague; Adviser: A. B. Hockin, Department of Finance; Adviser and Secretary: J. E. Thibault, Department of External Affairs.
14. *Meeting of Copyright Specialists Committee of UNESCO*. Paris — June 18. W. P. J. O'Meara, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
15. *Commonwealth Defence Conference*. London — June 21. Observer: L. D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom; Advisers: Maj. Gen. S. F. Clark, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London; S. Rae, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
16. *14th Conference of International Office of Documentation on Military Medicine*. Vichy — June 24-25. Brig. W. L. Coke, Director-General of Medical Services; Col. E. M. Wansbrough, Director-General of Dental Services.

Conferences to be held in July and August

(The inclusion of the name of a Conference or Congress in the following list means only that the Government of Canada has received an invitation to participate. It does not follow that the invitation has been or will be accepted).

1. *Conference of Plenipotentiaries re Convention on Refugees and Protocol on Stateless Persons*. Geneva — July 2-20.
2. *Ninth International Management Conference*. Brussels — July 5-11.
3. *Commonwealth Survey Officers' Conference*. London — July 9-20.
4. *General Assembly of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics*. Copenhagen — July 10-14.
5. *International Welding Institute*. London and Oxford — July 14-21.
6. *UNESCO Seminar*. Paris — July 18-August 17.
7. *Fourth International Congress of the Sea*. Ostend — July 20-22.
8. *Economic Committee of ECOSOC*. Geneva — July 23-July 28.
9. *13th Session of ECOSOC*. Geneva — July 30-September 21.
10. *Ninth World Poultry Congress*. Paris — August 2-9.
11. *Second Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology of FAO*. Igls, Austria — August 6-9.
12. *Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (ITU)*. Geneva — August 16.
13. *Ninth International Congress of Entomology*. Amsterdam — August 17-24.
14. *International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics*. Brussels — August 21.
15. *E.C.E. Timber Committee*. Geneva — August 28-September 1.
16. *Eighth Congress of the International Institute of Refrigeration*. London — August.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS†

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

- * *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery* (Second Session); 4 May 1951; document E/1988, E/AC.33/13; 36 p.
- * *Report of the Population Commission (Sixth Session)* 23 April to 4 May 1951; 18 May 1951; document E/1989, E/CN.9/88; 35 p.
- * *Report of the Statistical Commission (Sixth Session)* 7-18 May 1951; 31 May 1951; document E/1994, E/CN.3/139; 38 p.
- * *First Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Organization and operation of the Council and the Commissions*; 31 May 1951; document E/1995, E/AC.34/23; 35 p.
- * *Comparative approach to National and International Corporate Tax Problems* (Note by the Secretariat); 3 May 1951; document E/CN.8/55; 159 p.

(b) Printed Documents:

- * *Financial Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1950 and Report of the Board of Auditors*; April 1951; document A/1800; 36 p.; 30 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 6.
- Final Report of the First Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 11 December 1946-31 December 1950*; 22 January 1951; document E/1908, E/ICEF/160; 160 p.; 40 cents; Economic and Social Council Official Records; twelfth session, supplement No. 3.
- * *World Economic Report 1949-50*; 16 March 1951; document E/1910/Rev.1, ST/ECA/9; 247 p.; \$2.50; Sales No.: 191.II.C.1 (Department of Economic Affairs).

* *Report of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (Seventh Session)* 28 February - 7 March 1951; 16 April 1951; document E/1981, E/CN.11/306; 67 p.; 60 cents; Economic and Social Council Official Records: thirteenth session, supplement No. 7.

Resolutions of the Twelfth Session (20 February - 21 March 1951) of the Economic and Social Council; 3 May 1951; document E/1987; (bilingual); 30 cents; Economic and Social Council Official Records: twelfth session, supplement No. 1.

Nationality of Married Women (Report submitted by the Secretary-General); 29 November 1950; document E/CN.6/126/Rev.1, E/CN.6/129/Rev.1; 74 p.; 50 cents; Sales No.: 1951.IV.12.

* *Budgetary Structure and Classification of Government Accounts*; 15 February 1951; document ST/ECA/8; 100 p.; 75 cents; Sales No.: 1951.XVI.3 (Department of Economic Affairs).

World Health Organization

- a) *Work of World Health Organization 1950* - Annual Report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations; Official Records No. 30; Geneva, April 1951; 202 p.; \$1.25.
- b) *Executive Board, Seventh Session held in Geneva from 22 January to 5 February 1951* (Part I - Resolutions and Decisions, Annexes); Geneva, April 1951; 86 p.; 50 cents; Official Records No. 32.
- c) *Financial Report 1 January - 31 December 1950 and Report of the External Auditor*; Geneva, April 1951; 50 cents; 55 p.; Official Records No. 34.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the King's Printer at the price indicated.)

Canadian Representatives Abroad and Representatives of Other Countries in Canada, June 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

† Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 51/21—*Aspects of Canadian External Policy*, a statement made in the House of Commons on May 14, 1951, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the course of the debate on Canadian external affairs.
- No. 51/22—*The Idea of Citizenship*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, before the Rotary Club, Ottawa, May 21, 1951, on the occasion of a visit to Ottawa of 132 high school students from across Canada.
- No. 51/23—*The Price of Peace*, a broadcast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made on May 26, 1951, in a United Nations series on the subject.
- No. 51/24—*Foreign Trade in a Time of Partial Peace*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered at the Canadian International Trade Fair in Toronto, on June 5, 1951.
- No. 51/25—*The Partnership to Uphold Freedom*, a Commencement address by the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, delivered at Northwestern University, at Evanston, Ill., on June 11, 1951.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

- No. 51/26—*The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences*, an address delivered by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, P.C., C.H., to the Canadian Club, Montreal, June 11, 1951.
- No. 51/27—*Canada's Contribution to the Strength of the Free World*, an address by the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, delivered at the semi-annual National Meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, at Toronto, on June 13, 1951.
- No. 51/28—*The Organization and Work of the Department of Defence Production*, a statement by the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, made in the House of Commons, on June 14, 1951.



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE KOREAN CRISIS

Malik Proposal Clarified

During the week following the proposal for a peaceful settlement in Korea, made by the Soviet Union Delegate to the United Nations, there was widespread discussion and examination of the statement as a possible first step in ending the fighting.

3. The United States Government sought in New York and Moscow clarification of certain aspects of Mr. Malik's statement of June 23. It reported publicly on the results in the following press release of June 28:

Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko received the United States Ambassador in Moscow yesterday afternoon. In discussing Mr. Malik's statement Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military representatives of the Unified Command and of the Korean Republic Command on the one hand and the military representatives of the North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units" on the other to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Malik's statement. The armistice, Mr. Gromyko pointed out, would include a cease-fire and would be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters; the military representatives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption of hostilities.

Beyond the conclusion of an armistice the Soviet Government had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement to which Mr. Malik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however, that it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subsequent special arrangements would have to be made for a political and territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik's statement.

The implications of Mr. Gromyko's observations are being studied. The Department of State is consulting with the representatives of other countries having armed forces in Korea under the Unified Command.

Armistice Talks Arranged on Initiative of U.N. Commander

On June 29 it was announced in Washington that the United Nations Commander had been authorized to seek to negotiate a cease-fire with the enemy Commander in Korea. The next day General Ridgway sent the following message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Communist forces:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbour.

The enemy reply was broadcast a day later by the Peking radio:

A notification was issued jointly today after consultation by General Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army, and General Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese Volunteers, in reply to the statement of General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces. The notification of General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-Huai reads as follows:

General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces:

Your statement of June 30 this year concerning peace talks has been received. We are authorized to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace.

We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the 33th Parallel. If you agree our representatives are prepared to meet your representatives between July 10 and 15, 1951.

General Ridgway replied on July 3 that he was prepared to have the meeting take place in Kaesong on July 10 or earlier. Since this city had been entered by United Nations troops at the end of June and been found to be unoccupied by Communist forces it was apparently believed by the Unified Command that such a location would provide the neutral ground necessary for armistice discussions.

First Meeting Held July 10

After a preliminary meeting of liaison officers from both sides on July 8 the official representatives of the opposing commanders met for the first time on July 10. The United Nations delegation was composed of four United States military officers and one officer of the Republic of Korea Army; the delegation was led by Vice Admiral C. T. Joy. The Communist delegation was composed of two officers of the North Korean Army and two officers of the Chinese Communist forces. In his opening statement the leader of the United Nations delegation asserted that the success of the negotiations depended directly on the good faith of the delegations; he stressed the intention of his delegation to act in good faith. Admiral Joy described the terms of reference of his delegation and emphasized their military nature when he said:

The United Nations Command delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an armistice agreement with representatives of the Communist forces in Korea, for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will assure against their resumption. This delegation is here for this sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea relating to that subject.

This delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind. This delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.

Communists Accept U.N. Demand for Neutralization of Kaesong Area

At the first formal meeting, and even at the preliminary meeting, it became apparent to the representatives of the United Nations Commander that in one essential respect the armistice talks could not progress satisfactorily: Kaesong was not a neutral location. In the interval between the United Nations reconnaissance and the holding of the first meeting, Communist armed forces had entered the Kaesong area. In this situation the Communist press and radio depicted General Ridgway's representatives as emissaries of a defeated army suing for peace. When Communist guards refused to permit a United Nations courier to leave Kaesong and a group of newspapermen to enter the city, General Ridgway informed the Communist Commanders that his representatives would not attend further meetings until Kaesong was effectively neutralized and reciprocity of treatment was assured. A few days later the Communist Commanders agreed to these conditions and the discussions were then resumed.

Discussions Stalled on Basic Issue

During most of July the armistice discussions were devoted to the preparation of an agenda on which to base the detailed discussions. After preliminary discussion and some compromise the conference, by the 6th meeting on July 18, had agreed on all but one item. The United Nations communiqué reported on that day that "... one major issue remained unsolved when the Conference recessed for the day. Agreement on the key point is essential to the successful completion of the first phase of negotiations."

The key point was disclosed and explained the next day by the United States



—National Defence

PRESIDENTIAL CITATION PRESENTED

General Omar Bradley, left, the United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his recent visit to Ottawa presented to Mr. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, the official Presidential Citation awarded to the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry which was recently cited by President Truman "for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of combat duties in action against the enemy near Kapyong, Korea, on April 24 and 15, 1951".

Secretary of State. In a prepared statement Mr. Acheson said:

The Communist delegation at Kaesong has raised the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in connection with an armistice. The United Nations Command delegation has stated that it cannot go into this question, which is political in character and can only be settled by the United Nations and the governments concerned.

This is no theoretical argument as to whether the question is political or military. The United Nations forces are in Korea because of decisions made by governments to send them to Korea in response to a request by the United Nations. They are there to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area.

If there is an effective armistice, a United Nations force must remain in Korea until a genuine peace has been firmly established and the Korean people have assurance that they can work out their future free from the fear of aggression. The size of the United Nations force remaining in Korea will depend upon circumstances and, particularly, upon the faithfulness with which an armistice is carried out.

Korea's neighbours know that the presence of United Nations forces in Korea constitutes no danger or threat to themselves. The repeated expressions of policy by the U.N. and, indeed, the very nature of that organization, furnish them entirely adequate guarantees on this point.

Once before, foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea as a part of a U.N. plan to reach a final settlement of the Korean problem. The Communists defied this effort and committed aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Korean people can be assured that a repetition of this act will not be tolerated.

The determination of the Unified Command to stand by its position on this basic issue was reaffirmed publicly by the United States Secretary of Defence on July 24. General Marshall went a step further and revealed what the United States Government considered to be the basic conditions for an armistice in Korea. He said:

If the talks resume and get to the substance of an armistice arrangement, there must be agreement upon a military line which will be defensible in the event of any renewal of hostilities; there must be agreement not to reinforce the troops now in Korea; there must be provision for adequate supervision and actual inspection by representatives of both sides to insure against any preparations for a surprise attack and as a continuing evidence of good faith; there must be a satisfactory agreement regarding prisoners of war. These are basic conditions to an armistice, and agreement with respect to them must precede a later effort to reach a final settlement of the Korean question.

Agenda Agreed Upon

After a 4-day adjournment requested by the Communist delegation the Conference met on July 25 to try again to obtain agreement on the agenda. At this meeting the Communist delegation proposed a substitute for the controversial item on withdrawal of foreign troops. With the acceptance of this proposal the following day by the United Nations delegation the introductory phase of the Conference — preparation of an agenda — was completed. The United Nations communiqué for July 26 announced that the agenda was as follows:

- (1) Adoption of agenda;
- (2) Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides, so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea;
- (3) Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of the cease-fire and armistice;
- (4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war;
- (5) Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

Acceptance of Agenda Merely Initial Step

The United Nations communiqué emphasized that the agreement reached on that day was confined simply to a list of the points which the negotiators would discuss and that major problems would have to be solved in the discussions before an armistice agreement could be achieved and the fighting stopped. It explained this distinction and warned against over-optimism for an early end of the war in the following words:

Having agreed upon an agenda, the way now is clear for the delegations to enter the area of really substantive discussion of the terms of a military armistice. Major problems remain to be solved in these discussions. It is much too early to predict either the success or the rate of progress to be obtained. Preliminary discussion began immediately after the agreement on the agenda in order that the potential for halting bloodshed in Korea may be realized as soon as possible.

It must be fully realized that mutual acceptance of an agenda is merely the initial step for the final goal of a military armistice and resultant cease-fire, which must be achieved under conditions giving every reasonable assurance against the resumption of hostilities.

There are numerous basic points within the framework of the agenda on which agreement must be reached and on which there is presently wide diversion of views.

Conference Tackles Substantive Questions

At its meeting on July 27 the Conference began its discussion of the second point on the agenda, the fixing of a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone to separate the opposing forces. At the end of the month no progress had been made in finding a line acceptable to both sides.

Lull in Fighting

At the beginning of the month the customary heavy fighting gave way to probing activities on both sides to gain information of troop locations and strengths and possible intentions. For several days United Nations reconnaissance planes reported large numbers of enemy motor transports moving south signifying a build-up of enemy forces. Although ground fighting declined sharply after the opposing Commanders agreed to discuss an armistice, United Nations forces continued to attack by air.

THE SCHUMAN PLAN

On May 9, 1950, on the eve of the meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers in London, the French Government issued a declaration proposing that the entire French and German production of coal and steel be placed under a common High Authority, membership in which would be open to other European countries. This far-reaching proposal was received with great interest not only by those countries more directly concerned but by the whole world. In Germany, Chancellor Adenauer called the French plan "a magnanimous proposal". In the United States, President Truman praised the Plan as "an act of constructive statesmanship", which the United States welcomed. Secretary Acheson recognized "with sympathy and approval the significance and far-reaching intent of the French initiative". In the United Kingdom House of Commons, Mr. Atlee termed the French proposal "a notable contribution towards the solution of the major European problem", namely, the entry of Germany into the community of European nations. In Canada, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, referred to the French offer as "indicative of the imaginative approach to their problems that Western European nations are making, and we can only hope it will be successful, both politically and economically".

French Policy

Though completely unexpected and representing a new approach to the German problem, the above proposal, known as the Schuman Plan, after Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, followed the general pattern of post-war French foreign policy. Since 1945, an important objective of that policy had been to promote wherever possible the integration of Western Europe. The first timid step in that direction was an effort to achieve a broad measure of co-ordination between the French and British economies, in the hope that the two countries would form the nucleus around which Western European integration could proceed. In 1947, the Treaty of Dunkirk between the United Kingdom and France envisaged ways and means of integrating and co-ordinating the various aspects of the life of the two countries; these aims were later extended to the three Benelux countries by the Brussels Pact. The French desire for Western European integration was more specifically expressed when largely at the instance of the French Government, the Council of Europe was established. Within the Council, the French Government steadily endeavoured to give real powers to the Consultative Assembly so that it might gradually become the parliament of a federal Western Europe. As the world situation developed, it became evident that neither the Western Union envisaged by the Brussels Pact, nor the Council of Europe could, by themselves, achieve the political and economic integration of Western Europe. As this fact became clear, the hopes kindled in Western Europe by the two above mentioned endeavours began to wane. Mr. Schuman's announcement arrested and tended to reverse this negative trend. By offering to Germany not only equality but close partnership in the coal and steel industries of both countries, the French proposal opened the way for a solution transcending the difficult problems facing the West. To France and Germany the Schuman offer meant more than the prospect of economic betterment and increased security; it restored their self confidence by providing them with a great historic mission to accomplish.

New Road for European Integration

Equally important, the French proposal opened a new line of approach to European integration; it combined some features of both the federalist and functionalist approaches which had hitherto been followed. Mr. Schuman's declaration of May 9, 1950, makes the new line very clear:

Europe will not be built at one stroke or by means of a single general plan. It will be built by means of practical achievements, which will first create real solidarity. The unification of the European nations demands that the age-old enmity of France and Germany be eliminated; the action undertaken must apply primarily to France and Germany. To this end, the French Government proposes immediately to take action on a limited but decisive point: it proposes to place all French and German steel and coal production under a common High Authority in an organization open to other European countries . . . this proposal will lay the first real foundations of a European Federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.

The first sentence of the above statement expounds the functionalist doctrine. To this doctrine, however, is added the acceptance of the cardinal feature of the federalist philosophy, namely, the surrender of national sovereignty. True, this surrender is limited but it is real and takes place in a decisive sector; moreover its clearly stated purpose is to lead to the ultimate establishment of a European federation.

German Reaction

The reaction to the French proposals in Germany was on the whole enthusiastic. Since 1945, the sentiment in that country in favour of the integration and federalization of Western Europe had been gaining ground. The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, was convinced that reconciliation with France was the best way to bring this about. At the same time, perhaps understandably, the Germans saw in the Schuman Plan a way to regain their sovereignty and attain a position of equality with other Western European nations. More specifically, the Germans hoped that the Schuman Plan would enable them to get rid of the universally disliked International Ruhr Authority and would lead to the abandonment of the quantitative restrictions on German coal and steel output. It seems probable, on the other hand, that France saw in the Schuman Plan the best way to ensure its security in a manner that would be both acceptable to Germany and in line with broader Western interests in the maintenance of peace. Thus, although the attitude of France and Germany towards the Schuman Plan was partly based on self-interest, it was also the result of the sincere, far-sighted European spirit prevailing in the Governments of the two countries.

British Position

Although Germany was the only country specifically mentioned in the Schuman proposal, it was addressed to other European nations as well; of these the United Kingdom was politically and economically the most important. The British Government had been caught by surprise by the Schuman declaration, since, in order not to compromise the desired dramatic effect, the French Government had not consulted their Western Union partners. A series of diplomatic exchanges between the two countries followed and these culminated in the British decision not to send delegates to the conference convened by the French in Paris for the purpose of giving effect to the Schuman proposal, the principles of which had been endorsed by the governments of the six participating countries — France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The motives behind the British decision were varied. Politically, the British could not agree to accept in advance the basic principles of a surrender of sovereignty to a supra-national authority as set forth in the original French communiqué. The French proposal, it was thought, did not sufficiently provide for the democratic control of the proposed High Authority and would therefore not be in accordance with traditional British democratic principles. Moreover, the political powers of the High Authority were thought to be too great, since its edicts could override the decisions of a member country and prevent the application of its internal policies. As in the Council of Europe, the United Kingdom Government preferred inter-governmental agreements to the establishment of a supra-national authority.

Economically, the United Kingdom, unlike the other partners in the Plan, did not have the same geographical pressure to link its industries with those of other countries. With increased demands for coal at home and reduced production, it was less than ever dependent on the continental European market for coal.

In spite of its decision not to participate in the conference in Paris, the British Government made it very clear that the United Kingdom would not obstruct in any way the efforts of the six countries to put into effect the contents of the Schuman declaration; it expressed the hope "that the international discussions in Paris would lead to a new era in Franco-German relations with beneficial effects for Europe as a whole".

Institutions of the Plan

The magnitude of the objectives set out in the Schuman declaration explains the lengthy and arduous negotiations between the six countries which adhered to the principles of the Schuman proposal. After ten months of negotiations, on April 18, 1951, a treaty establishing a "European community for coal and steel" was signed by the foreign ministers of France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries. The Treaty consists of two parts — the Treaty itself and an Agreement in regard to Interim Provisions. The latter Agreement provides for the effective application of the Treaty to be undertaken in two periods: the preparatory period which is to last six months, and the transitional period, which is to last five years from the date of the establishment of the common market for coal. The Treaty provides for four main institutions: the High Authority assisted by a Consultative Committee, the Council of Ministers, the Assembly and the Court of Justice.

In accordance with the original idea of the Schuman Plan, the most important institution created by the Treaty is the "High Authority". It is a collegial body endowed with executive authority. To it is given the task of ensuring the achievement of the objectives set by the Treaty. It is to consist of nine members, to be elected by the Council of Ministers for a period of six years, with a third of them replaced or re-elected every two years. These members are not responsible to any single state or group of states but only to the whole community represented by the Assembly. The High Authority will publish every year, at least one month before the meeting of the Assembly, a general report on the work of the group which will be presented to the Assembly for examination.

The "Consultative Committee", whose task it will be to assist and advise the High Authority, is to be composed of at least thirty and at most fifty-one members representing producers, workers, consumers and merchants, in equal numbers. These members are to be nominated individually by the Council of Ministers from lists of names submitted by representative organizations. They are not to be bound by any instructions or mandate from the organizations which put their names forward. The Consultative Committee can be convened either at the request of the High Authority, or at the request of a majority of its members wishing to consider some special problem. The High Authority is bound to consult the Consultative Committee, whenever such consultation is required by the Treaty.

Of great importance, the "Council of Ministers" is to consist of one minister from each of the participating countries. The Council meets on the summons of its President, at the request of a member state or of the High Authority. Its special task will be to co-ordinate and harmonize the activity of the High Authority with the general policies of member states. The voting procedure of the Council takes into account three principles: no single state has the right of veto, the four smaller states cannot be outvoted by France and Germany and conversely France and Germany cannot be outvoted by the four smaller states. The Council has powers of control over the High Authority on a number of specific questions such as the introduction by the High Authority of a system of production quotas in time of slump and of rationing measures to deal with a state of scarcity, the restrictions of exports to non-mem-

bers, the fixing of minimum and maximum tariff rates, and the establishment of quantitative restrictions against non-members. It also has the power to decide on applications from new countries wishing to join the group. It may not, however, force the resignation of the High Authority.

The "Assembly" is to be composed of 78 members, 18 each from France, Germany and Italy, 10 from Belgium and the Netherlands and 4 from Luxembourg. The members are to be elected annually by national Parliaments from among their members and preferably from those who represent their Parliaments at the Council of Europe. Its main function is to provide for the democratic control of the High Authority; with this aim in view, it meets once a year in public session to examine the report of the High Authority and may address to it oral or written questions. If the Assembly disapproves of the report by a two-thirds majority, consisting, at least, of over half of its members, the High Authority must collectively resign. It may also be called into special session to give an opinion on questions put to it by the Council of Ministers.

The "Court of Justice" has the essential function of enforcing the law "in respect of the interpretation and application of the Treaty". It is composed of seven judges appointed for six years by common consent of the governments of the member states. The Court is competent to pronounce judgments on appeals against the decisions and recommendations of the High Authority by a member state, by the Council of Ministers or by an individual firm or association. Conversely it can proclaim null and void, at the request of one of the member states or of the High Authority, the resolutions of the Assembly or of the Council of Ministers.

Economic and Social Provisions

It had been the original French plan to draft a treaty which would be limited to setting up the necessary institutions and which would cover economic and social questions in broad, general terms, leaving the details to be filled in subsequently by the High Authority. This procedure was not acceptable to the Benelux delegates, who felt that economic and social questions should be settled between Governments and the detail of the settlement written into the treaty. Accordingly, the delegates reached agreement on a series of provisions covering the establishment of the single market, the financial aspects of the work of the community, investments, technical research, reconversion of industry and the readaptation of displaced workers, production and prices, commercial policy with regard to non-participant countries, transport, and cartels, trusts and monopolies.

With regard to the single market, the delegates agreed to abolish immediately all customs duties, import licences and quantitative restrictions on the coal and steel trade between the six member countries, so that the unified market might come into effect as soon as the mechanism of the transitional period had been instituted.

The High Authority was given power to raise money by a levy not exceeding one per cent on the average yearly value of production, by borrowing and by gifts. For instance, ECA might make a grant to the High Authority. Funds obtained in these three ways will be used to cover the administrative expenses of the "Community", to promote technical research, to help in the modernization of existing plants and in financing new ones, to finance programmes likely to ensure the productive re-employment of the labour force displaced as a result of the establishment of the single market or the introduction of new production techniques, and to assist by means of non-repayable grants in the retaining, rehousing and maintenance during the interim period of such displaced labour. The High Authority will also underwrite loans to individual firms.

A special equalization fund for coal will be maintained during the transitional period for the purpose of facilitating the integration of certain high-cost national coal industries (Belgium and Italy) into the single market. This fund will be raised by a

levy of 1.5 per cent on the gross receipts of the producers in countries (West Germany and the Netherlands) where the mean cost prices are below the balanced mean of the group. In order to obtain aid from the Equalization Fund, the Governments of beneficiary countries will have to contribute an amount at least equal to the aid received from the fund.

Exchange regulations between the six countries will be liberalized. Prior notification to the High Authority will be required in the case of investment programmes for the coal and steel industries. Prices are to remain the responsibility of individual firms but it is hoped that they will be as low as is compatible with a fair margin for depreciation and an adequate return on capital. Indirect means of influencing production in normal periods will be used. Provision is made for notification to the High Authority of prospective commercial treaties with third parties involving coal and steel. Harmonized tariffs are envisaged, and minimum and maximum tariff rates may be fixed by the Council of Ministers. Differential transport rates and conditions will be prohibited. Release from most-favoured-nation commitments will be sought by the six participating nations with regard to coal and steel.

All agreements and practices of a concerted nature which might restrain or distort competition are to be subject to authorization by the High Authority. The German delegates agreed to this provision following a compromise reached in Bonn by United States High Commissioner McCloy and Chancellor Adenauer on the deconcentration and decartelization of the Ruhr. It was agreed that the German coal sales agency would be dissolved by October 1, 1952, with two supplementary delays of six months each, in case the "Community" envisaged by the Schuman Plan was not in effect on the date fixed. Furthermore, the steel industry would be deconcentrated into 24 steel firms, but would retain control of up to 75 per cent of its coal and coke requirements.

General Considerations

When Mr. Schuman made his historic proposal shortly over a year ago, critics of the Plan, especially in Britain, expressed the fear that too much uncontrolled power would be given to the High Authority. The Treaty recently signed by the Foreign Ministers of the six powers has, however, considerably reduced the previously anticipated power of the High Authority. Indeed the question now is, has the High Authority sufficient power to achieve the political and economic objectives of the Plan? The Treaty specifically states that the High Authority shall "accomplish its mission with limited direct intervention". Over and above being politically controlled by the Assembly, it is counter-balanced by a Council of Ministers. Some of the powers, originally envisaged as belonging to the High Authority, have been given to the Council. In other cases, action by the High Authority requires the consent of the Council.

The institution of the Council of Ministers, by restoring a measure of governmental control, represents a partial withdrawal from the surrender of sovereignty envisaged last year. This point must not, however, be exaggerated, since no country has been given the power of veto in the Council; the voting procedure adopted represents quite a triumph for the federalist point of view. The Council, moreover, might be the best place for national interests to be aired, since in an international body these are likely to be moderated. In this view, the Council would shield the High Authority from serious conflicts with national governments.

The Treaty provides for five institutions but it is impossible to visualize in advance how it would work in practice. The federalist principle of a partial surrender of national sovereignty allied to the doctrine of the separation of powers has produced a negative rather than a positive constitution. It has led to removing powers from national governments without giving them intact to anyone else. For the successful working of this constitution, much will depend on the personality of the

members of the High Authority, as well as on the influence of the practical working of the scheme on the relations between, and respective powers of the High Authority and Council of Ministers. In any event, it was probably the only way to reconcile divergent national interests with a supra-national authority. Indeed it is perhaps remarkable that the High Authority has retained so many of the wide powers originally envisaged for it.

It is widely admitted that regardless of the vital importance of the political objectives of the Schuman Plan, it is on economic performance that the Plan will stand or fall. The economic objective of the plan is the rationalization on an international scale of the continental European coal and steel industries, by means of the establishment of a single market.

In this connection, the Treaty is less ambitious than was originally contemplated. It was originally intended to ensure and organize full employment; now the High Authority, through the Council of Ministers, will only harmonize its actions with member states for the purpose of dovetailing investments into periods of falling demand. Similarly the early objective of equalizing wages in the coal and steel industries of the six countries has been abandoned. Wages will not be subject to interference and the right of countries to reduce wages by means of a devaluation is recognized. The early idea of equalizing transport rates has been discarded, although discrimination is prohibited. In the same way, the High Authority has not been given the power to prevent a firm from making what is considered to be an uneconomic investment, provided the investment comes from the firm's own resources.

Canadian View

The broad political and economic objectives of the Schuman Plan, which are to further the integration of Western Europe, to put an end to the traditional Franco-German enmity, and to establish a large single market for coal and steel, have won general approval in Canada. Speaking before the House of Commons on February 22, 1950, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, said, quoting from his statement at the Colombo conference:

We welcome the prospect of a closer economic co-operation among the countries of Western Europe. Such a development might be expected to contribute to the military strength of the democratic countries concerned and also, by eliminating uneconomic production and encouraging competitive efficiency, to hasten the day when they would no longer require extraordinary financial assistance from abroad. It would also restore to countries occupied and ravaged during the war that sense of hope which they need more now than they need United States dollars. Western Europe could once again look forward to playing in the world the great role for which its history and the resourceful intelligence of its people qualify it.

This statement, made before the coal and steel merger was proposed, presaged official Canadian reaction to the Schuman proposal. Referring to this proposal, Mr. Pearson told the House on June 5, 1950:

It may mean a long step forward in ending the ancient feud between Gaul and Teuton which has caused so many dark things to be written on the pages of European history. I believe that this is an example of the new approach by Europeans to their problems, and we can only hope it will be successful, both politically and economically.


With regard to the United Kingdom attitude to the Schuman Plan, Mr. Pearson made the following statement before the House on September 4, 1950:

. . . as it happens, we did informally tell them (the United Kingdom Government) that we thought this was an important and far-reaching Plan, the importance of which was possibly greater politically than economically, and that whatever the economic difficulties may be in carrying it out . . . it would be unwise for any government not to fall in at once with the principle behind this Plan to further the integration, politically and economically, of the Western European countries. It would

be unwise especially not to do everything to encourage the French in any proposal which may heal the age-long conflict between the French and the Teutons.

Again on February 2, 1951, Mr. Pearson emphasized Canada's military and political interest in European unity in terms which are applicable to the Schuman Plan:

So far as Western Europe is concerned—and this, I repeat, is the most vital area in the front line of our defence—the effort required is partly military and partly, in the broader sense of the term, political. The free nations of Europe are profoundly aware that their future security and prosperity depend in large measure on the unity which they can achieve among themselves . . . if there were no other reasons for pressing ahead with these policies of European unification, the problem of Germany itself would make imperative the need for some form of European unity. If democratic Germany is to play her constructive part in a free Europe, it is essential that she should do so within the framework of a freely co-operative Europe coming closer together economically, politically and militarily.



CANADIAN ARMS FOR ITALY

—National Defence

Self-propelled guns have been made available to Italy as part of Canada's programme of providing arms and equipment to other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Taking part in the deckside ceremony at Montreal, above are, left to right: Mr. Jean Désy, Canadian Ambassador to Italy; the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton; and the Italian Ambassador to Canada, His Excellency, Mario di Stefano.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered to a meeting of the Council Deputies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in London, on June 25, 1951.

I am very glad to be given the opportunity to meet with the Deputies of the North Atlantic Council. The decision to establish the Deputies was one of the wisest the Council has made. It should rank in importance with that to establish an Integrated Force under General Eisenhower.

When the Council met here thirteen months ago, it was apparent that the kind of co-ordination of NATO activities essential for the success of the whole undertaking could not be provided by the necessarily infrequent meetings of Ministers. Since that time, the variety, complexity, and difficulty of NATO problems have vastly increased. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of the role of the Deputies, not only in tackling those problems one by one, but also in giving continuity and direction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole. The Deputies, however, to discharge their important responsibilities, need the backing of and to be endowed with effective authority by the governments which they represent. They need also leadership and that has certainly been provided by your Chairman, Mr. Spofford.

To my mind, perhaps the most important attribute of the Council Deputies is their competence to deal with the many related aspects of the task of co-ordinating the civilian side of the NATO effort, and its relationship with the military agencies of the Treaty. Certainly in the course of your work you have had to consider military, economic and political problems of great importance and variety, and you have worked with a degree of cohesiveness which parallels the best traditions of "cabinet solidarity". We all recognize that this group has responsibilities which are quite distinct from that of a cabinet in any of our Governments. There is, however, a similarity in the fact that, although your final action takes the form of recommendations, these recommendations have a very great importance since it is unlikely that any NATO Government would reject a course of action which had the unanimous approval of your Council. It is that factor which underlines the great responsibilities which attach to your deliberations. It is that fact, too, which makes it all the more important that an effective link should be established between the Council Deputies and the subordinate agencies of NATO, so that in coming to your decisions here on which recommendations to Governments are based, you are acting on the best advice available. As a former Civil Servant, I have a lively appreciation of the value of adequate preparation and expert advice before final decisions are taken. I think, therefore, that the recent steps to strengthen the organization by the establishment of the Defence Production Board and the Financial and Economic Board, and the plans which I understand are now under consideration for strengthening the International Staff, will greatly facilitate your own work in the months to come.

NATO Re-organization

The importance of the Deputies has, of course, been increased by the re-organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization top structure announced last month. The Canadian Government is pleased that its proposals to this effect — after a careful and collective study of the problems involved — have met with the approval of the Deputies and their Governments. The new organization is simpler than the old. The lines of responsibility are clearer. Although a good organizational system is not an end in itself, it will without doubt help the governments here represented to do the job which the Treaty requires, and on which the people in all our countries are counting so heavily.

Collective Defence — the Integrated Force

It is little more than two years since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and less than two years since it came into force. Much has been accomplished in this time. During this short period, NATO has pursued the unique task of building a system of collective defence in peacetime. Perhaps the grave practical problems involved in establishing the Integrated Force in Europe tend to make us forget the historical and dramatic importance of this decision. I think one would have to go far back into history for a peacetime precedent for the integration into one international force of units of so many nations.

It would be tragic indeed if we were not able to carry this development forward, effectively and speedily. It would also be dangerous to our very existence as free political societies, because only by collective military strength can we hold at bay the forces of potential aggression, and thereby give ourselves time and opportunity to establish peace on a stronger foundation than force.

We have been given, already, two years for this purpose. That is a short enough period — against the background of history — to do what we have done. Against the background of the danger which faces us, however, it is a longer time, and we should be impatient that we have not been able to do more.

In that impatience lies one of our hopes for further progress. In it also lies dangers which may divide and weaken our association: dangers of invidious comparisons and consequent irritations. We must have confidence in each other's desire and determination to make this coalition effective; broadly and fairly based. Confidence, however, can only be established by results. If my own country, for instance, does not carry its fair share of the total burden, the association will be weakened, and in a more than material sense. That applies to all of us. It means that we should be completely frank in analysing difficulties and in exchanging views. It means also that we should understand each other's problems, and appreciate any special difficulties which may arise. The Deputies can be of very great importance here. The feeling of friendly solidarity among you which has developed makes it possible, even easy, for you to discuss questions without reservations, and without fear of recrimination. You can also explain to your own governments the positions and the attitudes of other members, when difficulties arise, and thereby help to resolve them.


Broader Vision of the North Atlantic Community

Although the building of collective defence is at present the main activity of NATO, the Canadian Government and people do not look upon the Treaty merely as a military alliance. Canadians seek the Treaty as an expression of the reality of the North Atlantic community and of the determination of that community to strengthen its free institutions, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to defend the liberty of each of the nations belonging to it. Our common defence is the immediate and urgent goal of the North Atlantic Treaty. But there is no reason why we should lose sight of the farther horizon — the ultimate creation in the Atlantic area of a great community of free nations. In the face of a common danger, under the stern remorseless threat to our survival, we twelve nations of the Atlantic have come together to pool our resources that we may survive. In the process we are developing new working institutions, and, what is possibly even more important, a common desire to make them work. They concern not only purely military things, but inevitably too, the economics and the politics of joint effort. In our struggle for security from a very present threat, we are developing a new consciousness of Atlantic unity, the results of which may far exceed our immediate purposes and expectations. May we not in these past two years have taken at least the first steps toward something much greater and more positive — a genuine community of the Atlantic?

This is a long-term objective which, of course, has to be subordinated at present to the exigencies of the immediate situation in which we find ourselves. We are defending ourselves against a threat which is not regional, but global. It is undeniable that the increased defence efforts to which we are each committed in the North Atlantic area were directly stimulated by the Communist aggression in Korea. Korea also has shown us that an Atlantic Alliance cannot isolate itself from Pacific questions. It is not necessary for me to emphasize the difficulties with which we are faced, the inter-relationship of those difficulties, and the importance of giving the most serious study to any new steps affecting the future course of action of our organization. A year ago the NATO powers embarked on a policy of deterring further Soviet expansionism at a time when Western strength was really inadequate to the task and when the Soviet reaction could not be foreseen with any degree of certainty. This policy has had its effect and, with the gradual, if somewhat uneven, growth of Western strength during the ensuing year, we are undoubtedly in a better position as a group than at the outset. This does not, however, mean that the dangers of the situation have been overcome, or that the NATO powers can afford to undertake new commitments without carefully examining each new proposal in the light of our increasing but still inadequate armed strength, and without the fullest consultation on all political aspects. Since we are now approaching what is considered by all parties to the Treaty to be the period of greatest danger it behoves us all to take new decisions with full knowledge of the issues involved, political as well as strategic. In those decisions, we will often have to consider and to balance short-term and long-term factors.

A second potential danger is the fact that the course of international developments, and the technique of Communist strategy, may cause the focal point of our attention to be drawn away from the area which, I think, remains the one of principal concern, Western Europe. In recent months the limelight has tended to shift to the Far East, and more recently to the middle East as a result of the Iranian crisis and the problem of the relationship of Greece and Turkey to Western defence planning. Although the Soviet Union may have played some part in bringing to a head these Middle Eastern problems, the problems themselves are not of the Soviet Union's making. They do, however, lend themselves admirably to the Soviet practice of fishing in troubled waters and diverting attention from more vital areas. We should perhaps remind ourselves more frequently that the need to preserve the integrity of Western Europe and the United Kingdom, as the Eastern frontier of the Atlantic community, was what originally inspired the formation of NATO and remains to-day its principal objective. This does not mean that the Middle East and other areas are not matters of deep concern, or that action is not urgently required to build adequate machinery for strengthening resistance to aggression in this and other vital areas. It does, however, mean that these essential and related tasks should not distract our attention from the area which we are specifically committed to defend, or the longer-term aims which our alliance must ultimately seek to attain.

In conclusion, may I congratulate you on the contribution that the Deputies are making to both these shorter-term and longer-term aims.



—U.S. Army

CANADIAN WORLD WAR II DEAD HONORED IN JAPAN

A Cross of Sacrifice, erected by the Imperial War Graves Commission at Hodogaya, near Yokohama, Japan, before the graves of one hundred and fifty Canadian World War II dead, was unveiled on June 12, 1951, by the Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Japan, Mr. A. R. Menzies, and the Head of the New Zealand Mission in Japan, Mr. R. S. Challis, as part of a ceremony marking the completion of the British Commonwealth Cemetery. The fifteen-foot granite cross has on each side of it an inverted bronze sword symbolizing the sacrifice of the Canadian and New Zealand war dead. Soldiers from the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Reinforcement Depot at Kure and the New Zealand Field Artillery Regiment stood guard by the monument. Following the unveiling ceremony, Mr. Menzies laid a wreath on behalf of the Government of Canada, and Brigadier F. J. Fleury, Head of the Military Mission, Far East, on behalf of the Canadian Legion.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Trusteeship Council

The Ninth Session of the Trusteeship Council, which was held at Flushing Meadow, New York, terminated on July 30. During the course of the session, the administering powers presented reports on the administration, for 1949 and 1950, of the trust territories of Tanganyika, Ruanda Urundi, French Cameroons, British Cameroons, French Togoland and British Togoland. Italy presented its first annual report for the administration of the new trust territory of Somaliland. The various committees (Rural Economic Development, Petitions, Administrative Units) submitted their reports to the Council, and the Ewe question was considered.

The Council was concerned for the most part with a detailed consideration of the reports submitted by the administering powers. This time-consuming process of discussion and analysis, out of which arise the recommendations which make up the final report to the General Assembly, is perhaps the paramount function of the Trusteeship Council. In general, the discussion was moderate in tone, the criticism constructive and the reports well presented.

A good part of the discussion centred on the educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories. Each administering power commented on the difficulty of obtaining suitable teachers. The development of vocational training and programmes of adult education had to some extent compensated for the lack of formal education among large populations, most of whom were illiterate. It was hoped that new techniques in the field of visual education would hasten educational development in the trust territories.

The future of the Ewe tribal group in Togoland is likely to be one of the most involved problems yet presented to the Council. The Ewes, who number about 1 million and who are one of the most progressive of the West African peoples, now desire the unification of their homeland, the various parts of which lie within the borders of the Gold Coast and British and French Togoland. The unification of the Ewes would be most difficult from both an economic and an administrative point of view. The chief question is which authority should assume administrative responsibility: France, the United Kingdom, a condominium of the two, or the United Nations. To complicate matters still further, the Ewes themselves are not in accord, and each political group has its own ideas about the proposed union. The United Kingdom and France recommended to the Council the creation of a joint council, for British and French Togoland, without executive or legislative powers, which would serve as a link between the Ewes on each side of the border. This recommendation was adopted by the Council, with the addition of an amendment calling upon the administering powers to ensure that the joint council's responsibilities would be "sufficiently broad" to enable it to deal with the political, economic and social aspects of the Ewe question.

The majority of the members of the Council were agreed that considerable progress had been made in each of the trust territories during the period under review. There was a realization of the magnitude of the task confronting the administering powers in the trust territories, and of the infinite complexity of their problems which could only be solved by continuous and patient endeavour.

The most contentious question, which will be dealt with at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, is the Italian request to be granted voting rights in the Council. Somaliland is to be administered by Italy for the next ten years, but Italy, which is not a member of the United Nations, is not allowed to vote in the Council and is allowed to take part in the discussions of the Council only when these

have to do with Somaliland. The addition of Italy to the Trusteeship Council as a voting member would presumably involve the election of another non-administering power to the Council so as to balance the number of administering powers. This question is likely to produce an extended debate in the General Assembly.

Because of the uncertainty regarding the date on which the General Assembly will conclude its Sixth Session, the Trusteeship Council decided to hold a short special meeting in Paris in order to fix the date for its next Session in 1952.

NATO COUNCIL MEETING ANNOUNCED

The Department of External Affairs announced on August 3 that a meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to take place in Ottawa beginning September 15. A NATO announcement, issued simultaneously, stated:

Two meetings of the North Atlantic Council will be held this autumn, it was announced today by Mr. Paul Van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Council. Prior to the ordinary annual session, which is to convene in Rome at the end of October a meeting of the Council will be held in Ottawa on September 15 to consider such problems as may be ready for discussion or action by the Council at that time.

The Department's announcement added:

The Canadian Government is pleased that the capital of this country has been chosen as the site for the Council meeting, and will be glad to welcome the national delegations of the other eleven members of NATO to Canada. The importance of building up the collective defences and of promoting the closer association of the North Atlantic area hardly needs to be stressed. Canada has from the inception of the Treaty been very conscious of the need to carry this work forward effectively and speedily. The present meeting will serve to emphasize the determination of all the NATO countries to maintain the momentum already created in order that the strength of the North Atlantic area may shortly reach the point where it can hold at bay the forces of any potential aggressor.

TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY

The Department of External Affairs announced on July 10 that the state of war with Germany had been terminated by Royal Proclamation published in the Canada Gazette on July 10, 1951.

Although active hostilities were ended by the declaration of June 5, 1945, regarding the unconditional surrender of the German Reich, it has proved impossible since then to conclude a Treaty of Peace which would dispose of questions relating to Germany and arising out of the state of war. With this in mind the Government of Canada announced last October its intention of taking action to terminate the state of war with Germany as soon as it was in a position to do so.

The action by Canada terminating the state of war with Germany does not prejudice decisions on questions arising out of the war with Germany which remain to be determined by a future Treaty of Peace or by other agreements with Germany, nor does it affect in any way the Allied agreements and declarations regarding control machinery for Germany which have been made since the surrender of that country. The satisfaction of Canadian claims against Germany arising out of the war is not affected.

This action by Canada simply means that insofar as Canadian domestic law, both public and private, is concerned, a state of war no longer exists between Canada and Germany and German nationals are no longer considered to be enemy aliens. The Government of Canada still reserves the right to retain any money or property which is vested in the Custodian by virtue of the Canadian Trading with the Enemy Regulations, but it will be recalled that no obstacle has been placed since December 29, 1949, in the way of the resumption of all commercial and financial dealings between persons in Canada and persons in Germany or of the acquisition of property which was not subjected to control up to that date. This position remains unchanged.

The Honourable T. C. Davis, K.C., presented to President Theodore Heuss, his Letter of Credence on August 16, as Canadian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Davis has been accredited to the Allied High Commission as Head of the Canadian Mission, Bonn, since June 22, 1950. The mission's new status as an embassy will mark the resumption of direct diplomatic relations between the two countries.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. W. Holmes was posted from the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations at New York, to Ottawa, effective July 2, 1951, and from Ottawa to the National Defence College at Kingston, effective July 18, 1951.
- Mr. J. B. C. Watkins was posted from the Canadian Embassy in the U.S.S.R., to Ottawa, effective July 11, 1951.
- Mr. W. G. Stark was posted from the Canadian Embassy in Brazil, to Ottawa, effective July 3, 1951.
- Mr. M. A. Crowe was posted from the Canadian Embassy in the U.S.S.R., to Ottawa, effective July 3, 1951.
- Mr. H. H. Carter was posted from the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, to Ottawa, effective July 16, 1951.
- Mr. B. A. Keith was posted from the Canadian Consulate General in New York, to Ottawa, effective July 16, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Mr. Richard E. Kleinhans, Commercial Attaché and Consul, Embassy of the United States of America, June 18. Mr. Kleinhans was previously Consul at Montreal.

Squadron Leader L. A. Popham, R.A.F., Assistant Air Force Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, July 13.

Mr. J. H. Weir, Assistant Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, July 18.

Departure

Mr. B. S. Lendrum, Assistant Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, June 28.

His Excellency the Honourable Stanley Woodward, Ambassador of the United States of America, left on July 5 on leave of absence. Until his return Mr. Don C. Bliss, Minister, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Dr. Agustin Nores Martinez, Ambassador of Argentina, left on July 6 for a vacation in Argentina. During his absence Mr. Gaston Zapata Quesada, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Dr. Rade Pribicevic, Ambassador designate of Yugoslavia, left on July 8 for a trip to Vancouver and returned on

July 25. During his absence Mr. Slavko Zecevic, First Secretary was Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Mr. Eugeniusz Markowski resumed his duties as Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires at the Legation of Poland, July 11, on his return from a trip to Poland.

Mr. Zdenek Roskot resumed his duties as Second Secretary and Chargé d'Affaires at the Legation of Czechoslovakia on July 15 on his return from a vacation in his country.

His Excellency Sean Murphy, Ambassador of Ireland, left on July 14 for a vacation in the United States. Mr. John O'Brien, Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim during Mr. Murphy's absence.

His Excellency Per Wijkman, Minister of Sweden, left on July 18 for a vacation of two weeks. During his absence, Mr. J. Sigge de Lilliehook, Second Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency A. H. J. Lovink, Ambassador of the Netherlands, left on July 20 for a vacation of three weeks. Until his return Mr. M. J. van Schreven, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Dr. Victor Nef, Minister of Switzerland, left on July 23 for a vacation in his country. Mr. Emile Bisang, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim during the Minister's absence.

CONSULAR

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Thomas J. B. Wenner as Consul of the

United States of America at Montreal, July 10.

August, 1951

Mr. Mahmoud Rachid as Consul of Egypt at Ottawa, July 20.

Mr. Richard E. Kleinhans as Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, July 25. Mr. Kleinhans is also Commercial Attaché at the Embassy.

Mr. Ricardo Almanza Gordo as Consul of Mexico at Vancouver, July 26.

Mr. Gonzalo Carrillo as Vice-Consul of Venezuela at Montreal, July 26.

Mr. Kingdom W. Swayne as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, July 26.

Departures

Mr. Charles C. Adams, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Halifax, June 30.

Mr. Laurence C. Frank, Consul General of the United States of America at Winnipeg is on leave from July 13 to August 13. During his absence Mr. Mulford A. Colebrook, Consul, is in charge of the Consulate General.

Mr. Sebastian Emilio Valverde, Consul General of the Dominican Republic at Ottawa, left on July 26 for two weeks leave in his country.

TRADE

New Appointment

Mr. L. R. Rogers, Assistant Trade Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Toronto, July 16.

Mr. A. P. Timms, Trade Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Toronto has been transferred to Vancouver in the same capacity.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of July 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs".)

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs" January 1, 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions.)

Conferences Attended in July

1. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris—February 15. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
2. *Conference of Plenipotentiaries re Convention on Refugees and Protocol on Stateless Persons (ECOSOC).* Geneva—July 2-25. L. G. Chance, Department of External Affairs; K. D. McIlwraith, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
3. *Ninth International Management Conference.* Brussels—July 5-11. V. L. Chapin, Canadian Embassy, Brussels (Observer).
4. *Commonwealth Survey Officers' Conference.* London—July 9-20. Lt. Col. C. H. Smith, Department of National Defence; P. E. Palmer, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys; J. P. Messervey, Deputy Minister of Mines, Nova Scotia.
5. *General Assembly of International Union of Pure and Applied Physics.* Copenhagen—July 10-14. L. E. Howlett, National Research Council.
6. *International Welding Institute.* London and Oxford—July 14-21. H. J. Nichols, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
7. *UNESCO Seminar.* Paris—July 18-23. J. W. Watson, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys (Observer).
8. *Fourth International Congress of the Sea.* Ostend—July 20-22. V. L. Chapin, Canadian Embassy, Brussels (Observer).
9. *International Whaling Commission.* Capetown—July 23. G. R. Clark, Assistant Deputy Minister of Fisheries.
10. *Economic Committee of ECOSOC.* Geneva—July 23. J. Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance; Adviser: S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance.
11. *13th Session of ECOSOC.* Geneva—July 30. Representative: J. Lesage, M.P.,

Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Deputy Representative: J. Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance; Principal Adviser: E. B. Rogers, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Canadian Legation, Prague; Advisers: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations,

Geneva; Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs; S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. A. D. Stephens, Canadian Embassy, The Hague; Secretary: K. D. McIlwraith, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.

Conferences to be held in August and September

(The inclusion of the name of a Conference or Congress in the following list means only that the Government of Canada has received an invitation to participate. It does not follow that the invitation has been or will be accepted.)

1. *Ninth World's Poultry Congress*. Paris—August 2-9.
2. *Second Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology of FAO*. Igls, Austria—August 6-19.
3. *Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (ITU)*. Geneva—August 16.
4. *Ninth International Congress of Entomology*. Amsterdam—August 17-24.
5. *International Union of Goedsy and Geophysics*. Brussels—August 21.
6. *Regional Congress on Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FAO)*. Panama City—August 21.
7. *Eighth Session of the E.C.E. Timber Committee*. Geneva—August 28-September 1.
8. *Eighth Congress of the International Institute of Refrigeration*. London—August 29-September 11.
9. *14th Conference of Beekeeping*. Leamington, England—September 3-8.
10. *Forest Fire Study Tour*. United States—September 4-October 12.
11. *Sub-Committee on Rules of Procedure and Working Methods of the Legal Committee of ICAO*. Madrid—September 8.
12. *International Gerontological Congress*. St. Louis—September 9-14.
13. *Fifth World Congress of International Society for the Welfare of Cripples*. Stockholm—September 10-14.
14. *Eighth Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO*. Madrid—September 11.
15. *Building Research Congress*. London—September 11-20.
16. *World Conference on Documentation*. Rome—September 15-21.
17. *Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Geneva—September 17.
18. *World Tobacco Conference*. Amsterdam—September 17-24.
19. *International Conference of Deaf-Mute*. Rome—September 19-23.
20. *International Congress of Anaesthesiology*. Paris—September 20-22.
21. *14th Congress of International Society of Surgery*. Paris—September 24-29.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS†

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

Report of the seventh session of the Commission on Human Rights; 24 May 1951; document E/1992, E/CN.4/649; 163 p.

**Report of the Fiscal Commission (Third Session)*; 31 May 1951; document E/1993; E/CN.8/62; 32 p.

Report of the Commission on the Status of

Women (Fifth Session, 30 April-14 May 1951); 28 May 1951; document E/1997, E/CN.6/175; 47 p.

Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (Sixth Session); 1 June 1951; document E/1998, E/CN.7/227; 89 p.

Relations of Inter-Governmental Organizations with the United Nations and the

† Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

Specialized Agencies (List of Inter-Governmental Organizations in the economic and social fields, 1951 Edition); 4 June 1951; document E/1999; 54 p.

**United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance (Report by the Secretary-General);* 6 June 1951; document E/2001; 72 p.

**Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Europe, 16 June 1950-13 June 1951;* 13 June 1951; document E/2002, E/ECE/130; 73 p.

International Refugee Organization—Third Annual Report to the United Nations; 6 June 1951; document E/2005; 41 p.

Report of the Economic, Employment and Development Commission (Sixth Session); 7 June 1951; document E/2006, E/CN.1/86; 17 p.

International Refugee Organization—Third Annual Children's Emergency Fund; 20 June 1951; document E/2013, E/ICEF/178/Rev. 1; 77 p.

Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea (Report

by the Secretary-General); 25 June 1951; document E/2032; 26 p.

(b) Printed Documents:

**Measures for the economic development of under-developed countries (Report by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations);* 3 May 1951; document E/1986, ST/ECA/10; 108 p.; 75 cents; Sales No.: 1951.II.B.2.

The expanded programme of technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries (An explanatory booklet issued on behalf of the United Nations, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, WHO, International Bank for Reconstruction and development, and International Monetary Fund); document TAB/1; 32 p. (Issued by the Technical Assistance Board, United Nations, New York, 1951).

The Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and The Torquay schedules on Tariff Concessions (The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, May 1951); \$7.00; Sales No.: GATT/1951-1.

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs; Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 51/30—*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B.

Pearson, delivered to a meeting of the Council Deputies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in London, on June 25, 1951.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 51/29—*National Defence Planning*, an address by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, delivered to the Kiwanis Club of Ottawa, on June 26, 1951.

No. 51/31—*Canada's New Programme for Old Age Security*, a broadcast by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, over the Trans-Canada Network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, on July 3, 1951.



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING

*By the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Mr. L. B. Pearson.*

On September 15, the principal body of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council, began its meeting in Ottawa. Later in the year, possibly during November, a further session of the Council will take place in Rome. The convening of these meetings will serve to remind us of the important part NATO is playing today in preserving the peace and security of the Western World.

For the first time these meetings of the North Atlantic Council brings together most of the Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers of the twelve member countries of NATO. This is as a direct result of the re-organization of NATO, approved earlier this year, and in which Canadian initiative played a major role. Under the re-organization the Council is now the supreme and only ministerial body of NATO, and incorporates not only the Council as envisaged in the Treaty, but the former Defence and Defence Finance and Economic Committees. As the single directing authority of NATO the new Council should be able to deal effectively and expeditiously with any problems confronting it.

A word about the purpose of these meetings is perhaps in order. The Council is charged under the Treaty with "the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty". This is a broad mandate, which enables the Council to discuss any aspect of North Atlantic defence and co-operation. However, it should be borne in mind that the day-to-day work is performed by the various agencies of NATO, the Council Deputies on the political side, the Standing Group on the military side, the Defence Production Board on the production side, and the Financial and Economic Board on the economic side. The main importance of the Council is, therefore, to provide an opportunity for close consultation between governmental leaders of the North Atlantic countries. This consultation may take many forms, such as reviewing the progress of the work of the organization, charting the course for the future, or considering and approving particular policies. The essential task of the ministers at a Council meeting, however, is to ensure that NATO is carrying out the aims for which it was originally established. Such work is not always spectacular. Major decisions may or may not be required depending on the tenor of world events. Council meetings may be viewed somewhat in the light of directors' meetings of a company. And a smooth-functioning organization is judged by its accomplishments rather than by the publicity it gets.

It may be helpful to recall the basic purpose for which the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April, 1949. In the post-war world the original hopes for universal peace were followed by disillusionment and anxiety as the determination of the Soviet Union to pursue its imperialistic aims became only too evident. Against the threat of Communist aggression it was clear that only an alliance borne of the strength of free peoples and possessing sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressor, could safeguard the free institutions of the Western world. In this spirit, the original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty united for their collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. The North Atlantic Treaty from its very inception was defensive in character, as its terms make self-evident. Its aim is peace and not war. Like a policeman it is the guardian of the peace standing ready if the need arises to prevent any attempt to disturb the security of the Western World.

To preserve peace in the world of today, it is, of course, necessary to possess strength. For this reason the main preoccupation of the North Atlantic countries in the past two years has been the development of their collective military power. This has involved increased defence efforts on the part of each member country, which has in turn necessitated sacrifices on the part of each of us. Liberty is not a commodity that can be purchased at bargain basement prices. In order to build up the strength of



—Capital Press

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO NATO COUNCIL MEETING

The Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council meeting at Ottawa was headed by, above, left to right: the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson; the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton; and the Minister of Finance, Mr. D. C. Abbott.

the North Atlantic community to the point where any potential aggressor will be unable to enslave the free world, further sacrifices in the common cause will be required.

Concomitant with the increased defence efforts of its members NATO has taken important steps to organize and co-ordinate the individual national programmes. An integrated force has been established in Europe under a Supreme Commander. The position of Supreme Commander has been entrusted to one of the outstanding soldiers of the present time, General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower has now established his headquarters, known as SHAPE, just outside of Paris, and the framework of his command organization is growing each day. To this command each NATO country is contributing forces in proportion to its ability. In this way the free world is demonstrating its determination to combine for its own protection.

Although the build-up of collective defence is the main task of NATO at the present time, we should not lose sight of the other objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty is more than a mere defensive alliance, important as this alliance is. It is the nucleus of a future North Atlantic community of free nations, a community in which the promotion of closer political co-operation and the improvement of economic and social conditions is a major goal. No opportunity should be lost to further the creative task of strengthening existing institutions and forming new ones which will contribute to the establishment of this community. We cannot afford to take a passive stand on this subject; for, if a North Atlantic federation is ever to develop, now is the time that solid foundations must be laid. The development of a community consciousness among the North Atlantic nations should, therefore, be ever present, even though the ultimate attainment of union may still be a somewhat remote goal.

NATO TRAINING BY THE RCAF

The experience gained by the Royal Canadian Air Force in operating the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan during the Second World War promises to make Canada one of the principal air training incubators for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Commonwealth Air Training Plan was one of the major contributions made by Canada to the effort of the Allies against the Axis powers. Starting with an agreement signed in December, 1939, by the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Canada, the plan eventually grew into a smooth-running air training scheme that at its peak in January, 1944, had seventy-three flying training schools under its jurisdiction and in its lifetime produced more than 131,000 highly trained aircrew.

Canada has particular advantages for the operation of such an air training scheme. Her young men have proved themselves excellent airmen; she has vast areas of level terrain away from large population centers; her variable climate gives airmen training in all types of weather, and her great size, combined with a comparatively small population, makes her less vulnerable to bombing attack than might be the case in other NATO countries.

With the expansion of Western defences to meet the danger of aggression, Canada's ability to produce well-trained pilots and navigators takes on renewed importance. During a NATO meeting at Paris in March, 1950, the Minister of National Defence Mr. Brooke Claxton, offered to train fledgling aviators of the signatory powers in R.C.A.F. schools, with Canada providing, in addition to the cost of training, all food, accommodation, and transportation within Canada, and medical and dental care. The offer was accepted and in July, 1950, the first trainees arrived in Canada.


Pilots Train Throughout Country

After a pre-flight orientation course at London, Ont., where the cadets received language instruction, lessons in Canadian geography and customs, and other information to assist them in their encounter with R.C.A.F. training techniques, they moved on to Centralia, Ont., for pilot training, or to Summerside, P.E.I., for navigation instruction.

Understanding and co-operation on the part of both instructors and students avoided what might otherwise have been the obstacles of language, and differences of rank and customs. In May, 1951, the first graduates received their coveted flying badges. By the time this initial phase of the Plan had ended, over one hundred aviators from Italy, Belgium, France, Norway and the Netherlands were wearing the special R.C.A.F. pilot and navigator wings devised for NATO graduates.

Now pronounced a success by all the participating members, the NATO training scheme is being expanded. Canada now proposes to train a total of 1,400 NATO cadets each year. The NATO Standing Group in Washington requested that for the remainder of this year, the Plan should concentrate on United Kingdom trainees but that next year it should increase the number of other NATO representatives.

To prepare for this training build-up and to meet Canada's commitment of eleven squadrons for the Integrated Force in Europe, the R.C.A.F. has reopened a number of wartime flying stations and accelerated its entire flying training programme. A second large air navigation school has been established at Winnipeg, Man., and a number of United Kingdom and Canadian cadets are already taking the thirty-six-week navigation course. They will be joined in the fall by trainees from Norway, France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, with many more to come during 1952, including trainees from Denmark.



NATO PILOTS TRAIN IN CANADA

—*National Defence*

Pilots from Norway, Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands train at Centralia, Ont., as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plan for training air force personnel in Canada.

Establishments in West

In addition to Centralia, Ont., where the first NATO pilots were trained, pilot training schools have been opened at Gimli, Man., Claresholm and Penhold in Alberta, and Moose Jaw in Saskatchewan. Advanced flying training schools will be located at Saskatoon, Sask., and Portage la Prairie, Man., with a pilot gunnery school at Macdonald, Man. Future plans call for the Gimli school to be converted into an advanced training school.

Large numbers of aircraft are being manufactured in this country and others purchased as an interim measure from the United States. Twin-engined Mitchell bombers are being used as a conversion trainer to multi-engine aircraft; and T-33 trainers, a twin-seater version of the F-80 Shooting Star, are employed for conversion to jet-propelled aircraft. The T-33, along with the U.S.-designed F-86 Sabre and the Canadian-designed CF-100 Canuck are being produced in this country.

THE KOREAN CRISIS

During August the United Nations and Communist negotiators at Kaesong continued their discussion, begun on July 27, of the first of the four substantive items on the armistice agenda, the "fixing of a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea". At the end of the month the negotiations were no further advanced than at the beginning; the fundamental question to be settled was still whether the cease-fire should be based on the battleline or on the 38th parallel.

Attempt to Break Deadlock on Cease-Fire Line

In the middle of the month the United Nations delegation proposed that a joint sub-committee from within the delegates and staff should be appointed to "make recommendations to the two delegations as to ways and means of emerging from the present deadlock". The Communist delegation accepted the proposal and for several days two members from each group met "around, rather than across" a table in what was reported to be a more congenial and productive setting than that of the armistice conference. However, no progress in breaking the deadlock was reported from the sub-committee.

Negotiation Decreases While Fighting Increases

The armistice talks were suspended twice in August by allegations that the neutrality of the Kaesong area had been violated. They were resumed within six days of the first suspension but at the end of the month were in the eighth day of the second break. The impasse in the armistice talks was accompanied by increasing military activity. United Nations aircraft and warships stepped up their attacks on targets in North Korea and United Nations ground forces captured several important hills in heavy fighting along the front. There was no appreciable change in the battleline.

Communists Violate Kaesong's Neutrality

On August 4 the United Nations delegation observed approximately an infantry company of Communist troops passing the Conference House on foot and carrying rifles, pistols, grenades, automatic weapons and mortars.

The following day the United Nations Commander broadcast a message to the Communist Commanders in which he reviewed the arrangements originally made for guaranteeing the neutrality of the conference area, and concluded:

I now invite your attention to this flagrant violation of the assurances which I required and which you promised. The United Nations delegation is prepared to continue conferences as soon as satisfactory explanation of this violation and assurance of non-recurrence are received. Meanwhile the delegation will remain within United Nations lines. I await your reply.

The Communist commanders explained the incident and gave their assurances the next day; the most important part of their message was the following paragraph:

In order that our conference will not be obstructed by such trivial accidental incidents we have again ordered the guards of the Kaesong neutral zone to adhere strictly to the agreement of 14th July and to assure that such a violation of the agreement will not occur again.

Because the Communist commanders described the breach of the neutrality agreement as trivial and accidental, General Ridgway felt impelled to seek further assurances. After denying the Communists' description of the incident he said:

It must be clearly understood that my acceptance of a resumption of the armistice talks is conditional on complete compliance with your guarantees of neutralization of the Kaesong area. Any further violation in this regard will be interpreted as a deliberate move on your part to terminate the armistice negotiations. I await your acceptance of this condition.

On August 9 the Communist Commanders accepted the condition and the following day the two delegations resumed their discussions.

Talks Suspended by Communists

The negotiations were interrupted for the second time during the month on August 23 when the Communists charged that a United Nations aircraft had attacked the site of the armistice meetings in Kaesong during the night of August 22/23. Less than three hours after the attack was alleged to have taken place a Communist liaison officer, speaking from written notes, told a United Nations liaison officer that all meetings were "off from now on".

Culmination of Series of Communist Charges

This charge followed several others by the Communists, the two most serious of which were that United Nations personnel had ambushed a Chinese patrol in the Kaesong area on August 19 and killed the patrol leader, and that on several occasions United Nations aircraft had attacked the Communist delegation's motor vehicles even though they carried white flags.

The United Nations delegation denied that United Nations troops had attacked the Chinese patrol and reminded the Communists that prior notification of the departure and proposed route of travel of all vehicles was required if such vehicles were to be free from air attack. The delegation also rejected earlier charges that United Nations patrols had violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area, and suggested, without response, that a "standing bilateral Kaesong neutral zone committee" should be formed to make periodic inspection of the zone and conduct on-the-spot investigations of alleged incidents.

In their formal protest against the alleged air attack on Kaesong the Communist commanders said:

We hope that the peace talks will be smoothly carried out and that both sides will come to a just and reasonable agreement . . . Our delegation cannot help suspending the peace talks from August 23 so as to wait for your side to settle this serious incident in a responsible manner . . . You must bear the responsibility of whatever may happen as a result of the breaking off of the talks . . . We are waiting for a satisfactory reply from you.

United Nations Commander Rejects Charges

On August 25 General Ridgway rejected vigorously the Communist charge of a United Nations air attack and other charges of United Nations violations of Kaesong's neutrality. Among other things he said:

This most recent addition to alleged incidents by elements of the United Nations Command, so utterly false, so preposterous and so obviously manufactured for your own questionable purposes, does not, in its own right, merit a reply.

. . . The evidence in this most recent alleged violation was even more palpably compounded for your insidious propaganda purposes than your earlier efforts. In line, however, with our constant adherence to ethics of decency, I have in this case, as in all others, fully investigated your charges.

My senior Army, Navy and Air Force commanders have individually certified to me in writing that none of their elements have violated, or could possibly have vio-

lated, the Kaesong neutral zone in this or any other instance of alleged violations reported by you.

. . . The allegations made in your several recent communications concerning the alleged firing on Panmunjom, the alleged ambush of 19 August by United Nations forces, and the alleged bombing and strafing of Wednesday night, 22 August, are rejected without qualification as malicious falsehoods totally without foundation in fact.

When you are prepared to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 August I will direct my representatives to meet with yours with a view to seeking a reasonable armistice agreement.

In reply the Communist commanders repeated the series of allegations, accused General Ridgway of manufacturing incidents to break up the truce talks and of slandering the Communists, and then stated:

We hereby once more propose to you that this grave action of provocation should be dealt with by your side with an attitude of serious responsibility. Then the continuation of the negotiations for a just and reasonable armistice agreement can be guaranteed.

At the same time we demand that your liaison officers proceed to Kaesong to carry out a reinvestigation jointly with our liaison officers of the incident that occurred on August 22, when your military aircraft bombed and strafed the vicinity of the residence of our delegation in order once again to prove the full validity of our protest.

Resumption of Talks Up to Communists

The following day, August 29, the United Nations Commander rejected the Communists' demand for a reinvestigation of the incident. "A reinvestigation after this lapse of time" he said "could serve no purpose other than to continue this unjustifiable delay in the armistice negotiations". He observed that during the original investigation a few hours after the alleged bombing on the night of August 22, a Communist liaison officer "specifically refused the requests of my liaison officer to continue the investigation during daylight and to leave all of the alleged evidence in place". He closed his brief message to the Communist Commanders by repeating his earlier statement that negotiations could be resumed when they were willing to lift the suspension which they had declared on August 23.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

On September 2, 1945, aboard the U.S. battleship *Missouri* lying at anchor in Tokyo Bay, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), headed the delegation which accepted for the Allied Powers at war with Japan the Instrument of Surrender signed by representatives of the Emperor of Japan and his government. The Instrument stipulated the unconditional surrender of Japan's armed forces, the implementation of all SCAP orders, the acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, and acknowledgment by the Emperor that he and his government should henceforth be subject to the Supreme Commander. This ceremony, which began the Allied occupation of Japan, was one of a series of decisions by the Allied Powers aimed at making policy for a defeated Japan a co-operative effort.

Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam

In November, 1943, the Cairo Conference of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek laid down the war aim that Japan must surrender unconditionally. At the Yalta meeting in February 1945, of the leaders of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter agreed to enter the war against Japan. Five months later, the leaders of these countries met again at Potsdam. One of their purposes was to clarify terms for Japan's surrender. Since the Soviet Union was still not a belligerent, this task was performed by the United States, the United Kingdom and China. The latter government, although not represented at the conference, subscribed to the resultant proclamation. This document reaffirmed the Cairo demand for Japan's unconditional surrender. It called for the elimination of the influence of those advocates of irresponsible militarism who had misled Japan, the disarmament of the Japanese forces, the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people and an Allied occupation of the country until the purposes of the Declaration had been achieved and there had been established "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government". On August 14, 1945, President Truman announced that the Japanese Government had fully accepted the Potsdam Declaration, and named General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to carry the Japanese surrender into effect.

Objectives of the Occupation

Early in September, a statement of United States initial post-surrender policy for Japan was sent to the Supreme Commander. This document laid down the following ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan: first, to ensure that Japan would not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and, second, to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which would respect the rights of other states. To achieve these objectives, Japan's sovereignty would be basically limited to her four main islands, she would be completely disarmed and the authority of the militarists eliminated from her political, economic and social life, her people would be encouraged to desire individual liberties and respect fundamental human rights and they would be afforded the opportunity to develop for themselves a viable peacetime economy.

Mechanism of the Occupation

The military occupation of Japan would have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal Allied Powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan, and the Supreme Commander would be designated by the United

States. Although it was hoped that, through consultation, policies for the conduct of the occupation would be established which would satisfy the principal Allied Powers, in the event of differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States would govern.

Although the Supreme Commander would exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery including the Emperor, this policy did not commit SCAP to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the Japanese towards modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies were to be favoured.

The disarmament and demilitarization of Japan were to be carried out promptly. Active exponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism were to be excluded from public life and their organizations expunged from Japanese society. Suspected war criminals would be tried.

To encourage democratic processes, the Supreme Commander was to ensure freedom of religion and to promote the formation of democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion. Laws which established discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion were to be abrogated, political prisoners released and the judicial, legal and police systems reformed and thereafter progressively influenced to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

The basis of Japan's military strength was to be destroyed, and the development of democratic organizations in labour, industry and agriculture encouraged. To strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese, the Supreme Commander was to exclude from positions of importance individuals who did not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends and to favour a programme for the dissolution of the industrial and banking combinations which had controlled most of Japan's trade and industry.

Reparations for Japanese aggression would be made through the transfer of property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan and of goods and equipment not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy.

Japan was to be permitted eventually to re-enter normal international trade but during the occupation SCAP was to maintain control over imports and exports, and foreign exchange and financial transactions.

The Far Eastern Commission

Meanwhile, the United States Government had undertaken negotiations for the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission to make recommendations on the formulation of policies for occupied Japan. These negotiations resulted in such a Commission, composed of the representatives of Australia, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States, being convened in Washington on October 30, 1945. The Soviet Union refused to participate in the work of the Commission because of its purely advisory character. This obstacle to Soviet participation was removed in December 1945, by the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers. At that time agreement was reached between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment in Washington of a Far Eastern Commission to take the place of the advisory organization. The membership of the new body was to be the same as the latter with the addition of the Soviet Union and India, but could be increased by agreement.

Its terms of reference assigned the Far Eastern Commission two principal functions: first, "to formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may

be accomplished" and, second, "to review on the request of any member any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission".

The terms of reference also provided that the Commission would respect the existing control machinery in Japan. The United States Government would prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the Commission and transmit them to the Supreme Commander who would be charged with their implementation. If urgent matters arose not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission, the United States Government, pending action by the Commission, might issue an interim directive to SCAP. However, any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control would first require Commission agreement.

The Commission might take action by a majority vote provided the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China all concurred in the action taken.

The Allied Council for Japan

The Moscow agreement also established the terms of reference for an Allied Council for Japan. This organ, composed of SCAP, or his deputy, as chairman and United States member, one representative from the U.S.S.R., one from China, and one representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India, was to sit in Tokyo and consult with and advise the Supreme Commander. If the Supreme Commander had chosen to utilize the services of the Council extensively and if its Soviet representative had been less intransigent in his approach to its work, the Council might have compiled a worthwhile record of service. As a component of the occupation system, it has been ineffective.

The machinery for Allied co-operation in policy-making for Japan was designed to leave the United States with primary responsibility for the occupation. Although each of the four great Powers held the veto power over the policy decisions reached by a majority of the Far Eastern Commission, the United States within broad limits was free to initiate action through the medium of interim directives. Moreover, it has so happened that both SCAPs have also been Far East commanders of the U.S. Armed Forces. In that capacity, they also took orders from Washington. Although the United States has contributed the majority of occupation troops, a joint Commonwealth Force under the command of an Australian General long formed a part of the occupation. Canada has not participated in the garrisoning of Japan.

The United States had issued 36 directives to SCAP before the Far Eastern Commission was established. Thereafter, the Commission adopted the United States initial post-surrender policy as its own basic occupation policy. Its other decisions have been on specific points, some of which had already been covered by the earlier United States directives.

Implementation of Policy

Within Japan, SCAP has executed policy by directives and memoranda to the Japanese Government setting forth his wishes. His section heads have dealt with their opposite ministers and give them written or verbal advice. The Japanese Government gives effect to SCAP's will either through executive decrees or bills approved by the legislature, according to expediency. As Far Eastern Commander, SCAP has checked the implementation of his wishes by the Japanese Government through United States Army establishments throughout Japan. Among the more important staff sections within General Headquarters are the economic and scientific section

which deals with economic, industrial, financial and scientific affairs, the civil information and education section which deals with the various media of public information, and with education and religion, the natural resources section which deals with agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, the government section which supervises Japan's governmental institutions, and the diplomatic section which serves virtually as Japan's foreign office in her relations with other countries.

The Supreme Commander speedily accomplished those of his duties related to the liquidation of the war. Most of the Japanese military were repatriated and the country completely disarmed. By the end of 1948, an International War Crimes Tribunal, on which Mr. Justice McDougall served as the Canadian representative, had tried and sentenced Japan's foremost war criminals. Those military, political and industrial figures who had been associated with Japan's policies of aggression were removed from public life.

SCAP also undertook to support extensive political, social and economic reforms. The Meiji constitution was replaced by a new democratic one which reduced the Emperor to the symbol of the State, made for responsible government, guaranteed civil rights and established the principle of local autonomy. The police system was decentralized, women's suffrage introduced, the administrative structure of government and the educational system reformed and industrial monopolies dissolved. Labour unions were encouraged and workers protected. The land tenure system was adjusted so that now most Japanese farmers own their own land.

In the spring of 1947, the Supreme Commander informed the press that the occupation had virtually attained Allied objectives except in relation to economic recovery. Since 1948, SCAP has shifted the emphasis of the occupation from reform to a policy designed to restore Japanese industrial production to the pre-war level. This change entailed the stopping of reparations shipments, a few of which had been made, and the continued import of American aid. After six years of occupation, Japan views the conclusion of a peace treaty with a balanced budget, an economy on the way towards rehabilitation and all the legal earmarks of a democracy.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND EUROPEAN UNITY

Two years ago a group of European countries agreed among themselves to give expression to the feeling for unity which was then, and still is, abroad on the European continent. The result of that action, the Council of Europe, has recently sought to establish links with a number of non-European countries including Canada. In this context it seems useful to take a look at the Council of Europe, see what purposes it was intended to serve and how well it has carried them out.

Before doing so, however, one must be careful to distinguish between the purposes of the Governments which began the Council of Europe and the objectives of many of its ardent supporters. After so short a time as two years it would obviously be unfair to measure the success of a political instrument by standards not in mind when it was created. It is relevant and reasonable, nevertheless, to note the extent to which it has evolved and the tendency of its evolution so far as it is possible in so short a history.

Object of the Council of Europe

The Statute that the ten founding Governments agreed to in May of 1949 and which, with minor textual amendments, remains the Constitution of the Council, says that the new organization was to have as its object the achievement of "greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress."

These objects were to be achieved through examination of common problems, the conclusion of agreements and by the adoption of common action in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative fields, and through the development of the rights of man and fundamental freedoms.

For an untrammelled legislature the programme would be an impressive task, but the means by which the Council was to achieve these ends, as we have seen, did not include legislation. The composition of the Council and the powers of its constituent organs (for a discussion of the organization of the Council of Europe see *External Affairs* Volume 2, No. 5 of May 1950) precluded such a direct approach. It was with this limitation of its powers that the first and perhaps most spectacular debates were concerned. The broadly "popular" Consultative Assembly spent much of its first two years trying to free itself from the veto of the "governmental" "Upper House", the Committee of Ministers. At the same time efforts were made to abolish the unanimity rule required for taking decisions in the Committee of Ministers.

Federalists and Functionalists

The "Union Now" school, supporters of direct action to federate Europe, rallied behind the Consultative Assembly. They became known as Federalists. The others, who considered that the Council must prove itself and gradually assume power, became known as Functionalists. The end, greater European unity, has never been in debate as, indeed, that is the declared purpose of the Strasbourg experiment.

The frontal attack on the Council's Constitution was pressed by the Federalists with great vigour and ingenuity from the day of the first meeting of the Consultative Assembly until the last part of its Second Session in November 1950. Reform of the Statute was the declared objective. Many Federalists wanted a radical change which would in effect have made the Council of Europe a truly European legislature and

the Consultative Assembly the predominant organ in it. They sought for the Council "limited functions but real powers." Of the less radical propositions the one that attracted the greatest attention was the so-called Protocol of Mr. R. W. G. MacKay, a United Kingdom Labour M.P. and Member of the Consultative Assembly. Mr. MacKay's proposal was to re-cast the Council of Europe in the form of a legislature without increasing its powers but making an increase of its powers a relatively simple procedure should the Governments of the member countries wish to do so. The "Protocol" would have given the Council greater flexibility and changed its composition and procedures to bring them more closely in line with the familiar forms of national parliaments.

Before the first part of the Third Session began in May 1951 the Committee of Ministers declined to consider fundamental changes in the Statute. This applied both to the MacKay Protocol and to another ingenious plan for revision prepared by Mr. La Malfa of Italy. As a result, during the first half of the Third Session, ardent Federalists were not only admitting that the functional approach had gained the day, but they were also arguing that to continue the struggle for direct federation and major statute reforms would be a disservice to the cause of European unity. With energy almost equal to that which they had exerted in their previous efforts they addressed themselves to the problems of bringing about European unity as a fact in as many fields as possible. The underlying assumption was, of course, that if European unity became a fact in a significant number of fields then the forms of unity would follow. This new approach raised as an acute question the matter of the policy to be followed in creating these partial unities. The problem was whether, within these specialized agencies, Europe should be treated not only in its functional parts but also in its geographical parts. The question was whether European unity would be served if a specialized authority on, for example, agriculture were made applicable only to the part of Europe willing to accept a supra-national authority. Arguments were advanced that partial agreements, so far from uniting Europe, might impose yet more divisions upon those already in existence. The progress of the Schuman Plan probably curtailed this discussion and it was generally accepted in Strasbourg that partial unifications were inescapable but that the way must always be left open to other Member States to join in at a later date should the experience of the original participants justify their doing so.

Many Conventions Proposed

In its last session the Assembly displayed great energy in following this line and draft conventions for international authorities on transportation and agriculture were submitted, as well as conventions for the co-ordination of national policies in the matters of full employment, refugees, the purchase of raw materials, manpower and social security, customs, exchange control, monetary systems, postal relations and telecommunications. The Council had already approved and submitted to member governments a Convention on Human Rights.

Progress Made in Defence

In the matter of defence, which under the Statute is excluded from consideration by the Council, the Consultative Assembly had made considerable evolutionary progress. Without amendment of the Statute, the Council has considered defence matters, it being acknowledged that very few of the subjects with which it was concerned could be treated outside the context of European defence in present circumstances. An attempt was made to draw the line so as to exclude technical, tactical and strategic problems but in the matter of standardization of arms, with which the Assembly concerned itself at one point, it was clear that even this line could not be made hard and fast.

Having plunged into the business of setting up specialized European authorities, the Council was concerned to give these authorities a roof under which their activities could be co-ordinated and where the interests of countries not taking part in the Specialized Authorities but affected by them could be safe-guarded. The Council has already established direct connection with OEEC and has received an annual report from it. The Schuman Plan has been considered a matter of first importance and the Consultative Assembly has striven to find some manner in which the Council could be associated with it. A protocol to the draft Schuman treaty on coal and steel already makes some provision for this association. The protocol says that the members of the Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community might be selected from among the representatives of the Consultative Assembly of the Council. The treaty when ratified is to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council and annual reports of the Coal and Steel Pool will be submitted to the Consultative Assembly under the protocol. Should this practice be adopted and be extended to the Plevan Plan for a European Army and other similar European authorities, the role of the Council of Europe in the unification of the continent becomes obvious. It will be able to publicize and criticize the actions of these various organizations and by throwing light on their activities, go some distance in protecting the interests of affected non-participants.

Two Years' Achievement

Against this background it is possible to see something of what the Council of Europe has achieved in the two years of its existence to bring about greater unity, realize the ideals and principles of European civilization and facilitate the economic and social progress of the continent. It is convenient to discuss its record under three headings: the practical measures that have been brought about directly by the Council; the influence it has exerted on movements toward the achievement of these ideals even though those movements have taken place outside Strasbourg; and the fitness of the Council of Europe as an instrument to achieve the objectives given to it.

The structure of the Council of Europe is such that it can at best merely make recommendations and then only recommendations acceptable to Governments who exert their decisive influence in the Committee of Ministers. It is, therefore, not likely to produce very many direct acts of its own. As the name "Consultative Assembly" distinctly implies, the "popular" chamber is not intended to act itself but rather to give advice and exert influence. As a consequence, the number of things that the Council of Europe has done directly is limited and not likely to appear as a very heavy contribution to the "building of Europe". From the first session, the Consultative Assembly has endeavoured to produce a European postage stamp as a symbolic foreshadowing of European unity. There has been a tendency for the success of the Council to be gauged by the success of this project. The fact that the Council of Europe has not been able to succeed in this "trifling practical matter" has led to some despondency over its future, chiefly on the part of persons who saw in the Council an organization for European action which was not in the minds of the founding Governments. The opponents of the Federalists have argued that to accomplish this "trifle" could require a revision of the Statute.

The most direct action that the Council may take is to produce a convention or recommendation to be submitted to Governments of Member States. By the time the document has passed the hurdles of the Consultative Assembly, which is broadly representative of the democratic content of the various national Parliaments, and the Committee of Ministers, which is made up of responsible members of Governments, there would appear to be few obstacles standing in the way of ratification by national Governments and Parliaments. The most significant document to be presented to Governments in the name of the Council of Europe was the Convention on Human Rights, a document comparable to its U.N. equivalent but containing some unique features. One of these is a provision for the establishment of an international court

to which citizens of subscribing states could, under certain circumstances, appeal. This is an accomplishment of considerable magnitude on the part of the Council, although the convention still remains to be implemented by the ratification of Member States.

Problems in Procedure

The very number and diversity of the proposals introduced into the Consultative Assembly is evidence of the fact that the Assembly has not yet solved all the problems of its own procedure. Much of the Assembly's energy and time is dissipated among the vast quantities of paper produced by its members. This has in the past meant that the Assembly has considered a great deal of paper slightly but has been unable to give full consideration to many of the very significant matters that come to its attention. The weight attached to the Assembly's resolution has suffered in consequence. The question of revising the rules of procedure is now being studied and doubtless this difficulty will be given serious consideration.

It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty what effect the Council of Europe has had on other movements of a European character. It is, for example, frequently said in Strasbourg that the Pleven Plan for a European Army was inspired by Mr. Winston Churchill's resolution adopted by the Assembly in its session of August 1950. Before Mr. Schuman made his proposal for the creation of a European steel and coal pool similar propositions had been discussed in Strasbourg. If a direct relationship between the Council and these initiatives could be established it would go some way in demonstrating the utility of the Council. There are, however, other matters of European concern which are less dramatic than these bold strokes but which may in the long run be of equal importance to European unification. There is in evidence at Strasbourg something which can be called a European opinion. As the area in which this opinion operates is extended and as the number of people who identify themselves with this opinion is increased, the effect will manifest itself and the prospects of European unity will be considerably enhanced. Already in Strasbourg it is a bold man who will argue a proposition on the grounds of his own country's interests exclusively. Moreover, the once enshrined principle that domestic affairs are no concern of other countries has gone by the board and domestic policies of all member states are frequently brought up for comment. Perhaps the most useful of all the intangible contributions to European unity is the help that the Consultative Assembly's debates give in understanding different points of view over a wide range of international and internal problems.

COLOMBO PLAN—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Canadian Government has now taken a number of concrete steps to put the Colombo Plan into practical effect.

It is now expected that most of the \$25 million voted by Parliament for economic aid under the Plan will be divided between India and Pakistan with about three-fifths going to the former and two-fifths going to the latter.

In the case of Pakistan, an agreement has been reached on a number of specific projects to be undertaken in that country with Canadian assistance during the first year of the Colombo Plan. These projects, amounting in all to some \$10 million, include capital works and equipment (dump trucks, motors, pumps, etc.) in connection with a large settlement scheme in the Thal area, experimental and demonstration work in the field of live stock, and some electrical and transport equipment. If, for any reason, any of these projects prove impracticable others will be substituted in the programme.

In the case of India, discussions are still continuing between officials of the two countries as to the exact form of Canadian aid, and an announcement will probably be made within the next few weeks.

Both India and Pakistan have agreed to a "Statement of Principles" in which are set out the methods by which funds will be made available for the various types of projects selected.

The foundation has now been laid, but a great deal of work still remains to be done to make sure that present plans really take shape. For this purpose the services of Mr. R. G. Nik Cavell have been employed. He has been appointed administrator of a new International Economic and Technical Co-operation Division within the Department of Trade and Commerce.

Mr. Cavell will supervise all Canadian commitments for economic aid under the Colombo Plan and also the technical assistance service which has been functioning for some months within the Department of Trade and Commerce. Canadian participation in the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme (see *External Affairs*, July 1951, p. 267) is also included in his responsibilities.

Mr. Cavell is well known to many readers of *International Affairs* as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. His world-wide experience includes 20 years in the East, both in government service and in private business. As Mr. Howe said when announcing the appointment, "Mr. Cavell's intimate personal knowledge of the East will be especially valuable in his new post".

Canada's participation in the Colombo Programme for Technical Co-operation is showing tangible results with the arrival in Canada of scholars, fellows and technical missions from India, Pakistan and Ceylon. As part of the Canadian Government's contribution to the Programme, sixty fellowships and scholarships have been extended to the countries of this region, and their technical missions in the fields of agriculture, highway and bridge construction, and hydro-electric development, are now being received in Canada. In addition, the Canadian Government has agreed to provide experts and technicians to the countries of the area when specific requests are received by Canada either directly from the country concerned, or through the Technical Co-operation Bureau in Colombo.

Eleven fellows and scholars from India, six from Pakistan, and one from Ceylon have already arrived in Canada. The balance of forty-two fellows and scholars are expected to arrive by October 1 for the commencement of the coming academic year.



—Capital Press

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER COLOMBO PLAN

Pakistan members of an agricultural mission who came to Canada under the Technical Co-operation Programme of the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, study a test plot of Canadian wheat at the Central Experimental Farm in Ottawa. Left to right: Mr. A. M. Sial, Minister of Agriculture and Education, State of Khaipur; Mr. T. J. Brook, Director, Technical Assistance Service, Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa; Mr. K. A. Rahman, Director of Agriculture and Dean of University Instruction, Punjab University, Lahore; Dr. C. H. Goulden, Chief of Cereal Division, Department of Agriculture, Ottawa; and Dr. S. Hedayetullah, Director of Agriculture, East Bengal.

The fellows will receive training in various Federal and Provincial Government departments, and the scholars will study at universities from Halifax to Victoria.

An agricultural mission and a highway and bridge construction mission, both of which are composed of senior government officials from India and Pakistan, are now touring Western Canada. A hydro-electric development mission, whose members are drawn from related government departments in India and Pakistan, is engaged on an 8-week tour of hydro-electric facilities in Canada. These missions each contain ten members, and will spend nearly two months in Canada.

An expert fisheries consultant has now left Canada for Colombo at the request of the Ceylonese authorities, to help develop the fishing industry of that country. He will shortly be joined by a refrigeration engineer.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Economic and Social Council

The Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council, which opened on July 30, is still in progress at Geneva and will probably not complete its work till late in September. In his inaugural speech, Mr. Hernan Santa Cruz, the president of the Council, stated that while the political events of the last few months had brought a ray of light to the world horizon, the outlook confronting the United Nations in the economic and social fields was "utterly depressing". He hoped that the Council, in acting on the several questions of fundamental importance before it, would not limit itself to the adoption of facile solutions having no repercussions on the economic life of the world and finding no answering echo in public opinion. Mr. Santa Cruz expressed his strong belief that the survival of the Council as a body of world influence would be determined by its attitude towards the financing of economic development and the terrible problem of hunger which afflicts vast areas and affects millions of human beings.

By the end of August, the Council had dealt with about half of the fifty-seven items on its agenda. It had examined and approved, in certain cases with minor modifications, most of the regular reports from its technical commissions and from specialized agencies. It had adopted resolutions on two of the major economic subjects before it: the financing of economic development and the review of the world economic situation.

Problem of Financing Economic Development

The Council's discussion of the problem of financing economic development was based on a report entitled "measures for the economic development of under-developed countries" recently prepared by a group of independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General. The Council's resolution embodies several of the experts' recommendations. It emphasizes the need for under-developed countries to create the conditions necessary for the effective mobilization of domestic resources and the attraction of foreign private capital. It formally recognizes, for the first time, that for some countries and under some circumstances, the financing of basic non-self-liquidating projects may require outside help. It directs the International Bank to study whether the establishment of an international finance corporation, which would make equity investments and lend to private undertakings operating in under-developed countries, could make significant additional contributions to economic development.

The Council, however, was not able to accept, at the present time, the experts' recommendation to establish an international development authority which would distribute grants in aid to under-developed countries and assist them in preparing and implementing their development programmes. The Council also rejected a Chilean proposal calling for the creation of a special fund for the purpose of making grants to under-developed countries. Nevertheless, the final resolution adopted by the Council, which Canada supported as a satisfactory compromise, states clearly that the proposals for the establishment of an international fund and an international development authority are neither accepted nor rejected in principle. The Canadian representative indicated that Canada, while greatly sympathetic to the needs and aspirations of the less advanced countries, believed that existing institutions, such as the International Bank, could cope effectively with the problem of financing economic development. Canada was opposed therefore to the creation of new international machinery under present circumstances.

The Council resumed its debate on the world economic situation which had been discussed at the Twelfth Session in Santiago. The discussion on this item related to the measures which countries were taking to combat inflation, increase production and co-operate in the allocation of scarce commodities. The Council's resolution on this subject urges members of the United Nations to continue their efforts to cope with the economic problems resulting from defence preparations.

Middle East and Africa

The Council gave special attention to economic conditions in the Middle East and Africa and to the proposal to establish economic commissions for these two regions. Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, in view of the disturbed political conditions in the area, requested the Council to defer once more the creation of an economic commission for the Middle East and the Council agreed to this request. A resolution providing for the setting up of an ad hoc committee composed of administering and non-administering powers to examine factors bearing on the establishment of an economic commission for Africa was submitted by the Philippines and rejected by a majority of one. The debate on Africa occasioned bitter political controversy both between the Cominform and the western countries and between European countries with colonial interests in Africa and under-developed countries, led by India, which felt that more should be done to help the depressed peoples of that continent.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. J. D. Foote was posted from the Canadian Legation in Poland to Ottawa, effective July 30, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Mr. K. S. Weston, O.B.E., Secretary (Finance) Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, August 7.

Mr. Iqbal Ahmed Akhund, Third Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan, August 9.

Mr. Tevfik DüNDAR Saraçoğlu, Third Secretary, Embassy of Turkey, August 15.

Squadron Leader L. McArdle, D.F.C., Assistant Air Force Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, end of August.

Departures

Mr. Kenan Cökart, Counsellor, Embassy of Turkey, August 15.

Miss Silvia Shelton, Second Secretary, Embassy of Cuba, August 13.

Mr. Guy Pérez Cisneros, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Cuba, August 13.

Mr. Carlos Guillermo O'Grady, Labour Secretary, Embassy of Argentina, end of August.

His Excellency Sean Murphy, Ambassador of Ireland, resumed charge of the Embassy on August 4 on his return from a vacation in the United States of America.

His Excellency the Honourable Stanley Woodward, Ambassador of the United States of America, resumed charge of the Embassy on August 5 on his return from leave of absence.

His Excellency Dr. Agustin Nores Martinez, Ambassador of Argentina, resumed the direction of the Embassy on August 6 on his return from a visit to Argentina.

His Excellency Cesar Montero de Bustamante, Minister of Uruguay, who left Ottawa in November 1950 for a visit to Uruguay, relinquished his duties on August 7. Pending the appointment of a successor, Mr. Luis A. Soto will continue as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Per Wijkman, Minister of Sweden, resumed the direction of the Legation on August 16 on his return from a vacation in Sweden.

The address of the Office of the High Commissioner for India is now 200 McLaren Street (Tel. 2-3549).

CONSULAR

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Lewis Dean Brown as Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, August 13. Mr. Brown was formerly Vice-Consul. He is also Second Secretary at the Embassy.

Mr. Eric Low as Honorary Consular Agent of Brazil at Vancouver, August 13.

Mr. Xavier W. Eilers as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, August 13.

Dr. Frederick Reidl-Reidenstein as Consul General of Austria at Ottawa, August 13.

Mr. Ralph Johnson as Honorary Acting Vice-Consul of Sweden at Prince Rupert, August 18.

Dr. José Ramon Hernandez Lebron as Consul General of the Dominican Republic at Ottawa, August 28.

Mr. Antonio Rosell Carbonell, as Consul of Cuba at Halifax, August 28. He was formerly Consul at Montreal.

Departures

Mr. Sebastian Emilio Valverde, Consul

General of the Dominican Republic at Ottawa, July 26.

Mr. Benjamin C. Trevino, Consul of Mexico at Vancouver, end of July.

Mr. Zygmunt Ziemiński, Consul of Poland at Winnipeg, resigned on August 16.

Mr. A. Brooksbank, Honorary Vice-Consul of Sweden at Prince Rupert is on leave of absence for a period of six months from July 1. During his absence Mr. Ralph Johnson will be Honorary Acting Vice-Consul.

Dr. Werner Dankwort, Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottawa, left on August 22 for a visit to the Western Provinces of Canada until about September 17. During his absence Dr. J. F. Ritter, Consul, is in charge of the Consulate General.

Mr. Joao Severiano da Fonseca Hermes, Jr., Consul General of Brazil at Montreal, left on August 18 for a visit to Brazil. During his absence Mr. Milton Faria, Consul, will be in charge of the Consulate General.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of August, 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs").

The Department of External Affairs, through its International Conferences Section, is responsible for co-ordinating all invitations to international conferences. The decision as to Canadian participation at such conferences is made by Cabinet upon the recommendation of the department of government functionally concerned.

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs", January 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions.

Conferences Attended in August

1. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris—February 15. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
2. *13th Session of ECOSOC.* Geneva—July 30. Representative: J. Lesage, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Deputy Representative: J. Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance; Principal Adviser: E. B. Rogers, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Canadian Legation, Prague; Advisers: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs; S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; L. A. D. Stephens, Canadian Embassy, The Hague; Secretary: K. D. McIlwraith, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
3. *Ninth World's Poultry Congress.* Paris—August 2-9. H. S. Gutteridge and J. E. Henault, Department of Agriculture; J. R. Cavers, Ontario Agricultural College, Guelph; F. L. Wood, Department of Agriculture, Fredericton, N.B.; A. Graton, Oka Agricultural College, Oka, Quebec.
4. *Second Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology of FAO.* Igls, Austria—August 6-19. W. E. Wakefield, Department of Resources and Development.
5. *Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference. (ITU).* Geneva—August 16. Head of Delegation: C. J. Acton, Department of Transport; Delegates: A. J. Dawson and C. M. Brant, Department of Transport; Maj. W. H. Finch, Lt. Cmdr. R. H. Dunbar and S/Ldr. W. D. Benton, Department of National Defence; E. P. Black, Canadian Embassy, Moscow; Adviser: F. P. Johnson, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
6. *Ninth International Congress of Entomology.* Amsterdam—August 17-24. H. Martin, Department of Agriculture, London; R. Glen, J. J. de Gryse and G. E. Shewell, Department of Agriculture; C. W. Farstad, Department of Agriculture, Lethbridge, Alberta.
7. *International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.* Brussels—August 21. J. E. R. Ross, Acting Dominion Geodesist; J. L. Rannie, Dominion Geodesist; C. S. Beals, Dominion Astronomer; P. D. Baird, Arctic Institute of North America; B. W. Currie, University of Saskatchewan; F. T. Davies, Defence Research Board; W. L. Ford, Naval Research Establishment, Halifax; E. W. Gowan, University of Alberta; E. K. Hare, McGill University; R. F. Legget, National Research Council; G. D. Garland and J. T. Wilson, University of Toronto.
8. *Regional Congress of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. (FAO).* Panama City—August 21. O. Hall, Department of Agriculture.
9. *Eighth Session of the E.C.E. Timber Committee.* Geneva—August 28-September 1. R. D. Roe, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, London. (Observer).
10. *Eighth Congress of the International Institute of Refrigeration (Executive Committee and General Conference).* London—August 29-September 11. W. H. Cook, Department of Agriculture; O. C. Young, Fisheries Research Board; J. G. Malloch and J. C. Robertson, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.

Conferences to be held in September and October

(The inclusion of the name of a Conference or Congress in the following list means only that the Government of Canada has received an invitation to participate. It does not follow that the invitation has been or will be accepted).

1. *First International Congress of Mass Radiography*. Sondalo, Italy—September 1-3.
2. *14th Conference of Beekeeping*. Leamington, England—September 2-8.
3. *12th Session of Congress of Pure and Applied Chemistry and the 16th Session of the General Conference of the International Union of Chemistry*. New York and Washington—September 3-13.
4. *Forest Fire Study Tour*. (FAO). Washington—September 4-October 12.
5. *Conference to Conclude a Treaty of Peace with Japan*. San Francisco—September 4.
6. *Sub-Committee on Rules of Procedure and Working Methods of the Legal Committee of ICAO*. Madrid—September 8.
7. *International Gerontological Congress*. St. Louis—September 9-14.
8. *Fifth World Congress of International Society for the Welfare of Cripples*. Stockholm—September 10-14.
9. *International Foundry Congress*. Brussels—September 10-14.
10. *Eighth Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO*. Madrid—September 11.
11. *Building Research Congress*. London—September 11-20.
12. *World Conference on Documentation*. Rome—September 15-21.
13. *North Atlantic Council*. Ottawa—September 15.
14. *Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Geneva—September 17.
15. *World Tobacco Conference*. Amsterdam—September 17-24.
16. *International Conference on Deaf-Mute*. Rome—September 19-23.
17. *International Union for the Protection of Nature* (Technical Committee). The Hague—September 19-22.
18. *International Congress of Anaesthesiology*. Paris—September 20-22.
19. *14th Congress of International Society of Surgery*. Paris—September 24-29.
20. *Sixth Meeting of International Tin Study Group*. Rome—September 24.
21. *International Plant Protection Convention*. (FAO). Rome—September 25-27.
22. *Preliminary Migration Conference*. (ILO). Naples—October 2-16.
23. *Second Session of the Executive Committee of the World Meteorological Organization*. Lausanne—October 3.
24. *Economic Commission for Asia and Far East—Regional Conference on Trade Promotion*. Singapore—October 9-18.
25. *Sixth International Conference and General Assembly of the International Union of Travel Organization*. Athens—October 9-12.
26. *First International Congress of Anatomy and Surgical Techniques*. Mexico City—October 10-14.
27. *World Metallurgical Congress*. Detroit—October 15-19.
28. *79th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Health*. San Francisco—October 15.
29. *Tenth Session of Executive Committee of IRO*. Geneva—October 18.
30. *Eighth Session of the General Council of IRO*. Geneva—October 22.
31. *First Pan-American Congress on Veterinary Medicine*. Lima, Peru—October 20-26.
32. *Third Session of the Permanent Committee of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works*. Paris—October 25-27.
33. *Fifth Meeting of the South Pacific Air Transport Council*. Wellington—October 29.
34. *Fisheries Statistics of FAO*. Rome—October 29-November 3.
35. *Commonwealth Auditors* (General). London—October.
36. *North Atlantic Council* (Annual). Rome—October.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY CANADA

Multilateral

Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces. Signed at London on June 19, 1951.

London revision of the Union Convention of Paris, March 20, 1883, for the Protection of Industrial Property, revised at Brussels, December 14, 1900, at Washington, June 2, 1911, at The Hague, November 8, 1925. Signed on June 2, 1934. Canadian accession took place on June 26, 1951.

Belgium

Agreement between the Governments of the Commonwealth and the Government of Belgium regarding the War Cemeteries, Graves and Memorials of the British Commonwealth in Belgian Territory. Signed at Brussels on July 20, 1951.

Ireland

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Ireland amending the Annex to the Agreement for Air Services of August 8, 1947. Signed at Dublin on July 9, 1951.

Netherlands

Agreement between the Governments of the Commonwealth and the Government of the Netherlands regarding the War Cemeteries, Graves and Memorials of the British Commonwealth in Netherlands Territory. Signed at The Hague on July 10, 1951.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the King's Printer, at the price indicated.)

Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in Ottawa, August 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

Treaty Series 1950, No. 4: Exchange of Notes between Canada and Norway constituting an Agreement regarding Visa Requirements for Non-Immigrant Travellers of the two countries. Signed at Ottawa, March 4 and 13, 1950. (Price, 10 cents). Bilingual Text.

Treaty Series 1950, No. 10: International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Opened for signature at Washington, D.C., on February 8, 1949. Canadian ratification deposited on July 3, 1950. (Price 25 cents). Bilingual Text.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS†

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

**Report of the Universal Postal Union*; 11 June 1951; document E/2012; 73 p.

Proceeds of sale of UNRA Supplies (Report by the Secretary-General); document E/2016; 25 p.

**Method of International Financing of European Emigration* (Report by the Secretary-General); 18 June 1951; document E/2019; 121 p.

**Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Latin America*; 15 June 1951; document E/2021, E/CN.12/266; 176 p.

**Full Employment*—Analysis of replies to the full employment questionnaire covering the period 1950-51, submitted under resolutions 221 E(IX) and 290 (XI) of the Economic and Social Council (Report by the Secretary-General):

Part A. The problems of unemployment and inflation in 1950 and 1951; 27 June 1951; document E/2035; 41 p.

Part B. Balance-of-Payments Trends and Policies 1950-51; 27 June 1951; document E/2035/Add.1; 61 p.

**Economic development of under-developed Countries*—Volume and distribution of National Income in under-developed Countries (Report by the Secretary-General); 28 June 1951; document E/2041; 91 p.

(b) Printed Documents:

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine—General Progress Report and Supplementary Report (covering the period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950); 1951; document A/1367/Rev. 1; 31 p.; 30 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 18.

Assistance to Palestine Refugees—Interim report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; document A/1451/Rev. 1; 22 p.; 25 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19.

Economic Survey of Europe in 1950; May 1951; document E/ECE/128/Rev. 1; 263 p.; \$2.50; Sales Number: 1951.II.E.1 (Department of Economic Affairs).

**Organization of the Secretariat*; 8 June 1951; document ST/AFS/2; 69 p.; 70 cents; Sales No.: 1951.X.2.

† Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

OTTAWA MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SEPTEMBER 1951

THE Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council met in Ottawa from the 15th to the 20th of September. It made no dramatic headline decisions but it proved by the steady development of wide co-operation between its members that the North Atlantic alliance has vitality and determination in seeking a common solution of our problems. The fact that this was the seventh time the Council has met in the two years since the Treaty came into force shows that the members are growing to consider these reunions as a regular part of the conduct of their international affairs, and not merely as emergency gatherings called to deal with a particular crisis. The Ottawa session was the first where members sent Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers together for a joint discussion of their problems and this was particularly fitting as Canada had been in the lead in advocating this re-organization of the Council to join to it the Defence and Finance Ministers' Committees.

Aims of Treaty

Since the signing of the Treaty in 1949 it has been recognized that it has both a short-term and a long-term aim. The short-term aim is to increase our military strength to the extent necessary to give the security that we failed to find at the end of the war. Great strides have been made towards this goal. General Eisenhower has now under his command in Western Europe the nucleus of a force in being and the Council dealt with the problems of increasing its strength until it is the deterrent force we have planned. Despite the progress that has been made these problems are still great. The Council heard from the various special agencies which have been studying particular aspects and while the emphasis was still on the requirement of military strength some of the Western European countries made a strong case that their economies must not be over strained by their contributions to the defence effort. Thus the problem was seen to be two-fold, to build up the strongest forces in being as speedily as possible and at the same time not to damage the economic viability of the member countries.

The Council saw that these problems could not readily be solved by the application of a formula prepared by experts but called for negotiation on a broad political and economic plane to reconcile the military requirements with the capabilities of the member states. To this end the Council formed a temporary committee of twelve, where each member would be represented by a minister or a person closely related to his government, to make a co-ordinated analysis of defence plans. Thus it is hoped that a militarily acceptable plan for the defence of Western Europe can be fulfilled within the realistic limits of the political and economic capabilities of the member countries. Canada has appointed the Minister of Finance, Mr. D. C. Abbott, to be its representative and the committee starts its deliberations in Paris at the beginning of October and is to have its report ready by December 1 of this year.

Admission of Greece and Turkey

Another decision of far-reaching importance to the security of the North Atlantic area was the expected one to recommend the admission of Greece and Turkey. The Council, not being an executive body, could only recommend to members that they take the necessary legislative action required by their respective constitutions and that when this has been done these two countries who can make such a contribution to security on the East flank of the North Atlantic area will be invited to join.



—Capital Press

NATO COUNCIL MEETING AT OTTAWA

Delegates to the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council were addressed by the Chairman of the Council, Mr. Paul Van Zeeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium, at the opening session, held in the House of Commons.

The decision to admit these two new members with the consequent wide extension of the Treaty area was, like all Council decisions, unanimous. However, the candid discussions in the Council which preceded the decision showed that, as is publicly known, all members did not share the same enthusiasm for offering these countries full membership in order to bring them into association with the North Atlantic alliance. Nonetheless unanimous agreement was reached and this fact in itself is evidence of the feelings of confidence and the desire for co-operation which characterized the meetings. It was evident that those countries which would have preferred another solution than the offer of full membership of Greece and Turkey had much in mind the desire not to retard the growth of the North Atlantic community which was one of the long-term aims of the alliance and which could now be identified as one of the most healthy and effective impulses which influence the acceptance of unanimously agreed decisions.

"Atlantic community"

The expression "Atlantic community" has been used often in connection with the Organization and although the concept is enunciated in Article II of the Treaty, it must be admitted that there has never been a very clear idea of its meaning. The fact that the term is vague should not however be interpreted to mean that the concept is unreal, theoretical or unworkable. It is vague because the path along which the community is developing must remain undefined since it is growing as co-operative achievements are realized and not along the lines of any preconceived plan into which subsequent developments will have to be fitted. At the Ottawa meeting the existence of the foundation for a system where member states who are working to-

gether could build up something that is closer than the ordinary arrangement of sovereign states was recognized as a fact.

It was felt that there would be value in stressing the existence of this foundation and exploring, at this time, means of extending the field of co-ordination of foreign policy and of closer economic, financial, and social co-operation to promote the well being of the North Atlantic people. A ministerial committee of five, composed of representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands and Norway was formed and they are to have their first report for the next meeting in November. When the Committee was formed it was recognized that the Community was not to be an exclusive organization but rather a core of nations who are now working together most fully and successfully. It was certainly not intended that it would cut across any existing ties nor loose any recognized bonds such as those which join the U.K. and Canada within the Commonwealth. It was also realized that the sort of thing that were aimed at takes a long time to develop and that any forced growth would almost certainly be doomed to wither. Thus the steps that were taken at Ottawa were just the beginning of a long process which might eventually bring the members' closer together. In order to stress the importance which the Council attached to this development a separate statement was issued at the close of the session describing these steps towards the development of the North Atlantic community. The text of the statement is reprinted on page 326.

Reports Reviewed

As well as deciding on these broad major issues the Council also received and reviewed the reports of the various specialized boards and directed their further enquiries. In the purely military field each member country, with the exception of Iceland, presented a report on the progress of their national defence effort. These reports were referred to the Military Committee and Military Commands for study and will be the subject of final reports at the next meeting of the Council.

The Council Deputies met frequently during the session and as well as continuing to be of invaluable assistance to the Council in doing preliminary and background work for its discussions, settled some specific issues. Among these was a decision on the contributions to finance an infrastructure programme and these projects for the construction of airfield communications and certain installations for the support of troops are to continue without delay.

Before the Council ended it was resolved that in order to fulfil its duty of forming and directing the policy of the Treaty Organization its meetings should be held more frequently and at regular intervals. The next meeting will be in Rome and it is expected to take place towards the end of November. At the close of the meeting the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. VanZeeland, vacated the Chair and in accordance with the alphabetical order of precedence, which calls for Canada to provide the next Chairman, handed over his duties to Mr. Pearson.

The following communiqué was issued at the end of the meeting giving an outline of the Council's work:

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, OTTAWA, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951

1. The North Atlantic Council has concluded its Seventh Session, in which for the first time the member governments were represented by Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Economic or Finance Ministers. The new composition of the Council reflects the wide fields in which co-ordination is being steadily developed.

2. In an exchange of views on the world situation, note was taken of the growing confidence and strength of the Atlantic community in a world of continuing tension. The Council

was informed by the Occupying Powers of the progress of discussions directed toward the establishment of a new relationship with the German Federal Republic. It was also informed of the statement made by the three foreign ministers after their meeting in Washington in which they welcomed the plan for a European Defence Community of which Germany would form part.

3. The Council, considering that the security of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the member governments that, subject to the approval of national Parliaments under their respective legislative procedures, an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty.

4. The Council considered the reports submitted by the military and civilian agencies of the Treaty Organization:

(a) The Standing Group reported on the establishment and development of the integrated force under General Eisenhower, and progress on other military matters.

(b) The Defence Production Board reported on the problems relating to the further development of production and recommended means of dealing with these problems.

(c) The Financial and Economic Board presented a report analyzing the economic and financial impact of the NATO defence effort with special reference to the equitable sharing of the burden.

(d) The Council Deputies, the permanent working body of the Treaty Organizations, reported on their activities in political, organization, and administrative matters and in developing closer co-ordination between the Treaty agencies.

(e) The Chairman of the Council Deputies summarized the major issues before the Organization and suggested action to meet them.

As a result of the study of these reports, the Council issued guidance and directives to the respective agencies concerning their future work.

5. All member governments recognize as their joint aim the building up of defence forces to a sufficient level of strength, and the no less important objective of a sound and stable economy necessary to support that effort. The reports of the Defence Production Board and of the Financial and Economic Board, and the discussion thereon, have indicated a number of difficulties in the production and economic fields. The member countries recognize the need to surmount such difficulties in order to assure the continued progress of their efforts to strengthen the free world. The Council has noted the danger of inflation, the burdens which increased defence efforts place on the balance of payments, and the obstacles to an adequate defence arising from price and allocation pressures on raw material supplies. The Ministers recognized that the common effort requires a common attack upon these problems, and agreed to take such action severally and jointly as they deem appropriate to find solutions to them.

6. Accordingly a temporary committee of the Council was established to survey urgently the requirements of external security, and particularly of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe, and the realistic political-economic capabilities of the member countries, with a view to determining possible courses of action for their reconciliation so as to achieve the most effective use of the resources of the member countries.

7. The Council received reports from the member governments on the status of the defence effort in their countries and referred them to the military agencies and appropriate commands for study and recommendations to improve the early effectiveness and availability of forces.

8. The Council noted that agreement had been reached on the financing of an "infrastructure" programme of airfields, communications, and certain installations for the support of forces. These projects will continue without delay.

9. The Council has issued a separate statement making clear the importance which the member governments attach to the development of the Atlantic community, not only to safe-

guard their freedom and common heritage on an equal footing but also to strengthen their free institutions and to advance the well-being of their peoples. The statement announced the establishment of a ministerial committee to study and recommend lines of future action toward these objectives.

10. The Council resolved that, in order to develop more effective unity of action, and in accordance with its duties as the institution for forming the policy and directing the operations of the Treaty Organization, its meetings would be held more frequently and at more regular intervals. In order to continue progress on the problems discussed at the Seventh Session, it was agreed that the question of the date of the next meeting of the Council, which will be held in Rome, would be referred to the Council Deputies for decision.

STATEMENT REGARDING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY ISSUED AT THE END OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, OTTAWA, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951

The peoples of the North Atlantic community are united under the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve their freedom and to develop their common heritage of democracy, liberty and the rule of law. During the past two years, since the Treaty came into being, North Atlantic countries have joined in collective efforts for their defence. They will continue to work together closely to consolidate the North Atlantic community. All obstacles which hinder such co-operation on an equal footing should be removed.

The persistent attempts which have been made and are being made to divide the peoples of the North Atlantic community will fail. Those who make these attempts do not understand the nature or the strength of the close ties between the free peoples of the North Atlantic community. The preservation of peace is the very essence of that community, and free discussion as to how this can best be done is a source of continuing strength.

It was the threatening international situation that brought 12 nations of the North Atlantic community formally together under the North Atlantic Treaty to create sufficient strength to preserve their freedom and liberty. A series of so-called peace offers as vague in language as they are obscure in content are made from time to time. The peoples of the North Atlantic community will test these offers by the deeds that follow them. They will never reject any genuine move for peace, but will not be deflected from building up their defensive strength by mere empty words about peace.

The strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the past two years has developed in the minds of the peoples of a strong sense of their common interests and ideals. There is a desire within the North Atlantic community to meet specific needs in all fields where close collaboration will advance the welfare of the community.

One source for the further development of the North Atlantic community is Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty which states:

The Parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

A clear sense of the direction in which the community is developing should make it easier to take practical steps towards that end.

The Council has therefore decided to set up a Ministerial Committee composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherland and Norway, to consider the further strengthening of the North Atlantic Community and especially the implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Committee, assisted by the Council Deputies, will, in particular, consider and make recommendations to the Council on the following matters:

- (a) Co-ordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy, having particular regard to steps designed to promote peace;
- (b) Closer economic, financial and social co-operation, in order to promote and to ensure conditions of economic stability and well-being, both during and after the present period of the defence effort, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or through other Agencies;
- (c) Collaboration in the fields of culture and public information.

In these and other ways the Council will build up the inner strength of the North Atlantic community, without duplicating the work of other international organizations which promote the same objectives.

The Council endorses the recent declaration of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation which called on all sections of the European community to increase production and play their part in the collective effort for peace and well-being.

In developing the North Atlantic community, the Council will act in conformity with and seek to strengthen the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is only by the work and by the enlightened understanding of the free peoples everywhere that the cause of freedom and democracy will be upheld against any challenge.

THE KOREAN CRISIS

The armistice talks at Kaesong remained suspended throughout the month of September. The Communist Commanders continued the series of charges, begun in mid-August, of violations of Kaesong's neutrality by United Nations forces. By mid-September, when the series ended, they were demanding that the United Nations Commander should accept responsibility for eleven incidents. Responsibility for the eleventh charge, that a United Nations aircraft had strafed the Conference site in Kaesong, was in fact accepted by the United Nations Command. It said: "the United Nations Command regrets this violation of the agreed neutrality which resulted from the pilot's error in navigation. Appropriate disciplinary action is being taken". Other charges were denounced by General Ridgway "as baseless and intentionally false".

Possibility of Resuming Negotiations

At the end of a strongly-worded note of September 6 concerning alleged violations of Kaesong's neutrality by United Nations forces, General Ridgway proposed that "our liaison officers meet immediately at the bridge at Panmunjom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations can be continued without interruptions". Six days later the Communist Commanders replied that unless the United Nations Command dealt "conscientiously and responsibly" with the various charges there seemed to be no useful purpose in changing the location of the talks, since violations by the United Nations Command would presumably continue.

In the middle of the month General Ridgway repeated his willingness to resume the talks and dropped any specific mention of his desire that a new site should be found; instead he suggested that the liaison officers should "discuss conditions that will be mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks".

On September 19, the Communist Commanders accepted General Ridgway's proposal for a meeting of liaison officers. However, they proposed that "the delegates of both sides should immediately resume the armistice negotiations at Kaesong without any need for further discussion of the conditions" and that the liaison officers should consult only about "the date and time for resuming the negotiations". They said that they had taken this decision "in view of the fact that your side had expressed regret concerning the latest incident in which the United Nations forces violated the Kaesong neutral zone and willingness to take a responsible attitude regarding violations of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement".

Liaison Officers Meet Amid Disagreement

Before the liaison officers held their first meeting on September 24 there was a further exchange of messages in which the opposing Commanders defined their positions and indicated a sharp difference of opinion on the scope of the preliminary meetings and on the question of the responsibility for violations of neutrality. General Ridgway denied that any instances of alleged violations remained unsettled and that the alleged violations made it impossible to continue the negotiations. He stated that he had instructed his liaison officers to ensure that the subject of conditions for the resumption of negotiations "received careful attention in any future discussions". The Communist Commanders in their turn stood by their demand that the United Nations Command should accept responsibility for all the alleged violations and proposed that "appropriate machinery should be set up by mutual agreement after the resumption of the Kaesong talks in order to deal with unsettled incidents". They repeated that their liaison officers would discuss only the date and time for resuming the negotiations in Kaesong.

When several meetings of the liaison officers failed to produce any agreement the United Nations Commander proposed to the Communist Commanders on September 27 that both delegations should meet as early as possible at a point approximately midway between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-ni, several miles southeast of Kaesong, to return to the discussion of a demarcation line and demilitarized zone immediately following any discussion that might be needed to clarify physical and security arrangements at the meeting place. At the end of the month agreement on resuming the substantive discussions was still lacking.

Meanwhile, on the battlefield the fighting increased in scale and scope, with many local engagements being fought for important hill positions; and from the air and the sea, United Nations forces kept up their intensive pounding of targets in North Korea.

CANADIANS IN CHINA

The Department of External Affairs announced on September 10 that the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires in Peking made representations on September 1 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of China expressing the grave concern of the Canadian Government at China's policy towards Canadians and requesting that measures be taken in the near future to bring about an improvement in this situation. The Canadian Government has availed itself of the good offices of the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of a Canadian representative in Peking.

Representations were made in April about the arrest of United Kingdom, Australian, Canadian and United States nationals and their detention *incommunicado* often without any explanation of the reason for their arrest. However, the position has in fact deteriorated since that time. Arbitrary arrests and detention for indefinite periods without access to families, friends or national representatives have continued. Harsh treatment has been inflicted on missionaries of all denominations and on other people who have for many years been engaged in humanitarian work in China. In addition continual difficulties and delays are placed in the way of all classes of foreign nationals wishing to obtain entry and exit permits.

The treatment inflicted on Canadians in China is a matter of continuing concern to the Canadian Government which welcomed the opportunity of being associated with the approach of the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires to the Peking Government, who spoke on behalf of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States.

It will be recalled that seven Canadians are known to be under arrest in China. Five Sisters of the Immaculate Conception are being detained in Canton; Dr. Stewart Allen, a United Church Medical Missionary, is under arrest in Szechwan; Bishop C. M. O'Gara of the Order of the Passionist Fathers was arrested at Yuanling and is now reported to be in hospital but there is no indication that he has been released from detention.

THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

*A Statement by the Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at the Japanese Peace
Conference, in San Francisco,
September 7, 1951.*

Practically everything has been said that can be said and all words used that can be used about the draft treaty that is before us. Nevertheless, it is my duty and my privilege on behalf of my delegation to say a few words concerning it.

Two delegations have attacked this Charter with that kind of "white is black" and "up is down" logic with which we have become familiar and which convinces no one, I suggest, except those whose convictions are prefabricated. In any event, these statements from the delegations of the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia are not primarily directed toward this Conference, nor indeed are they primarily concerned with making peace with Japan. It is particularly unconvincing to hear these two delegations complain of the procedure adopted in negotiating and drafting this treaty, because it was the destructive and delaying tactics of their governments that made this admittedly unusual procedure necessary and indeed unavoidable if we were to have a treaty at all.

My government accepts this treaty and will sign it. As so many speakers before me have said, it is not a perfect treaty. No human document ever is. But it is a good treaty and in our opinion it would not be a better one if we spent two or three months discussing it around the conference table in this lovely and hospitable city of San Francisco. It brings to an end the state of war between Japan and a great majority of those countries which were forced into that war by Japanese aggression, some of which were sorely hurt by that aggression. As such, it is action for peace and not merely talk about peace.

My country, Canada, desires only friendly relations with Japan and with all other countries of the Pacific area, for Canada is by geography a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power. Although in the past the problems of Europe may have seemed to most Canadians the most urgent and the most fateful, the catastrophic events of the past two decades, especially the Communist aggression in Korea in the past year, have made all of my countrymen, not only those living on the Pacific Coast, realize that we cannot insulate ourselves from wars or the threat of wars in the Pacific area merely by directing our gaze and our plans across the Atlantic. There are Canadian military cemeteries in Asia as well as in Flanders Fields. I know that I speak for the overwhelming majority of my countrymen when I say that we welcome this formal and legal ending of the war with Japan, not only for itself but even more because it is a step toward peace and security in the Pacific. We are also glad to meet in a spirit of reconciliation the Japanese people who have themselves suffered so greatly from the policies of their former military leaders. We shall watch with genuine interest and real sympathy their continued efforts toward achieving a free, peaceful, and prosperous way of life which should itself be the greatest guarantee against the rebirth of aggressive militarism in Japan, a greater guarantee, possibly, — and history seems to show this — than anything we could write into the treaty itself.

The Canadian Government has felt for some years that a peace treaty with Japan was highly desirable and we continually gave our support to efforts in that direction. As conferences and consultations took place, we became more impressed than ever with the necessity of seizing every opportunity that might lead to an early and suitable settlement with Japan. From the evidence at our disposal we were satisfied many months ago that the main task of the occupation, so admirably directed by General MacArthur, had been accomplished. Disarmament and demo-

bilization had been achieved and Japan's feet had been set on the path toward free and responsible government. So it seemed to us as well as to others, that future progress could be made only by the Japanese people themselves working out their own solutions to political and economic problems with such assistance as would naturally arise from friendly relations with their erstwhile foes.

Just as the spirit of the occupation was one of moderation, justice, and friendly guidance, so the peace treaty itself, as has so often been said from this rostrum, is just, even generous, and without rancor or revenge. I congratulate those primarily responsible for the drafting of this treaty, the Government of the United States and in particular, Mr. John Foster Dulles, and the Government of the United Kingdom in fashioning an instrument that is imaginative, farsighted, and ungrudging.

The United States, as the chief occupying power, would have been well within its legal rights in continuing the occupation of Japan. Yet she has been striving earnestly and long to convoke a peace conference which would return to the Japanese people their full sovereignty and freedom and relieve them from any position of subservience and inferiority. That is a generous policy but it is also a realistic one. Canadians who have had for so long a close and friendly relationship with their neighbour would expect no other attitude from the great country which is our host at this Conference. I would also like to state that my own government was given an adequate opportunity to comment fully on the various drafts as they appeared. Our suggestions for change were given careful consideration by other governments and although naturally — and of course unfortunately! — not all were accepted, some of our most important points have been met fully in the draft before us. We have therefore a sense of direct participation in the framing of the treaty.

I have been talking in general terms of Canada's interest in a peace settlement with Japan. I would like for a moment to speak about one or two matters of special interest to my country, which are dealt with in this treaty. Under its terms, Japan agrees to enter into negotiations with interested Allied Powers for the conclusion of fisheries agreements. Canada will implement this provision by attempting to reach an agreement with the Japanese Government on this matter with the least possible delay. It should be clear that there is nothing discriminatory, exclusive, or punitive in our desire to draw up such an arrangement. It is, moreover, the understanding of my Government that until such a fisheries convention is negotiated to which both Canada and Japan will be signatories, the undertakings expressed in the exchange of letters on the fisheries question between Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Dulles under the date of February 7, 1951, the effect of which was extended to cover all interested parties on July 13, 1951, will still obtain.

Insofar as general commercial questions are concerned, Japan agrees in the treaty to conform to internationally accepted fair trade practices. It is the confident hope of my government that Japan, in the future conduct of its commercial relations with other countries, will avoid certain prewar practices which were widely condemned at that time by other trading nations. Canada has no wish to see any discrimination against or any unnecessary obstacles to normal Japanese trade. On the contrary, as a trading nation ourselves, we wish to see Japan develop its full trading possibilities. It is only common sense for us to wish for a prosperous rather than a poor Japan. Such prosperity, however, can never, in the long run, be established or even assisted by trading practices considered unfair by other countries, and against which those countries have no alternative but to protect themselves if they unhappily should be adopted.

To turn to another subject, my delegation, like other delegations, very greatly regrets the absence at this Conference of any delegation from China, a great nation whose fate is inextricably interwoven with that of Japan. The Peking Government,

however, must bear the blame for this absence. Had that regime not participated in the aggression already committed by the Communist forces in North Korea; had it lent its efforts to discouraging, rather than extending that aggression, it might have spoken for China at this Conference. The Peking Government must realize that just as it cannot shoot its way into the United Nations, neither can it force its way by violent acts or threats into a conference which has as its prime purpose the making of peace with Japan.

Our regret that the conduct of the Peking regime has made impossible the presence of China at a conference such as this must be the greater since Japan as an important nation in the Far East cannot cut itself off from the mainland of Asia. The industry and thrift of its people, its high educational and technical development, will all combine to insure that Japan will very soon play again a great part in Asian affairs. May that role be beneficent, progressive, and peaceful. We have reason to hope that it will be so, unless its continental neighbours now object to and plot against Japan's right to security and development. This treaty is the recognition of that right by those friendly nations who sign it. It registers the confidence which the nations of the world now have in the ability of the Japanese to work out their own destiny in peaceful co-operation with their friends. It reflects also the wisdom and basic democracy of the United States Government and people in refusing to embark on the imperialistic course of making Japan a mere appendage to the United States; or more subtly perhaps, of attempting to refashion Japan in the image of America. This is a policy which we have seen attempted in Eastern Europe, and one which is abhorrent to all free people. Free people have not only the right peacefully to work out their own destiny, but they have the right to do it in their own way. They can only contribute to the rich variety of culture and experience in the world when they are permitted to develop without foreign interference.

So I think that we of the West would be well advised not to apply too strictly our own national experience as a yardstick to Japanese progress. Men reach the truth by different paths and they can strive toward a tolerant and peaceful society on widely variant roads. The Japanese have learned from their own bitter experience the tragic folly of aggressive war; that immediate success by means of military superiority is not victory, but only the postponement of overwhelming disaster. It is our hope that some of Japan's continental neighbours will learn this lesson.

In this treaty both sides secure real advantages, but not at each other's cost. The Japanese, after waiting with patience and discipline for six long years, will have restored to them now the right to be treated as an equal by all other powers in the world. The Allied Powers on their side exchange an enemy for a friend, and one which we trust will play its part in maintaining peace and security, and in building up the international community in the Pacific area.

In the dark days of Japan toward the end of feudal isolation a century or so ago, a Japanese writer and patriot, Sakuma Shozan, said that at twenty he knew that men were joined together in one province; at thirty he knew that they were joined together in one nation; and at forty that they were joined together in one world.

The Canadian delegation, speaking for the people and Government of Canada, hope that this treaty, unlike so many treaties between victor and vanquished, will become a strong foundation for the co-operation of "one nation", Japan, with other friendly nations in the search for "one world" of welfare and peace.

THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY (1945-1951)

On July 10, 1951, Canada terminated the state of war with Germany.* This event offers a convenient occasion to provide, for purposes of reference, a brief annotated chronology of the occupation of Germany (with emphasis on the Western zones) which followed the unconditional surrender of the German High Command on May 7 and 8, 1945, and is still in force. Germany lies at the heart of Europe, and Europe lies at the centre of the present East-West tension. It is for this reason that the success or failure of the Allied occupation will be a measure of the success or failure of our attempts to win Europe for the free world.

East and West Zones

The occupation began as a quadripartite venture and has gone through many phases, conditioned largely by the intransigence of the U.S.S.R. which soon made quadripartite unanimity impossible and led eventually to the present division of Germany into two parts, the East zone under Soviet control, and the three Western zones which now form the West German Federal Republic. To be sure, the occupation of one country by another after the cessation of active hostilities between them has seldom been easy; the occupation of Germany by *four* great powers was of necessity peculiarly difficult. As was to be expected, the Germans did not take kindly to having four masters, particularly when, as sometimes happened, these spoke not with one voice but several. Nor was the occupation liked by the citizens of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States where, from the outset, the taxpayers objected to its cost. Unfortunately, during the first two years some abuses of power were seized on and magnified by the press, which did not always give credit to the hard and unselfish work done by the staffs of the occupying powers in restoring a semblance of normal life to the battered body of Germany. It is only fair to recall in 1951 that in 1945 the tasks which met the conquering armies of the Allies and the Soviet Union were, without exaggeration, colossal. At the end of the war, Germany had collapsed politically, economically, morally and spiritually. Great cities lay in ruins, ordered government no longer existed, displaced persons roamed the countryside or congregated in insanitary hutchments, food was scarce, transportation had broken down, and the elementary necessities of civil life were lacking. To bring order out of this chaos was an enormous task which the occupying armies tackled with an energy and, on the whole, a decency, to which scant tribute has been paid.

On June 5, 1945, supreme authority over Germany was assumed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the U.S.S.R. Excluding the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line, Germany was divided into four zones to be administered separately by the four powers. "Greater Berlin" was divided into four sectors, one to each of the four powers, and governed jointly by an inter-allied authority (the Allied Kommandatura).

Allied Control Authority

To lay down and co-ordinate policy for Germany as a whole, the Allied Control Authority was set up in this same month of June. It consisted of:

- (a) a Control Council, composed of the four commanders-in-chief,
- (b) a Co-ordinating Committee, composed of the four deputy commanders, and
- (c) a Control Staff of twelve divisions or directorates, on which the four powers were equally represented. Decisions of the Control Council and its quadripartite organs had to be unanimous. Liaison with other United Nations governments was established through military missions accredited to the Council.

* See *External Affairs*, August 1951, p. 292.



At the Control Council level, agreement in principle was eventually reached on demilitarization, judicial reform, reparations, industrial quotas, German foreign assets, taxation, control of scientific research, and the punishment of war criminals. Agreement was not reached on such matters as labour organization, national political parties, central economic administration, external and internal trade, currency, land reform, education, and many others.

The Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945, laid down the political and eco-

conomic principles which were to govern Germany for the first period of control and dealt with reparations, the frontiers, of Eastern Germany, transfers of Germans from east of the Oder-Neisse Line, and the punishment of war criminals. One result of Potsdam was the influx of millions of Germans from East into West Germany, a mass migration which caused and is still causing some of the gravest problems which Western Germany has to face.

Throughout 1946 it became increasingly clear that unanimity of the four powers did not exist and the United Kingdom and the United States began gradually to merge their policies. From April to July the Council of Foreign Ministers met inconclusively in Paris and in September, Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States, put into words in a speech at Stuttgart what many had been thinking: "So far as many vital questions are concerned, the Control Council is neither governing Germany nor allowing Germany to be governed." From November 4, 1946, to January 31, 1947, the Council of Foreign Ministers met again but made no progress on Germany. On January 2, the United States-United Kingdom Zonal Merger Pact was signed. The other zones drifted further apart, although in all four an active political life was developing at the zonal level, and local elections were held in all of them during the year.

Throughout 1947 economic problems dominated the German scene. The severe winter caused an industrial shutdown and a critical fuel shortage. Food was scarce and the U.S. and U.K. military governments were hard put to it to secure even the meagre rations issued to the German population. In May an economic council for the bi-zone was formed and a plan to raise the level of industry announced. Two further meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at Moscow in March and at London from November to December, failed to reconcile the growing divergence in the policies of the U.S.S.R. and the Western powers. On December 17, the United States and the United Kingdom signed an agreement fixing control over the bi-zonal economy in proportion to the share of cost borne by each. This gave the United States the major say in economic matters.

1948 a Turning Point

In many ways 1948 marks a turning-point in the history of the occupation. During this year the split between East and West Germany became final. By the beginning of March a Joint Export-Import Agency, a Bi-Zonal Economic Administration, a Bi-Zonal High Court, and the Bank Deutscher Laender (Bank of the German Provinces) had been established in the West.

Meanwhile relations between the Soviet Union and the other three powers on the Allied Control Council had been steadily worsening since the beginning of the year. There had been trouble in January over the law on the control of dangerous Germans and the directive calling on the four powers to plan for the repatriation of all prisoners of war. In February the Soviet representative, Marshal Sokolovsky, reproached the British for the alleged failure to carry out demilitarization in their zone, and both the British and the Americans for setting up the Bi-Zonal Administration. On March 10, Sokolovsky attacked the Western Powers for their failure to recognize the S.E.D., the communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party, in their zones. At the meeting of March 20, Sokolovsky introduced the Prague declaration of the foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, which was in effect an attack on the policies of the Western powers in Germany. The representatives of these powers refused to consider this declaration on the grounds that it had been addressed to their governments and not to the Allied Control Council. The Soviet representative then demanded to be informed of all agreements on Western Germany made by the three Western powers at London in February and March, 1948. Not receiving immediate satisfaction on this point, he read a long prepared statement in which he repeated all the old charges against the policies and conduct of the Allies

in Germany. Without waiting for his colleagues to reply, he then rose and saying, "I see no sense in continuing this meeting; and I declare it adjourned", he left the room. The Allied Control Council, and with it the quadripartite government of Germany was over. On June 16 Soviet representatives withdrew from the Allied Kommandatura (which, however, resumed its work on a tripartite basis on December 21, 1948, and is still functioning). On March 31 the Soviet Union began the blockade of Berlin which was successfully countered by the now historic airlift which started on June 25. The blockade was not finally ended until May 12, 1949.

This political victory of the West was matched by the successful carrying through of a major currency reform in June 1948, which improved the economic situation of Western Germany in a way which seemed to those who were there at the time little short of a miraculous. Since then, in spite of occasional difficulties with their balance of payments, the recovery of West Germany has continued to astonish the world.

In September 1948, as a result of the London Agreements announced in June 1948, between the Western powers and the Benelux countries, a significant event took place, namely, the meeting at Bonn of a Parliamentary Council, consisting of representatives elected from each of the 11 Laender (provinces), to draft a constitution for West Germany. The London Agreements also made possible in 1948 the setting-up of the International Authority for the Ruhr, the Military Security Board to guard against any revival of German militarism, and the participation of the Western zones in the European Recovery Plan. Thus while economic recovery continued, the foundations of democratic government were being laid.

First Elections Held

This development continued throughout 1949. At Paris in June, an Allied High Commission was set up and military government came to an end. In the previous month the constitution of a West German government had been adopted by the Parliamentary Council, approved by the Military Governors, ratified by the Laender Governments and promulgated. This was followed on June 15 by the promulgation of an electoral law, and on August 14 the first elections of the Federal Republic were held.* Final results showed that 78.5 per cent of the 31,179,422 eligible voters participated. Of the 402 seats in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), the C.D.U./C.S.U. won 139, the S.P.D. 131, and the F.D.P./D.V.P. 52.† Dr. Konrad Adenauer of the C.D.U. became Federal Chancellor and Professor Theodor Heuss was named President of the Federal Republic.

On September 21, 1949, the occupation statute entered into force. This necessary counterpart to the federal constitution defined the relations of the occupying powers to the German Government and listed those powers which the Allied High Commission reserved to itself.‡ As a result of the Washington Agreements of April 1949, France had consented to a tri-zonal fusion so that the occupation statute was binding on all three Western powers. France had also adhered to the Prohibited and Restricted Industries Policy in April 1949. At the end of November, the Petersberg Protocol of Agreements reached between the Allied High Commissioners and the

* See *External Affairs*, September 1949, pp. 15-19.

† C.D.U.—Christian Democratic Union;
C.S.U. (Bavaria)—Christian Socialist Union;
S.P.D.—Social Democratic Party (Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands);
F.D.P.—Free Democratic Party;
D.V.P.—Democratic People's Party (Demokratische Volks-Partei).

‡ In view of the special position of Berlin, the Western Powers had issued in May 1949, a statement of principles guaranteeing the powers of the city government under the temporary constitution, setting forth those fields in which powers were reserved to the Allied Kommandatura and guaranteeing the civil rights of all persons.

Chancellor of the German Federal Republic marked a further step towards the goal of transferring full responsibility for the conduct of its affairs to the German Government.

During the early months of 1950 the conflict between East and West dominated developments in the Federal Republic. Both the United States High Commissioner (in February) and the German Government (in March) proposed all-German elections which the Soviet-sponsored "National Front" of the East zone rejected. There were also signs in the Federal Republic that German gratitude for the concessions made by the occupying powers was taking the form of "a lively anticipation of favours to come".

Preparations were made at this time to open German consulates abroad and West Germany was admitted to a number of international agencies. German opposition to French policy in the Saar provided evidence of latent nationalism; and dismantling continued to be a thorn in the flesh of the Government and the Allied High Commission. The attacks on dismantling came mostly from the Socialist party (S.P.D.) under the fiery leadership of Dr. Kurt Schumacher. For different reasons the Communist Party under Max Reimann joined in these attacks. Resentment of the occupation grew more vocal, particularly with regard to the power of disallowance of legislation and to occupation costs.

On April 1 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited the German Federal Republic to become an associate member of the Council. On May 25 the Upper House accepted the invitation in principle, and on June 15 the Lower House followed suit. In this same month the United States and the United Kingdom accepted German consuls general.

Closer to Family of Free Nations

Thus by 1950 Western Germany had gradually moved closer to the family of free nations. The proposal for the Schuman Plan paved the way towards Franco-German rapprochement and eventual integration. Germany's economic recovery continued but the problems raised by refugees, unemployment, and the lack of investment capital remained far from solved in spite of the general increase in industrial production throughout Western Europe, caused in part by the anticipated defence effort. Soviet rejection of Western proposals for all-Berlin elections and Soviet refusal to reply to the foreign ministers' proposals for unifying Germany widened the split between East and West Germany. The Whitsuntide rally in Berlin of the Communist Free German Youth (F.D.J.) brought a sharp reminder that the young people of East Germany were being gathered into the communist fold.

In October, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet bloc announced in Prague conditions for the unification of Germany which the Western powers and the German Government found unacceptable. Both the Soviet and the East German Governments made further propaganda efforts to prevent West Germany's rearmament and to split the Western powers. Sporadic communist demonstrations in the Western zones were troublesome but not successful. The Soviet Union and the three Western powers charged one another with remilitarising their respective zones. In November, Minister-President Grotewohl of the so-called German Democratic Republic set up a government to replace the provisional one which had functioned up to the East zone elections of October 1950. In December this regime promulgated the "law for the protection of peace" which laid down heavy penalties, including death, for such acts as propagating "aggressive action", restoring militarism, and using atomic weapons.

As a result of the Brussels decisions of the North Atlantic Council in November 1950, the High Commissioners were empowered to discuss with the Federal Government the Council's proposals to associate Germany with the defence of the West.*

* These discussions have continued intermittently and have been paralleled by the Conference on the creation of a European Army which began in Paris on February 15, 1951.

Although the Federal Government has placed Germany squarely on the side of the West, there have been voices of protest from the neutralists, from Pastor Niemöller's followers, and from various neo-Nazi groups. Some of this dissent stemmed from a very real fear that Germany might become another Korea. The S.P.D., although agreeing that Germany belonged to the West, insisted that she should be allowed to come in on her own terms!

This rapid march through time brings us now to the year 1951. The sixth quarterly report of the United States' High Commissioner, Mr. McCloy, sums up the first three months of this year thus: "The initialing of the Schuman Plan, the promulgation of the first instrument of revision of the occupation statute, and the sense of national unity which the West German Parliament displayed in rejecting the East Zone's bid for the unification of Eastern and Western Germany on communist terms, mark the significant progress during the past quarter of the Federal Republic's integration into free Europe, its further advance towards sovereignty and its growth in political maturity. The favourable effect of these political developments was somewhat beclouded by a deterioration in the German economic situation . . .".*

At the end of March 1951, the Allied High Commission approved a relaxation of the controls imposed on industry during the Prohibited and Restricted Industries Agreement, already referred to in this article. Progress was also made towards the eventual replacement of the occupation statute by some form of contractual agreement, and the study of a federal German contribution to Western defence was continued both in Bonn and in Paris.

Economic Crisis

Unfortunately, West Germany's growing foreign exchange indebtedness to the European Payments Union produced an economic crisis in February. This led to the drawing up of a more realistic programme by the Federal Government. The two-fold aim of this programme was to raise the levels of production and employment by expanding the output of coal and other basic materials and by providing needed investment funds, and to improve the balance of payments by increasing exports and limiting imports to a level which could be financed from anticipated export earnings and external aid.

Throughout this period, communist propaganda continued to rage furiously and the World Peace Council which met in Berlin in February looked for a time as if it might become a Soviet-dominated rival of the United Nations organization.

Legislation to carry out an agreement between Chancellor Adenauer and representatives of labour management on the question of co-determination† of workers with management in the coal industry and the iron and steel producing industries was initiated and eventually passed in April.

In May, Western Germany became a full member of the Council of Europe and Chancellor Adenauer brought before the Council's Consultative Assembly a strong plea for an international solution of the refugee problem. In June both Houses of the Federal Republic passed legislation eliminating from German law all references to the state of war. The way was now open for the occupying powers and other foreign countries to terminate the state of war with Germany and this step was taken, without prejudice to the eventual peace treaty, by the three occupying powers and a number of other countries on or shortly after July 9, 1951. As stated at the beginning of this article, Canada terminated the state of war on July 10, 1951.

* Sixth Quarterly Report on Germany: Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, pp. III-IV.

† Co-determination (Mitbestimmungsrecht) is a term used by the German trade-unions to describe the right of workers to participate, on terms of equality with the management, in decisions which concern the plant where they are employed.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY*

By the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

In May of this year, 5,500 additional Canadian troops arrived in Korea to join the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry which were already there as part of the United Nations forces. At Valcartier, near Quebec City, another brigade group is now in training and is scheduled to become part of the North Atlantic force commanded by General Eisenhower in Western Europe before the end of the year. The presence of these Canadian forces in areas so far distant from Canadian shores, and in a period of at least nominal peace, will provide perhaps the best indication of the development that has been occurring in Canadian foreign policy.

In some ways this change is as remarkable as the parallel and vastly more important one that has transformed the foreign policy of the United States. The break made by the United States with the policy of isolation — which has already produced so many acts of imaginative statesmanship — is one of the most important facts in the history of our time. Nevertheless, in spite of the abruptness of the transition, there are some aspects of American experience which have helped American people to adjust themselves to the tremendous responsibilities they now shoulder. The United States has been a great power for at least half a century. During that period it has held a number of overseas possessions; and in many areas of the world its political influence has been of great importance. The effects of its economic and commercial policies have long been apparent everywhere. Furthermore, its power now matches its responsibilities. It is the unquestioned leader of the coalition of free states.

Canada, on the other hand, is neither a great nor an overseas Power; and only occasionally can her voice be influential in deciding the policies of the free world. The key to Canada's present position in international affairs and to the special problems of Canadian diplomacy may be found in the fact that, notwithstanding these limitations on its power and influence, it has accepted heavy international responsibilities.

Before the Second World War the activity of Canadian governments in external affairs was to a considerable extent concerned with the development of Canada's national position in the international community. But the period ushered in by this successful effort (during which it was theoretically possible for Canada to remain neutral in a general war) was of short duration; lasting, indeed, only from the early thirties until September 10, 1939, when Canada declared war on Germany. After that date, Canada for six years committed her resources without reserve to the prosecution of a world-wide war; later became increasingly involved in world problems; and recently has accepted far-reaching collective security obligations. In this process, questions of national status have been subordinated to the necessity of thinking in terms of national security, and to attempts to realize this security through international collective action. Our experience in this regard has been shared by other states which have had far longer participation in international affairs.

The main reason for this growing emphasis on national security through collective action has been, of course, the threat to the free world which is presented by Soviet imperialism. The gravity of the danger has been unveiled in successive stages, so that now it is impossible for any country which values freedom to be unaware of

* Reprinted in two parts, of which this is the first, from an article in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1951, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City. The second part of this article will be reprinted in the November issue of *External Affairs*.

it or to overlook its implications. The danger is complicated and multifold. It is complicated because international Communism is now used as a weapon of Soviet imperialism. It is multifold because the conspiracy with which we are confronted works sometimes through plausible propaganda, sometimes through espionage and subversion, sometimes through the threat of force, and sometimes, as in the case of Korea, through naked military aggression. The response to such a challenge, it is clear, must show not only strength, but wisdom and versatility. But the need for proper tactics cannot obscure the brute fact that military aggression is included in the armory of Cominform weapons and that, if the expansive force of Soviet imperialism issues in armed attack against other countries, it must be met by collective and armed resistance. The armed forces of the free world must, therefore, be increased in the face of the much greater forces which are now at the disposal of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Even more important, however, is the justified conclusion that the creation of adequate military strength, under collective control and for collective use, is now our best hope of deterring the Soviet Union from attempting further acts of aggression. As clearly as any other people, Canadians realize the jeopardy in which their own freedom, and indeed the cause of freedom throughout the world, has been placed by the imperialist ambitions of the Kremlin. It is for this reason that no substantial body of opinion in Canada has advocated a policy of isolation or "neutrality". All parties have been united in support of Canada's efforts, in co-operation with other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the United Nations to preserve peace by building collective strength as a deterrent to aggression.

II

The part that Canada is playing in this concerted international effort would not be possible were it not for the remarkable industrial growth which has been taking place during the last ten years. During the Second World War, the base of Canadian production was greatly widened by the establishment of new industries. Since 1945, our economy has shown exceptional resilience. The commercial dislocations produced by the war inevitably created difficulties for a country so heavily dependent on foreign trade. Nevertheless, though many of Canada's traditional markets have, unhappily, been curtailed, we have been able to find new markets in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, great new natural resources, such as the oil fields of Alberta and the iron ore deposits of Labrador, are being opened up. Perhaps the most comprehensive index of Canada's increasing industrial maturity is provided by her progress in the field of atomic energy. The country's natural resources and its scientific and technical competence have been such as to permit the construction of an atomic energy plant at Chalk River in Ontario to house what is perhaps the most advanced atomic reactor in the world today.

Even before the worsening international situation had led Canada into wider defence commitments, the growth and soundness of the Canadian economy had made possible a vigorous foreign economic policy. Between 1946 and 1951, for example, Canadian contributions for relief and development in other countries totalled 2 billion dollars. The bulk of this took the form of loans to the United Kingdom and other countries of Western Europe. In part, these loans were designed to finance Canada's export surplus during the years immediately after the war and to prevent the domestic dislocation which would have occurred if traditional customers had been forced by exchange difficulties to reduce drastically their imports from Canada. The loans were also, however, regarded in Canada as a contribution toward the re-establishment of a multilateral world economy based on liberal, nondiscriminatory trade policies and stabilized exchange rates, which would make possible a steady expansion of trade and the maintenance of high levels of employment in all countries.

Although Canada's foreign lending after the war was largely concentrated in Western Europe, some of it was directed to the Far East. Loans, for example, were

made both to China and to Indonesia. And previously, during the course of the war, the Chinese Nationalist Government had been the recipient of some Canadian Mutual Aid.

In making the detailed arrangements for these transactions, the Canadian Government for the first time was involved in some of the general problems of the Far East. During the last three years that involvement has increased at a very rapid rate. Far Eastern questions now absorb much of the attention of the Canadian Parliament and Government. The increase in interest in Asian matters among the public and the press has also been remarkable. In our Far Eastern relations, we have not so much been opening a new chapter as opening a whole new volume; for, until recently, Asia to most Canadians was a closed book. One of our provinces is on the Pacific and through its ports for many years missionaries, businessmen and travellers had passed on their way to and from the Far East. There had been a Canadian Legation in Tokyo before the war and substantial Canadian economic interests in Japan. The Canadian Government had participated in a number of negotiations on particular questions dealing with commerce, with the position of Canadian missionaries and with Asian immigration. But none of these concerns made it necessary for Canada to have what could conceivably be called a Far Eastern policy.

The extent of the recent change may be illustrated by Canada's active participation in the Colombo Plan for economic development in South and South-East Asia. Unlike previous Canadian financial assistance, it is not expected that this participation will be of direct economic benefit to Canada, since our export surplus has now dried up and any grants or loans must inevitably compete with the demands of our own economic development. The purpose of the Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan is, simply, to assist in raising the standard of living of friendly peoples on the other side of the globe whose well-being and stability are of importance to the whole of the free world — ourselves included.

As the area covered by the Colombo Plan would suggest, the main avenue of approach for Canada to the problems of Asia has been by way of the Indian sub-continent. India, Pakistan and Ceylon are all members of the Commonwealth, and Canadians have watched with close and sympathetic attention their achievement of independence. Precedents from Canadian constitutional history were not without value in arranging for the transfer of sovereignty to India and Pakistan which occurred in 1947; and the Canadian Government was able at a Commonwealth conference in April 1949 to offer some suggestions which made it easier to find a formula, which would permit India to remain within the Commonwealth even after it had become a republic. The meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers which was held in Colombo in January 1950 — the first Commonwealth conference to be held in Asia and the first to consider chiefly Asian issues — not only witnessed to the success of the constitutional evolution which had been taking place but also provided a further opportunity for Canada and other Commonwealth countries to become better acquainted with Far Eastern problems.

It will be noticed how significant a role the Commonwealth of Nations has played in this reorientation of Canada's interest toward the Far East. Of late years, Canada's attitude toward the Commonwealth has entered, I think, on a new phase. During the period when Canadian political leaders were achieving and consolidating autonomy for Canada in her external relations, it was perhaps natural that appreciation of the value of the Commonwealth association should not exclude, in many quarters, some considerable grain of wariness. This diffidence was kept alive by repeated proposals for centralized machinery which would have given institutional form to the very close and continuous, but often informal, co-operation already existing between members of the Commonwealth; proposals which were primarily designed, in the eyes of many who favored them, to enable all Commonwealth coun-

tries to have a single foreign policy. Canada consistently opposed these proposals, partly because, to many Canadians, collective action in those days seemed likely to be overly influenced by imperial interests; partly because such Commonwealth arrangements might have appeared to be an obstacle to closer co-operation with the United States. Canadian opinion is, I think, as strongly opposed as ever to a centralized Commonwealth; though for different reasons which arise out of the different circumstances of today. The problem, however, is no longer a serious one, because the new Commonwealth, with three Asian members, lends itself even less to centralizing proposals than the old one.

The nature of the present-day Commonwealth is now well understood, I think, in all of the member countries; and, for that reason, the reservations and even suspicions that have sometimes marked Canada's attitude in the past have largely died away. At the same time Canadians have been discovering new and positive advantages in their membership in this family of free nations. The lifeblood of the modern Commonwealth is constant exchange of information and constant consultation. This process brings Canada into close and friendly touch, not only with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which share with us the heritage of Western civilization, but also with some of the most important countries of Asia. In a world so plagued by divisions and misunderstandings as ours, it is no small advantage, I think, that Asian and Western leaders should be able to sit down together in Commonwealth meetings in an atmosphere of intimacy and complete equality. There are other links which connect the countries of Asia to the West — and in the course of time I hope there will be many more. Of those which exist at present, the Commonwealth of Nations provides, in my opinion, the most important. It is essential that it should be maintained, in the interest not only of its members but of all free states.

III

The Commonwealth, then, has helped to make Canada more conscious of Asia. We recognize that the growth of freedom in Asia is primarily the responsibility of Asian peoples themselves. There is much, however, which the countries of the West can do either to help or hinder this process; and it is clearly vital that their policies should be so designed as to promote development of free political institutions on a sound basis of social and economic well-being. If, through aggression or folly or inertia, the whole of Asia were to be allowed to fall under Communist domination, the free world would be tragically maimed and would be exposed to even greater dangers than it faces today. The problem of what Western countries, including Canada, should do is difficult, since the Asian panorama is so broad and, to Western eyes at least, so confused. Nevertheless, there are a number of landmarks which stand out through the mist and which have been taken by the Canadian Government as guides for policy. In the first place, in some Asian countries as elsewhere social changes are required. It is essential that nothing done by Western countries should impede in any way changes which are thought necessary and desirable by Asian opinion. Secondly, the standard of living throughout most of Asia is pitifully low. If ordinary men and women in the free countries of Asia are to feel attached to the new political institutions which they have established, they must be given hope of receiving some tangible benefits for themselves in the form of more food, more clothing, better housing and better protection from disease. This can be done only if the wealthier and more highly industrialized countries of the West are willing to assist. In honesty it must also be added, however, that economic help from abroad will have little effect if political animosities between Asian countries prevent them from making the best use of their own resources in the work of economic development. Third, the countries of Asia must be encouraged to take a large share in settling the many vexing political issues which cry out for solution. There is a complex network of racial, religious and cultural affiliations among the countries of Asia which cannot safely be

ignored and which can be of great use in the search for a stable and acceptable settlement of Asian problems. Fourth, the forces of nationalism are probably the most powerful influences on Asian opinion today. The achievement of national independence by these countries was to them an essential prerequisite for further progress. Any action by the West which could be interpreted as showing a desire for their retrogression to subordinate or colonial status would be bitterly resented. Absolute equality is now the only possible foundation for friendly relations between the countries of East and West. We must not let Communism become the accepted champion of nationalism and racial equality in Asia.

We in Canada have built a nation based on equality between two different cultures. I think that in working out a satisfactory and fruitful relationship between Asia and the West, this principle may prove as valuable as the doctrine of universal human rights. Certainly, we must remember that the civilization of the West has now to be regarded as only one of the independent civilizations to be found throughout the world. After a sleep of many centuries, the civilizations in the Far East, which had long lain quiescent or subdued, are stirring. They have had glorious achievements. They still have their own values; and they are demanding the right to develop them in their own way. The reemergence in a modern political form of these ancient civilizations, with their own individual traditions, should enrich the life of all men throughout the world.

If the Western world is successful in convincing the peoples of Asia that its policies are not dictated by considerations of pride or power, but are intended to create a world in which Far Eastern civilizations can develop freely; if we can show them that collective action against aggression does not mean support for reaction, or resistance to necessary change, then I think we may be confident of retaining the friendship of those Asian countries which are still free. We may also be bold enough to hope, I think, that the people of China will not indefinitely be willing to have their national interests subordinated to the imperial interests of Russia, and that the present unnatural alliance between Chinese nationalism and Soviet imperialism may be broken. In our determination, however, to meet the menace of Communist aggression in Asia or elsewhere, we should not be led, or misled, into policies which harness us to reactionary forces or blind us to the sincere groupings of millions of Asians for more bread and more freedom.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Forthcoming Session of the General Assembly

The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly will convene at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, November 6. The provisional agenda contains fifty-eight items, to which a number of supplementary items may be added. The session is expected to last until February 1952.

The Korean crisis will, of course, play a dominant role at Paris. At the present, however, it is profitless to speculate on the nature of the Assembly's debates on this question, until the results of the efforts now being made to achieve a cease-fire are known. Nevertheless, the problem of the relief and rehabilitation of this war-ravaged country is bound to be of primary importance for the Assembly, regardless of the outcome of the cease-fire talks.

Maintenance of Collective Security

Other items on the agenda will undoubtedly bring to the fore fundamental problems concerning the functions of the United Nations in maintaining collective security. For example, one question which will have to be decided is whether the studies of the present Collective Measures Committee will be continued in some form, or whether this body, set up by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, should be discontinued. Another similar question concerns the role of the Peace Observation Commission, which was also established by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. This body was formed in order to observe and report on situations in any area where international tension exists, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace. Up to date the Peace Observation Commission has not sent out any observers.

At this session another debate will probably take place on disarmament and the control of atomic energy. The immediate question to be decided is whether a single commission, responsible to the Security Council, should take over the functions now assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. It cannot, however, be expected that the debate on these vital problems will be confined to the narrow question of machinery.

A number of items on the agenda of this session have been discussed at least once before by the Assembly. The question of human rights is certain to be debated in several contexts, particularly in relation to the treatment of the indigenous inhabitants of dependent territories, and also perhaps with reference to the violation of fundamental human rights in several of the Balkan countries. The problem of Palestine is once more on the agenda. Once again, also, the Government of the Union of South Africa will be called upon to explain its position regarding the status of South-West Africa and the treatment of people of Indian origin living in South Africa. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans has now made its report to the Assembly. The future of this body, which was established in order to observe violations of Greece's borders by her northern neighbours, will also be one of the important political subjects before the Assembly.

Economic and Social Questions

In the economic and social field several questions will be coming up for consideration, arising principally from the recent session of the Economic and Social Council. Among these will be the financing of the economic development of under-developed countries, the draft Covenant on Human Rights, and the provision of

technical assistance to under-developed areas. The Assembly will also review the recommendations made by the Economic and Social Council for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the United Nations and the various specialized agencies with a view to increasing their efficiency and eliminating duplication. One other subject of urgent importance is the relief and resettlement of the vast numbers of refugees and displaced persons in various parts of the world. This problem has, of course, been greatly intensified during the past year by the huge number of refugees who have lost their homes because of the war in Korea.

Other items on the agenda concern trusteeship, legal and financial questions. Two of these items will no doubt give rise to considerable debate. One is the question of the participation of Italy in the Trusteeship Council, and the other is the problem of the scale of contributions by member states to the United Nations budget.

Finally the Assembly will be required to elect three member states to the Security Council and six to the Economic and Social Council. Elections to the International Court of Justice will also take place at this session.

The Economic and Social Council

The Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council adjourned on September 21, 1951. An account of its work during the month of August appeared in the September issue of *External Affairs*. Since then, the Council has examined a number of important problems.

Economic Questions

On the economic side, the Council reviewed the technical assistance activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. It approved a limited participation of the International Telecommunications Union and of the World Meteorological Organization in the expanded programme of technical assistance, and made provision for the financing of the programme in 1952. It also agreed to a more generous interpretation, in future, of the rules governing the furnishing of supplies and equipment in connection with training and demonstration projects.

On the initiative of the United States, which asserted that a number of pre-war international cartels were now being revived, the Council considered the need for international action in this field. It reaffirmed the principles relating to restrictive business practices contained in the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, and set up an ad hoc committee of nine members, including Canada, responsible for the submission of proposals for the implementation of these principles by international agreement.

Social and Humanitarian Questions

Among other social and humanitarian items, the Council had to determine whether the Convention on Freedom of Information, drafted by an ad hoc committee appointed by the General Assembly in 1950, was satisfactory, and whether a plenipotentiary conference should be called to complete and sign the proposed Convention. After having rejected a resolution proposed by France, Chile and India recommending such a conference, it adopted a resolution, sponsored by Canada, Peru and the United Kingdom, which states that the existence of a wide divergence of views concerning the restrictions and limitations which may legitimately be imposed upon freedom of information renders impossible, for the time being, the conclusion of a generally acceptable convention. This action by the Council conforms with the Canadian attitude toward the draft Convention and with the views submitted to the Canadian Government by the principal press, radio and film agencies in Canada.

Part of the debate on freedom of information was devoted to the Oatis case. After prolonged and bitter exchanges, mainly between the United States and Czechoslovakia, Poland and the U.S.S.R., the Council endorsed a United States resolution which "views with extreme concern all governmental action aimed at the systematic exclusion of bona fide correspondents" and urges strongly that personal restraints on such correspondents "be removed and sentences imposing arbitrary punishments be revoked".

The Council also had before it a report from the Commission on Human Rights regarding the draft International Covenant on Human Rights. Because of the difficulties encountered by the Commission in its attempts to formulate economic, social and cultural rights, the Council decided to invite the General Assembly to reconsider its earlier instructions to include, in one covenant, articles on those rights together with articles on civil and political rights. While recognizing the importance of economic, social and cultural rights, the Canadian delegation believed that it would be extremely difficult to formulate them in a way that could give rise to enforceable legal remedies. It therefore considered that the United Nations should at this stage concentrate on the completion of a covenant on political and civil rights.

The Council took note of a report by the Secretary-General on methods of international financing of European emigration. It deferred however any action on the Secretary-General's substantive recommendations until after the Migration Conference, held in Naples in October under the auspices of the International Labour Organization.

The Council also noted a report by the Secretary-General on measures for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. The report lists the offers of assistance for civilian relief, including the sum of \$7,250,000 already contributed by Canada to the United Nations Korean Relief Agency. The Council reaffirmed the hope that all members of the United Nations would, to the extent that their resources permit, find it possible to contribute to the Agency.

Reorganization of the Council

Finally, the Council took a number of decisions aimed at simplifying its complex structure and at organizing its work on a more efficient basis. In particular, it abolished the Economic, Employment and Development Commission and the three Sub-Commissions on Statistical Sampling, on Freedom of Information, and on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Human Rights and Narcotic Drugs Commissions will as before meet annually, while the remaining functional commissions will henceforth meet every two years. The three regional economic commissions (for Europe, for Latin America, and for Asia and the Far East) are maintained with only slight modifications in their terms of reference. The Council itself will continue to hold two regular sessions a year. Its second session will adjourn at least six weeks before the General Assembly and will be resumed for a few meetings in December to plan the work of the Council for the following year in the light of the new instructions addressed to it by the Assembly.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. M. Cadieux was posted from Ottawa, and attached to the Canadian Embassy in France until November 19, at which time he will proceed to the NATO Staff College on course.
- Mr. H. F. Davis was posted from the National Defence College, Kingston, to Ottawa, effective August 26, 1951.
- Miss F. M. Carlisle was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Embassy in Mexico, effective September 1, 1951.
- Mr. G. P. Kidd was posted from Ottawa, to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 1, 1951.
- Mr. J. L. Delisle was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Consulate General, Boston, effective September 13, 1951.
- Mr. G. W. J. Charpentier was posted from Ottawa, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in Australia, effective September 19, 1951.
- Mr. C. Hardy was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, effective September 15, 1951.
- Mr. E. H. Gilmour was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Embassy in the United States, effective September 15, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Mr. José de Oswaldo de Meira Penna, Second Secretary, Embassy of Brazil, September 6.

Mr. Raul José de Sa Barbosa, Third Secretary, Embassy of Brazil, September 6.

Captain Roberto A. Cabrera, Assistant Naval Attaché, Embassy of Argentina, September 7.

Mr. Jacques François Lorilleux, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of France, September 8.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mario de Perdigo Coelho, Assistant Air Attaché, Embassy of Brazil, September 13.

Miss Rukmini Menon, Second Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for India, September 28.

Departures

Mr. H. H. Woodward, Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, September 4.

Mr. Fernando Ramos de Alencar, First Secretary, Embassy of Brazil, end of September.

His Excellency Vicomte du Parc, Ambassador of Belgium, resumed charge of the Embassy on September 1 on his return from a vacation in Belgium.

His Excellency Primo Villa Michel, Ambassador of Mexico, left on September 10 for a visit to his country. During his absence Mr. Luis Fernandez MacGregor, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

CONSULAR

Exequaturs were issued to:

Mr. John C. L. Allen, Honorary Consul of Thailand at Toronto, August 27.

Mr. Ellis A. Bonnet, Consul of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, August 27.

Mr. Arthur Henry Carson, Honorary Consul of Thailand at Vancouver, August 27.

Mr. François de Vial, Consul General of France at Quebec, August 27.

Mr. Ricardo Almanza Gordo, Consul of Mexico at Vancouver, August 27.

Mr. Frederick W. Hinke, Consul of the United States of America at Victoria, August 27.

Mr. Vernon V. Hukee, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, August 27.

Mr. Perry N. Jester, Consul General of the United States of America at Hamilton, August 27.

Mr. Eugene H. Johnson, Consul of the United States of America at Regina, August 27.

Mr. Ernest de W. Mayer, Consul of the United States of America at Quebec, August 27.

Mr. Eduardo Padro Meyer, Consul of Mexico at Toronto, August 27.

Mr. Horatio T. Mooers, Consul General of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, August 27.

Mr. Ernesto Anselmo Noguez, Consul of Argentina at Montreal, August 27.

Mr. Guy Radenac, Consul of France at Vancouver, August 27.

Definitive recognition was granted to:

Mr. Norman E. Lamb as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, August 16.

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Andrew E. Hanney as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, September 6.

Miss Eva Taylor as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, September 15.

Mr. Ernst Wanner as Acting Consul of

Switzerland at Winnipeg, September 15.

Departures

Mr. Jay F. Steinmetz, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, August 20.

Mr. Francis C. Jordan, Consul of the United States of America at Quebec, August 24.

Mr. Edwin A. Steiner, Acting Consul of Switzerland at Winnipeg, September 11.

Mr. William A. Just, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, September 13.

Mr. D. V. Klein, Honorary Consul of Denmark at Toronto, September 25.

Mr. C. C. Busch, Honorary Consul of Denmark at Vancouver, September 25.

Mr. Perry N. Jester, Consul General of the United States of America at Hamilton, was absent from August 31 until September 24. During that period of time, Mr. G. Edward Reynolds, Vice-Consul at Toronto, was in charge of the Hamilton Office.

The appointment of Mr. John H. Morris as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, has been cancelled.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of September 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future: earlier conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs".)

(The Department of External Affairs, through its International Conferences Section, is responsible for co-ordinating all invitations to international conferences. The decision as to Canadian participation at such conferences is made by Cabinet upon the recommendation of the Department of Government functionally concerned.)

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs" January 1, 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions.)

Conferences Attended in September

1. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris—February 15. Observer: Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Mission, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.

2. *13th Session of ECOSOC.* Geneva—July 30. Representative: J. Lesage, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Deputy

Representative: J. Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance; Principal Adviser: E. B. Rogers, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Canadian Legation, Prague; Advisers: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; Miss B. M. Meagher, Department of External Affairs; S. S. Reisman and W. J. Callaghan, Department of Finance; L. A. D. Stephens, Canadian Embassy, The Hague; Secretary: K. D. McIlwraith, Permanent Delegation of

- Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
3. *Eighth Congress of the International Institute of Refrigeration (Executive Committee and General Conference)*. London—August 29 - September 11. W. H. Cook, Department of Agriculture; O. C. Young, Fisheries Research Board; J. G. Malloch and J. G. Robertson, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
 4. *First International Congress of Mass Radiology*. Sondalo, Italy—September 1-3. Dr. M. J. M. LaSalle, Canadian Immigration Medical Service, Rome. (Observer).
 5. *12th Session of Congress of Pure and Applied Chemistry and the 16th Session of the General Conference of International Union of Chemistry*. New York and Washington—September 3-13. E. W. R. Steacie, National Research Council.
 6. *ILO-WHO Meeting of Experts on Medical Standards for Immigration*. Rome—September 3-6. Dr. H. B. Jeffs, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
 7. *Forest Fire Study Tour (FAO)*. Washington—September 4 - October 12. J. C. MacLeod, Department of Resources and Development; T. E. Mackey, Department of Lands and Forests of the Province of Ontario.
 8. *Conference to Conclude a Treaty of Peace with Japan*. San Francisco—September 4-8. Delegates, L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; R. W. Mayhew, Minister of Fisheries; Chief Adviser: E. H. Norman, Acting Canadian Representative of Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York; P. T. Molson, Executive Assistant to the Head of Delegation; Secretary: J. J. McCardle, Department of External Affairs.
 9. *Sub-Committee on Rules of Procedure and Working Methods of the Legal Committee of ICAO*. Madrid—September 8. C. S. Booth, Council Member for Canada.
 10. *Fifth World Congress of the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples*. Stockholm—September 10-14. H. C. Hudson, Unemployment Insurance Commission.
 11. *International Foundry Congress*. Brussels—September 10-14. J. E. Rehder, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
 12. *Eighth Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO*. Madrid—September 11. C. S. Booth, Council Member for Canada; G. W. Nadeau, Air Transport Board.
 13. *Building Research Congress*. London—September 11 - October 18. R. F. Legget, National Research Council; M. F. Goudge, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
 14. *Fifth Conference on the Principles of Declassification of Atomic Energy*. Washington—September 14-15. Dr. W. B. Lewis, Dr. L. G. Cook and C. W. E. Walker, Representatives, Canadian Atomic Energy Project.
 15. *North Atlantic Council*. Ottawa—September 15-20. Delegates: L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; B. Claxton, Minister of National Defence; D. C. Abbott, Minister of Finance; Advisers: Department of External Affairs—A. D. P. Heeney, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; L. D. Wilgress, Canadian High Commissioner, London, and Member of NATO Council Deputies; J. Désy, Canadian Ambassador to Italy; H. O. Moran and C. S. A. Ritchie, Assistant Under-Secretaries; R. A. MacKay, A. F. W. Plumpre; A. G. S. Griffin; R. Campbell and J. Côté; Department of National Defence—R. O. Campney, Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Defence; C. M. Drury, Deputy Minister; Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff; Commodore H. S. Raynor; Air Commodore C. L. Annis; Department of Finance: W. C. Clark, Deputy Minister; R. B. Bryce, Assistant Deputy Minister; J. J. Deutsch; J. F. Parkinson; Department of Defence Production—M. W. Mackenzie, Deputy Minister; H. R. MacMillan; Press Officer: A. C. Anderson, Department of External Affairs; Secretary: H. F. Davis, Department of External Affairs.
 16. *World Tobacco Conference*. Amsterdam—September 17-24. Delegate: N. A. Macrae, Department of Agriculture; R. J. Haslam, Dominion Experimental Farm, Harrow, Ontario.
 17. *Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Geneva—September 17. Chairman: C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce; Deputy Chairman: C. M. Isbister, Department of Trade and Commerce; Parliamentary Adviser: J. Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance; Delegates: L. Couillard, Permanent Delegate of Canada to O.E.E.C., Paris; W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; M. Schwarzman, Department of Trade and Commerce; Secretary: M. K. Goldschlag, Department of External Affairs.
 18. *Sixth Meeting of the International Tin Study Group*. Rome—September 24. Delegate: V. L. Chapin, Canadian Embassy, Brussels.

19. *Fifth Meeting of the Pan-American Sanitary Organization (WHO)*. Washington — September 24 - October 2. R. W. A. Dunn, Canadian Embassy, Washington.
20. *Meeting of Commonwealth Supply Ministers*. London — September 24-29. C. D. Howe, Minister of Defence Production;
- T. N. Beaupre, Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Defence Production; R. P. Bower, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
21. *International Plant Protection Convention (FAO)*. Rome — September 25-27. W. N. Keenan, Department of Agriculture.

Conferences to be held in October and November

1. *Preliminary Migration Conference (ILO)*. Naples — October 2-16.
2. *Second Meeting of the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization*. Lausanne — October 3.
3. *Fifth American and Fourth Mexican Congresses on Urology*. Mexico City — October 8-23.
4. *Economic Commission for Asia and Far East — Regional Conference on Trade Promotion*. Singapore — October 9-18.
5. *Sixth International Conference and General Assembly of the International Union of Travel Organizations*. Athens — October 9-12.
6. *World Metallurgical Congress*. Detroit — October 15-19.
7. *79th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Health*. San Francisco — October 15.
8. *Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe*. Strasbourg — October 15.
9. *Tenth Session of Executive Committee of IRO*. Geneva — October 18.
10. *First Pan-American Congress on Veterinary Medicine*. Lima — October 20-26.
11. *Eighth Session of the General Council of IRO*. Geneva — October 22.
12. *Third Session of the Permanent Committee of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works*. Paris — October 25-27.
13. *First Inter-American Convention on Mineral Resources*. Mexico City — October 29 - November 4.
14. *Programme Committee of UNICEF*. Paris — October 29.
15. *Fifth Meeting of the South Pacific Air Transport Council*. Wellington, N.Z. — October 29.
16. *Meeting of Fisheries Statistics of FAO*. Rome — October 29 - November 3.
17. *Meeting of Commonwealth Auditors General*. London — October.
18. *North Atlantic Council — Military Committee*. Rome — October - November.
19. *North Atlantic Council — Annual*. Rome. October - November.
20. *Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. Paris — November 4.
21. *Executive Board of UNICEF*. Paris — November 4.
22. *Conference of British Commonwealth Statisticians*. Canberra — November 12-24.
23. *13th Session of the Council of FAO*. Rome — November 12-17.
24. *117th Session of the Governing Body of ILO*. Geneva — November 14-24.
25. *Sixth Session of the Conference of FAO*. Rome — November 19.
26. *Technical Problems Relating to Food Aspects of Civilian Defence*. London — November 21 - December 13.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

Canadian Representatives Abroad and Representatives of Other Countries in Canada, September 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 51/32—*Freedom of Information*, a statement by Mr. Jean Lesage, Head of the Canadian Delegation to the 13th Session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, made at Geneva on August 13, 1951.
- No. 51/33—*General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, delivered to the Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at Geneva, on September 17, 1951.
- No. 51/34—*The Ottawa Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made over the Trans-Canada network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, September 21, 1951.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Melbourne (83 William Street)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Belgian Congo.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Casier Postal 373)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (46, rue Montoyer)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
".....	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Colombo (P.O. Box 1006)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Bank of London and South America Bldg.)
China.....	Consul General.....	Shanghai (27 The Bund)
Colombia.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Bogotá (Calle 19, No. 6-39 fifth floor Seguros)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida de las Misiones No. 17)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Prague 2 (Krkowska 22)
Denmark.....	Minister.....	Copenhagen (Osterbrogade 26)
Egypt.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Cairo (Osiris Building, Sharia Walda, Kasr-el-Doubara)
Finland.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvagen 7-C)
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris 16e (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Ambassador.....	Bonn (Zittelmansstrasse, 14)
".....	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Commonwealth House)
".....	Consul.....	Frankfurt (145 Fuerstenbergerstrasse)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 Queen Sofia Blvd.)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City No. 28, 5th Avenue South)
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Hong Kong (Hong Kong Bank Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
".....	Commercial Secretary.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via Saverio Mercadante 15)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Canadian Bank of Commerce Chambers)
Japan.....	Head of Mission.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3 Chome, Minato-Ku)

Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 1A)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)
Norway.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plaas 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole)
"	Commercial Secretary.....	" (Hotel Metropole)
Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Tuason Bldg., 8-12 Escolta)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (Hotel Bristol)
Portugal.....	Acting Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Lisbon (Rua Rodrigo da Fonseca, 103)
Singapore.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room D-5, Union Building)
Spain.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Madrid (Avenida José Antonio 70)
Sweden.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvagen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Minister.....	Berne (Thunstrasse 95)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (43 St. Vincent St.)
Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (211, Ayranci Baglari, Kavaklidere)
"	Commercial Secretary.....	Istanbul (Istiklal Caddesi, Kismet Han 3/4, Beyoglu)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (24, Barclay's Bank Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grand Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Building)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushny Pereulok)
"	Chargé d'Affairs, a.i.	"
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Avenue)
"	Consul General.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
"	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
"	Consul.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
"	Trade Commissioner.....	Los Angeles (Associated Realty Bldg.)
"	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
"	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (503, 120 Exchange Street)
"	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
Venezuela.....	Consul General.....	Caracas (8° Peso Edificio America)
Yugoslavia.....	Ambassador.....	Belgrade (Sv. Markovica, 20)
*OEEC.....	Representative.....	Paris 16e (c/o Canadian Embassy)
United Nations.....	Permanent Delegate.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
"	Permanent Delegate.....	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the House of Commons on October 22, 1951.

Relations with the United States

In making what I might call a "tour d'horizon", I think it is desirable that I should begin with our relations with that country which is nearest to us, the United States of America. The day-to-day problems between Canada and the United States are growing in complexity and number and scope, but are approached in almost every case from either side with a desire to find fair and mutually satisfactory solutions. It is natural that these contacts between our two countries, especially in the field of defence and defence supply, should have increased as we work together with other states in a closely knit coalition to safeguard the peace. The United States is the powerful leader of that coalition, I suppose by any test.

Of course it is quite normal that we in Canada should be preoccupied with that leadership and with the power behind it. Not long ago the spectre that haunted Canadian policy makers in this field of foreign affairs was that the United States would remain aloof from international efforts which were being made to protect the peace against nazi and fascist aggression. We sometimes worry now lest the United States may feel it necessary to pursue policies inside our coalition which the other members cannot wholeheartedly follow, or that inadequate co-operation from those other members may discourage American effort and leadership to the point where Washington may even decide, on some unhappy day, to go it alone.

Any Canadian government is bound to do what it can to remove either of these unhappy possibilities. This may mean at times expressing its own views forthrightly in other places including of course Washington itself. This is indeed a first principle of Canadian diplomacy deriving from the inescapable fact that no country in the world has less chance of isolating itself from the effect of American policies and decisions than Canada. We must recognize, however—and I am sure we do recognize—that a diplomacy of this kind, depending as it does on the influence we exert with greater powers, can only be carried out successfully if our interventions are restrained, responsible and constructive, and if we act in discharging our own obligations in a way which deserves the respect of our friends.

In addition, all of us inside the coalition must avoid words, actions or reactions which will weaken our unity without any compensating advantage to the national interest. I do not mean by this that we should hide our differences by pretending that none ever existed. In any coalition, indeed in any neighbourly relationship, there are bound to be honest differences, and unless they are examined and discussed frankly they may fester underground and poison the relationship. It is, however—and I am sure all hon. members will agree with me—of vital importance that in any such discussions of differences we should act with good temper and in good faith; that we should always display a sense of responsibility, a sense of proportion, and indeed I suggest at times a sense of humour. Our effort should constantly be not to score points at each other's expense but to come to agreed solutions.

St. Lawrence Seaway

There is one question in our relations with the United States, that of the St. Lawrence seaway, concerning which we have not been able to reach such an agreed solution. We would like to see that seaway built as an international project as a witness to our good neighbourhood and close co-operation. That, however, has not been possible, and the action, or rather the inaction, of the United States Congress,

which adjourned last Saturday night, shows, I think, that it is not going to be possible to secure agreement with the United States on this matter at an early date. Therefore we are prepared to recommend that this seaway should be built by Canada, and we shall soon request and expect to receive that co-operation from the United States government which it must be remembered is required under the boundary waters treaty.

The following steps remain in fact to be taken before the Canadian development can take place. In Canada, authorizing legislation, as announced in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present session of Parliament, is required and will be introduced to provide for the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, and to provide for an appropriate agency of the Federal Government to deal with the construction of the seaway. Then an agreement, the terms of which have already been worked out, must be concluded with the Government of Ontario for the construction by the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission, together with the appropriate authority in the United States, of the power development in the international rapids section of the river, and with respect to the division of costs between power and navigation. There must also be an agreed division of responsibility with the United States agency for the construction of these power development works. Then, although the situation is somewhat different because the international section of the St. Lawrence stops before the Quebec border is reached, steps are being taken to work out an agreement with the Province of Quebec covering possible power developments in that province arising out of the Canadian waterways construction.

And, finally, from the point of view of Canadian action, an application by the Ontario authorities for the construction of the power works must be transmitted by the Canadian Government to the International Joint Commission for approval there.

Then, on the United States side, a decision must be made—and I am now talking of the construction of the Canadian seaway—a decision must be made and approved by the President as to what agency in the United States will be responsible for constructing the United States part of the power project in the international section of the St. Lawrence River. That is a complicated problem in which many United States political considerations are no doubt involved, and the solution of the problem may take some time. At least, it cannot I suppose be reached overnight.

Secondly, for United States action, the agency which is to be responsible for the construction of the United States part of the power development must obtain a licence from the United States Power Commission. The procedure for obtaining such a licence involves public hearings before the Commission, to which all interested parties must be given an opportunity to present their views.

And thirdly, for United States action again, an application by the agency responsible for the construction in the United States must be transmitted for approval by the United States Government to the International Joint Commission in conjunction with a similar application by Ontario.

So far as Canadian action is concerned, that part of it which is a responsibility of the Federal Government will be pressed without any delay. That is all I wish to say this afternoon, though I could say much more if time permitted, on our relations with our great and friendly neighbour.

Relations with the Commonwealth

May I say a word at this time about our relations with the nations of the Commonwealth? Those are, as usual, on a good and friendly basis. There is full exchange of information and adequate consultation. We are satisfied with the existing position. . . . There is nothing static about our Commonwealth of Nations, nor is there anything static in Canada's attitude to this Commonwealth of Nations . . . Our attitude has I think altered somewhat toward the Commonwealth in recent years. During the

period when Canadian political leaders of all parties were achieving and consolidating autonomy for Canada in her domestic, and later in her external, relations it was I think natural that appreciation of the value of the Commonwealth association should not exclude in many quarters some degree of what I might call wariness. This wariness was kept alive by repeated proposals for centralized machinery which would have given institutional form to the very close and continuous, but often informal, co-operation which existed between the members of the Commonwealth. Canada consistently opposed these proposals, because, to many Canadians, collective action in those days seemed likely to be overly influenced by imperialist interests, also because such Commonwealth arrangements might have appeared to be an obstacle to closer co-operation with the United States. Though Canadian opinion is I think as strongly opposed as ever to a separate and centralized Commonwealth, that problem however is no longer a serious one because the new Commonwealth, with its three Asian members, lends itself less to centralizing proposals than the old one did.

The nature of the present-day Commonwealth, based on complete freedom of its members, along with the accepted obligations of those members to work together to the greatest possible extent, is now well understood in all the member countries. For this reason, I think the reservations and indeed even the hesitations that have sometimes marked Canada's attitude in the past have largely died away. At the present time Canadians have been discovering new and positive advantages in their membership in this association of free nations. The life blood of the modern Commonwealth is constant exchange of information, free and full consultation and a strong and genuine desire to co-operate. That process brings Canada into close and friendly touch not only with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which share this heritage of western civilization, but also with some of the most important countries of Asia. In a world so plagued by division and misunderstanding as ours is today, it is no small advantage that Asian and Western leaders should be able to sit down together in Commonwealth meetings in an atmosphere of close, friendly and complete equality.

There are other links which connect the countries of Asia to the west, and in the course of time I hope there will be many more. Of those which exist at the present time, in my opinion, the Commonwealth nations provide the most important. It is essential that it should be maintained in the interest not only of its members but of all the states.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

There is another group of free states with which we are proud to be associated, namely, those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The seventh meeting of the Council of the organization took place in Ottawa in September last. I think we were proud and privileged that Ottawa should have been chosen as the scene of that meeting. It was the first time that the North Atlantic Council meeting met under the new order by which it is a council of governments rather than a council merely of foreign ministers. On this occasion the countries were represented by two or three members of each government.

It was a successful meeting itself, and also a great deal of valuable preparatory work was done towards the next meeting which will take place in Rome near the end of November. This may prove to be an even more important session than the recent one. I believe it would be agreed by all those who had the privilege of attending this meeting that the habit of consultation is growing up amongst the North Atlantic group, and that a feeling of community is being developed. We have come to the conclusion that meetings of this Council should be held, not merely to settle crises, but for the continuing business of co-operation. Meetings for that purpose, and it was agreed we should have more of them than we have had in the past, should become as normal as meetings of Parliament.

At this council meeting two goals of the North Atlantic organization were discussed, the short term goal and the long term goal. The short term goal is how to increase our security against military aggression, and the long term goal is how to promote economic and social stability among all the nations of the North Atlantic community; how to bring those nations that make up that community closer together. As for the short term goal, we reviewed our defence programme, and we took an important step which is, I think, related to this programme. We recommended the admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A protocol for that purpose was drawn up and signed in London on Wednesday last by, among others, our representative, the High Commissioner. This protocol will be submitted to this Parliament later for approval before ratification by the Government.*

In this connection it might be desirable to postpone that discussion until we see what happens in regard to ratification in other countries which are even more directly concerned with this matter than we are, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. To my mind there is no question about the desirability of bringing Greece and Turkey into closer association with North Atlantic defence plans. In recent years these two countries have stood in the forefront of the common defence against communist imperialism and aggression. They have given proof of their devotion to the cause of freedom and collective security, not only at home but on the hills and plains of Korea. I believe it is true to say that a full-scale attack on either of them would vitally weaken the defence of Western Europe, and would probably mean a general war.

The problem, then, is how to remove the temptation for such an attack by building up collective defence arrangements in the areas of the Mediterranean. It was felt by some members of the North Atlantic group that probably the best way to do this would be by agreement on a Mediterranean security pact which could have some form of association with the North Atlantic pact. That was a non-NATO solution, and was attractive to some members of the Council but was opposed by others, more particularly the United States of America. Indeed, it was opposed by those countries most concerned with this matter, Turkey and Greece, as well as by the military authorities of the North Atlantic Organization. It may be argued that the full membership of these nations in the North Atlantic group will mean the extension of our commitments. In theory, that is the case, but I suggest it is more than compensated for by the deepening of our security, adding greatly to our collective defensive strength and thereby making an attack on any one of us less likely.

In any event, the extension of our commitments in this way is more theoretical than actual. If an attack took place on Greece or Turkey, it would not really make very much difference in regard to the extension of the war whether or not they were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whether or not they belonged to a Mediterranean pact, or indeed whether Turkey or Greece had only their existing treaty obligations. I, for one, agree it is normally unwise to extend the specific commitments of this country, in contrast with our general commitments under the United Nations Charter which, as we know from Korea, can be specific enough. I agree it would be unwise to extend these additional specific commitments, unless such extension is effective from the point of view of enlarging the defensive strength of the coalition and strengthening peace. It was felt by the Council that the admission of Greece and Turkey to the council would have this result. It is not, I submit, a provocation to any power that does not contemplate aggression, any more than the membership of Norway on the north flank of the North Atlantic community is a provocation.

In any event the greatest provocation to Soviet imperialism is not strength but is weakness. It was Karl Marx himself who said that the Russian bear is capable of anything, especially when he knows the other animals are capable of

* See p. 387.

nothing. Well, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be capable of doing much more for the defence of peace with Greece and Turkey as members. I hope, therefore, that the Russian bear will be capable of doing much less against us.

Other defence questions were discussed at this Council meeting. The Council received the report of the Finance and Economic Board and the Defence Production Board, which were concerned with two more forms of the problem of creating the necessary military strength for General Eisenhower's integrated force in Western Europe. It was realized by the Council that the studies which had been under way in this field through subordinate agencies of the Council had reached the stage where they should be coordinated, and that this could be achieved by a consultation on the high political level, to reconcile the political, economic and military aspects of the problem. This problem is not simply one of providing forces. The European members of the organization made that quite clear to us. It is also the problem of preserving the economic stability of the member countries, so a temporary ministerial committee was set up by the council to solve this fundamental problem. Lest it be thought that this is just another high level piece of international machinery being created for an indefinite time, it was made clear that this committee was set up for the single purpose of recommending a course of action and reconciling and I quote:

... the requirements of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of western Europe, and the realistic politico-economic capabilities of the member countries.

That committee is to report at the next meeting in Rome...

So much then for the short term objective. The long term objective of the North Atlantic pact was also given much more serious discussion at this meeting of the Council than it had received at any time previously. It was admitted by all that that is not an objective of prior and immediate importance. Defence must come first. In our preoccupation with anything else, we must never forget that. We did feel, though, that it was important also to give serious examination to the non-military objectives of NATO, especially as some of them have a direct bearing on defence itself. They include the closer association of member countries for the promotion of collective well-being and economic and social stability. It became increasingly clear at the Council meeting that particularly those countries in Europe which were feeling most the economic burden of their defence contributions needed a long term aim for the backing of faith and confidence which is so necessary if this organization is to succeed.

To them the problem is not merely to provide for military defence from an abundance of resources; it is a peacetime struggle for stability and indeed for survival after a period of great difficulty, distress and even destruction. So we thought that this required that attention should be paid to the non-military aspects of the treaty which are described in Article 2 of that treaty; to the building up of the North Atlantic community. One often hears this term "Atlantic community" these days without any clear idea what it means. I readily admit that I am probably one of those most guilty of using it without a definite picture of what path its development may follow. But I believe this lack of precision is the result of the healthy circumstance that this community is growing out of satisfactory and practical solutions to common problems, not from preconceived plans for a grandiose if airy structure. At the Ottawa meeting it was clear that a spirit of community, as I have already stated, was developing on solid foundations; that these foundations should now be strengthened; that they should form the basis for closer consultation on foreign policy matters so that decisions would not be made, or certainly would not be announced by any one member of the group without discussing that problem with the other members of the group.

It was also felt that we should work for greater co-operation in the economic sphere, for the strengthening of our free institutions, and for promoting a better understanding between and conditions of well-being among our various peoples.

To promote this development a ministerial committee of five was set up in Ottawa, representing Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Canada. It will begin its work at Paris on Monday next, though useful preparatory work has been done in London by a group of officials under the chairmanship of a member of the Department of External Affairs. The chairmanship of this ministerial committee falls to me as the next president of the Council; so, as the Prime Minister has indicated, I shall have to attend its meetings when I am in Europe for the meetings of the United Nations Assembly. We have welcomed the appointment of this committee but we do not expect, nor should we expect, immediate or, indeed, early concrete results. Indeed, the Atlantic community is something which will take many years, many decades to develop. That does not mean, however, that we should not work and plan towards this great end now.

To work towards the establishment of a North Atlantic community of nations, all sharing in the great legacy from the past, all with their own special contributions to make in the future, all pledged to be of mutual assistance to one another, is surely a task worthy of our finest efforts and of our greatest zeal. The goal of such a society, strong, varied and secure but not self-centered or exclusive, and anxious to profit by contact with other civilizations, is, it seems to me, an ideal which can support and encourage us all through all the difficulties of the present time.

The Position of Germany

There is one great Western European state which was absent from our Ottawa meeting, but which was very much in our thoughts. I refer to Germany, a country which has made such a great contribution to the growth of and indeed to the destruction of European civilization.

At our Rome meeting the question of free Germany's association in our common defence will be considered, and some highly important decisions may require to be taken then.

I am sure that all hon. members of the House are familiar with the reasons which have made it impossible to conclude a peace settlement with Germany. The main one is the continued division of that country into two areas of occupation, and the refusal of the U.S.S.R., which occupies one area, to permit any German unity except on a basis which they think will ensure communist control—that is Russian control—of the united country. Unity, based on free self-government, must one day soon come to Germany; and, if it is on the right basis, the sooner the better; but it must not come in such a way that a united Germany will be forced to go the way of a united Poland and Czechoslovakia, and become a united Russian satellite.

In the absence of a peace settlement, I think it will be agreed that this nation, whose continued democratic and peaceful development is so important to all of us and to the future of Europe, should not remain indefinitely in its present position. It is in all our best interests that Germany should be encouraged to assume increasing responsibility for the guidance of its own destinies, on the basis of equality within but not domination of the European community. We therefore welcome the progress that has been made toward the closer association of Western Germany with the free world, both at the political level and in terms of German participation in European defence. We also share the desire that a satisfactory conclusion of arrangements for a new contractual relationship replacing the present occupation statute should be achieved in the near future in such a manner as to secure the

wholehearted co-operation of the German people. Yet it must be recognized that the path towards this goal may not be an easy one and that many difficulties lie ahead. However desirable may be the integration of Western Germany in the European community, we must not forget, nor must the Germans forget, the fact that co-operation involves a sharing of responsibilities and that no encouragement should be given to any tendency in Germany to look upon the present negotiation as an opportunity to obtain unconditional guarantees of German security or to assume that we are willing to pay almost any price for German assistance in the defence of Western Europe, even to the extent of accepting with complacency neo-nazi tendencies.

The Middle East

I should like to cross the Mediterranean and say a few words about the Middle East, which is very much on our minds these days, and about which I spoke in a special connection in the House last week. The crisis in Egypt following close on the heels of another dispute in the Middle East which for a time threatened to erupt into violence and which still smoulders. This Anglo-Iranian oil dispute which had been developing for some time, began its present phase on March 20 with the passage of the oil nationalization law by the Iranian Parliament. It has since witnessed the complete shutdown of the vast Iranian oil industry, the expulsion of all United Kingdom oil personnel from that industry, and a reference of the dispute to the United Nations Security Council, the inconclusive result of which brings little credit to that body.

I do not intend to review in detail, because I have not sufficient time in which to do so, the events which have taken place in Iran, in Egypt and elsewhere throughout the Middle East in recent months; but I should like to refer briefly to some of the forces which are at play behind the present unrest in this strategic Middle East area and to try to place them in perspective against the wider background of the security of the Western world. The Iranian and Egyptian disputes have many elements in common; and indeed there is reason to believe that one is the emotional and possibly the political consequence of the other. Both disputes have been characterized by the unilateral breach of a solemn pledge, thereby injuring the structure of international law. Both have had as their original inspiration the natural and justifiable wish of states which have experienced periods of foreign intervention to assert their right to be masters of their domestic affairs, even if in the pursuit of this understandable objective they may do great damage to their own countries.

What is happening in the Middle East is another manifestation, if a distorted one, of the national awakening which in so many parts of the Middle East has led to revolt against outside influences, which often has very quickly deteriorated from legitimate nationalism to militant xenophobia, and indeed now threatens to upset by force all stability in the Middle East, and possibly also in North Africa.

It would be folly indeed to underestimate the strength of this movement, as it would be folly to misunderstand the basis of its inspiration. The tragedy for these countries and a danger to themselves, and indeed to world peace, lies in their blind refusal to recognize that, in their anxiety to gain full control of their affairs by the elimination of foreign influence, they are exposing themselves to the menace of communist penetration and absorption—absorption into the Soviet sphere.

Certainly there is no assurance that countries of the Middle East are capable of defending themselves from outside attack, and with their present stage of economic, political and social development, it is doubtful whether, without the support which the West is able and willing to give them, these countries are capable of maintaining a sufficient level of internal stability to resist the relentless pressure of international communism. On the contrary the unsatisfactory social and economic

conditions which prevail throughout this area render that whole area a fertile ground in which communism, which has already succeeded in falsely identifying itself with nationalism, will thrive and eventually dominate, if allowed to grow unchecked.

Surely it must be abundantly clear that such development would remove at one stroke the independence which the countries concerned claim to be their only objective. The Middle East is strategically far too important to the defence of the North Atlantic area to allow it to become a power vacuum or to pass into unfriendly hands.

It is therefore a matter of major importance to the security of the whole free world, and that includes us, and in the interest of the Middle Eastern states themselves, that the situation in the Mediterranean area be stabilized as quickly as possible, and that the principle of collective security and collective action be extended to embrace this vital area. And indeed a proposal to that effect, as I said last week in the House, had already been made to the Egyptian Government just before they took the action they did take. As we know in the North Atlantic pact, there is no incompatibility between responsible participation in such a collective system and the full exercise of national sovereignty.

The Situation in Korea

Now I turn for a moment to the Far East, to Korea, where a war sometimes called, but is not in our minds, the forgotten war, drags on its weary and bloody way. The aggressor there shows no disposition to cease his aggression. However, the United Nations forces, more broadly representative than when I spoke on the subject last, are showing at heavy cost to themselves, but far heavier cost to the enemy, that aggression does not pay.

The temporary optimism from the initiation of the cease-fire talks was not maintained for very long, but there had been better news in the last few days, and I hope that the period of delaying tactics by the communists may be now over, and that an armistice can be arranged. Certainly the United Nations are not rebuffing any move which might lead to the end of the war. But certainly we also have to be careful in how we deal with any such proposal made from the other side.

If I may adapt a quotation, our motto in that part of the world at the present time might well be: Trust in Kaesong but keep your powder dry. I think it is fair to say also that the United Nations Supreme Commander in the field, General Ridgway, is handling these negotiations with skill, patience and an unprovocative firmness which must command our wholehearted admiration.

Korea is only one problem. There are other Asian questions. So far as we are concerned in this government, we remain willing to discuss these other Asian questions with all those concerned, and to negotiate in respect of them through the United Nations.

There is very real danger in having our diplomacy frozen in the Far East and allowing ourselves no room to manoeuvre. So I suggest we should keep our policy in that part of the world, even now, as flexible as possible. However—and this is important—before we can proceed to any of these further Asian matters which are dealt with in the United Nations resolution of last February, which I think is still valid, the aggression in Korea must first be brought to an end. That is the immediate danger, and that is our immediate purpose, to end that war on honourable terms. If and when that can be done we will not refuse to discuss any other Asian questions relevant to the situation out there.

But aggression is not the only enemy in Korea. There is the enemy of hunger, poverty and misery, the source and the strength of that communism which the Russians have used in other countries for their own unworthy purposes.

I know the House will be glad and proud to know that in the matter of relief of distress in Korea in recent months no country has made a greater contribution than Canada. Indeed I do not know whether any country has contributed as much as Canada. I think however it is true to say that no matter what happens in Korea, the people there have already lost. They are disillusioned and desolate. In that sense the West has also lost; and this is not the least of the tragedies arising out of the Korean aggression.

The Colombo Plan

In referring to this important matter of fighting communism by fighting distress hunger and privation in Asia I should—perhaps I should apologize for the length of time I am taking—say a few words about the development of the Colombo Plan since we last met.

On May 14 last I reported that shortly after our contribution of \$25 million had been voted by this Parliament we took steps to implement our share of the plan by asking the Indian and Pakistan Governments to send over representatives to discuss with us the projects we might finance, or help to finance, having in mind those items which Canada is best fitted to undertake.

Since then we have made some considerable progress, and have had discussions with representatives of those two Governments. In the case of Pakistan, to which we have allocated approximately two-fifths of the total contribution, several interesting projects have been selected. Among these, to name only a few, are an experimental and demonstration livestock farm which we are undertaking, jointly with New Zealand and Australia, and for which Canada expects to supply machinery; an irrigation project for which we expect to provide some pumping equipment; a large colonization or settlement project in the Thal area of the Punjab, for which we hope to provide such items of equipment as dump trucks, motors, pumps and some electrical and transport equipment.

So far as India is concerned, as we foreshadowed in my earlier statement, we have been asked by the Indian Government, and have agreed, to make available a large part of our allocation to that country in the form of wheat. The provision of foodstuffs was clearly envisaged in the original Colombo Plan report, and we think will provide a most welcome support to India in her efforts to combat famine and basically to strengthen her economy. The Indian Government intends to set up what are known as counterpart funds. The rupee equivalent of the value of the wheat we are providing to them will be used as internal financing for development projects they are undertaking under the plan. Those funds would be available for purchases of material within India and of course for Indian labour. We are continuing at the present time to explore with the Indian authorities projects requiring external finance to which we could apply funds over and above those which are being used for wheat. One particular project is an irrigation project in west Bengal to increase rice production in that area.

Japanese Peace Treaty

I cannot leave this part of the world without making a reference to the Japanese peace treaty . . . which was signed at San Francisco on September 8. That was a conference called, not to negotiate a treaty but to sign a treaty. The signature took place only after eleven months of serious diplomatic discussions during which time all the governments concerned including the government of the U.S.S.R., had ample opportunity to express their views. Certainly we expressed our views in regard to the draft which had been submitted originally to us by the United States of America. As a result of those views certain changes were made in the draft. Not all the changes were made that we wished to have made, but in a treaty of this kind you cannot get unanimity with perfection.

On the whole, the treaty as it was signed was considered by the Canadian representatives there to be a good treaty. Of course there were some important omissions in the countries represented at San Francisco, particularly China and India. As far as China was concerned, the reason for that omission was obvious. If the representatives of the Chinese Government on Formosa had been invited to attend that conference, certain delegations would not have turned up. If the representatives of the Communist Government in China had been invited to attend that conference, then more delegations would not have turned up. The obvious thing to do under the circumstances was to postpone the problem of Chinese representation and Chinese accession to the treaty. We regretted also the absence of India for reasons which seemed good to that Government.

But there were other free Asian nations which were present at San Francisco and they spoke in no uncertain way. In signing this treaty we did so, not as a treaty of revenge but of reconciliation. Of course the treaty leaves Japan a much weaker state than she was when she entered the war, and that is as she should be. She has been stripped of all her outer islands and has been reduced to the four main islands. Her capacity to commit aggression again in the future has been very sensibly and very rightly diminished. But although Japan is weaker as a result of this treaty, she is not prostrate, nor, I hope, bitter. I like to think also that this treaty is one treaty after a war which does not bear within it the seeds of future wars. We do not know about that, of course, for sure, and we may not know for many years. In signing a treaty of this type you have to take a calculated risk, but in view of the alternatives those risks on this occasion were worth taking.

This treaty brings Japan back into the family of free nations on the Pacific and gives her an opportunity to contribute to the peace and security there. We hope that she will take advantage of that opportunity. In any event 83 million disciplined, frugal, hard-working and intelligent people cannot be ignored, whether we sign a treaty with them or not.

We also had some special interests in this treaty and we made those known at the conference. We expressed the hope that Japan would not return to certain international trade practices of before the war which had caused so much trouble to so many countries, including our own. We were also interested in the fisheries question. We had hoped at one time that a fisheries agreement would be included in the peace treaty, but that was not possible. However, there was included in the treaty a clause which made it incumbent upon Japan to begin discussions with the United States and Canada for a fisheries arrangement. Those discussions have been going on since the treaty was signed. Satisfactory progress has been made and I hope that an announcement in regard to that progress can be made within the next day or two.

The treaty is now ready for ratification. I think it would be wise on our part before it is submitted to parliament for approval or otherwise, before ratification, to wait and see what happens in Tokyo and Washington, especially in Tokyo where it is now being considered by the Japanese Legislature. It opens a new chapter in our relations with Japan. I hope it will be a happier chapter than that which we have just closed. I think it also opens a new chapter in the security of the Pacific which is just as much a Canadian interest as is the security of the Atlantic.

Pacific Security Arrangements

It may be asked, indeed, and it has already been asked, "why not try to guarantee peace in the Pacific with a pact as you have tried to guarantee it in the Atlantic?" Within a few hours of signing the Japanese Peace Treaty the United States signed a defence pact with Japan. Recently she signed a defence pact with the Philippines, I think on August 30 last. She signed a security arrangement on September 1 last with New Zealand and Australia. But none of these arrangements, not even the tripartite arrangement which I referred to last, constitute anything like a Pacific pact.

Mr. Truman called the New Zealand-Australia-United States security arrangement a natural initial step in consolidation of peace in the Pacific, and that is what it is. It differs from the North Atlantic pact in another way. The obligation assumed under this tripartite Pacific arrangement is to be found in article 4 which reads:

That an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

As far as this government is concerned, I think we could almost accept that obligation at the present time, without any Pacific pact, with most of the countries with whose security in the Pacific we are concerned. But this is not a Pacific pact, so the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra asks why we do not take the lead in negotiating such a Pacific pact. Leaving aside for the moment the propriety of Canada taking leadership in this effort, I suggest that it would be impracticable at the present time to negotiate a Pacific pact similar to the North Atlantic pact. The best proof of that fact is that the United States has separate pacts with Japan, with the Philippines, with New Zealand and with Australia. If the United States has made separate pacts with those countries she did so because she did not think it desirable or practicable to make a general pact.

I think this reasoning of the United States and the other governments referred to seems sensible. If you tried to negotiate at this time a general Pacific pact, whom would you leave out? What about China? Would you include the Chiang Kai-shek Government in Formosa as part of a general Pacific pact, along the lines of the Atlantic pact? If you did not include that Government, would it be easy in the eyes of some governments to leave them out? Would you include the three Indo-Chinese states? Would you include Thailand? Would you include an Asian state that wished to join? If not, how would you exclude them if they wished to join? I suggest that any attempt to negotiate that kind of general Pacific agreement at this stage would not strengthen but weaken security in the Pacific. But I can assure the House at the same time that this Government is vitally interested in security in the Pacific. We are a Pacific country in a geographical as well as in a political sense, and we desire to play our proper part in the Pacific in political and economic as well as in diplomatic matters because that area is becoming of great and growing importance to Canada.

Speaking in Vancouver immediately after the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, in a statement to which my hon. friend, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra made a reference the other day I said:

We have now in the Pacific certain defence arrangements. The United States and Japan have one. The United States and the Philippines have one. The United States, Australia and New Zealand have one. Canada and the United States, both Pacific powers, have one. It may well be that in the future we will be able to gather together these arrangements into a general Pacific pact, and if that time comes—

And I suggest it has not come yet.

—I am sure that Canada will show her appreciation of the importance of collective security in the Pacific as we have already done in the North Atlantic...

The United Nations

My last subject in this survey—and it may be one I should have mentioned first—is our relations with the organization which still remains, with all its weaknesses and its disappointments, our best hope for peace, the United Nations. I do not think I should close my statement without some reference to our world organization, the

Assembly of which is to meet very shortly in Paris, and the Canadian Delegation to which has already been appointed. In that Delegation we have continued what I think is the useful principle of all party representation. This forthcoming meeting of the Assembly may be a very significant one. There are a good many important subjects on the agenda, but even more important than the actual subjects on the agenda is, I think, the feeling in the minds of most delegations which will attend this meeting that the United Nations is now either at or coming close to the crossroads.

There are two main developments which lead me to say that. One is the division of the world which has now become hardened into competing and conflicting blocs, and which has been reflected at the last two Assemblies in every discussion there. If this is going to continue indefinitely, it certainly is going to undermine the usefulness of the assembly as a universal organization. For that development we of the Western world are not of course primarily responsible, but whoever is responsible is doing his part in undermining the foundations of our world organization. We are in danger of that organization becoming nothing more or less than an instrument in the cold war. We have to be on guard against that, because if it does become that then we will have completely altered the ideals which we had for this organization when we signed the charter, long years ago now, as it seems.

Another danger, and it seems to be an increasing one too, is that some members of the United Nations, and not always those who do the most to promote its principles, treat its resolutions almost with contempt. They certainly ignore them if they happen to be against their national policies, and if it becomes the accepted practice of this world organization that any resolution which is against the national interest of any member state can be ignored because of that fact, then it will not be very long before the United Nations will go the way of the League of Nations. We must be on guard against that development and do what we can to stop it.

On the more positive side, the United Nations has shown of course in the last year since the last assembly what it can do in stemming aggression in Korea. The Prime Minister said in this House on April 29, 1948:

Our faith in the United Nations as an effective organization for peace and security has been pretty severely shaken.

However, he added:

What is unshaken is our determination to make of it or within it an effective organization for this purpose.

We have endeavoured to respond to this determination in Canada by supporting, as the Security Council becomes less effective, measures taken within the United Nations Assembly itself to increase its capacity for dealing effectively with any active aggression it might be called to meet. However, far more notable than any resolution or any step of that kind taken at the Assembly is the application of the principle of collective resistance to aggression by those men who are actually fighting for the United Nations in Korea. The Korean experience has provided the free nations with a number of lessons which, if carefully studied and properly interpreted, can be of great benefit to the United Nations in the days ahead. There can be little doubt that the first application of the principle of collective security—and this is an optimistic observation—has strengthened both the principle of collective security and, indeed the United Nations itself.

There are developments of danger and developments of hope in this organization, and I hope that in the forthcoming assembly we may be able to do something which will advance the hopeful developments and cause the dangerous developments to recede. I believe, I have always believed, and most members in this house believe that collective security is a necessity for Canada, and so I believe that we should support all responsible and reasonable proposals for achieving it. Having said that,

I would add that, though aggression of all kinds and in all places should be met and condemned, we must face the fact that at the present time—and the lesson of Korea is very much in my mind when I say this—the free world may not possess the necessary strength to make that principle of collective action effective in every part of the world. Carried to an extreme degree, the theory of unlimited collective security everywhere might, because of the dissipation of strength its application would involve, mean no security anywhere. On the other hand, failure in any instance to defend collective security would deal a serious blow to the hopes of millions who have placed their trust in the United Nations.

This certainly involves us in a dilemma. Those of us who are charged with responsibility in these matters have therefore to exercise pretty careful judgment as to how on any given occasion this principle of collective security can best be put into effect without fatally weakening us for other and possibly more difficult tests. What is involved is essentially an ad hoc calculation of the political, strategic and moral factors which will be present in any particular issue.

The General Outlook

... I am sure the House would expect me to make a few general concluding observations on the situation as I see it, and what my own views are about the days immediately ahead. I think myself that there has been a little general improvement in the international situation in the last six months. I doubt, however, whether there has been any substantial easing of world tension in any respect. It is true I think that in the countries of Western Europe, which I had the privilege of visiting this summer, and where I discussed with those concerned with foreign affairs the possibilities and dangers that lie ahead, it is true in those countries morale is higher, and the persistent and pressing fears of an immediate armed aggression seem to have lessened somewhat. However, against this possible brightening of the picture in one area is the fact that in the Middle East, as I have tried to indicate, there are grave and growing dangers to stability and peace, and that in the Far East the aggressive forces of communist imperialism remain as militant and as defiant as ever. Even in Western Europe itself, the danger of military aggression is ever present, while economic and social difficulties remain a constant threat to stability, and one which the forces of Soviet imperialism are exploiting and will continue to exploit to the limit. Furthermore, if the strictly military picture has improved in the European area, that has been, I think, owing to the certain realization by any country which may now be tempted to break the peace that a group of free countries stand together in resistance to any such aggression, and that the ground on which they stand is becoming firmer. The moral to be drawn from this is therefore not that we should slacken our efforts, but that we should go ahead steadily and with determination to complete the job.

However, there are two types of aggression that we have to fear. There is military aggression, expressing itself in armed action, but there is social and economic aggression which expresses itself through the subversive activity of international communism. As to the first, military aggression, our military weakness—and in the face of Soviet land and air strength it is still a weakness—has been a standing temptation to Soviet attack. In strengthening ourselves, as we have done, and rightly so, to remove that temptation, we have, of course—and this I suppose applies particularly to the European countries—to be careful not to weaken ourselves unnecessarily in the economic and social field, and by doing so encourage the other kind of aggression. How to maintain this proper balance in the days ahead between military power, economic stability and social progress is probably the paramount problem of the free world today, and will only be solved by co-operative action which takes into account every factor, moral, social and economic, as well as military, that makes for strength.

It may well be that the Soviet Union, impressed by the action of the United Nations in Korea, and aware of the far greater residual strength of the West, will


now wish, for tactical reasons, to avoid an open conflict, and try to sap our strength by other means. It may even attempt—indeed it has already attempted and with some effect—to deceive and divide us by false peace campaigns, by exploiting economic and social difficulties. In short, as it has been put very graphically, it may put poison in our soup instead of cutting our throats.

It is, I think, necessary for free countries to take counter measures against this danger as well as against the danger of military aggression. We should, for instance, never lose a chance to drive home the fact—it may be more obvious to us than it is to others — that we are for peace alone; that while we in NATO, for instance, are determined to press forward with our defence programme, undeterred either by threats of war or phony promises of peace, nevertheless our primary purpose is always to prevent war and not to fight one; to ensure that D-day like tomorrow never comes; to underline our desire to use our energy and wealth not for arming but for peaceful, social and economic progress in a world where armaments will not be necessary.

In the kind of situation with which we are faced today, it may be that if we have achieved our defence objectives by, say, the end of 1954, we will have surmounted the most acutely dangerous period; but that in its turn may be followed by the longer term phase of the conflict, the marathon race as opposed to the sprint, and that may last for many, many years. It will require discipline, steadiness and perseverance; a refusal also to yield to the temptation to adopt the policies of even the tactics of those who would destroy us. We must not only maintain, as a normal part of national activity, the level of defence effort required, but also prove to our own and other people that our civilization and our way of life are worthy of this effort.

The achievement of military and social strength, of short-term and long-term objectives, is now a main feature of the policy of every free state. To secure these objectives there must be mutual understanding and confidence. This can be blocked by a feeling, on the one hand, that there is an unequal sharing of the burden of defence. It can be blocked by the feeling on the other hand that there is an unequal sharing of the burden of existence.

This partnership of the free world must then be founded on mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual aid. It is now backed by increasing strength. With that strength, we can defend ourselves if we have to. From it we can negotiate, if we are given a chance. From strength, used with wisdom and restraint, through negotiation, carried on with realism and sincerity, to a peace which rests on a more solid foundation than any that we have today; that is the course which the governments and peoples of the free world have set, and one which this Government in its foreign policy, and indeed which this Parliament and this people of Canada, will do their best to follow.



—National Defence

KOREAN STAMPS HONOUR CANADA

The Republic of Korea has issued a matched set of stamps, honouring Canada as one of the 19 nations which have sent forces to aid in the war against communist aggression. Designed by Park Moon Cho of the Korean Postal Section, one of the 500-Won stamps is in the United Nations color, a light blue, which symbolizes the sky. The other, in pastel green, represents the fruitful earth.

THE KOREAN CRISIS

After the rejection of his proposal that negotiations towards a cease-fire should be reopened at Songhyon-ni, General Ridgway proposed, on October 4, that the enemy negotiators choose a site half-way between the lines of the two opposing armies. The enemy were unwilling to transfer the negotiations away from Kaesong but, as a result of General Ridgway's insistence, finally agreed to a meeting of liaison officers at Panmunjom, the place six miles south of Kaesong where messages had often been exchanged in the past. General Ridgway agreed to a meeting at the new site as he considered that Panmunjom would meet the "fundamental condition of equality of movement and control".

On October 8 the enemy suggested that both sides assume responsibility for the security of the neutral area around the conference site and agreed to discuss the regulations under which the meetings could be resumed. This again was a concession on the part of the enemy who had previously maintained that the main negotiations should be resumed where they had been broken off on August 22.

Conduct of Future Negotiations

The liaison officers had lengthy discussions over the size of the neutral zone and the content of the regulations for resuming the negotiations. In the midst of these discussions the enemy charged that a United Nations air attack had taken place on Kaesong and Panmunjom killing one Korean and wounding another. This charge was admitted by General Ridgway who promised to take disciplinary action. Finally, on October 22, the two sides reached a series of agreements concerning the conduct of future negotiations as follows:

1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed is in the vicinity of Panmunjom.
2. The conference site area is a circular area having a radius of 10,000 yards centered on the conference site.
3. No hostile acts of any kind shall be carried out by any armed forces of either side including all regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area as defined above.
4. Except for the military police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side shall be permitted in the conference site area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and the preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side shall provide a military police detachment of two officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present in the conference site area. During the periods when the delegation parties are not present in the conference site area, one officer and five men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area. The military police shall carry only small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines.
5. Both delegations and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within the Panmunjom conference site area. The composition of each delegation party shall be as determined by the senior delegate thereof.
6. Physical facilities and communications and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation each delegation will provide its own facilities.

7. All armed forces of both sides, including regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces shall refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the circular area having a radius of three miles centered on the traffic circle at Kaesong, against the camp area of the United Nations Command delegation contained within a circle having a radius of three miles centered as indicated on the attached map, and against the area of 200 meters to either side of the Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan Road.

8. The date and time for the resumption of the conference of the delegations will be determined by agreement between liaison officers of both sides.

The first meeting of negotiators took place on October 25.

Military Operations

Throughout October United Nations air attacks on communications facilities in North Korea continued. On the ground, most of the fighting took place on the east-central front where the United Nations forces conducted a series of local attacks with limited objectives.



—National Defence

VETERANS OF KOREAN WAR IN OTTAWA

Ottawa played host on November 1 to a group of wounded veterans representing the 19 countries which have contributed to the United Nations forces in Korea. During their stay in the capital, the group of veterans which included Cpl. Jean Raymond Roy of Montreal, who served in Canada's Korea Brigade were entertained by the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the leaders of the other political parties in Parliament.

The group is shown above in the Memorial Room of the Parliament Buildings, examining the hand-engraved Honour Roll of Canadian veterans who died in World War I. Left to right: Sgt. Molla Kebede, ETHIOPIA; Pte. Jushal Both, INDIA; Major Goreko, GREECE; Stoker Chuch Haridhi, THAILAND; Staff-Sgt. Celerino Mabao, PHILLIPINE ISLANDS; Capt. Richard A. Baldwin, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.; M-Sgt. Anthony Herbert, Hermine, Penn., U.S.A.; Sgt. Maj. Mamoushet Goshime, ETHIOPIA; Sgt. Ziya Buras, TURKEY; Seaman Francisco M. Guzman, COLOMBIA; Quartermaster Kim Chun Bea, Seoul, KOREA.

GOVERNMENT DIRECTION OF CULTURE IN THE SOVIET UNION

The following extracts from official Soviet pronouncements are printed as illustrations of the way in which art and literature in the U.S.S.R. are required to conform to standards set by the ruling political party. In 1946 the Soviet authorities began a new campaign to compel all artistic activity to serve the needs of the state. One of the opening moves in this campaign was the announcement of the decree, reproduced in part below, on the magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*. The decree was supplemented by a speech by the late Andrei Zhdanov, then a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party, who took a leading part in the assertion of party control of such matters. Although Zhdanov is now dead the campaign continues. The other extracts printed below relate to music, in 1948, and to the theatre, in 1949.

These statements deal with one or two particular writers and musicians and with two particular magazines but they are clearly meant to be taken as a general instruction to all writers, musicians and literary publications. The persons and magazines named may be regarded as examples which happened to be chosen at the time of the decrees. Many others have since been criticized on similar grounds. The excerpt printed from an article in *Pravda*, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, is illustrative of the directions issued from time to time in *Pravda* and other official journals. These criticisms are also typical of the way in which control is exercised over the entire field of culture and science.

C.S.P.U. Decree

On August 14 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (b) (1) issued a decree "On the Magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*" the tone and content of which are sufficiently illustrated by the following quotations:

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) notes that the literature and art magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, published in Leningrad, are being conducted in a completely unsatisfactory way.

In the magazine *Zvezda*, side by side with significant and successful works by Soviet writers, there have recently appeared many works which are devoid of ideas and ideologically harmful. The grave error of *Zvezda* lies in offering a literary rostrum to the writer Zoshchenko, whose works are alien to Soviet literature. The editors of *Zvezda* were aware that Zoshchenko has long specialized in writing empty, inane and trivial things, propounding the corrupt negation of ideas, triviality, and indifference to politics, calculated to disorientate our youth and poison its consciousness. The most recent of the published stories of Zoshchenko, "The Adventures of an Ape" (*Zvezda*, No. 5-6, 1946) is a vulgar lampoon on Soviet life and Soviet people. Zoshchenko portrays Soviet customs and people in a monstrously caricatured form, slanderously depicting the people as primitive, uncultured, stupid, with Philistine tastes and customs. The maliciously hooligan description by Zoshchenko of our life is accompanied by anti-Soviet attacks . . .

The magazine *Zvezda* also broadly popularizes the works of the writer Akhmatova, whose literary and socio-political personality has long been familiar to Soviet society. Akhmatova is a typical representative of the empty poetry without ideas which is alien to our people. Her poems, which are imbued with a spirit of pessimism and decadence, expressing the tastes of old drawing-room poetry which has never progressed beyond the attitudes of bourgeois aristocratic aesthetics and decadence—"art for art's sake"—and which has not wished to keep in step its people, are harmful in the education of our youth and cannot be tolerated in Soviet literature . . .

(1) Communist Party of the Soviet Union (bolsheviks)

Like the editors of *Zvezda*, the editors of the magazine *Leningrad* have permitted grave errors in having published a number of works penetrated with a spirit of obsequiousness to everything foreign . . .

How could it happen that *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* published in the hero city known for its advanced revolutionary traditions, a city which was always a nursery of advanced ideas and advanced culture, permitted apolitical works without idea content, and alien to Soviet literature, to creep into its magazines? What is the significance of the errors made by the editors of *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*?

The leading employees of the magazines, in the first place their editors, Comrades Sayanov and Likharev, forgot the thesis of Leninism that our magazines, be they scientific or artistic, cannot be apolitical. They forgot that our magazines are a powerful means whereby the Soviet State educates the Soviet people and, in particular, the youth, and for this reason must be guided by the phenomenon which comprises the vital foundation of the Soviet structure—its politics. The Soviet system cannot suffer its youth to be educated in a spirit of apathy towards Soviet politics, in a spirit of disrespect and lack of ideas.

The strength of Soviet literature, the most advanced literature in the world, is that it is a literature in which there are not and cannot be any interests other than those of the people and the State . . .

For this reason any preaching of lack of ideas, indifference to politics, "art for art's sake", is alien to Soviet literature, harmful to the interests of the Soviet people and State and can have no place in our magazines . . .

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) decrees:

The editors of *Zvezda*, the board of directors of the Union of Soviet Writers, and the propaganda administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) are to take steps for the unconditional elimination of the errors and weaknesses of the magazine indicated in our decree, are to correct the line of the magazine and guarantee a high level of ideas and in art while forbidding access to the magazine for the works of Zoshchenko, Akhmatova and others like them . . .

The Zhdanov Report

At about the same time Zhdanov made a lengthy report to the Leningrad Party *Aktiv*⁽¹⁾ and to a meeting of Leningrad writers on the shortcomings of these two Leningrad magazines. He cruelly dissected and ridiculed the humorous stories of Zoshchenko and the highly individual lyrics of Akhmatova, quoted Lenin's strictures against literary works which did not serve the Party and hence the people, declared that the best traditions of Soviet literature were a continuation of the best traditions of Russian 9th century literature created by "our great revolutionary democrats — Belinsky, Dobrolyubov, Chernishevsky, Saltykov-Shchedrin, continued by Plekhanov, and scientifically worked out and put on a sound basis by Lenin and Stalin" and defined the wishes of the Central Committee as follows:

Comrades, what does the Central Committee demand and desire? The Central Committee of the Party desires that the Leningrad *Aktiv* and Leningrad writers should well understand that the time has come when it is necessary to raise our ideational work to a high level. It behooves the young Soviet generation to increase the strength and power of socialist Soviet development, using to the full the moving forces of Soviet society for a new unparalleled flourishing of our well-being and culture. For these great tasks the young generation must be educated to be steadfast, courageous, unafraid of obstacles, ready to meet them and able to overcome them. Our people must be an educated people, with high ideals and with high cultural and moral requirements and tastes. For this purpose it is necessary that our literature and our journals should not stand aside from the tasks of the day but should help the Party and the people to educate youth in a spirit of supreme devotion to Soviet development, in a spirit of supreme service to the interests of the people.

(1) Active members

A few days later the *Aktiv* of the Leningrad Party Organization assembled to discuss Zhdanov's report and passed a long and humble resolution in accordance with it and the writers of Leningrad were summoned to a special meeting to endorse the decree. If any voices were raised in defence of so popular a humorist as Zoshchenko and so gifted a poetess as Akhmatova, they went unrecorded.

Decree Applied to Music

On February 10, 1948, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) issued a decree, from which the following extract is taken, in which the principles enunciated in the decree on the magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* were applied in the field of music:

As far back as 1936, the anti-popular formalistic distortions in the work of D. Shostakovich were subjected to sharp criticism in the organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b), *Pravda*, in connection with the appearance of the composer's opera, *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*, and the harm and danger of this trend in its effects upon the development of Soviet music were exposed . . .

Despite these warnings and in the face of the instructions issued by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) in its decisions on the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, on the film *Bolshaya Zhizn*, on the repertoire of theatres and measures for their improvement, no reorganization has been carried out in Soviet music . . . The situation is particularly bad in the sphere of symphonic and operatic work. It is a case of composers adhering to a formalistic and anti-popular trend. This trend has found its fullest expression in the works of composers such as D. Shostakovich, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturyan, V. Shebalin, G. Popov, N. Myaskovski and others, in whose work formalistic distortions and anti-democratic tendencies in music, alien to the Soviet people and to its artistic tastes, are particularly clearly represented. Characteristic features of this music are the denial of the basic principles of classical music, the propounding of atonality, dissonance and disharmony, which are alleged to be the expression of 'progress' and 'innovation' in the development of musical form, the rejection of the most important bases of musical composition such as melody, predilection for confusing and neuropathical combinations, which make of music, cacophony and a chaotic accumulation of sounds. This music is strongly redolent of the contemporary modernistic, bourgeois music of Europe and America, which reflects the miasma of bourgeois culture, the complete denial of musical art, the impasse which it has reached . . .

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) considers that this unhappy situation on the front of Soviet music has come about as the result of the incorrect line pursued in the sphere of Soviet music by the Committee on Art, attached to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and by the Organizing Committee of the Union of Soviet Composers . . .

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(b) decrees:

1. To condemn the formalistic trend in Soviet music as anti-popular and in fact leading to the liquidation of music.
2. To instruct the propaganda and agitation department of the Central Committee and the Committee on Art to secure a rectification of the position in Soviet music, the elimination of the shortcomings outlined in the present decree of the Central Committee, and to secure the development of Soviet music in a realistic direction.

Criticism Continued

Criticism of creative work in all the arts on the basis of the above decrees has continued by means of authoritative articles in *Pravda* and other influential periodicals. Of this type of criticism the following excerpts from an article entitled "Concerning an Anti-Patriotic Group of Theatre Critics", printed in *Pravda* of January 28, 1949, will serve as an example:

An anti-patriotic group has developed in theatrical criticism. It consists of followers of bourgeois aestheticism. They penetrate our press and operate most freely in the pages of the magazine *Theatre* and the newspaper *Soviet Art*. These critics have lost their responsibility to the people. They are bearers of a homeless cosmopolitanism which is deeply repulsive to Soviet man and hostile to him. They obstruct the development of Soviet literature; the feeling of national Soviet pride is alien to them.

Such critics attempt to discredit the progressive phenomena of our literature and art, furiously attacking precisely the patriotic and politically purposive works, under the pretext of their alleged artistic imperfection. It is worth recalling that precisely such attacks were once made by ideological opponents upon the work of the great writer Maxim Gorky, and upon such valuable works as "Summer Love" by T. Trenev, and others . . .

How did certain critics receive the statements made by the Party on the repertoire of the dramatic theatres and measures to improve it? Did the severe, just Party criticism stimulate them to reconsider their position? Did these critics engage in self-criticism?

No. They did not wish to regard themselves critically because they were afraid of discovering their own complete ideological bankruptcy. But they also failed to halt their clannish and anti-patriotic activities, now directly against the Party's instructions. Certain leaders of this group entrenched themselves in the musty commissions of the All-Union Theatrical Society. Here, having assembled their friends around them, they began to fabricate a falsified "public opinion" against the new Soviet plays, actually against the Soviet repertoire in general . . .

Hissing and maligning, attempting to form a kind of literary underground, they defamed all the best that has appeared in Soviet dramaturgy. They did not find a kind word for such plays as "The Great Force", "A Moscow Character", "Our Daily Bread", "Large Destiny". Plays which have been awarded Stalin prizes were particular targets of their malicious and slanderous thrusts.

Of course, there are still no few shortcomings in many plays of the current Soviet repertoire. Naturally they are all subject to creative, comradely criticism, ideological and artistic. But it was not to such criticism that the esthetic gossips devoted their thought and concern. They defamed these plays in wholesale fashion and precisely because these plays, with all their shortcomings, are imbued with the Soviet ideological attitude and sense of principle; raise most important political questions; help the Party and the Soviet people in the struggle against kowtowing before bourgeois things foreign; in the struggle against bureaucratism, against pilfering, against the prevailing of private motives over social ones. All these plays instill Soviet patriotism and endeavor to show on the stage, with the strength of artistic portraits, all that is new and progressive, all that is being born in Soviet society . . .

The top-priority task of Party criticism is the ideological crushing of this anti-patriotic group of theatre critics.

ESTIMATES AND THEIR PREPARATION

About this time each year, the Department has to turn its mind to the problem of how much money it will need to carry on its business for a twelve-month period beginning some six months hence on April 1 of the new year.

In other words, we have to estimate what it will cost us to do what we should be doing eighteen months ahead not only in Ottawa but in thirty-four different countries scattered over the globe where the costs of supplies and services are wobbling uncomfortably and where movements in exchange rates and revaluations of currencies can nullify estimates over-night.

The best, therefore, that we can hope to come up with is a "guestimate". But we strive to make it as informed a guess as possible; for, as taxpayers, too, we are anxious to be assessed on the basis of estimates which will bear the closest possible resemblance to proper expenditures.

Before considering the preparation of the estimates, it might be well to say something about the manner in which they are set up and the various restrictions which are inherent in the form in which they are approved. It is important to remember that Parliament does not approve a lump sum of money for running the country's external business and then leave it to the Department to apportion it among the various services as it sees fit. It ties strings around parcels of the money to ensure that each parcel is used for a specific purpose. For example, Parliament approved (as it did in June of this year) not \$11,701,395 for running the Department and paying Canada's contribution to certain international bodies, but \$2,272,597 for running the Department at home; \$4,492,816 for running the Department abroad; \$225,000 for Canadian Representation at International Conferences; \$15,000 to assist distressed Canadians abroad, and so on through thirty-seven absolutely separate packages of money known as Votes — each Vote representing an activity of the Department, the subject of which lends itself to separate consideration. And money may not be moved from one Vote to another without the approval of Parliament.

For this reason if for no other, it would be necessary to estimate by Votes.

Primary Allotments

Parliament may, therefore, be said to exercise control of the total amount voted for each Department down as far as the Votes. Parliament, of course, could not make a very intelligent assessment of the Votes if they had before them for consideration only the bare totals of the Vote. To meet the need for further information, the printed Estimates show each Vote broken down into the main headings — known as Primary Allotments — under which money will be spent. For example, the Vote for operating the Department abroad is made up of fifteen Primary Allotments, examples of which are, Salaries; Travelling and Removal Expenses; Telephones, Telegrams and other Communications Services; Rental of Buildings; and Repairs to Property.

These Primary Allotments not only show Parliament how the total of a Vote is arrived at; they are also the instruments by which a further control is exercised upon Departmental spendings. The Primary Allotments are approved by the Treasury Board, a Committee of the Cabinet; and money may not be moved from one Primary Allotment to another without their approval — and then only if surplus money which may be borrowed exists in one of the other Primary Allotments in the same Vote. For it must be remembered that the total amount of the Vote itself may not be exceeded without the approval of Parliament.

For this reason then, if for no other, it would be necessary to estimate not only by Votes but also by Primary Allotments within the Votes.

Objects of Expenditure

In actual fact, however, the books of the Department are kept, and hence the estimating is done, on a breakdown of expenditures finer than the Primary Allotments. These finer breakdowns are known as Objects of Expenditure. For example, under the Vote for Departmental Administration, \$203,200 is earmarked as a Primary Allotment for Telephones, Telegrams and other Communications Services. This amount is made up of four separate Objects of Expenditure: Telephones, Telegrams, Teletypes, and the Carriage of Diplomatic Mail; for practice has shown the need of keeping records of expenditure in this Primary under those four Objects in order that separate expenditure patterns for each may be studied.

The Vote themselves, therefore, are broken down into the finest detail considered necessary and practicable. Almost one hundred of these separate Objects of Expenditure appear as cogs in the Departmental accounting machine. Not all of them apply to each of the Votes, it is true, but enough of them are tagged to each Vote to give us a picture of expenditure considered sufficiently detailed for proper control. For example, the expenditures made each month by each of our Missions abroad are parcelled out into forty-seven different Objects. We consider that division to be sufficiently detailed for present purposes. Should we want more detail, we can easily design more expenditure objects to get it.

The most satisfactory and satisfying method of estimating for expenditure is to do so in the greatest possible detail. The alternative would be to reach up in the air and come down with a figure. It might be a good figure; it might be bad. But good or bad, it could never be supported. And plenty of support is necessary for the latter consideration of the Estimates, first, by the Treasury Board, second, by the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, and lastly, by Parliament itself.

Breakdown of Estimates

At this time of year, then, all Divisions of the Department which have a knowledge of any project that will cost money, and all Missions abroad, are asked by the Finance Division — which co-ordinates the work of preparation of the Estimates — to make known their needs and to support them in detail. For the Missions abroad, particularly, this involves a detailed study. They are asked to estimate on the basis of the forty-seven Objects of Expenditure which go to make the amount provided for them each year. To assist them, the Department prepares a statement of the amount the Mission expended under each of these headings during the last fiscal year and during the first half of the current fiscal year. The Mission is asked to estimate what they will need under each heading for the remainder of the fiscal year, and — upon the basis of current expenditure and anticipated local trends in costs — what they estimate they will need to carry them for the full fiscal year beginning April 1 next. And they have to do this not only for their running costs but also for anticipated expenditures on Capital account, i.e., for buildings, structural repairs and furnishings.

While Missions abroad are doing this, the Divisions in Ottawa are likewise projecting themselves forward and evaluating their financial requirements. The United Nations Division, for example, gathers all possible information affecting the Canadian Government's contributions to the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. The Economic Division, familiar as it is with Government planning in international matters, particularly insofar as assistance to under-developed countries is concerned, prepares its plans for contributions for the coming year. The Personnel Division and the Establishments and Organization Division consider the needs of the Department from the point of view of numbers of staff and their salaries and allowances. The International Conferences Section calculates what amount will be necessary for Canada's participation in conferences anticipated during that year. The Supplies and Properties Division, which concerns itself with the estimates of expenditures from

Posts abroad on Capital account, has to sift the requests and arrange them in a priority order, for not all of the desirable property developments abroad could or should be undertaken in any one year. And so on throughout the Department.

Departmental Report Prepared

When all this information has been obtained, the Finance Division prepares the statement of over-all Department financial requirements, supported by all the detail it can lay its hands on. This formidable mass of material is then considered by the Under-Secretary and the Minister and adjusted in accordance with Departmental planning and the over-all Government fiscal policy. When an agreed figure has been arrived at, the Minister passes the Estimates to the Minister of Finance who, at an appropriate time, invites him to appear before the Treasury Board to answer any question they may have concerning the amounts of money he is asking for to carry on his business for the coming fiscal year. Once the Treasury Board is satisfied, the Estimates are ready for printing and for later consideration — insofar as this Department is concerned — first by the Standing Committee of the House on External Affairs which conducts a detailed examination of them, and, finally, by Parliament.

IMMIGRATION TO CANADA FROM PAKISTAN

The Department of External Affairs announced on October 23 the conclusion of an immigration agreement between the Governments of Pakistan and Canada. The agreement took the form of an exchange of notes made in Karachi and came into effect immediately. The Canadian note was signed by Mr. Geoffrey S. Murray, Acting High Commissioner for Canada in Pakistan, and the Pakistani note by the Honourable Chaudri Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

The agreement, which may be terminated by either government on six months notice, reads as follows:

- (1) In the twelve month period commencing on the 1st day of January, 1951, and in each succeeding twelve month period thereafter, the admission to Canada for permanent residence of one hundred citizens of Pakistan, including both sexes and all ages, shall be authorized provided the immigrants comply with the provisions of the Canadian Immigration Act.
- (2) In addition to the citizens of Pakistan whose entry to Canada for permanent residence is authorized in accordance with paragraph (1) above, a citizen of Pakistan who can otherwise comply with the provisions of the Canadian Immigration Act may be admitted to Canada for permanent residence if he or she is the husband, wife, or unmarried child under twenty-one years of age of any Canadian citizen legally admitted to and resident in Canada and if the settlement arrangements in Canada are shown to the Canadian authorities to be satisfactory.
- (3) The provisions of Canadian Order-in-Council P.C. 2115, dated the 16th day of September, 1930, as amended by Order-in-Council P.C. 6229 of the 28th day of December, 1950, shall not apply to citizens of Pakistan.
- (4) The admission to Canada as non-immigrants of citizens of Pakistan shall not be affected by the preceding paragraphs.

This agreement is almost identical to that concluded with the Government of India earlier this year.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY⁽¹⁾

By the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson.

IV

Canada's North Atlantic policy comes closer home, because that area includes the three countries that are nearest to us historically, politically, and even geographically: the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Our policy here is to help build up a cohesive group of states, closely co-operating in all fields of activity. That objective will not be achieved quickly or easily. It will never be achieved if we do not succeed in renewing and maintaining the vigour and progressive character of our common Western civilization and if we do not strengthen its unifying forces.

The restless intellectual energy of the West has created cathedrals, philosophic systems and turbo-jet engines. It has greatly extended the frontiers of knowledge and has spread Western science and trade throughout the world. The national states which have been formed during this process have sometimes through their own rivalries come close to destroying the civilization of which they were all a part. Yet, in spite of the wars in which they have been engaged, they have always recognized that they had much in common. They all acknowledge, for instance, their debt to Greek speculation, to Hebrew prophecy, to Roman law and to the Christian faith. The countries of the new world all share in these traditions and form a part of the same civilization. Canadians are never likely to forget the fact, since we have two mother countries in Europe. With one of them we have maintained, by our own deliberate choice, a political connection. With the other, we have kept close cultural relations. The bells in the steeples along the St. Lawrence round which the villages cluster still ring out to remind us that Paris and Chartres are as much a part of our heritage as Canterbury and London.

The wealth of this common civilization — material, intellectual and moral — carelessly dissipated though some of it has been, is, nevertheless, immense. To work toward the establishment of a North Atlantic community of nations, all sharing in this great legacy from the past, all with their own special contributions to make in the future, all pledged to be of mutual assistance to one another, is surely a task worthy of our finest effort and of our greatest zeal. The goal of such a society, strong, varied and secure but not self-centered or exclusive, and anxious to profit by contact with other civilizations, is an ideal, it seems to me, which can support and encourage us through all the difficulties of the present time.

No country has a greater stake in the success or failure of this great movement than Canada. For we are both North American and European. Before the last war, the spectre haunting Canadian policy-makers was that the United States would remain aloof from British and French efforts to protect the peace against Nazi and Fascist aggression. Today the spectre is that the United States may feel it necessary to pursue policies inside our coalition which the other members cannot wholeheartedly follow; or that inadequate co-operation from the other members may discourage American effort and leadership to the point where Washington may decide to "go it alone." Any Canadian government is bound to do what it can to exorcise these dangers; and this may mean at times expressing its own views forthrightly in London or Paris or, above all, in Washington, where the center of power now lies. This is the first principle of Canadian diplomacy. It is founded on the inescapable fact that no

⁽¹⁾ Reprinted in two parts, of which this is the second, from an article in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1951, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City. The first part of this article was reprinted in the October issue of *External Affairs*.

country in the world has less chance of isolating itself from the effect of American policies and decisions than Canada. If Washington "went it alone," where would Ottawa go?

We recognize, however, that a diplomacy of this kind, depending as it does on the influence Canada can exert with greater powers, can be carried out successfully only if our interventions are restrained, responsible and constructive; and if we act, in discharging our own obligations, in a way which receives and deserves the respect of our friends in the coalition. For us the very essence of the North Atlantic coalition, and of its developing sense of community, is that the co-operation which it makes possible bridges the ocean.

Though it has deep roots and is a natural creation, the North Atlantic community is still in its infancy as an association commanding loyalty and support. It is, as yet, only an incipient entity, and, so far as I am aware, has made only one appearance in an international instrument -- in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Canadian Government sets great store by that Article as an earnest of future co-operation in the North Atlantic area in other than military fields.

It may be that, while the North Atlantic community is gradually developing, an even more tightly-knit grouping in Western Europe may emerge. The arguments for closer co-operation among the countries of Western Europe as a method both of muting old antagonisms and of increasing economic efficiency by providing a larger market are strong. It is for European countries themselves to decide whether they think that integration of this kind would be in their own best interests.

The Canadian Government has followed with great interest and sympathy these moves toward European unity. We hope, however, that they will be made within the framework of that wider movement toward a North Atlantic community. It would be premature at this stage, I think, to attempt to decide whether such a community could grow more rapidly if the countries of Western Europe were first to form a closer association among themselves, or were to move toward membership in the North Atlantic community as national entities, retaining as high a degree of national sovereignty as the United States and Canada. However, even now it seems clear to us that the creation of an exclusive and probably high-cost trading bloc in Western Europe would be unwise and unfruitful. It is equally clear that an attempt to form a solid neutral political grouping in Western Europe which would weaken or even break the defence links which now bind North America to Western Europe would in the long run be disastrous both to Europe and to the cause of freedom itself. It would also be highly dangerous for North America since, in the view of the Canadian Government, Western Europe is of greater strategic importance than any other area in the world. Indeed, it was that strategic appreciation of our own security interest which above all else led us to accept the military obligations contained in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Canada regards its NATO commitments as a particular means for implementing the general doctrine of collective security embodied in the United Nations Charter. The first Article of the Charter enunciates a universal obligation which rests on all members of the United Nations alike "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." That obligation must be honoured if the morale of countries in exposed positions is to be maintained, and if the melancholy story of the 'thirties, when one victim after another was picked off by the aggressor, is not to be repeated. On the other hand, under present circumstances when the military strength of the free world, although increasing, is much less in many important categories than the military might of its adversaries, and when we are living through a period which is neither peace nor war, the general obligation stated in the forefront of the Charter cannot always be automatically interpreted as a cast-iron commitment to resist aggression anywhere it may occur

with unlimited military force. If that reasoning were accepted, the theory of unlimited collective action everywhere might mean in practice no real security anywhere. While recognizing aggression always for what it is, and while taking appropriate action against it, we will yet need to exercise judgment in any particular case to determine how the obligation of collective security can most effectively be implemented so that aggressors may not exploit the provisions of the Charter to dissipate more than would be advisable the presently limited military forces of the free world. In certain regions aggression must obviously be countered with every military resource that can be mustered. To ensure the protection of these areas, the general obligation of the Charter must be put in more precise and automatic form. This, I believe, can best be done by the negotiation of security pacts for particular areas; indeed that is the immediate purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The need to exercise judgment in deciding how the security obligations of the Charter can be discharged to the best effect does not mean that we can ever afford to turn a blind eye to any act of aggression, or can pick and choose among possible victims, helping some and leaving others entirely to their fate. Nor does it mean that there is one law to be applied to the strong and another to the weak. It does mean, however, that the responsibility of defending the free world in the present circumstances is so grave that those who share it will require the highest qualities of intelligence as well as the most sensitive consciences in deciding where the limited forces at their disposal should be applied. For the time being this principle may seem of not much more than academic importance since any armed attack on a large scale, no matter where it occurred, might easily precipitate a general war, and since one of the most pressing tasks of diplomacy is to convince would-be aggressors that they cannot count on immunity from instant retaliation if they move against their neighbours. But there have been situations, even within the present year, when the necessity for careful judgment has been highly relevant; and it is quite possible that similar situations may recur.

V

Let no one think, however, that this attitude indicates that the Canadian Government is, or has been, under any temptation to abandon the principle of collective security. The facts speak for themselves. The contingent which we have contributed to the United Nations forces in Korea is the third largest of all those which have been provided by members of the United Nations. Our troops, our ships and our planes have been sent to Korea to maintain the principle of collective security. That will also be the purpose of the brigade group and the 11 squadrons of aircraft which we have undertaken to station in Western Europe.

Let no one think, either that we have lost faith in the United Nations. We believe that the United Nations has still a central rôle to play in security matters, and we welcome the inquiry now being made in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of last November to see how the organization can be put in a position where it can carry out this rôle more swiftly and effectively than in the past. The United Nations has, of course, other important functions to perform. But it is probably true that unless it can prove itself as a security organization its vitality will be sapped. Under the strong and resolute leadership of the United States it has met the challenge in Korea and has shown its value as a means of organizing collective resistance to aggression. It should not be expected, however, that the theory of collective security can be translated into practice without encountering complexities and special problems. One of these problems, to my mind, is how to make the best use of the free world's growing, but still limited, military resources for the maintenance of world-wide security.

Another problem which has been revealed by this first attempt to organize collective security on a large scale is how to devise a mode of association which

will allow for effective leadership and yet give a strong sense of participation to all those countries which are contributing military forces. The same problem has also risen within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Canada shares with her allies a real concern in finding a solution to this problem. The field of our foreign interests and the extent of our military commitments have in recent months been almost visibly stretched; and such a process can never be accomplished without discomfort. This will be eased and Canada's participation made most effective only if Canadians can be made to feel that their share in the vital decisions which must be made is proportionate to their contribution. But that is a necessity for many other countries besides Canada. Indeed, it is a requirement to which great importance is attached by all countries which, like my own, have voluntarily and wholeheartedly accepted the leadership of the United States.

There is, I think, no task more difficult of accomplishment than the leadership of a coalition of friendly but free nations, agreed on objectives but not always agreed on how they should be reached. The operation of a coalition in wartime, as all history teaches, is difficult enough. It is more difficult in peacetime when the absence of external danger accentuates the importance of smaller conflicts of interest and advantage between the various allies. It is most difficult of all in a time such as the present of "partial peace"—or, if you like, "phony peace"—when the threat to security is present but when the willingness to strive and sacrifice which accompanies an all-out armed struggle for survival can be maintained only with great effort. The problem is complicated by the necessity of basing our association on a theory of sovereign equality of states, which is sometimes hard to square with the fact that the states concerned are unequal in power and in responsibility. The reconciliation of fact and theory will require among all of us qualities of restraint, understanding and tolerance; a vision wider than our own national boundaries.

Mr. Acheson put the point wisely and succinctly when he said on June 29 in Washington that "the pattern of responsibility within which we operate is a responsibility to interests which are broader than our own. . . ." We in Canada are confident that such a pattern of responsibility and such a mode of freely accepted association can increasingly be realized. In that confidence, we will continue to make our contribution to the creation of a peaceful world in which freedom can be secure.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

Statements of Government Policy

Speech from the Throne

In the Speech from the Throne, read at the opening of the 5th Session of the 21st Parliament on October 9, 1951, announcement was made of the intention of the Government to introduce into the debates of the Houses the following matters of external policy:

- (1) Canada's contribution to the United Nations cause in Korea.
- (2) Measures taken by Canada to fulfil its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- (3) Ratification of a protocol to enable an invitation to be sent to Greece and Turkey to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- (4) Construction by Canada alone of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

Mr. Cauchon (L, Beauharnois), the first speaker to discuss any of these topics, opened the debate on the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne on October 12. He was followed the same afternoon by Mr. J. A. Simmons. During the ensuing week, the following speakers discussed the same subjects:

- October 15 – Mr. Drew (PC, Carleton)
Mr. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown)
Mr. McIvor (L, Fort William)
Mr. Gillis (CCF, Cape Breton South)
- October 16 – Mr. Brooks (PC, Royal)
- October 17 – Mr. Bruneau (L, Prescott)
Mr. Dinsdale (PC, Brandon)
Mr. Wright (CCF, Melfort)
Mr. LaCroix (L, Quebec-Montmorency)
- October 18 – Mr. MacLean (L, Huron-Perth)
Mr. Green (PC, Vancouver-Quadra)
- October 19 – Mr. Campney (L, Vancouver Centre)
Mr. Riley (L, Saint John-Albert)
Mr. Argue (CCF, Assiniboia)
- October 24 – Mr. Gibson (Ind. Comox-Alberni)
Mr. Boivin (L, Shefford)
- October 29 – Mr. Boisvert (L, Nicolet-Yamaska)

External Affairs Policy

On October 22, Mr. St. Laurent made the following motion:

That this House approves the continuation of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace, and in particular to defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea, and by the North Atlantic Treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

The Prime Minister next reviewed the developments that had occurred during the previous Session in Canadian policy regarding the Korean war and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and continued:

While there is nothing specifically new in our programme, and while hon. members are not being asked to approve any change or any expansion of existing policies

... it is nevertheless true that the course of world events, particularly in the past two years, has made it necessary for Canada, in concert with other free nations, to adopt fundamentally new measures in our external relations ...

In the North Atlantic area we have undertaken to send armed forces overseas in time of peace, which is certainly something new. These Canadian forces will take their place in an international formation designed as a deterrent to aggression, a safeguard of peace in the whole North Atlantic area and a guarantee of the security of Canada itself ...

It seemed to us that it would be a source of encouragement to our forces in Korea and to the forces we are about to dispatch to Europe, as well as strengthening the position of those who will represent Canada at these international meetings, if there were an affirmation by this House of its wholehearted and, I would hope, unanimous support of the efforts our country is making to help maintain peace and security in the world ...

Mr. Pearson rose next, to support the Prime Minister's motion, and announced his intention of giving the House "a general ... review of the international situation at the present time" and of discussing "some developments in that situation" that had occurred since the previous session.*

Pacific Pact

Recurring to the subject of a "Pacific pact", already discussed in his sessional statement the previous day and referred to in speeches by Mr. Macdonnell, Mr. Green, Mr. Graydon and Mr. Hees, Mr. Pearson said, on October 23:

When you begin to contemplate the possibility of a Pacific pact of that kind you run up at once against the fact that those countries most concerned with general security in the Pacific do not think the time is ripe for it. If the United States of America and the United Kingdom do not feel that it is possible to work out that kind of Pacific pact in the present circumstances, is it desirable, is it appropriate that we should take the initiative in trying to make them change their minds? As I tried to say yesterday, if the United States had felt that a Pacific pact of that type was desirable in the present circumstances for the security of the Pacific they would not have made separate pacts with the Republic of the Philippines and with the two dominions, Australia and New Zealand. I have no doubt in my own mind, and I have discussed it more than once with representatives of these governments, because we take this question of a Pacific pact seriously — that one reason they think it undesirable under present circumstances to initiate discussions for a pact of that nature is that they would at once be faced with the question that I asked yesterday: what countries would be included and what countries would be left out. There are certain countries in the Pacific area at the present time which would certainly expect to be included in a general Pacific treaty of that nature; and in the minds of certain governments it would not be conducive to general security in the Pacific to include those governments at this time in any such policy. That is the reason we have not taken any leadership in regard to the development of such a Pacific pact. But we have discussed this matter on more than one occasion with governments concerned.

Japanese Peace Treaty

To a question in Mr. Coldwell's speech regarding the submission of Canadian views on the Japanese Peace Treaty to the Government of the United States as the first mover, Mr. Pearson replied in part:

I would point out that the procedure adopted in the announcement of the Treaty was very unusual. It would have been a lot better in our minds, and in the minds of other governments, if we could have followed the traditional procedure of negotiating around a conference table ...

* For the full text of the statement made to the House of Commons on October 22 by Mr. Pearson, see p. 354 of this issue.

A treaty negotiated at a conference of that kind would be either a treaty agreed to 100 per cent by the U.S.S.R. or there would not be any treaty at all. Surely we have learned that in the long drawn out and desultory discussions over the treaty with Austria, and the treaty with Germany. That procedure would have resulted in indefinite delay. As most of us were agreed that we should bring to an end as soon as possible the state of war with Japan, the United States Government, with the approval of other governments, decided to initiate discussions at the diplomatic level to get the views of the governments concerned, so we could reach the greatest possible measure of agreement. Having reached that, the draft was signed.

Korea

In his remarks on the situation in Korea, the Minister had the following to say about the Canadian contribution to the United Nations plan for Korean relief:

Under the United Nations relief plan for Korea contributions were requested from all members. At the present time the contribution which has actually been made by Canada exceeds that of any other country. When I say that I do not wish to suggest that much more is not being done in this field in Korea by the United States than by Canada. It is being done, however, as an adjunct to military operations, and is the type of relief with which we became familiar in Europe in 1945. I should have made that clear yesterday, because it would be unfair to the effort that the United States is making in this field if I gave the impression that they were not doing more than anybody else outside the United Nations. But under the United Nations resolution on Korean relief Canada has, as I said, exceeded any other country in its contributions. The United States has however authorized a very large contribution which has not been appropriated as yet.

Mr. Pearson told Mr. Diefenbaker that the dollar figures for the Canadian contribution were "about \$8 million", and, on the contribution of the United States, he added:

Under military relief in Korea the United States has contributed very much more than that as part of its military appropriation. I am speaking from memory, but I think the United States has authorized an appropriation of something in the neighbourhood of \$75 million or \$100 million for U.N. relief. Of the funds which the relief agency now has at its disposal for Korea, a large part comes from Canada.

German Re-armament

On the subject of the re-armament of Germany, discussed in the speech of Mr. Coldwell, the Minister said:

In respect of that matter we have followed with very great interest, as have other governments, the plans which are now under way for the development of a European army under some form of European as opposed to national civilian control. . . . At first some of the governments, even the governments of the United Kingdom itself, had some hesitation in respect of this development because it was felt that it might indefinitely postpone the building up of a North Atlantic integrated force. But most of these doubts and hesitations have been dispelled by the progress achieved during the last six months. . . .

About the only main obstacles towards the successful conclusion of these discussions now is the size of the German contingent in this European army and the kind of supra-national control which will be exercised over it by European governments. My own feeling is that this is a helpful development, and that it may be a great thing for European peace. If we can get Germans, Frenchmen, Belgians and Dutchmen all operating in the same European army, not under national but European control, it may be a long step forward towards ending that long feud between Gaul and Teuton. At the same time, a European force is not enough. This European army should, in its turn, become integrated — that is a word we seem to use a great deal these days — with the North Atlantic force. There should be no distinction of that kind between an European army on the one side and General Eisenhower's army on the other.

National Defence Policy

Canadian Commitments to NATO

On October 18, the Minister of National Defence, recalling the sections of the Throne Speech announcing Canada's contribution to the forces under the command of General Eisenhower in Europe, read and tabled Order-in-Council P.C. 5598, which provided for maintenance of a special army unit for that purpose. Mr. Claxton then spoke as follows:

While preliminary arrangements are being proceeded with, it is intended that the movement of the brigade will begin in early November and be completed by the middle of December.

The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade will, from the time of its arrival in Europe, form part of the integrated force under General Eisenhower and will be stationed in Germany for defence purposes under the North Atlantic Treaty with the concurrence of the allied high commission, the present competent defence authority in Germany.

Arrangements have been made to group the Canadian brigade with the British, Belgian and Netherlands forces. The brigade will be stationed in the Hanover area.

No. 410 squadron of the R.C.A.F., equipped with F-86E Sabre aircraft, is proceeding next month on H.M.C.S. *Magnificent* to England where this and other squadrons, which will follow later, will be stationed at North Luffenham airfield in the Midlands pending the provision of airfields and other accommodation in western Europe.

Representation at the Vatican

On October 24, Mr. Gagnon (Ind. Chicoutimi) asked for a statement on the likelihood of the Canadian Government's appointing a representative to the Vatican. Mr. Pearson replied:

From time to time the Government gives consideration to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with sovereign states in which Canada has at the present time no diplomatic missions. This, of course, includes the Vatican.

Death of Liaquat Ali Khan

Concerning the death by assassination of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent said in part:

I was shocked to learn, as I am sure all other hon. members were, of this terribly tragic event. I had met Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on a number of occasions, and happily recall being host to him during his visit to Canada in the spring of 1950. Hon. members will recall the occasion when he spoke so eloquently to both Houses of Parliament in this chamber at the end of May 1950, on the subject of Pakistan, the Commonwealth and the future.

The House rose to observe a short silence, following which similar expressions of sympathy were made by Mr. Drew, Mr. Coldwell and Mr. Low.

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty

Replying on October 16 to a question by Mr. Green on the Canadian attitude toward the unilateral Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Mr. Pearson said:

The situation in the area to which my hon. friend's question refers is a difficult one indeed at the moment, and highly inflammable. I do not think any statement from me at this time in answer to a question will be helpful. I shall take that question as notice, however, and if anything can usefully be said, I shall say it at the first opportunity.

On October 19, Mr. Pearson made the following statement on the present situation in Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone:

I believe, if hon. members wish to understand the complete significance of what has been transpiring in Egypt, it might be desirable to give very briefly a short historical background. It must be remembered in the first instance that even when the protectorate in Egypt was terminated in 1922 and Egyptian independence was proclaimed, the questions of the Sudan and British defence interests in Egypt remained unsolved issues, and were the subject of differences between the two governments until 1935, when the invasion of Ethiopia brought war to the very borders of Egypt and led directly to the signing of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty.

This treaty, which was to run until 1956, was designed to put an end to the military occupation of Egypt, and to replace it with a permanent alliance for mutual assistance both in times of peace and war between the United Kingdom and Egypt. That treaty also authorized the maintenance of United Kingdom troops in the Suez canal zone — and I quote these words “until such time as the parties agree that the Egyptian army is in a position to ensure, by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of navigation of the canal”. That treaty, the 1936 treaty, also continued the administration of the Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of 1899.

During the war years — that is the years of World War II — the treaty, through the facilities in Egypt which it placed at the disposal of the allies, played a very important role in the attainment of ultimate victory over the axis powers. As the tide of war receded from Egypt, however, the popular Egyptian demand for the removal of all remaining limitations on independence was revived and led to an inconclusive reference of this matter to the United Nations Security Council by Egypt early in 1947.

With the return to power in Egypt in 1950 of the Wafd government, it became the declared objective of Egypt to achieve the complete evacuation of United Kingdom troops from the canal zone and the unification of the Nile valley, including the Sudan, under the crown of Egypt. Rejecting a revision of the treaty with the United Kingdom, and finally rejecting more recently a place of equality in a system of collective defence for the whole Middle East area, the Egyptian Government has pursued its national aims to the point reached a few days ago, when it abrogated its treaties with the United Kingdom.

It was implicit, in the recent decision taken in Ottawa a few weeks ago to invite Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, that the defence of the Middle East is vital to the successful defence of Europe and the North Atlantic area, as was clearly shown during World War II. It was for the same reason that it was also decided to establish a separate command in the Middle East which, through the peacetime co-operation of the states in the area and those states directly concerned in the defence of that area, could make adequate preparation for its successful defence in time of war.

Those states directly concerned, and which were invited to participate in the Middle East command, included Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. These proposals, which were submitted to the Egyptian Government before the denunciation of the treaty, would have superseded the Treaty and would have terminated the present United Kingdom regime, under which it had responsibility for the security of the Canal Zone. These proposals were rejected by the Egyptian Government, and that rejection was followed very shortly by the action taken last week.

So far as the Canadian Government is concerned, it regrets exceedingly the action taken by the Egyptian Government to repudiate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 — action all the more regrettable in view of the fact that alternative arrangements were under discussion with the Egyptian Government at the time the repudiation took place.

The Secretary of State of the United States has already characterized this repudiation and, indeed, also that of the agreements of 1899, regarding the Sudan, as without validity. We agree with that view.

The situation which has developed in the Suez canal zone is highly inflammable and can become dangerous to general peace. For that reason the Canadian Government joins other governments in expressing the earnest hope that every effort will be made to avoid any breach of the peace and to achieve a satisfactory arrangement for the security of the area.

The Government has welcomed the assurances which we have received from the United Kingdom that, as we would naturally expect, they are doing their best and will continue to do their best to avoid incidents and violence. The Canadian Government considers it of major importance for the security of the free world, indeed for the maintenance of peace itself, that no action should be taken to alter by force the present regime of responsibility of the United Kingdom for the defence of the Suez canal zone. These views have already been communicated to the United Kingdom Government.



THE ROYAL VISIT

—*Capital Press*

As Princess Elizabeth steps off the Royal Train at the Island Park station in Ottawa, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, presents the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Department of External Affairs released on October 15 the text of a draft Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey* which had been agreed upon by the North Atlantic Council Deputies and made public in all the NATO capitals the same day. Following signature, the Canadian Parliament will in due course be asked to approve the ratification of the Protocol. When all twelve present signatories of the Treaty have duly signed and ratified the Protocol, a definitive invitation will be extended to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

THE PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack —

- (i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- (ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force, or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

* See External Affairs, October 1951, p. 322.

ARTICLE III


The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Done at.....the.....day of....., 19.....



—National Defence

SHOULDER FLASHES FOR CANADA'S NATO FORCE

Shoulder flashes to be worn by the three major battalions of Canada's new 27th Infantry Brigade when serving in Europe are shown in the above picture. At the left is the flash for the 1st Canadian Highland Battalion. The center flash will be worn by the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion. The flash on the right is for the 1st Canadian Rifle Battalion. Other miscellaneous units of the Brigade will wear the same French grey shield without any insignia beneath the "CANADA" lettering.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Sixth Session of the General Assembly

The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly opened in Paris on November 6. The October issue of *External Affairs* contained a brief summary of the more important items on the provisional agenda, to which have since been added nine supplementary items. The Assembly may add further items to the agenda if they are considered to be of an "important and urgent" nature.

The supplementary agenda contains several subjects of importance: the admission of new members; the alleged violation of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights in Morocco; the draft protocol relating to the status of stateless persons; financial and economic provisions in respect of Eritrea arising out of the Italian peace treaty; and a review of the Assembly's methods and procedures for dealing with legal and drafting questions.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs is Chairman of the Canadian Delegation. Other Representatives are:

Mr. S. S. Garson, M.P., Minister of Justice and Deputy Chairman of the Delegation,
Senator J. R. Hurtubise, M.D., C.M.,
Mr. Maurice Bourget, M.P., and
Mrs. R. J. Marshall, LL.D., Past President of the National Council of Women.

The alternate Canadian Representatives are:

Mr. Colin Bennett, M.P.,
Mr. T. A. Stone, Canadian Minister to Sweden,
Mr. D. M. Johnson, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Minister at the Canadian Embassy, Paris, and
Mr. J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Representative to the OEEC, and to the Financial and Economic Board of NATO.

Two parliamentary advisers are also with the Delegation:

Mr. F. H. Larson, M.P., and
Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., M.P.

United Nations Day

On October 24, United Nations Day, the flag of the United Nations was flown from a flagpole in front of the centre block of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. In a statement on United Nations Day, the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, said:

On this day, peoples of all nations are celebrating the sixth anniversary of the coming into force of the Charter of the United Nations, and with it the launching of an experiment in international co-operation unique in the history of the world. This particular anniversary is of special significance, since it comes during a prolonged and critical period for the United Nations. During the past sixteen months, the principle of the use of effective collective measures in the maintenance of peace and security has been put to the test in Korea. In meeting the aggression there, the United Nations gave heart to threatened peoples in other parts of the world, and took a step forward in the long search for universal peace.

In other fields, the United Nations and the various Specialized Agencies are increasing their efforts to raise living standards, to improve health, to develop self-government in colonial areas, and to promote respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. The international technical assistance programmes continue to expand. The



—United Nations

PARIS SITE OF SIXTH SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the opening of the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations flag is hoisted at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris where a special structure has been erected to house the Assembly rooms and the Secretariat office. In the background, the permanent buildings of the Palais are seen.

task which lies ahead is enormous. Poverty, sickness and ignorance have always been a breeding ground for mistrust and war; and it is regrettable that the Cominform countries have refused to participate in this work of building a better world. Canada, together with other free countries, will, however, continue actively to support these United Nations activities.

There is evidence that Canada's stature in world affairs has been increased by our participation in the work of the United Nations. At the same time, that participation carries with it responsibilities for every one of us. We recognize that the time is past when this country, or any other country, can ignore its international obligations. Support by individual Canadians of the ideals and purposes of the United Nations, as well as of those of the Commonwealth and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is, in fact, the best, and perhaps the only way of avoiding another world war.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. P. Beaulieu was posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Boston, to Ottawa, effective October 2, 1951.
- Mr. H. F. Clark was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Embassy in France, effective October 4, 1951.
- Mr. G. E. Cox was posted from the Canadian Embassy in the United States, to Ottawa, effective October 1, 1951.
- Mr. J. W. L. H. LaVigne was posted from the Canadian Embassy in the United States to Ottawa, effective October 1, 1951.
- Mr. J. D. Foote was posted from Home Leave (Warsaw) to Ottawa, effective October 9, 1951.
- Mr. P. Tremblay was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Embassy in the Netherlands, effective October 8, 1951.
- Mr. R. P. Cameron was posted from Home Leave (Havana) to Ottawa, effective September 17, 1951.
- Mr. D. V. LePan was posted from Ottawa, to the Canadian Embassy in the United States, effective October 13, 1951.
- Mr. G. Sicotte was posted from the Canadian Embassy in Mexico, to Ottawa, effective October 15, 1951.
- Mr. C. H. West was posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, to Ottawa, effective October 22, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

Colonel Constantin Provorov, Military Attaché for Air, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 6.

Wing Commander P. C. Webb, D.F.C., Assistant Air Force Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, October 7.

Mr. Traugott Johannes Endemann, Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, October 10.

Mr. Nicholas Fieschi, Attaché, Embassy of France, October 11.

Mr. Michal Krycun, Second Secretary, Legation of Poland, October 12.

Major Otakar Taschner, Military and Air Attaché, Legation of Czechoslovakia, October 16.

Mr. Hendrik Albertus Geldenhuys, Assistant Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, October 17.

Mr. Edgar Enrique Perez Colman, Second Secretary, Embassy of Argentina, October 19. He was previously Consul at Quebec.

Departures

Wing Commander S. G. Birch, O.B.E., As-
November, 1951

sistant Air Force Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, September 19.

Colonel Guiorgui G. Kolikov, Military Attaché, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, September 24.

Dr. Miroslav Mares resigned his post of Commercial Attaché at the Legation of Czechoslovakia on October 5.

Mr. Dmitri Moussine, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 9.

Mr. André Rousselet, Attaché, Embassy of France, October 11.

His Excellency Dr. Rade Pribicevic, Ambassador designate of Yugoslavia left Ottawa on October 14 to return to his country. Pending the arrival of a successor Mr. Slavko Zecevic, First Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires at interim.

Colonel Janko Susnjar, Military, Naval and Air Attaché, Embassy of Yugoslavia, October 16.

Mr. Gaston Zapata Quesada, Counsellor, Embassy of Argentina, October 19.

Mr. N. Best, Assistant Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, October 21.

Mr. S. D. Kalelkar, Information Officer, Office of the High Commissioner for India, October 25.

His Excellency Hubert Guérin, Ambassador of France, left Ottawa on October 18 for a holiday in France. During his absence, Mr. François de Laboulaye, Counsellor, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Liu Chieh, Ambassador of China, left Ottawa on October 24 for Paris,

France, to attend the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. During his absence, Mr. Kechin Wang, First Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Dr. Victor Nef, Minister of Switzerland, resumed charge of the Legation on October 24 on his return from a visit to his country.

Mr. Luis Ibarguen, Third Secretary, Embassy of Mexico, was promoted to the rank of Second Secretary effective September 1.

CONSULAR

Exequaturs were issued to:

Miss Dorothy M. Barker, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, October 19.

Mr. Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr., Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, October 19.

Mr. Vinicio da Veiga, Consul of Brazil at Toronto, October 19.

Mr. Richard E. Kleinhans, Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, October 19.

Mr. Robert A. McKinnon, Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Halifax, October 19.

Mr. Stefanos Rockanas, Vice-Consul of Greece at Toronto, October 19.

Mr. Carlos Buzzoni Villela, Consul General of Chile at Montreal, October 19.

Definitive recognition was granted to:

Mr. George A. Berkley as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, October 15.

Mr. Xavier W. Eilers as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, October 15.

Miss Eva Taylor as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Ottawa, October 19.

Mr. Ralph C. Fratzke as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Windsor, October 19.

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Ray Neil Bryson as Honorary Consul of Denmark at Toronto, October 15.

Mr. George J. Haering as Consul General of the United States of America at Toronto, October 16.

Mr. Albert W. Scott as Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, October 16.

Mr. William Espinosa y Dominguez as Consul of Cuba at Montreal, October 16.

Mrs. Louise O. deCourcy O'Grady as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, October 16.

Mr. Leonard E. Thompson as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, October 16.

Miss Mildred V. Deike as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Toronto, October 19.

Baron Kurt F. J. Paumann as Honorary Vice-Consul of Austria at Ottawa, October 19.

Mr. Donald F. Hunter as Honorary Consul of Portugal at Toronto, October 24.

Mr. Jose Vicente Ayestaran as Vice-Consul of Argentina at Montreal, October 31.

Departures

Mr. E. M. Petersen, Vice-Consul of Denmark at Montreal, October 9.

Mr. Fernando Carderera, Consul of Spain at Montreal, October 14.

Mr. Tulio de la Rua, Consul of Argentina of Toronto, October 19.

Mr. Manuel Lezica, Consul of Argentina at Vancouver, October 19. Pending the appointment of a successor, Mr. Jose Alberto Caballero, Vice-Consul, is in charge of the Consulate.

Mr. Ignacio E. Pico Estrada, Vice-Consul of Argentina at Montreal, October 19.

Dr. Frederick Riedl-Riedenstein, Consul General of Austria at Ottawa, end of October. Pending the appointment of a successor, Baron Kurt F. J. Paumann, Honorary Vice-Consul, is in charge of the Consulate General.

Dr. Francisco Villagran resumed his duties as Consul General of Mexico at Montreal on October 1 on his return from a holiday in his country.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a List of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of October 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier Conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs".)

(The Department of External Affairs, through its International Conferences Section is responsible for co-ordinating all invitations to International Conferences. The decision as to Canadian participation at such Conferences is made by Cabinet upon the recommendation of the department of government functionally concerned.)

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs" January 1, 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions.)

Conferences Attended in October

1. *Conference to Discuss Creation of European Army*. Paris - February 15. Observer: Maj. Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Embassy, Bonn; Advisers: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
2. *Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (ITU)*. Geneva - August 16. Head of Delegation: C. J. Acton, Department of Transport; Delegates: A. J. Dawson and C. M. Brant, Department of Transport; Maj. W. H. Finch, Lt. Cmdr. R. H. Dunbar and S/Ldr. W. D. Benton, Department of National Defence; E. P. Black, Canadian Embassy, Moscow; Adviser: F. P. Johnson, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
3. *Forest Fire Study Tour (FAO)*. Washington - September 4 - October 12. J. C. MacLeod, Department of Resources and Development; T. E. Mackey, Department of Lands and Forests of the Province of Ontario.
4. *Building Research Congress*. London - September 11 - October 16. R. F. Legget, National Research Council; M. F. Goudge, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
5. *Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*. Geneva - September 17. Chairman: C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce; Deputy Chairman: C. M. Isbister, Department of Trade and Commerce; Parliamentary Adviser: J. Sinclair, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance; Delegates: L. Couillard, Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to OEEC, Paris; W. J. Callaghan and S. S. Reisman, Department of Finance; M. Schwarzman, Department of Trade and Commerce; Secretary: M. K. Goldschlag, Department of External Affairs.
6. *Fifth Meeting of the Pan-American Sanitary Organization (WHO)*. Washington - September 24 - October 2. R. W. A. Dunn, Canadian Embassy, Washington (Observer).
7. *Preliminary Migration Conference (ILO)*. Naples - October 2-16. Head of Delegation: C. E. S. Smith, Department of Citizenship and Immigration; Representatives: S. H. McLaren, Unemployment Insurance Commission; N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; J. Boucher, Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
8. *Second Meeting of the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization*. Lausanne - October 3. Dr. A. Thomson, Department of Transport, Toronto.
9. *Annual Convention of Association of Military Surgeons*. Chicago - October 8-10. Surgeon Commander: W. J. Elliot; K. A. Hunter; G/Capt. A. A. G. Corbet and Sq/Ltd. F. M. Oakes, Department of National Defence.
10. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Temporary Committee for the Co-ordinated Analysis of Defence Plans*. Paris - October 9. D. C. Abbott, Minister of Finance; Advisers: Gen. C. Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee; J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Representative to OEEC, Paris; J. J. Deutsch, Department of Finance; E. A. Ritchie, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
11. *Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East - Regional Conference on Trade Promotion*. Singapore - October 9-18. Delegate: D. S. Armstrong, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Singapore.
12. *Sixth International Conference and General Assembly of the International Union of Trade Organizations*. Athens - October 9-12. M. Blais, Canadian Embassy, Athens. (Observer).

13. *World Metallurgical Congress*. Detroit — October 15-19. Canadian Government Representative: H. J. Nichols and Dr. J. Convey, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
14. *79th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Health*. San Francisco — October 15. Representative: Lt. Cmdr. J. W. Rogers, Department of National Defence.
15. *Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe*. Strasbourg — October 15. Official Observer: T. C. Davis, Canadian Ambassador to Germany.
16. *Meeting of Commonwealth Auditors General*. London — October 15-19. R. Watson Sellar, Auditor General of Canada; G. A. Morrison, Office of Auditor General of Canada.
17. *Tenth Session of the Executive Committee of IRO*. Geneva — October 18. Delegates: G. L. Magann, Canadian Ambassador to Greece; J. Boucher, Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
18. *Eighth Session of the General Council of IRO*. Geneva — October 22. Head of Delegation: G. L. Magann, Canadian Ambassador to Greece; Delegates: J. Boucher, Department of Citizenship and Immigration; N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canadian to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; S. H. McLaren, Unemployment Insurance Commission.
19. *36th Session of the Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body*. Geneva — October 22-27. C. H. L. Sharman, Department of National Health and Welfare.
20. *Third Session of the Permanent Committee of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works*. Paris — October 25-27. Dr. V. Doré, Canadian Minister to Switzerland.
21. *First Inter-American Convention on Mineral Resources*. Mexico City — October 29 - November 4. W. R. McClelland, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
22. *Programme Committee of UNICEF*. Paris — October 29. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.
23. *Fifth Meeting of the South Pacific Air Transport Council*. Wellington, N.Z. — October 29. A. Rive, Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand; J. R. Maybee, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, Canberra.
24. *International Wheat Council*. Lisbon — October 30 — Delegate: G. H. McIvor, Canadian Wheat Board; Alternate: J. B. Lawrie, Canadian Wheat Board.

Conferences to be held in November and December

(The inclusion of the name of a Conference or Congress in the following list means only that the Government of Canada has received an invitation to participate; the dates are tentative. It does not follow that the invitation has been or will be accepted.)

1. *Conference to Conclude a Fisheries Treaty with Japan*. Tokyo—November 5.
2. *Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. Paris—November 6.
3. *Executive Board of UNICEF*. Paris — November 8.
4. *Conference of British Commonwealth Statisticians*. Canberra — November 12-24.
5. *13th Session of the Council of FAO*. Rome—November 12-17.
6. *117th Session of the Governing Body of ILO*. Geneva—November 14.
7. *North Atlantic Council — Military Committee*. Rome—November 17-24.
8. *Sixth Session of the Conference of FAO*. Rome—November 19.
9. *Conference on Morbidity Statistics of WHO*. Geneva—November 21-26.
10. *Third Session of Facilitation (FAL) Division (ICAO)*. Buenos Aires—November 21.
11. *Seventh International Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association*. Montevideo—November 21-December 2.
12. *North Atlantic Council*. Rome—November 24.
13. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization — Committee on North Atlantic Community*. London or Paris—November.
14. *Second Pan-American Congress on Pharmacy*. Lima—December 1-8.
15. *Official Medical Historians Liaison Committee*. New Delhi—December 3-19.
16. *Fourth Session of the Inland Transport Committee of ILO*. Geneva—December 4-15.
17. *27th Session of the International Statistical Institute*. New Delhi — December 5-11.

18. *United Nations Sub-Committee on Statistical Sampling*. (ECOSOC). New Delhi December 5-11.
19. *Meeting of Experts on Women's Work (ILO)*. Geneva—December 11-15.
20. *World Federation for Mental Health — 4th International Congress on Mental Health*. Mexico City—December 11.
21. *World Federation for Mental Health — Fourth Annual Meeting*. Mexico City—December 12-19.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS†

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

- **World Economic Situation — Economic Development of Under-developed Countries Relation of Fluctuation in the Prices of Primary Commodities to the Ability of Underdeveloped Countries to obtain Foreign Exchange* (Report by the Secretary-General); July 5, 1951; document E/2047; 233 pp., E/2047/Add.1, 59 pp.
- Historical Survey of the Activities of the League of Nations regarding the question of disarmament 1920-1937*; June 18, 1951; document A/AC.50/2; 187 pp.
- Second report on the High Seas* by J. P. A. François (Rapporteur); April 10, 1951; document A/CN.4/42; 71 pp.
- **Report of the International Law Commission covering its Third Session, 16 May-27 July 1951*; July 30, 1951; document A/CN.4/48; 63 pp.

(b) Printed Documents:

- **United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund—Financial Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1950 and Report of the Board of Auditors*; document A/1810; 34 pp.; 30 cents; General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 6A.
- **Budget Estimates for the financial year 1952 and Information Annex*; document A/1812; 281 pp.; \$3.00; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 5.
- **Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*; document A/1844/Add.1; 7 pp.; 10 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.
- **Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions — Second Report of 1951 to the General Assembly*; document A/1853; 61 pp.; 60 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 7.
- **Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*; document A/1857; 32 pp.; 50 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 11.
- **Report of the Committee on Contributions*; document A/1859; 6 pp.; 10 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 10.
- **Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the period from 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951*; document A/1873; 100 pp.; \$1.00; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 2.
- **Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1950*; July 13, 1951; document E/CN.11/307; 541 pp.; \$3.75; Sales No.: 1951.II.F.4 (Department of Economic Affairs).
- **Services of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration and How to obtain them*; May 24, 1951; document ST/TAA/3; 52 pp. (Technical Assistance Administration, United Nations, New York, 1951).
- **Yearbook on Human Rights for 1949*; 421 pp.; \$5.00; Sales No.: 1951.XIV.1.
- **Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1950* (First issue); New York, 1951; 174 pp.; \$1.75; Sales No.: 1951.XVII.2 (Prepared by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs).
- **Freedom of Information (A compilation)*; Vol. II.—Texts communicated by governments; 218 pp.; Sales No.: 1950.XIV.1. Vol.II (Department of Social Affairs).

† Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 51/35—*Perspectives Nord - Atlantiques*, allocution prononcée le 6 septembre 1951 par le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures, M. Jules Léger, devant le Club Richelieu, de Montreal.
- No. 51/38—*Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan*, an address by Mr. R. G. Nik Cavell, Administrator, International Economic and Technical Co-operation Division, Department of Trade and Commerce, delivered at a joint meeting of the Canadian Importers and Traders Association, Canadian Exporters Association, and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, in Toronto, October 5, 1951.
- No. 51/39—*The Japanese Peace Conference*, an address by the Minister of Fisheries, Mr. R. W. Mayhew, made to the United Nations Association at Toronto, October 2, 1951.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

- No. 51/36—*Recent Developments in Canada's Foreign Trade*, an address by the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. W. F. Bull, made to the Canadian Exporters Association, at Montreal, September 20, 1951.
- No. 51/37—*Transportation and Industrial Development*, an address by the Minister of Transport, Mr. Lionel Chevrier, to the Toronto Junior Board of Trade, made at Toronto, September 25, 1951.



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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

NORTH AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD OF TODAY

An address by the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Louis S. St. Laurent, to the Economic Club of New York, on November 19, 1951.

... I chose the subject, "North America's Place in the World of Today", full well knowing that many of you members would be more competent to treat it than I might be; but I did so because, being a Canadian, I necessarily look at it from a somewhat different point of view, and I thought that a view of North America's place in the world of today from the Canadian angle might help to make the position clearer from your point of view here in the United States.

It is, of course, only the blind ones among us in North America today who do not realize we are directly concerned about what is happening in the rest of the world. It is always true, in some degree, that North America is concerned with what is happening in the rest of the world, just as it has always been true—since Columbus' time—that North Americans have been affected by the really important changes in the world outside this hemisphere. But it seems to me that the degree of concern has changed.

Before 1914, most North Americans, whether they lived in the United States or whether they lived in Canada, did not feel the need of paying much attention to what was happening across the Atlantic or on the other side of the Pacific. And we had little sense of responsibility for international affairs outside this hemisphere. For that, there were historical as well as geographical reasons.

In the 18th century, when the thirteen English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard cut their political ties with England and established the United States, this nation practically turned its back on Europe and faced westward across an almost empty continent. The vast energies of the early settlers in this country, and of the thousands and thousands who later joined them, were concentrated on the development of a free and expanding society in North America. All you asked from Europe was to be left alone—to be left in peace—to live your lives in your own way—in what is has become the fashion to call "the American way".

In Canada, our development was somewhat different. At the time of your War of Independence, the Canadian population was still almost exclusively French-speaking. The St. Lawrence valley had been ceded to the British Crown only a dozen years before, and the leaders of your revolution expected to find ready support among the French-speaking Canadians for their revolt against the English. There were several reasons why they did not get that support. One was that the traditional enemy of the average French-speaking Canadian of the 18th century was not the remote English nation across the Atlantic, but the English-speaking people of Boston and New England, the English-speaking people of Albany and the Hudson valley, with whom they had been trading scalps for a century and a half.

In any event, Canada did not join in your revolution, and we Canadians retained our connection with the British Crown, and hundreds of refugees from your War of Independence moved northwards to lay the foundations of English-speaking Canada. In Canada, these immigrants were called Loyalists, and though they were loyal, they were determined to maintain the political connection of their new home with old England, most of them were also determined to manage their own affairs.

The political freedom you achieved by the sudden stroke of revolution, we achieved more slowly, more gradually, but we did achieve it by evolution. Without breaking our tie with the British Crown, we transformed a disunited group of small colonies into a single nation, stretching, like yours, from one sea to another, and I venture to say, just as free as the United States. But our continuing political tie with

the British Crown did keep us somewhat closer in spirit to Europe than you were. When the First World War broke out in 1914, our status in international law made us an automatic belligerent, but that was all our status did. The decision to participate actively in the prosecution of the war was made in Ottawa in our own Parliament by the freely-elected representatives of our own people. For many, that decision was a matter of course because of our sentimental ties with the mother country, but many others did come to the conclusion somewhat earlier than the people of the United States that, if the world was to be a decent place to live in, this military clique in Germany had to be shown that they could not win even at their own chosen game of war.

I suppose it will always remain a subject of debate whether, if the United States had not gone to war in 1917, and if the Germans had won the war—two ifs and we in Canada are still apt to regard them as two separate ifs—the independence and integrity of the United States and Canada would have been in immediate jeopardy. But there can be no argument that defeat of the Allies in 1917 or 1918 would have resulted in a much more uncomfortable world for North Americans to live in than the one we had been used to before 1914.

After the war, as many will recall, the initial wave of enthusiasm for the League of Nations was quickly followed by a reaction of disillusionment and isolation. In your country many felt it had been a mistake to go into the war, that the war had settled nothing, and that, for the future, the right course for the American people was to turn their backs resolutely on the Europeans and leave them to stew in their own juice. Canada became a member of the League of Nations, and, though we never repudiated our membership, our enthusiasm certainly waned and there was, with us, too, a strong reflection of the sentiment for isolation which prevailed on your side of the border.

When war came again in 1939, Canada's status had become different. We were not automatically at war; we had to make our decision for ourselves in law as well as in fact. We did decide to go to war, but many of us made the decision with a heavy heart and some misgivings. A large number of our people asked themselves uneasily whether it was the fate of Canada in each generation to sacrifice the finest of its youth in the interminable quarrels of Europeans. On the other hand, we all shared your horror of the regime Hitler had fastened on Germany, and his brutal aggressions against Germany's neighbours. We could not believe that, so long as the Nazi system lasted, any country would be safe. The danger to our North American society became even clearer when Japan by that attack on Pearl Harbor dragged you in and proclaimed to the world its confident expectation that with Germany and Italy they were going to overcome us all. We knew they could not do it but nevertheless we were thus, twice in one generation, forced into wars which neither of us had had any share in starting, and which we did not want and in which we did have to commit all our resources. Some felt that with more foresight those wars might have been prevented, but certainly we had not wanted them, we had not started them, and yet we had not been able to keep out.

Speaking for Canada, I can say that, by 1945, our people were overwhelmingly convinced that the only way that they could keep out of world wars was to help establish the kind of world in which there would not be any war. I can speak with some assurance for Canada on this point because we debated the issues in our Parliament, and reached virtual unanimity on them, before sending to San Francisco a delegation representing our main political parties to share in founding the organization of the United Nations. The main reason why we were unanimous in 1945 was precisely because we had not been able to keep out of war in 1914 and 1939 and because you had not been able to keep out of war. Our conviction was greatly strengthened because of the almost revolutionary change which had come over opinion in the United States between 1940 and 1945.

The conference at San Francisco had been called by your President. The proposal for a worldwide organization to maintain peace and security in the world was sponsored by your government, and was already receiving the support of the best elements in both your historic political parties.

It was reassuring to us in Canada to see that your conclusions were the same as ours; that you had become convinced the United States could not again turn its back on the rest of the world, and that this country must actually take the lead in international affairs.

There are many people who feel that the calling of the conference at San Francisco and the establishment of the United Nations, with the United States as its leading member, represents a revolution in your foreign policy. I venture to suggest to you that this is a superficial view; that, in fact, it represents a revolutionary change only in method, and that there has been no real change in the fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States.

I said at the beginning of these remarks that the real aim of your Founding Fathers was to have this country left in peace by the rest of the world to develop a free and expanding society on this continent. I believe that is still the real aim of the American people, and I know it is the real aim of the Canadian people. We do not want to dominate anybody. We do not want to throw our weight around anywhere. But we do not want to let events take such a course that we will find ourselves a third time, as we did in 1914 and in 1939, with no real choice but to take part in a world war.

The change, I believe is not in aim but in method. Perhaps your hopes in the United States were a little stronger than ours were in Canada, but we all shared the hope—that, if we simply minded our own business and did not trespass on the rights of others, we might remain at peace. We now see that, if we are to have peace, the people and the governments of this continent have no choice but to take positive and sustained action to help prevent another war.

It might be said that we have already failed in that task because of what has happened in Korea. To those in that unhappy land there certainly has been no peace. But I think that our action there is designed to prevent aggression from spreading into a general world conflict.

Peace is still our aim, but we see that to have peace we must go about it differently. To the vast majority of North Americans on both sides of the border, keeping the peace is the most important business we have or we can have. It is the greatest national interest of the United States as it is the greatest national interest of Canada.

No doubt it is still true that, if a world war came in 1951, other countries in the old world would suffer more immediate destruction and devastation than this continent—though we could certainly not expect to go untouched. But on the other hand, we on this North American continent are today the most privileged people on earth. Having the most to lose by the devastation and dislocation of a world war, we have the strongest incentive to prevent one. By taking positive steps to prevent war, we inevitably take the kind of action which might be regarded as provocative by the only possible major aggressor. This is the kind of calculated risk which every businessman and every economist understands. In any case there is no real choice. We know what did happen when we were not ready to take such risks.

In the first year or two after San Francisco, we continued to hope, against hope, that the great powers in the United Nations which had been charged with the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world would, in fact, cooperate to that end. But the prospect of that co-operation grew dimmer and dimmer, because one of the great powers seemed bent on different ends, and many of us in

Canada, like many others in the United States and in Western Europe, decided that the only hope for immediate security and the only one likely prospect of preventing another world war lay in combining and in expanding the resources—military and economic and moral—of those nations which genuinely wanted peace, and which had potential strength either of population or resources to contribute to an effective combination for peace.

It was this growing centre of common interest which was the genesis of the North Atlantic alliance. The military aim of that partnership is to build up a force adequate to deter an aggressor from starting any D-day in the hope that D-day, like tomorrow, will never come. The United States is inevitably the dominant factor in that partnership. There could have been no North Atlantic alliance worthwhile without the leadership of this country. And I believe there could have been no North Atlantic alliance if American leadership had not been based upon a consistent and clear-sighted foreign policy which has been pursued steadily by the United States ever since the close of the war.

American participation in European affairs has been beneficial to the people of the world. American aid has been indispensable to the orderly survival of European society. We in America, on both sides of the border, find it hard to understand why some Europeans have not shown proper gratitude and appreciation of what you have done for Europe, and sometimes we wonder whether the effort has been worth what it has cost. But when we begin to talk about gratitude and appreciation for what you have done for Europe, I wonder if we North-Americans are being realistic. Of course we are glad that the effect of our external policies is helpful to other nations, but I think we might be honest enough to admit that the fundamental aim of our policies is to serve our own interests as North American nations. I believe the administration in Washington and our government at Ottawa—where we follow parallel lines—have conceived in those interests the long and right view.

The real justification for asking the taxpayers of the United States to provide loans and gifts, Marshall Aid and military support has been that all these things are necessary if your own people are to have any reasonable ground for hoping that they will not have to provide the infinitely greater cost of another world war. What we have done in Canada is inspired by the same justification. We are not trying to build up the economies and the military strength of the nations of Western Europe out of disinterested love for Englishmen, or Frenchmen or Dutchmen or Belgians or Italians, or any other of our allies. We are doing it for the safety and the future of Americans and Canadians who inhabit this North American continent. We want to help build up the strength of our friends and allies in Europe because all of us are in the same boat. We need each other.

Speaking as a Canadian, I can assure you that the great majority of my fellow-citizens have admired the single-minded resolution with which the Government of the United States, under the leadership of President Truman and General Marshall and Mr. Acheson, has pursued objectives in foreign policy which we believe are essential to the security of the North American way of life. We have admired, too, the non-partisan way in which the administration of your country has been supported in pursuing these general objectives by such distinguished Republicans as the late Senator Vandenberg, Governor Dewey and Mr. John Foster Dulles. We all know what the leadership of that most civilian-minded of soldiers, General Eisenhower, has meant in rallying the spirits as well as in leading the forces of the North Atlantic nations. While we might sometimes differ about tactics, the rest of the free nations cannot quarrel with the strategy of American leadership.

The importance of North America in the world today is not something which is transitory. It seems to me that it represents something of a permanent shift in the real balance of power in the world, something which may be expected to last for

many generations, provided the leadership of North American statesmen and the resolution of our North American population is equal to the power which is now ours. Although I have said North American, and although we like and expect to be consulted, we Canadians are realistic and we know that there has to be a proper relationship between power and responsibility; and that the United States alone has the necessary power to support the required leadership.

The American people have certainly not striven for their present position of power and responsibility in the world. I am sure most of you and, indeed, most North Americans on both sides of the border look back often with longing to the days before 1914 when it seemed safe to ignore international affairs outside this hemisphere. But we in North America have no such choice. The only choice before you and before us is a choice between wise, patient and intelligent leadership of the free world by the United States or a rapid shrinkage of the circumference of the free world, with all the disastrous consequences that it would bring even if we were able to maintain some kind of independent existence in our Western Hemisphere.

In the kind of world we are now living in there is no quick and easy way to peace or to anything we would like to think of as a normal existence. We have first of all to create, and after that to maintain, perhaps for generations, military strength which will be too substantial to be challenged by any potential aggressor with any hope of final victory.

We cannot count on any early collapse of the totalitarian system erected behind the Iron Curtain. We are faced with the problem of living in the same world with that system. I am not sure that one of the greatest dangers we shall have to face will not be the danger of aggression, but the danger of listening to those who think they have a quick way and an easy solution to this dangerous problem.

There will be many who will say that since communism is bent on extinguishing our way of life, we should hit first, that the best thing to do is to get the inevitable over with. The appeal of that kind of doctrine is likely to grow as the military strength of the free world grows. In the next few years, it may be that nothing will be so important as to remember that what we are doing is to try to prevent a third world war, not to win one.

One of your distinguished American diplomats has said that "the United States will fight, if necessary, to preserve freedom and justice, but it will not make war merely because the road to peace is inevitably long and hard and tiresome." I have not the slightest doubt and I am sure you have no doubt that, if a test of strength is forced upon us by an aggressor, we in the free world could win again. But the cost will be far greater than the cost of any previous war. Even victory will bring with it destruction, dislocation and desolation so great as to constitute a threat to civilization itself. That is why we must never forget that our real aim is to be strong in order to prevent war. Of course, we need the help of our European partners. Of course, we need to do everything we can to win the sympathy and preserve the stability of the countless millions of the East.

But, if the free world is to be saved, and, if we and our children and our children's children are to enjoy a free and expanding society in this Western Hemisphere I feel that we in North America must now and for many months ahead accept and discharge, with wisdom and with patience, the heavy responsibilities which are inseparable from the position of power which North America has in the world of our generation.

THE COLOMBO EXHIBITION*

"Canadians welcome the opportunity offered by the Colombo Plan to share their technical skills with the older civilizations of South and South-East Asia. This partnership can enrich the lives of us all."

In these words, which have been inscribed in the principal languages of the area — Urdu, Hindustani, Tamil, Singhalese and English — at the entrance to the Canadian Pavilion of the Colombo Exhibition, are to be found the greetings of the Prime Minister of Canada to the peoples of South and South-East Asia. This Pavilion is intended to provide a picture of Canada and of its natural resources for visitors to the Exhibition, which is being held next February in Colombo, Ceylon, to commemorate the first anniversary of the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia.

As evidence of its sympathy with the aspirations of the newly independent states of the area, Canada has welcomed the inauguration of the Colombo Plan, which provides for economic aid and technical assistance to the countries of South and South-East Asia. The Colombo Plan comprises two programmes, one a capital development programme to provide capital and necessary equipment for certain specific projects in the countries of the area, and the other, a technical assistance programme to aid the governments of these countries to use to the full their as yet undeveloped natural resources, by finding means to increase food production, improve health standards, develop communications and transportation systems, and train efficient public administrators. As the Colombo Plan is essentially a co-operative venture, it is hoped that the Exhibition in Ceylon will enable those countries participating in the Plan to indicate the measure of assistance already rendered and the extent to which they hope to contribute, individually and collectively, towards the economic development of South and South-East Asia.


The Exhibition is scheduled to last for a month. More than 1,500,000 people from Ceylon and the countries of the area are expected to visit the Exhibition grounds, which are located in Victoria Park, Colombo. Her Royal Highness The Princess Elizabeth will open the Exhibition officially during her visit to Ceylon.

In addition to the national pavilions of the countries participating in the Colombo Plan — Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Laos, Malaya, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom — and the countries which have shown an interest in the Plan — Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam — the Exhibition will include a trade fair section, in which commercial firms of these nations have been invited to display their products. As host, the Government of Ceylon will have a special section setting forth its economic and social welfare activities. A cultural section for the fine arts, and an amusement section will also be located in the forty acres of park lands set aside for the Exhibition.

Canadian Exhibit

When the Canadian Government Exhibition Commission was assigned the task of designing and producing the Canadian Pavilion, many climatic difficulties, peculiar to tropical countries, had first to be considered. In order that the peoples of South-East Asia might have some idea of the materials produced in Canada, it was decided to prefabricate, in Ottawa, the building to house the Canadian exhibit. The contemporary design of the structure creates a distinctly Canadian atmosphere and materials of aluminum, fir and cedar panelling are used in their natural finish. To allow for sufficient ventilation under tropical conditions, a large part of the building has been left open.

* See also "Colombo Plan—Recent Developments", September 1951, p. 313.



—NFB

CANADIAN PAVILION — COLOMBO EXHIBITION

Shown above is a scale model of the Canadian pavilion at the Colombo Exhibition, which will open in February, 1952. The pavilion was prefabricated in Ottawa by the Canadian Government Exhibition Commission for shipment to Ceylon.

The theme of the Canadian exhibit is expressed in the slogan, "blueprint for democratic planning", and an attempt has been made to present some of the problems that Canadians have had to solve in building a nation, suggesting that, by example, some Canadian solutions to these problems may be of use to the countries of South and South-East Asia in their plans for the future.

The graphic display in the Canadian building depicts various phases of agriculture in this country, including the manufacture and use of farming equipment, the operation of experimental farms, the control of soil erosion, irrigation projects, farm co-operatives and the National Farm Radio Forum.

Among many projects illustrated in the agricultural section of the Canadian Exhibit is a mounted aerial model of the Central Experimental Farm in Ottawa. Miniature versions of the main buildings at the farm are surrounded by some typical Experimental Farm plots.

The section on soil erosion control, following the Experimental Farm panel, depicts some Canadian remedies for this world-wide problem. Panels illustrating water conservation programmes, strip farming and contour plowing, and reforestation, emphasize that "soil erosion control is self-help for farmers now on the land, and a legacy for future generations".

An interesting feature of the hydro-electric display is a working model, with water running down the spillways, of the control dam at the Shipshaw development

of the Aluminum Company of Canada which has an installed capacity of 1,500,000 horsepower.

The engineering section contains a table-top copy of the model of the Fraser River tidal system, which was constructed on 400 square feet of ground on the campus of the University of British Columbia. Canadian engineers have been experimenting with a series of control dykes to prevent the tons of silt pouring down the river channels from choking up the mouth of the estuary. Their experiments with this problem on the original model may be of considerable value to the countries of South and South-East Asia in their new port developments.

A cross-section of Canadian health and welfare services, which would relate to Colombo Plan projects, has been arranged, in the final section, as leaves and branches of a stylized health tree. Here are to be found mounted booklets which are distributed by the Department of National Health and Welfare in connection with health programmes in this country. Some photographs of a travelling X-ray unit, a well-baby clinic, immunization for children, and a home industry shop in Newfoundland, were chosen as representative Canadian services which would coincide with some of the most urgent needs of the countries of South and South-East Asia.

A preview of the exhibit was held in Ottawa on November 28, prior to its shipment by sea to Ceylon. During the period of the Colombo Exhibition the Assistant Director of the Canadian Government Exhibition Commission, Mr. F. P. Cosgrove, and the Canadian Representative on the Council for Technical Co-operation in Colombo, will be in attendance at the Canadian Pavilion.

Colombo Plan a Co-operative Venture

Although the Canadian exhibit has been designed to demonstrate to the peoples of South and South-East Asia the types of assistance which Canada has to offer in helping them to surmount their problems, it has been hoped that the Exhibit would emphasize the conception of the Colombo Plan as an essentially co-operative venture. As the concluding paragraph of the booklet which has been prepared for distribution at the Canadian exhibit states:

Although we may have something to give and to teach, we have also much to receive and to learn. In this vast country of ours, we have found out something of how we may live and prosper; but from the East with its ancient cultures we have much to learn of the abiding things that bring comfort and delight to the mind and heart. We should like to know more of your art and of your riches in poetry and in philosophy. We in Canada have learned how to tame a wilderness and to work with nature in creating material prosperity; but this we realize is not an end in itself, and indeed, much of our prosperity depends upon the effectiveness with which we can share our resources with you and with the rest of the world. Of the technical processes and skills useful in increasing production we have something to impart; for the purposes to which a greater measure of material prosperity may be devoted we may properly turn to you, since according to our ancient proverb: "Out of the East cometh wisdom".

CANADA'S NATO FORCES ARRIVE IN EUROPE

On September 18, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Claxton, announced that, subject to the approval of Parliament, the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade would move overseas to form part of the NATO Integrated Force under General Eisenhower.

In his statement, Mr. Claxton said:

Late last week General Eisenhower sent word expressing deep satisfaction that the Canadians could be available in the autumn of 1951 and stressed the great importance which he attached to a Canadian contribution to the Integrated Forces of NATO at this juncture. For military reasons he was of the opinion that the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group should be deployed in the Northern Army Sector in association with the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Belgian forces, and where suitable accommodation and training areas could be made available. General Eisenhower also stated that he would take a personal interest in the arrival and arrangements for accommodation of the Canadian force.

Mr. Claxton also said that, subject to Parliamentary approval, Canada would contribute an air division of eleven fighter squadrons to the forces under General Eisenhower. The first three of these squadrons would remain in the United Kingdom until facilities are available for them on the continent.

On October 23, the House of Commons adopted the following resolution, which indicated its approval of Canadian participation in the Integrated Force. The resolution, which was also approved by the Senate, reads as follows:

That this House approves the continuance of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace, and in particular to defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea, and by the North Atlantic Treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

Following this, the actual movement of the Brigade to Europe was carried forward.


Troops Welcomed in Rotterdam

On November 21, Mr. Claxton and General Eisenhower welcomed 1,500 men of the Brigade in the square before the *Stadhuis* of Rotterdam, the Netherlands. This contingent was the third to arrive overseas and brought the strength of the Brigade elements in Europe to about 2,350 men. It consisted of the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion; the 58th Independent Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers; the 194th Infantry Workshop, RCEME; an advance party of the 79th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery; a base repair section; members of the Provost Corps and a dental detachment.

The full Brigade, which comprises 5,500 men, has been moving to Europe in six separate sailings during November and December, and is expected to be in barracks near Hanover by the end of the year.

After a salute taken by General Eisenhower and inspection of the troops, Mr. Claxton spoke as follows:

This is an historic day, when the Canadian forces return to this land of Europe; this time, not to help to win a war, but to prevent a war, protect peace and preserve freedom. They are proud to join their comrades of the other North Atlantic Treaty countries in this great endeavour.



CANADA'S 27TH BRIGADE ARRIVES IN EUROPE

—Anefo

Members of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade are welcomed at the Rotterdam city hall by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton.

It is a good omen that these Canadians should arrive in the Netherlands, a country which is close to the heart of all Canadians. I wish on their behalf to tell Her Majesty Queen Juliana that they remember the days when she was in Canada during the last war.

Mr. Burgomaster: It is good too that they should arrive in Rotterdam. You were here then as Burgomaster, and more than anyone else will remember the great march of liberation when the Canadians were the first to arrive here on May 8, 1945. The Government of Holland, the city of Rotterdam, and the armed forces of your country are due our thanks for the arrangements that they have made and for the warm welcome they have so hospitably extended.

Soldiers of Canada: The uniform of Canada has been recognized everywhere as a badge of courage and a certificate of high conduct. You carry on your shoulders the name of Canada and you carry also the responsibility for that good name. There comes and will stay with you the love and support of people in every corner of our great and beloved country. Good luck to all of you.

General Eisenhower: It was under your great leadership that the Allied forces, including many Canadian veterans here today fought and won the war. It is our



—National Defence

GENERAL EISENHOWER INSPECTS CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE

General Eisenhower inspects the 58th Independent Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers, in front of the city hall, Rotterdam. He is accompanied by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton and Major R. W. Potts (left).

good fortune that again under your leadership our collective military strength is being built up in order to secure the peace which we hoped had been brought with the end of the war. These men from Canada, who are now placed under your command, join you in your great task to build up our common strength to preserve the peace so that the men, women and children of Europe and all free peoples everywhere may enjoy a better life than they have ever known.

General Eisenhower welcomed the Canadian contingent in the following words:

It is my privilege this morning to represent every member of the North Atlantic Treaty Forces allocated to SHAPE in extending to this great Brigade a warm welcome to your new home. Every individual from Field Marshal to military recruit welcomes you, not only because of yourselves, your gallantry in action, your proved record on the battlefields, but because this means that Canada is with us not only with her productive factories, and with all the resources that she has within her borders, but actively, in the area where danger could be incurred.

This morning as I drove within this square someone turned to me and said: "General, what do you think of meeting your old friends the Canadian Infantry in red berets?" and my answer to him was: "I am glad to meet the Canadian Infantry anywhere. I know them. Moreover, if there is any unit, any organization that has ever earned the right to wear a headgear of its own choosing it is the Canadian Infantry." And that is the kind of feeling that you are going to encounter everywhere you go. For your part, I know you will be a working representative of your own great country in this great organization designed to preserve the peace and security for freedom loving people. There shall be nothing provocative on the part of this organization or any individual in it, but we stand secure in the knowledge that in strength we can protect ourselves. We do not wish to do more and we could never in justice to ourselves do less.

To all of you, again our warm welcome, a good tour of duty, great success and good luck.

THE KOREAN CRISIS


Negotiations Resumed

The approval on October 25 of regulations for the conduct of future negotiations was immediately followed by a meeting of sub-delegations to resume substantive discussions on a military demarcation line. At this meeting, the Chinese and North Korean negotiators abandoned their insistence on placing the cease-fire line at the 38th parallel.

With this change of attitude, the negotiations were able to proceed and after nearly a month of discussion the sub-delegations approved an agreement in the following terms:

1. The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed Armistice Agreement both sides will withdraw two kilometers from the line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.

2. If the Military Armistice Agreement is signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, determined by the sub-delegations on the basis of the above stated principle and in accordance with the present line of contact as indicated in the attached map and explanatory notes, the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides.



The cease-fire line agreed to by allied and enemy negotiators on November 23, 1951, is shown in the map above. This line will be the effective cease-fire line if an armistice is signed within 30 days of November 23.

3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the Armistice Agreement, if the Military Armistice Agreement is not signed within 30 days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in paragraph two above, the sub-delegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the Military Armistice Agreement, the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the Military Armistice Agreement and will constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice.

On November 27, the negotiators approved a line drawn by the sub-delegations in accordance with the foregoing agreement and proceeded to a discussion of item 3 of the agenda: "Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of the cease-fire and armistice". The enemy negotiators refused to give any consideration to item 4 ("Arrangements relating to prisoners of war") until item 3 was disposed of.

Military Operations

During November there were several heavy engagements on the ground but no significant exchanges of territory were made. The Royal 22nd Regiment of the 25th Canadian Brigade Group withstood particularly heavy attacks towards the end of the month. Enemy air activity increased significantly during the month. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force warned:

The air space between the Yalu and Pyongyang in which we have previously been able to operate unhindered is now no man's air and has become the area of decision in the Korean air war. It is for this reason that I recently stated that the air situation could become serious and even critical. Unmistakably, the enemy is intensifying his efforts in the air, despite his forced acceptance of a stalemate on the ground. And we must accept that if he wins in the air the stalemate on the ground is not likely to continue.

A Canadian Film Note From Japan

Motion picture films have become increasingly important in the programme of making Canada better known in many parts of the world. Canadian documentary films, produced mainly by the National Film Board, are lent to, or screened for, interested groups in 50 foreign countries by Canadian diplomatic, consular and trade posts abroad. During 1951 more than four million people have seen Canadian films provided through our posts. The audiences have included such diverse groups as agriculture students in Karachi, doctors and psychologists in Mexico City, art students in San Francisco, factory workers in Naples and school children in Malaya.

Most showings are held in class-rooms or lecture-halls; occasionally they take place in less conventional surroundings. A recent report of film activities from the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo vividly describes a series of screenings of Canadian films held for the first time in one of the poorer districts of the Japanese capital during the spring and summer of 1951. It says in part:

I should like to make some mention of the efforts of a Japanese member of our staff, Mr. K. Tasho, to increase the number of his fellow nationals who see our films. For three months now Mr. Tasho has been a regular borrower of our films and projection equipment for use in the Tokyo ward where he lives. One night one of our officers went out to see his show.

The theatre consisted of a wide cement blind alley, empty of seats. Projection equipment was carefully mounted on a wagon. The electricity for the machine came from a small dance hall which suspended its operations during the show. The audience was as general as it could be, the ratio of children to adults being about 5 to 2. The alley was packed and indeed most of the street which flanked it. Two policemen kept the street open for traffic. Mr. Tasho had had to obtain special police permission to hold his outdoor meetings but received full co-operation from members of the force at every show.

Although the sound track must have been unintelligible to the great majority of those present the audience was extraordinarily silent through the proceedings. During the intermissions Mr. Tasho gave a brief résumé in Japanese of what the next film to be shown was about. The meeting lasted more than two hours. During the latter part of the programme our officer suggested that perhaps if the performance were to continue, the interest in it of the standing audience might decline precipitately. Thereafter before each film was screened the audience was asked if they wanted to see another, and they always did. If anyone present did not, he was neither heard nor observed leaving, and the exhibition ceased when the supply of films ran out.

The people of Mr. Tasho's ward are very poor. Few of them could often afford to see films which are commercially distributed and our staff member has, through his efforts this summer, added much to their enjoyment. There can be no doubt of the good-will value of films distributed here. The headman of the ward has personally visited our office to thank us on behalf of all ward residents who saw the films.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

Statements of Government Policy

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

On November 8 Mr. Alphonse Fournier, acting for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, moved that the House go into committee to approve the following resolution:

That it is expedient to introduce a measure to approve the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and international staff, and to provide for carrying out the obligations, duties and rights of Canada thereunder.

Status of Civilian Staffs Abroad

Mr. Jean Lesage, Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, spoke to the motion as follows:

The purpose of this resolution is to make way for the introduction of a bill approving the agreement regarding the immunities and privileges of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that is for the organization itself, national representatives and international staff. The agreement was signed in Ottawa by all the members of NATO on September 20, 1951. It follows generally the form of agreement which, beginning with the general convention on privileges and immunities of the United Nations in 1946, has been adopted with more or less minor variations to define the privileges and immunities of practically all important international organizations. Certain departures have, however, been made from the precedents in order to meet the particular requirements of NATO.

NATO differs from other international organizations in that it has subsidiary bodies in permanent session in several countries. Other organizations generally only have a permanent seat in the country where they have their headquarters and it has been usual, in addition to the general agreement defining privileges and immunities which all member states are expected to accord, to have a special headquarters agreement between the organization and the member state in whose territory the headquarters are located. An example of this headquarters agreement would be the agreement between the Government of Canada and the United Nations concerning the International Civil Aviation Organization with its headquarters in Montreal.

This headquarters agreement covers the special requirements of the organization in the country where it has its headquarters and, in particular, grants to any national representative stationed permanently in that country a rather more liberal scale of privileges than is given to national representatives under the general agreement. Since NATO has permanent bodies in several countries it has been found convenient to include in the general agreement provisions, mainly concerning national representatives, which are generally found in a headquarters agreement

Following comments by Mr. Coldwell (CCF, Rosetown-Biggan) and Mr. Fulford (L, Leeds), the motion was agreed to and the House went into committee.

After some brief remarks by Mr. Pouliot (L, Temiscouata), Mr. Lesage continued his statement as follows:

. . . The members of the international staff of the United Nations located in Canada are very few. Practically the only members here are those of the International Civil Aviation Organization with headquarters in Montreal. Occasionally representatives of the International Labour Office are in Canada, and I do not know if there are still representatives of the International Refugee Organization located in this country.

The bill to be founded upon this resolution deals with the privileges and immuni-

ties to be granted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, its officials and national representatives. As a matter of fact the Council sat here in Ottawa in September, but I do not know when it will sit here again. That was the first occasion when we had national representatives of NATO in Canada. The three principal seats of NATO are Washington, Paris and London, and that is where the international staff and the national representations will be.

At the present time the staff numbers approximately 170. I cannot state how many will benefit from these diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Status of NATO Forces Abroad

On November 15, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, moved that the House go into committee to consider the following resolution:

That it is expedient to introduce a measure to approve an agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces when present in the territory of one another; to provide on a reciprocal basis for certain exemptions for personnel in a country other than their own from income tax, customs duty and certain claims arising out of death, personal injury or property damage resulting from the negligence of their members.

The motion was agreed to, and the House accordingly went into committee.

Mr. Claxton opened the debate on his motion as follows in part:

... Perhaps I can make plain the reason for this legislation when I say that without such legislation in effect in this and other countries the forces of Canada and the other North Atlantic Treaty nations when in another country would have no more rights or immunities than tourists. In respect of the laws of the country they were visiting they would be in the same position as one travelling on civilian business. That would affect their position with regard to passports, immigration, health services, taxation, customs and civil and criminal jurisdiction.

To provide for this we passed the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933, which deals with the situation with regard to forces of the Commonwealth which happen to be in Canada. The Commonwealth countries have adopted similar legislation to give us reciprocal rights and immunities. We also adopted the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act in 1947 which dealt with United States forces which happened to be in Canada. Canadian forces have exactly the same rights in the United States. The bill now proposed will follow along the lines of this legislation. It will approve the agreement and give effect to these provisions

The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade is on the way to Europe. Some elements have already arrived and the main units will begin to arrive, as I have said, on November 20 or 21. We have made arrangements with the Government of the Netherlands that such requirements will be waived in respect of Canadian troops in their passage through the Netherlands. We have also made arrangements with the Allied High Commission, which is the responsible defence authority in Western Germany, that while our troops will not be occupation troops and will have no occupation duties they will have the same status with respect to rights and immunities as if they were British, American or French forces, which have been there since the end of the war.

Korea

Replying, on November 26, to an enquiry by Mr. Coldwell about the cease-fire negotiations in Korea, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent said:

... The information I have received is that the sub-delegations of the United Nations and enemy delegations meeting at Panmunjom have agreed on the line of contact between the United Nations and enemy forces for the 145 miles across the peninsula of Korea, and have thereby established the description of a neutral buffer zone which would extend two kilometers in depth from this contact line on either

side, and from which both sides will withdraw if an armistice is signed within thirty days. It was expected when this dispatch was sent to us that at a meeting which was to take place at Panmunjom at eleven o'clock Tuesday, their time, which corresponds with nine o'clock p.m. Eastern Standard Time today, the full delegations would approve the findings of the sub-delegations.

However, before a cease-fire can take effect it will be necessary for the full delegations to concur on arrangements for inspection to ensure that the truce is being observed, and to care for the exchange of prisoners of war. There is a third remaining outstanding item on "recommendations to the governments concerned on both sides", which has not yet been explored. And it is only when agreement on all three of these outstanding points has been reached that it will be possible for a cease-fire to take official effect.

The sub-delegations were to meet at eight o'clock Eastern Standard Time to complete their report for the full delegations of the two sides. The full delegations are probably in session at the present time. They were called to meet at what would correspond to nine o'clock Eastern Standard Time today; and it is assumed that they are now in conference dealing with this line of demarcation which has been set out on the plans, and with the explanatory notes.

It was expected that they would ratify this line of demarcation. The arrangement with respect to it signed on November 23 provided that when the cease-fire becomes operative, each side would withdraw two kilometers in depth from this line of demarcation, and that that would be the line of demarcation if the other items were agreed upon within thirty days from the ratification of the line of demarcation.

If they did not agree within thirty days they would nevertheless continue their negotiation of these other points; and when they had arrived at agreement upon them, the sub-delegations would revise the line of demarcation in conformity with what might then be the point of contact between the opposing forces.

On November 30, the Prime Minister replied as follows to a question by Mr. Graydon (PC, Peel) concerning cease-fire orders alleged to have been issued in Korea:

I am not sure that the statement I have here will clear up the confusion but I have from our embassy in Washington the text of the statement made by General Van Fleet of the United States 8th Army Headquarters about the matter. It is in the following terms:

An incomplete digest of military directive has led to unfounded speculation regarding a cease-fire in Korea. Eighth Army Headquarters released a statement 28 November, 1951, wherein it was explicitly stated there is no cease-fire order in Korea. I don't know how I can be more emphatic on this matter than by reiterating this statement. Amplifying the original statement, I can say that certain military instructions were disseminated from this headquarters to corps and division levels. War correspondents' reports indicate that when these instructions were passed down to some lower command elements there was a distortion of meaning in the text of these instructions. Action is being taken to clarify these instructions for those officers and enlisted men who misinterpreted the directive. I am not at liberty to disclose the contents of the instructions which are related to future operations of the 8th army. I can definitely say, however, there is no mention made in the text ordering a cease-fire in Korea.

James A. Van Fleet, General, U.S.A.

Po River Flood

Asked, on November 26, by Mr. Catherwood (PC, Haldimand) whether the Government had received an appeal from the Italian Government for assistance in connection with the Po River flood and whether, if so, it was intended to respond to this appeal, Mr. St. Laurent stated:

The short answer to both questions is no, but I do not think I should leave it at that. I think that I should inform the House that the Secretary of State for External

Affairs as chairman of the North Atlantic Council has sent the following message to the Prime Minister of Italy, Signor de Gasperi:

I am sure that I speak for all NATO governments in expressing to you our warm sympathy and deep concern for the trials and hardships which the people in Northern Italy are suffering from the disastrous floods. Italy's partners in NATO will, I know, wish to co-operate by whatever means may be possible in giving him help and assistance to meet this tragic emergency.

I know that the means by which some assistance, either direct or indirect, could be made available to supplement the rescue operations which are being assisted by the United States and United Kingdom forces are being actively explored. The United States and the United Kingdom had armed forces stationed quite close by and they were able to be of very substantial assistance in this disaster. As soon as more details are available as to what is urgently needed—I have heard something to the effect that it is blankets and medical supplies—we will all be in a better position to determine what could or should be done.

Next day the Prime Minister returned to this subject, and said in part:

... Perhaps hon. members will have noticed in the news this morning that the Canadian Red Cross Society in addition to supplies from a stock pile in Geneva is contributing \$15,000 worth of supplies from Canada. These supplies are taking the form of blankets, woolen underwear, shoes, powdered milk and medicines. The Society has approached the Government with the request that we facilitate the transport of this material to Europe.



—Capital Press

MR. CASEY IN OTTAWA

Australia's Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Richard G. Casey, (second from right), accompanied by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, chats with Canadian war veterans in Confederation Square, Ottawa. Mr. Casey spent three days in the Canadian capital in discussion with Canadian Government leaders, en route from the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris to Australia.

I am glad to inform the House that the Government has today placed at the disposal of the Canadian Red Cross Society two North Star aircraft. These aircraft will deliver the material to some airport in Europe which has not yet been designated. Through arrangements made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, both of whom are in Rome attending the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe have undertaken to deliver the material from whatever airport is selected to the actual scene of the disaster . . .

Mr. Drew expressed approval of the Government's action.

CBC International Service

On November 9, the Minister of National Revenue, Mr. J. J. McCann, speaking to his own motion for a committee to consider the CBC Annual Report and an amendment to the Canadian Broadcasting Act, made the following statement regarding the work of the CBC International Service:

. . . The committee will also likely wish to consider the work of the International Service which the CBC operates in effect as an agent for the Government. This service has continued to be carried on under close consultation with the Department of External Affairs regarding policy matters.

At the end of last year a weekly service to Finland was begun which has brought a remarkable response from that country. In February, following discussions with British and United States authorities, a service to Russia was opened. Broadcasting in the Ukrainian language will shortly be incorporated in this service. Members of the committee may wish to examine material that is broadcast from Canada in fourteen languages and to consider some of the evidence of the response to it. I do think it is unfortunate that it is not easy for many people in Canada to hear these broadcasts because they are beamed directly to other countries although they can be heard fairly clearly and regularly in many parts, including the city of Ottawa.

I might say that there is no secret in any way about what is broadcast. The CBC International Service is glad to show any scripts at any time to any responsible person. In addition, recordings of what actually goes on the air are kept and are available for some time afterwards. The service is, of course, designed to play an effective broadcasting role in the present international situation with all its tensions and dangers. I think members of the committee will be very interested in seeing just how it goes about this work in the present international situation.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Conclusion of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly

The Fifth Session was adjourned in Paris on November 5, 1951. One agenda item still remained to be disposed of, the report of the Special Committee of the Assembly on the representation of China. The Committee had submitted a report that it was unable to make any recommendation in the present circumstances. Mr. Entezam, the President of the Fifth Session, proposed that the report be "noted"; however, the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia objected and asked that the item be placed on the agenda of the Sixth Session. This proposal was defeated and the report of the Special Committee was then adopted. The President then declared the Fifth Session concluded.

Sixth Session of the General Assembly*

On the following day, November 6, the Sixth Session of the General Assembly was opened at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. Representatives of sixty countries heard an address by the retiring president, who reviewed the events of the past year and expressed the opinion that the period of the Fifth Session had seen a lessening in world tensions. The President of the French Republic, M. Vincent Auriol, then addressed the Assembly. He welcomed the Delegation to Paris and appealed to the heads of the great powers to seek to lessen world conflicts through informal meetings in Paris during the period of the Assembly.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. again proposed that the question of Chinese representation be placed on the agenda. This proposal, however, was defeated by a decisive majority in a later plenary session.

Election of Officers


At the first meeting of the Assembly, Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico was elected President. Representatives of the following countries were elected to the seven Vice-Presidencies: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China, Yugoslavia and Iraq.

The following were elected Chairmen of the seven main committees: First (Political and Security) Committee, Mr. Finn Moe of Norway; Second (Economic and Financial) Committee, Prince Wan Waithavakon of Thailand; Third (Social) Committee, Sra. Ana Figueroa of Chile; Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee, Dr. Max Henriquez-Urena of the Dominican Republic; Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee, Mr. Thomas A. Stone of Canada; Sixth (Legal) Committee, Dr. Manfred Lachs of Poland; Ad Hoc Political Committee, M. Selim Sarper of Turkey. The above officers together with the President of the Assembly and the seven Vice-Presidents constitute the General Committee.

Agenda

The General Committee recommended an agenda of sixty-eight items. Several of these gave rise to protests by the Cominform representatives, including items on Nationalist Chinese and Yugoslavian charges against the U.S.S.R. and on the proposed German elections commission. The General Assembly nevertheless voted in favour of including all these items on the agenda, and approved the General Committee's report. The General Assembly decided that a Christmas recess should be held which would last from December 23 to January 1, inclusive.

* For the Agenda, see *External Affairs*, October 1951, page 344; for the composition of the Canadian Delegation, see *External Affairs*, November 1951, page 389.



AN INFORMAL CHAT AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

—Rosenthal

At the end of a meeting during the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, discusses conference developments with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, (centre) and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Dean Acheson (right).

General Debate

Much of the general debate in the plenary meetings of the Assembly centred around the question of disarmament (see page 420). While all delegations were concerned with peace and how to maintain it, many representatives also paid particular attention to the role of the United Nations in the development of under-developed territories as an important way to help to foster peace. Mr. R. G. Casey, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, called upon the Soviet Union not to "press the crisis beyond "the point of no return". He said that the ultimate goal of the United Nations was "collective prosperity". The Egyptian representative called attention to disputes over Palestine, Morocco and the Suez Canal. Some delegations mentioned that certain deserving nations had not yet been made members of the United Nations. Mr. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, called for "a truce to name-calling and angry words" and asked that representatives apply their minds dispassionately to the serious problems with which the Assembly was faced.

Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States, pointed out, before dealing with the question of disarmament, that the cause of peace had, during the past year, prospered in tangible ways. A treaty of peace had been signed with Japan; the Collective Measures Committee had laid solid foundations for action through the United Nations to prevent aggression; and the Atlantic community had been building

up its strength in support of, and in accordance with, the principles of the United Nations. However, building up of armed strength was not enough, Mr. Acheson said; no opportunity should be neglected to reduce the danger of war and to meet the economic and social needs of the peoples of the world. These aims could be fostered if the free nations could be relieved of some of the burden of armaments.

The Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Pearson, in his address to the Assembly in the general debate, warned that it was necessary to take a realistic approach to the problems which the United Nations faces. He said in part:

The United Nations remains our last, best hope for peace. But the emphasis is shifting from *best* to *last*. We will have to stop that shift if our world organization is to survive as an effective instrument to maintain peace and promote security. . .

If we can reach that objective, the tragic split between the Great Powers which now weakens and endangers our world organization could be healed; the United Nations could grow in strength and prestige to a point where many of the items on this Assembly's agenda would be unthinkable. If however, that split persists and grows deeper and more dangerous, then the United Nations, as we know it now, as we formed it in San Francisco, may disappear. With that disappearance, if it ever took place, the risk of a war in which everything worth having would also disappear, would become immeasurably greater. To the prevention of that final catastrophe, my delegation hopes that this Assembly will be able to make an effective contribution. To that end, we pledge our own best effort.

Mr. Pearson emphasized the problems created for the constructive work of the United Nations by the existence of two blocs between which a chasm had been widened:

Many of the states between the two blocs are what we now describe as under-developed areas. They are receiving a measure, indeed an increasing measure, of technical assistance from the United Nations, and technical and economic aid from various agencies in the free world, including that from the Colombo Plan, an initiative of the Commonwealth of Nations, in which my country is proud to play a part.

If only the burden of defence programmes could be reduced, a much larger measure of such technical assistance and aid for capital development could and would flow in a far greater stream into the under-developed countries and territories.

The general debate was brought to a close by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, who asked that the United Nations continue with unflagging purpose the labour of constructing peace. He said that the general debate had reflected "the compelling desire of all peoples to extricate themselves from the morass of fear and danger in which they are now struggling". He outlined the three goals towards which members of the United Nations were striving; universal reduction of armaments, collective security and economic and social development. These, he said, were universal and had the universal support of the peoples of the world. Therefore they required the universal approach for which the United Nations stood. He closed his statement by asking that leaders of the delegations of member states take the opportunity which was presented to them at the time of the General Assembly to undertake direct, quiet, straightforward discussion amongst themselves.

The Disarmament Debate*

On November 7 in a radio broadcast President Truman stated that the United States was expecting to introduce in the General Assembly important new pro-

* The Canadian position on armament proposals was made in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson. This statement appears in the Department's Statements and Speeches series as No. 51/47, and is obtainable on application to the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

posals regarding the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. On the same day a statement was issued by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States announcing that these three powers would sponsor the new proposals and indicating their general content. On November 8, in his opening statement in the general debate, Mr. Acheson discussed the nature of these proposals in greater detail and asked that an item be added to the agenda to provide for their consideration.

In the general debate Mr. Vishinsky attacked the tripartite proposals in a manner both scornful and frivolous. His remarks were not well received, and in a second speech he dealt with the plan more seriously and put forward counter-proposals for the Assembly's consideration. New items were added to the agenda to provide for both the tripartite and Soviet plans, which were referred to the Political Committee for consideration.

The tripartite plan recommended the replacement of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments by a single "Arms Reduction Committee" under the Security Council. The new Commission would be charged with the task of preparing a treaty for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments in accordance with certain general principles. In the first place, there should be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces and all armaments, the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed being verified by a system of effective international inspection. The Commission should formulate general criteria for limiting the size of armed forces and the amount of national armaments, and should develop within these limits a system of mutually agreed national programmes relating to the armed forces and armaments that each country would maintain. The treaty should include provisions for the international control of atomic energy which would be no less effective than the plan previously approved by the majority of the members of the United Nations in ensuring the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Observance of the terms of the disarmament programme should be ensured by an adequate system of safeguards, to provide for the prompt detection of violations while causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. The treaty could come into effect only when approved by all the powers of major military importance.

The Soviet proposals consisted of four points. Of these the first was the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, to be embodied in a convention and to be enforced under strict controls. The second requirement was a one-third reduction of their armed strength by the five major powers. The third requirement was the provision by all states of complete information concerning their armed forces within a month of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed strength by major powers. Finally, the plan included the establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council to implement these decisions.

Speaking in support of the Western proposals Mr. Eden referred to three new and important features: the suggestion that disarmament be approached by stages, beginning with the least important and working up to more important categories; the suggestion that definite criteria be worked out for limiting armaments in all countries; and the suggestion that atomic weapons be included in the general disarmament scheme. Mr. Vishinsky attacked the proposals on two main points: he said they made no provision for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and he argued that the provision for the progressive disclosure of armaments and armed forces prior to any prohibition of such weapons or reduction of other armaments was putting the cart before the horse. Mr. Vishinsky made no serious effort to demonstrate that his proposals included any new provisions of importance, and his plan was attacked by the Western powers for this reason. They charged spe-

cifically that the Soviet Union was still unwilling to agree to arrangements for inspection adequate to ensure the observance of any control plan which might be adopted.

In the course of the debate a new issue was introduced by the Indian Delegation. Sir Benegal Rau put forward a draft resolution to establish immediately a U.N. fund for reconstruction and development. He proposed that governments should divert to such a fund a proportion of those resources now being used by them for armaments. It is not possible to say what success this suggestion may have, although at the time of writing the response to it has been limited.

A draft resolution which came as something of a surprise to the major powers was introduced by Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria. They proposed the establishment of a sub-committee of the Political Committee to consist of representatives of France, the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. under the chairmanship of the President of the Assembly. It would be the task of this sub-committee to formulate "agreed proposals concerning the control and reduction of armed forces and armaments, and the abolition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction". After the addition of a clause providing that the sub-committee should report back by December 10, this proposal was accepted by the Political Committee.

UNSCOB

The Ad Hoc Political Committee discussed on November 20 two resolutions dealing with the method of handling threats to peace and security in the Balkans. The first resolution, submitted by Greece, approved the report of UNSCOB, expressed appreciation for the work that the organ had done and called for its dissolution. The second, submitted jointly by France, Greece, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States, called for the establishment of a Balkan sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission, composed of not less than 3 and not more than 5 members, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters and with authority to despatch observers or to visits "any area of international tension in the Balkans on the request of any state or states concerned" and to report to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Secretary-General.

These resolutions were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on November 23, Canada voting in favour of both.

Repatriation of Greek Children

On December 1, 1950, the General Assembly adopted a resolution setting up a Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children, composed of representatives of Peru, the Philippines and Sweden. This Standing Committee was enjoined to confer with representatives of the states harbouring Greek children with a view to making the necessary arrangements for their early return to their parents. During the period which has elapsed since that Standing Committee was set up, no progress in this direction could be reported. Consequently, on November 26, 1951, the representatives of these three states submitted a resolution to the Ad Hoc Committee requesting that the Governments concerned be invited to designate representatives to meet with the Standing Committee in Paris if possible before December 15, and asking that a discussion of this item be ajourned until the Standing Committee had been able to report on the implementation of these plans. This resolution was adopted with Canadian support.

Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Matters

The Social, Humanitarian and Cultural (Third) Committee began its meetings on November 15. The first item on its agenda was the discussion of Chapter IV



—United Nations

CANADIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

Mr. David M. Johnson, recently appointed Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, presents his credentials to the Secretary General, Mr. Trygve Lie. Previous to this appointment Mr. Johnson had been Canadian High Commissioner in Pakistan.

of the Report of the Economic and Social Council (social welfare questions, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, population, narcotic drugs, etc.). The first resolution passed was adopted without a recorded vote. It drew the attention of "all United Nations organs concerned with social welfare" to the needs of flood victims in northern Italy. The Committee also adopted a resolution making an earnest appeal to all countries and persons to contribute to UNICEF during 1952 and a resolution detailing action to be taken to provide housing for under-privileged people. The main resolution adopted, however, was that sponsored by France, Pakistan and Yugoslavia calling upon the Economic and Social Council to examine in detail the social activities undertaken by the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies in order to fulfil the various social tasks assigned to it by the Charter and to ensure that efforts and resources are effectively concentrated upon those social problem. The resolution further called the attention of the Economic and Social Council to the report on the world social situation to be submitted to the Social Commission at its next session and requested the Council to draw up a programme of practical action in the social field in the light of the findings of this report. This resolution was adopted by 43 votes in favour and 5 against (the Soviet bloc).

Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories

The most significant question so far discussed in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee during this session of the General Assembly, has been the item, proposed by the Trusteeship Council, on Italy's full participation in the Trusteeship Council.

The French and Guatemalan Delegations submitted a draft resolution in which the General Assembly noted that Italy had been made responsible by the United Nations for the administration of the trust territory of Somaliland and that it was exercising its responsibilities towards the United Nations as an administering power. The resolution went on to state that the General Assembly considered that Italy should be enabled to exercise those responsibilities with complete effectiveness and that it was necessary for Italy to become a member of the Trusteeship Council and for that purpose to be admitted to the United Nations, and recommended that the Security Council give urgent consideration to such immediate admission of Italy.

The Fourth Committee adopted the two-power resolution over the objections of the Cominform countries. Canada voted in favour of the resolution. The Canadian representative on the Fourth Committee, in a statement supporting the resolutions, said that Italy, while assuming the same responsibilities and obligations as other states which administered trust territories, had not been endowed with the same rights and privileges which those other states enjoyed. He said that under present circumstances there was only one way in which the United Nations could legally attempt to remove this anomaly, and that way was pointed out in the draft resolution. The resolution recognized that rights of membership under the Charter could only be granted by a recommendation of the Assembly together with a decision of the Security Council.

During the discussion of the item on information from non-self-governing territories, the Iraqi and Uruguayan Delegations brought forward resolutions "reaffirming the powers of the Trusteeship Committee to discuss political matters and political aspects in regard to non-self-governing territories". These resolutions were strongly opposed by the administering powers, who claimed that the Fourth Committee had power to discuss only economic, social and educational conditions in the non-self-governing territories on which information is transmitted to the Secretary-General. However, after an appeal by the Chairman of the Committee to members not to bring up political matters when this particular item was being discussed, the sponsors withdrew the two resolutions.

The Trusteeship Committee approved a revised standard form for the submission of information by the administering powers on the colonial territories for which they are responsible. The report of a special committee of the General Assembly on "economic conditions and problems of development in non-self-governing territories" was also approved without change.

Appointment of Negotiating Committee

On November 27 the Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee adopted a resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States requesting the President of the General Assembly to appoint a negotiating committee composed of seven members for the purpose of consulting during the current session of the General Assembly with member and non-member states as to the amounts which governments may be willing to contribute on a voluntary basis towards programmes approved by the Assembly but for which funds are not provided in the regular budget of the United Nations. These programmes include assistance to Palestine refugees and Korean civilians and the expanded programme of technical assistance of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies.

CONTROL OF POLLUTION IN CANADA-UNITED STATES BOUNDARY WATERS

On November 19, 1951, the Governments of Canada and the United States, authorized the International Joint Commission* to adopt the measures to facilitate control and prevention of pollution in the boundary waters connecting Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie and Ontario which were recommended in the Commission's report of October 11, 1950.

The Commission's report was made in response to a Reference dated April 1, 1946, in which the Governments of the United States and Canada requested an investigation and report to determine whether the boundary waters connecting the Great Lakes were "being polluted on either side of the boundary to the injury of health and property on the other side of the boundary."

In 1946, the Commission appointed a Board of Technical Advisers to conduct the necessary investigations and studies in the waters between Lake Superior and Lake Huron and between Lake Huron and Lake Erie. In 1948, when the scope of the Reference was extended to include the Niagara area between Lakes Erie and Ontario, a similar Board was appointed to carry on the investigations in that area. Both Boards were composed of federal, state and provincial officials concerned with pollution problems.

Working through the regularly established agencies from which they were drawn, the technical advisers analyzed waste disposal practices and problems of some 60 municipalities, 100 industries, and the vessels navigating the boundary waters. More than 100,000 laboratory determinations of the quality of water were made. Data from float tests and other sources were studied to determine trans-boundary effects of pollution.

The technical advisers recommended adoption of "Objectives for Boundary Waters Quality Control" and the Commission held hearings in Sault Ste Marie, Windsor, Detroit, Buffalo, and Niagara Falls (Ontario) to obtain information on existing waste treatment practices, the cost and time required for additional pollution control and the views of all concerned on the "Objectives" proposed by the technical advisers.

With respect to the boundary waters connecting Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie and Ontario, recommendations which the Commission has submitted to the Governments of the United States and Canada, after consideration of the reports of the technical advisers and data obtained at the hearings:

(1) Provide for adoption by the two Governments of specific objectives for boundary waters quality control as the criteria to carry out that portion of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 wherein the two countries "agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other." (36 Stat. 2448)

(2) Provide for implementation, by those responsible for pollution, of the measures necessary to obtain or maintain the specific water quality objectives. This programme which would necessarily require many years for completion, would cost approximately \$125 million.

(3) Provide for continuing supervision of boundary waters quality control by the Commission through international "boards of control" and through the appropriate authorities in each country charged with enforcement of pollution control laws or regulations.

* For an article on the International Joint Commission, see *External Affairs*, March 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. A. F. Broadbridge was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, effective November 15, 1951.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN CANADA

DIPLOMATIC

New Appointments

His Excellency Dr. Werner Dankwort presented his Letter of Credence as Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on November 8. He had been Consul General at Ottawa since September 1950.

The members of the diplomatic staff of the new German Embassy are:

Dr. J. F. Ritter, First Secretary. He was previously Consul at Ottawa.

Mr. Dietrich W. Keller, First Secretary (Commercial Affairs).

Dr. H. C. Halter, Second Secretary. He was previously Consul at Montreal.

Mr. Helmut Vitzthum von Eckstaedt, Second Secretary (Commercial Affairs). He was previously Consul at Ottawa.

Dr. Edgar Gerwin, Second Secretary (Press Affairs).

Mr. Marcel Roellinghoff, Second Secretary (Social Affairs).

Dr. W. D. Weiss, Third Secretary. He was previously Vice-Consul at Ottawa.

Mr. Werner Gautier, Third Secretary (Commercial Affairs). He was previously Vice-Consul at Montreal.

Mr. Karl H. Berlet, Third Secretary (Commercial Affairs).

Dr. W. Bammer, Third Secretary (Commercial Affairs).

Mr. P. N. Agarwala, Information Officer, Office of the High Commissioner for India, November 1.

Mr. Grigori Ioanissian, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jens Holger Johansen, Military Attaché, Legation of Denmark, November 7. Lieutenant-Colonel Johansen is concurrently Military Attaché at the Danish Embassy in Washington and will reside in that city.

Lieutenant-Colonel Poul Zigler, Air Attaché, Legation of Denmark, November 7. Lieutenant-Colonel Zigler is concurrently Air Attaché at the Danish Embassy in Washington and will reside in that city.

Dr. Ruggero Farace, Counsellor, Embassy of Italy, end of November.

Departures

His Excellency Per Wijkman, Minister of Sweden, November 26. Pending the presentation of the Letter of Credence of his successor, Dr. Klas Bök, the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim is Mr. J. Sigge de Lilliehöök, Second Secretary.

Mr. Luis Fernandez MacGregor, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim and Counsellor, Embassy of Mexico, end of October. Pending the Ambassador's return to Ottawa, Dr. Ignacio D. Silva, Third Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Miss J. E. Thomson, Assistant Official Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for Australia, November 2.

Mr. Rolando Dalla Rosa Prati di Collecchio, Counsellor, Embassy of Italy, end of November.

His Excellency Urho Toivola, Minister of Finland, left Ottawa on November 7 for a vacation. During his absence, Mr. Olavi Lahonen, Second Secretary, is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency Hubert Guérin, Ambassador of France, resumed charge of the Embassy November 13 on his return from a holiday in France.

His Excellency the Honourable Stanley Woodward, Ambassador of the United States of America, was absent from November 18 to December 4. Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, Counsellor for Economic Affairs, was Chargé d'Affaires ad interim from November 18 to 26 and Mr. Don C. Bliss, Minister, from November 27 to December 4.

CONSULAR

Provisional recognition was granted to:

Mr. Andrew E. Hanney as Consul of the United States of America at Montreal, No-

vember 10. He was previously Vice-Consul in that city.

Miss Dorothy M. Barker as Vice-Consul

of the United States of America at Quebec, November 13. She was previously Vice-Consul at Montreal.

Mr. Pedro A. Estrada Mujica as Vice-Consul of Venezuela at Vancouver, November 23.

Mr. Arthur B. Corcoran as Vice-Consul of the United States of America at Edmonton, November 24.

Mr. Moshe Yuval as Acting Consul General of Israel at Montreal, November 30.

Departures

Mr. John I. Copeland, Vice-Consul of the

United States of America at St. John's, Newfoundland, November 14.

The address of the Consulate General of Guatemala at Montreal is now:

401 Metcalfe Avenue,
Westmount, Montreal.
Telephone Fitzroy 4540.

The address of the Consulate General of the Dominican Republic at Ottawa is now:

105 Cameron Ave.,
Ottawa.
Telephone 2-1439.

TRADE

New Appointment

Mr. Ronald B. Hines, Assistant Trade Commissioner of Australia at Vancouver, November 12.

Departures

Mr. F. R. Gullick, Trade Commissioner of Australia at Vancouver, November 12.

Mr. E. M. M. Partridge, Trade Commissioner of the United Kingdom at Montreal, November 15.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

(This is a list of International Conferences at which Canada was represented during the month of November 1951, and of those at which it may be represented in the future; earlier conferences may be found in the previous issues of "External Affairs").

(The Department of External Affairs, through its International Conferences Section, is responsible for co-ordinating all invitations to International Conferences. The decision as to Canadian participation at such Conferences is made by Cabinet upon the recommendation of the department of government functionally concerned.)

Continuing Boards and Commissions

(Now published annually. Only new Continuing Boards and Commissions will be listed in the intervening months. See "External Affairs", January 1, 1951, for a complete list of Continuing Boards and Commissions).

Conferences Attended in November

1. *Conferences to Discuss Creation of European Army.* Paris—February 15. Observer: Maj. Gen. G. P. Vanier, Canadian Ambassador to France; Senior Political Adviser: J. Chapdelaine, Canadian Embassy, Bonn; Adviser: Brig. R. W. Moncel, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London.
2. *Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (ITU).* Geneva—August 16. Head of Delegation: C. J. Acton, Department of Transport; Delegates: A. J. Dawson and C. M. Brant, Department of Transport; Maj. W. H. Finch, Lt. Cmdr. R. M. Dunbar and S/Ldr. W. D. Benton, Department of National Defence; E. P. Black, Canadian Embassy, Moscow; Adviser: F. P. Johnson, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
3. *First Inter-American Convention on Mineral Resources.* Mexico City—October 29–November 4. W. E. McClelland, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys.
4. *Conference to Conclude a Fisheries Treaty With Japan.* Tokyo—November 5. Chairman: R. W. Mayhew, Minister of Fisheries; Vice-Chairman: S. Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries; Delegates: E. T. Applewhaite, M.P.; Dr. J. L. Hart, Director, British Columbia Biological Station, Nanaimo, B.C.; S. V. Ozere, Department of Fisheries; J. M. Buchanan, Chairman, Salmon Canneries Operating Committee, Vancouver; A. R. Menzies, Head of Canadian Liaison Mission to Japan.
5. *Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.* Paris—November 6. Representatives: L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Chairman; S. S. Garson, Minister of Justice,

- Deputy Chairman; Senator J. R. Hurtubise; M. Bourget, M.P.; Mrs. R. J. Marshall, Past President of the National Council of Women; Alternates: C. Bennett, M.P.; T. A. Stone, Canadian Minister to Sweden; D. M. Johnson, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York; R. M. Macdonnell, Canadian Embassy, Paris; J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Representative to the OEEC., Paris; Parliamentary Advisers: F. H. Larson, M.P.; Maj. Gen. G. R. Pearkes, M.P.; Advisers: A. C. Smith, Canadian Embassy, Brussels; S. Pollock, Department of Finance; G. G. Crean, Canadian Embassy, Belgrade; A. J. Pick, Department of External Affairs; E. A. Côté, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; L. A. D. Stephens, Canadian Embassy, The Hague; N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva; J. George, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York; P. T. Molson, Department of External Affairs; D. Stansfield, Canadian Embassy, Moscow; H. B. O. Robinson, Department of External Affairs; O. G. Stoner, Canadian Embassy, Paris; J. J. McCardle, Department of External Affairs; Information Officers: F. Charpentier, Canadian Embassy, Paris; Miss M. Gordon, Canadian Consulate General, New York; Secretary-General: A. R. Crepault, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York.
6. *Executive Board of UNICEF.* Paris — November 8. Mrs. D. B. Sinclair, Department of National Health and Welfare.
 7. *Conference of British Commonwealth Statisticians.* Canberra — November 12-24. H. Marshall, Dominion Statistician; N. A. Keyfitz and F. H. Leacy, Bureau of Statistics.
 8. *13th Session of the Council of FAO.* Rome — November 12-17 — Delegates: Dr. G. S. H. Barton, Special Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture; Advisers: Dr. S. C. Hudson, Department of Agriculture; S. G. MacDonald, Canadian Embassy, Rome.
 9. *117th Session of the Governing Body of ILO (and its Committees).* Geneva—November 14-24 — P. Goulet and A. H. Brown, Department of Labour; K. D. McIlwraith, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.
 10. *Sixth Session of the Conference of FAO.* Rome — November 19—Member: J. G. Gardiner, Minister of Agriculture; Alternate: Dr. G. S. H. Barton, Special Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture; Associate Members: Dr. S. C. Hudson and S. J. Chagnon, Department of Agriculture; D. A. Macdonald, Department of Resources and Development; Dr. L. B. Pett, Department of National Health and Welfare; Advisers: Dr. H. H. Hannam, Canadian Federation of Agriculture; A. B. Hockin, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; F. G. Hooton, Department of External Affairs; S. G. McDonald, Canadian Embassy, Rome; J. H. Tremblay, Canadian Embassy, Paris; H. L. Trueman, Department of Agriculture.
 11. *North Atlantic Military Committee.* Rome — November 20 — Delegate: Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff; Advisers: A/V/M H. L. Campbell; Maj. Gen. J. D. Smith; A/C C. L. Annis; Cmdr. H. S. Rayner; Aides: Maj. J. O. A. Letellier; Capt. K. E. Moffatt, Department of National Defence.
 12. *Seventh International Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association.* Montevideo — November 21 - December 2 — J. W. T. Michel, Commissioner of Patents.
 13. *Conference on Morbidity Statistics of WHO.* Geneva — November 21-26 — F. F. Harris, Bureau of Statistics.
 14. *Third Session of Facilitation Division of the Air Transport Committee of ICAO.* Buenos Aires — November 21 — Delegates: G. N. Bunker, Department of National Revenue; J. A. Irwin, Department of External Affairs.
 15. *North Atlantic Council.* Rome — November 24 — Delegates: L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence; D. C. Abbott, Minister of Finance; Advisers: Department of External Affairs: A. D. P. Heeney, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; D. L. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada to the United Kingdom; J. Déry, Canadian Ambassador to Italy; R. A. MacKay; A. F. W. Plumtre; A. J. Pick; Department of Finance: J. F. Parkinson, Canadian Representative to the OEEC; J. J. Deutsch; Department of National Defence: Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff; A/V/M H. L. Campbell; Maj. Gen. J. D. B. Smith; A/C C. L. Annis; Cmdr. H. S. Rayner; Aides: Department of External Affairs: P. T. Molson; Department of National Defence: P. Paré; Maj. J. O. A. Letellier; Capt. K. E. Moffatt; Secretary: H. F. Davis, Department of External Affairs.
 16. *Ad Hoc Migration Conference.* Brussels — November 26 — Head of Delegation: C. E. S. Smith, Department of Citizenship and Immigration; Delegate: N. F. H. Berlis, Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United

Nations, Geneva; Advisers: P. W. Bird, Canadian Immigration Mission, Germany.

17. *Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe*. Strasbourg — November 26 — Parliamentary Observers: Senator J. R. Hurtubise; Maj. Gen. G. R. Pearkes, M.P.; Official Observer: Hon. T. C. Davis, Canadian Ambassador to Germany.
18. *Tripartite Conference on Food Aspects of Civilian Defence*. London—November

26 - December 13—Head of Delegation: Maj. Gen. F. F. Worthington, Department of National Health and Welfare; Delegates: S. J. Bailey and Dr. L. B. Pett, Department of National Health and Welfare; G. B. Miller, Department of Agriculture; D. A. B. Marshall, Dr. J. G. Malloch and J. F. Granby, Office of the Canadian High Commissioner, London; Dr. J. G. Armstrong, Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence.

Conferences to be held in December and January, 1952

(The inclusion of the name of a Conference or Congress in the following list means only that the Government of Canada has received an invitation to participate; the dates are tentative. It does not follow that the invitation has been or will be accepted.)

1. *Second Pan-American Congress on Pharmacy*. Lima — December 1-8.
2. *Conference on Trade and Balance of Payments Statistics*. Panama City — December 3-15.
3. *Fifth Session of Expert Committee of Biological Standardization of WHO*. Geneva — December 3-6.
4. *Expert Committee on Public Health Administration of WHO*. Geneva—December 3-6.
5. *Fourth Session of the Inland Transport Committee of ILO*. Genoa — December 4-15.
6. *27th Session of the International Statistical Institute*. New Delhi — December 5-18.
7. *Meeting of Experts on Women's Work (ILO)*. Geneva — December 11-15.
8. *World Federation for Mental Health — 4th International Congress on Mental Health*. Mexico City — December 11.
9. *World Federation for Mental Health — 4th Annual Meeting*. Mexico City — December 12-19.
10. *Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East*. Burma — January 29-February 9.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS†

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Mimeographed Documents:

- * *Expanded programme of technical assistance—Third report of the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee*; 19 July 1951; document E/2054; 367 p.
- * *Bibliography on the protection of Human Rights of works published after December 1939* (Prepared by the Secretariat); 2 April 1951; document E/CN.4/540; 248 p.

Report by Dr. Frank Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, to the Security Council; 15 October 1951; document S/2375; 56 p.

(b) Printed Documents:

- * *Report of the Special Committee on Information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter (2-27 October 1951)*; document

A/1836; 43 p.; 40 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 14.

- * *Report of the Trusteeship Council covering its special session and its eighth and ninth sessions, 22 November 1950 to July 30, 1951*; document A/1856; 272 p.; \$2.50; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 4.

- * *Report of the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 16 August 1950 to 21 September 1951*; document A/1884; 174 p.; \$1.75; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 3.

- * *Report of the Collective Measures Committee*; document A/1891; 48 p.; 50 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 13.

- * *Development of a twenty-year programme*

† Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian Sales Agent for United Nations publications, the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West, Toronto; mimeographed documents can only be procured by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, New York. Publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", September, 1950, p. 359.

* French version not available until noted in a future issue of "External Affairs".

for achieving peace through the United Nations (Progress Report by the Secretary-General); document A/1902; 7 p.; 15 cents; General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session, Supplement No. 15.

World Health Organization — Executive Board, eighth session, held in Geneva from 1 to 8 June 1951 — Resolutions and decisions, annexes; October 1951; 48 p.; 50 cents; Official Records No. 38.

CURRENT DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the King's Printer, at the price indicated.)

Diplomatic and Consular Representatives in Ottawa, November 15, 1951. Price, 25 cents.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 51/41—*The United Nations Today and Tomorrow*, an address by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to a combined luncheon meeting of the Empire Club and the United Nations Association in Canada (Toronto Branch) made at Toronto, on October 5, 1951.

No. 51/42—*Review of the International Situation*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B.

Pearson, made in the House of Commons, on October 22, 1951.

No. 51/46—*Canadian Statement at General Assembly*, the text of the statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the general debate in plenary session on November 12, 1951.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 51/40—*Canada's Defence Production Programme*, a statement by the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, made in the House of Commons, October 19, 1951.

No. 51/43—*The Universities and the Public Service*, the partial text of an address given by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, at the United College Commencement, Winnipeg, on November 9, 1951.

No. 51/44—*Transportation and Industrial*

Preparedness, an address by the Minister of Transport, Mr. Lionel Chevrier, at the Annual Dinner of the Canadian Preparedness Association, made in Toronto, on November 9, 1951.

No. 51/45—*Some Aspects of the Canadian Defence Production Programme*, an address by the Deputy Minister of Defence Production, Mr. M. W. Mackenzie, at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association, made in Toronto, on November 8, 1951.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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