ARMS CONTROL IN THE NORTH PACIFIC:

THE ROLE FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND VERIFICATION

Third Annual
Cooperative Research Workshop
25-27 February, 1994

Edited by
James A. Boutilier

Workshop Proceedings Prepared for the

Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

September 1994

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PREFACE

The Third Annual Workshop on "Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence Building and Verification" was held in Victoria, British Columbia from 25 to 27 February 1994 under the aegis of the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Royal Roads Military College and the University of Victoria. The nineteen participants included academics, serving and retired foreign service officers, representatives from National Defence Headquarters and the Maritime Command Pacific, serving and retired military and naval personnel and private security analysts from Canada and Korea. In addition, Dr. M.K. Nam and Dr. Jin-Pyo Yoon from the Arms Control Research Centre at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis in Seoul, took part.

Nine papers were presented at the workshop which was held in the Senate chamber of Hatley Castle at Royal Roads Military College. Those papers embodied a wide variety of themes. First and foremost was the importance of history; its didactic value and its power to legitimate. Dr. Bob Bedeski's analysis of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (which functioned on the peninsula in the aftermath of the Korean War) demonstrated the forces of historical continuity between the 1950s and the 1990s. His study revealed the similarities in North Korean negotiating culture in those two eras and the ways in which small scale violations, when left unchecked, aggregate toward the point of major crisis.

The lessons of the nuclear histories of Iraq, India and South Africa emerged from the workshop deliberations, but James MacIntosh cautioned the participants that critical distinctions had to be made between these various cases. MacIntosh's lucid, Newtonian schema, the product of ten years of reflection on complex phenomena, helped locate the Royal Roads discussions within a historical and theoretical framework. That framework highlighted the epistemological

and cultural dimensions of the arms control process. Central to arms control negotiations is the nature of arms control language. Negotiators need, somehow, to penetrate the thought processes of their opponents, in order to amend the ways in which the latter think. Confidence building measures contribute to the transformation of world views. But while history suggests that we must move steadily toward the disarmament goal, there was concern expressed about the nature of western negotiating cultures. Were we, Dr. Jim Boutilier wondered, the victims in many cases of our own dedication to conciliation and reasonableness? Did that dedication afford duplicitous dictators with the opportunity for delay; delay which could be fatal in the long term.

Another critical issue embodied in many of the papers related to the matter of sovereignty. The growth in international regulatory regimes, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a greater propensity for intervention in the domestic affairs of states suggested a steady diminution of state sovereignty. There were, however, very real limits to interventionist power. The inability of the IAEA to conduct on-site inspections in North Korea was a case in point. Even in Iraq, as Ron Cleminson confirmed, highly intrusive inspection procedures could not guarantee complete transparency. Despite a menu of sticks and carrots, the United States has enjoyed relatively little success in altering North Korea's nuclear weapons policies. As James MacIntosh indicated, timing was a critical ingredient in the application of power: too soon and it was inappropriate; too late and it was irrelevant. One of the lessons to emerge from the workshop discussions was the need to intervene in a timely fashion, to prevent the accumulation of violations of which Dr. Bedeski spoke.

But without political will there could be no intervention and many of the papers addressed this concern. Central to political will, particularly in the case of multilateral initiatives, was the achievement of consensus. It was clear around the workshop table alone, that there was a lack of consensus. Dr. Boutilier maintained that the nuclear negotiating war with North Korea was,

for all intents and purposes, lost and that what was required was that more incentives or carrots be offered to Pyongyang. Dr. M.K. Nam, by way of contrast, felt that there was very little potential in a "carrots" approach to the nuclear impasse on the peninsula. Complicating matters inordinately was the increasing complexity of the international organizations involved, the unwillingness of United Nations members to contribute to the costs of conflict reduction, and the failure of the People's Republic of China to support the concept of U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea.

Various commentators flagged the importance of the perceptual dimension of the North Korean problem. How, for example, does Pyongyang view the world? Many analysts implicitly or explicitly discount the legitimacy of North Korean policies. But stripped of turgid rhetoric, these policies have a basis in legitimate concerns and perceptions. Does Pyongyang see its problems as mainly economic or military? The ways in which regional powers like Canada address the nuclear impasse depend in large part on that assessment.

And how does one assess the economic dimensions of weapons acquisitions and arms control? Ms. Shannon Selin and Ms. Janice Heppell addressed that issue in two finely documented and argued tours d'horizon; the former looked at the patterns of arms sales and acquisition in East Asia and the latter providing the backdrop to the major security issues in northeast Asia. There appears to be a clear nexus between economic growth and weapons acquisition. Arguably the North Korean nuclear weapons programme is perceived by Pyongyang as an inexpensive way of bridging the military gap between the northern and southern regimes; a gap that is, itself, a product of the profound asymmetry in economic performance between the two nations. Can economics be invoked to resolve the nuclear dilemma on the peninsula? Can an infusion of capital in the form of trade and aid provide a beleaguered state like North Korea with a sense of assurance sufficient to make it willing to abandon the nuclear option?

In the final analysis the challenge may be educational. Currently, the negotiations with the North Koreans are tantamount to one-hand clapping. The problem is how to create what MacIntosh called an epistemic community: to create a community of like-minded negotiators where the players are fully aware of the value of confidence building and the counter-productivity of the hardware that Dr. Yoon reviewed with such authority. At the heart of confidence building is transparency and, as Ronald Diebert revealed, greater satellite sophistication has enabled us to move beyond the primitive verification techniques of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to the subtle enquiries of National Technical Means. But the problem remains, how to educate the protagonists about the value of greater transparency.

The discussions stimulated by the Third Annual Workshop were particularly valuable, occurring as they did at a time of heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. The deliberations were characterized by candour, a recognition of the complexity of the issues at hand, a search for precision of meaning, and a desire to arrive at policy-relevant conclusions. Fresh links were forged with the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis and members of the Canadian security community had an opportunity to wrestle with the most perplexing and lethal security problem in the Asia-Pacific region.

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March 1994

Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence Building and Verification Third Annual Workshop Overview[1]

The Third Annual Korea/Canada Co-operative Research Program workshop explored the potential for arms control, confidence building, and verification efforts on the Korean peninsula. This year, the main focus was on North Korean nuclear weapon and ballistic missile developments and the varieties of arms control and confidence building approaches that might help address these disturbing developments. A secondary and related focus was the broader problem of conventional weapon proliferation throughout the North- and South-East Asian security regions. Papers were presented (1) exploring the nature of the Korean security environment and its broader context as well as (2) discussing various dimensions of arms control experience, both practical and conceptual. As in previous workshops, the discussions following the paper presentations tended to be exploratory, with participants focusing on the complex nature of the Korean security environment. A serious effort was made to combine the largely Western-based experience of arms control approaches with an appreciation of security relations on the Korean peninsula and in the adjoining area, as understood by the people who live there.

The first paper, "The Emerging Security Balance in the North Pacific and the Nuclear Impasse on the Korean Peninsula" by Dr. James Boutilier, provided an excellent overview of the region's basic security relationships and their recent development. It also introduced the complex problem of North Korean nuclear ambitions and posed the question whether arms control could play a role dealing with this problem. This was a central concern throughout the workshop's deliberations. The paper touched sequentially on the security concerns and perspectives of China, Russia, Japan, the United States, and the Koreas. This treatment stressed the state of flux in relations within the region as China grows more powerful — but perhaps less stable; Russia recedes as a regional player; Japan approaches difficult economic, military, and domestic leadership problems; and the United States continues to grapple with its role in the region and its relations with both China and Japan. The last section of the paper focused on the problems on the Korean peninsula, particularly the threatened North Korean withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Dr. Boutilier explored North Korean motivations and the options available to South Korea and the international community.

1. This report concentrates on general summaries of the discussions following each paper presentation. Although the basic nature of each paper is noted, there is no detailed summary of its content because the papers are included in this volume.

A central issue broached in this paper and touched on by other participants numerous times throughout the workshop was the appropriate approach to take regarding North Korean nuclear ambitions and its clandestine development programme. Should the North's efforts be regarded as a fait accompli or should efforts — either strenuous or modest — be expended to reverse the North's clandestine programme? Dr. Boutilier wondered whether threats of any sort were wise and suggested that the main concern ought to be the strengthening of the North's badly deteriorated (and deteriorating) economy since that was a major reason for the nuclear option in the first place. Some measure of internal stability was in everyone's interests.

In the discussion that followed the Boutilier paper, there was considerable interest in discussing how best to approach the Kim regime in North Korea. In particular, what combination of "carrots" and "sticks" would best achieve three important but perhaps incompatible objectives: (1) contain or even reverse the North Korean nuclear weapon programme; (2) promote stability on the peninsula (i.e., reduce and/or control the chance of conflict between North and South Korea); and (3) foster the smoothest possible integration of the North into a larger, South Korean-based state. Several participants agreed that it might be best to abandon any hope of forcing the Kim regime to undo its nuclear programme because such efforts were not only unlikely to succeed but could easily promote greater instability in the attempt. Aggressive efforts to force North Korea to renounce its nuclear programme could even precipitate war. Other participants were uncomfortable with the idea of permitting the Kim regime to flaunt the NPT and, in effect, suffer no penalty for defying international will.

This basic conundrum structured many workshop discussions. The Kim regime was so resistant to outside pressure and so apparently volatile that any efforts to shape or constrain its behaviour could be very dangerous — as might be doing nothing. And doing nothing risked undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was very difficult — if not impossible — to gauge these two risks.

Most participants agreed that there was relatively little leverage available to the international community if it did decide to apply more serious pressure. An outright attack against the suspected North Korean nuclear facilities seemed to be out of the question. Larger scale conventional or nuclear attack seemed even less likely. That left sanctions of various levels of severity, official entreaties, or trade-offs of some kind (the "buy-out option").

Of course, North Korea already was very isolated from the rest of the world which made sanctions a dubious option, particularly given the regime's volatile nature. The Kim regime had thus far proven surprisingly resilient and no one knew what it could sustain in the way of additional

economic pressure. Just as important, without the active participation of both China and Japan, there was little chance of sanctions doing much good. China had an extensive and porous border with Korea while sympathetic Koreans resident in Japan accounted for a surprisingly large flow of hard cash into the North every year. North Korea had escaped the full impact of trade restrictions because of these two factors. In addition, there was the concern that increased pressure might be too successful and could topple the regime. This would force unification at a time and under circumstances that would overwhelm South Korea. Most participants agreed that the unification of Korea would present even more demanding challenges than had the unification of Germany which itself had proven a daunting exercise. Thus, there was a certain logic to modestly bolstering the North's economy for the present rather than trying to damage it.

The issue of how best to respond to the North Korean clandestine nuclear programme precipitated further discussion. Some who saw merit in the "do nothing" approach — accept reluctantly that there was nothing that could be done about the programme — also suggested that the international community should simply ignore North Korea in all fora, thereby denying it the recognition and status it hoped to achieve by going the nuclear route in the first place. After all, some argued, North Korea's example is not a model that anyone else would emulate so this approach risked little in the larger context of the NPT. Accepting but ignoring the North Korean "fact," it was felt, would probably have no negative impact on the NPT.

Other participants were not convinced that this was a wise course — or even possible. First of all, the very fact that there was a suspected nuclear weapon programme in the North would inevitably alter the way other states interacted with North Korea. This could not be avoided. So, ignoring the North Korean nuclear weapon programme — and its many implications — was impossible in practice. Thus, the North Korean example might after all be seen to be worth emulating by other states facing difficult regional problems. Worse, the fact that the North had gone this route, and done so without punishment, could only encourage some other regional states to consider the nuclear option, as well, whether on a clandestine or open and "legal" basis. Japan, some felt, would be sure to move in this direction as might Taiwan, if only for defensive reasons.

These developments would surely undermine the NPT and introduce the potential for dangerous instabilities in the region. At least one participant, however, wondered whether a moderately proliferated world was necessarily all that bad. With the exception of a crazy state like North Korea — about which nothing could be done at present, anyway — how would the proliferation of nuclear weapons to relatively stable and responsible states in the region undermine security? We might be exhibiting an ethnocentric bias in assuming that Asians could not manage affairs as well as the United States and the Soviet Union had during the Cold War.

The workshop participants returned to the concern that North Korea was an unpredictable and dangerous state. Provoking the Kim regime in any way seemed to many to be unwise and counterproductive. Some felt it was important to separate longer-term concerns about unification and shorter-term concerns about security discussions and negotiations. There clearly was some virtue to the strategy of letting the Kim regime do what it wanted short of outright attack while attempting to provide minimal economic assistance. As some observed, there might be no quid pro quo for economic aid but that might not be a relevant consideration. Performance-tied aid would likely lead nowhere, with the Kim regime either rejecting it or failing to abide by conditions. The short-term objective, according to many participants, must be to survive the Kim years and hope that the successor regime in the North will be more reasonable. To this end, providing some level of economic aid — without strings — might be the best and only real option. More aggressive options would be too likely to cause conflict, possibly even drawing a reluctant China into a broader crisis.

This laissez faire approach, however, ran the risk of undermining the NPT and of encouraging other regional states — most notably Japan — to go nuclear. One participant observed, as well, that the eventual unification of Korea would see the continued presence of a nuclear Korea in the region, but presumably under South Korean control. Thus, the nuclearization of North Korea could be a problem of long-lasting implications, even if the Kim regime collapsed and a new Korean state emerged to replace the North and South Korea of today. While this new regime might rapidly denuclearize under international observation there was no guarantee that the new government would see this as the best course to pursue.

Finally, a participant noted that a number of the states in the region, including especially China, possessed what amounted to a 19th century view of the nation state and nationalism, one that made them less susceptible to outside pressure or influence than some non-regional policy makers and analysts appreciated. When combined with an inward-looking or self-centred national character, this state-centric view could be quite limiting. This notion that the nation state was supreme and that international organizations and multilateralism were not very important suggested that European ideas about international relations might not fare too well in the region. Other participants echoed this concern and wondered just what role Western-based arms control ideas might play in regional relations. Perhaps conventional arms control would not work. It certainly was clear that analysts ought not to assume that approaches developed in the European context could be exported without great care, if at all, into new political cultures. Combined with existing concerns about the volatility and imperviousness to outside influence of the Kim regime in North Korea and the limited options available to the rest of the world, this realization was a salutary warning to avoid simple-minded optimism. Nevertheless, as the rest of the workshop indicated, there were real options with real promise to be pursued in the region, even if they were more long-term in character.

The second paper, "Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue: A South Korean Perspective" by Dr. Man-Kwon Nam, explored South Korean attitudes and options in a very focused and practical manner. This paper argued that the North Korean government had pursued a deliberately devious course in initiating its nuclear weapon programme in order to offset growing South Korean conventional military advantages and to strengthen its very weak diplomatic hand in dealings with the South and the United States. The Kim regime was almost certain to continue its tactics of brinkmanship, stalling, and blackmail in protecting the programme. The nuclear programme was initiated to protect the fundamental survival of the Kim regime and the regime would abandon the programme only if it felt that its very survival was at risk.

Dr. Nam argued that any attempt to develop a responsive policy must begin with a good understanding of the origins and nature of the Kim regime and its "Juche" ideology. He also stressed the double-edged nature of the North's basic policy: It plays a clever negotiating game with the South, the US, and the IAEA in order to avoid international sanctions but works aggressively to sustain a maximum sense of "nuclear suspicion." Of course, even if IAEA safeguards and inspections were accepted by the North, there is little chance that bombs or major portions of the nuclear weapon-making infrastructure would ever be uncovered.

Dr. Nam stressed the importance of understanding the North's extremely strong desire to drive a wedge between the South and the US. Much of the North's manoeuvring was designed to achieve this. The best course of action, in the paper's view, was to press for the introduction of sound IAEA controls to prevent any further weapon development in the North (accepting that some weapons may already exist or be close to completion). The full support of Russia, Japan, and (especially) China would be necessary to persuade the Kim regime that this was the best course to pursue. The use of sanctions and other aggressive measures must be viewed as very risky and these options (with their risk of precipitating war on the peninsula) must be weighed against the risk of allowing the North to pursue its nuclear policy. Attempting to tie Northern acquiesence to various types of economic incentives might be the better course. Ultimately, however, it was difficult to see how incentives or concessions would work.

The discussion following Dr. Nam's presentation began by noting the interesting possibility that the North's nuclear programme might be a bluff. The North Korean reactors create plutonium as a byproduct of technological limitations. The Kim regime might be pretending to develop nuclear weapons in order to gain maximum political leverage. Others noted that even if this were true, the Kim regime nevertheless has a long-term goal of acquiring nuclear weapons and would likely act in the same way regardless of its current success in developing weapons. Although an interesting possibility, it was best to assume that the North Korean programme was genuine and act accordingly.

Several participants noted the great importance of China in our efforts to develop responses to the North Korean nuclear programme. China was very difficult to read in this regard but seemed not to regard North Korea as a big threat and was taken to be unwilling to support any strong action against the North. Chinese support might be gained if China came to ponder the consequences of eventual Korean unification with the assimilation of the North's nuclear weapons into a new, larger, Southern-dominated, militarily sophisticated Korean state on its border. The participants agreed that China was central to any developments on the peninsula. The Kim regime could survive for a long time with even tacit Chinese support. It was not clear, however, what degree of influence China actually had on North Korea. Some wondered if Chinese reticence masked the recognition on their part that they had very little real influence in the North. Some participants also wondered if the Chinese really understood the Koreans very well. As well, it was suspected that the central Chinese government had little real capacity to manage the Korean-Chinese border as a result of the continuing, de facto decentralization of control in China. A consideration that might alter Chinese perceptions was the growing economic relationship between China and South Korea. It was observed, however, that the Chinese government typically maintained a sharp separation between political and economic considerations, rarely allowing the latter to unduly influence the former. The emergence of a new, younger leadership group in China, however, might change Chinese attitudes towards the North.

The discussion also addressed the potential role of arms control approaches, particularly confidence building. Few participants saw great promise in promoting confidence building arrangements, primarily because the Kim regime was perceived to be untrustworthy. Confidence building simply will not work in this type of environment. From the North Korean perspective, there was nothing attractive about transparency as it posed a direct threat to its basic nuclear strategy. The Kim regime appeared not to understand the logic of confidence building in any event so this policy direction seemed unrewarding at present.

A very interesting discussion developed around the example of the South African government's decision to renounce its nuclear programme. This was seen by several participants as being a potentially useful reference example that might be emulated by a successor regime in North Korea. The South African government had opted for this course in order to divest itself of what now seemed to be a counter-productive and embarrassing policy. In a sense, getting rid of their weapons had been a unilateral confidence building measure. It was suggested that the best strategy for North Korea's neighbours may be to develop an "excuse" or rationale for a post-Kim regime to use as a "fig leaf" permitting it to abandon its nuclear programme.

The afternoon session began with the presentation by Ms. Shannon Selin of her paper. "Arms Build-ups in the Pacific Region" looked at the broad phenomenon of weapons acquisitions throughout

the Pacific region. A central point in the paper was the difficulty analysts encountered in assessing the motivations for and the significance of acquisitions. Were they "normal" state behaviour or were they destabilizing acts that threatened to create genuine arms "races" and instability in key parts of the region? It was clear that Asia's share of global defence spending had increased but this was as much a function of other regions' relative decline as it was a product of dramatic changes in Asia. Nevertheless, it was obvious that a number of states were enhancing their military capabilities quite significantly with acquisitions of a wide range of sophisticated weapons systems and capabilities. Particularly troubling was the definite trend in enhanced sea power projection.

Despite these apparent trends, the picture was more complex than simple "racing" behaviour between states. A pervasive sense of uncertainty was one factor that motivated many states to improve their military capabilities, either by buying weapons or by developing licensed or indigenous production capabilities. The end of the Cold War had accelerated this trend because it had further reduced any sense of stability and structure in global security affairs. For many regional states, general economic prosperity made enhancing military capabilities a feasible option, particularly when linked to the desire to develop a domestic arms industry. As well, many states perceived the growth of very real maritime-related threats or potential threats that required (at least in their eyes) the expansion of their own capabilities. Issues of national pride and military reputation compounded these two factors. To some extent, greed and corruption could also be seen as a factor in some acquisition programmes. Senior policy makers saw an opportunity to profit personally from new programmes. An important consideration that often failed to attract analytic attention was the simple need to replace aging equipment which, in many cases, occurred in definite cycles. Replacement and modernization inevitably conferred significantly enhanced military capabilities whether explicitly intended or not. Thus, even the most benign motivation to replace old equipment could acquire a threatening character in the eyes of neighbours. Regardless of the reasons underlying the acquisition of modern military capabilities, however, those enhanced forces could precipitate anxiety on the part of neighbours and make any conflict more intense and destructive.

Ms. Selin's presentation then turned to an assessment of developments in various regions of Asia. There were reasons to be concerned, in particular, about developments in China. There seemed to be an increasingly "muscular" attitude driving the modernization of the Chinese military, particularly its naval capabilities. Nevertheless, the Chinese did not yet possess a truly worrisome military capability due to a variety of limitations in system quality, training, and experience. As well, military expansion did not appear to be a major priority. Instead, managing domestic economic reform was the main concern of the government. This, however, could change and the picture might darken.

Of the other states in the region, Japan and the two Koreas were of greatest significance. In the case of Japan, much depended upon what happened with Japanese-American security relations. If those relations soured and Japan began to feel increasingly isolated, it might very well develop a significantly expanded military capability despite current domestic ambivalence. Developments in North Korea and in China could also precipitate a significant adjustment in Japanese policy. Russia was not seen to be a major consideration within the region due to its vast internal problems. Overall, it could be expected that most defence budgets in the region would grow, including large amounts for capital improvements. Nevertheless, because so many deployed systems were nearing the ends of their service lives, there would likely be limits on the wide-scale acquisition of increasingly sophisticated systems. This would restrict the number of new systems deployed in the region.

In the related discussion, participants focused on the unique characteristics of security relations in the North-East Asian security environment. These conditions were very different compared with CSCE Europe and this made European-style analysis and solutions potentially suspect. The reasons for many states arming in the region were either idiosyncratic or tied to a complex multiple set of potential bilateral threats that bore no resemblance to the traditional bipolar relationship that had structured relations in the West for so long. These complexities made at least some participants wonder just how confidence building, for instance, could work in the region. To the extent that arms control efforts could help, there was some sentiment for the UN Arms Registry approach. However, this and other transparency-related approaches were seen to be rather blunt instruments, ones that would disadvantage the weak. The existing register was also thought to be poorly suited to maritime forces although that could be changed.

The fact that most states in the region had a maritime focus made the development of security management solutions more difficult. Many states felt that they had legitimate concerns, especially with respect to major regional sea lanes of communication, that required action now. Maritime forces have been the object of relatively little analytic and policy attention as far as arms control and related approaches are concerned. This made it more difficult to develop or apply region-specific solutions.

Most participants agreed that there was relatively little prospect of conflict in the near-term within the region and that the bigger concern was the mid-term. The obvious exception to this assessment was the ever-present danger of conflict on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser extent, in the area of the Spratly Islands. A major confounding consideration noted by several participants was the fact that most regional states could easily see each of its neighbours as a potential adversary, creating a very complex set of multiple dyadic security relations. The future configuration of North-East Asian power relations was difficult to predict and this could only encourage states in the region to engage in worst-case thinking when considering acquisition options.

The second paper of the afternoon session, "Linkages Among Bilateral and Regional Confidence and Security Building Measures: The North Pacific Case," was presented by Ms. Janice Heppell. This paper assessed the opportunities for bilateral confidence building amongst the North Pacific states, stressing the complex set of potential threats with which each state must deal. These complex relations were seen to undermine the potential for broader, region-wide efforts. Modest bilateral packages were seen to be much more promising.

The paper first explored the nature of potential threats in the region, seen in the light of the post-Cold War world. Chief amongst a variety of potential concerns were a remilitarizing Japan; declining US presence and power; Chinese military modernization and a more aggressive security policy; and North Korea's clandestine nuclear programme. These concerns, to various degrees, were causing increased defence spending, the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons; the development of indigenous arms industries; and even the potential pursuit of programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction.

The presentation concentrated on the dynamics of relations between each pair of North Asian states. The point was to illustrate just how complex and uncertain those relations were and how the assessment of threat from those neighbours could shift, moving from the short- to the long-term. This assessment also included domestic developments that could alter the security relations of these states such as recession in Japan or the collapse of central authority in Russia or China. Japan, China, Russia, South and North Korea were each dealt with in turn. It was striking how each state could see a distinct threat posed by every other state in the region. This is what made developing security management approaches for North Asia so complex and difficult.

The second main portion of the presentation dealt with the potential role of confidence building measures in improving bilateral relations. The regional states could be seen in terms of ten bilateral relationships, structured by varying concerns about such priorities as economic growth, political reform, and military modernization. Eight of these relationships clearly could benefit from the development of measures to promote trust. Ms. Heppell suggested possible bilateral CBM regimes for each of these pairs of states. Most of the suggested regimes included basic collections of CBMs such as "no-first-use of force" declarations; the exchange of budget and force structure information; the exchange of officials (both regional and national); exchanges of and visits by military personnel; the notification of various types of military manoeuvres; the observation of military manoeuvres and activities; the establishment of "Hot Lines" (for emergency use) and "Cool Lines" (for the normal exchange of security information); and the creation of consultative groups or commissions to address specific types of security problems (such as nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear waste disposal; doctrine; and military modernization) or general issues of compliance. These CBM regimes stood as

meaningful but modest attempts to establish the basis for progressively more complex arrangements that one day might acquire a multilateral character.

Ms. Heppell concluded by stressing that bilateral CBM arrangements were particularly useful for dealing with the issue-specific nature of relations in North-East Asia. The complex relations amongst these states made multilateral approaches much more difficult to execute. However, even the bilateral route could pose problems as each successful arrangement could upset relations with other neighbours. The one multilateral CBM opportunity that offered real prospects of interest and success was an arrangement organized around the issue of nuclear waste disposal.

The discussion of confidence building approaches in the North Asian region touched on a number of issues that were relevant to Ms. Selin's presentation, as well. There was general concern, expressed by many participants, that the confidence building idea was not well understood by many policy makers in Asia. This handicapped efforts to explore the potential of the approach. The observation was made again that many Asian decision makers have a very strong sense of nationalism and the complete sovereignty of the state which further impairs the possibility of using confidence building and many other security management approaches.

Several participants were interested in exploring whether it was possible to move bilateral efforts into a multilateral forum. Perhaps existing regional organizations could support the development of multilateral confidence building agreements. Others felt that it was most appropriate to start at the bilateral level and gradually expand as initial efforts bore fruit. At least one participant, however, argued that starting at the bilateral level risked exposing too many sharp differences between each pair of participants. If small groups of states attempted to develop basic confidence building arrangements, they might be able to find sufficient common ground to overcome this type of problem. Of course, this might not help very much in addressing the bilateral problems that underlay the relationship. One participant wondered if it wasn't possible to develop a broad multilateral CBM programme where each participating state would adopt only those measures it felt comfortable with.

The discussion shifted to the consideration of who might participate in a multilateral security arrangement. Some analysts have suggested a very small group including only the main regional actors (China, Japan, and the two Koreas) while others have suggested a somewhat expanded base including the United States and Russia as well as, perhaps, Taiwan. Some have also suggested that Canada might play a role in a regional organization. It was useful to remember that smaller states such as South Korea might be overwhelmed by big states (China and Japan) if the composition of the group was too small. Adding more participants would create a more diverse array of states of varying power and influence. This was an issue that required a good deal more thought and research effort.

Another consideration that emerged in the discussion was the fact that people in the region tended not to know very much about each other. There was quite profound ignorance about the history and concerns of neighbours, even amongst elites. Indeed, the people in some states were ill-informed about their own countries, usually as a result of deliberate government efforts. The role of the media in countering this tendency was discussed but it was unclear what impact it could have, particularly given the decision of some governments in the region to control the content and nature of media reports. This was at least in part a function of the political culture of the states in the region and Westerners had to be cautious in recognizing these differences. Reiterating an earlier point, one participant remarked that there was a fair degree of latent animosity in the region, in large part a function of well-remembered history. This was partly responsible for the tendency of each state to consider virtually every neighbour a potential threat.

The discussion concluded with two contrasting assessments of the degree of perceived threat in the region. One participant suggested that only North Korea posed a real threat and that primarily to South Korea. Other states were dealing with potential threats that didn't, perhaps, warrant special efforts to develop confidence building or other security management arrangements. Another participant, however, stressed that there was ample reason for virtually every state in the region and those nearby to be concerned about its security. There was plenty of potential for concern and things looked as if they might get worse rather than better. Therefore, security management efforts — including confidence building agreements — were definitely worth exploring and promoting.

The second day's session began with the presentation of Dr. Jin-Pyo Yoon's paper, "North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs from a Non-Proliferation Perspective: Challenge to Verification." Dr. Yoon argued that different perceptions of what motivated the North Korean government to pursue its clandestine nuclear programme could suggest different policy options and approaches. Understanding the motivations of the Kim regime would suggest the most appropriate response. The paper's main theme held that the North Korean government had decided to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in order to sustain the faltering and extremely insecure Kim regime. These programmes served both a military and a diplomatic objective: (1) They offset increasingly powerful South Korean conventional military capabilities and (2) they increased negotiating leverage with the international community (especially the United States and Japan) by obliging it to deal directly with North Korea. Although these might seem to be inconsistent or contradictory objectives, the Kim regime did not see them in this way. Additionally, the North Korean government could sell its technological expertise in the nuclear and ballistic missile areas as well as the products of that expertise — the nuclear weapons and missiles themselves.

Dr. Yoon's paper included a brief history of the North Korean nuclear weapon and ballistic missile efforts. Following the history was an assessment of where these two programmes currently stood. North Korean achievements in the ballistic missile field were easier to evaluate because some of these systems were exported and all were tested. Dr. Yoon noted that the most recent of these efforts (Nodong 1 and possibly Nodong 2) possessed ranges sufficient to threaten most of North Korea's neighbours. Indeed, the fielding of the Nodong 2 armed with a serviceable nuclear warhead would alter fundamentally the security relationships in the region. The extreme secrecy of the Kim regime made evaluations of its clandestine nuclear programme much more difficult and no outsider could say with confidence where that programme stood. The concern, of course, was that the North Koreans had already reached the stage of assembling crude weapons.

The last portion of the paper addressed North Korean participation in the Non-Proliferation regime, reported its recent diplomatic machinations regarding continued and "suspended" membership, and offered some suggestions about negotiable verification for responsive policies. The presentation and the paper concluded with an assessment of whether or not the North Korean regime would be able to attain the two objectives noted in the introduction: nuclear offset to conventional military imbalance and enhanced access to key members of the international community. It seemed clear that the two objectives were incompatible with the nuclear programme creating increasingly negative reaction — but the fear that the Kim regime might resort to violence if pressed too hard tended to militate against strong international action. The recommended course of action was to abandon the IAEA demand for special inspections, revert to a program of routine inspections to facilitate some degree of nuclear transparency, and re-animate the inter-Korean talks. Direct talks between the North and the United States would also play a part in this strategy. Should talks progress, the South could propose economic cooperation and an effort could be made to get the North Korean government to participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

In the discussion that followed, one participant wondered whether the IAEA had lost its credibility in North Korean eyes because of its reliance upon American intelligence resources for key data on the North Korean nuclear programme. The feeling was that the North Korean government might complain about the IAEA's objectivity but that it would accept routine inspections. The key to understanding the North's position was to recognize that "special inspections" were seen to be an intolerable challenge to sovereignty. This, of course, made addressing the North Korean's clandestine nuclear programme next to impossible. The only plausible option was to return to the routine IAEA inspection regime and shift the issue of special inspections into an inter-Korean context, possibly with US participation.

Several participants raised a fundamental issue: What was the international community — and, for that matter, key individual actors such as South Korea and the United States — prepared to give up in order to stop the North Korean nuclear programme? What were the "buy-out" options? Who would pay? Was the North Korean government even interested in trading its programme for anything else when its saw its very survival linked so closely to that programme? These were very difficult questions with answers that seemed discouraging.

Returning to the point made earlier about the role of the United States in providing some key technical information on compliance, several participants suggested that this reliance by arms control regimes on data from national technical means (NTM) sources would be a continuing trend in the future. The information provided by the United States, as well as other states with competent NTM resources, would be vital for virtually any new arms control or security management regime. Although new arms control or security organizations could incorporate independent monitoring means, this would be an extremely costly measure and one unlikely to be welcomed by cost-conscious participants. As long as appropriate procedures were developed for the use of outside monitoring data, few participants saw any fundamental problem with this approach. It certainly offered the prospect of enhancing the capabilities of virtually any arms control regime, but only if the participants felt that the information was developed on a non-discriminatory basis.

The general conclusion in this discussion was that we must assume that North Korea now had nuclear weapons. Although it was agreed that the Kim regime might not yet possess actual, functioning weapons, it was safest to assume that it had at least a handful of working systems, however crude. This fundamental assumption structured all policy options in the opinion of the participants. The safest and wisest course was to both appease the Kim regime and, as far as it was possible, ignore its nuclear status, thereby minimizing the diplomatic benefits of having gone nuclear. This course of gentle isolation ought to be pursued, it was thought, against a background of strong conventional defence preparedness in South Korea. At the same time, all reasonable efforts ought to be undertaken to open new or maintain existing channels of negotiation and contact with the North. It seemed quite clear that sanctions would not work and easily could become counter-productive. There was also a consensus that modest economic cooperation and assistance would, on balance, be wise, as it would help sustain the Kim regime until its demise. Chaos in the North was not a preferred option and would only make the eventual reconciliation of the two Koreas more difficult.

The second morning paper was presented by Mr. Ron Deibert. "ISMA Reappraised: The Politics of Multilateral Satellite Reconnaissance" fit in well with the earlier discussion of NTM and monitoring resources for arms control regimes. Mr. Deibert's presentation focused on the feasibility of developing a multilateral reconnaissance satellite image distribution centre operating out of the

United Nations. He argued that a combination of political and technological changes made this approach an attractive one. Chief amongst them were the end of the Cold War and the emergence of great power cooperation; a growing interest in multilateral arms control and verification; the commercial availability of moderately high-resolution satellite imagery (with the prospect of even better quality images in the near future); and a greater willingness on the part of international actors (both states and organizations) to rely on this type of monitoring data.

Despite the promising possibilities, several basic concerns stood as potential barriers to acceptance. First, the tendency for the international community to think in terms of "one treaty, one verification regime" (treaty specificity) made it difficult for many to accept the use of a single image distribution centre for the support of several different treaties. As well, it was not self-evident to many that this type of body would make a constructive difference — that there was any real need for it. This view was at least in part a product of the fact that existing arms control efforts had not adopted this course. Fiscal viability was another concern. This type of approach could be seen to be very costly (although the scheme presented here was not). Finally, technical and operational issues needed to be addressed. For instance, processes of image data dissemination, the speed with which requests could be honoured, procedures for pre-distribution analysis; and the question of how to maintain appropriate confidentiality needed to be resolved.

Mr. Diebert's presentation sought to address these concerns. The treaty-specificity barrier, he argued, was no longer rational (if it ever was) because of the proliferation of similar monitoring requirements and the exorbitant costs of developing duplicative verification regimes for each new arms control agreement. The end of the Cold War only served to underline the need for many states lacking sophisticated NTM to have access to monitoring data. This also meant that there was indeed a need for some form of satellite image distribution organization. With overlapping requirements underlying more and more existing and potential security management agreements, it made good sense to support the creation of a single body capable of meeting a number of those shared requirements. Cost was not the problem that many imagined it to be. The image distribution function was not costly in itself as it simply served to collect and direct image data from existing satellites. The body in the proposal was **not** a monitoring agency per se tasked with the development and operation of monitoring satellites. Finally, the operational requirements for this type of body did not appear overly onerous. Procedural arrangements ensuring, amongst other things, timely and technically competent performance as well as confidentiality could be worked out.

The remainder of the presentation focused on a more detailed discussion of the proposed United Nations Centre for Image Acquisition and Distribution (UNCIAD). Part of that discussion compared the UNCIAD idea with the earlier French proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring

Agency (ISMA). Other elements in the discussion included an overview of the UNCIAD infrastructure, an estimate of operating expenses, and a provisional look at terms and conditions for UNCIAD duties. On balance, a strong case was made for the development of an UNCIAD-style multilateral image collection and distribution system.

The third paper in the morning session, "The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea: A Case Study in Monitoring Arms Control" by Dr. Robert Bedeski, explored the problems that had beset the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission (NNSC) from its very inception at the close of the Korean War. As a function of the Armistice Agreement, the NNSC ostensibly was to ensure that the armistice was not used to prepare for another war. Composed of members from four states — two true neutrals (Switzerland and Sweden) and two non-participants in the Korean War (Poland and Czechoslovakia) — the NNSC was to be engaged in three distinct types of verification enterprise. These included fixed inspection teams at five sea ports in the North and the South; challenge inspections; and the management of full reports on the replacement of men and equipment in the North and the South.

The NNSC was a good example of how not to design and manage a monitoring system. It had no authority of its own to conduct effective inspections, no real capacity to observe or punish violations, and its inspection team approach was badly conceived. Dr. Bedeski observed that the NNSC experience highlighted the impossibility of developing a meaningful monitoring system when a principal participant does not want it to function successfully. As well, a monitoring system that has no recourse to durable and reliable sanctions could not keep the parties from misbehaving with impunity. Although a more comprehensive system — one with the capacity to send inspectors to any suspect site or event — might have helped in principle, the unwillingness of North Korea to be a meaningful participant would have doomed any monitoring efforts to failure. The NNSC experience also demonstrated the great importance of true neutrals in managing an unbiased monitoring system and illustrated the mischief that insincere or dishonest inspectors could make.

It was interesting to speculate how the NNSC, as an existing body, might be revised in order to function more effectively in the future. A change in the attitude of North Korea might permit this existing entity to undertake a meaningful monitoring role if the security relationship between North and South Korea entered a new, more positive phase in the near future. The historical failure of the NNSC by no means meant that it would never play a useful role in overseeing the transformation of Korean security relations.

The last of the morning paper presentations was by Mr. James Macintosh. "Confidence-Building Evolution in Europe: Static or Portable" presented an introduction to the confidence building

approach based on the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) case. This revised understanding stressed the notion of transformation, arguing that confidence building as a security management approach could only be truly effective when the perceptions of threat in neighbouring states were on the verge of fundamental positive change. The confidence building process appeared to be uniquely suited to animating and perhaps even initiating this process of fundamental change, hence its special value. Although it was always dangerous to infer too much from a single instance, the CSCE case provided a compelling illustration of what confidence building could accomplish.

The bulk of the paper was devoted to detailing this transformation view of confidence building and included the presentation of several generalized definitions (each one characterizing a distinctive aspect of the phenomenon), a typology of confidence building measures, and treatments of the security regime and epistemic community concepts that helped explain how confidence building functioned. Also prominent in the overview was a discussion of initial conditions that appeared to be necessary for confidence building to function successfully.

Having presented the basic features of the transformation view, the paper turned its attention to a variety of conceptual issues and problems, many of which suggested that efforts to use the confidence building approach in new contexts ought to be undertaken with some care. For instance, the CSCE-based understanding that explicitly or implicitly informed most people's basic idea of confidence building was potentially quite idiosyncratic. Did this mean that its lessons were non-portable? Despite these concerns, it seemed sensible to explore the potential of confidence building in new geographic and substantive areas using as generalized as possible an understanding of confidence building. In particular, this might be done by encouraging analysts from different security regions to develop a more sophisticated appreciation of confidence building sensitive to their own security contexts and problems but informed by the basic concepts seen in the CSCE case.

The possibilities for developing effective confidence building arrangements for the Korean peninsula were enticing, not least because of the general similarity in basic geostrategic circumstance between Korea and Central Europe. However, the lessons of the transformation view of confidence building suggested that great caution was in order unless a fundamental change in security conceptions and perceptions was near. There was nothing to suggest that this was the case today in Korea. The need to prepare for the departure of the Kim regime in the North, however, made the active exploration of confidence building a wise course to pursue, particularly if relatively less-doctrinaire North Korean officials could be involved.

The afternoon was devoted to a presentation by Mr. Ron Cleminson and an extended discussion. The latter sought to develop general themes and conclusions and also included a discussion of the Deibert, Bedeski, and Macintosh papers.

Mr. Cleminson's presentation, "On-site Monitoring Experience to Date: A Case Study for Verification of Future Compliance," focused on the role that cooperative aerial and space surveillance might play in the future. The presentation first examined the background of the multilateral use of overhead imagery, stressing the increasingly important role that multilateralism played in arms control and the importance assigned to it by Canada. The most compelling contemporary illustrations of multilateral monitoring efforts were seen in the Stockholm/Vienna CCSBMDE process, the Open Skies Treaty, and UNSCOM (in Iraq).

A central element in Mr. Cleminson's presentation was the inevitable globalization of the arms control process. Verification, confidence building, peacekeeping, and transparency were going to become even more important elements in the pursuit of international stability. It was quite clear in looking at the way monitoring efforts had expanded over recent years that overhead imagery was playing an increasingly important role. Canadian research efforts had highlighted a variety of possibilities, including PAXSAT B with its synthetic aperture radar for monitoring ground force deployments; a DASH "Open Skies"-type aircraft; and a mini-dirigible containing a video and electronic camera for expanding the view of on-site inspectors. The Stockholm Agreement had codified the use of overhead inspection and the Open Skies Treaty carried the concept of aerial observation much further.

However, Mr. Cleminson argued that UNSCOM and UN Security Council Resolution 687 provided the richest example of overhead monitoring synergies. While the overall effort of UNSCOM should not be confused with traditional arms control, the use of NTM and commercial satellites, high- and low-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, terrestrial inspectors and sensors, and collateral means (including defector reports) suggested how comprehensive and effective a multi-layered system of monitoring could be.

Mr. Cleminson concluded his presentation by noting three basic verification models that might be employed in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty case. Verification capabilities could be developed in a new, "stand alone" entity; they could be developed in association with (but distinct from) an existing organization; or they could be developed within an existing entity. In each case, advantages and disadvantages needed to be weighed against each other. The freedom of a unique and independent organization also meant that there was no infrastructure or experience to guide its efforts. Alternative-

ly, creating a verification organization within an existing organization would likely mean collisions with existing bureaucracies and old ethics.

The afternoon discussion touched on several of the day's presentations. In response to questions, Mr. Deibert clarified several misconceptions having to do with how the proposed UNCIAD would operate. In particular, it was important to remember that UNCIAD would operate largely as a clearing house for this data. No one was proposing that the agency own and operate its own satellite resources. This was a much more modest undertaking intended to facilitate the general availability of satellite imagery, whether from commercial satellites or, possibly, more sophisticated sources. Many questions had yet to be resolved, including what the eventual membership might be and how UNCIAD would be related to the UN. One participant wondered if UNCIAD might supplement satellite-derived data with images from aerial resources. Another wondered whether UNCIAD might endeavour to collect information to combat piracy, crime, or environmental abuse. There was some reluctance to see a UNCIAD-type organization attempt too much and spread itself too thin.

With respect to the nature of confidence building, one participant made the good point that there must be some reason to sit down and begin negotiations in the first place. In the case of North Korea, what would drive it to begin serious confidence building negotiations (as opposed to simply going through the motions)? The reasons for undertaking a negotiation might not be compelling or enduring, as was the case with the Soviet Union prior to the CSCE. Nevertheless, there had to be some reason. Another participant observed that the literature on the pre-negotiation period might be helpful in understanding how "paradigm shifts" in security thinking occur, shifting participants' thinking in profound and unexpected ways. That literature might also suggest ways of enticing North Korean participation in the expectation that, down the road, significant change might become possible.

The discussion pursued this issue of how to engage North Korea in some form of negotiation. The consensus appeared to be that until the Kim regime came to an end, there was little prospect for constructive engagement. With the emergence of a new government in the North, more might be possible although this obviously remained an open question. It seemed both reasonable and constructive to make a variety of efforts to involve North Korean officials at various levels in discussions and informal contacts that would at least create a common ground and shared concepts for future interaction. It was also important, most participants felt, to begin training verification specialists now for the eventual task of monitoring a future security management regime on the peninsula.

A number of participants felt that it was very important to involve both policy makers and academics in the exploration of new security management options and approaches for Korea. Each could bring something useful to the table and would benefit from the interaction. There was less

agreement over whether to involve representatives from other Asian states in these discussions. While other viewpoints might be helpful and educational, this might dilute the focus of the Canadian-Korean effort.

Ultimately, the discussion refocused on several key questions: Was it best to ignore or engage the North Korean government on security issues? How could we interest them? What do they want? What forum could we all rely upon to manage this expanded set of contacts? Most participants appeared to believe that efforts ought to be expended to engage as wide as possible a variety of North Korean officials while maintaining a very wary guard. Efforts expended now might bear security management fruit within the next several years despite the current, gloomy environment.

As in the previous workshop, this one came to a close with a concluding overview of Dr. James Boutilier. He noted ten issues that characterized the content of the workshop's papers and the larger subject matter addressed by the workshop. Many of the issues ultimately had to do with understanding context.

Outsiders would not grasp the nature of security problems in the region nor how to handle them if they did not understand the history and culture of the region. The legacy of hostility between many regional actors was profound and coloured relations in a variety of ways. Some regional states saw the world in ways very different from their neighbours, making peaceful relations quite difficult. Contrasting notions of sovereignty compounded these historical, psychological, and cultural differences with many Asian states exhibiting a sense of state versus personal rights and state versus international obligations that conflicted with Western ideas. This made them less accessible to external pressure and hostile to outside efforts to change them. This carried over into differing conceptions and understandings of arms control, its language, its assumptions, and the negotiating cultures that are associated with it.

The security environment was further confused by the growing problem of proliferation with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems spreading throughout the region. This was a function, in part, of economics and technology strategies in some regional states. In short, the security environment was complex, non-Western in a number of key but poorly understood ways, and the product of a host of factors that did not necessarily lend themselves to easy control. The task of improving this environment would require thoughtful understanding and context-relevant elaborations of security management approaches already seen to enjoy some success in other areas of the world. Non-regional actors might help but the principal motivation would have to come from within.

Dr. Boutilier's final assessment from the preceding year seemed equally apt for this year's workshop. Then, he had observed that the near-term prospects of arms control in Korea were not very promising, particularly when viewed through the eyes of the North and the South. It was nevertheless important to maintain a constant dialogue (an insight derived from the European experience) and to be extremely patient. It was wise to prepare for future advances by devoting considerable energy today to various security management approaches. However, the process could not be rushed and much would depend upon the evolution of the North Korean political system. Although the role for outsiders was not extensive in this waiting game, there were constructive insights and observations that Canada could bring to the process. Its considerable experience in a variety of arms control fora (including confidence building, verification, proliferation control, and Open Skies) and other security management approaches such as peacekeeping might be helpful in the development of new security approaches for Korea by Koreans.

THE EMERGING SECURITY BALANCE IN THE NORTH PACIFIC AND THE NUCLEAR IMPASSE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

by

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INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace to describe the current era as one of uncertainty. Indeed, we seem to have lost sight of the fact that the Cold War was a period of great uncertainty. Be that as it may, the outlines of a new order have begun to emerge in the Asia-Pacific region. The central feature of that new order is the prominence of China. Reviled and underestimated after Tiananmen in 1989, China has risen, phoenix-like, to capture journalistic and analytic attention.[1] New statistical measures suggest that it is now the world's third largest economy and that it will surpass Japan and the United States early in the twenty-first century. By way of comparison, Russia has become invisible. Paralysed by economic and political instability, it has lost sight of Gorbachev's Vladivostok vision. Temporarily at least, Japan and the United States appear to be in a condition of stasis, feeling their way forward slowly as they try to cope with the recession and articulate appropriate foreign policies. The Koreas continue to constitute the most volatile corner of northeast Asia. Peninsular instability is not new, of course, but Pyongyang's threatened withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993 has given rise to a lethal totentanz; an inconclusive round of negotiations linking Washington, Pyongyang and Seoul in which the solutions appear to be as deadly as the problem they are meant to solve. Thus, the number one question on the North Pacific security agenda is how to escape from the nuclear labyrinth.

Generally speaking the outlook is bleak. As a rough rule, challenges to the state system appear to be growing in inverse proportion to their ability to deal with them. The Bosnian, Iraqi and North Korean cases underscore the limits to power. Furthermore, they raise very disturbing

questions about the weaknesses in Western negotiating cultures and the interplay between media coverage and the operationalization of foreign policy. Where does arms control fit into this landscape? Is it merely a reassuring mantra or does it have real value? What part can it play in North Korea or does the solution to the Korean impasse lie elsewhere in trade and aid for example? As with most things, it is probably not an either or situation. It may be (and indeed is likely to be) that it is too early to bring the arms control arsenal to bear on the Korean problem. These and other issues related to the new order in northeast Asia are the subject of this paper.

CHINA

For the moment China is on everyone's lips and the Napoleonic adage about leaving China undisturbed has been resurrected by many commentators. Dazzled by explosive economic growth, particularly in the southeastern coastal states, these same commentators have tended to overlook the fact that there are in fact several Chinas and that the non-littoral portions of the People's Republic are in many ways profoundly backward.[2] What emerges from an analysis of contemporary development in China is the realization of a dramatic tension between the centre and the periphery.[3] The aged leadership in Beijing is terrified of losing control. Paradoxically, they are committing slow-motion suicide; presiding over asymmetrical economic development which threatens the very fabric of China and the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. Recent events have suggested the existence of a near fatal disjuncture between economic growth and the physical and fiscal infrastructure needed to sustain it.[4] While the Chinese have been infinitely more successful then the Russians in effecting a transition towards a free market

economy, they lack the monetary and legal frameworks with which to control their dizzying, headlong course. The result has been a series of starts and stops in the national economic programme (such as it is, since in many instances it has developed a life of its own) as much reflective of political manoeuvring on the eve of Deng's death as a desire to regulate the economy.[5]

What are the implications of double digit growth in China? Leaving aside such issues as inflation and corruption, economic growth of this sort has had the effect of committing Beijing to a policy of peace and good order.[6] Clearly, it is in China's best interest, at least in the short to mid-term, to foster regional stability because that will create an environment conducive to growth. However, there is another side to this phenomenon that is less reassuring. For the first time in many decades China's continental borders are secure. Thus the past decade has witnessed a shift in the military centre of gravity away from the north and northwest toward the south and southeast.[7] The primary vehicle for displaying Chinese power in the latter regions in the People's Liberation Army Navy.

For many years the Chinese navy was the product of Soviet military doctrine which argued that the PLA(N), like the Soviet navy, was merely an adjunct to the army, intended to repel amphibious assault and provide coastal or flanking protection for the PLA. Now, however, the PLA(N) is undergoing something akin to a Gorshkovian revolution, ceasing to be an auxiliary to the army and becoming a sea-going force in its own right.[8] Modest shifts within the Chinese defence budget (so far as they can be tracked at all) lend support to this thesis. The evidence suggests that, proportionally, more money may be going to the navy and air force than in times

past. However, to say that China has a full-fledged blue-water navy is to over-state the case. At best it has a brown-water navy with blue water tinges; despite some fairly long-range deployments.[9] Some of the ships are new but the equipment is from the sixties and seventies. The Chinese are well aware of this fact and are eager to improve their sea-going technology. Fresh impetus has been added to Chinese naval programmes by virtue of the increased importance of maritime commerce as a consequence of rapid economic growth in coastal and riverine China. Furthermore, the maritime law of 25 February 1992 ennumerates Chinese claims to virtually the whole of the South China Sea and to broad reaches of the Western Pacific adjacent to the Chinese coast. The PLA(N) is clearly intended to enable China to uphold these claims, although the Chinese see the growth of their naval capability as being non-threatening to their neighbours. Indeed, they maintain that the PLA(N) is simply an appropriate expression of the state of China's power.[10]

Economic growth in China and fire-sale conditions in Russia have enabled the Chinese to acquire a significant number of high performance SU-27 fighter jets from the Russians. Many of these aircraft have been deployed to Hainan Island, the closest thing the Chinese have to an aircraft carrier in the disputed region of the South China Sea. The acquisition of a carrier is probably only a matter of time. While the Chinese alleged in 1992 that it would cost too much to purchase the partially completed Soviet carrier Varyag, the real concern then (quite apart from the political complexities of dealing with the Russians and the Ukrainians) was the message that the acquisition of the vessel would have telegraphed to the rest of Asia. Two years on, a more confident leadership seems less concerned about such matters and will probably opt for two

smaller, less sophisticated, carriers to begin with.[11]

Another source of anxiety is China's nuclear programme. The detonation of a major nuclear device in October 1993 not only distinguished the People's Republic from the other nuclear powers, that were observing an informal test ban, but signalled Asia in general and the volatile ex-Soviet republics in particular that China was a country to be reckoned with. Coming when it did, the test highlighted the problems associated with the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime in mid-decade and underscored the fact that the Chinese appear no closer to embracing arms control limitations on their nuclear programme.[12] In the 80's and now in the 90's Beijing has argued that China will continue to build its nuclear arsenal until such time as the fundamental asymmetry which sets that arsenal apart from the Russian and American stockpiles has been addressed. Thus while China's declaratory and de facto policy involves the promotion of fairly high levels of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is still committed to keeping its nuclear powder dry.

RUSSIA

Like some bumblebee that the laws of economic physics suggests should not fly, Russia continues to function in a manner of speaking. Viewing Russia today is like looking at a bizarre blend of Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union in 1922; with massive economic instability, widespread scepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the democratic process, rampant inflation, absurd state subsidies, the spectre of wholesale unemployment, and a drift toward political fundamentalism.[13] One frightening aspect of this litany of horrors and the last

mentioned phenomenon in particular is the reassertion of Great Russian ambitions. Encircled by unstable states housing Russian minorities, Russia has begun to express interventionist sentiments reminiscent of the Brezhnev doctrine.[14] At the same time its military doctrine has undergone a paradoxical revision. Recently the Russians abandoned their commitment to the no-first use of nuclear weapons; an undertaking that Brezhnev had made in 1982. The irony is that the no-first-use arsenal was on hair-trigger alert throughout the 1980's. Concerned now about the growth of Chinese power, the Russians have abandoned that undertaking at the very time that they have begun to stand down more and more of their nuclear weapons.[15]

There is another irony in all this. While they fear the Chinese, the Russians, driven by the desperate need to acquire hard currency or to conduct trade without it, have been actively engaged in selling war materials to the People's Republic. Outwardly, however, the Russians express little anxiety about the Chinese military buildup, arguing that it will be ten to fifteen years before China constitutes a real threat.

Gorbachev's vision of Russia and the Pacific Century has been consigned to history's scrap heap for the moment. Once again, conditions in the Russian Far East are resonant of conditions in the same area after the First World War when there was talk of autonomy and local officials in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok were uncertain which claimants to back in far off Moscow. What development there is appears to be largely the result of local initiatives.[16] In some respects the region has everything. Proximity to large, rich markets, abundant natural resources, and cheap labour. In other respects, it seems doomed to stagnate; tainted by economic and political instability, haunted by the prospect of hyper-inflation, and constrained by a

fundamental lack of infrastructure. Thus while the Russians have not abandoned their dream of profiting from the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, their ability to realize those dreams seems almost non-existent. It would be misleading to say that there is no economic activity in the Russian Far East, but the real breakthrough, normalization of relations with Japan, appears beyond Moscow's grasp. The fate of isolated Russian minorities, the appeal of simplistic ultra-nationalist dictums, and the problematic nature of Yeltsin's power make the forfeiture of the disputed Kuriles impossible for the moment.[17]

Yeltsin is not unaware of Russia's lost opportunities in the Pacific. A Russian priority is membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation community. However, APEC's guiding principle is the articulation of macroeconomic policies and Russia's lack of such coherent policies denies it the membership that might help it achieve its goals in the Pacific. Instead, it must content itself with trying to persuade the southern tier of APEC members that it is indeed serious about being a Pacific player; something that Gorbachev's flying circus of diplomats attempted to do in Southeast Asia in the late 1980's, before the Soviet empire collapsed.[18]

What all this suggests is that Russia is likely to remain a marginal player at best in the Asia-Pacific region for the balance of this decade. Except where its interests or Slavic credentials are directly involved (as in the Yugoslav case), it is likely to be a fairly passive participant in the UN Security Council and in other international fora. Its military will be retooled to achieve greater rapid deployment capability for peripheral brush fire wars and its massive naval, air, and land arsenals will be undermined by prolonged neglect. It is difficult under the circumstances to see the Russians playing much of a role in arms control and security in the North Pacific region

unless there is significant instability on the Korean peninsula.[19]

JAPAN

The Japanese appear to be at something of an economic, political (both in the domestic and foreign policy sense) and military cross-roads. Having thought that they could defy the laws of economic gravity in the late 1980's, the Japanese have gone from blitzkrieg to sitzkrieg; their economy crippled by huge debt overhangs and the impact of the global recession. A great many of the leading financial institutions are saddled with vast portfolios of non-performing loans. They are desperate to liquidate those loans but are reluctant to call them in because of loyalty to their creditors and because they are afraid that liquidation would accelerate the number of bankruptcies, deflate assets, and endanger the Nikkei.[20] Stimulus packages have had little discernible impact on the economy and unemployment--hitherto almost unthinkable--has become a part of the landscape as major Konzerns, faced with plummeting profits and sluggish demand, curtail overtime, lay off casual labour, and terminate long-time employees.

It is hard to imagine that the remarkable concatenation of circumstances which underlay Japan's breathtaking growth in the 1960's, 70's and 80's will be replicated again in the future. Instead, the Japanese will have to content themselves with managing a powerful but mature economy where growth rates -- after the current recession ends sometime beyond mid-decade -- will probably be in the 4-4.5 percent range. The aging of the Japanese population, the inadequacy of the welfare infrastructure, the demands that younger workers are making on society, and the limitations of the education system will increasingly offset those features of Japanese culture that contributed to rapid economic performance.[21]

Japan is also on the cusp of a generational change. Like Clinton in the United States, Hosokawa is the product of the post-war era; a new man chronologically and in terms of his political stripe. Unfortunately, despite his apparent political deftness, he presides over a highly fragile coalition; a coalition which represents enough elements in the political spectrum that it is difficult for the prime minister to embark upon foreign policy initiatives. This political unpredictability compounds an innate ambivalence about foreign policy. For many years the Japanese were content to let their American patrons set the foreign and security agendas in East Asia.[22] That passivity was no doubt congruent with a fundamental lack of interest in foreign affairs. For the Japanese, it was sufficient to say that foreign affairs were economic affairs. Now, however, conditions have changed. The patron-client relationship between Washington and Tokyo more nearly approximates one of equality and the Japanese find themselves under increasing pressure to articulate a foreign policy commensurate with their economic strength, (qualified as it may be for the moment). Thus, the Japanese are caught in the crossfire between their sense of pride and their sense of inferiority. In the first instance they want (or at least think they want) to be more active players internationally. In the second instance, they feel that their efforts -- whether at defence burden sharing, peacekeeping, or contributing to the cost of the Gulf War -- have never been suitably acknowledged.[23]

At another level they see the world as significantly less secure. The American security guarantee strikes them as problematic particularly when trade frictions give rise to bombast from Washington. Just across the Sea of Japan (as narrow as it ever was) lies the huge Russian arsenal -- missiles, fighter jets, guided missile cruisers, ballistic missile submarines and tank divisions -

- mouldering away. What if the centre loses control of the periphery? What happens if the military community in the Russian Far East blunders fatally somehow? And even if it doesn't, will the Russians be back in strength in a decade at which time the Americans might not be to hand. And what of the Chinese with their maritime ambitions that could endanger Japan's sea lanes of communication?[24]

Compounding these concerns are anxieties about developments on the Korean peninsula. Tokyo has a vested interest in maintaining peace on the peninsula, but lacks the authority to resolve the nuclear impasse between Washington and Pyongyang. Japan's sense of impotence was underscored in May 1993 when the North Koreans launched a Nodong-1 intermediate range ballistic missile in the direction of the Japanese home islands. While the missile fell well short of Kyushu (by design),intelligence estimates concluded that Pyongyang would soon be able to deliver nuclear or chemical warheads to most of western Japan. In the aftermath of the test shot the Japanese and Americans engaged in high level talks about the possibility of installing a limited ABM system in Japan based on the Patriot PAC 2 missile.[25]

It is difficult to say what impact the North Korean threat will have on domestic defence debates. The Peacekeeping Operation Bill, enacted in 1992, following a year of national soul-searching and factional manoeuvring, may be the thin edge of the wedge in terms of greater participation by Japanese Self Defence Force personnel outside of Japan.[26] Slowly but surely the legacy of Japanese brutality in World War II appears to be losing its currency. Apologies, albeit limited, have been made, comfort women grow old, a new generation emerges in Asia, and the elderly leaders have derived what benefit they are likely to get from playing the Japan card.

Thus it may be possible for Japan to play a more active part within multilateral fora without exciting anxieties about Japanese remilitarization. In the Korean case, however, the Japanese find themselves in an awkward position. There is no multilateral framework for dealing with the Korean standoff, and the possibility of United Nations sanctions against the North raises the awkward issue of how to prevent the flow of remittances from the Korean community in Japan to Pyongyang without focusing the spotlight on reputedly questionable dealings between that community and leading Japanese politicians.[27] For the moment, therefore, Tokyo is playing a wait and see game. Absorbed by such issues as electoral reform and economic recovery, Hosokawa's coalition has contented itself with leaving the Koreas largely to the Americans.

THE UNITED STATES

Two things worry observers about America's presence in the Asia-Pacific region; the apparent disjunction between US declaratory policy and commitment to the region and the destabilizing potential of trade related tensions. While it appears that at the cerebral level President Clinton is persuaded of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, his failure to restate America's commitment to the region emphatically in his first year in office generated a good deal of anxiety in Asian capitals. The regional consensus is that the Americans must stay to provide continuity and stability. US involvement in APEC and the potential for APEC to transmogrify into a security forum, have tended to reassure Asian analysts.[28] However, despite a strong showing in the third quarter of 1993, the American economy is still in trouble and the persistence of trade deficits with Japan, China and a number of other Asian countries has translated into

significant diplomatic tensions.

In the Japanese case, negotiations between Prime Minister Hosokawa and the president in February 1994 ended in failure and the American insistence on being able to quantify the US trade relationship with Japan has generated anger and resistance in Tokyo.[29] Similarly, Washington's insistence on linking Most Favoured Nation status with China to China's human rights record has annoyed and perplexed Beijing. Unfortunately, in many respects, these trade negotiations are exercises in theatre in which bluff and the maintenance of face obscure the fact that the Americans cannot afford to push the trade issue to the point of open rupture with either country. Japan and China are far too important to the United States. One of the truly worrisome questions that will arise in the next decade is which country Washington will chose to back if there is a dispute between Tokyo and Beijing. Whereas before a triangular relationship existed between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, now a new triangular relationship is taking shape in the Pacific linking Washington, Tokyo and Beijing.

What is also disturbing is the perception of irresolution on America's part and indeed on the part of the international community. Ineffectual sabre rattling in Bosnia, Haiti, Somali and North Korea can, it is argued, only embolden dictators.[30] Is the international community capable of acting resolutely or is endless prevarication and deception a winning strategy? Nowhere are these issues more critical than on the Korean Peninsula.

THE KOREAS

Historically CBM regimes have been based on the assumption that greater transparency

equalled greater reassurance which equalled greater stability. The reverse appears to have been true in the North Korean case. There, the combination of US spy satellite technology and highly sophisticated analysis by IAEA inspectors revealed early in 1993 that Pyongyang had been lying about the nature of its nuclear programme centred on Yongbyon, ninety kilometres north of Pyongyang. Analysts have speculated that the North Koreans failed to appreciate the subtlety of IAEA tests and that, alarmed by the prospect of further revelatory inspections, they decided to threaten withdrawal form the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[31]

One of the techniques used by the Nazis in their death camps was hope and hope dashed. At the very moment when all seemed lost, hope was rekindled. Much the same can be said for the negotiations which ensued following Pyongyang's March decision. To what extent the liturgy of resistance and concession has been carefully orchestrated or is simply symptomatic of a beleaguered regime opportunistically exploiting its diminished range of options is hard to say. Whatever the case, negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang constitute a fascinating case study in foreign policy decision-making.[32]

One of Pyongyang's long term goals has been to decouple Washington from Seoul. The Russians tried to do the same thing with Tokyo but without success. North Korea's nuclear weapons programme has provided Kim Il Sung with the bargaining power to marginalize Seoul and deal more or less directly with Washington. It would appear that the Americans have continued to consult with their South Korean and Japanese allies but the principal decision making has taken place in the American and North Korean capitals.[33]

The North Koreans had ninety days in which to confirm their withdrawal from the NPT.

They stepped back from the brink just before the deadline, having exploited the intervening uncertainty to press for the discontinuation of the US-ROK Team Spirit Military Exercises which they have always deemed are highly provocative. For all that the Pyongyang is a secretive even bizarre regime, their vision of the world is not without foundation. Throughout the prolonged US-DPRK negotiations, Pyongyang has seen US demands couched in specifics while US promises of aid or military reductions are couched in generalities.[34]

Continued North Korean adherence to the NPT raised the matter of continued IAEA inspections. However, in the North Korean case the IAEA, no doubt motivated by its unhappy experiences in Iraq, pushed for challenge inspections of facilities outside the designated list of installations provided by Pyongyang. Of particular interest were two waste disposal facilities that the North Koreans had attempted to camouflage. The North Koreans refused to entertain IAEA demands. This refusal, which persisted in various forms throughout the autumn of 1993 and into early 1994, raised the whole question of options. How, in short, should the United States and the IAEA respond?[35]

One option was to stage a pre-emptive attack on the Yongbyon facilities and destroy them as the Israelis had done in the early 80's at Osirak in Iraq. Advocates of this approach argued that smart weapons were capable of pin-point accuracy. Opponents countered by pointing out that there was no way conventional weapons could destroy storage facilities in mountain caves and that even if they were destroyed there was no way of knowing whether all the elements of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme had been located in the targeted sites.[36]

Another option appeared to be United Nations sanctions. If Pyongyang failed to comply

with IAEA demands, might not the international community impose sanctions on the North? The problem with this option was that in general terms sanctions were seen as ineffective. Even if they were effective they would take too long to bite and in the process they might drive the cornered regime to employ its nuclear weapons in a final military paroxysm. More particularly, sanctions would require UN Security Council authorization and it is highly unlikely that China would vote in favour of their imposition as a permanent member.[37] Thus while a sea blockade could be thrown up around the DPRK, there would be no way of preventing the flow of goods across the Yalu from China or Russia. Although both nations abandoned their client in the early 90's, in the sense that they demanded payment in hard currency at world prices from the bankrupt North Korean regime, a good deal of trade flows into the north nonetheless. A further argument for the ineffectiveness of sanctions is the fact that the dramatic reduction in the amount of oil reaching the north after the Russian and Chinese decisions means that the DPRK has, for all intents and purposes, been the subject of de facto sanctions for several years now.[38]

That is not to say that the economy has not suffered grievously. The DPRK's problems are not merely or even largely external. Most are domestic in origin, the result of grotesque distortions in the command economy as Stalinist giganticism destroys agricultural environments and military expenditures sap the remaining economic vitality of the state. Observers reported during 1993 that food was in particularly short supply and that the nation's industrial plant was operating at about forty percent capacity. The question which these conditions pose is how much longer can the DPRK go on absorbing negative growth? There have been some half-hearted attempts to attract foreign investment, but the economy has reached such a parlous state that there

is genuine concern that it may collapse, precipitation some sort of political implosion. Or will the North Koreans, inured to hardship and largely unaware of alternatives, simply bow more deeply beneath their burden?[39]

No one knows for sure and indeed the biggest problem in dealing with the North is ignorance of what is really happening north of the DMZ. Uncharacteristically, however, the regime actually acknowledged its desperate economic plight in official pronouncements late in 1993 and those schooled in studying May Day line-ups on Lenin's tomb have noted some curious shifts in personalities at the pinnacle of political power in Pyongyang.[40] Quite what these changes mean is unclear. Are hardliners in the ascendant, arguing that years of negotiations have brought nothing but vague promises from Washington and Seoul? Or are younger, less ideologically inclined apparatchiks gaining a say and promoting emulation of the Chinese Open Door policy?[41]

Much of the debate in Washington and elsewhere has been predicated on forcing the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons. The argument goes that the North must do so in view of Pyongyang's adherence to the NPT and to the bilateral non-nuclear agreement with Seoul. Futhermore, failure to force the North to forfeit its nuclear weapons would set an unacceptable example for the rest of the world on the eve of the NPT renewal process in 1995. States already emboldened by Iraq's nuclear programme would be persuaded of the value of duplicity if the DPRK were to go unpunished. There are some, however, who argue that the United States and others will have to live with imperfection; that a perfect inspection and accounting regime is beyond realization and that there may be no way to oblige the North to

abandon its nuclear weapons.[42]

If that is indeed the case, it raises some sobering prospects. Will the unambiguous achievement of nuclear weapons capability by the North have a spill over effect on the Republic of Korea, Japan or Taiwan? Will the world have to resign itself to living with a united, nuclear Korea in the twenty-first century? Will the achievement of nuclear weapons capability accelerate nuclear proliferation in other parts of the Third World?[43]

And what does all this say about arms control and inspections? It is difficult to be sanguine when one analyzes the UNSCOM experience in Iraq. Probably at no other time in nuclear history has a country been subject to such investigative scrutiny and yet there is every likelihood that clandestine facilities have not been discovered.[44] Certainly if the IAEA were to visit the undeclared sites in the North there would still be no way of knowing whether more sites existed elsewhere. At its simplest, the Iraqi and North Korean cases suggest the need to strengthen IAEA authority dramatically. But beyond that is the problem of political will; the willingness to act resolutely early on in the process. Instead, in the North Korean case the Americans and the North Koreans have allowed themselves to become caught up in a process of circular causation in which every delay increases the likelihood that the North is nearer to achieving nuclear weapons capability and that awareness has reduced the number of viable options and given rise to more delay.

One wonders whether the solution to the problem is to abandon carrots and sticks and offer carrots only?[45] Of course such an approach would give rise to howls of dismay that criminal activity was being rewarded and that the Americans were not capable of acting with

resolution.[46] But what are the alternatives? Increasingly the sticks have become hollow, counterproductive rhetorical devices that fool no one unless one is to consider a full-scale American nuclear attack on the North. Short of that, what real pressure can the Americans bring to bear? Why not exploit the advantages of carrots? At the heart of the matter is the North Korean economy. The nuclear weapons programme is a product of the failing northern economy. That programme alone enables the North to bridge the gap that has begun to develop in the conventional weapons capabilities of the two peninsular regimes. Furthermore, that programme provides the Kim dynasty with threadbare proof of the ability of juche and the Kim family to deliver on its promises. Thanks to nuclear weapons, Pyongyang can treat directly with Washington and Tokyo, winning concessions, albeit vague and ephemeral, and commanding worldwide attention.[47]

But the Kims are doomed. In the final analysis they will go the way of other tin-pot dictatorships.[48] The forces of history are against them, and it is the enhancement of the North Korean economy that will accelerate their slide into oblibion. There are, of course, some very real questions about the absorptive capacity of the North and the willingness of investors to commit their money to an unpredictable regime. But what is needed may be some sort of Gorbachavian new thinking; a bold departure which abandons nuclear legalism as a lost cause and promotes the recovery of the DPRK economy by whatever means possible.[49]

What will that mean in practice? In the short term, aid will be resisted because it is antithetical to North Korean autarchy; but it will become increasingly acceptable because it can be portrayed by Pyongyang as a victory over the West and an illustration of the power of the

Kims. In the long term it will render the Kims irrelevant, demonstrating the absurdity of juche and setting in train forces that will destroy North Korean socialism. Furthermore, economic development in the North is an essential prelude to reunification. For years Seoul and Pyongyang have propagandized about reunification while pursuing policies hostile to that end.[50] As the gulf widened relentlessly between the northern and southern economies, even the pretext of reunification tended to be abandoned. Indeed, it became in the South's best interest to try to prop up the North in order to avoid a catastrophic collapse of the Pyongyang regime and the fate that befell West Germany. It is widely recognized that the South is far less capable of absorbing the North than West Germany was of absorbing the East. Thus, closing the economic gap is critical to the future stability of the peninsula.[51] Inter-Korean trade has, of course, been growing dramatically (albeit from a very small base) and it strikes this writer that every means should be employed to develop the Northern economy; setting aside -- for all intents and purposes -- the nuclear issue which is a war that is already lost.

CONCLUSION

The broad outlines of the post-Cold War order in the Asia-Pacific have begun to emerge. For the most part the regional outlook is benign even if the global outlook is much less so. Economic interdependence is the order of the day as socialist states abandon their bankrupt ideologies and embrace free market economies. American power in the region remains sufficient for the moment. The Russians have plunged from view. The Chinese, in the ascendant, seem firmly committed to fostering stability as a necessary precondition to their continued economic

take-off while probing constantly and surreptiously for weak spots in their neighbours' armour. The Japanese have fallen in on themselves, temporarily, as they wrestle with disturbingly intractable economic problems. Their first tentative essays in peacekeeping may point the way towards greater independence in the foreign policy realm, but they will pick their opportunities with care and the problematic quality of the coalition argues against many foreign policy initiatives in the short term.

The Korean impasse suggests fewer and fewer options and greater and greater levels of danger. A radical departure in negotiating procedures may be necessary in order to move beyond the nuclear issue and address the economic dynamic which underlies the DPRK's difficulties and the peninsular imbalance. Until such time as the economic asymmetry between the two Koreas is addressed there will probably be little if any movement on the nuclear issue and until there is movement on that issue there will be little if any room for the application of traditional arms control and verification processes.

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RESOLVING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: A SOUTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

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RESOLVING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: A SOUTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

Man K. Nam

The Real State of North Korea's Nuclear-Card Game

The IAEA and several countries decisively concerned over the North Korean nuclear issue have failed to force a defiant North Korea to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). The frustrating task of negotiating with the inflexible and dogmatic North Koreans is nothing new to the outside world, which has had enough of it. But this time the Communist regime in Pyongyang is going too far in trying the international community's patience which is wearing thin over this most sensitive matter.

North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 but delayed concluding the obligatory safeguard accord for many years. In March 1993 the North threatened to pull out of the regime subsequently, " suspending" its withdrawal indefinitely from the NPT. Meanwhile, Pyongyang sought to use the standoff as a sort of brinkmanship to induce Washington into political bargaining for early recognition and rapprochement. The US and South Korea tried to use the carrot and stick approaches alternately. Actually, neither government came near to using the stick for fear of unleashing a military conflict or for lack of the consent of Beijing, which is opposed to any kind of sanctions against Pyongyang.

The bottom line has been that North Korea has gotten away with its tactics of blackmail and stalling in order to earn time to proceed with its nuclear program. The time gained brought with it increased diplomatic leverage in dealing with its negotiating partners, who were left with no alternative but one of appeasement. It could be concluded now that the favorite delaying tactics of the North Koreans has paid off handsomely. The whole process of North Korea's playing of the nuclear card was devious, repititious and provocative, reminiscent of its tactics played against the United Nations forces in the two year-long truce negotiations that finally concluded the Korean War.

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It seems that North Korea is not ready to return to its status prior to the declaration of withdrawal from the NPT. Even assuming that the North returns to the NPT, it is believed that the North, as long as it has a will, could continue technically its nuclear program, just like the case in which Iraq has pursued its development of nuclear bombs while receiving IAEA insepctions. On the other hand, there is a possibility that North Korea might already have more than one bomb which it conceals at secret places. After all, any kind of concession or incentive from the U.S. through the Washington-Pyonyang high-level talks aimed at bringing the North back to the NPT and to IAEA inspections will not change the basic nuclear poliy of Kim Il-sung.

Essence and Implications of the North Korean Nuclear Problem

North Korea is belived to have started its nuclear program in order to obtain a means for the survival of its regime, and for military superiority over the South. The logic of this assumption derives from the understanding that Kim's regime is known to recognize nuclear weapons as a unique way to be able to overcome its varied crises. In addition to those purposes, the North is now using its nuclear card to pursue interests in economic and diplomatic areas. Pyongyang currently denies accepting IAEA inspections in order to cover up the real status of its nuclear program, an action which diminishes the possibility of peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.

The reason why the North denies opening its nuclear program to outside inspections in any case is sufficiently explained in the follwing simple logical statements: (1) if the fact it already has bombs is disclosed, then it will face international pressure to remove them and their related facilities; (2) if its capability for developing nuclear weapons is shown to be short of getting a nuclear bomb, then the utility of its long-lasting nuclear card will decrease or disappear immediately.

Acquiring its own nuclear weapons would give North Korea great military and diplomatic advantages. First, regarding strategy toward South Korea, (1) the Pyongyang regime could achieve an effective miliatry superiority over the South, (2) it could strengthen its position at the inter-Korean negotiations by the power of force, and (3) it could create an atmosphere of nuclear horror and social unrest in the South Korean society.

Regarding the regime survival, (1) North Korean possessing nuclear weapons in its hands could offset its limitations in a conventional arms race with the South, and (2) it could demonstrate its will and capability for self-reliant defense. Regarding diplomatic uses, (1) Pyongyang could use its nuclear card to improve relations between the U.S. and North Korea, (2) it could induce an end to the Team Spirit military exercises and withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea, and

(3) it could influence nonaligned nations including Third World countries.

On the other hand, even if Pyongyang acquires only a few bombs, South Korea might face rather fatal disadvanges. In terms of inter-Korean relations, (1) all of the agreements signed between South and North Korea including "the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation" and "the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" might be come invalid and (2) the North-South Korean dialogue might in turn be blocked.

Militarily, (1) nuclear armed North Korean forces might broaden gap between the armed forces of the South and the North and result in accelerating the arms race on the peninsula, (2) it increases the possibility of the outbreak of war in response to imposing international sanctions to the North, and (3) it blocks foreign military assistance to South Korea in the event of military conflict. In terms of international and regional security, (1) allowing North Korea to possess nuclear weapons might paralize the NPT and accelerate nuclear proliferation over the rest of the world, and (2) it could lead to Japan's nuclear arming and militarization resulting in a fundamental modification of the security structure in Northeast Asia and trigger a regional arms race.

Many Korean experts analyzing the Kim's regime have a firm belief that Pyongyang will never give up its nuclear program until it concludes that the nuclear issue jeopardizes its survival. These experts also show some observations on the North Korean nuclear problem: (1) the sense that North Korea is using the nuclear issue only to pursue diplomatic interests might be incorrect and a misunderstanding of the real state of the Pyongyang regime; (2) North Korea's intention for possessing nuclear weapons is part of the supreme strategy for the regime survival; (3) if Kim Il-sung decides to abandon the North' nuclear program and his strategy for liberation of the southern part, he will one day lose the absolute devotion and faith of his people; (4) immediately after the Pyongyang regime accepts capitalism to pursue peaceful coexistence with South Korea, the pillars of the Juche ideology will crumble and the regime collapse.

The Korean experts' perspective and observations described above might well provide the policy-makers of the U.S. and other Northeast Asian countries some important insights on how to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. It is believed that if nuclear policy-makers want to have correctly understand the essence of the North's nuclear issue, then they must grasp the origin of the North Korean regime and the characteristics of the "Juche ideology" and should analyze Kim Il-sung from the viewpoint of his Juche ideology, not just from their own frames of mind.

Problems and Prospects of Recent Nuclear Negotiations

Attempting to solve the nuclear problem posed by Pyongyang, the U.S. has been playing the world's leadership role as usual. Technically, it has been acting under the U.N. Charter Obligation for containing nuclear proliferation while representing the international community. In the latest development, an agreement was reached with Pyongyang through informal talks in New York on resumption of IAEA-North Korea negotiations for inspections of 7 declared nuclear sites in North Korea. In return, South Korea and the U.S. were to announce the cancellation of their annual Team Spirit military exercise. Upon completion of the IAEA inspections and an exchange of special envoys by the two Koreas, the third round of US-N.K. talks was planed to be held.

The resumption of IAEA-North Korea negotiations, won after 1 year of contacts with North Korea, simply retumed to the situation to where it was a year ago, when the IAEA first found evidence of North Korean deception. In the one year during which no international inspections occurred, it is needless to say that North Korea was supposedly diverting some amount of plutonum for military purposes without any restrictions. Pyongyang has still barred the IAEA officials from conducting special inspections of the suspected nuclear sites that North Korea has not declared part of its atomic program. North Korea again has rejected IAEA demands for unfettered inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities.

Most of the North Korean objections involve the definition of the modalities and procedures for inspections of nuclear sites at Yongbyon that harbor spent reactor fuel laden with plutonium, as well as nearby facilities for reprocessing the fuel to separate the plutonium. North Korea insists that Pyongyang has only "suspended temporarily" its March 1993 decision to withdraw from the NPT and has not yet fully returned to the pact so that it is not subject to regular nuclear safeguard checks by the IAEA. North Korea also points out that it has agreed with the U.S. to allow spot inspections which are needed merely to guarantee the continuity of safeguards conforming to its special position.

Particularly, North Korea's rejection of the IAEA demand for special inspections of the two undeclared nuclear sites in Yongbyon, which the IAEA has been demanding for a year, hints significant and negative implications to the futue of IAEA safeguards and the NPT. From South Korea's position come some of lingering doubts: (1) will Pyongyang ever agree to the IAEA special inspections on the two undeclared sites and prove transparency to the satisfaction of the IAEA inspectors? (2) how successful will be the negotiations on bilateral inspections through the exchange of special envoys between the two Koreas? (3) will the bilateral inspections ever lead to the ultimate goal of the denuclearization of the peninsula?

North Korea again has showed a double-sided tactic at recent negotiations regarding the IAEA

inspections. On one hand, the North intends to avoid international sanctions for the moment by beginning negotiations with the IAEA, and on the other hand it wants to sustain "nuclear suspicion" at the maximum level. This double-sided tactic is the same as that North Korea has repeatedly played for the past year. Whenever the Pyongyang regime was in a critical situation, it pursued an advantage that worsened the situation. The withdrawal from the NPT when the North faced strong pressure is a typical case of such deceptive tactics. In addition, for the last two years that the IAEA safeguards have come into effect, North Korea has rejected not only special inspections but also ad-hoc inspections, which are the first step in IAEA inspections. The North misled the IAEA by emphasizing an irrelevant point: "to make progress on the North Korean nuclear problem is only to resume ad-hoc inspections."

Conflicting positions between Pyongyang, who strongly denies special inspections, and the IAEA, who strongly demands special inspections, seem unresolvable through negotiations. Not until those inspections are conducted is there much chance for answering the two most important questions about North Korea's nuclear program: (1) how much plutonium, the element at the core of nuclear weapons, has North Korea already produced? and (2) are American intelligence agencies right when they say that Kim's scientists have likely already pieced together crude nuclear weapons? Unfortunately, we know nothing more than we knew last spring, the period when North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and halted all inspections.

In reality, it will be virtually impossible to be sure that the bomb project has been halted, much less reversed. North Koreans are known to be master tunnel builders. Several tunnels big enough to drive tanks through were secretly dug underneath the heavily armed demilitarized zone in apparent preparations for eventual attacks on South Korea, and most experts presume some part of the North Korean nuclear sites are underground as well. Both Americans and South Koreans must take a pragmatic view on the nuclear inspection issue: Finding a bomb in an environment like that would be a little like trying to find a subway token dropped somewhere downtown.

Principles for Solving the North Korean Nuclear Impasse

Psychoanalyzing Pyongyang's intentions has been fashionable among the observers of the isolated regime. How not to antagonize Pyongyang so that it will not explode? The "doves" are worried about Pyongyang's feelings, and want to bring it out of isolation. Critics ask why the Americans talk with the North Koreans without the direct participation of the South Koreans?

In January 1992, just after the two Koreas signed the bilateral nonaggression agreement, Washington began to deal directly with Pyongyang supposedly to eliminate doubts regarding the

latter's intentions. Pyongyang eagerly began to negotiate for concessions from Washington, opting for maximum use of its nuclear card. But one must not forget that the most important goal Pyongyang has sought since 1953, the year of the Armistice and the establishment of the ROK-US defense treaty, has been to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.

In his New Year's speech for 1994, Kim Il-sung again criticized South Korea and did not fail to point out South Korea as "an enemy." Then he only stressed the need for direct talks with Washington without saying a word about inter-Korean dialogue. According to Kim's New Year speech, it is believed that North Korea might utilize the inter-Korean dialogue as a means to continue Pyongyang-Washington high-level talks. Therefore, South Korea should make efforts to prepare proper countermeasures by analyzing the North's intention with a calm mind rather than having optimistic prospects for the possible improvement in North-South relations.

Early this year the South Korean government reaffirmed its position that a third round of Pyongyang-Washington high-level talks are possible only after Pyongyang receives nuclear inspections by the IAEA and show a sincere attitude toward inter-Korean talks. South Korea must continue close consultations with the Clinton administration of the United States. Relating to the joint efforts between the U.S. and South Korea, Sam Nunn, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, visited South Korea in January 1994 and told reporters in a press conference in Seoul that both the U.S. and ROK need to establish two goals for solving the North Korean nuclear problem: (1) to preserve peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; and (2) to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state. He also stressed that the ROK and the U.S. must pursue two goals and should not choose between the goals to sacrifice one at the expense of the other.

These two ultimate goals for ROK/US nuclear policy toward North Korea seem desirable as long as they can be accomplished. However, reality would not allow us to achieve those two goals to the same level of satisfaction. It must be emphasized that the second goal, "preventing North Korea from becoming a nuclear state," should be considered as having a higher priority than the first goal. This consideration is out of the question due to the following simple logic: (1) if North Korea becomes a nuclear state, then stability on the Korean peninsula can not preserved; (2) if stability must be pursued preferentially, then the ROK/US will have no choice but to continue negotiations which have made no progress in the past. It is very clear that only resorting to negotiation might result in allowing North Korea to become a nuclear state in the not too distant future. A well prepared coalition approach to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state is the best guaranttees to secure everlasting stability on the Korean peninsula.

Sam Nunn also indicated preconditions for improving diplomatic relations between the U.S. and North Korea: (1) Pyongyang's full compliance with the safegauards of the IAEA; (2) implementation of the inter-Korean Declaration of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; (3) be a UN member nation responsible for international obligations, such as settlement of the terrorism and missile exports issues. These preconditions coincide pretty much with the position recently reaffirmed by South Korea.

Solving the nuclear problem seems not to be fully secured only by carrying out the preconditions and improvement of relations between the U.S. and North Korea. This is because a strategy to resolve the nuclear problem will depend upon whether or not Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons. If the fact of North Korea's possessing nuclear bombs is disclosed through the IAEA inspections or from reliable sources of information, then the removal of nuclear bombs must be included within the scope of a nuclear-resolving strategy.

A Strategy to Stop the North Korean Nuclear Program

The strong will of the U.S. to stop the North Korean nuclear program and Kim Il-sung's deep attachmant to acquire nuclear weapons are on collision course. Sooner or later the South Koreans might face the special situation of either having to cope with nuclear armed North Korean forces, or having to become involved in tense circumstances for imposing international sanctions against North Korea.

According to estimates of North Korea's nuclear capability given by the U.S. and other regional states' intelligence agencies, a recent development in the nuclear issue is very pessimistic. The agencies assert that it is already too late for international community to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state, and now it is time for the IAEA to endeavour to restrict any further development of nuclear bombs.

The intelligence agencies' assertions seem to gain credibility in light of following: (1) the IAEA concluded North Korea has already made enough plutonium to produce at least one nuclear bomb, (2) the Clinton administration recently emphasized pressing for new IAEA inspections(i.e., special inspections) to collect imformation on the amount of plutonium already produced and to block any further plutonium production in future. After all, in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem, the ROK/US should consider both cases- i,e., North Korea not possessing nuclear weapons and North Korea possessing nuclear weapons- until the transparency of Pyongyang's nuclear program is secured through IAEA special inspections.

It is very important for policy makers to estimate what course of action Pyongyang will most

likely take regarding its nuclear issue in the near future. Possible courses of action are divided into two groups: when the North does not possess nuclear weapons, and when the North already possesses nuclear weapons. Each course of action must be viewed in two conditions: without UN sanctions and with UN sanctions.

Suppose North Korea progresses with its nuclear development program. The possible courses of action Pyongyang may take include: (1) refusing nuclear inspections(i.e., comprehensive inspections for the 7 declared sites plus special inspections for the 2 undeclared sites) by the IAEA and continuing its secret nuclear program; (2) accepting IAEA inspections while taking concessions from the U.S. but continuing its secret nuclear program; (3) accepting IAEA inspections while taking concessions but stopping its secret nuclear program; (4) withdrawing from the NPT when UN sanctions are about to be imposed and continuing its secret nuclear program; (5) when UN sanctions are imposed, accepting IAEA inspections and stopping its secret nuclear program; (6) when UN sanctions are imposed, accepting IAEA inspections but continuing its secret nuclear program; (7) when UN sanctions are imposed, withdrawing from the NPT and accelerating its secret nuclear program.

On the other hand, suppose North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. The possible courses of action Pyongyang may take include: (1) refusing IAEA inspections and maintaining a "neither confirm nor deny(NCND)" policy; (2) accepting IAEA inspections while taking concession but maintaining a NCND policy; (3) withdrawing from the NPT when UN sanctions are about to be imposed and maintain a NCND policy; (4) when UN sanctions are imposed, accepting IAEA inspections but maintaining a NCND policy; (5) when UN sanctions are imposed, accepting IAEA inspections and destroying its nuclear weapons and facilities; (6) when UN sanctions are imposed, withdrawing from the NPT but maintaining a NCND policy; (7) when UN sanctions are imposed, withdrawing from the NPT and declaring it possesses nuclear weapons.

It is unsure how North Korea will respond before UN sanctions are about to be imposed and after UN sanction are imposed. North Korea's course of action is quite up to Kim Il-sung. The critical variables which could modify Kim Il-sung are considered as the country's internal problems, concessions from the U.S., intenational pressure. North Korea's internal problems are closely related with the concessions from the U.S. which Pyongyang persistantly has been asking the U.S. concerning the North's political, security, economical interests.

The possible courses of action the ROK/US could take are as follows: (1) induce Pyongyang to accept IAEA inspections by providing incentives to North Korea in advance(a strategy of concession-driven inducement); (2) provide incentives after the North accepts IAEA inspections

(a strategy of incentive-driven persuation); (3) exchange Pyongyang's acceptance of IAEA inspections for providing incentives at the same time(a strategy of trade-off); (4) refer the issue to the UNSC(a strategy of negative incentives); (5) impose UN embargoes and other trade sanctions supplemented by increasing the military pressure on North Korea(a strategy of soft coersion); (6) contemplate military options(a strategy of hard coersion).

Economically, Pyongyang is in dire need of help. The question is whether the North Korean regime sees its problems as primarily economic and whether it believes that plausible levels of assistance, trade and investment from South Korea, Japan and the U.S. would enhance its prospects for suvival. One might argue that such contacts with the outside world could just as easily be fatal to the regime. The North Korean leadership might recognize that opening its doors to reform will invite collapse of its regime. Pyongyang seems to seriously face a dilemma in dealing with its nuclear card mainly aimed at extending the regime's life.

International sanctions would require Chinese cooperation, which cannot be taken for granted. On estimating possible results from economic sanctions, (1) sanctions would lead the North Koreans to accept the full range of IAEA inspections; (2) sanctions could cause the regime to collapse or to lash out against South Korea; (3) the regime could withdraw from the NPT and press ahead with an expanded nuclear program unhindered by any inspections. At that point, we would have to choose between (1) retaining economic sanctions and taking the necessary defensive steps, and (2) the use of force.

Use of sticks by decision of the UN Security Council might have better prospects achieving the goal for resolving the nuclear problem by setting back the program or producing a more compliant North Korea depending on how much and how effectively it is applied. However, it brings the risk of triggering a war on the peninsula. Ultimately, the risks of allowing North Korea to continue its nuclear weapons program must be compared with the risks of adopting an objective that may require the use of increasingly tougher measures.

Sould we remain committed to the ultimate goal, we will have to rely increasingly on sticks. In particular, we must realize that time is not working in our favor, given the assessment that North Korean has diverted some plutonium from its civilian reactor or has already developed at least one nuclear bomb. Thus, while we must be ready to react to any provocative new development, we must also set a deadline for North Korean agreement to IAEA special as well routine inspections.

Conclusion

The "North Korean nuclear problem" is real, serious, and unlikely to be solved successfully by a continuation of the current policies. To pursue a certain strategy successfully, a coalition approach is essential. The most key players are the United States and South Korea. Other major players whose cooperation or acquiescence would be required are China, Japan and Russia. Particularly, the role of China would be great.

However, it is possible that China believes that the North Korean nuclear program is not of a serious concern in the long run because the regime is likely to disappear soon in any case. Thus, we need as good an understanding as possible of Chinese reasoning to formulate a strategy that would result in their cooperation or acquiescence should we decide to seek sticks.

In the short term, we should aim at guaranteeing the transparency of North Korea's nuclear program to prevent dramatic developments that could lead to renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula. But, how effectively can the transparency of North Korea's nuclear program be guranteed as long as the Pyongyang regime does not agree to all the inspections the IAEA is asking for?

Do we need to wait until the current North Korean regime disintegrates as the result of decay or Kim Il-sung's death? There would be a distinct risk that North Korea could develop a few operartional nuclear weapons before the regime collapse and there is no assurance that a post-Kim regime would be willing or able to give up its nuclear weapons. After all, if we do not maintain a firm attitude toward North Korea in connection with the nuclear issue, then we would allow "North Korea to become a nuclear state", which is only a matter of time.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS BUILD-UPS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC[1]

Shannon Selin[2]

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two years there have been numerous media reports of an "arms race" or at least an "arms stroll" in Asia Pacific. Although the end of the Cold War has virtually extinguished the prospect of the threat or use of force among Asia Pacific's major powers, the region has failed to parallel the global downward trend in military spending and arms acquisition. China's Su-27s, Taiwan's F-16s, Indonesia's East German ships -- these are just the more prominent examples of a region-wide strengthening of arsenals.

Analysts disagree over whether, and about which acquisitions, the West should be concerned. Some argue that regional force modernization is proceeding at a modest pace and scale, and that postures are essentially defensive. Others argue that Asia Pacific states are developing a growing ability to project military power and that this should be of concern in a region rife with historical animosities, territorial and jurisdictional disputes, ethnic tensions, and uncertainty about the future nature and strategy of leadership in several key players.

What is happening in the region? About what should we be concerned? Can anything be done to allay these concerns? And what are the implications for regional security, and for the incipient security dialogue processes in the region (and vice versa)? These questions are explored briefly in this paper.

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE REGION?

While defence spending is notoriously difficult to measure and not all arms acquisitions have been confirmed, one can make some general observations.

Defence Spending

Asia's share of world military expenditure has doubled over the last decade. This reflects in part a decline in defence spending in the US, Europe and the former Soviet Union, but it is also the result of an increase in regional defence spending, particularly in Northeast Asia. Between 1982 and 1991, real defence spending grew by some 47% in South Korea, 46% in Japan, 41% in North Korea and 38% in Taiwan. China's estimated defence expenditure has increased by more than 50%. In Southeast Asia, the picture is mixed. Measured in constant dollars, defence spending *fell* by 32% in Indonesia over the 1982-91

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period, by 37% in Malaysia and by 30% in the Philippines. However, it rose by 32% in Thailand and a whopping 90% in Singapore. Looking at Southeast Asian spending in the 1987-91 period -- a time when military budgets elsewhere around the globe tended to drop -- all but Indonesia (down 13%) posted a real growth: Malaysia by 9%, the Philippines by 26%, Thailand by 15% and Singapore by 34%.[3]

Moving into the 1990s, real defence budgets continue to increase by between 5 and more than 10 percent in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, China, South Korea and Taiwan. Japan's rate of growth has fallen by more than half since the late 1980s (to 2% in 1993, its lowest increase in 33 years) but still represents the largest absolute increase in the region. It has been estimated that defence expenditures in East Asia and Australia amounted to some US$105 billion in 1992 and will increase to more than $130 billion by 1995.[4]

Although growing, the level of defence spending in Southeast Asia remains modest compared to that in Northeast Asia. In 1993, the relevant figures in the former ranged from roughly US$1 billion in the Philippines to $3 billion in Thailand, as opposed to $12 billion in South Korea, an estimated $12-24 billion in China and $40 billion in Japan.[5]

Arms Acquisitions

Much of the increase in Asia Pacific defence budgets has gone directly to capital acquisition programs, as opposed to operating costs and salaries. Generally, the growth in arsenals has been import-led. Asia's share of world expenditure on arms transfers rose from 15.5% in 1982 to 34% in 1991.[6] There has also been an increase in domestic arms production, typically under licensing agreements, as the industrial base of regional states has become more developed and states have become keen to promote defence self-reliance and to generate employment.

Asia Pacific is such a vast region that it can be misleading to talk about trends in arms acquisition. Still, patterns can be identified. Recent acquisition programs place a distinct priority on the development of naval and maritime air capabilities. States are acquiring more capable surface combatants and submarines, as well as anti-ship missiles and long-range aircraft configured for maritime operations.[7]

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[3]*SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 261.

[4]Desmond Ball, "Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls," Paper prepared for the ASEAN ISIS Seventh Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 6-9, 1993, pp. 2-3.

[5]*The Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993); Chinese estimate from "Russia muscles in," *The Economist*, July 17, 1993, p. 33.

[6]*SIPRI Yearbook 1992*, p. 308.

[7]Figures in the following sub-sections come from Ball, "Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls"; "South East Asian Naval Programmes, Part II," *Naval Forces*, Vol. XIII, No. 6 (1992); "South East Asian Naval Programmes, Part III," *Naval Forces*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1993); *The Military Balance 1993-1994*; Andrew Mack, "Arms Proliferation in the

Modern surface combatants

Asian navies are slated to procure some 200 major surface combatants through the 1990s, with about another 50 under serious consideration. This includes a Thai helicopter carrier, a potential Chinese aircraft carrier, more than 100 new frigates, and over 100 corvettes and ocean patrol vessels in the 1,000-1,500 ton range. It is also likely that more than 200 new minor surface combatants (e.g., corvettes, fast attack craft, missile patrol boats) will have been procured in the region by the end of the decade.

Submarines

East Asian navies currently possess about 100 submarines (though many of China's and North Korea's *Romeo*-class subs are no longer operational). This number will grow by some 36 during the 1990s. In Northeast Asia, Japan is acquiring as many as 12 submarines, South Korea at least 8, and Taiwan is seeking some 6-10. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia -- currently the only ASEAN possessor of submarines, with two Type 209s -- has ordered 3 more from Germany for delivery in 1995-96. Malaysia has decided to acquire 2-4 submarines later in the decade and Thailand and Singapore are seriously considering acquiring small numbers. Australia is acquiring 6 highly capable Swedish-designed *Collins*-class submarines (built in Australia).

Anti-ship missiles

The number of modern anti-ship missile launchers in the region -- currently around 1,600 -- is likely to more than double through the 1990s, as most states are equipping their new surface combatants with Harpoons, Exocets or indigenous versions (e.g., the Chinese C-801 and the Taiwanese *Hsiung Feng* II). Most of the new fighter aircraft and long-range maritime patrol aircraft being introduced to the region are also being fitted with anti-ship missile capabilities.

Multi-role fighter aircraft

It has been estimated that Asia Pacific countries will procure 3,000 new fighters and strike aircraft during the 1990s. Most of these will be deployed by China (about 550), Taiwan (466), Japan (400) and South Korea (160). In addition to new planes, existing fighters and strike aircraft are being upgraded with new mission avionics and armaments.[8]

The aircraft being acquired are extremely capable, suited to maritime attack roles as well as to air-superiority manoeuvres. In most cases they are F-16s,[9] though F-18s (Malaysia, Australia), F-15s (Japan has 153), and MiG-29s (Malaysia has reportedly ordered

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Asia-Pacific: Causes and Prospects for Control," *Working Paper* 1992/10, Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, December 1992.

[8]Ball, "Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls," p. 17.

[9]In addition to Taiwan's 150, Singapore has eight F-16A/Bs with a further 10 on order; Indonesia has 12 F-16As and may be seeking as many as 36 more; Thailand has 18 with 18 on order, South Korea has 36 F-16Cs and is adding 120 F-16C/Ds.

18) are also on the order books. Australia's F-111s (22 acquired, 18 on order) are the most potent long-range strike aircraft in the region. All new Southeast Asian fighters are being equipped with Exocet or Penguin anti-ship missiles. China's new Su-27s and B-7 fighter-bombers are being configured for anti-ship operations. Strike range and capability is typically being further enhanced by the acquisition of air-to-air refuelling capabilities and some form of airborne early warning.

Maritime surveillance aircraft

The number of maritime surveillance aircraft in the region, such as P-3s, will also close to double under present acquisition programs. More than 120 new aircraft are planned: Japan is seeking as many as 74 P-3Cs; South Korea another 8-10. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei are all modernizing their airborne surface surveillance capabilities.

Other

Other trends include the development or significant expansion of:[10]

- electronic warfare capabilities;
- strategic and tactical intelligence systems, many concerned with ocean surveillance as well as with more general signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection;
- national command, control and communications systems; and
- rapid deployment forces.

Summary

In general, Asia Pacific navies and air forces are getting more equipment, while armies are getting less. Countries are tending to base their forces on modern, relatively high-tech weapon systems rather than on manpower. There is an increasingly outward-looking focus to forces, with the introduction of weapons of greater reach and lethality. This could be described as a movement in the direction of power (or force) projection capabilities, with "power projection" understood as the capability to strike distant military targets or the capability to put the assets or territory of another state at risk. However, most regional states would argue that the same weapon systems can -- and are intended to -- be used as counter-offensive capabilities, in contingencies.

To determine whether states are plugging gaps in defence or preparing to maraud about the Pacific (or something in between), it is helpful to take a look at factors prompting the acquisitions. Causes can give clues to intentions, which can provide guides to what ought to worry us and what ought not. In addition, causes can provide clues to potential remedies.

If the dominant motive for arms acquisition in a particular region is the suspicion and mistrust between states, then confidence-building, verification and compliance measures would go some distance towards reducing this cause. If, however, the main motive stems from internal politics, then such measures

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[10]These are identified and discussed in Ball, "Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls."

are unlikely to stem proliferation (or even to be accepted).[11]

Causes

Different causes are important in different proportions in different countries. Nonetheless, the reasons behind most recent arms acquisitions in the Asia Pacific fall into the following, often linked, categories.

Uncertainty

The end of the Cold War has become a cliche to explain almost any development on the world stage since 1989, and Asia Pacific arms acquisitions are no exception. According to this argument, regional arms build-ups can be attributed at least in part to "uncertainty" accompanying the demise of the relatively stable US-USSR-China Cold War structure. With Russia momentarily out of the picture and the long-term US commitment appearing shaky, the restraints on possibilities for action by other regional powers, notably China and Japan, are less strong. States are bolstering their arsenals to contend with a less predictable strategic environment -- preparing to fill an anticipated "power vacuum" or to counter others filling.

While greater-than-usual uncertainty about the region's future power structure and security arrangements is undoubtedly conditioning thinking in Asia Pacific defence ministries, the extent to which it is driving current acquisition programs is less clear. Most weapons now entering service were ordered or planned before the end of the Cold War. The Southeast Asian naval build-up began in 1980. China's "green water" strategy was adopted in 1982. Northeast Asian arms expenditure has been overheated for at least a decade. One has to delve deeper than "uncertainty" to try to explain what is happening in the region.

Perception of US withdrawal

Breaking "uncertainty" into its constituent parts, the most germane factor is the US drawdown in Asia Pacific deployments -- both actual and anticipated. Notwithstanding US statements to the contrary, there is a widespread belief in Asian capitals that the US is not likely to have the will or the economic wherewithal to sustain its present military commitment to the region through the end of the century.[12] Countries are thus enhancing

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[11]Keith R. Krause, "The Compliance and Verification Aspects of Proliferation: An Action Plan for Policy-Relevant Research," in *Non-Proliferation in All its Aspects: Verification of Compliance Effectiveness,"* Workshop Proceedings, 21-22 December 1992, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto, p. 81.

[12]Department of Defense reports to Congress envisage a continued but reduced US naval and air presence in Asia Pacific throughout the decade and call for manpower withdrawals of 7,000 from US Forces in Korea, of 5,000 from US Forces in Japan and 2,000 from the Philippines in phase 1 (1990-92). Phase 2 of the Korean reductions, scheduled for 1993-95, have been postponed because of the North Korean nuclear threat. United States Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century* (Washington, April 1990) and *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress* (Washington, July 1992).

America's stated desire to play the role of a balancer rather than a policeman in the region is not particularly instructive. Does it mean, for example, that if China continues to increase its arsenal the US will

their own defence capabilities in the anticipation they will have to rely on them, not only in potential regional conflicts (e.g., the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan), but also in the routine patrol and early warning operations that the US would normally conduct.[13]

For most Asia Pacific states, increased self-reliance against regional contingencies requires independent surveillance, warning and intelligence capabilities to monitor regional developments, especially in the maritime approaches, as well as an ability to defend such approaches -- thus the emphasis on maritime strike capabilities. This is especially important for those with primarily non-offensive postures, such as Australia, Japan, China and Indonesia. As states move to greater self-reliance, there is a tendency to acquire a little bit of everything, without much thought as to how it might actually be employed -- the regional attitude towards procurements appearing to be that it is better to do something badly than not to do it at all.

Replacement and modernization

Many acquisitions in the region can be put down to the replacement or modernization of aging capabilities. Australia's *Collins*-class subs will replace six *Oberon*-class boats built in the 1960s; Malaysia's new frigates will replace boats also of that vintage; by the time Indonesia completes its three new submarines, its existing ones will be 15 years old. China's submarine designs date back to the mid-1970s and its fighter aircraft are decrepit. Inevitably, the replacements are much more capable than their predecessors, leading not only to a maintenance of force levels but also to a "ratcheting up" of capabilities.

Even if new acquisitions are primarily a question of maintaining force levels, the fact that force levels are being maintained -- i.e., are not going down -- says something about the regional security environment, or about other factors influencing defence decision-making.

Growth of maritime claims and threats

In Southeast Asia, the modernization process involves a shift in emphasis from largely land-based forces focused on internal security and counter-insurgency operations to naval and air forces focused on the protection of claimed offshore areas. The promulgation of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) by regional states, under the 1982 UN Convention on the

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increase its deployments in response? Not likely, as Japan and Taiwan are well aware.

[13]Again, this perception may have preceded the end of the Cold War, particularly in Southeast Asia. As far back as 1969, the "Nixon Doctrine" made clear that the US was no longer prepared to make an automatic commitment of conventional forces to its regional allies. This was followed by the 1975 withdrawal from South Vietnam, the withdrawal of US forces from bases in Thailand, and the demise of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1977, all of which added to the view that the US could not be relied upon to provide a permanent security umbrella in the region (see S.E. Speed, "The Evolving Maritime Environment in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Naval Procurements and Regional Security," Unpublished paper, University of British Columbia, December 1993, p. 15). China, Vietnam, and Indonesia adopted self-reliant defence policies in the 1960s. The other Southeast Asians began moving away from a colonial force structure in the 1980s, starting with building land forces; they are now moving to sea.

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has created overlapping claims over resource-rich areas that require surveillance and policing. The improved security of land borders and internal territories for all ASEANs except the Philippines means that countries have been able to turn their attention to protection of these claims, as well as to trade protection and to combatting the increasing level of illegal activity in the region's waterways -- piracy, smuggling, unlicensed fishing. These latter factors are important for Northeast Asian states as well, particularly Japan.

This necessarily involves an emphasis on maritime and air capabilities, particularly surveillance and constabulary operations (e.g., signals intelligence and sophisticated maritime reconnaissance aircraft). The potential for maritime conflict over EEZs or disputed offshore islands or illegal activity generates a requirement for longer-endurance surface combatants, platforms able to launch anti-ship missiles, and longer-range aircraft.

Economic prosperity

If uncertainty, UNCLOS and illegal activities have provided the need for extensive defence modernization programs, economic prosperity has supplied the resources. There has been a strong, positive correlation between defence expenditure and GNP growth in Asia Pacific over the last decade. Rapid rates of economic growth across the region have permitted increased spending on arms without any increase -- and in some cases with a decrease -- in the percentage of GDP allocated to defence spending.[14] While offshore protection has always been of concern in the region, in the past most states have not had the wherewithal to buy the type or numbers of sophisticated military equipment needed to patrol air and sea space. In fact, economic growth alone may have provided the incentive for the region's shopping spree, irrespective of need.

> Recent research indicates that the single best indicator for increased defence expenditure is...the rate of increase in GDP.... [This] helps explain situations like that in Thailand where the major perceived threat -- that from a Soviet-backed Vietnam -- collapsed, yet where defence expenditure continued to soar.... [N]ational economic decline may be most effective means to control rising defence budgets and hence arms imports.[15]

Favourable arms market

Asia Pacific states have money to spend on arms just at the time it is most advantageous to do so. It is a buyers' arms market, with a plentiful supply of surplus European arms and declining prices for advanced weapons. Russia, in particular, is trying to carve niche for itself in the regional market, offering very good prices (for example, a MiG-29 at less than half the price of an F-18), and accepting part payment in commodities rather

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[14]In fact, the rate of growth of defence spending has generally been less than the rate of growth of GNP so that defence spending as percentage of GNP has generally fallen over the past decade. e.g., In Indonesia fell from 3% in 1981 to 1.6% in 1991; in Malaysia fell from 5.8% in 1981 to 3.4% in 1991 and in Thailand fell from 3.8% in 1981 to 2.6% in 1991. Singapore rate fairly constant (6%).

[15]Mack, "Arms Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific: Causes and Prospects for Control," p. 3.

than cash.[16] But Russia is not the only eager seller. Britain, France and the US are keen to retain their traditional shares of the market, and the competition among suppliers means that buyers can acquire sophisticated weapons systems that Western states would once have been reluctant to sell.

Corruption

Greed is an oft-underestimated factor in regional weapons purchases. In a number of Asia Pacific countries, powerful individuals or groups can earn private revenue from arms transactions, leading to the purchase of weapons that make little strategic sense. For example, "service charges" from arms sellers to senior Thai military officials reportedly typically represent 13-17% of the deal.[17] Thailand is not alone -- generals in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and China are also believed to have benefitted from arms purchases.

National and armed service prestige

There is a psychological dimension to some recent arms purchases that could be described as "macho symbolism" or "toys for the boys." State-of-the-art weapon systems have a prestige value for military establishments. As the military plays a dominant role in decision-making in many regional states (e.g., South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, China), arms are acquired as a symbol of national power and resilience. In China, the military may be pushing for modern weapons as a reward for loyalty in the 1989 Tiananmen Square killings.

Technology acquisition and reverse engineering

In some cases, weapons are being acquired to gain new technologies that might be transferred to the civilian sector. China, for example, has acquired small numbers of certain systems for reverse engineering and technology transfer.[18]

Arms racing

It should be clear from the above that many Asia Pacific states are buying arms for reasons not directly related to what their neighbours are purchasing. There are some manifestations of arms racing; for example, Singapore's 1983 purchase of F-16s is thought to have in part spurred similar acquisitions by Indonesia and Thailand and stimulated Malaysia's interest in a strike fighter, but even here other considerations were relevant, including the importance of air defence and strike capabilities in enhanced self-reliance.

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[16]"Russia muscles in," *The Economist*, July 17, 1993, p. 33.

[17]See Kenneth Stier and Bao Anyou, "The Bitter Truth Behind Thailand's Khaki Commerce," *Asia, Inc.*, October 1992, pp. 34-36. They note, for example, that Thailand's F-16s made little sense given that the only air threat to the country came from Vietnam's obsolete US and Russian planes. "The important thing to remember when you sell to the Thai military is not what a weapon can do, it's how much it can produce in under-the-counter payments," says an unnamed arms-sales specialist quoted on p. 36.

[18]See Ball, "Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Region: Implications for Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls," p. 11.

ABOUT WHAT SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED?

Southeast Asia

Although the ASEAN countries are acquiring a relatively large amount of weaponry, they seem mainly preoccupied with being able to patrol and defend their coastal waters and EEZs. The ASEANs have a newfound ability to control proximate areas but are not yet able to operate at extended ranges from their home waters. They lack major surface warships in significant numbers, hardened shelters for their aircraft, and C3 for military forces in the field; none seem to have an interest in acquiring credible ASW capabilities. Indonesia's German ship purchase can reasonably be explained in terms of the requirements for presence and surveillance in vast archipelagic waters. Thailand's naval capabilities are still inadequate to provide coverage of the entire Thai coastline. Singapore -- the most capable -- limits its sea lane protection sphere to 500 miles, and this would be demanding enough.[19]

Some Southeast Asian purchases are less impressive than they sound. For example, Thailand's Chinese patrol frigates are poorly constructed out of cheap material. In addition, the ability of most ASEANS to take full advantage of their new-found capabilities is doubtful. As the range of weapons increases, the cost of operation tends to increase by a square and the difficulty of reaching one's target by a cube.[20] The "in operation" rates of Indonesian weapon systems is very low, with only about 10% of their F-16s in service at any one time. Singapore fares much better, at an estimated 70%, but even here the integration of new capabilities into existing forces has not always gone smoothly.

Though, on the whole, individual acquisitions do not pose a threat to regional stability, there are some troubling elements:

1. Thailand's navy is undergoing a major expansion that will give it the capability to go into deep waters, the hallmark purchase being a light helicopter carrier from Spain, expected to be delivered in 1997. While primarily a prestige item, the stated purpose of which ranges from protection of the western coasts to disaster relief in the south, the purchase worries other ASEANs and could condition Indian naval developments. The Navy has informally justified the carrier as allowing an intervention capability in the Spratlys, and is now talking of purchasing a second one.

2. The increasing number of vessels and aircraft operating in a relatively small area increases the risk of incidents and accidents. This is exacerbated by the fact that most Southeast Asians are not able to use their capabilities effectively. Although all regional navies are acquiring long-range anti-ship missiles, few have the capability for effective over-the-horizon targeting (e.g., the Harpoon has a 100 km range while shipborne radar has a 15 km range) and most do not have enough new missiles to

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[19]"Singapore's maritime forces have a strategic intent which is very much defensive, even if some of the equipment and tactical methods rely very much upon the tactical offensive." James Goldrick, "Implications for Southeast Asia and Australia," Unpublished paper, Sydney, Spring 1993, p. 13.

[20]Goldrick, "Implications for Southeast Asia and Australia," p. 7.

afford to practice with them, raising the prospect of miscalculation and error. Although a single incident is unlikely to create a conflagration when relations are good, there is a greater risk of crisis instability and inadvertent escalation when relations are bad.

3. Even if countries are interested only in protecting offshore assets, this can still cause problems where economic zones and territories are contested. What Malaysia regards as defensive with respect to the Spratlys may not seem so to China or the Philippines. Intentions may not always be clear. The Southeast Asians are putting a lot of money into highly capable air power, as the most cost-effective solution for defending maritime approaches. However, many of the new acquisitions have a strike capability that is well-suited to offensive operations.

Several purchases -- the Thai helicopter carrier, the Harpoons, the numbers of F-16s -- do not seem to be linked to identifiable policies or reasonable planning scenarios. They can often be explained by some of the "non-threat" causes listed earlier (corruption, prestige, money to spend, etc.). However, once in service, they can generate inter-state tensions and counter-acquisitions, due to the tendency to base planning on worst-case assumptions. The ASEANs do have misgivings about each other and about arms purchases, but do not want to point accusing fingers, at least publicly. To the extent the ASEANs have defined "threats," they tend to focus on action by another ASEAN member. While the prospect of the use of force is highly unlikely, arms acquisitions could sour relations and lead to lesser military incidents. Tensions are already resulting from the attempts by some countries to discern the purposes and intentions of their neighbours. For example, the espionage controversy which damaged relations between Malaysia and Singapore in late 1989 was reportedly due, least in part, to Singapore's efforts to collect information on a Malaysian arms deal with Britain.

Over the long term, there is the danger of a continuing spiral upwards -- a series of purchases not tied to what is strictly necessary, but bought "just-in-case" because there is underlying tension, others are buying and the money is there to spend. This is more likely to happen if Southeast Asian security is seen to be linked, as it is, with what is happening in Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia

China

Reasons to worry

In 1987, the PLA Navy embarked on an ambitious fleet modernization plan that aims at making it the dominant sea-going force in East Asia by the year 2000. The PLA's South Sea Naval Fleet has gone from 20 to more than 70 surface combatants within a

10-year period.[21] China is acquiring a new class of destroyer (the *Luhu*), upgraded versions of the *Luda*-class destroyers, a new class of missile frigates (*Jiangwei*), and new classes of resupply and amphibious assault ships, capable of sustaining operations farther from shore and for longer periods. Reports of Chinese ambitions to acquire an aircraft carrier have been in the media for the past two years: either by buying the Varyag under construction in the Ukraine or by transferring a carrier from the Russian Pacific Fleet or by building a 40,000-50,000-ton carrier in China. None of these have been confirmed and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announced in October 1992 that China had abandoned plans to buy a carrier. However, it is clear that the Navy has not dropped a carrier from its wish list.

China has purchased at least 24 and possibly up to 72 Su-27 *Flanker* long-range strike fighters from Russia. This is the first truly modern combat aircraft in China's inventory, with a combat radius of 1,500 km and fuel capacity for an over 4,000 km range. China has also acquired from Russia 24 MiG-31 *Foxhound* interceptor fighters, with the possibility of manufacture under licence of some 300 more, and is said to have ordered SA-10 surface-to-air missiles (claimed to have an anti-ballistic missile capability). Other purchases include long-range early-warning radar systems and a small number of 11-76 Mainstay airborne warning and control aircraft. The Chinese have also reportedly talked to the Russians about acquiring supersonic Tu-22 *Backfire* bombers.[22] China is also producing locally (with some outside technical assistance) the F-7 (a MiG-21 variant), the Q-5 (a MiG-19 variant) and Chinese-designed fighters such as the J-8.[23]

As the PLA Navy and Air Force become more capable of operating in the Western Pacific, their deployments show an intention to do so. Some of the Su-27s are based on Hainan Island, where they would greatly aid air cover in a contingency in the Spratlys, some 1,000 km away. China's ability to project power in the South China Sea has been enhanced with the construction of an airbase (capable of supporting Su-27 operations) and anchorages (for three frigate-sized vessels) on Woody Island in the Paracels and the acquisition of a mid-air refuelling capability for its naval air force. Three *Romeo*-class submarines are reported to have been placed on station in the Spratlys. China's Naval Marine Corps holds periodic exercises in the Hainan, Paracel and Spratly Islands, during which their main missions are to seize landing points, defend islets, engage in submarine incursions and resist landing operations. One marine unit, trained for operations in a tropical environment, is based on Hainan Island.[24] Taiwan claims that China is placing more and better equipped forces opposite it, now that they have been freed from the Sino-Russian border. The Chinese

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[21]"South East Asian Naval Programmes, Part III," *Naval Forces*, Vol.XIV, No. 1 (1993), p. 22.

[22]*The Military Balance 1993-1994*, p. 148; Desmond Ball, "China's Disturbing Arms Build-up," *The Independent Monthly*, February 1993, pp. 23-24.

[23]Young Koo Cha, "The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry and Regional Arms Control Regimes in Northeast Asia: A South Korean Perspective," Paper prepared for delivery at the Third Workshop on Advanced Weaponry in the Developing World, American Association for the Advancement of Science, February 25-28, 1993, p. 10.

[24]"South East Asian Naval Programmes, Part 1," *Naval Forces*, Vol.XIII, No. 5 (1992), p. 33.

are also modernizing soldiers and tactics in line with Gulf War lessons. They are placing more emphasis on night exercises, training on dissimilar ground, and combined arms operations.

These activities are more troubling in the context of China's apparent unwillingness to relinquish the use of force in pursuing its territorial claims in the region. In February 1992, China proclaimed a law claiming the Spratlys as sovereign Chinese territory, including the airspace and seabed; it also reserved the right to use military force to prevent any violations of its waters.

To the west, in return for assisting with the construction of naval bases in Myanmar, China has reportedly received access to all of Yangon's existing and planned ports, including a base on Hanggyi Island in the Bassein River as well as to a site for a monitoring station on Coco Island, just north of India's Andaman Islands. This could give China access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, and provoke a build-up of Indian garrisons now stationed in the Andaman and Nicobar island chains neighbouring Myanmar and Indonesia.

The Chinese arms build-up is likely to continue. China's military budget continues to increase at a greater rate than its rapid economic growth. Even if defence spending ceases to rise as a percentage of GNP; the sheer size of China's GNP and its rate of growth means that a lot of money is available for new equipment (particularly as PLA manpower drops). In addition to the PLA's allocated portion of the central government budget, the PLA is raising its own funds through arms sales and extensive commercial operations and is able to spend these on whatever equipment it wishes. The Chinese believe that they deserve the equipment of a major power, and regard a strong, modern military as a necessary guarantor of their recent economic achievements. The development of strong capabilities for deployment in the East and South China Seas is regarded as necessary to support Chinese claims to disputed islands and surrounding resources.

> More generally, Chinese leaders view many post-Cold War developments in the Asia Pacific region as forming a common pattern of encirclement, threatening to strangle China in much the same way as Western actions did at the turn of the century. The growth of Japanese defence capabilities, the arms build-up in Taiwan, the opposition to China's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and the warming of US-Indian relations are all seen as part of a concerted encirclement strategy which can only be countered by strengthening China's offensive capabilities.[25]

Reasons not to worry

Although China's armed forces are the largest in the region, they are technologically one of the most obsolete. Many Chinese military units are not motorized and still rely on equipment that was used during World War II. Communication and transportation links are limited and outdated. China is not buying equipment in quantities large enough to make a substantial difference in the near term.

China's posture is not as disturbing as it could be. The PLA Navy remains

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[25]Ball, "China's Disturbing Arms Build-up," pp. 23-24.

essentially a coastal rather than a blue-water fleet. The Navy's mission profiles are organized around the country's 'peripheral defence' concept, in which the armed forces are expected to engage in limited retaliation, followed by seizing the initiative along the country's borders. It is essentially a sea denial rather than a sea control posture. The South Sea Fleet is not the most modern of the three Chinese fleets but instead is composed primarily of older classes of destroyers and frigates. The number of planes China can put on its Woody Island strip is not large. The Navy has not been developing the fleet train (vessels that provide the fuel, ammunition and stores) to operate at a long distance and for long periods away from its home ports. Now, from a fixed base, Chinese aircraft could barely make it to Malaysia and back. They do not have the air range to cover all of the South China Sea. China's three IL-76 heavy cargo planes give it the ability to move larger quantities of troops and equipment, but they would still need tremendous numbers of these to have an effect (e.g., the US in Panama needed every C141 to move a brigade). There is no evidence of Chinese para-training operations.

Chinese servicemen lack the training and skills necessary to successfully operate much of their new equipment. It is not clear that China has an air-to-air refuelling capability; even if it does, the PLA Air Force can barely fly planes close to one another. To give an indication of just how far behind other Asia Pacific militaries the PLA is, the military press brags about the first deployment of a unit by a civilian aircraft. China's main experience up to now has been with ground force operations, and the PLA's mindset remains essentially geared to land rather than sea. Even if China acquires an aircraft carrier, China has little experience with shipborne aviation.

Chinese equipment is poorly maintained. The Chinese typically do not buy service contracts when they buy new equipment, and they lack the trained technicians (and the schools to train technicians) to repair equipment themselves. Chinese-produced equipment is often shoddily made. For example, the engines of F-7 fighter bombers are reportedly good for only 150 to 200 flying hours before they needed replacement or overhauling, compared with 1,000 to 5,000 for Western engines.[26]

There are severe constraints on what Beijing can realistically achieve in terms of force improvements over the next 10-15 years. Defence modernization is subordinate to China's other three modernizations (industry, agriculture, and science and technology). Even with bargain basement buys, Su-27s are still expensive in terms of China's budget. It will take at least a decade and tens of billions of dollars of investment before China acquires sufficient advanced weaponry to make the PLA capable of fighting a high-tech war.

Finally, China seems to recognize that it is not in its interests to adopt an aggressive force posture in the region. The priority of the current Chinese leadership is economic reform and managing the impact of economic reforms on social and political behaviour. To achieve these goals, China requires a calm international environment and access to foreign capital and technology. China has been improving relations with its neighbours, including the ASEANs, South Korea and Japan, and has repeatedly emphasized its peaceful intentions in the region. The PLA is itself so involved in the civilian economy that it has a great

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[26]Stier and Bao, "The Bitter Truth Behind Thailand's Khaki Commerce," p. 28.

interest in regional stability. It is unlikely that China, in the short turn, would do anything that might damage its political and economic relationships in the region. China has been relatively cooperative on Cambodian and North Korean issues. Meanwhile, Beijing has more pressing security concerns than the Pacific to which to turn its attentions, namely Islamic influence in Chinese Central Asia.

On balance

As long as China is preoccupied with economic development and requires a peaceful environment and Western investment towards this end, it is unlikely to risk setting off a conflict in the region.

However, China could still pose a localized problem. Beijing seems determined to become a dominant regional power with the ability to exercise control over the East and South China Seas. However inadequate the Chinese Navy in modern 'great power' terms, it possesses real capabilities in the regional context. China already has the power to take the Spratlys if it wanted, assuming the opposition did not include the US Navy. China is not an expansionist power, but it will protect what it believes to be its territory -- whether disputed or not. Other disturbing behaviour includes the harassment of fishing and commercial vessels on the high seas. Targets have included Japanese, Russian, Taiwanese and Vietnamese ships. The piracy could be happening without central government acquiesence, but the government has not done much to stop it.

Over the longer term, the danger comes from a number of potential scenarios. These include:

- economic failure in China, which could lead to more centralized leadership and the adoption of a more assertive foreign policy;
- a breakdown of central authority, leading to local conflicts and destabilized border areas (e.g., with Vietnam, Hong Kong, India, Russia and the Central Asian states);
- skirmishing over Deng's succession, which could lead one faction or another to court military support by taking a strong stand on issues such as Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Even continued stability and growth, coupled with regional ambition (or global power aspirations), could create significant tensions. Any power of China's size building up its military forces must cause concern among its neighbours. No one has to think China has any aggressive intentions today. The question centres on what Chinese intentions will be twenty years from now, particularly as China moves through a period of leadership change and political uncertainty. The Chinese still think of security primarily in military terms -- unconventional security is recognized as legitimate concept, but it has no evident role in the formation of Chinese security policy. Beijing believes that China needs to be powerful militarily because it is the only way China will be taken seriously on the world stage. The possibility of a wealthy but lightly armed China (à la Japan) is unlikely.

The fact that the picture is so mixed, that Chinese intentions (both with respect to the strategic purposes of new capabilities and to the ultimate dimensions of the build-up) are so veiled, and that what transparency there is -- e.g., Chinese figures on defence expenditure -- is false or misleading does not add to confidence. Meanwhile, uncertainty about Chinese intentions encourages others in the region to maintain relatively strong force levels, which in

turn confirms Chinese apprehensions.

China is not a threat, but rather a potential source of instability that should be watched closely. We should become more concerned if China starts to devote a greater proportion of its resources to power projection capabilities (e.g., aircraft carriers, more amphibious assault vehicles, small landing craft, Backfire bombers) or starts to deploy more of its resources further from home.

Japan

Japan spends more on defence than any other country in the region. It has a substantial and very modern naval force, including some 100 maritime combat aircraft, 62 major surface combatants (7 destroyers and 55 frigates) and 17 submarines. It is building up to eight *Yukikaze*-class destroyers equipped with the *Aegis* radar surveillance and tracking system, modernizing its submarine fleet, planning to acquire tanker aircraft to extend the range of its air coverage and is considering acquiring a small aircraft carrier. Its air force is equally sophisticated, with advanced jet fighters, including more than 170 F-15s. Japan has cancelled plans to buy AWACS but is considering development of its own.

However, Japan maintains a defensive posture, sufficient to deal effectively with limited acts of aggression in its immediate environment. The JSDF is not equipped to seize and maintain control of territory more than 1,000 miles away for an extended period. Japan does not have, and does not plan to acquire, the equipment necessary to transport and support a significant military force abroad. It is deficient in fleet support and the fleet itself lacks intrinsic air cover. Japan is well aware of apprehensions about its military role in the region and continues to avoid acting independently of the US or the UN.

The worry with respect to Japan, as expressed in Southeast Asia, the Koreas, China and Taiwan, is that if Washington reduces its security commitment to Tokyo -- particularly in the context of a continued Chinese arms build-up and/or a North Korean nuclear capability -- Japan might reconsider the constitutional restraints on its forces and adopt a more assertive posture. Economically, it has the capability to do so, i.e., were Japan to develop its military power commensurate with its economic influence, it would be a formidable contender in the region. However, there is continuing strong opposition within Japan to playing a larger military role regionally and internationally, as illustrated in the debate over passage of the 1992 Law on Cooperation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, and economic recession is likely to make the Japanese even less willing to consider increasing defence outlays. Japan is unlikely to develop independent, powerful military capabilities (e.g., a carrier group, long-range bombers, long-range missiles), as long as US-Japan security relationship is maintained.

The more interesting question, as the US among others encourages Japan to play a larger role in regional defence, is where will the line of comfort for all parties (in terms of Japanese military operations abroad) be drawn? The fact that Japan's defensive posture has <u>not</u> put to rest lingering concerns about Japan's military involvement in the region says something about the underlying level of mistrust. How will the Japanese translate their growing interest in international cooperation into changes in exercises, deployments and materiel. At the same time, how might US, Chinese and Korean actions start to change security debate in Japan?

The Koreas

Although recent international attention to the Korean peninsula has focused on nuclear concerns, the biggest risk of conventional war in the region still lies on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea is the only state in the region with forces clearly configured to seize and hold territory. It fields the world's fifth-largest armed forces (after China, India, the US and Russia). A good two-thirds of its men are deployed close to the demilitarized zone. North Korea has been importing virtually no arms since 1991, when Russia began demanding hard currency in return for its weapons. Russia has since indicated it will no longer sell arms to North Korea (though it will still supply the North with spare parts). However, North Korea has a fairly advanced weapons industry and is becoming more self-reliant in weapons improvement. Despite Pyongyang's economic problems, it is continuing to increase the number and capability of its forces (especially artillery and missiles), although oil shortages appear to be affecting the frequency of exercises and morale is assumed to be poor.

South Korea's growing defence budget is helping to finance a fleet expansion, including a planned 17 new destroyers, some 68 fast attack craft and at least six submarines. Seoul is also quadrupling its F-16 holdings and beefing up its missile defences. Part of this is due to anticipated US drawdowns: US troops in South Korea have been reduced by about 5,000 over the past five years, to some 36,000, and will shrink further.

The respective build-ups are happening in the context of no prospect of arms control, a possible North Korean nuclear bomb, and the general unpredictability of the North Korean regime.

> A North Korean leadership that feels more isolated ideologically and cut off from its traditional sources of external economic and military support could still opt for higher levels of confrontation, perceiving that the DPRK's survival and legitimacy can be salvaged only through developing more self-reliant and lethal military capabilities.[27]

Meanwhile, Japan has its eye on Korean developments, and the birth of a South Korean "green water" navy is thought to betray a concern about Japan's future role.

Taiwan

China's acquisitions have overshadowed Taiwan's, but Taiwan's arsenal has been undergoing a healthy modernization process. In addition to ordering 150 F-16 fighters from the US and 60 *Mirage* 2000 multirole aircraft from France, Taiwan intends building 200-250 of its own *Ching-Kuo* fighters. Taiwan also has a licensing deal with Israel for production of the *Gabriel* missile. Taipei is seeking new submarines, acquiring 16 *Lafayette* guided missile frigates from France (10 to be built under licence in Taiwan), and building 8 US *Perry*-class frigates under licence. Other deals include minesweepers from Germany, torpedoes from Italy and rocket guidance and propulsion systems from Belgium. The F-16 sale has cleared the way for Taiwan to acquire advanced weapons more easily than before, as western countries are beginning to compete for the market. There are hints that Taiwan is now

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[27]William T. Tow, "The Military Dimensions of the Korean Confrontation," in *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Sheldon W. Simon, ed., New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1993, p. 74.

designing a force structure not just to defend against the traditional threat of a Chinese blockade or invasion, but also for contingencies involving Japan.

These recent acquisitions reflect more the development of a force in being rather than the capability to launch an attack. Instead, the main concern about Taiwan's build-up is how it is perceived in Beijing. On the one hand, China is concerned about Taiwanese purchases, which it is unable to match -- either in quantity or quality. On the other, there is increasing economic cooperation between the two (Taiwan is the second-biggest investor in mainland China) and the Chinese response to the *Mirage* sale (it closed the French consulate in Guangdong but kept open the embassy in Beijing) was softer than that to a 1980 Dutch submarine sale (it closed the Dutch embassy). As long as Taiwan continues its arms shopping spree, China is unlikely to constrain its own build-up.

A Word About Russia

The Russian Pacific Fleet consists of 2 aircraft carriers, 49 principal surface combatants, about 55 patrol and coastal combatants, 70 mine warfare vessels, 15 amphibious warfare ships, 22 SSBNs and 44 tactical submarines, and some 200 support and miscellaneous vessels. Reports indicate that many of these ships are unable to go to sea; for example, neither aircraft carrier is considered to be in service[28] and it has been estimated that only one-third of the attack subs are operational, 40% of the main surface warships and half the land-based naval aircraft.[29] Russian capability in the Pacific is likely to continue to be limited due to a severe fuel shortage, lack of operating funds, low morale, a disintegrating command structure, and the absence of clear direction on missions and roles. Even the Japanese, who continue to list Russia as one of their top security concerns (the others are North Korea and China) have reduced their spending on forces designed expressly to cope with the Russians. The Russian force may get back to health, but not before the turn of the century. Meanwhile, concerns could arise from the spillover effects of internal instability, from Russian arms sales, and/or from hardline leadership changes.

If Present Trends Continue

A key question is to what extent will countries continue to pursue modernizations as through the mid- and late-1990s?

Even where real growth in defence spending has stopped, most regional defence budgets now contain relatively high votes for capital procurement, which are likely to be maintained over the foreseeable future. Also, the concerns prompting the acquisitions -- economic prosperity, corruption, the need to modernize outdated equipment, the buyers' market, etc. -- are likely to continue. This, coupled with the pervasive, underlying mistrust in the region could lead to a steady build-up, in which Taiwan's continued growth feeds China's continues growth, which feeds Japan's, which feeds South Korea's, with North Korea not needing to be fed by anyone and the ASEANs falling in step behind. One doesn't have to spend too long in the region before speculative fears about all the combinations and

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[28]*The Military Balance 1993-1994*, pp. 97, 103.

[29]"Asia's Arms Race," *The Economist*, February 20, 1993, p. 20.

permutations start being trotted out: Sino-Japanese arms race, Sino-Japanese collusion, Japanese-Korean arms race, Sino-Russian collusion, etc.

There are constraints on the build-ups, in the form of:

- limited money available. The most sophisticated modern fighters (F-15, FA-18, Tornado, Mirage 2000, even F-16) are still expensive enough that most states in the region cannot afford to buy large numbers. Also, later in the decade, states will have to turn to the replacement of systems acquired in the 1980s. This may slow the acquisition of new capabilities, but the modernization process will continue.

- suppliers are still exercising some discretion, both in whom they will sell to and what they will sell.[30] Russia is refusing to sell to North Korea and is withholding its most sophisticated equipment from China. The US is not allowing the transfer of *Stealth* fighters or *Tomahawk* cruise missiles. This may prevent regional states from acquiring top-of-the-line equipment or from taking qualitative leaps ahead of one another. However, it does not restrict them from getting the numbers necessary to operate in some of the region's smaller theatres. Moreover, the trend towards domestic production is likely to continue, making regional states less reliant on traditional suppliers and leading outside suppliers to try to sell even more advanced equipment and technology to regional states in an attempt to maintain market share.

- popular pressure. The growing influence of the middle class in the political process and the growth of civilian administration is leading to a rationalization of defence policy-making in several regional states. This will lead, one imagines, to fewer "prestige" purchases, less corruption and increasing pressure on defence budgets as there is growing demand for spending in other sectors.

- good relations with neighbours. One should not look at force build-ups without also looking at the overall context within which they are occurring. I.e., will the growing multilateral security dialogue and economic interdependence in the region "kick in" and act as constraints on arms build-ups before they become too troubling. Or will the build-ups act as constraints on security dialogue and economic cooperation?

WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?

As other papers at this workshop deal more directly with the possibilities for confidence-building, verification and arms control, what follows is a list of possible courses of action, with brief comments.

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[30]Buyers have to restrict themselves in some cases. A state cannot buy from all sellers. Considerations of interoperability and ability to maintain the equipment enter in; this ties less capable states to certain suppliers and limits the rate of introduction of equipment from new sources (e.g., the Thai Navy is still quite dependent on China; most Southeast Asian air forces are dependent on the US for fighters).

Economic Growth/Interdependence

The ASEANs, for example, are largely counting on the shared interest in continued high growth rates to constrain any military adventurism in the region. However, the economic dynamism of the region is somewhat fragile and the consequences of rapid growth and burgeoning populations (e.g., deforestation, resource scarcity, pollution, refugee flows) may themselves generate inter and intrastate violence. The implications of an economic downturn are unclear. On the one hand, one might expect to see a drop in weapons acquisition if central budgets are squeezed. On the other, a downturn might spur a readiness to press claims more fiercely or to exploit resources in disputed areas, leading to tension and possibly conflict.

Security Guarantees/US Presence

US policy is perhaps the largest single, controllable (by non-Asians) factor bearing on future force developments in Asia, as Washington is both the region's leading arms supplier and the guarantor of Japanese, South Korean and (to a lesser extent) Southeast Asian security. Much will depend on the pace and nature of US reductions, and the extent to which the US remain a strong and credible Asia Pacific power.

Defence Cooperation

There is a reluctance within the region to move beyond modest, informal arrangements for defence liaison and cooperation. Defence cooperation might build confidence among those who cooperate, but what would be the effect on those left out of the cooperation?

Rational Defence Planning

Rational defence planning could help to eliminate clearly inappropriate or unusable purchases; in addition, it could make states more willing to enter into transparency measures (the revelations would be less embarrassing). It could also, however, result in "leaner and meaner" forces.

Dialogue

The ASEAN Regional Forum now provides a forum for security dialogue. It is not clear what the ARF will do. There seems to be a divergence between the expectations of the Western participants (especially Canada/Australia) and those of the Asians. The diversity of threat perception may make it difficult to focus on key issues. The process will probably move slowly and will be better for discussion of Southeast Asian security issues than of Northeast Asian. Other bilateral and sub-regional security dialogues are taking place and may be more relevant for dealing with specific concerns; they are also more likely to satisfy the Asian preference for doing things behind closed doors. The most useful dialogues may be those among and between military personnel, at both high and mid levels.

The fact that states are talking at all is important: the hope is that the ARF -- and the myriad other dialogues -- will help build a cooperative political climate over the long term. Whether the dialogues have much relevance to the continuing arms build-ups in the region will depend on whether they help generate a change in security perceptions that provides the

initial climate suitable for a "transformational" process of confidence-building (discussed in Jim Macintosh's paper).

Transparency

The fact that Asia Pacific arms build-ups are not primarily threat-driven has led to disjunctures between force structures and strategic assessments. This in itself is likely to prompt continued arms buying and cause tensions if states are not certain why their neighbours are acquiring weapons (i.e., base their planning -- necessarily worst case -- on force structures rather than assessments). Transparency about the nature of current acquisition programs, as well as about their long-range objectives and motivations, might help. However, most regional states regard transparency as a form of intelligence gathering that could just as easily endanger security (by revealing weaknesses) as promote it. They also argue that they already know what the others have (i.e., there is little understanding that the process of information-sharing -- under the right conditions -- might be just as important. in promoting confidence as the information itself). Forward-looking transparency (i.e., about what states are planning to do) would probably be more helpful than static (what states are already doing).

Defence-Dominant Force Postures

There are some examples of this in the region (e.g., Japan, Singapore basing its F-16s in Arizona). A useful objective of the dialogue process would be to encourage regional militaries to start thinking about how to structure forces such that they develop an appropriate balance between deterrence and reassurance.

Other Confidence-Building Measures

It is not clear that the region as a whole is at a stage where CBMs would have much effect. CBMs may, however, be useful in particular bilateral or sub-regional contexts.

Arms Control

The prospects for arms control in the region are extremely bleak, even where it might be most useful, i.e., on the Korean peninsula.[31]

Domestic

The course of many regional military build-ups, particularly in China, Russia and North Korea, will depend to a large extent on factors internal to those countries. How can other countries, acting alone or in concert, have an effect on those developments?

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[31]One could make a case that arms control would be in North Korea's interest -- it would reduce the economic burden of maintaining large conventional forces and halt the slide towards imbalance in the South's favour. However, the atmosphere of fear, distrust and seemingly irreconcilable objectives on the peninsula is hardly conducive to negotiations, and even South Koreans indicate privately that they prefer no arms control and military superiority to arms control and parity.

CONCLUSION

What we find in Asia Pacific is a robust modernization of arsenals, with some troubling elements, but a low probability of military conflict, at least in the next five years or so. Nonetheless, regional military capabilities are being transformed in ways that could be destabilizing should political relationships deteriorate seriously in future. Now is probably a good time to try to take measures to defuse potential crises and put into place security mechanisms that could have some effect if the political (or economic) climate deteriorates. However, the lack of clear threat leads to inhibition to taking serious action, and what action could be taken is not that clear. The establishment of a rudimentary multilateral forum for dialogue is encouraging, as is the lip service to the notion of increased transparency, but difficult to obtain consensus about this or any other direct action. The most promising (but still difficult) avenues for alleviating or forestalling troubling developments seem to lie in the areas of: economics (growth/interdependence, corruption); other domestic factors (leadership change, development of middle classes, anti-military sentiment); and creating climates (bilaterally, sub-regionally and regionally) in which confidence-building could lead to a transformation of threat perceptions.

ADDRESSING DIVERGENT THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA: LINKAGES BETWEEN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

by

JANICE K.M. HEPPELL

POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Northeast Asian region is perched on the fence between the Cold War and the New World Order. On one hand, there have been many positive developments, including the improvement in relations between Russia and both the United States and China, the diminished threat of armed conflict, economic cooperation and reconciliation with neighbouring countries, and movements toward more democratic political administrations in the countries of the region. However, vestiges of the Cold War still remain, such as the situation on the Korean peninsula, while territorial disputes such as the issue of Taiwan, and the Northern Territories issue between Russia and Japan, pose roadblocks to greater cooperation and mutual understanding between Northeast Asian countries and to the establishment of a subregional multilateral security dialogue.

The current Northeast Asian environment is one characterised not so much by discernable threats, but rather by potential threats. On the surface, this would seem to suggest a more secure environment, but rather, in the absence of concrete, identifiable threats, Northeast Asian countries are seeking to protect themselves from a host of possible scenarios. These include 1) the potential drawdown of US forces in the region and a resulting power vacuum, potentially filled by Japan or China; 2) Japanese remilitarisation, in the absence of a reliable US security umbrella and the restraint provided by the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, to protect its economic interests and reflect its status as a world economic leader[1]; 3) Chinese military modernisation and forward power projection, to secure disputed territories and match its role as an emerging

[1] A variety of recent events, observed together, have caused alarm in regional capitals: Gulf War participation, passage of the PKO Bill, debate over revising Japan's constitution, the pursuit of a UN Security Council Seat, and the shipment and storage of large amounts of plutonium. Although many Japanese themselves object to some or all of these measures, concern has nonetheless arisen around the region.

power; 4) North Korea's increasing ballistic missile sales and pursuit of a clandestine nuclear weapons program; and 5) the uncertainty associated with Russia's domestic economic and political reforms.

Some startling trends have also been witnessed in Northeast Asia: 1) increased defence spending; 2) the purchase of more technologically sophisticated arms and weapons systems; 3) the growth of arms sales, spurred by the need to earn foreign currency, the freedom of nations to sell former enemy states and in Russia's case, excess capacity; and 4) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technology. These trends, occurring simultaneously, are self-perpetuating, generating a regional arms buildup in the absence of discernible threats, and clearly demonstrate the need for measures to create confidence among the Northeast Asian nations, so that defensive measures taken by one nation are not perceived to be offensive and threatening by others.

In the North Pacific arena, many old anxieties are unrelated to the Cold War rivalry, and remain as sources of distrust, despite the thawing of the East-West ideological confrontation. It is essential for Northeast Asian states to seek methods aimed at developing a better understanding of the capabilities, intentions, and concerns of neighbouring countries. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of proposals floated for the formation of a regional multilateral organisation to address the complicated challenges in today's security environment. However, due to the complexity of the region, this is not easily achieved, as there is no history of collective or cooperative security in Northeast Asia and most countries possess different priorities, threat

perceptions, and deep rooted historical legacies. To effectively address this situation, a series of modest bilateral confidence building measures can be pursued, taking advantage of the windows of opportunity which will exist for the resolution of each stumbling block in bilateral relations. Through these efforts, impediments to regional cooperation will be removed and the spirit of dialogue and cooperation essential to a multilateral security framework will be reinforced.

THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERGENT THREAT PERCEPTIONS

All Northeast Asian nations perceive the stability of their subregion from various perspectives. This is based not only on recent events, but perhaps more importantly on incidents and precedents set throughout a period of nearly two millennia. One only has to visit any historical monument in Seoul to garner a fraction of the emotion and pain suffered through its tumultuous history with Japan. Such deeply ingrained sentiment cannot be eradicated with ease, or money or even seemingly sincere apologies. New attitudes must be nurtured by expanded contact, consultation and the pursuit of common interests. Following is a brief look at the varying threat perceptions of the Northeast Asian players.

JAPAN

SHORT TERM THREAT: NORTH KOREA'S RODONG MISSILE Pyongyang's testing of the Rodong 1 ballistic missile in May 1993, capable of delivering chemical or nuclear weapons as far as Osaka, in western Japan, generated great concern in Tokyo. Although a strike at Japan would seriously damage the valuable flow of goods and cash from the pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, Tokyo has reason to be concerned due to the unpredictability of the North

Korean leadership and the absence of normalised relations with Pyongyang.[2]

LONG TERM THREAT: A REUNIFIED AND NUCLEAR ARMED KOREA North Korea's nuclear weapons program is also of acute concern to Tokyo in the long term, for a reunified Korea of 70 million people (consolidated either under peaceful conditions or due to a collapse of the North Korean leadership and/or economy) could prove threatening to Japan. In fact, many analysts believe that Japan would prefer to see the peaceful coexistence of a divided Korea, for fear of economic competition and persisting animosity from a militarily powerful and possibly nuclear armed Korea.

THE OLD THREAT, RUSSIA For decades, the former Soviet Union was considered to be Japan's preeminent security threat, and even with the publication of Japan's most recent Defence White Paper,[3] Russia continues to be considered a possible threat, supported by the continued presence of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk,[4] the outstanding Northern Territories

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[2] There are approximately 260,000 pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, the largely concentrated in Osaka, who take or remit between $700 million and $1 billion cash and goods each year to North Korea. Given the rise of the yen in recent years and the shrinking North Korean economy, the annual inflow from Japan would have exceeded the entire 1990 North Korean budget, and may now represent 2 years' worth of Pyongyang's budget. Katsumi Sato, "Japan Stop Funding Kim Il Sung,"*Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)* Vol. 156, No. 36 (9 September 1993), p. 23. See also David E. Sanger, "Cash for N.K. N-plant traced to Osaka," *The Korea Herald*, 2 November 1993, p. 1, and Charles Smith, "Cash lifeline," *FEER* Vol. 156, No. 30 (29 July 1993), p. 23.

[3] For a concise discussion of Japan's 1993-94 white paper, including changing threat perceptions and new acquisitions to address post-Cold War security needs, see Kensuke Ebata, "Japan poised for promotion," *International Defense Review*, Vol.26, No. 11 (November 1993), pp. 870-872.

[4] Although the Russian Pacific Fleet has been less affected than other services by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Navy is faced with major military budget reductions, which will ultimately reduce the size and power of the fleet. For example, the loss of skilled workers from naval shipyards has become so extreme that some officers are forced to make repairs themselves, lest the ships rot in harbour, while many of the engineering factories that once provided parts are no longer under central government coordination. Future effectiveness will be undermined by

dispute, and Tokyo's need to justify continued weapons acquisitions to Japan's pacifist population, which generally supports only a purely defensive role for the military.

VERY LONG TERM THREAT: POWERFUL CHINA, WEAK CHINA Japan sees Chinese aspirations for regional hegemony as a threat to its security in the very long term, for the reorientation of China's forces to forward force projection, oriented around a blue water navy, will be more threatening to Japan than China's past continentally and domestically oriented defence posture. Coupled with this, the newly revised Chinese constitution states China's goal is to become wealthy and powerful, which is not reassuring to its neighbours; subsequently, Japan will continue to maintain a close watch on China's military development.

Conversely, a weak China could also pose problems. China, characterised by regionalism throughout its long history, could disintegrate due to a disparity of growth between North and South, coast and interior. With economic growth racing ahead in many areas of China, regional officials are increasingly wielding more influence and power as the central government experiences difficulties in collecting revenues and asserting control. While a disintegrated China in a benign state is not a security risk, the potential flow of refugees to Taiwan and Hong Kong would undermine both China's and the region's economic growth and stability, which Japan has

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these developments, which will be further exacerbated by increasing corruption and lack of discipline in the remote Russian Far East. For details, see Peter Lewis Young, "What Future for the Russian Pacific Navy?" *Asian Defence Journal* (May 1993), pp. 32-36.

a vested interest in maintaining.[5]

CHINA

LOOMING THREAT: US BULLYING AND INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

The United States and China have gone head to head recently on a number of issues. Washington has continued to tie renewal of China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status to China's human rights violations and ballistic missile sales, particularly the shipment of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, Iran and Syria. Although China supports the continued US presence in the region as a balancer and hedge against Japanese ambitions of remilitarisation, Chinese leaders resent Washington's interference in China's domestic affairs, which could undermine its socialist political structure and thus their hold on power. In addition, Washington's sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan infuriated Beijing, prompting it to accuse Washington of utilising double standards and trying to undermine the military balance across the Taiwan Straits.

CONCEIVABLE THREAT: RUSSIA'S INTERNAL DISARRAY AND SPILLOVER INTO CHINA The state of Russia's domestic situation five years hence is anyone's guess, as it struggles with economic and political reform. As areas of the former Soviet Union separate piece by piece, there is a concern in Beijing regarding the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism (accompanied by the destabilising nature of the Islamic bomb) and pan-Turkism across Asia,

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[5] This issue was raised by Professor Akihiko Tanaka of the University of Tokyo, during a personal communication, 1 October 1993. China is the fastest growing recipient of Japanese foreign investment, as Tokyo turns from 1980s investment hotspots such as Malaysia and Thailand, fraught with labour shortages and infrastructural bottlenecks, towards China and its cheap labour and huge domestic market. For details, see Charles Smith, "Neighbour's Keeper, *FEER* Vol. 157, No.10 (10 March 1994), p. 56.

inciting separatist aspirations in China's Muslim minorities.[6] Internal chaos in Russia might induce the Russian Far East to seek autonomy, sending shock waves through China's own domestic empire, rife with many non-Han Chinese minorities.[7] At a time when the return of Hong Kong to the motherland is imminent and efforts to establish control over disputed territories are strong, China has no desire to see other parts of her territory break away. Finally, although remote and despite markedly improved relations recently, there is speculation that in the 21st century, a strong and resurgent Russia could threaten China again. Coupled with the transfer of arms from the European theatre as a consequence of the CFE Treaty, which could be deployed quickly to the Sino-Russian border if relations deteriorated, Beijing will not discount Russia as a possible long term threat.

LATENT THREAT: INSTABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA Although the threat has existed for over 40 years, instability on the peninsula would affect China in a very different way. As North Korea's only remaining ally, albeit less supportive than in the past, China does not want to be drawn into conflict with South Korea, which has become a valuable economic partner in recent years, or with the international community. China's cooperative economic relationships in Northeast Asia are essential to its continued economic growth and survival of the state. Although Beijing would not support North Korean adventurism or Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program at the expense of its growing relationships in the region, both issues place Beijing in

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[6] Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions - Interests and Ambitions," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993) p. 255.

[7] Richard J. Ellings and Edward A. Olsen, "A New Pacific Profile," *Foreign Policy* No. 89 (Winter 1992/93), p. 124.

a delicate and unwanted position diplomatically.

LONG TERM THREAT: JAPAN'S INCREASED MILITARY PROWESS Though China does not consider Japan to be an immediate threat to its security, it shares the position that many nations hold regarding Japan's potential for remilitarisation in the future.

RUSSIA

A SHORT TERM EXTERNAL THREAT DOES NOT OFFICIALLY EXIST In a major turnaround from the Cold War era, Yeltsin publicly stated that "there are no potential enemies, but at the same time, Russia will develop its armed forces in such a manner that would allow it to defend itself and its people."[8] Instead, the primary threats for the Yeltsin administration are domestic political strife and economic stagnation, as it struggles to make the transition to a market oriented system. For the first time, Russia's foreign policy is subject to domestic debate, which can be partially credited with derailing Yeltsin's efforts to make more progress on the Northern Territories issue with Japan.[9] In addition, the sparsely populated Far East is becoming

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[8] Statements made by Yeltsin after his approval of Russia's first post-Soviet military doctrine. Military leaders are said to have demanded fast approval of the new doctrine as payment for crushing Yeltsin's opponents in parliament last month. It is not yet known what concessions were made to the military, which has complained about shrinking budgets, arms reductions and inadequate housing for soldiers. See "Russian Military Posture Defensive," *The Korea Times*, 4 November 1993, p. 1.

[9] The four disputed islands in the Kurile island chain (referred to as the Northern Territories by Japan) were seized by Soviet troops in the closing days of World War II. In the 1965 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, the USSR promised to return the two smaller islands (Shitokan and Habomais) after the conclusion of a peace treaty. For details of recent developments on the territorial issue, see Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Moscow's Relations with Tokyo - Domestic obstacles to a Territorial Agreement," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 10 (October 1993), pp. 953-967. Campaigns had been launched against the return of the disputed islands to Japan during Gorbachev's visit in 1991 and criticism intensified when Yeltsin showed signs of yielding to Japanese pressure. Russians would not accept the vision of a weak Russia being compelled to surrender to a stronger power, especially when it was considered to be an historical antagonist, like Japan. They subsequently stepped up their criticism. Yeltsin cancelled two

increasingly economically independent due to a bustling border trade with Japan, China and South Korea and could eventually see its interests better served by autonomy, leaving Moscow without an eastern port. An increasingly self-reliant Far East could be vulnerable in the future to neighbouring China and Japan, who Russia considers to possibly entertain longterm ambitions on its territory.

SOUTH KOREA'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS

PRIMARY, IMMINENT THREAT: NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS South Korea, more than any other country in the region, has faced an imminent threat for the past 40 years. Since the Korean conflict, threat has always come from the North's conventional military capabilities and defence planning has focussed primarily on that. The North Korean nuclear crisis has added another, more frightening dimension to the equation. The security of the South has always been guaranteed by the US Forces Korea and the commitment by Washington to cooperatively ensure South Korea's security. Despite assurances that Seoul will not have to "go it alone", policy makers search for ways to ensure South Korea's security to cope with this deadly variable while designing contingency plans for eventual reunification. Unfortunately, policy planning is difficult with such unpredictable adversaries as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, whose primary concerns are the preservation of the their regime and their own leadership positions.

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planned trips to Japan before finally going in October 1993. See Leszek Buszynski, "Russia's Priorities in the Pacific," *The Pacific Review* Vol. 6 No. 3 (1993), p. 285 and Yakov Zinberg and Reinhard Drifte, "Chaos in Russia and the Territorial Dispute with Japan," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1993), p. 277.

SEOUL'S LONG TERM CONCERNS: A NUCLEAR JAPAN... Seoul is very concerned, in the long term, about a nuclear capable Japan and worries that the current North Korean crisis will provide Tokyo the justification that in would need to "go nuclear."[10] South Korea, under US pressure in the 1970s, abandoned its nuclear weapons programs, which it saw as an equalizer in its unfavourable conventional military balance with Seoul. (Ironically, nearly 20 years later, Pyongyang is likely pursuing a nuclear capability for the same reason.) The memory of an aggressive Japan still looms in the minds of many Koreans, and despite positive developments in bilateral economic relations, Seoul would not rule out a change of face in Tokyo, if it were seen to be in Japan's interests. Without its own nuclear deterrent against a nuclear Japan, Seoul could find itself in a vulnerable position.

...AND A STRONG CHINA In response to concerns about China's future power projection capabilities, South Korea plans to develop the navy into an ocean going force to cope effectively with a potential threat "which may come the sea", given China's ongoing efforts to develop strong a strong navy.[11]

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[10] Despite Japan's 3 Non-Nuclear Principles (not to produce, possess or permit introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan) and Washington's offer to jointly develop a TMD system, Japan may have all necessary parts to build a nuclear weapon, including plutonium and electronic triggers, needing only to select adequate amounts of plutonium for the core. It also has sophisticated rockets for launching space satellites that could be converted to intermediate or long-range missiles. However, there is no evidence that Japan is proceeding with a nuclear weapons program or that it has strayed from the 3 Non-Nuclear Principles. See "Japan 'has parts to build N-bomb'," *The Straits Times*, 31 January 1994, p. 4. Speculation surfaced in July 1993 that Japan's non-nuclear commitment might be weakening, when it initially failed to commit to an indefinite extension of the NPT regime beyond 1995, although Prime Minister Hosokawa did give his full support to an indefinite extension in August 1993 during an address to the UN General Assembly.

[11] Citing concern about naval conflict with China, Rear Adm. Kim Hong-ryeol, chief of naval operations, said that the Navy plans to make Korea a "future-oriented naval power toward the 21st century in line with the growing role" of South Korea in the Asia-Pacific era.

NORTH KOREA

OFFICIAL THREAT: US AND SOUTH KOREAN AGGRESSION North Korea, the most isolated of the five Northeast Asian countries, sees South Korea and the United States as its main threats, which it accuses of offensively deploying forces towards the North, undertaking provocative combined military exercises, and impeding reunification by continuing to maintain US forces on the peninsula. North Korea once clearly held the balance of military power over South Korea, but this has disappeared over the last decade due to growing economic superiority of the South. The possession of nuclear weapons would eradicate the imbalance while the nuclear weapons issue has certainly captured the attention of the international community and delivered to Pyongyang highly coveted direct negotiations with Washington while allowing it to sidestep and marginalise Seoul in the process. Analysts cannot predict the true stage of nuclear weapons development nor can they accurately pinpoint the true motivation behind the weapons program (deterrent? bargaining chip for aid? an ace in the game of internal power politics?), which makes realistic solutions to the crisis even more difficult to ascertain. [12]

REAL THREAT: ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND IDEOLOGICAL POLLUTION The real threat to the survival of the regime is economic paralysis and international isolation, which is a result of the staunchly proclaimed 'juche' ideology of self reliance, inept economic planning, and

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[12] For a variety of theories on the possible rationale behind Pyongyang's alleged nuclear weapons program, see James Bayer and Robert Bedeski," North Korea's Nuclear Option: Observations and Reflections on the Recent NPT Crisis," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 99-118; Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and the State Survival in North Korea", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 137-153; Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (April 1993), pp. 339-359; and Michael J. Mazarr, "Lessons from the North Korean Crisis," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July/August 1993), pp. 8-12.

the need to prevent information and other polluting influences from filtering in and undermining Kim Il Sung's carefully crafted and nurtured personality cult, which lauds Kim and son Jong Il and lies about everything else. The challenge the Kims is how to attract desperately needed foreign investment and aid without allowing information from the outside world to filter in, or permitting the international community to truly witness the state of internal affairs. Confirmation of reported human rights violations would almost certainly pose barriers to valuable economic aid, and Pyongyang must surely be sensitive to Washington's policy towards China, linking the renewal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status with an improvement in its human rights record. There is clearly an inverse relationship between the amount of information that seeps in or seeps out, and the prospects for the survival of the Kim regime.

THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES[13]

It is evident from the preceding discussion that all Northeast Asian states envisage their neighbours to be threatening in some way, either in the short term or long term, and as each individual state seeks to safeguard national security, other neighbours may misinterpret such actions to be offensive or threatening. Consequently, efforts must be undertaken to reassure neighbours of benign intentions.

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[13] The principles of confidence building are drawn heavily from the works of James Macintosh. See *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, No. 1, Ottawa: The Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, 1985; and "Key Elements of a Conceptual Appproach to Confidence Building," in *Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence-Building and Verification*, Ottawa: Verification Research Unit, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, April 1993.

Confidence building is not simply the negotiation or the adoption of specific measures, but rather it is the *relationship* between negotiation and implementation that is the key, which ultimately leads to a transformation in threat perceptions. Although recent history has demonstrated that confidence building measures can be portable, it is ineffective to simply apply a blanket package of confidence building measures to a situation and expect them to be effective, even if they had been completely successful in previous circumstances. Over the past five or six years, a variety of proposals have been tabled to transfer the structures and measures of the CSCE process in Europe to the Asia-Pacific region. However, great controversy has arisen because those specific arrangements cannot effectively address the distinct differences in history, culture, force structure, domestic politics or levels of economic development, nor the intra-regional animosities and rivalries, non-contiuguous nature of states or divergent threat perceptions. As Macintosh notes, "disassociated from the larger politcial process and purpose, confidence building loses much of its meaning and becones a narrow, information enhancing activity incapable of fundamentally altering a security relationship."[14] However, this is not to say that the lessons learned cannot be applied with care and attention.

The bilateral relationships of Northeast Asia are characterised by an intricate blend of political/diplomatic, economic and military stumbling blocks while different priorities (economic growth, political reform, military modernisation) exist within each country each year.[15] Based on the five Northeast Asian States (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia and South Korea, there

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[14] Macintosh, "Key Elements of a Conceptual Approach to Confidence Building," p. 65.

[15] For example, South Korean President Kim's priority in 1993 was domestic political reform and the eradication of corruption; in 1994, it is economic revival through internationalisation and globalisation.

are ten different bilateral relationships, only two of which have any current or previous alliance affiliation (North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia).[16] As a result, there are eight independent relationships, falling at different points along the friend-enemy spectrum, that require the development of measures to promote trust and solve some persistent problems, so that central decision makers will come to see that neighbours are not the threat they once were, or in Northeast Asia's case, the threat they might become.

By initially utilising a combination of basic information, communication, and constraint CBMs, it is possible to attempt to negotiate, what Gerald Segal refers to as an effective menu of *a la carte* measures[17]. For the Northeast Asian region, it is also important to include a category of non-traditional CBMs, either quasi-military or non-military CBMs, to deal with comprehensive security concerns, including economic, political, environmental and cultural security issues. Although not part of the European experience, they would prove useful in the intricate Northeast Asian security context.[18] Most of the measures proposed here are very modest in nature, like the Helsinki CBMs of 1975, yet they could provide a starting point in developing a habit of dialogue and allow individual pairs of countries to move at their own pace in improving their relations and addressing issues of mutual concern. As most of the threats at this point are not imminent, this exercise has value in establishing avenues of dialogue *before* crisis situations occur

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[16] This also excludes the two most important bilateral relationships, those existing between the United States and both Japan and South Korea. The maintenance of these is critical to the security of the Northeast Asian subregion and the Asia-Pacific as a whole.

[17] Gerald Segal, "Common Security or a la Carte?" *International Affairs* Vol. 67, No. 4 (October 1991).

[18] For a comprehensive explanation of CBMs and the additional category of non-traditional CBMs, see Macintosh, "Key Elements of a Conceptual Approach to Confidence Building," pp. 57-78.

and provides a foundation for a regional security dialogue and broader CBM regime in the future. The following section will trace recent developments in the eight bilateral relationships and delineate modest packages of CBMs that form the foundation for a more comprehensive regional security mechanism in the near future.

THE APPLICATION OF CBMs IN THE BILATERAL CONTEXT

RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS The Northern Territories dispute serves as a **diplomatic stumbling block** to building confidence as it impedes developments in both the military and economic arenas; consequently, many have argued for delinking the territorial dispute from efforts to develop contacts in other areas. However, some progress has been made recently. Indeed, Russian President Boris Yeltsin finally visited Tokyo for a long awaited summit in October 1993, after failing to show for two previously scheduled summit meetings, where Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa discussed plans for the transfer of two of the four disputed islands. If realised, such a development would be the most significant in Japanese-Russian relations to date and would pave the way for greater cooperation, particularly economic, which Japan had stated cannot be fully realised until resolution of the dispute.[19] Returning the disputed Northern Territories has met with strong opposition form within Russia for two reasons:

[19] Yeltsin articulated his strategy on the normalisation of Russo-Japanese relations in a five-stage plan tabled in 1990. He envisaged a progression through five stages: 1) Official recognition of the territorial problem; 2) demilitarisation of the four disputed islands; 3) establishment of a zone of free enterprise on the islands with an agreement to cooperate on trade, economic, techno-scientific, cultural and humanitarian cooperation; 4) signing of a peace treaty; and 5) resolution of the territorial issue over a period of 15 to 20 years. Although Russia claimed this method could make the islands a uniting rather than a divisive factor, such a protracted solution did not satisfy Tokyo.

1) nationalist resistance to losing yet another piece of Russian territory, and more importantly 2) relinquishing the strategic advantages provided by the islands. The islands screen the Sea of Okhotsk, which hosts Russian submarine bases and ballistic-missile-firing area, serve as bases for advanced jet fighters and signals-intelligence posts, and bestow valuable mineral and fishing rights. Although there is little likelihood of Russian military aggression against Japan, the presence of Russian naval, air and ground forces within the sight of Hokkaido coupled with uncertainty in Russia's domestic politics is of concern to Tokyo.[20]

An additional stumbling block in Russo-Japanese relations is Russia's persistent dumping of nuclear waste at sea, which has been carried out for over 20 years and which continues due to the "lack of funds" necessary to establish suitable land based storage.[21] The dumping endangers both Japanese and South Korean waters and Russia has been pressuring Japan for aid in establishing a land based waste disposal. The issue has the dual prospect of being both a divisive issue or one on which to devote cooperative efforts to solving. There is reason for caution however as large scale, unilateral Japanese economic assistance could stimulate fears among Russians of creeping Japanese economic annexation, provoking nationalist backlash and destabilising the shaky Yeltsin administration; therefore, large scale aid should be directed and

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[20] See Robert R. Rau, "Japan's Growing Involvement," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 119, No. 12 (December 1993), p. 66.

[21] A Russian government report, produced by environmentalists and other officials, indicated that the Soviet Union and its successor Russia tossed over 144,000 cubic metres of liquid and solid radioactive waste into the East Sea and waters near Kamchatka between 1966 and 1992, on 216 occasions. See "Soviet Union Dumped N-Waste in Far Eastern, Arctic Seas," *The Korea Times*, 4 April 1993, p.1.

administered through multilateral channels.[22]

The timing is ripe for moving towards a bilateral confidence building initiative. An improvement in military and economic relations with Japan could help stabilize the tenuous position of the Yeltsin administration and establish a precedent for dialogue and cooperation in the event that a more conservative-hard line regime assumes power in the future.

Russia and Japan already signed an agreement on the **Prevention of Incidents at Sea** in September 1992 and military officials have been engaging in bilateral security dialogue. Yeltsin and Hosokawa agreed to increase high level exchanges of officials, promote non-proliferation, enhance the role of the United Nations and work to make Russia a part of the Asia-Pacific community. Further confidence building measures could include the following:

* **No first use of force declaration**

* **Exchange of data on defence spending, force structure and deployment.** Japan is still concerned about Russian deployments in the Far East, especially after the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, and the fate of the Russian Pacific Fleet.

* **Exchange of military officials** This should include ***contacts with both central and regional officials,*** as authority within Russia is steadily devolving to regional administrations and many decisions are increasingly being made by regional commands.[23]

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[22] Leszek Buszynski's argument in "Russia's Priorities in the Pacific," p. 290.

[23] In addition, the Russian Far East administrations are increasingly participating in independent commercial ventures and retaining the receipts for use in the region. This could lead to differences between official policy or figures flowing from Moscow and actual activity occurring in the Far East. The potential for illegal entrepreneurial activity exists, including the smuggling of consumer goods from Japan, South Korea and China. Reports have indicated that Pacific Fleet personnel actively smuggle goods or help civilian smugglers violate borders. See Peter Lewis Young, "What Future for the Russian Pacific Navy?" p. 36.

* **Notification of airforce and particularly naval manoeuvres and movements**[24] Japan's concern over security of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) makes this a particularly vital issue. The observation of military manoeuvres could be negotiated in the near future, after the mutual dialogue process is underway.

* **Establishment of a hot line and a cool line**

* **Establishment of a nuclear consultative group** to discuss issues of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear waste disposal, nuclear safety and nuclear power. These issues are of mutual concern to both countries and could provide a focus for unofficial discussions of concerns and strategies regarding these issues. The findings could be communicated to respective governments, providing an unofficial and non-confrontational dialogue channel between administrations.

These very basic bilateral moves could be established despite the existence of the Northern Territories Dispute and further confidence building measures could be adopted in a gradual manner over time.

JAPANESE-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS Negotiations on normalisation between Japan and North Korea broke off at the eighth round of talks in Beijing in November 1992, when Pyongyang refused Tokyo's demand for an investigation into the alleged abduction of a Japanese national.[25] However, when there seemed to be an easing of Pyongyang's recalcitrant attitude toward nuclear inspections by the IAEA, Tokyo stated in mid February that it would seek to resume negotiations with Pyongyang, although this was sidelined by the negative events of March

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[24] Providing one day of notice, Russia dispatched a cruiser into the South China Sea, near the disputed Spratly Islands, on the pretext of protecting Russian vessels from pirate attacks. Japanese officials suspected that the piracy patrols could be a rationale for future naval buildup in the area, given that Russian vessels have not been subject to pirate attack for some time. Japan was notably disturbed by such unexpected action. *The Japan Times*, 25 August 1993, p. 2.

[25] North Korean terrorist Kim Hyun-hee, who planted a bomb on a South Korean airplane that exploded off Myanmar in 1987, confessed that she had learned Japanese from a Japanese woman who had been abducted from Japan by North Korean agents. *The Korea Herald*, 18 February 1994, p. 2.

1994 when Pyongyang prevented the IAEA from completing thorough inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, Japan is in a good position to participate in economic cooperation with North Korea since it has the money and is not obstructed by the intracacies of the reunification issue. Possible confidence building measures could include:

* **No first use of force declaration** Although both North Korea and Tokyo fear the use of nuclear weapons more than conventional weapons, the inclusion of "nuclear" in such a declaration would imply 1) an undeclared intention of Japan to develop a nuclear capability, and 2) the current development or existence of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Discussion of that issue would only serve to impede other CBMs and thus, a general declaration covering all types of weapons (conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear) would be more effective.

* **Consultation between defence officials** should be encouraged if only that it establishes a channel for dialogue, available for use in the event of a crisis situation.

* **Notification of military manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan** Although North Korea's cash-strapped economy precludes large scale military manoeuvres at this time, such a promise would be a good place to begin a reciprocal agreement. Japan staged its largest military exercise in post-war history during early October 1993, and the first combined exercise since 1983.[26] Observation of manoeuvres would not be agreed to by Pyongyang, for fear of revealing weaknesses more than strengths.

* **Consultations on economic cooperation and tourism** Pyongyang is appealing for foreign investment in free trade zones, and although the conditions are not favourable for investment due to lack of infrastructure, it is an opportunity for Japan to encourage North Korea out of its isolation, while the cooperative experience could be the basis for greater developments in the political or military realms.[27] Japan would have to be sensitive to and consult with Seoul prior to any such action, lest it strain Seoul-Tokyo relations. Until the issue of inspections has been dealt with satisfactorily and the international community ceases to look at sanctions, Japan will not be able to move on this issue.

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[26] The exercise involved 9000 ground self defence force (GSDF) members, 37000 maritime SDF personnel (MSDF) and 46000 air SDF personnel (ASDF), operating a total of 120 ships and 760 aircraft. The navy and air force held joint anti-submarine and anti-aircraft exercises with the US Navy and Airforce. *The Korea Times*, 3 October 1993, p.1.

[27] The Ranjin-Songbong special economic zone is located in the northeast corner of North Korea and is part of the Tumen River development area, a "grandiose" project backed by the United Nations Development Project, intended to open up the hinterland of China, North Korea and Russia. According to Mark Clifford, the Tumen River project is a pipe dream in search of money. However, there *are* a number of interested investors but the NPT crisis has slowed progress. See Clifford, "Send Money" *FEER*, Vol. 156, No. 39 (30 September 1993), p. 72 and Ed Paisley, "White Knights," *FEER*, Vol. 157, No. 9 (3 March 1994), p. 46.

These measures are extremely limited but do represent a start to the process. Basic communication measures are the only reasonable measures that can be suggested at this time.

JAPANESE-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Despite a continued underlying lack of trust and understanding of one another's societies, relations and cooperation continue to improve. South Korean President Kim Young Sam hosted Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa for a successful summit meeting in November 1993, where Hosokawa delivered a clear apology to Koreans for Japan's aggression during the colonial period and WWII, the first time a Japanese politician had sufficiently addressed the issue. A follow-up summit was held in late March 1994, in Tokyo, where pledges were made for the **meeting of defence ministers** and **reciprocal goodwill portcalls by naval vessels**, unprecedented in military relations. A variety of meetings are now being held in the economic, political and most recently security fields but clearly, while bilateral economic and political cooperation is forging ahead, military and cultural exchanges[28] still lag far behind. Military CBMs will have to be very modest at the outset.

* **Non-use of force declaration**

* **Direct exchange of military information, including published white papers, defence budgets, force structures, weapon systems, and weapons system development information.** As both have mutual security treaties with the United States, there is little threat of short term military confrontation, but the act of exchanging information is more important that the actual information exchanged, in establishing the process of information sharing.

* **Exchange of defence officials and defence ministers** to establish communication on a high level and provide an opportunity to clarify misplaced threat perceptions and discuss mutual concerns.

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[28] To date, Japanese mass popular culture, including music, films, are prohibited by law from entering South Korea. Although there have been discussions for some time directed at lifting the ban, opposition is strong.

* **Exchange of military delegations** of mid-ranking and lower ranking military personnel. This would provide the opportunity for better understanding the fundamental nature of each group. This should be conducted on the basis of invitation, demonstrating goodwill and a desire for better relations.

* **Establishment of hot lines and cool lines** In the short run, these may serve more as a communication link relating to the North Korean crisis rather than an emergency link between the two countries.

* **Notification of military activities, particularly naval and air** in the Sea of Japan.

* **Observation of military activities** This could be undertaken by joint teams of Korean and US Forces Korea military personnel and Japanese and US Forces Japan military personnel, the US forces acting as a buffer between direct Japan-South Korean activity. The US Forces, having a working understanding of both militaries, may be well positioned to clarify misunderstandings or aid in communication. This should be undertaken at first by invitation, along the lines of the Helsinki CBMs, later expanding to obligatory observation.

* **Promotion of the cultural exchange high school and university students**, sponsored by both government and business groups with commercial interests in the other country. Emphasis should be placed on visiting a variety of historic and culturally important sites, providing students the opportunity to better understand the foundations of the other culture and to dispel persistent disdain. In addition, students should be asked to identify issues that they consider to be important on a regional or global scale. Issues of common interest could then serve as a focal point for an ongoing and task oriented project addressing the concerns. Access to quality mass culture (such as movies, music and arts) should be permitted and promoted jointly. This unconventional measure is important to address the persistent lack of accurate understanding about each other. Prejudices persist and will continue to breed suspcions in the future unless addressed now.

After implementation of these information and communication CBMs, South Korea and Japan could move to apply constraint CBMs.

* **Mutual inspection of facilities related to nuclear energy, the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapons development capability.** After employing these basic information and communication CBMs and developing a habit of consultation, it would be useful to discuss implementation of such an inspection regime, given that both South Korea and Japan are concerned about future weapons development spurred by changes in the international environment.

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Both China and Japan share suspicions about one another's aspirations for economic and military dominance in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century.

However, China and Japan have made moves to establish links between both their foreign and defence ministries. Inaugural security talks were held in December 1993, where Japan's defence policy and China's rapid equipment modernisation program were discussed, providing a good starting point from which to proceed with CBMs.

*** No first use of force declaration**

*** Publication and exchange of defence budget, force structure and deployment.** China recently printed a white paper on defence, although it was a very brief document which contained basically the same information found in the IISS *Military Balance.* However, the fact that Beijing produced one at all is a significant step in itself. China's defence budget does not include revenue earned from the production of civilian goods or arms sales, nor does it include arms purchases. Efforts should be made for standardisation of this information and subsequent direct exchange.

*** Continued exchange of high level defence officials** The military still has a great deal of influence politically in China, and thus it is important to establish positive relations with those in charge at the higher levels. In addition, the military has become involved in business and development projects. **Economic cooperation** in general but particularly with **military enterprises producing civilian goods** could establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

*** Establish hot and cool lines**

*** Notification of naval and air manoeuvres or movements** China, Japan and Taiwan all claim the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.[29] Beijing's recent bold reassertion of its sovereignty over the Senkakus, the Spratly's and the Paracels and subsequent stationing of troops in the Spratly's has alarmed many in the region, fearing that Beijing may be willing to take the islands by force. This casts suspicion over unexpected manoeuvres or deployments and thus advance notification by both is very important.

The Chinese have been known to value their secrecy, which although it makes a good case for transparency, necessitates development in a very gradual manner. China staunchly advocates

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[29] The Senkakus lie approximately equidistant from Okinawa and Taiwan, bestowing over 21000 square kilometres of continental shelf, believed to contain one of the last explored sources of oil and natural gas in maritime Asia. Sovereignty would extend to the airspace above the claim as well. See Rau, "Japan's Growing Involvement," p. 66.

non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and thus would resist implementation of intrusive measures, at least in the formative stages of a relationship.

SINO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Seoul and Beijing have witnessed bilateral trade soar, particularly since they normalised relations in August 1992. In an scheduled visit to Beijing in March 1994, South Korean President Kim Young Sam will discuss such **joint development of aircraft and other projects, cultural exchanges, fisheries concerns and most importantly the North Korean situation.** On the diplomatic front, in 1993 China returned the remains of five Korean independence fighters to South Korea, a **tacit acknowledgement of South Korea as the legitimate government on the peninsula.** On the military side, in October 1993 the respective foreign ministers agreed to **exchange military attaches between embassies.** Although most of the developments between the two former enemies are in the economic sphere, small steps are being made in the security arena. Further confidence building measures could include:

* **Non-use of force declaration**

* **Publication and exchange of defence budgets and force structure**

* **Notification of naval and airforce manoeuvres** particularly in the East China Sea.

* **Hot lines and cool lines** for immediate consultation in crisis. This could be most useful in dealing with developments in the North Korean situation.

As Pyongyang's lone remaining ally, Beijing is sensitive not to alienate Pyongyang by undertaking significant steps in the area of military confidence building and cooperation with

Seoul, lest it isolate Pyongyang further and prompt it to resort to drastic measures.[30] By the same token, an exceptionally weak stance on Pyongyang's intransigence could adversely affect the budding Seoul-Beijing relationship.[31] For the time being, a bilateral relationship fostered by economic and industrial cooperation would seem more prudent than seeking far reaching methods of military cooperation. One area slated for **industrial cooperation is in the construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants,** which could provide the foundation for a trilateral or multilateral cooperation project with North Korea, which is desperately in need of electricity.[32]

SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS The current relationship between Beijing and Moscow is one of the most active of the previously antagonistic relationships in the region and one which has displayed the most characteristics of traditional and successful European style confidence building measures. Since the early 1980s **significant unilateral, non-negotiated cuts in border troops and tanks have been made by both Beijing and Moscow.**[33] The first *formal* agreement was not signed until 24 April 1990, when Li Peng visited Moscow to discuss further border reductions. Currently **senior Ministry of Defence officials exchange visits,** and **officials at the**

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[30] China and North Korea still maintain their relationship as allies, requiring each to automatically intervene if the other is engaged in war against a third country, although in reality, China's ties with Seoul are becoming increasingly stronger and Beijing would not likely blindly support adventuristic action by Pyongyang.

[31] China has refused to join the other powers in approving economic sanctions against North Korea, choosing instead to work behind the scenes and encourage Pyongyang to engage in dialogue.

[32] For further details, see Yu Kun-ha, "Seoul, Beijing seek industrial alliance," *The Korea Herald*, 20 February 1994, p. 8.

[33] For more detailed discussion of the unilateral reductions along the border by both China and the Soviet Union, see Gerald Segal, "A New Order in Northeast Asia," *Arms Control Today* Vol. 17, Nol 7 (September 1991), p. 14.

political level meet regularly to discuss issues of regional and global concern.

In December 1992, Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Yang Shangkun, signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to accelerate work on a **mutual reduction of armed forces in the border region and building confidence in the military sphere across the border**, culminating in an agreement by the end of 1994. Until then, they agreed to **reduce armed forces in the agreed border region to a minimum level**, give remaining troops a **clearly defensive nature**, and commit to **"no first use" of nuclear weapons nor to use the threat of nuclear use against any non-nuclear state.**[34] Prior to the Yeltsin-Yang meeting, the eighth round of Sino-Russian disarmament talks was held, resulting in a commitment to eventually withdraw their main forces back 100 km on each side of the border to **establish a 200 km stability zone of decreased military activity.**[35] In November 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev met with his Chinese counterpart Chi Haotian in Beijing, the first Russian defence minister to visit China since the Soviet breakup. In establishing further confidence building measures, they agreed to **send 3 additional military attaches to each capital, exchange military delegations** (7 Chinese delegations are slated for Moscow in 1994), **jointly develop a new jet fighter for China**, the Super 7, based on the Russian MiG-21, and **signed a five year agreement on military cooperation and promote friendly relations between the two armies.**

Ironically, the success of these bilateral confidence building measures can have a potentially

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[34] Pledges were also made to improve trade and cooperation in the conversion of defence industries, construction of atomic power plants and outer space research to name a few.

[35] See Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions," p. 256.

adverse affect on other regional players, who might view the new relationship as a little too cosy for comfort. Pyongyang has certainly been isolated by this evolution, as it can no longer play China and Russia off against one another. Japan and South Korea may also be threatened by such a development in the future. Such is the paradox of bilateral confidence building in a regional context: confidence building in one case can stimulate confidence erosion in another.

RUSSO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Russia has eyed South Korea as a possible substitute economic partner for Japan, yet despite surging two-way trade, which has doubled in the last five years, the economic and political cooperation foreseen when diplomatic relations were restored in 1990 has failed to materialize for two main reasons: 1) Seoul's suspension of economic aid due to Moscow's tardy servicing of interest payments on previous loans; and 2) Russia's refusal to pay compensation for victims of the Korean Air Lines flight shot down ten years ago.[36]

Military ties have been expanding however and Russia is hoping to expand military cooperation with South Korea. In August 1993, a **Russian flotilla paid a goodwill visit to Pusan,** the first since 1904 while **two South Korean ships made a return port call in Vladivostok** one month later. **Russia has proposed joint naval drills but Seoul has yet to agree. Russia envisages increased military exchanges, leading to joint rescue exercises for fishing boats and**

[36] Although Russia has offered to settle some of its debts through weapons transfers, Seoul will unlikely accept on the basis of incompatability with US equipment and Washington's obvious opposition. Regarding the airlines issue, Russia has failed to reveal if it recovered any of the bodies or belongings from the crash and accepts no responsibility, citing the jet's failure to respond to warnings, a claim staunchly disputed by Seoul. For details, see Shim Jae Hoon, "Russian Roulette, *FEER*, Vol. 156, No. 40 (7 October 1993), p. 30.

ultimately combined drills.[37] However, Seoul is sensitive to a reaction from Tokyo, given that Tokyo and Moscow have yet to normalise relations. **Russia is also interested in the joint development of privatising Russia's arms industry,** eyeing South Korean capital and marketing expertise, although little is likely to happen until the aforementioned issues of contention are relieved.

Russia seems to have little concern for the impact that closer relations with Seoul will have on Pyongyang. Although North Korea still permits Russia overflight rights en route to Vietnam, the two countries have **ceased joint naval manoeuvres since 1990.** Russia has also **terminated nuclear and military assistance** to its former close ally. However, Russia has not relinquished all ties and should a more conservative government arise in the future, there could be a reinvigoration of relations.[38]

NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS The North-South relationship is currently at an impasse, as Pyongyang insists on dealing directly with the United States on the NPT issue. However, North and South Korea *had* made progress in the realm of confidence building by agreeing to **The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and**

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[37] South Korea only has one chopper and one boat for rescue operations. The boat tragedy of 10 October 1993, which left 200 people dead or missing, proved that the maritime police were incompetent in rescue operation. New attention placed on joint search and rescue operations could be of benefit in the prevention of future tragedies.

[38] Russia sold 12 submarines to North Korea, allegedly for use as scrap metal. However, analysts feel that North Korea might use the old Russian subs to upgrade its own fleet.

Cooperation at the sixth Inter-Korean prime minister's talks in 1990.[39] During the talks, Seoul indicated its acceptance of Pyongyang's proposal for simultaneous, mutual inspections, and went further to propose a simultaneous trial inspection at the end of January 1992. In addition, they signed the **Joint North-South Declaration on Denuclearisation,** 31 December 1991, pledging the renunciation of nuclear processing and uranium enrichment facilities and a North-South reciprocal inspection, to be carried out by the **Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).** Disagreements over the scope of inspections and necessity of challenge inspections prohibited progress of the JNCC and served as a warning sign to Seoul that Pyongyang was stalling for time to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities.[40] However, regardless of previous steps and agreements relating to arms control and confidence building, it would seem that there is little hope for the resumption of positive steps until the NPT crisis is resolved, a time which no one can predict for now.

There has been endless debate regarding the use of carrots and/or sticks in dealing with Pyongyang's intransigence. The main carrot to be offered by both Seoul and the international community would be economic assistance while the primary stick would be economic sanctions. However, although investment is desperately needed, it would almost certainly be accompanie

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[39] The Basic Agreement on Non-Aggression contains the following provisions: 1) No use of force and no armed aggression against the other side; 2) peaceful settlement of differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiation; 3) designation of the military demarcation line and zone of nonaggression; 4) establishment and operation of a North-South Joint Military Commission to implement and guarantee nonaggression along with confidence building matters; 5) installation of a telephone hotline between the military authorities of both sides; and 6) formation of a North-South Military Commission to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement and the removal of military confrontation. See Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Inter-Korean Military Confidence Building: A Creative Implementation Formula," *Korea Observer* Vol. 24, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 381.

[40] See Paik Jin Hyun, "Nuclear Conundrum: Analysis and Assessment of Two Koreas' Policy Regarding the Nuclear Issue," *Korea and World Affairs,* Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 632.

by a foreign presence, which brings both polluting influences to North Korean society and potential witnesses of North Korea's decay and suspected human rights violations, turning a carrot into a "poisoned carrot."[41]

One proposal that has been discussed in Seoul, albeit behind closed doors, has been that in exchange for Pyongyang's acceptance of challenge inspections, Seoul would help bankroll and jointly construct and operate a nuclear power plant in the DMZ.[42] This could offer an interesting opportunity for Canada, which is expanding its cooperative agreement with South Korea in the atomic energy industry by jointly advancing into third world countries for the construction of nuclear power plants.[43] Such a project would be a true carrot for Pyongyang as it would not involve any penetration into North Korean society, which is the prime consideration for Pyongyang.

BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: A SUMMARY

Bilateral confidence building measures can be useful in dealing with the issue-specific nature of relations in Northeast Asia and they provide flexibility in circumventing stumbling blocks that

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[41] See Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," p. 150.

[42] Personal communication with Richard Lawless, President, USAsia Commercial Development Corporation, 15 February 1994, Seoul.

[43] Ottawa and Seoul reached an agreement to closely cooperate in the resolution of nuclear problems in the international community, including the extension of the NPT, regional nuclear proliferation and the peaceful use of atomic energy. Planned projects include the transfer of nuclear fuel-related technology from Canada, assistance in training nuclear technicians from third countries and cooperation in the management of nuclear spent fuel and wastes. For details of the new agreement, see "Korea, Canada Agree on Energy Projects, *The Korea Times*, 31 October 1993, p. 3.

would otherwise be road blocks in a multilateral confidence building regime. The proposals suggested here are extremely modest and militarily insignificant, primarily utilising information and communication CBMs, while leaving verification and constraint CBMs for application after some barriers of mistrust and misperception have been broken down. Verification plays a vital role in confidence building, but at the outset it is important for nations to get to the table and establish channels for dialogue. There is reason for caution however. With every improvement in bilateral relations, there is the possibility of a counterreaction by another regional member, who may feel threatened when a previously adversarial or benign relationship improves. For this reason, it is important to work simultaneously toward enhancing a regional security dialogue process as well.

A ROLE FOR A MULTILATERAL REGIONAL FRAMEWORK?

For a number of years now, there have been a host of proposals tabled to establish a framework for a multilateral security dialogue in Asia, at both regional and subregional levels. Although opposed at first by the Americans, Japanese and Chinese, there has been a gradual acceptance of the idea but no agreement yet on the form. Indeed, the first proposals for collective security came from the Soviets, thus generating cold responses from the Americans, but now almost every nation has voiced a proposal. There has been much talk about architecture and structures, yet function seems to recived less attention due to the preoccupation with form. There are a number of common security issues which require regional cooperation to be effectively addressed, but unfortunately in many cases, there are competing interests. For example, there are proliferators and non-proliferators of missiles within the same region. Will a proliferator agree to cooperate

on non-proliferation measures? The following list includes some of the common security concerns in Northeast Asia:

*** Pollution, such as the dumping of nuclear waste into the Japan Sea by Russia and environmental degradtion from rapid industrialisation, particularly in China.**

*** Protecting the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs).**

*** Ensuring the dismantling nuclear arsenals in the former Soviet Union and disposal of fissile materials**

*** Unemployment of a growing number of Russian nuclear scientists and defence industry personnel, who could be tempted to work for clandestine weapons programs in China, North Korea and Middle East countries.**

*** Ensuring the safety of civilian nuclear power plants, which are the preferred source of electricity for Northeast Asian states.**

*** Controlling the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, by addressing supply side incentives.**

AN EXERCISE IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

The difficulty in establishing a regional security dialogue is in trying to find a common, tangible interest that all states benefit from and none suffer. As Stewart Henderson notes:

> States do not base their security on altruistic, unfounded notions of cooperation. It is only through an appeal to national interests that the building blocks of a cooperative security system will be put in place. Cooperative security is not a theory but a practical method of dealing with important issues.[44]

Some have stated that the North Korean NPT crisis could provide serve as a focal point for regional cooperation, since it is the greatest threat to regional and quite possibly international

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[44] Stewart Henderson, *Canada and Asia Pacific Security - Recent Trends*, NPCSD Working Paper Number 1, (Toronto: York University, 1991) p. 2.

security.[45] This issue, more than any other issue, demonstrates the perils associated with lack of trust, the absence of reliable information and insensitivity to the fears of other states. Although the NPT crisis has served as a catalyst in bringing together nations that would otherwise not cooperate on international foreign policy, such as the United States and China or Russia and Japan, it can in the future also serve as a divisive issue. China, for example, does not support the imposition of sanctions against Pyongyang but recommends continued dialogue.[46] The United States and its allies would need the cooperation of China in order to enforce an embargo against North Korea, since China is one of the few countries still conducting trade, limited as it is, with Pyongyang. In addition to official channels of trade, economic activity between North Korea and the northeast China region is not well regulated, and any attempt at sanctions, if supported by Beijing, would have to address this independent regional activity. However, the failure of Beijing to officially cooperate would surely strain relations between the United States and China, who are already on unfriendly ground over human rights issues, arms sales, nuclear testing and the extension in June of Most Favoured Nation trading status to China.

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[45] According to CIA Director James Woolsey, North Korea represents the highest potential for instability in the world, cited in *The Korea Herald*, 26 February 1994, p. 1. The comment was made prior to the IAEA's unsuccessful attempt to fully carry out desired inspections, the subsequent referral of the situation to the UN Security Council and North Korea's comments that Seoul would turn into a "sea of flames" if Pyongyang were provoked by sanctions or the resumption of Team Spirit military exercises.

[46] After the failure of the IAEA to complete full inspections of the radiochemical laboratory (believed to be a nuclear reprocessing facility) during mid-March 1994, Washington and Seoul began to reconsider an increasingly hardline approach, and voiced hopes for China's cooperation. However, the Chinese seem even more reluctant to oblige than in the past. According to Zhang Tingyan, Chinese Ambassador to Seoul, "It's an international rule to solve all issues through dialogue. Why should the North Korean nuclear problem be an exception? China cannot agree to sanctions by the Security Council or any other stringent measures,[which] are not only ineffective, but would also complicate matters and aggravate the situation." See *The Korea Herald*, 20 March 1994, p. 2.

Within the Japanese cabinet as well, the issue of sanctions is a particularly divisive issue. The socialist faction (SDP), the largest in the Hosokawa government, relies heavily on political contributions and electoral support from the pro-Pyongyang Koreans and emphatically opposes sanctions. Hosokawa, under pressure from the United States to lend his support to international efforts, leans towards supporting sanctions. It is also questionable whether the government has the ability or the political will to cut the unofficial cashflow to North Korea. There is additional concern within the administration that Tokyo's support of sanctions would infuriate Pyongyang and potentially incite retaliation against Japan.[47] Therefore, although it is in the interests of all to continue to work together to improve the situation, it does not quite fit the aforementioned criteria as an ideal problem solving solution to enhancing regional cooperation.

It is a tall order to find such a common problem acceptable for cooperation by all Northeast Asian states, but there is one that exists now, is a threat to all in the region, and which all states, even North Korea, can cooperate in addressing. This is the dumping of nuclear waste (primarily and most extensively by Russian) into the Sea of Japan.

In April 1993, it was revealed that Moscow had been dumping nuclear waste into the Seas of Japan at least since the earliest records were kept in 1966. Public outcry has been especially loud in Japan, as the dumping is practically on its doorstep. However, both Koreas and China have

[47] The North Korean Workers' Party daily newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun,* attacked Japanese leaders for supporting the "hardline stance" of the US, stating "If the situation on the Korean Peninsula [becomes] worse and war breaks out, Japan will never be safe, either...The reckless military action of the japanese reactionaries against the Korean people will result in digging their own grave." *The Korea Herald*, 27 March 1994, p. 1.

also condemned the dumping.[48] Tokyo was particularly enraged that Moscow would dump nuclear waste on Japan's doorstep only days after Yeltsin visited Japan to improve bilateral relations, seemingly without any warning.[49]

Russia claims that it has no choice by to dump the waste at sea because it lacks the storage capacity on land and the amount currently stored on floating tankers is growing as submarines and other atomic powered navy vessels are being decommissioned. Japan has been considering releasing some of the $100 million it has set aside in funds to help Russia disarm its nuclear weapons. Japan has agreed to finance the construction of a reprocessing plant by Japanese firms in Russia's Far East if Russia stops the dumping, although these would take two years to construct. However, in late February, Russia said that it could not ratify the permanent ban on nuclear dumping but would "endeavour to avoid pollution of the sea by dumping of wastes and other matter" according to the International Maritime Organization.[50] However, subsequent reports indicate that Russia sees the need to continue dumping.

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[48] China announced a ban on nuclear waste dumping on 18 February 1994. The new rules will conform to the three resolutions approved last year by the international Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution. Beijing stated that "disposing of wastes without a license or dumping irresponsibly at sea will be punished severely". *The Korea Herald*, 20 February 1994, p. 5.

[49] However, Moscow did inform one of the three nuclear watchdogs, the IAEA, two weeks in advance of its plan, but the international body failed to pass on the information. The dumping occurred at precisely the same time that IAEA director-general Hans Blix was in Seoul participating in the IAEA sponsored "International Symposium on Advanced Nuclear Power Systems." Greenpeace condemned Blix and the IAEA stating, "The IAEA's failure to inform the governments involved clearly shows where its intention lies - not in environmental or human protection, but in promotion of nuclear power and radioactive waste dumping." That same day, Blix met with President Kim Young Sam, expressing his concern over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which Greenpeace called a terrible contradiction. See *The Korea Times*, 20 October 1993, p. 4.

[50] *The Korea Herald*, 23 February 1994, p. 1.

The situation provides a good opportunity for joint cooperative effort in achieving a common goal. In addition, this issue overlaps a wide range of government agencies and officials from departments of foreign affairs, environment, science and technology, national security and maritime and port administrations. Cooperation by similar ministries of the regional members could be a prime example of non-traditional CBM, as it would establish a channel for dialogue in which all have a common goal. Likely 80% of the people who would be involved in an arms control and confidence building dialogue would have to be involved in such a project.

The issue is not only the dumping of low level radioactive waste, which is a highly visible, political and psychological issue, but also dealing with the spent fuel rods upon decommissioning. These rods, which are highly radio-active *and* can be reprocessed for use in a bomb pose both a *safety* and a *safeguards* risk. Finally, there is the issue of the reactor, which must be physically extracted from the vessels and dealt with effectively. In the past, they have been dumped in the ocean as well. With 100 more ships to be decommissioned in the near future, 30-40 of which use nuclear propulsion, this issue is timely and a time-bomb, not only in the environmental sense but as it affects Russia's relations with its neighbours.

The public perception of nuclear issues, be it weapons or energy or waste, is of great concern to the all Northeast Asian administrations, who are all committed to nuclear energy. Negative press on this issue could pose domestic challenges as people question the safety of the nuclear energy option. This offers as opportunity for Canada to contribute its expertise in the area of nuclear energy, nuclear safety and verification and provides the Northeast Asian states with a

viable, necessary and mutually beneficial project for cooperation. This, coupled with efforts to improve bilateral relations, could establish an issue driven framework which could be expanded into a regional security dialogue in the future, once efforts on the bilateral side address the stumbling blocks to larger cooperation and facilitate the view of a common house.

North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs From a Non-Proliferation Perspective: Challenge to Verification

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I . Perceptual Importance on North Korea's Arms Programs

North Korea's nuclear development porgram has emerged as one of the most important security issues of world politics in the post Cold War era. The international community is mainly concerned about nuclear weapons porliferation on a global scale due to North Korea's nuclear program as well as the inter- Korean problem on the Korean Peninsula. The United States as the sole military super power after the Cold War takes charge of preventing North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons in cooperation with Japan, Russia and China. Through bilateral and multilateral talks such as the IAEA and the U.N., the U.S. gradually puts pressures on North Korea to give up its dubious program.

It is of no question that North Korea sticks to development of nuclear weapons as its regime-defensive strategy in the environment of diplomatic isolation and economic plight. It would be almost cirtain for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons in the near future if the current situation continues. By the way, the inter- Korean negotiation on reciprocal inspections has been interrupted. The international negotiations with North Korea led by the U.S. and the IAEA also encountered difficult situation due to North Korea's stubborn attitude toward its nuclear issue. Yet the efforts of the international community to guarantee North Korea's nuclear transparency will contunue. On the other hand, North Korea has made another effort to develop ballistic missiles and already possesses sophisticated missiles with range of over 1,000 km. North Korea's missile program emerges as significant regional security threat which will be able to deliver nuclear warheads.

This article is written to empahsize the importance of basic perceptions of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. According to various informations and different judgments, concerned countries perceive North Korea's arms programs and take measures. Yet

it is quite natural that different recognitions eventually lead to different policy options. Thus the perceptual importance on specific situation can not emphasize too much.

In order to see North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, we must expand our analytical horizon to historical background. It is well known that North Korea has sought to overthrow South Korean government and communize the entire Korean Peninsula at any means and its regime's legitimacy has been internally sustained by the national strategy. Lots of military provocations and subversive actions against South Korea convinces us of aggressive hostilities of the Kim Il-Sung regime.

North Korea still lives in the defunct Cold War. Although North Korea feels isolated from outside world and falls far behind South Korean econmy, we are not still comfortable because of the likelihood of the North's desperate dependence on military means against us. With historical facts and rigidity of the regime, we can not get rid of our negative perceptions of North Korea. Its provocative behavior and deceptive attitude never be easily changed. Without verifying North Korea's voluntary change, our perception can not turn into favorable terms.

Our perception on the North has been aggravated by its suspicious nuclear program. Whether North Korea develops nuclear weapons for the sake of its regime defense or for acquisition of reliable military operational weapons system, we ought to countermeasure any North Korean plots for prevention of devastating effect of nuclear warfare on the Korean Peninsula. However, even if we perceive North Korea's intention negatively, our policy toward the North is based on the principle of peaceful coexistence and resolution which is characteristic of step-by-step negotiations and incremental approaches. Considering current situation of the Korean Peninsula and security environment, we are convinced that South Korea's gradual reunification policy pursues the most desirable common values for two Koreas emphasizing enhancement of confidence and security building measures, expansion of exchange and economic

cooperations, and recovery of national identity.

Despite of our die-hard negative perception on North Korea, destabilizing impact of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs should be restored through diplomatic efforts with concerned countries. Our negative images to North Korea do not mean to deny effectiveness of negotiations with North Korea. It rather should develop constructively into tolerating and embracing strategy which reflects South Korea's grown capacity compared with the North. South Korea also endeavors to keep pace with policies of the international community to prevent catastrophic situation in the Korean Peninsula on the basis of shared perception on the North.

Taking the perceptual importance and the choice of cautious strategy into consideration, I would like to express some suggestions about solving North Korea's nuclear and missile issues with special emphasis of negotiability from a non-proliferation perspective. At first, I begin to analyze North Korea's intentions and capabilities of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Then I review the negotiation procedure which has muddled through between two Koreas and the international community until now.

Ⅱ. North Korea's Intentions on the Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs

Why does North Korea adhere to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs so strongly? The answer of its intention should be sought from the changing international security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula since the collapse of communism on a global scale from the end of the 1980s. North Korea began to feel its political and economic situations quite unsecure which could affect its totalitarian hermit kingdom to come to an end abruptly. Its national economic indicators also have signalled very pessimistically with drastic reduction

of external assistances from its communist neighbor countries. Even if North Korea has contended that it could survive at any rate without aid of other countries, it never overcome diplomatic isolation and deteriorating economy. It is quite certain that the North suffers from gloomy symptoms of communism like other collapsed communist countries.

Moreover North Korea can not endure the growing superiority of South Korean economic power. Since the 1970s, North Korea has fallen behind South Korea in terms of almost all of competitions between two countries. Up to 1990 South Korean economy has developed 10 times of that of North Korea which led the North to accept its failure of economic planning. Since the establishment of the Kim Il-Sung regime, North Korea has devoted itself to economic development and excessively invested its achievement to building up its armed forces in order to forcibly unify the Korean Peninsula. Its once formidable military became an economic burden toward the end of the 1980s.

North Korea also became aware of possible reversal of conventional military balance in favor of South Korea which has pursued the ambitious conventional weapons development program with assistance of the U.S. The North felt it necessary that it should turn its attention to development of strategic weapons system such as nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

In short, nuclear and ballistic missile programs are the result of strategic choice of the North which tries to maintain its weakening regime capability in both miliary and economic aspects. North Korea's intentions to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles can be summarized into two objectives. One is military objective, the other is diplomatic objective. Under the isolated situation in the post Cold War era, North Korea never accept South Korean superiority in conventional arms race. Only way to refrain from this possible reality is to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as its delivery system. In case of North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, what South Korea is most worried about is not the possibility that North

Korea would use nuclear weapons directly to us, but the fact that North Korea will become easy to decide the war against the South. With nuclear weapons, the North will be more comfortable to wage war against us. The hostilities of the Kim Il-Sung regime will be increased with the development of weapons of mass destruction on the verge of deadlock of politico-economic situation of North Korea. That is the prime reason why we make every effort to deter North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

With respect of diplomatic objective, it seems to be true that North Korea's arms programs provide it with some leverages to negotiate with the international community. Especially North Korea attempts to improve diplomatic relationship with the U.S. and Japan which will be able to help the North out of its diplomatic isolation. North Korea desperately needs foreign investment and financial assistance which will be available from these countries. Taking advantage of nuclear development program as the most sensitive international issue, North Korea plays at a tug of war with the U.S. Kim Il-Sung may have believed that having nuclear weapons could neutralize the threat from US nuclear weapons. It has been successful in attracting concerns from the U.S. and the international community by playing the game with the NPT. However, it is doubtful whether North Korea has achieved diplomatic objective because the U.S. and concerned countries have not expressed any interests except deterring North Korea's nuclear weapons. This is the obvious limit of North Korean diplomacy focusing on its nuclear program.

On the other hand, nuclear and ballistic missile programs can offer a low-cost alternative for security in comparison with conventional weapons in economic aspects.[1] North Korea also alleviates its economic plight by exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and related equipments to the Middle East countries such as Iran, Syria and Libia. In conclusion, North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are intended to pursue its military objective primarily in order to keep superiority over South Korea and its diplomatic objective additionally in order

to connect itself with the U.S. and Japan for defending the regime.

Ⅲ. North Korea's Capabilities of the Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs

North Korea's nuclear development program began when it concluded an agreement in August 1956 with the Soviet Union to participate in establishing the Dbuna Mulinational Nuclear Research Institute in the Soviet Union. North Korea used to send many scientists every year to exchange nuclear technology with East European scholars and to establish a foundation for its own nuclear development.

In September 1959, an agreement between North Korea and the Soviet Union on a mutual assistance program for nuclear energy research was concluded. It meant the establishment of official ties for cooperation in regard to nuclear development. In February 1962, North Korea, with Soviet aid, constructed a nuclear energy research in Youngbyun. In June 1965, it introduced a 2 MW test reactor from Moscow. In the 1970s, North Korea concentrated on expanding nuclear research facilities and training the necessary personnel. In September 1974, it joined the IAEA and began to import various nuclear related equipment such as radioactive sensors and uranium detecting devices from western countries.

From the middle of the 1980s, outside world saw the signs that North Korea was pursuing a full-scale nuclear development program. From the end of 1986, nuclear reactor NO 1 of Youngbyun, with an electrical output of 5 MW, began to operate. It emerged rapidly as a problem nuclear facility. The world suspects that North Korea has extracted plutonium from the used nuclear fuel discharged from this nuclear reactor. In short, North Korea's nuclear reactor NO 1 is being used to justify the necessity of reprocessing, producing plutonium needed

for developing nuclear weapons, and to experiment for the design and consturction of medium or large-sized nuclear power plant in the coming years. Because of the characteristic of this reactor, North Korea contends to possess its reprocessing facilities. With its experience constructing nuclear reactor NO 1, North Korea is building a 50 MW power generating reactor in Youngbyun and a 200 MW power generating reactor in Taechun.

The Soviet Union signed a construction agreement with North Korea for a nuclear power plant at Shinpo in December 1985 in exchange for North Norea joining the NPT in 1985. But the project was suspended after North Korea delayed implementing full-scale safeguards measures required by the IAEA. North Korea wanted to operate nuclear reactor NO 1 without inspections. This event led the international community to be suspicious of North Korea's nuclear development program. This reactor had been in operation for five years until international inspections started in 1992.[2]

There are conflicting analyses of North Korea's nuclear weapons manufacturing capability. Some estimate the capacity of the reprocessing facilities in Youngbyun from the size of the building to be approximately 200 tons per year, while other specialists estimate it to be about 70 tons per year. There are also many different opinions on the quantity of the after-use nuclear fuel that could be discharged from nuclear reactor NO 1 with its 5 MW capacity. Some believe that there is almost none of the after-use nuclear fuel stockpiled since the fuel has never been replaced as North Korea claims, while others believe that the reactor must have discharged as much after-use nuclear fuel as it could by a short-term-low-output method. There are conflicting opinions also on what could have happened to the discharged after-use nuclear fuel. Clarifying these conflicting guesses on North Korea's nuclear capability, the IAEA has continued to demand North Korea that its nuclear facilities should be fully inspected as a duty of the NPT membership.

North Korea began to develop ballistic missile program in the early 1970s when the Soviet Union delievered FROG-5 surface-to-surface missiles to North Korea. At first North Korea accumulated its missile technology mainly for reverse-engineering. In 1981, North Korea acquired 24 Soviet SCUD-B missiles whose range is 180 to 300 km with the CEP (Circle Error of Probability) of 900 meters. North Korea discarded its plans to reengineer the FROG-7 and completely reorganized its missile program around the SCUD-B. In an agreement with Iran in 1985, North Korea agreed shipment of missiles and related technology to Iran when they became available, while Iran provided financing for the North Korea's missile program. North Korea also made various covert efforts to acquire missile-related technology and equipments, and guidance system from western countries from 1982 to 1987.

In 1985 North Korea succeeded to develop the improved version of SCUD-B missile with range of 320 to 340 km and payload of 1,000 kg. Encouraged by the achievement, North Korea speeded up its missile program. It produced 8 to 12 operational model of SCUD-B missiles every month and shipped 100 missiles to Iran from 1987 to 1988. In late 1988, North Korea began to deploy these missiles in regiment-sized elements with each unit having between 12 and 18 launchers.[3]

Because of various merits of possessing ballistic missiles, North Korea spurred the improvement of SCUD-series missile. The acquisition of ballistic missiles would off-set a similar capability that South Korea has. An improved SCUD would provide North Korea with a strategic weapon in Northeast Asia. Ballistic missiles are an important symbol of political and military prestige to Third World countries as well as earning hard cash which North Korea desperately needs. In 1989, North Korea produced another improved version of the SCUD, called the SCUD-C, with a range of 500 to 600 km and a payload of 700 to 800 kg. Its range is decided depending on the weight of the warhead. North Korea expanded existing missile regiment to the missile

brigade equipped with the SCUD-C missiles in 1991 and also exported them to Iran and Syria.

On May 29 1993, North Korea test-fired a new ballistic missile, called SCUD-D or Nodong-1. The range of the Nodong-1 is estimated to be about 1,000 km with 800 kg warhead which can reach Osaka and Nagoya in Japan and Beijing in China. Some analysts observed that North Korea is developing SCUD-E (the Nodong-2) with range of 1,500 km which will be able to strike any area of Japan. If North Korea could equip a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead, it would make devastating impact on Northeast Asian security environment. The capability of North Korea's missile program is already proven. As North Korea continues to develop, improve, and deploy ballistic missiles, it will escalate security threat felt by South Korea and Japan, which is certain to bring new phase of arms race into Northeast Asia with more deadly consequences.

Ⅳ. The Non-Proliferation Regimes Against North Korea's Arms Programs

North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs have been checked by the non-proliferation regimes of international community such as the NPT and the MTCR. North Korea joins the NPT managed by the IAEA, but does not participate in the MTCR.

In December 1985, North Korea joined the NPT, but delayed to fulfill its obligation under the treaty to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In February 1989, when the IAEA Board of Governors raised the issue of North Korea's delay to conclude a safeguards agreement, North Korea's nuclear program became an important security issue surrounding the Korean Peninsula and drew international attention and suspicion. Shocked by the exposure of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program by the IAEA after the Gulf War, nuclear non-proliferation

became one of the most urgent agenda of the post Cold War era. North Korea claimed that unless all U.S. nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territory of South Korea, it would not sign the safeguards agreement which should have been concluded within 18 months after it became a member according to the Article 3 of the NPT.

In September 1991, President Bush proclaimed unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. ground-launched short-range tactical nuclear weapons from abroad. Responding to President Bush's initiative, President Roh of South Korea unilaterally announced the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in November. According to the Declaration, South Korea would not produce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

North Korea had little choice but to announce that it would sign the safeguards agreement following the U.S. and South Korean's consecutive initiatives. Two Koreas adopted the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization at the last day of 1991 which included the renunciation of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities and the South-North reciprocal inspection. Subsequently, in January 1992 North Korea signed the long-delayed safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Eventually the framework of two inspections system, that is the IAEA inspection and the South-North reciprocal inspection, was designed to enhance transparency over North Korean's nuclear program. The two inspections system was recognized to be mutually complementary to shortcomings of individual inspection.

According to the Joint Declaration, the Joint Nuclear Control Commission was set up in March 1992 to work out the details for the South-North reciprocal inspection. Until January 1993 when its last meeting took place, the JNCC held thirteen plenary meeting and eight working-level contacts. Yet little progress was made due mainly to disagreements over such issues as the modality of inspections and necessity of challenge inspections. North Korea's dubious and

reluctant attitude throughout the JNCC meetings was more than enough to increase our suspicion that the North was simply stalling for time to enable itself to develop nuclear weapons.

In April 1992, North Korea ratified the safeguards agreement and subsequently submitted to the IAEA a report on its nuclear facilities and materials. Based on the report, the IAEA conducted six ad hoc inspections until February 1993. As expected, the reality of North Korea's nuclear ambition began to surface as a result of the inspections. The IAEA technical experts detected significant discrepancies between claims by North Korea and sample analysis of the IAEA. The discrepancies raised the issue of whether the North had reprocessed more plutonium that it had disclosed. The IAEA demanded an unprecedented special inspection of two suspected sites which were believed to store nuclear wastes in February 1993.

In March 12 1993, North Korea abruptly announced to withdraw from the NPT regime responding to the IAEA's resolution to urge North Korea to accept its special inspection. The IAEA referred the matter to the UN Security Council. In May 1993 the Security Council adopted a resolution which called upon North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT and urged all member states to encourage North Korea to respond positively to the resolution.

Apparently in response to this call, two rounds of high-level talks were held between the U.S. and North Korea, the first in New York in June and the second in Geneva in July. At the first round, North Korea decided to suspend the effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT as long as it considered necessary. In turn, the U.S. confirmed the principles of non-use of nuclear weapons, respect for soverignty and non-interference with internal affairs applied to North Korea. At the second round, North Korea promised to begin consultations with the IAEA on safeguards issues and to resume inter-Korean talks on bilateral issues. The U.S. in turn reaffirmed its commitment to the above principles. The U.S. also expressed its intention

to support the conversion of the North Korean nuclear reactor from the current graphite-moderated to light water-moderated ones.[4]

Since August 1993, according to the agreement of the second round talks, the IAEA has consulted with North Korea on the special inspection issue. Yet no progress was made and the nuclear negotiations was stalemated. Blaming South Korea on decision of '94 Team Spirit joint military execise with the U.S. and international cooperation on the nuclear issue, North Korea stalled any inter-Korean talks.

With the prospect for diplomat settlement growing dim, North Korean diplomats held inconclusive talks with the IAEA on January 24 on the deadlock over North Korea's refusal to allow full inspection of its suspected nuclear sites. Meanwhile, the U.S. has signalled it would press the UN to impose sanctions on North Korea if North Korea failed to agree to international inspections by February 21 when the IAEA Board of Governor's meeting was scheduled. The international community was fed up with North Korea's stubborness. With North Korea threatening withdrawal from the NPT again, the time for diplomatic efforts was running out. The world was faced with the serious question of what should be the next step.

On February 15, North Korea announced the acceptance of IAEA's inspections on the declared nuclear facilities. It objected to special inspections to the suspected facilities. The situation turned back to the time just before the North declared the withdrawal from the NPT on March last year. The U.S. tells North Korea that the third round talks between two countries will be held possibly on the end of March according to results of IAEA's inspections and inter-Korean talks for the exchange of special envoy. Although the crashing case was temporarily evaded, North Korea is likely to use stalling tactics in every stage of inspections. The world continues to observe North Korea's next responce to the inspections.

With respect to North Korea's ballistic missiles, it is true that international community

does not have any effective measures enough to deter its development and proliferation. As "technology-denial and sensitive export control regime" like the NPT, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was initiated by western countries in 1987 which is focused on export control of missiles and its related technology.

The MTCR originally focused on delivery systems for nuclear weapons only and applied to missiles with a range in excess of 300 km and a payload of 500 kg or greater. At the Oslo Plenary Meeting of the MTCR members in July 1992, the guidlines for the regime were extended to cover delivery systems intended for use with all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical) capable of a maximum range equal or superior to 300 km. At the Canberra Plenary Meeting in March 1993, the MTCR members expanded to 23 states.[5]

As far as North Korea is already known to possess its own strategic missiles and develop more sophisticated missiles self-sufficiently, the world will not be able to prevent North Korea from developing its missile program. Since it is expected that North Korea would not be interested in joining the MTCR at all, the export of North Korean missiles to the Third World can not stop thoroughly. At present, we observe that the MTCR is not functioning enough to check North Korea's ballistic missile program.

V. Some Suggestions for Negotiable Verification

North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs have been challenging the non-proliferation regimes on a global scale. North Korea's nuclear program is to the NPT what its ballistic missile program is the MTCR. The IAEA has dealt with North Korea's nuclear issue within the framework of the NPT, yet the demand of the IAEA for special inspections on suspected facilities is confronted with North Korea's denial of access to these facilities. North

Korea continues to put blames on the IAEA, the U.S. and South Korea for infringing its sovereignty. But the international community will keep on putting more pressures to the North because North Korea with nuclear weapons loaded in ballistic missiles should never be acceptable due to its unpredictability and hostility.

Given the current situations, will North Korea be able to fulfill both military and diplomatic objectives simultaneously? The answer is absolutely not because two policy objectives are basically contradictory. If North Korea forces its nuclear program for military objective, it will face devastating reactions from the international community which would drive the Korean Peninsula into catastrophe. By the way, if North Krea pursues its diplomatic objective for improvement of relations with other countries, it will first open itself and adapt to the international regimes because the international community never give anything to North Korea before North Korea changes itself. Eventually North Korea should know that it never catch two birds at a stone with the present attitude on the nuclear issue.

As a conclusion, let me raise some suggestions for negotiable verification of North Korea's nuclear program to solve the issue with peaceful manner. The key of successful negotiation lies in dealing between the U.S. and North Korea. The IAEA executes its technical role in order to guarantee the continuity of nuclear transparency. As for South Korea, North Korea's nuclear issue should be handled through international cooperation since South Korea has some carrots to give North Korea, but in fact it does not have enough sticks available to deter and punish North Korea. Although Japan, China and Russia also have influences on the issue to some extent, their roles are not independent, but complementary in the area of international cooperations.

The current mood of the IAEA and the U.S. tends to be much aggressive against North Korea's obstinate stance about its nuclear inspections. Then I would like to suggest that the

IAEA should take back the demand of special inspections to the suspected facilities and concentrate its efforts on completion of lasting routine inspections to seven declared facilities for the purpose of ensuring the transparency of North Korea's nuclear program. With samples of nuclear fuel rod from 5 MW nuclear reactor NO 1 analyzed, amounts of nuclear fuel wastes and reprocessed plutonium could be technically estimated upon which the IAEA would deal with North Korea while sustaining the routine inspections system. Because North Korea as a sovereign state would want to maintain its justification, it is most likely to deny any special inspections ay any cost and instead accept the routine inspections by the IAEA.

With the routine inspections accepted by North Korea, the U.S. should demand the inter-Korean talks concerning resumption of the JNCC on reciprocal inspections between two Koreas. As a consideration, the U.S. would promise North Korea the inspections to the U.S. military bases in South Korea and the suspension of the Team Spirit exercise. The U.S. would also suggest a regular meeting of the high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea. The U.S. would urge North Korea to resume the inter-Korean high-level talks and the Joint Commissions. As a matter of course, all these suggestions should be carried out through close consultations between the U.S. and South Korean governments.

As the nuclear issue is settled down, South Korea will propose various economic cooperations to North Korea and the U.S. will escalate talking level with North Korea. As everything will go fine, North Korea's missile program naturally will be the next agenda to be negotiated within the MTCR framework. As far as possible, we should evade extremely confronting measures and make every effort to solve the difficult issues with peaceful diplomatic methods to the end. Inspections as a method of verification has been and will continue to be a major mechanism to be used not only in implementing a denuclearized Korean Peninsula but also in improving overall inter-Korean relationship.

[Notes]

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The Politics of Multilateral Satellite Reconnaissance

A Reappraisal

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It is generally accepted among historians of the Cold War that satellite reconnaissance helped the superpowers to overcome persistent insecurity and enter into negotiations for bilateral arms control.[1] It should come as no surprise, then, that some analysts familiar with the stabilizing effects of satellite reconnaissance should make proposals to widen access to this technology to support the interests of the international community as a whole. Probably the best known of these proposals is the French recommendation for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) made at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. Though clearly the most famous, the ISMA proposal was not the first, nor the last, recommendation to envision the use of satellite reconnaissance for multilateral arms control verification and crisis management. While suggestions, theories, recommendations, and proposals for multilateral satellite reconnaissance abound, the fact remains that concrete implementation of a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body remains to date an illusory goal.

This paper is a synopsis of a larger work which reexamines the prospects for multilateral satellite reconnaissance in light of political and technological changes since the ISMA proposal was first put forth.[2] It argues that these political and technological changes have created a "window of opportunity" for the introduction of a United Nations Centre for Image Acquisition and Distribution (UNCIAD). This synopsis will omit most of the overview of the ISMA proposal as well as discussions regarding changing international and technological conditions, focusing instead on the proposal for an UNCIAD.

Background

When the ISMA proposal was first put forth, a number of barriers in the "external" environment stood in the way of its implementation (see appendix b, attached). First, the bipolar conflict that was the essence of the Cold War created a climate of hostility and suspicion that effectively dashed any hopes for a wider multilateral role in verification. For these reasons, the ISMA proposal was unacceptable to the superpowers, who would not accept any substantial outside authority into the arms control process. Second, ideological divisions stemming from the superpower hostility prevented the UN from taking a more prominent, and independent role in international security affairs. During the Cold War, the Security Council was effectively made impotent by divisions among the US and the Soviet Union. The ISMA proposal would have entailed a substantial augmentation of UN authority -- something that the superpowers would have been unwilling to accept. In the realm of technology, the most important barrier was the fact that only the two superpowers had sufficient satellite capabilities to contribute to the proposed ISMA. However, both states jealously guarded their national technical means and opposed sharing data or systems with the ISMA. At the time of the ISMA proposal, no other source of satellite reconnaissance data existed with the capabilities sufficient to contribute to the ISMA.

Many of these barriers are no longer relevant in the post-Cold War world. First, the Cold War has ended taking away one of the most important external political barriers

to multilateral satellite reconnaissance and a wider UN role in international security affairs. There is widespread agreement among the great powers on the principles governing the international order. At the same time, the international security environment has been altered. Issues of non-proliferation and conflict management have replaced the bilateral arms control agenda as the most important arms control issues in the post-Cold War world. The United Nations stands poised to take a more prominent role in international security affairs depending on member states' commitments to internationalism. The most important variable in this respect is the direction of US foreign policy, which remains ambivalent towards the UN -- though clearly movement has been made in the UN's direction since the nadir point of relations in the 1980s. Technological barriers have also been made obsolete by changing conditions. Satellite reconnaissance data are no longer mysterious and exotic technologies confined to the national security organizations of two states. The end of the Cold War has seen a loosening of the restrictions surrounding the distribution of high-resolution imagery, most importantly regarding a portion of the US and Russian systems. Furthermore, many more outlets for satellite reconnaissance exist today that were not yet developed during the time of the ISMA proposal. Taken together, these changes in the external environment are seen as creating a "window of opportunity" for the possible introduction of a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body. The following section will sift through the remaining "internal" barriers to put forth a feasible design for a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body for the post-Cold War world.

DESIGN OF A FEASIBLE SATELLITE IMAGE DISTRIBUTION CENTRE

The original ISMA proposal was not only defeated by prevailing political and technological conditions, but also by its "internal" design flaws. In other words, the ISMA proposal poorly conceptualized the formidable obstacles involved in multilateral satellite reconnaissance. The following section can be seen as a sifting process. The remaining "internal" barriers to a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body will be outlined. These barriers are derived from the conclusions and observations of analysts and scholars who have considered the ISMA, and other similar proposals, in depth. They may be taken as "fundamental" in so far as there is widespread consensus on their validity. Consequently, any multilateral satellite reconnaissance body would have to satisfy the conditions of these barriers to be feasible. The organization that will be outlined -- the United Nations Centre for Image Acquisition and Distribution, or UNCIAD -- will then be assessed in terms of its political feasability.

Is there a need for an multilateral satellite reconnaissance body?

The first barrier to be considered is the necessity of convincingly demonstrating a need for such an organization. Any proposal for a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body would have to convincingly demonstrate that such an organization is indeed required. The following section will demonstrate that a "need" exists for information among various arms control and crisis management organizations; it will then point to studies that show how satellite reconnaissance imagery can help fulfil that need;

finally, it will make the case that pooling resources is the most attractive option given the limited amount of requests that would be made by each individual organization or party.

It was shown in section three how the duties of certain arms control organizations and the activities of crisis management were becoming more demanding in the post-Cold War world. Responding effectively to these more demanding duties will require additional information. For example, in the non-proliferation arena attempts have been made to strengthen the safeguards provisions of the IAEA in light of the discovery of Iraqi non-compliance.[3] One component of these strengthening efforts is the necessity of acquiring intelligence and information on suspected clandestine activities in order to facilitate effective use of "special inspection" rights.[4]

As in the case of the IAEA, the recently negotiated CWC (and its organization charged with carrying out verification duties -- the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW) will have a "need" for information. By most accounts, verification of a CWC will be a highly complex affair due to the need to monitor on an on-going basis both military and civilian activities. Because of the diversity of the chemical industry, there will likely be a greater burden on non-routine monitoring, such as special inspections of suspect sites. As in the case of the CWC and the IAEA, should a comprehensive test ban be negotiated there will be a need for information by whatever organization is charged with carrying out the verification duties of that treaty.

A need also exists for access to information in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management. As outlined in section three, steps have been taken to strengthen the UN's performance in maintaining peace and security. Some of the areas where strengthening was deemed necessary by the Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace* report include advance warning of conflict, more demanding peacekeeping and peacemaking duties once conflict arises, and the possibility of peace-enforcement in specific circumstances.[5] The current situations in which the UN has been asked to intervene are much more complex than the more traditional notions of peacekeeping developed during the Cold War. As peacekeeping and crisis management duties become more demanding, access to information will be vital for logistical requirements and general surveillance tasks. According to most observers, these requirements are not met at present.[6]

To date, a growing number of studies have convincingly demonstrated the way in which satellite reconnaissance can help fulfil this need for information in arms control verification and crisis management. Without completely recapitulating these studies, it may be useful to touch on some of the areas where satellite reconnaissance is considered to be especially useful. First, various studies have emphasized the role that commercial satellite reconnaissance can play in various issue-areas. Many of these studies were done prior to the recent availability of higher-resolution Russian DD5 imagery, so the benefits outlined in those studies would probably be magnified by access to better resolution imagery. While the resolution on most commercial

imagery is not as fine as national technical means, the broad-area overview is deemed useful for such tasks as correlating site plans and drawing perimeters prior to on-site inspections, and monitoring adjacent areas for possible diversion of other clandestine activity.[7] Other studies have demonstrated the possibility of observing large-scale security measures around a facility that might indicate, for example, a clandestine nuclear facility.[8] Commercially available imagery is also considered useful for detecting changes over time -- new construction starts or extra-security measures that might act as a trigger for further inquiries.[9] The tasks outlined above could help fulfil the information requirements of the OPCW and the IAEA, both of whom have verification mandates requiring long-term monitoring of specific facilities as well as detection of possible clandestine activities.

Other studies have demonstrated the way in which commercial satellite reconnaissance imagery can play a role in monitoring a possible test ban agreement.[10] Imagery can help detect the physical effects associated with a nuclear explosion, such as surface craters. Imagery can also be used to possibly detect preparations for nuclear tests (such as mining and drilling).[11] Commercial satellite imagery would also be useful for correlating seismic signals with mining activities. Further evidence of the way in which satellite reconnaissance imagery could help in the verification tasks of a comprehensive test ban is the fact that many serious proposals for a comprehensive test ban have included provisions for the use of satellite reconnaissance as a verification tool. In a 1991 proposal for a comprehensive test ban put forward by Sweden, extensive provisions were made for the use of satellite reconnaissance data, including the establishment and operation of a Satellite Image Processing Centre.[12]

Other studies have demonstrated the way in which satellite reconnaissance imagery can help fulfil the need for information in peacekeeping and crisis management activities. Jasani has shown how commercially available imagery can assist in monitoring cease-fires or crisis situations in certain areas of the Middle East.[13] Banner has demonstrated how effective use could be made of SPOT imagery to assist in peacekeeping operations by, for example, updating maps, resettling populations, and monitoring troop emplacements.[14] Similarly, Jeffrey Tracey affirms that "high resolution commercial satellite imagery, such as that available from SPOT-Image, Soyuzcarta or Russian DD-5, could provide additional preparatory information to ground-based peacekeeping forces for updating existing maps in terms of roads, large structures or camps."[15]

For each of these areas mentioned, of course, higher resolution national technical means would probably magnify the potential benefits.[16] It should be emphasized that most studies mentioned above recognize the limitations of satellite reconnaissance. While images derived from commercial satellite reconnaissance systems can partially fulfil the "need" for information described above, they should not be seen as a panacea for arms control verification and crisis management activities. At best, satellite reconnaissance images are seen to be useful only as part of a verification synergy within and among other verification modes. Nevertheless,

as the studies outlined above indicate, satellite reconnaissance can potentially contribute to more effective arms control verification and crisis management.

Further evidence of the way in which satellite reconnaissance can fulfil the need for information is the fact that such uses of satellite imagery have moved beyond the hypothetical and are beginning to make inroads into the verification practices of at least one organization, and possibly more in the future. As pointed out in the previous section, the IAEA has had experience using national technical means in the UNSCOM/IAEA inspections over Iraq, and in the recent North Korean episode. In the latter case, the US provided intelligence data showing two suspected nuclear dump sites that reinforced suspicions derived from laboratory analyses of plutonium samples taken near the site.[17] The US revealed imagery showing the construction of walls and sentry posts around the sites to a closed session of the IAEA Board of Governors precipitating a call for special inspections.[18] While most applaud the use of national technical means by the IAEA, a serious concern is that such ad hoc applications might create an imbalance of influence in the organization. A more autonomous intelligence capability would not ony facilitate such exchanges of member states' contributions, but it would also give the organization greater decision-making independence and credibility with the entire international community.

While the preceding analysis has demonstrated that a "need" exists for information on the part of certain arms control verification, crisis management, and peacekeeping operations, and while it was shown that images from satellite reconnaissance systems can at least partially fulfil that need, it remains to be seen whether a real "need" exists for some sort of multilateral satellite reconnaissance body to provide the necessary data. There are two other ways in which this need could be satisfied short of creating such an organization. However, each of these options are not as efficient or reliable as a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body.

First, each individual treaty-organization or UN body could rely on contributions of national technical means from member states. While certainly offering the potential gain of greater resolution capabilities and rapid coverage, this option is least desirable. Organizations relying on such contributions risk being seen as dependent on a select group of states for intelligence contributions. Such dependency is risky not only for political reasons, but also because access to national technical means is always the prerogative of the state, as is denial. Furthermore, the organizations concerned could never be confident that manipulation of data, or the withholding of data has taken place. Additionally, contributions of national technical means might be politically motivated to serve parochial national interests that may or may not happen to coincide with the interests of the organization concerned.

A second, more attractive option, would be for each individual treaty-organization or UN body to make use of commercial imagery on an ad hoc basis. Given the extent to which high resolution satellite imagery is becoming available in the open market, such an option would appear to offer the benefits of access without the necessary costs for infrastructure investment. However, there are also drawbacks to this option.

Each time that a specific organization required data, a "request-for-proposal" would have to be drawn up, indicating to the commercial outlet the exact specifications of the area concerned. The writing, responding and evaluation of "request-for-proposals" generally take months.[19] Though this process might not be speeded up by the existence of a centralized image distribution centre, the effort put forth to search through the existing commercial outlets and the filling out of requests would be left to the multilateral satellite reconnaissance body, freeing up the treaty-organization concerned for more pressing verification tasks. Furthermore, should a treaty-organization or UN body wish to manipulate the data in certain ways to meet specific req^R
+((^U^^^S or merely store data in an archive for future reference, then investments in infrastructure would have to be made regardless. Given the fact that many treaty-organizations might only make infrequent use of satellite data, then such an investment would not seem worthwhile. The benefits of currently available technology would thus be lost.

Is there a need for a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body? As shown above, many existing and possible future treaty-organizations and UN bodies require information that is currently not provided on a regular and systematic basis. Many studies have demonstrated the way in which satellite reconnaissance imagery from existing commercial outlets can help at least partially fulfil that need. As higher resolution commercial imagery becomes more widely available, then the benefits that accrue from such images will be magnified. As outlined above, the two alternative options -- relying on contributions of national technical means or purchasing imagery on an ad hoc basis -- are not seen as attractive as a centralized institution that would pool resources among individual organizations. Given these considerations, it is the opinion of this analyst that a need does indeed exist for a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body.

The Barrier of Treaty-Specificity

A second fundamental barrier to the implementation of a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body concerns opposition to a greater UN role in arms control verification, and the concomitant widely held belief that verification should be treaty specific. The question of balancing the belief that only treaty-specific organizations should undertake verification with the demand for a greater UN role that a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body would entail is probably one of the largest barriers to be tackled. Any feasible multilateral satellite reconnaissance body would have to satisfactorily address this concern.

The Financial Barrier

Another substantial barrier that must be addressed is the question of financing. Two issues are relevant in this respect, one general to the UN and one specific to a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body. The first general issue centres on the fact

that the UN is already financially overwhelmed to such an extent that the issue of bankruptcy crops up nearly every fall.[20] More specific to the issue of financing a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body is the fact that those states with the most sophisticated satellite systems would probably end up being asked to pay the largest share for the project without any immediate benefits to themselves. The question of balancing costs with needs is also a difficult question to answer in advance. In today's frugal climate, however, it is a safe bet that the least expensive of all options would have the most chance of success.

The Data Confidentiality Barrier

Another barrier to the concrete implementation of a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body is the question of ensuring confidentiality of data. Many observers considered that questions of data dissemination were the least satisfactorily handled aspects of the 1981 Group of Experts Study on the ISMA proposal. In general, these issues were most frequently sounded during the Cold War when mutual suspicions were high and the only source of satellite imagery with resolution detailed enough to provide a meaningful contribution to verification were monopolized by the superpowers. To assuage the fears of member states, a viable systems of data confidentiality would have to be demonstrated for a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body to be acceptable.

Suggestions for a Politically and Financially Feasible Multilateral Satellite Reconnaissance Body

Given these remaining barriers, what might a feasible multilateral satellite reconnaissance body look like? The first pillar of the agency would be its acknowledgement of the principle of *treaty-specificity.* As pointed out above, it is a widely held belief that responsibility for compliance assessment, and interpretation of relevant data should be left to an organization centred around a specific treaty. To accommodate this principle, the agency would have to be as *apolitical* as possible. To meet this requirement, it is useful to consider a common distinction made between two different aspects of verification: data collection versus data analysis. While it may be difficult to exclude bias from any social undertaking, the difference between the two aspects of verification might best be understood when represented along a continuum: as one moves from the process of data collection to data analysis, one also moves from the most objective to the most subjective, from the apolitical to the political. The agency's mandate would have to be properly circumscribed so that its duties would confined as much as possible to the data collection end of the spectrum, leaving for each individual treaty-specific organization the more subjective, political task of data analysis. In this respect, we could characterize the agency as being largely *technical*; that is, its mandate would be strictly confined to technical duties that could be undertaken in a political vacuum. (Of course, accommodating this principle would necessitate each individual treaty-specific organization and UN body to employ at least one qualified photo-interpreter. However, such a minor staffing addition would probably be seen as acceptable given the benefits that would be

gained by access to satellite reconnaissance imagery on an on-going basis.)

How might these duties be carried out in practice? The agency would take requests from specific organizations, like the IAEA. Such requests would include details on longitude and latitude, and may include select details on a range of options, for example on the preferred level of resolution or spectrum characteristics. Standard acquisition arrangements could be made to facilitate the appropriate ordering provisions and to smooth exchanges between member organizations and the agency. Once given the request, the agency would mobilize, contacting via computer network specific satellite image suppliers. If more immediate data is required for tactical reconnaissance purposes, as might be the case with more demanding peacekeeping duties or crisis management activities, the agency could log requests with satellite image suppliers to start acquiring data on a daily basis over a specific region. Data would then be processed to the specifications of the request and distributed to the organization concerned for analysis and interpretation. In general terms, the agency would be charged with the following duties:

(1) to search among available sources of imagery (including national sources) to meet the requirements of the request;

(2) to order such data following the approval of the organization concerned;

(3) to process and distribute such data in a number of different formats and media depending on the specific preference of the organization making the request;

The agency may also be charged with the following duties:

(1) to maintain a data archive of specific facilities/areas/regions/other for participating organizations;

(2) to provide, upon request by participating organizations, a comprehensive list of archived data, and/or to make available specific data from the archive to member organizations.

To avoid politicization, the agency would not be permitted to:

(1) pass judgement or interpret any aspect of the data concerned apart from technical characteristics derived from pre-processing/processing activities;

(2) to distribute data to any state, organization, group, or person apart from the participating organizations of the agency.

By following these criteria, then, the agency might be able to side-step some of the most important barriers to a multilateral satellite reconnaissance body, including

the principle of treaty-specificity, problems related to data dissemination, and questions of judgement/interpretation. It should be pointed out that although the agency would be similar in form to Phase I of the ISMA, it would, in fact, be different in fundamental ways. First, the agency's mandate and corresponding duties would be strictly confined to data collection and distribution. Unlike Phase I of the ISMA proposal, the agency would not pass judgement on any aspect of the data regarding compliance; assessment of the data to determine treaty compliance would be left solely to the organization concerned or the parties of the treaty in question, depending on the nature of the treaty's provisions. (In fact, the fundamental pillar of the agency would be its strict avoidance of such questions.) Second, the agency would have no pretensions of evolutionary growth culminating in satellite procurement or more expansive verification responsibilities.

Reflecting its limited mandate, its ties with the United Nations, and its centralization, an appropriate title for the agency might be the ***UN Centre for Image Acquisition and Distribution*** (UNCIAD).

There are a variety of ways in which the UNCIAD could be financed. As the operations of the UNCIAD would likely overlap with agencies covered by both the regular UN budget, specialized agencies, voluntary contributions, and peacekeeping operations, funding for the UNCIAD would have to come from a variety of sources. Though such arrangements might seem complicated, there is very little than can be done to side-step such financing issues considering that the UNCIAD would pool resources among member organizations. (One way in which initial capital costs could be made in order to side-step such issues would be for a single-state, or a group of states acting collectively, to donate the necessary infrastructure for the UNCIAD.) On-going costs related to data acquisition would be paid by member organizations on a pay-per-use basis. A premium would be added according to percentages of annual use by member organizations in order to cover additional on-going costs.

How Would UNCIAD Be Received Politically?

Political opposition to the UNCIAD could come from a variety of quarters. First, arms control treaty organizations, like the IAEA, might be reluctant to enter into such a collaborative arrangement for fear of compromising autonomy. Both the IAEA and the recently created CWC have made it clear that treaty autonomy is highly guarded. Both organizations firmly believe that verification of compliance is the sole prerogative of the Organization and/or state parties to the treaty. Furthermore, these organizations might be hesitant to enlarge their relationship with the UN system. For example, the IAEA refers to itself as an autonomous agency within the UN system. Any attachment to the UN that an UNCIAD would entail might be seen as pulling the IAEA, or other organizations, too closely to the operations of the UN itself. In other words, these are international *organizations*, and like any organization they are concerned with maintaining internal coherence and preventing outside manipulation. While the UNCIAD goes to great lengths not to compromise the principle of treaty-

specificity, the very act of collaboration between organizations and the UN might be seen by those organizations as an infringement on treaty autonomy.

Second, opposition to the UNCIAD might come from those who oppose giving the UN a greater role in intelligence-gathering. Though many states support expanding the powers of the UN in international security affairs, suspicion persists among some countries that intelligence-gathering equals spying. In other words, the barriers stemming from national security concerns are not yet obsolete. Two sources of opposition might be particularly relevant here. First, as outlined in section 3, hesitations are still strong within some US foreign policy making circles about expanding the powers of the UN in this direction. Part of this hesitation may stem from the fact that these groups fear losing leverage over international security matters. However, this type of fear is increasingly made moot by the commercial availability of high-resolution imagery. Second, opposition might stem from developing countries who believe that the UN already spends too much money and effort on security, and too little on economic development, the so-called "other half of the UN." Successfully confronting this barrier would have to involve demonstrating the fiscal conservation of the UNCIAD design, as well as the long-term benefits to economic development that might derive from the potential effectiveness of arms control, peacekeeping and crisis management that an UNCIAD would facilitate.

Despite these possible political objections, the reasons for optimism are strong. Many of the barriers stemming from the "external" political environment have been removed, opening up a "window of opportunity" for the possible introduction of the UNCIAD. Reinforcing this argument is the growing consensus among policymakers, observers, and analysts that international verification organizations must be strengthened to meet the demands of non-proliferation and crisis management in the post-Cold War world. While the specific contours of the post-Cold War world are still hazy, should developments proceed in the direction of expanded legitimacy and authority for the UN in international security affairs, increasing governance by the great powers over the rest of the globe, and the widespread availability of high-resolution satellite reconnaissance imagery, then there are strong indications that an UNCIAD, designed to meet the fundamental barriers referred to above, would indeed be politically acceptable.

Appendix A

Overview of UNCIAD Infrastructure and Costs[1]

Initial Capital Costs for Infrastructure	
Workstation	
General purpose computer	$100,000
Software	$20,000
Peripherals	
tape recorders	
optical disk recorders	
printer	
high-speed modem	
	$30,000
Office supplies	
desks, shelving, lighting	
pens, filing, etc	$8,000
Total Initial Capital Costs	**$158,000**
On-going costs (annual)	
Staffing and Adminstration	
One manager @ $100,000	$100,000
Two analysts/interpreters	
@ $75,000	$150,000
Benefits, etc.	$25,000
Periodicals	$1,000
Communications	$6,000
Rent for Office Space	$12,000
Travel	$5,000
Misc.	$10,000
Total On-Going Costs (annual)	**$309,000**

[1]Note that these costs exclude data purchases, as such costs would be borne on a pay-per-use basis by individual treaty-organizations or UN bodies. An overview of such costs are listed in Appendix B.

Appendix B: Barriers to ISMA

	1978	1993
Political		
Cold War	yes	no
Bilateral Security Structure	yes	no
Arms Control dominated by Bilateral issues	yes	no
Ineffective United Nations	yes	partial
Multilateralism Weak	yes	no
Transparency in Security Affairs	no	yes
Treaty-specificity	yes	yes
Problems regarding data dissemination	yes	yes
Financial issues	yes	yes
Demonstration of real "need"	yes	yes

Technological

Satellite Reconnaissance Monopolized by Superpowers	yes	no
Suspicion surrounding sharing of ntms	yes	partial relaxation
Use of satellite reconnaissance by int. verification organizations	yes	emerging

Endnotes

1.see, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System." International Security. (Vol.10, 1996); Coit Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds.) International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p.222.

2.Ronald J. Deibert, ISMA Reappraised: The Politics of Multilateral Satellite Reconnaissance. (Forthcoming, 1994). This synopsis operates on the assumption that readers are familiar with the ISMA proposal. Those not familiar with the ISMA proposal are encouraged to refer to the original study cited above.

3.Jon Wolfsthal, "IAEA to Implement 'Suspect Site' Inspection Powers," Arms Control Today. (March 1992), p.27.

4.On re-affirming "special inspection" rights, see J.Jennekens, R. Parsick, and A.von BAeckmann, "Strengthening the International Safeguards System," IAEA Bulletin. (1, 1992), p.7.

5.Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping," (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. SC Doc s/24111, 17 June 1992).

6.See Alex Morrison, (ed.) The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993)

7.See A.V. Banner and A.G. McMullan, "Commercial Satellite Imagery for UNSCOM," in S. Mataija and J. Marshall Beier, (eds.) Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf War Environment: Learning from the UNSCOM Experience. (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1992), p.153; Krepon, *et al.*, Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, *op cit.*; Bhupendra Jasani, "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery," Jane's Intelligence Review. (Vol.5, No.5, May 1993); Ronald J. Deibert, Satellite Reconnaissance for Multilateral Verification: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Test Ban, and Chemical Weapons Convention, Project Report 93/07, Ottawa: Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, April 1993).

8.Leonard S. Spector, "Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation," in Krepon *et al.*, Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, *op cit.*, p.129.

9.*Ibid.*, p.132; see also Deibert, Satellite Reconnaissance for Multilateral Verification, *op cit.*

10.See Deibert, Satellite Reconnaissance for Multilateral Verification, *op cit.*; and Non-Seismic Technologies in Support of a Nuclear Test Ban, (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade, May 1993).

11.See Allen M. Din, "Means of Nuclear Test Ban Verification Other Than Seismological," in Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, (eds.) Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.238; Jozef Goldblat, "Further Limitation and Prohibition of Nuclear Test Explosions: The Problem of Verification," in Goldblat and Cox, (eds.) Nuclear Weapon Test, *op cit.*, p.24; Peter de Selding, "Satellite Images Unveil Secret Soviet Test Site," Defense News. (Vol.7, No.50, December 14-20, 1992); United States Delegation. Preliminary Results of Use of Satellite Imagery in Correlating Seismic Signals from Mining Explosions. (GSE/US/73, March 1992); William Leith and David W. Simpson, "Monitoring Underground Nuclear Tests," in Krepon *et al.*; Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, *op cit.*

12.See Conference on Disarmament documents, CD/1089.

13.see Jasani, "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery," *op cit.*, p.235-239.

14.Allen Banner, Overhead Imagery for Verification and Peacekeeping. (Ottawa: Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper, No.6, March 1991).

15.Jeffrey Tracey, "The Use of Overhead Surveillance in United Nations Activities," in Morrison, (ed.) The Changing Face of Peacekeeping, *op cit.*, pp.109-110.

16.For a focused comparison, see Deibert, Satellite Reconnaissance for Multilateral Verification, *op cit.*

17.See Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, (September 1991), p.408; Nayan Chanda, "Atomic Shock Waves," Far Eastern Economic Review, (25 March 1993), pp.10-11; and David E. Sanger, "Reversing Its Earlier Stance, North Korea Bars Nuclear Inspectors," New York Times, (February 9, 1993).

18.Chanda, "Atomic Shock Waves," *op cit.*, p.11.

19.Personal Interview, Michael de Sandolini, MacDonald-Detwiller Limited.

20.See Simon Duke, "The UN Finance Crisis: A History and Analysis," International Relations, (Vol.XI, No.2, August 1992).

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea: A Case Study in Monitoring Arms Transfers

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PRINCIPLE FINDINGS

1. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was one of the first post-World War Two attempts at arms control verification. As an early mechanism to insure compliance with an arms control agreement, a study of its mission, operations, structure and environment may provide useful lessons for current and future verification systems.

2. The concept and structure of the NNSC emerged out of the long negotiations to end the Korean War. While the United Nations side was willing to assign verification to genuinely neutral observers, the North Koreans and Chinese would settle for only Communist "neutrals". This even division between strict neutrals and Communist partisans doomed the NNSC from the beginning, and precluded objective observation and verification in the northern half of the peninsula. North Korean external interference and Polish-Czech internal obstruction significantly limited the Commission's effectiveness.

3. The limited scope of the NNSC efforts could also be attributed to the general language of the Armistice Agreement, which contained no provision for enforcing compliance. After a year, after accumulated frustrations in information gathering concerning illicit military reinforcements in the Communist area, the NNSC went so far as to call for its own

dissolution. A combination of loopholes in the agreement and deliberate non-compliance by the Communists nearly led to the abrogation of the Armistice Agreement.

4. The armistice was designed to preserve the balance of forces which had stalemated in war, and thus prevent an advantage to one side or the other by building up preponderance for another round of fighting. The absence of any stipulated enforcement mechanism and the geopolitical advantage of North Korea gave the Communists ample opportunity for cheating, and they assumed the UN forces were probably cheating as well. But had the southern forces sought to keep up with or win the illicit arms race, the NNSC would have easily detected it.

5. The only effective punishment for a pattern of violations was to withdraw from the Armistice Agreement and risk renewed war. By introducing nuclear weapons into South Korea, the U.S. restored the military balance and avoided renewed war, but probably escalated the North Korean desire for their own independent nuclear device in the longer run.

6. The design of the NNSC, with its fixed and mobile inspection teams, could have been an effective verification system, if combined with greater sea and air surveillance. The Communist belligerents had little of their own capability in this area, and would have demanded creation of some neutral surveillance organization. The U.S. was unlikely to

contribute its intelligence technology to this project, since it would certainly and quickly find its way to the Soviet Union through the Communist "neutrals".

7. The main benefits of the NNSC were probably the unintended ones: (1) It served as a witness to the Armistice, calling international attention to agreement violations. (2) It provided a communication node between the two sides. The daily meetings, the informal relations (albeit highly restricted from the North Korean side), and at least visual familiarity with mutual neutrals served to soften the brittle antagonisms that threatened the fragile armistice. (3) The NNSC was a trip wire to prevent, or at least, restrain, a sudden surprise attack of the kind which North Korea had launched in 1950. Pyongyang had attacked South Korea in order to unify the peninsula in what they hoped would be a brief civil war. With the armistice, the presence of the NNSC internationalized any future conflict - raising the stakes significantly.

8. Despite the NNSC's operational flaws, its main real purpose (in contrast to its formal function of verification the arms control aspect of the Armistice Agreement) was to be a guarantor of the armistice. In this it was a successful component in preventing a second Korean war in spite of early recognition that it could not fulfill its role in verification.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND*

In the last months of the Korean War, the negotiators at Panmunjom sought an armistice formula which would both maximize their respective interests and end the war. The confrontation between two world views - communism and liberal democracy - assured continued conflict, even when the military battles were ended. The negotiators had no illusions that they were creating peace - but wanted to end a war already stalemated after three years of fighting up and down the peninsula.

To insure that the armistice would not be an interregnum for building up arms stocks for another attack to complete the unfinished task of reunification, an elaborate armistice apparatus was established, including the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The background of this Commission will be examined as well its salient functions as a setting to the understanding of an early post-World War Two attempt to control arms in a peacekeeping context. Some lessons may be drawn concerning the experiences and limitations of the

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Commission for future bodies which may attempt at stemming the flow of arms into volatile areas.

GENESIS AT PANMUNJOM

After years of war and negotiations held between the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command on the one hand and the Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers on the other, the military armistice was achieved in Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. This agreement established a Military Armistice Commission (MAC), composed of representatives of the two belligerent sides, and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) to insure that both sides observed the agreement. The NNSC reported its findings to the MAC.

The NNSC consisted of representatives of four nations which had not formally participated in the war, and therefore were considered neutral. Two senior military officers were appointed by Sweden and Switzerland, who were nominated as neutral nations by the United Nations Command. Poland and Czechoslovakia were nominated by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.[1] The representatives and their duties were specified by the Military Armistice Agreement (MAA), Paragraph 13(c), in which both sides agreed to cease the introduction of

reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition into Korea.[2]

The NNSC was to meet daily in Panmunjom with a provision to recess, if agreed, for not more than seven days. The records of all NNSC meetings were to be forwarded to the MAC as soon as possible and were to be kept in English, Korean and Chinese. The NNSC was able to make recommendations to the MAC with respect to amendments or additions to the Armistice Agreement. Finally, the NNSC or any of its members was authorized to communicate with any member of the MAC.[3]

By the terms of the Armistice, the line of demarcation between North and South Korea closely approximated the front line as it existed at the final hour. Slanting as the line did from a point on the west coast fifteen miles below the 38th parallel, northeastward to the east coast anchor forty miles above the parallel, the demarcation represented a relatively small adjustment to the prewar division. Within three days of the signing of the armistice, each opposing force withdrew two kilometers from this line to establish a demilitarized zone that was not to be trespassed. The Armistice provisions forbade either force to bring additional troops or new weapons into Korea, although replacement one to one and in kind was permissible. To oversee the enforcement of all Armistice terms and to negotiate settlements of any violations of them, a Military Armistice Commission was established. This body was assisted by the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission which had the mission to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs I 3c and I 3d and Paragraph 28, of the Armistice Agreement, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

VERIFICATION TASKS

The NNSC was to accomplish its task of verification by using three types of operations. These included:

1. Fixed inspection teams were to be located in a total of five ports in North and five ports in South Korea. Since neither Korea had a substantial armaments industry of its own, it was believed that all armaments as well as troops would be moved through these designated ports. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team (NNIT) was composed of at least four members - two nominated by the UNC Commander-in-Chief, and two nominated by the Supreme Commander of the North Korea and Chinese forces. Sub-teams of two members (balanced between non-Communist and Communist members) were also allowed. Additional personnel were also permitted as interpreters, clerks, drivers, etc.

2. The North Koreans and the United Nations Command were to give full reports on all replacements of personnel and materials to the NNSC.

3. If either side suspected violations of the Armistice, it could request inspections anywhere in North or South Korea to determine if there was a foundation for the accusation. The NNSC mobile inspection teams at Panmunjom were to carry out these inspections.[4] Composition of the teams consisted of at least four officers, half appointed by the UNC, and the other half by the North Korea and Chinese Command (Armistice Agreement, Article 40b). The non-existent neutrality of the Polish and Czech officers usually insured delays or other interference in challenging North Korea, while in South Korea, the special inspections were perceived as more motivated by a desire to gather intelligence for the Communist side.

These were the responsibilities and activities, as laid out by the Armistice Agreement, of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The Armistice Agreement was essentially an arms control agreement. It limited the number of conventional weapons North and South Korea, to the numbers at the time of the signing, and allowed for "in kind" re-supply. Within the Armistice Agreement, verification was to be left in the hands of the NNSC, who would then report their findings to the Military Armistice Commission.

The Armistice gave the MAC responsibility for supervising "the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations and violations of the Armistice Agreement."[5] The MAC set up Joint Observer Teams to assist it in carrying out the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in

the DMZ and the estuary of the Han River.[6] It was the responsibility of the NNSC to observe conformity with the Armistice Agreement in areas outside the MAC zone, except in the ports where permanent NNSC inspection teams were stationed in accordance with Section 43. The NNSC had no authority except to report violations to the MAC which would then settle the alleged violations through negotiations and report them to the commanders of the opposing sides. The Armistice Agreement contained detailed provisions concerning the organization of the NNSC.[7] Provision of the administrative personnel to support the senior officers, is the responsibility of each neutral nation.

INSPECTION TEAMS

The NNSC was to establish twenty Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, five located at ports in South Korea and five located in ports in North Korea,[8] with ten mobile teams in reserve near the Headquarters of the NNSC. Each inspection team was to consist of not less than four officers, preferably of field grade, two from the Swedish and Swiss contingent and two from the Polish-Czech contingent. Subteams of two officers could be formed as required with half either Swedish or Swiss and half either Polish or Czech. Each of the four contingents consisted of ninety-five men. The allocation was as follows: 15-20 to the secretariat and command headquarters; 35-40 to the inspection teams located at designated ports; 30-

35 to the mobile inspection teams; and 5-10 to special functions.[9]

At the time of the armistice, each of the four NNSC states assigned three or four men to each fixed inspection post, a chief, an assistant, a secretary or interpreter, and a telegrapher. The organization of the ten mobile groups depended on the function they were called upon to perform. The first group was set up to investigate complaints from both North Koreans and from United Nations Command concerning conditions in prison camps. The composition of the second group was constantly changing since it was called upon to investigate the illegal entry of military planes into North Korea. Up to November 30, 1953, only four of the ten mobile teams had been used for only six days. As a result, Switzerland proposed the reduction of the number of teams to six and this was accepted. In early 1955, at the request of Switzerland, two stationary teams were abolished in both North and South Korea, and the size of the remaining six fixed teams were reduced by 50 percent.[10]

On 3 May 1956, the United Nations Command requested the NNSC to withdraw the fixed inspection teams from South Korean ports because of the claim that the Communists had ignored their obligation not to rearm North Korea, and to permit inspections to verify this. Therefore, it was an unfair burden for the teams to operate in the South. On 8 June 1956,

the NNSC withdrew all of its fixed teams and instructed the personnel to return to Panmunjom.[11]

Since 1956, the only remnant of the NNSC is stationed at Panmunjom. It consists of the Commission, the secretariat, and the representatives at command headquarters. The commission still meets daily as specified in the Armistice Agreement and adjourns in less than ten minutes.[12] Its operations have been reduced to a mere formality, although it does provide some mode of communication across the DMZ. Further problems have emerged when, following the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the Communist side refused to recognize the delegate from the new Czech Republic. They have also impugned the neutrality of all the delegates, because Czech, Polish, Swiss, and Swedish delegations have observed the Team Spirit exercises so as to verify their non-aggressive nature. To the North Koreans, this unofficial verification has negated their neutrality as observers. In addition, normalization of relations with Seoul has further eroded the former Eastern bloc neutrality. One must conclude that Pyongyang's notion of neutrality has meant one-sided sympathy to its own side.

II. OPERATIONS OF THE NNSC

The Armistice Agreement established the NNSC to prevent the introduction of military personnel or weapons beyond those existing on the date of the armistice into either North or

South Korea . It sought to accomplish this objective by using the types of operations described earlier.

OBSTACLES

Obstacles arose immediately. Within the first month of operations it became clear to the Swiss and Swedish representatives that their Polish and Czech counterparts were far from neutral, and hardly differed from the North Korean and Chinese side in what they observed and reported. The introduction and removal of materials and personnel in North Korea was taking place outside of the five designated ports where inspection teams were based, and therefore knowledge of these entries had to depend on the reports given by North Korea which were blatantly erroneous. The mobile inspection teams could not engage in inspections unless a majority approved. With an even number of votes, a tie meant inaction on all reports, and most of the demands for inspections from the United Nations Command were refused as a result of a two to two vote in the inspection teams.[13]

A second obstacle lay in the divergent conceptions of the Armistice held by each side. During the Armistice negotiations it had become clear that, while the representatives of the United Nations wanted neutral supervision to be as extensive as possible, the North Korean and Chinese representatives wanted its responsibilities and powers restricted. In South Korea, three of the fixed observation groups worked day and night, in Pusan, Inchon and

Taegu. There were few shipments to the remaining two designated ports in South Korea. All non-military shipments as well as military shipments to South Korea were declared, and the Poles and Czechs insisted on complete inspections.[14]

In the North, numerous opportunities for evasion existed. There was little traffic in two of the North Korean ports, and none at all in the other three. It was assumed that railway lines were being used to bypass the inspected ports. When the Swiss and Swedish delegates wished to inspect trains they were required to announce their arrival two hours in advance. When the teams eventually arrived at the station it was either deserted or there were no bills of lading or documents of any type which would record shipments or transactions at the station. Many rail lines that linked North Korea to Siberia and Manchuria did not pass through ports of entry and were, therefore, outside the terms of reference for regular inspection. Also, air traffic was not examined and it became virtually impossible to apply the strict inspections used in the South Korea and to use them in North Korea.[15]

The Swiss delegation illustrated the weakness of North Korean reports of armament movements with the following summary of weapons transfers from the beginning of the armistice until the end of 1954:[16]

TABLE ONE: SUMMARY OF REPORTED ARMS TRANSFERS,
(July 1953 - 31 December 1954)

Type of Armament	South Korea	North Korea
Combat planes	631	0
Combat vehicles	631	7
Rifles	82,860	641
Munitions	226,000,000 rounds	56,650 rounds

According to Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement,(the Commanders of the opposing sides shall) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof...reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission...(emphasis added)

Under these provisions, the Communist side claimed to have replaced a mere 641 rifles during a period of eighteen months, in a country with hundreds of thousands of soldiers! Small wonder the Swedish and Swiss NNSC members became cynical.

There was also evidence of aircraft buildup in violation of the armistice. All North Korean airfields were inoperative on 27 July 1953. United Nations Command Radar surveillance detected a continuous increase in jet aircraft activity after that date, despite the North Korean reports that no combat aircraft had been brought in. On 21 September 1953, this evidence was confirmed when a North Korean pilot defected and

surrendered a MIG-15 to the United Nations Command. The pilot then reported sighting at least eighty more combat aircraft brought into North Korea.[17]

Communist truculence over complaints about unreported military reinforcements hastened the erosion of an armistice over which few had illusions. On 12 February 1954, the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans announced that they would no longer admit the NNSC mobile inspection teams into North Korea at the request of the United National Command. The reason given was that the inquiries were based on "lying complaints".[18] This led to a situation of extensive inspections in South Korea and virtually none at all in North Korea. South Korea's understandable resentment of the asymmetry of NNSC inspections culminated in demonstrations on 31 July 1954 against the NNSC. Guards were posted to protect NNSC staff. The Czech and Polish members became more accommodating after the demonstrations, and the North allowed a number of inspections to take place. Eventually, the pattern of frustrations continued as access was repeatedly denied to the inspection teams in the North. This stimulated a movement to abolish the NNSC.

As early as 14 April 1954, the Swiss and Swedish delegates suggested to the North Koreans and the United Nations Command that the NNSC be terminated. The Czech and Polish delegates, as well as the Chinese Communists had opposed this request on the grounds that the NNSC was a

necessary part of the armistice mechanism. A compromise agreement was made to reduce the stationary inspection teams by abolishing two in each area. Furthermore, there was to be a 50 percent reduction in the number of men on the remaining teams.[19]

On 25 January 1955, Switzerland and Sweden again proposed the abolition of the NNSC. The United States reply on 2 March indicated agreement, as well as doubts that any useful purpose would be served by the continuation of the NNSC.[20] Frustrations over the inability to carry out its mission and the growing distrust against the NNSC, the United Nations Command on 31 May 1956 informed the Sino-North Korean Command in Korea and the NNSC of its intentions to suspend the activities of the NNSC's teams in the three South Korean ports due to Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement. At a meeting of the MAC on 4 June, the Communist representatives attacked the United Nations Command for violations of the Armistice Agreement and demanded withdrawal of the 31 May announcement. The United Nations Command refused and the NNSC fixed inspection teams returned to Panmunjom on 10 and 11 June 1956.[21]

The further breakdown of armistice observation occurred in 1957 with the decision of the United States to proceed with the rearmament of South Korea in order to maintain a military balance and to preserve the stability of the Armistice Agreement. A UN report[22] cited the failure of the North

Koreans to live up to paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement which required both sides to cease the introduction of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition. The report also cited the inability of the NNSC to obtain information due to Communist obstruction. Since the NNSC was established only to observe the enforcement of 13(c) and 13(d), it ceased, therefore, to have any function at all, but it continued to exist.[23]

The MAC had to accept the United Nations Command decision to introduce new weapons into Korea (1957), despite the formal violation of the Armistice Agreement. In January 1958, the United Nations Command announced its intention to introduce atomic weapons into South Korea. Communist non-compliance with the Armistice Agreement - especially interfering with arms verification while pursuing an arms buildup - led to the inability of the armistice supervisory bodies to carry out their tasks of inspection, as provided in the Armistice Agreement, and had contributed to the United Nations Command decision to violate the Armistice Agreement in order to preserve the peace on the Korean peninsula. It was a fateful development shifting the modus vivendi from reliance on armistice supervision to power balancing by introducing non-conventional weapons.

The Communists clearly disregarded the provisions of the Armistice Agreement which prohibited the introduction of additional military personnel and hardware into Korea, and

they completely obstructed the NNSC from carrying out its mission. This suggested some of the different concepts, perceptions, and expectations held by each side regarding the purpose of the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command saw it as a step toward a broader peace settlement and considered itself bound by the provisions of the Agreement. The Communists looked upon the Agreement and the NNSC as useful instruments in camouflaging their true intentions until a socialist victory could be achieved. The victory had been frustrated by the UN intervention, and the Armistice Agreement was an inconvenient interruption until a South Korean "people's revolution," joined by Communist forces, would overthrow the Syngman Rhee dictatorship. The popular revolt against the government and the continued unrest in the south probably provided Pyongyang with enough encouragement for its patience in waiting for another opportunity to attempt reunification by force. The US military presence, according to North Korean calculations, would eventually stir South Koreans to rise up and destroy the "fascist dictatorship and its US protectors."

LIMITATIONS OF THE NNSC

The NNSC emerged only because of the battlefield stalemate that forced the combatants to stop the slaughter. It halted a war of attrition which had the potential of widening to a broader theater. The election of Eisenhower to the US presidency gave further impetus to US desire to halt

the war, while Communists probed in other areas of the world for Western weakness. It was an environment that defied permanent peacemaking in part because of the transnational alliances and antagonistic ideologies of the participants.

The mechanism of the NNSC was flawed from the beginning. There were three significant restrictions upon NNSC authority which contributed to its failure.

First, the NNSC was subordinate to the MAC, which alone was authorized to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. The NNSC was mandated responsibility for verifying restrictions on arms replacements and additions, but was limited by its lack of freedom of movement and cooperation from the Communist belligerents. This scope of limitations on verification ability most certainly allowed blatant violation of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover, the NNSC was exclusively an agent of verification, and had no enforcement power in the sense of having an independent ability to punish non-compliance with the Armistice. When violations were reported to the MAC, the Commanders of the opposing sides were notified. Except to report again to the Commanders that a violation had been corrected, the MAC was authorized to take no further action. Resumption of war may have been the only effective means of enforcement, and the U.S. and its allies were unwilling to take this action.

Second, the NNSC fixed Inspection Teams were geographically restricted in that the reinforcing personnel and supplies which violated the Armistice could easily avoid the ports designated for the fixed inspection teams. This was especially true in the DPRK. South Korea was at a severe geopolitical disadvantage because it was bounded by sea on three sides and the "militarily sterilized" DMZ on the north: all military supplies had to enter through ports by sea or from the air. Any resupply of arms or personnel was easily observed. North Korea, on the other hand, because of its long contiguous land border with China (demarcated by the Yalu River for some of its length), was porous enough to allow undetected movement of military equipment and personnel outside the five designated ports. In theory, the fixed inspection teams were to observe all shipments coming through the ports to determine whether there were violations of the Armistice Agreement. But in practice a pattern of interference in North Korea prevented full and timely inspections. The fixed teams were not allowed freedom of movement when it was felt necessary to do inspections, and the Communist members of the teams rarely cooperated in pursuing reports of violations - even in the ports where the teams were located.

Finally, half of the NNSC was neutral in name only. It was clear from the start that the Polish and Czech members supported their Asian Communist comrades, and stalemate in

supervision and inspection was the result. The NNSC failed to achieve its monitoring objectives and began to serve as a device to fill the vacuum which would have been created if abolished. Operationally, the NNSC Inspection Teams in both North and South Korea were accompanied by body-guards who restricted their movements even in the limited areas where access was allowed. An explicit protocol on the rights and duties of inspectors versus those of the escorts might have reduced this one area of friction and interference. The main problem was that the NNSC was immobilized from within, by its own composition and by the fundamentally different commitments of its members. The NNSC was unable to make decisions since on all crucial issues the vote was tied.

III. PRESENT CONDITION AND PROSPECTS OF THE NNSC

The author's visit to the NNSC camp in May, 1993 permitted discussions with the Swiss, Swedish and Polish delegates. The Swiss-Swedish camp was located near the DMZ and Peace Village at Panmunjom, almost in the shadow of the North Korean observation posts. The collapse of the Soviet system, the harassment of the Polish delegate, and the many years of exclusion from actual inspection missions have made the NNSC a footnote in modern Korea. The Commission continues to serve as a minor communication link between the UN and Communist commands, and its presence remains as a barometer of North Korean attitudes in relations with former allies and the

West. Its intended role of arms control has completely disappeared.

THE NNSC'S ROLE AS COMMUNICATION NODE

Today, the NNSC maintains relations between both sides and thus keeps a channel of communication open between North Korea and the rest of the world. It has a symbolic role representing the structure of the Armistice Agreement. Possibly, it could play the role of face-saver in a confrontation between the UNC and North Korea, but this is increasingly unlikely as North Korea moves to dismantle the NNSC. With Polish and Czechoslovakian recognition of South Korea, their pro-Pyongyang "neutrality" was damaged - perhaps fatally. In retrospect, it represented a symbolic institution to allow the Armistice to take place and end the armed hostilities of the Korean war. P. Wesley Kriebel writes that the presence of the MAC and "of other foreign nationals in the NNSC camp inhibited the North Koreans from undertaking greater harassment and more serious forays than they did. Certainly, they were not inhibited in seriously increasing the level of tension in 1967 but there may be a ceiling on the level of violence they are willing to undertake and this may be influenced by the MAC machinery."[24] Major Ernest A. Simon, writing in 1970, ranked the MAC as the most important among the supervisory organs of the armistice because of its overall responsibility, and considered the NNSC the most important from a practical standpoint.[25]

The NNSC continues to play a role as a node of communication between North Korea and its allies even after the end of the Cold War, although the weekly meetings accomplish little except as pro forma exchange of formal documents. For years it was the only regular and direct contact with North Korea. Some small degree of camaraderie occasionally emerged among the four-nation staff of the NNSC, and occasional social gatherings which included the North Koreans may have injected some personal contact into an otherwise tense atmosphere and provided a platform for minor informal communication. The members also visit North Korea on occasion, but have virtually no access to military bases or key points where arms shipments could enter.

EROSION OF THE NNSC

In recent years, several developments have occurred which place the future of the NNSC in doubt. The decline of Soviet power in the late 1980s, and the success of South Korea's Nordpolitik, saw the two Communist members of the Commission recognize the Seoul government. (Poland established diplomatic ties with the ROK on 1 November 1989, and Czechoslovakia on 22 March 1990.) These acts seriously compromised the neutrality of Warsaw and Prague in the eyes of Pyongyang, but in fact made them more neutral with their two-Korea policy. On 22 June 1991, North Korea asked the two countries to withdraw from the NNSC, but their governments

refused.[26] Under the 1953 armistice, any change to the Commission required agreement by all three signatories - China, North Korea, and the United Nations Command. Subsequently, North Korea engaged in daily harassment of the Polish and Czech delegates - cutting off gas, water, and electricity supplies to their residences. North Korea further attacked their neutrality because the Polish and Czech governments had sent observers to the Team Spirit exercises, which Pyongyang considered to be a rehearsal for a United Nations Command invasion of its territory.

When Czechoslovakia divided into two republics, North Korea insisted that it alone had the right to decide which of the successor republics (if any) would take its place on the NNSC. When the new Czech representative took up residence in the NNSC camp (under the jurisdiction of North Korea), he and his staff were ejected soon afterwards. By the spring of 1993, only the Polish representative remained, and complained of steady harassment from the North Koreans.

The North Koreans have refused to attend meetings of the Military Armistice Commission as well, citing the appointment of a South Korean general as chair of the UN side as a violation of previous arrangements. The U.S. claims that it is perfectly within the rights of the UNC to appoint whomever it deems appropriate as chairman. In addition, the U.S. command sees it as a step towards giving the South Koreans more responsibility over their own affairs. This is

disingenuous because such a move was obviously provocative to Pyongyang and in a way, a violation of the spirit of the Armistice Agreement. South Korea was not a direct party to the armistice, and technically Pyongyang has a legitimate complaint. North Korea would have a more justified claim if it had a better record of abiding by the agreement, but its harassment of the Communist (now ex-Communist) "neutrals" and eviction of the Czech representative were a challenge to the Armistice Agreement which could not be ignored by the NNSC. Aside from formal and informal protests (which came close to compromising the neutrality of one NNSC member), the MAC appointed a South Korean general as senior member - an unprecedented step since South Korea had not been a party to the armistice. The U.S. states that this step is part of the process of giving the Republic of Korea greater responsibility in its own defense, and was unrelated to Pyongyang harassment of the NNSC.

North Korea interpreted it otherwise. In a press release by the Pyongyang news agency on 9 August 1991, the North Koreans claimed that the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were no longer operative:

> By appointing the South Korean Army 'general' senior member of the 'UN forces' side to the MAC, the United States sought to avoid its legal obligation to replace the armistice agreement by a peace agreement and gain some political profit by raising the status of South Korea at whatever cost.[27]

On 24 October 1991, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the "NNSC is now in the position where it is unable to discharge its duty at all according to the armistice agreement. The U.S. side is wholly to blame for it."[28]

The affair demonstrates the primary political nature of the NNSC, and the subordination of its now moribund verification system to the international environment.

IV. LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY ARMS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION

UNSCOM IN IRAQ

There are conceptual and operational lessons to be drawn from the NNSC experience, with respect to arms control verification efforts, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. Problems inherent in the NNSC can be found in modern day agreements. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) has some crude parallels with the NNSC, with the crucial exception that North Korea - unlike Iraq - was not a defeated country. Peace was imposed on Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War, and UNSCOM had the responsibility for supervision. It was assumed that, similar to the NNSC in dealing with North and South Korea, UNSCOM would check the veracity of Iraqi declarations, using information from independent sources and the inspection powers given to it by the Security Council resolution. Similar to the NNSC, UNSCOM would then report its

findings to a higher body, the Security Council in its case. It was soon obvious that Iraq was not acting in good faith, and used every possible pretext to reinterpret UNSCOM's inspection rights. The Baghdad government used harassment tactics to make inspections as difficult as possible in order to resume its weapons buildup.

However UNSCOM has been more successful in achieving its goal of inspection than was the NNSC. This was achieved by using something that was absent from the Korean Armistice Agreement: the threat of reprisal. The NNSC was helpless because it had no ability to punish violations of the Agreement. In contrast, the efficacy of credible force was recognized and implemented in Iraq. Two threats implicitly backed up the process, and both assumed continued determination to see the cease-fire resolution fully implemented. First, there was the threat of continued sanctions and oil embargo regimes until Iraq complied with the terms of the cease-fire. Second, there was the threat of resumed hostilities by the coalition or some of its members if Iraq failed to comply with the provisions of the cease-fire resolution. The decision on whether and when to use these threats rests with the Security Council and its members, not UNSCOM, whose role is to implement and verify the provisions of the resolutions and to report to the Security Council on progress and on any incident preventing UNSCOM from fulfilling its mandate.[29] UNSCOM has been successful because it had force, via the Security Council, to back it up with its

dealings with Iraq. This was a major item missing with the regime set up by the Military Armistice Commission for the NNSC.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

A lack of enforcement power was not the only problem with the mandate of the NNSC. The tools of verification were also inadequate, but have substantially improved since 1953. One of the most comprehensive treaties is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - an historic agreement, banning all chemical weapons worldwide and imposing wide-ranging inspections to verify that ban. The CWC goes far beyond the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans only the use of chemical weapons in warfare.[30] Article I of the CWC prohibits all development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. The conceptual aspects of verification went far beyond those that could be implemented by the NNSC. The CWC was the first global arms control agreement to require participating states to accept challenge inspections at any site, without a right of refusal.

This right is not absolute, however, reflecting the parties' need to protect sensitive information. Challenge inspections under the final agreement still provide for mandatory on-site inspection anytime and anywhere. A complex set of rules governs the timing of the arrival of the inspections team at the point of entry in the challenged state, the determination of the location of the perimeter, and

the commencement of the on-site inspection. Unless the Executive Council rules otherwise, the challenged state must grant access to the suspect site. [31] These type of inspections were not used or enforced by the NNSC. Enforcement, even at the rudimentary level of stopping trade in chemicals, is an element in the CWC that was missing in the Korean Armistice Agreement, where there was no specific measures to penalize violations.

The CWC includes a variety of incentives to encourage states to join, both "carrots" and "sticks." Defensive assistance is one motivation - states facing chemical threats or attack are entitled to receive assistance including defense equipment. Civilian chemical trade is another important area of inducements. Article XI encourages parties of the treaty to "participate in the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information. for purposes not prohibited." [32] If a nation fails to comply it will be stripped of its privileges within the convention framework and reported to the United Nations Security Council for disciplinary action.

These procedures were not available in the Korean Armistice Agreement, and the NNSC was left to operate without an enforcement framework in place. The result was that the NNSC could not carry out its mission effectively. The fundamental problem was that hostilities and standoff

remained, with virtually no consensus on expanding the armistice.

WEAKNESSES OF THE NNSC

A full study of the NNSC is needed to evaluate its lessons for present and future verification and peacekeeping. On the surface the Commission made a contribution in solving the bloody stalemate of the Korean War by providing a compromise mechanism that had formal access to both belligerent sides. But the Armistice itself had no enforcement mechanism nor the political will to punish violations. Nor did the NNSC have the honest neutrality which was necessary to carry out verification, inspection and supervision in an objective manner. The NNSC was a toothless watchdog at birth, but its presence provided a political rationale for ending the war with neither victory nor defeat. It enabled Washington to claim that a mechanism was in place to prevent an arms buildup on the Korean peninsula which would lead to another attack against the south in the future.

One could point to the Armistice Agreement itself as the source of weakness of the NNSC. (1) Greater detailing of procedures would have removed some of the discretion of the Commission, which was stymied by split votes on numerous issues. (2) An even number of members was a consistent source of tie votes, but there was little evidence that a fifth, "super-neutral" member would have been acceptable to either

side to break ties. (3) The design of the Commission was flawed because the member states had been insufficiently involved in the design, but again, the neutral nations had to be approved by both sides of combatants, and their neutrality might have been further compromised by such participation at an early stage.

A major dilemma of arms inspections by any external body is that they infringe on a nation's most intimate aspect of sovereignty. Governments have a legitimate right to restrict the scope of inspections - a right somewhat analogous to an individual's right of privacy. But in order to achieve a higher degree of national security, a nation must make some concessions to this right of privacy. The voluntary acceptance of verification inspection hinges on the expectation and demonstration of fairness - that all parties are subjected equally to restrictions on the right of self-defense. There is an interesting parallel between international arms control and gun control in the U.S. The fear of vulnerability in an environment increasingly perceived as anarchy fuels opposition to restrictions on gun ownership, especially the common sense view that those who will be least likely to turn in their guns will be those persons most likely to use them in performance of crimes. At the international level, short term benefit may accrue to the cheater, who will have to act within a short time frame to take maximum advantage of his relative position. The longer he waits to

exploit his better position, the greater the chance of discovery of his cheating and the exaction of major penalties. This was the lesson of Communist violation of the Armistice Agreement that resulted in the U.S. introduction of nuclear weapons to counter the North Korean buildup.

The more effective the inspection, the more there is the possibility of compromise of national security secrets. While the North Koreans depended on conventional weapons, their replacements, reinforcements, movements and intentions were the legitimate target of NNSC inspections, which they naturally resisted. The UN forces were anxious to support the armistice and gave the Commission the freedom of movement in the agreement, despite South Korean misgivings about the espionage potential from the Polish and Czech members inspections. When it became clear that the North Koreans had no intention of reciprocating access, the collapse of the NNSC mission was a foregone conclusion.

Part of the failure of the NNSC was technical. On-site inspections were "state of the art" technology at the time, since satellite sensing had not yet developed, and precise aerial photography had not achieved the degree of technical sophistication of today. Fulfillment of responsibilities under the Armistice Agreement required far more freedom of movement throughout the peninsula (especially in the North) than was provided in the ten designated ports. Although the mobile inspection teams were supposed to have free movement

under the Armistice Agreement, informal restrictions and interference appeared to nullify this right. Moreover, the North had considerable incentive to cheat, and little impulse to abide by the agreement. Pyongyang felt it had been deprived of victory and unification by the intervention of the UN, and would succeed a second time when US and UN will and attentions were distracted from Korea. The Commission was perceived as a temporary expedient to stop the fighting. Few anticipated that the East-West confrontation would persist for another third of a century after the Korean war. Perhaps it was here that the NNSC played its other role - as witness to the armistice. It was a minor third party standing between North and South. There could be no surreptitious conventional attack - from either direction - without the NNSC (at least the truly neutral members) sounding the alarm. As a "trip wire" in place on the DMZ, various ports, the NNSC had a small and limited role as potential witness to surprise attack. In this the Commission was a practical and moral watchman that had an objective interest in safeguarding the armistice.

A workable inspection system would have required penalties for non-compliance. These were missing from the Armistice Agreement, and more importantly were probably unworkable under the circumstances. The reality of the armistice was that the two sides had stopped fighting because of a stalemate, and the assumption was the war would resume when either side felt it had a chance of winning a quick

victory. The Armistice Agreement had accomplished its main purpose by ending the war, and its terms were necessarily vague or silent on the hard issues - including penalties for violation. The experience of negotiating the armistice at Panmunjom meant that fighting would have been prolonged if a genuinely enforceable verification system were demanded by the UNC.

Aside from the practical question of ending the war quickly, would a schedule of sanctions and penalties have tightened the arms control regime on the Korean peninsula? Here, context may be everything. According to the Armistice Agreement, the UNC was to make decisions on the disposition of violations. This meant the matter could be referred to the United Nations itself - where Soviet veto would be the final verdict. (Part of the Korean dilemmas was that the United Nations Command was the "policeman" largely - but not entirely - guided by the U.S. The United Nations General Assembly, or more specifically, the Security Council, was judge and jury, and subject to more diverse and conflicting pressures.) Or the Commander of the UN forces could take initiative and apply military pressure, but risk censure. After the Truman-MacArthur feud, the U.S. President kept his commander in Korea on a shorter leash, and local initiative was therefore unlikely. No pressure would be invoked on armistice violations without express approval from Washington, and the

last thing Eisenhower wanted was renewal of hostilities in Korea.

In this context, stipulated penalties for violation of the armistice terms could have backfired. If the UNC invoked penalties against the Communist side, it would have led to a new crisis. If violations occurred and were not answered with stipulated penalties, the remaining credibility of the Armistice Agreement might have eroded. By leaving the actual response to violations in a grey area of field commander discretion, the armistice probably insured its own longevity.

From the standpoint of verification and arms control, there were few disincentives to non-cooperation. In fact, cheating was probably rewarded because it provided a probe of UNC will and intelligence capacity. One can speculate how Kim Il Song could have used the arms control system as a mechanism to remove his rivals and tighten state security: A hypothetical shipment of mortars arrives by night convoy from Manchuria into North Korea. This violation shows up in a report from the NNSC. The North Koreans rule out aerial surveillance, and suspect espionage and even treason. A few executions, imprisonments, and security campaigns serve to terrorize the ranks and perhaps remove a supporter or two of Kim Il Song's rivals.

Kim Il Song's totalitarian rule was consolidated during the period after the Korean war, and any evidence - however

flimsy - of domestic opposition to him was met with tighter control and liquidation. In this context, not completely unlike that of Iraq today, the information and intelligence component of an arms verification system can provide a dictator with an instrument to tighten his control over all parts of the state. This points to a negative consequence of arms control, disarmament and verification - it may instruct a violator how to evade detection more effectively in the future by tightening up his own apparatus.

With the two Communist members of the NNSC acting as virtual extensions of Soviet policy, there was no chance of genuine neutrality. The UN remained toothless in enforcement capabilities, and the US and its allies were not willing to resume the war over the North Korean violations.

PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING

The NNSC can also be viewed as an early post-World War Two peacekeeping operation. Some lessons can also be drawn from the NNSC regarding contemporary peacekeeping and peacemaking operations for Canada and other nations. Since the late 1940s Canada has participated in over thirty peacekeeping missions and has participated in every UN peacekeeping mission.[33] In his September 1991 statement on defence policy, the Minister of National Defence stated that "Canada will also continue its peacekeeping efforts whenever such action can help to contain regional conflicts, promote

security, relieve suffering and support the work of the United Nations." [34]

However, peacekeeping is changing. The NNSC fits into a more traditional category, when peacekeeping was limited to conflict containment, using third party personnel and observers with the consent of the parties to the dispute. It rested on the presumption that an effective cease-fire was in place. Peacekeeping missions are deployed today, on the other hand, with broadly expanded roles and objectives, many more players and clearer mandates. They not only have the traditional military element, but also contain police, election supervisory and human rights officials, as well as assorted technicians. Tasks which can only be described as "nation-building" have been added on as well.

Peacekeeping continues to evolve and has become more interventionist, with overlaps into humanitarian missions.. The scope of modern peacekeeping has expanded far beyond the mediation of conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping missions, typified by the NNSC, took one of two forms: truce observation missions consisting of unarmed military observers, or peacekeeping forces comprised of formal units of troops, armed for their own defense.[35] In the post-Cold War era the political dimension of peacekeeping has taken on new importance. For example, in Namibia in 1989 the UN accepted a new role with the traditional concept of truce monitoring to include military, political, humanitarian, economic and social

functions. This is also evident with the United Nations Transitional Force in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Conflict containment and conflict resolution are being brought together. In essence the new role can be seen as not only monitoring but as nation-building. Peacekeepers are now dealing with human rights violations, restoration of governmental institutions, law and order, and even the formation of transitional governments as in Cambodia.[36]

Peacemaking must be examined in the same context. It is a diplomatic activity, but is normally conducted after the commencement of conflict, and it aims to establish an end to military hostilities. It includes negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and other political and diplomatic efforts. Peacemaking can continue in conjunction with peacekeeping, or can be conducted in advance of the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to establish conditions under which peacekeeping becomes possible. The degree to which peacemaking is successful, will strongly influence the ability of the peacekeeping operation to carry out its mission. For example peacemaking efforts in Bosnia have been unsuccessful, and, as a result, peacekeeping efforts by the UN troops have been ineffective in stopping the war.

How did the NNSC responsibilities and activities of arms control verification and peacekeeping compare to the present? An arms control agreement is an agreement between states to undertake restrictive measures expected to result in the

decreased likelihood in war.[37] As a result, the verification aspect of an arms control agreement becomes crucial. Agreements negotiated in the last decade have heavily emphasized verification, particularly those negotiated between the United States and the former Soviet Union. However, verification must be placed in perspective. Even though it is important to the arms control process, it should not be considered the central factor in evaluating the usefulness of an arms control agreement.

Among the key elements in analyzing arms control agreements should be the political, economic and military impact of such an agreement. Verification is important, if not central, to success. It is generally necessary to have an effective verification system in any arms control regime, but even the best verification by itself will not produce success. Nations will comply if it is in their best interest to do so - effectively reducing the importance of the verification process. On the other hand, by raising the costs of violating an arms control regime by increasing the probability of detection, verification affects what a country may calculate as "best interest".

When analyzing the responsibilities and activities of the NNSC, and comparing them against the present arms control verification practices, such as those found in the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty, one finds similarities and differences. There are some structural

similarities. Both had consultative bodies which met to assess the implementation of agreements. The MAC had defined supervisory powers, and the NNSC was responsible for carrying out the Armistice Agreement. The relevant body in the CFE verification regime is the Joint Consultative Group (JCG)[38], which is not supervisory and has no equivalent of the NNSC to implement compliance with the agreement. Also, the basic responsibilities of the NNSC (supervision, observation, inspection and investigation) can be found within the CFE verification package. However, the way in which these responsibilities are carried out are different. The NNSC used fixed inspection, disclosure, and mobile inspection teams as the activity for verification. In contrast, the CFE arms control verification system has each state performing inspections, (although multinational teams are developing) - in contrast to the NNSC third party inspections. The CFE package contains five basic components:

- notification and information exchange (Articles XIII and XVII);
- ground on-site inspections (Article XIV);
- national or multinational technical means (Article XV);
- aerial inspections (Article XIV [6]); and
- the Joint Consultative Group (Article XVI)[39]

The differences are significant, but similarities remain, such as the main emphasis in NNSC and CFE on ground inspections. More recent arms control regimes, represented by the CFE Treaty, the Sinai Disengagement Agreements[40], and the

United Nations Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM)[41] have been technologically more advanced than the NNSC, even though more sophisticated means are available. Moreover, the NNSC lacked access to multiple sources of information. The use of national technical means, aerial inspections and challenge ground inspections allows for immediate and up to date information and verification. While the 1953 Armistice Agreement allowed for challenge inspections, their effectiveness had been neutralized by major interference and non-cooperation from the Communists inside and outside the NNSC.

The responsibilities and activities of peacekeeping should also be considered. The purpose of peacekeeping is not only to halt conflict, but also to create an environment in which the search for peaceful solutions to the underlying causes of tensions can be resolved through negotiations.[42] The NNSC gave substance to the Armistice Agreement and acted as a communication link between North and South Korea. Working with the Military Armistice Commission, it jointly acted as a negotiating body between the two sides. The NNSC can be viewed as a peacekeeping operation that supervised, observed, inspected and investigated the Armistice Agreement.

This traditional activity of peacekeeping is also used today, and supervision - in the sense of coordination, communication, and other administrative tasks - remains a key element in many United Nations peacekeeping efforts.

Verification also plays an important traditional activity in UN peacekeeping operations, just as it did for the NNSC. These include: [43]

- the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
- United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador established 1991 (ONUSAL)
- United Nations Observer Group in Central America established 1989 (ONUCA)
- United Nations Angola Verification Mission II established 1991 (UNAVEM II)
- United Nations Protection Force established 1992 (UNYPROFOR)

V. SOME LESSONS FROM THE NNSC EXPERIENCE

(1) An important lesson of the NNSC experience was that genuinely neutral parties are indispensable to effectiveness of certain kinds of agreements - especially those where neither belligerent has been defeated. It is crucial to preserve and cultivate some genuinely neutral countries in the world today. In the Cold War atmosphere, neutrality was considered as a moral lapse and an unwillingness to take a stand for "justice". The North Koreans had insisted that China and the Soviet Union should be the neutral parties of their nomination, and Poland and Czechoslovakia were the results of some hard bargaining. The result was a half-neutral NNSC.

Today there are few genuinely neutral nations with the long tradition and credibility of Sweden and Switzerland. The end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War provides the world with an opportunity for the emergence of more risk-free neutralism in a few countries. Every country has interests to preserve, and is therefore immune from perfect neutrality on all disputes. There are degrees of neutrality which depend upon distance from the issue. Canada, for example, might have difficulty in establishing neutrality in a dispute involving the U.S. and another country, but would be considered neutral in Southeast Asia.

Participation in UN peacekeeping operations is a valuable training experience for would-be neutrals. Non-membership in alliance systems is a usual criterion for an advanced degree of neutrality, since the interests of an ally may be compromised by the actions of a neutral. While Poland and Czechoslovakia were technically not allies of North Korea and China, their subordination to Moscow, which had been a main supplier of the Asian Communists, rendered their neutrality meaningless and hopelessly compromised.

A further criterion of neutrality - but one which cannot be easily applied today - is a fairly advanced economic system, in the sense that a country will not be vulnerable to material incentives to compromise its objectivity. To these can be added the criteria of a reasonably advanced legal system which has conditioned at least some citizens to the

genuine impartiality in application of rules and laws. In Communist countries, the Communist Party was the law, and representatives to international bodies could hardly detach themselves from this fundamental axiom.

With the passing of communism, the opportunities for neutrality have multiplied, so the "pool" of potential neutrals is not nearly as small as it was in 1953. Whether in peacekeeping or arms control verification, the list of potentially impartial countries has grown, which should make the tasks easier. With the United Nations as the framework of cooperation, the delegation of verification duties can be done with much less reference to blocs and with greater attention to competence and realistic assessment of neutrality. Nation-states remain the primary actors, and are likely to remain so in future decades. At the same time, as various treaty organizations establish their own identity, procedures, and credibility, they will undoubtedly enlarge their roles in arms control, disarmament, verification, and peacekeeping - as has been occurring with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with its activity in Iraq and North Korea.

(2) Regarding the fixed inspection teams, the intention was to have officials similar to those of customs service on hand to scrutinize incoming and outgoing shipments of military personnel, equipment, and weapons. The idea had some effectiveness in South Korea where the bulk of shipments passed through the major ports, but even there evasion was not

difficult with numerous smaller ports outside the designated five - including sea and air ports. (The author has seen no evidence to indicate that such evasion did occur in South Korea.) A larger number of fixed teams would have helped to cover more entry points, but probably not enough to justify the additional resources necessary to support them. The limits on their effectiveness were not so much caused by numbers as by their half-neutral, half-partisan composition. The same was true of the mobile teams.

(3) A related factor is the important lesson that genuine neutrality is a precious commodity in the world. If all four parties in the NNSC had approximated the neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland, the verification system would have had a much better chance of success. Mere lip service to impartiality by the Poles and Czechs was transparent and destroyed the effectiveness of the inspection teams.

(4) Some of the lessons of the NNSC are negative - how not to design and conduct verification. The Armistice Agreement had only one purpose - to stop the war and minimize the possibility of resumption. All other considerations were secondary, including the verification system. Only when the degree of Communist non-compliance was so great as to destroy the armistice did the UNC/US counter with the nuclear challenge. This may be the major lesson of the Korean armistice - of which the NNSC was a central part - that the price of accumulating small-scale violations will result in a

major crisis, and probably a new scale of escalation. The U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons undoubtedly stimulated China to accelerate its nuclear development program, and inspired North Korea to embark on one of its own to counter "nuclear blackmail." The lesson here is that countering a conventional military threat with nuclear weapons can be successful in the short run, but it makes the threatened party determined to prevent the same threat in the future which can only be done by development of its own nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Japan, having experienced two nuclear attacks, may be among the last industrial countries to ever desire such devices.

(5) Without durable and enforceable sanctions against violations, parties may act with impunity - as the current crisis over potential North Korean nuclear weapons illustrates. The Armistice Agreement made no provision for measured responses to violations, and thus the UNC had few options besides restarting an unpopular war. A more rigorous stipulation of the rights and duties of inspectors and the rules for access to suspected sites of violations might have made the Inspection Teams more effective. But in hindsight, the Communist "neutrals" interfered as much as the Chinese and North Koreans in pursuit of violations in North Korea. After three years of war, the U.S. and UN had few illusions concerning the nature of the enemy, but they were not prepared

for countries which observed agreements with so little regard for international law.

(6) Finally, the system might have worked better if a more comprehensive, multi-layered regime had been designed. Today, ground sensors and some variation of AWACS and satellite surveillance would be valuable in monitoring air, land, and sea movement. The traffic across the relatively long border with China poses a problem to any technology. Moreover, one must not underestimate the capacity of the North Koreans to evade detection. Many military installations are underground, or under shelters undetectable from the air. The North Koreans also constructed at least three long and large tunnels under the DMZ with which to infiltrate the South and even launch a second invasion. These were discovered only after revealed by defectors from the DPRK. No arms control agreement in the world could have anticipated this loophole - which was literally large enough to drive trucks through.

VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The division of the Korean peninsula has been a major threat to peace and stability of the Pacific regions since the end of World War Two. The Korean War ended with the Armistice Agreement in 1953, and the establishment of the NNSC to monitor the balance of forces on the peninsula. Today the structure remains in place as witness to the uneasy peace.

For all the irrelevance of the NNSC, it has remained the formal expression of suspended war which did not break out.

The present study has emphasized the place of this Commission in the armistice which has been far more institutional and political than technical. More study of this question of the relationship between the political environment and arms verification is needed, as well as the structure of legal stipulations and organization relating to verification systems. The Korean Armistice Agreement was a case of stopping a war and preventing its resumption by compelling disengagement of forces, and probably has parallels with similar agreements. A comparative study of several cases would be useful to draw lessons of what is effective and what is not, and under what circumstances.

A second area of needed research is a historical inquiry on the actual operation of the NNSC during the first year of existence. Records are available, and participants are still alive, so the procedures and problems of the fixed and mobile teams can still be detailed. The problem would be the North Korean and Chinese side where cooperation in the project would not be forthcoming. What formal and informal rules emerged and governed the NNSC activities? How did they gather information? What examples of cooperation and non-cooperation did they experience both in North and South Korea? What pressures were exerted on the Communist "neutrals"?

A third area of needed research is to examine the updating of the NNSC in the context of contemporary arms control requirements for the Korean peninsula. With the involvement of the IAEA under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in North Korea, the NNSC has become redundant in nuclear arms control, but can still have a role in monitoring conventional arms. What technology today would give the Commission the necessary eyes and ears to carry out its original mission? When and if the two Koreas get to the point of realistic discussions of reunification, the NNSC may provide a useful mechanism for verification of conventional arms leading to disarmament, or amalgamation of the two forces and withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Today, a new chapter is being written in Korea. South Korea has won the diplomatic, economic, and political war with hardly a direct human casualty, while North Korea is isolated, practically bankrupt, and an international pariah. Moreover, it faces a succession crisis as Kim Il Song prepares to "meet Marx and Lenin". Pyongyang is trying desperately to survive its long string of adversities with development of nuclear weapons, and in doing so, may seriously undermine the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and even stimulate an arms race in East Asia. The peninsula retains a stubborn potential for conventional and nuclear conflict.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

In essence, the NNSC was established to monitor a local armistice to end a war. Its ability to do this was severely limited by circumstances of stalemate between the major world powers, the stalemated structure of the four party neutral nations, and the near-total absence of leverage over offending parties to move them to compliance with the Armistice Agreement. The axiom of "trust, but verify" could hardly be applied in an environment in which there was no trust due to a stalemated war, and little opportunity for authentic verification. The system of on-site inspections was relatively easy to evade, and there was little will to resume an unpopular war in order to enforce the NNSC mandate.

The dilemma of the Korean armistice was that it was not a true peace, but more of a rest in preparation for another round of fighting - at least that was the working assumption of the North Koreans. The Chinese Communists were not eager to get involved in another war if they could help it. Their own economy and military condition required urgent attention. The accumulation of Communist violations no doubt frustrated the genuinely neutral observers as well as the UNC as they watched the erosion of the military balance which had provided the baseline of the Armistice Agreement. Even the NNSC recognized its inability to stop the flow of arms into North Korea and called for its own dissolution. But a unilateral dissolution of the NNSC would have demolished the Armistice

Agreement, which was the major prop of uneasy peace. Under the circumstances, the U.S. introduced nuclear weapons as a step calculated to restore the military balance on the peninsula.

This phenomenon may be described as a "step function". Incremental changes on one side of the equation (armistice violations) do not produce incremental results on the other side (sanctions). When a sufficiently high threshold was reached, a major counter-action is taken (introduction of nuclear weapons). Alternative responses would be war or surprise attack. This "step function" contrasts with the curvilinear equation in which incremental changes on one side are met by roughly proportional changes on the other. A dam may leak more water as the inflow increases (curvilinear), or it may hold a vast increase and burst without warning (step function).

A verification system may be designed with the expectation of curvilinear expectations on the compliance and response sides of the equation, but this may occur over a longer time span than expected. One cannot predict how parties will react to a pattern of violations of an arms control agreement, and indeed, this very unpredictability is an important element adding to the risks taken by a violator. It is also an argument against detailed prescriptions of penalties in an agreement. The problem with taking early measures against violations is that it allows the violator to

test the system at minor cost and then modify violation methods making them more sophisticated. A more effective strategy may be to restrain the penalty until a certain pattern has been established, or to tolerate small violations as long as no major improvements to military capability are permitted. That is, a "fuzzy logic" approach, rather than tit for tat, may be effective. In any event, the verification system is crucial in fine-tuning the responses. North Korea was a menace to regional peace then, and remains one today, as the recent NPT crisis demonstrates.

How might the NNSC have better succeeded in its mission? In retrospect, its primary mission was to act as third party witness to the armistice and prevent resumption of the war. In this respect its assignment was fulfilled. Its continued existence and presence on the DMZ was vindication of the original intentions of the armistice negotiators. Even though the NNSC was prevented from accurate monitoring of arms flows into North Korea, there was no illusion of Communist compliance. The genuine neutrals bore witness to this as they faced interference, evasion, harassment, and non-cooperation. While the Communists violated the armistice with arms increases and enhancements, they appeared to be cautious not to endanger the armistice itself. They had little fear from the UN, since it had already done its worst by launching the counterattack against North Korea aggression in June 1950. Moreover, with the Soviets back in the world organization

after their untimely boycott at the time of war, a united and forceful resumption of the Korean war was highly unlikely.

Any such action, however, would have upset the delicate armistice achieved at Panmunjom, and led to a resumption of war. Neither the UN nor the US had the will to pursue strong measures. The US introduction of nuclear weapons expressed Washington's exasperation at the tilting of the military balance of power in favor of North Korea, and commitment to South Korea's security has been the best insurance of peace on the peninsula.

The NNSC was a device without the necessary support and enforcement it required. Its continued existence remains a symbol of the stalemated war and subsequent armistice, and little more. As a model of peacekeeping, it was toothless, and dependent upon the cooperation of the two recently warring sides. It served as witness to the fragile armistice and was seriously flawed by the dishonest claims of neutrality of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its provisions were grudging compromises. While aerial photo reconnaissance had developed even before World War Two, much more sophisticated technology of satellite surveillance and verification was still in the future. In some respects, the NNSC may be a model of how <u>not</u> to carry out peacekeeping and verification in the contemporary world.

ENDNOTES

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3. Ibid. p. 108.

4. David W. Wainhouse, "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and Military Armistice Commission (MAC), 1953-1964", International Peace Observation, 1966, p. 347. According to the Armistice Agreement, the MAC was authorized to request the NNSC to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the DMZ where violations of the Agreement were reported. (Article 28)

5. Article 24.

6. Article 26

7. See Appendix.

8. The following sites were designated as Ports Of Entry:
North Korean Ports: Sinuiju; Chongjin; Hungnam; Nampo; and Sinanju.
South Korean Ports: Inchon; Pusan; Taegu; Kangnung; and Kunsan.

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13. Wainhouse, p. 348.

14. Wainhouse, p. 348.

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23. Ibid., p. 4.

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APPENDIX ONE

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

VOLUME I

Text of Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

Note #1:

UNC PARTICIPANTS IN KOREAN CONFLICT	NON-BELLIGERENTS FURNISHING HOSPITALS AND HOSPITAL SHIPS
1. United States	
2. United Kingdom	
3. Canada	Denmark
4. Belgium	India
5. Luxembourg	Italy
6. France	
7. The Netherlands	
8. Columbia	
9. The Philippines	
10. Turkey	
11. Greece	
12. Thailand	
13. New Zealand	
14. Australia	
15. Ethiopia	
16. South Africa	

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1).

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

See Note #2

See Note # 3

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map (Map 2). Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

See Note #4

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

Note #2: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreement" - TAB "S"
Note #3: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TABS "H"(3) and "H"(4)
Note #4: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB"A"

See Note #5

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

See Note #5

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to

See Note #6

be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of

Note #5: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" – TAB "F" and TAB "K"
Note #6: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" – TAB "Q"

either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as

directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands", as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3.)

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary

duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

See Note #7.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea

See Note #8

Note #7: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "L"
Note #8: (a) Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "B"
(b) Refer to UNC Position declared at the 75th MAC Meeting, 21 June '54

for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

See Note # 9

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

See Note # 10

See Note # 10

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of

Note # 9: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "L"
Note # 10: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "C"

entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

See Note #11

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

Note # 11: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "J

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side

shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

See note # 12

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

See note #13

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

See note # 13a

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

Note # 12: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H"(1) and "H"(2)
Note # 13: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "D"(1) and "D"(2)
Note # 13a: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "N"(1) and "N"(2)

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

See note # 14

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

See note #15

Note # 14: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "G"
Note #15: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB ("H"(1)

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

See note #16

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

See note #16

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

See Note #.17

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as

See note # 16

Note # 16: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "N"(1), "N"(2) and "I"
Note # 17: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "H"(1)

may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and

equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43

hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Subparagraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

See note # 18

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command		Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers	
INCHON	(37°28'N, 126°38'E)	SINUIJU	(40°06'N, 124°24'E)
TAEGU	(35°52'N, 128°36'E)	CHONGJIN	(41°46'N, 129°49'E)
PUSAN	(35°06'N, 129°02'E)	HUNGNAM	(39°50'N, 127°37'E)
KANGNUNG	(37°45'N, 128°54'E)	MANPO	(41°09'N, 126°18'E)
KUNSAN	(35°59'N, 126°43'E)	SINANJU	(39°36'N, 125°36'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

Note # 18: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "O"

3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

ARTICLE III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any), and internment or military serial number.

(((PAGES 19-24 OMITTED - NOT RELEVANT TO NNSC)))

Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

See note # 19

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

ARTICLE IV

RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

Note #19: Refer to the "Subsequent Agreements" - TAB "E"

ARTICLE V

MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 JULY 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of JULY, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG
Marshal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

PRESENT

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

CONFIDENCE BUILDING EVOLUTION IN EUROPE STATIC OR PORTABLE?[1]

JIM MACINTOSH
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Introduction

Confidence building typically is understood to involve the use of formal, cooperative measures designed to improve information, increase understanding, and reduce uncertainty about neighbours' military forces and activities. Some see in it a much more powerful approach that, ***when successfully applied under the right conditions,*** can help change in a fundamental and enduring manner the way states view each other. Directly as a result of its success in Europe, confidence building is now recognized as an important cooperative approach to improving security relations amongst states suspicious about and uncertain of each other's intentions.

We do not know yet what role confidence building might play in many other areas of application — geographic or substantive — but the possibilities are exciting and definitely worth exploring, particularly given the record in Europe. This paper looks at these possibilities and touches, briefly, on a variety of the conceptual and practical issues raised by efforts to ***generalize the Eurocentric confidence building experience.*** Central to this exploration are three basic questions:

(1) Do we ***understand*** fully how confidence building actually has worked in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) case? If we do not, how can we hope to use the approach successfully in different contexts?

(2) How ***generalizable*** is the European experience? Even if we understand the European case, can we construct a meaningfully general understanding on the basis of a single case?

(3) Is it necessary to have a conceptually-based, general, and abstract understanding of confidence building in order to use "confidence building" in new contexts?

Overview

The paper is divided into several main sections. These include:

- A basic discussion of the traditional "minimalist" and more radical "transformation" views of confidence building;
- The introduction of key elements in a general understanding of the confidence building approach based on the transformation view, including:
  - General definitions of confidence building seen in terms of an ***activity;*** an ***outcome;*** and a ***process;***
  - A typology of CBM ***categories;***
  - A provisional discussion of ***initial conditions*** for the successful pursuit of confidence building;
- A discussion of basic ***questions and issues*** associated with the transformation view of confidence building;
- ***Implications and recommendations*** flowing from this analysis, with a particular concern for using this transformation-oriented understanding of confidence building in new application areas.

A Central Proposition

Underlying the paper is a central proposition:

Contrary to more modest conceptions, confidence building is a potentially powerful security management approach that can facilitate — and perhaps even initiate — fundamental transformations in perceptions of threat and hostility in

security relations. "Minimalist" accounts of confidence building fail to capture this key capacity to mediate the transformation of security relations. The transformation view argues that the processes of exploring, negotiating, and implementing a confidence building agreement — by their very nature — can help to alter the way leaders, policy makers, and publics see potentially hostile neighbours. However, conditions must be right for this to occur. Ideally, these fundamental changes in perception come to be institutionalized in a genuine security regime reflecting the content of CBM agreements and the implicit rules of behaviour associated with them and their negotiation. Efforts to develop confidence building agreements when the initial conditions are inappropriate and/or when the nature of the process is imperfectly understood can lead to disappointing or even dangerous results because transformation is not imminent. Without transformation, confidence building efforts can, at best, achieve modest increases in "transparency" but risk exaggerating existing suspicions or masking hostile acts.

What is Confidence Building?

Our principal practical experience with the confidence building approach thus far has been in the European context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, confidence building ideas also have been used in the United States-Soviet Union strategic nuclear relationship (for instance, "Hot Line" and launch warning agreements) as well as in the maritime context ("Incidents at Sea" agreements). Some modest confidence building arrangements also have been developed in Latin America and Asia (ASEAN). These are all thought to be examples of confidence building.

Nevertheless, the bulk of our ideas about confidence building have a distinctly European flavour, one informed by concerns about large conventional armed forces with substantial tank armies, the terrain of Central Europe, and fears of surprise attack as well as unintended escalation, all in the context of a relatively rigid bipolar security environment underwritten by the existence of large nuclear forces.[2] Virtually all of the ideas in the confidence building literature have been developed with the European Cold War conventional military stand-off in mind. The recent dramatic success of CSCE confidence building negotiations has only underlined the dominance of the CSCE case in influencing our thinking about the confidence building phenomenon. We ignore this historical focus only at our peril.

A careful analysis of the traditional confidence building literature developed over the past twenty years will reveal that it is driven by an understanding of the phenomenon that could be called the ***"minimalist"*** perspective. This perspective

> "... recognizes little in the way of clear causal connections between the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements and any deeper, underlying associated process of change or transformation. Instead, "confidence building" is treated for all intents and purposes as an approximate synonym for ***implementing*** a collection of CBMs. And implementing these measures is associated with a general but unexplored expectation that the adoption of CBMs will reduce suspicion and misperception and thus improve a security relationship. This is presumed to occur because participating states will have more (and more reliable) information about each others' military capabilities and activities."[3]

The Transformation View

The minimalist perspective may be too limited, the product of an earlier time when analysts and policy makers did not yet see the greater potential of confidence building. This was likely because the political environment was very negative in the early- to mid-1980s and the impressive achievements of Stockholm and Vienna (and all that they implied) lay in the future. As a result of studying the more recent experience of confidence building in the pre-eminent CSCE case, we are beginning to appreciate that confidence building, as a discrete security management approach, can — and perhaps must — involve something more profound than improved access to security information and modest constraints on military deployments.

If the European case is any guide, it appears that "real" confidence building must be associated with a process of security conception transformation. This process, according to this developing view, produces a fundamental, positive shift in the way leaders, policy makers, and publics think about potentially dangerous neighbours and the sorts of threats that they may pose. The transformation in thinking makes it possible to escape from the circle of suspicion and to build new relationships that have no assumptions of hostility built into them.

This notion of ***fundamental transformation*** is key to explaining why decision makers become willing to adopt ever-more-comprehensive, cooperative CBM packages when,

objectively, these packages represent serious intrusions into their security planning and policy.[4] Transformation is central to understanding how these confidence building programmes become acceptable and then develop an enhanced capacity to further alter security conceptions in a positive manner. Without this type of transformation, it is difficult to imagine decision makers entertaining comprehensive confidence building-type solutions.

Thus, confidence building, according to this more expansive understanding, is ***not*** simply the adoption of specific measures providing participating states with more (and more reliable) information about each others' military capabilities and activities (including the opportunity to observe those capabilities and activities up close). Nor is it simply the process of acquiring that information once an agreement is in place, although this undoubtably plays some role in the larger confidence building process.

At the risk of oversimplifying the basic claims of conventional ("minimalist") confidence building thinking, it must be understood that more information about — and greater exposure to — dangerous neighbours' military forces will not necessarily improve security relations as conventional thinking implies. Indeed, relations may worsen as added information feeds existing misperceptions and fears, particularly as natural acquisition and development cycles yield forces of increased military capability. Even a modest conception of the confidence building process must (but rarely does) acknowledge this and grant that more is going on. This is an important point and speaks to the absence of much clear thought in conventional thinking about the causal nature of confidence building. In short, how does confidence building improve security relations?

Decades of Cold War experience with the progressively more refined acquisition of information via National Technical Means (NTM) would suggest that access to more detailed information ***by itself*** is not the key to confidence building and can easily produce the opposite effect. NTM, after all, did little to disabuse Superpower decision makers of exaggerated and frequently incorrect assessments in the strategic nuclear and conventional realm during the Cold War.

Instead, it seems that successful confidence building must somehow be associated with a basic shift in security thinking that makes genuinely cooperative arrangements acceptable and even attractive when earlier they would not be possible. Then, agreements to share increasingly detailed and sensitive military information can occur and reinforce changes in threat perception.

Thus, it may be most accurate to suggest that successful confidence building is a critically important but distinguishable part of a somewhat larger phenomenon involving fundamental change in conceptions of security. ***Confidence building, according to this emerging view, is by far the most effective means of operationalizing and institutionalizing the potential for change in security relations.*** This is because confidence building is a fundamentally cooperative activity focusing centrally on intention and perceptions of threat. It also tends not to rely on zero-sum reasoning, as does much of arms control more generally. Indeed, the development, negotiation, and implementation of confidence building agreements may be the only effective way of animating the potential for change in a security relationship. Thus, successful confidence building should be thought of as being part of larger ***compound phenomenon*** that combines (1) the process of negotiating and implementing CBM agreements and (2) an associated transformation process that sees basic perceptions of threat changed dramatically. It seems that the two must occur together for either to be truly successful. Otherwise, the potential for change remains incipient or a CBM agreement produces trivial gains in information.

Defining the Transformation View of Confidence Building

To make these initial observations about confidence building a bit more concrete as well as general, it might prove helpful to look at the confidence building phenomenon from a variety of distinctive but internally consistent perspectives. These are all discrete dimensions of confidence building as seen through the filter of the transformation approach. Collectively, they entail a comprehensive understanding of the confidence building phenomenon.

These distinctive perspectives include definitions of confidence building, understood in terms of:

(1) An ***activity*** (collectively, the processes of exploring, negotiating, and implementing a CBM agreement);

(2) An ***outcome*** (the ideal functional content of a CBM agreement);

(3) A ***process*** intimately associated with ***transformation.***

In addition, we can also gain an understanding of confidence building and what it means by examining:

(4) A *typology* of CBM categories.[5]

The most important distinction amongst the different faces of confidence building is that which sets apart agreements — packages of CBMs — from the much more comprehensive process of developing and then implementing agreements. Too often, "confidence building" is simply assumed to be something analogous to implementing CBMs. This is misleading as confidence building, as a process, involves much more. Of equal importance is the still-imperfectly-understood relationship between the confidence building (negotiation and implementation) process and the process of security environment transformation that makes the confidence building process both possible and meaningfully successful. On the basis of the CSCE experience, the larger process of security environment transformation seems to be triggered and/or nourished (in whole or in part) by the confidence building process (i.e., the pursuit of negotiations and then the implementation of developed CBM agreements). The confidence building process may be the only security management approach that can trigger and/or nourish the transformation of a security environment in this cooperative direction — or other multilateral undertakings may be capable of supporting the transformation process, as well. What does seem clear, however, is that without the larger transformation process, there cannot be meaningful confidence building.

Confidence Building as an Activity

This perspective attempts to place the larger transformation process and the functional procedure of confidence building within a unifying context. It corresponds (roughly) to the sense we may have in mind implicitly when we speak of or think about confidence building in terms of an ***activity***. In large part, its virtue lies in its ability to clarify the relationships amongst confidence building as a measure, as an agreement, as an activity, and as several forms of process.[6] It is really only the glue that holds together the more commonly appreciated "outcome" sense of confidence building and the more obscure but ultimately more important transformation process associated with confidence building. Nevertheless, it is important because it injects a degree of coherency into these definitional efforts that is missing when the focus is restricted to process and procedure alone.

This intermediate, activity-oriented definition states that:

> Confidence building is the ***activity*** of exploring, negotiating, and implementing a confidence building agreement that, when successful, initiates and/or facilitates a significant positive transformation process in the security relations of states.[7]

A General Definition of a Confidence Building Agreement

For a different level of understanding, we can draw on a generalized definition of what a confidence building agreement does. This functional view of confidence building as an ***outcome*** provides a more operationally-oriented appreciation of confidence building although it does ***not*** replace the process-oriented understanding.

A confidence building ***agreement*** is

- a formal arrangement undertaken with a ***reasonable*** expectation that fellow participating states do not currently have hostile intentions,
- that attempts to reduce or eliminate misperceptions of and concerns about potentially threatening military capabilities and activities
- by providing verifiable information about and advance notification of potentially threatening military activities
- and/or by providing the opportunity for the prompt explanation or exploration of worrisome military activities or developments
- and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces and their equipment by adopting verifiable restrictions on the activities, deployments, or qualitative improvements of those forces (or crucial components of them), frequently within sensitive areas near the borders of neighbours.

Confidence Building and the Transformation Process

The relationship between confidence building and transformation is particularly difficult to assess and explain. After extensive analysis, it seems inappropriate simply to say that confidence building and the positive transformation of a security relationship are synonymous or entail the same thing. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the two are intimately inter-related.

At present, it seems most accurate to suggest that when a fundamental change in security perceptions and conceptions is "in the air," the pursuit of confidence building arrangements may be the most effective — and possibly the only — way of operationalizing or institutionalizing that potential. It is less clear but probably true as well that exploring the possibilities for confidence building and negotiating an agreement can help to make that potential for fundamental change imminent. To employ a metaphor from nature, confidence building and transformation may be seen to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with each other.

Based on the experience of our most successful example — the European case — we might define confidence building as

> a discrete security management activity that is particularly well suited to animate/or facilitate the process of fundamental security perception transformation.

And, we might then define the ***transformation process*** as:

- a psychological process
- involving the transformation of expert and government decision maker beliefs about
- the nature of threat posed by other states,
- primarily entailing a fundamental shift from a basic assumption of hostile intentions to one of non-hostile (but not necessarily friendly) intentions.

The key element in this process perspective is the identification of ***transformation*** — the fundamental transformation of ideas and beliefs about the threat posed by neighbouring states. The exact character of the transformation and why leaders come to feel comfortable with new, less stark conceptions of threat remain unclear. However, it seems that subtle processes of genuine change (perhaps the result of fatigue and enduring concern about the costs of security) are combined with dramatic acts of statesmanship. Central decision makers must see — or at least suspect — that neighbours are no longer the threat they once were and act to formalize this new reality in concrete terms. The existence of expert groups (epistemic communities)[8] that cut across national lines, all with a shared conception of security problems and basic policy solutions — in this case, the confidence building approach — also appears to be an important component in the formula for success. Also critical is the very process of pursuing, negotiating, and then implementing confidence building agreements, a process that feeds into the transformation process.

Disassociated from this larger process of transformation, confidence building loses much of its meaning and becomes a narrow, information-enhancing activity incapable of fundamentally altering a security relationship. Studies that slight this dimension and focus instead on the assembly of collections of CBMs run the risk of divorcing the confidence building enterprise from the processes of change that give it meaning. Although we should be reluctant to dismiss these "smaller" examples as ***faux*** confidence building, it is increasingly clear that we need to distinguish between ***transformation confidence building*** and less comprehensive examples ("transparency confidence building"?).

Thus, there is an emerging view that the confidence building process — the process of exploring and initiating negotiations, negotiating, and then implementing confidence building agreements — must be closely associated with a transformation in the encompassing security environment in order for it to be considered successful. This transformation typically will be seen in the fundamental shift of decision maker perceptions of and beliefs about threat. And when it is successful, the security environment comes to be governed by a cooperative security regime[9] which is defined by the contents of the confidence building agreement and the behaviourial practices that emerge during the agreement's negotiation and implementation.

Categories of Confidence Building Measure

We can also gain a good if more basic idea of what confidence building is about by examining a comprehensive collection of CBM categories. This operationally-oriented perspective serves as a menu from which policy makers can select appropriate measures which then can be tailored to their specific needs. Although confidence building involves more than simply putting together a collection of CBMs, this is the raw stuff of policy.

Based on the careful examination of over one hundred specific confidence building proposals, we can identify the following general categories, defined by basic function:

Type A: Information and Communication CBMs

(1) *Information Measures* (provision of information about military forces, facilities, structures, and activities)

Examples include: publication of defence information, weapon system and force structure information exchange, personnel exchanges and joint training;[10] consultative commissions, publication of defence budget figures, publication of weapon system development information, doctrine and strategy seminars;

(2) *Communication Measures* (provision of means of communication)

Examples include: hot lines for exchange of crisis information, joint crisis control centres, "cool lines" for the regular distribution of required and requested information;

(3) *Notification Measures* (provision of advance notification of specified military activities)

Examples include: advance notification of exercises, force movements, mobilizations — including associated information about forces involved;

(4) ***Observation-of-Movement Conduct Measures*** (provision of opportunity to observe specified military activities)

Examples include: mandatory and optional invitations to observe specified activities (with information about the activity) and rules of conduct for observers and hosts);

Type B: Constraint CBMs

(1) ***Inspection Measures*** (provision of opportunity to inspect and/or monitor constrained or limited military forces, facilities, structures, and activities)

Examples include: the use of special sensing devices, special observers for sensitive movements, on-site inspections of various forms;[11]

(2) ***Non-Interference (with verification) Measures;***[12]

(3) ***Activity Constraint Measures*** (provision of assurance to avoid or limit provocative military activities)

Examples include: no harassing activities such as "playing chicken" on the high seas or near territorial boundaries;

(4) ***Deployment Constraint Measures*** (provision of assurance to avoid or limit the provocative stationing or positioning of military forces)

Examples include: no threatening manoeuvres or equipment tests, no threatening deployments near sensitive areas (such as tanks on a border), equipment constraints such as no attack aircraft within range of a neighbour's rear area territory, manpower limits, nuclear free zones;

(5) ***Technology Constraint Measures*** (provision of assurance to avoid or limit the development and/or deployment of specified military technologies, including systems and subsystems, believed by participating states to have a destabilizing character or impact)

Examples include: no ***replacement*** of deployed military equipment of certain types (typically, tanks, heavily armoured combat vehicles (HACVs), self-propelled artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) with new, more advanced types; no ***modernization*** of deployed military equipment of certain types in certain key, well-defined respects; no ***training*** with new systems; no ***field testing*** of new designs; and ***no production*** of specified new systems or subsystems.

Confidence building agreements are constructed using these basic categories of CBMs in various combinations and to varying degrees of strictness. Measures can be assembled and designed in countless ways to address specific concerns. Agreements can include two or three very basic measures with modest limits or they can include a wide variety of diverse measures with very strict limits and thresholds. The Open Skies Treaty characterizes a very focused type of confidence building arrangement that concentrates on a hybrid task combining aspects of inspection and observation. Its confidence building character flows from the willingness of participating states to permit neighbours access to troubling activities or facilities. The CSCE's Vienna Document, on the other hand, is a good example of a comprehensive agreement.

Collectively, these perspectives provide a general sense of the process of confidence building as well as its operational character.

Initial Conditions

Working from the case of the CSCE, there seem to be some identifiable initial conditions that must be present in order for a fundamental transformation in security relations to be possible and for confidence building to animate it. This assessment is very provisional, however, and may require revision as we come to understand the CSCE case better and gain some experience in evaluating new application areas and their conditions. The risks of inferring a general view inductively from a single case are only too well illustrated in this discussion and ought to be borne in mind at all times. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to develop an accurate, abstract sense of initial conditions based on the thoughtful analysis of the CSCE case.[13] This will be true, in particular, if the CSCE case proves to be typical of other, potential transformation cases. And having inferred a general treatment, it is not unreasonable to at least explore how general this view truly is.

We should be cautious, however, in making policy decisions solely on the basis of these preliminary ideas. The absence of one or more of these conditions, in particular, ought not to taken as clear grounds to abandon interest in confidence building. On the other hand, advocates should be careful in pursuing confidence building if the environment seems completely at odds with the conditions noted here.

On the basis of the CSCE experience, the following initial conditions appear to make transformation a promising possibility:

- the existence of an epistemic community cutting across government and academic lines, able and willing to explore and promote confidence building solutions within at least most of the potential participant states;

- an initial negotiating forum, however, modest, to act as a focus for further explorations, whether formal or informal;

- a sense of fatigue emerging in the ongoing, long-term security relationship amongst unfriendly states (too many years of stand-off with no prospect of positive change);

- recent absence of overt conflict during the period of stand-off;

- ambiguous estimates of military capabilities and intentions;

- increasing sense of concern about costs (economic, political, social, and perhaps even moral) of maintaining the status quo;

- the emergence of a new generation of policy makers capable of embracing new ideas;

- a "leap of faith" by at least one key decision maker (an act of "leadership" in proposing a major security-related initiative) to cross a key emotional and conceptual threshold ("the Gorbachev factor").[14]

When most or all of these conditions exist, so the provisional reasoning goes, the pursuit of a confidence building agreement will help in significant ways to animate the

potential for real transformation. The confidence building negotiation will help to operationalize and institutionalize the essence of the transformation in security relations.

Key Conceptual Issues and Questions

Thus far in this paper, we have looked at some general observations derived from the CSCE case. These observations have provided the basis for generalized definitions of distinct aspects of the confidence building phenomenon. There are, not surprisingly, a number of questions associated with this relatively radical view of confidence building.

The idea of a major change in perceptions of threat is central to this new conception of confidence building because it alerts us to the likelihood that CBMs may work best when a positive shift in security thinking is already taking place or, perhaps more likely, on the verge of occurring. According to this view, the negotiation and implementation of a package of confidence building measures will ***accelerate or facilitate that process of transformation.*** If the precursor conditions are sufficiently promising, the pursuit of a preliminary CBM arrangement may itself be the critical agent of change.

Thus, the timing of negotiations to develop a confidence building agreement may be critical to their success and to broader changes in a security relationship. Pursue the negotiations too soon and they will produce a disappointingly marginal — or even dangerous — result. Wait too long and the pursuit of a CBM agreement will miss the window during which it can have a positive impact on the evolution of security relations. We do not yet completely understand the exact role played by the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements in this larger process of change. Thus, we remain uncertain about their precise status as ***agent*** (cause) or ***artifact*** (effect) of change. Nevertheless, it seems increasingly clear that the negotiation of confidence building agreements can play an important — perhaps crucial — part in the positive transformation of security relations. This makes their pursuit worthwhile and important.

Without attempting to make confidence building sound more complex or less promising than it is, we should nevertheless be clear that confidence building is an imperfectly understood security management approach. Thus far, we have good reasons for thinking that the approach has yielded successful outcomes in the European case. Although we aren't entirely sure we understand how confidence building has worked in this case, we have an increasingly good sense of its basic nature, including its association with fundamental trans-

formations in security perceptions. Confusing matters, the use of confidence building measures in other application areas — the United States-Soviet Union nuclear relationship (Hot Lines) and the maritime military environment (Incidents at Sea) — may ***not*** be particularly good illustrations of the sort of process that has unfolded in Europe. They may be very limited examples that have no real connection to the creation of a broader security regime of enduring and profound impact. This remains an open question and warrants further study although the incomplete or isolated nature of these examples is suggestive.

On the basis of our CSCE experience, it is the relationships amongst:

(1) the negotiation and implementation of a confidence building agreement (probably best understood as two distinct but related processes);

(2) the transformation of basic security perceptions and conceptions; ***and***

(3) the emergence of a true security regime

that distinguish successful from premature or imperfect applications of the confidence building approach. An important element in this developing understanding of confidence building is the notion of an associated security regime, a pattern of cooperative behaviour that manifests the behaviourial rules and practices associated with confidence building. Thus, the security regime is a reflection of:

(1) the principles inherent in the content of the confidence building agreement(s);

(2) the cooperative behaviourial patterns associated with the negotiation and implementation of the agreement (in effect, formal and informal diplomatic practices); and

(3) more basic shifts in security thinking.

Thus, a successful ***confidence building regime is a specific type of security regime.***[15]

This understanding of confidence building is obviously more involved than the views associated with the minimalist approach.[16] The transformation process is seen to involve basic changes in the way decision makers perceive potentially threatening neighbours.

Critical to this transformation process is the evolution of assumptions about hostility. States assume that their neighbours are likely to have hostile intentions before the transformation process. As part of the change, that assumption is eroded.

Although the transformation process notion may seem alien to conventional confidence building thinking, it is not entirely so. Whether analysts acknowledge it or not, they must in their thinking also rely upon some basic change in the way decision makers from unfriendly neighbouring states think about each other in order to account for the willingness of these decision makers to engage in progressively more intrusive CBM agreements. Otherwise, it is very difficult to explain anyone's interest in negotiating CBM agreements. Viewed in naked terms, CBM agreements of the Stockholm type offer little in pure security return and demand a lot from fundamentally suspicious actors. Thus, most confidence building thinking is obliged to rely implicitly on some form of change in perceptions, a reduction in suspicion, and a resultant willingness to engage in cooperative arrangements. Without such a change, it is difficult to imagine confidence building being able to start let alone grow.

It may be that confidence building is the one security management approach that empowers decision makers who are newly doubtful that their traditional suspicions about neighbours are largely groundless — or at least no longer warranted. Because it focuses on countering suspicion, it is a natural path to pursue in these circumstances. In a sense, the confidence building approach may formalize a way out of an antagonistic security relationship where most participants are no longer so certain their neighbours really do represent threats.

Without intending to represent the list as exhaustive, we can note a variety of questions relating to key issues discussed in this treatment of confidence building. Some have tentative answers while others are, as yet, unexplored in any depth.

- Can we have a general and abstract conception of confidence building based largely or exclusively on the CSCE example?

  Yes, but we must proceed with caution in developing a general model. It must be subject to careful scrutiny in each new instance confidence building is attempted. Inferring a general model from a singular case is risky but by no means guaranteed to fail. If the case is in most ways typical of other existing or potential examples, the model can be sound and useful. At least as trouble-

some is the potentially idiosyncratic nature of the CSCE case. This may undermine efforts to construct a general model of confidence building.

- What conditions are necessary for the existence of successful transformation confidence building?

  An epistemic community; fatigue; concern about the costs of the status quo; ambiguous estimates of intentions and capabilities; an existing negotiating focus; new leadership; and a "leap of faith."

- Can there be meaningful confidence building without transformation?

  Almost certainly not. As understood in this treatment, confidence building without transformation is, at best, a marginal activity.

- Can confidence building "drive" transformation? Is it the only security-related activity that can do so?

  Yes, it can. Confidence building seems uniquely suited as a cooperative and non-zero sum activity to animating transformation. Perhaps other activities can also animate the process but this seems unlikely.

- Is the assumption of non-hostility necessary for the initiation of meaningful transformation confidence building?

  Yes. Without it there can be no constructive reason to engage in serious confidence building negotiations.

- Where does confidence building lead? Is a security regime the end of the process? Does confidence building enjoy only a fixed lifetime at the end of which relations are either transformed or the process fails?

  Confidence building efforts either lead to transformation (manifested in a security regime) or they wither. It does not go on for ever although its artifacts may. Confidence building is tied to transformation which is a relatively short-term phenomenon.

- Does confidence building have a clear window of opportunity, during which it can be initiated and help produce transformation, after which or before which it can have little real impact?

  Yes.

- What is the best way to start the confidence building process?

  Epistemic community promotion and then modest negotiations.

- Can you start too soon and, if so, what will happen?

  Yes, you can. You risk being taken advantage of. Less ominously, negotiations fail to acquire non-zero sum character and likely lead no-where ... although they can help to foster the emergence of an epistemic community which might re-ignite interest later.

- Must the confidence building process be formal? Must its product be formal?

  Probably yes. Without formality, the chance of developing a regime seems limited. However, informal efforts of a CBM-like nature could facilitate transformation. On balance, the answer nevertheless seems to be yes.

- Are there — or can there be — parallel, non-military confidence building (or analogous) routes to transformation?

  It is difficult to say. This is a largely unexplored question. If hostility is seen to be manifested in other (non-military) ways, it can be addressed in ways that might parallel the military security-oriented confidence building approach. The goal would still be the transformation of perceptions of threat. What makes it even possible to think about this possibility is the separation of military confidence building from the transformation process. If another type of activity resembling confidence building can facilitate transformation and alter hostile state relationships, then the answer is yes.

- How important is an epistemic community to the prospects of successful confidence building?

  Probably vital but we don't know ... yet.

- Is it necessary or helpful to have formal blocs of states participating in confidence building negotiations?

  Perhaps it is helpful, in as much as it can improve discipline and make the process of negotiation less fractious. On the other hand, blocs typically function on the basis of consensus or dominance, neither of which is particularly good for developing flexible and imaginative solutions. No answer seems warranted here, at present.

- What are the roles of superpowers, non-regional great powers, and regional great powers in facilitating or frustrating negotiations?

  There is a suspicion that superpowers are more likely than not to resist transformation confidence building as it risks upsetting the status quo. Otherwise, no general conclusion about tendencies seems warranted.

- Are we making too much of the unique conditions of the CSCE case in our attempt to construct a general understanding of confidence building?

  Perhaps, but it is the only example that we have to work with regardless of how formal or informal, explicit or implicit our inferences are.

Conclusion — Implications and Recommendations

In the introduction, three questions were posed. They follow with brief answers reflecting the views developed in this paper:

(1) Do we ***understand*** how confidence building has worked in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) case?

Imperfectly, but we are making progress. If we do not develop an adequate, comprehensive explanation of how confidence building has worked in the CSCE case, we will have grave difficulty in developing a general account. As a result, we will have even graver difficulty employing confidence building ideas in new contexts or developing contextually-relevant versions of confidence building that reflect the unique requirements of new regions or application types.

(2) How ***generalizable*** is the European experience? Can we construct a meaningfully general understanding on the basis of a single case?

This is not clear but we must remember that virtually all of our thinking about confidence building, in any event, is either implicitly or explicitly dependent upon the CSCE case (and the European application area, more generally). It is better to be explicit and conscious of what we are doing.

(3) Is it necessary to have a conceptually-based, general, and abstract understanding of confidence building in order to use "confidence building" in new contexts?

This is an important question. We need a deliberately-constructed general account because it is too easy to misunderstand the CSCE case or the phenomenon more generally and to apply that misunderstanding to other application areas. It is in the effort to construct an abstract and general account that we uncover a host of difficult issues that might otherwise escape scrutiny and exploration. The literature to date has not devoted much energy to this task and its underdeveloped nature stands as mute testimony to this weakness. It is also necessary to engage in a deliberate process of abstraction and generalization in order to isolate (as best as we can) those aspects of our understanding of confidence building that really are idiosyncratic artifacts of the CSCE case. It is infinitely more helpful to those who wish to employ confidence building ideas in new application areas to have reference to a clear, abstract, and general explanation of confidence building than it is for them to rely upon incomplete accounts derived without much reflection from a dated literature.

It seems inescapably clear that any effort to employ the confidence building approach will only be aided by the development of a conceptually-oriented understanding. Without it, the development of confidence building solutions will be based on either:

(1) inadequate, informal models implicitly informed by the European case; or

(2) "from scratch" efforts that fail to benefit from the European experience and rely on inventing key concepts all over again in new circumstances.

The virtue of a general and abstract understanding extends beyond the obvious, however. We should never be ethnocentric about the ways in which ideas and approaches can be applied in areas with different characteristics. Significant adjustments may be necessary before the confidence building idea will work in new contexts. Which understanding of confidence building is most easily modified to suit unique requirements: an unselfconscious understanding implicitly based on the CSCE case? or a deliberately abstract understanding that explicitly seeks to infer general lessons from the critically important CSCE case? The latter would appear to offer more scope to analysts and policy makers in other parts of the world.

How do we proceed? Perhaps the most useful course is to support the development of regionally-oriented epistemic communities with strong ties to the existing Eurocentric community. By encouraging interested policy makers and (especially) academics to form regionally-focused epistemic communities, the potential of the confidence building approach would be enhanced significantly. As part of the broader community of specialists looking at confidence building, they would share common goals, concepts, and concerns. Of course, the extension of the existing epistemic community will be of limited value if the conceptual exploration of confidence building within it does not move forward with greater vigour than it has demonstrated in the past. Perhaps new blood will help.

Ultimately, our best contribution is the production of the clearest and fullest articulation of what we understand to have happened in the CSCE case. With luck, the CSCE example will have a future to explore and explain.

NOTES

1. This paper was prepared for the "Third Annual Arms Control in the North Pacific Workshop" held at Royal Roads Military College in British Columbia, 25-27 February 1994. The workshop was sponsored by the Verification Research Unit of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. The first draft of this paper received a number of helpful comments from workshop participants. Particularly appreciated were those of Ambassador Chris Anstis, Dr. Jim Boutilier, Mr. Ron Deibert, Colonel Gary George, Ms. Janice Heppell, Dr. Roman Jakubow, and Mr. Peter Jones. Colonel George was particularly gracious in providing a number of helpful remarks. Any oversights or errors, of course, are the author's responsibility.

Many of the ideas presented in this paper are drawn from a larger study (***From Stockholm to Vienna and Beyond: The Confidence Building Process Revisited***) currently being prepared for the Verification Research Unit. The Unit's enduring support is appreciated, particulary the encouragement and patience of its Head, Mr. Ron Cleminson. The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent those of the Government of Canada.

2. It hardly needs to be emphasized that one of the relatively few potential application areas that comes even close to duplicating the bulk of these characteristics is the Korean Peninsula. This makes the exploration of confidence building in the Korean case very exciting. It stands as part-Asian and part-CSCE-like which makes it an ideal starting point for exploring the utility of confidence building in Asia-Pacific application areas.

3. This description appears in James Macintosh, ***From Stockholm to Vienna and Beyond,*** a study under preparation for the Verification Research Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

4. The same package of CBMs would be seen in very different terms by a cross-section of NATO military officers in 1984 and in 1990. What would have been seen as a completely unacceptable and dangerously intrusive package of CBMs in 1984 is no longer seen that way. Obviously, changes in the material threat make a big difference — the Warsaw Pact is no more and the Soviet empire has fallen on hard times — but this misses the point. The key transformation in security conceptions occurred over a short time (in the 1986-88 period) when the objective balance of forces changed very little. What mattered was that the nature of the threat suddenly was seen in different terms, not that the material basis of the threat had actually changed. The key to understanding the transformation view of confidence building lies in thinking about these sorts of changes.

5. We can also derive a fuller sense of what confidence building entails by examining the contents of the Vienna CSBM Document (the most comprehensive example of a real CBM agreement). The Vienna Document 1992 is the most recent of three comprehensive confidence building agreements developed in the CSCE context. Each has expanded on the content and scope of the preceding example, starting with the Stockholm Document of 1986. The Stockholm agreement, in turn, grew out of the much more modest Helsinki Final Act CBMs of 1975.

An important lesson from the CSCE experience is the way in which the confidence building enterprise began with a modest package of measures and then expanded on it with each successive agreement to eventually produce a very comprehensive confidence building agreement. This is a pattern that we might expect to see repeated in other regions and with other application types.

The Vienna Document 1992, in outline, includes the following CBMs:

- Non-Use of Force Re-Affirmation;
- **Annual exchange of military information** — requires the submission of information detailing land force organization, unit location, manpower, and major weapon and equipment systems organic to formations. It includes non-active and low-strength formations and combat units. Additional requirements include information on military budgets ***and*** major new weapon system deployments;
- **Risk reduction** (employing the Conflict Prevention Centre) — entails timely consultation regarding unusual military activities; cooperation as regards hazardous military incidents; and voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about troubling military activities;
- **Contacts** — to enhance openness and transparency through invitations to visit air bases; expanded military exchanges; ***and*** the demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems;
- **Prior Notification** — requires minimum 42 days advance notification of all military activities involving at least: 9,000 troops or 250 tanks, if organized in a division-like structure (air force participation also is to be notified if fixed-wing sorties associated with the activity are expected to exceed 200); or 3,000 troops in an amphibious or parachute assault exercise; or transfers or concentrations of a division equivalent (including extensive information about the activity and participating forces);
- **Observation** — requires invitation of up to 2 observers per state to observe any exercise, transfer, or concentration involving at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks or 3,500 amphibious or parachute assault troops and includes extensive regulations to ensure acceptable observation opportunities;
- **Calendar** — requires extensive information about notifiable military activities scheduled for the following year;
- **Constraining provisions** — limit notifiable major activities of more than 40,000 troops or 900 tanks to one per two years and smaller exercises (13,000 to 40,000 troops or 300 to 900 tanks) to six per year for each state. Of these six activities per year, only three may be over 25,000 troops or 400 tanks. Maximum of three simultaneous notifiable activities and none may exceed more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks;

- **Compliance and verification** — provides for short-warning ***inspections*** (to be initiated within 36 hours of the request, employing a maximum of four inspectors, and to last no more than 48 hours) of troubling sites and activities (limit of three received inspections per year for each state) as well as ***evaluation*** visits to confirm the accuracy of the information measure's data (the number of visits based on force size but a maximum of fifteen received visits per year for each state);

- **Communications** — establishes an efficient and direct communications network for CSCE use in distributing notifications, clarifications, and requests; and

- **Annual Implementation Assessment** — which mandates an annual assessment of compliance.

6. Although this, like many other ideas presented in this paper, is not fully developed, it may prove helpful to think of transformation as having four distinct but inter-related dimensions. Collectively, they represent key parts of the overall transformation process:

(1) ***Analytic transformation:*** the transformation of expert views about the nature of a security relationship (including the extent of threat posed by states normally assumed to be hostile to each other) and the resulting emergence of a commitment to the confidence building approach within a coalescing epistemic community;

(2) ***Procedural transformation:*** the transformation of views about the nature of a security relationship (including perceptions of threat posed by participants to each other) amongst negotiators involved in a confidence building negotiation and the resulting emergence of a common commitment to shared principles and practices;

(3) ***Political transformation:*** the transformation of views about the nature of a security relationship (including perceptions of threat posed by participants to each other) within national capitals amongst more senior policy makers, especially within foreign and defence ministries;

(4) ***Cultural transformation:*** the transformation of views about the nature of a security relationship (including perceptions of threat posed by participants to each other) in broader national communities, especially informed publics and extended security policy elites.

It is instructive to think about the ways(s) in which confidence building efforts are woven into these four types of transformation.

7. The ***activity*** of exploring, negotiating, and implementing a confidence building agreement entails what can be seen to be three quite distinct if obviously related processes. The main point that the activity definition attempts to make is that confidence building is a ***compound activity*** involving all three aspects of the confidence building process as well as a negotiated outcome and an associated process of transformation. A more detailed and comprehensive analysis would step down to this next level and explore the relationships amongst these three stages of the confidence building process

(initial exploration, negotiation, and implementation). It is even possible to distinguish distinct stages within the "exploration" and "negotiation" phases of confidence building. This is discussed in the forthcoming ***From Stockholm to Vienna and Beyond.***

8. An ***epistemic community*** is "a [transnational] network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area."Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," ***International Organization*** Vol.46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), p. 3.

9. "Regime" is used in the formal, analytic sense. In the simplest of terms, a regime is an enduring pattern of cooperative behaviour with discernable implicit or explicit guidelines for action. See the special regime issue of ***International Organization*** edited by Stephen D. Krasner (Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982)). Krasner defines regimes as:

> "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. ...
>
> Regimes must be understood as something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or interest. ... The purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. ...
>
> It is the infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes regime-governed activity in the international system from more conventional activity, guided exclusively by narrow calculations of interest." (pp. 186-187.)

10. There are good reasons for breaking exchanges and joint training activities out of the "Information Measure" category and making it a separate category under Type A. Colonel Gary George pressed me on this point and I now believe there is real merit in this suggestion.

11. "Open Skies"-type arrangements are difficult to categorize in functional terms. The existing Open Skies regime rejects the use of the term "inspection" but nevertheless relies in practice on what appears to be at best a hybrid combination of inspection and observation. Successor or parallel arrangements may include explicit aerial inspection provisions. Part of the definitional difficulty lies in the desire to produce a truly ***general*** typology of CBM types. The intention is not to recapitulate the content of existing arrangements. Despite the fact that it collides with sematic habit in the Open Skies Consultative Commission, it seems most accurate to say that the flights sanctioned by an Open Skies-***type*** arrangement perform the function of an inspection.

Recognizing that this is not a completely satisfactory resolution to the problem, particularly given that habits of language tend to redefine reality, an alternative approach might be in order. We could, for instance, introduce a new category under Type A (Information and Communication) called "General Observation Measures." Distinct from both inspection measures and observation-of-

movement conduct measures, this category would embrace those CBMs that call for opportunities to engage in non-focused "looks" at presumably small and generally-specified sections of territory. Open Skies would be the central example.

12. Note that "verification" has an ambiguous status in a confidence building agreement. Verification is a fundamentally unilateral activity that can be ***facilitated*** by provisions in a confidence building agreement. According to this view, verification provisions provide the opportunity and right to verify compliance but they do not constitute verification ***per se***. Facilitating verification has a positive confidence building impact.

13. At least as important is the fact that the CSCE case is probably the only example at present that we can draw on. Other examples of confidence building arrangements noted earlier in the paper do not seem to be good examples of the sort of transformation confidence building this paper discusses.

14. Workshop discussions highlighted the renunciation of the North Korean nuclear programme by a post-Kim regime, along the lines of the South African model, as the sort of dramatic gesture that could trigger transformation in North-South Korean relations.

15. The argument has been made that the regime approach does not work very well in the realm of security relations. The key element underlying this observation is the fundamentally uncooperative nature of security relations in the typically anarchic international system. In the absence of cooperation, it does not make much sense to talk about a regime in the formal sense. The best example of a security-related regime is to be found in Roger K. Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime and International Relations," ***International Organization*** Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1987). This article provides a useful general discussion of the role of regime theory.

Because confidence building entails cooperative principles and shifts in basic perception about the operation of international relations within the security realm, it may also be a good candidate for the application of regime theory.

16. It should be noted that the transformation view is a reconstruction of what we now think we understand about the CSCE's confidence building experience. The minimalist view corresponds to the expectations and understandings of those who initially pursued confidence building efforts. The claim here is not that the minimalist view is wrong, only that it is incomplete. It is incomplete because of what we have since learned about the unanticipated power of the confidence building approach.

REGIONAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

ON-GOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION: LEARNING FROM IAEA/UNSCOM EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ

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INTRODUCTION

In a statement made before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives on November 10, 1993, Lynn E. Davis, Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, identified non-proliferation as the arms control priority of the post-Cold War world. In addition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles and advanced conventional weapons, she included the technologies necessary for their development as representative elements of the most critical security threat faced today. Clearly, the Clinton administration has accorded a high priority to its non-proliferation agenda.

Not surprisingly, Canada's concerns relating to non-proliferation, as outlined in Session #1 of this workshop, closely parallels that enunciated by the United States administration. Indeed Canada joined with its NATO colleagues in the final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, in Athens, Greece on June 10, 1993 in a commitment to remain determined to pursue NATO arms control objectives "in particular in the field of non-proliferation." Once thought of in almost exclusively global terms, the threats to proliferate -- even in the nuclear weapons area -- have now taken on a distinct regional dimension. With the decline of bipolarity, the legitimacy of multilateral corrective action is growing, and the United Nations seems on the verge of taking its place at the heart of a new approach to constrain proliferation.

The challenge we are facing today is not merely confusion caused by "old think", but, for some, a lingering doubt as to the ultimate efficacy of the present supplier dominated approach to non-proliferation. The old principles may ultimately prove counter-productive if they remain the sole focus of policy in the decade ahead. Such an emphasis could alienate rather than attract states in developing world. Particularly with the demise of the Cold War, it is regional instability and conflicts which dominate security concerns of most states. Non-proliferation, if it is to be successful as a primary containment tool in the global arms control and disarmament process, must be seen to be at least as beneficial to the security interests of the developing world as it is to the developed one.

In terms of regional agendas, the "stand-offs" on the Korean peninsula and in the Gulf area are occupying centre stage. There are, however, significant differences between the two. Indeed, just as James Macintosh cautioned in his presentation in Session #2 that CBMs may not "travel well" from one region to another, transfer of non-proliferation scenarios may require delicate

handling as well. Be that as it may, there are likely to be valuable lessons worth learning and these ideas may indeed be transferable. These are likely to be in areas relating to multilateral or third party activity and particularly to the role of the United Nations in its broadest dimension in facilitating rapproachment.

In order to achieve a lasting agreement, there must be an ability to ensure, in a non-discriminatory manner, that parties to an agreement are complying with it. This assurance must be satisfactory particularly for the signators and also for the international community at large. We are in the very early stages of tackling these problems. The activities relating to the United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) in the case of Iraq and of possible resolutions in the case of North Korea are at the cutting edge of a new phase of conflict resolution as the next decade approaches.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to provide a succinct review of the background and results to date of the IAEA and of UNSCOM relating to UNSCR 687(1991); to identify from the standpoint of future compliance some of the technologies and techniques employed as an on-going monitoring and verification capability is devised by the IAEA and by UNSCOM; and to discuss the possible transfer of this experience where applicable in the case of North Korea.

BACKGROUND AND RESULTS TO DATE

Security Council Resolutions

Between April and October 1991, the United Nations Security Council established the basic future compliance undertakings for all three parties in three specific resolutions (687,707 and 715). Collectively, these three resolutions elaborate the scope of the monitoring and verification regime required to ensure that Iraq continues to meet its obligations. Selected provisions from these three resolutions are provided in Annex "A".

The first resolution, UNSCR 687(1991), adopted on 3 April 1991, outlined the cease-fire conditions that ended the Gulf War. Its key provisions required Iraq to declare and destroy all of its non-conventional (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. In effect, UNSCOM and the IAEA were mandated to finalize the job which the Coalition forces had begun in the Gulf War itself in dismantling Iraq's non-conventional military capabilities and infrastructure.

UNSCR 707(1991), passed on 15 August 1991, applied greater precision to the process. It required Iraq to reveal all relevant details pertaining to its non-conventional weapons programs and to ensure that UN inspectors were provided with unrestricted and unconditional access to any area, facility, equipment and records which they wished to examine.

UNSCR 715, adopted by the Council on 11 October 1991, approved the long-term monitoring and verification plans submitted to it by UNSCOM and the IAEA in compliance with direction outlined in UNSCR 687(1991). It directed Iraq to accept and facilitate the implementation of the plans through methods which included on-site inspections, aerial overflights and the provision of full, final and complete declaration on the part of Iraq. These monitoring and verification plans focussed on both the civilian and military sectors of the Iraqi industrial complex. They incorporated the use of periodic inspections and environmental sampling as means for deterring any clandestine production of non-conventional weapons.

These three resolutions form an indivisible package from which the final future compliance verification regime will be fashioned. From the perspective of the United Nations, efforts to plan for implementation with Iraqi authorities, without the latter's explicit and unconditional recognition of all three resolutions, proved impossible. It was Iraq's refusal to recognize this inter-applicability, particularly in terms of UNSCR 715(1991), which created a number of confrontations and delayed implementation of a future compliance mechanism by more than two years.

Inspection Experience

During the period between 15 May 1991 and 31 December 1993, UNSCOM and the IAEA completed 65 on-site inspections (OSI) in Iraq (see Annex "B"). Approximately one-third of these inspections were related to the nuclear weapons program area, another third to the ballistic missiles field and the remainder to matters associated with Iraq's inventory of chemical weapons as well as to Iraq's biological weapons research program. UNSCOM has implemented at least four different types of on-site inspections designed to meet special requirements. A number of inspections were of a specialist nature. For example, one inspection focused on a computer centre in connection with computers suspected to have been used for prohibited activities. Another, the last inspection of 1993, was designed to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use in the southern marshland near Basrah. The inspections generally have been energetic, rigorous and intrusive, mainly because of Iraq's failure to adopt a candid and open approach to the full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapon programs as called for in the Security Council resolutions.

To meet the challenges posed by an often adversarial relationship between Iraq on the one side, and IAEA and UNSCOM on the other, a number of technologies have been employed for effective monitoring in the near term. The challenge posed in this unique situation has been met by making full use of the experience and resources available to the IAEA and UNSCOM as well as the combination of methodologies in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Exploitation of the synergies between various monitoring methods is now recognized as an important value-added component to achieving and enhancing cost-effectiveness in terms of on-going monitoring and verification.

Resources Available

The IAEA maintains a staff of some 500 people, including some 200 inspectors, to manage a safeguards system established to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to create confidence that nuclear installations in non-nuclear weapons states, on an international scale, are used for peaceful purposes only. In fact, the IAEA safeguards system constitutes the world's first international on-site inspection system. It has now been in operation for more than a quarter of a century. When called upon to undertake its monitoring and verification responsibilities under UNSCR 687(1991), therefore, the IAEA was able to immediately call upon the resources and extensive inspection experience already acquired. The current cost of maintaining the IAEA's safeguards inspection program for purposes related to the NPT is estimated at some US65 million dollars per year.

UNSCOM, on the other hand, was created by the same resolution that established the inspection mandate. On 18 April 1991, after Iraq had formally accepted the provisions of Resolution 687, the Secretary General submitted to the Security Council his report regarding the establishment of UNSCOM as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. A small, full-time office to assist the Executive Chairman in the exercise of his function was set up at United Nations Headquarters in New York, supported by field offices in Bahrain or Baghdad. Today's organizational structure remains essentially the same with a staff of 35 in the offices of the Executive Chairman in New York, 23 in the Bahrain field office and 76 in the Baghdad field office. While comparative costs are difficult to determine, UNSCOM annual expenditures have approximated $28,000,000, exclusive of the U-2 aircraft, helicopter operations and the salary costs for national inspectors seconded to UNSCOM.

Unlike the IAEA with its permanent cadre of inspectors, UNSCOM inspectors and staff have been provided on an ad-hoc basis by member states, the United Nation Secretariat and the World Health Organization(WHO). Inspection team comprise members from both UNSCOM and the IAEA.

Multilateral Monitoring Techniques

Probably the most important result of field operations has been the lessons learned following the introduction of new inspection techniques and the application of technologies to the multilateral monitoring and verification process. Methodologies and mechanisms for future on-going monitoring and verification purposes are summarized in Annex "C". During the 65 inspections conducted by UNSCOM and the IAEA, modifications to procedures have taken place in almost every field. In the early stages, the IAEA learned of the shortfalls in the safeguards inspection programme. The crucial importance of inspectors having unimpeded rights of access to relevant materials and sites (including suspect sites) is now recognized. In the use of on-site inspections, UNSCOM had developed a number of different inspection scenarios. The initial one provided for a standard team for a short period (an average of 20 inspectors for 10 days). Later, the concept of a very small team for a longer period (perhaps 4 specialists for 45-60 days) was explored. Finally, a large team (50 inspectors) divided into specialist groups (5-7 inspectors) for different periods of time was used. The need to tailor on-site inspections to specific applications is now recognized.

The first use of overhead imagery on a sustained basis and as an important supplement to existing monitoring assets for multilateral arms control purposes was initiated in July of 1991. By the end of 1993, a total of 215 U2 missions had been flown on behalf of the United Nations. There have been coordinated on occasion with helicopter surveillance (for which 330 mission have been flown). Overhead imagery has proven itself as an effective monitoring tool and is likely to form the core of a future compliance monitoring regime. UNSCOM has been a prime innovator in terms of applying overhead imagery as a significant monitoring tool in a multilateral verification scenario. For a summary of methodologies and mechanisms applied by UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1993, see Annex "D".

Results

Although some inspections relating to the determination of the accuracy of baseline data are likely to continue as well as removal/destruction activity, the results of these two stages of the on-going monitoring process are encouraging:

- In the nuclear area, for example, the IAEA has identified and placed under safeguards the proscribed nuclear material and has initiated a removal program. Facilities related to proscribed activities have been destroyed -- the IAEA, while not possessing a full knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapon research program, is confident that enough is known to guard against its reactivation.

- In terms of Ballistic Missiles, despite a lingering doubt expressed in some quarters, UNSCOM is comfortable in stating that all 819 SCUD missiles and derivatives have been plausibly accounted for.

- In the chemical weapons field, the main current concern of UNSCOM has related to the termination date of the destruction activities at Muthana. All CW agents will have been certified as destroyed and the indigenously built UNSCOM CW Destruction facility was handed over to Iraqi authorities on 16 June 1994.

- Biological weapon inspections have determined only that a BW research program had existed prior to April 1991. This is likely to be the most difficult of the possible Iraqi WMD program to verify. Several new BW inspections were undertaken up to and through June 1994.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Future Compliance

IAEA inspections, in Stages 1 (Baseline) and 2 (Reduction/Destruction), have produced a comprehensive and detailed, if not a fully complete, picture of Iraq's overall nuclear program. With the recognition of UNSCR 715(1991) by Iraq, the IAEA is phasing-in certain of its on-site activities as elements of a long-term monitoring plan of Iraq's nuclear program. The long term plan includes inter alia the periodic collection of radio nuclides and other stable nuclides of the main water bodies of Iraq. The first radio-nuclides survey of Iraq's survey of Iraq's surface water was concluded in November 1992. The goal is to establish a baseline from which to identify anomalies which might indicate prohibited activities in the future. The IAEA, in concurrence with UNSCOM and using the UNSCOM field office infrastructure, will establish a means to monitor acquisitions of dual-use equipment and supplier and user patterns which might identify proscribed activity.

From UNSCOM's perspective, long-term monitoring will make use of the database and field operation framework developed in Stages 1 and 2. Clearly, from the staff side, UNSCOM's Information Assessment Unit (IAU) and the IAEA's Action Team and HQ Assessment unit will be key elements in future compliance monitoring. The IAU, which has doubled its size within the last six months, is likely to double again. UNSCOM will have to focus increasingly on the following:

- The completion and certification of the reduction/destruction activities, including production equipment and facilities. This is mainly in relation to Iraq's former chemical weapons programme at Muthanna and nuclear activity centered on Tuwaitha.

- Verification of Iraq's declarations to the level at which the Commission can accept them as fulfilling the requirements of the relevant resolutions.

- Inventorying and tagging certain of Iraq's dual-purpose equipment in preparation for ongoing monitoring and verification.

- Identification of ongoing monitoring and verification capability gaps, to be followed by a survey of existing or nearly available technology in order to identify means to fill these gaps.

- The installation of additional monitoring technology, such as chemical sensors.

- The initiation of monitoring inspections. This entails the identification of the sites to be subjected to a second series of baseline inspections, by means of Iraq's declarations and other information available to the Commission.

- The development of the mechanism for import and export monitoring. This is a highly important task of some urgency as this system must be in place prior to the easing or lifting of either the sanctions under para 21 or the oil embargo under para 22 of resolution UNSCR 687 (1991).

- The establishment of practice and precedent in the exercise of the Commission's privileges, immunities and facilities.

A notional organizational chart for long-term monitoring and verification is attached as Annex 'E'. It draws from the existing field structure which is likely to be modified as experience in this area builds and additional requirements are identified.

APPLICATION OF THE IAEA/UNSCOM EXPERIENCE

There are two contemporary regional scenarios involving arms control and non-proliferation to which the IAEA/UNSCOM experience is directly relevant. In the Middle East context, Iran poses a proliferation threat directly linked to Iraq itself but with regional implications beyond the bilateral context. The second area is the Korean peninsula and the North Korea's apparent drive toward NWS status.

Iran

Like Iraq, Iran has been assessed by some analysts as having a nuclear research program capable of developing a nuclear weapon. Speculation abounds that Iran has been attempting to acquire nuclear technology from a number of Western countries for

clandestine purposes but IAEA inspections have revealed no diversions of nuclear materials that would lead to such in conclusion. Combined with acquisitions of ballistic missiles and an assessment that Iran has the technical capability to indigenously produce an ICBM within a 10-15 year timeframe, the experience acquired by UNSCOM in monitoring Iraq's ballistic missile production capacity could prove invaluable.

North Korea

On 25 February 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. Six previous safeguard inspections had not been able to verify the correctness nor assess the completeness of the DPRK's nuclear inventory as declared to the IAEA in 1992. The Director General requested special access to two sites invoking the Articles of the DPRK's Safeguard Agreement relating to special inspections. Special inspection techniques bear resemblance to the inspections undertaken by the IAEA under UNSCR687(1991) and that experience would be directly relevant. To date, this special inspection request has not been granted. North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (a right of a signatory state given the proper notification) and more latterly from the IAEA. Following the June 1994 initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and the possible subsequent reinstitution of bilateral USA/DPRK discussions in mid-July 1994, both actions at the time this paper was written appear to be "on hold".

IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA SCENARIOS COMPARISON

The concerted and successful international response to Iraqi aggression resulted from effective coalition building and leadership on the part of the United States during the period between the invasion of Kuwait and the launching of Desert Storm some six months later, and by the consensual nature of Security Council decision making which had evolved following the end of the Cold War. While there has been no identifiable, single overt action on the part of North Korea comparable to naked aggression, the need for coalition building in terms of support for non-proliferation actions and the necessity for consensus -- or at least no exercise of the veto -- within the Security Council remain essential elements in the case of North Korea's contravention of the NPT and of its subsequent threats to withdraw from both the NPT and its regulatory agency, the IAEA.

There are a number of significant similarities between the situations in Iraq and North Korea as the focus on proliferation threats shifts to regional security. It is from a recognition of these similarities that subsequent actions may be judged. As well, however, there are a few basic differences in these two regional scenarios which caution for discrete handling. A comparison of similarities and differences in the security scenarios of Iraq and North Korea is provided in Chart 1.

CHART 1
IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA SECURITY SCENARIOS COMPARISONS

SIMILARITIES	DIFFERENCES
DICTATORIAL REGIMES	GEOGRAPHY
LEADERSHIP CULT	ETHNIC HETEROLOGY
OVERSIZED MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT	REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
APPARENT ECONOMIC CHAOS	RESOURCE BASES
OLIGARCHIES	LEADERSHIP AGE
WARS WITH UN COALITIONS	WARS 40 YEARS APART
WMD PROGRAMS	REUNIFICATION

SIMILARITIES

The first and obvious similarity is that both Iraq and North Korea are controlled by dictatorial regimes inspired by an unrelenting leadership cult which broaches no deviation from party policy. Leaders in both countries depend upon unswerving support from an oversized military establishment which in turn receives favoured recognition from the leadership. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, it constituted the sixth largest army in the world. Even in defeat, the Iraqi military has displayed unswerving loyalty to the regime. The North Korean forces, estimate to constitute the world's fourth largest army with in excess of 1,000,000 personnel, concentrates more than 70% of its strength within 100 miles of the 38th parallel. Both countries were recipients of substantial weapons support, particularly in the missile area from the USSR and, to a lesser degree, China. Both developed an indigenous capability to modify imported weapons systems. Although the economies of both countries have been judged by Western standards to be in shambles, the countries and the regimes continue to survive and each continues to consigned large percentages of their national revenues into military programs including the pursuit of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. Both leaders appear to be attempting to perpetuate their regimes through the placement of family members in position of authority.

DIFFERENCES

The most apparent difference relates to geography and the geo-political states of each nation as a result. While both have fought major wars with coalition of United Nations forces, the wars were separated by more than 40 years. The population of the Iraqi federation is diverse both ethnically and religiously; the population of North Korea is, by contrast, homogeneous. Because of its large energy reserves and petro-chemical infrastructure, Iraq is potentially an affluent country. North Korea, lacking in natural resources is not. It is dependent for energy products on others and the regime is likely to value its population as its

most exploitable resource. Given its geopolitical situation, Iraq has legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis its neighbours. The most direct threat is posed by Iran with which Iraq fought a protracted war. North Korea, by contrast, is bordered by China and the Russian Federation, both of which have been considered since World War II as supporting states. Though projecting the Republic of Korea and the presence of United Nations (United States) forces in its southern border as potential aggressors, this assessment is clearly based on political expediency rather than any legitimate security concern.

REGIONAL/GLOBAL INTERFACE

Although the conventional threat of two heavily armed states, Iraq and North Korea, is the basis of immediate concern for neighbouring states, the international dimension includes both regional and global considerations. In that sense while each regional threat can be and is seen as unique, the global aspect of both focusses on the same issue which is the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. From that perspective, the United Nations actions through the IAEA and UNSCOM in developing an on-going monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, have direct and immediate relevancy to a final and peaceful solution to the North Korean dilemma. The problem is that a proven on-going monitoring and verification regime is unlikely to be in place and operating until 1996 at the earliest. The North Korean issue requires initial steps now.

VERIFICATION OF FUTURE COMPLIANCE

Though the nature, shape and number of agreements relating to North Korean compliance with future obligations are unknown, it is likely to pose a complicated framework for on-going monitoring and verification. Such a framework will include both a multilateral and a bilateral dimension. The multilateral dimension will benefit from the experience already gathered and will include a significant interplay with the United Nations. Bilaterally, the focus will be on South Korea/North Korea interface. Some sort of third party involvement might be seen as a useful means of facilitating the bilateral process. Even though the agreements are not arrived at, it is possible, even at this stage, to identify precautionary steps which might be taken for preparatory purposes.

MULTILATERAL VERIFICATION

To enhance on-going monitoring and verification in the aftermath of the Iraq experience, the IAEA has already taken some important steps in a generic problem-solving sense. First, the agency is attempting to establish an "early warning" capability through wider access of information from states. The aim is to enhance the agency's capacity to cross-check and confirm reports on international transfers, detect undeclared nuclear material and installations, and more quickly sound the alarm when needed. Second, the agency is considering expanding its powers to the

point where special inspections could be called whenever there is reason to believe that undeclared material exists and official explanations have not sufficiently clarified the matter. States might even invite the relevant inspectors when they are confident that the check will refute allegations and dispel doubts regarding their weapons programs. On the other hand, inspections are likely to be rejected in cases where they might uncover programs and activities inconsistent with the state's official declarations. In such cases, the matter should be immediately brought to the attention of the UN Security Council, to which the IAEA has direct access. Together, these two measures increase the prospects of detecting undeclared weapons programs, although the Iraqi and North Korean cases demonstrate the range of difficulties associated with reaching judgements of non-compliance in the absence of direct proof. In other words, despite recent initiatives, detecting violations of treaty commitments will remain difficult, as states have a myriad of options from which to choose to disguise and conceal programs which are judged to be political sensitive.

Turning specifically to the North Korean scenario as being played out at present, it is the right to conduct regular intrusive inspections of all nuclear facilities -- that lies at the heart of the current impasse between North Korea and the United Nations. Apparently suspecting that the North was not being entirely forthcoming in its statements regarding plutonium separation, the IAEA requested in February 1993 to conduct "special inspections" of two nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon, an undeclared nuclear complex about 100 km from Pyongyang. Rather than comply with the IAEA request, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the NPT. Two rounds of US-North Korean negotiations, held in June and July 1993, failed to resolve the issue, although North Korea did announce that it would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT as long as the talks continued. In January 1994, an interim solution was reached, with the North agreeing to allow partial inspections of its nuclear facilities, occurred in February, albeit under rigidly controlled circumstances. By late March, the issue remained unresolved, as the IAEA announced that the permitted inspections had been unacceptable. At the time of writing, following the visit by former President Carter to North Korea, there is the possibility of a meeting of the leaders of the two Koreas in mid-summer 1994.

Although there is no consensus on the extent to which the IAEA/UNSCOM experience in Iraq has set a precedent for future verification regimes in situation such as North Korea, there is a growing feeling among Analysts that the lessons learned from Iraq must not be forgotten.

BILATERAL VERIFICATION

The legitimate requirements for on-going monitoring and verification on a bilateral basis are even more complicated and far-reaching than for the multilateral situation described above. Bilateral monitoring will include not only the field of weapons

of mass destruction, but also conventional weapons, weapons inventories and personnel strength. Monitoring verification at the bilateral level will also include the principle of reciprocity. Nevertheless there are lessons which can be usefully learned from past experience. More importantly, there are steps which can be taken now to facilitate the verification process even before the details of the bilateral agreement(s) are known.

Experience suggests that for purposes of bilateral verification there are likely to be two methods of monitoring which will serve as the basic means of effectively verifying compliance. The first is the use of on-site inspections tailored to the requirements of the agreement. The second is the use of overhead surveillance, both spacebased and airborne.

The experience gained by UNSCOM in initiating "tailor-made" on-site inspections using teams put together on an ad-hoc basis was discussed earlier. Conceptually, the use of a small OSI planning cell rather than the maintenance of a large cadre of dedicated inspectors deserves serious attention. From the perspective of the Korean Ministry of Defence, however, the background gained by NATO's Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) might be of greater relevance. Under the mandate of the CFE Treaty, the VCC can draw from the results of more than 1000 completed OSIs. Of particular significance to the Korea Armed Forces is that more than 95% of the CFE OSI inspectors have been military officers.

The application of overhead surveillance is less widely known. Nevertheless, it has been used as the primary and precise means of monitoring compliance under a series of "superpowers" arms control agreements for more than 20 years. A recently completed (1994) Canadian study confirms that useable spaceborne imagery suitable for arms control monitoring purposes is currently available on a commercial basis.

The familiar Landsat series of satellites, is operated by an American company and can acquire a multi-spectral spatial resolution of approximately 30 meters. The French SPOT (Système Pour l'Observation de la Terre) acquires both multi-spectral imagery of approximately 20 meter and panchromatic imagery of 10 meters. Recently available reconnaissance imagery made available by the Russian Federation is thought to have a capability of near that of NTM with a high resolution panchromatic imagery of less than 2 meters.

Useable airborne imagery is also available on a commercial basis. Aerial photography can be acquired by contract from literally hundreds of companies and organizations around the world. The relevant level of useful capability in this regard need not be state-of-the-art and expensive. On the other hand, acquisition of multi-spectral and thermal infrared aerial imagery is available from only a handful of commercial firms and organizations. Radar imagery, including real and Synthetic

Aperture Radar (RAR, SAR) is available from a very small number of companies or organizations globally. The recent "GLOBESAR" exercise undertaken by RADARSAT INTERNATIONAL can supply a useful training base in this regard.

The conceptual modelling for Chart 2 is based on the assumption that the acquisition rate of satellite imagery will be approximately 600 scenes per year, and uses the 1993 costs charged by SPOT Image as an average. Prices for acquisition from Russian sources for NNTM imagery is likely to be less expensive. Personnel costs have been determined by using North American commercial sector rates. These have been reinforced by experience relating to the commercialization of certain verification functions gained from bilateral verification within the context of the INF Treaty. This latter experience suggests that some of the inflated costs sometimes associated with permanent international staff persons can be avoided without detriment to effectiveness.

CHART 2
IMAGERY ANALYSIS GROUP: ILLUSTRATIVE PERSONNEL STRENGTH

DIRECTOR/ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 2 PY		
ADMIN SUPPORT	ANALYSIS PROCESS	TECHNICAL SUPPORT
OFFICE MGT 1PY	SENIOR ANALYSST 2PY	TECHNICAL MGR 1PY
CLERKS 5PY	ANALYSTS 26PY	TECHNICAL SUPPORT 2PY
		ARCHIVIST 1PY
		ARCHIVIST SUPPORT 1PY
		PROGRAMMER 2PY
SUBTOTAL 6PY	SUB-TOTAL 28PY	SUB-TOTAL 8PY
		TOTAL 44PY
PY = PERSON YEAR		

An imagery analysis group staffed at the level shown above could produce in excess of 50,000 person hours of imagery analysis per year. This would be focussed into updating of existing maps, providing an ability to undertake broad area coverage, identify and draft site maps, provide graphic material required for briefing and familiarization purposes and develop data fusion techniques. With familiarity gained from experience and the progressively improved resolution quality of imagery acquired, effectiveness could be increased significantly over time without additional PYs.

This cost estimate does not include capital costs incurred in setting up an imagery analysis capability. An estimate of these one-time costs can be interpolated from the United Nations Experts Study undertaken in 1981 following the submission by France for a proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA).

For comparative purposes, a more accurate estimate could be obtained from the Western European Union which established and is now operating a satellite centre in Torrejon, Spain. The WEU Satellite Centre, with a staff of 50 personnel, has some of the characteristics of the type of organization which would be required for CTBT purposes. When the WEU Satellite Centre which approximates the capability likely to be required for effective on-going verification a bilateral agreement is fully operational and executing its interpretation duties drawn from the various satellite and space organizations with which it is to work on a contractual basis, its operational experience will provide a useful background against which to compare operational concepts, personnel strengths and cost estimates for CTBT verification purposes. Now in its initial experimental phase, the Centre is training analysts in the interpretation of satellite imagery derived from commercial sources such as SPOT, LANDSAT and ERS. The WEU has drawn up an MOU under which Helios partners (France, Italy and Spain) might make data available in future years. The Centre's initial aim is to establish a degree of integration by pooling knowledge and standardizing working procedures in a manner not unlike that which would be required in activity Phase I and II as discussed earlier.

CONCLUSION

A careful review and study of the IAEA/UNSCOM Experience in Iraq, supplemented by available material from NATO's experience under the CFE Treaty suggests that an effective on-going monitoring and verification mechanism can be developed for the Korean Peninsula. Such a system need not be inordinately expensive if the concept of layered verification is applied. Recognizing the multilateral and bilateral dimension of the problems combined with application of other approaches such as the confidence-building process, steps can be taken now to meet the obligations likely to be imposed as part of an arms control agreement in the Korean Peninsula.

General Obligations Assumed by Iraq relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	General Verification Provisions Relating to Process	General Provisions for Future Compliance Monitoring and Verification
UNSCR 687(1991): Subsection "C" Para 8 • Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal and rendering harmless, under international supervision of: - all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, developments, support and manufacturing facilities; - all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts and repair and production facilities. UNSCR 687(1991): Subsection "C" Para 12 • Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear - weapons - useable material or any subsystems or components or any research, developments, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above.	UNSCR687(1991) Subsection "C" Para 9(b) • The Secretary General ... shall develop ... a Special Commission which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself. Subsection C Para 13 • The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the Secretary General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission ... (shall) carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declaration and the designation of any additional location of the Special Commission.	UNSCR 687(1991) Paras 10 and 13 • UNSCD S/22871/Rev 1 dated October 1991 and UNSCD S/22872/Rev 1 and Corr 1 dated Oct 1991 contain respectively the future compliance plans submitted by the Secretary General on behalf of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)and the plan submitted by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required pursuant to UNSCR 687(1991). UNSCR 707(1991): Para 3 • Allowed the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, resources and means of transportation which they wished to inspect. • Allowed the Special Commission, the IAEA and the Inspection Teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights ... for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics. •Prohibited concealment or any movement or destruction (of proscribed items) whether notification to and of the Special Commission. UNSCR 715(1991): Para 2 • Provided authority for UNSCOM to carry out the future on-going monitoring and verification plan submitted to the Security General (S/22871/Rev1): para 3. •Requested the Director General of the IAEA to carry out, with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him (S22872/Rev1 ad Corr.1). all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics. • Prohibited concealment or any movement or destruction (of proscribed items) without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission.

Appendix VII

UNSCOM/IAEA

Inspection Schedule

(In-country dates)

Nuclear

15 May-21 May 1991	IAEA1/UNSCOM1
22 June-3 July 1991	IAEA2/UNSCOM4
7 July-18 July 1991	IAEA3/UNSCOM5
27 July-10 August 1991	IAEA4/UNSCOM6
14 September-20 September 1991	IAEA5/UNSCOM14
21 September-30 September 1991	IAEA6/UNSCOM16
11 October-22 October 1991	IAEA7/UNSCOM19
11 November-18 November 1991	IAEA8/UNSCOM22
11 January-14 January 1992	IAEA9/UNSCOM25
5 February-13 February 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM27
5 February-13 February 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM30
7 April-15 April 1992	IAEA11/UNSCOM33
26 May-4 June 1992	IAEA12/UNSCOM37
14 July-21 July 1992	IAEA13/UNSCOM41
31 August-7 September 1992	IAEA14/UNSCOM43
8 November-19 November 1992	IAEA15/UNSCOM46
5 December-14 December 1992	IAEA16/UNSCOM47
22 January-27 January 1993	IAEA17/UNSCOM49
3 March-11 March 1993	IAEA18/UNSCOM52
30 April-7 May 1993	IAEA19/UNSCOM56
25 June-30 June 1993	IAEA20/UNSCOM58
23 July-28 July 1993	IAEA21/UNSCOM61
1 November-9 November 1993	IAEA22/UNSCOM 64

Chemical

9 June-15 June 1991	CW1/UNSCOM2
15 August-22 August 1991	CW2/UNSCOM9
31 August-8 September 1991	CW3/UNSCOM11
31 August-5 September 1991	CW4/UNSCOM12
6 October-9 November 1991	CW5/UNSCOM17
22 October-2 November 1991	CW6/UNSCOM20
18 November-1 December 1991	CBW1/UNSCOM21
27 January-5 February 1992	CW7/UNSCOM26
21 February-24 March 1992	CD1/UNSCOM29
5 April-13 April 1992	CD2/UNSCOM32
15 April-29 April 1992	CW8/UNSCOM35
18 June 1992-	CDG/UNSCOM38
26 June-10 July 1992	CBW2/UNSCOM39
21 September-29 September 1992	CW9/UNSCOM44
6 December-14 December 1992	CBW3/UNSCOM47
6 April-18 April 1993	CW10/UNSCOM55
27 June-30 June 1993	CW11/UNSCOM59
19 November-22 November 1993	CW12/UNSCOM65

Biological

2 August-8 August 1991	BW1/UNSCOM7
20 September-3 October 1991	BW2/UNSCOM15
11 March-18 March 1993	BW3/UNSCOM53

Ballistic Missiles

30 June-7 July 1991	BM1/UNSCOM3
18 July-20 July 1991	BM2/UNSCOM10
8 August-15 August 1991	BM3/UNSCOM8
6 September-13 September 1991	BM4/UNSCOM13
1 October-9 October 1991	BM5/UNSCOM18
1 December-9 December 1991	BM6/UNSCOM23
9 December-17 December 1991	BM7/UNSCOM24
21 February-29 February 1992	BM8/UNSCOM28
21 March-29 March 1992	BM9/UNSCOM31
13 April-21 April 1992	BM10/UNSCOM34
14 May-22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM36
11 July-29 July 1992	BM12/UNSCOM40A+B
7 August-18 August 1992	BM13/UNSCOM42
16 October-30 October 1992	BM14/UNSCOM45
25 January-23 March 1993	IMT1a/UNSCOM48
12 February-21 February 1993	BM15/UNSCOM50
22 February-23 February 1993	BM16/UNSCOM51
27 March-17 May 1993	IMT1b/UNSCOM54
5 June-28 June 1993	IMT1c/UNSCOM57
10 July-11 July 1993	BM17/UNSCOM60
24 August-15 September 1993	BM18/UNSCOM62
28 September-1 November 1993	BM19/UNSCOM63

ANNEX "C"

Methodologies and Mechanisms Provided for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraqi Compliance Under Pertinent Security Council Resolutions

METHODOLOGY/MECHANISM	*UNSCOM*	*IAEA*	
1. SUPPLIER STATES REPORTING MECHANISM	X	X	
2. USERSTATE REPORTING MECHANISM	X	X	
3. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS	X	X	
- ANYWHERE/ANYTIME	X	X	
- URGENT/UNANNOUNCED	X	X	
4. AERIAL OVERFLIGHTS	X	X	
- FIXED WING	X	X	
- HELICOPTER	X	X	
5. CONTINUOUS IN-SITU SURVEILLANCE & SENSING	X X	X X	
6. AIRBORNE SENSORS	X	X	
- PHOTO	X	X	
- VIDEO	X	X	
- INFRA-RED	X	X	
- RADAR	X	X	
7. STOP AND INSPECT	X	X	
8. IMPORT/EXPORT	X	X	
9. SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS	X	X	
10. NPT SAFEGUARDS		X	
11. NON-CONCEALMENT	X	X	
			DRAWN FROM UNSCD S/22871/Rev.1 and UNSCD S/22872/Rev. 1 ad Corr. 1

ANNEX "D"

Methodologies and Mechanisms Used in UNSCOM/IAEA Monitoring and Verification Activities in Iraq to Date

- Satellite Imagery - NTM and Commercial
- High Altitude Aerial Imagery - USA U-2 reconnaissance flights
- Medium Altitude Aerial Imagery - Russian AN-30 (on hold)
- Helicopter Aerial Imagery - Using UNSCOM C-53 helicopter provided by FRG
- On-Site Inspections - Mod 1 - Medium team (20-30 people), short timeframe
  - Mod 2 - Small team (3-4) long timeframe
  - Mod 3 - Large team (50-60) medium timeframe
  - Mod 4 - Routine Inspections
- Environmental Monitoring - Air Sampling
  - Soil Sampling
  - Water Sampling
- IAEA Safeguards
- Ground Penetrating Radars - Using BELL helicopters, GPR from France
- Radiation Detectors
- Remote Sensors in situ
- Collateral Analysis

Notional Organizational Structure For United Nations Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Compliance by Iraq Pursuant to UNSCR 687(1991) and Subsequent Resolutions



* ***MISSION ASSIGNMENT ONLY***

1 JULY 1994

NOTIONAL ORGANIZATION CHART FOR AN ON-GOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION GROUP FOR THE KOREAN SCENARIO



TOTAL 90 PYS AT AN ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COST OF USD 10.75 M*

* OPERATING COST DOES NOT INCLUDE CAPITAL AND EQUIPMENT COSTS
** DATA FUSION COSTS ESTIMATED AT PERCENTAGE OF IMAGERY COSTS
*** PHOTO INTERPRETATION IS BASED ON 400 SPOT TYPE IMAGES PER YEAR
**** BASED ON UNSCOM TYPE OSI OPERATIONS, MODIFIED BY CFE EXPERIENCE

ARMS CONTROL IN THE NORTH PACIFIC:
THE ROLE FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND VERIFICATION

THIRD ANNUAL WORKSHOP

KOREA/CANADA CO-OPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

25-27 February 1994

ROYAL ROADS MILITARY COLLEGE
VICTORIA, B.C.

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