



FIRST REPORT  
of the Sub-committee on  
**NATIONAL DEFENCE**  
of the Standing Senate Committee  
on Foreign Affairs

Manpower  
in Canada's  
Armed Forces

JANUARY 1982

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Membership of the  
Sub-committee



The Honourable Paul  
The Honourable Jack Marshall, Deputy Chairman

The Honourable  
FIRST REPORT  
of the Sub-committee on

# NATIONAL DEFENCE

of the Standing Senate Committee  
on Foreign Affairs

Ex Officio Members  
Copies of this report as well as the Proceedings of the Sub-  
committee are available upon request from the Clerk of the  
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Canada K1A 0A1

## Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces

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FIRST REPORT  
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NATIONAL DEFENCE

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JANUARY 1982

# Membership of the Sub-committee

The Honourable Paul C. Lafond, *Chairman*

The Honourable Jack Marshall, *Deputy Chairman*

The Honourable Senators:

Buckwold, Sidney L.

\*Flynn, Jacques

Grosart, Allister

Hicks, Henry D.

Lafond, Paul C.

Langlois, Leopold

Marshall, Jack

McElman, Charles R.

Molgat, Gildas L.

Molson, Hartland de M.

Neiman, Joan

\*Perrault, Raymond J.

Roblin, Duff

Smith, George I.

Thompson, Andrew

van Roggen, George

Yuzyk, Paul

\**Ex Officio Members*



# Orders of Reference

Extract from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Senate, Wednesday, May 14, 1980:

“With leave of the Senate,

The Honourable Senator van Roggen moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Asselin, P.C.:

That the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs be authorized to hear evidence on and to consider matters relating to national defence.

The question being put on the motion, it was—  
Resolved in the affirmative.”

Robert Fortier  
*Clerk of the Senate*

Extract from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thursday, June 12, 1980:

“Pursuant to Rule 77(4) of the Rules of the Senate, the Honourable Senator Lafond moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Stanbury:

“That a Sub-committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be known as the Sub-committee on National Defence, be appointed;

That the Sub-committee be authorized to hear evidence on and to consider matters relating to national defence; and

That the Sub-committee be composed of the Honourable Senators Flynn, Grosart, Hicks, Lang, Lafond, Langlois, Marshall, McEIman, Molgat, Molson, Neiman, Perrault, Roblin, Smith, Stanbury, van Roggen and Yuzyk”.

The motion carried.

Patrick Savoie  
*Clerk of the Committee*





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# Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The Sub-committee recommends that a new White Paper on National Defence be undertaken immediately. This should assess manpower and other military requirements against our commitments to collective defence and include a careful examination of the principal military threats to Canada, such as the danger that this country could be exposed to the direct effects on the Canadian population and territory of thermonuclear exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. (page 7)

2. The Sub-committee believes and recommends that military viability — that is to say the capacity to execute competently the military tasks which are demanded of them — remain the essential criterion for judging the operations of the armed forces. (page 12)

3. The Sub-committee recommends that a NATO exercise including an augmentation operation should be undertaken at an early date. It views this as an essential first step towards recasting Canada's contribution to NATO. (page 14)

4. The Sub-committee recommends an increase in Canadian troop levels in Europe, initially to 7,800 and subsequently to about 10,000. The target date for transferring the 2,400 land augmentation personnel to Central Europe would be 1985, with the additional increase in 1987. (page 16)

5. The Sub-committee recommends that Mobile Command should have enough regular troops available at all times to carry out the domestic tasks now assigned to the European-augmentation personnel and the CAST force. An additional 6,400 Regulars should be recruited for Mobile Command, of which 2,400 would be transferred to Europe by 1985 as recommended earlier by the Sub-committee. (page 19)

6. The Sub-committee recommends that the Canadian government should initiate at an early date, in conjunction with SACEUR and our NATO allies, a review of the CAST commitment, to determine whether this constitutes the best possible use of Canada's limited military manpower and resources. (page 20)

7. The Sub-committee recommends that the Regular Force component of Mobile Command should be increased as follows:

MOBILE COMMAND : REGULAR FORCE

Increase from 1981 to 1985

Current strength	16,000	
Make up current shortage	<u>2,500</u>	
TOTAL 1985		18,500

Increase from 1985 to 1987

To cover CAST's domestic duties and the extra rotational needs of a larger force in Europe	4,000	
TOTAL 1987		<u>22,500</u>

(page 22)

8. The Sub-committee recommends a complete overhaul of the Militia and the Supplementary Reserve and their dedication to specific tasks fitting their own characteristics. The importance of the Militia regiments and other units should be recognized, and the Militia should be assured that it will be employed mainly by units, so as to strengthen morale and guarantee that as many of its 16,000 members as possible can be utilized in an emergency. A major re-equipment programme for the Militia should also be launched. The Supplementary Reserve should be provided with some minimal training and mobilization arrangements. The government should also examine the question of establishing new Reserve formations, such as a small Standing Reserve Force mainly for territorial defence in the North and elsewhere, and a Ready Reserve for rapid reinforcement of Canadian forces overseas. (page 24)

9. The Sub-committee recommends that, as a first step, the roles and requirements of Maritime Command should be re-examined and clarified. There should be no increase in the Command's manpower until there are new ships and equipment to be manned. The immediate goal should be to make up current shortages in recognized requirements. (page 26)

10. The Sub-committee further recommends closer integration of naval operations between Maritime Command and other agencies with maritime vessels, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Department of Transport (the Coast Guard), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It also recommends that plans should be developed for full integration of Canadian sea operations in times of hostility. (page 26)

11. The Sub-committee recommends that the Canadian Forces carry out an exercise of defence capabilities, including air transport capacities, in Northern and coastal frontier regions. It further recommends that any deficiencies revealed by such an exercise should be made good as soon as possible. (page 28)

12. The Sub-committee recommends that, as is the case with Maritime Command, there should be no increase in Air Command's manpower until there are more aircraft in service or other additional materiel to be manned. The immediate goal should be to make up current shortages in recognized requirements. (page 29)

13. The Sub-committee recommends that the Canadian Forces Training System should be expanded immediately, to permit the armed forces to meet fluctuations in enrollment, face high attrition rates and recruit additional personnel. Expansion would also help to ensure that the training system has readily available adequate cadres to move into high gear without depleting combat forces should mobilization have to take place. (page 29)

14. The Sub-committee recommends that the cadet movement, in view of its great contribution to Canadian youth, should be given fuller recognition and all possible material and moral support by the government and the people of Canada. Everyone should bear in mind the great services the movement performs in forming good citizens, developing qualities of leadership and discipline, and encouraging positive attitudes towards enrollment in the armed forces. (page 30)

15. The Sub-committee recommends that combat-readiness should be re-emphasized as the fundamental criterion for the armed forces. The Sub-committee also recommends much greater co-ordination and consultation between the defence staff and the operational commands. The new White Paper should address itself, among other things, to the question of defence organization. (page 36)

16. The Sub-committee recommends that DND urgently package its requirements for exemptions from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and draft such consequential amendments to the National Defence Act as

may be necessary. The Minister of National Defence should then present those amendments to government and Parliament for serious and prompt consideration. (page 39)

# Foreword

In the late 1970's several members of the Senate who had been closely associated with the North Atlantic Parliamentary Association, notably the late Senator A.H. McDonald, developed the view that Parliament for quite some time had shown little interest in and support for Canada's Armed Forces and that unfortunately this attitude was becoming prevalent in the Canadian public. The Senate having among its members many former service persons from all three services seemed the indicated Chamber to undertake a review and assess of all aspects of our armed forces.

The Senate accepted the proposition and the Sub-committee was constituted in June 1980. It held its first hearing in October 1980. It began its work with a general review of the activities of the armed forces and then concentrated its attention on the manpower aspect, one of the most crucial issues now facing the Armed Forces. The Department of National Defence is also giving priority to manpower at the present time.

In attempting to develop findings about manpower, the Sub-committee had to survey the whole of the defence field. Realistic answers on manpower would not otherwise have been possible.

Parliament has not attempted a broad general survey of Canada's defence activities since 1972. This initial report constitutes an essential first step towards in-depth analysis of specific aspects of defence matters such as an examination of present materiel (inventories, acquisitions, planning, major items of equipment, the effects of technology, etc.), the condition of defence installations, budgets, the state of the commands, continental defence, the surveillance and control of the national territory, intelligence gathering and policy options for the future.

Using this report as a basis, the Sub-committee would wish to proceed in 1982 to other studies on defence questions. It hopes this report will serve as a frame of reference for other committees or groups working in the defence area. The views and analyses contained here should also serve as a basis in the formulation of the urgently requested new defence White Paper.

The Sub-committee wishes to express its gratitude to the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, P.C., M.P., the Chief of the Defence Staff, General R.M. Withers and their senior and other officials for their valuable and forthcoming assistance to the Sub-committee in its undertaking; also to witnesses no longer associated with the armed services who so readily responded to our invitation to share their views.

The Sub-committee wishes to express its appreciation to Mr. Patrick Savoie, the Clerk of the Sub-committee, to Mr. Roger Hill, Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, who so competently organized our programme and research, and to the Director of the Centre, Mr. Peter C. Dobell, for his wise counsel.



# List of Abbreviations and Definitions

ACE Mobile Force	Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Command Systems
CAST	The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable force committed for use in North Norway
CF-18	The Hornet New Fighter Aircraft
CFE	Canadian Forces Europe
Class C Reserves	Reserve personnel who serve with the Regular Force for periods of up to one year
CMR	Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean
DDH 280 destroyers	Helicopter-equipped destroyers of the 280 class
DND	Department of National Defence
GNP	Gross National Product
LOTREP	Land Operations Trade Re-Assignment Plan
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	The North American Air Defence Command. <i>(Since 12 May, 1981, this command has been designated the North American Aerospace Defence Command. However, the acronym remains unchanged).</i>
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters, in Ottawa
P O & M	Personnel, Operations and Maintenance
RMC	The Royal Military College in Kingston
ROCCS	Regional Operations Control Centers
SACEUR	The Supreme Allied Commander Europe <i>(The Commander of NATO forces in Europe)</i>
SAR	Search and Rescue

SS-20

Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with multiple warheads.

*(There are over 200 of them and they pose a major military threat to Western Europe).*

UN

The United Nations Organization

# Introduction

The Sub-committee believes that Canada's armed forces should be strong enough to meet this country's own needs and to enable it to make a significant contribution to the maintenance of peace and the search for international security. The world continues to pass through troubled times, requiring Canada and its allies to maintain adequate defences so as to uphold sovereign rights and to preserve a satisfactory international military balance.

Canada's pursuit of security cannot be undertaken in isolation. We need an association with the United States to provide for the defence of North America, and we must continue to participate in the Atlantic Alliance so long as there is danger to the security of Europe. Canada also has a long and distinguished record of contributing military units to United Nations peacekeeping forces and other international efforts to maintain world order.

Participation in alliances and other international security arrangements should not, however, be viewed as a reason to allow others to provide our security for us. This leads to a loss of respect and acceptability among the country's allies and associates, and can have serious repercussions on political and commercial relations. It could even lead to encroachments upon national sovereignty if Canada relied too heavily on its allies for the defence of its own territory.

Canada's efforts in the defence field should be commensurate with the country's economic strength, geographic size, strategic position and international obligations. Canada is far from being a superpower, but neither is it a small or weak state. It emerged as a major economic and military force during the Second World War and is now one of the world's leading industrialized countries. The population will soon pass twenty-five million, and there are good prospects for continuing economic development as the years proceed. This country certainly possesses the skills and industrial strength required to maintain an effective, medium-sized military force.

Canada's military record is impressive and the Canadian Forces have maintained high standards of professionalism in war and peace. This should be given full recognition by the people and their government. Atti-

tudes towards the armed forces are vitally important. The Sub-committee believes that Canadians as a whole are proud of their armed forces and will support national policies designed to maintain and promote a reasonable military contribution to international peace and Canada's own security.

At the same time, the Sub-committee acknowledges that the government has many other pressing responsibilities in addition to national defence. Investments in the armed forces should not constitute too heavy a drain on the resources needed to promote economic development, maintain social services or carry out other important programmes, but should be in proportion to our international obligations and interests. The maintenance of effective armed forces should go hand in hand with efforts to develop Canada's foreign trade, promote economic development among the poorer nations of the world, and develop good relations with all members of the international community. While protecting itself and contributing to the various arrangements for collective security, Canada, together with its allies and all other nations, should continue to seek international peace and balanced reduction in global armaments.

These are the considerations which guided the Sub-committee in its enquiry into our armed forces' manpower. It set out to examine some of the basic questions underlying the manpower issue: overall manning levels; the manning of the commands and other sectors; personnel problems; and the kind of armed forces which Canada should develop during this decade.

# Outline of the Sub-committee's Work

During 1980-81, the Sub-committee held a series of hearings on the current activities of the Canadian Forces and then focussed on the manpower question. The Minister of National Defence appeared before it, as did a number of senior military officers, officials and defence experts. The Sub-committee also authorized a modest level of research effort to help provide depth to its enquiries.

The general review of Canadian Forces' operations was carried out in the autumn of 1980, when the Sub-committee heard presentations by the Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence; General R.M. Withers, Chief of the Defence Staff; and other senior officers and officials. These briefings dealt with the overall situation and activities of the Canadian Forces and their efforts to carry out current defence commitments with respect to NORAD, NATO, UN peacekeeping missions, sovereignty surveillance and control, aid to the civil power and national development. The Sub-committee felt that the information provided during these meetings was most valuable as a base for conducting further enquiries.

Hearings on the manpower question began with a presentation by Mr. Nicholas Stethem, Executive Director, Strategic Analysis Group, Toronto, who discussed: "Defence — the human factor; manpower in the 1980's". Subsequent meetings up to Easter included hearings with the following private witnesses: Brigadier General S.V. Radley-Walters (Ret.) on "Current Defence Problems and their Manpower Implications"; Professor Philippe Garigue, Principal of Glendon College, York University, on "Recruiting, Education and Training of Military Personnel"; and Major General R.H. Rohmer, former Chief of Reserves, on "The Forces' Manpower Requirements and the Role of the Reserves." Lieutenant General H.A. Carswell, the Assistant Deputy Minister Personnel, and his senior officers also came to give the following briefings: "The Composition of the Forces and Established Manpower Requirements"; "Current Manning — Problems in the 1980s"; "Recruiting, Education and Training of Military Personnel"; "The Reserve Forces"; and "Forces' Personnel Policies for the 1980s".

After Easter, the Sub-Committee focussed on the manning of the commands and other key issues in the manpower field. It heard the following private witnesses: Lieutenant General J. Chouinard (Ret.) on "The Manning of Mobile Command"; RearAdmiral R.W. Timbrell (Ret.) on "Canada's Maritime Defence Requirements"; Lieutenant General G.A. MacKenzie (Ret.) on "The Manning of Air Command"; and Dr. George G. Bell, Vice President, Finance and Development, York University, and President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, on "Key Issues in the Manpower Area." The Sub-committee also heard the Judge Advocate General and the Deputy Judge Advocate General/Advisory on "The Effects of Human Rights Legislation on the Canadian Forces".

# Some Basic Questions

At the outset of its enquiry, the Sub-committee recognized that consideration of armed forces' manpower would entail some examination of defence activities as a whole. Manpower levels must be assessed against the defence commitments the government has accepted or may accept, and the military tasks it has prescribed for the armed forces.

Canada's present defence commitments are well-enough known in their broad terms. They were carefully listed and described in the last White Paper on national defence, *Defence in the 70's*, published in 1971, and consist of the protection of Canada, joining in the defence of North America, participation in NATO and contributing to UN and similar peacekeeping missions.

The first of these commitments involves surveillance and control of Canadian territory, airspace and waters; aid to the civil power; assistance to the civil authorities such as participating in fisheries surveillance and ice reconnaissance operations; providing search and rescue services; and contributing to national development. The second requires close co-operation with the United States to counter direct military threats to this continent. Participation in NATO involves the stationing of land and air forces in Europe and the maintenance of sea, land and air forces in Canada which are committed to NATO. Canada's peacekeeping effort at present includes the provision of contingents to UN forces in Cyprus and the Middle East.

Defence commitments provide a broad framework for the pursuit of national policies, but they need to be translated into a series of specific military tasks if the armed forces are to carry them out. For example, surveillance of the Canadian Arctic includes periodic patrols by long-range aircraft, while participation in NATO includes such tasks as ground defence in Central Europe. The Canadian Forces at present have a total of fifty-five major military tasks, which were outlined to the Sub-committee in a confidential paper. They also carry out a great range of para-military and non-military tasks such as search and rescue and fighting forest fires, all of which make great demands on their time and resources. Whether these commitments and tasks are being carried out effectively requires further examination.

In the manpower field, the Sub-committee examined manning levels in the armed forces in general and then reviewed the situations in the main military commands. It based its assessment on three main criteria, which will now be described.

One gauge of performance is current shortages in the required peacetime military establishment which the government itself recognizes. These are indicated in the valuable data provided to the Sub-committee by the Department of National Defence, and are outlined in the next section of this report.

A second measure of performance is provided by a comparison of the war-authorized establishment and available manpower. The armed forces are expected to be able to field immediately a certain military establishment at the outbreak of hostilities, and the question is whether they have the trained troops available.

The third measure concerns military viability, i.e. whether the present peacetime and war-authorized establishments are capable of performing their prescribed military tasks in war and peace, as well as serving various diplomatic and other functions. Commands and units are modified over time in response to various pressures and may lose combat-readiness in the process.

This question of combat-readiness is crucial, since the utility of the armed forces depends on it. They must be ready to meet their commitments if war breaks out, and they need the manpower, equipment and other resources for this eventuality. Otherwise they have no *raison d'être* and are useful neither as a defence nor a deterrent.

A policy of bluff is not an alternative. It only amounts to self-delusion. In today's world, information about military forces is widely available, with the result that the main outlines of each country's capabilities are well-known by both its allies and its adversaries.

If commitments and tasks exceed manpower and resources, then either the defence effort should be increased or the tasks should be reduced. However, Canada's extensive territory, geographic position between the two superpowers and membership in NATO may in practice limit the scope for reductions. This country's defence effort is at present minimal and should be strengthened by the employment of some additional manpower, new equipment and other resources.

Commitments, tasks and manpower policies should also be modified to meet changing domestic and international circumstances. Canada's defence policies cannot continue indefinitely to be based on a White Paper which was published before the energy crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the deployment of SS-20 missiles and the emergence of popular



unrest in Poland. They should also take into account continued rapid changes in technology, for example with respect to surveillance satellites and other aerospace systems.

**The Sub-committee recommends that a new White Paper on National Defence be undertaken immediately. This should assess manpower and other military requirements against our commitments to collective defence and include a careful examination of the principal military threats to Canada, such as the danger that this country could be exposed to the direct effects on the Canadian population and territory of thermonuclear exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union.**

Estimated total requirement	83,170	87,470
Current strength Regular Force	71,100	
Class C Reservists	1,100	
Current strength of Regulars	72,200	72,200
Class C Reserve		1,270

While the government is increasing the regular force to 83,170 by the end of the year, it is being done at the expense of 10,000 men and women who will be lost to the 83,170 figure until the end of the year.

In the meantime, the Regulars are supplemented by about 1,100 Class C Reservists, who serve with the Regular Force for periods of up to one year. This enables the Force to meet the establishment of approximately 80,000 person-years allotted by the government for the 1964-65 fiscal year.

Furthermore, even among the present number of Regulars, there are about 12,400 personnel undergoing training. These men and women are not currently available for active duty to carry out the assigned tasks of the armed forces.

Shortages of a kind paralleled in civilian life exist in a number of professions. Data provided by the Department of National Defence shows, for instance, that shortages in the present Regular Force include 100 pilots, 110 maritime personnel, 253 primary instructors and 610 communications personnel.

Through the Regular Force's normal training cycle we lose 10,000 men and women to the Department of National Defence during the 1964-65 fiscal year.



# Overall Manning Levels

## Current shortages: Regular Force

The current manning situation is as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Recognized total requirement		83,400
Current manning Regular Force	80,100	
Class C Reserves	<u>1,100</u>	
Current number of Regulars	79,000	<u>79,000</u>
Current shortage of Regulars		<u>4,400</u>

While the government is increasing the armed forces each year to fill this gap, this is being done at the rate of only 400 men and women per year so that the 83,400 figure will not be attained until almost the end of the decade.

In the meantime, the Regulars are supplemented by about 1,100 Class C Reservists, who serve with the Regular Force for periods of up to one year. This enables the Forces to meet the establishment of approximately 80,100 person-years allocated by the government for the 1980-81 fiscal year.

Furthermore, even among the present number of Regulars, there are about 12,400 personnel undergoing training. These men and women are not currently available for active duty to carry out the assigned tasks of the armed forces.

Shortages of trained personnel in certain categories are a serious problem. Data provided by the Department of National Defence shows, for instance, that shortages in the present Regular Force include 170 pilots, 110 maritime engineers, 455 avionics technicians and 616 communications personnel.

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout the report, figures on current manning levels are for 31 March 1981, as provided by the Department of National Defence during the Sub-committee hearings.

## War-authorized strength

The Canadian Forces would require some 108,000 troops at the outbreak of a major conflict to meet their commitments for the first days of hostilities. This is a figure provided by the Department of National Defence and mentioned by other witnesses.

In theory, this requirement could be more than met by a combination of the Regulars and Reserves. The latter include approximately 16,000 Militia, 2,900 Naval Reserve, 1,000 Air Reserve, 1,500 Communications Reserve, 1,000 Rangers and 14,000 Supplementary Reserve.

However, there are serious questions about the current effectiveness of the Reserves owing to years of neglect, shortages of equipment, inadequate training, uncertainty about roles and the absence of a mobilization plan. If they were given sufficient resources and attention, they could play a major part in the national defence effort; but under current conditions, it is doubtful whether they could provide more than a few thousand trained troops in a crisis. Some witnesses argued that the Militia would not be able to supply more than 1,000-2,000 trained infantry for immediate use, and others noted that the Supplementary Reserve is at present little more than a list of names. The impression conveyed to the Sub-committee — and presumably to Canada's allies and adversaries — is that this country would probably find itself with a shortage of about 20,000 trained and effective troops if a general war broke out.

There are indications that the Minister and the Department of National Defence themselves recognize the urgent need to thoroughly overhaul and revitalize the reserves. The Minister has stated his intention to upgrade the Reserve Forces and the Department is carrying out an intensive mobilization study and considering other improvements, for example in the Supplementary Reserve. The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence is also now conducting an enquiry into the status of the Reserves. The Sub-committee welcomes all these developments: however, it also notes that good intentions about the Reserve Forces have been expressed on many occasions in the past. What is required now is action and the investment of time and resources.

Another problem to consider is what proportion of the war-authorized strength should be provided by the Regular Force. The government evidently believes that there should be at least 83,400 Regulars, since this is the level it is now working towards. In addition, there are questions relating to the 4,000 men of the CAST force — the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable force committed to North Norway — and the 2,400 troops designated to augment Canadian Forces Europe. Both groups have duties in Canada as well as overseas, and several witnesses argued that additional

Regular troops are needed in Canada to cover the possibility that these 6,400 men might be sent to Europe. Others raised questions about the feasibility of the CAST commitment and the augmentation concept. These questions are examined later in this report.

Consideration must also be given to the reinforcement of Canadian Forces in Europe beyond currently committed levels, either to provide extra strength in a crisis or to replace casualties in wartime. The crucial question here is whether trained troops are available and could be mobilized and transported to Europe within the likely period of hostilities.

### **Military viability**

A realistic appraisal of Canada's defence effort must enquire beyond the current manpower situation and the present war-authorized establishment and consider whether the various components of the armed forces are militarily viable. Whether they make sense, in relation to their commitments and tasks, in present circumstances, or will continue to make sense by the end of this decade, needs to be determined.

At the outset, one must recognize that defence postures are often determined by diplomatic and other non-military considerations as well as military ones. For example, the Canadian Forces carry out a whole range of para-military and non-military duties such as search and rescue, operating reception centres for refugees and assisting in disaster relief. Canadian participation in NORAD is designed to preserve Canada's sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States and other friendly powers as well as to provide some protection for North America; and Canada's commitments to Norway and the Central Front in Europe are often described as being both political and military. The CAST force is seen as a concrete expression of Canada's solidarity with Norway, while the Canadian Force in Europe provides assurances that Canada will participate in the collective defence of Western Europe if such should become necessary. Peacekeeping operations have very obvious diplomatic and political functions, such as providing ways for countries to avoid conflicts with their neighbours, or to withdraw from wars or other difficult situations without too much loss of prestige.

Canadian defence policy as a whole has been very heavily influenced by non-military considerations in recent years. For example, when the Canadian contingent in Europe was cut in half in 1969, this reflected the attitude of the government of the day towards NATO and that government's relatively optimistic view on East-West relations rather than any visible reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe. Canada embarked on a re-equipment of the armed forces in the mid-1970s partly because it wished to maintain and improve relations with its allies, including trade

and other links with Western Europe. Now there are fears that the present re-equipment programmes may be tapered off long before they are completed owing to pressures on federal government finances and doubts in some circles about the usefulness of maintaining substantial military forces.

Whatever the political, financial and other influences which bear on the activities of the armed forces

**The Sub-committee believes and recommends that military viability — that is to say the capacity to execute competently the military tasks which are demanded of them — remain the essential criterion for judging the operations of the armed forces.**

# Manning the Commands and Other Sectors

## Canadian Forces Europe

Canadian Forces Europe is the only major command located overseas. Its full peacetime establishment consists of 5,400 Regulars, composed of 3,200 in Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and 2,200 in First Canadian Air Group and CFE headquarters and support roles.<sup>2</sup> Augmentation of the land element — building up units in Europe to committed levels during a crisis period preceding hostilities — would add another 2,400 troops to the command and bring its full strength to 7,800. The command is presently supported by 1,300 Canadian and German civilians.

In wartime, Canadian Forces Europe would also receive reinforcements from Canada if the war lasted long enough and it was physically possible to move in these reinforcements. Their role would be to build up troop levels beyond the augmented level or to provide replacements for casualties.

Canadian Forces Europe is committed to one of the most likely areas of conflict, the Central Front in Europe. The force is politically important because it demonstrates that Canada stands by its commitment to participate in the collective defence of Europe. It is visible to Canada's allies in Europe, should serve to reassure Europeans about Canadian intentions and provides a tangible expression of Canada's continuing interest in European defence.

One of the major difficulties about Canadian Forces Europe concerns augmentation. A witness from DND noted that augmentation personnel are all in place in Canada, already identified and virtually ready to go in one or two days. However, other observers have expressed fears that a crisis preceding warfare might be a very short one, or else take place in the kind of political atmosphere which would make it difficult to augment troop levels or move to higher states of alert without aggravating the then existing delicate situation. Some of the testimony heard by the Sub-committee convinced it that augmentation is a very dubious proposition.

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<sup>2</sup> First Canadian Air Group has approximately 800 personnel stationed in Europe.

The Sub-committee is gravely concerned that there might not be the time to carry out augmentation. For example, a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could start during the suppression of an uprising in Eastern Europe, as Soviet air forces pursued dissident air units fleeing into the West. This could lead to attacks on NATO airfields and then a rapidly escalating war. Canadian airfields in Europe could be bombed while Canadian transport flights into Germany were intercepted. Augmentation movements could be disrupted and Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group might have to go into action without the additional 2,400 troops it requires to operate as a self-supporting unit.

In other crisis situations, augmentation might be difficult to achieve because of the danger that this manoeuvre could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as provocation or interference. For example, a new Berlin crisis might demand calmness and resolute insistence on Western rights rather than troop movements which could be destabilizing. Alternatively, should there be domestic upheaval in the German Democratic Republic, or another Warsaw Pact state, the West might decide to refrain from augmenting its forces for fear of giving the Soviet Union a pretext for intervention. Yet, despite the best efforts of the West, crises of these kinds could conceivably escalate with extreme rapidity and lead to military action before Canada was able to augment its troops in Europe.

Canada has never carried out a full test of the augmentation operation. The Canadian Forces have never been authorized to try to assemble 2,400 men and fly them into Germany in a matter of a few days. Obviously aircraft would have to be available on very short notice and the Canadian bases in Lahr or elsewhere in Europe would have to cope with a massive influx of arrivals.

Augmentation seems an uncertain prospect at this time. It might prove completely impractical in various circumstances.

**The Sub-committee recommends that a NATO exercise including an augmentation operation should be undertaken at an early date. It views this as an essential first step towards recasting Canada's contribution to NATO.**

A second major question about the Canadian Forces in Europe concerns their military viability, even when augmented. The Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group is committed to a "strategic reserve" role in support of allied forces on the Central Front, but according to witnesses it is lacking necessary elements. It is missing components that are critical on the battlefield, they argued, and should have an additional infantry battalion and extra tank, artillery, signals and other units if it is to be a well-



balanced, effective fighting force. These witnesses favoured a Brigade Group of about 7,600 troops in peacetime plus a supporting Air Group at about the current level. To achieve this objective would require an increase of Canadian Forces Europe to about 10,000 men and women. This would represent a major shift in Canadian defence and foreign policy.

Such a move would signify that Canada has found it necessary to reassess East-West relations since it cut troop levels in Europe in 1969, and has come to the conclusion that present conditions call for new efforts in the defence field. It would indicate Canada's disappointment with the lack of progress towards real rapprochement in Europe.

Detente has been seriously weakened in recent years by the continued and unprecedented build-up of Soviet military power; Soviet expansionism and opportunism in Africa and elsewhere; the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; and fears of mounting Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf, the principal source of Western oil supplies. The Polish situation also obliges the Western powers to maintain proper defences since it could lead to other upheavals in Eastern Europe, the use of armed force to suppress internal disorders there, and increased dangers of East-West conflict.

The Sub-committee believes that the hopes for a real rapprochement between East and West are now a long-term prospect at best, and that consequently Canada and the other NATO countries must give due attention to the military aspects of security so as to preserve a satisfactory balance. They must strengthen their armed forces where necessary so as to bolster international stability and provide incentives for arms control and similar negotiations. Canada should play its full part in this process, beginning with a decision to transform the Canadian force in Europe into a more viable military formation. This country should demonstrate that it is determined to make a really solid contribution to allied defences and ready to invest the necessary resources.

Increasing the Canadian forces in Europe to about 10,000 troops would not, of course, in itself, bring about a shift in the overall East-West military balance in Europe. However, the increase in Canadian military capability in Europe would be greater than the simple manpower figures appear to indicate, especially if the brigade group was well-equipped with a powerful array of modern weaponry. NATO would be provided with a strong, balanced military formation capable of sustained action, rather than an understrength body which is inadequate for its present role. Allied military commanders would almost certainly not view such a change as a negligible development.

In addition, the increase in Canadian troop levels would serve as a very clear demonstration of Canada's readiness to play a full part in sharing the

allied defence burden. It would encourage other alliance partners to maintain and strengthen their own defence efforts and thus enhance Western coherence and collective strength. It would also offset some of the criticism now being levelled at Canada for spending less than two percent of its Gross National Product on defence. As indicated in the chart below, all the NATO allies except Canada, Iceland and Luxembourg spend more than two percent of the Gross National Product on defence. Most spend between 3 and 5.5 percent. Canada is thirteenth among the allies in defence effort.

Maintaining an effective, well-equipped force in Europe would also enhance the perception of Canada's good faith among the European allies. It would give this country a stronger claim to be heard in consultations among the NATO allies and between East and West. This could strengthen Canada's hand in pressing for new initiatives on arms control and disarmament, while also yielding benefits in vital negotiations among allied countries on such questions as trade and energy.


A further effect of increasing the Canadian Force in Europe would be to put Canada's entire defence effort on a much more solid and combat-oriented basis. Not only would the brigade group in Germany be greatly strengthened, but Mobile Command also would have enhanced importance as the provider of trained replacement units for rotational purposes. This question is discussed further in the next section of the report, on Mobile Command.

**The Sub-committee recommends an increase in Canadian troop levels in Europe, initially to 7,800 and subsequently to about 10,000. The target date for transferring the 2,400 land augmentation personnel to Central Europe would be 1985, with the additional increase in 1987.**

## **Mobile Command**

Mobile Command is responsible for most of Canada's land forces. It is charged with providing augmentation and reinforcement troops for Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany; maintaining the CAST force for deployment to North Norway; keeping units in readiness for deployment to Europe as part of the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force; providing troops for peace-keeping forces in Cyprus, the Middle East and elsewhere; ensuring the land defence of Canadian territory; carrying out duties related to the protection of Canada, including aid to the civil power; and assisting in national development through such activities as mapping, charting and bridge-building and airfield construction in the North. The Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in

## NATO COUNTRIES DEFENCE SPENDING PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT



1. United States 2. United Kingdom 3. Greece 4. Turkey 5. France 6. Portugal  
 7. Netherlands 8. Germany 9. Belgium 10. Norway 11. Italy 12. Denmark  
 13. Canada 14. Luxembourg

Note: These figures are derived from a publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance 1981-1982". All figures are from the year 1980. Iceland is not listed on the table because it has no armed forces.

Germany is the only major land combat element in the Canadian Forces which does not come under the direction of Mobile Command.

The active strength of Mobile Command at present is about 16,000 Regular troops and 16,000 Militia, supported by 4,600 civilians. Like the other military commands, Mobile Command could also draw to some degree on the Supplementary Reserve.

Mobile Command needs about 2,500 more Regulars to meet the requirements which the government itself recognizes. It should have another 1,300 trained troops at present, and will need to add about 1,200 more as the government implements current plans to increase the Regular Force to 83,400 men and women.<sup>3</sup>

### *Regular troops available in Canada*

The pool of trained Regular combat troops available in Canada is very small. It includes the 2,400 augmentation troops and the 4,000 men of the CAST force, who are multiple-tasked, that is to say designated to go overseas in an emergency even though they have duties in Canada.

According to testimony before the Sub-committee, if the augmentation troops were sent to Europe, whether for the duration of a crisis or permanently, only about 6,000-7,000 trained combat personnel would remain in Canada. If the CAST force was sent to North Norway at the same time, the numbers would fall to about two battalion groups consisting of a total of 2,000-3,000 men.

These are the only combat troops the government would be certain to have in Canada to defend this country itself in a crisis. They would bear primary responsibility for defending coastal and Northern Canada, protecting vital installations across this country and providing aid to the civil power.

Yet each of these tasks could require several thousand trained combat personnel. For example, use of the armed forces to maintain internal security and aid the civil power has a long history in Canada. The numbers of troops required for this purpose alone can be very substantial, such as the 10,000 men involved in the 1970 FLQ crisis and the 16,000 service personnel required for the 1976 Summer Olympics. Most of the troops used in this way must be combat-ready and should be Regular personnel rather

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<sup>3</sup> The 2,500 figure for the current shortage is an estimate, since unclassified figures are not available for the recognized requirements of the commands or the numbers of Class C Reservists in each command. However, the margin of error is not likely to be great, since overall figures are available for recognized requirements and Class C Reservists.

than Reserves, since professionalism and lengthy training are all-important in internal security work.

**The Sub-committee recommends that Mobile Command should have enough regular troops available at all times to carry out the domestic tasks now assigned to the European-augmentation personnel and the CAST force. An additional 6,400 Regulars should be recruited for Mobile Command, of which 2,400 would be transferred to Europe by 1985 as recommended earlier by the Sub-committee.**

### *The future of the CAST commitment*

Following testimony about some of the transportation and other military problems facing the CAST force, the Sub-committee questions whether Canada should endeavour to improve the present force or seek alternative NATO tasks for its 4,000 men.

Doubts about the military viability of the force arose because of the time required to move it from Canada to North Norway and fears that a Soviet assault on Norway might be a massive one launched without much warning. One element of the CAST force consists of air-transportable and air-droppable units and has a fair prospect of reaching its forward positions before Soviet forces could occupy them. The remainder would be transported to North Norway by sea and has a much lower probability of reaching North Norway and its battle stations on time.

Another consideration relating to the CAST force is the fact that one of its battalion groups is also Canada's contribution to the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force. This battalion group is stationed in Canada like the remainder of the CAST force, but would be flown into Denmark if Warsaw Pact forces attacked Denmark before Norway. The battalion group is supposed to be withdrawn from Denmark and transferred to North Norway with the rest of the CAST force, however, if a Soviet assault is subsequently launched on North Norway and the CAST force is able to reach the combat area.

The CAST and ACE Mobile commitments have substantial political significance as expressions of Canada's readiness to come to the defence of two important NATO allies, and the Canadian government would probably encounter strong objections from Norway and Denmark if it raised the question of relinquishing them. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the other NATO powers would also have to be consulted about this question, and, unless Norwegian and Danish concerns could be met and new NATO tasks worked out for the CAST force which significantly strengthened allied defences, they would almost certainly object to any changes.

The Sub-committee recommends that the Canadian government should initiate at an early date, in conjunction with SACEUR and our NATO allies, a review of the CAST commitment, to determine whether this constitutes the best possible use of Canada's limited military manpower and resources.

### *War-authorized strength — revitalization of the Reserves*

Another crucial issue facing Mobile Command is the attainment of war-authorized levels in a crisis. As indicated in previous sections of the report, this would require reliance on the Militia and parts of the Supplementary Reserve. (see the table below, comparing Canada's Regular and Reserve Forces with those of the other NATO allies).

## NUMBERS OF CANADIAN AND OTHER NATO REGULAR AND RESERVE FORCES

(for 1979, in '000s personnel)

	Army	Navy	Air	Total Regular Forces	Forces as % of men 18 - 45	Estimated Primary Reservists	Para- Military forces
Greece	145.0	17.0	22.6	184.6	10.6	290.0	129.0
Turkey	470.0	45.0	51.0	566.0	6.7	425.0	120.0
Norway	20.0	9.0	10.0	39.0	5.0	245.0	—
France	326.8	70.3	103.7	509.3	4.7	350.0	85.4
United States	750.8	708.2	563.0	2,022.0	4.5	818.7	—
Belgium	62.3	4.4	20.1	86.8	4.5	54.4	16.3
Germany	335.2	36.5	106.0	495.0	3.9	755.0	20.0
Netherlands	75.0	16.9	19.0	114.8	3.8	171.0	8.2
Portugal	37.0	14.0	9.5	60.5	3.7	—	31.9
Italy	254.0	42.0	69.0	365.0	3.3	738.0	196.5
Denmark	21.4	6.1	7.2	34.7	3.3	154.3	—
United Kingdom	163.7	72.9	86.3	322.9	3.0	257.6	—
<b>Canada</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>19.1</b>	—
Luxembourg	0.7	—	—	0.7	0.9	—	0.4

Note: These figures are from *The Military Balance 1979-1980*, the last edition of this publication to include separate statistics on Army, Navy and Air personnel and The forces as a % of men 18-45. The 1981 figures for Total Regular Forces are contained in *The Military Balance 1981-1982* and are in most cases very similar to those for 1979.

The Sub-committee's examination of the Militia and other Reserve Forces was relatively limited, because this year's study was concerned with the manpower situation in the armed forces as a whole. Also, the Sub-committee was aware that the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence would be conducting an in-depth analysis of the Reserve Forces, and it did not wish to duplicate this activity. However, the testimony which the Sub-committee did hear on this question was enough to convince it that the Reserve Forces are suffering from some very serious problems which make it difficult for them to contribute to the overall effectiveness of the armed forces in a way that they should.

It was suggested to the Sub-committee that the government and senior military officers have very little regard for the Reserve Forces and are not clear as to how they would utilize them in a crisis. There is no immediate reaction plan to specify what the various military units, including the Reserves, should do in an emergency, one witness said; and consequently the Reserves suffer from the lack of a sense of purpose and low morale. This is made worse by shortages of equipment, facilities and resources for training, and by a range of other problems including high turn-over of personnel, a very inadequate budget and a tendency to subordinate the Reserves to the requirements of the Regular Force.

So far as the Militia in particular is concerned, the general impression conveyed to the Sub-committee was that of an organization which is unsure of its roles and suffering from serious deficiencies with respect to equipment and training. Militiamen have complained that their force lacks clear objectives fitting its own character and traditions and argued that it has now become a mere source of skilled manpower for the Regular Force. They fear that the Militia's real purpose today is to be ready to squeeze out a few hundred trained personnel in a crisis.

If this is so, the Militia will not be able to make the contribution it should to the attainment of war-authorized levels in a crisis. An article in the Winter 1978/79 edition of the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* showed that, of the 5,817 infantrymen in the Militia at that time, only 647 would be available for augmenting the Regular Force. The remainder consisted of recruits, those attending school, female personnel, under-age people, non-effectives or those working in essential occupations.

The Supplementary Reserve, for its part, is simply a list of names of former Regular or Reserve service personnel who have indicated that they would be ready to serve again in a crisis. The majority have served with the armed forces in the last five years, but most have undergone no military training since then and some may now be physically or otherwise unfit for service. The Department of National Defence is now aiming to revital-

ize the Supplementary Reserve, but at present there are no specific procedures for mobilizing this Reserve on the outbreak of hostilities, and it is doubtful whether it would make much of a contribution to the attainment of war-authorized manpower levels.

In addition to having enough Regular and Reserve personnel to meet present war-authorized requirements, Mobile Command must be able to draw on some surplus of trained manpower for reinforcement purposes. This would be necessary if a war in Europe continued beyond the initial stage of a week or so. Such reinforcements could be provided by Militia units, the Supplementary Reserve or new reserve formations such as a Standing Reserve Force or a Ready Reserve. Present capabilities might be improved if the Department of National Defence effectively implements a New Development Plan intended to rejuvenate the reserve forces by requiring Regular Force personnel to join the reserves for a period on release from their units. Trained personnel in various industries and professions could also be listed, so that they could be called on if necessary should a major conflict be imminent.

### *Mobile Command in the 1980's*

In light of the considerations discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter,

**The Sub-committee recommends that the Regular Force component of Mobile Command should be increased as follows:**

MOBILE COMMAND	:	REGULAR FORCE
<u>Increase from 1981 to 1985</u>		
Current strength		16,000
Make up current shortage		<u>2,500</u>
TOTAL 1985		18,500
<u>Increase from 1985 to 1987</u>		
To cover CAST's domestic duties and the extra rotational needs of a larger force in Europe		<u>4,000</u>
TOTAL 1987		22,500

This assumes that the 2,400 European-augmentation troops, now under Mobile Command, would be transferred to Germany and that 2,400 new Regular troops would replace them in Canada.



Increasing Mobile Command in this way would have the added advantage of providing extra rotational possibilities for Canadian troops overseas. Mobile Command should have a total strength of about 22,500 in the future for the following reasons:

- A. Increasing the Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group to 7,600 troops as recommended earlier will require approximately 15,200 positions in Mobile Command for their rotation (to allow units six years in Canada for each three years in Europe);
- B. Canada is likely to continue making the same contribution to peacekeeping as in the past ten years, so that 600 to 2,000 Mobile Command troops will be deployed overseas with peacekeeping missions. One battalion might be retrieved if the operation in Cyprus ends in the near future. However, it seems safe to assume that other peacekeeping responsibilities will be accepted and that Canada's contribution in this field will remain at current, or higher, levels;
- C. Mobile Command should have another 1,200 to 4,000 positions for the rotation of the peacekeeping units;
- D. Mobile Command also has to maintain a complex of permanent bases in Canada. About 3,000 — 4,000 specialized support personnel are employed in this duty and are not normally rotated out of Canada with the operational units;
- E. The total manpower requirement of Mobile Command, seen from the rotational perspective, is the sum of the figures listed above, i.e., at least 20,000 and possibly as high as 25,200 positions.

One should note that this rotational question affects the suggestion which is sometimes made for a simple trade-off from the CAST commitment to an increased force level in Central Europe, i.e., to abandon CAST but send its 4,000 men to join the Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany. Mobile Command would still need around 22,500 positions if this happened, because of the rotational requirement as well as other established needs.

The overall capabilities of Mobile Command will depend heavily on the utilization of the Reserves. They could be given major responsibilities for territorial defence and reinforcement if properly equipped, trained and organized. For example, the Militia could be employed for the protection of vital installations across Canada as well as reinforcement of Canadian Forces Europe in wartime (by units rather than individuals).

A new Standing Reserve Force might be created, for example consisting of 2,000-3,000 personnel recruited into units which could be called for

some 6 months service on a rotational basis. One of its main tasks would be to maintain an effective Canadian presence in the North. The Supplementary Reserve could be upgraded and made a major source of augmentation and reinforcement personnel for Regular formations. A new Ready Reserve for augmentation and reinforcement purposes might also be considered.

It would appear to the Sub-committee that the Militia has a more pressing need for specific assignments, equipment and other resources than additional personnel at the present time. If more Reserve troops become needed to provide some extra surplus beyond war-authorized levels, then it would be more appropriate to create new formations as mentioned above, or to expand the Supplementary Reserve. The latter might be increased to 25,000 personnel, for example, so as to draw on more of the trained former service people now in civilian life. Such an increase could be carried out at minimal cost and would help to ensure that the Canadian Forces have some additional strength, above the 108,000 war-authorization figure, to cover unforeseen needs and provide a satisfactory level of reinforcement capability.

**The Sub-Committee recommends a complete overhaul of the Militia and the Supplementary Reserve and their dedication to specific tasks fitting their own characteristics. The importance of the Militia regiments and other units should be recognized, and the Militia should be assured that it will be employed mainly by units, so as to strengthen morale and guarantee that as many of its 16,000 members as possible can be utilized in an emergency. A major re-equipment programme for the Militia should also be launched. The Supplementary Reserve should be provided with some minimal training and mobilization arrangements. The government should also examine the question of establishing new Reserve formations, such as a small Standing Reserve Force mainly for territorial defence in the North and elsewhere, and a Ready Reserve for rapid reinforcement of Canadian forces overseas.**

## **Maritime Command**

Maritime Command is responsible for carrying out surveillance to identify and track air, surface and sub-surface naval threats; joining in the protection of sea lines of communication to Europe; contributing to surveillance of the Canadian North; assistance in fisheries protection; and participating with the United States in maintaining a North American underwater surveillance system. It has 8,700 Regular personnel, 2,900 Reserves and 6,700 civilians; 8 destroyer escorts, 8 helicopter-equipped

destroyers, 4 DDH 280 destroyers, 3 operational support ships, 6 training vessels, 3 submarines, 1 deep-diving vessel and 3 destroyer-escorts in reserve.

Maritime Command appears to be about 1,000 men and women short of recognized requirements at the present time.<sup>4</sup> Even in terms of the 1980-1981 authorized establishment, it suffers from a shortage of more than 550 trained personnel, including 91 naval officers, 110 maritime engineers, and 374 seamen. There are also more than 100 Class C Reservists serving with Maritime Command at present.

Concerning the present state of the fleet, a former Commander of Maritime Command testified before the Sub-committee that "of the 23 destroyers in Canada's navy, four are able to fight a modern war. The other 19, to be truthful, should not be sent to sea to fight a present-day war. They are not capable of looking after themselves against air missiles or submarines."

Another witness noted that Canada has no minesweepers at present. The fleet has a very limited capability for identifying and tracking naval threats to Canada; some capacity for protecting sea-lines of communication, although this is weakened because its ships could be deprived of bases or mobility by enemy mines; minimal capability in the Canadian North; overly large ships for fisheries protection; and, probably, a very limited role in underwater surveillance. The current state of Maritime Command reflects the government's obvious uncertainty about present naval commitments and failure to maintain the credibility of the fleet through the addition of new ships dedicated to realizeable objectives.

By the end of the 1980's, the fleet will be in much the same condition as at present. The government has engaged in the acquisition of six new Canadian Patrol Frigates and indicated that it will eventually acquire other naval vessels, but there are already some delays in the frigate programme. The first of the new ships seems unlikely to be completed before the second half of 1987, two years behind schedule. Meanwhile, the existing fleet grows older. Ninety per cent of the present ships will remain operational in 1990 only if they undergo planned life-extension work in the meanwhile.

If Northern surveillance is to remain among Maritime Command's responsibilities, then some ice-breaking capability should surely be devel-

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<sup>4</sup>This is the requirement which the government itself recognizes, i.e., part of the 83,400 total requirement for the whole of the armed forces. As for Mobile Command and all the other military commands, this figure is an estimate, since unclassified data was not provided on shortages in recognized requirements by commands.

oped. If anti-submarine warfare continues as a task, then the government should determine which ASW roles are technologically and financially realistic for Canada. If fisheries protection is to remain a Maritime Command duty, then a careful appraisal should be made of this immense task, and the ships should be built to carry it out properly.

**The Sub-committee recommends that, as a first step, the roles and requirements of Maritime Command should be re-examined and clarified. There should be no increase in the Command's manpower until there are new ships and equipment to be manned. The immediate goal should be to make up current shortages in recognized requirements.**

**The Sub-committee further recommends closer integration of naval operations between Maritime Command and other agencies with maritime vessels, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Department of Transport (the Coast Guard), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It also recommends that plans should be developed for full integration of Canadian sea operations in times of hostility.**

## **Air Command**

Air Command is responsible for the air defence of Canada and the support of Maritime Command and Mobile Command. It also provides combat-ready air forces, personnel and training for the First Canadian Air Group in Europe. Air Command now consists of six main organizations: Air Defence Group, which is tasked to provide the combat-ready air defence forces required to enforce Canadian sovereignty over national airspace and to meet Canada's commitment to continental defence under the NORAD Agreement; Tenth Tactical Air Group, whose role is to provide the air mobility and support needed by Canada's land forces; Maritime Air Group, which is responsible for the provision of combat-ready maritime air forces for operational employment by the Commander of Maritime Command; Air Transport Group, which is tasked to provide the Canadian Forces with operationally effective air transport; Fourteenth Training Group; and Air Reserve Group, which provides support to the Regular Force both operationally and through augmentation of bases and units. Air Command also has duties in the area of search and rescue.

In terms of Regular Force personnel, Air Command is the largest command in the Canadian Forces. It has 22,000 Regular Force personnel, plus 1,000 Reserves and a supporting element of 7,000 civilians.

The current shortage of Regulars compared with recognized requirements appears to be about 1,500 personnel. Two categories which are especially affected are pilots and avionics technicians.

Air Command's manpower requirements are heavily influenced by equipment holdings. The composition of the Command varies as old aircraft and materiel are phased out and new systems such as the Aurora Long Range Patrol Aircraft enter the inventory. A major programme is now underway to equip Air Command with 84 CF-18 Hornet interceptors for Canada, plus 54 for Europe. Other projects may also be undertaken in this decade to modernize radar systems; acquire additional transport, training and medium-range patrol aircraft; replace some tactical and ASW helicopters; and generally upgrade air-weaponry.

The NORAD commitment could become increasingly crucial for Canada in the future, leading to new demands upon Air Defence Group. NORAD has now been redesignated The North American Aerospace Defence Command in recognition of its importance in warning of missile attack and detecting and tracking space vehicles as well as defending against the manned bomber. Canada and the United States renewed this accord for five years on 11 March 1981, and may invest heavily in aerospace defence during the remainder of this century. Canada in particular is now purchasing the CF-18 new fighter aircraft and building two new Regional Operations Control Centres (ROCCs). It may also decide, with the United States, to reshape the Pinetree Line and upgrade other radar systems. Canada already contributes a limited number of men to manning AWACs (Airborn Warning and Control Systems) aircraft and may decide to participate in the deployment of space-based surveillance devices and similar advanced systems.

The demands on Maritime Air Group are also likely to be heavy in this decade. One major equipment requirement is to replace the 20 Tracker medium-range patrol aircraft, since they are now obsolescent and used mainly for fisheries surveillance. Additional long-range patrol aircraft beyond the present 18 Auroras already appear to be necessary.

The Department of National Defence must also ensure that its capability for airlifting troops into the North and coastal frontier regions is maintained and strengthened where necessary. Commercial activity such as oil exploration and production may increase substantially in these areas, and the Canadian Forces must have the capacity to ensure that sovereignty is preserved while this work goes ahead. Other northern and coastal frontier tasks may include the defence of NORAD forward air bases and the protection of Canadian commercial, scientific or other installations. The Canadian Forces must have the air transport capability needed to air-

lift a brigade of troops to any Northern or coastal points which may be threatened by disorders or outside interference or incursion.

**The Sub-committee recommends that the Canadian Forces carry out an exercise of defence capabilities, including air transport capacities, in Northern and coastal frontier regions. It further recommends that any deficiencies revealed by such an exercise should be made good as soon as possible.**

The demands on Tenth Tactical Air Group and the new Training Group are likely to remain heavy throughout this decade, especially if the former has to support an expanded Mobile Command. New helicopters and training aircraft will be needed for these groups.

Search and rescue also makes substantial demands on Air Command. Canada is divided into four rescue regions, with headquarters in Victoria, Edmonton, Trenton and Halifax, and emergency centres in Quebec and St. John's. Aircraft crews and para-rescue teams are on call in each of these regions around the clock. An annual SAR plan is co-ordinated through an interdepartmental committee. Growing requirements in this area have led to a small increase in manpower allocations in the past three years.

Air Command's manpower needs will alter with changes in activities and equipment holdings. However, the total requirement of the Command may not increase significantly, because some of the systems to be phased out are more labour intensive than the new ones which will replace them. A notable example is the Pinetree radar line. At present it suffers from high operating costs and difficulties in maintenance. If it is reconstructed its stations will be replaced by modern, minimally-attended radars and a modernized communications net. Manning and maintenance requirements would be greatly reduced in this area.

The Air Reserve plays a most useful role in Air Command's operations, flying aircraft assigned exclusively to them and also providing personnel to augment Regular Force squadrons. The Air Reserve is presently undergoing some re-equipment with Kiowa helicopters.

One of the witnesses before the Sub-committee also strongly recommended the establishment of an Air Transport Reserve, formed mainly of commercial pilots and other aircrew with previous military training. This could prove invaluable, he indicated, because Canada would need to use commercial aircraft to fly many of the augmentation and reinforcement troops into Europe during a crisis or hostilities, and it would be preferable to have their crews under the wing of the armed forces. The Sub-commit-

tee learned that the Department of National Defence and other government departments are now studying this idea and similar concepts.

Noting the equipment-intensive nature of air defence and the importance of equipment in determining air force manpower levels,

**The Sub-committee recommends that, as is the case with Maritime Command, there should be no increase in Air Command's manpower until there are more aircraft in service or other additional materiel to be manned. The immediate goal should be to make up current shortages in recognized requirements.**

### **Communication Command**

Communication Command is responsible for providing effective communications throughout Canada and abroad, and consists of approximately 3,100 Regulars, 1,500 Reserves and 1,100 civilians. Figures provided by the Department of National Defence indicate that this command may be about 400 Regular Force personnel short of recognized requirements.

### **Canadian Forces Training System**

Canadian Forces Training System is responsible for recruit training, individual trades and specialist training and the officer development programme. It is staffed by about 4,600 Regular personnel and 3,900 civilians. The training organization and infrastructure underwent major reductions as Canadian Forces were cut from about 125,000 in 1962 to 78,000 in 1975, and now constitute a relatively small establishment fitted to a small force.

**The Sub-committee recommends that the Canadian Forces Training System should be expanded immediately, to permit the armed forces to meet fluctuations in enrollment, face high attrition rates and recruit additional personnel. Expansion would also help to ensure that the training system has readily available adequate cadres to move into high gear without depleting combat forces should mobilization have to take place.**

### **Other military organizations and groups**

Other substantial bodies of military personnel are undergoing training and in the administrative and logistics support systems. These latter groups include such organizations as National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, the Northern Region Headquarters in Yellowknife, and the Logistics Organization.

## **The Canadian Rangers**

The Canadian Rangers form part of the Reserve Force. They are a para-military body numbering about 1,000 and composed mainly of native people, who serve as observers and guides. There do not appear to be any shortages relative to requirements at the present time.

Members of the Canadian Rangers are recruited for their great knowledge of the area where they live. They have special skills in arctic and sub-arctic operations, which could prove very valuable to the armed forces in emergency situations. The Sub-committee emphasizes that this important force should be maintained and given full support by the government. Its organization and manning should be reviewed and improved where necessary.

## **The cadets and youth programmes**

Canada has a large cadet movement, trained and assisted by 113 officers and men of the Regular Force and 5,000 personnel from the Cadet Instructors List, a part of the Reserves. There are army, sea and air cadets, amounting to a total of 60,000 young people. However, the cadets are not part of the manpower of the armed forces since the cadet movement is supported by private associations and distinct from the military establishment.

Members of the Sub-committee expressed their strong interest in the cadet movement and their conviction that it performs an invaluable service in training young Canadians to play an active and responsible role in the life of their country. They noted that it also provides an excellent source of good recruits for the Regular Force and the Reserves.

**The Sub-committee recommends that the cadet movement, in view of its great contribution to Canadian youth, should be given fuller recognition and all possible material and moral support by the government and the people of Canada. Everyone should bear in mind the great services the movement performs in forming good citizens, developing qualities of leadership and discipline, and encouraging positive attitudes towards enrollment in the armed forces.**

The Sub-committee feels that additional Regular Force personnel should be assigned to the cadets for training purposes. The armed forces should also take advantage of the fact that many institutions now seem to be more supportive of the cadets than they have been at times in recent years. For example, a number of school boards across the country now seem to be taking a renewed interest in links with the cadet organizations.



The Department of National Defence sponsors the Summer Youth Employment Programme, which provides 8-12 weeks training each year for 13,000 students. It also provides a 3-month military training option for 300 of the young people who participate each year in the Katimavik project. Members of the Sub-committee drew attention to the great value of such activities for Canadian society as a whole, and stressed the importance of strengthening them and building public support for them.

### Recruitment, training, retention, attrition and structure

Underlying the current operating situation are a number of crucial personnel questions which affect the system's capacity to maintain existing manpower levels or meet new requirements. These questions include such problems as recruitment, training, retention, and attrition.

Recruitment requires constant effort but is not the overwhelming obstacle to maintaining or expanding the Forces that it is sometimes supposed to be. Admittedly, the proportion of 17-24 year-olds in the population is dropping, but the problem of recruitment does not lie with demographic trends so much as with inadequate recruiting programmes. The armed forces have a very limited budget of personnel for advertising, contacting potential recruits and carrying out testing and selection. It should be noted that the severe interruptions to these advertising programmes were subjected by two successive changes of government in 1979-80 had a disruptive effect on recruiting. Steps should be taken to remove DND from the ambit of effects of these partisan activities.

The armed forces could obtain many more capable recruits if they were authorized to increase and focus their efforts and expenditures. At present, they reach less than 5 per cent of the 17-24 year-old category, and take only about one third of those who make a formal application to join the service. In the words of one witness, the "armed forces are skimming the cream".

There is some concern about recruitment of particular categories such as married and armed officers, owing to changes in societal attitudes which have made prolonged sea duty less acceptable to men and their families than it once was. However, the difficulties of sea duty are reduced nowadays by the fact that commandoes are able to fly commercial back home if serious family matters arise. Sea duty could not be a major problem for the young unmarried men who almost invariably make up a substantial proportion of a naval command. A much greater problem, in the view of one witness, is the outdated equipment that Canada's military has to operate.



# Personnel Problems

## **Recruitment, training, retention, attrition and structure**

Underlying the current manning situation are a number of crucial personnel questions, which affect the system's capacity to maintain existing manpower levels or meet new requirements. These questions include such problems as recruitment, training, retention, and attrition.

Recruitment requires constant effort but is not the overwhelming obstacle to maintaining or expanding the Forces that it is sometimes supposed to be. Admittedly, the proportion of 17-24 year-olds in the population is dropping, but the problem of recruitment does not lie with demographic trends so much as inadequate recruiting programmes. The armed forces have a very limited budget at present for advertising, contacting potential recruits and carrying out testing and selection. It should be noted that the severe interruptions to which advertising programmes were subjected by two successive changes in government in 1979-80 had a disruptive effect on recruiting. Steps should be taken to immunize DND from the serious effects of these partisan activities.

The armed forces could obtain many more capable recruits if they were authorized to increase and focus their efforts and expenditure. At present, they reach less than 5 per cent of the 17-24 year-old category, and take only about one third of those who make a formal application to join the service. In the words of one witness, the "armed forces are skimming the cream".

There is some concern about recruitment of particular categories such as seamen and naval officers, owing to changes in societal attitudes which have made prolonged sea duty less acceptable to men and their families than it once was. However, the difficulties of sea duty are reduced nowadays by the fact that commanders are able to fly personnel back home if serious family crises arise. Sea duty ought not to be a major problem for the young unmarried men who should normally make up a substantial proportion of a naval command. A much greater problem, in the view of one witness, is the outdated equipment that Canada's sailors have to operate.

Many intelligent young people are simply not attracted to serve in ships which are becoming obsolete.

Other categories which may be relatively difficult to recruit in the future are engineers, communicators, computer specialists, and similar groups who are in heavy demand by industry. Some witnesses argued that expansion of certain sectors of the Canadian economy in the 1980's might lead to intense competition for promising people in their early 20's. However, the Canadian Forces train almost all their own skilled personnel.

Armed forces training systems in themselves are a major issue. They were adequate for the 78,000 personnel who were serving in 1975, but are now being stretched to the limit. Witnesses before the Sub-committee pointed out that additional staff, buildings, equipment and other facilities are now needed, and that this will entail added costs. If the armed forces are expanded to more than 83,400 in due course, the training costs will increase commensurately. However, the extra burden will not be so onerous if the additional manpower is brought into the system in carefully phased increments.

Other forms of individual training and education appear to be in a good state at present. The Sub-committee learned that the Canadian Forces give over 3,000 courses of varying length to more than 45,000 personnel each year (including the new enrollees). Extensive facilities and opportunities include provision for advanced trades training, language training, in-service training with the commands and officer education and development.

Witnesses noted that operational training on a major scale has been less than satisfactory in recent years. Exercise Rendez-vous '81, while very valuable, was the first major field exercise carried out by the Canadian Forces in 24 years. Similar exercises for the deployment of Canadian troops in the arctic and the augmentation of Canadian troops in Europe also appear necessary. One recent article by a group of military officers at the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College pointed out that operational training for ground troops has suffered because of the number of different tasks to prepare for, shortage of resources, the large turn-over of personnel, undermanning and imbalances in certain commands.<sup>5</sup> In the Sub-committee's view, greater attention and resources should be devoted to collective, operational training.

Probably the greatest problem affecting the entire manning of the Canadian Forces is the question of retention and attrition. The Forces evi-

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<sup>5</sup>See "The Development of Collective Training in the Army", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1978, pp. 8-15.

dently try hard to retain good people by providing conditions and pay as attractive as the defence budget will allow, and by appealing to the individual's interest in career-development and inclination towards involvement in service life. For example, a project known as LOTREP (Land Operations Trade Re-Assignment Plan) is employed to open the possibility of trades training for combat-arms personnel, while another scheme known as the socialization programme was developed to make people feel at home in the military environment. Still the attrition rate remains unacceptably high, at around 13 per cent per year. The Canadian Forces lose about 11,000 people each year and these have to be replaced by new recruits who are then trained at great cost. Many of those lost are highly skilled people. Industrial companies have a higher attrition rate, but, unlike the military, they do not have to provide complete training for all their new employees.

Of course, there is no desire to eliminate attrition completely. Department of National Defence officials believe that 6 per cent attrition is desirable because of the need to retire older personnel, release those who are not suited to service life and maintain a young and dedicated force. They would like to reduce the remaining 7 per cent of attrition, however, which at present accounts for a loss of more than 5,500 people per year.

The Sub-committee could find no precise explanation for the high attrition rates. The armed forces have conducted enquiries into this question but answers have proved elusive. One major reason may be the fact that service personnel are entitled to leave the Armed Forces at any time with only six months' notice, and do not have to serve out a full period of engagement. Outdated equipment, undermanning, and overwork in certain categories such as ships' crews and avionics technicians also seem to be obvious causes of departure. Then there are such broader problems as natural restlessness among young people, dislike for constant moving among older, married personnel, and inadequate quarters.

Another reason for attrition is pay. Owing to the intensive training they receive in the armed forces, most service people are highly skilled in technical or other areas and possess capacities which are attractive to industry and other civilian sectors. Private companies, crown corporations, government departments, educational institutions and other groups can often offer salaries which the armed forces cannot match, and so draw people away from the military establishment. The attraction of civilian employment is especially strong in expanding regions, where industrial salaries are sometimes very high whereas the armed forces have to pay rates which are similar across the country. One should note, however, that DND announced in December that some relief would be afforded to personnel stationed in Alberta facing high housing costs.

The armed forces' role in training skilled personnel should be given much greater recognition. They perform an immense public service in training tradesmen, technicians and others for industry and the civilian sector in general. Defence expenditures yield substantial economic benefits in the manpower training field, and this should be borne in mind when considering the costs of defence programmes.

Some witnesses also felt, with regard to attrition, that young people become disenchanted with the armed forces because the reality does not live up to their expectations of adventure and dedicated service. They argued that the Canadian Forces have become bureaucratic and career-oriented rather than combat-ready, while regimental traditions and the military ethos have been down-graded and overshadowed by cost-effectiveness and current fashions in management techniques. They also deplored the lack of recognition for the armed forces among the Canadian public and the tendency to isolate the military from the civilian life of the country, for example by stationing troops on bases distant from the major population centres. The whole question of maintaining morale and a fighting spirit in the armed forces in peacetime is certainly a very serious one, though there are differences of opinion about the remedies.

This problem of the basic objectives of the armed forces is linked to the question of organization and structure. Some witnesses believe that the operational commands are vastly under-emphasized while National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa is too powerful and overstaffed. They see this as a natural reflection of a military establishment which is over-centralized, top-heavy with officers and NCOs and composed mainly of logistics, administrative and other support personnel. They argue that the defence staff in Ottawa should be brought into a closer association with the senior operational commanders of Mobile Command, Maritime Command and Air Command. Some contend that the headquarters staff in Ottawa should be cut in half while operational manpower in the field is increased.

Officials of the Department of National Defence disagree with such assessments of the organizational structure and also argue that the rank-structure of the Canadian Forces is not unduly top-heavy or out of line with the armed forces of other allied countries. The Sub-committee also heard evidence suggesting that the logistics and administrative structure of the Canadian Forces is a carry-over from previous times when the Forces had more troops. This situation could be remedied by increasing the armed forces so as to meet current needs properly, rather than by cutting the administrative tail.

**The Sub-committee recommends that combat-readiness should be re-emphasized as the fundamental criterion for the armed forces. The**

**Sub-committee also recommends much greater co-ordination and consultation between the defence staff and the operational commands. The new White Paper should address itself, among other things, to the question of defence organization.**

### **Bilingualism in the armed forces**

The Sub-committee examined the question of languages in the services. The francophone percentage in the armed forces has increased from 18.4% in 1972 to 25.6% in December 1980. This proportion has not yet permeated the higher ranks because for many francophones time in service has not yet been sufficient. While the forces are not yet functionally bilingual nor have all the instruments of work been converted yet into French, great progress has been achieved.

Some 33% of all classifications and trade training courses are available in French and a further 23% offer tutorial assistance, an increase to 56% from 6% in 1970. Approximately 4,000 persons receive language training each year, 2,000 learning French and 2,000 English. In the military colleges, CMR St. Jean (500 students) is bilingual, while at RMC Kingston (600 students) all engineering courses are bilingual. Royal Roads Military College Victoria (250 students) has not completely progressed to that stage. In all three services French language units have been established where language of work and of communications to and from is French. In operations, e.g the Royal 22nd Regiment, no serious operational problems have been experienced.

There has been no evidence of internal tensions between language groups. The armed forces are to be commended for their approach and their achievements to date in the use of both languages.

### **The role of Women**

The Sub-committee examined as well the presence and the role of women in Canada's armed forces. Evidence established that the proportion of women in the forces has increased from 1.8% in 1971 to 7.6% (6,114 members) as of January 31, 1981. Attrition, however, is at a higher level than with males and this creates some difficulties in the assignment of women to military tasks.

Women are not at present being trained for combat roles. However in 1981, at the officer level, they are employed in 21 of 34 classifications, and in other ranks in 62 of 103 trade classifications. In fact, the proportion has to be limited in some instances to protect the opportunity for operational or combat troops to serve periods of non-operational or shore duty.

Employment trials are being carried out introducing more women to demanding non-operational duties. Some are employed in "near combat" areas such as field support units, air crews, etc.

Aircrew training of service women as pilots, flight engineers and navigators, now being introduced, does not involve combat duty but such areas as transportation, search and rescue and training.

Service women are now admitted to the military colleges. On a trial basis, some are serving in isolated areas, e.g. Canadian Forces Station Alert in the Northwest Territories.

### **The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the armed forces**

Since the subject was unusually timely, the Sub-committee had one session on May 19, 1981, which was devoted to the concerns and views of the defence staff with respect to certain provisions of the draft Charter of Rights and Freedoms contained in the Resolution on the Constitution of Canada then before Parliament.

It was pointed out that the sole peacetime purpose of the Canadian Forces is to train and maintain servicemen and service-women for combat readiness, not public servants in uniform.

Members of the Canadian Forces are unlike other employees because of their profession and the commitment they must bring to it. Identical structures, standards and duties proposed in the draft charter with respect to some human, civil and legal rights would be inappropriate in many cases and extremely difficult to enforce. Indeed, under emergency or war-time conditions a failure to permit the required latitude to the requirements of command of the armed forces could impair national security.

Most nations appear to have recognized the unique position of their armed forces by exempting them from at least certain provisions of any rights legislation which they have enacted, notably in the United Kingdom.

In Canada, the Human Rights Act applies to the Canadian forces without exception. It has been invoked, particularly in the area of alleged discrimination based on sex and physical handicap. Some grievances were rejected on the basis of "bona fide occupational requirements", as provided for in the Act. However, the draft Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not contain that provision. In other instances the armed forces' practices and procedures were modified, obviously without affecting adversely either their efficiency or their overall objectives.

The Sub-committee was told that the armed forces had on several occasions made official representations to the Department of Justice while the Resolution was before Parliament. No response came forth nor was



any indication given that exemptions to the armed forces under certain conditions would even be considered.

The Sub-committee suggested at the time that even though it appeared then to be too late to achieve some necessary changes in the proposed Charter, DND should submit a draft of the kind of changes they felt were necessary in any Charter, plus a series of proposed changes in the National Defence Act and in the Code of Service Discipline which would conform to those provisions in a Charter of Rights and Freedoms which the armed forces should in any case be expected to observe.

Since then, the federal government and a substantial number of provincial governments have agreed to a Charter of Rights and Freedoms containing a "notwithstanding" clause permitting delay or modification in the application of Fundamental Freedoms, Legal and Equality Rights provided such options are reenacted not less frequently than once every five years.

This would appear to provide an avenue through which the Federal Government could extend to the armed forces the essential exemptions required to fulfill their role, with review and reenactment by Parliament not less frequently than once every five years. The Sub-committee was deeply impressed and concerned that the functioning of our armed forces would be seriously hindered without these exemptions.

**The Sub-committee recommends that DND urgently package its requirements for exemptions from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and draft such consequential amendments to the National Defence Act as may be necessary. The Minister of National Defence should then present those amendments to government and Parliament for serious and prompt consideration.**



# The Canadian Forces in the Future

## Sub-committee's Recommendations

The Minister of National Defence and senior officers recently indicated that they are now giving priority to manpower, following a long period when it was necessary to focus on re-equipment. The Sub-committee supports this policy and proposes that some additional manpower should be added to the armed forces beyond the levels now planned. The entire defence structure should also be made more combat-effective. Canada simply does not have enough combat personnel or modern combat equipment at present in relation to commitments and the overall size of the armed forces.

Based on the analysis contained in the previous chapters of the present report, the Sub-committee believes that the strength of the Regular Force, once shortages have been made up, should be increased in two stages, as follows:

### Stage I — 1985

Currently identified requirement	83,400
Augmentation of Canadian Forces Europe	2,400
TOTAL	<u>85,800</u>

### Stage II — 1987

Increase in Canadian Forces Europe	2,000
Increase in Mobile Command (to cover rotational needs of the extra troops in Europe and take over some of CAST's internal duties)	<u>4,000</u>
TOTAL	<u>91,800</u>

The target should be a total of about 92,000 men and women by 1987.

Meanwhile, the Reserves should be improved and strengthened as suggested in the chapters on overall manning levels and the manning of the commands. The Militia, Naval Reserve, Air Reserve, Communication Reserve and Rangers should receive additional equipment and other resources. The Supplementary Reserve should be completely overhauled and increased in numbers. Other reserve formations such as a small Standing Reserve Force and a Ready Reserve should also be considered.

The manpower figures for the Reserves in 1985 and 1987 should be as follows:

Militia	16,000
Naval Reserve	3,000
Air Reserve	1,000
Communication Reserve	1,500
Rangers	1,000
Supplementary Reserve	<u>25,000</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>47,500</b>

The Ministry of National Defence and senior officers recently indicated that they are now giving priority to manpower following a long period when it was necessary to focus on re-equipment. The Sub-committee supports this policy and believes that some additional manpower should be added to the armed forces beyond the levels now planned. The main defence structure should also be made more combat-effective. Canada simply does not have enough combat personnel or modern combat equipment at present in relation to commitments and the overall size of the armed forces.

Based on the analysis contained in the previous chapters of the present report, the Sub-committee believes that the strength of the Regular Force, once shortages have been made up, should be increased in two stages as follows:

<b>Stage I — 1985</b>	
2,000	Regular Force strength
2,000	Regular Force strength
4,000	TOTAL
<b>Stage II — 1987</b>	
2,000	Regular Force strength
2,000	Regular Force strength
4,000	Regular Force strength
8,000	TOTAL

The target should be a total of about 92,000 men and women by 1987. Meanwhile, the Reserve should be improved and strengthened as suggested in the chapters on overall manning levels and the training of the commands. The Militia, Naval Reserve, Air Reserve, Communications Reserve and Rangers should receive additional equipment and other resources. The Supplementary Reserve should be completely overhauled and increased in number. Other reserve formations such as a small Ready Reserve Force and a Ready Reserve should also be considered.

# Financial Implications of the Sub-committee's Recommendations

On the basis of reliable research, the Sub-committee estimates that the extra cost of increasing the armed forces to 92,000 Regulars and 47,500 Reserves by 1987 would be about \$350 million per year in 1981 dollars, or six percent of the present defence budget. This includes funds for capital and other initial expenditures and for continuing annual personnel costs.

Capital and other initial expenditures would amount to about \$1,300 million dollars, phased in over a period of about five years. Half would be allocated to purchases of new equipment and ammunition for the larger force in Europe and Canada. The remainder would be required for the construction of new base installations and training facilities; additional costs related to a larger Supplementary Reserve; and other expenditures of a similar nature.

Additional annual Personnel, Operations and Maintenance (PO&M) costs would also be incurred as manpower levels were raised. They would amount to about \$100 million more in 1981 dollars in 1985/86 when an additional 2,400 troops would be added to Canadian Forces Europe in accordance with the Sub-committee's recommendations. They would then rise to \$350 million by 1987, when a further 6,000 personnel would be added to the Canadian armed forces.

**TABLE — SCHEDULE OF ADDITIONAL DEFENCE  
EXPENDITURES**  
(in millions of 1981 dollars)

	Extra Personnel	Personnel, Operations and Maintenance Costs	Initial Capital and Similar Costs	Total
		\$ Millions	\$ Millions	\$ Millions
1982/83	—	—	100	100
1983/84	—	—	350	350
1984/85	—	—	350	350
1985/86	2,400	100	250	350
1986/87	2,400	100	250	350
1987/88	8,400	350	—	350
1988/89	8,400	350	—	350
1989/90	8,400	350	—	350
1990/91	8,400	350	—	350

Increases in expenditure of this magnitude would certainly not be negligible. Acceptance by the government of the Sub-committee's recommendations would require revision of its recent statement (concerning the 1981 budget) to the effect that no further increases would be made in the defence envelope in the next two years beyond those outlined in the 1981 budget. The allowances for defence spending in the next two years were increased in this budget (for example from \$7,019 million to \$8,000 million for 1983/84), but this was largely to keep abreast of inflation and does not expand defence expenditures by more than the 3 percent annual growth rate to which Canada has committed itself.

The times call for more expenditure on defence even though other concerns are pressing. Canada's defence effort was allowed to lag for almost a decade and now needs to be increased significantly to meet domestic defence requirements and the responsibilities imposed upon Canada by the current international situation. Minor changes are not enough. By the middle of this decade Canada must be well on the way to having defence forces which can meet all this country's military obligations. Defence expenditure should be related to a determination to ensure that Canada has the armed forces to look after its own requirements while also carrying its proper share of the Western defence burden.

An additional \$350 million per annum of defence expenditure in 1981 dollars would amount to only about 0.1 per cent of the present Gross National Product. Even if this sum were added to the current commitment to increase the defence budget by 3 per cent per annum, Canada's defence spending would increase by only about 0.2 percent of the GNP in this decade, from 1.7 to 1.9 percent of GNP. This is a very moderate price to pay for the defence of this country and the fulfilment of its international obligations.

# Appendix A

List of persons who appeared before the Committee, showing the number and date of the issue in which their evidence appears.

## *First Session of the Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-82*

Name	Issue No.	Date
Allan, VAdm. J., 4, 1980 Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff	2	November 4, 1980
	3	November 25, 1980
	5	December 9, 1980
Beattie, BGen. C.E., Director General, Policy Planning	2	November 4, 1980
	4	December 2, 1980
	5	December 9, 1980
Bell, BGen. G.G. (Retired), Vice President, Finance and Development, York University, and President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies	19	June 9, 1981
Buskard, Col. R.W., Director of Air Plans	2	November 4, 1980
Carswell, LGen. H.A., Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel)	8	February 17, 1981
	9	February 24, 1981
	10	March 10, 1981
	12	March 24, 1981
	13	March 31, 1981
	14	April 7, 1981
Chouinard, LGen. J. (Retired)	16	May 19, 1981
Cowan, BGen. J., Director General, Reserves and Cadets	13	March 31, 1981
Edwards, Cmdre. G.L., Director General, Military Plans and Operations	2	November 4, 1980
	3	November 25, 1980
Garigue, Professor P., Principal of Glendon College, York University	11	March 17, 1981
Karwandy, Col. F., Deputy Judge Advocate General/Advisory	17	May 19, 1981
Kinney, BGen. C.M., Director General, Organization and Manpower	8	February 17, 1981
	14	April 7, 1981
Lamontagne, The Hon. J. Gilles, P.C., Minister of National Defence and Acting Minister of Veterans Affairs	6	December 16, 1980





Leslie, Maj. D.S., Staff Officer, Directorate Military Plans Coordi- nation	4	December 2, 1980
Mackenzie, MGen. D.C., Chief, Air Doctrine and Operations	2	November 4, 1980
MacKenzie, LGen. G.A. (Retired)	18	May 26, 1981
Mathewson, Mr. A. de W., Chief, Policy Planning	3	November 25, 1980
McLean, LCol. R.A., Directorate of Military Plans, Coordination	5	December 9, 1980
McNaughton, BGen. D., Director General, Air Doctrine and Operations	3	November 25, 1980
Mitchell, BGen. P., Director General, Land Doctrine and Operations	3	November 25, 1980
Mortimer, Col. R.L., Director, Military Manpower Distribution	19	June 9, 1981
Nixon, Mr. C.R., Deputy Minister	6	December 16, 1980
Peart, BGen. J.B., Director General, Recruiting, Education and Training	10 12	March 10, 1981 March 24, 1981
Radley-Walters, BGen. S.V. (Retired)	9	March 3, 1981
Rohmer, MGen. R.H., Former Chief of Reserves	15	April 14, 1981
Simonson, Col., K.O., Directorate of Military Operations, Coordination	5	December 9, 1980
Stethem, Mr. N., Executive Director, Strategic Analysis Group	7	February 10, 1981
Thériault, LGen. G.C.E., Vice Chief of the Defence Staff	1	October 28, 1980
Therriault, BGen. R.G., Director General, Personnel Careers (Officers)	17	May 19, 1981
Timbrell, RAdm. R.W. (Retired)	18	May 26, 1981
Vance, MGen. J.E., Chief, Personnel Careers and Senior Appointments	14	April 7, 1981
Williams, BGen. J., Director General, Manpower Utilization	8 10 13 14	February 17, 1981 March 10, 1981 March 31, 1981 April 7, 1981
Withers, Gen. R., Chief of the Defence Staff	1 6 8 17	October 28, 1980 December 16, 1980 February 17, 1981 May 19, 1981
Wolfe, MGen. J.P., Judge Advocate General	17	May 19, 1981

