


# SOUTH ASIA'S SECURITY DEFICIT

## Some Implications of the Nuclear Tests


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Prepared for:  
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## **SOUTH ASIA'S SECURITY DEFICIT**

### **Some Implications of the Nuclear Tests**

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

Nuclear tests in India and Pakistan last Spring altered perceptions of the regional strategic order. Considerable effort has been expended since then, explaining why the two states chose to move from nuclear ambiguity to the status of nuclear states. Within academe, explaining the reasons, and downplaying the consequences, has consumed much the intellectual effort to date. At the political and diplomatic level, containment of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, or at least efforts to shore up the battered non-proliferation regime, has preoccupied the international arena.

Here we will argue that more attention should be paid to the new security environment within the region, and suggest that the situation is worse than the protagonists and many analysts seem really to accept; and that contemporary concepts of security, that is, human security, should be added into the reckoning. In summary, it will be argued that in traditional security terms South Asia is now in an apparently perpetual 'security deficit' trap; and additionally that the costs in terms of paths not taken will be a worsening of human development. The opportunity costs of the tests may prove to be the greatest long term result of crossing the nuclear threshold.

The final section deals with policy implications for Canada and the international community. There it will be suggested, in a preliminary fashion, that a 'second generation' response be considered, designed to foster complex interdependence within South Asia, through a complex effort to engage the nuclear states.<sup>1</sup>

### **THE BLASTS OF SPRING: How to Think About the Unthinkable**

After a half a year to reflect, there is still little consensus on the implications of South Asia becoming officially nuclear. Among academics and close observers, there seem to be two polar positions. Essentially the divergence is between the *qualitative* and *incremental* perspectives. There are those who see the tests as a watershed, a crossing from one era to another. From this view, moving from nuclear-capable, to open possession of nuclear capacity, is a qualitative change in the subcontinent and in the wider global context. There is something inherently different about nuclear weapons of mass destruction; the tests are a step with inevitable consequences. The other view is that there is little material difference between being nuclear-capable and openly-nuclear. The strategic thinking remains the same, the military planning and the overall balance are not disturbed. The incremental step may have consequences for other states, but for the subcontinent it is just another stage in a long and predictable strategic relationship. The balance is not changed, and if it is, then it is in the direction of stability. Avowedly nuclear states act more cautiously. Carried to the logical conclusion, this perspective becomes an argument that if there is a new era, it is one of balance of terror. The tests of Spring become the harbinger of more stable relations. They

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<sup>1</sup> The author is a political scientist and Asian Studies specialist at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. This paper represents a 'snapshot' of how events appear six months after the South Asia nuclear tests, and draws on publically available sources. It was first presented in spoken format at the CANCAPS Annual Conference held at Dunsmuir Lodge, Victoria, December 4-6, 1998.

are the preserver of stability and promoter of peace. Who would go to war in a nuclear sandbox?

The two sides of the 'stability issue' are presented effectively by observers who were commenting shortly before the tests. Neil Joeck has several publications and papers on the subject, including "Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia" (Adelphi Paper 312 September 1997); and *Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia*, (Oxford University Press, 1998). He maintains "nuclear capabilities have in fact not created strategic stability. Such capabilities neither explain the absence of war over the past decade nor why war is currently unlikely. While limited nuclear capabilities increase the costs of conflict, they do little to reduce the risk of its occurrence." The other side is well presented by Devin Hagerty in his book *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia* (MIT Press, 1998), and in his article "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis", ( *International Security*, Winter 1995/96). He denies the assertion now widely accepted that both states were already nuclear in 1990, and were forced by outside pressure to pull back from the brink of nuclear war. On the contrary he feels that both sides used self restraint because of the mutual knowledge of nuclear potential. In his book, he is particularly forceful, (as are the South Asian states), in pointing to Western hypocrisy:

The United States should stop preaching nonproliferation while continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence to meet its own security needs. If a country protected by two vast oceans and a seemingly insurmountable lead in conventional military technologies still requires the insurance provided by nuclear weapons, why should India and Pakistan\_\_ with their much more vulnerable geopolitical positions and technological inferiority\_\_\_\_ be expected to the denuclearize first? [page 195].

The argument between the 'qualitative' and 'incrementalist' perspectives is as old as the nuclear era. It has just been rekindled by the South Asian situation. Perhaps a good

starting point for revisiting this early debate is Henry Kissinger's classic study, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Norton, 1957). His insight seems salient today, regarding the situation in South Asia: "...we added the atomic bomb to our arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking. Because we saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare which knew no goal save total victory..." Later he adds "at this scale of catastrophe [created by nuclear weapons] it is clear that the nature of war has altered".

Within the subcontinent, it may be that few have seriously integrated nuclear reality into their thinking: strategic, political or economic. For both states, going nuclear so far appears to be seen as a way to pursue traditional foreign policy goals. For Pakistan it has been a golden opportunity to raise the Kashmir issue; for India to stake claim to regional hegemony and to status as an emerging global power. Ratification in the NPT that China could be trusted to be a nuclear state but not India was, understandably, perpetually galling; making the nuclear tests a matter of pride. That nuclear weapons are instruments of mass destruction, not expressive and symbolic politics, seems to be a dim and distant reality, indeed an un-reality. Skirmishes soon resumed along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and the Siachen Glacier, and both India and Pakistan continue to enhance conventional weapons along their de facto front, in a small and volatile theatre of operation. Is it nascent nuclear capability which has prevented wider escalation, or just a mixture of mature military prudence, democratic politics, and luck?

It is not for outside analysts to resolve the debate whether nuclear weapons are a major or minor step for South Asia. That is almost a 'theological' debate resting on occupation and temperament. The responsible authorities in South Asia need to come to grips with the *reality* of a new military situation that has catastrophic, end-of-history<sup>2</sup>, potential.

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<sup>2</sup> In the broad Hindu tradition, we are nearing the end of the fourth and final stage in the present cycle of creation, the Kali yuga. It is to end in chaos, class disorder, and fire. Watching people dance in the streets after

That is the primary difference between being ambiguously nuclear-capable, and weaponized nuclear states.

External adherents to both 'the qualitative difference' and 'incremental change' side in the nuclear debate would concur on the next steps: putting in place mechanisms for management. Whether the blasts were monumental or incremental, a regime is needed to provide orderly regulation of relations between the two newest nuclear states. Engagement, applying to South Asia the accumulated knowledge of the world's nuclear era, is the present situation. Thus much of the emerging literature on the South Asian nuclear tests consists of the vocabulary of management: command and control, prevention of leakage to third parties, confidence and security building measures.

However, there are still important differences between the two schools of thought. For those who see nuclear weapons of mass destruction as *inherently* different from all others, the most important goal is to stop nuclear proliferation. Much of the global, and Canadian, diplomatic effort is to induce South Asia to enter the web of international agreements which have evolved to bottle the nuclear genie. If the cork has been pulled out in South Asia, then the priority is to get engagement in the nuclear management regimes. Most especially that means getting the two states into the CTBT and the more fundamental Non-Proliferation Treaty. Effort will soon focus on the ancillary issues of gaining South Asian accession to international efforts to control the manufacture and deployment of missile delivery systems.

The other perspective, the incrementalist view, is associated with the beguilingly titled 'realist school'. The nuclear tests in South Asia have given an opportunity to replay the 'Great Debate' in international relations theory and policy, between the 'idealists' and

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the May nuclear tests brought to mind that Shiva marks the end of this cycle by the dance of Destruction.

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'realists'. The advice of realists is to accept the situation, and put efforts into dealing with the consequences. That is certainly the view of the Indian government, and the intelligentsia there (and here) supporting the decision to cross the threshold.

Thus the emerging school of thought contrasts 'non-proliferation' with 'managed proliferation'. There will be other related terms appearing soon. The longer the two new nuclear states stay outside the containment regimes, the more this perspective will enter the arena. The advice will be geared to normalization, and application of safeguards, implementation of military and political measures to raise technical competence and reduce uncertainty.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding management issues, the present situation is unclear. Both India and Pakistan have declared a moratorium on testing, immediately after conducting their tests, (and seeing the world reaction). Both have said they would consider making the moratorium permanent and legally binding by joining the CTBT. However, both have hedged agreement to sign the Treaty with conditions, and appear to be backing away from an easy or early signing. There is speculation that India's leaders proceeded to test last May, in anticipation of ever increasing pressure against all testing emanating from the CTBT.<sup>4</sup> Two new nuclear states have replaced 'nuclear ambiguity' with 'signing ambiguity'. They have not yet followed the strategy of 'test-and-sign'.

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<sup>3</sup> In fact the Great Debate is as false in this context as it was in academe for the past fifty years. No one wakes up in the morning and says 'today I will be an idealist'. Alternative approaches to achieving safety in a dangerous world are bound to stir serious debate. Wrapping the vocabulary of 'realism' around an argument provides some debating heft, while diminishing opposition by implying that other viewpoints are naive.

<sup>4</sup> They could even feel that need once again, prior to the September 1999 re-opening of the treaty for signing. The Buddha could smile again in the Spring. Pakistan would be under great pressure once more to follow suit.

About signing the NPT there is much less ambiguity: according to their leaders, neither will do so. And both have said they will move from testing to weaponization. India, an original proponent of non-proliferation, will wait until there is universal and complete disarmament. Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 is seen as hypocrisy and as a humiliating attempt to discriminate against India; it was another reason suggested for the alleged decision to go ahead with testing in that year, which was aborted under heavy US pressure, and the decision of the new BJP government to do what earlier governments would not. Pakistan takes a similar view, but more directly relates its position to the military situation it faces because of India.

The policy implications of the conceptual divide is clear. There is a need for a multi-track approach in South Asia. Pressure to join the global consensus on non-proliferation is today's primary emphasis; there is no need to accept the siren call of pseudo realism. There is also a need for sensible management of the new reality, of a nuclear South Asia.

## **PART ONE: THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

### **INTRODUCTION**

For the moment, then, it may be worthwhile to establish some of the basic parameters of that military situation. The debates and literature are all valid, but also somewhat to some degree beside the point. India and Pakistan have indeed entered a new era, a fact which seems little internalized at any level of debate.

At immediate issue is the security environment of the region. India inaugurated the current situation with its tests on May 11 and 13<sup>th</sup>, of this year. India cited a worsening security environment for its actions. After all prior governments refrained from testing since India's first nuclear explosion, in 1974, the newly elected BJP government last Spring said it was forced to go ahead because of the continued presence of nuclear weapons by China,

and the transfer by China of critical nuclear technology to Pakistan, a state with which India had fought several wars. Pakistan responded with its own tests on May 28<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup>, citing the Indian tests as its only reason for doing so. Both states indicated the nuclear tests were a prelude to weaponization. While India's reasons for proceeding to test are open to discussion, the fact of the test is now un-doable and undeniable. Attempts to portray this step as incremental and militarily not significant, miss the special nature of nuclear weapons.

### THE MILITARY BALANCE

Let us begin by examining the strictly military implications. The balance between India and Pakistan in conventional weapons is clearly in India's favour, and overwhelmingly so, as you would expect from a country 10 time the size of Pakistan. India can and does leave a million soldiers stationed near the Pakistan border and still has ample troops left over to carry out other military objectives.

PAKISTAN		INDIA
15-25	Possible Nuclear Weapons	65
40-50	Ballistic Missiles	100
930 mi. (1,500km)	Maximum Missile Range	1,550 mi(2,500km)
587,000	Troops	1,145,000
2,120	Battle Tanks	3,314
436	Combat Aircraft	845
20	Combat Ships	42

Source: Military Balance; Centre for Defence Information

The nuclear dimension enters with the question of delivery systems. Both countries have deep strike aircraft capable of delivering conventional or nuclear ordinance, and both have fighter planes and other defensive strategies to counter such air strikes, although again, India has a decided advantage.<sup>5</sup>

That leaves missiles as the emerging critical factor in the strategic balance. One of the reasons given by India for seeing a deterioration in its security environment, and thus introducing nuclear weapons as a factor in the region, was the acquisition by Pakistan of advanced missile technology. Pakistan had made no secret of its efforts to do so, and indeed was quite open, even boastful about its success. Over time it introduced ever more powerful missile technology, and let India know about it.

The 'father' of the Pakistan's bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, is a highly respected scientist. He openly touted the Pakistan tests in May, which he reputedly oversaw,<sup>6</sup> as being intended to provide 'screw-on war heads'; and has announced that Pakistan will have new missiles, presumably the Ghauri II, capable of vastly expanded range. The map and accompanying text presented in the next two pages are extracted from a Pakistani military

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
<sup>5</sup> Pakistan attempted to even that advantage by adding to its F-16 arsenal, purchasing 71 more from the US. The sale was blocked in 1990 after the purchase but not delivery of 28 planes, when the US government said it could not certify that Pakistan was not attempting to become a nuclear weapon state, thus triggering the Pressler Amendment. Pakistan has recently announced a purchase of cheaper and less powerful planes from China. India even more recently has announced a major purchase of equipment from Russia. India was already able to build the Mig 29 under licence, long before the plane was supplied to the East European allies of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

<sup>6</sup> Some doubt has been raised about his role in the actual tests last May. The exact location of control in Pakistan is not clear. Shortly after the tests he told reporters Islamabad could deploy its nuclear weapons "within days if needed" and had begun mass production of its medium-range Ghauri missile, which could carry nuclear warheads. He added "Ghauri is a very reliable and proven system so why should we go for an unproven system? And it is very long-range and is highly mobile. You can see the mobile launcher," he said as he pointed to a photograph on a wall of a Ghauri mounted on a pad attached to a large truck. "Just you put it on the truck and you can move it. In one hour you can move it 60-70 km (37-44 miles) away. You fire it and within 10 minutes you can move to another place." Reuters, May 31, 1998.

web page. They show how Pakistan measures, and advertises, its progress in rocket-based technology. Each major line, superimposed over a map of India, shows how far succeeding generations of missiles can reach. The title of the chart is “Theatre of Operation”.

### Defenders Of Pakistan

Courage their weapon - Allah their guide



### **The Theatre of Operations**

With the successful test firing of the Nuclear capable Hatf-III missile, Pakistan has radically altered the balance of power in the region. The F-16 combat fighters of the PAF and the B57 deep penetration strike bombers too have their role to play in any coming conflict.

Another achievement of the Pakistan armed forces is the development of battlefield and short range strategic strike missiles; the Hatf-I and Hatf-II. Both of these missiles will guarantee Pakistan the ability to annihilate large advancing forces, while at the same time, will play a major role in neutralising forward enemy air defences thus clearing the way for Air strikes deep into enemy territory.

The missile programme codenamed 'Ghauri' has reportedly begun the development of a nuclear capable ballistic missile capable of hitting targets at a range of 1,500km. The successful deployment of this system would provide a reliable delivery mechanism for nuclear weapons which could be seen as one more reason for avoiding any future conflict in South Asia.

India was quick to point out the Pakistani advances in missile technology, and the alleged role of China and Korea in supplying them. The leaders of the Hindu nationalist BJP, presently the government of India, were especially indignant that the latest missile, the Ghauri, was named after a Muslim General who defeated a Hindu monarch, leading to a few centuries of Muslim rule in the subcontinent. What they were less forthcoming about is that the Pakistani missile program lagged well behind the Indian efforts both in *timing* and *potency*. (They also seem unaware of any irony in referring to their own tests as the 'Smiling Buddha', after one of history's greatest apostle's of peace<sup>7</sup>.) They also are proud of the high Indian content in the design and manufacture of their missile technology, downplaying the critical role of the USSR and later Russia in assisting them. Similarly they are (justly) proud of their own indigenous nuclear developments and (justly) scornful of weak international controls which led to Pakistan's acquisition, ignoring their own active procurement policies overseas, starting with Canada, in the early 1950's, and including recent critical nuclear technology from the US.

An overview of India's missile capabilities may be found in the next pages. You will note that they also measure the striking distance of the missiles in terms of a map of the subcontinent.<sup>8</sup>


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<sup>7</sup> "It is one of those quirks of history that the quest for military nirvana in India is inextricably linked to a man who dedicated his life to peace. In May 1974, it was a cryptic message, 'the Buddha has smiled', that signalled the country's entry into the nuclear age. Exactly 24 years later, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee chose the auspicious Buddha Purnima to trumpet India's status as the world's sixth nuclear weapons state. "We now have the capacity for a big bomb," a proud Vajpayee told India Today." India Today, May 25, 1998.


<sup>8</sup> The pages are reproduced, rather poorly, from Regional Studies (Vol. XVI, No.4), which regularly carries articles on security and other matters, and provides newspaper extracts from the subcontinent.

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Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Facilities




Missile Range Comparison




-15-

Just to complete the picture, are maps of India's and Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Note the clustering of infrastructure around Pakistan's capital, and that India claimed to have tested in May a thermonuclear device known informally in US circles as a 'city buster'.<sup>9</sup> The proximity of the two states to each other, and the lack of either warning time or fall back room for either state in case of war, makes the nuclear scenario exceptionally catastrophic.



<sup>9</sup> See John Burns, New York Times, May 27<sup>th</sup>, 1998. The bomb, he reports, 'was code-named Shakti-1, after a Hindi word for power commonly used when referring to the most potent of the Hindu gods.' The testing exercise was code named Operation Shakti. There has been some scepticism both in Pakistan and from experts in the West, that the device was in fact 'a hydrogen bomb'.

### Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities



Introduction of nuclear weapons of any type into this theatre sets up a new strategic situation. It can be seen as an obvious threat to the very existence of Pakistan. There is no 'second strike' capacity for Pakistan while in theory that is an advantage possessed by India, which is much larger and has plans for a nuclear submarine fleet.<sup>10</sup> While Indian rhetoric has toned down from the vocabulary of triumphalism to the strategic terminology of 'minimum nuclear deterrence'<sup>11</sup>, there is no doubt that a broad cross section of the government and intelligentsia see the tests as ushering in a new role for India.

On the other hand for Pakistan, the presence of nuclear weapons appears decisively to redress the military balance in its favour, making one wonder why it did not introduce such weapons long ago. India's substantial superiority in conventional weapons is nullified by weapons of mass destruction which can be used against either advancing armies overrunning Pakistan's borders, or against military and civilian targets deep inside India.<sup>12</sup> Thus both sides see nuclear weapons as a *qualitative* change in their security environment.

But the security environment is not restricted to the subcontinent. China is clearly a factor. Certainly it is to India, the progenitor of nuclear concern in the region. The government of India made China its focus of attention as soon as Pokhran II become known.

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<sup>10</sup> Here is the view of the authoritative Jane's Intelligence Review, as reported in the press shortly after the May tests: "The development of India's nuclear weapon delivery systems indicates that a classic nuclear triad force -- with distinct land, sea and air components -- will eventually be created," the article said, adding that this could happen by the end of the next decade. A missile-based delivery system would probably be the mainstay of this emerging nuclear force, Jane's said. 'In the case of Pakistan, India clearly has conventional superiority and also a second-strike nuclear capability,' the article said". Reuters, June 30, 1998. The lead of this news story is that India's potential nuclear arsenal may be bigger than England's and in the same league as France and China.

<sup>11</sup> India's interior minister, Lal Krishna Advani, had been accused of "war-mongering" after warning Pakistan that India's tests had shifted the balance of power in India's favour. Advani, considered the most hawkish of the Hindu nationalists who control the government, also stated that India intended to adopt a "pro-active" military policy in Kashmir including the use of "hot pursuit" operations against Pakistan-backed insurgents. See John Burns, New York Times, May 30.

<sup>12</sup> Of course this same arithmetic is the origin of NATO's 'first strike option', to nullify Soviet advantage in conventional forces in Europe. The post cold war logic is more difficult to fathom.

The senior government leadership, including the Defence Minister, Prime Minister and Home Minister, all made statements indicating that India had a much wider area of concern than merely Pakistan and that China was that concern. Of course China has been a nuclear state since 1964. More importantly, China humiliated India in a border war in 1962, still occupies what India considers to be portions of Indian territory, and has a long standing, durable, and mutually satisfactory relationship with Pakistan. That relationship is military and strategic and involves transfer of nuclear technology (The famous case of the 5000 magnetic rings is one sore point, affecting China-US relations as well as the subcontinent). The Indian government has made it clear that its nuclear weapons programme is aimed at China.<sup>13</sup>

China will be forced to return the favour. India will now be a focus of attention for China in a way which was neither necessary nor desirable from China's perspective, prior to the tests and statements last Spring. From a strategic point of view, China had all that it wants from India: a commanding tactical advantage on the ground where it matters to them, in Aksai Chin, and a natural barrier from India in the form of mountains and buffer states. All of that changes when the present Indian government forces China to rethink the situation. A revanchist government in New Delhi, with advanced missile capability, now potentially able to deliver nuclear payloads, has to attract renewed interest from the Chinese dragon.

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<sup>13</sup> The anti-Chinese rhetoric was striking. The Home Minister and others declared China 'India's enemy number 1'. Both the present BJP Prime Minister and Home Minister first came to national prominence as leaders of the RSS, rallying Indian nationalism against China in 1962. The present Defence Minister has a long record of concern about Tibet.

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But here is where the new post nuclear South Asia comes into clearer focus. For China is not only a well established nuclear power,<sup>14</sup> with a stockpile of an estimated 435 nuclear weapons, but has advanced delivery capacity compared to India. While South Asia contemplates missiles spanning the distance from Islamabad to Calcutta (or vice versa), China has long had multi-stage intercontinental ballistic capacity, with a virtual global reach. It has or will have MIRV's.

### CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES

System	Alternative Name	Missile Type	Supplier	Export Customers	Range (km) Maximum	Payload (kg)	Status
CSS-2	DF-3 / 3A	IRBM	Domestic	S. Arabia	2,800	2,150/1 RV	In Service
CSS-3	DF-4	IRBM	Domestic	None	4,750	1 RV	In Service
CSS-4	DF-5 / 5A	ICBM	Domestic	None	13,000	1 RV	In Service
CSS-5	DF-21	MRBM	Domestic	None	1,800	1 RV	In Service
CSS-6	DF-15/M-9	SRBM	Domestic	nk	600	950	In Service
CSS-7	DF-11/M-11	SRBM	Domestic	Pakistan Iran, Syria?	300	800	In Service
CSS-8	M-7	SRBM	Domestic	Iran	160	190	In Service
CSS-N-3	JL-1	SLBM	Domestic	None	1,700	1 RV	In Service
DF-25		MRBM	Domestic	None	1,700	2,000	Development
DF-31		ICBM	Domestic	None	8,000	1 RV	Tested
DF-41		ICBM	Domestic	None	12,000	MIRVed	Development
JL-2		SLBM	Domestic	None	8,000	1 RV	Tested

<sup>14</sup> "China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its first nuclear missile (October 25, 1966), and detonated its first hydrogen bomb (June 14, 1967.) ....In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons remained unconfirmed in 1987. In 1988 Chinese specialists tested a 1-5 KT nuclear device with an enhanced radiation yield, advancing the country's development of a very low yield neutron weapon and laying the foundation for the creation of nuclear artillery." Federation of American Scientists, June 1998.

### China Expands ICBM Force

On July 21, 1998, the Washington Times reported that China produced six new DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBMs in the first four months of this year. The additional missiles boost China's long-range missile force by a third. The report is particularly important because it sheds new light on China's expanding arsenal of long-range missiles and helps inform public debate on Chinese military modernization despite Beijing's continuing efforts to conceal its activities in this key strategic area.

A report carried in the Washington Times in May, based on classified CIA information leaked to the paper, indicated that China possessed 18 DF-5/5A ICBMs, 13 of which are targeted on American cities, and five on Russian and Asian targets. The new report, assembled from information provided by Pentagon intelligence officials, also states that two additional ICBMs will be built in 1998, giving China a total ICBM force of 26 DF-5/5-A missiles.

The DF-5A carries a nuclear warhead with a very high explosive yield of 4 to 5 megatons up to 13,000 km/8,060 miles. It was initially designed to cover targets in Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as North America. The DF-5 has a range of about 12,000 km/7,440 miles.

#### DF-31 Engine Test

In a follow-up report on July 22, the Washington Times revealed that China test-fired an engine for its new DF-31 ICBM, which is under development, during President Clinton's recent state visit. The test reportedly took place on July 1 at the Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center, located some 250 miles southwest of Beijing. Wuzhai is said to be a major launch site for ICBMs and overland Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tests.

A US official quoted in the report asserted that the test was deliberately carried out as a statement of China's lack of regard for US non-proliferation policies, in effect flaunting Beijing's growing strategic independence and power status.

The DF-31 is a road mobile, solid fuel design, with an anticipated range of 8,000 km/4,960 miles. It is scheduled for deployment by 2000. China is also developing the JL-2 SLBM, a sea-based version of the DF-31. This SLBM will be carried by a new nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN) and will enable China to target portions of the United States from operating areas near the Chinese coast.

Source: The Rumsfeld Commission. Established by the US Congress in January 1998 to provide an alternative assessment of missile threats. The panel is officially known as the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.

China can and will move through diplomacy to contain the newly active threat on its border. Both India and China are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the nascent security regime for and by the Asian states, along with interested outside powers. At its meeting shortly after the explosions, China reportedly took a very strong stand against India.<sup>15</sup> Indeed India and Pakistan have received harsh criticism from a number of international fora, including the UN Security Council (where China has a seat of course), the G-8, and most interestingly from the Nonaligned Movement, under the leadership of South Africa, an erstwhile putative nuclear state which renounced development of nuclear weapons, and which is a long standing ally of India.

However the diplomatic and political route will not be the final recourse for China. In regards to South Asia, it is in a militarily superior position in terms of nuclear knowledge, stockpiles and delivery capacity (interestingly Indian commentators during this time period of renewed tension have blithely asserted India's superiority in conventional armaments, as if that were an acknowledged and unchallenged fact).

No foreseeable turn of events will alter that reality. Moreover, possession of nuclear weapons by India is quite useless in terms of Indian interests. It cannot use them in a restricted theatre of war to regain control of territory that China considers vital, for its access to Tibet. To do so would lead automatically to a wider nuclear war with a superior power; India this time would not face humiliation, as in 1962, but annihilation<sup>16</sup>. India says it wants deterrence against China, a power which has all it wants from India except to be left alone.

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<sup>15</sup> China has also moved closer to the US as a result of the tests, at least at the level of rhetoric. The US and China have escalated their vocabulary of mutual engagement, with terms such as 'strategic partnership' now in play. India has countered with a visit by Soviet Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who employed similar language.

<sup>16</sup> "Chinese leaders repeatedly have pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and they have accompanied the no first-use pledge with a promise of certain nuclear counterattack if nuclear weapons are used against China." Federation of American Scientists, op. cit .

But India's actions have guaranteed that China, which had a declining military budget, will no longer be content with a slice of Indian-claimed territory, and otherwise a watching brief on India. Whatever the level of China's nuclear attention devoted to India before the blasts, they must inevitably be intensified now. Keeping in mind China's MIRV'S capacity, and the map of India's nuclear facilities presented above, the dark shadow of nuclear threat now hangs over India in a way never contemplated before the tests of Spring.

### SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR TESTS

The central conclusion from this overview is that South Asia is now locked into a situation of perpetual security deficit. The security dilemma—a move to bolster defence by one state appears to be a move to prepare an offence by a neighbouring state—takes on a whole new dimension in nuclear South Asia. Here are some of the implications.

**1. Pakistan will preserve its first strike option against India.** No future foreseeable relationships of any kind, no matter how beneficial or cordial, will remove the imperative for maintaining the only option available which may neutralize the advantage of its larger and better armed neighbour. As noted, unlike India, Pakistan has no 'second strike' potential.

No change of government in New Delhi, change of tone, inspection arrangements or signed agreements bilaterally or internationally, will eliminate the 'last-best-chance' option for the smaller state. Even a settlement in Kashmir would not put the security concerns completely to rest; the India-Pakistan issue is as much ideological as strategic. In a benign and presently unforeseeable future, the nuclear option may be moved from the front room to the back room or even into a closet in case an inspection regime is put in place. It will never go out the back door and into the garbage. Pakistan is in a permanent security deficit with India. It will not give up its chance to bring some balance to its security equation.

**2. China will now consider India a permanent potential threat, and take the necessary security measures accordingly.** Thus India will always be in security deficit to China. China is too far ahead for India to catch up; efforts to do so will only reaccelerate China's military programme. And China now is forced to pay attention to India.<sup>17</sup> Again no nice words, treaties or mutuality of interests not presently foreseeable, will alter that fact. The people responsible for China's security will remember the bellicose statements from New Delhi, long after forgetting the pre-1962 slogan, 'Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai' (The Chinese and Indians are brothers)


**3. Thus India will be placed in a permanent security dilemma from which there is no extrication.** The world's largest democracy, home to a billion people by the year 2000, ancient land and great civilization, will soon be targeted by nuclear weapons, in depth, from (at least) two sides. There is no foreseeable way to remove its security deficit, no security regime that will remove it from its peril. Even the unlikely collapse of both Pakistan and China, from internal weakness, would not remove the dilemma. Unstable successor states, in possession of already-targeted weapons of mass destruction, would be an even greater threat. The enhanced likelihood of 'leakage' in situations of chaos, would also loom large in a state like India, with numerous internal disputes, and neighbours which have lingering grievances with India, and with severe security deficits of their own.

Universal disarmament, as India has long proposed, might offer some solace. But ironically, the Indian actions have further postponed any hope in that direction, by triggering the security response mechanisms of its neighbours, and fanning the nuclear hopes of others farther afield.

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<sup>17</sup> Early in January 1999, the President of China presented his mandate to the military, the worlds largest; it included 'defence of China from nuclear attack', a threat it had not faced for at least a decade. *Globe and Mail*, January 9, 1999.

In an apparent bid for status and recognition, South Asia faces diminution. (The political cartoon below, aptly sums up world reaction, or at least North American views.) No greater proof of the special nature of nuclear weapons is needed than the effort expended by the international community in encompassing them. The CTBT is the most comprehensive international treaty ever to be devised. There are more signatories (187) than states in the United Nations. The near-universality of the NPT leads some critics to believe that nuclear South Asia can be accused of violating international law. India has moved away from the emerging international norm, forcing Pakistan to follow suit. The subcontinent is now mired in a security deficit from which there is no apparent release.



**PART TWO: HUMAN SECURITY****INTRODUCTION**

South Asia faces marginalization for reasons other than flouting of prevailing trends. The tests did more than shift the vocabulary from emerging consensus on an interdependent world, back to cold war perspectives of nuclear *real politique*. South Asia was not merely left looking militarily out of sync with a post cold war order. It seems unready to join in that order in other ways as well. First some conclusions about lost opportunities, choices not taken, then some supporting detail on the concept and reality of human security in South Asia.

Time may be running out for South Asia. It seems locked into a micro paradigm of its own, cutting it off from new reckoning of power and security. The decision to go nuclear has enclosed South Asia into an apparently permanent security threat. But it adds to the difficulty of escaping from the more tractable and equally real deficit in human security.

South Asia already was losing out in the struggle for international stature precisely because it was losing out in the battle for human dignity at home. Successful states are not measured only in throw weights and kilotons of explosives. Increasingly, success is measured, and status is accorded, by the dignity and security of the individual. The nuclear tests were seen in India I believe, as largely a symbolic statement, a calling card in the application for recognition as a major power, a state not to be trifled with or ignored. That they are harbingers of weapons of mass destruction, and set in place a permanent (in)security dilemma, as noted above, seems not to have been thought through by the political decision-makers.

The real symbolic message of the test is that policy choices at the highest level, and with broad support from the intellectual class, are fundamentally in the wrong direction. The blasts were signals to the outside world that India was not ready to re-order its priorities to

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meet its human security deficit Pakistan, already carrying less weight in the world because of its fifty year record of inadequate internal reform, had no choice but to follow suit.

## OPPORTUNITY COSTS

Here a few of the significant opportunity costs of the tests may be summarized.

1. **Confrontation versus Cooperation.** Security threats may be met in a variety of ways. India's strengths in human resources and institutions, and Pakistan's to a lesser degree, have allowed a multitrack approach. The highly sophisticated political and diplomatic skills in South Asia were put in the service of full engagement in the dynamic field of world politics. Here both states use their strengths to advantage. Resources were mobilized globally to carry out the competition within Southern Asia, between India and Pakistan and India and China.

After 1989, globalization replaced the cold war as the new international dynamic. Neither India nor Pakistan reoriented their essential local priorities but both had to alter their approach. After a prolonged period of post-cold war policy disorientation, India apparently perceived a power vacuum waiting to be filled. It moved aggressively to acquire the military means to assert its claim to be the emerging regional hegemon, in a vague area stretching from the Indian Ocean (at least) to the Straits of Malacca (at least). Pakistan struggled to recover its balance amidst growing domestic economic and political crises.

The post cold war world required a new approach, in order to adjust to globalization and the new set of international dynamics. Regional cooperation moved slowly to the fore. Disunity, tension, and bilateral disputes within South Asia were a stumbling bloc for India's new foreign policy aspirations, and a distraction from pressing domestic needs. Under several governments, India turned to improving the home front, that is, the South Asian subcontinent. While limited progress was made over the Kashmir issue, which indeed

worsened during this time period, considerable progress was made in the past ten years in creating regional stability and cooperative relations with neighbouring states. This was accomplished through the formal apparatus of regional cooperation, SAARC, which made significant gains in recent years; through the active participation of civil society in pushing for cooperation; and by deliberate policy choice of succeeding governments.<sup>18</sup>

Most notable in this regard was the 'Gujral Doctrine.' As India's Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral moved in a systematic fashion to remove bilateral irritations, signing treaties and agreements with several of the South Asian states and establishing working arrangements with Pakistan to defuse tensions. SAARC took on ambitious agendas in the fields of trade and poverty alleviation. 'Track II' diplomacy flourished during this time, in part because Mr. Gujral was a prominent player at that level before returning to office. Civil society was increasingly active at a regional level, becoming a 'Track III', within the enabling environment established by the attitudes and activities at the top.

The Gujral Doctrine extended well beyond South Asia. Relations with China warmed significantly, to the point of worrying Pakistan that its traditional ally might be 'switching sides'. Relations with the west also improved. Canada and India seemed finally over the freeze which resulted from the nuclear test in 1974, which Canada saw as betrayal of trust in use of Canadian nuclear technology. The long climb upward seemed complete, with the visit of the Prime Minister and Team Canada; promulgation of the 'Focus India' trade agenda, the cordial exchange of visits by the Foreign Ministers, capped by a highly successful visit of the Governor General last year, just as the election in India brought the BJP to power in a coalition with a workable majority.

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<sup>18</sup> See *SAARC in the 1990'S*, Elliot L. Tepper, PhD A Study Prepared for The South Asia Division, Canadian International Development Agency, October 31, 1994.

In short, India was launched into a path of mutual interdependence as a way to ensure its security and development needs. Scholars there began to speak of a return to the Nehru style of diplomacy, when India's prestige and influence was at its peak. Cooperation and trust seemed to be the hallmarks of India in the world. All of that was blown away by deliberate choice of an alternative path. Trust is a delicate tissue, and cooperation rests on trust.

The impressive human and intellectual resources of India now will be used in the international arena to explain why nuclear tests are not confrontational; to explain to bordering states why the emergence of India as a regional hegemon is a natural and expected occurrence; why everyone should go back to the *status quo ante*, as if nothing very momentous has occurred, in the repudiation of cooperation as an approach to world affairs. It will be long winter for India in the neighbourhood and in the world. Policy choice has led to a severe opportunity cost for India, in the field of peaceful, cooperative and expanding relations with the neighbours, and in reputation in the world. Precious ground has been squandered. To re-start the process of cooperation, India may need even greater use of 'asymmetrical response', giving more than it was getting, which was the hallmark of the Gujral Doctrine. There is little sign that the present government has the strength or temperament to do so, despite the symbolic gestures of the Prime Minister's bus ride to Lahore (discussed further below).

**2. South Asia versus South East Asia.** South Asia was given a great present by the rest of the Asian states. Just as it appeared that the Asia Pacific would leave the subcontinent irrevocably behind in the global economy, the rest of Asia caught the 'Asian Flu'. The gap between the two parts of Asia was startling and growing wider. By any measure, up until a year ago last July, the Asia Pacific region, with notable but minor exceptions, was pulling ahead so far and so fast that South Asia would be forever marginalised. That very visible

fact certainly contributed to the willingness of South Asia to take SAARC seriously, and to pledge to move toward a South Asia Free Trade Area by the year 2002.<sup>19</sup>

Then came the economic stumble in much of the Asia Pacific. The rest of Asia slowed down. South Asia has limited economic exposure to that region; relatively closed economies; and liberalizing policies which were beginning to show results in growth rates. The large South Asian states were buffered from the 'Flu', and ready to turn to cooperation in catching up to the rest of Asia.

The tests will bring a halt to such speculation. There are many ancillary costs of becoming an aspiring nuclear superpower, and in creating a credible nuclear deterrent. Weaponization, command and control mechanisms, hiding defence activities from scrutiny, are all very expensive propositions. (India's known expansion of its nuclear budget is already high). Diversion of funds to defence are only a start. The security forces of India and Pakistan will have much greater access to the central treasury of course. But so too will the intelligence community, and the covert operations branches of the major protagonists. The 'porous borders' of the subcontinent already have provided a half century of opportunity to make trouble for neighbouring states. Each country's 'Department of Dirty Tricks' is likely to go into overdrive. Covert operations are cheaper than nuclear development, but not free, and not without long term consequences.

Trust is needed for expansion of business relations within the subcontinent. The impediments to tourism and business travel, apart from the trade barriers and non tariff barriers, are already so severe that the simplest transactions are difficult. With the increase in paranoia accompanying the blasts, the impediments will only get worse. Accordingly, the halting steps to a more integrated regional economy, even if formally approved at summit

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<sup>19</sup>See *Emerging Trends in Regional Cooperation in South Asia*, Elliot L. Tepper, PhD, the South Asia Regional Programme, Asia Branch, Canadian International Development Agency, March 31, 1998.

meetings, will be hobbled on the ground. It is hard to do business, legally, with even more internal security agents clocking your every move.

The great gift presented by the Asia Pacific, the gift of time, has been vitiated by the tests of Spring. Projecting forward any time line, the Asia Pacific is likely to recover its economic steam before South Asia recovers its fledgeling attempts to catch up. To squander such a present is a severe opportunity cost.

**3. Guns versus Ghee.** Of course, the greatest cost of all is the investment in traditional security rather than human security. India's hopes to be elevated to the official status of a nuclear power, and even to the UN Security Council, are not dashed simply because of the tests, and the unanticipated negative reaction by the world community. South Asia is held back by the crushing burden of poverty. India does not get the recognition that it feels it deserves, and that I feel it deserves, because of a number of policy choices over a long period of time. This is a truly great country, democratic, plural, complex, fascinating, that cannot overcome the consequences of colonialism, societal dysfunctions, and the choices about how to deal with them. The contrast with the rest of Asia is stunning. No excuses about the nature of the problems or the neighbourhood can overcome the brute fact that South Asia cannot feed its people, that it is the largest pool of poverty in the world; that it has more aids cases than anywhere else, that malnutrition is the regions biggest killer, especially of children. It also spends more on arms than Saudi Arabia, is increasing its military budget when the rest of the world is cutting back, has two of the ten largest standing armies in the world, and cannot find any means better than nuclear testing to demonstrate that it should be taken seriously.

Attached are a few charts to illustrate what this means for South Asia. These are from the excellent study, *Human Development in South Asia, 1997*, by Mahbub ul Haq. They illustrate the real cost of present priorities of the newest nuclear states:

South Asia is fast emerging at the poorest, the most illiterate, the most impoverished, the least gender sensitive—indeed the most deprived region in the world. Yet it continues to make more investment in arms than in the education and health of its people.

He even provides an estimate, in a chart which follows, of the ‘peace dividend’ which could have been available prior to the nuclear Spring. The opportunity cost of paths not taken can be given both financial and human accounting.

### Box 4.3 The human cost of arms purchases

What is the cost of arms *vis-à-vis* the cost of urgently-needed social services for the people? Here are some illustrations:

- A battle tank normally costs \$4 million. Immunizing a child against deadly diseases costs only one dollar. For the purchase of each battle tank, 4 million children can be immunized.

- A Mirage 2000-5 reportedly costs \$90 million. It costs an average of \$30 a year to maintain a child in primary school. If one Mirage 2000-5 is not purchased, it would be possible to extend primary school education to 3 million children.

- A modern submarine along with several support programmes costs around \$300 million. It costs roughly \$5 to supply safe drinking water to one person over the course of a year. Each submarine purchased means denying the provision of safe drinking water to 60 million people.

These are not theoretical trade-offs. Such decisions are being taken every day in South Asia. Only, the policymakers do not pause long enough to consider the various alternatives. Nor do their civil societies fully realize the human cost of arms purchases. Some of the recent arms purchases in Pakistan and India illustrate this trade-off between arms and people quite graphically.

Pakistan is reported to have purchased three Agosta 90 B submarines from France at a total cost of \$1 billion. Just this one purchase could have financed much of the social agenda of Pakistan

for at least one year. For instance, it would have:

- provided primary school education for a year to all the 17 million children who are out of school at present; *and*
- supplied safe drinking water for one year to 67 million people who are denied this facility at present; *and*
- provided family planning services for one year to an additional 9 million couples.

India is reportedly considering an expenditure of \$4.5 billion on the purchase of modern jet fighters, submarines, aircraft carriers, attack helicopters, air defence systems, and many other weapons. If this is true, there is still time to consider the alternatives, since this amount can finance:

- primary education for a year for all the 45 million children who are denied such education at present; *and*
- safe drinking water for one year for all the 226 million people who have no access to such a facility at present; *and*
- essential medicines for a year to all the 135 million people who have no access to any health facility at present; *and*
- family planning services for a year to an additional 22 million couples.

It will be an interesting experiment if people in these countries were offered a free choice in a national referendum on whether they would feel more secure with the proposed purchase of arms or, alternatively, with the supply of basic social services.

Source: IISS 1994; UN 1994c; UNICEF 1996b.

**Box 4.1 The expanding military arsenal in India and Pakistan**

India already possesses a formidable arsenal of modern weapons: 3,400 battle tanks, 770 combat aircraft, two aircraft carriers, 13 submarines, five destroyers, and a broad range of new technology weaponry. Its current shopping list reportedly includes: another aircraft carrier, four new submarines, more MIG-29s or Sukhoi fighter aircraft, the Boeing E-3C airborne early warning and control aircraft, attack helicopters, advanced jet trainers, air defence systems, upgraded MIG-21s, and T-72 tanks, and many other weapons. Pakistan has recently purchased three Agosta 90B Submarines from France and is now in the market for three Lockheed P-3C Orion aircraft, Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, and electronic warfare equipment.

In addition to conventional weapons, both countries are alleged to

possess a considerable nuclear arsenal. India is reported to possess 9 nuclear power reactors, 1 heavy water plants, 1 plutonium reprocessing plants, 2 uranium enrichment facilities, 9 research reactors, and one fast breeder reactor. There is much less information available about Pakistan's nuclear potential.

A more ominous development for the region is the start of a new missile race between India and Pakistan. India has already developed several types of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles. Pakistan is trying to augment its defenses through imports. This is a potentially dangerous and increasingly expensive component in the current arms race between India and Pakistan and can greatly harm the prospects for an adequate investment in their human capital.

Source: Chatterjee 1993b; Tahir, 1991.

**Table 4.4 Potential peace dividend in South Asia**

	Potential military expenditure (annual increase in real terms)		Recommended level (frozen at 1996 level in real terms)		Reduction of 2% per annum in real terms		Reduction of 5% per annum in real terms	
	5% rise	6% rise	Pakistan (Rs. billion)	India (Rs. billion)	Pakistan (Rs. billion)	India (Rs. billion)	Pakistan (Rs. billion)	India (Rs. billion)
	Pakistan (Rs. billion)	India (Rs. billion)						
1996	115	255	115	255	115	255	115	255
1997	121	270	115	255	113	250	110	242
1998	127	287	115	255	111	245	104	230
1999	134	304	115	255	109	240	99	219
2000	140	322	115	255	106	235	94	208
2001	147	342	115	255	104	231	89	197
2002	153	362	115	255	102	226	85	188
2003	162	385	115	255	100	221	81	178
2004	170	406	115	255	98	217	77	169
2005	179	431	115	255	96	213	73	161
2006	188	457	115	255	94	208	69	153
2007	197	484	115	255	92	204	66	145
2008	207	513	115	255	91	200	62	138
2009	217	544	115	255	89	196	59	131
2010	228	577	115	255	87	192	56	124
Total military spending (1997-2010)	2,372	5,641	1,610	3,570	1,392	3,074	1,124	2,483
Peace dividend	-	-	742	2,111	943	2,603	1,248	3,198

## PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

### INTRODUCTION

The negative reaction to India's tests seemed to have stunned the government and much of the intelligentsia. The emergence of India as a regional superpower and global player seems to them to be the natural status owed to India. The fact that India is moving opposite from the mainstream, thwarting the hopes for a nuclear free world, seems to have escaped them altogether. Pakistan is dragged along, maintaining both nuclear weapons and the moral high ground. Ironically, it may be the 'winner' in all this, as the world finds ways to avoid its economic collapse, Kashmir is back on the front burner of attention, and India is once again seen as bracketed with it, just as India was pulling away from the subcontinent as its primary domain. And Pakistan now has a perceived nuclear 'equalizer'.

There is movement within the region to get beyond the tests. India and Pakistan have opened bilateral discussions with a surprisingly broad mandate.<sup>20</sup> The dramatic gesture of the Indian Prime Minister's bus trip to Pakistan, and his insistence on allowing Pakistan's cricket team to tour India, despite opposition from one of his party's own political allies, the increased visibility of Pakistani produce in India's vegetable stalls, the struggling on of SAARC, are positive harbingers. South Asia's states and citizens, or at least significant elements, seem to want to deal with each other on a revised basis. After a half a year, it may be time for movement by external actors as well, time to consider new policy options.

Here are a few very preliminary suggestions, as requested, regarding general policy options. I take as my starting point that the overall purpose of the policy is to assist the reintegration of nuclear South Asia into the comity of nations. A series of 'second generation'

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<sup>20</sup> Summarized well in an article which also provides substantive advice on an appropriate nuclear policy for South Asia. See Tariq Rauf, "Learning to Live with the Bomb in South Asia: Accommodation Not Confrontation", first published in *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January/February 1999. The author, a Canadian, is Director, International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

responses are suggested: the initial global approbation has been registered by India and to some degree discounted. Presented here are suggestions for a 'post-blast' phase of international policy response. The policy challenge for South Asia has been set: "we must find the means of affecting political will in both Islamabad and Delhi, if we are to succeed in modifying their policies."<sup>21</sup> The framework presented here is intended to be helpful in doing so.

In summary form, the best hope for South Asia is for marginalization of the security issue altogether in a wider sphere of regional cooperation, and entanglements with the global community, combined with the highest degree of military containment through international security regimes. In the absence of some innovative diplomacy, marginalization of South Asia, rather than of the security issue, seems more likely in the near term future. However, with a 'second generation' response, South Asia can become a test case for 'soft power'. Comments here are presented in outline form, as a framework; specific and detailed policy agendas could be built upon them.

#### **PRELIMINARY POLICY OPTIONS: A FRAMEWORK**

Overall a multi part strategy is presented. For each of the following sections, policy options are framed. They are intended to be cumulative. While a specific strategy might be evolved for any one section, the intention is to build from one to the other. The more the parts work together the more effective will be the whole. A complex policy is required, in order to promote complex interdependence within the subcontinent, and productive engagement of South Asia with a rightfully concerned external environment.

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<sup>21</sup> "Canada and Asian Security: Broadening the Agenda," Address by Mr. Joseph Caron, Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia and Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, to the CANCEPS conference in Victoria, BC, December 5, 1998.

The framework provides general guidelines. Within each section a 'package' or cluster of particular policies or programmes would follow. By having an overarching framework some conceptual coherence can be provided for what otherwise might be piecemeal—or non-existent—activities.

1. **Lower the Volume.** This suggestion is based on an assessment of underlying realities in India, and a sombre view of the diplomatic tools at hand. Political competition in India is for control of the rising nationalism of an emerging middle class.<sup>22</sup> While the decision to test was by the BJP, any government in the future will even further reflect the national sensitivities for which India is already well known. An approach based on mutual respect is the only way to get a positive response from this or any successor government. Especially if the means of effective diplomatic coercion are limited.

By now India's policy makers are painfully aware that the government's decision to test has dug a deep diplomatic hole for India in the international community, though some may feel time is on their side. The proximate goal is to find a way to affect the behaviour of a defensive government in a major state. The first step to approaching the nationalist regime in a proud nation, is attitudinal. Now that the point has been made in virtually every international fora, the time is right to transform the approach, from what India sees as hectoring, to the

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<sup>22</sup> Domestic determinates of foreign policy frequently are an overlooked factor. While much of the commentary in this paper of necessity is about interstate relationships—to establish the costs and consequences of the nuclear tests—both India and Pakistan obviously have domestic imperatives. The long term goals of the BJP affect its decisions, and so too does its world view, degree of ideological rigour, structure of the party and relationship to the rest of the Hindutva movement, etc. In Pakistan the role of a Praetorian military, weak state, geopolitical situation, economic vulnerability and other factors would be worth analysis. That appropriately would be the focus of another paper. For now, the most salient domestic consideration in India is that the BJP has come to power with a message of Hindu nationalism, and a long standing policy stance of being anti-Muslim, anti-China and pro-nuclear. In Pakistan, security needs vis a vis India have always taken precedence. When India first tested, in 1974, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said that if necessary 'Pakistan would eat grass for a thousand years', but it would expend what was needed to match India's nuclear capacity. The fundamental ideological dimension of Partition in 1947, and India's role in breaking up Pakistan in 1971, makes the security issue a matter of absolute survival for Pakistan. There is concern that its internal contradictions will be exacerbated by the expense of nuclear competition and that too is a threat to the state. A Human Security agenda for Pakistan is long overdue.

established role of 'helpful fixer'. Canada is ideally situated to take the lead in such an effort. This a matter of voice not essence. Change the tone, not the message. Global displeasure is manifest. The way out is not.

One track or component of world response to the nuclear crisis can be the 'good cop' scenario: 'We both know that we have a problem. As old friends, and working allies, what can we do together to find a solution?' There is no need to compromise fundamental positions, just move to the next phase in *how* they are stated: 'We understand that you have legitimate regional security concerns; you understand that we have legitimate global security concerns. What are we going to do to assist each other to find a solution?'

**2. Change the Subject.** The nuclear states in South Asia would like to hear something other than condemnation. Normalization, however, is political. Resumption of business-as-usual by Canada and other external actors confers de facto consent to actions which have earned disapproval. Hence there is no movement. This is a closed circle, a recipe for frustration. In an impasse like this, amending the equation, expanding the dialogue, is an option worth considering. There is a need to change the climate for discussion. The proximate goal is to find an effective way to influence decision making in a plural, democratic society. The means is to nurture the infrastructure for constructive engagement

This is a time to work with your friends. India is not monolithic and Canada has many avenues for interaction. The fragile climate for cooperation in the subcontinent has been shredded by the tests.<sup>23</sup> Canada can promote mutual interdependence, within the region and beyond. Conceptually, this may be thought of as promoting a pro-peace program. Practically

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<sup>23</sup> We are reduced to grasping at straws: India does appear at the SAARC Summit meeting in Colombo soon after the tests; India and Pakistan open a single bus link for the first time in fifty years; there is talk of India purchasing surplus electricity from Pakistan. These simply display the deplorable state of official bilateral relations between the two new nuclear neighbours. The only concrete cause for optimism at the official plane is the stated willingness to consider bilateral talks on all outstanding matters, at a senior level. Support for the Indian Prime Minister's overtures by his own hard line Home Minister is also encouraging.

it may range across wide and disparate fields: promotion of SAARC, support for subregional cooperation, assistance to civil society on a regional basis, cooperation with business and trade associations. Canada is already well placed to proceed, because of its formal relationship with SAARC, deep involvement with NGO's, a legacy of good will built up over half a century in South Asia. There is no better place to implement a full scale Human Security agenda.

Civil society is well ahead of the official level. Societal response is far forward of the leadership, as shown *inter alia* by the ovations in India given to the visiting cricket team from Pakistan. Business leaders in India and Pakistan felt they were driving the agenda, prior to the nuclear assertion of pride. NGO's are cooperating on a regional basis. Film and sports exchanges are wildly popular. A new generation has arisen which knows nothing of the Partition experience, which is the defining moment of their leaders own youth. The long term hope for South Asia is the desire for peace and reknitting of bonds of amity by civil society. This is a basis for policy by concerned external actors.

Complex interdependence is the theory which underlies regional integration and regional cooperation. The conundrum in South Asia is that it has had cooperative activity, through SAARC, without the spill over effects into cooperative behaviour. Political will has been lacking to allow the processes of complex interdependence to come into play. The sadness of India's abrupt departure into nuclear activism is that meaningful progress was underway in South Asia. The tests of May reversed the global trend toward progress in nuclear matters, but also the regional trend toward enhanced cooperation. Pakistan, India, and the other states were evolving mechanisms for overcoming obvious disparities of size and power. Civil society, including the business community, increasingly was pressing for more effective cooperation. That is what was brought to a halt in May, and which provides an organizing focus for Canadian policy.

Complex interdependence rests ultimately on political will. Political will is affected by societal forces. Those forces are affectable by policy choice. Pressing for *human* security,

at official and civil society levels, is a way to bring resources back from the money pit of *nuclear* security. In this context, the idea of a 'Confidence Building Measure' requires broad interpretation. What is needed is an agenda for re-invigorating the movement towards interdependence, as a way to affect priorities within the region. (For a beginning point, see Tepper, 1998, cited above.)

**3. Contain the Security Threat.** The nuclear issue itself, and ensuring stability, require direct engagement. This is a more wide ranging aim than attempting to shore up the NPT. The proximate goal here is to contain the military and security threat posed by the advent of two new nuclear states. The means is to apply to South Asia the management regimes for weapons of mass destruction. The measures are more likely to be accepted within the broader playing field of a favourable and more complex approach to peace and stability, sketched above. A virtuous circle of cooperation will be more effective in securing the goal than a hostile stand-off between the large South Asian states and the international community. Canada's history of involvement in South Asia, high level of technical ability, established international role in peace building, non-threatening posture as a middle power, and clear desire for a beneficial relationship, provide a platform which is unique. As a starting point it would be useful to draw to the attention of both South Asian states the distinctive role that Canada plays within global nuclear debates, especially vis a vis its own nuclear neighbour to the South.<sup>24</sup>

Measures for containment are varied, and are well known to specialists in non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. They appear in some form in the benchmarks

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<sup>24</sup> The subtleties of North American nuclear discussion may not be discerned from South Asia. A nuclear policy dialogue, if established with South Asia, would make that clear. Matters then could be raised which make understandable the context for Canada's reaction, including: the government's role in pushing for a revised NATO nuclear policy; Canada's human security agenda; and the policy thrust of the government's own major study of the nuclear issue, which came to fruition just as the South Asian states startled the world with its tests. See "Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century," Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1998.

set out by the international community. In outline, they may be conceptualized under three headings: to delay, to control, and to pre-empt.

**A. Delay.** India and Pakistan are fledgling nuclear states. The weak point in their rate of progress is the move from nuclear testing, to nuclear usefulness militarily. The two stages involved after induction are weaponization and deployment. Intense international effort is already underway to convince both states not to take these decisive next steps. Such efforts are likely to fail. The only reasons to reverse course that India would accept are strictly internal: economic, technical or sustained resistance from the military. Pakistan will be forced to follow suit, once again, whatever the cost. Moreover, as noted above, it is their interest to proceed, in order to neutralize India's conventional weapons superiority.

But a weak point is worth probing. There are domestic restraints on each state and the foreign pressure cannot just be ignored.<sup>25</sup> It is in everyone's interest to slow, postpone, delay the two decisive steps as much as possible. Strategic perceptions may alter over time and new management devices may appear. Both new nuclear states need time for 'nuclear maturity' to set in. A short term policy option remains maximum effort focussed on the choke points in nuclear weapons evolution: weaponization and deployment.

**B. Control.** An on-going policy option is to engage both nuclear states in the web of management devices so far devised by the international community. This involves the whole

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<sup>25</sup> The US missions led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, as personal emissary of the American President, are now far advanced; the effect is not yet known. The 'first bus to Lahore' can be seen as response to the US and other world demands for opening dialogue within South Asia. After eight Missions from Washington, the gesture is an inexpensive alternative to yielding on the broader demands of the global community: signing the CTBT, progress on fissile limitations, meeting the benchmarks of the P5.

What is clear is that to date there is significantly more progress in lifting of sanctions than in signing of control treaties. That may show as much about effectiveness of sanctions as about international effectiveness in modifying Indian policy. Of course, positive gestures in a dark environment are always to be welcomed; but they expose just how dark the situation had become since May.

nuclear containment package: CTBT, NPT, MTCR. The South Asian wake up call to the international community will lead to additional techniques for reacting to proliferation, such as invigoration of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Unremitting effort to gain South Asia's compliance, if not membership, in the international non proliferation regimes remains a critical goal. But none are likely to fully succeed without a more favourable negotiating climate than presently exists. A complex, step by step approach to changing that climate, as outlined briefly above, will also be needed.

Control implies more than signing on to international regimes. There are the technical issues of command-and-control, theatre and crisis management, confidence building measures, hotlines, nuclear weapons spread or leakage, which appear to be purely internal, not reachable by external actors such as Canada. International demands may irritate as much as prompt action. Still there is an obligation to be that irritant. The world has set standards of responsible behaviour by nuclear weapons states (even if they are not always adhered to by established nuclear states) . If accompanied by a change in approach as suggested above, the advice may become more palatable, and thus acceptable.

South Asia's military record is a factor in this regard. India and Pakistan are not rogue states, international pariahs. Their military establishments are thoroughly professional, among the best trained in the world. Through their long history of hostility, measures have evolved to contain conflict. Despite repeated warfare, neither side has targeted civilian populations.

Treaties and practices are in place to minimise the danger of escalation or surprise. Both sides know the rules of the game.

Introduction of nuclear weapons creates a new game. In South Asia, thinking about issues of nuclear management is well underway.<sup>26</sup> Canada, previously engaged with the military establishment of both states, could be effective in helping to adjust to the new defence requirements. It is an experienced player in the nuclear game.

A longer term policy option is to provide assistance to achieve the *technical controls* which the two states will need and want, and the *transparency* which the international community requires. In the present climate, Canada is not well positioned to provide such assistance. But in a changed environment, Canada is an ideal choice: technically advanced, non-threatening, with knowledge in depth on disarmament and control issues. A 'cooperation agenda on nuclear control and disarmament' is premature, but may come into play in the next stage of relations. The new nuclear states need it now; Canada may find a way to assist them to acquire it.

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<sup>26</sup> For a discussion see the edited volume by Air Commodore (ret), Jasjit Singh, *Nuclear India*, New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, July 1999. The opening essay contains a laboured explanation of why the tests are in support of development and why Mahatma Gandhi would have agreed to go nuclear ; the remainder are chapters examining technical aspects of the new nuclear situation.

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**C. Pre-empt.** India and Pakistan have not travelled far down the nuclear road as yet. There are known hazards just ahead. These may be pointed out and prevented, to the benefit of all concerned. A mid range policy goal is to help South Asia avoid nuclear escalation and risk, from weaponization and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. Risk reduction is needed in at least two areas: accidental war, and the environment

Breathing room is needed by the states in their confrontation with each other. As the maps given earlier make clear, there is no margin for error in military judgement, no time for second thoughts. Hotlines will not help much in case of accident or impetuosity. CBM's are no help against airborne ICBM's. The imperative for a preemptive strike in case of conflict is even more frightening in a nuclear South Asia. The subcontinent requires measures to insert a 'pause and reflect' mode on potential nuclear war.

Methods evolved during the West's Balance of Terror may be applied to South Asia. What is needed, to coin a phrase, is 'pre-emptive de-alerting' and 'pre-emptive de-targeting'. As part of a security dialogue, or benchmarking exercise, agreement by the two states to forgo hair triggers, and programmed targets, would be a service to security. Keeping warheads separate from missiles, installing full command and control measures, and advanced fail safe devices are well known international safeguards. Many others exist which undoubtedly are being explored by the military establishments in South Asia. There is a potential role for external but fraternal military cooperation in instituting nuclear management.

Similarly, now is the moment to instill awareness of nuclear environmental hazards. Stepped up nuclear programmes means additional byproducts, spent fuel, and potential for seepage. No nuclear state has fully solved such problems, and all proposed solutions are economically prohibitive. Once again, human security in a direct way is endangered by the nuclear tests and their aftermath.

**CONCLUSION**

South Asia is locked into a security deficit which it cannot erase. It has a human security deficit which it can. There are avenues for influence by the international community. If there is any solace in the material given here, it is this: policy choice can make a difference. The temptation to surrender to the 'grand forces of history': to globalization, the market, inevitable conflict between hostile states, or indeed to any inevitability, is surly groundless. The BJP has already paid an electoral penalty for choosing guns over ghee, mushroom clouds over cheap onions.

The robust civil society of democratic India, the yearning for alternatives to endless confrontation in all the South Asian states, the full realization of what 'becoming nuclear' entails, is the ultimate hope for an alternative to perpetual sacrifice of human security on the altar of traditional security. In realizing this hope, Canada can play a positive role.

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