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ARCTIC EXPEDITIONS.

R E P O R T

OF THE

COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS
OF THE ADMIRALTY

TO INQUIRE INTO AND REPORT ON

THE RECENT ARCTIC EXPEDITIONS IN SEARCH OF
SIR JOHN FRANKLIN,

TOGETHER WITH

THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE,

AND

PAPERS CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



LONDON:

PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,

PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1852.

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REPORT OF THE ARCTIC COMMITTEE.

Sir,

Admiralty,
Arctic Committee,
20th November 1851.

1. The Committee appointed by their Lordships letter of the 22d October to inquire into and report on the conduct of the officers intrusted with the command of the late expeditions in search of Sir John Franklin, and whether everything was done by them to carry into effect their instructions, and to prosecute the search for the missing ships, commenced their proceedings on the 24th ultimo; and conceiving that the only distinct inculpations are those contained in Mr. Penny's letters to their Lordships of the 15th September and 10th October, we considered it our duty to direct our attention in the first instance to this part of the subject, and we accordingly examined Mr. Penny himself, and all the principal officers of the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," with the view of ascertaining satisfactorily every circumstance connected with the exploration of Wellington Strait, and the channels discovered above it, and how far Mr. Penny's subsequent statements are in conformity with those he so distinctly expressed in his letters of the 4th and 11th August, addressed to Captain Austin; and having obtained all the information in our power, and most carefully considered the whole question, we are of opinion that Captain Austin could only put one construction on Mr. Penny's two letters referred to, and that, having been thus assured by him that the open water found above Wellington Straits was (to use his own expression), from "the fearful rate at which the tide runs (not less than six "knots) through the sounds that divide the channel, dangerous even for "a boat, much more to a ship, unless clear of ice, which from its present "appearance would not be so that season," impracticable for navigation at that time, and that the shores and islands on both sides had been thoroughly examined by the exploring parties, without any traces of the missing ships being discoverable, we do not think Captain Austin would have been justified in commencing a fresh search in a direction concerning which he naturally considered himself to have received such authentic information.

2. It will be observed that in Mr. Penny's letter of the 4th August 1851 (from which we extract the preceding paragraph) he distinctly acquaints Captain Austin of his fixed determination to return immediately to England, and that nothing is to be found in it in any way expressive of his wish for a further search in Wellington Strait, and the channels connected with it. In his Journal, also, several remarks occur, all equally discouraging and fully indicative of his opinions at that period; and we can only account for his subsequent change of language on his arrival in England by his considering (as he himself states in his evidence) that "he found everybody disappointed;" that it had been said, "more might "have been done;" and "that he therefore wished to have the means "of going out again;" but we are bound to state that the evidence

Nos. 21 and 29., p. lv. and lviii.

Mr. Penny to Captain Austin, 4th and 11th August 1851. Evidence, A. 331 and 336, pp. 33, 36.

Mr. Penny to Captain Austin, 4th August 1851. Evidence, A. 331, p. 33.

Enclosure No. 17.

Evidence, A. 87, 88, p. 8.

brought before us has not, in our opinion, corroborated the statement, that he expressed to Captain Austin at the time any such sentiments; and it will be seen that Captain Austin distinctly denies having received any communication to that effect.

Evidence, A. 343, 345, and 380, pp. 37, 44.

Evidence, A. 336, p. 35.

3. Some desultory conversation, however, certainly appears to have taken place on this subject when Captain Austin and Mr. Penny met on the 11th August 1851, and it was for this reason that the former (very prudently and properly, in our opinion,) pressed Mr. Penny so strongly for his opinion in writing.

Evidence, A. 347 to 349, pp. 39, 40.

Evidence, A. 336, p. 36.
Mr. Penny to Captain Austin, 11th August 1851.

4. We think, therefore, that Captain Austin could only form his judgment on Mr. Penny's written communications, which, although very laconic, were sufficiently explicit; and that, under all the circumstances of the case, much weight is due to the feeling expressed by Captain Austin in his evidence, that as Mr. Penny's expedition was, equally with his own, equipped at the public expense, and receiving its orders from the Admiralty, although independent of his authority, he considered himself bound to abide by the strongly expressed opinion of the officer who had, by mutual agreement, undertaken that particular portion of the search, that "*all had been done which it was in the power of man to accomplish.*"

Evidence, A. 43 to 53, pp. 4, 5.

5. We beg to remark on this part of the subject, that although Mr. Penny endeavours to draw a distinction between Wellington Strait and the channels to the north-west, which he has since named Queen Victoria's Channel, no such distinction appears in the track chart delivered by him to Captain Austin at the time, and which we annex to this Report; and we therefore think that Captain Austin could not fairly be expected to recognize any distinction between the upper and lower parts of this channel.

Enclosure No. 19.

6. It appears to have been under this impression, which we think Captain Austin fully justified in entertaining, that, after finding Wellington Strait closed, the ice still presenting the same impenetrable barrier it had done in 1850, he decided on occupying the remainder of the navigable season in the examination of Jones's Sound, to which Inlet his own instructions, as well as Mr. Penny's, directed attention, but which the latter had been unable to explore in the preceding season.

Evidence, A. 114 to 117, p. 10.

7. We think that considerable benefit might have arisen, especially with reference to future operations in Wellington Strait, if one of the expeditions had remained near the entrance about a fortnight longer, in order to obtain the latest information of the state of the ice in that direction, and therefore the probable practicability of the navigation of this strait, and we think this might have been accomplished by Mr. Penny without involving any serious risk of being detained during the winter; but we are clearly of opinion that as no certain traces of Sir John Franklin's ships had been met with in any direction beyond their wintering place at Beechey Island in 1845-6, and no record of the route intended to be pursued by them could be discovered, after the most diligent and repeated search, (thus leaving this question a mere matter of conjecture,) both Captain Austin and Mr. Penny were fully justified by the tenor of their Lordships instructions in not risking their detention in the ice during another winter; and we beg to add that all the most experienced Arctic officers in both expeditions appear to have unanimously concurred in opinion as to the expediency of returning to England.

Evidence, A. 195 to 200, p. 15, A. 460, p. 53, A. 522, p. 59, A. 590, p. 65, A. 651, p. 73, A. 921 to 926, p. 92, A. 977 to 980, p. 96.

8. With respect to the conduct of the officers intrusted with the command of the expeditions and several exploring parties, we most gladly express our highest and most unqualified admiration of the zeal, energy, intrepidity, and perseverance with which every individual amongst them performed their respective duties. They appear to have been animated by a common feeling of determination to endure every hardship, and brave every danger, in their endeavours to obtain some traces of their missing countrymen. The journeys accomplished under the most difficult and trying circumstances far exceed both in distance and duration any to be found in the previous records of Arctic exploration in those parallels of latitude; and the arrangements made by Captain Austin and Mr. Penny were so well considered and so complete that all their parties returned (with only one exception) in perfect health, and without having experienced any sufferings beyond those which were inseparable from severe fatigue in such inclement regions.

Evidence, A. 1158, p. 107.

9. With respect to the results of the late expedition, as regards the search for the missing ships, on which their Lordships desire our opinion, we may remark, that, in the first place, it is a matter of no small interest and importance to have ascertained with certainty the exact position in which they passed the winter of 1845-6, while the careful and minute exploration of the coast to the southward and westward by Captain Ommanney and Lieutenant M'Clintock, without discovering any traces whatever of Sir John Franklin, would seem to afford a very strong presumption that he did not pass that way; and conjecture, therefore, naturally turns towards Wellington Strait, to which it is well known he had often looked, as affording one chance of a passage to the north-west, and which we see by Mr. Penny's account of his examination of the upper part of the channel appears to form at least a possible outlet in that direction.

Sir E. Parry and Sir G. Back's verbal information.

10. It is not without considerable hesitation and anxiety that we proceed to reply to the last point on which their Lordships request our opinion; namely, "what benefits can be expected from any further research, with the means and directions in which the Committee are of opinion that such search should be prosecuted."

11. We should deeply grieve at being considered capable of treating with coldness or indifference the natural and praiseworthy feelings of those who are still without certain information of the fate of their nearest and dearest relatives, who in this state naturally cling to hope "even against hope," and whose thoughts (as might be expected) turn eagerly towards further explorations, in any and every direction; but we have felt at the same time, while considering calmly and carefully this difficult question, that we have an equally important duty to perform towards those brave and meritorious men whose lives must be risked in this arduous and perilous search, and to reflect in what manner it may be best conducted with a due regard to their safety.

12. Taking, therefore, all these circumstances into consideration, we have, after a most careful and anxious deliberation, decided on recommending to their Lordships that an expedition should be despatched next year to Barrow's Strait, consisting of the same ships which composed Captain Austin's division, namely, two sailing ships and two steamers, with orders to proceed direct to Beechey Island, and to

consider that harbour,—beyond which we think one sailing ship and one steamer should on no account be taken,—as the base of future operations.

13. We consider any further exploration in the direction of Melville Island or to the south-west of Cape Walker wholly unnecessary; and we would therefore propose that all the strength and energy of the expedition should be directed towards the examination of the upper part of Wellington Strait; and we are of opinion that by the adoption of the same careful and well-considered arrangements which were attended by such satisfactory results on the late occasion this examination may be effected without any serious risk of loss or danger.

14. If, on arriving at the proposed rendezvous early in August, the barrier of ice at the entrance of the Strait renders any attempt to penetrate it unsafe or imprudent, it may, perhaps, still be possible to convey boats on runners or sledges, or by any small "lanes" which may offer, and launch them into the open water above, and by this means depôts of provisions may be advanced to the most convenient points, and such further information obtained during the remainder of the navigable season as might very much facilitate the operations of the ensuing spring.

15. These operations must, in that case, be commenced as early as possible in the season of 1853, and pushed forward with as much rapidity as is consistent with prudence, it being clearly understood by all the exploring parties that they must return to the depôt at Beechey Island in good time for their embarkation by the middle of August at latest. The object in view would be to examine the upper part of Wellington Straits, as far beyond Mr. Penny's north-western advance as possible; and if Sir John Franklin did really proceed in that direction, it appears highly improbable that some traces of his expedition should not be discovered by the exploring parties in their search.

16. If, on the other hand, Wellington Strait is found open and navigable on the arrival of the expedition in the summer of 1852, we think one of the sailing ships, with a steamer, might proceed at once to take advantage of this opportunity, if the officer commanding should judge such a measure safe and prudent, and be thus placed in winter quarters in a more favourable position for commencing the land search in the spring of 1853, but with the most distinct injunctions not to advance to such a distance as to endanger their return to the depôt, or their communication with it in that year; and it should be enjoined with equal strictness, that, in the event of any irreparable disaster to the ships so proceeding, or if they should be too firmly fixed in the ice to be extricated during the summer of 1853, they are to be abandoned, and the crews brought down to the depôt.

17. It is, however, proper to provide for one possible contingency, namely, that of the difficulty of travelling at a late season rendering the retreat of the crew to Beechey Island more hazardous to their lives than their remaining by the ships (if they are only frozen up) another winter; and in that case the division at Beechey Island, which will be still amply provided with provisions, &c., must remain also until the following year; but this is, we hope, an improbable supposition, and our confident belief is, that with the improved equipments and

appliances of all kinds which past experience will dictate, such an exploration may be made in the early part of 1853 as to enable the whole expedition to return to England before the close of the navigable season.

18. It is obviously impossible to provide in a Report of this kind for more remote and less probable contingencies; but their Lordships instructions to Captain Austin (Par. 4. and 7.) contain all the discretionary power with which an officer under such circumstances can be intrusted; and we conclude they will be embodied in any future orders on the same subject.

Rear-Admiral Sir J. Ross.
The Rev. Dr. Scoresby.
Captain Austin.
Captain Kellet.
Captain Ommanney.
Sir John Richardson.
Mr. W. Penny.
Mr. A. Stewart.

19. We have thought it right to request from the several gentlemen named in the margin their opinions on this interesting but most difficult question; and we annex their replies, to which we beg to call their Lordships attention.

Captain Ommanney.
Lieut. M'Clintock.
Lieut. S. Osborn.
Mr. Bradford, Surgeon.
Mr. Brooman, Paymaster.

20. We have also requested from Captain Austin and the officers specially employed in his travelling parties such suggestions as to practicable improvements in equipments, clothing, and provisions as their recent experience so well qualifies them to offer. They are annexed to this Report, and will be found of considerable importance.

21. Although our instructions do not advert to the report of the loss of the missing ships received from an Esquimaux named Adam Beck, and to which Sir John Ross in his evidence still attaches much weight, we beg to state that a paper written by Adam Beck, in the presence of Sir John Ross and Captain Ommanney, and purporting to be the substance of information communicated to him by another Esquimaux, now in England, named Erasmus York, on the subject of the loss of the ships and the murder of the crews, has, on being translated before us by a Moravian missionary well acquainted with the Esquimaux language, proved not to contain a single word relating to this occurrence.

Evidence, A. 461 to 467,
p. 53.

Evidence, p. 135.

22. Adam Beck's subsequent deposition, which was sent to Copenhagen for translation, has not yet been returned; but if their Lordships should consider any further inquiry necessary, we would only express an earnest hope that it may be conducted separately, and not allowed to interfere with the early arrival of the proposed expedition in Barrow's Strait.

23. With respect to the efforts now making to afford relief to the missing ships in the direction of Behring's Strait, we do not venture to offer any suggestions, beyond a hope that, until further accounts are received from Captain Collinson and Commander M'Clure, the Plover may be kept fully provisioned.

We have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servants,

WM. BOWLES, Rear-Admiral.
ARTHUR FANSHAWE, Rear-Admiral.
W. E. PARRY, Captain.
F. W. BEECHEY, Captain.
GEORGE BACK, Captain.

To J. Parker, Esq., M.P.,
&c. &c. &c.
Admiralty.

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20th November 1851.

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FRED. JAMES FEGEN,
Secretary to Arctic Committee.

THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY to Rear Admiral BOWLES, C.B., M.P.

Sir,

Admiralty, 22d October 1851.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that they are pleased to appoint a Committee, consisting of yourself and the following officers; namely,

Rear Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain Frederick W. Beechey, and
Captain Sir George Back.

To this Committee, which is to meet at this office at eleven o'clock A.M. on the 24th instant, their Lordships refer all the papers and documents respecting the late Arctic expeditions, with power to call for any other papers which they may require, and to call for and examine any officer or other persons whose testimony they may consider necessary.

My Lords desire that the Committee will direct their attention to and report on the conduct of the officers intrusted with the command of the expeditions and the several exploring parties, and whether everything was done by them to carry into effect their instructions, and to prosecute the search for the missing ships.

In respect to this part of the inquiry, their Lordships direct the particular attention of the Committee to the return of the expeditions from Cape Riley in this season, and they desire that the Committee will specially report whether it would have been of any advantage if Captain Austin or Mr. Penny had remained a further time to continue the search in that direction.

My Lords further desire that the Committee will consider the results obtained by the late Expeditions, and report what benefits can be expected from any further research, with the means and directions in which the Committee are of opinion that such search should be prosecuted.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) J. PARKER.

Enclosure No. 1.

LETTERS from Captain AUSTIN, R.N., C.B., H.M.S. "RESOLUTE," and Captain PENNY, commanding the "LADY FRANKLIN," relative to the ARCTIC SEARCHING EXPEDITIONS under their respective Command.

Letters from Captain Austin.

No. 1.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," at Winter Quarters between Cape Martyr and Griffith Island, 14th July 1851.
(Received 30th September 1851.)

Sir,

1. Captain Penny having apprized me of his intention to despatch a boat to communicate with the whalers at Ponds Bay (although doubtful of the success of the attempt), it is my duty to transmit a brief account, at least, of the proceedings of the expedition intrusted to my charge, since the 7th of July 1850, the date of report forwarded by the whaling vessel "Joseph Green."

2. An account of our proceedings from the 7th of July to the 18th of August 1850, and a copy of the memorandum, dated the 25th of July 1850, setting forth in detail the arrangements determined upon for accomplishing the object of our mission, were deposited at the summer encampment of the Esquimaux at Ponds Bay; and a letter detailing further movements from the 18th to the 22d of August, was prepared for transmission by the "North Star;" copies of which three documents are now inclosed for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

3. Captain Ommanney having examined Wolstenholme Sound, which proved to have been the winter quarters of the "North Star," and completed the search of the north shore of Lancaster Sound and Barrow Straits from Cape Warrender to Cape Fellfoot, looked into Port Leopold, and then proceeded in further execution of his orders; the "Intrepid" having in the meantime examined Maxwell Bay and Cape Hurd, finding at the latter place a record from the "Investigator."

4. Captain Ommanney in the "Intrepid" reached Cape Riley and Beechy Island on the night of the 23d of August, and at both found positive traces of the missing expedition.

5. On the 24th, Captain Ommanney was joined by the United States schooner "Rescue," and in the latter part of that day he despatched the "Intrepid" to search the shore to the northward, but she was stopped by the fixed ice about four miles beyond Point Innes.

6. On the 25th, a lead opened towards Cape Hotham. Captain Ommanney hoping to find a record there, despatched the "Intrepid" to take advantage of it, following in the "Assistance" and leaving Captain Penny, who had now arrived and communicated, to search the Bay between Cape Riley and Beechy Island.

7. The "Resolute" having in her search been detained by weather, did not reach Cape Riley and Beechy Island until early on the morning of the 28th. She found between the latter and Cape Spencer the "Felix," Sir John Ross, the two brigs of Captain Penny, and the "Rescue," Lieutenant De Haven; and saw from the Crow's Nest the "Assistance" and "Intrepid" on the opposite shore near Barlow Inlet. The other United States schooner "Advance" was beset, a few miles to the northward, with a searching party to Cape Bowden, where a bottle, scraps of newspaper, shot, and other miscellaneous fragments were found, conveying the impression that it had been the resting place of a shooting or other small party.

8. Previous to the arrival of the "Resolute," Captain Penny had found on Beechy Island three graves and various other conclusive evidence, which, so soon as I saw them, assured me that the bay between Cape Riley and Beechy Island had been the winter quarters of the expedition under Sir John Franklin in the season 1845-6, and that there was circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove that its departure was somewhat sudden; but whether at an early or late period of the season, very difficult to determine.

9. The absolute necessity for the "Resolute" being held ready to push across the strait at the earliest moment, to communicate with Captain Ommanney, determine further movements, and get to the westward, prevented travelling operations; but the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Riley, Beechy Island, and the coast of Wellington Strait, to near Cape Bowden, were satisfactorily searched, without any record whatever being found.

10. On the morning of the 29th the ice eased off sufficiently to enable Lieutenant De Haven to rejoin his consort round Cape Spencer. On the afternoon of the 4th September, upon a southern movement of the ice, the "Assistance" rounded Cape Hotham, and the United States expedition reached to near Barlow Inlet. And on the morning of the 5th another movement enabled the "Resolute" and "Pioneer" to reach the western shore, but not in time to obtain security in Barlow Inlet.

11. We continued beset until the evening of the 7th, when the ice gave way to the northward, and carried us in a critical position out of the strait to the south-east of Cape Hotham; this movement enabled Captain Penny and Sir John Ross to cross the strait.

12. Early on the morning of the 9th another change occurred, when we succeeded in relieving ourselves from the ice, and (with the brigs and schooners) gained the water between the Pack to the southward and Cornwallis Island; then pushed on, with raised hopes, to the westward, steering for the southern extremity of Griffith Island, and sighting in the evening the "Assistance" and tender in that direction.

13. On the morning of the 10th we reached an extensive floe, extending from the south-west end of Griffith Island to the southward, as far as the eye could reach; to which the "Assistance" and tender were secured. We joined company, as did the brigs; and (in the evening) the United States expedition. Captain Ommanney informed me that he had searched by parties on foot (unhappily without finding any trace) the shores of Cornwallis Island from six miles above Barlow Inlet to Cape Martyr; had found two bays on the south shore eligible for winter security; and had deposited on Cape Hotham a depôt of twenty days provisions for ninety men, as also a small depôt on Griffith Island (since taken up).

14. Early on the morning of the 11th, Captain Ommanney in the "Intrepid" was despatched to the south-west to ascertain the state of the ice; Captain Penny also proceeded. The former returned in the evening having only been able to proceed in a south-west direction about twenty-five miles. Of the situation of the brigs I was somewhat apprehensive, confident that (from the severe weather) they were to the south-eastward of their former position.

15. Having now seen the uncertainty of the navigation to the westward, and the necessity for measures of precaution and prudence with a view to subsequent operations, I determined upon placing the "Assistance" and tender in winter quarters in the bay, midway between Capes Hotham and Martyr; and addressed a letter to the leaders of the two expeditions, apprizing them thereof, and proposing that the whole force might be concentrated, and arrangements made for each taking such portion of the search as under the circumstances might best insure the accomplishment of the object of our mission.

16. On the morning of the 13th September, the weather having somewhat cleared, with the temperature down to plus 3°, we cast off; after much labour and difficulty cleared the bay and stream ice, and reached open water east of Griffith Island, when the United States expedition were seen to communicate with each other, hoist their colours, and stand to the eastward. And it was not until some short time after that I recollected Lieutenant De Haven had, in reply, apprised me by letter of the probability of his return to America this year; but the circumstances in which we were placed wholly prevented our bearing up for communication. The same evening we made fast to the fixed ice between Cape Martyr and Griffith Island, as the only hope of finding security and gaining westing.

17. On the morning of the 14th the "Pioneer" proceeded to examine the ice to the southward, and returned in the evening, reporting no change; and early on the morning of the 16th the "Assistance" and tender left for their winter quarters; the "Resolute" and tender remaining at the edge of the floe, in the hope of obtaining at least an amount of westing that would be of good service when carrying out spring operations.

18. The bay ice proving very strong, the "Assistance" and tender got closely beset, and drifted for some time helplessly towards the shore; upon which (as soon as the vessels could be extricated) Captain Ommanney deemed it advisable to return, rejoining the same evening.

19. We thus remained in hope that the "Resolute" and tender might be able to advance, until the 24th, when, from the state of the ice and the low temperature, we were (after mature consideration) reluctantly compelled to give up all idea of prosecuting further, and to consider it imperative to look forthwith to the security of the expedition. The bay ice having this day slightly eased off a short distance astern, we commenced to cut through the newly formed pressed-up ice (between three and four hundred yards in extent, and from two to five feet in thickness,) between us and the lane of water, with the view of reaching the small bay a little to the eastward of Cape Martyr; but the new ice again making very fast, we were compelled to abandon the effort on the evening of the 25th.

20. Although it was now late to hope for much by travelling parties, yet, as the ships were well fixed, I determined to despatch a limited number to do all that could be accomplished before the season finally closed, as pioneers to the routes of the ensuing spring parties, and to gain experience. There accordingly started on the 2d of October a party of six men, under the command of Lieutenant Aldrich, with one runner sledge and thirteen days provisions, (assisted by one officer, six men, and one flat sledge, with three days provisions,) for Somerville and Lowther Islands on the Cape Walker route; a double party of twelve men, under the command of Lieutenant M'Clintock and Mr. Bradford, surgeon, with four flat sledges, fourteen days provisions, and a depôt for the Melville Island route; a small party under the command of Lieutenant Meham, towards Cape Hotham, to ascertain if any of the expeditions late in company were in sight from that position; and (afterwards) a small party, under the command of Lieutenant Osborn, to search the bay between Cape Martyr and the cape north-west of our position; but the weather becoming severe, with a considerable fall of temperature (minus 17°), they shortly returned, having only succeeded in placing the depôts, Lieutenant Aldrich on Somerville Island, and Lieutenant M'Clintock on Cornwallis Island, to the westward about twenty-five miles, but without discovering any traces. Lieutenant Meham found in the bay intended for the winter quarters of the "Assistance" and tender the expeditions of Sir John Ross and Captain Penny.

21. On the afternoon of the 17th Captain Penny arrived in his dog sledge, when the spring operations were determined upon, Captain Penny cheerfully undertaking the complete search of Wellington Strait. Thus ended the season of 1850.

22. The expedition was now prepared for the winter, and every means taken to pass as cheerfully and healthfully as possible this dreary season. Exercise in the open air, instruction and amusement, were resorted to, which, with the most perfect unanimity and a fair portion of conviviality, (under the blessing of Providence,) carried us through the monotony and privations of an Arctic winter in good health and spirits, for which much credit and my best thanks are due to Captain Ommanney, the officers, and all composing the expedition.

23. On the 18th of February 1851 a communication was opened (by a small party from this expedition) with our neighbours to the eastward, (temperature, minus 37½°,) and shortly after an interchange was made with Captain Penny of the detail of equipment for travelling parties determined upon by each.

24. By the 10th of March every arrangement had been made and generally promulgated for the departure of the spring searching parties as early as practicable after the first week in April. All appeared satisfied with the positions assigned to them, and became alike animated in the great and humane cause. With regard to myself, it appeared imperative that I should remain with the ships, and leave to those around me the satisfaction and honour of search and discovery, from their ages well adapting them for such service; the confidence

I felt in their talent and experience being fully equal to direct the energies and command the powers of the parties under them, and their determination to carry out the tasks they were appointed to perform. I must, however, say, that (if such a feeling could exist in a matter of duty) I did not, without the sacrifice of some personal ambition, refrain from participating in this great work of humanity.

25. From this period all joined heart and hand in putting forward every effort in the general preparation. Walking excursions for four hours a day when weather permitted, and sledge dragging with the actual weights, were measures of training.

26. By the 28th of March each individual was ready, and the equipment of the sledges generally complete. The best feeling and highest spirit prevailed throughout the expedition, and all now looked forward most anxiously for the arrival of the time when weather and temperature would permit their departure.

27. The weather being more promising on the 4th of April, Mr. M'Dougall, second master, with one officer and six men, one runner sledge, and twenty days provisions, left to examine the depots laid out in October last, and to search and examine, with the view to a subsequent survey, the unexplored part between Cornwallis and Bathurst Islands.

28. The temperature having arisen, on the 5th of April the final departure of the parties was determined upon for the 9th. On the 7th sledges were packed and made ready for that purpose; but fresh winds frustrated the arrangement.

29. The weather becoming more favourable on the morning of the 12th, the whole of the sledges, fourteen in number, (manned by 104 officers and men, and provisioned some for forty and other for forty-two days, with an average dragging weight of 205 lbs. per man,) were conducted under the command of captain Ommaoney to an advanced position on the ice off the north-west end of Griffith Island, where tents were pitched, luncheon cooked, and closely inspected by myself. The highly satisfactory result gave me great confidence and hope. All then returned to pass the next day (Sunday) in quiet reflection and prayer.

30. A moderate gale from the South-east, with heavy drift, prevented their departure on the 14th as intended.

31. On the evening of the 15th of April, the wind having fallen, and the temperature risen to plus 28°, all proceeded to the sledges; on arrival a short period was devoted to refreshment, after which all joined in offering up a prayer for protection and guidance; then started with perhaps as much determination and enthusiasm as ever existed, with the certainty of having to undergo great labour, fatigue, and privation.

32. On the 24th another party of one officer and six men left to search Lowther, Davy, and Garrett Islands, and examined the state of the ice to the westward. Between this and the beginning of May the temperature fell considerably (to minus 37°), accompanied by strong winds.

33. The whole of the limited parties returned at periods between the 27th April and the 19th of May, unhappily without any traces. They brought in casualties of men, wholly from frostbite, to the number of eighteen; one of which (it is my painful duty to relate) ended fatally. George S. Malcolm, captain of the hold of the Resolute, a native of Dundee, whose death was attributed to exhaustion and frostbite brought on whilst labouring as captain of the sledge Excellent, (virtually, it may be said,) died at his post. He was a most valuable and much respected petty officer. His remains are at rest on the north-east shore of Griffith Island.

34. During this interval four sledges, manned with twenty-seven officers and men, were despatched with refreshments for the extended parties in their return, and to assist them, if necessary, as also to make observations, fix positions, deposit records, &c.

35. The extended parties returned, unhappily without any trace whatever, between the 28th of May and the 4th of July, in safety and good health, but requiring short periods of rest and comfort to remove the effects of privation and fatigue. They were out respectively forty-four, fifty-eight, sixty, sixty-two, and (the Melville parties) eighty days, some portions of which periods they were (from heavy drift) detained in their tents with the temperature ranging as much as 69° below the freezing point.

36. The details connected with these directions I must defer for a future occasion, the following being the general results, viz. :—

Nature of party.	Officer in command,		No. of crew.	Name of sledge.	Days out.	Miles travelled.		Miles of coast searched.		Extreme point reached.	
	Name.	Rank.				Newly discovered.	Old.	Lat.	Long.		
<i>Along South Shore.</i>											
Extended	Erasmus Ommanney	Captain	6	Reliance	60	480	205	—	N.	72° 44'	100° 42' W.
Extended	Sherard Osborn, Esq.	Lieut.	7	True Blue	58	506	70	10	—	72° 18'	109° 25'
Extended	Wm. H. Browne, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Enterprise	44	375	150	—	—	72° 49'	96° 40'
Limited	G. F. Meham, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Succour	29	236	80	—	—	—	—
Limited	Mr. Vesey Hamilton.	Mate	7	Adventure	28	198	—	23	—	—	—
Limited	Mr. Charles Ede	Ass ^t Surg.	6	Inflexible	20	175	—	—	—	—	—
Auxiliary	Mr. F. J. Krabbe	2d Master	7	Success	13	116	—	—	—	—	—
Reserve and Hydrographical	G. F. Meham, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Russell	23	238	—	75	—	—	—
	Mr. F. J. Krabbe	2d Master	6	Edward Riddle.	18	110	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Along North Shore.</i>											
Extended	R. D. Aldrich, Esq.	Lieut.	7	Lady Franklin.	62	550	70	75	76° 16'	104° 20'	
Extended	F. L. M'Clintock, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Perseverance	80	760	40	215	74° 38'	114° 20'	
Extended	A. R. Bradford, Esq.	Surgeon	6	Resolute	80	669	135	30	76° 23'	106° 15'	
Limited	Mr. R. B. Pearse	Mate	7	Hotspur	24	208	—	—	—	—	
Limited	Mr. Walter W. May	Mate	6	Excellent	34	371	—	—	—	—	
Limited	Mr. W. B. Shellabear	2d Master	6	Dasher	24	245	—	—	—	—	
Auxiliary	Mr. John P. Cheyne	Mate	7	Parry	12	136	—	—	—	—	
	R. C. Allen, Esq.	Master	7	Grinnell	18	137	—	25	—	—	
Reserve and Hydrographical	R. C. Allen, Esq.	Master	5	Raper	7	44	—	—	—	—	
	Mr. W. W. May	Mate	5	"	6	45	—	—	—	—	
	Mr. G. F. M'Dougall	2d Master	7	Endeavour	18	140	95	20	—	—	
	Mr. G. F. M'Dougall	2d Master	6	Beaufort	18	198	—	—	—	—	

37. The extent of coast searched will be seen more readily in the accompanying outline of a chart.

38. Although all have experienced in the performance of this extensive undertaking considerable privation, labour, and suffering, and been animated with corresponding ardour in the great cause of humanity (which I earnestly hope will meet the approbation of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty), yet I feel it to be due to bring specially before their Lordships notice the great performance of Lieutenant M'Clintock and the crew of the sledge "Perseverance."

39. I feel it will be a source of much satisfaction to their Lordships to know, that every officer reports the conduct of his men to have been most exemplary, which, with their untiring labour and the good feeling they exhibited towards each other, was highly gratifying. And I must not omit to mention, that the crews are reported to have been animated by the example of the junior officers, who were almost constantly at the drag ropes.

40. It is my pleasing duty to report, that the health of all composing the expedition is highly satisfactory; the sick lists dated the 12th instant being as follows,—viz. :—

Ship.	Sledge.	Name	Rank or rating	Nature and extent of disease or injury.	Estimated time for being entirely recovered.
Resolute	Resolute	A. R. Bradford	Surgeon	Contusion and laceration of muscles of leg, producing debility of system.	One month.
	Excellent	Thomas Browne	Blacksmith	Severe frostbite of right leg, with gangrene.	Three month.
	Supernumerary, received from "Felix," Sir J. Ross, for medical treatment.	Peter Ecclestone	Cook	Scurvy and general disease of body.	One month.
	Reliance	Edward Privett	A. B.	Frostbite and amputation of great toe of left foot.	One week.
	Perseverance	James Rogers	A. B.	Frostbite of three first toes of left foot.	Three weeks.
	Adventure	William Colwill	Blacksmith	Frostbite and ulcer	Ten days.
	Inflexible	Thomas Rumble	A. B.	Frostbite of great toe of left foot, and inflammation of right knee.	One month.
	Success	John Heydon	A. B.	Frostbite of toes and plantar part of left foot.	One month.
Pioneer	"	None.	"	"	"
Intrepid	"	None.	"	"	"

41. The complements of the vessels composing the expedition are complete, the vacancy in the "Resolute" having been filled up by James Fox, A. B., volunteer, (native of Portpatrick, Wigtonshire,) who was received on the 17th of August last from the "Prince Albert" (Commissioner Forsyth) for medical treatment.

42. The navigation of these straits is in a remarkable degree favourable, with the promise of release during the present month. The distance from our position to the edge of the fixed ice is about eight miles, with several cracks.

43. Having now carefully considered the direction and extent of the search (without success) that has been made by this expedition, and weighed the opinions of the officers when at their "extremes," I have arrived at the conclusion, that the expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait, and therefore deem it unnecessary to attempt the prosecution of any further search to the westward; and should the result of Captain Penny's labours unhappily prove as fruitless as those of his officers, I shall then without hesitation determine upon the return of the expedition this year. But, looking to their Lordships intention, and the impression that may now become strengthened with reference to Jones's Sound, I shall consider it a duty, if the state of the ice and circumstances permit, to prosecute an examination in that direction.

44. Large cairns have been built and records deposited at Beechy Island, Cape Martyr, southern end of Griffith Island, Cape Walker, in latitude $73^{\circ} 55'$, long. $99^{\circ} 25' W.$, and in lat. $75^{\circ} 0'$, long. $99^{\circ} 0'$. Printed notices have also been deposited on the routes of the several searching parties.

I have, &c.

HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

P.S.—In preparing this Report I have omitted to notice, that when rounding Beechy Island on the morning of the 28th of August 1850, the closing of the ice hampered the vessels, and drove the "Pioneer" into shoal water, when she grounded, but she was shortly after hove off, without having sustained any damage.

As also, that on the 23d of May last Captain Penny reached the "Resolute," and made known to me that he had discovered a large space of water up Wellington Strait, commencing about seventy miles N. W. and N. of Cape Hotham. I had much regret that our remaining strength did not admit of my placing at his disposal sufficient aid to convey a boat to enable him to ascertain its nature and extent.

The results of the operations, with the tracing of a rough outline chart, have been transmitted to the two expeditions to the eastward.

(Signed) H. T. A.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN to CAPTAIN OMMANNEY, H. M. ship "Assistance," and the Lieutenants in charge of H. M. screw tenders "Pioneer" and "Intrepid."

General Memo.

Her Majesty's ship Resolute.
At sea, lat. $75.25.N.$, long. $61.34.W.$
25th July 1850.

In the hope that the expedition is now not far distant from the North Water, and although the nature and movements of the ice are so varied in different seasons as to prevent any determination of plan until the moment for acting arrives, it becomes desirable that what is contemplated in the prosecution of the charge assigned to me (the accomplishment of which we all have so much at heart) should be made known.

I therefore here promulgate it, and it is to be received as an addenda to the instructions issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and carried out with all the earnestness and zeal that so highly important a service demands.

The circumstance of a tender being attached to each ship established in a great measure the security and confidence necessary in the prosecution of this service (which would not be felt by one vessel alone), and admits of a partial separation for the season to enable a more extended search being made.

When maturely considering the most probable route of the missing expedition in its return by way of "Lancaster Sound," or any of the crews that might have left their

vessels, it appears that they would have attempted to reach "Ponds Bay," either during the late autumn of last year or the earliest moment this spring, with the hope of meeting the whalers in the present season.

Therefore, the "Resolute" and her tender will proceed to "Ponds Bay," and, if it can be done, communicate with the natives there; then, as circumstances admit, search along that shore on her way to "Whaler Point."

The "Assistance" and her tender will commence the search at "Cape Warrender," continuing it along the north shore to "Wellington Strait," examine its shores and neighbourhood, and proceed as far up it as is practicable and sufficient to fully satisfy that it has, or has not, been the course of the missing ships; and as Mr. Penny in his success will traverse the northern part of this strait, there is good reason to hope that so very important a doubt will be set at rest.

Should any record be found of Sir John Franklin having proceeded in that direction, then it is to be made known to the "Resolute" by depositing a notice thereof at either "Cape Reilly" or "Cape Hotham," and the search proceeded with most vigorously; in which the "Resolute" would hasten to join at the earliest moment.

But in the event of no record being found there, and as it is most desirable and important that the ships should meet, or at least communicate results of labours to this point, then the rendezvous to be between Capes "Rennell," "Hotham," and "Reilly;" the "Resolute" standing to the northward from midnight to noon, and to the southward from noon to midnight, in the meridian of "Cape Hotham."

But should the examination of "Wellington Strait" be speedily accomplished, without traces being found, and the "Resolute" not having reached the rendezvous, then, in order to save time, the "Assistance" will take up the search to "Cape Walker," examining its neighbourhood thoroughly as far as it is practicable, and, failing to obtain any information there or to meet the "Resolute," will then continue it on the north shore of the "Parry Islands."

And with a view to have a fixed place where there is good reason to expect that vessels may reach, should the rendezvous, on account of time, fail for communication, then a full account of proceedings, with any change of plans called for from circumstances not anticipated here, must be deposited at the southern extremity of "Griffith's Island."

In the event of the "Resolute" first reaching the rendezvous between Capes "Rennell," "Hotham," and "Reilly," then all endeavour will be made to prosecute to the entrance of "Wellington Strait," touching at "Cape Reilly" and "Cape Hotham" in order, according to circumstances; and, failing to meet there with information of "Assistance" or traces of the missing expedition, will then proceed towards Capes "Rennell" and "Walker," and not finding traces in that direction will continue the search in the south-west towards "Melville Island," where it would be expected to take up winter quarters; but if, on the contrary, traces are found, then the object of reaching "Melville Island" would be abandoned, and winter quarters taken in the south-west direction according to circumstances.

Should "Assistance," on reaching "Cape Hotham," discover that "Resolute" have preceded her, and gone on without finding any traces, she will then make the best of her way in the direction of "Cape Walker," and, failing to meet with "Resolute" in that neighbourhood, or any traces, will without delay carry on the search along the north shore of the "Parry Islands."

The "Resolute," failing to reach "Melville Island" to winter, will endeavour to communicate in early spring with "Winter Harbour," and should "Assistance" similarly fail she must do the same, independently of other searching parties that may be despatched, as it is most important that the results of the several examinations made up to this period should be communicated.

On every occasion of visiting the shore a record must be deposited, comprising every necessary particular, taking as a guide my minute of the 3d instant, and being careful to note that a considerable supply of provisions and fuel is deposited at "Whaler Point" on the western entrance of "Prince Regent's Inlet."

With a view to attract the attention of any of the missing persons, care must be taken that during the periods of darkness, and when fogs prevail, periodical signals are made; rockets, blue lights, guns, muskets, maroons, drums, gongs, bells, and whistles being employed as most suitable, according to circumstances.

When in open water a document is to be occasionally thrown overboard, containing the necessary particulars as detailed in the printed papers supplied.

The substance and spirit of their Lordships orders under which I am acting must be the guide for any point not herein provided for, or whenever doubt arises, as they will govern all the operations of the "Resolute."

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY of the ADMIRALTY.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," Ponds Bay,
18th August 1850.

Sir,

Having reached Ponds Bay I deem it advisable to deposit an outline of the proceedings of the expedition under my orders, for their Lordships information, although (as I am impressed that none of the whalers have been able to get to the north water this season) I cannot expect that it will reach England before the Autumn of 1851.

Since my report of the 7th ultimo, our constant endeavour has been to round the pack, and get to the north water, which has employed us under various circumstances most anxiously, and not without a fair portion of labour, until the period of reaching "Cape Dudley Digges" on the night of the 13th instant.

Our object was to keep along the land ice until reaching the northern extreme of the pack, but large portions of it breaking away, especially about "Melville Monument," we were, from the time of arriving off that place on the 18th ultimo, more or less closely beset until the 10th instant, when, after earnest exertions, the land ice was reached a little to the northward of "Cape Walker," where the tenders were again able to act efficiently, and our advancement to be proportionately successful, having only been detained for short periods by three nips between Capes "Walker" and "York."

Mr. Penny's expedition and ourselves had been almost constantly in company from the 19th ultimo until the 1st instant, co-operating together most satisfactorily in endeavouring to round the pack, the tenders towing the ships and brigs whenever circumstances admitted; but on the latter date the brigs, by a sudden movement of the floes, succeeded in reaching to a lead, which, coupled with the extreme vigilance, energy, and untiring labour displayed in all their operations, eventually enabled them to get into a large space of water under "Cape Walker," and they were not again overtaken until the evening of the 13th instant off "Cape York."

The "Felix" and "Prince Albert" were fallen in with, on the 10th instant, a little to the northward of "Cape Walker," the latter communicating with us. Their successful progress in so short a period may be accounted for from the circumstance of the land floes having become detached, and their being able to keep along the coast in a lane of water for a considerable period of their route.

While stopped at a heavy nip under "Cape Melville" on the evening of the 11th instant, these vessels joined company, since which, in consequence of the calms and very light airs that have prevailed, they have been continued in tow in order to their being placed in the north water at the earliest moment to enable them to prosecute to the utmost this season.

Upon the "Assistance" communicating with natives who were seen in passing Cape York information was obtained, through the interpreter of the Felix (an Esquimaux from Holsteinsborg), somewhat to the effect, "that in year 1845 two ships were there; that in the year 1846 they were stranded and burnt a little to the northward, and the officers and crews destroyed by natives."

Although, from the difficulty of interpreting, and the fact of several hours having elapsed after the information was received by the Esquimaux interpreter before the serious part of it was made known, with other attendant circumstances, I had much confidence in believing that the sad intelligence was not correct, yet I felt that it should be most thoroughly investigated without delay; and as Mr. Penny had just previously visited the place, I despatched Captain Ommanney in the "Intrepid" to confer with him, and through the medium of his Danish interpreter to make another most minute and careful investigation, the vessels remaining in company to await the result.

Perceiving that the "Intrepid," after communicating with Captain Penny's expedition, was proceeding towards "Cape York," I deemed it important to go there also, and accordingly followed in the "Pioneer," taking with me the Esquimaux interpreter of the "Felix," and a Shetlandman the interpreter of the "Prince Albert;" Sir John Ross and Commander Forsyth accompanying, the latter of whom had been present when the information was received. However, before reaching "Cape York," the "Intrepid" was seen coming out of the bay, having Captain Ommanney and Mr. Penny with his Danish interpreter on board, who stated that "having fully investigated the matter they were satisfied that it originated in the Esquimaux of the 'Felix' understanding but little of the language of the natives; and a confusion of the vessels of Mr. Penny, who had just previously visited there, with the circumstance of the 'North Star' having wintered (as it appeared from them) a little to the northward (most probably in "Wolstenholme Sound")."

During our return to the ships under "Cape Dudley Digges," I had before me the Danish interpreter of Captain Penny's expedition, the Esquimaux interpreter of the "Felix," the interpreter of the "Prince Albert," and a native (one of those who gave the information) who had voluntarily embarked with Captain Ommanney; and, assisted by the leaders of the several expeditions, most carefully and minutely sifted the subject, when all became satisfied that the statement had no reference to the expedition under Sir John

Franklin, and appeared to originate, the first from questions put to the natives relative to two vessels in the years 1845 and 1846,—from the language of the Esquimaux of the “Felix” differing to a considerable extent from that of the natives there,—from the circumstance of some vessel (in all probability the “North Star”) having been seen by the natives, who appeared to recognize our caps as similar to some they had seen there,—from Captain Penny’s two vessels having just previously visited them,—from the death of a considerable number of Esquimaux to the northward through starvation and sickness, and the massacre of others in a quarrel.

Having returned to the ships, the whole proceeded, the “Resolute” and “Prince Albert” in tow of “Pioneer,” and the “Assistance” and “Felix” in tow of “Intrepid,” (Mr. Penny’s expedition proceeding alone,) till reaching a little to the northward of “Cape Dudley Digges,” when, the pack edge showing much less compactness than before, the expedition separated; the “Assistance” and her tender, with the “Felix” in tow astern, standing along shore towards “Wolstenholme Sound” to ascertain if the “North Star” was there, and then to proceed in the execution of her orders; and the “Resolute” and her tender, with the “Prince Albert” in tow astern, proceeding to round the pack on her way to “Ponds Bay.”

At noon of the 17th instant, in a thick fog, there being a light fair breeze, the “Prince Albert” was cast off, with the intention of proceeding, first to “Cape Hay,” and then to “Wollaston Island” and “Cape Charles Yorke,” on her way to “Prince Regent’s Inlet,” and if she succeeded in obtaining information of the missing expedition at either of those places, would use her best endeavours to make the same known to me at “Port Leopold.” The earnestness and readiness displayed by Commander Forsyth in the object we have in view entitles him to my best thanks.

Commander Forsyth informed me that when to the southward of “Cape Walker” on the 6th instant he saw the American expedition, consisting of two schooners, about seven miles to the southward of him.

I enclose herewith a copy of the memorandum given for the future proceedings of the expedition.

It affords me much satisfaction in reporting that good health and high spirits prevail throughout.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

Her Majesty’s Ship “Resolute,” Lancaster Sound,
24th August 1850.

Sir,

1st. In continuation of my Report dated the 18th instant (a copy of which is enclosed herewith), I have the honour to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that in consequence of the wind having freshened towards the close of the 17th, just enabling the vessels to lie for “Possession Bay,” at midnight I left the “Resolute” to search that place, proceeding myself in the “Pioneer” for “Ponds Bay;” but, owing to fogs, a gale of wind, and being without an observation, that place was not reached until the night of the 21st instant, when, during a partial clearance of the weather, the “Pioneer” proceeded about twelve miles up this bay or inlet, which, as far as the eye could reach, was clear of ice.

2d. On Lieutenant Osborn landing here on the north side there was found a summer encampment of the Esquimaux, including the material of several huts, with stores of oil and blubber, the blood of animals appearing quite fresh, giving evidence of the residence of the natives not long since, and the promise of their intended return next season.

3d. Official documents with private letters (addressed to the care of the master of any whaler) were deposited here as the most promising course to adopt for them to reach their destination, it being the custom of the natives to visit the ships before the breaking away of the land ice, and earlier than the ships can reach the shore. Some presents were also left here as an inducement to the natives to deliver over these documents as soon as an opportunity offers.

4th. The “Pioneer” then proceeded with all despatch to rejoin the “Resolute,” her progress being much retarded by a strong head wind, and she did not reach her until the evening of the 22d.

5th. During my absence the “Resolute” had communicated with “Possession Bay,” and there found a record deposited by the “North Star” on the 9th instant, as well as one left by the “Enterprise” in 1848, but unhappily none having reference to the object of our search.

6th. Although the not meeting with natives at “Ponds Bay” (doubtless owing to the late period of the season) was a considerable disappointment, and prevented our ascertaining

from them whether they had heard anything of the missing expedition, yet as the north shore of this "inlet," as well as the coast between it and "Possession Bay," has been well examined, without any sign or trace of them having been discovered, I feel convinced that none of our unfortunate countrymen have reached these parts.

7th. Therefore, from these examinations, coupled with those undertaken by Commander Forsyth, we proceeded on the evening of the 22d direct to communicate with Port Leopold, fully satisfied that the coast between it and Pond's Bay will have been fully searched.

8th. Although the passing of valuable time (from bad weather) at Pond's Bay is a cause of considerable regret, yet it will be satisfactory, when prosecuting hereafter, to know that all in our rear has been thoroughly searched, besides which the examination of Wellington Strait by Captain Ommanney will most likely occupy several days, the accomplishment of which is most important before I proceed to the westward.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
 Captain, &c.

No. 2.

(Captain Austin furnishes Copies of the Inscriptions on the Three Graves found at Beechey Island, together with a Sketch of the Three Tablets.)

No. 3.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

No. 4.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," off the Winter Quarters
 of Captain Penny's expedition, 11th August 1851.
 (Received 27th September.)

Sir,

HAVING reached the winter quarters of the "Felix" previous to her departure, I have the honour to state (with reference to my Report of the 14th ultimo), that, having communicated with Captain Penny, and fully weighed his official reply to my letter relative to the search of Wellington Strait made by the expedition under his charge, I do not feel authorized to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in that direction. It is now my intention to proceed with all despatch to attempt the search of Jones's Sound.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
 Captain, &c.

No. 4.

Captain AUSTIN to Mr. WILLIAM PENNY, H. M. Brig "Lady Franklin," and in charge of an expedition searching for the Expedition under Sir John Franklin.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," off the Winter Quarters of
 Captain Penny's Expedition, 11th August 1851.

Sir,

HAVING this day most unexpectedly reached your winter quarters, and also having had the satisfaction of a personal communication with you, I now beg leave to acquaint you that, having maturely considered the directions and extent of the search (without success) that has been made by the expedition under my charge, and weighed the opinions of the officers when at their extremes, I have arrived at the conclusion, that the expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait.

Under these circumstances I now await your reply to my letter transmitted herewith, in order that I may make known to you, at the earliest moment, the plans for the future movements of this expedition.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
 Captain, &c.

No. 4a.

Captain AUSTIN to Mr. WILLIAM PENNY, H. M. brig "Lady Franklin," and in charge of an expedition searching for the Expedition under Sir John Franklin.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," off the Winter Quarters of
Captain Penny's Expedition, 11th August 1851.

Sir,

HAVING this day most unexpectedly reached your winter quarters, and also having had the satisfaction of a personal communication with you, I feel it incumbent (previous to making known to you my determination as to the further movements of the expedition under my orders) to request that you will be pleased to acquaint me whether you consider that the search of Wellington Strait, made by the expedition under your charge, is so far satisfactory as to render a further prosecution in that direction, if practicable, unnecessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

No. 5.

Mr. PENNY to Captain AUSTIN.

Sir,

Assistance Bay, 11th August 1851.

YOUR question is easily answered. My opinion is, Wellington Channel requires no further search. All has been done in the power of man to accomplish, and no trace has been found. What else can be done?

I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM PENNY.

No. 6.

Captain AUSTIN to Mr. PENNY, H. M. brig "Lady Franklin," and in charge of an expedition searching for the Expedition under Sir John Franklin.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," off the Winter Quarters of
Captain Penny's Expedition, 12th August 1851.

Sir,

I BEG leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter making known to me the result of the search of Wellington Strait by the expedition under your charge.

I have now to inform you, that I do not consider it necessary to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in that direction with the expedition under my orders.

It is now my intention to proceed to attempt the search of Jones's Sound.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

No. 7.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

No. 5.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," off the Winter Quarters of Capt. Penny's
Expedition between Capes Martyr and Hotham, 12th August 1851.
(Received 11th September.)

Sir,

1. IN order that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may learn by the first opportunity the proceedings of the expedition intrusted to my charge,

I consider it advisable that a brief account (amended since the return of Captain Penny) should be placed on board the "Lady Franklin," my brief report of the 14th instant having been transferred to the "Felix" in consequence of the attempt to send a boat to Ponds Bay to communicate with the whalers being relinquished.

2. Captain Ommanney having examined Wolstenholme Sound, which proved to have been the winter quarters of the "North Star," and completed the search of the north shore of Lancaster Sound and Barrow Straits from Cape Warrender to Cape Fellfoot, looked into Port Leopold, and then proceeded in further execution of his orders; the "Intrepid" having in the meantime examined Maxwell Bay and Cape Hurd, finding at the latter place a record from the "Investigator."

3. Captain Ommanney in the "Intrepid" reached Cape Riley and Beechy Island on the night of the 23d of August, and at both found positive traces of the missing expedition.

4. On the 24th Captain Ommanney was joined by the United States schooner "Rescue," and in the latter part of that day he despatched the "Intrepid" to search the shore to the northward, but she was stopped by the fixed ice about 4 miles beyond Point Innes.

5. On the 25th a lead opened towards Cape Hotham. Captain Ommanney, hoping to find a record there, despatched the "Intrepid" to take advantage of it, following in the "Assistance;" Captain Penny, who had now arrived and communicated, remaining to search the Bay between Cape Riley and Beechy Island.

6. The "Resolute," having in her search been detained by weather, did not reach Cape Riley and Beechy Island until early on the morning of the 28th. She found between the latter and Cape Spencer the "Felix," Sir John Ross, the two brigs of Captain Penny, and the "Rescue," Lieutenant De Haven, and saw from the crow's nest the "Assistance" and "Intrepid" on the opposite shore near Barlow Inlet. The other United States schooner "Advance" was beset, a few miles to the northward, with a searching party to Cape Bowden, where a bottle, scraps of newspaper, shot, and other miscellaneous fragments were found, conveying the impression that it had been the resting place of a shooting, or other small party.

7. In rounding Beechy Island we were hampered by the closing of the ice, which drove the "Pioneer" into shoal water, where she grounded, but was afterwards hove off without having sustained any damage.

8. Previous to the arrival of the "Resolute" Captain Penny had found on Beechy Island three graves, and various other conclusive evidence, which, the moment I saw them, assured me that the Bay between Cape Riley and Beechy Island had been the winter quarters of the expedition under Sir John Franklin in the season 1845-1846, and that there was circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove that its departure was somewhat sudden, but whether at an early or late period of the season very difficult to determine.

9. The absolute necessity for the "Resolute" being held ready to push across the strait at the earliest moment to communicate with Captain Ommanney, determine further movements, and get to the westward, prevented travelling operations; but the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Riley, Beechy Island, and the coast of Wellington Strait, to near Cape Bowden, were satisfactorily searched, without any record whatever being found.

10. On the morning of the 28th the ice eased off sufficiently to enable Lieutenant De Haven to rejoin his consort round Cape Spencer. On the afternoon of the 4th of September, upon a southerly movement of the ice, the "Assistance" rounded Cape Hotham and the United States expedition to near Barlow Inlet; and on the morning of the 5th another movement enabled the "Resolute" and "Pioneer" to reach the western shore, but not in time to obtain security in Barlow Inlet.

11. We continued beset until the evening of the 7th, when the ice gave way to the northward, and carried us in a critical position out of the strait to the south coast of Cape Hotham. This movement enabled Captain Penny and Sir John Ross to cross the strait.

12. Early on the morning of the 9th another change occurred, when we succeeded in relieving ourselves from the ice, and (with the brigs and schooners) gained the water between the pack to the southward and Cornwallis Island; then pushed on, with raised hopes, to the westward, steering for the southern extremity of Griffith Island, and sighting in the evening the "Assistance" and tender in that direction.

13. On the morning of the 10th we reached an extensive floe, extending from the south-west end of Griffith Island to the southward, as far as the eye could reach, to which the "Assistance" and tender were secured. We joined company, as did the brigs; and (in the evening) the United States expedition. Captain Ommanney informed me that he had searched the parties on foot (unhappily without finding any trace) the shores of Cornwallis Island, from six miles above Barlow Inlet to Cape Martyr, had found two bays on the south shore eligible for winter security, and had deposited on Cape Hotham a depôt of twenty days provisions for ninety men, as also a small depôt on Griffith Island (since taken up.)

14. Early on the morning of the 11th, Captain Ommanney in the "Intrepid" was despatched to the southward and westward to ascertain the state of the ice. Captain Penny also proceeded. The former returned in the evening, having only been able to proceed in a southward and westward direction about twenty-five miles. Of the situation of the brigs I was somewhat apprehensive, confident that (from the severe weather) they were to the southward and eastward of their former position.

15. Having now seen the uncertainty of the navigation to the westward, and the necessity for measures of precaution and prudence, with a view to subsequent operations I determined upon placing the "Assistance" and tender in winter quarters in the bay, midway between Capes Hotham and Martyr, and addressed a letter to the leaders of the two expeditions, apprising them thereof, and proposing that the whole force might be concentrated, and arrangements made for each taking such portion of the search as under the circumstances might best ensure the accomplishment of the object of our mission.

16. On the morning of the 13th the weather having somewhat cleared, with the temperature down to near zero (plus 3), we cast off, after much labour and difficulty, cleared the bay and stream ice, and reached open water east of Griffith Island, when the United States expedition were seen to communicate with each other, hoist their colours, and stand to the eastward; and it was not until some short time after that I recollected Lieutenant De Haven had in reply apprized me by letter of the probability of his return to America this year; but the circumstances in which we were placed wholly prevented our bearing up for communication. The same evening we made fast to the fixed ice between Cape Martyr and Griffith Island, as the only hope for finding security and gaining westing.

17. On the morning of the 14th the "Pioneer" proceeded to examine the ice to the southward, and returned in the evening, reporting no change; and early on the morning of the 16th the "Assistance" and tender left for their winter quarters; the "Resolute" and tender remaining at the edge of the ice, in the hope of obtaining at least an amount of westing that would be of good service when carrying out spring operations.

18. The bay ice proving very strong, the "Assistance" and tender got closely beset, and drifted for some time helplessly towards the shore; upon which (as soon as the vessels could be extricated) Captain Ommanney deemed it advisable to return, rejoining the same evening.

19. We thus remained, in the hope that the "Resolute" and tender might be able to advance, until the 24th, when, from the state of the ice and the low temperature (plus $13\frac{1}{2}$), we were (after mature consideration) reluctantly compelled to give up all idea of prosecuting further, and to consider it imperative to look forthwith to the security of the expedition. The bay ice having this day slightly eased off a short distance astern, we commenced to cut through the newly formed pressed up ice (between three and four hundred yards in extent, and from two to five feet in thickness) between us and the line of water, with the view of reaching the small bay a little to the eastward

of Cape Martyr, but the new ice again making very fast we were compelled to relinquish the effort on the evening of the 25th.

20. Although it was now late to hope for much by travelling parties, yet as the ships were fixed I determined to despatch a limited number to do all that could be accomplished before the season finally closed, as pioneers to the routes of the ensuing spring parties, and to gain experience. There accordingly started, on the 2d of October, a party of six men, under the command of Lieutenant Aldrich, with one runner sledge and thirteen days provisions, (assisted by one officer, six men, and one flat sledge, with three days provisions,) for Somerville and Lowther Islands on the Cape Walker route; a double party of twelve men, under the command of Lieutenant M'Clintock, and Mr. Bradford, surgeon, with four flat sledges, fourteen days provisions, and a depôt for the Melville Island route; a small party under the command of Lieutenant Mecham, towards Cape Hotham, to ascertain if any of the expeditions late in company were in sight from that position; and (afterwards) a small party under the command of Lieutenant Osborn, to search the bay between Cape Martyr and the cape north-west of our position; but the weather becoming severe, with a considerable fall of temperature (49° below the freezing point), they shortly returned, having only succeeded in placing the depôts, Lieutenant Aldrich on Somerville Island, and Lieutenant M'Clintock on Cornwallis Island, to the westward about twenty-five miles, but without discovering any traces. Lieutenant Mecham found in the bay intended for the winter quarters of the "Assistance" and tender, the expeditions of Sir John Ross and Captain Penny.

21. On the afternoon of the 17th, Captain Penny arrived in his dog sledge, when the spring operations were determined upon, Captain Penny cheerfully undertaking the complete search of Wellington Strait. Thus ended the season of 1850.

22. The expedition was now prepared for the winter, and every means taken to pass as cheerfully and healthfully as possible this dreary season. Exercise in the open air, instruction and amusement, were resorted to; which, with the most perfect unanimity, and a fair portion of conviviality, (under the blessing of Providence,) carried us through the monotony and privations of an arctic winter in good health and spirits, for which much credit and my best thanks are due to Captain Ommanney, the officers, and all composing the expedition.

23. On the 18th of February 1851 a communication was opened (by a small party from this expedition) with our neighbours to the eastward, temperature $69\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ below the freezing point; and shortly after an interchange was made with Captain Penny of the detail of equipment for travelling parties determined upon by each.

24. By the 10th of March every arrangement had been made, and generally promulgated, for the departure of the spring searching parties as early as practicable after the first week in April. All appeared satisfied with the positions assigned to them, and became alike animated in the great and humane cause. With regard to myself, it appeared imperative that I should remain with the ships, and leave to those around me the satisfaction and honor of search and discovery, from their ages well adapting them for such service, and the confidence I felt in their talent and experience being fully equal to direct the energies and command the powers of the parties under them, and their determination to carry out the tasks they were appointed to perform. I must, however, say, that (if such a feeling could exist in a matter of duty) I did not, without the sacrifice of some personal ambition, refrain from participating in this great work of humanity.

Tempera-
ture ranging
from 10° to
 43° minus.

25. From this period all joined heart and hand in putting forward every effort in the general preparation. Walking excursions for four hours a day when weather permitted, and sledge dragging with the actual weights, were measures of training.

26. By the 28th of March each individual was ready, and the equipment of the sledges generally complete. The best feeling and highest spirit prevailed throughout the expedition, and all now looked forward most anxiously for the arrival of the time when weather and temperature would permit their departure.

27. The weather being more promising, on the 4th of April Mr. M'Dougall second master, with one officer and six men, one runner sledge and twenty days provisions, left, to examine the depôts laid out in October last, and to search and examine, with the view to a subsequent survey, the unexplored part between Cornwallis and Bathurst Islands. Temperature 38° below freezing point.

28. The temperature having risen, on the 5th of April the final departure of the parties was determined upon for the 9th. On the 7th the sledges were packed and made ready for that purpose, but fresh winds frustrated the arrangement. Temperature 44° below freezing point.

29. The weather becoming more favourable, on the morning of the 12th the whole of the sledges, fourteen in number, (manned by 104 officers and men, and provisioned, some for forty and others for forty-two days, with an average dragging weight of 205 lbs. per man,) were conducted, under the command of Captain Ommanney, to an advanced position on the ice off the north-west end of Griffith Island, where tents were pitched, luncheon cooked, and all closely inspected by myself. The highly satisfactory result gave me great confidence and hope. All then returned to pass the next day (Sunday) in quiet reflection and prayer. Temperature 50° below freezing point.

30. A moderate gale from the south-east, with heavy drift, prevented their departure on the 14th, as intended.

31. On the evening of the 15th of April, the wind having fallen, and the temperature risen to plus 18°, all proceeded to the sledges. On arrival a short period was devoted to refreshment, after which all joined in offering up a prayer for protection and guidance, then started with perhaps as much determination and enthusiasm as ever existed, with the certainty of having to undergo great labour, fatigue, and privation. Temperature 14° below freezing point.

32. On the 24th another party of one officer and six men left to search Lowther, Davy, and Garrett Islands, and examine the state of the ice to the westward. Between this and the beginning of May the temperature fell considerably (to minus 37°), accompanied by strong winds.

33. The whole of the limited parties returned at periods between the 27th April and the 19th of May, unhappily without any traces. They brought in casualties of men from frostbite to the number of eighteen, one of which (it is my painful duty to relate) ended fatally. George S. Malcolm, Captain of the hold of the "Resolute," a native of Dundee, whose death was attributed to exhaustion and frostbite brought on whilst labouring as captain of the sledge "Excellent," (virtually it may be said) died at his post. He was a most valuable and much respected petty officer. His remains are at rest on the north-east shore of Griffith Island.

34. During this interval, four sledges, manned with twenty-seven officers and men, were despatched with refreshments for the extended parties in their return, and to assist them, if necessary, and also to make observations, fix positions, deposit records, &c.

35. On the 23d of May Captain Penny reached the "Resolute," and made known to me that he had discovered a large space of water up Wellington Strait, commencing about seventy miles N.W. by N. of Cape Hotham. I much regretted that our remaining strength did not admit of my placing at his disposal sufficient aid to convey a boat, that he might ascertain its nature and extent.

36. The extended parties returned, unhappily without any trace whatever, between the 28th of May and the 4th of July, in safety and good health, but requiring short periods of rest and comfort to remove the effects of the privation and fatigue. They were out respectively, forty-four, fifty-eight, sixty, and sixty-two, and (the Melville Island parties) eighty days, some portions of which periods they were (from heavy drift) detained in their tents, with the temperature ranging as much as 69° below the freezing point.

37. The details connected with these operations I must defer for a future occasion, the following being the general results; viz.

Nature of party.	Officer in command.		No. of crew.	Name of sledge.	Days out.	Miles travelled.	Miles of coast searched.		Extreme point reached.	
	Name.	Rank.					Newly discovered.	Old.	Lat.	Long.
<i>Along South Shore.</i>										
Extended	Erasmus Ormanney	Captain	6	Reliance	60	480	205	—	N.	W.
Extended	Sherard Osborn, Esq.	Lieut.	7	True Blue	58	506	70	10	72° 44'	100° 42'
Extended	Wm. B. Browne, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Enterprise	44	375	150	—	72° 18'	103° 25'
Limited	Geo. F. Meham, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Succour	29	236	80	—	72° 49'	96° 40'
Limited	Mr. Vesey Hamilton	Mate	7	Adventure	28	198	—	23	—	—
Limited	Mr. Chas. Ede	Ass ^t Surg.	6	Inflexible	20	175	—	—	—	—
Auxiliary	Mr. Fk. J. Crabbe	2d Master	7	Success	13	116	—	—	—	—
Reserve and Hydrographical	Geo. F. Meham, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Russell	23	238	—	75	—	—
	Mr. F. J. Krabbe	2d Master	6	Edward Riddle.	18	110	—	—	—	—
<i>Along North Shore.</i>										
Extended	Rob ^t . D. Aldrich, Esq.	Lieut.	7	Lady Franklin.	62	550	70	75	76° 16'	104° 30'
Extended	F. L. M ^c Clintock, Esq.	Lieut.	6	Perseverance	70	760	40	215	74° 38'	114° 20'
Extended	A. R. Bradford, Esq.	Surgeon	6	Resolute	80	669	155	30	76° 23'	106° 15'
Limited	Mr. R. B. Pearse	Mate	7	Hotspur	24	208	—	—	—	—
Limited	Mr. Walter W. May	Mate	6	Excellent	34	371	—	—	—	—
Limited	Mr. W. B. Shellabear	2d Master	6	Dasher	24	245	—	—	—	—
Auxiliary	Mr. John P. Cheyne	Mate	7	Parry	12	136	—	—	—	—
	R. C. Allen, Esq.	Master	7	Grinnell	18	137	—	25	—	—
Reserve and Hydrographical	R. C. Allen, Esq.	Master	5	Raper	7	44	—	—	—	—
	Mr. Walter W. May	Mate	5	—	6	45	—	—	—	—
	Mr. Geo. F. M ^c Dougall	2d Master	7	Endeavour	18	140	95	20	—	—
	Mr. Geo. F. M ^c Dougall	2d Master	6	Beaufort	18	198	—	—	—	—

38. The extent of coast searched will be seen more readily in the accompanying outline of a chart.

39. Although we have experienced in the performance of this extensive undertaking considerable privation, labour, and suffering, and been animated with corresponding ardour in the great cause of humanity, which I earnestly hope will meet the approbation of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, yet I feel it to be due to bring specially before their Lordships notice the great performance of Lieutenant M^cClintock and the crew of the sledge "Perseverance."

40. I cannot omit to notice, that the runner sledges have withstood the severe wear and tear of these journeys most admirably. I believe their construction to have arisen from the experience of arctic voyagers, but feel it to be due to express that the manner in which they are put together reflects the highest credit on the persons who did it.

41. I feel it will be a source of much satisfaction to their Lordships to know, that every officer reports the conduct of his men to have been most exemplary, which, with their untiring labour, and the good feeling they exhibited towards each other, was highly gratifying; and I must not omit to mention, that the crews are reported to have been animated by the example of the junior officers, who were almost constantly at the drag ropes.

42. It is my pleasing duty to report, that the health of all composing the expedition is highly satisfactory, the sick list, dated the 9th instant, being as follows; viz.

Ship.	Sledge.	Name.	Rank of rating.	Nature and extent of disease or injury.	Estimated time for being entirely recovered.
Resolute	Excellent	Thomas Brown	Blacksmith	Several frostbites of right leg with gangrene.	Three months.
	Supernumerary received from "Felix," Sir J. Ross, for medical treatment.	Peter Ecclestone	Cook	Scurvy and general disease of body.	Convalescent, discharged Felix.
	Reliance	Edward Privett	A. B.	Frostbite and amputation of great toe of left foot.	—
	Perseverance	James Rogers	A. B.	Frostbite of first three toes of left foot.	Three weeks.
Assistance	Adventure	William Colvill	Blacksmith	Frostbite and ulcer	Ten days.
	Inflexible	Thomas Rumble	A. B.	Frostbite of great toe of left foot and inflammation of right knee.	One month.
	Success	John Heydon	A. B.	Frostbite of toes and part of left foot.	One month.
Pioneer		None.	—	—	—
Intrepid		None.	—	—	—

43. The four vessels composing the expedition are in every way efficient. The defects of the "Pioneer," consisting of twenty-one top timbers crushed by a heavy nip in the Melville Bay, have been made good. The machinery of both steam vessels has undergone repairs and numerous adjustments, and is in a state highly satisfactory, reflecting much credit on the engineers.

44. The complements of the vessels composing the expedition are complete, the vacancy in the "Resolute" having been filled by James Fox, A. B., volunteer, (native of Portpatrick, Wigtonshire,) who was received on the 17th of August last from the "Prince Albert" (Commander Forsyth), for medical treatment.

45. Large cairns have been built and records deposited at Beechy Island, Cape Martyr, southern end of Griffith Island, Cape Walker, in latitude $73^{\circ} 55'$ north, longitude $99^{\circ} 25'$ west, and in latitude $75^{\circ} 0'$, longitude $99^{\circ} 0'$. Printed notices have also been deposited on the routes of the several searching parties.

46. Having yesterday been released from our winter quarters, and most unexpectedly reached to those of Captain Penny, I have now the honour to state, that, having materially considered the directions and extent of the search (without success) that has been made by this expedition, and weighed the opinions of the officers when at their extremes, I have arrived at the conclusion that the expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait, and having communicated with Captain Penny, and fully considered his official reply to my letter relative to the search of Wellington Strait by the expedition under his charge (unhappily without success), I do not feel authorized to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in those directions.

47. It is now my intention to proceed with all despatch to attempt the search of Jones's Sound, looking to their Lords' intention, and to the impression that may now become strengthened with reference thereto. I have at the last moment the satisfaction of stating that we are proceeding under favourable circumstances.

I have, &c.

HORATIO P. AUSTIN.

Captain, &c.

No. 8.

Captain OMMANNEY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Her Majesty's Ship Assistance,
Off Scarborough, 28th Sept. 1851.
(Received 29th Sept.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of my arrival off this port with H.M. ship under my command, together with the steam tender Intrepid. After procuring a pilot it is my intention to proceed towards Yarmouth and the river.

We unavoidably parted company with H.M. ship "Resolute" off Buchanness, on the 26th instant, in a heavy gale of wind from the northward. On the same night we fell in with the "Intrepid," which had previously also parted company in bad weather off the Orkneys. I am happy to state that the officers and crews of the expedition are well.

I have, &c.

ERASMUS OMMANNEY,

Captain.

No. 9.

Lieutenant OSBORN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

H.M.S. Pioneer, Grimsby, Lincolnshire,
28th Sept. 1850.

Sir,

I HAVE to report the arrival at this port of Her Majesty's vessel under my command, for the purpose of receiving on board a pilot.

Having parted company from the squadron under Captain H. T. Austin, C.B., on the 17th instant, in the North Atlantic, I shall, with a view to rejoin him,

proceed with all possible despatch to Yarmouth Roads, and there await such instructions as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may be pleased to give me.

I have, &c.

SHERARD OSBORN,
Lieut. in Command.

No. 10.

LIEUTENANT OSBORN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

H.M.V. Pioneer, near Yarmouth, the Roads,
30th Sept. 1851.

SIR,

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th instant, directing me to proceed with all despatch to Woolwich.

It is at present blowing hard from the S.W. Immediately the gale abates I will hasten to comply with your Lordship's instructions.

I am, &c.
SHERARD OSBORN, Lieut.

No. 11.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.

Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute,"
at Anchor off Winterton, Norfolk, 30th September 1851.
(Received 1st October.)

1. IN continuation of the report of the 12th of August last, transmitted by Captain Penny, I have now the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that having arrived off Cape Warrender on the evening of the 14th, in clear water and under favourable circumstances, I attached to the "Intrepid," Lieutenant Elliott, and Mr. Hamilton, Mate, and to the "Pioneer," Mr. M'Dougall, Second Master, for hydrographical purposes, as also Mr. May, Mate, in addition, to the latter vessel, so that in the event of opportunity offering, the acquirements of those officers might be brought to good account; gave to each vessel six additional men; directed Captain Ommanney to erect a cairn and beacon and deposit a record on Cape Warrender, and conduct the ships to the east shore off Baffin's Bay, and rendezvous between Wolstenholme Sound and Cape York. Then, placing myself on board the "Pioneer," proceeded at 7. O. P.M. with both steam tenders along the west shore of Baffin's Bay; rounded Cape Horsburgh on the 15th, advanced along the coast to the northward about thirty miles, and then proceeded up by the northern shore of an extensive sound in a north-west direction about forty-five miles. Here our progress was arrested by a fixed barrier of ice, that was subsequently found to extend from shore to shore a distance of twenty-five miles. The vessels then stood along the edge of the ice to the north shore, when, proving it impracticable to prosecute further, a cairn and beacon was erected and record deposited upon a remarkable conical island. After which we returned by the north shore, out of the sound, having closely examined both sides without discovering traces of the missing expedition.

2. The mouth of this sound is about sixty miles broad, with an island at its entrance twenty miles in length, of which Cape Leopold is a part. During the clearest period we have had here, when distant objects were very distinct, there was every appearance of a well-defined outline of land stretching across and terminating it to the westward; and although I am impressed that there is no outlet in that direction, yet by no means assert such to be the case.

3. There is every reason to consider this the Jones's Sound of Baffin, although its northern shore is situated about ten miles to the southward of that upon the chart.

4. The attempt was then made to get to the northward along the west shore of Baffin's Bay, to satisfactorily determine this question; but the ice rendered it impracticable, for by this time it had set home upon the coast, and blocked up

both entrances to the sound. We therefore directed our course with considerable difficulty through a drifting pack towards the east shore, in the hope of being able to get to the northward and westward on that side, but were arrested ten miles to the northward of Wolstenholme Sound on the 20th, and detained and beset in that locality until 28th, during two days of which, with spring tides, and a heavy gale from the southward, our position was both critical and perilous. Upon one occasion the "Intrepid" was driven up on the tongue of a berg, where her rudder was carried away, the frame of her screw broken, and two of her boats run over by a floe, the vessel herself remaining for about 20 hours in great peril, during a part of which her stern was raised to a very considerable extent, with the ice piling up forward to her gunwale, and all but falling on her deck, rendering it doubtful whether it would not become imperative to abandon her; but happily the wind fell, the ice eased, and she became relieved in a most remarkable manner, apparently without having sustained any vital injury.

5. Being unable to rejoin the "Intrepid," and the ice casing to the northward, the "Pioneer" proceeded in that direction until reaching nearly opposite Cape Parry, the southern entrance of Whale Sound, where she was again arrested by the ice in close pack, and made fast, in the hope of being able to examine that sound, which is of limited extent, (from 8 to 10 miles broad at its entrance), takes a north-easterly direction, and was filled with ice. After remaining a few hours, the ice began to close from the southward, rendering it necessary to forthwith retrace our steps, to avoid being beset, and we proceeded in the direction of the "Intrepid."

6. Having now, after full consideration, seen the impracticability of prosecuting further to the northward or westward in Baffin's Bay, without risking detention from another winter, and the uncertainty of even then being able to do so, and considering that Baffin's Bay had been examined as far as the supposed Jones's Sound on its west side, and as Whale Sound on its east, without any trace of the missing expedition, in addition to which looking to the late period of the navigable season, I deemed it my duty to proceed at once to rejoin the ships, and return to England in accordance with the spirit of my instructions. We were, however, impeded a few miles to the northward of Wolstenholme Island by a close and heavy pack to the southward until the 1st instant, when a slight easing of the ice took place, enabling us, after considerable difficulty, and doubt, to rejoin the ships, the "Pioneer" on the morning of the 2d, and the "Intrepid," not being able to take the same lead, on the 6th.

7. It is here necessary to notice that had it not been for the capability of the screw propeller, most remarkable under such circumstances, I do not consider that either the passage across Baffin's Bay, or that to rejoin the ships, could have been accomplished in the manner or time they were.

8. During the detention off Wolstenholme Sound on the night of the 28th, the vessels were visited by a party of five Esquimaux with dog sledges; but apprehending, as spring tides were in operation, that their return to the shore might be cut off, their departure was hastened, after liberally supplying them with useful articles from the presents furnished to the expedition for that purpose, as also with as much wood for constructing sledges as they could convey. The confidence with which these harmless people approached the vessels, and their general manners, indicated their having visited the "North Star" or some other vessel, and their state of health and appearance altogether betoken content and comparative comfort.

9. On my return to the ships, I learnt from Captain Ommanney that in crossing Baffin's Bay they had been hampered considerably by the ice, and were compelled to pass to the northward of the Cary Islands.

10. On the evening of the 6th of September the Expedition proceeded to make the best of its way out of Baffin's Bay and Davys Strait, being much favoured by fair winds and open water. Cape Farewell was passed on the 16th, since which we have been followed by fresh gales and high sea until abreast of Aberdeen, on the evening of the 26th, reaching this at 1. 30. p. m. this day.

11. The "Pioneer," in advance of the other vessels, parted company during a strong breeze on the 18th; the "Intrepid" during a fresh gale and thick

weather, while pressing the ships through the Fair Island passage on the 25th; and the "Assistance" during a strong gale and thick weather off Kennaird's Head on the 26th. The "Resolute" has been delayed in proceeding between the Pentland Skerries, in the hope of the other vessels rejoining; but although they have not done so I have every reason to believe that they are either in advance or in our immediate vicinity.

12. The watchfulness called for in proceeding out of Baffin's Bay and Davis's Straits, the unexpected rapidity of our passage from Cape Farewell, combined with a following sea, have prevented the completion of a compiled chart showing the land newly discovered and that surveyed by this expedition, but which, with other records and documents in detail, shall be transmitted at an early period.

13. In concluding this report, I feel it to be due to express my sense of the ready and zealous co-operation I have received from Captain Ommanney, and of the efficient state in which the ship under his command has been at all times held. To the officers in command of the steam tenders, to the executive officers of the expedition, and to the heads of the respective branches, my best thanks are due; and I must not omit to notice the talented assistance I have had in the navigation of the expedition from Mr. Allen, master of the "Resolute." Of all in their respective stations (not forgetting the admirable conduct and spirited exertions of the crews) I cannot speak too highly, and hope, should their Lordships be pleased to think favourably of the labours of the expedition intrusted to my charge, that they may be further induced to reward the individual merit.

14. When looking to the return of the expedition under such favourable circumstances from the privations and dangers we have had to contend with, with the loss of but one life and so few casualties, I cannot close this report without expressing to their Lordships the deep sense that is generally felt of the great mercy and protection that has been vouchsafed unto us. At the same time I must ever deeply regret, that, although aided by most liberal resources, our exertions unhappily have not been crowned with success.

15. Herewith I enclose a chart descriptive of the proceedings of the steam tenders while prosecuting the search in the northern part of Baffin's Bay, as also a few sketches of some of the most prominent points.

I have, &c.

HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

No. 12.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

H.M.S. Resolute, Yarmouth Roads,
1st October 1851.

SINCE forwarding my report dated 30th September, I have the honour to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the Resolute, with her tender the Pioneer, have arrived in Yarmouth Roads, and that the Assistance, with her tender the Intrepid, are in the Humber.

I have, &c.

HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

No. 13.

Lieutenant ALDRICH to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

H.M.S. Resolute, Yarmouth Roads,
Sunday, 5th October.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that this ship is still wind and weather bound here.

The "Pioneer" has gone on, having left here on Thursday forenoon last. I did not consider myself justified in detention of that vessel for assistance,

after perusal of Lieut. Osborne's orders from their Lordships in answer to his communication.

I had shortened in sails for sea yesterday at noon, in consequence of a change (which has proved but temporary), when their Lordships order of the 2d October arrived. I could not receive it on the 3d, when it reached Yarmouth, owing to very bad weather, the boat attempting to bring it off swamping in the surf.

In obedience to the order I have hired the Royal Albert (tug) for 50*l.*, being 20*l.* less than first asked; but as I did not consider myself justified in giving more, the company at last acceded to the terms; and I hope to weigh to-day, but the weather is still very bad and unsettled.

All the vessels that worked in here with us are still at anchor. Not a single vessel, I believe, (except steamers,) has gone south since our arrival.

I have, &c.

ROBERT D. ALDRICH,
Senior Lieutenant, &c.

No. 14.

SECRETARY of the ADMIRALTY to Commodore EDEN.

Sir,

Admiralty, 8th October 1851.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that you are to make known to Captain Austin of H. M. S. "Resolute" the satisfaction their Lordships have experienced at receiving satisfactory reports of the exemplary conduct of the officers and men of Her Majesty's ships under his command, during the period of their servitude in the Polar Seas; and that it is their Lordships desire that, before these ships are paid off, Captain Austin should convey their Lordships approbation of their conduct to them, more expressly to those officers and men who, with so much zeal, energy, and perseverance, conducted the land expeditions, under circumstances of great trial and difficulty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

Woolwich, 24th October 1851.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the remaining part of the correspondence that passed between the leaders of other expeditions and myself, as well as the principal orders given during the execution of the late service intrusted to my charge, not already forwarded, the whole of which I request you will be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

2. I regret that from the duties attending the paying off of the expedition I have been unable to forward these documents earlier.

3. On the other side is a list specifying the purport of each.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

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(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

Captain OMMANNEY to Captain AUSTIN.

Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance," off Griffiths Island,
10th September 1850.

Sir,

Having the satisfaction of rejoining you, after being detached to prosecute the search of Sir John Franklin's expedition along the northern shores of Barrow Strait, I beg to lay before you the following report of my proceedings.

After parting company with you on the 18th ultimo off Cape Dudley Digges, I proceeded to Wolstenholm Island, and then went on board I.M. Steam Tender "Intrepid" for the purpose of tracing out the ship which the Esquimaux at Cape York had seen in Wolstenholm Sound during the winter. Under the guidance of the native, who I entered at Cape York, two deserted Esquimaux Settlements (Naksakus inside of Cape Athol) were first examined, which had been inhabited last winter, but had been abandoned in consequence of the ravages which some epidemic had inflicted and carried off several of the tribe. On landing, we found several dead bodies still unburied; in one hut there was a heap of six bodies, one was that of an infant, they were lying over each other in a state of decomposition, clothed in the usual Esquimaux dress of skin; there were also several recent graves, and one of them proved to belong to a relative of our guide, who evinced much grief on seeing an attempt to disturb it.

The tribe had located at Cape York in consequence of this afflicting visitation; about the huts several fragments of "naval stores" were picked up.

After this examination I proceeded to a bay at the bottom of the Sound, about thirteen miles from Cape Athol, formed by the projection of an isthmus, at the extremity of which a remarkable mount rose from the sea; three cairns were seen in different parts of the bay, all of which were examined. We were first directed to the spot where the ship had laid. On examining the cairns a document was found in each, stating that the "North Star" had wintered in the bay, one of which I enclose. Near one of these cairns were interred four of her crew, over whose remains were neatly constructed graves. Having inserted a record of my visit on Mr. Saunder's document, the cairn was rebuilt and left in the same state I found it.

On the isthmus was another deserted settlement, called "Ommak," where we picked up several articles of clothing belonging to the people of the "North Star," apparently left behind in a hurry.

Having thus succeeded in ascertaining the "winter quarters" of the North Star, no time was lost in returning to the ship to proceed in execution of your orders.

At the request of Sir John Ross, I allowed Commander Phillipps, R.N., of the "Felix," and his Esquimaux interpreter, to accompany me on this occasion. Having deposited a record on Wolstenholm Island at 7 A.M. on the 16th, we proceeded to the westward,

taking the "Felix," Sir John Ross, astern of us, the tender towing both vessels; after proceeding ten miles, we fell in with loose ice and detached floes.

At noon on the following day we reached clear water. Capes Leopold and Clarmee in sight; the "Felix" being placed in a position to proceed without further obstruction was cast off. I left with Sir John Ross a letter addressed to you, or in case of her meeting the "North Star," to the Secretary of the Admiralty, a copy of which I enclose. In it I abstained from making any reference to the story raised by Sir John Ross's interpreter, because I considered the matter had been entirely put at rest after my subsequent interrogation of the natives at Cape York with Captain Penny on the 14th, of which you were informed; and more particularly on finding that the "North Star" had wintered among those people without hearing of the circumstance.

We entered Lancaster Sound on the 18th of August; on rounding Cape Warrender it blew too hard to effect a landing; keeping along the land I discovered a harbour nine miles W.N.W. (true) from the Cape, and landed on a tongue of land which formed the protection of this harbour; here a record was left, and a beacon erected on a conspicuous hill.

As no previous mention appears of this harbour, it may be of interest to future voyagers to know that it is capacious and well sheltered, at that time perfectly free from ice; and I have every reason to believe that there is good anchorage from the appearance of the shores and the few soundings obtained at the entrance. At some former period it must have been a favourite resort of the natives, from the remains of an extensive and substantially built settlement found there, abounding with the bones of various animals on which they subsisted.

I continued close along the northern coast of Barrow Strait, keeping within two miles of the beach, sufficiently near to perceive any cairn or beacon; near Cape Bullen I endeavoured to land, but owing to the increase of the wind and sea was frustrated in the attempt.

On the 19th, off Cape Fellfoot, I was induced to haul off the land, in consequence of the heavy gale blowing from E.S.E., which blew with great violence during the night, when the "Intrepid" parted company.

On the 20th, when the gale moderated, we found ourselves at the entrance of Prince Regent's Inlet. With a view of communicating with the "North Star" I looked into Port Leopold, and found the "Prince Albert," Commander Forsyth, lying to off the port, with a boat at Whaler Point. At this time the harbour was full of ice; the hut and boat left there by Sir James Ross's expedition appeared to be in perfect preservation. Baffling winds detained us off Leopold Island all the day of the 21st.

On the 22d the "Intrepid" rejoined us off Cape Hurd (the appointed rendezvous), Lieutenant Cator having, during our separation, most judiciously examined Maxwell Bay and Cape Hurd, when he found the record deposited there by Sir James Ross. At 2 p.m., when off Radstock Bay, our progress was arrested by a body of closely packed ice, extending across the strait.

On the 23d, from Cape Ricketts, I proceeded in the tender, through the slack ice, close along the coast towards Cape Riley, and succeeded in effecting a landing at about a mile from the Cape, aided by a party of officers to search for traces; walking along the beach under Cape Riley, I had the satisfaction of meeting with the first traces of Sir John Franklin's expedition, consisting of fragments of naval stores, ragged portions of clothing, preserved meat tins, &c., which had evidently been there for some time, two or three years at least, and the spot bore the appearance of an encampment; the various fragments were collected, and a close search made for a record, but all in vain; a beacon was erected on Cape Riley depositing a record of this success.

A cairn being seen on the summit of Beechey Island, the steam tender was pressed through the packed ice to examine it, in the full confidence that some document would be found containing information of the missing expedition. We were obliged to land on the west side of the island, as the bay between Beechey Island and Cape Riley was full of fixed ice; more fragments of stores were found on the island, but on pulling down the cairn, to my great disappointment, no record could be found, though it was carefully examined, and the site dug out with a spade. A few small shot were found lying on a flat stone which formed the top of the cairn; it was rebuilt, and a document deposited in it.

From the top of Beechey Island I had an extensive view of Wellington Channel and Cornwallis Island; nothing but a close body of ice could be seen, an unbroken field of ice covering an extensive sea to the northward, but no land visible beyond. During the search the ice began to stream off, the current carrying it past Cape Riley into Barrow Strait. As the ship was some miles to leeward, I left the island at midnight to return, fearing a further delay might involve a separation.

The extraordinary circumstance of picking up these traces, without any sort of record, was naturally most perplexing; I resolved on a closer examination of the locality, to solve the mystery, as soon as the ship could approach. From the nature of the traces, it was evident that a party had passed a considerable time on the spot.

On my return to the ship, on the morning of the 24th, the United States schooner "Rescue" had joined company, she had parted from her consort in the late gale. We communicated, and her commander expressed his readiness to make a further search of the coast. In the afternoon we were enabled to work up to Cape Riley, when I sent a party on shore with spades to search the ground, but was unsuccessful. In the meantime Captain Penny's expedition and another schooner were in sight. A strong north wind

was clearing the ice out of the channel, I therefore despatched the "Intrepid" to search the coast to the northward; she returned at midnight, unable to proceed more than four miles beyond Cape Innis, prevented by an unbroken field of ice.

On the 25th a lead opened across the strait towards Cape Hotham; I therefore considered it my duty to avail myself of this opportunity to carry out your instructions, and examine a spot where I felt confident a record would be left by the expedition on their progress westward. The "Intrepid" was dispatched under steam to execute this service, whilst we followed under canvass. I adopted this step in consequence of Penny's expedition, the United States expedition, and another schooner being off Beechey Island, feeling assured that they would take up a further examination of the eastern shores of Wellington Channel. During the day Captain Penny communicated with me, and having informed him of my intention, he returned to search the bay inside of Beechey Island. We kept along the solid field of ice extending from Cape Innis to Barlow Inlet, which bounded the horizon to the northward, and where no land was visible.

When six miles east of Barlow Inlet, the pack ice closed in on the main floe, and stopped my further progress, where the "Intrepid" rejoined us.

Lieutenants Cator and Meham had landed near Barlow's Inlet, and after a laborious walk they examined Cape Hotham and the coast for some miles beyond, but no traces were met with; the blade of an oar belonging to a whaler, marked "Friendship" was picked up.

In this position we continued beset in Wellington Channel from the 25th ultimo to the 3d instant, strong south-easterly winds and thick weather prevailing. We sustained several pressures from the ice, which generally occurred at the change of tide; it was of a thicker and heavier nature than any I had yet seen. The head of the "Intrepid's" rudder was injured by one of the pressures, which defect was made good out of her old bowsprit. When the weather permitted the officers were dispatched to examine the coasts about Barlow Inlet.

A partial opening on the 3d instant enabled us to get to within a mile of Barlow Inlet, when a further search was made and a cairn erected on the south entrance; the inlet at this time was full of ice, and it could not be recommended as a winter quarters owing to the contracted entrance.

The grounded ice was of heavy dimensions, and another movement on the 4th enabled us to round Cape Hotham with the aid of the steam tender towing us through loose ice.

As a measure of precaution for the relief of any party who should (by any unfortunate circumstance) stand in need of it, I caused a depôt of provisions to the amount of twenty days allowance for ninety men to be prepared; these articles were landed under the able superintendence of Lieutenant M'Clintock without loss of time between Cape Hotham and the bluff west of it; a beacon was placed half a mile west of this depôt; here the ice closed round us and drifted us back close under the cape.

On the 5th at the change of tide, by means of boring through slack ice, with a fresh leading wind, running close along the edge of the grounded ice, and frequently within a cable of the shore, I gained a position six miles west of Cape Hotham, near to a point of land where we secured to some old fixed ice which filled an indenture of the coast; here we were compelled to hold on, the ice being closely packed in all directions, *drifting* the floes close by the ship, and requiring every means we could adopt to secure her from being driven on the point; these masses were driving past us at the rate of two knots an hour whenever the tide set to the eastward. In this critical situation the ship received considerable pressure, and on one occasion she was forced up four feet forward, carrying away our stream anchor twice; the ship was in imminent danger of being driven on the point, against which the floes were grinding and piling the ice to the height of thirty feet, fortunately she was brought up in time; there were twenty fathoms water at a cable's length from the point.

The coast was here examined for several miles by parties of officers. A sudden shift of wind from the northward on the 7th instant released us from this unpleasant position, when I despatched the "Intrepid" along the coast, and on this occasion a well sheltered bay open to the south was examined and found in every respect well adapted for a winter quarter; this circumstance afforded me some confidence in proceeding, as from the unfavourable aspect of the navigation and the lateness of the season we could not expect to navigate for many days longer.

On the morning of the 8th the wind had cleared a passage along the coast and enabled us to proceed to Griffiths Island, where I found an unbroken floe fixed from that to Cornwallis Island, with no means of rounding Griffiths Island for the main pack.

To the southward of Cape Martyr I landed with a party of officers and searched the coast; here a deep bay was discovered, with the remains of a large Esquimaux settlement at its entrance; numerous bones of the whale still standing erect in the ground. This bay was filled with ice, which, if required, could be cut into for a winter station. The southern shores of Cornwallis Island were thus examined from six miles north of Barlow Inlet to Cape Martyr.

The pack having drifted away, on the morning of the 9th we reached the S.W. point of Griffiths Island where a party of officers was again landed to search for traces and erect a beacon; here I also placed another small depôt of provisions for ten days (for ten men) for the travelling parties next spring, and in the meantime despatched the Tender to examine the west shores of the island. I regret to say that even here on this conspicuous

position no further traces of the expedition can be found. The tender returned after an inspection of the west side of the island and succeeded in approaching Somerville Island to within three miles, where nothing but solid ice was seen in all directions.

In the evening of the 9th instant we secured to the solid floe, which presented an impenetrable barrier to any further progress westward, or in the direction of Cape Walker.

The services of the steam tender during these operations have been most valuable, and I therefore avail myself of this occasion to convey my testimony of the many advantages we have derived by the aid of scow propulsion in this intricate navigation, its capabilities have been fully developed, and the facility with which the vessel is managed amongst the ice quite exceeds anything I ever anticipated.

In conclusion, I beg to express my satisfaction (by the zeal and activity manifested) of Lieutenant Cator of the tender, and the officers of all grades under my command, how exerted themselves in carrying out this interesting search.

Herewith is appended a list of the places where records were left, and of the provisions left at the depôts.

Balloons were despatched on favourable occasions, and casks put overboard with records, agreeably to your instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERASMUS OMMANNEY,
Captain.

Records left at Wolstenholme Island.

Port Dundas.
Cape Hurd.
Cape Riley.
Beechey Island.
Barlow Inlet.
Cape Hotham.
Griffith's Island.

Depôt of Provisions at Cape Hotham, left 4th September 1850 :

Bread, 504 lbs.
Preserved meats, 1,646 lbs.
Spirits (strong), 20 gallons.
Sugar, 167 lbs.
Chocolate, 113 lbs.
Tea, 28 lbs.
Opening knives, 2.

Depôt of Provisions on Griffiths Island, left 9th September 1850 :

Bread, 25 lbs.
Preserved meats, 100 lbs.
Spirits, 1 gallon, 18 gills.
Sugar, 9 lbs. 6 oz.
Chocolate, 6 lbs. 4 oz.
Tea, 1 lb. 9 oz.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain OMMANNEY.

H. M. Ship "Resolute," in Winter Quarters between
Cornwallis and Griffith Islands,
15th September 1850.

Sir,

I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, reporting your proceedings from the 18th ultimo, the date of your being detached for the purpose, first, of visiting Wolstenholme Sound, and then of searching along the northern shore of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, as far as Cape Hotham.

I thank you for your exertions, and beg leave to join cordially in the satisfaction you express at our again meeting.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Captains DE HAVEN and PENNY.

Her Britannic Majesty's Ship "Resolute" off
Griffith Island, Barrow's Strait,
11th September 1850.

Gentlemen,

The present fixed state of the ice to the westward having brought three of the expeditions in search of the one under Sir John Franklin to the same point, and it being very probable that if all prosecute to the westward with the same determination as hitherto,

a similar result will take place without a more extended search being carried out than could be accomplished by one of the expeditions, I deem it necessary to make the following revision of the general memorandum of the 25th of July last, given for the proceedings of the vessels under my orders; viz.

From traces found at Beechey Island it is beyond a doubt that the missing vessels wintered there in 1845, but although a considerable and careful search has been made of the shores of Wellington Strait to the northward from Capes Riley and Hotham, of Cornwallis Island westward from Cape Hotham, and of Griffith Island, yet no record has been discovered to give information of the route taken by the object of our search.

And as from an extensive view carefully taken of Wellington Strait, with all local causes considered, there is no reason shown why the missing expedition may not have proceeded in that direction, coupled with the importance of a depôt being established in its neighbourhood upon which the crews of any of the ships in advance may fall back in the event of lengthened detention in the ice, or other disaster.

I have deemed it most advisable to direct the "Assistance" and her tender to take up winter quarters near to Cape Martyrs on the southern shore of Cornwallis Island, and prosecute a thorough search along the shores of Wellington Strait, and the strait or inlet between Cornwallis and Bathurst Islands, and intend that the "Resolute" and her tender shall, if practicable, examine Cape Walker, and then proceed to the westward in the direction of Melville Island, examining it, and such portion of the Parry group as she can accomplish.

Such is the task I felt to be assigned to the expedition for which I am responsible.

But as the unfavourable state of the ice has caused much less than was anticipated to be accomplished, coupled with the present late period of the season, I fear that the "Resolute" and "Assistance" will not by travelling parties be able to perform satisfactorily the search allotted to them.

Therefore being strongly impressed with the high feeling, determination, and perseverance which animate the United States of America and Captain Penny's expeditions in the great cause of humanity we have all equally at heart, I feel called upon by the position in which I am placed as the lawful representative of the government of the country by which the expedition was equipped to propose that the expedition so nobly sent forward by the United States of America, and the mercantile expedition fitted out by the British government and placed under the charge of Mr. Penny, do unite with us, and in the ensuing spring each take a particular division of the several lines of coast to be searched, by which under the blessing of Providence I see great reason to hope that the important work we have in hand will be accomplished to the entire satisfaction of our countries and those who have sent us forth, be the result happy or not.

I have therefore to beg of Captain De Haven and Captain Penny to reply to these views as early as possible, after which, should they accord with them, it will afford me great satisfaction to enter fully into the arrangements necessary as far as present circumstances admit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Captain DE HAVEN to Captain AUSTIN.

U.S. Brig "Advance" near Griffith's Island,
11th September 1850.

Sir,
I have just received your circular of this date addressed to Captain Penny and myself. I have made every effort with the expedition under my command to prosecute the search in which we are all enlisted. It was therefore with extreme regret that I found the same causes simultaneously arresting our progress and congregating into this limited area the entire searching squadron.

In accordance with my "Instructions," a copy of which I have the honour to enclose, you will perceive that unless I should gain a position from which I could commence operations in the season of 1851 with decided advantages, I am ordered to return to the United States.

If by any possibility I can give such a position, or if I can render any special services to the cause in which we are embarked, I need not say how willing I would be to give my instructions their utmost latitude. Should, however, this be impossible, I must abide by the tenor of my orders.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWIN J. DE HAVEN,
Lieut. commanding the American
Arctic Expedition.

INSTRUCTIONS.

U.S. Navy Department, Washington,
15th May 1850.

Sir,

Having been selected to command the expedition in search of Sir John Franklin and his companions, you will take charge of the two Brigantines, the "Advance" and "Rescue," that have been fitted out for that service, and as soon as you are ready proceed with them to sea, and make the best of your way to Lancaster Sound.

These vessels have been furnished to the government for this service by the munificence of a private citizen, Mr. Henry Grinnell of New York. You will therefore be careful of them, that they may be returned to their owner in good condition. They have been provisioned for three years.

Passed midshipman S. P. Griffin has been selected to command one of the vessels. You will therefore consider him as your second in command, confer with him and treat him accordingly.

The chief object of this expedition is to search for and, if found, afford relief to Sir John Franklin of the Royal Navy and his companions.

You will therefore use all diligence and make every exertion to this end, paying attention as you go to subjects of scientific inquiry, only as far as the same may not interfere with the main object of the expedition.

Having passed Barrow's Straits, you will turn your attention northwards to Wellington Channel, and westwards to Cape Walker, and be governed by circumstances as to the course you will then take.

Accordingly, you will exercise your own discretion, after seeing the condition of the ice, sea, and water, whether the two vessels shall here separate, one for Cape Walker and the other for Wellington Straits, or whether they shall both proceed together for the one place or the other.

Should you find it impossible on account of the ice to get through Barrow Straits, you will then turn your attention to Jones's Sound and Smith's Sound. Finding these closed or impracticable, and failing of all traces of the missing expedition, the season will probably be too far advanced for any other attempts; if so, you will return to New York.

Acquaint passed Midshipman Griffin, before sailing, and from time to time during the voyage, fully with all your plans and intentions, and before you sail from New York appoint a place of rendezvous, change it as often as circumstances may render a change desirable, but always have a place of rendezvous fixed upon, so that in case the two vessels of the expedition may at any time become separate, each may know where to look for the other.

Nearly the entire Arctic front of the continent has been secured without finding any traces of the missing ships. It is useless for you to go there, or to re-examine any other place where search has already been made; you will therefore confine your attention to the routes already indicated.

The point of maximum cold is said to be in the vicinity of Parry Islands; to the north and west of these, there is probably a comparatively open sea in summer, and therefore a milder climate.

This opinion seems to be sustained by the fact that beasts and fowls are seen migrating over the ice from the mouth of Mackenzie River and its neighbouring shores to the north. These dumb creatures are probably led by their wise instincts to seek a more genial climate in that direction, and upon the borders of the supposed more open water.

There are other facts elicited by Lieut. Maury in the course of his investigations touching the winds and currents of the ocean, which go also to confirm the opinion that beyond the icy barrier that is generally met with in the Arctic Ocean there is a polina, or sea free from ice.

You have assisted in these investigations at the National Observatory, and are doubtless aware of the circumstances which authorize this conclusion; it is therefore needless to repeat them.

This supposed open sea and warmer region to the north and west of Parry Islands are unexplored. Should you succeed in finding an opening there, either after having cleared Wellington Straits, or having cleared Parry Islands by a northwardly course from Cape Walker, enter as far as in your judgment it may be prudent to enter, and search every headland, promontory, and conspicuous part for signs and records of the missing party. Take particular care to avail yourself of every opportunity for leaving as you go records and signs to tell of your welfare, progress, and intentions.

For this purpose you will erect flag staffs, make piles of stones or other marks in conspicuous places, with a bottle or barraca buried at the base containing your letters.

Should the two vessels be separated, you will direct passed Midshipman Griffin to do likewise.

Avail yourself of every opportunity, either by the Esquimaux or otherwise, to let the department hear from you, and in every communication be full and particular as to your future plans and intended route.

If by any chance you should penetrate so far beyond the icy barrier as to make it in your judgment more prudent to push on than to turn back, you will do so, and put yourself in communication with any of the United States Naval Forces or Officers of the Government serving in the waters of the Pacific or in China, according to your necessities and opportunities. Those officers will be instructed to afford you every facility possible to enable you to reach the western coast of the United States in safety.

In the event of your falling in with any of the British searching parties, you will offer them any assistance of which they may stand in need, and which it may be in your power to give. Offer also to make them acquainted with your intended route and plans, and be ready to afford them every information of which you may have become possessed concerning the object of your search.

In case your country should be involved in war during your absence on this service, you will on no account commit, or suffer any of the expedition to commit, the least act of hostility against the enemy, of whatever nation he may be.

Notwithstanding the directions in which you have been recommended to carry your examinations, you may, on arriving out on the field of operation, find that by departing from them your search would probably be more effectual.

The department has every confidence in your judgment, and relies implicitly upon your discretion, and should it appear during the voyage that by directing your attention to points not named in this letter traces of the absent expedition would probably be found, you will not fail to examine such points. But you will on no account uselessly hazard the safety of the vessels under your command, or unnecessarily expose to danger the officers and men committed to your charge.

Unless circumstances should favour you, by enabling you to penetrate, before the young ice begins to make in the fall, far into the unexplored regions, or to discover recent traces of the missing ships and their gallant crews, or unless you should gain a position from which you could commence operations in the season of 1851 with decided advantages, you will endeavour not to be caught in the ice during the ensuing winter, but after having completed your examinations for the season make your escape and return to New York in the fall.

You are expressly enjoined not to spend, if it can be avoided, more than one winter in the Arctic regions.

Wishing you and your gallant companions all success in your noble enterprize, and with the trust in God that He will take you and them in His holy keeping.

I am very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

To Edwin J. De Haven, (Signed) WM. BALLARD PRESTON.
Lieut. commanding the American Arctic Expedition.
&c. &c. &c.
New York.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain OMMANNEY.

By Horatio T. Austin, Esq., C.B., Captain of Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," and in charge of an expedition to the Arctic Seas.

Herewith you will receive a copy of a letter that I have addressed to Lieutenant De Haven and Mr. Penny, charged with expeditions in search of the one under Sir John Franklin, the substance of which you were conversant with previous to its delivery.

You are also in possession of copies of Lieutenant De Haven's reply thereto, and the instructions under which he is acting; you will therefore know that it is probable he will return to America this year; and Mr. Penny having parted company in the late severe weather before a counterpart of my letter could be delivered to him (although with the substance he was verbally made acquainted), and not having returned, it has now become necessary that our future proceedings should forthwith be determined, as any change in the state of the ice may admit of this ship proceeding to the westward.

It is therefore my direction that you proceed in the "Assistance" with her tender, and take up winter quarters near to Cape Martyr on the southern shore of Cornwallis Island, it being the central and apparently the best position for observations in this quarter.

As early as practicable in the spring of 1851 you will detach a travelling party to complete the examination of Wellington Strait, as also a travelling party to examine Cape Walker and its neighbourhood, and in addition, if it can be done, the unexplored part between Cornwallis and Bathurst Islands.

An alteration in the state of the ice may admit of your tender performing some portion of the examination of Wellington Strait this season, but which with all other detail (having had sufficient proof of your perseverance, zeal, and prudence in the duties hitherto assigned to you) I leave to your own discretion.

As it is impossible, until the moment for acting arrives, to determine more than an outline of the proceedings, I have great satisfaction in knowing that we fully coincide in the principle of the operations to be carried out in the endeavour to accomplish the task assigned to us. Should it be found that the missing expedition proceeded in either of the directions allotted to your examination, you will in the open season of 1851 follow up the search to the utmost of your powers, depositing records thereof for my information at Cape Martyr and Cape Hotham.

However if Captain Penny should rejoin, and you find that he undertakes to examine Cape Walker and its neighbourhood, you will consider yourself relieved of that responsibility.

As soon as the state of the ice admits, the "Resolute" and her tender will prosecute to the westward in the direction of Melville Island, which, if possible, she will reach, and in the spring of 1851 examine it, and such portion of the Parry group and of Banks's Land to the southward and westward as she can accomplish. Should traces be found in either of those localities they will be followed up in the open season of 1851 by the "Resolute" and her tender; but should no information be obtained those vessels will then endeavour to return.

In the event of your not finding traces in the parts allotted to your search, the "Assistance" and her tender are to be kept in their winter quarters near to Cape Martyr as a depôt upon which the crews of any vessels to the westward may fall back in case of necessity; but should open water to the westward make it appear desirable for you to proceed in that direction to meet or communicate earlier with the "Resolute," you will act as your judgment at the time may guide you.

Should no information have reached you respecting the "Resolute" before the spring of 1852, you will then detach a travelling party to Bedford Bay to communicate with one from her; and failing to meet there, to proceed on to Cape Cockburn so as to arrive at that place between the 23d and 27th of May inclusive, remaining there until the latter date; and then, should the party from the "Resolute" not have arrived, to return, leaving first a full account of proceedings during the separation of the ships (with which the party must be furnished leaving), as also of the proceedings of the party itself up to the period of quitting Cape Cockburn.

However, should such parties fail to communicate, and provided the "Resolute" does not return early in the season of 1852, you will then place on board your tender such provisions as you can spare, leave her at your winter quarters, and proceed in the "Assistance" to Disco, where I understand the "North Star" intended to land her provisions; take them on board, and return as early as possible to Cape Martyr, taking care in the passage back to examine the several points along the north shore of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait (or on the south shore if the wind should drive you there) for records that would be deposited in the event of our return during your absence.

The provisions you have landed at Griffith Island and Cape Hotham are to remain there as depôts in case of necessity.

I remind you that it is important that a record should be occasionally deposited by travelling parties in their route, as also that the occasional employment of balloons during the separation of the ships may prove advantageous.

Given, &c., 14th September 1850.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Enclosure 4 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Mr. PENNY.

H. M. S. "Resolute," Winter Quarters between
Cornwallis and Griffith Islands,
5th March 1851.

Sir,

With reference to the conversation we had at the commencement of the winter, relative to the prosecution of the search for the missing expedition by travelling parties in the ensuing spring, I avail myself of the occasion of your party returning from their visit to make you officially acquainted with the arrangements determined upon for the expedition under my orders; also doing myself the pleasure to give the general details connected with the equipment of the parties, and I shall feel obliged by your apprising me of your plans and the details connected with them, in order that by a mutual interchange of views we may probably be both aided in accomplishing the great work that we have now to do.

PROGRAMME OF PARTIES.

ROUTE.	Extended or Limited.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Number of Runner Sledges.
South from Cape Walker should coast not prove continuous - - - }	Extended -	2	12	2
- - - }	Limited -	2	13	2
South-west from Cape Walker, bays or inlets employing a party southerly - - }	Extended -	1	7	1
- - }	Limited -	1	7	1
West towards Melville Island - - - }	Extended -	2	12	2
- - - }	Limited -	2	12	2
North from Byam Martin Island to examine between Bathurst, Byam Martin, and Melville Islands - - - }	Extended -	1	7	1
- - - }	Limited -	1	7	1
To examine Depôt on Bathurst Islands, returning before parties set out if it can be - }	Limited -	1	6	1
To examine Depôt on Somerville Island and state of ice, returning before parties set out if it can be - - - }	Limited -	1	6	1

Note.—It is hoped that the resources of the expedition will admit of another sledge as an auxiliary being attached to each of the extended parties.

All preparation to be completed during the present month, and if weather is favourable, with a good rise of temperature, the parties to leave during or shortly after the first week in April.

SCALE OF PROVISIONS for each MAN per DAY.

Biscuits.	Penmican.	Boiled Pork.	Rum.	Mixed.		Alternately.		Sugar.	Tobacco per Man per Week.	Spirits of Wine for Fuel each Sledge.
				Lime Juice.	Sugar.	Tea.	Moore's Chocolate.			
<i>lbs.</i> $\frac{3}{4}$	<i>lbs.</i> 1	<i>oz.</i> 6	<i>gills.</i> 1	<i>oz.</i> $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>oz.</i> $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>oz.</i> $\frac{1}{4}$	<i>oz.</i> $1\frac{1}{2}$	<i>oz.</i> $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>oz.</i> 3	<i>pints.</i> 1
Or in such proportions as each party may desire.										

Besides which each sledge will be furnished with a small quantity of pickles, and pepper and salt mixed.

Equipment of each Sledge.

- 1 gutta percha or oil canvas casing.
- 1 tent and 4 pikes as poles.
- 1 floor cloth and 3 wolf skins.
- 1 felt or blanket sleeping bag each man.
- 1 shovel.
- 1 cooking apparatus, and for extended parties an additional apparatus for melting snow, to serve also a second cooking apparatus in the event of accident.
- 1 haversack for luncheon.
- 1 haversack each officer.
- 1 knapsack each man, to serve for carrying clothes and provisions in the event of accident to the sledge.
- 2 guns in addition to officers gun.
- 2 lbs. powder, percussion caps in proportion.
- 8 lbs. shot.
- 2 lb. ball each gun.
- 1 bag of sundries, such as awls, thread, twine, &c.
- 1 panniken, 1 spoon, and 1 knife each person.
- Instruments for observations.
- 1 small tin case of medical stores, &c.
- 1 tinder box and bag for getting a light.
- 1 brush for clothes.

Walking Dress each Person.

- 1 inside flannel.
- 1 Guernsey frock.
- 1 serge frock.
- 1 duck jumper.
- 1 pair drawers.
- 1 pair breeches.

1 pair overall duck pantaloons tied about the calf.
 1 waist belt.
 1 pair stockings.
 1 pair blanket feet wrappers.
 1 pair wadmill hose.
 1 pair canvass boots, leather soles, ship made.
 1 welsh wig.
 1 fur cap.
 1 comforter.
 1 pair pitts.
 An eye shade as per model.
 1 bottle to carry inside frock for water.

Ditto, Spare Clothing.

1 flannel shirt.
 1 pair drawers.
 2 pair stockings.
 2 pair blanket feet wrappers.
 1 pair canvass boots, ship made, for long parties only; short parties taking in lieu their worn cloth boots.
 1 pair mitts.
 1 towel and a piece of soap.
 1 comb.

Each party will be furnished with printed notices and small tin cases, one of which will be deposited every day at its encampment.

The sledges will be loaded so as to limit the weight each man will have to drag on starting from the ship to about 190 lbs., and as an experiment some two or three kites will be taken with the view of aiding the draft of a fair wind. The parties crossing the straits will carry two Halkets Boats.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
 Captain, &c.

Mr. PENNY to Captain AUSTIN.

H. M. S. "Lady Franklin," Assistance Harbour,
 10th March 1851.

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your official letter of the 5th March, giving the details of your intended lines of search by travelling parties, and in return I now inform you of the course which I at present intend to pursue in searching in the vicinity of Wellington Channel.

Availing myself of the whole force of my vessel, six parties of one officer and six men each will start together about the second week of April, should the weather appear promising. At the end of six days two of these parties will break off, having supported the other four sledges during that period and made a depôt for their return, the remaining four sledges will then pair off, the fatigue sledge of each feeding the extended party for ten days, making a deposit, and returning, one of the extended parties prosecuting the search in an easterly, and the other in a westerly direction, should no previous trace have been found to cause a different arrangement.

The dog sledges will join the others at the head of the Channel, provisioned for fifteen days, and should there be no prospect of a further supply of provisions for the dogs being procurable, they will be employed on the route where their limited means may appear most likely to be of use.

With reference to the scale of victualling, I have to inform you that I have fixed on the following:

Biscuit, 1 lb. per day.	Tea, $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. per day.
Pemmican, $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. per day.	Rum, $\frac{1}{2}$ gill per day.
* Pork, $3\frac{1}{4}$ lb. per day.	Tobacco, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. per day.
Sugar, 1 oz. per day.	

* The pork previously boiled, boned, and skinned.

In lieu of spirits of wine, 40 lbs. of prepared fat will be taken with each sledge, that fuel having been found best adapted to our shape of conjurers.

In the general outfit of the parties your scheme has been followed, so far as our means would permit, and we have now every thing prepared to start as soon as the state of the weather may appear to warrant such a procedure.

One of the return parties will proceed to Beechey Island, examining the depôt left there, and visiting Caswalls Tower and its vicinity; and on the 12th of July, should the prospect of an early liberation appear unfavourable, a boat will be despatched to communicate with

the whalers at Ponds Bay, as they generally continue in that neighbourhood till the 7th of August.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WM. PENNY,
Captain, &c.

Captain AUSTIN to Mr. PENNY.

H. M. S. "Resolute," in Winter Quarters between
Cornwallis and Griffith Islands,
8th April 1851.

Sir,
I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt this day of your letter of the 10th ultimo, acquainting me with your plan of operations for the spring travelling parties, for which I return you my best thanks.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Enclosure 5 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain Sir JOHN ROSS.

H. M. S. "Resolute," Winter Quarters between
Cornwallis and Griffith Islands,
21st June 1851.

Sir,
In order that you may be aware at the earliest moment of the result of the search by travelling parties from the expedition under my charge, I hasten on the return of those to the southward and westward from Cape Walker, and of those to the northward (the Melville Island parties not having yet come in), to transmit on the other side hereof for your information an account of the extent of search in each direction, which I believe to be as nearly correct as it can be until the data in detail is worked out.

Unhappily, not the slightest trace has been discovered of the missing vessels.

As soon as the other parties are in you shall be apprised of all that has been done by the travelling parties from this expedition, and may I request you to be good enough to furnish me with your results as early as is practicable, in order that I may duly consider and determine the further movements of the vessels under my orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

The ACCOUNT referred to.

Captain Ommanney to the southward and westward from Cape Walker reaching to lat. $72^{\circ} 44' N.$, long. $102\frac{1}{3}^{\circ} W.$

Lieutenant Osborn to the westward and southward from Cape Walker reaching to lat. $72^{\circ} 40' N.$, long. between 105° and $106^{\circ} W.$

Lieutenant Browne south from Cape Walker reaching to lat. $72^{\circ} 52' N.$, long. $96^{\circ} 50' W.$

Note.—Cape Walker has proved to be on an island.

Lieutenant Aldrich to the northward and westward from Cape Cockburn, Bathurst Island, reaching to lat. $76^{\circ} 11' N.$, long. $106^{\circ} 30' W.$

Mr. M'Dougall, second master, has completed the survey of the bay between the Cornwallis and Bathurst Islands of our charts, with the exception of a river or small inlet running to the N.E. and about four miles broad at its entrance, which he was unable to explore.

Lowther and the islands adjacent have also been searched, with the exception of Davy, which could not be found on account of the thick weather and its supposed flat low form, besides which the ice was very much pressed up around these islands.

A counterpart of the foregoing letter was addressed to Captain William Penny on the same day.

H. T. A.

Captain Sir JOHN ROSS to Captain AUSTIN.

Schooner "Felix," Cornwallis Island,
23d June 1851.

Sir,
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant, in which you have been kindly pleased to inform me of the return of Captain Ommanney and other gallant officers from the arduous service on which they have been employed; at the same time annexing an account of their proceedings, and the important results of their indefatigable endeavours.

I join in the universal regret that "not the slightest trace has been discovered of the missing ships," but it is important to find that they cannot have taken that "road to destruction," while to me it is satisfactory to see so clearly proved that my conclusions of land intervening between the heavy polar ice and the coast of America were perfectly correct.

Inclosed you will receive Captain Phillips's report, which does him infinite credit, though only what I must have expected from my knowledge of his character and acquirements, and to him I beg to refer you for any explanation or further information you may require.

I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my unfeigned congratulations on the return of your south-western parties in excellent health, after having undergone such privations and sufferings as they must have experienced in their arduous journey of sixty days. Hoping sincerely that you will have good accounts from your extreme western parties, I am with truth and respect,

Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) JOHN ROSS.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain Sir JOHN ROSS.

H.M.S. "Resolute," Winter Quarters between
Cornwallis and Griffith Islands,
26th June 1851.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23d instant, and its inclosure, the report of the proceedings of Commander Phillips while prosecuting by your orders a journey over a portion of the Cornwallis Island of our charts (doubtless at this period of the season an operation of considerable labour), for which I thank you.

The result of this journey, performed by an officer of Commander Phillips's intelligence and character, is very satisfactory, inasmuch as it goes far to verify work carried out on the south-western shore by an officer from this ship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Enclosure 6 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain Sir JOHN ROSS.

H.M.S. "Resolute," Winter Quarters between
Cornwallis and Griffith Islands,
4th July 1851.

Sir,

With reference to my letter of the 21st ultimo, I now do myself the pleasure to acquaint you of the return this afternoon after an absence of eighty days of the parties despatched from this expedition in the direction of Melville Island, they having succeeded in accomplishing the following amount of search (unhappily without discovering the slightest trace of the missing expedition), viz. :

Lieutenant M'Clintock from Point Griffith along the south-eastern side of Melville Island to Cape Dundas and Lyddons Gulf, crossing from thence overland to winter harbour.

Mr. Bradford from Point Griffith along the east coast of Melville Island to the northward, reaching to latitude 76° 18', longitude between 107° and 108°, which I believe to be as nearly correct as it can be until the data in detail is worked out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

A counterpart of the foregoing letter was addressed to Captain Wm. Penny on the same day.

H. T. A.

Captain Sir JOHN ROSS to Captain AUSTIN.

"Felix," Discovery Vessel, Cornwallis Island,
8th July 1851.

Sir,

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 4th instant, by which I am rejoiced to find that your two extreme western parties returned safe, after having very fully and meritoriously accomplished the important and arduous service on which they had volunteered. I beg to return you my best thanks for the reports you have been so good as to send of their proceedings, and while I cordially join in the general feeling of disappointment that "not a simple trace has been found of the missing ships," I cannot restrain myself from adding that I am afforded some satisfaction in having it so clearly proved and testified by the unanimous opinions of those employed, that the gallant Franklin and his

devoted companions *cannot* have pursued any of the courses westward of Beechey Island, which it must now be admitted would have eventually led to their destruction.

Under such circumstances there still remains a hope, a faint hope indeed, that traces of a more favourable nature may be found in one or other of the positions in the N. W. extremity of Baffin's Bay, or on its western coast, which have not yet been visited; but this, should the season permit, is for you to judge.

On our part we shall be obliged to make the best of our way home, not having on board the "Felix" provisions for another season to enable us to continue a longer search.

The ice has certainly now a more favourable appearance than it had, but here all three vessels are still frozen in. We hope, however, that early in August, if not before, we may be free, when I shall be ready to be the bearer of any despatches or letters you may have for Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN ROSS,
Captain R. N.

Enclosure 7 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Mr. PENNY.

H. M. S. "Resolute," at Winter Quarters between
Cape Martyr and Griffith Island,
14th July 1851.

Sir,

I now, it being as early as practicable, do myself the pleasure to transmit herewith, for your information, a tracing of a rough outline chart, showing the several directions and extent of search carried out by this expedition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

Counterpart of above, same date, addressed to Sir John Ross.

H. T. A.

Captain Sir JOHN ROSS to Captain AUSTIN.

Schooner "Felix," Winter Quarters, Cornwallis Island,
16th July 1851.

Sir,

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 14th instant, and to return you my best thanks for it, and its valuable enclosure, which is at one view a manifestation of your admirable arrangements, and the very creditable manner in which they have been carried into execution by the zeal and unflinching perseverance of the gallant officers and men employed in that arduous service; while it proves, to my mind at least, that the missing expedition cannot have taken any course westward of Cornwallis Island, it must produce a general feeling of satisfaction, that under Providence that journeys unparalleled for distance and duration in these desolate regions have been so fully accomplished, and that the officers and men, with so very few exceptions, have returned in perfect health, and I trust in due time to receive the rewards so justly due to their merit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN ROSS,
Captain R. N.

Mr. PENNY to Captain AUSTIN.

H. M. Brig "Lady Franklin," Assistance Bay,
4th August 1851.

Sir,

I forward an outline of search by the expedition under my charge. No trace of H.M.S. "Erebus" and "Terror" farther than a bit of English elm.

As soon as at liberty with my ships I will come to Griffiths Island, and have an interview.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM PENNY.

[*Note.*—Received with the tracing of an outline chart, 11th August 1851, on arrival off the Winter Quarters of Captain Penny's expedition. (Signed) H. T. A.]

Enclosure 8 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain Sir JOHN ROSS.

H.M. Ship "Resolute," Winter Quarters between
Cape Martyr and Griffith Island,
19th July 1851.

Sir,

I have to express my best thanks for your offer to convey letters in your return to Great Britain, of which (as there is every probability of your reaching home first) I avail

myself, by forwarding to you the accompanying box containing an official report and chart, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, requesting that it may be posted at the earliest moment, as doubtless their Lordships are anxious to learn an account of the proceedings of this expedition.

I am happy to inform you that Peter Ecclestone of the "Felix" is sufficiently recovered to return as soon as we may be able to communicate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN,
Captain, &c.

P.S.—Will you be good enough to note on the box referred to, for the information of the Secretary of the Admiralty, the period of your posting or delivering it to any other person.

H. T. A.

Captain Sir JOHN ROSS to Captain AUSTIN.

"Felix" Discovery Vessel, Cornwallis Island,
21st July 1851.

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 19th instant, expressing your thanks for my offer of conveying letters to Great Britain, and accompanied by a box containing an official report and chart, and also an official letter, both addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, with a request that they should be posted at the earliest opportunity, all of which were safely delivered to me yesterday by the officer who had charge of them, and I am to assure you that your request and instructions respecting them shall be particularly attended to. I am happy to observe, that "Peter Ecclestone" of the "Felix" is sufficiently recovered to return, and will accordingly send for him as soon as it is possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN ROSS.

P.S.—I shall not neglect to note on the box and despatch the period of my posting them or delivering them to any other person, and in the event of a boat going to Ponds Bay I shall comply with your request of sending the official documents by her.

J. R.

Enclosure 9 in No. 15.

Captain AUSTIN to Captain OMMANNEY.

By Horatio T. Austin, Esq., C. B., Captain of Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute," and in charge of an expedition to the Arctic Seas.

From the result of the search for the missing expedition under Sir John Franklin to the westward of Wellington Strait made by this expedition, and that of Wellington Strait made by the expedition under Captain Penny, without any traces (beyond those at Beechey Island, its first winter quarters, found last year), I have arrived at the conclusion that had it been practicable it would neither have been prudent, nor in accordance with the spirit of the orders under which I am acting, to have prosecuted further in either of those directions; but looking to the instructions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Captain Penny, relative to the search of Jones's Sound, which he did not succeed in carrying out, as also to their Lordships instructions to Sir James Ross and the "North Star" relative hereto, I have determined to attempt a search in that direction.

Therefore the expedition being now in clear water, advancing under favourable circumstances, it is my intention to proceed forthwith with the steam tenders "Pioneer" and "Intrepid" to attempt the accomplishment of that object.

You will remain in charge of the "Resolute" and "Assistance," conduct them with all despatch towards the eastern shore of Baffin's Bay, and rendezvous between Wolstenholme Sound and Cape York, where you will await the return of the steam tenders until the 15th of September, or until you find the state of the ice become so unfavourable as to lead you to consider it unsafe to remain longer in that position, as it is my positive intention to rejoin before the present open season closes.

You will then transfer such provisions to the "Resolute" as circumstances will permit; receive on board the "Assistance," from her, all such persons as are recommended by the medical officers to be sent home, as also those who are desirous to return; fill their vacancies by volunteers from the "Assistance;" direct the "Resolute" to proceed to winter quarters, if practicable in Wolstenholme Sound, if not, then in the best harbour along the shore of the rendezvous that she can reach, and make the best of your way in the "Assistance" to England, reporting all proceedings to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

You will on the most western point of rendezvous you search, as also on each convenient

and conspicuous point, as you advance to the eastward, erect a cairn and deposit a record of your intentions, placing over it the symbol already arranged between us.

You will, while continuing in the rendezvous, endeavour to communicate with the Esquimaux, and furnish them with such articles from the presents liberally supplied by the Government for that purpose, as also with such stores from the ships, as may tend to ameliorate the condition of so helpless and destitute a people exposed to the rigours of the inhospitable regions.

During the absence of the steam tenders it will be desirable for a printed record to be thrown overboard daily from each ship, and whenever a party lands for a smoke ball to be burnt.

Given under my hand on board Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute" off Cape Warrender, Lancaster Sound, the 14th of August 1851.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSTIN.

Letters from Mr. Penny.

No. 16.

Mr. PENNY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

H. M. S. Lady Franklin, Assistance Harbour,
Cornwallis Island, 12th April 1851.
(Received 11th September.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that after parting company with H. M. S. "North Star" on the 21st of August, I reached along the north shore of Barrow Straits until Sunday the 14th, keeping a strict look out. Being then off Beechy Island I spoke the American schooner "Rescue," and learned that H. M. S. "Assistance" had found traces of the Franklin expedition on Cape Riley. The "Assistance" was then running to the westward; and, anxious to be possessed of every particular, I followed her, with the intention of going on board, but I had not that opportunity till 2 P. M., when both vessels were made fast to the land ice, two thirds of the distance across Wellington Channel, the "Assistance" being about one mile and a half to the westward of us.

Finding that the traces were apparently those of a retreating party, I thought it my proper course to return to the east side of Wellington Channel, which I accordingly did. The succeeding morning I landed with a party, and examined the coast from ten miles to the northward of Cape Spencer to that promontory, and an encampment was found near the latter place, seemingly that of a hunting party about three years previous.

Joining company with the "Advance," the "Rescue," and the "Felix" schooners the following morning, we made fast in a bight under the N. W. side of Beechy Island; and having consulted with Captain De Haven and Sir John Ross, it was agreed that the former should despatch a party to continue the search northward along the east coast of Wellington Channel, while I explored the coast to the eastward. Meantime a party of all my officers which had been despatched in the direction of Caswall's Tower discovered the quarters which had been occupied by the vessels of Sir John Franklin's expedition in the winter of 1845-6. Three graves were also found, the headboards showing them to be those of three seamen who had died early in the spring of 1846; but, notwithstanding a most careful search in every direction, no document could be found. The same evening a boat party was despatched under Captain Stewart to explore Radstock Bay and its vicinity, but no further traces were found in that direction. The "Resolute" and the "Pioneer" came up and made fast on Wednesday morning, and an unfavourable condition of the ice detained us all till evening, when water being open to the westward. I stood a certain distance across Wellington Channel, and in the morning sent away a party under Mr. J. Stuart to communicate with the "Assistance." The same evening we were again in Beechy Bay; and the party returned the following forenoon, having accomplished upwards of forty miles. By them we were acquainted, that the "Assistance" had found no traces in about thirty miles of coast examined by her to the north and south of Barlow Inlet. The state of the ice prevented the least motion being made with the ships until Thursday the 5th of September, when we left Beechy Bay; but so little was the ice slackened off, that we were unable to reach the west side of the channel before Sunday the 8th.

While lying under Beechy Island arrangements were made with Sir John Ross to lay up the "Mary" yacht, and a quantity of provisions was contributed as our share of the depôt there formed.

On Sunday the 8th I landed with a party about twelve miles to the northward of Barlow Inlet, and a cairn and pole was erected in a conspicuous situation.

Wellington Channel being blocked up with old land ice, no alternative was left but to proceed to the westward, with a view of reaching Cape Walker, or attempting some other passage between the islands of the Parry Group, or, failing either of these, Melville Island. Following out this course, we pushed

on through the bay ice, which was now so strong as to retard us greatly ; but, notwithstanding that obstacle, we reached Griffith's Island on Tuesday the 10th September ; and having made fast there, on account of the state of the ice, I had again a consultation with Captain Austin with a view to acting in concert.

The following morning the more favourable appearance of the ice induced me to make an attempt to reach Cape Walker, but after proceeding twenty-five miles the ice became packed, which, with a heavy fog, caused me to put about and make for our former position. The hourly increasing thickness of the bay ice, which had now become such an obstacle that with a strong breeze the ships stayed with considerable difficulty, rendered it absolutely necessary that a place of safety should be obtained for the vessels, and I accordingly made for this harbour, a rough sketch of which I had previously obtained from the "Assistance." We brought up at 11 A.M. on Thursday the 12th September, and shortly afterwards the "Felix" schooner, Captain Sir J. Ross, came in and brought up. Two boats were sent ashore, and hauled up, to fall back upon, should further progress be made ; but being unable to get out by the 20th, so as to be usefully employed, preparations were commenced for wintering.

With reference to the winter that we have spent, one fact will speak for itself, viz. that there has not been one single case of sickness in either the "Lady Franklin" or "Sophia." Indeed, so completely were both the minds and bodies kept properly occupied and carefully attended to, that, with the crews I have, it would have been surprising to have seen sickness. While on this subject, I cannot but make mention in terms of praise of Messrs. Sutherland, Goodsir, and Stuart,—their exertions alike to instruct and amuse the men greatly contributing to the happy issue.

Frequent communication has been held with Captain Austin's expedition, which has wintered in the strait between Griffiths and Cornwallis Islands, and arrangements were made with reference to the different routes to be taken in the coming travelling. Pursuant to these there are at present ready to start from the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia" two parties of three sledges each, to explore Wellington Channel and the land which may be found at the head of that great inlet. Independent of the above, there are two dog sledges prepared for extended search in the same direction. One of these will be conducted by the interpreter, Mr. Peterson, of whom I would beg to make particular mention, trusting that his noble devotion in the cause of our countrymen may be remembered to his advantage.

The day at present fixed for the start is Monday the 14th April, should the weather continue favourable. Previous to starting I have thought proper to make out this despatch for their Lordships information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. PENNY,
Captain, &c.

No. 17.

Mr. PENNY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

H. M. S. Lady Franklin, at sea,
8th September 1851.

RESUMING my report of proceedings from the date of my last despatch, I have to inform you, that on the 17th April six sledges, with forty-one officers and men, started from the ships, under the command of Captain Stewart of the Sophia ; and I could not but be gratified by seeing what our small means had put in our power to do, with these parties of men alike able and willing. The sledges were variously officered by Captain Stewart, Messrs. Marshall, Reid, and J. Stuart, and Drs. Sutherland and Goodsir. The course intended to be pursued was, to proceed so far together up the west side of Wellington Channel, and, after returning the depôt sledges, two parties to cross to the east side of the channel, while other two follow up the west coast to the head of the channel, the position of land then seen determining their future procedure. Each sledge was equipped for forty days, and the average weights per man were upwards of

200 lbs. I started from the ships on the 18th with the dog-sledges, accompanied by Mr. Peterson, and at noon on the 18th I joined the sledges. They had found the ice very heavy, in consequence of the recent snow, and the high temperature; and their journey of the previous day had not exceeded six miles and a half. The inefficient state of our cooking apparatus had already begun to cause much inconvenience. On the 19th the temperature fell, and a gale of wind faced in immediately on entering the channel, which continued with only partial intermission till the 22d. During all this time I was continually among them; and whatever doubts the want of experience of my young officers might have warranted my entertaining, they were all removed by witnessing their management of their men on the occasion. On the 21st Mr. J. Stuart was returned with the two depôt sledges, and only one tent. In consequence of the extreme severity of the weather, I felt great anxiety for this party; however, in two marches they reached the ship with only a short interval of rest.

Meanwhile the gale continued down the channel, with a temperature varying from 25 to 30. This, and the want of numerous articles, such as a sufficient supply of fuel, stronger conjurers, &c., caused me to entertain a fear of failure, if these defects were not remedied in time. I accordingly consulted my officers on the subject; and, in consequence of our unanimous opinion that a timely return was the most advisable step, I determined to deposit all the provisions and the two best sledges at this spot, returning with the other two to receive alterations. The distance travelled to this spot was forty-two miles. The dog-sledges in their return accomplished this distance in one stage.

The other four parties, after making the deposit, returned, reaching the bay at noon on the 26th, every one in the best of health, and not a single case of frostbite; and I cannot but state my admiration of the constant contentment and steady and willing endurance of the officers and men of the parties, under circumstances of no small hardship. From this date till the 5th of May every one was busily engaged preparing more amply for what we had found to be necessary in our first journey. On the 6th, after a short prayer to the Almighty to enable us to fulfill our duty, three sledges again started, the crews of the two that had been left up channel being distributed amongst them.

They were again in charge of Captain Stewart till such time as I should myself join them at their upper depôt, when I was to see each party take its separate route. At 6 A. M., on the 9th May, I started with Mr. Peterson and Thomson (one of the seamen) with the two dog-sledges; and at 2 P. M., we overtook the parties, then camped at their further depôt. From Point Separation, in $75^{\circ} 5' N.$ lat., Captain Stewart, with his auxiliary, Dr. Sutherland, and Mr. J. Stuart of the "Lady Franklin," left, proceeding to Cape Grinnell, Mr. John Stuart there separating, and proceeding along the coast to Cape Hurd, examining the various beaches, &c. for further traces, as strong opinions were still entertained that more was to be found in that quarter.

Mr. Goodsir, with Mr. Marshall as his auxiliary, had assigned to them to examine the west side, and to follow up after the dog-sledges, receiving final instructions on reaching the head of the channel. Rapid journeys were made with the dogs to Cape De Haven in $N.$ lat. $75^{\circ} 22'$. Hence the land was seen to trend $N.W.$ ten miles, terminating in a point, afterwards named Point Decision, which was reached at $10\frac{1}{2}$ P. M. on the 12th May. A hill of 400 feet in height was ascended, and in consequence of the land being seen continuous in a north-westerly direction, instructions were left to Mr. Goodsir to take this coast along to the westward, while I myself proceeded in a $N.W.$ by $N.$ direction towards land seen to the northward. At 5 P. M. on the 14th we encamped on the ice, having travelled twenty-five miles $N.W.$ by $N.$ from Point Decision. The following day, after travelling twenty miles from this encampment in a $N.W.$ by $N.$ direction, we landed at 7 P. M. on an island named Baillie Hamilton Island. Ascending a hill about 500 feet high above the headland on which we landed, the ice to the westward in the strait between Cornwallis and Hamilton Island was seen to be much decayed, and an island was seen to the westward distant thirty-five or forty miles. As the decayed state of the ice prevented further progress to the westward from this point, and no trace being found, we proceeded round the island, first to the $N.N.E.$; and afterwards, on rounding Cape Scoresby in a $N.N.W.$ direction, on the 16th we came upon what to all appearance was water; and on halting on the 17th at Point Surprise we were astonished to

open out another strait, which was twenty-five miles of clear water. An island was seen bearing $W\frac{1}{2}S.$, distant forty miles, and a headland distant fifteen miles $W.$ by $N.$; the dark sky over this headland indicating the presence of water to the extent of perhaps twenty miles on the other side. This point was found to be in $76^{\circ} 2' N.$ lat. and $95^{\circ} 55' W.$ long. Further progress being prevented by water, we being still without traces, and the dogs provisions being exhausted no other course remained but to return to the ships, which we reached after rapid journeys at midnight on the 20th May.

The carpenters and people on board were immediately set about preparing a boat to endeavour to reach this water soon.

On the 29th May the second mate arrived, having left Mr. Goodsir in $75^{\circ} 36' N.$ and $96^{\circ} W.$ Water had been seen by them to the northward from their furthest station. He made a very rapid return, having run in one day from twenty-five to thirty miles. Every one on board continued actively employed, preparing the boats, provisions, &c.; and on the 4th June it started with one auxiliary sledge, and one dog sledge, the whole party being in charge of Mr. Manson.

On the 6th of June Mr. John Stuart returned with his party from Cape Hurd, after an absence of thirty-one days, but without having found any trace either indicative of the course pursued by H. M. S. "Erebus" and "Terror", or of any retreating party having subsequently passed along that coast. After thirty-six hours rest Mr. Stuart again started to join Mr. Manson, having equipped his sledge for a twenty days journey. He overtook the boat on the morning of the 8th June, then one mile to the westward of Cape Hotham. The same day a dog-sledge from Mr. Manson arrived at the ship, stating that the sledge on which the boat was placed, after trial, had been found unfit for the purpose. The armourer, who was returned with the dog sledge, was immediately set about preparing a larger sledge, but having no carpenter on board the woodwork was finished by Sir John Ross's carpenter. On the 11th, at 4 A.M., I joined the boat with the two dog-sledges; and all hands were immediately set about fitting and lashing the new sledges, and arranging the weights of the party between the two long sledges and the two dog-sledges. On the 12th Mr. Manson returned, no one then being left in the ships but the clerk in charge.

The improvement on the boat sledge was remarkable, and the ice also so much better, that a distance of 105 miles was accomplished in seven marches. The boat being then launched into the water and laden, the fatigue party returned, and reached the ship on the 25th June, all in good health. The dogs dragging their light sledges the whole way,

On our journey out we met Dr. Sutherland at Depôt Point, returning after an absence of thirty-eight days. He reported having left Captain Stewart in $76^{\circ} 20' N.$ in the opening of Wellington Channel, but without having yet fallen in with any traces. When off Point Griffith's on the 14th, Messrs. Goodsir and Marshall were fallen in with, having examined the northern shores of Cornwallis and Bathurst land as far $99^{\circ} W.$, but still without having fallen in with any traces. They were obliged to return in consequence of the water.

Resuming the boat journey, after separating from the fatigue sledges on the 17th June, we proceeded about ten miles to the westward, when we were obliged to take shelter in an adjacent bay, in consequence of a head sea and strong westerly gale. From this date until the 20th of July, 310 miles of coast were examined by the boat, under very disadvantageous circumstances, arising from constant unfavourable winds and rapid tides. Our provisions being then within eight days of being consumed, and our distance from the ships such that prudence would not warrant further perseverance with this supply, we commenced our return, and with a strong north-west wind succeeded in reaching Abandon Bay after fifteen hours and a half. The ice being so decayed as to preclude the launching of even an empty boat, we were compelled to haul the boat ashore and abandon her, taking with us four days provisions. The weather during our return was boisterous in the extreme, with continued rain, which made the streams it was necessary to ford very rapid. The constant

wet caused the greatest discomfort, but from none of my men did I once hear a complaint. In 75° N. lat. we found a boat which Captain Stewart had wisely sent out in case of such a contingency as had occurred; but the ice having set into the mouth of Wellington Channel, which had up to this time been open, we were unable to fetch her down further than Barlow Inlet. Thence we walked to the ships, which we reached at 10 P. M. on the 25th July.

Captain Stewart had returned on the 21st June, having reached Cape Becher in $76^{\circ} 20'$ N. lat. and 97° W. long.

He had again started on the 1st July, and carried up a depôt for my return to Cape De Haven, returning from this journey on the 17th July.

For particulars during the different searches, I would refer you to the accompanying reports.

On my return I was agreeably surprised to hear that Barrow Straits had been open, as far as could be seen, since the 2d of July, an occurrence which was so far to be expected as the strait was seen to be in motion till the 11th of March. The land ice had also come out of Wellington Channel as far up as Point Separation, probably about the 5th of July; and on the 27th July, when our travelling operations concluded, the fast edge in the Channel continued in the same position.

The ships continued ice-bound till the 10th August; but, had our parties returned in sufficient time to refit, and be ready to cut out from the date of water making, we would have been at liberty on the 15th of July.

On the 11th of August, Captain Austin's ships entered our harbour in their progress to the eastward. His parties had penetrated as far as ships could hope to do, yet, like our own, unsuccessful in finding the least trace of the missing expedition. In fact, none had been found, such as would warrant the risk of a second winter; and my orders being such as left no alternative, I determined on immediately returning to England, if no instructions to the contrary should be met with. In proceeding down the country, we landed at Cape Hay and Button Point in Ponds Bay, positions considered the most probable for despatches being left on by the whale ships. Finding none we continued our course down along the land, crossing in 70° N. lat. through a body of 140 miles of ice. We made repeated endeavours to reach Lievly, on the island of Disco, to ascertain if any despatches had been left there for our guidance; but thick weather, and a strong northerly wind, obliged us to haul off after having made a narrow escape from a reef lying close inshore. We parted from the "Sophia" about twenty miles off the land, expecting to rejoin her after having communicated with the Danish settlement; but the thick weather and strong gale continuing for twenty-four hours, we separated from her, and have not since seen her. Captain Stewart's instructions in case of such an event were, to make the best of his way to Woolwich, having it in his power to take either the English Channel or the Pentland Firth as his route, according as the wind might lead.

In speaking of the services of the various officers under me, I would mention my second in command as an able and energetic coadjutor, both on board ship and in conducting the search along the east coast of Wellington Channel and the south shores of Albert Land; and his foresight in laying out depôts and a boat for the boat party greatly facilitated our safe return. Dr. Sutherland of the "Sophia" as his auxiliary, in travelling proved himself a most indefatigable officer, and his attention while on board to natural history and meteorology will no doubt afford many useful facts. Of Mr. D. Manson, the chief mate of the "Sophia," an old and experienced whaling master, I cannot speak too highly. He had charge of the vessels during the absence of myself and Captain Stewart, and throughout the winter he paid the greatest attention to tidal and barometrical registers; and his services in conducting the boat to Cape Hot-ham, under peculiarly disadvantageous circumstances, were beyond all praise. Mr. James Reid, the second mate of the "Sophia," a son of the ice-master of the "Erebus," accompanied Captain Stewart in the first journey as an auxiliary, and afterwards proceeded with him to his furthest.

Of Messrs. Marshall and Leiper, the chief and second mates of the "Lady Franklin," I would make mention as experienced and skilful ice officers; and the exertions of the one in accompanying Mr. Goodsir in the whole extent of

his journey, and the other as my second in the boat, were such as could not but afford me the greatest satisfaction. The whole of the duties of refitting the ship during my absence fell upon Mr. Marshall, and were accomplished in a time remarkably short, considering the few hands on board. Of Mr. John Stewart, the youngest officer under my command, I cannot speak too highly. Finding that there were no duties as assistant surgeon, he acted as third mate; and his exertions in preparing the travelling equipments, his surveys of various bays during his travels, and his assisting in preparing charts, &c., have proved of the greatest use; and for his proceedings during the search of the beaches, &c. between Cape Grinnell and Cape Hurd, I would refer you to his journal. He afterwards started as an auxiliary to the boat party, with an interval of only thirty-six hours, and was subsequently employed in numerous short journies, conducting boats, &c.

Mr. Goodsir, in his western search, discharged alike his duty to this expedition and his missing brother.

Mr. Peterson, the interpreter, in conducting the dog sledges, and in affording much useful information with reference to travelling, as well as his personal exertion in the same, to the extent even of injuring his health, has afforded me the greatest satisfaction; and of his services as an interpreter on a former occasion, I have made mention in a previous despatch.

Of the seamen of both vessels placed under my command I cannot speak too highly; for neither in winter quarters, nor while enduring the privation and fatigues of travelling did ever one complaint or grumble reach my ears. Of their unwearied exertions a schedule is laid before you, and if success has not attended their labours they have not the less performed their duties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM PENNY,
Commanding the Expedition.

SCHEDULE showing the total number of days engaged and miles travelled in the journeys of the officers and men of the LADY FRANKLIN and SOPHIA, under the orders of Captain WILLIAM PENNY, during their search for Her Majesty's Ships EREBUS and TERROR,—17th April to the 27th of July 1851.

THE LADY FRANKLIN.

Name.	Rate.	Total.	
		Days.	Miles.
1. Captain William Penny	- - - -	66	932
2. Mr. John Marshall	Mate - - - -	53	428
3. John Leiper	2d Mate - - - -	84	862
4. John Stuart	3d Mate - - - -	53	535
5. Robert A. Goodsir	Surgeon - - - -	53	428
6. J. Carl C. Petersen	Interpreter - - - -	26	542
7. Moses Robinson	Boatswain - - - -	59	515
8. Daniel Hendry	Carpenter - - - -	88	832
9. Alexander Robertson	Steward - - - -	-	*
10. Richard Kitson	Captain of Hold - - - -	56	498
11. Alexander Leiper	Carpenter's Mate - - - -	53	428
12. Alexander Bain	Sailmaker - - - -	53	428
13. William Mark	Cook - - - -	21	222
14. James Leslie	Armourer - - - -	54	524
15. John Noble	Cooper - - - -	53	428
16. Alexander Thompson	Able Seaman - - - -	69	932
17. John P. Lucas	A. B. - - - -	57	702
18. Thomas Langster	A. B. - - - -	57	594
19. George Findlay	A. B. - - - -	57	540
20. William Brands	A. B. - - - -	56	498
21. Boreas A. Smith	A. B. - - - -	63	627
22. William Bruce	A. B. - - - -	84	862
23. James Hodgston	A. B. - - - -	84	862
24. J. Davidson	A. B. - - - -	88	832
25. Walter Craig	A. B. - - - -	31	347
26. George Farce	A. B. - - - -	60	557

* Left in charge of stores.

THE SOPHIA.

Name.	Rate.	Total.	
		Days.	Miles.
1. Captain Alexander Stewart	- - - - -	76	625
2. Mr. Donald Manson	Mate	8	33
3. Mr. James Reid	2d Mate	59	560
4. Dr. Peter C. Sutherland	Surgeon	55	380
5. Alexander Samuel	Boatswain	76	705
6. Matthew Shiells	Carpenter	31	302
7. John Gordon	Captain of Hold	28	277
8. James Knox	Cook	50	837
9. Alexander Hardy	Steward	18	186
10. John Eddie	Carpenter's Mate	53	
11. Donald Sutherland	Sailmaker	20	155
12. Andrew Adams	Able Seaman	59	560
13. James M'Kenzie	A. B.	77	747
14. William Marshall	A. B.	77	702
15. Alexander Smith	A. B.	77	737
16. John Lawson	A. B.	56	622
17. George Knowles	A. B.	76	705
18. George Thomson	A. B.	50	500
19. John Dunbar	A. B.	77	747
20. Andrew Robison	A. B.	51	542

Every officer and man has done his duty.

(Signed) WM. PENNY.

No. 18.

Mr. PENNY to the LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY.

My Lords,

Ship Hotel, London, 12th September 1851.

ON my return from the Arctic regions I beg to lay before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, at the very earliest moment on consideration, certain points which are of vital importance to the search in which I and so many others have been engaged; and I beg your Lordships to excuse any undue freedom of expression which may occur in putting before you my convictions. First, I have, under a deep sense of duty, to express to your Lordships the extreme importance of the fact, which I have learnt only since my return, that the provisions carried out by the "North Star" are lying in Lancaster Sound instead of at Disco Island. Had this fact been made known to the searching squadron, either at the time when so deposited, or this year, it must have very materially affected the question of the return of the expedition, whose labour, now that the course taken by the missing ships is known almost to a certainty, could not have been cramped for want of resources to fall back upon. The whole of Captain Austin's squadron are convinced, from my report, and from not having seen the "North Star" themselves, that Mr. Saunders deposited his provisions at Disco. I feel bound to add, that had that officer permitted me to see your Lordships instructions, I should have been aware that his interpretation of them was not in conformity with the meaning of your Lordships.

Secondly. Your Lordships are aware that I have discovered the course of Wellington Channel lies N.W. a distance of sixty miles beyond the point which I reached, and about 180 beyond the entrance of the channel from Barrow Straits; and that it is my conviction, that the extensive yet unavailing investigations of the coast of Barrow Strait westward place beyond a doubt that the missing expedition has taken this N.W. channel, and that their course should be therein followed with the utmost energy, determination, and despatch.

The heavy barrier of ice which has blocked up Wellington Channel near its junction with Barrow Straits prevented all access northwards, both last year and the present, up to the period of our return; and in my opinion a powerful steamer only, to take advantage of the short season, is fit for the accomplishment of the work. It is not possible to over-rate the advantages of such a steamer; it would do with safety what nothing else could accomplish.

Thirdly. My observations convinced me, that, this northern latitude once reached, comparative open water would be found. The climate improves; and in proof of this I may mention that within this channel at Point Surprise, lat. $76^{\circ} 2'$, long. $95^{\circ} 55'$, we found ducks on 17th May, full a month earlier than in the lower latitude; while the sea was even then so free from ice that the water washed our very feet as we stood upon the point. The quantity of drift wood was comparatively; and among this was found a piece of drift wood of English elm, evidently to me a bit thrown overboard from the "Erebus" and "Terror." Walrus and seals were also seen and killed. And from all these circumstances of improved food and fuel it is impossible to doubt that Sir John Franklin's party may still be living in this most northern region.

In conclusion I venture to put before your Lordships the importance of immediate steps for the prosecution of the search; and I entreat you to send up a powerful steamer without delay to follow up the work which we have failed to accomplish for want of fitting means to do so. And on account of feeling myself fettered by the terms of my instructions, I feel myself bound to state, in further explanation, that the terms of the instruction I received from your Lordships seemed to leave me no alternative but to return home. Had it not been for those restrictions, I should not have dared to have done so. At the same time, with my present means, but crippled by the depôts of provisions which have been left on the coast, and with no known resources to fall back upon, I could not have lasted on another year without great risk to my men.

Since my return, I learn that Captain McClure and Captain Collinson are proceeding eastward from Behring Strait, intending to reach Melville Island, which I have not the slightest doubt of their accomplishing; and being aware also of the opinion of Captain Kellett, which is my own also, that they would not return westward, I leave your Lordships to judge if such a certainty, as I may presume to call it, does not afford additional necessity for sending to meet them at the earliest moment.

If the promptest measures are adopted, and a steamer prepared with all possible despatch, she may easily reach Lancaster Sound before it is closed by ice for the season; and for the command of such a vessel, to be accompanied by the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," whose officers and crews are to a man willing and eager to return, I beg to offer my services. My officers and men are in perfect health, and willing to follow wherever I may lead them. If this plan be adopted, the "North Star" should be sent up next spring, with provisions, coals, and stores.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM PENNY.

No. 19.

Board Minute, 18th September.

My Lords have thought it proper to request the attendance of Sir Francis Beaufort, Sir Edward Parry, and Sir James Ross, Captain Beechy, Sir George Back, and Sir John Richardson.

The following Officers, viz., Sir Francis Beaufort, Sir Edward Parry, Sir James Ross, and Captain Beechy, attended here this day; Sir John Richardson and Sir George Back not being within reach.

This letter, No. 18., was placed before the above officers present, and they have seen Captain Penny, and having afterwards communicated with their

Lordships, my Lords, on a full consideration of the circumstances, declined acceding to Captain Penny's offer.

Present:—Sir Francis Baring.
Admiral Berkeley.
Admiral Stewart.
Captain Milne.

W. A. B. H., Secy.

Acknowledge receipt of this letter, and acquaint Captain Penny, that my Lords are much gratified by his zeal, and this generous offer of his services to proceed with his two ships, and a steamer, to endeavour to reach Lancaster Sound this season; but that, on a full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, their Lordships declined to accept of his offer.

W. A. B. H.

No. 20.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY TO MR. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 13th September 1851.

REFERRING to a despatch from Captain Austin, of H.M.S. "Resolute," dated the 12th August last, in which he states that, "having communicated with Captain Penny, and fully considered his official reply to my letters relative to the search of Wellington Strait by the expedition under his charge (unhappily without success), I do not feel authorized to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in these directions," I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to signify their direction to you to take the earliest opportunity of transmitting to me, for their Lordships information, a copy of your official letters to Captain Austin referred to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 21.

MR. PENNY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

437, Strand, 15th September 1851.

I AM sorry that I have not with me a copy of the note to which Captain Austin refers in his despatch, but I know the words by heart, and they will appear in the following statement which I have the honour to lay before you for the information of the Lords of the Admiralty.

I stated verbally to Captain Austin that it was my conviction that Sir John Franklin had gone through the strait leading N. W. out of Wellington Channel (which I have for the present named Queen Victoria Channel), and that he had gone off in clear water, and that he was beyond our reach. I meant, of course, beyond the reach of my parties and my means. He did not seem disposed to credit my statement. I begged him to give me one of his steamers, and I would take the "Sophia," and would act as pilot, and go up the channel, and wait to see if the ice would clear away; that he would thus have the advantage of my practical experience. Captain Austin declined this request, and went away. Late at night he wrote me note, saying, "Is Wellington Channel searched, or is it not searched?" My reply in writing was, "Sir, your question is easily answered. I did all in the power of man to do in Wellington Channel. It requires no further search." I feel convinced that I have given the exact words I used, and I limited myself to the question he put to me. Captain Austin is perfectly aware that I had previously put before him all the circumstances, and that I had discovered open water leading north-west out of Wellington Channel.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. PENNY.

No. 22.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY to Mr. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 15th September, 1851.

WITH reference to your letter of this day's date, in which you state that "I begged him (Captain Austin) to give me one of his steamers, and I would take the 'Sophia' and act as pilot, and go up the Channel," I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that my Lords would wish you to explain clearly whether there was not a barrier of ice at the entrance of Wellington Channel, which would have prevented these vessels proceeding in that direction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 23.

Mr. PENNY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

437, Strand, 16th September 1851.

IN reply to your letter of the 15th instant, in reference to my application to Captain Austin to give me one of the steamers, and I would take the "Sophia" and act as pilot, and go up the channel, and requesting me to explain clearly whether there was not a barrier of ice at the entrance of Wellington Channel which would have prevented these vessels proceeding in that direction, I beg to state in reply that there was undoubtedly a barrier of ice at the time I made the application, but that I nevertheless was anxiously desirous to go up to it with the vessels I have named, and remain there for the chance of its opening until the setting in of the frost at the close of the season; it being understood that had the wind remained from the west, as it then was, I could not expect any change, but a shift of wind to the eastward would have made a rapid alteration in the ice.

It is my conviction that to such a sudden change is to be attributed the signs of Sir John Franklin's precipitate departure from his winter encampment. For this reason I was most anxious to be watching at the edge of the ice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. PENNY.

No. 24.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY to Mr. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 15th September 1851.

WITH reference to the first paragraph of your letter of the 12th April last, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, in which you state that, "the traces found of the Franklin Expedition were apparently those of a retreating party," I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to call upon you to define more particularly what is meant by the said expression.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 25.

Mr. PENNY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

437, Strand, 18th September 1851.

IN reference to the expression used by me in my despatch of April 17th, that the traces found of the Franklin expedition were apparently those of a retreating party, of which you call upon me to define more particularly my meaning, I have to state, that I formed my opinion entirely from Captain Ommanney; but that, as appears farther on in my despatch, I was afterwards

led to a very different conclusion on landing, and finding undoubted traces of a winter station of the Erebus and Terror in 1845 and 1846, of which the date upon the graves is positive evidence. Captain Ommanney had not seen these evidences of a prolonged stay when he found the opinion to which I had alluded, and which was afterwards rejected by the whole of the squadron. To make the matter more sure, I took a travelling party to explore all the way to Cape Hurd, without finding anything which could justify the idea of a retreating party.

Had it been a retreating party traces would have been found of such in the way to it and in the way from it, in some quarter or another, whereas the whole country has been scoured without discovering any.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. PENNY.

No. 26.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY TO Mr. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 17th September 1851.

WITH reference to the 12th paragraph of your sailing orders, dated the 11th of April 1850, in which you are referred to the 22d paragraph of Sir John Franklin's orders, an extract from which is enclosed, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to signify their direction to you, in conformity with that part of your instructions, on the arrival of the "Lady Franklin" at Woolwich, to transmit to me, for their Lordships information, all logs, journals, or remarks, together with all letters that you may have received, on matters relating to the service on which you have been engaged, from Captain Austin or other officers in command of Her Majesty's ships, with copies of your replies thereto, together with any other papers relating to your voyage, and all charts and drawings, duly sealed, for their Lordships information and disposal. And, on the arrival of the "Sophia" at Woolwich, you are to give similar directions to Mr. Stewart, who is in command of that vessel, to deliver all documents as above named to you, to be in like manner transmitted to me for their Lordships information and disposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 27.

Mr. STEWART to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

Peterhead, 13th September 1851.

I BEG to acquaint you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the "Sophia" arrived here this forenoon, having parted company with the "Lady Franklin" on the 21st August off Disco Island in thick weather since that time. In pursuance of my orders from Captain Penny, I have been returning to England as expeditiously as possible, and made the land of Noup Head on the evening of the 9th instant; since that time I have been detained by light calm weather, and only arrived here in the fore part of the 13th.

Ascertaining that Captain Penny has already arrived I have nothing further to command, and intend proceeding with the "Sophia" down the east coast to Woolwich.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEX. STEWART.

No. 28.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY TO Mr. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 22d September 1851.

WITH reference to your letters of the 12th April and 8th September last, and to your report of the zealous assistance afforded to you by the several officers

and others therein named, as well as to the general good conduct of your men, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that my Lords desire to express to you, and to the officers and crews of the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," the sense they entertain of their praiseworthy conduct throughout the service they have been employed upon; and the satisfaction of my Lords at the untiring and praiseworthy exertions of the travelling parties, as evinced in the space traversed by them, and the geographical discoveries they have made.

My Lords are further of opinion, that great credit is due to you and Captain Stewart, and to the officers under your orders, for the state of health maintained on board your respective ships.

You will assure Mr. Petersen that the value of his services is fully acknowledged by their Lordships.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 29.

Mr. PENNY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

497, Strand, 10th October 1851.

I HAVE read in the "Times" the correspondence between Captain Austin and myself, which their Lordships have been pleased to send to the newspapers; without meaning any disrespect to their Lordships, I hope I may be allowed to say, that I think this is not fair to myself, as I had no opportunity of making any explanation of the circumstance, which are quite necessary to a right understanding of it.

If the object is to show that I thought nothing more could be done than the complete search I had made of Wellington Channel, it is answered by my having asked Captain Austin for the help of a steamer, which I would pilot up. Captain Austin's own despatch shows, that on a previous occasion he did not afford me the assistance which I might have expected from him, in getting my boat up to the open water. But when Captain Austin seemed to wish to throw upon me, after I had done all that man could do, the responsibility of his going there himself and following up my discoveries, I told him that he had got my chart, and that I had also told him my convictions that Sir John Franklin had gone up that channel in clear water, and begged him to judge for himself. My last words to Captain Austin when he was going to Jones Sound were, "Go up Wellington Channel, Sir, and you will do good service to the cause."

Their Lordships know that I have not been doing by Captain Austin in his absence what he appears to have done by me, but now that he is on the spot I do not hesitate to say that I have received from him very unkind and, as I think, very unfair treatment, and I am sure some of his own officers could bear out my assertions. I have always endeavoured to behave to Captain Austin with the respect which is due to an officer holding so high a command in Her Majesty's Service, and I think his officers have been witness to this. I disdained to say anything of this in his absence.

Their Lordships know that my training has not been to write official letters, and I am free to confess that I felt much hurt and offended that Captain Austin should think it necessary to write to me as if all I had been saying to him beforehand had gone for nothing.

I left London for my home at Aberdeen on Saturday last to see my children, but two hours after, being informed of the publication of the letters, I started on my return, and am now ready to make such personal explanation as their Lordships may give me an opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. PENNY.

No. 30.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY to Mr. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 15th October 1851.

HAVING laid before their Lordships your letter of 10th instant, I am desired to acquaint you that an opportunity of making such explanations as you may wish, with regard to your late proceedings, will be afforded you, and that my Lords will communicate further with you on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 31.

Mr. PENNY to the SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sir,

437, Strand, 14th October 1851.

I HOPE there will be no objection on the part of their Lordships to my having returned to me the reports and journals of my officers and myself, as I am anxious that some account of what has been done should appear in print as soon as possible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WM. PENNY.

No. 32.

SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY to Mr. PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 16th October 1851.

IN return to your letter of the 14th inst., requesting that the reports and journals of your proceedings, and those of the officers under your command, in the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," may be returned to you, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that the documents will be returned as soon as the public service will admit.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Enclosure No. 2.

THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE.

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First Day. October 27, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, M.P., C.B., Chairman,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain Beechey,
Mr. Fegen, Secretary to the Committee.

CAPTAIN PENNY called.

Mr. Penny.

27th Oct. 1851.

THE CHAIRMAN.—The Committee wish me to say in the first instance that there is not the slightest intention on the part of this Committee to bring any accusation or crimination against any of the officers of the expedition. They are quite certain that you have all acted to the best of your ability during the expedition with which you were connected. We are about to inquire rather with a view to the future than to the past, although our inquiries must naturally embrace the past as well as the future. There is nothing alleged either against you or Captain Austin. We are anxious that that circumstance should be perfectly understood in the course of the proceeding to-day.

1. *Chairman.*—The first question we should like to ask you is, upon what grounds you consider it would have been practicable to proceed farther in the Wellington Straits during the autumn of this year?

Captain Penny.—I have to state that the ice was broken up in Wellington Strait as far on the 25th day of July 1851 as it was on the 8th of September last year. At the time we left that country it was too early to decide whether the channel would clear away or not. We could have stopped there one month longer, and had strong north-east winds come it would have cleared away the ice through Queen Victoria's Channel. By having a steamer up at the edge of the ice in Wellington Strait we could have been watching for such an event. Do you understand? as they say I sometimes put in a word that completely changes the sense of a sentence.

2. *Chairman.*—We quite understand you. Now, tell us your own opinion as to the probability of the ice clearing away?

Captain Penny.—I have seen as great changes take place in forty-eight hours with a strong favourable wind in that country.

3. *Chairman.*—At what date did you see the edge of that barrier last?

Captain Penny.—On the 25th of July. After that, about the 14th of August, Captain Austin passed over Wellington Channel. I did not see the bar later than the 25th of July. In the year 1850, on the 9th of September, from thirteen to fifteen miles of ice came out of that channel.

4. *Chairman.*—You had better not remark upon Captain Austin's proceedings, as we shall hear him afterwards. It was in 1850 you saw what you have described?

Captain Penny.—I will tell you. Last year in crossing this channel, we left Beechey Island to cross over to the west side of the channel; it came on thick with a strong northerly wind, and we were obliged to make fast to the ice. A strong northerly wind came on, and from thirteen to fifteen miles of ice broke away and drove out of the channel, and I passed to the northward of this floe of ice. Captain Austin was on the south side of this floe, and I was on the other; this floe left fifteen miles of water behind it.

Mr. Penny.
27th Oct. 1851.

5. *Chairman.*—That was on the 8th or 9th of September of last year, 1850?
Captain Penny. I merely mention it to show how rapidly changes take place.

6. *Chairman.*—Do you believe the channel cleared at all last year?

Captain Penny.—I do not think it did. It was my opinion as well as the officers whom I requested to examine the ice, that fifteen miles of old ice remained in that channel.

7. *Sir E. Parry.*—I think you said in your evidence at Woolwich that about fifteen miles of ice were left at the last time?

Captain Penny.—Yes; Dr. Sutherland was the officer who was appointed to examine that ice, and it was his opinion also that fifteen miles remained.

8. *Chairman.*—Do you say that in 1850 the channel was never opened at all?

Captain Penny.—Such is my opinion.

9. *Chairman.*—Was there any possibility of a vessel going up the channel last year?

Captain Penny.—No possibility of any.

In reference to some conversation which took place,

The *Chairman* said, I think it would be convenient if you were to distinguish the two channels, Queen Victoria's Channel from the Wellington Strait, or some confusion may ensue.

Sir E. Parry.—It is a very important thing to make the distinction. Wellington Strait may be compared to the door into the Queen's Channels shown on your chart; but those channels should not be called Wellington Strait.

10. *Chairman.*—Have you any reason to say, of your own knowledge, that a passage for a ship has been opened into this channel?

Captain Penny.—I have no doubt of its having been opened, but I cannot say of my own knowledge.

11. *Chairman.*—But from your own observation, as an experienced man, you have come to the conclusion you have stated?

Captain Penny.—I should say that once in two years this channel is opened. In 1850 we can only speak with certainty of it; this year we left too early to judge.

12. *Chairman.*—Where was it you reached the water with your boat?

Captain Penny.—About ten miles east of Disappointment Bay, on the 17th of June, into clear water. Wind came from the westward, and brought in all the broken and detached ice upon us. We continued to struggle through this ice, and examine the various islands. The wind continued adverse for thirty-three days, less about thirty hours, and the tide kept the ice bound in the channel, which prevented us from reaching the water until the 19th of July. All our provisions were expended.

13. *Chairman.*—Could a vessel of larger size navigate the waters your boat was in?

Captain Penny.—With perfect safety.

14. *Chairman.*—Do you think Sir John Franklin went through this channel?

Captain Penny.—I have no doubt on my mind that he went through it in clear water; my conviction has always been so. Nobody has heard me say anything else.

15. *Chairman.*—Did you sound going through it?

Captain Penny.—No, we did not sound. If the water had been shallow the ice would have grounded. All the three channels were deep in the middle. What is to be guarded against in limestone formation is, the bolder the land the shallower the water. There was only one small shallow in the middle channel, and it was close in shore and covered with pressed-up ice, which prevents ships grounding upon these shores.

16. *Sir E. Parry.*—How many soundings did you get?

Captain Penny.—In consequence of the sea being covered with ice we had no time to take the soundings. Had there been any shallows the ice would have told us of them by grounding upon it.

17. *Chairman*.—Had you any line with you?

Captain Penny.—Yes, we had a line with us, but it was not very often used. I have no doubt that in the centre of all the channels the water was very deep.

18. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you speaking of the middle channel now?

Captain Penny.—I am speaking of all three.

19. *Chairman*.—That you rather conjectured from the formation of the land than from any experience of your own?

Captain Penny.—Yes; both from the formation of the land, and my own experience.

20. *Chairman*.—From the 17th June to the 20th July what instrument had you with you?

Captain Penny.—My sextant and artificial horizon. I have a great many observations.

(*Captain Penny* produced the observations, and handed them to the *Chairman*.)

21. *Chairman*.—You wrote to the Admiralty for your journals; did they return them to you?

Captain Penny.—No, they did not.

22. *Chairman*.—Have you any other memorandum of your proceeding?

Captain Penny.—The journals are here (in the Admiralty).

23. *Chairman*.—Did you write them every day?

Captain Penny.—Every day they were dotted down at the time when travelling. The observations for longitude were rendered useless in consequence of the timepieces not keeping equal rate. I am confident of the latitudes. Could a man be in command of a ship for sixteen years and not take a correct observation?

24. *Chairman*.—Was the weather sufficiently fine to enable you to make these observations?

Captain Penny.—We had the latitude as often as three times in one place in consequence of being beset with the boat. The longitude was by a dead reckoning, and could not have been far out.

25. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you to alter any of the officers' observations?

Captain Penny.—Being young travellers, we all over estimated our distance, and had to reduce them, some nearly eighty miles. Having gone so frequently over the distance we could judge within a very little.

26. *Chairman*.—Then of the latitudes you can speak with certainty?

Captain Penny.—Yes; I can speak with perfect confidence of the latitudes.

27. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is there not a discrepancy between Mr. M'Dougall and Dr. Goodsir as to some of their latitudes?

Captain Penny.—I can explain that. I was deceived myself at the time. It was a low shingly isthmus covered with snow, which the best surveyor must have taken for ice. Mr. M'Dougall made his observation while it was covered with snow, and he was deceived, as I was, from a distance. I think from Dr. Goodsir's description some of his little islands were only hills on this flat. Dr. Goodsir passed over it.

28. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think Cornwallis Island and Bathurst Island join there?

Captain Penny.—I have not the slightest doubt of it.

Sir E. Parry.—When in the hydrographical office they put Mr. M'Dougall's and Dr. Goodsir's surveys together, the land overlapped. All who know what travelling is upon low flats know how easy it is to make such mistakes. That was the case, I understand, when Captain Ommanney and Lieutenant Osborne travelled towards Banksland; they did not know whether they were on land or ice.

29. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Do I understand you that your journals from the Admiralty have not been returned to you?

Captain Penny.—They have not been returned.

Mr. Penny.
 27th Oct. 1851.

30. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you not come near Wellington Strait in 1851?
Captain Penny.—No; we passed off from Cape Hotham, about ten miles on the outside of a floe. I did not go up the Wellington Channel.
31. *Sir E. Parry.*—In 1851 you were not able to see anything of Wellington Strait?
Captain Penny.—Not after the 25th of July, when we left the edge of the ice with the boat.
32. *Captain Beechey.*—The farthest point you reached up the channel was Cape Becher in the Queen Victoria Channel?
Captain Penny.—Yes.
33. *Captain Beechey.*—What was the latitude?
Captain Penny.—It was 76·25 N.
34. *Sir E. Parry.*—Mr. Stewart gave me a long list of latitudes that he took. He travelled round the east side of this channel, and came to Cape Becher
35. *Chairman.*—Did you observe at this point?
Captain Penny.—No, but Captain Stewart did; and I could depend upon his observation.
36. *Chairman.*—Which side of the channel was that?
Captain Penny.—That was on the north-east side.
37. *Chairman.*—How far did you get on the south-west side?
Captain Penny.—I could not get farther than Baring Island.
38. *Chairman.*—Then before you turned about to return how far did you consider yourself from the main points of Sir John Franklin and Cape Lady Franklin?
Captain Penny.—No one can judge well of distances without knowing the height of the land; probably sixty or seventy miles.
39. *Chairman.*—Do you think the water was all clear and open?
Captain Penny.—I have no doubt of it from the way the winds prevailed.
40. *Chairman.*—What sort of weather was it when you turned back?
Captain Penny.—It was a clear day when we turned, but came on very moist weather afterwards. We had some days clear, but the greater part of them were moist.
41. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think a ship could have navigated any of these channels?
Captain Penny.—Yes, in clear water I have no doubt of it. I have navigated worse.
42. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I think you expressed your opinion that Sir John Franklin passed that way?
Captain Penny.—Yes, that was my conviction, and has ever been.
43. *Chairman.*—There is another question that you must expect to be asked. How was it you wrote a letter to Captain Austin stating that Wellington Channel was thoroughly searched and that nothing more could be done?
Captain Penny.—Wellington Channel was searched, but not beyond Wellington Channel.
44. *Chairman.*—Let us just read the letter from you to Captain Austin?
 (*The letter was here read by the Chairman.*)
Captain Penny.—Captain Austin knew very well what I had done in Wellington Channel. I had expressed to him my conviction that Franklin had gone away through the channel in clear water. I could do no more with my means.
45. *Chairman.*—It is necessary that you should explain this. What do you mean when you say, “I could do no more with my means?”
Captain Penny.—I meant what I had told Captain Austin before, that I could do no more with the means I had at command.

See *Mr. Penny to Captain Austin*, 11th August 1851, *Answer to No. 336*, page 36.

46. *Chairman*.—You meant then by that expression to separate Wellington Channel from the Upper Channel?

Captain Penny.—Will you allow me to ask you a question?

47. *Chairman*.—I think you had better answer mine first.

Captain Penny.—I told Captain Austin I could not undertake the fearful responsibility of saying beyond the channel was searched; why ask me what I could not tell? I mean, why should Captain Austin ask me what I could not tell?

48. *Chairman*.—All we want is an explanation; you had better confine yourself to that?

Captain Penny.—In that remark I confined myself to Wellington Channel.

49. *Chairman*.—Very good. Did you explain to Captain Austin at that time that a search should be made higher?

Captain Penny.—I asked him for a steamer, and would pilot her up the channel to the ice, and wait till the ice should clear away. I would have waited there a month.

50. *Chairman*.—That was your reason for asking for a steamer?

Captain Penny.—Yes; most undoubtedly.

51. *Chairman*.—And you are still of opinion that if the ice had cleared away you could have gone up?

Captain Penny.—Most unquestionably.

52. *Chairman*.—Did you explain that to Captain Austin at the time?

Captain Penny.—Yes, and he refused me that steamer to go up with.

53. *Chairman*.—Did you explain to Captain Austin at that time that Sir John Franklin had gone up that channel?

Captain Penny.—Most unquestionably.

Chairman.—That is a sufficient answer.

54. *Chairman*.—You meant by asking for a steamer that it would be the best vessel to prosecute the discoveries if the ice had cleared away?

Captain Penny.—Yes, the only vessel.

55. *Chairman*.—And you offered to pilot the steamer on account of your own experience?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

56. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you ask for a steamer to command it yourself?

Captain Penny.—To pilot it.

Sir E. Parry.—Piloting through the ice I hardly understand. We are so much at the mercy of the ice that we can hardly call it piloting.

57. *Captain Beechey*.—If you were so certain of the ice going away from that channel and the water clearing, by waiting a few days, could you not consistently with your orders have waited that period?

Captain Penny.—My vessel was not suited to go further than I did. Before I could have gone any distance the season would have gone; whereas in a steamer 500 miles could have been gone over in a week, as it was very likely we should have had to proceed that distance before we obtained any fresh traces.

58. *Captain Beechey*.—How long are those seas navigable?

Captain Penny.—It depends greatly upon the seasons. In Barrow's Straits last year the frost set in on the 13th of September, but this year there was more water in Barrow's Straits, and it may be later before the frost sets in.

59. *Chairman*.—There is another expression in Captain Austin's letter to you of the 11th August last, to which I must call your attention. He requests you to acquaint him "whether you consider that the search of Wellington Strait, made by the expedition under your charge, is so far satisfactory as to render a further prosecution in that direction, if practicable, unnecessary." What did you do in consequence of this?

Captain Penny.—I would not take upon myself the fearful responsibility of saying whether the channel was sufficiently searched. I am free to confess that I was very angry at being written to at all by Captain Austin when we had conversed so long upon the very same subject, and I had told him all in my power,

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giving him my chart, and begged him to let me pilot one of his steamers up Wellington Channel. Had I been cool I should have used better words.

60. *Chairman.*—What I mean by the last question is this: In the letter Captain Austin sent to you he meant to ask you whether the search up the channel was practicable,—advisable, or not?

Captain Penny.—I explained my views to Captain Austin, and still he sent me that letter. Captain Austin was competent to judge for himself. I am not accustomed to write official despatches, or probably I should have been more cautious. Captain Austin ought to know what to do.

61. *Chairman.*—It was hardly fair to Captain Austin not to give a full opinion on the subject. Your letter was so short that any one on reading it would suppose you intended to express your opinion that it was useless to wait for the breaking up of the ice, and that you were convinced no further search was necessary,—that all that could be done was done, and that no further traces could be found?

Captain Penny.—Nothing of the sort could have been intended; and Captain Austin could not have put that interpretation upon the letter, as he well knew my previous opinions. That letter was written under strong feelings of irritation and in answer to a note from Captain Austin.

62. *Chairman.*—Instead of exciting yourself why did you not explain to Captain Austin that further search ought to be made in the direction where you had been?

Captain Penny.—I asked him for a steamer in order to prosecute that search.

Captain Austin rose and said, After sending Captain Penny that note I sat down and wrote him a calm request on the subject, (knowing that he was an experienced person,) urging him to let me have an answer. I think Captain Penny must have had my letter eight hours. It was two o'clock in the morning when I received his answer. I wrote a private note to Captain Penny which he must have.

Captain Penny.—I have not got it; I have searched for it in every quarter. I sent down to Aberdeen for it on my arrival here in London, but it is not to be found anywhere. I am not accustomed to tie up all my letters, and many official despatches have been destroyed.

63. *Chairman.*—Have you had any further correspondence with Captain Austin than that which appears in print?

Captain Penny.—Yes; there was another letter in which I stated that I had expressed my opinion to him. I told Captain Austin what I had done; I told him that my orders were not such as would allow me to run the risk of another Arctic winter without some prospect of success.

Captain Austin said he had not received such a letter from Captain Penny.

Captain Penny.—Captain Stewart was present when Captain Austin got the letter.

64. *Sir E. Parry.*—When was it?

Captain Penny.—About the 11th of August.

65. *Chairman.*—The letter which appears in print is dated 11th of August; was it before or after that?

Captain Penny.—After that.

66. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Stewart was there, you say?

Captain Penny.—Yes; and he knows that I delivered it to him.

67. *Chairman.*—Have you the letter with you?

Captain Penny.—It is in London now, and I can send for it.

68. *Captain Austin.*—I do not exactly understand what is the question; is it that a letter was delivered to me?

Sir E. Parry.—It is that there was a letter delivered to you (as an answer to your first letter) by Captain Penny, in the presence of Captain Stewart and Captain Ommanney.

*Vide Answer to
No 336, where this
is explained.*

69. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you ever *in writing* state to Captain Austin your recommendation to him to go up Wellington Strait?

Captain Penny.—Certainly not. What was the use of writing when I was telling him what I had done?

(Captain Stewart was called in, and was sent for the despatch alluded to by Captain Penny.)

70. *Chairman*.—What quantity of provisions do you consider you had left when you determined to give up all further search?

Captain Penny.—About fourteen months provision for the two vessels at the rate we were going on; but the search assumed a new feature. I had nothing to carry out the search.

71. *Chairman*.—Supposing the barrier had not cleared away, what would you have proposed to do?

Captain Penny.—If the barrier had not cleared away the search must be carried out with boats and sledges.

72. *Chairman*.—Do you think that it would have been possible to carry out the further search with your provisions?

Captain Penny.—Certainly not; I was unprepared with travelling equipment to carry out the search, and vessels not well adapted to go up the channel at that late season.

73. *Chairman*.—When you asked for a steamer, did you ask for one steamer, or more?

Captain Penny.—Only one.

74. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you intend to pass another Arctic winter if you could have obtained a steamer and got up the channel?

Captain Penny.—That would be the advantage of a steamer. We could have proceeded 500 miles up the channel if the way had been clear.

75. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you contemplate being detained another winter?

Captain Penny.—Yes. If traces had been got unquestionably we should have stopped.

76. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Suppose that the ice in the Wellington Strait had cleared away, and Captain Austin had been able to afford you a steamer, where would you have thought of wintering?

Captain Penny.—If we could have got 500 miles up the channel, we should have wintered there, if more traces had been found. It would have been of no use going there unless we had wintered there.

77. *Captain Beechey*.—Where were the limits of the ice in 1851?

Sir E. Parry.—He never saw it in the best portion of 1851.

(Captain Penny explained this matter to the committee.)

78. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the water open as far up Wellington Strait in 1851 as in 1850?

Captain Penny.—Yes; it was in the same spot in 1851 as in 1850; it was as far up in 1851, on the 25th day of July, as it was on the 9th day of September 1850.

79. *Captain Beechey*.—In 1851 Captain Stewart in returning walked over the ice from his farthest, which was Cape Becher, and found it much decayed. Now did that ice clear away in 1851?

Captain Penny.—I was there on the 22d of July, and that was the last I saw of it. It was then broken and much decayed, and only wanted a strong north-east wind to clear it away. On the 5th September 1850 I saw clear water in that channel.

80. *Captain Beechey*.—Was this ice more or less broken in 1851?

Captain Penny.—The last time I saw the Queen Victoria Channel was on the 23d day of July; it was then much decayed and broken, and would not allow an empty boat to be launched over it.

81. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—And referring to your own two ships, you say you had not sufficient provisions to prosecute the search?

Captain Penny.—I had not the means in my power to carry the search out,

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and I would never for one moment think of stopping out there without sufficient means to carry out the search.

82. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You say you had not sufficient provisions and means to carry out the search?

Captain Penny.—Certainly.

83. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Before you came away did you ask Captain Stewart, of the *Sophia*, or any of the officers, their opinion about the further prosecution of the search in Wellington Strait?

Captain Penny.—Certainly not; the masters of our vessels take all that responsibility upon themselves.

84. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I understand you did not take Captain Stewart's opinion about further search in the channel?

Captain Penny.—No; he might have had an opinion on the subject, but I did not ask him; the responsibility was mine, not his.

85. *Sir E. Parry.*—When you started to come home, did you contemplate asking for a steamer to go out again?

Captain Penny.—No, but I was prepared to do so.

86. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you and your officers contemplate going out again?

Captain Penny.—No, not when I first returned.

87. *Sir E. Parry.*—What made you propose it afterwards?

Captain Penny.—It struck me that if I had the means I could prosecute the search to advantage. I was prompted to make the proposal in consequence of its having been said that more might have been done than was done.

88. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that what led you to propose to the Admiralty to go out in a steamer? Was it in consequence of what was said when you came home?

Captain Penny.—I found that everybody was disappointed, and I wished to have the means of going out again.

(Captain Stewart here brought in the letter referred to in the previous part of the inquiry, and it was read.)

89. *Sir E. Parry.*—Explain that expression in the letter, "I can only judge when I see Wellington Channel." What is the meaning of that?

Captain Penny.—The meaning is, that if Wellington Channel is open, I would proceed up it with my two vessels. I never intended to answer Captain Austin's letter.

90. *Sir E. Parry.*—Surely it was incumbent upon you to answer so important a question?

Captain Penny.—I do not justify that portion of the letter, written, as I have before stated, under feelings of irritation. Captain Austin came, and I told him everything that had taken place about the Wellington Channel, which would have been worth fifty letters from me.

91. *Sir E. Parry.*—I think Captain Austin had a right to have an answer to the question. When an officer in his position put a specific question to you so cautiously, surely it demanded an answer?

Captain Penny.—Captain Austin is perfectly well aware that he had his answer, and he understood it very well, but it was not what he wanted.

92. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do not you think now it would have been better to give a specific answer to Captain Austin's inquiry?

Captain Penny.—Any one can see under what circumstances it was written, and the intention of it.

93. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Suppose Captain Austin had died, nothing would have been in writing to pass to the second in command?

Captain Penny.—I have said before, that it was not my intention to give an answer to this despatch.

94. *Chairman.*—We must put on record the answer to the question put to you. The question was this, "Do you not think on further consideration that it

Vide p. 35.
Ans. 336.

“ would have been better if you had answered Captain Austin’s note more explicitly, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case ?

Captain Penny.—In the position I occupied, I think I pursued the right course. I told Captain Austin what I had done, but he would not avail himself of it.

95. *Chairman.*—Would it not have been better for you to have said you would not take upon yourself the responsibility ?

Captain Penny.—That is precisely what I said. I said that I would not take any further responsibility upon myself.

96. *Captain Beechey.*—On what day was it that you told Captain Austin your views with respect to the channel ?

Captain Penny.—It was on the 11th of August.

97. *Captain Beechey.*—Then on the 11th of August you told Captain Austin that the strait ought to be better examined, and that if he would give you a vessel you would go up there ?

Captain Penny.—Yes, I asked him for a steamer to go up there. The very last words I used to him were, “ Now, Sir, go up there, and do the cause some “ service.”

98. *Captain Beechey.*—Had you at that time received Captain Austin’s official letter ?

Captain Penny.—Yes, that was after all the other letters had passed.

99. *Captain Beechey.*—Was it after you explained your views to Captain Austin that you received his letter ?

Captain Penny.—Yes, it was.

100. *Chairman.*—Had you any conversation about this letter ?

Captain Penny.—No, no conversation whatever. The last thing I said was, “ Go up into the Wellington Channel, and you will do good service to the “ cause.”

101. *Chairman.*—On what day was that ?

Captain Penny.—I think it was on the morning of the 12th of August.

102. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I think your opinion was that Sir John Franklin went through the channel to the north-west ?

Captain Penny.—I am convinced of that. I always had that impression, and I have never had occasion to alter it. I do not think he could have gone any other way.

103. *Sir E. Parry.*—Why not go any other way ? Why not go the way I went ? Why do you think he might not have gone that way ? Why might he not have gone by Cape Walker and the south-west ?

Captain Penny.—Why then he would have reached the American shore, and we should have had him long ago. Travelling parties belonging to the north-west companies would have seen him.

104. *Sir E. Parry.*—But you said he could not have gone another way ?

Captain Penny having handed in a paper,

The *Chairman* said, I suppose your object in giving me this paper is that it should appear in evidence, so that I must ask you some questions upon it, and then you will have an opportunity of recording it if you like.

105. *Captain Beechey.*—We do not expect from you any scientific matter beyond what you have given us with respect to the latitudes ; but I may ask you whether you put the work together yourself (*adverting to a chart which was placed on the table*) ?

Captain Penny.—Captain Stewart did a great portion of it, but I was present when it was done.

106. *Captain Beechey.*—When you were at Cape Becher did you get the bearing of these distant points ?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

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107. *Captain Beechey.*—When you saw Sir John and Lady Franklin points, was the weather clear?

Captain Penny.—Yes, the weather was perfectly clear. I am accustomed to take heights, and by computation I imagine that 500 or 600 feet might have been the measurement.

108. *Captain Beechey.*—With fourteen months provisions on board, do not you think you would have been justified by your orders in remaining to see whether the ice would break away or not?

Captain Penny.—I do not think it would have been of the slightest use with a sailing vessel.

109. *Captain Beechey.*—Do not you think you ought to have stopped to see whether the ice cleared away?

Captain Penny.—I might have been justified in that, but not in going up the channel.

110. *Captain Beechey.*—Could you have stopped with the amount of provisions you had?

Captain Penny.—Oh yes.

111. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you understand that Captain Austin meant to come home about the 12th of August?

Captain Penny.—I thought so.

112. *Sir E. Parry.*—How did you ascertain the fact that Captain Austin was coming home; you were right enough, but how did you ascertain it? The reason why I ask is this; knowing that Captain Austin was going away to Jones's Sound, would it not have been desirable to stop and see what became of the ice in the Wellington Channel?

Captain Penny.—It would have been of no use stopping there; if the idea had struck me at the time it is possible I might have remained there some time.

113. *Chairman.*—One thing more occurs to me to ask you. You were quite aware from Captain Austin's letter to you of the 12th of August that he had determined (in consequence probably of the letter he had received from you) that he did not consider it necessary to prosecute the search further, even if it were practicable, in that direction. Now after all you have said it is hardly worth while to ask you any more questions, but were you not then fully aware that that was the last opportunity you would have of urging upon him a further search in that direction?

Captain Penny.—The last thing I said to Captain Austin was, "Go up the Wellington Channel, and do the cause good service."

114. *Chairman.*—What course did you take to explore Jones's Sound?

Captain Penny.—When we came there we fell into a body of ice, and we could proceed no further.

115. *Chairman.*—You say you found it so blocked up with ice that you could not proceed?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

116. *Chairman.*—Do you think that later in the year that might have been accomplished?

Captain Penny.—It might have been, but everything depends upon the winds.

117. *Chairman.*—It is in the same category as the Wellington Strait, that may open sometimes and close sometimes?

Captain Penny.—Yes, I think it is very likely.

118. *Chairman.*—We are directed to inquire not only into the past but in reference to the future. Will you tell us what are your opinions concerning operations next year?

Captain Penny.—I will tell you. The first and most important thing is that the party who goes out must be the responsible party.

119. *Captain Beechey*.—When you came to Cape Becher, your furthest distance northwards from Queen Victoria's Channel, in what state did the waters appear to you?

Captain Penny.—In the north-west nothing but clear water as far as the eye could reach; a water sky bound it. The height of Cape Becher was about 500 feet.

120. *Captain Beechey*.—In the north and south channel was there a strong current?

Captain Penny.—Yes, there was.

121. *Captain Beechey*.—How strong did the currents run?

Captain Penny.—Not less than four miles in the hour.

122. *Captain Beechey*.—On what day was that?

Captain Penny.—I could not tell without reference. I think it was at the full moon.

123. *Captain Beechey*.—Then it was about the time of the springs?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

124. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think it was a regular tide?

Captain Penny.—It was the regular tide, but running from the westward longer than from the eastward.

125. *Captain Beechey*.—I find from your evidence before the Committee at Woolwich that you make the following remarks:—"At Point Surprise and Disappointment Bay there was about four feet rise and fall, a pretty regular tide. The water on the ledge of grounded ice on Cape Benjamin Smith was low about the 16th of July, lower than usual; a greater fall than we had observed in other parts. Full moon having occurred on the 13th, the spring tide may have accounted for this. In the Queen's Channel the current ran to the eastward not less than four miles on the 16th of July, the wind being fresh from the westward. Thinks the stream came most from the westward; the stream of tide was not regular. Different observations were made to ascertain which way the flood tide came. As seen from Assistance Harbour, the currents seemed to be influenced principally by the winds." Do you assent to all this?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

126. *Chairman*.—You have given it in evidence before the Woolwich Committee that you met with wood and foreign substances in the channel?

(The Chairman read a list of the articles which had been found by Captain Penny as stated before the Committee at Woolwich.)

127. *Chairman*.—Is all that correct?

Captain Penny.—Yes, it is.

128. *Chairman*.—In your journeys and voyages along the shores of the Queen Channel what animals did you meet with and in what quantities?

Captain Penny.—In our travelling parties we met with thirty-four bears.

129. *Chairman*.—White polar bears?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

130. *Chairman*.—Any seals?

Captain Penny.—Yes, a great many, and two were killed.

131. *Chairman*.—Any other animals?

Captain Penny.—Several walrus; one of them was killed. I think we saw about fourteen deer, mostly down upon the islands. Thousands of birds might have been easily approached and killed.

132. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you eat any of the walrus?

Captain Penny.—Yes, and I thought them as good as the seals. The men did not eat them.

133. *Chairman*.—On Baillie Hamilton Island you found more birds than anywhere else, did you not?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

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134. *Sir E. Parry.*—What would be your view,—the public feeling in England makes it desirable to ask it,—suppose you had been left there with your guns and ammunition, to what extent could you have supplied provisions, anything, for instance, that starving people would eat?

Captain Penny.—We might have supplied abundance of food. The very exertion to produce food would be conducive to health.

135. *Chairman.*—Could fish be procured in any quantity?

Captain Penny.—There are some crawfish, but they are small and very few in number.

136. *Sir E. Parry.*—There are some small fish in the lake near Assistance Bay, are there not?

Captain Penny.—Yes, some trout, but very few.

137. *Chairman.*—Had you a thermometer with you?

Captain Penny.—No. Captain Ommanney had it much colder down his part than we had. I had a thermometer the first time, but not the second.

138. *Sir E. Parry.*—Dr. Sutherland had one, had he not?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

139. *Sir E. Parry.*—Who first landed at Beechey Island and discovered the traces of the “Erebus” and “Terror”?

Captain Penny.—All my officers and some of the men went down together and discovered winter quarters.

140. *Chairman.*—You mean that they discovered the winter quarters of the “Erebus” and “Terror”?

Captain Penny.—Yes.

141. *Chairman.*—We are directed to inquire into the conduct of the officers in the expedition. Have you any complaints to make against them, or did they conduct themselves to your satisfaction?

Captain Penny.—They performed their duties creditably throughout the expedition.

Mr. A. Stewart.

CAPTAIN STEWART, late of Her Majesty's Ship “Sophia,” called.

142. *Chairman.*—Did you command the “Sophia” under Mr. Penny's orders?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, I did.

143. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of all the transactions during the summer of this year when in the Queen's Channel and the Wellington Strait?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

144. *Chairman.*—Did you consider the ice likely to clear this year at the mouth of Wellington Strait?

Captain Stewart.—There was a chance.

145. *Chairman.*—It was all firm when you last saw it?

Captain Stewart.—When I last saw it it was quite firm.

146. *Captain Beechey.*—When was that?

Captain Stewart.—About the middle of July.

147. *Chairman.*—Have you been accustomed to polar navigation, and to ice?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

148. *Sir E. Parry.*—How many voyages have you been in the Polar Seas?

Captain Stewart.—Six or seven.

149. *Chairman.*—What is your own opinion on the subject; do you think that it was fast ice or not?

Captain Stewart.—I do not think it is fast ice.

150. *Chairman.*—Was there any appearance this year of its being likely to break up?

Captain Stewart.—It was breaking up from the southward as far as the line marked by Mr. Penny on this chart, (signed by Mr. Fegen,) between Cape Bowden and Separation Point.

151. *Captain Beechey*.—At what time did you see that appearance of the ice ? *Mr. A. Stewart.*

Captain Stewart.—About the 17th of July.

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152. *Captain Beechey*.—How far north did that ice extend ?

Captain Stewart.—It extended to the line marked Sept. 5, 1850. It was very sound ice, and to the north-westward of that it was more broken.

153. *Captain Beechey*.—How far did it extend to the westward ?

Captain Stewart.—I do not know.

154. *Sir E. Parry*.—Between Baillie Hamilton Island and Baring Bay, was ice there ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

155. *Captain Beechey*.—You were on Cape Becher; what was the appearance of the sea and ice from Cape Becher on the 1st of June ?

Captain Stewart.—I could have gone anywhere to the westward with a ship from the edge of the ice.

156. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it perfectly clear to the north-west as far as you could see ?

Captain Stewart.—It was, and we could have sailed anywhere. The ice was very much broken up.

157. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the sailing ice ?

Captain Stewart.—About the same ice as in the channel, about five feet thick.

158. *Sir E. Parry*.—You would call it very light ice ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

159. *Captain Beechey*.—You travelled over part of this ice at the north-east part of Wellington Channel in your outward journey ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

160. *Captain Beechey*.—Of what thickness did the ice appear to you ?

Captain Stewart.—We travelled over some very heavy pieces of ice, quite distinct from the other sort of ice.

161. *Captain Beechey*.—It appeared to be the ice of one winter, with heavy masses frozen on it ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, that was the case exactly.

162. *Captain Beechey*.—On returning you thought to pass over part of this ice, and found it so cracked that it was not safe to walk over it ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

163. *Captain Beechey*.—What time was that ?

Captain Stewart.—About the middle of June ?

164. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you see the clear water in 1850 to the north of Wellington Channel ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

165. *Sir E. Parry*.—Where from, and when ?

Captain Stewart.—From Cape Spencer, and about the first week in September.

166. *Sir E. Parry*.—How much ice do you think remained in Wellington Strait ? What breadth of ice remained unbroken there in 1850 ?

Captain Stewart.—I should say from twenty to thirty miles.

167. *Sir E. Parry*.—So much as that ?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

168. *Sir E. Parry*.—From your own observation in 1851, when you were travelling, do you think there were from twenty to thirty miles of old ice not broken up in the autumn of 1850 ?

Captain Stewart.—I think it was broken up, but it did not come out.

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169. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you make any observations on the tides in the Queen's Channel? Did you notice any regular rise or fall?

Captain Stewart.—No, I did not. I had no opportunity of doing so on account of the old ice.

170. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you see the ice in motion in the Northern Channel going to and fro with the tide?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

171. *Captain Beechey.*—At what rate do you suppose?

Captain Stewart.—At three or four miles an hour.

172. *Captain Beechey.*—Did it go to the westward or to the eastward, in your opinion?

Captain Stewart.—I do not know; it came longer from the westward.

173. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think there is a set or current from any particular direction?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, from the westward, independently of the tides.

174. *Captain Beechey.*—Did there appear to be any pressure of ice in any particular direction south or west?

Captain Stewart.—There was a heavy pressure of ice at Cape Becher from the south and west.

175. *Captain Beechey.*—That refers to the same ice you before spoke of?

Captain Stewart.—That formed no part of the sailing ice, but remained fixed to the land.

176. *Chairman.*—You were not in the boat with Captain Penny?

Captain Stewart.—I was not with the same party, but had charge of another, and had Dr. Sutherland with me.

177. *Chairman.*—Did you see any animals?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, a good many.

178. *Chairman.*—Describe what quadrupeds?

Captain Stewart.—About a dozen bears and one deer.

179. *Chairman.*—Any walruses?

Captain Stewart.—None.

180. *Chairman.*—Any seals?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

181. *Chairman.*—Any white bears?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

182. *Chairman.*—Any ducks' eggs?

Captain Stewart.—No, because we were too soon there.

183. *Chairman.*—At that time it would have been impossible for any person; not having the means of subsistence to supply themselves from such sources?

Captain Stewart.—Quite impossible.

184. *Chairman.*—They could make up something to increase their stores?

Captain Stewart.—Oh yes.

185. *Chairman.*—Did you shoot any bears?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, I fired at one or two, but we did not want them.

186. *Chairman.*—There was a letter sent by Captain Penny to Captain Austin on the 12th of August. Do you know anything about it?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

187. *Chairman.*—State what you know about it?

(The letter addressed by Captain Penny to Captain Austin was handed to Captain Stewart.)

188. *Chairman.*—Is that the letter?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, that is the letter sent by Captain Penny from Assistance Bay.

189. *Chairman.*—Had you had any conversation about it with Captain Penny previously?

Captain Stewart.—Not about this one.

190. *Chairman*.—Do you say you know the contents of the first letter written to Captain Austin in Assistance Bay, or did you see Captain Austin's letter to Captain Penny about further search up Wellington Strait?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, I did.

191. *Chairman*.—Did Captain Penny consult the officers of his vessel on the subject of further search?

Captain Stewart.—The matter was mentioned, but I cannot say he consulted the officers on the subject.

192. *Chairman*.—What was your opinion on the subject? Did you think the bar of ice would clear away sufficiently to enable any vessels to get up Wellington Straits?

Captain Stewart.—That is a very difficult question to answer. I should say it was not at all impossible.

193. *Chairman*.—Do you think there would have been time to pass up the Straits after the ice had cleared away?

Captain Stewart.—I think it is quite possible.

194. *Chairman*.—Possible that it might have cleared away?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

195. *Chairman*.—If you had had charge of the expedition, do you think you would have been induced to wait there to see whether it would clear away?

Captain Stewart.—We could not have done it with our little ships.

196. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you not have waited?

Captain Stewart.—We might have waited, but it would have been impossible to have done any good.

197. *Chairman*.—State why it would have been impossible to have done any good?

Captain Stewart.—We might have got into the loose ice, and our two small vessels could not have effected any good.

198. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did the advisability of remaining there ever occur to you?

Captain Stewart.—I was quite in doubt whether Penny would remain there or not.

199. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Is it your own opinion, under all the circumstances of the position of your vessel, and the stores you had, that you might have stopped another month?

Captain Stewart.—I think not, certainly.

200. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—There was not then any possibility of prosecuting any further search?

Captain Stewart.—We had nothing to search with.

201. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Suppose you had not fallen in with Captain Austin's expedition, and you had found those relics of Sir John Franklin, would you have prosecuted the search through the Wellington Strait and the Victoria Channel, or would you have returned?

Captain Stewart.—We should have returned, most certainly, under the circumstances.

202. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you form any opinion as to the way Sir John Franklin had passed?

Captain Stewart.—He could not have gone by the south-west.

203. *Sir E. Parry*.—Why do you think so?

Captain Stewart.—It is scarcely possible that a vessel could come all that distance without some one hearing of it. I think he went by the Wellington Strait. My reasons for thinking so are on account of the water discovered in the north-west, and were I sent to look for a north-west passage I would go up Wellington Strait.

204. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you express any wish to remain in the *Sophia* for that investigation?

Captain Stewart.—No.

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205. *Chairman*.—You speak confidently of Sir John Franklin taking the north-west passage. You cannot state whether any obstacles exist that way or not?

Captain Stewart.—No, I cannot.

206. *Sir E. Parry*.—After the travelling parties returned, was there not a meeting between Captain Penny and Captain Austin to talk over the matter?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, there was such a meeting.

207. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you know what was the result of that meeting? What did you understand to be the result of it?

Captain Stewart.—I don't think there was any understanding come to.

208. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you not suppose some understanding must have been come to?

Captain Stewart.—I heard Captain Penny ask Captain Austin for the steamer to go up the channel with.

209. *Chairman*.—Repeat, as nearly as you can recollect, what he said on that occasion?

Sir E. Parry.—Did not Captain Penny at the same time express his opinion that further search was unnecessary?

Captain Stewart.—Captain Penny wrote a letter to that effect; but I believe it was contrary to his convictions.

Sir E. Parry read from Captain Stewart's journal of the 28th July 1851 as follows:

“ Communication was held with Captain Austin, and an exchange of proceeding took place between the two commodores. The result was that Captain Austin considered the search to the westward was done, and Captain Penny that further search in the Wellington Channel was unnecessary, to which every one agreed. After having been so far in it without having got any trace, I had no hesitation in giving my opinion that further search in that direction was unnecessary, and, as far as I know, it was the opinion of every one. Nothing was then left for us to do, and after some ten days in the ice in the bay, we broke adrift, and were once more free.”

210. *Chairman*.—Were these your opinions at the time?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

211. *Chairman*.—Have you seen any cause to alter them?

Captain Stewart.—I did not know at that time that traces had been found in any other direction.

213. *Sir E. Parry*.—At that time you understood that nothing more was to be done?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

214. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could anything more have been done than *was* done?

Captain Stewart.—If we could have traced him, more could have been done.

215. *Captain Beechey*.—You say that if you had been at Wellington Strait, and it had been clear, you could have gone up to examine it?

Captain Stewart.—We could have gone if it had not been blocked up.

216. *Captain Beechey*.—Was it blocked by sailing ice?

Captain Stewart.—It was sailing ice we met with.

217. *Captain Beechey*.—If there had been no sailing ice would you have gone up it?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

218. *Sir E. Parry*.—If you could not have got up there, why could Sir John Franklin? If you think he is gone up there, he must have got through. If he could not get through, how could *you* get through?

Captain Stewart.—He might have got through, but of course there is a great deal of chance-work in it. It is a very difficult navigation.

219. *Sir E. Parry*.—The tides make it difficult?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

220. *Captain Beechey*.—Then we are to understand that from Cape Becher to ~~Baring~~ Island and Houston Stewart Island there is a great deal of packed ice that was driven to the eastward and blocked up the channel?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

221. *Captain Beechey*.—Will you mark the line where you saw the ice packed when you were there in June?

Captain Stewart.—It was to the westward of Bailey Hamilton and Dundas Island. There was loose ice as far as the eye could reach.

222. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Have you expressed any opinion since your return to England about a steamer going out this winter?

Captain Stewart.—I was quite willing to go out.

223. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—But have you volunteered your services in a steamer?

Captain Stewart.—No.

224. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was anything of the sort spoken of by any of you before you came home?

Captain Stewart.—No; I often thought a ship would go out again but not this winter. If a vessel had been going I should have been very happy to go again.

225. *Chairman*.—I dare say you are aware that Captain Penny wrote a letter to the Admiralty volunteering to go out, and stating that the officers who had been connected with him would follow him?

Captain Stewart.—Yes; I and others would have done so.

226. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Do you know what amount of provisions you had when you turned about to come home?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, we had provisions for about 13 months.

227. *Captain Beechey*.—Do you know what answer Captain Austin gave Captain Penny about the steamer?

Captain Stewart.—I do not recollect that any answer was given by Captain Austin about the steamer.

228. *Chairman*.—And you do not know anything more of any conversation that took place between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

Captain Stewart.—No; I never was on board after that.

229. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you aware of letters that passed between Captain Penny and Captain Austin, in which Captain Austin requested Captain Penny to acquaint him, whether in his opinion, "the search of the Wellington Strait had been so far satisfactory as to render a further prosecution in that direction, if practicable, unnecessary?"

Captain Stewart.—I am not acquainted with such a letter, but the conversation I have often heard.

230. *Sir E. Parry*.—If you had been in Captain Austin's place, and had received such a letter as Captain Penny sent, what should you have supposed it meant?

Captain Stewart.—If I had known what Captain Austin knew, I should never have asked anything of the sort.

231. *Sir E. Parry*.—No, that is not what I meant. What would you have understood by that answer?

Captain Stewart.—There was considerable doubt at the time whether the Wellington Channel was navigable, and Captain Penny in a state of irritation sent his letter, after a conversation of many hours with Captain Austin. If it had been my case I should not have answered Captain Austin.

232. *Chairman*.—Do you think you would have been justified in refusing to answer a letter from an officer in such a position?

Captain Stewart.—He had received the information already. He had the same amount of information and the same chart up to this time.

233. *Captain Beechey*.—In your own journal you state that further search was quite unnecessary?

Captain Stewart.—I scarcely knew Captain Penny's opinion at that time.

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234. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Austin's question was as plain as man could put it. The question is, what Captain Penny's answer meant?

Captain Stewart.—Captain Penny meant to say no search was required beyond the Wellington Channel under the circumstances. Neither myself nor Captain Penny have been much accustomed to these sort of despatches, and perhaps have not been cautious enough in framing them. We did not think such letters would be brought forward in this investigation.

235. *Sir E. Parry.*—When did you first hear of a steamer going out this year? When did you first hear it suggested?

Captain Stewart.—I never heard of it until I arrived at Woolwich.

After some consideration, the Committee adjourned.

Second Day. October 28, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral William Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,
 Captain F. W. Beechey,
 Mr. Fred. J. Fegen, Secretary.

Dr. SUTHERLAND called.

236. *Chairman.*—You were Surgeon of the “Sophia,” I believe, under Captain Penny? *Dr. Sutherland.*

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

Dr. Sutherland.

237. *Chairman.*—You were one of the officers who explored the coast of the Wellington Strait, and higher up?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

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238. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observation on the barrier of ice that you found at the mouth of Wellington Strait?

Dr. Sutherland.—Not that we found at the entrance of the strait, but between Cape Bowden and Point Separation.

239. *Chairman.*—It was a complete barrier of ice that no one could get through, was it not?

Dr. Sutherland.—At what time?

240. *Chairman.*—When you travelled over it?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes; it rose and fell with every motion of the tide, but there was no open water in it.

241. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the open water was first discovered in June?

Dr. Sutherland.—I was at Prince Alfred’s Bay when Captain Penny discovered the open water to the west of us.

242. *Chairman.*—But you did not see it yourself?

Dr. Sutherland.—No, I did not, except that intense refraction was observed to the westward, which, under the circumstances, I was disposed to attribute to the presence of open water.

243. *Chairman.*—So that you cannot give the Committee, of your own knowledge, any information on that point?

Dr. Sutherland.—No; except that I found the ice broken in the channel,—that is, it had parted,—on my return.

244. *Sir E. Parry.*—What part of the channel do you mean?

Dr. Sutherland.—At the north headland, in latitude $75^{\circ} 30'$ or $75^{\circ} 25'$. I found a crack two feet wide, and several smaller ones, on the 6th of June, extending at right angles with the land, and going across to the westward.

245. *Sir E. Parry.*—On which shore were you?

Dr. Sutherland.—On the east shore. The crack in the ice might have been two feet wide. It was about seven feet thick there.

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246. *Sir E. Parry.*—How long do you think that ice had been there?

Dr. Sutherland.—It was that year's ice I am certain. From its thickness and structure I had no doubt it had been there only since the previous October.

247. *Chairman.*—How far to the north did you go?

Dr. Sutherland.—I accompanied Captain Stewart nearly to Cape Simpkinson.

248. *Captain Beechey.*—Then Captain Stewart left you and you returned, making the circuit of Prince Alfred's Bay, having previously crossed over the neck of it?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes. I had orders to examine a portion of the coast in order to discover if there was an island there, of which we had some doubts. On our way back I found that island in $75^{\circ} 49'$, on the north side of Baring Bay.

249. *Captain Beechey.*—How far off the coast?

Dr. Sutherland.—Three miles.

250. *Captain Beechey.*—I do not find it marked down on the chart?

Dr. Sutherland.—No; but I have entered it down in my report.

251. *Captain Beechey.*—On your return what course did you take?

Dr. Sutherland.—From Baring Bay I made straight across to Cape Osborn.

252. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observation of the line of ice which is drawn on this chart from Cape Osborn? You saw that ice?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes, we passed over it.

253. *Captain Beechey.*—There is a line drawn from Cape Osborn to Cape De Haven, 1850. Was there any difference between that ice and that to the northward?

Dr. Sutherland.—I can only speak of five miles along the land. I am sure it was all of one year's ice. I felt confident that it was of that year's formation. That was round Baring Bay. There were appearances of old ice mixed up with it.

254. *Captain Beechey.*—There was new ice, and extensive floes of old ice?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes, there were large floes of a mile and a half in extent.

255. *Chairman.*—How far down your wintering place did this barrier of ice appear to extend?

Dr. Sutherland.—I saw no old ice in Wellington Channel below 75° ; but there might have been.

256. *Chairman.*—That is, from Cape Bowden to Point Separation?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes; but a few miles to the southward of Cape Bowden.

257. *Sir E. Parry.*—You saw no old ice there?

Dr. Sutherland.—No.

258. *Captain Beechey.*—In your advances you walked over the ice across Prince Alfred's Bay. On your return, was there any reason why you could not go over there?

Dr. Sutherland.—It was very good ice all the way. It had severed a little from pressure, and it was very young ice. I felt convinced that a pressure must have taken place from the previous floes, and when the sun shone upon it it melted away, giving it the appearance of old ice, which it was not.

259. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what breadth of ice remained in Wellington Strait up to the end of the navigable season of 1850? Do you know what breadth of ice was supposed to remain there?

Dr. Sutherland.—I am afraid to say at what time the navigable season closed. I can feel confident to Cape Osborn, that being its northern limit—from Cape Osborn to Cape De Haven.

260. *Sir E. Parry.*—What breadth was there, north and south, of ice remaining in the channel the last time you saw it?

Dr. Sutherland.—On the 8th of September the line of ice extended from about two miles to the south of Cape Bowden to near Point Delay on the other side.

261. *Sir E. Parry*.—How much remained?

Dr. Sutherland.—I cannot say how much ice remained to the northward of the southern edge.

262. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you hear of any water to the north of it?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

263. *Chairman*.—That was in 1850?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes, in the first week in September.

264. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is it your impression, from what you saw in your journey, that Wellington Strait had been clear that year (1850) after you left?

Dr. Sutherland.—I am sure it was not clear of ice altogether, but I feel confident the ice in Wellington Channel had started, and that it was navigable at a period subsequent to our crossing it in the ships.

265. *Sir E. Parry*.—You think it might have been navigable even at that season?

Dr. Sutherland.—The navigable season was then too far advanced for sailing vessels.

266. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think there was a navigable passage through Wellington Strait that season, as far as you can judge?

Dr. Sutherland.—If the navigable season extends only to the 11th of September it was not practicable for sailing vessels.

267. *Captain Beechey*.—What reason have you for believing that the ice was loose?

Dr. Sutherland.—From our observations the following year. In 1851 we found from Cape Separation new ice extending to President Bay, but old ice amongst it angled together as though the ice had been drifting about.

268. *Captain Beechey*.—Then to the northward of President Bay do you suppose that it was loose also?

Dr. Sutherland.—I am sure that it was loose also. There were five miles of ice extending along the land of one year's formation. From what I saw of the ice on my journey, subsequently to the visits of the ships in the autumn, there had been a disruption of the ice in Wellington Channel.

269. *Chairman*.—Do you think it possible to have made any advance through the Wellington Strait in the season of 1850?

Dr. Sutherland.—On the 8th of September 1850, when we left the Wellington Channel, we gave it up as hopeless. We were impressed by this, that the ships would be powerless amongst the ice. With steamers we should not feel powerless. On the 9th of September (Sunday) we found the sea in Wellington Channel covered in many parts with a film of bay ice—of pancake ice, which in a calm water so fastens our ships to the spot, that we must drift in any direction the wind may choose to blow. In about two days time our ships were so encumbered with new ice, that we found progress to be quite hopeless, but with steam power we felt that such would not have been the case. In a calm we could always be moving on in whatever direction we might choose.

270. *Sir E. Parry*.—Have you any personal experience of the effect of steamers? Have you seen the effect of steam power in the navigation amongst the ice?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes; I have seen steamers working across the Wellington Channel. The day we crossed altogether the *Resolute* and *Pioneer* left us. We were nearly driven on Cape Spencer.

271. *Sir E. Parry*.—I want to know why it is, from your experience of steam in bay ice, that you attribute so much to it? What is your personal experience of it?

Dr. Sutherland.—I know two instances. One day our ships left Union Bay with *Resolute* and *Pioneer*. *Resolute* and *Pioneer* went out of sight to westward. We were detained at first in clear water with bay ice, and towards evening we were completely encumbered by the quantity of bay ice; both our ships were encumbered, the *Lady Franklin* and the *Sophia*; we were within about five or six miles of land, between Cape Spencer and Point Innes. The *Resolute* and *Pioneer* went out of sight to the westward, and we did not know where they might be, and we remained quite powerless. The bay ice cemented

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our ships so much that they were quite powerless. If we had had steam power we could have gone on to the westward. There was no bay ice in the day, it formed at night time.

272. *Sir E. Parry.*—That is one instance; mention any other instance you may have witnessed?

Dr. Sutherland.—On the 9th of September (I do not feel confident of the date)—on the 9th or 10th of September, we observed the *Resolute* and *Pioneer* drifting to the east of Cape Hotham. At that time we believed these two ships to be encumbered amongst bay ice and the packed ice. With steam power they very soon got cleared, and proceeded to the westward at the rate of three or four miles an hour through bay ice; I cannot say how thick the ice might have been. Our two sailing vessels plied the American vessels, and kept a respectable distance ahead of the two ships that were advancing astern of us, the *Resolute* and *Pioneer*; but with our sailing vessels we were unable to get through the fast ice to the south-west of Griffith Island within perhaps half an hour of the time Her Majesty's ships arrived there. We felt powerless for want of steam, but now we felt that we were able to do as much as Her Majesty's ships. Had it not been for the power of steam the *Resolute* would not have done so much against the bay ice.

273. *Chairman.*—I asked you a question just now, which you have not answered. It is this: Do you think it possible to have made any advances through Wellington Strait in the season of 1850?

Dr. Sutherland.—With steam power my opinion is that it would. Taking advantage of the late opening with steam power, we might have been able to navigate through the Wellington Channel in the season of 1850.

274. *Chairman.*—Did you see any leads or lanes through the ice in Wellington Strait at that time, that a steamer might have gone through?

Dr. Sutherland.—We saw sufficient to induce us to leave Wellington Channel, and we saw sufficient to induce us to remain there had we had steam power.

275. *Chairman.*—I asked you whether you saw any opening in the ice, or leads or lanes in Wellington Strait at that time, that a steamer might have gone through?

Dr. Sutherland.—I must answer that in the negative. But at the same time I think it is not doing justice. The fact of the strait being navigable by a steamer —

276. *Sir E. Parry.*—We want a distinct answer to a distinct question.

Dr. Sutherland.—Then my answer is, No.

277. *Captain Beechey.*—From the state of the ice when you travelled over it in 1851 did you suppose that the Wellington Strait was navigable after the period when the expedition left it in 1850?

Dr. Sutherland.—Not for sailing vessels.

278. *Captain Beechey.*—But with steamers you think it was?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

279. *Chairman.*—What experience have you in ice? How often have you gone to the polar regions? What experience have you to enable you to distinguish between the different sorts and appearances of ice?

Dr. Sutherland.—I have been two voyages.

280. *Sir E. Parry.*—To what part?

Dr. Sutherland.—To Baffin's Bay; two voyages previous to this expedition. One winter there is better than twenty summers to instruct any one of common observation on the character of the ice.

281. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observations on the tides or currents?

Dr. Sutherland.—No.

282. *Chairman.*—With respect to animals, did you see many animals in your journey in the early part of 1851, when you went up as high as Prince Alfred's Bay? Did you see any quadrupeds or birds which would enable you to exist without any other provisions?

Dr. Sutherland.—I saw birds, seals, foxes, ptarmigan, in May and April, and in June, ducks, geese, and two or three specimens of sandpipers.

283. *Chairman*.—Is it your opinion that party, left to their own resources, and without provisions, could possibly exist for any length of time on what they could take of those animals and birds?

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Dr. Sutherland.—Not on the eastern side of the Wellington Channel, if left to their own resources. Previous to the 1st of June they might be enabled to increase their stock of food a little, but more so after that period, as the birds begin to migrate to the northward. It would depend a good deal upon whether any of the party were good marksmen. One might kill a bear where another would fail.

284. *Chairman*.—Take it in the most favourable point of view, that they were good hunters?

Dr. Sutherland.—We had hunters, who might be able in April and May to make the provisions of forty days last out fifty-five or fifty-six days. Good sportsmen, taking advantage of seal's flesh and bear's flesh, might eke out their provisions fifty-five or fifty-six days instead of forty.

285. *Sir E. Parry*.—There is another question I will ask you, as it is of importance in reference to the fate of Sir John Franklin's expedition. From what you saw, and from what you have heard from others, do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent upon their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year?

Dr. Sutherland.—My own opinion is, that they would not be able; but if I give due weight to the opinions of others, I fear my own opinion would become of less weight.

286. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you saw of animals, and the reports of others concerning animals, is it your opinion that parties could subsist upon their own resources by procuring in summer what was to last them during the rest of the year?

Dr. Sutherland.—From what I have seen myself I do not think they could; but judging from the reports brought home by others who had better opportunities of judging, I believe they could.

287. *Chairman*.—Did you keep a meteorological register in your journeys in 1851? Did you observe at the same periods what was the difference of temperature between your winter quarters and your furthest north-west?

Dr. Sutherland.—I compared the register kept on board the ship with the register on the journey, and I found a difference of one, two, or three degrees colder to the north.

288. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you pick up any drift wood?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes, between Cornwallis Land and Cape Hotham; but I believe it to have been left there by the Esquimaux. It had holes in it which appeared to have been burned.

289. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it very old?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

290. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you form an opinion how long since the Esquimaux had been there, knowing how long that climate preserves wood?

Dr. Sutherland.—Not for many hundreds of years.

291. *Sir E. Parry*.—What is your opinion now as to the route Sir John Franklin has probably pursued?

Dr. Sutherland.—My opinion is, that Sir John Franklin pursued the route through the Wellington Channel.

292. *Chairman*.—What grounds have you for that opinion?

Dr. Sutherland.—The chances he saw before him, from his very great experience, of succeeding in making a north-west passage through the Wellington Channel.

293. *Chairman*.—How can you be certain that the barrier of ice that impeded you did not impede him?

Dr. Sutherland.—I cannot be certain of that.

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294. *Chairman.*—What grounds have you for thinking that Sir John Franklin, after wintering at Beechey Island, did not proceed, agreeably to his instructions, to the south-west by Cape Walker?

Dr. Sutherland.—Had he proceeded by that route traces of him would have been found by the parties who have explored those parts.

295. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then why were not traces found of him in the other direction, namely, to the northward and westward which you suppose he took?

Dr. Sutherland.—The extreme haste with which he might have found it necessary to proceed in that direction under the most favourable circumstances.

296. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then I return to the question. Why might he not have proceeded under the same haste in the south-western direction by Cape Walker?

Dr. Sutherland.—Before the expedition could have got clear of winter quarters the ice in Barrow Straits towards Cape Walker must have been broken up into a pack, which would drift about loosely and render the progress of the ships necessarily very slow. The ice in the Wellington Channel we know would retain its fixed position until late in the season, and, when the opening might have taken place, to allow the ships to proceed in that direction, the ice would not be in the form of a loose pack, but in the form of large floes that would permit of hasty and rapid progress close along the eastern shore of the Wellington Strait; that will account for the haste in one direction and the slowness in the other.

297. *Sir E. Parry.*—Am I to understand that it is your opinion that the ice breaks up sooner in the south-west direction than in Wellington Strait? I mean in the direction of Cape Walker?

Dr. Sutherland.—Two months sooner.

298. *Sir E. Parry.*—In the preceding year I believe it was not navigable to Cape Walker?

Dr. Sutherland.—Not when we arrived there; but it might have been earlier in the season.

299. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what was the state of the ice when you left it in August 1851? If you had been trying to get to Cape Walker this year, how far could you have got in the ships?

Dr. Sutherland.—It was much clearer of ice in July, when we could have got there, than it was in August, and more easily navigable.

300. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you find any traces of Sir John Franklin anywhere in your travelling party?

Dr. Sutherland.—No; not any traces.

301. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you consider that Beechey Island was thoroughly searched for records?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes; thoroughly searched.

302. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you know anything of Cape Riley?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

303. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider that that place was thoroughly searched?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes. I went to examine Cape Riley and the immediate points, and no traces were discovered.

304. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were at Cape Riley yourself?

Dr. Sutherland.—Yes.

Mr. Penny.

CAPTAIN PENNY, who was examined yesterday, was recalled.

305. *Chairman.*—There was a question we omitted to put to you yesterday, Captain Penny, on which we should like to have some information. It is, whether you consider that the winter harbour of the *Erebus* and *Terror* has

been so thoroughly searched that it is not possible that any document left by Sir John Franklin there could have been overlooked.

Captain Penny.—I do not think it possible, for the ground was gone over as a bloodhound would go over it. Captain Austin and his party, myself, and others went over it and round about it, over and over again, so as to prevent any doubt upon the subject. My persuasion was very strong that Sir John Franklin would not leave without leaving some traces.

306. *Sir E. Parry.*—You are satisfied that this must have been the winter quarters of the Erebus and Terror in the winter of 1845-6?

Captain Penny.—I am perfectly satisfied of that.

307. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were strict searches made on Cape Riley

Captain Penny.—Yes. Captain Stewart and Dr. Sutherland landed upon that cape, and examined it minutely, but they found no traces.

The Committee then adjourned.

Mr. Penny.

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Third Day. October 29, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir E. Parry,
Captain Beechey,
Captain Sir George Back,
Mr. Frederick J. Fegen, Secretary.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN, C.B., called.

Captain Austin.

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The Chairman (addressing Captain Penny, who was present,) said,—
Before we commence the proceedings I must inform you the Committee have determined on allowing you to be present during the examination of Captain Austin and his officers. We think it is rather a stretch of fairness, as no accusation is brought against any of the officers in your expedition; but it is proper that all parties should be in a position to correct any misrepresentations that may be made, and we therefore allow you to be present.

308. *The Chairman to Captain Austin.*—Are you prepared to go into your evidence now?

Captain Austin.—I am perfectly ready to answer any questions that may be proposed to me, reserving the privilege which I may hereafter have occasion for, of referring to my notes and to documents, some of which I shall refer to with great reluctance, if it become necessary. With that privilege I am ready to go into the examination.

309. *Chairman.*—The first question the Committee wish to put is in reference to your opinions respecting reports contained in your letter of the 11th August 1850 as to Adam Beck. Do you continue to consider that the examination at that time was a full and sufficient one, and do you still entertain the same opinion as to that story?

Captain Austin.—I do, precisely. I consider that everything was gone into, and that every one who was present agreed that the conduct of Adam Beck was most discreditable.

310. *Chairman.*—To what circumstances do you allude that have not been detailed in reference to Adam Beck?

Captain Austin.—Everything has since been borne out by the conduct of Adam Beck.

311. *Chairman.*—What do you allude to?

Captain Austin.—I allude to his stopping back, and to what passed when he was landed, which Captain Ommanney can speak of better than I can,—to his conduct when with Sir John Ross. He was a man in whom no faith could be placed from his irregular conduct and I believe drunkenness. I think he was about the worst description of a civilized savage I ever saw.

312. *Chairman.*—Do you consider, that from Ponds Bay on the south, to Cape Warrender on the north, have been properly searched, and all the points as far as Lancaster Sound?

Captain Austin.—Yes; I believe it has all been thoroughly examined.

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313. *Chairman.*—And you extend that answer both north and south as far as Lancaster Sound?

Captain Austin.—Yes; I believe that from Ponds Bay to Port Leopold has been thoroughly examined. Searching and examination are two different things; this coast has been most satisfactorily examined.

314. *Chairman.*—Do you consider that the whole of the south coast as far as Port Leopold and Ponds Bay has been thoroughly examined?

Captain Austin.—Yes, most thoroughly examined.

315. *Chairman.*—What were your proceedings after passing Port Leopold? Did you get to Cape Riley and find the first traces of the expedition?

Captain Austin.—We proceeded to Cape Riley rounding Beechey Island, where I was detained.

316. *Chairman.*—Give an account of your further proceedings. When did you receive information of the discovery of Sir John Franklin's winter quarters?

Captain Austin.—The moment I reached the fast ice at Union Bay where the vessels were lying, Commander Phillips came out and assisted in leading "Resolute" in, and from whom I heard of the graves. I was up all night and was unequal to go on shore. At length Captain Penny and I went together to the graves, and then considered that here were the winter quarters.

317. *Chairman.*—In fact you discovered undoubted traces of the missing expedition?

Captain Austin.—I saw that there were traces of the expedition having wintered there.

318. *Chairman.*—What was the next step you took?

Captain Austin.—I accompanied Captain Penny and some other officers to the top of the hill at Beechey Island; while there we went to a cairn, took it down and examined it to a certain extent, but not in the way we were satisfied it should be examined. We then returned to the ship. Both of our searches were made at this cairn. Nothing do I recollect being found at this moment more than a few shot. I beg to hand in my report.

319. *Chairman.*—In paragraph 8 of your letter to the Admiralty of the 14th of July 1851 you state that you consider that the departure of the expedition was somewhat sudden?

Captain Austin.—Yes, I am of that opinion. There was a number of coal bags and other materials left about which it is not probable would have been left, unless the missing expedition had gone away suddenly, or if they had been prosecuting. There was a great deal of burning material, coal bags, and other things which evidently proved to me that they had gone out rapidly or were not advancing.

320. *Chairman.*—What quantity of coal bags was there?

Captain Austin.—Perhaps a dozen altogether.

321. *Chairman.*—All empty?

Captain Austin.—Yes. I brought away four. There might have been more than a dozen.

322. *Chairman.*—What were your further proceedings afterwards?

Captain Austin.—I will go on with my narrative. I proceeded as far as was in my power. I will explain what I mean by the word power. I considered it was my duty to go to the westward, looking to the westward position as being one of difficulty, and that if anything should have to be done in the Wellington Strait I could return; and further, that it was necessary then, from what I saw of the state of the ice, to be prepared for making arrangements for the forthcoming season for action, the present season of navigation being evidently closing very fast. As soon as possible after opportunity offered we prosecuted to the westward.

323. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—When you speak of proceeding to the westward was it in pursuance of your orders to use every possible exertion to get to Melville Island?

Captain Austin.—Yes, most undoubtedly it was. I used every exertion to get to Melville Island.

324. *Captain Austin* continued his narrative.—We were stopped at the south

end of Griffith Island, and there the expeditions were together, with the exception of that of Sir John Ross in the *Felix*. After reaching this spot Captain Penny came on board, and conversed upon the matter fully, the subject being the operations that should now be entered into to ensure the accomplishment of our object, at the same time offering to convey Captain Penny or one of his officers to examine an apparent lead to the south-west. I refer to my circular which I addressed to Lieutenant De Haven in command of the American expedition. I think you will find that Captain Penny did not receive it.

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325. *Chairman.*—Is it dated the 11th of September 1850?

Captain Austin.—Yes, it is. The substance of it was a conversation between Captain Penny and myself when he came on board.

326. *Chairman.*—You had better read it, and it will become part of the evidence.

Captain Austin.—The substance of this circular was gone into in conversation with Captain Penny. Captain Ommanney came on board, and there was a question about some dark clouds in the south-west near Cape Walker. Looking to the state of the ice, which was drifting to the southward, and the weather generally, I thought it would be anything but the duty of an Arctic navigator to proceed. Captain Penny's vessels were moving about from one part of the ice to the other, and towards the evening they were at some distance from us. Captain Ommanney left early in the morning, with directions from me to give Captain Penny an opportunity to proceed to the south-west. When Captain Ommanney reached, the brigs were adrift, under sail, and there was a kind of race between the brigs and the *Intrepid*, between Captain Penny's two brigs and the *Intrepid*. Shortly after this the weather changed, a thick fog came on,—it was very severe weather,—and the *Intrepid* returned. I shall have to refer to Captain Ommanney's report as to what passed on that occasion. He came back with difficulty, and from that time until I sent a party out to examine if the ships were fast, and preparing themselves for the winter, I did not know where the brigs were, although I had certain apprehensions about them. The *Intrepid* returned. We had very severe weather at this period, and we were drifting with the ice to the southward. The first moment that admitted of it we cast off,—that is, our expedition, and one of the American vessels,—the other having broken adrift during the severe weather; and after as severe a day as ever I experienced in my life, we got into open water under the lee of Griffith Island. I considered that our situation at this moment was a very serious one, for every thing depended upon our reaching to the west of Griffith Island, and I thought that unless we came upon the remains of our fellow countrymen between that and Melville Island, nothing would have allowed me to have returned to England as long as I existed, for my orders were Melville Island. We thus arrived under lee of Griffith Island. Seeing, from the state of the season, the lowness of the temperature, that I had no dependence upon the steamers, on account of that low state of the temperature, as the injection of water from the sea could not be regularly supplied, (which I wish to be kept in view,)—seeing that if they stopped there was no moving again, and it would be sailing ships on which I should have to depend,—under these circumstances I must say that I felt very anxious. There was no ice to keep us off from Griffith Island, and therefore it was necessary to push for something in the shape of security. But to the eastward I would not go; I called for Captain Ommanney on board to inquire as to the state of the ice between Griffith Island and Cape Martyr, his report being that there were hopes of some fast ice being found there. We continued under a press of sail to make that ice. Whilst doing so the American vessels hoisted their colours, and bore up, and I was much pained at the moment by a supposition that they must be for America, and that they would have no report on board from me. But I felt at that moment that nothing would justify me in keeping the expedition without some holdfast. We pushed on, and reached the fixed ice at Griffith Island, which eventually became our winter quarters. As will be seen from my circular, I made up my mind that the "*Assistance*" should not advance; but I was anxious that she should remain to the latest moment, to see if we could get round Griffith Island. And again it required some little time carefully to think over the instructions necessary to give to Captain Ommanney, to ensure the operations being carried out to the utmost next spring. In the meantime a

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tender was despatched to look to the south end of Griffith Island, in the hope that there might be something in the shape of water that would admit of fifty miles more to the westward being obtained, as I must say that I had made up my mind, that, having the "Assistance" in her place, the "Resolute" should become a forlorn hope. However, as my report will show in detail, there was no hope, and the "Assistance" and her tender were sent off in the execution of her instructions to get into port. She made the attempt, but with her tender and her steam she became in such a helpless position that Captain Ommanney felt that the sooner he could get back into a channel of water to join us it was his duty to do so. The "Assistance" having returned, the temperature fell considerably. There was much ice and very little open water, and this state of things continued some days. At last I felt that there was no hope of getting this fifty miles, and in that case that both ships had better be together, for then we should have joint operations, which would be more successful. The ice had formed so strongly, and become so pressed, and the temperature so low, that I determined that both ships should go into winter quarters. I saw there was not the slightest hope of getting westward, and I began to cut through 300 and 400 yards in extent between us and the channel, which promised to lead us into a little bay to the eastward of Cape Martyr, but the ice again made so fast that I felt it was necessary to give up further operations in that direction. We then, considering the ships fixed, despatched parties in the hope of doing something, at the same time with the view of giving them some idea of what travelling would be. One of the party discovered the position of Captain Penny. I must say that the weather was so severe, the temperature being down to 17 below zero, that our advance parties were driven in. I would refer to their journals for the sufferings these people underwent at this period. Captain Penny came over in his dog sledge, and he cheerfully undertook to complete the search of Wellington Strait. He was two days' march nearer than we were. This brings us up to the commencement of the winter. We then commenced our operations for the health and exercise of the men during the winter season.

327. *Chairman.*—If you refer to your report of July for the proceedings of the winter, you can proceed at once to the spring, when you sent your parties out?

Captain Austin.—Yes. These papers will be produced. I have nothing to repeat further in that respect.

327 a. *Captain Austin* continued.—Winter commenced, and our great object was to establish health, improvement, and happiness amongst the men. So soon as the weather would admit of it we commenced training, which I consider a most important thing. It was most beneficial in this instance. It gave us, in the first place, confidence in the men; and, secondly, by testing their strength, it enabled us to form an opinion as to the extent of labour they could endure. This was continued as far as the weather would admit. Previous to this I assembled all the officers together, and gave them the plan of operations, which I take the opportunity of saying were wholly my own; for my occupation during the winter was having my instructions before me, as well as all the best works which had been written on the subject of Arctic travel. All the officers to whom I communicated my opinions appeared satisfied with their destinations, and I called upon them to give me their views and their anticipations, to name their sledges, select their men, their flag, and their motto, and they were to be brought to me on a certain day. This was done, and received my approval. I never met with so much earnestness as was exhibited on that occasion by the officers and men in training for that work. At the same time I consulted all the authorities as to the time I could ensure safety in departure, because I felt that we could not go away too early; first, that we should avoid the risk of the ice being disrupted in the strait on our return, and second, because as the season advanced the labour of proceeding would become so much greater. Everything worked well, and was highly satisfactory. During the period of detention from the weather, seeing that there was great anxiety, I addressed one of the best petty officers of the division, and asked him how he felt about the weather, and he said he thought the sooner we were off, the better. My attention was rather called to this remark of his, and I asked him why? His reply was, I feel assured that we

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shall find it much worse as the season advances than the severity we have now. That convinced me that the men were reasoning and reflecting, and I derived considerable satisfaction from the circumstance. The time had arrived for an inspection of the parties as arranged for departure, and I must say that I never witnessed anything equal to it in my life. The earnestness, determination, and general conduct of all afforded me the highest gratification. I addressed them on the spot and issued a memorandum. I felt it due to them to embody my opinions in a document so that they might stand on record as a public document; that document will be amongst the papers to be produced. They departed, and from that time until they returned not one of the arrangements we had made failed. When they returned they did so, just as was anticipated, and the greatest confidence existed in the abilities of all to accomplish what they had undertaken. I had almost forgotten to state that as the parties came in I again despatched what I considered the limited and auxiliary parties; first, in order that in the event of anything happening to the distant parties they should be there to bring them in; and, second, in order that what had been discovered should be satisfactorily laid down, that is, that the positions should be fixed, and that all should be surveyed that could by any possibility be accomplished. Captain Penny reached the "Resolute," and communicated to me that he had discovered a large space of water up the Wellington Strait. At this time I really had no assistance to give to Captain Penny, but I am by no means prepared to admit that Captain Penny asked me for it. My impression is, that I observed to Captain Penny that I regretted that I had not the means, but that we must have a boat in that water. What I meant by that was, that Captain Penny and myself, that is with my assistance, should have a boat in that water, and I recollect also that Mr. Allen, the master of the "Resolute," said to me, "Why, Sir, I should be glad to go under Captain Penny if it is only to do the astronomical part." I said, "You have gratified and pleased me much; we must talk that over." This conversation occurred after our dinner on, I believe, a Royal birth-day. I have no very full recollection of this, but I may refer to my notes, and, if necessary, I will return to the subject hereafter. Previous to this in the afternoon Captain Penny and myself were walking before dinner, and I desired to elicit from Captain Penny, if I could, what really was the state of the case as to the water, for round about me there was nothing but ice, and I could not well understand that he had been in an open sea, circumstanced as we were. I put some close questions to Captain Penny, but not by any means so close as I should have put to Captain Ommanney, or any one of his rank who had come to me with that report. I found that Captain Penny was angry, and I felt that he would not allow me to make such inquiries. My object was most certainly not to create any bad feeling, and therefore I can say little more about the questions. We went to dinner then. I have related the conversation before dinner. In the evening, finding Captain Penny in conversation with my officers, as he was my guest I did not wish to interrupt his conversation with them, considering it was not in good taste to do so. I descended the cabin two or three steps, and it occurred to me I must say good night to Penny. I went up and asked him if he would take anything. Knowing him to be a very abstemious man, I might have asked him if he would take a glass of water. The conversation proceeded and I went away. To my astonishment,—for I must say I was looking forward to the Sabbath passing with a view to some determined arrangement as to what was to be done in the Wellington Strait,—to my astonishment the bombardier came to me at twelve o'clock at night to say that Captain Penny had gone. I think he said to the "Assistance," but I am not positive. I know that Captain Penny had an invitation to dine on board the "Assistance" on Sunday, for I was invited to meet him. I never made it a practice to accept invitations on Sunday, but out of compliment to Captain Penny I determined on going. I said, "I think Captain Penny is in want of meat for his dogs; I should not be at all surprised if he is gone towards Griffith's Island." I declare that from that time to this I have endeavoured to account for it. However, among other things, I afterwards became impressed that Captain Penny was angry with me, perhaps because I had not returned his visit.

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He had offered me his dog sledge, and I am sure I should have been very happy there; I am sure of that, for I have always considered him a very generous man; but there were a hundred of my people out. My mind was on the stretch, causing me great care and anxiety; under such circumstances I could not think of leaving the ships. However, there was an interval between what may be called the limited and the extended parties. I determined to walk over to Captain Penny's, and found it a most tiresome journey,—a most laborious journey of from eight to nine hours. I thought of catching Captain Penny before he went out, but when I arrived, unhappily I found that Captain Penny had gone up Wellington Channel. I was detained there. My intention was to remain there forty-eight hours, but, in the hope of some one coming back, my stay extended over six days at Captain Penny's winter quarters on board the "Lady Franklin." During the time I was there the extended party came back a little earlier than they expected. I was away during the arrival of Captain Ommanney, Aldridge, and Osborne. While on board the "Lady Franklin" thinking that there must be some mistake between myself and Captain Penny, I wrote him a letter. I cannot recollect the substance of it, for I never intended it to be produced at such an inquiry as this. I apologized to him, and desired that there should be no coolness between us for the good of the cause. I then returned to the expedition.

328. *Chairman.*—Had you not better say what you apologized for?

Captain Austin.—I think I said, "If you are offended, the desire of an honourable mind must be to make an apology. If I have offended you I never intended it."

Captain Austin continued.—I came back to the ship after another very laborious journey, and the parties came in unhappily without finding traces, having looked most carefully and minutely for any trace.

329. *Sir E. Parry.*—Will you state about the time of this?

Captain Austin.—All the parties were in by the 4th of July. I cannot, without notes, speak now, but after minutely considering with my colleague, and receiving the officers journals and reports, I felt satisfied that there was nothing more to be done to the southward and westward, and I decided accordingly.

330. *Chairman.*—You had better explain here what had been done?

Captain Austin.—Nothing more could be done to the northward and westward by Lieutenant Aldridge and Lieutenant M'Clintock, Mr. Bradford the Surgeon, and Mr. M'Dougall the second master; and to the southward and westward by Captain Ommanney, Lieutenant Osborne, Lieutenant Browne, and Lieutenant Mecham, and also by Mr. Allen, who had searched Lowther Island and Garrett Island, and the ice generally in that direction, as shown in my outline chart.

331. *Chairman.*—That completes that part of your evidence. You say that those parts having been examined by such and such parties, nothing more could be done in that direction?

Captain Austin continued.—All returned unhappily without traces of the missing expedition. Having maturely weighed and considered the matter, I now felt that all had been done that could be done to the westward and south-westward of the Wellington Channel. I must say I became very anxious at this period to be able to make known generally what was to be the plan of future operation. At the earliest moment I sent my track chart to Captain Penny who was away, and to Sir John Ross. During this period I had occupied my mind with plans for going overland in case of hearing from parties coming in from Captain Penny, so that in the event of anything being found I might send a party across the land at the head of the bay; my calculations were that, taking the best people I had, I must devote three weeks in order to do it. I mean to say I would send across the head of the bay surveyed by Mr. M'Dougall. I had reports, and I suppose that I must have had something from Sir John Ross or some of the parties connected with Captain Penny who had gone to the westward. Perhaps I had better tell exactly what I felt. If it had not been

for delicacy in the one case, and having a doubt about land travelling at the time of the year, I might have made an attempt to cross there; but that would have been mere hydrography, and would not have accomplished my object. I thought, also, that it would be going over ground my colleague was doing, and that I had better wait till he returned, having the full determination in my mind that I would never allow a word to pass by which it might be inferred that I had any intention of returning to England. It was well known that I had determined on waiting until Captain Penny returned. Captain Penny returned about 25th July, and I received a note from him, but no official letter. That note, with other things that occurred to me, fully impressed me that the search had been carefully made, that no traces had been found, and that so far as the sea was spoken of it was not a navigable sea. The note I received from Captain Penny was as follows:—

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“ Dear Sir,

August 4, 1851.

“ Your first note, written on board the “Lady Franklin,” escaped my notice by some overlook for four days; the language it conveys is sufficient apology to any generous-minded man, however much his feeling had been injured by expressions and marked neglect.

“ And believe me, Austin, when I state it, that Penny has been all his lifetime accustomed to speak the language of the heart.

“ You, as well as myself, has very great reason to be thankful to our Maker for His manifold mercy to us and all those under our command for the high state of health they enjoy after an arduous and prolonged dutys (*sic*).

“ The result of my boat expedition as far as the fate of Sir John and the brave men under his command are satisfactory, for what other conclusion could we arrive at after visiting Duck Island and Bird headlands with hundreds of nests, and no trace,—likewise water about these islands for two months, and latterly, beyond the pack ice nothing but water as far as the eye could reach from the highest mountain; but the fearful rate the tide runs (not less than six knots) through the sounds that divide the channel renders it dangerous even for a boat, much more so a ship, unless clear of ice, which from the appearance of the ice here will not be clear this season.

“ The conclusion I have arrived at after what has passed under my observation is to return to England after I have had an interview with you.

“ Poor Lady Franklin, and the friends of those brave men whose fate will ever remain in oblivion! Was it not a strong conviction of my sense of duty, the very thought of meeting any of them without intelligence would almost tempt me to another winter.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) WM. PENNY.”

“ Captain H. T. Austin.”

Endorsement in pencil.

“ Rec^d by Captain St. “Sophia,” the 11th August, Monday, at anchorage off Penny’s winter quarters, just before anchoring.”

332. *Chairman.*—You received that letter on the 11th of August?

Captain Austin.—Yes; it was received by me on the 11th of August.

333. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that endorsement placed on it at the time?

Captain Austin.—Yes; it was not touched from that time until it was taken out on our return.

334. *Sir E. Parry.*—How do you account for the delay between the 4th of August, which date the letter bears, and the 11th of August when you received it?

Captain Austin.—My impression why I did not receive the letter for a week was, that the party intrusted with it could not reach me. There was an attempt on the part of Captain Penny to reach me at Griffith Island, although an engineer came from Captain Penny’s vessel after his return, and also after that again, the Esquimaux Adam Beck came over the ice. At the same time my first lieutenant who was on board Captain Penny’s ship did not come, and there was therefore considerable difficulty; that is to say, that the first

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lieutenant of the "Resolute" was on board the "Lady Franklin" when Captain Penny returned from his second trip. On the 11th of August I came to the winter quarters of Captain Penny; Captain Stewart was on board. I cannot trust my memory for details of my visit. Captain Stewart came on board. My belief is, he gave me that private note and also an official letter from Captain Penny with an outline chart. Why I say I believe this, is that it will be before you on record, and therefore that will determine it. It will be produced. This is the letter:—

"Her Majesty's Brig, Lady Franklin,
Assistance Bay, August 4, 1851.

"Sir,

"I forward an outline of search by the expedition under my charge. There are no traces of Her Majesty's ships 'Erebus' and 'Terror' further than a bit of English elm. As soon as I am at liberty I will come to Griffith Island and wait an interview.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM PENNY."

"To Captain Horatio T. Austin, C.B.,
commanding Her Majesty's ship
'Resolute,' and the Expedition to the Arctic."

Endorsement.—"Received on the 11th of August, dated the 4th of August 1851, on the arrival of the 'Resolute' at the winter quarters of Captain Penny's Expedition."

Captain Austin continued.—Shortly after Captain Stewart delivered this letter Commander Phillips and the first lieutenant of the "Resolute" came on board the "Resolute." Shortly after anchoring Captain Penny came on board. Sir John Ross came on board; that is to say, Sir John Ross and Captain Penny were in my cabin of the "Resolute" together, as far as I believe; that is my impression. There was conversation going on between Captain Penny and myself and Sir John Ross, all connected with the search of the Wellington Channel, all connected with the service which was at our hearts, I believe. Captain Ommanney came on board. My impression is, that I could not reason with Captain Penny. I could not get anything that was satisfactory. It was a sort of rambling conversation of which I could make nothing. Sir John Ross and Captain Ommanney may recollect more of the affair than I can. This I am quite prepared to recollect, that when Captain Penny left the ship I went to the side and endeavoured in every possible way to be polite and attentive, and to cause him to be treated in the manner which his position demanded. I could not but say to Captain Ommanney, "Did you see Penny's conduct to me, is it not distressing?" I was pained in the extreme, but never mentioned the circumstance to any one but Captain Ommanney. Now with respect to the letter which I sent to Captain Penny, requiring him to state to me officially the result of his search for Sir John Franklin, the date of it was as follows:—

"Captain Austin to Captain W. Penny, Her Majesty's Brig 'Lady Franklin,' and in charge of an expedition searching for the expedition of Sir John Franklin.

"Her Majesty's ship 'Resolute,' off the Winter Quarters of Captain Penny's expedition, 11th August."

Captain Austin continued.—My belief is, that this letter was sent by my clerk to Captain Penny, Captain Ommanney remaining on board with me. Mr. Lewis was the clerk of the "Resolute." I cannot at this moment remember the hour, that is, whether Captain Ommanney and I dined first, but my impression is, that Captain Ommanney and I dined together from about three to four o'clock. My dinner hour was generally three, but of course in this service I took it when I required it to sustain me. Dinner being over, it was arranged that we should go and pay a complimentary visit to Captain Penny and Sir John Ross. We proceeded on board the "Lady Franklin," and in the cabin were assembled Captain Penny, Captain Stewart, Captain Ommanney, and myself. I said to Captain Penny, "Now, Penny, let us set aside all feeling," or words to that effect. "We are going home non-successful. Depend

upon it we shall be called upon closely," or words to that effect. "It is now necessary that we should take upon ourselves a certain amount of responsibility, and there must be a little official correspondence pass between you and me. You see that I have told you that I am satisfied; after mature consideration, with what has been done by my own officers, and it is now for you to tell me in some way what you think of your work," or words to that effect.

335. *Chairman*.—You state that you received an outline chart from Captain Penny communicating his discoveries. Did you communicate your exploring operations to him?

Captain Austin.—Directly after my exploring parties came in I sent to Sir John Ross and Captain Penny with a view of informing them of what had been done, and eliciting from them at the earliest opportunity what they had accomplished. The date of my communication was the 4th of July 1851.

336. *Chairman*.—How soon after that did you receive Captain Penny's outline chart?

Captain Austin.—I received it on the 11th of August.

Captain Austin continued.—Captain Penny then, I think, said, "Oh, I have answered that," and turned to the back of the cabin and gave me a letter. I opened the letter and found it was not at all an answer to the questions I put. He gave me the letter which he has now put in. Until I saw that letter here I forgot it, for I never noticed it in any other way than that I have mentioned.

The letter was as follows :

" Sir, Assistance Bay, 11th August 1851.

" I have this moment received your despatch. I beg to state that you have already my chart and expressed opinions, which I again send you in writing; i. e. that I have not found any trace otherwise than a bit of elm, which you have seen, and I only can judge when I see Wellington Channel what course I will then pursue.

" My orders are such as would not justify me in passing another winter in the Arctic seas.

" I have the honour to be, Sir,

" Your most obedient servant,

" WILLIAM PENNY."

" To Captain Austin,
Her Majesty's ship 'Resolute,' and in charge
of Her Majesty's expedition in search
of Sir John Franklin."

Captain Austin continued.—I took this letter, and I said: "This is not a reply to my question;" and I believe I put it in my pocket. After reasoning a little Captain Penny became more cool; and I then took the letter out and said, "Well, I do not mean to say that if the Wellington Channel was opened, and I believe that two days would accomplish it, that I would not proceed up with a steamer and get some soundings, some angles and observations." But I said, "Penny, I will tell you what; if you will tell me, and give me from under your hand that you are satisfied with the work you have performed, I will not go up the Wellington Channel. Geography is not our object, and therefore I should tell you I am satisfied if you are satisfied; but if you give me this letter I must write to you again, and it will not be satisfactory before the public that we are altercating," or something to that effect. I am ready to declare that I gave that letter to Captain Penny again. I cannot say he was unwilling to receive it; I do not know. How I was able to maintain myself as an officer and a gentleman under the circumstances I cannot tell. I then said to Captain Penny, "Now reflect, as soon as you give me your answer you may rely upon it that I shall not look over your work, and you will then know what are my plans for the future." I then bade him good-bye, and went on board the "Felix." Sir John Ross had been kind enough to supply us with five tons of coals, and my anxiety to get them on board kept me there a little longer than I might otherwise have been. On returning to the ship I passed with Captain Ommanney under the stern of the "Lady Franklin." Captain Penny was on deck, and, I believe, kindly asked me to come on board. I said, "No, I thank you." Several of

Captain Austin.

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our officers were on board, and I think I said to Captain Ommanney, "All I want is his reply, and if we go on board it will only delay us. I have reasoned with him, and the sooner I get on board the better." I said to Captain Ommanney, "You must remain on board, because I shall have an answer to that letter, for till that comes not a word can I say as to what we are going to do." I must refer to some notes I made at that time. I waited up until midnight for Captain Penny's answer. Being much fagged, I went to bed. Captain Ommanney was on board the "Resolute" until midnight, when I requested him to go to his ship. Previous to going to bed I wrote a note to Captain Penny, most kindly, for an official answer. The substance is this:—first of all the note was very kindly written, appealing to Captain Penny as an active and energetic Arctic navigator for a reply to my official letter. I impressed upon his mind that the expedition I was charged with was lying in that bay in the midst of stragglng ice. At that time I did not know but that I was going to remain out another winter. Up to that moment I meant to say that not a soul had any reason to expect that he was to go to England before I had a satisfactory answer from Captain Penny; therefore it was a very anxious moment for me from the time I came on board the "Resolute." At two o'clock on the morning of the 12th of August 1851 Captain Penny's reply came on board; at that time I was really too tired to get up and close my report. The following is Captain Penny's reply:—

"Sir, Assistance Bay, 11th August 1851.
Your question is easily answered. My opinion is, Wellington Channel requires no further search; all has been done in the power of man to accomplish, and no trace has been found. What else can be done?"

"I have the honour to be,
Your most obedient servant,
WM. PENNY."

Captain Austin continued.—Shortly after the receipt of this letter the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia" were making preparations to move. I sent a letter to Captain Penny, dated "Her Majesty's Ship 'Resolute,' off Captain Penny's Winter Quarters, 12th April 1851." It was as follows:

"Sir,
I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter making known to me the result of the search in Wellington Strait by the expedition under your charge. I have now to inform you that I do not consider it necessary to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in that direction, with the expedition under my orders. It is now my intention to proceed to attempt the search of Jones's Sound.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
HORATIO T. AUSTIN."

Captain Austin continued.—On sending this letter on board I sent also my compliments, I think by Mr. M'Dougall, the second master, with an offer to tow the brigs out by the steamers. I now closed the report for the Admiralty for Sir John Ross, and wrote to him privately, telling him my plans, with an offer to tow him in the "Felix." Sir John Ross closed, and he was taken in tow, and proceeded, the "Sophia" and "Lady Franklin" having previously sailed out. We proceeded to the eastward, the wind being very light. We came up with the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," and I went on board the "Lady Franklin" with my report, and an outline chart accompanying it, showing the proceeding of the expedition under my care.

337. *Sir E. Parry*.—In Captain Penny's letter to you of the 11th of August 1851, and put into your hand that day by him in the cabin of the "Lady Franklin," he speaks of his chart, and expressed opinions, which he again sends you in writing; now I want to know what opinions those were that Captain Penny had before expressed to you?

Captain Austin.—I suppose it refers to Captain Penny's letter of the 4th of August 1851, addressed to me, and received on the 11th of August.

338. *Sir E. Parry.*—Previously to Captain Penny putting that letter into your hands on the 11th of August, had he ever expressed an opinion to you that you ought to go up Wellington Strait?

Captain Austin.—Never, to the best of my belief.

339. *Sir E. Parry.*—Can you conjecture what Captain Penny meant by the following expression in his letter of the 11th of August put into your hand:—“and I only can judge, when I see Wellington Channel, what course I will then pursue?”

Captain Austin.—No, not any more than I can of much more that passed in conversation between Captain Penny and myself.

Captain Austin continued.—I came up to the “Lady Franklin” and “Sophia,” and went on board with my chart and report to the secretary of the Admiralty. Captain Ommanney joined. I was most guarded in what I said and did. Captain Penny was quite dissatisfied. He said something about,—had I not heard or understood from some of my officers that had we not got clear, meaning of our frozen-in position, he intended waiting until the 13th of August for us. I replied, Certainly it had never been intimated to me, but I was quite satisfied he would have been ready to help us if he could. In the presence of Captain Ommanney I said, “Penny, I suppose it would be a bad compliment to ask you if we can give you anything,” meaning provisions or anything of that sort, “although I cannot say we are off,” meaning going home. He expressed something in reply, which I do not recollect; but his manner was so unpleasant that I cannot recollect what he said. After trying to be civil, and getting his letter, I took my leave.

340. *Chairman.*—You are aware of the evidence which Captain Penny gave the day before yesterday?

Captain Austin.—Yes, I was present during his examination.

341. *Chairman.*—Captain Beechey asked Captain Penny whether, on the 11th of August, he said to you “Go up there (Wellington Channel), and do the cause some service?” Referring to Captain Penny’s examination, will you admit that that conversation passed between him and you, as there stated; and that he asked you for a steamer to go up the Wellington Channel, and that the last words he used to you were “Go up there, and do the cause some service?”

Captain Austin.—No such thing, or any thing like it, was ever expressed.

342. *Chairman.*—Was anybody present at the time you were conversing with Captain Penny on that occasion?

Captain Austin.—Yes, Captain Ommanney, and my own boat’s crew, but none of Captain Penny’s officers, of whom I was anxious to take leave.

343. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Penny in his evidence has made use of these words:—“The last thing I said was, Go up into Wellington Channel, and you will do good service to the cause.” This was on the morning of the 12th of August. Do you admit that Captain Penny said those words to you?

Captain Austin.—I declare he did not do so.

345. *Captain Beechey.*—Captain Penny states also, “On the 11th of August I told Captain Austin that the Strait ought to be better examined, meaning Wellington Channel, and that if he would give me a steamer I would go up there.” Did he say that?

Captain Austin.—No, never.

346. *Captain Austin* continued.—I received a sealed letter from Captain Penny for transmission, addressed, I believe, to the Secretary of the Admiralty. I took my leave, and towed Sir John Ross up to Beechey Island. I went on with Sir John Ross, taking some supplies for him. I wished to keep him in tow, but he desired particularly to go on in the neighbourhood of Beechey Island. I then cast him off, and proceeded.

The Committee then adjourned.



Fourth Day. October 30, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain F. W. Beechey,
Captain Sir George Back,
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

On the assembling of the Committee this morning,

The Chairman, addressing Captain Penny, said,—The Committee have looked over the corrections you have made in your printed evidence, and they think that some of them are so extensive that they could not allow them to stand in that way without confusion to the examination generally. It will be open to you to offer any explanations you may think proper, and they will be added to the printed report.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN'S examination resumed.

Captain Austin.

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346. *The Chairman to Captain Austin.*—Will you now continue your narrative from the point at which we broke off yesterday until the period at which you determined to return to England?

Captain Austin.—Without having had an opportunity of examining the printed evidence of yesterday, I feel that I could not enter into a continuous detailed narrative from memory, and I therefore beg to refer you to my official report to the Admiralty, dated at anchor off Winterton, 30th September 1851, for all my explanations on that part of the subject. I put it in as a narrative of my further proceedings, this report being brought down to my arrival off Winterton.

347. *Chairman.*—Very well; then we must proceed to examine you upon the different points. If you look to paragraph 46 of your despatch to the Admiralty, dated the 12th of August 1851, off the winter quarters of Captain Penny's expedition, you use the following words:—"Having yesterday been released from our winter quarters, and most unexpectedly reached to those of Captain Penny, I have now the honour to state, that having maturely considered the directions and extent of the search (without success) that has been made by this expedition, and weighed the opinions of the officers when at their extremes, I have arrived at the conclusion that the expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait; and having communicated with Captain Penny, and fully considered his official reply to my letter relative to the search of Wellington Strait by the expedition under his charge (unhappily without success), I do not feel authorized to prosecute (even if practicable) a further search in those directions." Will you state your reasons for determining that, even if practicable, you did not feel authorized to prosecute any further search in those directions?

Captain Austin.—My feeling was that Captain Penny, being the leader of an expedition authorized by the Admiralty, having expressed to me, officially, as well as verbally, that all the search that could be made had been made

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without any traces, I considered that I was not justified in going over ground again that I had every reason to believe had been well searched by a person as responsible to his country as I was; and again, that in navigating such regions as we were then in, that there was not time to deliberate and defer. I felt that there was only one other step, which was to proceed in what I considered the further execution of my orders, being satisfied that everything had been done that could be done in the other direction,—to proceed in the direction of Jones's Sound. I refer to the orders which were given to Sir James Ross, a copy of which was sent to me for my guidance and instruction by an Admiralty letter, which called especial attention to Sir James Ross's orders. The orders to Sir James Ross were as follows:—

“ Sir,

Admiralty, 15th May 1849.

“ Herewith you will receive a copy of the instructions which have been delivered to the commanding officer of the ‘North Star,’ together with a complete set of the printed papers referred to in those instructions. From the former you will see that, judging from the lateness of your arrival in Lancaster Sound, and your instructions to Captain Bird in your memorandum of 12th February 1848, there is every probability of the ‘Investigator’ returning to England this summer, and it being, in the opinion of the Lords of the Admiralty, most inexpedient that you should be left to prosecute the search with the ‘Enterprise’ only, and with the possible contingency of your having to receive on board of her the whole of Sir John Franklin's party, the ‘North Star’ has been equipped for the double purpose of preventing the return of the ‘Investigator,’ and of furnishing the ships under your orders with the necessary supplies for the continuance of your search during the summer of 1850. The orders given to the ‘North Star’ will furnish you with their Lordships opinion as to the quarter and direction in which they think it desirable the search for Sir John Franklin's party should be prosecuted, especially in the Wellington Channel and Prince Regent's Inlet, as well as in Jones's and Smith's Sounds, and their wishes in that respect, on the perusal of these orders, may appear to you to be more extended than those expressed in their original instructions to yourself. My Lords are aware that no pains or exertions will be spared by you to carry out these views to the utmost; but they cannot too strongly urge upon you the necessity of using all your judgment and ability to prevent your ships being detained the winter of 1850 in the ice, to the imminent hazard of the people under your command. It will be needless in this communication to revert to the steps now taken for replenishing your ships,—the papers accompanying this will put you in possession of all that has been done in that respect and the grounds on which those steps have been taken,—and it is equally unnecessary to repeat their Lordships anxious desire for your welfare and success. They would, however, take this occasion to assure you of their entire confidence in your ability to conduct a service to which such increasing and universal interest is attached.

“ I am, Sir,

your obedient servant,

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.”

348. *Chairman.*—You see your attention was directed in the first place to the Wellington Strait as well as to Jones's Sound. Will you explain why the examination of Wellington Strait was not further prosecuted when you joined Captain Penny at that time, and when you had heard from him that open water had been found above the Strait?

Captain Austin.—I think I have answered that.

349. *Chairman.*—You have stated in your last despatch to the Admiralty that you did not feel authorized to examine the Wellington Strait further. You were directed to attend to these instructions of Sir James Ross which included Wellington Channel as well as Jones's Sound. Be good enough to explain this?

Captain Austin.—Looking to the position of Captain Penny as the responsible leader of an expedition, I think I discharged my duty.

350. *Chairman.*—The instructions to Sir James Ross having comprehended the search of the Wellington Strait, why did you not, being off that strait on the

12th of August, proceed to the further examination of the barrier which prevented the search?

Captain Austin.

Captain Austin.—I went across the barrier. Wellington Strait was ablock when I passed it.

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351. *Chairman.*—Did you go up yourself and see the barrier of ice?

Captain Austin.—I did not go up for the purpose of examining it; but the strait was blocked up when I passed in 1851.

352. *Chairman.*—Why did you not examine the barrier for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was likely to give way, and the Wellington Strait to become navigable during the season of 1851?

Captain Austin.—My conviction was on crossing the Wellington Strait that there was a considerable barrier of fixed ice in that strait as well as a large quantity of ice in a state of disruption, consisting of large floe pieces and pressed up; and this generally was the state of the ice in Wellington Strait, as far as the eye could see from the crow's nest. On this subject I put in the report of two officers I sent to the crow's nest, the position of the ship being at that time (11th August 1851) a little to the northward of Barlow Inlet. The reports of these two officers are as follow:—

“As far as the eye can reach from the crow's nest, the Wellington Strait is filled with ice, consisting of large floe pieces and loose and pressed-up ice; the whole of it appears to be detached from the land, and lanes of water stretch across from side to side.

“To the eastward, Barrow Strait is quite clear of ice, right across so far as can be seen.

“To the southward, also, there is a great deal of water mixed with the ice.

(Signed) ROBERT C. ALLEN, Master.”

“In compliance with your request that I should observe from the crow's nest the state of the ice to the northward of us whilst crossing Wellington Channel, I have to report that at 1.30. P.M. I went aloft to examine, and observed large floes and quantities of loose sailing ice in the centre and body of the channel, and a continued floe from side to side as far as the eye could reach, about 10 or 12 miles up, rendering it perfectly unnavigable at the present time, and apparently likely to continue so some weeks to come.

(Signed) ROBERT D. ALDRICH, Lieutenant.”

353. *Chairman.*—State what was the position of the ship at that time; whether it was half way across the strait, or a third, or two thirds, or how?

Vide chart, position marked A.

Captain Austin.—I have marked on the chart what I consider to have been about the position of the ship at the time these observations were made.

354. *Sir E. Parry.*—The report of Mr. Allen states that the whole of the ice in Wellington Strait appears to be detached from the land, and lanes of water stretched across from side to side. Do you understand by that, that it was navigable?

Captain Austin.—No; nor do I consider that it was so.

355. *Captain Beechey.*—What was the direction of the wind?

Captain Austin.—At the time of the report the wind was light, and from the northward, but increased rather as we neared Beechey Island from the northward.

356. *Captain Beechey.*—Then by packed ice we are not to understand that it was fast ice?

Captain Austin.—No. For a certain distance I think it was fast ice. I did not consider that the distance of the disrupted ice was for more than three or four miles.

357. *Captain Beechey.*—Then you did not consider that the further examination of the state of the ice in Wellington Channel of sufficient importance to induce you to search the lanes of the water reported to you by Mr. Allen?

Captain Austin.—I did not, as I saw and judged for myself.

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358. *Sir G. Back.*—You say that the wind was from the northward at the time you went towards Beechey Island. Did the ice drift past you to the south?

Captain Austin.—I cannot say I observed it. My impression is that the ice was generally connected with the ice in Barrow Straits, and that in getting across we were navigating through ice. So that there was a pack of moving ice some distance to the southward of the entrance of Wellington Channel. I am not prepared to say that the ice was in motion any way. If it was it was not considerable.

359. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you any report of the state of the ice in Wellington Channel in 1851 from the officers of any of the other vessels under your command?

Captain Austin.—I have no report from any officer, except those of the master and first lieutenant of the ship I commanded, as to the state of the ice in Wellington Channel in 1851. The "Felix," with Sir John Ross, was in tow at the stern of the "Resolute," having on board a most experienced arctic navigator, Mr. Abernethy; as was the "Assistance" following in tow of the "Intrepid."

360. *Sir E. Parry.*—From your experience of steam vessels in the navigation amongst the ice, are you of opinion that such vessels afford the power of continuing the navigation later in the season than the sailing vessels?

Captain Austin.—Yes, when separated from the sailing vessels.

361. *Sir E. Parry.*—How much later?

Captain Austin.—For a short time; depending on temperature.

362. *Sir E. Parry.*—At about how low a temperature would you say they might continue to navigate?

Captain Austin.—I think I can state that by referring to my documents, which are not here at present. One day may make the most important difference; and, as a proof of this, when the American expedition bore up from us I observed to Captain Ommanney, who came on board, that I very much doubted whether that expedition would be able to reach America this year, on account of the sudden changes that were taking place with regard to the formation of the bay ice.

363. *Sir E. Parry.*—With what thickness of young ice, according to your experience, could the steamers you had succeed in navigating those seas?

Captain Austin.—To answer that question satisfactorily I must refer to documents which I have not here; but I may observe, that there is scarcely such a thing as one plain sheet of bay ice to be met with in the course of a few hours navigation.

364. *Sir E. Parry.*—For how many days later in the season of 1850 could your steamers pursue the navigation with safety beyond the time that your sailing vessels could?

Captain Austin.—As far as my impression at present goes, a very few days; but on reference to my notes, which I have not got here, I hope to be able to answer that question more satisfactorily.

365. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—After the diligent examination of the shores of the Wellington Channel, made and reported to you by Captain Penny and his officers, and of the coast about Cape Walker and Melville Island, by your own officers, and the statement of your conclusion that Sir John Franklin did not proceed to the southward and westward of the Wellington Strait, what opinion did you form as to the best course to be pursued for the rescue of the missing expedition?

Captain Austin.—I had not the slightest hope of a rescue. Looking to my orders, there appeared to be something left undone. Captain Penny not having searched Jones's Sound for which service he was equipped I proceeded there, although, I am free to admit, with scarcely a hope.

366. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you entertain at that time any conviction that Sir John Franklin had passed through Wellington Strait and the channel to the north-west of it?

Captain Austin.—I did not.

367. *Chairman*.—We are directed by the Admiralty to inquire into your opinion as to the conduct of the officers and men under your command. Was their conduct satisfactory, or have you any exceptions to make?

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Captain Austin.—As regards that question I have to refer in reply to my report already made to the Admiralty, dated 30th September 1851.

368. *Captain Beechey*.—In your despatch to the Admiralty you say that you had weighed well the opinions of the officers at their extremes. Did you call upon the officers for their opinions as regarded a further search?

Captain Austin.—No.

369. *Captain Beechey*.—Did they give you their opinions?

Captain Austin.—I am under the impression that I alluded to their journals.

370. *Captain Beechey*.—But had you the journals at that time?

Captain Austin.—Yes. I had the substance of their journals directly they arrived.

371. *Captain Beechey*.—After you quitted the country, did you call upon the officers to give you any opinion as to whether you should continue the search, or to proceed to England?

Captain Austin.—No.

372. *Captain Beechey*.—Then what do you allude to in your despatch?

Captain Austin.—These allusions must be to the official opinions of the officers, stated in their reports of their proceedings to me during their travels.

373. *Captain Beechey*.—Did they report their opinions to you in writing?

Captain Austin.—Yes.

374. *Captain Beechey*.—Then you allude to those reports?

Captain Austin.—Yes; and in general conversation with the superior officers of the expedition. My firm belief is that they were convinced that nothing more was to be done in the direction that I have stated myself.

375. *Captain Beechey*.—You say, “I much regret that our remaining strength did not admit of my placing at the disposal of Captain Penny sufficient aid to convey a boat to ascertain its nature and extent,” alluding to the water discovered in the Queen’s Channel. Why did you feel that you had not the power of placing these means at his disposal?

Captain Austin.—In consequence of the number of persons absent, and of those who remained being appointed as succour to those who were away, I could not afford him any assistance.

376. *Captain Beechey*.—Had you been applied to on or previous to the 23d of May 1851 by Captain Penny for a boat?

Captain Austin.—No, certainly not.

377. *Captain Beechey*.—By being applied to by Captain Penny, I mean had he sent any message to you by any other person to the same effect?

Captain Austin.—No.

378. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—During the co-operation between the two expeditions did you at any time decline any application of Captain Penny or his officers for aid or assistance?

Captain Austin.—Never. On the contrary, I have rendered every assistance in my power. I have towed Captain Penny’s brigs through the ice, and have at other times given aid whenever I could do it in the execution of my orders.

379. *Sir G. Back*.—In answer to a question from the Chairman, Whether Captain Penny had at that time explained to you that a search should be made higher in Wellington Straits, Captain Penny afterwards says, “I asked him for a steamer, and he refused me that steamer to go up.” Was that the case?

Captain Austin.—No.

380. *Chairman*.—You have read two letters from Captain Penny to the Admiralty which appear on page 47, No. 21., dated September 15th, 1851, and the other at page 50, dated 10th October 1851. In the first of these letters Captain Penny makes the following statement:—“I stated verbally to Captain Austin that it was my conviction that Sir John Franklin had gone through the strait

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leading north-west out of Wellington Channel (which I have for the present named Queen Victoria Channel), and that he had gone off in clear water, and that he was beyond our reach. I meant, of course, beyond the reach of my parties and my means. He did not seem disposed to credit my statement. I begged him to give me one of his steamers, and I would take the "Sophia" and would act as pilot, and go up the Channel, and wait to see if the ice would clear away." Now what is your explanation of that?

Captain Austin.—There was a sort of rambling conversation, but certainly not to the effect that Sir John Franklin had gone there, but that if he had gone there he was out of our reach. It was a rambling conversation that I never thought worthy of consideration. This I declare, that Captain Penny never asked me for a steamer, nor did he ever assert to me that Sir John Franklin had gone away in clear water.

381. *Chairman.*—Turn to page 50, No. 29., Captain Penny to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 10th of October 1851. You abide by your former answer that Captain Penny did not ask you for a steamer which he would pilot out?

Captain Austin.—Yes, I abide by that answer, most certainly.

382. *Chairman.*—Did he say to you, when you were separating, and you were going up Jones's Sound, "Go up Wellington Channel, and you will do the cause some service?"

Captain Austin.—No.

383. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Your orders called upon you to renew your search in the open season of 1851, connected with your return to England in that year. Was it your conviction, from your own observation, and all the reports you had received at the time of quitting Wellington Channel, that every hope of rescuing the missing expedition in that direction was past, and that therefore delay was useless?

Captain Austin.—My impression was, that there was no hope of a rescue in any way; and further, that not to have returned forthwith might have led to a detention of the expedition another winter.

384. *Chairman.*—Nothing particular occurred, as we understand, during your passage from Cape Riley to Jones's Sound?

Captain Austin.—Not anything.

385. *Chairman.*—Will you state to the Committee what your proceedings were in the execution of that part of your instructions?

Captain Austin.—On this subject I again refer to my report to the Lords of the Admiralty, which gives an account of my proceedings in reference to my labours in the north of Baffin's Bay, dated 30th September 1851, at anchor off Winterton, Norfolk.

Capt. Ommanney.

CAPTAIN OMMANNEY, late of Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance,"
 called.

386. *Chairman.*—Have you read Captain Austin's despatches to the Admiralty, containing a full report of his proceedings, dated the 12th of August 1851 and the 30th of September 1851?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, I have read them.

387. *Chairman.*—Do you concur in opinion, that they contain a full and correct report of the expedition during the time you were second in command?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, I consider them perfectly correct.

388. *Chairman.*—As far as you know of the reports of the exploring parties during the spring of 1851, under the command of the different officers of the squadron, do you consider them correct?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes.

389. *Chairman.*—The point to which the Committee chiefly direct their attention at this moment is grounded on letters of Captain Penny which will be put before you; the first is dated the 12th of April 1851; the next, the 8th of September 1851; the next the 15th of September 1851; and there are

some subsequent ones, which I need not now recapitulate. Have you read all that correspondence?

Captain Ommanney.—No, I have not read it.

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390. *Chairman.*—Were you on board the “Resolute” on the 23d of May of this year, when Captain Penny reached that ship, and made known to Captain Austin that he had discovered a large space of water above Wellington Strait?

Captain Ommanney.—No, I was travelling at that time.

391. *Chairman.*—At what time did you return?

Captain Ommanney.—On the 14th of June.

392. *Chairman.*—What was the first communication from Captain Penny to Captain Austin on the subject of the discovery of open water above Wellington Strait that came under your own personal knowledge and observation?

The Chairman here mentioned that he had received a note from Captain Penny, objecting to Captain Austin being present during Captain Ommanney’s examination, to which the Chairman replied that this objection had been already anticipated by the Committee, and that they had determined that Captain Austin had a right to be present during the examination of his officers.

Captain Ommanney. (In reply to the Chairman’s question.)—On my return to the ship on the 14th of June I was informed that Captain Penny had reached Baillie Hamilton, and the adjacent islands, that he had found a considerable space of water there, and had consequently returned to his vessel with a view of taking a boat up there.

393. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of his having asked for any assistance from Captain Austin at that time?

Captain Ommanney.—No, I never heard of it.

394. *Chairman.*—When did you see Captain Penny first after he had returned from his exploring expeditions above Wellington Strait?

Captain Ommanney.—I had no opportunity of seeing Captain Penny until we all broke out of our winter quarters, when the expedition repaired to Assistance Bay on the 11th of August.

395. *Chairman.*—Will you state what took place at that time with respect to any report or communication made by Captain Penny on the subject of his discoveries?

Captain Ommanney.—We anchored in Assistance Bay about 2.30 P.M. on the 11th of August, when we were glad to find Captain Penny’s expedition and Sir John Ross’s were free from the ice, ready to go to sea. As soon as the ship was secured, I went on board the “Resolute” to wait upon Captain Austin, as is customary in the service. I found that Captain Penny had been there some time before me; so I understood from Captain Austin. I went down in the cabin, and Captain Penny showed me his chart. We had some conversation, congratulating each other on what we had done, or something to that effect. Captain Austin came down afterwards,—followed me almost. They (Captain Penny and Captain Austin) entered into a long conversation; the subject referring generally to what Captain Penny had seen, and the navigation. I cannot remember the exact words that transpired; but I will, if you please, read from my notes, made at the time, the substance of what I gathered on the 11th August 1850. “Our further operations now depended upon the opinion of Captain Penny respecting the necessity of a further search into the straits discovered by him during his search. The ship being secured I proceeded to the ‘Resolute’ to wait upon Captain Austin, and found Captain Penny with him giving an account of his search and opinions respecting the necessity of prosecuting it in the direction of his discovery. His firm conviction was, that there was nothing to justify the risk of incurring another winter,—expressed his great anxiety to act in concert, and requested that one of his brigs might accompany a steamer if it was requisite to make a further examination. Captain Penny did not consider the straits a safe navigation for any vessel, a strong current of five and a half miles per hour setting between the islands (Baillie Hamilton and the adjacent islands), which narrowed the straits to small passages. The

Capt. Ommanney.
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“ islands abound with wild fowl. Penny examined the shores of them most
“ thoroughly, without meeting a trace. Penny could hardly suppose it pos-
“ sible that Sir John Franklin’s expedition could have gone by those islands
“ without meeting some traces or record of their progress. Penny picked up
“ a piece of elm ; one side of it had been painted lead colour, the other side
“ was bleached by exposure. Captain Penny could not state decidedly to
“ Captain Austin whether it was his opinion that a further examination was
“ required, but stated that even if there was clear water he would not extend
“ his search up the Wellington Channel beyond the 20th of August. He
“ was also of opinion, that from the accumulation, and from there being a
“ barrier of ice extending across the Wellington Straits, they would not be
“ clear of ice this year.” These were the only remarks I took down at the
time that were impressed upon my memory.

396. *Chairman.*—Did you hear Captain Penny use any expression tending to urge a further search of the open sea in the Wellington Strait, or express an opinion to Captain Austin that Sir John Franklin had gone that way ?

Captain Ommanney.—No, decidedly not ; I never heard anything of the sort from him.

397. *Chairman.*—Had you an opportunity yourself of seeing the state of the ice in Wellington Strait in 1851,—I mean at the time you were crossing from your own winter quarters to the eastern side of the straits ?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, I saw the ice on crossing it, and observed it attentively.

398. *Chairman.*—What opinion did you form at that time ?

Captain Ommanney.—On crossing the Wellington Strait it was full of very extensive floes, close along the western shores up to Cape Hotham, quite impenetrable, in my opinion. I could not have got to Barlow Inlet if I had wished to do so. On passing round the edge of the ice to cross the channel, I remarked that we went considerably to the southward of what we had done the previous year ; that was on account of the ice extending seven or eight miles further southward than it had done in September 1850. As we approached the eastern shores of the straits, making across to Cape Riley, there was more water on that side. Union Bay was full of ice, but there was a considerable quantity of water extending to Point Innes, at which point, in my opinion, the ice packed close into the land. This occurred on the 12th of August 1851. I was aloft myself in crossing the channel on that day, for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the ice ; and I called the second lieutenant up (Mr. Elliott) to bear witness to what I saw on that occasion,—the extensive floes with which the channel was filled.

399. *Chairman.*—Then it was your opinion that the fast ice at that time rendered the Wellington Strait impossible to navigate ?

Captain Ommanney.—At that time we certainly could not have proceeded to the northward.

400. *Chairman.*—Was there any appearance of the ice breaking up before the close of the season, so as to render Wellington Strait navigable ?

Captain Ommanney.—The changes are so very sudden that such a thing might have happened.

401. *Chairman.*—In putting the question I only speak of reasonable expectations ?

Captain Ommanney.—There was sufficient time for such a thing to have happened between that and the close of the navigation season. At the same time, I could not say positively, unless I had gone to the northward.

402. *Chairman.*—If you had been in command of the expedition, should you have thought it your duty to wait, and until what period, in the hope that if the barrier broke up,—in the event of your having been convinced that further search ought to be made in that direction ?

Captain Ommanney.—Had I been convinced that further search was necessary, I should have held on to the very last, and made up my mind to pass another winter.

403. *Chairman.*—What was the impression you received yourself from the information that had been communicated by Captain Penny ?

Captain Ommanney.—After the receipt of Captain Penny’s letter to Captain

Austin I did not trouble my head further about it, the answer was so satisfactory. The letter I allude to is No. 5, dated 11th of August 1851. I agreed with Captain Austin that we were satisfied with Captain Penny's opinion.

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404. *Chairman.*—What was your view of that answer ?

Captain Ommanney.—I considered it perfectly satisfactory.

405. *Chairman.*—In what respect satisfactory? I suppose you had been in doubt whether the search ought to be continued or not. What effect would that communication have had upon your mind ?

Captain Ommanney.—I certainly should place every reliance on Captain Penny's opinion. The construction that I put upon it was, that nothing was to be done, either by the one or the other expedition.

406. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of a further communication from Captain Penny to Captain Austin, dated the 4th of August, and received by Captain Austin on the 11th ?

Mr. Fegan, the Secretary to the Committee, read the letter alluded to by the Chairman.

Vide ante, p. 33.
Ans. 331.

407. *Chairman.*—Had you any previous knowledge of that letter ?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes ; that is one of those which Captain Austin showed me.

408. *Chairman.* Would that have corroborated the impression that the letter dated the 11th of August had already given you as to the prosecution of the search above Wellington Strait ?

Captain Ommanney.—I consider that it does corroborate that opinion ; the opinion, I mean, that nothing more was to be done.

409. *Chairman.*—What do you consider to be the close of the navigable season in those seas ?

Captain Ommanney.—From the 15th to the 20th of September.

410. *Chairman.*—How soon do you think,—if the strait broke up at all,—it would have broken up after the 12th of August, when you left it all fast ?

Captain Ommanney.—There was such a space of water then in Barrow's Straits, that any day, any hour almost, might have effected a great change. Changes are so sudden that we can never tell when they are likely to come about. Watching for these changes is a constant source of anxiety when navigating.

411. *Captain Beechey.*—Captain Penny says, in one of his letters to Captain Austin, " My opinion is, that Wellington Channel requires no further search." What do you suppose him to mean when he says Wellington Channel ?

*Mr. Penny to Cap-
tain Austin,*
11th August 1851.

Captain Ommanney.—I suppose he alludes to the whole of Wellington Channel, described by Captain Penny, because I consider that that was the portion where Captain Penny had been, for that part had formed the subject of conversation on the 11th of August,—more especially the open water.

412. *Captain Beechey.*—You do think Captain Penny would have limited that to the narrow part of the channel merely, in the chart produced as Wellington Channel ?

Captain Ommanney.—No ; that never entered my mind.

413. *Captain Beechey.*—You said you founded your opinion of the state of the ice in Wellington Channel from what Captain Penny had said. What had he said, to your knowledge ?

Captain Ommanney.—In the conversation he said to Captain Austin that even if he wished to go up this year he did not think that barrier would clear away. I heard that in the course of the conversation on the 11th of August 1851.

414. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was Captain Austin in the habit of communicating freely to you his views and intentions with respect to the service in which you were engaged ?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, at all times.

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415. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you aware of Captain Austin's reason for relinquishing further search, either in the direction of Cape Walker and Melville Island, or in the north-west route by Wellington Channel?

Captain Ommanney.—From the previous reports of the officers under his command, and the report of Captain Penny.

416. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was your own individual impression at that time as to the probable route which Sir John Franklin's expedition had pursued in 1846?

Captain Ommanney.—There are two opinions which I hold, and have always held. In the event of its having been an extraordinary clear season, and very much favoured, he may have got through Captain Penny's Queen's Channel, to a position difficult of access; or the ships may have foundered on their way to England. The latter was a very general opinion in both expeditions.

417. *Sir G. Back.*—In that case do you consider that the coast from Ponds Bay up to the Beechey Island had been sufficiently examined to look for any relics?

Captain Ommanney.—It would require to walk the whole beach to do that.

418. *Captain Beechey.*—Had any piles of stones been erected on the coast to attract attention, as is the case in such expeditions, would you have seen them?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes. From Cape Warrender to Beechey Island I passed sufficiently near to that coast to have seen a top-gallant mast had it been lying there. I was never without the glass from hand to eye the whole time, and officers were directed to keep a look out.

419. *Captain Beechey.*—Were you present on the 11th or 12th of August when Captain Penny took his leave of Captain Austin? Did you hear Captain Penny say to Captain Austin, "Go up Wellington Channel, and you will do the cause some service"?

Captain Ommanney.—I never heard such an expression.

420. *Sir G. Back.*—You were present on that occasion when they parted?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, I was.

421. *Captain Beechey.*—Was anybody else present?

Captain Ommanney.—No. Captain Penny was walking up and down the deck. Captain Austin went on board, for the purpose, I presume, of taking leave. I went and joined them there for the same object. The expression alluded to I never heard.

422. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were walking the "Lady Franklin's" quarter deck when the conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin took place?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes.

423. *Captain Beechey.*—Then did you hear what took place in the boat alongside on that occasion, or did you ever hear Captain Penny say to Captain Austin at any time, "Go up Wellington Channel, and you will do the cause some service"?

Captain Ommanney.—Never.

424. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you ever hear him say to Captain Austin, about that time, August 12th, That strait ought to be better searched, meaning Queen's Channel, and that if he would give him a steamer he would go up?

Captain Ommanney.—I never heard him say that.

425. *Captain Beechey.*—Do you happen to know that he did say that?

Captain Ommanney.—No. I think Captain Austin, who was in the habit of communicating to me almost everything that anybody told him, would have informed me of this if it had been the case.

426. *Sir E. Parry.*—When Captain Penny's expedition parted from yours, had you any impression on your mind that Captain Penny had expressed an opinion to Captain Austin, that he, Captain Austin, ought to take further measures *then* for the examination of Wellington Strait, and the channels connected therewith?

Captain Ommanney.—I had no such impression.

427. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think it possible that such a communication could have been made by Captain Penny to Captain Austin without your being aware of it?

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Captain Ommanney.—I do not think it possible. I am quite sure, if such a communication had been made, Captain Austin would have told me. If such a communication had been made, Captain Austin knew that I was ready to go. I said I was ready to go up with steamers as soon as Captain Penny gave his opinion. I was ready to go at any time Captain Austin wished. Captain Austin and I had frequently talked about going up with the steamers when we met Penny, should it be considered desirable.

428. *Sir G. Back*.—Did it ever occur to you that there was any misunderstanding existing between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes. Captain Austin told me so himself on my return from travelling, that there had been some misunderstanding. I believe Captain Penny was on a visit to Captain Austin, and went away hastily. Captain Austin told me, and the other officers informed me of it also. Captain Penny was invited to dinner on board the "Assistance." He came at midnight to my officers and asked to be excused, as he wished to return to his ships. The reason was unknown, but it was supposed there was some difference between him and Captain Austin. Captain Austin's subsequent visit to Captain Penny was with a view of effecting a reconciliation. That is all I know about it.

429. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you examine Cape Riley and the circles of stones on it?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes; I discovered the first traces there on the 23d August 1850.

430. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—So completely as to satisfy yourself that no record was left there of the missing expedition?

Captain Ommanney.—Perfectly so. I spent some hours there myself, several officers with me, for the purpose of finding records, but all in vain; and on the 24th of August 1850 I sent Mr. M'Clintock from the ship with a party of men for the purpose of digging out any place where he might possibly find anything.

431. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you also present at an examination at the winter quarters of Sir John Franklin at Beechey Island?

Captain Ommanney.—On the 23d of August 1850, after the search of Cape Riley, we proceeded across the bay to Beechey Island for the purpose of examining a cairn that we had seen on the summit, fully convinced that it contained some records which would throw a light on the relics I had found. We had some difficulty in pressing the steamer through the ice. After great exertion we proceeded through to the west side of Beechey Island. On first landing we pulled up a piece of rope which had become firmly fixed in the ground, and found a few preserved meat tins. We then all ascended to the summit, racing almost, so eager were we to see what the cairn contained. On reaching it it was carefully pulled down. In the upper stone of this cairn, in the hollow part of it, were contained some loose shot. We removed it carefully stone by stone to the very ground without seeing anything. With pickaxes we dug as far as we could, as the ground was very hard; afterwards placed a record, and rebuilt the cairn.

432. *Captain Beechey*.—How far away from the centre of the cairn did you dig?

Captain Ommanney.—Immediately under.

433. *Captain Beechey*.—You are aware that it was an arrangement of Sir John Franklin, in another expedition, to bury his information at a distance from the pile. Did you dig in any direction from it?

Captain Ommanney.—I did not know of such an arrangement. We walked round about the cairn for some distance, carefully examining the ground. After we had spent the whole of the day in searching Cape Riley and Beechey Island, a change took place in the ice; the wind had shifted northwards, and the ice was drifting out of the Wellington Channel. I was eight or ten miles from the ship, and the ice was coming out in such great masses that I was

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afraid of being separated from the ship. I returned in the tender, and joined the ship, with the intention of making another examination on the following day. That examination was made on the 24th by Lieutenant M'Clintock; that was at Cape Riley; for I had no implements for digging about Cape Riley when I was there on the previous day.

434. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider that the examination of the whole of the winter quarters of Sir John Franklin was so complete as to leave an impression on your mind that no record was left there?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, I do, from all I have heard from Captain Austin and the officers of both expeditions that were there.

435. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you form any opinion of Sir John Franklin having quitted his winter quarters hastily?

Captain Ommanney.—I have often thought of it. The number of things left there induced me to think that he left hastily or intended to return home.

436. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you know the number of coal bags found there?

Captain Ommanney.—No; but I think naval officers prosecuting would not have left such things there. I would not have left so many things behind.

437. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—It appears, on reference to the journals, that your exploring parties suffered more from frost-bites than either Lieutenant M'Clintock's or Captain Penny's. Can you assign any reason for that?

Captain Ommanney.—The temperature was lower; we had worse weather, more wind; we were a longer time confined to our tents; for two or three days at a time I could not show my face outside the tent.

438. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Was there any difference of clothing?

Captain Ommanney.—No, the clothing was the same.

439. *Sir E. Parry.*—In Captain Austin's instructions from the Admiralty their Lordships desire that he will render to Captain Penny any aid and assistance in his power, so far as he may be able to do so without risk of crippling the resources of the vessels under his own command. Are you of opinion that Captain Austin fully complied with those instructions?

Captain Ommanney.—Most fully.

440. *Sir E. Parry.*—Having had some experience of steam vessels in the navigation of the ice, is it your opinion that they afford an opportunity of prolonging the season of navigation in those seas comparatively with sailing vessels?

Captain Ommanney.—No, not if all seasons were like the autumn of 1850.

441. *Sir E. Parry.*—Why are you of that opinion?

Captain Ommanney.—I was on board the "Intrepid" on one occasion when the engines brought up, and on inquiry being made it was found that the injection cocks were choked by an accumulation of ice in them. I was sent down to look towards Cape Walker. The engines were going at full speed with all sail set, which would have propelled the vessel in open water seven or eight knots an hour. Our way was almost stopped by this young ice forming on the surface of the water.

442. *Sir E. Parry.*—About what thickness might that young ice be, when you were stopped on that occasion?

Captain Ommanney.—Not more than six inches.

443. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know what was about the temperature of the atmosphere at that time?

Captain Ommanney.—About fifteen above zero.

444. *Captain Beechey.*—The ice that impeded your progress on that occasion, —was it ice or sludge?

Captain Ommanney.—Sludge, not more than six inches thick.

445. *Captain Beechey.*—How low down were your injection cocks?

Captain Ommanney.—About six feet below the surface of the water. They were choked up.

446. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then, Captain Ommanney, you are distinctly of opinion that the season of navigation in these seas is not likely to be prolonged by the use of steam vessels?

Captain Ommanney.—Certainly not. Another reason is, that if you could

use steam vessels, still the men could not be exposed to the severity of the climate. The hawsers could not be used. They become under such circumstances as stiff as bars of iron.

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447. *Captain Beechey.*—On the 11th of August a letter was delivered to Captain Austin by Captain Penny in the cabin of the “Lady Franklin,” in which he says, “and I can only judge when I see Wellington Channel what course I shall then pursue.” You had overheard the previous conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin. What, in your opinion, did that expression refer to?

Captain Ommanney.—I remember a letter being given to Captain Austin which was not considered an answer to the question Captain Austin had put, and it was returned to Captain Penny. The letter was read at the time; but there was nothing in it that made an impression on my mind.

The letter which appears in the Evidence, page 35, was then put in, and read.

448. *Sir G. Back.*—Was that the letter you heard read?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes. There was nothing in it that impressed my mind, except that it was not a distinct answer.

449. *Captain Beechey.*—Are you of opinion that at that time Captain Penny entertained any opinions in regard to that strait which he would have expressed under different circumstances?

Captain Ommanney.—I do not understand what other circumstances there could be, because Captain Austin was frequently asking him for his opinions.

450. *Captain Beechey.*—It is implied in that letter that Captain Penny delivered an opinion which was not his real opinion. Do you believe that Captain Penny had any reserved opinion?

Captain Ommanney.—No, I do not, because his answer to Captain Austin’s inquiry was so very decided.

451. *Captain Beechey.*—He says, “When I see Wellington Channel I shall be able to judge what course I shall pursue.” It is implied by Captain Penny that he had expressed some opinions to Captain Austin which were not agreeable to him. Do you know anything of it?

Captain Ommanney.—No.

452. *Captain Beechey.*—He had not expressed then in your hearing any opinion to Captain Austin as to the advisability of going up Wellington Channel?

Captain Ommanney.—In the evening I accompanied Captain Austin to Captain Penny’s for a reply, which Captain Penny seemed disinclined to give. Captain Austin remonstrated, and after some discussion Captain Penny agreed to give it.

The Committee then adjourned.

Fifth Day. October 31, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain F. W. Beechey,
Captain Sir George Back,
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR JOHN ROSS called.

*Rear-Admiral
Sir John Ross.*

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453. *Chairman.*—I believe you wintered at the same spot as Captain Penny's expedition?

Sir John Ross.—Yes.

454. *Chairman.*—And you had a personal knowledge of everything that occurred during the winter and spring to the expedition?

Sir John Ross.—Certainly.

455. *Chairman.*—When did you first hear of the discovery of the open water to the north of Wellington Strait in May 1851?

Sir John Ross.—It was on the 2d of June 1851. I have here Captain Penny's letter giving me the information.

456. *Chairman.*—Was it not in May when the open water was discovered?

Sir John Ross.—Captain Penny's letter is dated the 2d of June. He mentioned the circumstance before that. I think it must have been about the last of May.

457. *Chairman.*—When did you hear of his subsequent proceedings,—when he took the boat and launched into the open water?

Sir John Ross.—It must have been in the first week of July.

458. *Chairman.*—What was the impression on your mind at the time, as to the state of that open water? Did it appear to you from what you heard, that it was an open and navigable sea, and that there was any probability that Sir John Franklin passed that way?

Sir John Ross.—No.

459. *Chairman.*—State your reasons?

Sir John Ross.—Other water of the same description was found in another part, occasioned by the rapidity of the tide coming into these great channels.

460. *Chairman.*—Do you consider that Captain Austin would have been justified in continuing the expedition in the hope of penetrating the water so discovered?

Sir John Ross.—Certainly not. Captain Austin and Captain Penny were both right in coming home; there was no chance of doing any good at that time.

461. *Chairman.*—Can you give the Committee any information on the subject of that report of the loss and murder of the crew of Sir John Franklin's ships that you received from Adam Beck?

Sir John Ross.—I did not consider it to be true after Peterson had contra-

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dicted it; but after Beck had been discharged, and swore that it was true, and being authorized by the Resident at Godhavn to say that he believed it, I believe it to be true also.

462. *Chairman.*—Do you continue to believe it to be true, that that occurrence took place?

Sir John Ross.—Most certainly I do.

463. *Chairman.*—Upon the faith of what Adam Beck has said?

Sir John Ross.—Yes.

464. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the examination took place by Captain Austin and the officers of his expedition?

Sir John Ross.—I was not present then.

465. *Chairman.*—Are you aware of what passed at that time?

Sir John Ross.—Perfectly.

466. *Chairman.*—And you are aware that they (Captain Austin and his officers) are of an entirely different opinion?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, and that they all believe that Adam Beck had been telling a story. I believed so at the time, and I wrote home to that effect. I believed that he was not telling the truth until he was sworn. When he came home, he came and voluntarily made his depositions. The Resident at Godhavn informed me that this man was born in Greenland, had been brought up to the Christian religion by the missionaries, that he had never known a man under these circumstances speaking falsely, and that he believed every word he said was true. Speaking of Peterson, Captain Humble, of a Danish ship, said he had written to his wife, stating that he had made an excellent bargain with Captain Penny; that he would winter in some snug place; that he would have plenty of money to get himself and his wife home to Copenhagen, and desired his wife to sell his things to enable him to go. In another letter, either by himself or his wife to her sister, who is married to one of the mates, a hope was expressed that Peterson would go to England, because the Government would be obliged to pay him two winters instead of one, and that he would come out with Captain Penny next year and be able to go to Copenhagen. I asked the Resident about Peterson. He said he was a man who was dissatisfied with his situation, and said that he did not care whether the Government gave him leave or not, because he would go back to Copenhagen.

467. *Chairman.*—Did you bring home any depositions of Adam Beck?

Sir John Ross.—Yes; I brought home his depositions, and sent them to the Hudson's Bay Company, who sent them to Copenhagen to be translated. There is every reason to believe they will be returned in the course of a month. I know that the depositions were to be sent for translation to persons in Copenhagen well qualified to perform the duty.

468. *Chairman.*—Have you anything further to communicate that you think interesting on the subject of the search for Sir John Franklin?

Sir John Ross.—I consider it will be of no use going into the Wellington Channel until there has been a favourable winter previously. The navigation of the Arctic seas mainly depends upon the previous winter, which has not been duly thought of by Arctic navigators. Unless there is a mild winter this year it will be quite useless to go out there. Captain Austin towed my vessel to the mouth of Wellington Channel. I went up and saw the barrier of ice. It was just as it was the year before, and it will remain there until there is a mild season to melt it. The great mistake, in my opinion, is, that they have not sufficiently studied the previous winter. When I went last (expedition of 1829), my only object in proceeding after the meeting of the store ships was on account of my letters from Sweden and Denmark having assured me that there never had been so mild a winter. When I went to Holsteinberg, the clergyman, who had been resident there twenty years, told me he had kept a comparative account of the temperature, and found that when it was mild in Baffin's Bay it was mild in Denmark, and that when it was severe at Baffin's Bay it was severe in Denmark. He added that it would depend upon the previous winter what success we should have in Baffin's Bay. I think, therefore, that in all such expeditions it is highly advisable,—absolutely

necessary indeed,—to consult the previous winter. I have been fourteen times frozen up, and I have examined the records of Sweden, Russia, and Denmark. I have invariably found that when there is a mild winter in these parts there is the same mild winter in the parallel latitudes throughout the globe. With respect to Adam Beck's report, that is a thing very easily ascertained any year, for an expedition might sail in June and be back in October.

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469. *Chairman.*—What measures would you take to ascertain the truth or falsehood of Adam Beck's relation?

Sir John Ross.—I should send an expedition consisting of two small vessels with a steamer in the month of June, which might ascertain it and return in the month of October. This might be done any year.

470. *Chairman.*—But to whom would you apply for information?

Sir John Ross.—I would carry an interpreter with me. It is absolutely necessary that some person should go who understands the Danish language, for the way in which they speak to Greenlanders is in Danish, and then they answer in the language of Greenland, I used to speak to my interpreter in Danish, and I believe I am the only officer in the navy who speaks Danish.

471. *Chairman.*—Do you think the best way would be to apply to the Danish governor at Disco?

Sir John Ross.—Yes; for an order to send some person with an expedition to determine that question, and the Danish Government should be applied to.

472. *Chairman.*—You think that when the translation is received in England it will throw considerable additional light upon the subject?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, I do think so, most certainly.

473. *Chairman.*—Did you understand that Captain Penny had urged Captain Austin to persevere in an endeavour to go up through Wellington Strait in 1851, with a view to continue the search after Sir John Franklin's expedition?

Sir John Ross.—I did not.

474. *Chairman.*—Do you think you should have known if Captain Penny had so urged Captain Austin?

Sir John Ross.—I think I should have known it. What Captain Penny said to me was, that if the ice broke up in the channel, that he could do a great deal with a steamer; but it was conditionally, if the ice broke up; and he once mentioned that if this was the case, he would apply for a steamer to assist him, but he did not say that it was to Captain Austin he would apply. To apply to Captain Austin would have been absurd, for none of his officers could do duty under Captain Penny. It was quite evident then that there was no probability of a steamer, or anything else, getting up Wellington Channel. I went up after Captain Austin cast me off, and saw the barrier that had been there all the year before, and there is no doubt that it is there now.

475. *Captain Beechey.*—You are aware that Captain Penny reported the discovery of a large space of open water in the Queen's Channel, and that he had not gone to the extent of the open water or examined the shores around it, except those which bordered on the south-east part of it. Taking this state of things into your consideration, is it your opinion that the examination of the further part of the strait was necessary?

Sir John Ross.—It was unnecessary.

476. *Captain Beechey.*—Will you allow me to ask you what was the character of the barrier of ice in the Wellington Strait, whether it was old ice or not?

Sir John Ross.—I should say it was three years old.

477. *Captain Beechey.*—You said, that on sending out an expedition to that part, they had not sufficiently considered the importance of a mild previous winter. Whom do you mean by *they*?

Sir John Ross.—I mean the officers whom Government consulted.

478. *Captain Beechey.*—Then what means would you take of ascertaining if there had been a mild winter?

Sir John Ross.—I should ascertain it by sending to Denmark and Sweden.

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479. *Captain Beechey*.—Then two or three years must elapse before an expedition could reach?

Sir John Ross.—Oh no; it could reach the same year.

480. *Captain Beechey*.—Then you mean to say you would be guided by the winter in Denmark?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, certainly, by the previous winter at that place.

481. *Sir E. Parry*.—Will you state what you know about the piece of wood and the piece of tin, said to have been found by Adam Beck on the shore of the harbour in which Sir John Franklin's expedition is supposed to have wintered?

Sir John Ross.—Adam Beck found that piece two days after the other ships had left the bay. The piece of wood was four feet nine inches long, and three inches by four square. On the top it had been cut with a saw, and in that was a piece of tin. I saw that piece of tin. Adam Beck was carrying it along, when the tin dropped out and sunk into the snow which was very deep at the time; it could not afterwards be found. The man has sworn that on this piece of tin was "September 1846."

482. *Captain Beechey*.—Did I understand you to say you saw the tin?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, I saw him bringing the tin along with my spyglass. I was about a quarter of a mile away. This was on the north-east side of Union Bay. I considered it to be a meridian mark. There was a cairn that it had fallen from.

483. *Sir E. Parry*.—Will you point out where you were with the spyglass when you saw it?

Sir John Ross.—I was fast to the ice in the place I have marked on the chart.

484. *Sir E. Parry*.—Can Adam Beck read English well?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, he can read it perfectly well, and write it.

485. *Chairman*.—Then what date did Adam Beck assign for the loss of Sir John Franklin's ships?

Sir John Ross.—He said it was in the winter; he could not say the month; they have no names for months.

486. *Sir George Back*.—Did he say what part of the winter?

Sir John Ross.—No; I do not think that was asked him.

487. *Chairman*.—Do you consider that the search after records in the wintering place of the Erebus and Terror in 1845-46 was so complete, that there is no probability of any records deposited there having been overlooked or left behind?

Sir John Ross.—That is possible but not probable. There is a tin containing some lines of poetry that I left on the top of the hill above Leopold Harbour, and although a hundred men have been there since it has never been found, and it is there yet. Almost all the ships companies of the Investigator and Enterprise have been there, and have never found it.

488. *Chairman*.—Do you consider that Cape Riley was also sufficiently searched for records or anything else that might have been left behind?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, I think a very strict search was made. There was a cairn, but there was nothing in it.

489. *Chairman*.—Do you think the cairn consisting of tin canisters on Beechey Island was sufficiently searched?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, I think so. I conceive that there having been no records left may be considered a proof that Sir John Franklin had given up all hope of proceeding further, had determined on proceeding home, and was lost. I think he was lost by getting into packed ice as Sir James Ross got into. That is one reason why I think Adam Beck's story probable. I agreed with Sir John Franklin before he went away that if he advanced he was to leave notices where he was going, and to make deposits. I did not require that the Government should make these deposits, but that Sir John Franklin should make them out of his own resources, as I did. I said to him, "I shall most likely be the person to come out for you if you are missed, so that we will

understand that you are to leave deposits at Cornwallis Island and Melville Island. State what your intentions are. If you do not leave anything I shall conclude that you are returning home, and that you consider it would be of no use to leave notices."

*Rear-Admiral
Sir John Ross.*

31st Oct. 1851.

490. *Chairman.*—Did Adam Beck say anything about the time the ships were lost?

Sir John Ross.—He said, upon his examination, he would be prepared to produce articles belonging to the vessels which would prove them to be Government ships, and that he was ready to go with the Government expedition. He is at present living at Holsteinberg on the western coast of Greenland. I should add that the class of persons to whom he belongs are perfectly insane when drunk.

491. *Chairman.*—Do you think there is a reasonable probability of Adam Beck being found to fulfil his promises by any expedition that may be sent next year?

Sir John Ross.—No doubt he would be found at Holsteinberg if sent for.

492. *Chairman.*—Do you know whether Captain Austin provided Captain Penny with every assistance in his power consistently with the safety of his own expedition?

Sir John Ross.—I think he did.

493. *Admiral Funshawe.*—Do you know to what extent Sir John Franklin's exploring parties had gone in any direction from their wintering quarters?

Sir John Ross.—I think they were traced up the Wellington Channel about thirty miles. They were upon sledges.

494. *Sir George Back.*—On which side?

Sir John Ross.—On the east side of the Wellington Strait.

495. *Chairman.*—Have you made any report of your proceedings?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, to the Hudson's Bay Company.

496. *Chairman.*—Will you furnish the Committee with a copy of it?

Sir John Ross.—The Hudson's Bay Company have already furnished the Admiralty with it.

497. *Sir George Back.*—From your experience in the Arctic seas do you think it likely that sufficient provision could be obtained, in any case, to support such a party as Sir John Franklin's, more particularly in the neighbourhood of the Wellington Strait and Channel?

Sir John Ross.—Most certainly not.

498. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you make any observations by which you could ascertain which way the flood tide probably came?

Sir John Ross.—We made no observations of that kind up the Wellington Channel.

499. *Captain Beechey.*—May I ask whether you found the tides to be much affected by the wind?

Sir John Ross.—There was a regular tide no doubt, but that tide was accelerated or retarded by the action of the wind.

500. *Admiral Funshawe.*—During your experience in the navigation of these seas did you generally find the leads open on the eastern and northern shores of channels first?

Sir John Ross.—Yes, generally on the eastern shores, and upon the north side of Baffin's Bay particularly.

501. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you receive from Captain Austin every assistance you required consistently with his own resources and the safety of his own expedition?

Sir John Ross.—I certainly did.

502. *Chairman.*—Do you think that everything that was possible was done by the joint expeditions?

Sir John Ross.—I think that everything that could be done in that season was done.

Rear-Admiral
Sir John Ross.
31st Oct. 1851.

503. *Chairman*.—Do you think that anything was left undone?
Sir John Ross.—Nothing. I think Captain Penny and Captain Austin were quite justified in coming home.

504. *Chairman*.—And you think that during the time they continued the search, they did all they could?

Sir John Ross.—I think they did everything that men could do.

Capt. Ommanney.

CAPTAIN OMMANNEY recalled: Examination continued.

505. *Captain Beechey*.—With reference to my question 452. yesterday, which was, "Captain Penny did not express in your hearing any opinion to Captain Austin as to the advisability of going up Wellington Channel." What is your answer to that?

Captain Ommanney.—I never heard any.

506. *Captain Beechey*.—In Captain Austin's letter of the 11th of August 1850 mention is made of some reports on the authority of Adam Beck. Do you believe in them?

Captain Ommanney.—No. I was present during the transaction at Cape York and Wolstenholme Sound in August 1850, and was satisfied the report was untrue. Referring to my letter sent to the Admiralty, I said "I abstained from making any reference to the story raised by Sir John Ross's interpreter, as I considered that the matter had been completely placed at rest after my subsequent examination of the natives with Captain York and Penny on the 14th, of which you were informed, and more particularly finding that the "North Star" had wintered amongst these people without hearing of the circumstance; but I did not put any faith in the report itself. I was with Captain Penny, and we investigated it very closely."

507. *Sir George Back*.—Then you do not believe Adam Beck's story?

Captain Ommanney.—No, I do not. I have a native Esquimaux with me, who will be able to give some information upon the subject, and his evidence will be interpreted, as he is one of the party with whom I communicated at Cape York when Beck was present.

508. *Sir E. Parry*.—What is the age of the Esquimaux you have brought home?

Captain Ommanney.—He is nineteen or twenty years of age.

509. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is he an intelligent young man?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, we all believe so. He is a person of observation, and is very quiet.

510. *Captain Beechey*.—You conducted an exploring party to the south-west, I believe? What were the limits of your journey?

Captain Ommanney.—I commanded the division of sledges which proceeded to examine the coasts to the southward and westward of Cape Walker, and I was absent sixty days under great privations. From our winter quarters we went to Cape Walker across the ice, and thence I traced the coast to the west and south-west until I came to the gulf at the north-west extreme in $73^{\circ} 5'$ north, and longitude $101^{\circ} 55'$ W. When I crossed this I could not see the bottom of the gulf. I considered it my duty to ascertain what it was, and I found that it terminated in the gulf. On my return I made the circuit of this deep gulf which I had crossed the neck of on my outward journey.

511. *Captain Beechey*.—What was the state of the ice generally along that shore?

Captain Ommanney.—It was very heavy fixed ice; I considered a great portion of it had been fixed several years. Some pieces which pressed upon this coast must have been forty feet thick.

512. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you search minutely every part of the coast for traces of Sir John Franklin?

Captain Ommanney.—Most minutely.

513. *Captain Beechey*.—And is it your opinion, after your search, that Sir John Franklin did not pass that way?

Captain Ommanney.—I do not think he passed that way.

514. *Captain Beechey*.—Have you stated in your report every thing that would be useful in a further search, if desirable to renew it?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, I believe I have told all.

Capt. Ommanney

31st Oct. 1851.

515. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days longer do you consider your exploring party could have continued their labours under similar privations and difficulties?

Captain Ommanney.—Ten or twenty days longer.

516. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Had the provisions and fuel you took with you been expended could you have found other means of maintaining life?

Captain Ommanney.—None whatever.

517. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—You have expressed to us one of two opinions you have formed that Sir John Franklin's expedition may have passed through the Wellington Straits to the north-west. Supposing that to have been the case, do you now, from your experience in the Polar seas and in Arctic navigation, consider that if these people (Sir John Franklin's) had been obliged to quit their ships, any of them could be now alive in those regions looking for rescue?

Captain Ommanney.—Not one of them. I do not believe any of them could be alive.

518. *Captain Beechey*.—In your excursion from the ships to your south-western extreme did you see any tracks of animals?

Captain Ommanney.—I saw traces of rein-deer at about 74° N., and some down at the bottom of the gulf.

519. *Sir George Back*.—Under these circumstances, you could not have procured food?

Captain Ommanney.—Certainly not. I only shot three brace of ptarmigan during the whole sixty days. I did not even see the track of a bear along the whole of the coast which I travelled,—a proof of the absence of animal life.

520. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the land you discovered to the southward of Cape Walker?

Captain Ommanney.—At Cape Walker the land is high, with precipitous cliffs. Proceeding south-west by west it declines and becomes very low. The whole of this land is of the same character, with shingle spits extending out into the sea.

521. *Chairman*.—You are fully conversant with the proceedings of the expeditions, not only of your own, but of Captain Penny's. What I wish to ask you in conclusion is, whether every thing was done by both expeditions that could be done, and whether anything was omitted that could be accomplished in furtherance of their instructions?

Captain Ommanney.—From all the circumstances, and from the position in which we were obliged to winter, I consider that more was done than the most sanguine of us ever anticipated. Before setting out travelling, the opinion was that any one going 200 miles in a direct line from the ship, or stopping out forty days, would be as much as any human beings could do. There was nothing omitted that could have been accomplished.

522. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think Captain Austin and Captain Penny were fully justified in coming home this autumn?

Captain Ommanney.—Fully justified.

523. *Captain Beechey*.—If Captain Penny had thought the Queen's Channel ought to have been further examined, taking into your consideration the provisions and the steam vessel left by Sir James Ross at Leopold Island, could he have waited longer than he did at the entrance of Wellington Channel to await any change that might have taken place in the ice, to prosecute the search he states he was so anxious for?

Captain Ommanney.—From all I know of his resources I think he could have remained out if he had wished and determined to do so. I am not aware of what his resources were, further than having heard that his expedition was supplied for three years.

Mr. Penny.

31st Oct. 1851.

CAPTAIN PENNY recalled.

524. *The Chairman (addressing Captain Penny)* said,—We told you yesterday that we could not allow such large additions to be made to your evidence as you had proposed to insert by way of correction; but you are now at liberty to explain any part of your evidence you may wish?

Captain Penny proceeded as follows:—To the answer to the question on page 6, No. 62. beginning, "Instead of exciting yourself," &c., I wish to add these words, "Because I was too angry." To the answer to the question No. 70., commencing "What quantity of provisions did you consider," &c., I wish to add, "I was provided with no travelling equipment by the Admiralty. I had not one piece of spare wood on board my vessel; every bit of wood on board my expedition was used up in preparing my travelling equipment; therefore had that ice not cleared away I could have been of no further service to the search by continuing there, from the distance Sir John Franklin and his party must have been away." On page 7 the following question occurs, No. 80.: "Was the ice more or less broken in 1851?" At the commencement of the answer to the question I wish these words to be placed, "I cannot tell." At page 8 there is the following question, No. 85.: "When you started to come home did you contemplate asking for a steamer to go out again?" The addition I wish to make to the answer is, "On arriving at Aberdeen I mentioned it to Mrs. Penny." On page 8 the following question occurs, No. 86.: "Did you and your officers contemplate going out again?" The answer I have given only applies to my officers. At page 8 is the following question, No. 87.: "What made you propose it afterwards?" This does not imply that I did not think of this before, for I mentioned to my people, that if we got instructions and despatches at Disco, we should return to the search. I expected Mr. Saunders had landed his provisions there for the "North Star." In consequence of its coming on thick, and a little wind, we parted company with the "Sophia," he not being aware of my intention to come home. On page 8 is this question, No. 92.: "Do not you think *now* it would have been better to give a specific answer to Captain Austin's inquiry?" I wish to add to the answer already given these words, "Had Captain Austin not been present, I should have given another answer. I should have said, Most certainly, I am very sorry for it. I wish further to state, that when I was on board Captain Austin's ship, I laid my chart before him, and explained my ideas, that Sir John Franklin had pursued that route up Wellington Channel. At that time, I beg to state that Captain Ommanney was not present when this conversation took place. I was not long in his cabin, and I stated to Captain Austin that I requested a steamer to go up; of this I have no doubt. Lieutenant Aldrich, who was there on a visit, and was detained for three weeks previously, knew that it was my most anxious desire, if the channel opened, to go 500 miles further search, and that I never at any time changed my opinions in reference to Wellington Channel. At page 8 is the following question, No. 93.: "Suppose Captain Austin had died, nothing would have been in writing to pass to his second in command?" I wish to add to my answer that I did not consider the probability of Captain Austin dying, and I am sorry I gave Admiral Fanshawe that answer. On page 9 is the following question, No. 105.: "We do not expect any scientific matter beyond what you have given us with respect to the latitudes; but I may ask you whether you did this work yourself (*adverting to a chart which was placed on the table*)?" The answer was, "Captain Stewart did the great portion of it, but I was present when it was done." I wish to add to that these words: "This must not be understood that I could not make it myself, as their Lordships have charts of my construction, as have also the whalers, by which they have run for harbours in Cumberland Strait in a gale of wind." On page 10 I am asked, No. 110.: "Could you have stopped with the amount of provisions you had?" The answer I gave was, "Oh yes." I wish to add these words: "We could have lived on board our ships, but we could have done no good to the search." On page 10 is the following question, No. 112.: "How did you pick up that Captain Austin was coming home," &c. I wish to add to my answer,

"When I saw Sir John Ross taken in tow by Captain Austin, from this moment I was determined I should go home before him, and had great cause to be satisfied with the decision, for I had every reason to suppose that disrepute would be thrown upon what we had done, and I told this to my officers."

Mr. Penny.
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Sir E. Parry.—I wish to ask some questions upon this supplementary evidence, as it has led us completely into another train.

525. *Sir E. Parry, to Captain Penny.*—Is the Committee to understand, that had your own expedition been supplied with more provisions and other necessary resources, you would, on the 12th of August 1851, have remained at Wellington Strait, with a view of watching the ice there, and proceeding up to the north-westward if it opened, so as to risk another winter, under your existing instructions?

Captain Penny.—Not under my existing instructions.

526. *Sir E. Parry.*—Supposing you had got into Disco on your return, and had found abundance of resources and no further instructions, what would you have done then?

Captain Penny.—I should not have felt justified in returning to the search without further instructions.

527. *Sir E. Parry.*—When you left England on your expedition in 1850 were you acquainted with the proceedings of the former expedition under the orders of Captain Sir James Ross?

Captain Penny.—Yes, I was acquainted with them.

528. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you then aware of a considerable depôt of provisions and stores having been left by Sir James Ross at Port Leopold?

Captain Penny.—Yes, I was aware of that.

529. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did it ever occur to you to make use of these provisions to enable you to prolong your search?

Captain Penny.—Yes; I have often spoken of this depôt of provisions.

Captain Penny continued as follows:—During winter the steam launch left by Sir James Ross was frequently spoken of,—that if we got early clear, and I had been at ship all the time, and Barrow Strait opened,—we spoke of the steam launch, if it was possible to put her in order, to my armourer, but he said in consequence of the machinery being so long exposed it could not be put together in a way to be made useful.

530. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you examine it?

Captain Penny.—No, I did not examine it myself.

531. *Chairman.*—Do you recollect that in your journal of the 6th of August, before Captain Austin had joined you, you used this expression: "They are all so very anxious to get home," (that is, the crews of your vessels,) "as we have now no hope of being of any use to our missing countrymen, whose fate will for ever remain in obscurity"?

Captain Penny.—Yes. I felt convinced that they were so far beyond our reach, that with our means we could not reach them,—and the limited instructions we had.

532. *Sir E. Parry.*—You have stated in your letter to Captain Austin, dated the 4th of August 1851, that "the powerful rate the tide runs in the channels near the Queen's Channel, not less than six knots, renders it dangerous in a boat, much more a ship, unless clear of ice, which from the appearance of the ice here will not be clear this season." How do you reconcile that to the wish you have expressed to go up that season with a steamer?

Captain Penny.—When I returned I was very anxious about what more could have been done. I thought it was possible this ice might clear away, and that if we could get 500 miles further up there might be some further traces. I felt that in a short season of navigation that could only be accomplished with a steamer. Hence my anxiety to go up to pilot the steamer, being acquainted with the rapidity of the tides. I offered my assistance as pilot, because it would be less objectionable than asking for the command.

Mr. Penny.

31st Oct. 1851.

533. *Sir E. Parry.*—Are we to understand that you altered your opinion after you had written this letter on the 4th of August?

Captain Penny.—I was still anxious that something more was to be done, convinced that Sir John Franklin had pursued that route, and I was anxious that we should obtain further traces.

534. *Captain Beechey.*—You spoke to your people of the probability of returning to pursue the search, providing you got provisions at Disco. When did you make that known to the crew?

Captain Penny.—It was after we left Barrow's Straits.

435. *Captain Beechey.*—That is at variance with your amended evidence, in which you say that when you saw Sir John Ross in tow, you determined to be home first. Will you explain that, and then show how it was that you spoke to your people of the probability of returning, providing you got provisions at Disco? Do you mean that you determined to proceed home *if you did not find instructions at Disco?*

Captain Penny.—Yes, that was it.

536. *Sir G. Back.*—Did the idea of prosecuting the research for Sir John Franklin occur to you before you returned to England?

Captain Penny.—Yes, it did; it very often occurred to me.

Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL called.

537. *Chairman.*—You were first mate on the Lady Franklin, I believe?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes.

538. *Chairman.*—Be good enough to give us an account of what you observed in your exploring expedition. Were you out twice or once?

Mr. Marshall.—Once.

539. *Chairman.*—You were not with Captain Penny when he launched his boat?

Mr. Marshall.—No; Captain Penny was going up, and I was coming down.

540. *Chairman.*—Did you find any traces of the missing ships?

Mr. Marshall.—We found no traces. There was a good deal of drift wood. One piece was about fifteen feet long and about eighteen inches round. It was quite wasted.

541. *Chairman.*—What was the date of your proceeding from the ship on the first journey?

Mr. Marshall.—We started on the 17th of April, returned to ship, and then started again on the 6th of May.

542. *Chairman.*—Did you find any open water when you got above Wellington Strait?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes, a good deal.

543. *Chairman.*—What sort of open water did you consider it to be?

Mr. Marshall.—It was clear water as far as the eye could reach, with a small portion of ice along the shore. From "Goodsir's and Marshall's farthest" I could see to the northward as far as my eye could reach.

544. *Chairman.*—How many islands did you discover there?

Mr. Marshall.—I could not tell how many, but there were many islands there. We took it at first for one island, because it was at such a distance.

545. *Chairman.*—Do you consider this chart to be correct, as far as your knowledge and observation go?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes.

546. *Chairman.*—By what route did you return?

Mr. Marshall.—We returned by the same route, following the western shore, by Cornwallis Island.

547. *Chairman.*—Was that the only land journey you made?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes, it was.

Mr. Marshall.

31st Oct. 1851.

548. *Chairman.*—When was it you saw Wellington Strait last, the north end of it?

Mr. Marshall.—On the 1st of June.

549. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of the state and character of the ice in the strait itself? Did you think it fast ice, likely to remain in the channel, or that it might come away with a strong breeze from the northward?

Mr. Marshall.—I believe the whole of it was one year's ice.

550. *Chairman.*—You had an opportunity of looking at the whole of it on the west side?

Mr. Marshall.—Not any further than through the cracks, just to see the thickness.

551. *Chairman.*—What did you think the probable thickness?

Mr. Marshall.—Not more than four and a half or five feet.

552. *Chairman.*—Have you been much accustomed to ice?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes.

553. *Chairman.*—How many voyages have you made?

Mr. Marshall.—Thirty-one to that country.

554. *Sir E. Parry.*—And in command of ships?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes; I commanded a ship one time.

555. *Chairman.*—Give the Committee your opinion of the ice which prevented navigation through that strait. Do you think that it is a barrier that remains three or four years, or is it one that opens every year?

Mr. Marshall.—I look upon it that it is not open every year, but at stated seasons; it is pressed into Barrow's Straits by strong northerly winds.

556. *Chairman.*—Do you consider that the Wellington Strait was navigable in 1850?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes; in the latter part I consider it was navigable.

557. *Chairman.*—You think all the ice came out of that year?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes; I am quite certain of it.

558. *Sir E. Parry.*—What! after the navigable season closed did the ice come out?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes.

559. *Chairman.*—But would it have been possible for any vessel to go up?

Mr. Marshall.—Nothing but steam would go up when there were light winds. Sailing vessels would be of no use.

560. *Chairman.*—All the vessels must have been already blocked up in the ice before the strait broke up, consequently neither expedition could have gone up the strait again at that time?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes, that is right.

561. *Sir G. Back.*—Then for any available purpose of navigation the opening was of no use?

Mr. Marshall.—No, of no use whatever.

562. *Chairman.*—Do you think there was any appearance of the ice coming away when you left the strait on the 12th of August 1851?

Mr. Marshall.—Well, I could not say, for I did not see the ice for about five weeks before that.

563. *Sir G. Back.*—Was there much floe ice at the entrance to Wellington Channel?

Mr. Marshall.—It was all floe.

564. *Sir G. Back.*—What was the size of the ice at the largest floe in 1850?

Mr. Marshall.—It was a floe piece as far as the eye could reach, from side to side.

565. *Sir E. Parry.*—What breadth of ice do you think remained in Wellington Channel when you left in 1850?

Mr. Marshall.—Not more than fifty miles.

Mr. Marshall.
 31st Oct. 1851.

566. *Sir E. Parry.*—But you could not see water over that?
Mr. Marshall.—Oh yes; it was very high land.
567. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what point of land did you see it?
Mr. Marshall.—I did not see it myself.
568. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What do you consider was the height of the land at the farthest point?
Mr. Marshall.—From 500 to 600 feet.
569. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How far do you think you saw the open water?
Mr. Marshall.—I think I saw sixty miles from that height.
570. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you think you saw the two islands marked Barrow and Parker Islands in the chart?
Mr. Marshall.—I might have seen them, but I did not know them from the body of land. I saw land as far as my eye could see in that direction.
571. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you keep any register of the state of the temperature?
Mr. Marshall.—Yes; it was kept on board the *Sophia*.
572. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—But in your journeys had you a thermometer?
Mr. Marshall.—Dr. Goodsir had one.
573. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you know on the day you turned back from Marshall's farthest point what was the state of the temperature?
Mr. Marshall.—No; but it was very warm.
574. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the date?
Mr. Marshall.—The 1st of June.
575. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any birds?
Mr. Marshall.—Yes, ducks and some others.
576. *Sir G. Back.*—Any animals?
Mr. Marshall.—Two days I had the opportunity of seeing rein-deer. I saw 20 on the first day and 19 on the second.
577. *Sir G. Back.*—Could you have got within shot of them?
Mr. Marshall.—Oh yes.
578. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider from your observation that there is a free channel to the north-west?
Mr. Marshall.—That I can hardly answer, but from what I know I think there is.
579. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you ever been employed in steam vessels?
Mr. Marshall.—No, always in sailing vessels.
580. *Captain Beechey.*—In the strait where you have been, Queen Victoria Channel, the tides are of interest. Did you take notice of the tides in that channel?
Mr. Marshall.—Yes, but I paid no particular attention to them, only just sufficient to ascertain which way they were going.
581. *Captain Beechey.*—Was there a rise and fall of the water?
Mr. Marshall.—Yes, between five and six feet.
582. *Captain Beechey.*—At what time of the moon was it, near the spring or otherwise?
Mr. Marshall.—Dr. Goodsir will answer that question.
583. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you notice any stream in the channel?
Mr. Marshall.—Yes, the stream went westward.
584. *Captain Beechey.*—Did it run fast or slow?
Mr. Marshall.—Three or four knots.
585. *Captain Beechey.*—When the water was rising, which way did the stream run?
Mr. Marshall.—I think it came from the eastward; but I cannot positively say.

586. *Captain Beechey*.—Are you tolerably confident of that?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes, I think so.

Mr. Marshall

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587. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you notice whether one stream ran longer than the other?

Mr. Marshall.—I consider that the water ran longer to the westward, tide and half tide.

588. *Captain Beechey*.—From what point did you make your observations?

Mr. Marshall.—From "Goodsir's and Marshall's farthest."

589. *Chairman*.—You are aware it has been said, that if the expeditions had not come away, it is very possible the ice might have broken up, and they might have proceeded through this new channel above Wellington Strait, which is called Queen's Channel. Do you think there was any probability after the twelfth of August of such an event occurring?

Mr. Marshall.—I was not there long enough to tell how the ice was. All I can say is, that it was open last year (1850), but I cannot venture to say whether it will be open this year.

590. *Chairman*.—In point of fact, do you consider that you came away too soon, and that you ought to have staid longer?

Mr. Marshall.—We might have staid there a considerable time longer, but we could not have gone up the channel, as far as I could see. I do not see how we could have got up, even if we had stopped longer.

591. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—If you had been master of the vessel, wishing to proceed to the northward in that direction, and you had seen the ice sufficiently clear, as in some years, would you have thought there was any difficulty in navigating the channel above?

Mr. Marshall.—Not the slightest difficulty as far as eye could see; so long as there was clear water there could be no difficulty in navigating a vessel.

592. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you see any floating ice drifting with the current?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes.

593. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you form any idea of the strength of the current from that floating ice?

Mr. Marshall.—I saw the ice going on the face of the water two knots.

594. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How was the wind then?

Mr. Marshall.—It was from the westward, and the ice was going against it.

595. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you one of the officers who examined the winter quarters of Sir John Franklin at Beechey Island?

Mr. Marshall.—I was not there. It was my duty to attend to the ship.

596. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you at Cape Riley?

Mr. Marshall.—No.

597. *Captain Beechey*.—Can you call to mind, when the water was falling there, which way was the current?

Mr. Marshall.—It was going to the eastward, if I recollect rightly. I made no particular observation of it.

598. *Sir E. Parry*.—Considering all the circumstances that have come to your knowledge of the expeditions, which way do you think Sir John Franklin went from Beechey Island?

Mr. Marshall.—I think he went up Wellington Channel. That was always my thought.

599. *Sir G. Back*.—On what do you ground that opinion?

Mr. Marshall.—The year before, as I suppose, he had seen the water, and then he went up there. That is my opinion.

600. *Sir G. Back*.—Then you think that water was open in 1846?

Mr. Marshall.—I cannot undertake to say. I have no doubt it is open at certain points every year.

Mr. Marshall.
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601. *Sir G. Back.*—In your opinion, that barrier of ice was not more than one year old, none of two or three years?

Mr. Marshall.—It is all ice of one year.

602. *Captain Beechey.*—Is it your impression that the open water in Queen's Channel is there every year, and that it is kept open by strong tides?

Mr. Marshall.—Yes, by the strength of the tides; at least, I suppose so.

The Committee then adjourned until Monday.

Sixth Day. November 3, 1851

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman.
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,
 Captain F. W. Beechey,
 Captain Sir George Back,
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

COMMANDER C. G. PHILLIPS called.

*Commander
 C. G. Phillips.*

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603. *Chairman.*—I believe you were second in command of Sir John Ross's vessel "Felix?"

Commander Phillips.—Yes, I was.

604. *Chairman.*—You wintered at the same spot as Captain Penny's expedition?

Commander Phillips.—Yes, we did.

605. *Chairman.*—Had you a personal knowledge of everything that occurred during the winter and the spring of that season?

Commander Phillips.—Yes, I had.

606. *Chairman.*—When did you first hear of the open water to the north of Wellington Strait, which was discovered in May 1851?

Commander Phillips.—On my return from land travelling, which was on the 16th of June 1851, I was informed that Captain Penny had returned to Assistance Bay, in consequence of having discovered water. He had returned to his own ships, prepared a boat, and started again.

607. *Chairman.*—When did you hear of any subsequent proceedings after he had taken the boat and launched it in the open water?

Commander Phillips.—Not until his return.

608. *Chairman.*—What was the impression on your mind after hearing that account? Did it appear to you to be an open and navigable sea, and that Sir John Franklin had passed that way?

Commander Phillips.—I heard very little upon the matter, for there was so much reserve on the part of Captain Penny's officers that I abstained from putting any questions, and as much as possible stopped away. All I know of Captain Penny's proceedings I have gleaned from the newspapers, and from the track chart of his discoveries which he was good enough to send to Sir John Ross.

609. *Chairman.*—Then you can give the Committee no information further than what you have heard and read?

Commander Phillips.—No, I cannot. As I have stated, there was so much reserve on the part of Captain Penny's officers that I abstained from putting any questions to them. I heard that Captain Stewart and Dr. Goodsir had been stopped by open water, and that Captain Penny had searched the islands that he had discovered (Baillie Hamilton, and others).

610. *Chairman.*—Then you are not able to give any positive answer to my question?

Commander Phillips.—Certainly not; I am not sufficiently well informed upon the subject.

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611. *Chairman.*—Do you consider, from all you have heard, that Captain Austin would have been justified in remaining there with the expedition, in the hope of penetrating up the channel so discovered?

Commander Phillips.—I think that the Wellington Channel is only clear once in a few years. I think that Captain Austin would not have been justified in prosecuting the search up the Wellington Strait and the seas beyond it without more positive evidence that Sir John Franklin had gone that way.

612. *Chairman.*—Can you give the Committee any information on the subject of the report in circulation with reference to the loss and murder of Sir John Franklin, and which you received from Adam Beck?

Commander Phillips.—Yes. I took Adam Beck on shore on 13th August 1850, on Cape York, when all the vessels were off there, except Captain Penny's. Captain Ommanney had landed from the "Intrepid," and Captain Forsyth from the "Prince Albert," about half an hour previously. They were in communication with three natives when I arrived in the "Felix's" boat with Adam Beck. A conversation took place between the natives and Adam Beck; but there was no emotion visible in the countenances of Adam Beck or any of the natives to induce me to think that there was anything they were anxious to report; so much so, that I remarked to Captain Ommanney, "Well, it is pretty clear that no vessel has been wrecked in this neighbourhood;" and we all quitted in the "Intrepid," to overtake our several vessels. Captain Ommanney got on board of his ship, and we proceeded in tow towards Captain Austin and the "Felix." I was on board the "Intrepid," endeavouring to rejoin my own ship. For six or seven hours Adam Beck never came near me to make signs, or to manifest that he had any information to disclose. About seven or eight o'clock I thought I should be better lodged on board Captain Forsyth's vessel, there being no chance of getting on board my own vessel for some time, and I dropped on board. Adam Beck came on board the same vessel, and found a man who spoke a good deal of Esquimaux. His name was John Smith, steward of the "Prince Albert." This man almost immediately afterwards came to Captain Forsyth, and, looking aghast, as you may suppose, he told us he had just been informed by Adam Beck that in the year 1846, when snow was falling, two ships (not whalers) had been broken by the ice in the direction beyond Cape Dudley Digges. The officers, he said, wore epaulettes and gold bands; and that they had guns, but no balls. Some of the crew were drowned, others lived in tents apart from the natives, and were eventually killed with darts and arrows. The figures were written very plainly by Adam Beck, and showed that snow was falling at the time. On receiving this information, Captain Ommanney was immediately hailed. The "Prince Albert" was in tow of the "Assistance," the "Assistance" being in tow of her steam tender, the "Intrepid." Captain Ommanney was immediately hailed, and Captain Forsyth and myself thought it was not proper to hail any intelligence of this story, but to ask him to come on board the "Prince Albert." He was made acquainted with this statement, and resolved immediately to cast off his own ship, and proceed in the "Intrepid," with Captain Forsyth, myself, and Adam Beck, and the steward who was the interpreter. We accordingly proceeded in the steamer as fast as we could to overtake Captain Austin. As soon as it was practicable, signals were made to the "Resolute," and at about one or two o'clock in the morning we had all assembled in Captain Austin's cabin. Sir John Ross came on board too. I reported to him, as my superior, and he immediately went on board Captain Austin's ship. Captain Austin was made acquainted with the circumstances. Captain Penny was recalled, and on the subsequent day I was left in charge of the "Felix" off the Crimson Cliffs near Dudley Digges. Then an investigation took place that I am not cognizant of. Sir John Ross, Captain Ommanney, and Captain Penny went back to Cape York and investigated the subject. On Sir John Ross returning after the second investigation, he told me there was some mistake, for that the story was now that one ship had been wintering round Cape Dudley Digges. The squadron having arrived off Cape Dudley Digges, Captain Austin hailed the "Felix," and asked Sir John Ross what he wished to do. Sir John said he should like to proceed into Wolstenholme Sound, to pursue this inquiry with Captain Ommanney, and the "Felix" was taken in tow by the "Assistance" and her tender, and these three vessels proceeded towards Wolstenholme Sound, Captain Austin and his tender and the "Prince

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Albert" going away to Lancaster Sound and Ponds Bay. Captain Ommanney was detached to investigate the truth of this report, and Sir John Ross took the advantage of the steam tow that was offered to us so kindly to go also. Having arrived off the entrance of Wolstenholme Sound, Captain Ommanney and myself and Adam Beck, and a young native called Erasmus York, embarked on board the "Intrepid," leaving the "Assistance" and the "Felix" outside of Wolstenholme Sound. We proceeded up the sound about five miles,—about halfway,—when we observed from the vessel some Esquimaux huts, two or three in number. We landed there, and the first things we saw were some preserved meat tins, bits of hoop, and undoubted evidence of a Queen's ship having been there. As we were still anxious about this massacre report, we were very much excited, and a very careful search was made in the neighbourhood. The huts were examined, and either in the first or second hut that we examined, I am not sure which, there were decomposing remains of human beings, which we were able to satisfy ourselves were Esquimaux, and Erasmus York manifested a great deal of emotion when an attempt was made to strip one of the bodies. It was covered with something like a blanket. He lifted up his hands, and cried piteously, when he found we intended to strip the body. From what we heard from Adam Beck, we understood that the body was that of Erasmus York's brother. A harpoon and a bow were lying by the side of him. We were convinced that they were not Europeans, and therefore Captain Ommanney would not allow the bodies to be disturbed. Two or three clusters of huts were examined in this way. The steamer then proceeded further up the sound, and we saw three well built cairns, (mounds of stone about twelve feet in height,) the best built cairns I ever saw, and which must have taken a great deal of time and labour to put up. The first cairn was opened in my presence and that of Captain Ommanney, and we were all very much excited. Adam Beck was standing by at this time. The preserved meat tin was discovered in due course. It was secreted in the cairn. A paper was taken out of it, which I have since read in print. I have a memorandum of it, but I have not the original document with me. It was a memorandum from Mr. Saunders of the "North Star," stating that his ship had been beset on the 29th of July. The most important part that struck me in connexion with Adam Beck's story was reported to me by one of the officers. I did not hear it myself. As reported to me, Adam Beck used these words, "Adam Beck no good. I lie." After that we proceeded in a boat to examine cairns about two miles off, in another position. That was examined, and there we found a counterpart of the paper that we found in the first cairn. There then remained the third cairn to be examined, near the graves of the "North Star" people. Captain Ommanney and myself went, but Adam Beck wandered away, I imagined under the influence of shame. The third cairn contained a statement to the same effect as discovered in the two first. It was to mark the spot where the poor men of the "North Star" crew had been buried. Adam Beck would not come down to the boat, and we had to go off to the steamer without him. I was a little uneasy about him, not knowing what he might do under the influence of shame, as I fancied; but as I knew that the "Intrepid" would have to stop there two or three hours, to lodge particulars of our visit, I did not ask for a boat to be sent for him; it was not necessary, for he came on board two or three hours after in the boat sent to lodge the Intrepid's papers and rebuild the cairn. I had then come to the conclusion that this story of Adam Beck's was a fabrication, and I said so in the presence of Sir John Ross and Captain Ommanney. That, however, was merely an opinion I had formed. We then rejoined the "Felix," and Captain Ommanney was kind enough to tow us round the north end of the ice. As soon as we got to the north-west end, and the west land appeared in sight, a fresh breeze sprung up, and Captain Ommanney cast us off.

613. *Chairman.*—Are you aware that Adam Beck has since made a deposition which has been sent to Copenhagen to be translated?

Commander Phillips.—Yes, I know that to be the case.

614. *Chairman.*—That is all you know on the subject?

Commander Phillips.—Yes.

615. *Chairman.*—Did you yourself examine the barrier of ice in Wellington Strait?

Commander Phillips.—We were not high enough up in the "Felix."

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616. *Chairman.*—You did not go there in the course of your land journey?
Commander Phillips.—No; not further than Cape Hotham.

617. *Chairman.*—You saw the ice when you crossed Wellington Strait in 1851, did you not?

Commander Phillips.—We saw the ice when we came round Cape Hotham in tow of Captain Austin. Our course then lay towards Cape Riley, and led us into open water. We were not near enough to form any judgment upon the subject of barrier ice.

618. *Sir E. Parry.*—At the present moment, what is your impression as to the truth of Adam Beck's report?

Commander Phillips.—I think it is a fabrication of Adam Beck's.

619. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you know the story of that piece of wood (adverting to a piece of wood produced before the Committee on a previous day)?

Commander Phillips.—That piece of wood was brought on board the "Felix" on the 7th or 8th of September 1850. Adam Beck had got a little tipsy, and had run away from the vessel in the morning, just as she was getting ready to start, because he said if we went any further we should not come back. He was evidently much frightened. The vessel had to be made fast. We tried to catch him, but could not. He came on board in the evening, and a couple of days afterwards I was told he brought this piece of wood on board.

620. *Chairman.*—We should tell you that Sir John Ross has said that he saw Adam Beck from the "Felix" with the wood upon his shoulder?

Commander Phillips.—I heard some one say that he had got a piece of wood on his shoulder. I was below at tea when he brought it, and I did not see him.

621. *Sir G. Back.*—Do you know anything about the piece of tin said to have been found in that wood?

Commander Phillips.—I was sent to look for it a few weeks ago. On the 12th of August 1851, after we had been cast off by Captain Austin, the "Felix" made a visit to the land ice of Beechey Island within a mile of Franklin's Graveyard. Sir John Ross desired me to go with Mr. Abernethy,—the surgeon of the "Felix," two of the seamen, and Adam Beck, who was to show us the place where he had found this piece of wood, and where Adam Beck told us he had thrown a piece of tin away in 1850. We were accompanied by Adam Beck to a height of seven or eight or nine hundred feet, I think, of almost precipitous cliffs, overlooking the entrance to the bay in which no doubt the "Erebus" and "Terror" wintered in 1845. Adam Beck told us this was the spot, and we searched very carefully in every direction from the precipice, I may call it, fully 100 feet backwards and forwards in each direction.

622. *Sir G. Back.*—Was there any snow on the ground at that time?

Commander Phillips.—No snow. It was loose shingle and slate sandstone. The spot on which Adam Beck said the post had been set did certainly look as if a number of slates had been collected to form a mound in which to insert the post. That was all the evidence that I could gather there that a post had been set up. We searched diligently for papers, and for the piece of tin which he said he had thrown away. We found nothing whatever, and we returned on board again.

623. *Sir G. Back.*—Did Adam Beck notice any writing upon the tin?

Commander Phillips.—Yes; it had upon it the words, September 1846, according to Adam Beck.

624. *Chairman.*—And he can read and write?

Commander Phillips.—Oh yes; Esquimaux, or what he calls Esquimaux.

625. *Chairman.*—You are aware that there are letters cut upon this wood? Could Adam Beck have cut them?

Commander Phillips.—Adam Beck is quite capable of cutting those letters on wood.

626. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was Adam Beck in the habit of getting drunk?

Commander Phillips.—Whenever he could.

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627. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you happen to know whether he was tipsy at the time he made the report respecting the crews of two ships in the north-east part of Baffin's Bay?

Commander Phillips.—Certainly not.

628. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think the fact of his getting drunk would throw discredit upon his statement?

Commander Phillips.—No. I think fear of being led by the voyage into danger induced him to fabricate this story.

629. *Sir E. Parry.*—You mean extending the length of your voyage?

Commander Phillips.—Yes; thinking that we were going too far, and that we should never come back again.

630. *Sir G. Back.*—Have you been employed in the Polar regions before you accompanied Sir John Ross?

Commander Phillips.—Not in the North Polar, but in the Antarctic regions.

631. *Sir G. Back.*—Then you have had experience amongst ice before?

Commander Phillips.—Yes; for four years.

632. *Chairman.*—Did you ever hear that Captain Penny had urged Captain Austin to persevere in his endeavour to search the Wellington Strait in 1851, with a view to find traces, if possible, of Sir John Franklin?

Commander Phillips.—No.

633. *Chairman.*—Do you think you should have known if Captain Penny had so urged Captain Austin?

Commander Phillips.—Yes; Captain Austin was very communicative to me.

634. *Chairman.*—Then you are sure that no such idea was prevalent in the part of the expedition in which you were?

Commander Phillips.—That Captain Penny had applied to Captain Austin to prosecute the search? That is the question, I believe. If such had been the case it would have been known to me, certainly. Captain Austin would have told me, for he had often told me previously that he could not decide upon anything with reference to his squadron until Captain Penny reported his opinions to him. It was a great source of anxiety among the officers, what were the Captain's opinions, and the exclamation was frequently made, "I wish Captain Penny was in;" for on his report appeared to hang the question, whether they were to stop out another winter or not. It was discussed as a very probable circumstance that the "Assistance" and her tender would go home, and that Captain Austin and his tender would remain out.

635. *Chairman.*—Did you see Captain Penny after he returned from his last expedition?

Commander Phillips.—Yes. I went out to welcome him in. I had come to the conclusion that it was not my place to ask questions. I said, "There are no traces, I suppose," and that "you are all well." He had walked forty or fifty miles that day, and I thought it would be out of place to trouble him.

636. *Chairman.*—At any subsequent period did you understand that it was Captain Penny's intention to urge Captain Austin to prosecute the search in Wellington Strait?

Commander Phillips.—Subsequent to the 25th of July 1851, I recollect Captain Penny said to me, as he was going up the ladder, "I shall ask Captain Austin to put a steamer under my orders," or words to that effect. I made no observation, because I knew there would be technical difficulties in the way, and I felt sure that if steam was wanted it would be sent.

637. *Chairman.*—Is that all you know upon the subject?

Commander Phillips.—That is all I know about the steamer.

638. *Chairman.*—This transpired after Captain Penny's return?

Commander Phillips.—Yes; two or three days.

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639. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What are we to understand by technical difficulties?

Commander Phillips.—I mean that we could not put a naval officer in commission under Captain Penny.

640. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—It was not in reference to the steam?

Commander Phillips.—Oh no.

641. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were present on some of the occasions when search was made in the winter quarters of Beechey Island and Cape Riley?

Commander Phillips.—The winter quarters in Beechey Island, but not in Cape Riley.

642. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider that the search for records connected with the "Erebus" and "Terror" was so complete that there was no probability of any, if left by those ships, being overlooked and left behind?

Commander Phillips.—I am quite satisfied of that.

643. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you make your search with the same object at any other places you visited with the "Felix"?

Commander Phillips.—Yes; in the neighbourhood of the winter quarters I went over myself. Whenever we walked or travelled it was always with eyes on the ground. We stopped nowhere else, except at Barlow Inlet.

644. *Sir G. Back.*—Will you point out how far you went on Cornwallis Island itself?

Commander Phillips.—75 degrees 29 minutes was the farthest I went.

645. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see open water?

Commander Phillips.—No.

646. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you meet any animals in your way?

Commander Phillips.—Two deer.

647. *Sir G. Back.*—If you had been distressed for food, could you have supplied yourself and party with your guns?

Commander Phillips.—Not during the first eighteen days of our travelling; after the 3d of June we might possibly have got a few birds.

648. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Having been second in command under Sir John Ross, did you form any opinion of the course Sir John Franklin took after leaving his winter quarters at Beechey Island?

Commander Phillips.—I must confess that the opinion I have arrived at hardly satisfies myself, but I think Sir John Franklin and his crew perished on their way home. I will give my reasons for this conclusion: I think that no prudent man who had spent a winter in Barrow's Straits would attempt this unknown passage to Bhering Straits—the passage by the Wellington Strait to Bhering Straits—with two years provisions, some of them probably suspicious as to quality, and having experienced his full average of mortality,—three deaths out of 138. Under these circumstances, I think he would not have taken this passage without depositing documents in a conspicuous place to say where supplies and support might be passed on to him. And I do not think it quite agrees with the ordinary discipline of the navy that the beach of the winter quarters should be left as it was. Certainly the articles left were of no great value, but a man who was to make the north-west passage would not have left even a smith's block. An American officer remarked to me that there was no sign of the people being in want who wintered there. The absence of any document to indicate his proceedings makes me fear that he left Beechey Island to come home.

649. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you saw of the harbour in Beechey Island, do you think that ships could have been forced out of it with or by the ice?

Commander Phillips.—Not at all likely. There would be great trouble in getting out.

650. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you saw, and from what you have heard from others, do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent upon their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year, supposing them to have arms and ammunition?

Commander Phillips.—I do not think they could. I have heard Captain Penny

express his conviction that life could be sustained under such circumstances. I have often heard it, but I doubt it. Deer are difficult to take in an open country. In answer to the question, I must say I think not.

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651. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you been in command of either of these two expeditions that went out under Captain Austin and Captain Penny, should you have felt justified in prosecuting this search further in the autumn of 1851?

Commander Phillips.—From what I recollect of the Admiralty orders to both of those officers, and Captain Penny's emphatic reply contained in his letter to Captain Austin of the 11th August last, (I mean that in which Captain Penny says, "Wellington Channel requires no further search," and that "all has been done in the power of man to accomplish,") I should say certainly not. I do not think there was any strong probability that the "Erebus" and "Terror" went up the Wellington Channel. The piece of wood that Captain Penny picked up I suppose is accounted for now by the position into which the American vessels are said to have been driven.

The evidence of this witness having closed, and another witness being about to be called,—

Captain Penny asked whether he should remain in the room while his officers were being examined, and was informed by the Chairman that he might do exactly what he liked in the matter. The Committee had not the slightest wish that he should withdraw.

Captain Penny said, that, having objected to Captain Austin being present during the examination of his officers, he thought it right to withdraw. He then left the room.

Mr. GOODSIR called.

Mr. Goodsir.

652. *Chairman*.—I believe you were the principal medical officer on board the "Lady Franklin?"

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes, I was.

653. *Chairman*.—And you commanded the exploring expedition to the west side of Wellington Strait?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes, I did.

654. *Chairman*.—Be good enough to give the Committee an account of what you know in reference to the open water?

Mr. Goodsir.—The first appearance of open water we noticed was on the 17th of May 1851. We were then up the eastern headland of Abandon Bay. We merely noticed the water sky then; we did not see the water itself to the eastern end of Hamilton Island. It was a heavy black sky. On the 19th of May we found the ice very much decayed, and had great difficulty in dragging our sledges over it. That was in the south channel. At the latter part of that day's journey, where the ice was completely decayed, we found it full of seal holes and saw walrus in the open water. On the 20th we were storm-stayed. On the evening of the 21st I went with one of the men to the top of the eastern headland of Disappointment Bay, and then saw the open water plainly for the first time. There were long lanes stretching from east to west in the south channel. We then proceeded to the westward, and every day saw more and more open water. When we got to the farthest west, which was "Goodsir's and Marshall's Farthest," marked on the chart, the water was evidently increasing. There was not much water to the north of Milne Island at that time, but the ice was fast decaying. That was on the 1st of June, the thermometer being at that time 45 plus. The ice was drifting so fast that we thought it prudent to return on the 1st of June, having been out 27 days.

655. *Chairman*.—Did you consider that the water was sufficiently open for navigation?

Mr. Goodsir.—I consider that the water was sufficiently open. It would have been navigable by a boat if we had had one. I could have examined Houston Stewart Island, Milne Island, Baring Island, and Hamilton Island.

656. *Chairman*.—Did you, either in going or in returning, examine the ice in Wellington Strait, properly so called,—the line of ice marked above and below in the chart?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes, we did.

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657. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of it?

Mr. Goodsir.—I saw no ice of the previous season until I came to the westward of Point Decision, between Point Decision and Point Phillips, where we passed over detached pieces of ice two years old. All the other was of the formation of 1850–1851, as far as I am able to judge; indeed I am almost confident of it. I may mention, that Peterson the interpreter held the same opinion, that it was the ice of one season.

658. *Captain Beechey.*—From what did you form your opinion of its being the formation of 1850 and 1851?

Mr. Goodsir.—One who has been accustomed to see ice can easily form such an opinion. The ice of two years is of a peculiar wavy appearance, in consequence of its having been honeycombed by the heat of the previous summer; the ice of one season being level on its general surface.

659. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you ascertain the thickness of the ice?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; the average thickness of the ice must have been between five and six feet between Point Decision and Point Phillips. In the south channel it was not more than three feet thick.

660. *Captain Beechey.*—Have you had much experience in polar seas?

Mr. Goodsir.—I have been two voyages to the Arctic regions; in the summer of 1849 before the last.

661.—*Captain Beechey.*—Can you give us the date about which you were at your farthest point in Victoria Channel, where Mr. Marshall made the observations on the tides?

Mr. Goodsir.—That would be on the 4th or 5th of June, north-west of Cape Austin.

662. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any animals?

Mr. Goodsir.—We saw upwards of twenty bears and thirty rein-deer during the whole journey, and some of both were shot. The first ptarmigan we saw was on the 15th of June.

663. *Sir G. Back.*—Any birds?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; a great number of long-tailed ducks in particular, and of gulls, guillemots, &c.

664. *Sir G. Back.*—Not over the ice?

Mr. Goodsir.—No, at the open water.

665. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you saw, and from what you have heard from others, do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent on their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year, supposing them furnished with arms and ammunition?

Mr. Goodsir.—They might, with difficulty, if they had plenty of ammunition.

666. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see much drift wood in your journey?

Mr. Goodsir.—Not much, in consequence of its being so early in the season. The beaches were found to be deeply covered with snow. We did find drift wood on the eastern side of Lady Hamilton Bay. We found a rough spar of pine without bark twelve feet long.

667. *Sir G. Back.*—Much blanché?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; very much blanché, and evidently of a great age.

668. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you at the farthest point you reached ascend the highest land of “Goodsir’s and Marshall’s Farthest” as marked in the chart?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; from about 150 to 180 feet high was the highest point we ascended;—it was the highest ground in the neighbourhood, the coast being very low;—to a low round-topped hill.

669. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—At what distance did you see the water to the north-west?

Mr. Goodsir.—Not further than the north end of Milne Island. We could see a faint loom to the north-west after that.

670. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What do you think was the extent of your vision?

Mr. Goodsir.—From twenty-five to thirty miles.

671. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you yourself distinguish the islands, Parker's and Barrow's Islands, marked on the chart?

Mr. Goodsir.—No; I cannot say I did.

672. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—From your observation, did you form an opinion that there was a free channel to the north-west?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes, I did.

673. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you take notice of the strength of the tide in the south channel?

Mr. Goodsir.—The only way I had of judging of the tides was, when leaving Cape Austin, on the 4th and 5th of June, by the extra rapidity with which the ice flowed out of the south channel into the Queen's Channel. The ice was going at that time at five or six miles an hour.

674. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—You found no traces of Sir John Franklin's expedition through all your travels?

Mr. Goodsir.—No.

675. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—I think you said you had entered in your journal the state of the temperature?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes. I sent my journals on that subject to Sir Edward Parry.

676. *Sir E. Parry*.—Have you any reason to think the climate is better in the neighbourhood of the Queen's channel than at Assistance Harbour?

Mr. Goodsir.—No.

677. *Sir E. Parry*.—You landed at Beechey Island, and saw the things left by Sir John Franklin?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes.

678. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you saw, do you think the Franklin expedition departed hastily from that harbour?

Mr. Goodsir.—I do not think there is any evidence of that, except the few things that were left behind.

679. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you have seen of the arctic regions, do you believe that it was possible that a ship could have been forced out of that harbour by or with the ice?

Mr. Goodsir.—No, I do not.

680. *Sir E. Parry*.—Considering all the circumstances that have come to your knowledge, which way do you think the Franklin expedition went, on leaving Beechey Island?

Mr. Goodsir.—Since the journey I made up there, I always had an idea that he went up Wellington Channel to the Queen's Channel.

681. *Sir E. Parry*.—On what do you ground that opinion?

Mr. Goodsir.—That in the summer of 1846 Sir John Franklin had found Wellington Channel open, and that, having gone up there, he found Queen's Channel in the same state as we found it in 1851. At different times Wellington Channel has been seen,—twice by Sir Edward Parry,—clear of ice, and although it was blocked with ice when we passed it in 1850, still, as far as I was able to judge, when travelling over the ice of Wellington Channel in May 1851, I formed the idea that it had been clear of ice in the autumn of 1850. Taking all these things into consideration, it is probable that Sir John Franklin found it clear of ice, and proceeded up in that direction.

682. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you make any observations for latitude yourself?

Mr. Goodsir.—No; we had no artificial horizon with us.

683. *Sir E. Parry*.—How did you determine the position of the places where you were? What means did you use?

Mr. Goodsir.—The position of the furthest point we reached was laid down by that of Houston Stewart Island according to Captain Penny's position.

Mr. Goodsir.
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684. *Sir E. Parry.*—How did you determine the other distances and positions? Was it by “dead reckoning”?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes. At the end of every day’s journey I consulted with Mr. Marshall and one or two of the seamen as to the distances they thought they had travelled, and I generally took the mean of the different opinions.

685. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You were at the winter quarters of Beechey Island?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes.

686. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you consider the search for records at winter quarters at Beechey Island was so complete as to render it improbable that Sir John Franklin had left any there?

Mr. Goodsir.—I think it improbable that Sir John Franklin could have left any there, because there would be no necessity for concealing them. So many people landed there that there was a great deal of confusion, and no method in the search, so that it is possible some document might have been turned over, and thus escaped notice; but it is not very likely. Directly it was known that we had found anything, the whole of the crews, Americans and our own, and Sir John Ross’s, were on the spot. I should add that Captain Austin’s ships were not there at the time I am speaking of.

687. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present at any examination at Cape Riley, of the circle of stones?

Mr. Goodsir.—No; I was not at Cape Riley.

688. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Captain Penny, I believe, returned before you?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes.

689. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you ever hear of Captain Penny applying to Captain Austin for assistance with a steamer to proceed up the Wellington Channel?

Mr. Goodsir.—I heard of it on the 12th of August. I merely heard the report.

690. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—From whom did you hear it?

Mr. Goodsir.—It was a vague rumour, spreading very much amongst the crews of the “Lady Franklin” and the “Sophia.” Captain Penny did not tell me that he had made such an application. Captain Penny had frequently spoken of proposing to Captain Austin to have a steamer.

691. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you hear Captain Penny say that he must have a steamer?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; that he must proceed up Wellington Channel in a steamer.

692. *Chairman.*—Did you notice the barrier of ice on your return as well as on your progress out?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; it was decaying, and it was covered with water between Cape Dehaven and Barlow Inlet from six inches to a foot in depth.

693. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that in consequence of the melting of the snow on the ice?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes.

694. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was there much snow upon it?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; and at the outlet of all the streams in the land there were large cracks. To the north of Dépôt Point we passed many cracks on the ice. It was very difficult to get our sledges over, the cracks being five or six feet broad. We could just leap them, and get our sledges over. It extended to the eastward as far as we could see.

695. *Sir E. Parry.*—That was about what season?

Mr. Goodsir.—It was on the 14th of June 1851.

696. *Chairman.*—Had you any further opportunity of examining the ice in that direction?

Mr. Goodsir.—The ice to the south of Barlow Inlet was not so much decayed, and the whole way to Assistance Harbour; there was no water on it.

697. *Chairman*.—Have you any reason for believing that during the autumn of 1850 Wellington Strait was clear of ice?

Mr. Goodsir.—I say it was clear, for I have every reason to believe that all the ice we passed over in Wellington Channel was ice of the previous winter's formation.

Mr. Goodsir.

3d Nov. 1851.

699. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any old Esquimaux traces?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; a few at Abandon Bay, and even there, they were so faint that I was doubtful whether they were remains; they might have been formed by natural causes.

700. *Sir E. Parry*.—But if they were Esquimaux traces, they must have been very old?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; very ancient. Others were found on the south coast of Cornwallis Island, about Cape Hotham and Cape Martyr.

701. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you leave any of your own traces as you returned?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; at Cape Austin a large cairn, and another at the farthest point reached called "Goodsir's and Marshall's Point."

702. *Sir G. Back*.—In your opinion was everything done that was possible to prosecute the search for Franklin?

Mr. Goodsir.—For that season, everything that could possibly be done, unless we had remained a little longer in Beechey Island.

703. *Sir G. Back*.—When you say that season, did you mean 1851?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes.

704. *Chairman*.—In what manner would you have proposed to proceed if you had remained there?

Mr. Goodsir.—By endeavouring to carry out the search in Queen's Channel, although I do not think much good would have been done. Of course it would depend upon how the ice cleared out of Wellington Channel.

705. *Chairman*.—You think there was a fair probability of the ice clearing out of Wellington Strait?

Mr. Goodsir.—From what has been seen of it on previous occasions, I think there was.

706. *Chairman*.—Do you think you could have waited to see whether the ice would clear out of the strait without incurring the risk of passing another winter in that vicinity?

Mr. Goodsir.—We might have waited for a month longer.

707. *Chairman*.—It would appear that Captain Penny had made up his mind to return before he communicated with Captain Austin?

Mr. Goodsir.—I do not know. He was not much in the habit of communicating his intentions.

708. *Chairman*.—The day he communicated with Captain Austin (on the 12th of August) he sailed for England, did he not?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes; he sailed that very day for England.

709. *Chairman*.—Does not that show, in your opinion, that he had made up his mind to return to England?

Mr. Goodsir.—Yes, I think so.

Mr. MANSON called.

Mr. Manson.

710. *Chairman*.—What situation did you fill?

Mr. Manson.—That of chief mate of the "Sophia."

711. *Sir E. Parry*.—And I believe you were third in command of the expedition?

Mr. Manson.—Yes, I was.

712. *Chairman*.—How many Arctic voyages have you made?

Mr. Manson.—Forty-two. I made twenty to Greenland and twenty-two to Davis's Straits.

Mr. Manson.
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713. *Chairman.*—You remained in charge of the ship when the exploring expeditions were sent out?

Mr. Manson.—Yes; I was in charge of both ships.

714. *Chairman.*—You made observations with respect to the ice?

Mr. Manson.—That was under my notice.

715. *Chairman.*—And you delivered in these observations?

Mr. Manson.—Yes.

716. *Chairman.*—Had you any opportunity of examining the fast ice in Wellington Strait?

Mr. Manson.—No. I was not in the travelling parties; I was in charge of the ships.

717. *Chairman.*—Did you see the ice in the Wellington Strait in the autumn of 1850, when you were in Beechey Island? What is your opinion of that ice, and how long do you think it has been there?

Mr. Manson.—I cannot with any confidence say how long it has been there.

718. *Sir G. Back.*—Not whether it was old or new ice?

Mr. Manson.—It might have been two years. I was only passing along, and did not observe it accurately.

719. *Chairman.*—Can you give a decided opinion how long it was since the straits were opened?

Mr. Manson.—No; I cannot, positively.

720. *Chairman.*—Did Captain Penny ever consult you as to the steps he should take, after having discovered open water above the ice in Wellington Strait?

Mr. Manson.—Repeatedly.

721. *Chairman.*—What did you consider to be his opinion of the open water?

Mr. Manson.—Captain Penny's opinion, when he returned, was, that there was a probability of getting a boat into that water; that was his first impression.

722. *Chairman.*—Then he did get a boat into the water?

Mr. Manson.—Yes, he did.

723. *Chairman.*—Well, he came back after that expedition after having had a boat in the open water, what was your impression of the state of the ice, and sound altogether?

Mr. Manson.—As to the probability of getting up the Wellington Strait, one of the ships was to be left behind, and one was to go up the Wellington Strait. One vessel was to remain behind at some convenient point; Beechey Island, for example. Captain Penny was to proceed up the channel with the "Sophia," with Mr. Stewart as well as Captain Penny.

724. *Chairman.*—Do you think such an opportunity offered when you were there?

Mr. Manson.—Not that I am aware of.

725. *Chairman.*—If you had to give your advice on the subject, how much longer would you have remained to see whether the channel would have cleared or not?

Mr. Manson.—We might have remained there until the 12th of September; but I do not know. We were fixed in our winter quarters at that time in 1850.

726. *Chairman.*—You might have had a reasonable expectation that you would have been frozen up?

Mr. Manson.—Yes; and we had to guard against it.

727. *Chairman.*—Do you think you might have remained a fortnight with safety?

Mr. Manson.—I do not know; the seasons differ so.

728. *Sir G. Back.*—With your great experience of the ice, does your knowledge of it enable you to say whether it was likely to continue open?

Mr. Manson.—I assure you the seasons differ so very much that I can give no positive answer on the subject; but I think we might have remained about a fortnight.

729. *Chairman.*—Had not Captain Penny made up his mind to return to England without any communication with Captain Austin?

Mr. Manson.—I cannot say that.

730. *Chairman.*—On what day did you communicate with Captain Austin?

Mr. Manson.—On the 11th of August.

731. *Chairman.*—On what day did you sail for England?

Mr. Manson.—On the 12th of August.

732. *Sir E. Parry.*—You have said that Captain Penny mentioned at one time that he would leave one ship somewhere about Beechey Island, and would take the other ship himself up Wellington Strait. When did he alter that view?

Mr. Manson.—He never altered it, to the best of my knowledge. There was not an opportunity of doing so. Captain Penny's opinion was formed when in winter quarters; when liberated from winter quarters, if there was a probability of proceeding with one of the ships he would have done so. I was to remain behind.

733. *Sir E. Parry.*—Why did he not do it?

Mr. Manson.—Because there was not a probability of getting up.

734. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think there was not a probability of getting up?

Mr. Manson.—None, when we left on the 12th of August.

735. *Sir E. Parry.*—How much of the navigable season was remaining then?

Mr. Manson.—That is a quarter of the Arctic seas that I have not much experience of. Perhaps a fortnight would be about the time.

736. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then if you had wished to get up Wellington Channel would you have stopped that fortnight to look at it, and to see what chance there was?

Mr. Manson.—There was a probability, if I may use such an expression, of the ships being beset. Again I do not think there was sufficient provisions in the ships to carry on another winter. I think that Captain Penny and Captain Austin did well in coming home.

737. *Sir E. Parry.*—With respect to the tides which you have particularly observed, was there anything by which you could judge which way the flood tide came?

Mr. Manson.—My impression was, that, during the time of the water flowing, the tide went to the westward; but we were so far embayed that we could not positively say.

738. *Sir George Back.*—Could you judge of the rise and fall?

Mr. Manson.—Yes; the rise was about six feet two inches.

Sir E. Parry said, Nothing could be more creditable than the manner in which Mr. Manson observed the tides, judging from his journals. The manner in which he did this was highly ingenious and useful.

739. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you search Beechey Island?

Mr. Manson.—No, I did not. I was in charge of the ships.

740. *Sir E. Parry.*—What is your impression *now*, as to the probable course the Franklin expedition took after leaving Beechey Island?

Mr. Manson.—The only impression I have is, that they have gone up the Wellington Channel; but really I have no very great reasons to assign for it; but that is my opinion as to the way the expedition went.

Mr. Manson.
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741. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think, from what you know of Beechey Island and the harbour there, that ships could be forced out by or with the ice?

Mr. Manson.—I had not an opportunity of judging, never having been on it.

742. *Sir E. Parry.*—You think that Wellington Channel is occasionally navigable?

Mr. Manson.—Well, I should think so. My reason is, that the ice, as far as we saw, never attained to extraordinary thickness, and must disappear occasionally, although perhaps not every year.

743. *Sir E. Parry.*—You think that occasionally it is navigable?

Mr. Manson.—Yes, I suppose so.

744. *Sir G. Back.*—Will you state what thickness the ice was?

Mr. Manson.—Every season, in my opinion, there is about a quarter of the ice which attains to a thickness of from five to eight feet. I mean by an extraordinary thickness, that in two or three years it would amount to a thickness of from 12 to 14 feet by accumulation.

745. *Sir G. Back.*—Under these circumstances, do you consider that everything was done that was possible to be done for the search of Sir John Franklin?

Mr. Manson.—Yes, there was, in my opinion, for that season, (1851,) by both expeditions.

746. *Chairman.*—When did you begin making the boat sledges on board the "Lady Franklin" after Captain Penny's return?

Mr. Manson.—As soon as Captain Penny returned, it was set in agitation about the boat sledges. Captain Penny went over and called upon Captain Austin, and upon his return preparation was continued for a new sledge. The first preparation for the boat was meant for Ponds Bay, and when Captain Penny returned it was intended then for the water Captain Penny had seen.

Mr. J. Stuart.

Mr. JOHN STUART called.

747. *Chairman.*—You were assistant surgeon and third officer on the "Lady Franklin," I believe?

Mr. Stuart.—I acted as third mate at the request of Captain Penny. I went out as assistant surgeon.

748. *Chairman.*—Had you ever been in the Arctic seas before?

Mr. Stuart.—Never before.

749. *Chairman.*—So that you cannot speak as to the age of the ice?

Mr. Stuart.—No, I cannot, any more than a person who was out a single season.

750. *Chairman.*—You took an exploring party by yourself?

Mr. Stuart.—Yes, I did.

751. *Chairman.*—How far did you go?

Mr. Stuart.—We started from Assistance Harbour, and proceeded up the Wellington Strait as far as Point Separation, crossed over a little to southward of Cape Grinnel, and then proceeded along the shores of North Devon to Cape Hurd.

752. *Chairman.*—Describe the appearance of the ice in Wellington Strait?

Mr. Stuart.—It was perfectly smooth; covered with deep snow. We met at different parts as we crossed over what we thought to be old ice, but they were detached pieces apparently left there, and the new ice formed around them.

753. *Chairman.*—How far north and south did the ice extend, as far as you could judge?

Mr. Stuart.—When we crossed there was ice in every direction as far as we could see. That was from the 10th to the 13th of May 1851.

754. *Chairman.*—State how far you went eastward?

Mr. Stuart.—As far eastward as longitude 90°.

755. *Chairman.*—And then did you return for want of provisions, or because there were no traces, and you thought it useless to go on?

Mr. Stuart.—I was ordered to return on reaching that point. I found no traces to the north of Cape Spencer; but at Caswall's Tower there were traces of a party from the Franklin expedition having been there.

Mr. J. Stuart.

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756. *Chairman.*—What were those traces?

Mr. Stuart.—The arrangement of stone usual in putting up tents, several tin canisters marked "Goldner", a few glass bottles, and remains of a fire.

757. *Sir G. Back.* Did you look for any document near that spot?

Mr. Stuart.—There were two cairns, but no documents.

758. *Sir G. Back.*—And you saw no further traces as far as Cape Hurd?

Mr. Stuart.—Not any.

759. *Sir G. Back.*—In going along the coast, did you perceive any animals?

Mr. Stuart.—Yes; five hares at Cape Bowden, and one hare at Cape Riley.

760. *Sir E. Parry.*—You found an apparent encampment near Caswall's Tower.

Mr. Stuart.—Yes.

761. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you meet with any cairns of stone about there?

Mr. Stuart.—Yes; there were two near where the party was supposed to have encamped.

762. *Sir G. Back.*—If you had not been provided with food, do you consider that you could have supplied yourselves and party with the aid of your guns?

Mr. Stuart.—I do not think we could.

763. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you among the party at Beechey Island, searching for records?

Mr. Stuart.—Yes.

764. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you consider that the island was well searched?

Mr. Stuart.—Yes; thoroughly searched.

765. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you on shore at Cape Riley?

Mr. Stuart.—Not during the autumn of 1850. In the spring of 1851 I passed Cape Riley.

766. *Sir E. Parry.*—Had you an opportunity of searching it?

Mr. Stuart.—I had, and saw a cairn that had been put up by Captain Ommanney, which had not been noticed by a former party from the "Sophia."

767. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is there anything else you wish to state?

Mr. Stuart.—Not at all.

768. *Sir E. Parry.*—No other information that would be of interest?

Mr. Stuart.—I think I stated I saw no animals but five hares; at Cape Ricketts, near Radstock Bay, I saw a number of mollymoks.

769. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any traces of Esquimaux?

Mr. Stuart.—There was a large Esquimaux encampment near Caswall Tower.

770. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it recent?

Mr. Stuart.—I should think it was not less than 100 years old.

Mr. HARWOOD called.

Mr. Harwood.

771. *Chairman.*—You were the chief engineer of the "Pioneer."

Mr. Harwood.—Yes.

772. *Chairman.* Had you ever been in the Arctic regions before this voyage?

Mr. Harwood.—No.

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773. *Sir E. Parry.*—You had an opportunity of seeing the effect of steam power in the navigation of those seas?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes.

774. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it was a very valuable assistance?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes, very valuable indeed.

775. *Sir E. Parry.*—Explain your own experience of it.

Mr. Harwood. On the 1st and 2d of September we were packed in the ice for some miles, and we were two days forcing our way through. If it had been a sailing vessel, we could not have done it.

776. *Sir E. Parry.*—But after the young ice begins to form, in consequence of the temperature falling, is steam power very valuable in prolonging the season of navigation?

Mr. Harwood.—We had one trial of that kind in the autumn of last year. We went round Griffith's Island, and the ice was three quarters of an inch thick. We forced through by steam, whereas a sailing vessel would, in all probability, not have accomplished it. But it was very calm then.

777. *Sir E. Parry.*—But in calm weather, when the young ice is formed, is steam power of great value?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes.

778. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you find any difficulty in respect to the ice getting into any of the pipes?

Mr. Harwood.—I found when the temperature was very low, the injection pipe froze so as not to be able to work.

779. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did it freeze when the loose ice got in?

Mr. Harwood.—The injection pipes froze so that we could not do any good with the vessel.

780. *Sir E. Parry.*—At what temperature do you recollect that that occurred?

Mr. Harwood.—2°+. It was on the 30th September when I had to get the steam up, to disconnect the screw, and to clear the engines and boiler from water.

781. *Sir E. Parry.*—When that is the case, the injection pipe becomes useless?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes.

782. *Sir E. Parry.*—Under these circumstances it would not be safe to keep a steamer at sea?

Mr. Harwood.—We could not obtain water for the boiler.

783. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you any difficulty in clearing your pipes when they are not quite clear?

Mr. Harwood.—On the 26th June I got steam up to try the machinery, and found the water between the gratings in the bottom of the ship and Kingston's valves had frozen, so as to prevent pushing the valves down, which I easily cleared; this was about six weeks before we got clear of our winter quarters. I found no difficulty in clearing the pipes in the spring, because in the autumn I ran all the water out of them.

784. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is there anything you can suggest, as to the improvement of the steam machinery for the Arctic navigation?

Mr. Harwood.—Nothing further than that the expansion gear might be fitted. It would be a great saving of fuel, which, in such a place, is of great importance.

785. *Chairman.*—Then your vessels were not fitted with expansion gear?

Mr. Harwood.—No.

786. *Chairman.*—Supposing the injection pipes perfect, would the severity of the weather sometimes become so great that you would not venture your people on deck without danger to their lives?

Mr. Harwood.—Nothing in the temperature would be dangerous, provided the men were well clothed. It was not so cold at the time I spoke of. If it had been and a case of necessity arose, we could have fed the pipes with hot cinders.

787. *Sir G. Back*.—What is your opinion of the size of a steamer for navigating amongst the ice with effect? About as large as the "Pioneer," or larger?

Mr. Harwood.—About that size. If it had more power there would be a great increase in fuel; but if there were expansion gear it would remove the difficulty.

788. *Sir E. Parry*.—How many boilers had you?

Mr. Harwood.—Only one.

789. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the screw very effective?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes, very good, and worked well.

790. *Chairman*.—Did you find that the aperture for the screw got frozen or choked up?

Mr. Harwood.—On the 1st and 2d of September there was a great quantity of ice passed through with the screw, which bent the cross rods and the corner of the screw, but we received no further injury; I found the screw worked much better when the vessel was drawing more water.

791. *Sir G. Back*.—There is an impression abroad that a steamer of larger power would make more way and get on faster than the "Pioneer," taking the season of navigation. What is your opinion on that point?

Mr. Harwood.—I do not think the greater power would be of much assistance. I think that the power of the vessel to run at the ice is almost sufficient, and is as much as a vessel can stand.

792. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you any apparatus for lifting the screw up?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes.

793. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you occasion to lift it often?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes, a great many times.

794. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was the rudder unshipped at the same time?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes, except when sailing.

795. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you find that the concussions the ship met with on striking were liable to injure the machinery?

Mr. Harwood.—No.

796. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the machinery in good order when your ship returned to England?

Mr. Harwood.—Some of the cylinder facings wanted repair, and some other minor repairs are required.

797. *Sir E. Parry*.—But that might have occurred in any other service?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes, certainly.

798. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then could you have remained out another season effectively with your steamer if it had been necessary?

Mr. Harwood.—Yes.

799. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the temperature of your engine room; when you got into Baffin's Bay, for instance?

Mr. Harwood.—95, 96, and 100. I have seen it at 105.

Mr. RYDER called.

800. *Chairman*.—What vessel were you chief engineer of?

Mr. Ryder.—Of the "Intrepid."

801. *Chairman*.—Did you find, when the temperature fell very much, in the navigation of the Arctic regions that the pipes got choked up or frozen?

Mr. Ryder.—Yes; one pipe particularly; the injection pipe.

802. *Chairman*.—And you had no means of remedying that difficulty?

Mr. Ryder.—The remedy for the future would be to pass the injection pipe through the boiler; but this need only be used when the temperature was reduced.

803. *Chairman*.—How much later do you think a steamer can navigate the Arctic seas than a sailing vessel, taking into consideration the loss of the temperature and the coldness of the weather?

Mr. Ryder.—In our own case, as far as I could see, not many days. The

Mr. Harwood.
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Mr. Ryder.

Mr. Ryder.
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ice was too thick, and we could not break it. If we had a powerful steamer we might navigate two or three weeks later than sailing vessels; but the increased consumption of fuel would not warrant that.

804. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you have navigated longer in your own vessel than you did?

Mr. Ryder.—I think not.

805. *Sir E. Parry.*—You had apparatus for lifting the screw?

Mr. Ryder.—Yes; and were obliged to lift it some scores of times.

806. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it under the same circumstances that you lifted the rudder?

Mr. Ryder.—No; sometimes we lifted the screw for sailing purposes.

807. *Sir E. Parry.*—Can you suggest any improvements in the machinery?

Mr. Ryder.—No, I think not, with regard to the screw, the shaftings, and the steam arrangements.

808. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were the engines in good order when you came here?

Mr. Ryder.—Yes. I understood that the engineers' report of the engines at Woolwich was, that we could have gone out again immediately if it had been required.

809. *Sir G. Back.*—Then your engines would have been effective for another winter?

Mr. Ryder.—Yes; but the fuel would have been insufficient.

810. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you experience any difficulty in freeing the "Intrepid" from the ice at her winter quarters? What is your opinion on that subject, as it affects a screw steamer?

Mr. Ryder.—I am of opinion that there would be no difficulty whatever.

811. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did the vessel suffer?

Mr. Ryder.—No, not that I am aware of.

812. *Sir G. Back.*—In navigating these seas would you prefer a larger steamer than the "Intrepid?"

Mr. Ryder.—With a larger steamer there would be a larger consumption of fuel, and that is not advisable. You would not get increased speed or power in correspondence with the amount of fuel consumed. A heavier vessel might break through the ice, but the collision with the ice would be much increased.

813. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did your machinery suffer in any degree by concussion with the ice?

Mr. Ryder.—One of our suspending rods of the screw frame was damaged by being forced upon the berg. By the concussion with the ice with the composition screw, the entering angle of one blade was slightly bent. The screw was replaced by the wrought iron one, coming home, through all the difficult passages of the ice.

814. *Chairman.*—How soon could you get your screw up in an emergency?

Mr. Ryder.—It has been got up in seven minutes, and we can get it down in about eight or nine minutes. That is the shortest time.

815. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you suggest any better mode of raising the screw than that which you had?

Mr. Ryder.—I dare say I might, upon consideration.

The Committee then adjourned.

Seventh Day. November 4, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain F. W. Beechey,
Captain Sir George Back,
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

LIEUTENANT M'CLINTOCK, late of the "Assistance," called.

Lieut. M'Clintock.

816. *Chairman.*—Were you on shore when the first traces were found of the wintering places of the "Erebus" and "Terror"?

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Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

817. *Chairman.*—You have no personal knowledge of the search?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No; I landed subsequently at Cape Riley.

818. *Chairman.*—From what you know, do you think the search for records was complete, and that there is no reason for apprehending that anything was overlooked or left behind?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think everything was quite complete.

819. *Chairman.*—Did you, in passing to the westward in September 1850, observe the Wellington Strait in such a manner as to be able to judge whether it was blocked up with ice at that time?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—We passed along the edge of the fixed ice.

820. *Chairman.*—What is your opinion of that barrier? Was it old ice or ice of the preceding year?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—It was ice of different formations, most of it was two or three years at the least.

821. *Chairman.*—Then it had been fixed in that place two or three years?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, I think so.

822. *Chairman.*—Do you consider yourself sufficiently competent to speak of the different sorts of ice that you observed?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think so; but there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the age of ice, which no amount of experience can remove.

823. *Sir E. Parry.*—How many voyages have you been?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I have been out two winters and four summers in the Arctic seas.

824. *Chairman.*—Then it was your opinion that Wellington Strait had not been opened for any purposes of navigation during the preceding year 1849?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Just so.

825. *Chairman.*—Have you any reason to believe that it opened in 1850?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think it did open.

826. *Chairman.*—You think it opened completely for navigation in 1850?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I cannot say to what extent, perhaps about thirty or forty miles.

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827. *Chairman.*—What I ask you is, whether the Wellington Strait was navigable during 1850, whether the ships could go in?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes, from what I have been told by Captain Penny, and from what I have heard of the American expeditions having drifted up, I think so.

828. *Chairman.*—What did you know of the American expeditions drifting up?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—They drifted up to 75° 25' from the published account.

829. *Chairman.*—Do you know from your own knowledge what progress the Americans made to the northward?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No, I do not.

830. *Chairman.*—Can you speak of your own knowledge further about the navigation of Wellington Strait at that time?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No.

831. *Chairman.*—When you returned this year, after you got out of your winter quarters, what was the state of Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—We could see no ice along the eastern shore northwards of Beechey Island. We could see eight or ten miles to the north of Beechey Island in 1851.

832. *Chairman.*—State the date of that?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—I think it was on the 13th of August 1851.

833. *Chairman.*—You naturally saw the west first; what was the appearance of the channel on its western side?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—It was completely blocked with ice from Cape Hotham, about three quarters across the Wellington Channel.

834. *Chairman.*—Then in your opinion was there any reasonable hope that the strait might have become navigable during any part of the remaining season for navigation in those seas?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes, I think so.

835. *Chairman.*—Do you think that if the expeditions had remained at the mouth of the strait about a fortnight longer, the strait might have cleared sufficiently to enable them to get into the open sea discovered by Captain Penny?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—I can only say that it is probable they would.

836. *Chairman.*—Why do you think it probable?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—From the portion I saw clear on the 13th of August, and from the forward state of the season in 1851.

837. *Chairman.*—Then with respect to the land journeys that you made during the early part of the year 1851, you are quite convinced that you searched every part of the Melville Island, and the whole coast between your wintering places and Sir Edward Parry's at Winter Harbour, as well as the whole of the coast marked as searched by you on this chart. You are quite convinced that your examination was so exact in that part that no traces of Sir John Franklin's expedition could have been overlooked?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes, I am quite convinced of that. My examination commenced on Byam Martin Island; all that I examined confirms my belief that it would have been impossible that we could have passed any conspicuous traces of the Franklin expedition.

838. *Chairman.*—And there was no trace of anybody having been at Sir Edward Parry's wintering place until you arrived there yourself?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—None.

839. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you trace any lane or lead in Wellington Strait at the time you spoke of, and how far?

Lieutenant M. Clintock.—My answer was, that there was no ice observed from the crow's nest along the eastern shore; there was no obstruction to navigation at that time.

840. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you express to Captain Ommanney any opinion as to the probability of the passage through the strait at that time? *Lieut. M'Clintock*

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

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841. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—You were in the "Assistance" with Captain Ommanney?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes; the state of the ice was reported from the crow's nest and entered in the ship's log.

842. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Are you giving evidence of what was reported from the crow's nest, or what you saw yourself?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—What was reported from the crow's nest. I am giving evidence from the report that was communicated to me, and not from my own observation.

843. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Then your opinion of the ice was not from your own observation but from the report from the crow's nest?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, so far as regards the position of the ice.

844. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Who made the report from the crow's nest?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I do not recollect; there was constantly one of the petty officers in the crow's nest.

845. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was it seen by the master or any other officers of the ship?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I am almost certain it was seen by Lieutenant Meecham, the third lieutenant of the ship.

846. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you at Cape Riley also?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

847. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—And took part in the search there of the cairns?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

848. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—There were some stones placed in circles, I believe?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

849. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Was such a search made of Cape Riley as to convince you that no record was left?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

850. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you acquainted with the harbour of Beechey Island?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

851. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you know the form of it?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, I think I do.

852. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is it your opinion that any ships could be forced out by or with the ice?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

853. *Sir E. Parry*.—When you were at Melville Island your resources would not permit you to go to the northward of Bushnan Cove, so that you had not any opportunity of seeing anything of the north shore of Melville Island?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

854. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the state of the ice between Cape Dundas and Banks's Land?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—It was remarkably heavy and closely packed.

855. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it heavier ice than, generally speaking, you had seen to the eastward?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, much heavier.

856. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was there any appearance of the probability of an opening in that ice up to the time you saw it?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—The appearance of the ice was such as to indicate motion at some period of the year, but there was not the slightest appearance of its having been navigable to the westward of Melville Island.

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857. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was that the case also to the south of where you were off Cape Dundas?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes; it refers to the ice between Cape Dundas and Banks's Land.

858. *Sir E. Parry.*—Does that remark apply to the whole of the ice to the southward of Melville Island?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No.

859. *Sir E. Parry.*—State whereabouts in your opinion it was likely to be navigable to the south of Melville Island?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—I think to the east of Winter Harbour.

860. *Sir E. Parry.*—What appearances gave you reason to suppose that?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—The much less crushed up appearance of the ice; and from the extensive floes there could not be so much pressure as there was off Cape Dundas.

861. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then you think a ship could probably get to the southward and westward more easily to the eastward of Winter Harbour than by going on to the west part of Melville Island?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes.

862. *Sir E. Parry.*—You saw Banks's Land pretty clearly, did you not?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes.

863. *Sir E. Parry.*—What sort of land did it appear?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—It was high land, similar in character to the land about Cape Dundas.

864. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you distinguish any capes?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No.

865. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any ravines?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—Yes, several.

866. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any appearance of a water sky in that direction anywhere to the southward and westward of Melville Island?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No.

867. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was the date at which your best view in that direction was obtained?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—It was on the 28th of May 1851.

868. *Sir G. Back.*—Where was your position?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—It was in about $74^{\circ} 40'$ latitude (to the north of Cape Dundas) and $114^{\circ} 28'$ longitude.

869. *Sir E. Parry.*—About what height were you above the sea?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—600 or 700 feet.

870. *Sir E. Parry.*—You said your examination of the coast began at Byam Martin Island; where did you end?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—My examination of the coast included the south part of Byam Martin Island, and then from Point Griffiths the whole of the southern coast of Melville Island to Cape Dundas, then along the west coast into Liddon's Gulf into Bushnan Cove, from which I returned over land to Winter Harbour, and then from Winter Harbour nearly the same course back to the ship. Returning from Byam Martin Island I followed round the shore of Graham Moore Bay to Cape Cockburn, and thence along the shores to the ship at Griffith's Island.

871. *Sir E. Parry.*—Had you an opportunity of noticing the rise and fall of the tides in any part of your voyage?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No, except the indications along the shore.

872. *Sir E. Parry.*—You had no opportunity of noticing from which direction the flood tide came?
Lieutenant M. Clintock.—No.

873. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you make any observations on the stream outside Beechey Island? *Lieut. M'Clintock.*

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

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874. *Captain Beechey*.—You do not know whether there was any stream probably?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—We made no observations on it, but we could not help remarking that the ice set to the eastward; that was independent of the wind I think.

875. *Captain Beechey*.—Then you are of opinion that the prevailing stream is to the southward and eastward out of Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

876. *Sir G. Back*.—May I ask you whether you saw any Esquimaux encampments on Melville Island?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, there were three or four different positions along the south shore.

877. *Sir G. Back*.—Were they old encampments, or of recent date?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—They were very old.

878. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any animals on the coast, more particularly on Melville Island?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

879. *Sir G. Back*.—What were they?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I saw four bears, forty-six musk oxen, twenty reindeer, seventy hares, one wolf, about fifty ptarmigan, many large flocks of Brent geese, and many ducks in large flocks.

880. *Sir G. Back*.—Of those how many did you kill?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—One bear, four musk oxen, one reindeer, five hares, twelve ptarmigan, thirteen ducks, and one Brent goose.

881. *Sir G. Back*.—Could you have killed more than that if your necessities had required it?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

882. *Sir G. Back*.—How many more do you think you could have killed; could you have doubled or trebled the number?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think that nearly two thirds of the animals might have been killed, and a large number of ducks and geese.

883. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you notice which way the ducks and geese were flying?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think they generally came from the westward, and were going to the eastward.

884. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you at that time form any idea of any open water in the direction in which they were flying?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

885. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was there any indication of open water to the north when you were upon Melville Island?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

886. *Sir E. Parry*.—From what you saw do you think it possible that parties of men entirely dependent upon their own resources could exist through the year by laying up in the summer season that which was to last them for the rest of the year, supposing them to be well supplied with arms and ammunition?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think there was sufficient game for that purpose, but I think they would be short of fuel with which to cook it. The scarcity of fuel would render it impossible for them to maintain themselves although there was plenty of game.

887. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you leave any notices of your travels as you proceeded by Cape Dundas?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

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888. *Sir G. Back.*—Will you state where?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—In several positions; the principal were in Skène Bay, Winter Harbour, and Bushnan Cove. Also one on the western extremity of Melville Island reached.

889. *Sir G. Back.*—For that purpose, did you erect cairns or any conspicuous objects that could be seen?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

890. *Sir G. Back.*—What were they?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Cairns of stone.

891. *Sir G. Back.*—May I ask you how many days you were out on this journey altogether, from the time of your leaving your ship till your return?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Eighty days.

892. *Chairman.*—Had you expressed any opinions as to the probability of Sir John Franklin having passed through the western strait, early in the year before the search was commenced, or in the paper that was edited in the squadron at that time, the *Aurora Borealis*?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

893. *Chairman.*—Did you think at that time that Sir John Franklin had gone up the Wellington Channel?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

894. *Chairman.*—Did the subsequent proceedings confirm you in the belief that that was the course of Sir John Franklin's expedition?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

895. *Chairman.*—Will you state your reasons?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Sir John Franklin probably found the ice to the westward fast, as we found it, and that then he retraced his steps to try Wellington Channel. Secondly, that his travelling parties from Beechey Island would have got as far as Captain Penny's, and would have received the same encouragement; also from the fact of the workshop on shore, they seem to have left rather hastily, as if a favourable opportunity had presented itself, and they lost no time in availing themselves of it.

896. *Chairman.*—These were your reasons for thinking that he had gone up Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think another may be added, not having found any record at Beechey Island.

897. *Chairman.*—Do not you consider, on the contrary, if he had taken the new channel that he would have left at his wintering place some information of the route he had taken, to guide others in the search for him?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think not.

898. *Chairman.*—Why do you think so?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think it was in accordance with his instructions that he made the second attempt by Wellington Channel.

899. *Chairman.*—Then if Sir John Franklin took that direction, can you tell why no traces were found of his previous exploring parties which he had sent out to discover the channel that he afterwards took himself?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Some traces were found, I believe, as far as Cape Bowen on the east side. These journeys were accomplished when the snow was on the ground, and one could hardly expect to find traces of him two or three years after.

900. *Chairman.*—Do not you think they would do as subsequent explorers have done, set up cairns in conspicuous places?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I have no doubt they did on reaching the farthest point, as Sir James Ross did. I think his travelling parties put up cairns before they commenced the return to their ships.

901. *Chairman.*—Then you think cairns would have been discovered on either side of the Queen's Channel had Captain Penny's exploring parties

proceeded farther? How can you explain satisfactorily to us that Sir John Franklin's exploring parties should not have done the same thing as other explorers?

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Lieutenant M^cClintock.—I think they did before they commenced their return, but I think that neither Captain Penny nor Mr. Goodsir got as far as the Franklin travelling parties may have attained.

902. *Chairman.*—Then under all these circumstances you are of opinion that further search ought to have been made in that direction before the return of the expedition to England?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

903. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you form the opinion you have given that Sir John Franklin had ascertained by his exploring parties the appearances of the sounds and islands and open water beyond Wellington Channel which were seen by Captain Penny before Captain Penny's return?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

904. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—That was your previously formed opinion?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

905. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were your men much exhausted when you returned?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—No.

906. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How much longer do you imagine they could have sustained the same labour and privations; how much longer than the eighty days you were out?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—I believe that they could have gone on three or four weeks longer if it had been necessary to do it.

907. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How long after the summer commences, do you think it practicable to travel over the ice by sledges?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—I think travelling becomes almost impracticable in that locality after the 15th of June.

908. *Captain Beechey.*—Do you think you could have reached Banks's Land, as marked on the chart, if you had been left to your discretion?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

909. *Captain Beechey.*—What distance did it appear to you that Banks's Land was from Cape Dundas?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—About fifty miles.

910. *Sir E. Parry.*—Is that about the distance that I made it?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes. I consider it about fifty miles.

911. *Sir E. Parry.*—Does my idea of the distance coincide with your own?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

912. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—You have stated the number of days you were out; will you state the number of miles you travelled, and the daily average?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—My sledge travelled 900 statute miles; the daily average was twelve miles. I walked considerably more than 900 miles.

913. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was your longest day's journey?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Twenty-four statute miles.

914. *Captain Beechey.*—Could you have commenced your journey earlier than you did?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Under the circumstances of our equipment, I think not.

915. *Captain Beechey.*—Why could you not?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Because we were not prepared to meet so great a degree of cold.

916. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you see any land to the westward of your position to the west of Melville Island?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

917. *Captain Beechey.*—Will you state how far it appeared to you to extend?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—It was land extending from the north shore of Liddon Gulf westward to longitude 117° 40', in northern latitude 75° 17'.

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918. *Sir E. Parry.*—Between that and Banks's Land you saw no land?
Lieutenant M'Clintock.—None.

919. *Captain Beechey.*—Was the ice in motion any time during your journey?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—No.

920. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How many men of the sledge crews returned to the ships, by the arrangements made by Captain Austin, sick or frost bitten during your exploration?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—From the division of sledges under my orders ten men were sent back disabled by frost bites, illness, and debility. From my own party two were sent back disabled by severe frost bites.

921. *Chairman.*—You have said that you think further search ought to be made in the direction of Wellington Strait. Will you tell us in what way, had you commanded the expedition, you would have prosecuted that search, taking into consideration the quantity of provisions you had left?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—It is impossible to say what I should have done had I the command of the expedition.

922. *Chairman.*—You must take into consideration the instructions from the Admiralty, which were, that unless some traces of Sir John Franklin were found, to return to England at the end of the season of 1851; you must take into consideration also your provisions, and that you were then at the 13th of August?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think I should have done my utmost during the navigable season of 1851, and that I should have come home in obedience to my orders.

923. *Chairman.*—You are speaking of 13th August. You got out of your winter quarters as soon as you could. You were off the straits on the 13th of August. How would you have proceeded, and in what direction, to make the further search which you considered necessary?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I said, I think, I would have done my utmost during the navigable season of 1851 by sending one or more vessels up Wellington Strait, but to return in time so as not to risk another winter, in compliance with the Admiralty orders.

924. *Chairman.*—You mean, I apprehend, that you would have sent a steamer up to the open water you saw off Cape Bowden?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

925. *Chairman.*—Supposing the steamer had found open water?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I would have proceeded as far as possible in that direction.

926. *Chairman.*—In that case, supposing that you had found the strait open, you would have gone forward with the whole expedition?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I would send up one or more vessels, and if the strait had opened I would have gone further, but still bearing in mind that if no further traces were found it was our duty, in compliance with our orders, to return.

927. *Chairman.*—All that you know on the subject at present of the navigable water is, that there is an open lead ten miles up. All the evidence we have had states that the ice across the strait extends twenty or thirty miles up the strait, so that this open water reported to you could not have been more than one third of the whole barrier?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

928. *Chairman.*—Then do you think that it would have been prudent with only two years provisions left to have risked passing a winter in the upper part of this strait, not knowing where it might lead to, and having no certain traces that Sir John Franklin went that way?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—It is a risk which I would try to avoid by returning before the winter set in, but I think it is only a risk which it would have been my duty to run were I placed in such a position.

929. *Chairman*.—How much more of the navigable season remained to you on the 13th of August?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Three weeks.

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930. *Chairman*.—If you had ascertained, on a farther examination of the barrier, that it still continued fast to the northward, how much longer would you have remained off Cape Riley?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—In any delay that I might have made there I would have been governed by the appearance of the ice.

931. *Sir E. Parry*.—What records did you find of my expedition of 1819 and 1820?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—The first record found was at Bushnan Cove, and consisted of writing on parchment deposited in a tin cylinder beneath a cairn of stones; the tin cylinder was very much corroded and the writing nearly obliterated. The next trace found of the expedition of 1819 and 1820 was a monument on Table Hall near the Winter Harbour, but we had not time to search for the record beneath it. The third record found was an inscription upon a rock at Winter Harbour, on a sandstone rock. The fourth and last record found was on a point south of Fife Harbour; it was a paper document in a sealed bottle, buried beneath a cairn of stones; it was in perfect preservation; it was replaced together with the record of the expedition of 1850 and 1851.

932. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you consider bottles better than tins for that purpose, from what you saw?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, much better.

933. *Sir E. Parry*.—What records did Captain Austin leave at his winter quarters?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Two monuments; one on the south point of Griffith's Island, the other on Cape Martyr. They were built with stone from ten to fifteen feet in height, and in each a record was placed.

934. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you know whether in bottles or cylinders?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I do not know.

935. *Sir E. Parry*.—You were with Sir James Ross in his last expedition, were you not?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes.

936. *Sir E. Parry*.—What record did you leave at your winter quarters at Port Leopold?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—The paper which was subsequently found, I think, by the North Star.

937. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was there more than one record left there?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Not that I am aware of.

938. *Sir E. Parry*.—As it appears to have been the general practice to leave records at all the places wintered in by our ships, why do you think Sir John Franklin deviated from that practice?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I think his deviation from that practice was not intentional, but that it was overlooked in the excitement of leaving his winter quarters hastily.

939. *Sir E. Parry*.—As you have said that it was not likely that ships could be forced out of the harbour of Becchey Island, have you formed any idea as to what circumstances led to so sudden a departure of Sir John Franklin's expedition as not to give time for leaving a record at so important a station as that?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—I suppose that a favourable opportunity presented itself for prosecuting his voyage which hastened his departure, and that not having left a record was an oversight.

940. *Sir E. Parry*.—You think then that under some such circumstances you might have omitted to leave the records there yourself?

Lieutenant M'Clintock.—Yes, I think so.

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941. *Chairman.*—Are you aware that on the 12th of August 1851, when the ships were crossing the mouth of Wellington Channel, Captain Ommanney went aloft himself for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the ice, and that he called Mr. Elliott, the second lieutenant, to witness what he saw on that occasion?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—I was not aware of that.

942. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you meet with any drift wood on your journey?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Only one small piece in Graham Moore Bay. It appeared to be decayed fir.

943. *Sir G. Back.*—There were no indications of its having been cut or charred?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—No.

944. *Sir G. Back.*—Was there any ice blink at your extreme point of view westward from Cape Dundas?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

945. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny in 1851?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—No. I have not seen Captain Penny this year until to-day.

946. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you any suggestion to offer to the Committee as to any improvement in the fitting-up or equipment of sledges for ice travelling, from your experience?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—I think our equipments might be considerably improved.

947. *Chairman.*—Will you send into the Committee any suggestions you may have to make on this subject?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—Yes.

948. *Chairman.*—In what time could you prepare those suggestions?

Lieutenant M^cClintock.—I will draw them up, and send them in on Friday.

Mr. Abernethy.

Mr. ABERNETHY called.

949. *Chairman.*—You were in Sir John Ross's expedition?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

950. *Chairman.*—When you passed from Cape Riley to the western side of Wellington Straits, did you make any observations upon the nature and quantity of the ice in September 1850? Were you near enough to make correct observations?

Mr. Abernethy.—It came under our observation, because we were the first vessel that came into what we call Union Bay; that was on the 27th of August 1850, the day on which we went in there.

951. *Chairman.*—Did you see the ice in Wellington Strait on that day?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, it was so closely packed. I saw Captain Penny and the two Americans working to the northward. There was no other way for them to go at that time.

952. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of the ice at that time? Were the straits navigable or blocked up?

Mr. Abernethy.—Not navigable.

953. *Chairman.*—What sort of ice was it?

Mr. Abernethy.—It was heavy floe ice.

954. *Chairman.*—Did you consider from the appearance of the ice on the 27th of August that it was likely to break up, and that the straits would clear before the end of the navigable season?

Mr. Abernethy.—My opinion is, from what I know and from what I have heard that it did not break up in Wellington Channel, and that Wellington Strait was not navigable during the year 1850.

955. *Chairman.*—What extent of ice north and south do you think remained at the conclusion of the navigable season in 1851?

Mr. Abernethy.—As far as I know from the report that I have had and my own experience I should say about twenty miles.

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956. *Chairman.*—Did you see any open water to the northward of the ice?

Mr. Abernethy.—I did not.

957. *Chairman.*—Do you think that, supposing the extent of ice up and down the strait, from north to south, was twenty miles, anybody could have seen open water on the other side at a distance of twenty miles?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I think not. I know nobody could do that.

958. *Chairman.*—For what reason?

Mr. Abernethy.—From the ship's mast-head you could not see open water twenty miles.

959. *Sir G. Back.*—You could see whether there was an ice or a water blink?

Mr. Abernethy.—You might guess at it, but guessing is not what we want.

960. *Chairman.*—Can you give us any further particulars of the state of the ice that year before you crossed over and went into your winter quarters near Griffith's Island?

Mr. Abernethy.—It was a very open season, but when we crossed Wellington Strait we crossed to Cape Hotham between Griffith's Island and Cornwallis Island, and there we found the ice stationary, not broken up at all, and we could not get any further.

961. *Chairman.*—Then you went into your winter quarters?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, that was the only thing we could do.

962. *Chairman.*—Can you tell when you first heard of open water being discovered to the north of Wellington Strait?

Mr. Abernethy.—I think it was on the 10th May that I heard open water was found in Wellington Strait.

963. *Chairman.*—What opinion did you form from your own experience? Did you think it was part of the navigable channel?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, I was always of that opinion. The flood came from the westward, behind Cornwallis Island in the South Channel, whereas in Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait the flood comes from the southward.

964. *Sir E. Parry.*—How do you know the flood comes from the westward to the north of Cornwallis Island?

Mr. Abernethy.—I heard from Captain Penny that the flood tide comes westward to the north of Cornwallis Island. I had always that opinion before Captain Penny told me.

965. *Chairman.*—You did not see the open water yourself; you know no more about it than you have heard?

Mr. Abernethy.—No.

966. *Chairman.*—And you did not make any inland journeys yourself?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

967. *Chairman.*—How far?

Mr. Abernethy.—Forty miles, as near as I know.

968. *Chairman.*—But no journey that enabled you to see the open water and to judge for yourself?

Mr. Abernethy.—No.

969. *Chairman.*—Then you do not from your own personal knowledge know anything more till you got out of your winter quarters again, and came back to the entrance of Wellington Strait?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

970. *Chairman.*—Will you tell us what you observed? Was the ice there still?

Mr. Abernethy.—The ice was there still, and if ever Wellington Strait was clear of ice it was clear last season, for I saw the ice coming down like

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stones down a hill, and there was water at the back of it; that was on the 12th of August 1851.

971. *Chairman.*—Where were you at that time?

Mr. Abernethy.—Crossing the mouth of Wellington Strait, within sight of land. It was quite clear; we could see from Cape Hotham to Beechey Island.

972. *Chairman.*—What situation did you fill in the "Felix"?

Mr. Abernethy.—Master.

973. *Chairman.*—Did you go up and examine the ice after you were cast off? You were coming across by Cape Hotham and Cape Riley, and saw the ice go out?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

974. *Chairman.*—And when you got to the southward, the ice was still coming out?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

975. *Chairman.*—And you think that if you had waited the ice would have cleared out entirely?

Mr. Abernethy.—My opinion is, that the ice was breaking up at that time in the strait.

976. *Chairman.*—How long do you think it would have taken to clear the strait?

Mr. Abernethy.—I do not know. I think we could have found a way past had we wanted to go up Wellington Strait.

977. *Chairman.*—From your knowledge of Arctic navigation do you think it would have been prudent, supposing you had found a way through the strait, to persevere in a search which must have involved the risk of passing a second winter there, with, at that advanced season of the year, only two years provisions on board?

Mr. Abernethy.—I would not risk that, for a different arrangement must be made. Wellington Strait is a dangerous navigable passage, particularly to go to Cornwallis Island, and the ice flowing about with the tide. It would not be safe for a ship to go up there.

978. *Chairman.*—Then you mean to say you would not have proceeded into Wellington Strait?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, not if I had wished to keep my head; nothing could be done, in my opinion, farther than was done.

979. *Chairman.*—Then you consider that both expeditions were justified in returning to England without making any further search this year?

Mr. Abernethy.—Certainly, I say so.

980. *Chairman.*—You would not have taken up your winter quarters again?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, certainly not.

981. *Sir E. Parry.*—Which way do you think Sir John Franklin was likely to have gone?

Mr. Abernethy.—I really do not know how to answer that question. I cannot answer it, because it is all guess work.

982. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you ashore at Beechey Island?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

983. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it was well searched for documents?

Mr. Abernethy.—I searched it myself; I turned up every stone, and I went to every place with a pickaxe, and overhauled it myself.

984. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you on shore at Cape Riley?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

985. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think it was well examined?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, I have every reason to think so.

986. *Sir E. Parry.*—From your experience in the ice do you think that ships wintering in Beechey Island could have been forced out by the ice?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I am quite sure they could not have been forced out; they might have been forced in, but not out.

987. *Sir E. Parry*.—The Committee have asked you these questions because they consider you an experienced person in navigation amongst ice. State to the Committee what your experience is?

Mr. Abernethy.—I was six voyages in whalers before I went out with Sir E. Parry. I was two voyages with him. I was only one winter with him; in 1827 we did not winter. Since that I have been four winters and five summers with Sir John Ross. I was with Sir James Ross in the Antarctic regions four years. I was one voyage with Sir James Ross in Barrow Straits to Port Leopold. Then in the “Felix;” that was another winter.

988. *Sir E. Parry*.—When you returned in the “Felix” to the east side of Wellington Strait in 1851 did you see any lead or lane of water upon the east side of the strait?

Mr. Abernethy.—I do not exactly know about that, for I did not take much notice. I did not want to go that way.

989. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Do you know whether anybody in the “Felix” saw it?

Mr. Abernethy.—There was no one who had a better right to look after it than myself, but I did not want to go that way, the flocs were coming down.

990. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What time elapsed from your leaving Assistance Harbour to your reaching the winter quarters of the “Erebus” and “Terror”?

Mr. Abernethy.—We left winter quarters on the 12th of August, and we went to Union Bay on the same day. We left it on the next morning at four o'clock.

991. *Sir G. Back*.—Do you know anything about a piece of tin said to have been found there by Adam Beck?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I did not see it, although I went there to look for it I went to the top of the hill to look for it. I heard there had been such a thing, and I went to look for it myself, but I did not see it.

992. *Sir G. Back*.—Was Adam Beck a man whose word you could rely upon?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I should rather hesitate; he is not a person I would rely much upon.

993. *Sir E. Parry*.—Why?

Mr. Abernethy.—Because he equivocates so much; he would say one thing at one time, and at another time a very different thing.

994. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was he a sober man?

Mr. Abernethy.—No.

995. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you believe his story about the ships being lost up by Cape York?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I do not believe that exactly, but, as I said to Captain Austin, “it was well to look into it, as it had been reported to us.”

996. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you believe it now?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I do not. I never did believe it

997. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you as an experienced man in Baffin's Bay think that two ships could be lost upon the north-east part of it, and the vessels destroyed, and the crews all murdered or perished?

Mr. Abernethy.—I think not.

998. *Sir E. Parry*.—You have known ships to be lost in Baffin's Bay?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, up in Melville Bay.

999. *Sir E. Parry*.—Have the crews escaped generally?

Mr. Abernethy.—Always escaped, because as long as there are ships there is no danger.

1000. *Sir G. Back*.—As you have had a great deal of experience amongst ice, you will be able to answer a question I am now going to put. It has been related by good authority that in the middle passage of Baffin's Bay, the ice has been known to run over a vessel, so that in a few minutes nothing was seen

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of her but the spanker boom. Do you think it possible that such an event might have happened to both Sir John Franklin's ships?

Mr. Abernethy.—It might have happened. I know that ice will walk over a ship, but to take the two at once is not probable.

1001. *Sir G. Back.*—But you know that ice will “walk over” a ship?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes.

1002. *Sir G. Back.*—Have you in your experience ever known such a case to have happened to a ship?

Mr. Abernethy.—I saw a ship belonging to Aberdeen, called the “Elizabeth;” she was taken off by two floes of ice, the one floe walked up over her side, and the other cringed the other side, and the ship was lost, but the men were saved by jumping on the ice.

1003. *Chairman.*—How were the men saved afterwards?

Mr. Abernethy.—They escaped over the ice to the next ship.

1004. *Sir G. Back.*—Whereabouts was this?

Mr. Abernethy.—I think it was in Melville Bay.

1005. *Sir G. Back.*—Supposing that no ships had been near, what then would be your opinion as to what would have happened to the crew of the “Elizabeth”?

Mr. Abernethy.—They must have made their best way to the shore by the boats. The men on such occasions are always saved.

1006. *Chairman.*—Supposing such a catastrophe to have happened to Sir J. Franklin's ships, if there had been no other ships near, where could the people have gone to?

Mr. Abernethy.—They must have gone to where the natives are, and they are with them still if they are in existence at all. That is all they have to do. Some of the officers who went with Sir John Franklin know the Esquimaux; and I think that search should be made amongst these different tribes of Esquimaux on the north side of Baffin's Bay.

1007. *Chairman.*—And you think that if Sir John Franklin's ships were broken up in Baffin's Bay, and the men are still alive, they would be found among the Esquimaux?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, I think so.

1008. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you known much of the Esquimaux in that part of Melville Bay?

Mr. Abernethy.—Yes, I have.

1009. *Sir E. Parry.*—From what you know of the Esquimaux in other parts do you think they are likely to have murdered our people?

Mr. Abernethy.—No, I never believed anything like that; they do not appear to have any ill feeling towards us; they are a different kind of people.

Lieut. Osborn.

LIEUTENANT SHERARD OSBORN called.

1010. *Chairman.*—You commanded the steam tender “Pioneer”?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

1011. *Chairman.*—You were employed in the exploring parties to the southwest in the spring under Captain Ommanney?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

1012. *Chairman.*—And you explored along the southern part land marked in the chart as explored by you?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes, the last part of it.

1013. *Chairman.*—Do you think that it was so thoroughly examined that no traces could be left behind of the missing expedition?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

1014. *Chairman.*—Did you examine the gulf laid down in the chart?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Captain Ommanney went down and examined it.

1015. *Chairman.*—Was that the first Arctic expedition that you had been connected with?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

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1016. *Chairman*.—And you have made no personal observations as to the ice in the Wellington Strait, either in September 1850 when you crossed it going to the westward, or when you returned and crossed to the eastward?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Nothing more than the other officers who made the search.

1017. *Chairman*.—In 1851 did it look like old ice or new ice?

Lieutenant Osborn.—It was decidedly fixed ice.

1018. *Chairman*.—You think the strait had been opened the first year that you saw it?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No, I did not think so.

1019. *Chairman*.—When you recrossed it in the following year what was the state of the ice?

Lieutenant Osborn.—It was broken on the west side, from Barlow Inlet to Cape Hotham; there was broken or loose ice to the southward; on the east side water was running up towards Point Innes.

1020. *Chairman*.—How far did you see? What was your range of vision?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I went on to the crow's nest, and on a clear day we calculated we saw ten or twelve miles.

1021. *Chairman*.—You saw no open water over the fixed ice?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No, nothing that I should say that looked like that. I saw a strong ice blink to the northward.

1022. *Chairman*.—You had no opportunity of ascertaining the amount of ice north and south of the strait at that time?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No. I saw an ice blink to the northward, and a piece of loose stuff to the westward.

1023. *Chairman*.—You had no opportunity yourself of seeing these two lines of ice marked on the chart. Do you think they are accurately laid down?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I should think so. Of the lower one I can judge, for in 1850 the ice was fixed at the time we crossed, but in 1851 we were not far enough to the northward.

1024. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days were you out from the ships to the south-west?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Fifty-eight days.

1025. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the total distance in miles that you went over?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I think 506.

1026. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days were you alone after parting from Captain Ommanney?

Lieutenant Osborn.—From the 16th to the 25th of May.

1027. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—From your own observation do you consider that there is any navigable sea in the south-west direction, along the coast you travelled?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No. I never saw anything that had that appearance.

1028. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—In what state did your men return to the ships were they much fatigued?

Lieutenant Osborn.—On the day they returned they were much fatigued, otherwise they were in good health.

1029. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How much longer do you consider they might have undergone the same labour with the same amount of provisions?

Lieutenant Osborn.—On the outward march we were on bare allowance, and on that they could not have gone on more than eight or ten days. In returning we were able to give our men increased allowance of food in consequence of the rapid march. That improved their health considerably.

1030. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What animals did you see?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Two foxes on the outward march, two bears on the homeward march, but they were close to Griffith's Island. I killed a fox. I think I saw 18 ptarmigan.

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1031. *Chairman.*—No ducks or geese?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes; I think a couple. As we reached Griffith's Island the bears were passing to the north-west.

1032. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Do you think you could have travelled over the ice with sledges during the whole of the season?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Not with heavy sledges.

1033. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Up to what period?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Up to the 15th of June.

1034. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—State how many men of your sledge division were frost-bitten?

Lieutenant Osborn.—One on my sledge, and Mr. Hamilton's sledge had two men slightly frost-bitten.

1035. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How many men returned to the ships sick under Captain Austin's arrangements?

Lieutenant Osborn.—One man only.

1036. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Taking into consideration the provisions you had, could you have carried the search further to the south-west?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No; if I had taken the same time in coming back as I took in going out I should have been out of provisions when I reached the ship. I timed myself.

1037. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Have you any suggestions to make to the Committee for the improvement or equipment of sledges to carry out ice-travelling?

1038. *Chairman.*—It would be more satisfactory if you were to put your suggestions on paper, and send them in to the Committee?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I will do so. I will send them in on Friday.

1039. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present at any interview in 1851 between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No.

1040. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any Esquimaux encampments in your journeys to the south?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes; one very old one.

1041. *Sir G. Back.*—How old was it?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I cannot tell; but a great number of years.

1042. *Sir G. Back.*—From your southern extremity did you see any lane of water or loom of land to the south-west?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Not to the south-west; I struck off to the west, and I think I saw a loom of land. It cleared up, and the loom of land disappeared, and I saw a distinct loom to the southward.

1043. *Sir G. Back.*—What distance do you suppose that land was off?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I think about twenty or twenty-five miles.

1044. *Sir G. Back.*—Did it appear to be mountainous or hilly?

Lieutenant Osborn.—It was distant so that I could not tell,—perhaps about 300 or 400 feet.

1045. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it your impression that it was connected with the land on which you stood?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

1046. *Sir E. Parry.*—From your experience of steamers in navigating among the ice, are you of opinion that they are of great value in that navigation?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes, of great value. I should be sorry to go in anything else.

1047. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think that the season of navigation is prolonged in any degree by having steamers in those seas?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes; perhaps for ten or twelve days, just while the young ice is forming.

1048. *Sir E. Parry*.—To about what temperature do you think steamers make the navigation practicable under those circumstances?

Lieutenant Osborn.—To three or four degrees below zero.

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1049. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you navigate in as low a temperature as that?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No.

1050. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then on what do you form your opinion?

Lieutenant Osborn.—On the ease with which we navigated at a temperature of three above zero.

1051. *Sir E. Parry*.—Were any of your pipes choked by the ice under these circumstances?

Lieutenant Osborn.—We kept a careful watch upon the injection.

1052. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the injection water never impeded coming in by the ice?

Lieutenant Osborn.—It was not reported to me as having occurred.

1053. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think that is a circumstance to be apprehended?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

1054. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the land to the south-west on which you went?

Lieutenant Osborn.—The low limestone began rising in the interior to hills, forming from 150 to 300 feet.

1055. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was a great deal of the land over which you travelled there, low land?

Lieutenant Osborn.—A great deal; the beach was mostly so.

1056. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you perceive any appearance of shoals in the offing, by ice being pressed up upon them?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I saw the shingle showing itself constantly between nips in the floe. The floe had broken, and turned up the gravel where the pressure had been.

1057. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was that at any distance from the beach?

Lieutenant Osborn.—The weather was usually thick. On one occasion I saw at farthest fifteen miles from the beach.

1058. *Sir E. Parry*.—Then you would consider that coast a very difficult and dangerous one?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes, one decidedly to be avoided.

1059. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood in the course of your journey?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No; I never saw a piece.

1060. *Sir E. Parry*.—As you got to the southward did the horizontal magnetic needle become more sluggish?

Lieutenant Osborn.—It appeared to improve as we went from our longitude of 100 degrees.

1061. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it of practical use as an instrument for taking bearings?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Kater's compass was.

1062. *Sir E. Parry*.—And you used it for that purpose?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

1063. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you ever in a position of particular danger in a steamer in those seas?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I have been in a position of difficulty.

1064. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—State when?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Off Wolstenholme Sound. It was our intention to rejoin the "Resolute" and the "Assistance," and we had to pass through thirty miles of very heavy pack; the vessel became almost helpless, and it was only by constantly backing and proceeding that we forced our way through it.

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1065. *Sir G. Back.*—In your opinion do you think that everything was done that could be done by both expeditions for carrying out the search?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes, I think so.

1066. *Sir G. Back.*—Do you therefore think that Captain Austin and Captain Penny were fully justified in coming home?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes, I thought so then.

1067. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the winter quarters of the "Erebus" and "Terror" were discovered?

Lieutenant Osborn.—No, I was there after the discovery.

1068. *Chairman.*—Did you go on shore at the time the search was being made for records?

Lieutenant Osborn.—I visited it several times after the search had been made.

1069. *Chairman.*—And you know that every possible search was made for anything that might have been deposited there by Sir John Franklin?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes, a most careful search had apparently been made.

1070. *Sir E. Parry.*—When you were on the spot, what was your opinion of the route Sir John Franklin had taken?

Lieutenant Osborn.—My opinion was, that he had gone to Cape Walker to carry out his instructions, and that he returned when he found that it was impracticable, in order to proceed up Wellington Channel.

1071. *Sir E. Parry.*—Under all the circumstances, what is your impression on that subject now?

Lieutenant Osborn.—My impression is, that Sir John Franklin has got to the north-west by Wellington Strait, or some other route.

1072. *Sir E. Parry.*—Do you think now that Wellington Strait was the most probable route he pursued?

Lieutenant Osborn.—Yes.

Lieut. Cator.

LIEUTENANT J. B. CATOR called.

1073. *Chairman.*—You commanded the "Intrepid"?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1074. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the first traces of Sir John Franklin having wintered were discovered?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1075. *Chairman.*—Do you think that every search was made for records that might have been left there?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1076. *Chairman.*—As far as you know, do you think every possible search was made to prevent any document deposited by Sir John Franklin being left behind unobserved?

Lieutenant Cator.—Not when we first found them.

1077. *Chairman.*—Do you think the search subsequently made by the officers of the expeditions to obviate the possibility of anything left behind was complete?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1078. *Chairman.*—Did you, in crossing the mouth of Wellington Strait, make any observations on the ice? Was Wellington Strait open or closed at that time?

Lieutenant Cator.—It was closed.

1079. *Chairman.*—Have you been an Arctic voyage before?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1080. *Chairman.*—Then you are not able to give any information about the age of the ice with which Wellington Strait was closed?

Lieutenant Cator.—Comparing it with the ice met with in Baffin's Bay, I think it is much heavier in Wellington Strait.

1081. *Chairman*.—How near to the southward extremity of the fast ice in Wellington Strait did you pass in September 1850?

Lieutenant Cator.—We went close along the edge. We took the only opening there was. We crossed before the other ships. We had ice on both sides, and the only opening was from Point Innes to Barlow's Inlet.

1082. *Chairman*.—And the whole way across was blocked up by ice at that time to the northward?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1083. *Chairman*.—How far do you consider you saw from the crow's nest?

Lieutenant Cator.—I should think twenty miles at the outside.

1084. *Chairman*.—Did you see any open water or any appearance of open water to the northward, or anything like a water sky?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1085. *Chairman*.—Did you accompany any of the exploring parties at the spring of this year?

Lieutenant Cator.—No. I was employed preparing the vessel for sea, and was three weeks away trying to procure fresh meat for the expedition.

1086. *Chairman*.—On the 11th of August 1851 did you again pass the southern barrier of Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1087. *Chairman*.—What observations did you make as to the state of the ice you had left in the preceding autumn?

Lieutenant Cator.—I think the ice was of a heavier nature than in the previous autumn. It was more hummocky.

1088. *Chairman*.—As you passed over to the eastward did you see any leads of water?

Lieutenant Cator.—Up from Beechey Island, as far as I could see, there was towards Cape Innes.

1089. *Chairman*.—How far do you think you could see them?

Lieutenant Cator.—About ten miles.

1090. *Chairman*.—Was that a broad or narrow channel?

Lieutenant Cator.—It might have been four or five miles wide, without any apparent obstruction of the ice as far as I could see.

1091. *Chairman*.—Was the ice apparently running out of the strait at that time?

Lieutenant Cator.—I do not think it was. I should say it was packing up Wellington Strait.

1092. *Chairman*.—You did not see any ice coming rapidly from Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1093. *Chairman*.—Do you recollect which way the wind was at that time?

Lieutenant Cator.—It was a calm in the morning. Towards one or two o'clock in the afternoon we got clear of the ice, and there was wind from the west or west-north-west.

1094. *Chairman*.—How long did you remain in that neighbourhood?

Lieutenant Cator.—We steered down Barrow Strait the same day and never stopped.

1095. *Chairman*.—Are you sure that was on the 11th?

Lieutenant Cator.—No; it was on the 12th, the day when we left "Assistance Bay."

1096. *Chairman*.—Then on the 12th you proceeded down Barrow Strait?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1097. *Chairman*.—Did you, from any observations of your own at the time, consider that there was a probability of Wellington Strait opening and becoming navigable during the remaining part of the season?

Lieutenant Cator.—No, I imagined that the ice was packed.

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Lieut. Cator.
4th Nov. 1851.

1098. *Chairman.*—Does that apply to the open channel that you had seen? You had seen an open channel close in to the eastern shore. Where do you think that open channel closed?

Lieutenant Cator.—That I cannot answer, for I have no idea where it closed. The ice struck me as packing up Wellington Strait.

1099. *Chairman.*—How far did you go in your attempt to procure fresh meat for the squadron?

Lieutenant Cator.—About eight miles.

1100. *Chairman.*—What animals did you see?

Lieutenant Cator.—Loon, and duck, and dove-key.

1101. *Chairman.*—Any quadrupeds; musk oxen, or bears?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1102. *Sir E. Parry.*—Anything besides birds?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1103. *Chairman.*—Will you state your opinion as to steam navigation. To what extent might you prolong the examination of those sea with steam vessels beyond what you might do with sailing vessels?

Lieutenant Cator.—We could not prolong it after the temperature fell to 3 or 4 below zero. We tried it in reaching Cape Walker, and our injection pipes froze then, and we were obliged to apply hot coals out of the furnace.

1104. *Chairman.*—And by that means could you keep the engine working?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes, but not with any efficiency; for when the cinders became cold the water froze again.

1105. *Chairman.*—How many days longer in September last year were you able to prolong the navigation with the assistance of steamers?

Lieutenant Cator.—I should say four or five days later.

1106. *Chairman.*—Have you any knowledge of any further circumstances with regard to the search for Sir John Franklin which you wish to state to the Committee?

Lieutenant Cator.—No, none.

1107. *Chairman.*—Do you think that everything was done by both expeditions to carry out the instruction of the Admiralty?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1108. *Chairman.*—And do you think anything further might have been done by persevering at the risk of passing another winter in Barrow's Strait?

Lieutenant Cator.—I do not think there could, for the men were worn by their exertions in travelling in the spring. I do not think they could accomplish anything equal to the distance in the second year. Without they could have got further than Cape Riley, they would have to go over nearly 300 miles before they found new ground beyond what Captain Penny had explored.

1109. *Chairman.*—Then you do not think that anything could have been done with the ships themselves if they could have got above Wellington Strait into the open water?

Lieutenant Cator.—From all I have heard, I should say not.

1110. *Chairman.*—Were you present at the search and the examination that was made in consequence of a report that was received from Adam Beck?

Lieutenant Cator.—No, I was not present.

1111. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was your impression on the spot as to the course Sir John Franklin pursued after leaving Beechey Island?

Lieutenant Cator.—My idea was that Wellington Channel was the course he had taken.

1112. *Sir E. Parry.*—Having heard all the circumstances, now what is still your impression on the subject?

Lieutenant Cator.—I do not think he ever passed Cape Riley.

1113. *Sir E. Parry*.—Having heard and considered all the circumstances, what is now your impression on the subject?

Lieutenant Cator.—My impression is that he never passed Beechey Island either to the west or north, but that he was swept away by the ice and lost in Barrow's Straits. My reason for that is, that when we were at Beechey Island the ice coming out of Wellington Strait set in round us towards Cape Riley, and very nearly cut us off from the "Assistance." We had to go close in to the land ice, between the drift and the land ice.

1114. *Sir G. Back*.—Therefore you infer that Sir John Franklin's vessels have been swept away?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes.

1115. *Sir G. Back*.—Out of Union Bay?

Lieutenant Cator.—I suppose he has been swept from his winter quarters. My impression is, that he has cut out to the edge of the ice, and been swept away by the ice coming down, and carried away to the south-east.

1116. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you present at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1117. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Were you ever in any position of danger in the "Intrepid?"

Lieutenant Cator.—On the 27th of August 1851 I was driven in contact with an iceberg, and was forced forty feet up against the berg; the ice ran under us, and forced us up with our taffrail forty feet above the edge of the floe, and our bow was thirty feet above.

1118. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Describe any damage the vessel sustained, and how she was extricated?

Lieutenant Cator.—We lost our rudder, and broke our screw framing. We were altogether twenty-one hours in that position. The ice eased off, and we slipped down off the berg. We came down quite easily.

1119. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did the hull of the vessel sustain any damage?

Lieutenant Cator.—I think it was strained, but it was not damaged much.

1120. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the steam machinery injured by it?

Lieutenant Cator.—No, not at all.

1121. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the lowest temperature that you ever navigated the "Intrepid" with under steam?

Lieutenant Cator.—I think it was three or four below zero.

1122. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the date of that?

Lieutenant Cator.—To the best of my recollection it was on the 12th of September 1850; we were navigating under steam at a temperature of three below zero.

1123. *Sir G. Back*.—After Captain Penny's return from his discovery of open water above the Wellington Strait do you know whether he asked Captain Austin for a steam vessel to pilot it up there?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1124. *Sir G. Back*.—You never heard?

Lieutenant Cator.—No.

1125. *Sir G. Back*.—You have said that every thing was done by both expeditions. Do you think, therefore, they were justified in coming home this season?

Lieutenant Cator.—Yes; I think they were justified in returning.

Mr. BRADFORD called.

1126. *Chairman*.—What ship were you surgeon of in the expedition?

Mr. Bradford.—Of the "Resolute."

1127. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the winter quarters of the "Erebus" and "Terror" were discovered?

Mr. Bradford.—Not when they were first discovered. I was there when the search was made.

Lieut. Cator.
4th Nov. 1851.

Mr. Bradford,
Surgeon.

Mr. Bradford,
Surgeon.

4th Nov. 1851.

1128. *Chairman.*—And did you think the search was so complete that there was no probability of any records being overlooked or left behind?

Mr. Bradford.—I think the search was quite complete.

1129. *Chairman.*—Cape Riley you have no knowledge of, I believe?

Mr. Bradford.—No; I was not on shore there.

1130. *Chairman.*—You assisted in the exploration of the coast to the westward during the early part of the spring of this year?

Mr. Bradford.—Yes.

1131. *Chairman.*—Will you point out where your separate search began?

Mr. Bradford.—It began off Griffith's Point, east coast of Melville Island. Then I proceeded along the east of Melville Island to the northward, reaching about $76^{\circ} 21'$, north latitude. I was there stopped by the weather, heavy gales of wind from the northward and westward. I remained two or three days, and then returned southwards towards Byam Martin Island, carrying out the instructions I had received. Then I returned to Bathurst Land from Byam Martin Island, went round Graham Moore Bay, exploring the upper parts of it, rounded Cape Cockburn, and returned along the coast by Alison's Inlet, round by Bedford Bay up to Cape Capel, where I met Mr. M'Clintock again. I then returned by Mr. M'Clintock's route to the ship.

1132. *Chairman.*—How long were you absent?

Mr. Bradford.—Eighty days.

1133. *Chairman.*—How many people had you ill or frost-bitten?

Mr. Bradford.—I sent no men back with frost bites, but every man in the tent suffered more or less from frost bites.

1134. *Chairman.*—And you are quite convinced that the search was made with such care and minuteness that nothing was likely to be overlooked?

Mr. Bradford.—Yes, I am convinced of that. As a proof, I found Lieutenant Aldrich's cairns on the east coast of Byam Martin Island, not having previously known that he had been there.

1135. *Chairman.*—Have you anything further that you wish to communicate to the Committee with reference to the search after the missing expedition?

Mr. Bradford.—No, we met with not the slightest trace.

1136. *Chairman.*—Do you think everything was done by the two expeditions to fulfil the instructions under which they were acting?

Mr. Bradford.—I think there was a great deal of zeal and energy displayed in carrying out the objects they had in view.

1137. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the number of miles you travelled?

Mr. Bradford.—670 nautical miles.

1138. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was your lowest temperature?

Mr. Bradford.— 39° minus was the lowest we registered.

1139. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the longest day's journey?

Mr. Bradford.—Fifteen or sixteen miles, running under sail.

1140. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were your men much exhausted on returning to the ship?

Mr. Bradford.—Their feet had become swollen by being so long in the water.

1141. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—From your experience, how much longer could the sledge crew have continued their labour with the same amount of provisions?

Mr. Bradford.—Not many days more, for their feet were swelling from walking so much in the water.

1142. *Sir G. Back.*—Suppose a party of men left to their own resources, how long could they maintain themselves?

Mr. Bradford.—I do not think a party could maintain themselves at any place I have visited during the winter. I saw game on Bathurst Land, round Graham Moore Bay, some deer, many ptarmigan, and a few hares.

1143. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What did you consider the latest period in the season that sledge travelling could be safely continued?

Mr. Bradford.—We returned on the 4th of July, and I consider we were very

late. I think we might go out in many seasons, and not be able to stay longer than the latter end of June.

1144. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—State the number of animals and birds you killed?

Mr. Bradford.—Fifteen or twenty brace of ptarmigan. I assisted in killing a bear at the west part of Graham Moore Bay. Melville Island is very barren of game. I saw nothing there hardly; in fact I only shot one brace of ptarmigan along the coast.

1145. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Can you suggest any improvements in sledge travelling by equipments or other means?

Chairman.—We will ask you to put any suggestions you may have to offer on this point in writing, and send them in on Friday?

Mr. Bradford.—I will do so.

1146. *Chairman*.—Were you present at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny in the present year?

Mr. Bradford.—I have met Captain Penny in Captain Austin's cabin before the travelling commenced, but not since the 4th of July.

1147. *Sir E. Parry*.—When you were at your farthest north on the east coast of Melville Island, did you see any appearance of open water to the northward?

Mr. Bradford.—None.

1148. *Sir E. Parry*.—You saw nothing but ice?

Mr. Bradford.—Nothing but ice.

1149. *Sir E. Parry*.—What did you think was the direction of the land in Melville Island beyond your farthest point?

Mr. Bradford.—My view was very limited on account of the heavy drift snow and gales of wind.

1150. *Sir E. Parry*.—Do you think that Bathurst Land and Melville Island are connected?

Mr. Bradford.—I have one reason for thinking so, the smoothness of the floe and the want of pressures on the north part of Byam Martin Island.

1151. *Sir E. Parry*.—Had you any opportunity of noticing the rise and fall of the tides on your journey?

Mr. Bradford.—No.

1152. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the land very barren on Melville Island?

Mr. Bradford.—Yes, very barren in vegetation, and deeply covered with snow.

1153. *Sir E. Parry*.—And it appeared to shelve off?

Mr. Bradford.—Yes, very much. There was considerable pressure on the east coast of Melville Island from the eastward, but none from the northward.

1154. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was the ice in the neighbourhood of Byam Martin Island heavy?

Mr. Bradford.—Yes; the ice in the south of Byam Martin Island was very heavy.

1155. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any traces of Esquimaux?

Mr. Bradford.—None along the eastern coast of Melville Island. At the eastern point of Byam Martin Island there were several, and very old.

1156. *Sir E. Parry*.—Could you form any judgment as to the date?

Mr. Bradford.—They appeared to be similar in date to those of Cornwallis Island. They were numerous along the coast of Cornwallis Island.

1157. *Chairman*.—What was the state of the men when they returned to England?

Mr. Bradford.—They had quite recovered, and were very healthy.

1158. *Sir E. Parry*.—I think you lost one man. State to the Committee how it was?

Mr. Bradford.—He was frost-bitten in the feet, in consequence of wearing leather boots. It was against orders, and he put a pair of felt gaiters over to conceal them, and made them look like winter boots. I think the American mocassins are the best things to wear in the Arctic regions.

Mr. Bradford,
Surgeon.

4th Nov. 1851.

Mr. Penny.
—
4th Nov. 1851.

1159. *The Chairman (addressing Captain Penny)* said,—Before you go, we wish to know whether you wish any other of your officers to be examined?
Captain Penny.—No.

In reply to a similar question from the Chairman, Captain Austin said, he thought he should have to call Mr. Brooman. He and Captain Austin were walking together when Captain Penny returned, and he could speak as to what transpired.

The Committee then adjourned.

Eighth Day. November 5, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles C.B., M.P. Chairman,
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,
 Captain F. W. Beechey,
 Captain Sir George Back,
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

The Chairman spoke as follows:—The Committee having received and considered Mr. Penny's letter of this day's date, are of opinion that he should be informed by the Chairman, that the Committee do not feel themselves justified in pronouncing any opinion upon the question to which his letter refers; but that he is at liberty to use his own judgment in bringing forward further witnesses if he thinks proper.

The letter alluded to by the Chairman was as follows :

" Sir, 437, Strand, 5th November 1851.
 " Before I wait upon the Committee this morning, I beg permission to ask
 " if I may understand that I am not now in the wrong position in which I
 " was placed by the publication of the correspondence between Captain Austin
 " and myself, making me appear to be the cause of Captain Austin's not going
 " up Wellington Channel.
 " If this is not proved to your satisfaction, I shall beg permission to bring
 " forward witnesses in my favour, who can prove what I wish.
 " I have the honour to be,
 Sir,
 " With great respect,
 " Your obedient servant,
 " WM. PENNY."

LIEUTENANT ALDRICH called.

Lieut. Aldrich.

5th Nov. 1851.

1160. *Chairman.*—You were first lieutenant of the "Resolute," I believe?
Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes.

1161. *Chairman.*—Were you on shore, immediately after the traces of the missing ships on Beechey Island?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No. I was much engaged for two or three days, and then I was sick for about five days.

1162. *Chairman.*—So that you have no personal knowledge of the matter?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—None whatever.

1163. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observations on the appearance of the Wellington Strait as you passed in September 1850?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Nothing, beyond it being very full of ice.

1164. *Chairman.*—Did it appear completely blocked with ice?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes, with the exception of the line east and west.

1165. *Chairman.*—You were engaged in the spring of the present year with an exploring party in Bathurst Land?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes.

Lieut. Aldrich.
5th Nov. 1851.

1166. *Chairman.*—Do you think that the part examined by you was so completely searched that there was no chance of any records or documents deposited being overlooked or left behind?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I think so, certainly.

1167. *Chairman.*—Are you quite satisfied, generally speaking, that the whole exploration of the coast to the westward by different officers was as carefully and minutely made as that you made yourself?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes, I think so. I speak somewhat confidently on the point from what I know of those officers.

1168. *Chairman.*—Have you any personal knowledge of the report made by Captain Penny in 1851, of his having discovered open water at the north and west of the strait?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No; I was absent. I know nothing of it myself.

1169. *Chairman.*—When you got out of your winter quarters and proceeded to the eastward, in crossing the strait from Cape Hotham to Cape Riley, did you make any observations upon the ice?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes. I was ordered to the mast head by Captain Austin and made a report in writing on the state of the ice.

1170. *Chairman.*—Do you recollect on what day of the month it was?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—It was on the 12th of August. We came out of the Assistance Bay on the 11th, and crossed the bay on the 12th.

Vide p. 41. A. 352.

1171. *Chairman.*—You stated to Captain Austin then that, “in compliance with his request that you should observe from the crow’s nest to the northward when crossing Wellington Channel, you went aloft to examine and saw large floes of ice in the channel, and that there was a continuous floe as far as the eye could reach, rendering it perfectly unnavigable, and likely to continue so some weeks to come?”

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I must remark that at half past four o’clock that afternoon there was a very great deal of open water to the east side of the strait; but of course, as I was not called upon to give my observations then, I did not give them.

1172. *Chairman.*—Did you consider, at that time, that there was any probability of the strait clearing?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes, I think so.

1173. *Chairman.*—Was the open water to the eastward of Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes.

1174. *Chairman.*—Will you state how far you saw the open water towards Point Innes?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Ten or twelve miles.

1175. *Chairman.*—I suppose what happened was, that as you changed your position, and got further to the eastward, you got a view of open water which had been previously concealed from you?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—By the ice or by reflection. I could not see any water at half past one o’clock, but at four o’clock, from the change of position, I could see but very little ice.

1176. *Chairman.*—How far did the water extend?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—There appeared to be open water from Beechey Island to Cape Bowden.

1177. *Chairman.*—What is your experience in polar navigation? Have you been more than one voyage?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—None previous to this.

1178. *Chairman.*—Have you any knowledge of a communication from Captain Penny to Captain Austin asking him for a steamer to go up Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Nothing, beyond hearing that he had asked.

1179. *Chairman.*—From whom did you hear that?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—It was the subject of conversation amongst ourselves, that Captain Penny had applied for a steamer.

1180. *Chairman.*—Did you speak to Captain Penny on the subject?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes; we had a long conversation. I said that I thought it would be very important to employ the rest of the season in steaming up

Wellington Channel, not with the view of remaining; but because he expressed himself very sorry that he was not able to get further than he did. He said he should ask for a steamer. I have only reason to believe that he asked from hearing people say that he did; I was not present at any communication that took place between Captain Penny and Captain Austin on that subject, nor on any other.

Lieut. Aldrich.
5th Nov. 1851.

1181. *Chairman.*—Were you at Captain Penny's winter quarters after he had discovered the open water in Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes.

1182. *Chairman.*—And what was the result of your conversation, as far as Sir John Franklin was concerned?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Captain Penny said he believed that Sir John Franklin's expedition had gone away in open water, and that it was now beyond our reach from this side.

1183. *Chairman.*—How did he describe the water to you that he had discovered? Did he say that it was navigable?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—There appeared to be great difficulties for ships and boats, from what Captain Penny said. He went round Baillie Hamilton and Deans Dundas Islands. On one side or the other the ice blocked up the navigation of these islands, and he stated that the currents were so swift that a boat could not possibly pull against it.

1184. *Chairman.*—What impression did that make upon your mind?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—That there was a vast difficulty in navigating it, and that the only hope was of a steamer penetrating further than he did himself, and I often said to him that I thought it would be very desirable that a steamer should go up.

1185. *Chairman.*—Did you consider yourself that if you had remained a further time to watch the opening of the Wellington Strait, you could have done so without endangering your return to England before the setting in of winter?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I do.

1186. *Chairman.*—How long do you think you could have remained off Cape Riley without endangering the ships?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—With safety a week or ten days; but that would have shortened the time for going up Wellington Strait in order to ensure the return.

1187. *Chairman.*—What would have been the danger if you had gone up?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—The danger would have been in getting through those islands, and the risk of being blocked up on our return; the ice might have completely filled up the passage against our return. I do not apprehend that there would be any freezing in until about the first ten days in September.

1188. *Chairman.*—Suppose you had succeeded in 1851 in getting up into the open water discovered by Captain Penny, as far as Cape Sir John Franklin; do you think there would have been considerable risk of your not getting back this year?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Very considerable risk.

1189. *Chairman.*—Why?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—From the circumstance of the ice blocking up the passages of those islands.

1190. *Chairman.*—And you would have been left there during the whole winter, encountering the greatest difficulty in obtaining provisions?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Not if the steamers had been previously provisioned, as we were in Baffin's Bay, for the purpose.

1191. *Chairman.*—What quantity of provisions would your steamers have carried?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Nine months.

1192. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Did you report the open water on the east side of Wellington Strait to Captain Austin, or make any statement to Mr. Allen, the master?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I made no official report, because I was not ordered to do so.

Lieut. Aldrich.
5th Nov. 1851.

1193. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I observed in the journals that you were a long time on board the "Lady Franklin" at winter quarters, from the 24th of July to the 11th of August, what was the object?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I went to visit Captain Penny's vessels, and I was unable to get back on account of the breaking up of the ice, and the thaw having filled the gullies with torrents of water. Captain Penny could not spare me a boat for the purpose, being occupied preparing his ships for moving and cutting out.

1194. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Was that the time you had a conversation with Captain Penny as to the steamer?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes.

1195. *Sir E. Parry.*—In your sledge journeys did you see any open water anywhere?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—None; not a particle till I returned.

1196. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any water sky?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No.

1197. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you, if you had time, suggest any improvement in such travelling parties?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I have often thought of it, and I have made a report on the subject. I do not think I could add anything to what I have stated in my report. I think there was a great shortness of grog, and spirits of wine.

1198. *Chairman.*—What the Committee wish is this, that you would be good enough to put on paper, for the future guidance of officers similarly situated, any observations that may occur to you for the improvement and equipment of parties for polar expeditions of this sort.

Lieutenant Aldrich.—To each of my reports there is appended, by Captain Austin's desire, my opinions as to equipments. If I were to consider for months I should have nothing to add to the reports I have already made, and our health and strength after sixty-two days I consider the best proof.

1199. *Chairman.*—As you think you could not suggest anything further, Captain Austin will be good enough to put in the report made at the time.

1200. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was the farthest north you made in your northward journey?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—76° 16'.

1201. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was the trending of the land from your furthest extreme?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—It was so thick that I could not see one mile beyond.

1202. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you think, at that time, that Melville Island is connected with Bathurst Land?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I always thought the contrary.

1203. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was your reason for that impression?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I could see no land between that I stood upon and the opposite point.

1204. *Sir E. Parry.*—Had you any opportunity of seeing to the northward?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes.

1205. *Sir E. Parry.*—And you saw no land in that direction?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No.

1206. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was the state of the ice in that part?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—It was level.

1207. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any drift wood?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Not a bit.

1208. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you see any Esquimaux encampments?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Only one. Not in the spring travel, but in the year before, opposite Griffith's Island; that was the only one I ever saw.

1209. *Sir G. Back.*—Did you see any animals?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I saw twenty-seven deer.

1210. *Sir G. Back.*—Anything else?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I saw one fox, and it was the fifty-fourth day before I saw a bear.

Lieut. Aldrich.

5th Nov. 1851.

1211. *Sir G. Back.*—If you had had no provisions could you have supplied yourselves?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No; we could not have existed without the provisions we had.

1212. *Captain Beechey.*—Have you made any report to Captain Austin as to the number of animals?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No.

1213. *Sir E. Farry.*—Did you leave records of your own journeys?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—Yes; on every opportunity I had I left records under cairns of stone; but I must observe that the ground was so thoroughly frozen that it was with the greatest difficulty at times that we got stone sufficient to make the smallest cairn.

1214. *Captain Beechey.*—Was there any rise or fall of the tide?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—I should judge so by the uplifting of the ice, but of the amount I cannot judge. I thought at the time that it would have been a serious loss of time if I had stopped to make any examination of the kind.

1215. *Captain Beechey.*—Were you present when Captain Penny took his leave of Captain Austin?

Lieutenant Aldrich.—No, I was not.

Captain Austin rose, and read the following paper:

“Mr. Chairman.—With regard to a journal which you have called for, I beg to state that I have no journal, but that I have with care made the log a journal from which all may be obtained of any necessary interest required. It is necessary to remind you that the transmission of journals is not called for in my orders, as upon the occasions of discovery or as on former Arctic voyages; further that such was generally understood by all composing the expedition, early after our departure from England.

“Under these circumstances I have only in my possession notes that were made from time to time. These notes are my private thoughts, and never intended, in their present state, for other eyes than my own. I place them before the Committee, who will perceive that they are so; and the Committee I am sure will agree with me in opinion, that from their nature being private, in some measure sacred, I ought not to be asked to put forward their contents, further than so far as they may bear upon the subject of the search, or matter connected with the Wellington Channel. At the same time, whatever may be there stated I most rigidly desire to abide by. My impression is, that the substance of these views has been stated already in evidence.

“These notes are as they were tied before our arrival, with the exception of one parcel which I referred to in the Committee-room when giving evidence.”

Mr. ALLEN called.

Mr. R. C. Allen,
Master.

1216. *Chairman.*—You were the master of the “Resolute,” I believe?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1217. *Chairman.*—Have you any experience in the Arctic seas, or was this your first voyage?

Mr. Allen.—This was my first voyage.

1218. *Chairman.*—So that you do not consider yourself very experienced in the appearance of ice?

Mr. Allen.—Nothing more than I learned this voyage.

1219. *Chairman.*—Were you present when the first traces were found of the missing expedition in Beechey Island?

Mr. Allen.—No; the “Resolute” came up after the other ships

1220. *Chairman.*—Were you on shore afterwards?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, I was afterwards.

Mr. R. C. Allen,
Master.
 5th Nov. 1851.

1221. *Chairman.*—Do you consider from your own knowledge and observation that the search made was so complete as to render it impossible that any records or documents deposited there could have been overlooked?

Mr. Allen.—I think it possible that they did not dig deep enough under the cairn.

1222. *Chairman.*—How deep did they dig?

Mr. Allen.—Mr. Bradford, the officer in charge of the party, dug about two feet, and asked me if it was deep enough; and I said, Yes. Some time afterwards, when travelling, I was told that in Sir James Ross's expedition they dug four feet when searching for a document in Possession Bay, and were about giving it up, when a man took up a pickaxe, and said he would give another pick. The result was, that Sir Edward Parry's bottle turned up. I understand, however, that the "Assistance's" people dug five feet.

1223. *Chairman.*—In crossing the mouth of the Wellington Strait, as you proceeded to the westward, did you make any observations on the state of the strait as regards the ice at that time?

Mr. Allen.—Yes; we passed the Wellington Strait in the course of the afternoon and evening of the 12th or 13th of September 1850, and the ice appeared to me as though it had not broken away that season. Captain Penny came across after us some ten or twelve miles to the northward of us, and the ice had much broken. Captain Penny came across thirty-six or forty hours after us.

1224. *Chairman.*—After the ships got into winter quarters did you make any journey yourself, or form any part of the exploring parties?

Mr. Allen.—I was sent to Lowther Island, Davy Island, and Garnett Island, to examine the state of the ice generally, and to lay out a depôt of provisions for one of the return parties. I left the ship on the 24th of April 1851.

1225. *Chairman.*—And what did the state of the ice appear to you to be in Barrow's Strait at that time? Was there any appearance of open water?

Mr. Allen.—Not a bit; it was all hard frozen.

1226. *Chairman.*—When you got out of your winter quarters, and proceeded again to the eastward, you crossed Wellington Strait?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1227. *Chairman.*—And what observation did you make on the state of the ice there?

Mr. Allen.—In coming across it appeared to me from the crow's nest that Wellington Strait was completely filled with ice. Between two and three o'clock we had arrived over to the eastward when I saw a channel of water of about five miles in width. There was water to the eastern shore, extending to the north, as far as I could see from the crow's nest, eleven or twelve miles.

1228. *Chairman.*—Point out on the chart how far the open water extended from Beechey Island northwards?

Mr. Allen.—It came from Cape Hotham to Beechey Island, from whence open water was seen extending on the east side of Wellington Strait about ten or twelve miles.

1229. *Chairman.*—Had you any information how far that barrier of ice extended north and south?

Mr. Allen.—No; I had no means of judging.

1230. *Chairman.*—This is a memorandum which you gave in to Captain Austin at the time you were on the crow's nest, is it not?

Mr. Allen.—No, sir; I know nothing about this. It is in Mr. Aldrich's handwriting.

Captain Austin explained to the Committee that he had handed in the memorandum under the impression that it was the one given to him by *Mr. Allen.* He then produced another paper, which he handed to the *Chairman.* Vide p. 41. Q. 352.

1231. *Chairman.*—Is this yours?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, this is. This is the state of the ice at noon.

1232. *Chairman.*—At that time, you saw no open water?

Mr. Allen.—Not up Wellington Strait.

*Mr. R. C. Allen,
Master.*

5th Nov. 1851.

1233. *Chairman.*—As you went over to the eastern coast did you see any change in the appearance of the ice?

Mr. Allen.—Yes; a very remarkable one. There was a channel of water, five miles in width, along the eastern shore of Wellington Strait, extending from Beechey Island ten or twelve miles to the northward towards Cape Bowden.

1234. *Chairman.*—Did you report that to Captain Austin?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1235. *Chairman.*—What was your own opinion on the subject? Did you think that the channel was suddenly opening, or that it was a lane of water which you had not previously perceived?

Mr. Allen.—I do not know how long it could have been; but as we went in over there I saw it opened.

1236. *Chairman.*—Was the ice coming out or in motion at that time?

Mr. Allen.—It was stationary, but the wind would set it in motion.

1237. *Chairman.*—What was the date of that?

Mr. Allen.—I think it was on the 12th of August 1851; it was the day on which we passed Wellington Strait at all events.

1238. *Chairman.*—In your opinion, could you have waited in safety to examine this open water, and also to observe whether any change took place in the barrier of ice by which Wellington Strait was frozen up?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1239. *Chairman.*—How long do you think you could have stopped without risking another winter there?

Mr. Allen.—About a month perhaps, judging from last year; the only means I had of judging.

1240. *Chairman.*—Did you receive any information enabling you to form an opinion as to the navigation of the open water said to be discovered to the northward?

Mr. Allen.—The information came in such a piecemeal manner that I could not tell. At one time it was said that there was plenty of water, and at another that there was very little.

1241. *Chairman.*—When did you first see Captain Penny's Land, that is now inserted in the chart?

Mr. Allen.—When we went over there.

1242. *Chairman.*—Were you called upon to examine that chart?

Mr. Allen.—Captain Austin gave it me to look at.

1243. *Chairman.*—Were there any documents appended to it?

Mr. Allen.—No.

1244. *Chairman.*—You had no conversation with Captain Penny on the subject?

Mr. Allen.—No.

1245. *Chairman.*—Do you know on what day that chart was given in?

Mr. Allen.—It was on the 10th or 11th of August.

1246. *Chairman.*—On what day did Captain Penny sail?

Mr. Allen.—On the same day that we did.

1247. *Chairman.*—Can you say of your own knowledge that Captain Penny ever asked for a steamer to go up Wellington Strait?

Mr. Allen.—No. I heard some persons talking at different times that such was the case.

1248. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation?

Mr. Allen.—No.

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1249. *Chairman.*—And can you explain in any way why you were not called upon to give your opinion, as the master, on so important a discovery as that?

Mr. Allen.—No.

An outline of a map was handed in which Mr. Allen had made for Captain Austin, from Captain Penny's description after his return from his first trip to the northward.

1250. *Chairman.*—Do you recollect when that was; I mean the date?

Mr. Allen.—It was on the 24th of May; it was when Captain Penny came over the first time.

1251. *Chairman.*—At that time had you any further consultation on the subject, with regard to any measures that should be taken to examine further what appeared to be so important a discovery as that?

Mr. Allen.—Captain Penny said he would get a boat up.

1252. *Chairman.*—Do you know that he asked for any assistance from Captain Austin?

Mr. Allen.—I do not know how I got hold of what I am going to say, so that I cannot be held responsible for it. There was a talk that Captain Austin would send people to assist the dragging of Captain Penny's boat up Wellington Strait, on the return of his people from travelling. That was my impression at the time, but I must repeat that I never heard it officially.

1253. *Chairman.*—How many people had you on board at that time?

Mr. Allen.—Not more than ten or twelve.

1254. *Chairman.*—So that it was out of Captain Austin's power at that time to lend him any assistance?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1255. *Chairman.*—And you are aware that subsequently Captain Penny's expedition did take a boat from their own resources?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, that was the case.

1256. *Chairman.*—Did you offer to Captain Austin to go in that expedition?

Mr. Allen.—Yes; I offered to go if any party went from our ships to search in that direction, either to act under Captain Penny or independently.

1257. *Chairman.*—Was Captain Penny aware of that offer?

Mr. Allen.—I did not mention it, but I think somebody told him of it.

1258. *Sir E. Parry.*—Had you an opportunity of observing the tides during any part of the winter?

Mr. Allen.—Very little. The tides were given in charge of Lieutenant Elliot of the "Assistance".

1259. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it a regular tide?

Mr. Allen.—The tide ran to the north-west and south-east, between Griffith's Island and Cornwallis Island; eight hours to the north-west and four to the south-east.

1260. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you judge which of these was the flood tide?

Mr. Allen.—That running to the north-west, coming from the south-east.

1261. *Sir E. Parry.*—You think the flood tide there came from the south-east?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1262. *Sir E. Parry.*—What was the rise and fall of the tide?

Mr. Allen.—Five or six feet.

1263. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did you find any drift wood in the course of your journey or elsewhere near the winter quarters?

Mr. Allen.—Not any.

1264. *Chairman.*—You are aware of the instructions Captain Austin had from the Admiralty?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1265. *Chairman.*—In your opinion, was everything done that could be done, by both expeditions, to complete the search for the missing ships?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, I think so; the travelling will show that very fully.

1266. *Chairman*.—You have said that you might have remained a month longer in the neighbourhood of Cape Riley, to wait for the possible opening of Wellington Strait; why do you think that, having come away so soon as you did, there would have been no probability, if you had stayed, of continuing the search?

Mr. Allen.—I think it very possible that the Wellington Channel might have been examined by us, if found necessary to do so.

1267. *Chairman*.—What course would you have taken to examine Wellington Strait?

Mr. Allen.—I would have put the two vessels in Radstock Bay, and sent the steamers up.

1268. *Chairman*.—Would you have proposed to have hazarded the steamers remaining all the winter in Queen's Channel?

Mr. Allen.—When I got there I should have seen what more could be done, and what means I had of sending out travelling parties for the next year.

1269. *Chairman*.—You must take into consideration the instructions of Captain Austin, and the amount of provisions left. What I meant to ask you was, if you had had command of the expedition, what measures you would have taken to search further in that direction. What do you think might have been done with safety?

Mr. Allen.—Such sudden changes take place from time to time that I think the ships might have been put in Beechey Island or Radstock Bay, or some place of safety, and then that the steamers might have tried to get up Wellington Strait into the water Captain Penny had discovered. But we could only see twelve miles from the crow's nest, and it is possible there might have been an obstruction. Those two vessels should have been provisioned with eighteen months each for about thirty-six men. The provisions for the expedition were for three years, and when we came home we had two years left nearly.

1270. *Chairman*.—Should you have run the risk of leaving the steamers during the winter in that channel?

Mr. Allen.—That I cannot answer. If it was, as Captain Penny reports, that the tides were violent there, I should perhaps have fallen back upon the ships, and in all probability returned with the expedition to England.

1271. *Chairman*.—Do not you think there might have been danger at that late season of the year of the ice closing in again and preventing the return of the steamers?

Mr. Allen.—Nothing more likely.

1272. *Chairman*.—You would have sent the steamers up, although you admit that the risks might have been very great?

Mr. Allen.—Yes.

1273. *Sir G. Back*.—Would you, under any circumstances, have made an attempt, with a sailing vessel, to get up there, providing one had been wanted for a depôt of provisions?

Mr. Allen.—I would not, if I could possibly avoid it.

1274. *Chairman*.—What is your opinion, from all you have heard and seen, of the probable direction the missing ships must have taken?

Mr. Allen.—I think they must have gone up the Wellington Strait, or to the S. W. between the meridian of 106° and 110° west longitude.

1275. *Captain Beechey*.—With reference to the operations in the polar seas; at what period do you think the climate becomes too severe for the handling of hawsers and tracking lines?

Mr. Allen.—About the latter end of September, or before sometimes, if the temperature falls rapidly.

1276. *Sir E. Parry*.—At what time in September 1850 did you go into the harbour in the *Resolute*?

Mr. Allen.—The 13th of September; that was the last day the ship was under weigh; but she was kept in expectation of getting further to the westward to the 24th of September.

Mr. R. C. Allen
Master.

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Mr. R. C. Allen,
Master.
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1277. *Sir E. Parry.*—How long could you have navigated the seas that year?

Mr. Allen.—Not later than the 13th of September.

1278. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then why did you consider the end of the month as the proper limit of the season?

Mr. Allen.—It all depends upon the season. At Baffin's Bay you can navigate much later.

1279. *Sir E. Parry.*—But in Wellington Strait what was the limit?

Mr. Allen.—The 12th of September, I think.

1280. *Chairman.*—How much sooner than the 12th of September was your progress so seriously impeded that your further progress was impossible?

Mr. Allen.—I think the navigation cannot be said to have ceased until the 13th of September that year.

1281. *Captain Beechey.*—Was it from the bay ice forming rapidly, or from your having been beset, that your progress was impeded?

Mr. Allen.—Both. We were beset at one time, and the last day we were under weigh the ice was forming. By pushing through it we got on tolerably well.

1282. *Chairman.*—Do you think that if you had waited another month would have had any chance of going out of Barrow's Strait, and home year?

Mr. Allen.—Yes, I think so. The Committee will recollect that this is my first arctic voyage, and I do not like to speak with too much confidence on the subject.

Lieut. Browne.

LIEUTENANT W. H. J. BROWNE called.

1283. *Chairman.*—What was your ship?

Lieutenant Browne.—The "Resolute;" I was third lieutenant.

1284. *Chairman.*—Did you explore the south part of Barrow's Strait marked with your name? It is the next land to the westward of North Somerset?

Lieutenant Browne.—Yes.

1285. Do you consider that the whole of that so marked on the chart was so carefully and minutely searched by you that no traces of the missing vessels could have been overlooked?

Lieutenant Browne.—Yes.

1286. *Chairman.*—Were you by yourself or with Captain Ommanney?

Lieutenant Browne.—I was travelling with Captain Ommanney, as far as Cape Walker; after that I went on alone.

1287. *Chairman.*—When did you return?

Lieutenant Browne.—On the 28th of May.

1288. *Chairman.*—Did you see any animals?

Lieutenant Browne.—Two rein deer, and two or three grouse, and one small bear.

1289. *Chairman.*—Do you think it possible for any persons left to their own resources there to have existed?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

1290. *Chairman.*—Have you any personal knowledge of anything that happened subsequently with regard to Wellington Strait?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

1291. *Chairman.*—Have you been out before?

Lieutenant Browne.—Yes; with Sir James Ross.

1292. *Chairman.*—What was your opinion of the Wellington Strait? Did you think that the ice in Wellington Strait was new ice, or of old formation that might have blocked it up for a considerable time?

Lieutenant Browne.—When we came past it was loose ice, but I was not near enough to see the barrier, whether it was old or new; I only saw the south edge of it, so that I could not form an opinion as to whether it was navigable higher up or not.

1293. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many of your men suffered from frostbites or sickness?

Lieutenant Browne.—Several of them suffered, but nothing serious. All came back in good health. I suffered myself.

Lieut. Browne.

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1294. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you send back any of the men who suffered from the sledge to the ship?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

1295. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—How many days were you out?

Lieutenant Browne.—Forty-three.

1296. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was the distance you travelled?

Lieutenant Browne.—375 miles I think, that is out and home.

1297. *Chairman*.—Did you give in to Captain Austin, on your return, any suggestions as to improvements in sledge travelling in these regions?

Lieutenant Browne.—Yes, I gave them to Captain Austin.

1298. *Chairman*.—Have you anything further to add?

Lieutenant Browne.—I have only to suggest improvements in the sledge and in the sleeping apparatus.

1299. *Chairman*.—That appears in your journal?

Lieutenant Browne.—Yes, it does.

1300. *Sir F. Parry*.—What was your most southern latitude in your journey?

Lieutenant Browne.—72° 52'.

1301. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the nature of the land?

Lieutenant Browne.—Cape Walker was old red sandstone, and further southward limestone and traces of granite. From 73° 50' to 72° 50' it was limestone.

1302. *Sir E. Parry*.—Was it high land?

Lieutenant Browne.—The point immediately to the south of Cape Walker is a remarkably high cliff, about 600 feet, perhaps more, and it lowers from that. The land for about forty miles is composed of hills 400 feet high.

1303. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you see the land of North Somerset clearly all the way?

Lieutenant Browne.—No, not all the way; we saw it when the day was clear.

1304. *Sir E. Parry*.—What was the state of the ice between these two lands?

Lieutenant Browne.—As far as I could see it was smooth floe ice. The whole journey was smooth ice, with the exception of the landing at Cape Walker.

1305. *Sir E. Parry*.—That ice did not appear to have been disturbed then?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

1306. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you observe the rise and fall of the tides?

Lieutenant Browne.—It appeared to me in these bays that the ice was on the ground, for I saw no tide marks. I frequently went on the land without knowing it.

1307. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you make any observations on the rise and fall of the tides?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

1308. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

1309. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—What was your lowest temperature?

Lieutenant Browne.—The lowest I registered was 22° minus

1310. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any traces of Esquimaux?

Lieutenant Browne.—At Cape Walker.

1311. *Admiral Fanshawe*.—Did you experience any difficulty in returning over the ice?

Lieutenant Browne.—It was too soon.

Lieut. Browne.
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1312. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Were you present during this year at any interview between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

Lieutenant Browne.—No.

Captain Kellett was called before the Committee, and informed that certain questions would be submitted to him, in writing, relative to any future search for the missing ships, to which he will be requested to give his most careful consideration, confining his replies (which are to be in writing) to Behring's Straits.

Mr. M'Dougall.

Mr. M'DOUGALL called.

1313. *Chairman.*—What position did you occupy?

Mr. M'Dougall.—Second master of the "Resolute."

1314. *Chairman.*—Had you been an Arctic voyage before?

Mr. M'Dougall.—No.

1315. *Chairman.*—You were sent to explore that part between Cornwallis Island and Bathurst Land?

Mr. M'Dougall.—Yes.

1316. *Chairman.*—Do you feel confident that the whole of that part was so completely searched as to enable you to say that no documents or records of the missing expedition were overlooked?

Mr. M'Dougall.—I did not land in the north part of the bay. I only saw it.

1317. *Chairman.*—Did you not advance yourself to the head of this gulf?

Mr. M'Dougall.—I had not sufficient provisions. I had only sufficient to take me back. Indeed I was away two days longer than I was provisioned for, and was consequently on short allowance.

1318. *Chairman.*—Did you meet Mr. Goodsir?

Mr. M'Dougall.—No.

1319. *Chairman.*—You are aware he passed along the bay you explored?

Mr. M'Dougall.—I understand he passed along the north shore of the isthmus between my position and Wellington Strait.

1320. *Chairman.*—You were always on the ice?

Mr. M'Dougall.—Yes; about a hundred yards from the shore.

1321. *Chairman.*—How long were you there?

Mr. M'Dougall.—I left the ship on the 4th of April 1851 provisioned for twenty days, to ascertain the state of the depôts laid out in the autumn of 1850. I found nearly all the provisions on Somerville Island had been destroyed by the bears and foxes. Feeling the lives of the travelling parties might depend on the safety of the depôts, I thought myself justified in deviating from my orders, and returned to the ship after an absence of five days, for the purpose of informing Captain Austin of what had occurred. I was again despatched and was absent thirteen days, a third time I left and was away twenty-two days, making in all forty days.

1322. *Chairman.*—Then you were out three different times?

Mr. M'Dougall.—Yes; five, thirteen, and twenty-two days.

1323. *Chairman.*—Did you observe the ice in Wellington Strait?

Mr. M'Dougall.—In September 1850 I was despatched from the ship to Point Innes. At that time the ice extended across the channel to Point Innes. I was desired to hoist a flag when it opened. I had not been there an hour when a floe of from seven to eight miles broke adrift, enabling the ship to pass. The ship at that time was fast to the floe about four miles off Cape Spencer.

1324. *Chairman.*—Do you think there was any chance of the Wellington Strait clearing for purposes of navigation at that time?

Mr. M'Dougall.—I should say not.

1325. *Chairman.*—When you returned the following year to Cape Riley did you observe the state of the ice?

Mr. M'Dougall.—No, except from the deck.

1326. *Chairman*.—Were you present in 1850 when the traces of the wintering quarters of the “Erebus” and “Terror” were discovered?

Mr. M^cDougall.

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Mr. M^cDougall.—I was not there when they were discovered.

1327. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the search for documents took place?

Mr. M^cDougall.—Yes.

1328. *Chairman*.—Do you think every possible search was made to prevent any documents being overlooked?

Mr. M^cDougall.—I think not a stone was left unturned. Every little cairn of two or three stones was fully searched.

1329. *Chairman*.—Was Cape Riley searched in the same way?

Mr. M^cDougall.—I landed at Cape Riley, looked round, and saw documents of Captain Ommauney. His documents were placed back in the cairn.

1330. *Chairman*.—What was the date of your turning back to rejoin the ship, and what was the state of the travelling?

Mr. M^cDougall.—When I rejoined the ship the last time (on the 13th June 1851) the travelling was very bad. The ice began to get very soft, and this difficulty increased as we approached the ship.

1331. *Sir E. Parry*.—You surveyed that land by which Cornwallis Island and Bathurst Land are connected; what was your furthest latitude north on that journey?

Mr. M^cDougall.—75° 17'.

1332. *Sir E. Parry*.—Are you quite sure of the junction of these two lands?

Mr. M^cDougall.—As far as I could see, the only opening was in the north-east corner of that bay. I saw the land all round distinctly with the exception at that part.

1333. *Sir E. Parry*.—Is the latitude of the north part of that bay liable to some correction?

Mr. M^cDougall.—It is very likely, as the distance is only estimated.

1334. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you observe the rise and fall of the tides?

Mr. M^cDougall.—Not particularly.

1335. *Sir E. Parry*.—Did you find any drift wood up in that bay?

Mr. M^cDougall.—None.

1336. *Sir G. Back*.—In going round the bay did you perceive any Esquimaux encampment?

Mr. M^cDougall.—Yes, one on a point six miles north of Baker Island, apparently of very ancient date.

1337. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you see any animals?

Mr. M^cDougall.—Half-a-dozen bears and one or two foxes.

1338. *Sir G. Back*.—What was the character of the ice in this bay?

Mr. M^cDougall.—It was one mass of floe ice.

1339. *Sir G. Back*.—Was there any packed ice against Cornwallis Island or Bathurst Land?

Mr. M^cDougall.—Not much, but a great deal near Baker Island.

1340. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you find any other encampment?

Mr. M^cDougall.—Another was found about eight miles west of Baker Point. It was apparently very old. In that situation I erected a cairn composed of the stones of the encampment.

1341. *Sir G. Back*.—I merely ask you as a general question, considering your limited experience amongst the ice, whether everything was done that could be done in following out the search for the missing ships by both expeditions?

Mr. M^cDougall.—I am scarcely competent to form a correct idea of what was done by Captain Penny's expedition; but with reference to our own, I think everything was done that could be done.

Dr. Sutherland.

Dr. SUTHERLAND recalled.

5th Nov. 1851.

1342. *Chairman.*—Dr. Sutherland, you have received from the secretary a communication to the effect that I am now going to make to you, viz., that we consider the corrections and additions to your evidence which you suggest would amount to a total alteration of what you said, and that we cannot receive them in that form, but you are at liberty to state them as supplementary evidence, on which you must expect to be cross-examined. I will put a corrected copy of the evidence into your hands that you may state what you may wish to add.

After the consideration of some verbal alterations which were assented to by the Committee,

Dr. Sutherland directed attention to the following question on page 20, No. 258. of the printed evidence: "In your advances you walked over the ice across Prince Alfred's Bay; on your return was there any reason why you could not go over it?" He wished the following to stand as the answer to that question:—"There was no reason, except that the orders were to keep along the land. The ice was tolerably good, although it appeared to have suffered a little from pressure when in the form of young ice, and I had no doubt the sun had not exercised its thawing power upon it during one summer, therefore it must have been only of one year's growth, and open water must have been in that locality some time last year."

The Committee then adjourned.

Ninth Day. November 6, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,
 Captain F. W. Beechey,
 Captain Sir George Back,
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

Sir JOHN RICHARDSON, C.B., Inspector of Hospitals, &c., called

Sir J. Richardson.

6th Nov. 1851.

1343. *Chairman.*—Sir John, two pieces of wood have been sent to you for examination?

Sir John Richardson.—Yes. I examined them and made a report upon them. There was a small piece of drift wood partially burnt. It was found in Disappointment Bay, on the north side of Cornwallis Island, latitude $75^{\circ} 36'$, and longitude, by computation, 96° west. It is a small piece of spruce fir, such as grows on all rivers of the North American continent that fall into the Arctic seas. It had evidently been exposed to the weather, and drifted for many years. It has been partially exposed to the action of fire recently, and could not have drifted far subsequently to its having been burnt. I cannot say, with confidence, how it has been burnt; but it may have been charred in the flame of a spirit lamp, as it has not been exposed to the strong action of fire. Then there was a piece of English elm plank picked up in Record Bay of Baillie Hamilton Island by Captain Penny, in latitude $76^{\circ} 2'$ north, longitude, by computation, 96° west. It was eighteen inches long when found, and an inch and a half broad at its widest part. The rough saw marks remain on one side; on the other side it has been dressed and pitched. It has been split from the board to which it belonged by the blows of an axe. From the state of decay in which this wood is upon the surface, I believe it to have been exposed to the action of the atmosphere and the surf for more than ten years. These are the only pieces of wood sent for my examination. I have made a very full report of my observations, and have also included the observations of the Reverend Mr. Berkeley, who is a very high authority on microscopic observations in this country.

1344. *Sir E. Parry.*—Are you of opinion that the little piece of burnt pine may have belonged to Sir John Franklin's expedition?

Sir John Richardson.—I think it may have belonged to some of his spring excursion parties.

1345. *Sir E. Parry.*—With respect to the elm, are you of opinion that it also belonged to Sir John Franklin's expedition?

Sir John Richardson.—I am of opinion that it has no connexion whatever with the expedition.

1346. *Sir E. Parry.*—From the reports laid before us at Woolwich of the drift wood seen by Captain Penny and his officers to the north and west of Wellington Strait, with which reports you are acquainted, can you form any conjecture as to the direction from which the pieces of drift wood probably came?

Sir John Richardson.—From conjecture merely. I think they may have come from the westward. It is most probable they came in that direction, not from the circumstance of their being found where they were, but because

Sir J. Richardson. such wood grows on the continent to the westward, and not to the eastward. I believe, however, that timber drifts up the Wellington Channel also.

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1347. *Sir E. Parry.*—What is your opinion of the piece of wood now before the Committee, brought home in the "Felix" by Sir John Ross, and reported by him to have been picked up on a hill on the north shore of the harbour where Sir John Franklin passed the winter of 1845-6?

Sir John Richardson.—From the cursory examination that I have given it since I came into the room, I believe it to be a piece of wood that has laid a long time on one side. The saw mark at the top is very recent. I cannot say how recent, but it does not appear to be above a year old, and is quite fresh in comparison; the post was tapered at the lower end. The handle of a rake brought home by Captain Ommanney from Beechey Island is much less weathered than the surface of Sir John Ross's stake, which contains lichens in a knot hole, but at the same time not nearly so fresh as the saw cut.

1348. *Sir E. Parry.*—You have examined the meteorological journal kept by Dr. Sutherland in his journey to the north of Wellington Strait?

Sir John Richardson.—Yes.

1349. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you compared the temperature shown in that journal with the temperature registered in Assistance Harbour on the same days and at the same hours?

Sir John Richardson.—I have compared them with Mr. Manson's.

1350. *Sir E. Parry.*—What difference of temperature did you observe in making this comparison?

Sir John Richardson.—The temperatures shown by Dr. Sutherland were colder by upwards of three degrees mean temperature. I wish to add an observation on climate. This is a question as regards the comparative climate in these two places. The presence of open water is no indication of a milder climate, unless the degree of saltness of the water is known. Where the water is very salt it requires a lower temperature to freeze it, and therefore a current coming from the north and north-west bringing down salter water would dissolve the ice sooner, although the mean temperature of the atmosphere might be lower than in more southern localities, under the influence of fresh waters poured out from the continent. My meaning is, that near the mouth of a large river the fresher water would be frozen sooner, but if the ice drifted into salter water it might again thaw.

1351. *Chairman.*—It appears, with regard to the register at winter quarters, that the thermometer was on the ice, and that Dr. Sutherland's was on the land. Would that make any material difference?

Sir John Richardson.—At that time the land was mostly covered with snow. I have noticed in my report that the influence of the ship might make some difference, but not enough to overlie the 3°. There cannot be a great difference, because there is only a degree or a degree and a half of latitude between the places of observation. I think there was no evidence of a warmer climate.

The *Chairman* acquainted Captain Penny, that some of the officers of his ships wished to be discharged from further attendance, but that the Committee did not think it proper to do so without consulting him previously. He (the *Chairman*) wished to know, as those officers were detained at considerable expense, whether any of them need be detained for the purpose of giving further evidence?

Captain Penny.—I should wish some of them to be called, that I may ask them some questions in order to elicit more clearly some points I wish to bring out.

Chairman.—The result of that would be, that Captain Austin must re-examine his witnesses, and the inquiry would be endless. Captain Austin was permitted to be present at the first, in order that he might hear and take notes, but was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses; and as we so decided with respect to Captain Austin, who is an accused party, we cannot alter our course of proceeding in your favour.

The Committee-room was then cleared; and on being re-opened the Chairman addressed Captain Penny as follows:—The Committee direct me to acquaint you, that having on all occasions (and more particularly yesterday) distinctly disclaimed the character of prosecutor or accuser during this investigation, you cannot be permitted to re-examine evidence; but that both Captain Austin and yourself will be allowed to offer any final observations at the conclusion of our proceedings. You have been at full liberty to be present during the whole course of the examinations, and to call all the witnesses you considered necessary.

Sir J. Richardson.

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CAPTAIN STEWART re-called.

Mr. A. Stewart.

1352. *Chairman.*—You have made a great many alterations in your evidence, several of them merely verbal, and the secretary will correct them with you without difficulty. There are others more extensive, and which entirely alter the sense of what you said, and we cannot allow them to be made. You will be allowed to offer any explanation you please; but where you have said “Yes” or “No” you cannot be allowed to change “Yes” into “No” or “No” into “Yes.”

Captain Stewart.—In reference to the following question, page 14, No. 183.: “At that time it would have been impossible for any persons not having the means of subsistence to have supplied themselves from such sources?” I said, “Quite impossible.” I meant to say, “If they had been successful in fishing it would have been quite possible.” In answer to a question in page 15, No. 197.: “State why it would have been impossible to have done any good?” the answer given was, “We might have got into the loose ice, and our two small vessels could not have effected any good.” I wish to correct this, by adding to that answer these words: “Without the assistance of steam.” The following question appears in 15, No. 199.: “Is it your opinion, under all the circumstances of the position of your vessel, and the stores you had, that you might have stopped another month?” The answer I gave was, “I think not, certainly.” I wish to explain, upon this answer, “That we could have stopped another month, but not another year. I understood a year to have been meant.” In page 15 is the following question, No. 202.: “Did you form any opinion as to the way Sir John Franklin had passed?” The answer given was, “He could not have come by the south-west.” I wish to explain, “That he could not have gone by the south-west, and that he could not have been driven down Barrow’s Strait without somebody seeing him.” In the same page (15), No. 204. this question occurs: “Did you express any wish to remain in the ‘Sophia,’ for that investigation?” I answered “No.” I wish to add, “Except I had been accompanied by a steamer.” In page 16, No. 209., the following appears: “Did not Captain Penny, at the same time, express his opinion that further search was unnecessary.” No answer is given in the evidence. I wish to make the following statement: “After the ‘Resolute’ came into Assistance Bay, I went on board with the chart, and Captain Penny followed immediately afterwards. After they had looked over the chart, and Captain Penny had explained to Captain Austin where he had been, he asked Captain Austin for a steamer.” He said to him, “You say we have been acting in concert. Let us prove the sincerity of that concert. Give me a steamer, and with the little ‘Sophia’ I will go up 500 miles further?” Captain Austin did not say “No;” but he drew himself up,—refused. I do not recollect the exact words he said; but it was a refusal. He said something, and Captain Penny said, “Then I know the truth of your sincerity, and I will have nothing more to do with you.” Then Captain Penny left immediately, both displeased and disappointed. This took place on the 11th of August, on board the “Resolute.” The next question, No. 209., is, “Did not Captain Penny at the time express his opinions that further search was unnecessary.” The answer I gave was, “Captain Penny wrote a letter to that effect; but I believe it was contrary to his convictions.” After the word “letter” in that answer I wish the words “which appears” to be inserted. In page 16, No. 211. is the following question: “Have you seen any cause to alter them?” The answer given was, “I did not know at the

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time that traces had been found in any other direction." I should have said, "I saw cause for further search with proper means." On the same page (16), No. 218. is the following question: "If you could not have got up there, why could Sir John Franklin; if you think he is gone up there he must have got through; if he could not get through how could you get through?" The answer I gave was: "He might have got through, but of course there is a great deal of chance work in it. It is a very difficult navigation." I wish to add to that answer, "When there is loose ice." In page 16, No. 219. is the following question: "The tides make it difficult?" The answer I gave was, "Yes." I wish to add, "When there is much ice." In page 17, No. 220. is the following question: "Then we are to understand that from Cape Beecher to Baring Island and Houston Stewart Island there is a great deal of packed ice that was driven to the eastward, and blocked up the channel?" The answer I gave was, "Yes." I wish to add these words, "About the middle of July." In the same page is the following question, No. 221. "Will you mark the line where you saw the ice packed when you were there in June?" The answer I gave was, "It was to the westward of Baillie Hamilton and Dundas Islands. There was loose ice as far as the eye could reach." I wish to add, "None of it was packed on the 1st of June." In the same page (17), No. 228. is this question: "And do you know anything more of any conversation that took place between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?" I answered, "No; I was never on board after that." I wish to add these words, "Captain Penny told me, a day or two afterwards, that he had said to Captain Austin, 'Go up Wellington Strait, and you will do the cause some service.' That was coming down Barrow Strait." In answer to a question in page 18, No. 234. I said, "Captain Penny meant to say, that no search was required beyond the Wellington Channel under the circumstances." I wish "in" to be substituted for "beyond."

The Committee, after a lengthened consultation, adjourned.

Tenth Day. November 7, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
 Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
 Captain Sir Edward Parry,
 Captain F. W. Beechey,
 Captain Sir George Back,
 Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

COMMANDER PULLEN called.

Commander Pullen.

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1353. *Chairman.*—You were First Lieutenant of the “Plover,” I believe?
Commander Pullen.—Yes.

1354. *Chairman.*—And you left her to go to Mackenzie River, and to explore the North American Continent?

Commander Pullen.—Yes; I left the “Plover” off Wainwright Inlet, and proceeded to Cape Barrow, and then to Mackenzie River.

1355. *Chairman.*—Will you give us some account of your journey, and inform us what were your observations on the thickness of the ice?

Commander Pullen.—From Wainwright Inlet I proceeded to the northward; a little to the southward of Cape Smyth I discovered what I considered to be a barrier of ice; from its appearance I thought there was no passage along the coast, and that I should have to return to the vessel. I hauled off the shore to the westward, ran along the line of ice three or four miles, met the yacht “Nancy Dawson,” and learning from Mr. Shedden (her owner) that he had been up to seventy-two degrees north without finding a lead to the north, and seeing no open water, hauled in for the land again, still keeping along the ice, when I met the Esquimaux, who told me that there was sufficient water for boats along the coast. Approaching the shore about Cape Smyth I got into a deep bight formed by the pack on the shore, and made fast to a heavy grounded mass of ice; this was late in the afternoon. We arrived at Mackenzie River on the 27th of August 1849, after an absence from the “Plover” of thirty-three days. Fort Simpson on the Mackenzie we reached on the 13th of October.

1356. *Chairman.*—Will you state how many boats and men you had?

Commander Pullen.—On leaving the “Plover” we mustered twenty-five men, including the Russian interpreter. We had four boats, the “Herald’s” barge decked over, the “Plover’s” pinnace, and two dockyard whale boats. We had seventy days provisions for each man.

1357. *Chairman.*—Do you think after leaving the “Plover,” and on your way to the Mackenzie River, you observed sufficiently close to enable you to say you did not pass any traces of the missing expedition?

Commander Pullen.—Yes; except between Cape Halkett and Point Berens, and there the shore was very low. I was aground in two feet of water out of sight of land.

1358. *Chairman.*—Did you generally travel in the day or night time?

Commander Pullen.—I only went on once at night; in fact it was hardly possible to do so; for as to taking rest in the boats so loaded as they were was out of the question, and we did not muster strong enough to spell; I therefore always considered it better to land; the coast then in the vicinity was always most particularly examined.

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1359. *Captain Beechey.*—What is the probability of Sir John Franklin's vessels from the eastward being able to pass Cape Barrow ;—through the ice of course ?

Commander Pullen.—In July 1849 the ice was packed heavy off Point Barrow, so as to prevent the possibility of a vessel getting in to the coast, and as far to the westward as I went.

1360. *Captain Beechey.*—What is the nature of the shore to the eastward of Point Barrow as to its depth ?

Commander Pullen.—The shore generally speaking is low, but in many places deep enough to allow of heavy ice lying close in ; inside a line from Cape Halkett to Point Barrow the water is very shoal ; crossing this bay, when outside of this line, ice was aground in three fens water. This was out of sight of land.

1361. *Captain Beechey.*—That was at the mouth of the Colville River, was it not ?

Commander Pullen.—I consider small vessels can generally go along the coast if not more than eight feet draught of water. From Herschell Island there is a deep water close in shore until you approach the mouth of the Mackenzie, then it becomes shallow.

1362. *Captain Beechey.*—Would it be safe, in your opinion, for a vessel of the "Plover's" draught of water to attempt the navigation of that shore between the ice and the land ?

Commander Pullen.—No.

1363. *Captain Beechey.*—What draught of water is the "Plover" ?

Commander Pullen.—Thirteen feet, I believe.

1364. *Captain Beechey.*—And why do not you think a vessel of that draught could not navigate there ?

Commander Pullen.—There is not sufficient water, except in parts ; there would not be water for a vessel of the "Plover's" draught between the ice and the land at the time I passed.

1365. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you meet many natives there ?

Commander Pullen.—Yes.

1366. *Captain Beechey.*—Whereabouts ?

Commander Pullen.—From Point Berens to the return reef was where I met the largest number of them. They also mustered strong at Point Barrow, but at other parts in small numbers.

1367. *Captain Beechey.*—Are you of opinion that a party deprived of their ships along that coast would find the natives friendly, and willing to render them assistance ?

Commander Pullen.—At the time I came along it is likely they would, but not now, I think, on account of the massacre at Point Separation, which I reported to the Admiralty.

1368. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you land at any part of your journey between Cape Barrow and the Mackenzie ?

Commander Pullen.—Yes, we landed frequently ; we landed to get our meals, generally about three times a day.

1369. *Captain Beechey.*—What probability is there of persons without resources receiving assistance in those parts ?

Commander Pullen.—In summer a good huntsman could supply a small party with deer and wild fowl, and would be able to procure salmon and other fish, otherwise there is no probability, as the Esquimaux about the Mackenzie are, I think, unfriendly.

1370. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you ascend any heights along the coast during your voyage ?

Commander Pullen.—No. The highest was on the east point of Flaxman's Island ; from twenty-five to thirty feet.

1371. *Captain Beechey.*—Then, from what you saw of the ice in the offing, do you think that the pack extends any considerable distance from the shore ?

Commander Pullen.—Yes, I do not recollect that I saw a water sky in the offing ;—nothing but ice.

1372. *Captain Beechey.*—Was that ice there similar to what you saw at Mackenzie ?

Commander Pullen.—It was not so heavy about Mackenzie. After leaving

Point Kay I did not see much ice, it having been driven off by the streams of the Mackenzie. Between Herschell Island and Point Barrow the ice is all of the same heavy character as it is to the westward of Point Barrow.

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1373. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you notice any tides in your journey?

Commander Pullen.—Yes. The rise and fall was very small; I think fourteen inches was the greatest. I should call eleven inches the average from Point Barrow till you get in the influence of the Mackenzie.

1374. *Sir G. Back*.—I would ask you whether the fresh water you got was brought down from the Babbage River or the Mackenzie?

Commander Pullen.—The water we drank was from the Mackenzie.

1375. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you find any harbour between Return Reef and Flaxman's Island where a ship might anchor in safety?

Commander Pullen.—No.

1376. *Sir G. Back*.—Nor anywhere else?

Commander Pullen.—Yes. Inside Herschell Island a vessel of small draft of water could anchor, and they might possibly winter under or to the south end of the eastern part of Flaxman's Island and the Spits between the Return Reef and Jones' Island.

1377. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you find much drift wood?

Commander Pullen.—Immense quantities, chiefly of pine. One piece was eighty feet in length and ten feet in circumference. That was in Camden Bay.

1378. *Sir G. Back*.—May I ask whether the highest piece of ice had any gravel on the top of it?

Commander Pullen.—The highest ice was from seventy to eighty feet, about two miles off the shore. I saw no gravel on the top of it, as I did not ascend it. As we came along there was a great deal of fog, and we were making use of ice to drink.

1379. *Captain Beechey*.—Did you notice that the tides were high at any particular days of your journey?

Commander Pullen.—Yes, we did; the effect of wind. It is in my journals in the Admiralty.

1380. *Captain Beechey*.—Will you state whether, between the Mackenzie and Cape Bathurst, a vessel would be safe in navigating that shore with the same draught of water as the "Plover"?

Commander Pullen.—No, it would not. The same objection exists as that I stated just now.

1381. *Sir G. Back*.—Did you not find the water proceeding to the eastward from Point Barrow vary very much in depth; four or five miles out for instance?

Commander Pullen.—I never could get out so far on account of the ice, except in crossing Harrison's Bay.

1382. *Captain Beechey*.—If a party were deprived of their ships, proceeding from Mackenzie to Cape Bathurst, would there be any material difficulty from the natives in reaching the Mackenzie?

Commander Pullen.—There would be great difficulty for want of boats, and when reaching the Mackenzie great difficulty from the natives. The Mackenzie natives have told us that they would show white men no quarter.

1383. *Captain Beechey*.—If a party had been amongst the natives and destroyed by them, do you imagine that you would have heard of it?

Commander Pullen.—We should have been sure to have heard of it.

1384. *Sir G. Back*.—Did not your party find a gun made by Barnett in the possession of the Esquimaux?

Commander Pullen.—Yes.

1385. *Sir G. Back*.—Had you any idea at the time to whom that gun had belonged?

Commander Pullen.—I had not the slightest idea, nor how they came by it.

1386. *Sir G. Back*.—You did not find out that the gun was lost by one of the men in my boat in 1826?

Commander Pullen.—No; I did not know it until the other day.

1387. *Sir G. Back*.—Supposing a party of men wrecked on that coast, midway between Icy Cape and the Mackenzie River, do you think they

Commander Pullen. would be able to proceed to the post on that river without aid from the natives?

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Commander Pullen.—Yes, if the party was not weakened by want, and the natives were friendly.

1388. *Captain Beechey.*—How far along the coast eastward did you proceed?

Commander Pullen.—As far as the Spit off Cape Bathurst.

1389. *Captain Beechey.*—Is Cape Bathurst high?

Commander Pullen.—No. I could not get to it for ice, but should say the Cape itself was from ten to fifteen feet high.

1390. *Captain Beechey.*—From what you saw of the ice and the offing, knowing the position of Banks's Land, what probability would there be of success of a party attempting to cross?

Commander Pullen.—None at all; I do not think it possible.

1391. *Captain Beechey.*—What is the nature of the ice off Cape Bathurst?

Commander Pullen.—It is heavy hummucky ice. It was one continued struggle from the 25th of July to the 5th of August to get along that ice, it being so close in, and we were cutting all the time.

1392. *Captain Beechey.*—Did you see any land to the northward during your voyage?

Commander Pullen.—No.

1393. *Captain Beechey.*—Did there appear to you to be any general current along that shore, beyond what is occasioned by the wind?

Commander Pullen.—No, I do not think there is.

1394. *Sir G. Back.*—Now there seems a remarkable difference in the season when you were there and when I was with Sir John Franklin, viz., that on the 15th of August 1826 there was a complete open sea, with the exception of one piece of ice to the north and west. What was its state when you were there?

Commander Pullen.—It was all ice to seaward, and along the coast east and west.

1395. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—How many days were you occupied in exploration with the boats after you left the "Plover"?

Commander Pullen.—From the 25th of July to the 30th August. That was the first time, in 1849, from the "Plover" on the coast when we entered the Mackenzie, and my arrival at Fort Simpson was 3d October.

1396. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the health of your party on reaching Fort Simpson?

Commander Pullen.—Their general health was good.

1397. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—Not much exhausted from their labour?

Commander Pullen.—I was obliged to leave five of them at the most northern post. One of them I thought I should lose.

1398. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—What was the second journey?

Commander Pullen.—On the 22d of July 1850 I got into the Arctic seas, reached Cape Bathurst on the 10th of August, remained there, or in its vicinity, until the 15th of August, and returned, arriving at the mouth of the Mackenzie River on the 1st of August, and reached Fort Simpson on the 5th of October.

1399. *Sir E. Parry.*—Just state to the Committee what boats you think best adapted for navigating that shore?

Commander Pullen.—Steam launches of about three feet draft of water.

1400. *Sir E. Parry.*—Could you carry fuel for that purpose?

Commander Pullen.—I should depend principally upon the drift wood, of which there is plenty. There is an immense quantity of it to be found. With these steam launches I should like to have a light boat, a good whale boat; not like the present dockyard whale boat, but one with more beam and flatter floor, such as the whalers use.

1401. *Sir E. Parry.*—Can you suggest any practicable means of prosecuting the search for Sir John Franklin's expedition from the continent of America?

Commander Pullen.—Not from the continent at all with boats. The disadvantage of boats is, that the best season for navigation is when we are making

the best of our way for our winter quarters. If there had been a ship or establishment on the coast I could have remained there much longer than I did. It was only the 5th of October when I reached winter quarters at Port Simpson. The ice was making then in the Mackenzie, and driving fast down when we came up; it was one continued drift of ice and heavy snow storms. I refer to the year 1850; in 1849 the weather was somewhat better.

Commander Pullen.

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Mr. BROOMAN called.

*Mr. Brooman,
Paymaster.*

1402. *Chairman.*—You were Paymaster of the “Resolute,” I believe?
Mr. Brooman.—Yes.

1403. *Chairman.*—Were you in any of the exploring parties yourself?
Mr. Brooman.—No.

1404. *Chairman.*—Did you land at Beechey Island, where traces of Sir John Franklin’s winter quarters were found?

Mr. Brooman.—Yes.

1405. *Chairman.*—Were you present at the search which took place for records and documents?

Mr. Brooman.—Yes, on one occasion.

1406. *Chairman.*—Do you think that the search was so complete as to render it impossible that any documents left there could have been overlooked?

Mr. Brooman.—Yes, I think so.

1407. *Chairman.*—During the time you were in winter quarters you remained in the ship?

Mr. Brooman.—Yes.

1408. *Chairman.*—You know nothing, then, except from the reports you heard?

Mr. Brooman.—Nothing more.

1409. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin as to the discoveries that had been made by Captain Penny?

Mr. Brooman.—Yes. We were walking from the shore, towards the latter end of May 1851, shortly after Captain Penny had returned. Captain Penny was talking of the immense distance he had travelled, and of the amazing quantity of water he had seen, at least, I think he said sixty miles. Captain Austin expressed astonishment at that. Captain Penny threw himself back, and said “Austin! Austin! do you doubt me?” Captain Austin said, “No, but I think you may be mistaken.” Captain Penny said this water was teeming with life; seals, walruses, white whales, ducks, gulls, and some bears were seen. He stated that from the top of the hills,—after some conversation,—he must have seen fully thirty miles of water. Captain Austin still expressed doubt, and he then said there was at least ten miles of water. He came back from sixty to ten. Captain Austin then said “Why, you must have discovered the Polar Basin.” Captain Penny said he did not know about that. I am speaking to the best of my recollection. Captain Austin then said “You will discover the north-west passage;” and Captain Penny said “There is no difficulty about that, but that he would not try it through Wellington Strait, but would go round by Behring Straits.” Captain Austin then said he would leave that honour to Captain Penny, or to younger men than himself.

1410. *Chairman.*—Did you hear Captain Penny make any distinct request to Captain Austin for assistance, in boats, men, or in any other way, to enable him to proceed with his discoveries?

Mr. Brooman.—While smoking that evening, I heard Captain Austin offer Captain Penny officers, boats, or anything else for that purpose, but I did not hear Captain Penny apply for them. The impression on my mind was that Captain Penny wanted it. After smoking a cigar, about a quarter to eleven at night, Captain Austin went down. Captain Penny, Dr. King, and I went down into the gun-room, and had a glass of brandy and water. I asked Captain

*Mr. Brooman,
Paymaster.*

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Penny distinctly whether he thought Sir John Franklin went up the Wellington Channel. His answer was, "It is my firm conviction that he never went up there." Captain Penny retired to bed, as I thought, as it was very late. About an hour afterwards I heard that he had put his dogs to, and had gone away entirely, very suddenly indeed. I was at a loss to account for it, except that the next day being Sunday he might have gone to read prayers to his crew. As he did not return on the Monday as I expected, I began to consider that he had been offended some way or another, but how I did not know.

1411. *Chairman.*—Is there anything further you can relate on the same subject? Did you hear any conversations between Captain Austin and Captain Penny, on arriving at the winter quarters of the latter, when they met again?

Mr. Brooman.—No. I have no personal knowledge.

1412. *Captain Beechey.*—Have you anything to remark on the provisions, in case it is necessary to send another expedition to the polar seas?

Mr. Brooman.—Yes. I consider the preserved meats perfectly tasteless. I would advise that spice should be mixed up with them so as to render them more palatable.

1413. *Chairman.*—Have you given in any report or suggestions as to the quality of your provisions, and the better care that should be taken in future?

Mr. Brooman.—No.

Chairman.—Then the Committee will request you to draw up a paper containing a full report of all you have observed, with your objections to the provisions taken out under Captain Austin, and suggesting such alterations as may cause better care to be taken for the future. You will be kind enough to send those suggestions in to the Committee in the course of this or next week.

1414. *Chairman.*—We understand a large quantity of the provisions was returned as unserviceable?

Mr. Brooman.—I think we had only about four cases of preserved meat that were bad.

1415. *Chairman.*—Can you state the quantity of provisions you returned into store?

Mr. Brooman.—About two years for the whole complement or number victualled.

Mr. RICHARD KING called.

*Mr. R. King,
Assistant Surgeon.*

1416. *Chairman.*—What situation did you fill in the "Resolute"?

Mr. King.—Assistant surgeon.

1417. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

Mr. King.—Not between Captain Austin and Captain Penny, except when Captain Penny first returned from Wellington Strait. He returned on the 24th of May. In the gun-room he stated the distance he had gone, what he had seen, and what he believed to be the state of Wellington Channel. He mentioned about the island he got to,—Baillie Hamilton. He said he went on shore at Baillie Hamilton Island, and saw water to the north-west. He saw a piece of ice, and from the rapidity at which it was going, he thought the current was four knots an hour. He was very sorry he had not sufficient food for his dogs to eat, otherwise he would have had some other views, which he thought would have been of great assistance to him. Not having food for his dogs, he was obliged to return. I think Captain Penny said he saw a bear, but that he had no opportunity of killing it.

1418. *Chairman.*—We have heard it stated that you were present at a conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin?

Mr. King.—No, I was not. In the evening Mr. Brooman and I were chatting with Captain Penny, and having some brandy and water. Mr. Brooman asked Captain Penny whether he thought Sir John Franklin had not gone up Wellington Channel. Captain Penny said he thought he had not, and that he considered that the old ice had been there for a number of years; I think Mr. Penny said twenty years. Mr. Brooman and I were the only persons there. Mr. May was sketching something; I do not think he heard the conversation.

1419. *Sir E. Parry.*—Were you present at any other conversation at any time between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

Mr. R. King,
Assistant Surgeon.

Mr. King.—No.

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The Chairman.—I should mention to Captain Austin and Captain Penny, that after to-morrow the Committee will adjourn to Monday se'nnight. It may be convenient for you to know this, that you may make your arrangements. I must observe to you (addressing Captain Austin) that we have had some supplementary evidence from Captain Stewart; and the Committee wish me to mention it to you, because there are several points which Captain Stewart now adds to his original evidence, and which you may perhaps wish to call somebody to explain.

Captain Austin.—I have not gone into that evidence sufficient to say; but I think that Captain Ommanney might recollect something more of it.

Chairman.—You will recollect that you are not to call any witnesses to examine them yourself. The feeling of the Committee is, as regards the additions that Captain Stewart has made, that he ought to have recollected them before. If there are any of your officers who were present at the time, we are ready to call and examine them.

Captain Austin.—Captain Ommanney is the only one I think of at present.

Chairman.—After hearing Captain Stewart's new evidence we looked at Captain Ommanney's, and found it very distinct on the subject.

Captain Austin.—As this is now a question of character, and as, from what Captain Stewart has said, there may be some doubt in your minds whether I have always rendered assistance to Captain Penny in every way, I will put in a note written by him in reference to that subject, in his own handwriting. It is dated "Assistance Bay, 10th April 1851."

Chairman.—That is a very early date. Nobody says anything about what took place between you at that time.

Captain Austin.—I beg to put in the letter.

1420. *Chairman (to Captain Penny).*—Will you look at this letter, and say whether it is in your handwriting?

Captain Penny.—Oh yes, I quite admit it.

The following is a copy of the letter.

" My dear Austin,

Assistance Bay, 10th April 1851.

" In answer to your kind letter allow me to express my opinion of your admirable arrangements. They are such, my dear Austin, that had the Board of Admiralty, with dear Lady Franklin at their head, they could not have improved upon them, to serve the mission we have been sent upon. The result is in the hand of the Disposer of all events; and whosoever may be the fortunate one, we will look back with pleasure in having acted together in forwarding the noble cause we have entered upon with all the energy of our natures.

" There has been no expedition ever out in the Arctic sea that has managed as you have done with so many wild spirits to control. I have no doubt you have much to annoy you, but you will look back with pleasure on the sacrifice you made. The country demanded an active and energetic officer, and they have not been disappointed, whatever the result may be.

" I must now conclude with an earnest prayer that all may be enabled to do their duty.

" I remain,

" Yours sincerely,

(Signed) " W. PENNY."

The Committee then adjourned.



Eleventh Day. November 8, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P., Chairman,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain F. W. Beechey,
Captain Sir George Back,
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

ERASMUS YORK, the Esquimaux brought over by Captain Ommanney, was introduced to the Committee for the purpose of giving information. The Rev. P. Latrobe, Secretary to the Moravian Missions, and the Rev. Christian Beck, acted as interpreters.

Erasmus York.

8th Nov. 1851.

1421. *The Chairman (addressing the Rev. Mr. Latrobe).* You are perhaps aware that a report prevailed last year amongst the Esquimaux at Baffin's Bay, that Sir John Franklin's ships had been lost, and their crews murdered?

Mr. Latrobe.—Yes. At the request of Captain Hamilton, some papers connected with the subject were forwarded to Germany for translation by our missionaries. The translations have been made, and the papers are now in Captain Hamilton's hands.

1422. *Chairman.*—There is another deposition of Adam Beck's, taken before a magistrate, which has been sent to Copenhagen for translation, but which we have not yet received.

1423. *Sir E. Parry (to Mr. Latrobe).*—What is Mr. Beck, who is about to act as Esquimaux interpreter?

Mr. Latrobe.—He has been a missionary in Labrador thirty-four years. He was born in Greenland. His father was a missionary in Greenland fifty-two years, and his grandfather forty-three years on the same coast.

A paper containing a deposition by Adam Beck, an Esquimaux, who professed to have received the information it conveyed from his countryman Erasmus York, was put in by Captain Ommanney, and translated into German by the Rev. Christian Beck, Mr. Latrobe giving the sense in English. It was as follows:

“ While I have been here there have been many ships. There were
“ also many people upon the land. On the islands there were but few
“ native people. A good many show themselves when pleased. (The
“ Rev. Mr. Latrobe understood this to mean that when anything occurred to
“ interest or please them a great number showed themselves.) There were
“ birds, such as eider fowl (and there was another word which he the
“ Rev. Christian Beck did not understand, signifying a particular kind of bird
“ which he did not know). There were also other little birds, that look white,
“ that are found in the country, and also ravens; little ravens and great
“ ravens, and various birds mixed together. (There are other words, evidently
“ names of birds, but incorrectly written, probably local names for birds,
“ which the Rev. C. Beck did not understand). There is a little bird with

Erasmus York.
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“ red at the top of the head. The people here are few. And this is written
“ by me from my heart.

(Signed) “ JOHN ROSS, witness to the above being written
“ by Adam Beck on board Her Majesty’s
“ Ship ‘ Assistance,’ this 17th day of August
“ 1850, in my presence.

“ Erasmus Ommanney, Captain of Her Majesty’s
“ Ship ‘ Assistance,’ this 17th day of August 1850,
“ witnessed the above being written in my presence by
“ Adam Beck.”

1424. The Chairman directed that the first question put to Erasmus York should be the following:—“ What have you related to Adam Beck ?”

The Rev. Mr. Beck put this question to Erasmus York, and after a considerable time communicated the answer to the Rev. Mr. Latrobe.

Mr. Latrobe.—Mr. Beck and the Esquimaux seem to understand each other very well, a few expressions excepted. Erasmus admits that he mentioned to Adam Beck a number of things, chiefly about the country. Further than that Mr. Beck has not been able to get anything out of him.

1425. *Sir E. Parry.*—Ask him of what place he was a native ?

Erasmus York, in reply to the question, said he was a native of Innagana, being Cape York of the English.

1426. *Sir E. Parry.*—How far north has he ever been ?

Erasmus York said that when a little boy he had gone up as far as a place marked on his own chart “ Pickierloo.” Since he had grown up he had not been farther than Wolstenholme Sound.

1427. *Sir E. Parry.*—Has he ever heard of any Kabloonas (white men) ships being wrecked on that coast ?

Erasmus York replied that Adam Beck had related to him that two ships had been wrecked.

1428. *Sir E. Parry.*—But does he say he ever heard it from his own people ?

Erasmus York said that far up to the north a ship had been wrecked. He had heard a woman say so. The name of the place was Onoctoke.

1429. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did he ever hear of more than one ship being wrecked there ?

Erasmus York.—Only one ship.

1430. *Sir E. Parry.*—How long was that ago ? How many winters ago ?

Erasmus York.—Eight winters ago.

1431. *Sir E. Parry.*—Does he know what became of the Kabloonas belonging to the ship ?

Erasmus York replied that he had never heard what happened to the people.

1432. *Sir E. Parry.*—Has he ever heard that there are any Kabloonas in that direction now ?

Erasmus York said he knew nothing of any Kabloonas being on shore within the last four years.

1433. *Sir E. Parry.*—Did he see the “ North Star ” on its arrival there ?

Erasmus York.—Yes.

1434. *Sir E. Parry.*—That was only two years ago. Ask him when ?

Erasmus York.—Two winters ago.

1435. *Sir E. Parry.*—Has he ever heard of any Kabloonas being murdered by the Esquimaux on the north ?

Erasmus York said he had neither seen anything of the kind, nor heard anything of the kind on that coast.

1436. *Sir E. Parry*.—Has he heard anything of the kind on any other part of the coast?

Erasmus York replied that he had not. He had never heard of any murder or ill-treatment.

1437. *Sir E. Parry*.—Ask him again how long it was since these ships were lost that he heard of?

Erasmus York replied that it was when he was eight years old.

1438. *Sir E. Parry*.—Does he know how old he is now?

Erasmus York, on this question being put to him, counted upon his fingers up to nineteen.

1439. *Sir E. Parry*.—What does he think is the character of Adam Beck?

Erasmus York replied to the question in English as follows: "Adam Beck tell lie; no good."

The Rev. Mr. Beck remarked, that, after the Esquimaux fashion, *Erasmus* was very reluctant to speak out. Sometimes he would say that Adam Beck was good, and sometimes that he was bad. He said too that he was a mixture of good and bad.

1440. *Sir E. Parry*.—Ask him whether he believes Adam Beck's word?

Erasmus York said, "Adam Beck's words are fine, but they are not to be believed."

A long conversation took place on the subject of Adam Beck's depositions which had been submitted last year to the Moravian missionaries for translation.

Mr. Latrobe said the missionaries had attentively considered the depositions, and had returned a translation. The Rev. Gentleman then read the following letter:—

Letter from the Rev. A. S. Elsner to the Rev. P. Latrobe.

Translated from the German.

"Dear Brother,

Hernhut, October 29, 1850.

"I am very sorry to be only now enabled to send you the result of my investigation referring to the two Esquimaux sentences in No. 20,608 of the Times. This long delay has been occasioned by the following circumstance: both passages, as you know, being written in impure Esquimaux, and being therefore only half intelligible to me, I considered it absolutely necessary to confer with one of our Greenland missionaries. But Paulsen Lund, the only Greenland missionary here, being on a journey, I had to put off the matter until to-day. Unfortunately, however, the very words which are not intelligible in the Esquimaux language are likewise not completely so to a person conversant with the Greenlandish dialect. I, therefore, prefer sending rather an imperfect than a false translation. The following is the result of our investigations.

"The first sentence merely states the different dwelling places and names of the Esquimaux who went to 'Omanak' (the name of a place, probably an island). The sentence, however, is so confusedly composed that it is hardly possible to give a coherent translation of it. The only word whose interpretation is rather doubtful is the word 'innaesonet.' As the spelling of this word is incorrect, it might either mean 'many persons' or the plural number of 'murderer.' In our Esquimaux dialect a murderer means 'innuartok,' and in the Greenlandish 'innuraersok.' It is, however, very improbable, that the interpreter should designate as murderers all those Esquimaux who had gone to Omanak from so many different places which he mentions; especially since he merely states in this sentence, that those Esquimaux had gone there, without stating the object of their going. He then finishes this sentence with these words:—'Twenty-six is the number of the Esquimaux in the neighbourhood of Omanak.' The second sentence, speaking of the vessels themselves, is better constructed, and, with the exception of a few words, is intelligible to us. The sense is as follows:—'The Esquimaux, whom I saw for the first time on the 13th August 1850, and whom I asked

Erasmus York.
8th Nov. 1851.

“ whether they had seen any vessels which staid over winter in their country, answered.’ (The three words which indicate the time when the ships set sail again are unintelligible. The writer then continues,) ‘ Therefore I write concerning them ’ (which probably means as much as ‘ I suppose ’) ‘ in the year 1846, when the ice began to break, they set sail and went to Omanak, and stayed there during the winter, because they could not proceed on account of the ice ; because there were many vessels the Esquimaux ’ . . . The last four words are unintelligible to us. The writer annexes to one of them the syllable ‘ gog,’ which means ‘ they say.’ This proves that he was not quite sure of what he is stating. I am sorry to be obliged to send so imperfect a translation ; but it is impossible to make a better one. We cannot well decide here whether, in those parts, another dialect is spoken, or whether the bad spelling produces the difficulty. The latter is a very common fault of the Greenlanders who have not been regularly instructed.”

Lieut. Elliott.

LIEUTENANT J. E. ELLIOTT called.

1441. *Chairman.*—What situation did you hold ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Second Lieutenant of the “ Assistance.”

1442. *Chairman.*—Did you accompany any of the exploring expeditions ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—No.

1443. *Chairman.*—Did you make any observations on the state of the ice in Wellington Strait when you came out of your winter quarters, and when you returned to the eastward, and were sent to the crow’s nest to report on that subject ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—I found the ice more to the southward than it was the year before. It was to the Southward of Barlow’s Inlet, and extended two thirds across Wellington Strait.

1444. *Chairman.*—To the westward, did it appear fast ice ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Yes ; it was completely blocked up.

1445. *Chairman.*—But to the eastward it extended farther to the north ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Yes. We could see as far as Point Innes, and the open water reached apparently as far as that.

1446. *Chairman.*—Had you been on an Arctic voyage previously ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—No.

1447. *Chairman.*—From your own observation at the time, and comparing the ice in 1850 and 1851, when you passed it going to the westward, did it appear to you as thick as on the preceding year ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Yes. In September 1850 we passed farther north than in 1851.

1448. *Chairman.*—How high were you yourself in September 1850 ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Nearly as high as Point Innes.

1449. *Chairman.*—Did you see any open water ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—None to the northward. There was a fixed floe right across.

1450. *Chairman.*—Do you think from what you saw that there was any probability of the strait clearing that year after you passed ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—No.

1451. *Chairman.*—Why ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Because it appeared so thick and fixed, and the thermometer fell to near zero soon after we were obliged to go to winter quarters.

1452. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation that took place between Captain Austin and Captain Penny ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—No.

1453. *Chairman.*—You know nothing then, except from hearsay ?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Nothing more.

1454. *Chairman*.—Were you present when the search for traces was made in Beechey Island?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Yes. I discovered the first traces myself. It was a piece of bottle found at Cape Riley. We searched further, and found a staff, iron bar, and other articles.

1455. *Chairman*.—Do you think the search you made was so complete that there was no chance of any records or documents being overlooked?

Lieutenant Elliott.—Yes. I assisted in taking down a cairn on Beechey Island. We took it down stone by stone, and dug two feet underneath it, but found nothing.

1456. Did you know anything of the search in Cape Riley?

Lieutenant Elliott.—It was at Cape Riley where the piece of bottle was found.

1457. *Chairman*.—Were you one of the party that went down and discovered the graves?

Lieutenant Elliott.—No. Captain Penny came down to us when beset in the ice. We told him what we had done, and that we had left Beechey Island and coast near it unfinished. Captain Penny said he would return, and complete the search of Beechey Island and the neighbourhood, as we were beset.

1458. *Chairman*.—In 1851, when you crossed Wellington Strait again, going to the eastward, did the ice appear to be in motion?

Lieutenant Elliott.—The outward or southern edge of the ice was in motion, the floe in the channel was to all appearance fixed.

1459. *Chairman*.—Was there any appearance of the ice breaking up before the close of the season, so as to render the Wellington Strait navigable?

Lieutenant Elliott.—I cannot say.

LIEUTENANT MECHAM called.

Lieut. Mecham.

1460. *Chairman*.—What rank did you hold in the "Assistance"?

Lieutenant Mecham.—Third Lieutenant.

1461. *Chairman*.—I believe you explored the coast to the southward in the chart which is marked with your name?

Lieutenant Mecham.—Yes.

1462. *Chairman*.—Without any superior officer?

Lieutenant Mecham.—Yes.

1463. *Chairman*.—Are you sure that you explored so carefully that no traces of the missing expedition could have been overlooked?

Lieutenant Mecham.—Yes.

1464. *Chairman*.—Have you such personal knowledge of the ice in Wellington Strait as would enable you to say whether the strait would be navigable this year or not?

Lieutenant Mecham.—In August 1850 it was not navigable to the north as we crossed it. In recrossing in August 1851 heavy ice was streaming down its western shores, but as we approached the eastern side we could see no fixed ice to the northward from the crow's nest.

1465. *Chairman*.—How far did the open water appear to extend?

Lieutenant Mecham.—We saw open water as far as we could see from the crow's nest. I should judge that fixed ice could not be distinguished over ten miles.

1466. *Chairman*.—You have no personal knowledge of any conversation between Captain Austin and Captain Penny?

Lieutenant Mecham.—None.

1467. *Chairman*.—Were you on shore when the search took place on Beechey Island and Cape Riley for traces of the missing expedition, when just discovered, in 1850?

Lieutenant Mecham.—No; I was on board the ship off Gascoigne Inlet.

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1468. *Chairman.*—Did you give in any report when you returned from your exploring expedition as to the sledges, and the improvements that might be made hereafter?

Lieutenant Meham.—Yes. They were contained in my travelling journal which I gave to Captain Austin.

1469. *Chairman.*—Have you anything to add to that?

Lieutenant Meham.—I should like to look over it again. I do not think I could state anything more on the subject now.

1470. *Chairman.*—We understand you left a boat somewhere. Will you explain the circumstances?

Lieutenant Meham.—I was ordered to take it to the position of Captain Ommanney's first depôt, latitude $73^{\circ}57'$, longitude $99\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$. The boat was placed fifteen miles to the eastward of that, and was left there in case Captain Ommanney wished to leave the first depôt direct for the ship, instead of proceeding to Cape Walker for the purpose of obtaining one of the Halketts which were buried there. The boat was left to the east of the depôt, on account of the heavy character of the ice.

Mr. Pickthorne.

Mr. PICKTHORNE called.

1471. *Chairman.*—What rank did you hold in the "Resolute"?

Mr. Pickthorne.—Additional Assistant Surgeon of the "Resolute" for service in the "Pioneer."

1472. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation between Captain Penny and Captain Austin in May 1851 or August 1851?

Mr. Pickthorne.—I recollect being present on the 24th of May, when Captain Penny dined with Captain Austin, and spent the evening there. During the evening Captain Penny gave Captain Austin an account of his proceedings up Wellington Channel. He said he intended to transport a boat across the ice, in order to carry on the search in the open water he had discovered. In the course of the evening Captain Austin offered him, if I recollect right, two sledge parties and officers to assist him in transporting his boat up Wellington Channel. I do not recollect any more of the conversation. Captain Penny left in the evening rather hurriedly.

1473. *Chairman.*—All that you heard?

Mr. Pickthorne.—Yes.

1474. *Chairman.*—Can you state any further conversation that took place?

Mr. Pickthorne.—No.

1475. *Chairman.*—Were you present at any conversation that evening amongst the officers of the "Resolute" after Captain Austin had retired?

Mr. Pickthorne.—No.

1476. *Chairman.*—Were you present at a conversation between Captain Austin and Captain Penny on the 11th or 12th of August 1851?

Mr. Pickthorne.—I was on board the "Lady Franklin," but I was not present at any conversation.

1477. *Chairman.*—Was the impression on your mind when this took place, that Captain Austin was doing all he could to co-operate with Captain Penny, or that Captain Penny had any ground of complaint from not having the assistance rendered him that he had asked for?

Mr. Pickthorne.—I think Captain Austin was endeavouring to co-operate with Captain Penny, by offering to furnish him assistance. On the night of the 11th of August Captain Penny said to me, when he was going, "I asked Captain Austin if he would let me go up Wellington Channel in one of his steamers to prosecute the search there; but that has not been agreed to;" leaving an impression on my mind that he wished to go up in a steamer if Captain Austin lent one. This was on board the "Lady Franklin," after Captain Austin's interview with Captain Penny.

1478. *Chairman.*—Did Captain Penny appear to be of opinion that there was open water in Wellington Strait at that time?

Mr. Pickthorne.—On the 26th of July I understood from Captain Penny's report and others that there was a fixed barrier twenty miles in width.

1479. *Chairman*.—Was any third person present at the conversation with Captain Penny?

Mr. Pickthorne.

Mr. Pickthorne.—No. It was in bidding him good-by.

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1480. *Chairman*.—Did you accompany any other exploring expedition?

Mr. Pickthorne.—No.

The Chairman (addressing Captain Penny) said, “ You have communicated to the Committee this morning that you shall require Dr. Sutherland and Captain Stewart to be in attendance here. The Committee desire me to remind you of the communication made to you on the preceding day, in which I was directed to acquaint you, that, you having on all occasions, and particularly yesterday, distinctly disclaimed the character of prosecutor or accuser during this investigation, you could not be permitted to re-examine evidence; but that both yourself and Captain Austin would be allowed to offer any observations at the close of our proceedings. We therefore think it right to acquaint you now, that we shall not permit you to re-examine either Dr. Sutherland or Captain Stewart yourself; that they will be continued here in attendance until the Committee discharge them, and they will be in attendance here until the 17th; but you must clearly understand that you will not be permitted to re-examine them yourself. The Committee may recall any one they please, but they will not allow either you or Captain Austin to do so.”

The Committee then adjourned until Monday the 17th instant.

Twelfth Day. November 17, 1851.

Present, Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P.,
Rear-Admiral Arthur Fanshawe, C.B.,
Captain Sir Edward Parry,
Captain F. W. Beechey,
Captain Sir George Back,
Mr. F. J. Fegen, Secretary.

CAPTAIN OMMANNEY recalled.

Capt. Ommanney.

17th Nov. 1851.

1481. *Chairman.*—Captain Ommanney, there is a question the Committee wish to ask you with respect to the Esquimaux paper signed by Adam Beck, and witnessed by Sir John Ross and yourself. When that paper was drawn up, did you imagine that it was a paper of any consequence, or that it had any bearing upon the loss of the ships and the massacre of the crews?

Captain Ommanney.—I considered that that was the subject alluded to, and no other.

1482. *Sir E. Parry.*—Have you, in your intercourse with Erasmus York, had occasion to believe that there is any truth in Adam Beck's statement relative to the wreck of the ships and the murder of their crews in Baffin's Bay?

Captain Ommanney.—Erasmus York always maintained the same opinion, that Adam Beck made a false statement; and he said that no two ships ever came up the coast except the North Star, that is, to remain on the coast; he has seen passing whalers. Peterson, the interpreter, came to the ship once or twice during the winter, and I used to get him into my cabin in order to obtain further information from him. His answer always was, "No, no; no ships came there but the North Star."

1483. *Captain Beechey.*—From whom did Adam Beck receive his information?

Captain Ommanney.—From three Esquimaux, of whom York was one; a woman, and a child.

1484. *Sir G. Back.*—Were they of York's tribe?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes. The tribe consisted of three men (one of whom was York), three women, and four or five children.

1485. *Captain Beechey.*—Was this statement taken down at the time? [The statement referred to was the paper dated 17th August 1850, and which is given in answer to question 1423 in the examination.]

Captain Ommanney.—We communicated at Cape York, in the first instance, on the 13th or 14th of August 1850, when an investigation with the natives took place, and we were perfectly satisfied that there was no foundation for the report. This paper was taken down on the 17th. After clearing Sir John Ross from the ice, he came on board, and in parting company requested that York's statement might be taken down in writing by Adam Beck.

Capt. Ommanney.
 17th Nov. 1851.

1486. *Captain Beechey.*—Was that statement taken down by Adam Beck in York's presence at that time?

Captain Ommanney.—York dictated, and Adam Beck wrote, in the presence of Sir John Ross and myself.

1487. *Captain Beechey.*—Then Adam Beck received his entire information from York?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes; what is written here.

1488. *Captain Beechey.*—Did Adam Beck deliver that as the statement he had received of the loss of the ships as related to him by the natives?

Captain Ommanney.—As far as I could understand him, he did.

1489. *Sir E. Parry.*—Then you supposed, when you came to England, that that statement did relate to Adam Beck's story?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, certainly; I was always under that impression.

1490. *Captain Beechey.*—That that paper would contain the substance of the story respecting the loss of the ships?

Captain Ommanney.—Yes, certainly. During our first communication with the natives on board the *Intrepid*, as I understood, he was an interpreter. I pressed him to give me all the information he could, during our conversation with the natives. And at that time, he said nothing whatever about the murder of the crews or the loss of the ships. It was about eight hours after leaving Cape York that Adam Beck's statement relative to the wrecked ships and murdered crews was made known to me.

1491. *Captain Beechey.*—Had Adam Beck remained on board your ship all the time?

Captain Ommanney.—No; he remained on board the *Intrepid* some time, and then he dropped down, first on board our ship, and subsequently to the *Prince Albert*, which was towing close under our stern.

Captain Austin.
Mr. Penny.

CAPTAIN AUSTIN and CAPTAIN PENNY recalled.

1492. *The Chairman* (addressing Captain Penny).—As you were the first examined of the two, the Committee think they would rather have your final observations on the matter first.

Captain Penny then produced the following statement, which he read to the Committee :—

“ STATEMENT 1.—I am not the cause of Captain Austin's return, as I am
 “ made to appear by the publication of that correspondence (alluding to letters
 “ Nos. 4. and 4 (a) of Captain Austin's letters to the Secretary of the Admi-
 “ ralty), since, besides other reasons I have given, Captain Austin says, ‘ Sir
 “ John Franklin is not gone that way.’ 2.—I showed my desire for co-
 “ operation, and to continue the search, by asking Captain Austin to let me
 “ pilot a steamer up Wellington Channel; and I deny that I had any other
 “ reason for asking for the steamer than to seek for Sir John Franklin. Captain
 “ Ommanney was not present in Captain Austin's cabin when I asked for it.
 “ 3.—My decided opinion that Sir John Franklin had gone north-west from
 “ Wellington Channel was given to Captain Austin at the same time, and
 “ with my chart before us, that I asked for the steamer to be sent up the
 “ channel, on the 11th of August. I went on board the *Resolute* for the
 “ express purpose of telling everything to Captain Austin, and of asking for
 “ the steamer. So I had repeatedly told Lieutenant Aldrich I would, and he
 “ assured me he thought Captain Austin would grant my request. I left
 “ the *Resolute* very much hurt and angry. 4.—I have to say again that the
 “ correspondence between myself and Captain Austin followed our conversation
 “ almost immediately, all but my letter, which I was very unwilling to give
 “ at all; but Captain Austin came on board the *Lady Franklin*, and urged
 “ me all he could to give him a letter, he left without it, and then sent his
 “ boat for it some hours after, and I then wrote in great irritation. To a man
 “ like me, one conversation was worth fifty letters, and I could not understand
 “ what he meant by it. 5.—I wish to say that I do not acknowledge the
 “ correctness of the conversation with me, which Captain Austin and Captain

“ Ommanney have *written down*. I never did the like of that myself, and I am not a match for those that do it. 6.—In all I have now said I am only replying to charges made against me, either directly or indirectly, by Captain Austin. I could press against him what I have already stated, namely, that he treated me upon several occasions very unfairly and unkindly, and this I could bring his own officers to prove, but unless compelled I do not want to do it, only to set myself right, which I am determined to do.”

“ WILLIAM PENNY.”

1493. *Chairman*.—Now, Captain Austin, the Committee will be happy to hear any final observations you may have to make?

Captain Austin.—I have put them on paper, as I have felt hurt and pained at the observations which have been made. I thought it better to put them on paper.

Captain Austin then proceeded to read the following statement to the Committee:—

“ In availing myself of the permission of the Committee, I beg to offer a few words in addition to my former statement. The evidence of some of my officers has recalled to my mind the substance of the note which I wrote to Captain Stewart shortly after his return from his search, to the effect that it would be a happy event should the reported barrier of ice in Wellington Channel break away so as to admit of the steamers going up; that I could put on board several surveyors, who would in a very few days fix positions and get some angles. I have no doubt that this note gave rise to the notion that the steamers would be sent up. I suppose this note to have been written about the end of June. But Captain Penny never asked for a steamer, nor did he ever give me the slightest reason to hope that either trace or rescue was to be obtained by sending a steamer up the Wellington Channel. I merely alluded to the possible event of my sending the steamers up, and to the extent I have described. These are the only additions I have to make to my former evidence, with one exception. I forbear from making any observations whatever upon the statements made by others upon the present inquiry. As the officer in charge of the expedition, I feel that I ought not to allow the present inquiry to close without noticing a portion of the evidence given by Lieutenant M'Clintock. In answering question 908, Lieutenant M'Clintock states that he could have reached Banks's Land if he had been left to his own discretion. I am willing to believe that Lieutenant M'Clintock gave that answer with the view of showing his own zeal and devotion in the cause, and without considering the consequences to which his answer inevitably led. My orders to Lieutenant M'Clintock, and to all, were *to prosecute the most active, earnest, and persevering search for our missing countrymen*, and it was my firm belief (a belief entertained by me until I heard his own assertion to the contrary) that Lieutenant M'Clintock had done his utmost; and it was for that reason, and on that account alone, that I placed Lieutenant M'Clintock's name in the very prominent position it occupies in my report. In laying before the Committee the outline chart furnished by Captain Penny, received on the 11th of August, I may observe that no separation of channels is shown there by naming as Queen's Channel the open water stated to be seen either the northern or westward at the head of Wellington Channel. Therefore, until my arrival in England, I had not the slightest knowledge of any other name than that of Wellington Channel to any water stated to have been seen to the northward and westward at the head of that channel.”

“ HORATIO T. AUSTIN.”

CAPTAIN STEWART recalled.

Captain Penny informed the Committee that he did not wish to be present during Captain Stewart's re-examination, and accordingly withdrew.

1494. *Chairman*.—It appears from Captain Penny's journal that you received fresh instructions from him on the 15th of August 1851. Will you state to the Committee what those instructions were?

Captain Stewart.—My instructions were then to make the best of my way home. I was to have received written instructions the following day, but the weather came on thick, and we parted company without my having received written instructions. I then proceeded homewards for England.

Captain Austin.
Mr. Penny.

17th Nov. 1851.

Mr Stewart.

Mr. Stewart.
17th Nov. 1851.

1495. *Admiral Fanshawe.*—I understand you expected to have received instructions to the same effect?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, I supposed so.

1496. *Sir E. Parry.*—When did you part company?

Captain Stewart.—I do not recollect the date. You will see it in my journal.

1497. *Sir E. Parry.*—Was it the day after you received the instructions, or some days afterwards?

Captain Stewart.—It was some days afterwards. It was coming through the ice the night after we got clear of the middle ice.

1498. *Sir E. Parry.*—Captain Penny's journal says, on the night of the 21st of August, "This night lost our consort;" was that the day?

Captain Stewart.—I do not know the date. It was just after we left the middle ice.

1499. *Sir E. Parry.*—It was a few days after you received these verbal instructions?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, a few days afterwards.

1500. *Chairman.*—Did you receive a letter from Captain Austin, after your return from your exploring journey, about the end of June this year?

Captain Stewart.—Yes.

1501. *Chairman.*—Will you state to the Committee the purport of that letter?

Captain Stewart.—I do not recollect; I have not got my papers here.

1502. *Chairman.*—Can you state, to the best of your recollection, what it was about?

Captain Stewart.—I think the purport of it was congratulating me on my safe return, and on having discovered that new land to the northward.

1503. *Chairman.*—Did he say anything about steam vessels prosecuting the discovery, or any thing to that effect?

Captain Stewart.—I do not think he said it in the letter, but I saw him afterwards, when he spoke about it; he said that if there were steamers up there, they could fix their positions so nicely, as there were such excellent surveyors.

1504. *Chairman.*—Then he meant if the channel opened, for they could not get up at that time, could they?

Captain Stewart.—No, not at that time.

1505. *Chairman.*—Then the communication from Captain Austin to you was expressing a wish that steamers could pass up the channel and examine the open water more thoroughly?

Captain Stewart.—I do not know that it was expressing a wish. He stated that if the surveyors were there they could fix the points so well.

1506. *Chairman.*—Could you send up the note to the Secretary of the Committee when you get home?

Captain Stewart.—Yes, if I can find it; all my papers are in Scotland.

The Committee then adjourned.

A P P E N D I X.

Enclosure No. 3.

INSTRUCTIONS to Captain AUSTIN, C.B.

Captain Austin's
Instructions.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

1. Having appointed you to the command of the Expedition which it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to despatch on a further search for Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror," under the command of Sir John Franklin, you are hereby required and directed to take the vessels named in the margin under your command, and, so soon as they are in all respects ready to put to sea, and to make the best of your way to Davis' Straits, for the express purpose of prosecuting a most vigorous search for the missing ships.

"Resolute,"
"Assistance,"
"Intrepid,"
"Pioneer."

2. We have directed you to be furnished with a copy of our orders which were given to Sir John Franklin, and which will afford you full information how he was directed to proceed. We have likewise ordered you to have a copy of our instructions to Captain Sir James Ross; and to these we have to direct your especial attention.

Vide Evidence,
p. 40.

3. The various papers which have been laid before the Houses of Parliament have also been sent for your information. By reference to them you will be made aware that we have taken the opinions of the most able and experienced persons connected with Polar navigation relative to the missing Expedition; you will observe that many valuable conjectures have been made; and it has been suggested that Sir John Franklin may have effected his passage to Melville Island, and been detained there with his ships. It has again been suggested as possible that his ships may have been damaged in the ice in the neighbouring sea, and that with his crews he may have abandoned them, and made his escape to that island. To these, as well as the other possibilities, you will not fail to give every proper weight.

4. It therefore appears to us to be a main object of the Expedition for you to use every exertion to reach Melville Island, detaching a portion of your ships to search the shores of Wellington Channel and the coast about Cape Walker, to which point Sir J. Franklin was ordered to proceed. We trust that a diligent examination of these several places will afford you some certain trace or record of the missing Expedition which will enable you to form an opinion of the best course to adopt for their rescue. As your course of action must clearly depend on such information, we consider it unnecessary to give you any definite or specific instruction, and inexpedient to bind you down to any certain line of proceeding. We confide in your knowledge and experience of the navigation of the Polar Seas; and, placing just reliance on your energetic character and zeal, we leave you entirely unfettered to do what may seem to you best for attaining the great object of the expedition intrusted to your charge, feeling assured that you, as well as all those under you, will use your utmost exertions to afford relief to our unfortunate countrymen, and to justify the reliance we have placed in you.

5. The officers whom we have consulted have expressed an opinion that no vessel should be allowed to prosecute the search alone, and it is for this reason that to your own and to Captain Ommanney's ship an auxiliary screw vessel has been attached. We therefore direct your attention to this important consideration.

6. Your ships have been fully equipped and provisioned for a period of three years, to meet any emergency which may arise from falling in with Sir John Franklin's party. In addition to these supplies, there are stores and provisions, &c. left by Sir James Ross at Port Leopold, and a further store was sent out in the "North Star" in the summer of last year. These will be available for you in case of necessity; but you are not to consider them as a part of your own stock, but as a reserve for the aid of any of Sir John Franklin's party who may reach that spot, or as a depôt on which any party may fall back upon, should they unfortunately be separated from their ships.

7. In the prosecution of your search you will use your utmost efforts during *this* summer, taking care not to lose any opportunity which may be open to you of getting to the westward, and of securing your ships in some safe harbour before the winter sets in, from whence you will despatch such overland parties as the means placed at your disposal will permit. On the return of the open

Captain Austin's
Instructions.

season of 1851 you will again renew your search; but it is our intention and directions that you shall return to England in the autumn of that year, unless some trace should be found of the missing expedition, which may lead you to believe that a delay may contribute to their rescue, and which may justify a deviation from our orders.

8. You are aware that this is not the only expedition fitting out or being despatched with the same object. One such, under the command of Mr. Penny of Aberdeen, has already sailed for Davis' Straits, provisioned as your own for a period of three years. We furnish you with a copy of the instructions under which he is acting, and we desire that you will render him any aid and assistance in your power, as well as to any other expedition, either from this country, the United States of America, or from any other nation, so far as you may be able to do so without risk of crippling the resources of the vessels under your command.

9. You will take the utmost care in leaving memorials of your track in the usual manner and in every prominent place, and enjoin the same precaution upon all the ships and land parties detached from you or them.

10. You will keep your second in command well informed of the instructions under which you are acting, consulting with him on all points, and stating your own views as to the best means of carrying them out, so that no information may be wanting on his part, if accident to yourself should cause him to succeed to the command.

11. As soon as you reach the Whale Fish Islands, to which rendezvous the "Emma Eugenia" transport has already been despatched, and that you have distributed the supplies taken on board that vessel for the use of the expedition, you will send her to England, and you will also give orders to the master of the "North Star," should you fall in with that vessel, to return home.

12. The several vessels thus placed under your command have been fitted out under your own immediate superintendence, and with every attention to the wants and requirements of the great enterprise you have volunteered to undertake. The officers in command of the vessels composing it, and who are animated with the same ardour as yourself, have been selected by you, with our full concurrence as to their fitness for this particular service. All that could be effected by the generous sympathies of your Queen and your country has been done; and it only remains for us to conclude our instructions with an earnest prayer that success may attend your exertions, and that a good Providence may guide your councils, and be your constant defence.

Given under our hands, this 2d of May 1850.

F. T. BARING.
M. F. F. BERKELEY.

To Horatio T. Austin, Esq., C.B.,
Captain of Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute,"
in charge of an Expedition to the Arctic Seas.

By Command of their Lordships,
J. PARKER.

Enclosure No. 4.

INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. W. PENNY.

Mr. Penny's
Instructions.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. &c.

1. HER Majesty's Government having determined that further endeavours shall be made to trace the progress of Her Majesty's ships "Urebus" and "Terror," under the command of Sir John Franklin, and to resume the search after that Expedition, and having resolved to employ you in the command of the two vessels, the "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia," which have been equipped for that service, you are hereby required and directed, so soon as the said vessels shall be in all respects ready for sea, to proceed with them with all due despatch to Davis's Strait.

2. In intrusting you with the above command, we do not deem it advisable to furnish you with minute instructions as to the course you are to pursue.

In accepting your offer of service regard has been had to your long experience in Arctic navigation, and to the attention you had evidently paid to the subject of the missing ships. We deem it expedient, rather, that you should be instructed in all the circumstances of the case, and that you should be left to the exercise of your own judgment and discretion in combining the most active and energetic search after Her Majesty's ships "Erebus" and "Terror" with a strict and careful regard to the safety of the ships and their crews under your charge, and with a fixed attention to that part of your orders which relate to your returning with those ships to this country.

3. For this purpose you will be furnished with copies of the original instructions given to Sir John Franklin, and which instructions will indicate the course he was directed to pursue, together with our orders and directions to Sir James Ross, when he was despatched on a search after Sir John Franklin, in the spring of 1848.

4. You will be aware that the case virtually stands now as it did then; Sir James Ross, from adverse circumstances, failed in discovering traces of the missing Expedition.

5. Our orders of the 9th May 1848 to Sir James Ross will still serve as the indication of our views of the general course you will have to pursue; but it being our desire that a certain strait known as Alderman Jones's Sound, and which would not appear to have been as yet examined, should be searched, you are hereby required and directed to proceed in the first instance to that sound, closely examining the shores for any traces of Sir John Franklin's course, and proceeding, should it offer the means of your doing so, in the direction of *Wellington Strait and on to the Parry Islands and Melville Island.*

6. On your proceeding in the above direction, too much vigilance cannot be observed in your search along the various shores for traces of the missing Expedition. At the same time you will bear in mind that Sir John Franklin's orders were "to push on through Lancaster Sound, without stopping to examine any openings north or south of that sound, till he had reached Cape Walker." And although it may be possible that the obstructions incident to navigation in those seas may have forced Sir John Franklin north or south of his prescribed course, yet that his principal object would be the gaining the latitude and longitude of Cape Walker.

7. To that point, therefore, failing your discovering traces of the Expedition in your course by Jones's Sound and the Parry Islands, your efforts will be directed, and beyond this your own judgment must be your principal guide.

8. The circumstance of Sir James Ross having partially searched the shores of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait as far west as Cape Rennell without discovering traces of Sir John Franklin's ships has led in some quarters to the supposition of an extreme case; viz., that failing to get into Lancaster Sound, Sir John Franklin had proceeded in the direction of Smith's Sound, at the head of Baffin's Bay.

9. We do not deem it expedient to direct your attention specially to this sound (or supposed sound); but should your passage by Jones's Sound, to which you *are* specially directed, be early and absolutely impeded, and there should appear to you to be the time (without hazarding the only remaining chance of proceeding to Wellington Strait, the Parry Islands, and Cape Walker by Lancaster Sound,) for examining Smith's Sound, you are at liberty to do so; but this is a contingency scarcely to be contemplated, as, in the event of your being frustrated in the attempt to get to the westward and towards Wellington Strait by Jones's Sound, the late period of the year when Smith's Sound is said to be open would render it difficult, if not impossible, to combine a search in that quarter with the securing a passage into Lancaster Sound before the season closed.

10. Much of the painful anxiety that now exists respecting the missing ships might possibly have been avoided if greater care had been taken to leave traces of their progress. You will consider it rigidly your duty, and a matter of the utmost importance, that every means should be adopted for marking your own track.

For this purpose you will provide yourself with an ample supply of red and white lead for making paint; and, in addition to the usual pole or staff, or cairn of stones, usually looked for on a cape or headland, you will, wherever the colouring of the cliff or shore admits of a mark being made in strong relief,

Mr. Penny's
Instructions.

paint a red or white cross, as the case may be, depositing as near to its base as possible, and at right angles with the perpendicular part of such cross, a bottle or other vessel containing a short summary of your proceedings up to the date of the deposit, an account of the state of your supplies and resources, the health of your party, and your further intended course.

11. There remains but to caution you as to your return with your ships to this country.

These ships have been provisioned and stored for three years; but you will bear in mind that this liberal supply is to meet contingencies separate on the one hand from the victualling of your own people, and, on the other, from a needless, reckless, and hazardous continuance in the Arctic regions.

You have been victualled to supply the missing Expedition, or any part of it you may providentially discover; here is the one contingency; unforeseen impediments, or a certain prospect of coming up with any part of the missing Expedition, compelling you to pass a second winter in the ice, is the other; but our directions to you are, 1st, to use your utmost endeavours (consistent with the safety of the lives of those intrusted to your command) to succour in *this summer* the party under Sir John Franklin, taking care to secure your winter quarters in good time; and, 2d, that the same active endeavours will be used by you in the ensuing summer of 1851 to secure the return of your own ships to this country.

12. We refer you to the instructions contained in par. 21. of Sir John Franklin's orders, for your guidance in the event of one of your ships being disabled, or in case of any accident to yourself; and in par. 22. of the same orders are full instructions as to transmitting reports of your progress to our Secretary for our information; to both of which you will strictly attend.

13. In conclusion, we have only to repeat the expressions of our confidence in your skill and in your known ardour in a generous cause; and we commend you and those with you to a good Providence, with our earnest wishes for your success.

Given under our hands, this 11th April 1850.

By Command of their Lordships,
W. A. B. HAMILTON.

(Signed) F. T. BARING.
J. H. D. DUNDAS.

Mr. William Penny,
Ship "Lady Franklin,"
in charge of an Expedition to the Arctic Seas, at Aberdeen.

Captain HAMILTON to Captain PENNY.

Sir,

Admiralty, 10th April 1850.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith the original and duplicate of a letter addressed to Mr. Saunders, Master commanding Her Majesty's Store Ship "North Star," in the Arctic Seas, containing instructions for his guidance, one of which my Lords request you will take charge of yourself, for delivery to that officer, should you fall in with him, and the other you are to put in the possession of Mr. Stewart of the ship "Sophia," for the same purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Enclosure.

Sir,

Admiralty, 10th April 1850.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you,

1. That Sir James Ross having returned to England in the month of November last without having discovered any traces of the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin's orders, and the necessity for the stores and provisions with which he was charged being deposited as directed being all the more urgent, my Lords can only trust that you have been able to land them accordingly.

2. That as our last reports from you were dated 19th July 1849, lat. $74^{\circ} 3'$ long. $59^{\circ} 40' W.$, the anxiety on the part of their Lordships to receive further intelligence of your proceedings is great; and they can therefore only hope, in the event of this despatch reaching you, and of your not having succeeded in affording succour to any of Sir John Franklin's party, that it may find you returning with Her Majesty's ship under your command to England.

3. And that, in order that you may be in full possession of all that has occurred or that has been done since your departure relative to the relief of Sir John Franklin, you are herewith furnished with a printed return which will put you in complete possession of the state of the case, and to which my Lords have only to add, that four ships under the command of Captain Austin, two of them being auxiliary steam vessels, are now fitting at Woolwich, in addition to the two vessels under Captain Penny's orders, and by which this despatch is sent, for the purpose of continuing the search after Sir John Franklin's Expedition (irrespective of private expeditions from this country and the United States); and that as supplies of stores, especially coals, would be most needful for these vessels, as an auxiliary, you are to land at the Whale Fish Island or at Disco whatever proportion of coals or provisions you consider you can with propriety spare, returning without loss of time to England.

I am, &c.

Mr. James Saunders,
Master Commanding H.M.S. "North Star."

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Mr. Penny's
Instructions.

Enclosure No. 5.

Rear Admiral Sir JOHN ROSS to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir John Ross's
Replies.

Sir,

Ayr, 1st November 1851.

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 31st ult., annexing, by desire of the Arctic Committee, certain questions for my answers, which have been submitted to other officers, and to give them my careful consideration.

I have to acquaint you, for the information of the Committee, that I have annexed to this letter my answers to the said questions, after having given them a *most careful* consideration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JOHN ROSS, Rear Admiral.

Enclosure.

Question 1.—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his expedition, still survive? If so, in what direction?

Answer.—I do not think it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his expedition, still survive. It is *barely* possible, if the ships have been wrecked on the east or west coast of Baffin's Bay, where there are natives, but nowhere else.

Question 2.—What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

Answer.—From my experience in having passed four successive winters in the Arctic regions, I do not think that British-born officers and men could withstand the effect of six winters, even if they had plenty of food. I have a very strong constitution, but I think it was very doubtful if I could have withstood the effects of the fifth winter, and most certainly not the sixth. Ten out of twenty would have perished in a month had we not been picked up by the "Isabella."

Sir John Ross's
Replies.

Question 3.—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

It is requested that this question be answered with a full explanation of every particular of the proposed place of search.

Answer.—A further search in the Wellington Channel will depend on the mildness or severity of the approaching winter and spring. But at any rate the truth or falsehood of Adam Beck's report should be ascertained in the manner pointed out in my evidence. If I could have obtained provisions (which I expected to find at Disco), I should have remained during this winter on the east side of Baffin's Bay as far north as I could get, to decide that question. But as the "North Star" did not land or leave any provisions there according to orders, I was disappointed, and, having only three months provisions left, I was obliged to return to England.

On leaving Lancaster Sound in August last, I told Adam Beck that I was determined to visit the place where he reported the ships were wrecked, when he appeared much delighted, and when it was evident that the state of the ice prevented our approach to it, he was much dejected.

The only other place that requires a strict search is the west coast of Baffin's Bay between Ponds Bay and Cumberland Strait. This Mr. Penny told me, in presence of Mr. Goodsir and others, that he intended to do most thoroughly, as he had now an interpreter; and conceiving it would take him to examine 600 miles of coast; at least all October, I did not send my letters by the "Lady Franklin."

JOHN ROSS, Rear Admiral.

Enclosure No.6.

Dr. Scoresby's
Replies.

The Rev. Dr. SCORESBY to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

Torquay, 7th November 1851.

I regret that a small part of my designed "replies" is yet wanting, the manuscript having been sent off a week ago. If I receive the article, as I hope, I will take the liberty of forwarding some remarks on "Appliances for Search," &c.

The first two questions, you will perceive, I have ventured to recast, as, in the form I have adopted, they were more convenient for answering.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM SCORESBY

Enclosure.

REPLIES to QUESTIONS proposed for personal consideration and opinion by the ARCTIC COMMITTEE, by William Scoresby, D. D., F. R. S., London and Edinburgh, &c.

Question 1. Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive; and what are the grounds for forming that opinion?

Reply.—That Sir John Franklin or some portion of his associates *may* still survive is a position which cannot be controverted. It follows, therefore, that *some degree of probability*, whatever that degree may be, does exist. Such probability, it appears to me is involved in or supported by a variety of considerations. Sir John Ross was absent and unheard of for *four years* and some months (though never at a greater distance from positions often visited by the whalers than 250 miles), and returned with nearly all his crew in health. Hence I conceive that Sir John Franklin, or some portion of his associates, with incomparably superior equipment and resources, might yet survive, at some much greater distance beyond the positions ordinarily visited, though a period of somewhat more than *five years* (reckoning from the date of the plain indications and traces of him found on and near Beechy Island) have since elapsed without further information. 2. The Esquimaux, in similar regions, as cold, as desolate, and as apparently resourceless (*altogether* resourceless indeed, except in Arctic

animals), live out, not six or seven winters merely, but a fair portion of the ordinary life of man. Why then may not hardy enterprizing Britons, sustained, over and above, by the moral courage and Christian hope which preserved the same Franklin, a Richardson, a Back, and others, when the ordinary powers of life in men experienced in like hardships, Canadian voyages, failed. Why may they not be yet surviving amid the desolateness of Arctic solitudes, and the wreck of the hopes of the timid and doubting? 3. In the well-known case of four Russian seamen, who, after the loss of their ship on the coast of Spitzbergen in 1743, took refuge on an island near the main, three out of the four survived on resources (except a few pounds of flour and a little tobacco) entirely provided by themselves, during a period of six years and three months, whilst unheard of, and assumed to have perished, and were then rescued, and, enriched with the results of their hunting and fishing, restored in health to their friends. With facts such as these before us,—with the knowledge of their extensive original resources, and of the abundance of animal life in the region into or beyond which I believe they have entered, available for the extension of their original supplies,—I cannot but believe it to be probable that Sir John Franklin, or some of his associates in adventure, do yet survive.

In the entire absence of either information or traces of the expedition beyond the spring of 1846, I might observe there is, in my judgment, no essential grounds for detracting from the assumed probability. There being no information,—none among them having yet returned from whence we could hope to seek them out,—only necessarily implies, either that their applicances for ice travelling, or their condition of physical strength, (circumstances quite to be expected,) are inferior to ours. And there being no observable traces within the extent of recent researches, except at Beechy Island, can prove nothing against such probability, or against the direction we believe they have pursued, as marks on shore would scarcely be planted anywhere except under circumstances of detention, and might not be planted till the second summer's progress was closed, or if planted might not be seen.

It may be proper to notice (as bearing on the question of probability of success of the Expedition) a conjecture which some have entertained, that the ships may have been wrecked, and that the entire crews may have summarily perished, by some sudden catastrophe of the Arctic ices. There is only one special case, however, and that, I think, not in the least degree probable in respect to the Franklin Expedition, in which such *summary catastrophe*, attended by the imagined destruction of the adventurers, could, I believe, be rationally contemplated; and that is, the case of the ships being drifted out to seaward after the manner of Sir James Ross and Captain de Haven, and on approaching the seaward edge of a pack of ponderous ices being overturned by a heavy gale at sea. And even in this possible case the contingencies are such as not in any instance that I am aware of to have been ever fulfilled, even among the thousands and tens of thousands of adventurers in these regions in pursuit of the whale fishery, so that the entire crews of two ships, with the ships themselves (and these, as to the Franklin Expedition, among the strongest ever sent out to the Arctic seas), should be so completely annihilated as to leave not a wreck behind. In every other case but this,—of which I believe we have no corresponding or commensurate example in modern history, as to Davis' Strait or Baffin's Bay,—any sudden catastrophe happening to a ship within the icy regions referred to would yield at least the opportunity of escape to the crew, by the platform of the ice itself, to which, in the first instance, they might retreat. But against the conjecture alluded to, in regard to its bearing on probabilities, we have to set the incomparably better supported conjecture of the ships having advanced on the object of their mission towards the north-west into such a position or circumstances as to render the self-applied efforts of the voyagers inadequate to the effecting of their retreat. For as the probability of the discovery ships advancing in the direction they wished to pursue (as they might have advanced apparently either to the westward or the north-west) must obviously be greater than that of their being driven away, under some special embarrassment, in the very contrary direction, the conjecture of the least likely circumstance, consummated by a barely possible issue in total annihilation, should, I conceive, have the least possible weight, when set against the contrary probabilities.

Dr. Scoresby's
Replies.

Question 2.—In what direction do you suppose Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, if surviving, is to be looked for? And what are your grounds for forming that opinion?

Reply.—From the information derived from the operations of the various Search Expeditions, the impression conveyed to my own mind from the very first has been, that the Franklin Expedition must, on the strongest probabilities, have proceeded by the Wellington Channel, and from thence north-westward into some remote position, or into some position of inextricable embarrassment among the ices of the north-west Polar Sea. In the official instructions of the Admiralty, directing Sir John Franklin (failing in finding a passage westward and south-westward beyond Cape Walker) to proceed, as a second route, by Wellington Channel, we have sufficient grounds for looking to this as the probable direction pursued. But it may be proper to state my views in respect to this probability more particularly.

From the ascertained fact of the voyagers having wintered at Beechy Island in 1845-6, the inference is irresistible, that in the first season of their adventure either no passage was found to the westward at all, or some such opening only as that met with by the Search Expedition in the summer of 1850, or else that the ships were too late for that year to enter on the desired exploration. In any of these cases the next season would necessarily be employed in searching out one or other, whichever might appear the most promising, of the two principal routes prescribed for their investigation, for their guidance in which their fortunate position at a point commanding both of the routes afforded peculiar advantages.

As to which of these was actually pursued the conclusion arrived at by Captain Austin, after his admirable and elaborate explorations of the regions westward from Barrow's Strait, seems to afford, negatively at least, satisfactory guidance; viz. "that the Expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the "object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait." The primary direction proposed by Sir John Franklin's instructions being thus disposed of, we reasonably look for him in that other direction next in order appointed to him, which Captain Penny's interesting researches show us he *might have pursued*,—a direction which a mere view from the hills might have shown him to be open, or which a very short sledge exploration in the spring might have proved to him was as replete with promise of a grand and successful progress north-westward as was the westerly channel which burst forth upon the delighted view of Captain Parry and his ardent comrades, when, on the 1st of August 1820, he first passed through Lancaster Sound and entered into Barrow Strait.

But, in further support of these probabilities, it should be borne in mind, first, as to the practicability, apparently, of Wellington Channel, that on Captain Parry's discovery of this "noble channel," 22d August 1820, when, on a beautiful clear evening, they came before the mouth of it, "neither land nor ice could be seen (within it) from the masthead;" and, secondly, as to Sir John Franklin's favourable opinion of this channel, we have documentary evidence in Arctic papers, I believe, published by the Admiralty; whilst the accordant opinion of Captain Fitzjames, the second in command in the expedition, is still more explicitly shown in a letter to the late Sir John Barrow, dated January 1845, where he says, "The north-west passage is certainly to "be gone through by Barrow's Strait, but whether south or north of Parry's "group remains to be proved. I am for going north, edging north-west till "in the longitude of 140 deg., if possible."

Where then, we might confidently ask, under such variety of according circumstances, could we rationally seek our missing adventurers but by this channel, deemed to be practicable,—which, on Parry's discovery of it, seemed then to be practicable,—and to which, failing in the first route, the high expectations of Franklin and his next in command were so decidedly and hopefully directed? And who of their sympathising and benevolent countrymen, I would add, will not join us in the ardent decided expression, "Let us, in reliance on the Divine blessing, seek them there."

As to the probable practicability of a passage through Wellington Channel, notwithstanding the recent experience of an icy incumbrance of the entrance, we have, I think, satisfactory grounds for concluding favourably thereon. We have, indeed, no evidence which might lead us to infer anything

like a general incumbrance of this channel. No ship that I am aware of has come home to report the actual existence throughout the year of an impassable barrier, except for one solitary season, that of 1850. And no ship removing from the entrance for a single week in any one summer could give conclusive proof that the barrier had not relaxed even in that very week. After the retreat of the recent searching expedition before the close of the present season, the incumbering field, which was only about fifteen miles in breadth in the previous autumn, might, under the power of a few hours favouring gale, have so drifted upward and westward from the eastern shore as to have afforded a free and easy passage, had they been on the spot, to the entire fleet. And most probably it was a sudden and unexpected opening of this kind,—filling the hearts of our adventurers with hope and gladness, in the prospect of at once reaching a sea which had perhaps, as with Captain Penny, before been seen from the hill,—which urged a departure so hurried and imperative as to leave no moment for caring for records, when the idea of bringing through Behring's Straits their own despatches was the one grand and absorbing impression of the whole of the adventurers. And as to the extreme importance of improving the chance of progress at the earliest possible moment, every experienced navigator in Arctic seas is aware of the fact that one hour of time, yea, a few minutes, wasted, may possibly sacrifice the results of months of previous labour and diligence. These are facts of experience which hundreds can verify. Well, therefore, might Franklin, if a prospect of furtherance and success so suddenly burst upon him, be in haste to improve it, and well might the relics brought home by Captain Penny and others of the Search Expeditions be the only records of a sojourning at Beechey Island, and of a hasty departure.

As to no traces of the progress of the Expedition being met with in all the extent of Captain Penny's explorations, I would take occasion to remark that we cannot fairly infer from this anything essentially discouraging. All that can be concluded is, that the probability of Sir John Franklin having passed that way into the north-western or north Polar Ocean lacks what might have been demonstration, but loses, as to probability, nothing. A variety of circumstances, such as a fair and rapid and hopeful progress, when blowing hard, an intervention of land ice, or packed ice on shore, a strong offshore wind, &c., might have prevented the erection of cairns on shore on the part of Franklin, whilst other circumstances, various in their kind, might have prevented Penny's party from discovering even existing traces. Many of the traces which have now been met with at Beechey Island escaped the observation of those who first visited it, and none of them would have been detected by an ordinary course along shore. If the progress of Franklin through Wellington Channel, which I cannot but believe he has passed, were free and rapid, there could be no reasonable expectation of his staying his progress anywhere within the limits of Penny's shore examinations—a distance, in a direct course by the south channel, of perhaps not more than 120 to 140 geographical miles; and it could only be when the erection of marks on the shore could be effected without essential interruption of progress that the adventurous party could think of providing for the information of those who might chance to follow them.

Whilst submitting to the Committee the foregoing views on the first two questions on which they have done me the honour to request my opinion, it may be proper to notice certain objections which have been publicly announced to the conclusions, as to personal convictions, I have arrived at.

1. The first of these objections, indeed, as to a conjectured retrograde movement of the Expedition after wintering at Beechey Island, has already been referred to as bearing on the probability of Sir John Franklin or some portion of his associates being yet surviving. It bears, too, (by consequence,) on the views now expressed as to the direction in which survivors, if any, would probably be met with. Hence I may take occasion to observe, that the supposition,—urged, I believe, on the indications of a hasty and unpremeditated departure of the Franklin Expedition from its winter quarters,—that it was driven off to the southward by some sudden disruption and movement of the ice, can have no greater probability for its support than what belongs to a sudden drifting northward through Wellington Channel, in correspondence with the primary drifting of the American Expedition; whilst the supposition of the Franklin Expedition having passed Wellington Channel has the *additional*

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foundation, 1st, of this being one of the directions which Sir John Franklin was instructed to try; 2d, of this direction being in all probability occasionally navigable; 3d, of this channel actually communicating with a further channel in a north-westerly direction of the most promising extent towards the object aimed at, and open and navigable at an early period of the season; and, 4thly, of this direction being not unlikely to be suddenly opened out during a heavy gale from the eastward or south-eastward, and, if so, presenting an opportunity or prospect of effecting the grand object of the Expedition such as would abundantly explain the indications of a hasty retreat from their wintering quarters.

2. In regard to another suggestion bearing on the possible fate of our missing countrymen which some persons have felt to be discouraging, viz., that where we might penetrate they might get out. I would take occasion to add, that this is only a particular and limited truth. All things on both sides being the same, the proposition would of course be true. Mechanically, the force required to move a body from A. to B. on a horizontal plane would, under like circumstances of resistance, be the proper force for moving the same body from B. to A.; but, physically and geographically, the relative resistances, as well as the appliant forces, are not necessarily equal. In the present case they are obviously very unequal. Besides, we have fresh hands, full of hope and health; and we have now well-tested appliances which our predecessors had not duly estimated.

Question 3.—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

[“ It is requested that this question be answered with a full explanation of every particular of the proposed plan of search.”]

Reply.—Nothing of actual progress, except in the nature of pioneering, it is obvious, has yet been accomplished in the search for Sir John Franklin. Captain Austin sought him where, as the result of a search of something like 6,000 miles of sledging has shown, he was not to be found. Captain Penny pursued what I believe to have been his track, but up to a position only where he could not have halted, or, if he had stayed, could not now have been missing. In pioneering before the march of humanity much and most important information has been gained. In the widely-spread trackless common, so to speak, in which we had hitherto been so perplexed, and our adventures so prevalently wasted by the indefinite variety of directions of more or less promise, a track has now most happily been discovered narrowing to one specific direction the pursuit of the missing, and guiding us in the concentration of newly-directed appliances, where zeal and energy, sympathy and humanity, may have their most hopeful and encouraging exercises.

From what we know of the region to be explored, the uncertain extent of interruptions from the condition of the ice, peculiarity of season, and incidents attending a difficult and often perplexing navigation, we can only calculate, as a probability, on the reaching of any particular advance station during the first summer's enterprize of a renewal of search. But in the employment of a sufficient number of vessels, say four, with tenders, some of the contingencies will become proportionally reduced, so as to leave a reasonable confidence of gaining some such position as that wintered in by the recent expeditions. On such an advanced position at least we may, I think, reasonably calculate. And on the passing beyond this position within Wellington Channel, or probably beyond it, even during the summer of 1852, we may entertain, if the views we have submitted be sound, no inconsiderable expectation. In either case, whether the navigation through the newly-discovered Victoria Channel be actually accomplished, or whether the exploring vessels should be stopped at the entrance of Wellington Channel, all the requirements of humanity, by the appliances now at command may, we believe, be satisfactorily attained.

In order to this, four vessels, besides tenders, would, I think, be necessary; two of them, as the experience of the late trials sufficiently point out, having efficient steam-propelling power. One of the vessels, a principal one in tonnage and accommodation, I would propose (as originally submitted in “The Franklin Expedition,” published in January 1850,) for the service of a general depôt, receiving or refuge ship, for parties which might adventure in distant researches.

And this ship should be stationed as near as practicable to the entrance of Wellington Channel, such as at Beechey Island or Assistance Bay, in reliance upon the shelter and resource of which the other vessels might, with much confidence of safety, be pushed forward to the very extremity, perhaps, of any sea or channel of navigable waters extending towards the western outlet of Behring's Strait.

In like manner each of these other vessels having succeeded, as we now assume, in passing through Wellington Channel, would, in the extreme position which they might happen to gain, serve in its turn as a second or third refuge ship and depôt for travelling parties thrown out from their advance position. So that, thus provided with two or more places of principal replenishment and refreshment, in positions far advanced, it might be hoped, beyond each other in the desired direction, we can see no unreasonable risk in attempting to explore the so-long sought north-west passage, to any extent whatever to which our missing voyagers may have advanced, and in which, by circumstances on which we have no data for calculating, they may have become, as to any means capable of being made self-available, inextricably embarrassed; for if the very encouraging channel discovered by Penny were to happen to yield an advance in free navigation of 500 miles from Beechey Island, we should have the residue of the distance to Point Barrow, the north-western headland of the American continent, reduced (as estimated on the great circle direction) to some 500 or 600 miles. To travel so far, and return to the supposed advance depôt, did the means by favourably disposed ice admit, would not very greatly exceed an extraordinary performance of Dr. Rae in the spring of 1847, who informs us that himself and one of his men travelled, without lacking resources, a distance of 1,000 miles on foot, and on their return, though rather low in flesh, were as sound and well as when they started. And a distance such as that referred to it will be remembered is fully within the range of one of the transglacial journeys so admirably effected by no less than four of the enterprising parties sent out by Captain Austin in his late expedition, and might therefore be possibly repeated under the imagined contingencies of the now contemplated search, provided the parties were not required to return, by supplies or a refuge vessel being secured to the adventurers at the Behring's Strait extremity of their great undertaking. And here, whilst contemplating the practicability or the possibility, at least, of such a grand result with searching parties from a far westerly station, an important question naturally arises; whether, for the encouragement of such an undertaking and such a completion of the great object of search, means should not be taken, and promptly if at all, to meet the adventurous travellers in a sufficiently northerly parallel from the westward, or to secure to them, in case of success, the resources necessary to preserve them from becoming sacrifices in the cause of humanity? In contemplating a possibility of such a consummating result as this referred to, we do so advisably, and, with Commander Pullen's wonderful enterprise fresh, as it were, before us, with a reasonable measure of hope; for with such appliances as we have now at command, hitherto quite unapprehended, what may we not hope for from a renewal of the search as stimulated by the ennobling and soul-stirring feelings of humanity, and undertaken with the zeal and bravery characteristic of British seamen?

But we return from the contemplation of these very sanguine views, grounded on the hope of the passage of Wellington Channel being effected, and considerable westing in the newly discovered channel beyond being gained, in the summer of 1852, to the consideration of the prospect of remote and successful researches in the same direction being effected by ice-travelling and boating parties, starting from a position no further advanced than that of the winter quarters of the recent Search Expedition.

From a starting point such as this, which we are encouraged to believe to be very generally attainable, we doubt not but efficient and conclusive researches might be made north-westward, provided the channel, or Polar Sea, as presumed, so continues to an extent of several hundreds of miles. Previous to the late splendid experiments in ice-travelling I had confidently expressed (at page 85 of "The Franklin Expedition") the firm persuasion that we were but yet beginning to learn what might be done by this method of research. Towards this attainment, besides some suggestions as to the application of auxiliary agencies for the furtherance of progress, I took occasion to submit

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the plan of pushing forward depôts and supplies to stations 100 to 150 miles in advance, and of the employment of small parties on the several lines to be explored, &c. ; a plan to which the admirable results of recent enterprise have given such satisfactory approval. No less than five of Captain Austin's parties, we find, accomplished with six or seven men sledges a distance averaging for each above 600 miles ; whilst one of them, under the direction of Lieutenant M'Clintock, travelled the extraordinary distance of about 800 miles, returning, after an absence of eighty days, in safety and good health. And it is worthy of particular consideration, that of the numerous parties despatched from the "Resolute" and her associates (some of whom were exposed to the severity of a temperature of 37° below zero), as well as those under the general direction of Captain Penny, all accomplished their respective enterprises in safety.

So much in these admirably conducted enterprises having been already accomplished, the repetition, under as favourable circumstances, may be reasonably expected ; and, assisted by recent experience and information, we believe still greater triumphs in the humane enterprise now contemplated to be, under the furtherance and protection of that gracious Providence so fittingly and piously invoked by the late adventurers, reasonably attainable.

In order to this we would submit, as of vast importance, the extension in distance and number of stations (now that one line of research requires only to be pursued) of the system of depôts. Something considerable, perhaps, might be done towards this object in the early autumn, as soon as the navigation for ships should be found closed ; a plan, indeed, tried by Captain Austin, with considerable advantage, I apprehend, to his spring successes. The economizing of training exercises, capable of being commenced probably by the middle of March in a tolerably favourable season, might give important aid in the preliminary arrangements. No physical labour, I would submit, even in training for the great adventure, need be wasted. Until the whole of the supplies for the advance posts and depôts should be despatched, even a four hours exercise would be available for useful service ; and when the training might be extended to one or two or more nights bivouacking abroad, the mass of supplies could get pushed forward with much advantage to the ultimate measures for travelling. To carry forward this system too, to the best advantage, it would be important to add to the stores of the advance depôts, or to continue to push forward still more extended supplies long after the departure of the exploring parties towards points or positions previously agreed upon. Baillie Hamilton Island, under the contemplated arrangements, would obviously be a very important position for a principal depôt, where, by means of hunting, shooting, and fishing parties, there would be every probability of obtaining an ample enlargement. All this would of course require the reservation of a considerable number of hands for the special service, but they would well and effectively subserve the great object in view ; for, whilst every fresh station for a depôt would yield additional security to the adventuring travellers, each additional advance station must give encouragement to further and more complete researches after the objects of our sympathy abroad. Under such a system, and under circumstances tolerably favourable, an extension of exploration might not improbably be attained, at once unapprehended in previous expectations, and commensurate with the requirements of the great undertaking humanely contemplated.

Open water, it appears, was discovered by Captain Penny at no great distance westward of Baillie Hamilton Island so early as the 16th of May of the present year, with a dark "water sky," not to be mistaken, indicating an indefinite extension of it in a westerly direction beyond ; for the indications of a dark water sky, when favourably elicited, I may remark by the way, are, under the eye of an experienced whale fisherman, not to be mistaken ; at least with the one exception, not in the case referred to of probable occurrence, of bay-ice, a condition peculiar to ice of new formation, whilst yet without any covering of snow, and so thin as to present a surface equally unreflecting of light as that of the sea. In every other case a plainly developed water sky is unailing in its indications.

The occurrence of water at so early a period in the year in the region to be explored involves at once a difficulty and an advantage in the contemplated researches,—a difficulty in requiring the conveyance of a boat or boats, with the requirements for again taking to the ice if the extension of open water

should fail,—and an advantage as to the means of making rapid progress, compared with the necessary tediousness of men-drawn sledges. But the difficulties, being anticipated, would no doubt be efficiently provided for, so that, on the whole enterprise, the general anticipations we have ventured to submit might possibly gain rather than lose by the change of circumstances in the method of progress.

Whilst contemplating thus hopefully the probability of effecting satisfactory and conclusive researches in respect to the fate of our missing voyagers, it may be proper, in order to a candid exposition of the whole subject, to remark, that an undue importance in the public mind appears to me to have been given to the condition of the region explored by Captain Penny, as indicating *a change in and improvement of climate*. No such inference, I feel assured, can justly be drawn from the circumstances of open water, early decaying ice, or multitudes of birds and other living creatures. Peculiar geographical and hydrographical conditions are obviously sufficient to account for the apparent amelioration of climate. Thus, on the western coast of Spitzbergen, in the parallels of 77° to 79° or even up to 80°, the sea is often open as early as (or before) the month of May, and abounding near the shore with animal life, when to the southward of the lowest of these parallels the ice is continuous from Nova Zembla to Cape Farewell in Greenland, and when to the northward of the 80th or 81st parallel of latitude neither bird nor beast is to be seen, but a sea covered with a continuous and unbroken surface of ice, and that never, I believe, penetrable by shipping, except to a small extent beyond the latitude of 81° occasionally (perhaps *rarely*) in summer, and within the particular meridians of 10° to 25° east. Again, on the east coast of Greenland, when in Scoresby's Sound in the 71st parallel all ice was gone, and a temperature such that in one spot on which a landing was effected the men were bitten by mosquitos, in regions farther north the coast was blocked with heavy ice, and no such moderation of a mild or genial climate (except again in some peculiar geographical or hydrographical positions) to be met with.

The Rev. Dr. SCORESBY to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

Torquay, 14th November 1851.

I beg leave to add to my former replies to queries of the Arctic Committee the portion *on means and appliances* herewith sent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. SCORESBY.

Enclosure.

In conclusion of this communication in reply to the questions of the Arctic Committee, I may yet venture to append a few observations *on the means and appliances* available for further, and, I would hope, more extended explorations in search of our missing voyagers. And of these various appliances yielding promise of most effective aid that of steam propelling power is obviously of grand importance. This, indeed, was one of the special advantages contemplated in the case of the Franklin expedition. Captain Ross had first tried it, but it failed in his case by the unfortunate adoption of an untried, and, as it proved, a useless system of machinery. To this instrumentality, though the power of the machinery in the Erebus and Terror was but feeble, Sir John Franklin could yet look as affording the means of advancing under circumstances when mere sailing vessels could do nothing, and of so facilitating the general progress as to afford new and additional hopes of accomplishing the long and ardently sought north-west passage.

In the expedition under Captain Austin the steamers Pioneer and Intrepid, though of no very commanding capabilities, yet did all and more indeed than was generally expected from them. Their services in towing the rest of the expedition, in making rapid researches in clear water, in clearing the passage of ordinary obstructions, and by their momentum, employed as a battering-ram, crushing or breaking through blockings of ice not otherwise removable, were so important and effective as to cause this species of agency now to take

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position among the leading essentials in an exploring expedition among Arctic ices.

The only difficulty indeed ever apprehended in rendering this powerful agency available was that of securing the propelling apparatus from damage by contact with ice. In the use of the screw propeller there was obviously sufficient security for general circumstances, and for the ordinary quality of the ices of Baffin's Bay. But there was a risk to the projecting sternpost or frame of the screw, as was remarked in the Franklin Expedition, "of its being twisted " or carried off by contact with any deeply immersed masses of ice, together " with that essential machine appended to it, the rudder." Whilst, however, the experience in the late expedition of the vast importance and availableness of the screw-apparatus was such as to counterbalance, in the general result, the measure of risk encountered, yet I can hardly pass over the curious impression of the before-expressed views, as found in one of Captain Austin's reports to the Admiralty, where he says, "Upon one occasion (referring to a dangerous position of the ships at the conclusion of their researches in Baffin's " Bay) the Intrepid was driven upon the tongue of a berg, while her rudder " was carried away, and the frame of her screw broken." But this incidental risk, in much less degree to be apprehended in these western regions than among the heavier ices of the Spitzbergen Seas, leaves the general advantage so exceedingly predominant as to cause this important appliance, as above intimated, to be now considered as indispensable in any contemplated enterprize for Arctic researches.

Great, however, as the power of steam is, and admirably as it is adapted for the facilitating of researches among Arctic ices, there is in the public mind, as the Committee are well aware, much misconception as to the limitation of its applicability, not merely as to its incapability of acting against the impenetrable masses of fields and floes, or severely compressed or consolidated heavy packs, but even with any satisfactory effect against the continuous resistance of hundreds of miles of bay ice. In the advance of summer, when the ice becomes decayed, and the crystallization is in the course of separation, a powerful steamer might easily pass through a sheet of bay ice of considerable thickness; but in the progress of freezing, when the texture is compact and tenacious, a sheet of ice of six or eight inches would, I believe, arrest any steamer within a space of a quarter of a mile, or even a hundred yards. If indeed the bay ice were disposed to separate (whereas it would be more likely to be disposed to close), a steamer might be possibly backed in the canal she had commenced, and so gaining a fresh momentum, might make a further and a further advance; but the attempt to effect by such a process, with the chances of stoppage by pressure, a passage of perhaps a hundred miles or more through this tenacious substance, must necessarily and eventually fail. None but those who have actually experienced the mortifying and vexatious effects of bay ice in resisting the progress of a ship, even when urged by a favouring gale, can duly estimate the formidableness of such a hindrance.

The advantage derivable from the employment of *dogs* in transglacial travelling has long been matter of history in Arctic adventure. Explorations of an extraordinary extent, as well as of rapidity in the performance, are on record in connexion with Russian discoveries within the Arctic circle; and Captain Penny on different occasions seems to have realized much advantage from his dog-sledges. In one instance, when obliged to return from a position forty-two miles in advance, the dog-sledges accomplished the distance in *one stage*. And from Point Surprise, on Baillie Hamilton Island, the dogs appear to have run the distance to the ship, probably a hundred miles, in about three days. But future explorers, knowing these facts, will of course avail themselves of the like instrumentality, if what appears on the face of Captain Penny's brief report be here correctly understood.

In conclusion of these suggestions, which I throw out with a view to consideration by the Executive in the renewed enterprize of humanity, rather than as the formal proposition of a plan expected to be pursued, I may allude to another and most important agency which, with much deference, I would submit, as being not improbably available for ice-travelling; viz., the employment of a steam-propelling power. The feasibility of adapting this powerful agent to a *sledge-boat* designed for the proposed researches—a boat which on arriving at open water might leave her runners and frame behind—is commended to my own

mind by the two important facts elicited in the late sledge operations of our Arctic exploring parties; first, the extraordinary load which each man, on an average, was able to draw,—a weight, stated in Captain Penny's report, of 200 pounds, and in Captain Austin's, of 205 pounds per man; and, secondly, the deducible fact of the extremely small resisting force with properly adapted sledges.

What the actual resistance to be overcome in a six-man sledge amounts to we can only judge (no actual experiments that I am aware of having been made thereon) by estimation on the datum of ordinary manual power in drawing. Such datum we have in the experiments of M. de la Hire, published in an early volume of the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris, where he determines that the whole strength of a man is only available to the extent of a force of 27 lbs. or livres (about 30 lbs. English), in drawing in a horizontal direction. On this estimate we cannot suppose the draught per man in our ice-travelling parties, whilst making a distance of ten to fifteen miles daily (or ten miles on the general average, including all delays and stoppages), to have been more than 20 lbs. avoirdupois per man, and it is much to be doubted whether it were so much. This estimate would give a resistance of 120 lbs., or 10 per cent. of the load, on the general average of ice-travelling at a rate of perhaps one and a half or two miles per hour.

A compactly constructed steam-engine of a couple of horses power would in such case be sufficient, I suppose, if its force could be made duly available, to carry forward, and with no inconsiderable speed, a sledge of the weight referred to, say 1,200 lb., besides the additional burden of itself. Not possessing positive information on the subject of the weight of such an engine, that is, with tubular boiler, and heated by spirituous or oleaginous fuel, I can only throw out the suggestion for more accurate inquiry. But I cannot suppose that the additional weight of the engine, with its requisite supply of fuel, could present any essential objection to the employment of such an apparatus. There would be an obvious advantage, I may observe, in employing oil for fuel, inasmuch as the Arctic regions afford such variety of means of replenishing the store of this combustible; for almost every creature which inhabits the sea or frequents the waters of the north, furnishes oil; not only the whale, but the seal, walrus, bear, and, in a slight degree, even the aquatic birds.

As to the mode of adapting the power of the engine to the propelling of a sledge, I would merely submit the apparent applicability of a modification of the ordinary paddle-wheel, such as in a projecting series of radiating points of metal on the rim of the wheel, adapted to penetrate or scratch upon a surface of snow or ice, with an upward movement regulated by a spring, to provide against a too violent resistance from any hard and elevated surface travelled over. These radiating points might, I conceive, be rendered ultimately available for the attachment of the requisite floats of the paddle-wheel, should it be found that the sledge-boat might be convertible into a steam-boat, on reaching any navigable water.

The steering of a sledge of this kind could probably be effectively accomplished by a short fore-keel, slightly depressed below the runners of the sledge, and moveable on a pivot by an apparatus on board, so as, by deflecting the line of the fore-keel out of the longitudinal centre, it would act after the manner of the movements in the fore-body of a carriage, in giving direction to the entire machine.

From any hasty judgment that such a scheme is chimerical, the triumphs of art hitherto realized in the employment of the agency of steam should be sufficient to defend it. I submit it with diffidence, but do not imagine that it involves any mechanical or other essential difficulties which, should the demand for its trial call out the ingenuity of our practical engineers, would not be easily overcome.

An important matter of economy would be involved in the expenditure of fuel, which it may be proper to notice, that of the providing for the travellers, without trouble or waste of resources, a constant supply of *water* and of water heated, according as the arrangements for the economizing of the heat of the escape or condensed steam might be provided, so as to be always ready for their culinary requirements.

Such are the means and appliances as well as the plans for practical operation which have occurred to me as being likely to be available, and, I would venture

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to hope, effective too, in the prosecuting of the desired researches after our anxiously sought adventurers. With the variety of minor or isolated particulars belonging to the general subject of these communications which have from time to time occurred to me I need not trouble the Committee, except, indeed, to call attention to a new article of portable provision, the American *meat-biscuit*, the invention of Mr. Borden, which might, not improbably, be a useful addition to the stores of ice travelling parties.

All the matters, however, which have appeared to me of any essential consideration as bearing on the important subject of inquiry before the Arctic Committee having now (with the previously stated views on the same general subject given in "The Franklin Expedition") been sufficiently elicited, I would close this communication by the expression of the fervent and prayerful hope that the special cause of humanity and national duty now being inquired into may, under the blessing of the ALMIGHTY, be so prospered through the instrumentality of an ample and conclusive Expedition for search, that the sadly-trying mourners amongst us may eventually be comforted, and Britain be yet called upon to rejoice at the restoration of her long-lost sons.

WILLIAM SCORESBY.

Torquay, Nov. 14, 1851.

Enclosure No. 7.

Captain Austin's
Replies.

Replies of CAPTAIN AUSTIN to Questions put by the Arctic Committee relative to the subject under their inquiry, 28th October 1851.

First Question.—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive? if so, in what direction?

Reply.—Having most carefully and most anxiously given this question the fullest consideration, I am compelled, with deep regret, to state, "I do not believe, nor suppose it probable, that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive."

Second Question.—What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

Reply.—1st. The protracted period of their absence, a period of six years in July last having elapsed since the Expedition under Sir John Franklin left the Whale Fish Islands, provisioned at that time for three years.

2d. From my own knowledge, and from the opinions and reports of the officers, made to me during the time they were actually in the performance of duties under the responsibility of my orders. Those reports were to the effect, that resources could not be obtained for the support of a party either in the neighbourhood of our winter quarters, or of the parts visited by any one of the Expedition under my charge.

This conclusion is borne out by the circumstance, that although native encampments have been constantly met with by our parties, yet nothing has been seen to indicate the existence of a human being for a lengthened period; from which I assume, that the inability of the natives to procure subsistence had compelled them to abandon these parts for others.

3d. The ill-effects of a second winter on the mind and body, arising from the want of fresh food (both animal and vegetable), are much greater than is generally considered, and are much greater than even those who have experienced its intensity are willing to acknowledge when they are no longer undergoing the privations. Our crews were free from scurvy, yet at the close of the winter season they had, I am sure, lost a considerable portion of their original physical strength, and to such an extent in some that they could not proceed with the travelling parties; and my belief is, that those individuals would not have survived a second winter.

4th. It further occurs to me, that even after a second winter, although Sir John Franklin's crews would have been much debilitated, and rendered less capable of encountering the fatigue of travelling, yet still that some individuals amongst those crews would have been despatched in the hope of effecting a

communication with whalers, or for the purpose of reaching Melville Island (as they knew that animals had been seen there), or that they would have pushed forward for the American continent.

This opinion may be considered as opposed to the representation that has been made to the Committee, that Sir John Franklin had "gone away in clear water beyond our reach" (say 500 miles). From my experience, I am unable to place any confidence in such a representation, and I believe that those who are thoroughly conversant with Arctic navigation will entertain similar distrust.

5th. In addition to the grounds which I have offered for supposing it to be impossible that Sir John Franklin and his crews are now alive, I beg to refer to the opinion of Captain Penny—not the opinion adopted by Captain Penny since his return to England, and after communication with other parties—but I beg to refer to the opinion of Captain Penny, written by him upon the spot, in his letter to me of the 4th of August 1851, at his winter quarters. After expressing his intention of returning to England, Captain Penny concludes his letter thus, "Poor Lady Franklin, and the friends of those brave men whose fate will ever remain in oblivion! Was it not a strong conviction of my sense of duty, the very thought of meeting any of them without intelligence would almost tempt me to another winter." This letter is in the hands of the Committee.

Third Question.—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

Reply.—It is with much diffidence that I offer any opinion on this subject. But first, as to the direction:—any search up the Wellington Strait would, in my opinion, be fruitless. I cannot bring myself to search at all with the hope of success in any direction. I found this conclusion on the circumstance of the late extensive search, having discovered no traces beyond those in the neighbourhood of the first winter quarters; and I cannot resist the conviction that the missing Expedition did not advance in the second season beyond Beechey Island.

I am confirmed in this belief by the following considerations:—assuming that my opinion is correct, that Sir John Franklin did not advance in the second season beyond Beechey Island; I have then to observe, that he had failed in prosecuting his discovery during the previous season, even as far as had been accomplished by the Expedition of 1819; that Expedition reached Melville Island, and it was the generally received opinion that that point might be reached every season, and under every circumstance, and did not depend upon favourable seasons and ice navigation. Sir John Franklin would therefore have to commence his second season, with his crews suffering from the prejudicial effects of an Arctic winter, with the additional discouragement of their success not having been equal to even what had been accomplished 25 years before.

It is also reasonable to suppose that Wellington Channel was blocked when his ships took up their winter quarters in 1845. Impressed with these considerations, I feel that a prudent commander, duly regarding his responsibility, would not have considered himself justified in prosecuting north-west in an unknown region, bearing too in mind that he had only some 20 months provisions in search of a passage to the Pacific, a distance of 1,100 to 1,200 miles of ice navigation, and approaching 3,000 miles from any place where supplies could be obtained, and that difficult navigation to be accomplished in the five or six weeks only which is open during each year for that purpose.

With regard to Wellington Channel, it will be seen from my report that that channel was blocked in September 1850; and that, although aided by steam, not more than 30 miles of direct advance to the westward in Barrow's Strait (a far more extensive channel) was made; and although Wellington Channel was reported favourably from aloft in 1819 and 1820, yet knowing that in Arctic navigation how frequently the reports of a clear sea from the crew's nest in narrow waters are followed by the end of the lead or a block being seen within an hour, it was not a sufficient inducement for a former very experienced Arctic navigator, either to prosecute in that direction, or to examine the extent of the water seen, in the hope of success in the object of a north-west passage.

Captain Austin's
Replies.

Furthermore, I am convinced by late experience that the navigation of Wellington Channel is most critical; as all narrow straits in icy seas are, more or less, of which good proof is furnished in the cases of "Griper," "Fury," "Victory," and "Terror"; in that of the "Fury," my recollections are fully alive to our state of helplessness.

In passing Radstock Bay in the "Resolute" in August 1850, the ice came in so rapidly towards the shore, that had not steam been at hand, she might have been beset and carried to the eastward: a similar event occurred to the "Intrepid." The "Pioneer," when rounding Beechey Island with the "Resolute" in tow in August 1850, found the effect of the ice in motion was such that she was driven into shoal water, where she grounded, and it was not until after considerable labour that she was hove off at the expiration of two days. The "Resolute" nearly experienced a similar disaster at the same time, gaining the fast ice with considerable difficulty, and avoiding being set on shore or drifted out of the channel. The "Assistance" and her tender were subject to very severe pressure in Wellington Channel, when the "Intrepid" had her rudder head carried away: afterwards, from the easterly set with pressure off Cape Hotham, the "Assistance," was in a very critical position. Lieutenant De Haven informed me, that in September 1850, while attempting to make his way up the channel, when near Point Innes his vessels were in considerable danger from the movement of the ice when affected by wind or tide; indeed, he, of necessity, employed every effort to reach security in Barlow Inlet. The situation of the "Resolute" and her tender in September 1850, when drifting from above Barlow Inlet out of the Strait, I consider, was very critical and helpless; had they been nearer in they might have been forced on shore; and had it not been for the aid of steam, I believe that they would have been carried away to the south-east in the Pack—the Pack being all but tied together for the winter. In the case of Captain Penny, when crossing from Union Bay in September 1850, his brigs were nearly forced on shore at Cape Spencer.

The accounts that have recently been received of the drifting of the American Expedition in Wellington Channel appear to confirm these views.

If Wellington Channel gave much hope for advancing in the second season, is it not fair to infer, that parties would have been despatched if only to reconnoitre for places of security as the Expedition proceeded? but it appears that these did not extend beyond Cape Bowden to the northward, and Caswell's Tower to the eastward. A bottle was found at Cape Bowden; meat canisters at Caswell's Tower; the remains of a coal-fire at Cape Spencer (most probably of a shooting party); and more extensive remains at Cape Riley; but in no case beyond those places. And I would submit, as a just inference, that if it had been Sir John Franklin's object to prosecute up Wellington Channel, economy of his fuel would have been a matter of most rigid care and anxiety, and that he would not have left at his winter quarters a quantity of materials that would have served for fuel, and which at the time did not escape remark.

Further, it appears most probable that if Sir John Franklin's Expedition had proceeded up Wellington Channel, a record of it would have been left. It is also reasonable to consider that vessels could not have passed through a narrow passage between the islands which appear in Captain Penny's chart without detention; and (being new discovery) possession would have been taken and some mark of such discovery left on them. I may also mention, that Sir John Ross, Captain Ommanney, Lieutenant De Haven, and Captain Penny all left the Wellington Channel and proceeded towards the south-west

I have now offered my views of Wellington Channel, and have expressed some of the grounds upon which I entertain them; but there are other grounds,—there are opinions which have influenced and guided me,—there are the recorded opinions of our most eminent Arctic navigators and men of science, far from favouring the search for Sir John Franklin by the way of the Wellington Channel. The Committee will remember that the orders to Sir John Franklin himself laid no stress upon the importance of that channel, but pointed his especial attention to another direction.

I may here remark, as bearing upon the present inquiry, that Lady Franklin in a letter to me upon my departure, expressed her anxiety that particular search should be directed to the south-west of Cape Walker; but not one word of Wellington Channel.

With all these important considerations before me, I am at a loss to account for the strong feeling that is abroad in favour of a further search for the missing ships in the direction of Wellington Channel. With reference to the extent of open water reported in the upper part of Wellington Channel, it is well known to those accustomed to ice navigation, that much deception arises from ice covered by water being mistaken for open water, particularly in the months of June and July; the snow being melted on the surface of the ice, the latter becomes transparent and acquires a sea-tint; and has, combined with the almost constant deceptive state of the atmosphere, not only the appearance of water, but with numerous pools upon it presents also the appearance of an open sea, in which the undulating wave can almost be fully recognized; and it is to this optical deception that much that is said to have been seen may be fairly ascribed. Beyond six or eight miles the floe ice upon the horizon frequently presents such a peculiar surface that much caution and determination is necessary to avoid being led into error.

In explanation of the water said to have been seen "on each shore, and for some miles distant from the places of observation," without its following that there was a navigable sea or outlet, I would observe, that the situation of our wintering corresponded in a manner with that of the head of Wellington Channel; and although much limited in extent, the west side being formed by islands, and a bay with no outlet at the head, yet water made to the northward two to three miles from our position, while we were fixed to a fixed barrier, and blocked in to the southward. The "Intrepid" afterwards sailed in this water, which then proved of limited extent. It had before given the idea of an extensive navigable space; and although there was much more water in Barrow's Strait in the autumn of 1851 than in that of 1850, yet there was very little difference as to the power of navigating Wellington Channel.

Having therefore very maturely weighed all these circumstances, I cannot but be strongly impressed that Sir John Franklin did not prosecute beyond Beechey Island; but that leaving his winter quarters, he was either beset on that occasion, or was attempting to return to England. The loss of whalers in the pack will fully account for the complete destruction of any vessel or vessels; and if at a period of winter, instead of summer, also for the total loss of the crews. Contact with bergs would also sufficiently account for the disappearance of the ships, with all on board. Many whalers, having large numbers of casks on board, have been destroyed in Baffin's Bay, without scarcely a vestige having ever been found; and I am not aware that any part of the hull or the spars of the "Fury" have ever been found.

In reply to that portion of the third question which requires what measures I should recommend if a further search be decided on, I have to say, that the two ships and the two steam-vessels which composed the late Expedition under my orders, were found to be well adapted for the service upon which they were then employed; and that (except in some little matters of detail) I have no improvements in their equipment to suggest.

I have now completed my answers to the written inquiries of the Committee, and I have endeavoured to lay before them, through the medium of those answers, not only all the information in my power, but every opinion and answer which my own experience has suggested. If from inadvertence or forgetfulness I have failed in affording the Committee all that they may require, I will at once supply the omission as soon as I am made acquainted with their wishes.

HORATIO T. AUSTIN, Capt. R.N.
Late of Her Majesty's ship "Resolute," and
in charge of the Arctic Expedition.

London, 15th November 1851.

Enclosure No. 8.

Captain Kellett's
Replies.

Captain KELLETT to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

10, Alexander-square, Brompton, 6th November 1851.

With reference to your letter of yesterday's date, submitting to me certain questions relative to the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin, I have to request that you will lay before the Arctic Committee the accompanying paper, containing my most carefully considered replies.

F. J. Fegen, Esq.,
Secretary Arctic Committee.

I have, &c.,

HENRY KELLETT,
Captain, R.N.

Enclosure 1.

Answers to Questions submitted by the Arctic Committee to Captain Henry Kellett, 5th November 1851.

Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews comprising his Expedition, still survive?

There is, I consider, no evidence of their having been wrecked; on the contrary, I think we have evidence that they have not been wrecked.

I feel that it is not within the power of man to say that they are dead, nor do I consider it right to do so when we hear the evidence of the experienced traveller, Dr. Rae, as to the small quantity of food and fuel that will support vigorous life in those regions; as well as Captain Penny's and Lieutenant M^cClintock's account as to the number of animals that may be procured in a higher northern latitude than I think they would be found in.

I must therefore give it as my *opinion* that there is a *possibility* that some may *still survive*.

If so, in what direction?

What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

The answers to these questions must be conjectural.

I base my opinion on the following points:— Giving Sir John Franklin credit for pursuing the object of his Expedition, the ships will be found, I think, a long way to the westward of any point reached by the parties from the late Expeditions.

In the summer of 1846 he may have reached a navigable sea, north of the Parry Islands, which may have enabled him to get to the westward and probably to the southward of Melville and Banks's Land (which may be one), making his return by the eastward more difficult than that by the westward; and the open water, as far as he could know, less distant by the western route. He would therefore persevere westerly, and having made his westing, may have been stopped in his endeavour to get south by continuous land or islands.

We have certain proof of there being land in this sea, for, on the 17th August 1849, I *landed* on an island in lat. 71° 19' N., long. 175° 16' W. (named Herald's Island); it is almost inaccessible, and literally alive with birds. From the neighbourhood of Herald's Island, I saw (as far as a man can be positive of his sight in those seas) to the westward an extensive land, very high and rugged, distant I consider from my position 50 or 60 miles.

I could not land or approach it with my ship, unfortified as she was, but I am convinced it might have been easily reached by a steam vessel.

Now I do consider that it is more probable that the ships are stopped to the westward of the meridian of Behring's Straits, than anywhere within 600 miles north-west of their winter quarters, 1845-6; for, had they been within that distance, we should have had long ere this some *one* out of so large a party return to give us information of their whereabouts.

Being in the meridian of Behring's Straits, or to the westward of it, is, I consider, the very reason we have not heard from them; for they could not possibly reach either America or Asia in boats or on foot.

Vide extract
from my official
letter to their lord-
ships, enclosed.

Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction? Captain Kellett's
Replies.

To reach the point I refer to, I consider screw steam vessels would be the most eligible. We have heard what they have done with Captain Austin. The season is so short, that vessels capable of taking advantage of every opening must be employed; not being able to avail themselves of a lead either from foul winds or calms, may and is likely to cause the loss of the whole season. There should by all means be two vessels with small crews, and filled with provisions; all their resources must be within themselves, as I know of no port where a reserve of provisions would be of any use to vessels endeavouring to get to the north-eastward by Behring's Straits. A depôt in either Kotzebue Sound or Grantley Harbour could only be useful to a vessel having failed; and then I consider her return to a southern port would be preferable to her wintering in either of those ports where her departure in the ensuing spring would be dependent on the breaking up of the ice.

In October 1850, there were 300 tons of government coals at the Sandwich Islands; here these steamers might fill up. Between these islands and the ice, from where their voyage would commence, they certainly would not require more than two days fuel, one to take them through the Aleutian Chain, and another through Behring's Straits.

Before stating the route I should follow to gain what I suppose may be the position of the missing ships, I will describe the character of the ice in Behring's Sea, as required from me by the Arctic Committee.

I found it whenever I made it, with only one or two exceptions, closely packed; not in general high, as I could easily land on it from a boat; very much broken or rough, with pinnacles of considerable height. Travelling over it for any distance, is, I should say, impossible; many of the floes are nearly covered with water, the mirage from which distorted objects in the most extraordinary way.

Its general trend from the coast of America was to the north-west, by steps of unequal sides, the northern sides being the longest. By following this course, I reached on the 28th July, 1849, lat. $72^{\circ} 51' N.$, long. $163^{\circ} 48' W.$, where I was stopped by impenetrable packed ice; a water sky was reported to the northward (by the ice men) which I could not reach, though, I am convinced, had my object been to reach a higher northern latitude, I might have done so by following the pack to the westward.

Again in 1850 I found the packed ice near the coast of America in nearly the same position as Captain Beechey did in 1827, but still Captain Collinson, in the same year, after rounding that point of the pack, was enabled to reach a higher latitude by 20 miles than has ever been attained before; from this position he attempted to get to the eastward, where he was stopped by closely packed and heavy ice. Packed ice, in Behring's Sea, cannot be seen from a ship's mast head more than ten miles. I have proved this by running to, and even from, the pack. In nearly the
same longitude.

Although I was always stopped by packed ice, yet it will be recollected that it was my object to keep my ship *clear* of the ice, and not to *enter* it.

Were I proposing to make the N.E. passage, I should recommend an attempt to be made, directly north, in the meridian of Behring's Straits, where the sea is clearer of ice for a greater extent northerly than in any other direction; but as the object of an Expedition would be one of search, not of discovery, I should recommend their making Herald Island, and then push westerly for the land seen by me, which may be a continuation of the land seen by the natives from Cape Jakan, and which we know, from Baron Wrangell's voyage, is not connected with the coast of Asia. I would pass, if possible, to the westward of this land, and then prosecute the search easterly along its northern face.

In this unknown sea much must be left to the discretion of the officer in command, both as to the time of his return and the direction circumstances may oblige him to pursue to reach the point of search indicated.

Where was her Majesty's Ship "Investigator" last seen?

The "Investigator" was last seen by the "Plover" in lat. $70^{\circ} 44' N.$, long. $159^{\circ} 52' W.$, steering to the north with a strong S.W. wind. It will be seen by
H h

Captain Kellett's
Replies.

the accompanying chart that she would have an open sea ahead of her for some distance.

Should Commander M'Clure be successful in getting far to the eastward, I am convinced, from a conversation I had with him, and indeed his own letter will show, that he will use every endeavour to reach Melville Island with his parties if he failed with his ship. Should one of these parties reach Melville Island, or *even* the northern shore of Banks Land, they will endeavour to get home by the east, being a safer route than attempting to return to their ships.

Should a further search be decided on through Behring's Straits, I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of an immediate departure. Captain Moore, in the "Plover," and Captain Collinson, in the "Enterprise," left this country a great deal too late; it leaves an officer, in the event of any casualty, no time to remedy it, and he must, therefore, fail; steam vessels *even* should be clear of the channel by Christmas to *ensure* their being up with the ice in time.

HENRY KELLETT, Captain, R.N.

Enclosure 2.

Extract from my Official Letter to their Lordships, dated 17th November 1849, relative to Islands and supposed Land discovered by "Herald" on August 17th of the same year.

Shortly after 8 A.M., when one of the snow storms cleared off, the packed ice was seen from the mast head from S.S.W. to N.N.E. 5 miles distant. The weather was so bad that I was obliged to bear up for the rendezvous; it however as suddenly cleared up, and I hauled my wind for the N.W. extreme of the ice that had been seen.

At 9:40 the report of "Land ho" was made from the mast head. In running a course along the pack towards our first discovery a small group of islands were reported on our port beam. The pack here was not so close as I found it before; lanes of water could be here seen, reaching almost to the group, but too narrow to enter unless the ship had been sufficiently fortified.

These small islands at intervals were very distinct. Still more distant than this group (from the deck) a very extensive and high land was reported, which I had been watching for some time, anxiously awaiting a report from some one else. There was a beautifully clear atmosphere (such as can be only seen in this climate) except in the direction of this extensive land. There the clouds rolled in heavy masses, occasionally leaving its very lofty peaks uncapped, when could be distinctly seen columns, pillars, and very broken angles on their summits, which is characteristic of the high headlands in this sea. East Cape and Cape Lisburne, for example.

With the exception of the N.E. and S.W. extremes, none of the intermediate lowland could be seen, unless, indeed, what I at first took for a small group of islands was a point of this great land. This island or point was distant 25 miles from the ship's track; the higher part of the land not less, I consider, than 60 miles. When we hove to off the first land seen, the north extreme of the great land showed out for a moment to the eastward, and so clear, as to cause some who before had doubts to cry out "*There, Sir, is the land quite plain.*"

Enclosure No. 9.

Capt. Ommanney's
Replies.

Captain OMMANNEY to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

40, Charing-cross, 12th November 1851.

In compliance with the desire contained in your letter of the 28th ult., I beg to transmit, for the information of the Arctic Committee, my replies to the questions annexed thereto, after giving them my most careful consideration.

I have, &c.,

ERASMUS OMMANNEY,
Captain, R.N.

Enclosure.

Capt. Ommanney's
Replies.

Question 1.—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive; and if so, in what direction?

Answer.—I am of opinion that neither Sir John Franklin or any portion of the Expedition can be now alive.

Question 2.—What are your grounds for forming that opinion?

Answer.—First, from the fact that on leaving Whale Fish Islands in June 1845, the Expedition was then provisioned for three years. It was, probably, August 1846 when they quitted Beechey Island. Thus they had less than two years provisions left to last them up to the present time; even allowing that their numbers diminished, I maintain that no English constitution or people habituated to civilized life could exist so long on reduced allowance.

Secondly, I place no reliance upon the support they are likely to procure from the quantity of game or animals found in those regions. The whole amount of game procured near our winter quarters this summer amounted to about one bird a man for the whole Expedition, although parties were sent out expressly to shoot; and, bear in mind, these were obtained with some labour by people in good health. Admitting that there are birds and animals,—the former are migratory, as are most of the latter,—then there are but 8 weeks out of the whole year on which you can depend for this supply. There is nothing to induce me to suppose that any party could kill sufficient food to sustain them for the remaining 10 months. The numerous old Esquimaux settlements met with along the south shores of the Parry group leads me to believe that a change has taken place in those seas, in the course of time, which, becoming blocked up with ice for a longer period of the year, deprived the natives of the means of living, which caused them to emigrate eastward. I consider the opinions of continental travellers on this subject as fallacious, for it does not follow that because animal life abounds on the American continent, the same should be found 400 or 500 miles further north. I see no analogy between the two countries,—the coast of America and the Parry group.

Thirdly, if they abandoned their ships northward of the Parry group, in all probability their travelling parties would have retraced their steps towards their first winter quarters, or made for Melville Island, where it appears there is more animal life, of which they, of course, were quite aware of from Parry's voyage.

Lastly, there are reasons to suppose they did not prosecute the north-west passage after leaving Beechey Island. We know that 3 of their men (young men) died the first year, from which we may infer they were not enjoying perfect health. It is supposed that their preserved meats were of an inferior quality. No records being left, does not look like advancing; as Sir John Franklin and Captain Crozier, the latter of whom had served in four expeditions, were alive to the importance of depositing records. Again,—look at the position of Cape Riley,—they had made little progress in the object of their voyage; all their work was still before them, for I regard that position merely as the threshold of the north-west passage. Under these circumstances, and supposing that Franklin had examined the seas beyond Cape Walker in the fall of 1845, and by travelling parties found this impenetrable barrier of ice across the Wellington Channel, spoken of by Penny's Expedition, what other course had Franklin left but to retreat? That two ships could be lost in the ice without meeting a vestige of them afterwards, is a catastrophe I can easily conceive possible, especially if the two ships happened to be beset close to each other.

Assuming that they did advance through the Wellington Channel, and became blocked up in some inaccessible place, my firm conviction is that none can now survive; for I think it impossible for the constitution to endure the climate and the privations necessarily exposed to, even with a moderate allowance of provisions, for so long a period.

Capt. Ommanney's
Replies.

Question 3.—Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

Answer.—Should another search be considered desirable, I would recommend that the Expedition be composed of vessels fitted with screw-propellers, so as to act without the encumbrance of a sailing vessel after reaching the ground of operations.

From the indefinite statements made with regard to the channel seen by Mr. Penny's Expedition since his return to England, and the impression excited in consequence on the public mind about a navigable sea in that direction, viz., north-westward of the Wellington Channel, it seems to me to require a further examination. To accomplish this, two questions present themselves:—first, whether it would be requisite to provide for a prolonged absence; secondly, whether it would not be more desirable to arrange for a rapid execution of this service? In the former case it would involve the necessity of a depôt ship being stationed at Beechey Island; in the other, I would be attended with one depôt ship to accompany the steamers as far as practicable, so as to secure her return to England the same season.

My firm conviction is, that if ever the Wellington Channel is navigable to any considerable distance, it must be only on an occasional open season. Should an Expedition be so favoured as to hit on such a season the year of its departure from England, we should gain an advanced position, from whence an extensive search would be effected in the ensuing spring; accordingly I would recommend preparing an Expedition for rapid movements.

I propose having two steam screw-propelling vessels; they cannot have much power because you want all the space you can gain for your crew and provisions; to accomplish a rate of 7 knots per hour at full speed is quite sufficient; and, in my opinion, their size should not exceed 500 or 600 tons, drawing about 12 or 13 feet water. They should not be so long as our last steamers were, and broader in proportion, being so constructed, as far as may be practicable, preserving her efficiency as a steamer, to possess all the qualities of a sailing vessel—one that would work quickly in narrow lanes of water in the event of being solely dependent on the use of sails. They ought to spread more canvas than our last steamers, and be provided with square sails on the main-mast. Vessels of this description would require to use their steam less frequently than we did on the late Expedition.

To stow the same proportion of fuel, on reaching the Arctic seas, as was effected by our last steamers, is ample; being unencumbered with sailing vessel, that quantity, or even less, would produce a greater result in distance than before, and I am satisfied, as before stated, be less frequently used.

As a depôt ship to carry out the ultimate supplies for these two steamers, I would take the "Assistance," which is ready prepared for such a service; she has great capacity, and will stow 100 tons more than on the last voyage. Let her have 50 working hands, with a limited number of officers. She should accompany these steamers, as far as the nature of the season would admit of, to the entrance of Lancaster Sound, if possible. Port Dundas, which I visited, near Cape Warrender, would be a good position to complete up with fuel and provisions. This accomplished, the "Assistance" would return, and the steamers proceed with the search.

The "Assistance" would have to carry 300 tons of fuel, independently of the stores and provisions for the steamers. This would be effected by removing the warming apparatus, dispensing with unnecessary anchors, cables, boats, &c., and all the stores which we carried for three years use, would in this case be substituted for by provisions, and with only sufficient executive officers, a large space would also be gained; she would be quite adequate to answer this purpose.

Should it prove a very favourable season, I would carry the depôt ship as far as Beechey Island, there complete up, and make a depôt on shore as well, before advancing.

From my experience, and looking to all previous Arctic navigation, it is impossible to follow up any previously-defined line of operations to pursue; no two seasons are ever alike; whoever he may be, he must be guided by circumstances: assuming that we reach Cape Riley (which may not be gained in all seasons,—refer to Sir John Ross's Expedition, and to the North Star,) with the

two steamers, efficient in all respects, and with leads before you up the channel, then I should push forward while the season lasted, to gain the most advanced position for wintering in, and with travelling parties would in all probability effect the desired search.

Capt. Ommanney's
Replies.

But taking such a season as we met with, there is no alternative but to winter at Beechey Island, from whence it would also be practicable by travelling, (through the experience of the late Expedition,) to set at rest the question respecting the channel seen by Mr. Penny; it may terminate in a deep gulf, which I am not unprepared for, from what I remarked about the tides in Wellington Channel.

Another proposition here presents itself; you find the Wellington Channel blocked up, but all promises well for advancing to the westward: as some people express wish for Banks Land to be explored, the leader of the Expedition might have authority for detaching one vessel in that direction.

I would not recommend advancing up the Wellington Channel a second season, unless certain of your retreat again, for it almost amounts to a certainty that the vessels would be blocked up, as may have been the fate of Franklin.

Having gained an advanced position to the north-westward of the Wellington Channel in 1852, in an open season, in all probability a succession of close seasons will follow, leaving the Expedition blocked up; we must therefore be prepared to sacrifice the ships; the spring of 1854 would therefore be the period to abandon the ships, and retreat with the crews to Port Leopold, and the depôt left by the "North Star," near Admiralty Inlet.

I have no faith in the theory of a Polar Basin, consequently my opinion is, that the success of a searching Expedition to the north-westward of the Wellington Channel depends entirely on the state of the navigation next year; the commander of the Expedition should have full discretionary power, and every one who joins must understand that their lives are to be risked, not only with a hope to save others, but to ascertain the fate of the missing Expedition.

The travelling gear should be of the most perfect description, and in ample quantity, availing ourselves of all the improvements recommended by myself, and the officers of the late Expedition, and given in to Captain Austin at his request; the detail of all the travelling equipments have, I believe, been all laid before you.

Some description of light boat, on runners, for carrying over ice, would be most desirable.

A large quantity of Bickford's fuze should be carried for ice-blasting; we had to prepare all our charges, which involved loss of time, and the occupation of two or three working hands when most required; these might be prepared by the Ordnance, of the proper weight, and stowed in cases, ready for use and the application of the fuze; we found the blasting most invaluable in clearing away a short trip, and I recommend it for all future Arctic Expeditions.

The Expedition ought not to be less efficiently equipped than the last, which in all respects was most complete; there was a superabundance, perhaps, of some stores, which might be dispensed with; the provisions and vegetables might consist of a greater variety with great advantage; and the salt provisions, the beef particularly, should be cured without so much saltpetre; travelling boots should be prepared before starting; glass shades for the protection of the eyes for all the crew should be supplied, and of the best description.

I would recommend that no more officers than are actually necessary be employed; the non-executives only occupy space, require attendance, and curtail the accommodation for the crew. It is also important that the officers should be well versed in practical astronomy, with some knowledge of surveying, sufficient to lay down a coast line correctly. The engineers must be ready to perform any other duty when not navigating or at work about their engines. It is my decided opinion that none but naval officers should be employed on such a service, selecting those who have already proved themselves competent to undergo the privations in the former Expeditions, and by their ability and dispositions adapted for such peculiar service. More time should be allowed for fitting out the Expedition than we had; and I consider the middle or end of May quite early enough to sail. The selection of men is most important, and I much prefer the "man-of-war's man." The system of having ice quarter-masters answered admirably, and I would recommend the same again.

Capt. Ommanney's
Replies.

In selecting steam-vessels such as I have described, for independent operation, it will be necessary to provide for a larger crew and more officers; but they should not exceed 600 tons, and 7 knots is the utmost limit of speed required. A large steamer should accompany the Expedition to the edge of the ice, or Disco.

I have thus stated my general opinion for a further search on the basis of rapid operations, which I consider, under the present circumstances, is all that is required. As we are in possession of the detail necessary for equipping an Arctic Expedition it is needless here to enter into them. The officer, selected from former experience, will be fully competent to make his own arrangements, as was done in the late Expedition under Captain Austin; and of all things let the officer in command be unfettered from co-operation with other expeditions.

London, 12th November 1851.

ERASMUS OMMANNEY, Capt. R.N.
Late Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance."

Enclosure No. 10.

Sir J. Richardson's
Replies.

Answers to three questions from the Arctic Committee, by
Sir JOHN RICHARDSON, C.B., M.D.

Sir,

Haslar Hospital, 15th November 1851.

I have to request that you will lay before the Arctic Committee the subjoined replies to the three questions which they have done me the honour of submitting for my consideration, and which I have most carefully weighed:—

Question 1st.—"Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive? If so, in what direction?"

Answer.—I think it probable that part of the crews may still survive, to the north, or north-west of Melville Island.

Question 2d.—"What are your grounds for forming that opinion?"

Answer.—The reply to this question divides itself naturally into two heads, viz., the possibility of people surviving for a series of years on the polar islands, and the direction which the discovery ships took after leaving their winter quarters of 1845-6.

With reference to the first head, many facts may be adduced to prove that life may be supported for a number of years on animals inhabiting the land and waters of the most northern known islands. The existence of Eskimos up to the 77th parallel, and perhaps still higher in Baffin's Bay, is in itself sufficient evidence of the means of subsistence being produced in these latitudes. Except practical skill in hunting seals, and the art of building snow-houses, that people have no qualifications that may not be surpassed by the intelligence, providence, and appliances of Europeans. The islands lying to the north of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Straits were once frequented by Eskimos, and the remains of their winter huts, though perhaps two centuries old, are still numerous along the coasts. Why these islands have been abandoned by them in recent times is unknown, but that the tribes that once resorted thither were not cut off by any sudden pestilence or famine is apparent from the absence of human skeletons in the vicinity of the deserted dwellings, while the much decayed bones of whales, walruses, seals, deer, musk-oxen, birds, and other animals are abundant, and the small fireplaces built near the huts still contain morsels of charred wood, hidden beneath the moss which has overgrown them in the lapse of years. The absence of the natives is favourable, inasmuch as the animals, whether marine or terrestrial, not being hunted will be more easily accessible.

Musk-oxen frequent Melville Island, and with ordinary caution a whole herd may be secured by moderately skilful hunters, since it is the habit of the animals to throw themselves into a circle on the approach of danger, and to remain in that position, with their heads facing outwards, though individuals of their number are falling from their ranks under the fire of their assailants. Lieutenant M'Clintock, on his recent admirable pedestrian journey, shot a musk-bull, and having gone to his sledges for assistance to carry down the meat, on his return with a party of men found the herd still grazing beside their slaughtered leader.

Reindeer also pass over from the continent to the islands in numbers in the months of May and June, and though they are shy animals if they be allowed to get scent of man, they may be readily approached on their lee side by a hunter who possesses the requisite stock of patience.

Sir J. Richardson's
Replies;

The nature of the country in the vicinity of the ships will necessarily influence its productiveness in animal life, and in the absence of information respecting it, our conclusions cannot but be in great measure conjectural. A flat limestone tract, whereon the surface stone is continually splitting into thin slates under the action of frost, and from which the mud is annually washed into the sea by floods of melting snow, or a low, shingly, barren flat, such as that coasted by Captain Ommanney, produces few grasses and little vegetation of any kind, hence it is shunned by herbivorous animals, or if they must necessarily cross it in their migrations they do so at speed; but in the sheltered ravines of a sandstone or trap country, or in the narrow valleys which occur among granite or gneiss rocks, there are grassy meadows to which deer and musk-oxen resort, the latter also frequent lichen-producing acclivities, which are generally denuded of snow by high winds. Mr. Rae saw the reindeer migrating over the ice of Dolphin and Union Straits in the spring, and passing in great haste into the interior of Wollaston land. There seems to be no reason why these herds should not range beyond the 80th parallel, if the islands reach so high, since the same kind of deer travel annually from the continent of Europe to Spitzbergen, over a wider expanse of sea-ice. Polar hares are also numerous on Wollaston and Melville Islands, and as they are very tame and consequently easily shot, they add to the means of support. In the neighbourhood of open water the Polar bear is frequent, and being bold in its approaches falls a ready sacrifice to a party armed with fowling pieces. The simplicity of the Arctic fox renders its capture a very easy affair. Fish of various kinds are by no means scarce in the Arctic seas, and the fresh water lakes abound in trout. Sir John Franklin was well acquainted with the methods of taking these by hooks or in nets set under the ice in spring.

Brent geese, eider and king ducks, gulls and many other water fowl, resort in the breeding season in vast flocks to the most remote islands; and it may be necessary to state here, that these birds reach their breeding stations in the high latitudes only in July, hence officers travelling a month or two earlier, when the ground is still covered with snow, are not aware of the manner in which the most barren islets teem with life later in the summer.

Walrus and seals of several species were observed by Captain Penny and his officers to be numerous in Victoria Channel, and *beluge* and black whales may be looked for wherever open water of considerable extent exists. Both kinds abound in the sea that washes Cape Bathurst.

This enumeration comprises all the principal animals likely to yield food to a party shut up by ice in the Arctic Archipelago. How far they could be made available for feeding the crews of Sir John Franklin's ships for four years beyond the expenditure of his English provisions must depend on many circumstances, concerning which we are at present in total ignorance. Such as whether the ships were enclosed in ice and drifted to a distance from the land, in which case the hope of aid from terrestrial animals would fail; or, whether they were simply shut up in a convenient harbour with their resources entire; or, thirdly, whether the ships were overwhelmed by ice or pressed ashore and wrecked, and if so, what clothing and ammunition were saved, also what portions of the wreck convertible into fuel drifted on shore. Fuel is as indispensable as food in the high latitudes, and the Eskimos generally employ animal fat for this purpose, especially in the winter. Drink in that season can be procured only by melting snow or ice, and for this service one pound of fat, at least, is required daily to make drink for three people, exclusive of other cookery.

It seemed necessary that I should enter into this lengthened detail, in order to present a faithful view of the prospects of ships' crews shut up to the north of Melville Island. We must also advert to the fact, that provisions for the whole year must be secured in two short summer months; hence a skilful and complete organization of the hunting parties would be necessary to husband the natural resources of the country. Rash and awkward efforts would surely drive the animals out of the district.

The shortness of the hunting season would be a great obstacle to the movement of a large party, either towards the continent or Lancaster Sound. Many

Sir J. Richardson's
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of the number would be sick and the remainder could scarcely transport their disabled companions, the utensils, and a year's provisions to any great distance. We ought also to take into account the probable ravages of scurvy among the crews, in the course of so many years seclusion in the north. That disorder has hitherto always appeared in a greater or lesser degree in the discovery ships after the second winter, and it is likely to be severe and fatal, just in proportion to the scantiness of the diet on which the people feed.

Much of what I have advanced above is conjectural, since we are ignorant of the position of the ships, and it is fortunate that we can refer to fact to prove that life may be maintained in the most Arctic lands under circumstances, at first sight, seemingly the most hopeless. A narrative printed in St. Petersburg in 1768, by M. Le Roy, and translated and published in Parkinson's collection, relates the adventures of four Russian sailors, who being left on Spitzbergen almost destitute of supplies of any kind, supported themselves there by their ingenuity and activity for six years and a quarter. These four men were part of a crew of 14 who went in a small vessel to fish for whales on the east coast of Spitzbergen in the year 1743. The ship having neared the land, was enclosed by ice, and the master, despairing of extricating her, was minded to winter on shore. He accordingly landed his boatswain and three men to look for a wooden hut which he knew of in that vicinity. The men having to travel over the ice, set out purposely with very light loads, and in fact took with them only a small bag of meal, a musket, a powder-horn, 12 charges of ammunition, an axe, a knife, a small kettle, a stove, a piece of touchwood, a tobacco-box, and each man his tobacco-pipe. At the distance of a quarter of a mile from the beach they found the hut, which was built of deal, and was 30 feet long, 9 feet wide, and also 9 feet high. Within there was a fireplace constructed of clay, and a stove without a chimney, the smoke being allowed to escape by holes in the roof. The interior was damp and uncomfortable, and the afternoon was spent in making it habitable by caulking the rents in the walls with moss, and expelling the damp by fires made of drift-wood. After completing these operations, and supping on a portion of their meal, they went to rest, and passed a night of sound repose; but on repairing to the beach in the morning, their ship was no longer visible, having drifted off with the ice, and she was never again heard of. The men were not overwhelmed by this unlooked-for calamity, but instantly set about providing for their future wants. The wreck of a ship which they found on the shore supplied them with fuel, and the 12 charges of powder and ball procured them as many reindeer, which fortunately were numerous on the island. With nails extracted from a piece of ship-timber, they made three lances, wherewith they killed a bear, and with the strong tendons of the bear they strung and strengthened a piece of crooked drift-wood, which they had fashioned into a serviceable bow, with the knife. With this bow, and the arrows which they easily made, they killed all the reindeer and blue and white foxes they required during their enforced stay on the island. They constructed a lamp of baked clay, curing its porousness with a little of their meal, and feeding it with the fat of the animals that they killed. Wicks were obtained by tearing their shirts into shreds, and the skins of the deer, bears, and foxes furnished them with clothing and bedding. During the six years of their residence they killed in all 250 reindeer, 10 bears, with a multitude of foxes; and when they were at length relieved by a vessel which touched unexpectedly on the island, they were able to pay for their passage home, with 2,000 lbs. of deer-fat, and many hides of the animals they had slain. One of their number, Fedor Weregine, a very indolent man, who from the beginning had eschewed almost every kind of exertion, died of scurvy, while the other three found health in their daily active employments.

I may also adduce the success of Mr. Rae in wintering on the very unpromising shores of Repulse Bay, as another proof of the possibility of sustaining a party on the products of an Arctic country. That coast yields no drift timber, but trusting to the withered stems of a herbaceous *andromeda*, he determined on passing the winter there, and having built a house of stones gathered from the beach, and collected the *andromeda* into small cocks like so much hay, he fed his party of 13 men for 11 months, principally on the produce of his own gun and that of his Eskimo interpreter. In the month of September 1846 alone, 63 deer, 172 ptarmigan, and 116 salmon were brought into store, and when he departed in 1847, after completing his discovery and survey of the shores of

Akkolee or Committee Bay, he returned to Churchill with more than a third of the two months provisions with which he originally set out, and with his well-fed crew in excellent health and prime working condition. These facts, and they might be largely added to, will, I believe, be generally considered as sufficient to prove the general argument of the northern islands being frequented in summer by herds of animals sufficient to feed large bodies of men.

With respect to the second clause of the answer to question 2d, viz., the reasons for supposing that Sir John Franklin went up Wellington Channel, and is now beset somewhere to the west or north-west of Melville Island, the absence of any written document mentioning his intended line of route after leaving his winter quarters of 1845-6, renders the reply to this also one of election among various probabilities. I do not, however, feel inclined to admit the inference that has been drawn from the want of such a memorandum, namely, that the only reason for Sir John's not leaving one, was his intention of returning forthwith to England. It is well known that he contemplated staying out a second winter, if necessary, in the prosecution of his enterprise; and the moral certainty that there was no mortality among his crews during his stay in Union Bay subsequent to the beginning of April, supports the belief that his ships and their equipage were in an efficient state at the opening of the navigation in August or September 1846. It is much more probable that he did actually leave a memorandum, but that the post intended to call attention to the spot has been thrown down by bears or wolverines, and thus overlooked. Beechey Island seems to have been very carefully searched for documents, but the memorandum may have been placed on the north or east side of Union Bay; and I have not heard that the cairn from which the thick post had fallen, which was carried on board the "Albert" by Adam Beck, was searched.

It is certainly possible that on emerging from under the shelter of Beechey Island the two ships may have been involved in a pack of ice, and drifted therein involuntarily into Baffin's Bay, as Sir James Ross's ships and the two American schooners were, and there overwhelmed. Looking, however, to the great strength of the "Erebus" and "Terror," I should think that such a catastrophe could not have occurred without leaving some traces of it, either in boats, spars, or other pieces of wreck to be discovered by the whalers. Adam Beck's confused and imperfect story of the murder of two ships companies by a feeble horde of Eskimos in Wolstenholme Sound, is sufficiently disproved by the "North Star" having seen neither ship's timbers nor the spoil of the crews in possession of the Eskimos, during the long anchorage in that quarter. In the defect of positive evidence of the shipwreck and wholesale murder of the crews, or other loss of the ships in Baffin's Bay, the necessity for search in Queen Victoria Channel remains the same as if no such calamity had ever been mooted.

The direction of search is now actually limited to the channel here indicated, since Captain Austin's most extensive and accurate examination of the shores of Barrow's Strait to beyond the 114th meridian, shows that the discovery ships did not take a westerly course. If this conclusion needed further support, it has been supplied by the account of Mr. Rae's very remarkable pedestrian journey which has just arrived, and by which we are informed, that that zealous and active traveller had explored the coasts of Victoria and Wollaston Lands from the 110th to the 118th degrees of longitude, approaching on the one side within 220 miles of Lieut. Osborn's farthest point south-west of Cape Walker, and on the other within an equal distance of the north side of Banks's Land. The large horde of Eskimos, exceeding 100 in number, met by Mr. Rae on Victoria or Banks's Land, (for they form, probably, only one island), had never seen ships or white men; and it is not probable that Franklin's crews, if cast on any part of that island, would not, in their summer excursions, have left tracks that would have been seen during the lapse of five years by the Eskimos hunters, who pursue the reindeer in their migrations into the interior.

The way in which I think the information that has been collected by the various searching Expeditions ought to be interpreted is, that in the summer of 1845, Sir John Franklin was foiled in his attempts to pass Barrow's Straits, that while waiting for the disruption of ice, Captain Fitzjames and other magnetic observers landed on Cape Riley to keep the August term day, and having then discovered the qualities of Union Bay as a secure harbour, the ships eventually chose it as their winter retreat. In the spring, exploring sledge

Sir J. Richardson's
Replies.

parties were sent up Wellington Channel, and having merely a passage to look for, and neither bays to examine nor the circuits of islands to make, they had gone much beyond Captain Penny's furthest, and that cairns will be found erected as usual at the limits of their journeys. The strong tides or currents in the straits which bound Baillie Hamilton Island will probably keep the sea open there in most seasons, and thus Sir John would be encouraged to take that route, which his instructions justified him doing, if the ice remained fast to the westward.

Question 3rd. Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for that purpose, and in what direction?

Answer. The considerations adverted to in the preceding paragraphs limit the direction to Queen Victoria's Channel, and its westerly or north-westerly prolongations.

In reference to the measures to be adopted, I beg to state, that the very variable condition of the ice in the Polar seas and straits in different years, and the experience of the late searching squadron, show that in most seasons the search may be most effectually carried on by sledge parties; ample provision should, therefore, be made for that department. With respect to the kind and size of the ships to be employed, I would say generally, that such an Expedition as that lately commanded by Captain Austin seems to be fully adapted for the purpose. The experience of the officers employed on it will suggest such improvements on the equipments as are needful, and it would be presumptuous in me to offer details on that head. But in regard to provisioning the ships, I would recommend a very considerable proportion of pemican to be furnished. This article has great advantages in respect of stowage, and if served out together with wheaten flour, or, what is preferable, sound, coarse barley meal, at the rate of from 2 to 3 lbs per diem, I should have very little fear of scurvy; and I think that it would be preferred by the men, as a standing article of food, to the preserved meats, which are less nutritious, weight for weight, owing to the quantity of water the cases contain. Meat biscuit made of wheaten flower, and dried and pounded meat, is another form in which nourishing food may be carried, and if it be secluded from moisture in tin canisters it will remain long in a sound state. As a further preventative against scurvy, a considerable stock of preserved potatoes may be laid in, though bulk for bulk it is much less nutritious than the substances mentioned above.

To render sledge parties thoroughly effective, advanced depôts should be made, if possible, in the autumn, and well secured against the depredations of bears. If the ships, for instance, were to reach Beechey Island in July or August, and to find Wellington Strait choked by floe ice, boats should forthwith be launched over it, instead of waiting for its disruption, and provisions transported as far to the westward as can be done. This would not be lost labour, even if the ice broke up, so as to allow the ships to follow, for it will be prudent to establish depôts at convenient distances, as a necessary precaution for retreat. With this view also, it might be advisable to land a party of four or five in Union or Radstock Bays, with provisions and materials for erecting a winter hut, so as to form a channel of intercourse between the ships, should they pass up Victoria Channel, and Queen's ships or whalers that may be sent with instructions or supplies into Lancaster Straits.

For sledges to be employed on the ice, I would recommend those of the Canadian construction, with high runners made of wrought iron faced with steel, welded on and not screwed, as screws invariably work loose. To accommodate parties that may find it necessary to cross tracts of land, a few sledges, made of two narrow thin birch deals rolled back—fiddle-fashion—in front, and sewed with strong sinew to slender cross-bars, should be supplied.

Each sledge party should have an apparatus made of tinned iron or copper, for the melting of snow and cooking with a lamp. Snow is best melted in a shallow dish like a frying-pan, and the apparatus should have a cork casing, for the purpose of reducing the waste of heat. Could two or three Eskimos be procured, the necessity of carrying tents, which are a great encumbrance, would be avoided in the spring parties by the erection of snow houses. Mr. Rae, on his recent journey to Victoria Land, found the snow huts which he had practised his men in raising during the winter superior in comfort to tents. For draught I would further advise dogs to be carried out in the proportion of six or eight for each of the large sledges. Young dogs taken from this country in spring

would be serviceable when about a year or fourteen months old in the beginning of the following season, and they are very speedily trained. A cross between an English mastiff and a Newfoundland dog is superior in strength to an Eskimo dog. Seal blubber, especially when rancid, is a kind of food on which dogs will labour well, but on board ship they may be kept in good condition on oatmeal.

Sir J. Richardson's
Replies.

For the men's use in winter, I would recommend shoes made of soft tanned leather (such as boots are made of) in preference to canvas shoes. They should be made in shape of the Canadian mocassin, and roomy enough to hold three socks of white fearnought. For spring travelling, mocassins of tanned ox-hide should be substituted, made equally roomy; and as the season advances, and the ground or ice becomes bare, gutta-percha soles may be added with great advantage. The efficiency, and even the safety, of a travelling party depends on rigid attention to minute particulars in their equipment. A surtout coat of leather, lined with warm flannel, is the best for winter travelling. Snow-houses, erected as soon as a sufficiency of material can be procured, will stand until the spring is far advanced, and may be constructed with advantage at the end of each day's journey, so as to be available for parties returning or coming up with supplies.

I take it for granted, that steam tenders, or a steam-vessel of superior power, will be employed in the event of another Expedition being decided on. As early as 1826, I had formed an opinion, which I have alluded to in the narrative of Sir John Franklin's second Expedition, that steam would eventually be employed in the Arctic seas, and recent experience has fully shown that many advantages attend its use.

I beg leave to add, that pemican is made best in the winter time, and directions should therefore be given for its preparation as soon as another Expedition is decided upon.

I have, &c.,

F. J. Fegen, Esq.,
Secretary, Arctic Committee.

JOHN RICHARDSON,
Medical Inspector.

Enclosure No. 11.

Replies of Mr. PENNY to Questions put by the Arctic Committee.

Mr. Penny's
Replies.

Question.—Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crew composing his Expedition, still survive? if so, in what direction?

Answer.—I do think it possible that Sir John Franklin and his crews or a portion of them may still survive. My grounds for thinking so are, first, my knowledge of the habits of the Esquimaux, who live to a good old age in an equally inhospitable climate; the same mode of procuring food which the Esquimaux have is open to our countrymen, who have amongst them men, Mainely, Blanky, M'Donald, and Read, well acquainted with the means employed by Esquimaux in obtaining food.

Secondly. Independently of their guns and snares, they could subsist by fishing for seals, walrus, narwals, (all of which I saw in Victoria Channel) and possibly whales, this can be done by harpoon and lance, lings and drags; there are also thousands of eider and king duck which may be easily snared upon their nests in the season. It may not be out of place here to mention, that on one small island on the east side of Davis' Straits during my last voyage we loaded a whale boat with eggs, and might have done so again and again if they had been in season; and from what fell under my observation, I have no doubt the same thing occurs more to the north, where the ice is more broken up.

As to the next part of the question, in what direction, I am firmly of opinion that Sir John Franklin pursued his course through Wellington Straits and Victoria Channel, and has got far advanced towards Behring Straits; my reasons for thinking so are first, the strong easterly gales, which we experienced from 18th August to the 5th September, 1850, had counteracted the effect of the prevailing currents from the west, and had cleared Victoria Channel by the westward; on the latter date, with my officers from the top of Cape Spencer, I saw beyond the fixed ice in Wellington Straits the channel free from ice to

Mr. Penny's
Replies.

the northward, and an open sea. Again, on the 17th May, 1851, when at Point Surprise, open water was found to the extent of 25 miles to the west, and was visited at different intervals up to the 23d July, 1851, when the channel to the westward of Hamilton and Dundas Islands was clear of ice as far as the eye could reach, from the top of a hill 600 feet above the level of the sea, with a dark blue sky beyond—a sure indication of water.

Sir John Franklin must have been well aware of the presence of this water, having passed his first winter at the mouth of Wellington Straits, and a watch tent having been discovered north of Cape Spencer, about 4 miles from the ships, from which they could observe any change in the state of the ice in the channel that they could take advantage of, also the ruts of loaded sledges which apparently had been sent to examine the channel. These circumstances, taken into consideration with the second clause in Sir John Franklin's instruction, and his own well-known preference, and that of his officers, for the passage by Wellington Strait is quite conclusive to my mind, that he has gone in that direction, while our finding no cairns or appearance of his having landed, seems to me to indicate that the passage must have been open and nothing to stop him in 1846; and that he took every advantage of it.

Third Question.—Should a further search be decided on, what further measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?

Answer.—For the plan of operations I would prepare five vessels, namely, two steamers, "Lady Franklin" and "Sophia." A store ship manned with 150 men; they would be all working men. Vessels like the "Pioneer" and "Intrepid" will do very well, only it would be better if they were a little shorter, and with more steam power. The store ship to be left as a depôt ship at Beechey Island, rather than at any place higher up, because it is so easy of access from England. Their crews would be employed in collecting provision from Navy Board Inlet and Whale Point to the above-named position. The other four vessels to proceed through Wellington Strait, leaving depôts of provisions at every 100 miles. After advancing 400 miles, I should leave another of my vessels to be a connecting link to keep up the communication between the searching vessels and Beechey Island, and thence to England. From this second vessel one will proceed upon the same plan as already described, either with the remaining ships or boat sledge, until a point be reached in Behring's Straits.

But should a barrier preclude our passing through Wellington Strait, I would be prepared with six boat sledges to drag over the ice to the water, which I have no doubt will be again found in lat. $76^{\circ} 30'$ long. 97° at a very early period of the year. Four boats will continue to pursue the west and north-west, the other two boats keeping up the supplies to advanced positions, as directed by the notices left by the advancing boats for their information. If food and fuel could be procured, I would establish a winter quarter for two boat crews, at the farthest advanced position of course. This Expedition would be greatly aided by vessels coming to meet it from Behring's Straits.

OBSERVATIONS.

No. 1.

I wish to make a few observations besides.—First, it is my opinion that Albert Land extends to the north-west not less than 500 miles, and that Sir John Franklin has kept along this shore to that extent, and that at this distance from Cape Becher will probably be found another winter quarter; my reasons for thinking so are, that had this land not extended a great distance to the west, Victoria Channel would have filled with ice, whereas the N.W. winds had driven the ice round Melville Island upon the American shore, in place of filling up this Channel.

No. 2.

It may be a singular opinion, but I cannot help thinking that a migration of Esquimaux has taken place from a people living in a higher latitude, and that they came down Wellington Strait, from the remains of stone huts along the north-east side of the Channel, and that the stock from which they came may still be existing on some land to the north of the open sea, which I expect to find leading to Behring's Straits. From what I have said of the climate and resource, there is no reason why this should not be so; and Sir John Franklin and his companions may have found a refuge among them.

In connexion with this view, I know of a race of Esquimaux at Hogarth's Inlet, as I named it on discovery, 1840, or rather rediscovering it, because I believe it to be the Cumberland Strait of Baffin, but since improperly called Northumberland Inlet. This race of Esquimaux is far superior to any I have seen, either on the east or west side of Davis's Straits. The opinion I have formed of the cause of the improvement of this race is, that it has taken place in consequence of their amalgamation with shipwrecked seamen of early discovery ships, many of them having decidedly European cast of features.

I have, &c.,

The Secretary of the Arctic Committee.
November 15th, 1851.

WILLIAM PENNY.

Mr. Penny's
Replies.

Enclosure No. 12.

Mr. A. STEWART to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

437, Strand, 15th Nov. 1851.

I beg leave to acquaint you, for the information of the Arctic Committee, that having seen Captain Penny's plan of "*search*," in which I fully concur, I need not, therefore, trouble the "Committee" with a repetition of the same.

And I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEX. STEWART.

Enclosure No. 13.

Lieutenant M'CLINTOCK to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

90, Great Portland-street, London,
7th November 1851.

Agreeably to the direction of the Chairman of the Arctic Committee, I have drawn up the enclosed scheme of equipment for searching parties detached from their ships when wintering within the Arctic circle; and I have to request you will place the same before the said Committee.

This scheme has been prepared with all the care which so important a subject demands, and with an earnest desire not to over estimate the period for which a party so provided could maintain itself.

The party consists of 1 officer and 10 men; they are amply provisioned for 50 days, and otherwise equipped and clothed for 100 days, commencing from the end of March.

It is also contemplated that travelling parties may render important services in the autumn by setting out as soon as the ship is secured in winter quarters, and continuing their labours until the end of October.

I have, however, to regret that some valuable plans and notes, made during and subsequent to my recent journey to Melville Island, have been forwarded to Ireland with other papers, and therefore are not available on the present occasion; and I am thus deprived of the gratification of more clearly and accurately illustrating the various articles of equipment.

With reference to the advance of our knowledge in carrying out this mode of search, as derived directly from the experience of the recent Expedition, I beg to refer the Committee to a letter dated 5th June 1850, which I had the honour of submitting to Captain H. T. Austin, and which embraces all that was known upon the subject at that period. A copy of this letter is enclosed.

I have, &c.,

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.

Late of Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance."

Lieut.
M'Clintock's
Suggestions.

Enclosure 1.

Sir,

Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance," at sea,
5th June 1850.

In consequence of your having expressed to the officers of the Expedition your willingness to receive any suggestions calculated to promote the grand object of our voyage, I am induced to address you upon the subject of

Lieut.
McClintock's
Suggestions.

travelling parties; the more so, as the list of articles necessary for their equipment, which by your direction I prepared, received your approval, and were accordingly provided.

It may not, therefore, be altogether unnecessary to offer some explanation of such as are novel in their construction, that they may be perfectly understood and used to the utmost advantage. Indeed, I feel fully persuaded that we have at our disposal the means of accomplishing a far more extensive and lengthened search by detached parties than has hitherto been attempted, or even contemplated.

I have, therefore, ventured to draw up the following memoranda in the hope that something of utility may be gleaned therefrom; and trust that an ardent desire of being useful, together with the Experience of the last Expedition, and the constant study of this important branch of our deeply interesting duty, may be received as an excuse for my seeming presumption.

It is of great importance that depôts of provisions be carried out in autumn, that the searching parties may be despatched as early in spring as the climate permits. This may be done in October, the mean temperature of that month usually being 10°; but the parties should be on board again by the 25th; as at this season the snow is soft and deep, the flat sledges must be used. To carry out and deposit at a distance of 14 days' journey from the ship a month's provisions for 7 men, 3 flat sledges, 12 men and 2 officers will be required. The constant weights (that is the tents, furs, blankets, spare clothing, and sledges) will amount to about 650lbs.; and the weight of provisions for 14 persons for 40 days will be about 1,550 lbs. Hence the load for each man will not exceed 183 lbs. Sir James C. Ross's party dragged 191 lbs. each.

Suppose they travel outward for 14 days, and then deposit 14 days' provisions, being sufficient for 7 persons for 28 days, they will still have remaining 12 days' provisions, which will be ample to serve them for their return with light sledges. The depôt should consist of cases of pemican, and of bread, flour, tea, sugar, tobacco, and perhaps spirits of wine, packed in a cask to protect them from the bears and foxes. For the use of the autumn provision parties, a small boat's stove is well adapted, weighing only 20 lbs., and by using lignum vitæ a large expenditure of spirits of wine will be saved. During this journey the men should wear their cloth boots, reserving the sealskin travelling boots for the more important spring journeys.

The spring parties, each consisting of an officer and 6 picked men, should start about the middle of April. The following is an outline of one such party, together with the approximate weight of each article:—

Tent, 5 poles, 2 fur blankets, 7 blanket bags	85
Macintosh, floor-cloth, shovel, cooking apparatus, complete	26
Spare clothing (for each person) 1 pair stockings, 1 pair boot hose footed with lambskin, 1 pair blanket socks, 1 pair drawers, towel, and soap, stowed in a knapsack, together with the blanket bag	50
Spyglass, sextant, artificial horizon, compass, chronometer, thermometer	20
Medicines in an 8lb. tin canister, "calico and flannel bandages, plaster, lint, salts, linament, eye-wash, pills, ointment, lancet, pins, and instructions"	5
Sundry bag, containing "slow match, awls, sail and sewing needles, twine, thread, spare soles, wax, bristles, nettlestuff, two yards of crape, hammer, shoe-tacks, cylinders, and white lead to render them water-tight, brush"	12
Luncheon haversack, 7 pannikins, and covered meat-tins (in which to keep the daily allowance of pemican)	6
Two guns, either a double gun and a rifle, or 2 double guns, cleaning rods, powder flasks, shot pouches, covers, &c.	17
No. 1 shot, 5 lbs.; No. 4, 3 lbs.; bullets, 3 lbs.; powder, 2lbs.; caps, packages, &c.	38
Small runner sledge, lashings, and drag ropes (of hair rope)	60
Gutta percha sledge top or boat, stancheons, and 3 yards No. 4 canvas	30

Amount of the necessary constant weights 349

40 days' provisions, according to the following scale:—

1 lb. pemican ; $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. pork ; $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. biscuit ; $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. flour or bread dust to mix with pemican into a hot mess ; $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. tea ; $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. sugar ; 3 oz. tobacco weekly ; also, pepper and salt for 7 persons	lbs. 711
30 pints spirits of wine, also as extra, 4 pints of ditto ; tea, sugar, and biscuit	66
Total weight, amounting to 188 lbs. a man, nearly	- 1,126

The men should start in the following dress:—1 flannel shirt or Guernsey frock, 1 pair drawers, 1 blue serge or knitted frock, 1 pair breeches, waistbelt, 1 pair worsted stockings, 1 pair cloth boots, comforter, Welsh wig, southwester, mitts, veil, jacket or sealskin jumper—the latter is much preferable, being longer, less bulky and cumbrous, much lighter and impervious to wind, snow, or wet.

I would suggest that dressed sealskin be purchased from the Esquimaux for this purpose, and made up on board.

After arriving at the depôt they may put on their sealskin boots and leave the cloth ones until their return.

By this arrangement the party is victualled for 68 days, should it return by the same route, and 54 days if by any other ; they will also have a sufficiency of extra necessaries to prolong their absence for several days, should they be so fortunate as to procure game. As Sir James C. Ross made $10\frac{3}{4}$ miles daily, including all stoppages and with many of his men disabled, and moreover as he did not set out until 15th May, the whole of his journey was performed through soft snow, we are led to infer that 12 miles daily is not too much to expect from our parties, which will be much better fed and clothed ; and that every such party could perform a journey of 800 miles in 68 days, proceeding with safety to a distance of 400 miles from their ship.

The routine to be observed upon a spring journey is as follows:—Sleep by day, travel by night ; breakfast at 5 P.M. upon tea, biscuit, and a portion of pemican ; whilst breakfast is preparing, measure off the allowance of rum, fuel, pork, and biscuit to be used at luncheon ; after tea is made dissolve enough snow to dilute the concentrated rum, making up the mixture to a gill of stiff grog for each man ; start at 6 P.M. ; halt for half an hour to lunch at midnight ; dissolves now for drinking ; encamp about 6 A.M., issue the day's allowance of pemican, flour, and $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. biscuit (the remaining $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. reserve for luncheon) ; warm a portion of the former for supper ; wind up chronometer before the fur blankets are allowed to be spread, and write up the remarks for the previous march.

The officer should not trust entirely to the tinder-box, but be well provided with lucifer matches. Sir James C. Ross's allowance of provisions was, 1 lb. meat, 1 lb. biscuit, and the usual allowance of rum, chocolate, and lemon-juice : it was not sufficient to maintain the strength of the men.

Sir John Richardson recommends 2 lbs. of pemican and $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of flour : he deprives the men of their greatest luxuries, namely, biscuit, rum, and tobacco.

By pushing out the depôts in autumn the men may be employed in searching parties exclusively in the spring. If men can be spared, fatigue parties are very desirable for the first few days of both the autumn and spring journeys.

As no preparations were made in autumn it was not until the middle of May that Sir James C. Ross could set out.

I have, &c.,

Capt. H. T. Austin, C.B.,
Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute."

F. L. McCLINTOCK, Lieut.

Enclosure 2.

SCHEME of the COMPLETE EQUIPMENT necessary for a PARTY consisting of ONE OFFICER and TEN MEN to perform an ARCTIC SPRING JOURNEY.

It has been arranged under three principal heads ; namely, EQUIPMENT, PROVISIONING, and CLOTHING, to each of which a Detailed Explanation is subjoined ; then follows a Travelling Routine ; and after which a few General Remarks are added.

Lieut.
M'Clintock's
Suggestions.

LIST OF EQUIPMENT.

Articles.	Weight.
1 tent, with rope and poles, complete	75 lbs.
2 floor clothes	24
2 fur blankets	45
2 shovels	10
2 cooking apparatuses, complete	26
1 medicine canister, complete	5
1 small chopping axe	3
1 store bag, complete	15
1 luncheon haversack, with measures, daily rum can, water bottles, pannikins, and spoons	10
2 guns and gear, complete	20
1 ammunition bag	} complete
1 small ditto	
1 runner sledge, sledge boat, and lashings, complete	160
11 knapsacks, containing the spare clothing	110
11 sleeping bags	48
1 pickaxe	11
Instruments	12
Total	590 lbs.


Detailed Explanation.

Tent.

The *Tent* to be of the same material and plan as used in the recent Expedition, but to be of the following dimensions:—

- Length - 14 feet
- Breadth - 8 "
- Height - 8 "

The flap round the bottom of the tent to be 1 foot wide; to have curtains attached to the door end so as to form a porch, each curtain to be 3 feet wide and 6 feet high. It is intended to keep out the snow drift and afford shelter to the cook or look-out man.



Four small holes in the top will be found useful to permit the escape of steam and breath, which otherwise condenses and falls in a shower of fine snow. The tent should be double-seamed only at the corners, and lined along the ridge; roping is not required. The tent poles should be of ash, pointed at one end

with metal, and they should be 9 feet 8 inches in length; boarding pikes can be obtained of this length, and answer very well.

Two spare poles should be taken, one fitted with a boat hook, the other stouter and longer than the rest, to serve as a mast; 15 fathoms of 2-inch rope is required for the tent; the doorway should be fitted with large hooks and eyes.

Floor Clothes.—One to be waterproof, of the description of macintosh which is now prepared to remain pliant in extreme cold; the other to be of No. 7 canvas, to spread over it or upon gravel; also to be used as a sail, for which purpose it should be fitted with ear rings and rope bands; their dimensions should be:—

Macintosh -	-	15 feet by 9 feet
The canvas	-	13 " 8 "

Fur Blankets.—It is recommended to have the underneath one of reindeer-skin, and the upper one of wolfskin; their dimensions should be:—

16 feet by 9 feet.

Shovels, such as are supplied from the dockyard; they will serve also as paddles, if required

Cooking Apparatus very similar to those used in the recent Expedition, and made by Mr. Dale of Thames-street, after a plan furnished by me, but to be proportionably larger, the kettle to hold 12 pints instead of 8 pints. When complete, the articles included under this designation are—stand and cover, hoop, kettle, stewpan, spirit or tallow lamp, and tinder-box; the whole shutting up closely, and may be conveniently carried in a bag. The kettle should be made of very stout double block tin, no solder to be used in any part of the apparatus; fearnought should be sewed on to the cover to prevent as much as possible any waste of heat; one apparatus should have a spirit lamp, the other a tallow lamp.

A plan of this most useful article would here have been introduced, with some improvements and alterations, but for the reason assigned in my letter to the Secretary of the Arctic Committee.

Medicine Canister to be fitted by the surgeon. The following have been found most useful:—Calico and flannel bandages, plaster, lint, cotton wool, simple ointment, aromatic spirit of ammonia, wine of opium, laudanum, pills of opposite qualities ("compound colocynth" and "compound rhubarb"), liniment, lancet pins, and instructions.

Two or three splints may also be supplied to each party.

Small Axe necessary to chop up the pemican when frozen.

Store Bag to contain 12 spare soles; a small bag of shoemaking gear, namely—awls, waxed ends, shoe-tacks, and small hammer; slowmatch; sail, sewing, and glover's needles; palm; twine; white thread; cotton for wicks; brimstone match; tent brush; 2 yards of No. 4 canvas; large knife; skein of marline; 30 fathoms of cod line, marked as a lead line; a few strips of canvas for wicks for the tallow lamp; 2 yards of crape; records, and small copper cases for do.; also rosin, sealing-wax, or pitch, to render them water-tight; several boxes of lucifer matches (vestas).

Luncheon Haversack.—With this a number of small articles are enumerated, the only measures required are—one half pint, one gill, and one half gill, a pannikin may be marked to serve as a pint measure; a small can to hold the day's allowance of rum; a pannikin and spoon for each person; also one or two spare ones; and a tin water-bottle for each person, to hold three quarters of a pint, and to be of a flattened form to adapt it to be carried as close as possible to the body.

Two Guns and Gear, complete.—Double-barrelled percussions, gauge 12, so that they will take a musket-ball; with cleaning rod, nipple wrench, and spare nipples, turnscrew, 2 powder flasks (filled), 2 shot pouches (filled), 2 waterproof gun covers, and gun slings.

Ammunition Bag, complete.—No. 1 shot, 6 lbs.; No. 4 shot, 3 lbs.; bullets, 36; wads, 500; percussion caps, 250; powder, 2 lbs.; some white oakum or tow. The small ammunition bag is intended to hold "present use" ammunition, and to be always kept at hand.

Lieut.
M-Clintock's
Suggestions.

Floor Clothes.

Fur Blankets.

Shovels.

Cooking
Apparatus.

Medicine
Canister.

Axe.
Store Bag.

Luncheon Haver-
sack, Measures,
Water-bottles.


Two Guns com-
plete.

Ammunition Bags.

Lieut.
M. Clintock's
Suggestions,
—
Runner Sledge.


Runner Sledge to be constructed wholly of Canada elm, with the exception of the cross-bars, which should be of ash; the uprights (*u*) to be tenoned through the upper and lower pieces termed the bearer and the runner, and with a wood screw through each tenon; a shoeing of one eighth inch iron 3 inches wide, and slightly convex on its under surface, to be secured on with nuts and screws. Dimensions are—length extreme, 13 feet; space on the sole, 7 feet; curve at each end, 3 feet; breadth of all parts, 3 inches; height from shoeing to top of bearer, 12 inches; thickness of bearer, $1\frac{1}{2}$ inch; of runner, $1\frac{3}{4}$ inch, the lower side slightly convex to fill the shoeing, the upper edges chamfered off; thickness of uprights, 1 inch; width of sledge from out to out, 3 feet; length of cross-bars, 3 feet 2 inches, their width 4 inches, and thickness 1 inch, the edges to be chamfered off; one cross-bar to be placed over each upright and securely lashed with well soaked hide.

A broadside view of Sledge and Boat.



Section through the midship stancheons.

SCALE:—
 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch to a foot.



Sledge Boat.

The Sledge Boat should be made of strong material, similar to that used in the construction of Lieut. Halket's boats, but should be of the newly-prepared material which continues pliant under any degree of cold, as the new patent waterproof cloth, which can be obtained from Mr. Roberts, 32 Moorgate-street, and which has been tested in the Hudson Bay Company's territories. Its dimensions will be—length on the top, 14 feet; at bottom, 11 feet; breadth on the top, 4 feet; at bottom, 3 feet; depth, 20 inches; the gunwales to be formed of 4 tent poles, supported by 6 stancheons; the sides of the boat laced to the poles; the bow to be kept in shape by a few slight battens, which can be shipped and unshipped at pleasure. The boat is attached to the sledge by beackets along the sides, which are made fast to the bearers between the cross-bars. When laden with the complete equipment the immersion of the sledge boat will be $10\frac{1}{2}$ inches. It is indispensably necessary for extended journeys, and renders the advance or retreat practicable, although considerable spaces of water may exist; being always in its place, there is no delay occasioned, as when Halket's boats are used, since the lading of the sledge must be transferred to them.

For sledge lashings, about 20 fathoms of soft rope is required.

Knapsacks.—These are most convenient when of the ordinary size, without any wooden framing; they should be precisely similar to those used in the recent Expedition, and can be made on board of No. 8 canvas. In the event of the sledge being rendered useless, they would become extremely useful.

Sleeping Bags should be made of felt, similar to those used in the recent Expedition, and should be 7 feet long.

Pickaxe required for making *cachés* in the frozen ground, and should be strong.

Instruments.—A good sextant; artificial horizon; 4-inch prismatic compass (Kater's), with small tripod and table; pocket chronometer; thermometer; box sextant; telescope and sling and small measuring tape; a square case, which will receive the sextant with eye-tube fixed and any angle on the arc, and will also receive the artificial horizon, will be found very convenient.

The box sextant is intended as a pocket companion for the officer, and will be very frequently required for taking angles.

Lieut.
M'Clintock's
Suggestions.

Knapsacks.
Sleeping Bags.

Pickaxe.

Instruments.

LIST OF PROVISIONS.

Daily allowance for each person.	Total quantity for 50 days.
1 lb. pemican	- 550
4 oz. pork (when boiled and bones extracted)	- 137½
12 oz. biscuit	- 418½
¼ oz. tea	- 8½
½ oz. sugar	- 17
1 oz. pounded biscuit	- 34½
¼ pint of rum (its equivalent of concentrated rum)	- 115
Weekly 3 oz. of tobacco	- 15

For the party of 11 persons:—

2 lbs. fuel, spirits of wine, or tallow	- 110
Salt, 4 lbs.; pepper, 2 lbs.	- 6
Lemon-juice and sugar, 15 lbs.; allowance for packages	85
Weight of provisions	- 1,487
„ equipment	- 590
Total weight of complete equipment	- 2,077

Being 207¾ lbs. per man.

The load of 207¾ lbs. is less than that of most of the spring parties detached from the recent Expedition, and admits of their carrying a sufficiency of extra necessaries to prolong their journey for several days, should they be so fortunate as to procure game.

Detailed Explanation.

Pemican, with the exception of such portions as may be intended to be placed *en caché*, may be stripped of its tin covering, then marked with saw-cuts into daily allowances, and sewn up in old canvas, which will subsequently serve as wick for the tallow lamp.

Pork is intended to be used for luncheon only, after it has been well soaked, boiled, and bones taken out; it should be weighed and cut up as nearly as possible into daily allowances for the party, and then put up in bags.

The Biscuit should be sifted, then stowed in bags of 2, 3, or 4 days allowance each.

Tea, ¼ oz. and *Sugar* ½ oz. They should be mixed together and made up into packets for daily use; the whole to be stowed in a bag.

Pemican.

Pork.

Biscuit.

Tea and Sugar.

Lieut. M'Clintock's Suggestions.	<i>Pounded Biscuit</i> to be made up into packets of 2, 3, or 4 days allowance each; the whole to be stowed in a bag.
Pounded Biscuit. Tobacco. Fuel.	<i>Tobacco</i> .—Each weekly allowance for the party to be made up in a separate package, and the whole to be kept together in a bag.
Rum.	<i>Fuel</i> .—Spirits of wine and tallow in equal quantities, the former to be camphorated and kept in tin cans similar to those supplied (by Mr. Dale of Thames-street) to the recent Expedition, having patent bungs and secured with padlocks; the tallow may be kept in a bag. Should fuel become short, the rum may be used in the spirit lamp, also strips of gutta percha or the fat of animals will burn well in the tallow lamp.
Lemon-juice and Sugar.	<i>Rum</i> .—It should be taken in its concentrated form as supplied to the ship, and the day's allowance diluted previous to commencing each march; to be contained in tin cans similar to those used for the spirits of wine, and which should contain 2, 3, or 4 gallons each. This stimulant was much approved of by all the travellers.
Salt and Pepper.	<i>Lemon-juice and Sugar</i> .—Ten days full allowance should be taken as a medical luxury; the lemon-juice in bottles, and the sugar in packets for daily use.
	<i>Salt and Pepper</i> .—Highly necessary where so much animal food is daily consumed; is most convenient when packed in half pound tin canisters.

LIST OF CLOTHING.

Clothing in wear.	<i>In wear</i> .—Flannel shirt. Knitted woollen frock. Blue serge frock. Loose overall sealskin frock. Waistbelt. Pair of stockings. ,, blanket feet wrappers. ,, wadmil boot hose. ,, Canadian mocassins. ,, thick woollen drawers. ,, sealskin trowsers. Welsh wig. Fur cap and crape veil. Woollen comforter and pair of winter mittens.
Spare clothing	Every person is expected to carry a knife. <i>Spare clothing</i> .—1 flannel shirt. 2 pair of stockings. 2 ,, blanket feet wrappers. 2 ,, mocassins. 1 ,, Esquimaux sealskin boots. 1 ,, canvas boots with leather soles. 1 ,, boot hose (to be reserved for sleeping in). 1 ,, woollen drawers. 1 ,, mitts. 1 towel, soap, and comb.

Detailed Explanation.

The clothes enumerated as "in wear" are such as would be suitable for the commencement of a spring journey; when the weather becomes more mild many of these may be dispensed with, and when thawing has begun, sealskin or canvas boots must be substituted for the mocassins. The range of temperature experienced during the recent journey to Melville Island was 88° Far. The loose sealskin frock should resemble that worn by the Esquimaux, but should

have outside breast pockets; it will be very useful in cold, windy, or wet weather.

The mocassins to be made of the thickest smoke-dressed mooseskin, and made of the largest size.

After the thaw has commenced, the *Esquimaux Boots* are superior to every thing else. They can be obtained from St. John's, Newfoundland, through the Messrs. Hunt, 34, Great Winchester-street; but at least ten weeks notice should be given. It is also possible they may be obtained in time for a Barrow Straits Expedition, from the Hudson Bay districts, through Mr. Roberts, 32, Moorgate-street. It is difficult to get boots of this description sufficiently large for Europeans.

Canvas Boots also answer well for the latter part of a spring journey; they can be made on board by any ordinary shoemaker. The soles should be of single leather, very broad, and sewn on "pump fashion," as shoemakers term it; and they should be large enough to go on easily over 1 pair of stockings, 2 pairs of blanket wrappers, 1 pair of boot hose.

The *Blanket Feet Wrappers* should be 14 inches square.

The winter *Mitts* to be of dressed deerskin, lined with duffle or blanket.

Lieut.
M'Clintock's
Suggestions,

Esquimaux Boots.

How to be obtained.

Precaution.

Canvas Boots.

Precaution.

Blanket Wrappers.

Mittens.

TRAVELLING ROUTINE.

To avoid snow-blindness, occasioned by the dazzling whiteness of the snow under a bright sun, it is necessary, after the 20th April, to sleep by day and travel by night. Breakfast at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, upon warm pemican, biscuit, and tea. After tea is made, dissolve enough snow to dilute the day's allowance of rum, and fill the water-bottles. After breakfast measure off and dilute the rum, measure off the day's allowance of fuel and of pork, which, with the remainder of the previous day's allowance of biscuit, serves for lunch.

See the tallow-lamp trimmed to prevent delay in dissolving snow when halted for lunch; it is most difficult to allay the sensation of thirst occasioned by hard labour in severe cold. Start about 6 P.M., varying the time an hour or two according to the east or west direction to be travelled in, so as to keep the sun as much as possible in your back.

Halt for lunch after five or six hours, according to the labour undergone, dissolve snow, serve out biscuit, pork, and half allowance of rum, refill water-bottles, and proceed.

The period between lunching and encamping should be about an hour shorter than between the time of starting and halting for lunch. When encamped, serve out the day's allowance of biscuit and remaining half allowance of rum; the allowance of pemican may be chopped off as required. Supper to consist of biscuit and warmed pemican, after which a drink of water. Wind up chronometer before the fur blankets are allowed to be spread, and write up the remarks for the previous march. In very severe weather it is safer to breakfast before getting out of the blanket bags, and to get into them before supper, so that the man whose turn it is to cook alone remains outside. It is, however, sometimes necessary to cook in the tent. Unless in the vicinity of Esquimaux, it is unnecessary to keep watch; but the guns should always be ready for bears, and kept within the tent.

Unless constant and strict attention is paid to the lamps and system of cooking, much valuable time will be wasted. After encamping, everything should be placed on the sledge, and covered over to keep out the snow drift, or hung up to the tent-rope. If these precautions are not taken, and things are left lying about on the snow, many losses will be sustained, since the lightest wind is sufficient to drift the snow over them.

Precaution.

Constant thirst.

Precaution.

Chronometer, precaution.

Frostbites, precaution.

Watch keeping.
Defence.

Cooking.

Snowdrift, precaution.

GENERAL REMARKS.

1. By paying attention to the arrangement and packing up of the provisions—so many days allowance in each package—the certainty of their lasting the allotted period is insured, and much of the delay and labour of “measuring off” is saved.
2. Preserved potatoes (Edwards’) may be substituted for pounded biscuit to mix with pemican, but double the quantity is necessary.
3. It is recommended to take some concentrated rum in lieu of a small portion of the spirit of wine, so that if fuel is abundant it may be used as a part of the provisions.
4. In like manner, 2 or 3 pounds of lard may be substituted for tallow, since bears will probably be shot, and the steaks will not fry themselves, although the blubber will cook them.
5. All the small provision bags may be made of “waxed wrapper” as it comes off the bales of slop clothing.
6. A few gutta percha or horn cups would be very desirable for drinking water or grog out of, as at very low temperatures it is difficult to drink out of metal without having the skin taken off one’s lips.
7. To secure depôts of provisions from bears it is necessary to bury them in the earth, and to cover the place with snow, or pour water over it, so as to destroy the scent.
8. Gutta percha depôt cases for containing the dry provisions would be very useful, since those which are not taken up before the thaw commences are frequently destroyed. The cases should be made and taken out in the ship, and if of sizes to stow within each other would occupy but little room on board; besides, being the lightest material adapted to the purpose, these cases would subsequently be valuable as fuel.
9. Portions of the 50 days provisions should be packed in these cases previous to leaving the ship, that they may be ready for depositing at any stage of the journey that it may be deemed desirable to do so.
10. A very light waterproof cloth of dark colour will be found serviceable. In the severe cold it may be spread over the upper fur to receive the condensed steam, which falls in the shape of very fine snow; and later in the spring, to thaw snow for drinking, by spreading it on an inclined plane in the sun, and sprinkling it lightly over. This cloth should be of the vulcanized material called the “new patent waterproof cloth,” which remains pliant under any temperature, and is devoid of smell.
11. If a small quantity of the prepared solution is taken, the cloth just described may also be used to patch up leaks in the sledge-boat or floor-cloth.
12. The kites presented by Mr. Smyth to some of the officers of the Expedition were used by me, and found very useful in directing the course when the winds were fresh and fair, and snow drift or fog obscured distant objects; also in lessening the labour of dragging the sledge. I think one or two large kites (7 or 8 feet square) would be found useful, more particularly if any improvements have since been made in their construction.
13. For autumn travelling, a lantern and candles will be required.
14. The second set of spare blanket wrappers should not be cut off, but the blanket supplied to the party, and used for other purposes as required, until necessary to apply it as originally intended.
15. The iron shoeing of the runners should be as even as possible, and highly burnished; if case-hardened they would be more durable, and retain their polished surface much longer.
16. It often happens that the sun is clear, but snow drifting so heavily as to render the mercury unsteady, or instantly to cover the glass roof; also it is

frequently too low to be brought into the artificial horizon, as at the inferior meridian passage, and the land often intercepts the natural (or ice) horizon; in any of these cases one of the many ingenious fog or false horizons would be very useful, and could be used with much greater accuracy than is possible at sea.

17. The eyetubes of telescopes, and, as far as practicable, all the metal parts of instruments requiring delicate manipulation, should be covered with chamois leather.

18. Where there is any probability of meeting with large spaces of open water, as in Wellington Channel, efficient boats should be provided; those used by Sir Edward Parry in 1827, and still preserved in Woolwich Dockyard, will serve as models; but as only about half their burthen and strength would be necessary, the weight of the boats required would probably be reduced to 400 or 500 lbs. each. In order to render the equipment of the detached parties complete in every respect, one such boat should be attached to each division of the search.

19. Lastly, the officer fares in all respects precisely as the men; he carries a gun, spyglass, thermometer, chronometer, compass, box sextant, note-book, and small measuring tape.

20. In the plan of travelling here submitted, the scale of victualling is almost precisely the same, but the equipment is rendered more complete, and clothing much better adapted for the severe climate of an Arctic March or April, than that adopted in the recent Expedition; the travellers will but rarely be detained in their tents by the weather, and they will be able to travel later in the autumn, and earlier in the spring, with perfect safety; also the resources of each party, which in the recent Expedition amounted to 40 days provisions, being now increased to 50 days, it is confidently hoped that future explorers will find their journies lengthened and difficulties diminished in the same proportion.

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.,
Late of Her Majesty's Ship "Assistance."

Prepared for the Arctic Committee,
7th November 1851.

Lieut. M'CLINTOCK to Mr. FEGEN, Secretary to the Arctic Committee.

Sir,

2, Gardiner's-place, Dublin, 9th November 1851.

The enclosed letter is the reply of Messrs. Hunt and Henley, relative to obtaining a supply of Esquimaux boots for any future Expedition which it may be in contemplation to send out; and the necessity for having them is shown in my "Scheme of Equipment," which you have already received, and to which, perhaps, it would be as well to attach the enclosed letter.

I remain, &c.,

F. L. M'CLINTOCK, Lieut.

Enclosure.

Sir,

34, Great Winchester-street, 8th November 1851.

In reply to your inquiry a few days since, we find that about 150 pairs of sealskin boots were sent round to Newfoundland by our Labrador agent this autumn, and altogether we may have some 200 pairs there. But they will be gradually disposed of during the winter, and if you wish to secure any, it will be well to give us notice in time for next week's mail, 14th instant.

The price in Newfoundland remains the same as for many years; say, two dollars, equal to 8s. 4d. sterling per pair.

We are, &c.,

HUNT & HENLEY.

Lieut. M'Clintock, R.N.,
90, Great Portland-street.

Enclosure No. 14.

REMARKS ON THE EQUIPMENT OF SLEDGES AND TRAVELLERS FOR ARCTIC SERVICE, by
LIEUTENANT OSBORNE.

Sledge runners—Would be improved by the curve being constant, as in those constructed by the Danes for travelling in Greenland,—a model of which is in my possession.

The more rigid the runner can be made the more will the friction and resistance be reduced. I think weight may be sacrificed to gain this point with advantage.

Sledge casing.—For parties likely to be back to their vessels by the 15th or 20th June, I deem casing on boats unnecessary weight, a piece of oil canvass laced taut over the stretchers being sufficient. For longer parties, however, a casing on boats capable of floating the sledge with a light load, is imperatively necessary. Common mackintosh material, of strong texture, would answer well.

Where parties have to cross broad channels or straits of from thirty miles and upwards, I would always recommend that a light wooden boat be placed so that she may be available. The rapid manner in which the water makes after the 15th June in the most confined seas is remarkable.

Boats for travellers.—The boats in our Expedition were none of them adapted for rapid transit over the sea. I feel confident that the short floor and light build of the South Sea whale boat would make it a far more useful description of craft for such service. The Greenland boats are built strong and heavily, for express purposes.

Sledge sail.—The floor-cloth answered so well as a sail that I think it needs no improvement beyond being made full large for the tent.

Number of party.—I prefer sledge parties consisting of seven men and one officer to that of six men and one officer. The increased number of men enables the dead weight to be reduced with much effect; and the breaking down of one man in seven is not so serious as one in six.

Eye-shades.—Spectacles of a neutral tint, with side-shades, and set in bone or tortoiseshell, would be much superior to any shades or veils for the eyes.

Weight per man.—On starting in the spring or autumn, I should not be afraid to load the sledge to a weight of 210 lbs. per man, if the crews are generally healthy.

Depôts of provision.—The provisions for forty days, which is about what a crew can well start with, should be divided into small proportions, so as to form a series of depôts at every fifth day's journey, or indeed oftener, if it can be done without entailing great additional weight in packages.

Securing depôts.—Depôts should be placed under large stones; and when made in the autumn for the use of spring parties, I would advise water being poured on the mound, so as to cement the whole over with ice. Snow or blocks of ice are useless; the bears remove it easily. The Esquimaux secure their cachés as I have proposed.

Additional tallow for fuel.—The allowance of spirits for fuel, being better under control than tallow, is preferable; but, in addition to the full allowance of spirits of wine, as much tallow as can possibly be carried will be found the greatest comfort and luxury.

Vary the food.—Where no game is likely to be killed, I think it would be advantageous to carry out a proportion of cheese, jerked meat, dried beef, or other nutritious and portable food, so as to give the men an occasional variety, instead of feeding constantly on pemmican.

PROPOSED SCALE OF VICTUALLING.

<i>Per man</i> .—Pemmican	-	-	12 oz.	
Pork	-	-	8 oz.	
Biscuit	-	-	16 oz.	
Concentrated rum	4 oz.	=	$\frac{3}{4}$ gill.	} When travelling in April, at low temperature, allow 1 gill.
Tobacco	-	-	$\frac{1}{4}$ oz.	
Biscuit dust	-	-	1 oz.	

Mr. Bradford's
Suggestions.

One of these journies occupied a period of eighty days absence from the ships stationed in winter quarters between Cornwallis and Griffiths islands, and was directed to the exploration and search of the north-east shores of Melville Island, with the coast-line of the intermediate lands.

Men for the party.—Too much importance cannot be attached to the duty of selecting the men to compose the party. They ought to be strong and robust, ruddy complexioned, with a good and full chest, perfectly sound in their wind, flat and well-muscled about the loins, with good buttocks and strong muscular thighs.

Having the men of nearly the same height is favourable to the effort in dragging being simultaneous. Tall long-legged men stow badly in the tent, and frequently are not so capable of long-continued fatigue as those of a shorter stature and more compact form. Five feet seven inches and a half to five feet eight or nine inches is a height that frequently combines great strength and power of endurance with a sufficient length of limb to admit of free action. The very short-legged heavy-bodied man ought not to be selected, as he soon becomes exhausted in deep snow by his struggles to clear his legs. The age may vary between twenty-five and thirty-five years. Temper is not to be overlooked, as an irritable man, under the privations and hardships of a lengthened journey, is certain to break out, and be a constant source of annoyance and irritation to his more patient neighbours, both on the drag-rope and in the tent.

The true thorough-bred man-of-war's man or royal marine I should select in preference to any others, as they never think of having an interest, in cases of difficulty, at variance with that of their officer, whereas the merchant-seaman is apt on such occasions to think of himself. Stewards, idlers whose duties have confined them much below, and men who have led debauched lives, ought not to be selected for lengthened travelling, as it will be found on trial that after a few days they either shrink from their fair proportion of work or else break down.

Having the party composed of ten persons in preference to that of seven, as was the case in the Melville Island division, would be attended with some advantages, and probably lead to greater results, as the weight per man would decrease with the increased number of men, and still admit of several additions, more especially an increased allowance of fuel.

But the principal reason for having the larger party in preference to the smaller consists in the confidence a party so strong would have in case casualties occurred; one or two men disabled in such a party would have little or no influence on their safety, should they be at the time 300 or 400 miles from their ship; whereas the same loss to the smaller number under similar circumstances might lead to their total destruction, as a sufficient force might not be left to drag the sledge along.

Sledge.—The "runner-sledge" is the only one that can be used for travelling in the Arctic regions. The one made use of by our parties was not sufficiently high for the summer season. It ought to be raised at least four inches higher, should it be contemplated keeping parties out so late in the season as we were. Whenever the bottom of the sledge came in contact with the soft snow it stopped dead, and required a standing pull or bowline haul, and frequently the shovel to clear the snow away, to enable us to get on a few feet, when the same labour had to be again repeated. If the sledge had been four inches higher a great deal of this very severe work would have been saved. The increase of height in the sledge would necessarily carry with it an increased weight and substance in some of its component parts.

The "runner-sledge" supplied to me for the Melville Island journey was remarkably strong and well put together, reflecting great credit on its builder. The only defect proved by so long a journey in the "fastenings" was in the manner in which the iron-band or "tire" was secured to the lower runner, viz., by means of screws into the wood (commonly called wood-screws), nine of these worked out by the time I had returned to the ship, one of the bands was very loose, and the wood of the runner, in consequence, much cut by the young ice. We had no means of replacing these screws; and a wood-screw never holds well when replaced in a hole from which it has worked out. I would therefore suggest that the screw should go through to the top of the

under-runner, and be there secured with a nut, which could be tightened at pleasure, or, in case of accident to the screw, it could be readily replaced.

Mr. Bradford's
Suggestions.

Tent.—The one supplied answered the purpose well. The head requires doubling about half way up. This end is always pitched to windward, with strong winds, in a low temperature. The cold was intensely bitter from the wind coming through the single part of the light material of which the tent was made.

Sleeping gear—Was good, and in my opinion cannot be improved, unless it should be intended to send away parties at a very low temperature, such as we had it, viz. 69° of frost, when buffalo ought to be substituted for wolf skins.

Cooking apparatus.—In form and size answered well enough. Not sufficiently strong for the rough handling of seamen, or capable of bearing with impunity the intense heat given out by the combustion of tallow. The one supplied was made of tin, and some parts of it soldered together. I am of the opinion that it ought to be made of the best copper, and "rivetted" throughout.

Provisions.—The allowance was liberal, but not too much for the work required of the men. Pemican 1 lb.; boiled pork 6 oz.; biscuit $\frac{3}{4}$ lbs.; Moore's preserved chocolate $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz., or tea $\frac{1}{2}$ oz., on alternate days; sugar $\frac{1}{4}$ oz.; and 1 oz. of biscuit-dust to mix with the pemican; rum 1 gill; spirit fuel 6 gills. The fuel consisted of a proportion of spirits and tallow, both having their comparative advantages.

The latter was much preferred in my tent to the spirits, as it was more easily managed by the cooks in very cold weather, and required little preparation. The disadvantages attending its use were, that it could not be used inside the tent on account of the dense smoke it gave out; secondly, it required some little time to solidify, when we were in a hurry to pack up, after our short halts at midnight for refreshment.

The spirits of wine was not so much liked by the cooks, as the spirit lamp required constant attention to the "wicks," and was very cold to the fingers when handled. Six gills per diem barely suffices to give two warm meals, and a small quantity of water at midnight. This was more particularly the case when the temperature was minus in April and the early part of May. In June, three and four gills was sufficient to cook our meals; but had it not been for the fortunate circumstance of shooting a bear giving a small supply of fat we should have been very hard up for fuel. The spirits of wine requires vessels for its safe custody and carriage, thereby increasing the weights; a great and important question in all subjects relating to sledge equipment. The lump of tallow is perfectly secure, wrapped up in a piece of old canvass or placed in a bag, which can be cut up to supply wicks to burn it with.

A small supply of the preserved potato and lime juice was added to the allowance; the former in lieu of an equal proportion of the bread-dust. Of these two articles (potatoes and lime-juice) I would recommend an increased allowance, to be used as antiscorbutics, as I am satisfied that several of the men of my party showed some of the premonitory symptoms of scurvy, which I think was in some measure owing to the saltness and under-cooked state of a part of the pork supplied, as well as to the long-continued use of a meat diet without vegetables.

Dress.—The outward clothing was not in the least adapted to the exigencies of an Arctic travelling party, more particularly so in the colder season, when the cold winds, loaded with a fine drift, penetrated through every garment that was in the most minute degree open in its texture, such as woollen and cloth fabrics.

The prepared leather trousers and frocks worn in the Hudson Bay territory appears to me to be peculiarly well adapted to the Arctic regions.

On such a smooth surface as the leather garments afford, no accumulation of drift can lodge.

The Esquimaux sealskin dress stands next in my estimation. When procured from the natives, ready made, it is scarcely ever sufficiently large to go on our men comfortably; but this is a difficulty that might be overcome. Clothing

Mr. Bradford's
Suggestions.

should never be tight fitting in an Arctic climate, as any impediment to a free circulation in a limb leads to its readily becoming frozen. The only objection to the sealskin is that the very fine drift lodges under the hair, which the most careful brushing will never entirely remove. The consequence is, when the man has turned into his bag, and become sufficiently warm to melt this fine snow, a great accumulation of damp takes place, and the bags become saturated with wet when the men are in them, or frozen hard a few minutes after they get out, no opportunity offering to dry damp or wet articles until the season is well advanced. This evil can be obviated by causing the men to remove their outward dress of seal-skin before turning in.

Provided attention be paid to these points, the seal-skin frock and trousers of a comfortable size I believe to be one of the best dresses to face the polar blasts in. I speak from experience on this particular subject, as I wore on my journeys sealskin trousers, and however cold the wind blew it never penetrated directly through as it did to other parts of my body incased in cloth.

A minute attention to keeping bags and sleeping gear dry may appear to some persons a very unimportant and trivial affair, but I am quite satisfied that one of the principal duties of an officer in charge of a travelling party is to look well after and examine each man on coming into the tent from off the journey. The one most attentive to these minor points is the least likely to have the strength of his party diminished by casualties.

The canvass boots worn by our men when travelling, like much more of the equipment, were the best the circumstances we were placed in admitted of. The Indian deer-skin moccasin is a most admirable covering for the foot in the dry cold weather, before the snow becomes soft. In the wet season it is useless. Then the canvass boot, well made, with a stout sole, and the "uppers" doubled on account of the friction caused by the young ice, might answer the purpose required.

The Esquimaux sealskin boot, when made by the natives, is a very useful boot both in wet and dry weather.

A great objection to a boot of any description is the difficulty of freeing the inside from ice. There is little or none with the Indian moccasin, as it can be turned inside out and cleared of ice and snow in five minutes, and made ready for the next journey. The canvass boots occupied a long time in clearing the inside of ice, which had to be scraped out with a knife. They were occasionally frozen so hard and stiff that the men had to take them into their sleeping-bags for one or two hours between their legs to thaw them, before they could be got on.

The canvass moccasin was tried, but did not wear well when used by the men dragging. It gave out in the bottom in three or four journeys, and on slippery ice was not safe.

Having transmitted the greater part of my notes and papers into the country, I have not been enabled to enter so fully on the subject as I could have wished. Trusting that what I have said will meet with the favourable consideration of the Committee,

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. R. BRADFORD,
Late Surgeon of H.M.S. "Resolute,"
and Second in command of the
Western division of travelling
parties.

Enclosure No. 16.

Mr. Brooman's
Suggestions.

Mr. JOHN E. BROOMAN to Rear-Admiral BOWLES, Chairman of the Committee.

Sir,

15, Queen's-terrace, St. John's-wood,
15th November 1851.

In compliance with the wishes of the Arctic Committee, requesting me "to state all I have observed with regard to the provisions taken out under Captain Austin, and to suggest such alterations for the better, as may have occurred to me," I beg in the first place to remark, that I consider the whole

of the provisions with which the Expedition under Captain Austin was supplied, to have been cured and packed with more than usual care, having had but very few canisters which became putrid, and therefore unfit to eat, either from the bursting of the cases or any other cause; yet, notwithstanding this, the whole of the preserved meats, particularly after they had been frozen, were exceedingly insipid, and almost tasteless,—more especially the boiled beef.

The roast mutton was generally considered the best of the meats, although it has frequently been a matter of great doubt as to whether we were eating roast beef or roast mutton.

I cannot help here alluding to the ox-cheek soup, more especially that furnished by Mr. Cooper, the whole of which was most excellent and nutritious; it contained all its goodness to the last; that which has been returned into store being, I believe, as good as when first put on board.

I beg also to remark, that all the meats appeared to me to be by far too much dressed or cooked, and I think, that if they could be preserved, by being at least one-third less done, much more of the flavour as well as of the nutritive properties of the meats would be retained. As none but the very best meat should, I think, be used for this purpose, it might perhaps be advisable for the Admiralty, when entering into a contract for a large supply, to have an agent of their own, to overlook the process of curing, as they have when contracting for the building and repairing of ships; and if the issuing of these articles should be continued for the use of the navy, the Admiralty would most likely find it more beneficial, if not more economical, to preserve them under their own control, either at Deptford, at Gosport, or at Plymouth.

I beg further to suggest, that instead of having plain boiled fresh beef, which at the best of times does not, I think, possess much flavour, it should be stewed with onions and a little spice, which would, I consider, render it much more palatable.

In the event of fitting out another Expedition to the Arctic Regions, I would beg to recommend that it should be furnished with a sufficient supply of pemican, as prepared under the superintendence of Captain Sir Edward Parry and Mr. Grant, as would enable the Commandant to issue it at least once a week, as I consider that with which the Expedition under Captain Austin was provided, to be by far the most nutritious and wholesome species of diet with which we were furnished. The rice and scotch barley might perhaps be dispensed with, as but little of either was taken up, and the greater part of that was, I think, scarcely sufficient. In other respects, I consider the scale of victualling as established by Captain Austin (a copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith) to be as efficient as can well be.

I trust I may be pardoned for adding, that when at New Zealand I observed a French whaling ship curing pigeons, which were there very large and numerous, first skinning them and taking out their entrails, then placing them in casks in layers, and covering each layer as it was completed with boiling fat, which they assured me kept them good for years; I am therefore induced to think that slices of fresh meat might thus be kept for any length of time, and that even legs of mutton and pieces of beef with the bones taken out might be packed in small casks of about 1 cwt. each, and cured with boiling fat in a similar manner, thus retaining all their flavour.

In conclusion I beg to state that, amongst the private stores of Captains Austin and Ommanney, there was a quantity of Australian preserved beef in tins, which was allowed to possess much more flavour and to be more palatable than any of that supplied for the use of the Expedition.

I have, &c.,

JOHN E. BROOMAN, Paymaster and Purser,
Late of Her Majesty's Ship "Resolute."

Rear-Admiral Bowles, C.B., M.P.

Mr. Brooman's
Suggestions.

SCALE OF VICTUALLING for the Arctic Ships; Captain H. T. AUSRIN in charge of Expedition.

	Biscuit or flour	Spirits	Salt		Preserved				Chocolate	Sugar	Tea	Split peas	Oatmeal	Scotch barley	Vinegar	Pickles	Mustard	Pepper		Salt (fine)	Lemon juice	Sugar for lemon juice	Apples	Sugar for apples	Dried yeast	Chilies	Baking powder	
			Beef	Pork	Flour, including suet and currants	Meats	Soups	Vegetables										Black	Cayenne									
Monday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tuesday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wednesday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Thursday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Friday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Saturday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sunday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Monday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tuesday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wednesday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Thursday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Friday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Saturday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sunday	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

In substituting one article of Provision for another, $\frac{3}{8}$ lb. of preserved meat is to be considered equal to $\frac{3}{8}$ lb. of salt meat; $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of vegetables, or $\frac{1}{2}$ pint of soup, or $\frac{1}{4}$ pint of split peas, equal to $\frac{3}{8}$ lb. of flour or $\frac{1}{2}$ pint of peas.

(Signed) HORATIO T. AUSRIN,
Captain.

Enclosure No. 17.

EXTRACTS FROM MR. PENNY'S JOURNAL.

Extracts from
Mr. Penny's
Journal.

1st.—16th May 1851. The moment I passed over this point (Point Surprise?), the expression that escaped me was, No one will ever reach Sir John Franklin. Here we are, and no trace. So we returned very much disappointed.

2d.—19th July 1851. Oh, to have been here only with my little vessels! what could we not have done in the way of search; but I fear greatly that even if we had they (the missing ships) are beyond our reach

* * * * *

The struggle (as to returning in the boat, having only one week's provisions left,) was severe, but there was no other course left but to return. That he is beyond our reach I have no doubt, for if he had not we would have found trace about some of the Bird Heads or Duck islands, which have been surrounded with water ever since the 17th May.

3d.—6th August 1851. Poor fellows! (Alluding to his ship's company.) All day standing up to the knees in water, but no complaint, they are all so very anxious to get home, as we have no hope now of being of any use to our missing countrymen, whose fate will for ever remain in obscurity.

EXTRACT FROM DR. SUTHERLAND'S JOURNAL.

11th August 1851.—In the afternoon Captain Austin's squadron came steaming into the harbour, and dropped anchor. We again met our brother "Arctics;" and, certainly, if anything could have moved the adamant human heart to gratitude, surely this meeting of both ships and men in, I may safely assert, perfect safety and health, failed not to raise the ideas of every individual in the harbour far above what his eyes were beholding. After the "heads" of the Expedition had considered matters fully, we were given to understand that little remained to be done but proceed to England. Captain Austin was satisfied the missing Expedition need not be searched for to the due west or south-westward; and Mr. Penny, uncertain whether they had proceeded up the channel, could hold out no hopes of our being able to accomplish anything deserving almost inevitable risks of a *second winter*.


Extract from
Dr. Sutherland's
Journal.

Enclosure No. 18.

(*Authorized Chart annexed.*)


Enclosure No. 19.

(*Mr. Penny's Outline Track Chart annexed.*)



ARCTIC AMERICA.

Discoveries of the Searching Expeditions
under the Command of
CAPTⁿ H. T. AUSTIN, R.N.C.B.
CAPTⁿ PENNY, 1851.



Received
11th August 1967
M.T.C.

770 dune Chart of Coast
explored by travelling parties from
Dr. Eddy Franzen and Sigitin. In search
of new Eskimo and Inuit.

For copy of 770 dune Chart of Coast

