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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1985 SESSION



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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF

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FEBRUARY 1986

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Statements Made in Plenary Session
Chronological Index

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
			<u>1985</u>	
114	CD/PV.288	9	Secretariat/Konatinov	5.2.85
	CD/PV.288	26	USSR/Isacovskiy	5.2.85
	CD/PV.288	29	Sweden/Theorin	5.2.85
	CD/PV.289	8	<u>PREFACE</u> GDR/Hogewitz	7.2.85
	CD/PV.289	13-16	<u>PV</u> Sweden/Breus	7.2.85
	CD/PV.289			12.2.85
	CD/PV.289			17.2.85
	CD/PV.289			12.2.85
117	CD/PV.291	9-10	Bulgaria/Tallalov	14.2.85
	CD/PV.291	14-15	Japan/Imai	14.2.85
	CD/PV.291	19-20	Yugoslavia/Beyari	14.2.85
	CD/PV.291	24	Kenya/Kiilu	14.2.85
118	CD/PV.292	10	GDR/Rose	19.2.85
	CD/PV.292	14	Romania/Datcu	19.2.85
	CD/PV.292	26-27	Australia/Butler	19.2.85
	CD/PV.292	33	China/Qian Jindong	19.2.85
119	CD/PV.293	11	Egypt/Alfarargi	25.2.85
	CD/PV.293	34	Poland/Tarbanek	25.2.85

This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1985 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Statements Made in Plenary Session Chronological Index

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
<u>1985</u>				
114	CD/PV.288	9	Secretariat/Komatina	5.2.85
	CD/PV.288	26	USSR/Issraelyan	5.2.85
	CD/PV.288	29	Sweden/Theorin	5.2.85
115	CD/PV.289	8	FRG/Wegener	7.2.85
	CD/PV.289	14-16	Sweden/Ekeus	7.2.85
116	CD/PV.290	11,12-13	USA/Adelman	12.2.85
	CD/PV.290	20-21	Poland/Turbanski	12.2.85
	CD/PV.290	27	USSR/Issraelyan	12.2.85
117	CD/PV.291	9-10	Bulgaria/Tellalov	14.2.85
	CD/PV.291	14-15	Japan/Imai	14.2.85
	CD/PV.291	19-20	Mongolia/Bayart	14.2.85
	CD/PV.291	24	Kenya/Kiilu	14.2.85
118	CD/PV.292	10	GDR/Rose	19.2.85
	CD/PV.292	14	Romania/Datcu	19.2.85
	CD/PV.292	26-27	Australia/Butler	19.2.85
	CD/PV.292	33	China/Qian Jiadong	19.2.85
119	CD/PV.293	11	Egypt/Alfarargi	21.2.85
	CD/PV.293	24	Poland/Turbanski	21.2.85

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
120	CD/PV.294	16	Brazil/de Souza e Silva	26.2.85
121	CD/PV.295	15	Burma/U Maung Maung Gyi	28.2.85
	CD/PV.295	19	Algeria/Ould Rouis	28.2.85
	CD/PV.295	28	Morocco/Skalli	28.2.85
122	CD/PV.296	16	New Zealand/Lange	5.3.85
	CD/PV.296	31-32	Italy/Alessi	5.3.85
123	CD/PV.297	10	Yugozlavia/Vidas	7.3.85
	CD/PV.297	39	Sweden/Ekeus	7.3.85
	CD/PV.297	48	Nigeria/Tonwe	7.3.85
124	CD/PV.298	10-13	UK/Luce	12.3.85
	CD/PV.298	18	Finland/Tornudd	12.3.85
	CD/PV.298	23	India/Alam Khan	12.3.85
125	CD/PV.299	10	Iran/Shahabi Sirjani	14.3.85
126	CD/PV.301	9-10	Norway/Froysnes	21.3.85
	CD/PV.301	14	USA/Lowitz	21.3.85
	CD/PV.301	27-28	Belguim/Depasse	21.3.85
127	CD/PV.303	7-13	USA/Lowitz	28.3.85
	CD/PV.303	25	Zaire/Monshemvula	28.3.85
	CD/PV.303	28-29	USSR/Issraelyan	28.3.85
	CD/PV.303	32-33	Iran/Shahabi Sirjani	28.3.85
128	CD/PV.305	14	FRG/Genscher	2.4.85
129	CD/PV.306	12-16	USSR/Issraelyan	4.4.85
	CD/PV.306	27-29	Canada/Beesley	4.4.85

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
130	CD/PV.307	6-10	Japan/Imai	11.4.85
131	CD/PV.308	9-12	Iran/Ali Akbar Velayati	16.4.85
	CD/PV.308	17-21	UK/Cromartie	16.4.85
	CD/PV.308	24-25	Brazil/de Souza e Silva	16.4.85
	CD/PV.308	26-27	USA/Barthelemy	16.4.85
132	CD/PV.309	7-9	Romania/Datcu	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	9-13	Hungary/Meiszter	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	17-18	Netherlands/Van Schaik	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	20-24	Australia/Butler	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	25-28	USA/Barthelemy	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	29-31	GDR/Rose	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	32-33	Belgium/Depasse	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	34,35	Iran/Shahabi Sirjani	18.4.85
	CD/PV.309	35	Morocco/Sbihi	18.4.85
CD/PV.309	35	Egypt/Badr	18.4.85	
133	CD/PV.310	9-12	Poland/Turbanski	23.4.85
	CD/PV.310	14-16	France/de la Gorce	23.4.85
	CD/PV.310	38-39	Senegal/Sene	23.4.85
	CD/PV.310	44	GDR/Rose	23.4.85
	CD/PV.310	45-47	FRG/Wegener	23.4.85
	CD/PV.310	48-49	Canada/Beesley	23.4.85
	CD/PV.310	52	Yugoslavia/Vidas (Chairman)	23.4.85
134	CD/PV.311	13	Sweden/Theorin	11.6.85
135	CD/PV.312	9	Yugoslavia/Dizdarevic	13.6.85

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
136	CD/PV.313	6-7	France/Jessel	18.6.85
	CD/PV.313	7-9	Canada/Beesley	18.6.85
	CD/PV.313	9	UK/Cromartie	18.6.85
137	CD/PV.314	15	USSR/Issraelyan	20.6.85
	CD/PV.314	17	USA/Lowitz	20.6.85
	CD/PV.314	17	USSR/Issraelyan	20.6.85
138	CD/PV.315	11	GDR/Rose	25.6.85
	CD/PV.315	21-22	Peru/Cannock	25.6.85
	CD/PV.315	23-24	FRG/Wegener	25.6.85
139	CD/PV.316	7-8	Norway/Kristvik	27.6.85
140	CD/PV.317	14	Sri Lanka/Hameed	2.7.85
	CD/PV.317	18	Zaire/Bagbeni	2.7.85
141	CD/PV.318	18-20	Australia/Butler	4.7.85
	CD/PV.318	22-23	USSR/Issraelyan	4.7.85
142	CD/PV.322	8	Cuba/Lechuga Hevia	18.7.85
	CD/PV.322	8-10	Yugoslavia/Mihajlovic	18.7.85
	CD/PV.322	10-14	USSR/Issraelyan	18.7.85
	CD/PV.322	17-18	Mongolia/Bayart	18.7.85
	CD/PV.322	23-27	Canada/Beesley	18.7.85
	CD/PV.322	28-29	USA/Barthelemey	18.7.85
	CD/PV.322	29-30	USSR/Issraelyan	18.7.85
143	CD/PV.323	7-10	USA/Lowitz	23.7.85
	CD/PV.323	13-16	Spain/Lacleta	23.7.85
	CD/PV.323	17-20	Brazil/de Souza e Silva	23.7.85
	CD/PV.323	22-24	Bulgaria/Tellalov	23.7.85

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
144	CD/PV.324	7-10	Japan/Imai	25.7.85
	CD/PV.324	13	Bangladesh/Ataul Karim	25.7.85
	CD/PV.324	15-18	Sweden/Ekeus	25.7.85
	CD/PV.324	18-20	GDR/Rose	25.7.85
	CD/PV.324	21-24	USSR/Issraelyan	25.7.85
145	CD/PV.327	26-29	France/Jessel	6.8.85
146	CD/PV.328	6-8	FRG/Elbe	8.8.85
147	CD/PV.330	16	Burma/U Maung Maung Gyi	15.8.85
	CD/PV.330	29-30	Netherlands/Van Schaik	15.8.85
148	CD/PV.331	9-10	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	20.8.85
	CD/PV.331	11-12	Sweden/Ekeus	20.8.85
149	CD/PV.332	12	Sweden/Schori	22.8.85
	CD/PV.332	14-15	USA/Lowitz	22.8.85
150	CD/PV.333	17	USSR/Issraelyan	27.8.85
	CD/PV.333	21-23	Poland/Turbanski	27.8.85
	CD/PV.333	32	France/Jessel	27.8.85
151	CD/PV.334	8	GDR/Rose	29.8.85
	CD/PV.334	10	China/Qian Jiadong	29.8.85
	CD/PV.334	12	Argentina/Campora (Chairman)	29.8.85
	CD/PV.334	12-13	GDR/Rose	29.8.85
	CD/PV.334	13-14	USSR/Kashirin	29.8.85
	CD/PV.334	14	UK/Edis	29.8.85
	CD/PV.334	15	GDR/Rose	29.8.85
152	CD/PV.335	7	Algeria/Belaid	30.8.85

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the
Conference and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General)

"The effective prohibition of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of your Conference for a number of years now. Considerable work has already been done on all technical issues relating to a ban on chemical weapons and on the destruction of existing stocks. Comprehensive and detailed proposals have been put forward on all aspects of a convention text. I would urge that no effort be spared at this session to achieve compromise solutions to the political issues which have so far prevented agreement. I am convinced that this would be in the best interests of all nations and that it is feasible.

CD/PV.288

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Important tasks also face the Conference on Disarmament in 1985 in connection with the questions of prohibiting chemical weapons and radiological weapons. The record of the Conference's work on these problems in previous years shows that all preliminary conditions exist for achieving progress in these fields. Only one thing is needed: a common desire and political will for the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements, the abandonment of attempts to impose one's own approaches which, as is now obvious to everyone, cannot provide a basis for reaching a consensus. With regard to the question on the prohibition of chemical weapons, we are in favour of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons resuming its work without delay on the basis of the existing mandate for the holding of appropriate negotiations with a view to drafting an agreement.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The question of chemical weapons has been a priority item in the multilateral disarmament negotiations in Geneva for the last 15 years. It is gratifying to note the progress made during the last year's sessions of the Conference on Disarmament towards a total prohibition of chemical weapons. The full process of drafting a multilateral convention is now well under way.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has continued its work this year by a three-week session, covering some of the most vital issues of a future Convention on Chemical Weapons. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee resulted in further clarification of some of the issues involved, while other issues were identified and explored for the benefit of the future negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee under its new Chairman. Although progress during this meeting was limited, the work was carried out in a good political atmosphere.

I would like to appeal to all countries producing or considering producing chemical weapons. History clearly tells us that disarmament can never be achieved through armaments. All States must therefore refrain from producing chemical weapons -- binary or others -- during the negotiations on a convention prohibiting such weapons.

Last year my delegation submitted draft provisions of a treaty prohibiting the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes. Our draft proposal addresses, in particular, one of the major outstanding issues, that of releasing radioactive material through attacks on nuclear facilities. The draft proposes a prohibition against attacks on nuclear facilities causing destruction, damage or injury through radiation.

For our part we were pleased to see the work on this matter revitalized during last year's session. We hope that this year the Conference will make tangible progress towards such a treaty.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The positive momentum generated by the two major Powers should, in the view of my delegation, primarily be instilled into the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons. The Federal Government attaches the highest significance to a rapid conclusion of a world-wide, internationally verifiable chemical weapons ban. As in past sessions, my delegation expects to contribute to the success of these negotiations by concrete and constructive proposals.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): On 31 August last year the Conference on Disarmament adopted the recommendation by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/539, containing inter alia that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume its work under its mandate for a session of limited duration during the period 14 January - 1 February 1985, and that the work should cover the two specific issues of Permitted Activities and Verification on Challenge, including related issues with regard to the Consultative Committee, as well as further negotiations on such material in Annex I of the report CD/539 which had been subject to preliminary drafting.

As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons I have today the pleasure to present to the Conference the report of the Committee on its work during the resumed session, contained in document CD/546.

This report contains a technical part which was agreed upon and adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on 1 February, as well as an annexed report by me, in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, constituting a summary of the work of the Committee during its resumed session. This latter annex, the report by the Chairman, is made with the intention of providing the Conference with further material for the negotiations of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. The views contained therein are those of the Chairman and do not in any way bind any delegation.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee in its report from last year, document CD/539, I undertook consultations in preparation for the resumed session. As a result of those consultations and of other considerations, some proposals and documents were put forward as Working Papers by the Chairman to serve as a basis for the negotiations, together with the report, CD/539, of the 1984 session of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Negotiations in the Committee were carried out mostly as consultations chaired by myself and by Dr. Lundin of Sweden, Ambassador Beesley of Canada, Mr. Duarte of Brazil, and Dr. Thieliicke of the German Democratic Republic. Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands also assisted me with some exploratory work on the issue of destruction of chemical weapons. Seven Working Papers addressing substantive issues were introduced during the session.

The deliberations of the Committee on the issue of "Permitted Activities" were focused on various options for the production of chemicals for permitted purposes. It was recognized that a regime for permitted activities should be based on the principle that production of all chemical weapons should be prohibited. A number of different suggestions were made on principles and circumstances related to production for permitted purposes under the Convention. Thus, two main approaches were considered with regard to the concept of a single small-scale production facility. One approach was that such a facility should have a production capacity just about the agreed maximum production limit for one year. The other approach was that the facility concerned should allow for a larger production capacity than the agreed maximum production capacity. The different verification methods for each one of the alternative approaches were analysed.

The issue of production of laboratory quantities of listed super-toxic lethal chemicals was considered in some detail. Differences in approach between delegations reflected variations in production methods and in social systems among the States represented by them. No information about the possible number of super-toxic lethal chemicals was made available, although a view was presented that the number of laboratories that might have to be declared and perhaps verified would be rather small.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

~~Attempts~~ were made to identify such production facilities that would be of relevance to provisions under the Convention. Attention was paid to the question of how to handle production facilities which had only temporarily or partly been used to produce toxic chemicals and key precursors intended for the production of chemical weapons in other facilities.

With regard to compliance issues, attempts were made to explore modalities for bilateral consultations under the future convention as well as verification by challenge. A general understanding seemed to emerge that the Convention would include basic procedures for the conduct of systematic international on-site verification to be carried out in accordance with relevant Articles of the Convention. The Consultative Committee would under the future convention work out detailed procedures in relation to each facility, subject to systematic international on-site inspection. The result of the consultations were summarized in a Working Paper of the Committee.

The question of prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the future convention was subject to consultations aimed at finding a common approach. In particular the interrelationship between the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and the future convention, as well as formulations of the prohibition of use of chemical weapons were considered.

A Working Paper on a principal order for the complete destruction of chemical weapons was distributed by the Chairman. The problem addressed in the Working Paper, how to ensure that the destruction of chemical weapons does not lead to military advantage for a Party possessing chemical weapons, was not the subject of consultations in the Committee as a whole.

It has been generally agreed that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during the January session has resulted in further clarification of some of the issues involved, while other issues were identified and explored for the benefit of the future negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee under its new Chairman.

It is also my opinion that we now can identify some issues which could be addressed with good prospects for progress.

I would like to express my thanks to all delegates having participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. A special thanks goes to those delegates that have assisted the Chairman and the Committee by undertaking to lead consultations, whether open-ended or limited, or in other ways for their valuable contributions in bringing this phase of our negotiations to a successful conclusion. I have of course in mind Ambassador Beesley of Canada, Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands, Mr. Duarte of Brazil and Dr. Thielicke of the German Democratic Republic.

I will also express my special gratitude to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail for the excellent handling of the Secretariat services by him and his able staff as well as for his indispensable advice to me and my delegation during my Chairmanship of the Committee. On behalf of the Committee I also thank the whole Secretariat, including interpreters and translators, for their perfect services to the Committee.

As my statement today will be my last act as Chairman of the Committee I would like, before concluding, to make some few remarks on the nature of the work of the

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Committee. As delegates recall the Ad Hoc Committee is entrusted with a negotiating mandate. I have got a feeling that the word "negotiations" has been subject to very different interpretations and also, I regret to say, to some confusion.

The Conference on Disarmament is based upon the important principle of equality between all its 40 members. Gone is the time when two co-chairmen's delegations provided the multilateral body with their joint draft proposals. Now the Committee must generate the substance for negotiations through using the dossier which has been accumulated during the work process in the Conference. The negotiating approach has so far been to start by using available basic material from the elaborations during earlier years. The Chairman and those other delegates undertaking the task to assist him in his work, must base themselves on this material, when providing delegations with written proposals to be negotiated upon. In order to avoid futile polemics and controversy, the Chairman should see to it that any proposal put to the full membership for consideration, has been prepared in consultation with delegations which in accordance with the Chairman's perception could have a special interest or an articulated attitude to the proposal in question. The Chairman should, of course, always be available to all Members of the Conference wishing to see him on any of the subjects under consideration. Thus, preparatory consultations would assist the Chairman in his evaluation of the prospect for success of a proposal. Such a procedure would also make it possible to modify and tailor proposals in a way that would enhance the possibilities to make the proposals acceptable to the membership as a whole. This approach is a necessary one for the Committee to be able to successfully cope with the complexity of a chemical weapons convention.

It should be generally recognized that preparatory consultations, also in a limited scale, are integrated and necessary elements of the negotiating process of the multilateral negotiating body. The multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons would have a chance of success if delegations could thus actively participate in the negotiating process, not only by restating their views but also by participating in the search for solutions to the many formidable problems still remaining to be solved.

The whole process from identifying the base material, through consultations in different configurations to joint drafting of provisions of a future convention, thus contains integrated elements in the negotiation on a future Chemical Weapons Convention. It is essential that delegations recognize the importance and the indispensability of all those stages in the process. The Conference undertook one of the most complicated international negotiations when it set itself the task of creating a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It is crucial not only for the success of the negotiations on chemical weapons but for the future of all multilateral disarmament negotiations that all delegations join in mutually shaping working procedures and negotiating methods that will demonstrate the effectiveness and political fairness of the multilateral approach to disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

In addition, the Soviet Union has violated its obligations under the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and under international law as embodied by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Thankfully, there have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemical toxin weapons in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan in 1984. If those kinds of activities have indeed stopped, and we hope they have, that is all to the good and constitutes a testimony to the policy -- practiced here today -- of being forthright in raising arms control violations. The goal is not aimless accusations of another country but stopping such violations. It is a testimony to the outcry of people everywhere that such sentiments can and do stop such unacceptable activities.

This underscores the fact that compliance is not just a bilateral concern. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.

This Conference is, I know, serious about arms control and thus must be serious about the twin issues of compliance and verification. In this regard, the United States delegation today is introducing the President's message to the Congress of the United States, and his unclassified report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, as a Conference Document.

It is now clear that provisions of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which regrettably contains no verification provisions, have been violated at the cost of many lives of innocent peoples in less developed, and non-aligned countries. The United States recognizes that it was one of the States that did not fully appreciate the danger of the lack of adequate compliance provisions. It now sees a need to fashion such provisions.

Negotiations on the issues the Conference deals with must factor in whether the activities to be limited can be effectively verified. Just as we dare not sit by and permit our past efforts to be debased through violations, we likewise need to take the past compliance record fully into account as we seek to formulate new agreements. Each of us must tackle this urgent task. Better still, we can tackle it together.

...

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

...

To do this, however, we must set realistic objectives. We should, first identify those global security concerns of highest priority which can be addressed appropriately through multilateral solutions. All items on this Conference's agenda are proper subjects for attention of this group but not all are of equal priority. Banning chemical weapons is to me the top priority.

In 1915, at the beginning of World War I, clouds of chlorine gas rolled across the battlefields in Belgium. A Major Auld then wrote:

"Try to imagine the ... troops as they saw the vast cloud of greenish-yellow gas spring out of the ground and slowly move downwind toward them, the vapour clinging to the earth, seeking out every hole and hollow ... first wonder, then fear; then, as the first fringes of the cloud enveloped them and left them choking and agonized in the fight for breath -- panic. Those who could move broke and ran, trying, generally in vain, to outstrip the cloud which followed inexorably after them."

Chemical weapons caused over 1 million casualties and 90,000 deaths in World War I. In the 1930s they were used in Ethiopia by Mussolini's forces. Then, for 30 years, no nation used them on the battlefield.

In the late 1960s, however, there was evidence of their reappearance on an obscure battlefield in Yemen. In the mid-1970s, the Hmong people of Laos became the next victims of chemical warfare. In 1979 began reliable reports of chemical weapons being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. And Vietnamese and Lao troops, Soviet surrogate forces, continued to use chemical weapons against the Hmong resistance. Then, in 1983 the world witnessed Iraq using chemical weapons in its dismal war against Iran.

All this despite a major international agreement that bans the use of chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol, completed in 1925 with the grim lessons of World War I then so fresh in mind, has been a major bulwark against chemical weapons use. More than 100 countries are parties. But that international legal restriction and the morality which lay beneath it have been in danger of crumbling as a result of these barbaric practices since 1975.

The political, moral and legal barriers against the use of chemical weapons are in danger of being torn down by such violations. We need now to re-establish and further buttress those longstanding norms of acceptable and civilised international behaviour. Today, there are even more threatening, toxic killer chemicals available. They are weapons of mass destruction, and weapons of mass suffering inflicted on defenseless civilians, thus far in non-aligned, poor countries. And as the Iraqi example makes clear, they are relatively cheap and readily available.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

Two years ago, in his speech to the United Nations second special session devoted to disarmament, President Reagan noted that: "The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized societies. No peacemaking institution can ignore the use of these dread weapons and still live up to its mission".

It is the view of the United States Government -- and, as those of you who have worked with me in the United Nations and elsewhere know, my strong personal conviction as well -- that this Conference should put its highest priority and its utmost efforts toward achieving a complete global ban on chemical weapons. Make no mistake about it, the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation are increasing. The problem is getting much worse.

Last April, Vice President Bush introduced our draft convention, and the negotiations subsequently intensified. We should not ease up until we have succeeded in effectively abolishing these weapons. Our proposed ban on chemical weapons focuses world attention on the issue and thereby helps to re-establish international norms long respected and now so much in danger of eroding.

In this connection, we were very heartened when the United Nations Secretary-General, on 5 February, urged that a comprehensive test ban on chemical weapons be completed by the end of 1985. We fully endorse his injunction. We hope that the Soviet Union will engage in serious negotiations on every element of the United States draft with that goal in mind. Were that goal met, 1985 would become a historic year in the annals of arms control -- much as 1968 became with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament would be infused with new importance to world affairs, which is so badly needed.

We recognize that chemical weapons pose some of the most confounding verification problems encountered in the vast realm of arms control. For this very reason, we are seeking new and rather bold approaches, including an "open invitation" for mandatory international inspection on short notice.

As I noted earlier, overcoming the problems of verification and compliance is essential. Arms control is empty without compliance; and compliance, particularly for a closed society, is impossible to establish without verification. A ban on chemical weapons honoured by open societies and violated by closed societies would be no ban at all. It would constitute unilateral disarmament in the guise of multilateral arms control.

During the course of these discussions, I also encourage the Conference to look carefully at how to handle chemicals normally used in industry or agriculture, but which also can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons used in Iraq's war with Iran were produced from just such substances. To help prevent development and use of chemical weapons in the future, we need to ensure that steps are taken to control the export of such chemicals and related equipment and technology. Countries with advanced chemical industries have a special obligation in this regard, and in the future should exercise considerable restraint. Personally, I believe this is an ever-increasing priority in arms control.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The negotiating process with regard to the banning of chemical weapons is relatively advanced. During last year's session, under the very able and dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, a lot of hard and useful work towards further clarification of some very important questions has been done, although no major breakthrough could be achieved. We believe, however, that at this stage of the negotiations substantial progress is within our reach if only we all work with the greatest seriousness, desire for mutual accommodation and recognition of other States' legitimate interests. The provisions which are to be worked out have to be of extreme accuracy. At the same time they must not go into inordinately tiny details. Such a tendency could defer reaching final results almost indefinitely. It is best to avoid unrealistic expectations. No convention, existing or future, can settle all conceivable situations and cases. To find this subtle demarcation line will unquestionably be a very difficult but nevertheless feasible task.

I should also like to see the work on a chemical weapons convention proceed on a double track, that is, by trying to reach common understanding on some of the most difficult problems while at the same time moving forward on issues where there is less discrepancy of views.

Before concluding, I wish also to express our appreciation for the work done during the January session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the report delivered by its Chairman, which we are about to adopt. I hope that the business-like manner which characterized this work will prevail during the present session of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Mr. Adelman cited facts relating to the use of chemical weapons in a historical review, so to speak. He committed many inaccuracies, to put it lightly. In our statement in right of reply to the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Bush, in February 1983 we already cited all the events concerning the use of chemical weapons from the time of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and I shall not return to this question. But it is very surprising that he forgot to mention the use of toxic chemicals during a decade by the United States in their aggression in Viet Nam. At the same time, he repeated more than once the lie about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South East Asia. We have rejected and we reject this lie. In his statement, and I must confess this is the first time that I encounter such a declaration by a representative of the United States —

Mr. Adelman said:

[Spoke in English] "thankfully, there have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemical or toxic weapons in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan in 1984."

[Spoke in Russian] Naturally so, inasmuch as neither in 1984 nor at any earlier time has the Soviet Union used chemical weapons. The fact that last year the United States decided to discontinue its campaign of insinuations on this score is explained solely by the fact that the American administration began its pseudo-peacemaking rhetoric in pursuit of a definite goal: to improve its political image in the international arena.

A few words on the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Mr. Adelman expressed the hope that 1985 will be the year of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We will strive to achieve this goal. But what has the United States itself done to this end? The talks on this issue have already been underway for a long time. The Soviet Union has repeatedly advanced its own constructive proposals on this issue. In April 1984 the United States submitted its draft convention. Did this help the negotiations? Did it narrow the differences? No. On the contrary. Clearly it was intended to make the achievement of an agreement on chemical weapons more difficult.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The Bulgarian delegation would like to express its satisfaction that the Conference has already taken a decision to continue the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We welcome the desire of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, to go ahead with business-like negotiations and assure him of our readiness to assist in the implementation of this responsible goal. In the opinion of my delegation, it might be expedient to hold an additional session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of last year's Report. I avail myself of this opportunity to express my gratitude to Ambassador Ekéus for his personal contribution as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during last year's session.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

As we have stated before on many occasions, we believe that this Conference should deploy its best efforts for the early realization of a global and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Fortunately, the discussions have been very active in recent years, and we appreciate the fact that the major points of a future convention prohibiting chemical weapons have become clear and for this we have to thank the untiring efforts of the former chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus.

At the same time we note that with the increasing intensity of the discussions and further identification of related problems, we have been getting increasingly involved in details which are, of course, necessary and important but at the same time may have the effect of confusing the priorities. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to reconfirm the basic objectives of the convention; that is, the prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retaining, and transfer as well as use of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities. In discussing this matter, we should always bear in mind that the chemical weapons convention as outlined above should work to enhance national security of all States while at the same time it should not pose any impediments to the development of normal activities of the world's peaceful chemical industries.

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

With this basic perception as a starting point, we should work out the problems facing us with regard to "objectives", "definitions", "destruction" and "verification". We should especially like to stress that we hope early agreement can be reached with regard to an explicit identification of the chemical substances to be prohibited or controlled under this convention, and to a practical system of verification measures designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.

Furthermore, greater efficiency may be achieved if we can divide our work into two levels, and first work out the basic framework of a draft convention, with proper identification of principles to guide application. Then, within such a framework, as a second stage we might enlist the help of technical experts in a subsidiary body to try to work on the areas where there can be significant differences amongst the negotiating parties.

CD/PV.291

19-20

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

As for chemical weapons, we believe that resolutions 39/65 B and 39/65 C, which urge the Conference to intensify its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, deserves special attention. In this connection, it should be noted that the first of those resolutions calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons. The Mongolian delegation expresses its satisfaction with the Conference's decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We share the view of many other delegations that every pre-condition exists for the achievement of practical results in this field. I should like to take the opportunity to thank Mr. R. Ekéus of Sweden for his active work as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and to congratulate his successor in that office, Mr. S. Turbanski of Poland, and wish him every success.

(Mr. Kiilu, Kenya)

In the area of chemical weapons, my delegation feels that considerable progress has been made in the negotiations in this complex issue. We share the guarded optimism that a comprehensive convention which would outlaw for ever the development, production, stockpiling, storage and use of those terrible weapons and provide for the destruction of existing stocks can effectively be concluded and internationally respected. In this context, Kenya welcomes the efforts of the United States Government, among others, for their initiative to table a draft convention last year and the Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections on the destruction of existing stocks. It is our earnest hope that the Conference will overcome the major political difficulties in order to compromise formulations in the treaty language. It is only political will and trust between the United States and the USSR that will resolve the divergent views that have emerged in the crucial area of verification. Meanwhile, we welcome the decision of the Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able Chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Besides these agenda priorities in the nuclear field and outer space, my delegation attaches great importance to the progress in the negotiations for a convention banning all chemical weapons. It is my country's understanding that further results can be attained in that area in 1985, if all members of the Conference are willing to search for compromises. Headway will, however, be impossible if a particular delegation is not ready to take other views into consideration and continues to cling to positions which are generally regarded as unrealistic.

We are grateful to Ambassador Turbanski, the 1985 Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for the circumspect and goal-oriented manner in which he has tackled his job. At the same time, we wish to assure him of our readiness to co-operate in the search for solutions to the problems we are faced with.

After the promising conclusion of the January meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Ekéus for the sense of commitment with which he discharged his duties in the chair of this body.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

We share the widely held view that the Conference on Disarmament could and should redouble its efforts to prepare this year the first draft of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The excellent work that was carried out last year under the inspired Chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, together with the rapid establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the promising beginning of consultations under the active Chairmanship of Ambassador Stanislas Turbanski of Poland, are positive signs that give us cause to hope for a major break-through in this respect. For our part, we shall do our best to contribute to this positive course of events.

Under the present circumstances, the Conference on Disarmament is in particular need of a break-through, especially as the prohibition of chemical weapons would undoubtedly represent the first step towards outlawing a weapon of mass destruction that exists in the arsenals of some States.

However, I wish to add straightaway that, notwithstanding the importance and urgency of the work aimed at the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Geneva Conference should not be confined exclusively to this question. We would like to stress the need for an approach under which the issue of top priority, namely, nuclear weapons, should not be left out of our negotiations under the pretext of concentrating our efforts on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

There is nothing which should divide members of this Conference with respect to the objective of removing all chemical weapons from this earth. The existing regime of international law relating to chemical weapons, while largely effective, is incomplete.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Chemical weapons should never be used and thus the case for their complete elimination and their non-production is absolute, and that case expands whenever we hear of the use of chemical weapons, as we regrettably have within the last 24 hours. The work which has been proceeding in the Conference towards this end is work of great importance; we all have an interest in its early and successful completion. Work on this Convention raises the fundamental question of the role of verification within arms control agreements. Because of the stakes at issue, an effective universal chemical weapons convention will need a level of verification which provides full confidence that the objectives of the convention are being met. We all know that there is, at present, an argument about what that level and nature of verification should be, but it is my Government's conviction that we can settle this argument.

What is required for this result is both, the removal from the work on the convention of political contention which has little if any relevance to the technical problems which need to be solved, and the emergence of real determination, real will, to bring this convention to an early and successful conclusion. It has been proposed that the Conference should increase the priority attention it has previously given to the chemical weapons problem so that a convention may be concluded this year. Australia supports this approach. Having said this, I want to record that we do not believe that it is beyond our capacity to put extra effort and resources into our work on chemical weapons and at the same time carry out serious and detailed work on other important items on our agenda. I referred a moment ago to the necessary political will in support of our work on chemical weapons. Australia has that will and holds the view that if all of us at this table truly want to bring this convention into existence we can do so, and can do so quickly.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

The prohibition of chemical weapons is an area which is widely considered to be more promising. As a result of the three extra weeks of consultations and deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee held in January, positions were further clarified and common ground as well as divergencies identified on some of the issues involved. This will be helpful for the future negotiations. Here, I wish to express once again my appreciation for the efforts made by the former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, and the co-ordinators.

It is still an arduous task to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, we are convinced that if all sides proceed from a constructive and co-operative spirit, greater progress could be achieved during the current session. It was proposed at the last session that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons be re-established before the end of the second week of this session. We are pleased to note that it was actually re-established in the first week of the session with Ambassador Turbanski of Poland as its Chairman. We have in a way accomplished our task ahead of schedule. I hope this augurs well for our work. The current year is the sixtieth anniversary of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol — a historic document which has played a significant role over the years in the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. **Regrettably**, however, mankind is to this day still not yet completely safe from the threat of chemical warfare. In commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of this important international legal instrument, let us redouble our efforts in the negotiations and come to substantial results so as to rid mankind of the danger of this abominable weapon as early as possible.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

The fact that we have reiterated the importance we attribute to the above mentioned agenda items, should not be interpreted as disregard for the importance of other agenda items. On the contrary, we eagerly look forward to the rapid achievement of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is an objective that has been repeatedly reiterated by previous speakers. We sincerely hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will succeed in finding a way for conciliating controversial views and compromise solutions for the remaining problems in order to build upon the progress that has been achieved until now.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons I deem it necessary to inform the Conference on the current state of advancement of preparations for the commencement of the Committee's work.

It has been my firm intention to start the Committee's work on matters of substance at the earliest possible date, preferably this week.

The two-week consultation period, abundant also in informal meetings and consultations on other organizational matters, have turned out not to be sufficient for reaching common understanding on issues pertinent to the successful start of the Committee's work.

I fully appreciate the willingness demonstrated by delegations to reach the necessary understanding on issues often sensitive and of particular concern to delegations, as well as certain practical difficulties which they face.

At the same time I feel, however, that discussions on the general outlines of matters to be considered by the Working Groups, as well as on other organizational issues should not prevent us for too long from commencing the substantial work by the Committee.

On this assumption I felt it proper to ask the President and the secretariat that the first meeting of the Committee be arranged for Wednesday, 27 February 1985.

I want to assure you, Mr. President, of my continuous desire to carry out consultations with a view to overcoming the existing difficulties. In doing so I hope that all the delegations will display as co-operative and flexible an attitude as possible, so that the remaining issues will be settled before we meet on Wednesday, thus enabling the Committee and its Working Groups to carry out the mandate entrusted to them by the Conference.

CD/PV.294

16

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Let me revert to the argument on invention and disinvention and take the example of chemical weapons. They were invented, utilized in World War I and subsequently in other circumstances. Their use was outlawed 60 years ago, and we are now all engaged, together with the few owners of those weapons, in what we consider a good faith exercise to eliminate them, or in other words to disinvent them for warlike purposes. In the case of the most dreadful weapon ever invented, the nuclear weapon, what is required is a clearcut political and juridical commitment to prohibit and abolish it, followed by a steady and continuous operational process of negotiations.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

Since the late 1960s, the prohibition of chemical weapons has been the preoccupation of successive multilateral disarmament forums. The procedural format of the negotiations can be said to have reached an advanced stage by the drafting of the structure of a convention. The Conference cannot afford to conduct negotiations in the languid style of the past decade, for in recent years the development of new technology for chemical weapons is making them more important in the military thinking of some nuclear-weapon States. Disarmament agreements have a better chance of succeeding before weapons become firmly integrated to play an important role in the military arsenals of States, and it is therefore necessary to clinch a timely agreement before chemical weapons assume such a role.

CD/PV.295

19

(Mr. Ould Rouis, Algeria)

On the question of prohibition of chemical weapons, evaluation of the results which have been achieved in this area allows for a degree of satisfaction, since the work so far undertaken has led to the clarification of standpoints and identification of the technical questions involved in the preparation of a future convention of the prohibition of such weapons.

Further efforts were made in this direction at the most recent session of the Ad Hoc Committee but more still must be done.

The moment is ripe for a display of the political will and realism needed for achieving the preparation of a draft future convention.

CD/PV.295

28

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

After a year during which it has been marking time, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at present in a decisive phase inasmuch as all the conditions are met for 1985 to be, perhaps, the year of a convention on chemical weapons, since the political will to achieve success in these negotiations seems clear. In this regard, the Moroccan delegation continues to give high priority to the total and absolute prohibition of all chemical weapons in the world.

We pay tribute in passing to the excellent work done by Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, who was Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1984, and assure his successor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, of our full co-operation.

(Mr. Lange, New Zealand)

New Zealand is grateful to the Conference on Disarmament for the opportunity to contribute to its work. We appreciate that the negotiation of disarmament agreements is a difficult, arduous process. We have followed with particular interest the work on a Chemical Weapons agreement and hope that the parties involved in the negotiations will keep up the momentum developed last year on this issue. The international community needs a comprehensive and verifiable ban on these weapons as soon as possible. The events in the Middle East show the urgency with which the negotiations on a draft convention must be brought to a successful conclusion. The New Zealand delegation will participate in these negotiations and on other items of the Conference's agenda to the extent our resources allow. I look forward to the time when New Zealand will be able to be more directly involved in this most important Conference.

CD/PV.296

31

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Continuation of the negotiation of a treaty to ban all use of chemical weapons is still the principal item on our work programme.

The Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference has done intensive work, as is shown by its voluminous report annexed to the Report of the Conference. Many points have been examined in greater detail and we now have an organized outline of the topics which might be dealt with in the future convention. We wish, at this point, to express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, who served as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee with dedication and competence, not only during the 1984 session, but also during the three-week resumption of negotiations, from 14 January to 1 February this year.

Even though the results achieved are still less than might have been hoped for, we must recognize that the work of the 1984 session enabled us carefully to identify the many problems to be dealt with and this should facilitate our future work.

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(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In the course of 1984, a full draft Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons was submitted to the Conference by the Government of the United States. We are grateful to the American authorities for this important contribution to our work, which shows the extent of that country's commitment to the success of our efforts. Like any human enterprise, the United States draft can be improved, even on important points. Nevertheless, it constitutes a substantial basis for our work. It would be preferable if those who criticize or oppose it were to make known their views on it in a no less coherent and comprehensive fashion. If criticisms only are expressed, without putting forward any specific proposals, the negotiations will be condemned to turn in circles and the favourable moment for a successful outcome will be missed.

Last year we stressed the problems of destruction of stocks and of production facilities for chemical weapons. We believe that this year, in the light of the experience gained in 1984, we must also place emphasis on the procedures for verification of the observance of the future convention. This is a matter of vital importance; it constitutes the real test of genuine determination to achieve a result and the entire negotiations are bound increasingly to turn around it.

It is our hope that in the present year 1985, under the enlightened direction of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, an equitable and viable agreement may be reached, an agreement which, on the one hand, fully satisfies the priority requirement that a truly effective convention be drawn up and, on the other hand, is compatible with the differences between the socio-economic systems of the States parties to the negotiation. Only an effective and universally acceptable convention can ensure the protection of mankind against the scourge of chemical warfare. We, for our part, reaffirm our determination to participate, with an open mind, in the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee, our sole aim being the success of our joint efforts.

While the work on chemical weapons is now beginning to progress in the direction of preparation of a draft treaty, other items on our agenda have, notwithstanding their urgency and importance, been given only superficial attention so far and have been discussed only from the procedural angle. This is a situation that is prejudicial to the Conference's image and casts some doubt on the effectiveness of our work.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

In the course of the last year, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made a step further in the direction of elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. We hope that this year the negotiations on the outstanding issues will be completed in the Committee so that the drafting of the convention may enter its final phase. To achieve this, it will be necessary to generate greater political will. Any further delay and hindrance of the final solution will adversely affect disarmament.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

We should by now have learnt that it is a futile exercise to try by means of far-reaching mandates to force an unwilling government to commit itself in advance to concluding a treaty before it knows the full contents of that treaty. For example, this multilateral negotiating forum has for many years (15 years) registered progress in the very complicated task of reaching a Chemical Weapons Convention without a negotiating mandate. It was not until last year that the subsidiary body was entrusted with a full negotiating mandate. If our predecessors in this body had applied the same policy of requiring full negotiating mandates as we ourselves try to do now with regard to a nuclear test ban, the Conference would not be even close to negotiations on chemical weapons. Happily enough they took a more pragmatic approach, with the effect that we are now drafting a Convention on the subject.

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

While my delegation believes that priority should be accorded to measures leading to nuclear disarmament, we would not in any way wish to derogate from the importance and urgency of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons.

My delegation is gratified that some progress has been made during this session with regard to the setting up of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on the question. We hope that all the subsidiary bodies connected with a chemical weapons prohibition treaty will soon be in place so that the problem can be tackled more effectively.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

It was commendable that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was promptly re-established at the beginning of the 1985 session. Chemical weapons are the area in which this Conference has recently made the most progress. The Committee's report for 1984 identified encouraging areas of common ground and should make the Committee's work easier this year, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

I must say, however, that I had hoped to see more progress here in the year since my last visit. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 concluded here in this city 60 years ago has been and remains of inestimable value to mankind. There is, however, a generally recognized and increasingly urgent need for this existing prohibition of the use of chemical weapons to be supplemented and buttressed by a total ban on all elements of chemical warfare including development, production, and stockpiling of these appalling weapons. There is a major, and a growing, imbalance between East and West. My own country gave up its chemical weapons a quarter of a century ago. The United States decided in 1969 not to produce any new chemical weapons. From that time, they have not done so. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has neither abandoned chemical weapons nor stopped producing them. On the contrary, it has relentlessly built up larger stockpiles than any other country. Those stockpiles now comprise over 300,000 tons of lethal chemical warfare agents, and they are still growing. We therefore face a specific and worrying threat from an existing capability to wage chemical warfare.

But all of us, as Secretary Shultz noted in his important speech last week, face the danger of proliferation of these appalling weapons. Recent events have sadly demonstrated that no part of the globe is safe from the threat of chemical weapons. There are continuing reports of their use in South East Asia. The confirmation in March 1984 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War is another cause for deep concern. Following this, my Government and other Western Governments acted quickly to impose export controls, until further notice, on certain chemicals which could be misused to make weapons. In view of the threats we face, there is a danger that States will proceed to chemical rearmament, unless we make swift progress towards a comprehensive ban. Let

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(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

us therefore make an urgent and concerted effort now to conclude such a ban. Chemical weapons threaten us all. All of us should therefore show a common resolve to take the necessary steps swiftly to crown these negotiations with success. Let history record that this Conference — these 40 nations — bear the credit for banishing chemical weapons from the face of the Earth.

A lot of work remains to be done especially in the vital field of the verification needed to provide assurance to each Party that others are complying fully with the Convention. My Government believes that confidence in the Convention as a whole needs to be sustained by a confirmation of several mutually reinforcing systems of verification. The task is a daunting one but I believe that solutions can and will be found. I welcome the broad agreement already reached on several aspects. First, it is common ground that assurance of compliance must in the last resort be provided by a system of fact-finding, including on-site inspection on request. Last year I tabled a paper, CD/431, on this issue of verification by challenge.

However, it is also accepted that this form of challenge inspection should be only a safety net. It could not, and should not act as the main system of verification. The vast majority of inspections — indeed, we must hope the totality of inspections — should be carried out by routine and regular means. There is, I believe, a consensus in this Conference on the relationship between routine and challenge inspection which I have outlined. This systematic routine supervision, including continuous on-site inspection, must cover the destruction of stockpiles and dismantling of chemical weapons factories.

Thirdly, it is agreed that as another element of routine verification there must be a permanent system of routine inspection of those sectors of the chemical industry making substances which might be diverted from civil use to the illicit manufacture of chemical weapons. My predecessor, Mr. Douglas Hurd, tabled detailed proposals on this non-production aspect in March 1983 in document CD/353. That paper asked other delegations to provide data on the production in their countries of certain chemicals known as "key precursors", compounds that can be used to make chemical weapons. We are grateful to those delegations who have responded to our request. I hope other delegations will soon follow their example, in order to enable informed negotiation on this aspect of the Convention. In the light of the information provided, the United Kingdom delegation presented a further paper on 10 July 1984 (CD/514) which classified chemical warfare agents and their precursors according to the perceived risk that they would pose to the Convention.

On each issue, proposals from different quarters are on the table. At this point, I must express my disappointment that the draft Convention (CD/500) tabled last April by the Vice-President of the United States has not given a greater impetus to the negotiations. This comprehensive piece of work provides an admirable basis for negotiation, and the Conference has not yet done it justice. Some delegations have criticised it, and particularly aspects of its verification provisions. But those delegations have not come forward with serious alternatives of their own. All agree on the need for a high degree of assurance that parties are complying with their obligations. There is now another need: for concentrated and detailed application. There will be no lack of effort on the part of my Government.

(Mr. Luce, United Kingdom)

Today I have pleasure in introducing a further British paper, CD/575, relating to the verification of non-production. It makes specific proposals for a system of routine inspection of industrial plants making or handling substances identified as posing a high risk to the Convention. The paper also contains specific proposals for an international exchange of data on the production and transfer of a wider range of substances, some of which have actually been used as chemical warfare agents. This paper builds on the earlier British papers to which I have referred and on the relevant section of the United States draft Convention. I believe that it now offers a firm basis for a system of verification of non-production of chemical weapons which would complement the system of challenge inspection. Moreover, by creating a situation which should give rise to the minimum of suspicions that a party was misusing its civil chemical facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons, I believe that it would ease the burden on the system of challenge inspection.

As I said earlier, challenges should be very few and far between. The fewer and the further apart, the better for the Convention. And the more robust the routine inspection régime, the less need to invoke the challenge procedures. In that sense, the details of these latter procedures need to be fitted into the broader picture of the routine arrangements. In the jigsaw of the Convention, the pieces for challenge may be the hardest to place. Let us therefore ease our task by building up the rest of the puzzle with agreement on the routine elements.

I would emphasize that it is not my Government's intention to hinder the manufacture or use of chemicals for civil, peaceful purposes. Our sole aim is to provide confidence that no party could exploit its civil chemical industry for the clandestine production of chemical weapons. Our paper draws where appropriate on the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which performs a similar function in the nuclear field. Of course, there are many important differences, which we have endeavoured to take into account. The ideas contained in our paper have been discussed with representatives of the chemical industry in the United Kingdom, who recognize the need for routine inspection. They have co-operated with the British Government in considering how to ensure adequate verification without compromising commercially confidential information or hampering industrial activity. We believe that our proposals take due account of these problems. We hope that they will be of benefit to other delegations both for discussions in this Conference and for consultations with their own national chemical industries.

This paper also touches on the role of the organization responsible for implementing the Convention. This organization should play a significant role in creating a new type of verifiable arms control agreement. It could also help to promote a positive climate for greater international co-operation between States Parties in the expansion and development of a safe chemical industry throughout the world. My delegation would be pleased to join others in studying this aspect further.

We will welcome other delegations' comments on our ideas. We do not claim to have in this paper the final answer. Nor are we interested in quick-fix solutions. In 1985 let us test to the full our capacity to address and resolve the hardest issues of verification. We should seek to continue this work in either New York or Geneva after the formal end of the Conference's Session. I urge the Conference to decide to do this. Mr. President, I make no apologies for dwelling on chemical weapons at such length. I believe that this is a goal within our reach in this Conference. The dangers are great. Together we should make every effort to achieve a ban now.

(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

Some progress has been made last year with regard to the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. While we welcome this development, it is to be emphasized that the conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty is a most urgent task of the whole international community. This urgency was underlined by the statement of the United Nations Security Council that chemical weapons had been used in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Additional efforts should be made in the field of verification of the future treaty. My country has contributed to this work in the past and will continue to do so. Solid scientific knowledge is, we believe, necessary in order to achieve a set of reliable methods for all the various tasks of verification. This will continue to be the focus of the Finnish chemical weapons verification project.

(Mr. Alam Khan, India)

Before concluding, I would like to mention another important item before the Conference, that is, the negotiation of a treaty banning chemical weapons. The work already accomplished by the Conference has been promising. We are all very keen to see a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons concluded as soon as possible. The Government of India is a Party to the 1925 Protocol on Chemical Weapons and is convinced of the need of a new régime which will complement the Geneva Protocol and prohibit completely the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

We have taken note of the important proposals submitted by the Honourable Minister of State of the United Kingdom, Mr. Luce; the question of non-production has a bearing on the civilian chemical industry of a large number of countries including our own. We will therefore study these proposals very carefully and with all the attention they deserve.

Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran hopes to have the opportunity to express its congratulations fully at a more suitable moment.

My delegation deems it necessary to draw the attention of the respected members of the Conference to the profoundly regrettable news that yesterday, 13 March 1985, Iran was again subjected to the use of chemical weapons.

Yesterday's use of chemical weapons on the part of Iraq was to be foreseen in view of its lack of response to the humanitarian appeal of 29 June 1984 of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the use of chemical weapons should be discontinued; this appeal was addressed to Iraq and the Islamic Republic (document S/16663).

Exactly one year ago yesterday, on 13 March 1984, the United Nations Secretary-General's team of experts arrived in Tehran to investigate the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic. During the course of its one-week investigation of the Iran-Iraq war front, the team came to the unanimous conclusion that chemical weapons were in fact used against Iran (document S/16433 of 26 March 1984).

In view of this coincidence in time, are we not to consider that yesterday's use of chemical weapons by Iraq was a wilful show of disrespect for the Secretary-General's humanitarian efforts, the serious concern of the international community, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the serious endeavours of this Conference towards the total elimination of chemical weapons?

In the course of the past 12 months, since 13 March 1984, the date of the arrival of the United Nations team of experts in Iran to investigate the use of chemical weapons, up to the present, Iraq has resorted to the use of chemical weapons on 26 further occasions.

During the period beginning 9 August 1984 up to the day before yesterday, 12 March 1985, Iraq had not resorted to the use of chemical weapons. However, yesterday's use of chemical weapons, if not repressed by the concerned organs and the international community as a whole, will foreshadow a new phase of this type of warfare, with a risk of escalation to the level of last year's unprecedented peak.

Mr. President, I would like to express the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Governments which can provide assistance to victims of the use of chemical weapons, to declare their willingness to do so in respect of yesterday's victims. It is hoped that Governments members of the Conference on Disarmament will respond positively to this humanitarian appeal in view of their specialized knowledge of this subject.

(Mr. Frøysnes, Norway)

Energetic efforts should now be made to prepare a draft convention at the earliest date. An important problem area involves solving the basic procedures for on-site inspections. Another major unsolved question refers to non-production of chemical weapons. Verification of non-production of chemical weapons should in principle be based on routine on-site inspections and data exchange under the auspices of the Consultative Committee. In this regard we would welcome the detailed proposals put forward by the Minister of State of the United Kingdom, Mr. Luce, in his statement on 12 March and I would add that Norway has already submitted data to the Conference on Disarmament concerning civil uses of key components in the chemical field, or so-called key precursors.

In five days we shall see the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention. In Article IX of the Convention it is stated inter alia that each State Party undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons. The thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly decided on the basis of a Norwegian initiative to hold the second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva in 1986. The holding of that Review Conference further underlines the urgency of the on-going negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

May I assure you that Norway will continue her research on verification questions relevant to a chemical weapons convention. It is our intention to present a new working paper, based on the results of the research this year, at the second part of the Conference's 1985 session.

CD/PV.301

14

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Here in the Conference on Disarmament we are negotiating a global ban on chemical weapons. In this connection, Vice-President Bush re-affirmed our commitment by tabling a draft convention in the Conference last April. We are still awaiting a serious and positive response to our initiative from those who have had little to offer so far but criticism.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

Where chemical weapons are concerned, my delegation will work towards concluding as soon as possible a convention efficiently and forever banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons. We are not unaware of the difficulties of this undertaking, since in this sphere too it is a question of coping with the risks of diverting science and technology to military purposes, a basic difficulty one finds in other spheres such as nuclear weapons or space, and which for chemical weapons arises here in particularly difficult circumstances.

Firstly, the chemicals industry has been developing both qualitatively, quantitatively and geographically since last century. It has grown considerably in many countries. This does not necessarily apply to space or nuclear activities.

Secondly, the military applications of chemistry have long been known and the acquisition of the technology enabling such weapons to be manufactured has, alas, proved relatively simple. Large stocks of chemical weapons have been built up. Recent violations of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 have shown the risks inherent in this situation.

Thirdly, the verification of the non-production of weapons is further hindered by the fact that production and stockpiling can take place relatively discreetly.

As a non-chemical-weapons industrial country which has had the sad privilege of numbering among its soldiers the first victims of chemical weapons, my country attaches primordial importance to the success of our work. It considers that the verification and monitoring of a ban on chemical weapons production is by no means incompatible with the conservation of the conditions for the optimum development of the industry. There are ways and means to be found, some difficulties to be solved, but the obstacles are not insurmountable. It is essential to establish an efficient verification system. We think that it is indispensable that when the convention is signed it should be clearly known that every measure has been taken to ensure that no suspicion of non-observance of the convention can last, and that doubts as to the behaviour of a party can be rapidly dissipated.

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(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

That is the price of the credibility of the convention. My delegation particularly appreciates the constructive efforts made to solve this problem of verification and non-production, including the important aspect of verification by challenge. It has noted with great interest the proposals transmitted to our Conference by the United Kingdom Minister of State, Mr. Richard Luce, on 12 March 1985. It regards the United Kingdom Working Paper as an extremely useful contribution to our work.

It hopes, in connection with the problems raised by the Working Paper, as well as on all other questions of substance still open, that delegations will take a decision during this session. Belgium considers that in view of the stage we have reached on this topic it would be advisable to give priority to considering basic political options so that the essential provisions of the drafts for the treaty can emerge during the 1985 session. I should like to add that Belgium will certainly experience major administrative difficulties should it be decided to continue work between the 1985 and the 1986 sessions -- difficulties shared by many other delegations. But it will contribute to reaching consensus on such an extension, the importance of which it regards as primordial in comparison with the bureaucratic, budgetary and administrative difficulties.

CD/PV.303

7

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, negotiations to ban chemical weapons have been under way for over 10 weeks thus far this year. During our plenary sessions devoted to these important negotiations, it is appropriate to take stock -- to determine what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. That is what I propose to do today.

1985 marks the sixth year of the existence -- in one form or another -- of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Under the leadership of a series of dedicated chairmen, significant progress has been made towards a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Many delegations have contributed to the development of guiding concepts and to the elaboration of specific provisions.

Last year my own delegation presented a draft convention (document CD/500) which built upon the work already accomplished in the Conference and incorporated a number of new ideas of our own. The convention would provide a complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons without undue interference in the use of chemicals for permitted purposes. To ensure confidence in compliance -- confidence which is essential for an effective ban -- the convention would provide for a system of routine declarations and inspections of key facilities, supplemented by a flexible system for resolving concerns that may arise. It is our view that the types of verification measures contained in the United States draft convention would serve the interests of all countries.

This year, Finland and the United Kingdom have presented carefully elaborated and very constructive Working Papers. We welcome their dedicated work.

But despite our efforts, an impartial assessment of our present situation must be that the really difficult problems remain. Moreover, time does not favour those that seek a chemical weapons ban. Let me address the latter point first.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Information available to us -- and the dramatic evidence that chemical weapons have been used in several recent conflicts -- make clear that chemical weapons capabilities are spreading. In fact, more than a dozen States possess chemical weapons. The spread of chemical weapons poses a threat to all countries, particularly developing countries.

As more countries acquire chemical weapons, the likelihood increases that chemical weapons will be used, causing horrible suffering and a weakening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Both fashion and fear may prompt additional countries to obtain chemical weapons and this dangerous process of the spread of chemical weapons could begin to feed on itself. At some point an effective chemical weapons ban could become almost impossible to negotiate because of the number of countries with security requirements to be satisfied, not the least of which would be the extensiveness of the verification system.

The United States has expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons by several countries in various regions of the world -- in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, and in South-East Asia. We have strongly supported international investigation of reports of the use of chemical weapons. We believe that the legal and moral authority of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 must be upheld and that urgent attention by the world community is called for whenever use of chemical weapons is reported.

A year ago, on 13 March 1984, the United States representative to this Conference conveyed our conclusion that Iraq had used lethal chemical weapons in its conflict with Iran and that this constituted a serious breach of the protocol and of related rules of customary international law. Today it is my sad task to report our conclusion that Iraq has again used chemical weapons, in the recent fighting with Iran. My Government condemns the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law and conventions whenever and wherever it occurs, including this latest instance.

There is little doubt that recent violations of the Geneva Protocol are a threat to the integrity of the most venerable of arms control agreements and, in fact, a threat to the foundations of the arms control process itself: the belief that States may find genuine security based on international agreements and law instead of their own armaments. This should be a sobering thought for a conference seeking to negotiate new arms control agreements.

All States need confidence that the treaties they enter into are being complied with. When that confidence is eroded so is the hope we place in an international structure based on law.

Many nations prefer to treat compliance concerns as a matter only for the accuser and the accused. Yet in matters of international security, especially in the nuclear age, there can be no spectators. A State's responsibility for an arms control agreement must not end when it is signed. States cannot remain indifferent when such basic interests as the integrity of present and future treaties are involved: they must take an active role. However, the United States is not asking other nations to choose sides, but only to realize that the allegations are sufficiently troubling -- especially but not exclusively in the area of chemical weapons -- to warrant an active interest in the matter, including a search for resolution of the disputes.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Some States have justified silence by citing their high standards of proof. Indeed, we would agree that the evidence is complex and that the world rarely yields incontrovertible proof. But does this mean that States should do nothing at all? Would they have those responsible for law enforcement in their own countries refuse even to investigate a case until the courts could guarantee a conviction? Such an approach would yield neither justice nor confidence within a country, and it cannot be expected to provide a stable system of international agreements.

States must realize that there is a direct relationship between the manner in which compliance concerns have been dealt with in the past and the kinds of verification measures in new arms control initiatives. The verification proposals in the United States draft convention are, in part, a direct result of our experience with the international response to our concerns about non-compliance. This experience forms a key part of the background to understanding our proposals.

Time is working against us in another way -- through the development of science and technology.

Unfortunately, chemical weapons are not difficult to make in comparison with nuclear weapons. As more countries develop their chemical industries the potential for manufacturing chemical weapons will inevitably expand as well.

Moreover, the chemical warfare agents known today are relatively primitive. They were discovered largely by trial and error. But our knowledge of biochemistry is rapidly growing, and such information about the chemical processes in the human body provides in turn the ability to manipulate those processes. Thus, the invention of new and even more deadly types of chemical warfare agents become technically feasible.

As another example, there are chemicals which are present naturally in the body in small quantities, but which in larger amounts could be injurious. Advances in biotechnology make it possible to produce large quantities of such chemicals.

Finally, we are concerned about development of chemicals which could make existing protective equipment useless.

All of these disquieting developments have prompted my Government to try to accelerate the negotiations. Since 1983, we have taken a number of initiatives, including the introduction of a complete draft convention. On behalf of President Reagan, Vice-President George Bush has twice visited the Conference to stress the urgency of negotiating an effective ban of chemical weapons. We have explained our positions in detail and expressed our readiness to negotiate. And what has been the result? So far, not much. There is no sense of urgency. There is no spirit of problem-solving.

As I have argued today, the effective prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent matter which should concern us all. Such weapons are not limited to the super-Powers or a handful of industrialized countries. In fact, the majority of chemical-weapon States are developing countries in the Middle East and Asia. It is in the developing world where chemical weapons have been used in recent

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

-years and where the risk of use in the future is greatest. And it is precisely developing countries which are the most vulnerable and which can least afford to divert scarce resources to chemical defence. We cannot agree with those who argue that a ban on chemical weapons should somehow be dependent on progress in other matters before the conference or that it is a matter of interest to only a few countries.

I believe that an effective chemical weapons convention can be achieved. The disturbing trends mentioned earlier do not have to get out of hand. But it will require a new sense of urgency and dedication from all of us. The Conference cannot continue on a "business as usual" basis and expect to succeed.

What then is to be done? Let me offer some specific suggestions.

First, our work must be put on a more rational schedule. Under the present arrangements no serious negotiations take place between mid-August and late February. Almost half of each year is being wasted. No other international negotiation operates in such a fashion. Our experiments with a three-week session in January have not succeeded -- for a variety of reasons. A better way needs to be found. For this reason my delegation strongly supports the proposal for a six-week negotiating session in the autumn.

Understandably, a number of delegations have pointed to the difficulties such a schedule would pose for existing staffing patterns. Concern has been expressed that the benefits might not outweigh the costs. I believe that a more rational schedule would lead quickly to better results. Of course, there is no way to know in advance. But there is a way to ensure that negotiations do not move forward in the six months between August and February. If there is no negotiating session there will be no progress. Instead of following a course that will clearly not help to accelerate the negotiations, let us take an initiative to provide the framework for swifter progress.

The second suggestion for accelerating the negotiations is for the Conference to identify and focus on the truly pivotal issues. At times it seems that the negotiations have become entangled in a thicket of secondary issues. Each of these issues is important to at least one delegation. But solving these numerous complex issues one-by-one will not move the negotiations ahead very quickly. The Conference should concentrate its efforts on those issues which are the keys to progress. In every negotiation there are a few such issues. If progress can be made on these pivotal issues, momentum will build up and secondary issues will be resolved much more rapidly.

At the current stage of the negotiations, three issues seem to my delegation to be the keys to progress. One is the declaration of locations of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. A second is how to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production. The third is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Today I will briefly recall the approach to each issue proposed in the United States draft convention (CL/500) and elaborated in the statement by my delegation on 23 August 1984.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Regarding the first issue, the United States has proposed that the locations of chemical weapons stocks and of chemical weapons production facilities be declared within 30 days after a State becomes a party to the convention. In our view this is essential for assessment of whether all stocks and facilities have been declared and thus for ensuring confidence in compliance. It is the key not only to assessing the initial declarations, but also to monitoring the declared stocks and facilities until they are destroyed.

On the second issue, the importance of ensuring that the chemical industry is not misused for chemical weapons purposes has been emphasized by Western, Socialist and Group of 21 delegations alike. The United States strongly supports the approach developed by the United Kingdom. Under this approach the level of verification would depend on the level of risk, and unnecessary interference in civil use of chemicals would be avoided.

As for the third issue, an effective compliance mechanism, including challenge inspection, is an essential safety net. It would supplement the system of routine verification, which should be the principal means for ensuring confidence in compliance. My Government, beginning with an assessment of the verification difficulties unique to chemical weapons and the dangers posed by undeclared stocks and sites, has taken the unprecedented step of proposing to open our country to mandatory inspection anywhere, any time. We are proud of this commitment: it was not an easy one to make. Yet it represents in our view the best and most effective way that we know of to deter possible violations -- by ensuring that suspect activities are promptly dealt with.

These, then, are my delegation's views on where the real problems lie. We would welcome the views of other delegations, so that the negotiations can be focused on the major obstacles to a convention.

The third suggestion for accelerating work on a chemical weapons ban is related to delegations' readiness to negotiate. This means establishing clear positions, responding constructively and promptly to proposals from others, and working co-operatively to develop new, mutually-acceptable solutions. This factor is something of a truism, but I feel compelled to underscore its fundamental importance, because this is perhaps the area of greatest disappointment for my delegation. The United States has established detailed positions. It has responded to numerous questions. And it has made clear that the United States proposals have not been presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.

Unfortunately, the actions of the delegation of the Soviet Union give us the impression that the Soviet Union is not yet prepared to negotiate with the United States or others in this Conference. There is no point in speculating here about the reasons that may lie behind this unresponsiveness. The regrettable fact is that detailed substantive responses to proposals from us and others have not been made.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The Soviet delegation has not responded to major Western initiatives that have been before this Conference for a year or more. What is the Soviet response to the proposals made by the United Kingdom for ensuring non-production of chemical weapons? We do not know, although the basic approach was first presented two years ago. What is the Soviet response to the United States draft convention presented a year ago? It is whispered in the corridors that the Soviet delegation intends to ignore the United States draft. So it seems, but this can hardly be called negotiation.

The Soviet delegation has responded to the United States proposal for "open invitation" challenge inspection. But not constructively. Those who choose to criticize have a responsibility to present an equally effective alternative. But the Soviet delegation has not done so. Furthermore, it has rejected or ignored United States efforts to meet Soviet concerns and continues to misrepresent the United States proposal for propaganda purposes.

What my delegation is looking for is a problem-solving approach by our Soviet negotiating partners -- for evidence of a commitment to try to work out mutually-acceptable solutions that accommodate our concerns. The delegation of the Soviet Union would find that such a commitment to co-operation would be fully reciprocated.

This is no empty promise. My delegation is prepared to match words with deeds. Let me give some specific examples.

The United States delegation has explained in detail the reasons why the locations of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities must be declared promptly for the convention to be effective. In an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to consider the possibility that a party could move its chemical weapons stocks before declaration from their original storage sites in combat units to regional depots.

Since only the regional depots -- and not the combat units -- would contain chemical weapons, only the locations of these depots would have to be declared. Thus, the locations of combat units would not be revealed. The locations of depots would be declared within 30 days after the convention enters into force for the State.

As a second example, with respect to destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation has insisted that a party be allowed to divert some chemicals to industrial uses. My delegation has not been in favour of this concept. The Soviet delegation has not made clear what would be diverted nor how the peaceful use of the chemical would be verified. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to explore in detail whether a mutually-acceptable solution can be developed which would permit diversion under effective verification.

As a third example, the issue of how to identify so-called "key precursors" has consumed considerable amounts of time and energy. The Soviet position has been that "objective criteria" must be agreed to before lists can be developed. My delegation and others have questioned whether criteria could be established

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

that were not subject to varying interpretation. The United States view has been that efforts should focus on the lists themselves, rather than on abstract and imprecise criteria. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to work in parallel on guidelines for the lists and on the lists themselves. In this way the interests of both sides could be accommodated.

The final example of our co-operative attitude is in the area of challenge inspection. My delegation believes strongly that mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection is essential for an effective chemical weapons ban. It is essential because of the difficulty in distinguishing between permitted and illicit production of chemicals and in establishing confidence that all declared stocks and sites are in fact all the stocks and sites there are.

However, as we have made clear on numerous occasions, we are willing to consider any counterproposal that is designed to meet our concerns. We have never insisted on retaining every jot and tittle of our convention: we have sought only to satisfy our security concerns. The collective efforts of this body may develop a better, more effective way of meeting these concerns, and we would welcome such a development. Furthermore, in an effort to meet concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation, let me state again that my delegation is prepared to explore means to ensure that all relevant facilities are subject to challenge inspection, regardless of whether they are privately or State-owned.

I began this statement with a fairly pessimistic assessment of the present state of affairs. I pointed out the increasing risk that the negotiations to ban chemical weapons completely will be overtaken by the spread of chemical weapons capabilities and by the emergence of completely new types of chemical weapons. For my Government these developments are compelling reasons to accelerate the work of the Conference on a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

How can we accelerate the negotiations? By adopting a problem-solving attitude. The four specific topics I mentioned a moment ago would be good places to start. My delegation is ready to work on them, as well as on all other aspects of the future agreement. Our hope is that all delegations are prepared to join us.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

Accordingly, my delegation welcomes the re-establishment, during this session, of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with the task of continuing the comprehensive and complete process of negotiations and preparing a draft convention on chemical weapons. This Committee, which is presided over by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, has already made considerable progress, during the last session, under the competent direction of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. It is our fervent hope that the few remaining difficulties will be overcome, since the Convention to be concluded in this respect must comprise all the necessary provisions, including those relating to verification and compliance.

The Conference has before it document CD/544 of 5 February 1985 in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the President of our Conference numerous resolutions that were adopted at the thirty-ninth regular session of the General Assembly and which entrust certain specific tasks to the Conference. At the same time, he also transmitted a number of our resolutions relating to questions of disarmament. Under the terms of operative paragraph 3 of resolution 39/65 E, the General Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention for submission to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

It is obvious that all States without distinction, and primarily the two super-Powers, must exhibit a stronger political will to overcome the political obstacles and succeed in drafting a universally acceptable convention during the present session.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation has asked for the floor today in order to exercise its right of reply. We had not intended to speak on the subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons — we propose to make a separate statement on it shortly — but we should like to comment on the statement made by our colleague, Ambassador Lowitz of the United States. This is not the first time I have heard an American statesman speak on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It has become a sort of fashion for United States representatives to refer in their statements to various alleged cases of utilization of chemical weapons. Vice-President Bush did so in 1983, Mr. Adelman, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency did so in 1985, our colleague Ambassador Lowitz is doing so today. But in each of these cases the speaker has for some reason "forgotten" to mention that it is the United States of America which, in the whole post-war period, was the country that used toxic chemicals most widely and massively for an entire decade at the time of the war in Viet Nam. That was a gross violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We shall systematically recall this when such "omissions" are made in statements by United States representatives.

As my colleagues know, I am not given to quoting myself. But on this occasion I should like to recall that speaking on another topic in this room two days ago I said that ignorance of facts, ignorance of a question's history, is not to the speaker's credit, and if he knows the facts and distorts them, then that is all the worse for him. Today I have been surprised by some of my United States colleague's assertions. For example, I quote: "What is the Soviet response to the United States draft convention presented a year ago? It is whispered in the corridors that the Soviet delegation intends to ignore the United States draft". Well, first of all, my advice to the United States delegation is not to listen to rumours; they are not the best source of information; it would do better to read the Conference records. If the United States delegation and its experts had done so, they would probably have been able to recollect that last year we spoke three times — three times — about the United States draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To substantiate my remarks and help the United States experts to avoid referring to rumours and glance at the documents instead, let me give the dates: 26 April, 24 July and 9 August 1984. Does the United States delegation perhaps think that statements about their draft convention should be made every week or at every meeting? That is something we shall not do. We shall not do it simply because we do not think that this particular draft deserves such attention. Three times is quite enough.

Ambassador Lowitz said: "The Soviet delegation has responded to the United States proposal for 'open invitation' challenge inspection. But not constructively." A question arises in my mind: the United States delegation seems to think that the only possible reaction to a United States proposal is enthusiastic approval, a storm of

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

applause, unconditional acceptance. No, we have not and will not react in such a way, not because this is a United States proposal but because we adopt a serious and critical approach to any proposal. Those proposals which are really constructive and acceptable we accept, and in the case of those which are unacceptable to us we explain our motives in the most detailed manner possible. Let me recall once more that such comments were made by us in connection with the United States proposal concerning "open invitation" challenge inspection and that they can be read on pages 6 to 11 of the Russian text of document CD/PV.280. An English text certainly exists as well. Anyone can look and see why the Soviet delegation cannot accept this United States proposal.

And now my last point. The United States delegation has made an attempt to represent the United States position as being very flexible and constructive and going halfway to meet the positions of other delegations, including the Soviet Union, and the Soviet position as being rigid, stubborn and uncompromising. Is this really so, gentlemen? After all, in politics a State's position is judged not on the basis of self-advertisement but of comparison and of analysis of the development of the attitude of the State in question. And if you compare the position of the United States on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons in 1984 with, say, the position it adopted during the bilateral negotiations in 1976-1980 or even in 1983, you will see it has become more rigid, more unyielding and more unacceptable to many States, including the Soviet Union. Take, for example, the famous proposal on "open invitation" challenge inspection. On the other hand, I challenge any delegation to consider the Soviet Union's and other socialist countries' 1972 draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the 1982 Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the way our position has moved forward to meet that of other delegations, including the delegation of the United States of America, and they will see whose position is flexible and whose position is unyielding. After all, we have to try to move towards one another, not away from each other. That is the ABC of diplomacy. Those are facts, and facts, Mr. President, are stubborn things, even in diplomacy.

The United States representative also said: "What my delegation is looking for is a problem-solving approach by our Soviet negotiating partners — for evidence of a commitment to try to work out mutually acceptable solutions that accommodate our concerns". I understand Mr. Lowitz has in mind, so to speak, "mutually acceptable solutions" — an approach which, so to speak, would be designed to "accommodate interests and concerns of all States participating in negotiations". We agree. That has always been our position. If the United States delegation will really follow such a course, then, I think, there will be progress in negotiations.

(Mr. Shahabi Sirjani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

In my last intervention, on 14 March 1985, I drew the attention of the distinguished members and observers in the Conference to another escalation in the use of chemical weapons by Iraq on the war front. On that occasion I presented the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to all governments, and particularly to those present in this Conference, who can provide assistance to victims of the use of chemical weapons, to declare their willingness to do so in respect of the victims of such recent use. Fortunately, the request of my Government has been met in a manner deserving warm appreciation and today more than 30 Iranian victims of the use of chemical weapons are under treatment in a number of European countries. In this regard, our special thanks go to the Governments of Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, who have accepted a large number of the victims.

I should also thank a number of governments who have clearly and strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the past few days and today. However, it is regrettable that in the course of the past few days two of the victims of chemical weapons have died due to the extreme severity of their conditions, and one more is under intensive care in a hospital in Europe.

The examination of the victims and the post mortem examinations of the dead in European hospitals have made very clear indications of the extensive use of highly lethal chemical agents, including the blistering agent known as mustard gas, against Iranian forces.

In respect of the recent escalation in the use of chemical weapons and other violations of international agreements by Iraq, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a statement early this week and I would refer to the relevant part of it, which states that the Secretary-General is dismayed that a moratorium on attacks on purely civilian areas has not been observed, that attacks on unarmed merchant shipping persist and that international civil aviation in the area is under threat. He strongly urges both sides to put an end to such action.

The Secretary-General abhors in particular the use of chemical weapons in the course of these hostilities. Information emanating from medical sources in Vienna and London indicate that such use has recurred. As he had stated on previous occasions, the Secretary-General condemned the use of chemical weapons wherever and whenever this may occur. The appeal that he issued to ensure the strict observance of the Geneva Protocol still stands.

It is our desire and hope that adoption of appropriate positions and measures on the part of those Governments who have genuine and scrupulous support for the maintenance and preservation of the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in war would diminish and remove further gross violations of the Protocol to the benefit of all mankind.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Federal Government attaches central importance to the negotiations on a world-wide agreement outlawing chemical weapons. We have long held the view that every effort must be made to attain a comprehensive, universally applicable and reliably verifiable ban on these weapons 60 years after the conclusion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The reports on the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iraq and Iran have in a horrifying manner confirmed fears regarding the proliferation of chemical weapons. Fresh dynamism and willingness to be flexible are now called for to expedite these negotiations.

Difficult questions in the fields of "on-challenge" inspections, verification of the destruction of stocks and production facilities, and verification of the non-production of chemical weapons are still to be resolved. In its active participation in the work of the Conference in these spheres, my country is the only one that can invoke practical experience of international controls in connection with its pledge not to produce chemical weapons, controls which have been carried out within the Western European Union framework.

This experience has shown that effective verification of the non-production of chemical weapons is possible and can be reasonably expected, even in cases where the country in question has such an extensive and widely diversified chemical industry as the Federal Republic of Germany.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Today, we wish to consider in detail the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which has a special place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. World-wide public opinion expects the Conference to resolve this issue as early as possible. The activities of the Conference on Disarmament are ever more closely associated in the minds of many with the chemical weapons negotiations. No one would deny that much has been done in this area over the past years. The beginning of intensive negotiations this year on banning chemical weapons under the guidance of the Committee Chairman Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski is also a source of satisfaction.

Nevertheless, we remain concerned at the slow pace of the negotiations. The talks continue year after year and there are still no tangible results, no radical breakthrough. Some of the parties, as if frightened by the possibility of the negotiations being successfully completed and the convention signed, come out from time to time with deliberately unacceptable and, I would say, extremist proposals.

In spite of all these serious complications resulting from the position of certain parties, the Soviet Union still believes in the possibility of solving this urgent problem and continues to make efforts towards concluding a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons on terms acceptable to all the negotiating parties.

For more than half a century, ever since the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and up to the present day, the Soviet Union has been following a consistent, unswerving course aimed at drawing up and signing a convention which would ban chemical weapons completely and for all time while posing no risks to the security, economic or any other interests of any State taking part in the negotiations.

It may be of some interest to the members of this Conference that as early as 1928 the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory Commission for the General Conference on Disarmament introduced a proposal to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol with a new one containing, in particular, the following provisions: all the means and devices serving the purposes of chemical warfare, namely all asphyxiating gases used for military purposes as well as all devices for the diffusion of such gases, in particular gas-throwers, spray devices, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices in service with troops, as well as stored in depots or in the process of production, were to be destroyed. Furthermore, it was proposed that industrial facilities producing chemical weapons should immediately stop their production.

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Had those proposals of the Soviet Union been accepted by the other parties to the negotiations, chemical weapons would have long since been eliminated and there would be no need for the difficult and protracted discussions we are presently engaged in on this issue.

What is today the main obstacle, the main hindrance to the progress of chemical-weapon negotiations? Apparently, the continuing efforts by some of the parties to impose their own approaches and their own selfish perceptions on others. This attitude is utterly unsound. We are convinced that in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, in particular to key problems, one should bear in mind the specific political, economic and defence interests of each party, as well as remember the historical experience of every nation and people. I wish particularly to stress this. Some, and namely the Soviet Union, which has lost dozens of millions of lives as a result of foreign intervention and aggression, have been taught by the hard experience of their history to be especially cautious about various proposals calling for "openness", "publicity", unlimited verification and other dubious ideas. Meanwhile others, who have not had to go through the same ordeals as our people has, are proceeding mainly from the "experience" of petty suspicions, trumped up and blown out of all proportion by their own propaganda.

We were recently told in this chamber that, and I quote, "anyone with nothing to hide can agree to specific verification measures". This is probably true, provided that the one applying such measures acts in good faith and without ulterior motives. But given our historical experience, can we rest assured that such will always be the case?

The distinctive feature of Soviet proposals is precisely that we are not trying to force on others provisions which might impair their national security or inhibit their economy. Let us look, for instance, at the Soviet Union's approach to the question of chemicals used for permitted purposes.

This approach would spare the civilian, commercial chemical industry the considerable burden of intrusive outside verification procedures which would otherwise have extended virtually to each individual enterprise. At the same time, for the purposes of the convention, we feel obliged to propose several specific restrictions on the operations of chemical industries. We are suggesting that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals should be restricted, as well as that of one particular class of substances which poses the greatest threat while having almost no peaceful uses -- namely the methyl-phosphorus compounds. Such restrictions could not do any significant damage to any party to the future convention. We would like to recall in this connection that limitations on the production of certain chemicals are not completely unusual. It is common knowledge that pesticides are not nearly as dangerous to humans as are supertoxic lethal chemicals. Yet the production of some pesticides is actually subject to definite restrictions.

Indeed, do the peaceful branches of chemical industry in fact depend on supertoxic lethal chemicals as greatly as is sometimes portrayed by certain delegations? Would it not be wiser to consider including in the convention a provision allowing for such amendments with regard to supertoxic lethal chemicals and methyl-phosphorus compounds as may be required in view of scientific and technological developments and industrial needs in the future?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The other approach, which is not ours, is that of extending verification to all chemical industries, which would, in our view, be unpracticable and could most adversely affect the economic activities of States.

This has been only further proved to us by the Working Papers of the United Kingdom (CD/514 and CD/575) which reveal under close scrutiny that their authors would like to make hundreds and even thousands of different chemicals subject to all kinds of rigorous monitoring, which would be all-embracing rather than focused on the most dangerous technological stages of production. Now is this actually feasible?

One might properly ask what would be less burdening for the chemical industry -- a certain number of reasonable restrictions or an expensive across-the-board monitoring whose implications for the economic and other interests of States might prove to be far from benign?

Another question which demands a very cautious, balanced and responsible approach is that of the elimination, dismantling or conversion of chemical-weapon production facilities. Everyone will probably agree that toxic chemicals, including ones intended for chemical-weapon purposes, are obtained in the chemical industry as a result of several production stages, each having a different technological set up. One of these is the final technological stage in the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals or key components of binary systems. What, then, should be the object of practical interest from the viewpoint of drawing up the convention? Should the entire facility be eliminated, or would it be more appropriate to eliminate only the part responsible for the final technological stage? The answer to this seems obvious.

The reluctance of certain negotiating parties to accommodate the positions of others and the desire to impose one's own unilateral approach explain why the question of destroying chemical-weapon stockpiles has not yet been resolved at the negotiations. The main thing that remains to be done here is, in our view, to agree on a procedure for destroying the stockpiles of chemical weapons that would not offer unilateral military advantages to anyone at any stage of the destruction. We are prepared to examine all kinds of proposals submitted during the negotiations, including the working proposal by one of the delegations to alternate the destruction of the more dangerous weapon stockpiles with that of less dangerous weapons, thereby taking account of such factors as the increase in mutual trust between States as stocks are destroyed, the capacity maintained during that time for adequate reaction to possible convention violations by parties or non-parties, and so forth.

Throughout the long history of international negotiations, the partners in any talks have first established agreed baselines and criteria and only then proceeded to formulating specific definitions on their basis. This has also been the case with the talks on banning chemical weapons. Toxicity criteria have been defined with utmost precision on the basis of objective factors, a tentative

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

definition of key precursors has been provided, work has been done on certain other provisions of the future convention. And now after several years of strenuous negotiating efforts, it is suggested that we should give up objective criteria and replace them with such purely subjective categories as, for example, the notion of "risk" presented by various chemicals. I repeat, this is a subjective concept. It will mean one thing to one State and something else to another State. And it will certainly be very hard to reach agreement on this basis. This kind of approach actually turns the question of key precursors upside down. It is our firm conviction that the first thing to do is to define the criteria and have them agreed upon, and only then, based on those criteria, should a list of key precursors be drawn up. We believe that a technical solution to this problem has already evolved and that it should now be set out as a draft clause for the future convention.

This would open the way to drawing up the list of key precursors as such. Arguments to the effect that certain individual precursors may fail to meet all the established criteria do not stand up to criticism. We presume that exceptions to the general rule, where they are truly necessary, could be dealt with under the convention. Recently we were offered a "new" approach, presented as an important "concession", according to which criteria would be formulated parallel to the drawing up of lists. But this takes us nowhere. The question of criteria will arise whenever another key precursor is added to the list. Therefore criteria should be defined and agreed upon in advance.

The question of the key precursors that can be used to produce binary chemical weapons is of course a separate one. The Soviet delegation suggests that for the purposes of the convention such key precursors be referred to as key components of binary chemical systems, since not all key precursors are suitable for that role in view of the particular thermodynamic requirements of a binary system.

During the negotiations some delegations suggest totally different régimes to be adopted for the very same chemicals. While for protective purposes supertoxic lethal chemicals could be produced only at a small-scale specialized facility in quantities up to one tonne per year and subject to the most stringent international control, their production for other permitted purposes would be allowed anywhere and in unlimited quantities. A convention based on such proposals, while eliminating the present industrial base for chemical-weapons production, could end up establishing all the prerequisites for the creation of a new, more advanced and sophisticated one. We cannot accept such a double standard for ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons. This must not be allowed. The Soviet delegation believes that a study of Finland's proposal on possible versions of the small-scale facility could be of some use in dealing with this issue.

Proposals from other delegations aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions receive our careful consideration. This applies in particular to the proposals of France concerning the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals, classification of facilities and determination of their respective régimes, and solution of the binary weapons problem, as well as proposals by the delegation of China and by other delegations.

The elaboration of principles and arrangements for challenge inspection to clarify ambiguous situations has been and remains one of our most formidable tasks. No one is suggesting, as the United States delegation is trying to make it appear, that challenge inspection should not be conducted unless there is a proved violator

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the convention. At least this is not our position. What we do believe is that challenge inspection requires a particular sense of responsibility and political realism on the part of States. It must be understood that compliance with the convention will be based primarily on the goodwill of the States parties to it, on their wish for a peaceful world less burdened by arms race, and on their desire to eliminate the very means of waging chemical war. It will also be based on the fact that States, which usually set a high value on their political prestige, will not allow it to be damaged through their own fault.

This is the only approach that can help us place challenge inspection in a proper perspective within the convention and correctly formulate the relevant provisions without eroding the very purpose of such inspection or undermining the sovereign rights of States. It should be well understood in Washington that efforts to make challenge inspection mandatory and automatic will only waste our time in working out the convention. Our response to such proposals is unambiguously negative.

In this connection I would like to make the following point of principle which does not concern only the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As is well known, the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament indicates that the form and the terms of verification provided for in any particular agreement depend on the purposes, the scope and the nature of that agreement. Applied to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which is now being drawn up, this obviously means that the form and the terms of verification must be such as to reliably ascertain whether the convention is being complied with, on the one hand, and not to go beyond its scope, on the other. Hence we cannot but object to forms of verification that could be used for purposes beyond those of the convention.

Prohibition of chemical weapons by no means requires such things as providing access to facilities which produce the types of weapons not affected by the agreement in question. It is therefore only natural that if we are to approach the task of banning chemical weapons seriously, verification procedures have to be drawn up that could not be abused to interfere in the activities of States not covered by the convention which bans one specific type of weapon of mass destruction.

We have repeatedly emphasized that general and complete verification can be discussed only at the stage of general and complete disarmament, whereas attempts to impose general and complete verification as part of a limited agreement banning one specific, although important, type of weapon of mass destruction -- namely chemical weapons -- is to raise artificial obstacles in the way of working out such an agreement.

In conclusion I would like to reiterate that the Soviet delegation stands ready to continue serious and constructive negotiations with a view to the earliest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. As is well known, we were among those who advanced the proposal to make a more rational use of our time for negotiations and we remain firmly committed to the Conference decision or recommendation at its previous session to hold an extended session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the autumn of 1985.

For the USSR, the prohibition of chemical weapons has been and remains a priority task set out in the most important documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government. The Soviet delegation will do everything in its power to solve this task as rapidly as possible.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Turning to chemical weapons, it is only appropriate that I dwell for a few moments on that subject, since this is the period set aside in the first part of the 1985 session specifically for discussion in plenary of this issue.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has done intensive work during the 1984 session under the very able chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus and has not only clarified many points but focused attention on the basic framework of a future agreement, and I would like to express my personal gratitude to him, as well as that of my Government.

Ambassador Turbanski is already showing our wisdom in selecting him as successor to Ambassador Ekéus. He has lost no time in setting the course of the chemical weapons negotiations for the 1985 session. As a result, I would hope that, by making full use of our time, we might at least come close to completing our work during the 1985 session. It is a pretty tall order, I realize. Work in the three working groups is, however, progressing rather slowly, and there seems to be a worrisome tendency, which I do not level at any one group or any one delegation, to utilize the time in restating old positions and covering old ground. What we think that we must strive to do is to pinpoint those issues on which we agree and then work on those key issues which remain to be resolved, rather than continue to devote attention to somewhat less important issues in ever greater detail. We must in other words avoid creating inflexibility by our own working methods.

Clearly, we are at a stage in the negotiations where we must address certain critical issues related to verification. To delegations opposed to a discussion of the conceptual aspects of verification in isolation from concrete issues, let me say that we see too little indication of much willingness to come to grips by one means or another with the essential requirement of verification. For example, agreement must be found on procedures for the inspection of stockpile and production sites upon declaration at entry into force of the convention, which implies agreement on the principle of such inspection. How else can we be assured that the production sites are sealed and no longer active until they are destroyed? While the concept of continuous inspection during the destruction of existing chemical weapons has been generally accepted, similar agreement has eluded us on monitoring the destruction of the means of production. The issue of challenge verification must be addressed objectively, and I have listened with great interest to the important statement just delivered by the distinguished representative of the USSR which touched on that very issue. I think that what are needed are proposals, and we know that the United States delegation has taken the initiative in putting forward proposals outlining its views in detail on these issues. Without directing criticism at other delegations, we do

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

think that those who see matters differently should be prepared to table their own proposals on possible alternative approaches, updated proposals from earlier ones if necessary, so that the process of real negotiation may move forward. The first step obviously is to address the issues, and this does now seem to be occurring; but the second, I would hope, would be the tabling of relevant proposals or counter-proposals, bearing in mind the present state of negotiations.

On a separate and seemingly procedural matter, Ambassador Turbanski, as directed in the report of last year's ad hoc committee on chemical weapons, has already held consultations on the subject of the extension of work into the autumn and even possibly the early part of 1986. My delegation is prepared to agree to increase the time devoted to this subject during the year, as we have been urged to do in United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/65C. In spite of the obvious difficulties, and they are really considerable for many delegations, we would be prepared to carry on work on the convention anytime between the regular sessions of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed how can we do less when reports continue to appear of the actual use of chemical weapons? I am going to personalize for a moment again, to say that I know something about the effects of chemical weapons because my own father suffered from them in the First World War: so many of us come to this Conference with personal convictions as well as national positions. It seems to me that the renewed use of these dreadful weapons long after we all believed they had been outlawed adds ever-increasing urgency to our work.

I have emphasized in the past our concerns about the danger of proliferation of chemical weapons, and have pointed out that this proliferation would inevitably exacerbate regional tensions and lead to new dimensions in regional arms competition. This proliferation is now fact and no longer mere theory.

Any war produces horrible results, but the use of chemical weapons greatly heightens the human suffering entailed. It represents a totally unacceptable escalation of any conflict. It is moreover, as I have just pointed out, a violation of international law in the form of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For this reason, Canada, in agreement with many other countries, has imposed controls on the export of certain chemicals which could be useful in the production of highly toxic chemical warfare agents. We recognize that this is far from adequate in closing off the many routes to production of all of the known chemical warfare agents. That overriding goal can only be achieved through a verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

It is important, of course, to bear in mind that work on a prohibition of use in this forum and in the context of a future chemical weapons convention does not in any way detract from the status or obligations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Last year when I acted in a personal capacity as friend of the Chairman, Rolf Ekéus, on the prohibition of use issue, this was a point often made to me by other delegations privately as well as during the informal discussions at which I presided. At the same time, it is essential to preserve the full force and effect of the Geneva Protocol by precise formulations which take into account the legitimate apprehensions of delegations about the possible loopholes created by imprecise language.

If I may, I would like to draw attention to one other aspect of the informal discussions which I have just mentioned. As we are all aware, the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons (CD/416) provides an outline of various

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

ways in which the basic prohibition of use might be dealt in a future convention. Annex I to the Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/539) attempts to re-arrange these options in draft treaty language. These documents, and the interventions of many delegations during the informal discussions I have mentioned, have made us all much more aware of the complexities of the formulation of the prohibition of use issue and of its interrelationship with other elements of the future convention.

It is a matter of some gratification that some momentum has been developing behind the view that the formulation of the prohibition of use should be kept as simple and as unencumbered as possible by any qualifying statements or reservations. Of course, it is recognized that such an approach shifts part of the burden to other sections of the convention, such as those dealing with definitions and permitted activities. It might of course reasonably be argued that that is where such matters belong. I certainly do not wish to expand upon these issues at this time, however I would like to reiterate a point that I have made several times informally. Such progress as we have made on these questions has occurred precisely because we have sought to determine, through very informal process, the nature and extent of the area of possible common ground, as well as the areas of possible flexibility, and then have sought to clarify, define and gradually expand this area of common ground. Clearly, in order to do so, on this or any other issue, it is necessary to avoid freezing or formalizing our positions to the point where we back ourselves into opposing corners. Admittedly the question of the precise formulation of the absolute prohibition of use, and I mention this for illustrative purposes, and the question of the relationship between the convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, can both finally be resolved only when we are in a position to determine how other related issues are to be settled. Well then, how can we proceed without getting involved in a circular process?

I suggest that the process we should adopt not only on this issue is that we try to reach agreement in principle on a formulation, such as the short form on use, on a contingent basis, on the express understanding that the interrelated issues will be addressed one by one, with a view to reaching further agreements of principle on each of these issues. Final approval of the treaty language on each point could await agreement on the entire package. This approach could be followed on other parts of the treaty, and I suggest on other subjects. Let us therefore continue to sound each other out informally as possible in order to determine whether there may exist common ground and the areas of flexibility and then seek to expand it, leaving final texts open, if necessary, on interrelated issues. If we could follow this process and apply our experience to other questions on chemical weapons and elsewhere, I think we could make more success than might otherwise be possible.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): I have to resort to rule 30, as you have mentioned, for I have asked for the floor today in order to take up the subject of chemical weapons, and in particular to elaborate on my statement of 14 February in which I placed special emphasis on agenda item 4. In my February statement, I talked about possible merits in trying to "first work out the basic framework of a draft convention ... then within such framework ... to work on the areas where there can be significant differences amongst the negotiating parties" in order to achieve greater efficiency.

We are all more than aware that the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament concerning a chemical weapons convention have been very active and detailed in recent years. At the same time, we realize that the report of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1984, for example, contains many paragraphs in square brackets, indicating remaining areas where agreement is still to be worked out. In spite of strenuous efforts the parties have exerted, and I must add here the sincere appreciation of my delegation to the past and present chairmen and co-ordinators, nevertheless it is not necessarily clear how much real progress has been achieved towards the drafting of a chemical-weapons convention.

The work for a chemical weapons convention involves a myriad of political, military, technical and legal problems, and there is a danger that if priorities are mixed with regard to the various details, without a clear perception on the broad framework of the convention being first established, then continued discussions might merely lead to increased difficulties in finding a balance between the interests of the parties concerned. We therefore consider it worthwhile to stop every now and then to look back to where we have started from, and to reconfirm the basic objectives of the negotiations. This will enable us to have a clearer view regarding the over-all structure of the future chemical weapons convention.

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

In such an attempt to go back to the starting point of our work, I should like to make some remarks which present my delegation's perception of the major elements of this convention.

What is to be prohibited in the Convention? This, obviously is related to the basic objectives of the convention and we think that sufficient work has been accumulated to make it possible at this stage to clarify those areas where there has been basic agreement. An important point is how to express the prohibition on use, including its relationship with the earlier Geneva Protocol on the subject. In this respect, I wish to make two points.

Firstly, it would seem possible clearly to affirm the continuing validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by providing for a confirmatory clause in either the preambular or operative part of the convention to the effect that nothing in the present Convention shall be understood or interpreted to imply a limitation or reduction of the obligations undertaken by States under the said Protocol.

Secondly, though there have been a number of proposals for the appropriate expression with regard to the prohibition on use, my delegation feels that we should first try to reach clear agreement to provide for a clause in the convention along the lines such as is being contemplated now; namely, that "Each State Party undertakes not to use chemical weapons". Discussions on whether or not the right of reprisal should be clearly spelled out and on other related matters could be left to a meeting of legal experts to be called at some later date to draft the details.

Next, I would like to look at how we are to define chemical weapons. My country would consider it to be most desirable if chemicals used exclusively for weapons purposes were to be identified and listed together with related munitions as substances to be prohibited under this convention. For the purpose of declaration, elimination and other controls, it is essential to start with a clearly defined list of chemicals. However, if it were to prove difficult to achieve general consensus on this approach, we consider it inevitable to follow the present understanding and rely on the general-purpose criteria for defining chemical weapons. A certain difficulty accompanies this latter approach because a definition in this manner depends on a set of criteria for achievement of objectivity of judgement.

I have already pointed out, particularly during my intervention at a plenary in July 1983, that a definition on the basis of general-purpose criteria may call for a very difficult verification of the specific "intent" in regard to the material in question. It means that great care should be exercised so that an undue burden will not fall upon normal industrial activities through the process of inquiry into the reasons why various activities are conducted in chemical industries. We deem it necessary to include an explicit provision in recognition of this danger in the operative or preambular part of the convention, and intend to present our ideas in more definite form to the Ad Hoc Committee in due course.

Next, the declaration and elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Various proposals have been put forward concerning the timing and content of the declaration, as well as the time-limit and methods for elimination. My delegation believes that declaration and elimination together form the most important part of the convention, and, therefore, that the relevant provisions should be as detailed and definitive as possible.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

At the same time, we must always bear in mind the basic understanding that what are to be declared and eliminated are those chemicals defined as weapons according to the general-purpose criteria, related weapon systems and their production facilities. If we lose sight of this basic point, the scope of the definition is likely to expand beyond control, leading us into a dangerous vicious circle in treaty language.

I should like to mention here that in looking for suitable verification technology to monitor chemical-weapons related facilities, especially facilities for elimination, it would be relevant to consider the application of what the IAEA utilizes as a reliable remote sensor technology in the implementation of safeguards. This is known as RECOVER, and I would like to present a working paper in due course introducing an example of this technology as applied to verification of a chemical weapons convention.

Allow me next to turn to permitted activities. The two major activities foreseen in this regard are those for protective purposes and peaceful purposes.

With regard to protective purposes, Japan is able to support the following two points, namely: that the production of super-toxic lethal and related chemicals for protective purposes should take place in a single specialized facility and in no case should the gross total of such chemicals exceed one ton: and that this specialized facility should be submitted to routine international on-site verification.

As regards peaceful purposes, such as industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other activities, language should be elaborated which takes due account of the guiding principle already agreed to previously, namely that States Parties to this convention undertake not to create any impediments to such peaceful activities.

There have been a number of proposals regarding the effective monitoring of the production and other related activities with regard to specific chemicals which might possibly hinder the attainment of the objectives of the convention. These measures are important means to enhance confidence amongst the States Parties in the implementation of the convention. The basic approach which Japan supports with regard to this is as follows. First, specific chemicals to be put on the list of material to be so monitored should be defined as clearly as possible by giving the exact scientific name and, where necessary, the chemical formula. Second, the number of chemicals to be included in such a list should be kept to the bare minimum, but the list should be subjected to periodic review after the entry into force of the convention. Third, the list should start with super-toxic lethal chemicals used exclusively for weapons purposes, and go on to their immediate precursors which have little peaceful applications. I realize that whether we can agree to the above as the criteria to define a key precursor is something to be elaborated through future negotiations.

With respect to precursors other than those mentioned above and the so-called dual purpose substances, a great deal of care is required in their identification and listing because many of them are widely produced and used for peaceful purposes. It would seem extremely difficult to determine clearly and objectively whether a given chemical in this category was intended for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, whereas given our free market economy, we would be unable to accept undue restrictions on normal industrial production. This fact must always be borne in mind in all considerations to include these chemicals in the list and place them under some kind of control.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Further consideration leads us to the following.

First, it is very important and necessary that the criteria for selecting the individual chemicals for inclusion in the list are clearly spelled out. One way of doing this job properly would be to appoint a group of scientific experts to give a clear explanation as to why one substance from among a production or synthesizing chain had been selected as a precursor in the context of the convention. Identification of practical processes for synthesizing known super-toxic lethal chemicals could serve to create a common basis for consideration of this matter.

Second, in the event that, for lack of better alternatives, certain chemicals produced or used for peaceful purposes in industry have to be placed under control through reporting of production amounts etc. in order to prevent illegal or undesirable diversion, the concept of a "significant quantity" becomes of particular importance. In this respect, it should be useful to request experts to develop concrete quantitative figures with due regard being given to existing national capabilities of chemical industries. At the same time, special attention must be paid to the cost/effectiveness aspect in consideration of controls with regard to widely-used chemicals produced on a large scale for peaceful purposes. Measures to implement the convention with regard to these chemicals could cause undue difficulties to the chemical industry, while the collection and processing of the related data would require extensive efforts and entail great cost.

Thirdly, with regard to those chemicals to be listed, we need to study and agree on what information is significant and, therefore, required under the convention. I might add that experience in other fields indicates that presentation of statistical data on production, export and import, conversion into final products, etc. has to be handled very carefully. Data collection, unless carefully designed in advance, can lead to increased confusion, while a possibility of data manipulation cannot be denied.

I wish now to turn to matters concerning verification, and especially how we are to provide for on-site inspection. It would seem to us to be most practical if the final details of on-site inspection of the individual facilities were to be worked out in the form of supplementary agreements between the States concerned and the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organ following the entry into force of the convention. However, in order to provide for a smooth functioning of the convention from the very beginning, and further, to ensure a non-discriminatory and fair application to all States Parties, it would be preferable that agreed rules or guidelines to this end be developed and annexed to the convention as an integral part thereof. Since it is conceivable that peaceful industrial activities are included in on-site inspections in the course of implementation of the convention, especially where a challenge is involved, provisions should be included therein to protect industrial proprietary information and other industrial property.

We hope to see early agreement on the basic composition and functions of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary body, the Executive Committee, along the lines developed at the Ad Hoc Committee's meetings in the past.

We are much interested in the composition of the Executive Committee, and think that the following points should be given due consideration, namely: (i) the participation of the two chemical-weapons Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union; (ii) equitable geographic and political representation; and (iii) equitable representation of the world's chemical industry.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Further, we think that the number of States to be represented on the Executive Committee would of necessity be limited in order for it to be viable as an executive body. Re-election to the Committee should not be prohibited.

Next, I would like to talk about procedures regarding compliance. On-going discussions on implementation indicate various modes for consultation and co-operation between parties, as well as fact-finding conducted under the supervision of the Consultative Committee or of its subsidiary body as the means for resolving all matters related to the implementation of the convention. Much ground has already been covered in previous work of the Ad Hoc Committee in this regard, which we hope will provide for an early agreement on principles.

With regard to the formulation of fact-finding arrangements and to its time-frame, there is a tendency to place emphasis on the element of speed. I should like to take this opportunity to present our comments in this regard.

We feel that the situation calling for prompt reaction is one in which suspicion has arisen with regard to possible chemical weapons use. There can also be problems of clandestine facilities and clandestine activities which call for prompt action. These two categories represent serious violations so that somewhat unusual procedures may be justified.

With regard to those facilities which are subject to routine international on-site inspection, we feel that challenge verification can be justified, in the form of a special inspection, when data transmitted from on-site instrumentation etc. indicate irregularities. The procedure for such special inspection should be set out in an annex to the convention.

Regardless of whether or not a certain facility is required to provide information under the convention on its activities, it is possible that a question might arise regarding possible diversion of chemicals from peaceful to military purposes. One can argue about a system of on-site inspection to provide for timely detection. On the other hand, excessive exercise of this right could create undue difficulty for the normal operation of the world's peaceful chemical industry. There are also practical limitations arising from availability of inspection resources. Therefore, with regard to suspicion concerning the activities of the peaceful civilian industry, the State concerned should first be given the opportunity to present information and explanation in order to clarify the situation. Only when doubts persist, would it be advisable to move on to other means of verification including on-site inspection. In this respect, we also feel it necessary to provide for procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exercise of requests for on-site inspection. It is our considered view that inspection resource requirements should be calculated in advance, before deciding definitively as to what chemicals are to be included in the list, what their significant quantities are, what level of confidence one requires from routine inspection, and how many challenge inspections might likely be conducted. This will give a very useful sensitivity analysis regarding the cost/effectiveness of chemical weapons verification.

I do not need to emphasize that these views are the result of careful consideration and examination not only of our own situation but also of the world's chemical industries in general, in their inevitable association with matters of chemical weapons and chemical warfare. I have emphasized in this intervention points about listing for definition and the concept of a significant quantity, and considered them in the over-all context of the implementation of a chemical weapons convention. I hope that I was able to present a general outline of our line of thinking. I wish to repeat again that the Conference on Disarmament during this session should work, work hard and together, to make substantive progress in the negotiation of this very important convention.

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

A year has already passed since the publication of the report by the United Nations fact-finding mission regarding the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. I do not think that the time has been insufficient for a full international investigation into a critical question which has been the focus of concern of the international community. Could you, as the most informed individuals conducting the multilateral disarmament negotiations in this Conference, come to terms with your conscience to justify the catastrophic and conspiratorial indifference of international bodies vis-à-vis this crime of genocide through lack of appropriate international means to prevent the use of chemical weapons? A fortnight ago, exactly at a time when the United Nations Secretary-General was in Baghdad to pursue his efforts to persuade the Iraqi régime to abide by international conventions and regulations, the Islamic Republic of Iran was once again the victim of an extensive chemical attack. The report concerning this attack and its human toll has already been circulated as a document of the United Nations. Without delay, we invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to fly from Baghdad to Tehran immediately to witness at close quarters the catastrophic effects of the deployment of chemical weapons. By choosing this particular time to launch another chemical attack, the Iraqi régime has, in fact, declared to the United Nations Secretary-General personally that it is determined not only to continue the deployment of chemical weapons, but absolutely to disregard world public opinion and all international conventions and regulations. Does this tragic state of affairs not persuade all fair-minded people to suspect that the Iraqi régime dares ridicule all universal values of humanity on the strength of certain behind-the-scenes backings, and escape any punitive action by the Security Council and other practical international measures?

Only during the six previous weeks from 3 March to 9 April 1985, according to the figures, the list of which will be submitted with photographs to the Conference for the information of the distinguished delegates, 4,600 people were wounded and martyred by 33 instances of use of chemical weapons. I repeat, 4,600 people were wounded and martyred by 33 instances of use of chemical weapons. Iraq has not only perpetrated the crime of repeatedly resorting to chemical warfare, but has also conducted extensive research and experiments for the deployment of new chemical weapons. In its earlier deployment as reported by the United Nations team, Iraq used Mustard Gas and Tabun, which is a nerve gas.

Here it is worth mentioning that although Tabun was developed during World War Two, it was never used, and the Baathist régime of Iraq is the first to have used this deadly weapon, shunned by mankind. In its later development, the Iraqi régime used a new chemical weapon composed of Tabun and an asphyxiating agent, and finally in its most recent deployments, this régime has utilized a newer agent comprising of Tabun, Cyanide compounds as well as Mustard Gas. This new chemical agent was deployed through aerial bombardment and was sprayed by crop-spraying aircraft. The Conference is asked to take effective measures to halt the development and test of new chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime.

Who do you think still respects the 1925 Geneva Protocol? Should not an answer to this question precede the resumption of efforts by this Conference to ban the deployment of chemical weapons? Does not the shockingly repeated use of chemical agents by Iraq and the extensive research and experiment for the development of new ones not have anything to do with international peace and security? If it has, could the Security Council offer the least justification for its irresponsible attitude to the international community? Could the Security Council deny that its silence has not persuaded and encouraged Iraq to continue to deploy these weapons?

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Of course, the attitude taken by this Council was not unexpected to us. Small wonder that the Security Council, which once adopted the Resolution 552 concerning the attacks on commercial ships and tankers, now refrains from issuing a resolution condemning Iraq for the use in war of chemical weapons.

What is surprising under such circumstances is the continuous efforts, long talks, and holding of several sessions aimed at adopting new conventions as regards disarmament.

It is against common sense to waste time and money on agreements which can only be used in libraries and referred to in conferences. If 60 years after the adoption of the 1925 Protocol, and so many years of painstaking efforts of our fathers to work out common values of humankind leading to the preparation of a protocol in which the use of chemical weapons is considered inhuman and immoral, 33 cases of violations of this agreement during only six weeks create no proper sensitivity in international fora, especially the ones directly concerned with this matter, must not the world community sadly mourn for the moral collapse of international organizations?

It is not necessary during the short opportunity given to me to deal with the deficiencies and weaknesses of the existing international organizations that are responsible for maintaining peace and security, and safeguarding international agreements and regulations. All of you, by and large are aware of these weaknesses. Undoubtedly the delegates representing various countries in international fora have paid attention to these weak points in proportion to their independence, and efforts were made to eliminate the current shortcomings. Here my main concern is not the above-mentioned shortcomings; rather I would like to draw attention to those elements which manipulate international regulations and executive bodies for the achievement of sublime human goals. In my letter dated 29 January 1985, to the United Nations Secretary-General, I said

"Certainly there are more effective ways to prevent Iraq from using chemical weapons, and still the Islamic Republic of Iran is not willing to think of the last option. Is there any other internationally accepted legal instrument to meet this goal, which, in fact, is an international objective? It is hoped that Your Excellency will seriously consider this question and give an answer accordingly. It is self-evident that if the answer does not include a practical solution independent of the imposed war, it will be considered a negative answer, and implies that the Islamic Republic of Iran and all members of international community are absolutely defenceless against the violation of the Geneva Protocol, thus forcing all countries to independently adopt necessary preventive measures in order to confront this action."

Now, do you not think that refraining from giving an answer to this question would have no other result than to strengthen the theory of deterrence.

We even suggested a practical solution. On 16 February 1985, in a letter to the United Nations, we requested sending a permanent mission to Tehran in order to investigate and give reports on the deployment of chemical weapons. The same elements that prevented the Security Council from taking a proper position as regards this

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

problem created obstacles in the acceptance of this request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization. We received no explanation indicating according to what legal principle the despatch of a mission aimed at realizing such a goal contravenes the duties of the United Nations.

Is there any better way to encourage the arms race? Unfortunately, it was not long before the incident we had given prior warnings of happened again. Chemical weapons were once again used in a very extensive manner.

The Islamic Republic of Iran once again asked the Secretary-General to station a permanent mission in Tehran to monitor such violations and report accordingly.

Naturally we insist on this stand because we still believe that the presence of such a team in Tehran can, to some extent, play a deterring role. We still have no intention to resort to other deterrent means to stop the Iraqi régime's crimes. At the same time, we evidently cannot remain defenceless for a long time. We are no more prepared unilaterally to sustain the damages resulting from this crime.

I am sure the Security Council has inevitably felt the special sensitivity of the present juncture. But I do not think that the Security Council has yet become bold enough to overcome political barriers of its members' influence. The Security Council is certainly aware of the grave consequences that a chemical retaliation may bring about for the human community and for the credibility of the Security Council and the whole United Nations if quick measures are not taken to stop it. But such measures require sincerity and determination, both of which the Security Council unfortunately lacks.

Considering the incentives and the philosophy behind the formation of this Conference, we believe it should be, more than any other United Nations organ, prepared to react to the prevailing sensitive state of affairs. The principled reaction of this Conference would certainly pave the way for other United Nations organs.

If for any political reason the Security Council cannot adopt an open stance on this matter, why should not this Conference call on the concerned United Nations to condemn the repeated and extensive Iraqi use of chemical weapons, and send the team the Islamic Republic of Iran has requested.

In order to prevent such crimes from being repeated in other parts of the world, we are ready to provide this Conference with the results of this bitter experience our people have undergone. The wounded of the recent chemical attacks of Iran have been sent to several European countries for treatment and studying their medical files will help the Conference to achieve its objective, and will make them understand the depth of the catastrophe.

Furthermore, it is advised that a glance be made at the book on biological and chemical warfare published by Gent University of Belgium. It is advisable that the distinguished representative of the Secretary-General should work out a method for compiling these findings and distribute them among Member States accordingly.

The Islamic Republic of Iran once again openly declares that in spite of its ability to retaliate in all such cases, it would not like to violate international laws and regulations, and would do so only when there is no other option. As regards chemical weapons, the reservations to the 1925 Protocol were changed into the non-first-use document. What is more, the Iraqi régime is one of the signatories to the non-first-use document. The Islamic Republic of Iran could indisputably embark on a retaliatory act through a legal interpretation of the document. But last year

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

here in this Conference it undertook not to retaliate, because it believes that such acts would discredit one of the most important international documents that has been violated less than any other convention, due to the fact that public opinion abhors the use of chemical weapons. Besides, it has had the hope that the international community would be able to stop its violation by the Iraqi régime.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

I am speaking today to introduce a further British Working Paper entitled "Chemical Weapons Convention: Organs and Constitution of the Organisation", which has already been circulated to all delegations as document CD/589. This paper is designed to complement the series of papers already tabled by the United Kingdom delegation on verification under a chemical weapons convention. The latest of these, CD/575, was tabled on 12 March by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Richard Luce, who emphasized the great importance attached by my Government to the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The present paper on the constitution of the organization builds on a wide area of common ground that has already been identified in the course of the negotiations on this subject. In this particular area there is already broad agreement that there should be a Consultative Committee composed of representatives of all parties to the convention, with the primary task of ensuring compliance with its provisions. It is also common ground that there should be an Executive Council of limited membership, and an international Secretariat which would include an Inspectorate. Our paper contains detailed proposals for the constitution and functions of these three organs and for the division of responsibility between them. We believe that it would be important to define these responsibilities with care and precision if the Organization is to be fully effective in its vital task of ensuring compliance with the convention and thus providing the confidence needed for its conclusion and continual stability.

The Organization would be responsible for implementation of the various verification measures required under the Convention to give assurance of compliance with its provisions. It would be responsible for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons by routine inspection and data exchange for which we have made

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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

detailed proposals in earlier papers. It would also be responsible during the first 10 years of the life of the convention for the verification of destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and of facilities for their production. Last but not least, it would become responsible for carrying out fact-finding procedures for verification on challenge, which could provide the safety-net to supplement routine inspection and thus represent the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. If this system of verification is to provide assurance to parties to the convention that its provisions are being complied with by other parties it would be essential that it should be, and be seen to be reliable and effective. For this purpose parties will need to have confidence in the Organization responsible for the operation of the verification system. With this aim in view my delegation proposes the creation of an independent international organization composed of parties to the convention, with a separate legal personality, on the lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which enjoys wide respect internationally for its effectiveness and impartiality. It would need a highly professional Secretariat which would command the confidence of all parties for its impartiality and integrity. The ability of the Secretariat to take effective action in a crisis in the event of suspicion of non-compliance would be fostered by its performance of the inspections on a routine basis of destruction of stockpiles and production facilities and of industry for the verification of non-production.

In addition to having an efficient and reliable Secretariat it would be essential for the Organization to have the capacity to make rapid and effective decisions to allay suspicions of non-compliance. It would not be practicable to convene the Consultative Committee composed of all parties within the timescale required to restore confidence in the convention. We have proposed therefore that the Executive Council should have delegated authority to carry out the day to day functions of the Organization and to be endowed with the necessary powers to enable it to carry out the objectives of the convention in a timely and efficient manner.

The Organization would need to start operating as soon as the convention enters into force. The demands on it would be particularly heavy for the first 10 years of its existence when it would be responsible for verifying the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and of the facilities for their production. The Organization would not therefore be able to grow gradually into its responsibilities but would need to make a flying start. To ensure this we have proposed the establishment of a Preparatory Commission composed of signatories to the convention with the task of creating the necessary machinery for the Organization to be operationally effective as soon as the convention enters into force.

In his statement to the Conference on 12 March my Minister, Mr. Luce, suggested that the Organization might help to promote a positive climate for greater

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

international co-operation between States Parties in the civil chemical industry throughout the world. My delegation has in mind the possibility that the Organization might, in addition to its primary role in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons, have also a separate role in the promotion of safety in the manufacture and handling of highly toxic substances. It would, of course, be important to keep any collaboration in this field on a voluntary basis and entirely separate from that of the mandatory inspections under the convention to provide assurances of compliance with its prohibitions. My delegation would be happy to join with other delegations in studying this aspect further, as Mr. Luce suggested.

My delegation believes that this Working Paper tabled today offers a practical blue print for an effective and viable organization which would allow all States Parties to play a full part in the operation of the Convention while providing machinery for rapid decisions relating to its implementation and operation. We hope that other delegations will share this view and that the paper will stimulate discussion of this important aspect of the convention which has hitherto received relatively little attention.

I should like to take this opportunity to offer some comments on the statement on chemical weapons made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 4 April. My delegation welcomes the readiness of the Soviet delegation which he expressed to continue serious and constructive negotiations with a view to the earliest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. With the same aim in view I should like to take up some points made by Ambassador Issraelyan, especially those related to proposals and ideas put forward earlier by the United Kingdom delegation.

The proposals for verification of non-production we made in document CD/575 are carefully limited, both in the proposed measures of inspection and data exchange, and in the list of compounds to which they would be applied. Inspection on a routine basis is proposed only for those toxic agents and precursors which would pose a high risk to the convention if manufactured industrially. This category is confined to super-toxic lethal compounds and possibly other named compounds which can be used directly in chemical weapons, and to a strictly limited number of key precursors. The high-risk key precursors comprise four classes of compounds plus three particular compounds. The total number of compounds in this category that are manufactured on a significant scale is not numbered in hundreds still less in thousands. In fact the number of plants making such compounds, according to the data given to my delegation in response to the appeal we made two years ago in our document, CD/353, is less

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

than 11, for all the high-risk compounds taken together. This figure is derived from the data given in the two Working Papers we have circulated at the end of the 1983 and 1984 sessions (CW/WP/57 and CW/WP/86) updated to include some additional data received since August 1984. We do not of course know with certainty how many such plants there are in other countries which have not yet provided us with the information requested. The onus is, however, on the countries which have not provided data to substantiate their claims that our proposals would not be feasible because of the large number of plants involved.

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, verification of non-production needs to be based on an agreed list of compounds or chemically defined classes of compounds. It would be desirable to have an agreed mechanism under the aegis of the Consultative Committee to modify this list in the light of changing circumstances, especially the development of new technology. In our view, however, the initial list of key precursors needs to be agreed before the Convention is concluded. The analysis of risks given in the United Kingdom Working Paper, CD/514, of 10 July 1984, was designed to provide a basis on which the list or lists of compounds could be agreed by negotiation between the delegations represented round this table. We should need to reach a collective judgement on which compounds should be included and which should not. For this purpose agreed criteria would be useful but not in our view essential. In contrast to the toxicity criteria used to define classes of chemical weapons which depend on quantitative experimental determinations, the criteria under discussion for defining key precursors would not lead unambiguously to a list of precursor compounds even if there were complete agreement on criteria. It would not inspire confidence in the Convention if one party were uncertain whether another party was interpreting the criteria to include a particular compound. The criteria that have been discussed include the concept of minimal peaceful use which is likely to vary with the advance of technology. For example, it would have been said only a few years ago that no compound containing a carbon-phosphorus bond had significant peaceful uses; but this is no longer true, because compounds in this category are used as flame retardants and for other civil purposes. Nevertheless, my delegation attaches great importance to the inclusion of this class of compound in any list of key precursors for the purpose of verification of non-production.

The Soviet proposal to ban altogether the manufacture of compounds containing a methyl-phosphorus bond goes further in this direction than we would wish to and would require the abandonment of existing civil applications of some compounds. Moreover, it would not be logical to ban these compounds containing a methyl group and to leave undeclared and uncontrolled ethyl and other homologues which could be used to make chemical weapons of a similar toxicity. We believe that the verification measures proposed in CD/575 would give adequate assurance that chemical industry was not being misused for the clandestine production of chemical weapons, without impeding industrial operations or compromising their commercial confidentiality.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Like the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union my delegation looks forward to continuing the negotiations on chemical weapons in the autumn. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, for the effort that he has put into finding an agreed basis for additional work on this subject between the end of the current session in August 1985 and the beginning of the 1986 session. We trust that the Conference will be able to take a decision on this point before adjourning for the spring recess, in accordance with its earlier decision, taken at the end of the 1984 session, in order to enable delegations and their governments to make plans.

We are honoured by the presence among us today of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Iran, and I have listened with interest to the statement he made. My Government has repeatedly expressed its concern about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict, most recently in the speech made by my Minister of State, Mr. Richard Luce, to the Middle East Association in London on 28 March. Mr. Luce then made it clear that the British Government vigorously condemned the use of such weapons, which is contrary both to the relevant international legal instruments and to the norms of international behaviour in armed conflict. My Government will continue to work strenuously in this Conference for a total ban on chemical weapons. Most delegations will agree that there is an increased risk of the use of chemical weapons in the future which makes even more urgent our task of negotiating a convention banning the manufacture and possession of chemical weapons as well as their use.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize that my delegation has no wish to impose its views on other delegations. The proposals that we have tabled today on the organs and constitution of the Organization to be set up under the convention are intended, like our previous papers, on the verification of non-production, and on the challenge aspect of verification, to be a stimulus for discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its Working Groups, and to accelerate progress by agreement between all delegations towards the conclusion of a convention. I would echo what was said recently by the distinguished representative of Canada about the need to determine common ground and then to seek to expand it. We need to work together with a common sense of purpose and of urgency towards our common goal of concluding without delay a convention to which all our governments can subscribe.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, as consultations are being held on the possibility of an extraordinary session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons between the 1985 and the 1986 regular sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to put on record the views of my delegation on this matter.

In August last year, the Conference took a number of procedural decisions on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. In order to fulfill the general desire for an earlier resumption of its work in February 1985, we chose its Chairman and agreed on the format and purpose of its activities last January. The 1984 Report also contains a mention of the possibility that the Ad Hoc Committee might meet during the Fall of 1985.

Consultations by its distinguished Chairman have been under-way since then in order to ascertain how best to utilize a possible intersessional period. Differences of opinion on procedure have arisen. My delegation, for one, believes that the setting of specific dates is a matter of detail that can be arranged at the appropriate time. For some, the extraordinary session should not overlap with the First Committee of the General Assembly, in October, while others are concerned with international meetings scheduled for next September. There are those who would like the extraordinary session to take place in Geneva, and a few might also consider New York. None of such concerns address the substance of the question, however. At this stage, we must first ascertain the possibilities of progress in the negotiations, which would be the only justification for holding an extraordinary session of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The representatives of the two countries which possess the largest arsenals of chemical weapons, therefore key participants in the negotiations, have both stated in this plenary how they view the prospects and conditions for progress. We might benefit from recalling their opinions on the matter.

On 28 March last, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, urged the acceleration of the current negotiations and reiterated his country's readiness to step up the work on the convention. He stated further

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(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

that "unfortunately, the actions of the Soviet Union give us the impression that the Soviet Union is not yet prepared to negotiate with the United States or others in this Conference". I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the representative of the United States.

One week later, on 4 April, the leader of the Soviet delegation also addressed the question of progress in the negotiations on chemical weapons. In Ambassador Issraelyan's words, the "main obstacle" to progress in these negotiations "are the continuing efforts by some of the parties to impose their own approaches, their own selfish perceptions, to others". He then commented on certain proposals of the United States and concluded that they "will only waste our time which we need to work on the convention. To such proposals we react in an unambiguously negative manner". Similarly, I have no reason to doubt the words of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

It would seem from those indications that at this point any decision on convening a special meeting on chemical weapons is at least premature, and it will probably remain so as long as one super-Power charges that the actions of the other "can hardly be called negotiation", and while the latter contends that the proposals of the former are "deliberately unacceptable and extremist".

Despite the level and emotion of the current rhetoric, both representatives have stressed their Governments' interest in continuing the process of elaboration of the convention. I believe, therefore, that it is advisable to keep the door open to the possibility of calling a special meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, in case there are concrete signs that serious multilateral work can be achieved. Extraordinary meetings require extraordinary reasons. I am sure that, in such circumstances, even the smaller delegations, like my own, would be willing to make extraordinary efforts to meet the opportunities for achieving results in the negotiations.

May I recall, in this connection, that since the inception of this Conference, in 1979, the Group of 21 started calling for the establishment of a subsidiary body with a negotiating mandate on chemical weapons, an objective to which others agreed only as late as 1982. Among the seven substantive items of its agenda, chemical weapons is the only subject where this Conference is currently conducting any negotiations. Should the two main protagonists of the confrontation that has so far slowed down progress decide to start making better use of the time already available during the regular session of the Conference on Disarmament, and thus enhance prospects to speed up our work, I am confident that there would be agreement on suitable arrangements during the second part of our current session.

Mr. BARTHELEMY (United States of America): My delegation will return to the subject of chemical weapons at our next meeting, but I do not want to miss the opportunity to speak for a moment today. My delegation is always looking for opportunities to find common ground with the delegation of the Soviet Union; we do not find them as often as we would like, but we work tirelessly for those possibilities and it is a pleasure for me today to say that we are on common ground with the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on this question.

We believe that it is indeed the responsibility and right of all nations of the world to work toward international security, arms control and disarmament, and it is the moral responsibility in particular, in our view, of every delegation in this body, which after all does not include all the Members of the United Nations. Not all Members of the United Nations are invited to participate in this negotiating body. Therefore it is the special responsibility for all of us in this body to work tirelessly for success.

Some nations clearly have special responsibilities in the area of arms control and disarmament, but all nations have an important responsibility, and in view of the statement that we heard here by the first speaker today it is clear that this matter is deeply pressing. And, in the process of the negotiations, my delegation believes that all participants must not simply urge others to make progress but they must each make judgements and each make a contribution. For there are differences of opinion, in our view, to which we must all seek solutions, and it is not sufficient to ask others to make judgements. We must all make judgements in pursuit of the security of our own nations and of all the nations of the world.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

As I said, my remarks today will concern the negotiations on chemical weapons taking place in the Ad Hoc Committee chaired with competence and dedication by our colleague and friend, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski of Poland.

In taking the floor at this plenary meeting of the Conference, my delegation fully understands that the basic work is being done, and will continue to be done in future, in the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups, efficiently co-ordinated by Mrs. E. Bonnier of Sweden, Mr. P. Poptchev of Bulgaria and Mr. F. Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I wish to stress my delegation's positive assessment of the activities carried out so far within the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups. The constructive atmosphere and frank exchange of opinions within these bodies are encouraging signs. Nevertheless, for a subject which enjoys unanimous agreement within the Conference, the progress of negotiations cannot satisfy us. It is rather uncommon at this Conference to hear statements as convergent as those on the urgency of concluding a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, as well as on the practical possibility of achieving this. But measured against such consensus, the progress of negotiations cannot be considered satisfactory.

My delegation would like to make a few brief and somewhat meteorological observations today about this situation.

First of all, what we are witnessing is an apparently endless ramification on every point of the negotiations. As soon as there is a prospect of agreement on a particular issue, a discussion ensues which goes still more into every possible detail. Instead of solving a question, we are confronted with more problems than before. The impression is sometimes given that we forget the goal in our total absorption with the ways and means of reaching it.

We believe that this technical exercise, whose importance and usefulness must be recognized, should not be indefinitely prolonged.

We think that there is a risk that we shall become bogged down in technical considerations whose importance should not be exaggerated. We therefore think that an effort by everyone is needed in order to reverse this trend and try to simplify to the greatest possible extent the points which are still outstanding, so as to facilitate the attainment of a consensus which, technical considerations notwithstanding, will finally be political.

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(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

It goes without saying that the achievement of agreement on such questions as criteria for identifying super-toxic and binary agents, permitted activities, the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and the verification of certain specific provisions would greatly facilitate progress in our negotiations.

My second comment concerns the very nature of our activities. Although the Committee's mandate requires it to continue the full and complete process of negotiations and of developing and working out the convention, we still find ourselves in a pre-negotiating stage. The activities of the Ad Hoc Committee and of the groups set up within it are predominantly exploratory and deliberative in nature.

The actual process of collective drafting of the future convention has not yet really begun.

This is why the Romanian delegation thinks that, at the start of the second part of our annual session, the Working Groups of the Committee must be transformed into drafting groups.

Such a change is strictly necessary if we wish to go beyond the present stage and enter upon the drafting process properly speaking.

A third comment is connected with certain technical aspects of our work. The envisaged complex instrument prohibiting chemical weapons must, of necessity, cover important technical aspects. Discussion within the Working Groups has revealed first, that the number of countries able to contribute effectively to the technical discussions is limited, and, second, that the countries which do have the necessary capacity are showing a certain reticence as regards their contribution at the strictly technical level.

This is the situation with regard to the preparation of lists of chemical warfare agents, of components of binary chemical weapons and of their precursors and key precursors.

In order to deal with this difficulty, my delegation suggests that the Conference should request the assistance of scientific institutions such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or other research institutes, including military ones.

Co-operation between the Conference on Disarmament and institutions of this kind will be beneficial to us and will contribute towards progress in our work.

Lastly, I should like to stress the importance of maintaining the pace and continuity of the negotiations. It seems to us that interruptions which are too prolonged, such as those arising from the Conference's time-table, are not propitious to the process of negotiation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee could, in our view, have more time to conclude its negotiations at its own pace.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Once its mandate has been approved by the Conference, we feel that in the organization of its work the Ad Hoc Committee could enjoy a certain degree of flexibility in relation to the Conference as a whole. Of course, in doing this we must take into account the opinions of all our colleagues and the practical possibilities which exist.

These are the comments which my delegation wanted to make at the present stage of our work on chemical weapons.

The Romanian delegation, too, considers it most important that concrete results should be achieved this year with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. The urgency of such a measure no longer needs to be emphasized.

We feel obliged, however, to stress the importance of such results to our Conference which, since its establishment in 1978, has been unable to elaborate a single concrete disarmament measure.

If we cannot achieve results in a field such as that of chemical weapons, on whose importance and urgency everyone is agreed, the credibility of our Conference will be seriously put in doubt. We must avoid such a failure at all costs.

Before concluding, with your permission I would like to say a few words of thanks to the Government of this country which is such a friendly and cordial host to us, the Government of Switzerland, for the kind invitation extended to members of the Conference to visit some civil-defence anti-chemical-weapon facilities, and for the success of that visit. I wish also to voice my delegation's appreciation for the words spoken on that occasion by the Secretary of State of the Federal Council of Switzerland, of the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Edouard Brunner.

CD/PV 309

9

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

I seek your permission to invoke rule 30 of the rules of procedure in order to address the subject of chemical weapons. It would seem improper to speak in 1985 about an agenda item entitled chemical weapons without rendering homage to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, as 60 years have passed since the Protocol was signed here in June 1925. My delegation feels entitled at such a juncture to take stock in an even more general way than usual.

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(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

The life span of six decades might be considered a mature age for agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, especially if we do not lose sight of the fact that the notion of security based on disarmament has virtually failed so far to take deep root in international politics. The bald fact that the Protocol has been regulating the legal norms of international behaviour in the field of chemical weapons for such a long period of time might be a morale-booster for all those who believe that common security can be created without mortgaging real national security interests. One could claim that a lasting and durable legal act came into being six decades ago.

At the same time, if one looks at the time factor, which is only a relative litmus test of durability, from a different angle, one could assert that even six decades were not enough to turn the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons into a comprehensive prohibition and total elimination of those dreadful weapons. It might be justifiable to say that during those 60 years of existence of the use-prohibition régime nearly everything has undergone a change in the field of chemical warfare, the chemical industry and inter-State relations but the way of thinking in terms of disarmament, leaving the relevant chemical arms control régime unchanged.

For us who are dealing with disarmament, the ultimate weapon to resort to in such a situation is optimism, and since there is no total ban on that weapon either, I venture to say that some positive developments of the last 10 to 15 years have lit a light, though only a dim one, at the end of the chemical disarmament tunnel. As a result of multilateral and bilateral negotiations during this period of time, the framework and the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention have been taking shape gradually. That process was marked by an evolution from the idea of a partial prohibition of chemical weapons to the general acceptance of the notion of their total prohibition and elimination, although that achievement might seem to be a relative one in the light of the statement made by the distinguished representative of the USSR two weeks ago, recalling a Soviet proposal directed at the total elimination of chemical weapons already in 1928. Notwithstanding the ups and downs in the multilateral and bilateral chemical disarmament negotiations, another positive development has been marked by the process of narrowing down the gap between somewhat different positions. It is true, however, that this process took a strange form on questions like verification, where the compromise efforts of one group of States were not only not met halfway, but the relevant position of another group evolved in just the opposite direction.

Due to the efforts undertaken within the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors, and within the framework of Soviet-United States negotiations, all the basic ingredients are there today to achieve in the not too distant future an effective total ban on chemical weapons. To that end a certain amount of political will and readiness to compromise is needed on the part of those States which still do not believe that disarmament as a whole, and chemical disarmament in particular, has a raison d'être of its own, going beyond the role of provisionally restoring stability to international relations destabilized by the undesirable consequences of resting security solely on military power.

The Hungarian delegation, in accordance with the relevant positions of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and of other socialist States directed at the early elimination of chemical weapons, is of the opinion that both the results achieved so far in the negotiations and also in the recent positive trends in the international situation serve as a foundation for speeding up the negotiations with an aim to achieve an early agreement. It is our firm conviction that a further amelioration of the international political climate would postulate an agreement of that kind. Just to refer to an historical analogy, it might be

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

useful to recall that the improvement of Soviet-American relations at the end of the 1960s, and the agreement in principle on the SALT negotiations, to a certain degree cleared the way for the subsequent conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention, and the latter in its turn had a feedback effect reinforcing the momentum of on-going negotiations. We hope that recent favourable trends and developments in the international situation and in the bilateral Soviet-American context might be instrumental in speeding up the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention, bringing it within easy reach, despite the problems still outstanding, a development which in its turn could have, beyond any doubts, a stimulating effect on the early solution to the far more important, but far less resolved questions of nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

While assessing the prospects of chemical disarmament one should not fail to pay attention to the many chinks in the edifice of chemical disarmament. It is a blunt reality that the possibility of outlawing chemical weapons altogether originates, to a significant degree, from the multifold moral, technological, military and domestic political barriers which prevented chemical weapons being more deeply integrated into military stockpiles, posture and thinking. These constraints or the diminishing usefulness of chemical weapons as means of coercion have been related, among other things, to the mass destructive and indiscriminate effect of these weapons -- as a legal and moral constraint; to the need for expensive and dangerous facilities to produce them -- as a technological constraint; to the problems of stockpiling in forward and rear areas due to the stringent storage and handling requirements -- as a military constraint; to the problems of storing these weapons in, and transporting them through, populated areas -- as a domestic political constraint. However, developments generated by unilateral steps have brought about a critical erosion of those moral, technological, military and domestic political barriers, and thus have been increasingly challenging the prospects of their ban.

Some of those closely interrelated developments might be identified as follows:

First, the continued failure to outlaw nuclear weapons, weapons with a destructive power several orders of magnitude higher than that of chemical weapons;

Second, an evolution of nuclear technology, posture and doctrine from deterrence towards acquiring warfighting capabilities, narrowing down to a dangerous degree the line dividing the possession of these weapons from their possible use, and dictating on the whole a new "fashion" in military thinking;

Third, the same technological and doctrinal pattern in the field of chemical weapons;

Fourth, the increased questioning of chemical disarmament as an effective alternative to building security on chemical armaments;

Fifth, the identification of alleged gaps between the chemical weapons stockpiles of major Powers, and the continued demand to close such gaps, a trend that became extremely vigorous in the second half of the 1970s when bilateral talks held out some promises of success;

And finally, continued and mounting pressures in order to build up existing chemical weapon capability so as to be able to put pressure on negotiating partners by the use of so-called "bargaining chips".

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

A revolutionary new means of chemical warfare seems to have been simultaneously the cause and the effect of that process of erosion. That revolutionary new means of chemical warfare is called a binary weapon. Fully realizing that those who refer to binary weapons in this chamber are running the risk of being accused of trying to score propaganda points, I nevertheless venture to point out some of the reasons why my delegation strongly believes that binary weapons represent a unique threat to the existing chemical arms control régime and to a future chemical weapons convention. It would be useless to pretend impartiality in such a divided world as the one we are living in, yet let me state that I have the indivisible interest of common security in mind while approaching that controversial subject.

Binary weapons, by reason of their characteristics, threaten to remove nearly all the constraints which have inhibited up to now chemical weapons being converted into militarily useful means of coercion.

They remove the technological constraints because they do not require stringent safety measures of production, thus making the production facilities less expensive and less dangerous. Their components might be procured from the chemical industry in large quantities, at short notice and at a low cost.

They remove the military constraints because their storage and handling requirements permit their easy transportation between rear and forward areas, their deployment in forward areas and, as a whole, their flexible integration in the military posture.

They remove the domestic political constraints because readily available chemical industrial capacities drastically reduce the stockpiling needs, and because stockpiling in and transportation through populated areas pose no significant risks.

They challenge, as a cumulative effect, the moral and legal constraints because of the basic contradiction between deterrence, on one hand, being reinforced by strengthening warfighting capabilities and by making the use of those weapons more and more certain, and on the other hand, the moral and legal obligation not to use those weapons.

The eventual emergence of binary weapons in the military arsenals, by reason of their inherent characteristics and of the critical erosion of the earlier constraints, would have as a consequence:

First, the revaluation of the role of chemical weapons as a militarily useful means of coercion;

Second, it would result in a shift from deterrent capabilities towards acquiring chemical warfighting capabilities, a shift generating mutually reinforcing doubts about intentions and fears of a first strike;

Third, the lower rungs of the imaginary escalation ladder, a ladder leading from the use of conventional weapons towards the use of weapons of mass destruction, being reinforced by integrating binary weapons closely into conventional capabilities, thus the distinction line between chemical and conventional weapons being blurred;

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

Fourth, the upper rungs of the same escalation ladder being strengthened by obtaining a tactical flexibility and a destructive capacity close to that of tactical nuclear weapons;

Fifth, it would result in an increased possibility of unauthorized initiation of the use of chemical weapons by virtue of the relaxation of command and control;

And finally, it would lead to proliferation pressures due to the changing world-wide perceptions of the military value of chemical weapons.

These implications, besides weakening international security, and increasing political tension and military confrontation, would doom to failure present chemical disarmament efforts, if not for political reasons, then because of the insurmountable problems of definition, delimitation and verification. What is more, chemical warfighting doctrines and postures, coupled with proliferation trends, would fatally undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol as well.

That is how the Hungarian delegation at the present juncture perceives, on the one hand, the prospects of a chemical disarmament régime being created and, on the other hand, the threats jeopardizing the creation of such a régime. Those prospects and threats, though they have been in existence for the last decade in a complicated sort of a symbiosis, cannot coexist indefinitely. They are not mutually reinforcing but, on the contrary, mutually destroying factors. It is the conviction of my delegation that the interaction between the degree of flexibility and mutual comprehension displayed in the negotiations here, and the fate of the programmes calling for new generations of chemical weapons, will soon decide whether the world community will witness a move in the direction of a late-blooming commitment towards the total prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons or will be faced by a new cycle of the chemical rearmament and counter-rearmament process.

The reason why I did not touch in my statement today on the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its Working Groups is not that my delegation does not appreciate the work undertaken in those bodies under the guidance of their Chairpersons or that my delegation has no comments on the questions under discussion there. On the contrary, I would like through you, Mr. President, to assure the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Turbanski, and the Chairpersons of the relevant Working Groups that we highly appreciate the efforts they are making in order to advance our work towards finding mutually acceptable solutions to questions still unresolved. I would like as well to make known the wish of my delegation to address at a later stage in a detailed fashion some of the concrete questions under discussion.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Reports of continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iraq and Iran are of most serious concern to my Government. The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is a well established and binding rule of international law. Continued violation of this and other rules of international law is not only deplorable from a humanitarian point of view but also because of the negative influence it may have on the future of the international law of war.

Moreover the relevance of the laws of war, including those embodied in such agreements as the Environmental Modification Treaty (ENMOD), the dubious weapons convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, would be totally undermined when compliance with these laws is made dependent on the willingness of the adversary to end the war. The Netherlands Government feels compelled to denounce such a link and will continue to condemn infractions of the laws of war.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations deserves all our support for his persevering attempts — reflected inter alia in his recent statement of 26 March and by his recent visit to the two capitals of the parties to the conflict — to achieve cessation of hostilities between the two States involved and, subsequently, a lasting settlement of the dispute underlying the conflict. Thus, an end would be put to the senseless waste of human life, involving the use of ever more devastating and lethal weapons. Meanwhile, strict observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol should urgently be restored.

My delegation was heartened by the speedy resumption early this year of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament under the able guidance of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland. Through provisions prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons and on destruction of stockpiles, including adequate verification measures, the future chemical weapons convention will reaffirm and complement the provisions of the Geneva Protocol and constitute the basis for complete exclusion of the possibility of toxic chemicals being used as weapons.

As concerns the actual provision in the future convention to prohibit the use of chemical weapons, we are happy to note that apparently delegations increasingly share the view that this could take the simple form of a straightforward undertaking by parties to the convention "not to use chemical weapons". Such a provision, however, will need to be backed-up, as it were, by provisions to ensure that the validity of the Geneva Protocol that set the norm for as long as 60 years, will not be impaired. Early agreement on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament would in itself constitute a well-timed admonishment of the international community against violation of the Geneva Protocol and it would stimulate progress in other areas of the future Convention.

The subject of "non-production of chemical warfare agents in the civilian industry" is among the themes at present most debated in our work. The issue is of crucial importance, as the destruction of existing stockpiles and military production facilities of chemical weapons would virtually be of no avail if production could clandestinely be resumed in the civil chemical industry.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Two, so far contrasting, approaches have been developed for the prevention of production in the civilian industry. One concentrates on several constraining or, if possible, prohibiting the production of a few chemical weapons related compounds that have a very limited commercial use. The other focuses on routine verification of non-production for weapons purposes of a large number of compounds with potential application for the production of chemical weapons (this latter approach was reflected in the interesting British Working Paper CD/549 and constituted the working hypothesis for the earlier Dutch Working Paper CD/445).

We think that these two approaches are, in principle, not mutually exclusive but could very well be complementary in nature. The first one, the partial practicability of which should further be explored, leaves in fact inadmissible loopholes in verification that cannot be justified by simple reference to the legitimate needs of the chemical industry. The second, while being in itself indispensable for adequate verification of the Convention, could become more effective if combined with the system of selective production restrictions. The draft treaty presented by the United States (CD/500) indicates how the two approaches could be combined. Other combinations are conceivable. Both approaches should, however, avoid hampering, or unduly interfering with the legitimate interests of the chemical industry in their activities on research, development, production, retention, transfer and use of chemical compounds for permitted purposes.

Other problems, including the question of challenge inspections, require further intensive work. It is therefore only natural that negotiations on chemical weapons will be continued beyond the close of the summer part of this year's session in August. It is for this reason that we reiterate our proposal that, in accordance with the relevant recommendations of last year's report, the Conference should take an early decision providing for an opportunity to extend the negotiations to a period between the months of August and January.

Perhaps the solution could be found in a session in the coming fall to be followed by a meeting in January to wrap up the work done and to formulate recommendations for the oncoming session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Last Tuesday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Velayati, touched upon matters that are of great concern to my Government. If our colleague, the Ambassador of Brazil, is in search of an extraordinary reason to justify an extended session of chemical weapons, he undoubtedly also wishes to take into account the urgency of the situation. We think, in fact, that these problems are extraordinarily urgent. Let me add that I do not consider it extraordinary when, in the intensive negotiation of a treaty, we make an effort to break the habit of suspending those negotiations for a period of five months. Even if the differences of views are great, and they are, we believe we all have a responsibility to help bridge the gap. We recognize that for practical reasons an extended session may be inconvenient for some delegations, but that is exactly why we hope we can very soon take a decision so as to permit delegations to adjust to the new time schedule.

The Netherlands armed forces do not possess chemical weapons and the Netherlands Government has no intention of introducing those weapons in its armed forces. The Government also rejects the stockpiling of chemical weapons on Netherlands territory.

We are opposed to the further spread of chemical weapons and have taken export-control measures to avoid such spread. When we introduced those measures, we made use of a list of key precursors developed in the framework of this Conference. Unfortunately, similar action has not been taken by all countries. This is all the more reason that we should with redoubled efforts seek an early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons for all time.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

One item on which we have all been able to agree, in terms of its intrinsic and priority importance, and even in more difficult times than those we face today, is the need to get rid of, and to get rid of absolutely, the whole class of weapons known as chemical weapons. Our work directed towards this end, that is, to a universal convention which would rid us of those weapons, has been proceeding in a relatively business-like fashion. But our rate of progress has not been fast enough. Clearly, substantial problems are involved, and not least because our objective is a great and complex one.

It is not easy to predict the use to which chemicals may be put. It is not easy to design acceptable means of verification of a universal chemical weapons convention. But the difficulty of the task does not mean it should not be accepted. A great deal of good work has been done and is still being done but in spite of this, it is my Government's firm view that we need to increase our effort on chemical weapons and we need to do that now. Ten days ago the United States Ambassador called for "a new sense of urgency and dedication from us all". We agree.

He made the point that progress might best be sought through concentrating our efforts on certain keys to progress, and we agree. But this subject of chemical weapons is one on which we also need some reassurances. It is not clear to my delegation that all of us are sufficiently determined to solve the problems, which are manifestly difficult, but which all of us have said should be solved. So the question is -- if we want it why can't we get it? If we agree that chemical weapons are abhorrent why can't we eliminate them? We agree that chemical weapons should never be used. This is stated in an international agreement which is almost 60 years old. We should affirm the agreement of this Conference to precisely that rule of international law -- that chemical weapons must not be used. We should join the unique responsibility and authority of this Conference to that purpose -- a reaffirmation of the rule of international law and international relations -- that chemical weapons must not be used.

The scope of our proposed convention on chemical weapons is complete. That convention would outlaw and eliminate all chemical weapons. It would state that they must not be used and for that purpose we would go on to ensure that they cannot be used precisely because they would not exist. This means that those weapons that do exist would be destroyed, and that destruction would be verified. This convention would mean that those weapons would not be developed or produced in the future and this would be verified.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The logic is clear, the point is absolute -- you cannot use what does not exist. You must not bring into existence that which must not be used. But the question of the use of chemical weapons remains central. My Government's commitment is an absolute prohibition on use. If this is the case, let us say and declare so now.

A particular part of the draft convention on which we are working and is one of the "keys to progress" is to verify the non-production of chemical weapons. Because this is a complex area of the convention I want to take a brief while to outline some thoughts on it.

We have advanced these thoughts at the working group level but I want them to be in the record of the plenary meetings of this Conference.

In Australia's view, procedures for the verification of non-production should include: materials accountancy; routine, random inspections of the chemical industry; import/export regulations and customs checks; challenge inspection to resolve ambiguities.

Materials accountancy must form the basis for the monitoring of the chemical industry. We suggest that quantities of chemicals greater than 1 tonne should be monitored. Quantities less than this would not attract any regulation, thus leaving research free from undesirable control. In Australia an inventory is kept, by the Government, of all chemical substances produced or used in quantity greater than 1 tonne. New compounds which are to be imported or produced must be registered, with full details including toxicity, use, and fate in the environment. Other nations have or are about to acquire such inventories. The information they contain would form a logical starting point for the process of materials accountancy for verification. Chemicals which have been designated by the convention as posing a possible threat to the purposes of the convention could be identified from such inventories.

Having been identified they should then be monitored in two ways. First, all such chemicals should be followed by the process of materials accountancy throughout their life time. Thus a precursor such as phosphorus oxychloride could be accounted for to a level of accuracy commensurate with the risk posed by any illegal diversion.

The type of data required would include: (a) total annual production, per cent used in the country of origin, purpose of such use, and nature of end-products; and (b) quantity exported and to whom.

Second, the production and use of such chemicals should be subject to routine, random inspection. Where a precursor is used in the last technological stage of the synthesis of a nerve agent, that is, the last reaction vessel, its relevance to the convention is apparent. The example of phosphorous oxychloride I have referred to is related to: (a) its use in the synthesis of tabun; and (b) the fact that it is made in a small number of facilities. It is made in large volume, but as it is corrosive a small number of plants make it, at least, that is, in the West.

The question arises of what chemicals are to be monitored in the way we have suggested. Clearly they must be listed, otherwise inspectors will not know what they must monitor. Super-toxic lethal and other lethal chemicals must be monitored, if there is any possibility that they could be diverted to military use. We have also discussed at length criteria for determining "key" precursors of such chemicals, which should also be monitored. In our view, such a precursor should be critical

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

in determining the toxic properties of the final product, should take part in the last technological stage of the production of such a chemical, and should have little use in civilian industry. If a chemical can readily be converted into a nerve agent then it must be considered to pose a threat to the convention. In order to limit the number of compounds to be accounted for, an additional criterion could be that the chemical to be designated be produced in a small number of facilities. Additionally, our task would be easier if it were also used in a small number of facilities. This approach is pragmatic: where several precursors take part in the final reaction, we seek to control the precursors which are most readily accounted for.

Experience may teach us that the approach chosen is either inadequate or too cumbersome. But guidelines can be considered which will provide a framework for verification of non-diversion.

If it is agreed that designated chemicals and their precursors are to be accounted for throughout their lifetime, then we must decide on ways to do this. One method of controlling such chemicals would consist of banning all supertoxic lethal chemicals. Thus if any such chemicals appeared in national inventories or were found during inspections, steps could be taken to eliminate them. This procedure could suffer from several defects. Firstly, some supertoxic lethal compounds have legitimate uses in the pharmaceutical industry, as veterinary preparations, and in general chemistry. In the future the number of such compounds may increase. The production of supertoxic lethal compounds should and will be monitored by States, because of the health hazard implicit in their production and use. Thus, the pharmaceutical industry is subject to rigorous control which extends from the production of scheduled drugs through to their consumption by the patient. States could therefore provide detailed information for the purposes of the convention, which could be checked, as appropriate.

A second and perhaps more cogent reason against an outright ban is that any cut-off point in toxicity would be arbitrary, and could lead to production of compounds slightly less toxic than the designated level, but which could pose a threat to the convention equal to the supertoxic lethal category. Further, binary technology highlights the need to control precursors as well as the supertoxic lethal chemical to which they can lead.

Restriction of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals to a single facility has been suggested as a means of facilitating verification. Such a restriction would seem to offer several disadvantages, but few advantages. Pharmaceutical companies making small quantities of drugs (more than 1 tonne, but less than 10 tonnes) will use very different synthetic processes, and may use drugs of biological origin. Thus production may well be more effectively grouped according to the type of chemical process required rather than to the toxicity of the chemical. Drug dispensing also requires specialized facilities to ensure purity, sterility, etc. Such facilities are not required for industrial chemicals. Inspection of such facilities to confirm materials accountancy data should not present any particular problem. A further argument against the permitted production of supertoxic lethal compounds in one facility relates to the use of such compounds. Drugs present little problem in that they are used by patients (or farm animals) in small quantities, and are dispensed by pharmacies with rigorous controls on the safeholding of dangerous drugs.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Toxic industrial chemicals will be easiest controlled if they are used "on-stream" at the facility where they are produced, in the manufacture of an end product of low toxicity. Transport is in itself hazardous to the population, and could also lead to illegal diversion between one plant and another. Moving a chemical from a single facility to points of use would require verification. I have noted that materials accountancy methods will be needed to follow designated compounds throughout their lifetime. Thus, if the life of a chemical begins and ends in the one plant the task will be simplified and the burden of inspection reduced.

I have not, so far, addressed the criteria to be used in assessing the risk that compounds pose to the convention, or how we should differentiate between levels of risk, and the concomitant stringency of verification needed. The approach contained in document CD/112 laid the foundation for such criteria, and has served us well. Toxicity was seen as a cornerstone, supplemented with the general-purpose criterion. Concepts put forward since CD/112 have in fact merely extended and particularized the original criteria.

Our discussions of precursors and "key" precursors has highlighted the need to monitor these chemicals as well as their end-products. The possibility that toxic chemicals and/or their precursors could be diverted to military use from the civil chemical industry has led us to formulate ways to block such a loophole. We suggest that materials accountancy, carried out by all States parties and processed by a central, dedicated computer would provide a suitable data base. This would be verified by routine, random inspection and sampling, backed up in case of serious ambiguity by challenge inspection.

Australia believes that, in verifying compliance with regard to "non-production", procedures which involve monitoring will always be preferable to outright bans, since there will be ways to circumvent bans. For instance, a ban on all methyl-phosphorous compounds would not stop the production of analogous compounds with equal toxicity but lacking the methyl-phosphorous group could equally well serve a military purpose.

Monitoring is a more flexible approach, since it can take account of technological changes which cannot be foreseen at the time of entry into force of the convention. It will, however, require constant vigilance by a technical secretariat to keep abreast of changes which might threaten the convention. Monitoring will lead to controls which may in our view include specific bans. However, the imposition of such bans should only be temporary, to control a particular set of circumstances, and would not be an integral part of the convention.

Thus, if it is agreed that it will be prohibited "to assist or induce anyone to take part in banned activities", a temporary ban might be placed on the export of identified chemicals to a State shown to be engaged in such activities. The process of monitoring should involve or lead to actions which are appropriate to the violation. The task ahead will require us to develop an adequate and cost-effective verification régime. Monitoring of stockpile destruction will involve some 10 years of work. However, monitoring of the non-production of chemicals for military purposes will be an ongoing process.

I want to return now to the question of the use of chemical weapons. Surely if one were to ask what are we doing in this field the answer would be given with resounding clarity. What we are doing is seeking to make absolutely sure that chemical weapons are not used. One way of doing this is to ensure that they are

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

not produced -- what does not exist cannot be used. But there is also the requirement to absolutely forbid the use of chemical weapons. Significant work has been done towards this requirement in this conference. We are all grateful, very grateful, to Ambassador Beesley of Canada and, now, to Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia, for the work that they have done towards a requirement of absolutely forbidding the use of chemical weapons, and I understand that that work has brought an agreement.

As we are agreed that chemical weapons must not be used surely our purpose, our work, our confidence in what we are negotiating with each other, would be advanced by our stating that we are agreed on this -- that chemical weapons must not be used.

I would propose now that this Conference make this declaration, that we declare that, pursuant to our responsibility established under paragraph 120 of the Final Document, we are negotiating a universal convention on chemical weapons; that in the context of those negotiations we have agreed that chemical weapons must not be used; and that in whatever convention we bring to conclusion and submit for universal adherence, a fundamental provision in that convention will be that the States parties to it undertake solemnly that they will not use chemical weapons.

What I have proposed now is fundamental in character and completely consistent with the role and authority of this body. I have proposed it because I believe we are agreed to this principled commitment and because I believe that there would be value in making that commitment clear, now, and in promulgating it now. My delegation does not dismiss the difficulties involved in elaborating other parts of a chemical weapons convention.

But we are convinced that there is value in promulgating our agreements when they have been reached.

There is the additional reason to do so in this field because, in recent time, there has been evidence and there have been allegations, of the use of chemical weapons.

This year we will witness the sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Let us bear witness by our own promulgation now of our commitment that chemical weapons must not be used. This would be a solid reaffirmation of the Geneva Protocols and it would set, in concrete, one of the firm foundation stones on which the universal convention we are negotiating must be built.

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States of America)

I would like to turn now to the important subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Indeed, its urgency was brought home to us again during our last plenary meeting. My delegation has already presented detailed views on this subject in a plenary statement on 28 March and listened with interest to the recent statements from other delegations, in particular the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 4 April. We welcome the stated Soviet interest in reaching mutually acceptable solutions. But we were disappointed that once again we did not hear new ideas for finding mutually acceptable solutions. We continue to be prepared promptly to give serious consideration to any such ideas.

Today I would like to comment on one particular substantive issue dealt with in Ambassador Issraelyan's statement and also to offer a procedural suggestion for making the negotiations more productive.

The substantive issue I want to raise is how best to ensure that toxic chemicals and precursors that pose a particular threat to the convention are not produced in the chemical industry. In particular, how can we best ensure that organophosphorus nerve gases and their key precursors are not manufactured under the guise of production for peaceful purposes?

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(Mr. Barthelemy, United States of America)

Two approaches have been put forward -- one by the Soviet Union; another by the United Kingdom, the United States and several other countries. Under the Soviet approach, production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or methylphosphorus compounds for all permitted purposes, including civilian use, would be limited to one small facility and a maximum aggregate amount of one ton per year. Under the approach we support, production facilities would be declared and inspected, and detailed information on the amount and uses of the chemicals would be reported.

It is our impression that both approaches stem from similar basic concerns. Both have stated their desire to ensure that production of the most dangerous types of chemical weapons does not occur in the chemical industry. Both sides want to ensure that States do not possess a production capability in excess of peaceful needs. In other words, both sides want to guard against development of a "break-out" capability: that is, one that would enable a State to withdraw from the convention and then rapidly begin producing enormous quantities of super-toxic lethal agents. Finally, both sides want to ensure that production facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals for peaceful purposes are not used to produce currently unknown agents for chemical-weapons purposes.

Which approach is the most useful? To find out, we need to compare them to see which most effectively meets the three concerns I have just mentioned. We also need to take into account the burden each approach would pose on the chemical industry and economic development.

First of all, how effectively would the two approaches prevent illegal production of nerve gas in the chemical industry? Here, we see the Soviet approach as having two serious inadequacies. Facilities for production of the banned chemicals that exist before the convention comes into force are ignored. They would be subject neither to declaration or inspection. Facilities for production of ethylphosphorus compounds are also ignored, even though most of them could easily produce either ethylphosphorus or methylphosphorus compounds for chemical weapons. As explained in document CD/CW/WP.51 both types of phosphorus chemicals are equally dangerous. The approach we support, on the other hand, deals effectively with both types of facilities through declaration and inspection.

Second, how effectively would the two approaches prevent development of a "break-out" capability? Here again, the Soviet approach has serious inadequacies in our view. Since pre-existing facilities and ethylphosphorus chemical facilities would be ignored, there would be no way to judge a State's break-out potential. The approach we support, however, deals more effectively with this problem through declaration and inspection of all relevant facilities. If a State declares more production capacity than others consider justified for peaceful purposes, the mechanism for dealing with compliance issues could be invoked to clarify the situation and to resolve any disputes that may arise.

Third, how effectively would the two approaches prevent production of unknown super-toxic lethal chemicals for chemical weapons purposes? We believe that the Soviet approach could actually encourage development of new agents since it ignores ethylphosphorus compounds, which could easily be substituted for the banned methylphosphorus compounds. The data in document CD/CW/WP.51 clearly demonstrate that ethylphosphorus-based nerve gases are virtually as deadly as the existing agents based on methylphosphorus compounds. The British approach, which we support has no such loophole. It covers all high-risk toxic chemicals and high-risk precursors.

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States of America)

Finally, how would the chemical industry be affected under the two approaches? In our judgement, the Soviet approach is seriously deficient. It would mean that production of a number of useful chemicals for peaceful purposes would have to be stopped. The economic damage would be significant, both in terms of existing production and of lost opportunities for improving human life. The monetary costs alone would probably be in the range of millions of dollars. We have heard it said here that methylphosphorus chemicals have "almost no peaceful uses" and that the United Kingdom's proposal would extend inspection to all chemical industries. But such a statement does not take into account the chemical industries in western countries, nor even the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons' own documents. For example, document CD/CW/CRP.90 makes clear there are plans to produce a methylphosphorus herbicide in industrial quantities in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Here it is worth noting that in the Soviet Union the preference is to use ethylphosphorus compounds instead. These would not be constrained by the Soviet proposal.) Document CD/CW/WP.86 substantiates our view that only a small number of chemical plants would be subject to inspection under the United Kingdom approach.

The production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, largely as drugs, is relatively small, but it is carried out by a number of companies. The super-toxic lethal chemicals which are of commercial interest are hardly suitable for chemical weapons purposes and pose no risk to the objectives of the convention. The question of production of large quantities of nerve gas for supposedly peaceful purposes does not arise. There is, in fact, a specific provision in our draft convention to prohibit it.

In contrast to the Soviet approach, the approach we support would not stop existing peaceful chemical production activities and prevent economic development. Rather it would allow peaceful activities to continue, and to expand, but -- and I emphasize this point -- under the watchful eye of the international community. All relevant facilities would be declared and inspected.

It seems to us that the burden of proof must be on those who would impose limitations on peaceful chemical production. They must demonstrate that such interference is absolutely necessary. But we have not heard any persuasive argument why our approach would not be effective.

In negotiating a convention the Conference must take into account that different States have different economic systems and different chemical industries. Perhaps the two different approaches in this area really reflect the differing economic systems in the Soviet Union and in western countries. The Soviet approach seems designed for a centrally-planned economy, in which all chemical production facilities are Government-owned and in which the chemicals in question have not yet been produced. It seems to ignore the reality of a market economy, where a number of different and highly competitive companies are involved and the types of chemicals in question are already in production.

How can a mutually-acceptable, compromise solution be found to this issue? A good place to start might be the approach outlined by the previous Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in document CD/CW/WP.89. Under this approach, a State could choose between production at a single site or at multiple sites. Verification provisions would be equivalent, whichever approach were chosen. This approach tries to take into account the differences between centrally-planned and market economies. At the same time it preserves the strengths of the earlier approaches. In some areas the new approach may need to be strengthened, for example,

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States of America)

to deal adequately with pre-existing production facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals. But we believe this approach is promising and deserves serious consideration.

Let me put forward a procedural suggestion for making the negotiations more productive. As others will recall, my delegation has strongly supported the proposal to hold a six-weeks-long negotiating session in the fall. I would like to assure those who may be sceptical about the likelihood of productive work that, for its part, the United States delegation will do everything in its power to make such a session a fruitful one. In connection with the proposal, a question has arisen about how to report on the negotiations to the General Assembly. Should the report be a substantive or a purely technical one? How could a substantive report be forwarded in August if the negotiations are to continue in the fall?

The United States delegation believes that the General Assembly should receive a report which gives a full picture of the current stage of negotiations. And we believe that this is fully consistent with the proposal for a fall negotiating session. In our view the working text contained in annex I of last year's Report, CD/539, should be updated whenever new language is agreed. In August there should then be no need to devote several weeks to drafting a special report. Instead the report could be composed of the usual descriptive section, the reports of the Working Group Chairmen, and the working text. Using this approach the report could easily be updated whenever it was deemed necessary. In effect, we would have a kind of "rolling" report. We hope that this suggestion may help to resolve the question of how to report to the General Assembly.

I want to conclude the remarks offered today with a few general observations about our work thus far this year. My delegation had the honour of presiding over the Conference during the month of February, and we noted at the first meeting that we had a sense of cautious optimism about the prospects for the year. I would not go so far as to say that in every particular our expectations have been met, and with respect to the slow pace of the chemical weapons negotiations this is particularly true. Nevertheless I continue to believe that we are doing better in our work this year than we did last year. Perhaps we can draw some additional sense of commitment from this fact, and redouble our efforts when we resume our work in June.

There were a number of issues on which the Conference did not focus during the past three months. One in particular my delegation believes we should attempt to resolve during the summer, and that is the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. Again, the spirit of compromise and co-operation displayed during the present part of our session may find its application in this difficult matter.

Finally, I wish to extend the thanks of my delegation to the host country, Switzerland, for the truly exceptional hospitality it extended yesterday during our visit to Spiez. We found the trip a most profitable one. And my delegation looks forward to a similarly rewarding experience as the guests of Norway for the seismic workshop they are hosting on 5 and 6 June. It will be a stimulating beginning to our work this summer.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Today my delegation wishes to speak about some topical aspects of a chemical-weapons ban. We feel that work on a convention could be brought to a successful conclusion, if all the sides concerned displayed a constructive attitude. The Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized this very point in the communiqué they issued in Berlin last December.

The socialist countries have translated their willingness into concrete deeds. At this juncture, I would like to stress the Soviet Union's readiness to accept continuous international on-site inspection during the process of destroying chemical weapon stocks. This move was preceded by a number of detailed proposals pertaining to the Basic Provisions of a Convention on Chemical Weapons, which the USSR had submitted in 1982. They aim, for example, at inserting in the convention provisions to ban the use of chemical weapons. Also, the ideas advanced by socialist countries regarding the way the Consultative Committee should be organized and operate (CD/532) testify to their desire for practical results.

The members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were guided by the same constructive spirit when they proposed a year ago that a chemical-weapon-free zone should be created in Europe. The establishment of such zones would be a major confidence- and security-building measure, conducive to efforts to prohibit chemical weapons on a world-wide scale. By setting up those zones, the countries in question would convincingly demonstrate their resolve to make rapid headway in liquidating chemical weapons and preventing their geographical spread. It is profoundly regrettable that the other side, instead of responding favourably to this initiative, is devising new ways of using chemical weapons, under the so-called Rogers Plan.

Businesslike negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament are made a lot more difficult, and distrust rather than trust is sowed, if the atmosphere is poisoned with unfounded allegations, while upholding unrealistic demands unacceptable to many delegations. Such an attitude will not help bring our work to an expeditious close, now that the convention is within reach. Even less helpful are the stepped-up efforts to manufacture a new generation of chemical weapons.

We should remember that there has for many years been agreement among the overwhelming majority of States that the start of the production of binary weapons would spur the chemical arms race. At the same time, it would interfere considerably with the process of drafting a convention to ban chemical weapons, especially its compliance procedure. This is precisely what the socialist States pointed out in their Working Paper CD/258 back in 1982. What must not be overlooked either is the proliferation effect the production of binary and other new chemical weapons of mass destruction would have.

What we are facing now is the danger of a pattern, which we know all too well from the history of disarmament negotiations, repeating itself: while delegations are racking their brains in years of negotiations to find solutions, one side is preparing for another qualitative leap and is deploying new weapon systems, which, once they have become established components of military arsenals, are to be excluded from any form of limitation. This policy of creating faits accomplis will diminish the value or even render worthless the negotiating results attained thus far. We cannot help thinking that the negotiations are to be obstructed through unacceptable conditions. The lack of progress which would inevitably result is then to serve as an alibi for the acceleration of the arms race in the chemical weapons field. This must be prevented.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The call to all States in General Assembly resolution 39/65 B "to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons" shows how to go about it. By responding favourably to this appeal, all the sides concerned would demonstrate that they are interested in serious negotiations to outlaw chemical weapons and that they are willing to achieve quick results.

In line with my country's past efforts to contribute to the success of the negotiations, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to present a few ideas on a number of different aspects of the convention, such as permitted activities and the national verification system.

An important function of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is to ensure that no chemical weapons are manufactured. In order to cover reliably the so-called non-production of chemical weapons, the activities permitted under the convention must be defined so as to preclude the abuse of certain chemicals for chemical weapons. My delegation made known its position on that score in the deliberations of the Working Group of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. What we need are effective provisions to govern permitted activities. In other words, major chemicals and those of particular relevance to the possible production of chemical weapons must be subjected to a special régime, based on the equality of all States.

Regarding the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, all States would have to concentrate the production of those agents in a small-scale facility. It would not be justified to permit the option of manufacturing those chemicals in several plants, since such an option would virtually be tantamount to allowing certain countries to acquire a concealed chemical-weapon production capability. What is more, the concentration of the production of specific chemicals in a single installation would make effective national and international verification possible with little effort.

The convention should contain unambiguous stipulations regarding such a facility and its verification procedure. Details relating to the construction, mode of operation, and verification of the plant could be annexed to the convention.

The need to prevent the construction of chemical weapons facilities in countries not parties to the convention is another important matter touching upon the principle of equality and equal security. Document CD/CW/WP.93, submitted on this issue by Spain in January contains interesting ideas requiring close scrutiny. It must be made impossible for transnational corporations to sidestep the convention by moving the production of certain chemicals to other places. As a matter of fact, a lot more is involved here than verification in a traditional sense. To prevent the spread of chemical weapons, the country where such corporations are headquartered must be under the obligation to watch very strictly over their activities in third countries. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the agreement in principle that has been reached on an article concerning national measures to be taken to implement the convention. The article, contained in document CD/539, also provides for an appropriate national organization. Ever since the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been set up my delegation has been advocating a solution to that effect and put forward a series of proposals on how that body should operate and be composed. Detailed suggestions have also been advanced by the Group of socialist countries in document CD/532 and by Yugoslavia, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and other States.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Underlying this approach is the recognition that it will be up to the States themselves to implement the convention on the territory under their jurisdiction and that a smoothly operating national verification system would offer a basis on which compliance with the convention can be monitored and dependable international inspection is possible. Current international practice proves that this approach is correct: just take the national systems that many countries have set up to account for and control nuclear materials.

My delegation believes that it would be helpful to work out guidelines on a national verification system and thus to give concrete shape to the provisions pertaining to national implementation measures and co-operation between the Consultative Committee and national organizations on a number of verification issues. Such guidelines could be added to the convention as an annex. They could be of use to the States parties to the convention when they establish, maintain and review their national implementation system. The latter could consist of the following main components: (a) a legal element, allowing governments to determine the area of verification; (b) government-level organizational and functional elements (national organizations); and (c) facility-level organizational and operational elements.

A major duty to be performed under the national system would be to verify the so-called non-production of chemical weapons, which is an aspect of the convention with long-term ramifications, while verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and production facilities would cover a comparatively brief span of time only. Each party to the convention would, of course, have to work out and regularly review the laws, regulations and other measures needed to ensure that the provisions dealing with the accounting for and control of certain chemicals are observed in the territory under its jurisdiction. The measures we are talking about would relate to chemicals, facilities and international transfer. The question of how to cover the transnational corporations, as mentioned earlier, must be posed in this context.

It would be incumbent upon the governments of the States parties to the convention to create and maintain the national organization referred to above.

The facilities subject to verification should make available to the national organization information on the chemicals covered by the convention. The data thus obtained would serve as the basis for the reports to be transmitted to the Consultative Committee and for possible national verification activities.

In consultations and as the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary bodies progresses, my delegation will revert to these issues and advance further ideas.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that my country's delegation will spare no effort in the negotiations to arrive at an early conclusion of a convention to prohibit chemical weapons. Having said this, permit me to add that my delegation would support a decision to the effect that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should come together for additional deliberations after the summer part of the session.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

The Conference on Disarmament is at present engaged in a considerable effort to prepare a draft convention aimed at the total elimination of chemical weapons.

Within the highly complex set of provisions of which the convention will consist, there is already now I believe, a point on which a firm consensus of all delegations exists. That point is the confirmation of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons already enshrined in the Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1925.

On this fundamental issue, whatever controversies may exist among lawyers as to the future relationship between the Geneva Protocol and the future convention, the international community seems to me to be unanimous.

It can be said, therefore, that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons today forms part of international law, and that no one challenges the principle of this provision's permanent validity.

On 15 April we heard the extremely serious allegations which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran brought before our Conference concerning the recent use of chemical weapons in the so-called Gulf War in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

In the view of the Belgian delegation, our Conference cannot remain indifferent to these accusations, which emphasize, if that were necessary, the urgency of bringing to a successful conclusion our work on a convention completely prohibiting chemical weapons, a convention which should include efficient machinery for the verification of compliance with all its essential provisions, including those concerning prohibition of use.

While Belgium continues to contribute actively towards the preparation of such a convention, it does not feel that until the achievement of that end the international community can afford to remain passive in the face of repeated and persistent allegations of violations of this international instrument, whose sixtieth anniversary will be celebrated this year.

My delegation believes that violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, if it is proved and if no sanctions are taken against it, would undermine the very foundations of the negotiations in progress here, inasmuch as it would reveal the international community's present inability to defend an essential provision of positive international law -- a provision which the future convention could only confirm.

The Belgian delegation takes the view that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body by virtue of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly of 1973, should with all due solemnity draw the attention of the competent bodies of the United Nations to the fact that its task of drawing up a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons is compromised so long as a doubt exists as to the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict. Belgium considers that, as a matter of priority, the international community must dispel this doubt through the establishment of an impartial fact-finding procedure.

The proposal I have just made should not, of course, be seen as conflicting with the proposal made this morning by my distinguished colleague and neighbour, the Ambassador of Australia, that the Conference on Disarmament should make a declaration concerning its solemn agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The proposal I have just advanced seems to me on the contrary to be complementary to that proposal: the deeper the prohibition of chemical weapons becomes entrenched, the greater will be the need for the objective verification of alleged breaches of this international instrument.

(Mr. Depasse, Belgium)

I should like here, in passing, to address a question to my distinguished colleague from the German Democratic Republic. A moment ago he referred to -- and I noted a few words in English -- the danger of [spoke in English] "stepping up the arms race in chemical weapons", "the acceleration of the arms race in chemical weapons".

[Spoke in French] I do not know to what race he is referring. Since 1969 the United States has unilaterally renounced the production of chemical weapons, and I do not think that there has ever been the slightest accusation of a violation of this independent decision. Thus, from 1969 to 1984 not a single chemical weapon has been produced in the United States. Mr. Luce, the British Minister of State, told us in a recent statement that Great Britain had renounced the production of chemical weapons over a quarter of a century ago. I would like the representative of the German Democratic Republic to tell us which Western State has produced chemical weapons since 1969: I know of none. On the other hand, I do know a super-Power which produces chemical weapons every day of the year, and I would like to ask the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic where he sees a race, unless it is the Soviet Union taking part in a race against the clock or a race against itself. That is a possibility, but I do not think that it is what my colleague had in mind. I would therefore like to ask him a last question, in Cicero's words, "Quousque tandem abutere Catilina ..." -- How far will you try our patience, Catilina? According to our colleague from the German Democratic Republic, how long is it legitimate to ask the West to wait before taking a decision which would restore a strategic balance in the field of chemical weapons?

Mr. SHAHARI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.

I have no choice but to repeat what we discussed in the informal meeting, namely that my delegation strongly objects to the request made by Iraq to address this Conference, in view of the war crimes committed by Iraq, especially in the course of the last year, and in view of its recent repeated uses of chemical weapons.

This year is the sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in war, which has enjoyed considerable respect for many years since coming into being. Unfortunately, however, due to the terrible developments in the course of the past few years, that respect has been severely shaken and the Protocol has been subjected to affront and humiliation in the worst manner possible by the widespread use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

I have photographs here that show very clearly and in an unprecedented manner the crime committed by the Iraqi régime in its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some of these photographs are unique in nature, especially the one which shows a victim of the use of tabun by the Iraqi régime. There are other photographs of the victims of the use of mustard gas, who have died hours or days after the use of different kinds of chemical weapons. Recently Iraq has used new kinds of chemical weapons, and it is really a matter of serious concern that after a year from the time when a team of experts was sent by the Secretary-General to the Iran/Iraq war front and confirmation that chemical weapons have been used by Iraq, and after the international community expressed its condemnation of such violations on the part of the Iraqi régime, this régime still allows itself to resort to new kinds of chemical weapons and to new methods of their use.

Is it not profoundly unfortunate that we are now the witnesses of such quite unprecedented evidence not only of the violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the year in which we celebrate its sixtieth anniversary, but further of the unprecedented violation of international humanitarian rules governing the conduct of war? Is it not seriously disturbing that a government, namely the Government of Iraq, has made attacks on civilian populated areas a declared policy?

In the course of the past year, the Iraqi régime has not only not been discouraged from such open violations of international law but seems, from the evidence that we have here, actually to have been encouraged to continue its violations which are nothing less than war crimes. It is in view of this that we shall not allow a war criminal to address this highly distinguished Conference, and we believe that our sentiments and our feelings in this regard have already been expressed by some of the distinguished delegations in this morning's session and in the sessions of the Conference before today.

Today the Conference should really devote its efforts and resources to preservation of respect for international agreements achieved so far concerning the conduct of war and humanitarian aspects of such situations. We therefore cannot see why the precious time of the Conference should be given to futile activities which not only have no value for the goals the Conference is seeking, but have highly damaging effects on its honour and repute.

Mr. SBIHI (Morocco): Mr. President, as you know the Moroccan delegation has always been in favour of participation in this Conference by all States Members of the United Nations. Therefore, on grounds of fairness and without wishing to prejudge the substance of the problem, we think the Iraqi delegation could participate in our work, if only to enlighten us on some points and bring us further information on the issue discussed a moment ago. We therefore regret that there is not a consensus on this matter.

(Mr. Badr, Egypt)

I have asked for the floor to associate myself with the representative of Morocco in supporting the request by Iraq to participate in the work of the Conference, in the context of Egypt's well-known stand on supporting the right of non-member States to speak and participate in the work of the Conference.

Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am obliged to return to the statement made by my distinguished colleagues from Morocco and Egypt. Both statements are the same so I can reply to both at once. We are of the same opinion and we support the Moroccan view that all Members of the United Nations should participate in the work of this Conference. But there is an important factor here which stops us from allowing the representative of Iraq to address this conference, since it has now been proved to the whole international community that the régime of Iraq is a war criminal; and this does not need any sophisticated proof, since it is a declared policy of the régime in Baghdad that they will continue to attack civilian targets, civilian populated areas. They will continue to attack civilian airlines, international airlines and merchant shipping. This is their declared policy and I do not believe that any sincere member of this Conference can fail to support our sentiments and feelings in this situation.

The best the Iraqi régime can do to participate in this Conference is to reply to the long-delayed appeals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which requested Iran and Iraq not to use chemical weapons in their conflict. Iran already does not use chemical weapons and has responded immediately to the Secretary-General's request, made in June 1984 I believe. What the Iraqi régime can do is follow this. If they will only respond to the Secretary-General's request, then I do not believe that there is any reason why they cannot participate in the work of this Conference.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons I deem it my duty to inform the Conference on the Committee's work during the first part of this year's session, emphasizing at the same time some issues which, in my opinion, are pertinent to a successful second part of the session.

Due to the efforts of the delegations, an early decision was taken by the Conference enabling the Committee to start its work at the very beginning of the session.

In its work the Committee has followed the outline for the organization of work during the 1985 session contained in the Chairman's working paper CD/CW/WP.98, which provided for concentrating the work of the Committee on the following areas:

Working Group A on Scope, Definitions, Non-Production, Permitted Activities, chaired by Mr. Peter Poptchev of Bulgaria, to deal with

1. Permitted Activities regarding various categories of chemicals.
2. Laboratories, small-scale production facilities, industrial production facilities, their role in the permitted activities.
3. Definitions to be included in the Convention.
4. Principles and methods of declarations and verification with regard to the activities of the small-scale production facility.

Working Group B on Elimination of Stocks and Production Facilities, chaired by Mrs. Elisabeth Bonnier of Sweden, to deal with

1. Declarations, plans and notifications.
2. Order of destruction of stocks; its practical implementation.
3. Destruction facilities.
4. Principles and methods of verification with regard to the destruction of stocks.
5. Principles and methods of verification with regard to the elimination (destruction, dismantling, conversion, etc.) of production facilities.

Working Group C on Compliance, chaired by Mr. Frank Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany to deal with

1. Institutional aspects of compliance.
2. Consultation and co-operation.
3. Principles and methods of fact-finding including on-challenge verification.
4. Interaction between the national and international organs of verification of compliance.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Moreover, the question of the prohibition of use of chemical weapons and problem of herbicides were dealt with in open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by Mr. Hoegroho Wisnomoerti of Indonesia.

To begin with, some statistical data. I have to say that the work on chemical weapons has been very extensive. Altogether 23 meetings took place, including 4 meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, 21 meetings of the Working Groups and 3 open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee, not to mention numerous regular multi- or bilateral consultations organized by the Working Group Chairmen or the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as the delegations themselves.

I cannot fail to mention that a number of important statements on chemical weapons have been made in plenary. Many of the ideas put forward there, dealing both with matters of substance and procedure of our work deserve a thorough consideration. I am grateful for this intellectual help of which I and the Committee shall make the best possible use.

Several working papers on important issues have been presented. I am very glad to notice -- and I would like to stress it as a very positive and promising fact -- that the delegations have demonstrated a great interest and activity in all forms of the Committee's work, which has been carried out in a business-like atmosphere with a rather rare intensity.

In the Chairman's Working Paper I have proposed that the Working Groups concentrate their efforts on consideration, clarification and finding generally acceptable formulations of specific problems which, at this stage, have key importance for the elaboration of the Convention. It was also stated therein that the process of drafting is composed of several subsequent phases, from the exploration of problems through identification of various positions and viewpoints and their elaboration, to the stage when common understandings are reached.

This means that progress cannot be measured solely in terms of the final stage of the actual drafting process, as some delegations seem to suggest.

During the spring part of the session a great deal of hard and serious work has been carried out especially with respect to the consideration and clarification of problems, though it was not possible to reach the stage of common understanding to an extent which would satisfy all of us.

I believe it was a fruitful session. On some issues, the area of common understanding was broadened; in some other cases, rapprochement of positions was achieved. What may be even more important for our work in the second part of the session is that we came to better understanding of different concerns and positions, especially on some controversial issues.

I am glad that great interest and involvement of the delegations in the search of the best possible expression in the future convention of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons together with its links to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, resulted in considerable progress. A draft of preambular and adequate operative paragraphs has been prepared, which gives a solid basis for consensus to be reached hopefully in the second part of the session. I firmly believe that the eventual solution of this problem, which is of great importance to many delegations will positively affect other issues. This welcome development should go a long way to satisfy the concerns expressed by a number of delegations such as for example, the Australian delegation at our last plenary.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

One of the most important issues under discussion was the broad and complex area of permitted activities: delegations expressed deep concern with respect to excluding any possibility of chemical weapons production by commercial industry, and to securing assurance that no activities other than permitted ones will be carried out. In this context a basis for common understanding is beginning to take shape. Common views seem to exist as to the necessity of drawing up lists of specific chemicals for the needs of the Convention.

Delegations also seem to be in agreement that the peaceful activity of the chemical industry should not be subject to interference.

Another area of common understanding seems to be the non-transfer of chemical weapons to other States for purposes of destruction.

Common views were expressed as to the need for co-operation among States parties to the future convention in fact-finding procedures. In addition there seems to be common acceptance of the idea of on-challenge verification as an independent or, in some cases, complementary form of routine verification. In this respect an important and sensitive issue at stake is the need to exclude the possibility of misuse of such verification.

If we keep in mind that it is impossible to have 100 per cent verification and that on the other hand it is impossible to have 100 per cent assurance against the misuse of verification, then we may be able to accommodate each other's view more easily.

Likewise, it is worth mentioning that delegations seem to agree that the national organs of verification cannot be subordinate to the international ones. They can and should complement each other in the process of mutual co-operation.

These were some principles, which seem to be mutually shared, on which we mainly build our hopes for progress in further, more detailed work.

A number of important issues were the subject of a thorough and extensive exchange of views, resulting in a considerable progress in mutual elucidation of delegations' approaches. This is, for instance, the case with regard to the general goals and principles of verification and the problem of diversion of stocks.

We have, however, to bear in mind that very often, the approaches and ways, proposed by delegations, to achieve common goals are based on different perceptions and different concerns which we should all try to more fully understand and accommodate.

A typical example of such different approaches is the controversial problem of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes.

Some delegations are of the opinion that all super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes should be produced in a small-scale production facility in a quantity not exceeding 1 metric ton, while others would prefer no limitation on their production for industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other activities.

I could obviously give other instances of divergencies of views which we meet and try to overcome in our work. I do not like, however, to burden the Conference with too many details. All the more so as several delegations have been pointing to these differences in their statements in the plenary.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

To find the best possible, mutually acceptable, solutions to the very complex and sensitive problems under consideration, is not an easy task. At stake are the specific political, military and economic concerns of all participating States. These interests are not irreconcilable. But we all have to agree that only by a realistic approach and by compromise can they be reconciled. In some cases, it may be possible within our instructions; in others political decisions may be needed. But in all cases the readiness of the negotiating parties to compromise will be a decisive factor for progress. And we need more of such readiness if we are to achieve a breakthrough in our negotiations.

I do not like to enter into a very detailed analysis of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. The respective reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups as well as of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the non-use of chemical weapons, were presented yesterday to the Ad Hoc Committee meeting. They reflect in greater detail various aspects of our work on a chemical weapons convention and, in my assessment, this is an optimistic reflection.

These reports, together with proposals put forward in working papers as well as in the plenary meetings of the Conference, constitute a valuable material to ponder on in order to use it in our future work.

We also should not and will not forget all the rich and valuable material gathered in previous years; on the contrary, we should draw from it more extensively if we feel that it might be used to the advantage of the negotiations.

Though we have not been able to achieve full success in what we had planned at the outset of our work, I envisage that the summer part of the session will be of extreme importance for the negotiating process. A sufficient material to build on was worked out. Thus we may not only reach agreement on some pivotal questions but also to remarkably move forward in the drafting of some parts of the Convention.

This assumption is based on a thorough analysis of the current state of our work as well as of different aspects of the negotiating process.

In this context, let me draw your attention to the present state of affairs with regard to an additional session of the Committee, which, despite some expressed doubts, might prove to be very useful.

As we all remember, in last year's report (CD/539), the Conference on Disarmament adopted a recommendation with regard to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that "a decision be taken early in the first part of the 1985 session on the continuation of the process of negotiation on the Convention after the closure of the 1985 session, with a view to holding a resumed session of a duration which will ensure that the time available in the period between September 1985 and January 1986 is more fully utilized for negotiations".

In implementation of this recommendation I started the consultation process actually even before the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee took place. Both individual delegations and groups of delegations have been consulted. A special meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee and open-ended consultations were held on this question

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The only substantive negotiations carried on at the Conference during the spring part of its session have been those on chemical disarmament. The French delegation attaches the greatest importance to this subject. It will devote a special statement to it at the beginning of our summer session. It welcomes the rapid resumption of work of this topic last February; it firmly hopes that this work will lead to substantial advances; it expresses its confidence and good wishes to our Polish colleague, Ambassador Turbanski, who this year enjoys the honour and bears the heavy responsibility of presiding over the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mrs. Bonnier, Mr. Frank Elbe and Mr. Poptchev, to whom I should like to add the name of Mr. Wisnoemerti. Despite the efforts and the important contributions made, the pace at which the negotiations are advancing undoubtedly falls short of what we might have wished. We have criticisms from various quarters on this point. The French delegation regards the difficulties which have been encountered as yet another reason for devoting all the time that may be required to this capital task. We hope, therefore, that agreement may be reached in due course on a resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee's work this autumn.

Negotiations have their own dynamics: recesses, useful though they are for the consideration of problems in our capitals and the formulation of new instructions, should not be so long as to destroy the momentum that results from daily and prolonged discussions between delegations.

Moreover, chemical disarmament is a particularly pressing and serious matter in the present circumstances. Last week we heard the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran; the accusations he brought justify the holding of an investigation under the international community's auspices. Last year, accusations of the same nature gave rise to an investigation decided upon by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The team of experts appointed by him brought back incontrovertible proof of the use of chemical weapons. The manufacture of such weapons is within reach of any State possessing a chemical industry. The risk of their proliferation and, consequently, of their use has in recent years aroused the international community's serious concern. Thus, three years ago the United Nations General Assembly established a provisional investigation procedure aimed at ascertaining facts which might constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol and of the rules of customary international law incorporated in it. This procedure offers every guarantee of objectivity, and the General Assembly noted last year that the provisions for its implementation had been completed. The present situation calls for such implementation. Failure to act on the part of the competent bodies of the international community would have the effect of seriously undermining the authority of the Geneva Protocol and would constitute a deplorable setback for the rule of law in a fundamental field.

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(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The investigation procedure set up by the General Assembly, on the basis of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations acted last year, is only a provisional measure. The convention we are negotiating here will have to contain treaty obligations having legal force. We therefore attach primordial importance to those aspects of the negotiations which relate to the prohibition of use. In that connection, it is our wish that the Convention should, first, contain in its preamble a reference to the Geneva Protocol, whose validity it would thus reaffirm; then, in the operative part, it should impose a prohibition of a general character on the use of chemical weapons. This would clearly indicate the prohibition's specific scope, which should not coincide with those of the prohibitions relating to the production, possession and transfer of chemical weapons and of their components. It would be entirely compatible with the equally general character of the prohibition imposed by the Geneva Protocol with regard to chemical weapons.

Lastly, the Convention would stipulate that none of its provisions should be interpreted as affecting in any manner whatsoever the obligations assumed by States Parties under the Geneva Protocol. By so doing it would affirm the Protocol's authority and continuing validity and ensure its autonomy in relation to the provisions of the Convention itself. In particular, this would avoid the obligations of parties to the Protocol being affected by their possible withdrawal from the Convention or by a subsequent modification of the latter's provisions. The consultations in progress under Mr. Wisnoemoerti's guidance make us hopeful of an agreement broadly in line with the ideals I have outlined.

The Ad Hoc Committee will, of course, have to work out verification procedures to fit the special conditions of an investigation into the use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

With regard to chemical weapons, we must recall the tragic memory of clouds of chlorine gas which swept over the battlefields of Europe at the beginning of the First World War, causing a million victims, with 90,000 dead, including many Senegalese. Drawing the lesson of this barbarous evil, the Geneva Protocol concluded in 1925 was a legal instrument which prohibited the use of chemical weapons.

Since then, however, several violations of this rule of international law have taken place in the Third World, and therefore everything must be done to achieve a complete prohibition of chemical weapons that is universally applicable and reliably verifiable, while taking into account the 1925 Geneva Protocol which is, in fact, one of the oldest disarmament agreements.

Today, with the advance of biochemical and biotechnological know-how, it is to be feared that any delay in the prevention of the proliferation of these fearsome weapons runs the risk of allowing the invention of new and still more lethal types of chemical warfare agents that are more toxic, more dangerous and also cheaper, which could bring about the mass destruction of defenceless populations.

The Conference should therefore devote considerable efforts to achieving a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, laying down the main objectives of the future convention -- as the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, Mr. Turbanski, explained this morning -- concerning the prohibition of the development, manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling, storing and transfer as well as use of chemical weapons, the destruction of existing chemical weapons and of production facilities.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Seno. Senegal)

Here again, the difficulty lies in the identification of the essential issues, although I think on this point a great effort has been made; and above all, there is a problem as regards the procedures to be adopted for on-site inspections of non-production or peaceful use of key components or precursors in chemistry or industry.

In this connection, the proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom concerning monitoring and a system of verification measures designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the future convention have particularly engaged our attention.

The same applies to the Federal Republic of Germany's undertaking not to manufacture chemical weapons, placing itself under the control of the Western European Union.

Of course, it remains for the Conference to seek conciliatory approaches in order to find the right diplomatic treaty language for the principles of inspection and verification of the destruction of existing stocks when the time comes. At this level, it should be stressed, only political will and mutual trust, between the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, will make it possible to overcome the differences of view which have appeared in the crucial area of verification and on-site inspection.

To sum up, we must now set to work and give priority to the political options so as to negotiate a draft treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons within the shortest possible time.

Similarly, the provisions of the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons, which does not appear to contain verification rules, may perhaps be revised to adapt it to the present circumstances.

An agreement on the prohibition of the use of radioactive substances as radiological weapons would supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic):

In connection with my delegation's statement at our last meeting on 18 April, the distinguished representative of Belgium, Ambassador Depasse, posed a question concerning an arms race in the chemical weapons field. Let me briefly reply to that question. With a view to emphasizing the possible consequences of the incorporation of new binary chemical weapons in arsenals, I said the following on Thursday:

"What we are facing now is the danger of a pattern, which we know all too well from the history of disarmament negotiations, repeating itself. While delegations are racking their brains in years of negotiations to find solutions, one side is preparing for another qualitative leap and is deploying new weapon systems, which, once they have become established components of military arsenals, are to be excluded from any form of limitation. This policy of creating faits accomplis will diminish the value or even render worthless the negotiating results attained thus far. We cannot help thinking that the negotiations are to be obstructed through unacceptable conditions. The lack of progress, which would inevitably result, is then to serve as an alibi for the acceleration of the arms race in the chemical weapons field. This must be prevented."

In this passage, I expressed my delegation's conviction that it would be wrong to play down the considerable adverse effects that the introduction of binary weapons into arsenals would have on disarmament negotiations and international security. Nobody can seriously believe that such weapons would bring more security and improve the chances of concluding a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The opposite is almost certain to be the case. It is an indisputable fact that the incorporation in arsenals of a new generation of chemical weapons leads to a further dangerous spiral in the chemical arms race. Equally indisputable is who started and is advancing that process. In my understanding, it is our task here to do everything in our power to avert any development likely to impede or even make impossible the conclusion of a convention. We need a constructive spirit rather than bickering over speculations and unfounded allegations. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic wants to underline that it advocates an early prohibition of chemical weapons and that it will make its contribution to this end in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany)

This Conference has again been faced, only a few days ago, with one of the most preoccupying phenomena of our time, the possible resurgence of the use of chemical weapons in conflict. I refer to the statement of the Foreign Minister of Iran on 16 April.

It is an integral part of our mandate as negotiators for a convention containing a permanent ban of chemical weapons that we cannot remain passive in the face of renewed indications that chemical weapons have been employed in breach of international law. This has been a consistent view of my Government and it has been expressed with equal vigour throughout recent years when there were strong indications of the use of chemical weapons in other parts of the world. As in those instances, it is now imperative that action be taken, and this applies not only to individual delegations but to the Conference as such.

My delegation, like many others, professes a policy of rigorous neutrality vis-à-vis the Gulf war and the parties engaged in it. However, neutrality in the conflict in the Gulf is not identical with neutrality in the face of the use of chemical weapons or its possibility and the claim that international law has been violated. As delegations, but also as part of an international conference of States, we can remain neither neutral nor passive towards the allegation that international law has been breached. Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands has rightly pointed out to us that the overriding political plans of one of the adversaries in such a conflict -- even though they may aim at the rapid termination of war -- cannot justify the violation or erosion of international law.

In these chambers the forthcoming sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Protocol has frequently been recalled. It is our joint duty to see to it that the Geneva Protocol continues to command respect. This means that a suspicion must be followed up no matter who raises it, against whom it is raised and who will finally emerge as a violator of law. A full inquiry into such suspicions is important in order to make sure that no country can hope to have recourse to these outlawed weapons with impunity, but also that nobody can use the violation of law by others as a pretext for illegal action on his part. An escalation of breach of this kind must be stopped in the first cycle of a potentially disastrous spiral.

My delegation supports the view of a number of delegations which have spoken on 18 April -- Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands -- that the Conference should at the earliest possible point and as strongly as feasible confirm its unconditional support for the Geneva Protocol and the commitment of the international community that chemical weapons not be used in war. My delegation would wish to add its voice to this request, a voice that we hope is particularly strengthened by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany has been and is the only country, that, in addition to being a signatory of the Geneva Protocol, has by international obligation foregone the production and possession of chemical weapons of all kind. In this tradition, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany is ready for participation in any

(Mr. Wagener, Federal Republic of Germany)

appropriate action which contributes to the re-enforcement of the Geneva Protocol and the future non-use of chemical weapons. The adjournment of the Conference must not be allowed to break the momentum for action by the Conference. When we reconvene for the summer part of the annual session, this point should again be at the top of the priority scale of our political endeavour.

The United Nations must rise to the challenge. My delegation recalls with gratitude the determined action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in March 1984 designed to investigate allegations that were formulated at that time. It appears unfortunate that the facts and insights which the team of experts brought back from the conflict area have not brought a definitive remedy to the suspicion of chemical-weapon use in that regional context. It is therefore imperative that the Secretary-General renew his efforts to investigate allegations of chemical-weapon use in the Gulf region. For this purpose it is incumbent upon him to make use of all possibilities offered to him by the Charter and the organs of the United Nations. Both have equipped him with substantial powers. There is the specific mandate imparted to him by the General Assembly in a number of resolutions, empowering him to conduct investigations according to a well-defined procedure. Today it is more important than ever that the authority with which the Secretary-General has thus been clad not be allowed to lapse but that it be fully utilized in the interest of the international community. We should all be aware that non-application of these operational possibilities in the face of an open accusation and of the formal request by one of the Governments of the region would damage this precious constitutional tool and possibly invalidate it for the future. At the same time, it is desirable in the view of my delegation that the Secretary-General make full, if circumspect, use of his fact-finding mandate under Article 99 of the Charter.

The renewed allegations concerning the possible use of chemical weapons in war are a saddening reminder that the threat of chemical warfare agents, in spite of the intensive effort of this Conference to eliminate this category of weapons forever from human arsenals, is still with us. The accusations which have been brought before us make us once again aware of the fact that the most acute threat emanates from existing stocks of chemical weapons, -- a threat that appears particularly ominous to countries like mine in the midst of Europe, faced with the manifest military preponderance of one of the alliances. There continues to be alarming information about the on-going process of chemical armament by the countries of the Warsaw Pact, the rapid growth of its chemical arsenals during the entire period in which the United States has been observing a comprehensive one-sided moratorium, and the catastrophic dimension which the use of such arsenals would add to any conflict on European soil. These prospects, so disquieting for the population in my country, have motivated us to insist with particular urgency on the rapid conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, and particularly on the first part of its implementation, the one where all existing stocks of chemical weapons are to be declared, and then to be destroyed under international supervision. It is of obvious importance that at least approximate information about the dimensions of the threat and the dimensions of the necessary destruction be obtained at an early point. In this sense, my delegation is particularly grateful to Ambassador Depasse who, in a number of

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

At the same time, we must always bear in mind the basic understanding that what are to be declared and eliminated are those chemicals defined as weapons according to the general-purpose criteria, related weapon systems and their production facilities. If we lose sight of this basic point, the scope of the definition is likely to expand beyond control, leading us into a dangerous vicious circle in treaty language.

I should like to mention here that in looking for suitable verification technology to monitor chemical-weapons related facilities, especially facilities for elimination, it would be relevant to consider the application of what the IAEA utilizes as a reliable remote sensor technology in the implementation of safeguards. This is known as RECOVER, and I would like to present a working paper in due course introducing an example of this technology as applied to verification of a chemical weapons convention.

Allow me next to turn to permitted activities. The two major activities foreseen in this regard are those for protective purposes and peaceful purposes.

With regard to protective purposes, Japan is able to support the following two points, namely: that the production of super-toxic lethal and related chemicals for protective purposes should take place in a single specialized facility and in no case should the gross total of such chemicals exceed one ton: and that this specialized facility should be submitted to routine international on-site verification.

As regards peaceful purposes, such as industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other activities, language should be elaborated which takes due account of the guiding principle already agreed to previously, namely that States Parties to this convention undertake not to create any impediments to such peaceful activities.

There have been a number of proposals regarding the effective monitoring of the production and other related activities with regard to specific chemicals which might possibly hinder the attainment of the objectives of the convention. These measures are important means to enhance confidence amongst the States Parties in the implementation of the convention. The basic approach which Japan supports with regard to this is as follows. First, specific chemicals to be put on the list of material to be so monitored should be defined as clearly as possible by giving the exact scientific name and, where necessary, the chemical formula. Second, the number of chemicals to be included in such a list should be kept to the bare minimum, but the list should be subjected to periodic review after the entry into force of the convention. Third, the list should start with super-toxic lethal chemicals used exclusively for weapons purposes, and go on to their immediate precursors which have little peaceful applications. I realize that whether we can agree to the above as the criteria to define a key precursor is something to be elaborated through future negotiations.

With respect to precursors other than those mentioned above and the so-called dual purpose substances, a great deal of care is required in their identification and listing because many of them are widely produced and used for peaceful purposes. It would seem extremely difficult to determine clearly and objectively whether a given chemical in this category was intended for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, whereas given our free market economy, we would be unable to accept undue restrictions on normal industrial production. This fact must always be borne in mind in all considerations to include these chemicals in the list and place them under some kind of control.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Further consideration leads us to the following.

First, it is very important and necessary that the criteria for selecting the individual chemicals for inclusion in the list are clearly spelled out. One way of doing this job properly would be to appoint a group of scientific experts to give a clear explanation as to why one substance from among a production or synthesizing chain had been selected as a precursor in the context of the convention. Identification of practical processes for synthesizing known super-toxic lethal chemicals could serve to create a common basis for consideration of this matter.

Second, in the event that, for lack of better alternatives, certain chemicals produced or used for peaceful purposes in industry have to be placed under control through reporting of production amounts etc. in order to prevent illegal or undesirable diversion, the concept of a "significant quantity" becomes of particular importance. In this respect, it should be useful to request experts to develop concrete quantitative figures with due regard being given to existing national capabilities of chemical industries. At the same time, special attention must be paid to the cost/effectiveness aspect in consideration of controls with regard to widely-used chemicals produced on a large scale for peaceful purposes. Measures to implement the convention with regard to these chemicals could cause undue difficulties to the chemical industry, while the collection and processing of the related data would require extensive efforts and entail great cost.

Thirdly, with regard to those chemicals to be listed, we need to study and agree on what information is significant and, therefore, required under the convention. I might add that experience in other fields indicates that presentation of statistical data on production, export and import, conversion into final products, etc. has to be handled very carefully. Data collection, unless carefully designed in advance, can lead to increased confusion, while a possibility of data manipulation cannot be denied.

I wish now to turn to matters concerning verification, and especially how we are to provide for on-site inspection. It would seem to us to be most practical if the final details of on-site inspection of the individual facilities were to be worked out in the form of supplementary agreements between the States concerned and the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organ following the entry into force of the convention. However, in order to provide for a smooth functioning of the convention from the very beginning, and further, to ensure a non-discriminatory and fair application to all States Parties, it would be preferable that agreed rules or guidelines to this end be developed and annexed to the convention as an integral part thereof. Since it is conceivable that peaceful industrial activities are included in on-site inspections in the course of implementation of the convention, especially where a challenge is involved, provisions should be included therein to protect industrial proprietary information and other industrial property.

We hope to see early agreement on the basic composition and functions of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary body, the Executive Committee, along the lines developed at the Ad Hoc Committee's meetings in the past.

We are much interested in the composition of the Executive Committee, and think that the following points should be given due consideration, namely: (i) the participation of the two chemical-weapons Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union; (ii) equitable geographic and political representation; and (iii) equitable representation of the world's chemical industry.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Further, we think that the number of States to be represented on the Executive Committee would of necessity be limited in order for it to be viable as an executive body. Re-election to the Committee should not be prohibited.

Next, I would like to talk about procedures regarding compliance. On-going discussions on implementation indicate various modes for consultation and co-operation between parties, as well as fact-finding conducted under the supervision of the Consultative Committee or of its subsidiary body as the means for resolving all matters related to the implementation of the convention. Much ground has already been covered in previous work of the Ad Hoc Committee in this regard, which we hope will provide for an early agreement on principles.

With regard to the formulation of fact-finding arrangements and to its time-frame, there is a tendency to place emphasis on the element of speed. I should like to take this opportunity to present our comments in this regard.

We feel that the situation calling for prompt reaction is one in which suspicion has arisen with regard to possible chemical weapons use. There can also be problems of clandestine facilities and clandestine activities which call for prompt action. These two categories represent serious violations so that somewhat unusual procedures may be justified.

With regard to those facilities which are subject to routine international on-site inspection, we feel that challenge verification can be justified, in the form of a special inspection, when data transmitted from on-site instrumentation etc. indicate irregularities. The procedure for such special inspection should be set out in an annex to the convention.

Regardless of whether or not a certain facility is required to provide information under the convention on its activities, it is possible that a question might arise regarding possible diversion of chemicals from peaceful to military purposes. One can argue about a system of on-site inspection to provide for timely detection. On the other hand, excessive exercise of this right could create undue difficulty for the normal operation of the world's peaceful chemical industry. There are also practical limitations arising from availability of inspection resources. Therefore, with regard to suspicion concerning the activities of the peaceful civilian industry, the State concerned should first be given the opportunity to present information and explanation in order to clarify the situation. Only when doubts persist, would it be advisable to move on to other means of verification including on-site inspection. In this respect, we also feel it necessary to provide for procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exercise of requests for on-site inspection. It is our considered view that inspection resource requirements should be calculated in advance, before deciding definitively as to what chemicals are to be included in the list, what their significant quantities are, what level of confidence one requires from routine inspection, and how many challenge inspections might likely be conducted. This will give a very useful sensitivity analysis regarding the cost/effectiveness of chemical weapons verification.

I do not need to emphasize that these views are the result of careful consideration and examination not only of our own situation but also of the world's chemical industries in general, in their inevitable association with matters of chemical weapons and chemical warfare. I have emphasized in this intervention points about listing for definition and the concept of a significant quantity, and considered them in the over-all context of the implementation of a chemical weapons convention. I hope that I was able to present a general outline of our line of thinking. I wish to repeat again that the Conference on Disarmament during this session should work, work hard and together, to make substantive progress in the negotiation of this very important convention.

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

A year has already passed since the publication of the report by the United Nations fact-finding mission regarding the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. I do not think that the time has been insufficient for a full international investigation into a critical question which has been the focus of concern of the international community. Could you, as the most informed individuals conducting the multilateral disarmament negotiations in this Conference, come to terms with your conscience to justify the catastrophic and conspiratorial indifference of international bodies vis-à-vis this crime of genocide through lack of appropriate international means to prevent the use of chemical weapons? A fortnight ago, exactly at a time when the United Nations Secretary-General was in Baghdad to pursue his efforts to persuade the Iraqi régime to abide by international conventions and regulations, the Islamic Republic of Iran was once again the victim of an extensive chemical attack. The report concerning this attack and its human toll has already been circulated as a document of the United Nations. Without delay, we invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to fly from Baghdad to Tehran immediately to witness at close quarters the catastrophic effects of the deployment of chemical weapons. By choosing this particular time to launch another chemical attack, the Iraqi régime has, in fact, declared to the United Nations Secretary-General personally that it is determined not only to continue the deployment of chemical weapons, but absolutely to disregard world public opinion and all international conventions and regulations. Does this tragic state of affairs not persuade all fair-minded people to suspect that the Iraqi régime dares ridicule all universal values of humanity on the strength of certain behind-the-scenes backings, and escape any punitive action by the Security Council and other practical international measures?

Only during the six previous weeks from 3 March to 9 April 1985, according to the figures, the list of which will be submitted with photographs to the Conference for the information of the distinguished delegates, 4,600 people were wounded and martyred by 33 instances of use of chemical weapons. I repeat, 4,600 people were wounded and martyred by 33 instances of use of chemical weapons. Iraq has not only perpetrated the crime of repeatedly resorting to chemical warfare, but has also conducted extensive research and experiments for the deployment of new chemical weapons. In its earlier deployment as reported by the United Nations team, Iraq used Mustard Gas and Tabun, which is a nerve gas.

Here it is worth mentioning that although Tabun was developed during World War Two, it was never used, and the Baathist régime of Iraq is the first to have used this deadly weapon, shunned by mankind. In its later development, the Iraqi régime used a new chemical weapon composed of Tabun and an asphyxiating agent, and finally in its most recent deployments, this régime has utilized a never agent comprising of Tabun, Cyanide compounds as well as Mustard Gas. This new chemical agent was deployed through aerial bombardment and was sprayed by crop-spraying aircraft. The Conference is asked to take effective measures to halt the development and test of new chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime.

Who do you think still respects the 1925 Geneva Protocol? Should not an answer to this question precede the resumption of efforts by this Conference to ban the deployment of chemical weapons? Does not the shockingly repeated use of chemical agents by Iraq and the extensive research and experiment for the development of new ones not have anything to do with international peace and security? If it has, could the Security Council offer the least justification for its irresponsible attitude to the international community? Could the Security Council deny that its silence has not persuaded and encouraged Iraq to continue to deploy these weapons?

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Of course, the attitude taken by this Council was not unexpected to us. Small wonder that the Security Council, which once adopted the Resolution 552 concerning the attacks on commercial ships and tankers, now refrains from issuing a resolution condemning Iraq for the use in war of chemical weapons.

What is surprising under such circumstances is the continuous efforts, long talks, and holding of several sessions aimed at adopting new conventions as regards disarmament.

It is against common sense to waste time and money on agreements which can only be used in libraries and referred to in conferences. If 60 years after the adoption of the 1925 Protocol, and so many years of painstaking efforts of our fathers to work out common values of humankind leading to the preparation of a protocol in which the use of chemical weapons is considered inhuman and immoral, 33 cases of violations of this agreement during only six weeks create no proper sensitivity in international fora, especially the ones directly concerned with this matter, must not the world community sadly mourn for the moral collapse of international organizations?

It is not necessary during the short opportunity given to me to deal with the deficiencies and weaknesses of the existing international organizations that are responsible for maintaining peace and security, and safeguarding international agreements and regulations. All of you, by and large are aware of these weaknesses. Undoubtedly the delegates representing various countries in international fora have paid attention to these weak points in proportion to their independence, and efforts were made to eliminate the current shortcomings. Here my main concern is not the above-mentioned shortcomings; rather I would like to draw attention to those elements which manipulate international regulations and executive bodies for the achievement of sublime human goals. In my letter dated 29 January 1985, to the United Nations Secretary-General, I said

"Certainly there are more effective ways to prevent Iraq from using chemical weapons, and still the Islamic Republic of Iran is not willing to think of the last option. Is there any other internationally accepted legal instrument to meet this goal, which, in fact, is an international objective? It is hoped that Your Excellency will seriously consider this question and give an answer accordingly. It is self-evident that if the answer does not include a practical solution independent of the imposed war, it will be considered a negative answer, and implies that the Islamic Republic of Iran and all members of international community are absolutely defenceless against the violation of the Geneva Protocol, thus forcing all countries to independently adopt necessary preventive measures in order to confront this action."

Now, do you not think that refraining from giving an answer to this question would have no other result than to strengthen the theory of deterrence.

We even suggested a practical solution. On 16 February 1985, in a letter to the United Nations, we requested sending a permanent mission to Tehran in order to investigate and give reports on the deployment of chemical weapons. The same elements that prevented the Security Council from taking a proper position as regards this

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

problem created obstacles in the acceptance of this request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization. We received no explanation indicating according to what legal principle the despatch of a mission aimed at realizing such a goal contravenes the duties of the United Nations.

Is there any better way to encourage the arms race? Unfortunately, it was not long before the incident we had given prior warnings of happened again. Chemical weapons were once again used in a very extensive manner.

The Islamic Republic of Iran once again asked the Secretary-General to station a permanent mission in Tehran to monitor such violations and report accordingly.

Naturally we insist on this stand because we still believe that the presence of such a team in Tehran can, to some extent, play a deterring role. We still have no intention to resort to other deterrent means to stop the Iraqi régime's crimes. At the same time, we evidently cannot remain defenceless for a long time. We are no more prepared unilaterally to sustain the damages resulting from this crime.

I am sure the Security Council has inevitably felt the special sensitivity of the present juncture. But I do not think that the Security Council has yet become bold enough to overcome political barriers of its members' influence. The Security Council is certainly aware of the grave consequences that a chemical retaliation may bring about for the human community and for the credibility of the Security Council and the whole United Nations if quick measures are not taken to stop it. But such measures require sincerity and determination, both of which the Security Council unfortunately lacks.

Considering the incentives and the philosophy behind the formation of this Conference, we believe it should be, more than any other United Nations organ, prepared to react to the prevailing sensitive state of affairs. The principled reaction of this Conference would certainly pave the way for other United Nations organs.

If for any political reason the Security Council cannot adopt an open stance on this matter, why should not this Conference call on the concerned United Nations to condemn the repeated and extensive Iraqi use of chemical weapons, and send the team the Islamic Republic of Iran has requested.

In order to prevent such crimes from being repeated in other parts of the world, we are ready to provide this Conference with the results of this bitter experience our people have undergone. The wounded of the recent chemical attacks of Iran have been sent to several European countries for treatment and studying their medical files will help the Conference to achieve its objective, and will make them understand the depth of the catastrophe.

Furthermore, it is advised that a glance be made at the book on biological and chemical warfare published by Gent University of Belgium. It is advisable that the distinguished representative of the Secretary-General should work out a method for compiling these findings and distribute them among Member States accordingly.

The Islamic Republic of Iran once again openly declares that in spite of its ability to retaliate in all such cases, it would not like to violate international laws and regulations, and would do so only when there is no other option. As regards chemical weapons, the reservations to the 1925 Protocol were changed into the non-first-use document. What is more, the Iraqi régime is one of the signatories to the non-first-use document. The Islamic Republic of Iran could indisputably embark on a retaliatory act through a legal interpretation of the document. But last year

(Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

here in this Conference it undertook not to retaliate, because it believes that such acts would discredit one of the most important international documents that has been violated less than any other convention, due to the fact that public opinion abhors the use of chemical weapons. Besides, it has had the hope that the international community would be able to stop its violation by the Iraqi régime.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

I am speaking today to introduce a further British Working Paper entitled "Chemical Weapons Convention: Organs and Constitution of the Organisation", which has already been circulated to all delegations as document CD/589. This paper is designed to complement the series of papers already tabled by the United Kingdom delegation on verification under a chemical weapons convention. The latest of these, CD/575, was tabled on 12 March by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Richard Luce, who emphasized the great importance attached by my Government to the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The present paper on the constitution of the organization builds on a wide area of common ground that has already been identified in the course of the negotiations on this subject. In this particular area there is already broad agreement that there should be a Consultative Committee composed of representatives of all parties to the convention, with the primary task of ensuring compliance with its provisions. It is also common ground that there should be an Executive Council of limited membership, and an international Secretariat which would include an Inspectorate. Our paper contains detailed proposals for the constitution and functions of these three organs and for the division of responsibility between them. We believe that it would be important to define these responsibilities with care and precision if the Organization is to be fully effective in its vital task of ensuring compliance with the convention and thus providing the confidence needed for its conclusion and continual stability.

The Organization would be responsible for implementation of the various verification measures required under the Convention to give assurance of compliance with its provisions. It would be responsible for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons by routine inspection and data exchange for which we have made

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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

detailed proposals in earlier papers. It would also be responsible during the first 10 years of the life of the convention for the verification of destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and of facilities for their production. Last but not least, it would become responsible for carrying out fact-finding procedures for verification on challenge, which could provide the safety-net to supplement routine inspection and thus represent the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. If this system of verification is to provide assurance to parties to the convention that its provisions are being complied with by other parties it would be essential that it should be, and be seen to be reliable and effective. For this purpose parties will need to have confidence in the Organization responsible for the operation of the verification system. With this aim in view my delegation proposes the creation of an independent international organization composed of parties to the convention, with a separate legal personality, on the lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which enjoys wide respect internationally for its effectiveness and impartiality. It would need a highly professional Secretariat which would command the confidence of all parties for its impartiality and integrity. The ability of the Secretariat to take effective action in a crisis in the event of suspicion of non-compliance would be fostered by its performance of the inspections on a routine basis of destruction of stockpiles and production facilities and of industry for the verification of non-production.

In addition to having an efficient and reliable Secretariat it would be essential for the Organization to have the capacity to make rapid and effective decisions to allay suspicions of non-compliance. It would not be practicable to convene the Consultative Committee composed of all parties within the timescale required to restore confidence in the convention. We have proposed therefore that the Executive Council should have delegated authority to carry out the day to day functions of the Organization and to be endowed with the necessary powers to enable it to carry out the objectives of the convention in a timely and efficient manner.

The Organization would need to start operating as soon as the convention enters into force. The demands on it would be particularly heavy for the first 10 years of its existence when it would be responsible for verifying the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and of the facilities for their production. The Organization would not therefore be able to grow gradually into its responsibilities but would need to make a flying start. To ensure this we have proposed the establishment of a Preparatory Commission composed of signatories to the convention with the task of creating the necessary machinery for the Organization to be operationally effective as soon as the convention enters into force.

In his statement to the Conference on 12 March my Minister, Mr. Luce, suggested that the Organization might help to promote a positive climate for greater

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

international co-operation between States Parties in the civil chemical industry throughout the world. My delegation has in mind the possibility that the Organization might, in addition to its primary role in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons, have also a separate role in the promotion of safety in the manufacture and handling of highly toxic substances. It would, of course, be important to keep any collaboration in this field on a voluntary basis and entirely separate from that of the mandatory inspections under the convention to provide assurances of compliance with its prohibitions. My delegation would be happy to join with other delegations in studying this aspect further, as Mr. Luce suggested.

My delegation believes that this Working Paper tabled today offers a practical blue print for an effective and viable organization which would allow all States Parties to play a full part in the operation of the Convention while providing machinery for rapid decisions relating to its implementation and operation. We hope that other delegations will share this view and that the paper will stimulate discussion of this important aspect of the convention which has hitherto received relatively little attention.

I should like to take this opportunity to offer some comments on the statement on chemical weapons made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 4 April. My delegation welcomes the readiness of the Soviet delegation which he expressed to continue serious and constructive negotiations with a view to the earliest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. With the same aim in view I should like to take up some points made by Ambassador Issraelyan, especially those related to proposals and ideas put forward earlier by the United Kingdom delegation.

The proposals for verification of non-production we made in document CD/575 are carefully limited, both in the proposed measures of inspection and data exchange, and in the list of compounds to which they would be applied. Inspection on a routine basis is proposed only for those toxic agents and precursors which would pose a high risk to the convention if manufactured industrially. This category is confined to super-toxic lethal compounds and possibly other named compounds which can be used directly in chemical weapons, and to a strictly limited number of key precursors. The high-risk key precursors comprise four classes of compounds plus three particular compounds. The total number of compounds in this category that are manufactured on a significant scale is not numbered in hundreds still less in thousands. In fact the number of plants making such compounds, according to the data given to my delegation in response to the appeal we made two years ago in our document, CD/353, is less

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

than 11, for all the high-risk compounds taken together. This figure is derived from the data given in the two Working Papers we have circulated at the end of the 1983 and 1984 sessions (CW/WP/57 and CW/WP/86) updated to include some additional data received since August 1984. We do not of course know with certainty how many such plants there are in other countries which have not yet provided us with the information requested. The onus is, however, on the countries which have not provided data to substantiate their claims that our proposals would not be feasible because of the large number of plants involved.

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, verification of non-production needs to be based on an agreed list of compounds or chemically defined classes of compounds. It would be desirable to have an agreed mechanism under the aegis of the Consultative Committee to modify this list in the light of changing circumstances, especially the development of new technology. In our view, however, the initial list of key precursors needs to be agreed before the Convention is concluded. The analysis of risks given in the United Kingdom Working Paper, CD/514, of 10 July 1984, was designed to provide a basis on which the list or lists of compounds could be agreed by negotiation between the delegations represented round this table. We should need to reach a collective judgement on which compounds should be included and which should not. For this purpose agreed criteria would be useful but not in our view essential. In contrast to the toxicity criteria used to define classes of chemical weapons which depend on quantitative experimental determinations, the criteria under discussion for defining key precursors would not lead unambiguously to a list of precursor compounds even if there were complete agreement on criteria. It would not inspire confidence in the Convention if one party were uncertain whether another party was interpreting the criteria to include a particular compound. The criteria that have been discussed include the concept of minimal peaceful use which is likely to vary with the advance of technology. For example, it would have been said only a few years ago that no compound containing a carbon-phosphorus bond had significant peaceful uses; but this is no longer true, because compounds in this category are used as flame retardants and for other civil purposes. Nevertheless, my delegation attaches great importance to the inclusion of this class of compound in any list of key precursors for the purpose of verification of non-production.

The Soviet proposal to ban altogether the manufacture of compounds containing a methyl-phosphorus bond goes further in this direction than we would wish to and would require the abandonment of existing civil applications of some compounds. Moreover, it would not be logical to ban these compounds containing a methyl group and to leave undeclared and uncontrolled ethyl and other homologues which could be used to make chemical weapons of a similar toxicity. We believe that the verification measures proposed in CD/575 would give adequate assurance that chemical industry was not being misused for the clandestine production of chemical weapons, without impeding industrial operations or compromising their commercial confidentiality.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

pertinent questions to one delegation representing a Warsaw Pact country, has asked for the Conference to be enlightened on the subject. My delegation was gratified to hear that answers had been promised to its queries, and I trust they will be forthcoming, supplementing the statement we heard earlier today.

It is obvious that Ambassador Depasse had put his questions exclusively in the interest of clarification and of rationalization of our debate. My motivation in raising the subject is identical to his.

CD/PV.310
48

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada):

I am taking the floor today, having spoken relatively recently, in order to re-emphasize the urgency and importance we attach to achieving concrete results in our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We have heard an extremely useful report from our excellent Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, and I congratulate him on that report. I noted, however, that he shares a concern, which I suspect is general in this Conference, over the pace of our work in spite of his own best efforts and those of his colleagues who share his task in assisting us with our negotiations. I want merely to underline some points that I think differentiate our negotiations on that question from others equally important but not quite so special in certain respects which I shall now underline.

Firstly, what we are seeking to achieve is a disarmament treaty, not a mere arms control treaty but a disarmament treaty, and this makes our objective one of fundamental importance.

Secondly, the treaty we are collectively attempting to achieve would be a genuine non-proliferation treaty, and that I think adds to its importance.

Thirdly, because of the nature of the treaty we are attempting to achieve, it would have to be a comprehensive treaty, and that of course entails even more effort on our part than would otherwise be the case.

Fourthly, what we are seeking is a law-making treaty, a very significant legal instrument which would have legal implications — I would hope in its own right and not merely with respect to the obligations it might lay down for its immediate parties.

Taking into account all these factors, it seems hardly necessary to emphasize the importance of this convention, and yet we seem unable to make the kind of progress that we all desire. It is after all of importance in yet another way, going beyond its symbolic importance, in that the position of every State, whether large or small, powerful or less powerful, can ultimately make or break that treaty. It follows of course that breaches of such a treaty would be breaches that would not only affect us individually, but would affect the whole rule of law itself.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

We know that we have already in existence the 1925 Geneva Protocol; I am one of those who insist that our own law-making efforts do not in any way derogate from the significance of the Geneva Protocol and I am satisfied that it is possible for us so to draft our proposed convention that we reinforce the Geneva Protocol and in no sense weaken it. I agree of course with the distinguished representative of France, who has emphasized this very point, that it would be of very limited utility if we produce a convention that left open the possibility that renunciation of its obligations would also thereby remove any pre-existing obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This is a problem which I think can be addressed and resolved with a little patience and skill.

In sum, we see our efforts directed towards the achievement of a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons as not merely one of the many subjects on which we are attempting to make progress, and I certainly disassociate myself from any suggestion that it is the only issue on which we should be working, but I would say that if we cannot make progress on that subject, then our failure would call into question the whole basis of our Conference. It would raise questions in the minds of many as to whether we have the capability, the capacity and the will to negotiate a genuine disarmament convention. References have been made to recent events that re-emphasize the importance and urgency of our task.

It has also been suggested, I think only informally, that we would do well to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and I would like to associate myself with those suggestions. But, I think that if we do not give some very careful consideration to our own working methods, we are in danger of working along the lines so eloquently expressed by our Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, and only gradually making progress; but in the meantime events occur outside this forum and we cannot afford a leisurely pace. That is really the message I take from the report we heard this morning. So my suggestion is one that during our recess we should all think very seriously about how to improve our own working methods -- a point that I had discussed in my last intervention. I will not say more than that at the moment because I have reason to know that our Chairman will be giving thought to that very question and I look forward to the opportunity, along with those who will not be going to New York for the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, to consult with him on how to ensure that we achieve the maximum benefit from both the recess and also of course our resumed session.

(The President)

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons continued to search for, and to provide, some answers in respect of the so-called permitted activities, namely the declaration and verification of small-scale production and industrial facilities; methods of verification with regard to the elimination of production facilities and destruction of stocks, and the issues relating to compliance. It is also encouraging to note that a convergence of views has emerged on a set of provisions dealing with the prohibition of use of chemical weapons and the link of such a prohibition with the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Aware of the new sense of urgency, we have the obligation to work with redoubled efforts on a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention, which would be universally adhered to and observed.

CD/PV.311

13

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Reports of use of chemical weapons, most recently from the Gulf War, give rise to serious apprehension. The use of chemical weapons stands in glaring contrast to international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The reports remind us of the urgency of a complete ban on chemical weapons.

In spite of persistent efforts by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, and other delegates directly involved, progress has been slower than we have had reason to expect, due to an over-cautious and guarded approach by key delegations. Delegations should more than hitherto actively engage in trying to solve the remaining problems and firmly commit themselves to be more constructive. Some encouraging signs and some helpful proposals have, however, been noted during the spring part of the session. The negotiations are now approaching a situation where some key issues may need to be dealt with in a more comprehensive way.

In view of the sensitivity of the negotiations, I would once again like to appeal to all countries producing or considering producing chemical weapons -- binary or others -- to refrain from producing weapons during the negotiations on a convention prohibiting such weapons. Disarmament can never be achieved through increased armaments.

(Mr. Dizdarević, Yugoslavia)

We consider that we should all be particularly concerned at further refinement of other weapons of mass destruction. The world finds itself faced with the immediate danger of an extremely dangerous expansion not only of chemical, but also of radiological, neutron, genetic and other weapons. We are confronted with the reality of no less deadly conventional weapons for the destruction of the environment. Actually, there is no empty space any longer, nor is there a clearly defined borderline between these categories of weapons, on the one hand, and nuclear weapons on the other.

What is the purpose of new generations and new stockpiles of armaments? Is the intention to achieve military-strategic supremacy? Or, perhaps, to exhaust the adversary materially and financially? One should not labour under the illusion that either is possible. No new weapon is final, as it is bound to be succeeded by an even more deadly weapon. However, every new weapon increases the already high risk threatening not only us but future generations and the survival of mankind as well.

Yugoslavia insists resolutely on the need for halting the arms race in weapons of mass destruction and on their comprehensive ban. This is, in fact, in the interest of all — not less in the interest of those who possess such weapons than those who do not have them. All of them are potential victims. Consequently we expect that the Conference on Disarmament will make a decisive step forward towards the adoption of a Convention on the Comprehensive ban on Chemical Weapons. This would provide an important incentive both for the total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and for their final elimination. Yugoslavia is prepared to continue to be actively involved in such efforts.

Mr. JESSEL (France)

My purpose today is more limited. Among the tasks for which we are gathered here, my Government attaches priority to the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as on their destruction. It is our hope that the summer part of our session will see some progress in this direction.

In this connection, it is symbolically significant that one of our first meetings falls within a day of the sixtieth anniversary of the Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

My country's attachment to the 1925 Protocol stems, of course, from the conditions in which the Protocol came into being, which led France to agree to act as a depositary Power. It also stems from its conviction that the prohibition of use laid down in the Protocol remains an effective translation of the entire international community's desire to maintain that prohibition.

We are all convinced that this prohibition should also apply to the production of such weapons, and particularly of chemical weapons. On the occasion of this sixtieth anniversary the French Government therefore wishes to confirm that for its part it will spare no effort to contribute to attaining that objective.

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

The 1925 Protocol does not provide for any verification procedure to establish possible violations; France and a number of other countries therefore sponsored resolution 37/98 D whose purpose is to establish provisional procedures of that kind, pending the conclusion of the negotiation of a permanent convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to prompt and impartial fact-finding in case of alleged use.

The support given to this initiative shows the extent to which the international community is concerned to preserve the permanent authority of the Geneva Protocol.

The action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in relation to the conflict between Iraq and Iran -- action that is in keeping with the spirit of resolution 37/98 D -- uses the same methods, serves the same purposes and has the same perspective.

Finally, needless to say France is concerned at the recent information suggesting that chemical weapons have once again been used in 1985 in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. I should like to recall that on many occasions my country has stressed the serious risks which the continuation of this conflict carries for the Gulf region, for the entire Middle East, and for international peace and stability.

To conclude, and particularly on this sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Protocol, my country wishes once again to register its attachment to the Protocol and reaffirm its condemnation of any use, anywhere in the world, of toxic agents of warfare prohibited by the Protocol, as well as its rejection of any undermining of the existing prohibitions and of anything that might lead to the use of such weapons becoming commonplace in modern conflicts.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada):

May I also take the liberty of expressing the welcome of the Canadian delegation to the distinguished representative of France who has just spoken, Ambassador Jessel, and also of associating my delegation with his comments concerning the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Indeed, my purpose in speaking today is to emphasize the importance of the sixtieth anniversary of the signature of that Protocol which occurred yesterday, on 17 June to be precise. It is, in our view, of very great significance that that Protocol went so far in outlawing the use of chemical weapons and yet fell short of our collective endeavours in ensuring compliance with its provisions. It is only fitting, therefore, that we should pause to take stock of the situation in so far as this long-standing arms control agreement is concerned,

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

both to acknowledge its importance, and to note candidly its weaknesses with a view to ensuring against any similar weaknesses which may otherwise occur in the results of our labours.

I am also speaking to re-emphasize the urgency and importance of achieving early results in our negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. One can take the position that we have little reason to celebrate on the anniversary of the signature of that Protocol if we consider reports of actual uses of chemical weapons in breach of the Protocol. As we have emphasized, along with many others, any renewed use of these dreadful weapons long after they have been outlawed raises a serious concern, not only about the danger of the proliferation of these weapons, which would almost inevitably exacerbate regional tension, and lead to a new dimension in regional arms competition; but concern also about the long-term significance of breaches of the rule of law. It is, as I understand it, common ground that our on-going negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons are meant to complement and reinforce the prohibition on chemical weapons embodied in the Geneva Protocol and must not in any way weaken or detract from the status or obligations of that treaty. I pointed out on an earlier occasion that what we are seeking to achieve in our chemical weapons negotiations is of four-fold importance: firstly, we are seeking a disarmament treaty and not merely a limited arms-control measure; secondly, we are seeking an effective non-proliferation treaty; thirdly, we are seeking a comprehensive treaty that would ban development, production and stock-piling and transfer of chemical weapons with provision for destruction of stockpiles and production facilities and, most important in our view, appropriate verification; and fourthly, what we are seeking is a law-making treaty which could have far-reaching legal implications in its own right which would transcend the obligations it would lay down for its immediate parties.

We remain convinced that it is possible for us to draft our proposed convention in such a way that we reinforce the Geneva Protocol and in no sense weaken it. I would repeat, however, what I said on an earlier occasion, "it would be of very limited utility if we were to produce a convention that leaves open the possibility that renunciation of its obligation would also thereby remove any pre-existing obligation under the 1925 Protocol".

Rising international concern within and outside the United Nations stemming from allegations of chemical-weapons use and the consequential alarming threat to the rule of law and to the authority of the 1925 Protocol, coupled with growing public awareness of the potential for proliferation, add immediacy to our efforts to reach agreement on an effective, comprehensive non-proliferation treaty.

In the meantime, however, as pointed out by the distinguished representative of France, as an interim measure, pending a complete and verifiable ban on development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons, important steps have been taken within the United Nations to enable the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of use of these weapons. He deserves the support of all Members of the United Nations in such efforts. His fact-finding mission helped bridge the gap between prohibition and verification, between legislation and enforcement. Again, in summing up, we consider that the allegations of recent use and the dangers of increasing proliferation give tremendous urgency to our own negotiations and we hope that we are all going to be able to take note of this in our on-going action. I will not repeat what I and others have said on similar occasions about the difficulties our own procedures create for us, but will be

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

content to quote again some of the recently discovered Treatise of Grotius, father of international law, in which he urged that we concentrate on what unites us rather than on what divides us. In conclusion, I would like to associate my delegation with all others to appeal for strict and complete compliance with the Geneva Protocol -- an appeal which we consider is the most appropriate commemoration we can give to the sixtieth anniversary of that important instrument.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom):

I have asked for the floor today to read to the Conference the message I delivered to you yesterday on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 from the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Howe. The message reads as follows:

"Today, 17 June, is the sixtieth anniversary of the signature of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare. It is an historic anniversary. The Protocol has been of great value to mankind. It remains a guiding-light for multilateral arms control agreements between sovereign States.

I applaud the efforts now being made at the Conference on Disarmament in order to build upon this Protocol and to achieve a total ban on chemical weapons. I welcome the apparent consensus in the international community that our goal must be agreement on a comprehensive and verifiable Convention which will proscribe the development, production and stockpiling of all elements of chemical weapons. On behalf of all mankind, we should rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons once and for all.

There is still much to do. Recent events in Asia have demonstrated the continuing threat from the use of chemical weapons. At Geneva, the problems we are trying to solve together are complex; they touch on fundamental issues. I therefore urge the Conference to mark this anniversary year with redoubled efforts to conclude a Convention."

(Mr. Issraclyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union continues to view the prohibition of chemical weapons as an important and pressing problem. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski these negotiations have received this year firm new impetus, and they have been oriented at the examination of many basic aspects of a future convention. The outlines of possible agreements on several of these questions have become perceptible.

However, in pursuing this work, using the existing wide variety of methods which have justified themselves, we should give some thought to the question of how to make the talks more effective. First of all, it would seem necessary to put down on paper agreed elements in the form of draft provisions of the convention. We are convinced that this could help us to find mutually acceptable formulas on the issues on which different approaches still exist.

The international community is now commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. There is no need to speak in detail here, in the Conference on Disarmament, of the enormously beneficial role this document has played and continues to play in preventing the use of such weapons of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological weapons. In spite of numerous attempts to cast a shadow on it or to revise it in some way under artificial pretexts, it remains firm and continues to fulfil its mission.

It has just been learned that the House of Representatives of the United States Congress has agreed to earmark 124.5 million dollars in the coming financial year for the development and preparation for the production of an essentially new and barbarous kind of chemical weapon -- binary nerve-gas ammunition. Earlier the Senate also gave its agreement to the production of binary weapons. The United States army's chemical facility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, already has the technical capability to carry these decisions into practice.

We reserve the right to comment at greater length on the United States decision to produce binary chemical weapons. Today I should like to stress that this decision strikes a new blow against the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and perhaps does them irreparable harm. This is a new and dangerous step in the United States preparations for chemical war.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Thank you Mr. President. I am impelled to make a brief response this morning to one point in the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. He has dealt with the question of reports on one step in the legislative process of the United States Congress on the issue of 124 million dollars for resumed chemical weapons production.

Further details, on this matter will of course, be promptly reported in the free press of our country and many other countries as they are available. However, I for one would be more interested in the words of the Soviet representative on the question of Soviet legislation. What is the amount in the Soviet budget this year, or in any one of the past 16 years, for chemical weapons production? Our task here in this Conference is to negotiate a chemical weapons treaty that will result in a total and effective ban on these horrible weapons. My Government continues to be committed to moving ahead as rapidly as possible to accomplishing that goal.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I believe that the meeting has not yet risen and I may therefore take the floor. I should like to give the United States delegation the article on the decision taken, which they have apparently not received. The article is headed "United States to resume production of chemical weapons", and contains full details concerning the decision. I am giving it to Ambassador Lowitz.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

My delegation attaches great importance to the prohibition of chemical weapons. We should all look upon the sixtieth anniversary of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol as an occasion to redouble our efforts for a comprehensive ban on those dangerous weapons of mass destruction. I should like to take this opportunity to say how much I appreciate Ambassador Turbanski's single-minded commitment.

What we must achieve is real progress in drafting a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Everyone knows how important practical political and military developments are for the activities we conduct at this Conference. They can have favourable effects and they can have adverse effects on what we are doing here. The appropriation of funds by the United States House of Representatives for the production of binary weapons is definitely a development that has exceedingly adverse effects on our work.

The funding decision confirms the suspicion, which my delegation voiced on previous occasions, that the primary aim of the calls for unrealistic verification measures is to hamper progress in the negotiations and to divert attention from the plans to deploy a completely new generation of chemical weapons.

We see, however, also the great efforts that have a favourable effect on the negotiations regarding a global chemical weapons ban. An excellent example in this context is the proposal which the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty presented on 10 January 1984 with a view to ridding Europe of chemical arms. If that proposal were accepted, the risk of chemical warfare would diminish considerably. The establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons would pave the way for the world-wide prohibition of those terrible arms.

The idea of a chemical-weapon-free zone has met with widespread public support, including in a number of NATO countries. Take, for instance, the recent draft framework agreement concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, jointly worked out by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the leading political party in the German Democratic Republic, and by the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany. The draft is based on the understanding that the establishment of such a zone would be a promising step towards universal disarmament in the chemical weapons field and averting a new round in the chemical arms race. What is more, the zone proposed would substantially strengthen Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of such weapons.

The framework agreement contains all the elements needed, ranging from the definition of the subject matter to verification. The two sides furthermore agreed to submit the draft to their Governments. Putting this initiative into effect would, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, represent a significant contribution to the efforts to eliminate those terrible weapons of mass destruction everywhere on this globe.

Mr. CANNOCK (Peru)

We have not, then, asked for the floor in order to reiterate those positions, as we do not wish to abuse the patience of this distinguished audience. Instead, this very short statement is linked with the occasion of the recent commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925.

We consider that this significant anniversary cannot pass by unnoticed. It reminds us that the efforts to limit the arms race in various fields have been going on for several decades now; it also reminds us that nations have been alive to the need to put an end to the use of particularly cruel and destructive weapons; and finally, this anniversary also demonstrates that it is possible for States possessing a particular type of weapon to reach an arms control agreement.

My country, although not involved in the historical circumstances which led up to the conclusion of the 1925 Protocol, has viewed with concern the fact that the use of chemical weapons, rather than becoming increasingly unlikely, appears to be an ever-present possibility for a growing number of States in a large number of diverse circumstances. This state of affairs calls for rapid and effective

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(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

action by all peace-loving nations and particularly the members of this Conference, whose mandate is precisely to negotiate international disarmament instruments.

As you know, Peru has acceded to the 1925 Protocol and to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972. And in keeping with other initiatives adopted in various regions of the world, as mentioned earlier by our distinguished colleague of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, last November the Prime Minister of Peru, Dr. Luis Percovich, told the General Assembly of the Organization of American States of the Peruvian Government's aspiration to make Latin America a chemical-weapon-free zone.

This aspiration clearly displays my Government's firm conviction that international peace and security are essential requirements for the wellbeing of our peoples, and the certainty that international security should be based on constructive negotiation and a spirit of co-operation, and not on the build-up and development of increasingly destructive weapons.

In the light of these principles, the need for an international instrument prohibiting the production, development, stockpiling, deployment and use of chemical weapons is more pressing than ever, whatever technical difficulties may stand in the way of its conclusion.

My delegation, together with many others, has praised the progress made by this Conference in 1984, through its subsidiary body on chemical weapons, in the direction of the preparation of an international treaty. The present state of the negotiations, however, does not warrant boundless optimism.

There seem to be States which do not have sufficient political will to proscribe chemical weapons despite public statements to the contrary. Perhaps they have not noticed that the idea that in a given case it may be necessary to use means which bring about the mass and indiscriminate destruction of entire human communities and the atmosphere essential for life, stands in glaring contrast with the technological advances and the ethical and humanitarian values of which those same States sometimes boast.

My delegation therefore hopes that the sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol will bring us a degree of realism and convince us that it is now time to achieve tangible results.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany)

In the first statement of this morning, Ambassador Rose, my distinguished neighbour, has among many other important things, laid out before us and spoken again of the project of a zone free of chemical weapons in parts of Europe. He has alluded to a recent joint memorandum by two parties -- two political parties -- including the State Party of the German Democratic Republic.

Several colleagues have inquired of me the significance of this memorandum and that is why I thought I should take the opportunity, briefly, to give my Government's perspective of it. You know that I have often spoken about the idea of establishing a zone free of chemical weapons as a Government delegate. The present framework agreement of which mention was made by Ambassador Rose does not stem from governments, it stems from political parties. On the part of the Federal Republic of Germany it has been agreed upon by the Social Democratic Party, one of our political parties, presently in opposition. It is thus a minority view; but it purports to help towards the elimination of chemical weapons. That is an important purpose and that is why the memorandum merits thorough examination. That examination is taking place at the moment. It will be conducted under three major criteria: the first criteria is: will it help military security? The second one is: will it help with the verification of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban? and the third criteria is: will it promote or rather hinder the negotiation and conclusion of the world-wide chemical weapons ban, the negotiation of which we are engaged in?

Now, some preliminary insights are already quite certain as part of this examination. My Government believes that such a zone project will not help military security because it leaves the arsenals untouched; they would only be removed East to join other important arsenals, especially the immense arsenals of chemical weapons held by the Soviet Union, where, as we all know, the production of such weapons still continues unabated. Nor does the framework agreement envisage the destruction of production facilities that might exist in the potential zone.

The second criteria is verification. Does the project help verification? My Government is of the opinion that it aggravates the verification problems, since only one more intricate verification problem is added to the well-known difficult verification issues we deal with: guaranteeing that the weapons are not brought back: a zone agreement would require the verification of access.

On the third point: would a free zone negotiation hinder or rather promote a world-wide agreement, so paramount to all of the negotiators here? I fear that it would hinder such an agreement because important negotiating resources would

(The President)

be diverted to a partial venture while the global venture is of such significance, especially in the view of third-world countries. We are all aware of the fact that chemical weapons have, in all recent cases of which we hear, been applied outside of the potential zone. This is why my Government is of the opinion that the examination of this proposal, of this minority view, which will be examined in good faith, will probably confirm its negative position on the general idea of a very restricted chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe.

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(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

In his statement on 21 March the Norwegian State Secretary of Foreign Affairs also confirmed that Norway was continuing her research on verification questions relevant to a chemical weapons convention and that we intended to present the results of this year's research in the second part of the 1985 session. The research programme, which was initiated in 1981 in connection with Norway's participation in the subsidiary body on chemical weapons, concerns sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions. I should like to stress that this research has been undertaken on the basis of field experiments in order to make sure that the findings have as realistic a basis as possible and thus avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory set-up.

Today, I have the honour to present three documents on chemical weapons.

First of all, I should like to draw your attention to the detailed report on the research undertaken during the winter 1984/85. The report is circulated as an annex to document CD/598. Additional copies of the report are available from the Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva. The working paper in document CD/600 outlines the results of, and the conclusions which can be drawn from, the field experiments and research undertaken during the last winter. This year the research was concentrated on the verification of arsenic compounds in snow samples, on detection of thiodiglycol which is the hydrolysis product of

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(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

mustard, and analysis of biological samples from humans which had been contaminated by mustard. The work on sample handling was continued and elaboration of a procedure for system analysis for sampling was started.

In the third document on chemical weapons -- CD/601 -- we have prepared preliminary proposals for procedures that could be used by a fact-finding team under the Consultative Committee when investigating alleged use of chemical weapons under winter conditions. These proposed procedures are based on the field experiments undertaken during the last four winters and on documents presented by Norway to the Conference since 1981 in connection with the research programme.

The timing for presenting these proposed procedures should be seen in light of the progress which so far has been made in the open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee concerning the inclusion of prohibition of use of chemical weapons in a convention. In our view, the draft preambular and operative paragraphs contained in document CD/CW/WP.107 of 22 April represent a solid basis for consensus, which should be further consolidated during this part of the 1985 session.

Our proposals concern the following four aspects of the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons under winter conditions: the composition of a fact-finding team under the Consultative Committee, the collection of samples, the handling of samples and listing of equipment for a fact-finding team. It is recommended that the team should include a military expert, a chemist, a medically qualified person and an interpreter. An Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) expert would also be of importance. In some circumstances it may be of value to include a sociologist, ethnologist or a cultural anthropologist. A collection of 20 samples from a target area of approximately 100,000 m² is recommended. Procedures for the extraction of the chemical agents to an organic solvent in the field as well as the means for subsequent safe transportation have also been proposed. The annexed detailed list of equipment recommended for a fact-finding team concerns equipment for personal protection, field detection, sampling and handling.

I would like to stress that these proposed procedures are not presented in order to be included in a draft convention. They are, rather, proposals which could facilitate the implementation of a new convention. It is the intention of Norway to develop these procedures further and to elaborate a more complete draft system for selection, handling, transportation and analysis of samples collected in the field.

Our initiative should furthermore be viewed in the light of the fact that a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is more than ever a priority in the multilateral disarmament negotiations. A convention on chemical weapons should be finalized as soon as possible. Through the able leadership of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, progress has been made this year in the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Energetic efforts should now be pursued by all parties concerned with a view to solving the major outstanding questions, in particular those concerning on-site inspection.

(Mr. Hameed, Sri Lanka)

Sri Lanka is happy to note the progress made in the Conference with regard to achieving a chemical weapons ban. It is appropriate that concrete steps are being taken to conclude a Treaty in this sixtieth anniversary year of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on Chemical and Biological Warfare. The Third World has suffered greatly from the use of these horrible weapons including the use of herbicides aimed at destroying vegetation. We appeal for a speedy resolution of all issues with a view to arriving at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Bagbeni, Zaire)

Nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, of course, but it is also necessary to envisage other priority disarmament measures such as the conclusion of a treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/65 B, which in operative paragraph 3 urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia):

The subject of my intervention today is our work on chemical weapons. My Government is deeply concerned about the work of our Conference on chemical weapons.

The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka said on Tuesday in this room, that in the seven years we have been at work in this unique body, we have produced no treaty or agreement on disarmament. This is a fact and I think it should worry all of us.

In this seven years abundant consideration has been given to the question of chemical weapons. During the last couple of years, our concern about chemical weapons has heightened, and heightened very considerably.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol is an immensely important instrument. But we all know that, in itself, it is not enough. We need a universal convention completely banning chemical weapons -- their production, deployment and use. Under such a convention, existing stockpiles of these abhorrent weapons would be destroyed. They would not be made again in the future and they would certainly never be used.

This issue affects us all, all of us, from all corners of the globe. All the member States in this Conference recognize these facts and have committed themselves to the negotiation of such a convention. But what are we doing? Our negotiations have not in fact quickened. They have slowed down to a snail's pace. Some would say they are at a standstill.

How can this be, given our commitments, and the deeply disturbing fact that there are signs that these terrible instruments of war and death are in fact proliferating? We all know of disturbing reports of the use of chemical weapons in recent times and of a growing interest, in a number of countries in the acquisition of chemical weapons where they have not previously possessed them.

A tide is developing which looks like running in the wrong direction. The right direction is a universal convention. We have little time to lose.

Fifteen months ago our work in this field was given impetus when the Vice-President of the United States came to this Conference and tabled a new draft of a possible convention. When that draft was tabled I said, on behalf of my Government, that the action of the United States gave us an opportunity which should not be lost, an opportunity which future generations would never understand our losing.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Vice-President Bush made it clear that the United States draft convention was a basis for negotiation. That draft was not tabled on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This was the understanding of my delegation when we welcomed the action of the United States in tabling that draft convention. We also acknowledged that there were other documents, other approaches, which should command our attention and this remains the position today.

There is more than enough reason to bring this work to an early and successful conclusion. There is more than enough danger to us all if we fail to do so. What then is the problem? The answer would seem to lie in the area of verification, and if one takes the verification provisions of the United States draft convention as an example, article X of that convention serves as a case in point.

Some delegations have said that draft article X is unacceptable and have even gone to the point of saying that it displays a cynical approach to a universal convention. They say it is so ambitious in its terms of verification that it was clearly never intended to be taken seriously.

My delegation has no reason to accept such a cynical interpretation. On the other hand we can understand and give serious consideration to criticisms of such a provision because verification is crucial and should not be taken lightly. It is a key to progress towards a universal convention. What we would have hoped to see, therefore, is a willingness on the part of the critics of the American approach to suggest alternatives. Surely both sincerity and rationality demand no less.

If a proposed provision is flawed or stands in the way of an effective universal convention, then let us hear alternative proposals which are not so flawed. If the sincerity of a proposal is questioned, let it be challenged by serious counter-proposals.

This is the process of negotiation, but it is precisely that process which seems to be absent.

As far as the United States is concerned, I have already stated that my delegation accepts that the United States draft, tabled by the Vice-President on 18 April 1984, is negotiable and was not put on to this table on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We believe that that draft is negotiable. On the side of the Soviet Union we do accept that it wishes to see the universal convention brought into existence. On 4 April this year, Ambassador Issraelyan said "for the USSR the prohibition of chemical weapons has been and remains a priority task set out in the most important documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government. The Soviet delegation will do everything within its power to solve this task as rapidly as possible".

Ambassador Issraelyan also said "I would like to reiterate that the Soviet delegation stands ready to continue serious and constructive negotiations with a view to the earliest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons".

My delegation takes this commitment by the Soviet delegation seriously but I must say, frankly, that we have not seen evidence of it being put into practice this year.

If the Soviet delegation has objections to existing proposals it would assist us all by coming forward with new proposals consistent with the policy commitment it has made and which has been illustrated in the citations I have just read out.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

There was a vote in the United States Congress recently to resume production of chemical weapons in two years' time under certain conditions. The United States has not produced new chemical weapons for 16 years.

Let me ask this question, Mr. President. Has the Soviet Union produced chemical weapons during the last 16 years? Is it producing chemical weapons now? What are the facts?

If the Soviet Union has not stopped production is that a reason to refuse to negotiate, or is it on the contrary, a reason to negotiate vigorously? Are we to allow a vote in the United States Congress to prevent us from moving forward with our negotiations?

I most strongly suggest we should not. Indeed the opposite is the case. Given that qualified vote, surely our task, the urgency of which was already unquestionable has now even greater importance. Simply, we must negotiate a universal convention as soon as possible. Putative decisions of the kind made in the United States Congress recently should not divert us from this task. Such a vote should not be used as justification by anyone for walking away from our negotiations. Instead it should be seen in a clearer light, that is, as underlining the importance of our reaching agreement on this convention as soon as possible in order to ensure that no further or new production of chemical weapons takes place. I have no doubt, if we were successful in this task, there would be no such production.

I have addressed this subject today because it is one of great concern to my Government. We have looked for and hoped for negotiations on this subject in this Conference in good faith and with all possible dispatch. We have been distressed by growing evidence that at least one group of member States, the socialist group, has failed to take up the present challenge in spite of its declared policy.

Our concern and distress in the face of this situation has been heightened by the growing problem of use, and of the potential proliferation of chemical weapons. We appeal to delegations in this Conference to enter into serious negotiations on a universal convention. The way ahead is to address what we all know to be the key issues. If verification is one of those issues then let those who have problems with the existing proposals put forward some alternative proposals. This is not a subject on which there is any place for propaganda or posturing. What we need is a clear and sharply demonstrated willingness to negotiate. This is the appeal that we make to members of this Conference today, that is to move forward now in these negotiations.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation intends to address the specific issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons and expound its views once again on this question, although I make no secret of the fact that sometimes I have doubts about whether it is necessary for us to do so, in view of the presence of some delegations such as, for example, the Australian delegation, which either cannot understand our position or, most likely, do not wish to understand it. The representative of Australia did not find time to recall a single one of the Soviet Union's proposals. His eyes are fixed on Vice-President Bush's draft treaty. But there is another draft treaty, distinguished representative of Australia. There is the draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. True, it was not presented by the Head or Deputy Head of the Soviet State, but by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly made proposals on various issues relating to the prevention of chemical weapons, including verification, as recently as in February 1984, for example. But that is nothing to the representative of Australia. The representative of Australia must, in his opinion, subject the Soviet Union's position to serious criticism. But I would advise him to do something else: to endeavour to find a compromise solution to issues which are of universal interest; not to look at the world from his own parochial standpoint, but to seek to understand others, even if for that purpose it is necessary to read their statements. Today we were told that some countries, and I understand that this is also addressed to us, took a cynical view of the United States draft and its article 10. I do not accept this definition and consider it an attack on myself personally as well, as on 9 August last year I devoted my statement to a calm, reasoned analysis of article 10 of the American draft and tried to explain why this provision was not acceptable to us. My advice is therefore that before criticizing the position of any State, it is necessary at least to learn what that position is. And secondly, if the representative of Australia likes the decision of the United States House of Representatives, that is his business, let him enjoy it; but it distresses us as well as very many others who want real progress on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

With regard to herbicides, a question being considered in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which some view as secondary in relation to the rest of the issue, we wish merely to recall the experience of Viet Nam. For many years to come it will suffer from the consequences of the indiscriminate use of herbicides by the United States, which sprayed thousands of tons of "Agent Orange" and "Agent Blue", causing more than 50 per cent of the cultivable land and forest to be eroded, to the point that experts have stated that it will take at least 50 years more for Viet Nam's soil to regain its earlier fertility.

As we know, herbicides are chemicals that are highly toxic not only for plants and animals but also for human beings. For example, an impurity of "Agent Orange" is dioxine, which affects human beings and takes many years to become innocuous, and thus after the Viet Nam war there has been a considerable increase in the rate of malformation in newborn babies.

The use of herbicides not only causes sterility of plants but also eliminates the sources of supply for the population in general, kills the fish in contaminated water, erodes the soil, causes serious poisoning of human beings and animals, and leads to sterility in women and malformation in newborn babies: in other words, it is hardly a gardening product -- it is something far more important and far more dangerous.

This is the tragic experience of its indiscriminate use in Viet Nam, which in fact was used as a large testing-ground in what no one can deny was an offensive act of war: its importance and its danger therefore cannot be underestimated. These are, in sum, the comments we wished to make.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, I am taking the floor to introduce the Yugoslav Working Paper entitled "Permitted Activities and Verification Measures", which has been distributed to delegations under the symbol CD/613. Besides its basic task of banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, the future convention should also have an important task of regulating a number of permitted activities for which specific verification measures should be provided. These permitted activities concern permitted activities for protective purposes and so-called other permitted activities.

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(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

The permitted activities for protective purposes imply all activities aimed at the research, development and production of protective items and medicaments-antidotes. Some of these activities may create doubt about compliance with the convention and thus lessen confidence among States parties. In order to avoid this, the Working Paper points to the necessity of defining criteria for specific types of toxic chemicals which will be used for protective purposes, and measures of verification applicable to the production facilities for these purposes. To this end the production of toxic chemicals, mostly of super-toxic lethal chemicals, not exceeding 1 metric tonne per year is envisaged. Such production of toxic chemicals for these purposes should be carried out in a special facility the capacity of which should not exceed these quantities. Hence, such a facility should by its size belong to the category of small-scale production facilities.

Bearing in mind that this type of facility is used for the synthesis of highly toxic chemicals, of chemical warfare agents for the most part, it should be effectively automated. Automation would be needed for effective data recording, monitoring of the production and process control. The monitoring of all wastes would also be necessary. The monitoring of the production should, for its part, meet the basic requirements of continuous control of the material and energy balances of the synthesis and storage of the data in a computer centre. The verification of such a facility should, in our view, be international, and its method random inspection or challenge, depending on the consensus reached. The declaration of such a facility should be as detailed as possible, with all the necessary information on the technological processes, capacity of the facility and end use both of intermediates and final products.

Within the framework of other permitted activities, the attention of the previous negotiations was focused on the production of chemicals (other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals) which are widely used today in the civilian commercial industry. Such production is now being carried out, and is likely to be carried out in the future as well, in large industrial facilities. Further processing of such toxic chemicals is more often than not carried out within one technological process in the same facility. In this case the control of these chemicals is very simple, especially if the process is automated. The situation is a little more complex if the chemicals are sent to another processor. Then, in our view, the appropriate declaration should be made to permit verification. In any case, the verification of these facilities should, according to our Paper, be carried out by a national authority which should regularly inform the Consultative Committee about the production. Only if there is doubt that the convention is being violated will it be possible to proceed to international verification.

Having in mind the proposals put forward by many delegations that the convention should not prevent the development of the chemical, and pharmaceutical industry in particular, the Yugoslav delegation considers that there is a need to examine the possibility of producing super-toxic lethal chemicals for other permitted purposes. Namely, the rapid development of synthetic organic

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

chemistry over the past decades has brought about new methods of synthesis of biologically active chemical compounds whose structure is similar to that of natural compounds. Some of these compounds are highly toxic, but have, nevertheless, certain therapeutic characteristics which are increasingly being used in the treatment of many diseases. Due to their high toxicity, the doses of these chemicals used in human and veterinary treatment are very small. Consequently, the production of these compounds can be carried out in a pilot plant. In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, the annual production of these super-toxic lethal chemicals for other permitted purposes should not exceed 1 metric tonne, and only exceptionally their production should be maximally 2 metric tonnes per year. The number of such facilities will depend on the development of the pharmaceutical industry. The facility, however, should be so designed to permit full automation and monitoring at all stages of the production process. As in the case of small-scale production facilities for protective purposes, these facilities also should be equipped with instruments for recording aggregate material and energy balances and all parameters (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the process of synthesis.

As with the small-scale production facilities for protective purposes, the verification of these facilities should be carried out on an international basis depending on the consensus achieved. Having in mind, further, that the commercial products are also involved, it is necessary, we believe, to provide detailed information on the end user.

Overall, the purpose of this Working Paper is to contribute to the general desire that the Convention permit those activities which do not prevent further development of the chemical industry and technology, as well as the development of natural science in general.

The Yugoslav delegation expresses the hope that the Paper will be considered favourably by the delegations and will contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in its drafting of the Convention.

Mr. ISSRAELIYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, in today's statement I would like to address the present state of the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

I would recall that these talks have been under way since 1980 when the Committee on Disarmament decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group. In past years we have achieved a certain amount of progress, and although such progress could have been considerably greater, nevertheless, at least until now, there has been movement in the direction we are seeking, namely, the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. I am not going to refer now to the difficulties which stood in our way and hampered our progress, or to what caused those difficulties. The purpose of my statement today is to analyse the state of affairs at the negotiations and to assess a new obstacle our talks are currently facing.

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I have in mind the recent decision by the House of Representatives which, following the decision by the Senate of the United States Congress, has approved the appropriation of funds for the production of binary chemical weapons. And although this production is to start in 1987 and the decision contains some reservations, this does not change the substance of the matter: the United States is practically ready to add a new type of weapon -- binary nerve gas -- to its military arsenal.

It is highly significant that it is planned to deploy these weapons above all on the territory of West European countries. As in the case of the new United States nuclear missiles (Pershing-2 and long-range land-based cruise missiles), this decision also clearly reveals Washington's calculation to ward off a possible retaliatory strike from its territory and to divert it against its allies. Thus, binary weapons would become one more source of a sinister danger to the densely-populated countries of Western Europe.

However, this is not an aspect directly related to our negotiations. The Soviet delegation wishes to stress the negative effect which the practical creation and deployment of binary chemical weapons can have on our negotiations.

Even before the adoption of the above-mentioned decisions by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States Congress on appropriations for the production of binary chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation was proceeding on the understanding that the convention under consideration should contain provisions prohibiting the development of such weapons. It is well known from the records of disarmament negotiations that it is far simpler to prevent the development of a new type of weapon than to try to remove it from arsenals after it has been developed. This applies to binary weapons to an even greater degree, above all, because of the additional difficulties which can arise in singling out components of binary weapons from the vast, diversified area of commercial activities and the determination of the régime for key components and verification of compliance with that régime.

What is the basic difference between binary and non-binary chemical systems? Above all, it is that in order to produce components of binary weapons it is not absolutely necessary to create facilities specially designed for the purpose, whereas this is necessary for non-binary weapons. By their properties, the components of binary weapons can be produced at all usual commercial facilities of the chemical industry. That is the first basic difference between binary and unitary weapons.

Furthermore, key components and key precursors, are by no means the same from the standpoint of their military importance, in spite of the fact that according to their level of toxicity they could belong to the same category of chemicals. To produce the final product, i.e. supertoxic lethal chemicals, at least one more technological stage of production in industry is needed. But a key component is by no means a semi-product in the technological chain of the production of supertoxic lethal chemical that is one or more technological processes away from the stage of munition-filling; it is a part of a munition that is completely ready for use.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Industrial facilities are not required to produce the final product from the key component. The production process will be carried out during the delivery of the munition to the target, and at the point of use in combat the supertoxic lethal chemical, for instance YX nerve gas, would be released from the munition, as if the latter contained that chemical and not its precursor.

Thus, both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components whose reaction with other component would produce this supertoxic lethal chemical at the moment of combat use, are chemicals of one and the same type, the same category. That is why the same requirements should apply to both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components, both from the point of view of prohibition and limitations and from the point of view of the verification of how the prohibition and limitations are complied with. In this connection a whole number of additional complex questions can arise, which we will have to resolve taking due account of the United States decision to produce binary weapons.

If, within the framework of the convention which is being elaborated now, we were to ban binary weapons on the same basis as other types of chemical weapons, then, bearing in mind the above-mentioned specific features of binary weapons, the convention would contain very significant loopholes.

We have been told that binary weapons can be banned by the provisions on the verification of key precursors, which would be included into the convention. In other words, the same régime is proposed for the limitation and verification of both key components and key precursors, which would differ from the régime for supertoxic lethal chemicals. We agree with this as far as key precursors are concerned, for key precursors of such chemicals can be used in peaceful industry too. This softer régime for key precursors would also be justified with regard to the interests of the commercial chemical industry as well as the purposes of the convention because, as I have already said, key precursors by themselves cannot directly serve destructive purposes. To process them into supertoxic lethal chemical would require an entire industrial cycle or cycles. And it is precisely this stage -- and as far as we understand there is a broad understanding in this regard -- that should be controlled in an especially strict manner.

Actually, there are several chemicals that can be simultaneously key components and key precursors. Naturally, any key component can be used as a key precursor in commercial industry. The whole question is whether it is appropriate to do so. However, by no means all key precursors can be key components. Therefore, key components belong to a more dangerous category of chemicals than key precursors.

What will happen if key components are equated with key precursors? There would be a possibility that key components would be directly used to fill binary munitions, and the régime designed for key precursors would not prevent the circumvention of the provisions of the convention. These components of binary weapons can be produced in commercial industry both deliberately, which would certainly represent a violation of the convention, and also -- if relevant

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

limitations are not introduced — not deliberately, because at commercial facilities some chemicals can be produced for peaceful purposes and, if desired, easily be switched over to the production of binary weapons. It would also mean that under the conditions for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles the States with the technology for the production of binary weapons would have considerable military advantages because they would have a certain industrial base, in the form of commercial facilities, for developing chemical munitions.

That is why the TASS statement published on 10 July this year, which has been circulated as a Working Paper of the Conference on Disarmament, under symbol CD/615, of 17 July 1985, stresses that the Soviet Union firmly condemns the plans for the production and deployment of binary weapons and that the United States project to begin production of binary chemical weapons must necessarily arouse serious alarm and indignation. The United States Government bears full responsibility for all consequences of this step. It is the direct duty of peoples not to allow this planned new crime against peace and mankind.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the radical solution of the question of the prohibition and elimination of all types of chemical weapons, and reiterates its readiness actively to co-operate with all States to accomplish this task. This is also stressed in the above-mentioned TASS statement.

We have thought it necessary to explain our position on the binary problem in detail in the hope that other delegations will also consider most seriously the new situation that has arisen in the negotiations. For there remain some delegations which seek to brush aside the problem of binary weapons. Unless it is solved, there can be no effective chemical-weapon ban.

Needless to say, in the negotiations there are many other complicated issues, chief among which may be said to be the question of verification. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated considerable flexibility on this question, having agreed to systematic on-site inspections of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and of permitted production at special facilities. With regard to other types of activities to be prohibited, we also admit the use of international procedures, in particular on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. The combination of national forms of verification with international procedures provides, in our view, the basis on which the problem of verification could be resolved.

The Soviet side seeks the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We proceed from the understanding that its conclusion may be preceded by steps to prohibit chemical weapons at the regional level. In this connection I would like to recall the proposal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO States to rid Europe of chemical weapons, which was submitted in January 1984.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Partial measures at the regional level for the limitation, reduction and destruction of chemical weapons would involve a smaller number of States than the global measures, and it would be easier to co-ordinate and implement them. At the same time these regional measures leading to the elimination of the entire class of weapons of mass destruction would certainly strengthen European security, contribute to the lessening of the military threat, the strengthening of mutual confidence and the improvement of the political atmosphere as a whole.

In this context I would like to mention the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany which also propose to resolve the problem of chemical weapons at a regional level, involving three States. This positive initiative is designed to rid the European continent of chemical weapons.

The implementation of such partial measures would contribute to the efforts undertaken on a global scale aimed at the speeding up of the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remains a final goal of the Warsaw Treaty member States.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, is ready to speed up the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the implementation of the relevant United Nations General Assembly decisions which express the will of mankind as a whole.

We believe, that it is high time to begin, according to the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate to draft provisions of the Convention. There is a good foundation for this work in the form of the Annex to the 1984 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We are ready actively to participate in this process both within the framework of existing Working Groups and in the course of any multilateral and bilateral consultations. In our view, the fixing of agreements already reached would substantially facilitate further progress on other questions which remain unresolved.

In conclusion I would like to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Turbanski, for his great contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, and also to take this opportunity to congratulate him on the forthcoming National Day of the Polish People's Republic and wish him and his colleagues all the best. This is especially appropriate now, in the year when the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism is being commemorated. The Polish people made a great contribution to this victory, by paying with the lives of many millions of its sons and daughters and vast material losses for the great victory over nazism and fascism.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Mankind does not face the threat of war only from the nuclear arms race. The use of other types of weapon of mass destruction could also have disastrous consequences. Together with nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are one of the means of mass destruction that have been developed in practice. In addition, chemical warfare agents, unlike nuclear weapons, are available to a broad circle of States, which makes them still more dangerous. Thousands of tons of chemical weapons are stockpiled in the arsenals of States. Nevertheless, recently the House of Representatives of the United States Congress decided to appropriate funds for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, binary weapons. All this makes the prohibition of chemical weapons one of the most urgent and pressing tasks.

Tangible progress must be made in the Conference on Disarmament in working out a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, bearing in mind that negotiations in this field are at an advanced stage.

We consider that building on the work that has already been done it would be possible to proceed to an agreement on the text of particular articles of the Convention on the issues on which there is general consensus.

The Mongolian Delegation welcomes the agreement recently reached between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the leading political party of the German Democratic Republic, and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany on a framework for negotiations between Governments for the conclusion in the foreseeable future of a treaty for the creation of a chemical weapon-free-zone in Europe. There can be no doubt that such regional measures would greatly facilitate the achievement of an agreement for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

The sixtieth anniversary of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was recently commemorated. This document laid the basis for the prohibition of chemical weapons and its political significance remains entire. It must be strengthened in future, and the main thing that is required of the Conference of Disarmament in this connection is a display of political will and decision to achieve as rapidly as possible an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as the logical culmination of the Geneva Protocol.

that we really do need to come to grips with these problems a little better than we are doing.

I have said again and again that we regard this comprehensive chemical weapons convention as an attempt to develop a non-proliferation treaty. Now whether that term has an unfortunate connotation for some or not, I use it as a term of art. We want something more than a bilateral treaty. We want a genuine non-proliferation treaty that would head off the spread of these horrible weapons. True to my mind, and to the mind of my delegation and Government, every

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada):

I intend to try and bring us down from the stars for a moment, and in so doing I mean no criticism of any statements by anyone else. But I am concerned more and more about our lack of progress on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, and that is the subject of my statement today.

We all agree that a major objective of our deliberations are negotiations -- I am afraid deliberations may be the more appropriate term, although that is supposed to be the term applied to the United Nations Disarmament Commission: that is the deliberative body; this is supposed to be a negotiating body. A major objective of our negotiations, we all agree, is to make significant progress in negotiating a comprehensive verifiable ban on chemical weapons, including in particular their use. During the last two years, I think we would all agree also that some considerable progress towards this objective has been achieved. The basic structural framework of a treaty as set out in CD/539 has been largely agreed. Moreover, much useful work has been done in exploring and defining the specific provisions to be included in a treaty. Our thinking about the various treaty elements has obviously been steadily acquiring greater precision, and that is particularly true in the case of Canada, as I propose to indicate today in the case of one example. A little later I hope to be able to introduce a Working Paper to give further indications of the direction of our

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

thinking. I have to say also that if it were left to our Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, we would be making much more progress than we are, and this applies to the friends of the Chair also, as they do try to urge us on. The failure seems to be a collective one, because the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups are continuing in their work but the results are not very great.

Our efforts to conclude a chemical weapons ban are not, in our view, being pursued with the universality and the urgency which they deserve. While some conscientious and useful work is being done, important areas of divergence or disagreement remain to be addressed. Indeed, at a time of growing concern, and many would say, growing dangers of an alarming proliferation of chemical weapons capability, our sense of urgency seems to be dying away rather than intensifying. It is our view that this sense of urgency should be reflected through a more widely participatory and intensive negotiating process. My delegation is involved in weekly meetings of the various working groups dealing with specific aspects of a convention; it is difficult -- we all know the difficulties, and there are so many working groups meeting during each week and so many other calls upon their time -- but if this is a priority we have to show it. We have to show a readiness, I believe, to increase the time devoted to the task of achieving a ban on chemical weapons through intersessional work, something that most of us took for granted a little while ago but now seems to be very much open to question.

Let me cite one example, of the kind of proposal which we should at least be addressing in more concrete and specific terms. Of the concepts and language of the existing provisional texts, and there have been more than one, the most comprehensive one undoubtedly is that presented by the United States, CD/500. Now, delegations are addressing that text, and it is to their credit that they do so. Usually we hear more questions and criticisms than alternative solutions, but as I said on other occasions, that is the first step in working towards solutions, to determine whether the proposals before us already do reflect a measure of consensus. We do, however, need more in the way of counter-proposals, from those who do not find that they can accept this particular text. Let me make myself quite clear. We do not see this issue as a bilateral negotiation. We are not therefore addressing ourselves, for example, to the USSR or to the socialist group. It is not enough for us to leave it to the United States and the USSR, for reasons I have already mentioned, namely, the danger of proliferation. Are we all here addressing that issue because of fears arising out of the present position and the situation pertaining between the USA and the USSR? I do not think so. Again and again we preach to each other, although I do not know if the world notices, about the importance of multilateral negotiations on these issues, and on others, but when the opportunity presents itself to us we do not seem to be quite able to deliver. Let me make clear again that this is self-criticism as much as criticism of anyone else. I am saying that we really do need to come to grips with these problems a little better than we are doing.

I have said again and again that we regard this comprehensive chemical weapons convention as an attempt to develop a non-proliferation treaty. Now whether that term has an unfortunate connotation for some or not, I use it as a term of art. We want something more than a bilateral treaty. We want a genuine non-proliferation treaty that would head off the spread of these horrible weapons. Thus to my mind, and to the mind of my delegation and Government, every

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

one of us has the duty to make our contributions as concrete and as specific as we can make them in attempting to move these negotiations ahead. I have seen such contributions, and I have witnessed them personally, and seen evolutions of thinking indicating it can happen and does happen, but it is too uneven and it happens too infrequently. It seems to us that it really is the duty of all of us -- not only to our Governments, but to each other and to the countries not represented in this forum -- to do a little better than we are doing. In fact a lot better. Some delegations have gone to the trouble and the expense -- and it entails devoting resources to this, -- to table various kinds of working papers to push our work along. I think I should compliment the Yugoslav delegation for having just done that. This is an example of what we think more of us should be doing.

There is little doubt as far as we are concerned, that the key elements of a treaty, a comprehensive treaty, are reflected in the United States proposal, for example, since it is undoubtedly the most comprehensive and far-reaching. Now in so saying, I am endorsing it, I am not asking that anyone else endorse it as is. Indeed, as I understand the United States position, they themselves say that they do not consider that every line of every text is set in concrete. But it does seem to us that we have to address the elements, the issues reflected in that comprehensive draft.

It is no news to anyone here that to Canada verification and compliance are considered to be the most difficult and contentious but most important issue, and that is the point we will come to a little later when, if we manage to finish our homework, we will submit a working paper. However, we consider that the confidence of the parties that the treaty is being universally and effectively observed will depend on the efficacy of just such a provision. It is too easy in this case for something to be occurring without any obvious means of detecting it. That does not necessarily assume that we must all agree on the most intrusive types of inspection available, but it means that if we settle for less than that, there is going to have to be an element of good faith. It does not seem to be very much in evidence thus far, and perhaps we could work on that problem a little too.

We accept that delicate and legitimate issues arise touching on sovereignty and national security concerns for all States here represented and for all of those we represent collectively who are not in this Conference. These questions are involved. We accept also that patience, imagination and a very strong political commitment are required if we are going to avoid having this particular issue go the same route as others, on which we seem to have established a kind of track record for seven years, of a lot of talk, not much action.

The Canadian Government attaches great priority to these chemical weapons negotiations, and is particularly mindful of the need to ensure that any verification provisions are both effective -- that is to say capable of providing reasonable assurances of compliance -- and realistic in the sense of being operationally viable. Now I said I would give an example, I am going to do so, and I'm well aware that it is a sensitive one. In reflecting these concerns, the Canadian Government recently commissioned a private study by two Canadian jurists versed in international law, and perhaps as important for us, in Canadian constitutional law, to examine the implications for the

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Canadian Government and for Canadian industry — for Canada, in other words, — of a hypothetical requirement to implement a chemical weapons treaty incorporating verification provisions of the type set out in CD/500.

Now others may have made this kind of statement to accept such provisions, but I must have been sleeping when such statements were made. When we made this study, special attention was given to the potential implications of the open invitation verification provision as given in that text. If there is any importance to my statement it is in our effort to make clear that the central conclusion of our study — and I confess that we were somewhat surprised — is that the existing Canadian legislation would, in fact, allow for verification which includes on-site inspection on short notice. Such inspections are seen, for example, as no more stringent than existing domestic law, to which the Canadian chemical industry is already subject.

I recognize the distinction between internal process and something that involves representatives of other countries. Nonetheless, there is not a constitutional difficulty for us, and maybe for others, including perhaps some western States, some non-aligned, perhaps some socialist States. We consulted representatives of the Canadian chemical producers, and we still came to the same conclusion.

We recognize that this conclusion in relation to the constitutional, legal and regulatory processes of Canada may not have application to the situations in other States. Further, we recognize that the commissioning of this study and its conclusions, about which I have informed the Conference today, and I would like to emphasize this, should not be interpreted as signifying that the Government of Canada advocates agreement by this Conference on the precise verification provisions set out in CD/500. The purpose of my intervention is a more modest one, but one at least as concrete as that. It is to illustrate, as we see it, the desirability of each member State in the Conference on Disarmament, which is after all a representative body, giving close examination to the practical and operational implications of all proposals put before this body, from all sides, and I have spoken before of the USSR proposal on destruction of stocks, which we take quite seriously, in order to arrive at a considered evaluation of their acceptability. If we cannot find them acceptable then we continue to say that we should be trying to produce counter-proposals, even if they do not necessarily reflect the final word of the State or of the delegation putting them forward.

I would like to reiterate and make abundantly clear that we are certainly not addressing these comments to any one delegation, to any one group whether the western group, the socialist group or the Group of 21 and China. It is all of these groups outside of this Conference as well as those represented in it who have to address these problems. The onus, as we see it, is on all of us, and I do not think we are discharging this onus. It is very easy, as every lawyer knows, to reject a proposal and to pick holes in it. It is a little harder to propose solutions. My definition of a second-rate lawyer is one who can tell you all the reasons why you cannot do something. My definition of a good lawyer and a good diplomat is to tell you how to find your

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

way through the difficulties. I do not want to say how we are qualifying, but I do not know how we would get through law school the way we are working lately. It is easy, of course, just to remain silent, and that is happening, but I suggest that it is open to us to utilize the tremendous wealth of talent in this room, backed up by expertise, and share it and pool it with one another, and give the support to the Chairman that he is entitled to, and to you, Mr. President, and to the others in working groups, to try and push this process a little further and a little faster than its going. I weep for Ambassador Turbanski trying to get us to move the way he asks us to. I think it is time we gave him a little better results than we have been doing. I am directing this at my own delegation as well as at anyone else. I do not often go into the working groups and one of the reasons I did not want to get involved in being a friend of the Chair again is because I knew just how much work was involved so I am as guilty as anyone else.

I think the time has come to fish or cut bait. It is hard to conceive of solutions. We accept that, and having said so, we think that we may be forced to consider other approaches, and especially important in the case of proposals which appear to depart boldly from established international practice, the kind that raise initial doubts about their operational viability.

Please look at just one issue, one of the most difficult and the most sensitive. We found that it did not present us with the kind of difficulties we thought we would find. I am talking, of course, about some form of verification which would not be merely internal, but which would include other countries, and not just neighbours, unless we think of neighbours as being north and south in the case of Canada. It is only by adopting such a pragmatic approach, in our view, that we are likely to succeed in concluding an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, before the capability for production and use of such weapons begins to proliferate uncontrollably.

This is our concern, proliferation. We do not see it as an east-west or north-south or any combination or variations on those kind of groupings. It is a problem which involves all of us, and we think that we have to indicate our good faith by hard work and by submitting proposals designed to focus on those areas of common ground that do exist -- and some good work has been done here -- but also to develop new areas of common ground, something I think I might have mentioned once or twice before. So perhaps I could conclude as I often do, by citing Grotius without repeating his exact words, and urge that we all follow his advice and attempt a little faster and little harder to develop common ground in this vital area of work.

Mr. BARTHELEMEY (United States of America): My delegation will be providing a more detailed statement on chemical weapons issues in the near future. The United States statement will include concrete and practical suggestions aimed at opening the way to progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

However, as the United States delegation has made clear, both privately and in meetings of this Conference, we do not intend to sit silently in the presence of the kind of statement that was given today by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union without responding in an immediate way. So I ask the indulgence of the delegations for a brief response.

What we have been increasingly hearing here, and I think it is clear that it reached a new level today, can only remind students of European history -- and we have been told a good deal about various anniversaries at our session this year -- of events not four decades ago but, perhaps more appropriately, five decades ago. What we have, in document CD/615, and in the accompanying Soviet statement, is the product of what I will call, to be diplomatic, an information machine. Like that other, very famous information machine that operated in Europe some 50 years ago, this one produces material often oddly insensitive to the knowledge of the immediate audience. For we have been told about a new type of barbarous weapon, a deadly nerve gas mixture intended to ensure the military superiority of the United States. We have been told about a planned crime against peace and mankind.

Now most delegations here have the benefit of fairly substantive sophistication in the area of chemical weapons. This issue has been under negotiation for some period of time so the delegations here consider the matter with considerable knowledge. To begin with, I have no doubt that the delegations here view chemical weapons with abhorrence as do the people of the United States and their Government. We want these weapons to be effectively and verifiably banned. You know about the 16-year moratorium on chemical weapons production that has been followed by the United States Government. You know that the Soviet Union has, by a wide margin, and, I repeat, by a wide margin, the largest stockpile and forces in being for the use of chemical weapons, in the world, and of course these Soviet chemical weapons include nerve gas. But you are not the intended audience of the disinformation as contained in the TASS statement that is in document CD/615. That audience is perhaps the Soviet population, or it may be, and it is likely the case, that the intended audience is populations elsewhere, who, it is hoped, will be uninformed and will not ask about Soviet chemical-weapon capabilities, or whether indeed they have the safety that would be built into binary chemical weapons if they are produced by the United States at some point. I would submit that you delegations are indeed the intended audience of another message, and that message is the same one that was purveyed by that other famous information machine five decades ago. That machine drove home the message over and over again that States had no right to national defence or collective defence. This message was the message of intimidation and this message was accompanied by aggression. The United States and its allies have no intention of renouncing the right to national or collective self-defence, so once again, we would ask the Soviet delegation to devote its attention, not so much to discussing the process by which the United States considers its

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

defence programmes but instead to provide us with information on the Soviet chemical weapons programme. How much, in roubles, has been devoted to CW production, last year, this year, any of the last 16 years. Bearing in mind our experience of the last 50 years, I believe that the delegations in the Conference may not hold their breath as they wait for this information, but, rest assured, the United States delegation will continue to ask for it. We will also continue to work tirelessly toward a chemical weapons ban and we urge that all delegations to this Conference engage seriously in negotiations so that a treaty can be achieved, that bans these heinous chemical weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Now, with regard to the statement of my friend Ambassador Beesley, I should like to say the following: it pleased me, and I endorse both its emotional tenor and its substantive proposals. We must indeed speed up our work, and his appeal to us, the representatives at the Conference, is absolutely right. Of course, our positions are fixed in our capitals, but we ourselves can do a great deal, and here Ambassador Beesley was quite right, and we ourselves should do as he advises. I also endorse his views concerning the significance of working papers if, of course, such working papers further the progress of the negotiations. I share his view that it is necessary to try to understand the position of the other sides; to understand the reasons why they encounter this or that difficulty, to take into account the many circumstances, above all social and economic, political, geographical and, indeed, if you will, traditional, since behind each of us or each country which we represent there are many years, a thousand years of history. Different countries have developed different approaches to specific issues, and we must together try to find acceptable solutions, taking these differences into account. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee has this intention, as I already mentioned in my main statement. Naturally, we support him as regards, so to speak, the formulation of our convention.

Today we have, to put it bluntly, a clean sheet of paper, for as we all know document CD/539 — the annex to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee which worked last year under its Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus — this document does not contain the provisions we have all agreed upon. These are the possibilities open to us.

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We could already this year submit the agreed texts to the General Assembly; even though there may not be many of them, even though there may be few of them, at least we will be able to say to the General Assembly that we have already agreed on something, we have reached agreement, and we are continuing work on the other provisions. I do not know how my colleagues feel when they return to their capitals to report, but I do not feel very comfortable when I am asked what the Conference has achieved after five years of negotiations. What have the 40 States represented in the Conference managed to agree on? To this question unfortunately the reply must be, "So far it has not been possible to agree on anything". Probably each of us has to answer this question in the same way. Therefore let us, as Ambassador Beesley has also invited us to do, do all we can, spare neither effort nor time, to advance the negotiations.

I know that many of my colleagues have an objective difficulty in allocating the extra time and personnel for negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, but of course if we do not conduct negotiations tirelessly, if we do not attempt to fix the agreements achieved day by day, then we will never reach the end. We are sometimes told that negotiations can be continued if there are results, but of course there will be results only through a process of negotiation. We endorse the appeal made by Ambassador Beesley, but at the same time we do not agree with everything he said. In particular, we consider that the basis for our work (and I believe this is the general view, and hope that Ambassador Beesley will support me in this) is document CD/539 which is the result of the previous years' work. Let us therefore advance step by step on the basis of that document and not of any other document.

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Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, we are entering the last weeks of the chemical weapons negotiations during this session, and I believe it is important at this time for my delegation to make a brief intervention on this question. The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, in his address to the Conference on Disarmament in February, reaffirmed the primary importance the United States places on these negotiations. The first priority of the United States remains the prompt negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Unfortunately, thus far this year we have made little concrete progress toward that goal.

In adopting a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament has recognized the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This mandate is a concrete expression of the universal revulsion for these terrible weapons, and of the strong desire on the part of peoples around the world to be rid of them forever. The United States fully supports this objective and is committed to making every effort to conclude our negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

My Government is particularly concerned about the lack of progress in these negotiations in view of the continuing spread of chemical weapons to States that had not previously possessed them. This proliferation not only threatens stability

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

in key areas of the world, but also makes the completion of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention more difficult to achieve. The more States that have such weapons, we fear, the more difficult it will be to achieve world-wide agreement to ban them totally.

A second factor lending urgency to our task is the spreading use of chemical weapons. The United States has taken the lead in condemning chemical weapons use wherever it has occurred -- in south-east Asia, Afghanistan and, most recently, against Iran. Despite the preponderance of evidence presented concerning these instances of use, many nations have questioned the reliability of such evidence without seeking to examine the facts closely, and, unfortunately, few have been impelled to condemn either the use of chemical weapons or the tortoise-like pace of the negotiations here in the Conference.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical weapons constitutes an undertaking of vital importance for humanity. It embodies the mutual commitment of nations to refrain from using chemical weapons. It is, accordingly, all the more regrettable that this agreement has recently been honoured in the breach. Moreover, the Geneva Protocol does not prevent the acquisition, production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. In terms of international law, it is not illegal to acquire chemical weapons. To combat most effectively the further spread of chemical weapons, and to preclude the possibility of their use, we must make their acquisition and retention illegal. The definitive way to accomplish this objective is through a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This is a key factor in the desire of the United States to conclude such a convention here at the Conference on Disarmament without delay.

The lamentable situation with regard to the use of chemical weapons also underlines the need for the convention to contain a mechanism rapidly and unequivocally to determine the facts whenever and wherever a violation is suspected. Unfortunately, the delegation of the Soviet Union has repeatedly refused to address the general wish of other delegations for reliable verification of provisions in the chemical weapons ban, and it has repeatedly criticized as "not serious" the detailed United States proposals for verification of compliance. It has not, however, been forthcoming with concrete alternatives that address the need to establish mutual confidence that States are, in fact, in compliance with the convention. My delegation encourages all delegations to make specific and concrete proposals, so that we may have a firm and rational basis for resolving our different views. The United States draft convention in CD/500 is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, but its provisions do respond to the need for reliable verification. We are prepared to consider any alternatives that provide for an equal or greater degree of effectiveness. We cannot accept less.

The United States delegation has made more than a few efforts to stimulate the negotiating process. Most recently, in our intervention on 28 March, we set forth three proposals to accelerate the work of the Committee.

The first was to put this work on a more rational basis by scheduling a negotiating session in the autumn. As I said then, if there is no negotiating session, there can be no progress between August and February. I can add that it

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

appears to my delegation that those who have hesitated in approving an extended schedule for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons are precisely those who could be most threatened by the further spread and use of chemical weapons, and are among those who should be most interested in completing the negotiations as soon as possible.

Our second suggestion was that the Committee should focus on issues that would be key to progress. The Committee is attempting to address the declaration of chemical weapons stocks in Working Group "B", and although some progress has been made, we have not yet resolved the important issue of the timing of declarations. On the equally important issue of chemical weapons production facilities, progress has been stalled because in Working Group "A", inexplicably, the group of socialist States has refused even to agree that the definition of a chemical weapons production facility would include facilities devoted solely to making chemicals which were used solely for chemical weapons. The issue of ensuring that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production is likewise bogged down in Working Group "A".

In Working Group "C", we look forward to an examination of the issue of challenge inspection. This is certainly one of the key issues of the negotiations, and we should give it the full discussion it deserves. A discussion of the principles underlying the important concept of challenge inspection and of the necessity for States rapidly to satisfy concerns about compliance with the convention is a clear necessity to further our negotiations.

My last suggestion for accelerating work was related to delegations' willingness to negotiate. I note with sadness that the delegation of the Soviet Union has remained virtually silent in many of the sessions of the Working Groups. This silence has done nothing to further our progress, and it raises serious questions whether the Soviet Union, despite its claims, is interested in a chemical weapons convention. In addition, while it criticizes our verification proposals, the Soviet delegation has not introduced a concrete proposal on this subject in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons since the United States tabled its draft convention last year.

As I said in beginning my statement, the priority United States objective is the negotiation of an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons without further delay. Unfortunately, however, in addition to the difficulties we have experienced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, there may be external obstacles to our negotiations. The current imbalance in chemical weapons capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union may well be such an obstacle.

The long discussions that have occurred in our Executive branch and in the Congress of the United States over the past five years are ample evidence of my Government's reluctance to resume production of chemical weapons. But during the past sixteen years -- during, that is, a 16-year unilateral moratorium on United States chemical weapons production -- the Soviet Union has continued to produce its own chemical weapons and to expand the chemical weapons potential of its large deployed chemical warfare forces.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

This year's debate in the United States Congress once again underscores that it is the clear preference of the Administration, the Congress and the American people to ban rather than to build chemical weapons. If we can achieve a convention here promptly, the United States will build no binary chemical weapons. And, in any event, the United States binary programme is not an obstacle to concluding our negotiations.

Let me further illustrate this point. In the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 18 July, an attempt is made to explore alleged differences in the positions of the United States and the USSR on the treatment of binary chemical weapons in the convention. The simple fact is that the Soviet Union and the United States have expressed essential agreement on how to treat these weapons in the convention. The Soviet Union seeks to destroy them along with super-toxic lethal weapons. So does the United States. The Soviet Union would unequivocally ban the production of the key precursors of binary weapons as it would super-toxic lethal weapons. So would the United States. There is no essential disagreement. By portraying an area of essential agreement as one of disagreement, however, the Soviet statement appears to sow confusion regarding a problem already solved. In our view, it would be better to work together to solve our remaining problems rather than trying to create new ones.

The 18 July statement of the Soviet delegation contained other unfounded allegations and inflammatory assertions to which my delegation has already responded. I regret that it was necessary to do so, and I firmly hope that future statements by the Soviet Union and its socialist colleagues will not require further interventions by my delegation.

In spite of the meagre results achieved so far this year, there remains sufficient time for constructive work during the remaining weeks of this session. I urge all delegations to join in serious negotiations. Let us together find ways to bring our work closer to a successful conclusion.

In this regard, the Conference should adopt a single text for negotiating the chemical weapons convention. There is a good foundation for this work in the form of the annex to the 1984 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/539. Such a negotiating text, which would encapsulate agreements already reached, would ensure that such progress as we make is carried forward to future negotiating sessions.

We have a unique opportunity at this point in history, the opportunity to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth. History will not judge us kindly if we fail to seize that opportunity. The United States delegation is committed to the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons convention and is prepared to demonstrate its commitment. We hope that other delegations are prepared to join us.

(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

I shall now refer to the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We welcome the fact that continuity in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has been maintained and wish its Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, every success. As is logical, the work of the Committee reveals new problems but also gives some idea of solutions, although on occasion it appears to follow a spiral if not actually a circular course, when issues which appeared to have been resolved surface again in the working groups. Overall, however, we think the Committee will make progress, albeit slowly.

I should like to state now that we welcome the formula contained in the annex to document CD/CW/WP.107 of 22 April, aimed at guaranteeing the compatibility of the future convention with the 1925 Protocol and we have the pleasure of congratulating the Chairman of the Consultative Group on this formula.

At the beginning of this statement I mentioned the specific problems arising from agreements of the type of the future convention on the prohibition, not only of the use, like the 1925 Protocol, but also of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. While in accepting that Protocol States were able to formulate appropriate reservations and even announce that they were prepared to take reprisals if attacked with chemical weapons, in our opinion that possibility has no place in the future convention. In our future convention the possibility of reprisals should not even be mentioned for the simple reason that they would not be possible, at least for States which observed the convention to the full and in good faith; once the period -- perhaps 10 years -- set for the destruction of stockpiles of weapons had elapsed, they would not be in a position to take reprisals. Furthermore, what possible reprisals could there be if any of the parties to the Convention, violating its obligations, should renew its research, manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons? Would that induce other parties to the convention also to carry out those activities in reprisal? In any case it could not mean mere reprisals but the total destruction of the convention since the latter cannot be broken down into a large number of bilateral relationships.

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(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

That was why we said that the possibility of reprisals should not be mentioned because it would simply not be possible. In this type of agreement, once again verification should deprive reprisals of any meaning. That is why simple verification systems are not possible. The certainty that nobody is developing, stockpiling or manufacturing chemical weapons or certain chemical substances is much more difficult to verify than the mere non-use of such weapons. That certainty is, however, vital for the convention to have the desired effects. If verification shows that someone is violating the convention, the first response cannot be a reprisal. The offender must be discovered in time. If, by misfortune, that should not be possible, the convention would lose all its force, and, call it reprisals or denunciation, by the application of well-known rules of treaty law, the convention would have ceased to exist.

Of course, if conventions of this type do exist, like the 1972 Convention prohibiting biological weapons, which lack an efficient verification system and seem to have operated satisfactorily because there have been no reports of violation, in actual fact it is because we do not know whether this apparent state may not just be an illusion. We do not know, and we would have to wait for the violation of the prohibition on the use of such weapons which would certainly leave the party which had observed the Convention in good faith in a very difficult situation without any possibility of defence or response.

This is why my Government considers the issues of verification, where difficulties continue to exist, to be of such importance in our future convention; we hope that the recent proposals contained in document CD/575 can provide a basis for progress in the sphere of verification of non-production, and we hope to see proposals on verification of destruction of existing weapons and on the necessary declarations, particularly with regard to the

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(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

location of arsenals. It should be possible to ensure that within a reasonable period existing weapons can be placed under international control in depots devoted exclusively to that purpose, during the period necessary for their complete destruction, we think that it will be possible in this way to avoid the difficulty which some States understandably experience with regard to proposals which involve a need to declare the location of depots or stockpiles belonging to their armed forces which also contain other types of weapons, while at the same time the danger of their use during the destruction period would be eliminated thanks to this international control.

With regard to the definition of chemical weapons and of the chemical agents which should be prohibited and placed on the appropriate list, for the purposes both of destruction and of non-manufacture in the future (except for protective purposes in a single facility), our delegation considers that the treaty should only contain an express prohibition concerning single-purpose agents. The list of such agents should be adopted, and possibly updated, by all parties by consensus. We would reiterate that it should be the single-purpose criterion which is basically used for the list.

Other agents, on whose inclusion in the above-mentioned list there was no consensus, could be prohibited by applying the general-purpose criterion to them, and they would appear on another list. Their production for permitted purposes, other than for protection, would not be restricted to a single facility nor their quantity to one metric tonne, but their production would have to be subject to very strict on-site inspection.

I should like to add here that in our opinion such an inspection would necessarily require appropriate institutional organization; in this sphere we largely agree with the substance of document CD/589, recently submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom.

For other agents, both supertoxic lethal agents and precursors (key or otherwise) which are indisputably dual-purpose, constructive solutions have been proposed. To conclude my reference to lists of agents, I should like to add that in any case these lists must be open-ended and we believe that there is already some degree of consensus to the effect that they could be updated by the Consultative Committee of the organization to be set up, and that, of course, the fact that an agent was not included in the list would not alone automatically mean that its production must be unconditionally legalized.

For the identification of the chemical agents to be included in those lists and for the consideration of the numerous technical problems which emerge at each stage of our work, we think that it might be very useful for a group of chemical and military experts to hold meetings, as already suggested by the representative of Japan in his statement of 11 April last. We would add that those meetings could be periodic and should report to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on their results.

As for the Executive Council of the future organization to be set up, we think that it should be constituted according to criteria of equitable geographical and political distribution. We also believe that all States which have made a positive declaration of production of chemical agents (not necessarily chemical weapons) appearing in the above-mentioned lists should be represented in it.

(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

Apart from the foregoing, although it is certainly related to the issue of the declaration of stocks and destruction of chemical weapons, I should like to add that our delegation considers that a special treatment for binary weapons does not seem to be justified. We believe that the agents used to manufacture them should be subject to the arrangements that apply to them as chemical agents, and the weapons subject to that laid down for weapons.

We are anxiously awaiting urgent discussion of the problem of the time-periods for the destruction of weapons and facilities and their order, a problem which seems to be fraught with difficulties. The proposals made so far do not seem satisfactory to us, particularly where time-periods are concerned. As for the order of destruction, I should like to note that the greatest urgency should be apportioned on the basis of how operational the stocks are, leaving the oldest and already obsolete stocks to the last. The proportional and balanced destruction of the toxicity capability proposed by the People's Republic of China (CD/605), would only be acceptable if all the States had the same initial stock of declared chemical weapons. Otherwise, the relative military advantage revealed at the initial moment of declaration would be maintained. This means that the establishment of international control over stocks and facilities as soon as possible after the entry into force of the convention is very important. Thus the problem of time-periods would become less important.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, today I would like to make a few comments on item 4 of our agenda, chemical weapons. As we approach the close of the 1985 session, it becomes increasingly apparent that the expected progress towards the drafting of a Convention will not be achieved this year, despite the efforts of Chairman Turbanski and of Mr. Poptchev, Mrs. Bonnier, Mr. Elbe and Mr. Wisnomoerti, the Chairmen of the three Working Groups and of the consultations on use.

This situation is especially disappointing for the members of the Group of 21. Contrary to what recent statements in this Chamber would have us believe, the history of multilateral efforts to achieve the prohibition of chemical weapons can be traced back to the mid-sixties, in one of the predecessor bodies to this Conference. The countries not belonging to military alliances have always been in the forefront of those efforts, as a direct result of which it became possible to conclude the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

The members of that group of countries continued to press for the multilateral negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons since the inception of the former Committee on Disarmament. In 1979, the Group of 21 proposed the establishment of a subsidiary body with a negotiating mandate, against tenacious objections that were only lifted in 1982, for reasons linked to the peculiar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Perhaps as a consequence of that situation, the negotiations in this Conference have not proceeded with the desired consistency and speed. The two super-Powers, which possess the largest arsenals of chemical weapons, seem to attach greater importance to the public relations effect of our multilateral endeavours than to the achievement of progress towards a convention. While one super-Power, the United States, apparently tailors its own proposals to the perceived objective of proving its stated opinions about the nature of the rival's society, the Soviet Union seizes every opportunity afforded by the open character of the debate on national defence going on in the other super-Power to justify its views about the adversary's intentions.

These counterproductive attitudes are generated by and feed on the mistrust and rivalry which have characterized the relationship between them in matters pertaining to the field of disarmament. The only exception may be found, of course, when there is a coincidence of their interests in order to preserve and reserve for themselves certain privileges, as is the case of their close co-operation to prevent developing countries from mastering so-called "sensitive" technologies in the nuclear field.

Despite all the difficulties, work has at least proceeded diligently in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary organs. My delegation hopes it will be still possible to include some generally agreed draft formulations in the report that must be adopted in August by the Conference, which should contain the basis for the resumption of work at the 1986 session. It is important, in this context, that such formulations be achieved as a result of the participation of all delegations, within the institutional framework provided by the Conference. While the normal activity of selective consultations with interested parties by the elected officers is necessary and legitimate, one should guard against a too broad interpretation which would generate awkward situations. No delegation has any mandate or proxy to negotiate in the name of any other, or at least this is the case as far as my delegation is concerned.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

The action and proposals of Brazil on the prohibition of chemical weapons stems from our basic concerns with regard to the future convention. First, we support the mandate received from the General Assembly in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the instrument should aim at the prohibition of production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and at their destruction, as well as the prohibition of their use. Brazil does not possess chemical weapons, and we consider the existing arsenals as a threat to international peace and security. Not only do such arsenals endanger individual nations, which may become victims of mass destruction, but they also constitute an incentive to the proliferation of chemical weapons. Thus, we attach primary importance to the obligation of their destruction, in a treaty which will bring about the elimination of the threat they pose. Second, as a developing country, Brazil strives for economic and social progress, and in that effort the development of our chemical industry plays a crucial role. We do not believe that the future convention, deriving as it does from a specific concern in the field of disarmament, should in any way attempt to regulate civil chemical industry. Therefore, the constraints it must impose on certain activities directly connected with a chemical weapons capability should not be of such a magnitude that it would interfere with legitimate civilian needs.

In short, the final text of the convention should strike an adequate and workable balance between two important concerns: the destruction of existing arsenals and the prevention of their future emergence, as well as the need to promote the wider and non-discriminatory utilization of scientific achievements in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. With those basic concerns in mind, let me now briefly discuss some of the issues currently under consideration in each of the four subsidiary organs of the Ad Hoc Committee.

My delegation favours a short, simple formulation on the prohibition of use. Document CD/CW/WP/107, presented by Mr. Wisnomoerti at the close of the first part of the session, provided a good basis for the discussions of the past weeks. The text contained in the annex of that document reflects a considerable measure of understanding on the relationship between the 1925 Protocol and the prohibition of use to appear in the Convention. We would not, however, favour the maintenance of the proposed third operative paragraph, since it is difficult to conceive that a State would remain committed by provisions of an instrument from which it has withdrawn. Subject to the understanding recorded in the footnote of that annex, regarding the definition of chemical weapon, the remainder of the text could in our view be accepted with a few minor drafting improvements.

During the second part of the session, work centred on the prohibition of use of herbicides. Brazil did not wish to question the inclusion in the Convention of provisions to that effect, since the matter seems to be of considerable concern to several other delegations. We do recognize the importance of an eventual prohibition of herbicides as a method of warfare. If it is the general understanding that this issue should be addressed in the framework of the convention, we would urge that herbicides are not assimilated to chemical weapons, be it in their definition, in their purpose or in possible restrictions to be imposed on their use. We welcome, in this connection, Working Paper CD/118, introduced by the delegation of Pakistan. By the same token, we think that the protraction of the debate on herbicides would hinder the work on the main subject matter of the convention, which is and should continue to be the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

The issues discussed in Working Group A also touch directly on the basic concerns of Brazil, which I mentioned at the start of my remarks. From the approach of my Government, to the effect that the convention is not meant to regulate the activities of civil chemical industry, but only to prohibit chemical weapons, it follows that all peaceful activities are by definition permitted under the instrument. Accordingly, it would be advisable, in the view of my delegation, to replace the expression "permitted purposes", wherever it occurs, by the expression "purposes not prohibited by this Convention", with the necessary adaptation of pertinent language. That would, for instance, be the case of Section VI of the current structure of the Convention, dealing with "permitted activities".

In fact, as it appears from the relevant documents, that section deals with the restrictions to be imposed on certain categories of chemical products, and should be titled accordingly. The caput of the relevant article must therefore reflect, as it does in document CD/539, the recognition of the right of each State Party to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use any chemical for purposes not specifically prohibited by the Convention, subject to the restrictions, or rather, the régime, spelled out in the several paragraphs dealing with different categories of chemicals. Such chemicals should, in our view, be listed by category in a systematic manner, particularly those super-toxic lethal chemicals that have no civilian application and other single-purpose compounds, which would thus be distinguished from dual-purpose chemicals. Such lists might be periodically reviewed by the competent organs created by the convention so as to ensure the inclusion of any new compounds of the same kind. This proceeding would seem to be preferable to a classification exclusively based on the notion of risk, since this involves a subjective element difficult to ascertain; it would, furthermore, effectively complement the general purpose criterion and its companion criterion of toxicity.

We regret that the controversy of a confrontational nature over components of binary weapons has prevented Working Group A from achieving progress in its deliberations on several issues before it.

My delegation attaches particular importance to the questions under examination in Working Group B. The complete and effective elimination of existing arsenals of chemical weapons by those few countries that possess them constitutes, in fact, the necessary and liminar counterpart of the prohibitions and restrictions on their legitimate activities to be accepted by those which have chosen not to develop or possess such weapons. In that respect, my delegation generally supports the conclusions and suggestions presented by the Chairman of Working Group B in document CD/WP.108.

In the course of the second part of the session, a considerable amount of work was undertaken on detailed aspects of the declaration of possession of chemical weapons and on the practical implementation of their destruction. We await the report to be presented by the Chairman of Working Group B on those matters, so that the many valuable ideas and suggestions that we expect to be contained therein can be properly studied with a view to the continuation of the work at the 1986 session of the conference.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

I would also wish to put on record our support for the approach taken by the Chairman of Working Group C in document CD/WP.106, on which the discussion has focused. On the question of national implementation measures, my delegation would prefer the shorter formulation contained in that document, but in deference to the concerns expressed by others we would accept the result of the discussion of the past few weeks in the Working Group as reflecting a general understanding on this matter. On another topic of that document, I would reiterate our view that the question of the so-called "national technical means" need not be addressed by the Convention.

The deliberations in Working Group C also contributed to further refinement of the text of the current article VIII on the Consultative Committee. Our main suggestions on that subject, which seem to be acceptable to many, consist in the inclusion of the promotion of international co-operation for peaceful purposes among the general functions of the Consultative Committee and the slight enlargement of the membership of the Executive Committee so as to ensure the adequate balance supported by all. In this connection, we are confident that it will also be possible to arrive at a provision on membership that would make due allowance for specific situations and interests without blessing or sanctioning discrimination among sovereign States.

Finally, the present formulation for the article on consultation, co-operation and fact-finding, as it appears in document CD/WP.106, seems to us an adequate expression of a compromise solution to the many complex differences of opinion that have been raised by other proposals. My delegation would hope that such maximalist proposals will eventually be dropped in favour of a reasonable compromise.

At the start of the 1985 session, we had hoped that the questions I touched upon above would have been generally solved by now. It is regrettable that the negotiations on chemical weapons in this multilateral forum are now dangerously close to becoming yet another casualty of the confrontation between the super-Powers. This has already been the sad fate of several items on the agenda of this Conference. Let us strive to prevent it from happening to the once promising prospects of achieving the total elimination of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Right from the beginning of the current session one of the items of immediate practical importance has been considered to be the chemical weapons ban — given the advanced stage of the negotiations and the clearly-worded mandate, which envisages formulating a draft convention. Under the able and consistent guidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, the negotiations gained in depth. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Turbanski on the occasion of his country's National Day, 22 July, which he also spent working on various problems of the negotiations on chemical weapons.

On a number of areas of the convention a good basis was set up for finding mutually acceptable solutions. I have in mind the meaningful negotiations that took place on many important aspects of the "Permitted Activities"; the further progress made in regard to the issue of diversion of chemical-weapon stocks; the consideration of the function and role of the national body for implementation and control. It is noteworthy that the discussion in the three Working Groups throughout the spring part of the session and until recently was marked by a business-like spirit and the extremist positions, it seems, yielded to the tendency for a more sensible and balanced approach.

From the point of view of these positive trends in the negotiations, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria cannot but point out, with regret, the United States' decision to give the green light to large-scale production of binary chemical weapons. This decision creates a new, complex situation at our multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons — both from a political and diplomatic point of view, and because of the obstacles and complexities of a military and a technological character resulting from this new weapon. The socialist countries have been repeatedly warning that the introduction of binary chemical weapons

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

in the United States arsenal — the initial arrangements for which were made recently — would put the world in jeopardy because it would start an arms race in a new, particularly dangerous and costly direction.

The Bulgarian delegation is especially preoccupied with the intention to deploy the binary weapons on the territory of the United States' West European allies, thus bringing new dangers to the densely populated areas of the European continent. In this connection I should like to recall the topical importance of the proposal, put forth by the Warsaw Treaty Member States, to declare Europe a chemical-weapon-free zone.

This proposal should be viewed in its proper perspective, i.e. as an important disarmament measure, though of regional dimension. Such a measure would by no means diminish the significance of, or interfere with, the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament but would rather complement them and strengthen the European security as a whole.

We also welcome the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany to consider and develop the idea to establish a zone free of chemical weapons on the territory of three Central European States.

The implications stemming from the United States decision to authorize the production of binary weapons will have yet to be assessed in full, for it will, undoubtedly, have further repercussions on the nature and pace of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and indeed on all efforts aimed at banning and eliminating the chemical weapons. It is obvious that many important areas in the draft convention are complicated by the binary problem. I, therefore, reserve the right to speak again and in more detail, if necessary, on the problems recently created at the negotiations.

In the meantime, no efforts should be spared in the search for advancing the negotiations. Above all, it is necessary to arrive as soon as possible at a complete and satisfactory solution to the problem of binary and multi-component weapons. Such a solution ought to comprise: a sufficiently reliable approach for identifying the key components of that type of weapon; an agreement on a régime ensuring their non-production anywhere; and the adoption of such a schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons which would envisage their elimination in a priority order, if they should appear in the arsenals.

A comprehensive solution is also required for the issue of measures to be applied towards the chemical industry with the aim of ensuring non-production of chemical weapons in general. A final agreement is feasible following a consensus on the approaches for identification of the various categories of chemicals and on the role of the so-called

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

"single small-scale facility". In the long run the only method in this regard is that of agreeing on balanced and realistic arrangements for data reporting and verification.

In my delegation's view, it would be unrealistic and incorrect to bind down a considerable part of the chemical industries of tens of countries around the world — once the convention enters into force and for untold number of years thereafter — with some kind of continuous, obtrusive international control, of the kind some delegations suggest.

A calm, sensible and realistic approach on the problem of verification as a whole should prevail. A positive fact is already at hand — the emerging understanding on the question of the role and functions of the national body for implementation and control of the convention.

My delegation has been upholding the view that the role of continuous and uninterrupted national control for compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention would be of particular importance and that it should be supplemented by international control measures.

It is not my intention to go now into the details of the various subject matters of the convention. At the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its respective subsidiary bodies my delegation has had an ample opportunity to do so. Before I conclude, however, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for the analytical and well-founded speech of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan, on the present state of affairs at the negotiations on chemical weapons, delivered on 18 July. We are also heartened by the fact that the delegation of the Soviet Union, whose expertise and constructive contribution have positively affected the negotiations on many occasions, is once again offering its readiness to participate actively in fresh efforts to draft provisions of the Convention.

My delegation supports such an approach and for its part will do its best in assisting, together with all delegations, the process of developing and drafting the text of the Convention.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor today in order to introduce Working Paper CD/619 on chemical weapons verification. Before doing so, however, since this is the first time I speak before the Conference on Disarmament in the summer part of its session, let me begin by first congratulating you, Ambassador Ould-Rouis, on your assumption of the important office of President for the month of July. I would like to express the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the skilful manner in which you have guided the Conference. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the delegation of Zaire which had taken the Presidency for the month of June. I would also like to extend a welcome to the Ambassador of Argentina upon his attendance in the Conference on Disarmament. May I also be permitted to express the sincere welcome of my delegation to Ambassador Jessel of France, and at the same time to say how sorry we are to see the departure of Ambassador Carasales of Argentina from our forum.

It has been one of the constant themes of the Japanese delegation in the discussion of disarmament measures that effective, acceptable and appropriate multilateral verification is one of the most central, although complicated and thus challenging, tasks. The difficulties stem not only from political considerations of disarmament but from technical details, and very much more and very often from the fact that one is dealing with the complicated and sophisticated structure of modern industries. To find an adequate system to suit the purpose is not easy. At the same time, we consider it fortunate that the international community has a wealth of experience at least in one form of such multilateral verification measures. I refer here to the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of safeguards against diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to possible military

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

applications primarily under the régime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are many aspects of that experience that are useful in other areas of disarmament verification.

Let me add in haste, however, that IAEA safeguards have their own unique features which make it difficult to think about direct applications to other fields. For example, the IAEA system deals only with two chemical elements, namely uranium and plutonium, and in future possibly a third element, namely thorium, may be added to the list. These elements are unique in the sense that they emit distinct and characteristic radioactive energy. This is often called their unique signature which makes them very easy to locate and identify even in very minute and so-called trace quantities. There are not very many areas of industry in which these two or three chemical elements are used on a day-to-day basis. Compared to that, what we are dealing with in the context of a chemical weapons convention is a much more complicated situation. The chemical elements in question include chlorine, phosphate, hydrogen, oxygen and carbon, etc., which are among the most commonly available on earth or in the atmosphere.

The situation leads to the distinction that in the case of the nuclear industry, the pattern of what is called a nuclear fuel cycle is fairly limited and thus makes it easier to simplify the whole problem into mathematical models, and thus enable application of the theory of statistical sampling in order to calculate inspection frequencies. The complexity of the chemical industry as we know it today is such that I do not dare to even begin to discuss the general outline of the problems involved.

It should be clear from the outset that there is little likelihood of direct application of the IAEA safeguards technology to the case of a chemical weapons convention, and that careful assessment and evaluation are required in order to transfer various outcomes of the IAEA safeguards to let us say a chemical weapons convention.

At the same time, since we are talking about multilateral verification and related technologies, it is possible that there can be a number of basic concepts which are common and on which we can draw useful analogy from the work already done in the area of nuclear safeguards.

I would like to point out as one such example the application of the theory of statistical sampling in determination of the frequency of routine inspections. What is involved is that one determines the flow chart of chemicals within a designated facility, that is both the chemical forms and quantity as well as the pattern of their reactions, and then set a desired level of confidence of verification at, say, 85 per cent; then the theory will permit one to determine the frequency of routine sample-taking on a random basis in order to assure that if anything irregular is happening, one becomes aware of it with a level of confidence up to 85 per cent. It may be easier to understand if one said that the underlying mathematics is the same

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

as that for quality control in industrial production. I shall not go into further details of the mathematics of sample-taking, but would like to mention that the IAEA safeguards have arrived at an extensive application of this idea after considerable debate, and it now forms the basis of determining what is called the maximum frequency of routine inspection for different facilities. It might be useful in due course for us to arrange to look into its applicability in the case of our CW convention.

Another device which may find useful application in the CW case is an extensive use of tamper-proof, or more exactly, tamper-resistant automated mechanisms. These may be seals to ensure that no unauthorized withdrawal of material has taken place from a designated store. In this case, there is a choice of dispatching international inspectors every now and then to confirm the integrity of the seal. Or one may adopt a slightly more costly but overall more cost-effective way of remote sensing so that any violation of the seal would be known to the control centre, at the time of such violation. Introduction of on-line real-time remote sensors, connecting the objects to be verified with control centres through modern electronic devices is probably what Norbert Wiener once described as the "humane use of human beings" in that it will release a considerable number of human inspectors from the tedious chore of looking at seals and meters on-site, all day long, and enable them to turn to more creative and profitable work. One may note in passing that this is the basic concept for introduction of robots into various industrial processes. The idea of continual remote verification had already been introduced in our forum, for instance through CD/271 and other papers. What I am presenting today is an advanced version of such a concept which we have developed in Japan and have found useful in the case of IAEA safeguards.

The system as described in CD/619 is made of various devices which convert data into digital form and then transmit them either through ordinary telephone lines or through special satellite communication devices to the control centre. Advancement in sensor technology, in analog-to-digital convertors, and miniaturization of data transmission devices make it possible now to send: (a) readings from meters and other instrument panels; (b) still pictures; and (c) written messages, almost instantly, automatically and with a great deal of accuracy and reliability. It is thus possible to carry out a constant monitor of flow, temperature, or even chemical components, or to take intermittent time interval pictures of a premise from a distance. It is no surprise that high-speed, high-density communication through use of devices such as fibre-optics represent the most advanced of the so-called high technologies of today, so that the above-mentioned functions, if applied on a consistent scale, can be achieved without much of an additional cost.

The occasions where this technique may be applied are, for example: firstly, declared CW stockpiles, after initial verification to ensure against any unauthorized and unscheduled removal of the material in question; secondly, to ensure that the process of elimination or destruction at the declared dedicated facilities is taking place according to the schedule, and

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

in accordance with the declared method; and thirdly, to ascertain that production of those categories of chemicals for permitted activities are within the stipulated limits.

There may be many other applications of this technology. It is at the same time important to realize that automated, remote, on-line verification can be feasible only when the design and lay-out of the facilities in question, as well as the flow pattern of chemicals in process is accurately known. In this sense, there is no difference from the case of the continued presence of human inspectors on site.

I would not want to bother my colleagues any further with the technical details on this subject, I hope that Working Paper CD/619 will be enough, at least for the moment, to give the outline of the proposed concept. One important point that I would like to emphasize is that the system as described in the Working Paper is one that we know to actually work, and that it is on the basis of such knowledge that we consider it can find application in certain aspects of a verification of a CW convention. What is more, I would like to point out that automated, remote sensing has an additional merit to the advantage of cost/effectiveness in the employment of human inspectors. It has the merit of objectivity and uniformity in the quality of data they collect and transmit, which are very important elements in verification.

I am of course aware of the status of the deliberations and negotiations in the various working groups of our Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am not proposing that the simplistic adoption of robotic technology will solve these problems. There is no question that we need first and foremost an agreement in principle regarding the kind of verification that should be an integral part of our agreement. At the same time it is the conviction of the Japanese delegation that approaching the problem from the angle of "what is possible" is sometimes very helpful in understanding the scope of the problem itself. I hope that Working Paper CD/619 will be able to serve such a purpose.

(Mr. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh))

While the Bangladesh delegation is seriously preoccupied with the dangerous implications of the escalation of the nuclear arms race, it is no less preoccupied by the dangers posed by other non-nuclear arms, including chemical weapons. It is the position of my Government that development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction should also constitute one of the foremost priorities of international disarmament efforts. We were, therefore, encouraged to note with deep appreciation the progress achieved by the Conference on Disarmament during its last session in this particular field. There are now a number of concrete proposals before this Conference which could constitute the basis of a viable agreement on chemical weapons. No one will be more happy than Bangladesh to see the negotiations now going on in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on the basis of these and other proposals which interested parties might present lead to an early agreement.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, we sometimes hear statements to the effect that the negotiation of a chemical weapon convention is not moving ahead as we would like it to. I agree. But I disapproved of the conclusions usually drawn from statements like that, namely, that one or several delegations are to blame. The very existence of problems, be they political, military or technical, is an expression of relevant and serious concerns of one or more delegations. We must learn to respect the problems of our negotiating partners, all of them, and to address those problems in a serious manner.

During this session much useful work has been done in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It has been especially useful in the sense that positions and views on the subject matter have been more clearly crystallized, so that it is now easier to identify both the problems and concerns involved and the areas where a basis for agreements does exist.

Some of the problems in the Committee are not only technical in nature but have arisen because the negotiators do not have a full picture of how different aspects of the future convention will interrelate. There is a tendency to get stuck on a single aspect of an issue because it is closely related to another aspect of the same issue and neither of the aspects can be solved without the other. To take one example: we have difficulties when dealing with the question of what measures to take as regards CW production facilities, because we have not been able to agree on what constitutes such facilities. And we cannot agree on what constitutes such facilities partly because we have not agreed upon how to approach facilities producing the same chemicals in the civilian industrial context. In short, we cannot agree on the basic measures to be taken in one part of the Convention because we lack an overall view of the measures that will be prescribed in other parts of the Convention.

Another example: we have spent month after month, even years, on how definitions and criterias for identifying certain categories of chemicals should be arranged. This is not because the eminent chemists, whose participation we do benefit from, consider it a technically or chemically insurmountable problem, but because we know that the measures to be devised will relate to how the chemicals are classified. The crux of the matter is that we have no agreement on the measures to be taken since the chemicals concerned, although well defined, have not been organized in a way conducive for the application of measures. And we will continue to have difficulties in how to organize them for the purpose of the Convention since we have no common agreement on the measures to be applied.

In the Committee we have, as outlined in CD/539, Annex I, divided relevant chemicals into five basic categories: i.e. supertoxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals as well as key precursors and precursors. This has been very useful to our work and should be the foundation on which we must try to formulate some approaches to cope with the contradictions mentioned.

There is, however, a growing concern that all chemicals within one and the same category are not dealt with according to the same principles in every part of the Convention, and that even one and the same chemical might be subject to qualitatively different measures depending upon the purpose of its production. At the same time there is a concern that one and the same level of measure is applied to a whole category of chemicals, notwithstanding the diversity within

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

the category and the varieties of purposes for which these chemicals can be used. All attempts to apply the same set of measures to all relevant chemicals in each one of the five categories just mentioned has shown very clearly that such an approach is not politically and practically feasible. There is therefore a definite need to refine the concepts. The work in the Committee has demonstrated that this is a widely held view.

In addition, it is our impression that there is a broadly shared view that the way to cope with these difficulties is through a comprehensive approach, through which it would be possible to break out from the circular difficulties we have encountered in the Committee.

The main purpose of my speech today is to outline such a comprehensive approach for dealing with all the chemicals relevant to the Convention. In doing so my delegation is basing itself on what we consider to be joint concerns as well as generally shared views.

We are proposing a way to structure the substance involved, covering all the different aspects of the Convention from declarations, through elimination of chemical weapons and continued production, to verification of the various articles. The proposed structure draws upon principles on which we seem to agree and is founded on the basic structure and definitions as presented in CD/539, Annex I. The principles and solutions proposed could rather easily be transformed into texts for articles incorporated under the headlines of CD/539, Annex I.

The proposal in substance uses elements which, according to our understanding of the result of the work in the Ad Hoc Committee, represent a common approach, without being necessarily formally agreed upon.

Thus the proposal does not contain any new elements or alternatives to what appears to have a general support in the Committee. What could be looked upon as new is the way in which the generally acceptable elements are organized and registered. We would like to characterize the proposal as ideas for a structure of already accepted elements of substance. With this proposal we hope to make a contribution to the efforts to speed up the drafting of articles of the future convention.

The philosophy of the proposal is simple. We base ourselves on the definitions as they already appear in CD/539, Annex I. Following declarations, it is proposed that the supertoxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals, key precursors and precursors be arranged in three groups. To summarize, Group I contains mainly supertoxic lethal chemicals which could be used for chemical weapons and single-purpose key precursors. Group II contains the remaining supertoxic lethal chemicals and key precursors. Group III comprise other lethal and most of the other harmful chemicals and some precursors.

For each one of these three groups a régime for elimination, production and verification is devised. Régime I should be the most stringent and demanding one and shall apply to all Group I chemicals. Régime II should also be stringent but somewhat less burdensome and apply to all the Group II chemicals. Régime III would be least stringent of the three and apply to the Group III chemicals.

I would now like to elaborate a little on this approach.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

My delegation considers that with respect to Group I the following chemicals are relevant: all supertoxic lethal chemicals which are or could be used for chemical weapons. Group I also should include single purpose other lethal chemicals, if any, and some other harmful chemicals, for example glycollate incapacitants. Another category which should be among the Group I chemicals are all key precursors with no or little peaceful use including those which could be used as key components of multicomponent weapons, such as DF and QL.

In Group II, my delegation would put chemicals which according to their toxicity are supertoxic lethal chemicals but which are used only for peaceful purposes, mainly within the pharmaceutical industry. Heart glucosides and some carbamates are examples of such chemicals. There is always a risk that the development of these chemicals could lead to the development of new chemical weapons. Therefore, if a State Party has reason to believe that a chemical in this group is a potential chemical weapon it may propose that the Consultative Committee move it to Group I.

Group II should also include key precursors which have peaceful uses.

In Group III we would include other lethal chemicals which have widespread peaceful uses but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes. Furthermore Group III would encompass "other harmful chemicals", other than those in Group I, as well as some precursors with widespread peaceful uses which might also be used in the early stages of the production of chemical weapons.

Having thus outlined the groups of chemicals, the basic principles for three corresponding régimes should be drawn up.

Régime I should apply to all the Group I chemicals. It should be a very strict and demanding régime, since the Group I chemicals basically are the ones solely intended for chemical weapons.

As regards the question of elimination of stocks the rule of Régime I should be elimination through destruction. Exceptions to this rule should be very few and must be explicitly permitted. One such exception would be a provision in the Convention that Group I chemicals may be retained for protective purposes in aggregate quantities not exceeding one ton annually.

As regards continued production the rule should be: no such production. Here again, some limited and explicit exceptions could, however, be envisaged. I am thinking about production for protective purposes in which case the aggregate amounts produced and retained should not exceed one ton annually. All such production should take place in a single small scale facility. Production for other purposes could also be permitted on a laboratory scale, in very small quantities, measured in grams/year.

As regards capacity for production of Group I chemicals, the rule should be that such capacity should be declared and eliminated.

The verification measures applicable in Régime I should be the most stringent and include the permanent presence of international inspectors as regards the elimination processes and monitoring and systematic international on-site inspection of the production.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Finally, Régime I should naturally apply also to munitions and other devices.

Régime II should be designed for the Group II chemicals. Key precursors existing in stocks for chemical weapons purposes should be eliminated either through destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes. Since Group II contains chemicals with a certain potential for future development of new chemical weapons, the continued production could be limited to a certain quantity annually and should take place at a single small-scale facility or at other specially approved facilities.

Facilities having produced these chemicals should be declared if the production has exceeded a certain quantity. It should also be declared if the production will continue or new production is planned.

To ensure that these chemicals are not developed into new types of chemical weapons the verification régime would need to be stringent. Data reporting as well as systematic international on-site inspections are envisaged.

The elimination of the Group III chemicals in chemical-weapons stocks could be carried out through destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes. Continued production should be declared. Facilities having produced the Group III chemicals should also be declared if production has exceeded, let us say, one ton annually.

The verification measures applicable under Régime III would comprise data-reporting and systematic international on-site inspection.

This would be the broad outline of the principles and policies which my delegation believes could form the basis for common agreements. What I have just said has also been summarized in a rather simplified graph on a single piece of paper, which has been attached to my speech today, the text of which has been submitted to the secretariat for distribution. This graph could easily be further elaborated on. But before doing so my delegation would like to receive from other delegations the comments on and reactions to this approach.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic)

Mr. President, in my statement today, I would like to present a Working Paper, CD/620, which my delegation has prepared on measures to verify compliance with a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In recent years, we have repeatedly expressed our views and positions on that subject. My country is convinced that the combination of national verification measures and international procedures constitutes the basis on which the problems can be solved.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In the last few years, agreement has been reached to the effect that certain forms of international verification may be used with regard to various aspects of the CW convention. The formulation of measures concerning international inspections should be approached in a realistic and balanced manner, since security, national sovereignty, and commercial and financial issues are involved.

My delegation concurs with the opinion the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, put forward here on 14 February that the CW convention "should work to enhance the national security of all States, while at the same time it should not pose any impediments in the development of normal activities of the world's peaceful chemical industries". My country believes that it is in the first instance up to the States themselves to enforce on their national territories what they have undertaken internationally and to give other parties the assurance that those obligations are being complied with. The establishment of a national control system is, of course, the prerogative of the countries concerned. But this should not prevent us from making recommendations relating to such a system in connection with a chemical weapons convention.

National verification measures are of fundamental significance. In applying them, States would live up to the responsibility they have for the implementation of the Convention. What is more, those measures represent the basis on which the entire system of verification must be built.

International verification procedures can only be effectively developed in close connection with national procedures. The sovereign right of States to decide on internal measures for the implementation of the Convention is beyond all doubt. Likewise, it should be recognized that the exchange of information on the essentials of those measures will be indispensable, if confidence is to be created, which will be necessary to ensure co-operation among the parties to the Convention.

The purpose of the Working Paper is to stimulate the process of drafting provisions pertaining to two aspects of national verification, that is, guidelines for the establishment of a national verification authority and principles relative to the control of certain chemicals.

Part I contains proposals and possible international guidelines concerning the operation of a national authority. By setting up a special body or commissioning an existing one, the party in question would be in a position to meet its responsibility for the implementation of the Convention on its territory and for compliance with it. The national authority should have appropriate powers and co-operate with the international consultative committee, especially with regard to the exchange of data and support for international procedures. It may be set up as a single body. Its duties may also be performed by several separate bodies.

Part II sets out possible guidelines for a national system of accounting for and control of chemicals in connection with the Convention. An important aspect of the activities of the national authority is to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced.

The problem of non-production has recently acquired added topicality in view of the plans to produce a new generation of chemical weapons. The Convention must, therefore, provide for appropriate measures to guarantee that such weapons are not manufactured in a way circumventing the Convention. Clearly-phrased regulations concerning permitted activities in the Convention will have to satisfy that requirement.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The Working Paper does not claim to be complete. The suggestions made in it are to help make progress. Their purpose is to give guidance to States in the discharge of their obligations under the Convention. It stands to reason that, besides the functions outlined in this paper, other tasks, such as the monitoring of the destruction of CW stockpiles and facilities, may have to be specified in greater detail.

As the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its Working Groups proceed, my delegation will revert to the issues addressed in this statement and advance further ideas. Last year, our efforts produced certain results. However, my delegation is worried about the slow pace at which the negotiations are progressing and about the fact that the negotiating climate has suffered because one of the sides has seen fit to revive well-known insinuations, totally unfounded accusations and slander. But this is no way to resolve problems.

The decision to deploy binary weapons has compounded the serious difficulties. Let me repeat what my delegation has said on previous occasions: What we must achieve now is the prohibition of a new generation of chemical weapons. The resultant problems can only be solved through businesslike negotiations in a sound atmosphere. It is certainly not helpful to refuse to realize that now an extra effort is needed to prevent the future convention from being undermined.

At this juncture, Mr. President, permit me to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Turbanski, very warmly for using all his energy and diplomatic skills to ensure progress in the Committee's work.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Today the Soviet delegation wishes once again to deal with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We listened with interest today to the business-like statements containing concrete proposals by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic, Sweden and Japan concerning this issue, and needless to say we will study these proposals most attentively and seriously, as the Soviet delegation always does. But today I should like to deal with the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons in the broad sense. And I must do so chiefly in connection with some statements made comparatively recently in the Conference on Disarmament.

In the course of this session of the Conference on Disarmament the United States delegation has repeatedly invited everyone, including the Soviet delegation, to avoid polemics and engage in constructive dialogue. It did not, apparently, extend this appeal to itself, as almost every statement by the United States delegation this year, beginning with that of Mr. Adelman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has contained polemical elements, as well as direct attacks against the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and at times individual non-aligned States.

However, the statement by the United States delegation of 23 July, and Mr. Barthelemy's statement of 18 July, were especially arrogant. What are the hallmarks of these statements by the United States delegation? Above all, slander against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, distortion of the facts and demagoguery. To take, for example, even Ambassador Lowitz's latest statement, he thought it necessary, apparently for the purposes "of constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union", to repeat the slander about the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Did he adduce any facts at all? Of course not. He presented no facts and could produce no facts because they do not exist. Many other assertions by the United States delegation have the same unsubstantiated character.

If we turn to the facts, we are faced with a picture quite different from that which the United States delegation is seeking to portray.

The fact is that no other State in the world has used chemical weapons on such a massive scale as the United States of America. At one time it dispersed 40 million litres of different toxic agents over the territory of Viet Nam. Two million Vietnamese were the victims of this chemical warfare. Ten thousand inhabitants of Laos and Kampuchea have suffered for many years from various illnesses caused by toxic agents used by the United States Army in Indo-China. In Kampuchea alone, United States chemical weapons affected up to 85 per cent of the forests and killed more than 55 per cent of the animals.

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

I recall these facts in connection with Ambassador Lowitz's statement of 23 July when he said that "the United States has taken the lead in condemning chemical weapons use wherever it has occurred".

Today the United States has a vast arsenal of chemical weapons. It consists basically of 55,000 tons of nerve gas. It includes more than 3 million shells, 10,000 bombs, 100,000 mines, and many thousand-tons of toxic agents. In the United States Army depots on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany along there are 4 million litres of Sarin and VX nerve gases.

Furthermore, the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Congress recently decided to authorize spending on binary weapons. In its statement on 18 July the Soviet delegation explained in detail its views about the dangerous consequences these decisions might have, including the difficulties which might arise for negotiations on working out a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many delegations, including delegations from the western countries, expressed interest in our statement. In the course of various bilateral consultations and meetings with them we discussed these matters in a calm, business-like manner.

How did the United States delegation react to our statement? By its statement of 23 July, which can only be described as a polemical nervous outburst based on unsubstantiated allegations.

In particular, Ambassador Lowitz said the following: "If we can achieve a convention here promptly, the United States will build no binary chemical weapons. And in any event, the United States binary programme is not an obstacle to concluding our negotiations".

It is clear from this quotation that the United States side does not agree that the development of binary weapons will hinder the negotiations. In that case it might have been expected that the United States delegation would produce some kind of counter-argument to refute the argument we advanced. This did not occur, however. Ambassador Lowitz merely asserted that the United States intended to prohibit binary weapons under the convention to be elaborated, but did not react in any way to the dangers we pointed out, dangers that are very real, and based on a specific argument, i.e., the impact of binary weapons on the course of our negotiations.

Some general conclusions inevitably come to mind concerning the United States' approach to arms limitations measures and to negotiations to reach agreement on them. The United States adopts a programme to develop and deploy a new type of weapon and then sits down at the negotiating table allegedly to prohibit these new types of weapons; in the course of the negotiations it demands that we should agree to its conditions, and when this does not occur, because of the glaring unacceptability of the conditions proposed, states that it has not been possible to reach agreement and therefore, it says, it has no other course than to proceed to the deployment of this or that new type of weapon. We are thoroughly familiar with this method. It is what the United States calls "strong diplomacy in negotiations", and the new type of armaments is a means of exerting pressure on negotiating partners. We perceive this differently: judging by the results produced by such negotiations, they are held not to achieve agreements but to justify requests for new military appropriations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

However, let us return to the negotiations under way in this Conference on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. On 23 July Ambassador Lowitz said: "In our view, it would be better to work together to solve our remaining problems rather than trying to create new ones". I thoroughly agree with that view; but unfortunately, he is proposing one thing while doing another.

As a major indication of the United States' interest in concluding a convention the United States delegation referred in its statement of 23 July to the fact that in 1984 the United States side submitted a draft convention on the subject. The mere fact, however, of submitting a document of some kind does not mean that it furthers progress in the negotiations. Sometimes, in fact, the result is quite the reverse. This is exactly what happened as a result of the submission of the United States draft convention. Instead of searching for a way to bring positions closer together; the authors of this document submitted a so-called "new convention" which hardened even further the United States position on the verification issue, and thus, in other words, represented a departure by the United States side from its positions not in the direction of agreement but in quite the opposite direction.

One of the authors of the "new convention", United States Assistant Secretary of Defence Perle, according to reports in the United States press, obtained the inclusion in the draft convention of verification provisions which would inevitably stalemate the negotiations. He himself did not hide this. Mr. Perle publicly acknowledged that "we will not be able to reach agreement on this basis. They [the Russians] may turn out to be simply unready to go to that level of inspection".

We considered the United States' submission of the draft convention as intended to create new difficulties in the negotiations and to prevent further work in preparing the convention for which the prospects were favourable in 1984 as a result of efforts by many delegations and, in particular, of proposals advanced by the Soviet Union which went to meet the positions of our negotiating partners, including the western countries. Their positive nature was recognized by many delegations, including western delegations. The representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Norway and even the United States expressed satisfaction over our proposals on verification of stocks and of the elimination of chemical weapons. We had the right to expect that this satisfaction would lead to movement towards us from the other side, and that it would facilitate the search for agreement in other areas too. However, the response was a hardening of the United States' position.

It must be said that the United States achieved its goal. Actually, after the introduction of the United States draft here, an extremely complicated situation has developed in the negotiations.

On 23 July the United States delegation asserted that although the United States draft convention was not an ultimatum, the verification provisions it contained do have the character of an ultimatum. In essence the United States delegation has refused to discuss verification proposals which would be less rigid, less burdensome for States (in the American terminology, "less effective").

The decisions to develop binary weapons and the introduction of the United States draft convention last year follow the same pattern. The

(Mr. Issraelyan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

United States' entire line of policy on chemical weapons over the last fifteen years testifies to its desire not to allow such a prohibition. It may be recalled that when in 1969 the socialist States proposed the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the United States categorically rejected the conclusion of such a convention with regard to chemical weapons.

In 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States reached agreement to launch a joint initiative and as a first step to prohibit more dangerous, lethal forms of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union concurred in this agreement out of a desire to overcome the deadlock in the solution of the problem of chemical weapons. For two years the United States delayed the start of the negotiations in which this initiative could have been worked out. Finally, in August 1976 the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons began in Geneva. In the course of 12 rounds of talks, which continued until 1980, considerable progress was made on the basic provisions of the future convention. The USSR and the United States delegations twice submitted information to the Committee on Disarmament on the results of the bilateral negotiations, in 1979 and in 1980. This information was welcomed with great satisfaction in the Committee. Nevertheless, in 1980 these negotiations were broken off by the United States and the Reagan Administration has refused to resume them. Thus the considerable efforts undertaken over four years were erased.

The United States has stubbornly opposed the start of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament aimed at working out a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. In 1980 it agreed to the setting up of a working group on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament, but managed to weaken its mandate in such a way that it did not provide for holding negotiations. Only in 1984 was it possible to reach agreement on such a mandate, which directly and fully provides for holding negotiations in order to work out the text of a convention. This was done in defiance of the United States, as a result of the wish of the overwhelming majority of other States to agree as rapidly as possible on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. And now, obliged to take part in these negotiations, the United States is deliberately hindering and complicating them and making it difficult to reach agreement.

The attempts by the United States delegation to shift the blame for the stalemate in the negotiations away from themselves and onto others by all sorts of references to the Soviet delegation's "silence" and its unwillingness to comment on the United States proposals and other fantasies do not withstand criticism. It is high time the United States side understood that so long as it does not display genuine, rather than ostensible, flexibility in the negotiations, the chances of their being successful are extremely small.

These are the real facts of the matter, and I should like to draw your attention to them, Mr. President. These facts constitute the genuine picture of the state of affairs as regards a chemical-weapon ban, and not the unsubstantiated allegations manipulated by the representative of the United States on 23 July.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Another particularly important aspect of our Conference's work concerns chemical weapons and the ongoing negotiations on this issue, and it is to this subject that I wish to address the remainder of my statement.

Coincidences in the time-table, and the very useful discussions currently being held in Working Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, most ably chaired by Mrs. Bonnier, to whom I would like to pay tribute, have led me to submit to you today a Working Paper on the destruction of stocks and elimination of the chemical weapon production facilities.

Hitherto, our delegations have devoted entirely justified attention to the problems of prohibition of use and of defining the agents whose manufacture should be controlled or forbidden.

Substantial contributions have also been made on the problem of the destruction of stocks under international control, an area in which, in my view, the elements of a verifiable solution are beginning to emerge.

Hence it seems to us that at this stage our Conference should in future address itself in a more detailed and specific way to an absolutely essential aspect of the convention which our Conference has the task of preparing: the destruction of existing stocks and the elimination of the production facilities which would make it possible to build up new stocks.

The approach in the document submitted today closely links these two elements: what good would it do to destroy existing chemical weapons, if the means of manufacturing new ones were left untouched? The approach is based on a fundamental concept in drawing up a time-table for destruction, that of the balance of security for all States, gradually achieved as the dual process of elimination is carried out. First, it has now been recognized, at this stage in the negotiations, that a residual retaliatory capability shall be determined in advance by agreement among the parties, until the last phase of destruction, that is, the eighth year. Secondly, clearly the purpose of this decision is not to maintain during the first eight years the supremacy of one or more parties over the others. On the contrary, it is desirable, the better to ensure the safety of all, both those who possess such weapons and those who do not, to bring gradually down to parity the arsenals of those possessing chemical weapons.

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

Today everyone concedes that the elimination period, a period set by common agreement at 10 years, will raise the most difficult problems, particularly in matters of security.

Unless they are taken into account, the initial imbalances may well be maintained, or indeed increase dangerously, either quantitatively or qualitatively, over this period, and thus at some stage in the process give an unacceptable military advantage to one of the parties.

It is easy to see that a progressive, linear elimination, if that is the method chosen, is likely to lead to a danger of this sort because this type of elimination favours the strong and weakens the weak, who would lose more quickly a militarily significant retaliatory capability.

This is naturally true for equal amounts and identical toxic qualities. But the truth is naturally more complex, and a simple example will illustrate my point.

Obviously, a State whose stocks include 100,000 tons of phosgene -- bought on the world market, since hundreds of thousands of tons of this agent are manufactured every year in the world -- does not have the same chemical warfare capacity as a country which holds 100,000 tons of nerve gas which it manufactures itself. A decision to eliminate these two stockpiles according to an identical linear procedure over a period of 10 years fails to provide the desired solution -- one which would progressively lead to a balance of capacity,

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

guaranteeing general security. It would also be necessary to be able to control in the same fashion both the world market and national production facilities. But first and foremost, when it is known that phosgene is 32 times less toxic than a nerve agent, should it be considered that a country which has 100,000 tons of the latter is 32 times more powerful than one which possesses 100,000 tons of phosgene? Should it be considered that, in order to achieve a balance, at some point in the linear process the nerve agents should be destroyed 32 times faster than the phosgene?

Unfortunately, neither science nor common sense can provide an answer to these two questions. This example, which already leads us to raise almost insoluble questions, nevertheless refers to simplified data compared with reality. It is therefore easy to imagine the difficulty of succeeding in the exercise to which we are addressing ourselves.

Lastly, in order to achieve an acceptable result, we have selected the following three priorities: first, the need to co-ordinate the time-tables for the destruction or conversion of stocks and production plants, by agreement among the possessor countries, and in agreement with the others; secondly, the need to reduce quantitative and qualitative disparities so as to achieve a certain parity by the end of the eighth year, thus ruling out linear elimination; and thirdly, the need to pay due regard to the requirements of control which must not, according to the arrangements selected for elimination, run up against insurmountable difficulties.

Having described the way in which we have set the different problems, I should like to sketch the outlines of the solutions that we would propose to you for adoption.

First, we have worked out the very precise time-table, divided into sub-periods, each with their rules, which favours progress towards a balance of security. Secondly, this time-table combines, from the starting point at which the destruction of stocks and the halt of production are simultaneously initiated, the progressive elimination of the stocks and of the capacity to replace them. Thirdly, we have abandoned the idea of comparing the various categories of toxic agents, owing to the difficulty of finding unquestionable equivalents both at the scientific and at the military level. Accordingly we have decided to compare only identical stocks, phosgene with phosgene, nerve gas with nerve gas. Fourthly for these same reasons, we have reversed the order of priority proposed, in another context, in the French document CD/494. Today we are proposing giving priority to the destruction, not of supertoxic chemicals, but of other lethal chemicals that are comparable with each other.

We hold the view in fact that these agents cannot be effectively controlled if they exist simultaneously in arsenals and on the market where they continue to be offered in large quantities for civilian purposes. The temptation would be very great to slip unverifiable quantities of the agents from the arsenals on to the market, and still more in the other direction. On the other hand, when these agents are banned from arsenals, diversion will be more difficult and easier to detect.

Let us add to these arguments the fact that if we begin by destroying the supertoxic agents, the possession of other chemical warfare agents, lethal toxic

(Mr. Jessel, France)

agents, would be more valuable in that they would be the only ones available. All these reasons have led us to reverse the order of our priorities. Fifthly, we would round off the process of elimination by destroying the supertoxic agents, the most dangerous agents without doubt but also the easiest to control.

At the end of this progress towards the balance of security, that is to say in the eighth year, an identical capacity for reprisal by chemical weapons, composed of a limited and equal quantity of similar products, i.e. nerve agents, will be established and authorized for the two largest Powers as well as, at a lower level, for other States possessing them.

This residual capacity can then be destroyed in a progressive, linear fashion over the last two years, since the starting point will now be absolutely the same, as regards both quantity and quality.

For ease of reference, the various necessary adjustments in terms of the time-table, the elimination procedure and the order of destruction are set out in a synoptic table at the end of our document.

The thinking which has led us to draw up this document has naturally been assisted by the very useful contributions of several delegations, particularly that of the Chinese delegation which submitted to the Conference the very interesting document CD/605. We have noted that our Chinese colleagues, while adopting a different approach from ours, since they superimpose on the phased destruction of stocks the criteria of "stockpiled equivalent", are prompted by the same basic concept, which is a balance of security.

My delegation, which hopes to contribute by the document introduced today to progress in the drafting of a convention, will naturally study with the closest attention the comments and observations which we trust the text will elicit from other delegations.

Mr. ELBE (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to speak today on the agenda item of chemical weapons. I should like to introduce a Working Paper that deals with the verification of the non-production of chemical warfare agents by means of inspections in the civilian chemical industry. The Paper is now before you and bears the symbol CD/627.

It has been a longstanding tradition of my delegation to focus its interest upon the question of verifying a future chemical weapons convention.

We note that important progress has been achieved in particular in the field of verification of the elimination of existing arsenals of chemical weapons. My delegation has frequently stated that the destruction of stocks requires primary attention since the actual threat for mankind emanates from the existing chemical warfare capabilities.

The technical possibilities, however, of producing chemical weapons anew relatively easily present an equally dangerous threat that requires effective control of the industrial sector.

My delegation has therefore paid at an early stage of our negotiations serious attention to the solution of the problem of verifying non-production of chemical weapons. The chemical industry plays a key role in the industrial performance of the Federal Republic of Germany. We are one of the most important partners in the trade in chemical products. We therefore consider it as our duty to the Conference to make our experience and knowledge available to others.

Today we attempt to introduce another contribution to the problem of verification of non-production which logically builds on previous papers.

I should like to recall our very early conceptual contributions as contained in CD/WP.265, CD/WP.326 and CD/WP.439. My delegation was the first to introduce the idea that on-site inspections should be carried out on a random basis by casting lots. This idea has been meanwhile generally accepted in the Conference.

It goes without saying that a future convention on banning chemical weapons must include a régime that submits the chemical industry to international

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

controls in order to prevent the fundamental prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons being circumvented. On the other hand, the future convention must be implemented in such a manner that is designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological activities of States parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, including the international exchange of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of toxic chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of a future CW convention.

Obviously these two conflicting principles -- namely, an effective ban on chemical weapons and the unencumbered functioning of the chemical industry and trade -- require solutions that maintain a fine balance between them. There should be on the one hand a sufficiently stringent system of international monitoring of the relevant sectors of the chemical industry that creates the necessary confidence that no chemical weapons are produced. On the other hand, such a monitoring system should avoid unnecessary intrusiveness.

My delegation believes that its present Working Paper contributes to finding a solution that keeps the afore-mentioned conflicting principles adequately balanced.

We feel all the more encouraged to undertake a new search for such an equilibrium point because my country possesses some practical experience in this field. In 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany declared in an internationally binding form that it will not produce chemical weapons and ever since its chemical industry has been subject to international controls carried out by the Western European Union.

Under a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, the branches of the civilian chemical industry relevant to the verification of non-production would be subject to systematic international inspections.

In our view such inspections would apply in the industrial sector both to producers, manufacturing industries, and end-users.

Working Paper CD/627 surveys the range of substances involved and the scope of surveillance and outlines the industrial sector that would have to be covered.

The choice of substances for non-production inspections may cover products usable exclusively for chemical warfare (single-purpose agents), characteristic key precursors for their production, and substances that are both of military and civilian significance (dual-purpose agents).

As to the criteria for the selection of such substances, we deem it necessary that a future convention should contain a definition of the terms "key precursor".

In the opinion of the Federal Republic of Germany the precursors in the final technical reaction stage of the production of supertoxic lethal weapons which are characteristic for the toxicity of the end-product should be defined as key precursors. This definition is already contained in Working Paper CD/439 on the transfer problem submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984.

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

Notwithstanding this general rule, other precursors could be treated as key precursors if, within the meaning of the convention, they constitute a risk and if the competent body under the convention reaches agreement on this point. The designated key precursors would be listed and annexed to the convention.

We consider the combination of a definition of key precursors -- based on objective criteria -- and the application of the exception-from-the-rule principle to be a reasonable instrument providing sufficient flexibility for the purposes of the convention.

As far as supertoxic lethal chemicals and their precursors for which there is no civilian use are concerned, an explicit ban would appear to suggest itself. Such a ban should be included explicitly in a list and ought to cover any quantities in excess of a production of one metric ton per annum.

It goes without saying that key precursors for multi-component weapons for which there is no permitted use would equally have to be included in the list of banned substances. I am saying this with such explicit clarity because one delegation recently expressed the view in this forum that there were some delegations "seeking to brush aside the problem of binary weapons". My delegation, however, was unable to identify any such delegation in our midst.

As for the scope of inspections, my delegation holds the view that the intensity of inspection procedures must be such as to ensure to an adequate degree of certainty that compliance with the contractual undertaking not to produce chemical weapons is systematically and internationally verifiable.

Inspections of key precursors should be conducted on the basis of annual statistical data and on-site inspections if the total annual quantity produced exceeds one metric ton.

To ensure that the manufacturers of the key precursors in question receive equal treatment, on-site inspections should be carried out on a random basis. Companies should be determined by lot, with a competent body under the convention fixing every year the percentage of all firms to be subjected to inspections. The inspection, consisting of statistical data, the review of plant records, interviews, viewing of facility areas, as well as sampling and analysis, must ensure reliable verification of the non-production of chemical weapons.

We are quite certain that an effective monitoring régime can be established without violating the legitimate interests of the chemical industry and without disclosure of secret technological and industrial information.

My delegation expresses the hope that the present Working Paper CD/627 will contribute to facilitating the ongoing negotiations on the elaboration of an adequate system of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma)

With regard to the subject of chemical weapons, the only item on which negotiations can be said to be in an advanced stage and on which considerable strides have been made in previous years, work this year has not seen any break-through, but momentum has been maintained through the drafting of the elements of a treaty text through the efforts and able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, and we hope that this will stimulate progress in finding compromises on outstanding key issues which are essential for the realization of a treaty.

Therefore, we strongly support efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, to find a formula on continued work on which we can all agree. We on our part agree with informal consultations, conducted

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

I shall now say a few words on chemical weapons. If I had spoken some weeks ago, my comments on the work done so far on chemical weapons would not have been very favourable. Indeed, in spite of various admirable efforts of a number of delegations in their search for solutions to specific problems that block the road to a convention, at that time the balance of the 1985 sessions was rather meagre.

But in these last weeks we fortunately witnessed limited, and as we noted in the Ad Hoc Committee yesterday, fragile, progress. We register some positive results recently achieved in the three Working Groups of the Ad Hoc Committee. On specific points such as the toxicity criterion and the denomination of binary weapons as a separate category, delegations seem to be finding a way out. We earnestly hope that these signs of greater flexibility will prove to be only the beginning of more substantive and broader progress.

We also hope that more justice will be rendered to the pile of very substantial documents produced by delegations. We feel that still too often certain delegations prefer to remain in the shadow of reticence or non-committal remarks, instead of clearly expressing views on the laborious products undertaken by others. We are convinced that it is only through such painstaking efforts that the political will of governments can be expressed.

This brings me to the question of how to proceed with our work after the closure of this session at the end of the month. We believe that in some areas the progress made is such that incentives for future work have been offered where at first there seemed no movement at all. At any rate, the concluding documents of the three Working Groups provide us with a basis on which we can seek fresh instructions. There is evidence of progress and therefore every reason to consider how our intersessional work could be organized.

Let me assure you that my delegation by no means wishes to indulge in hazy illusions about the chances of early, substantive progress. But we do believe that work between the end of this month and February next year could prove to be fruitful. Apart from that, we are somewhat puzzled by the argument of those who on the one hand observe that the main contending parties -- Washington and Moscow -- do not move and on the other hand do not wish to permit those same delegations to make more headway in the Conference on Disarmament in the intersessional period.

Therefore, we strongly support efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, to find a formula on continued work on which we can all agree. We on our part could agree with informal consultations, conducted

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(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

by Ambassador Turbanski, to be held here in Geneva towards the end of September and in October, in which those willing could participate. We appreciate that the consultations would focus on two or three themes. We think that "permitted activities" and "declarations of stocks" would be appropriate subjects for consideration. We hope the Chairman will explore whether the major issue of compliance and verification could not also be usefully discussed on this occasion. The results of those consultations could then be discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee in January next year, in a period of about two weeks prior to the opening of our session.

In addition, we hope that we can agree now that at the 1986 session a timely decision will be taken on how we shall continue the process of negotiations on the convention after the closure of the 1986 session. Such a timely decision would also permit smaller delegations, for whom intersessional work in the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups represents an extraordinary effort, time to take the required measures for regular work in the autumn of 1986. Let me add that we remain convinced that, if there is work to be done, sufficient time should be made available in the autumn of 1986.

In concluding on the subject of chemical weapons, I wish to express my Governments interest in the issue of verification of the prohibition of production of chemical weapons and its practical implications for the civilian chemical industry. We noted that the assessment of those implications for the chemical industry may differ from country to country. But we presume there certainly are common elements to be taken into account.

In the light thereof, the Netherlands authorities intend to organize a workshop in the Netherlands on the subject of verification of the prohibition of production, in which also representatives of the Netherlands chemical industry would be associated. The intended workshop would take place in early June, immediately preceding the summer part of the session in 1986. We very much hope that delegations, some of whom may not be that familiar with the intricacies of the chemical industry, will be prepared to come to my country in order to deepen their insight into the practical problems arising from the implementation of our future convention. In due course, we shall present you with an outline of the programme for this workshop, at which stage we shall certainly be grateful for any comments that you might wish to make.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

My delegation, together with a large number of other delegations, has been constantly calling on the Conference to start drafting a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We proceeded from the presumption that while differences in the approach towards some aspects of the future convention persisted common texts on less controversial parts could be helpful. But it was impossible to elaborate such texts in the past. Finally, this year, the Ad Hoc Committee on chemical weapons, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, made a first step in this direction. Reports of the three working groups, though with some brackets and footnotes, represent a sort of common, integral text, which more clearly than the previous texts reflect the achieved level of consensus. Let me therefore congratulate Ambassador Turbanski on this positive result of his Committee. Naturally, our thanks go to all the three chairmen of the Committee's working groups -- Comrade Poptchev, Mrs. Bonnier and Mr. Elbe, for their tireless effort.

The outcome of this year's work on chemical weapons is even more encouraging if one takes into account that the recent political decisions concerning chemical weapons did not improve conditions for such negotiations; quite the contrary. By adopting a decision to produce binary chemical weapons the United States made a first step on the way which may lead to substantially complicating negotiations on chemical weapons, if not undermining them completely. As if realizing this threatening development, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons worked more effectively, directed its attention to substantive problems and was practically free of interminable squabbles over procedural questions, which in the past took up much of its time.

As we supposed, work on the texts brought about new interesting ideas which undoubtedly have the potential to ease the movement forward on some aspects. Thus, in Working Group A, a notion of a key component of binary chemical systems of chemical warfare was introduced and met with a basically positive response. The use of this notion enables us to label in a clear way basic components of binary and multicomponent chemical weapons. We proceed from the obvious fact that a key precursor is not a chemical weapon, whereas a key component can practically be considered such a weapon. For this reason a key component should be defined and considered differently from a precursor. We welcome the fact that the notion of key component has already been accepted as one of the instruments for the solution of the problem of the CW definitions and we believe that, though for the time being it is treated by some delegations through brackets, it should be further considered once the Ad Hoc Committee resumes its work.

While we assess positively this year's results of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we fully realize that we are still far from having achieved decisive progress in the elaboration of the convention. It is important that we do not lose the momentum gained this year. For this to be preserved, the co-operation of all is needed. Those who still consider starting a new round in the chemical arms race should realize that their plans are contrary to the willingness and readiness of the whole international community to get rid of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

On 25 July I made a statement in this forum on the negotiations of a chemical weapons convention and on the difficulties in devising measures to be applied to the different chemicals involved. Today, I have asked for the floor to introduce a working paper containing the ideas presented in the statement of 25 July.

For the purpose of the Convention, the relevant chemicals have in CD/539 been divided into five categories, i.e. super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals, key precursors including key components for binary and multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons, and precursors. This has proved to be a very useful categorization. However, attempts to apply one and the same set of measures to all relevant chemicals in each one of the five categories have failed.

There is now a growing recognition that the diversity within a category and the different purposes for which these chemicals are produced need to be taken into account when elaborating the measures to be applied, in order not to hamper the development of the peaceful chemical industry, while at the same time ensuring that chemicals are not produced for chemical-weapons purposes. There is also concern that one and the same chemical might be subject to qualitatively different measures depending on the purpose of its production and that this might create "loopholes" in the Convention. The time has therefore come to refine the concepts somewhat and to look for alternative ways of structuring the relationship between the categories of chemicals and the measures to be applied to them.

In the statement in July, my delegation suggested a comprehensive approach for dealing with all the chemicals relevant to the Convention. This alternative approach allows for bringing together chemicals from different categories under one and the same régime, as well as for applying different régimes to different chemicals within one and the same category. This could be achieved through a regrouping of the chemicals without in any way changing the definitions and the five categories already agreed upon.

Such a regrouping also opens the way for a comprehensive way of dealing with the chemicals, so that one and the same chemical would be subject to the same régime in all parts of the Convention (i.e., as regard declarations, elimination, permitted production and verification). The philosophy of the approach is simple. Based on existing definitions, the chemicals are arranged in three groups. For each group a régime for the declarations, elimination, production and verification is devised. Régime I is the most stringent and demanding one and applies to all Group I chemicals. Régime II is also stringent but somewhat less burdensome and applies to all the Group II chemicals. Régime III is the least stringent of the three and applies to the Group III chemicals.

A number of delegations have been in contact with my delegation to express their interest in and to discuss various aspects of this approach. In order to facilitate further study by delegations of the issues involved and to assist in the search for a possible solution of the problems encountered in the Committee, my delegation is today tabling a working paper, CD/632, outlining the suggested comprehensive approach. It is my hope that it will prove useful for the negotiations.

(Mr. Schori, Sweden)

The Conference on Disarmament has taken important steps to ban chemical weapons. These efforts must be sustained and accelerated. A successful outcome of the chemical-weapons negotiations would provide us with a complete and verifiable disarmament treaty. It would be the first of its kind. A Chemical Weapons Convention would thus transcend into a demonstration that it is possible to eradicate a whole category of existing weapons and to ban all future such weapons. It will also demonstrate that the even more important task of banning all nuclear weapons through verifiable agreement could be legally and technically possible.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Regarding the negotiations on chemical weapons, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, the distinguished Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, is to be congratulated for the Committee's report. My delegation notes with pleasure that this report contains a comprehensive text that will serve as the basis for future work on the Chemical Weapons Convention. We believe it is a document that, to a higher degree than in the past, reflects the current state of the negotiations. Where there is agreement, the text to a great extent reflects it; where agreement is lacking, that, too, is made clear.

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The patient efforts of the Chairmen of the Working Groups -- Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria, Mrs. Bonnier of Sweden, and Mr. Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany -- are also to be commended.

In my statement on 23 July, I registered my delegation's disappointment that the amount of progress had not been satisfactory in the chemical weapons negotiations. During the past four weeks, we have seen some new movement and have noted some additional progress. On balance, we continue to believe the negotiations are moving far too slowly. Unfortunately, the continuing spread and use of chemical weapons has not yet imparted a greater sense of urgency to our work. My delegation is fully committed to making every effort to conclude our negotiations for an effective, verifiable chemical weapons ban at the earliest possible moment, and urges all other delegations to join us in this task.

There is no question that a Chemical Weapons Convention must encompass all chemical weapons, including binary weapons. As I said in my statement on 23 July, the clear preference of the American people is to ban rather than to build chemical weapons and my delegation has sought to ensure that appropriate régimes are devised to accomplish that goal. In article VI of the new draft text established in the Committee's report, both the United States and the Soviet Union have taken a step toward the development of the régimes that will effectively deal with all classes of toxic chemicals. We note that both the United States and the Soviet Union have now agreed to ban the production in civilian industry of chemicals in the category that can be used as supertoxic lethal chemical weapons or key precursors of binary weapons. We should now expand our efforts to find mutually acceptable ways to identify which chemicals would fall under the various régimes envisioned.

While substantial areas of disagreement remain, we hope that further intensive work in the area of permitted activities during the intersessional period will yield rapid and positive results in both clarifying and resolving differences.

We also note the progress made, Mr. President, on the subject of declarations of chemical weapons and on outlining the form of a future agreement on production facilities. However, the Committee has not yet agreed on the timing of the declaration of stockpile locations, nor has it yet developed a régime that would permit diversion to peaceful purposes under effective verification.

In order to move the negotiations along in the area of elimination of production facilities, my delegation has introduced at the working level an approach that may help us past the current impasse over definitions. We hope that this approach, which provides for the sequential examination of different types of facilities, will be a useful way to move ahead in an area that has been deadlocked too long.

Another key area, clearly, is that of challenge inspection. The need for mandatory, short-notice challenge-inspection provisions to complement the routine verification provisions of the convention is basic. Again, as my delegation has made clear in the past, it is a question of the level of verification required to satisfy security concerns, not specific language, that is important. I hope that next year our work will be furthered through the development of a mutually acceptable framework as a basis for coming to terms with the requirements in this area.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

On the whole, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the banning of chemical weapons may also be deemed positive. It can safely be said that the negotiations on this issue have this year entered upon a qualitatively new phase. Academic discussions and abstract deliberations have given way to the substantive fixing and formulation, if only in the most preliminary way, of individual provisions of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Hardly anyone would dispute the fact that the decision by the United States administration to commence the production of binary chemical weapons harmed the negotiations. The Conference would undoubtedly have achieved more tangible results in its work on a draft convention. All the prerequisites for that were present. This was, however, frustrated by a sharp change in the position of one delegation towards the end of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the banning of chemical weapons. We have already encountered more than once in the past a situation in which a State that spares no effort in proclaiming itself willing to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and its own draft convention on the matter has undermined the talks at the very moment when some measure of progress begins to emerge in the Conference. Such was the case in 1984. The same story repeated itself in 1985, and, indeed, in the very closing days of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Tribute is due to distinguished Ambassador Turbanski, who selflessly strove for positive results in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which he headed.

The Soviet delegation is ready to do everything in its power to further the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the forthcoming consultations in the autumn and at the Ad Hoc Committee's extended session in January 1986. It goes without saying that much will depend on the position taken by our partners in the negotiations.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Speaking now in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to submit today to the Conference the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, contained in document CD/636, which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee, on 19 August. Let me at the outset briefly recall the basis and the scope of the Ad Hoc Committee's activities and, subsequently, characterize the main results of the negotiations.

In accordance with its mandate adopted by the Conference on 7 February 1985, and in pursuance of its work programme contained in the Chairman's paper CD/CW/WP.98, the Ad Hoc Committee established three Working Groups with the following scope of reference:

Working Group A, under the chairmanship of Mr. Petar Poptchev of Bulgaria, considering problems under articles II and IV of the future Convention, that is, scope, definitions, non-production, and permitted activities;

Working Group B, chaired by Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier of Sweden, concentrating on articles III, IV and V, that is, on the elimination of stocks and production facilities;

Working Group C, having as its Chairman Mr. Frank Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany and focusing its attention on articles VII, VIII and IX, that is, on questions of compliance.

Additionally, the question of prohibition of use of chemical weapons and its relation to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the problem of herbicides were considered at the Open-ended Consultations under the chairmanship of Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.

The results obtained by the Working Groups and at the Open-ended Consultations are reflected in the Working Groups' reports and in the report of the Chairman of the Open-ended Consultations. They were adopted without any changes therein by the Ad Hoc Committee on 12 August 1985. These reports are contained in Appendix II of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Appendix I of the report contains the cumulative texts elaborated in the Working Groups and during the Open-ended Consultations, as assembled by the Chairman and, before being adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee, commented upon, explained, and interpreted by the delegations. The clarity of the text of Appendix I is in my view not seriously diminished by a relatively small number of brackets and footnotes, which we were unable to avoid but which duly reflect the differences of opinions and positions of States and may serve, on some occasions, as a guideline for further deliberations.

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Appendix I thus constitutes the preliminary formulations of provisions of the future Convention and aptly illustrates the present state of the process of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Since articles X, XI, XIII, XV and XVI of the preliminary structure of the future Convention were not considered during the 1985 session of the Ad Hoc Committee, no texts appear in Appendix I under the general titles of these articles.

I am convinced that Appendix I, as well as Appendix II and other existing and future documents of the Conference, will, as recommended in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, be a useful basis for further negotiations and for the preparation of the Convention.

In pursuance of the recommendation of the Conference to continue the process of negotiation on the Convention after the closure of the 1985 session, in order to ensure that the time available in the period between September 1985 and January 1986 is more fully utilized for negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends that it should be convened at a resumed session to be held from 13 to 31 January 1986. This session would be devoted to the specific issues under articles IV and VI, including the relevant parts of article II, and under article IX. Moreover, the resumed session would be preceded by informal preparatory consultations which I intend to hold in Geneva from 30 September to 19 October 1985. I am also ready to carry out such consultations, if possible, in New York within the period of work of the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee, as well as again in Geneva during the week immediately before the January session of the Ad Hoc Committee. All these possibilities will, hopefully, enable delegations to take part in the preparation of the resumed session.

The Ad Hoc Committee also recommends that it be re-established before the end of the second week of the 1986 session with its 1985 mandate and that Ambassador R.I.T. Cromartie of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland be appointed as its Chairman. I offer my sincere congratulations on his designation.

I do not intend to embark on a complete and thorough analysis of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1985. The work is adequately reflected in the report and each delegation will on its own analyse the texts therein. For my part, I would like to make only a few points. The preliminary formulations of the provisions of the future Convention contain an attempt at a more precise definition of the term "chemical weapons". Moreover, the provisions on declarations of chemical weapons' stocks were further developed. Very useful examples of tabulations associated with these declarations were elaborated. Progress was made on the matter of the preparation and presentation of plans for the elimination of chemical weapons, as well as on the question of the actual elimination of their stocks. The considerations on the production facilities were also carried out with, however, somewhat more modest results as regards the preliminary formulations arrived at. It may be stated that the provisions concerning the national implementation measures and the Consultative Committee were also expanded and improved. It was also possible to arrive at a formulation of a ban on use of chemical weapons, as well as of provisions contained in the Preamble and in articles XII and XIV.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

In my opinion, the results of the 1985 session of the Ad Hoc Committee visibly reach further than expected by some of us who, during the Conference's debate, expressed on some occasions pessimism as to the proceedings of the Committee. These results are, on the other hand, less than we all would hope and wish them to be. The evaluation of the relation between the expected and the achieved is always subjective and depends on several external factors, and first of all on the general international climate, and is mutually interconnected with them. The CW Convention is not being worked out as a separate, self-contained measure, but is itself an element of a wider political setting. Taken in this light, I would assess the results of the 1985 session as a step forward towards the future CW Convention. The process of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons is slow and arduous, but it progresses systematically and distinguishably.

Even these modest results the Ad Hoc Committee reports today to the Conference would not be possible without a large measure of hard work, good will, and co-operation on the part of the delegations participating in the negotiations. I want to express my appreciation of their attitude and of their constant moral and working support. I wish also to thank all those delegations which enriched the deliberations of the Committee by presenting various working documents and forwarding relevant proposals. All of them represent a valuable input and manifest a desire to look for the effective solutions which may permit an early conclusion of the CW Convention.

Closing now, Mr. President, permit me to thank all the individual delegates and experts for their active participation in the work of subsidiary organs of the Committee and especially the Chairmen of the Working Groups and the Chairmen of the Open-ended Consultations: Mr. Poptchev, Mrs. Bonnier, Mr. Elbe, and Mr. Wisnoemoerti. Without their devotion and stamina, without their initiative, the Ad Hoc Committee could not have achieved what it did.

Last but not least, Mr. President, the Ad Hoc Committee and I personally are indebted to the secretariat of the Committee, that is, to Mr. Bensmail and his collaborators. They were tireless, devoted and always able to come up with advice. On behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, I also want to express our appreciation of the competent, highly professional work of the interpreters.

This concludes the introduction of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its 1985 session.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

This brings me, finally, to the two fields in which I feel that we can speak of positive results — limited results, I admit, but very real ones.

This applies first of all to the negotiations on chemical weapons. I am not alone in holding this view. On the contrary, I am pleased to note that it has already been expressed around this table by several of my colleagues; I note, too, that in his statement just now the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union judged the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to have been positive. The credit for these results must undoubtedly be shared by all the delegations. But we must also pay tribute, and, it is a pleasure for me to do so, to the tireless efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski, not forgetting to thank the Chairman of the Working Groups, Mr. Poptchev, Mrs. Bonnier and Mr. Frank Elbe, and the Chairman of the Open-ended Consultations, Mr. Wisnoemoerti. Of course, our labours are not at end: the intensive discussions that have taken place during the six months of the current session have shown the extent of the differences of opinion concerning binary weapons on the one hand and herbicides on the other. We have expressed our own opinions on this subject, and I will not revert to them at this stage. The exchanges of views at this session have also produced positive results, particularly in regard to the prohibition of the use and the elimination of stockpiles and the neutralization of the means of production. These are questions to which my authorities have given particular attention and concerning the second of which they have consequently submitted a document which appears under the symbol CD/630. Other questions too, remain outstanding and have not been settled. However, to conclude this chapter on a positive note, permit me to say how gratified we are to see that we are all agreed that the Committee should resume its work next January and that, in the meantime, its current Chairman should continue his consultations: the importance of the negotiations is, indeed, such that we should devote as much time to them as possible and international public opinion should be made aware of the multilateral efforts that are being made in their regard by the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Our determination to prohibit chemical weapons once and for all was demonstrated by our concrete contribution to the activities of the Conference. We welcome the progress the Committee made this year under the chairmanship and able guidance of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland. Thanks to his great personal devotion and professional skills the negotiating process reached a new stage. This is reflected in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Conference. We congratulate Ambassador Turbanski wholeheartedly on these positive achievements.

CD/PV.334

10

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China)

During the spring part of the session, people were rather optimistic about the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, cherishing the hope that substantial progress would be achieved on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol. Unfortunately, polemics and mutual charges on the issue of binary weapons during the summer part of the session cast dark shadows over the Conference. In spite of the tireless efforts made by Ambassador Turbanski, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and the co-ordinators, as well as the various proposals put forward by the Chinese and many other delegations, little progress was achieved. On such vital issues as definition and verification, differences of opinion could hardly be ironed out. We appreciate Ambassador Turbanski's readiness to carry on consultations after the end of the current session. We shall be happy to exchange views with him during the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly, if possible.

CD/PV.334

12

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I suggest that we now take up for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/636. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

CD/PV.334

12

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): In connection with the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/636 I wish to make a statement on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries concerning the recommendation for next year's chairmanship of that Committee.

The socialist countries proceed from the position that the chairmanship of that subsidiary body should rotate as this is the case with other committees of the Conference on Disarmament. According to a gentleman's agreement the principle of rotation, an already established practice, applies to all subsidiary bodies of the Conference with only one exception, to which we all agreed.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In Working Paper CD/WP.100/Rev.1 on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference which was elaborated by a group of seven, including the representatives of Argentina, China, France, Hungary, the Soviet Union, the United States and Yugoslavia in their personal capacities, and which the Conference took note of last year, the view is expressed that the Conference should decide the future of subsidiary bodies, including their chairmanship, in the process during which their reports are adopted. This would allow the subsidiary bodies to start substantive work from the very beginning of the Conference's sessions. Prolonged procedural discussions could, therefore, be avoided.

That is the reason why the socialist countries put forward their suggestion to include in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for its 1985 session a recommendation concerning the chairmanship of that Committee in 1986. We consider this as a normal practice for which precedents do already exist.

With all this in mind, and in conformity with the principle of rotation, the socialist countries gave their consent to include in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the recommendation for the candidature put forward by the Group of Western Countries in connection with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year.

We assume that the same principle will be applied to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In that regard the Group of Socialist Countries wishes to inform the Conference that Ambassador L. Bayart of Mongolia will be its candidate for the chairmanship of that Committee for the 1986 session, as reflected in document CD/641.

Mr. KASHIRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Soviet Union highly appreciates the results of the negotiations conducted in 1985 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the leadership of its Chairman, the representative of a socialist country, Ambassador Turbanski of the Polish People's Republic. We note with satisfaction that this year the participants in the negotiations finally succeeded in breaking the "discussion barrier" and proceeding to concrete work on the elaboration of the text of the future convention. It is gratifying that for the first time in the negotiations the participants have a consolidated text of the basic provisions of the future convention which gives a clear presentation of the positions of the participating States and provides a sound basis for further work on the convention. We see in this the great merit, and the personal contribution, of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, and of the Chairmen of the Working Groups on specific provisions of the future convention, Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria, Mrs. Bonnier of Sweden, Mr. Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.

At the same time we do not wish to paint you an excessively rosy picture. It is no secret that the results of our work could have been much more substantial if all delegations had endeavoured, not in words but in deeds, to undo the knots, and in the first place to resolve the binary problem.

The Soviet delegation approves the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as a whole but wishes to state the following. With regard to the provision in article III, paragraph 4 on declarations of the location of chemical weapon stocks, the Soviet delegation reaffirms its position that we are ready to consider the creation, in the specialized facility for the destruction of stocks, of a depot whose location would be declared at the same time as the declaration of the location of the facility. We do not request that this verbal statement be set forth in any kind of footnote.

With regard to article VI, we wish to point out once again that we reserve our position as a whole on this article in view of the fact that its structure does not fully fit our approach to supertoxic lethal chemicals, which does not envisage dividing them into two categories, and also in this connection that its basic provisions in this regard have not been worked out. We consider that the provision concerning key components of binary or multicomponent systems requires further work. The position of the USSR is fully reflected in the relevant footnote to article VI.

These are some comments we wish to make in connection with the adoption today of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. EDIS (United Kingdom): In the unavoidable absence of my Ambassador because of a ministerial visit to another conference, I should like to pay tribute to the skill and hard work which Ambassador Turbanski has brought to the task of chairing the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The United Kingdom delegation will do its best to carry forward this honourable burden at our next session.

I know that my Ambassador will wish to take a future opportunity to express more formally our appreciation to Ambassador Turbanski as well as to his colleagues from Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia and Sweden, who also made important contributions.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries, I wish to make a statement concerning the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The socialist countries reaffirm their position already stated in connection with the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should rotate, as is the case with other Committees of the Conference on Disarmament. That is the reason why the socialist countries put forward their suggestion to include in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, for its 1985 session, and contained in document CD/641, a recommendation concerning the chairmanship of that Committee in 1986. We consider this a normal practice for which precedents already exist. With this in mind, and in conformity with the principle of rotation, the socialist countries gave their consent to including in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the recommendation for the candidature put forward by the group of Western countries, in connection with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, next year. We did this, however, on the assumption that the same principle would be applied to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I informed the Conference already that Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia would be the candidate of the Group of Socialist Countries for the chairmanship of that Committee for the 1986 session.

(Mr. Belaid, Algeria)

The progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the drafting of joint texts for a future convention remains limited in this respect, if we bear in mind the important questions that are outstanding.

The possibilities for broader agreement that were not exploited during the negotiations, and the difficulties that arose during the finalization of the work of the present session, clearly show that only mutual understanding and the requisite political will could enable the Ad Hoc Committee to carry out its task of drafting a convention on chemical weapons.



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