





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

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LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,

16th March, 1865.

The first resolution of the Committee of Supply was then carried.

On the second resolution for \$1,000,000, for the permanent defence of the country:—

Hon. Mr. ROSE said: I feel that the duty which devolves upon the Government, with reference to this measure, is one of the most serious character. (Hear, hear.) It is one of a nature which, I hope, will not very often arise in this or any other colony. I think it behoves the House and every member who loves the country who has an interest in its future prosperity, and who has a regard for the defence of it, to strengthen the hands of the Government in every possible way. It is desirable that they should be enabled in their intercourse with the Imperial Government to feel that they represent not merely a party in this country, but the unanimous opinion of nearly three millions of British subjects. (Hear, hear.) I trust, therefore, that the resolution to which the Government are asking our assent will meet with the unanimous concurrence of the House. The Canadian delegation to England will have no enviable task. It is a serious and solemn responsibility that will devolve upon them, and for which not only this Province but I may add the whole Empire, will hold them to a strict account. I say this because I feel that the vote which the Government are asking for, must be looked upon merely as an instalment, or an earnest of what the desire and intention of this country is with reference to its own defence. It is useless for us to do anything, it is folly to undertake a part, unless we are prepared to carry out to the full extent all such measures as will enable the country to be put in an efficient state of defence. It would be useless for us to spend—as the Imperial Government appeared, by the recent debate in the House of Lords, inclined to do—the small sum of £50,000 this year and £50,000 per annum for two or three succeeding

years unless the assent of that Government is obtained to co-operate with this country in that fair and liberal expenditure for the completion of the whole scheme of works, which, if they are to be of any service, must be made within the shortest possible time; and it is because I feel we ought to strengthen the hands of our Government in its negotiations with the Home Government upon this important question, that I trust there will be no dissent from this resolution. I believe that if the Government go to England with a spirit of conciliation, and, at the same time, of firmness, knowing what this country is prepared to do, on the one hand, and what it is their right to demand, on the other, that we should receive that same measure of consideration from the Imperial Government which it has ever before extended to us. There is no reason to apprehend anything else. I feel, at the same time, that the crisis is very grave because of the difficulties in the way, for our Delegates have not only to obtain the assent of the Government of England, but they must bear their part in the work of enlightening and convincing the judgments, and enlisting the sympathies of the people of England, in order that full justice be done to us. I know the influence of that school of politicians in England who affect to despise the colonial connexion and who disregard the obligation it entails, and that my Hon. friends on the Treasury benches will have a stubborn battle to fight with that school and to overcome its influence with the Government at home. In the present juncture when the Imperial Parliament is upon the eve of a dissolution and when the government is not unnaturally desirous of strengthening its hands the work will not be an easy one. I, therefore, consider it the more incumbent upon this House and the people of this country to back up the Government and increase its weight with the Home Government in the conduct of these negotiations about to be entered upon. (Hear, hear.) There are considerations which the delegation from this country can present—and

which from the confidence I have in them I feel sure they will present to the attention of the Imperial authorities, and, if need be, to that of the English people, which I believe will have the effect of obtaining for us that co-operation on the part of England necessary for the immediate works and also those assurances which are necessary for the future, in case hostilities should take place. It is high time that an explicit understanding should be arrived at on this subject. We have had too much quarrelling, recrimination and bandying of words on both sides. On our part, we have been accused of neglecting our duty, while we charge the Imperial Government with lukewarmness in the matter of the defence of Canada. In the presence of danger, it will be no time for discussion or bickering. We should now ascertain exactly what England expects from this country, and come to a decision as to what we are prepared to do. This is what should be done, not only to escape from a temporary difficulty, but in order that our relations with England should be placed on such a footing as to put an end to all those misunderstandings, recriminations and disagreeable bandying of words on either one side or the other. (Cheers.) I have said that the first duty of the Government will be to arouse public attention in England to the gravity of the present crisis, and to the necessity of deciding *now and once for all* whether this Country is to be abandoned or whether it is to be defended. (Hear Hear.) If the former,—undertake no works, withdraw your Troops—spend no money at all:—if the latter, come to an immediate understanding what each Country is to contribute, and prosecute *all* the works to *immediate completion*. There must be no delay; for promptitude may avert War. Premising then that we are no longer to cavil about our own contribution either in money or men,—but that we are prepared to place every available man and all our means at the disposal of the Empire, I feel that we have strong claims on that Empire for support. They may not un-justly be reminded that the work of defence has been rendered infinitely more difficult by the rectification of our Frontier some 25 years ago by Imperial Commis-

sioners. (Hear, hear.) Who does not know the story of Franklin's Map of 1782, and the "*Strong Red Line*"? We know that the Frontier of the United States was brought many miles nearer the heart of this Country than it ought to have been—that the Boundary of Maine is run almost within sight of Quebec, and that Rouse's Point on Lake Champlain, the most important position as regards Canada on the Continent,—was literally surrendered and given up in 1842, although acknowledged to be within British Territory. (Hear, hear.) Well might Mr Webster in defending the Treaty of Washington, say that it was the key to Canada—that the advantages which England obtained in New Brunswick were not worth a rush in comparison to it—that the possession of *Rouse's Point overbalanced all other advantages forty times told*—for that the true road to Canada was by way of Lake Champlain.—Let me quote his words.—“Of one thing I am certain, that the true way to Canada is by way of Lake Champlain. That is the old path. I take to myself the credit of having said here (Congress) thirty years ago, speaking of the mode of taking Canada, that, when our American woodsmen undertake to fell a tree, he does not begin by lopping off the branches, but strikes his axe at once into the trunk. The trunk, in relation to Canada, is Montreal, and the St. Lawrence down to Quebec: and so we found in the last wars. It is not my purpose to scan the propriety of military measures then adopted, but I suppose it to have been rather accidental and unfortunate that we began the attack in Upper Canada. It would have been better military policy as I suppose, to have pushed our whole force by the way of Lake Champlain, and made a direct movement on Montreal; and though we might thereby have lost the glories of the battles of the Thames and of Lundy's Lane, and of the sortie from Fort Erie, yet we should have won other laurels of equal and perhaps greater value, at Montreal. *Once successful in this movement, the whole country above would have fallen into our power.* Is not this evident to every gentleman? Rouse's Point is the best means of defending both the ingress into the lake, and the

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“exit from it. *And I say now, that on the whole frontier of the State of New-York, with the single exception of the Narrows below the city, there is not a point of equal importance.* I hope this Government will last forever; but if it does not, and if in the judgment of Heaven, so great a calamity shall befall us as the rupture of the Union, and the State of New-York shall ther by be thrown upon her own defences. I ask, is there a single point, except the Narrows, the possession of which she will so much desire? No there is not one. *And how did we obtain this advantage for her? The parallel of 45° north was established by the treaty of 1783 as our boundary with Canada in that part of the line. But as I have stated, that line was found to run south of Rouse's Point.* And how did we get back this precious possession? By running a semicircle ikethat of the King of Netherlands? No; we went back to the old line, which had always been supposed to be the true line, and the establishment of which gave us not only Rouse's Point, but a strip of land containing some thirty or forty thousand acres between the parallel of 45° and the old line.

“*And here let me say, once for all, that, if we had gone to arbitration we should inevitably have lost what the treaty gave to Vermont and New York; because a'l that was clear matter of cession and not adjustment of doubtful boundary.*”

These, Mr. Speaker, are sad and weighty words for us. I say, therefore, that the surrender of this point has made the defence of Canada infinitely more difficult and costly. It entails the erection on our part of extensive works to defend Montreal, between the St. Lawrence and Champlain, the cost of which Colonel Jervis estimates at half a million sterling, and which works will take many thousand troops to man. If the fortress since erected by the Americans on the position of Rouse's Point had been ours, it alone would have closed up that avenue of approach to the heart of Canada. [Hear, hear.] In these facts we have a strong claim on the Imperial Government.

But there is another view of the case which practically presents itself to the minds of Canadians. If war takes place, it is almost

certain to spring from causes over which Canada has no control—from international disputes—to which we are not likely in any way to give rise. The history of the past is appealed to—the right of search led to the war of 1812—the possession of Ruatan, a barren island on the South American coast, nearly involved us in hostilities—the Enlistment Question during the Russian war—the Boundary Question in Oregon—the transactions at St. Juan—the Trent affair—the equipment of the Alabama and Florida—are all Imperial questions. [Hear, hear.] The St. Albans raid and other kindred aggressions would never have taken place, but with the hope of embroiling England in the American war. [Hear, hear.] But, Sir, when our people consider that aspect of the case, we must not be insensible to the other, and the *advantageous* one to us. We must not forget that the invasion of our soil means war with England;—that the English flag protects our comm-ree in every quarter of the globe. The English name protects our citizens wher-ver they are—we enjoy the countless and inappreciable blessings of being British subjects—and we must be ready to make those sacrifices—exceptional and trying though they may be—to preserve those blessings. [Cheers.] In identifying ourselves thus with the rest of the Empire, we may fairly ask Eng'nd to pause before she adopts a policy which must lead to its dismemberment—so far at least as the Colonies are concerned. If Canada is left to herself—the whole of British North America follows. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. [Hear, hear.] The Imperial Government may save themselves the trouble of fortifying Quebec, or Halifax either. Every shilling of outlay is *useless*, and if these Colonies go, and are added to the power of the United States, as they would be—how long would Bermuda—or even the West Indies remain? How long would British Columbia, or Vancouver remain? England would be without a Port on the West shores of the Atlantic, or the East of the Pacific! [Hear, hear.] Talk of holding Quebec and Halifax, as if they were Gibraltar and Malta! Why, Sir, the thing is absurd! You can't hold Quebec or Halifax either, without you hold the Cities and the sur-



rounding Country—and you cannot hold these without you have the protectorate over the entire Colony and possess the loyalty and devotion of the people. [Hear, hear.] We may also fairly ask our fellow subjects in England to reflect, that war to us is a very different thing from what it is to them. An addition to their taxation and some derangement to their trade are what it would be to them. To us, it means the destruction of every interest—the entire annihilation of all industry—the positive ruin of every individual in the Colony—the actual presence of a powerful and hated foe—perhaps mercenaries drawn from Europe,—desolate homes, youth and age both in the trenches and in the field—the extremities of the country exposed to rapine and plunder—and the thought of something worse than death itself present to the imagination of our wives and children, if not a real horror! Whoever has seen Virginia or Kentucky, or Tennessee or those Countries which are the actual theatre of war, can form but a faint notion of what the actual presence of war involves. I would ask our fellow subjects in England, to consider what the presence of an overwhelming force in Surrey—or Hampshire or Lancashire would be,—and to make their case ours. [Hear, hear.] What would *they*—what would *we* be willing to pay in the way of money, if we could prevent war being on our soil, if we could avoid the presence of hordes of a lawless soldiery? Why, there is not a man among us who would not be willing to purchase it at the price of his entire substance. [Hear, hear.] But Sir, I repeat that we have no right to ask the people of England to consider these things unless we, at the same time, give the assurance—that if England will but stand by us, we are prepared to make any sacrifice, in men or money—that in fact the present generation here is ready to forego to a great extent the pursuit of material advancement—to make the defence of the Country their first object, and money making and prosperity in other ways subordinate to the sterner work of military life. [Hear, hear.] We must do that. The time for professions is gone by;—we must realise to ourselves the necessity of making sacrifices and immediate and last-

ing ones too. [Hear, hear.] But it may be asked what is practically to be done? I answer this. Let the two Governments first settle what is *necessary* to be done—let them next weigh in a spirit of fairness all the considerations which specially affect Canada, and those which concern the Empire, and come to an understanding what proportion of the expense we are to contribute! Dont let us be too grudging or exacting about this, whether it is to be a third, a half or two thirds. It is far more important that the people of England should feel we are cordial and liberal, earnest and ready,—than that we are close and bargaining in a matter on which depend the preservation of our national blessings. [Cheers.] That point being arrived at, let there be no delay, but let cordial co-operation take the place of what has hitherto been mistrust. But how it is asked? Is the money to be raised? Canada is already largely in debt and heavily taxed. The English manufacturers, and the English press complain of our duties on imports, declare that the colonies are only to be regarded in the light of customers, and that we are useless in that relation because we tax their productions. In this again, I repeat, we are misunderstood; and our delegates should take pains to place our exceptional position before the minds of the English people. We are largely in debt it is true, and it has nearly all been incurred since the union twenty-five years ago—the beginning, I may say, of our history. But what has it been incurred for? We found a country which, of all countries in the world, required that its natural capabilities should be developed. We had two courses open to us: one, to sit down quietly;—till the soil and fish the seas, disregard progress, and be a mere agricultural and fishing population, neither increasing in number, nor wealth, nor power. The other course was to set to work to construct canals and railways, open up roads, build light-houses and harbours, subsidise steamships, construct slides to get the products of the forest to market, get rid of the seigniorial tenure, establish municipal institutions; and in short by entering on a determined and bold policy, to anticipate by a century at least, the resources and the natural development of the country. (Hear, hear.)

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Sir, as Englishmen, and following the instincts of our race, we disdained the easy and comfortable course, and unhesitatingly entered on the hardy and energetic work of immediate progress. (Cheers.) In this we had the cordial co-operation of our French fellow subjects. (Hear, hear.) But these works required money: we had none of our own, and we have had to borrow some \$67,000,000. But as the House well knows, the undertakings I have mentioned represent every shilling of this debt. It has not been incurred unwisely or improvidently. Let me ask those who say we have been going too fast—that we have been over-running the constable, to consider what we would have been if we had taken the more easy course? Would we have had a population of nearly three millions to-day? Would England have had a power on this continent that could afford her any assistance whatever? Would she have had a great and growing community here, whose co-operation she is now not ashamed to place some account on, and which, indeed, she is a little too disposed to consider strong enough to stand alone? (Cheers.) The wisdom of the past is too apparent. Well, sir, the interest on this debt must be met; and it is said we ought to have done it, and to do it now, not by duties on imports, but by direct taxation. It ought to be understood once for all, that our customs tariff is a *revenue necessity*. It is said we discriminate against English manufactures. This is an entire mistake. Why, sir, we have been accused by the Americans of *favouring* English as against American goods; and they have urged this as one of the reasons for abolishing the Reciprocity Treaty. (Hear, hear.) I would just like to ask those who say we ought not to depend on customs duties, but on direct Taxation to show us how in a new Country like Canada,—sparsely peopled—no realized incomes,—it is to be collected. Let Mr. Gladstone,—himself come here or Mr. Cobden, and point out how we can meet our liabilities except by relying in a main degree on customs and excise. Our revenue from customs and excise is about \$6,000,000. Of that we collect from duties on Tea, Sugar, and Coffee about \$1,700,000, we collect from Excise on Spirits, Beer and Tobacco about \$600,000; from stamps about \$150,

000, and the rest is by an indiscriminating *ad valorem* duty on imports from whatever part of the world they may come. (Hear, hear.) How unfair then is this cry among the Manchester and Sheffield men of a differential protective tariff against their interests. Let them consider our necessities: We have lately imposed a Stamp Tax;—and I hope my Hon. friend the Finance Minister will extend it—and follow it up by other taxes of a like kind tending to direct taxation as the progress and circumstances of the Country will enable him to do!—But heretofore that has been impossible. We ought to explain these things to the people of England, who are not unjust nor unreasonable, and it is at the present time most important that the remnant of the feeling on that point should be removed. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I have no fear but that if the Canadian Delegation approach the English Government in this spirit and with these feelings—we shall be met in a corresponding way. (Hear, hear.) It is one thing for irresponsible writers and critics to discuss the expediency of retaining or throwing off the Colonies by arguments confined entirely to considerations of profit and loss—to the balance sheet in fact. But it is another when they come to be practically applied by those who are responsible for their acts to the Crown and to the people of England. (Hear, hear.) I do not believe that any Ministry that could be formed in England would venture to propose, as a practical question to be submitted to the approval of the English people, the abandonment of the Colonies. We have a practical illustration of this fact in the speech of Lord Malmesbury the other day. Look at his speech last year, to which the *Times* devoted a leader, and compare it with that made lately in the House of Lords, in which, in stirring language, he denounced as absurd and trifling the amount the Government proposed expending upon the fortifications of Quebec. That noble Lord stated that what he meant was that England should furnish this colony with every military supply necessary, and then look to Canada for the men required to defend the country—that to the latter, on this condition, England should supply all the armaments, ships, material of war, and so forth, re-

quired for the defence of this Province. We find this nobler man so pathetic before when danger now really threatens, the first to hold the English Government to a strict and solemn account for the defence of Canada. I believe it will ever be thus in England with the majority of her statesmen and people. I do not deny that there are very grave difficulties to be considered at this juncture but that is the greater reason why the hands of the Government should be strengthened so that they may be able to speak plainly and firmly and with the united voice of the whole people, when they go to England to confer respecting our defence. As I understand this vote it is taken for this purpose—as an earnest of what the people of Canada are prepared to do in behalf of themselves—that in reference to any fair scheme that may be discussed, and respecting any fair conclusion which may be come to by this country and England, Canada is prepared to bear her full weight of responsibility. I do not understand this vote as meaning that we are to expend one million of dollars merely as a contribution towards any particular defensive works; but this, that the Government, on going home, can say—the people of Canada are serious in this matter, and as an earnest of what they are prepared to do for defence, they have armed us with authority at once to spend money for this object, on condition that a correct understanding be come to with reference to the future entire system of defence, and that all those anterior misunderstandings which have existed between the two countries should be brought to an end. While on this point I trust I shall be pardoned if I refer for one moment to a little work just published from the pen of one of the most popular and graphic writers of the day: and one who has always taken a fair, just, and practical view of the colonial relation and who understands well the real feelings of the English people, I mean Mr. Russell. He says:—"In the face of very frigid warnings from the press, and very lukewarm enunciations of policy from her best friends, Canada had some reason to fear that there is a secret desire to let her "slide," and that nothing would please England so much as a happy chance which placed the Province beyond our

care without humiliation or war. The duty of Canadians to their own country is very plain indeed, if the people of England refuse to give them distinct guarantees that, under certain conditions, they will give them the whole aid of money, men and ships that is required. But those are implied in the very fact of suzerainty of the Crown. It must, however, be made known—if it be not plain to every Englishman, that the abandonment of Canada implies a surrender of British Columbia, of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward, Newfoundland, if not also the West India Islands. Many bitter words, written and spoken here, rankle in the breasts of Canadians, and I have quoted the words in which a Canadian statesman has placed before Englishmen the terrible consequences which Canada may suffer from war, because she is a part of the British Empire, engaged in a quarrel, on Imperial grounds, with the Government of the United States. We do undoubtedly owe something to Canada, from the bare fact that for many years she resisted temptation and remained under the flag, unmoved by the blandishments and threats of the United States. In my poor judgment, the abandonment of Canada would be the most signal triumph of the principle of democracy, and the most pregnant sign of the decadence of the British Empire, which could be desired by our enemies. No matter by what sophistry, or by what expediency justified, the truth would creep out through the fact itself that we were retiring, as the Romans did, from Britain, Gaul and Dacia, but that the retreat would be made in the face of united and civilized enemies, and that the sound of our recall would animate every nation in the world to come forth and despoil us. As yet there is no reason for such a pusillanimous policy." (Hear, hear.)

I have said, Sir, that I am not insensible to the difficulty of getting the home Government at the present juncture, on the eve of a General Election—and naturally anxious to conciliate a certain class—to deal with this question as promptly and liberally as the real emergency demands. But it is all the more the duty of our representatives to place before them the real facts, respectfully but candidly and

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firmly. They should be told that for years past, party difficulties have prevailed in Canada, which have prevented the true feelings and sentiments of the people from being understood—or their practical readiness to defend themselves being evinced:—that now however we have a strong united government which has no fears for its own existence in proposing that outlay and undertaking those measures which are necessary:—and that we are now ready to enter on negotiations by which all future misunderstanding shall be avoided. They should also be told that there is a deep and abiding spirit of fervent loyalty both to the Crown and Constitution here, which is sensitive to, or has sometimes been wounded by the tone now and then taken towards us at home—that there is serious danger, that the notion that England wishes to get rid of us will sap that principle of loyalty—not in Canada alone, but in all British America—that we are prepared—not in words merely, but practically—to make any sacrifices to maintain our connection with England.—They should be told even more strongly than Col. Jervis has told them, that danger is imminent—that the country is utterly defenceless, and that Canadians could not hold it 24 hours—they should be told that in case of war we shall need the whole strength and all the resources, not of Canada only, but of the whole Empire, and that these must be given ungrudgingly as before: they should be asked at once to take care of the Lakes, and to send a flotilla of the smaller class of gunboats that are now laid up useless in Ports-mouth. [Hear, hear.] If there is proper cooperation between the two countries we need not fear the result: at all events, England may be a sured *we* will sacrifice our last man, spend our last shilling, and defend the last inch of ground, if she is but true to us. (Cheers.) But she must not grumble if we are compelled, for these

purposes to impose taxes on ourselves, even by placing duties on all imported merchandise, unless she would have us break faith with the public creditor. Let her examine for herself and satisfy herself, that this way of raising a revenue in this country is, for the present at least, unavoidable. I know there are a few—but only a few among ourselves—who dread this expenditure, and think we are overtaxing the country. To these I answer: this is a crisis in our history—the country can never prosper so long as this constant fear exists of its becoming the theatre of war and that it is known to be defenceless. Will emigrants come here—will capitalists invest money in a country so situated? But let it be put once and for all in a condition of defence, and the danger of war is greatly diminished, if not at an end. (Hear, hear.) We will then have a sense of security among ourselves which will restore confidence abroad. Every year we will be gaining strength and getting abler to defend ourselves. As a mere balance of pecuniary advantage then, I say, it is clear we must now, and promptly, incur this expenditure, whatever it may be. The members of this house must not merely be content to follow public opinion in this—we must direct it, and we must all take pains, and spare no effort to reconcile our people to the necessity of additional taxation and new sacrifices. (Hear, hear.)

If we go to England in this spirit, I believe that ministers will be enabled to announce to the house at the adjourned session, that we have once more re-established a cordial understanding with her, and that parent and child will meet the invader at the frontier with the whole power of the Empire. (Cheers.) I would again entreat the house to have no division on this question. Let us be as unanimous here as I believe the country is. (Loud cheers.)

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